NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LORENZO VASQUEZ VASQUEZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

 Respondent.

No. 22-991

Agency No.

A206-547-375

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 16, 2023**

Portland, Oregon

Before: TALLMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District 

Judge.

***

Petitioner Lorenzo Vasquez Vasquez seeks reversal of the final order of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal and affirming 

the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying his application for 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 22 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 22-991

cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under 

the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 

U.S.C. § 1252. Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this appeal, we 

do not recite them here. We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition.

“Where the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather 

than adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, 

except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Rodriguez v. Holder, 

683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). We review factual findings 

related to eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT for 

substantial evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 

25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (CAT protection); Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 

1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021) (asylum and withholding of removal).

1. To be eligible for cancellation of removal, a petitioner must show in 

part that they are a person of good moral character during the ten years 

immediately preceding the application. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). 

Petitioner urges this court to assert jurisdiction over the IJ’s finding that 

Petitioner lacks good moral character and is therefore ineligible for cancellation 

of removal. However, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes our jurisdiction 

over discretionary moral character determinations under the “catchall” provision 

of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). And on appeal Petitioner fails to raise a colorable legal 

or constitutional question. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see Martinez-Rosas v. 

Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005).
3 22-991

2. To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner must either file an application

within one year of arrival or show that the petitioner is eligible for an exception 

to the deadline. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D). It is undisputed that Petitioner 

entered the United States in 2000 and did not apply for asylum until 2015. 

Before the agency, he unavailingly argued he was eligible for an exception. In 

his opening brief, Petitioner does not challenge the agency’s determination that 

he failed to timely apply for asylum and focuses instead on his risk of 

persecution. Because Petitioner chose not to address the agency’s 

determination that his asylum application is time barred, he has waived the issue 

on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring opening briefs to contain 

all arguments). 

We also find that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination 

that Petitioner failed to establish his eligibility for withholding of removal. 

Petitioner failed to adduce evidence of past persecution and the BIA 

appropriately found that evidence that other members of Petitioner’s family who 

also owned land continued to live in Mexico unharmed undermined Petitioner’s 

contention landowners in his hometown and of his ethnic background would 

likely be persecuted. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 

2006) (noting that “[t]o qualify for withholding of removal, an alien must 

demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he would be subject to 

persecution on one of the specified grounds”).

3. To be eligible for CAT protection, a petitioner must show that “it is 
4 22-991

more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed 

country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “The same ‘more likely than 

not’ standard applies to CAT protection as it does to withholding of removal; 

however, for CAT protection, the harm feared must meet the definition of 

torture.” Sharma 9 F.4th at 1067 (quoting Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 

1095 (9th Cir. 2010)). Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the harm he fears 

meets the definition of torture or that he would be tortured if removed to 

Mexico. Instead, he points generally to country conditions reports showing 

conditions in Mexico have deteriorated. Accordingly, his CAT claim fails.

PETITION DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.