United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 20, 2018 Decided December 7, 2018 

No. 17-7151 

MARTIN SCAHILL AND HRH SERVICES LLC, 

APPELLANTS

v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:16-cv-02076) 

Brendan J. Klaproth argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellants. 

Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, 

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were 

Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, and Loren L. AliKhan, 

Solicitor General. Caroline S. Van Zile, Deputy Solicitor 

General, entered an appearance. 

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges. 
2 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS. 

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal arises from 

conditions placed by the D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control 

Board on the liquor license of the Alibi restaurant. The court

must decide whether the curable defect exception to issue 

preclusion allows a plaintiff to establish standing under Article 

III of the Constitution based on events that arose after the initial 

complaint was filed, and whether the license conditions violate

appellants’ First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district 

court had ruled the original complaint controlled its jurisdiction 

as to most of HRH Services, LLC’s constitutional claims. On 

the merits, it ruled that HRH’s retaliation allegations and 

Scahill’s nearly identical constitutional allegations failed to

state a claim. 

Guided by Supreme Court instruction and precedent from 

our sister circuits, we hold that HRH properly invoked the 

curable defect doctrine and that the district court was wrong to 

reject HRH’s proposed second amended complaint that would 

have cured the standing defect. We deny on the merits HRH’s 

claims that were dismissed for lack of standing, and 

consequently HRH’s unconstitutional conditions claim fails as 

well. HRH’s compelled speech claim is foreclosed by Full 

Value Advisors, LLC v. SEC, 633 F.3d 1101, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 

2011), which held that required notification of the government 

does not constitute compelled speech. HRH’s commercial 

association claim is foreclosed by Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 

U.S. 609, 620 (1984), and City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 

19, 25 (1989). 

We affirm the dismissal of HRH’s First Amendment 

retaliation claim because even assuming the facts alleged in the 

complaint are true, the record shows that retaliation was “not a 

plausible conclusion,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 
3 

(2009). We also affirm the dismissal of Scahill’s claims. His

commercial association claim fails for the same reasons as 

HRH’s; his freedom of movement claim fails under the court’s 

precedent; and his procedural due process claim fails to 

identify a cognizable liberty or property interest. 

I. 

In January 2015, HRH Services, LLC, d/b/a The Alibi 

(“HRH”) applied to the D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control 

Board for a license to serve alcoholic beverages at the Alibi 

restaurant. Rachel Traverso and her father Richard Traverso 

were identified as co-owners of HRH, but the Board was 

concerned about the possible involvement of Martin Scahill, 

who had been part owner of the previous restaurant at that 

location, which was fined by the Board for allowing underage 

drinking. Scahill had originally applied with two others for a

liquor license at the same location before withdrawing the 

application when the Board raised issues regarding his 

qualifications. He also had been working at the Alibi 

restaurant. The Board “required HRH to demonstrate that it 

was not engaging in subterfuge to allow Mr. Scahill to obtain a

license without the legally required review of his qualifications 

for licensure.” ABC Board Order at 3 (May 18, 2016) (“2016 

Board Order”). At a hearing on HRH’s application, HRH 

informed the Board it had served a barring notice on Scahill 

that he could not be on the premises and stated it would accept

other license conditions as the Board deemed necessary. See 

id. ¶ 90. 

On May 18, 2016, the Board granted HRH a liquor license 

with conditions. The conditions required HRH to “maintain a 

barring notice against Martin Scahill to prohibit him from 

entering or accessing the licensed premises for a period of five 

years” and to notify the Metropolitan Police Department 
4 

(“MPD”) of any violations. The conditions also prohibited 

HRH from “directly or indirectly transfer[ing] or attempt[ing] 

to transfer ownership” of the business to Scahill, providing him 

“access or control over any financial accounts maintained by 

the business,” and “employ[ing] [him] as a manager, employee, 

independent contractor, or volunteer” at the restaurant. 2016 

Board Order at 36-37. The Board denied HRH’s motion for 

reconsideration. 

Scahill and HRH thereafter unsuccessfully attempted to 

have the license conditions set aside on statutory grounds. The 

D.C. Court of Appeals dismissed HRH’s petition for review 

under the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act (“DCAPA”) for 

lack of standing because of its lack of aggrievement. HRH 

Servs., LLC v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., No. 16-

AA-758, Order at 1 (D.C. Oct. 13, 2016). The court rejected 

on the merits Scahill’s claims under the DCAPA that the 

imposition of the license conditions exceeded the Board’s 

authority and was unsupported by the evidence and arbitrary 

and capricious, holding the Board acted within its discretion. 

Scahill v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., No. 16-AA775, Mem. Op. and J. at 5-7 (D.C. Feb. 8, 2018). 

Scahill and HRH also seek to have the license conditions 

set aside on constitutional grounds. After filing a complaint in 

the U.S. district court on October 18, 2016, Scahill filed an 

amended complaint on December 28, 2016, adding HRH as a 

plaintiff and arguing that the license conditions violated their 

First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court granted 

the government’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint for 

lack of standing and failure to state a claim. Scahill v. District 

of Columbia, 271 F. Supp. 3d 216 (D.D.C. 2017); see FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Except as to HRH’s First Amendment 

retaliation claim based on appellants’ legal challenges to the 

license conditions, the district court ruled that issue preclusion 
5 

prevented HRH from re-litigating its standing in view of the 

D.C. Court of Appeals’ determination that it was not aggrieved 

by the Board’s license order. On the merits, the district court 

ruled that Scahill and HRH had failed to allege sufficient facts 

to support the remainder of their claims. 

HRH moved on October 16, 2017, for reconsideration and 

for leave to file a second amended complaint. Paragraph 60 of 

the proposed complaint alleged that in retaliation for exercise

of HRH’s First Amendment rights, the Board, by order of July 

19, 2017, “took adverse action against HRH Services by 

issuing a $4,000.00 fine, the maximum allowable penalty, to 

HRH [S]ervices for the alleged violation[s] of the Liquor 

License conditions.” The Board found that HRH had allowed 

Scahill to be on the premises of the Alibi restaurant on two 

occasions and each time failed to notify the MPD about his 

presence. Although agreeing that HRH had shown an injuryin-fact as a result of the $4,000 fine, the district court ruled that 

the fine did not trigger the curable defect exception to issue 

preclusion because the fine was imposed nine months after the 

original complaint was filed and thus was too late to confer 

standing. Scahill v. District of Columbia, 286 F. Supp. 3d 12, 

18 (D.D.C. 2017). The district court also denied the motion for 

leave to file as futile, stating the proposed second amended 

complaint would not change its view of the inadequacy of 

HRH’s retaliation claim. Id. at 20-24. 

II.

On appeal, Scahill and HRH contend that the district court 

erred in ruling that HRH lacked standing under Article III of 

the Constitution on the basis of issue preclusion because the 

court should have applied the curable defect exception in view 

of the Board’s imposition of the fines and granted its motion 

for leave to file the amended complaint. On the merits, they 
6 

contend that the district court erred in ruling that their wellpleaded claims failed to show violations of their rights under 

the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. Our 

review of the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a

claim is de novo. Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 

1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). So too is our review of the denial 

of leave to amend the complaint based “on grounds of futility 

where the proposed pleading would not survive a motion to 

dismiss,” In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 629 F.3d 

213, 215-18 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

 

Issue preclusion occurs when (1) the same issue was 

“contested by the parties and submitted for judicial 

determination in [a] prior case,” (2) the issue was “actually and 

necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in 

that prior case,” and (3) preclusion does not result in “basic 

unfairness to the party bound by the first determination.” 

Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. 

Cir. 1992). The district court correctly found all conditions 

were met with respect to HRH’s standing to bring a challenge 

to the Board’s license order, in view of the decision of the D.C. 

Court of Appeals dismissing HRH’s petition for review upon 

concluding it was not aggrieved by the Board’s conditions. 

First, the issue of HRH’s standing was “contested” and 

“submitted for judicial determination,” id. The D.C. Court of 

Appeals issued an order to show cause why HRH’s petition 

should not be dismissed for lack of standing because HRH did 

not appear to be aggrieved by the Board’s conditions, and HRH 

filed a response. Appellants maintain that standing under the 

DCAPA is different from Article III standing because in 

addition to showing injury-in-fact, the interest sought to be 

protected must be arguably within the zone of interests 

protected by the DCAPA, and no clear legislative intent must 
7 

withhold judicial review. HRH acknowledges that both require 

an injury-in-fact, which is the aspect relevant here, for 

aggrievement under the DCAPA requires the same concrete 

and particularized injury as Article III standing. D.C. Code 

§ 2–510(a); see Mallof v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 1 

A.3d 383, 394 (D.C. 2010); York Apartments Tenants Ass’n v. 

D.C. Zoning Comm’n, 856 A.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. 2004); Dist. 

Intown Props., Ltd. v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory 

Affairs, 680 A.2d 1373, 1377 (D.C. 1996). HRH objects that 

the D.C. Court of Appeals order dismissing its petition did not

set forth the grounds for its holding but HRH ignores the order

to show cause. Second, the issue was “actually and necessarily

determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,” Yamaha, 961 

F.2d at 254, because the D.C. Court of Appeals dismissed 

HRH’s petition for lack of standing in view of its nonaggrievement, and that court has jurisdiction over petitions 

regarding D.C. agency orders, see D.C. Code § 2–510(a). 

Third, applying issue preclusion involves no basic unfairness 

to HRH because the order to show cause put HRH on notice 

and HRH had the same incentives to litigate this standing issue

before the D.C. Court of Appeals where it was challenging the 

same license conditions. 

 

The curable defect exception to issue preclusion allows 

relitigation of jurisdictional dismissals when a material 

occurrence subsequent to the original dismissal remedies the 

original deficiency. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 786 

F.3d 34, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 

702 F.2d 1189, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Neither the Supreme 

Court nor this court has decided whether the lack of Article III 

standing at the outset of litigation is determinative of the 

court’s jurisdiction because events occurring subsequent to the

filing of the original complaint cannot cure that deficiency. 

The district court relied on Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 

U.S. 724, 734 (2008), for the proposition that “[t]he standing 
8 

inquiry is ‘focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction 

had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.’” 

Scahill, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 734). 

There, Jack Davis, a candidate for a seat in the U.S. House of 

Representatives, challenged the asymmetrical campaign 

contribution limits under Section 319(a) of the Bipartisan 

Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441a–1(a), as 

violative of his First Amendment rights, because the provision 

allowed his opponent to be subject to higher campaign 

contribution limits in view of Davis’s expenditure of his 

personal funds. Davis, 554 U.S. at 729-31. Rejecting the 

Federal Election Commission’s view that Davis could not show 

the requisite injury because his opponent had yet to qualify for 

the higher limits at the outset of the litigation and ultimately 

chose not to take advantage of them, see id. at 734, the Supreme 

Court held that Davis faced the requisite Article III injury when 

he declared his intent to spend his personal funds and there was 

no suggestion that his opponent would forgo the Section 319(a) 

advantage. Id. Davis, then, held that Article III injury is 

satisfied at the outset of the litigation even if the anticipated 

injury fails to come to fruition, but does not address whether 

subsequent events can provide standing that was lacking at the 

outset. 

More instructive is the Supreme Court’s precedent where 

jurisdiction was determined by looking beyond the original 

complaint. In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 75 (1976), a 

Medicare applicant did not file his Part B application until after 

he was joined as a plaintiff in an amended complaint. Although

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) made filing an application a “nonwaivable 

condition of jurisdiction,” the Supreme Court held that 

condition was met. The Court stated it had “little difficulty” in 

holding that the district court had jurisdiction over the 

plaintiff’s constitutional claim. Id. Citing Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 15(d), the Court stated that “[a] supplemental 
9 

complaint in the District Court would have eliminated this 

jurisdictional issue.” Id. Likewise, in Rockwell International 

Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 460 (2007), the Court 

made clear that the original complaint was not dispositive of 

jurisdiction. There, the Court stated that “when a plaintiff files 

a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the 

complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to determine 

jurisdiction.” Id. at 473-74 (citations omitted). In determining 

jurisdiction, the Court looked to the final pretrial order, which 

“superseded all prior pleadings and ‘controll[ed] the 

subsequent course of the action,’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 16(c).” 

Id. at 474. The Court observed that it did not matter that the 

pleadings were not formally amended. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV.

P. 15(b) and 16; other citations omitted). 

A number of the circuit courts of appeal have addressed 

whether events subsequent to the filing of the original 

complaint can cure a jurisdictional defect. Some courts have 

held that a plaintiff may cure a standing defect through a 

supplemental pleading alleging facts that arose after the 

original complaint was filed. See Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. 

v. Schwab Investments, 779 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015); 

United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 

1, 6 (1st Cir. 2015); Daniels v. Arcade, L.P., 477 F. App’x 125, 

131 (4th Cir. 2012); Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 

F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 

Third Assocs., 973 F.2d 82, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1992). Other courts 

have affirmed the dismissal of the original complaint for lack 

of jurisdiction even if subsequent events cured the standing 

deficiency, so that the plaintiff would have to file a new lawsuit 

to pursue the claims. See S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Palma, 707 

F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2013); Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009); Park v. Forest Serv. 

of U.S., 205 F.3d 1034, 1037-38 (8th Cir. 2000). 
10 

The circuit courts of appeal adopting the former approach 

have relied on the supplemental pleadings provision of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), which provides such pleading 

may “set[] out any transaction, occurrence, or event that 

happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented,” 

FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d).1

 The Advisory Committee has explained 

that Rule 15(d) was amended in order to place broad discretion 

in the district court in order to avoid “needlessly remitt[ing]

[plaintiffs] to the difficulties of commencing a new action even 

though events occurring after the commencement of the 

original action have made clear the right to relief.” Id.,

advisory committee notes to 1963 amendment. Tracking this 

approach, the Ninth Circuit in Northstar Financial Advisors 

Inc., 779 F.3d at 1042, affirmed the district court’s decision to 

allow Northstar to file an amended complaint as a supplemental 

pleading pursuant to Rule 15(d), id. at 1043-44, where it had 

filed a shareholder class action lawsuit against an investment 

trust before obtaining an assignment of claims allowing suit on

the shareholders’ behalf, id. at 1043. Permitting subsequent 

pleadings to correct jurisdictional defects “circumvents the 

needless formality and expense of instituting a new action 

when events occurring after the original filing indicated a right 

to relief.” Id. at 1044 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Although Rule 15(d) refers to deficiencies “in stating 

a claim or defense,” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d), the court concluded 

 

1

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) provides: 

On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just 

terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading 

setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that 

happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented. 

The court may permit supplementation even though the 

original pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense. 

The court may order that the opposing party plead to the 

supplemental pleading within a specified time. 
11 

there was no reason why a jurisdictional defect should be 

different, relying in part on the Supreme Court’s discussion of

amended pleadings in Matthews v. Diaz and Rockwell 

International Corp. v. United States. See Northstar, 779 F.3d 

at 1044. 

The government acknowledges the open jurisdictional 

question in this court and the Supreme Court and the circuit 

split. Citing the Tenth Circuit’s 2013 decision as “significant 

authority contrary to plaintiffs’ position,” Appellee’s Br. at 22, 

the government offers no analysis of which approach this court 

should adopt. Instead the government maintains that even 

assuming that there is merit to the Northstar approach, 

appellants cannot prevail because their proposed second 

amended complaint had not been accepted for filing when the 

district court considered HRH’s standing in view of the 

Board’s imposition of the $4,000 fine. This approach harkens 

back to the type of technical obstacle that the Supreme Court 

rejected in Rockwell International Corp., 549 U.S. at 474, and 

that the amendment to Rule 15(d) was designed to avoid. 

Appellants simultaneously filed their motions for 

reconsideration and for leave to file a second amended 

complaint, and the district court considered the motions 

together. See Scahill, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 15. The government 

offers no reason why Rule 15(d)’s reference to “claim or 

defense” would weigh in favor of a different interpretation. See 

Northstar, 779 F.3d at 1044. To the extent the government 

suggests this court’s review of the denial of appellants’ motion 

for leave to file the second amended complaint is for abuse of 

discretion only, maintaining there can be no such abuse when 

the law is unsettled, it overlooks In re Interbank Funding Corp. 

Securities Litigation, 629 F.3d at 215-18, which holds review 

is de novo when the denial is based on futility. 
12 

Therefore, we hold that a plaintiff may cure a standing 

defect under Article III through an amended pleading alleging 

facts that arose after filing the original complaint. The 

alternative approach forces a plaintiff to go through the 

unnecessary hassle and expense of filing a new lawsuit when 

events subsequent to filing the original complaint have fixed 

the jurisdictional problem. The “reasonable notice” and “just 

terms” limitations in Rule 15(d) guard against undue expansion 

of a provision designed to eliminate “needless[] remitt[ing]” of 

a plaintiff. FED.R.CIV. P. 15 advisory committee notes to 1963 

amendment. Because the district court found that HRH 

suffered an injury-in-fact as a result of the imposition of the

$4,000 fine nine months after HRH filed its original complaint 

in federal court, HRH properly invoked the curable defect 

exception to issue preclusion. The district court, consequently, 

was wrong to reject HRH’s proposed second amended 

complaint that included allegations about the Board’s 

enforcement action that would have cured the standing defect. 

We turn, therefore, to the merits. 

III. 

 HRH contends that the license conditions violate its First 

Amendment rights against compelled speech and its right of 

commercial association. Absent a finding that HRH has such 

constitutional rights, appellants’ counsel conceded, Oral Arg. 

Tape 9:50-10:19 (Sept. 20, 2018), that HRH cannot prevail on 

its claim that the license conditions are unconstitutional 

conditions. 

 HRH’s compelled speech claim is based on the license 

conditions requiring HRH to report any violation of the barring

notice to the MPD and the Board. This claim is foreclosed by 

Full Value Advisors, 633 F.3d at 1108-09. There, the court 

held that requiring notification of the government does not 
13 

constitute compelled speech because First Amendment 

concerns are not implicated where the government requires 

disclosures for its operations, such as requiring individuals to 

provide information about their income in tax returns. Id. 

Similarly, here, the District of Columbia government has an 

interest in restricting the ability to sell alcohol to applicants 

who are “of good character and generally fit for the 

responsibilities of licensure,” D.C. Code § 25–301(a)(1), and 

an interest in promoting public safety, see Marusa v. District 

of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1973). HRH thus 

fails to state a claim that the license conditions compel its 

speech in violation of its First Amendment rights. 

HRH’s commercial association claim is foreclosed by U.S. 

Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 620, and Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25. The 

Supreme Court has recognized the right to intimate association 

and expressive association, U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 617-18, 

but no general right of social association, Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 

25. As a result, prohibiting HRH from employing or hosting 

Scahill on the Alibi restaurant premises does not violate a 

cognizable associational right. Because no constitutional 

rights of HRH were violated, HRH’s unconstitutional 

conditions claim also fails. 

HRH’s retaliation claim is unavailing. In the proposed 

second amended complaint, HRH alleges that the Board’s 

enforcement action resulting in the fines was in retaliation for 

HRH’s and Scahill’s efforts to overturn the license conditions 

by filing a motion for reconsideration by the Board, petitioning 

the D.C. Court of Appeals, and filing a complaint in federal 

court. Even assuming the truth of the allegations in the 

complaint, the district court did not err in concluding retaliation 

was “not a plausible conclusion.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. 
14 

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, HRH 

must show (1) “that [it] engaged in protected conduct,” (2) 

“that the government took some retaliatory action sufficient to

deter a person of ordinary firmness in plaintiff’s position from 

speaking again,” and (3) “that there exists a causal link between 

the exercise of a constitutional right and the adverse action 

taken against him.” Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F.3d 96, 

106 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). To establish the causal link, the constitutional speech 

must be the but-for cause of the retaliatory action. Id. at 107. 

HRH did not plausibly allege the requisite causation. 

Although it maintains that investigators appeared at the Alibi 

restaurant in retaliation for appellants’ legal challenges, the

Board relied on testimony that D.C. investigators visited the 

Alibi restaurant on two occasions in response to complaints 

that Scahill was seen at the restaurant. See ABC Board Order 

¶¶ 12, 19 (July 19, 2017) (“2017 Board Order”). The proposed 

second amended complaint alleges that the Board unreasonably 

fined HRH even though one of the two investigators, Ms. 

Cullings, “testified under oath that she never identified Mr. 

Scahill as being present at the Alibi on June 10, 2016.” 

Proposed Second Am. Compl. ¶ 63. The Board could properly 

rely on testimony from the other investigator, Mr. Brashears, 

who was familiar with Scahill and identified him talking to 

Rachel Traverso and working at the restaurant; Ms. Cullings 

testified that she had no reason to doubt this. Appellants also 

object to the district court’s adoption of the Board’s factual 

findings, but HRH attached the 2017 Board Order to its motion 

for leave to amend the complaint and the district court need not 

“accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations insofar as 

they contradict exhibits to the complaint or matters subject to

judicial notice,” Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 963 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004). 
15 

Scahill’s commercial association claim fails for the same 

reasons as HRH’s fails. His Fifth Amendment claims fail as 

well. Appellants contend Scahill adequately pleaded a 

substantive due process claim based on his right to travel. But, 

as the district court ruled, neither the Supreme Court nor this

court has recognized a general right to intrastate travel. See 

Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 537-38 (D.C. 

Cir. 1999). In these circumstances, Scahill has no substantive

right to be in a particular place at a particular time, namely to 

be at the Alibi restaurant. Scahill’s procedural due process 

claim that the license conditions prevent him from being able 

to enter and eat at the Alibi restaurant and from pursuing his 

chosen profession without due process likewise fails because 

he did not identify a cognizable liberty or property interest. 

Appellants point to no authority that a cognizable liberty 

interest is implicated by the ban from one commercial 

establishment. Nor is Scahill thereby deprived of his “right to 

follow a chosen trade or profession without governmental 

interference,” O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126, 1141 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), 

merely because he cannot work at one particular establishment 

in the District of Columbia. To the extent that Scahill asserts a 

property right on the basis of his status as a guarantor on the

Alibi lease, such a property interest must “stem from an 

independent source such as state law,” Bd. of Regents of State 

Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), and Scahill has not 

identified any state law or term of the lease agreement that 

gives him a property interest as result of his status as a 

guarantor. 

Accordingly, we affirm the September 25, 2017 dismissal 

of Scahill’s claims and HRH’s First Amendment retaliation 

claim; we reverse the December 11, 2017 denial of HRH’s 

motions for reconsideration and for leave to file the second 
16 

amended complaint; and we affirm the dismissal of HRH’s 

remaining claims.