UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

GAINESVILLE DIVISION 

CLAUDE SEJOUR, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. CASE NO. 1:10-cv-96-MW/GRJ 

STEVEN DAVIS FARMS, LLC and 

STEVEN M. DAVIS, 

Defendants. 

____________________________________/ 

ORDER GRANTING H-2A FARMWORKER PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 This matter comes before this Court on the motion of twenty-nine (29) H-2A Plaintiffs 

for Partial Summary Judgment. ECF No. 134.1

 In particular all of these Plaintiffs seek partial 

summary judgment regarding the reimbursement of their transportation and visa expenses under 

the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201-209, and the H-2A regulations, 20 

C.F.R. § 655, et seq. Further, a smaller subset of Plaintiffs comprised of Wislain Wilson Orelus, 

Jimmy Jean-Louis, Gesner Elta Duverny, St. Juste Saintamand Orelus, Mikelson Lacour, 

Lalanne Guerrier, Negus Almonor, Olibrice Orelus, Ronald Jean, and Brunet Martin (hereinafter 

“Group II Plaintiffs”) as well as Modeline Sejour (hereinafter “Group III Plaintiff”) seek 

 

1

 As used herein, the term “H-2A farmworkers” refers to Plaintiffs who were employed on temporary visas issued 

under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(A). This group is comprised of the 

following Plaintiffs: Lysner Valcin, Jean Robert Sejour, Richerson Sejour, Claude Sejour, Emmanuel Mondesir, 

Elin Medar, Jean Francois Cajour, Edil Exainvil, Arold Pierre, Jodany Sejour, Marie Claudette Milien, Juslaine 

Auguste, Odette Antione, Gladys Geffrard, Manouche Sejour, Derdine Riodin, Jocelyne Pierre, Plenita Laurent, 

Wislain Wilson Orelus, Jimmy Jean-Louis, Gesner Elta Duverney, St. Juste Saintamand Orelus, Mikelson Lacour, 

Lalanne Guerrier, Negus Almonor, Olibrice Orelus, Ronald Jean, Brunet Martin, and Modeline Sejour. Upon order 

of this Court, this case was consolidated with case 1:10-cv-136-SPM/GRG, an action against the Defendants 

involving claims by farmworkers who were not employed under the H-2A visa program. This Court will issue a 

separate order regarding those Plaintiffs. 

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summary judgment for unpaid wages under the FLSA, the federal regulations governing the H2A program, 2

 and the Florida Minimum Wage Act, Fla. Stat. § 448.110. 

Defendants, Steven Davis (“Davis”) & Steven Davis Farms, LLC, acknowledge they did 

not reimburse Plaintiffs for any of their pre-employment expenses. Defendants contend they are 

not liable for these sums because Plaintiffs are not covered by the FLSA or the H-2A regulations 

since they are entitled to various defenses which preclude liability. Defendants argue they are 

entitled to an exemption under the FLSA for being a small business with less than 500 man days. 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to reimbursements for their travel and 

subsistence costs because Plaintiffs did not complete 50% of the contract. Defendants argue they 

are exempt from their obligations under the H-2A contract because “an act of God” relieved 

them of liability. Finally, Defendants argue they are not liable for these sums because they did 

not “employ” Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA, the Florida Minimum Wage Act, or the 

H-2A regulations. 

Having reviewed the record and supporting evidence submitted by both parties, this 

Court finds Defendants are not entitled to a 500 man day exemption under the FLSA because it 

was not raised as an affirmative defense. This Court finds Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs 

are not entitled to transportation and visa expenses because they abandoned the job prior to 

completing 50% the contract to be inapplicable and not supported by the evidence on the record. 

Furthermore, this Court finds Defendants' “act of God” defense inapplicable to this case. The 

facts support a finding that Defendants are joint employers, along with crew leaders Carline 

Ceneus (“Ceneus”) and Cabioch Bontemps (“Bontemps”). Further, there is no issue of material 

fact with respect to any of Plaintiffs’ claims for reimbursement of transportation and visa 

 

2

 The H-2A Plaintiffs have raised additional claims; however, they have agreed to file a motion to voluntarily 

dismiss the other claims upon this Court’s entry of this order. 

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expenses, nor is there any issue of material fact with respect to the Group II and III Plaintiffs’ 

wage claims. 

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Davis owns and rents land in Alachua County to grow vegetables, and operates Steven 

Davis Farms, LLC, which owns a packing shed. Plaintiffs are foreign guest workers who 

worked under H-2A visas harvesting peas and beans on Davis’ farm property, and grading peas 

and beans in the packing shed. 

In early 2008, Davis purchased his packing shed. Steven Davis Farms, LLC was created 

to operate the packing shed, with Davis as the principal owner and chief executive officer. Even 

though it was intended that the farm, with Davis as sole proprietor, and the packing shed 

operated by Steven Davis Farms, LLC, would operate separately, the financial accounts of the 

two are substantially intertwined. Among other things, the operating expenses for the farm, 

including the cost of harvesting crops, are paid by Steven Davis Farms, LLC. 

Prior to the 2008 season, Davis told Ceneus that he wanted to bring in guest workers 

under the H-2A visa program to harvest his fields. Ceneus is a family friend of Davis, who had 

used her brother, Bontemps, to recruit labor for nearly a decade. Davis helped Ceneus fill out the 

H-2A applications, and Ceneus did the “legwork” to obtain H-2A visas for guest workers who 

would be employed on Davis’ operations. Davis wrote a letter in support of Ceneus’ application 

for foreign labor certification; Ceneus was granted certification and traveled to Haiti to recruit 

workers for Davis. 

In May of 2008, Ceneus traveled with a group of H-2A workers from Haiti to the United 

States to work at Defendants’ farm. The following Plaintiffs arrived with Ceneus in May of 

2008: Lysner Valcin, Jean Robert Sejour, Richerson Sejour, Claude Sejour, Emmanuel 

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Mondesir, Elin Medar, Jean Francois Cajour, Edil Exainvil, Arold Pierre, Jodany Sejour, Marie 

Claudette Milien, Juslaine Auguste, Oddette Antione, Gladys Geffrard, Manouche Sejour, 

Derdine Riodin, Jocelyne Pierre, and Plenita Laurant. These workers are referred to by the 

parties as the Group I Plaintiffs.3

 Shortly after arriving in the United States, Group I Plaintiffs 

began to work on Davis’ farm, and were employed for varying amounts of time from May, 2008, 

until November, 2008, appearing on Ceneus’ payroll records anywhere from eight (8) to eighteen 

(18) weeks.4 While Davis had hired Ceneus to be the farm labor contractor in 2008, she was not 

always present on the farm. When Ceneus was not present, her brother, Bontemps, was 

responsible for supervising the workers. 

In October of 2008, a second group of H-2A workers began working at Davis’ farm. The 

Group II Plaintiffs are as follow: Jimmy Jean Louis, St. Juste Santamand Orelus, Mikelson 

Lacoeur, Lalanne Guerrier, Negus Almonor, Olibrice Orelus, Ronald Jean, Brunet Martin, 

Gesner Duverny, and Wislain Wilson Orelus. The Group II Plaintiffs were admitted to the 

United States pursuant to a foreign labor certification application filed on behalf of Puroul 

Picking. Plaintiffs were recruited in Haiti by Willy Paul Edouard (“Edouard”) and Ceneus. The 

foreign labor certification did not list Davis’ farming operation as the worksite; however, 

Plaintiffs worked at Davis’ operation under the supervision of Bontemps and Ceneus. 

 

3

 Plaintiffs filed a notice of death for Plaintiff Elin Medar on May 12, 2014. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(a)(1), Plaintiff Medar’s heirs will have 90 days from the filing of the notice of death to appoint a 

personal representative. A personal representative must be appointed by August 12, 2014. 

4

 Group I Plaintiffs are the only H-2A farmworker Plaintiffs whose names appear on the payroll records submitted 

by Ceneus. Payroll records were submitted by Ceneus and attached to Defendants’ response and objection to H-2A 

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 150-1. With the exception of Plaintiff Gladys Geffrard who only 

appears on Ceneus’ records until July 11, 2008, all Group I Plaintiffs appear on payroll records from at least May 

22, 2008, until July 24, 2008. Plaintiffs Juslaine Auguste, Melianna Lazarre, Marie Claudette Milien, Emmanuel 

Mondesir, Claude Sejour, Richerson Sejour, and Manouch Sejour appear until July 24, 2008, and not after. From 

July 24, 2008, until September 5, 2008, there are no payroll records submitted by Ceneus. Plaintiffs Jean Francois 

Cajour, Edil Exainvil, Derdine Riodin, and Edil Exainvil only appear on payroll records until September 19, 2008. 

Plaintiffs Plenita Laurent, Oddette Antione, Jodany Sejour, Jean Robert Sejour, Arold Pierre, and Elin Medar all 

appear on Ceneus’ payroll records until November 21, 2008. The Group I Plaintiffs all provided estimates of weeks 

worked in their affidavits. Plaintiffs’ estimates are similar to the amount of weeks they actually appear on payroll. 

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Finally, Plaintiff, Modeline Sejour, the sole Group III Plaintiff, arrived as an H-2A 

worker pursuant to a foreign labor certification application for P.A. Farm Labor Services, having 

been recruited in Haiti by Pierre Avesca. Again, the foreign labor certification did not list 

Davis’ farming operation as the worksite; however, Plaintiff worked at Davis’ operation. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A party may be granted summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact... and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). “The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its 

motion and of identifying those materials that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232 F. 3d 836, 840 (11th Cir. 2000); see 

also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must establish that 

there is a genuine dispute of material fact, and “it must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A fact in dispute is material only if it “might affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). The adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading, but 

must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Rice-Lamar, 232 F.2d 

at 840. 

DEFENDANTS’ COVERAGE UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

Defendants argue they are entitled to claim an exemption under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 

213(a)(6)(A), for being a small business with less than 500 man days. An agricultural employee 

is exempted from the minimum wage and overtime coverage of the FLSA if the employee works 

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for an employer who did not use more than 500 man days of agricultural labor during a 

preceding calendar quarter. 29 U.S.C § 213(a)(6)(A). A man day is defined as “any day during 

which an employee performs any agricultural labor for not less than one hour.” Centeno-Bernuy 

v. Becker Farms, 564 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(u)). “The 

regulations note that ‘500 man-days is approximately the equivalent of seven employees 

employed full-time in a calendar quarter.’” Centeno-Bernuy, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (citing 29 

C.F.R. § 780.305(a)). 

Defendants contend that the corporation, Steven Davis Farms, LLC, was not formed until 

2008 and could not have had 500 man days during any of the calendar quarters of the previous 

year. Defendants also contend there is an issue of fact with respect to Defendant Davis’ 

exemption under the 500 man day provision, arguing that they are entitled to a hearing on 

whether the exemption exists. However, Defendants failed to raise this exemption as an 

affirmative defense. 

Defendants are not entitled to claim a 500 man day exemption where they did not raise 

the exemption as an affirmative defense. Rotondo v. Georgetown, 869 F. Supp. 369, 373 (D.S.C. 

1994) (explaining that “the assertion of an exemption from the mandates of the FLSA is an 

affirmative defense that is waived if it is not specifically pleaded by a defendant” (citing Renfro 

v. City of Emporia, 741 F. Supp. 887, 888 (D. Kan. 1990), aff’d, 948 F.2d 1529, 1539 (10th Cir. 

1991)). Under Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim of exemption is an 

affirmative defense that must be specifically pled or it will be deemed waived. See Morrison v. 

Exec. Aircraft Refinishing, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1318-19 (S.D. Fla. 2005). “The general 

purpose of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 8(c) is to provide particularized and specific notice of certain 

defenses.” Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1539 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing State Distrib. 

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Inc. v. Glenmore Distilleries, 738 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 1984)). Defendants are not entitled to 

claim an exemption because they failed to specifically plead their exemption in their answer. 

Since Plaintiffs were not given timely notice of Defendants’ intention to assert this exemption, to 

allow Defendants’ argument would be unjust and would defy the purpose of the FLSA. 

Defendants have, therefore, waived the 500 man day exemption defense. 

Even if Defendants had not waived their 500 man day exemption, they are not entitled to 

an exemption because they have not submitted evidence to prove they are entitled to the 

exemption. This exemption is an affirmative defense and thus Defendants have the burden of 

establishing the exemption on summary judgment. See Roca v. Alphatech Aviation Serv. Inc., 

961 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1238 (S.D. Fla. 2013); United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 

941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that when the moving party has the burden of proof 

at trial, it also has the burden of proof for summary judgment purposes); Klem v. Cnty. of Santa 

Clara, 208 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that in a summary judgment motion, “the 

burden is on [the employer] to demonstrate its entitlement to an exemption from the overtime 

provisions of the FLSA.”). 

The FLSA is a broad remedial statute designed to eliminate “labor conditions detrimental 

to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and 

general well-being of the workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). It was designed to “aid the unprotected, 

unorganized and lowest paid of the nation’s working population; that is, those employees who 

lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure for themselves a minimum subsistence wage.” 

Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945). Accordingly, the FLSA “is to be 

liberally construed to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with Congressional direction.” 

Leever v. Carson, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Klem, 208 F.3d at 1089). 

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Exemptions, on the other hand, are disfavored, and not given generous application. They are to 

be construed narrowly against the employers asserting them. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 

462 (1997). 

An employer claiming an exemption under the FLSA faces a heightened burden of proof. 

The employer must do more than merely meet the usual preponderance of evidence standard in 

order to prevail; he must show that the employee fits “plainly and unmistakably” within the 

exemption’s terms. Hagadorn v. M.F. Smith & Assoc., Inc., 172 F.3d 878, No. 97-1446, 1999 

WL 68403, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 1999) (unpublished table decision) (“Moreover, the 

employer’s burden is heightened beyond the usual preponderance standard, such that the 

employer must show that the employee fits ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within the exemption’s 

terms.”); Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960) (“We have held that these 

exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their 

application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms or 

spirit.”) 

Defendants have not submitted any evidence to show they are entitled to the 500 man day 

exemption for the relevant year. Similarly, this Court does not find Defendants' argument that 

Steven Davis Farms, LLC is automatically entitled to a 500 man day exemption for 2008 

compelling. Ordinarily, a new business would be entitled to the 500 man day exemption 

automatically if it had no employees during the previous year. However, this is only true if the 

new entity is indeed a new entity and not a continuation of a pre-existing employer. See, e.g., 

IUAIW v. Ruiz, No. B–83–270, 1991 WL 315133, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1991) (denying a 

newly incorporated company the small-business exemption under the AWPA because it was 

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simply a reconstructed and continuing version of an earlier entity).5

 Here Steven Davis Farms, 

LLC never acted independently from Davis in his individual capacity. As Davis’ bookkeeper 

noted, there was regular comingling of the assets of the individual accounts of Steven Davis 

Farms, LLC and Davis. Defendants are not entitled to an exemption where Steven Davis Farms, 

LLC was an extension of Davis’ previous business. 

Defendants next argue that the H-2A workers are not entitled to reimbursements for their 

travel and subsistence costs because Plaintiffs did not complete 50% of the contract, as required 

by the H-2A program regulations. This contention is legally misguided. The federal 

regulations which govern the H-2A program dictate that an employer shall provide transportation 

or reimburse the costs of inbound transportation and subsistence en route for any worker who 

completes 50% of the contract period. 20 C.F.R. § 655 102(b)(5)(i).6

 Although the regulations 

only require reimbursement for inbound transportation and subsistence costs after a worker 

completes 50% of the contract period, to the extent that these expenses reduce the worker’s 

earnings below the minimum wage, the employer is obligated to reimburse those expenses 

during the first week. Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002).7 

Furthermore, Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to an exemption under the H2A regulations because of an “act of God” is inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ claims. While the H-2A 

regulations do mention an “act of God,” it is mentioned in conjunction with the employer’s 

ability to terminate the work contract prematurely, not to circumvent payment obligations under 

 

5

 Although this case involves the Agricultural Workers’ Protection Act (hereinafter “AWPA”), the statute 

incorporates by reference FLSA’s 500 man day exemption in 29 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2), the jurisprudence relating to 

the exemption applies equally for both statutes. 

6

 The regulation citation changed in 2010; the new citation is 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(h)(l). 

7 Arriaga concerned expenditures which could not be credited against the employers’ minimum wage obligations 

under Section 3(m) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), because they were primarily for the benefit 

of the employer. Arriaga, F.3d at 1235-37. The same section 3(m) principles apply with regard to employer’s 

obligations to pay other legally mandated wages, such as the adverse effect wage rate. See Wage and Hour 

Memorandum No. 99-03, February 11, 1999, at 3. 

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the FLSA. For example, if a worker is no longer needed due to fire, weather, or other “act of 

God” that makes fulfillment of the contract impossible, the employer may terminate the contract 

but nonetheless fulfill the 3⁄4 guarantee for the period prior to contract termination. 20 C.F.R. § 

655.122(o). However, Defendants’ right to terminate the contract due to an “act of God” is not 

at issue here. Plaintiffs are demanding compliance with Defendants’ minimum wage 

obligations; these obligations are not excused due to fire, weather, or other “act of God.” Group 

I Plaintiffs are asking for transportation and visa expenses, and Group II and III Plaintiffs are 

asking for transportation and visa expenses as well as unpaid wages. The “act of God” argument 

proposed by Defendants is not applicable to the expenses and wages claimed by Plaintiffs. 

EMPLOYER STATUS

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated the FLSA, the Florida Minimum Wage Act, Fla. 

Stat. § 448.101 et seq., and the federal H-2A regulations, 20 C.F.R § 655.11 et seq. Defendants 

argue they were not “employers” of Plaintiffs under any of these laws. The FLSA, Florida 

Minimum Wage Act, and the federal H-2A regulations all contemplate that a worker may be 

“employed” by more than one employer. The FLSA imposes obligations on those entities which 

“employ” workers. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207. Under the FLSA, an entity “employs” an individual 

if it “suffers or permits” the individual to work. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). The Courts have held 

that the definition of “employ” under the H-2A regulations is similar to the definition provided 

by the FLSA. See Guijosa-Silva v. Roberson, No. 7:10–CV–17 (HL), 2012 WL 860394, *19 

(M.D. Ga. Mar. 13, 2012); see also Hernandez v. Two Bros. Farm, LLC, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 

1383 (S.D. Fla. 2008). In 2008 the regulations governing the H-2A program defined employer 

as follows: 

Employer means a person, firm, corporation or other association or organization which 

suffers or permits a person to work and (1) which has a location in the United States to 

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which U.S. workers may be referred for employment, and which proposes to employ 

workers at a place within the United States; and (2) which has an employer relationship 

with respect to employees under this subpart as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, 

fire, supervise or otherwise control the work of any such employee. 

20 C.F.R. § 600.100(b) (1987) (emphasis added).8

 Therefore, an entity found to employ workers 

under the FLSA is also an employer for those workers under the H-2A contracts. In GuijosaSilva, the court explained the relationship as follows: 

Federal regulations defining the employer/employee under H-2A are almost 

identical to the standards set by the FLSA. An H-2A employer is defined as one 

who ‘suffers or permits’ a person to work. 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(b). Such an 

employer is characterized by his ability to ‘hire, pay, fire, supervise or otherwise 

control the work of such employee.’ Id. These factors are almost identical to the 

factors that are used to determine whether an employer falls within the FLSA 

definitional scope. Therefore the Court deems that, for the same reasons that Sid 

Roberson and W[endel Roberson Farms] are deemed to be ‘employers’ within the 

context of the FLSA, they are also deemed to be ‘employers’ under the H-2A 

contracts. 

Guijosa-Silva, 2012 WL 860394, at *19. 

Since this lawsuit began, the Eleventh Circuit has clarified its position with respect to 

joint employment. The court in Layton v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 686 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 

2012), reviewed the joint employment factors set out in Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, Inc., 20 

F. 3d 434 (11th Cir. 1994). The Layton decision is only binding on non-agricultural cases. See

Layton, 686 F.3d at 1175. Layton left undisturbed both Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d. 925, 

932-33 (11th Cir. 1996) and Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999), and the 

reasoning of those cases continues to govern joint employment situations in agriculture. 

Applying two different joint employment tests to members of the same work crew could 

lead to incongruous results in this case, with the domestic workers able to recover against the 

grower under the principles of Antenor and Charles, while their H-2A co-workers, under exactly 

 

8

 The regulations have since been amended. The new citation is 20 C.F.R. § 655.103. 

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the same facts, are perhaps unable to so under Layton. Such disparate results would also 

contravene the purposes of the H-2A agricultural guestworker program. Ceneus was required to 

submit a job offer, or a clearance order, as part of her temporary labor certification to obtain 

permission to employ H-2A workers. This job offer was to be used to recruit both U.S. and H2A workers. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.101(b)(1) (1987). In this case, the H-2A farmworkers did work 

alongside domestic farmworkers. Some of the payroll records submitted by Defendants in their 

response to summary judgment did, in fact, list domestic farmworker Anite Labrousse as a 

plaintiff. SDF Supplement 000291 and 000293 at ECF No. 150-1. Restricting Defendants’ joint 

employment obligations to only AWPA-covered U.S. workers would create an incentive for 

employers to hire only H-2A workers instead of domestic workers. This would run counter to 

the “obvious point” of the H-2A provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act: ensuring that 

U.S. workers are given a preference over foreign workers for jobs in this country. See Alfred L. 

Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 596 (1982); Elton Orchards, Inc. v. Brennan, 

508 F.2d 493, 500 (1st Cir. 1974).

The courts have traditionally applied a multi-factor test set out by the Department of 

Labor (“DOL”) in 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(A)-(G) to determine if an employer jointly 

employed its workers. These regulatory factors provide guidance in determining economic 

dependence and, ultimately, whether an employment relationship exists. Charles, 169 F.3d at 

1328-29. The courts have applied the same joint employment factors for both H-2A workers and 

domestic workers. See generally Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (Southeast), Inc., No. 1:06-

CV-2000-JEC, 2008 WL 754452 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2008). In applying these factors, the inquiry 

is not whether the worker is more economically dependent on one entity than another, with the 

winner avoiding responsibility as an employer. Instead, each employment relationship must be 

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evaluated separately to determine whether the putative employer has suffered or permitted the 

employee to work. Antenor, 88 F.3d at 932-33. Under an analysis of these factors, this Court 

finds that Davis is a joint employer of the H-2A workers as outlined below.

1. Davis controlled the work of the farmworkers.

The first factor identified in the DOL’s regulations evaluates whether the agricultural 

employer has the power, either alone or through control of the farm labor contractor, to direct, 

control, or supervise the workers or the work performed. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(A). 

In evaluating control in employment cases, courts evaluate the degree to which the 

putative employer has the right to control the work of the employee, regardless of whether this 

power was actually exercised. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 957 

(1989). Control may be exercised indirectly as well as directly. “In an agricultural setting, ‘the 

grower is not expected to look over the shoulder of each farmworker every hour of every day. 

Thus it is well settled that supervision is present whether orders are communicated directly to the 

laborer or indirectly through the contractor.’” Charles, 169 F.3d at 1330 (citing Antenor, 88 F.3d 

at 935). In evaluating the degree of control exercised by a potential employer, courts will 

consider “specific indicia of control,” such as decisions regarding employment, whom to assign 

to specific tasks, how to design the management structure, when work should begin on a 

particular day, whether a worker should be disciplined, whether the agricultural employers were 

free to delay or stop the workers directly from continuing their work, and whether the 

agricultural employers could assign work to specific workers indirectly. Id. at 1329-31. Courts 

may also consider factors such as the degree to which the potential employer oversees the 

activities of the workers and provides direction, and whether the potential employer supplies the 

workers with the containers upon which piece-rate earnings are based. Id. 

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Davis exceeded the control threshold set forth in Charles and Antenor. From the 

beginning, Davis played an active role in making decisions and overseeing the workers. He 

controlled the major stages in the production cycle, such as site preparation, planting, weed 

control, fertilization, and harvest. The process started with site preparation which includes land 

testing. Davis made all the preparation decisions, including disking the land and soil testing. 

After the land was prepared, the planting process began. Davis made all the decisions regarding 

when to begin planting and which crops to pick in a particular year. He planted peas and butter 

beans, purchased seeds from a broker, and assumed the risk of loss. After planting, Davis 

decided when to apply fertilizer, how much to fertilize, and which areas of the field to fertilize. 

Davis also decided on the appropriate time to begin plowing and how often to plow. Davis 

decided when the crop was ready to begin harvesting, and whether to use machine or manual 

harvesters to harvest certain crops. 

Davis also made important management decisions. Although Bontemps was responsible 

for bringing Plaintiffs to the farm, it was ultimately Davis who made the decisions regarding 

when to harvest and what fields Plaintiffs should harvest on a particular day, and whether 

Bontemps needed to split his crew between the field and the packing shed. 

Davis exercised direct supervision and direct control over Plaintiffs. Davis visited the 

field several times a day to check on Plaintiffs’ progress, and often picked with Plaintiffs, 

throwing beans into their buckets. Plaintiffs picked beans and placed them in five gallon 

buckets, which were furnished and owned by Davis, before emptying the beans into sacks, which 

were also furnished and owned by Davis. Additionally, Davis instructed the crews (Farmworker 

Plaintiffs) on how to pick peas, pointing out if some were too young to be picked. Davis also 

decided the number of times Plaintiffs were required to pick in a field, and whether Plaintiffs 

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15 

needed to go through the same field two, three, or four times. On certain occasions, Davis 

notified a crew leader if a Plaintiff was picking the beans incorrectly. Davis’ control was not 

limited to the fieldwork; he also personally oversaw Plaintiffs’ work in the packing house. 

Based on the numerous examples of control and supervision outlined in the preceding 

paragraphs, this Court finds Davis had full control of his farming business. 

2. Davis had the power to modify employment conditions and determine pay rates 

of the workers. 

The second factor set in the DOL regulations examines whether the putative employer 

has the right to hire or fire workers, modify the workers’ employment conditions, or determine 

the rates or method of payment. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(B). As with control, the focus is 

on the putative employer’s power or authority to exercise these functions should it be in its best 

interest to do so, regardless of whether this power is ever exercised. The retention of power is as 

revealing of the workers’ economic dependence on the putative employer as is actual exercise of 

power. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 11,734, 11,740 

(Mar. 12, 1997). 

Davis exercised a substantial amount of control over hiring and firing decisions, 

employment conditions, and rates and methods of payment. Davis directly determined the piecerate pay for various types of produce picked at the farm, and determined when to pay Plaintiffs 

an hourly rate instead of piece rate. Davis delegated the task of finding a picking crew to harvest 

the beans to Bontemps and Ceneus, and therefore indirectly enjoyed the rights to hire, fire, and 

modify the employment conditions of the workers. As mentioned above, Davis prepared the 

land, plowed, decided when to fertilize the field, knew the appropriate time to begin planting, 

and directed Bontemps to have Plaintiffs harvest the beans on certain dates. Davis further 

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16 

exercised his power to modify Plaintiffs’ conditions by deciding when Plaintiffs would begin 

picking, where they would pick, and for how long. 

Additionally, Davis, with the assistance of Ceneus, hired H-2A workers for the 2008 

season. Davis found out about the H-2A program through a leadership conference and decided 

to use the program for the 2008 season and approached Ceneus for assistance. He helped Ceneus 

fill out the H-2A applications, and Ceneus did the “legwork” to obtain the H-2A visas for guest 

workers to work in Davis’ fields and packing shed. Furthermore, Davis wrote a letter to the 

Department of Labor for Ceneus to be allowed to recruit labor under the H-2A program to work 

on Davis’ farm. Davis was very involved in the hiring of workers, the employment conditions of 

workers, and the payment process. 

3. The duration of the parties’ relationship. 

The third factor in the DOL regulation evaluates the degree of permanency and the 

duration of the relationship of the parties, in the context of the agricultural activity at issue. 29 

C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(C). Where a labor contractor and its crew are engaged for the duration 

of the operation and are obligated to work for or be available only to the putative employer at its 

discretion, this suggests economic dependence. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker 

Protection Act, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,740. Some courts have considered the duration of the parties’ 

relationship as an issue and have found that “[h]arvesting of crops is a seasonal industry without 

much permanence beyond the harvesting season. However temporary the relationship may be . . 

. the relationship is permanent [if] the migrants work only for [the] defendants during that 

season.” Haywood v. Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568, 589 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (quoting Donovan v. 

Gillmor, 535 F. Supp. 154, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1982). Based on this analysis, the H-2A Plaintiffs 

were economically dependent on Davis. 

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As mentioned above, Davis participated in the H-2A program in 2008. Group I H-2A 

Plaintiffs were obligated under contract to work exclusively for Davis for the 2008 beans season. 

While the Group II and III Plaintiffs were not obligated to work for Davis, they were brought to 

Davis’ farm and worked exclusively for Bontemps, who testified he worked exclusively for 

Davis. H-2A workers who are admitted temporarily to the United States to work for a specific 

employer are isolated by both geography and language, making the permanency of their 

relationship even more solidified. The geographic isolation of Plaintiffs in a rural area, the 

unlikely possibility that the Plaintiffs would have found other work given their limited language 

ability and knowledge of the area, and the record evidence showing Plaintiffs worked exclusively 

for Davis all weigh in favor of a finding of permanency and economic dependence. 

4. Bean picking is unskilled, rote work. 

Another indicator of employment status is the extent to which the services rendered are 

repetitive or rote tasks requiring little skill. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(D). The lower the 

worker’s skill level, the lower the value and marketability of his services, and the greater 

likelihood of his economic dependence on the person utilizing these services. Migrant and 

Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,740-41. In addition, unskilled 

jobs, particularly those performed on a piece-rate basis, require less direct supervision. See

Antenor, 88 F.3d at 935. 

Picking and grading beans is extremely simple work. The job requires no experience and 

can be learned instantly. Picking beans is a repetitive and rote task requiring relatively little 

training; thus, the workers are economically dependent on the employer. See Charles, 169 F.3d 

at 1332. 

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5. Bean picking is an integral part of Davis overall business. 

The fifth factor set out in the Department of Labor’s regulations examines whether the 

activities performed are an integral part of the overall business of the agricultural employer. 29 

C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(E). A worker who performs a routine task that is a normal and integral 

part of the grower’s production is likely to be dependent on the grower’s overall production. See 

Antenor, 88 F.3d at 937; Charles, 169 F.3d at 1332-33. Davis testified that harvesting is a 

crucial step in the process of farming because without harvesting he would not have any produce 

to sell. ECF No. 134-1, Exh. 20. Plaintiffs were therefore dependent on Defendants because 

harvesting beans is an integral part of Davis’ business. 

6. The work was performed on Davis’ premises. 

 The sixth factor set out in the Department of Labor’s regulations considers whether the 

work is performed on the premises of the putative employer. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(F). 

This element reveals the worker’s dependence on an entity because without the land, the 

employee might not have work. In addition, the business owning the land “will likely be able to 

prevent labor law violations, even if it delegates hiring and supervisory responsibilities to labor 

contractors.” Antenor, 88 F.3d at 936-37. Plaintiffs worked exclusively on Davis’ premises. 

7. Davis undertook responsibilities that are ordinarily performed by employers. 

 The final factor identified by DOL evaluates whether the putative employer undertakes 

responsibilities ordinarily performed by an employer, including preparing payroll records, 

issuing paychecks, providing workers’ compensation insurance or providing field sanitation 

facilities or tools for use by the workers. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(G). A putative employer 

voluntarily assuming responsibility for workplace obligations imposed on employers indicates 

voluntary assumption of employer status for other purposes, and is relevant to whether or not the 

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employees were economically dependent on the putative employer for a workplace protection or 

benefit. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,736. 

Furthermore, such behavior indicates it is in the interest of the putative employer to perform 

these functions, rather than to rely on the labor contractor. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 

Worker Protection Act, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,741. 

 Federal regulations issued under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) require 

agricultural employers to provide toilets, drinking water, and hand washing facilities at 

worksites. 29 C.F.R. §1928.110(c). Davis rented the port-a-potties and sinks for the workers to 

use in the fields, and provided housing for the workers. Davis voluntarily assumed the employer 

status by providing these accommodations and undertaking responsibilities ordinarily performed 

by an employer. 

 The analysis of the above factors weighs in favor of a finding that Davis is a joint 

employer. Defendants, however, argue that they are not joint employers, relying primarily on the 

decision in Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (11th Cir. 1994). However, the 

Aimable decision is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In Aimable, the farmer made 

decisions how many acres to pick but had infrequent oversight over the workers. Id. at 441. The 

Aimable decision involved a case where the crewleader had “absolute, unfettered, and sole 

control over [the workers] and their employment.” Id. at 440-41. Referencing the decision in 

Leach v. Johnston, 812 F. Supp. 1198, 1203, 1207 (M.D. Fla. 1992), the court found “control 

when the farmer goes beyond general instructions such as how many acres to pick in a given day, 

and begins to assign specific tasks, to assign specific workers, or to take an overly active role in 

the oversight of the work.” Aimable, 20 F.3d at 441. 

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 Defendants, unlike the farmer in Aimable, did exercise direct control and supervision 

over the workers. Davis would visit the field several times a day to check on the workers’ 

progress. He would routinely pick with the workers, throwing beans into their buckets. Davis 

also instructed the crews on how to pick peas, telling them if some were too young to be picked. 

Davis also decided the number of times the workers got to pick in a field and whether the 

workers needed to go through the same field two, three, or four times. Additionally, Davis was 

present in the packing house overseeing the workers. 

 Furthermore, in Aimable, the crew leader was responsible for setting compensation. In 

the instant case, Davis controlled compensation. Even if analyzed under the factors set out in 

Aimable, Defendants are joint employers. There is no issue of material fact as to whether 

Defendants are joint employers. 

 The last consideration regarding joint employment involves Group II and III Plaintiffs. 

Defendants have argued that Davis is not the employer of Group II and Group III Plaintiffs who 

were brought to the United States after being recruited by Willy Paul Edouard and Pierre Avesca. 

Defendants’ main argument with respect to Group II and III Plaintiffs is that Davis’ farm was not 

listed as Plaintiffs’ worksite on the work order. Furthermore, Defendants originally argued that 

with the exception of two of the Group II Plaintiffs (Wislain Wilson Orelus and Gesner 

Duverny) none of the Group II Plaintiffs worked on the farm. Defendants contradicted this 

argument in their opposition to H-2A plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and admitted that 

several of the Group II Plaintiffs did in fact work on the farm under the supervision of Bontemps. 

Further, two Group II Plaintiffs, Olibrice Orelus and Mickelson Lacour, appeared on a 

Department of Labor investigation of Davis’ operations. ECF No. 134-42.9

 Although workers 

 

9

 A separate report from the Department of Labor finds that “[b]ased on all available evidence [Willy Paul Edouard] 

[was] issued an approval by the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration to furnish 60 

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had the burden to prove they worked on the farm, they satisfied this burden by testifying that 

they worked for Bontemps. See Antenor, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 1378 (noting that pickers can 

establish that they worked on defendant farm through indirect means short of being able to 

identify the farmer). Bontemps testified that he worked exclusively for Davis during the 2008 

harvest season. ECF No. 131-4, 69. Therefore, the record reflects that Defendants are joint 

employers with respect to the Group I, Group II, and Group III H-2A Plaintiffs. 

Defendants’ Violations of the FLSA and H-2A Regulations

 The H-2A Farmworker Plaintiffs seek summary judgment only on the issues relating to 

reimbursement of visa and transportation expenses under the FLSA and unpaid wages under the 

FLSA and Florida Minimum Wage Act for the Group II and III Plaintiffs. Each will be 

discussed separately. 

Transportation and Visa Expenses

This Court finds that because Davis was a joint employer along with Ceneus and 

Bontemps, he was responsible for reimbursing each of the H-2A Plaintiffs’ transportation and 

visa expenses. Each of the H-2A Plaintiffs incurred costs obtaining an H-2A visa and in 

traveling from Haiti to the United States. Under the FLSA, the Plaintiffs’ employers were 

obligated to reimburse these expenses during the first week of work to the extent that these costs 

reduced the Plaintiffs’ earnings below the FLSA minimum wage. See Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. 

Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d. 1228, 1241-44 (11th Cir. 2002); Moreno-Espinosa v. J & J AG Prods., 

Inc. 247 F.R.D. 686, 689 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“[U]nder the 11th Circuit case law workers must be 

reimbursed for pre-employment expenses in the first week of employment.”). Plaintiffs were 

entitled to receive wages at least equal to the adverse effect wage rate for their labor: the wage 

 H-2A workers to Larry Rogers. Facts indicate that you actually recruited and furnished these workers to Cabioch 

Bontemps, an unregistered farm labor contractor. Mr. Bontemps then provided these workers to Steve(n) [sic] Davis 

Farms, LLC. ECF No. 188-2. 

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level that Defendants should have exceeded during Plaintiffs first week of work after accounting 

for the visa and transportation costs. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(9)(i). See also Avila-Gonzalez v. 

Barajas, No. 2:04CV567-FTM-33DNF, 2006 WL 643297, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2006). 

However, because of the expenses they incurred in obtaining and traveling to the job, the 

Plaintiffs arrived at the jobsite “in the hole.” These expenses were never reimbursed by the 

Defendants. See Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1237. The undisputed record evidence reflects that the 

following expenses were incurred by the Plaintiffs primarily for the benefit of Davis, none of 

which were reimbursed: 

 Visa Application fee. Like Plaintiffs in Arriaga, Plaintiffs were required to pay $131 for 

the issuance of a visa once the application was approved. 22 C.F.R. § 22.1. 

 Travel from Port au Prince to Miami. The workers were required to travel from Port au 

Prince to Miami, Florida, in order to secure employment in the United States. The cost of 

the plane ticket was $405.70. ECF No.134-45. 

Defendants did not dispute this evidence and because Davis employed the H-2A 

Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA and the H-2A regulations, Davis was jointly and 

severely responsible for these reimbursements, along with Ceneus.10

Defendants have not presented any issues of material fact with respect to the cost paid by 

Plaintiffs for transportation and visa expenses. In fact, Defendants’ own payroll records do not

indicate that Plaintiffs were reimbursed for their transportation and visa costs. (SDF SUPP Bates 

# 000116-000117 at ECF No. 150-1). Transportation costs are typically paid by the employer. 

 

10 The H-2A Plaintiffs previously argued that there was no issue of fact with respect to the Group II and III workers 

receiving their recruitment or travel expenses. That argument was based on Defendants’ almost blanket denial that 

Group II and III workers ever worked on the farm. Defendants admitted, however, that several Group II and III 

workers were present at the farm in their Opposition to H-2A Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Despite 

that admission, Defendants have not submitted names or payroll records to challenge Group II Plaintiffs’ affidavits. 

Thus, there is no longer an issue of fact with respect to these workers. 

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Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1241-44. 

Calculations for the Group I Plaintiffs’ transportation and visa fee reimbursements are 

calculated using hours from the payroll records submitted by Defendants. There are no payroll 

records present for the Group II or III Plaintiffs; however, these Plaintiffs have submitted 

estimates which have not been rebutted by Defendants. This Court finds that all the H-2A 

Plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement of their travel and visa expenses. 

Unpaid Wages for Group II and III H-2A Plaintiffs

The Group II and III H-2A Plaintiffs have established through their testimony and 

Affidavits that they worked for Bontemps during the 2008 season. Bontemps testified on the 

record that he worked exclusively for Steven Davis Farms in 2008. The Plaintiffs have met their 

burden in proving they have worked on Davis’ farm and have provided affidavits indicating the 

length of the time they worked at Davis’ farm and the hours they worked during the 2008 

harvesting season. 

In order to prove a violation of the FLSA, an employee bears the initial burden of proving 

that he performed work for which he was not properly compensated. Anderson v. Mt.Clemons 

Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). In Anderson, the Supreme Court explained the burden as 

follows: 

[A]n employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact 

performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he 

produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work 

as a matter of just and reasonable inference. The burden then shifts to the 

employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work 

performed or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference 

drawn from the employees’ evidence. If the employer fails to produce 

such evidence, the court may then award damages to the employee even 

though the result be only approximate. 

Anderson, 328 U.S. at 686-88. 

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Courts must accept evidence submitted by plaintiffs as the “most accurate basis possible 

under the circumstances,” and are required to draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. 

Id. at 688-693. Plaintiffs have submitted estimates of time they worked at Davis’ farm, including 

time spent waiting for Davis’ fields to dry before they were able to start picking. Under the 

FLSA, “[c]ompensable hours worked . . . include time during which employees are required to 

be present at the worksite.” Birdwell v. Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802, 807 (11th Cir. 1992). See also

Fields v. Luther, No. JH–84–1875, 1988 WL 59963, at *15 (D. Md. May 4, 1988) (finding that 

time spent in fields waiting for the dew to dry is compensable under the FLSA); Wales v. Jack 

M. Berry, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1290 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Vega v. Gasper, 886 F. Supp. 

1335, 1338-40 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (finding farmworkers entitled to be paid from when they arrive 

at the field until they departed). 

Because Defendants have offered no pay records with respect to these Plaintiffs, this 

Court accepts Plaintiffs’ estimates. See, e.g., Reeves v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 616 F.2d 1342, 

1352 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming judgment for the plaintiff where “totals corresponded to the 

rough computations of his subconscious mind”); Marshall v. Mammas Fried Chicken, Inc., 590 

F.2d 598, 599 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing district court’s rejection of “reconstructed employee 

hours” where some had been shown to be “inaccurate” because “[a]lthough the evidence was not 

perfectly accurate, it provided a sufficient basis to calculate the number of hours worked by each 

employee.”); Olivas v. A Little Havana Check Cash, Inc., 324 Fed. Appx. 839, 844 (11th Cir. 

2009) (rejecting an employer’s complaint that damages “lack[ed] sufficient precision” where 

“[employer] did not present any evidence as to the amount of work [plaintiff] performed or to 

rebut her [damages]” and affirming damage award although plaintiff “admitted [her calculations] 

were inaccurate.”). 

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Although Defendants argue that Group II Plaintiffs were paid in full by Bontemps, 

Defendants have not submitted any evidence to support this assertion. Ceneus’ declaration does 

not mention any of the Group II or III Plaintiffs. Likewise, Bontemps’ declaration does not refer 

to the Group II or III Plaintiffs. Defendant Davis, as a joint employer for Group II and III 

Plaintiffs, had an obligation to pay workers their wages. See Maldonado v. Lucca, 629 F. Supp. 

483, 486 (D.N.J. 1986); Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp. 621, 626 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding 

farmer liable when crew leader absconded without paying the crew). Plaintiffs are entitled to 

receive lost wages up to the adverse effect wage rate, which was $8.82 in 2008, and liquidated 

damages up to the Florida minimum wage. Plaintiffs are entitled to receive wages at least equal 

to the adverse effect wage rate for their labor. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(9)(i). 

This Court expressly determines that there is no reason for delay and expressly directs the 

entry of judgment as set out in this order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(4). This is particularly true 

where, as here, counsel has indicated that Plaintiffs are likely to abandon the balance of their 

claims. In any event, unless and until Plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss the balance of their claims, 

the case will go forward on all remaining claims. Moreover, Plaintiffs may apply for an award 

of attorney’s fees and costs in light of this judgment. 

For these reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED: 

The H-2A Farmworker Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 134, 

is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the H-2A Farmworker Plaintiffs 

against Defendants, Steven M. Davis and Steven Davis Farms, LLC, jointly and severally, for 

transportation and visa reimbursements for each H-2A Plaintiff in the amount of $21,294.49, and 

Case 1:10-cv-00096-MW-GRJ Document 241 Filed 07/01/14 Page 25 of 37
26 

judgment in the amount of $39,131.88, for wage damages for Group II and Group III Plaintiffs, 

for total judgment in the amount of $60,426.37.11 

More specifically, the Clerk shall enter judgment as follows: 

JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS FOR RECRUITMENT AND TRAVEL 

EXPENSE DAMAGES: 

 

Name of Plaintiff Amount of Judgment

Oddette Antoine $ 507.84 

Juslaine Auguste 483.34 

Jean Francois Cajour 493.84 

Edil Exainvil 507.84 

Gladys Geffrard 521.84 

Plenita Laurent 521.84 

Elin Medar (deceased) 476.34 

Marie Claudette Milien 500.84 

Emmanuel Mondesir 497.84 

Arold Pierre 423.84 

Jocelyne Pierre 486.84 

Derdine Riodin 514.84 

Claude Sejour 493.84 

 Richerson Sejour 511.34 

Jean Robert Sejour 423.84 

 Jodany Sejour 493.84 

Manouche Sejour 581.34 

 

11 For a detailed description of the amounts due each H-2A Plaintiff, see attached Addendum. 

Case 1:10-cv-00096-MW-GRJ Document 241 Filed 07/01/14 Page 26 of 37
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Lysner Valcin 469.34 

Wislain Wilson Orelus 1,011.23 

Jimmy Jean-Louis 810.24 

Genser Elta Duverney 1,382.85 

St. Juste Saintamand Orelus 1,276.75 

Mikelson Lacour 930.95 

Lalanne Guerrier 1,249.70 

Negus Almoner 1,462.85 

Olibrice Orelus 1,011.23 

Ronald Jean 1,080.89 

Brunet Martin 1,277.63 

Modeline Sejour 889.55

Total Recruitment & Travel Expenses $21,294.49 

JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS FOR WAGE DAMAGES: 

Name of Plaintiff Amount of Judgment

Wislain Wilson $3,276.16 

Jimmy Jean-Louis 483.91 

Gesner Elta Duverney 5,916.20 

St. Juste Saintamand Orelus 5,044.96 

Mikelson Lacour 2,010.60 

Lalanne Guerier 3,130.10 

Negus Almonor 4,317.15 

Olibrice Orelus 3,276.16 

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Ronald Jean 4,185.24 

Brunet Martin 7,367.44 

Modeline Sejour 123.96

Total Wage Damages: $39,131.88 

SO ORDERED on July 1, 2014. 

 s/Mark E. Walker 

 United States District Judge 

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29 

ADDENDUM

TABLE A: RECRUITMENT AND TRAVEL EXPENSE DAMAGES GROUP I 

PLAINTIFFS

Amount Owed = Estimated Wages Earned + Pay Received During First Week + Visa and Plane 

– Actual Wages Paid. 

Estimated wages due = Hours on payroll records (ECF No. 150-1, at 31-35) multiplied by the 

AEWR of $8.82. Plaintiffs are entitled to $8.82 per hour under the precedent in Arriaga. Arriaga

concerned expenditures which could not be credited against the employers’ minimum wage 

obligations under Section 3(m) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), because 

they were primarily for the benefit of the employer. Arriaga, F.3d at 1235-37. These same 

section 3(m) principles apply with regard to employer’s obligations to pay other legallymandated wages, such as the adverse effect wage rate. See Wage and Hour Memorandum No. 

99-03, February 11, 1999, at 3. 

Actual Wages Paid = Hours reported as paid on Defendants’ payroll records week ending May 

30, 2014. 

Oddette Antoine 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $245.00 $507.84 

Juslaine Auguste 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages Pid Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $269.50 $483.34 

Jean Francois Cajour 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $259.00 $493.84 

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Edil Exainvil 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $245.00 $507.84 

Gladys Geffrard 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $231.00 $521.84 

Plenita Laurent 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $231.00 $521.84 

Elin Medar 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $276.50 $476.34 

*Plaintiff has 

passed away. See 

Notice of Death 

(D.E. 134) 

 

Marie Claudette Milien 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $252.00 $500.84 

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Emmanuel Mondesir 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $255.00 $497.84 

Arold Pierre 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $329.00 $423.84 

Jocelyne Pierre 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $266.00 $486.84 

Derdine Riodin 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $238.00 $514.84 

Claude Sejour 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $259.00 $493.84 

Richerson Sejour 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $241.50 $511.34 

Case 1:10-cv-00096-MW-GRJ Document 241 Filed 07/01/14 Page 31 of 37
32 

Jean Robert Sejour 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $329.00 $423.84 

Jodany Sejour 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $259.00 $493.84 

Manouche Sejour 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $171.50 $581.34 

Lysner Valcin 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

– Based on 

Payroll Records 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$216.09 $536.75 $283.50 $469.34 

For a total of $8,910.62 for the Group I Plaintiffs’ reimbursement for transportation and visa 

expenses.

12 

Damages for Reimbursement of Travel and Visa Expenses for Group II and III Plaintiffs

Amount Owed = Estimated Wages Earned + Transportation (Visa and Plane) – Actual Wages 

Paid. 

Estimated wages due = Plaintiffs’ own estimations multiplied by 2008 adverse effect wage rage 

of $8.82. 

 

12 Plaintiff Elin Medar is deceased. His damages are included in the $21,294.49 judgment. However, should a 

personal representative not be appointed by August 12, 2014, this Court will consider his claim void and the 

judgment reduced accordingly. 

Case 1:10-cv-00096-MW-GRJ Document 241 Filed 07/01/14 Page 32 of 37
33 

Actual Wages Paid = Clients’ estimations of wages paid during 1st work week. 

Wislain Wilson Orelus 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$564.48 $536.75 $90.00 $1,011.23 

Jimmy Jean-Louis 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

273.49 $536.75 $0.00 $810.24 

Genser Elta Duverney 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

926.10 $536.75 $80.00 $1382.85 

St.Juste Saintamand Orelus 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

740.88 $536.75 $0.00 $1,276.75 

Mikelson Lacour 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$529.2 $536.75 $135.00 $930.95 

Lalanne Guerrier 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

712.95 $536.75 $0.00 $1249.70 

Negus Almonor 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

926.10 $536.75 $0.00 $1,462.85 

Case 1:10-cv-00096-MW-GRJ Document 241 Filed 07/01/14 Page 33 of 37
34 

Olibrice Orelus 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$564.48 $536.75 $90.00 $1,011.23 

Ronald Jean 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$679.14 $536.75 $135.00 $1,080.89 

Brunet Martin 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$740.88 $536.75 $0.00 $1,277.63 

GROUP III

Modeline Sejour 

Estimated Wages 

Earned During 

First Work Week 

Amount Paid for 

Plane Ticket and 

Visa Processing 

Actual Wages 

Paid 

Amount Owed 

$352.8 $536.75 $0.00 $889.55 

For a total of $12,383.87 in Transportation and visa expense reimbursement for Group II and III 

workers. 

TABLE B GROUP II and III PLAINTIFFS WAGE DAMAGES

Hours Worked = Based on Plaintiffs’ estimations 

Estimated H-2A Wages Earned = Plaintiffs estimations of hours multiplied by the adverse 

effect wage rate of $8.82 

Actual Amount Paid = Plaintiffs’ estimation of amount paid 

Unpaid H-2A Wages = Estimated H-2A Wages – Actual Amount Paid 

Estimated Minimum Wage Earned = Plaintiffs estimation of hours x 2008 Florida 

minimum wage of $6.79 

Total Wage Damages = Unpaid H-2A Wages + Unpaid Minimum Wage 

Case 1:10-cv-00096-MW-GRJ Document 241 Filed 07/01/14 Page 34 of 37
35 

Wilsain Wilson Orelus 

Harvest Hours 

Worked 

Estimated 

H-2A 

Wages 

Earned 

Actual 

Amount 

Paid 

Unpaid 

H-2A 

Wages 

Estimated 

Minimum 

Wage 

Earned 

Unpaid 

Minimum 

Wage 

Total Wage 

Damages 

(offered + 

Fla. 

Liquidated)

2008 256 $2257.92 $360.00 $1897.92 $869.12 $1897.92 $3276.16 

Jimmy Jean-Louis 

Harvest Hours 

Worked 

Estimated 

H-2A 

Wages 

Earned 

Actual 

Amount 

Paid 

Unpaid 

H-2A 

Wages 

Estimated 

Minimum 

Wage 

Earned 

Unpaid 

Minimum 

Wage 

Total Wage 

Damages 

(offered + 

Fla. 

Liquidated) 

2008 31 $273.42 $0.00 $273.42 $210.49 $210.49 $483.91 

Gesner Elta Duverney 

Harvest Hours 

Worked 

Estimated 

H-2A 

Wages 

Earned 

Actual 

Amount 

Paid 

Unpaid 

H-2A 

Wages 

Estimated 

Minimum 

Wage 

Earned 

Unpaid 

Minimum 

Wage 

Total Wage 

Damages 

(offered + 

Fla. 

Liquidated) 

2008 420 $3704.40 $320.00 $3384.40 $2851.80 $2531.80 $5916.20 

St. Juste Saintamand Orelus 

Harvest Hours 

Worked 

Estimated 

H-2A 

Wages 

Earned 

Actual 

Amount 

Paid 

Unpaid 

H-2A 

Wages 

Estimated 

Minimum 

Wage 

Earned 

Unpaid 

Minimum 

Wage 

Total Wage 

Damages 

(offered + 

Fla. 

Liquidated) 

2008 216 $1905.12 $540.00 $1365.12 $1557.36 $1017.36 $5044.96 

Mikelson Lacour 

Harvest Hours 

Worked 

Estimated 

H-2A 

Wages 

Earned 

Actual 

Amount 

Paid 

Unpaid 

H-2A 

Wages 

Estimated 

Minimum 

Wage 

Earned 

Unpaid 

Minimum 

Wage 

Total Wage 

Damages 

(offered + 

Fla. 

Liquidated) 

2008 180 $1587.60 $405.00 $1182.60 $1233.00 $828.00 $2010.60 

Case 1:10-cv-00096-MW-GRJ Document 241 Filed 07/01/14 Page 35 of 37
36 

Lalanne Guerrier 

Harvest Hours 

Worked 

Estimated 

H-2A 

Wages 

Earned 

Actual 

Amount 

Paid 

Unpaid 

H-2A 

Wages 

Estimated 

Minimum 

Wage 

Earned 

Unpaid 

Minimum 

Wage 

Total Wage 

Damages 

(offered + 

Fla. 

Liquidated) 

2008 120 $1058.40 $270.00 $788.40 $865.20 $595.20 $3130.10 

Negus Almonor 

Harvest Hours 

Worked 

Estimated 

H-2A 

Wages 

Earned 

Actual 

Amount 

Paid 

Unpaid 

H-2A 

Wages 

Estimated 

Minimum 

Wage 

Earned 

Unpaid 

Minimum 

Wage 

Total Wage 

Damages 

(offered + 

Fla. 

Liquidated) 

2008 315 $2778.30 $300.00 $2478.30 $2138.85 $1838.85 $4317.15 

Olibrice Orelus 

Harvest Hours 

Worked 

Estimated 

H-2A 

Wages 

Earned 

Actual 

Amount 

Paid 

Unpaid 

H-2A 

Wages 

Estimated 

Minimum 

Wage 

Earned 

Unpaid 

Minimum 

Wage 

Total Wage 

Damages 

(offered + 

Fla. 

Liquidated) 

2008 256 $2257.92 $360.00 $1897.92 $1303.68 $1378.24 $3276.16 

Ronald Jean 

Harvest Hours 

Worked 

Estimated 

H-2A 

Wages 

Earned 

Actual 

Amount 

Paid 

Unpaid 

H-2A 

Wages 

Estimated 

Minimum 

Wage 

Earned 

Unpaid 

Minimum 

Wage 

Total Wage 

Damages 

(offered + 

Fla. 

Liquidated) 

2008 462 $4074.84 $810 $3264.84 $1730.40 $920.4 $4185.24 

Brunet Martin 

Harvest Hours 

Worked 

Estimated 

H-2A 

Wages 

Earned 

Actual 

Amount 

Paid 

Unpaid 

H-2A 

Wages 

Estimated 

Minimum 

Wage 

Earned 

Unpaid 

Minimum 

Wage 

Total Wage 

Damages 

(offered + 

Fla. 

Liquidated) 

2008 504 $4445.28 $250.00 $4195.28 $3422.16 $3172.16 $7367.44 

Case 1:10-cv-00096-MW-GRJ Document 241 Filed 07/01/14 Page 36 of 37
37 

GROUP III WAGE DAMAGES

Modeline Sejour 

Harvest Hours 

Worked 

Estimated 

H-2A 

Wages 

Earned 

Actual 

Amount 

Paid 

Unpaid 

H-2A 

Wages 

Estimated 

Minimum 

Wage 

Earned 

Unpaid 

Minimum 

Wage 

Total Wage 

Damages 

(offered + 

Fla. 

Liquidated) 

2008 40 $352.80 $250.00 $102.8 $271.6 $21.16 $123.96 

For a total of $39,131.88 in Group II and III wage damages. 

* 

Case 1:10-cv-00096-MW-GRJ Document 241 Filed 07/01/14 Page 37 of 37