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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:10cv454/RS/CJK

MARK DANIEL LEITNER, et al.,

Defendants.

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate Default and Application for

Default Judgment Against Defendant Mark Daniel Leitner. (Doc. 61). Defendant

Leitner has responded by filing a document titled “Notice and Petition in the Nature

of a Motion, and Objection.” (Doc. 71). The matter is referred to the undersigned

magistrate judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and

N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(E). Having fully considered the parties’ submissions, the

record and relevant case law, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s motion be

granted. 

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A detailed background and procedural history of this case dating back to its

inception are outlined in the court’s March 29, 2011 order (doc. 49). The material

procedural facts, as demonstrated by the record, are these. On November 4, 2010, the

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United States brought this suit on behalf of seven federal officers and employees

(“Federal Officers”), claiming that defendant Leitner filed false UCC financing

statements and liens against the Federal Officers in retaliation for their participation

in Leitner’s criminal prosecution for tax and mail fraud. Personal service of the

summons and complaint wasmade upon Leitner on December 16, 2010, while Leitner

was incarcerated at FTC Oklahoma City, a Federal Transfer Center located in

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. (Doc. 10). Leitner was required to serve a responsive

pleading by January 6, 2011. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). A few days after service,

Leitner was transferred to another federal penal institution and was without his legal

property until the first week of January. (Doc. 34, p. 2¶ 3)

When Leitner failed to plead or otherwise defend by January 26, 2011, the

United States moved for entry of a Clerk’s default. (Doc. 15). The Clerk entered a

default on January 28, 2011. (Doc. 17). Leitner then submitted a flurry of

documents, none of which complied with the court’s procedural rules, and most of

which made no sense in the context of this case. To create a record of the types of

papers Leitner was attempting to file, the Court allowed a few to be filed despite their

non-compliance. Others were returned without filing. On February 28, 2011, the

Court docketed Leitner’s “Common Law Petition in the Nature of a Motion for

Enlargement of Time.” (Doc. 34). Defendant Leitner sought, in part, to set aside the

default, arguing that it was “impossible” for him to timely respond to the complaint

due to his prison transfer just “a few days” after service. He asserted he did not have

access to the complaint until “mid-first week ofJanuary.” (Doc. 34, p. 2¶ 3). Leitner

sought an extension of time until May 15, 2011 in which to answer the complaint. 

The United States opposed the relief. (Doc. 44).

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On March 29, 2011, the Court set aside the default, finding that Leitner had not

willfully or culpably ignored the summons (at least not at the time the default was

entered), and that the United States would not be prejudiced by setting aside the

default. (Doc. 49). The court provided Leitner twenty-one days (until April 19,

2011) in which to file a response to the complaint, warning that, “Should Mr. Leitner

choose to persist in the bizarre filings at which he has already shown himself adept,

rather than taking this opportunity to file an appropriate responsive pleading, or

should he otherwise fail to timely comply with this order as instructed, the court will

not hesitate to impose sanctions.” (Id., pp. 5-6). One of the discussed sanctions was

reinstatement of the default. (Id., p. 5). 

In response, Leitner filed a document titled “Emergency Petition for

Enlargement of Time Due to Extenuating Circumstances, Notice to Court,

Preliminary Objections.” (Doc. 60). Leitner sought an extension of time until May

28, 2011, arguing that his legal materials were confiscated on April 8, 2011 due to an

impending relocation and that he would not have access to them until he arrived at

his new institution. (Doc. 60). In his “Preliminary Objections,” plaintiff contended

that because he had filed maritime liens and UCC financing statements against this

Court itself and certain of its officers and employees, this Court is a debtor to Leitner

and must dismiss or consolidate this case with a similar one pending against Leitner

in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. (Id., pp. 9-

14 in ECF).

In an order dated April 21, 2011, the Court noted that plaintiff had had access

to his legal property for at least three months before the Court imposed the April 19,

2011 deadline and before his materials were confiscated. Nonetheless, plaintiff was

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granted a brief extension, until May 6, 2011, in which to respond to the complaint. 

(Doc. 62). 

In the meantime, on April 20, 2011, the United States filed the now-pending

motion to reinstate the default and for default judgment. (Doc. 61). On May 11,

2011, the Court ordered (1) that the motion be held in abeyance for two weeks, (2)

that plaintiff’s counsel ensure that all relevant case documents were provided to

Leitner at his present place of confinement (plaintiff has been confined at the Santa

Rosa County Jail since April 27, 2011, see doc. 71, p. 3), and (3) that the motion for

default judgment be taken under advisement on May 25, 2011. (Doc. 67).

Leitner acknowledges that on May 18, 2011, he received copies of the

following documents: plaintiff’s motion for reinstatement of the default and for

default judgment (doc. 61), the court’s April 21, 2011 order (doc. 62), and the court’s

May 11, 2011 order (doc. 67). (Doc. 71, p. 5). Instead of filing a pleading responsive

to the complaint, plaintiff has filed a document titled “Notice and Petition in the

Nature of a Motion, and Objection.” (Doc. 71). In this document, Leitner takes issue

with the court’s April 21, 2011 order, arguing that he was entitled to detailed findings

of fact and conclusions of law concerning the “objection” raised in his “Emergency

Petition for Enlargement of Time Due to ExtenuatingCircumstances, Notice toCourt,

Preliminary Objections,” (doc. 60). (Doc. 71, pp. 1-2). Leitner further asserts that

the United States has conspired to deprive him of the opportunity to respond to the

complaint by filing “false” criminal charges against him(Leitner) in thisCourt. (Doc.

71, p. 4). Leitner says he requires an indefinite stay of this proceeding, because his

legal materials, including his copy of the complaint, drafts and legal research, remain

stored at his previous institution in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania; therefore, he is unable

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to answer the complaint. Leitner also claims he lacks access to legal resources and

research materials. (Id., pp. 3-6). As relief, he requests, among other things, that the

motion for default judgment be denied and this case stayed indefinitely.

ANALYSIS

Reinstatement of Clerk’s Default

“The threat of default (and default judgment) is the court’s primary means of

compelling defendants in civil cases to appear before the court.” African Methodist

Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Ward, 185 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11 Cir. 1999). The entry of th

a Clerk’s default is authorized if it is shown that a defendant “has failed to plead or

otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Entry of default by the Clerk under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) constitutes a general prerequisite for a

subsequent default judgment under Rule 55(b). See, e.g., 10A Charles Alan Wright,

Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2682 (2007)

(“Prior to obtaining a default judgment under either Rule 55(b)(1) or Rule 55(b)(2),

there must be an entry of default as provided by Rule 55(a).”). 

Rule 55(b)(1) states that “[i]f the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain or a sum

that can be made certain by computation,” then the clerk of court must enter judgment

for that amount, on request of the plaintiff. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). The Rules

provides that in all other cases, a party seeking default judgment must apply to the

court. Rule 55(b)(2) permits the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to

establish, when necessary, the truth of any allegation by evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P.

55(b)(2). Nevertheless, an “evidentiary hearing is not a per se requirement,” and is

not needed when “all essential evidence is already of record.” SEC v. Smyth, 420

F.3d 1225, 1232 n. 13 (11 Cir. 2005). th

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A defaulted defendant is deemed to “admit[ ] the plaintiff’s well-pleaded

allegations of fact.” Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200,

1206 (5 Cir. 1975). The defendant, however, “is not held to admit facts that are not

th 1

well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” Id. The defendant, even though in

default, is still entitled to contest the sufficiency of the complaint and its allegations

to support the judgment being sought. Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d

1267, 1278 (11 Cir. 2005). In deciding whether to grant a default judgment, a court

th

may consider whether: (1) a denial would prejudice the plaintiff; (2) the defendant

appeared to have a litigable defense; and (3) the defendant’s delay was caused by

culpable conduct. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3 Cir.

rd

2000). 

Defendant Leitner has failed to answer or otherwise defend this action. His

failure stems not from a lack of accessto necessary legal materials, but fromLeitner’s

culpable and willful disregard of the judicial process and the rights of the plaintiff. 

Therefore, asthe Court warned Leitner, the Clerk’s entry of default will be reinstated. 

As to entry of a default judgment, Leitner received the requisite seven days’ notice

of plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, which reiterated the detailed factual

allegations of the complaint. Leitner was notified that the court could enter a default

judgment on May 25, 2011, unless he filed an answer or other responsive pleading

permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. With full knowledge of what

was taking place – possible entry of a final default judgment – Leitner elected to do

nothing in the way of addressing the United States’ allegations against him. Leitner

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh 1 th

Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to

close of business on September 30, 1981.

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has neither presented a meritorious defense, contested the allegations to support the

judgment being sought, nor shown good reason why the proposed default judgment

should not be entered. The plaintiff, including the Federal Officers affected by

Leitner’s conduct, will be prejudiced by further delay of this proceeding. 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Final Judgment

Plaintiff United States seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under 26 U.S.C.

§ 7402 and 18 U.S.C. § 1345. (Doc. 1). Subject matter exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

(federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (providing the district court with

“original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing

for internal revenue”), 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (providing the district court with “original

jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United

States”), and 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (authorizing the district court to “render such

judgments and decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the

internal revenue laws.”). Defendant Leitner has not raised the issue of personal

jurisdiction in a proper Rule 12(b) motion; therefore, the issue is waived. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b). Even absent waiver, Mr. Leitner is subject to personal jurisdiction

here, because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim

occurred in this district. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Florida as all of

the fraudulent liens were executed and notarized in Escambia County, Florida, which

is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In addition, the UCC Financing

Statements filed against Ms. Eggers, Mr. Kirwin and Mr. McCool were made in

Tallahassee, Florida, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 28

U.S.C. § 1391(b).

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The undisputed factual showings presented against defendant Leitner in the

complaint and exhibits (docs. 1, 5, 7), as reiterated in plaintiff’s motion for default

judgment (doc. 61), establish that defendant Leitner is a federal prisoner serving a

sentence imposed by a judge of this Court on July 29, 2010, upon Leitner’s

conviction ofConspiracy to Defraud the United States(the InternalRevenue Service)

and Commit Wire Fraud. (Doc. 1, p. 2 ¶ 5; Doc. 61, pp. 3-4; see also United States

of America v. Mark Daniel Leitner, Case No. 3:08cr79/MCR, docs. 1166, 1319). The

United States proved at Leitner’s criminal trial that Leitner promoted Pinnacle Quest

International (PQI), an umbrella organization for various vendors in a multi-level

marketing scheme, the most prominent of which were fraudulent tax evasion and debt

elimination schemes. Most of the PQI members and vendors, including Leitner, were

tax defiers who claimed to be immune from federal tax laws. (Doc. 1, p. 6 ¶ 20; Doc.

61, p. 3). 

Defendant FloridaUCC is a private entity that, under a contract with the State

of Florida, maintains the Florida Secured Transaction Registry (the “Florida

Registry”) which records Uniform Commercial Code filings in Florida. The Florida

Registry provides the public with notice of consensual liens given by debtors to

creditors. (Doc. 1, p. 2 ¶ 6).

In March of 2010, while Leitner wasin Pensacola, Florida, for his criminal trial

(a jury trial lasting twenty days from March 1-31, 2010), Leitner executed and caused

to be notarized a “Notice of Claim of Maritime Lien” against the “vessel” Jarod

2

A human body has, in the theological sense, been referred to as a “vessel.” Eg. Acts 9:15, 2

1 Cor 3:16. Nothing in the context of Leitner’s actions suggests he intended a religious analogy. 

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Koopman, a New York resident and Special Agent with the Criminal Investigation

Division of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) who led the investigation resulting

in Leitner’s prosecution and conviction. (Doc. 1, p. 6 ¶ 22 and p. 10 ¶ 35; Doc. 5, Ex.

A; Doc. 61, pp. 4, 5). In the “Notice of Claim of Maritime Lien” Leitner stated, under

oath, that Mr. Koopman owed Leitner $48,489,000,000, plus interest, penalties and

fees, and that the debt was secured by all of Mr. Koopman’s real and personal

property. (Doc. 1, p. 10 ¶ 35; Doc. 5, Ex. A; Doc. 61, p. 5). Leitner’s signature on

the “Notice of Claim of Maritime Lien” was notarized on March 23, 2010 in

Escambia County, Florida. (Doc. 5, Ex. A, p. 2). As evidence of Leitner’s purported

secured interest, he identified a document he had submitted for filing in his criminal

case – an “Affidavit of Specific Negative Averment, Opportunity to Cure, and

Counterclaim” – that had been returned to him without filing. (Id.; see also United

States of America v. Mark Daniel Leitner, Case No. 3:08cr79/MCR, doc. 775 (order

returning document without filing)). 

At the time Leitner executed the “Notice of Claim of Maritime Lien” against 

Mr. Koopman, he executed six others, one each against the following “vessels”: 

1. Tiffany Eggers, a Florida resident and an Assistant United States Attorney

for the Northern District of Florida who briefly assisted in the prosecution of Leitner. 

(Doc. 1, p. 6 ¶ 23 and pp. 10-11 ¶¶ 38, 39; Doc. 5, Ex. C; Doc. 61, pp. 4, 6);

2. Thomas Kirwin, a resident of Florida and an Assistant United States

Attorney in the Northern District of Florida, was Acting United States Attorney for

the Northern District of Florida during Leitner’s criminal trial. (Doc. 1, p. 7 ¶ 24, and

p. 11 ¶ 40; Doc. 61, pp. 4, 6);

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3. Michael Watling, a Washington D.C. resident and Trial Attorney in the

Criminal Enforcement Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division who

assisted in the prosecution of Leitner. (Doc. 1, p. 12 ¶ 41; Doc. 7, Ex. D; Doc. 61, pp.

4, 6);

4. Adam Hulbrig, a Washington D.C. resident and Trial Attorney in the

Criminal Enforcement Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division who

assisted in the prosecution of Leitner. (Doc. 1, p. 12 ¶ 41; Doc. 7, Ex. D; Doc. 61, pp.

4, 6);

5. William McCool, who at the time was a Florida resident who officiated as

the Clerk of Court of the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Florida during Leitner’s criminal trial. (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8 ¶ 28 and p. 13 ¶¶ 44, 45; Doc.

7, Ex. E; Doc. 61, pp. 5, 6-7); and

6. Jonathan Marx, a Virginia resident and Trial Attorney in the Criminal

Enforcement Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division who served on

the Tax Division’s trial team during Leitner’s criminal trial. (Doc. 1, p. 7-8 ¶ 27 and

pp. 13, 14 ¶¶ 46, 48; Doc. 5, Ex. F; Doc. 61, pp. 4, 7).

The Notices of Claim of Maritime Lien were identical to the one against Mr.

Koopman, with the exception of the Federal Officer named in the lien. In each

“Notice of Claim of Maritime Lien,” Leitner stated, under oath, that the particular

Federal Officer owed Leitner $48,489,000,000, plus interest, penalties and fees, and

that the debt was secured by all of that Federal Officer’s real and personal property. 

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 23, 38, 39, 41, 44, 48; Doc. 5, Exs. A, C, F; Doc. 7, Exs. D, E; Doc. 61,

pp. 4, 6, 7). Leitner caused each “Notice of Claim of Maritime Lien” to be notarized

on March 23, 2010 in Escambia County, Florida. (Doc. 1, p. 15 ¶ 50; Doc. 5, Exs. A,

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C; Doc. 7, Exs. D, E; Doc. 61, p. 8). In each “Notice of Claim of Maritime Lien,”

Leitner referenced, as evidence of his purported secured interest, the “Affidavit of

Specific Negative Averment, Opportunity to Cure, and Counterclaim.” he had

attempted to file in his criminal case. (Id.).

After preparing the alleged maritime liens, Leitner prepared a UCC Financing

Statement against each Federal Officer, claiming himself (Leitner) as the “secured

party” and the Federal Officer as the “debtor.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 35, 38, 41, 44, 46, 48;

Doc. 5, Exs. A, C, F; Doc. 7, Exs. D, E; Doc. 61, pp. 5-7). In describing the collateral

covered by the Financing Statement, Leitner stated that “[a]ll property belonging to

the debtor belongs to the secured party,” referencing an attached “Notice of Claim of

Maritime Lien.” (Id.). Attached to each Financing Statement was the “Notice of

Claim of Maritime Lien” against that Federal Official. (Id.). 

On March 25, 2010, while still in Pensacola, Leitner caused the UCC

Financing Statement with attached “maritime lien” against Mr. Koopman to be filed

with the New York Secretary of State. (Doc. 1,¶ 35; Doc. 5, Ex. A; Doc. 61, p. 5). 

On June 11, 2010, defendant Leitner filed a UCC Financing Statement Amendment

against Koopman, again referencing the “maritime lien.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 36; Doc. 5, Ex.

B; Doc. 61, p. 5). 

On March 25, 2010, Leitner caused the UCC Financing Statement with

attached “maritime lien” against Ms. Eggers to be filed in the Florida Registry

maintained by defendant FloridaUCC. (Doc. 1, ¶ 38; Doc. 5, Ex. C, p. 1; Doc. 61, p.

6). In that same Financing Statement, Leitner named Thomas Kirwin as an

“additional debtor.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 38; Doc. 5, Ex. C; Doc. 61, p. 6). Although the

“Notice of Claim of Maritime Lien” against Mr. Kirwin is not provided as an exhibit,

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the United States asserts, and defendant Leitner does not dispute, that the “maritime

lien” was the same as that executed against Ms. Eggers and the other Federal

Officers. (Doc. 61, p. 6).

On July 26, 2010, Leitner caused the UCC Financing Statement with attached

“maritime lien” against Mr. Watling to be filed in the State of Washington

Department of Licensing. (Doc. 1, ¶ 41; Doc. 7, Ex. D; Doc. 61, p. 6). In that same

Financing Statement, Leitner named Mr. Hulbrig as an “additional debtor,” and

attached the “maritime lien” against Mr. Hulbrig. (Id.). 

On March 31, 2010, Leitner caused the UCC Financing Statement with

attached “maritime lien” against Mr. McCool to be filed in the Florida Registry

maintained by defendant FloridaUCC. (Doc. 1, ¶ 44; Doc. 7, Ex. E, p. 1; Doc. 61,

pp. 6-7). In that same Financing Statement Leitner named “United States District

Court Northern District of Florida Pensacola Division” as an “additional debtor.” 

(Id.). A copy of the “Notice of Claim of Maritime Lien” against this Court has not

been provided. 

On March 29, 2010, Leitner caused the UCC Financing Statement with

attached “maritime lien” against Mr. Marx to be filed with the Virginia Secretary of

State (the Secretary of the Commonwealth/UCC Division). (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 46, 48; Doc.

7, Ex. F, p. 1; Doc. 61, p. 7). On June 10, 2010, defendant Leitner filed a UCC

Financing Statement Amendment against Marx, again referencing the “maritime

lien.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 49; Doc. 5, Ex. G; Doc. 61, p. 7).

On June 3, 2010, defendant Leitner sought to enforce the alleged maritime liens

by filing the eight Notices of Claim of Maritime Lien, as well as other documents, in

the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. Leitner v.

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Lahood, No. 10-MC-6019-CJS, 2010 WL 2539698 (W.D. N.Y. June 18, 2010); see

also Case Docket for Western District Case No. 6:10mc06019. The Notices were the

same eight notices discussed above, against Koopman, Eggers, Irwin, Watling,

Hulbrig, McCool, this Court and Marx, seeking $48,489,000,000 against each

“vessel.” Id. at *1 . On June 18, 2010, the district court in New York denied the lien 3

claims with prejudice and directed the clerk of court to close the case without any

liens being issued, explaining:

Petitioner’s attempt to place a lien on, among others, the Northern

District of Florida court and Internal Revenue Service agent Jarod

Koopman, as well as the prosecutors and Clerk in the Northern District

of Florida, shows that his applications in total are fantastic, delusional

and incredible. Considering that [United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Florida] Judge Rodgers has already informed

Petitioner that Admiralty law does not apply in the circumstances, that

Petitioner has made no showing that the “vessels” he identifies are

located within this district, or that he has a valid basis for any liens, let

alone liens totaling over forty-eight billion dollars per vessel,

Petitioner’s lien claims are without merit, and no opportunity to amend

his claims is warranted. 

Id. at *3.

The notices provided anthropomorphic labels for the subjects of the “maritime liens”: 3

“U.S. M/V MICHAELJOHN WATLING; U.S.M/VADAM REDERICK HULBIG;

U.S. M/V JAROD J. KOOPMAN; U.S. M/V THOMAS FRANCIS KIRW IN; U.S.

M/V TIFFANY HOPE EGGERS; U.S. M/V U.S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PENSACOLA DIVISION; U.S. M/V WILLIAM M.

MCCOOL.” Id.

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At all times material to this suit, each Federal Officer referenced above was

acting in his or her official capacity, in the course and scope of his or her employment 

as an official of the government of the United States of America. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-8 ¶¶

22-28; Doc. 61, p. 5). The seven Federal Officers were involved only in their official

capacities in the criminal investigation and/or prosecution of Leitner for violations

of the internal revenue laws. None of the Federal Officers has never entered into any

contract with Leitner, and they are not, nor have they ever been, indebted to Leitner,

nor have they agreed to, nor authorized Leitner to file any documents purporting to

reflect a debt or lien in the public record or in any private registry with public access,

including without limitation the “maritime liens” and UCC Financing Statements

described above. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47; Doc. 61, pp. 7-8).

Defendant Leitner had all the above-described “maritime liens” notarized in

Escambia County, Florida, and he mailed them, or caused themto be mailed, utilizing

the United States Postal Service to the filing offices shown on the above-described

UCC Financing Statements. (Doc. 1, ¶ 50; Doc. 61, p. 8). The plaintiff asserts, and

Leitner does not dispute, that Leitner has caused recordings of such UCC financing

statements and the above-described claims against the Federal Officers within the

past year, demonstrating that his harassment of these officials is ongoing. (Doc. 1, 

¶ 53; Doc. 61, p. 9).

Leitner knew the falsity of the information in the “maritime liens,” UCC

Financing Statements and other documents at the time he prepared and filed them. 

(Doc. 1, ¶ 60; Doc. 61, p. 11). Leitner filed the false liens and other documentsin bad

faith and with the purpose of slandering the credit of, harassing, intimidating,

punishing, and retaliating against the Federal Officers for enforcing the Federal tax

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laws, and to interfere with the prosecution of criminal conduct under those laws. 

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 55, 58-59, 62; Doc. 61, p. 9-11).

The sham documents are actually or potentially damaging to the credit ratings

of the Federal Officers, having been recorded in the state or local registries for such

records, in which the Federal Officers are identified by name and business address as

debtors. (Doc. 1, ¶ 64; Doc. 61, p. 11). The effects on one’s credit report from such

actions may have repercussions not yet felt. It is not difficult, however, to imagine

the harmful effects on the employees who have been maligned by the actions of

defendant Leitner. Some of these filingsincluded private personal information of the

Federal Officers, such as their Social Security Numbers. (Id.; see also Exhibits

attached to Docs. 5, 7). The Social Security Numbers were redacted by such

registries after filing; however, this may not have prevented the release of such

private information before the redaction occurred. (Id.). These registries are also

accessible by the public through the internet. (Id.). 

Section 7402(a) of the Internal Revenue Code permits a court to enjoin a

defendant if “necessary and appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue

laws.” 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a). “The language of § 7402(a) encompasses a broad range

of powers necessary to compel compliance with the tax laws,” United States v. Ernst

& Whinney, 735 F.2d 1296, 1300 (11 Cir. 1984), and, “therefore, it can be used to th

enjoin interference with tax enforcement “even when such interference does not

violate any particular tax statute.” United States v. Kaplowitz, 201 Fed. Appx. 659,

661 (11 Cir. 2006). A district court may enjoin conduct where (1) a party establishes

th

a violation of the right asserted in his complaint; (2) there is no adequate remedy at

law; and (3) he will sufferable irreparable harm if the conduct is not enjoined.

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Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1128 (11 Cir. 2005). th

“Courts have used Section 7402(a) on numerous occasions to grant the exact relief

sought here,i.e., to enjoin taxpayersfromfiling frivolous and unsupported documents

against IRS [and other federal] employees acting in accordance with their official

duties, and declare such documents null, void, and with no legal effect.” United States

v. McGugan, 600 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611 and n. 3 (D. N.J. 2009) (collecting cases);

Kaplowitz, 201 Fed. Appx. at 661 (affirming district court’s expungement ofrecorded

“judgments” against IRS employees, and court’s grant of injunctive relief preventing

taxpayer from recording any further sham documents; noting that “several circuits

have held § 7402(a) gives the district court authority to declare void and enjoin

baseless common law liens or other similar documentsrecorded in the public records

against government employees and officials” (citing cases from the Fifth, Seventh,

Eight, Ninth and Tenth Circuits)); United States v. Barker, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 1383

(S.D. Ga.1998) (“It is by now established beyond dispute that the United States may

request the assistance of Article III courts to protect its officials from attempts at

harassment, intimidation, and extortion in the form of ‘liens’ commonly filed by tax

protestors and prisoners.”); see, e.g., United States v. MacElvain, 68 F.3d 486, 486

(11 Cir. 1995) (unpublished opinion) (summarily affirming district court’s th

declaration, permanent injunction, and expungement of public records regarding

“common law liens,” “complaints,” and “commercial notices” taxpayer filed, because

the bogus documents illegally interfered with the administration of the internal

revenue laws). 

Plaintiff United States has provided sufficient evidence in support ofits claims,

and is entitled to judgment against defendant Leitner based on the facts established

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by the record and the governing law. The rights and liabilities (including security

interests) purportedly created by the false “maritime liens,” UCC Financing

Statements and other documents are patently false, have no basis in fact or law and

are thus invalid. These false documents were designed to, and did harass and cause

substantial interference with the enforcement of the laws of the United States

pertaining to the internal revenue. The public filing of such bogus documents

imposes irreparable harm on the federal employees that are the subject of the

documents. The harassment of federal employees by a prisoner, simply for

performing the duties of that employment cannot be tolerated and should meet, in all

cases, with swift justice.

The United States’ complaint also sought injunctive relief under 18 U.S.C. §

1345(a)(1), which permits the Government to commence a civil action in federal

court to enjoin the current or future commission of fraud against the United States or

any agency thereof. 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(1). To succeed on this claim, the plaintiff

not only must demonstrate its entitlement to injunctive relief, but also must establish

that fraud has been committed and demonstrate the extent ofsuch fraud. Because the

United States contends defendant Leitner’s actions constitute mail fraud under 18

U.S.C. § 1341, it must demonstrate that Leitner devised a scheme or artifice to

defraud or to obtain money or property by false or fraudulent pretenses and, with an

intent to defraud, knowingly used the Postal Service or other commercial interstate

carrier for the purpose of executing or attempting to execute such scheme or artifice. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Because the nature of the injunctive relief this court would

issue under § 1345 is essentially the same as that already being recommended under

26 U.S.C. § 7402(a), the court need not address this issue.

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Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

1. That plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate Default and Application for Default

Judgment Against Defendant Mark Daniel Leitner (doc. 61) be GRANTED.

2. That the Clerk’s entry of default against defendant Mark Daniel Leitner be

REINSTATED.

3. That the Court DECLARE the Notices of Claim of Maritime Lien, UCC

Financing Statements, UCC Financial Statement Addenda and other documentsfiled

by Mark Daniel Leitner against Jarod Koopman, Tiffany Eggers, Thomas Kirwin,

Mark Watling, AdamHulbrig, WilliamMcCool, JonathanMarx and the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Florida false, fraudulent, null and void, and

of no legal force or effect.

4. That the Court ISSUE the following permanent injunction:

a. Mark Daniel Leitner is enjoined from filing, or causing to be filed, 

any financing statement or claim of lien of any kind against any federal employee

unless Mr. Leitner has had commercial dealings with the person and the person has

signed a contract, note, security agreement, or other document explicitly authorizing

the filing.

5. That Mark Daniel Leitner be required to disclose to counsel for the plaintiff

all actions similar to the filings described herein, within thirty days of entry of

judgment.

6. That judgment be entered against defendant Mark Daniel Leitner

accordingly. 

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7. That this matter be referred to the undersigned for further proceedings on

plaintiff’s claims against defendant FloridaUCC, Inc., including the issuance of an

initial scheduling order.

At Pensacola, Florida this 6th day of June, 2011.

/s/Charles J. Kahn, Jr.

CHARLES J. KAHN, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Anyobjections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days after being served a copy hereof. Any different deadline that may

appear on the electronic docket is for the court's internal use only, and does not

control. A copy of any objections shall be served upon any other parties. Failure to

object may limit the scope of appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. §

636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11 Cir. 1988). th

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