# EUR-Lex - 52012DC0571 - EN

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# 52012DC0571

**COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments ("stress tests") of nuclear power plants in the European Union and related activities /* COM/2012/0571 final */**

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

on the comprehensive risk and safety
assessments ("stress tests") of nuclear power plants in the European
Union and related activities

1.           Introduction

There are currently 132 nuclear
reactors in operation in the EU, grouped on 58 sites. Their safety record is
such that although incidents have occurred and continue to occur, no major
accidents have ever taken place. While the overall safety record is therefore good,
EU citizens' confidence in Europe's nuclear industry hinges on continuous
improvements of the EU nuclear safety and security framework, so as to ensure
that it remains the most effective in the world, based on the highest safety
standards.

The challenges which nuclear
safety and its governance face were highlighted in the accident at the Fukushima reactors in Japan following the earthquake and the tsunami in March 2011. This
event demonstrated that nuclear reactors must be
protected even against accidents which have been assessed as highly improbable.
Events at Fukushima revealed well-known and recurring issues: faulty design,
insufficient backup systems, human error, inadequate contingency plans, and
poor communications. The EU must learn the lessons of Fukushima to further
reduce the risk of nuclear incidents in Europe.

The Fukushima accident resulted in
unprecedented efforts to review the safety of nuclear installations in Europe and worldwide. Initiatives were taken at national, regional and international level.

In the EU, the European
Council, in March 2011[1]
concluded that “the safety of all EU nuclear plants
should be reviewed, on the basis of a comprehensive and transparent risk and
safety assessment ("stress tests"); the European Nuclear Safety
Regulatory Group (ENSREG) and the Commission are invited to develop as soon
as possible the scope and modalities of these tests in a coordinated framework
in the light of lessons learned from the accident in Japan and with the full
involvement of Member States, making full use of available expertise (notably
from the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association); the assessments will
be conducted by independent national authorities and through peer review; their
outcome and any necessary subsequent measures that will be taken should be
shared with the Commission and within the ENSREG and should be made public.” In addition, the European Council asked the Commission to invite EU neighbouring countries to take part in the
stress test process, to "review the existing legal and regulatory
framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and to "propose by
the end of 2011 any improvements that may be necessary".

Close cooperation between
plant operators, nuclear regulators and the Commission made it possible to
carry out stress tests in 2011 and 2012. The Commission can now give a response
to the European Council's mandate with the present report which identifies the
Commission's conclusions and recommendations based on the stress tests and
related activities. It also considers the international dimension of nuclear
safety and security and outlines how the nuclear safety framework in the EU can
be improved, underlining the dynamic nature of nuclear safety: enhancing
nuclear safety is not a one off exercise, it must be continually reviewed and
updated. Above all, it brings together all the strands of the review exercise
with a view to developing legislative, non-legislative and project proposals. All
these measures seek to improve the safety of the plants and related governance
at EU and national level, and to promote EU values for nuclear safety and
security in the international context.

Details on the technical
findings and the stress test methodology are presented in the accompanying
Commission Staff Working Document.

2.           The process, key findings and
immediate follow-up to the risk and safety assessments

2.1.        An
unprecedented review of nuclear safety and security

In response to the Fukushima accident and the subsequent mandate given by the
European Council to the Commission, many layers of activities ran in parallel.
These are presented briefly below.

While ENSREG and the Commission developed the
scope and modalities of the tests, the assessment of the safety of nuclear
power plants falls under the responsibility of nuclear operators and national
regulators who participated in the stress tests on a voluntary basis. The Commission cannot guarantee the nuclear
safety and security of nuclear installations, since the legal responsibility remains at national
level. All the conclusions in the present Communication need to be read against
this background.

The safety assessments lead by ENSREG

The stress tests were defined as a targeted
reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs in the light of the lessons drawn
from the events in Fukushima related to extreme natural events challenging the
plants safety functions. They were organised taking due account of the
distribution of competences among the various stakeholders in the area of
nuclear safety[2].
All fourteen EU Member States that operate nuclear power plants[3] plus Lithuania[4] participated in these
assessments on a voluntary basis. The 132 nuclear reactors[5] in operation in the EU, are based on different technologies and types, but are mainly
Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR), Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) or gas cooled
reactors. Stress tests were
started by self-assessments carried out by nuclear operators and the
preparation of national reports by national regulators in line with the
responsibilities for the safety of NPPs. Peer review teams mainly composed of
experts from the Member States, with support from the European Commission,
visited 23 sites, taking into account the type of reactor as well as the
geographical location. Team
visits to selected sites in each country were organized in order to firm up the
implementation of the stress tests, without encroaching on the responsibilities of national authorities
in the area of nuclear safety inspections, which organised inspections of each
operating nuclear power plant (NPP) in the EU after the Fukushima accident.
Information on each NPP can be found in the accompanying Commission Staff
Working Document as well as its references to information made available by
plant operators, the national regulators or ENSREG as a whole.

Following the presentation
of the Commission Interim Report[6],
an extensive EU wide peer review process was carried out from January to April
2012. It produced an overview report by the ENSREG Peer Review Board, endorsed
by ENSREG, and seventeen individual national reports[7] with detailed
recommendations. In July, ENSREG agreed on an Action Plan to follow up the
implementation of the peer review recommendations. It
is on this basis that safety findings and recommendations described in this
Communication are formulated.

Work on nuclear security by the Council
(Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security, AHGNS)

In order to deal with matters related to the
security of nuclear power plants, a new ad hoc group was set up in the
Council. The group met regularly as of September 2011, chaired by the Polish
and Danish Presidencies. It comprised security experts from the Member States
with the Commission closely associated. In contrast to the ENSREG safety
assessments, the AHGNS did not look at individual installations but assessed
the state of nuclear security in the EU as a whole, by looking at methodology
for the evaluation and protection of nuclear power plants including preventive
measures.

The AHGNS encouraged the exchange of existing
practices and identified possible methodological improvements, making mainly
use of good practices in the existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
guidance. It concluded its work in May 2012.

Involvement of EU neighbouring countries in the process

Switzerland, Ukraine and Croatia participated fully in the EU stress tests and the peer review process, while
other neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey[8],
 Belarus and Armenia[9])
that agreed to work on the basis of the same methodology, are working within
different timetables. The Russian Federation also carried out re-assessments
and identified improvement measures at its NPPs, using its own methodology. Switzerland is fully committed to follow up the recommendations of the stress tests, while Ukraine has included the stress tests finding in the modernisation programme of its nuclear
power plants. The Commission appreciates these efforts
to converge with the EU's approach in this field.

Commission assessment of the institutional and legal framework

Beyond the review of the safety of the plants,
the Commission has assessed the institutional architecture and legal framework
for nuclear safety in Europe, taking into account the IAEA Action Plan[10] and the outcome of
international discussions on the Convention on Nuclear Safety. It has identified gaps and best practices that can be addressed or included
within EU legislation on the basis of the existing balance of competences,
extended collaboration among Member States or in the implementation of existing
EU programmes.

Effects of aircraft crashes

Events that could affect both the safety and
the security of nuclear power plants, like aircraft crashes, have been
considered within this review exercise. The effects of aircraft crashes on the
safety of nuclear power plants are covered in the ENSREG stress tests
specification. On security, the AHGNS report identifies good practices to be
followed by Member States on the prevention of malevolent aircraft crashes.

The Commission has organised a seminar "Safety
of Nuclear Power Plants against Aircraft Impacts" on 25 September 2012
aimed at upgrading plant safety and exploring alternative protection methods. Participation included Member States safety regulatory authorities
as well as contributions from USA and Japanese experts. Invited experts
considered the characteristics of existing plants and new designs separately.

Off-site emergency preparedness

During the peer review phase of the safety
stress tests some NGOs requested to extend the scope of the stress tests to
off-site emergency preparedness. In the EU, 47 nuclear power plants with 111
reactors have more than 100 000 inhabitants living within a circle of 30 km.
This demonstrates that off-site preventive measures are of primary importance.
The responsibility for such measures is shared by several national, regional
and local authorities. The Commission, with ENSREG support, is launching a
study aiming at drawing a picture of current arrangements, focussing on cross
border regions in the EU and at making recommendations as necessary. Results
are expected by the end of 2013.

Cooperation in the framework of international organisations

The Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear
Safety held an Extraordinary Meeting in August 2012 to review its effectiveness
and continued suitability. The Commission prepared a report on behalf of the
Euratom Community[11]
and has been mandated by the Member States in the Council to negotiate
improvements to the implementation of the Convention as well as amendment
proposals tabled by other Contracting Parties.

2.2.        Findings from the safety
assessments and from the institutional and legal review

The findings are described in detail in the
Commission Staff Working Document accompanying this Communication. Key
considerations for each topic are summarised in the following paragraphs.

2.2.1.     Findings on safety measures
in existing NPPs

Based on the stress tests, national regulators
concluded that there are no technical reasons requiring the shutdown of any NPP in Europe, and
identified a series of good practices. The Commission
is not empowered to make assessments of this nature. However, practically all NPPs need to undergo safety improvements,
as hundreds of technical upgrade measures have been identified. Following the
accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, measures to protect nuclear
plants were globally agreed. The stress tests demonstrated however that in many
instances the implementation of those measures is still pending.

The Annex highlights the main recommendations
identified in the stress test exercise. Further detail on required improvements
and on good practices detailed by NPP is provided in the Staff Working
Document.

Examples of significant findings:

In 4 reactors (located in two different countries), there is less
than 1 hour available to operators to restore the safety functions in case of
loss of all electrical power and/or ultimate heat sink.

In 10 reactors, on-site seismic instrumentation is not installed
yet.

4 countries currently operate additional safety systems fully
independent from the normal safety systems, located in areas well protected
against external events (e.g. bunkered systems or hardened core of safety
systems). A fifth country is considering this option.

Mobile equipment, especially diesel generators needed in case of
total loss of power, external events or severe accident situations, are already
available in 7 countries, and will be installed in most of the others.

The seminar on aircraft crashes showed the
existence of significant differences in the national approaches to deal with
the assessment of the safety implications with regard to existing and new NPPs:

Design requirements for new NPPs require that –
following impact of a large aircraft, no releases to outside of the containment
take place. For historical reasons, the situation is different for existing
NPPs, and the methodologies applied and implications developed are not
necessarily coherent and consistent across Member States.

Participants stressed the need to keep a clear
separation with security issues because of the different level of institutional
responsibility and transparency vis-à-vis the public.

2.2.2.     Findings on safety
procedures and frameworks

The stress tests highlighted best practices as
well as shortcomings in Member States. These are detailed in the Staff Working Document.
The following key issues have emerged from the stress tests and from other
reports on the Fukushima investigations[12]:

·
There is a lack of consistency with respect
to assessing and managing external hazards to plant safety. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency guidance for
seismic loads or the guidelines for flooding are not implemented by all Member
States (first ENSREG peer review Board recommendation, see 2.3.2.).

·
The scope and depth of the Probabilistic
Safety Assessment (PSA) used to characterise the
safety of nuclear reactors differ significantly and in some Member States there
is an urgent need to bring them up to accepted international standards.

·
Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG's) covering all types of situations have to be available in
all NPPs. The stress tests have shown that SAMG's need to be updated and fully
implemented as soon as possible in a number of Member States.

·
Improvements in safety culture are needed. There are gaps in ensuring comprehensive and transparent
identification and management of key safety issues. A glaring lesson from Fukushima is that the tsunami hazard was
underestimated, mostly due to human, systemic and organisational factors.

2.2.3.     Findings on the legal
framework for safety and its implementation

A number of weaknesses in the existing nuclear
safety framework at the European and the Member States level have been
identified.

·
The key finding relates to continuing
differences between Member States resulting in the absence of a consistent
approach to nuclear safety regulation. There are no codified EU mechanisms
to agree on technical standards and ways to conduct safety reviews. The Nuclear
Safety Directive does not have any provisions to this end.

·
The provisions covering the independence of
the national regulatory authorities and the means to ensure their
effectiveness are minimal and not necessarily sufficient
for preventing situations where the regulatory responsibility is split between
several entities or is included directly in Ministries (Economy, Environment,
etc.). Moreover, the existing catalogue of regulatory competencies
is not sufficiently explicit.

·
Transparency is essential
in ensuring that the best possible safety practices are used, as shown by the
stress tests. However, the Nuclear Safety Directive contains only generic
requirements on public information.

·
The monitoring and verification mechanisms at
EU level are limited to the peer review of the national nuclear safety
framework.

2.3.        Key recommendations from
the stress tests on safety

2.3.1.     Recommendations on safety
measures in existing NPPs

The Staff Working Document provides an overview
of the number of safety measures required in individual nuclear power plants.

Follow-up:

All participating countries have begun to take
operational steps to improve the safety of their plants. These measures include
additional mobile equipment to prevent or mitigate severe accidents, the
installation of hardened fixed equipment, and the improvement of severe
accident management, together with appropriate staff training measures. The
costs of additional safety improvements are estimated to be in the range of €30
million to €200 million per reactor unit. Thus, the total costs for the 132 reactors operating in the EU could be in the order of €10–25
billion for all NPP units in the EU over the coming years. These figures are
based on the estimates published by the French nuclear safety authority
(covering more than one third of the reactors in the EU) and are subject to
confirmation in the national actions plans.

In line with a Joint Declaration issued by the
Commission and ENSREG on 25 April 2012[13],
ENSREG agreed an Action Plan in July, which aims at ensuring that the recommendations
from the peer review process are implemented in a consistent and
transparent manner. This must be a priority for all affected Member States. In
view of the high number of recommended improvements, methods and criteria need
to be developed and applied to judge the importance of different measures, to
prioritise and allocate funding to those areas which bring the greatest safety
benefits.

At the same time, the assessment carried out on
plants being constructed considered the likelihood for new reactor designs to
be strongly affected by all of these safety upgrading measures as low.
Therefore, large increases in the investment costs for new nuclear generation
capacity in Europe are unlikely if the best available technologies are chosen.

The responsibility for implementing monitoring
and verification mechanisms belongs to the Member States.

2.3.2.     Recommendations on
procedures and frameworks

Regarding safety, the ENSREG peer review Board
report identified four main areas for further improvement across Europe:

·
European guidance should be developed on the
assessment of natural hazards, including earthquake, flooding and extreme
weather conditions, and safety margins, in order to increase consistency
between Member States. The Western European Nuclear
Regulators' Association (WENRA), involving the best available expertise from Europe (linked with the first finding under 2.2.2.) would be well placed to carry out this
task.

·
Periodic Safety Review (PSR) of each NPP
should be carried out at least every 10 years, to
maintain and improve the safety and robustness of plants and revaluate the natural
hazards to which plants may be subject to.

·
Recognised measures to protect containment integrity as the last
barrier to protect people and the environment against radioactive releases must
be implemented.

·
Accidents resulting from natural hazards should
be prevented and/or mitigated so as to limit their consequences. Measures to be considered include bunkered equipment to prevent and
manage a severe accident, mobile equipment protected against extreme natural
hazards, emergency response centres protected against extreme natural hazards
and contamination, rescue teams and equipment rapidly available to support local
operators in long duration events.

Follow-up:

The Commission and national regulators have
agreed that national action plans with timetables for implementation
will be prepared and made available by the end of 2012. The peer review
methodology will be applied to them in early 2013 in order to verify that the
“stress tests” recommendations are consistently implemented in a transparent
way throughout Europe. In areas where additional technical analysis and
guidance are needed national regulators will closely collaborate in the WENRA
framework.

The occurrence of incidents in nuclear plants,
even in Member States with otherwise good safety records, confirms the need for
thorough safety reviews on a regular basis and for the assessment of
operational experience, and highlights the need for close cooperation
and information sharing between operators, vendors, regulators and European
institutions, such as the European Clearinghouse of Operating Experience,
maintained by the Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC). In addition, ENSREG
can play a key role in ensuring that experience and conclusions from any
nuclear incident are shared promptly and applied consistently in other Member
States. For example, the results of recent investigations into the Doel 3
reactor in Belgium have demonstrated the need to continuously check plant
status with state of the art techniques and share information as widely as
possible.

Furthermore, the Commission recommends that
national regulators include in their future safety reviews more detailed
analysis with respect to the effects of multi-unit accidents, considering
also ageing on equipment and materials, protection of spent fuel storage ponds
and possibilities to reduce the amount of spent fuel stored in ponds, in order
to reduce risks due to loss of cooling.

The Commission considers that extending the
safety assessment to off-site emergency preparedness and response
arrangements is an important additional activity to improve citizens'
safety. Therefore, as a first
step, the Commission is launching a study on the "Review of Current
Off-Site Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response Arrangements in EU Member
States and Neighbouring Countries". The objective is to review the
off-site nuclear emergency preparedness and response capabilities in EU Member
States and neighbouring countries, to identify inconsistencies and gaps, and to
develop proposals (legislative or non-legislative) for possible improvements.

Regarding the safety implications of aircraft
crashes on nuclear power plants, the Commission recommends to ENSREG to work
urgently on a European safety approach in order to develop a coherent
methodology and to arrive at comparable high-level standards across the
European Union.

2.4.        Key findings and
recommendations from the security assessments[14]

The final report of the Ad Hoc Group on
Nuclear Security[15]
presents conclusions on the five themes discussed, namely physical protection, malevolent aircraft crashes, cyber-attacks,
nuclear emergency planning, and exercises and training.
As national security remains a Member States responsibility and the sensitivity
of the subjects and confidentiality obviously implies strict constraints, the
report contains several recommendations to the Member States in order to
strengthen nuclear security in the EU. It highlights in particular:

·
the urgent need for the Member States which have
not yet done so to complete ratification of the amended Convention on
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials;

·
the added value of IAEA's guidance and
services, including IPPAS[16]
missions on a regular basis in all Member States having nuclear power plants;

·
the importance of regular and close
cooperation between Member States and with neighbouring countries and

·
the necessity to define modalities and fora for
the continuation of EU work on nuclear security.

2.5.        Recommendations on linking
work between safety and security issues

Sustained efforts are required to link up work
on nuclear safety and security and address possible gaps. For example, neither
the safety stress tests nor the report on nuclear security answer all relevant
questions on issues like aircraft crashes or the resistance of nuclear power
plants to external events. However, the stress tests have to a considerable
extent covered the effects of aircraft crashes through the thorough work
undertaken on station blackout and loss of plant cooling. While this is an area
where competence is shared among different authorities, the Commission intends
to further study this area through dedicated expert hearings. On other areas of
nuclear security, specific projects under the EU CBRN Action Plan and actions
on cyber security will need to be considered in close collaboration with Member
States ENSREG has agreed in its action plan to further collaborate on the issue
of aircraft crashes as far as the legal competencies of national regulators
permit.

3.           Strengthening the EU Nuclear Safety
Framework

3.1.        Implementing the existing
nuclear safety legislative framework

The deadline for the EU Member States to
complete the transposition of the Nuclear Safety Directive[17] at
national level was 22 July 2011. The European Commission started infringement
proceedings against twelve Member States that did not comply with this deadline[18]. To date, two Member States[19] have still not completed their
transposing measures. The Commission will now start an in depth analysis of the
quality of the transposing measures by the Member States.

3.2.        Improving the legislative
framework for nuclear safety

3.2.1.     Revision of the nuclear
safety directive

It is crucial to ensure that the lessons
learned from the Fukushima accident and the conclusions of the stress tests are
properly and consistently implemented in the EU and reflected in the
legislative framework. The stress tests, the reports from Japan and the work of the international community in the IAEA have confirmed that there are
not only significant differences between Member States, but also gaps in
ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key
safety issues.

Moreover a number of weaknesses with the
existing EU nuclear safety framework have been identified (see section 2.2.3). In
order to address these, the Nuclear Safety Directive requires revision in the
following area:

(1)
Safety procedures and frameworks. The scope of the existing Nuclear Safety Directive is limited to
overall principles mainly fixing the distribution of competencies among nuclear
operators, national regulators and other national instances, hence it cannot
address the technical safety issues identified in the Fukushima nuclear
accident and the stress tests. The main framework
recommendations arising from the stress tests (e.g. the periodic revaluation of
external hazards, the implementation of recognised techniques to minimise the
impact of accidents, etc.) need to be translated into agreed mechanisms
anchored in the revised directive on which the national regulatory authorities
can base their independent decisions. Improvements are needed in preparing and
responding to a serious nuclear or radiological emergency. The revised directive should include provisions that
require Member States to have in place appropriate on-site emergency preparedness
and response measures. Specific
attention needs to be paid to the safety of new nuclear installations. While
the revised directive can define basic parameters and safety objectives, the
role of ENSREG in providing guidance for their implementation needs to be
defined, as shown by recent developments in the reactor in Doel. Those events have once more highlighted the need
for dialogue between operators and safety authorities in order to share and
implement best practices and state of the art technology. For new reactors, WENRA safety objectives should be considered in
the directive.

(2)
Role and means of nuclear regulatory authorities. The current provisions on regulatory separation and the
effectiveness of nuclear regulatory authorities need to be strengthened to
ensure the effective independence of these authorities and guarantee that they
have the appropriate means of action.

(3)
Openness and transparency. Transparency of regulatory decisions and regular provision of
information to the public by nuclear operators should
be extended and specified, for example by putting obligations on the licence
holders, or by specifying the type of information that should be provided, as a
minimum, to the public by the competent regulatory authority.

(4)
Monitoring and verification. The provisions on monitoring and
verification, for example through the extended use of peer reviews, should be
extended to other areas than the review of the national regulatory framework.

3.2.2.     Nuclear Insurance and Liability

The analysis of provisions for the compensation
of victims in case of nuclear incidents or accidents is not covered at all by
the current EU legislative framework. As such, this was not part of the stress
test process. However, Euratom Treaty article 98 provides for Council
Directives establishing binding measures on this issue. Therefore,
based on an impact assessment, the Commission will analyse to what extent the
situation of potential victims of a nuclear accident in Europe should be
improved, within the limits of EU competence. The Commission intends to propose
binding legislation in the area of nuclear insurance and liability. In this
context, compensation for damage to the natural environment should also be
addressed.

3.2.3.     Revising
the legislation on food and feedstuff

The management of food and feedstuff that is
contaminated as a result of a nuclear emergency is covered both by the Basic
Safety Standards Directive (96/29/Euratom), and it is subject to specific
provisions with regard to their placing on the market in Council Regulation
(Euratom) No 3954/87 laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive
contamination. The latter legislation has become the subject of a recast
procedure[20].
However, the Commission now intends to withdraw the proposal for a recast and
to bring this Regulation in line with the new Comitology Regulation[21] which entered into force in
March 2011.

The experience gained from the events in
Fukushima and Chernobyl demonstrated a need to
differentiate between instruments regulating the import of food from third
counties and those for the placing on the market of food in case of an accident
within the EU. On the basis of this experience, the
Regulation needs to be revised in order to provide more flexible tools which
will allow specific, targeted reactions to any nuclear accident or radiological
emergency (in the EU, in the vicinity of the EU or in a remote country).

3.3.        Strengthening human
resources and training

Whether a country
has chosen to continue the use of nuclear energy, to phase out the use or to
start using this energy source for the first time, ensuring the availability of
an experienced workforce should be a top priority.

At European level the EC Joint Research Centre,
in cooperation with EU nuclear safety regulators and TSOs, manages the
Operating Experience Feedback initiative. The Joint Research Centre will open
these activities to all national nuclear regulatory authorities, who want to
participate, in order to establish a permanent European Nuclear Safety
Laboratory for the continuous improvement of safety. This laboratory will
provide scientific and technical support for effective work for the continuous
improvement of nuclear safety in particular through incident analyses and
assessments, which may be identified by the Commission or ENSREG.

In Euratom research and innovation actions
(Horizon-2020), special attention should be dedicated to the lessons from Fukushima, and better coordination between national, European and international actions in
this area is needed. Further exchanges of best practices should be encouraged
as a way of continuously improving and harmonising nuclear safety culture.

3.4.        Building up international
cooperation

The Commission will
continue to encourage all EU neighbouring countries through appropriate
incentives and instruments to share the results of their stress tests, participate
in peer reviews and ensure that experiences in the implementation of
recommendations are shared to improve nuclear safety both inside the EU and at
its borders. A Euratom loan is currently being considered for Ukraine, in order to speed up the implementation of its comprehensive safety upgrade
programme.

Contacts are also under way to develop
bilateral cooperation on stress tests and regulatory issues with Japan. A draft Memorandum of Understanding for better cooperation on nuclear safety has
already been submitted to the IAEA. More generally, the Commission will work
with the European External Action Service (EEAS) in order to make the best use
of existing external cooperation instruments in the field, in particular the
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, the Instrument for Stability in its
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear risk mitigation component and
the Instrument for Pre-Accession.

3.5.        Improving the global legal
framework for nuclear safety

Through the IAEA, the main instruments
governing nuclear safety are internationally agreed safety standards and conventions,
in particular the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), and the Convention on the
Early Notification of a Nuclear Emergency, to which the Euratom Community is a
Contracting Party. The extraordinary meeting of the
Convention on Nuclear Safety in August 2012 agreed to set up a working group
tasked with reporting in 2014 on a list of actions to strengthen the Convention
and on proposals to amend it, if necessary. A majority of nations participating
to this working group highlighted the need to take into account the IAEA safety
standards, regulatory independence and effectiveness, extended use of peer
reviews as well as improved openness and transparency. The Commission will take
full account of these principles and objectives. The continued
commitment of Member States and EU institutions is needed to ensure that the EU
legislation is reflected to the extent possible in future revisions of the
international nuclear safety framework. The Commission will continue its
efforts to make this possible.

4.           Reinforcing nuclear security

The Commission supports
the findings and recommendations highlighted in the final report of the AHGNS. In order to contribute to the work on nuclear security matters, the
Commission will use the existing competencies and programmes to encourage Member States in progressing further
on the implementation of specific measures. In particular, the Commission will
continue to work with Member States on:

–
the reduction of the threat of Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) incidents of intentional origin,
including acts of terrorism and detection of radioactive and nuclear materials,
through the implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan and the management of
programmes on CBRN security;

–
the revision of Directive 2008/114/EC on the
identification and designation of European critical infrastructures[22], foreseen in 2013;

–
the Commission will table a legislative proposal
on network and information security by the end of the year. Under the proposal
operators in certain critical sectors relying heavily on ICT will be required
to ensure the security of their information systems and report serious security
breaches to public authorities. Electricity utilities with nuclear operations
will be subject to these requirements;

–
adoption of the proposal for the revision of the
Union Civil Protection Mechanism[23]
that facilitates co-operation between the Member States in
civil protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies,
including radiological and nuclear accidents as well as prevention and
preparedness actions (e.g. risk assessments and risk management plans, CBRN
modules, training and exercises for large-scale disasters, scenario development
and contingency planning);

–
the speedy ratification of the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials by
all Member States. The Commission will complete the
ratification process by Euratom as agreed by the Council in 2006 once Member
States have finalised their internal procedures.

The Commission also considers that there
remains a need to tackle more explicitly aspects located at the interface
between nuclear safety and security.

Outside the EU, the Instrument for Stability – the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence
programme – will enhance
institutional capacities of selected countries and regions against chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear risks.

5.           Conclusions and Way Forward

The EU nuclear stress tests were an
unprecedented exercise in terms of extent,
collaboration and commitment of all parties involved. They have been used
internationally either as basis or as a benchmark for the safety assessment of
nuclear power plants[24].
The public availability of all safety-related reports and the participation of
non-nuclear countries have made the exercise an example of transparency.

The stress tests are now
completed. However, their impact should not be considered as a one-off
exercise, but as an on-going process to improve nuclear safety, in close
collaboration with national regulatory authorities in the context of ENSREG and
the IAEA. The EU must seek to develop a comprehensive European approach to
safety, which includes a revision of nuclear safety specific Euratom
legislation, complemented by legislative or non-legislative instruments on
nuclear liability, on emergency preparedness and response, and by pursuing
actions in the area of nuclear security. In this way, citizens in the whole EU
can be confident that nuclear power produced in the EU is subject to the most
stringent safety conditions in the world.

The stress tests and related activities are a
major achievement for the EU and the regulatory authorities in the Member
States and have led to tangible results:

·
Significant and tangible plant improvements have
been identified in all participating countries, and are being implemented or
planned.

·
Weaknesses in frameworks and procedures, as well
as gaps in the legal arrangements, have been identified and proposals to
improve these are on the drawing board.

·
First bridges have been built between
authorities dealing with safety and those dealing with security. Improving the
dialogue between them on topics that reside at the safety/security interface is
essential to respond to citizens' concerns.

With a view to ensuring proper follow-up to the
stress tests, the Commission:

·
invites the European Council to commit Member
States and to call upon participating third countries to implement swiftly the
recommendations of the stress tests. The Commission
will ensure openness and transparency during the follow-up of the stress test
process but will, under the current legislation, not be legally responsible for
the operational assessment of the safety of NPPs. It proposes that the European
Council examine the status of the implementation of the recommendations by June
2014, on the basis of a consolidated report by the Commission, to be drafted in
close cooperation with ENSREG. It invites Member States to take action without
delay to implement all stress test recommendations, in accordance with the
timetable of the ENSREG action plan and with the aim of implementing the vast
majority of the required safety improvements by 2015;

·
will present an ambitious revision of the EU
nuclear safety directive, which it will submit to the European Parlament
and Council by early 2013 at the latest, after consulting Member States
scientific and technical experts as foreseen by article 31 of the Euratom
Treaty. Presentation of a further proposal on nuclear insurance and liability is
under consideration and will follow in 2013, just as the proposal on maximum
permitted levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and feeding stuffs;

·
will explore proposals in the the Horizon 2020
Euratom programme aiming to faciliate the exchange between Member States of
staff working in the nuclear field;

·
will propose to the Council a mandate to participate
actively in the working group on effectiveness and transparency in the
framework of IAEA seeking improvements of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and
preparing a European joint proposal for the next review meeting in March 2014;
the Commission will also maintain the ongoing dialogue with other countries to
ensure the maximum convergence on the European proposals;

·
will continue to encourage scientific activities
aiming at further harmonization of nuclear safety assessments and practices in
EU;

·
will continue to contribute to the reinforcement
of nuclear security building as appropriate on existing work on CBRN, by
using reinforced cooperation of Member States and EU insitutions as needed as
well as external cooperation instruments in close collaboration with the EEAS.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:

AHGNS               Ad-hoc
Group on Nuclear Security

BWR                    Boiling Water Reactor

CBRN                  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

CNS                    Convention on Nuclear
Safety

EEAS                   European External Action
Service

ENSREG             European
Nuclear Safety Regulators' Group

IAEA                   International Atomic Energy Agency

ICT                      Information and Communication Technologies

INSC                   Instrument
for Nuclear Safety Cooperation

IPPAS                  International Physical
Protection Advisory Service

JRC                      Joint Research Centre
of the European Commission

NPP                     Nuclear
Power Plant

SAM                    Severe Accident Management

SAMG                 Severe Accident Management Guidelines

TSO                     Technical
Safety Organisation

PSA                     Probabilistic Safety Assessment

PSR                     Periodic Safety Reviews

WENRA              Western European Nuclear
Regulators' Association

Annex[25]

Summary of the Main
Recommendations for Improvement during the Stress Tests in EU Member State
Nuclear Power Plants

External hazard
safety cases corresponding to an exceedance probability of less than once in
10 000 years should be used for earthquakes.

(The suitability of a NPP construction site
should be assessed based on an seismic analysis that takes into account the
most severe earthquake over the last 10 000 years)

External hazard safety cases corresponding to
an exceedance probability of less than once in 10 000 years should be used
for flooding.

(The suitability of a NPP construction site
should be assessed based on an analysis that takes into account the most severe
flood over the last 10 000 years)

A Design Basis Earthquake corresponding to a
minimum peak ground acceleration of 0.1 g should be used.

NPP design must be able to withstand an
earthquake producing at least a peak ground acceleration 0.1 g.

Means needed to fight accidents should be stored
in places adequately protected against external events.

On-site seismic instrumentation should be
installed or improved.

Time available to the operator for restoration
of the safety functions in case of loss of all electrical power and/or ultimate
heat sink should be more than 1 hour (without human intervention).

Emergency Operating Procedures should cover all
plant states (full power to shutdown states).

Severe Accident Management Guidelines should be
implemented and should cover all plant operating states (from "full power"
to "shutdown" states).

Passive measures to prevent hydrogen explosions
(or other combustible gasses) in case of severe accident should be in place
(such as Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners or other relevant alternatives).

Containment Filtered Venting Systems should be
in place, so as to limit the amount of radioactivity released outside the
containment in case of accident.

A backup Emergency Control Room should be
available in case the Main Control Room becomes inhabitable as a consequence of
the radiological releases of a severe accident, of fire in the Main Control
Room or due to extreme external hazards.

[1]               EUCO 10/11 (paragraph 31).

[2]               According to article 6 of the Nuclear Safety
Directive, the prime responsibility for nuclear safety lies with the
"licence holder" (i.e. the plant operator) under the supervision of
the national competent regulatory authority. Member States are responsible for
establishing and maintaining a national legislative, regulatory and organisational
framework for nuclear safety. Under the Euratom Treaty, the Commission can make
legislative proposals to create an EU legislative framework for nuclear safety,
without however being able to substitute its responsibility for that of the
Member States. A change to this situation would require an amendment of existing
legislation.

[3]               Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

[4]               Where the Ignalina NPP is
being decommissioned.

[5]               Altogether,
the stress tests were performed on the 132 reactors in operation in the EU, 13
EU reactors that were phased out since the stress tests were initiated, 15
reactors in Ukraine, and 5 reactors in the Swiss Confederation.

[6]               COM 784 final, 24.11.2011.

[7]               14 Member States operating
nuclear power plants (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom), Lithuania (where the Ignalina units are being
decommissioned under operating licenses) and Switzerland and Ukraine as EU neighbouring
countries.

[8]               Stress test report submitted to the Commission in May
2012.

[9]               Financial and technical assistance from the EU Instrument
for Nuclear Safety Cooperation. A report is expected by early 2013.

[10]             http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/actionplan/reports/actionplanns130911.pdf

[11]             C(2012) 3196 final, 10.5.2012.

[12]             "Investigation Committee on the Accident at
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company", final
report July 2012 (http://icanps. go.jp/) and "The Fukushima Nuclear
Accident Independent Investigation Commission", final report July 2012 (http://www.naiic.jp/en/2012/)

[13]             http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/EC%20ENSREG%20Joint%20Statement%2026%20April%202012%20-Final%20to%20publish.pdf

[14]             This section is based on the Final Report of the
Council Ad-hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS).

[15]             http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st10/st10616.en12.pdf,
31.5.2012.

[16]             International
Physical Protection Advisory Service.

[17]             Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009
establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear
installations.

[18]             Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and the United Kingdom.

[19]             Poland and Portugal.

[20]             COM(2010)184 final, 27.4.2010.

[21]             Regulation EU 182/2011.

[22]             Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the
identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the
assessment of the need to improve their protection, OJ L 345, 23.12.2008, p.
75–82.

[23]             Proposal
COM/2011/0934 under negotiation in the Parliament and the Council to repeal
Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom establishing a Community Civil Protection
Mechanism (recast).

[24]             For example the Latin American forum of nuclear
regulators (FORO), the Russian Federation and Japan have followed closely the
EU stress tests and made use of part of the specifications.

[25]             The issues listed should be read together with the
accompanying Commission Staff Working Document where they are explained in more
detail and linked to nuclear power plants where they were observed.