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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

KENNETH McGHEE,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 5:10-cv-279-RS-EMT

HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP,

INC., SOVEREIGN HEALTHCARE

OF BONIFAY LLC d/b/a BONIFAY

NURSING AND REHAB CENTER, and

NANCY HALL,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

ORDER

Before me are Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Docs. 67 & 69)

and Plaintiff’s responses (Docs. 83 & 85).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is 

“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 

jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). 

The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to 

any material fact, and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden, the 

court must view the movant’s evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in 

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the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 

U.S. 144 (1970); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). 

Thus, if reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed 

facts, then a court should deny summary judgment. Miranda v. B & B Cash 

Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Mercantile Bank 

& Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)). However, 

a mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's position will not 

suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for 

that party. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251). 

II. BACKGROUND

I accept the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Galvez v. 

Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 

1340, 1343 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002)). “ ‘All reasonable doubts about the facts should 

be resolved in favor of the non-movant.’ ” Id. (quoting Burton v. City of Belle 

Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999); Clemons v. Dougherty County, 684 

F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1982). 

Plaintiff was hired as an account manager with Defendant Healthcare 

Services Group, Inc. (“Healthcare”) around November 2008 by Bill Simpkins. 

Healthcare was contracted by Defendant Sovereign Healthcare of Bonifay, LLC, a 

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nursing and rehab facility (“Sovereign”), to maintain its laundry and housekeeping. 

Healthcare was responsible for the “hiring, firing, discipline, wages, benefits and 

tax withholdings” of the laundry and housekeeping employees at Sovereign. (Doc. 

67, p. 3). As Account Manager, Plaintiff had the duty to oversee the cleanliness of 

Sovereign and supervised approximately eighteen employees.

Defendant Nancy Hall was the Administrator for Sovereign and was 

responsible for overseeing the facility’s maintenance. Hall was not involved in 

human resources or personnel decisions at Healthcare and “never had the authority 

to hire, promote, demote, or terminate Plaintiff or any other employee of 

Healthcare.” (Doc. 69, p. 5). 

Around February 24, 2009, Plaintiff’s wife, Wendy McGhee, attempted 

suicide while she was employed as the Director of Admissions and Marketing for 

Defendant Sovereign. After her suicide attempt, Mrs. McGhee took medical leave 

and returned to work around March 16, 2009. She was terminated on or about 

April 21, 2009. After her termination, Mrs. McGhee filed a discrimination claim.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Sovereign and Hall retaliated against him 

after his wife filed the discrimination claim. According to Plaintiff, Hall contacted 

Mr. Simpkins and told him she wanted Plaintiff fired and “began demanding that 

Plaintiff’s superiors evaluate Plaintiff’s work at the Bonifay facility to try and 

establish deficiencies in Plaintiff’s performance.” (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff was 

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eventually terminated around September 18, 2009, by Tammy Stephenson, 

Plaintiff’s supervisor.

Mr. Simpkins supports Plaintiff’s allegations; however, Ms. Stephenson and 

Mr. Banyansky, Healthcare’s Regional Manager, contend that they were never 

approached by Hall about terminating Plaintiff. Ms. Stephenson testified that 

“Plaintiff never completed projects as directed. She repeatedly counseled Plaintiff, 

he would apologize and make promises, but did not improve his performance.” 

(Doc. 69, p. 5). Mr. Banyanksy was unsatisfied with Plaintiff’s performance, 

stating some deficiencies such as “systems not being followed, not doing 

inspections on his staff, not following up on projects that need to be done, and just 

a bunch of excuses.” (Id.).

In response to his termination, Plaintiff filed a four-count complaint alleging 

two alternative counts of tortious interference with a business relationship, 

retaliation by Defendant Sovereign, and retaliation by Defendant Healthcare.

III. ANALYSIS

Counts One & Two

Counts One and Two allege that Sovereign, through Hall, tortiously 

interfered with the business relationship between Plaintiff and Healthcare. Count 

One alleges that the interference occurred within the scope of her employment, and 

Count Two alleges that it occurred outside the scope of her employment. To 

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successfully prove Defendant tortiously interfered with a business relationship, 

Plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of a business relationship, (2) Hall’s 

knowledge of the relationship, (3) Hall’s intentional and unjustified interference 

with the relationship, and (4) damages as a result of the interference. Castelli v. 

Select Auto Management, Inc., 63 So.3d 52, 53 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 

Prongs one, two, and four are clearly met; therefore, the issue is whether 

Hall interfered with Plaintiff’s employment and if so, whether the interference was 

intentional and unjustified. “A third party interferes with a contract or business 

relationship by influencing, inducing or coercing one of the parties to the 

relationship to abandon the relationship or breach the contract, thereby causing 

injury to the other party.” West v. Troelstrup, 367 So.2d 253, 255 (Fla. 1st Dist. 

Ct. App. 1979). There are conflicting witness accounts of Hall’s requests and 

involvement in Plaintiff’s termination from Mr. Simpkins, Mr. Banyansky, and

Ms. Stephenson. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the 

intentional and unjustified interference by Sovereign through the acts of Hall.

Counts Three & Four

Counts Three and Four are against Sovereign and Healthcare for retaliation 

after Plaintiff’s wife filed a discrimination claim against it. Plaintiff claims he is 

entitled to Title VII protection because of the familial association with his wife.

To establish a case for retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must show (1) that he

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engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) that he suffered an adverse

employment action, and (3) that there is a causal link between the conduct and the

action. Howard v. Walgreen, Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010).

Previously, there was a split in the circuits on third-party association claims, and 

the issue had yet to be addressed by the Eleventh Circuit. However, the Supreme 

Court recently addressed this issue in Thompson v. North American Stainless, 131

S.Ct. 863 (2011). In Thompson, the Supreme Court rejected a categorical rule that 

third-party associations do not violate Title VII and held that an employer’s alleged 

act of firing an employee in retaliation because that employee’s fiancée who 

engaged in protected activity, if proven, constituted unlawful retaliation. 

Thompson, at 867-68. 

Defendants contend that Thompson is not applicable to this case because

Plaintiff was employed by Healthcare and his wife was employed by Sovereign. In

the Order denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 26), this Court concluded

that:

Although Plaintiff and his wife were employed by different entities, 

Thompson gives no indication that this prohibits recovery. Plaintiff’s 

employer was a subcontractor of Bonifay, and Plaintiff’s physical workplace 

was at the Bonifay facility. The two employers and their employees are 

clearly intertwined, and under Plaintiff’s version of the facts Bonifay used 

its relationship with Healthcare to retaliate against Plaintiff’s wife for her 

protected activity. Allowing employers to induce their subcontractors to fire 

the subcontractor’s employees in retaliation for the protected activity of a 

spouse would clearly contravene the purpose of Title VII. It is easy to 

conclude that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in 

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protected activity if she knew that her husband would be fired by his 

employer. See Thompson, at 868. Therefore, under the test set forth in 

Thompson Plaintiff’s interests fall within the “zone of interests” of those 

intended to be protected by Title VII. 

(Doc. 26). Standing by that conclusion, Defendants’ argument that Thompson does

not apply in this case fails.

Healthcare argues that even if Plaintiff can meet the prima facie case for

retaliation, Healthcare terminated Plaintiff for legitimate non-retaliatory reasons.

Healthcare claims that Plaintiff was not meeting his job requirements; however,

Mr. Simpkins deposition testimony stated that “And [Hall] brought me into her

office, and she told me that she didn’t care what it took, that she want [sic]

[Plaintiff] fired. And I told her that I could not do that. That in my opinion

[Plaintiff] was doing a good job and that I could just not walk out in the hall and

fire him.” (Doc. 88, #3, p. 12). Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists

whether Plaintiff was meeting his job requirements or was fired for legitimate

reasons.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 67 & 69) are DENIED.

ORDERED on November 2, 2011.

/s/ Richard Smoak 

RICHARD SMOAK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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