DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CORY J. MORGAN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D20-720 

[June 3, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, 

Martin County; Sherwood Bauer Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No. 

20000059CFAXMX.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo and Logan

T. Mohs, Assistant Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

LEVINE, C.J.

Appellant appeals his sentence for possession of heroin, claiming the 

offense should have been scored as a level 1 offense, rather than a level 3 

offense. Because we find that the statutory provisions enacted by the

legislature identify the offense in the severity ranking chart as a level 3 

offense, we affirm. 

Appellant entered an open plea to possession of heroin under section 

893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2019), and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. Before entering the plea, appellant objected to the 

scoresheet, arguing that his primary offense of possession of heroin should 

be scored as a level 1 offense, not a level 3 offense. Scoring the offense as 

a level 1 would reduce his total sentence points to less than 22 points, 

making him ineligible for a prison sentence absent a finding that he was a 

danger to the public. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant 

proceeded with the plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his 

objection to the scoresheet. After noting that this was appellant’s sixth 

felony conviction, the trial court sentenced him to one year and one day in 
2

prison for possession of heroin and time served for possession of drug 

paraphernalia. 

On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in scoring 

possession of heroin as a level 3 offense rather than a level 1 offense. 

Appellant claims that because possession of a controlled substance, 

section 893.13(6)(a), is listed under both level 1 and 3 in the Criminal 

Punishment Code offense severity ranking chart, it must be scored as a 

level 1 offense.

An allegation of scoresheet error presents a pure issue of law reviewed 

de novo. Somps v. State, 183 So. 3d 1090, 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). 

The Criminal Punishment Code ranks the severity of felony offenses on 

a scale of level 1 to 10, with 10 being the most severe. § 921.0022(2), Fla. 

Stat. The offense severity ranking chart has three columns identifying the 

applicable statute, degree of felony, and a description of the categorized 

offense. § 921.0022(3), Fla. Stat. (2019). A point value is assigned to each 

level. § 921.0024(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019). A level 3 primary offense scores 

16 points, while a level 1 primary offense scores 4 points. Id. 

Two portions of the severity ranking chart in section 921.0022(3) are 

relevant to appellant’s claim. Under the level 1 category, the legislature 

listed: 

Florida Statute Felony Degree Description 

893.13(6)(a) 3rd Possession of

cannabis (more than 

20 grams).

Under the level 3 category, the legislature listed: 

Florida Statute Felony Degree Description 

893.13(6)(a) 3rd Possession of any 

controlled substance 

other than felony 

possession of 

cannabis.

Appellant pled to possession of heroin in violation of section 

893.13(6)(a). Section 893.13(6)(a) states: 
3

A person may not be in actual or constructive possession of a 

controlled substance unless such controlled substance was 

lawfully obtained from a practitioner or pursuant to a valid 

prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the 

course of his or her professional practice or to be in actual or 

constructive possession of a controlled substance except as 

otherwise authorized by this chapter. A person who violates 

this provision commits a felony of the third degree . . . .

Subsection (6)(b) provides that “[i]f the offense is the possession of 20 

grams or less of cannabis, as defined in this chapter, the person commits 

a misdemeanor of the first degree . . . .” 

The trial court properly overruled appellant’s objection to the 

scoresheet because no error occurred. Possession of heroin was properly 

ranked as a level 3 offense. Although section 893.13(6)(a) is listed under 

both levels 1 and 3, the description section explains that the level 1 

ranking is limited to possession of cannabis, while the level 3 ranking is 

intended for all other possession offenses, including possession of heroin. 

The statute and ranking chart were both enacted by the legislature in 

sections 893.13(6)(a) and 921.0022(3), respectively, and demonstrate an 

intent for possession of all controlled substance offenses to be treated the 

same except for felony possession of cannabis cases, which the legislature 

desired to treat less severely. 

Appellant argues that a court cannot consider the “description” section 

of the ranking chart in determining the appropriate offense level. 

Appellant claims that the following statutory language makes the 

description column legally irrelevant: 

For purposes of determining which felony offenses are 

specifically listed in the offense severity ranking chart and 

which severity level has been assigned to each of these 

offenses, the numerical statutory references in the left column 

of the chart and the felony degree designations in the middle 

column of the chart are controlling; the language in the right 

column of the chart is provided solely for descriptive purposes.

§ 921.0022(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). If the “descriptive purposes” 

language was legally irrelevant, then the legislature would not have 

included it in the statutory scheme. In interpreting a statute, “courts 

should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless,”

and courts “must give full effect to all statutory provisions . . . .” Unruh v. 
4

State, 669 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1996) (citations omitted). “[T]he legislature 

does not intend to enact purposeless and therefore useless, legislation.” 

Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, we find that the addition 

of the third column for “descriptive purposes” is relevant in determining 

which level that offense should be. 

Even if the relevant statutes were ambiguous, which they are not, 

affirmance would still be warranted under the canons of construction. 

Under the harmonious-reading canon, “there can be no justification for 

needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if they can be interpreted 

harmoniously.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 180 (2012). The purpose for this canon is to 

make the provisions of the statutory text be interpreted in a “compatible” 

not “contradictory” manner. “[O]ne part is not to be allowed to defeat 

another, if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand 

together.” Id. (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional 

Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the 

American Union 58 (1868)). See also Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 100 

(Fla. 2004) (rejecting an interpretation that would “directly undercut this 

Court’s charge of interpreting statutes as a harmonious whole, giving effect 

to each of their constituent parts”). 

The provisions in section 893.13(6)(a) and the listings in the severity 

ranking chart can easily be harmonized. Although the severity ranking 

chart lists section 893.13(6)(a) in levels 1 and 3, only by referring to the 

description in the same severity ranking chart can the various provisions 

be harmonized. By referring to all the provisions, it is clear that level 1 is 

limited to felony possession of cannabis, and level 3 refers to all other 

controlled substances, including possession of heroin. 

The other relevant canon of construction is the related-statutes canon. 

In this canon, the statutes are interpreted in pari materia (“in a like 

matter”), “as though they were one law.” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 

252. “Several acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject, are to 

be taken together, and compared in the construction of them, because 

they are considered as having one object in view, and as acting upon one 

system.” Id. (citation omitted). “So, if possible, it should no more be 

interpreted to clash with the rest of that corpus than it should be 

interpreted to clash with other provisions of the same law.” Id. Thus, we 

should read other statutes, relating to the subject area, so the “body of 

law” should be compatible and not “clash.” See also State v. Fuchs, 769 

So. 2d 1006, 1009 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing that “statutes which relate to 

the same or closely related subjects should be read in pari materia”); 

Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1999) (reading related statutory 
5

provisions in pari materia to achieve a consistent whole). By reviewing in 

pari materia the related statutes of sections 921.0022(2), 921.0022(3), and 

893.13(6)(a), the legislature was stating that only felony possession of 

cannabis should be a level 1 for the purposes of the sentencing guidelines.1 

In further support of his position, appellant relies on Hicks v. State, 711 

So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), and Ducharme v. State, 690 So. 2d 1358 

(Fla. 2d DCA 1997). In Hicks, the Third District affirmed scoring 

possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver as a level five offense, 

rather than a level 4 offense. In reaching this conclusion, the Third 

District stated, “The ranking chart is intended to be applied by statute 

number, with the ‘description’ column serving as an aid to reference. In 

the event of inconsistency, the numerical statutory listing is, in our view, 

controlling.” 711 So. 2d at 1367 (emphasis added). Contrary to 

appellant’s contention, Hicks never stated that the description column was 

legally irrelevant but rather that it serves as an aid to reference. 

Additionally, Hicks stated that the statute column is controlling only in the 

event of an inconsistency, but here there is no inconsistency. 

Appellant’s reliance on Ducharme is also unavailing because in that 

case, the Second District declined to opine on the severity level of the 

offense because the “precise issue is not before us and because the state 

of this record is undeveloped as to the nature of the appellant’s offense 

and when she committed it, [so] it would be inappropriate for us to reach 

the merits of such an argument.” 690 So. 2d at 1360. 

In sum, we affirm because the criminal statute under which appellant 

was charged and the ranking chart make clear that possession of heroin 

is to be treated as a level 3 offense. 

Affirmed.

DAMOORGIAN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur. 

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1 Appellant also attempts to rely on a canon of construction to justify his position: 

the rule of lenity. However, the rule of lenity does not apply in the present case, 

since “the rule of lenity has no application when the statute is clear.” Scalia & 

Garner, Reading Law at 301.