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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

THOMAS CLEVELAND WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 5:10-cv-83-RS-GRJ

LT. KARLA JO BROCK,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff initiated this case by filing a pro se, in forma pauperis, prisoner civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is proceeding pursuant to an Amended

Complaint. Doc. 21. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Florida Department of

Corrections. The Defendant, Lt. Brock, is the administrator of the Washington County

Jail. Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated his constitutional rights in connection

with a probation violator sentence imposed in Washington County, and that Defendant’s

actions caused Plaintiff to serve an extra 162 days in state prison on an expired

sentence. Now pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary

judgment, Docs. 49 and 50. Each party has responded in opposition to the other’s

motion. Docs. 50, 54. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends

that both motions for summary judgment be denied. 

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Background and Allegations of Complaint

Plaintiff has a complicated custodial history, which may be summarized as

follows. See Docs. 49, 50. Plaintiff was convicted of second degree murder and arson

in Washington County, and was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment and five years of

probation. Plaintiff entered the Department of Corrections (DOC) on this sentence in 1

July 1993. He was released on July 1, 1999, and his Washington County probation

commenced. Doc. 49, Exh. A & B.

On May 7, 2001, the state court issued an arrest warrant charging Plaintiff with

violating the conditions of probation (the “VOP warrant”) by failing to submit a monthly

report, failing to pay the cost of supervision, failing to obtain consent to change his

residence, and failing to provide proof of community service. Id. Exh. C. 

On July 14, 2002, Plaintiff was arrested in Pasco County on drug and arson

charges, and also on the Washington County VOP warrant. He was arraigned on all

charges, including the VOP, and was committed to the custody of the Sheriff of Pasco

County. Id. Exh. D & E.

On September 27, 2002, the U.S. Marshal Service (USMS) notified the Pasco

County Jail of a detainer stemming from controlled-substance and firearms offenses in

the Middle District of Florida. Id. Exh. F. Plaintiff was released to the USMS on

December 13, 2002, and the USMS was advised of the Washington County hold on

Plaintiff. Id. Exh. G & H. 

On May 2, 2003, Plaintiff was sentenced to 97 months in federal prison. He was

It appears that Plaintiff’ s sentence w ould be characterized as a “ probationary split

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sentence,” meaning a period of incarceration follow ed by a period of probation. See, e.g., M oore v.

Stephens, 804 So2d 575, 577 (Fla. 5 DCA 2002).

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released on February 20, 2009. Plaintiff was transported to Washington County Jail,

where the VOP warrant was executed on February 21, 2009. Id. Exh. J. 

Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the VOP charges, pursuant to a plea agreement that

provided for “credit for prior prison and jail time.” Doc. 50, Exh. I. Plaintiff was

adjudicated guilty on February 26, 2009, and sentenced to three years in state prison,

with credit for time served. Doc. 49, Exh. K. Specifically, by checking a box on the

judgment and commitment form, the court ordered that Plaintiff receive “original jail

credit.” Although the form provides a space for the court to fill in the number of days of

jail credit, the parties agree that the court did not determine the number of days at

sentencing. The court also checked the box on the form directing the DOC to “apply 2

the original jail time credit and to compute and apply credit for time served and the gain

time awarded pursuant to section 944.275 Florida Statutes.” Id. Exh. K; Doc. 50 Exh.

A. 

After the hearing, Defendant completed a certification to the DOC reflecting that

Plaintiff was “originally incarcerated in county jail” on February 21, 2009, that he was

“arrested on violation of supervision” on February 21, 2009, and that he was sentenced

on February 26, 2009. Doc. 49, Exh. L. Defendant also completed a memorandum to

the Washington County Clerk of Court certifying that Plaintiff was entitled to six days of

jail credit “for time spent in the Washington County Jail or as directed by the Circuit

Court Judge.” Doc. 50 at 31. 

Defendant contends that during his VOP hearing the court stated: “Mr. Williams

Defendant’ s Exhibit K reflect s, how ever, that “ 6" is filled in as the number of days of

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count y jail credit aw arded. Doc. 49, Exh. K. On Plaintiff’ s copy of the original judgment and

commitment, the form is blank. Doc. 50, Exh. A.

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this court is awarding you enough credit time served to go to the North West Florida

Reception Center, get processed in and processed out in the same day. It’s been a

very long 17 years, good luck.” Doc. 21. Plaintiff alleges that he asked the court

whether “all present incarceration” meant 2418 days credit , and the judge replied that

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he did not know the exact number of days and that he would “send it to the Washington

County Jail for them to compute,” but that he would also prepare a transport order for

March 2, 2009, allegedly so that Plaintiff could be with his family on that afternoon. Id. 

Plaintiff was processed into the DOC on March 2, 2009, but was not immediately

processed out. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that after he entered DOC custody he

learned that Defendant had made an error in computing the credits on his sentence,

although he does not specify when he learned of the error. Doc. 21. 

On May 5, 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion to correct illegal sentence in Washington

County Circuit Court, arguing that he had not received all credit toward his sentence

that the court had intended. Doc. 50, Exh. I. The court granted the motion at a hearing

on August 10, 2009, and amended Plaintiff’s judgment and commitment by handwriting

“plus other prison time not awarded 2412 days,” next to the paragraph directing the

DOC to apply original jail time credit and compute and apply credit for time served and

gain time. The amended judgment also reflects that Plaintiff was entitled to “6 days” of

“original jail credit”. Plaintiff was returned to the Washington County Jail, his paperwork

It appears that this figure is derived from Plaintiff’ s belief that he w as entitled to 2412

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days (from the July 14, 2002, Pasco Count y arrest through February 20, 2009, w hen he w as

released from federal prison) plus the six days that Plaintiff served in the W ashington Count y Jail

pending his VOP hearing and commitment to DOC. See Doc. 50, Exh. I (motion to correct illegal

sentence). Defendant Brock maintains that Defendant w as entitled to credit for the time previously

served in state prison on the second degree murder charge. See Doc. 49 at 8.

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was finalized, and he was released. Doc. 50, Exh. M.4

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that as a consequence of Defendant’s actions

he served 162 days in prison from March 2, 2009, through August 10, 2009, beyond the

time that he should have served for the VOP sentence. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

violated his “rights to freedom and everything that comes with that right.” For relief,

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Doc. 21. 

Summary Judgment Motions

Defendant contends that she is entitled to summary judgment because she was

not legally responsible for computing credit for time served on Plaintiff’s VOP sentence. 

Instead, pursuant to state law, the sentencing court is responsible for calculating the

number of days of jail credit to award at sentencing, and the DOC calculates the

number of days of credit for prior prison service and gain-time after a convicted person

is received into custody. Defendant, as the jail administrator, has the statutory

obligation to certify in writing to the DOC the date the sentence was imposed, the date

the prisoner was delivered to the DOC, and the date and reason for any period spent at

liberty after sentencing, and Defendant in this case did so. Doc. 49 (citing Fla. Stat.

§ 921.161(2)). 

Defendant concedes, through counsel, that Plaintiff may have been entitled to

more than six days of jail credit for the time he spent in Washington County Jail, taking

into account the 152 days Plaintiff spent in Pasco County Jail between his arrest as a

Plaintiff is presently confined in the DOC pursuant to a 2010 Pasco Count y controlled4

substance conviction. He has a current release date of M arch 21, 2012, but also has a pending

federal detainer in the M iddle District of Florida. See DOC Inmate Population Information;

w w w .dc.state.fl.us.

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probation violator on July 14, 2002, and his transfer into federal custody. Under that

scenario, Plaintiff would have been entitled to a total of 158 days of jail credit toward his

three-year VOP sentence. Defendant reiterates that it was the sentencing court’s

responsibility to make that determination. Defendant further argues that it was the

DOC’s failure to award Plaintiff his prior prison credit that caused him not to be released

immediately after being processed into DOC. Doc. 49.

In opposition to Defendant’s motion and in his own summary judgment motion,

Plaintiff disputes that Defendant did not have the responsibility to calculate his jail

credit. Plaintiff argues that the Washington County Jail records (appended to his

motion) showed that he was arrested on the VOP warrant on July 14, 2002, and that

Defendant should have looked at the jail’s records in order to determine the correct

arrest date that was certified to the DOC. Plaintiff contends that failure to review the

records amounts to “deliberate indifference” on Defendant’s part. Plaintiff argues that

when Defendant received the incomplete commitment form from the sentencing court,

she should either have sent it back to the sentencing court for the court to award the

correct amount of credits, or she should have sent it to the DOC so that the DOC could

contact the court to award the time. Plaintiff argues that the Florida Statutes and the

U.S. Constitution compel such action. Docs. 50, 52. 

Summary Judgment Standard of Review

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the entry of summary

judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that “there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” In applying this standard, the Court must examine the pleadings, depositions,

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answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits and other

evidence in the record “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Samples on

Behalf of Samples v. Atlanta, 846 F. 2d 1328, 1330 (11 Cir. 1988). As the Supreme

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Court held in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the moving party bears the

initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a triable issue of fact. If the movant is

successful on this score, the burden of production shifts to the non-moving party who

must then come forward with “sufficient evidence of every element that he or she must

prove.” Rollins v. Techsouth, 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). The non-moving

party may not simply rest on the pleadings, but must use affidavits, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, or other admissible evidence to demonstrate that a material

fact issue remains to be tried. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250

(1986); Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 785-86 (11 Cir. 2005). th

DISCUSSION

Initially, the undersigned observes that neither party makes a compelling

argument that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because the motions are

devoid of any discussion of the relevant legal standard governing Plaintiff’s

constitutional claim.

In any section 1983 action, the initial inquiry must focus on whether two essential

elements are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a

person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether the conduct deprived a person

of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other

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grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-331 (1986); see also Duke v.

Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1403 (11th Cir.1993) (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535). There is

no dispute that Defendant was a person acting under color of state law. The critical

factor in this case is what standard governs Defendant’s conduct for purposes of

determining whether she should be held liable for any violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.

Plaintiff’s underlying constitutional right is well-established. When a prisoner's

sentence has expired, he is entitled to release. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781,

791 (5th Cir. 1969) (“There is no privilege in a jailer to keep a prisoner in jail beyond the

period of his lawful sentence.”) (citations omitted); Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d

1558, 1562–63 (11th Cir.1993), modified 15 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir.1994) (finding “[t]he

constitutional right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been

known that the detainee was entitled to release” a well recognized § 1983 claim)

(citations omitted); Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir.1980) (stating

“[d]etention of a prisoner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the

absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due

process.”).

Courts are divided as to whether this right is founded in the Fourteenth

Amendment’s due process clause or the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel

and unusual punishment. See McCurry v. Moore, 242 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1178-80 (N.D.

Fla. 2002) (discussing cases). In Cannon, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit held that a

§ 1983 claim for false imprisonment may be made under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

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Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1562 (“[C]ontinued detention in the face of repeated protests will

deprive the accused of liberty without due process.”). However, as the court pointed

out in McCurry, Cannon concerned a pretrial detainee who was detained based upon a

misidentification. In the instant case, as in McCurry, Plaintiff was a sentenced prisoner

and therefore the Eighth Amendment would be applicable to his claims. See McCurry,

242 F.Supp.2d at 1179; Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1989);

Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9 Cir. 1985). Under either a due process th

or Eighth Amendment analysis, “[t]he threshhold for liability . . . is the same,” the

Plaintiff must establish subjective culpability on the part of the Defendant. McCurry,

242 F.Supp.2d at 1180; see Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1563 (“a showing of deliberate

indifference is required to establish a violation of substantive due process rights

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 

In Sample, the Third Circuit assessed a similar claim under the Eighth

Amendment, stating “[w]e think there can be no doubt that imprisonment beyond one’s

term constitutes punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Sample,

885 F.2d at 1108. As to whether such punishment is “cruel and unusual,” the Court

concluded that “detention for a significant period beyond the term of one’s sentence

inflicts a harm of a magnitude similar to that involved in [Estelle v. Gamble].” Id. at

1109. “Accordingly, we hold that there can be no Eighth Amendment liability in this

context in the absence of a showing of deliberate indifference on the part of the

defendant to whether the plaintiff suffers an unjustified deprivation of his liberty.” Id. at

1110. The Court assessed the Eighth Amendment claim in that case against the

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following test:

To establish § 1983 liability in this context, a plaintiff must first

demonstrate that a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem

and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be,

inflicted. Second, the plaintiff must show that the official either failed to act

or took only ineffectual action under circumstances indicating that his or

her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to

the prisoner's plight. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal

connection between the official's response to the problem and the

infliction of the unjustified detention.

Id.

Sample provides an appropriate framework for the analysis of Plaintiff’s claims in

this case. The starting point for this analysis is Defendant’s subjective knowledge

regarding Plaintiff’s arrest date and incarceration history. Defendant’s summary

judgment motion relies heavily on contrasting her limited statutory duty to certify

Plaintiff’s dates in county custody with the sentencing court’s obligation to determine the

actual number of days of “jail time credit to be awarded for time served between the

date of arrest as a violator and the date of recommitment,” and with the DOC’s

responsibility for “calculating the credit for all other time previously served on the prior

sentence for the offense for which the offender is being recommitted.” Doc. 49 at 6. 

According to Plaintiff’s allegations, the sentencing court specifically directed that the

Washington County Jail would make the determination. While Defendant asserts that

the sentencing court was obligated by statute to make the determination, the record is

clear that the Defendant did certify to the Clerk of Court that Plaintiff was entitled to only

six days of jail credit. Doc. 50 at 31. What remains unclear is what procedures are

mandated when the jail receives a commitment order that is silent as to the number of

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days of jail credit being awarded, or what Defendant subjectively understood her duties

to be upon receipt of the commitment order. Defendant did not provide an affidavit in

support of the summary judgment motion. Receipt of a commitment order that is

missing a key provision arguably gives rise to knowledge that there is a problem with a

prisoner’s sentence, and thus a risk that unwarranted punishment could be inflicted. 

See Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110.

As to the second part of the Sample test, Plaintiff alleges that the Washington

County Sheriff had records reflecting his Pasco County arrest on the VOP warrant and

his continued detention by state and federal authorities pursuant to the Washington

County VOP hold. Doc. 50. Defendant conceded in her responses to Plaintiff’s

interrogatories that she did not review these files in connection with certifying Plaintiff’s

jail credit. Id. at 84. If, under the circumstances, those documents were necessary to

correctly certify Plaintiff’s jail credit to the Clerk of Court, then arguably a reasonable

jury could conclude that Defendant’s failure to review the records was a product of

deliberate indifference to the risk that Plaintiff might be subject to unwarranted

imprisonment due to an error in the certification. See Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110.

As to the third part of the Sample test – causation – it cannot be determined on

this record precisely what factors were involved in the sentencing court’s determination

of time credits, or in the DOC’s application of such credits to Plaintiff’s sentence upon

intake. Defendant “assumes” that the sentencing court ultimately awarded the 2412

days of credit on the VOP sentence for time previously served on the second degree

murder charge. Doc. 49 n.3. While Defendant further contends that it is immaterial

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how the sentencing court awarded the credit because Defendant was not responsible

for making the calculation, an understanding of how Plaintiff’s sentence was ultimately

determined would greatly aid this Court’s consideration of the parties’ claims and

defenses. The record is devoid of any transcripts or documents from the sentencing

court or from the DOC explaining how the court arrived at the conclusion that Plaintiff

was entitled to 2412 days of credit, or how the DOC applied such credits. On this

record, Defendant has not refuted Plaintiff’s claim that the credits were based on the

date of his Pasco County arrest and all subsequent incarceration. Plaintiff’s claim has

support in the record, because he made the same argument in his motion to correct his

sentence, and there is nothing in the record that suggests the sentencing court decided

the motion on a different basis. See Doc. 50 at 74.

In sum, the instant motions do not place their arguments within the framework of

the appropriate legal standard, which is tied to considerations of subjective culpability

that cannot be resolved in either parties’ favor on the basis of this record.

Consequently, because there remain unresolved issues of fact and neither party has

demonstrated that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law – on the record

presently before the Court – the motions for summary judgment are due to be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the parties’

motions for summary judgment, Docs. 49 & 50, be DENIED, and that this case be

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referred to the undersigned for further proceedings, including, if appropriate, the filing of

renewed and revised motions for summary judgment.

IN CHAMBERS this 2 day of February 2012. 

nd

s/Gary R. Jones 

GARY R. JONES

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

A party may file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations within 14 days after being served with a copy of this report and

recommendation. A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14

days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to file specific objections

limits the scope of review of proposed factual findings and recommendations.

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