- 673 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

Justin S. Furstenfeld, appellant, 

Lisa B. Pepin, appell

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed March 1, 2016. No. A-14-976.

1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question 

which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate 

court as a matter of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a 

conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision.

2. Modification of Decree: Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. In an 

action for modification of a marital dissolution decree, the award of 

attorney fees is discretionary with the trial court, is reviewed de novo 

on the record, and will be affirmed in the absence of an abuse of 

discretion.

3. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to settle jurisdictional issues presented by a case.

4. Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Once an appeal is perfected 

to an appellate court, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction to hear a 

case involving the same matter between the same parties.

5. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Generally, once an appeal has been 

perfected, the trial court no longer has jurisdiction, although the district 

court retains jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-351(2) (Reissue 

2008) for certain matters.

6. Statutes: Words and Phrases. The word “support” in Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 42-351 (Reissue 2008) is not limited to child support and, in fact, 

applies to spousal support.

7. Statutes. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary 

meaning.

8. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-351(2) (Reissue 

2008) does not grant authority to hear and determine anew the very 

issues then pending on appeal and to enter permanent orders addressing 

these issues during the appeal process.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

04/07/2016 12:10 PM CDT
- 674 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

9. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate 

court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order 

entered by the court from which the appeal is taken; conversely, an 

appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain appeals from nonfinal orders.

10. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 

(Reissue 2008), the three types of final orders that an appellate court 

may review are (1) an order that affects a substantial right and that 

determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order that affects 

a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order 

that affects a substantial right made on summary application in an action 

after a judgment is rendered.

11. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A substantial right under Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2008) is an essential legal right.

12. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A substantial right is involved if an 

order affects the subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing a 

claim or defense that was available to an appellant before the order from 

which an appeal is taken.

13. Final Orders. Substantial rights under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 

(Reissue 2008) include those legal rights that a party is entitled to 

enforce or defend.

14. Judgments. An order on summary application in an action after judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2008) is an order ruling 

on a postjudgment motion in an action.

15. Courts: Judgments. A district court has the inherent power to determine the status of its judgments.

16. ____: ____. The district court may, on motion and satisfactory proof that 

a judgment has been paid and satisfied in whole or in part by the act of 

the parties thereto, order it discharged and canceled of record, to the 

extent of the payment or satisfaction.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: John

A. Colborn, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part dismisse

Matt Catlett, of Law Office of Matt Catlett, for appellant.

Terrance A. Poppe and Andrew K. Joyce, of Morrow, Poppe, 

Watermeier & Lonowski, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.

Moore, Chief Judge, and Inbody and Bishop, Judg
- 675 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

Moore, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Justin S. Furstenfeld appeals from orders entered by the 

district court for Lancaster County in the course of this modification action. Justin challenges the court’s award to Lisa B. 

Pepin of $5,000 in temporary attorney fees. Furstenfeld also 

challenges the court’s order acknowledging that Pepin had 

made payments to him under a contempt purge plan, discharging her from the contempt judgment, and awarding her $120 

in attorney fees in connection with that order. Because the 

order awarding temporary attorney fees is not a final, appealable order, we dismiss the appeal as it relates to that order. We 

affirm the order discharging Pepin from the contempt judgment and awarding Pepin fees in connection with obtaining 

this order.

II. BACKGROUND

1. Decree of Dissolution

The parties were initially divorced in December 2010, and an 

amended decree was entered in January 2011. See Furstenfeld 

v. Pepin, 23 Neb. App. 155, 869 N.W.2d 353 (2015). The initial 

decree approved the parties’ property settlement agreement, 

custody agreement, and support agreement, while the amended 

decree corrected errors in certain provisions. See id.

2. Complaints to Modify and A

in Case No. A-14-

On August 30, 2011, Pepin filed an amended complaint 

to modify the parties’ dissolution decree, seeking to modify 

Furstenfeld’s parenting time and child support obligation. On 

September 18, Furstenfeld filed an answer and counterclaim, 

seeking custody of the parties’ minor child. On December 2, 

he filed a voluntary dismissal of his counterclaim. We note 

that resolution of Pepin’s modification action was delayed 

for some time because she experienced difficulty in obtaining Furstenfeld’s medical records and she had to obtain a 
- 676 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

court order requiring him to provide certain medical records. 

Furstenfeld filed an appeal from the order, which appeal was 

dismissed by the Nebraska Supreme Court because the appeal 

was not from a final, appealable order. See Furstenfeld v. 

Pepin, 287 Neb. 12, 840 N.W.2d 862 (2013).

On June 18, 2012, Pepin filed a motion seeking to enforce a 

settlement agreement reached by the parties in May after prolonged negotiations, which Furstenfeld subsequently refused 

to sign.

On June 10, 2014, while resolution of Pepin’s motion to 

enforce the settlement agreement was pending, Furstenfeld 

filed a motion seeking leave to file an amended or supplemental answer to Pepin’s operative complaint for modification. The 

record on appeal does not contain a ruling by the district court 

on Justin’s motion, but the parties both assert in their briefs 

that the court denied his request. On July 7, he filed his own 

complaint to modify the decree in which he asked for custody 

and child support.

On July 14, 2014, the district court entered an order finding 

Pepin in contempt for failing to make the parties’ child available for a previously planned trip with Furstenfeld, and the 

court entered a purge order assessing Pepin with travel costs 

incurred by Furstenfeld and the minor child, as well as attorney fees.

On July 31, 2014, the district court entered an order granting Pepin’s motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement. The court noted that the issues under consideration were 

parenting time and child support and found that the settlement agreement was valid. On August 29, the court modified 

the decree to incorporate the terms of the settlement agreement. We note that this modification order does not mention 

Furstenfeld’s July 7 complaint to modify. He appealed from the 

August 29 order, and in case No. A-14-814, this court affirmed 

the order of the district court enforcing the parties’ settlement 

agreement. See Furstenfeld v. Pepin, 23 Neb. App. 155, 869 

N.W.2d 353 (2015).
- 677 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

3. Proceedings During Pendency of A

in Case No. A-14-

The present appeal involves orders entered by the district 

court on motions filed by the parties while Furstenfeld’s appeal 

in case No. A-14-814 was pending.

On August 26, 2014, Furstenfeld filed a motion for the 

appointment of an expert and for production of the child 

for examination. On September 15, Pepin filed a motion 

for temporary attorney fees “with respect to [Furstenfeld’s] 

Complaint for Modification of Decree.” The district court 

heard these motions on September 23. The bill of exceptions 

on appeal does not include a transcription of the hearing, but 

it does reflect that the court received exhibit 86, an affidavit 

from Pepin in support of her motion for temporary attorney fees.

On September 29, 2014, the district court ordered the parties 

to submit to a custody evaluation and ordered Furstenfeld to 

pay temporary attorney fees to Pepin of $5,000.

On September 30, 2014, Pepin filed a “Motion Regarding 

Receipts,” in which she asked for an order compelling 

Furstenfeld and his counsel to provide receipts for sums she 

had paid for travel expenses and attorney fees pursuant to the 

July 14 purge order. In addition, Pepin asked for the award 

of a reasonable attorney fee. On October 1, Furstenfeld filed 

a motion asking the district court to clarify and reconsider its 

September 29 order.

On October 14, 2014, the district court entered an order 

ruling on Furstenfeld’s motion to clarify and reconsider and 

Pepin’s motion for receipts. The court clarified its September 

29 order with regard to the performance of the custody evaluation and a requirement that the minor child be made available 

for examination. The court denied his request to reconsider 

the award of temporary attorney fees, finding it had authority to award temporary attorney fees in a complaint to modify 

custody proceeding. With regard to Pepin’s motion regarding receipts, the court noted that she had made payments 
- 678 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

in accordance with the court’s July 14 purge order but that 

Furstenfeld’s attorney refused to provide her with receipts 

for her payments, arguing that he and his client have a “First 

Amendment Right not to be compelled to sign a receipt.” The 

court found that the July 14 judgment had been fully paid and 

satisfied. The court ordered the July 14 judgment for travel 

expenses and attorney fees discharged and canceled of record. 

The court awarded Pepin $120 in attorney fees in connection 

with her motion for receipts.

Furstenfeld subsequently perfected the present appeal 

from the district court’s orders of September 29 and October 

14, 2014.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Furstenfeld asserts that (1) the district court erred in ordering him to pay Pepin $5,000 in temporary attorney fees, (2) the 

court had no authority to rule on her motion for receipts, and 

(3) the court erred in ordering him to pay her $120 in attorney 

fees in connection with her motion for receipts.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of 

law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion 

independent of the lower court’s decision. In re Interest of 

Jassenia H., 291 Neb. 107, 864 N.W.2d 242 (2015).

[2] In an action for modification of a marital dissolution 

decree, the award of attorney fees is discretionary with the trial 

court, is reviewed de novo on the record, and will be affirmed 

in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Garza v. Garza, 288 

Neb. 213, 846 N.W.2d 626 (2014).

V. ANALYSIS

1. Jurisdictio

[3] This case presents several jurisdictional issues. Before 

reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty 
- 679 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

of an appellate court to settle jurisdictional issues presented 

by a case. Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb. 215, 803 

N.W.2d 1 (2011). First, we must consider the district court’s 

authority to enter the September 29 and October 14, 2014, 

orders following Furstenfeld’s action in perfecting his appeal in 

case No. A-14-814. If the court was not divested of jurisdiction 

by virtue of the appeal in case No. A-14-814, then we must 

also consider whether the orders he has appealed from in the 

present case were final, appealable orders.

(a) Did Appeal in Case No. A-14-814 Divest 

District Court of Jurisdiction?

[4,5] Once an appeal is perfected to an appellate court, the 

trial court is divested of jurisdiction to hear a case involving 

the same matter between the same parties. In re Interest of 

Jedidiah P., 267 Neb. 258, 673 N.W.2d 553 (2004). Generally, 

once an appeal has been perfected, the trial court no longer 

has jurisdiction, although the district court retains jurisdiction 

under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-351(2) (Reissue 2008) for certain 

matters. See, e.g., Spady v. Spady, 284 Neb. 885, 824 N.W.2d 

366 (2012).

On appeal, Furstenfeld relies upon § 42-351(2) in support 

of his argument that the district court retained jurisdiction following the appeal in case No. A-14-814 to enter the orders 

of September 29 and October 14, 2014. Section 42-351(2) 

provides:

When final orders relating to proceedings governed 

by sections 42-347 to 42-381 are on appeal and such 

appeal is pending, the court that issued such orders shall 

retain jurisdiction to provide for such orders regarding 

support, custody, parenting time, visitation, or other 

access, orders shown to be necessary to allow the use of 

property or to prevent the irreparable harm to or loss of 

property during the pendency of such appeal, or other 

appropriate orders in aid of the appeal process. Such 
- 680 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

orders shall not be construed to prejudice any party 

on appeal.

[6] In Spady v. Spady, supra, the husband appealed from a 

decree of dissolution. During the pendency of the appeal, the 

district court entered an order awarding the wife temporary 

alimony. Thereafter, the wife pursued a contempt action, based 

in part upon the husband’s failure to pay the temporary alimony. The district court found the husband to be in contempt 

on this basis. On appeal, the husband argued that the district 

court did not have authority to issue the temporary alimony 

order and that thus, his failure to pay it could not form the 

basis for a contempt finding. The Supreme Court rejected this 

argument and affirmed the finding of contempt for failure to 

pay the temporary alimony. The court ultimately rejected the 

husband’s argument that alimony was not one of the matters in 

§ 42-351(2) for which the trial court retains jurisdiction during 

the pendency of an appeal. The court determined that the word 

“support” in the statute is not limited to child support and, in 

fact, applies to spousal support.

[7] As recognized by the Supreme Court in Spady v. Spady, 

supra, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. In looking at § 42-351(2), there is no mention of attorney fees as a matter over which the district court 

retains jurisdiction once an appeal is pending. However, the 

September 29, 2014, award to Pepin of $5,000 in temporary 

attorney fees was not entered in connection with the proceeding which was on appeal in case No. A-14-814 (her motion 

to enforce a settlement agreement). Rather, the September 29 

order appealed from in the instant case was entered in a separate proceeding (Furstenfeld’s complaint to modify custody). 

Likewise, the October 14 award to Pepin of $120 in attorney 

fees was entered in a separate proceeding (her motion for 

receipts in connection with her payments under the July 14 

purge order). The October 14 order also ruled on Furstenfeld’s 

motion to reconsider the September 29 award of attorney 
- 681 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

fees in his modification proceeding. Accordingly, the question becomes whether these additional proceedings involve the 

same matter between the same parties as the appeal in case 

No. A-14-814.

In Bayliss v. Bayliss, 8 Neb. App. 269, 592 N.W.2d 

165 (1999), this court considered the question of whether 

§ 42-351(2) (Reissue 1998) allows a court to modify a decree 

while a previous order modifying the decree on the same 

issue is on appeal. In that case, the former husband filed a 

motion to modify child support and also asked that the former wife be responsible for visitation transportation costs as 

well as half of the unreimbursed medical, dental, and daycare 

expenses. The district court modified the decree and ordered 

that the former wife pay child support of $50 per month, be 

responsible for half of the transportation expenses, and be 

responsible for 38 percent of daycare and unreimbursed medical expenses. The former wife appealed, and while this initial 

appeal was pending, the former husband filed another motion 

to modify child support and requested that the former wife 

pay visitation transportation costs and contribute to daycare 

and unreimbursed medical expenses. The district court found 

that § 42-351 allowed it to retain jurisdiction while the initial 

appeal was pending and modified the decree, ordering the former wife to pay child support of $50 per month; ordered each 

party to be responsible for visitation transportation expenses; 

and made the child support retroactive to the first of the 

month in which the former husband filed the second motion to 

modify. This second modification order was entered while the 

initial appeal was still pending.

[8] The former husband appealed from the second modification order in Bayliss v. Bayliss, supra, and on appeal, 

this court determined that the district court did not have 

jurisdiction to enter the second modification order which 

modified the decree on issues that were the subject of the 

then-pending initial appeal. This court stated that § 42-351(2) 
- 682 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

does not grant authority to hear and determine anew the very 

issues then pending on appeal and to enter permanent orders 

addressing these issues during the appeal process. Bayliss v. 

Bayliss, supra. Accordingly, we vacated the order and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The present appeal was filed by Furstenfeld while the 

appeal in case No. A-14-814 was pending. Certainly, we have 

the same parties in the present appeal as in case No. A-14-814, 

but we are not presented with a situation involving two permanent orders in effect at the same time, in the same case, on 

the same issue. The underlying action in case No. A-14-814 

was initiated by Pepin when she filed a complaint to modify 

the decree, seeking to reduce or suspend Furstenfeld’s parenting time and to increase his child support. The parties reached 

an oral agreement, and the district court sustained Pepin’s 

motion to enforce the agreement. The court ordered that 

Furstenfeld’s child support obligation be increased, awarded 

Pepin attorney fees, and made certain modifications to the 

decree (which did not include any modification of custody or 

parenting time).

In July 2014, Furstenfeld filed his complaint to modify, 

seeking custody and child support. In September, the district 

court, upon Pepin’s motion, ordered Furstenfeld to pay her 

temporary attorney fees of $5,000, which order the district 

court refused to reconsider in its October order. In this appeal, 

Furstenfeld challenges the district court’s authority to award 

temporary attorney fees in a modification proceeding.

Furstenfeld also challenges in this appeal the portion of 

the October 2014 order which found that Pepin had fully paid 

and satisfied the July 2014 contempt order and purge plan, 

discharged the contempt judgment, and awarded her $120 in 

attorney fees incurred in connection with obtaining the order. 

Specifically, he challenges the district court’s authority to 

rule on her motion for receipts and to award attorney fees in 

that proceeding.
- 683 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

Neither the September 2014 nor the October 2014 order 

appealed from, when compared with the orders appealed from 

in case No. A-14-814, presents us with a situation of having 

two permanent orders in effect at the same time, in the same 

case, on the same issue. We conclude that the appeal in case 

No. A-14-814 did not divest the district court of jurisdiction to rule on Pepin’s motion for temporary attorney fees in 

Furstenfeld’s modification action, his motion to reconsider the 

award of temporary attorney fees, or her motion for receipts 

in connection with the prior contempt proceeding. However, 

we must still consider whether the orders appealed from were 

final, appealable orders.

(b) Were Orders Appealed From 

Final, Appealable Orders?

[9-13] For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an 

appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court from 

which the appeal is taken; conversely, an appellate court is 

without jurisdiction to entertain appeals from nonfinal orders. 

Kelliher v. Soundy, 288 Neb. 898, 852 N.W.2d 718 (2014). 

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2008), the three 

types of final orders that an appellate court may review are 

(1) an order that affects a substantial right and that determines 

the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order that affects 

a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) 

an order that affects a substantial right made on summary 

application in an action after a judgment is rendered. In re 

Estate of Gsantner, 288 Neb. 222, 846 N.W.2d 646 (2014). A 

substantial right under § 25-1902 is an essential legal right. In 

re Estate of Gsantner, supra. A substantial right is involved 

if an order affects the subject matter of the litigation, such 

as diminishing a claim or defense that was available to an 

appellant before the order from which an appeal is taken. Id.

Substantial rights under § 25-1902 include those legal rights 

that a party is entitled to enforce or defend. In re Estate of 

Gsantner, supra.
- 684 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

(i) Award of Temporary 

Attorney Fees

Furstenfeld argues that the September 29, 2014, order 

requiring him to pay Pepin $5,000 in temporary attorney fees 

and the portion of the court’s October 14 order denying his 

motion to reconsider the award of temporary attorney fees 

were final, appealable orders because they deprived him of a 

substantial property right, i.e., $5,000, thus affecting a substantial right of his under § 25-1902.

It is clear that temporary orders of alimony and child support are not appealable until the appeal from the final order 

in the case. See, e.g., Jessen v. Jessen, 259 Neb. 644, 611 

N.W.2d 834 (2000) (challenge to award of temporary alimony 

pending appeal is to be brought at same time as appeal of 

decree of dissolution); Kosiske v. Kosiske, 8 Neb. App. 694, 

600 N.W.2d 840 (1999) (temporary child support and alimony 

obligations are not final and appealable at time entered, but 

become final upon entry of decree dissolving parties’ marriage); Kricsfeld v. Kricsfeld, 8 Neb. App. 1, 588 N.W.2d 

210 (1999) (addressing adequacy of temporary alimony order 

at time of appeal from decree of dissolution). We have not 

found a case explicitly holding that temporary attorney fees 

are not appealable, but an award of temporary attorney fees 

was discussed in the course of an appeal from the final decree 

in Olson v. Olson, 13 Neb. App. 365, 693 N.W.2d 572 (2005), 

implying that the award was not appealable at the time it 

was entered.

We conclude that an award of temporary attorney fees is 

not an appealable order, but, rather, it may be addressed in 

any appeal from the final order in the modification proceeding. Because the award of $5,000 in temporary attorney fees 

was not a final, appealable order, we are without jurisdiction to 

address Furstenfeld’s assignments of error in connection with 

the award of temporary attorney fees.
- 685 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

(ii) Order Ruling on 

Motion for Receipts

[14] In its October 14, 2014, order, the district court also 

ruled on Pepin’s motion for receipts and awarded her $120 in 

attorney fees in connection with that motion. With respect to the 

portion of the court’s October 14 order requiring Furstenfeld to 

pay Pepin’s attorney fees of $120, he argues that the order 

appears to be one made upon a summary application in an 

action after judgment, the “judgment” being the order filed by 

the court on July 14, holding her in contempt and requiring 

her to take certain action in order to purge herself of contempt, 

and the “summary application” being her motion requiring him 

to execute receipts. An order on “‘summary application in an 

action after judgment’” under § 25-1902 is an order ruling on 

a postjudgment motion in an action. Heathman v. Kenney, 263 

Neb. 966, 968, 644 N.W.2d 558, 561 (2002).

We agree with Furstenfeld and conclude that Pepin’s motion 

for receipts was a summary application in an action after judgment under § 25-1902(3) and was therefore a final, appealable 

order. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction of the portion of his 

appeal challenging the award of $120 in attorney fees.

2. Award of $120 in Attorney 

Furstenfeld asserts that the district court had no authority to 

rule on Pepin’s motion for receipts and that it erred in ordering him to pay her $120 in attorney fees in connection with 

her motion for receipts.

[15,16] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2210 (Reissue 2008) provides 

in part that “[w]henever any judgment is paid and discharged, 

the clerk shall enter such fact upon the judgment record in a 

column provided for that purpose.” A district court has the 

inherent power to determine the status of its judgments. Jensen 

v. Jensen, 275 Neb. 921, 750 N.W.2d 335 (2008). The district 

court may, on motion and satisfactory proof that a judgment 

has been paid and satisfied in whole or in part by the act of 
- 686 -

Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

23 Nebraska Appellate Repo

FURSTENFELD v. PEPIN

Cite as 23 Neb. App. 673

the parties thereto, order it discharged and canceled of record, 

to the extent of the payment or satisfaction. Id.

Although framed in terms of a request for receipts acknowledging her payment of the sums ordered under the July 2014 

purge order, Pepin was essentially asking the court to determine the status of that judgment and find that her obligation 

under the purge order had been fulfilled. This is what the 

court did in its October order. The court found the evidence 

proved that the judgments for travel expenses and attorney fees 

ordered in the July order had been fully paid and satisfied and 

ordered the judgment for those expenses and fees discharged 

and canceled of record. The court had authority to do so and 

did not err in this regard.

Further, we find no abuse of discretion in the award of 

$120 in attorney fees incurred by Pepin in obtaining the order 

discharging the contempt judgments against her in light of 

Furstenfeld’s refusal to acknowledge receipt of the payments.

VI. CONCLUSION

Because the order awarding temporary attorney fees is not 

a final, appealable order, we dismiss the appeal as it relates 

to that order. We affirm the order discharging Pepin from the 

contempt judgment and awarding her fees in connection with 

obtaining this order.

Affirmed in part, and in part dis