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Case No. 4:10cv64-RH/GRJ

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

ROBERT L. ROWLAND,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 4:10cv64-RH/GRJ

DONNIE CONYERS,

LIBERTY COUNTY SHERIFF,

Defendant.

________________________________/

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This is a prisoner civil-rights case. The defendant has moved to dismiss on 

various grounds. This order grants the motion based on the statute of limitations. 

I

The plaintiff is Robert L. Rowland. The defendant is the Sheriff of Liberty 

County, Florida, in his official capacity. The pleading now before the court is the 

second amended complaint. The Sheriff has moved to dismiss. For purposes of 

the motion, the second amended complaint’s factual allegations must be taken as 

true. The allegations include the following. 
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The Sheriff operates the Liberty County Jail. Mr. Rowland entered the jail’s 

custody prior to January 8, 2006. On that day, Sheriff’s Department employees 

illegally took Mr. Rowland to work on a private residence, without pay. Mr. 

Rowland severed his thumb while using a defective saw. 

The Sheriff’s Department rendered no medical care. But by January 11, 

2006, Mr. Rowland was receiving treatment from Dr. D. Christian Berg, away 

from the jail. Mr. Rowland has not complained about the quality of care provided 

by Dr. Berg. Since that treatment, Mr. Rowland has remained in custody, but only 

in state facilities operated by the Florida Department of Corrections; he has not 

returned to the Liberty County Jail. 

II

Mr. Rowland seeks to recover on various grounds, not always set out clearly. 

He apparently asserts claims only under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the second amended 

complaint also could be read generously to also assert state-law claims. The gist of 

it is this. Mr. Rowland says he was illegally required to work without pay at the 

private residence, improperly required to use a defective saw, and improperly 

denied medical care, prior to seeing Dr. Berg.

Mr. Rowland delivered his original complaint to prison authorities for 

mailing on February 18, 2010. ECF No. 1 at 13. This case thus is properly treated 

as having been filed on that date.
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The Sheriff has moved to dismiss on various grounds including the statute of 

limitations. A complaint may be dismissed for failing to state a claim on which 

relief can be granted if the complaint shows on its face that it is barred by the 

statute of limitations. See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of 

Adjustment CSX Transp. N. Lines v. CSX Transp., Inc., 522 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th 

Cir.2008); Nguyen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, No. 12-11128, 2013 WL 

646410 (11th Cir. Feb. 22, 2013). 

III

The statute of limitations for Mr. Rowland’s § 1983 claims is four years. 

See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). The limitations 

period for any state-law claim is at most four years; it may be one year. See Fla. 

Stat. § 95.11(5)(g); Nicarry v. Eslinger, 990 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); 

Rogers v. Judd, 389 F. App’x 983 (11th Cir. 2010). 

The claims for being assigned to work at the private residence and for the 

resulting injury arose on January 8, 2006—the date when Mr. Rowland did the 

work and suffered the injury. By that date Mr. Rowland knew everything he 

needed to know to bring these claims. The claim arising from the denial of 

medical care arose by January 11, 2006—the date when Dr. Berg began treating 

Mr. Rowland. From that date forward, Mr. Rowland was not unconstitutionally 

denied care. And if he was denied care prior to that date as he alleges, he knew it 
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at the time; Mr. Rowland has not alleged any denial of care of a kind that could be 

discovered only later. 

The last applicable statute of limitations thus expired on January 11, 2010. 

Mr. Rowland filed this case more than a month later. His claims are barred.

IV

Mr. Rowland’s only response is that the limitations period was equitably 

tolled while he exhausted administrative remedies. Mr. Rowland’s original 

complaint included as exhibits his administrative filings and the responses. See

ECF No. 1 at 17-46. Mr. Rowland correctly asserts that the exhibits should also be 

considered part of the second amended complaint. See ECF No. 55 at 1-2. 

Serving additional copies of the same documents as exhibits to the second 

amended complaint would have served no purpose; such duplicative filings are 

routinely discouraged in this court. 

The administrative filings do not change the conclusion that this lawsuit is 

barred. Quite the contrary, the administrative filings confirm that the lawsuit is 

barred.

Mr. Rowland never filed a timely and proper grievance addressing any of the 

matters at issue in this lawsuit. Instead, Mr. Rowland filed grievances only within 

the Florida Department of Corrections—an entity with no control over, and no 

responsibility for, the Liberty County Sheriff or Liberty County Jail. Mr. Rowland 
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filed the grievances within a narrow time frame some three years after the events at 

issue—not promptly, as required by Florida law. See FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 

33-103.011 (2008) (“Informal Grievances – Must be received within a reasonable 

time of when the incident or action being grieved occurred”). And after the 

Department responded to the last of the grievances, Mr. Rowland still had nearly a 

year to file this lawsuit, without any equitable tolling. This is not a case where the 

administrative process interfered with Mr. Rowland’s ability to comply with the 

untolled statute of limitations.

Moreover, Mr. Rowland’s grievances complained primarily, if not entirely, 

not about the same things Mr. Rowland complains about in this lawsuit—being 

assigned to work at a private residence, severing his thumb, and being denied 

medical care—but rather about two related but different transgressions committed 

by different actors. First, Mr. Rowland complained about the failure of the Florida 

Department of Law Enforcement—an entity that investigates crimes—to properly 

investigate, for possible criminal prosecution, the improper assignment of Mr. 

Rowland to work on the private residence. Second, Mr. Rowland complained that 

he had suffered and was continuing to suffer retaliation for complaining about his 

treatment.

Mr. Rowland was required to exhaust any available administrative remedies 

for his alleged mistreatment at the Liberty County Jail. But a grievance directed to 
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the Department of Corrections was not an available remedy. The grievances 

belatedly and improperly filed with the Department of Corrections were not 

prerequisites to the filing of this lawsuit. The limitations period for filing this 

lawsuit was not tolled while those belated and improper grievances were pending.

This conclusion makes it unnecessary to decide whether the statute of 

limitations for a prisoner’s § 1983 action is tolled during the pendency of a timely 

and proper grievance that must be filed in order to exhaust administrative remedies 

and that interfere with the prisoner’s ability to file a timely lawsuit. Arguments 

can be mustered on both sides of that issue. 

The issue is governed by state law. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 

538-39 (1989); Leal v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections, 254 F.3d 1276, 1279-80

(11th Cir. 2001). A Florida statute lists circumstances that toll a statute of 

limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.051. Exhausting administrative remedies is not on 

the list. And by the statute’s explicit terms, the list is exhaustive: “No disability or 

other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those 

specified in this section . . . .” Id., § 95.051(2); see also Webb v. Chambly, 584 So.

2d 216, 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (stating that § 95.051 “limits tolling of statutes of 

limitations to the circumstances set out within”). There is much to be said for that 

approach; a statute of limitations is best when it is clear and easily applied. In the 
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absence of contrary Florida authority, this would strongly support the position that 

Mr. Rowland’s limitations period was not tolled. 

But there is other Florida authority. In Maschules v. Department of 

Administration, 523 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1988), the Florida Supreme Court held that a 

limitations period was equitably tolled on grounds not listed in § 95.051. This puts 

to rest the assertion that the statute’s list of tolling circumstances is exhaustive. 

Still, the court’s language suggested that equitable tolling is available only in 

circumstances far different from Mr. Rowland’s. The court said, “The doctrine [of 

equitable tolling] serves to ameliorate harsh results that sometimes flow from a 

strict, literalistic construction and application of administrative time limits 

contained in statutes and rules.” Id. at 1134. The court continued, “Equitable 

tolling is a type of equitable modification which ‘focuses on the plaintiff's 

excusable ignorance of the limitations period and on [the] lack of prejudice to the 

defendant.’” Id. (quoting Cocke v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 817 F.2d 1559, 1561 

(11th Cir.1987) (internal citations omitted)). The language provides little support 

for Mr. Rowland, who had ample time to file this lawsuit after the administrative 

process ended. Indeed, Mr. Rowland announced his intention to file a lawsuit, 

ECF No. 1 at 32—and said he was “in the process of” doing so, id. at 36—nearly a 

year before the untolled limitations period expired. This is a weak case for 

equitable tolling.
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There also are federal cases applying the law of other states and concluding, 

in circumstances unlike those here, that a limitations period was equitably tolled

while a plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies. See Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 

F.3d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 2011); Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2008); 

Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2000); Harris v. Hegmann, 198 

F.3d 153 (5th Cir. 1999). In Leal v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections, 254 F.3d 1276, 

1280 (11th Cir. 2001), the Eleventh Circuit noted the issue, but did not resolve it. 

None of these cases suggests that a limitations period is tolled by a prisoner’s 

untimely filing of grievances with a different agency, asserting different claims, 

than later asserted in an otherwise-untimely lawsuit. The cases do not help Mr. 

Rowland.

V

A statute of limitations, by definition, precludes consideration of a claim on 

the merits. The result almost always seems harsh. But there are good grounds for 

limitations periods: trials are better if memories are fresh; both sides benefit when 

disputes are promptly resolved; and at some point a defendant should be able to go 

forward without worrying about past transgressions. Equitable tolling prevents 

unduly harsh applications of a statute of limitations. It is not enough, though, that 

the plaintiff missed the deadline; otherwise a statute of limitations would serve no 

purpose at all. Here Mr. Rowland had ample time to file this lawsuit, but he chose 
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to wait until more than four years after the events at issue to do so. That was too 

late. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

The motion to dismiss, ECF No. 54, is GRANTED. The clerk must enter a 

judgment stating, “The plaintiff Robert L. Rowland’s claims are dismissed with 

prejudice.” The clerk must close the file.

SO ORDERED on February 26, 2013.

s/Robert L. Hinkle

United States District Judge