PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 12-4137

_____________

M.R.; J.R., PARENTS OF MINOR CHILD E.R.

v.

RIDLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

 Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No. 2-11-cv-02235)

District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

Argued October 17, 2013
2

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and LIPEZ*, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 20, 2014)

John Francis X. Reilly, Esquire (Argued)

230 North Monroe Street

Media, PA 19063-2908

Counsel for Appellant

Alan L. Yatvin, Esquire (Argued)

Popper & Yatvin

Suite 503

230 South Broad Street

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellees

O P I N I O N 

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge:

The ―stay-put‖ provision of the Individuals with 

Disabilities Education Act (―IDEA‖) states that a disabled 

child shall remain in his or her current educational setting

*Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, Senior United States 

Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 

sitting by designation.
3

during the pendency of proceedings to resolve a dispute over 

the child‘s placement. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). This case 

requires us to decide two issues of first impression in this 

Circuit concerning the obligation of school districts to pay for

private school education during that interim period: (1) 

whether parents are eligible for reimbursement for private 

school costs if they do not file a claim seeking payment until

after a court has ruled in favor of the school district, and (2) 

whether the right to interim funding, if applicable, extends 

through the time of a judicial appeal.

The district court answered both questions in the 

affirmative. It thus held that defendant Ridley School District

(―Ridley‖) must reimburse the plaintiff parents for the cost of 

roughly three years of their daughter‘s private school tuition

notwithstanding judicial findings disagreeing with the hearing 

officer – rendered before the parents sought payment – that 

Ridley had complied with the IDEA by offering the child a 

free, appropriate education in its own schools.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district 

court‘s judgment.

I. 

This court has previously described in detail the 

dispute between Ridley and the plaintiffs – M.R. and J.R. –

over the educational placement of plaintiffs‘ daughter, E.R. 

See Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 264-67 (3d Cir. 

2012) (―Ridley I‖). We briefly review here the factual and 

procedural background pertinent to the legal issues now 

before us.
4

E.R. attended kindergarten and first grade at Grace 

Park Elementary School in the Ridley School District during 

the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school years, receiving special 

services to address her learning disabilities and health-related 

problems. During the summer after first grade, plaintiffs 

concluded that the public school was not meeting their 

daughter‘s needs, and they enrolled her at a private school, 

Benchmark, that specializes in educating students with 

learning disabilities. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint 

with the Pennsylvania Department of Education claiming, 

inter alia, that Ridley had violated the IDEA and the 

Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide E.R. with a suitable 

Individualized Education Program (―IEP‖), thereby denying 

her the ―free appropriate public education‖ (―FAPE‖)

required by those laws.

1

See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 29 

 

1

The IDEA requires school districts to develop IEPs for 

children with disabilities to specify how they will be provided 

with a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (detailing the framework 

for evaluating a child and creating an IEP). The statute 

describes a FAPE as ―special education and related services‖ 

that—

(A) have been provided at public expense, 

under public supervision and direction, and 

without charge;

(B) meet the standards of the State educational 

agency;

(C) include an appropriate preschool, 

elementary school, or secondary school 

education in the State involved; and
5

U.S.C. § 794.2 Among other remedies, plaintiffs sought

reimbursement for the cost of sending E.R. to Benchmark for 

second grade.

3

On April 21, 2009, an administrative hearing officer 

found that Ridley had committed no violations during E.R.‘s 

kindergarten year, but that E.R. was denied a FAPE for part 

of first grade and all of second grade. The hearing officer 

 

(D) are provided in conformity with the 

individualized education program required 

under [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)]. 

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).

2

Section 794, more familiarly known as Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act, prohibits discrimination in public schools 

– among other federally funded programs – on the basis of 

disability. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(B); see also 34 C.F.R. § 

104.33(a). We explained in Ridley I that ―§ 504‘s  ̳negative 

prohibition‘ is similar to the IDEA‘s  ̳affirmative duty‘‖ and 

also requires schools that receive federal financial assistance 

to provide qualified students with a FAPE. See 680 F.3d at 

280 (quoting W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995), 

abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. 

Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 793 (3d Cir. 2007)).

3

In moving E.R. to private school without the school 

district‘s acquiescence, the parents were initially responsible 

for her tuition and other costs. At issue in this case is the 

extent, if any, of the school district‘s reimbursement 

obligation.
6

awarded compensatory education for the 2007-2008 school 

year (when E.R. attended first grade at the public school) and 

ordered Ridley to reimburse the plaintiffs for the tuition and 

transportation costs associated with E.R.‘s enrollment at 

Benchmark in 2008-2009.

4 Nearly two years later, in 

February 2011, a federal district court reversed the hearing 

officer‘s placement assessment, finding that Ridley‘s 

proposed IEP was adequate and, hence, that the school district

had offered E.R. a FAPE in the local public school. This 

court affirmed the district court‘s ruling on May 17, 2012. 

See Ridley I, 680 F.3d at 283.

Meanwhile, in March 2011, after filing their appeal 

from the district court‘s judgment, plaintiffs sent a letter to 

the school district requesting payment for E.R.‘s Benchmark 

costs from the date of the hearing officer‘s decision forward –

at that point, from April 2009 through spring 2011 – pursuant 

to the IDEA‘s stay-put provision. See infra Section II

(describing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) and related authority). When 

the school district declined to pay, plaintiffs responded with 

this action claiming that the IDEA required Ridley to finance

E.R.‘s private placement until all appeals had concluded in 

the previous litigation over the adequacy of her IEP.

Ridley denied responsibility for the Benchmark 

expenses on both procedural and substantive grounds. The 

school district asserted that the demand for interim tuition 

was barred at the threshold because it was untimely. This 

argument relied on three theories: res judicata, the 

 

4

E.R. remained at Benchmark for third, fourth and fifth 

grades as the case progressed through the courts, and her 

parents paid her tuition.
7

compulsory counterclaim requirement of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 13, and the statute of limitations. Ridley also 

contended that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because,

by the time of their second IDEA lawsuit, the district court 

had already held that Ridley had properly designated the local 

public school as E.R.‘s appropriate placement. The school 

district argued, in effect, that its validated placement 

determination had become the baseline for determining the 

parents‘ entitlement to a remedy and, accordingly, the IDEA 

did not provide for recovery of the private school costs.

 

On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, the 

district court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. The court rejected 

each of Ridley‘s timeliness contentions and concluded that 

the IDEA‘s stay-put provision entitled the parents to 

reimbursement for the costs they incurred to send E.R. to 

Benchmark for the entire period they had requested. The 

costs at issue – $57,658.38, as stipulated by the parties –

covered the approximately three years from the hearing 

officer‘s decision in April 2009 through proceedings in the 

court of appeals (which had by then concluded with this 

court‘s 2012 decision affirming the district court‘s judgment).

This appeal followed. Ridley again challenges both 

the timeliness of plaintiffs‘ reimbursement claim and the legal 

basis for the award. Our review of the district court‘s 

judgment on the pleadings is de novo. See Sheridan v. NGK 

Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 259 n.25 (3d Cir. 2010). 
8

II.

The premise of the IDEA is that parents and schools

working together to design an IEP is the ideal way to reach 

the statute‘s goal of a FAPE for every child. See Ridley I, 680 

F.3d at 269; see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 

(2005). Congress anticipated, however, that ―the 

collaborative process‖ may at times break down. Ridley I, 

680 F.3d at 269. Hence, the Act allows either party to

respond to a stalemate in the discussions by requesting an 

impartial due process hearing before a state or local

administrative officer. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); Sch. Comm. 

of Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368-

69 (1985) (―Burlington”); Ridley I, 680 F.3d at 269. A 

variety of disputes may arise concerning placement. For 

example, the parents may argue for removing the child from

public school because they believe the services are 

inadequate. Or the school district might argue for the same 

result, over the parents‘ objection, because it considers the 

child too disruptive to be in a regular school setting. 

Alternatively, either party could be advocating for publicschool placement – with the school district insisting that an 

expensive specialized private school is unnecessary or the 

parents insisting that participation in a regular classroom is 

essential for their child‘s development. See generally Honig 

v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323-26 (1988) (discussing school 

system‘s limited authority to exclude disabled students); 

Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373 (stating that one purpose of the 

stay-put provision ―was to prevent school officials from 

removing a child from the regular classroom over the parents‘ 

objection pending completion of the review proceedings‖); 

id. at 369-70 (discussing whether parents are entitled to 

reimbursement for private school tuition); Drinker v. Colonial 
9

Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 861-63 (3d Cir. 1996) (addressing 

parents‘ objection to school district‘s plan to move child from 

a placement outside the district to a local public school).

The parties have the right to seek state or federal court 

review of the administrative decision, 20 U.S.C. § 

1415(i)(2)(A), and – under the provision at issue in this case –

the child has the right to remain in his or her ―then-current 

educational placement‖ during the pendency of the dispute 

resolution proceedings, id. § 1415(j). Section 1415(j) states, 

in pertinent part:

[D]uring the pendency of any 

proceedings conducted pursuant 

to this section, unless the State or 

local educational agency and the 

parents otherwise agree, the child 

shall remain in the then-current 

educational placement of the child 

. . . .

5

This provision, known as the IDEA‘s ―stay-put rule,‖ serves 

―in essence, as an automatic preliminary injunction,‖ Drinker,

78 F.3d at 864, reflecting Congress‘s conclusion that a child 

with a disability is best served by maintaining her educational 

status quo until the disagreement over her IEP is resolved, 

Pardini v. Allegheny Interm. Unit, 420 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 

2005); Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864. ― ̳Once a court ascertains the 

student‘s current educational placement, the movants are 

 

5

 The stay-put provision was previously codified at 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(e)(3). Its language did not change when it was 

moved. 
10

entitled to an order [maintaining that placement] without 

satisfaction of the usual prerequisites to injunctive relief.‘‖ 

Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 (quoting Woods v. N.J. Dep’t of 

Educ., No. 93-5123, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. 

(LRP Publications) 439, 440 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 1993)); see 

also Pardini, 420 F.3d at 188 (―Congress has already 

balanced the competing harms as well as the competing 

equities‖); Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 

1982) (―The statute substitutes an absolute rule in favor of the 

status quo for the court‘s discretionary consideration of the 

factors . . . .‖).

The stay-put rule thus requires that the child‘s 

placement under the IDEA at the time a disagreement arises 

between the parents and the school district – what the statute 

terms the ―then-current educational placement‖ – be protected 

while the dispute is pending. To determine that placement, 

this court has looked to the IEP ―actually functioning when 

the  ̳stay put‘ is invoked.‖ Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867 (citing 

Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 625-26 (6th 

Cir. 1990)); see also Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 

F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1996) (―Raelee S.‖). The operative

placement could be either a public school or a private school

that the local district was financing to satisfy the requirement 

that every child be given a free, appropriate education. See, 

e.g., Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12 

(1993) (―Congress intended that IDEA‘s promise of a  ̳free 

appropriate public education‘ for disabled children would 

normally be met by an IEP‘s provision for education in the 

regular public schools or in private schools chosen jointly by 

school officials and parents.‖); Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 86

(noting that providing a FAPE may involve ― ̳placement in 
11

private schools at public expense‘‖ (quoting Burlington, 471 

U.S. at 369)).

6

The stay-put provision‘s protective purpose means that 

―it is often invoked by a child‘s parents in order to maintain a 

placement where the parents disagree with a change proposed 

by the school district.‖ See Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 83. During 

―the pendency‖ of the dispute process, the child is entitled to 

remain in her IEP-specified educational setting.

7

 See 20

U.S.C. § 1415(j). Where the parents seek a change in 

placement, however, and unilaterally move their child from 

an IEP-specified program to their desired alternative setting, 

the stay-put rule does not immediately come into play. 

Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 83. In such circumstances, the parents 

will be responsible for the costs of the child‘s new placement

– at least initially.

The new placement can become the educational setting

protected by the stay-put rule if the parents and ―the State or 

local educational agency‖ agree to the change. See 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(j). Also, importantly, a decision favorable to the 

parents during the administrative review process ―must be 

 

6

 If the dispute concerns a child who is applying for initial 

admission to a public school, the child ―shall, with the 

consent of the parents, be placed in the public school 

program‖ until the dispute resolution proceedings have 

concluded. See 20 U.S.C. § 1514(j); see also 34 C.F.R. § 

300.518(b).

7

 We have referred to this educational setting as the child‘s 

―pendent placement‖ – a term of art drawn from the language 

of § 1415(j). See Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 80 n.1.
12

treated as an agreement between the State and the parents,‖ 

34 C.F.R. § 300.518(d); see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372 

(noting that an administrative decision in favor of the parents 

and private school placement ―would seem to constitute 

agreement by the State to the change of placement‖); Raelee 

S., 96 F.3d at 83 (citing Burlington).

8

 Accordingly, an 

administrative ruling validating the parents‘ decision to move 

their child from an IEP-specified public school to a private 

school will, in essence, make the child‘s enrollment at the 

private school her ―then-current educational placement‖ for 

purposes of the stay-put rule. Having been endorsed by the 

State, the move to private school is no longer the parents‘ 

unilateral action, and the child is entitled to ―stay put‖ at the 

private school for the duration of the dispute resolution 

proceedings. See Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 83-84.

Although § 1415(j) does not specify which party pays 

when a child‘s pendent placement becomes a private school

based on an administrative decision, the school district‘s 

obligation to do so is well established by case law. See 

Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 84, 86. Hence, the school district is

 

8

 In Raelee S., this court declined to decide whether a 

decision in favor of the parents by a hearing officer – as 

opposed to an administrative appellate panel – ―would 

constitute agreement by the state for purposes of pendent 

placement and tuition reimbursement.‖ See 96 F.3d at 85 n.8. 

The subsequently enacted Department of Education 

regulation addressing pendent placement explicitly includes a 

hearing officer‘s decision within the scope of the pendentplacement protection, and we now do likewise. See 34 C.F.R. 

§ 300.518(d).

 
13

obliged to fund a private placement if it was either the 

educational setting prescribed by the current IEP or is 

subsequently designated by a hearing officer or administrative 

appeal official as the appropriate setting to meet a child‘s 

needs. In this case, the stay-put provision became effective in 

April 2009, when the hearing officer determined that Ridley 

had denied E.R. a FAPE and concluded that Benchmark was 

her appropriate educational setting. E.R. could thus ―stay 

put‖ at Benchmark at the school district‘s expense while the 

court proceedings were pending. Because E.R. was entitled 

to reimbursement for her costs at Benchmark beginning in 

April 2009, the parents could have requested that Ridley 

reimburse any tuition they already had paid for the remaining 

portion of the 2008-2009 school year and also could have 

asked the school district to reimburse the Benchmark costs in 

the following years (or pay those amounts as they became

due).

At issue in this case is whether the school district‘s

financial responsibility dissolves if the parents do not request 

reimbursement for their out-of-pocket private school costs 

until after an administrative decision in their favor has been 

reversed by a court upon further review. Ridley emphasizes 

that the remedial subsection of the IDEA provision that 

authorizes ―[a]ny party aggrieved‖ by the administrative 

ruling to file a civil action allows a court to grant only ―such 

relief as the court determines is appropriate.‖ 20 U.S.C. § 

1415(i)(2)(A), (i)(2)(C)(iii).9 The school district maintains 

 

9

 A civil action may be brought with ―respect to the 

[administrative] complaint,‖ 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), and 

complaints may be filed ―with respect to any matter relating

to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of 
14

that it was inappropriate in this case to award reimbursement

for private schooling that the district court had found 

unnecessary by the time the request for payment was made. 

Ridley argues that the court ruling returned E.R.‘s placement

to Grace Park Elementary School with respect to the school

district‘s funding obligation, eliminating the justification for 

any interim reimbursement. Ridley further asserts that, even 

if we conclude that interim reimbursement is required under 

the IDEA, any obligation for interim funding does not include 

the period of the appeal to the Third Circuit.

Before confronting those merits arguments, we address

Ridley‘s procedural claims.

III. 

Ridley asserts that E.R.‘s parents should have demanded 

tuition reimbursement for their daughter‘s pendent placement 

as part of the relief they requested through counterclaims in 

the earlier action, which was filed by the school district to 

challenge the hearing officer‘s ruling. Ridley offers a trio of 

rationales to support its contention that plaintiffs‘ request for 

reimbursement should be denied as untimely. We find none 

of them persuasive.

A. Res judicata

Ridley argues that plaintiffs, having failed to assert 

their claim for reimbursement in the earlier IDEA lawsuit

between the same parties, may not do so in this subsequent 

 

the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public 

education to such child,‖ id. § 1415(b)(2)(B)(6)(A).
15

action under the principles of res judicata, or claim 

preclusion. To rely on the affirmative defense of res judicata, 

a party must establish three elements: (1) a final judgment on 

the merits in a prior proceeding that involved (2) the same 

parties or their privies and (3) the same ―cause of action.‖ 

See, e.g., Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 

2010); Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 260 (explaining that ―the central 

purpose of the [res judicata] doctrine [is] to require a plaintiff 

to present all claims arising out [of] the same occurrence in a 

single suit‖ (third alteration in original) (internal quotation 

mark omitted)). The first two elements are not disputed. In 

examining the similarity of the claims (the third element), we 

focus on ―whether the acts complained of [are] the same, 

whether the material facts alleged in each suit [are] the same 

and whether the witnesses and documentation required to 

prove such allegations [are] the same.‖ United States v. 

Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984).

We agree with the district court that the reimbursement 

claim in this case differs materially from the issues addressed

in Ridley I. Although both cases concern the rights of E.R. 

and her parents under the IDEA, the similarity ends there. 

Ridley I focused on the substance of an appropriate education 

for E.R., while the current case is a payment dispute over

E.R.‘s stay-put expenses. The former was fact-intensive, 

requiring the courts to review testimony and documentary 

evidence about E.R.‘s needs and the school district‘s plans for 

meeting them, while the latter is centered on the legal 

question of financial responsibility and the undisputed fact 

that a hearing officer ruled in plaintiffs‘ favor.10 That the 

 

10

 The second action theoretically also involves fact-finding 

on the cost of E.R.‘s pendent placement at Benchmark, but 
16

cases are related does not erase these significant differences

between the causes of action at issue. Indeed, this court

previously has recognized, albeit in the different context of 

collateral-order review, that ―resolution of [pendentplacement and tuition-reimbursement rights] is completely 

separate from the merits issues which focus on the adequacy 

of the proposed IEP.‖ Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 81 n.4 (allowing 

appeal of pendent-placement ruling as a collateral order 

subject to review under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 

Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)); see also A.D. v. Haw. Dep’t of 

Educ., 727 F.3d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a stayput order ―resolves an important issue completely separate 

from the merits of the child‘s ultimate placement‖).

We therefore conclude that the res judicata doctrine 

does not bar this action.

B. The Compulsory Counterclaim Rule

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) requires a party 

to assert as a counterclaim any cause of action that is 

available against the opposing party that ―arises out of the 

transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 

opposing party‘s claim.‖ The failure to plead a compulsory 

counterclaim bars a later independent action on that claim. 

Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 

(1974); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 882 

(5th Cir. 1998); 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & 

 

the parties have stipulated to the amount at issue. Moreover, 

evidence proving tuition and transportations costs is plainly 

distinct from the evidence needed for the merits issues in 

Ridley I. 
17

Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1417, at 

147 (3d ed. 2010).

The inquiry to determine if a claim is compulsory 

under Rule 13(a) is ―whether the counterclaim  ̳bears a logical 

relationship to an opposing party‘s claim.‘‖ Transamerica 

Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 292 

F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Xerox Corp. v. SCM 

Corp., 576 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir. 1978)). This court has 

stated that a logical relationship exists ―where separate trials 

on each of the[] respective claims would involve a substantial 

duplication of effort and time by the parties and the courts.‖ 

Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 

631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961); see also Transamerica, 292 F.3d at 

389-90. The compulsory counterclaim inquiry thus requires 

essentially the same comparison between claims as the res 

judiciata analysis. See Transamerica, 292 F.3d at 391 (noting 

―the close connection between Rule 13(a) and the doctrine of 

claim preclusion‖).

As discussed above, despite a relationship between the 

two lawsuits, there is no meaningful overlap between the 

facts and law underlying the different claims at issue. Cf. 

Ross v. Bd. of Educ., 486 F.3d 279, 283-84 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(holding that current claims under Americans with 

Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

were compulsory counterclaims in a prior suit where both 

lawsuits ―deal with [the school district‘s] placement 

decisions, the services it offered [the plaintiff], and its 

response to her disability‖). Plaintiffs were therefore not 

compelled to advance their pendent-placement reimbursement 

demand by means of a counterclaim.
18

Moreover, as the district court observed, Rule 13(a) 

―effectively operates as a waiver,‖ M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 

No. 11-2235, 2012 WL 3279230, at *7 (Aug. 13, 2012) 

(Ridley II), and this court previously has expressed doubt that 

―parents can lose their stay put protection except by 

affirmative agreement to give it up,‖ Drinker, 78 F.3d at 868. 

E.R.‘s parents did not explicitly agree to forgo their child‘s 

stay-put rights. Hence, as in Drinker, ―even assuming that in 

a proper case the stay put provision can be waived, we find 

nothing in the record here that leads us to believe this is such 

a case.‖ Id.

Accordingly, Rule 13(a) does not foreclose this 

independent action seeking reimbursement for E.R.‘s interim 

placement expenses. We emphasize, however, that our 

conclusion that neither res judicata nor Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 13(a) bars the instant action does not mean that 

claims for stay-put reimbursement should not be brought in 

the same civil action with substantive IDEA claims, such as 

those addressing the child‘s placement or the provision of a 

FAPE. We hold only that, in the context of this case, 

plaintiffs were permitted to bring them separately.

C. Statute of Limitations

Ridley argues that plaintiffs‘ claim is barred by the 

IDEA provision requiring ―[a]ny party aggrieved‖ by a

hearing officer‘s decision to file suit within ninety days of 

that decision. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), (B). As the 

district court concluded, that statutory limitations period does 

not by its terms apply to plaintiffs‘ stay-put reimbursement 

claim. Although the parents did seek reversal of the hearing 
19

officer‘s decision on certain issues,

11 they had prevailed on 

the issue of E.R.‘s placement at Benchmark for second grade. 

That favorable decision included an award of E.R.‘s tuition 

and transportation costs for 2008-2009 and, under the stay-put 

provision, made Benchmark E.R.‘s pendent placement going 

forward with the right to interim tuition reimbursement.

12

Hence, the parents were not aggrieved by the hearing 

officer‘s decision on the issue raised in this case. Ridley 

points to no other applicable limitations period, and we 

therefore reject its statute-of-limitations defense to plaintiffs‘ 

claim.

 

11

 Their pleading in response to Ridley‘s Petition for Review 

alleged, inter alia, that the hearing officer had erred in finding 

that Ridley did not deny E.R. a FAPE for the 2006-2007 

school year and in finding that she was not improperly denied 

extended programming for the summer of 2007.

12

 After the courts reversed the hearing officer‘s ruling that 

E.R.‘s IEP for the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years 

was inadequate, plaintiffs were no longer entitled to 

reimbursement for the costs of E.R.‘s second grade year at 

Benchmark (2008-2009) based on the school district‘s failure 

to provide her a FAPE. At issue in this case is whether the 

stay-put provision gives them a separate basis to recoup a 

portion of their costs for that year (from the date of the 

hearing officer‘s decision in April 2009 through the end of 

the school year), as well as the costs for E.R.‘s enrollment at 

Benchmark through the date of this court‘s decision in May 

2012 (i.e., for the entire 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school 

years and for most of the 2011-2012 school year ).
20

IV.

Ridley‘s challenge on the merits also focuses on issues 

of timing. Its primary argument is that E.R.‘s parents are not 

entitled to any reimbursement under § 1415(j) because they 

filed their claim for payment too late, i.e., after the 

administrative ruling in their favor was reversed by the 

district court. The school district further argues that, even if 

the parents may recover some of the private school costs, the 

covered period ended with the district court‘s entry of 

judgment rather than at the time of the appeals court‘s 

decision. Both contentions require us to consider aspects of 

the stay-put right that this court has not previously addressed.

Ridley‘s assertion that plaintiffs‘ right to

reimbursement expired when the district court overturned the 

hearing officer‘s decision necessarily depends on two

assumptions about how the stay-put scheme works. First, the 

school district maintains that the reimbursement right does 

not ripen until a claim seeking payment is presented to the 

court. Second, Ridley contends that once the district court 

ruled that Ridley had offered E.R. a FAPE in its public 

schools, Benchmark was no longer E.R.‘s pendent placement. 

In Ridley‘s view, the parents failed to seek payment while the 

private school was designated as E.R.‘s pendent placement 

and, hence, their potential right to reimbursement never 

ripened into an entitlement.

We consider below Ridley‘s two assumptions: (1) that 

the right to reimbursement ripens only when parents file a 

claim with the court seeking payment, and (2) that E.R.‘s 

relevant educational placement had returned to the public 

school by the time her parents filed their claim. We then 
21

address Ridley‘s argument that the stay-put financing 

obligation lasts only until judgment at the district court.

A. When Does the Right to Reimbursement Accrue? 

Ridley argues that the IDEA does not automatically 

provide for reimbursement for the cost of private schooling 

during the stay-put period and that parents must make an 

affirmative request to the court for that remedy. As support, 

the school district cites the IDEA‘s remedial provision, 20 

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), which states that a court ―shall 

grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate.‖ Ridley 

infers from that statutory language that parents have no 

entitlement to stay-put reimbursement until a court rules that

it is ―appropriate.‖

We reject this interpretation as inconsistent with the 

IDEA‘s stay-put guarantee and this court‘s prior case law. 

The stay-put provision – titled ―Maintenance of current 

educational placement‖ – directs that ―the child shall remain 

in the then-current educational placement‖ throughout the 

pendency of any proceedings conducted to resolve a dispute

over the provision of a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (emphasis 

added). Ridley does not dispute that the hearing officer‘s 

decision in this case had the effect of switching E.R.‘s 

pendent placement from the public school recommended by 

her IEP to the private Benchmark School. As noted above, 

see supra Section II, we have expressly held that financing 

goes hand-in-hand with pendent private-school placement:

It is undisputed that once there is a state 

agreement with respect to pendent placement, a 

fortiori, financial responsibility on the part of 
22

the local school district follows. Thus, from the 

point of the [state administrative] decision 

forward . . . [the student‘s] pendent placement, 

by agreement of the state, is the private school 

and [the school district] is obligated to pay for 

that placement.

Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 84; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Schutz, 290 

F.3d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that ―once the parents‘ 

challenge [to a proposed IEP] succeeds . . . , consent to the 

private placement is implied by law, and the requirements of 

§ 1415(j) become the responsibility of the school district‖).

We have thus recognized that the stay-put provision 

itself impliedly, and necessarily, deems reimbursement for the 

costs of pendent placement in a private school an 

―appropriate‖ remedy. See Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 87 (―Without 

interim financial support, a parent‘s  ̳choice‘ to have his child 

remain in what the state has determined to be an appropriate 

private school placement amounts to no choice at all.‖). 

There is no separate requirement of a court finding of 

appropriateness; rather, the obligation arises automatically 

from a determination that the private school is the protected 

status quo during the period in which the dispute resolution 

process is ongoing. Indeed, Ridley admitted as much before 

the district court in this case when it acknowledged that the 

court would have been ―obliged‖ to order reimbursement if 

the parents had sought the funds through a timely 

counterclaim. Ridley II, 2012 WL 3279230, at *8 n.8. We 

think it pointless to insist on a formal demand for interim 

tuition reimbursement when there is no viable response to that 

demand.
23

Hence, plaintiffs secured the right to reimbursement 

when the hearing officer ruled in their favor in April 2009. 

We must now consider whether that right survived the 

subsequent district court ruling in favor of the school district. 

B. The Current Educational Placement 

Ridley contends that any reimbursement entitlement 

the parents may have had under § 1415(j) dissolved in 

February 2011, when the district court reversed the hearing 

officer‘s decision. The school district argues that the court 

ruling ―rendered the hearing officer‘s decision inoperative‖ 

and reinstated the public school as E.R.‘s stay-put placement,

making the parents ineligible for private-school 

reimbursement at the time they requested payment from the 

school district in March 2011. At that point, according to 

Ridley‘s theory, the parents‘ unilateral decision to send E.R. 

to Benchmark no longer had the state imprimatur that made 

reimbursement appropriate. Ridley‘s position thus depends 

on whether the district court‘s ruling in fact recalibrated the 

stay-put assessment. 

This court observed in Drinker that ― ̳the dispositive 

factor in deciding a child‘s ―current educational placement‖

should be the Individualized Education Program . . . actually 

functioning when the ―stay put‖ is invoked.‘‖ 78 F.3d at 867 

(quoting Woods, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. at 440). 

According to Ridley, plaintiffs did not invoke the stay-put 

until after the district court determined that the school 

district‘s IEP was appropriate and, hence, the original IEP, 

―placing the student in the school district, is the one now 

 ̳actually functioning.‘‖
24

Ridley‘s argument lacks support in the law. The 

operative placement is not determined by the date the parents 

seek reimbursement for stay-put expenses, but by the date the 

dispute between the parents and the school district ― ̳first 

arises‘‖ and proceedings conducted pursuant to the IDEA 

begin. Id. (quoting Thomas, 918 F.2d at 625). At the latest, 

the pertinent proceedings in this case began with the parents‘ 

filing of their due process complaint in December 2008, at 

which point E.R.‘s current placement was the public school. 

See A.D., 727 F.3d at 915 (―[A] stay-put placement is 

effective from the date a student requests an administrative 

due process hearing.‖); D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of 

Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 2012) (―By filing the [due 

process] petition, A.C. triggered the IDEA‘s  ̳stay-put‘ 

requirement.‖). As described above, however, E.R.‘s 

operative placement switched by law to the private 

Benchmark School when the administrative hearing officer 

agreed with the parents that Ridley had not offered the child a 

FAPE in the public school.

Nothing in the statute or this circuit‘s law provides a 

basis for changing E.R.‘s stay-put placement back to the 

public school during the pendency of the dispute process, 

notwithstanding the school district‘s successful appeal of the 

administrative decision. To the contrary, § 1415(j) states that 

the child shall remain in the current educational placement 

―until all [IDEA] proceedings have been completed‖

(emphasis added). We cannot conclude that Congress 

intended a placement based on an agreement with ―the State 

or local educational agency‖ to be less secure than one based 

on an IEP. Id. Indeed, any other conclusion would be at odds 

with our expressly stated understanding that the stay-put 

provision is designed to ensure educational stability for 
25

children with disabilities until the dispute over their 

placement is resolved, ―‛regardless of whether their case is 

meritorious or not.‘‖ Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 (quoting 

Woods, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. at 440) (emphasis 

added); see also A.D., 727 F.3d at 914 (stating that ―a student 

who requests an administrative due process hearing is entitled 

to remain in his educational placement regardless of the 

strength of his case or the likelihood he will be harmed by a 

change in placement‖); Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. 

Dist., 559 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2009) (―[T]he stay put 

provision acts as a powerful protective measure to prevent 

disruption of the child‘s education throughout the dispute 

process.‖); Mackey v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.3d 158, 160-61 (2d 

Cir. 2004) (quoting the Drinker language above).

Thus, under the statute and this court‘s precedent, 

E.R.‘s pendent placement under § 1415(j) remained the 

Benchmark School through at least the conclusion of the 

proceedings in the district court, and the school district‘s 

correlative obligation to pay for her schooling there also 

remained intact. The only remaining question is whether 

Ridley‘s financial responsibility extended through final 

judgment in the appeals court.

C. The Duration of the School District’s Reimbursement 

Obligation

Ridley asserts that its responsibility to finance E.R.‘s 

pendent placement at Benchmark terminated, at the latest, 

when the district court ruled in favor of the school district on 

plaintiffs‘ IDEA claim. This court previously has held that § 

1415(j) requires a school district to pay for a private school 

that is a pendent placement through the date of a district 
26

court‘s final order in an IDEA case. See Drinker, 78 F.3d at 

867. The court has not, however, addressed whether the stayput provision also applies through the pendency of an IDEA

dispute in the Court of Appeals. The only two circuits to 

have decided the issue in published opinions are split. 

Compare Joshua A., 559 F.3d at 1038-40 (holding that stayput obligation extends through appeals decision), with 

Andersen v. Dist. of Columbia, 877 F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (D.C. 

Cir. 1989) ((holding that Congress did not intend stay-put 

financing to cover federal appellate review). See also Kari H. 

v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist., 125 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 1997) 

(table), 1997 WL 468326, at *6 (Nos. 96-5066, 5178) (Aug. 

12, 1997) (following Andersen); N. Kitsap Sch. Dist. v. K.W., 

123 P.3d 469, 483 (Wash. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that stayput period extends ―throughout the entire process, including 

any appeals‖).

Having now considered the question, we agree with 

the Ninth Circuit – and the district court in this case – that the 

statutory language and the ―protective purposes‖ of the stayput provision lead to the conclusion that Congress intended 

stay-put placement to remain in effect through the final 

resolution of the dispute. Ridley II, 2012 WL 3279230, at

*11. The statute‘s text is broadly written to encompass ―the 

pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this 

section.‖ 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (emphasis added). Narrowing 

the provision‘s scope to exclude the appellate process strikes 

us as an unnatural reading of such expansive language. The 

―proceedings‖ specifically covered by § 1415 include civil 

actions in ―a district court of the United States.‖ Id. 

§ 1415(i)(2)(A). The district court reasonably construed that 

reference to include all phases of the federal proceedings that 

begin with a district court filing: ―Although Congress did not 
27

explicitly articulate that an appeal is a  ̳proceeding‘ under § 

1415, it seems intuitive that an appeal is part of a  ̳civil action 

. . . in a district court of the United States.‘ . . . In drafting § 

1415(j), Congress surely understood that district court review 

would necessarily include an appeal to a circuit court.‖ 

Ridley II, 2012 WL 3279230, at *11; see also Joshua A., 559 

F.3d at 1038 (―By giving Joshua the right to appeal the ALJ‘s 

decision to the district court, § 1415 also made it possible for 

Joshua to appeal the dispute to this circuit court.‖).

Even if we had doubts about the clarity of the language 

itself, we would nonetheless adopt the same construction

because that ―reading . . .  ̳best accords with the overall 

purposes of the statute.‘‖ Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162, 

170 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 

103, 116-17 (1990)), overruled on other grounds by Al-Sharif 

v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 734 F.3d 207 (3d 

Cir. 2013) (en banc)); see also Long v. Tommy Hilfiger 

U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that, in 

addition to language and context, we ―consider the  ̳overall 

object and policy of the statute, and avoid constructions that 

produce odd or absurd results or that are inconsistent with 

common sense‘‖ (quoting Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. 

Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008))). We 

have stated consistently that the stay-put provision is 

designed to preserve the status quo ― ̳until the dispute with 

regard to [the child‘s] placement is ultimately resolved.‘‖

Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 (quoting Woods, 20 Indiv. 

Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. at 440); see also, e.g., Pardini, 420 

F.3d at 190; J.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 

272 (3d Cir. 2002). We cannot sensibly find that a FAPE 

dispute is ―ultimately resolved‖ before proceedings have run 

their course through a final, unappealed decision by an 
28

administrative body or an appellate judicial decision. See 

Joshua A., 559 F.3d at 1040 (―It is unlikely that Congress 

intended the protective measure to end suddenly and 

arbitrarily before the dispute is fully resolved.‖).

Moreover, the rationale that underlies a school 

district‘s obligation to finance a child‘s pendent placement 

remains compelling through the appellate process. If we 

concluded that stay-put protection terminates while an appeal 

is pending, the parents of a child with disabilities would be 

faced with the untenable choice of removing their child from 

a setting the appeals court might find appropriate or risking 

the burden of private school costs they cannot afford for the 

period of the appeal. See, e.g., Joshua A., 559 F.3d at 1040; 

Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 86-87. In addition, 

cutting off stay-put protection 

after district court review has 

potential negative consequences 

in other factual scenarios besides 

private school placement. For 

instance, the stay-put provision 

could have been invoked during 

the pendency of an appeal to 

maintain a child‘s special services 

within the school district or to 

maintain a child‘s placement in a 

mainstream rather than a selfcontained classroom.

Ridley II, 2012 WL 3279230, at *12 n.10. The broad reading 

of § 1415(j) thus aligns with the statute‘s important mission 
29

to guarantee educational stability for all children with 

disabilities until there is a final ruling on placement.

The wisdom of this reading of § 1415(j) is reinforced 

by the Department of Education‘s implementing regulation, 

which states explicitly that the child must remain in his or her 

current educational placement ―during the pendency of ―any . 

. . judicial proceeding regarding a due process complaint.‖ 

34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a) (emphasis added). The unbounded

reference to ―any‖ judicial proceeding plainly extends the 

mandate through the conclusion of the appellate process, and 

the agency‘s view of the statute‘s reach thus mirrors our own. 

If we had considered § 1415(j) ambiguous on the issue of 

duration, we would have been obliged to give deference to 

this permissible construction by the agency. See Chevron, 

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 

843 (1984); Castillo v. Att’y Gen., 729 F.3d 296, 302 (3d Cir. 

2013). Every appropriate interpretive path thus leads us to 

the same conclusion.

The D.C. Circuit in Andersen adopted the contrary 

interpretation based on a view of the IDEA‘s purpose that we 

believe is unjustifiably limited. The Andersen court focused 

on the Supreme Court‘s decision in Honig v. Doe, where the 

issue was whether school districts may be excused from the 

stay-put requirement when a child‘s continuing presence in 

the classroom poses a danger to himself or others. See Honig, 

484 U.S. at 323; Andersen, 877 F.2d at 1023-24. In rejecting 

such an exception,13 the Supreme Court observed that ―one of 

 

13

 The IDEA does allow certain temporary exceptions to 

the pendent-placement provision, including for students 

carrying a weapon to school, using or selling drugs at school, 
30

the purposes of § 1415[(j)] . . . was  ̳to prevent school

officials from removing a child from the regular public school 

classroom over the parents‘ objection pending completion of 

the review proceedings,‘‖ Honig, 484 U.S. at 327 (quoting 

Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373). The Court emphasized the 

incompatibility of the asserted unilateral authority to exclude 

students perceived as dangerous with the IDEA‘s goals, see 

id. at 323, 327, and pointed out that school officials faced 

with a safety issue could, among other steps, seek court 

intervention under the IDEA if ―parents of a truly dangerous 

child adamantly refuse to permit any change in placement,‖ 

id. at 326.

The D.C. Circuit appeared to treat Honig as 

establishing a single goal for the stay-put provision, i.e., ―to 

protect children from unilateral displacement by school 

authorities.‖ 877 F.2d at 1024. The court thus reasoned that 

the automatic stay-put injunction is no longer justified once a 

district court has decided in favor of a proposal by school 

officials to transfer a student: ―Once a district court has 

rendered its decision approving a change in placement, that 

change is no longer the consequence of a unilateral decision 

by school authorities; the issuance of an automatic injunction 

perpetuating the prior placement would not serve the 

section‘s purpose.‖ 877 F.2d at 1024. Based on this 

 

or inflicting serious bodily injury on others. See 20 U.S.C. § 

1415(k)(1)(G); see also Honig, 484 U.S. at 325 & n.8 (citing 

a Department of Education position that a ten-day suspension 

―does not amount to a  ̳change in placement‘ prohibited by § 

1415[(j)]‖).
31

assumption about the role of § 1415(j), the Andersen court 

held that, after a court has endorsed the school district‘s 

educational plan for a disabled child, the child‘s parents may 

prevent a change in placement consistent with the court ruling 

only by satisfying the standard requirements for injunctive 

relief. Id. 

In our view, there is a flaw in the D.C. Circuit‘s 

reasoning. The Supreme Court has not declared protection 

from unilateral action by school officials to be the only

purpose of the stay-put provision. Rather, the Court

identified it in Honig as ―one of [the section‘s] purposes.‖ 

484 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added); see also id. (describing 

―the unilateral exclusion of disabled children by schools‖ as 

―one of the evils Congress sought to remedy‖ (emphasis in 

first phrase omitted) (emphasis in second phrase added)); 

Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373 (―We think at least one purpose

of § 1415[(j)] was to prevent school officials from removing a 

child from the regular public school classroom over the 

parents‘ objection pending completion of the review 

proceedings.‖ (emphasis added)). As we have just explained, 

the pendent-placement requirement also reflects a concern 

about the continuity of a child‘s placement generally. See 

A.D., 727 F.3d at 916 (―[T]he purpose of the stay-put 

provision . . . is to protect students from changes to their 

educational programs when there is a dispute over the 

lawfulness of the changes.‖); K.W., 123 P.3d at 482 (―[T]he 

holding in Andersen does not follow the general policy 

behind IDEA, which is to keep from disturbing the child

throughout the statutory process designed to resolve disputes 

between the school district and the child‘s parents or 

guardians over where the child can receive the appropriate 

educational opportunities.‖). The D.C. Circuit‘s limited 
32

perspective in Andersen undermines its conclusion that the 

stay-put protection, which triggers the school district‘s 

reimbursement obligation, does not extend through the period 

of an appeal.14

V.

We are not insensitive to the financial burden our 

decision will impose on school districts, see Raelee S, 96 F.3d 

at 87, or the seeming incongruity of the ultimately prevailing 

party having to pay for a now-rejected placement. Despite 

two judicial determinations that Ridley did not deny E.R. a 

FAPE, the school district will be assessed the cost of her 

private school education for a substantial period of time.

15 It 

is impossible, however, to protect a child‘s educational status 

quo without sometimes taxing school districts for private 

education costs that ultimately will be deemed unnecessary

by a court. We see this not as ―an absurd result,‖ Ridley II, 

2012 WL 3279230, at *13, but as an unavoidable 

consequence of the balance Congress struck to ensure 

stability for a vulnerable group of children.

Affirmed.

 

14

 The plaintiffs in this case did not seek Supreme Court 

review of the appeals court ruling in Ridley I, and we 

therefore do not address whether stay-put protection 

encompasses such proceedings.

 

15

 As noted above, the reimbursement period runs from the 

date of the administrative hearing officer‘s decision in April 

2009 – i.e., shortly before the end of the 2008-2009 school 

year – through the date of the appellate decision in May 2012.