In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-22-00013-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 355th District Court

Hood County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR14472

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr

ROBERT WESLEY KITCHING, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After Robert Wesley Kitching pleaded guilty to four counts of a six-count 

indictment and tried punishment to a jury, the jury assessed the following sentences: 

99 years’ confinement for aggravated sexual assault; 20 years’ confinement for 

attempted aggravated sexual assault; and 15 years’ confinement for each of 2 

indecency-with-a-child offenses. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15.01 

(attempt), § 21.11(a)(1) (indecency), § 22.021(a)(1)(B), 2(B) (aggravated sexual assault).

The jury also assessed a $10,000 fine for each of the four counts. The trial court 

ordered the four sentences to run concurrently.1 Kitching appealed.2

1

The trial court signed four judgments in the same cause number.

2

Kitching pleaded guilty according to a charge bargain with the State; charge

bargains bar most appeals. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2) (providing that in pleabargain case, appellant can appeal only (1) matters raised by written motion and ruled 

on before trial, (2) with the trial court’s permission, or (3) as expressly permitted by 

statute); Kennedy v. State, 297 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Although the 

trial judge here marked on the appeal certifications that Kitching had waived his right 

to appeal guilt, the trial judge also marked that Kitching had not entered into a plea 

bargain for “punishment.” In light of the certifications, the trial judge’s assurance to

Kitching that he had “an absolute right to appeal,” and the trial judge’s immediate 

appointment of an appellate attorney at the conclusion of trial, we determine that the 

trial judge impliedly gave Kitching permission to appeal punishment matters. See, e.g.,

Benavides v. State, Nos. 02-21-00168-CR, 02-21-00169-CR, 2022 WL 15053332, at *1 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 27, 2022, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication); Franklin v. State, No. 02-20-00159-CR, 2022 WL 803840, 

at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 17, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication); Craven v. State, Nos. 02-11-00089-CR, 02-11-00090-CR, 2012 WL 

2036449, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 7, 2012, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication). But cf. Marsh v. State, Nos. 02-21-00150-CR, 02-

21-00151-CR, 2023 WL 2178406, at *4–5 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2023, no 

pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding from different facts 
3

Kitching’s court-appointed appellate attorney has filed a motion to withdraw as 

counsel and a brief in support of that motion. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 

744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Counsel’s brief and motion meet the 

requirements of Anders, which requires presenting a professional evaluation of the 

record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. Id., 87 S. Ct. at 

1400. Kitching’s counsel provided him with a copy of the Anders brief and her motion 

to withdraw, notified him of his right to file a pro se response and to file a petition for 

discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals, and provided him with a form 

motion to access the appellate record. The trial court provided Kitching with a copy 

of the appellate record, and he filed a brief response stating that although he did “not 

wish to pursue the [a]ppeal for errors,” he wanted this court “to look into [his] 

sentence . . . for a reduction of time.” The State did not file a brief or other response.

We have fulfilled our duty to independently examine the record. See Stafford v. 

State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.); see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 

S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). After doing so, we have determined that the appeal is wholly 

frivolous and without merit. Our independent review of the record reveals nothing 

that trial judge’s handwritten notations on appeal certification did not indicate 

permission to appeal). But to provide guidance for those who prepare appeal 

certifications, we note that the appeal-certification form provides a specific choice for 

the trial judge in such a circumstance: that the case “is a plea-bargain case, but the trial 

court has given permission to appeal, and the defendant has the right of appeal.”
4

that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006). Therefore, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr

Elizabeth Kerr

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: April 27, 2023