[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-13554

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00010-CAR

JARVIS O'NEIL ADAMS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,

State of Georgia,

OFFICE OF GREENE COUNTY SHERIFF,

OFFICER PAQUETTE,

Greene County Deputy Sheriff,

OFFICER JOHN DOE, 

presumably McGammons, Greene County

Deputy Sheriff,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

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(June 12, 2020)

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Before WILSON, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Jarvis O’Neil Adams, proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte dismissal 

with prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action raising claims of an unlawful stop, 

search, and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and other rights. The 

district court granted Adams’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, but dismissed 

his case with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because he failed to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted and because amending his 

complaint would be futile under the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine. After careful 

review of the appellant’s brief and the record, we affirm in part and vacate and 

remand in part.2

I.

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d

1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). Section 1915(e) provides that an in forma pauperis

action shall be dismissed at any time if the court determines that it fails to state a 

claim for which relief may be granted. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). To avoid dismissal for 

failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain enough facts to “raise a right to 

1 Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 

462 (1983).

2 To the extent that Adams appeals the dismissal of any of his other constitutional claims, 

we have determined that such claims are conclusory and meritless, and we affirm their dismissal. 

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relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). And its claim for relief must be plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). We have stated that “conclusory allegations,

unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will 

not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 

(11th Cir. 2002). Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less 

stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers but must still suggest some 

factual basis for a claim. Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th 

Cir. 2015). And “[a] copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is 

a part of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).

To prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show that 

he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state 

law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). The

Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and

seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 

“A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth

Amendment and forms a basis for a section 1983 claim,” Ortega v. Christian, 85

F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996), but there can be no claim for false arrest without 

an arrest, Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1101 (11th Cir. 2018). 

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A traffic stop is considered a seizure subject to the protections of the Fourth 

Amendment. United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001). A 

decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when an 

officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred. Whren v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Probable cause is a “reasonable ground 

for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere 

suspicion.” United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d 1149, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004). 

This standard is met when an officer personally observes a traffic infraction. 

See United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 

A warrantless search of an automobile is constitutional if (1) the automobile 

is readily mobile and (2) there is probable cause to believe that it contains 

contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293, 1299–

1300 (11th Cir. 2011). The first prong is satisfied if the car is operational. United 

States v. Watts, 329 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). As for the 

second prong, probable cause to search a vehicle “exists when under the totality of 

the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 

will be found in the vehicle.” United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th 

Cir. 2007). This standard is met when an officer detects the smell of marijuana. 

United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 1982), abrogation on other 

grounds recognized by United States v. Phillips, 812 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1987)

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(per curiam). In addition to searching the vehicle, officers conducting a traffic stop

may “take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety,”

including conducting a protective search of the driver. Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1277 

(alteration accepted). 

A warrantless seizure of personal property in plain view is permissible under 

the Fourth Amendment where officers have probable cause to believe that the 

property is contraband. See United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir. 

2006). The government can establish probable cause for the seizure of property by 

showing that the property was related to “some illegal drug transaction.” 

$242,484.00, 389 F.3d at 1160. In considering the evidence that funds were 

related to a drug transaction, we employ “a common sense view to the realities of 

normal life applied to the totality of the circumstances.” Id. The sheer quantity of 

cash, although a significant fact, is not sufficient on its own to establish probable 

cause to believe money was related to a drug transaction. Id. at 1161. 

The district court did not err by dismissing Adams’s claims for unlawful 

arrest and unlawful stop. First, he was not arrested, and second, he alleged, and 

did not dispute, that the officers stopped him based on a traffic violation—failing 

to use his turn signal. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-123(b) (“A signal of intention to turn 

right or left or change lanes when required shall be given continuously for a time 

sufficient to alert the driver of a vehicle proceeding from the rear in the same 

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direction or a driver of a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.”). The 

district court also did not err by dismissing Adams’s claim for unlawful search of 

his vehicle as he alleged the officers stated that they searched his car because they

smelled marijuana, which established probable cause for the search. 

But the district court did err by dismissing Adams’s claim for unlawful 

seizure of his personal property during the stop because it did not specifically 

address whether there was probable cause for the seizure. In other words, the 

district court made no determination about whether the alleged facts supported that 

the officers had probable cause to believe the seized money was contraband—e.g., 

related to a drug transaction. As this determination requires a fact-specific inquiry 

governed by the totality of the circumstances, we will remand to the district court 

to address in the first instance whether Adams stated a claim for unlawful seizure 

under § 1983.

II.

“We review a district court’s decision to deny leave to amend for an abuse 

of discretion,” Woldeab v. Dekalb Cty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th 

Cir. 2018), but we review de novo the underlying legal conclusion that amendment 

to the complaint would be futile, Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1012 

(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We review de novo a district court’s determination 

that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims due to the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 

1331 (11th Cir. 2001).

Generally, the district court abuses its discretion if it does not provide a pro 

se plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend his complaint before dismissing it 

with prejudice, unless doing so would be futile because a more carefully crafted 

complaint would still not be able to state a claim. See Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291–

92. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts and courts of 

appeals lack subject matter jurisdiction “over certain matters related to previous 

state court litigation.” Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1332. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

“extends not only to constitutional claims presented or adjudicated by a state court, 

but also to [federal] claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court 

judgment.” Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per 

curiam). “A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if 

the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided 

the issues before it.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 

The Supreme Court has clarified that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 

confined to cases that are “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)

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(emphasis added). Rooker and Feldman do not support the idea that properly 

invoked concurrent jurisdiction vanishes when a state court reaches judgment on 

the same question while the case is still under review in federal court. Id. at 292. 

“Disposition of the federal action, once the state-court adjudication is complete, 

would be governed by preclusion law.” Id. at 293. Thus, “the relevant inquiry [for 

applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine] is whether the state court proceedings have 

ended” before the federal action was filed. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 

1277 (11th Cir. 2009); see Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1072 

(11th Cir. 2013) (noting Rooker-Feldman doctrine would only apply if state court 

proceedings ended before commencement of the plaintiff’s federal case). 

And under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1), “[a]n amendment to a

pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment 

asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 

set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” 

 Here, the district court erred by concluding that amendment would be futile 

because it would be barred from review under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As 

the district court noted, the state civil forfeiture proceeding had not concluded 

when Adams filed his initial complaint. Because any amended complaint based on 

the same facts could relate back to the date of the filing of the initial complaint, the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not apply to Adams’s amended complaint. 

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III.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

Adams’s claims for unlawful stop and search. We vacate the dismissal of Adams’s 

unlawful seizure claim and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.

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