1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### DAV E NP O R T ET AL


### . v . WASHIN GTON EDUC ATION ASSOCIAT ION
CERTIORARI TO THE SURPEM E COURT OF WASHINGTON No. 05–1 58 9. Ar g u ed Janu a r y10, 2007 —D ec ided Ju ne 14, 200 7 * Th e Nation al LaborRela tio n s Ac t per m its State s to r e g u late th eirlabo r

r e lation sh ips w i thpu blicemploy ees. Man yStates au th or ize pu blic

sec t oru n i on s to n e g o tiate a g en cy -sh o p agr e emen ts th aten title a u n ion to levy fee s on emp l oyees who are not union members but whom t h e unionrep r es ent s in col l ect ive b a r ga ining. Ho wev e r, t h eFirs t Amendmentprohib it s pub l ic-s ect o r unionsfrom us ing o bj e ct ing non

members’ fees for ideological purpos es not germane to the union’s col

lective-bargai n ing duties, Aboodv. Detroi t Bd. of Ed. , 431 U. S. 20 9, 235–236, and such u n ions must th erefore observe variou s procedural req u irement s t o ens ure t h a ta nobj e ct ing nonmemb e r ca n keep his fees from bein g usedfor such purposes, Te ache rsv. Hu ds o n , 475 U. S. 292, 30 4– 310. Wash in g t onState allo w s pu blic -sec toru n i on s to cha rgenonme m b e rs a na g encyfee eq uiv a lentt omemb ers h ip dues a n d t ohave t h e employer collectt h a tfee throu gh pa yrol l deduct ions

. Anin itia tiv e appr ov ed bys tate v o ter s (h er ein a fter§76 0 ) r e qu ir es a u n i onto obtai nth e n o n m ember s ’ affir m at i v e au th or izati onbefor e u s ing their fees for election-related purposes. Re sponde nt, a publics e ct or union, s e nta“Hudson pac k et” to alln o n m ember s tw ic e a y e ar detail i n gth eir r i gh t to object to the use of fees for no nchargeable ex

pendit ures ; re s p ondentheld a n y dis p ut ed fees in es crow unt il t h e Hudso n proce s s wa s complet e . In s e pa rat e la ws uits , pet i t i oners al

leg e d th at r e s p on den th a d failed to obt a inth e affir m at i v e au th or iza

tion required by §760 before spen ding no nmembers’ agency fees for elec tor a l pu r p oses. InNo. 0 5–1 65 7, th e tr ial c o u r tfou n da §7 60 v i o -

——————

* Tog e th er w i thNo. 05– 165 7, Washin g tonv. Was h ing t onEducation Asso ciation, a l s oon cert iora r it ot h e s a me court
.2 DAVENPORT v. WASHINGTON ED. ASSN. Sy llabu s la t i on a n d a w a r ded t h e S t ate monet a r y a n d inj unct ive r e lief. In No. 05– 15 89, an ot h e rju dg e h e ld th at §76 0 pr ov ided a pr iv at e r i gh t of ac

tion , c e r t ified a c l ass of n o n m ember s , an d stay ed th e pr oc eeding s pen d in gin ter l oc u t or yappeal. Th e State S u pr eme Cou r th e ld th at al

t h oughanon m emb e r’s fa ilure t oobj e ct a f t e r receivin g t h e Hu ds o n packet did not satisfy §760’s affi r m a t iv e-au th or izationr e qu ir emen t, th at r e qu ir emen t v i olated th e Fir s t Amen d men t
. Held: It does n o t v i olate th e Fir s t Amen d men tfora St a t e to r e qu ir e i t s

pu blic -sec toru n i on s to r e c e iv e affir m ativ eau th or izatio nfr om a n o n member befor e spending that nonmem be r’s agency fee s for electionr e lated pu r p oses. Pp. 5–13.

(a) Itis unden iab l y unus ua l for ago ver n menta g enc y t o give a pri

v ate en tityth e pow e rto taxg o v e rn men temploy ees. Th e n o tionth at §760’s modest limit ationu p o nth at ex tr aor d in ar yben efit v i olates th e Firs tAmendmentis count erint u it ive, b e ca us e itis un dis p ut ed t h at Wa s h ingt on could have res t rict ed pub lic-s ect o r a g encyfees t o t h e port ion of uni on dues devot e d t o co llective bargaining, or even elimi

na t e d t h em ent i rely. Wa s h ingt on’s fa r les s res t rict ive limita t i on on res p ondent ’s aut h oriza t i on to exa c tmoney from govern mentemploy

ees is of no gr e a t e r cons t i t u t i ona lconce rn. P. 5

.

(b) The State Supreme Co urt ex tendedthis Court’s agency-fee c a ses w e ll bey o n dth eirpr operambit inc o n c l u d in gth at th ose c a ses , h av i n gbalan c e d th e c o n s tit u tion al right s of unions a n d nonmemb e rs , req u ired anonmemb e r t oshoulder t h e b urden of obj e c t ing b efore a union ca n b e b a rred from s p ending his fe es for purpos e s impermiss i

ble under Ab o o d. Theagency-fee cases did not balance constitutional right s in s uch ama nner b e ca us e unions have no cons t i tut i ona lent i

tlement to nonmember-emp l oyees’ fees. The Court has never sug

ges t ed t h a tthe Firs tAmendmentis implica t e d whenever go ver n men t s lim it au n i on’s en titl emen t to ag en c y fees abov ean d bey o n d w h at Aboodan d Hudso nre q u ire. The co ns t i t u t i onal floor for unio n s ’ collection and spending of agency fees is no t also a constitutional ceil

ing for state-imposed restrictions. Huds on ’s admon i ti onth at “ ‘dis

sen tis n o t to be pr esu m ed,’ ” 47 5 U. S., at 306, n

. 16, me an s on lyth a t itwould b e improper for acourtt o enj o in t h e expendit ures of a ll nonmembers’ agency fees when a na rrower remedy could satisfy sta t u t or yor c o n s titu tion a lli mita tion s. Pp. 5–7.

(c) Contrary torespondent’s ar gument, §760 is not unconstitutional under t h is Court ’s ca mpa i g n -fina nce ca s e s . For Firs t Amendment pu r p oses, it is imma ter i al t h at §760 r e s t r i c t s a u n i on ’s u s e of fu n d s on lyafterth eyar e w i th inth e u n i on ’s possession. The fees are in th e union’s pos s e s s i on only b e ca us e Washingt on a n dit s unioncont ra ct ing go vernmenta g e ncies have co mpelled their employees to pay those fees. The campaign-finance cases deal instead with gov

-3 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s ernment a lres t rict ions on how aregula t e d ent i t yma y s p end money th at h a s c o me in to its pos s es sionw i th ou t su c hc o erc i on . Pp. 7–8.

(d) While cont ent

- b a s ed s p eech re g u lation s ar e pr es umpt ively inva

lid, see, e.g., R

. A. V. v. St . Paul , 505 U. S. 377, 382, strict scrutiny is unwa r r a n t e d when t h e ris kt h a tt h e gove rnmentma y drive idea s or viewpoints fro mthe marketplac e is atten u ated, such a s when the g o v e rn men tac ts ina c a pac i tyoth e rth anas r e g u lator

. Th u s , th e gover n mentca n ma ke cont ent

- b a s ed dis t inct ions whens u b s idizing speech, see, e. g., Re ganv. T axation With Repres entat io n of Wash

. , 461 U. S. 540, 54 8–55 0, an d c a nex c l u d e spea ker s base donr e ason able, v i ew poin t-n e utr a l su bjec t- m atterg r ou n d s w h e nper m itti n gspeec hon gover n mentpropert yt h a tis anonpub lic f o rum, s e e, e.g . , Corn eliusv. NAACP Legal Defe nse& Ed

. Fund, In c. , 473 U. S. 788, 79 9–8 00, 80 6. The principle underlyin g t h os e ca s e s is a p plicab l e here. Wa s h ingt on vot e rs did notimpermiss ibly dis t ortt h e ma rket pla c e of idea s when th eyplac ed a r e ason able, v i ew poin t-n e u t ral li mit ationo nth e State’s au th or ization

. Th ey w e r eseekin gto pr otec t th e in teg r ityof th e elec

tionpr oc ess, an d th eirr e str i c t ionw a s t h u s limited t o th e statecrea t e d ha rm t h a tt h ey s o ughtt oremedy. The Firs tAmendmentdid n o t c o mpel th em to li mit p u blic -sec toru n i on s’ ex tr aordin ar yen title

mentt o non m emb e rs ’ a g ency fees more b r oa dly t h a nneces s a ry t o v i n d ic ate th at c o n c e r n . Pp. 8–11.

(e) Section 760 is constituti onal as applie d to public-sector unions. Th er e is n o n e ed inth ese c a ses to c o n s ide rits appl ic ati onto pr iv atesec t oru n i on s. Pp. 11–13. No. 05–1 58 9 an d No. 05–1 657, 1 56 Wa s h . 2d 543, 13 0 P. 3d 352, v a c ated an d r e man d ed. S CALIA , J ., delivered t h e opinion of t h e Court , Pa rt s I and II– A a n d t h e s e cond pa ra gra p h of foo t n ot e 2 of whi ch were una ni mous , a n d t h e rema inder of whichwa s j o ined b yS TEVENS , K ENNEDY , S OUTER , T HOMAS , an d G IN SB U R G , JJ. B REYER , J ., filed a nopi n ion co nc urri n gin pa rta n d conc urri ng int h e j u dgment , in which R OBERTS , C. J., an d ALITO , J., join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Nos. 05– 15 89 an d 05– 165 7 

### GARY DA V E NP ORT, ET AL 

### ., PETI TIONE R S 05–1589 v. WASHIN GTON EDUC ATION ASSOCI ATION
WASHIN GTON, P E TI TIONE R 05–1657 v. WASHIN GTON EDUC ATION ASSOCI ATION ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREM E COURT OF WASHINGTO N [Ju n e14, 2007 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### delivered the opini o n of the Co urt. The State of Washingt on prohibi t s labor un ions from using the agency-shop fees of a n o nmember for election

related purposes unless the nonmember affirmativel y consents. We decide whether th i s restriction, as applied to public-sector labor unions, violates the First A m endment. I The National Labor Relations Act leaves States free to regulate their labor r e lation ships with their public em

ployees. See 49 Stat. 4 50, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §152(2). The labor laws of ma ny States a u thorize a union and a government employer to en ter into what is commonly known as a nagency-s hop agreement. This arrangemen t entitles the union to le vy a fee on employees who are not union mem b ers but who are nev e rtheless re presented by2 DAVENPORT v. WASHINGTON ED. ASSN. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the union in collective bargaining

. See, e.g., Lehnertv. Ferri s Fa cu lty Assn. , 5 00 U. S. 50 7, 511 (1991). The pri

mary purpose of such arrangements is to prevent non

members from free-riding on the union’ s effo rts, sharing the employment benefits obtained by the union’s collectiv e bargaining without sharing the c o sts incurr ed. See, e.g., Machinistsv. Stree t , 36 7 U. S. 740, 760–764 (1961). How

ever, agency-shop arra ngements in the public sector raise First Amen dment conc erns because they force individuals to contribute money to unions a s a condition of govern

ment employment. Thus, in Aboodv. Detroit Bd. of Ed. , 431 U. S. 2 09, 235–236 (1977), we held that public-sector unions are constitutionally prohibi t ed from us ing the fees of objecting nonmembe rs for ideological purposes that are not germane to the union’s co llective-bargai n ing duties. And in Tea c hersv. Hu dson , 475 U. S. 292, 302, 304–3 1 0 (1986), we set forth va rious procedural requirements that public-sector unions collecting agency fees must observe in order to en sure that an objecting nonmembercan prevent the use of his fees for impermissible purposes. Neither Hudsonnorany of our other cases, however, has held that the First Amendment mandates that a public-sector union obtain affirmative consent before spending a n o nmember’s agency fees for purposes not chargeable under Abood

. The State of Washington has authorized pu blic-sector unions to n e gotiate agency-shop agreements. Where suc h agreements are ineffec t , Washington law all o ws the unio n to charge n o nmembers an agency fee equival e nt to the full membershi p dues of the union and to have this fee col

lected by the employe rthrough payroll deductions. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code §§41.5 6 .122(1), 41.59.060(2), 41.59.100 (2006). Ho wever, §42.17.760 (hereinafter §760), which is a provision of the FairC a mpaign Pr actices Act (a state initiative approved by the voters of Washington in 1992), restricts the union’s ability to spend the agency fees that it collects. Section 760, as it stood when the decision3 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### under review was rendered, provided: “A labor organization may not use agency shop fees paid by an individual who is not a member of the or

ganization to make contributi o ns or expenditures to influencean el ectionor to oper ate a politi c al com

mittee, unless affirmatively authorized by the individual.” 1 

### Respondent, the exclusive bargaining agent for ap

proximately 70,000 p ublic ed ucational employees, col

lected agency fees from nonmem bers that it re presented in collective bargaining. Consistent with its res p onsibiliti e s under Aboodand Hudson(or so we assume forpurposes of these cases ) , respondent sent a “Hudsonp a cket” to a ll nonmember s twice a year, notify ing them of t h eir right t o object to paying fees for nonchargeable expen d itures, and giving the m three options: (1) pay full agency fees by not objecting w i thin 30 days; (2 ) obj e ct to paying for non

chargeable expenses and receiv e a rebate as calculated by respondent; or (3) object to pa ying for n o nchargeable expenses a n d receive a rebate as determined by an arbi

trator. Re spondent h e ld in escrow anyage n cy fees th at were reasonably in di spute until the Hudsonprocess was complete. In 2001, respondent found itself in Wa shin gton state

——————

1 Wash in g t onhas sin c eamen ded §760 to c o difya n a r r o werin ter p r e tationof “u se ” of ag en c y -sh o p fees th anth e in ter p r e tationadop ted belowbyth e s tate tr ial c o u r tth at p a s s ed onth at qu esti on . See Su pp. Br ief forResp on den t2–3. As r e spon den tc o n c e des, h o w e v e r, id. , at 3, t h es e ca s e s a r e notmoot
. Beca us e pet i tioners s o ughtmoney da ma ges for respondent’s alleged vio l ation of the prior version of §760, it still ma tt ers whet h er t h eS u pre m e Courtof Wa s h ingt on w a s correctt o h o ld t h a tt h atvers ion wa s incons is t e nt wit hthe Firs tAmendment

. Our analysis of whether §76 0 ’s affirm a t ive-a ut horiza t i on req u ireme n t violates the constitutional rights of respondent is not affected by the amen dmen t, w h i c hmer e ly c a u s es th at r e qu ir emen t to be applic ab l e less fr equ e n t lyth anth e state tr ial c o u r tth ou gh t.4 DAVENPORT v. WASHINGTON ED. ASSN. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### courts defending, in two se parate lawsuits, its expendi

tures of nonmembers’ agency fees. The firstlawsuit was brought by the State of Washington, petitioner in No. 05– 1657, and the second was brou ght as a putative cla ss action by several nonmembers of the union, petitioners in No. 05–158 9. Both sui t s claimed that respondent’s use of agency fees was in vio l ation of §7 60. Petitio n ers allege d that respon dent had fa iled to obtain affirmative authoriza

tion from n o nmembers before usi n g their agency fees fo r the election -related purposes specif ied in §760. In No. 05– 1657, after a trial on the merits, the trial court found th at respondent had violated §760 and awarded th e State both monetary and injunctive relief. In No. 05–1589, a differ

ent trial ju dge held th at §760 pro vided a pri v ate righ t of action, certified the class, and stayed furtherproceedings pending interlocutory a ppeal. After inter m ediate appellate court p r oceedings, a di

vided Supreme Court of Washingt on held th at, although a nonmember ’ s failure to object after receiving respondent’s
“Hudsonpacket” did not satis f y §760’s affirmative

authorization requirement as a matter of s t ate law, the statute’s imposition of such a requiremen tviolated the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution. See State ex rel. Wa shington S t ate Publi cDis c losureComm’nv. Washin gtonEd. Assn. , 156 Wash. 2d 543, 553–571, 130 P. 3d 352, 356–365 (2 006) (en ba nc). The c o urt reason ed that this Court’s agen cy-fee jurisprudence established a balance bet w een the First Amendment rights of union s and of nonmembers, a n d that §760 triggere d heightened First Amen dment scru tiny because it deviated from that balance by imposing on respondent the burden of confir m ing that a nonmemberdoes not object to the expenditure of his agency fees for electoral purposes. The court also held that §760 interfered with respondent’s expressive associational rights u n der Boy Scout sof Americav. Dale , 530 U. S. 640 (2000). We granted certiorari. 548 U. S. ___5 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### (2006). II The public-sector agency-shop arrangement authorizes a union to le vy fees on government employees who do no t wish to join the union. Regardless of one’s views as to the desirability of agency-shop agreements, see Abood, 43 1 U. S., at 22 5, n. 20, it i s undeniabl y unusual for a govern

ment agency to give a private enti ty the powe r, in essence, to tax gove rnment employees. A s applied to agency-shop agreements with public-sector u n ions like respondent, §760 is s i mply a condition on the union’s ex ercise of th is extraordinary po wer, prohibiting expenditure of a no n member’ s agency fees for election- r elated purposes unl e s s the nonmember affirmatively co nsents. Th e notion that this modest limitation upon anextraordinary benefit violates the First Ame n dment is, to say the least, counterintuitive. Respondent conc edes that Washington could have gone much furth er, restricti ng public-s ector agenc y fees to the portion of union dues devoted to collective bargaining. See Brief f o r Respondent 46–47. Indeed, it is uncontested that it would be constitutional for Washing

ton to eliminate agency fees entirely. See id. , at 46 (citing Lincoln Fed

. Unionv. North wes te rn Iron & Metal Co. , 335 U. S. 525 (1 949)). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the farless restric t ive limitat ion the voters of Wash

ington placed on re spondent’ s authorization to ex act money from government employees is of no greater consti

tutional concern. A The principal reason t h e Supreme Court of Washington concluded that §760 was uncon stitutional was that it believed that our age n cy-fee cas e s, having balanced the constitutional rights of unions and of nonmembers, dic

tated tha t a nonmember must s h oulder the burden of6 DAVENPORT v. WASHINGTON ED. ASSN. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### objecting before auni on can be b a rred from spending hi s fees f o r purposes imp e rmissible under Abood

. See 156 Wash. 2d, at 557–563, 130 P. 3d, at 358–360. The court reached thi s conclusion primarily because our cases have repeatedly invoked the following proposition: “ ‘[D]issent is not to be presumed—it must affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee.’ ” Huds on , 4 75 U. S., at 30 6, n. 16 (qu o ting St re et , 367 U. S., at 774); see also Ab ood , supra , at 238. The court concluded that §76 0 triggered h e ightened First Amendment scrutiny because it deviated fr om this perceived con s titutional balance b y requiring unions to obt a in affirmative consent. This interpretation of our agency- f ee cases extends them well beyond their p r oper ambit. Those ca ses were not balancing constitutional rights in the manner respondent suggests, for the simple reason that unions have no consti

tutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember

- employees. See Lincoln Fed. Union, supra , at 529–531. We have never sugg ested that the First Amendment is implicated whenever governments place l i m itations on a un ion’s entitlementto agency fees above and beyond what Aboo d and Huds onrequire. To the cont rary, we ha ve describe d Hudsonas “outlin[ing] a minimum set of procedures by which a [public-sector] union in an agency-s hop relation

ship could meet its requirement under Abood .” Kellerv. Sta t e Ba r of Cal. , 496 U. S. 1, 17 (1990) (emphasis added). The mere fact that W a shington required more than th e Hudsonmi nimum does not tri gger FirstAmendment scrutiny. The constitutionalfloor for unions’ collection and spending of agency fees is not also a constitutional ceiling for state-imposed restrictio n s. The Supre m e Court of Washington read far too much into our ad monition that “disse nt is not to be presumed.” We meant only that it would be i m proper fo r a court to enjoin the e x penditure of the agency fees of all employees , including t h ose who had not obje cted, when the statuto r y7 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### or constitutional limit ations established in those cases could be satisfied by a narrower re medy. See, e.g., Stre et, supra , a t7 68–770, 772–775 (discussing possible judicial remedies fo r violation of a federal statute that forbade unions from spending objecting e m ployees’fees for poli ti

cal purposes); Abood, s u pra , at 23 5–236, 237– 242 (discuss

ing possibl e judicial remedies f o r a state statute that unconstitutionally aut horized a public-sector union to spend objecting nonme m bers’ age n cy fees for ideological purposes not germane to collective bargaining); Hudso n, supra , at 3 02, 304–31 0 (setting forth procedu r es necessa ry to prevent agency-shop arrangements from violating Abood)

. B u t , a s t h e d i s s e n t i n g justices below correctl y recognized, our repeat ed affirmat ion that courtsha ve a n obligation t o interfere with a union’ s statutory entitlement no more than is neces s ary to vin d icate the rights of non

members does not imply that legislatures (or voters) them

selves cann ot limit the scope of that entitleme n t. B Respondent defends t h e judgment below on a ground quite differ e nt from the mistak en rationale a d opted by the Supreme Court of Was h ington. Its argument begins with the premise that §760 is a limit ation on how the union may spend “its” money, citing for that pr oposition t h e Washington Supreme Court’s des cription of §760 as en cumbering funds that are lawfully within a union’s pos

session. Brief for Resp ondent 21; 156 Wash. 2d, at 568– 569, 130 P. 3d, at 36 3–364. Relying on that premise, respondent invokes First Nat. B a nk of Bostonv. Bellotti , 435 U. S. 765 (1978), Austinv. MichiganChamber of Commerc e , 494 U. S. 6 52 (1990), and related campaignfinance cases. It argues that, u n der the rigorous First Amendment scrutiny required by those cases, §760 i s unconstitutional because it a pplies to ballot propositions and because it does n o t limit eq uivalent el ection-related8 DAVENPORT v. WASHINGTON ED. ASSN. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### expenditures by corpora t ions. The Supreme Court of Washington’s description of §760 notwithsta n ding, our campaign-fi nance cases are not o n point. For purposes of the Fi rst Amendment, it is entirely immaterial that §760 restricts a u n ion’s use of funds onl y after those funds are already within the u n ion’s lawful possessi on under Washington law. What matters is that public-sector agency fees are in the union’ s pos s essiononly because Washington and its union-contracting govern

ment agencies have compelled their employees to p a y those fees. The cases upon which respondent relies dea l with gover n mental restriction s on how a regulated entity may spend money that has come i n to its poss essionwith

out the assistance of governmental coercion of its employ

ees. See, e.g., Bellotti, supra , at 76 7–768; Austin, supra , a t 654–656. As applied to public-sector unions, §760 is not fairly described as a restriction on how the union can spend “its” money; it is a conditionplaced upon the union’ s extraordina ry sta t eenti tlement to acquire andspend ot her people’s money. 2

——————

2 Respon den tmigh t h av e h a d a poin t if, as i tsu g g e sts at time s, th e statute burdened its ability to spen d the d u es of its own members. Bu t §760 res t ricts solely the “use [of] agencyshop fees pa id b yan individua l who is notamemb er.” The only rea s on res p ondent ’s us e of it s mem b e rs ’ dues wa s b urdened is t h a tres p ondentchos et o co mmingle t h ose dues wit hnonmemb e rs ’ a g ency fees

. See App. to Pet. f o rCer t . inNo

. 05– 16 57, pp. 99a, 10 5a–1 0 7a. Respon d e n t ’s impr ov iden t ac c o u n t i n g pra c t i ces do n o trender §7 60 uncons t i t u t i ona l

. We note a s well t h a t , given currenttechnology, i twill not lik ely be burdensome for any n o n m emberwh o w i sh es to do so to pr ov i d e affir m ativ e au th or ization for use of his f ees for electoral expenditures. For similar reasons, the Supreme Co urt of Washington’s invocation of th e u n i on’s expr essiv e assoc i ation a lr i gh ts u n d er Boy Scouts of America v. Dale , 530 U. S. 640 ( 2 0 00), w a s qu it e misp lac e d, as r e spon den t bas ic allyc o n c edes byn o t r e ly in gu p onthe c a se. Sec t ion760 does n o t compel res p ondent ’s a ccep t a nce of unw a n t e d memb ers or ot herwi s e make u n i on member sh ip l e ss at tr ac tiv e . See Rumsfel dv. Forum fo r Academi c an d Instit utional Rights , In c. , 547 U. S. 47, 68–69 (2 00 6).9 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### The question that must be asked, therefore, i s whether §760 is a constitutional condit ion on the authorization that public-sector unions enjoy to charge government employ

ees agency fees. Respondent essen t ially answers that the statute unconstitutionally draw s distinctions based onthe content of the union’s speech, re quiring affi rmative co n sent only for election-relatedexpenditures while permit

ting expenditures for the rest of the purposes not charge

able under Aboodunless the nonmember objects. Thecontention that this amounts to unconstitutional contentbased discrimination is off the mark. It is trueenough t hat content-based regulations of speech are presumptively invalid. See, e.g., R

. A. V. v. St. Paul , 505 U. S. 377, 382 (1992) (citing case s). We have recognized, however, t hat “[t]he r a tionale of the general prohibition . . . i s that content discrimination ‘raises the specter tha tthe Gover n ment may effectively drive certai n ideas or viewpoints from the mark etplace.’ ” Id. , at 38 7 (quoting Si mon & Sch u ster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. Sta t e Crime Victi m s Bd. , 50 2 U. S. 105 , 116 (1991)). And we have identified numerous situatio ns in which that risk i s inconsequential, so that strict scrutiny is unwarran t ed. For example, speech that is ob scen e or defama tory can be constitutionally proscri bed bec ause the social interest in order and morality outweighs the negligible contribution of those categories of s p eech to the mark etplace of ideas. See, e.g., R. A. V., 505 U. S., at 382–384. Si milarly, con

tent discrimination a m ong various instances of a class of proscribable speech does not pose a threat to the market

place of ideas when the selected subclass is chosen for the very reason that the entire class can be proscribed. See id., at 388 (confirming that go vernments may choose to ban only the most prurient obsc eni t y). Of pa rticular rele

vance here, our cases r e cognize that the risk that conten tbased disti n ctions will impermis sibly interfere with the marketplace of ideas i s sometimes attenuated when the10 DAVENPORT v. WASHINGTON ED. ASSN. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### government is acting ina capa city other than as regulator. Accordin gly, it is wellestab lished t hat the government can make content-based distinctions when it subsidizes speech. See, e.g., Reganv. Taxa t i o nWith R e pre sen tatio n of Wash. , 4 61 U. S. 54 0, 548–550 (1983). And it is also black-letterlaw that, when the government permits speech on government property th at is a nonpublic forum, it can exclude speakers on the basis of their subject mat

ter, so long as the distinctions drawn are viewpoint neu

tral and reasonable inlight of the purpose s e rved by th e forum. See, e.g., Corn el iusv. N A

AC P

Le ga l De f

e nse& Ed

. Fund, Inc. , 473 U. S. 788, 799–800 , 806 (1985). The principle underlyi n g our treatment of those s i tua

tions is equally applicable to the narrow circu mstances of these cases. We do not believe that the voters of Washing

ton impermissibly distorted the marketplace of ideas when they placed a reasonab le, viewpoi n t-neutral limitation on the Sta t e’s general a u thorization allowing public-sector unions to acquire and spend th e money of government employees. As the Supreme Court of Washington recog

nized, the voters of Washington sought to protect the integrity of the election process, see 156 Wash. 2d, at 563, 130 P. 3d, a t361, which the voters evidently thought wa s being impa ired by the infusionof money extracted from nonmember s of unions without their consent. The restric

tion on the state-bestowed entitlement was thus limitedto the state-cr eated harm that the v o ters sought to remedy

. The voters did not have to enact an acro ss-the-board limitation on the use of nonmembers’ agency fees by pub

lic-sector unions in order to vindicate their more narrow concern with the integrity of the el ection process. We sa id in R. A. V. that, whe ntotally proscribable speech is at issue, content-based re gulation is permissible so long as “there is no realistic possibility that official su ppression of ideas is afoot.” 505 U. S., at 390. We think the same is true when, as here, an extraordi nary and t o tally repeal

-11 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### able authorization to coerce payment from government employees i s at issue. Even if it be thought necessary that the content limitation be reasonab le and viewpoint neu

tral, cf. Cor n elius, supr a , at 806, the statute s a tisfies that requiremen t
. Quite ob viously, no suppression of ideas is afoot, since the union remains as free as any other entity to participa te in the electora l process with a ll available funds other than the state-c oerced agency fees lacking affirmative permission. Cf. Regan, supra , at 549–550 (First Ame n dment does not require the government to enhance a person’s ability to speak). In su m, given the unique cont ext of publi c -sector agency-shop arrangements, the content-based nature of §760 does not viol ate the Firs t Amendment. We emphas ize an imp o rtant limitation upon our hold

ing: we uphold §760 onl yas appliedto public-sector unions such as res p ondent. Section 760 a pplies on its face to bot h public- and private-sector unions in Washington. 3

### S i n c e private-sect or unions c o llect agency fees through contrac

tually required action taken by p r ivate employers rather than by go vernment a g encies, Washington’s regulation of those private arrangements presents a somewhat different constitutional question. 4

### We need not answer that ques

-

——————

3 Un derth e Nation al Labor Relat i on s Ac t, it i s g e n e r a llyn o t anu n fairlaborpr ac tic eforpr iv ate-sec torempl oy er s to en ter in to ag en cy sh op ar r a n g emen ts, see 29 U. S. C. §158 (a)(3), bu t St ates r e tainth e power unde rt h e Actt ob a n t h e execut ion or a pplica t i on of s uch a g ree ments, see §164(b).

4 We do not suggest that the answer must be di fferent. We have pre

v i ou slyc o n s tr u e d th e au th or izationof pr iv ate-sec to rag en cy -sh o p ar r a n g emen ts inth e Na tion al LaborRel a t i on s Ac t ina man n e rth at i s ar g u ablyc o n t en t based. S ee Communications Wo rk ersv. Beck , 487 U. S. 735, 73 8, 76 2–7 63 (1 988) (§ 15 8(a)( 3 ) au th or izes ex pen d itu r e of private-sector agency fees over a no nmember’s objection only i nfur

th er an c e of the u n i on ’s obligation s a s ex c l u s iv e bar g a in in gr e pr esen ta

tive); Ellis v. Railway Clerks , 466 U. S. 4 35, 45 0– 45 1 ( 198 4) (ex pen d i

tu r e s onpu blic ation s th at r e por tabou ta u n i on ’s ac tiv i t i es as ex c l u s iv e12 DAVENPORT v. WASHINGTON ED. ASSN. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### tion today, however, because atno stage of this litigation has respon dent made an overbreadth challenge. See generally Schaumburg v. Ci tizen sfor Be tter En vironment , 444 U. S. 620, 633–634 (1980) (applying overbreadth doctrine). 5 

### Instead, respondent has consistently argued simply that §760 is un constitutional as appli e d to itself. The only purpose for which it has noted the statute’s applicability to private-sector unions is to establish that the statute was meant to be a general limitation on elec

toral speec h, and not just a condition onstate agencies’ authorization of comp ulsory agency fees. See Brief for Respondent 24, 48. That limited contention, however, is both unconvincing and immaterial. The purpose of the voters of Washington was undoubtedly the general oneof protecting the integrity of el ections by limiting electoral spending in certain ways. But §760, though applicable to all unions, served that purpose through v e ry different means depe nding on the type of union involv ed: It condi

tio n edpubl ic-sector u n ions’ authorization to coerce fees from government employees at the same time that it regul ated private-sector unions’collective-bargaining agreements. The constitutionality of the means chosen with respec t to priva t e-sector unions has no bearing on whether §7 60 is constitutional as applied to public-sector unions.

—————— bar g a in in gr e pr esen tativ e c a nbe c h a r g ed to n o n m ember s ov erth ei r obj e ct ion).

5 Nor is itclea r t h a tt h e “ s t r ong medicine” of t h e overb r ea dt h doct rine is even available to challen g e a statute such as §760. See Virginiav. Hicks , 539 U. S. 113, 11 8– 120 ( 200 3) (r ec og n i zin gth atth e doc t r i n e ’s benefits—eli m i nating the c h illing effec t that overbroad laws have o n nonpa r t i es —mus t b e weighed a g a i ns t it s cos t s
—b l ocking perfe c t l y c o n s titu tion alapplic a t ion s of a l a w)

. It maybe ar g u ed th at th e on l y oth e rtar g e ts of th e s tatu te’ s n a r r o wpr ohibit ion , pr iv at e-sec t oru n i ons, are sufficiently capable of defending their own i n terests in co urt that they will not b esign ificantly “chilled.”13 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### * * * We hold that it does not violate the First Amendment for a State to require t hat it s public-sector unions receive affirmative authorization from a nonmember before spen d

ing that nonmember’ s agency fees for elec tion-related purposes. We therefo r e vacate the judgment of the Su

preme Court of Washington and remand the cases for further proc eedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of B RE Y E R , J. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Nos. 05– 15 89 an d 05– 165 7 

### GARY DA V E NP ORT, ET AL 

### ., PETI TIONE R S 05–1589 v. WASHIN GTON EDUC ATION ASSOCI ATION
WASHIN GTON, P E TI TIONE R 05–1657 v. WASHIN GTON EDUC ATION ASSOCI ATION ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREM E COURT OF WASHINGTO N [Ju n e14, 2007 ] 

### J USTICE 

### B RE YE R 

### , withwhom T HE 

### C HIEF 

### J USTICE 

### and J USTICE 

### ALI T O 

### join, concurring inpart and concurring in the judgme nt. I agree with the Court that the Supreme Court of Wash

ington’ s decision restedentire ly on flawed interpretations of this Cou rt’s a g ency- f ee cases and our deci sion in Boy Scouts of Americav. Dale , 530 U. S. 640 (200 0). I there

fore concur in the Court’s judgment, and I join Parts I and II–A and th e second paragraphof n. 2 of the Court’s opi n ion. However, I do not jo in Part II–B, which addresses numerous arguments that respondent Washington Edu c a tion Association raised for the fi rst time in its briefs befor e this Court. See, e.g. , S t ate ex rel. Washin gton Sta t e Publi c Disclosu re Comm’nv. Washin gtonEd. Assn., 156 Wash. 2d 543, 565, n. 6, 130 P. 3d 352, 362, n. 6, (2006) (en banc) (noting that one of thes e arguments was neither raised nor addressed below). I would not address tho s e arguments until the lower cour ts have been given the opportunity to address the m . See, e.g. , National Colle g i at e At hlet ic As sn. v. Smith , 5 25 U. S. 459, 469–470 (1999).