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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

:

RONALD HARVEY DOTSON, :

:

Appellant : No. 992 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order May 22, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Criminal Division No(s).: CP-41-CR-0000373-2012

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED DECEMBER 12, 2014

Appellant, Ronald Harvey Dotson, appeals from the order entered in 

the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas modifying his Intermediate 

Punishment (“IP”) sentence based on two curfew violations of his house 

arrest.1 Appellant’s counsel, Kirsten A. Gardner, Esq. (“Counsel”), of the 

Lycoming County Public Defender’s Office, has filed with this Court a petition 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court did not revoke Appellant’s IP, but ordered him to serve the 

remainder of electronic monitoring/house arrest term in prison. See 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9773(a) (providing court may at any time increase or decrease 

conditions of county intermediate punishment), 9773(c) (stating court shall 

not revoke or increase conditions of county intermediate punishment 

without hearing at which court shall consider initial sentencing proceeding 

and defendant’s conduct while serving county intermediate punishment).
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to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).2 We grant 

Counsel’s petition and affirm the order.

On July 31, 2012, Appellant pleaded guilty to driving while operating 

privilege is suspended or revoked (“DUS”) and two counts of driving under 

the influence (“DUI”).3 On March 6, 2014,4the trial court imposed sentence 

as follows: (1) for DUI, five years’ Intermediate Punishment, with six months 

to be served on electronic monitoring at home and eligibility for work release 

or work crew; and (2) for DUS, a consecutive ninety days’ incarceration in 

the Lycoming County Prison, all of which may be served on the electronic 

monitoring.

Approximately two-and-a-half months later, on May 22, 2014, the 

court convened a hearing at which a probation officer (“PO”) alleged that 

Appellant twice violated the curfew conditions of his in-home electronic 

monitoring by leaving his house. The PO also averred that while detaining 

Appellant, Appellant admitting to using heroin, but the PO did not administer 

a urine test. The parties then agreed to the following: the PO withdrew the 

allegation of heroin use, Appellant admitted the curfew violations, and 

 

2

In lieu of an appellee’s brief, the Commonwealth has filed a letter 

indicating it is relying on the trial court opinion.

3 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1543(b)(1), 3802(a)(1), (b).

4 The record reveals a series of continuances resulting in the one year and 

seven month lapse until sentencing.
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Appellant would serve the remainder of his “time at the pre-release facility” 

at the Lycoming County Prison. The court did not revoke Appellant’s IP, but 

ordered that he serve the remainder of his electronic monitoring term at the 

county prison’s pre-release center, with work release. The court ordered, 

“So in essence you got 9 months, but you got credit for all the time you 

spent on in-home detention[ and in prison.]” N.T., 5/22/14, at 3. Appellant 

stated that he agreed and understood, and the hearing concluded without 

any objection from Appellant. Id. at 3-4.

Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion, but took this timely 

appeal and complied with the court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement.

We first consider Counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation. 

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc). This Court has summarized,

Counsel must: 1) petition the court for leave to withdraw 

stating that, after making a conscientious examination of 

the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would 

be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the brief to the 

defendant; and 3) advise the defendant that he or she has 

the right to retain private counsel or raise additional 

arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the court’s 

attention.

Id. (citation omitted). Additionally,

in the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed 

counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations 

to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set 
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forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and 

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal 

is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009)).

In the instant matter, Counsel’s petition to withdraw states she “has 

made a conscientious examination of the record and believes the appeal is 

frivolous,” informed Appellant of her intention to withdraw and his “need . . . 

to obtain new counsel or proceed pro se,” and provided him with a copy of 

her petition to withdraw and brief. Counsel’s Pet. for Permission to 

Withdraw as Counsel, 8/26/14. Counsel has also attached a copy of a letter 

to Appellant, stating the same.

In her brief, Counsel presents one issue: whether the court abused its 

discretion in imposing a manifestly excessive sentence. Counsel advances 

Appellant’s claim that the court failed to consider “that this was his first 

violation since his release date of April 24, 2014, and therefore [the court’s] 

modification of sentence was unduly harsh and manifestly excessive.” 

Anders Brief at 10. Counsel cites relevant decisional authority on the abuse 

of discretion standard for reviewing a sentence and concludes this issue is 

frivolous. Counsel recounts that at the hearing, Appellant admitted the 

curfew violations of his house arrest and stated his agreement with the PO’s 

proposal that he serve the remainder of his house-arrest term in prison. 

Counsel also reasons that the sentence modification was within the 
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sentencing guideline range, did not affect the length of the sentence, and 

“merely changed the place of confinement from house arrest to incarceration 

at the pre-release center.” Id. at 11.

We hold Counsel has complied with the requirements of Santiago. 

See Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1032. We thus independently consider 

Appellant’s sentencing claim.

“The right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not 

absolute.” Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1274 (Pa. Super. 

2006). “[I]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must 

be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial 

court during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection 

to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court reasoned that Appellant has waived any challenge 

to the discretionary aspects of his sentence by failing to object at sentencing 

or in a post-sentence motion. Our review of the sentencing transcript and 

the record confirms that Appellant did not object. Accordingly, we agree this 

issue is waived from our review. See id.

Finding no relief due on Appellant’s sentencing issue, we grant 

Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the order modifying Appellant’s IP 

sentence.

Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/12/2014