* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

FEB 13 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

CLARINDA MONAHAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WAL-MART STORES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97-6139

(D.C. No. CIV-96-706-T)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before PORFILIO, KELLY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.
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Clarinda Monahan was shopping in a Wal-Mart Super Center in Yukon,

Oklahoma, when several plastic laundry baskets fell off the top shelf of a display

counter and struck her on the head and arms. Claiming neurological and other

injuries that had made her unemployable, Monahan brought this diversity action

against Wal-Mart, contending that the incident resulted from Wal-Mart’s

negligence and seeking over $500,000 in compensatory damages. The case

proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict for Wal-Mart. Ms. Monahan

appeals.

Ms. Monahan first contends that the district court erred in rejecting her

request for a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction. We review a district court’s

decision whether to give a particular instruction for abuse of discretion, but

review de novo whether the instructions as a whole correctly stated the governing

law and provided the jury with an adequate understanding of the issues and

applicable standards. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1442

(10th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1997)

(No. 97-232). 

“Res ipsa loquitur is a pattern of proof which may be followed when an

injury is alleged to have been negligently inflicted and the harm is shown not to

occur in the usual course of everyday conduct unless a person who controls the

instrumentality likely to have produced that harm fails to exercise due care to
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prevent its occurrence.” Harder v. F.C. Clinton, Inc., 948 P.2d 298, 302-03

(Okla. 1997) (footnotes omitted). To be entitled to the benefit of the res ipsa

loquitur doctrine, a plaintiff must first prove, among other things, that the

defendant had exclusive control over the instrumentality that caused the injury. 

See id. at 303 n.12. The district court concluded Ms. Monahan had not shown

that Wal-Mart had exclusive control over the baskets. The baskets were sitting on

what is called a “riser,” the top level of a display shelf. Evidence indicated that

risers are generally only six feet high and that customers remove items from the

risers. Ms. Monahan points to testimony indicating that the risers are eight feet

tall, but this testimony described risers in a different department in the store. The

district court noted that the store was open twenty-four hours a day and that

customers had access to the baskets on the riser. We see no error in the court’s

refusal to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur. 

Ms. Monahan next contends that the district court erred in making several

evidentiary rulings. We review a district court’s admission or exclusion of

evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc.,

3 F.3d 1419, 1433 (10th Cir. 1993). To prove that Wal-Mart had notice of the

dangerous condition of the baskets, Ms. Monahan wanted to introduce evidence of

other accidents at Wal-Mart stores involving falling merchandise. The court

limited admissible evidence to accidents similar to this one, that is, falling plastic
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containers at this particular Wal-Mart, because “whether items are safely

displayed necessarily depends on the items involved,” and “the manner in which

items were displayed in other Wal-Mart locations is not relevant” to her claim. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 334. Ms. Monahan has failed to demonstrate that this

limitation was an abuse of the court’s discretion. She next contends that the court

erred by excluding evidence of certain Wal-Mart corporate safety policies, but the

only one she specifically refers to is an accident reduction plan not scheduled to

go into effect until a year after this accident happened. Again, we see no abuse of

discretion in the court’s ruling. Plaintiff also contends that the court erred by not

striking certain portions of a videotaped deposition. However, she does not

explain why this testimony should have been excluded or how it prejudiced her,

nor does it appear that she raised this particular point to the district court prior to

the objectionable testimony being presented to the jury. This contention is clearly

without merit. 

Finally, Ms. Monahan contends that Wal-Mart’s discovery abuses prevented

her from receiving a fair trial. She apparently suspects that Wal-Mart did not

produce all requested documents during discovery and that it unreasonably

delayed producing others. She fails to identify, however, any alleged error by the

district court in this matter, an obvious prerequisite to any relief from this court. 
-5-

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

John C. Porfilio 

Circuit Judge
Henry, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.

As the district court noted, the question of the exclusive control element of

the res ipsa loquitur pattern of proof was “a perfectly debatable matter.” In my

view, the debate has become closer with the issuance of a recent opinion by the

Oklahoma Supreme Court which was not available to the trial court at the time of

its decision. See Harder v. F.C. Clinton, Inc., 948 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997). Both

in its restatement of the law on this matter and its application to a unique fact

pattern, I believe this case clarifies and perhaps expands Oklahoma law on res

ipsa loquitur patterns of proof.

In Harder, Justice Opala, writing for the Court, listed the “foundation facts”

which should be shown for a res ipsa loquitur pattern of proof.

The foundation facts to be shown are: (a) an injury that does not

occur in the usual course of everyday conduct; (b) the defendant

exclusively controlled the instrumentality that caused the injury; (c)

evidence of the true explanation for the harm’s occurrence is more

accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff; and (d) the

circumstances surrounding the harmful event are not likely to

produce an injury unless the defendant fails to exercise due care to

prevent its occurrence.

Id. at 303 n.12. The court goes on to explain that

[t]he effect of the res ipsa loquitur evidentiary rule is merely to raise

a rebuttable inference which allows a plaintiff to take the case to the

jury and thus avoid a directed verdict for the defendant. Where the

proof is conflicting or subject to different inferences, some of which

are in favor of and others against the applicability of res ipsa

loquitur, the question must be left to the jury. It is only when one of

the foundation facts is irrefutably negated that the necessary prop
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may be deemed knocked out from under the sine qua non predicate

for application of the res ipsa proof pattern.

Id. at 303-304 (footnotes omitted).

Though a close question, I see the conflicting testimony in this case as

creating the kind of fact question the Oklahoma Supreme Court described above. 

Consequently, I would, with the hindsight benefit of Oklahoma’s most recent

exposition on this subject, send this question to a jury.