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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

JEAN M MEADOWS, 

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 1:11-cv-00045-MP-GRJ

CITY OF INGLIS,

TIMOTHY LETSON,

BRANDON ROBERTS, 

Defendants.

_____________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

(Doc. 47). Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. 55) and therefore the motion is ripe for

review. For the following reasons the motion is due to denied.

Defendants Letson and Roberts move for summary judgment on the grounds of

qualified immunity as to the Fourth Amendment claim and for statutory immunity under

Florida law as to the battery claim. Plaintiff, Jean Meadows, filed a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with state-based causes of action, against

defendants, Timothy Letson, Brandon Roberts, and City of Inglis. Meadows alleges

that Letson used excessive force in restraining her and that Roberts and City of Inglis

were negligent in supervising and training subordinate officers. 

The Amended Complaint discloses the following details as to the events in this

case. Meadows was caring for a minor during the fourth of July celebrations. (Doc. 16

at 3). Just before midnight, she stopped at a bar, went in, and left the minor in the car

for approximately ten minutes. (Doc. 16 at 3). Officer Letson and Sergeant Roberts

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saw the unattended minor in the car and arrested Meadows for child neglect. (Doc. 16

at 3). The State Attorney's Office, however, declined to prosecute. (Doc. 16 at 3). 

During the arrest, Meadows informed the officers that she recently had shoulder

surgery and asked them not to handcuff her behind the back. (Doc 16 at 4). Despite

Meadows's request, Officer Letson, in view of Sergeant Roberts, handcuffed her behind

the back. (Doc 16 at 4). Meadows alleges that Letson used such “excessive, improper

and unprovoked force that he so twisted [her] arm as to cause a scaphoid fracture and

severe pain and suffering.” (Doc 16 at 4). As a result, Meadows has a fractured wrist,

damage to her shoulder, and a permanent medical impairment. (Doc 16 at 4). 

Meadows filed a complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against defendants for

excessive force, battery, and negligent supervision and training. (Doc 1 at 6). 

Defendants, City of Inglis and Brandon Roberts, removed this case to federal court

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal question jurisdiction. (Doc 1 at 2). 

Defendants Letson and Roberts motion for summary judgment contains two

parts. Letson and Roberts ask the court to find that they are shielded from the 42

U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Defendant

Letson further requests summary judgment on the state battery claim on the grounds

that he did not commit a battery, and alternatively, that if he did commit a battery, he is

shielded from suit in his personal capacity by Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a).

The standard for summary judgment involved the following inquiry. Summary

Judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). “The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of

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demonstrating that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and that it is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Howard v. BP Oil Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 520, 523 (1994)

(citing Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). “The facts relied

on by the movant must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party so

that any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact will be resolved in

favor of denying the motion.” Id. (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1608 (1970). Summary judgment is inappropriate when there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in the nonmoving party's

favor. Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995).

Qualified Immunity

The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials “‘from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738)). The doctrine balances the competing but

equally important goals of affording officials immunity from suit for reasonable actions

taken within the scope of their duties and holding those officials responsible who abuse

their power. Id. 

The Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001) laid

out a two step test for determining whether the actions of a government official fall

outside the scope of qualified immunity. The Court held that in analyzing a qualified

immunity case a court should first ask whether, “on the facts alleged, a constitutional

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violation could be found.” Id. at 206, 121 S. Ct. at 2159. Next, the court must

determine whether the violation alleged is clearly established in the law, such that a

reasonable government official would be aware that he is bound by its prohibitions. Id.

at 202, 121 S. Ct. at 2156. In Pearson, the Court receded slightly from its holding in

Saucier, holding that a court may decide in its discretion “which of the two prongs of the

qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the

particular case at hand.” 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S. Ct. at 818. 

Following Saucier, the Court must first determine whether, on the facts alleged, a

constitutional violation could be found. 533 U.S. at 206, 121 S. Ct. at 2159. Meadows

argues that by handcuffing her behind her back despite her request to be handcuffed in

front and with knowledge of her injured shoulder, Letson used excessive force. (Doc.

55 at 5). She further alleges that Letson actions while handcuffing her were excessive

in that Letson broke Plaintiff’s wrist, and that his demeanor indicated that he wanted to

hurt her. (Doc. 55 at 4). Plaintiff alleges that Roberts was supervising the arrest and

failed to intervene. (Doc. 55 at 4). The evidence does not show that Meadows was

resisting arrest in a way that would cause the officers to view her as a threat. Viewing

the facts in a light most favorable to Meadows, it could be found that Letson and

Roberts violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during

arrest. 

Next, the Court must determine whether Meadows's Fourth Amendment right

was clearly established at the time, such that a reasonable police officer would have

known of its constraints on his actions. Id. at 202, 121 S. Ct. at 2156. Meadows

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alleges that a reasonable officer in Letson's and Roberts's position would have known

that Letson's actions were excessive in light of the circumstances. (Doc. 55 at 5). 

The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[a] right may be clearly established for

qualified immunity purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law with indistinguishable

facts clearly establishing the constitutional right, . . . (2) a broad statement of principle

within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right,

. . . or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in

the total absence of case law.” Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288,

1291-92 (11th Cir. 2009). While few cases exist in any Circuit presenting

indistinguishable facts to the instant case, a long history of case law clearly establishes

a constitutional right to be free of excessive force during arrest. See Davis v. Williams,

451 F.3d 759, 767 (11th Cir. 2006); Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1400

(11th Cir. 1998); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1865 (1989). 

What actions constitute excessive force depends on the circumstances of the

arrest. Relevant factors include the “severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Davis, 451 F.3d at 767. 

The arresting officer's knowledge of a significant pre-existing injury of the suspect can

also affect the analysis of whether a particular action by the officer is excessive. See

Rodriguez v. Farrell, 294 F.3d 1276, 1278 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002) (expressing willingness

to consider the arresting officer's knowledge of a pre-existing injury in the excessive

force analysis); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1342 (6th Cir. 1993) (“An

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excessive use of force claim could be premised on [the officer's] handcuffing [plaintiff] if

he knew that she had an injured arm and if he believed that she posed no threat to

him”); Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 896 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the

existence of plaintiff's gunshot wounds at the time of arrest and the officer's knowledge

thereof affected the analysis of whether the officer's method of handcuffing him

constituted excessive force). 

In the instance case, there is no evidence that Meadows posed a threat to the

arresting officers or that she was resisting arrest or attempting to flee. The crime at

issue was a non-violent one and probably would not have lead a reasonable officer to

view Meadows as a threat. Further, there is evidence that the officers were aware of

Meadows's injury. Meadows claims that she told the officers repeatedly about her

wounded shoulder and asked to be handcuffed with her hands in front. (Doc. 55 at 3). 

Meadows claims that at the time of the arrest there was visible evidence of her surgery

as well as stiffness that made handcuffing noticeably more difficult. (Doc. 55 at 6). It

appears that Meadow offered to have her husband, who lived nearby, verify her story. 

(Doc. 55 at 3). Further, the arrest resulted in the fracturing of Meadows's wrist,

apparently as a result of Letson twisting her arm. (Doc. 55 at 4). Meadows also alleges

that Letson's demeanor suggested that he was angry and intended to hurt her. (Doc.

55 at 4). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Meadows – as the Court is

required to do in ruling on a motion for summary judgment – a reasonable jury could

conclude that in handcuffing Meadows, Letson used a level of force that a reasonable

officer would have known to be excessive in light of the circumstances. A reasonable

jury could also conclude that Roberts unreasonably failed to intervene and stop this use

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of force. Qualified immunity should not apply when a plaintiff has pled, and the facts of

record support, the violation of the plaintiff's well established constitutional right. 

Determination of whether such a violation actually occurred is for the fact finder and is

inappropriate for summary judgment.

State Law Battery Claim

Letson further asks the court to grant summary judgment as to Meadows's

Florida state law battery claim against. Letson argues that 1) no battery occurred and

2) if a battery occurred, Letson is shielded by Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a), which

states:

No officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions

shall be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any

action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or

omission of action in the scope of her or his employment or function,

unless such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with

malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard

of human rights, safety, or property.

Fla. Stat.§ 768.28(9)(a).

Under Florida law, “a presumption of good faith attaches to an officer's use of

force in making a lawful arrest and an officer is liable for damages only where the force

used is clearly excessive.” City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So. 2d 46, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1996). “If excessive force is used in an arrest, the ordinarily protected use of force

by a police officer is transformed into a battery.” Id. “A battery claim for excessive force

is analyzed by focusing upon whether the amount of force used was reasonable under

the circumstances.” Id. As discussed above, sufficient facts exist whereby a

reasonable jury could determine that Letson's actions were not reasonable under the

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circumstances. Further, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Letson did not act “in

bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful

disregard for . . . [Meadows's] safety.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). The record contains

evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to determine that Letson acted in a manner

willfully disregarding Meadows's safety. According to Meadows, Letson handcuffed her

in an injurious way despite repeated warnings about her injured shoulder and restricted

motion. (Doc. 55 at 3, 6). She further stated that she believes Letson's actions and

demeanor indicated that he wanted to hurt her out of anger. (Doc. 55 at 4). For these

reasons, it would not be appropriate to rule as a matter of law that 1) Letson did not

commit a battery or 2) his behavior was within the bounds of the statutory shield of

Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a). The Court makes no judgment as to the strength or

credibility of any of the evidence except to say that it would not preclude a reasonable

jury from returning a verdict for the plaintiff. 

Recommendation

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that

defendants Letson and Roberts’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 47) be DENIED.

IN CHAMBERS this 26 day of January, 2012. th

s/Gary R. Jones 

GARY R. JONES

United States Magistrate Judge

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

A party may file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations within 14 days after being served with a copy of this report and

recommendation. A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14

days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to file specific objections

limits the scope of review of proposed factual findings and recommendations.

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