United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 26, 2021*

Decided July 27, 2021

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 20-3314 

DUSTIN TROWBRIDGE,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTION, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 

Terre Haute Division. 

No. 2:19-cv-00014-JMS-MJD

Jane Magnus-Stinson, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

The Indiana Department of Correction bars prisoners from possessing most 

materials depicting nudity. Dustin Trowbridge, a Wabash Valley inmate whose fiancée 

sent him an intimate photo intercepted by prison staff, challenged this policy under the 

First Amendment. He lost at summary judgment. Because a reasonable factfinder could 

not deem the policy irrational on this record, we affirm.

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 20-3314 Page 2 

Trowbridge’s fiancée emailed him a photo of her pubic area in partly seethrough underwear. But Department policy restricts prisoners from possessing, among 

other things, “personal photographs” of exposed “genitalia.” IND. DEP’T OF CORR.,

MANUAL OF POL’YS & PROCS., No. 02-01-103 § (XIX)(G) (Sept. 1, 2015). Citing this policy, 

a mailroom supervisor deleted the email. 

After grieving this dispute administratively, Trowbridge sued the Department, 

the mailroom supervisor, and several prison officials to whom he had complained

about the matter. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Claims for injunctive relief and damages against 

some of these defendants survived screening. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In a scheduling order, 

the district court outlined witness disclosure deadlines and explained the procedure for 

moving to compel discovery responses. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1).

In written discovery requests, Trowbridge sought (among other things) data 

about rates of violence and harassment in Indiana prisons before and after the policy

was enacted. Further, Trowbridge asked for the names—and motivations—of the

policy’s drafters, plus a description of the manner in which policies are reviewed and 

renewed. Yet the defendants asserted that this information was mostly unavailable or 

would be unduly burdensome to gather. The policy was “reviewed annually and 

updated if necessary,” they conceded, though they provided no details.

One of these discovery responses was signed by Andy Dunigan, the 

Department’s Director of Policy and Accreditation. Although Dunigan was not 

previously listed in the defendants’ initial disclosures, the disclosures contained a catchall statement that potential witnesses included “[i]ndividuals listed or identified in any 

discovery responses.” Trowbridge did not move to compel further responses. 

At the close of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing

that the policy was rationally related to a legitimate interest in protecting staff from 

sexual harassment by inmates. In support they cited a declaration by Dunigan, who 

explained that “inmate access to materials depicting nudity would create a hostile work 

environment for female custody and administrative staff”; further, he said, female staff 

at Indiana prisons “are more often objectified and harassed by the inmate population 

when inmates are allowed to possess printed materials depicting nudity.” 

Trowbridge countered with two scholarly articles that, he says, undermine this 

rationale. Both are cited in our opinion in Payton v. Cannon, 806 F.3d 1109, 1110 (7th Cir. 

2015), where we upheld a similar policy from Illinois. The first article voices doubts 

about some traditional rationales for explicit-photo bans, such as fostering prisoner 
No. 20-3314 Page 3 

rehabilitation. Corey D. Burton & Richard Tewksbury, Policies on Sexually Explicit 

Materials in State Prisons, 24(2) CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 222 (2011). The authors characterize 

the data as “mixed” and concede that officials “may still have a legitimate penological 

interest” in these regulations. Id. at 222, 230. The second article denies a causal link 

between pornography and violent crime in society. Christopher J. Ferguson & Richard 

D. Hartley, The Pleasure is Momentary ... the Expense Damnable? The Influence of 

Pornography on Rape and Sexual Assault, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 323 (2009).

In his response, Trowbridge also sought to strike Dunigan’s declaration because

Dunigan was not named in the initial witness disclosures. But, though Trowbridge

criticized the defendants’ discovery responses, he did not ask to reopen discovery or 

defer ruling on summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d).

The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, albeit without 

addressing Trowbridge’s request to strike Dunigan’s declaration. Instead, relying on 

that declaration and our decision in Payton, the court found no material factual dispute 

about the policy’s rational link to legitimate interests. Further, Trowbridge and his

fiancée still could communicate intimate thoughts through written text. IND. DEP’T OF 

CORR., MANUAL OF POL’YS & PROCS., No. 02-01-103 § (XIX)(H) (exempting written text 

from ban on explicit material); see generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987) 

(listing factors for evaluating prison rules that impinge on constitutional rights). 

On appeal, Trowbridge presses three arguments. First, he maintains that the 

district court should have disregarded Dunigan’s declaration because Dunigan was not 

named in the defendants’ initial disclosures. But, although the district court should 

have addressed this objection when Trowbridge raised it, any error was harmless. 

See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1); David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2003). The 

defendants’ disclosures said that anyone named in discovery responses was a potential 

witness. Dunigan, in turn, signed one of those discovery responses, listing his

Department title. Despite knowing this, Trowbridge sought no further discovery from 

Dunigan. So, even if we assume a violation of the court’s scheduling order, there is no 

reason to infer that a clearer disclosure would have yielded a different summaryjudgment record, or that the district court would have ruled to the contrary. 

Second, Trowbridge contends that the scholarly articles he cited at summary 

judgment create a factual dispute about the policy’s rationality. But the Burton and 

Tewksbury piece does no more than explain that further research is needed to fully 

understand the effects of regulations such as the one Trowbridge challenges. And it 

does not address inmate harassment of staff. The Ferguson and Hartley article, 
No. 20-3314 Page 4 

meanwhile, contests the link between pornography and violence in society as a whole—

but this does not address the narrower problem of non-violent harassment in prisons. 

And although, as Trowbridge notes, we cited these articles favorably in Payton, 806 F.3d 

at 1111, we did not say they were proof of an irrational policy. (Indeed, Payton lost.) 

Instead, we said they invited future social-science research. Id. These articles, on their 

own, would not permit reasonable factfinders to deem the policy here irrational. 

Third, Trowbridge argues that prison officials must justify their policies with 

data, not broad assertions about inmate behavior. But at summary judgment we “must 

distinguish between inferences related to disputed facts and those relating to disputed 

matters of professional judgment.” Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (plur.)). Dunigan’s statements, although 

not rooted in quantitative data, reflect the kinds of professional judgment about inmate 

behavior and prison safety to which federal courts routinely defer. See, e.g., Payton, 

806 F.3d at 1110; Trapnell v. Riggsby, 622 F.2d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Giano v. 

Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1054 (2d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases). The burden was “not on 

the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on [Trowbridge] to disprove it.” 

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). Where, as here, no reliable evidence 

contradicts plausible reasons advanced by prison authorities, the defendants are 

entitled to summary judgment. Payton, 806 F.3d at 1110.

AFFIRMED