Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-2277 | May 7, 2020 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Denise F. Hayden

Lacy Law Office, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Rodney T. Sarkovics

Sarkovics Law

Carmel, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

G.L.W.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

J.W.S.,

Appellee-Petitioner

May 7, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-DR-2277

Appeal from the Hamilton 

Superior Court

The Honorable Andrew Bloch, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

29D03-1002-DR-176

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-2277 | May 7, 2020 Page 2 of 16

Case Summary

[1] G.L.W. (Father) appeals the trial court’s order modifying his child support 

obligation for his now sixteen-year-old daughter, H.W., from his marriage to 

J.W.S. (Mother). The trial court also ordered Father to pay a portion of 

Mother’s attorney’s fees. On appeal, Father asserts that the trial court’s order is 

clearly erroneous. Finding no clear error, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The parties were married, and one child, H.W., was born of the marriage. The 

marriage was dissolved by decree on December 20, 2010. Mother was granted 

sole legal and primary physical custody of H.W. and relocated to South 

Carolina in 2013. Father resides in Camby, Indiana. Pursuant to a court order 

entered on October 1, 2013, Father was granted parenting time pursuant to the 

Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines when distance is a major factor and was 

ordered to pay child support of $141 per week.

[3] In November 2018, Mother enrolled H.W. at Compass Rose Academy in 

Wabash, Indiana on the advice of medical professionals to address H.W.’s 

troubling behavior and her mental health. Mother decided on Compass Rose 

after doing research on similar residential behavioral treatment facilities around 

the country. Father did not agree with H.W.’s enrollment at Compass Rose

and has refused to pay anything toward her attendance despite Mother’s 

requests that he do so.
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[4] On December 19, 2018, Mother filed a motion for rule to show cause asking the 

trial court to hold Father in contempt for failing to pay a portion of H.W.’s 

attendance at Compass Rose as a medical expense pursuant to the “Six Percent 

(6%) Rule” of Guideline 7 of the Indiana Child Support Guidelines. Appellant’s 

App. at 34. Father responded by filing his own motion for rule to show cause

asking the trial court to hold Mother in contempt for restricting his telephone 

contact with H.W. and denying him winter-break parenting time in December 

2018. Father also stated in his motion that he opposed Mother’s decision to 

enroll H.W. at Compass Rose.

[5] A hearing on the parties’ motions was commenced on February 5, 2019; 

however, matters were not resolved, and the hearing was continued to February 

26, 2019. In the interim, Father filed a petition for modification of both legal 

and physical custody, parenting time, and child support. Father requested that 

he be granted primary physical custody and sole legal custody of H.W., and 

that Mother be ordered to pay child support and granted parenting time. A 

hearing on the contempt motions was held on February 26, 2019. Thereafter, 

the trial court entered an order addressing the parties’ respective motions, 

denying both, and finding neither party in contempt.

[6] On March 22, 2019, Mother filed a petition to modify parenting time. Mother 

requested that the court restrict Father’s parenting time subsequent to H.W.’s 

release from Compass Rose. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the parties’

respective petitions for modification for May 2019. That hearing was later 

continued. On July 17, 2019, Mother filed a motion to compel discovery
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asserting that Father had provided late and incomplete discovery responses 

despite numerous requests. The trial court granted that motion to compel, 

ordered Father to comply with specific discovery requests, and stated that the 

issue of Mother’s attorney’s fees incurred with relation to the motion would be 

determined at a subsequent hearing.

[7] The trial court held a hearing on pending issues on July 30, 2019. Prior to the 

presentation of evidence, Father withdrew his request to modify custody and 

Mother withdrew her request to modify parenting time. Accordingly, the only

issues remaining before the court were child support and Mother’s request for 

attorney’s fees in conjunction with her motion to compel discovery. The trial 

court issued an order with sua sponte findings of fact on September 16, 2019. 

Regarding child support, the trial court found in pertinent part:

14. [H.W.] was placed at Compass Rose by Mother due to her 

mental health diagnoses.

15. The cost for [H.W.] to attend Compass Rose was $225 per 

day upon her enrollment. [H.W.] received a scholarship effective 

April 1, 2019 which reduced her cost to $112.50 per day.

16. Compass Rose charges for counseling and other expenses 

separate from its per diem rate.

17. Father has paid $0 towards [H.W.’s] Compass Rose 

expenses. This includes [H.W.’s] daily per diem and all other 

expenses associated with her commitment including counseling 

and/or therapy costs.

....
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29. The Commentary to Guideline 1 of the Indiana Child 

Support Guidelines state[s] that there are an infinite number of 

situations which permit the Court to deviate from the 

recommended Guideline amount for a support obligation

including among other things that one or both parties pay union 

dues, a party pays support for an elderly parent; and the

noncustodial parent purchases school clothes. See Commentary 

to Guideline 1.

30. Mother searched extensively for [H.W.’s] placement to treat 

her mental health diagnoses prior to enrollment at Compass 

Rose. Mother as custodial parent who lived with [H.W.] on a 

day-to-day basis and based upon the advice of mental health 

professionals determined that the best course of action for 

[H.W.’s] mental health was placement at a facility which 

provides the services that Compass Rose offers. Father has 

offered no financial assistance in this regard. Mother also

testified that the cost to see and visit [H.W.] is high considering 

the distance between her South Carolina residence and Compass 

Rose. Some of Mother’s claims are dubious with regards to her 

selection of Compass Rose, however. She claimed at one point 

to have examined every facility in the United States before

settling on Compass Rose. The Court is also concerned about 

the overall cost of Compass Rose and the parties’ ability to pay 

for it without help from other sources. When considering the 

income shares model, the Court wonders if Mother and Father 

had stayed together whether they would be able to afford

Compass Rose as an intact family unit. Nevertheless, there is no 

petition pending before the Court with respect to the continued 

use of Compass Rose, just how payment should be divided.

31. The Court has previously determined by order that Father is 

not in contempt for his non-contribution to any of [H.W.’s] 

Compass Rose expenses (See Order dated March 1, 2019). The 

evidence has also been that [H.W.’s] enrollment at a facility such 

as Compass Rose is necessary.
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32. The Court finds that Father’s weekly gross income is $1,176 

per week based on the information he presented to the Court, 

including the payment of personal expenses by his employer, 

which happens to be his Wife.

33. .... The Court finds that Mother’s gross weekly income 

should be imputed at $1,032.69.

....

35. The recommended weekly child support obligation without 

deviation is $142.00 (See attached worksheet). Which is virtually 

unchanged from the Court’s last order of $141.00 per week. The 

cost, as noted elsewhere in this Order, of Compass Rose is 

significant and the treatment [H.W.] is receiving is necessary. 

[H.W.] also has other expenses that are not covered by the per 

diem charge of Compass Rose, in that she still requires the 

normal expenditures that one would spend on a teenage 

daughter. The Court finds that deviation is justified due to the 

expense of [H.W.] attending Compass Rose and order[s] that 

Father’s weekly support obligation is $200.

36. [H.W.] has been enrolled at Compass Rose since prior to 

Father’s filing of his request to modify support. Accordingly, the 

Court will also find that the modified support obligation began 

on February 15, 2019 which is the first Friday following Father’s 

petition to modify.

37. The evidence was that Father has timely paid his support 

obligation through the hearing. The difference in child support 

between the present order and the modified support obligation is 

$59 per week. Accordingly, Father’s support arrearage is 

$1,770.00 as of September 30, 2019.

38. Father’s support arrearage shall be paid through the Clerk of 

the Court and to Mother within 60 days of the Court’s order.
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39. The 6% rule shall apply and Mother shall be responsible for 

the first $864.24 annually in [H.W.’s] uninsured medical 

expenses and thereafter any additional uninsured medical 

expenses shall be paid 53% by Father and 47% by Mother.

40. The 6% rule according to the worksheet in place required 

that Mother pay the first $768 in uninsured medical expenses for

[H.W.’s] benefit. Considering the cost of Compass Rose, the 

support modification having been filed in February and the 

retroactive support obligation, the Court will use $721 as the 

threshold for [H.W.’s] 2019 uninsured medical expense 

calculation.

Appealed Order at 2-7. Regarding attorney’s fees, the court found:

47. Mother filed a motion to compel on July 17, 2019, which

was granted. The Court’s order compelling discovery is dated 

July 18, 2019.

48. The pleading had 26(F) correspondence dated April 26 and

June 18, 2019 attached to it. Mother incurred attorney fees of 

$1,201 solely with respect to discovery issues. (Trial Rule 37). 

Mother is awarded said fees (rounded to $1,200) and payable 

within 30 days of the date of this Order.

49. Mother had a total of $9,017 in attorney fees which included

the $1,201 related to discovery issues.

50. Separate and distinct from discovery issues the Court is 

authorized to award attorney fees. Ind. Code 31-15-10-1. The 

Court shall consider the resources of the parties, their economic 

circumstances and ability to engage in gainful employment, and 

any other factors which bear on the reasonableness of the award.

The court does not believe Father would have contributed to 

Compass Rose, if Mother had not brought this action.
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51. The Court has considered such factors. Mother is awarded an 

additional $1,800 in attorney fees.

52. The total fee award to Mother is $3,000 which shall be paid 

within 90 days of the date of this order and any unpaid sum 

thereafter shall bear interest at the rate of 8% per annum and 

entered as a judgment against Father.

Id. at 8-9 (citation omitted). This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The trial court’s order modifying Father’s child 

support obligation is not clearly erroneous.

[8] Father appeals from the trial court’s most recent order dated September 16, 

2019. Father contends that the trial court’s order modifying his child support 

obligation and ordering him to pay Mother $200 each week in child support is 

clearly erroneous. We place a strong emphasis on a trial court’s discretion in 

determining child support obligations and will set aside a child support 

modification only when it is clearly erroneous. Lea v. Lea, 691 N.E.2d 1214, 

1217 (Ind. 1998). As already noted, in its order, the court entered sua sponte 

findings of fact. In such a situation, 

the specific factual findings control only the issues that they 

cover, and a general judgment standard applies to issues upon 

which there are no findings. It is not necessary that each and 

every finding be correct, and even if one or more findings are 

clearly erroneous, we may affirm the judgment if it is supported 

by other findings or is otherwise supported by the record. We 

may affirm a general judgment with sua sponte findings on any 

legal theory supported by the evidence. In reviewing the 
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accuracy of findings, we first consider whether the evidence 

supports them. We then consider whether the findings support 

the judgment. We will disregard a finding only if it is clearly 

erroneous, which means the record contains no facts to support it 

either directly or by inference.

Clary-Ghosh v. Ghosh, 26 N.E.3d 986, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

[9] Indiana Code Section 31-16-8-1 governs modification of child support orders 

and provides in relevant part:

(a) Provisions of an order with respect to child support ... may 

be modified or revoked.

(b) Except as provided in section 2 of this chapter, 

modification may be made only:

(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial 

and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; or

(2) upon a showing that:

(A) a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child 

support that differs by more than twenty percent (20%) from 

the amount that would be ordered by applying the child 

support guidelines; and

(B) the order requested to be modified or revoked was issued 

at least twelve (12) months before the petition requesting 

modification was filed.

(Emphasis added). “In any proceeding for the award of child support, there 

shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of the award which would 

result from the application of the Indiana Child Support Guidelines is the 

correct amount of child support to be awarded.” Ind. Child Support Rule 2. 

We observe that a trial court may deviate from the Child Support Guidelines, 
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but if it does so “the court shall enter a written finding articulating the factual 

circumstances supporting that conclusion.” Ind. Child Support Rule 3. 

[10] In challenging the trial court’s modification of his child support obligation, 

Father makes no assertion that H.W.’s behavior and resulting enrollment at 

Compass Rose did not constitute a change in circumstances so substantial and 

continuing as to make the terms of his prior child support obligation 

unreasonable pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-16-8-1(b)(1).

1

 Instead, 

Father argues that the trial court’s upward deviation from the amount 

recommended by application of the Child Support Guidelines is unwarranted

and therefore clearly erroneous.

2

 We disagree.

[11] The trial court here entered extensive written findings articulating the factual 

circumstances supporting the upward deviation of Father’s obligation from the 

$142 weekly amount recommended by application of the Guidelines.

3

Specifically, the trial court found that the per diem cost for H.W. to attend 

1 Although Father makes a strange argument that modification of his support obligation cannot be justified

pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of Indiana Code Section 31-16-8-1, Father ignores that the statute is written in 

the disjunctive and presents alternative methods of seeking modification. MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 

N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind. 2005). As noted above, Father makes no claim that H.W.’s behavior and resulting 

enrollment at Compass Rose did not constitute a substantial and continuing change in circumstances since 

the prior child support order.

2 Father makes some arguments that are difficult to understand, and while we do our best to fully address the 

overriding issue raised, we decline to specifically address certain subparts of his arguments that are disjointed 

or poorly articulated.

3 During the hearing, Father requested that his weekly child support obligation be modified downward from 

his prior obligation of $141 to just $15 based upon evidence of his gross income that the trial court clearly did 

not find credible. Tr. Vol. 2 at 156; Father’s Ex. E.
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Compass Rose was significant, and the court further found that the evidence 

presented demonstrated that the treatment H.W. was receiving at Compass 

Rose was necessary for her mental health. The court also found that H.W. 

incurred additional expenses in attending Compass Rose that are not covered 

by the per diem charge, and that she further required the normal expenditures 

that one would spend on a teenage daughter. The evidence presented supports 

these findings, these findings support the court’s deviation from the amount

recommended by the Guidelines, and Father directs us to no contrary evidence. 

Father has not demonstrated that the trial court’s deviation from the Guidelines 

is clearly erroneous.

[12] Still, Father argues that the court’s modification order is clearly erroneous 

because it “would seem” that an increase in his child support obligation due to 

H.W.’s enrollment at Compass Rose, coupled with the court’s order that he pay 

a portion of H.W.’s uninsured heath care expenses pursuant to the six percent

rule, results in a “double dip” for Mother as far as health care expenses are 

concerned. Appellant’s Br. at 12. This is not the case.

[13] Here, Father has been ordered to contribute to two different types of expenses.

As briefly discussed above, the evidence indicates that there are significant costs 

associated with H.W.’s attendance at Compass Rose that would not qualify as 

uninsured health care expenses. Those are accounted for within, and form the 

basis underlying, the increase in Father’s weekly support obligation. 
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[14] However, there are also expenses associated with H.W.’s attendance at 

Compass Rose that would qualify as uninsured health care expenses and, with 

respect to those, the trial court ordered Mother to pay the first $721 of H.W.’s 

uninsured heath care expenses pursuant to the six percent rule,

4 and thereafter

Father pays fifty-three percent and Mother pays forty-seven percent. While we 

decline to parse Father’s incorrect calculations, we reject his assertion that he is 

somehow contributing to the same heath care expenses, specifically the six

percent figure, twice. Contrary to Father’s suggestion, this amount is already 

accounted for in Father’s weekly child support obligation and is not a separate 

and additional amount. The Commentary to Guideline 7 of the Child Support 

Guidelines explains, with regard to uninsured health care expenses, that the 

“noncustodial parent is, in effect, prepaying health care expenses every time a 

support payment is made. Consequently, the Guidelines require that [the] 

custodial parent bear the cost of uninsured health care expenses up to six 

percent (6%) of the Basic Child Support Obligation found on Line 4 of the 

Child Support Obligation Worksheet ....” Father has not demonstrated that the 

court’s modification order results in him contributing twice to the same health 

care expenses.

[15] When all is said and done, Father’s overriding argument circles back to the fact

that he disagrees with H.W.’s placement at Compass Rose in the first place 

4 As noted earlier, the trial court adjusted its six percent calculation slightly from the submitted child support 

worksheet based upon various factors. Neither party challenges the resulting $721 figure.
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because it is an expense “he cannot afford and something he does not believe is 

necessary.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. In short, Father claims that he should not be 

required to pay anything toward H.W.’s attendance at Compass Rose through

an increase in child support, health care contribution, or otherwise, because he 

simply believes that she could get outpatient treatment somewhere cheaper. 

However, that ship has sailed. The trial court emphasized that the evidence

indicated that H.W. clearly needs treatment at a facility, and the court aptly 

noted that “there is no petition pending before the Court with respect to the

continued use of Compass Rose, just how payment should be divided.” 

Appealed Order at 5.

5

 Father’s assertion on appeal that his contribution toward

H.W.’s attendance at Compass Rose should be zero and Mother’s contribution 

should be 100 percent is unpersuasive.

[16] As a final matter, Father suggests that the trial court clearly erred in failing to 

reduce his child support obligation for times when H.W. was residing and as 

she continues to reside at Compass Rose rather than with Mother. Father did 

not make this argument to the trial court, and therefore it is waived on appeal. 

See, e.g., Plank v. Cmty. Hosp. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013)

(“[A]ppellate review presupposes that a litigant’s arguments have been raised 

and considered in the trial court.”); Carney v. Patino, 114 N.E.3d 20, 29 n.6 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2018) (“The trial court cannot be found to have erred as to an issue or

5 Although Father’s petition to modify custody addressed the choice of Compass Rose for H.W.’s treatment, 

Father withdrew that petition prior to the trial court’s hearing, and thus that issue was no longer pending. 

Appealed Order at 1.
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argument that it never truly had an opportunity to consider.”), trans. denied

(2019).

[17] In sum, Father has not demonstrated that the trial court’s order modifying his 

child support obligation is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court’s order.

Section 2 – Father has waived his challenge to the trial court’s 

order that he pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees.

[18] Father very briefly asserts that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay a 

portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees. The trial court ordered Father to pay $1200 

as a sanction for his discovery violations and an additional $1800 in fees, for a 

total of $3000. As a general matter, we note that we afford trial courts broad 

discretion in deciding whether an award of attorney’s fees is warranted. Russell 

v. Russell, 693 N.E.2d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. We will 

reverse a trial court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees only when we determine 

that it has abused this discretion. Stratton v. Stratton, 834 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 

[19] We decline to address this issue due to Father’s lack of cogent reasoning. It is 

well established that the argument section of an appellate brief must contain the 

contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent 

reasoning, and each contention must be supported by citations to the 

authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied

on. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Failure to present a cogent argument 
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results in waiver of the issue on appeal. Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 137 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2019). 

[20] Here, Father has not provided cogent argument, citation to sufficient relevant 

legal precedent, or citation to pages in the record. In the mere five sentences he 

dedicates to his entire argument on this issue, Father repeatedly refers to the 

court’s award of “$1,000.00” in attorney’s fees, claiming that such order is 

“illogical” given “the parties[’] incomes and Father’s financial status.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 20. As stated above, the trial court awarded Mother $3000 in 

attorney’s fees: $1200 as a discovery sanction, and $1800 pursuant to Indiana 

Code Section 31-15-10-1.

6

 Father does not explain the relevance of the $1000 

figure and, while it is possibly just a repetitive typographical error, we are 

unable to discern exactly what he is challenging and why, as he makes no 

attempt to differentiate the legal standard for awarding attorney’s fees pursuant 

to the dissolution statute from the standard for imposing sanctions for discovery 

violations. Moreover, Father references evidence of his alleged inability to pay

any portion of Mother’s fees, but he provides us no citation to the appendix or 

record on appeal. We will not search the record for evidence in support of his 

claim. In sum, we decline to put more effort into addressing Father’s argument

than he put into making it. Father has waived our review of this issue.

6 That section provides that, in family law/dissolution of marriage cases, “[t]he court periodically may order 

a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding 

under this article and for attorney's fees ....”
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[21] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.