Filed 6/28/21 P. v. Parker CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KEDRICK DESHAUN PARKER,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B303463

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MA070440)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed.

Doris M. LeRoy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General, Lance E. 

Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan 

Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Blythe J. Leszkay and Yun 

K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________________
2

Kedrick Parker appeals from a judgment entered after a 

jury found him guilty of human trafficking and pimping an adult 

female (A.C.), human trafficking and pimping a minor female

(W.S.), failure to register as a sex offender, and dissuading a 

witness (A.C.) from testifying. The trial court sentenced him to 

34 years and eight months in prison. He contends the trial erred 

(1) in admitting into evidence at trial A.C.’s preliminary hearing,

testimony based on a finding she was unavailable as a witness; 

(2) in admitting into evidence at trial for their truth A.C.’s 

statements to law enforcement under the spontaneous statement 

and forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exceptions; (3) not 

instructing the jury sua sponte on misdemeanor false 

imprisonment, arguing it is a lesser included offense of the 

human trafficking count involving A.C.; and (4) in admitting into 

evidence at trial testimony from W.S. and a detective regarding 

W.S.’s age, over Parker’s objection that the testimony lacked 

foundation. We reject Parker’s contentions and affirm the 

judgment.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History of Case

An amended information charged Parker with human 

trafficking A.C. (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (a); count 1); pimping 

A.C. (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a); count 2); pimping W.S., aka 

R.C. (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a); count 3); failure to register as 

a sex offender (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (b); count 4); possession of 

a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 6);1

possession of ammunition by a person prohibited (Pen. Code, 

1 The amended information did not include a count 5.
3

§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 7); human trafficking a minor (W.S.)

for a commercial sex act (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (c)(1); count 8); 

and dissuading a witness from testifying (Pen. Code, § 136.1, 

subd. (a)(1); count 9). The amended information also alleged 

Parker had a prior serious felony conviction, a burglary (Pen. 

Code, § 459), within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. 

Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(j) & 1170.12, subd. (b)).

At Parker’s first trial in July 2018, a jury found him guilty 

of dissuading A.C. from testifying (count 9) and found him not 

guilty of the firearm and ammunition offenses (counts 6 & 7). 

The jury could not reach a verdict on counts 1 through 4 and 8, 

and the trial court declared a mistrial as to these counts. On 

appeal, Parker does not challenge his conviction for dissuading a 

witness.

The prosecution retried Parker on counts 1 through 4 and 8 

in a second trial that commenced in November 2019. As 

discussed more fully below in the Discussion section of this 

opinion, after holding a due diligence hearing, the trial court 

admitted into evidence A.C.’s preliminary hearing testimony

(summarized below), finding she was unavailable as a witness 

and the prosecution demonstrated due diligence in attempting to 

secure her attendance at trial. The court also admitted into 

evidence the entirety of A.C.’s statements to law enforcement 

(two recorded interviews, summarized below) under the hearsay 

exceptions for spontaneous statements (Evid. Code, § 1240) and 

forfeiture by wrongdoing (Evid. Code, § 1390), and as

impeachment of her preliminary hearing testimony.

Below is a summary of the pertinent facts presented at 

Parker’s second trial.
4

II. Prosecution Case

A. Surveillance of Parker

In 2007, Parker was convicted in Nevada of pandering a 

minor, conspiracy to pander a minor, and second degree 

kidnapping. As a result of the pandering convictions, he was 

required to register as a sex offender in California pursuant to 

Penal Code section 290. Between late 2010 and May 2016, he 

registered at the sheriff’s station in Lancaster. He often

registered as a transient, indicating he did not have an address to 

include on the registration forms. In or about April 2016, a sex 

offender registration relief person who worked at the Lancaster 

sheriff’s station became suspicious of Parker’s registration 

because he did not seem homeless, as he was always wellgroomed and wore what appeared to be expensive clothing and 

jewelry. She suspected Parker had violated the statute by failing 

to resister an address where he lived. She brought her suspicions 

to Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Detective Daniel 

Gore, a member of the department’s Human Trafficking Bureau, 

who would become the lead detective in this case.

Detective Gore discovered that Parker had two vehicles 

registered to him at an apartment in Quartz Hill. The vehicles 

were also registered to a woman named Cashmeer Burks, who 

was the mother of Parker’s son, as Gore would later learn. Gore 

also learned from a postal inspector that Parker received mail at 

the same address where the vehicles were registered. Beginning 

on April 18, 2016, Gore conducted a five-day surveillance outside 

the Quartz Hill apartment. Each night, he observed a black 

Jaguar—one of the two vehicles registered to Parker and Burks—

arrive and park in the assigned space for the apartment. He 
5

could not identify the person who exited the Jaguar at night. 

Each morning, he observed Parker leave in the Jaguar.2

Knowing about Parker’s pandering convictions, Detective 

Gore assembled a five-person team from various law enforcement 

agencies to conduct a rolling surveillance operation to determine 

where Parker went when he left the Quartz Hill apartment each 

morning. On June 3, 2016, the team surveilled Parker as he left 

the apartment in the Jaguar at about 9:40 a.m. Another man 

was driving the Jaguar, and Parker was in the front passenger 

seat. They drove to the Sands Motel in Lancaster, a place known 

to law enforcement for commercial sex activity. Parker and the 

man exited the jaguar, entered the motel, and returned to the 

Jaguar with a female later identified as A.C. The team followed 

the Jaguar as it entered the 14 Freeway, exited the freeway, 

made a stop, and continued onto Highway 58. Believing the 

Jaguar was headed to Las Vegas, Nevada, and knowing Parker’s 

criminal history of pandering a minor in Nevada, Detective Gore 

did not want the Jaguar to cross state lines with the unidentified 

female in the backseat. Gore instructed the team members 

ahead of him to conduct a traffic stop. 

By the time Detective Gore arrived at the traffic stop, other 

team members had detained and handcuffed Parker and his male 

2 Evidence regarding the five-day surveillance, evidence 

recovered during a later search of the Quartz Hill apartment, and 

Burks’s trial testimony supported Parker’s conviction for failure 

to register pursuant to Penal Code section 290, subdivision (b) 

(count 4) because he failed to list the Quartz Hill apartment as 

his address on his registration form. We need not discuss this 

evidence further because it is not germane to the issues on 

appeal.
6

companion. Gore approached A.C. She appeared confused and 

angry about the traffic stop. She told him she was an adult (she 

was in fact 19 years old). He removed her from Parker’s view and 

had her sit in the backseat of his unmarked vehicle. Gore told 

her about the investigation of Parker, and A.C. began to talk to 

him. She appeared scared. She said she was “in fear for her 

family,” and Gore did not know what Parker “was capable of.”

She asked Gore to take her away from the scene. To avoid the 

appearance that A.C. was a “snitch,” Gore handcuffed her to 

make it look like an arrest. A.C. was in on the ruse. 

Just before Detective Gore and A.C. pulled away from the 

scene of the traffic stop, Gore began recording his conversation 

with her. A.C. was crying at times as they drove to the station.

B. A.C.’s statements to law enforcement

At trial, the prosecutor played for the jury audio recordings 

from A.C.’s June 3, 2016 interviews with Detective Gore, which 

occurred in the car on the way to the station and at the station. 

The prosecutor also provided transcripts of the interviews, which 

were admitted into evidence and are included in the record on 

appeal. 

1. Car interview

As the recording began, A.C. was asking Detective Gore to 

recover her belongings from the Jaguar, including her cell 

phones. Gore informed another team member that, according to 

A.C., Parker had taken her identification and Social Security 

card.3 As the discussion regarding A.C.’s belongings continued 

among A.C., Gore, and the other team member, A.C. said, “Get 

3 During a search of Parker at the traffic stop, an officer 

recovered A.C.’s identification and Social Security card from 

inside Parker’s shoe. 
7

me out of here.” She was crying as she made the request. She

asked Gore if he had told Parker and his male companion that 

she was being arrested. Gore indicated that they (he and A.C.)

would discuss the matter at the station and figure out what to 

tell Parker about her situation. 

A.C. inquired about the nature of Parker’s relationship 

with the mother of his son (Burks). A.C. asked Gore (1) if Burks 

knew what Parker did (presumably a reference to Parker’s 

criminal activity); (2) if Gore had seen Parker and Burks together 

at the apartment; and (3) if Parker and Burks were “lovey-dovey”

(e.g., holding hands). Later in the interview, A.C. returned to 

talking about the nature of Parker’s relationship with Burks, and 

she commented, “she [Burks] just couldn’t handle him being a 

pimp.” 

A.C. told Detective Gore, “the first time I tried to leave

[date not specified], I just told him [Parker] I couldn’t do this 

anymore.”4 She explained that the motel in San Bernardino 

where they were staying was raided by the police, and she 

decided she wanted to go to Las Vegas. Parker told her he would 

not be able to see her anymore if she returned to Las Vegas. A.C. 

told Gore that the weekend before this interview, she received a 

tattoo with Parker’s first name and a crown.5

4 At this point in the interview, A.C. did not elaborate on 

the nature of the situation she was attempting to leave. It is 

clear from the car interview that A.C. and Gore had discussed the 

nature of her relationship with Parker before Gore started 

recording.

5 Detective Gore testified at trial that it is common for 

pimps to have their commercial sex workers tattoo themselves in 

the manner in which A.C. was tattooed. 
8

A.C. informed Detective Gore that Parker had “another 

girl” named Ruby that he picked up and dropped off at an E-Z 8 

Motel in Palmdale. According to A.C., Ruby was staying in a 

room under Parker’s name. A.C. believed Ruby was 19 years 

old.6 A.C. indicated she (A.C.) was the only girl staying in the 

room at the Sands Motel (where the law enforcement team began 

its rolling surveillance that day). She informed Gore that 

management at the Sands Motel knew Parker was a pimp and 

that she was a prostitute, but management did not call the police 

on them. 

A.C. said she did not know Parker was required to register 

as a sex offender. Parker told her he had a pimping and 

pandering case that arose because another girl “snitched,” but 

the case was closed because the girl “back[ed] out at the last 

minute.” 

A.C. informed Detective Gore that Parker had “a girl in 

Santa Clarita,” but A.C. did not know where she was staying. 

A.C. explained that she (A.C.) was Parker’s “bottom bitch,” and 

he did not allow her to be around his other prostitutes because 

she became jealous of the other girls, and he did not “want [her] 

to burn off his money” by interfering in his relationship with his 

other prostitutes.7

6 Detective Gore would later learn that the girl who called 

herself Ruby is actually named W.S. Evidence presented at trial, 

over Parker’s objection, demonstrated that W.S. was 16 years old 

at the time Parker brought her to the E-Z 8 Motel for commercial 

sex work.

7 During his trial testimony, based on his experience in the 

Human Trafficking Bureau, Detective Gore described a “bottom 

bitch” as follows: “She’s the number one girl that a pimp has. I 
9

A.C. also explained to Detective Gore that she, Parker, and 

Parker’s male companion were driving to Las Vegas before the 

traffic stop on the day of this interview, because Parker was 

“supposed to pick-up [sic] some other girl there out there [sic] in 

Vegas” and bring her back to California. According to A.C., 

Parker connected with the girls who worked for him through his 

Facebook account.

Detective Gore asked A.C. how many times Parker had 

beaten her (based on their discussion before the recording began), 

and she replied, “Don’t get me started.” Responding to Gore’s 

inquiry about the reasons Parker beat her, A.C. explained: (1) he 

was jealous of her communications with her male friends; (2) she 

did not get along with the other women/girls; and (3) he got mad 

whenever she tried to leave. A.C. stated that a couple weeks 

before this interview, Parker “beat [her] up really bad” in a motel 

parking lot. He pulled out her hair, “threw out” her shoulder, 

and refused to allow her to go to the hospital for medical care 

because she had a black eye. She left with a friend, who drove 

her from Palmdale to Union Station in Los Angeles, so she could 

return home to Las Vegas. Parker was at Union Station when 

she arrived. He said, “ ‘I can’t lose you,’ ” which made her “feel 

bad,” and she went back with him. 

A.C. told Detective Gore she was enrolled in college and 

had missed two weeks of school. She also indicated she might be 

pregnant by Parker, but she did not want to have a baby with a 

“pimp” and a “liar.” She said she wanted nothing further to do 

with Parker, asserting: “I wanna give you guys the rest of the 

guess for better terms, she’s a sergeant at arms. She helps groom 

the girls, but she also helps keep them in line, and she is the 

right-hand man/woman [sic] to the pimp.” 
10

information, get you guys out of my hair so I can go back to being 

normal.” She told Gore that Parker “ruined [her] life.” She 

explained that she quit a “good job” working with autistic 

children to be with Parker. She thought they were going to move 

into an apartment together that summer, and he was going to tell 

Burks about her. He had a good relationship with her family and 

did not want them to know he was her pimp; in front of them, he 

acted like her boyfriend. 

2. Station interview

Once at the station, Detective Gore resumed his recorded 

interview of A.C. in a conference room. Gore asked A.C. how she 

first met Parker. She explained that she had a boyfriend when 

Parker first contacted her through Facebook in or around the 

beginning of 2016. Parker knew her ex-boyfriend. After she and 

her boyfriend broke up, she and Parker began communicating 

more frequently. On March 16, 2016 (two and a half months 

before this interview), Parker visited A.C. in Las Vegas where 

she lived. They became intimate.

A.C. stated that initially she “didn’t really catch on” that 

Parker was a pimp; the indications were “subliminal.” She 

explained that when she was 16 years old, she “was forced into a 

situation . . . where [she] had to prostitute.” When Parker “found 

out about it,” he indicated, “ ‘Okay. Well, you did it before, you 

can do it again.’ ” He asked her to return with him to California 

and work for him as a prostitute. She agreed. He did not want 

her to work for him in Las Vegas because there was a “crack 

down on prostitution in Vegas,” and her family lived in Las 

Vegas, and they would likely figure out what she was doing. A.C. 

stated her father was a well-known drug and human trafficker, 

who would “kill” Parker if he found out Parker was her pimp. 
11

When they arrived in California, Parker took her 

immediately to a cheap motel and posted an ad for her services 

on Backpage.com the same night. He indicated she could “catch 

more dates” and they would “have more money” if she stayed at 

cheap motels. Parker took all the money she earned from 

prostitution—and any other money she happened to have—so she 

“wouldn’t have the opportunity to leave.” 

A.C. worked out of several different motels. Parker set the 

prices she charged. He also established a code system so he could 

monitor the progress of her dates. She texted him the number 

one to indicate the date had arrived at the room and “everything 

was fine”; the number two to indicate “the tricks are acting-up 

[sic]”; and the number three to indicate the date was over, the 

customer had left the room, and she had the money. If she texted 

the number two, Parker would come to the motel room door. 

When she went on a date at a customer’s home, Parker drove her 

there and waited outside in the car in case something went 

wrong. 

In responding to an inquiry about the amount of sleep she 

got, A.C. stated, “ ‘I get to go to sleep when I’m told I can go to 

sleep.’ ” She also indicated she “wasn’t allowed to stop” working 

for Parker. Whenever she threatened to leave, Parker would 

take her phone because he knew she would not leave if she could 

not call her family. 

A.C. stated the last time Parker beat her was a couple days 

before this interview, and her shoulder, wrist, and head were 

hurting. Parker threw her into the bathroom, and the cover of 

the toilet broke when she landed. Detective Gore indicated he 

noticed a bruise on A.C.’s shoulder, which she confirmed had 
12

resulted from the incident.8 She explained she was too “scared” 

to fight back because whenever she did, Parker would pull her 

hair and choke her until it was hard for her to breathe. This 

particular altercation arose because Parker did not like the way 

A.C. was acting in front of some girls he had brought to the 

motel. As his “bottom bitch,” she “wasn’t supposed to act [like] 

that.” A.C. described Parker as a “gorilla pimp.”9

During the time she worked for Parker, A.C. continued to 

have a sexual relationship with him. He told her he was no 

longer in a relationship with Burks and did not live with her. He 

would get angry and hit her when she accused him of living with 

Burks. He told her Burks had a boyfriend. He also told her he 

lived in his own two-story house. 

A.C. told Detective Gore she knew W.S.—known to her as 

Ruby—was 19 years old because she had seen her identification. 

She explained, Parker “takes all of our IDs, that’s why I didn’t 

have mine.” A.C. first met Ruby the day before this interview, 

when they went to a nail shop for a manicure. Another officer, 

who was present for some of this interview, asked A.C. if she 

believed Ruby would talk to law enforcement. A.C. thought Ruby 

8 At trial, Detective Gore testified he did not notice any 

injuries on A.C. during this interviews. 

9 During his trial testimony, Detective Gore described a 

“gorilla pimp” as “a type of pimp who uses force[,] fear[,] and 

violence to get the girls to work for him or to keep them in line, 

keep them from running away.” He described a “Romeo pimp” as 

a pimp who uses a romantic relationship and emotional 

connection to get his prostitutes to continue to work for him. 

Gore opined that Parker’s relationship to A.C. was that of a 

Romeo/gorilla pimp. 
13

would talk to them if she (A.C.) was present. A.C. indicated Ruby 

might be hesitant to talk because Parker told all the “girls” he 

would hurt them if he went to jail because they talked to the 

police. He told A.C. “he would be forced to hurt [her] and [her] 

family” if he ever went to jail because of her. He knew where her 

family lived, and he had a key to her apartment in Las Vegas.

C. Law enforcement’s rescue of minor W.S. from 

motel

On June 3, 2016, after Parker’s arrest and A.C.’s 

interviews, Detective Gore and his team went to the E-Z 8 Motel, 

based on A.C.’s tip about W.S. (aka Ruby). They found W.S. in a 

motel room with a customer. She told them she was 19 years old 

and gave them a fake name (Ruby C.). After interviewing her at 

the station, they released her. 

Sometime later, Detective Gore was notified about a minor 

who had run away from a juvenile placement. He viewed a photo 

of W.S., the missing minor, and recognized her as Ruby. On 

January 11, 2017, after W.S. was located, Gore interviewed her 

and confirmed she was a minor. 

W.S. testified at trial. She stated Parker became her pimp 

a few days before he was arrested. She was a prostitute before 

she met Parker. Her testimony about her relationship with 

Parker is not pertinent to the issues on appeal, so we do not 

summarize it here. W.S. testified that she was born in January 

2000, and she was 16 years old when she was working for Parker 

as a prostitute. She told Parker she was 19 years old. She also 

testified that she was AWOL from a juvenile placement at the 

time of the events at issue in this case. 
14

D. Parker’s jail telephone calls (before 

preliminary hearing)

At trial, the prosecutor played for the jury audio recordings 

of the telephone calls Parker made from jail that are summarized 

below. The prosecutor also provided transcripts of the calls, 

which were admitted into evidence and are included in the record 

on appeal.10

On June 3, 2016, shortly after he was taken into custody, 

Parker called Burks from jail. Burks told him she had seen 

messages on Facebook that A.C. had written about her 

relationship with Parker. He told Burks he had sex with A.C. a 

couple times and lied to A.C. about wanting to be in a 

relationship with her, “for the money to keep flowing” and “to 

keep her going.” He added, “I had to play her . . . all the way to 

the left to get what I wanted.” He described his sexual 

relationship with A.C. as an “initiation,” designed to “to get to 

[her] mind, body, and soul,” so he could get her to do everything 

he needed her to do. He assured Burks his relationship with A.C. 

was “nothing personal.” He said A.C. was lying about being 

pregnant. He also said he became angry with A.C. when she had 

his name tattooed on her body. He told Burks he tried to “get rid 

of” A.C., but she “would not let [him] get rid of her.” In referring 

to A.C., Parker said: “She’s the only one working for me.” 

10 The prosecutor also presented these calls as evidence at 

the first trial, and they supported the jury’s guilty verdict in that 

trial on count 9 for dissuading A.C. from testifying. On appeal, 

these calls are germane to Parker’s challenge to the trial court’s 

admission of A.C.’s statements to law enforcement under the 

forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception.
15

Parker asked Burks to contact A.C. to find out what she 

told the police. He wanted to know if A.C. had snitched on him. 

He told Burks she could call his cell phone because A.C. probably 

had it. Burks called while she was still on the phone with 

Parker, and the call to Parker’s cell phone went to voicemail. 

Parker told Burks to send A.C. a Facebook message, telling A.C. 

the police lied to her, and she should not believe anything the 

police told her. He also told Burks to lie to A.C. about their 

relationship and tell A.C. he did not live with Burks. He 

explained he had told A.C. he lived alone, and he wanted Burks 

to confirm that, even though it was not true. He stated, “She 

[A.C.] didn’t want to pay my pockets if . . . I was in a relationship. 

So that’s what I told her.” He provided his Facebook user name 

and password to Burks so she could contact A.C. from his 

account. He instructed Burks to tell A.C., “you [sic] supposed to 

be down for the crown and you ain’t down for the crown.” He also 

told Burks to tell A.C. “to hold down the crown.”11 He instructed 

Burks to deactivate his Facebook account after she contacted A.C.

On June 6, 2016, three days after his arrest, Parker called 

his mother from jail. He asked his mother to contact A.C. and 

instruct A.C. to say that she never had sex for money on her 

dates. He added, “Make sure when you say that just say that, 

um, all she did was--what she did was just, uh, get massages.” 

He told his mother A.C. was “the main person” and “the reason” 

he was in jail. 

11 During her preliminary hearing testimony (summarized 

below), which was admitted into evidence at trial, A.C. testified 

that in the commercial sex industry “the crown” signifies “[h]e is 

a pimp for me.” 
16

On July 4, 2016, two days before A.C. gave her preliminary 

hearing testimony, Parker again called Burks from jail. Burks 

told him A.C. had been texting her, stating (1) that the detectives 

informed her about what Parker was saying about her in his jail 

calls (that A.C. was “nothing but a hoe, and [he] was making 

money off her”); (2) that she was going to see Parker and Burks 

in court and she would “have the last laugh”; and (3) that Parker 

was not “going to know her baby.” 

Parker requested Burks make a three-way call to A.C., so 

Parker could talk to her. Burks initially declined. Parker told 

her, “If she [A.C.] goes to court, I’m fucked.” He added, “I can’t 

afford this bitch to go to court.” Burks again declined. Parker 

told her his life depended on it because he was facing 41 years in 

prison, and their son would not have a father. He assured her 

the three-way call could not be recorded. He explained: “I’m 

going to have to sweet talk this bitch, whatever I have to tell this 

bitch, to make her not go to court.” He repeatedly told Burks he 

would tell A.C. whatever he had to tell her to make sure she did 

not go to court, emphasizing, “I can’t have her go to court.” Burks 

relented and made the three-way call to A.C.

When A.C. got on the line, she accused Parker of “trying to 

play [her], explaining she had heard a recording of a jail call and 

knew Parker did not want her to go to court. She also told 

Parker she had just now heard him tell Burks, “ ‘I’m going to do 

anything, say anything to make her not go to court.’ ” Parker 

confirmed he did not want her to go to court. A.C. said he did not 

care “how [he] hurt [her].” She also told him she was “pregnant 

with [his] baby.” Parker stated the detective was trying to play 

them against each other and wanted him to testify against her so 
17

she would go to jail.

12 He asserted he “got [her] out of” it by 

saying she was not involved in prostitution. She asked him why 

he was “calling [her] phone non-stop,” saying they were “going to 

be together.” He responded, “I’m going to tell you anything I 

need to tell you for you not to go to court.” He told her to “be 

strong” and not “let this white man [the detective] get in between 

your head [sic].” He claimed he was going to tell her the truth to 

make her not go to court because his life depended on it, and he 

would not see his children again if she went to court. A.C. told 

him people were calling and texting her, stating that Parker said 

he was going to hurt her and the baby when he was released from 

jail. Parker denied making such statements and told her he 

“didn’t even know [she] was pregnant” (although he and Burks 

had discussed A.C.’s pregnancy a month before this call). Before 

the call ended, Parker implored her to stop believing “all of those 

lies.” 

Later the same day, Parker called Burks again and begged 

her to make another three-way call to A.C. Burks resisted, but 

Parker told her he was “never going to see the light of day” if she 

did not make the call. He added, “My life is over in two days, if I 

don’t get through to this girl’s head.” He threatened to kill 

himself that night if Burks did not comply. He told Burks that 

A.C. was lying about the pregnancy, and he planned to lie to A.C. 

and tell her whatever “ridiculous, crazy” things would keep her 

from going to court. He claimed his heart was with Burks and he 

was telling her (Burks) the truth. Burks made the call.13

12 A.C. was not charged with any crime in this case.

13 For her role in these three-way calls, Burks pleaded no 

contest to a misdemeanor count of dissuading a witness from 

testifying in violation of Penal Code section 136.1. 
18

When A.C. got on the line, she told Parker she knew he was 

telling her what she wanted to hear so he could get “out of [his] 

situation.” He said he was lying to Burks and telling Burks what 

he needed to tell her, so she would let him see his son when he 

was released from jail. A.C. said she understood why he would do 

that (lie to Burks so he could maintain a relationship with his 

son). Parker told A.C. he wanted a future with her (A.C.). She 

responded that she was not going to go to court. He told her he 

did not care about that; he cared about his relationship with her. 

He told her he would probably be released from jail by the time 

their baby was due. 

A.C. reiterated that people were sending her messages, 

saying that Parker was going to hurt her. He said those people 

were lying to her. He also told her he knew the detective was 

lying about what she said in her interviews because he (Parker) 

never forced her to do anything, including getting tattoos. A.C. 

assured him she told the detective Parker did not force her to get 

the tattoos. She told Parker she wanted him to come home. She 

said the detective was calling her more frequently. Parker told 

her not to tell the detective anything.

Thereafter, Detective Gore travelled to Las Vegas, picked 

up A.C., and transported her to Los Angeles for her testimony at 

Parker’s preliminary hearing on July 6, 2016 (two days after the 

last jail call summarized above). A.C. later told Parker, during a 

jail call Parker made to her after she gave her preliminary 

hearing testimony (summarized below), that Detective Gore 

“popped up at [her] house” at 3:00 a.m. on July 6, 2016, to take 

her to the preliminary hearing. 
19

E. A.C.’s testimony at preliminary hearing 

A.C. did not appear at trial (either the first or the second 

trial that is at issue here). The prosecution read to the jury at 

the second trial A.C.’s testimony from the preliminary hearing on 

July 6, 2016.

A.C. testified that she met Parker around March 2016, and 

they began a boyfriend/girlfriend relationship. A couple weeks 

later, she chose to move to Lancaster with him. She suspected he 

was a pimp, and she told him she “wanted to go make some 

money.” She had “already had two previous pimps,” so she “kind 

of knew what he [Parker] was about.” When they arrived in 

Lancaster, she asked him to take her to a motel, and she booked 

the room.

A.C. stated she gave Parker “most” of the money she made 

as a prostitute, performing “sexual favors” for money. She “set 

[her] own expectations” regarding how much money she wanted 

to make per day. She posted her own ads on Backpage.com to 

solicit customers. Parker did not help her post the ads. When 

she met a customer outside the motel, either Parker drove her to 

the meeting, or she drove herself in his Jaguar. She explained

the numerical text code she used to keep him apprised of the 

progress of her dates, as described above. Parker provided her 

physical protection if a customer was causing trouble. 

A.C. testified about the tattoos she received after she met 

him—“his name and a crown.” To her, the crown signified that

“he was [her] king.” As set forth above, she acknowledged that in 

her industry—commercial sex work—the crown meant: “He is a 

pimp for me.” She stated that she “brought” the tattoo idea to 

him; he did not ask her to get the tattoos. 
20

A.C. denied ever trying to leave Parker. She also denied 

Parker ever asked her for her identification or Social Security 

card. She testified she gave those items to Parker willingly 

because she did not want to carry identification when she was on 

dates. According to A.C., Parker told her to leave “plenty of 

times,” but she “never wanted to leave.” 

A.C. acknowledged that Parker was “physical” with her 

during the time she worked for him as a prostitute. When the 

prosecutor asked her to be more specific regarding how Parker 

was physical with her, A.C. responded: “I don’t want to go into 

detail.” She acknowledged Parker had hit her in the face with an 

open hand but denied he had ever hit her in the face with a 

closed fist. She stated she was not injured when he hit her in the 

face; she did not receive a black eye. She also denied that Parker 

ever pulled her hair or threw out her shoulder. 

A.C. stated she was not “scared of” Parker. The prosecutor 

asked her: “Are you worried that by testifying or telling the 

truth, that the defendant [Parker] will get mad at you?” A.C. 

responded: “No, because he really wasn’t in the wrong. I’m an 

adult. I make my own decisions.” When the prosecutor asked 

her if she was afraid of anything Parker might do to her because 

of her testimony, she replied, “I don’t know.” 

A.C. recalled speaking to Detective Gore on the day of 

Parker’s arrest, a month before this preliminary hearing, and she 

acknowledged she told Gore that Parker had beat her, choked 

her, and thrown her into a motel bathroom, breaking the toilet. 

She testified that these statements to Gore were true. She also 

told Gore that she was required to turn over to Parker all the 

money she made from prostitution and that she was scared of 

Parker “[i]n certain situations.” She confirmed during her 
21

testimony that these were also true statements. She explained 

that at the time of Parker’s arrest, her fear of Parker was based 

on information Detective Gore and W.S. were telling her. 

A.C. denied telling Gore that Parker grabbed her hair and 

choked her because she tried to leave. She asserted she was 

always free to leave Parker and, on one occasion when she did 

leave, she “came back by [her] choice.” She stated that although 

Parker did beat her, choke her, and throw her into a motel 

bathroom, it was not because she tried to leave. She also denied 

telling Gore that Parker forced her to get the tattoo with his 

name and the crown. She testified that at the time of the 

preliminary hearing, she was not afraid of Parker, and she was 

expecting a child with him. 

The prosecutor asked A.C. about the other girl she 

mentioned to Detective Gore. A.C. said she did not know the girl 

well and believed her name was Ruby. A.C. stated that on a date 

not specified, she and Ruby went to a nail shop together, then to 

get food with Parker, and then Parker and A.C. dropped off Ruby 

at her room at the E-Z 8 Motel in Palmdale. 

On cross-examination, A.C. testified that at the time she 

met Parker in March 2016, she had just stopped working for a 

pimp. At that time, she did not typically engage in commercial 

sex work in Las Vegas because she did not want her family to 

learn about her prostitution. In the past, when her family 

discovered she was working as a prostitute, they disowned her for 

a time. Parker attended family events with her in Las Vegas as 

her boyfriend. A.C. said she never considered Parker to be her 

pimp. She always “considered him [her] boyfriend. Nothing less; 

nothing more.” He never forced her to be a prostitute. She used 

his telephone number in the ads she posted on Backpage.com for 
22

commercial sex work. She chose to get the tattoos of his name 

and the crown “to prove to him that [she] wanted to be there for 

the long run.” 

Later in her testimony on cross-examination, A.C. qualified 

the nature of her relationship with Parker, stating: “I wouldn’t 

call it girlfriend, though, like. [¶] . . . [¶] I mean, it was 

girlfriend, but it was like -- like, there was [sic] certain rules 

behind it.” She explained that she could not go to Parker’s house, 

based on an agreement between Parker and Burks. Parker did 

not spend the night with her in the motel rooms or keep any 

clothes or a toothbrush there, although she and he split the cost 

of the rooms. He told her he lived in a two-story house, separate 

from Burks. 

A.C. testified that the arguments and physical altercations 

she had with Parker arose because she “didn’t want him around 

any other girl.” She stated that when other “girls were around 

and they were too close, [she] would purposely do things that 

[she] knew would make him mad” (e.g., ignore him and not “try to 

help to teach the girls the ropes”). Her arguments with Parker

were not related to her work as a prostitute, and she was free to 

leave him at any time. She never called the police after one of 

their physical altercations because she loved him. She would 

threaten to call the police when he would walk out on her after 

an altercation “to make him come back.” 

A.C. stated she gave Parker her identification and Social 

Security card when she went on dates in case her customer 

turned out to be an undercover officer. At the time of the traffic 

stop and Parker’s detention, he had her identification and Social 

Security card on his person because she gave it to him. She 

explained, “that’s just what I do. I lose things very easily 
23

especially when we’re going far distances.” On the occasions 

when they broke up, during the couple months they were 

together, Parker returned her identification and Social Security 

card to her. 

On redirect examination, A.C. testified that Parker helped 

her place ads for her commercial sex work on Backpage.com, by 

taking photos of her and posting the photos on Backpage.com. 

She identified an ad Parker placed for her and stated that the 

phone number listed in the ad was hers. She acknowledged she 

told Detective Gore that Parker posted an ad for her on 

Backpage.com when they first arrived in Lancaster. 

On recross-examination, A.C. testified that it was her idea 

to post the ads on Backpage.com, and some of the photos she used 

in the ads were “[f]rom [her] previous pimp.” She explained she 

did not know how to download pictures and place them in an ad, 

so Parker did that for her. 

F. Parker’s jail telephone call to A.C. after the 

preliminary hearing

After A.C. testified at the preliminary hearing, Parker 

called her from jail. At trial, the prosecutor played for the jury 

the audio recording of the telephone call. The prosecutor also 

provided a transcript of the call, which was admitted into 

evidence and is included in the record on appeal.14

14 Like the other jail calls summarized above, this call 

supported the jury’s guilty verdict at the first trial on count 9 for 

dissuading A.C. from testifying, and it pertains to our analysis 

here of the forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception under 

which the trial court admitted A.C.’s statements to law 

enforcement.
24

Parker told A.C. she did well during direct examination 

and cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, but she “lowkey incriminate[d]” him during redirect examination. A.C. 

disagreed, informing him that Detective Gore told her: “I don’t 

know if you realize this, but you helped him [Parker] out a lot.” 

Parker said his defense counsel told him A.C. was scared of him. 

A.C. replied, “I still am.” She told Parker she did not know if she 

wanted to see him when he got out of jail. He asked, “You think 

I’m going to do something to you?” She responded, “You’ve told 

me before.” 

A.C. accused Parker of lying about not living with Burks. 

Parker denied he lived with Burks. They argued about the 

nature of his relationship with Burks and W.S. (aka Ruby). 

A.C. indicated she was upset that Detective Gore appeared 

at her residence at 3:00 a.m. to take her to the preliminary 

hearing. Parker asserted he would be out of jail if she had not 

testified, and that is why he told her previously not to testify. 

A.C. stated there was other evidence, aside from her preliminary 

hearing testimony, supporting the charges. Parker disputed this. 

A.C. said they (presumably referring to Detective Gore) told her 

Parker was found guilty on all charges. Parker explained to her 

that he had not gone to trial yet, so he could not have been found 

guilty. 

Parker told A.C. she was too easily influenced and scared 

by “these white people.” He stated the police did not know 

anything until she told them, and she did not have to tell them 

anything. He complemented and criticized her for her 

preliminary hearing testimony, stating: “And when you changed 

it up on me you did a good job. You did a good job when you went 

to court. You saved a lot of shit by you going to court that time. 
25

But if you never came, I would have got out [sic]. They can’t find 

me guilty on no charges if you’re not there. I got the right to 

cross-examine my witnesses against me. And they used you 

against me. That’s what I was trying to tell you.” 

A.C. said she would not go to court next time. Parker told 

her: “They’re going to subpoena you. You’re going to trial if I go 

to trial. If I decide to go to trial, you’re going to be there. And if 

you don’t show up, then you really can go to jail. They gonna [sic] 

send you to jail.” Parker indicated A.C. was in this situation (of 

now having to testify against him before a jury) because she did 

not listen to him, and she gave the police her grandmother’s 

address in Las Vegas, “and they came and got” her for the 

preliminary hearing. He said the “worst” that would have 

happened if she refused to cooperate, “if they even caught” her, is 

she could have spent a couple days in jail. He told her he would 

never have testified in court against her, and he would not have 

answered calls from the police, if she were in jail facing charges. 

A.C. explained: “They were threatening to subpoena me.” Parker 

responded:

“Okay. Let me tell you what a subpoena is. Right? A 

subpoena is when they send someone from the court and we say, 

uh, we need you to appear in court. Right? And then if you don’t 

appear--see this how [sic], this how it works. Somebody have to 

[sic] come and see you in person and give you the letter. They 

can’t say, oh, you’re subpoenaed to go to court and now you--if you 

don’t come, you’re going to get in trouble. They got to [sic] give 

you a paper in your hand face-to-face. If you’re not face-to-face 

with anybody, they can’t do nothing [sic] to you. You feel me? 

That means you got to get served. If you’re not served, you don’t 

have to show up in court. They can even leave it with your 
26

grandma, but it don’t [sic] matter. They can leave it with your 

mom. You still don’t have to show up because they didn’t give it 

to you in your face hand-to-hand. You can’t get in trouble.” 

A.C. told Parker she was still “down for [him].” They 

discussed the nature of their relationship. A.C. said things 

between them “got bad,” and that is why she left with China 

(presumably the woman who drove her to Union Station on the 

occasion discussed above). Parker responded: “You left with 

China because I let you go.” Parker said A.C. was too easily 

influenced by other people, including China, Ruby, and “these 

white people,” and that is why he did not “let people come 

around” her. 

Returning to the preliminary hearing, Parker said: “The 

whole point of you coming there and you’re supposed to testify is 

[sic] to make me not look like a pimp--more like your boyfriend.” 

They again debated the true nature of their relationship. A.C. 

told him she would be with him when he got out of jail until he 

“entertain[ed] the next bitch.” And he responded that he would 

be with her until she “entertain[ed] everybody else and these 

white people too.” Before the call ended, A.C. told Parker, “I love 

you, daddy,” and he said he loved her too.15

Detective Gore testified at trial that A.C. left the Lancaster 

area immediately after the preliminary hearing and relocated to 

another state because she “was afraid for her safety.” Gore’s last 

contact with her was in or around October 2016, when she called 

him and told him she was living in Georgia. 

15 Detective Gore testified at trial that pimps “commonly 

. . . require the girls to call them dad or daddy.” 
27

The prosecution also introduced at trial electronic evidence, 

including text and Facebook messages, which indicated 

discussions between Parker and his prostitutes (A.C., W.S., and 

another woman) regarding commercial sex work. These

discussions included the amounts to charge for sex acts, 

information about dates, the posting of Backpage.com ads, and 

showed use of the numerical text code system for monitoring 

dates, described above.

III. Defense Case

Parker testified at trial in the defense case. We need not 

set forth the details of his testimony because it is not pertinent to 

our resolution of the issues on appeal. He denied he was a pimp

and said he worked as a photographer, a computer repair person, 

and a disc jockey. He stated A.C. was his girlfriend from March 

16 to May 21, 2016. Thereafter, they were just friends. There 

was no violence between them, and she was free to leave at any 

time. During the course of their relationship, he learned from 

social media that she was a prostitute. She did not work for him 

as a prostitute, but she did work for him on occasion as a 

photography assistant. 

Parker testified that he met W.S. through Facebook when 

he advertised the sale of medical marijuana. They smoked 

marijuana together. He knew she was a prostitute because she 

asked him if he wanted a date, but she did not work for him as a 

prostitute. He rented a room for her at a motel at her request 

because she did not have identification, but she paid for the room. 

Parker denied that his text and Facebook messages related 

to commercial sex work. He attributed some of the text messages 

associated with his phone to others, stating he had cloned his 

phone for A.C., and she and others used the cloned phone. 
28

IV. Verdicts and Sentence

The jury found Parker guilty of the retried counts (counts 

1-4 & 8) and found the prior conviction allegation to be true as to 

each count. The trial court sentenced Parker to 34 years and 

eight months in prison: on count 8 for human trafficking a minor 

(W.S.) for commercial sex, the upper term of 12 years, doubled to 

24 years for the prior strike conviction; on count 1 for human 

trafficking A.C., two years and eight months (one-third the 

middle term), doubled to five years and four months; on count 4 

for failure to register as a sex offender, eight months (one-third 

the middle term), doubled to one year and four months; and on 

count 9 for dissuading a witness from testifying (the guilty 

verdict in the first trial), the middle term of two years, doubled to 

four years. The trial court imposed and stayed sentence on 

counts 2 and 3 for pimping. 

In this appeal, Parker challenges his convictions on count 1 

for human trafficking A.C., on count 2 for pimping A.C., and on 

count 8 for human trafficking a minor (W.S.) for commercial sex, 

based on the contentions discussed below.

DISCUSSION

I. Admission of A.C.’s Preliminary Hearing Testimony

Parker contends the trial court erred in admitting A.C.’s 

preliminary hearing testimony at the second trial because the 

prosecution failed to demonstrate due diligence in attempting to 

secure A.C.’s attendance at the second trial. He argues we must 

reverse count 1 for human trafficking A.C. and count 2 for 

pimping A.C. based on this claim of error. 

We note that the trial court found A.C. to be unavailable as 

a witness at Parker’s first trial as well.
29

A. Proceedings below

On November 20, 2016, during jury selection before the 

second trial, the trial court held a hearing to evaluate the 

prosecution’s diligence in attempting to secure A.C.’s appearance 

at trial. Krist Mason, a senior investigator at the Los Angeles 

District Attorney’s Office Bureau of Investigations, testified as 

follows. 

On April 30, 2019, the prosecutor requested Mason locate 

A.C. and personally serve her with a subpoena for the second 

trial. Each time the trial date was continued, the prosecutor 

notified Mason, and Mason stopped her efforts to locate A.C., so 

as not to tip off A.C. and give her time to disappear before trial. 

Detective Gore had told Mason that A.C. had become 

uncooperative. Mason began a sustained effort to locate A.C. on 

October 7, 2019, a month and a half before this due diligence 

hearing.

Mason prepared a “workup” on A.C., using the name and 

date of birth that appeared on the trial subpoena she received 

from the prosecutor. She also reviewed the police reports in this 

case. To complete her workup, she conducted research using 

multiple law enforcement resources and databases. She found 

A.C.’s Social Security number and various aliases (three different 

spellings of her first name) and used this information to search 

for A.C. She checked hospitals in Los Angeles and Las Vegas. 

Nothing in Mason’s investigation indicated A.C. was in 

California; everything indicated A.C. was living in Las Vegas. 

Mason found an address for A.C. on Flower Circle in Las Vegas, 

but her research revealed that A.C. stopped using that address in 

June 2019, several months before this hearing. 
30

Mason discovered that A.C.’s family members were “active 

on Facebook.” A.C., however, had not been active on Facebook for

a couple years. Mason viewed family Facebook posts, showing 

recent photos of A.C. with her grandmother. Mason determined 

that A.C.’s grandmother relocated from Las Vegas to Georgia 

about five weeks before this due diligence hearing. Based on her 

investigation, Mason believed that A.C. lived with her 

grandmother in Las Vegas prior to her grandmother’s relocation 

to Georgia. 

Around the same time A.C.’s grandmother moved to 

Georgia, utilities were turned on in an apartment on Maule 

Avenue in Las Vegas in A.C.’s name. Mason verified with the 

postal service that both A.C. and her mother received mail at this 

Maule Avenue apartment, and she assumed they lived there 

together. Mason was unable locate a work address for A.C. or her 

mother or determine A.C.’s father’s name. 

Mason contacted investigators at a district attorney’s office 

in Las Vegas and asked them to do a “door knock” at all 

addresses Mason found for A.C. in Las Vegas. The Las Vegas 

investigators went to multiple addresses, including the Flower 

Circle address, and reported back to Mason. They told her that 

at the Flower Circle apartment, the neighbors said they did not 

recognize A.C.’s photo; the building management reported that 

A.C. was not on the apartment lease and did not live there; and 

the occupant of the apartment, who had been living there for a 

while, reportedly did not recognize A.C.’s name. 

According to Mason, the Las Vegas Police Department sent 

someone to do a door knock at the Maule Avenue apartment, and 
31

the officer reported back to the district attorney’s office.16 Mason 

learned that a woman answered the door at the Maule Avenue 

apartment and stated that A.C. did not live there. Mason 

assumed this woman was A.C.’s mother and believed the woman 

was lying about A.C. not living there. Mason did not have more 

specific information about what the officer did at the door knock 

(e.g., whether the officer showed A.C.’s photo to neighbors). On a 

scale of 1 to 10, Mason’s confidence level that A.C. lived at the 

apartment on Maule Avenue was a 10, based on the utilities 

being in A.C.’s name and A.C. and her mother receiving mail 

there. 

Mason stated she was not authorized to conduct 

surveillance outside the Maule Avenue apartment in Las Vegas. 

She explained that sometimes out-of-state investigators would 

conduct such surveillance for the Los Angeles District Attorney’s 

Office as a courtesy. She informed the prosecutor that she 

believed the Las Vegas authorities would locate A.C. if they 

conducted such surveillance. Mason understood that the 

prosecutor was going to discuss the issue of surveillance with her 

contact in the Clark County District Attorney’s Office in Las 

Vegas. Mason did not know if such surveillance occurred. 

Mason located two telephone numbers associated with A.C. 

Between April and October 2019, Mason sent two texts and two 

voicemail messages to each number but did not receive a 

response from A.C. Mason also sent several email and voicemail 

messages to A.C.’s mother and received no response. Two days 

before this due diligence hearing, Mason left a voicemail message 

16 It is not clear from Mason’s testimony whether the Las 

Vegas Police Department officer reported back to the district 

attorney’s office in Las Vegas or Los Angeles.
32

on a telephone number associated with A.C.’s grandmother and 

did not receive a response. Mason did not ask authorities in 

Georgia to do a door knock at the grandmother’s house because 

all information Mason found indicated A.C. was living in Las 

Vegas. 

After Mason testified, the prosecutor informed the trial 

court: “I filed this morning a declaration indicating the steps 

that I took to file the appropriate paperwork here in Los Angeles 

County and what I did in terms of coordinating with Las Vegas 

for that paperwork to be filed. There also is a declaration from 

the investigator with the Clark County District Attorney’s Office 

indicating the steps that he took to locate [A.C.] and have her 

appear in court in Las Vegas to then be ordered to Los Angeles. 

[¶] I’d just note that this particular investigator went to all of the

addresses identified by Ms. Mason including that Maule address, 

spoke to the manager and showed pictures of [A.C.] around the 

property, and all indications were that she did not live there and 

had not been seen recently. Because there was no confirmed 

lease for her in Las Vegas, the Las Vegas D.A.’s Office told me 

that the order to show cause hearing needed to be taken off 

calendar because there was not a witness to bring into court.” 

The trial court marked these documents as Court’s Exhibit 1 and 

considered the documents in evaluating the prosecution’s 

diligence in attempting to secure A.C.’s appearance at trial, with 

no objection to the documents from Parker. 

We have reviewed Court’s Exhibit 1. The declaration from 

the investigator from the Clark County District Attorney’s Office 

states, in pertinent part, that on October 30, 2019, he went to the 

Maule Avenue apartment. The apartment manager informed 

him that no one with a surname relevant to this case was on the 
33

lease for the apartment. No one at the apartment building 

recognized A.C. as someone who had been on the property, based 

on the photo the investigator showed.

Defense counsel argued the prosecution did not show due 

diligence in attempting to secure A.C.’s attendance at trial 

because (1) the prosecution did not attempt to contact A.C. or her 

family members through the U.S. Postal Service and (2) no 

surveillance was conducted at the Maule Avenue apartment 

where Mason believed A.C. was living. The prosecution argued 

its efforts satisfied the due diligence standard.

The trial court ruled: “Having heard the arguments of both 

sides, the court feels there’s more than sufficient evidence this 

witness is unavailable pursuant to [section] 240 of the Evidence 

Code. As the D.A. points out, they don’t have to go to 

extraordinary means or all means, but they have to show due 

diligence, and that is a standard evaluated by this court. [¶] I 

find in reviewing the People’s -- Court’s Exhibit 1, the efforts 

[the] People made, they went through the court process. They 

went through law enforcement, D.A.’s office, investigators in 

Vegas. They used this -- the local investigator. They have 

searched numerous databases, and I think it’s probably a fair 

assessment to say that she [A.C.] is evading service based on the 

facts and circumstances of this case in light of the fact that the 

defendant has already been convicted of [a Penal Code section] 

136[.1] [violation for dissuading a witness] as to her, and she is 

most likely either in Vegas -- most likely if not in Vegas[,] 

temporarily knowing this case is pending[,] maybe in Georgia. 

We don’t know. [¶] But I think the People have gone above and 

beyond what is necessary, and I do think it supports the court 

making a finding of unavailability.” 
34

B. Applicable law and analysis

“A criminal defendant has a state and federal 

constitutional right to confront witnesses, but the right is not 

absolute. If a witness is unavailable at trial and has given 

testimony at a previous court proceeding against the same 

defendant at which the defendant had an opportunity to crossexamine the witness, the previous testimony may be admitted at 

trial. In a criminal case, the prosecution bears the burden of 

showing the witness is unavailable and, additionally, that it 

made a ‘good-faith effort’ [citation] or, equivalently, exercised 

reasonable or due diligence to obtain the witness’s presence at 

trial.” (People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 440 (Sánchez).)

This exception to the confrontation requirement is codified 

in the Evidence Code.17 (People v. Herrera (2010) 49 Cal.4th 613, 

621.) Under section 1291, “former testimony is not made 

inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable 

as a witness” and the “party against whom the former testimony 

is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the 

testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to crossexamine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that 

which he has at the hearing.” (§ 1291, subd. (a)(2).) A person is 

“unavailable as a witness” when he or she is “[a]bsent from the 

hearing and the proponent of his or her statement has exercised 

reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or 

attendance by the court’s process.” (§ 240, subd. (a)(5).)

“ ‘[T]he term “due diligence” is “incapable of a mechanical 

definition,” but it “connotes persevering application, untiring 

17 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence 

Code. 
35

efforts in good earnest, efforts of a substantial character.” ’ 

[Citation.] Relevant considerations include the timeliness of the 

search, the importance of the witness’s testimony, and whether 

leads were competently explored. [Citation.] The reviewing court 

defers to the trial court’s determination of the historical facts if 

supported by substantial evidence, but it reviews the trial court’s 

ultimate finding of due diligence independently, not 

deferentially.” (Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 440.)

Here, the prosecution conducted a timely and thorough 

search for A.C. All information discovered during the search 

indicated A.C. was living in Las Vegas. The prosecution

cooperatively and appropriately worked with law enforcement in 

Las Vegas to follow up on all leads regarding A.C.’s whereabouts. 

Based on the information gleaned during the door knocks, Las 

Vegas law enforcement indicated it did not believe A.C. would be 

found at any of the known addresses. Mason left messages for 

A.C., her mother, and her grandmother, but no one returned her 

calls, texts, or emails.

Parker argues the prosecution did not make a good faith 

effort or exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to secure 

A.C.’s attendance at trial because the prosecution failed to 

conduct surveillance outside the Maule Avenue apartment. The 

Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office was not authorized 

to conduct surveillance in Las Vegas, as Investigator Mason 

acknowledged during her testimony. While Mason expressed her 

belief that A.C. could have been found through such surveillance, 

she acknowledged she did not know the extent of the efforts law 

enforcement made to find A.C. at the Maule Avenue apartment. 

For example, she did not know that an investigator from the 

Clark County District Attorney’s Office, who provided a 
36

declaration, spoke to management at the Maule Avenue 

apartment building and showed A.C.’s photo. That investigator 

learned no information indicating A.C. had been on the property. 

Neither A.C. nor her mother signed the lease. The fact A.C. 

received mail at the Maule Avenue apartment and had the 

utilities in her name does not mean she lived there. Evidence 

presented at trial demonstrated that A.C. maintained a residence 

in Las Vegas and received mail there while she was living in 

California and planning a future here with Parker. To the extent 

the prosecution did not ask Las Vegas law enforcement to 

conduct surveillance, we conclude this was reasonable in light of 

the circumstances as conveyed to the prosecution by Las Vegas 

law enforcement.

Parker also argues it was unreasonable for Investigator 

Mason to alert A.C. that the prosecution was looking for her, 

knowing she had become uncooperative, by sending her texts and 

voicemail messages. We disagree. A.C. was out of state, and the 

prosecution had no viable means of keeping tabs on her. Because 

the prosecution was not in contact with A.C. and had not 

confirmed where she lived, telephone numbers and email 

addresses were the most reliable contact information the 

prosecution had. It would have been unreasonable for Mason to 

forgo these leads. Mason testified that she only conducted her 

search for A.C. using these methods when there was a looming 

trial date. Whenever the trial date was continued, she suspended 

her search, so she would not alert A.C. too far in advance and 

give her time to disappear.

“A court cannot ‘properly impose upon the People an 

obligation to keep “periodic tabs” on every material witness in a 

criminal case, for the administrative burdens of doing so would 
37

be prohibitive. Moreover, it is unclear what effective and 

reasonable controls the People could impose upon a witness who 

plans to leave the state, or simply “disappear” long before a trial 

date is set.’ ” (People v. Diaz (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 695, 706.) 

“ ‘The law requires only reasonable efforts, not prescient 

perfection’ ” by the prosecution. (Ibid.) Here, the prosecution 

made good faith efforts and exercised reasonable diligence in 

attempting to secure A.C.’s appearance at trial. The court did not 

err in declaring her unavailable and admitting her preliminary 

hearing testimony.

II. Admission of A.C.’s Statements to Law Enforcement

Parker contends the trial court erred in admitting into 

evidence at the second trial A.C.’s statements to law enforcement 

because no hearsay exception allowed the jury to consider the 

statements for their truth. Parker never had an opportunity to 

cross-examine A.C. regarding her statements to law enforcement 

because the prosecution did not introduce the statements at the 

preliminary hearing. He argues we must reverse count 1 for 

human trafficking A.C. and count 2 for pimping A.C. based on 

this claim of error.

As set forth above, one of the hearsay exceptions on which 

the trial court admitted A.C.’s statements to law enforcement is 

the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. This doctrine “allows 

admission of unconfronted testimonial statements ‘where the 

defendant ha[s] engaged in wrongful conduct designed to prevent 

a witness’s testimony.’ ” (People v. Reneaux (2020) 50 

Cal.App.5th 852, 865 (Reneaux); see also Crawford v. Washington

(2004) 541 U.S. 36, 62 [“the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing 

(which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on 

essentially equitable grounds”].) 
38

To admit evidence under the doctrine of forfeiture by 

wrongdoing, the trial court must find “by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant by a wrongful act made the witness 

unavailable with the intent of preventing the witness from 

testifying. [Citation.] The goal of the doctrine was to remove the 

‘otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, 

and kill the witnesses against them—in other words, it is 

grounded in “the ability of the courts to protect the integrity of 

their proceedings.” ’ ” (People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 

513, 549-550, citing Giles v. California (2008) 554 U.S. 353, 358-

368, 374.)

In 2010, the California Legislature codified the doctrine of 

forfeiture by wrongdoing in section 1390 (Stats. 2010, ch. 537, 

§ 2), providing: “Evidence of a statement is not made 

inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is offered 

against a party that has engaged, or aided and abetted, in the 

wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the 

unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” (§ 1390, subd. (a).)

“The underlying factual issues to be resolved by the trial 

court in applying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine include: 

(1) whether by his wrongful conduct the defendant caused a 

witness to be unavailable to testify; and (2) whether the 

defendant intended to cause the witness to be unavailable.” 

(Reneaux, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 865.) “Whether a 

defendant’s conduct constitutes ‘wrongdoing’ depends not 

necessarily on its character, but on the defendant’s intent and 

whether his actions caused the witness not to appear.” (Id. at p. 

868.) “This standard of wrongdoing is broad. The defendant’s 

affirmative act need not be criminal or even threatening. Rather, 

the action becomes ‘wrongdoing’ because the defendant acted 
39

with the intent to interfere with the court’s truth-finding function 

and his action caused the witness not to appear.” (Id. at p. 870.)

In reviewing the trial court’s decision to admit evidence 

under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, we “evaluate 

whether there is sufficient evidence from which the trial court 

could make its finding[s] on a preponderance [of the evidence] 

standard.” (People v. Merchant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1186 

(Merchant).) “Although we apply a substantial evidence standard 

of review to the trial court’s factual finding[s], ‘[w]e review for 

abuse of discretion the ultimate decision whether to admit the 

evidence.’ ” (People v. Quintanilla (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1039, 

1050.)

We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

implied findings that Parker intended to cause A.C. to be 

unavailable at trial and, by his wrongful conduct (i.e., interfering 

with the court’s process and dissuading a witness), did cause A.C. 

to be unavailable at trial. In the call Parker made to A.C. after 

the preliminary hearing,18 he told her the only reason he was still 

in jail was because she testified at the preliminary hearing. She 

told him she did not want to testify, but Detective Gore “popped 

up” at her house at 3:00 a.m. to take her to the preliminary 

hearing. Parker faulted her for giving Detective Gore her 

address. A.C. did not seem to understand there would be a future 

trial at which witnesses would testify against Parker. She 

indicated she believed Parker had already been found guilty of all 

charges. Parker disabused her of this notion. A.C. told him she 

would not testify against him at trial. Parker explained to her in 

18 Parker does not challenge the trial court’s admission into 

evidence of any of the calls he made from jail.
40

detail that if the prosecution could not locate her and did not 

personally serve her with a subpoena, she did not have to come to 

court and she would not get in trouble. A.C. told Parker she 

loved him, was “down for” him, and wanted to be with him when 

he was released from jail. Parker indicated he would be with her 

unless she continued to “entertain . . . these white people,” 

meaning cooperate with law enforcement in this case. A.C. 

admitted to Parker that she was afraid of him based on the 

threats he had made to her in the past. She also indicated to 

Parker during the prior calls that she had received messages 

from numerous people, telling her Parker planned to hurt her 

and their baby when he was released from jail because he 

believed it was her fault he was in custody. 

A.C. relocated to another state after this last call with 

Parker because she feared for her safety, and she stopped 

cooperating with the prosecution. Substantial evidence 

presented at the due diligence hearing (held the same day the 

trial court admitted these statements) indicates A.C. knew the 

prosecution was looking for her (through texts and voicemail 

messages to her and her family), and she was evading service of a 

trial subpoena. For example, Inspector Mason testified at the 

due diligence hearing that she was confident she reached A.C.’s 

grandmother’s phone because A.C.’s grandmother identified 

herself on the voicemail.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

A.C.’s statements to law enforcement under the doctrine of 

forfeiture by wrongdoing. In sum, Parker told Burks he would 

tell A.C. whatever he had to tell her to ensure she did not testify 

against him. After the preliminary hearing, Parker instructed 

A.C. on how to avoid being served with a subpoena for her 
41

testimony. She was expecting his child, and he manipulated her 

by indicating he would end his relationship with her if she 

continued to cooperate with law enforcement. The evidence also 

demonstrates he encouraged others to contact her to threaten her 

and dissuade her from testifying. Substantial evidence 

demonstrates that Parker’s wrongful tactics worked—A.C. 

stopped cooperating with law enforcement—and Parker will not 

now be heard to complain that evidence should be excluded 

because he did not have an opportunity to cross-examine A.C. 

regarding such evidence, after he did whatever he had to do and 

said whatever he had to say to keep her out of court. 

We are not persuaded by Parker’s arguments regarding the 

limited number of jail calls and the length of time between the 

last call and the second trial. Substantial evidence shows Parker 

wanted A.C. to disappear from law enforcement’s reach, and he 

figured out what to say to her to cause that to happen. We have 

no cause to disturb the trial court’s ruling.

Because we conclude the trial court properly admitted 

A.C.’s statements to law enforcement under the forfeiture by 

wrongdoing doctrine, we need not address the other hearsay 

exceptions under which the prosecution argued the statements 

could be admitted.

III. Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on False Imprisonment

Parker contends misdemeanor false imprisonment (Pen. 

Code, § 236) is a lesser included offense of human trafficking 

under Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (a), and the trial 

court erred in not instructing the jury sua sponte on 

misdemeanor false imprisonment. He argues we must reverse 

count 1 for human trafficking A.C. based on this claim of error.
42

Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (a)—the human 

trafficking offense for which Parker was convicted—provides: “A 

person who deprives or violates the personal liberty of another 

with the intent to obtain forced labor or services, is guilty of 

human trafficking . . . .” Misdemeanor false imprisonment—the 

offense for which Parker now claims the trial court should have 

instructed the jury—is defined as “the unlawful violation of the 

personal liberty of another.” (Pen. Code, § 236.)

“ ‘Under California law, a lesser offense is necessarily 

included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of 

the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory 

pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that 

the greater cannot be committed without also committing the 

lesser.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 

154, fn. 5.) A trial court errs if it fails to instruct “on all theories 

of a lesser included offense which find substantial support in the 

evidence. On the other hand, the court is not obliged to instruct 

on theories that have no such evidentiary support.” (Id. at p. 

162.) “[T]he existence of ‘any evidence, no matter how weak’ will 

not justify instructions on a lesser included offense, but such 

instructions are required whenever evidence that the defendant 

is guilty only of the lesser offense is ‘substantial enough to merit 

consideration’ by the jury. [Citations.] ‘Substantial evidence’ in 

this context is ‘ “evidence from which a jury composed of 

reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[]” ’ that the lesser offense, 

but not the greater, was committed.” (Ibid.) “In deciding 

whether there is substantial evidence of a lesser offense, courts 

should not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, a task for the 

jury.” (Ibid.) We apply a de novo standard of review in 

determining whether a trial court erred in not instructing the 
43

jury on an asserted lesser included offense. (People v. Cole (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218.)

The Attorney General disputes misdemeanor false 

imprisonment is a lesser included offense of human trafficking 

under Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (a) and points out 

there are no published California decisions on this issue. We also 

have found no published decisions resolving this issue. However, 

we need not decide the issue. There is insufficient evidence in 

the record demonstrating Parker only committed misdemeanor 

false imprisonment and not the human trafficking of A.C.

The evidence presented at trial established either (1) 

Parker was A.C.’s pimp, who took her identification, Social 

Security card, money, and phone, and beat her and threatened 

her so she would continue to work for him as a prostitute; or (2) 

Parker did not force A.C. to work as a prostitute, he held her 

identification and Social Security card because she asked him to, 

and she was always free to leave. If the jury credited the 

evidence most favorable to Parker, he would not be convicted of 

either human trafficking A.C. or false imprisonment. Because 

there was no substantial evidence that Parker was guilty of 

misdemeanor false imprisonment, but not human trafficking 

A.C., the trial court did not err in not instructing the jury sua 

sponte on misdemeanor false imprisonment.

IV. Admission of Evidence of W.S.’s Age

A. W.S.’s testimony

Parker contends the trial court erred in admitting trial 

testimony from W.S. and Detective Gore regarding W.S.’s age 

because the testimony lacked foundation. He argues we must 

reverse count 8 for human trafficking a minor (W.S.) for 

commercial sex based on this claim of error.
44

W.S. testified that she was 19 years at the time of trial, she 

was born in January 2000, and she was 16 years old at the time 

she worked for Parker as a prostitute. Parker objected to this 

testimony on lack of foundation grounds. 

On appeal, Parker argues W.S.’s testimony regarding her 

own age “lacked any foundational showing her testimony was 

based on her own perception of the event of her birth.” He cites 

People v. Montalvo (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328 (Montalvo) in support of 

this proposition, but his reliance on this case is misplaced. 

There, the defendant was convicted of the offense of furnishing a 

narcotic to a minor by a person 21 years of age or older, but the 

record included no “evidence or even mention of defendant’s age.” 

(Id. at p. 332.) The Attorney General argued “the burden of 

raising the issue of defendant’s age may properly be placed upon 

defendant under the rule of necessity and convenience,” but the 

Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the conviction. (Id. at pp. 

332, 334.) 

The Court explained: “The defendant may not necessarily 

have any substantially greater ability to establish his age than 

does the prosecution. A defendant’s precise age is not a matter 

within his personal knowledge but something he must have 

learned either from family sources or public or church records. In 

this age of documented existence there is little doubt that 

ordinarily the prosecution may be able to secure evidence of the 

defendant’s age. Moreover, in those rare cases where there is no 

evidence of the defendant’s precise age except his own belief as to 

what it is, the defendant might be as hard pressed as the 

prosecution to verify it. If minority be deemed a defense, a 

defendant in such a case would be at the mercy of the jury’s 

power to disbelieve his testimony even though it be the only 
45

available evidence of age. We conclude that a case for the 

application of the rule of necessity and convenience here has not 

been made out.” (Montalvo, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 334-335.)

Here, there is evidence of W.S.’s age in the record—her 

testimony. The Supreme Court did not hold in Montalvo that a 

person’s testimony regarding his or her age is inadmissible. 

Instead, the Court stated there is a danger to the proponent of 

such testimony that the jury will not believe it. Parker cites no 

authority indicating a trial court abuses its discretion when it 

allows a witness to testify to his or her own age. As Montalvo

points out, the credibility of that testimony, like any other 

testimony, is a question for the jury.19

B. Detective Gore’s testimony

Parker objected on lack of foundation grounds when 

detective Gore testified (1) that he confirmed W.S. was a minor 

during his January 11, 2017 interview with her; (2) that he 

learned during his investigation that W.S. was a minor; and (3) 

that W.S. was 16 years old during the events at issue in this case. 

We need not evaluate the merits of this claim of error 

because, even assuming there was error, it is not reasonably 

probable Parker would have a obtained a more favorable result 

on count 8 if the trial court excluded Detective Gore’s testimony 

19 Nor does Parker cite any authority supporting his 

argument that a person’s testimony about his or her own age is 

inadmissible under section 702, subdivision (a), which provides: 

“Subject to Section 801, the testimony of a witness concerning a 

particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal 

knowledge of the matter. Against the objection of a party, such 

personal knowledge must be shown before the witness may 

testify concerning the matter.”
46

regarding W.S.’s age. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 

836.) In light of W.S.’s testimony regarding her history of 

placements in juvenile facilities, we have no reason to believe the 

jury doubted the credibility of her testimony regarding her own 

age.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

FEDERMAN, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.