COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Koontz and Willis 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

SANDY LEON BROWN 

v. Record No. 0263-94-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

CITY OF DANVILLE MAY 9, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 

Kenneth M. Covington, Judge Designate 

 Mark T. Williams (Williams, Stilwell, 

Morrison, Williams and Light, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Robert L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Commonwealth's 

 Attorney (William H. Fuller, III, Commonwealth's 

Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 

 The Danville City Ordinance, under which Sandy Leon Brown 

was prosecuted and convicted, was valid as to the charge against 

him. However, because Brown was seized in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and 

dismiss the charge against him. 

 I. 

 Brown was charged with a violation of Danville City 

Ordinance § 21-49.3 which prohibited operating a motor vehicle 

while under the influence of alcohol. He contends that the 

ordinance was invalid because it failed to incorporate the 

enhanced penalty provisions contained in the July 1, 1993 

amendment to Code § 18.2-270 and thus did not satisfy the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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requirements of Code § 15.1-132. The July 1, 1993 amendment to 

Code § 18.2-270 set forth an enhanced penalty in circumstances 

not involved in Brown's case. The ordinance in effect at the 

time of his arrest conformed with general law insofar as the 

circumstances of his case were concerned. He cannot assert 

invalidity of an aspect of the ordinance that has no application 

to his case. See Sos v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 862, 865, 419 

S.E.2d 426, 428 (1992). 

 II. 

 When the police stop a motor vehicle and 

detain an occupant, this constitutes a 

"seizure" of the person for Fourth Amendment 

purposes, even though the function of the 

stop is limited and the detention is 

 brief. . . . [A] person may be detained 

briefly for questioning by an officer who has 

"'a reasonable suspicion, based on objective 

facts, that the individual is involved in 

criminal activity.'" 

 The totality of the circumstances must be 

considered in determining whether the facts 

authorize the police to stop a person. The 

detaining officer "'must have a 

particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the particular person stopped of 

criminal activity.'" 

Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611-12, 363 S.E.2d 708, 

709 (1988) (citations omitted). See also Castaneda v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 574, 376 S.E.2d 82 (1989) (en banc). 

 The arresting officer testified that a city employee had 

reported that Brown had given him "a problem about where he 

wanted to park his vehicle." The officer testified that he 

stopped Brown "to see what was wrong." He articulated no 
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suspicion of any particular criminal conduct. He described no 

circumstances supporting a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

conduct. Thus, in stopping Brown's vehicle and detaining Brown, 

the officer effected a seizure that violated the Fourth 

Amendment. 

 The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the charge 

against Brown is ordered dismissed. 

 Reversed and dismissed.