I n 2005 the leg islature abolished the Texas Workers’ Compensation C o m m ission and 1 cre ated the D ivision of W orker s’ Compensation in its pl ace . See Act of Ma y 29, 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 265 §§ 8.001(b), .004(a ), 2005 Tex. Gen. L aws 469, 607-08. T he fe e disputes that form the basis of this suit were dismissed by the TWCC . Howeve r, for simpli city

and cla rity we will re fer to both the Division and its predece ssor, the TWCC, as “the Division.” 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00 054 -CV

Te xa s M ut ualIns ur anc e Co m pany , A ppe lla nt

v. Apollo E nterprises , Inc., Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-05- 0035 48 , HO NORAB LE GISELA TRIANA-DO Y AL , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I ON This is a statutory - and r

ule-c onstruction case involving fee -dispute claims broug ht by appellee Apollo Enterpr ises, I nc. (“Apollo”) a g ainst appellant Te x as Mutual Insuranc e Company (“Te x as Mutual”) in the Division of Workers’ Compensation (“ Division”). The Division dismiss ed 1 Ap oll o’ s c la ims , c on c lud ingtha t Apo llo wa s no t a pro pe r p art y to t he Di vis ion ’s fe e -d isp ute resolution proce ss. Apollo filed suit in Tra vis County

district court cha lleng ing the dismiss als. The trial court g rante d Apollo’s motion f or summary

judgme nt and orde red the fee disputes at issue
re mand e d to the Di vis ion
. B e c a us e the Di vis ion ’s int e rp re tatio n o f t he pla in l angua g e of

its ru le is2

neither contra

ry to the rule itself nor to the statute, nor plainly err oneous, we will r ever s e t h e t ri al court’s judg ment and re nder judg ment aff irming the Division’s dismi ssal order
. BACK GR OUND Under the worke rs’ c ompensation scheme established by the Texas L eg islature and administered by the Divi sion, injured workers rece ive m edica l car e and pharma ceutica ls free at the point of service
. The healthcar e provider t hat s erve s the i njured worker is responsible for submitting claims to the appropr iate wor kers’ compensation insurer. Texas Mutual is a n o n -prof it insurance c ompany

established by

statute to provide worke rs’ c ompensation insuranc e in competition with other insurers. Apollo is a corpor ation that purc ha se s w or

ke rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n r e imb ur se me nt ri g hts fr om p ha rm a c ie s th a t di sp e ns e dr

ug s to injured worke rs. When one of Apollo’s client phar macies dispense s a drugto an injured wor ker, Apollo pa y s the pharma cy a contr actua lly ag ree d sum in ex chang e for the phar macy ’s statutory

rig ht of re imbursement from the a pplicable wor

kers’ compensation insurance c arr ier
. Apollo then
a ssume s th e burd e n o f s e e kin g re imb ur se me nt a nd the ri sk of no n- pa y me nt. The maximum amount of reimbursement that a he althcar e provide r may rec eive f or a drug is controlled by

administrative re g ulation. See 2 8 T e x. A dmi n . Co d e § 1 3 4
. 5 0 3 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ( T e x. Div. of Workers’ Comp., Med. S er vices, Char g es, & Pay ments); Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 413.011 (West 2006). Division rule 134.503 requir es that the ma x i m um reimburseme nt be the lesser of t h re e a m o u n t s : (1 ) t h e p h arm ac y ’s u s u al an d cu s t o m ary

ch ar ge f o r t h e s am e o r s i m i l ar

dru g; (2 ) t he ave ra g e wh ole sa le pr ic e on the date of

dis pe ns ing ; or

(3 ) a negot iat ed or

c on tr a c t amou

nt. 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 134.503. I f there is a dispute as to the proper amount o f r ei m b u rs em entApollo disputes Tex as Mutual’s cha rac terization of the claims as inflated. 2 3 betwee n the hea lthcare provider a nd the insurer , and the pr ovider c laims to be unpaid or under paid, the provider

is allowed to file a f

ee- dispute claim with the Divis ion. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 413.031 (West 2006); 28 Tex. Admin. C ode § 133.307 (2002) (Tex. Div. of Workers’ Comp., Gen. Med. Provisions), repeale d and re-e nacted by 31 Tex. Reg. 10313 (2006). The same rule allows an insurer to see k to rec over if it over pay s a cla im. 28 Tex . Admin. Code § 133.307(b)(2)
. T e xa s M ut

u a l a c c e p t e d

and pa id c la ims su

bmi tte d b y

Ap oll o w ith out c on te st f

or so me tim e be fo re the fe e dis pute s in qu e sti on aro se . Tex as Mutua l a lle g e s th a t be g inn ingso me tim e in 2001, it rea liz ed that Apollo was submi tting cla ims for pay ment to Texas Mutual that were g reater t h an t h e c o s tAp o l l o ’s cl i en tp h arm ac i es we re ch ar gi n g t h e ge n er al p u b l i c f o r t h e s am e d ru g. 2 Con c lud ingtha

t th e amou

nts c la ime d w e re mor e tha n the a llo wa

ble ma ximum , T e xas M utu a l pa id Ap oll o le ss tha

n what it ha d re qu e ste d. Te xas Mut ua l bas e d its pay

me nts to A

po llo on an e sti mate it f or mul a te d u sin g pr ic e data it h a d r e c e ive d f

ro m “ a c omp any

that ha d c on tr a c te d w ith 50,000 pharma cies nationwide and hundre ds of p h armacies in Texas for the pa y ment of presc ription drug s.” Thus, Texas Mutual paid Apollo what it believed to be the pha rmac ies’ usual
and c us tom ary

c ha rg e s. Ap oll o d isp ute d th e re imb ur se me nt a mou nts andbro ughtsev eral th ou sa nd fe e -d isp ute
c la ims to the Di vis ion
. Th e Di vis ion dis mis se d Apo llo ’s c la ims , c on c lud ingthat Apo llo wa s n ot a proper party to the disputes beca

use par ties to fee disputes are limit ed by Division rule 133.307(b)( 1) to healthca

re pr oviders and insura

nce c arr iers. See 2 8 Tex. Admin. C ode § 133.307(b) (1). The Division found that Apollo was not a “he alth car e provide r” a s defined in r ule 133.1(a )(9) , andApollo did not ap p ea l the Division’s dismis sal order s that were based on la ck of 3 t i m el y fi l i n g. The c laims at is s u e i n t h i s appea l were filed betwe en F ebrua ry 27, 2003 and November

1, 2004. We cite the statutes and rule s as they then exist ed unless other wise indicate d. 4 there fore was not a pr oper pa rty
. See 28 Tex. Adm i n . C o d e § 133.1(a) (9) ( 2002) (Te x . Div. of Workers’ Comp., Def

initions ), repeale d by 31 Tex. Reg. 3544 ( May 2, 2006). Apollo so u g h t j u d ic ia l r e v ie w o f th e a g e n c y ’ s d e c is io nin T r a v is Co u n ty

D is tr ict Court. The par

ties filed cr oss-motions for summary judgme nt. T h e t rial cour t gr anted Apollo’s motion in part and remanded the fee disputes at i ssue i n this appea l to the Division. The trial court also g rante d Texas Mutual’s motion i n part, dismissing some fe e disputes on proc edura l gr ounds beca use they wer e not timely

filed with the Division. I n a single issue on appea l, T ex as M u tual 3
asser ts that the Division’s inter pretation of the rele vant statutes and rules wa s proper , and ther efor e Ap ollo was not a prope r par ty to bring a fe e dispute. Texas Mutual seeks r ever sal of the district court’s or der a

nd rendition of judg ment in its favor.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Ge n er ally , an ag ency ’s rules a nd decisions ar e re viewed unde r the substantial-evidenc e rule , b ut the sole issue in this appeal is the prope r construc tion of an administrative rule. We c onstrue administrative r ules in the same manner a s statutes since they have the forc e and e ffe ct of

statutes. State Office of Risk Mgm t. v. Lawton , N o . 0 8

- 0 3 6 3 , 2 0 0 9 T e x. L EXI S 629, at *6 (Te x . Aug . 28, 2009); Rodriguez v. Servic e Lloyds Ins. Co. , 997 S.W .2d 248, 254 (Tex
. 1 9 9 9 ). Unless the rule is ambiguous, we follow the rule’ s clea r languag e. Rodriguez ,5

997 S.W .2d at 254. Our primar y objective in interpr eting a rule is to giv e ef fe ct t o the ag ency ’s intent. Id. We defe r to an a g ency ’s i nterpre tation of i ts own rule unless it i s inconsistent with the rule or is plainly

err oneous. Rodriguez , 9 97 S.W. 2d a t 25 5; Public Utilit

y Comm’n v . Gulf States Utils. Co. , 8 09 S.W. 2d

20 1, 20 7 ( Te x. 19 91 ); ASAP Paging Inc

. v. P u blic Utility Comm’n , 213 S.W .3d 380, 394 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied).
DI SCU SSIO N I n it s so le iss ue on

a pp e a l, T e xas M utual asse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d w he n it deter mined that Apollo w as a proper party to the Division fe e disputes. We r eview this dec ision de
novo. Texas Mun. Power Age ncy , 253 S.W .3d at 192. Texas Mutua l advanc es two main theorie s in support of its argumen t
. First, it argues that the Division proper ly dismiss ed the f

ee disputes beca use the Division’s interpre tation of its own rule was not contra ry to the statute or the r

ule itself,
no r w a s it

pla inl y e rr on e ou s. Se c on d, it urg e s th a t e ve n if ru le 13 3. 30 7( b) (1 ) a llo wed Apo ll o to pa rt ic ipate in f

e e dis pute s, Ap oll o w ou ld l a c k stand ing to do so b e c a us e the re is n o “ un de rp a id h e a lth
c are pr ov ide r” a s r e qu ir ed un der sec tio n 4 13 .0 31 (a )( 1) of the la bo r c od e . B e c a

us e we a g re e wi th Texas Mutual’s first theory , we ne ed not addr ess the sec ond.

Apo llo do e s n ot a sse rt

that th e Di vis ion

e xce e de d it s st a tut or

y a uth or ity wh e n it orig inally promulg ated the rules in question, but does challeng e the Division’s curre nt interpretation ba rr ingAp oll o f

ro m th e fe e -d isp ute pr oc e ss. Th e re fo re , we wi ll a ssume the ru le s are va lid on the ir fac e, and w ill analy

ze the Division’s interpretation of the rules, g iving de fer ence to the Division’s interpre tation if it is not inconsistent with the s tatute or the rule, nor plainly err oneous. Rodriguez , 997 S.W .2d at 254-55.I n it s d ism iss a l or de r, the Di vis ion a lso no te d th a t r

ule 13 4. 80 1( g ) a llo ws a

bil lin g a g e nt, 4 a s def ine d in the ru le , to subm it bill s on beh a lf of a he a lth c are pr ov ide r, and no te d th a t Apo llo did not q u al i fy as a billing a g ent. See 28 Tex. Admin. C ode § 133.308(g ) (2002) , repeale d and re-e nacted by 31 Tex. Reg
. 10314 (2006). The Divisi on further noted that eve n if Apollo did qualify as a billing ag ent, it was still barr ed from participatingin fee disputes beca use rule 133.307 doe s not g rant “par ty ” status to a billing ag ent. B eca use Apollo does not claim to be a billing ag ent as that term is define d in the rule, we need not a ddress this issue. We n ote that th e le g isl a tur e , e ff e c tiv e S ept embe r 1 , 2 00 5, a me nd e d th e la bo r c od e to 5 require the Division to adopt rules to allow age nts and assignee s of phar macies to proc ess claims and act on be half of pha

rmac ies in medical fe e disputes. Act of J une 1, 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 265, § 3
. 2 3 4 , 2 0 0 5 T e x G e n . Law s 4 6 9 , 5 4 9 ( c o d i f i e d a tT e x . La

b
. C o d e § 4 1 3
. 0 1 1 1 )
. A c c o r d i n g l y, 6 I n dismiss ing Apollo’s fee disputes, the Division concluded that rule 133.307(b)( 1), wh ic h d e fi ne s w ho may

be a pa rt y to a fe e dis pute , is an e xclu siv e lis t of pa rt ie s and thu s p ro hib its Apollo f rom participating beca

use it is not one of the pa rt i es l i sted. See 28 Tex. Admin. C ode 4 § 133.307(b)( 1) (2002) . The plain languag e of rule 133.307(b)( 1) limits t he par ties in a dispute over a “me dical bill” to the “he alth car e provide r . . . and the insurance car rier.” Id. The rule g ives the Di vis ion po we r t o d ism iss a

fe e dis pute if

an “ ind ivi du a l or

e nti ty re qu e sti ng med ica l fee disp ute resolution is not a proper

party to the dispute per subsec tion (b) of this section.” Id. § 133.307(m). Apollo admits that it is not a healthca re pr ovider a s that term is define d in the l abor c ode. See T e x. L ab. Code § 401.011(22)
.

Ap oll o’ s ma in a

rgume nt i s th a t, a s a

c on tr a c tua l as si gne e of

ri g hts be lon g ingto healthca re pr oviders, i t s t ands in the shoes of those providers f or all leg al purposes, inc luding br ing ingfe e -d isp ute c la ims be fo re the Di vis ion . T e xas M utu a l a sse rt s th a t th e la bo r c od e e xpre ssl y prohibits such assign m ents, or in the alter native, that the labor

code a nd the rules pr omulgated by the Division trump the common-law doc trine of a ssignment in the c ontext of a sy stematic re g ulatory scheme for pr oviding he althcar e to injured wor kers de signe d to suppla

nt the common law. We need 5Ap oll o’ s argume nt i s r e le va nt o nly to t he tim e pe ri od

a t is su e in t

his a pp e a l. 7 not rea ch the assigna

bility issue, howeve r, bec ause w e conc lude that rule 133.307, a s interpre ted by the Division, prohibits Apollo f rom participating in f

ee disputes r eg ardle ss of whether the labor c ode
a llo ws a ssi g nme nts —c omm on law o r o the rw ise —o f a he a lth c are pr ov ide r’ s st atu tor y ri g ht t o reimburse ment for se rvice s provided to injured wor kers. Assuming f

or the sake of arg ument that the l abor code doe s not prohibit common-law
a ssi g nme nts of

su c h s tatut or

y re imb ur se me nt ri g hts , an d that Apo llo is a va lid a ssi g ne e of the ri g hts at issue in this case, we conclude that the Division was still wit hin its aut h o ri t y t o l i m it the participa nts in a fee disput e o v er m edica l bills to the insurer a nd the hea lthcare provider, to the exclusion of an assig nee.

First, the Division’s interpr etation of rule 133.307 is not i n c o n s is te nt w it h th e r e levant statut e . T e xas L a

bo r C od e se c tion 41 3.03 1, e nti tle d “ Me dic a l D isp ute Re so lut ion ,” state s in pertinent pa

rt that “a party , including a health care provider, is e ntitled to a reviewof a me dical service provided . . . if a

health ca re provider is .
. . denied pa y ment or paid a

reduc ed amount for

the
me dic a l se rv ic e re nd e re d. ” Te x. L a b. Cod e § 4 13 .0 31 (a )( 1) . O the r tha n the statut e ’s re fe re nc e to a hea lthcare provider, it is silent with respec t to who must be a party or who may not be a pa rty . The statut or y langua g e , th e re fo re , me rely set s a fl oo r f or the ru le make rs a t th e Di vis ion . T he statut e require s that in all medical disput e resolution proce eding s the hea lthcare provider must be a llowed to participate . There fore , in cra fting a rule that, on its fac e, li mits the parties to a fe e dispute over medical bills to a healthca re provider and an insuranc e ca rrier , the Division acted w ithin it s broad statut or y a uth or ity to p ro mul g a te ru le s to imp le me nt a nd e nf or c e the wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n a c t.8

See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 402.061 ( West 2006) (Division’s statutory authority to promulgate rules)
. The Division’s plain-mea ning inter pretation of the rule is not inconsistent with the statute. Se c on d, the Di vis ion ’s int e rp re tatio n o f r ule 13 3. 30 7 is no t inc on sis te nt wi th the ru le itself, nor is it plainly

err oneous. See A SAP Paging Inc. , 2 13 S.W. 3d a t 3 94 . The ru le state s, in pe rt ine nt p art : (b) Par ties. The followingpersons may be re questors and r espondents in medica l fee dis pute s: (1 ) T he he a lthc are pr ov ide r (p ro vid e r) and the ins ur anc e c arr ie r ( c arr ie r) in a dis pute of

a me dic a l bi ll.
28 Tex. Admin. Code § 133.307(b)( 1) (2002). Concluding that Apollo was not a prope r par ty , the Di vis ion ’s dis mis sa l or de r s tate s: Reg ardingthis particular ty pe of dispute, Commission Rule 133.307(b )( 1) specific ally

states that a par

ty to a medica l fee dispute is the ‘hea lth care provider (provider) and the insurance car rier ( car rier) . . .’ I n these disputes, Apollo is a sepa rate and distinct entity fr o m t h e pharma cies that provide the pr escr iptions t o the injured wor kers. The ph armacies provide d the presc riptions and Apollo acted in some othe r role, subje ct to var i o u s contra ctual arr angeme nts. The term ‘he alth car e provide r’ is def ined in Rule 133.1(a) (9) a s so me on e wh o h a s ‘p ro vid e d or re nd e re d’ he a lth c are . . . . In th is s itu a tio n, Ap oll o d id not r ender any health car e and cannot be deeme d to be a hea lth care provider unde r the de fi nit ion

in t he Te xas L a

bo r C od e and

Com mis sio n Ru le s. Apollo admits that it i s n o t a healthca re pr ovider. Apollo simply disputes the Division’s interpre tation of rule 133.307( b)(1) , which re sults in t he exclusion from the fe e-dispute pr ocess of assignees of hea lthcare providers.9 The Division’s i nterpre tation of rule 133.307 limits the participation in fe e disputes to the parties e x pressly

listed in the rule. That interpr etation is not inconsistent with a plain-meaning
rea ding of the rule as it is written; on its face , the rule c an be r ead to limit the parties to a medic al-fe e dispute to those list ed.

Apo l l o argues that rule 133.307 must be r ead in the c ontext of the c ommon-law principle that a

n assig nee sta

nds in the s hoes of an assignor, and thus the Divi sion’s interpre tation of its own rule is plainly err oneous beca use it f ails to a cknowledg e that—at lea st for purpose s of the law of a ssignment—Apollo is the healthca re provider. Assuming without de ciding that the l abor code permits assig nments of t his ty pe, and a ssuming that Apollo has a valid assig nment in this case,
we a re still not persuade d by

Apollo’s argument. One of the Division’s c ore le g islative mandates is to “achie ve ef

fec tive medical c ost control” for the worke rs’ compensation sy stem. Tex. L ab. Code § 413.011(d), ( f)( 1). The Division could reasonably have concluded that allowing an assig nee of the re le va nt h e a lth c are pr ov ide r t o p art ic ipate dir e c tly in t he fe e-dispu te pr oc e ss w ou ld i nc re a se sy stem-wide c osts, thereby frustrating the le g islative mandate. Thereis ev i d en ce o f t h i s co s t -c o n s ci o u s n es s i nt h e T ex as R egi s t er fr o m t he ena ctment of re lated rule 134.801, which prohibited “ the pra ctice where by one entity

pay s a re duced f

ee to the he a lthc are pr ov ide r t

hat pr ov ide d th e tr e a tme nt( s) a nd/or se rv ic e (s ), the n b ill s th e wo rk e rs ’ compensation insurance c arr ier a highe r fe e.” 25 T ex. R eg . 2140, 42 (Mar . 10, 2000). Rule 133.801 pe rm its on ly

bil lin g a g e nts wh o r e mit

10 0% of the ir c oll e c tio ns to a he a lth c are pr ov ide r t o b ill wi thi n the sy stem. Id. The Division conclude d that companies that pay a re duced f

ee to he althcar e providers a

nd bill the sy st em at a hig her r ate “ incre ase[] costs t o the sy stem without adding va lue10

to the sy stem.” Id. Te xas M utu a l c la ims that Apo llo ’s bu sin e ss m od e l is e xac tly the ty pe of bu sin e ss that th e Di vis ion

wa s atte mpt ingto p ro hib it; Ap oll o d isp ute s th is. I n its brief and at oral argument, Apollo downplay ed the sig nificanc e of the quoted Texas Re g is te r la

n g u a g e
— f

ir s t, b e c a u s e it w a s p u

b li s h e d in r e f

e r e n c e to a r e late d r

u le and not
ru le 13 3. 30 7, and , sec on d, be c a us e it sup po se dly do e s not a pp ly to a ssi g ne e s, wh ic h Apo llo c la ims to be. We ag ree that the l anguag e is not directly applicable to rule 133.307 but find it persuasive evidenc e that the Division’s interpre tation of rule 133.307 ha s a re asonable basis, since it appe ars that th e Di vis ion , b y

int e rp re tin g the pl ain langua g e of ru le 13 3. 30 7 a s it

did , s ou g ht t o f

ur the r i ts le g isl a tiv e mand a te to re du c e sy ste m- wi de c os ts. Re qu ir ing the he a lth c are pr ov ide r to be a pa rt y to a fe e dispute appe ars to have been, at least in part, an effor t to reduc e the cost and eff ort nec essar

y to acquire information about “usua l and customary char g es.” O btaining that evidence co uld be
e xpe ns ive and

burd e ns ome if

the he a lth c are pr ov ide r n o lo ng e r h a d a fi na nc ia l in cent ive t o participate in the fe e- d ispute proce ss, as would be the c ase if the provider sold its reimburse ment rig hts to a third party
. See 28 Tex. Admin. C ode 134.503(a)(1) (one of possible amounts of
re imb ur se me nt i s pro vid e r’ s usua l and c us tom ary c ha rg e fo r same or

sim ila r s e rv ic e ). I n a

ny e ve nt,
we ne ed not spec ulate as to what the Division’s motivation was, bec ause a fter c oncluding that the Division’s interpretation of its own r ule is not contra

ry to statute, nor contra

ry to the plain meaning of the rule , nor plainly

err oneous, we defe r to the Divi sion’s interpre tation. Rodriguez , 997 S.W .2d at 254-55. F ina lly , Apo llo c on te nd s that our ho ldi ng in thi s ca se wo uld le a d to a bs ur d r e su lts
. See National Plan Adm’rs, Inc

. v. National Health Ins. Co. , 235 S.W .3d 695, 701 (Tex. 2007) (cour t11

s h o u l d n o tc o n s t r

u e s t a tu t e t o l e a d

t o a b s u r d r e s u l t s i f m o r e r e a s o n a

b l e c o n s t r

u c t i o ne x i s t s )
. It
su g g e sts that if e ve ry fe e dis pute re qu ir e d the he a lth c are pr ov ide r to pa rt ic ipate , the n the do or

wo uld be shut t o fe e d i s p utes in many common case s for the suc cessor s and assig nees of healthca re providers’ claims. In addition, Apollo sugg ests that pharma cies would find it more difficult to g et
cre dit if part of their ac counts rec eivable w as potentially unenfor cea

ble by a cr editor in the eve nt of de fa ult be c a us e that c re dit or

c ou ld n ot b ri nga

fe e -d isp ute c la im und e r ru le 13 3. 30 7. Th is, Ap oll o claims, would discoura g e hea lthcare providers f rom participating in the s y s t em. While the Division’s construction of its rule might ca use tension in some ca ses, they are mere ly

hy pothetical situations, none of which are presented in this case. In the vast majority of ca ses, such a s when one ph arm a c y buy s ano the r, a

he a lth c are pr ov ide r w ou ld s til l e xist a nd c ou ld b ri nga

fe e -d isp ute c la im. I n its drafting and interpr etation of rule 13 3
. 307, the Division was authorized to balanc e the competi n g f

a c to r s o f c o n tr o ll in g in c r e a s in g me d ic a l c o s ts s y s te m- w id e w it he n c o u r a g in g e a s e of
a c c e ss t o p ro vid e rs fo r i nju re d w or ke rs . CO NC LU SION Th e Di vis ion ’s int e rp re tatio n of ru le 13 3. 30 7 is ne ith e r i nc on sis te nt w iththe statut e nor the rule itself, nor is it plainly err oneous. Ac co rd i n gl y , we g ive def ere nce to the D ivision’s interpre tation of its own rule and hold that, unde r rule 133.307, the Division did not e rr in conc luding that Apollo was not a prope r par ty to the Division’s fee- dispute resolution proce ss. We rever se the trial court’s judgme nt with respec t to the dismi ssal order s challeng ed by Apollo and re nder judg ment aff irming the Division’s me dical fee dispute resolution order s dismis sing A pollo Enterprises, Inc.
o nt h e g r o u n d

t h a ti tw a s n o ta

p r o p e r p art y.12 __________________________________________ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Waldrop and He nson Reverse d and Rende red Filed: Oc tober 29, 2009