FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D18-248

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INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF 

DESIGN, INC. and 

INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF 

MERCHANDISING AND DESIGN,

INC.,

Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

Appellee.

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On appeal from a Final Order of the Department of Revenue.

Andrea Moreland, Deputy Executive Director.

December 31, 2018

KETCHEL, TERRANCE R., Associate Judge.

The International Academy of Design, Inc. and The 

International Academy of Merchandising and Design, Inc.

challenge a final order of the Department of Revenue determining 

that they were not eligible for tax exemptions from 2010 to 2013 

under section 212.0602, Florida Statutes (2010). For the reasons 

set forth below, we affirm the final order of the Department of 

Revenue.
2

The tax exemption at issue here involves the interpretation of

and interplay between section 212.0602, Florida Statutes and 

section 212.031(1)(a)9., Florida Statutes. Section 212.0602 

provides certain tax exemptions for “any entity, institution, or 

organization that is primarily engaged in teaching students to 

perform any of the activities or services described in s. 

212.031(1)(a)9.”1 § 212.0602, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Section 

212.031(1)(a)9. provides a separate tax exemption for “[p]roperty 

used as an integral part of the performance of qualified production 

services,” and goes on to define “qualified production services” as 

any activity or service performed directly in connection 

with the production of a qualified motion picture, as 

defined in s. 212.06(1)(b), and includes:

a. Photography, sound and recording, casting, location 

managing and scouting, shooting, creation of special and 

optical effects, animation, adaptation (language, media, 

electronic, or otherwise), technological modifications, 

computer graphics, set and stage support (such as 

electricians, lighting designers and operators, 

greensmen, prop managers and assistants, and grips), 

wardrobe (design, preparation, and management), hair 

and makeup (design, production, and application), 

performing (such as acting, dancing, and playing), 

designing and executing stunts, coaching, consulting, 

writing, scoring, composing, choreographing, script 

supervising, directing, producing, transmitting dailies, 

dubbing, mixing, editing, cutting, looping, printing, 

processing, duplicating, storing, and distributing;

b. The design, planning, engineering, construction, 

alteration, repair, and maintenance of real or personal 

property including stages, sets, props, models, paintings, 

and facilities principally required for the performance of 

those services listed in sub-subparagraph a.; and

 1 The statute also has three other conditions, but they are not 

at issue in this case.
3

c. Property management services directly related to 

property used in connection with the services described 

in sub-subparagraphs a. and b.

§ 212.031(1)(a)9., Fla. Stat. A “qualified motion picture” is defined 

in section 212.06(1)(b) as 

all or any part of a series of related images, either on film, 

tape, or other embodiment, including, but not limited to, 

all items comprising part of the original work and filmrelated products derived therefrom as well as duplicates 

and prints thereof and all sound recordings created to 

accompany a motion picture, which is produced, adapted, 

or altered for exploitation in, on, or through any medium 

or device and at any location, primarily for 

entertainment, commercial, industrial, or educational 

purposes.

§ 212.06(1)(b), Fla. Stat.

When interpreting a statute, the polestar is legislative intent, 

Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003), and the 

primary indicator of the legislature’s intent is the text of the 

statute, Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 297 (Fla. 2000). That 

is to say, “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and 

unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is 

no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation 

and construction.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)

(quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 

1931)). “When considering the [plain] meaning of terms used in a 

statute, this Court looks first to the terms’ ordinary definitions[, 

which] . . . may be derived from dictionaries.” Debaun v. State, 213 

So. 3d 747, 751 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Dudley v. State, 139 So. 3d 273, 

279 (Fla. 2014)). Ambiguity exists where reasonable people can 

find different meanings in the same language. Forsythe v. 

Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 

(Fla. 1992).

The term “describe” as used in the statute can mean either

“list” or “define.” See Describe, Webster’s Third New Int’l 

Dictionary (1971) (“to represent by words written or spoken for the 

knowledge or understanding of others”); Describe, The Oxford 
4

English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“1. To write down, set forth in 

writing or in written words . . . . 2. To set forth in words, written 

or spoken, by reference to qualities, recognizable features, or 

characteristic marks; to give a detailed or graphic account of.”); 

Describe, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 

Language (1982) (“To give a verbal account of; tell about in 

detail.”). In other words, the definition of “describe” is broad 

enough to encompass both parties’ interpretations.

The Academies argue that when section 212.0602 refers to 

those activities described in section 212.031(1)(a)9., it is referring 

only to the list of activities in sub-subparagraphs a. and b. So 

Appellants see the word “describe” as being synonymous with 

“list.” 

The Department argues that when section 212.0602 refers to 

those activities described in section 212.031(1)(a)9., it is referring 

to all those activities listed in sub-subparagraphs a. and b. that are 

“performed directly in connection with the production of a qualified 

motion picture.” § 212.031(1)(a)9., Fla. Stat. In other words, it sees 

the word “describe” as being synonymous with “define.”

Accordingly, section 212.0602 refers to those activities and services 

defined in section 212.031(1)(a)9., not just listed therein. 

Therefore, the Department argues that the statute does not

provide a tax exemption for an educational institution that is only 

primarily engaged in teaching students photography, sound and 

recording, creation of special effects, animation, wardrobe design, 

hair and makeup, writing, scoring, composing, etc. See 

§ 212.031(1)(a)9.a., Fla. Stat. It further requires that the 

institution teach students to perform any of those activities or 

services “directly in connection with the production of a qualified 

motion picture.” § 212.031(1)(a)9., Fla. Stat.

We find that both parties have presented us with reasonable 

interpretations of the statute. At this point, we would normally 

turn to the canons of statutory construction to wade through this 

ambiguity; however, two principles of law compel us to affirm the 

Department’s interpretation.
5

First, an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute 

that it is tasked with enforcing is entitled great deference.2 See

Fla. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 823 So. 2d 844, 847 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Sans Souci v. Div. of Fla. Land Sales &

Condos., Dep’t of Bus. Reg., 421 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)

(giving deference to the Division’s interpretation of a condominium 

statute because it has “special expertise” in that subject area). Said 

differently, “if the agency’s interpretation is one of several 

permissible interpretations, it must be upheld despite the 

existence of reasonable alternatives.” Doyle v. Dep’t of Bus. Reg., 

794 So. 2d 686, 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

Second, statutes providing exemptions from a general tax are 

strictly construed against the tax payer.3 State Dep’t of Rev. v. 

Anderson, 403 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1981). Because tax exemptions 

are strictly construed against the tax payer, we must utilize the 

Department’s definition of “describe” as synonymous with “define.”

Therefore, the Academies must prove that their students 

performed certain activities and services directly in connection 

with the production of a qualified motion picture.

The Academies alternatively argued that they satisfied the 

requirement because their students created portfolios throughout 

their degree program that constituted a qualified motion picture. 

The facts do not support the Academies’ position here. A qualified 

motion picture is a series of related images and the related sound 

recordings that constitute all or part of an original work created 

primarily for entertainment, commercial, industrial, or 

educational purposes. § 212.06(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Some of the 

 2 Florida voters recently passed an amendment to the Florida 

Constitution that will soon prevent us from deferring to agency 

interpretations of statutes. Art. V, § 21, Fla. Const. (effective 

January 8, 2019), printed in Fla. Dep’t of State, Proposed 

Constitutional Amendments and Revisions for the 2018 Gen.

Election 19, https://dos.myflorida.com/media/699824/

constitutional-amendments-2018-general-election-english.pdf.

3 This rule will not be abrogated by the recently passed

constitutional amendment and is an independent basis for our 

ruling.
6

Academies’ students may have produced portfolios that would 

qualify as a motion picture under the statute, but it is impossible 

to determine from the record what percentage of students were 

producing portfolios that would qualify because the ALJ did not 

break down the programs of study by percentage. We do not know 

what percentage of the Academies’ students created an animation 

program or a movie score; therefore, there is insufficient evidence 

to determine that the Academies were “primarily engaged” in 

teaching students to perform certain tasks “directly in connection 

with the production of a qualified motion picture.” 

To conclude, the Department’s interpretation of section 

212.0602 is reasonable, and we must affirm based on two 

principles of law. One, we owe great deference to an agency’s 

interpretation of a statute it has been tasked with administering. 

Two, we must strictly construe any tax exemption against the tax 

payer. For these two reasons, we affirm the Department’s final 

order determining that the appellants were not entitled to the tax 

exemption.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., concurs; WINOKUR, J., specially concurs with 

opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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WINOKUR, J., specially concurring.

I agree with the majority that interpretation of section 

212.0602, Florida Statutes, employed by the Department in this 

case is proper and compels affirmance.

I question whether we should, in making this determination, 

rely on the maxim that “statutes providing exemptions from a 

general tax are strictly construed against the tax payer.” Maj. op. 

at 5. I see no compelling reason to employ an interpretative rule 

for this type of statute that does not apply to any different statute, 

and that in practice obligates a court interpreting such exemption 
7

to rule against the taxpayer. I agree with the observations of Judge 

Griffin of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit:

[T]he statute at issue, like all statutes, should not be 

construed “broadly,” “narrowly,” “strictly,” or “liberally,” 

but rather fairly and reasonably. . . . “[A] text should not 

be construed strictly, and it should not be construed 

leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all 

that it fairly means.”

Appoloni v. United States, 450 F. 3d 185, 200 (6th Cir. 2006) 

(Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 

Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and The 

Law 23 (1997)). See also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 362 (2012) (“Like 

any other governmental intrusion on property or personal freedom, 

a tax statute should be given its fair meaning, and this includes a 

fair interpretation of any exceptions it contains. . . . [T]he terms of 

the exception [to a tax statute] ought to be reasonably, rather than 

strictly, construed.”).

Nonetheless, as stated, even without resort to this statutoryconstruction maxim, I believe the order below should be affirmed 

and concur in the majority opinion to do so.

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Jonathan W. Taylor, Joseph C. Moffa, Gerald J. Donnini, James F. 

McAuley, and James H. Sutton, Jr., of Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, 

P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellants.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor 

General, Edward M. Wenger, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and 

Christopher J. Baum, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, for 

Appellee.