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 IN T H E U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

ROCIO CARMEN SISKA

ALEXANDER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs. Case No. 5:10cv209/RS/CJK

JAN FREDERICK LUBBE, et al., 

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed a

third amended civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 11). Upon

review of the amended complaint, the court concludes that plaintiff has not presented

an actionable claim, and that dismissal of the case is warranted.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Rocio Carmen Siska Alexander (“Alexander”), on behalf of her two

minor children, initiated this lawsuit on August 6, 2010. (Doc. 1). In her third

amended complaint, filed on November 30, 2010 (doc. 11), plaintiff joined her son,

Alejandro Alexander (“Alejandro”), as co-plaintiff. Plaintiff, who named fifteen

defendants in the third amended complaint, seeks, inter alia, custody of her two

minor children and compensatory damages based on her claims that defendants have

interfered with her attempts to regain custody of the children, one of whom,

Alejandro, has since reached the age of majority. 

The chronology of relevant events giving rise to this complaint begins on or

around January 2008, when plaintiff and her three sons, all victims of domestic

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violence, began work on a “safety plan.” The following rather dramatic facts are

taken from the complaint filed by plaintiff. The children’s father, Jan Frederick

Lubbe (“Lubbe”), learned that plaintiff had been making financial arrangements and

became involved in a physical altercation with plaintiff and her children. Lubbe

broke plaintiff’s right arm, slashed Alejandro with a box cutter, and threatened to kill

them if they spoke to police. (Doc. 11, p. 7). Lubbe wrongfully withheld Alejandro’s

child support, his Social Security benefits, and plaintiff’s Social Security disability

benefits. (Doc. 11, p. 8). 

On March 11, 2008, plaintiff arrived home to find Lubbe conferring with a case

worker from the Florida Department of Children and Families (“DCF”). DCF tried

to have Alejandro involuntarily committed pursuant to the Florida Mental Health Act

of 1971 (“Baker Act”), but a court denied the corresponding petitions. On March 18,

2008, Rene Creteur (“Creteur”), a protective services investigator with DCF,

explained to plaintiff that Alejandro would be admitted to a residential facility in

Orlando for two weeks. Creteur stated that she was in control and directed plaintiff

to remain quiet. (Doc. 11, p. 8). Contrary to Creteur’s assurances, Alejandro was

admitted to a drug shelter unit at the direction of Jessica Gibson (“Gibson”), a

supervisor atBig Bend CommunityBasedCare (“Big Bend”), a child welfare services

agency. (Doc. 11, pp. 8-9). 

On March 20, 2008, plaintiff contacted Big Bend and spoke with program

director Mary Helen Barnes (“Barnes”), who “begged” her not to get an attorney. 

Plaintiff met with Barnes, who promised to remove plaintiff’s son from the drug

treatment shelter. Plaintiff informed Barnes that, pursuant to court order, she was

entitled to have Alejandro live at her house. On March 24, 2008, Barnes called

plaintiff and threatened to have her other two children, twin boys, removed from

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plaintiff’s home if plaintiff removed Alejandro from the drug treatment shelter. 

Barnes ordered plaintiff to meet with her at juvenile court the next day at 1:00 p.m. 

(Doc. 11, pp. 9-10).

On March 25, 2008, a hearing was held. Creteur and Barnes accused plaintiff

of sexually and physically abusing her children. Creteur and Barnes requested that

plaintiff be removed from her house. Plaintiff left the house that evening and did not

return for six weeks, during which time her twins suffered physically and

emotionally, and Alejandro was battered and assaulted in drug treatment. Plaintiff,

who is disabled, was homeless for those six weeks, during which period Lubbe

collected her disability benefits. (Doc. 11, p. 10).

On April 15, 2008, a Mr. Lacelle (“Lacelle”) evaluated Alejandro for the

Statewide Inpatient Psychiatric Program (“SIPP”). Lacelle recommended that

Alejandro return home immediately and warned plaintiff that it would be detrimental

for him to be institutionalized. Andrea Colbert (“Colbert”), a case worker for Big

Bend, perjured herself, falsified a report, and told Judge James B. Fensom that

Alejandro had run away from the drug treatment shelter. In fact, Alejandro wasin the

emergency room for injuries sustained when he was taken hostage at the shelter.

Despite the injuries, Colbert refused to authorize a CT scan, in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. (Doc. 11, p. 10).

On April 17, 2008, plaintiff submitted psychological and substance abuse

evaluations, as well as a parenting skills assessment, to Big Bend. On the same, day,

Alejandro attempted suicide after Colbert “instructed” the drug treatment shelter to

impose cruel and unusual punishment in retaliation for Alejandro’s reporting DCF to

law enforcement. Judge Fensom ordered that Alejandro be removed immediately

from the drug treatment shelter. Colbert, however, told the judge that she could not

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recommend that plaintiff be returned home, because she had not received the various

fitness evaluations plaintiff had personally delivered to Big Bend. Colbert tried to

blackmail plaintiff, telling her thatshe would arrange Alejandro’s release in exchange

for plaintiff’s “documents.” (Doc. 11, p. 11).

On May 19, 2008, an emergency hearing was held on a petition to have

Alejandro, who had been released from the shelter in Orlando, involuntarily

committed under the Baker Act. (Doc. 11, p. 11). In contravention of plaintiff’s

“right to due process oflaw,” Colbert, Lubbe, State AttorneyAmyThome (“Thome”),

and Public Defender Mike Reiter (“Reiter”) “conspired” to prevent plaintiff from

being notified of the hearing. (Doc. 11, pp. 11-12) A hearing was also held on May

20, 2008, but Alejandro was denied his constitutional right to be heard. On March

25, 2008, Thome conspired with Lubbe to accuse plaintiff of sexually abusing her

sons. Throughout the case, Thome failed to provide exculpatory evidence to Judge

Fensom. Colbert conspired with Lubbe with the intent to obtain financial gain. 

Plaintiff petitioned Judge Fensomto remove Reiter fromthe case, becauseReiter, too,

failed to provide exculpatory evidence. Colbert, Thome, and Lisa Coleman

(“Coleman”), a supervisor with Big Bend, conspired to violate plaintiff’s Fifth

Amendment rights. Colbert perjured herself and violated Alejandro’s Eighth

Amendment rights when she sent himto a sex offenders center in Bradenton, Florida. 

(Doc. 11, p. 12).

On July 15, 2008, Lubbe battered plaintiff after she returned with her twins

from Bradenton. Lubbe conspired with state officials to “inflict cruel and unusual

punishment” on plaintiff’s sons. Plaintiff met with an FBI agent on July 16, 2008,

and explained the conspiracy to separate her from her children. The agent directed

plaintiff to report her complaints to the State Attorney’s office. (Doc. 11, p. 13). On

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July 17, 2008, plaintiff met with Assistant State Attorney Shalla Phelps (“Phelps”)

and explained the various constitutional wrongs that had been visited upon her. 

Phelps replied that there was nothing she could do and that she would not “get

involved” with DCF, thereby “neglecting” her duty. (Doc. 11, p. 14).

Plaintiff and her sons moved to Bradenton in the middle of July 2008, but

Lubbe conspired with Colbert to interfere with plaintiff’s receipt of disability

insurance benefits. Lubbe threatened plaintiff that he would abscond with her sons

to “the Zulu jungle” if she did not pay him $10,000,000.00. (Doc. 11, p. 14). Lubbe

injured plaintiff severely, bruising her ribs to such an extent that they stuck out. 

(Doc. 11, pp. 14-15). On July 19, 2008, Lubbe again threatened plaintiff, explaining

that DCF would never allow her to maintain custody of her children. Plaintiff called

the police on July 21, 2008, when Officer Chris Taylor (“Taylor”) arrived at the hotel

where plaintiff and her sons had been residing. Taylor compiled a report of plaintiff’s

complaints, and Lubbe was charged with aggravated battery. (Doc. 11, p. 15). 

Despite plaintiff’s fear of retaliation, Taylor offered no information on services

available to victims of domestic violence, thereby violating plaintiff’s constitutional

rights under the First and Ninth Amendments. Without plaintiff’s consent, Taylor

proceeded to arrest Lubbe, who confessed to making false reportsto DCF, but did not

charge him for that offense. (Doc. 11, p. 16). 

At Taylor’s instruction, plaintiff drove to Bradenton with Sherill Clark-Antas

(“Clark-Antas”). (Doc. 11, p. 16). On July 25, 2008, Lubbe was released on bond

and told the local authorities that plaintiff had absconded with the twins. An officer

from the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office arrived with the intent to arrest plaintiff. 

Colbert called the Sheriff’s Office and stated that plaintiff had no parental rights and

represented a danger to her sons, in violation of the “First, Fourth, and Fifth

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Amendments.” Colbert also asserted that plaintiff had kidnapped her twins, was

wanted in Bay County, and suffered from mental illness. (Doc. 11, p. 17).

On August 9, 2008, plaintiff drove with her sons to Tallahassee, Florida, for

a meeting with DCF Regional Investigator Anthony C. Jackson (“Jackson”). Colbert

reported to Manatee Youth Center, where Alejandro had been staying, that Judge

Fensom had signed a “no contact” order prohibiting contact between Alejandro and

his mother. Colbert, however, failed to produce such an order, which does not exist. 

(Doc. 11, p. 17). Between August and December 2008, plaintiff saw Alejandro for

a total of forty minutes, because Colbert, in conjunction with Coleman and Lubbe,

lied about the issuance of a “no contact” order. Colbert thus violated plaintiff’s

constitutional “right to familial association” and inflicted “cruel and unusual

punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 11, p. 18).

Plaintiff met again with Jackson on August 11, 2008. Jackson told plaintiff not

to retain an attorney, because DCF would remedy the situation internally. (Doc. 11,

p. 18). On August 20, 2008, the tires on plaintiff’s truck were slashed, presumably

by Lubbe, who left his “signature” three nails. On August 21, 2008, plaintiff

petitioned the Circuit Court for Manatee County for injunctive relief under the

UniformChild Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). Judge Scott

M. Brownell granted an injunction, which granted to plaintiff temporary custody of

the twins and prohibited contact between Lubbe and his minorsons. (Doc. 11, p. 19). 

A hearing was held before Judge Brownell on September 3, 2008, on plaintiff’s

petition for a permanent injunction against domestic violence. (Doc. 11, pp. 19-20).

Plaintiff notified Clark-Antas of the hearing and faxed her the court records. In

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, and the First and Ninth Amendments, Ms. Bryant, a

domestic violence advocate with HOPE Family Services, attended the hearing and

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advised plaintiff not to “disclose any information.” C. Michael Kelly (“Kelly”),

counsel for Lubbe, told the court that plaintiff had absconded with the twins, that the 

children were not enrolled at any school, that Alejandro had sexually abused the

twins, that plaintiff suffered from mental illness, addiction, and was endangering her

children. (Doc. 11, pp. 20-21). Kelly presented to the court documents “falsified”

or “altered” by Colbert. Lubbe concealed from the court the fact that aggravated

battery charges were pending against him and that a “no contact” order had been

entered against him. (Doc. 11, p. 21). Judge Brownell ordered a change of venue (to

Bay County) and extended the injunction for protection against domestic violence,

granting temporary custody of the children to plaintiff and prohibiting contact

between Lubbe and his sons. (Doc. 11, pp. 21-22). 

The same day of the hearing, Lubbe violated the terms and conditions of the

injunction. Lubbe obtained plaintiff’s address and telephone numbers and began

“terrorizing” her again. On September 8, 2008, in Bay County, Lubbe, with the

assistance of his attorney, Nancy Jones Gaglio (“Gaglio”), made out an affidavit

under the UCCJEA to regain custody of the children. Lubbe, however, stated that

there were no pending cases or custody proceedings in any other venue, failing to

advise the court of the injunction granted in Manatee County. Lubbe also filed a

petition for dissolution of marriage. (Doc. 11, pp. 22-23).

On September 28, 2008, plaintiff attempted to file a notice of violation of

injunction in the Bay County Family Court. Sandra Childers (“Childers”), the Clerk

of Court, failed to document plaintiff’s notice or the receipt of records from the

Manatee County Circuit Court. (Doc. 11, pp. 23-24). Childers “conspired” with

Lubbe to violate “all” of plaintiff’s “constitutional rights” (Doc. 11, p. 24). Lubbe

and Clark-Antas “maliciously and intentionally” conspired with Colbert and Creteur

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to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Doc. 11, pp. 24-25).

Plaintiff, having been instructed by the Manatee County Circuit Court that the

injunction would expire if she did not petition for an injunction in Bay county, filed

a petition for protection against domestic violence on October 15, 2008. The petition

was granted, and the court granted plaintiff temporary custody of her children. 

Plaintiff faxed Clark-Antas a copy of the injunction, but Clark-Antas conspired with

Lubbe and Colbert to deprive plaintiff of her constitutional “rights and privileges and

immunities.” (Doc. 11, p. 25). 

On October 16, 2008, plaintiff took the twins to a safe house at HOPE’s

suggestion. (Doc. 11, p. 25). The same day, attorney Gaglio, on Lubbe’s behalf,

hand-delivered to Judge Richard Albritton a motion for temporary relief, seeking a

child pick-up order and accusing plaintiff of absconding with her children. Gaglio

ultimately obtained a “false”child pick-up order. In so doing, Gaglio violated

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff met with Kim Ali (“Ali”), with DCF, and

a detective from the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office on October 17, 2008. Plaintiff

and her twins were interrogated separately, without their consent, in violation of the

Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. (Doc. 11,

p. 26). On October 17, 2008, Clark-Antas gave to Gaglio plaintiff’s new cell phone

number and address, as well as documents relating to the injunction issued in Bay

County. Gaglio and Clark-Antas conspired in the “abduction” of plaintiff’s twins. 

(Doc. 11, pp. 26-27). 

At or around 6:30 p.m. on October 20, 2008, officersfromthe Manatee County

Sheriff’s Office surrounded the safe house. After five hours of negotiations, plaintiff

was ordered to “surrender” her twins to the Sheriff’s Office, which she did the next

day. This was the last time plaintiff saw them. Upon the advice of her attorney,

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plaintiffrequested a hearing before Judge Albritton, but Trish Reimer (“Reimer”), the

Family Court Case Manager for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit and Gaglio’s former

employee, “conspired” against plaintiff and refused to set a hearing. Reimer thus

violated plaintiff’s right to be heard under the Fourteen Amendment. (Doc. 11, p.

27). 

On November 10, 2008, plaintiff filed a motion for an order of civil contempt

under the UCCJEA. Reimer, however, replied by letter and, “impersonating” Judge

Albritton, stated that the motion had been denied for lack of sufficient evidence. 

Judge Albritton entered an order of dissolution of marriage on December 2, 2008. At

a hearing before Judge Albritton, Creteur stated, without supporting documentation,

that plaintiff had lost her parental rights. Judge Albritton ordered an expedited

hearing and instructed Gaglio to make the arrangements. This hearing has never been

held, in violation of plaintiff’s constitutional “opportunity to be heard.” On

December 16, 2008, Creteur called plaintiff and told her that Lubbe would never go

to jail. The same day, plaintiff contacted Officer Taylor and filed a police report

asserting that Lubbe had physically assaulted her and made false statements to DCF. 

In neglect of his official duty, Taylor responded, “I put him in jail once, I am not

putting him in jail again.” (Doc. 11, p. 28).

Plaintiff contacted the FBI on January 28, 2009, to report that her twins were

missing. (Doc. 11, pp. 28-29). Special Agent Alexus Hatten (“Hatten”) contacted

DCF and spoke with Coleman, who told himthat plaintiff had lost her parental rights. 

Plaintiff explained to Agent Hatten thatColbert, Creteur, Coleman, and Heather Hurd

(“Hurd”), Superintendent for the Bay County Department of Juvenile Justice, had

“conspired” with Lubbe to deny plaintiff contact with her children. Agent Hatten

“checked out” plaintiff’s version of events and found that plaintiff had not lost her

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parental rights. (Doc. 11, p. 29).

Plaintiffretained an attorney, Russell Ramey (“Ramey”), on February10, 2009.

Ramey determined that Lubbe had violated a number of legal prohibitions, including

the UCCJEA and “the Hague,” but refused to file suit in federal court or question any

state employees. Thus, Mr. Ramey “intentionally and willfully conspired” with

Michelle Mohedano (“Mohedano”), a case worker for Big Bend, Gaglio, Lubbe, and

Clark-Antas to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. On June 16, 2009, Mohedano

abandoned Alejandro in an orphanage in Jacksonville. (Doc. 11, p. 29). Mohedano

intentionally provided the Bay County Juvenile Court the wrong address for the

orphanage and declined to mention that she had left Alejandro in “inhumane”

conditions. (Doc. 11, pp. 29-30). Despite a transfer order issued by Judge Fensom,

Alejandro was never transferred. (Doc. 11, p. 30).

On November 5, 2009, Judge Fensom granted contact and visitation between

Alejandro and the plaintiff. Mohedano and Gibson, her supervisor at DCF,

“retaliated” by having plaintiff arrested in November 2010. (Doc. 11, p. 33). On

November 29, 2009, Agent Hatten instructed plaintiff to file suit in Tallahassee or

Miami for a violation of the UCCJEA. Plaintiff somehow found time, on December

5, 2009, to marry Ben Alexander, being given away by her son, Alejandro, by

telephone, while Alejandro was “falsely incarcerated.” (Doc. 11, p. 30). Two days

later, Judge Alan Apte ordered that Alejandro be transported to Jacksonville within

forty-eight hours. Mohedano accused plaintiff in open court, before Judge Apte, of

having lost her parental rights. Mohedano explained further that plaintiff was

required to comply with a “no-contact” order regarding her eldest son and that a

capias had been issued for Alejandro’s arrest in Duval County for failure to appear. 

Plaintiff arrived in Jacksonville the evening of December 7, 2009. (Doc. 11, p. 30).

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Plaintiff met with Alejandro’s Public Defender on December 8, 2009. The

Public Defender stated that plaintiff had no parental rights and refused plaintiff’s

attempts to produce pertinent documentary evidence. (Doc. 11, p. 30). On December

9, 2009, plaintiff tried to inquire with the Duval County Juvenile Court regarding

Alejandro’s whereabouts. Local law enforcement determined that he was in neither

Jacksonville nor Orlando. Plaintiff arrived at Juvenile Court again on December 10,

2009. At or around 10:30 a.m., Alejandro was escorted into the courthouse, where

plaintiff learned that he had been picked up in Gainesville in the company of

Mohedano. (Doc. 11, p. 31).

Alejandro has been incarcerated on numerous occasions and in different

counties since July 2009. Yet Alejandro’s criminal record consists of stealing onehalf of a sandwich, for which he was charged with petit theft, and firing a BB gun

while playing in the backyard of a friend’s house. (Doc. 11, p. 31). Colbert told

Judge Fensom in April 2008 that Alejandro was “on runaway,” when in fact he was

in an Orlando hospital receiving emergency medical care. Based on this false

testimony, the judge issued a pick-up order, which order has been relied upon to

arrest Alejandro seven times for failure to appear in court on the petit theft charge. 

Colbert and Mohedano have used this order for impermissible purposes, namely, to

keep plaintiffseparated fromher son. A second pick-up order, which was “falsified”

by Coleman and Mohedano, is not valid. (Doc. 11, p. 32).

On March 12, 2010, Judge Don Sirmons issued an order modifying a previous

“no contact” order. Laura McCarthy (“McCarthy”), plaintiff’s Public Defender, told

plaintiff on March 18, 2010, that a warrant had been issued for her arrest for the

offense of passing worthless checks. Plaintiff turned herself in immediately. (Doc.

11, p. 33). On March 25, 2010, Mohedano, Gibson, and Coleman filed a report

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alleging, falsely, that plaintiff had failed to comply with a case plan. In fact, plaintiff

had never signed a case plan. The named defendants thus conspired to violate

plaintiff’s civil rights. (Doc. 11, p. 34). 

Alejandro again attempted suicide on April 1, 2010, after speaking with

Mohedano, who told him that plaintiff had abandoned him and did not love him. 

Gulf Coast Youth Academy (“GCYA”), Alejandro’s residence at the time, prohibited

further contact between Alejandro and Mohedano. Plaintiff requested an emergency

hearing before Judge Fensom, but the request was denied, in violation of plaintiff’s

constitutional “right to be heard.” On April 5, 2010, plaintiff filed a petition for

injunctive relief after the Okaloosa County Sheriff’s Office opened an investigation

of Mohedano for sexual assault. Judge Elijah Smiley scheduled a hearing for April

15, 2010, and issued an order to transport and an order prohibiting contact between

Mohedano and Alejandro. (Doc. 11, p. 34). Childers, however, in “conspiracy” with

Mohedano, altered the order to transport, designating Alejandro as the defendant,

“with malicious and revengeful intent.” (Doc. 11, pp. 34-35).

A hearing was held in Bay County before Judge Brantley Clark, Jr., on April

15, 2010. Judge Clark told plaintiff thatshe had no standing in court, and Mohedano

and her counsel explained that plaintiff had no parental rights, had interfered with

custody, and was on pretrial release. Following the hearing before Judge Clark,

Coleman had plaintiff served for a hearing in Dependency Court scheduled for the

same day. At the hearing, the court ordered Alejandro to take Seroquel XR, which

is not approved for children under the age of eighteen. By having Alejandro

forcefully medicated, Mohedano violated Alejandro’s constitutional “rights,

privileges, and immunities.” (Doc. 11, p. 35).

Alejandro turned eighteen on June 27, 2010. Plaintiff obtained documents

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indicating that Mohedano had represented herself as Alejandro’s legal guardian and

parent. Mohedano also represented to the courts of Duval County that plaintiff had

lost her parental rights, and prevented plaintiff from discovering any information

regarding Alejandro’s whereabouts, welfare, and legal matters. Mohedano, however, 

did not produce a court order or otherwise document her standing as Alejandro’s

rightful guardian. (Doc. 11, p. 35). On June 28, 2010, Judge Fensom signed an

order, prepared by DCF, terminating plaintiff’s “jurisdiction” over Alejandro. (Doc.

11, p. 36).

In July 2010, plaintiff, apparently having access to medical care, took a few

days to have open, double lumbar fusion. (Doc. 11, p. 36). Once back in action,

plaintiff contacted Missing and Exploited Children (“MEC”) on August 16, 2010. 

An MEC case manager told plaintiff that her twins had “been located and then taken

away” and that Lubbe reported that she had violated an initial custody order. MEC

instructed plaintiff that she should request to have her case reopened, which she did

the following day. Plaintiff explained that Lubbe and Gaglio, in conjunction with

Clark-Antas, distorted the sequence of preceding events and thereby obtained an ex

parte pick-up order from the court in Bay County. (Doc. 11, p. 36). Plaintiff last saw

her twins when she surrendered them to the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office on

October 22, 2008. (Doc. 11, pp. 36-37). Alejandro completed his program at GCYA

on October 26, 2010, and has since returned home. 

Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs assert a multitude of constitutional claims

against the named state officials, private citizens, and their conspirators for, inter

alia, extortion,theft,slander,fraud, blackmail, forgery and falsification of documents,

false imprisonment, corporal punishment, “isolation,” “denied education,” torture,

retaliation, conspiracy, perjury, “a bible,” “endangerment,” identity theft, and

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organized crime. (Doc. 11, p. 37). Plaintiffseeks, inter alia, enforcement of an order

returning the twins to her custody, enforcement of the UCCJEA, and unspecified

compensatory damages. (Doc. 11, pp. 46-47). 

DISCUSSION

Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court may dismiss the

case if satisfied that the action is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court must read

plaintiff’s pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972). Dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by the same

standard as FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v. Farcass,

112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). In determining whether the complaint states

a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court accepts all factual allegations in

the complaint astrue and evaluates all reasonable inferences derived from those facts

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d

1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994). The complaint may be dismissed if the facts as pleaded

do not state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (retiring the negatively-glossed “no set of facts”

language previously used to describe the motion to dismiss standard and dismissing

plaintiffs’ case for failure to state a claim, because plaintiffs had “not nudged their

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible”). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

Under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain

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a “short and plain statement of the claimshowing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

As the Supreme Court reiterated in Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, although RULE 8 does

not require detailed factual allegations, the rule does demand “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” The mere possibility

that the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive dismissal for failure to

state a claim. See id. Rather, the complaint must include “[f]actual allegations . . .

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” that is, “across the

line from conceivable to plausible . . . .” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. 

A complaint is also subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim when the

allegations—on their face—show that an affirmative defense bars recovery on the

claim. See Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001); see

also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (reiterating that principle and

providing, as an example, that if a complaint’s allegations show that relief is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for

failure to state a claim).

Jurisdiction and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

A rule of jurisdiction announced in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413

(1923), and reaffirmed by District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462, 482 & n.16 (1983), “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizesthat federal

courts, other than the Supreme Court, do not have jurisdiction to review final state

court decisions.” McGee v. Kell, 335 F. App’x 3, 4 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Redford

v. Gwinnett Cnty. Jud. Cir., 350 F. App’x 341, 344 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courtslack subject-matter jurisdiction over certain

matters related to previous state court litigation.”); Goodman ex rel. Goodman v.

Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001). “The doctrine applies . . . to ‘cases

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brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments.’” Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); see also Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d

464, 466 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The doctrine applies not only to claims actually raised in

the state court, but also to claims that were not raised in the state court but are

‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment.”). “A federal claim is

inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment ‘if the federal claim succeeds

only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.’” Siegel

v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v.

Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring)).

Application of the jurisdictional rule articulated by Rooker-Feldman is

determined by reference to a four-part standard. See Morris v. Wroble, 206 F. App’x

915, 918 (11th Cir. 2006); Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1310 n.1

(11th Cir. 2003). “A federal district court does not have jurisdiction to review

state-court decisions where: (1) the party in federal court is the same as the party in

state court; (2) the prior state-court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the

merits; (3) the party seeking relief in federal court had a reasonable opportunity to

raise its federal claims in the state-court proceeding; and (4) the issue before the

federal court was either adjudicated by the state court or wasinextricably intertwined

with the state court’s judgment.” Morris, 206 F. App’x at 918; see also Redford, 350

F. App’x at 344-45 n.2. 

The instant case fits squarely within the narrow confines of the RookerFeldman doctrine. Plaintiff’s complaint is an explicit attempt to use the federal courts

to overturn the Florida state courts’ decisions regarding custody of her children. Mrs.

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Alexander seeks, inter alia, the “return” of her twins and compensatory damages. 

(Doc. 11, p. 46). Plaintiffs, however, were parties to the allegedly injurious state

actions, which resulted in final judgments. In addition, plaintiffs do not allege any

facts that would support a finding that Mrs. Alexander was unable to raise in those

proceedings the alleged constitutional abuses or state law claims she raises in the

instant cause of action. Instead, it appears that virtually all the allegations made in

this action were raised in state court, but, according to plaintiff, were overlooked or

ignored. In particular, the multitudinous claims of perjury, conspiracy, and falsified

documents, are exactly the types of matters that would be raised in the serial child

custody proceedings described in the complaint. The state courts rendered

determinations adverse to Mrs. Alexander, who now asks a federal tribunal for relief

that would, in essence, overturn those state court decisions. Such collateral review

of state court decisions is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which operates to

foreclose federal jurisdiction in this case. See, e.g., Redford, 350 F. App’x at 344-45

(applying Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar to plaintiff’s § 1983 action against

Georgia county judicial circuit, several judges, and county’s child support services,

alleging due process violations related to state court proceedings regarding his child

custody arrangement, because action was “an explicit attempt to use the federal

courtsto overturn the Georgia state courts’ decisions”); Doe v. Pryor, 344 F.3d 1282,

1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (observing that Rooker-Feldman would preclude federal

judicial review of state-court custody determination); Liedel v. Juv. Ct. of Madison

Cnty., Ala., 891 F.2d 1542, 1545 (11th Cir. 1990) (dismissing complaint for lack of

jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman where parents dissatisfied with state court’s child

custody determinations brought § 1983 suit seeking injunctive relief against

Department of HumanResources and Juvenile Court, because relief requested “would

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effectively nullify those state orders”); Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016, 1017 (11th

Cir. 1988) (holding that Rooker-Feldman deprived district court of jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim in which she requested reinstatement of parental custody

based on alleged violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the

Fourteenth Amendment, because plaintiff “in essence sought to reverse a state court’s

child custody determination”).

As noted above, in this case plaintiffs seek injunctive relief that would prevent

the enforcement of state-court child custody orders. Plaintiffs also seek

compensatory damages based on the alleged constitutional violations visited upon

them by various state and non-state actors. Nevertheless, the fact that plaintiffs seek

damages, in addition to injunctive relief, does not allow their claims to evade

application of the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar. The U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit does not distinguish between cases in which a plaintiff seeks

relief that would directly prevent enforcement of a state-court order and cases in

which a plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983 based on issues related to the state

cause of action. See Sipos, 259 F.3d at 1333. Rather, Eleventh Circuit decisions

“focus on the federal claim’s relationship to the issues involved in the state court

proceeding, instead of on the type of relief sought by the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Siegel,

234 F.3d at 1172). In Liedel, for example, even though part of the relief sought was

damages from the Alabama Department of Human Resources, the court held that the

plaintiffs’ claims were barred under Rooker-Feldman because their complaint

essentially sought “to challenge the final state court judgment.” See 891 F.2d at

1544-46. In Staley, 837 F.2d at 1017, the court applied the Rooker-Feldman

jurisdictional bar against claims that, in part, sought damages to pay for psychiatric

care. Such case law indicates that “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is broad enough

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to bar all federal claims which were, or should have been, central to the state court

decision, even if those claims seek a form of relief that might not have been available

from the state court.” Sipos, 259 F.3d at 1333.

In the absence ofsubject matter jurisdiction, this court does not have discretion

to pass judgment upon plaintiffs’ claims. See id. at 1332 n.6. Rather, “[a] federal

court must always dismiss a case upon determining that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, regardless of the stage of the proceedings, and facts outside of the

pleadings may be considered as part of that determination.” Id. (citing Smith v. GTE

Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause a federal court is powerless

to act beyond its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must zealously

insure that jurisdiction exists over a case, and should itself raise the question of

subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the litigation where a doubt about

jurisdiction arises.”). Having advanced claims that in essence seek to reverse a state

court’s child custody determination—thus divesting this court of jurisdiction—

plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Staley, 837 F.2d

at 1018.

Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 8(a)(2)

Rooker-Feldman and its progeny abrogate subject matter jurisdiction in this

case. For purposes of thisreport and recommendation, the complaint also fails under

the standards announced in Iqbal, because it does not state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. Far from presenting a “short and plain” statement of the claim as

instructed by FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8(a)(2), plaintiffs’ complaint is

discursive and unwieldy. Moreover, the complaint is littered with conclusory

statements, temporal and spatial inconsistencies, “factual” circumstances that have

already been resolved by the state courts, and legal theories not contemplated, let

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alone recognized or established, in the collected body of constitutional law. So

constituted, the complaint does not give the myriad defendants “‘fair notice of what

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’” see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)), and therefore does not allow for

an informed responsive pleading. Even when construed in the most liberal fashion,

the factual content offered does not allow the court to draw a reasonable inference

that the defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

1949. Because the complaint does not articulate a plausible claimfor relief under any

construction of the facts, this cause of action should also be dismissed for failure to

state a claim. See id. at 1950. 

Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

1. That plaintiffs’ claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for lack or jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

2. That the clerk be directed to close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida this 16th day of April, 2012.

/s/Charles J. Kahn, Jr.

CHARLES J. KAHN, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed

within fourteen (14) days after being served a copy hereof. Any different deadline that

may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only, and does not

control. A copy of any objections shall be served upon any other parties. Failure to

object may limit the scope of appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. §

636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

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