### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Ja nuary 25, 200 5 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KEITH L ATR ELL JA CKS ON

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 2001-D- 2175 Seth Norm an, Jud ge

No. M2004- 00562-CCA -R3-C D - F iled April 12, 2005

A Davidson County

jury found the Def

endant, Keith L atre ll J ackson, g uiltyof possession with the intent to se ll twe nty -six (26) g rams or more of a substanc e conta ining c ocaine in a Drug -Free School Z one and of poss ession of a firea rm with the i ntent to employ it in the commissi on of or e scape from

a n o ff e ns e . T he tr ia l c ou rt

se nte nc e d th e De fe nd ant to an ef fe c tiv e se nte nc e of

thi rt y -s ix y e ars in prison. On appeal, t he Defenda nt contends that: (1) the trial court erre d when it denied his motion to s up pr e ss; (2 ) the e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his c on vic tio ns ; ( 3) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in admitting the testimony

of a sur vey or pertaining to t h e use of GPS in determining the distance betwee n the location of the offe nse and the rea l pr operty that comprises Wharton School; and (4) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

se nte nc e d h im. Af

te r tho ro ug hly

re vie wi ng the re c or d a nd the app lic able authorities, we reve rse the Def endant’ s conviction and sentenc e for possession of a firea rm with the intent to employ

it in the commissi on of or esca pe from an offe nse, and w e af firm the De fenda nt’s conviction and se ntence for posse s s i o n wi th the intent to sell twenty -six (26) g rams or more of a substance c ontaining c ocaine in a Drug -Free School Z one. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed in Par t and Reverse d in P art

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the op i n i o n o f t he court, in which D AVI D H. W ELLES and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

Kenne th Quillen, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Keith J ackson.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Ri ch ar d H. Dunavant, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. (Tor

ry ) Johns on, I I I , District Attorney General; and John Zimmerma n and Christina Goodson, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION I. F acts-2-

I n October

of 2001, a D avidson CountyGra nd J ury indicted the De fenda nt for possession wi t h t h e i n t en t t o s el l t we n t y -s i x (2 6 ) gra m s o r m o re o f a s u b s t an ce co n t ai n i n g co ca i n e i n a D ru gFr ee School Z one and possession of a firea rm with the intent to employ it in the commissi on of or

e sc ape fr om a n of

fe ns e

. A Da vid so n Cou nty Jury c on vic te d the De fe nd a nt o f b othof the se c ha rg e s. The trial c ourt sentenc ed the De fenda nt to thirty -six y ear s, at 100%, for the possession with the intent to sell twenty -six (26) g rams or more of a substance containing cocaine i n a Dr ug -Free School Z one and to three y ear s, at 35%, for the possession of a f

irea rm with the intent to employ it in the commission of or esca

pe fr om an offe nse. The trial co urt order ed that the se ntence s be ser ved

concur rently

.
Th e fo llo wi ng e vid e nc e wa s p re se nte d at th e De fe nd a nt’ s tria l: J.D. Jone s, a lie ute na nt w ith t h e M et ro p o l itan Police Depa rtment, testified that, on September 28, 2001, he and othe r off icer s executed a sear ch warra nt for an apartment, located in an apartment complex, at 1612 16th Avenue, Na sh vil le . T he of

fi c e r s a id that he wa s w e ari ng a ve st a nda

raid j a c ke t th a t id e ntif

ie d h im a s a police off icer , and he and the other of fice rs announc ed their pr esen ce b y y el l ing that they wer e
e xec uti ng a

se arc h w arr a nt. L ieute na nt Jon e s te sti fi e d th a t, a s h e wa s a pp ro a c hin g the apa

rt me nt, he noticed f

our men, who a

ppear ed to be gambling , on the s toop of an apartment located in fr ont of the apa rtmen t that the office rs wer e sea rching . As the other of

fice rs went to sea

rch the back apartment, he attempted to contr ol the four men w ho wer e on the stoop. As h e did so, the men walked a way , while placing objects in their pocke ts. The lieutenant reque sted that another office r assist him control these men, and, at that time, the Defe ndant ran away from the office r. L ieutenant J o n es dre w his g un and told the Def endant to g et on the g round, and, a fter the Def endant r an approximately

fifty y ards, the D efe ndant re turned to the a partment.

L ie u te n a n t Jo n e s te s ti f

ie d th a t O f

f ic e r Jo h n s o n c a me o u ts id e to a s s is t h im a n d O f f ic er J o h n s o n s ea rc h ed t h e D ef en d an t

. T h e l i eu t en an tn o t i ce d a M o n t e C ar l o , t h at h ad a t em p o ra ryt ag, parke d near his police car, and he asked if any one had the key s to that car . He testified that none of the men said that they knew anything a bout the vehicle. Lieutenant Jones later discove red that the te mpo ra ry ta g wa s is su e d to the De fe nd a nt’ s mo the r. Th e lie ute na nt a tte mpt e d to u nlo c k th e Mo nte Carl o u sin g ke y s f

ou ndon th e Defenda nt, a nd , a ft e r h e de te rm ine d th a t th e ke y s su c c e ssf ull y unlocked the c ar, he re- locked the c ar a nd called f or a K -9 unit to searc h the car for the pre sence of

narc otics.

L ie ute na nt Jon e s te sti fi e d th a t he wa s p re se nt f or the K- 9 s e arc h o f the Mo nte Carl o. He sa id that the police dog alerted for the prese nce of narc otics by s cr at ch i n g o n the passeng er side door

. L ie ute na nt Jon e s te sti fi e d th a t he a ndthe oth e r of fi c e rs op e ne d the ve hic le a ndfo un d a pp ro xima te ly $3 8, 00 0 in the r i g h tp a s s e n g e r s e a t

. H e s a i d t h a tt h e d o g a l s o a l e r t e d t h e o f f i c e r s t o t h e c o n s o le insid e th e v e h ic le , a n d th e o f f ic e r s f o u n d a b a g th a t c o n tain e d b e tw e e n f if ty a n d s ixt y g r a ms of

cocaine. Lieutenant Jones testified that he a l s o discovere d a g un betwee n the console a nd the driver’ s seat, and el ec t ro n i c sca les that had c ocaine residue w ere rec overe d from the c onsole. He te sti fi e d th a t, u nd e r the se a ts o f the ve hic le , h e fo un d d ry e r s he e ts, wh ic h ar e ty pic a lly us e d to ma sk the sce nt of drug s. The lieutena nt said that the Defenda nt did not tell him where the D efe ndant had acquir ed $38,000, and the Def endant sa id that he was une mploy ed.-3-

L ieutenant Jones testified that he also re cover ed sever al paper s and a Sprint ce ll phone box with a bill from the ca

r. He said that the Sprint cell p h o ne bill was for an ac count held in the Def endant’ s name. The lieutenant found three cell phones either on the Defe ndant’s per son or in the

c ar. L ie ute na nt Jon e s st a te d th a t, ba se d on his expe ri e nc e , pe op le inv olv e d in dru g tr a ff ic kin g us e multipl e cell phones t o avoid detection. L ieutenant J ones t estified that there was a rec eipt in the car fo r i ts p ur c ha se

. He sa id that the re c e ipt wa s f ro m a n auto sa le s st or e , a ndit d e sc ri be d th e ve hic le as a bla ck Chevrole t Monte Carlo that was purchased for $5900 in ca sh and paid for by the Def endant. The rec eipt was sig ned by Donna Jackson, the De fenda nt’s mother.

On cr oss-examination, L ieutenant J ones testified that the sea rch w arr ant was f

or apa rtment C, the unit that was the farthest away from the street. He said that he believe d the Def endant ha d two cell phones on his person and one in the vehicle , but he admitted that theremay have be en only

one on the Def

endant. He testified that there wer e sever al key s on the key chain he obtained fr om the De fe nd a nt, a ndthe re c ou ld h a ve be e n k e y s to thr e e dif fe re nt c ars

.
Samuel J ohnson, an off

icer with the Metro Police Drug Task For ce, te stified that he wa s one of the off icer s that executed a se arc h war rant at 1612 16th Avenue North, apartment C , on September 28, 2001. He sa id that apartment C was located in a building that conta ined seve ral a partments. The office r said that, whe n he ar rived at the apartment building, he saw four men on the front porch of

a no the r, ne arb y apa

rt me nt. He te sti fi e d that he wo re a po lic e un if orm, a nd it wa s h is r e sp on sib ili ty to enter a nd secur e apa

rtment C for the other

office rs. Offic er J ohnson testified t hat, whil e he went to apartment C, L ieutenant Jones approa ched the four men on the near by porch. L ater , he assisted L ieutenant Jones by

sear ching the Def

endant, to ensur e off

icer safe ty , and he notice d a bulg e in the De fe n d an t ’s p o ck et o f h i s p an t s

. Of fi ce r J o h n s o n t es t i fi ed t h at t h e De fe n d an t t o l d h i m t h at t h e b u l ge was money , and the De fenda nt ga ve the of fice r permission t o remove the money

. T he off icer

e xpla ine d th a t he re mov e d two bu nc he s of mon e y tot a lin g $5 92 1, $2 00 0 of wh ic h wa s wr app e d in a whi te g r o c e r y b a g s e c u r e d b y ru b b e r b a n d s

. H e te s ti f ie d th a t th e D e f

e n d a n t a ls o h a d k e y s a n d a driver’ s license in his pocke t, and he r emoved a ll of these it ems and placed them on the sidew alk. Offic er Johnson testified that he was present whe n L ieutenant Jones inquired about the Monte Carlo, and no one r esponded.

Offic er J ohnson testified t hat t he K-9 office r and dog arrived t o examine two vehicles, one in front of the a

partment a nd the black Monte Carlo l ocate d on the stree t. He said that the dog g ave a positive alert to the presenc e of the odor of narcotics. He said that the dog s cratched the door of the Mo nte Carl o, a ndL ie ute na nt Jone s ope ne d the do or wi th the De fe nd a nt’ s k e y s. Th e do g a g a in alerted positively to the prese nce of narc otics in the console ar ea, w here they found a ba g containing approximately

59 g rams of c ocaine . The off icer also fou n d i n t h e car

drug scale s, a .9 millim eter handg un, a bag containing about $36,000, dry er sheets, some bag g ies, and pape rwork on the vehicle. He te sti fi e d th a t th e mon e y se ize d tot a le d $4 3, 88 6. Of fi c e r Joh ns on te sti fi e d th a t th e De fe nd a nt d id

no t li ve a t th e a dd re ss w he re he e xec ute d th e se arc h w arr a nt.

On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Of fi c e r Joh ns on te sti fi e d th a t hi s n ote s in dic a te d th a t on ly on e c e ll phone wa s taken fr om the Def endant. He ag ree d that, when he arrived at the location, the Defe ndantT enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 39

- 1 7

- 4 3 2 p rovides fo r enhanced p uni shment f o r d rug o f

fenses t hat oc cur 1

o n the gr o u n d s o r fa c ili ties o f an y sc h o o l o r with in o n e tho u sa n d fee t (1 ,0 0 0 ' ) o f the re a l p ro p e rty tha t co m p rise s a p u b lic

o r p riv a te e le m e n ta ry sc h o o l, m id d le sc h o o l, o r se c o n d a ry sc h o o l.
-4- wa s t wo d o o rs d o wn fr o map ar t m en tC , o n t h e co rn er s t o o p

. He s ai d t h at h e d i d n o tfi n d an y d ru gs on the Def

endant’ s person.

Ke n Sp e n c e r , a s e r g e a n t w ith th e M e tr o Po li c e D e p ar tm e n t, te s ti f ie d th a t h e w a s th e K- 9 handler in this case, and he assisted in the execution of the sea rch w arr ant at 1612 16th Avenue . He said that he a nd his drug K- 9 , n amed Rocky , wer e tra ined throug h the United States Police K-9 As so c ia tio n. He e xpla ine d tha t he a ndRoc ky ha d to be re -c e rt if

ie d e ve ry y e ar a s a K- 9 h a nd le r t e a m,
a nd he sa id that the y we re c e rt if ie d on Se pte mbe r 28 , 20 01

. He sa id that he wa s c a lle d to the 16 th Avenue location to perf

orm a ve hicle sea

rch on a black Monte Carlo. He testi fi ed t h at t he dog alerted him to the passeng er’ s side door, by scratching , which informe d him that the dog de tected

an odor of narc otics coming from the vehicle. Serg eant Spencer testified that he o p en ed the passeng er side door

of the Mo n t e Carlo, and the dog immediately went to the re ar pa sseng er side floorboar d and indicate d ag ain on a sa ck, which contained a larg e amount of mone y . He sa id the dog also alerted hi m to the center console of t he vehicle, where he found a bag of whit e powde r that later tested positive for cocaine. Serg eant Spencer said that it is common for money to ge t contaminated with the scent of na

rcotics, whic h was why the dog alerted hi m to the m oney

. He testified that he

a lso fo un d d ry e r s he e ts i n th e c ar, wh ic h d ru g de a le rs be lie ve ma sk the sc e nt o f the na

rc oti c s.

Donna F lowers testified, as an expert in f orensic chemistry , that she works at the Tenne ssee Bur eau of I nvestig ations (“TB I ”) Crime L aboratory and she an aly zes substances that various law enfor ceme nt a g encie s submit for the prese nce of controlled substances or drug s. Flowe rs said that

s h e an aly zed the white powder in this case, and she conclude d that the powder was c ocaine , a
sc he du le tw o c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e , a ndit w e ig he d 5 9. 2 g rams. Scott Cherry , a land surve y or, testified that he owns his own bus iness and one of the primary functions of that business is to conduct e ng ineering sur vey s. He identifie d a m ap from the Metro Planning Commissioner and said that it is normal proce dure to re ly on such a ma

p. He testified that a police of

fice r took him to the location of the sear ch war rant, 1612 16th Avenue, and he mea sured the distance from the Wharton School to t h at l o ca tion. Cherry testified that he de termined the property lines of the school, a nd he used a Global P ositioni ng Sy stem (“G PS”) to measure from two

corne rs of the sc hool property line to the location at 1612 16th Avenue

. He admitted that he does not have spe cialized trai n i n g i n t h e u se of GPS but an employ ee at his business rece ived such tr a ini ng a ndthat e mpl oy e e taug ht h im h ow to u se the GPS sy ste m. He sai d th at he u se s th is

e qu ipm e nt a

bo ut thr e e or

fo ur tim e s pe r we e k. Che rry te sti fi e d that, ba se d on his tw o me a su re me nts of the shorte st distance and the distance f rom the corner of the school prope rty , the distance s were 939 fee t and 947 fe et from the location at 1612 16th Avenue . He sa id that the measure ments were 1

acc urate to within about one inch. On cr oss-examination, Cherry testified t hat t he Wharton School is not visi ble from the loc ation on 16th Avenue. H e ag ree d that betwee n the 16t h Avenue location

a ndthe sc ho ol p ro pe rt y

the re is 1 7thAv e nu e , 1 8thAv e nu e , tw o a lle y s, a ndfo ur ro ws of ho us e s.-5-

Ba sed upon this evidence the jury found the De fenda nt guilty of poss ession with the intent to sell twenty -six (26) g rams or more of a subst ance containing cocaine in a Dr ug -Free School Z one and of posse ssion of a fire arm with the int ent t o employ it in the commi ssion of or esc ape f rom an of fe ns e . T he tr ia l c ou rt

se nte nc e d th e De fe nd a nt to thi rt y -s ix y e ars , a t 10 0% , f or the po sse ssi on wi th the intent to sell twenty -six (26) g rams or m o re o f a substanc e conta ining c ocaine in a Drug -Free Sc ho ol Z on e a ndthr e e y e ars , at 35% , for the po sse ssi on of

a fi re arm wi th the int e nt t o e mpl oy it i n the commission of or esc ape f rom an off

ense, a nd order ed that the se ntence s run conc urre ntly

.
II. Ana lys is
On appe al, the Def

endant contends that: (1) the tria l court er red by deny ing the Def

endant’ s motion to s uppress; (2) the evidenc e is insufficient to support t he De fenda nt’s convictions; (3) the trial court e rre d in admitting the testimony of a survey or perta ining to the use of GPS in determining the distance betwee n the location of the offe nse and the rea l pr o p ertythat comprises Wharton Sc ho ol; a nd(4 ) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

se nte nc e d h im.

A. M ot ion to Suppr e ss
Pretrial, th e Def

endant f iled a motion to suppress the wea pon found in the De fenda nt’s

ve hic le . A s g ro un ds , the De fe nd a nt al le g e d: (1 ) the la w en fo rc e me nt of fi c e rs la c ke d a ny

a uth ority to s e arc h th e De fe nd a nt; a nd(2 ) the la w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs e nte re d th e ve hic le wi tho ut a uth ority and without a war

rant. Specifica lly , the Def endant arg ues that the sear ch conducte d of him and the subsequent sea

rch of the vehicle was war

rantless, nonc onsensual, and did not fa ll within any of the

rec og nized ex ceptions to the F ourth Amendment prote ction ag ainst unrea sonable searc hes and seizures and, a s such, that all evidenc e derived from that se arc h is inadmissi ble. The trial court conducte d an evide ntiary

hearing and denied the motion. The tria l court held:
My rec ollection . . . is that once an individual denies any interest in the automobile, they have the rig ht to searc h and to use a ny thing, e ven thoug h he mig ht come along later a nd prove that it was his automobile or that he had inter est in the automobile.

. . . .
And t he proof

rig ht now befor e me is that eve ry body out there de nied anything to do with the automobile. That’s the proof be fore me.

. . . . [T] wo offic ers ha ve testified that e very body sai d t h eydidn’t have a ny thing to do with that vehicle, whose automobile is that? I don’t know, is what they said. Th e n late r o n th is g e ntl e ma n s a y s, afte r t he se arc h, thi s g e ntl e ma n s a y s it ’s my mother’s automobile. That’s wher e we are as fa r as the a utomobile is concerne d.-6-

The finding s of fa ct made by the trial court at the hearing on a motion to suppress a re binding upon this court unless the evidenc e conta ined in the re cord pr eponder ates a gai n s t them. State v. Ross, 49 S .W.3d 833, 839 (Tenn. 2001). The trial court, a s the trier of fac t, is able to assess the

cre dibilit y

of t he witnesses, determine the weight and value to be afforde d the evidenc e and r esolve

a ny c on fl ic ts i n th e e vid e nc e . St a te v. Od om, 92 8 S.W.2 d 18, 23 (T e nn . 1 99 6) . T he pr e va ili ng pa rt y is entitled to the stronge st leg itimate view of the evidenc e and a ll reasona ble infer ence s drawn f

rom that evidenc e. State v. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001). Howeve r, t his Court is not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law. State v. Simpson, 968 S .W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998). The application of the law to the fa cts found by the trial court are questions of law that this Court review s de n o v o

. St a te v

. D a n ie l, 1 2 S. W. 3 d 4 2 0 , 4 2 3 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 )

. T h e d e f e n d a n t h a s th e burden of establishing that the evidenc e contained in the rec ord preponde rate s ag ainst the finding s of fa ct made by the trial court. State v. Year g an, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

The F ourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, m ade applicable to the states by the F ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nt, pr ov ide s:

Th e ri g ht o f the pe op le to b e se c ur e in the ir pe rs on s, ho us e s, pap ers, a nde ff e c ts,
a g a ins t un re a so na

blese arc he s a ndse izur e s, sh a ll n ot b e vio la te d, a ndno wa rr a nts shall issue, b u t upon probable cause , supported by oath or a ffirmation, and particula rly describing the pla ce to be sear ched, and the person or things to be seized.

Artic le I § 7 of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion pr ov ide s th a t:
[P ]eople shall be s ec u re in their persons, houses, pa pers a nd possessions, from

unrea sonable sea

rche s and seizures; and that g ener al war rants, whe reby

an off icer may be commande d to searc h suspected pla ces, w ithout evidence of the fa ct committed, or to seize anyperson or persons not name d, whose off ence s are not particula rly described and supported by evidenc e, ar e dang erous to liberty and oug ht not to be g rante d.

Both of the se co n s t i t u t ional provisions are intende d to “‘saf eg uard the privac y

and sec urity

of individuals a g ainst arbitra ry invasions of g overnme nt of ficials.’” State v. Randolph, 74 S.W .3d 330, 334 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).

1. St op o f the De fend ant

Under b o t h fede ral a nd state constitutions, a warr antless sea rch or seizure is presumed

un re a so na

ble , ande vid e nc e ob ta ine d f ro m su c h a

se izur e sh ou ld b e su pp re sse d u nle ss the Sta te demonstrates by

a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the sear ch or seizure wa s conducte d pursuant to one of the na

rrowly -def

ined exceptions to the warr ant re quir em en t

. S ee State v. Y ear g an, 958 S.W .2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Coolidge v. N ew Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) ). Howeve r, should the sea

rch or seizure fa ll into one of these nar row e x ceptions , t h e fr u i t s of that-7-

sear ch and se izure may

be prope rly

admitted into evidence . State v. Shaw, 6 0 3 S.W .2d 741, 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). One such exception is the “stop-a nd-frisk situation,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 1 9 ( 19 68 ), wh e re by a n o ff ic e r m a y make a n in ve sti g a tory

sto p w he n the off

ic e r h a s a
rea sonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable fa cts, that a criminal offense has bee n or is about to be committed. I d.; State v. Watkins , 827 S.W .2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992)

.
We must first determine whether the detention of the Def endant by the p o l i ce o ff icer

a mou nte d to a

se izur e . I f s o, we mus t the n d e te rm ine wh e the r the of fi c e r p os se sse d a n a

rt ic ula ble

rea sonable suspicion for

an investig atory

stop under Te rry

and its prog eny . “Only

when the of

fice r, by means of phy sical for ce or show of authority , has in some way restra ined t he li berty of a c itiz en may we conclude that a ‘se izure’ has oc curr ed.” T erry , 392 U.S. at 19 n.16; State v. Hord, 106 S.W .3d 68, 70 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). The Supreme Court stated that “a person ha s been ‘ seized’ within the mean i n g o f t he F ourth Amendment only if, in view of a ll of the circ umstances surrounding the i n ci d en t , a re asonable person would ha ve believe d that he wa s not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenha ll, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Hord, 106 S.W .3d at 71. I n the ca se under submissi on, it is clea

r t hat t he Defenda nt was “seized” within the meaning of the State a nd Fe dera l Constit utions. Office r J ones testified that he orde red the Def endant to re turn to the apa rtment, made the Def endant lay

on the g round, and ha ndcuff ed the De fenda nt. There for e, i t i s clear that the Def endant wa s “seized” within the mea ning of the Ter ry decision. Thus, for

the seizure and subsequent sea

rch of the Def endant to be c onstitut ionally permissible, the off

icer must have had

rea sonable suspicion, supported by articula ble fac ts, that the Def

endant ha d committed, or was a bout to commit a criminal offe nse.

I nitially , we must ac knowledg e the less de manding s t andard of “r easona ble suspicion,” as compar ed with “pr obable c ause.” Reasonable suspicion “ca n be esta blished with information that is d if fe re nt in qua nti ty or c on te nt tha n tha t re qu ir e d to est abli sh pr ob able c a us e [an d] . . . c a n a ri se from information that is less reliable than t hat required to show probable cause .” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); see also Yea rg an, 958 S.W.2d at 632. I n ev aluating whethe r a police office r’s re asonable suspicion is supported by specific and articula ble fac ts, a court must consider the totality

of the c ircumstance s. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); Watkins , 827 S.W .2d at 294. “This [may ] i nclude

. . . but is not l imited to, objective observations, information obtained fr om other police of fice rs or a g encie s, information obtained fr om citiz ens, and the pattern of oper ation of ce rtain off ender s.” W atkins, 827 S.W .2d at 294; see a lso Cortez, 449 U.S . at 418. Also, a court must consider “the r ational infer ence s and deductions that a trained office r could dra w fr om the fa c ts a ndc ir c ums ta nc e s k no wn to him [ or her].” Watkin s, 82 7 S. W.2 d at 29 4; s e e a lso Terry , 392 U.S. at 27 n.23.

I n o u r v i e w , u n d e r

t h i s t o t a l i t y

o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t e s t , L i e u t e n a n tJo n e s ’ s w a rr a ntl e ss seizure and se arc h of the Def endant wa s permissible as a “ stop and frisk” e x ception to the wa rra nt require ment. When L ieutenant Jones arrive d at the apa rtment building whe re a

sear ch wa

rra nt was to be executed, he observe d th e De fenda nt and three other men on the stoop of another apartment in the building, g ambling w ith dice

. I t was the lieutena nt’s responsibilityto control these f our men while the other

office rs sea

rche d apartment C. Cont rolling the se men was nece ssary to e nsure the-8-

other off icer s’ safe ty . As L ieutenant Jones app roac hed these men to control them, the De fenda nt beg an to put some thing in his pockets and walk aw ay from the lieutenant. The De fenda nt then beg an to run down t h e s t re et , and the lieutenant drew his gun and order ed the De fenda nt to ge t on the g round. The D efen d an t went about fifty y ards, then stoppe d, and re turned to the a partment. The Def e n d an t’ s b e h a vior established a rea sonable suspicion that the De fenda nt was eng ag ed in unlawf ul conduct, ther efor e, Lieut en ant J ones wa s justified in ordering the Def endant to re turn to the apartment. Furthe r, Offic er J ohnson testified that he “ did a pat down” sear ch of the Def endant f or office r saf ety , and he noticed a bulge in the Defenda nt’s pants. The off icer remove d the bulg e which was $5921 in cur

renc y , and $2000 o f t hat amount was w rappe d in a white bag with rubber bands around it. We conc lude, there fore that the sea rch of the Def endant wa s permissible based on the “stop-and- frisk” ex ce p t i o n to the war rant re quirement. Ac cording ly , we must next determine whether the subsequent se arc h of the De fenda nt’s vehicle w as also permissibl e.

2. Se ar c h of t he Ve hic le

The De fenda nt further contends that the pol ice officer s had no authority or basis t o conduct

a s e ar c h o f

h is c ar

. O u r

Su p r e me Co u r t h a s p r e v io u s ly h e ldth a t “ a

c a n in e s w e e p ar o u n d the perimete r of a

vehicle w hich has been leg ally detained does not c onstitut e a sear ch, and thus, does not require probable caus e o r re asonable suspicion . . . .” State v. Eng land, 19 S.W.3d 762, 764 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ; s e e a ls o T im o th y Rath e r s v

. St a te , N o

. W2 0 0 0

- 0 2 1 7 7

- CC A

- R3

- PC , 2 0 0 2 WL 1549771, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Jan. 18, 2002), no perm. app. filed . I n order to find that an off

icer had proba

ble cause to sear ch a ve hicle base d upon a positive alert by a tra ined drug de te c tio n d og , th e do g ’s re liabil it y mu st b e e sta bli sh e d. I d. a t 76 8; s e e a lso Sta te v. John Da vid Smit h, No. W2003-01200-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 737532, at * 4 (T enn. C rim. App., at Jackson, April 6, 2004), perm. app. de nied (T en n

. 2 0 0 4 ). T h i s i n cl u d es co n s i d er at i o n o f t h e d o g’s tra i n i n g, the offic er’ s training and experienc e with the dog , and the r ecor d of fa lse neg ative and f alse positive alerts. I d.
At trial, Off

icer J ohnson testified that he wa s prese nt when L ieutenant J ones inquired about the vehicle parke d out f

ront, and Offic er J ohnson said that there was no a nswer f rom any of the men about the vehicle. Ba sed on their finding s from the initial sear ch of the Def endant, including a key that fit the vehicle , the offic ers subseque ntly contac ted t h e K- 9 unit to perform a swee p on the vehicle. A t trial, Offic er Spenc er te stified about Rocky ’s training and his own t raining as a ha ndler of K-9 dog s. The off

icer stated that Rocky

was a ssigne d to him in 2001, a n d he and Roc ky are
r e c e r tified ever y y ea

r a s a K

- 9 h a n d le r

te a m b y th e U n it e d St a te s Po li c e K

- 9 A s s o c iati o n

. We conclude that, since tra ining a nd reliability wer e established, the police had probable cause to searc h the veh ic le u p o n th e c a n in e ’ s a le r t o n th e p a s s e n g e r ’ s d o o r

. I d

. a t 7 6 8

- 6 9

. T h is is s u e is w ith o ut
me ri t.

B. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence

The De fenda nt contends that the e vidence was insuffic ient to s u p p o rt his convictions for possession with the i ntent to sell twenty -six (26) gr ams or m ore of a substance containing cocaine-9-

in a Drug -Free School Z one and of possession of a fir earm with the intent to employit in the commission of or esca

pe fr om an offe nse. Specific ally , the Def endant contends that the evidenc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a fi nd ing of

c on str uc tiv e po sse ssi on of

the a uto mo bi le or it s con te nts beca use no one sa w the De fenda nt in or near the vehicle and there is no e vidence that the Def endant attempted to exercise c ontrol over the a utomobile.

W h en an ac cused c halleng es the suff iciency of the e vidence , an appe llate court’s standard of review is whether , afte r considering the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution,

a ny ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( e ); Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); State v. Carter , 121 S.W .3d 579, 588 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 274, 278 (Tenn. 2000) . This rule applies to f ind ing s of

g uil t ba se d u po n d ir e c t e vid e nc e , c ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e , o r a c omb inatio n o f b oth dir e c t a ndc ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e . St a te v. Pe nd e rg ra ss , 13 S.W .3d 389, 392-93 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1999).

I n d e te rm ini ng the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , th is C ou rt

sh ou ld no t re -w e ig h o r re -e va luate the evidenc e. State v. Matthew s , 80 5 S. W.2 d 7 76 , 7 79 (Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 90 ). No r m a y thi s C o u rt s u b s t i t u t e i t s i n fe re n ce s fo r t h o s e d ra wn b y t h e t ri ero f f

ac tfr o mt h e e v i d en ce

. S t at e v

. Bu ggs , 99 5 S.W. 2d 10 2, 10 5 (T e nn

. 19 99 ); L iaka s v. Sta te , 286 S.W .2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956) . Questions

c on c e rn ing the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, th e wei ght a ndva lue of the e vid e nc e , a s w e ll a s a ll fac tual issues raised by

the evidenc e ar e re solved by t h e t rier of

fac t. L iakas
, 286 S.W .2d at 859. This Court must aff

ord the State of T ennesse e the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence contained in the rec ord, as well as all rea sonable infere nces which may be draw n from the e vidence

. State v. Evans
, 838 S.W .2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992) . Be cause a ver dict of g uilt ag ainst a def endant

remove s the presumption of innoce nce and raises a presumption of g uilt, the convicted criminal de fe nd a nt b e ars the bu rd e n of sho wi ng that the e vid e nc e wa s leg a lly ins uf fi c ie nt to sus ta in a g uil ty verdic t. I d.; see State v. Car ruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000)

.
1. P ossession w ith the Intent to Sell Tw enty-six (26) Gr am s or Mor e of a Su bstance

Co nt ain ing Co c ain e in a Dr ug- F r e e Sc hoo l Z one

To convict the Def

endant of the offe nse of possession w ith the intent to sell twenty -six (26) g rams or more of a substanc e conta ining c ocaine in a Drug -Free School Z one, the State was re quired to prove that the Def

en d an t : (1) knowingly

possessed a substanc e conta ining c ocaine within one thousand (1000) f

eet of rea l property

that comprised a

public or private school; (2) with the intent to sell; and (3) the a mount of t h e s u bstance containing cocaine possessed e qualed or exceede d twenty -six g rams. Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17- 417 (i)(5) , -432 (b)

.
We must first determine whe ther the State e stablished bey on d a re asonable doubt that the Def endant knowing ly

possessed a substance containing coca ine wit hin 1000 fee t of a school zone. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-17-418(a ), prohibiting possession of a contr olled substance, “is n o t r e s tric te d to p r o o f o f a c tu a l p o s s e s s io n , a n d e v id e n c e o f e ith e r c o n s tr u c ti v e p o s s e s s ion or other c ontrol over the substanc e is sufficie nt to e s t ab l i s h t his element.” State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d-10-

83 3, 84 5 ( Te nn

. 20 01 ). Con str uc tiv e po sse ssi on of a dr

ug is ba se d up on the po we r andint e nti on to
e xer c ise do min ion a nd c on tr ol ov e r the dr ug , e ith e r dir e c tly or thr ou g h oth e rs

. I d. “ I n o the r w or ds , ‘construc tive possession is the ability to r educe an object to a ctual possession.’” I d. at 845 (quoting State v. Transou, 928 S.W.2d 949, 955-56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (citations om itted)). “As such, althoug h a def

endant’ s mere pr esenc e at a place wher e contr olled substances ar e fo und will not support an infe renc e of posse ssion, a person in possession of the p remises where c ontrolled substances are found may also be presumed to possess the controlled substanc es themselves.” I d. (citation omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the l ight most favor able to the S tate, the evidenc e proves that the Def end an t had construc tive possession of the substance containing cocaine that was f ound in the Monte Car lo

. Se e St a te v

. L o n n ie Wa lt e r H u r d , N o

. E 2 0 0 2

- 0 0 8 3 2

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 3 WL 22303083, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Oct. 8, 2003), no perm. app. filed ; se e a lso Sta te v Br own, 9 1 5 S.W .2d 3, 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that “[k] nowledg e may be infe rre d from contr ol over the vehicle in w hich the contra band is se cre ted”)

. After

conducting a leg al sea

rch of the De fe nd a nt, of

fi c e rs fo un d a ke y to the Mo nte Carl o in his poc ke t. Af te r a K- 9 dog a le rt e d to the pr e se nc e of

dr ug s in th e Mo nte Carl o, the of fi c e rs the n c on du c te d a

le g a l se arc h o f the ve hic le using the Def

endant’ s key . When the o ff icer s sear ched the interior of the vehicle, the y found a Sprint c e ll ph on e bil l a dd re sse d to the De fe nd a nt. Th e Mo nte Carl o s a le s r e c e ipt wa s a lso fo un d in the ve hic le a nd wa s sig ne d by the De fe nd a nt’ s mothe r, wh o wa s no t pr e se nt a t the tim e the se e ve nts
occur red

. The off

icer s found a lar g e quantity of money

and a ba g containing cocaine in the ca r. Fr om this evidence, we conclude t hat a rational trier of fact could have found that the Def endant wa s in c on str uc tiv e po sse ssi on of

the Mo nte Carl o a nd its c on te nts . F urthe r, Sc ott Che rry te sti fi e d th a t,
acc ording to his two GPS measure ments, the distance to the school from the property was be tween 939 fee t and 947 fee t. There fore , we conclude that there was sufficient evidence that the Defe ndant knowing ly

possessed coc aine within a Dr ug -Free School Z one.
Next, we must determine whe ther the State e stablished bey ond a rea sonable doubt that the Def endant ha d the intent to sell the coca ine. When the police of fice rs sea rche d the Def

en d an t’s

ve hic le , th e y

fo un d a ba g co ntaini ng be tw e e n f if ty a ndsixty

g rams o f c oc a ine , a

pp ro xima te ly $3 8, 00 0 in c a sh , th re e c e ll ph on e s, dr ug sc a le s, ba g g ie s, pa

pe rw or k on the ve hic le , a nd dry e r s he e ts. L ieu t en an t J ones and O ffice r Johns on testified that these items ar e consistent with common char ac te r is ti c s o f p e o p le w h o p o s s e s s d ru g s to s e ll

. “ I t may b e in f e rr e d f r o m th e a mo u n t of a

c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e or

su bs ta nc e s p os ses sed by a n o ff e nd e r, a lon g wi th o the r r e le va nt f a c ts
su rr ou nd ing the arr e st, that th e c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e or su bs ta nc e s w e re po sse sse d w ith the pu rp os e
o f s e l l i n g o r

o t h e r w i s e d i s p e n s i n g

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 7

- 4 1 9 ; s e e a l s o S t a t e v

. S a m u e l L. Giddens, No. M2002-00163- CCA-R3-CD, 2 0 0 4 W L 2636715, at * 4 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 15, 2004), no perm. app. filed . We conclude that this evidence is suff icient for the jury to conclude be y ond a rea sonable doubt that the Def endant possesse d the coc aine with the intent to s e ll i t.
Finally , we must determine wh et h er t h e S tate showe d bey ond a re asonable doubt that the

su bs ta nc e c on ta ini ng cocai ne po sse sse d b y the De fe nd a nt e qu a le d o r e xce e de d tw e nty -s ix g rams.A l t ho ugh t he o f fense occ urr ed i n 20 0 1 , we no t e t hat t he 2 0 0 3 s t at ut e i s i d ent i cal t o t he st at ut e i n ef fect at t he 2

t i me of t he offens e.

-11- L ie ute na nt Jon e s a ndOf

fi c e r Joh ns on bo th t e sti fi e d th a t th e y re c ov e re d b e tw e e n f

if ty an d s i xty g rams of c oc a ine fr om the De fe nd a nt’ s c ar. F low e rs te sti fi e d th a t sh e a na ly zedthe su bs ta nc e in this c a se and conclude d that it wa s cocaine and it weig hed 59.2 g rams. The evidenc e cle arly shows that the amount of coc aine possesse d by the Def endant e x cee ded twenty -six g rams.

We conclude that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to prove that the Def endant possesse d more than twenty -six g rams of a substance containing cocaine within 1000 fee t of a Dr ug -Free School Z one. Ac c or din g ly , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

2. P ossession of a F ir e ar mwith th e Int e nt to Em plo y it

in t he Co m m iss ion of or Esc ape from an Of

fense
A person commits the crime of poss ession of a firea rm in the commission of or esca pe fr om an off ense w hen the pe rson “possesse s any deadly we ap o n wi th intent to employit in the commission of or esca

pe fr o m an o ffense.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 1307(c) (1) ( 2003)

. 2 There fore , in order f

or the S t at e to convict the De fenda nt of this crime, it had to prove be y ond a

rea sonable doubt that the Def endant possessed a deadly wea pon, and the Def

endant possessed the deadly wea pon with the intent to employ it in the commissi on of o r es cape from an of fense

. Additionally , this Court has stated that “[p] ossession may be ac tual or construc tive.” State v. Steven D. Pittm an, No

. M 1 999-00320-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 374755, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 7, 2000) , perm. app. dismissed ( T e n n

. Ju ly

3 1 , 2 0 0 0 ). Con str

uc tiv e po sse ssi on is essentially

the ability

to reduc e an obje ct to actua l possession. I d.

I n State v. Br entol Calvin Ja me s , N o

. M 1 9 9 9

- 0 2 5 3 3

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2000 WL 1763686 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 30, 2000), no perm. app. filed , this Court examined what is re quired to sustain a conviction of possession of a wea pon during the commi ssion of an offense . J ames, 2000 WL 1763686, at *3-4. This Court found t hat, for a conviction, “the State a dditionallyhad to prove that the appe llant possessed the we apon with the intent to employ it in the commission of, or esca pe from, an offense .” I d. at *4. This Court determined that the only evidenc e of the appellant’ s “intent to employ ” wa s an off

icer ’s t estimony

that the appe llant’s co-de fenda nt was lea ning into the appellant’ s car

when police approa ched. I d. This Court concluded that “ the State fa iled to prove that the appe llant possessed the pistol with the intent to e mploy it during the commission of or esca pe from an of

fense .” I d.

Simi larl y , in the c a se un de r su bmi ssi on , the Sta te pr ov e d that the De fe nd a nt c on str uc tiv e ly possessed the de adly

wea pon. The Def

endant possessed the key to the car in which the handg un was l o c a t e d , a n d t h e D e f

e n d a n tc o u l d h a v e o b t a i n e d a c t u a l p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e h a n d g u n a ta n y

t i m e

. In order to convict the Def

endant, the State additionally had to prove that the Def

endant possesse d the-12-

we apo n w ith the int e nt to e mpl oy it in the c omm iss ion of , o r e sc ape fr om, a n o ff

e ns e . B a se d o n th is

rec ord, there was no evidence of the De fenda nt’s “intent to employ ” the we apon. The wea pon was not found in the initial searc h of the ve hicle but was subsequently found between the driver’s se at
a ndthe c e nte r co ns ole of the ve hic le

. Th e re is no ev ide nc e that the De fe nd a nt at te mpt e d to ob ta in or use the w eapon. We c onclude that the e vidence is insufficient to sustain the Def endant’ s convic t i o n fo r poss ession of a w eapon w ith the intent to employit during the commission of or

esca pe fr om an offe nse, and, the ref ore, w e re verse the Def

endant’ s conviction for this offe nse.

C. Adm ission of T estim ony

The De fenda nt contends that the trial c ourt err ed when it allowed a survey or t o testify about the distance betwee n the location wher e the Def endant possessed cocaine and the rea l pr operty that comprises Wharton School. S pecif ically , the Defenda nt contends that the testimony of Scott Cherry that the Def

endant wa s within 1000 fee t of t he re al prope rty that comprises Wharton School when he wa s in po sse ssi on of c oc a ine is ina dmi ssi ble be c a us e Che rry wa s n ot an e xpe rt

on GPS de vic e s, and such te stimonyrequire s a scientific foundation. The State contends that the f oundation for the admission of t his evidenc e was proper ly laid, and the e vidence is admissibl e. At trial, the f ollowing

e x c h a n g e t o o k

p l a c e b e t w e e n d e f

e n s e c o u n s e l a n d t h e tr i a l c o u r tab o u tC h e rr y’ s t e s t i m o n y:
THE COURT: [C ounsel], as i n the s ituation with DUI ’s, t he C ourt has said time and time ag ain t hat i t is not nece ssary for the ope rator of a drug testing unit to have the underlying e x pertise a s to the sy stem. He must only be an operator and this man has te sti fi e d th a t he is q ua lif

ie d to op e rate thi s sy ste m.
[COU NSE L ]: Yo ur

Ho no r, I re sp e c tf ull y would distinguish those case s, I mean, they did think S ensing and others introduced reliability about particular instruments. And I do n’ t th ink

the re wa s a

qu e sti on abo ut the un de rl y in g s cie nce. H e re the re is a question about the under ly ing - -

TH E CO U RT : T h e r e h a s a lw a y s b e e n a q u e s ti o n ab o u t th e u n d e r lyin g s c ie n c e on breath meters. As long as I can r emember , as long as they h av e b een in use , there ha ve be e n q ue sti on s a

bo ut the un de rl y ing sc ie nc e . A nd the Cou rt ’s ha ve sa id that it is not necessa

ry for the ope rator to know the underlying sc ience of the mete r. Questions reg arding the admissibilit y , qualifications, relevancy an d competenc y of expert testimonyare left to the discre tion of the trial court. McDanie l v. CS X Tra nsportati o n , I n c., 955 S. W. 2 d 2 5 7 , 2 6 3

- 6 4 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 7 )

. Pu r s u a n t t o Ru le 7 0 2 , T e nn e s s e e Ru le s o f E v id e n c e , “ [i ]f

sc ie nti fi c , te c hn ic a l, o r o the r s pe c ia lize d kno wl e dg e wi ll s ub sta nti a lly a ssi st the tr ie r o f f

a c t to understand the evidenc e or to de termine a fac t in issue, a witness qualified a s an expert by knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining , or ed u ca t i o n m ay testify in the form of a n opinion or otherwise.” Rule 703, Tennesse e Rules of Evidenc e, re quires the e x pert’s opinion to be supporte d by trus tw orthy

fa c ts o r d a ta

“ of a ty pe re aso na

bly re lie d u po n b y

e xpe rt s in the pa

rt ic ula r f ie ld i n forming opinions or infere nces upon the subject.” The tr i al court may apply , in its di scre tion, the-13-

fo llo wi ng fa c tor s to de te rm ine re lia bil ity : ( 1) wh e the r the e vid e nc e abo ut whi ch th e expe rt is testify ing ha s been t es t ed and the methodology with which it has bee n tested; (2) w hether the

e vid e nc e ha s b e e n s ub

je c te d to pe e r r e vie w o r pu bl ica ti on ; ( 3) wh e the r a po te nti a l r a te of

e rr or is known; (4) whe ther the e videnceis ge nera lly acc epte d in the community involved in the body

of specia liz ed knowledge ; and (5) w hether the expert’s re sear ch in the fie ld has bee n conducte d independe nt of litigation. McDaniel, 955 S.W .2d 257 at 265; see also State v. Stevens, 78 S.W .3d 8 1 7 , 8 3 4 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 2 )

. T h e d e te r mi n in g f a c to r is “ w h e th e r

th e witne s s ’ s q u a li f

ic a ti o n s a u th o r iz e him or her to g ive an informed opinion on the subject in issue.” Stevens, 78 S.W .3d at 834. A trial court’s r uling on the a dmissibi lityof such e vidence may be overturned on a

ppeal only

if the discretion is exercised a

rbitrarily or abuse d. I d. at 832.

The re cord r efle cts that Cherry has bee n a license d survey or for six teen y ear s, and he pa ssed a six teen hour

test that cover ed all aspe cts of survey ing. He has also taken cour ses in surveying and

c ivi l e ng in eering . H e ow ne d h is o wn su rv e y ing bu sin e ss f or tw e lve y e ars , a ndhis bu sin e ss d id eng ineering sur vey s for ne w roa ds, sewer s, subdivisi ons, and stores. Cherry used a Tremble 4000 GPS de vic e to m e a su re the dis ta nc e be tween 16 12 16 th A ve nu e No rth a ndthe Wha rt on Sc ho ol. Cherry testified that GPS was deve loped by the Depa rtment of De fense and is based on twe nty -four sat el l i t es that orbit and re sult in very prec ise measur ements. He said that one of his e mploy ees
re c e ive d a fo rt y -h ou r sp e c ia lize d tr a ini ng c ou rs e to u se the e qu ipm e nt, a ndthat e mpl oy e e taug ht h im ho w t o u se the e qu ipm e nt. Che rry sa id that he ha d use d the sy ste m for se ve n y e ars , a ndit i s a c c ur a te to within one and a ha lf inches in thre e miles. Ba sed on the record, the te stimonyof this witness was tho ro ug h a ndsu ff

ic ie nt t o q ua lif

y him to t e sti fy in the fi e ld o f s ur ve y ing a ndme a su ri ng dis ta nc e s, even thoug h he is not an expert on GPS. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimonyof this witness to prove that the offe nse occ urre d within one thousand fee t of the re a l pr op e rt y

that c omp ri se s Wha

rt on Sc ho ol. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

D. Se nt e nc ing

The De fend an t , relying on B lakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004),

c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

e nh a nc e d his se nte nc e abo ve the pr e su mpt ive min imu m. The State c ontends that the Def endant has waived this issue. Additionally , the State contends that the Def endant ha s admitted all of the enhanc ement fac tors applied by the trial court, and, there fore , Blakely has no ef fec t on the Def

endant’ s sentenc e. The rec ord ref lects that the trial court found, and the parties ag ree d, that the Def endant was a Rang e I I multipl e offe nder. Additionally , the trial court enhanc ed the De fenda nt’s convictions based upon thre e enhanceme nt fac tors. First, the tria l court fo un d th a t the De fe nd a nt h a s a pr e vio us his tory

of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns or

c ri min a l be ha vio r i n addition to those nece ssary to establish the appropriate ra ng e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(2) (2 00 3) . T he tr ia l c ou rt

a lso fo un d th at th e Defenda nt h a s a pr e vio us his tory

of un wi lli ng ne ss t o comply with the conditions of a sentenc e involving rele ase in the community . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 9). F urther, the trial court found that the felony was c ommitt ed while the D efe ndant was on probation from a prior f elony conviction. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(14). The trial

c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t no mit ig a tin g fa c tor s a pp lie d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

se nte nc e d th e Defen da nt t oB ecause we have revers ed t he co nvi ct i o n fo r po ss ess i o n of a weap o n w i t h the i nt ent t o em p l o y i t duri ng t he 3
commi s s i on of , or e s ca pe f r om, a n of

fen s e, w e r ef

r ai n f r om di s cu s s i n g t h e appr opr i at en es s of t h e s en t en ce i mpos ed for t hat offens e.
-14- thirty -six y ear s, at 100%, for possession with the intent to sell t wenty -six (26) g rams or more of a substance c ontaining c ocaine in a Drug -Free School Z one. 3

When a def

endant challeng es t he length or manner of service of a sentence, it is the dut y of this Court t o conduct a

de novo re view of the rec ord with a pre sumption t hat “the de terminations made b y t h e co u rt from which the appea l is taken are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) (2003). This pre sumption i s “‘c onditioned upon the aff irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial

c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll re le va nt fa c ts a nd c ir c ums ta nc e s. ’” Sta te v. Ros s, 49 S.W. 3d83 3, 84 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) (q uo tin g Sta te v. Pe ttu s, 98 6 S.W.2 d 540 , 543 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ); Sta te v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . The pre sumption does not ap p l y t o the leg al conclusions re ache d by the t rial court in sentenc ing a defendant or to the determinations made by the trial court whic h are predic ated upon unc ontroverte d fac t s

. State v. Dea n, 76 S.W .3d 352, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) ; State v. Butler, 900 S.W .2d 305, 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ; State v. Smit h 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . I n conducting a de novo r eview of a sente nce, we must consider : (a) any evidenc e r ec ei v ed at the trial a nd/or sentenc ing he aring ; (b) the pr e se nte nc e re po rt ; ( c ) the princ ipl e s o f s e nte nc ing ; ( d) t he argum e nts of c ou ns e l r e la tiv e to sentenc ing a lternatives; (e ) the nature a nd char acte ristics of the off ense; (f ) an y m i t i gati ng or statutory enhanc ement fac tors; ( g ) any statements made by the defe ndant on his or her own beha lf; and (h) the defendant’s potential or l ack of potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (2 00 3) ; State v. Tay lor , 6 3 S. W.3 d 4 00 , 4 11 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 01 ). T he pa rt y
c ha lle ng ing a

se nte nc e imp os e d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt

ha s th e bu rd e n o f e sta

bli sh ing that th e se nte nc e is

e rr on e ou s. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ), Se nte nc ing Com m’ n Cm ts.

I n the ca se under submissi on, the Def endant wa s convicted of

a Class A fe lony . The sente nce rang e for a Class A felony , Rang e I I offe nder, is twe nty -five to f orty y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35 -1 12 (b )( 1) (2 00 3)

. I n ca lc ulatin g the se nte nc e fo r a Cla ss A fe lon y , the pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e is the midpoint of the rang e, in the abse nce of enhanc ement and miti g ating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40 -3 5- 21 0 (c ) (2 00 3)

. I f the re are e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s bu t no mit ig a tin g fa c tor s, the se nte nc e mus t be set at or abov e th e mi d p o in t o f th e r a n g e

. T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 2 1 0 ( d )

. I f th e r e are mitigating fac t ors but no enhanc ement fa ctors, the tria l court must set a sentenc e at or below the midpoint of the rang e. Te nn. C o d e Ann. § 40-35-210( d). I f there are both miti g ating and enhanc ement fa ctors, the tria l court must adjust the sentence based on the weig ht it assigns to ea ch fac tor. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-210( d).

I n the ca se under

submissi on, we conclude that there is ample evidenc e that the tria l court considere d the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances. The ref ore, w e re view its decision de novo with a pre sumption of corre ctness. Ac cording ly , s o l o n g as t h e trial court complied with the purposes a nd proce dures of the 1989 S en t en ci n g Act and its finding s are supported by

the fa ctual re cord, this Court may not disturb this sentenc e eve n i f we would have-15-

pref err ed a dif

fer ent re sult. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210, Sentenc ing Comm’n Cmts; S tate v. Fletc her, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Ten n

. Crim. App. 1991). We note that the def endant be ars the burden of showing t h at t h e s entenc e is improper. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401, Sentencing Comm’n Cm ts.; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.
The United States Supre me Court’s re cent opinion in Blakely ca l ls into question t he

c onti nu ing va lid ity

of ou r c ur re nt s e nte nc ing sc he me . In th a t c a se , th e Cou rt , a pp ly ing the ru le in Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 566 U. S. 466, 490 (2000), struck down a provision of the Washington sentenc ing g uidelines that permitted a trial judge to impose an “e x ceptional se ntence ” upon the finding o f ce rt ai n statutorily enumer ated e nhance ment fac tors. 124 S. Ct . at 2537. The Court

o b s er v ed t h at “t h e ‘ s t at u t o rym ax i m u m ’ f o r A p p re n d i p u rp o s es i s t h e m ax i m u ms en t en c e aj u d ge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury v erdict or admitted by the de fe nd an t. ” I d. Finally , the Court conclude d that “eve ry defe ndant has a right

to insist that the prosec utor prove to a

jury [bey ond a re asonable doubt] all fac ts le g ally essential to the punishment.” I d. at 2539. This Court has held that B lakely violations are subjec t to a Constit utional harmless er ror analy sis. St ate v. Chester Way ne Walters, No. M2003-03019- CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL2726034, at *24 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 30, 2004), no perm. app. filed . “Whi l e i t i s true that Blakely conce rns the inviolate rig ht to a jury trial, the cornerstone upon w hich our c riminal justice sy stem was construc ted, we c annot s ay t h at a j ury ’s fa ilure to determine an enhanceme nt fac tor ‘nec essarily

rende r[s] a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unre liable vehicle for de termining g uilt or innocence .’” I d. (quoting Nee der v. U nited States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999))

. Thus, befor e we modify a def endant’ s sentence , we will “r eview the Blakely err ors to de termine whether they wer e harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt.” I d.; see Chapman v. Ca lifornia, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

F ir st, we no te that th e De fe nd a nt h a s n ot wai ved th is i ssu e . We ha ve he ld that, b e c a us e B lake ly a nn ou nc e d a

ne w r ule , a ny de fe nd a nt wh os e c a se wa s st ill on dir e c t app e a l c ou ld r a ise thi s iss ue . Wa lte rs , 2 00 4 WL 27 26 03 4, a t *1 9. We e xpla ine d that, a lth ou g h B lake ly wa s th e Sup re me Cou rt ’s e xpla natio n o f i ts pr ior de c isi on in Ap pr e nd i, the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha d p re vio us ly

a nn ou nc e d th a t th e ru le in A pp re nd i di d n ot a ff e c t ou r Sta te ’s se nte nc ing sc he me

. I d. As a re su lt, the mandate of B lakely

cre ated a new r ule in Tenne ssee. I d. Fu rt hermore , in Walters, this C ourt he ld that B lake ly c ou ld be raise d in a ll c a se s o n d ir e c t app e a l, b e c a us e a vio la tio n o f this ma nd a te
wa s p la in e rr or ari sin g fr om the de privatio n of the Con sti tut ion a l rig ht to a jury tr ia l. I d. ; se e a lso State v. Charles B enson, No. M20 0 3-02127-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2266801, at *7–10 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 8, 2004), no perm. app. filed . Thus, beca use the De fenda nt did not waive this issue, t he question become s whether the s entenc e im posed by the trial court violates the United States Supreme Court mandate in Blakely

.
The trial c ourt applied e nhanc em ent factor (2) based on the Def endant’ s admission in t he prese ntence report of previous criminal behavior , specific ally , that he had use d marijuana on sever al

occa sions. W e note that this Court has held that ther e is a distinction for Blakely purposes be tween p re v i o u s criminal convictions and a previous history

of criminal behavior. State v. Micha el Paul Mondell, No. E2003-02791-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 378978, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knox ville, F e b

. 1 7 , 2 0 0 5 ), n o perm. app. filed

. I n th a t c a se , w e he ld thetr ia l c ou rt imp ro pe rl y

app lie d th is-16-

enhanc ement fa ctor ba sed upon the De fenda nt’s previous history of criminal behavior whe n the Def endant ha d no prior re cord of criminal convic tions. According ly , in the case under submissi on, the trial court could not properly apply this enhance ment fac tor based upon the Def endant’ s previous

m ar i j u a n a u s e u n l e s s t h i s e n h a n c e m e n tf a c t o r w a s a d m i t t e d b y t h e D e f e n d a n t o r s u b m i t t e d t o a

j u r y.

Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts that be c a us e the De fe nd a nt’ s two prior c on vic tio ns we re us e d to e sta bli sh that he wa s a Rang e I I

multipl e off

ender , the court’s application of f actor (2) wa s nece ssarily

based up on the De fe nd a nt’ s st a te me nt t o th e pr e se nte nc e re po rt of fi c e r that he us e d ma

ri juana on mul tip le

oc c a sio ns . We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in its app lic a tio n o f e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor (2 ) b e c a us e the Def endant’ s admission to prior dr ug use in the pre- sentenc e re port does not contain “ sufficie nt g uara ntees of tr

ustworthiness . . . without offendi n g Bl ak ely .” State v. Abe l Torre s, No. M2004- 00559-CCA-R3 -C D, 2005 W L 292431, at *8 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, F eb. 4, 2005), no perm. app. filed

. There fore , the t rial court’s application of this enhance ment fac tor was e rror , and

we ha ve c on c lud e d th a t th e e rr or wa s n ot h arm le ss b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t.

The trial c ourt also appl ie d e n h an c e me nt fac tor (9), that the Def endant “ has a pr evious history of unwillingne ss to comply with the conditions of

a sente nce involving rele ase in the c ommunity ,” the trial court applied this factor beca use the De fenda nt committed t h i s crime less than two y ear s afte r he was previously convicted of possession of cocaine, and “he was back on the stree t doing the same thing [a] s what he w as doing on some form of r elea se . . . .” We c onclude that this factor w as not admitted by

the Def endant or found by a ju ry

. Fu rt h er m o re, a s it is s ubject to B lakely , we conclude that the trial court erre d when it applied this enha nceme nt fac tor. This e rror , howeve r, wa s harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt. The De fenda nt’s prese ntence report, which was a dmitted as

a n e xhibi t w ith ou t obje c tio n during the se nte nc ing he ari ng , in dic a te s th a t th e De fe nd a nt h a s h a d h is probation revoke d on one occa sion. The Def endant was convicted of selling drugs a n d was sentenc ed to eig ht y ear s on probation on J uly 16, 1998. Thi s De fe n d ant was f ound g uiltyof a probation violation, and he w as orde red to serve the sentenc e in prison. Further, the D efe ndant was

a lso c on vic te d o f p os se ssi on of c oc a ine on Ma y

17 , 1 99 9 a ndwa s se nte nced to tw elve y e ars

. Acc o r d in g ly , w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e tria l c o u r t’ s ap p li c a ti o n o f th is f a c to r w a s h ar ml e s s bey ond a

rea sonable doubt.

Sim i l ar l y , we c onclude that the trial court e rre d when it applied e nhance ment fac tor (14). Although the Def

endant’ s brief c oncede s that he was on probation, t here is no evidenc e in t he re cord that the Def

endant a dmitted this fac tor during his trial or sentenc ing he ar i n g . We conclude, there fore , that this fa ctor was not a dmitted by the Def endant or found by a jury . W e t here fore conclude that the trial court e rre d when it applied this enha nceme nt fac tor. This err or, howe ver, w as harmless be y ond a re asonable doub t beca use the De fenda nt’s prese ntence report, which, as stated above, w as admitted as an exhibit wit hout objection during the sentenc ing he aring , indicates that the Def endant wa s on pro b at ion for selling drug s at the time this offense occur red. A ccor dingly , we
c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s e rr on e ou s app lic a tio n o f this fa c tor wa s h arm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble doubt.-17-

The trial c ourt’s er

roneous a pplication of t wo enhanceme nt fac tors wer e harmless bey ond a

rea sonable doubt, and, therefor e, we conclude that the Defenda nt’s sentenc e nee d not be modified. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

III. Conclusi on

I n acc ordanc e with the for eg oing a uthorities and re asoning , we r ever se the De fenda nt’s conviction and se ntence for possession of a firea rm with the intent to employ it in the commissi on of or e scape from an offe nse, and we aff irm the Def

endant’ s conviction and se ntence for possession wi t h t h e i n t en tt o s el l t we n t y -s i x (2 6 ) gr am s o r m o re o f as u b s t an ce co n t ai n i n g co ca i n e i n a D ru gFr ee School Z one.

________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE