The Honorable Paul L . Maloney , Chief United States District Judge, United States D istrict * Court for the Western D istrict of Michig an, sitting by desig nation. The voluntarine ss of this statement was ra ised as an issue in the state cour t of appe als and 1 in t he dis tr ic t c ourt . Wh e the r t his state me nt w a s v olu

nta ry is n ot a n is su e be fo re thi s c ourt
. NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON

File Na me: 10a0051n.06 No. 07-2015 UN I TE D ST AT ES C OU RT O F APP EA L S F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT AL AK I NS, Petitioner-Appellant, On Appea l from the United States District Court for the v. Easter n District of Michig an MI L L I CENT WARR EN, Warden, Respondent-Appe llee.
Be fore : BATCHEL DER, Chief J udg e; GI BB ONS, Circuit J udg e; MAL ONEY, D istrict J udg e. * PAULMAL ONEY, Chief District J udg e. Al Akins appea ls the district court’s dismissal of hi s 2 8 U. S
. C. § 2254 petition for writ of habea s corpus. Upon e x amination of the re cord a nd briefs, this pane l unanimously ag ree s that oral argument is not necessa

ry . F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a). F or the re asons provided be low, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
. Ak ins was cha

rg ed with shooting V ito Davis on Fe bruar y 19, 2001, during an attempted robber y . After his arre st, Akins a dmitted to the police that he acte d as a lookout for the robbe ry , but ins ist e d th a t O si ri s Cu e sta wa s th e pe rs on

wh o s ho t Mr . D a vis

. Ak ins and c o- de fe nd ant Jamari o 1 Mitchell were tried jointly , with separate juries. Cuesta, a lso charg ed with pa rt i cipating in theNo. 07-2015

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2 robber y , acc epte d a p l ea barg ain and a g ree d to testify at the trial. At the tria l, Cuesta identified Akins as the shooter. A j ur y c on vic te d A kin s o f f

ir st- de g re e fe lony

mur de r a nd a ssa ult wi th i nte nt t o r ob wh ile
arme d. On direc t a

ppeal, the Michig an Court of Appea ls va cate d Akins’s conviction and se ntence for a ssault with intent to rob while armed as vi olative of double-jeopa rdy protec tions, and aff

irmed the fe lony murder conviction and attenda nt sentence of mandatory life imprisonment. Se e Pe op le v. Ak ins , 6 75 N. W.2 d 8 63 , 8 69 n. 3 ( Mic h. Ct. Ap p. 20 03 ). Th e Mic hig an Cour t of Ap pe a ls a lso reje cted, inte r a lia , Akins’s claims (1) that improper testimony reg ardingunspecifie d independe nt
e vid e nc e that A kin s sh ot t he vi c timwa s a dmi tte d at tr ia l, a nd (2 ) t hat th e pr os e c uto r i mpr op e rl y prese nted the indepe ndent evidenc e testimony and made improper a rguments in closing. See id. at 875-77. The Mic higa

n Supreme Court denie d Akins leave to appea l. See P eople v. Akins , 682 N.W.2d 87 (Mich. 2004). Akins filed a pe tition for habea s corpus in the Un i t ed States District Court for the Ea stern District of Michig an, asse rting six g rounds fo r re lief and inc luding the two c laims raised in the Michig an Court of Appe als reg ardingthe entra nce a nd discussion of independe nt e vidence

. Akins v. W arren , No. 2:05-cv-73540, 2007 WL 20077864, at *6-9 (E.D. Mich. J uly 16, 2007). The district
c ourt dis mis se d A kin s’ s pet iti on in its en tir e ty and de nie d a c e rt if ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity on a ll c la ims

. Id. at *1 1. Ak ins tim e ly a pp e a le d to thi s c ourt , w hic h g ra nte d a c e rt if ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity wi th respe ct to his claims that improper evide nce w as pre sented at trial in violation of this Confrontation Clause rig hts and that prosec utorial misconduct in relation to that evidenc e violated his rig hts under the Due Proc ess Clause. Akins v. W arren , No. 07-2015 (6th Cir. Jul y 1, 2008).No. 07-2015

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3 STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Th is c ourt

re vie ws de novo a d i strict court’s de cision to deny a petition for wr it of habea s corpus. Me nd

oz a v . B e rg

hu is , 5 4 4 F
. 3 d 6 5 0 , 6 5 2 ( 6 th Ci r . 2008), ce rt. denied , 129 S.Ct . 1996 (2009). The Antiterror ism and Effe ctive De ath Penalty Act of 1996 ( AEDPA) pr ovides g uidelines for g rantinga petition for wr it of habea s corpus for s tate prisoners wher e the state cour t adjudicated the constitutional claim on the merits. Me nd oz a , 544 F.3d at 652. The AEDPA state s (d) An a pplication for a

writ o f h ab eas corpus on beha lf of a pe rson in custody pursuant to the judg m en t o f a S tate cour t shall not be g rante d with respec t to any claim that was a djudicated on the me rits in St ate c ourt proce eding s unles s the adjudication of the claim - - (1 ) r e su lte d in

a deci si on th a t w a s c on tr ary to, or inv olv e d a

n unr e a so na

ble a pp lic a tio n o f, c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d Fe de ra l law , as d e te rm ine d b y the Sup re me Court of the United States; or (2) r esulted i n a decision that was based on an unreasona ble deter mination of t h e f ac t s i nl i gh to f t h e e v i d en ce p re s en t edi nt h e S t at e c o u rt p ro ce ed i n g. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “Clear ly established F eder al law” ref ers to the g overningleg al principles a nd standards se t forth by the Unit ed S tates S upreme Court at the time the state c ourt rende rs its decision. Here ford v. W arren , 536 F .3 d 523 , 528 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) ; see W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) ( “That statutory

phrase ref

ers to t h e h o l d i n gs, as opposed to the dicta , of [the Supreme] Court ’s de c isi on s a s o f t

he tim e of the re le va

nt s tate -c ourt

de c isi on .” ). A f

e de ra l ha be a s c ourt

mus t presume the state cour

t’s fac tual finding s are corr ect. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1). T h e “ co n t ra ry

t o ” a n d “u n re as o n ab l e ap p l i ca t i o n ” c l au s es h av e i n d ep e n d en tm ea n i n g. Me nd oz a , 5 4 4 F. 3 d

at 6 5 2 (c i t i n g W

illiams , 529 U.S. at 404). A state court decision is “contr ary to” clea rly established fe dera l la

w “if the state court arr ives at a conc lusion opposit e to that re ache d by [t he Supreme ] C o u rt o n a q u es t i on of law or if the state c ourt dec ides a c ase diff ere ntly than [theNo. 07-2015

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The re cord r evea ls the following e x chang e af ter the obje ction was ove rruled: 2 Prosecutor: I ndepende nt of Mr. Cuesta’s a l l ega t ion that Mr. Akins was the

shooter, indepe ndent of that, do you have e vidence that Mr. Akins was the shooter ? Of fi c e r: Ye s. Pr os e c uto r: Th ank

y ou . I have no fu

rt he r q ue sti on s. (Tria l Tr. 7, Dec . 10, 2001; R. 898.) 4 Supreme] Court has on a set of materia lly indisti ng uishable fa cts.” W illiams , 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state c ourt’s dec ision is an “unrea sonable a pplication” of c lear l y es t ab l i shed fe dera l law “if the state cour t identifies the cor

rec t g overning leg al principle from [ the Supreme] Court’s decisions but
unrea sonably applies that principle to the fac ts of the prisoner ’s ca se.” Id. at 413. A fe dera l court
re vie wi ng a pe tit ion fo r ha be a s re lie f fr om a pr iso ne r c on vic te d by a state c ourt may no t f ind the state court de cision unrea sonable “ simply beca use that cour

t concludes in its independe nt judgment that the re levant state- court decision applied clearly established federa l law erroneously or incorr ectly .” Id. at 411. In order

to gr ant the re quested re li ef , the habe as cour

t must find “the state cour t’s application of c lear ly

established fe dera l law was obje ctively unrea sonable.” Id. at 409. AN AL YSI S A. Admission of Unspecif ied, Independe nt Evidence The district cour

t corre ctly found that Akins was not entitled to habea s relief even thoug h the state tri al co urt admitted testimony that independe nt evidence of his g uilt ex isted. At trial, the prosec utor asked one of the investig ating office rs whether the office r had e vidence , independe nt of Cuesta’s testimony , that Akins was the shooter. After an objection to the question was ove rruled, the offic er a

nswere d aff

irmatively , without any

further explanation or detail. Neither the prosec utor 2No. 07-2015

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5 nor counse l for either

defe ndant aske d the offic er a ny additional questions. After the case was submitt ed to the jury , the prosec utor admitted the evide nce r efe rre d to by the offic er w as the statement Mitchell, Akins’s co-de fenda nt, g ave to the police. The jury , howeve r, wa s never made
awa re of that information. Akins contends the office r’s testimony violated his Six th Amendment rig ht to confrontation. The M ic h ig an Co u rt o f A p p e a ls c o n c lu d e d th e tr ia l c o u rt a b u s e d it s d is c r e ti o n b y a dmitting the office r’s testimony , but found no violation of the Confrontation Clause b ec au se the e vidence was not testimoni al and the jury never hear d the substance of the e vidence . The district cour t assumed that admission of the eviden ce co n stitut ed a violation of the Confrontation Clause, but found the
e rr or ha rm le ss. The Confrontation Cl ause provides “[i] n all criminal prosecutions, the ac cused sha ll enjoy the ri g ht .

. . to b e c on fr on te d w iththe wi tn ess es again st him .

. . .” U. S. Co ns t. a me nd . V I . T his rig ht applies to prosec utions in bot h fede ral a nd state cour

ts. Crawf ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36, 42 (200 4 )

. A d e f

e n d an t’ s a dmi s s io n s , im

p li c a ti n g h is o r

h e r c o - d e f e n d an ts , c an n o t b e intr oduced at a joint trial unless the confe ssing defe ndant takes the stand. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 13 5- 36 (1 96 8) ; see Lill

yv . V irg ini a , 52 7 U. S. 11 6, 12 7- 29 (1 99 9) ; Ri c ha rd so n v . M ar sh , 4 81 U. S. 20 0, 20 6 ( 19 87 ); Cru

z v . Ne w York, 481 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1987). The Confrontation Cl ause doe s not a pply only to in-court testimony

. Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 50-51. The clause applies to testim onial statements, including “[s] tatements take n by police off

icer s in the course of interr og ations.” Id. at 52 . I n o rd e r t o a dmi t a

te sti mon ia l st a te me nt, the pr os e c uti on mus t sh owthe de c lara

nt i s unava ila

bleNo. 07-2015

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I n Cra wfo rd, the Court overr uled Ohi o v. Ro berts , 4 4 8 U
. S. 56, 68- 70 (1980), whic h allowed 3 testimonial statements to be admitted, so lo n g as t he prose cution established the de clar ant was unavailable and the statement bore suff icient indicia of r eliability . The Crawf ord opinion was issued in M arc h 2 00 4, a

bo ut t hr e e months be for e th e Mic hig an Su pr e me Cou

rt de nie d A kin s’ s le a ve to appea l. This holdingin Crawf ord constitutes a new rule. W horton v. Bock

ting , 549 U.S. 406, 416- 17 (2007). Be cause direc t r eview of Akins’s case was pendingwhen Cra wfo rd was iss ued, this new rule in Crawf

ord applies. See G riffi th v. Kentuck y , 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). Although no constitutional e rror occur red, the office r’s statement should not ha v e been 4 a dmi tte d. On a

pp e a l, the pr os e c uti on

c on c e de d th a t Mi tc he ll’ s st a te me nt w a s in a dmi ssi ble a g a ins t A k ins. See A kins , 6 75 N. W.2 d at 87 6. Withthat c on c e ssi on , th e Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls corr ectly held the off

icer ’s claim of the ex istence of independe nt evidenc e lac ked any foundation and the trial cour

t’s admission of the offic er’ s testimony was a n abuse of

discretion. Id. 6 and the de fenda

nt had a pr ior opportunity for c ross -ex amination. Id. at 68 . A s a thr e sh old 3 de te rm inatio n, the c ourt mu st de te rm ine wh e the r t he state me nts to t

he po lic e are “ te sti mon ia l” in nature
. United States v. Cromer , 3 89 F .3 d 6 62 , 6 72 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) . “ Th e pr op e r i nq uir y , th e n, is whether the dec lara

nt intends to bear testimony ag ainst the ac cused. That intent, in t u rn , may be de te rm ine d by qu e ry

ing wh e the r a

re a so na ble pe rs on

in t he de c lara nt’ s p os iti on

wo uld anti c ipate his statement beingused ag ainst the ac cused in investigating a nd prosec uting the c rime.” Id. at 675. Be cause the extent of the office r’s testim ony was the simpl e af firmation “y es,” no Cra wfo rd
or B r u ton err or occ urre d. No Bruton err or occ urre d beca use Mitchell’s admissions were not 4 introduced into evidenc e at trial. The testify ing office r did not descr ibe Mitchell’s statement, did not identify the nature of t he evidence, and di d not hint at t he sourc e of the evidenc e. The question the
o ff icer answe red c ontained no information about the nature and sourc e of the evidenc e. All the office r t e s ti f

ie d to w a s th e e xis te n c e o f s o me in d e p e n d e n t e v id e n c e . F o r th e s a me r e a s o n s , no Crawf ord err or occur

red. The evidenc e prese nted at trial wa s not testimoni al. The only evidenc eNo. 07-2015

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7 prese nted at

tr ia l w a s ana s s e rti o nth a t t h e r e e xis te d

s o me u n s p e c if

ie d , in d e p e n d e n t e v id e n c e of Akins’s g uilt. The jury

was ne ver infor

med about the nature or sourc e of that independent e vidence

. The investig ating office r testified o n l y t o the exist ence of some other evidenc e, without ever ref ere ncing Mitchell’s statement as the source of that evide nce. The declara nt in this sit uation was the te sti fy ingof fi c e r, no t Mi tc he ll. Ac c or din g ly , th e jud g me nt o f t he state c ourt

wa s n e ith e r c on tr ary

to l aw n or

an unr e a so na

ble application of c lear ly

established fe dera l law. B. Prose cutorial Misconduc t The district cour

t corre ctly found t hat Akins was not entit led to habea s relief even thoug h the prosec utor’s re marks we re imprope r. On two occ asions during closing argument, the prosec utor
re fe re n ce d the offic er’ s testimony that he wa s awa

re of independe nt evidence that Akins was the shooter. In the time set aside f or re buttal, the prosecu t o r aga i n addre ssed the existence of the independe nt evidence

. And y ou know what, if [defense counsel] w anted to know what t h at i n d epende nt evidenc e is, he didn’t ask [the offic er]. He sat there and didn’t ask t he question. He said Ihave no que stions, I have no que stions. You know why , beca use he kne w what the answe r would be. A nd that would have dr ove a strike into the hear t of the defe ndant. He didn’ t do it because he knew , Iknew what the answe r would be. I c ou ldn ’t a sk him but he c ou ld a

nd he did n’ t. Now he w ants to say

wher e is the independe nt evidence . What Ican te ll y ou, the re is i nd e pe nd e nt e vid e nc e . H e did n’ t w ant you

to k no w what it

is. (Tria l T r. 71, Dec . 10, 2001; R. 962.) As part of the jury instructions, the trial court a dvised the jury to disreg ard the prosec utor’s re mar k s d u ri ng closing arguments about the existence of the independe nt evidence beca use “ t h e d ef

en se wa s under no oblig ation to ask any questions of [theNo. 07-2015

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Dur i n g clos ing a

rguments, the prosec utor told the jury the victim’s pare nts no longe r had 5 a so n. B oth the state a

pp e llate c ourt

and the dis tr ic t c ourt

c on c lud e d th e state me nt w a s n ot o ve rl y inflammatory

. 8 investigating of

fice r] about an

y in d e pendent e vidence . Consider only the evidenc e that wa s admitted during this trial.” (Tria l Tr. 79; R. 970.) Akins contends the prosec utor acte d improperly when he (1) elicited the statement a bout the independe nt evidence from the investig ating office r, (2) appea led to the sy mpathy of the jury , and

5 (3 ) a sse rt e d th e e xiste nc e of the ind e pe nd e nt ev ide nc e e sta bli sh e d the c a se a g a ins t hi m. A kin s in sis ts the evidenc e ag ainst h i m i s n o t overwhelming. T he Michig an Court of Appe als reje cted Akins’s claim, finding the prosec utor’s re marks wer e improper , but holding that any prejudice was a lleviated by the c ur a tiv e instruc tio ns g ive n to the jur y . T he dis tr ic t c ourt

a lso re je c te d A kin s’ s c la im, concl u d i n g t h e prosecutor’s r emar ks were isolated and the e vidence ag ainst him was strong . The distric t c o u rt a ls o f

o u n d th e c u r a ti v e in s tr

u c ti o n s u n d e r

mi n e d an y h ar mf u l i mp a c t t

h e im proper
r e m ar k s m ay h av e h a d

o nt h e j u r

y. O na h a b e a s r e v i e w , t h i s c o u rtr e v i e w s c l a i m s f o r p r o s e c u t o r i a l m i s c o n d

u c td e f e r e n t i a l l y. Gi lla rd v . M itc he ll , 445 F.3d 883, 897 ( 6th Cir. 2006), cert. de nied , 549 U. S. 126 4 ( 20 07 ); Bowling v. Parke r , 344 F .3 d 487 , 512 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) ; see also Slagle v. B agley , 457 F.3d 501, 516 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (“ [T] he Supreme Court has clea rly indicated that the state courts have substantial bre athing
roo m whe n c on sid e ri ngpr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t c la ims be c a us e ‘c on sti tut ion a l li ne dr awi ng[in p ro s ec u t o ri al m i s co n d

u ct ca s es ] i s n ec es s ar i l y

i mp re ci s e. ’” (quoti n g Do nn e lly v . D e Chr istofo ro , 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974))) . When review ing a lleg ations of prosec utorial misconduct as pa rt of a ha beasNo. 07-2015

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9 petition, “[t ]he corre ct inquiry is whether the improper c omments or actions ‘so infe cted the tr ial with unfairne ss as to make the r esulting c onviction a denial of due proc ess.’” S

l ag le , 4 5 7 F.3d at 5 1 5 (q u o t i n g Darden , 4 7 7 U. S
. at 1 8 1 (c i t i n g Do nn e lly , 416 U.S. at 643)). “ Even if the pr osecution’s
c on du c t wa s imp ro pe r or e ve n ‘u niv e rs a lly c on de mne d, ’ thi s c ourt c an o nly re ve rs e if the state me nts
wer e so fla gra n t as to rende r the e ntire trial funda mentally unfair.” Gi lla rd , 445 F.3d at 897 (citations omitted). To de te rm ine wh e the r t

he pr os e c uto r’ s a lle g e d mi sc on du c t r e nd e re d A kin s’ s tria l unf a ir , th is court fir st must deter

mine whether the conduc t or rema rks wer e improper

. Sla

gle , 457 F.3d at 515- 1 6 (c i t i n g United St a t es v. Carter , 236 F.3d 777, 783 ( 6th Cir. 2001)). I f the prose cutor’s a ctions
we re imp ro pe r, thi s c ourt the n c on sid e rs fo ur fa c tor s to d e te rm ine wh e the r t he a c ts w e re su ff

ic ie ntl y flag rant to r equire reve rsal: (1) the likelihood that the r emar ks would mislead the jury or pre judice the ac cused, ( 2) whe ther the r emar ks were i s o l ated or

extensive, (3) whe ther the r emar ks were deliberately

or ac cidentally

prese nted to the jury , an d (4) whether the other e vidence ag ainst the defe ndant was substantial. Gi lla rd , 4 4 5 F. 3 d at 8 9 7 (q u o t i n g Bowling , 3 44 F .3 d at 51 2- 13 ); se e als o Sla gle , 4 5 7 F. 3 d

at 5 1 5 (c i t i n g Carter , 236 F.3d at 783). The prose cutor’s r emar

ks were improper. The pro s ecutor should not have elicited the statement about the e x istence of independe nt evidence from the investigating office r. Beca use the evidenc e itself was inadmissible, the office r’s statement that such evidenc e existed should not have been a dmitted. Dur ing closing argument, the prosec utor should ne ither have r efe renc ed the of fice r’s statement nor spe culated a s to why defe nse counse l opted not to inquir e ab out the independe nt evidenc e.No. 07-2015

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10 Even thoug h the prosec utor’s closingrema rks wer e i mp r o p e r , A k ins is not entitled to reve rsal of his conviction. The only fac tor weig hing in Akins’s favor is that the prosec utor’s statements we re de lib e rate . T he oth e r thr e e fa c tor s w e ig h a g a ins t r e ve rs a l. T he e vid e nc e a g a ins t A kin s is su bs tanti a l. Th e pr os e c uto r' s r e mark s w e re iso late d r a the r t ha n e xten siv e . T he tr ia l la ste d thre e da y s, wi th multipl e witnesses pr esente d on all but the final day of the trial. The improper rema rks wer e made during closing and we re f ollowed soon there afte r by the court’s curative instruction. The evide nce ag ainst Akins, in combination with the curative i nstruction, sufficie ntly overwhelmed any potential prejudice from the improper comments. On t his issue, Akins has not established that the judg ment of the Mic hig an Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls w a s e ith e r c on tr ary to o r a n unr e a so na

ble a pp lic a tio n o f c le arl y established fe dera l law. CO NC LU SION For the re asons set out above , we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.