alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

ELIZABETH BOYETT SMITH,

Petitioner,

vs. CASE NO.: 4:10-cv-406-SPM-WCS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

___________________________/

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE comes before the court upon the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation (doc. 5). Petitioner has been furnished a copy and has been

afforded an opportunity to file objections pursuant to Title 28, United States Code,

Section 636(b)(1). No objections have been filed. Having considered the Report

and Recommendation, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (doc. 5) is

adopted and incorporated by reference in this order.

2. The habeas petition is summarily dismissed.

DONE AND ORDERED this twenty-eighth day of June, 2011.

s/Stephan P. Mickle

Stephan P. Mickle

Senior United States District Judge

Case 4:10-cv-00406-SPM-WCS Document 6 Filed 06/28/11 Page 1 of 1
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50849

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ERNEST JAIR GONZALEZ-ORTIZ

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:07-CR-204-ALL

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Ernest Jair Gonzalez-Ortiz

raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States,

523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty

provision and not a separate criminal offense. United States v.

Pineda-Arrellano, 492 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (Aug.

28, 2007) (No. 07-6202). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is

GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 5, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Eagle Broadband, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-K for the year ended August 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Tom Matura, Principal
Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d),
as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: December 28, 2004

/s/ Tom Matura
--------------
Tom Matura
Principal Accounting Officer
Exhibit 13.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of CityView Corporation Limited (the
"Company") on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I,P M Smyth, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.


P M Smyth
December 11, 2006
Exhibit 32(b)

ENERGY FUTURE HOLDINGS CORP.

Certificate Pursuant to Section 906

of Sarbanes  Oxley Act of 2002

CERTIFICATION OF CFO

The undersigned, Paul M. Keglevic, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Energy
Future Holdings Corp. (the Company), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY that:



| | 1. | The Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2008 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has caused this instrument to be executed this 2nd day of March 2009.



/s/ PAUL M. KEGLEVICName:

Paul M. KeglevicTitle:

Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Energy Future
Holdings Corp. and will be retained by Energy Future Holdings Corp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

GARY C. QUILLING,

Plaintiff,

v. 4:10cv404-WS

MARTHA HUMPHRIES, et al.,

Defendants.

 

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

Before the court is the magistrate judge's report and recommendation

docketed October 20, 2010. See Doc. 6. The magistrate judge recommends that

the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. The

plaintiff ("Quilling") has filed objections to the report and recommendation.

Among other things, Quillling correctly contends that the "file date" for statuteof-limitations purposes was September 14, 2010, the date he turned his complaint

over to jail staff for mailing, and not—as the magistrate judge found—September 17,

2010, the date that the clerk's office received his complaint. He also contends that,

because an inmate is statutorily required to exhaust the grievance process before he

is permitted to file a civil action, the statute of limitations should commence when the

grievance process is completed and not—as determined by the magistrate judge---

when a prison official allegedly commits a constitutional violation. To be sure, there
Page 2 of 3

is case law to support Quilling's contention. See, e.g., Nickolich v. Rowe, 299 Fed.

Appx. 725, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that, given California's two-year statute of

limitations, a state prisoner's § 1983 deliberate indifference claim was not barred by

the statute of limitations, where the inmate commenced his prison grievance process

immediately after his claim accrued and filed a complaint within two years of

completing the mandatory grievance process); Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519,

522 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a federal court relying on the Illinois statute of

limitations in a § 1983 case must toll the limitations period while a prisoner

completes the administrative grievance process); Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595,

596 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that tolling is appropriate while prisoner completes

mandatory exhaustion); Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 157-59 (5th Cir. 1999)

(same). Quilling further contends that, in this case, equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations—for a matter of a few days—is appropriate given his allegation that

"extraordinary circumstances" beyond his control caused a delay in the filing of his

complaint. In addition, he contends that, even if tolling is not appropriate, some of

the defendants' alleged constitutional violations occurred after September 14, 2006,

and would, therefore, fall within the untolled statutory period.

The court has carefully reviewed Quilling's complaint, the magistrate judge's

report and recommendation, and Quilling's objections. Because the court cannot

find that the statute of limitations necessarily bars Quilling's claims, it is ORDERED:

The case shall be returned to the magistrate judge for further consideration.

DONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of November , 2010.
Page 3 of 3

s/ William Stafford 

WILLIAM STAFFORD

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
# C_2011032EN.01001201.xml

| 1.2.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 32/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.2.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/12

---

Special Report No 13/2010 ‘Is the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument successfully launched and achieving results in the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)?’

2011/C 32/06

The European Court of Auditors hereby informs you that Special Report No 13/2010 ‘Is the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument successfully launched and achieving results in the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)?’ has just been published.

The report can be accessed for consultation or downloading on the European Court of Auditors’ website: http://www.eca.europa.eu

A hard copy version of the report may be obtained free of charge on request to the Court of Auditors:

| European Court of Auditors |
| --- |
| Communication and Reports Unit |
| 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi |
| 1615 Luxembourg |
| LUXEMBOURG |
| Tel. +352 4398-1 |
| E-mail: euraud@eca.europa.eu |

European Court of Auditors

Communication and Reports Unit

12, rue Alcide De Gasperi

1615 Luxembourg

LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-1

E-mail: euraud@eca.europa.eu

or by filling in an electronic order form on EU-Bookshop.

---
HonorableD. C. Greer OpinionNo. WW-666

State Highway Engineer Texas Hi hway Department

& Re: Whether Certificates Austin 1 , Texas of Number of motorboats issuedby the Texas Highway Department pursuantto Houae Bill 11,Acts of the 56th Legislature,Regular Session, 1959, Chapter 179, Page 369, are valid for a two year or three Dear Mr. Greer: year period.

In your recent letteryou have propoundedthe following question to this office for an opinion: Whether Certificates of Number issuedby the Texas Highway Departmentare valid for a per-rod of three years or for a period of two years. House Bill 11,Acts of the 56th Legislature, Regular Session, 1959,Chapter 179, Page 369, provides for the registration of motorb~oats with the TexasHighway Department. The pertinent sections of the Act are as follows:
"Sec. 4.(f) Every Certificate of

Number awarded pursuant to this Act shall continue in full force and effect for a period of three (3) years unless aooner terminated or discontinued in accordancewith the provisionof this Act. Certificates of Number shall be valid for the biennium fromApril 1 of one year to March 31 of the second,,succeedingyear, both days inclusive.
"Sec. 17. (a) There ishereby levied a three (3) year fee in Section 4 of this Act as follows: 11 I,

. . .Honorable D. C. Greer, page 2 (WW-666)

The last sentence of Section 4(f)may cast doubt as to the period of timewhich then Legislature intended for a Certificate of Number to be valid. However, the first sentence of the same Section (4(f))togetherwith Section 17(a)reveal the intention of the Legislature to be that a Certificate of Numberbe valid for three years.
In Wood v. State, 133 Tex. 110, 126 S.W.2d 4, the Supreme Court used the following language in construing a statute: .

"It is the settled law that statutes shouldbe construed so as to carry out the legislative intent,andwhen such intent is once ascertained, it should be given effect, even though the literalmeaning of the words used therein is not followed. Also, statutes should never be given a constructionthat leads to uncertainty, injustice,or confussion, a0 it is possible to construe them otherwise.

. . .'
It is thereforethe opinion of this office a three year peri

od of validitywas contemplatedby the Legislature and that such a construction is the only reasonable construct

ion that can be placedon theAct.

JLE:rm SUMMARY

The Certificates of Number of motorboats issuecl by the Texas Highway Department pursuantto House Bill 11, Acts of the 56th Legislature,Regular Session, 1959,Chapter 179, Page 369, are valid for a three year period.

Yours very truly,
WILL WTLSONHonorable D. C. Greer,page 3 (WW-666)

APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE Geo. P.Blackburn, Chairman HoughtonBrownlee, Jr. Mrs. Marietta Payne Charles D. Cabaniss Dean Davis
REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W. V. Geppert
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, Randall Reneau, the Chief Executive Officer of Strategic American Oil Corporation, and Johnathan Lindsay, the Chief Financial Officer of Strategic American Oil Corporation, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to their knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Strategic American Oil Corporation, for the quarterly period ended April 30, 2009 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Strategic American Oil Corporation.



Date:    June 15, 2009.



|/s/ "Randall Reneau"                    
|----------------------------------------
|Randall ReneauChief Executive Officer   
|/s/ "Johnathan Lindsay"                 
|Johnathan LindsayChief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signatures that appear in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Strategic American Oil Corporation and will be retained by Strategic American Oil Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

TAMEIKA OLIPHANT,

Petitioner

v.

MINHV V. THAI AND KHEIM L. THAI,

Respondents :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 386 EAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 23rd day of March, 2021

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### STATE v. HAILSTOCK

No. 11 PC.

Case below: 15 N.C. App. 556.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 14 September 1972.
Case 3:10-cv-00269-WS -EMT Document 4 Filed 08/03/10 Page 1 of 2
Case 3:10-cv-00269-WS -EMT Document 4 Filed 08/03/10 Page 2 of 2
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CORNELL ROBERTS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-3877

[December 5, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; William W. Haury, Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No. 16-

003909CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and J. Woodson Isom, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. 

Picard, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CONCESSION OF ERROR

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was charged with attempted first degree murder. Following 

a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted 

second degree murder. As the state concedes, the trial court’s failure to 

instruct the jury on the necessarily included offense of attempted 

manslaughter by act amounted to fundamental error because that offense 

is one step removed from the convicted offense of attempted second degree 

murder. See Walton v. State, 208 So. 3d 60, 64 (Fla. 2016); Coleman v. 

State, 110 So. 3d 971, 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). Nothing in the record 

suggests that appellant expressly waived the instruction. Defense counsel 

did not waive the error by failing to request an instruction on attempted 

manslaughter by act. See Roberts v. State, 242 So. 3d 296,299 (Fla. 2018).

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

GERBER, C.J., WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
- 2 -

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1282 CA 16-00413 PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CARNI, DEJOSEPH, AND CURRAN, JJ.

COUNTY OF ERIE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FRANCIS B. VOLANTE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

MICHAEL A. SIRAGUSA, COUNTY ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (ANTHONY B. TARGIA OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

SMITH, MURPHY & SCHOEPPERLE, LLP, BUFFALO (STEPHEN P. BROOKS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Catherine R. Nugent Panepinto, J.), dated August 17, 2015. The order granted in part the motion of defendant for summary judgment.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c (6) seeking to enforce its right to be reimbursed for the salary and medical expenses paid on behalf of a police officer who was injured when his patrol car collided with a motor vehicle owned and operated by defendant. Supreme Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment in part, concluding that plaintiff’s “claim is . . . limited to those amounts it has paid in excess of basic economic loss.” We affirm.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, its “potential recovery pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c (6) of payments made to a police officer injured by the alleged negligence of the defendant in her ownership and operation of an automobile is limited by Insurance Law article 51” ( Village of Suffern v Baels , 215 AD2d 751, 751). Thus, the court properly determined that plaintiff can recover only those amounts paid to its employee pursuant to section 207-c that are in excess of basic economic loss as that term is defined by article 51 of the Insurance Law ( see Incorporated Vil. of Freeport v Sanders , 101 AD2d 808, 809; City of Buffalo v Murry
, 79 AD2d 1096, 1096, lv denied 53 NY2d 601).

Entered: December 23, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

LAMAR PLAYER, 

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 1:10-cv-00105-MP-GRJ

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, 

Respondents.

_____________________________/

O R D E R

This cause comes on for consideration upon the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation dated June 6, 2013. (Doc. 28). The parties have been furnished a copy of the

Report and Recommendation and have been afforded an opportunity to file objections pursuant

to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). I have made a de novo determination of any

timely filed objections. 

Having considered the Report and Recommendation, and any objections thereto timely

filed, I have determined that the Report and Recommendation should be adopted. 

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation is adopted and incorporated

by reference in this order.

2. The amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254, (doc. 11) is DENIED.
Page 2 of 2

3. A certificate of appealability is DENIED, pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts.

DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of September, 2013

 s/Maurice M. Paul 

 Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge

Case No: 1:10-cv-00105-MP-GRJ
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

FRITZNER DEVEAUX,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:10cv257/MCR/EMT

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

 Defendant.

_______________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause was initiated on September 24, 2010, by the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc.

1), in which Plaintiff seeks review of Defendant’s final administrative decision denying his claim

for disability benefits. Now before the court is Plaintiff’s “Motion to Dismiss Complaint,” in which

Plaintiff certifies that Defendant has no objection (Doc. 19).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) provides that an action may be dismissed without

an order of the court by filing: (i) a notice of dismissal before the adverse party serves either an

answer or a motion for summary judgment; or (ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who

have appeared in the action. Rule 41(a)(2) provides that “[e]xcept as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an

action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court

considers proper.” 

In the instant case, Defendant has filed an answer (Doc. 11), and Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss

is not accompanied by a signed stipulation of dismissal; therefore, dismissal pursuant to Rule

41(a)(1) does not appear appropriate. However, the court finds dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2)

appropriate, as Plaintiff has indicated that he “does not think that it is in his best interest to pursue

the claim after [his] review of the [Social Security Administration’s certified] transcript,” and

Defendant has no objection to a court-ordered dismissal.

Case 5:10-cv-00257-MCR-EMT Document 20 Filed 05/04/11 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

1. That Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 19) be GRANTED and this

action be DISMISSED. 

2. That the clerk of court be directed to close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida this 4th day of May 2011.

/s/ Elizabeth M. Timothy 

 ELIZABETH M. TIMOTHY

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed recommendations must be filed within fourteen (14)

days after being served a copy hereof. Any different deadline that may appear on the

electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only, and does not control. A copy of any

objections shall be served upon any other parties. Failure to object may limit the scope of

appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d

698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

Case No.: 5:10cv257/MCR/EMT

Case 5:10-cv-00257-MCR-EMT Document 20 Filed 05/04/11 Page 2 of 2