* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-11107

Summary Calendar

 

TOBY L. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WAYNE SCOTT, DIRECTOR,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, et al.

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(95-CV-15-C)

- - - - - - - - - -

November 12, 1998

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Toby L. Williams appeals from the

district court’s grant of a judgment as a matter of law for the

defendants on his civil rights claims. Williams has abandoned

any issues pertaining to the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for Cole by failing to address that matter in the

appellate brief he filed with this court. See Yohey v. Collins,

985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
2

Williams argues that the district court erred in granting

the defendants’ motion for a judgment as a matter of law on his

deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs and retaliation

claims. He contends that the district court abused its

discretion in refusing to issue writs of habeas corpus ad

testificandum and subpoenas and in denying his motion for the

appointment of counsel. He also contends that the district court

abused its discretion in purportedly imposing sanctions on him in

the form of loss of good-time credits for filing a frivolous

lawsuit.

The district court did not err in granting the defendants’

motion for a judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P.

50. No evidence suggests that the defendants were deliberately

indifferent to Williams’ health or safety. See Varnado v.

Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 303 (1991). Further, no evidence was introduced

supporting Williams’s claim of retaliation beyond his testimony

of his own “personal belief that he is the victim of

retaliation.” See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th

Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 559 (1997).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Williams’s motions for the issuance of writs of habeas corpus ad

testificandum and subpoenas because Williams did not indicate in

the motions the nature of the testimony sought. See Ballard v.

Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1977); Cupit v. Jones, 835

F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). Neither did the district court
3

abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion for appointment

of counsel. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir.

1982); see Jackson v. Dallas Police Dept., 811 F.2d 260, 261-62

(5th Cir. 1986).

Finally, Williams has failed to show that the district court

abused its discretion in imposing sanctions under Tex. Gov’t Code

Ann. § 498.0045. Williams has provided no support for his

contention that he lost good-time credits as a result of filing a

frivolous lawsuit; further, under § 498.0045, it is the Texas

Department of Corrections, not the federal district court, that

imposes sanctions for the filing of a frivolous lawsuit.

AFFIRMED.