# EUR-Lex - 52012DC0373 - EN

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# 52012DC0373

**REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY (19th report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011) /* COM/2012/0373 final */**

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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION

ON SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
(19th report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011)

1.           Introduction

This is the nineteenth annual report on the
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in EU
lawmaking. It is presented in accordance with Article 9 of the Protocol (No 2)
on the application of these principles (hereinafter ‘the Protocol’) attached to
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

As in previous years, the report looks at
how the principles are implemented by the different EU institutions and bodiesthe
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and the Committee of the
Regions and presents in more detail some Commission initiatives and legislative
proposals which have raised subsidiarity issues during 2011. It also examines
how the subsidiarity control mechanism, which under Article 12 of the TEU and
the Protocol gives national Parliaments a particular role in scrutiny of the principle
of subsidiarity, has developed since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
Given the close links between the subsidiarity control mechanisms and the
political dialogue between national Parliaments and the Commission, this report
should be seen as complementary to the Commission's annual report for 2011 on
relations with national Parliaments [1].

2.           How the institutions
apply the pirnciples

Decisions as to whether to propose action
at EU level (subsidiarity) and, if so, the extent and formof such action
(proportionality) are fundamental to smart regulation[2]. All EU
institutions and bodies have to comply with both principles.

A careful assessment of the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality during the pre-legislative phase is important ensuring that proposals are
appropriately conceived. At the post-legislative stage, the Court of Justice
could be called on to controlthe legality of adopted legislation. So far, the
Court has not annulled a measure for breach of the subsidiarity principle.

It is imperative to make the arguments on
subsidiarity and proportionality transparent, as this enables the various institutional
players as well as the public at large to discuss the validity of the proposal
constructively. Therefore, in accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol and irrespective
of where the initiative originates, a draft legislative act should contain a
detailed ‘statement’ making it possible for the interested parties to judge compliance
with the principle. Although subsidiarity cannot be assessed mechanically by reference
to operational criteria, the Commission continues to use ‘necessity’ and ‘EU
value-added’ tests as part of its analytical framework and recommends that
others do likewise.

2.1.        The Commission

As the author of legislative proposals
under its right of initiative, the Commission works to ensure that the correct
choices about whether and how to propose EU level action are made at an early
stage of policy development.

Roadmaps[3], which
are published for all the major
initiatives, outline the Commission’s intentions, including an initial
subsidiarity and proportionality justification. These ideas are verified later
during both stakeholder consultation and the impact assessment (IA) process.
The subsidiarity statement for each legislative proposal, as foreseen by Article
5 of the Protocol, is presented in the explanatory memorandum and recalled in
the recitals of the proposal. IAs, which accompany proposals with significant
impacts, provide the most detailed analysis of subsidiarity and
proportionality. The quality of this analysis is systematically scrutinised by
the IA Board.

In 2011, the Board continued to assess EU
added value when scrutinising the quality of IAs. Though the Board's recommendations
on subsidiarity and proportionality were down slightly compared to 2010, they
still featured in a significant number of opinions (43 %). The Board frequently
asked for stronger justification of the need for action at EU level, in
particular:

—        the need for more evidence of
problems that require action at EU level. As regards the initiative on Alternative
Dispute Resolution, the Board requested a better demonstration of the
existence and magnitude of market failure and its relevance for the functioning
of the internal market. Similarly, in the case of the EU Strategy for the
protection and welfare of animals, the Board asked that the problems
associated with EU competence, such as distortion of competition on the internal
market, be better distinguished from those other problems where action at
Member State level would be more appropriate.

—        on some occasions it concluded
that the evidence base to demonstrate the need for and proportionality of an EU
legislative initiative remained weak for instance in the case of the above
mentioned initiative on Alternative Dispute Resolution, which estimated
that 'there was not sufficient clarity on the costs and benefits of a full EU
coverage ADR [alternative dispute resolution] at both European and Member State
level’ .Similarly, concerning the initiative on access to a basic payment
account, the Board's view was that there remained a need to demonstrate
more convincingly the need for, and the proportionality of, a binding EU
instrument. Services introduced Board's comments into the final IA report.

2.2.        National Parliaments

The subsidiarity control mechanism gives national
Parliaments the right to express their views on whether draft legislative acts,
which do not fall within the EU's exclusive competences comply with the
principle of subsidiarity. Depending on the number of reasoned opinions concluding
that a proposal is in breach of the subsidiarity principle[4], i.e. if the thresholds
mentioned in Article 7 of the Protocol are met within the eight-week deadline, the
so-called ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ can be triggered. These entail a
review of the draft legislation and may lead to the relevant legislative proposal
being amended or withdrawn.

In 2011, the Commission received 64 reasoned
opinions from national Parliaments, an increase of almost 75% in comparison
with 2010, the first year of functioning of the subsidiarity control mechanism.
Despite this increase, these 64 reasoned opinions still represent only about
10% of the total number of 622 opinions received by the Commission in 2011 as
part of its broader political dialogue with national Parliaments.

As in the first year of application of the
new subsidiarity control mechanism, the focus of national Parliaments' reasoned
opinions remains quite disparate: the 64 reasoned opinions received in 2011 related
to 28 different Commission proposals. Most of the reasoned opinions focused on legislative
proposals in the fields of taxation, agriculture, internal market and justice. The
proposals which elicited the highest number of reasoned opinions concerned the
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (nine opinions), the temporary
reintroduction of border controls at internal borders in exceptional
circumstances (six), the Common European Sales Law (five) and the Single CMO
Regulation (five). The national Parliaments most active in issuing reasoned
opinions were the SwedishRiksdag, the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés
(lower chamber and the Polish Sejm and Senat (lower and upper chambers).

In none of the 2011 cases were the thresholds
for triggering the yellow or orange cards met. Apart from the above mentioned
files, the vast majority of the 28 legislative proposals on which national
Parliaments issued reasoned opinions in 2011 elicited at most three reasoned
opinions. As per to its political commitment to national Parliaments, the
Commission replied or is in the process of preparing a reply to each reasoned
opinion in the context of the political dialogue and put forward into account
in the ensuing interinstitutional discussions and negotiations.

Each national Parliament chooses its own internal
procedure for adopting reasoned opinions and the format in which these are sent
to the Commission. This is reflected in the huge diversity of formats, length,
detail and of the actors involved in the adoption process. Given that the
political dialogue and the subsidiarity control mechanism unavoidably overlap
to a certain extent, the only request President Barroso addressed to national
Parliaments in his letter of 1 December 2009[5]
was "to distinguish in their opinions as far as possible between subsidiarity
aspects and comments on the substance of a proposal, and to be as clear as
possible as regards their assessment on a proposal's compliance with the
principle of subsidiarity". The Commission will continue to emphasise this
latter point in its contacts with national Parliaments.

Apart from the more formal aspects, the
content and reasoning of the reasoned opinions sent to the Commission in 2011 also
varied. In several cases, national Parliaments used substantive arguments to
justify a breach of subsidiarity, such as the potential negative effects of a
proposed measure on the overall economic situation, while other based their
conclusions on subsidiarity and proportionality arguments or on an allegedly incorrect
or unspecified legal basis. Finally, national Parliaments in several cases used
a reasoned opinion to express their opposition to the proposed use of delegated
acts in a certain area or to the lack of subsidiarity justification in the
explanatory memorandum (see chapter 3.1.). As stated in the above mentioned
letter of President Barroso, the Commission will "consider all reasoned
opinions raising objections as to the conformity of a legislative proposal with
the principle of subsidiarity (...), even if the different reasoned opinions
provide different motivations as to the non-compliance with the principle of
subsidiarity". In line with its interpretation of the subsidiarity control
mechanism, the Commission considers that the issuance of a reasoned opinion on
a Commission proposal and the arguments on which it is based, fall solely within
the responsibility of each national Parliament.

As some reasoned opinions received in 2011 highlighted
insufficient or missing subsidiarity justifications and some have concluded
that this constitutes a formal breach of the subsidiarity principle, the
Commission reiterates its commitment to ensure that the explanatory memoranda
of all legislative proposals within the scope of the subsidiarity control
mechanism contain an appropriate subsidiarity justification.

2.3.        The European Parliament
and the Council

The legislators also have a responsibility
to ensure the proposal’s conformity with the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality and to provide a justification wherever an amendment they propose
affects the scope of EU action.[6]

In Council, the Committee of
Permanent Representatives (Coreper) ensures that the principles are complied
with.[7]
In the European Parliament, the internal Rules of Procedure contain a specific
Rule on the "Examination of respect for the principle of
subsidiarity"[8],
which states that compliance is verified by the committees in charge of
specific legislative dossiers, together with the Committee on Legal Affairs,
and that the committee responsible may not take its final vote before expiry of
the eight-week deadline.

It should also be noted that in 2011 the
Commission received a small number of parliamentary questions (32 out of more
than 12 000) which concerned issues in relation to respect for the principles
of subsidiarity and proportionality. They mainly covered requests to
substantiate the compliance of certain Commission proposals with these
principles, partially echoing concerns raised by other institutions and players.

2.4.        The Committee of the
Regions

The Committee of the Regions expresses
its views either when it is consulted or in the form of own-initiative
opinions. In accordance with Article 8 of the Protocol, it also has the right
to challenge under Article 263 TFEU the validity of legislation as regards
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but only if it has been
consulted by virtue of an obligation under the TFEU.

The Committee's
subsidiarity monitoring is expressed either via its opinions, the activities of
the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network (SMN) or via contributions which regional
parliaments with legislative powers provided to national Parliaments under the subsidiarity
control mechanism. The way in which regional Parliaments with legislative
powers are consulted by their national Parliaments varies and in this regard the
eight-week deadline poses a major challenge. A few regional Parliaments have
started to send their subsidiarity opinions directly to the Commission for
information.

Though it
observed no subsidiarity breach in 2011, the Committee has reinforced the
references to the principle in its opinions and plans to increase the number of
subsidiarity assessments included in its final opinions. It continues to use its
subsidiarity and proportionality analysis grid.

The Committee's
Subsidiarity Monitoring Network (SMN) included by the end of the year 2011 134
partners. This represents a significant increase in particular as regards
regional parliaments and governments. In 2011 the SMN conducted targeted
consultations on five Commission proposals (Connecting Europe Facility; Less
Bureaucracy for citizens; Review of EU Air Quality and Emissions policy; Energy
Efficiency and Roma Integration[9]). It also launched the second Action
Plan focused on TEN-T policy with the aim of identifying best practices in the
application of the subsidiarity principle in Europe’s regions and cities.

2011 also saw preparations for the launch of the REGPEX website,
which is designed to help regions with legislative powers play their part in
the subsidiarity control mechanism and to provide a source of information and
exchange between regional parliaments and governments as they prepare their
subsidiarity analyses. The website was launched in March 2012[10].

Finally, the
revised Agreement on Cooperation between the European Commission and the
Committee of the Regions, on which negotiations started in 2011 and which was
signed on 16 February 2012[11], reflects a willingness to strengthen further cooperation and
exchanges in terms of implementing of the Protocol.

2.5.        The Court of Justice

The Court of Justice of the European Union
is, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU, competent to review the legality of
legislative acts as regards compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. The
Protocol states that the Committee of the Regions or Member States, themselves
or on behalf of their national Parliaments, can bring a case before the Court.

A judgment Luxembourg vs Parliament and
the Council[12]confirmed
what was already noticed in the ruling on the Roaming Regulation[13] , covered
in 2009 report. In examining complianace with the principles of proportionality
and subsidiarity, the Court will look to the Commission's impact assessment.

3.           Key
cases where subsidiarity and proportionality concerns were raised

This section looks at the Commission
proposals which have generated the most discussion on subsidiarity and
proportionality.

3.1.        Follow-up
to cases mentioned in previous reports

For some of the cases mentioned in earlier
reports, such as the Directives on Aviation Security Charges,[14] Protection of Soil,[15] Equal Treatment outside
Employment[16]
andCultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms there were no significant
developments in the ongoing legislative procedures during 2011. On the Seasonal
Workers Directive, discussions continued in the EP and Council without
issues related to subsidiarity or proportionality being raised.

As regards the Maternity Leave Directive,[17] mentioned in the 2008 report,
the legislators have not yet managed to find common ground. At the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs
Council in June 2011, the Council took note of a progress report which notes
the concerns of some delegations calling for due consideration be given to the
principle of subsidiarity and the diversity of the situations in the different
Member States. Some delegations at the meeting recalled the minuted statement
by eight delegations at the December 2010 Council, proposing that each Member
State should be free to decide on the level of protection while respecting
certain minimum requirements, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. There
were some voices calling for the Council to discontinue its work on this topic.

During the inter-institutional discussions
in December 2011 an agreement was found on the proposal concerning Food
Distribution to the Most Deprived People,
which had elicited 3 reasoned opinions from national Parliaments in 2010.
The European Parliament expressed its strong support for continuing the
programme beyond 2013. The Council also reached a political agreement on continuing
the scheme up to 2013. In its declaration, the Commission took note of the
opinion of a significant group of Member States not to pursue the programme
beyond 2013. However, this is without prejudice to the Commission's right of
initiative under the Treaty.

The plenary session of the European
Parliament in February 2012 adopted a report on the Deposit Guarantee Scheme
proposal, on which a first reading agreement had not been possible. This
proposal elicited 3 reasoned opinions from national Parliaments in 2010.
Nevertheless, both the rapporteur, Mr Simon (S&D/DE), and the Danish
Presidency of the Council expressed their willingness to pursue negotiations
with a view to concluding an early second reading agreement.

Finally, the Consumer Rights Directive
was formally adopted by the Council in October 2011.

3.2.        Further cases where
subsidiarity was debated

Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)[18]

In March 2011 the Commission proposed a
common system for calculating the tax base of businesses operating in the EU.
The aim of this proposal is to reduce significantly the administrative burden, transfer
pricing compliance costs, allow cross-border relief of tax losses and tackle
legal uncertainties which businesses in the EU currently face by dealing with
up to 27 different national systems for determining their taxable profits.

This proposal attracted the highest number
of opinions from national Parliaments during 2011, eliciting in total17
opinions, nine of which were reasoned opinions according to the Protocol, namely
arguing that the proposal was in breach of the subsidiarity principle. As the
reasoned opinions received represented only 13 votes, the so–called
"yellow card procedure", which requires at least 18 votes, was not
triggered.

In addition to alleged shortfalls in the subsidiarity
justification, several national Parliaments were concerned that the proposal was
regulating an area of Member State competence. They claimed that it would
negatively affect Member States as they would not be entitled to use corporate
tax as an instrument for boosting growth and employment. They consiodered that
it would deprive the Member States of their individual competitive advantages
and would generate indirect pressure on national tax rates, leading to
budgetary erosion and a decrease in tax revenues. In addition, two reasoned
opinions raised the issue of proportionality claiming that the proposal went further
than necessary leading to two different corporate tax systems which would
result in unnecessary administrative burden.

In its replies to national Parliaments, the
Commission pointed out that the present area of taxation falls under shared
competence and that Article 115 TFEU provides the legal base for measures in
this area. It is on this basis that the Commission adopted draft legislation with
the aim of tackling fiscal impediments and disparities mainly resulting from
the fragmentation of the internal Union market into 27 distinct tax systems. Businesses
are faced with those obstacles when they operate within the internal market.
The CCCTB is expected to generate savings for companies thus encouraging
cross-border expansion not only of existing multinational groups but also of
purely domestic companies, including SMEs which currently cannot afford to establish
themselves accros the border. Therefore, the CCCTB aims at generating positive
scale effects and at encouraging cross-border business investment. Moreover,
the Commission emphasised that the proposal does not affect the Member States'
sovereignty to set tax rates individually, as this is left to be dealt with
through national legislation.

The proposal, falling under a special
legislative procedure is currently under discussion in the Council.The European
Parliament gave a favourable opinion to the proposal on 19 April 2012.

Temporary reintroduction of border
controls at internal borders in exceptional circumstances[19]

The proposal for a regulation adopted in
September 2011, building on the conclusions of the European Council in June
2011, is intended to strengthen the governance of the area without internal
border controls (the Schengen area). It aims to enable it to respond
effectively to exceptional circumstances which would put the overall
functioning of Schengen cooperation at risk, without, however, jeopardising the
principle of free movement of persons.

The Commission received 11 opinions from
national Parliaments on this proposal, 6 of which were reasoned opinions.
National Parliaments argued that the proposal encroaches on the sphere of
national sovereignty of Member States, which are better placed to assess and
decide on the possible reintroduction of border controls. Moreover, some
national Parliaments considered that compliance with the subsidiarity principle
was not appropriately justified. Arguments raised by national Parliaments were
also echoed in the Council discussions on this proposal.

In its replies to those national
Parliaments which had raised subsidiarity concerns, the Commission focused on
the fact that the Schengen area is an asset shared by the whole EU, so any
decision affecting it must be taken at EU level and not individually. The rules
governing the creation and maintenance of such an area without internal
frontiers are the subject of EU legislation, and any exceptions to the
principle of free movement should be made at that level. The Commission also
argued that the proposal fully respects the sovereign responsibility of Member
States with regard to maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of
internal security.

Passenger Name Records[20]

The Commission
received ten opinions from national Parliaments on this proposal, the majority
concluding that the Commission proposal was in line with the principle of
subsidiarity. However, five chambers considered the proposal not to be in
compliance with the principle of proportionality due to the perceived disproportionate
length of the proposed data retention period.

4.           Conclusions

As in previous years, the majority of
Commission proposals were adopted by the co-legislators without significant
discussions on subsidiarity and proportionality. In 2011 the thresholds for the
so-called "yellow card" and "orange card" were not reached and
only a small percentage (about 10%) of national Parliaments' opinions sent to
the Commission in the context of the political dialogue were reasoned opinions within
the meaning of the Protocol, i.e. stating a breach of subsidiarity. At the same
time, in cases where compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality was questioned, the views of the institutions and other players
involved sometimes differed widely.

The concepts of subsidiarity and
proportionality are fundamental elements in the policy development process of
the EU Institutions; and the Commission's impact assessments remain the main
vehicle for addressing subsidiarity and proportionality issues during the
pre-legislative phase, the IA Board playing a key role in this respect. However,
institutional practice shows that the way these principles are interpreted and
applied during the legislative phase often depends on the political context,
highlighting thus their political dimension.

The way in which most of the national
Parliaments implement the Protocol and use the subsidiarity control mechanism
has highlighted the primarily political character of this new tool, a fact,
which the Commission had already highlighted in President Barroso's letter of 1
December 2009.

The subsidiarity control mechanism has served
to make the process more transparent and has clearly helped to bring EU
policies into the public debate in Member States and thus to raise public
awareness on these issues.

ANNEX

List
of Commission initiatives on which
national Parliaments delivered reasoned opinions
on the subsidiarity principle in 2011

|| Title || National chambers submitting reasoned opinions

1. || Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011)121 || UK House of Commons BG Narodno Sabranie SE Riksdag NL Tweede Kamer PL Sejm ML Kamra tad-Deputati IE Dail Eireann RO Camera Deputaţilor SK Národná Rada

2. || Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances, COM(2011)560 || FR Assemblée nationale Both NL Chambers PO Assembleia da República SE Riksdag RO Senatul SK Národná Rada

3. || Single CMO regulation, COM(2010)799 || PL Sejm PL Senat DK Folketing LU Chambre des Députés SE Riksdag

4. || Common European Sale Law, COM(2011)635 || AT Bundesrat DE Bundestag UK House of Commons BE Sénat BE Chambre des Représentants

5. || Jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships, COM(2011)127 || PL Senat PL Sejm RO Senatul IT Senato della Repubblica

6. || Prudential requirements for credit institutions, COM(2011)452 || UK House of Commons SE Riksdag FR Sénat

7. || Common Financial Transaction Tax, COM(2011)594 || CY Vouli ton Antiprosopon SE Riksdag MT Kamra tad-Deputati

8. || European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (2014 - 2020), COM(2011)608 || Both NL Chambers SE Riksdag DK Folketing

9. || Specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest entities - COM(2011)779 || BE Chambre des Représentants SK Národná Rada SE Riksdag

10. || Marketing standards, COM(2010)738 || LU Chambre des Députés PL Senat

11. || Restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, COM(2011)169 || BG Narodno Sabranie Both ES Chambers

12. || Enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection, COM(2011)215 and in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements, COM(2011)216 || IT Camera dei Deputati Both ES Chambers

13. || Energy efficiency directive, COM(2011)370 || FI Eduskunta SE Riksdag

14. || Access to the activity and the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance firms in a financial conglomerate, COM(2011)453 || SE Riksdag RO Camera Deputaţilor

15. || Rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy, COM(2011)625 || DE Bundesrat LU Chambre des Députés

16. || Support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), COM(2011)627 || DE Bundesrat (joint with the reasoned opinion on COM(2011)625) LU Chambre des Députés

17. || Regulation on the distribution of food products to the most deprived persons in the Union, COM(2011)634 || SE Riksdag UK House of Lords

18. || Contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector, COM(2010)728 || PL Sejm

19. || Financing of the common agricultural policy, COM(2010)745 || PL Senat

20. || Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM(2010)748 || Both NL Chambers

21. || Interconnection of central, commercial and companies registers, COM(2011)79 || PL Sejm

22. || Jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011)126 || IT Senato della Repubblica

23. || Food intended for infants and young children and on food for special medical purposes, COM(2011)353 || IT Senato della Repubblica

24. || Definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of                aromatised wine products, COM(2011)530 || LU Chambre des Députés

25. || Information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of energy, COM(2011)540 || LU Chambre des Députés

26. || European Union Programme for Social Change and Innovation, COM(2011)609 || SE Riksdag

27. || Specific provisions concerning the European Regional Development Fund and the Investment for growth and jobs goal and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006, COM(2011)614 || LU Chambre des Députés

28. || Common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, COM(2011)615 || IT Camera dei Deputati

[1]               COM(2012) 375

[2]               Wider smart regulation issues were addressed in the
Commission Communication COM(2010)543

[3]               Access
to roadmaps is via the Commission’s IA Website:
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.htm.

[4]               A reasoned opinion is defined as an opinion sent by a
national Parliament to the Commission (or the European Parliament, the Council
, Court of Justice, the European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank –
depending on which institution has proposed the respective legislation) within
the eight weeks period mentioned in the Protocol and stating a breach of
subsidiarity.

[5]               http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_fr.htm

[6]               See
the Inter-Institutional Agreement on subsidiarity (OJ C 329, 6.12.1993, p. 132).

[7]               Council
Decision 2009/937/EU, OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 35.

[8]               Rule 38a

[9]               COM(2011)665, COM(2010)747, SEC(2011)342, COM(2011)370
and 173 respectively

[10]             http://extranet.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/regpex/Pages/default.aspx

[11]             http://cor.europa.eu/en/about/interinstitutional/Documents/EN.pdf

[12]             Case C-176/09,

[13]             Case C-58/8 Vodafone Ltd, Telefónica O2 Europe plc,
T-Mobile International AG, Orange Personal Communications Services Ltd v.
Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform about EC
Regulation No 717/2007

[14]             COM(2009)
217. Here and afterwards, details on inter-institutional discussion are
accessible via PreLex database: http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm.

[15]             COM(2006)
232.

[16]             COM(2008)
426.

[17]             COM (2008) 637.

[18]             COM(2011)121

[19]             COM(2011)560

[20]             COM(2011)32