If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PETER BORMUTH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

June 23, 2022

v No. 357292

Jackson Circuit Court 

CITY OF JACKSON and DEREK DOBIES, LC No. 20-001393-CZ

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and SAWYER and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Peter Bormuth unsuccessfully applied for a seat on the Jackson City Council. He 

sued the city of Jackson and its then-mayor, Derek Dobies, claiming that his rejection stemmed 

from religious discrimination in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), 

MCL 37.2101 et seq. Because Bormuth failed to present any evidence that animus toward his 

Paganism tainted the selection process, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bormuth is a resident of Jackson’s 5th Ward who has been a community activist for many 

years. Central to this case is Bormuth’s adherence to Paganism, which he describes as a 

“polytheistic religion” whose followers “hold a reverence for nature” and believe that “Christianity 

is the single most evil, repressive, and reactionary force in recorded human history.”

In April 2020, following the resignation of the city’s 5th Ward council member, a vacancy 

arose for that seat. The city charter charged the city council with the task of appointing an interim 

replacement to fill the vacancy. Bormuth applied for the position, along with Susan Murdie and 

Karen Bunnell. According to Bormuth, Murdie is an atheist and Bunnell is a Christian. The city 

council held recorded interviews with each applicant. Bormuth was not nominated for 

appointment by any council member, and Murdie’s nomination failed for lack of a second. Bunnell 

was nominated and seconded by Dobies, and Bunnell’s nomination was approved by a 4-2 vote. 

Dobies, 1st Ward Councilperson Arlene Robinson, 4th Ward Councilperson Laura Schlecte, and 

6th Ward Councilperson Will Forgrave voted in favor of Bunnell’s appointment. 
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Proceeding in propria persona, Bormuth filed this lawsuit, alleging that defendants 

violated the ELCRA by intentionally discriminating against him on the basis of religion when they 

voted to appoint Bunnell to the vacant city council seat.1 Defendants moved for summary 

disposition, arguing in part that Bormuth failed to present any evidence that the circumstances of 

Bunnell’s council appointment gave rise to direct evidence, or an inference, of unlawful 

discrimination. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition, and this 

appeal followed.

2

II. ANALYSIS

Bormuth argues that summary disposition was improper because he presented sufficient 

evidence that defendants discriminated against him on the basis of religion by refusing to appoint 

him to the city council.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition de novo. Brickey v 

McCarver, 323 Mich App 639, 641; 919 NW2d 412 (2018). The trial court granted summary 

disposition on Bormuth’s religious discrimination claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). When 

reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court considers 

facts set forth in affidavits, depositions, and other documentary evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 

“Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. Mere speculation is insufficient to 

satisfy the evidentiary burden to create a genuine issue of material fact. Cloverleaf Car Co v 

Phillips Petroleum Co, 213 Mich App 186, 192-193; 540 NW2d 297 (1995).

B. CONTROLLING LAW

Bormuth brought his religious discrimination claim under the ELCRA, which provides in 

relevant part:

(1) An employer shall not do any of the following:

(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate 

against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, 

condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national 

 

1 Bormuth’s amended complaint named the city of Jackson, Dobies, Councilperson Schlecte, and 

Councilperson Robinson as defendants, but the trial court later dismissed the complaint against 

Schlecte and Robinson pursuant to a stipulation from the parties. 

2 The trial court also granted summary disposition in favor of defendants on Bormuth’s claims of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of city ordinances. Bormuth does not 

appeal the trial court’s dismissal of those claims, and therefore we do not address them. 
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origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. [MCL 37.2202 (emphasis 

added).]3

“Proof of discriminatory treatment in violation of the [ELCRA] may be established by direct 

evidence or by indirect or circumstantial evidence.” Sniecinski v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 

Mich, 469 Mich 124, 132; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). Direct evidence is “evidence which, if believed, 

requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the 

employer’s actions.” Major v Village of Newberry, 316 Mich App 527, 540; 892 NW2d 402 

(2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of 

unlawful discrimination, the plaintiff must instead proceed under the burden-shifting framework 

of McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). Hazle 

v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462; 628 NW2d 515 (2001).

Under the McDonnell Douglas approach, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case 

of discrimination. Id. at 463. To make this showing, “a plaintiff must present evidence that (1) she 

belongs to a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified 

for the position, and (4) her failure to obtain the position occurred under circumstances giving rise 

to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Sniecinski, 469 Mich at 134. A plaintiff can establish 

an inference of unlawful discrimination by presenting evidence of disparate treatment, meaning 

that the plaintiff was “treated unequally to a similarly situated employee who did not have the 

protected characteristic.” Hecht v Nat’l Heritage Academies, Inc, 499 Mich 586, 608; 886 NW2d 

135 (2016). A “similarly situated” employee is an individual who is “ ‘nearly identical’ to the 

plaintiff in all relevant respects.” Id., quoting Town v Mich Bell Tel Co, 455 Mich 688, 699-700; 

568 NW2d 64 (1997) (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.). If a plaintiff sufficiently establishes a prima facie 

case of discrimination, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination exists. Hazle, 464 Mich at 464. 

The burden then shifts to the defendant to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 

employment decision.” Id. If a defendant produces the necessary evidence, the burden shifts back 

to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason offered by the defendant was pretextual for unlawful 

discrimination. Id. at 465-466.

 

3 Bormuth argues that he is an “employee” within the meaning of the ELCRA, an issue first raised 

by the trial court. It was unnecessary for the trial court to address this issue because Bormuth has 

never been an “employee” of defendants, and the plain language of MCL 37.2202(1)(a) does not 

limit its scope to employees. For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the 

ELCRA recognizes a failure-to-hire claim brought by a nonemployee seeking appointment to city 

council. See McClements v Ford Motor Co, 473 Mich 373, 386; 702 NW2d 166 (2005), amended 

474 Mich 1201 (2005) (noting that MCL 37.2202(1)(a) “clearly envision[s] claims by 

nonemployees for the failure or refusal to hire”).
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C. APPLICATION

Bormuth first argues that he presented direct evidence of religious discrimination under the 

ELCRA.4 He suggests that Dobies refused to appoint him to any positions based on his religious 

speech protesting the use of herbicides in a local cemetery. Specifically, Bormuth alleges that 

after he called the city parks director “Christian scum” regarding a dispute about this herbicide 

issue, Dobies sent the police to his home to silence his free speech. Not only does Bormuth fail to 

explain how these allegations relate to the appointment decision at issue on appeal, but he did not 

raise a free speech claim in his complaint. Therefore, this argument lacks merit.

Bormuth also points to a 2019 e-mail sent by Dobies as direct evidence of discrimination. 

In the e-mail, Dobies rhetorically asked Bormuth if he believed that a city councilperson who used 

the phrase “Pagan scum” would be serving public office well. This e-mail does not constitute 

direct evidence of discrimination for two reasons. First, the e-mail purportedly related to Dobies’s

decision as mayor to not appoint Bormuth to various city boards to which he had applied. As 

previously noted, Bormuth abandoned any argument with respect to religious discrimination in 

these miscellaneous appointments. Second, although the content of a statement may constitute 

direct evidence of unlawful religious discrimination, to do so the statement itself must convey a 

discriminatory animus. See Harrison v Olde Fin Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 609-610; 572 NW2d 

679 (1997). Nothing in Dobies’s e-mail reflected hostility toward Pagan beliefs or evidenced 

religious bigotry aimed at non-Christians. Rather, by rhetorically asking Bormuth whether an 

individual who repeatedly called residents “Pagan scum” had “the temperament to serve ALL 

residents, no matter what their religious beliefs are,” Dobies implied that disparaging followers of 

any religion was antithetical to the role of a city council member. Accordingly, neither the

statements in the e-mail nor any other actions relied on by Bormuth qualify as direct evidence of 

unlawful discrimination.

Because Bormuth failed to present direct evidence of unlawful discrimination, we next 

apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze any indirect evidence that Bormuth offered 

to support his claim. Using any indirect evidence, Bormuth must first establish a prima facie case 

of discrimination. He is unable to do so because he did not present any evidence supporting an 

inference that the decision to appoint Bunnell to the city council resulted from unlawful religious 

discrimination. For similar reasons previously discussed, the e-mail from Dobies fails to give rise 

 

4 To the extent that Bormuth claims religious discrimination in Dobies’sfailure to appoint Bormuth

to other city boards, that claim is abandoned. “An appellant’s failure to properly address the merits 

of his assertion of error constitutes abandonment of the issue.” Peterson Novelties, Inc v City of 

Berkley, 259 Mich App 1, 14; 672 NW2d 351 (2003). Bormuth’s brief lacks factual citations for 

these claims and merely makes conclusory statements of religious discrimination with respect to 

various appointments that Dobies made. We will not search for the factual basis to sustain 

Bormuth’s claims. Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 388; 689 NW2d 

145 (2004). See also MCR 7.212(C)(7) (“Facts stated must be supported by specific page 

references to the transcript, the pleadings, or other document or paper filed with the trial court.”). 

Accordingly, we decline to address any religious discrimination claim that does not pertain to the 

2020 city council appointment.
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to any inference of unlawful discrimination. Bormuth’s argument merely speculates as to Dobies’s

intent, and the content of Dobies’s e-mail does not create any reasonable inference of religious 

bias toward Paganism. Additionally, Bormuth failed to present evidence of disparate treatment 

because he and Bunnell did not have “nearly identical” qualifications for the vacancy, such that 

Bunnell was a “similarly situated” non-Pagan applicant. See Hecht, 499 Mich at 608. As Dobies 

explained in his deposition, Bormuth failed to exhibit the characteristics that Dobies looked for in 

a city councilperson, including an appropriate temperament and respect for others. Besides the 

inflammatory language that Bormuth used to describe Christians, he also argued with 

Councilperson Schlecte during his interview. Bunnell did not exhibit similar behavior toward 

council members, nor did she use aggressive rhetoric targeting a particular religious group. 

Therefore, Bormuth and Bunnell were not similarly situated applicants.

Bormuth further contends that defendants refused to appoint him to the city council based 

on his religious speech as a Pagan, that defendants believe that a Pagan who is critical of 

Christianity should not be appointed to public office, and that defendants cannot censure his 

speech. As Bormuth readily admits, he called individuals “evil Christian scum” at public meetings. 

Thus, Bormuth’s argument essentially posits that defendants may not consider his religious 

opinions—regardless of any offensive statements they may contain—when deciding which 

candidate is the best choice for a position on the city council. Bormuth’s theory conflates his right 

of free speech to criticize Christianity with the city council’s ability to consider that speech when 

voting to fill a vacancy. Accepting Bormuth’s argument could render a public employer’s 

consideration of an applicant’s incendiary language about religion violative of religious 

antidiscrimination laws. The law plainly does not require such a result. For those reasons, 

Bormuth failed to present any evidence supporting an inference of impermissible religious 

discrimination, and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.

Finally, even if we concluded that Bormuth had met his burden to establish a prima facie 

case, defendants provided many legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not appointing Bormuth

to the city council, and he has failed to offer any evidence that these reasons were pretextual. For 

example, Dobies testified that by calling others “Christian scum,” Bormuth lacked the respect that 

“public officials need to have for each other and for the general public.” It was entirely reasonable 

and legitimate for Dobies to conclude that Bormuth, who had expressed clear animus toward 

followers of Christianity, was not the best candidate for a public office that would require him to 

represent a wide range of constituents. Further, Councilperson Schlecte explained in her 

deposition that she did not nominate Bormuth for the vacancy because of an e-mail he sent her, in 

which he threatened to target her for recall if she voted for Bunnell. Bormuth also promised in the 

e-mail that he would “publicly attack[]” Bunnell at council meetings and “legally sue[]” Bunnell

whenever there was a valid opportunity. Schlecte’s consideration of this e-mail was a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory basis to assess Bormuth’s suitability for the council vacancy.

Considering all of the evidence, Bormuth’s claim of religious discrimination fails. ELCRA 

prohibits employment discrimination “because of religion,” MCL 37.2202(1)(a), and Bormuth

failed to present any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that discriminatory animus 

motivated the decision not to appoint him. Bormuth’s unsupported speculation that Dobies 

harbored religious animosity toward Pagans is insufficient to meet his evidentiary burden. See 
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Cloverleaf Car Co, 213 Mich App at 192-193. Accordingly, defendants were entitled to summary 

disposition on Bormuth’s claim of religious discrimination under the ELCRA.5

Affirmed.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

 

5 Bormuth also relies in part on MCL 37.2302(a), which prohibits “[d]eny[ing] an individual the 

full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 

accommodations of a place of public accommodation or public service because of religion, race, 

color, national origin, age, sex, or marital status.” MCL 37.2302(a) (emphasis added). Bormuth

argues that appointment to the city council constitutes “public service,” and he was denied equal 

enjoyment to this service on the basis of religious discrimination. We decline to apply this 

provision to Bormuth’s religious discrimination claim, particularly where a specific provision of

the ELCRA addresses religious discrimination in employment. See MCL 37.2202. Regardless, 

even if we applied MCL 37.2302(a) to Bormuth’s claim, defendants would remain entitled to 

summary disposition for the reasons explained in our opinion.