First Amended Complaint – Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

Mary E. Allen, Gayle Lindsey, Vicki L. Kirsch, 

Jessica M. Barnes, Denise L. Gibson, Robert 

John Metty, Jr., Deandrea K. Dawson, Martha 

Gough, Kace Browning, Sheila Bozeman, 

Rebekah Nolan, Mittie J. Waller, Michelle 

Winkler, Nancy B. Lay, Hayley Hinote, 

Kristan Harley, individually and as parent and 

next friend of S.M.H. and H.J.H., minors,

Falyn Martin, Chaz Riley, Philip Hughes 

Moon, Mary Katherine Beckham, Joseph A. 

Rogers and James T. Waters,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

School Board for Santa Rosa County, Florida, 

and Tim Wyrosdick, in his official capacity as 

Superintendent, Santa Rosa County School 

District,

 Defendants.

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Civil Action No.

3:10-CV-00142-MCR-CJK

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT 

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DAMAGES

Plaintiffs, MARY E. ALLEN, GAYLE LINDSEY, VICKI L. KIRSCH, JESSICA M. 

BARNES, DENISE L. GIBSON, ROBERT JOHN METTY, JR., DEANDREA K. DAWSON, 

MARTHA GOUGH, KACE BROWNING, SHEILA BOZEMAN, REBEKAH NOLAN, 

MITTIE J. WALLER, MICHELLE WINKLER, NANCY B. LAY, HAYLEY HINOTE,

KRISTAN HARLEY, individually and as parent and next friend of S.M.H. and H.J.H., minors, 

FALYN MARTIN, CHAZ RILEY, PHILIP HUGHES MOON, MARY KATHERINE 

BECKHAM, JOSEPH A. ROGERS and JAMES T. WATERS, by and through counsel, file this 

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civil action and respectfully request this Court to issue injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment and 

award damages for violations of the United States Constitution by Defendants, SCHOOL BOARD 

FOR SANTA ROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA (hereinafter “School Board”) and TIM 

WYROSDICK, in his official capacity as SUPERINTENDENT, SANTA ROSA COUNTY 

SCHOOL DISTRICT (hereinafter “Superintendent”). In support thereof, Plaintiffs state: 

1. Plaintiffs seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining Defendants 

from enforcing against Plaintiffs the policies Defendants consented to by virtue of entering into a 

Consent Decree and Order, which was subsequently entered by the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Florida on May 6, 2009 (hereinafter “Consent Decree@), as well as 

the policies and guidelines Defendants adopted to implement the Consent Decree (hereinafter 

“Policies”), and from violating Plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association, 

equal protection, and free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and violating the Establishment Clause contained 

in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2. Plaintiffs also pray for a declaratory judgment determining the constitutionality of 

the Consent Decree and Defendants= Policies and actions in denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to 

exercise their constitutional rights and in themselves violating the Establishment Clause, and to 

declare the Consent Decree, and Defendants’ Policies, both on their face and as applied, 

unconstitutional as a direct violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution.

3. Plaintiffs also seek damages.

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4. An actual controversy exists between the parties involving substantial 

constitutional issues, in that the challenged Consent Decree and Defendants’ Policies, on their

face and as applied, violate the United States Constitution and have infringed Plaintiffs’ rights.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. This action arises under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution and is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983.

6. This Court has jurisdiction under, and by virtue of, 28 U.S.C. '' 1331. 

7. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. ' 1391 (b). Each and all of the acts alleged 

herein were done by Defendants in Santa Rosa County, Florida, under the color and pretense of 

the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, policies, procedures, and law of the School Board

and/or the State of Florida.

8. This Court is authorized to grant declaratory judgment under the Declaratory 

Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. '' 2201-02, implemented through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57, 

and to issue injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.

9. This Court is authorized to grant Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief regarding costs, 

including a reasonable attorney=s fee, under 42 U.S.C. ' 1988.

PARTIES

Employee Plaintiffs

10. Plaintiff GAYLE LINDSEY (hereinafter “Lindsey”) is a natural born person who 

resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is an employee of Defendant School Board, 

and has been so employed for approximately twenty (20) years. Lindsey currently teaches tenth 

grade biology at Pace High School.

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11. Plaintiff VICKI L. KIRSCH (hereinafter “Kirsch”) is a natural born person who 

resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is an employee of Defendant School Board, 

and has been so employed for nineteen (19) years. Kirsch currently teaches third grade at S.S. 

Dixon Intermediate School.

12. Plaintiff JESSICA M. BARNES (hereinafter “Barnes”) is a natural born person 

who resides in Cantonment, in Escambia County, Florida. She is an employee of Defendant 

School Board, and has been so employed for three (3) years.

13. Plaintiff DENISE L. GIBSON (hereinafter “Gibson”) is a natural born person 

who resides in Milton, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is an employee of Defendant School 

Board, and has been so employed for nine (9) years. Gibson currently teaches first grade at W.H. 

Rhodes Elementary School.

14. Plaintiff ROBERT JOHN METTY, JR. (hereinafter “Metty”) is a natural born 

person who resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. He is an employee of Defendant 

School Board, and has been so employed for six (6) years. Metty currently teaches special 

education classes at Pace High School.

15. Plaintiff DEANDREA K. DAWSON (hereinafter “Dawson”) is a natural born 

person who resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is an employee of Defendant 

School Board, and has been so employed for approximately ten (10) years. Dawson currently 

teaches Law Studies and American History at Pace High School, where she also coaches the 

varsity cheerleaders.

16. Plaintiff MARTHA GOUGH (hereinafter “Gough”) is a natural born person who 

resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is an employee of Defendant School Board, 

and has been so employed for eighteen (18) years. Gough currently teaches reading at Pace High 

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School, where she sometimes also teaches career, personal and school development, and where 

she also assists in coaching the volleyball team.

17. Plaintiff KACE BROWNING (hereinafter “Browning”) is a natural born person 

who resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is an employee of Defendant School 

Board, and has been so employed for six (6) years. She currently teaches reading and literature at 

Pace High School.

18. Plaintiff SHEILA BOZEMAN (hereinafter “Bozeman”) is a natural born person 

who resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is an employee of Defendant School 

Board, and has been so employed for eighteen (18) years. Bozeman currently teaches 

kindergarten at W.H. Rhodes Elementary School.

19. Plaintiff REBEKAH NOLAN (hereinafter “Nolan”) is a natural born person who 

resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is an employee of Defendant School Board, 

and has been so employed for approximately seventeen (17) years. Nolan currently teaches fifth 

grade at W.H. Rhodes Elementary School.

20. Plaintiff MITTIE J. WALLER (hereinafter “Waller”) is a natural born person who 

resides in Milton, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is an employee of Defendant School 

Board, and has been so employed for thirty-six (36) years. Waller currently teaches kindergarten 

at W.H. Rhodes Elementary School.

21. Plaintiff NANCY B. LAY (hereinafter “Lay”) is a natural born person who 

resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is an employee of Defendant School Board, 

and has been so employed for seven (7) years. Lay currently teaches reading and literature at 

Pace High School.

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22. Plaintiffs Lindsey, Kirsch, Barnes, Gibson, Metty, Dawson, Gough, Browning, 

Bozeman, Nolan, Waller, and Lay are hereinafter collectively referred to as “Plaintiff 

Employees.”

Former Student Plaintiffs

23. Plaintiff MARY E. ALLEN (hereinafter “Allen”) is a natural born person who 

currently resides in Tallahassee, in Leon County, Florida. She is a student at the Florida State 

University. In 2009, Allen was a senior at, and graduated from, Pace High School.

24. Plaintiff FALYN MARTIN (hereinafter “Martin”) is a natural born person who 

graduated from Pace High School in 2010.

25. Plaintiff CHAZ RILEY (hereinafter “Riley”) is a natural born person who resides 

in Milton, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. He graduated from Milton High School in 2010.

26. Plaintiff HAYLEY HINOTE (hereinafter “Hinote”) is a natural born person who 

graduated from Pace High School in 2010. 

27. Plaintiffs Allen, Martin, Riley, and HAYLEY HINOTE are hereinafter 

collectively referred to as “Former Student Plaintiffs.”

Student Plaintiffs

28. Plaintiff KRISTAN HARLEY is a natural born person who resides in Pace, in 

Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is the mother of three minor students enrolled in the Defendant 

School Board’s public schools: L.H., who is in sixth grade, H.J.H, who is in ninth grade, and 

S.M.H., who is in eleventh grade. Plaintiff Kristan Harley sues both in her individual capacity 

and in her representative capacity as parent and next friend of S.M.H. and H.J.H.

29. Plaintiffs S.M.H. and H.J.H. are hereinafter collectively referred to as “Plaintiff 

Students.”

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Parent Plaintiffs

30. Plaintiff PHILLIP HUGHES MOON (hereinafter “Moon”) is a natural born 

person who resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. He is the father of C.M., a minor 

student enrolled in the tenth grade at Pace High School.

31. Plaintiff MARY KATHERINE BECKHAM (hereinafter “Beckham”) is a natural 

born person who resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is the mother of R.B., a 

minor student enrolled in the eleventh grade at Pace High School.

32. Plaintiffs Kristan Harley, individually, Moon and Beckham are hereinafter 

collectively referred to as “Plaintiff Parents.”

Local Community Plaintiff

33. Plaintiff MICHELLE WINKLER (hereinafter “Winkler”) is a natural born person 

who resides in Santa Rosa County, Florida. She is a former employee of Santa Rosa County 

Schools. Winkler is deeply concerned about the students and employees of the District, and 

desires to offer Bible and other religious studies in District facilities.

34. Plaintiff JOSEPH A. ROGERS (hereinafter “Rogers”) is a natural born person 

who resides in Pace, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. He is the Senior Pastor at Pace Assembly 

Ministries. 

35. Plaintiff JAMES T. WATERS (hereinafter “Waters”) is a natural born person who 

resides in Milton, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. He is the Associate Pastor, Minister to Students 

at First Baptist Church of Milton.

36. Plaintiffs Rogers and Waters are hereinafter collectively referred to as “Pastor 

Plaintiffs.”

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Defendants

37. Defendant School Board is the governing body for public schools in Santa Rosa 

County, Florida, with the authority to sue and be sued, and was at all times material acting within 

the course and scope of its authority and under color of law.

38. Defendant Superintendent is and was at all times relevant herein, Superintendent 

of Schools for the District, acting within the course and scope of his authority as Superintendent, 

under color of Florida state law and consistent with the custom, policy, practice, and use of the 

Santa Rosa County School District (hereinafter “School District”).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Prior Litigation and the Consent Decree

39. On or around August 27, 2008, Minor Doe I and Minor Doe II, through their 

parents, Parent I Doe and Parent II Doe, appeared as plaintiffs in a complaint filed against the 

Defendants School Board and Superintendent, and against H. Frank Lay in his official capacity 

as principal of Pace High School.

40. Before filing an Answer, Defendants School Board and Superintendent, together

with H. Frank Lay, in his official capacity, filed a “Notice of Admission of Liability” dated 

December 15, 2008. It stated, in part, “Defendants hereby provide notice that they admit liability 

in this action and acknowledge that plaintiffs are entitled to certain relief.”

41. Subsequently, those parties jointly requested a temporary injunction which the 

court entered without the required findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining the reasons 

for its issuance.

42. After Defendant School Board voted to approve its language, Defendants 

submitted to the court, again without the required statements of reasons why the injunction it 

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contained was issued, the stipulated Consent Decree which was entered by the court on May 6, 

2009. A copy of the Consent Decree is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein.

43. The Consent Decree contains, among other things, broad prohibitions against 

religious speech and expression by Defendants’ employees, including Plaintiff Employees, 

anytime those employees are present at a “School Event,” regardless of whether they are there in 

their official or private capacity. 

44. In fact, according to the Consent Decree, employees of the Defendants, including 

Plaintiff Employees, cannot be present at any School Event in their private, non-official capacity. 

45. On the contrary, according to the Consent Decree, “if these persons are present at 

a School Event, then they are present in their official capacity.”

46. Since “School Events” are “any happening sponsored, approved or supervised by 

a School Official,” the Consent Decree limits and restricts legitimate, private religious speech 

and expression anytime school employees are present anywhere on school grounds, including, 

for example, during lunch breaks, before school, after school, or while watching their children or 

grandchildren compete at a scholastic sporting event that they voluntarily attend outside of 

school hours.

47. On or about May 22, 2009, Plaintiff Employees received from Defendant School 

Board a copy of the Consent Decree.

48. Along with the Consent Decree, Plaintiff Employees received a memorandum 

from Defendant Superintendent. In this memo, Defendant Superintendent directed Plaintiff 

Employees to comply with the Consent Decree, and advised that if they violate it either 

intentionally or unintentionally, Plaintiff Employees will be disciplined at work and possibly 

terminated, as well as subject to fines, penalties and sanctions from the court. A copy of 

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Defendant Superintendent’s memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated 

herein.

The Mootness of the Consent Decree

49. On May 30, 2009, Minor Doe I and Minor Doe II graduated from Pace High 

School.

50. Upon graduation, Minor Doe I and Minor Doe II lost any interest in enforcement 

of the Consent Decree, and thereby lost standing for any court to maintain any continuing 

jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree.

The School Board’s Policies, and Its Interpretation and Application of the Consent Decree

51. Defendant School Board has also provided Plaintiff Employees with Policies as to 

how it will interpret and apply the Consent Decree. One version of some of the Policies provided 

by Defendant School Board is attached hereto as Exhibit C and incorporated herein.

52. Many of these Policies are vague and inconsistent, and they create more 

confusion about what conduct is permitted and what conduct is prohibited.

53. For example, while the Consent Decree (Exhibit A) strictly prohibits Defendants’ 

employees, including Plaintiff Employees, from placing any religious object, such as a Bible or 

devotional book, regardless of size or manner of display, on the School Board’s tangible property 

(such as a desk), the School Board’s Policies (Exhibit C) purport to allow employees to display 

religious “personal items,” including Bibles, as long as they are not “prominently displayed” and 

“oversized.”

54. Similarly, the School Board’s Policies prohibit teachers from using phrases such 

as “God Bless You” in email communications, or even replying to such communications 

received from parents or other third parties.

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55. Neither Defendant School Board nor the Consent Decree differentiate between 

Plaintiff Employees’ conduct at school as school officials, such as when they are coaching or 

teaching a class, and their conduct at school as private persons, such as when they are taking a 

lunch break, or during other non-instructional times when students are not around them, or when

Plaintiff Employees attend an evening sporting event to watch students compete, even when 

those students are their own children or grandchildren.

56. Instead, the Consent Decree dictates that Plaintiff Employees can never be at a 

school event, such as a sporting event, or in their planning periods or lunch breaks, in their 

private capacities. According to the Consent Decree and Defendant School Board’s Policies, 

every single time Plaintiff Employees are present at an event that has been approved by school 

officials, whether before school, during school or after school, and whether on school grounds or 

off school grounds, Plaintiff Employees are automatically deemed to be present there in their

official capacities and subject to the mandates and prohibitions of the Consent Decree.

57. Moreover, the Consent Decree defines, and the School Board interprets, the word 

“Prayer” broadly, to include not just communications with a deity in the traditional sense, where 

the person praying postures with head bowed, eyes closed and hands folded, but any form of 

religious expression or conduct, such as engaging in religious discourse, reading or discussing 

the Bible, or merely greeting other individuals with “God Bless You” or “I am praying for you.” 

58. The School District has actually applied the Consent Decree in this manner to 

prohibit the foregoing expression and conduct.

The Employee Plaintiffs

59. As a result, Defendant School Board’s Policies, and the Consent Decree, restrict 

and infringe upon Employee Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by prohibiting them from engaging 

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in the following activities and conduct which they have done in the past, and/or which they 

would do but for those prohibitions:

a. Plaintiffs Lay, Lindsey, Kirsch, Barnes, Gough, Browning, Bozeman and 

Waller: Keep their personal Bible and/or a small devotional book on their desk in their 

classroom, and/or keep small and discrete inspirational quotes, some of which are from the 

Bible, in their personal work area near their desk, to read to themselves during non-instructional 

time when students are not present, and to inspire them to be better, more caring teachers;

b. Plaintiff Lay: Wear on her person to school jewelry in the shape of a cross 

that has great inspirational significance to her;

c. Plaintiffs Kirsch, Dawson, Gough, Browning, Bozeman and Nolan: Use 

words and phrases in oral or written on-campus communications, including emails, that were an 

integral part of their vocabulary, such as “God bless you today,” “I’m praying for you,” “You are 

in my thoughts and prayers,” “thank God for that,” “good heavens,” “thank heavens,” “God is in 

control,” “God will take care of you” or simply “Bless you”;

d. Plaintiffs Gibson and Waller: Interact freely with the adult parents of their 

students, who often bring up matters of faith and religion in their verbal and written 

communications (including emails), because the Defendant School Board’s Policies, and the 

Consent Decree, forbid them from acknowledging or responding to those voluntary, parentinitiated comments, and therefore interfere with and diminish their teacher-parent relationships;

e. Plaintiffs Lay, Gough and Browning: Host and/or attend a voluntary Bible 

study for or with adult colleagues in the mornings at school, during non-instructional time before 

students arrive;

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f. Plaintiffs Lay, Lindsey, Kirsch, Barnes, Gibson, Dawson, Gough, 

Browning, Bozeman, Nolan and Waller: Pray with adult colleagues, talk freely and openly with 

them about matters of faith and religion, or ask them for prayer in return, during off-the-clock 

breaks and/or non-instructional times when no students are present, such as would routinely 

happen when a colleague or Plaintiff Employees are going through a difficult situation, a 

sickness or the loss of a loved one. Indeed, the 2009-2010 school year was particularly tough for 

Plaintiff Gibson because she was dealing with serious illness in her immediate family, and was 

unable to solicit and receive the prayerful support of her colleagues as had been their custom and 

practice prior to entry of the Consent Decree.

g. Plaintiff Waller: Pray silently with her head bowed for her own lunch 

during lunch time, while students are eating their lunches nearby;

h. Plaintiffs Lindsey, Barnes and Browning: Pray, silently with bowed head 

by themselves or audibly with other adults, for their food, for the safety of the players, or for the 

recovery of an injured player during non-instructional time at school events that they voluntarily 

attend on their own time, such as scholastic sporting competitions and events, school 

performances, holiday celebrations or lunch and snack breaks;

i. Plaintiff Lindsey: Pray and read her Bible, silently and to herself, on long 

bus rides when she accompanies the school football team to away games and during a football 

game itself;

j. Plaintiff Kirsch: Pray with other adults for her grandchildren and other 

student athletes at school sporting events which she attends voluntarily, as a grandmother, on her 

own time, outside of school hours;

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k. Plaintiff Kirsch: Pray with her adult colleagues at evening, off-campus 

events that they sometimes plan jointly at school and that they attend voluntarily for teambuilding, camaraderie, to honor a colleague or to celebrate a holiday or special occasion;

l. Plaintiff Gibson: Organize, coordinate and/or host voluntary, on-campus, 

faith-based support groups during non-instructional times for her fellow teachers who were going 

through difficult personal situations, such as dealing with divorce, death or illness;

m. Plaintiffs Kirsch and Browning: Attend with their children or 

grandchildren “See You at the Pole” and other community prayer events held on school grounds, 

outside of school hours, which are voluntarily attended by students, parents and community 

members;

n. Plaintiffs Lay, Lindsey, Barnes, Dawson, Browning, Bozeman and Nolan: 

Show respect for students when they engage in voluntary prayer in Plaintiff Employees’ 

presence during non-instructional time, such as would routinely occur at lunch time or sport 

competitions, by being silent, bowing their head, and/or folding their hands;

o. Plaintiffs Lay, Lindsey, Barnes and Browning: Speak at religious student 

clubs, such as Fellowship of Christian Athletes or First Priority, during non-instructional time 

and outside of school hours, when invited to speak by student organizers on their own initiative; 

p. Plaintiffs Dawson and Browning: Pray for and with a student going

through a difficult time, at that student’s request, during non-instructional time, on campus or 

off-campus at a school event, such as a sports or cheerleading competition, a banquet or a field 

trip;

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q. Plaintiffs Lindsey and Gough: Identify themselves as religious persons

and followers of Christ on the Internet webpage dedicated to them by Defendant School Board, 

where they are otherwise invited to reveal other personal hobbies and interests to let the 

community know who they are;

r. Plaintiffs Dawson and Browning: Use the Bible as a teaching tool within 

accepted curricular standards, to teach, for example, early American history, Social Darwinism, 

Imperialism, or the literature of various periods and cultures and the historical and factual 

context and circumstances of such literature;

s. Plaintiff Gibson: Recognize and commemorate the different facets and 

aspects of the federal, state and local holiday of Christmas, by displaying, among various secular 

ornaments, an angel on her classroom Christmas tree, and by having the students voluntarily 

perform, among various secular songs, some traditional Christmas carols;

t. Plaintiffs Gough and Browning: Plan and organize, during their free, noninstructional time on campus or off-campus, privately-sponsored, voluntary, religious 

baccalaureate services held off campus or in privately-rented school facilities for their students 

or former students when they graduate; and

u. Plaintiffs Lay, Lindsey, Kirsch, Barnes, Metty, Dawson and Browning: 

Participate in privately-sponsored, voluntary, religious baccalaureate services held off campus at 

a house of worship or in privately-rented school facilities for Plaintiff Employees’ students or 

former students when they graduate, including praying out loud, being recognized for their 

contributions as teachers, sitting with fellow educators and wearing school colors or other 

educator attire, such as their college graduation gowns.

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60. Defendant School Board and the Consent Decree place many restrictions on 

Plaintiff Employees’ ability to attend privately-sponsored religious baccalaureate services, and 

those restrictions have been an especially difficult area for many employees of Defendant School 

Board. 

61. Plaintiff Metty has attended several privately-sponsored religious baccalaureate 

services in the past, to support graduating students from Pace High School, and plans to do so 

again in the future. His daughter graduated from Pace High School in May 2010 and his son is 

currently enrolled in the eleventh grade at Pace High School. His freedom to sit with whomever 

he wants, including fellow teachers, and to wear whatever he wants, including a graduation 

gown, at privately-sponsored, voluntary, religious baccalaureate services held outside of school 

hours at a house of worship, is very important to him. His wife is also a teacher at Pace High 

School, as are many of his good friends. He wants to be able to sit with them, or with anyone 

else he chooses. He also wants to be able to be recognized as a teacher for his contribution to the 

success of the graduating seniors.

62. Plaintiff Metty advised Defendant Superintendent and Defendant School Board’s

attorney, Mr. Paul Green, that he takes his rights as an individual citizen when he is off the clock 

very seriously, that he planned to attend the 2010 privately-sponsored baccalaureate service for 

his daughter and the other Pace High School Seniors, and that he planned to sit where he wanted, 

with whomever he wanted within the house of worship that hosted the event. He also advised 

them that he planned to wear whatever he wanted at the baccalaureate service, including attire 

that may have identified him as a teacher. Defendant Superintendent and Mr. Green warned 

Plaintiff Metty that if he did any of the above, he would have violated Defendant School Board’s

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policy and the Consent Decree, and would have been subject to discipline and contempt 

sanctions.

63. In fact, due to the threat of discipline and contempt sanctions, and due to the 

uncertainty and confusion in Defendants’ policies and the Consent Decree, Plaintiff Metty did 

not attend the 2010 baccalaureate service honoring his own daughter. However, Plaintiff Metty 

desires to attend the 2011 baccalaureate service, as well as future services in order to support 

graduating Pace High students, which will soon include his son, without the threat of discipline 

or sanctions.

64. Furthermore, Defendant School Board’s Policies and the Consent Decree violate 

Plaintiff Employees’ constitutional rights because they force them to engage in the following 

conduct which Plaintiff Employees do not wish to engage in, and which Plaintiff Employees 

would not engage in but for those mandates:

a. Plaintiffs Lay, Lindsey, Kirsch, Gibson, Dawson, Gough, Browning, 

Bozeman, Nolan and Waller: Censor Plaintiff Employees’ students and prohibit them from 

discussing matters of faith or religion in school assignments, speeches, performances and 

presentations that Plaintiff Employees review, even if such discussions are germane to the topics 

assigned and are voluntarily chosen by the students themselves; and

b. Plaintiffs Lay, Lindsey, Kirsch, Barnes, Dawson, Gough and Browning: 

Prohibit parents and other adult third parties from engaging in any prayer at athletic competitions 

and other school events, such as routinely occurs when a student athlete is injured. 

65. Plaintiff Employees do not wish to engage in such censorship, disclaimers and 

other compelled conduct because they fear they may be sued by students, parents and other third 

parties whose rights they are forced to violate, but nonetheless they are forced to engage in such 

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conduct under threat of discipline from Defendant School Board or contempt sanctions from a 

court. Plaintiff Employees also do not wish to engage in such censorship, disclaimers and other 

compelled conduct because they sincerely believe that the students, parents and other third 

parties have the freedom and constitutional right to engage in religious activities without fear of 

censorship by Plaintiff Employees or other representatives of the government.

66. Defendant School Board and the Consent Decree are also interfering with 

Plaintiff Employees’ constitutional rights by compelling them to be hostile towards voluntary, 

student-initiated and/or student-led religious expression.

67. Defendant School Board and/or the Consent Decree compels Plaintiff Metty to

disclaim routine, voluntary, student-led and student-initiated religious expression, including 

prayers, devotions and formal or informal conversations regarding matters of faith and religion, 

and routinely uttered religious speech amongst students, such as “God Bless You,” “Jesus Loves 

You,” “come to church with me this Sunday” and other similar phrases. School officials have 

instructed him to issue a disclaimer every time a student spontaneously prays or engages in 

religious discourse in his presence. No other form of speech or expression has to be disclaimed. 

Defendant School Board and/or the Consent Decree have singled out religious speech and 

expression for this discriminatory and hostile treatment.

68. Plaintiff Metty does not want to issue disclaimers when students spontaneously 

pray or engage in religious discourse in his presence because it requires conduct that is far from 

neutral towards the religious expression of the students – it is outright hostile. Besides being 

disrespectful towards the students, this type of compelled speech is not conducive to healthy and 

productive teacher-student relationships. The only reason he has issued disclaimers against 

religious expression in the past, and will continue to do so in the future, is because he is

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compelled to do so by Defendant School Board policy and/or the Consent Decree, under pain of 

discipline or contempt sanctions.

69. Plaintiff Employees are personally aware that three employees of Defendant 

School Board, including Plaintiff Winkler and Plaintiff Lay’s husband, recently had to answer to 

civil and even criminal contempt charges because their religious expression was alleged to 

violate Defendant School Board policy and/or orders of the same federal court that issued the 

Consent Decree.

70. The individual forced to defend herself in civil contempt proceedings is Plaintiff 

Winkler. One of those individuals charged with criminal contempt, and threatened with jail, 

fines, and the loss of decades worth of accrued retirement benefits, is H. Frank Lay, the husband

of Plaintiff Lay and the former principal of Plaintiff Employees who work at Pace High School.

71. Plaintiff Employees do not wish to test the limits of their constitutional liberties, 

and to risk losing their jobs or to face civil or criminal sanctions for their conduct, as did their 

three colleagues. 

72. Therefore, if Plaintiff Employees have any doubt about whether their 

constitutionally-protected conduct is permitted under Defendant School Board’s Policies and/or 

the Consent Decree, Plaintiff Employees will err on the side of caution and voluntarily censor 

themselves.

73. Plaintiff Employees will also voluntarily censor themselves in instances where 

Defendant School Board tells them that Plaintiff Employees can engage in conduct which is 

prohibited by the terms of the Consent Decree, because Plaintiff Employees know that they are

ultimately responsible to the court for their conduct, and Defendant School Board has told them 

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that it will not defend Plaintiff Employees if they are accused of a violation, intentional or 

unintentional.

74. In fact, as a result of these concerns over discipline or prosecution, Plaintiff 

Employees have censored their own conduct and reluctantly relinquished their constitutional 

rights on multiple occasions since the entry of the Consent Decree, and Plaintiff Employees will 

continue to do so until a court intervenes to restore their rights.

75. Other similarly situated employees of Defendants routinely engage in similar 

activities and speech as contemplated by Plaintiff Employees, but from a nonreligious viewpoint,

and are not subjected to the restraints, restrictions and outright prohibitions that the Employee 

Plaintiffs have suffered. For example, teachers can and do form support groups, that do not 

discuss religious matters, without violating Defendants’ Policies or the Consent Decree.

Former Student Plaintiffs

76. It has long been the policy, practice, custom and tradition at Pace High School to 

allow the student body President, the Senior Class President, the valedictorian, and the 

salutatorian to make brief remarks at the graduation ceremony on subjects of his or her choice.

77. Plaintiff Allen was the student body President, elected by her fellow students at 

Pace High School, for the 2008-2009 school year.

78. As duly elected student body President at Pace High School, Allen earned the 

right to address her fellow graduating seniors at her graduation ceremony.

79. Plaintiff Allen was excited about speaking at graduation and had looked forward 

to it all year. This was going to be her final opportunity to address her classmates and to give 

them a proper send-off to college or wherever else their lives would take them. Speaking at 

graduation was extremely important to Allen.

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80. Plaintiff Allen’s school mates wanted her to address them at graduation, as well. 

In fact, when they elected Plaintiff Allen to lead them as their student body President, they did so 

voluntarily, without any adult pressure or influence, and they intended and expected that, as their 

President, she would address them at graduation.

81. Included in the remarks Plaintiff Allen was planning to make during her brief 

inspirational message was to thank those individuals who had influenced her and who had helped 

her to succeed in high school. Among those individuals were her parents, some of her teachers,

and God. She also planned to encourage her classmates to have hope as they go out into the 

world, because God loves them and has great plans for them.

82. Plaintiff Allen was confused, shocked and devastated when she heard on the 

evening news, approximately ten days before graduation that she would not be allowed to speak

at her graduation. Through a statement released by the attorneys for Defendant School Board, 

she learned that only the valedictorian and salutatorian would now be permitted to speak at 

graduation, despite the fact that the student body President had spoken at graduation every year 

for the last thirty or more years, and despite the fact that she was elected senior class President 

and thus had earned the right to speak.

83. The next day, Plaintiff Allen went to the Office of Defendant Superintendent, to 

ask for an explanation. Defendant Superintendent told Allen she would not be allowed to speak 

because her remarks would cause the District to violate the recently entered Consent Decree. 

84. Defendant Superintendent claimed that because some teachers at Pace High 

School could vote and might have voted along with the thousands of students that elected Allen

to be their President, and because those teachers might have known of her religious convictions, 

she was not neutrally selected and therefore could not speak.

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85. Incongruously, the valedictorian and salutatorian at Pace High School were not

prohibited from speaking, even though the grades that elevated them to those positions were 

given by Pace High School teachers.

86. Moreover, there was no indication that any teacher who voted for Allen was 

improperly influenced by Allen’s religious convictions. 

87. Even if a handful of teachers did actually vote in the student election, and even if 

they might have been unduly influenced by Allen’s faith, Allen’s margin of victory among the 

student voters was large enough that those teacher votes could not have altered the results.

88. After Plaintiff Allen explained those things to Defendant Superintendent, and 

after pleading with him not to take away her right to speak simply because she might allude to 

her faith or God, he remained steadfast and would not permit Allen to address her classmates at 

graduation.

89. Defendants’ decision to silence Allen injured her in that it was a devastating, 

distressing and demoralizing denial of her First Amendment right to speak, which has shaken her

belief in the First Amendment, and caused her to question whether she is a citizen of “the Land 

of the Free.”

90. Defendants’ decision to silence Allen also punished her for being a Christian

because she was powerless to change who she is, how others view her and the reasons they voted 

for her to speak at graduation.

91. Defendants’ conduct has caused Allen damages.

92. Plaintiff Riley graduated from Milton High School in 2010.

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93. In May 2009, Plaintiff Riley participated in graduation exercises with the senior 

class at Milton High School, in his capacity as a student government leader (not as a graduating 

senior).

94. During a practice run through of that graduation ceremony, one school official 

sternly warned every student there that anyone who would initiate or participate in any prayer 

during the graduation ceremony would be ejected immediately. The school official warned 

against participation in voluntary, student-led and student-initiated prayer at any time during the 

graduation ceremony.

95. In 2010, Plaintiff Riley and the other students were again warned against praying 

during the graduation ceremony. They were specifically warned not to attempt to engage the 

audience in prayer, or to ask them to recite any prayer in unison.

96. As President of the student body, Plaintiff Riley addressed his class at the 2010 

graduation. Although he did offer a short prayer at the beginning of his speech, and many in the 

audience bowed their heads out of respect, the teachers and staff were prohibited from doing so 

by the policies and the Consent Decree.

97. Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein cast a pall over the proceedings, despite 

Plaintiff Riley’s brief prayer, and inhibited the free speech and freedom of exercise of religion 

during the 2010 graduation ceremonies.

98. Additionally, in June 2009, Plaintiff Riley, as the elected student body President,

was asked by an Assistant Principal at Milton High School to write a “welcome letter” addressed 

to the student body, which would be published in the agenda planners and distributed to each 

student in August 2009.

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99. Plaintiff Riley was happy to comply with the Assistant Principal’s request and 

address the student body. He drafted a short letter in which he welcomed the students back to 

school, challenged them to work hard to succeed, and encouraged them to have fun and take 

advantage of all that Milton High School has to offer. A copy of the letter, as initially drafted by 

Riley, is attached hereto as Exhibit D and incorporated herein.

100. The letter drafted by Riley was not religious in nature. He ended his draft letter 

with the following phrase:

Let’s enjoy being Panthers and make Milton proud.

Good luck and God Bless,

Your Student Body President,

Chaz Riley

101. “God Bless” is an expression Plaintiff Riley uses often, especially as parting 

words. It is his way to inspire, encourage and challenge those with whom he comes into contact. 

He also regards the phrase as a patriotic one, which has been part of our American heritage, and 

which the President of the United States uses often when addressing Americans, including school 

children. The phrase is important to Plaintiff Riley, and was an important component of his

written welcome address to the student body at Milton High School.

102. Plaintiff Riley submitted a draft of his “welcome letter” to the Assistant Principal, 

who forwarded it to William Emerson, the Director of High School Education for the Santa Rosa 

County Defendant School Board. Mr. Emerson then forwarded the letter to Paul Green, an 

attorney for the School Board. A copy of these communications is attached hereto as Exhibit E

and incorporated herein.

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103. Plaintiff Riley was shocked, saddened and dismayed when, after discussion with 

Mr. Emerson and Mr. Green, his Assistant Principal told him that he was required to remove the 

phrase “God Bless” from his letter to the student body. 

104. As shown in Exhibit E, Mr. Green concluded that the phrase “God Bless” would 

fall “within the definition of Prayer” in “Para[graph] 3(b)” of the Consent Decree. Exhibit E

further documents that Mr. Green concluded that “Para[graph] 5(e)” of that Consent Decree 

required school officials to censor “God Bless” from Riley’s letter, because “God Bless” 

constituted the “offering [of] a prayer” under the Consent Decree. 

105. Mr. Emerson agreed with Mr. Green’s interpretation and direction, and directed 

the Assistant Principal to censor Plaintiff Riley’s letter and cleanse it of the “God Bless” 

“prayer.”

106. The Assistant Principal complied with the censorship order and Plaintiff Riley’s

letter to the Milton High School student body was published without the “God Bless” ending he 

chose. A copy of the censored letter as published is attached hereto as Exhibit F and incorporated 

herein.

107. Mr. Green’s and Mr. Emerson’s decision to deny Plaintiff Riley’s First 

Amendment right to speak and express himself, and to censor “God Bless” from his written 

address to the students under his leadership, caused him great sadness, distress and personal 

anguish. No one has been able to explain to him why, as an American living in Santa Rosa 

County, Florida, and as the duly elected President of the student body at his school, he does not 

have the same right to freely speak and express himself as are enjoyed by Americans elsewhere, 

including the President of the United States.

108. Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein has caused Riley damages.

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109. Plaintiff Martin, who recently graduated from Pace High School, was a member 

of First Priority, a Christian extra-curricular club at Pace High School that met once per week at 

school, before the start of classes. 

110. First Priority’s meetings were entirely voluntary – no one was forced to attend or 

participate. The meetings included religious devotions and prayers, and discussion of character, 

integrity and other life issues from a Christian perspective, usually facilitated by a guest speaker.

111. School officials and the Consent Decree interfered with First Priority’s ability to 

organize and conduct successful First Priority activities and events, and their right to receive 

information protected by the First Amendment.

112. School officials and the Consent Decree prohibited teachers and staff from 

coming to speak at First Priority meetings, even though the students took the initiative to invite 

them, and even though the speeches of teachers and staff would have taken place outside of 

school hours, during non-instructional time, before a voluntary high school audience.

113. In addition, school officials prohibited teachers and staff from serving as advisors 

to First Priority, strictly limiting their involvement in the club to that of chaperones to ensure 

physical safety of members. 

114. Other student extra-curricular clubs had faculty and staff advisors that helped the 

students plan and organize events, invite speakers and deal with administrative club and 

membership issues. 

115. There were several teachers and staff at Pace High School that would have readily 

served First Priority in this capacity, but they were prohibited from doing so by school officials 

and by the Consent Decree. 

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116. This put the entire burden of organizing and running the First Priority club on 

students, and deprived the club of any input or advice from adults that were very willing to 

provide it. This hurt the club and its members, including Plaintiff Martin, preventing them from 

receiving messages they desired to receive, putting them at a disadvantage.

117. In addition, school officials prohibited First Priority from inviting “regular” 

outside guest speakers. There were a few community members whom the club members enjoyed

listening to, and whom First Priority regularly invited to speak. This was beneficial to First 

Priority not only because the members enjoyed listening to those speakers, but because the 

speakers got to know the members, and were able to tailor their speeches accordingly.

118. School officials prohibited First Priority from inviting the same person to speak 

on multiple occasions, forcing the members instead to find a brand new speaker every week and 

denying them the right to hear from the speakers they chose.

119. This deprived First Priority members, including Plaintiff Martin, from being able 

to hear from their first choice as speakers, and interfered with their ability to achieve continuity, 

warmth and familiarity in their club meetings. There were many weeks when First Priority was 

unable to secure a brand new speaker, and ended up with no speaker at all, which hurt the club 

and its members further.

120. Defendants’ restrictions and prohibitions on “regular” outside guest speakers 

served no legitimate or compelling government interest.

121. Defendants’ restrictions and prohibitions on Plaintiff Martin’s meetings and 

activities violated her First Amendment rights.

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122. To the extent the Equal Access Act is construed or applied in a manner 

inconsistent with Plaintiff Martin’s and other Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, it is 

unconstitutional.

123. Prior to the Consent Decree, Plaintiff Martin had no difficulty approaching 

teachers whom she respected and knew from outside of school (such as from church or the 

community), sharing a problem or concern with them, and asking for their advice and prayers. 

Plaintiff Martin would initiate such conversations during non-instructional time, and would 

routinely bring up matters of faith and religion, expecting and enjoying a two-sided, productive 

conversation. These interactions helped Plaintiff Martin build great relationships with her 

teachers, which significantly aided her education.

124. Plaintiff Martin was not able to have these conversations with her teachers after

the entry of the Consent Decree, not because her teachers did not want to help her, but because 

they were prohibited from doing so and were afraid of being disciplined or prosecuted. 

125. There was a spirit of fear among Plaintiff Martin’s teachers, and they were

reluctant to even acknowledge her personal and spiritual needs and remarks, much less engage in 

the productive, two-sided conversations that they used to have. 

126. Whenever Plaintiff Martin approached them with a problem, issue or conversation 

that had a spiritual or religious component, no matter how tangential, her teachers either ignored

her comments, or quickly changed the subject, or told her outright that they could not respond or 

help her. 

127. This impeded Plaintiff Martin’s relationship with her teachers, including her 

ability to trust them and have confidence in them, which adversely affected her education.

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128. These actions of Defendants also caused Plaintiff Martin to self-censor her own 

messages, and in some cases not even to attempt to speak to her teachers due to the prohibitions 

on their responding in any meaningful way to Plaintiff Martin and her needs.

129. Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein has caused Martin damages.

130. Plaintiff Hinote recently graduated from Pace High School. During her time at 

Pace, she and other students frequently engaged in voluntary student-initiated and student-led 

prayer. However, Hinote and the others were told that they could get teachers and staff in trouble 

if they prayed in the presence of or near the teachers or staff, even though the teachers did not 

join in the prayer. 

131. Plaintiff Hinote was told by school officials that teachers and staff will get in 

trouble with Defendant School Board or the court if they are near when students choose to pray, 

even if the teachers and staff are not actually praying with the students, because someone might 

think that the teachers and staff “look like they are praying,” or that they are endorsing the 

students’ prayer if they are present and do not stop it, speak against it or dishonor it.

132. Plaintiff Hinote did not want to get her teachers and staff in any trouble, so she

limited her voluntary devotions and prayers in the short periods of free time when no adults were

present.

133. Plaintiff Hinote and her fellow students thus felt rushed and afraid to pray. 

134. Plaintiff Hinote and her fellow praying school mates were always nervous that an 

adult would walk in and catch them doing something they were not supposed to do, or witness 

something they were not supposed to see. Their prayers and devotions were hampered, restricted, 

and limited as a result, and they were not nearly as enjoyable and effective as they were in the 

past.

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135. Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein has caused Plaintiff Hinote damages.

The Current Student Plaintiffs

136. S.M.H. has been a member of the Pace High School Band since ninth grade.

137. In or around May 2009, her band colleagues selected her to be chaplain for the 

band. No adult told the band members to select any chaplain, or to select S.M.H. as their 

chaplain. Instead, her band colleagues decided on their own that they wanted a student to lead 

them in a short devotion and prayer during “down time” or “free time” before band 

performances, and they selected her for that role.

138. These devotions and prayers were completely voluntary. No one was forced or 

pressured to participate, and no one was embarrassed or made fun of if they chose not to 

participate.

139. S.M.H. was excited about serving as chaplain for her band colleagues and desired 

to do so. She saw it as an excellent way to build friendships and for band members to prepare 

their minds and hearts for performing. 

140. S.M.H. was very sad and upset when she learned just a few days after she was 

elected that Defendant School Board would not allow her to serve as a student-elected chaplain

nor allow band members to select any chaplain. School officials told her that she could not be a 

chaplain because the Consent Decree prohibited school organizations from having any kind of 

chaplain.

141. S.M.H. was stripped of her position by school officials, preventing her from 

serving her fellow band members as chaplain.

142. S.M.H. continues to desire to serve her band colleagues as their chaplain and, if 

allowed, would do so immediately and continue serving as chaplain until her graduation.

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143. Unless this Court intervenes to protect S.M.H.’s rights, she will continue to be 

denied the opportunity to serve as a student-elected chaplain for her fellow band members and 

the Consent Decree and school officials are going to continue to limit and restrict S.M.H.’s right 

and the rights of her band colleagues, to engage in voluntary, student-led and student-initiated 

prayers and devotions before band performances.

144. In the Spring of 2009, while H.J.H. was in the seventh grade at Sims Middle 

School, she and some of her school mates began a practice of reciting a verse from the Bible in 

the cafeteria, just before eating their lunch. One of the students would pick the “verse of the day” 

and share it with a few other students. A few of the students would print the verse and distribute 

it to those students who wanted to participate. Then, just before they ate lunch, they would recite 

the verse together.

145. The Bible verse recitation was entirely voluntary. None of the students were 

required to participate, and no student was made to feel bad or embarrassed for not participating.

146. The Bible verse recitation was initiated by students and led by students. No adult 

encouraged the students to read any verse, told them which verse to pick, or participated in any 

way in this exercise. It occurred during the students’ free time, when they were not in class and 

when they were allowed to speak out loud about anything they wanted.

147. The Bible verse recitation was not disruptive and did not bother other students. 

No student complained about this exercise.

148. The Bible verse recitation took place without incident for three or four days. It 

was popular, in fact. H.J.H. enjoyed it because it allowed her to give thanks for the food she was 

eating, and to focus on things that matter to her during a pause from the stressful school day. The 

verse recitation inspired her to be a better student, and to care for her fellow school mates.

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149. After three or four days, the Sims Middle School principal arrived as H.J.H. and 

her school mates were preparing to read the day’s verse, and told them that they were no longer 

permitted to recite the daily verse, and that they would be disciplined if they continued.

150. Because they were afraid of being disciplined, H.J.H. and her school mates 

immediately stopped reciting the Bible verse at lunch, and they have not done it ever since.

151. H.J.H. wants to resume reading a Bible verse at lunch with those school mates 

who also want to do it. If school officials allow them to do this, H.J.H. wants to start right away 

and continue the practice for as long as she can.

152. Additionally, the Consent Decree and school officials have further restricted or 

prohibited students, including S.M.H., from engaging in voluntary, student-led and studentinitiated devotions and prayers during non-instructional time at school.

153. S.M.H. and the other members of the Pace High School Band were told by school 

officials that their teachers and other band leaders will get in trouble with Defendant School 

Board or the court if they are near when students voluntarily pray. Because S.M.H. and other 

praying students do not want their teachers and other leaders to get into any trouble, they try to 

squeeze their voluntary devotions and prayers in the short periods of down time when no adults 

are present.

154. S.M.H. and her fellow students thus feel rushed and afraid to pray. 

155. S.M.H. and her fellow praying school mates are always nervous that an adult will 

walk in and catch them doing something they are not supposed to do, or witness something they 

are not supposed to see. Their prayers and devotions have been hampered, restricted, and limited 

as a result, and they are not nearly as enjoyable and effective as they were in the past.

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156. H.J.H., S.M.H. and others want to be able to resume their practice of praying or 

reading the Bible with those school mates who want to join them in such voluntary activities 

during non-instructional time, without fear of disciplinary actions against them or their teachers.

157. Faith and religious expression are very important to Student Plaintiffs and to 

many of their friends and school mates.

158. Students, including the Student Plaintiffs, wish to engage in voluntary, student-led 

and student-initiated prayers, devotionals and other forms of religious expression during their 

free time on campus, such as before classes start, after classes end, during lunch, at student 

government potluck lunches, at sports banquets or during informal gatherings.

159. In the 2009-2010 school year, the Consent Decree and school officials created a 

climate that is very hostile to religious expression by students, including Plaintiff Students. That 

hostile climate has continued in the current 2010-2011 school year. Plaintiff Students are made 

to feel like prayer is something dirty and shameful that can be done in secret only, when no 

adults are present.

160. Unless this Court intervenes to protect the rights of Plaintiff Students, they will 

continue to be denied the opportunity to freely and openly engage in voluntary, student-led and 

student-initiated prayers, devotions and other forms of religious expression during noninstructional time at school.

161. Student Plaintiffs have suffered injuries and damages as a result of Defendants’ 

conduct and the Consent Decree.

The Parent Plaintiffs

162. Plaintiff Moon’s son is a member of the Pace High School band. Moon has been 

involved with the band as a parent-volunteer since his son’s freshman year.

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163. Among many of the activities Plaintiff Moon participated in are chaperoning band 

outings, driving the truck with band equipment at band events, assisting band students with 

carrying band equipment to the actual location of a performance, and maintaining and repairing 

band equipment.

164. Plaintiff Moon has also been a member of the Band Boosters, a school support 

organization that coordinates band volunteer activities.

165. Plaintiff Beckham’s daughter is a member of the Pace High School band. 

Beckham was also involved with the band as a parent-volunteer for two years, her daughter’s 

freshman and sophomore years, but not since. 

166. Among many of the activities Plaintiff Beckham participated in are selling 

concessions at band events, fundraising for the band and chaperoning band outings.

167. Plaintiff Beckham was also a member of the Band Boosters but was forced to 

discontinue that involvement this year.

168. Being a band volunteer is very important to Plaintiff Moon and remains important 

to Plaintiff Beckham, because it allows them to be involved in their children’s education, and to 

contribute to their community.

169. Plaintiff Moon enjoys being a volunteer, and wishes to continue to volunteer for 

as long as his son remains in the band, and possibly beyond.

170. Plaintiff Beckham greatly enjoyed being a volunteer and wishes to continue to 

volunteer indefinitely.

171. In or around September 2009, Defendant School Board required parent volunteers 

and the Band Boosters to adopt and subscribe to “new school board rules ... regarding ‘religion 

in schools.’” Among those rules is a prohibition that “Parent/chaperone must not enter into a 

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dialogue with students regarding religion, religious views or the like.” A copy of the rules which 

Defendant School Board imposed on parent volunteers, such as Plaintiffs Moon and Beckham, is 

attached hereto as Exhibit G and incorporated herein.

172. Volunteers, including Moon and Beckham, were told they were required to accept 

and sign this new rule if they wanted to continue their involvement as parent volunteers with the 

band.

173. Plaintiffs Moon and Beckham object to this rule because it is unconstitutionally 

overbroad.

174. Plaintiffs Moon and Beckham have no interest in pushing their religious views on 

anyone, especially students. They have no interest in using their positions as parent volunteers to 

persuade students to believe the same things they believe. 

175. At the same time, however, Plaintiffs Moon and Beckham want to be free to 

discuss religion or religious views with others who initiate such conversations with them. For 

example:

a. if a student asks Plaintiff Moon or Beckham where either attends church, 

what time church services start, or what their faith believes and how it is different from another 

faith, they want to be able to answer such questions in a straightforward, honest and nonthreatening fashion;

b. if a student asks Plaintiff Moon or Beckham what Hindus or Muslims or 

Catholic Christians or Baptist Christians believe as the band bus passes by a house of worship, 

Plaintiffs Moon and Beckham want to be able to answer this question truthfully and 

pedagogically, to the best of their ability, without trying to convert the student to adopt any 

religious views;

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c. if a student asks Plaintiff Moon what he thinks the role of God is in our 

government and public life, Plaintiff Moon would like to discuss the teachings of our founding 

fathers, his own opinions, and how our current government and courts have handled these issues;

d. if a student asks Plaintiff Beckham what our founding fathers believed

about the role of God in society and government, and how that squares with the beliefs of our 

current politicians, she wants to be able to share the facts she knows, as well as her honest 

thoughts and opinions on that subject;

e. if a student asks Plaintiff Moon what he believes about the theory of

evolution and the origins of humans, Plaintiff Moon would like to answer those questions based 

upon his life experience and his training and professional experience as a former science teacher, 

which discussion likely will include the idea of a Creator;

f. if a student asks Plaintiff Moon how he deals with human emotions such 

as depression, anxiety or grief, Plaintiff Moon wants to be able to respond truthfully, which 

would include his reliance on family, friends and God to live life everyday; and

g. if a student asks Plaintiff Moon whether he thinks capital punishment or 

abortion is morally right or wrong, or asks Plaintiff Beckham whether she thinks assisted suicide 

or infanticide is morally right or wrong, they want to be able to share their opinions, including 

the factual, legal, ethical, moral and religious principles supporting their opinions.

176. Those types of discussions have taken place in the past, when students initiated 

them, and those types of questions are very likely to be asked again in the future.

177. Religious issues and matters of faith are important to a majority of band members

at Pace High School, and they are well educated and intellectually equipped to form their own 

opinions and share them with others.

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178. Defendant School Board’s current policy prohibits Plaintiffs Moon and Beckham 

from merely discussing the foregoing matters (and other similar subjects) while serving as parent 

volunteers. 

179. There are no similar restrictions placed on topics other than religion, perhaps with 

the exception of profanities or obscenities. 

180. That discussion of religious subjects is equated with obscenities is itself obscene 

to Plaintiffs Moon and Beckham.

181. Plaintiff Moon is very concerned that if he violates Defendant School Board’s 

policy, he may be prohibited from continuing to serve as a parent-volunteer. This concern has 

caused him to self-censor his speech, and he will continue to do so until and unless this Court 

intervenes to restore his rights.

182. Because Plaintiff Beckham refused to accept Defendant School Board’s 

unconstitutional limitation on her First Amendment rights, she was precluded from serving as a 

parent volunteer for the 2009-2010 school year, and has been similarly precluded during the 

2010-2011 school year.

183. Plaintiffs Beckham and Kristan Harley are very involved in their daughters’ 

education. 

184. One way they stay involved and informed is through formal and informal 

conferences and discussions with their daughters’ teachers. Through such discussions, they

communicate about their daughters’ assignments, their successes and challenges, their behavior 

and outlook on their education, and their goals and objectives.

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185. Because faith is a very important aspect of the lives of the Beckham and Harley

families, matters of faith and religion routinely come up in conversations between both Plaintiffs 

Beckham and Kristan Harley and their daughters’ teachers. 

186. For example, they might discuss an issue their daughters are facing, and they

would bring up a lesson they studied at church, or something they read in the Bible as a family, 

and then discuss how those principles relate to the issue at hand. Similarly, in passing they might 

discuss events or sermons at their church, especially with those teachers who attend the same 

church. Plaintiff Beckham might discuss a particular Christian song her daughter would perform 

in an upcoming student competition. Often, Plaintiffs Beckham and Kristan Harley would bring 

up a recent joy or struggle in their families’ life, and ask a teacher they knew shared their faith to 

pray for them and with them. Plaintiff Kristan Harley did this, for example, when her oldest 

daughter suffered a sports injury that kept her out of school for an extended period of time.

187. Those routine discussions and communications, which Plaintiffs Beckham or

Kristan Harley or their daughters would initiate with these teachers, were an important aspect of 

the parent-teacher relationship. They were an integral part of the overall communications. They 

allowed Plaintiffs Beckham and Kristan Harley to develop a meaningful relationship with their 

daughters’ teachers, which provided the basis for open and frank discussions about their 

daughters’ educations and their futures. This was of great benefit to Plaintiffs Beckham and 

Kristan Harley as parents, and to their daughters as students.

188. In addition, Plaintiff Kristan Harley routinely uses religious phrases in her written 

and verbal communications, because of the way she was brought up and because her faith is so 

important to her. Her communications with her daughter’s teachers, both written and verbal, are 

no exception. For example, Plaintiff Kristan Harley often says or writes things such as: “You’ve 

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blessed my daughter,” or “You are such a blessing to me,” or “God is so good,” or “God Bless 

You.” She has often included such phrases in email discussions with her daughters’ teachers.

189. Since entry of the Consent Decree and adoption of the School Board policies,

Plaintiff Beckham’s and Plaintiff Kristan Harley’s ability to communicate openly and build 

relationships with their daughters’ teachers has been severely limited.

190. As a result of the Consent Decree, Defendant School Board has prohibited 

teachers from engaging in any conversations with Plaintiffs Beckham and Kristan Harley that 

involve or touch upon matters of faith and religion.

191. Now, whenever Plaintiffs Beckham and Kristan Harley bring up any subject 

dealing with church, faith or religion, their daughters’ teachers are afraid to discuss their 

thoughts openly with them. The teachers either ignore them, or quickly change the subject, or 

they tell Plaintiffs Beckham or Kristan Harley that they cannot respond or engage with them in 

such conversations, despite the fact that all are consenting adults with a mutual goal – the 

welfare of the daughters of Plaintiffs Beckham and Kristan Harley.

192. In addition, when Plaintiff Kristan Harley attempts to communicate with her

daughters’ teachers through email, and Plaintiff Kristan Harley includes a question or solicits 

information on some issue, and also brings up one or more of the religious phrases discussed 

above, Plaintiff Kristan Harley either does not receive a response at all, or she receives a brand 

new email communication that omits her initial question or comment.

193. Plaintiff Kristan Harley understands that the teachers do this because they have 

been instructed by school officials not to “reply” to emails containing religious remarks, so as 

not to incorporate (voluntarily or involuntarily) those remarks into the teachers’ responses. 

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194. This prohibition has caused confusion in their email communications, because

Plaintiff Kristan Harley cannot always tell from the incomplete “response” which question or 

issue the teacher is addressing.

195. This prohibition and confusion has in turn led Plaintiff Kristan Harley to selfcensor her own communications in an effort to re-open lines of communication with the teachers 

and avoid the need to patch together broken email strings and the like. In some instances, 

Plaintiff Kristan Harley was forced to forego attempting to communicate at all.

196. As a result of these difficulties and limitations imposed by school officials and the 

Consent Decree, Plaintiffs Beckham’s and Kristan Harley’s parent-teacher relationships have 

suffered and deteriorated significantly, and will likely continue to suffer to the detriment of their 

daughters until those unreasonable communication restrictions between willing adults are 

removed.

197. Parent Plaintiffs have suffered injuries and damages as a result of Defendants’ 

conduct and the Consent Decree.

The Local Community Plaintiffs

198. Plaintiff Rogers has planned, organized and conducted baccalaureate services for 

graduating seniors at Pace High School in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.

199. Similarly, Plaintiff Waters annually organizes and leads a baccalaureate service 

for the graduating class at Milton High School.

200. Last year, in or around May 2009, Plaintiffs Rogers and Waters were the principal 

organizers of the baccalaureate services for the graduating classes of the high schools in their 

respective communities, for the benefit of the Pace High School senior class and the Milton High 

School senior class, respectively. 

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201. The principal attendees of the Pace and Milton baccalaureates were the graduating 

seniors in whose honor the event was taking place. Without the graduating seniors, there would 

be no reason for the events, and Plaintiff Pastors would not have organized them.

202. Although all students and their families were invited to attend the Pace and 

Milton baccalaureates services, no one was required to attend. The events were entirely 

voluntary for all involved. 

203. The events took place outside of regular school hours. 

204. The Pace baccalaureate took place outside of school grounds, specifically, in the 

auditorium at Pace Assemblies Ministries, Plaintiff Roger’s church.

205. Plaintiff Waters rented the auditorium at Milton High School for the Milton 

baccalaureate. 

206. Defendant School Board’s facilities are generally available for rental during offschool hours by private individuals and entities for community events, and they are routinely 

used in that fashion. 

207. The baccalaureate rental at Milton High School was on the same terms (including 

rental fees) applicable to all other private individuals and groups.

208. Plaintiff Pastors organized most of the details for their respective events. 

209. These were difficult tasks because Plaintiff Pastors were unable to enlist the help 

of volunteers from their own churches and communities who were employed by Defendant 

School Board. Those would-be volunteers were prohibited by school officials and the Consent 

Decree from assisting Plaintiff Pastors, even on their own, non-instructional time, and they were 

afraid of being disciplined by Defendant School Board or held in contempt by a court.

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210. For example, Plaintiff Waters asked Carol Jones, a member of his church, for 

assistance with organizing and running the Milton baccalaureate service. Mrs. Jones has been 

employed by Defendant School Board since 1986, and has been teaching American History at 

Milton High School since 1993. She is also the alumni coordinator, and has invaluable 

experience in planning and coordinating baccalaureate services. 

211. Plaintiff Waters was eager to have Mrs. Jones help during her own, noninstructional time, including evenings and weekends. 

212. Mrs. Jones agreed to help and was eager to help, until she was told by Paul Green, 

Defendant School Board’s attorney, that if she provided any assistance, she “will ride with Frank 

Lay to see Judge Rodgers,” meaning that she will be charged criminally for contempt of court. 

Mrs. Jones thus was afraid to assist and declined to be involved.

213. Plaintiff Waters also asked Sheila Thompson, another church member who plays 

the piano at his church, to play the piano at the baccalaureate service, as she had done many 

times in the past. 

214. Mrs. Thompson, who has worked for Defendant School Board for 30 years and 

currently teaches chorus at Milton High School, readily accepted, and was eager to play the 

piano. 

215. However, on the eve of the event, she was told by school officials, School Board 

members and Mr. Green that she could not play the piano, because a) someone might think that

Defendant School Board was sponsoring the event; and b) the event met the definition of 

“School Event” in the Consent Decree because it was held in rented school facilities and geared 

primarily to students, and thus no school employee could lead the event. 

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216. Mrs. Thompson was prohibited from playing the piano by Defendant School 

Board even after she assured school officials that she would play the piano in her personal

capacity, on her own time, outside of school hours, at a privately-sponsored event. 

217. Because she was afraid of being disciplined or held in contempt of court, Mrs. 

Thompson declined to play the piano, and Plaintiff Waters was forced to find a replacement.

218. Moreover, Plaintiff Pastors encountered several problems and difficulties during 

the events themselves. 

219. As part of the religious celebration and thanksgiving, Plaintiff Pastors wanted to 

recognize and thank the teachers that had made it possible for the graduating seniors to succeed. 

The best way to do this would have been to seat all of the teachers together in one bloc, just as 

the students were seated in a bloc, and to publicly recognize and thank the teachers for their 

service during the baccalaureate events. 

220. Since the baccalaureates were privately-sponsored religious events, attended 

voluntarily by students, teachers and community members during non-school hours (with the 

Pace event even inside of a house of worship), Plaintiff Pastors did not anticipate that there 

would be any problems or issues in organizing and conducting the event as Plaintiff Pastors

wanted.

221. Plaintiff Pastors were disheartened and dismayed, however, when they learned 

and witnessed that the teachers who voluntarily attended these privately-sponsored community 

events, on their own time (and in Pace at a house of worship), were actually afraid to, and did 

not, sit together. 

222. The teachers also were afraid to stand and be recognized, or to participate in any 

way in the services. 

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223. The teachers had been admonished by school officials not to sit together or 

participate in the baccalaureate service, and they were threatened with disciplinary action and 

contempt sanctions if they disobeyed. 

224. This provided for a chilly atmosphere at both events and transformed what should 

have been warm and joyous occasions into sometimes awkward, sometimes uneasy, and 

sometimes tense events.

225. All of the foregoing difficulties and problems Plaintiff Pastors encountered with 

organizing and conducting the baccalaureate services for the two Santa Rosa graduating classes

last year were rooted in Defendant School Board’s Policies, and its interpretation and application 

of the Consent Decree.

226. Among other restrictions, the Consent Decree and Defendant School Board 

prohibit teachers who attend privately-sponsored, voluntary religious events, held outside of 

school hours, from sitting together in one bloc, from wearing similar graduation attire (e.g., 

school colors or graduation gowns), or from leading or directing the baccalaureate services, 

whether the events are held inside a house of worship off campus or inside a privately rented 

auditorium on campus.

227. The Consent Decree and Defendant School Board also prohibit teachers and staff 

employed by Defendant School Board from assisting in planning, organizing, financing or 

promoting the baccalaureate service, especially during free or non-instructional time on campus.

228. Defendants School Board and Superintendent have interpreted and applied the 

Consent Decree in a manner consistent with these limitations, and have threatened to discipline 

any teacher or staff member who disobeys.

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229. Because the worship and expression communicated and sought to be 

communicated during and through these baccalaureate services are both corporate and 

individual, the actions and policies of Defendants set forth above infringed and interfered with 

the Plaintiff Pastors’ rights to the free exercise of religion as well as their rights to free speech, 

hampering their message and hindering their worship experience.

230. In 2010, Plaintiff Pastors organized and conducted baccalaureate services for their 

respective communities’ high school graduating classes. 

231. Once again, the Pace baccalaureate was held at Plaintiff Rogers’ church, while 

Plaintiff Walters rented the Milton High School auditorium for the Milton baccalaureate.

232. Because the Milton baccalaureate service was held in rented facilities at Milton 

High School, the Consent Decree, on its face and as interpreted and applied by Defendants again 

deemed it a “School Event,” because the principal attendees were students. 

233. Because Plaintiff Waters’ privately-sponsored religious baccalaureate service is a 

“School Event,” the Consent Decree, on its face and as interpreted and applied by Defendants 

prohibits school officials, including teachers and staff, from participating in any prayer or 

religious activity during the baccalaureate service. 

234. Moreover, school officials are required by the Consent Decree, on its face and as 

interpreted and applied by Defendants to prohibit any non-student third parties (such as parents, 

Plaintiff Waters, any religious leaders, or any community members) from engaging in any prayer 

during the baccalaureate service.

235. The concerns of Plaintiff Pastors were confirmed by the 2010 services, and the

difficulties and problems they had encountered in 2009 were repeated.

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236. The Consent Decree, on its face and as interpreted and applied by Defendants 

grossly interferes with Plaintiff Pastors’ ability to organize and conduct a privately-sponsored 

religious baccalaureate service, whether in a house of worship or privately rented School District 

facility. 

237. The Consent Decree, on its face and as interpreted and applied by Defendants 

precludes Plaintiff Pastors from seating participants at these religious events according to 

Plaintiff Pastors’ own consciences, tastes, preferences and religious convictions. 

238. The Consent Decree, on its face and as interpreted and applied by Defendants 

precludes Plaintiff Pastors from asking that attendees coordinate their dress to aid the function, 

presentation and decorum of the events. 

239. The Consent Decree, on its face and as interpreted and applied by Defendants

interferes with Plaintiff Pastors’ ability to publicly thank and recognize teachers for their selfless 

service to the graduating classes.

240. The Consent Order, on its face and as interpreted and applied by Defendants 

precludes Plaintiff Pastors from obtaining help of church members and community members in 

the leading or direction of the baccalaureate services, including Plaintiffs Gough and Browning, 

simply because they happen to work for Defendant School Board. 

241. In addition, again in 2010, individuals employed by Defendant School Board, 

such as Plaintiffs Gough and Browning, were prohibited from assisting with organizing the 

baccalaureate, or from actively participating in the service, with the exception of Mrs. 

Thompson, who was granted special dispensation to play the piano. Otherwise, they and their 

colleagues, including Plaintiffs Lay, Lindsey, Kirsch, Barnes, Metty, Dawson and Browning,

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were again prohibited from sitting together, or from being recognized as teachers who 

contributed to the success of the graduating seniors honored at the baccalaureate.

242. Under these circumstances, it was again extremely difficult for Plaintiff Pastors to 

organize and conduct warm, joyous, efficient and effective baccalaureate services for Santa Rosa 

County graduating seniors, who deserve to have one.

243. The above conduct of Defendants and the Consent Decree have therefore 

interfered with the free exercise rights of Pastor Plaintiffs.

244. Another way Plaintiff Waters ministers to students is by organizing and 

conducting private religious activities for school-age children.

245. Prior to the issuance of the Consent Decree, Plaintiff Waters organized and led at 

least two such offerings in Santa Rosa County: “Youth Alive” at Hobbs Middle School, and 

“Differencemakers” at King Middle School. In both instances, Plaintiff Waters organized the 

programs, created a curriculum, and led the clubs for students who voluntarily attended them 

outside of regular school hours. 

246. Among other things, Plaintiff Waters would teach students about responsibility, 

character, moral values, civic duties and the importance of hard work, all from a Bible-based, 

Christian perspective.

247. Since the Santa Rosa County School Board makes public school facilities 

available for use by private individuals and groups outside of regular school hours, Plaintiff 

Waters decided that it would be most convenient to conduct these programs at public school 

facilities, so that students can attend them without the need for separate transportation to an offcampus facility.

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248. Prior to the issuance of the Consent Decree, the programs were a great success 

and very popular with students and parents looking for an enrichment activity to supplement 

their studies. Around fifteen students attended each program, which met once per week at each 

school.

249. After the Consent Decree was issued, however, school officials felt compelled by 

the Consent Decree to prohibit Plaintiff Waters from regularly attending these programs. They 

told him that, because of the Consent Decree, Plaintiff Waters could no longer be a regular 

speaker at the very programs he organized. Because Plaintiff Waters has been prohibited from 

attending the meetings, the programs have suffered due to the lack of consistent leadership.

250. Defendant School Board and the Consent Decree prohibit non-student third 

parties, such as Plaintiff Waters or any other volunteer leaders, from engaging in any religious 

activity, including prayer, sermons and devotionals, at on-campus events where the principal 

attendees are students, even where the events are privately-sponsored and held outside school 

hours in rented school facilities.

251. Religious activities, including prayer and devotionals, are core functions and 

purposes of Plaintiff Waters’ programs and without them, the programs would not exist or make 

any sense. 

252. Without adult, non-student leaders such as Plaintiff Waters or another church 

volunteer leading and participating in prayers and devotions, these programs cannot function, 

especially at the elementary and middle school levels.

253. Plaintiff Waters very much desires and intends to continue to participate in the 

student programs Plaintiff Waters organized, or to participate in new, religious student programs 

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that Plaintiff Waters will privately sponsor and conduct for students on a voluntary basis at their 

schools, before or after classes.

254. However, Plaintiff Waters is prohibited from doing so by the Consent Decree, on 

its face and as interpreted and applied by Defendants, because such activities are deemed

“School Events” since they are principally attended by students. 

255. Unless and until this Court intervenes, Plaintiff Waters’ First Amendment rights 

as a private citizen will continue to be infringed every day.

256. For the same reasons, Plaintiff Winkler’s First Amendment rights as a private 

citizen are also being infringed and will continue to be infringed, because Plaintiff Winkler 

desires to organize and offer private Bible and other religious studies in District facilities, both 

for students and separately for faculty and staff, outside of school hours. Under the terms of the 

Consent Decree and Policies, however, she, like Plaintiff Waters, is prohibited from doing so 

because such activities are deemed “School Events.”

257. The Consent Decree and other Policies and actions of Defendants are clear, 

blatant and intentional violations of well-established law.

258. Due to Defendants’ unconstitutional interpretation and application of the Consent

Decree, as well as other Policies and actions of Defendants, Plaintiffs have been irreparably 

harmed and have suffered damages.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ FREEDOM OF SPEECH 

UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

259. Plaintiffs hereby reiterate and adopt each and every allegation in the preceding 

paragraphs numbered 1 through 258.

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260. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits Defendants from 

abridging Plaintiffs’ freedom of speech.

261. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, deny Plaintiffs the ability to communicate with others concerning religious matters on 

the same basis as others are permitted to communicate on non-religious matters. 

262. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, discriminate amongst similarly situated persons or groups, including the fora of School 

Board facilities available for rent, graduation platform podiums, other student speeches and 

addresses, student organization meetings, student organization leadership posts, student 

organization guest speaker opportunities, voluntarily attended “School Events” during noninstructional time, desktops and other personal work spaces of Plaintiff Employees, lunchrooms, 

flagpole areas, teacher internet web pages, teacher emails, teacher conferences and school 

volunteer positions and opportunities.

263. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, discriminate on the basis of content and/or viewpoint by singling out religious speech 

and expression for negative and discriminatory treatment.

264. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.

265. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, unconstitutionally limit the speech of Plaintiff Employees while they are not acting as 

government employees.

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266. There is no compelling government interest sufficient to justify Defendants=

actions in applying the Consent Decree together with other Policies in an unconstitutional 

manner against Plaintiffs.

267. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are not the least restrictive means to accomplish any permissible government purpose 

sought to be served.

268. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are not narrowly tailored restrictions on free speech.

269. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, do not serve a significant government interest.

270. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, do not leave open ample alternative channels of effective communication.

271. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are unreasonable, and impose unjustifiable restrictions on constitutionally-protected 

speech.

272. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, unconstitutionally chill and abridge the right of Plaintiffs to engage in free speech 

guaranteed by the First Amendment. 

273. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to correct the continuing deprivation of 

their most cherished constitutional liberties.

274. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= continuing violations of Plaintiffs’ 

First Amendment rights, Plaintiffs have suffered in the past, and will continue to suffer in the 

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future, direct and consequential damages, including but not limited to, the loss of their ability to 

exercise their constitutional rights.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court grant the relief set forth herein.

COUNT II

VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ FREEDOM OF

ASSOCIATION UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

275. Plaintiffs hereby reiterate and adopt each and every allegation in the preceding 

paragraphs numbered 1 through 258.

276. Plaintiffs’ right to freely associate is protected by the First Amendment to the 

United States Constitution, in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment.

277. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, unconstitutionally limit the free association rights of Plaintiff Employees while they are 

not acting as government employees.

278. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, unconstitutionally limit the free association rights of Plaintiff Students in student 

organizations (including selection of the leadership posts for those student organizations), in 

religious services, and in private events utilizing rented School District facilities. 

279. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, unconstitutionally limit the free association rights of Plaintiff Parents.

280. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, unconstitutionally limit the free association rights of Plaintiff Pastors. 

281. There is no compelling government interest sufficient to justify Defendants=

action in applying the Consent Decree together with other Policies to Plaintiffs.

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282. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are not the least restrictive means to accomplish any permissible government purpose 

sought to be served.

283. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are not narrowly tailored restrictions on free association.

284. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, do not serve a significant government interest.

285. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are unreasonable, and impose unjustifiable restrictions on constitutionally-protected 

associations.

286. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, unconstitutionally abridge the right of Plaintiffs to freely associate as guaranteed by the 

First Amendment.

287. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to correct the continuing deprivation of 

their most cherished constitutional liberties.

288. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= continuing violations of Plaintiffs’ 

First Amendment rights, Plaintiffs have suffered in the past, and will continue to suffer in the 

future, direct and consequential damages, including but not limited to, the loss of their ability to 

exercise their constitutional rights.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court grant the relief set forth herein.

COUNT III

VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT OF 

EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

289. Plaintiffs hereby reiterate and adopt each and every allegation in the preceding 

paragraphs numbered 1 through 258.

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290. Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the laws is protected by the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

291. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are unconstitutional abridgements of Plaintiffs’ affirmative right to equal protection of 

the laws, because they specifically target Plaintiffs’ religious viewpoints and speech.

292. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are unconstitutional because they treat religious speech, religious expression, religious 

viewpoints and religious conduct differently than they treat secular speech, secular expression, 

secular viewpoints and secular conduct.

293. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are unconstitutional abridgements of Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection of the law 

because Defendants treat Plaintiffs differently from other similarly situated individuals and 

groups on the basis of Plaintiffs’ religious speech, religious expression, religious viewpoint and 

religious conduct.

294. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are not supported by a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the 

punishment against Plaintiffs.

295. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are not the least restrictive means to accomplish any permissible government purpose 

sought to be served.

296. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, do not serve a significant government interest.

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297. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, do not leave open ample alternative channels of communication.

298. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are irrational and unreasonable, and impose irrational and unjustifiable restrictions on 

constitutionally protected speech.

299. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to correct the continuing deprivation of 

their most cherished constitutional liberties.

300. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= continuing violations of Plaintiffs’ 

equal protection rights, Plaintiffs have suffered in the past, and will continue to suffer in the 

future, direct and consequential damages, including but not limited to, the loss of their ability to 

exercise their constitutional rights.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court grant the relief set forth herein.

COUNT IV

VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE

OF RELIGION UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

301. Plaintiffs hereby reiterate and adopt each and every allegation in the preceding 

paragraphs numbered 1 through 258.

302. Plaintiffs’ right to the free exercise of religion is protected by the First 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment.

303. Prayer, devotionals, Bible reading, Bible studies, Bible verse memorization, 

religious services, religious meetings, evangelizing, preaching and teaching religious matters and 

fellowship with fellow believers are all protected forms of religious exercise.

304. Plaintiffs engage in religious exercises out of sincerely held religious beliefs and 

convictions.

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305. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, unconstitutionally limit the free exercise rights of Plaintiff Employees while they are not 

acting as government employees and while on their free time. 

306. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, unconstitutionally limit the free exercise rights of Plaintiff Students, outside of school 

hours or during non-instructional time at school.

307. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, unconstitutionally limit the free exercise rights of Plaintiff Parents and Plaintiff Pastors.

308. These limitations are a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious 

beliefs.

309. There is no compelling government interest sufficient to justify Defendants=

actions in applying the Consent Decree together with other Policies to Plaintiffs.

310. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are not the least restrictive means to accomplish any permissible government purpose 

sought to be served.

311. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are not narrowly tailored restrictions on free exercise of religion.

312. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, do not serve a significant government interest.

313. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, do not constitute neutral laws of general applicability, but instead single out religious 

speech and conduct for special adverse treatment.

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314. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are unreasonable, and impose unjustifiable restrictions on constitutionally-protected 

religious exercise.

315. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, unconstitutionally abridge the right of Plaintiffs to engage in free exercise of religion

guaranteed by the First Amendment.

316. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to correct the continuing deprivation of 

their most cherished constitutional liberties.

317. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= continuing violations of Plaintiffs’ 

First Amendment rights, Plaintiffs have suffered in the past, and will continue to suffer in the 

future, direct and consequential damages, including but not limited to, the loss of their ability to 

exercise their constitutional rights.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court grant the relief set forth herein.

COUNT V

VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 

OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

318. Plaintiffs hereby reiterate and adopt each and every allegation in the preceding 

paragraphs numbered 1 through 258.

319. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, are hostile to religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 

to the United States Constitution.

320. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, single out religious speech, expression and conduct for discriminatory and hostile 

treatment.

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First Amended Complaint – Page 58

321. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, require Defendant School Board’s employees, including Plaintiff Employees, to be 

hostile and not accommodating to students, parents, fellow employees and third parties based on 

their religious speech, expression and conduct. 

322. There is no compelling government interest sufficient to justify Defendants=

action in applying the Consent Decree together with other Policies to Plaintiffs.

323. Defendants’ actions, Policies, and the Consent Decree, on their face and as 

applied, violate the Establishment Clause protections of the First Amendment. 

324. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to correct the continuing deprivation of 

their most cherished constitutional liberties.

325. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants= continuing violations of Plaintiffs’ 

First Amendment rights, Plaintiffs have suffered in the past, and will continue to suffer in the 

future, direct and consequential damages, including but not limited to, the loss of their ability to 

exercise their constitutional rights.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court grant the relief set forth herein.

COUNT VI

INVALIDATION OF MOOT CONSENT DECREE

326. Plaintiffs hereby reiterate and adopt each and every allegation in the preceding 

paragraphs numbered 1 through 258.

327. On May 30, 2009, Minor Doe I and Minor Doe II graduated from Pace High 

School, thereby losing any interest in enforcement of the Consent Decree and thereby losing 

standing for any court to maintain any continuing jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree.

328. Minor Doe I and Minor Doe II have no standing to enforce or seek enforcement 

of the Consent Decree, because they cannot be harmed by any conduct of the Defendants.

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329. The Consent Decree is moot.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court grant the relief set forth herein.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

A. That this Court issue a preliminary injunction, enjoining Defendants, their 

officers, agents, employees and all other persons acting in active concert with them, from 

enforcing Defendants’ Consent Decree together with their other Policies against Plaintiffs in a 

manner that infringes upon their constitutional rights.

B. That this Court issue a permanent injunction, enjoining Defendants, their officers, 

agents, employees and all other persons acting in active concert with them, from enforcing 

Defendants’ Consent Decree together with their other Policies against Plaintiffs in a manner that 

infringes upon their constitutional rights.

C. That this Court issue a declaratory judgment declaring that Defendants’ Consent 

Decree together with their other Policies are unconstitutional, both on their face and as applied to 

Plaintiffs, and declaring that Defendants, their officers, agents, employees and other persons 

acting in active concert with them, unlawfully obstructed Plaintiffs from exercising their 

constitutionally-protected rights.

D. That this Court adjudge, decree, and declare the rights and other legal relations 

with the subject matter here in controversy, in order that such declaration shall have the force 

and effect of final judgment.

E. That his Court invalidate the unconstitutional Consent Decree as moot because 

there are no plaintiffs with standing to enforce it.

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F. That this Court retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purpose of enforcing this 

Court=s order.

G. That this Court award Plaintiffs such damages as are just and appropriate.

H. That this Court award Plaintiffs the reasonable costs and expenses of this action, 

including attorney=s fees, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. ' 1988.

I. That this Court grant such other and further relief as it deems equitable and just 

under the circumstances.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Horatio G. Mihet___________________

Mathew D. Staver

 Florida Bar No.

Anita L. Staver

 Florida Bar No.

Horatio G. Mihet

 Florida Bar No.

LIBERTY COUNSEL

PO Box 540774

Orlando, FL 32854-0774

800-671-1776 Telephone

407-875-0770 Facsimile

court@lc.org

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

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First Amended Complaint – Page 61

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed 

electronically with the Court this 8th day of April, 2011. Service will be effectuated upon all 

parties of record by the Court’s electronic notification system.

/s/ Horatio G. Mihet_____________________

Horatio G. Mihet, Esq.

One of the attorneys for Plaintiffs

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