THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC ) COMPANY, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SD 35236 ) Filed: December 5, 2019 COVERDELL ENTERPRISES, INC., ) ) Appellant, ) ) and ) ) CITY OF BRANSON, ET AL., ) ) Respondents. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TANEY COUNTY Honorable Timothy W. Perigo, Special Judge
AFFIRMED The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of HCW Develo pment Company, LLC; HCW Private Development, LLC; and HCW North, LLC (collecti vely, HCW) and against Douglas Coverdell (Coverd ell) and Coverdell Enterprises , Inc. (CEI) on Coverdell’s claim for adverse possession of approximately 27 acres of prope rty, which includes portions of the Branson Landing in Branson, Missouri. Following entry o f summary judgment in2 favor of HCW, a joint motion se eking to have the ruling on Cove rdell’s adverse possession claim reduced to a final judgment was filed by three other part ies also involved in the underlying dispute with Coverdell and CEI: the City of Branson (Branson), Empire District Electric Company (Empire), and Central Bank of Branson (Central ). The trial court granted the joint motion, thereby disposing of all claims and terminati ng the litigation. Coverdell and CEI filed separate appeals. T his appeal concerns CEI only. We affirm. Concurrently with this opinion, we are affirming the judgment i n Coverdell’s appeal via separate opinion. That is our third opinion in this case. See Empire Dist. Elec. Co. v.
Coverdell , --- S.W.3d ----, SD35226 (Mo. App. filed December 5, 2019) ( Empire III ). 1 In Empire III , this Court determined, inter alia , that as a matter of law, Coverdell cannot prove adverse possession of the 27-acre tract at issue, which Coverde ll described as Property A.
Id ., slip op. at 16. In CEI’s appeal, CEI essentially posits trial court error in ru ling against CEI because it owns Property B, which is a portion of Property A that Cover dell conveyed to CEI by quitclaim deed. The trial court did not err by granting summar y judgment against CEI. It is well settled that a quitclaim deed conveys only that which is p ossessed by the grantor and

1 We note the mandate in our second opinion, Empire Dist. Elec. Co. v. Coverdell , 484 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. App. 2015) (Empire II ), was limited to further proceedings concerning the claim for adverse possession by Coverdell only. Id . at 34. To the extent Coverdell might have prevailed, however, CEI continued to have an interest in t he subsequent proceedings and on appeal. Our mandate stated: [T]he matter is remanded for fu rther proceedings limited to the resolution of Coverdell’s claim for adverse po ssession of Properties A and B as described in [Coverdell and CEI’s] reasserted claims. If that claim is f ound to be meritorious, the trial court will then declare the extent to wh ich Coverdell’s adverse possession precludes the quieting of title in favor of Branson and Empire. Id

.3 nothing more

. Webster Oil Co., Inc. v. McLean Hotels, Inc. , 878 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Mo. App. 1994). “Even a good faith purchaser for value under a qu itclaim deed obtains only the rights, title, or interests his grantor possessed at the time h e conveyed the deed.” Pankins v.
Jackson , 891 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Mo. App. 1995); see McAboy v. Packer , 187 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Mo. 1945); see also R & R Land Dev., L.L.C. v. Am. Freightways, Inc. , 389 S.W.3d 234, 242 (Mo. App. 2012). Here, CEI’s claim of ownership to Pr operty B is entirely dependent on Coverdell’s claim of ownership of Property A by ad verse possession, and that claim has failed. Empire III , --- S.W.3d ----, slip op. at 16. Because Coverdell had no ownership interest in Property B, Coverdell’s quitclaim deed “c onveyed nothing” to CEI.
Webster , 878 S.W.2d at 894. CEI, theref ore, has no ownership interest in Property B. 2

2 The property description of Pr operty B was included in both o ur previous opinions in Empire II and Empire Dist. Elec. Co. v. Coverdell , 344 S.W.3d 842 (Mo. App. 2011) ( Empire I ). To be very clear, because Pr operty B is at issue in this ap peal, we repeat its description here: A parcel of land situated in the NE1⁄4 of the SW1⁄4 and the SE1⁄4 of the NW1⁄4 of Section 33, Township 23 North, Range 21 West, [Branson], as per general warranty deed and being described as follows: Commencing at the Northeast corner of Park Addition to [Branson ], thence N 02o29’46” W along the established property line (as per surve y of E.G. Nightingale, Book 13, Page 16) 27.8 0 feet to a set rebar being the point of beginning, thence continue N 02o29 ’46” W 749.81 feet to a refer ence point on the top bank of the mouth of Roark Creek, thence continuing N 02o29’46” W to the fluctuating waters edge of said Roark Creek, thence ea sterly and southerly along the fluctuating waters edge of Roark Creek and Lake Taneycomo to a point being S 89o 41’34” E of the point of beginn ing, thence N 89o41’34” W ... to a set rebar be ing a reference point on the b ank of said Lake Taneycomo, thence N 89o41’34” W 242.06 feet to the point o f beginning. Empire II , 484 S.W.3d at 34 (Appendix); see Empire I , 344 S.W.3d at 847 n.10 (reciting the same property description whe n tracing the history of Cover dell’s deed).4 Accordingly, the judgment against CEI and in favor of HCW, Bran son, Empire, and Central is affirmed.

JEFFREY W. BATES, J . – OPINION AUTHOR WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., P.J. – CONCUR MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCUR