NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-220

GREATER LOWELL TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOL SCHOOL COMMITTEE

vs.

GREATER LOWELL REGIONAL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Greater Lowell Technical High School School 

Committee (school committee), the governing body of the Greater 

Lowell Technical High School (district), filed a complaint in 

the Superior Court seeking a permanent stay of an arbitration of 

a grievance filed by the defendant, Greater Lowell Regional 

Teachers Association (union). See G. L. c. 150C, § 2. 

Following a hearing on cross motions for judgment on the 

pleadings, the judge allowed the school committee's motion, 

denied the union's motion, and entered a judgment permanently 

staying the union's request for arbitration. On the union's 

appeal, we affirm.

Background. As relevant here, the school committee and the 

union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)

from July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2021. Since 2002, Robert Jones 
2

has been employed as a teacher and is a union member. The 

district superintendent-director appoints all coaching positions 

on an annual basis. He appointed Jones as the varsity girls'

softball coach for the school years 2015-2016, 2016-2017, and 

2017-2018.

On May 24, 2018 an incident occurred during a varsity 

girls' softball game that resulted in the issuance of a letter 

of reprimand to Jones.1 The union filed a grievance on Jones's

behalf. The grievance was resolved in December 2018 when the 

parties entered into a memorandum of agreement (MOA). The MOA

provided, inter alia, that the letter of reprimand would be 

removed from Jones's personnel file on March 31, 2019, provided 

that Jones "d[id] not engage in misconduct." 

In February 2019, the district posted spring athletic 

coaching positions; Jones was one of five people who applied for 

the varsity girls' softball coaching position. Jones was 

interviewed by a panel of three school employees, one of whom 

witnessed the May 2018 incident. The panel unanimously 

recommended someone other than Jones for the position. Jones 

was not reappointed.

1 The district received complaints that Jones screamed at 

students, called students names, and threatened to "body slam" 

students and other coaching staff.
3

In April 2019, the union filed a grievance on Jones's 

behalf challenging the interview process for the girls' varsity 

softball coach appointment. The grievance was denied at each of 

the first four grievance levels on the grounds that the school 

committee did not violate the CBA. On January 16, 2020, the 

union filed a demand for arbitration pursuant to level five of 

the CBA's grievance procedure, contending that the school 

committee violated the CBA "by the manner in which interviews

were conducted and . . . by the non-selection" of Jones as the 

varsity girls' softball coach. The school committee responded

by filing a complaint in the Superior Court to stay arbitration 

arguing that the issue presented was a core managerial decision

committed by statute to the superintendent-director, and thus 

not arbitrable. 

Jones also filed a complaint with the Massachusetts 

Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) for the school 

committee's failure to reappoint him to the girls' varsity 

softball coaching position. In its submission to MCAD, the 

school committee acknowledged that Jones was not reappointed 

because of the incident that led to his reprimand.

Discussion. We review de novo an order allowing a motion 

for judgment on the pleadings under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 

Mass. 754 (1974). See Reilly v. Hopedale, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 

367, 377 (2023). The union contends that there is "no 
4

meaningful distinction between the coach appointment process and 

the substantive decision," and thus the matter must be 

arbitrated. The school committee responds that the interview 

process, and the union's request that Jones be appointed the 

coach, lies exclusively within the superintendent-director's 

decision-making authority pursuant to G. L. c. 71, § 47A

(superintendent may contract to employ athletic coaches), and 

thus is not arbitrable.

Massachusetts recognizes a strong public policy in favor of 

arbitration of disputes. See School Comm. Of Pittsfield v. 

United Educators of Pittsfield, 438 Mass. 753, 758 (2003). For 

that reason, where a CBA contains an arbitration clause, "there 

is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that an order to 

arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless 

it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration 

clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the 

asserted dispute" (quotation omitted). Local No. 1710, Int'l

Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. Chicopee, 430 Mass. 417, 421

(1999). This is particularly true where the arbitration clause 

is broad. See id. However, "[e]ven a broad clause . . . does 

not make arbitrable questions that a statute or agreement places 

beyond the authority of arbitrators." Lawrence v. Lawrence 

Patrolmen's Ass'n, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 704, 707 (2002). Indeed,

G. L. c. 150C, § 2 (b), provides that an arbitration proceeding 
5

may be stayed if "there is no agreement to arbitrate, or . . . 

the claim sought to be arbitrated does not state a controversy 

covered by the provision for arbitration and disputes concerning 

the interpretation or application of the arbitration provision 

are not themselves made subject to arbitration." 

Two provisions of the CBA are at issue here. Article II,

section A, defines a grievance as a claim of "misrepresentation, 

inequitable application or violation of any provisions of the 

[CBA]," of a policy or practice of the school committee, or 

dissatisfaction with employment or working conditions. Article 

III section L of the CBA provides that coaching positions can be

changed by administrative recommendation and that these 

assignments are "properly an administrative function and 

responsibility."

The union contends that Article II section A is broad, and 

therefore all disputes regarding it are subject to arbitration. 

The school committee responds that the appointment of an 

athletic coach is an administrative function pursuant to Article 

III section L, and that by statute, the superintendent-director 

is the appointing authority for athletic coaches. We agree with 

the school committee that Jones's non-selection as the girls'

varsity softball coach is not arbitrable. See School Comm. of 

Natick v. Education Ass'n of Natick, 423 Mass. 34, 41 (1996)

(athletic coach appointment is "statutorily created nondelegable 
6

right of management [that] cannot be abrogated by the [CBA]," 

and therefore is not arbitrable).

The union's purported distinction between the appointment 

process and the appointment itself lacks a substantive practical 

effect as there is no discernible difference between the two. 

This is best illustrated by the initial grievance wherein the 

union requested that the interviews be redone, and that Jones be 

appointed the girls' varsity softball coach. Moreover, the 

record does not support the union's claim of an unfair process 

as nothing in the MOA or the timing of the interviews prohibited 

consideration of the incident that gave rise to the letter of 

reprimand. In fact, the interviews were conducted in February 

2019, one month before the letter of reprimand was to be removed 

from Jones's personnel file. Regardless of how the union framed 

the issue, the superintendent-director's exercise of judgment in 

a nondelegable decision is not subject to arbitration. See

Massachusetts Community College Council v. Massachusetts Bd. of 

Higher Educ./Roxbury Community College, 465 Mass. 791, 798 

(2013) ("manner in which [the union member] was denied tenure 

does not change the fact that at bottom, the denial of . . . 

tenure was the issue)(quotations omitted);2 Massachusetts Bd. of 

2 We acknowledge that the motion judge relied on an Appeals Court 

case that was subsequently superseded by the Supreme Judicial 

Court. Compare Massachusetts Community College Council, 465 

Mass. 791, with Massachusetts Community College Council v. 
7

Higher Educ./Holyoke Community College v. Massachusetts Teachers 

Ass'n/Mass. Community College Council/Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 79 

Mass. App. Ct. 27, 34 (2011) (college administrator's exercise

of judgment as to which candidate was best qualified not 

arbitrable).3

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Green, C.J., 

Blake & Henry, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: November 27, 2023.

Massachusetts Bd. of Higher Educ./Roxbury Community College, 81 

Mass. App. Ct. 554 (2012). However, the subsequent opinion of 

the Supreme Judicial Court applied an essentially similar 

analysis to the question. In any event, as our review is de 

novo, this does not impact our analysis. See Reilly, 102 Mass. 

App. at 377. 

3 To the extent that the union contends the parties agreed to 

arbitrate the procedure for the appointment of athletic coaches, 

that contention is not supported by the record. See CBA Article 

III, Section L. The provision of the CBA cited by the union 

(Article X) does not apply to one-year appointments such as the 

coaching position at issue in the present case.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.