J-A08034-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

THEODORE TROSETH, AN 

INDIVIDUAL AND CHERYL 

TROSETH, AN INDIVIDUAL 

 v. 

CARSON HELICOPTERS HOLDINGS 

CO., INC., CARSON HELICOPTERS, 

INC. AND HELIGROUP FIRE, LLC 

APPEAL OF: CARSON HELICOPTERS 

HOLDINGS CO., INC., CARSON 

HELICOPTERS, INC. 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 249 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 13, 2022 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 210301222 

THEODORE TROSETH, AN 

INDIVIDUAL AND CHERYL 

TROSETH, AN INDIVIDUAL 

 v. 

CARSON HELICOPTERS HOLDINGS 

CO., INC., CARSON HELICOPTERS, 

INC. AND HELIGROUP FIRE, LLC 

APPEAL OF: HELIGROUP FIRE, LLC 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 250 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 13, 2022 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 210301222 

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J. 
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MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 8, 2024

 In these consolidated appeals, Carson Helicopters Holdings Co., Inc. and 

Carson Helicopters, Inc. (“Carson”), along with Heligroup Fire, LLC (“Heligroup 

Fire”) (collectively “Appellants”), challenge the trial court’s order overruling 

their preliminary objections to venue in this personal injury action filed by 

Theodore and Cheryl Troseth (“the Troseths” collectively). Upon review, we 

reverse and remand with instructions. 

 Succinctly, the pertinent history of this case is as follows. Mr. Troseth, 

who resides with his wife in Arizona, sustained injuries when a helicopter 

crashed in Afghanistan after its rotor blades separated. His employer, 

Construction Helicopters, Inc. (“CHI”) had leased the helicopter from 

Heligroup Fire, which is organized in and principally operates out of Montana.1 

Thereafter, the Troseths commenced this action in Philadelphia County. The 

complaint alleged that Carson, a Delaware corporation with its principal place 

of business in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, had refurbished the helicopter by, 

inter alia, installing the rotor blades before it sold it to Heligroup Fire. An 

amended complaint asserted that Appellants regularly conducted business in 

Philadelphia County. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Heligroup Fire is a holding company that owns and leases helicopters, such 

as the one it leased to CHI in this instance. Heligroup Fire and CHI are 

separate entities both owned by Heligroup Holdings, Inc. All three companies 

are controlled by Chris Turner. 
J-A08034-24 

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 Carson and Heligroup Fire filed preliminary objections challenging the 

propriety of venue in Philadelphia County. The trial court issued a rule to show 

cause why the objections should not be sustained. After the parties conducted 

discovery and submitted additional briefs, the court overruled the preliminary 

objections. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(b), Appellants filed timely appeals as 

of right following the trial court’s subsequent order certifying that the case 

presented a substantial issue as to venue.2 

The trial court did not direct Appellants to file Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statements but it did author a Rule 1925(a) opinion citing the Troseth’s 

allegations that, inter alia, Carson had a contract with Philadelphia-based 

Ehmke Manufacturing Company (“Ehmke”) to support its order. Argument 

was scheduled before a different panel of this Court. However, we concluded 

that we could not conduct appropriate review because the trial court’s opinion 

failed to adequately detail the facts upon which it relied in ruling that venue 

in Philadelphia County was proper. We therefore entered an order remanding 

for a new Rule 1925(a) opinion. Ultimately, the trial court submitted its 

supplemental opinion, the parties filed supplemental briefs, and the case was 

argued before the instant panel. 

In their joint brief, Appellants present the following questions for our 

consideration: 

____________________________________________ 

2

 This Court consolidated the appeals upon Appellants’ unopposed joint 

application. 
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1. Did the trial court err, and thereby abuse its discretion, by 

overruling [Carson’s] preliminary objection to venue in 

Philadelphia County where [its] business activities in Philadelphia 

County were insufficient to establish venue there? 

2. Did the trial court err, and thereby abuse its discretion, by 

overruling [Heligroup Fire’s] preliminary objection to venue in 

Philadelphia County where [the Troseths] showed absolutely no 

business contacts between [it] and Philadelphia County and the 

trial court’s sole basis for asserting venue was appropriate as to 

Heligroup Fire . . . depended on the court’s erroneous conclusion 

that venue was proper as to Carson . . .? 

Appellants’ brief at 5. 

 We begin with a review of the applicable law. A trial court’s ruling as to 

venue “will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” 

Hangey v. Husqvarna Prof’l Products, Inc., 304 A.3d 1120, 1141 (Pa. 

2023). 

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but 

occurs only where the law is overridden or misapplied, or the 

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the evidence or 

the record. An appellate court cannot find an abuse of discretion 

simply because it might have reached a different conclusion; if 

there exists any proper basis for the trial court’s decision . . . the 

decision must stand. 

Id. (cleaned up). Nonetheless, to the extent we must address questions of 

law, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope is plenary.” Id. 

 Proper venue is governed by Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006, which provides as follows 

in pertinent part: 

(a) General Rule. Except as otherwise provided by subdivisions 

(b) and (c) of this rule, an action against an individual may be 

brought in and only in a county where 
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(1) the individual may be served; 

(2) the cause of action arose; 

(3) a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the 

cause of action arose; 

(4) venue is authorized by law; or 

(5) the property or a part of the property, which is the subject 

matter of the action, is located provided that equitable relief is 

sought with respect to the property. 

(b) Venue Designated by Rule. Actions against the following 

defendants, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c), may 

be brought in and only in the counties designated by the following 

rules: . . . corporations and similar entities, Rule 2179. 

(c) Joint and Several Liability Actions. An action to enforce 

a joint or joint and several liability against two or more 

defendants, except actions in which the Commonwealth is a party 

defendant, may be brought against all defendants in any county 

in which the venue may be laid against any one of the defendants 

under the general rules of subdivisions (a) or (b). 

 . . . . 

(e) Improper Venue to be Raised by Preliminary Objection. 

Improper venue shall be raised by preliminary objection and if not 

so raised shall be waived. If a preliminary objection to venue is 

sustained, and there is a county of proper venue within the State, 

the action shall not be dismissed but shall be transferred to the 

appropriate court of that county. The costs and fees for transfer 

and removal of the record shall be paid by the plaintiff. 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006. Since Appellants are all corporations or similar entities, we 

look to Rule 2179 to determine in which counties venue is proper: 

(a) General Rule. [With exceptions not relevant here], a 

personal action against a corporation or similar entity may be 

brought in and only in a county where 
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(1) the registered office or principal place of business of the 

corporation or similar entity is located; 

(2) the corporation or similar entity regularly conducts 

business; 

(3) the cause of action arose; 

(4) a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the 

cause of action arose; or 

(5) the property or a part of the property, which is the subject 

matter of the action, is located provided that equitable relief is 

sought with respect to the property. 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 2179. 

As for the timeframe pertinent to the analysis, we have explained that 

“the venue rules exclusively address where venue properly may be laid at the 

time the suit is initiated.” Hausmann v. Bernd, 271 A.3d 486, 493 

(Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up, emphasis added). “Thus, [the] question of 

improper venue is answered by taking a snapshot of the case at the time it is 

initiated: if it is proper at that time, it remains proper throughout the 

litigation.” Id. (cleaned up). 

 Here, the Troseths contended that venue is proper in Philadelphia 

County pursuant to Rule 2179(a)(2) because Appellants regularly conducted 

business there. The trial court, in its initial Rule 1925(a) opinion, indicated 

that it agreed with the Troseths as to Carson, rendering venue proper as to 

Heligroup Fire as a potentially jointly-liable defendant pursuant to Rule 
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1006(c).3 In its supplemental opinion, the trial court additionally cited facts 

to support that Heligroup Fire also regularly conducted business in 

Philadelphia. Accordingly, we turn to the legal framework applicable to 

assessing whether business is regularly conducted in a forum. 

Our Supreme Court has recently confirmed that, 

in evaluating whether a company regularly conducts business in 

the forum county under Rule 2179(a)(2), courts are to perform 

the quality-quantity analysis first articulated in Shambe[ v. 

Delaware & Hudson R.R. Co., 135 A. 755 (Pa. 1927)]: 

The business engaged in must be sufficient in quantity 

and quality. The term “quality of acts” means those 

directly furthering, or essential to, corporate objects; 

they do not include incidental acts. By “quantity of 

acts” is meant those which are so continuous and 

sufficient to be termed general or habitual. A single 

act is not enough. Each case must depend on its own 

facts. 

Hangey, 304 A.3d at 1142 (cleaned up). The Court explained that “the word 

‘sufficient’ in the quantity prong refers to the acts deemed sufficient under the 

quality prong. It is those sufficient, quality acts that must be performed 

regularly to satisfy the venue inquiry.” Id. at 1143–44. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 It is apparent from the certified record that no other subsection of Rule 2179 

was a viable alternative, as none of Appellants had a registered office of 

principal place of business in Philadelphia County, and the cause of action did 

not arise there, involve a transaction or occurrence that took place there, or 

seek equitable relief concerning property there. 
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 Indeed, the Hangey Court emphasized that, in applying Rule 

2179(a)(2), “the crux of the court’s inquiry is regularity.” Id. at 1144 (cleaned 

up). In this vein, the Court clarified as follows: 

It must be remembered that it is the word “regularly” which we 

are construing and not “principally.” A corporation may perform 

acts “regularly” even though these acts make up a small part of 

its total activities. Nor does “regularly” necessarily mean . . . that 

the acts must be performed on a fixed schedule or, when driving 

is involved, over a fixed route. The question is whether the acts 

are being “regularly” performed within the context of the 

particular business. 

Id. at 1146–47 (cleaned up, emphasis in original). 

 For an example of the application of the quality-quantity analysis, in 

Purcell v. Bryn Mawr Hospital, 579 A.2d 1282 (Pa. 1990), the trial court 

determined that venue was proper in Philadelphia County pursuant to Rule 

2179(a)(2) based upon the fact that the defendant hospital, which was located 

in Montgomery County: 

(a) ha[d] contractual affiliations with residency programs of 

teaching hospitals in Philadelphia. . .; 

(b) recruit[ed] and employ[ed] medical residents from the 

aforementioned Philadelphia teaching hospitals for the 

performance of services to patients of Bryn Mawr Hospital in 

Montgomery County; 

(c) purchase[d] goods and services from business(es) in 

Philadelphia County for the furtherance of its business in 

Montgomery County; 

(d) maintain[ed] and pa[id] for advertisements listing the hospital 

in the Philadelphia County Yellow Pages; 

(e) maintain[ed] and pa[id] for advertisements in the White Page 

Telephone Directory of Philadelphia County; 
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(f) place[d] continuous advertisements in the Philadelphia 

Inquirer for distribution primarily in Philadelphia County; and 

(g) accept[ed] a portion of its income from residents of 

Philadelphia County, who, for whatever reason, whether it be 

advertising, telephone listings or other reasons, chose Bryn Mawr 

Hospital for treatment. 

Id. at 1283–84 (cleaned up). This Court affirmed. 

 However, our Supreme Court ruled that the facts of the case did not 

demonstrate business activities of sufficient quality and quantity to render 

venue proper in Philadelphia. First, the Court held that “the rotation and use 

of medical personnel is essentially an educational process which does not 

amount to the quality of business activity which we contemplated in Shambe

and its progeny.” Id. at 1287. It concluded that the arrangements with the 

medical schools did not “go beyond mere incidental contacts rather than being 

essential to Bryn Mawr” because “[t]he hospital ha[d] its own permanent staff 

which alone would be capable of treating patients.” Id. As for the remaining 

acts of the hospital cited by the trial court, our High Court summarily rejected 

them thusly: 

[W]e find it to be patently evident that the mere purchase of 

hospital supplies from Philadelphia merchants cannot form a 

satisfactory rationale for conferring venue. It is equally clear that 

advertisements in Philadelphia’s phone books and newspapers 

also fail to meet our standards for the exercise of venue. Mere 

solicitation of business in a particular county does not amount to 

conducting business. 
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Id. Accordingly, because the defendant did not regularly conduct business 

activities in Philadelphia County, the Court held that venue there was 

improper. 

 This Court has since relied upon Purcell numerous times in concluding 

that incidental acts like purchasing supplies in the forum county or utilizing its 

court system to enforce its legal rights in other matters do not support venue 

where the defendant had no physical presence in that county. See, e.g., 

Fritz v. Glen Mills Sch., 840 A.2d 1021, 1023–24 (Pa.Super. 2003) (ruling 

that the defendant school did not regularly conduct business in Philadelphia 

because the facts that “approximately 35% of its students are from 

Philadelphia” and that it had “independently utilize[d] the Philadelphia Court 

System” were merely incidental aids to its purpose to rehabilitate juveniles 

rather than being essential to the school’s existence); PECO Energy Co. v. 

Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 802 A.2d 666, 670 (Pa.Super. 2002) 

(holding the defendant’s acts of having a mile of pipeline run through 

Philadelphia County, making a purchase of 300,000 gallons of water from the 

City of Philadelphia, and entering a contract allowing additional future such 

purchases as needed were “minimal and incidental, at best” and were not 

“essential to the furtherance of [its] business in any significant way”); Kubik 

v. Route 252, Inc., 762 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding 

defendant restaurant’s contacts with Philadelphia County did not constitute 

regularly doing business there although it solicited patrons from Philadelphia, 
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sold gift certificates on its website to Philadelphia patrons, and purchased from 

Philadelphia “food commodities on a daily basis”). See also Watson v. Baby 

Trend, Inc., 308 A.3d 860, 868–69 (Pa.Super. 2024) (affirming transfer of 

case to Bucks County upon sustaining venue preliminary objections where 

defendant Baby Trend had no physical presence in Philadelphia County, its de 

minimis direct online sales to Philadelphia customers were not essential to the 

business, and the activities of Target and Walmart in selling Baby Trend 

products there could not be imputed to the defendant). 

 Notably, the Purcell Court opined that its “conclusion would be different 

if, for example, Bryn Mawr established a branch clinic in Philadelphia where 

paying customers would be diagnosed or treated on the premises in 

Philadelphia, just as there can be no question that Bryn Mawr [did] business 

in Montgomery County[,]” where the hospital was located. Purcell, 579 A.2d 

at 1287. The Hangey Court faced a variation of that scenario where the 

defendant HPP, a distributor of lawn maintenance equipment to retailers, did 

not itself have a physical store in Philadelphia County, but had contracts with 

two retailers whose stores were in Philadelphia County. 

Our Supreme Court concluded that the contracts with authorized dealers 

satisfied the quality prong of the test for proper venue, as these acts directly 

furthered HPP’s business objective by distributing products to Philadelphia 

retailers. See Hangey, 304 A.3d at 1148. The Court further concluded that 

these acts were of sufficient quantity to render HPP’s business conduct 
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regular, regardless of the sales volume or percentage of HPP’s revenues 

derived from these Philadelphia establishments, explaining: 

HPP entered into contracts with DL Electronics and S&H Hardware 

to allow them to sell HPP products as authorized dealers. HPP 

admits that unlike the big-box retailers that handle their own 

distributions to multiple locations, its authorized dealers typically 

do business at one specific location. Forming and maintaining 

these relationships with businesses that have physical locations 

specifically in Philadelphia County, and allowing them to stock, 

display, and sell HPP products in those physical locations on a dayto-day basis, HPP has regularly performed its business activities 

in the county. . . . [E]ven if HPP’s products are collecting dust on 

the store shelves and HPP is making relatively little money out of 

Philadelphia County, its business activities still satisfy the quantity 

prong when we consider the regularity of those activities, as we 

must under our precedent. Obviously, HPP is at least trying to 

make sales in Philadelphia, regularly and continuously. As a 

matter of law, when a company maintains a constant physical 

presence in the forum county to perform acts that are directly 

furthering, or essential to, its corporate objects, even when it does 

so through an authorized dealer, its business activities are 

necessarily so continuous and sufficient to be termed general or 

habitual. 

Id. at 1149 (cleaned up, emphasis in original). See also Monaco v. 

Montgomery Cab Co., 208 A.2d 252, 256 (Pa. 1965) (holding taxi cab 

defendant regularly did business in Philadelphia County where, although it was 

not legally permitted to pick up customers there, it habitually drove customers 

from Montgomery County to Philadelphia and collected the fares there, “acts 

directly essential to and in furtherance of corporate objects”); ZampanaBarry v. Donaghue, 921 A.2d 500, 506 (Pa.Super. 2007) (affirming venue 

in a suit against a law firm was proper in Philadelphia County under Rule 

2179(a)(2) where the defendant consistently derived revenue from providing 
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legal services to clients in Philadelphia, quality acts which were essential to 

the law firm’s existence). 

 Mindful of this precedent, we turn to the ruling at issue, beginning with 

Carson. In its initial Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court concluded, based 

upon the averments in the Troseth’s complaint, that the quality prong was 

met by Carson’s contract with Ehmke, equating it with the authorized dealers 

who sold the defendant’s lawnmowers in Hangey. See Trial Court Opinion, 

8/24/22, at 5. As for the quantity prong, the court, again not citing facts of 

record but “taking [the Troseths’] claims as true,” ruled that Carson had 

contacts of sufficient quantity with the forum through the Ehmke relationship, 

“several dealings with other undisclosed businesses around Philadelphia 

[C]ounty,” and “the alleged use of Philadelphia airports for their helicopters.” 

Id. at 6. 

In response to our direction to provide a supplemental opinion detailing 

the facts upon which it based its decision, the trial court identified a single 

evidenced-based connection with Philadelphia County to support both the 

quality and quantity prong as to Carson, namely its business relationship with 

Ehmke. Regarding the quality prong, the court explained: 

Ehmke is a Philadelphia[-]based company that supplies interior 

components to helicopters. As it pertains to this case, Ehmke was 

the entity that provided the interior for the subject helicopter 

involved in the accident that led to [Mr. Troseth’s] injuries and has 

done work for [Carson] on other occasions in the past. Although 

Appellants argue that no money was ever exchanged in 

Philadelphia as well as that all of the work that Ehmke has 

performed for [Carson] took place at . . . Carson’s warehouse in 
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Bucks County, Pennsylvania, a continuous business relationship 

between [Carson] and Ehmke still exists between the parties and 

because of such business relationship, and [Carson’s] choice to 

engage with a Philadelphia business, it is not outside the realm [of 

possibility] to believe that Appellants can be subject to suit in 

Philadelphia County based on this business relationship. 

Therefore, because of the current business relationship that exists 

between . . . Carson and the Philadelphia entity Ehmke . . . to 

further the corporate objects of . . . Carson as well as the fact that 

the Philadelphia entity performed work on the subject helicopter, 

this justifies Philadelphia County being a proper venue for this 

action. 

Trial Court Supplemental Opinion, 5/17/23, at 7 (cleaned up). Addressing the 

quantity of acts, the court reiterated the same: 

[A]s mentioned prior, . . . Carson has an existing business 

relationship with Ehmke . . . . In this business relationship, Ehmke 

provided . . . Carson with the interior components for the subject 

helicopter involved in the accident that led to [the Troseths’] 

injuries along with work done on other occasions for other 

helicopters. Although frequent business activity is not done 

between the parties and . . . Carson may use other businesses to 

help carry out its corporate objects, based on this business 

relationship and the fact that . . . Carson has the ability to utilize 

the business relationship with Ehmke to carry out its corporate 

objects, the acts done in this relationship can be considered 

continuous. Thus, it satisfies the quantity prong needed for venue 

to be proper in Philadelphia County. 

Id. at 9. 

 The Troseths maintain on appeal that the trial court’s ruling is legally 

proper and supported by evidence of record. They assert that Carson’s 

business relationship with Ehmke was undertaken “in furtherance of Carson’s 

core business” of refurbishing helicopters and, therefore, is a significant 

quality contact. See Troseths’ supplemental brief at 6. The Troseths further 

argue that Carson’s acts of doing business with Ehmke demonstrate 
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continuous, ongoing dealings amounting to over $1 million in payments to 

Ehmke between 2013 and 2021 that are of sufficient quantity to sustain venue 

in Philadelphia County. Id. at 5. 

 Carson, however, contends that the facts relied upon by the trial court, 

i.e., the circumstances of the Carson-Ehmke relationship, are insufficient to 

support venue in Philadelphia County. It first observes that the trial court, 

like the Troseths, looked not at a snapshot of Carson’s acts in Philadelphia 

County at the time the lawsuit was filed in 2021. Instead, Carson posits that 

the work Ehmke performed, both on the helicopter at issue and on others, 

was too far removed from the initiation of the lawsuit to contribute towards 

assessing the relevant quantity or quality of contacts. See Appellants’ 

supplemental brief at 5-7. Further, Carson argues that the deposition 

testimony of its corporate designee, Jordan Carson, cited by the trial court as 

the basis for its finding of a continuing association with Ehmke, supports no 

such relationship. Rather, it professes that Mr. Carson’s testimony was that 

he was aware of no current plans to purchase helicopter interiors from Ehmke. 

Id. at 12-13. Finally, Carson asserts that merely making purchases from a 

Philadelphia-based vendor does not amount to regularly conducting business 

in that county. Id. at 8-11 (citing, inter alia, Purcell, 579 A.2d at 1283-87; 

Kubik, 762 A.2d at 1122-24 ). 

 Reviewing the certified record in light of the applicable legal precedent, 

we agree with Carson that the evidence does not support a finding that it 
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regularly conducted business in Philadelphia County at the time this lawsuit 

was filed. While the Troseths correctly observe that Ehmke’s records reflected 

over $1 million in purchases from Carson, nearly $700,000 of that was in 2013 

and 2014. See Carson’s Supplemental Brief in Support of Preliminary 

Objections, 10/18/21, at Exhibit D. Ehmke had no record of sales to Carson 

in 2018 or 2019. Id. It had approximately $73,000 in sales to Carson in 

2020; and only one sale totaling $1,229 in 2021, which was the year the 

Troseths initiated this case in Philadelphia. Id. As for the continuing nature 

of the relationship, Carson’s corporate representative testified that, while they 

had not communicated to Ehmke any refusal to do business in the future, nor 

did Carson have any concrete plans to use Ehmke for any upcoming projects. 

Id. at Exhibit A (Deposition of Jordan Carson, 9/21/21, at 25) 

Based on the case law discussed above, Carson’s business dealings with 

Ehmke did not constitute actual business conduct in Philadelphia County. 

Carson did not go into Philadelphia to perform core business activities as did 

the taxicab company and law firm in Monaco and Zampana-Barry, 

respectively, or conduct its business in Philadelphia through an authorized 

dealer as did the defendant in Hangey. Rather, Carson made purchases from 

a Philadelphia company to use in conducting its business elsewhere, as did the 

defendants in Purcell, PECO, and Kubik. Those cases establish that doing 

business with a Philadelphia County company does not amount to doing 

business in Philadelphia County if the obtained goods, services, or personnel 
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are utilized elsewhere to further the defendant’s business activities. In other 

words, Carson’s act of hiring a Philadelphia company to supply helicopter 

refurbishing goods and services in Bucks County does not evince that Carson 

performed quality acts in Philadelphia for purposes of the venue analysis. 

Moreover, this Court has held that daily incidental acts of purchasing 

food in Philadelphia for the defendant restaurant were not sufficient to 

establish proper venue in Kubik, and a contract to make future purchases 

from a Philadelphia company was insignificant in PECO. As such, the sporadic 

purchases Carson made from Ehmke in the early 2020s, when the Troseths 

filed this lawsuit, and the possibility that it might one day turn to Ehmke again 

for heretofore unplanned future orders certainly cannot suffice in this case to 

establish the regularity of any essential business functions. 

Therefore, with both the quality and quantity of Carson’s lone business 

connection with Philadelphia County being less substantial than the forum 

connections found lacking in Purcell, PECO, Fritz, Kubik, and Watson, we 

readily conclude that the trial court erred in holding that venue was proper as 

to Carson pursuant to Rule 2179(a)(2). 

 Since Carson’s acts within Philadelphia County do not support venue 

there, venue is only proper if Heligroup Fire regularly conducted business in 

Philadelphia. In its initial opinion to this Court the trial court piggybacked the 

propriety of venue as to Heligroup Fire upon its finding venue proper as to 

Carson pursuant to Rule 1006(c)(1). See Trial Court Opinion, 8/24/22, at 8. 
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However, in its supplemental opinion drafted at this Court’s directive to 

articulate the facts upon which it rested its decision, the court opined as 

follows as to Heligroup Fire’s contacts with Philadelphia County: 

First, [Heligroup Fire] is in the business of operating, owning, 

leasing, and selling helicopters. [Mr. Troseth] mentions a few 

instances where [Heligroup Fire] has established contacts in 

Philadelphia County to justify venue being present in Philadelphia 

County. [Mr. Troseth] asserts in its response to [Heligroup Fire’s] 

preliminary objections that [Heligroup Fire] has utilized the space 

at Northeast Philadelphia Airport as well as Philadelphia 

International Airport to transport company personnel to and from 

other locations to carry out business activities. Specifically, this 

court relies on the instances where Heligroup Fire’s King Air 

aircraft flew out of Northeast Philadelphia Airport to transport Mr. 

Turner to purchase the subject helicopter, meet with and 

eventually purchase assets from a Philadelphia based drone 

company called AATI, as well as conduct other business 

endeavors. Furthermore, this trial court also relies on [the 

Troseths’] averments that [Heligroup Fire] has derived income 

from operations that have taken place in Philadelphia County. 

Specifically, in the deposition of Mr. Turner, [who was offered as 

Heligroup Fire’s representative,] it was revealed that [Heligroup 

Fire] received lease income from [sister company] CHI Aviation 

and CHI’s business activities in Philadelphia County. Given these 

instances, the business relationship, as well as the fact that that 

these acts were in furtherance of corporate objects of [Heligroup 

Fire], this allows for the quality prong to be satisfied and supports 

this court[’]s decision in venue being proper in Philadelphia 

County. 

Trial Court Supplemental Opinion, 5/17/24, at 7-8 (cleaned up). Addressing 

the quantity of Heligroup Fire’s acts in Philadelphia County, the trial court 

stated: 

[A]s previously stated above, [Mr. Troseth] cites multiple 

instances where [Heligroup Fire] has established contacts in 

Philadelphia County. Moreover, these contacts are in furtherance 

of [Heligroup Fire’s] business objects. Although it may be true 

that a single photograph of a party utilizing a space to help 
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facilitate travel is not enough to justify venue being proper in a 

specific county, when coupled with other occasions establishing 

the fact that [Heligroup Fire] engaged a Philadelphia based 

business to acquire assets, as well as derives income from acts 

performed in Philadelphia County, together, these instances 

demonstrate that these business acts are continuous and allows 

for the quantity prong to be satisfied which therefore justifies this 

court[’]s decision to have venue be proper in Philadelphia County. 

Id. at 9-10. 

 Faced with this opinion, the Troseths offered in their supplemental brief 

a remarkably tepid argument for affirming this ruling. See the Troseths’ 

supplemental brief at 9-10. We suspect that this is because, as Heligroup Fire 

details, the meager facts identified by the trial court are not soundly supported 

by record evidence and, in any event, fail to establish that Heligroup Fire 

regularly conducted business in Philadelphia County at the time this lawsuit 

was filed. In particular, examining the evidence rather than the Troseths’ 

averments, Heligroup Fire explains that (1) it does not operate helicopters; 

(2) Mr. Turner’s flight into Philadelphia was in his capacity as an officer of CHI, 

not Heligroup Fire, and when he purchased the subject helicopter on behalf of 

Heligroup Fire he flew into Bucks County; (3) Heligroup Fire did not generate 

revenue in Philadelphia County, rather CHI, which generated some revenue 

there, used that revenue to pay its bills, including the cost of leasing the 

helicopter from Heligroup Fire; and (4) the single photograph in question was 

taken by the Troseths’ counsel of a helicopter owned by CHI, not Heligroup 

Fire. See Appellants’ brief at 15-19. 
J-A08034-24 

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 As Heligroup Fire observes, “[a]lthough a parent and a wholly-owned 

subsidiary share common goals, they are still recognized as separate and 

distinct legal entities” and there is no case law holding “that a corporation may 

be subject to venue based solely upon the business activities of a sister 

corporation in the jurisdiction in question.” Wimble v. Parx Casino & 

Greenwood Gaming & Entm’t, Inc., 40 A.3d 174, 178–79 (Pa.Super. 

2012). As the Troseths offer nothing to support the imputation of CHI’s 

Philadelphia contacts to Heligroup Fire, CHI’s activities there do not pertain to 

assessing the quality and quantity of Heligroup Fire’s actions in that forum. 

 Consequently, the certified record is devoid of facts supporting a finding 

that Heligroup Fire regularly conducted business in Philadelphia County. 

Hence, its presence in this lawsuit cannot sustain venue there. 

In the absence of any defendant for whom venue is proper in the 

Troseths’ chosen forum pursuant to Rule 2179, the trial court erred in 

overruling Appellants’ preliminary objections raising improper venue. 

Therefore, we reverse the appealed-from order. As the record is clear that 

venue for this action properly lies in Bucks County, we remand for the trial 

court to transfer the action to the appropriate Bucks County court pursuant to 

Rule 1006(e), with “costs and fees for transfer and removal of the record [to] 

be paid by the plaintiff[s].” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006(e). 

Order reversed. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 
J-A08034-24 

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Judge Olson joins this Memorandum. 

Judge McLaughlin files a Dissenting Memorandum. 

Date: 10/8/2024