Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-78 | November 21, 2018 Page 1 of 13

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Matthew Abels

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Hodges,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 21, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-MI-78

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable John F. Hanley, 

Judge

The Honorable Ian Stewart, 

Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49D11-1711-MI-40912

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Michael Hodges (“Hodges”) appeals the trial court’s order granting the State’s 

motion to transfer $60,990 of his money to the United States. Hodges argues 
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that the seizure of his money was unlawful because it exceeded the scope of the 

search warrant. Concluding that the seizure was unlawful, we reverse the trial 

court’s order granting the State’s motion to turn the currency over to the United 

States and remand with instructions to the trial court to order the return of the 

money to Hodges.

[2] We reverse and remand with instructions.

Issue

Whether the trial court’s order granting the State’s motion to 

transfer Hodges’ money to the United States was erroneous. 

Facts

[3] In October 2017, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Detective Brian 

Thorla (“Detective Thorla”) was inspecting unopened packages at a local parcel 

shipping company when he noticed a suspicious package addressed from 

Hodges in Illinois to Christopher Smith in California. Specifically, Detective 

Thorla concluded that the package was suspicious because: (1) the shipping 

cost was paid in cash; (2) no signature was required at the time of the package’s 

delivery; (3) additional tape was added to a self-sealing box; and (4) the 

shipping box was a new box from the shipping company. Detective Thorla set 

the package aside, and his K9 partner, Hogan (“K9 Hogan”), later conducted a 

dog sniff of it. After K9 Hogan gave a positive alert to the package, which 

indicated the presence of the odor of controlled substances, the detective sought 

and received a search warrant, which authorized law enforcement officers to 
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open the package and search for: “Illegal Controlled substances (Marijuana, 

Methamphetamine, Cocaine, Heroin, MDMA) also records of drug trafficking 

and proceeds of drug trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, money laundering, 

involving the proactive attempts of concealing currency as listed in the affidavit; 

as well as money orders and gift cards.” (App. 23). The search warrant also 

authorized law enforcement officers to “seize such property, or any part 

thereof, found on such search.” (App. 23).

[4] When Detective Thorla opened the package, he discovered vacuum sealed 

packets of United States currency. The packets contained a large quantity of 

twenty-dollar bills, which were wrapped tightly in rubber bands. The seized 

currency was removed from the sealed packets and hidden in another room 

where K9 Hogan gave another positive alert, which indicated the presence of 

the odor of controlled substances on the currency. Based on his training and 

experience, Detective Thorla recognized these factors to be indicators that the 

currency was the proceeds of drug trafficking. 

[5] In November 2017, the State filed a motion to transfer the seized money to the 

United States. Specifically, pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-33-5-5, the State 

alleged that during the execution of a search warrant, “U.S. Currency was 

discovered and confiscated as proceeds of narcotics trafficking under Ind. Code 

Ann. 35-48-4-1 and money laundering under Ind. Code Ann. 35-45-15-4[.]” 

(App. 6). Based on the allegation, the State “move[d] the [trial] court to issue a 

Turnover Order authorizing the State to turn over to the appropriate federal 
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authority certain property seized from [Michael Hodges] and held by the State 

for forfeiture.” (App. 6).

[6] Hodges filed an answer objecting to the State’s motion to transfer wherein he 

argued that the seizure of the $60,990 was unlawful because it exceeded the 

scope of the search warrant. In support of his objection, Hodges cited Bowman 

v. State, 81 N.E.3d 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), modified on denial of rehearing, 

trans. denied, cert. denied, which involved the same detective and facts similar to

his own case.

[7] Specifically, in Bowman, Detective Thorla obtained a search warrant to open 

and search two suspicious parcels “for controlled substances, records of drug 

trafficking, and proceeds of drug trafficking.” Bowman, 81 N.E.3d at 1128. 

One parcel was sent by Bowman in Illinois to Jacob Murphy (“Murphy”) in 

California, and the second parcel was sent by Tommy Maurry (“Maurry”) in 

Illinois to Murphy in California. Law enforcement officials found $15,000 in 

each parcel and seized the $30,000. The State filed motions to transfer the 

$30,000 to the United States. After concluding that the appearance of the 

parcels, the excessive taping, the type of shipping and payment, the multiple 

parcels to the same destination in a known controlled substance import-export 

state, the positive K9 alert to the presence of the odor of controlled substances,

and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom constituted probable cause 

to authorize the seizure, the trial court granted the State’s motion.
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[8] On appeal, Bowman, Murphy, and Maurry argued that the seizure of the 

$30,000 was unlawful because the seizure went beyond the scope of the search 

warrant. This Court agreed. Id. at 1131. Specifically, we explained that the 

only evidence that this money was obtained through drug trafficking was: (1) 

the parcels were being shipped to California; (2) they were being sent to the 

same recipient; (3) they were heavily taped; (4) they were shipped priority 

overnight; and (5) a K9 unit alerted to the parcels. Id. at 1130. We further 

explained the insignificance of this evidence as it related to drug trafficking as 

follows:

We can easily dispense with the first four pieces of evidence. We 

are confident that a voluminous number of parcels meeting those 

criteria and having nothing to do with drug trafficking are 

shipped in this country every day. If all money shipped in 

heavily taped parcels mailed to California via priority overnight 

mail could be seized as proceeds of drug trafficking, many lastminute gift recipients at holiday and birthday time would be 

sorely disappointed (and surprised).

Id. We also explained that the remaining fact that a K9 unit gave positive alerts 

on both parcels meant only that at some point, someone handling the parcels 

transferred an odor of controlled substances to them. Id. We further explained 

that this could have been the parcels’ senders or any number of individuals 

involved with handling the parcels in transit. Id.

[9] We concluded that where no evidence of drug trafficking or any other unlawful 

activity was found in the parcels and neither the senders nor the recipient had 

been charged with any state or federal offenses in connection with the parcels, 
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no reasonable person would conclude that the currency discovered in the 

parcels was the proceeds of drug trafficking. Id. at 1131. Accordingly, we 

further concluded that the seizure was unlawful, and the trial court’s order 

granting the State’s motion to turn the currency over to the United States was 

erroneous. Id. We therefore reversed and remanded with instructions to order 

the return of the currency to the appellants. Id.

[10] In his answer objecting to the State’s motion to transfer his $60,990 to the 

United States, Hodges argued that:

14. The same analysis the Court of Appeals applied in Bowman

to reverse the trial court’s order granting the turnover order 

request should apply to this case. Detective Thorla cited the

same essential factors in this case for deeming the package 

suspicious as he did in Bowman. This case involves a positive 

dog alert but no additional evidence of criminality once the 

package was opened just as in Bowman. The Court of Appeals in 

Bowman clearly explained that a positive dog alert could be 

completely consistent with legal activity . . . .

15. It makes no difference that the State has amended its search 

warrant affidavit and/or the search warrant to include a request 

to seize records or proceeds of “bulk cash smuggling” or “money 

laundering” in addition to its previous request in Bowman to 

search for “proceeds of drug trafficking”, because the State still 

has presented insufficient evidence that the money seized in this 

case is records or proceeds of any of those things. The fact that a 

dog alerted to the package is no more an indication it is evidence 

that the money is proceeds of “money laundering or “bulk cash 

smuggling” no more so than it was considered evidence that the 

money was proceeds of drug trafficking in Bowman.
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16. Based on the holding of Bowman and the information 

presented in the search warrant and search warrant affidavit of 

this case, defendant would request the court deny the State’s 

turnover request in this case, because the seizure of the currency 

was unlawful just as it was in Bowman.

(App. 14).

[11] At a hearing on the turnover order, Hodges testified that he is an NBA agent 

and that he also owns a company that resells tickets to sporting events. He 

explained that the $60,990 belonged to him and that he had sent it to a contact 

in California to purchase a large number of World Series tickets that he had 

planned to resell. Hodges denied obtaining the $60,990 from selling drugs or 

other illegal activity. It does not appear that Hodges was charged with any state 

or federal offenses in connection with the parcel. 

[12] After the parties had presented evidence, the following colloquy ensued:

Trial Court: So, in Bowman that it appears from my reading the 

case that affidavit said proceeds from drug 

trafficking. So, Bowman had to determine was –

were these proceeds from drug trafficking? Here, 

our affidavit does not say just proceeds of drug 

trafficking, correct?

State: That’s correct.

Trial Court: It says bulk cash smuggling.

State: Correct.

Trial Court: So, do I even need to determine whether this cash is 

connected to drugs?
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State: No, you don’t. It could be just bulk cash smuggling.

Trial Court: And did the evidence show bulk cash?

State: Yes, it did.

Trial Court: And would that give me probabl[e] cause to find, 

okay, this could be – could be legitimate, could not 

be legitimate, but is this probable cause for bulk 

cash smuggling?

State: That would be our argument, Judge. That’s where 

we would be coming from.

* * * * * * * *

Trial Court: Bowman does create an exception which is if the 

seizure went beyond the search warrant. In 

Bowman, the search warrant was only for proceeds 

of drug trafficking. In this case, the search warrant 

was for something greater, specifically identified 

bulk cash. I think the evidence presented shows 

that this does not go beyond the search warrant. As 

such, I think there is probabl[e] cause for the seizure 

based on the search warrant, based on what was 

discovered, and I will be Granting the Motion to 

Transfer this over.

(Tr. 49-50, 55-56).

[13] Hodges now appeals the trial court’s grant of the State’s motion to transfer his 

money to the United States.

Decision

[14] At the outset, we note United States Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas’ 

recent commentary on forfeiture:
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Modern civil forfeiture statutes are plainly designed, at least in 

part, to punish the owner of property used for criminal purposes. . 

. . [C]ivil forfeiture has in recent decades become widespread 

and highly profitable. . . . And because the law enforcement 

entity responsible for seizing the property often keeps it, these 

entities have strong incentives to pursue forfeiture. . . . This 

system – where police can seize property with limited judicial 

oversight and retain it for their own use – has led to egregious 

and well-chronicled abuses.

Leonard v. Texas, 137 S.Ct. 847, 847-48 (2017) (Justice Thomas respecting the 

denial of certiorari) (emphasis added).

[15] We now turn to Hodges’ argument that the seizure of his money went beyond 

the scope of the search warrant. This presents a question of law, to which we 

apply a de novo standard of review. See Bowman, 81 N.E.3d at 1129.

[16] The statute authorizing the turnover of seized property provides as follows:

Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, the court shall order 

property seized under IC 34-24-1 transferred, subject to the 

perfected liens or other security interest of any person in the 

property, to the appropriate federal authority for disposition 

under 18 U.S.C. 981(e), 19 U.S.C. 1616(a), or 21 U.S.C. 881(e) 

and any related regulations adopted by the United States 

Department of Justice.

IND. CODE § 35-33-5-5. However, both the Indiana Supreme Court and this 

Court have held that if the seizure order was unlawful, the turnover order must 

be reversed. See Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. 2008); Bowman, 81 

N.E.3d at 1129.
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[17] Here, as we did in Bowman, we must determine whether the seizure of Hodges’ 

money was unlawful. Further, as we explained in Bowman:

A search warrant must describe ‘with particularity . . . the items 

to be seized.’ Pavey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 692, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2002). This requirement ‘restricts the scope of the search, 

authorizing seizure of only those things described in the warrant. 

. . .’ Id. An exact description is not required, but the items to be 

searched for must be described with some specificity. Overstreet v. 

State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1158 (Ind. 2003).

Bowman, 81 N.E.3d at 1129-30.

[18] The search warrant in this case authorized law enforcement officers to open and 

search the package for “Illegal Controlled substances (Marijuana, 

Methamphetamine, Cocaine, Heroin, MDMA) also records of drug trafficking 

and proceeds of drug trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, money laundering, 

involving the proactive attempts of concealing currency as listed in the affidavit; 

as well as money orders and gift cards.” (App. 23). Therefore, the only way in 

which the seizure of Hodges’ currency falls under the search warrant is if it can 

reasonably be concluded to be “proceeds of drug trafficking, bulk cash 

smuggling, [or] money laundering.” 

[19] The trial court in this case correctly pointed out that although the search 

warrant in Bowman authorized the seizure of only the proceeds of drug 

trafficking, the search warrant in this case also included the proceeds of bulk

cash smuggling or money laundering. The trial court then concluded that it did 

not need to determine whether the currency was connection to drug trafficking 
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because there was evidence that it was the proceeds of bulk cash smuggling. 

Based on this alleged evidence of bulk cash smuggling, the trial court further 

concluded that the seizure of Hodges’ $60,990 was lawful.

[20] First, although the search warrant authorized law enforcement officers to search 

for the proceeds of drug trafficking, money laundering, and bulk cash 

smuggling, the State’s motion to transfer the seized money to the United States 

alleged only that the money had been confiscated as proceeds of narcotics

trafficking and money laundering. The State’s motion no longer mentioned 

bulk cash smuggling. 

[21] We further note that Indiana statutes include neither the offense nor the 

definition of bulk cash smuggling. Rather, bulk cash smuggling is a federal 

offense, which is codified at 31 UNITED STATES CODE § 5332. Specifically, this 

statute provides that it is unlawful to knowingly conceal more than $10,000 in 

currency or other monetary instruments on a person or in a container and to 

transport or attempt to transport this currency across the border of the United 

States with the intent to avoid currency reporting requirements.

[22] Even if we were to apply this definition of bulk cash smuggling to the facts of 

this case, we find absolutely no evidence that Hodges attempted to transport his 

money across the United States’ border with the intent to avoid currency 

reporting requirements. Rather, the parties agree that Hodges attempted to ship 

the currency from Illinois to California. Based on these facts, no reasonable 
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person could conclude that the currency discovered in the parcel was the 

proceeds of bulk cash smuggling. 

[23] With regard to the State’s argument that the currency in the parcel was the 

proceeds of drug trafficking, we note that the facts before us are analogous to 

those in Bowman. Specifically, without more, Hodges’ method of payment, his

use of extra tape, his use of a new shipping company box, and his failure to 

require a delivery signature are not indicative of drug trafficking. See id. We 

agree with Bowman that many parcels meeting these criteria and having nothing 

to do with drug trafficking are shipped in this country every day. See id. We 

further agree with Bowman that the fact that a K9 alerts to a parcel, or even 

cash, means only that at some point, someone handling the parcels and the cash 

transferred the odor of controlled substances to them. See id. Based on these 

facts, no reasonable person could conclude that currency discovered in the 

parcels was the proceeds of drug trafficking. See id. 

[24] Lastly, the State also argues that the currency was evidence of money 

laundering. INDIANA CODE § 35-45-15-4 provides that money laundering is the 

knowing or intentional transfer of the proceeds of criminal activity. Where we 

have already determined that there is no evidence that Hodges’ currency was 

the proceeds of criminal activity, no reasonable person could conclude that the 

currency discovered in the parcel was the proceeds of money laundering.

[25] As we explained in Bowman, 81 N.E.3d at 1131, where no evidence of unlawful 

activity was found in the parcel, and there has been no allegation that Hodges 
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has been charged with any state or federal offenses in connection with the 

parcel, no reasonable person would conclude that the currency discovered in 

the parcel was the proceeds of bulk cash smuggling, drug trafficking, or money 

laundering. The seizure of the currency was therefore unlawful, and the trial 

court’s order granting the State’s motion to turn the currency over to the United 

States was erroneous. See id. We therefore reverse and remand this case with 

instruction to the trial court to order the return of the currency to Hodges.

[26] Reversed and remanded. 

Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, Sr.J., concur.