COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Fitzpatrick and Annunziata 

Argued by Teleconference 

GREGORY SCOTT ADDISON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2234-96-3 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 SEPTEMBER 9, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY 

Ford C. Quillen, Judge 

 Anthony E. Collins (Collins & Collins, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Gregory Scott Addison appeals his convictions of first 

degree murder, stalking, and use of a firearm in the commission 

of a murder. Addison asserts that the trial court erred in: (1) 

finding him competent to stand trial; (2) denying his motion for 

a competency hearing after he allegedly experienced visual 

hallucinations during trial; (3) denying his proposed jury 

instruction concerning the law of manslaughter; (4) denying his 

motion for a mistrial on the basis that his undisclosed 

statements, allegedly elicited during custodial interrogation, 

were introduced by the Commonwealth's witnesses; and (5) allowing 

introduction of his alleged "jailhouse confession" where 

Addison's statements to a fellow inmate were not provided to the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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defense pursuant to the trial court's discovery order. 

 We hold that: (1) it is within the discretion of the finder 

of fact to determine the weight to be accorded expert witnesses' 

testimony and that the trial court's finding that Addison was 

competent to stand trial was supported by credible evidence and 

was not plainly wrong; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support 

the trial court's finding that probable cause did not exist to 

order an additional competency evaluation; (3) the trial court 

did not err in refusing Addison's proposed instructions 

concerning involuntary manslaughter because the proposed 

instruction was not supported by the evidence; (4) the trial 

court did not err in denying Addison's motion for a mistrial on 

the basis that his statements to the police were erroneously 

admitted because there was no manifest probability that the 

denial was prejudicial; and (5) because Addison's statements in 

jail were not written nor made to a law enforcement officer, they 

were not contemplated by the court's discovery order and 

therefore did not have to be disclosed. Accordingly, we affirm. 

 On August 15, 1995, Addison approached his wife, Janet 

Addison, in the middle of the street in front of the City of 

Norton Post Office and shot her twice with a .38 caliber handgun, 

killing her. 

 On January 5, 1996, a discovery order was entered requiring 

the Commonwealth to make available to Addison, for inspection or 

copying, "[a]ny written or recorded statements or confessions 

made by [Addison] or the substance of any oral statements or 
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confessions made by [Addison] to any law enforcement officer, the 

existence of which is known to the Attorney for the 

Commonwealth." On February 16, 1996, the trial court granted 

Addison's motions that the court suppress any statements made by 

Addison to any police officer after he was taken into custody, 

that the court order an evaluation of Addison's competency to 

stand trial, and that the court compel the Commonwealth to 

provide witness statements. 

 On February 17, 1996, a competency hearing was conducted 

during which Drs. Pierce Nelson and Robert Granacher, Jr. 

testified for Addison. Nelson, a psychiatrist who treated 

Addison from November 1980 to June 1995, testified that Addison's 

behavior indicated a serious psychotic episode. Nelson 

recommended Addison be admitted to a psychiatric hospital for 

treatment and observation of Addison's alleged psychotic 

delusions. Granacher, a psychiatrist certified in general 

psychiatry, geriatric psychiatry, and forensic psychiatry, tested 

Addison prior to trial and reviewed his current medical and 

psychiatric records, school records, blood and urine samples, 

work product, medication, and videos of the crime scene, the 

police interrogation, and Addison in jail and at the hospital. 

Granacher also reviewed the competency report prepared by the 

Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Thomas Schact, and concluded that 

Schact's report lacked a sufficient database upon which to draw 

any conclusion regarding Addison's competency. 

 Granacher then testified that Addison is "psychotic . . . 
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severely mentally ill . . . suffers a delusional disorder . . . 

[and] is dangerous." Granacher also opined that Addison would be 

unable to assist his counsel in pursuing a defense because "[a]ny 

factual information an attorney attempts to get from Mr. Addison 

in an effort to defend him is a product of a sick mind, product 

of a delusion. It's erroneous information." 

 Testifying on behalf of the Commonwealth, Schact stated 

that Addison's responses suggested the possibility of some 

significant impairment to Addison's competency. Schact also 

agreed with Granacher that Addison suffered from delusions 

regarding his wife and her fidelity, but concluded that Addison 

was intentionally fabricating responses to some of the tests 

administered by Schact. Schact testified that Addison understood 

the charges against him, the behavior expected of him in the 

courtroom, who his attorney was, and his attorney's role in the 

proceedings. Schact also stated, however, that Addison had 

refused to discuss either the nature of the proceedings against 

him or whether he appreciated his legal options and their 

consequences. 

 Based on this evidence, the trial court ruled that in 

accordance with Code § 19.2-169.1(E), Addison had proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent to stand 

trial. Accordingly, the court ordered that Addison be admitted 

to a state psychiatric hospital for treatment and observation. 

Addison was subsequently confined to Central State Hospital. 

 On March 30, 1996, a second competency hearing was conducted 
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at which Dr. Miller Ryans, a psychiatrist at Central State 

Hospital, was the only expert to testify. Miller testified that 

Addison was kept under twenty-four hour observation and was 

subjected to a variety of tests during the twenty-six day period. 

 Based on the tests and observations, Ryans concluded that 

Addison suffered "from major recurrent severe depression" and 

"from residuals of delusional disorder-jealousy type." Ryans 

further opined, however, that despite these dysfunctions, it was 

his opinion that Addison had the "present capacity to plead and 

assist his attorney in his defense." Ryans testified that none 

of his testing or observation had confirmed the audible and 

visual hallucinations alleged by Addison. Ryans opined that the 

alleged hallucinations were the result of "malingering" and that 

the hallucinations in fact served other purposes of Addison. 

 On cross-examination, Ryans conceded that he was uncertain 

whether Addison could assist counsel if Addison became delusional 

during the trial when his wife's fidelity was addressed. Ryans 

also noted that Addison had "handicaps" in going to trial. Ryans 

stated that although Central State had the capacity to do testing 

of the type performed by Drs. Schact and Granacher, such testing 

had not been conducted. Ryans agreed that those tests might 

reveal attributes of Addison affecting competency that mere 

consultation with Addison would not reveal. Further, Ryans 

testified that Addison had trouble concentrating and remembering 

and conceded that Addison might suffer from conversion amnesia or 

shock which could have caused Addison to forget the killing. 
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 Ryans explained that Addison's delusions were "triggered" by 

addressing the subject of his wife's fidelity. Ryans opined that 

although Addison understood the operation of the court, he could 

have difficulty when his wife's fidelity was addressed. He 

explained, "I believe as attorneys you all have to try to 

transpose, he's aware of, he knows how the Courts work. And the, 

[sic] and it'll be up to you all with some, some great deal of 

effort to try to get him to apply to his own case." Ryans also 

admitted that the charge and the indictment intricately involved 

the subject which triggered the delusions and that should 

Addison's delusions be triggered, he could become incapable of 

assisting in his defense. 

 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found 

Addison competent to stand trial. On April 1, 1996, the trial 

began, at which time Addison's counsel motioned that the trial 

not go forward because Addison was incompetent. Addison's 

counsel argued that an unconstitutional burden was being placed 

upon his zealous representation of Addison because he was being 

required to assume the role of a psychologist or psychiatrist in 

order to "transpose" the case for Addison as suggested by Dr. 

Ryans. Counsel's motion was denied, and the trial proceeded. 

 On April 2, during the testimony of Addison's 

sixteen-year-old son, Addison reported to his counsel that he saw 

his son winking and gesturing to members of the audience. 

Addison also said he saw the Commonwealth's Attorney doing the 

same and that he believed the judge was winking at the 
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Commonwealth's Attorney. The Commonwealth's Attorney advised the 

court that he noticed Addison staring at him and making movements 

toward him. Upon the conclusion of Addison's son's testimony, 

Addison's counsel motioned for reevaluation of his competence. 

The court refused to suspend the proceedings at that time but, at 

counsel's request, ordered that Dr. Ryans reexamine Addison at 

the close of the day's testimony. 

 On April 3, Ryans testified regarding his examination of 

Addison the previous evening. Addressing Addison's alleged 

hallucinations, Ryans stated that his opinion regarding Addison's 

ability to assist in his defense remained unchanged. Ryans also 

testified that "it's my opinion that the key word here is 

volitional. If [Addison] chooses I believe that he can restrain 

his hostility here in order to get through the legal process." 

Based on Dr. Ryans' testimony and the court's own observations 

that "[Addison] was alert, cognizant of the testimony and was 

participating in with his counsel in his defense," the court 

denied counsel's motion for a new competency evaluation. 

 Trial proceeded and Trooper C.D. Willis, who was present 

during Addison's arrest, testified that while being taken into 

custody, Addison made an unsolicited statement that he caught his 

wife "screwing around" and that he had shot her. Willis also 

testified that Addison said, "I'm crazy." Willis, however, did 

not include a reference to the "crazy" statement in his written 

report of the incident, which was provided to Addison's counsel. 

 During cross-examination, Willis stated that prior to Addison's 
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comment, an officer asked Addison why he shot his wife. Willis 

testified that Addison's statement was made after he had been 

handcuffed and while he was lying on the ground amidst several 

police officers. 

 Addison's counsel then motioned for a mistrial, arguing that 

he had been led to believe that the statement made by Addison had 

been spontaneous, when in fact it was the product of an unlawful 

custodial interrogation. The Commonwealth's Attorney confirmed 

that he too had been led to believe that Addison's statement was 

unsolicited. The court ordered the jury to disregard Willis' 

testimony and denied Addison's counsel's motion for a mistrial. 

 Trooper Jackie Baldridge also testified that when arrested, 

 Addison said, "I'm fucking crazy, and I got the papers to prove 

it." Baldridge testified that Addison's statement was made in 

response to an unidentified person's inquiry of "why." Addison's 

counsel also objected to this testimony. The court allowed it, 

finding that it was a spontaneous statement. 

 The next day, James Childs, who had shared a cell in the 

Wise County jail with Addison, testified that Addison explained 

that he shot his wife because she had been cheating on him and 

that he had attempted suicide three times before deciding to kill 

his wife. Childs also testified that Addison said that he was 

going to try to plead insanity and that he thought he had a "good 

case" because of his medication and suicide attempts. Addison 

also told Childs that he "blacked out" and could not remember 

most of the shooting. 
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 Addison's counsel objected to this testimony and motioned 

for a mistrial, arguing that the Commonwealth violated the 

court's discovery order because it failed to disclose exculpatory 

evidence. The Commonwealth's Attorney learned of the jailhouse 

conversation several months earlier through a letter from Childs' 

attorney. Addison's counsel argued that because the Commonwealth 

had been given a written statement of Childs' account of his 

conversation with Addison and the statement had not been provided 

to Addison's counsel, the content of the conversation should be 

inadmissible. Counsel's motion was denied. 

 At the close of trial, Addison proposed several jury 

instructions, including one concerning manslaughter: "The 

difference between murder and manslaughter is malice. When 

malice is present, the killing is murder. When it is absent the 

killing can be no more than manslaughter." This jury instruction 

was rejected by the court and was subsequently proffered by 

counsel. 

Competency

 Contrary to Addison's assertion on brief, at a hearing to 

determine competency to stand trial "the party alleging that the 

defendant is incompetent shall bear the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence the defendant's incompetency." 

Code § 19.2-169.1(E). "[T]he standard for competence to stand 

trial is whether the defendant has `sufficient present ability to 

consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding' and has `a rational as well as factual 
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understanding of the proceedings against him.'" Godinez v. 

Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 

362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). Further, "[a] trial court's 

determination of a defendant's competency to stand trial is a 

question of fact." Delp v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 564, 570-71, 

200 S.E. 594, 596 (1939). "A factual finding made by the trial 

court is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong." Naulty v. 

Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 523, 527, 346 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1986). 

 At the March 30, 1996 hearing, Dr. Ryans testified regarding 

his testing and treatment of Addison during his twenty-six day 

commitment at Central State Hospital. Ryans opined that Addison 

was suffering from a major recurrent severe depression and a 

residual delusional disorder but that he had the present capacity 

to assist in his defense. No evidence was found of a physical 

defect interfering with Addison's ability to understand the trial 

process. Regarding Addison's alleged hallucinations, Ryans 

concluded that he was "malingering" and his alleged 

hallucinations in fact served some other purpose of Addison's. 

 It was within the trial court's discretion to accept or 

reject any of Ryans' testimony and to determine what weight it 

should be accorded. Street v. Street, 25 Va. App. ____, ____, 

____ S.E.2d ____, _____ (1997) (en banc); Bridgeman v. 

Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986). 

Ryans' testimony provided the trial court with credible evidence 

which supported its determination that on March 30, 1996, Addison 

was competent to stand trial. Holding that the trial court's 
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decision was not plainly wrong and was supported by credible 

evidence, we will not disturb its decision on appeal. 

 Addison's additional contention that the trial court erred 

in denying him a new competency evaluation after his alleged 

hallucinations is without merit. Code § 19.2-169.1(A) provides: 

 If, at any time after the attorney for the 

defendant has been retained or appointed and 

before the end of trial, the court finds, 

upon hearing evidence or representations of 

counsel for the defendant or the attorney for 

the Commonwealth, that there is probable 

cause to believe that the defendant lacks 

substantial capacity to understand the 

proceedings against him or to assist his 

attorney in his own defense the court shall 

order that a competency evaluation be 

performed . . . . 

(Emphasis added). Here, the record supports the trial court's 

finding that there was no probable cause warranting an additional 

competency evaluation. After counsel proffered that Addison was 

experiencing visual hallucinations, the trial court ordered that 

Dr. Ryans examine Addison. After questioning Addison, Dr. Ryans 

testified that his opinion about Addison's ability to assist in 

his defense had not changed. In addition, the trial court 

observed that Addison appeared alert during trial and cognizant 

of the proceedings and remained an active participant in his 

defense by conferring with his attorney. On the basis of these 

observations and Dr. Ryans' testimony, the court denied counsel's 

motion for a new competency evaluation. This evidence was 

sufficient to preclude a finding that probable cause existed to 

believe that Addison was incompetent or had become incompetent 
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since his original competency hearing. 

 We also note that Addison's claims that he could not 

remember the shooting and that he blacked out are insufficient 

evidence to establish as a matter of law that Addison was 

incompetent to stand trial. To the contrary, Code 

§ 19.2-169.1(E) specifically provides that "[t]he fact that the 

defendant claims to be unable to remember the time period 

surrounding the alleged offense shall not, by itself, bar a 

finding of competency if the defendant otherwise understands the 

charges against him and can assist in his defense." 

Jury Instructions

 Addison argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 

give his proposed instruction regarding voluntary manslaughter. 

"A reviewing court's responsibility in reviewing jury 

instructions is `to see that the law has been clearly stated and 

that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly 

raises.'" Darnell v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 485, 488, 370 

S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988) (quoting Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 

503, 290 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1982)). "`[T]he appropriate standard 

of review requires that we view the evidence with respect to the 

refused instruction in the light most favorable to'" Addison. 

Brandau v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 408, 411, 430 S.E.2d 563, 

564-65 (1993) (quoting Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 130, 

131, 415 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1992)). 

 So viewed, the Commonwealth's evidence proved that on the 

afternoon of August 15, 1995, Addison shot his wife twice, 
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killing her. Before the killing, Addison told several people 

that he believed his wife was having affairs with three or four 

of her male co-workers. While incarcerated awaiting trial, 

Addison told Childs that he had decided to kill his wife as an 

alternative to killing himself. Addison also told Childs that he 

had followed his wife all day on August 15 and that he had 

planned to kill her elsewhere, but that when he saw her on the 

street he "lost his head and went ahead and killed her." Addison 

himself testified that he believed his wife had been having 

affairs since January 1995. 

 "To reduce homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter, 

the killing must have been done in the heat of passion and upon 

reasonable provocation." Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 

105-06, 341 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1986). There was no evidence that 

Addison killed his wife in the heat of passion and upon 

reasonable provocation. In fact, the evidence demonstrated that 

Addison planned to kill his wife for what he believed were her 

long standing infidelities. Addison's own testimony that he 

"lost his head" when he killed his wife in front of the post 

office instead of in another location does not in any way 

ameliorate the fact that Addison planned to murder his wife on 

the day in question. Because Addison's proposed manslaughter 

instruction was unsupported by the evidence, it was properly 

refused. Bennett v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 228, 234, 380 

S.E.2d 17, 21 (1989). Accordingly, the trial court did not err 

in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. 
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Appellant's Statements

 Addison argues that the trial court erred in failing to 

grant his motion for a mistrial on the basis that his undisclosed 

statements to Trooper Willis, which Addison alleges were the 

product of custodial interrogation, were erroneously admitted. 

"On appeal the denial of a motion for a mistrial will not be 

overruled unless there exists a manifest probability that the 

denial of a mistrial was prejudicial." Harward v. Commonwealth, 

5 Va. App. 468, 478, 364 S.E.2d 511, 516 (1988). 

 Here, the trial court struck Willis' testimony concerning 

Addison's statements at the scene of the killing and ordered the 

jury to disregard that testimony. In the absence of evidence to 

the contrary, we presume that the jury followed the judge's 

instruction to disregard the allegedly objectionable testimony. 

Howard v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 132, 144, 367 S.E.2d 527, 534 

(1988). The record contains no evidence that the jury did not 

abide by the judge's instruction. We find no error in the trial 

court's failure to grant a mistrial on this basis. 

 Addison further contends that the discovery provided by the 

Commonwealth erroneously described Addison's comment to Willis as 

a spontaneous statement when in fact it was the product of 

custodial interrogation. The discovery order governing the case 

required the Commonwealth to disclose Addison's oral statements 

to police officers, but did not require the Commonwealth to 

describe the particular circumstances surrounding the statements. 

 Thus, assuming arguendo that the Commonwealth did 
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mischaracterize the statement to Willis as a spontaneous 

statement, no violation of the discovery order occurred. Again, 

we find no error in the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial 

on this basis. 

 Addison also objected to Trooper Baldridge's testimony that, 

immediately after the killing, Addison said, "I'm fucking crazy 

and I've got the papers to prove it." Baldridge testified that 

Addison made this statement spontaneously while he was lying on 

the sidewalk surrounded by police officers. The comment was not 

connected to the questions previously posed by the officers. 

 "'Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),] safeguards come 

into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either 

express questioning or its functional equivalent.'" Jenkins v. 

Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 453, 423 S.E.2d 360, 365 (1992) 

(quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)), 

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993). Where a suspect in custody 

makes spontaneous admissions which are not a product of police 

interrogation, the statements are not inadmissible as violative 

of the suspect's Miranda rights. See Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 

228 Va. 484, 490, 323 S.E.2d 567, 570-71 (1984). Therefore, the 

trial court did not err in refusing to suppress Baldridge's 

testimony about Addison's comment at the scene or in failing to 

grant a mistrial on this basis. 

Jailhouse Statements

 Addison objected to Childs' testimony because the 

Commonwealth's Attorney did not disclose before trial either 
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Childs' letter to his attorney concerning his jail cell encounter 

with Addison or Childs' attorney's letter to the Commonwealth's 

Attorney concerning the matter. 

 The discovery order required the Commonwealth to make 

available to Addison "[a]ny written or recorded statements or 

confessions made by the Defendant or the substance of any oral 

statements or confessions made by the Defendant to any law 

enforcement officer, the existence to [sic] which is known to" 

the Commonwealth's Attorney. Neither letter constituted a 

written or recorded statement of Addison. "To be discoverable 

the statement must be given by the accused rather than by a 

witness who heard the accused speak." Hackman v. Commonwealth, 

220 Va. 710, 714, 261 S.E.2d 555, 558 (1980) (decided under 

former Rule 3A:14). Nor were the letters oral statements made by 

Addison to a law enforcement officer. Consequently, the 

Commonwealth's Attorney's failure to disclose the two letters did 

not violate the discovery order, and therefore we hold that the 

trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Addison's 

conversation with Childs. 

 Holding that the trial court's finding that Addison was 

competent to stand trial was supported by credible evidence and 

was not plainly wrong; that the evidence was sufficient to 

support the trial court's finding that probable cause did not 

exist to order an additional competency evaluation; that 

Addison's proposed instruction concerning involuntary 

manslaughter was unsupported by the evidence; that the trial 
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court did not err in denying Addison's motion for a mistrial on 

the basis that his statements to the police were erroneously 

admitted; and that Addison's jailhouse statements were not 

contemplated by the trial court's discovery order, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.