J-S32013-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MATTIE PITTMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1220 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 19, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008404-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 17, 2019

Appellant, Mattie Pittman, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following her convictions of aggravated assault, simple assault, 

recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”), and various firearm 

violations. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual history of this case as follows:

Dorothy Howell, sixty-one years old, testified that on 

August 29, 2016, at around 1:00-1:30am, she received a phone 

call from her younger sister ([Appellant]). (N.T. 9/8/17 at pp. 9-

12). [Appellant], who did not live with Dorothy, informed Dorothy 

that she was outside her home. (Id.) [Appellant] told her that 

she was there to say a prayer, as Dorothy’s grandson had just 

been killed and Dorothy’s husband was in the hospital. (Id. at 12, 

14). Dorothy let her in. (Id. at 12).

Once [Appellant] was inside she said a prayer, but then told 

Dorothy, “Let me see your phone to see if I dialed the right 

number.” (Id. at 12). Dorothy responded, “Mattie, that is the 

right number; you just called me.” (Id.). Immediately, 

[Appellant] jumped up, pinned Dorothy down, and repeatedly 
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punched Dorothy in the face and the chest. (Id. at 12, 16, 17, 

23). She also began accusing Dorothy of sleeping with a man that 

[Appellant] was friends with. (Id.). Dorothy had no idea who or 

what [Appellant] was talking about. (Id. at 12).

[Appellant] then pulled a small, black and yellow, .22 caliber 

gun out of her pocketbook, pointed it at Dorothy from only one to 

two feet away, and said “Shut up you no good, stinking bitch. 

You’re fucking my friend.” (Id. at 13, 22). She also threatened 

“Shut the F up...before I blow your head off.” (Id. at 18, 20). 

Dorothy responded “Mattie, you about to kill me about a man? I 

don’t even know what man you talking about.” ([Id. at] 18-20).

[Appellant] then called the man in question on Dorothy’s 

phone, spoke to him, threw Dorothy’s phone, and continued to 

attack Dorothy; [Appellant] sliced open Dorothy’s face by 

punching her with the rings on her fingers. (Id. at 13). Dorothy’s 

eye started closing and stinging. (Id.). Dorothy hit [Appellant] 

back in the chest with her house phone to defend herself. (Id. at 

52). Dorothy then escaped to the kitchen and grabbed a kitchen 

knife; she thought about fending off [Appellant] with the kitchen 

knife but decided against it because she did not want to 

accidentally kill her sister. (Id. at 22, 25). Instead, she told 

[Appellant] to leave. (Id.). [Appellant] left Dorothy’s house. (Id. 

at 25). As she left, [Appellant] asked Dorothy if she was going to 

call the police and Dorothy responded that she was. (Id. at 26). 

[Appellant] left with the gun, and Dorothy tried to get 

[Appellant’s] license plate number for the police but could not see 

because there was blood, swelling, and incredible pain in her eyes. 

(Id. at 24, 45). Dorothy called the police, and the police then 

rushed her to the hospital. (Id. at 13).

At the hospital, Dorothy testified that she was treated for a 

fractured eye socket and a fractured nose, and she also received 

four stitches under her right eye. (N.T. 9/8/17 at pp. 17, 24). 

Dorothy had bruises all up and down her chest and arm. (Id. at 

18). She also testified that she had damage to the muscles under 

her eye. (Id. at 28). The pain in her eyes did not cease for two 

weeks after the incident. (Id. at 29). She had trouble seeing at 

first and her doctor told her that her eyes would take a while to 

heal. (Id. at 30). At trial, her medical records were admitted and 

revealed that she was officially diagnosed with “a periorbital 

contusion on her left eye, a facial fracture, a closed head injury, 

and facial laceration.” (Id. at 27). Photographs of Dorothy’s 
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injuries on the day after the incident were entered into evidence, 

including some of her face and one of bruising on her chest and 

arm. (Id. at 32, 34). Dorothy concluded that she still loved her 

sister but remains confused by her actions. (Id. at 35).

Detective Cherie Savoy testified that on August 29, 2016, 

at around 1:40am, she met with Dorothy Howell at Dorothy’s 

home in Philadelphia. (N.T. 10/20/17 at p. 7). At that time, 

Dorothy was crying, terrified, and badly beaten. (Id. at 7). Her 

face was bleeding from under her eye and from her forehead. 

(Id.). Dorothy told Detective Savoy that her sister came to her 

house, accused her of talking to a man, repeatedly punched her 

in the face, and pulled a small black and yellow firearm (possibly 

a .22 caliber) on her. (Id. at 9, 14, 15). She gave the officer 

specific information, including her sister’s name, address, date of 

birth, and car description. (Id. at 8, 11). The detective then gave 

[Appellant’s] information to other officers and personally 

transported Dorothy to the hospital. (Id. at 12).

Officer Timothy Carroll testified that on August 29, 2016, 

around 1:30am, he received a radio call with information about a 

suspect ([Appellant]) who had just committed an aggravated 

assault. (N.T. 10/20/17 at p. 18). Officer Carroll found the 

uninjured [Appellant] on [Appellant’s] street at 3:05am and 

arrested her. (Id. at 20-21).

Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/18, at 3-5.

On October 20, 2017, at the conclusion of a nonjury trial, Appellant was 

convicted of aggravated assault, prohibited possession of a firearm, firearms 

carried without a license, firearms carried in public in Philadelphia, possession 

of an instrument of a crime, terroristic threats, simple assault, and REAP.1 On 

March 19, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of 

incarceration of two to four years with three years of consecutive probation 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a), 6105, 6106, 6108, 907(a), 2706(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), 

and 2705.
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for the aggravated assault conviction and the three years of concurrent

probation for the conviction of prohibited possession of a firearm. The trial 

court imposed no further penalty for the remaining convictions. This timely 

appeal was filed on April 17, 2018.2 Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the Trial Court err in finding the evidence admitted at trial 

was sufficient to sustain the ... verdict for count 1, aggravated 

assault under Pa Crimes Code section 2702(A) as the evidence 

failed to prove causation or attempt to cause [serious] body 

injury?

2. Did the Trial Court err in finding the evidence admitted at trial 

was sufficient to sustain the ... verdict for count 8, recklessly 

endangering another person under Pa. Crimes Code section 2705 

as the evidence failed to prove that [Appellant] had an actual 

frame or receiver of a firearm?

3. Did the Trial Court err in finding the evidence admitted at trial 

was sufficient to sustain the ... verdict for count 2, possession of 

firearm prohibited under Pa. Crimes Code section 6105(A1) as the 

____________________________________________

2 We note that the notice of appeal indicated that Appellant was appealing 

“from the Order, dated March 29, 2018.” Notice of Appeal, 4/17/18, at 1. 

However, upon review of the trial court’s docket, this Court determined that 

there is no indication of an order being entered on March 29, 2018. On 

August 27, 2018, we issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not 

be quashed as having been taken from a purported order that is not entered 

upon the appropriate docket of the trial court. On August 28, 2018, 

Appellant’s counsel filed a response to the rule to show cause. In the 

response, counsel explained that the appeal was from the order entering 

judgment of sentence that was filed on March 19, 2018, and that counsel 

mistakenly typed March 29. Response, 8/28/18, at 1. In addition, Appellant 

requested amendment to the notice of appeal to correct the clerical error. 

Accordingly, we have corrected the caption to reflect that this appeal has been 

taken from the judgment of sentence entered on March 19, 2018.
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evidence failed to prove that [Appellant] had an actual frame or 

receiver of a firearm?

4. Did the Trial Court err in finding the evidence admitted at trial 

was sufficient to sustain the ... verdict for count 3, firearms not to 

be carried without license under Pa. Crimes Code section 

6106(A1) as the evidence failed to prove that [Appellant] had an 

actual frame or receiver of a firearm?

5. Did the Trial Court err in finding the evidence admitted at trial 

was sufficient to sustain the ... verdict for count 4, carry firearms 

[in] public in Philadelphia under Pa. Crimes Code section 6108 as 

the evidence failed to prove that [Appellant] had an actual frame 

or receiver of a firearm?

6. Did the Trial Court err in finding the evidence admitted at trial 

was sufficient to sustain the ... verdict for count 5, possession of 

an instrument of crime under Pa. Crimes Code section 907(A) as 

the evidence failed to prove that [Appellant] had an actual frame 

or receiver of a firearm?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5 (renumbered for ease of disposition).

Appellant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her 

conviction of aggravated assault. Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant states 

that “[n]o deadly weapon was used, and the repeated punches from 

[Appellant] did not cause or attempt to cause serious bodily injury.” Id.

Our standard of review is well established:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the 

fact-finder[’s]. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 
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probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying 

the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder 

of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2011).

The crime of aggravated assault is set forth at 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 and 

provides in relevant part as follows:

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of aggravated assault if 

he:

(4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly 

causes bodily injury to another with a deadly 

weapon[.]

18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4). Serious bodily injury is defined as “bodily injury 

which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent 

disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 

member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.

The trial court addressed Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence with the following thorough discussion:

[Appellant] argues that the evidence did not demonstrate 

serious bodily injury for the purposes of her aggravated assault 

conviction. However, [Appellant] confuses the standards required 

for her conviction. [Appellant] was not convicted of a first degree 

felony which would require attempted serious bodily injury. 

[Appellant] was convicted of a second degree felony, which states 

that a person is guilty when he attempts to cause bodily injury to 

another with a deadly weapon. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4).10 In 

the present case, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that 
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[Appellant] attempted to cause bodily injury with a deadly 

weapon: therefore the evidence is sufficient to hold [Appellant] 

guilty of aggravated assault.

10 Bodily injury includes any “impairment of physical 

condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.

To prove aggravated assault under this subsection,

[The] Commonwealth must demonstrate both a 

substantial step plus an intent to cause bodily injury 

to another with a weapon. The inquiry here is whether 

the surrounding circumstances evidenced defendant’s 

intent to commit bodily injury with a weapon. . . . We 

glean the following from these cases vis a vis the 

attempt aspect of §§ 2702(a)(1) and (a)(4). First, the 

resolution of each case is a function of the 

circumstances of the case as determined by the factfinder. Second, a substantial step for purposes of 

aggravated assault-attempt under §§ 2702(a)(1) or 

(a)(4) can involve little or no injury to the victim. 

Third, we view all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner, giving that party the 

benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom. Fourth, with respect to the intent 

requirement of each section, we examine the 

defendant’s words and conduct to determine whether 

the record supports a finding of the requisite intent.

Commonwealth v. Gruff, 822 A.2d 773, 778-79 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (citations omitted). Any firearm-loaded or unloaded-is a 

deadly weapon for the purposes of this statute. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2301. The mere act of pointing a gun at someone is not 

sufficient to support an aggravated assault conviction. 

Commonwealth v. Sanders, 627 A.2d 183, 187 (Pa. Super. 

1993). However pointing a gun with something more-for 

example, pointing a gun combined with a verbal threat-can be 

enough. Commonwealth v. Matthew, 909 A.2d 1254, 1259 

(Pa. 2006).

In Commonwealth v. Matthew, the Court found that 

there was sufficient evidence to find aggravated assault when a 

defendant pointed a gun at the victim, turned away to search his 

car, told the victim that he was going to kill him, then ran away 
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from the victim.11 909 A.2d 1254, 1259 (Pa. 2006). In coming 

to this conclusion, Matthew specifically asserted that a conviction 

should not be found to lack sufficient evidence just because a 

defendant had an opportunity to injure the victim with his deadly 

weapon but did not. Id. at [1258]. Instead, courts should follow 

a totality of the circumstances test. Id. (re-affirming 

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 383 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1978)).

11 This case was based off a conviction for Aggravated 

Assault under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1): However, its 

rationale was based on two cases concerning 

convictions under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4).

In Commonwealth v. Gruff, the defendant held a loaded 

rifle with an attached bayonet to the victim’s throat and said, “I 

just ought to kill you.” 822 A.2d 773, 774 (Pa. Super. 2003). This 

was deemed sufficient evidence of attempted serious bodily injury 

at that “critical moment” even though the victim felt the bayonet 

was removed from his neck and ran away and the defendant did 

not follow. Id. at 780; See also Commonwealth v. Sanders, 

627 A.2d 183, 187 (Pa. Super. 1993) (holding sufficient evidence 

where defendant pointed a loaded gun at the victim and 

threatened to shoot him before victim grabbed the defendant’s 

wrist and forced the gun from him).

In Commonwealth v. Fortune, the defendant pointed a 

gun at victim and said “If you don’t let go of the keys, I’m going 

to blow your head off.” 68 A.3d 980, 982 (Pa. Super. 2013).12 

The victim then gave the defendant her keys and ran away. Id. 

Though the defendant argued on appeal that his threat was 

conditional, the court held that there was still sufficient evidence 

of aggravated assault: a reasonable jury could conclude that the 

threat and point of the gun amounted to evidence of intent and a 

substantial step towards serious bodily injury. Id. at 987.

12 This case also focused on Aggravated Assault under 

18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1): However, its rationale was 

based on the Alexander/Matthew totality test which 

is commonly used for both 2702(a)(1) and (a)(4).

In the present case, [Appellant] pointed a gun at Dorothywhom she had just finished severely beating-and threatened her 

life. (N.T. 9/8/17 at p. 20). Dorothy described-both on the night 

of the incident and to the court-how [Appellant] pulled a small, 
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black and yellow, .22 caliber gun out of her purse and pointed it 

at Dorothy from only one or two feet away. (Id. at 19, 20, 22; 

N.T. 10/20/17 at pp. 14-15). Then, with a “crazy–looking” 

expression, [Appellant] yelled “shut the F up . . . before I blow 

your head off.” (N.T. 9/8/17 at pp. 18-21). Dorothy expressed 

how the gun could have killed her at this point. (Id. at 20). 

[Appellant] only left after Dorothy had escaped her grip and after 

she had grabbed a kitchen knife to defend herself. (Id. at 22, 46). 

If Dorothy had not taken this action, this encounter could have 

ended much more violently than it already did.

Here, [Appellant’s] substantial step and intent towards 

causing bodily injury to the victim with a deadly weapon can be 

observed through her “words and conduct” as advised by Gruff, 

822 A.2d at 779. By severely beating Dorothy (despite the fact 

that Dorothy was her sister, whose husband was in the hospital 

and grandson had just passed away), [Appellant] demonstrated 

her intent to cause her bodily injury. (N.T. 9/8/17 at pp. 11-14). 

[Appellant] beat Dorothy ferociously enough (with rings on her 

fingers) to cause multiple fractures and stiches to her face and 

bruising all over her body. (Id. at 24). Additionally, [Appellant] 

demonstrated these elements through her threat to “blow 

[Dorothy’s] head off” and the fact that she pointed a gun at 

Dorothy from merely a foot or two away. (Id. at 18, 22).

Although [Appellant] erroneously argues that there was 

insufficient evidence for aggravated assault because there was no 

serious bodily injury, there was ample evidence of attempted 

bodily injury by deadly weapon. Therefore, there was sufficient 

evidence for second-degree felony aggravated assault.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/18, at 6-9 (footnote omitted).

We have thoroughly reviewed the certified record before us on appeal, 

and we agree with the trial court’s determination that the Commonwealth 

presented sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Appellant committed the crime of aggravated assault. Immediately after 

physically beating the victim, Appellant drew a pistol, pointed it at the victim, 

and verbally threatened her. The fact that Appellant did not pull the trigger 
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is of no moment. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim challenging the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the crime of aggravated assault lacks merit.

Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth failed to present 

sufficient evidence to support the conviction of REAP. Appellant’s Brief at 14-

15. Appellant asserts that a conviction of REAP “requires proof that the 

firearm was loaded and therefore capable of causing harm.” Id. at 15. 

We disagree.

Our Crimes Code defines REAP as follows:

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he 

recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another 

person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. Section 2705 is satisfied where a defendant’s conduct 

“places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily 

injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. Further, we have held that “[t]he crime of REAP 

is a crime of assault which requires the creation of danger. As such, there 

must be an actual present ability to inflict harm. . . . [T]he mere apparent 

ability to inflict harm is not sufficient. Danger, and not merely the 

apprehension of danger, must be created.” Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 

835 A.2d 720, 727-728 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Under the plain terms of the statute, a REAP conviction is 

supportable even where the victim suffered no actual injury. See 

Commonwealth v. Rahman, 75 A.3d 497, 502-503 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(evidence was sufficient to support REAP conviction where the defendant 
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“thr[ew] punches at [a police officer] on a stairwell on a crowded balcony next 

to a glass divide;” although the officer did not actually fall down the stairs, the 

evidence was sufficient to place the officer “in danger of death or serious bodily 

injury” because the defendant’s actions “easily could have caused [the officer] 

to lose his footing and fall down the stairs”).

The trial court aptly addressed Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence with regard to the REAP conviction as follows:

In the present case, as discussed above, the evidence 

established that [Appellant] held down the sixty-one-year-old 

victim, Dorothy, and repeatedly punched her in the face and head, 

breaking her eye socket and nose. (N.T. 9/8/17 at p. 24). 

[Appellant] wore costume rings on her fingers, which sliced open 

... Dorothy’s face and resulted in her requiring stitches. (Id.). 

Dorothy was in excruciating pain and had limited vision for a “long 

time” after this event. (Id. at 24, 29). [Appellant] also punched 

her in the chest and arm, resulting in pain and bruising. (Id at 

29). [Appellant’s] actions easily could have cost Dorothy her eyes 

and her vision. Therefore, this evidence could reasonably lead a 

fact-finder to conclude that [Appellant] is guilty of recklessly 

performing an action which may cause serious bodily injury.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/18, at 10 (footnote omitted).

Here, regardless of whether the firearm that Appellant pointed at the 

victim was loaded, the remaining facts of the incident were sufficient to 

support the conviction of REAP. Appellant, while wearing rings on her hand, 

repeatedly punched the victim in the head, face, chest, and arms. 

Consequently, the victim suffered fractures to her eye socket and nose. In 

addition, she required stitches under her eye and suffered vision loss. The 

trial court, sitting as finder of fact, chose to believe the evidence presented by 
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the Commonwealth, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the 

trial judge. Under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence presented 

at the trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is 

sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction of REAP.

In her final four issues, Appellant argues that there was insufficient 

evidence to support her convictions of possession of a firearm by a prohibited 

person, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms publicly 

in Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of crime. Appellant’s Brief at 

10-14. However, Appellant did not present these issues to the trial court in 

her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement as required.

Our Courts have consistently ruled that, where a trial court directs a 

defendant to file a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, any issues 

not raised in that statement shall be waived. Commonwealth v. Bullock, 

948 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 

A.2d 306, 308 (Pa. 1998)). In Commonwealth v. Butler, 812 A.2d 631, 

633 (Pa. 2002), our Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Lord and stated: 

“In Lord, however, this Court eliminated any aspect of discretion and 

established a bright-line rule for waiver under Rule 1925 .... Thus, waiver 

under Rule 1925 is automatic.” See also Commonwealth v. Oliver, 946 

A.2d 1111, 1115 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that Lord “requires a finding of 

waiver whenever an appellant fails to raise an issue in a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement”).
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Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing upon 

those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal. “When a court has to 

guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful 

review.” Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

In addition, we are mindful that claims not raised before the trial court are 

waived. See Commonwealth v. Ryan, 909 A.2d 839, 845 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Gordon, 528 A.2d 631, 638 (Pa. Super. 1987))

(reiterating that “[a] theory of error different from that presented to the trial 

jurist is waived on appeal, even if both theories support the same basic 

allegation of error which gives rise to the claim for relief”).

Our review of the certified record reflects that on April 27, 2018, the 

trial court issued an order directing Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement within twenty-one days. The record further reveals that, after the 

grant of multiple extensions of time, Appellant filed her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement on September 5, 2018. Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement 

contains a total of four issues. The fourth issue is the only issue that raised a 

claim pertaining to the convictions for the firearm violations, and it provides 

as follows:

4. The Court erred and denied [Appellant] the due process and 

equal protection guaranteed to her by state and federal 

constitutions, because the verdicts for the charges of Possession 

Of Firearm Prohibited (18 § 6105 §§ A1), Firearms Not To Be 

Carried W/O License (18 § 6106 §§ Al), Carry Firearms Public In 

Phila (18 § 6108), and Poss Instrument Of Crime W/Int (18 § 907 

§§ A) were against the weight of the evidence. The verdicts on 

these charges were so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s 
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sense of justice, because there was no evidence whatsoever to 

corroborate and substantiate the complaining witness testimony 

about a firearm.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 9/5/18, at 2.

Thus, Appellant properly preserved for review claims challenging the 

weight of the evidence to support her firearm convictions. Although Appellant 

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions of 

aggravated assault and REAP in her Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant never 

specifically raised to the trial court any claims that there was insufficient 

evidence to support her firearm convictions. Indeed, the two arguments 

challenging the weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are 

distinct. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 799 A.2d 860, 864 (Pa. Super. 

2002) (“[w]eight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are discrete 

inquiries”). Therefore, because Appellant now attempts to raise claims 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the various firearm 

convictions, we conclude that these arguments are waived because Appellant 

failed to present these specific issues in her Rule 1925(b) statement.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/17/19