Filed 5/28/13 In re L.O. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re L.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B244855 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK91961)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
M.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Rudolph A. Diaz, Judge. Affirmed. Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Stephen D. Watson, Senior Associate Coun ty Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 INTRODUCTION M.P. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders finding his minor son, M.P., a de pendent child of the juvenile court. Father contends that
there was not substantial eviden ce to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
under Welfare and Institutions Code sec tion 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j) 1 that M.P.
was at risk because of father’s sexual abuse of S.P., M.P.’s older sister. We hold that father’s appeal is nonjusticiabl e, and in any event, we re ject father’s contention. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND On February 23, 2012, plaintiff and respondent Department of Family and Children’s Services (Departmen t) filed a detention report st ating that on February 17, 2012, L.O., then a 15-y ear-old girl, S.P., then a 10-year-o ld girl, and M.P., then about a 21-month-old boy, came to the attention of th e Department because of a referral alleging that father physically abused S.P. Father is the father of S.P. and M.P.; L.O. has a
different father than S.P. a nd M.P.; and E.O. (mother) is th e mother of all three children. 2
A children’s social worker (CSW) interviewed S.P., and S.P. said that father and mother physically abused her and engaged in domestic violence in her presence. When questioned about sexual abuse, S.P. stated th at father had touched her breast and vaginal
area “a few times.” S.P. stated that the sexual abuse began when she was seven years
old. She stated that father would sit near her on the couch and touch her clothes over her vagina while they were watching television. S. P. stated that father did not penetrate her, but he “[w]ould put his hand over [my vagina ] and then remove it.” S.P. stated that mother was present during the incidents of sexual abuse but mother “would only tell father to stop touching [S.P.].” S.P. said that she was afra id of father and believed he

1 All statutory references are to the We lfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.

2 Mother and L.O’s father ar e not parties to this appeal.3 would “hit her for speaking to her teachers about these problems.” S.P. said she did not
feel safe at home but would cons ider staying with mother if father were not there and if mother did not hit her anymore. The February 23, 2012, detention report states that S.P. told two Los Angeles Police Department officers that father t ouched her vaginal area with his hands. According to a Los Angeles Police Department i nvestigative report, S.P. told the officers that father touched her vagina over her clot hing approximately five times during the prior year. Each incident occurred during the day while S.P. was on the living room couch.
S.P. said on one occasion father touched her breast area. S.P., L.O. and M.P. were taken into prot ective custody; S.P. and L.O. were placed in a foster home, and M.P. was placed with a paternal aunt. The Department filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the children, alleging non-accidental, serious physical harm under subdivision (a), failure to prot ect under subdivision (b), sexual abuse under subdivision (d), and risk to si blings under subdivision (j). On February 23, 2012, the juvenile court found a prima facie case that the children were described by secti on 300, and detained them from pa rental custody. The juvenile court ordered monitored visits, and that the Department provide reunification services to the parents. On April 16, 2012, the Department filed a jurisdiction/disposition report stating that on April 3, 2012, S.P. sa id that father would sexually abuse her in the bedroom or
bathroom after she showered. S.P. said sh e would be wearing a r obe and dressing, and
father would look at and touch her vagina with his hand, and squeeze her breast. She said
on other occasions she would be on the living room couch wa tching televisi on and father would rub her vagina with his hands over her clothes. S.P. said she told mother of father’s sexual abuse “numerous times,” and that mother told father to stop touching her. On about June 20, 2012, the Department f iled a last minute information for the court stating that on June 13, 2012, father enrolle d in a sexual abuse progr am, and as of June 14, 2012, he had attended one session.4 At the September 14, 2012, adjudication hearing, father and mother pled “no contest” to the petition allegations, as amende d, of serious physical harm and domestic violence pled under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j), leaving the sexual abuse counts to be adjudicated by way of argum ent. The juvenile court accepted various Department reports into evid ence and heard argument from counsel regarding the merits of the sexual abuse allegations. At the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition as amended,
found that the children were described by section 300, subdivisions (a ), (b), (d), and (j), and declared S.P., M.P. and L.O. dependents of the juvenile court. With regard to the sexual abuse findings, the juvenile court sust ained the following language alleged in the petition under section 30 0, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j): “On prior occasions in 2011, [father] sexually abused the ch ild [S.P.] by fondling the child’s vagina and breasts. [Mother] knew of the sexual abuse of the child by father and failed to take action to protect the child. The mother continued to allow the father to reside in the child’s home
and to have unlimited access to the child, resulting in the ongoing sexual abuse of the child by the father. Such sexua l abuse of the child by father and the mother’s failure to protect the child endangers the child’s physic al health, safety and well-being, creates a detrimental home environment and places the ch ild and the child’s siblings, [L.O.] and [M.P.], at risk of physical harm, damage, dang er, sexual abuse and failure to protect.” In sustaining the petition with regard to the sexual abuse findings, the juvenile court stated that, “[t]here’s no question father touched [S.P .]. Father does admit to it, and I do believe the mother was aware of it. [¶] And I do think that the touching is just inappropriate. . . . He’s a father. His job is to protect his child ren. . . . I don’t know how he would not think he was wrong to touch his daughter in those areas where he did.” On October 31, 2012, the juvenile cour t made its dispositional orders, releasing
the children to mother’s cust ody and granting father monitore d visits because father had agreed to move out of the ho me. The juvenile court ordere d father to participate in sexual abuse counseling for perpetrators and individual counseling for sexual abuse, and5 that father’s visitation with all the childre n be monitored by a monitor approved by the Department.

DISCUSSION Although father’s appeal was taken from both the juvenile cour t’s jurisdiction and disposition orders, he does not question the disposition or der. Father also does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings that it had jurisdiction over M.P. under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j) based on th e petition allegations of serious physical harm and domestic violence, or that he sexually abused S.P. or placed L.O. at risk of being sexually abused. Instead, father conte nds that there was not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s juri sdictional findings that M.P. was at risk of being sexually abused by father. Father’s appeal is nonjusticia ble, and even if the appeal is justiciable,
we hold that father’s substantial evid ence contention is not meritorious.

A. Justiciability Father admits that, “[A] reviewing court may affirm a juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over a minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence . . . .” “When a dependency petitio n alleges multiple grounds for its as sertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a review ing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statut ory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are su pported by the evidence.” ( In re Alexis E . (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) “[I]t is necessary only for the court to find that one parent’s conduct has created circumstances triggering secti on 300 for the court to assert jurisdiction over the child. [Citations.] Once the child is found to be endangered in the manner described by one of
the subdivisions of section 300 [,] the child comes w ithin the court’s juri sdiction, even if6 the child was not in the physical custody of one or both parents at the time the jurisdictional events occurred. [Citation.] For jurisdictional purposes, it is irrelevant which parent created those ci rcumstances. A jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a particular parent is not necessary for th e court to enter orders binding on that parent, once dependency jurisdiction has been estab lished. [Citation.] As a result, it is commonly said that a jurisdictional finding invol ving one parent is ‘“good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if th e actions of either parent bring [the minor] within one of the statutory defi nitions of a dependent.”’ [C itation.] For this reason, an appellate court may decline to address th e evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence. (E.g., In re Alexis E .[, supra ,] 171 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 451 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 44] [addressing remaining findings onl y ‘[f]or [f]ather’s benefit’]; In re Joshua G. [(2005)] 129 Cal.App.4th [189,] 202 [when a jurisdic tional allegation involving one parent is found supported, it is ‘irrelevant’ whethe r remaining allegations are supported]; In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 330, [79 Ca l.Rptr.2d 922] [declining to address remaining allegations after one allegation found supported], supe rseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal. App.4th 73, 82; Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 72 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 770] [same].)” ( In re
I.A . (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491-1492.) When “issues raised in [an] appeal pr esent no genuine challenge to the court’s assumption of dependency jurisd iction[,] . . . any order we en ter will have no practical impact on the pending dependency proceeding, thereby precluding a grant of effective relief. For that reason, we find [such an] appeal to be nonjusticiable.” ( In re I.A ., supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) “The many aspects of the justiciability doctrine in
California were summarized in Wilson v. L. A. County Civil Service Com . (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450 [246 P.2d 688] : ‘“A judicial tribunal or dinarily may consider and determine only an existing controversy, and not a moot question or abstract proposition. . . . [A]s a general rule it is not within the function of the court to act upon or decide a moot question or speculative, theoretical or abst ract question or proposition,7 or a purely academic question, or to give an advisory opinion on such a question or proposition . . . .”’ ( Id . at pp. 452-453.) An important re quirement for justiciability is the availability of ‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the pa rties’ conduct or legal status. ‘“‘“It is this court’s duty ‘“to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot ques tions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”’”’”’ [Citations.]” ( In re I.A ., supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1490.) The juvenile court found that it had jurisdiction over M.P. based on the petition allegations, as amended, of serious physical harm and domestic violence pled under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j). Fath er does not challenge these findings, nor is mother a party to this appeal. Father’s appeal therefore is nonjusticiable. ( In re I.A ., supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) Father “requests [that we] reach the mer its of [his] challenge because the finding of jurisdiction as to him coul d be prejudicial or could pote ntially impact the current or future dependency proceedings, including all visitation orders between father and son, and future placement with father, and return of custody to the father.” This contention is conclusionary and speculative, and father does not develop it further. As the court explained in People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793, it is not the role of a reviewing court to independently seek out support for appellant’s conclusory assertions, and such contentions may be rejected without consideration. (See also Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp . (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1206, fn. 11 [“It is not our responsibility to develop an appellant’s argument”]; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [“An appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties”].) Father also requests that we reach the me rits of his appeal because at the time the parties submitted their briefs on appeal, “t here [was] a split of authority among the various Courts of Appeal . . . concerning wh ether a younger male sibling of a sexually
abused sister is at substantial risk for sexua l abuse, and the matter is currently pending in8 the California Supreme Court.” As discusse d below, after the parties submitted their briefs on appeal, the California Supreme Court resolved any split of authority by holding
that a father’s sexual abuse of his own chil d may provide substantial evidence to support a finding that all his minor children, regardless of their sex, are juvenile court dependents. ( In re I.J. (May 9, 2013, S204622) 56 Cal.4th 766 , __, __ [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005, *2, *24-*25].) In any event, fath er does not further discuss wh y any split of authority on this issue would have made it justiciable.

B. Substantial Evidence Assuming the justiciability of father’s c ontention that there was not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings that M.P. was at risk of being sexually abused by fathe r, we alternatively hold that it is not meritorious. On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction for substantial evidence. ( In
re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1433.) “T he term ‘substantial evidence’ means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is eviden ce which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. [Citation.]” ( Ibid .) “The issue of sufficiency of th e evidence in dependency cases is governed by the same rules th at apply to other appeals.” ( In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) An appellate court does not evalua te the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or reso lve evidentiary conflicts. ( Ibid .; In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 564 [issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact].) Instead, the reviewing court draws all reasonabl e inferences in support of the juvenile court’s findings, considers the record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirms the order if it is supported by substantia l evidence even if ot her evidence supports a contrary conclusion. ( In re L.Y.L ., supra , 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) With regard to the sexual abuse findings, the juvenile court found that M.P. was a child described by section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j). Section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j) provides in pertinent par t: “Any child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juve nile court which may adjudge9 that person to be a dependent child of the cour t: [¶] (b) The child has suffered, or there
is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her pare nt or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent fa ilure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child fro m the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failu re of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, she lter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardia n to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, devel opmental disability, or substance abuse. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (d) The ch ild has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or her parent or guardian or a member of hi s or her household, or the parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the child fro m sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the child was in danger of sexual abuse. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (j) The child’s sibling has been abus ed or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantia l risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defi ned in those subdivisions. Th e court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of th e sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether
there is a substantial risk to the child.” Subdivisions (b), (d), and (j) of section 3 00 require a finding of a substantial risk that M.P. would be sexually abused by father. Father contends that the evidence that he sexually abused S.P., by itself, was insufficien t to support a finding that her younger male sibling, M.P., was at risk of sexual abuse. U nder the facts of this ca se there is substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that M.P. was at risk of sexual abuse. At the time father submitted his briefs, he acknowledged th at there was a split among the various courts of appeal concerni ng whether a younger male sibling of a sexually abused sister is at substantial ri sk for sexual abuse, and that the matter was10 pending in the California Supreme Court. As noted, while this appeal was pending the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th 766 [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005] resolving that split of authority and, therefore, we invited the parties to provide letter briefs discussing that case.
In In re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th 766 [2013 Cal. Le xis 4005], the juvenile court found that over a three-year period the fath er had raped I.J., his daughter, and the abuse supported the juvenile court’s order declar ing I.J., her younger sister, and I.J.’s three younger brothers, to be dependan ts of the juvenile court. ( Id . at p. __ [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005, at p *4].) The juvenile court sust ained the allegations under section 300, subdivision (b), (d), and (j), finding that “‘on prior occasions for the past three years,’ father sexually abused I.J. ‘by fondling the child’s vagina and dig itally penetrating the child’s vagina and forcefully raped the child by placing the father’s penis in the child’s vagina. On prior occasions, the father forced the child to expo se the child’s vagina to the father and the father orally copulated the ch ild’s vagina. On a prior occasion the father
forced the child to watch pornographic videos with the fath er. [I.J.] is afraid of the father due to the father’s sexual abuse of [I.J.] The sexual abuse of [I.J.] by the father endangers [I.J.’s] physical health and safety a nd places the child and child’s siblings . . . at risk of physical harm, damage, danger, sexual abuse and failure to protect.’” ( Id . at p. __ [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005, at p. *3].) The Court of Appeal unanimously held th at the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that father had sexually abused I.J., and that the abuse supported the juvenile court order declaring I. J. and her sister to be dependants of the juvenile court. The majority of the jus tices of the Court of Appeal upheld the jurisdictional finding that I.J .’s sexual abuse also warranted the juvenile court’s order declaring her brothers to be depe ndents of the juvenile court. (In re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. __ [2013 Ca l. Lexis 4005, *4-*5].) The only issue before the Supreme Court in In re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th 766 [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005] was whether ev idence that father sexually abused his daughter supports the juvenile court’s finding that his sons are dependents of the juvenile court under11 section 300. ( Id . at p. __ [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005, at p. *5].) Although there was no evidence that father physically abused or neglected the boys, the Supreme Court in affirming the Court of Appeal’s judgment, stat ed, “We conclude that a father’s prolonged and egregious sexual abuse of his own child may provide substantial evidence to support a finding that all his children are juvenile court dependents.” ( Id . at p. __ [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005, at p. *2].) While the juvenile court had found, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, jurisdiction over the male siblings under section 300, s ubdivisions (b), (d), and (j), the Supreme Court focused only on subdivision (j). (In re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at pp. __, __ [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005, *9-*11, *19-*21] .) The court explained that when a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds, a reviewing court will affirm if any one of them provides a basis for jurisdiction. ( Id . at p. __ [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005, at pp. *8-*9].) The court stated that the broad language of section 300, su bdivision (j), requires the juvenile court to consider “‘the totality of the circumstances of the child and his or her sibling in determining whether the child is at substan tial risk of harm, within the meaning of any of the subdivisions enumerated in subdivision (j). The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have
been abused than the court would have in the absence of that circumstance.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. __ [2013 Ca l. Lexis 4005, *10-*11].) Although the Supreme Court assumed that because the father sexually abused his daughter that the father’s other daughter was at greater risk of being of sexual abuse than were his sons, the court stated that, “‘Some ri sks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability because the magnitude of the harm is potentially great. . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at pp. __, __ [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005, *19, *24].) The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that, “‘The juvenile court is mandated to focus on “ensur[ing] the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk ” of physical, sexual or emotional abuse. (§ 300.2.) That is what the court did here.’” ( Id . at p. __ [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005, at p. *25].)12 There is substantial eviden ce to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings that M.P. was at risk of being sexually abused by father. S.P. stated that father began to sexually abuse her when she was seven years old. S.P. stated that father had touched her breast and vaginal area. S.P. said that (1) she would be wearing a robe and dressing, and
father would look at and touc h her vagina with his hand, and squeeze her breast, (2) father would sexually abuse her in the bedroo m or bathroom after she showered, and (3)
father would sit near her on the couch and to uch her clothes over her vagina while they were watching television. S.P. stated that father touched her vaginal area approximately
five times in 2011. She said that mother was present during the incidents of sexual abuse,
and she told mother about th e father’s sexual abuse “numerous times.” The evidence showed that father did not stop sexually abusi ng S.P. even after mother told father to stop touching S.P. S.P. said that she was afraid of father, believed that he would hit her if she spoke to anyone about the abuse, and did not feel safe at home. Based on the totality of
the circumstances of father’s sexual abuse of S.P., it was reasonable for the juvenile court
to conclude that M.P. was at risk of being sexually abused by him.
In re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th 766 [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005] disapproved of In re
Alexis S . (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48; In re Maria R . (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48; In re
Rubisela E . (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, cases relie d upon by father in support of his
contention that the evidence of his sexual abuse of S.P., by itself, was insufficient to support a finding that M.P., S.P.’s younger male sibling, was at risk of sexual abuse. ( In
re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. __ [2013 Cal. Lexi s 4005, at p. *26].) Father however
contends that In re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th 766 [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005] is inapposite
because unlike in that cas e, there is no evidence here that father digitally penetrated the child’s vagina, forcefully rape d the child by placing his penis in the child’s vagina, forced the child to expose th e child’s vagina to him, orally copulated the child’s vagina, or
forced the child to watch pornographic videos with him. Although the specific facts of a father’s sexual abuse of his daughter may va ry from case to case, it is reasonable to conclude, based on the facts discussed above, th at father’s conduct here was sufficiently egregious and M.P. was at risk of being se xually abused by him. “[R]elevant to the13 totality of the circumstances su rrounding the sibling abuse is the violation of trust shown by sexually abusing one child while the other children were living in the same home and could easily have learned of or even interrup ted the abuse. ‘[S]exual or other serious physical abuse of a child by an adult constitu tes a fundamental betrayal of the appropriate relationship between the generations. . . . When a parent abuses his or her own child, . . . the parent also abandons and contravenes th e parental role. Such misparenting is among the specific compelling circumstances which ma y justify state intervention, including an interruption of parental custody. (See § 300, subds. (d), (e), (j ).)’ [Citation.]” ( Id . at p. __ [2013 Cal. Lexis 4005, at pp. *20-*21].) Under the applicable standard of review, we resolve all conflicts in favor of the juvenile court’s order and indulge all reasona ble inferences from th e evidence, and do not substitute our conclusions for those of the juve nile court. When th e evidence of abuse in
this case is reviewed within the limitations of those well-established principles, we
conclude that there was suffici ent evidence to support a reas onable inference that father’s behavior towards S.P. was “so sexually aberra nt that both male and female siblings of [S.P. were] at substantial risk of sexual abuse . . . .” ( In re Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84, 90-91.) The substantial evid ence shows that “[s]iblings of sexually
abused children are at substantial risk of harm and are entitled to protection by the juvenile courts.” ( In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.Ap p.4th 1339, 1347.) The juvenile court’s finding of a substantial risk of sexual a buse of M.P. was supported by substantial
evidence and did not exceed the bounds of reason.14 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

MOSK, J.

We concur:

ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J.

KRIEGLER, J.