Filed 2/17/22 P. v. Wallravin CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL ISODOR

WALLRAVIN,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B309292

(Super. Ct. No. 19F-09029)

(San Luis Obispo County)

ORDER MODIFYING

OPINION AND DENYING

REHEARING

[NO CHANGE IN

JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on February 2, 

2022, be modified as follows:

1. On page 14, the first paragraph is modified to read:

The prosecutor asked, “Is the court finding there was 

an emergency under CalECPA?”1 The court declined 

1 California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act 

(§§ 1546-1546.4).
2

to make a finding and responded, “I am not. So that’s 

part of the unease that I sit with here, but I see them 

as different standards.” It described Judge Harman’s 

denial of the application as “the final word on that 

issue, at least until the Appellate Court reviews it.”

2. On page 15, after the first full paragraph, the 

following paragraph is added:

The trial court here found “some element” of risk of 

death and great bodily injury, escape, and 

destruction of evidence. This satisfied both the

Fourth Amendment’s “exigent circumstances”

standard, and the narrower CalECPA “emergency” 

standard.

There is no change in judgment.

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

GILBERT, P. J. YEGAN, J. TANGEMAN, J.
Filed 2/2/22 P. v. Wallravin CA2/6 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL ISODOR

WALLRAVIN,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B309292

(Super. Ct. No. 19F-09029)

(San Luis Obispo County)

Michael Isodor Wallravin appeals from the judgment 

after the jury found him guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. 

Code, § 211)2and attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664/211) 

and found true allegations that he was previously convicted of a 

serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) and two prior strikes (§§ 667, 

subds. (d) & (e), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)). The trial court 

sentenced him to 25 years to life in state prison.

2

Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.
2

Wallravin contends the trial court erred when it: (1) 

failed to appoint two experts to examine his competence, (2) 

found he was competent without substantial evidence, (3) entered 

a not guilty plea on his behalf, (4) failed to suppress evidence of 

the location of his phone, and (5) failed to strike one of the 

strikes. He further contends that cumulative prejudice requires 

reversal. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bank robbery

One day at about 9:15 a.m., Wallravin and another 

person went into Pacific Premier Bank in Paso Robles. One wore 

a Halloween mask, one wore a hockey mask, and both wore 

gloves and carried guns. They yelled for everyone to get down. 

One pointed a handgun in the face of an employee, “[s]hoved [the 

employee’s] shoulder with the barrel of the gun,” and told him to 

get on the ground.

One robber pointed a gun at a teller and demanded

money from her drawer and from the teller next to her. He said 

to not give him any “bait money” or “dye packs.” She gave him 

$14,488. He told her he knew her name and where she lived.

One of the robbers cocked his gun, put it in the face of

the branch manager, and told her to unlock a teller’s drawer. He 

told her, “I’m not F-ing around.” She unlocked the drawer but it 

was empty. He told her to get money from the vault but the other 

robber yelled that “they had to go.”

They took tellers’ business cards, and as they ran out 

of the bank, they yelled that they knew where the tellers lived. 

They got into a car and drove away.

As a Paso Robles police officer approached the bank 

to respond to the robbery, someone jammed the police radio 
3

communications. The sheriff’s department radio channel was 

also jammed.

Wallravin purchased the getaway car the day before 

the robbery. Minutes after the robbery, the car was found in an 

empty field. Surveillance video showed the car approaching the 

field, then a pickup truck registered to Mary Wallravin leaving 

the area. Inside the truck were radio scanners capable of 

interfering with radio communications of the police and sheriff’s 

departments.

Bank surveillance photographs showed one suspect

had a distinctive jaw line, wore a striped gray shirt with 

unbuttoned cuffs, and held a revolver with a distinctive six-inch 

barrel. When police located Wallravin, his jawline and shirt 

matched those in the photographs. After an officer asked 

Wallravin if he had a black revolver with a six-inch barrel, “his 

eyes got really big” and he tried to run away. He was carrying

keys to the pickup truck and $5,805 in cash, including “bait 

money” from the bank.

Two bank employees believed that one of the suspects

had robbed the same branch two months earlier. They based 

their belief on his voice, build, walk, demeanor, and similarity of 

the masks and guns.

Competency proceedings and plea

Throughout the proceedings, Wallravin said he did 

not consent to the proceedings and demanded proof of the court’s 

jurisdiction. At arraignment, he said he wanted to represent 

himself, but he refused to complete a Faretta3 waiver form. He 

said, “I intend to make a guilty plea.” The court stated it was 

3 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.
4

clear he would not participate in the proceedings and could not 

represent himself. The court appointed counsel over Wallravin’s 

objection.

Appointed counsel, Bradley Cornelius, declared a 

doubt as to Wallravin’s ability to assist in his defense. The court 

appointed forensic psychologist Kevin Perry, Ph.D., to examine 

him. Wallravin told the court, “I have no need for a doctor.”

Dr. Perry’s report, submitted in December 2019,

stated that Wallravin refused to participate in an interview. The 

report stated that Wallravin “asked some relevant questions 

about [Dr. Perry] and the purpose of the interview. The 

statements he made were coherent and organized. There were no 

obvious signs of disorganization . . . . He did not appear to be 

responding to internal stimuli.” Dr. Perry talked to custody staff 

and reviewed jail records, neither of which showed any 

psychiatric issues. Dr. Perry concluded he was unable to form an 

opinion regarding Wallravin’s competency in the absence of an 

interview.

The trial court referred to Dr. Perry’s report and 

stated its “inclination to say he’s presumed competent . . . since 

we have no evidence otherwise.” Defense counsel responded,

“Submit on that, Your Honor.” The court ruled that Wallravin 

was presumed competent and reinstated criminal proceedings.

Defense counsel said, “I think we need to enter not 

guilty pleas.” Wallravin said he would not continue with the 

proceedings because his name was listed in all uppercase letters

in the complaint. The court entered a not guilty plea on his

behalf. Wallravin later told the court on several occasions that 

he had not entered a plea.
5

A series of attorneys declared conflicts and the court 

appointed other attorneys in their place. In response to a 

question by the court, one of these attorneys, Trace Milan, said 

he was satisfied that Wallravin was competent.

Another attorney, Harold Mesick, told the court that 

Wallravin refused to speak with him. Mesick expressed “a 

serious doubt as to Mr. Wallravin’s competency.” He based his 

belief on Wallravin’s “conduct in court, his demeanor, his 

irrational behavior, his refusal to participate in his own defense.” 

Mesick said Wallravin sent him a purported contract and then 

invoiced him and the deputy district attorney $4.5 million for 

alleged violations of the contract, and “tries to copyright his 

name.” Mesick said Wallravin “doesn’t truly comprehend his 

status.”

Mesick described a motion Wallravin wrote that

asserted the court had no jurisdiction based on pleading defects, 

and claimed the robbery of a federally insured bank must be 

prosecuted in federal court. Mesick said the motion “makes me 

question my . . . questioning of his competency because it’s rather 

artfully written.” But he nonetheless requested another 

evaluation.

The court stated that the concepts Wallravin 

presented were “illogical,” “bonkers,” and “bizarre.” However, the

court stated they were presented in “a coherent way,” Wallravin

was “intelligent and articulate,” and the court did not see any 

“signs of mental illness.” The court said that the conduct was

“consistent with Mr. Wallravin being an adherent to certain 

political theories; sovereign citizens, constitutionalists,” and did 

not necessarily “constitute[] mental illness.” The court continued, 

“So, if I had to guess, you are just insisting on holding this world 
6

view, you are being obstinate about it, to this court’s view, to your 

own disinterest.”

The court asked if Wallravin wanted doctors 

appointed. He responded, “No, I don’t need that. I need to be 

shown the jurisdiction.” Nevertheless, the court again suspended 

criminal proceedings and appointed a second clinical 

psychologist, Carolyn Murphy, Ph.D., to “rule out the possibility 

that mental illness is here.”

Dr. Murphy’s report stated that Wallravin declined to 

participate in the evaluation. However, he was “fluent,” “alert 

and fully oriented,” and his writings were “advanced.” He had 

“no known mental health history” and showed no signs of mood 

disturbance, thought disorganization, delusional ideation, mania, 

intellectual limitations, autism, or “any sort of mental health 

condition that would give rise to a finding of incompetence.” The 

report concluded, “Without more information about his history 

and a full medical workup to rule out any underlying condition or 

conditions that could be affecting his functioning, this examiner 

simply cannot reach a conclusion as to his competence at this 

time.” The report “suggested that counsel look into his 

background to see if there is any history of mental health 

difficulty . . . . If not, it is then suggested that the court to order 

[sic] a full medical evaluation to ensure that there is no 

underlying medical reason for his conduct.”

At a hearing in July 2020, the court stated it read Dr. 

Murphy’s report and the previous report. Defense counsel and 

the prosecution submitted on Dr. Murphy’s report. Wallravin 

objected. There was no request for a medical workup or further 

psychological examination. The court found that Wallravin was 
7

able to cooperate with counsel but chose not to do so based on his 

beliefs. The court reinstated criminal proceedings.

The court denied the “Motion to Withdraw Plea in 

Order to Demurrer” that Wallravin prepared and stated that “to 

the extent that that’s a barrier to you making a demurrer,” it 

would address the demurrer on the merits. The court then 

overruled the demurrer.

After the court scheduled a trial readiness date, the 

prosecutor made a plea offer. The court asked Wallravin if he 

wanted time to negotiate with the People. He responded, “I don’t 

consent to none of this process.” The trial proceeded and 

Wallravin was convicted by the jury.

Sentencing

After Wallravin was convicted, the trial court struck 

the five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction. 

(§§ 667, subd. (a), 1385.) The court denied the Romero4 motion to 

strike the prior strikes. The court imposed third-strike sentences 

of 25 years to life for each count, to be served concurrently.

DISCUSSION

Competency examinations

Wallravin contends the trial court erred when it 

failed to appoint two experts to examine his competence to stand 

trial on each occasion that his counsel declared a doubt. He is 

wrong.

“A person shall not be tried . . . while that person is 

mentally incompetent. A defendant is mentally incompetent . . .

if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental 

4 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 

(Romero).
8

disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of 

the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a 

defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).)

If counsel informs the court that the defendant may 

be mentally incompetent, criminal proceedings are suspended 

until the mental competence of the defendant is determined. 

(§ 1368.) “The court shall appoint a psychiatrist or licensed 

psychologist, and any other expert the court may deem 

appropriate, to examine the defendant. If the defendant or the 

defendant’s counsel informs the court that the defendant is not 

seeking a finding of mental incompetence, the court shall appoint 

two psychiatrists, licensed psychologists, or a combination 

thereof.” (§ 1369, subd. (a)(1).)

Here, the trial court was not required to appoint a 

second expert on each occasion that a doubt was declared

“because neither defendant nor counsel expressly informed the 

court during the competency hearing that defendant was not 

seeking a finding of incompetence.” (People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 

Cal.4th 257, 281, italics added.) Wallravin’s statements that he 

did not “need” a doctor were made in the context of his objection 

to virtually every aspect of the proceedings, based on his theory 

that the court lacked jurisdiction over him. 

Even if Wallravin or his counsel had said he did not 

seek a finding of incompetence, the court’s failure to appoint two 

experts for each of the two competency examinations was 

harmless. When the second competency finding was made, the 

trial court considered the reports of both experts. Moreover, 

“[t]he appointment of two experts . . . provides a minimum 

protection for the defendant against being incorrectly found 

incompetent to stand trial.” (People v. Harris (1993) 14 
9

Cal.App.4th 984, 996, italics added.) Because the trial court 

found him competent, he was not prejudiced by the failure to 

appoint additional experts. He has not shown “‘a reasonable 

probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have 

obtained a more favorable result.’” (People v. Leelu (2019) 42 

Cal.App.5th 1023, 1031-1032; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 

818, 836.) 

People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, relied upon by 

Wallravin, does not preclude a finding of harmless error. In 

Wycoff, a psychologist appointed to assess the defendant’s 

competence to represent himself volunteered the additional 

opinion that he was not competent to stand trial. (Id. at pp. 77-

78.) Our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s “failing 

to initiate the formal competency procedures set forth in sections 

1368 and 1369” was not harmless under those circumstances. 

(Id. at p. 91.) In contrast here, the trial court suspended criminal 

proceedings and appointed psychologists to evaluate Wallravin’s 

competency to stand trial. The parties submitted the issue of 

competency on the doctors’ reports and did not offer additional 

evidence or argument. The trial court did not err, and even if it 

did, the error was harmless.

Competency finding

Wallravin contends the trial court erred when it 

found him competent without substantial evidence to support 

that conclusion. We disagree.

We review a finding of competency “‘in the light most 

favorable to the verdict and uphold the verdict if it is supported 

by substantial evidence.’” (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 

769, 797.) “It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally 

competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
10

that the defendant is mentally incompetent.” (§ 1369, subd. (f);

Blacksher, at p. 797.) There is no evidence here to rebut the 

presumption of competency because there is no evidence that 

Wallravin had a mental health disorder or developmental 

disability.

Wallravin contends the trial court should have 

ordered a medical evaluation, as Dr. Murphy suggested. This 

issue is forfeited because Wallravin submitted the competency 

determinations on the reports and did not request additional 

evaluations. (People v. Blacksher, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 797.)

As noted by the trial court, Wallravin made 

statements throughout the proceedings consistent with 

“sovereign citizen” political beliefs. For example, he claimed that 

the court had no jurisdiction over him because he had not entered

into a contract with the court, and because the complaint listed

his name in uppercase letters. (See United States v. Mitchell

(D.Md. 2005) 405 F.Supp.2d 602; Kalinowski, A Legal Response to 

the Sovereign Citizen Movement (2019) 80 Mont. L.Rev. 153.) 

While these views are inconsistent with basic principles of our

judicial system, they do not establish “a mental health disorder or 

developmental disability.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).) On the contrary, 

Wallravin demonstrated that he was literate and intelligent. He 

understood the nature of the criminal proceedings but disagreed 

with the court’s authority to conduct them. He was not unable to 

assist counsel, but chose not to do so.

Wallravin relies upon People v. Wycoff, supra, 12 

Cal.5th at p. 84, which states that our Supreme Court “ha[s]

repeatedly reaffirmed that a finding of incompetence to stand 

trial can be based solely on a defendant’s ‘incapab[ility] of 

. . . cooperating with counsel.’” But neither Wycoff, nor the cases 
11

on which it relies, allow a finding of incompetence based on 

inability to cooperate with counsel unless it is caused by a mental 

health disorder. In Wycoff, the psychologist diagnosed the 

defendant as suffering from “‘Paranoid Schizophrenia,’” including 

“‘paranoid and grandiose delusions,’” and “directly linked 

defendant’s tumultuous relationships with counsel to his 

‘paranoid mental disorder.”” (Id. at pp. 76-77.) The cases cited 

by Wycoff either involve mental health disorders (People v. 

Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 512 [schizophrenia or paranoia, 

hallucinations, “psychotic furor”]) or found an insufficient basis to 

require competency hearings (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 

Cal.4th 446, 465-466; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 525-

526). Here, there is no evidence that Wallravin’s failure to 

cooperate with counsel was based on a mental health disorder.

Entry of not guilty plea

Wallravin contends the trial court improperly entered 

a not guilty plea on his behalf. The issue is forfeited, and any 

error is harmless.

“Unless otherwise provided by law, every plea shall 

be entered or withdrawn by the defendant himself or herself in 

open court.” (§ 1018; People v. Reza (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 647, 

651.) “If the defendant refuses to answer the accusatory

pleading, by demurrer or plea, a plea of not guilty must be 

entered.” (§ 1024.)

On the suggestion of his counsel, the court entered a 

not guilty plea on Wallravin’s behalf. Wallravin later moved to 

withdraw the plea for the specific purpose of eliminating a 

procedural barrier to his demurrer. (See §§ 1003, 1007; Hudson 

v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 999, 1017.) By failing to

move to withdraw the plea to enter a different plea, he forfeited 
12

the issue. (See People v. Turner (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1413 

[failure to move to withdraw guilty plea forfeited claim it was not 

entered knowingly or intelligently].)

Despite Wallravin’s consistent objections to the 

court’s jurisdiction, the court should have asked him how he pled. 

(§§ 1018, 1024.) But Wallravin was not denied the opportunity 

for a more favorable outcome. When the prosecution made a plea 

offer, Wallravin responded only that he did not consent to the 

proceedings, and never sought to accept the offer. Any 

irregularity in the entry of the plea was harmless because “we 

cannot see that any of the substantial rights of the defendant 

were in any way prejudiced.” (People v. McCoy (1886) 71 Cal. 

395, 396 [not guilty plea by counsel after defendant stood mute].)

Motion to suppress

Wallravin contends the trial court erred when it 

failed to suppress evidence derived from the location of his phone 

after the robbery. There was no error.

1. Facts

Shortly after the robbery, police asked AT&T to 

“ping” Wallravin’s cell phone to obtain its GPS coordinates.5 An 

officer went to the location and saw Wallravin “in the open” in a 

commercial area near a car wash. The officer contacted 

Wallravin, who had the phone and was wearing a shirt similar to 

that shown in the bank surveillance photographs. He carried 

keys to the truck and $5,805 in cash, including “bait money” from 

the bank. Police searched the phone and found a text message

5 A “ping” refers to a service provider sending a signal to a 

cell phone to identify its real-time GPS location. (United States v. 

Riley (6th Cir. 2017) 858 F.3d 1012, 1014, fn. 1.)
13

from the night before the robbery that stated, “Tomorrow it’s on 

and cracking after nine.”

Ten days later, Detective Bryce Lickness submitted 

an affidavit requesting approval of the “ping” based on an 

emergency. Judge Dodie Harman denied the request because

exigent circumstances had not been shown.

2. Hearing

Prior to trial, Wallravin moved to suppress all 

evidence derived from AT&T obtaining his cell phone location. 

(§§ 1538.5, 1546.4, subd. (a).)

Lickness testified that he believed there were exigent 

circumstances because a bank robbery had just occurred and the 

suspects pointed firearms at the tellers, told them to get on the 

ground, took the tellers’ business cards, and threatened them. 

Jamming law enforcement’s radio frequencies “introduced 

another high level of danger for the public and law enforcement.” 

He knew that one of the suspects may have committed an earlier 

armed robbery of the same bank. He submitted the application 

10 days after the ping because he was working on other aspects of 

the case and was not aware of the three-day deadline until he 

began working on the application. (§ 1546.1, subd. (h).) 

The court found probable cause that Wallravin

committed the crimes, that police acted in good faith, and there 

was a “well-founded belief” that the suspect “presented a danger.” 

The court found exigent circumstances pursuant to the Fourth 

Amendment based on the risk of death and great bodily injury,

escape, and destruction of evidence. The court stated, “There was 

some element of all those things present.” The court suppressed 

the “electronic information” obtained from the ping but not 

evidence obtained when Wallravin was located.
14

The prosecutor asked, “Is the court finding there was 

an emergency under CalECPA?”6 The court responded, “I am not. 

So that’s part of the unease that I sit with here, but I see them as 

different standards.” It described Judge Harman’s denial of the 

application as “the final word on that issue, at least until the 

Appellate Court reviews it.”

3. Discussion

“The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s 

ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to 

the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where 

supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on 

the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. 

[Citations.]” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)

CalECPA restricts government access to “electronic 

communication information,” which includes the “location of the 

sender or recipients at any point during the communication.” 

(§ 1546, subd. (d).) Except as provided, a government entity may 

not “[c]ompel the production of or access to electronic 

communication information from a service provider.” (§ 1546.1, 

subd. (a)(1).) Nor may a government entity “[a]ccess electronic 

device information by means of physical interaction or electronic 

communication with the electronic device.” (§ 1546.1, subd. 

(a)(3).) But CalECPA does allow a government entity to access 

electronic device information if it, “in good faith, believes that an 

emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to 

6 California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act

(§§ 1546-1546.4).
15

any person requires access to the electronic device information.” 

(§ 1546.1, subd. (c)(6).)

In People v. Bowen (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 130, 137, 

the court held that an emergency justified pinging a cell phone, 

without prior judicial authorization, of a suspect who had 

“‘brutally stabbed’” the victim near a preschool and a shopping 

center, and who was “‘still possibly armed.’” The court stated, 

“‘“A long-recognized exception to the warrant requirement exists 

when ‘exigent circumstances’ make necessary the conduct of a 

warrantless search. . . . ‘“[Ex]igent circumstances” means an 

emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent 

danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall 

imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.’”’” (Id. 

at p. 138, citing People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 465.)

Wallravin contends that his release from custody

after his arrest shows that officers were not concerned about the 

safety of witnesses or others. This contention fails because the 

record does not establish what official or agency released him 

from custody, or their reason for doing so.

Nor was suppression of evidence warranted based on 

delay in seeking judicial approval 10 days after the ping rather 

than the three court days provided by statute. (§ 1546.1, subd. 

(h).) CalECPA provides that a party “may move to suppress any 

electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or of this 

chapter.” (§ 1546.4, subd. (a).) But the exclusionary remedy is 

not required for every technical violation of CalECPA, and is not 

warranted here. (See United States v. Chavez (1974) 416 U.S. 

562, 575 [“suppression is not mandated for every violation” of 
16

analogous federal statute]; People v. Head (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 

954 [no suppression for late filing of search warrant return].)7

Cumulative error

Wallravin contends the combination of the asserted 

errors rendered the resulting trial unfair. We disagree. 

“‘The “litmus test” for cumulative error “is whether 

defendant received due process and a fair trial.”’” (People v.

Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1436.) Any irregularities 

here in the competency proceedings, entry of the not guilty plea, 

and late filing of the cell phone affidavit did not deny Wallravin a 

fair trial.

Romero motion

Wallravin contends the trial court abused its 

discretion when it failed to strike one of the strikes. There was 

no abuse of discretion.

A trial court has the discretion to dismiss a prior 

violent or serious felony conviction pursuant to the Three Strikes 

law. (Romero, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) We review the trial court’s 

decision to not dismiss a strike for abuse of discretion. (People v. 

Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.)

In reviewing a ruling whether to strike a strike, we 

“must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances 

of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony 

convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and 

prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s 

7 Based on our conclusion that the ping was justified by a 

good-faith belief of exigent circumstances, we do not consider the

Attorney General’s alternate theories.
17

spirit.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) Those 

factors support denial of the Romero motion here.

The current crimes were serious—bank robbery and 

attempted robbery in which bank employees were ordered to the 

ground and guns pointed in their faces. The crimes were 

sophisticated, with the robbers wearing masks and gloves, 

switching vehicles, and jamming police radios. Although perhaps

not the “mastermind,” Wallravin’s role was neither “passive” nor 

“minor.”

The trial court imposed a three-strikes sentence of 25 

years to life based on two prior robbery convictions from 1991. 

(§§ 211, 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(ii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(ii).) In a 

Romero motion, the court may consider the age of the prior 

offenses. (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1141.) But

the court may not strike a prior solely because it is remote in 

time. (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 812-813 

[error to strike 20-year-old strike]; People v. Pearson (2008) 165 

Cal.App.4th 740, 749-750 [strikes 24, 15, and 10 years old

properly imposed].)

Wallravin had been crime free between his release 

from prison in 2009 and the current offense in 2019. But his 

background included other criminal convictions, including a 2004

grand theft in which he pushed a woman down and took her 

purse. (§ 487, subd. (c).) His record reflected a large number of 

theft convictions.

The trial court found no “reason to believe that . . . a 

mental health condition played any part in this incident.” And 

although Wallravin was 62 years old and a sentence of 25 years 

to life might result in him spending the rest of his life in prison, 

“middle age, considered alone, cannot take a defendant outside 
18

the spirit of the [Three Strikes] law.” (People v. Strong (2001) 87 

Cal.App.4th 328, 332.)

In denying a Romero motion, “a trial court does not 

abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary 

that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. 

Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) The trial court here did 

not abuse its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
Jesse J. Marino and Dodie A. Harman, Judges

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

The Law Office of John Derrick and John Derrick for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. 

Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.