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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

HARRY MICHAEL WRIGHT,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 4:10-cv-474-RH-GRJ

MORRIS YOUNG, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This prisoner civil rights case, arising from an incident in which Plaintiff was

beaten by another prisoner, is before the Court on Defendant Keyshonda Thompson’s

(“Defendant Thompson’s”) Motion for Summary Final Judgment. (Doc. 67.) Plaintiff

has responded to the motion, Doc. 72, and the motion is therefore ripe for review. For

the reasons set out below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendant

Thompson's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED, and that the

remaining claims in this case against Defendants Morris Young and Carol Sutton

should be set for trial. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections

(“FDOC”) at the Bay Correctional Facility in Panama City, Florida, filed a First Amended

Complaint on the Court’s civil rights complaint form to be used by prisoners for actions

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 9.) The following background facts are primarily drawn

from the Complaint.
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Plaintiff alleges that on July 6, 2007, he was booked into the Gadsden County

Jail as a pre-trial detainee on pending state charges. When he was booked into the jail

Plaintiff had a skin infection on his left leg, which was red, swollen, blistered and had

open sores. (Doc. 9, at 6.) Plaintiff was originally placed in the “bullpen,” cellblock B-1. 

The condition of Plaintiff’s leg alarmed Marcus Harris (“Harris”), another inmate in

Plaintiff’s cellblock, and Harris allegedly threatened Plaintiff with harm and attempted to

incite others in cellblock B-1, to harm Plaintiff as well. (Id. at 6-8.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on July 7, 2007, Officer Lamonta Peterson (“Peterson”), a

correctional officer at Gadsden County Jail, was passing out meal trays in cellblock B-1

when he witnessed Harris’s threatening behavior towards Plaintiff. (Id. at 8.) When

Harris continued his threatening behavior towards Plaintiff after lunch, Plaintiff ran to

the entrance to the cellblock and started to kick the door and scream in order to get the

attention of jail staff. (Id.) Officer Peterson responded to Plaintiff’s calls. Plaintiff

informed Officer Peterson that Harris was continuing to threaten Plaintiff. Plaintiff

requested Officer Peterson to transfer Plaintiff to a different cellblock. (Id. at 8-9.) 

Officer Peterson told Plaintiff to “ chill out” and advised Plaintiff that Officer Peterson

knew Harris was “ crazy as hell.” Consequently, Officer Peterson advised Plaintiff “not

to ‘piss him [Harris] off, ... [because Harris] ... will whip your ass.’” (Id. at 9.) Officer

Peterson also told Plaintiff he would talk to the Sergeant on duty at the time to see

whether a transfer out of cellblock B-1 could be arranged for Plaintiff. (Id.) 

After the shift change that same day, Officer Kevin Peterson, another

correctional officer at Gadsden County Jail, escorted Plaintiff from cellblock B-1 to a

different cellblock, cellblock A-2. (Id.) Plaintiff informed Officer Kevin Peterson of

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Harris’s threatening behavior towards Plaintiff. Kevin Peterson told Plaintiff he knew

Harris was “ ‘crazy as hell,’” and he was aware Harris had a history of violence. (Id.) 

Kevin Peterson also promised to talk to the Defendant Sergeant Keyshonda Thompson

to inform Sgt. Thompson of the issues Plaintiff was having with Harris. (Id.) Sgt.

Thompson, however, was not working on July 7, 2007. (Doc. 67-3, at 2.)

One week later, on July 14, 2007 – after Plaintiff had been relocated to cellblock

A-2 – Officer Kevin Peterson moved Harris into cellblock A-2 and placed Harris into the

same cell as Plaintiff. (Doc. 9, at 9.) Almost as soon as Harris entered the cellblock, he

attacked Plaintiff, striking Plaintiff on the left arm and in the right side of the temple.

Plaintiff sustained a large, bleeding wound to his arm. (Id.) As a result of the assault

other detainees in cellblock A-2 screamed and pounded on the cellblock door to get the

attention of the correctional officers. Four officers responded, and one officer placed

Harris in another cell while the others escorted Plaintiff to the medical department. (Id.

at 10.)

 Defendant Sergeant Keyshonda Thompson (“Sgt. Thompson”), the shift

supervisor on duty when Plaintiff was attacked by Harris, met the three correctional

officers and Plaintiff at the medical department. (Id.) No medical staff were on duty, as

it was almost midnight, and thus the correctional officers were required to render first

aid to Plaintiff themselves. (Id.) Defendant Thompson allegedly told Plaintiff “ ‘Had I

known you were down in A-2, I would not have sent him (meaning Inmate Marcus

Harris) down there. But he’s raising so much hell and wanting to fight everybody

everywhere I put him, I had to move him somewhere. You know he’s a little crazy in the

head anyway.’” (Id.) The other three correctional officers apparently then each made

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statements that they all knew Harris had violent tendencies. (Id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff

filled-out an incident report the next day at Sgt. Thompson’s direction and Sgt.

Thompson told Plaintiff that charges would be filed against Harris. (Id. at 11.) 

As a result of the incident with Harris, Plaintiff lost vision in his right eye. (Id.) 

Plaintiff submitted a medical request to see a doctor and was treated by Defendant Dr.

Carol Sutton, who allegedly refused Plaintiff’s request to see an opthalmologist

because the jail could not afford it. (Id. at 11-13.)

Plaintiff was transported to the FDOC’s Reception and Medical Center (“RMC”)

in Lake Butler, Florida, on September 21, 2007, where it was determined that Plaintiff

had no vision in his right eye. (Id. at 13.) Despite his loss of vision Plaintiff alleges that

he was not provided with any care at that time. (Id.) Plaintiff was then transferred to

Walton Correctional Institution in November 2007. (Id.) After his transfer to Walton CI,

Plaintiff alleges nothing was done for his eye. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he was not

seen by a specialist until July 1, 2008, after Plaintiff was transferred back to RMC, and

the specialist diagnosed Plaintiff with a detached retina. (Id.) Surgery was performed

twice, but unsuccessfully, and Plaintiff is now blind in his right eye. (Id. at 13-14.)

In his Complaint, Plaintiff brought Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference

claims against Defendants Lamonte Peterson, Kevin Peterson, Keyshonda Thompson,

Dr. Carol Sutton and Sheriff Morris Young. The Court dismissed the claims against

Defendants Kevin Peterson and Lamonte Peterson. (Docs. 20, 48.) Sgt. Thomspon

has now moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff has presented no

evidence that she was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights.

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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the entry of summary

judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that “there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” In applying this standard, the Court must examine the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits and other

evidence in the record "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Samples

on Behalf of Samples v. Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). “In determining

whether summary judgment is appropriate, [the Court is] required to draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, not all possible inferences.” 

Horn v. United Parcel Services, Inc. 433 F. App’x 788, 796 (11 Cir. 2011) (emphasis th

added). 

As the Supreme Court held in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the

moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a triable issue

of fact. If the movant is successful on this score, the burden of production shifts to the

non-moving party who must then come forward with “sufficient evidence of every

element that he or she must prove.” Rollins v. Techsouth, 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th

Cir. 1987). The non-moving party may not simply rest on the pleadings, but must use

affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or other admissible evidence to

demonstrate that a material fact issue remains to be tried. 

The Eleventh Circuit has noted that 

[i]t is well settled that “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,

[summary judgment is appropriate] against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

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that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91

L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Accordingly, in response to a motion for summary

judgment, a nonmoving-plaintiff must present evidence in support of his

allegations sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding

each element of his claim. As established in Celotex, it is not necessary

for the party moving for summary judgment to introduce any evidence at

all in order to prevail on his motion. Rather, in cases in which the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant can seek

summary judgment by establishing that the opposing party has insufficient

evidence to prevail as a matter of law, thereby forcing the opposing party

to come forward with some evidence or risk having judgment entered

against him. Id. Where the nonmoving party fails to present such

evidence, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id.

Maxi-Taxi Of Fla., Inc. v. Lee County Port Auth., 301 F. App’x 881, 885 (11 Cir. th

2008). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, he must offer

more than a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of his position. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 

DISCUSSION

Sgt. Thompson argues that she is entitled to summary judgment because

she is protected by qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects government

officials performing discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities

unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486

F.3d 1199,1202 (11 Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. th

464, 472-73 (1985). Further, qualified immunity is only available in suits for

damages. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4021,

**7 (“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money

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damages”); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). An official wishing

to invoke the affirmative defense of qualified immunity must have been acting

within his discretionary authority. Skop v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 485 F.3d

1130, 1136 (11 Cir. 2007). th

There are two prongs to a qualified immunity test. The plaintiff must show

that “(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.

Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11 Cir. 2004). The U.S. Supreme Court has th

held that lower courts are permitted to exercise discretion in deciding which

prong of the test to address first. Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct.

808, 818 (2009). Here, Sgt. Thompson argues that Plaintiff has failed to provide

any evidence in support of his argument that she was deliberately indifferent to

his safety in the prison, and accordingly will be unable to demonstrate that she

violated a constitutional right.

Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee in custody at the Gadsden County Jail

awaiting the resolution of charges against him when the events in the First

Amended Complaint occurred. Claims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or

pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due

Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause, which applies to such claims by convicted prisoners. 

Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir.1996) However, “the

applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison inmates

applies equally to cases involving arrestees or pretrial detainees”. Id.

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“[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the

hands of other prisoners.” Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11 Cir. th

2003) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)) (omission in

original). “It is not, however, every injury suffered by one inmate at the hands of

another that translates into a constitutional liability for prison officials responsible

for the victim’s safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. For a prison official to be

constitutionally liable for failing to protect the safety of an inmate, the prisoner

must product “sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the

defendant’s deliberate indifference to that harm; and (3) causation.” Id. (quoting

Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11 Cir. 1995)). Deliberate th

indifference requires a showing that the defendant official “must have been

‘subjectively aware of the substantial risk of serious harm in order to have had a

sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38)

(internal quotations omitted). 

For a prison official to be liable for failure to protect an inmate, “there must

be much more than mere awareness” that the attacker is a “‘problem inmate’

with a well-documented history of prison disobedience” and a propensity to

violence. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349. The official “must be aware of specific facts

from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists—and the prison official must also ‘draw that inference.’” Id. (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A “generalized awareness of risk” that an inmate is

problematic “does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement,” because

“merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability

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under section 1983.” Id. at 1350 (quoting Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533,

1537 (11 Cir. 1990)). th

For Sgt. Thompson to be constitutionally liable for failing to protect

Plaintiff from Harris’s attack, Plaintiff would have to show that Sgt. Thompson

was aware of specific facts supporting an inference that Plaintiff was at a

substantial risk of serious harm, and that she actually drew such an inference. A

mere awareness on the part of Sgt. Thompson that Harris was a “problem

inmate” is insufficient. While Plaintiff is the non-moving party in this summary

judgment motion, he “will bear the burden of proof at trial,” and accordingly must

present evidence in support of his claims to survive summary judgment. MaxiTaxi Of Fla., Inc., 301 F. App’x at 885. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff has

failed to put forth evidence supporting his claim that Sgt. Thompson was

deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights.1

In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that

Sgt. Thompson was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm, to Plaintiff and

to other inmates, because she was aware that Harris was a violent individual and

was incarcerated because of charges of violent crimes. (Doc. 72, at 8-10.) 

Plaintiff also asserts that Harris assaulted a correctional officer on the same

In his response to the motion for summary judgment, filed February 11, 2013, Plaintiff

1

repeatedly assert s that “ discovery in this area is not complete.” (Doc. 72-2.) Plaintiff is incorrect.

Discovery in this case closed on November 9, 2012. (Doc. 49.) The Court granted Plaintiff’ s

motion to serve tw o subpoenas on non-parties, in light of Defendant s’ non-objection to the request,

after discovery had closed. (Doc. 71.) How ever, this did not have the effect of extending the

general discovery deadline, w hich had already passed. In any case, the information requested in

those subpoenas related only to Plaintiff’ s claims against Defendant s Young and Sutton, and had

nothing to do w ith the claims against Defendant Thompson. Accordingly, Plaintiff’ s assertion that

discovery is ongoing is misplaced, and the motion for summary judgment is ripe for review .

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night that Plaintiff himself was assaulted. As in Carter, evidence that Sgt.

Thompson was aware that Harris had a “propensity for being a problematic

inmate” is insufficient to show that she was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

rights. 352 F.3d at 1350. Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence that Sgt.

Thompson was aware of “specific facts” from which an inference of serious harm

could be drawn. Id. at 1349 (emphasis added). In recommending that Plaintiff’s

claims against Sgt. Thompson should survive a motion to dismiss, the

undersigned “[a]ssum[ed] for the purposes of this motion that Thompson not only

knew that Harris was dangerous but knew Harris previously had assaulted

Plaintiff.” (Doc. 30, at 9.) At the summary judgment stage, however, Plaintiff

may not rest on his pleadings, but must point to some evidence that Sgt.

Thompson was aware that Harris was a specific threat to him. 

It appears, on this record, that the only way that Sgt. Thompson would

know that Harris had threatened Plaintiff when they were housed together in the

“bullpen,” cellblock B-1, is if Officer Lamonte Peterson or Officer Kevin Peterson

had told her about the threats. Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence that this

occurred. Plaintiff asserts in his Complaint that he complained to Officer

Lamonte Peterson about Plaintiff’s threats on July 7, 2007, and that Officer

Lamonte Peterson told him that he would speak to the sergeant on duty to see if

he could arrange a transfer. (Doc. 9, at 9.) Sgt. Thompson’s timesheet reflects

that she did not work on July 7. (Doc. 67-3, at 2.) In his deposition, Plaintiff

testified that Officer Lamonte Peterson “didn’t say anything about getting me out

of the cell. He said he might come back later on.” (Doc. 67-2, at 9.) 

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s assumption that Officer Lamonte Peterson informed Sgt.

Thompson that he had been threatened by Harris is merely speculative.

Plaintiff also asserted in the Complaint that on July 7, 2007, Officer Kevin

Peterson escorted him from the bullpen, cellblock B-1, to cellblock A-2. (Doc. 9,

at 9.) He asserted that he told Officer Kevin Peterson about his problems with

Harris, and that Officer Kevin Peterson told Plaintiff that he knew that Harris had

a propensity towards violence. Plaintiff asserted that Officer Kevin Peterson told

him that he would tell Sgt. Thompson about the problems between Plaintiff and

Harris. (Id.) As noted above, however, Sgt. Thompson was not working at the

jail on July 7, and there is no evidence that Officer Kevin Peterson actually told

Sgt. Thompson anything about the conflict between Harris and Plaintiff. In his

deposition, Plaintiff stated that he “got the impression because I was being

moved out of [cellblock B-1], that was going to basically take care of the

problem.” (Doc. 67-2, at 11.) Plaintiff stated that “[o]ther than move me, there

was really nothing [Officer Kevin Peterson] could do, other than keep us

separated.” (Id.) He further stated that he did not ask Officer Kevin Peterson to

do anything else with respect to the situation with Harris. (Id.) Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s allegation that Officer Kevin Peterson informed Sgt. Thompson of the

prior conflict between himself and Harris is, on this record, merely speculative.

Because Plaintiff has presented no specific evidence to support his claims

that Sgt. Thompson was aware of the substantial risk of serious harm, the instant

case is similar to Carter, where the defendant correctional officer knew that the

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plaintiff’s cellmate was a “problem inmate,” and the plaintiff had told officials that

his cellmate was “acting crazy.” Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349. Because the plaintiff

had identified no specific facts that would have placed the defendant officers on

notice of a substantial risk of serious harm, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the officers. 

 Likewise, in McBride v. Rivers, 170 F. App’x 648 (11 Cir. 2006) (per th

curiam), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the defendant correctional officers where the plaintiff testified that he

requested the officers not to “place him in a cell with anyone with whom he might

have problems,” and that he told the officers that he previously had problems

with the inmate who attacked him and was in fear for his life. The Circuit Court’s

reasoning was based on the fact that the plaintiff “did not identify a specific prior

incident, from which the defendant could infer that a substantial risk existed.” 

McBride, 170 F. App’x at 655. 

In contrast, in Rodriguez v. Secretary for Department of Corrections, 508

F.3d 611 (11 Cir. 2007), the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant th

of summary judgment to one defendant and judgment as a matter of law to

another defendant. In Rodriguez, the prisoner had specifically told the defendant

correctional officers that he had been threatened by gang members, was afraid

for his life, and requested a transfer. The prisoner made these requests

repeatedly verbally and in writing, but the officers removed him from protective

custody and placed him in the general population, where he was stabbed by a

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gang member. Here, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that he informed Sgt.

Thompson of his fear of Harris, and has not presented any evidence that Officers

Lamonte or Kevin Peterson informed her of the threat. 

Sgt. Thompson also argues that insofar as Plaintiff has sued her in her

official capacity, such a claim is redundant because Plaintiff has already sued

the office of the Sheriff by suing Sheriff Morris Young in his official capacity. 

Plaintiff does not specify in his Complaint whether he has sued Sgt. Thompson

in her official capacity as well as in her individual capacity. Assuming for the

purposes of this motion that Plaintiff did intend to sue Sgt. Thompson in her

official capacity—which appears to be the case from Plaintiff’s response to the

motion—the undersigned finds that such a claim is redundant. An official

capacity claim against Sgt. Thompson is equivalent to a suit against the office of

the Sheriff, and Plaintiff has already made such a claim against Sheriff Young. 

Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted to Sgt. Thompson on this

claim.

Finally, Sgt. Thompson argues that she is entitled to summary judgment

on any state law claim of negligence that Plaintiff has asserted. In his

Complaint, Plaintiff states specifically that he is pursuing a Fourteenth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Sgt. Thompson, and does not

cite Florida state law. However, Plaintiff does assert in the Complaint that “Sgt.

Thompson had a legal responsibility and common law duty of reasonable care to

protect Plaintiff. . . and Sgt. Thompson knew the potential for harm was

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foreseeable, and Sgt. Thompson’s actions were in bad faith, with malicious

purpose, and in such a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of

Plaintiff’s human rights, safety, and/or property.” (Doc. 9, at 17.) This language

tracks the language of Florida Statute § 768.28, suggesting that Plaintiff may

have intended to bring a state law negligence claim against Sgt. Thompson. As

Sgt. Thompson argues, however, Florida law provides that Plaintiff may not sue

an officer of the state in her individual capacity unless she has acted “in bad faith

or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard

of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Plaintiff has

presented no evidence that Sgt. Thompson acted in this way. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s “exclusive remedy. . . shall be by action against the

governmental entity, or the head of such entity in his or her official capacity.” Id.

Therefore, the undersigned recommends that insofar as Plaintiff has made out a

state law negligence claim against Sgt. Thompson, Sgt. Thompson is entitled to

summary judgment. Plaintiff’s remaining claim against Sheriff Morris Young in

his official capacity may be construed to include a state law claim for negligence. 

For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages against Sgt.

Thompson should fail.

RECOMMENDATION

In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendant

Keyshonda Thompson’s motion for summary judgment, Doc. 67, should be

GRANTED, and the claims against her should be dismissed with prejudice. The

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remaining claims in this case, against Defendants Morris Young and Carol

Sutton, should be set for trial.

IN CHAMBERS this 26 day of April 2013. 

th

s/Gary R. Jones 

GARY R. JONES

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

A party may file specific, written objections to the proposed findings

and recommendations within 14 days after being served with a copy of this

report and recommendation. A party may respond to another party’s

objections within 14 days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to

file specific objections limits the scope of review of proposed factual

findings and recommendations.

Case No: 4:10-cv-474-RH-GRJ