J. S06044/19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

CHARLES LALONDE, : No. 137 EDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, December 20, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0003703-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 15, 2019

Charles Lalonde appeals from the December 20, 2017 order entered by 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing without a 

hearing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

The PCRA court provided the following synopsis of the relevant 

procedural history:

On March 12, 2011, [appellant] was arrested and 

charged with rape and aggravated indecent assault[1] 

after Philadelphia detectives received notification that 

there was a match in the Combined DNA Index 

System, linking him to a 2003 rape case that occurred 

on a secluded pedestrian-only walkway outside of the 

Franklin Mills Mall. On December 8, 2011, the [trial] 

court conducted a jury trial and on December 13, 

2011, the jury found [appellant] guilty of rape and 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a) and 3125(a), respectively.
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aggravated indecent assault. Following trial, 

[appellant] was evaluated by the Sexual Offender 

Assessment Board and determined to be a Sexually 

Violent Predator. On August 3, 2012, [appellant] was 

sentenced to 15 to 30 years[’] state incarceration. On 

August 7, 2012, [appellant] filed post-sentence 

motions, which were denied by operation of law on 

December 6, 2012.

[On] December 12, 2012, [appellant] filed a Notice of 

Appeal to the Superior Court. On April 28, 2014[,] 

the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s [judgment 

of sentence]. [Appellant] filed for allowance of appeal 

but was denied allocatur on October 8, 2014. [See 

Commonwealth v. Lalonde, 102 A.3d 544 

(Pa.Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), 

appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).] On 

April 28, 2015, [appellant] filed a timely pro se PCRA 

petition and a subsequent supplemental amended 

petition was filed on February 1[4], 2017. In his 

petitions, [appellant] argued that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to call witnesses and for failing 

to subpoena crucial security footage related to the 

case.

On July 26, 2016, David Rudenstein, Esquire, was 

appointed as PCRA counsel. On February 14, 2017, 

counsel filed an amended petition for post-conviction 

relief which included a request for funds to employ a 

private investigator. Said funding was granted by [the 

PCRA] court. Thereafter, [the PCRA court] received a 

letter from counsel on April 19, 2017[,] indicating that 

counsel would not be filing a supplement to his 

amended petition. On November 27, 2017, counsel 

informed [the PCRA court] at a scheduled status 

listing that, after having further contact with 

[appellant], he did not have sufficient necessary 

information to hire an investigator. As a result, [the 

PCRA court] sent a [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 907 Notice of Intent 

to Dismiss to [appellant] on November 28, 2017. On 

December 11, 2017, [appellant] replied to [the PCRA 

court’s] 907 notice. On December 20, 2017, after 

independent review of [appellant’s] pro se petitions, 

PCRA Counsel’s amended petition, the 
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Commonwealth’s answer, and [appellant’s] reply to 

the 907 notice, [the PCRA court] dismissed 

[appellant’s] petition without a hearing based upon 

lack of merit. On December 29, 2017, [appellant] 

appealed the dismissal of his petition to the Superior 

Court.

PCRA court opinion, 6/15/18 at 2-3 (citation to the record omitted).

On January 17, 2018, the PCRA court ordered appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Appellant timely complied on February 6, 2018. On June 15, 2018, the PCRA 

court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Did the Honorable PCRA Court err when it dismissed 

[appellant’s] Amended Petition without holding a 

hearing?

Appellant’s brief at 3.

When reviewing a PCRA court’s denial of PCRA relief, it is well settled 

that:

[o]ur standard of review [] is whether the record 

supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether 

the PCRA court’s decision is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d 317, 319 

(Pa.Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 

877 A.2d 479. 482 (Pa.Super. 2005)). The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no 

support for the findings in the certified record. Id.

(citing Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 

1166 (Pa.Super. 2001).

Commonwealth v. Larson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2014).

Our supreme court has further stated as follows:
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The PCRA court has the discretion to dismiss a petition 

without a hearing when the court is satisfied “that 

there are no genuine issues concerning any material 

fact, the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction 

collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose would be 

served by further proceedings.” Commonwealth v. 

Paddy, [] 15 A.3d 431, 442 ([Pa.] 2011) (quoting 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B)(2)). “To obtain reversal of a 

PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition without a 

hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a 

genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, 

would have entitled him to relief, or that the court 

otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.” 

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. D’Amato, [] 856 

A.2d 806, 820 [Pa.] 2004)). We stress that an 

evidentiary hearing “is not meant to function as a 

fishing expedition for any possible evidence that may 

support some speculative claim of ineffectiveness.” 

Commonwealth v. Jones, [] 811 A.2d 994, 1003 n. 

8 ([Pa.] 2002) (citation omitted). In Jones, we 

declined to remand for an evidentiary hearing when 

the appellant merely asserted that counsel did not 

have a reasonable basis for his lack of action but made 

no proffer of evidence as to counsel’s lack of action.

Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 640-605 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied 

sub nom. Roney v. Pennsylvania, 135 S.Ct. 56 (2014).

Here, appellant contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance for failing to “secure any video tapes that [Franklin Mills Mall] 

security would have made.” (Appellant’s brief at 8.) Moreover, appellant 

makes the bald allegation that “trial counsel, apparently, did nothing to 

marshal any evidence in this case[.]” (Id. at 9.) 

Appellant, however, provides no evidence to support these claims, aside 

from mere speculation that the videotapes in question even exist. Indeed, as 

noted by the PCRA court, 
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[Appellant] failed to demonstrate that this supposed 

tape ever existed or what was on it. Moreover, 

[appellant] committed [his] crimes in 2003 but was 

not apprehended until 2011, therefore it is very 

unlikely that security footage from eight years earlier 

would still have existed at the time of trial eight years 

later.

PCRA court opinion, 6/15/18 at 5-6.

Based on the record before us, we find that the record supports the 

PCRA court’s determination that holding an evidentiary hearing would serve 

no further legitimate purpose. We further find that the PCRA court’s 

determination is free of legal error. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not abuse 

its discretion when it dismissed appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/15/19