### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ugus t 9, 200 7 S es sio n BELLS OUT H A DV ERT ISING A ND PU BLISHIN G C ORP ORA TION

v. PRIMARY RESI DENTI AL MORTG AGE, I NC. Appeal from t he Chancery Court for Williamson Coun ty No. 31150 Robbie T. Beal, Ju dge

No. M2007- 00200-COA-R 3-CV - Filed Marc h 7, 20008

The trial c ourt held that a mortgage company’ s branc h manage r had a ppare nt authority to bind the company to loca l advertising contracts although there was a limit ation on t h e b ra nch mana ger’ s authority which prohibited e xecution of c ontrac ts without t he compa ny’s approval. Since the mortgage c ompany established the br anch ma n ag er as a gener al age nt, it was incumbent on the company to notify third parties of any limitations on the agent’ s authority. Since it did not do so, the third party had a good faith belief in the agent’ s appar ent authority, and the trial court is af firmed. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancer y Court Affir med
P AT R I C I A J. C OTTRE LL , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which E. R I LE Y A NDE R S ON , S P .J., joined. W I L L I AM B. C A IN , P.J., M.S., not participating. Kevin C. Baltz, Nashville, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Primary Residential Mortgage , Inc. Mark B. Reagan, Phill ip D. Patterson, Nashville, Te nnessee , for the appellee , BellSout h Advertising and Publishing C orporation.
OP IN ION
This case conce rns whethe r Primary Resid en t ial Mortgage, I nc. (“ PRMI”) is liable under contra cts exe cuted by one of i ts branch manager s with BellS outh Advertising & Publi shing Corporation (“ BellSout h”) f or Ye llow Page Directory and internet advertising. After PRMI refused to hono r t h e contracts, BellSout h sued PRMI for $34,120.06 re prese nting the balance due for the advertising contracts, plus costs and attorne y’s fe es as a llowed in the contra cts. BellSouth di d not name the br anch manager as a pa rty. The pa rties filed c ross motions for summary judgment. On July 26, 2006, the trial court grante d BellSout h’s motion for summary judgment as to liability finding that the bra nch mana ger had “a ppare nt and/or ostensible authority” to bind PR MI to the BellSouth advertising contrac ts and-2-

that PRMI is i n breach of the contra cts as allege d by BellSout h. Subsequently, after a hea ring on the issue of da mages on De cembe r 28, 2006, the trial court awarde d BellSout h $34,090.06 for br eac h of c on tr a c t, p re

jud gme nt int e re st at 7% tot a lin g $ 7, 62 3. 10 , a nda tto rn e y’ s f e e s u nd e r the c on tr a c ts for $3,000 totaling a judgment of $44,713.16. PRMI appeale d the trial court’s order solely on the ground that the t rial court erre d in finding that its branch mana ger ha d authority to bind PR MI to contra cts with BellSout h.
I. S TANDA RD OF R EVIEW A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment enjoys no p re s u m p t i o n of corr ectne ss on appea l. BellSouth Adve rtising & Publishing Co. v. Johnson, 100 S.W.3d 202, 205 (T e nn . 2 00 3) ; Scott v. Ashland H ealthcare Ctr., Inc. , 49 S.W.3 d 2 81 , 2 85 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Penley v. Honda Motor Co. , 31 S.W .3d 181, 183 (Tenn. 2000)

. We revie w the summary judgment decision as a que stion of law. Finist er v. Humboldt Ge n. Hosp., Inc ., 970 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn.1998) ; Robinson v. Ome r , 952 S. W. 2 d 4 2 3 , 4 2 6 (Tenn.1997)

. Acc ording ly , this court must review the rec ord de novo and make a fr esh dete rmination of whethe r the requireme nts of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have be en met. Eadie v. Complete Co. , Inc ., 14 2 S. W .3 d 2 88 , 2 91 (T e nn . 2 00 4) ; Bl air v
. We st To wn Ma ll , 1 30 S.W .3 d 7 61 , 7 63 (T e nn . 2 00 4) ; Staples v. CBL & Assoc. , 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000)

. The re q u ir e me n ts f

o r th e g r a n t o f

s u mm ar y ju d g me n t a

r e th a t th e f

il in g s s u p p o r ti n g the mot ionsh ow that th e re is n o g e nu ine iss ue of mate ri a l fa c t and that the mov ing pa rty is e nti tle d to jud gme nt a s a

matte r o f l a w. T enn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 4; Bl air , 130 S.W.3d at 764 ; Pero's Ste ak & Spaghetti House v. Lee , 90 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tenn. 2002) ; By rd v . H all , 847 S.W .2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993). Consequently , summary judgme nt should be g rante d only when the undisputed f

acts, a nd the inf e re nc e s r e a so na

bly dr awn fr om t he un dis pute d f

a c ts, su pport one c on c lus ion

- t hat th e pa

rt y seeking the s ummary judgme nt is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. W

e bb e r v . S tate Fa rm M u t. A u to

. I

n s . Co. , 4 9 S. W.3 d 2 65 , 2 69 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Brown v. Birman Managed Care, I nc. , 42 S.W. 3d 62 , 6 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; Staples , 15 S.W .3d at 88.
Inou r r e vie w, we mus t c on sid e r the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at the su mma ry jud gme nt s ta ge in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra bleto the no n- mov ing pa rty, a ndwe mus t a ff

or d th a t pa

rty a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces. Doe v . HCA Health Serv s., Inc. , 4 6 S. W .3 d 1 91 , 1 96 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Mem phis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson , 38 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tenn. 2001)

. We must dete rmine first whe ther fa ctual disputes exis t and, if so, whethe r the disputed fa ct is material to the c laim or defen se upon which the summa ry jud g me nt i s p re dic ate d a nd wh e the r t he di sp ut ed f

a c t c re a te s a

g e nu ine iss ue fo r t

ri a l. By rd , 8 47 S.W. 2d

at 21 4; Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trail er, Inc

. , 9 78 S.W. 2d 10 2, 10 4 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1998). “ [I ]f there is a dis pute as to any materia l fac t or any doubt as to the conc lusions to be drawn from that fa ct, the motion must be denied.” By rd , 847 S.W .2d at 211.
To meet the r equire me n ts f o r s u mm a r y ju d g me n t, a

d efe ndant moving for summary judgment must, in i ts filings supporti ng the m otion, either af firmatively negate an e ssential element ofthe nonmoving party’s cla im or conclusively establish an aff irmative def

ense. Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 767; Staples , 15 S.W.3d at 88. I f the moving party fails to meet this burden, the bur den to come f orwa rdThe Br anc h M ana ger A gr ee m ent a l s o pr ovi des t hat M r
. D al i es s o w i l l us e onl y m ar ket i ng t ool s a ppr oved or 1 p rov i d ed by PR M I. -3- with probative e vidence establishing the exis tence of a g enuine issue f or trial does not shift to the non-moving party , and the motion must be denied. Staples , 15 S.W.3d at 88-89. If, howe ver, themoving party succe ssfully negates a cl ai m ed basis for the ac tion or e sta bli sh e s a n a ff

ir ma tiv e de fe ns e , th e no n- mov ing pa rty may n ot s imp ly r e st u po n th e ple a din gs
. Staples , 1 5 S.W .3 d at 89

. I n th at si tuatio n, the no n- mov ingpa rt y ha s th e burd e n o f p ointin g out, re ha bil itatin g, or pro vid ingne w e vid e nc e to c re a te a fa c tua l di sp ute a s to the mate ri a l e le me nt i n dispute. Staples , 15 S.W .3d at 89; Rains v. Bend of the Riv er , 1 24 S.W. 3d 58 0, 58 7- 88 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 2003).
II. F A C TS Since this matter was prese nted to the court on cross-motions for summary judgment, eac h party be lieves the undisputed fa cts entitles it to judgment. Given the simple nature of the direc tory and interne t advertising contract, the ba sic fac ts are straightforwar d. Craig Daliesso wa s the branc h manage r for PRMI at its F ranklin, Tenne ssee location when he sig n e d a s e r ie s o f c o n tr a c ts w ith Be ll So u th to a d v e r ti s e PR M I in th e Fr a n k li n area . The advertising at iss ue wa s in the 200 2 Nashville, Tenne ssee Ye llow Pages and interne t directory a dv e rt isi ng in Frank lin fo r 200 2 an d 200 3. Th e Br a nc h Man a ge r Ag re e me nt b e tw e e n M r. Da lie sso and P RMI provided that Mr. Daliesso c ould enter into contra cts binding PR MI only with PR MI’s writt e n c on se nt.
Ma na ge r s ha ll h a ve no auth ority wh a tso e ve r to en te r int o an y c on tr a c t or a gr e e me nt, wh e the r i n o ra l or

writt e n fo rm , on be ha lf of the Emplo ye r, or to o the rw ise ob lig a te the Employer in any manner , without the prior written consent of E mployer. Ne ither s h all Manage r eve r re prese nt or hold himself or her self out as ha ving any such authority without such prior written consent of Employer

. For purposes of summary judgment, it is not disputed that Mr. Daliesso failed to ge t PR MI’s consent to the BellSout h Contracts. BellSout h was not aw are of the Bra nch Mana ger A gree ment 1
or of its re stric tio ns abo ut c on tr a c ts. During negotiations for the contra cts, Mr. Da liesso met with Peggy Handy, BellSouth’s sales repr esentative. Ms. Handy aske d Mr. Daliesso whe ther PRMI was a franchise a nd whether

he had authority to bind PR MI. Mr. Da liesso told Ms. Handy that he had authority to bind P RMI. Based upon the f

oregoing, the trial court c oncluded that Mr. D aliesso had “ appar ent and/or ostensible authority” to bind PRMI and conseque ntly PR MI’s failure to pay for the adve rtising c on sti tut e d b re a c h o f c on tr a c t.-4- III
. A N A L Y SIS Clearly, an ag en t m ay exer cise the authority actually granted by the princ ipal. Milliken Group, Inc. v . Hays Nissan , 86 S.W.3d 564, 5 6 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Aprincipal may a lso be bo un d w he n it

ha s n ot g rante d th e a ge nt au tho ri ty but the princ ipa l’ s b e ha vio r l e a ds thi rdpa rt ie s to believe the agent is vested w ith authority. Id

. a t 57 0, (c iti ng 3 A m.J ur .2 d A ge nc y § 78 (1 98 6) ). Th is type of a gency is c alled “a ppare nt agenc y.”
The ba sic framework of

“appa rent a gency” is well known and logically follows its titl e - i.e. , the authority the a gent appe ars to have

. It is clear that appar ent age ncy must be established by the acts of the principal and not by the ac ts of the age nt. Milliken Group , 8 6 S. W .3 d at 56 9; Edmond Br oth e rs S up

plyCom pa ny, I nc . v . B oy le , 4 4 S. W .3 d 5 30 , 5 35 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ); Bells Banking Co. v. Jac kson Centre, Inc

. , 938 S.W .2d 421, 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Put another way, a principal is re sponsible for the a cts of the a gent “whe re the principal himself by his ac ts or conduct has clothed the agent with the a ppear ance of authority.” Mec hanics Laundry Serv. v . Auto Glass Co. of M e mp his , 98 S.W.3d 151, 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) ( quoting So uth e rn R. Co. v . P ickle , 197 S.W. 675, 676 (Tenn. 1917) ). Consequently, appa rent a gency is a gency by estoppel since ha ving pla c e d it s a ge nt in the po sit ionof app e ari ng to h a ve auth ority , th e princ ipa l is e sto pp e d to de ny it. Ke lly v
. Clif

f Pe tti t M oto rs , 2 34 S.W .2 d 8 22 , 8 23 -2 4 ( Te nn . 1 95 0) ; White v. M ethodist Hospital , 844 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
In orde r to prove that an agent has apparent authority to bind its principal, the f ollowing three elements must be proved: (1) the principal either actually or negligently ac quiesce d in the agent’ s exer cise of a

uthority; (2) the third party had knowledge of the fa ct and a good faith belief that the agent possesse d such authority; and (3) the t hird party de trimentally relied on the a ppare nt authority. Mec hanics Laundry Serv. , 9 8 S. W .3 d at 15 7; Milliken Group , 86 S.W.3d at 569-70.
The de scriptive phra ses “a ppare nt authority” and “ ostensible authority” a re use d to describe the same type of authority. The c ourt in Ed mo nd Br oth e rs S up

plyCom pa ny, I nc . v . B oy le used the phrase s interchangeably a nd described “ostensible authority” thusly:
Os t en sible authority is such authority as a principal intentionally or by lack of or din ary c are c aus e s o r a llo ws a thi rdpe rs on to b e lie ve thea ge nt po sses se s. It is essential to ostensible authority that the princ ipal hold the agent out to the publ ic as possessing s u fficie nt authority to embrac e the pa rticular a ct in question when the agent doe s not actually have su ch authority, or allows the age nt to exerc ise such auth ority e ve n th ou ghno t a c tua lly gr a nte d, a ndthe pe rs on de a lin g w iththe agent , acting in good fa ith, believed or ha d rea s o n t o b elieve the agent ha d the nec essary auth ority . W he n a n a ge nt a c ts w ith in th e scop e of his app are nt o r o ste ns ibl e authority, the principa l cannot pre vail against a third pa rt y u n l ess i t shows that the third party knew or had r eason to be lie ve the a gent did not have the c laimed authority.
44 S.W.3d at 534.I t s houl d be not ed t hat t he r ec or d i s s i l ent on var i ous fa ct s
. The r ec or d does not c ont ai n a ny e vi denc e f r om 2
t h e a l l eg ed ag en t , M r. D ali esso
. F u rthe rm o re, t h ere i s n o ev i d en ce ab o u t t h e ac t i o n s o f P R M I w h en i t l ea rn ed o f t h ese c o n tra c ts, i

. e. , w h e th e r it i m m e d ia te ly n o tified B e llS o u th o f its d e n ia l o f th e c o n tra c ts o r w h e th e r it sim p ly re fu se d to p ay t h e b i l l

. W h i l e h elp fu l , t h ese fac t s are n o t n ec essa ry t o o u r an aly si s.

T he D i r ect ory A dv er t i s i ng O r der nam es “Prim ary R es i dent i al M ort gage” as t he cus t om er , t he cus t om er 3 sig n a tu re is C ra ig D a liess o , b u t in th e b la n k re q u irin g th e “ C u sto m e r T itl e ,” M r. D a liess o is d e sc rib e d a s “ M g r.-o w n e r.” Th e p a r t i e s , h o we v e r , h a v e n o t r a i s e d t h i s f a c t a s b e a r i n g o n M r
. Da l i e s s o ’ s a u t h o r i t y o r B e l l S o u t h ’ s g o o d f a i t h , s o we w i l l no t place pa rt i cu l ar em p h asi s o n i t ei t h er. -5- Inou r c a se , it

is c le ar that th e fi rs t a ndla st e le me nts a reme t. As to the fi rs t e le me nt, PRMI

2
c re a te d a n e nv ir on me nt g ivi ng Mr

. Da lie sso app are nt auth ority

. PRMI e sta bli sh e d M r. Da lie sso in a position of authority as its mana ger. By this public act a nd under the terms of the Branch Mana ger Ag re e me n t

d i s c u s se d late r, PRMI c re a te d th e app e aranc e that Mr . D a lie sso ha d a uth ority fr om P RMI to manage the branc h office

. With rega

rd to the third eleme nt, it is clea r th at B el l S o uth detrimentally relied on Mr

. Daliess o ’s ap p are nt authority when it signed a c ontrac t in reliance on the bra nch mana ger’ s authority. The que stion in t his c ase is w hether the sec ond require ment of appa rent authority is met, i.e. , whether BellSout h h ad a good faith belief in Mr. Da liesso’s authority to exec ute these pa rticular contra cts. In other w ords, did thes e fa ct s g i ve BellSouth a good faith belief in Mr. Daliesso’s 3 agenc y or did BellSouth have a duty to investigate furt h er b ef o re relying to its detriment on Mr. Daliesso’s a

ppare nt authority? We believe se vera l fac tors support BellSout h’s good fa ith belief.
We f ind the Supreme Cou rt ’s rationale in O’She a v. First Federal Sav ings and Loan Association , 405 S.W.2d 180 (Tenn. 1966) to be particularly helpful. The rein, the Court stated: The most pree minent authority on the law of a gency know n to us i s M ec hem on Ag e nc y ( 2dEd .) . T hr ou gh theye ars, we ha ve un if ormly fo un d th e su mmatio ns in this wor k of the c ase la w of the va rious states to be lucid and disc riminating. At Sec. 737 of this authority appea rs the following:
‘G e ne ra l a ndSpe c ia l A ge nts : If by expre ss a

ppointment, or by long acquiescenc e, rec ognition or course of dealing, one man has conf err ed upon anothe r the cha rac ter of one possessing the requisite authority to represe nt him in a ge ne ra l way du ri ng so me mor e or le ss c on tin uo us pe ri odin thetr a ns a c tio n o f a ll o f h is bu si ness of a c e rt a in kind , o r at a particula r plac e, or t o p er form all acts of a c erta in kind or class, he mus t b e h e ldto h a v e c o n f e rr e d u p o n h im

th e a tt r ib u te s a n d p o w e rs inhere nt in the char acte r so bestowe d. Such an age nt, the law denominates, for

convenie nce sa

ke, a ge nera l agent.’-6-

O’She a , 405 S.W.2d at 183.
The Bra nch Mana ger A gree ment is evidence that Mr. Daliesso ha d authority to repr esent PRMI in a genera l way. Mr. Daliesso’s Branc h Manage r Agre ement provide s that he is the bra nch manage r for

PRMI in F ranklin re sponsible for originations, proce ssing and selli ng mortgages. Mr. Daliesso is entitled to all commissions gener ated f rom proce ssing and selling all loans gener ated at the bra nch af

ter PRMI rec eives its cut. The mortga ges in question appea r t o have be en funde d by PRMI. T h e branc h manage r is require d to exec ute any doc umentation nece ssary for cre dit and backgr ound chec ks and to use his best ef forts to insure that the information provided PRMI about the loans arec omp le te , a c c ur a te , a ndpr op e rl y s up po rt e d. Th e br a nc h mana ge r a gr e e s th a t he wi ll on ly u se P RM I as a le nd e r. Th e Ag re e me nt p ro vid e s th a t th e br a nc h mana ge r i s to su bmi t

“ ne c e ssa ry or din ary a nti c ipate d d a y- to- day e xp e ns e s” of the br a nc h to PRMI fo r p a yme nt w ith

“ app ro pria te do c ume ntatio n. ” As br a nc h mana ge r, Mr . D a lie sso is e xp re ssl y giv e n th e auth ority to hir e , f ir e , a ndsu pe rv ise thee mpl oy e e s. On c e a n a ge nt i s app oin te d to tra ns a c t busi ne ss on be ha lf of a princ ipa l, s uc h a n a ge nt “ wi ll usually possess the authority to car ry out those ac ts which are commensurate t o his positi on.” Ga le Sm ith & Co mpany , Inc. v . Th e Go v e rn or s Cl ub , L. L.C. , M2001-01616-COA- R3-CV, 2002 WL 31 0 9 4 8 4 9 , a t * 3 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. Se p t. 2 0 , 2 0 0 2 ) ( n o T e n n
. R. A p p
. P. 1 1 ap p li c a ti o n f il ed). Although the agent’ s authority may be limited by the principa l, if a pa rty to a contra ct exe cuted by the age nt is unaware of that limitation, the party may “r ely on the age nt’s appar ent authority to take those ac tions which are commensurate with h i s p o s i t i o n.” Id . The Supreme Court explained the basis behind this principle in O’She a a s f oll ow s: On the other

hand, whe re the agent is authoriz ed to tra n s ac t all the principal’s business of a c erta in kind, or al l the ac ts of a ce rtain cla ss, the very br eadth of the employment, the duration of time involved an d the variety of the duties to be perf ormed ne cessa

rily involve more or less of discre tion and choice of methods, and rende r imprac ticable, if not impossible, much of particularity or pre cision, either a s to the e x a c t me a n s a n d me th o d to b e e mp lo y e d , o r a s to th e s c o p e o r extent of the authority itself. Whe re so littl e is e xpresse d, more may well be implied. The fac t of such an authority, of itself, presuppose s a genera l confidenc e bestowe d upon the agent, and a gene ral c ommitt al to his discretion and judgment o f all beyond the essential objec ts to be attained a nd the out lines of t he course to be pursue d. It may not unrea sonably be pre sumed, wher e nothing is indicated to the contra ry, that such an age nt possesses those power s which ar e commensur ate with his underta king, and which ar e usually and pr operly e xercised by other similar a gents under like circ umstances. This pre sumption m ay we ll be and is constantly re lied upon by pe rs on s d e a lin g w ithsu c h a ge nts , a ndso re a so na ble, pr op e r andne c e ssa

ry is this relianc e, that it may j u stly be require d that if the principa l would impose unusual re stric tio ns up on theauth ority of suc h a n a ge nt, he sh ou ld m ake the m kn ow n to per s o n s w h o may h a v e o c c a s io n to d e a l w ith th e a g e n t. A n d h e r e in , it is b e lie ved, lies the true distinction betwee n these two classes of authority [gene ral a nd specia l agent] . One is in its nature temporary, specia l and naturally suggests limit ations of power [spec ial agent]

. Of these limit ations thus suggested third persons must inform-7-

themselves, unless the principal has b y h i s wo rds or conduct held out the age nt as one upon whose authority such limitations are not imposed. The other [ge neral agency] is, in its nature, g en eral, c ontinu ing an d un rest rict ed by other lim it at ion s th an th os e whi c h c onf ine th e author it y wi th in th e bonds of wha t i s usu al, proper a n d n ec essary under like circumst ances. If ther e areother limitations, the princip al must disclose them.
Neith er o f t hese r

ules denies e ven to the spec ial authority its natural and or dinary inc ide nts , a ndne ith e r d isp e ns e s w iththat w hic h de vo lve s upo n ev e ry pe rs on the du ty of a s c e r tain in g n o t o n ly th e f a c t o f th e a g e n c y b u t a ls o th e n a tu r e a n d e x te n t o f the auth ority wh ic h theprinc ipa l ha s a pp are ntl y c on fe rr e d. An d n e ith e r o f the m pe rm its the auth ority to b e de fe a te d b y s e c re t li mit a tio ns
. O’She a , 405 S.W.2d at 183-84 (e mphasis added)

. Mr. Daliesso was the branc h manage r for the PRMI with the type of broad co n t i n uing auth ority to a c t on be ha lf of PRMI wh ic h c on sti tut e d a ge ne ra l a ge nc y. Al tho ug h PRM I l imi te d h is auth ority to c on tr a c t, the re c or d is sile nt on an y ac tio n tak e n by PRMI to d isc los e to o the rs that th is limit atio n about contra cts existed. Consequently, BellSouth relied upon Mr. Da liesso’s appar ent authority in good faith. In addition, while appa

rent a gency is c reated by the princ ipal, the a g e n t’ s r e p r e s e n ta

tions bear on a pa rty’ s g oo d f

a ithre lianc e . I f M r. Da lie sso ha d d e nie d o r e xp re sse d s ke pti c ism abo ut h is authority to bind BellS outh, then clea rly BellSouth would l ack a good faith belief in his authority. BellSout h’s repr esentative asked Mr . Daliesso about the a gency w hich Mr. Da liesso confirmed. Gi ve n th a t Mr . D a lie sso ha d n o a pparen t reas on to d e c e ive Be llSo uthabo ut h is auth ority , h is a ff ir ma nc e of

the a ge nc y g oe s to Be llSo uth ’s go od faith

. Ob vio us ly, ha d it be ne fi tte d M r. Da lie sso in some way to conf

irm the age ncy, th en that fa ct would under cut any good f aith relianc e by BellSout h on the age nt’s word a nd place upon BellSout h the obligation to inquire further

. Another f actor in the good faith analysis is whether it is rea sonable to believe that as branch manage r Mr. Da liesso was authoriz ed to purc hase loc al advertising. It should be borne in mind that the contra cts in question were for a dvertising the Franklin PRMI branch office ostensibly to produce business for that off

ice. Conseque ntly, the co n trac ts benefitted the loc al PRMI branch of fice that Mr. Daliesso mana ged.
For the fore going rea sons, the summary judgment gra nted BellSouth i s aff irmed. Costs of this appeal a

re a ssessed against the appellant, PRMI.

____________________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE