Affirmed and Opinion Filed April 16, 2015 

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In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-00779-CV DALLAS AREA RAPID TRANSIT, Appellant V. DONALD ARMSTRONG, Appellee On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-02528-D 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION NUNC PRO TUNC Before Justices Francis, Myers, and Brown Opinion by Justice Francis In this appeal, Dallas Area Ra pid Transit contends the trial court erred by denying its plea to the jurisdiction because DART did not have notice of Donald Armstrong’s claims. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s order. On April 27, 2013, Armstrong crosse d San Jacinto Street in Da llas, headed south toward the DART West Transfer Center at the southeast corner of Lamar Street and San Jacinto. A DART bus, driven by Rufus Childress, was making a right turn from Lamar onto San Jacinto at the same time and struck Armstrong, knocki ng him into another lane. Armstrong was transported to Parkland Hospital where he was treated for a severe spinal cord injury that left him partially paralyzed. On or abou t that same day, Childress comple ted an Operator Accident Form, the DART field supervisor Vickie Carruth co mpleted an accident report, and DART police–2– officer Harold Reeves filed both a Texas Incident Report #DTC13002453, and a Texas Police Officer’s Crash Report #DTA13000173. In the Texas Incident Re port, Reeves noted Childress “glanced at his rear view mirror to make sure his right rear tire cleared the curb” when Armstrong ran in front of the bus. He also noted Armstrong was taken to Parkland and had “suffered a spinal injury” with “no movement from his chest area to his feet.” In his report, Childress stated he was “watch[ing] to see if hi s rightside rear end had cleared” the curb when Armstrong “flashed into [Ch ildress’s] peripheral vision.” In late December 2013, DART Risk Management received a letter of representation from Armstrong’s legal counsel, and on March 12, 2014, Armstrong filed su it against DART alleging claims for negligence. In the petition, Armstrong asserted DART had notice as required by the Texas Tort Claims Act. DART filed its original answer which included a verified denial stating Armstrong had not performed all conditions preced ent because he failed to provide DART with notice of his claim not later than six months after the day the in cident giving rise to the claim occurred. DART then filed its plea to the jurisdiction asserti ng Armstrong’s failure to give timely notice barred any claim against the governmental unit. Following a hearing, the trial court denied DART’s plea to the jurisdicti on. This interlocutory appeal followed. On appeal, DART argues we must vacate the tr ial court’s order denying its plea to the jurisdiction because Armstrong failed to provide noti ce of his claim within six months of the date he was injured by the DART bus. DART claims none of the reports of the incident allege DART was at fault and, therefore, it had no actual or subjective awaren ess it could be at fault. A plea to the jurisdiction contests a tr ial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. City of Dallas v. Carbajal , 324 S.W.3d 537, 538 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam). Whet her a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).–3– Section 101.101 of the civil practice and remedi es provides that a “governmental unit is entitled to receive notice of a claim against it under this chap ter not later than six months after the day that the incident giving ri se to the claim occurred.” T EX
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. § 101.101(a) (West 2011). The purpose of the notice re quirement is to enable the governmental unit to gather the information necessary to guard against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial. Univ. of Tex. SW Med. Ct r. at Dallas v. Arancibia , 324 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2010). The notice requirement does not apply “if the governmental unit has actual notice that death has occurred, that the claimant has received some injury, or that the claimant’s property has been damaged.” T EX
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. § 101.101(c). Knowledge of fault requires actual subjective awareness of fault in producing or contributing to the claimed injury. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Simons , 140 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. 2004). This does not mean that the governmental unit is requi red to know that the claimant ha s made an actual allegation of fault; rather, the governmental unit must have knowledge that amounts to the same notice to which it is entitled by section 101.101(a), which in cludes subjective awareness that its fault produced or contributed to the claimed injury. Id . Fault is not synonymous with liability; rather, it implies responsibility for the injury claimed. Arancibia , 324 S.W.3d at 550. When the facts show the governmental unit is the sole instrumental ity of the injury or harm and has awareness of this fault, requiring formal, written notice “would do nothing to further the statutory purposes of information gathering, settling clai ms, and preparing for trial.” Id. (citing Simons , 140 S.W.3d at 347). Here, Armstrong sued DART, alleging Child ress, a DART employee, failed to pay attention while making a right turn in the DART bus he was driving. The bus struck Armstrong who was severely injured. Armstrong’s injuries were solely caused by the bus striking him;–4– there is no other cause th at produced or contributed to his inju ries. Under these facts, we cannot conclude DART was unaware of its fault producing or contributing to his injury. See id

. In reaching this conclusion, we reject DART’s argument that this “would impute actual knowledge to DART anytime a DART bus is involved in an accident.” The mere fact that a DART bus is involved in an accident does not, without more, impute actual knowledge. See Carbajal , 324 S.W.3d at 538. However, the facts in th is case do not involve a mere accident in which DART is involved; rather , the facts show th e sole reason Armstrong was injured was because a DART bus struck him while he was cr ossing the street. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Arms trong, we conclude DART had actua l notice as requi red by section 101.101(c). See id . at 551. The trial court did not err by denying DART’s plea to the jurisdiction. We overrule DART’s issues on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s order.

1400779F.P05 /Molly Francis/ MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE–5– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
DALLAS AREA RAPID TRANSIT, Appellant
No. 05-14-00779-CV V. DONALD ARMSTRONG, Appellee On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-02528-D. Opinion delivered by Justice Francis, Justices Myers and Br own participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that appellee DONALD ARMSTRONG r ecover his costs of this appeal from appellant DALLAS AREA RAPID TRANSIT.
Judgment entered this 16th day of April, 2015.