Filed 11/1/23 Young v. Hill CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SERENA YOUNG,

Plaintiff, Cross-defendant 

and Appellant,

v.

PHILIP E. HILL,

Defendant, Cross-complainant 

and Appellant;

PHILIP E. HILL, M.D., INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B306769

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. NC061797

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Reversed in part 

and remanded.

Tredway Lumsdaine & Doyle, Roy J. Jimenez and Brandon 

L. Fieldsted for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant Serena 

Young.
2

Daniel E. Park Law Corporation, Daniel E. Park

and Samuel F. Izzo for Defendants, Cross-complainant and 

Appellants Philip E. Hill and Philip E. Hill, M.D., Inc.

_________________________

Serena Young and Philip Hill jointly own an orthopedic 

surgery practice called Long Beach Advanced Orthopedic Medical 

Center, Inc. (LBAO). After nearly two decades working together, 

Young discovered that Hill had been depositing checks into his

own account, which she believed belonged to the practice. Young 

sued Hill and his corporation for, among other things, breach 

of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conspiracy. 

Hill, in turn, filed a cross-complaint against Young and her 

corporation, alleging Young failed to contribute an equal share 

to the partnership. 

The case proceeded to trial, but before submitting it to 

the jury, the court granted a directed verdict for Hill on Young’s 

fraud and conspiracy claims, as well as her request for punitive 

damages. On the remaining claims, the jury found in Young’s 

favor and awarded her more than $1 million in damages. The 

jury’s award included damages for lost profits, the loss in value 

of Young’s ownership interest in LBAO, and interest. After trial, 

the court eliminated the jury’s award of interest and reduced 

the damages related to the value of LBAO. Both Hill and Young 

appealed.

On appeal, Hill argues Young was not entitled to any 

damages related to her ownership interest in LBAO. He also 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s 

verdict. We reject each of Hill’s arguments. 

In her cross-appeal, Young argues the court erred by 

granting directed verdicts for Hill, eliminating the jury’s interest 
3

award, and reducing her damages by $150,000. We agree with 

Young in part, concluding the court erred in granting a directed

verdict on her fraud claim and request for punitive damages, 

eliminating the jury’s award of interest, and reducing the jury’s

award of loss-of-value damages. Accordingly, we reverse the 

judgment in part and remand the case for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The LBAO agreement

Young and Hill are orthopedic surgeons who met while 

they were both employed by Harriman Jones Medical Group 

(Harriman Jones). When Harriman Jones closed its orthopedic 

department, Young and Hill decided to go into private practice 

together.1

In 1999, Hill and Young incorporated a business for the 

purpose of practicing orthopedic medicine, which later became 

LBAO. Young and Hill were the directors of LBAO, and they 

each owned 50 percent of its shares. Young was LBAO’s CEO 

and performed all administrative duties until 2016. Young 

and Hill also set up individual corporations—Serena Young, 

M.D., A Professional Corporation (Young, APC) and Philip E. 

Hill, M.D., Inc. (Hill, Inc.)—to receive payment from LBAO. They 

created the individual corporations solely for “tax efficiencies.”

Young and Hill made an oral agreement concerning the 

operation of LBAO. According to Young, she and Hill agreed to 

a “50/50 partnership,” under which all the money they generated 

from their practice would go into LBAO, they would pay LBAO’s 

1 Most of the issues on appeal require that we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Young. Accordingly, 

we summarize the record in that light.
4

overhead expenses from those funds, and then they would evenly 

divide the profits.

At first, the bulk of LBAO’s business came from a contract 

with Harriman Jones to provide orthopedic services for its 

patients. At some point, HealthCare Partners Affiliates Medical 

Group (HealthCare Partners) purchased Harriman Jones 

and assumed its contract with LBAO. Over the years, LBAO 

contracted with other insurance companies as well. As of 2008, 

HealthCare Partners accounted for about half of LBAO’s total 

business.

2. The HealthCare Partners contract

Sometime around 2008, HealthCare Partners decided it 

did not want Young to treat any of its patients because it had 

concerns over her “complication rate.” Accordingly, HealthCare 

Partners entered into a new contract solely with Hill, which 

we refer to as the HealthCare Partners contract. The contract 

identified LBAO’s office as the “primary service location” and 

the “remittance address,” and it listed as “hospital locations” 

the surgery centers out of which LBAO operated. Young and Hill 

never discussed how to treat the income from the HealthCare 

Partners contract. Young believed that, because Hill would 

continue to service the HealthCare Partners patients through 

LBAO, income received under the contract would be governed 

by the parties’ oral partnership agreement.

LBAO treated HealthCare Partners patients the same 

as any other patient of the practice. The patients came to

LBAO’s office for appointments, checked in with LBAO’s 

receptionist, were attended to by LBAO nurses and medical 

assistants, consulted with LBAO’s orthopedic tech, and scheduled 

their surgeries with LBAO’s scheduler. LBAO paid for all the 
5

overhead associated with treating the patients, including rent, 

staffing, equipment, taxes, billing, and collections.

3. Young reduces her hours

In 2014, Young began suffering complications from a 

childhood polio infection, and she told Hill she was considering 

reducing her work schedule. Hill told her that was fine with him. 

The next year, Young stopped taking emergency room calls, 

which had required that she stay up the entire night. She 

otherwise continued to perform the same work for LBAO. 

Hill did not raise any concerns with Young about her reduced 

work schedule.

4. Young discovers Hill is diverting income

For many years, LBAO handled its billing internally. 

An LBAO employee would collect checks from the insurance 

companies and fill out corresponding bank deposit slips. The 

employee then gave the checks to Hill, who would deposit them 

at LBAO’s bank on his way home from work.

In 2016, LBAO hired an outside company to take over 

its billing. As compensation, the outside company would keep 

a percentage of the total income it processed on LBAO’s behalf. 

Young started noticing discrepancies between the company’s fees 

and the reported income for LBAO; each month, the company 

based its fee on $15,000 to $20,000 more income than Hill had 

deposited into LBAO’s account.

Young thought this discrepancy might correct itself over 

time, so she waited several months to investigate it further. 

When the issue had not resolved itself by the summer of 2017, 

Young asked an LBAO employee to try to reconcile the numbers 

with LBAO’s bank statements. After reviewing the documents, 

the employee told Young the discrepancies matched the income 
6

received under the HealthCare Partners contract, so it appeared 

that Hill had been pocketing those funds.

As Young was preparing to confront Hill about the issue, 

he came up to her and said, “ ‘I’m tired of taking care of you and 

supporting you. This is my money.’ ” Young told Hill he “ ‘didn’t 

pay overhead on that. That wasn’t the deal.’ ” Hill responded, 

“ ‘That’s my money.’ ” Young was shocked and hurt because she 

considered Hill to be her friend. She hoped she and Hill could 

work out their issues, but he refused to contribute to LBAO

any income from the HealthCare Partners contract.

5. The complaints

In May 2018, Young filed a complaint against Hill and 

Hill, Inc. for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing, fraud by concealment, breach 

of fiduciary duty, dissolution of corporation, conspiracy, 

and an accounting. Her claims were premised primarily on 

allegations that Hill and his corporation had been diverting funds 

that belonged to LBAO. In relief, Young sought compensatory 

and punitive damages.

Hill responded by filing a cross-complaint against Young 

and Young, APC for breach of contract, breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary 

duty. According to the cross-complaint, the parties had agreed 

to contribute to LBAO equally, which Young breached by working 

fewer hours and seeing fewer patients than Hill. Hill also alleged 

that Young “pilfer[ed] LBAO’s bank account, writing herself 

checks in amounts above and beyond her profit entitlement 

(which was to be even, 50-50, with Dr. Hill) . . . .” Like Young, 

Hill sought compensatory and punitive damages.
7

6. Young leaves LBAO

Without the income from the HealthCare Partners 

contract, Young struggled to cover LBAO’s overhead expenses 

and was not able to pay herself much income. Therefore, when 

LBAO’s lease ended in July 2019, Young decided to leave the 

practice. Young explained she was not willing to enter into a new

lease with Hill, so she accepted a position with another practice. 

Young, however, maintained her shares in LBAO and continued 

to monitor its account. Hill continued working at the practice.

7. The trial

The case proceeded to trial, and Young presented evidence 

establishing the facts summarized above. She also presented 

expert testimony that Hill had diverted $535,570 in profits 

that otherwise would have been paid to her. Young’s expert 

additionally opined that, as of July 2019, LBAO had been worth 

$674,741.

Hill testified at trial that the terms of his oral agreement 

with Young were somewhat different than what Young had 

asserted. According to Hill, the parties had agreed to “[e]qual 

contribution and equal distribution,” meaning each party was 

required to contribute an equal amount to be entitled to an equal 

share of profits.

According to Hill, he initially deposited all the income from 

the HealthCare Partners contract into LBAO’s account because 

he thought it was necessary to “keep the business running.” 

In 2011, he started “guesstimat[ing]” how much he owed to LBAO 

to compensate it for overhead expenses, and he would deposit 

the rest of the income from the HealthCare Partners contract into 

his corporation’s account. Hill did not discuss this practice with 

Young.
8

In 2017, Hill took a closer look at LBAO’s finances and 

discovered he had over-contributed to the practice by a significant 

amount. After this discovery, he stopped contributing any money 

from the HealthCare Partners contract into LBAO’s account.

One of Hill’s experts testified that, after subtracting 

overhead costs, Hill had contributed approximately $600,000 

more to LBAO than Young had. Another expert testified to 

the loss in value of LBAO caused by Young’s decision to leave 

the practice. The expert used three different methods to value 

the company before Young left, and he calculated the weighted 

average to be $856,000. The expert explained that, without 

Young, the business’s value was “shockingly low,” and it would 

go bankrupt within a year.

Before submitting the case to the jury, the court granted 

a directed verdict for Hill on Young’s fraudulent concealment and 

conspiracy claims, as well as her request for punitive damages. 

On Young’s remaining claims—breach of contract, breach of 

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach 

of fiduciary duty—the jury found in her favor and awarded her 

$1,057,737 in damages. The jury’s award consisted of $535,570 

for profits taken by Hill, $222,167 in interest on those profits, 

and $300,000 for the “[v]alue of half of [the] business.” The jury 

found Hill had not proven any of his claims against Young.

8. Hill’s post-trial motions

After the trial, Hill moved for a new trial and for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The court found Young was 

not entitled to interest and the jury had awarded her excessive 

damages related to her loss of interest in LBAO. According to 

the court, because Young was no longer working at the practice, 

its value should be reduced by one half. The court gave Young 
9

the option of a new trial or a reduction in her damages. Young 

selected the reduction in damages, and the court entered 

judgment.

Both parties timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

1. There was no prejudicial instructional error

Hill argues the court erred by instructing the jury that, 

in connection with Young’s breach of contract claim, she sought 

compensation for “the loss of her half interest in [LBAO].” 

He contends Young was not entitled to such damages because 

she admitted she retained her interest in LBAO as of the date 

of trial. Young does not contest that point. Nevertheless, she 

argues the court did not err because she never sought damages 

for the loss of her interest in LBAO. Instead, according to Young, 

she sought compensation for the loss in value of her interest

in LBAO, which was a proper category of damages.

a. Background

Young urged the court to instruct the jury that, in 

connection with her breach of contract claim, she sought damages 

for the “loss of her half interest” in LBAO. Hill objected, arguing 

Young should not be allowed to pursue such damages given she 

admitted she still owned her entire interest in LBAO. According 

to Hill, Young might be entitled to compensation for her interest 

in connection with the dissolution of the business, but she could 

not seek it as a form of damages.

Young explained her theory of damages was that, had Hill 

not breached the contract, “they would have continued to work 

together and the value of the business would have continued.” 

According to Young, because Hill refused to share income 

from the HealthCare Partners contract, she struggled to pay 
10

LBAO’s overhead expenses and was forced to leave the practice, 

which essentially destroyed the business. She pointed out 

that Hill sought essentially the same category of damages; 

the only difference was that Hill blamed Young for destroying 

the practice, while Young blamed Hill. Young also argued 

this was an issue for the jury to decide because, by the time 

the company is dissolved, there will be no value left for her 

to recover.

The court overruled Hill’s objection, explaining it was up 

to the jury to decide whether Young still had an interest in the 

business and, if so, its value. With respect to Young’s breach 

of contract claim, the court told the jury she was seeking several 

categories of damages, including damages for “the loss of her half 

interest in [LBAO].” The court separately instructed the jury on 

the categories of damages Young sought for breach of fiduciary 

duty, which included “loss of value of her half interest in LBAO.” 

The court also instructed the jury it could award each item of 

damages only once, regardless of the number of legal theories 

alleged. The court then listed the categories of damages subject 

to that rule, which included “loss of value of [Young’s] half 

interest in LBAO.” Finally, the court provided a special verdict 

form that informed the jury it could award Young several 

categories of damages, including the “[v]alue of half of [the] 

business.”

Young briefly addressed the damages issue in her closing 

argument, telling the jury “we want the value of half of the 

business of $300,000. There’s been testimony the business 

is worth somewhere between 600 to 800, $900,000, and there’s 

been testimony that it’s at a very small reduced value now. 

We attribute that loss of value to Dr. Hill. But for his conduct, 
11

they would still have a thriving practice, and they would be able 

to either go their separate ways and sell the practice or continue 

making money as they did.”

Hill, in turn, urged the jury not to award Young any 

damages for the loss of her interest because she had voluntarily 

abandoned the practice. Hill instead urged the jury to award 

him $428,404 for the loss of value to his ownership interest. 

According to Hill, the practice had been worth twice that amount, 

but after Young left the practice, “[t]he value of the business now, 

as our expert testified, is zero prebankruptcy.”

During deliberations, the jury submitted the following 

questions to the court: “What is going to happen to Dr. Young’s 

shares after this? Is Dr. Young selling her shares back to 

Dr. Hill? . . . Will Dr. Young retain her shares after the trial?” 

The court responded that the jury’s questions were “not relevant.”

After receiving the court’s response, the jury returned 

a special verdict awarding Young $300,000 for the “[v]alue of 

half of [the] business.”

b. Analysis

We review challenges to jury instructions under the 

de novo standard of review. (Sander/Moses Productions, Inc. 

v. NBC Studios, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1094–1095.) 

“ ‘ “In determining whether error has been committed in giving 

or not giving jury instructions, we must consider the instructions 

as a whole . . . [and] assume that the jurors are intelligent 

persons and capable of understanding and correlating all 

jury instructions which are given.” [Citation]’ [Citation.] 

‘Instructions should be interpreted, if possible, so as to support 

the judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably 
12

susceptible to such interpretation.’ ” (People v. Ramos (2008) 

163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.)

Despite Young’s insistence that she did not seek 

compensation for the loss of her interest in LBAO, the court 

plainly told the jury that she did. Indeed, the court explicitly 

instructed the jury she sought damages for the “loss of her half 

interest in [LBAO]” in connection with her breach of contract 

claim. Neither the instruction nor the verdict form clarified that 

Young sought damages for the loss in value of her ownership 

interest, rather than for the loss of the interest itself. Whether 

or not this was intentional, it was error. 

Although the court gave an erroneous instruction, “there 

is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’ prejudice applicable 

to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission 

or omission. A judgment may not be reversed for instructional 

error in a civil case ‘unless, after an examination of the entire 

cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion 

that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of 

justice.’ ” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 

580.) “ ‘[A] “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only 

when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, 

including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably 

probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party 

would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (Strouse 

v. Webcor Construction, L.P. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 703, 713–714, 

quoting People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see Collins 

v. County of San Diego (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1055 

[“an appellant must demonstrate that any alleged error in the 

jury instructions was prejudicial, i.e., that it was probable the 

appellant would have achieved a more favorable result without 
13

the error”].) To determine whether an instructional error was 

prejudicial, we may consider the degree of conflict in the evidence 

on critical issues, whether argument to the jury may have 

contributed to the instruction’s misleading effect, whether 

the jury requested a rereading of the erroneous instruction 

or related evidence, the closeness of the jury’s verdict, and the 

effect of other instructions in remedying the error. (LeMons v. 

Regents of University of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 869, 876.)

Here, it is not reasonably probable Hill would have 

achieved a more favorable result had the court properly 

instructed the jury. Despite the erroneous instruction related 

to damages for breach of contract, the court correctly instructed 

the jury on damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Specifically, 

it told the jury Young sought damages for the “loss of value of 

her half interest in LBAO,” which was nearly identical to the 

jury instructions for Hill’s claims. In another instruction related 

to economic damages, the court again told the jury Young sought 

damages for the “loss of value of her half interest in LBAO.” 

It also instructed the jury it could award Young damages only 

once for the “loss of value” to the company. Consistent with those 

instructions, Young argued to the jury that Hill’s conduct had 

caused the value of LBAO to decrease significantly. She never 

asserted Hill had caused her to lose her interest in the business. 

It is also apparent the jury’s $300,000 award was not 

intended to compensate Young for the loss of her entire interest 

in LBAO. Neither party’s expert testified that Young’s interest 

had been worth $300,000. Young’s expert opined that, as of 

July 2019, LBAO was worth $674,741. Hill’s expert valued 

the business significantly higher—$856,000—during the same 

time period. Had the jury intended to compensate Young for 
14

the total loss of her 50 percent interest in the company, it likely 

would have awarded her half of one of those valuations. Instead, 

it awarded her less than half, indicating it determined her 

interest in the business retained some value. This makes 

sense only if the jury intended to compensate Young for the 

loss of value of her interest in LBAO, rather than the loss of 

the interest itself. 

We acknowledge the jury’s questions suggest it may have 

been confused about the nature of the damages Young sought. 

Young’s plans for her shares after the trial would be relevant 

only if the jury were to award her compensation for the total loss 

of her ownership interest. The court, however, instructed the 

jury its questions were irrelevant, which implicitly conveyed that 

Young was not, in fact, seeking such compensation. Considered 

with the other instructions and the amount of the jury’s eventual 

award, we do not think it is reasonably probable the jury 

continued to be confused after receiving the court’s response. 

On this record, Hill has not shown the court’s instructional 

error was prejudicial. Accordingly, the error does not warrant 

reversal of the judgment. 

2. The jury did not erroneously reject Hill’s 

abandonment defense

Hill argued at trial that Young was not entitled to damages 

for the loss in value of LBAO because she had abandoned her 

ownership interest in the company. The jury implicitly rejected 

this defense and, instead, awarded Young $300,000 in damages.

On appeal, Hill argues the jury erred because the 

undisputed evidence compels a finding that Young abandoned 

her interest in LBAO. In support, he points to evidence that, 

in July 2019, Young stopped working at LBAO, accepted a 
15

position with a competing orthopedic surgery practice, stopped 

using LBAO’s facilities, and stopped depositing funds into 

LBAO’s account. According to Hill, this evidence “clearly 

showcases [Young’s] intent to abandon LBAO.”

Generally, we review a jury’s factual findings for 

substantial evidence. (Mathews v. Happy Valley Conference 

Center, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 236, 251.) In this case, 

however, Hill raised the abandonment issue as an affirmative 

defense, meaning he had the burden of proof at trial. (See Peal v. 

Gulf Red Cedar Co. of California (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 196, 199 

[describing abandonment argument as an affirmative defense].) 

Where “the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded 

that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden 

and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the 

failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports 

the judgment.” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE 

Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.) Instead, we must 

determine “ ‘whether the evidence compels a finding in favor 

of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, 

the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was 

(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such 

a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial 

determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” 

(Id. at p. 466.) 

The record in this case does not compel, as a matter of law, 

a finding that Young abandoned her ownership interest in LBAO. 

“Before an abandonment may be found it is necessary to establish 

nonuse[ ] accompanied by unequivocal and decisive acts showing 

an intent to abandon.” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Zuckerman

(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1145.) Young presented evidence 
16

refuting both elements. She testified that, through the date of 

trial, she continuously claimed an ownership interest in LBAO, 

maintained her shares of the company, held onto her position 

as CEO, and monitored the company’s books. Those actions 

do not reflect an intent to abandon her ownership interest.

That Young left the practice in July 2019 is not 

determinative. (See O’Flaherty v. Belgum (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 

1044, 1059 [an ownership interest in a partnership “ ‘is derived 

from the formation of the partnership and is not dependent upon 

a partner’s performance of duties and obligations under the 

agreement’ ”].) Young testified she accepted a different position 

because, without the income from the HealthCare Partners 

contract, she struggled to cover LBAO’s overhead and was not

able to pay herself much income. The jury reasonably could have 

found this explanation was plausible and did not reflect an intent 

to abandon her ownership interest. On this record, the jury 

reasonably could have rejected Hill’s abandonment defense.

Hill’s reliance on Quinn v. Quinn (1889) 81 Cal. 14, 

is misplaced. In Quinn, our state’s high court held sufficient 

evidence supported a trial court’s finding that a plaintiff 

abandoned his ownership interest in a quarry after he left 

the area for several months and told several people “that he 

had no interest in the quarry.” (Id. at pp. 17–18.) Unlike in

Quinn, the question here is not whether there is sufficient 

evidence that Young abandoned her interest in LBAO; instead, 

it is whether the evidence compels such a finding. Plainly, for 

the reasons discussed above, it does not.2 

2 Even if Young had the burden of proof on the issue, for the 

same reasons, we would conclude substantial evidence supports 
17

3. The court did not err by failing to instruct the jury 

on the date of valuation

During a discussion outside the jury’s presence, the trial 

court noted it would not allow the jury to award Young damages 

based on a valuation of LBAO from before she left the practice. 

Instead, the court ruled, the jury must use a valuation of the 

company as of the time of trial. Despite this ruling, the court 

did not instruct the jury on which date to use to value LBAO. 

Hill argues the court’s failure to do so warrants reversal.

Young contends Hill is barred from raising this issue on 

appeal because he did not timely raise it below. We agree. When 

“ ‘the court gives an instruction correct in law, but the party 

complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, 

he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in 

order to have the error reviewed.’ ” (Conservatorship of Gregory

(2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 514, 520; see People v. Franco (2009) 180 

Cal.App.4th 713, 719 [“a party forfeits any challenge to a jury 

instruction that was correct in law and responsive to the evidence 

if the party fails to object in the trial court”].) Hill never 

requested the court specifically instruct the jury on the date 

of valuation. His failure to do so forfeits the issue on appeal. 

Even if we were to overlook the forfeiture, we would reject 

Hill’s argument on the merits. While discussing the issue with 

the parties, it appears the court erroneously believed Young was 

seeking compensation for the loss of her ownership interest in 

LBAO. As discussed above, it is apparent Young instead sought 

the jury’s implicit finding that Young did not abandon her 

ownership interest in LBAO.
18

damages for the loss in value of her interest. To calculate those 

damages, the jury had to consider two valuations: a valuation 

without the wrongdoing and a valuation with the wrongdoing. 

The difference between the two is the loss of value. It would 

have been error, therefore, for the court to have instructed the 

jury to use only the value as of the date of trial. 

We also reject Hill’s argument that the jury improperly 

assumed LBAO had lost all its value as of the date of trial. As 

noted above, it appears the jury did not conclude the company 

had lost all its value. Even if it had, during his closing argument, 

Hill urged the jury to find LBAO’s current value “is zero.” Hill 

cannot complain on appeal that the jury ultimately agreed with 

him.

4. There is a sufficient nexus between Hill’s misconduct

and the loss in value to LBAO

Hill argues there is an insufficient causal connection 

between his wrongdoing—failing to deposit into LBAO’s account 

the income he received under the HealthCare Partners contract—

and the loss in value of Young’s interest in LBAO. He argues 

the undisputed evidence shows the loss was the result of 

Young’s voluntary decision to leave the practice, rather than 

any wrongdoing on his part. 

The test for causation in a breach of contract action is

whether the breach was a substantial factor in causing the 

damages. (Jenni Rivera Enterprises, LLC v. Latin World 

Entertainment Holdings, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 766, 792.) 

At trial, Young testified she left the practice in July 2019 

because, without the income from the HealthCare Partners 

contract, she was struggling to cover the company’s overhead 

expenses and pay herself sufficient income. She also explained 
19

that LBAO’s lease was expiring at the time, and she was not 

willing to enter into a new lease with Hill while he was in 

breach of their partnership agreement. On this record, the jury 

reasonably could have concluded Hill’s diversion of funds was 

a substantial factor in Young seeking alternative employment, 

which effectively destroyed the practice. Indeed, it would be 

unreasonable to expect Young to continue to work with Hill 

while he essentially was embezzling funds from the practice. 

Accordingly, we reject Hill’s argument that there is not a 

sufficient causal connection between his wrongdoing and 

the loss in value to Young’s ownership interest in LBAO. 

5. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding 

that Hill breached a contract with Young

Hill argues there is insufficient evidence to support the 

jury’s finding that he agreed to deposit into LBAO’s account all 

the income from the HealthCare Partners contract. According 

to Hill, the record shows he and Young disagreed about whether 

the income belonged to LBAO. Therefore, he argues, there 

was a “fundamental lack of mutual consent” concerning how to 

handle the income, which precluded the jury from finding he was 

contractually obligated to deposit the funds into LBAO’s account.3

3 Young urges us not to consider Hill’s arguments to the 

extent they concern the court’s denial of his motion for JNOV, 

including his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the jury’s finding that he breached a contract. She 

argues that, because the denial of a JNOV motion is directly 

appealable, Hill was required to identify it specifically in his 

notice of appeal. Hill, however, identified only the amended 

judgment in his notice. We need not decide the issue because, 

even if we lack jurisdiction to review the court’s denial of 
20

“Contract formation requires mutual consent, which cannot 

exist unless the parties ‘agree upon the same thing in the same 

sense.’ (Civ. Code, § 1580; see also §§ 1550, 1565.)” (Bustamante 

v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 208.) “[T]he consent 

of the parties to a contract must be communicated by each party 

to the other. (Civ. Code, § 1565, subd. 3.) ‘Mutual assent is 

determined under an objective standard applied to the outward 

manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable 

meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed 

intentions or understandings.’ [Citation.]” (Serafin v. Balco 

Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 173.) “If there 

is no evidence establishing a manifestation of assent to the ‘same 

thing’ by both parties, then there is no mutual consent to contract 

and no contract formation.” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. 

Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 811.) 

Whether mutual consent existed is a question of fact, which 

we review for substantial evidence. (Martinez v. BaronHR, Inc. 

(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 962, 966.) In doing so, we presume the 

jury found every fact and drew every permissible inference 

necessary to support its verdict, and we defer to the jury’s 

determination of the credibility of witnesses and weight of 

the evidence. (Ibid.) 

Based on Young’s testimony at trial, the jury reasonably 

could have found she and Hill orally agreed to deposit all the 

money generated from their partnership into LBAO. The jury 

also reasonably could have found this oral agreement governed 

Hill’s JNOV motion, we have jurisdiction to consider the same 

arguments in connection with our review of the final judgment 

and the denial of Hill’s motion for new trial.
21

the income Hill received under the HealthCare Partners contract. 

Young presented evidence that—although Hill was the only 

party to the HealthCare Partners contract—he treated patients 

under the contract the same as any other LBAO patient. Because 

Hill was using LBAO’s resources to care for those patients, it 

is reasonable to assume the parties would have wanted some 

agreement about how to handle the revenue and costs associated 

with the HealthCare Partners contract. It is undisputed, 

however, that the parties never specifically discussed those 

issues. This strongly suggests Hill and Young both understood 

the HealthCare Partners contract was to be governed by 

their preexisting agreement to contribute all income to LBAO. 

Consistent with such an understanding—and contrary to Hill’s 

current claim that he believed the income belonged to him 

personally—Hill initially deposited into LBAO’s account all 

the income he received under the HealthCare Partners contract.

On this record, the jury reasonably could have found 

Young and Hill implicitly agreed the income from the HealthCare 

Partners contract was subject to their 1999 oral agreement. 

The jury also reasonably could have found that, under the terms 

of the oral agreement, the income belonged to LBAO. That 

the record might support alternative findings is irrelevant. 

(See Claussen v. First American Title Guaranty Co. (1986) 

186 Cal.App.3d 429, 431 [“We review the evidence on appeal 

in favor of the prevailing party, resolving conflicts and drawing 

reasonable inferences in support of the judgment.”].)

6. The trial court did not err in granting Hill’s motion 

for directed verdict on Young’s conspiracy claim

During a break in the trial, the court noted it had a 

problem with Young’s conspiracy claim because “[y]ou can’t have 
22

[a] conspiracy between one person and his corporation. It has 

to be two separate individuals.” The court gave the parties 

citations to several cases standing for that proposition. The court 

said it would “go over that [at a later time], but I’m just letting 

you know that legally, as alleged, it’s not possible.” Young said

she would address the issue.

During a later discussion, the court noted it would not 

instruct the jury on conspiracy for the reasons it had explained 

earlier. The court remarked: “[Y]our whole theory is . . . that the 

conspiring party is Dr. Hill and his corporation. That is legally 

impossible. . . . [I]n order to have a conspiracy, you need two 

separate entities where there has to be a meeting of mind[s]

to conspire. That’s not the case here.” Young did not respond.

On appeal, Young acknowledges the general rule that 

an agent of a corporation cannot conspire with the corporation. 

(See Kerr v. Rose (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1564 [a 

“corporation cannot conspire with its agents”]; Black v. Bank 

of America (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1, 4 [same].) Nevertheless, 

she argues the court erred because this case falls within several 

exceptions to that general rule. (See, e.g., Black, at p. 4.) 

However, Young did not make this argument in the trial court. 

Indeed, she did not even object when the court indicated it was 

inclined to grant a directed verdict in Hill’s favor. Her failure 

to make a timely objection and advance these arguments below 

forfeits the issue on appeal. (See Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State 

Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1433 [“if an 

appellant wishes to argue a point on appeal, it must first make 

a record by raising the point in the trial court”].)

Even if we were to overlook the forfeiture, we would reject 

Young’s arguments on the merits. A civil conspiracy requires 
23

an express or tacit agreement to commit a civil wrong or tort. 

(Navarrete v. Meyer (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1293.) As best 

we can tell, Hill is the sole shareholder, principal, and employee 

of Hill, Inc. Therefore, in order to have conspired with the 

corporation, Hill must have reached an agreement with himself, 

albeit while operating in a different capacity. Young fails to 

present any authority that a civil conspiracy may be premised 

on an individual forming an agreement with himself in different 

capacities. Absent such authority, she has not met her burden 

to demonstrate reversible error.

7. The trial court erred in granting Hill’s motion 

for directed verdict on Young’s concealment claim 

and request for punitive damages

After Young presented her case, the court granted a 

directed verdict for Hill on her fraudulent concealment claim, 

apparently on the basis that Hill had no duty to disclose his 

diversion of funds if the information was otherwise available 

to Young. The court explained the evidence showed that, 

once Young started looking at LBAO’s financial records in 

2017, it took her only a few days to discover Hill had not been 

contributing all the income from the HealthCare Partners 

contract. The court also granted a directed verdict for Hill 

with regard to Young’s request for punitive damages, noting 

this was “simply a contract dispute” that lacked any evidence 

of oppression, malice, or fraud. Young argues the court erred 

because she presented sufficient evidence to support her 

concealment claim and request for punitive damages.

“A directed verdict is . . . subjected to de novo appellate 

review. . . . ‘A motion for a directed verdict “is in the nature 

of a demurrer to the evidence, and is governed by practically 
24

the same rules, and concedes as true the evidence on behalf 

of the adverse party, with all fair and reasonable inferences to 

be deduced therefrom.” ’ ” (Brassinga v. City of Mountain View

(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 195, 210, fn. omitted.) “ ‘A defendant 

is entitled to a [directed verdict] if the trial court determines 

that, as a matter of law, the evidence presented by plaintiff 

is insufficient to permit a jury to find in his favor. [Citation.] 

“In determining whether plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient, 

the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility 

of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to plaintiff 

must be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be 

disregarded. . . .” ’ ” (Colbaugh v. Hartline (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 

1516, 1521.)

“ ‘ “The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action

for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, 

concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity 

(or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; 

(d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” ’ ” (Thrifty 

Payless, Inc. v. The Americana at Brand, LLC (2013) 218 

Cal.App.4th 1230, 1239.) “Concealment is a term of art which 

includes mere nondisclosure when a party has a duty to disclose.” 

(Reed v. King (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 261, 265.) There are four 

circumstances under which a defendant’s nondisclosure may 

amount to actionable fraud: “(1) when the defendant is in a 

fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant 

had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the 

plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact 

from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial 

representations but also suppresses some material facts.” 

(Heliotis v. Schuman (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 646, 651.) 
25

Here, there is sufficient evidence from which the jury 

reasonably could have found all the elements of a fraudulent 

concealment claim. As to the first element, given the jury’s 

finding that Hill was in a fiduciary relationship with Young—

a finding Hill does not meaningfully challenge on appeal—

the jury could have found he had a duty to disclose to Young 

any diversion of LBAO’s funds. It is undisputed, however, that 

Hill waited several years to reveal to Young that he had been 

depositing checks from the HealthCare Partners contract into 

his own account. 

There is also sufficient evidence from which the jury could 

have found Hill had the requisite knowledge. As discussed above, 

Young presented evidence that she and Hill entered into an 

oral agreement under which they agreed to share all income 

from the practice. The jury could have found Hill was aware 

this agreement governed the HealthCare Partners contract 

and required that he deposit all the income he received into 

LBAO’s account. Indeed, he did precisely that for several years. 

For the same reasons, the jury could have found Hill knew he

had a duty to disclose to Young his diversion of funds, yet he

knowingly declined to do so.

Young also presented sufficient evidence to prove Hill 

acted with a fraudulent intent. It is reasonable to infer from the 

circumstances that Hill knew Young would be upset that he was 

diverting LBAO funds into his own account. It is also reasonable 

to infer Hill concealed that information from Young so she would 

not seek the money owed to her and would continue contributing 

to the practice. 

Finally, there is sufficient evidence of the two remaining 

elements: justifiable reliance and resulting damages. The jury 
26

reasonably could have found that, based on their past work 

history and personal friendship, Young trusted Hill and did 

not suspect he was diverting funds from the practice. Young, 

moreover, testified that, shortly after discovering Hill’s actions, 

she confronted him and demanded he repay her. Based on this

evidence, it is reasonable to infer that, had Hill disclosed his 

diversion of funds earlier, Young immediately would have taken 

action to recover her share of the funds. The jury also reasonably 

could have found Young suffered damages by continuing to 

contribute to the practice while receiving significantly less 

compensation than she was owed. 

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to 

Young—as we must—the jury reasonably could have found she 

proved all the elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment. 

Based on the same evidence, the jury also reasonably could 

have found Hill was “guilty of . . . fraud,” which would warrant 

an award of punitive damages. (See Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a) 

[a jury may award punitive damages where there is clear and 

convincing evidence of fraud].) Indeed, we see no meaningful 

distinction between Hill’s alleged misconduct and theft by 

embezzlement, which is a type of fraud. (See Pen. Code, § 503 

[“Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by 

a person to whom it has been intrusted.”]; CALCRIM No. 1806 

[restating the elements of theft by embezzlement].) The court, 

therefore, erred by entering a directed verdict in favor of Hill on

Young’s concealment claim and request for punitive damages.

Hill argues he could not be found liable for fraudulent 

concealment because the record shows Young would have 

discovered his diversion of funds had she exercised reasonable 

diligence. Hill, however, overlooks that the jury could have 
27

found—and did, in fact, find—he and Young were in a fiduciary 

relationship, which would excuse any diligence requirement. 

As the California Supreme Court has explained, when parties are 

in a fiduciary relationship, “ ‘ “there is no duty of inquiry until 

the relationship is repudiated. The nature of the relationship 

is such as to cause the plaintiff to rely on the fiduciary, and 

awareness of facts which would ordinarily call for investigation 

does not excite suspicion under these circumstances.” ’ ” (Alliance 

Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1240; see 

Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956) 47 Cal.2d 540, 559–560 [“where 

a fiduciary relationship exists, facts which would ordinarily 

require investigation may not excite suspicion”]; see also Hobbs 

v. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 

174, 202 [“[w]here there is a fiduciary relationship, the usual 

duty of diligence to discover facts does not exist”].) Whether 

Young easily could have discovered Hill’s misconduct might be 

relevant to the issue of justifiable reliance, but it does not present 

a complete bar to her claim. 

Mesmer v. White (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 665 is 

distinguishable. The parties in that case were not in a 

confidential relationship, so the party accused of fraudulent 

concealment did not have a special duty of disclosure. (Id. at 

pp. 669–670.) Absent a special duty, the fact that the other party 

could have discovered the truth “had diligent inquiry been made” 

was enough to defeat his fraud claim. (Id. at p. 674.) Here, in 

contrast, the jury reasonably could have concluded Young and

Hill were in a fiduciary relationship, which imposed on Hill a 

duty to disclose his diversion of funds and relieved Young of any 

inquiry obligation. Mesmer, therefore, is inapposite and no help 

to Hill. 
28

8. The court erred in eliminating the jury’s award 

of prejudgment interest

Young argues the court erred by eliminating the jury’s 

award of prejudgment interest. She contends the court 

erroneously believed the jury awarded her interest under 

Civil Code section 3287, rather than Civil Code section 3288.

a. Background

The court instructed the jury it had discretion to award 

prejudgment interest on any damages it awarded to either party. 

The court also instructed the jury with CACI No. 3935, which 

is a standard jury instruction concerning prejudgment interest 

under Civil Code section 3288. The jury, in turn, awarded Young 

$222,167 for “[i]nterest on profits taken by Defendants.” The 

special verdict form did not indicate whether the jury awarded 

the interest on the damages for the breach of contract, the breach 

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or the 

breach of fiduciary duty. 

In his post-trial motions, Hill argued the jury’s interest 

award was excessive and legally impermissible. He asserted 

the court had improperly instructed the jury it could award 

Young interest under Civil Code section 3288, which applies 

only to non-contractual claims. According to Hill, Young was 

not entitled to interest under that statute because the court had 

dismissed her fraudulent concealment claim, which was her only 

non-contractual claim. Hill alternatively argued the jury used 

an excessive interest rate to calculate the award.

In opposing Hill’s motions, Young focused her argument on 

his contention that the jury had used an excessive interest rate. 

In passing, she also noted that, even if she were not entitled to 

non-contractual interest, the award “need not fall under Civil 
29

Code section 3288.” Young did not specify on what other basis 

the jury could have awarded her interest.

The court agreed with Hill and eliminated the jury’s award 

of prejudgment interest. Although not entirely clear, the court 

seemed to base its decision on its belief that the jury awarded

Young interest under Civil Code section 3287, rather than Civil 

Code section 3288. The court determined this was error because 

a plaintiff’s entitlement to interest under Civil Code section 3287 

presents a legal question for the court to decide. The court then 

determined Young was not entitled to such an award because 

her damages were not certain or readily calculable, as required 

under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a).

b. Analysis

Whether a plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest 

depends on the nature of the claim and the type of damages 

sought. Under Civil Code section 3287, a plaintiff is entitled 

to interest on “damages certain, or capable of being made certain 

by calculation . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 3287, subd. (a).) Alternatively, 

under Civil Code section 3288, a jury has discretion to award 

interest in “an action for the breach of an obligation not 

arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, 

or malice . . . .” A jury may award interest under Civil Code 

section 3288 “[w]hen, by virtue of the fraud or breach of fiduciary 

duty of the defendant, a plaintiff has been deprived of the use of 

his money or property and is obliged to resort to litigation to

recover it,” such that the inclusion of interest is necessary to 

make the plaintiff whole. (Nordahl v. Department of Real Estate

(1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 657, 665.)

Young contends that, because she prevailed on her 

breach of fiduciary duty claim—which was premised on a 
30

non-contractual obligation—the jury had discretion to award her 

interest under Civil Code section 3288. Hill concedes the point. 

Nevertheless, he contends Young forfeited the issue by failing 

to raise it in opposition to his post-trial motions.

Although the forfeiture rule generally precludes a party 

from making a new argument on appeal, it is not absolute. 

A reviewing court may consider a new argument on appeal if 

it involves a legal issue based on undisputed facts. (Krechuniak 

v. Noorzoy (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 713, 725.) Here, whether the 

court erred by reducing the jury’s award of interest is a pure 

question of law, and it does not turn on any disputed facts. 

Indeed, Hill essentially concedes that, had Young made 

the argument below, the trial court would have (or at least 

should have) ruled in her favor. We decline to apply the 

forfeiture rule under these circumstances. 

Hill alternatively contends Young forfeited the issue by 

failing to file her own motion for a new trial seeking interest 

under Civil Code section 3288. We are at a loss to understand 

why she would have been required to do so. After all, the jury 

awarded Young interest under Civil Code section 3288, so there 

was no reason for her to move for a new trial. 

Hill next argues Young cannot recover prejudgment 

interest because she failed to request that the jury identify for 

which claim it made the award. Therefore, he argues, there is 

no way to tell whether the jury awarded interest on the damages 

for breach of contract—which would be improper—or on the 

damages for breach of fiduciary duty—which is permitted under 

Civil Code section 3288. 

We acknowledge Young should have requested that the 

special verdict form ask the jury to determine damages for each 
31

of her claims separately. Indeed, the court brought the potential 

issue to her attention, but she declined to heed its advice. 

However, Hill approved a similar verdict form for his request for 

interest, which also did not ask the jury to differentiate between 

his contractual and non-contractual claims. We highly doubt 

that, had the jury found in Hill’s favor and awarded him interest, 

he would have conceded the verdict form was fatally defective. 

In any event, the ambiguity in the verdict form does not 

warrant overturning the jury’s award. Young’s contractual and 

fiduciary duty claims were premised on essentially the same 

facts—Hill’s diversion of income from the HealthCare Partners 

contract—and she sought identical damages for each—the profits 

she would have earned on that income and the loss in value 

of her interest in LBAO. The jury found Young proved all her 

claims, and we can conceive no reasonable basis for it to have 

determined she suffered different damages for each. For 

the same reason, we can conceive of no plausible reason why 

the jury would have awarded Young prejudgment interest for 

the contractual claims, but not the same interest for the breach 

of fiduciary duty claim, especially given the court instructed 

the jury to use the same standard to determine whether to award 

interest for both types of claims. It is apparent, therefore, that 

had the court instructed the jury to calculate damages for each 

claim separately, the jury would have awarded Young $222,167 

of interest on the damages for the breach of fiduciary duty. 

Accordingly, any ambiguity in the special verdict form does 

not warrant invalidating the jury’s award. 
32

9. The court erred in reducing the jury’s award of 

loss-of-value damages

In his post-trial motions, Hill argued the evidence did 

not support the jury’s decision to award Young $300,000 for 

loss-of-value damages. According to Hill, neither expert testified 

to that amount, and Young’s expert erroneously assumed Young 

would continue to work at the practice. Hill also argued the jury 

should have awarded damages based on LBAO’s value as of the 

date of trial, when the business was at a “ ‘pre-bankruptcy’ ” 

and “ ‘pre-liquidation’ ” level.

The court agreed with Hill in part, finding the jury’s award 

was excessive. The court reasoned, “Plaintiff’s expert valued 

the practice on the assumption that two physicians would be 

working in the practice, and that assumption was incorrect. 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff left the practice and had not 

been working there since July 19, 2019 well before the date 

of valuation. The court believes that one physician working 

should reduce Plaintiff’s damages by half.” The court, therefore, 

conditioned the denial of Hill’s motion for new trial on Young 

agreeing to a reduction in her loss-of-value damages from 

$300,000 to $150,000. 

“[W]hen a trial court grants a new trial on the issue of 

excessive damages, whether or not such order is conditioned 

by a demand for reduction, the presumption of correctness 

normally accorded on appeal to the jury’s verdict is replaced 

by a presumption in favor of the order.” (Neal v. Farmers Ins. 

Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 932.) Therefore, we will reverse 

an order reducing damages on the ground that they were 

excessive only if the trial court abused its discretion. (Id.

at pp. 932–933; see Pearl v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 36 
33

Cal.App.5th 475, 486 [“We review the trial court’s use of its 

power of remittitur to reduce excessive damages for abuse of 

discretion.”].) A court abuses its discretion when, considering the 

law and all the relevant circumstances, its decision “ ‘ “exceeds 

the bounds of reason and results in a miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” 

(Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 329, 378.)

Here, it appears the trial court reduced Young’s damages 

based on a misunderstanding of the basis for the jury’s award. 

Although not entirely clear, it seems the court erroneously 

believed the jury was compensating Young for the loss of her 

interest in LBAO. In fact, the jury was compensating Young for

the loss in value of that interest. To calculate those damages, 

the jury had to consider LBAO’s value without the wrongdoing 

and its value with the wrongdoing. The parties agreed LBAO 

was worth more than $600,000 when they both were working 

at the practice, and its value decreased significantly—to a 

pre-bankruptcy level—after Young left the practice. Given 

those valuations, the jury reasonably could have determined 

Hill’s wrongdoing caused LBAO’s value to decrease by $600,000. 

Because Young owned 50 percent of the business, her share of 

the loss would be $300,000. 

The jury’s award was reasonable, and there was no basis

for the trial court to reduce it by half. The court, therefore, 

abused its discretion by conditioning the denial of Hill’s 

motion for new trial on Young’s agreement to a reduction 

in her damages. 
34

DISPOSITION

We reverse the judgment on Young’s fraudulent 

concealment claim and request for punitive damages, and we 

remand the case for a new trial on these issues. On remand, 

the court shall reinstate the jury’s damages award, including the 

award of interest. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. 

Serena Young shall recover her costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

LAVIN, J.