PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-6288

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RONALD SAMUEL JACKSON, a/k/a Young,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at

Harrisonburg. Elizabeth Kay Dillon, District Judge. (5:03-cr-30093-EKD-4)

Argued: October 29, 2019 Decided: March 10, 2020

Before KING, FLOYD, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge King 

and Judge Floyd joined.

ARGUED: Lisa M. Lorish, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer R. Bockhorst, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Juval 

O. Scott, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas T. Cullen, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
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RUSHING, Circuit Judge: 

When a defendant’s sentence is vacated and the district court resentences the 

defendant to a term of incarceration less than the time he has already served, the defendant

may have the option to “bank” the excess time served and credit that banked time toward

a future sentence of incarceration imposed for violating the supervised release term of his

sentence. In this case, we are presented not with a vacated sentence, but with a sentence 

reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 

5194, 5222 (2018). The district court granted Ronald Samuel Jackson’s motion for a 

reduced sentence under the First Step Act, reducing Jackson’s sentence from 240 months’ 

imprisonment and ten years of supervised release to time served (approximately 177 

months’ imprisonment) and eight years of supervised release. In reducing the sentence, 

the court rejected Jackson’s request for a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, which 

would have allowed Jackson to bank approximately 57 months toward a future sentence of 

incarceration if he violated his supervised release. The court reasoned that the need to 

protect the public and the need for deterrence dictated that Jackson not be given banked

time to offset the penalties for future violations of his supervised release, including future 

crimes. Jackson argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering the 

possibility of banked time in determining an appropriate reduced sentence. Because we 

conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in considering banked time and 

imposing a sentence of time served, we affirm. 
3

I.

A.

Ordinarily, a sentence of imprisonment is final and may not be modified once it has 

been imposed, except in narrow circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One such 

circumstance is when modification is “expressly permitted by statute.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(B). 

The First Step Act of 2018 expressly permits sentencing modifications. § 404, 132 

Stat. at 5222. As relevant here, the First Step Act makes retroactive certain provisions of 

the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). The Fair 

Sentencing Act “reduced the statutory penalties for cocaine base offenses” to “alleviate the 

severe sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine.” United States v. Peters, 

843 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2016). Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act modified the drug 

quantities required to trigger mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine base (often 

referred to as crack cocaine) trafficking offenses; it increased the amount required to trigger 

the five-year mandatory minimum from 5 grams to 28 grams and increased the amount 

required to trigger the ten-year mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280 grams. See 

United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Fair Sentencing Act, 

§ 2, 124 Stat. at 2372). Section 3 eliminated the five-year mandatory minimum for simple 

possession of crack. Id. (citing Fair Sentencing Act, § 3, 124 Stat. at 2372). 

The relevant provisions of the First Step Act apply to “a covered offense,” which 

means “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were 

modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . , that was committed 
4

before August 3, 2010.” § 404(a), 132 Stat. at 5222. The First Step Act provides that “[a]

court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as 

if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at the time the 

covered offense was committed.” § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. Even if a defendant is 

eligible for a sentence reduction, however, the decision whether to grant a reduction is 

entrusted to the district court’s discretion. § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222 (“Nothing in this 

section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this 

section.”).

B.

Jackson was convicted on May 7, 2004 of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more 

of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). Because of a prior drug 

conviction, Jackson faced a twenty-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and a 

ten-year minimum term of supervised release. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 851. The 

presentence report calculated Jackson’s Guidelines sentencing range as 188 to 235 months, 

increased to 240 months because of the mandatory minimum. The district court sentenced 

Jackson to the mandatory minimum of 240 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a tenyear term of supervised release. This Court affirmed. See United States v. Jackson, 166 

Fed. App. 54 (4th Cir. 2006). 

On January 26, 2019, Jackson moved in the district court for relief under Section 

404 of the First Step Act. The parties agreed that Jackson was eligible for a sentence 

reduction, because his offense was committed before August 3, 2010 and the penalties 

applicable to his statute of conviction were modified by Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing 
5

Act. In particular, because Section 2 increased the quantity of cocaine base required to 

trigger the statutory penalties in Section 841(b)(1)(A) from 50 grams to 280 grams, and 

Jackson was convicted of conspiring to possess 50 grams or more, Jackson was now subject 

to the penalties set forth in Section 841(b)(1)(B), which apply to convictions involving 28 

grams or more of cocaine base. Under Section 841(b)(1)(B), Jackson’s new statutory 

sentencing range was ten years to life imprisonment and at least eight years of supervised 

release. 

By the time he moved for a sentence reduction, Jackson had already served 

approximately 177 months of his 240-month sentence. In his motion, Jackson requested 

that the district court reduce his sentence to the new statutory mandatory minimum of 120 

months’ imprisonment and eight years of supervised release. Jackson’s new Guidelines 

range was 51–61 months, increased to 120 months because of the mandatory minimum.

He argued that the court should reduce his sentence to the mandatory minimum of 120 

months because his original sentence had been for the then-applicable mandatory minimum 

of 240 months. Jackson waived any hearing on his motion in order to expedite his 

immediate release.

The Government agreed that Jackson was eligible for immediate release but urged 

the district court to reduce his sentence to time served and eight years of supervised release. 

The Government objected to any sentence below time served because such a sentence 

would allow Jackson to “‘bank’ time to offset any future term of imprisonment that may 

be imposed upon a supervised release revocation.” J.A. 30–31. The Government argued 

that allowing Jackson to bank time would leave the probation office and the court with no 
6

real recourse in the event he violated the terms of his supervision and would undercut the 

rehabilitative aims of supervised release.

The district court determined that Jackson was eligible for relief under the First Step 

Act and that a sentence reduction was warranted. The court noted Jackson’s request to be 

sentenced to 120 months and stated:

Having considered the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court 

will reduce his sentence to a sentence of time served, to be followed by an 

eight-year term of supervised release, but will not reduce his sentence below 

a sentence of time served. In particular, the need to protect the public and 

the need for deterrence dictate[] that a defendant not be allowed to “bank 

time,” which could allow him to commit further crimes without the fear of 

imprisonment. Cf. Miller v. Cox, 443 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1971)

(“[T]he availability of credits against sentences for future crimes would 

provide a sense of immunity and an incentive to engage in criminal 

conduct.”). In all likelihood, similar concerns underlie the express 

prohibition on a court’s reduction of a sentence below time served when 

reducing based on a sentencing guideline amendment. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.10(b)(1)(C) (directing that a reduction in a term of imprisonment 

pursuant to a guideline amendment “[i]n no event may . . . be less than the 

term of imprisonment the defendant has already served”). 

J.A. 39–40. The court also observed that other courts granting sentence reductions under 

the First Step Act had reduced sentences to time served, “even where a defendant already 

had served more than the applicable guideline range.” J.A. 40. The court reduced

Jackson’s sentence to time served and eight years of supervised release. Jackson appealed. 

II.

As noted, this case comes to us on appeal from a sentence reduction under the First 

Step Act. The parties agree that we need not resolve various questions about the proper 

procedure to be followed in a First Step Act sentence reduction proceeding, either because 

the parties have not disputed them here or because, even though the parties disagree, 
7

resolution of their dispute is not necessary to resolve this appeal. We agree and so leave 

those questions for another day. 

The parties do dispute, however, the extent to which we should review the sentence 

reduction granted by the district court. The Government, borrowing from decisions 

reviewing sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), would have us review for 

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir. 2019). 

Jackson agrees that we apply an abuse of discretion standard but would have us review his 

sentence modification for procedural and substantive reasonableness, as we do the district 

court’s imposition of the original sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). We conclude that we need not resolve this debate either. “Even assuming (purely 

for argument’s sake),” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018), that 

we review a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act for reasonableness under an 

abuse of discretion standard, none of Jackson’s arguments convince us that his sentence 

reduction was unreasonable, as we explain below. 

III.

Jackson primarily argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by 

considering the possibility of banked time in reducing his sentence. Before the district 

court, Jackson requested the mandatory minimum sentence because his original sentence 

had been the then-applicable mandatory minimum, and he also renews this argument on 
8

appeal, contending that the district court failed to consider the relevance of his original 

sentence. We address these arguments in turn. 

A.

The concept of banked time in the federal prison system is most often associated 

with the credit a defendant receives for time spent in jail after his arrest but before his 

conviction and sentencing. In 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), Congress provided that “[a] defendant 

shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent 

in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences” as a result of (1) “the offense 

for which the sentence was imposed” or (2) “any other charge for which the defendant was 

arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.” The 

statute awards credit “only for presentence restraints on liberty.” Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 

50, 56 (1995). The Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), computes the 

amount of the credit in a particular case after the defendant begins his sentence. United 

States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992).

Another circumstance in which the concept of crediting or banking time may arise 

occurs when a defendant’s conviction is vacated. For example, if a defendant’s conviction 

is set aside and the defendant is then retried and convicted of the same offense, the time 

served under the voided conviction must be credited toward the subsequently imposed 

sentence to avoid a double jeopardy violation. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 

718–719 (1969); cf. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 382, 387 (1989) (crediting time served 

on one of two consecutive sentences after it became apparent that state law permitted only 

one of the sentences). But a defendant whose conviction has been vacated cannot credit 
9

the time served on the voided conviction against a new sentence for a new crime. Miller, 

443 F.2d at 1021. Similarly, this Court has declared it “unthinkable” that a defendant 

whose conviction is vacated could establish “a line of credit for future crimes,” reasoning 

that “the availability of credits against sentences for future crimes would provide a sense 

of immunity and an incentive to engage in criminal conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Questions about banked time also arise in the context of supervised release. The 

Supreme Court has held that when a defendant’s term of incarceration is partially vacated, 

the overserved time does not shorten his term of supervision. United States v. Johnson, 

529 U.S. 53, 54 (2000). Even if a defendant’s term of imprisonment should have ended 

sooner than it did, his term of supervised release does not begin until he is released from 

custody. Id. at 58. Although custodial and supervised release terms are components of 

one unitary sentence, see United States v. Ketter, 908 F.3d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 2018), they 

serve different purposes. The conditions of a defendant’s supervised release are intended 

to provide the defendant with assistance in transitioning into community life. Johnson, 

529 U.S. at 59. The rehabilitative objectives of supervised release “would be unfulfilled if 

excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release.” Id.

BOP has created extensive regulations concerning its duty to calculate sentences, 

including the treatment of banked time. Among other things, BOP’s regulations provide 

that “[a]ny prior custody time spent in official detention after the date of offense that was 

not awarded to the original sentence or elsewhere shall be awarded to the revocation term” 

when a defendant is sentenced to a term of incarceration for violating his supervised 
10

release. BOP Program Statement § 5880.28, Sentence Computation Manual-CCCA of 

1984 (1999) at 1-69. For example, if a defendant’s term of incarceration is partially vacated 

and as a result the defendant has served more time than necessary, the defendant may credit 

the excess time against future revocations of his supervised release term under the same 

sentence. The question in this case is not the legality of this regulation or how BOP should 

apply it; rather, the question is whether a district court in a sentence reduction proceeding 

may take into account the defendant’s potential to bank time against future supervised 

release violations. 

B.

The district court here considered Jackson’s ability to bank time against future 

supervised release revocations in its analysis of the need to protect the public and the need 

for deterrence, two factors a court considers under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in imposing a 

sentence. In particular, the district court declined to reduce Jackson’s sentence below time 

served because the court was concerned that allowing Jackson to bank time would “allow 

him to commit further crimes without the fear of imprisonment.” J.A. 39. Jackson argues 

that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court misapplied Section 

3553(a)’s protection-of-the-public and deterrence factors in considering banked time and 

substantively unreasonable because banked time is an improper sentencing factor. See, 

e.g., United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 684, 687–688 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding sentence 

unreasonable because it rested on a misapplication of Section 3553(a)(6)); United States v. 

Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 2006) (“A sentence may be substantively 

unreasonable if the court relies on an improper factor . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
11

omitted)). The arguments substantially overlap, requiring us to consider if, and how, a 

district court may consider banked time in reducing a sentence. 

Logically, we first assess whether consideration of banked time in reducing a 

sentence is forbidden. Jackson identifies no authority forbidding a court from taking 

banked time into account, and we are aware of none. In fact, in the context of a sentence 

reduction based on a change in the Sentencing Guidelines, a Guidelines policy statement 

specifically prohibits the court from imposing a sentence of less than time served, 

presumably to avoid creating banked time. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C) (“In no event 

may the reduced term of imprisonment be less than the term of imprisonment the defendant 

has already served.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (restricting courts’ authority to 

reduce sentences based on changes to the Guidelines to reductions “consistent with 

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”). That restriction does 

not directly apply here, but it suggests that a district court is not entirely forbidden from 

considering the impact of banked time when deciding whether to reduce a defendant’s

sentence to time served or some lesser term. 

More broadly, a defendant is not entitled to a sentence that would result in banked 

time. Even when a defendant’s conviction itself is vacated, there are situations where the 

defendant will not receive credit for the time during which he was incorrectly incarcerated. 

For example, in Johnson, there was no doubt that the federal defendant’s “term of 

imprisonment should have ended earlier than it did,” but the Supreme Court held that the 

defendant was not entitled to credit his excess time served against his term of supervised 

release. 529 U.S. at 58. Likewise, in Miller, this Court reiterated that a state defendant is 
12

not entitled to credit time served on a voided conviction against a new sentence for a new 

crime. 443 F.2d at 1021; cf. id. at 1022 (reasoning that, “where there is a strong indication 

that the defendant has been required to serve time for an offense he had not actually 

committed,” a sentencing court may, “and ordinarily should,” take into account time served 

on a voided sentence, but rejecting argument that the court must credit a new sentence for 

a new crime based on time served on a prior invalidated conviction). Here, Jackson’s 

conviction was not invalidated, and a sentence of time served, although above his new 

Guidelines sentence of 120 months, was well within his new statutory sentencing range of 

120 months to life. We cannot say that Jackson was entitled to a sentence that would 

provide him with banked time or that the district court was forbidden from considering the 

possibility of banked time when reducing Jackson’s sentence. 

Next, we must examine whether, in the context of a sentence reduction under the 

First Step Act, the district court permissibly considered the possibility of banked time in 

analyzing the Section 3553(a) factors of deterrence and protection of the public. Of course, 

a particular fact need not be mentioned specifically in Section 3553(a) to be considered in 

the court’s sentencing calculus; many case-specific facts fit under the broad umbrella of 

the Section 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020) 

(“Section 3553(a)’s broad language is consistent with the principle ‘that district courts 

enjoy significant discretion in sentencing, provided, of course, that they devise reasonable 

sentences.’” (quoting Clark, 434 F.3d at 689 (Motz, J., concurring))). The possibility of 

banked time that may be used to satisfy or offset a future supervised release revocation 

sentence is relevant to at least two factors: whether the sentence imposed will “protect the 
13

public from further crimes of the defendant” and “afford adequate deterrence to criminal 

conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C). 

Jackson argues that banked time is not relevant to these Section 3553(a) factors

because a defendant can spend his banked time to offset only future supervised release 

revocation sentences, not to offset future sentences for new crimes. Because a defendant 

could be prosecuted for any new crime he commits, and if he is convicted his banked time 

could not be credited toward his new criminal sentence, the argument goes, banked time 

does not create a sense of immunity or an incentive to commit new crimes, therefore a 

sentence fashioned to prevent banked time is not necessary for deterrence or to protect the 

public. 

While Jackson is correct that a defendant in these circumstances may credit banked 

time only against future supervised release revocation sentences, his conclusion does not 

follow. A district court can revoke a defendant’s supervised release upon finding, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated a condition of his supervision. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Therefore, a district court may sentence a defendant to a 

revocation sentence for violating state, local, or federal law even though the defendant has 

not been convicted of that new offense. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 

392, 393 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming revocation of supervised release even though 

defendant’s drug and firearm charges were dismissed after he successfully excluded the 

evidence); United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming revocation 

of supervised release because evidence was sufficient to prove by a preponderance that 

defendant cultivated marijuana in violation of state and federal law); see also 18 U.S.C. 
14

§ 3583(d) (requiring court to order, as a condition of supervised release, that defendant not 

commit another federal, state, or local crime). Similarly, a district court may revoke a 

defendant’s supervised release upon finding that the defendant violated a condition of his 

release that overlaps with illegal conduct. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (requiring court 

to order, as a condition of supervised release, that defendant “refrain from any unlawful 

use of a controlled substance” and submit to drug tests); id. (requiring court to order, as a 

condition of supervised release for a person required to register under the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act, “that the person comply with the requirements of that 

Act”). And when a defendant is convicted of a new crime while on supervised release, he 

may receive both a new sentence for the new offense and a revocation sentence. See United 

States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does 

not prohibit the government from criminally prosecuting and punishing an offense which 

has formed the basis for revocation of a term of supervised release.”).

We cannot agree, therefore, with Jackson’s argument that the availability of banked 

time to offset a revocation sentence is irrelevant to deterring future offenses and protecting 

the public simply because a defendant in some circumstances may be subject to a new 

criminal sentence in addition to a revocation sentence for an offense. It is reasonable for a 

district court to think that the prospect of returning to prison under a revocation sentence

would provide a measure of deterrence against future crimes of the defendant and thereby 

provide a measure of protection to the public. Cf. United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 

951 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting defendant’s contention that sentencing court could not 

consider good-time credit when crafting a sentence, because argument would “reward the 
15

defendant who says ‘I’m going to be a trouble-maker’” in the future). Moreover, the threat 

of consequences for violating the terms of a defendant’s supervision is important to the 

rehabilitative purposes of supervised release, including assisting the defendant in learning 

to become a law-abiding member of the community. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 59–60.

Although the district court here was focused on deterring criminal conduct, we 

acknowledge that revocation also can be a tool for encouraging compliance with conditions 

not directly related to criminal conduct but comparably important in a defendant’s 

rehabilitation. See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 530 Fed. App. 229, 230 (4th Cir. 2013) 

(per curiam) (affirming revocation of supervised release for testing positive for cocaine and 

absconding from residential re-entry center); United States v. Terry, 178 Fed. App. 232, 

233 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (affirming revocation of supervised release for failure to 

report to probation officer and work regularly).

Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering 

Jackson’s ability to bank time when reducing his sentence and consideration of that fact 

did not render Jackson’s reduced sentence unreasonable. Jackson also criticizes the district 

court for citing Miller and the policy statement in Section 1B1.10(b)(1)(C) of the 

Sentencing Guidelines, neither of which control here. However, the district court 

appropriately acknowledged that those authorities were not controlling but merely

supportive of its evaluation of the impact of banked time. See J.A. 39–40. Finally, we note 

that the district court, citing “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities,” also 

observed that other courts granting reductions under the First Step Act have reduced 

sentences to time served, even where a defendant already has served more than the 
16

applicable Guidelines range. J.A. 40. Although we agree with Jackson that this factor 

concerns only “defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 

conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), we do not conclude that the district court abused its 

discretion in considering these two cases for the limited purpose of evaluating how those 

courts handled requests to bank time in a First Step Act sentence reduction proceeding. 

C.

Jackson also contends that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his 

request for a sentence of 120 months, which is his new Guidelines sentence and the new 

statutory mandatory minimum, because he originally received a Guidelines sentence, 

which was the then-applicable mandatory minimum. This was the only argument Jackson 

presented to the district court in favor of his requested reduction to a sentence of 120 

months, and Jackson does not identify any other facts or Section 3553(a) factors that he 

contends would support a sentence lower than time served. Cf. Martin, 916 F.3d at 396 

(reversing the denial of a sentence reduction under Section 3582(c)(2) where district court 

did not address the “complexity” of the defendant’s case, which included a “mountain of 

new mitigating evidence”). Contrary to Jackson’s argument, a defendant in a sentence 

reduction proceeding is not entitled to a sentence at “a point within the new lower 

Guidelines range that is ‘proportional’ to the point previously chosen in the older higher 

Guidelines range,” nor is there “any law or any convincing reason” for presuming that a 

purportedly “proportional” reduction would lead to the “right” sentence. Chavez-Meza, 

138 S. Ct. at 1966. Moreover, under the First Step Act, even after the district court found 

Jackson eligible for a sentence reduction, the court was not obligated to reduce Jackson’s 
17

sentence at all. See § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222 (“Nothing in this section shall be construed 

to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.”). 

The district court acknowledged that Jackson’s original sentence was a withinGuidelines sentence at the old mandatory minimum, but the court explained why it believed 

a Guidelines sentence of 120 months was inappropriate and why a sentence of time served 

better reflected the Section 3553(a) factors. The court calculated the new Guidelines 

sentence, stated that it had considered the Section 3553(a) factors, responded to all of the 

arguments made by Jackson and the Government, and explained that the need to protect 

the public and the need for deterrence “in particular” warranted a sentence of time served, 

so as to avoid awarding Jackson with banked time. J.A. 39. Even assuming—again, purely 

for the sake of argument—that a district court in a First Step Act sentence reduction 

proceeding has equivalent duties to a court initially sentencing a defendant, but cf. United 

States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193, 198 (4th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), 

which requires a sentencing court to explain its reasoning when initially sentencing a 

defendant, does not apply to § 3582(c)(2) sentence modification proceedings), what the 

district court did here was sufficient. We are satisfied that the district court “considered 

the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal 

decisionmaking authority.” Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967 (first alteration in original)

(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). 

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in reducing Jackson’s sentence to time served and ordering his immediate release 
18

but denying his request to bank time for credit against future supervised release violations. 

The judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.