1 ... T h i s pr oce edi n g a r i s es ou t of Cau s e N o. 350091, s t y l ed K ort nee M

. Lam arr e v . D r ew R oi cki , pe nd i ng i n t he C o unt y C o urt at Law N o . 3, B exar C o unt y , T exas, t he H o no rable D avi d J. R o d ri guez p res i d i ng. H o wever, t he ch al l en g ed or der w as s i g n ed by t h e H on or abl e H
. Pau l Can al es , pr es i di n g j u dg e of t h e Coun t y Cour t a t La w N o. 2, B e x a r C o u n ty, T e x a s.

2 ... T h is p ro c e e d ing a rise s o u t o f t h e sa m e trial c o u rt p ro c e e d ing a s the inte rlo c u to ry a p p e a l. i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No . 0 4- 09 -0 05 72 -C V Dre w ROI CK

I, Ap pe lla nts
v. Kor tnee LAM ARRE , Appellee s F ro m th e County

Court a t L aw N o. 3, B e xar

County , T e xas Trial Court No. 350091, the Honor able Da vid J . Rodrigue z presiding 1 No. 04-09-00667- CV IN RE Dr e w ROI CK

I Orig inal Mandamus Proce eding 2 Opinion by : Marialy

n Ba rnar d, J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini , J ustice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: March 3, 2010 AFF I RMED; PETI TI ON F OR WR I T OF MANDAMUS DEN I ED04

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- 2- In these c onsolidated proce edin gs , Dr ew Roicki (“Roicki”) c omplains of the trial cour t’s August 21, 2009 order denying his mot ion to compel arbitration. W e af firm the trial c ourt’s orde r denying the motion to compel arbitration and de ny the petition for wr it of mandamus. B ACKG ROUND Th e un de rl yingdis pute aro se out of a ve hic le tr ans a c tio n in wh ic h Ro ic ki s old a ve hic le to Kortnee L amar

re ( “L amar

re” ). L amar

re f iled suit a g ainst Roicki on J une 5, 2009, alleg ing Roicki
s o ld h e r a v e h ic le th a t h a d

p r e v io u s ly

s u s ta in e d

f lo o d d ama g e . L ama

r r e a s s e rte d

th e f o ll o w ing
cause s of action in he r orig inal petition: (1) dece ptive trade prac tices; (2) neg lige nce; ( 3) neg lige nt mis re pr e se ntatio n; (4 ) ne g lig e nt hir ing , su pe rv isi on , and

/or mana g e me nt; and

(5 ) b re a c h o f c on tr a c t. On July 9, 20 09 , Ro ic ki f

ile d a mot ion to c omp e l arb itrati on , ass ertingL amarr e a g re e d to arbitration by

signingthe purc hase a g ree ment that contained a n arbitration p ro v i s i o n on J uly 13, 2008. On August 7, 2009, L amar re f iled a re sponse to the motion and attache d an af fidavit. L amar

re contends in her

response that she did not know what the doc ument was that she sig ned on Jul y 13, 2008 beca

use she wa s not a llowed to r ead it a nd she was never g iven a copy . In the uncontrove rted aff idavit, L amar

re asserts t hat prior to J uly 11, 2008 there wer e four meeting s betwee n L amar re a nd Roicki to ex amine the ve hicle bef ore pur chase . During t h e m eeting s, L amar re a lleg es she a sked Roi c ki s e ve ra l ti me s a

bo ut t he his tor y and natur e of the sa lva g e tit le on

the ve hic le , a

nd e a c h ti me Roicki denied that the ve hicle had be en in a f lood. On J uly 11, 2008, L amar re asserts she signed a “bill of sale.” On J uly

13, 2008, L amar

re went to Roicki’s home to pick up the vehicle , but Roicki was not at home. She c laims that she was tol d to wait out side for Roicki’s mother be cause there was additional paper

work for her to sig n. L amar re a lleg es that af

ter wa iting outdoors in the hot sun for th i rt y m i nu t es , R o i ck i ’s m o th er ca m e o u t an d as k ed h er t o wa i t l o n ger b ec au s e s h e n ee d edt o s i gn another d o cument that she ha d not signe d on J uly 11, 2008. L amar

re c laims she asked what04

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3 ... I n t he mo t i on t o com pel ar bi t r at i on, Ro i cki di d not s peci f y wh et her t he ar bi t r at i on ag r eement was e n fo rc e a b le un d e r th e F e d e ra l A rb itra tio n A c t (“F A A ” ), the T e x a s A rb itra tio n A c t (“T A A ” ), o r th e c o m m o n law
. R o i ck i no w co nten d s t he arb i t rati o n a gre em en t i s enfo rce ab l e u nd er the F A A , T A A , an d t he co m m o n law
. B ec au se we h av e det er mi n ed t h e t r i al c ou r t di d n ot a bu s e i t s di s cr et i on i n de n y i n g t h e mot i on t o c ompel a r bi t r at i on ba s ed on t he i s s ues pre s ent ed t o us , we do not f i nd i t ne ces s ar y t o det er mi ne whe t her t he ar bi t r at i on ag r eement was gove r ned b y t he FA A , T A A , or t he co m m o n l aw. A s a res ul t , we co nsi d er bo t h t he p et i t i o n f o r wr i t of m and am us and t he inte rlo c u to ry a p p e a l.

- 3- document wa s missi ng , and Roicki’s mother r eplied that it was “a formality require d by

the state that they are require d to keep on f ile for their

deale rship.” Af

ter wa iting outside for

another fiftee n minutes, L amar

re asserts R oicki’s m other returned with the document and showed her where to sign. L amar re c ontends she aske d what the doc ument was, a nd Roicki’s mother t old her ag ain “that it was a for m require d by

the state, a formality , and that [she] was re quired to sig n in order to take the ca r.” L amar re further asser

ts in her aff

idavit that “ [w] hile attempting to r ead it, De fenda n t ’s m other interrupted me and insisted that Isign the for m before taking the vehicle . She made it clea r that signingthis document was not optional.” L amar re contends she sig ned the doc ument and aske d for a copy for her rec ords, to which Roicki’s mother responde d that she did not need a copy since it was just something to keep on f ile for the state. On her drive home in the vehicle the che ck eng ine light
came on and there wer e sever al mecha nical issues that ensued. L amar re a sserts she tried to r eturn the ca r, but she could not find a ny one to speak with. After a fewwee ks, she receive d a “f lood titl e” in the mail. L amar

re conclude s she immediately called Roicki to rever se the de al, but he re fused. On August 21, 2009, the t rial court held a hear ing on Roicki’s motion to compel ar bitration and d en i ed the moti on without specifying the rea son. This consolidated interlocutory appea l and petition for writ of manda mus ensued. 304

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- 4- A N A L Y SIS Whe n, a s h e re , a pa

rt y re sis ts a rb itr a tio n, the tr ia l c ourt

mus t f ir st d e te rm ine wh e the r a

va lid ag ree ment to arbitrate exis ts. See J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. W ebster , 128 S.W .3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003). Once a valid agree ment to a rbitrate has been established, a presumption attache s favor ing a rbitration and the bur den shifts to the party resisting arbitration to establish a defe nse to enfor cingarbitration. Id. ; see also In reAdvanc ePCS Health L.P. , 172 S.W .3d 603, 607 (Tex. 2005). The pa rties d o n o td i s p u t e t h atL am arre ’s s i gn at ure i s o nth e p urc h as e a gre em en tth atco n t ains the ar bitration provision. I nstead, in the tria l co u rt L amar re a sserted the defe nse that she wa s fra udulently induced into a g ree ing to a rbitration. Howeve r, Roicki c ontends L amar re’ s fra udulent inducement c laim goe s to the contra ct as a whole, and, there fore , L amar re’ s fra udulent inducement defe nse should have be en conside red by the ar bitrator and not the tr ial court
. T h er ef o re, Roicki
a ss e rt s th e tr i a l c o urt a

b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e nyi n g h i s m o t i o n t o c o mp e l ar b i tr a t i o n b e c a

u s e it improperly

considere d L amar

re’ s fra udulent induce m en t d efe nse rather than se nding it to the abitrator. As the Court in In reLab att provided, “[t] here are two ty pes of challeng es to an a

rbitration provis io n : ( 1 ) a s p e c if

ic c h a ll e n g e to th e v a li d it y o f th e ar

b it r a ti o n a g r e e me n t o r c la

u s e , and (2) a br oa de r c ha lle ng e to the e nti re c on tr a c t, e ith e r o n a g ro un d th a t di re c tly

a ff e c ts t he e nti re a g re e me nt, or on the g round that one of the contra ct ’s provisions is ill eg al and r ender s the whole c ontrac t invalid.” 279 S.W.3d 640, 647-48 (Te x . 2009). “Acourt may deter mine the first ty

pe of c halleng e, but a cha lleng e to the validi ty of t he contract as a whole, and not specific ally to the arbitration clause, must g o to the arbitrator.” Id. ; In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A. , 52 S.W .3d 749, 756 (Tex. 2001) (holding that a defe nse such as fra

udulent inducement must spec ifically relate to the ag ree ment to arbitrate , not to the contrac t as a whole , in order to de feat arbitration).04

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- 5- Roi c ki a sse rt s L amarr e ’s frau du len t indu c e me nt d e fe ns e g oe s to the c on tr a c t a s a wh ole beca use none of

her a lleg ations of fra

udulent inducement c halleng e the v al i d i t y o f the a rbitration ag ree ment separ ate a

nd apar t from the entire purcha se agree ment she sig ned. See I n re RLS Legal So lut ion s, LLC , 2 2 1 S
. W
. 3 d629, 631-32. We disag ree . L amar re’ s contention is that she was fra udulently induced into ag ree ing to a rbi t ration because she was told that the docume nt she was signingwas just a for

mality and a doc ument require d by the state, she w as not allowed to re ad the document, and she was ne ver give n a copy of it. I n her or igina l petition, L amar re doe s not alleg e she was fr audulently

induced into ag ree ing to the contrac t as whole a nd does not cha lleng e any of the other provisions in the purc hase a g ree ment. Se e In reFi rstMerit , 52 S.W .3d at 756. L amar re’ s
c ha lle ng e is n ot “ a

br oa de r c ha lle ng e to the e nti re c on tr a c t, ei the r on a g ro un d th a t di re c tly a ff e c ts the entire ag ree ment, or on t he g round that one of the contra ct’s provisions is illega l and re nders the whole contr act invalid.” Se e In reLab att , 279 S.W .3d at 647-48. There fore , we c onclude L amar re’ s fr a ud ule nt i nd uc e me nt de fe ns e wa s a spe c if ic c ha lle ng e to the va lid ity of the a rb itr a tio n a g re e me nt, and, ther efor e, it was prope r for the trial court to consider. As a result of the f

oreg oing, w e hold the tr ia l court did no t abu se its dis c re tio n in con sid e ri ng L amarr e ’s de fe ns e of fr a ud ule nt i nd uc e me nt, rathe r than sendingthe issue to the ar bitrator to dec ide. C ONCL US I ON As a result of the fore g oing, we aff irm the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration and deny

the petition for wr it of mandamus. Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice