Vir-6A.-if 

DA 21-0082

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2023 MT 19N

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

 v.

DANIEL HUNTER FLANSBURG,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC-17-390

Honorable Michael G. Moses, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Jeavon C. Lang, Assistant Appellate 

Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Roy Brown, Assistant 

Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Scott D. Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: January 11, 2023

 Decided: January 31, 2023

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

01/31/2023

Case Number: DA 21-0082
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports. 

¶2 Daniel Flansburg (Flansburg) appeals from the January 22, 2019 Order Re Motion 

to Suppress of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denying

Flansburg’s Motion to Suppress. We affirm. 

¶3 On April 12, 2017, Flansburg was charged with one count of Sexual Intercourse 

Without Consent, a felony, or, in the alternative, Sexual Assault, a felony. Thereafter, the 

State amended its charges two additional times, ultimately charging Flansburg with two 

felony counts of Sexual Assault. On September 26, 2018, Flansburg filed a Motion to 

Suppress asserting his confession was involuntary as law enforcement “failed to obtain a 

valid Miranda rights waiver and used coercive interrogation techniques.” Following 

hearing on January 6, 2019, the District Court issued its order on January 22, 2019 denying 

Flansburg’s Motion to Suppress finding that, under a totality of the circumstances,

Flansburg understood his rights; made a voluntary, uncoerced choice to waive his rights;

and the interrogation techniques were not psychologically coercive such that Flansburg’s 

confession was voluntarily given. Thereafter, Flansburg entered into an Acknowledgment 

of Waiver of Rights and Plea Agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to Count I—

Sexual Assault, the State agreed to dismiss Count II—Sexual Assault, and Flansburg 
reserved his right to appeal the court’s suppression ruling. Pursuant to the plea agreement, 

on August 22, 2019, Flansburg plead guilty to one count of felony sexual assault, the State 

dismissed the other count of felony sexual assault, and the District Court sentenced 

Flansburg to 20 years at the Montana State Prison, with 12 of those years suspended. 

Additional facts will be discussed below as necessary.

¶4 We review a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress to determine whether 

the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the court’s application of the 

law is correct. State v. Eskew, 2017 MT 36, ¶ 12, 386 Mont. 324, 390 P.3d 129. 

The question of whether a defendant has given a confession voluntarily is a 

factual determination within the province of the district court. The district court 

has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best 

position to determine their credibility. We will not, on appeal, reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our evaluation of the evidence for that of the district court.

State v. Old-Horn, 2014 MT 161, ¶ 14, 375 Mont. 310, 328 P.3d 638 (citations omitted). 

¶5 “Whether or not a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination is triggered is a 

conclusion of law. Our standard of review of a district court’s conclusions of law is 

plenary. We determine whether the district court’s conclusions are correct.” State v. Hill, 

2009 MT 134, ¶ 21, 350 Mont. 296, 207 P.3d 307; State v. Fuller, 276 Mont. 155, 915 P.2d 

809. 

¶6 Flansburg asserts Detective Wichman “downplayed” the Miranda1 warning he read 

to Flansburg before proceeding with the custodial interrogation interview and, although 

Flansburg signed the Miranda warning, he did not read it or understand its importance. 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
Flansburg asserts the Miranda warning was inadequate such that the State cannot meet its 

burden to show Flansburg voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Conversely, the State 

asserts Detective Wichman advised Flansburg of the four Miranda tenets and confirmed 

orally and in writing that Flansburg understood his Miranda rights and, having these rights 

in mind, still desired to talk with Detectives Wachman and Baum. Further, Flansburg 

willingly signed the Miranda waiver of rights document and initialed the document twice 

confirming he understood his rights and that he still agreed to talk with the detectives. The 

State asserts the advisement of his Miranda rights together with Flansburg’s immediate 

actions thereafter support the District Court’s finding that Flansburg’s waiver was 

voluntary.

The law regarding confessions in criminal proceedings is well established in

Montana. Voluntary confessions are generally admissible in criminal

prosecutions, and they are recognized as an important tool for law

enforcement. State v. Allies, 186 Mont. 99, 109, 606 P.2d 1043, 1048 (1979). 

A voluntary confession is the result of a free choice by the suspect, and “if

he has willed to confess, it may be used against him.” State v. Davison, 188

Mont. 432, 438, 614 P.2d 489, 493 (1980) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut,

367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1961)). However,

a person charged with a crime has a right under the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment coupled with the Fifth Amendment right against

self-incrimination to not be convicted based upon an involuntary confession. 

Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 434-35, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2330, 147 L. Ed.

2d 405 (2000); State v. Morrisey, 2009 MT 201, ¶ 29, 351 Mont. 144, 214

P.3d 708. An involuntary confession is not admissible against the defendant,

and if the defendant moves to suppress a confession, the burden shifts to the

State to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession or

admission was voluntary.” Section 46-13-301(2), MCA; Davison, 188

Mont. at 438, 614 P.2d at 493. 

Eskew, ¶ 14. 
¶7 Determining whether a confession is voluntary is a factual issue which requires 

consideration of the totality of the circumstances—including, but not necessarily limited 

to, whether defendant was advised of his Miranda rights; the interrogation techniques used; 

the age and education of the defendant; the defendant’s demeanor, articulation, and 

capacities; and the presence of any threat of violence, improper influence, or promise to 

induce the confession. Eskew, ¶¶ 16-18. 

¶8 In denying Flansburg’s Motion to Dismiss, the District Court found he was 

twenty-four years old, had some minor experience with the criminal justice system, and 

there were no obvious concerns about his level of education and understanding. Flansburg 

does not contest these findings, but rather asserts Detective Wichman treated the recitation 

of the Miranda warning as a “mere formality” which did not make clear to Flansburg the 

seriousness of the situation, rendering the warning inadequate. Upon our review of the 

record, we disagree with Flansburg’s characterization of the Miranda warning given him 

by Detective Wichman as being inadequate. Here, prior to any substantive questioning of 

Flansburg, Detective Wichman read verbatim to Flansburg a standard Miranda warning 

advising him of Miranda’s four prescribed warnings—Flansburg had the right to remain 

silent, that anything he said could be used against him in court, that he had a right to have 

an attorney present, and if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed to him 

prior to any questioning if he so desired. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. Detective Wichman 

then followed up with Flansburg to confirm he understood his rights and was still willing 

to speak to him and Detective Baum. Flansburg did not indicate any misunderstanding as 

to his rights, did not indicate he had any difficulty with reading or comprehending the 
English language, presented in a manner indicating he comprehended the warning and the 

interview situation, did not ask for clarification of anything, did not request an attorney, 

and initialed the Miranda waiver in several locations and signed it. From our review of 

the record, the factual findings of the District Court were supported by substantial evidence. 

Although Detective Wichman advised Flansburg that reading his rights to him was for both 

of their “safeties” and Flansburg did not himself read the Miranda warning document, such 

does not negate the fact that Detective Wichman did read the Miranda warning in its 

entirety to Flansburg and then confirmed with Flansburg he understood his rights and that 

he was still willing to talk with the officers. Flansburg does not assert he has educational 

or cognitive deficits that precluded him from understanding the Miranda warning read to 

him and he does not assert he was forced to initial and sign the document. The manner in 

which Detective Wichman advised Flansburg of his Miranda rights was reasonable, not 

atypical, and certainly not a “hollow and meaningless exercise” as characterized by 

Flansburg. Considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence supports the 

District Court’s factual findings that Flansburg was adequately advised and understood his 

Miranda rights and the District Court correctly applied the law in concluding Flansburg 

voluntarily waived those rights. 

¶9 Flansburg also asserts that because of the interrogation circumstances—the use of 

subtle psychological coercion and the cold temperature of the interview room—his 

confession was not voluntary. In considering the interrogation circumstances, the District 

Court found the interview took place at the jail in the DUI interview room, the room was 

cold, but not intentionally kept cold. Flansburg was nervous, but not excessively so. He 
was not handcuffed. The detectives addressed Flansburg in a conversational, 

non-aggressive manner, did not express anything untrue to Flansburg, made no statements 

to Flansburg as to the evidence they did or did not have, made no promises about what 

might occur if he confessed, and made no statements to Flansburg that he was guilty. The 

interview was not unduly prolonged, lasting only a little over an hour, with Flansburg 

confessing forty-four minutes into the interview. 

¶10 Flansburg contends the detectives used subtle psychological coercion including 

assumption of guilt leading Flansburg to believe an admission of wrongdoing would lead 

to counseling as opposed to felony conviction and punishment. From our review of the 

record, considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence supports the 

District Court’s factual findings that the interrogation techniques were not psychologically 

coercive and the District Court correctly applied the law in concluding Flansburg’s 

confession was made voluntarily. Although it was cold in the interview room, Flansburg 

was not subjected to prolonged cold exposure. The entire interview was relatively short,

lasting about an hour. Although empathetic to Flansburg’s history of abuse, the detectives 

did not make any promises to Flansburg as to what would occur upon a confession and any 

belief on Flansburg’s part of an implied promise of treatment is not supported by the record. 

The detectives did question Flansburg regarding inconsistencies and matters they did not 

believe added up between his account and what was reported from others. This Court has 

not held that questioning a suspect, who has been fully advised of his Miranda rights and 

has agreed to talk with law enforcement, with legitimate evidentiary issues constitutes 
impermissible psychological coercion and we decline to do so under the circumstances of 

this case. 

¶11 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our 

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the 

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of 

applicable standards of review. 

¶12 Affirmed. 

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We concur: 

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR