IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kimberly D. Morgan, : CASES CONSOLIDATED

 Appellant : 

:

 v. : No. 1093 C.D. 2022

: 

The Stotesbury Community : 

Association, Inc. :

 

Kimberly D. Morgan : 

: 

 v. : No. 1125 C.D. 2022

: Submitted: December 4, 2023

The Stotesbury Community :

Association, Inc., : 

 Appellant : 

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: January 19, 2024

In these consolidated appeals, Kimberly D. Morgan (Morgan) and the 

Stotesbury Community Association, Inc. (Association) appeal the Court of Common 

Pleas of Montgomery County’s (trial court) order dated August 31, 2022 (Order), 

which granted in part and denied in part Morgan’s motion for an award of attorney 
2

fees and costs and denied the Association’s motion for an award of attorney fees and 

costs. After review, we affirm. 

The trial court aptly set forth the factual background underlying this dispute 

in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion,

1 dated Dec. 6, 2022 (Trial Court Opinion), as follows: 

The planned community, known as Stotesbury, is located in Springfield 

Township. Stotesbury was created pursuant to a Declaration of 

Community Covenants, Restrictions and Easements dated September 

26, 1979, and recorded with the Recorder of Deeds (“the Declaration”). 

[The Association] is the unit owners’ association for Stotesbury. It is 

governed by a Board of Directors (“the Board”), subject to the 

Declaration and the Bylaws of the Association. [Morgan] is the owner 

of a residential townhouse unit in Stotesbury. 

At the time that [Morgan] purchased her unit in November 1990, a 

retaining wall (“the Old Wall”) had been installed. The length of the 

Old Wall was located approximately 50% in [Morgan’s] backyard, 

within the boundaries and near the rear border of her unit, and 

approximately 50% on adjacent property that was common area owned 

by the Association. Beginning in 2004 and continuing thereafter, 

[Morgan] notified the Association, through its property management 

company and the Board, that the Old Wall was deteriorating and falling 

apart. The Association was not responsive. 

In 2014, [Morgan] engaged Max L. Lieberman, Esquire, [(Morgan’s 

Counsel)] to press her concerns to the Association. By letter to the 

property manager dated December 14, 2015, [Morgan’s Counsel]

reiterated [Morgan’s] concerns about the Old Wall and the need to 

replace it. Enclosed with the letter was the report of an engineering 

firm engaged by [Morgan], recommending replacement of the Old 

Wall. At a meeting of the Board on March 24, 2016, the Board 

discussed that the Old Wall needed to be replaced. 

The Old Wall functioned as a single structure and could only be 

replaced in toto. The Board engaged a contractor for removal and 

replacement of the Old Wall for the sum of $7,685. The Board did not 

consult with or collaborate with [Morgan] in the selection of the 

contractor or of the design for the replacement wall. 

1

See Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
3

By letter dated September 29, 2016, Stefan Richter, Esquire, [(the 

Association’s Counsel)] . . . notified [Morgan’s Counsel] that [Morgan] 

would be responsible for one-half of the cost of the work and that if she 

refused to pay, the Association would sue her to recover this amount 

together with costs and attorney fees. By a responsive letter dated 

October 6, 2016, [Morgan’s Counsel] informed [the Association’s 

Counsel] that [Morgan] objected to paying half the cost and also that 

she considered the proposed design of the replacement wall to be 

inadequate. Enclosed with the letter were a report from another 

engineering firm engaged by [Morgan] and estimates from two 

contractors for the more extensive work that [Morgan] was demanding. 

On or about October 24, 2016, the Association’s contractor removed 

the Old Wall and installed a replacement wall (“the New Wall”). The 

New Wall was erected in substantially the same location as the Old 

Wall, with the design to which [Morgan] had objected. Like the Old 

Wall, the New Wall functions as a single structure and can only be 

replaced in toto.

By letter to [the Association’s Counsel] dated November 28, 2016, 

[Morgan’s Counsel] stated that the New Wall was inadequate and 

needed to be replaced. Enclosed with the letter was a supplemental 

engineering report regarding the New Wall. Also enclosed was an 

“invoice” rendered by [Morgan] to the Association for fees from the 

two engineering firms she had engaged and for [Morgan’s Counsel’s]

fees. By letters to [Morgan’s Counsel] dated January 5, 2017, and 

March 24, 2017, respectively, [the Association’s Counsel] reiterated 

the Association’s demand for payment by [Morgan] of one-half of the 

$7,685 cost of the New Wall – i.e., $3,842.50. The March 24 letter 

again threatened suit if payment was not made. 

[Morgan] commenced this action against the Association by Writ of 

Summons on October 2, 2018. Her Complaint, filed January 22, 2019, 

asserted five counts. Count I sought a declaratory judgment that, inter 

alia, [Morgan] is not responsible for one-half of the cost of replacing 

the Old Wall and that the Association bears sole responsibility for the 

maintenance, repair, and replacement of the New Wall as necessary. 

Count I also sought unspecified damages, punitive damages, and 

attorney fees. Counts II (injunctive relief), III (nuisance) and IV 

(breach of contract) sought injunctive relief and monetary damages, 

including attorney fees, on the ground that the New Wall was 

inadequate and needed to be replaced. Count V, for implied contract, 
4

quasi-contract, and unjust enrichment, sought recovery of the 

engineering fees that [Morgan] had incurred. 

[A n]onjury trial was held on June 15 and 16, 2022. At the outset of 

trial, it was agreed that any award of attorney fees incurred in 

connection with the litigation would be reserved and would be raised 

by motion after issuance of the Court’s decision. That procedure was 

reconfirmed at the close of the trial.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/6/22, at 1-4 (footnotes, headnotes and internal citations

omitted).

On June 23, 2022, the trial court issued its decision on the underlying dispute. 

The trial court determined under the Uniform Planned Community Act (Act),

2

the 

Association bore the sole responsibility for replacing the Old Wall and maintaining 

the New Wall. Id. at 4. Therefore, it found in favor of Morgan on Count I, but did 

not award compensatory damages because the Association had paid its contractor in 

full for the replacement of the Old Wall, and it did not award punitive damages 

because it found the Association had not acted willfully. Id. at 6. On Counts II 

through IV, the trial court found the New Wall was structurally sound and in good 

condition and did not need to be replaced. Id. Therefore, the trial court found in 

favor of the Association. Id. Similarly, as to Count V, for unjust enrichment, the 

trial court found in favor of the Association. Id. Neither party challenged the trial 

court’s decision. 

On July 5, 2022, both Morgan and the Association filed motions seeking an 

award of attorney fees and costs. Morgan sought an award of $280,066.13. The 

Association sought an award of approximately $81,860.80. 

2

68 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101-5414.
5

In its Order, the trial court granted Morgan’s request, in part, by awarding her 

attorney fees in the amount of $50,000. The trial court denied the Association’s 

request for attorney fees entirely. The trial court explained its reasoning as follows: 

In determining the parties’ respective requests for fees and costs under 

[S]ection 5412 of the [Act], the [trial court] has considered primarily 

the following factors . . . . 

• This dispute arose from the Association’s repeated insistence that 

[Morgan] bear one-half the expense of replacing the Old Wall and its 

threats to sue her to recover that amount. As the [trial court’s d]ecision 

explains, while this position was apparently asserted by the Association 

in good faith, it did not represent a reasonable interpretation of the Act. 

But for the Association’s position, it is possible that litigation would 

have been avoided. 

• At the same time, the [trial court] found [Morgan’s] challenges to the 

adequacy of the New Wall to be without sufficient supporting evidence. 

These issues accounted for the great majority of time spent on discovery 

and trial. [Morgan’s] persistence in seeking to require the Association 

to remove and rebuild the New Wall made settlement of this matter 

especially difficult. Unlike the Association’s position on the cost of 

replacing the Old Wall, however, [Morgan’s] challenges to the 

adequacy of the New Wall were not unreasonable. 

• In the attorney invoices submitted by [Morgan], the descriptions of the 

subject matter of work performed are heavily redacted. As a result, the 

allocation of time spent between the issues on which [Morgan] 

prevailed and those on which she did not prevail is problematic. 

• Section 5412 [of the Act] authorizes the [trial court], in a suit for 

violation of the Act or the declaration or bylaws, to award costs and 

reasonable attorney[] fees to the prevailing party “if appropriate” –

language that vests the [trial court] with broad discretion. The 

Association’s reading of this provision – that it applies only when 

punitive damages are awarded – is inconsistent with its language and 

legislative history. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/6/22, at 8. 
6

On September 9, 2022, Morgan filed a motion for partial reconsideration of 

the trial court’s Order and on September 12, 2022, the Association responded with 

a cross-motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s Order. On September 19, 

2022, the trial court denied both motions for reconsideration. 

Both Morgan and the Association now appeal to this Court. On appeal, 

Morgan argues the trial court committed an error of law and abused its discretion by 

awarding her only $50,000 in costs and attorney fees when the statute authorizing 

the award of attorney fees compelled an award of $280,066.13. Morgan’s Br. at 4. 

Regarding the Association’s request for attorney fees, Morgan contends the trial 

court properly exercised its discretion in denying the Association’s request because

the trial court determined the Association’s conduct to be unreasonable and an award 

of attorney fees and costs would not be appropriate. Id. Meanwhile, the Association 

asserts the trial court erred and abused its discretion by denying the Association’s 

motion for attorney fees and expenses in its entirety when the Association acted in 

good faith and prevailed on the majority of the initial claims. Association’s Br. at 5. 

Regarding the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Morgan, the Association 

contends the applicable statutory scheme did not compel the trial court to award the 

full amount of requested attorney fees to Morgan and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in awarding $50,000 in attorney fees and costs. Association’s Third-Step 

Br. at 2, 5, 13.

DISCUSSION

Where an award of attorney fees is authorized by statute, we review the trial 

court’s fee award under an abuse of discretion standard. Samuel-Bassett v. Kia 

Motors Am., Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011). An abuse of discretion requires a 

“showing of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or 
7

such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous.” Wagner v. Pa. Capitol Police Dep’t, 

132 A.3d 1051, 1057-59 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Paden v. Baker Concrete 

Constr., Inc., 658 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa. 1995)). We will not find “an abuse of 

discretion . . . merely because [we] might have reached a different conclusion.” Id. 

So “long as the trial court reviews the record . . . it is difficult for an appellate court 

to hold a trial court abused its discretion in issuing a particular award of attorney 

fees.” Arches Condo. Ass’n v. Robinson, 131 A.3d 122, 132-33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). 

Credibility and conflicts in the evidence are for the trial court to resolve. Beaver 

Falls Mun. Auth. ex rel. Penndale Water Line Extension v. Beaver Falls Mun. Auth., 

960 A.2d 933, 940 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). This Court will “not disturb a trial court’s 

credibility determinations where explained” or obvious from the record. Id. Where 

the trial court’s discretion is challenged on appeal, the challenging party bears a 

heavy burden. Paden, 658 A.2d at 343. To the extent we address issues of statutory 

interpretation, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo. 

Samuel-Bassett, 34 A.3d at 51. This means that as to these issues, we do not defer to 

the trial court when reaching a decision and we review the entire record on appeal. 

Mercury Trucking, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 55 A.3d 1056, 1082 (Pa. 

2012) (citing Heath v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole), 860 

A.2d 25, 29 n.2 (Pa. 2004)).

First, we address Morgan’s argument that the trial court erred at law and 

abused its discretion when it awarded her $50,000 in attorney fees rather than the 

$280,066.13 she requested. Morgan asserts the “statutory scheme under the plain 

language of the [Act] . . . compel[ ] that she be made whole and awarded” her entire 

requested amount. Morgan’s Br. at 16. We disagree. 
8

It is the general rule that absent express statutory authority, each party pays 

its own attorney fees. Fitzgerald v. City of Phila., 487 A.2d 485 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985); 

see also Section 1726(a)(1) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 1726(a)(1) (providing 

attorney fees are not an item of taxable costs except as permitted by Section 2503 of 

the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503, relating to the right of participants to receive 

counsel fees, which is not at issue here). Here, the parties’ underlying dispute arose 

under the Act and Section 5412 of the Act, which provides:

 

If a declarant or any other person subject to this subpart violates any 

provision of this subpart or any provisions of the declaration or bylaws, 

any person or class of persons adversely affected by the violation has a 

claim for appropriate relief. Punitive damages may be awarded in the 

case of a willful violation of the subpart and, if appropriate, the 

prevailing party may be entitled to an award of costs and reasonable 

attorney fees.

68 Pa.C.S. § 5412. 

The Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act), 1 

Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991, provides “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction 

of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 

1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Generally, the best indication of legislative intent is the plain 

language of a statute. Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. 2005). It 

is well settled that “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all 

ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its 

spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. §1921(b). Furthermore, we construe the words and phrases of a 

statute “according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved 

usage.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). 

Section 5412 of the Act plainly provides “if appropriate, the prevailing party 

may be entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees.” 68 Pa.C.S. § 
9

5412 (emphasis added). The use of the phrase “if appropriate” and the word “may” 

are crucial in interpreting the meaning of the statute. “Although ‘may’ can mean the 

same as ‘shall’ where a statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice, it 

ordinarily is employed in the permissive sense.” Commonwealth v. Garland, 142 

A.2d 14, 17, n.5 (Pa. 1958) (internal citations omitted). Here, the word “may” is 

coupled with the phrase “if appropriate.” This plain permissive language leaves the 

decision of whether to award attorney fees at all to the sound discretion of the trial 

court. Moreover, the statute is clear that any award of attorney fees must be 

reasonable. 

Generally, the courts retain discretion to determine what is reasonable when 

awarding attorney fees. Oberneder v. Link Comput. Corp., 696 A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. 

1997). As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court outlined in In re Trust Estate of

LaRocca,

the amount of fees to be allowed to counsel, always a subject of 

delicacy if not difficulty, is one peculiarly within the discretion of the 

court of first instance. Its opportunities of judging the exact amount of 

labor, skill, and responsibility involved, as well as its knowledge of the 

rate of professional compensation usual at the time and place, are 

necessarily greater than ours[.]

 

246 A.2d 337, 340 (Pa. 1968) (citation omitted). Thus, a trial court’s award should 

be based on “all the circumstances” of a case and it is up to the court to determine 

whether certain tasks constitute a reasonable legal response to an action or, instead,

have an attenuated relation to the action. Twp. of Millcreek v. Angela Cres Trust of 

June 25, 1988, 222 A.3d 1199, 1208 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). 

In LaRocca, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court outlined the specific factors to 

be considered when determining reasonableness as follows: 
10

the amount of work performed; the character of the services rendered; 

the difficulty of the problems involved; the importance of the litigation; 

the amount of money or value of the property in question; the degree of 

responsibility incurred; whether the fund involved was ‘created’ by the 

attorney; the professional skill and standing of the attorney in his 

profession; the results he was able to obtain; the ability of the client to 

pay a reasonable fee for the services rendered; and, very importantly, 

the amount of money or the value of the property in question. 

LaRocca, 246 A.2d at 339-40. Notably, the trial court need not address every 

LaRocca factor because any one or a combination of those factors may convince the 

trial court a fee other than the requested fee is justified. Carmen Enters., Inc. v. 

Murpenter, LLC, 185 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Further, 

while the trial court must sufficiently explain its reasoning to enable meaningful 

appellate review, the trial court is not required to “delineate with specificity . . . 

every reason for every disallowance of every aspect of the fee request.” Twp. of 

Millcreek, 222 A.3d at 1206-07 (citing In re Appeal of Silverman, 90 A.3d 771, 786 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)).

Initially, we reject Morgan’s assertion that the plain language of the Act 

mandates she receive the full amount of her requested award. Morgan relies on 

Section 5114 of the Act,3 which provides the Act’s provisions are to be “liberally 

administered to the end that the aggrieved party is put in as good a position as if the 

other party had fully performed.” 68 Pa.C.S. § 5114. Morgan contends this requires

attorney fees authorized under Section 5412 of the Act “must be liberally awarded 

to make the aggrieved party whole.” Morgan’s Br. at 16. She interprets this to 

necessitate an award equal to the full amount of her requested attorney fees. 

However, the plain language of the Act grants the trial court discretion whether to 

award attorney fees at all, and if it does, mandates the trial court to ensure awarded

3

68 Pa.C.S. § 5114.
11

attorney fees are reasonable. To interpret the Act as Morgan suggests would 

obliviate the trial court’s discretion in determining the reasonableness of attorney 

fees. Because the plain language of the statute requires the trial court ensure awarded 

attorney fees are reasonable, Morgan’s interpretation of the Act would lead to an 

absurd result whereby a court would be required to award attorney fees paid by the 

party, even when those fees were unreasonable. A party is free to pursue all means 

and costs necessary in litigation, but it does not necessarily follow that the fees and 

costs incurred are reasonable. Therefore, we decline to adopt Morgan’s 

interpretation of the Act, which is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. 

Similarly, we reject Morgan’s arguments that the trial court abused its 

discretion by reducing her award of attorney fees. When determining its fee award, 

the trial court considered the relative degrees of success of the parties in the 

underlying litigation, the complexities of the legal issues involved, and the amount 

of work performed and required by the attorneys involved. The trial court 

determined that because Morgan only “prevailed” on one of the issues before the 

trial court, which was a less complex issue, a reduced award was warranted under 

the circumstances. Morgan asserts the trial court improperly considered the redacted 

billing statements as a basis to depart from the requested fee award and its award 

was “arbitrarily selected.” Morgan’s Br. at 37. However, the redacted billing 

statement was just one of the various factors considered by the trial court. Overall, 

the trial court was familiar with the underlying dispute, the litigation, and the parties.

The trial court considered appropriate factors when fashioning a fair and reasonable 

attorney fee. The trial court’s decision was not manifestly unreasonable, and the 

trial court did not act with partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Accordingly, we 
12

discern no legal error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of $50,000 in 

attorney fees to Morgan. 

Next, we turn to the Association’s argument that the trial court erred or abused 

its discretion when it denied its request for attorney fees. The Association asserts 

because it prevailed on four out of five counts in the underlying dispute, the trial 

court erred by failing to award it attorney fees. The Association relies on this Court’s 

holding in Serota v. London-Towne Homeowners’ Association (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

1451 C.D. 2017, filed Nov. 16, 2018).

4

 In Serota, an owner of numerous townhomes 

in a planned community filed suit against a homeowner’s association challenging 

the passage of an amendment that diluted the owner’s voting power. Id., slip op. at 

1. After prevailing in the underlying dispute, the owner sought an award of attorney 

fees and costs under, inter alia, a previous version of Section 5412 of the Act, which 

notably did not reference attorney fees. Id. The trial court rejected the owner’s 

argument that he was entitled to an award of attorney fees and held the Act did not 

mandate an award of attorney fees. Id. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial 

court’s decision. Id. In considering the language of the Act and the Uniform Law 

Comment, we explained: 

Contrary to [the owner’s] contentions, however, neither the statutory 

language of Section 5412 of the [Act] nor the Uniform Law Comment 

mandate an award of attorneys’ fees. As observed by [the trial court], 

the statutory language at that time did not refer to attorneys’ fees. And, 

while the Uniform Law Comment does refer to attorneys’ fees, such 

reference is not binding on the court and, additionally, it considers the 

award of such fees to be within the discretion of the court. Given the 

parties’ arguments before [the trial court], [the trial court] could have 

exercised its discretion to award attorneys’ fees, but it was not 

obligated to do so. We discern no abuse of discretion in [the trial 

4 Under Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a), 

an unreported opinion of this Court may be cited as persuasive authority.
13

court’s] decision not to award attorneys’ fees, given the complexity of 

the underlying litigation and [the trial court’s] familiarity with the 

litigation between these parties, including [the underlying lawsuit] and 

a second lawsuit that was eventually settled.

Id. (emphasis in original). 

Here, while the Association acknowledges the Serota holding in its brief, it 

asserts this decision supports its argument that the trial court erred or abused its 

discretion by failing to award it attorney fees. We disagree. Rather, our decision in 

Serota supports our affirmance of the trial court’s determination. Here, just as in 

Serota, and as we explained above, the plain language of Section 5412 of the Act 

grants the trial court discretion regarding whether to award attorney fees. We 

acknowledge the Association prevailed on numerous counts in the underlying 

dispute, but contrary to the Association’s assertion, the Act does not mandate an 

award of attorney fees. The Association fails to point to any evidence in the record 

or any authority demonstrating the trial court’s decision was manifestly 

unreasonable or the trial court acted with partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will in 

denying its request. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its 

discretion by refusing to award the Association attorney fees. 

CONCLUSION 

The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it issued its Order 

granting, in part, Morgan’s request for attorney fees and denying the Association’s 

request for attorney fees. The plain language of Section 5412 of the Act grants the 

trial court discretion to award attorney fees to a prevailing party. Moreover, the Act 

mandates the trial court ensure an award of attorney fees is reasonable. The trial 

court, familiar with the litigation and parties in the underlying dispute, properly 

considered various factors, including the complexity of the litigation, the degree of 

success of the parties, and the amount of work necessary for the attorneys to properly 
14

conduct the litigation, in fashioning its fee award. Neither party demonstrated the 

trial court’s decision was manifestly unreasonable or the trial court acted with 

partiality, prejudice, or ill-will. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion 

under the circumstances of this case. We therefore affirm the trial court’s Order. 

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kimberly D. Morgan, : CASES CONSOLIDATED

 Appellant : 

:

 v. : No. 1093 C.D. 2022

: 

The Stotesbury Community : 

Association, Inc. :

 

Kimberly D. Morgan : 

: 

 v. : No. 1125 C.D. 2022

:

The Stotesbury Community :

Association, Inc., : 

 Appellant : 

O R D E R 

 AND NOW, this 19th day of January 2024, the Court of Common Pleas of 

Montgomery County’s order dated August 31, 2022, is AFFIRMED. 

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge