MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 7 ME 18 Docket: Han

- 16

- 264 Submitted

On	Briefs: November	29,	2016 Decided: January 26 ,	2017 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J. ,	and ALEXANDER , MEAD, JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

IN	RE	CAMERON	B.

SAUFLEY , C. J. [¶1] The	mother	and	the	father	of	Cameron	B.	appeal	from	a	judgment	of the	District	Court	(Ellsworth, Roberts,	J. )	terminating	their	parental	rights to	the child pursuant	 to 22	 M.R.S.	 § 4055 (1)(A)(1)(a)	 and	 (B)(2)	 (201 6 )

. They contend	 that	 the	 court	 should	 have	 ordered	 a	 permanency	 guardianship instead	of	terminating	their	parental	rights. We	affirm	the	judgment.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] I n	 January	 2014, when	 Cameron was ten months	 old, the Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services filed	a	petition	for	a	child	protection order because	 of	 the	 parents’ neglect	 and	 the	 threat	 of	 neglect	 due	 to	 their substance	abuse. On	February	3,	2014,	the	Department sought	and	obtained a preliminary	 protection	 order placing	 the	 child	 in	 the	 Department’s	 custody after the	Department	alleged	that the	child was	found alone	in	a	car with	the2 parents in	contravention	of	a	safety	plan. The	child was	placed	in	foster	care with the	father’s unc le	and	the	uncle’s	wife on	the	same	day

. [¶ 3 ] By	agreement,	the	court	( Mallonee,	J. )	made	a	finding	of	jeopardy as to	both	parents based on their	substance	abuse

. A reunification	plan	required them	 to maintain	 sobriety,	 refrain	 from	 using	 non

- prescribed	mood

- altering substances,	and submit	to	random	drug	testing. [¶ 4 ] After	the	court repeated ly ,	and	unsuccessfully, order ed	the	parents to	comply	with drug testing requirements , t he	Department	 filed	a	petition	 to
terminate their p arental	rights	on	May	19,	2015. T he	court	denied	the	petition on	August	25,	2015, giving	 the	parents	additional	 time	 to	recover	 from	 their addictions. The	court admonished	the	parents	for	failing	to	comp ly	with	drug testing and	 warned	 them that	 their	 continued	 failure to	 engage	 in	 recovery could	result	in future termination	of	their parental rights

. [¶ 5 ] On	January	28,	2016, almost	two	years	after	Cameron	was	placed with his relatives, the	Department filed	a	second	petition	for	termination	of	the parents’	 parental	 rights

. The	 Department	 alleged that,	 in	 addition	 to	 both parents’	substance	abuse,	neither	was	engaged	in	treatment,	they	had	no	stable housing,	and	they	had	made	“little	or	no	progress”	in the	five	months	that	had elapsed	after	the	first	termination	petition	was	denied.3 [¶ 6 ] The second termination	hearing	was held	on	April	26 and	29,	2016

. T he	 Department	 caseworker	 testified	 that	 the	 Department	 recommended termination	because	of	the	child’s	young	age	and	the	risk	that	the	parents	would repeatedly	bring	the	matter	back	into	court.		The guardian	ad	litem	( GAL ) also recommended	 termination. Alt hough	 she	 believed	 that	 permanency guardianship	 could	 also	 provide	 permanency	 for	 Cameron,	 she	 expressed concern	about	“tension”	between	the	parents	and	the	foster	parents

. [¶7] In	 a	 judgment entered	 on	 May	 17 ,	 2016,	 the	 court ( Roberts,	 J. ) terminated	b oth	parents ’ parental	rights	to Cameron after	making the	following findings by	clear	and	convincing	evidence

. See In	re	Hannah	S. , 2016	ME	32 ,	¶ 3,
133 A.3d 590

. T he	parents	“continually	failed”	to	comply	with	the	drug	testing requirement and	never	tested	clean	for	a	period	of	thirty	days

. The	Department requested	drug	tests	from	both	parents	on	every	weekday	between	January	22, 2016,	 and	 March	 3,	 2016,	 but	 neither	 parent	 complied. P ermanency	 wa s important	for	the	child. The	child	had	l ived	with	his	foster	parents	for twenty
seven	 of	 the	 thirty

- eight	 months	 of	 his	 life.	 	 The	 foster	 parents	 provided	 “a lovi ng	and	stable	home”	for	him and	they	planned	to	adopt	him. T he	parents did	not	demonstrate	a	commitment	to	maintaining	a	sober lifestyle	despite	the passage	of	 twenty

- nine	months

. The	court	 further	 found	 that n either	parent4

wa s	 willing	 and	 able	 to	 protect	 the	 child	 from	 jeopardy , and	 th ose circumstances we re	unlikely	to	change	within	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to meet	his	needs , nor	was	either	parent willing	and	able	to	take	responsibility	for the	child	within	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	his	needs. See 22	M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

- (ii). To	achieve	permanency for	 the	child , termination
was	in his best	interest. See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). [¶ 8 ] Both	 parents	 appeal	 from	 the	 judgment

. See 22	 M.R.S.	 § 4006 (201 6 ) ; M.R.	App. P.	2 (b)(3).
II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 9 ]		The	parents do	not	challenge	the	court’s	factual	findings	regarding their	lack	of	capacity	for	parenting.		Instead,	they	argue that	the	court	erred	in terminating	 their	parental	rights	because	 the	child	was	placed	with	relatives who	 live	 in	 the	 same	 town	 and	 who	 suppo rt	 visitation. They	 contend	 that termination	was	not	in	the	child’s	best	interest	and	that	the	court	should	have ordered	a	permanency	guardianship	instead. [¶ 10 ] Before	a	court	may	terminate	a	parent’s	parental	rights,	the	court must	find	at	least	one ground	of	parental	unfitness

— which	is	uncontested	here

— and	 find,	 “by	 clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence

. . . that	 termination	is	in	 the child’s	 best	 interest.” In	 re	 C.P. ,	 2016	 ME	 18 ,	 ¶ 30,	 132	 A.3d	 174; see	 also5 22 M.R.S.	§ 4055(1)(B). We	review the	 trial	court’s factual	 findings for	clear error	and will	reverse	a	finding	only “ if	there	is	no	competent	evidence	in	the record	to	support	it , if	the	fact

- finder	clearly	misapprehends	the	meaning	of	the evidence , or	if	the	finding	is	so	contrary	to	the credible	evidence	that	it	does	not represent	the	truth	and	right	of	the	case.” Guardianship	of	Hailey	M. ,	2016	ME
80 ,	 ¶	 15,	 140	 A.3d	 478	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted) (citations	 omitted) .	 	 The weight	 and	 credibility	 of	 the	 testimony	 and other	 evidence,	 inclu ding	 GAL reports , are for	the	fact

- finder’s	determination. See In	re I.S. ,	20 15 ME	1 00 ,	¶ 11 , 121 A. 3 d	1 0 5. [¶1 1 ] “With	 regard	 to	 the	 best	interest	 determination,	we	 review	 the court’s

. . . ultimate	conclusion for	an	abuse	of	discretion,	viewing	the	facts,	and the	weight	to	be	given	them,	through	the	trial	court’s	lens.” In	re	M.B. ,	2013	ME
46 ,	 ¶ 37,	 65	 A.3d	 1260	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 “The	 District	 Court ’ s judgment	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 best	 interest	 is	 entitl ed	 to	 substantial	 deference because	that	court	is	able	to	directly	evaluate	the	testimony	of	the	witnesses.” In	re	Michaela	C. ,	2002	ME	159,	¶ 27,	809	A.2d	1245. [¶1 2 ] As	part	of	a	permanency	plan, a	court may create	a p ermanency guardianship to	establis h s afe,	long

- term	care for a child who	is	the	subject of a child	 protection	 proceeding

. See 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 4038

- C	 (201 6 )

. When	 it	 is6 appropriate, a permanency	guardianship allows parents whose	children	cannot be	 returned	 to	 them to	 have	 a	 meaningful	 opportunity	 to	 maintain a le gal relationship	with	the ir child ren and	to	have	the	court	determine	their	right s to have	contact	with	the ir child ren . See	id. The	question	before	the	trial	court	was whether	such	an	arrangement	would	serve	Cameron’s	best	interest	in	the	long

term. [¶1 3 ] By	 the	 time	 of	 the final	 hearing in this	 matter, three

- year - old
Cameron had been	 in	 foster	 care	 for more	 than	 two

- thirds	 of	 h is life

. His parents	had	demonstrated	their	inability	and	unwillingness	to	be	meaningfully involved	 in	 his	 life. To	 achieve	 permanency,	 h e	 needed the	 certainty	 and stability	of	adoption. The	potential	challenges	to	Cameron’s	stable	home	and consistent	parenting	along	with	the	possible	costs	and	stress	on	his	caretakers were	appropriate	for	the	court	to	consider. The	foster	parents	similarly	need ed clarity in their	role .		A ny	 tension s betw een	 them	and	 the	parents	could	have created	 further	 instability ,	 and,	 again,	 were	 appropriate	 for	 the	 court	 to consider	in	this	context

. Although	there	is	no	legal	requirement	for the	foster parents	to	allow	visitation	in	the	future,	solidifying	their	rol es	as	legal	parents may	enable	 them	 to support	 the	parents’	continuing	 to	have	sober	 visitation7 with	the	child

. 1 The	court	did	not	err	or	abuse	its	discretion	in	determining	that termination	was	in	the	best	interest	of	the	child

. The	entry	is: Judgment affirmed.

Jeffrey	C.	Toothaker,	Esq.,	Ellsworth,	for	appellant	mother Charles	Helfrich ,	Esq.,	Ellsworth,	for	appellant	father Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human Services

Ellsworth	District	Court	docket	number	PC

- 2014

- 03 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY

1 The	foster	mother	testified	that	even	if	the	parents’	rights	were	terminated,	and	she	adopted	the chi ld,	she	intended	to	allow	them	to	see	him.