This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 MAUREEN A. TELLES , 2 Petitioner-Appellee, 3

v. No. 35,170 4 EDMUNDO TELLES, 5 Respondent-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Gerard J. Lavelle, District Judge 8 Dorene A. Kuffer 9 Albuquerque, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Edmundo Telles y Padilla 12 Albuquerque, NM 13 Pro Se Appellant 14 MEMORANDUM OPINION 15 VIGIL, Chief Judge. 16
{1} Husband appeals several aspects of th e divorce decree entered by the district 17 court, as well as the manner inwhich the district court en forced an award of attorney 183 fees granted to Wife. We issued a noti ce of proposed summary disposition proposing 1 to affirm in part and reverse in part . Wife has responded with a memorandum in 2 opposition, and Husband has responded with a memorandum supporting portions of 3 the proposed disposition and opposing others . Having given careful consideration to 4 the parties’ submissions, we continue to belie ve reversal in part and affirmance in part 5 is warranted. We affirm in part and reverse in part for the reasons stated in this 6 opinion as well as in the notice of proposed summary disposition. 7
{2} We address Wife’s memorandum in oppos ition first. Wife does not challenge 8 our proposed holdings to the effect that , under the parties’ premarital agreement 9 (PMA), the BMW was her separate property and Husband contributed $7500 of his 10 separate property to reduce the debt ow ed on the BMW. [MIO 1] However, Wife 11 argues that awarding Husband reimburseme nt of the $7500, as the PMA requires, 12 would result in unjust enrichment of Husb and. She argues that she contributed far 13 more than $7500 toward the debt owed on the Lexus, which according to the PMA 14 was Husband’s separateproperty. [Id. 2] According to Wife, these contributions 15 included both separate and community funds. As we stated in the notice of proposed 16 disposition, the district court did not treatthe Lexus as Husband’s separate property 17 but instead found that it had been transmuted into community property. The district 18 court therefore did not address the possib ility of reimbursing Wife for community and 193 separate funds that may have been expended to reduce the debt on the Lexus. On 1 remand, the district court will have anopportunity to follow the PMA, treat each 2 party’s separate property as separate in accordance w ith the PMA, and determine 3 which party is entitled to re imbursement for reductions in the debts owed on each 4 piece of separate property. At this time, however, since both the BMW and the Lexus 5 were erroneously treated as community property we cannot determine whether the 6 appropriate reimbursement am ounts have already been ordered. We therefore reverse 7 and remand to allow the district court to strictly apply the terms of the PMA in 8 dividing the property and debts of the parties. 9
{3} In reaching the above result, we note Wife’s argument that the district court had 10 jurisdiction over all the property of the parties, and had discretion to divide the 11 parties’ property and debts e quitably. [MIO 3] However, Wife has cited no authority 12 indicating that the district court’s discreti on allows it to override the clear terms of a 13 PMA entered into by the parties knowingly and voluntarily, and we are aware of no 14 such authority. The district court in this cas e appears to have ignored the terms of the 15 PMA by treating all of the property as community property, in contravention of the 16 requirements of the PMA. The district court’s discretion over property and debt 17 matters in a divorce cannot go so far as to allow the court to simply ignore a PMA 18 entered into by the parties. See NMSA 1978, § 40-3A-4(A)(1) (1995) (authorizing 194 spouses to enter into a PMA that contracts with respect to any and all property owned 1 by the parties); Lebeck v. Lebeck , 1994-NMCA-103, ¶¶ 18-24, 118 N.M. 367, 881 2 P.2d 727 (discussing fact that a PMA is a c ontract, and is valid in the absence of 3 defenses to a contract such as undueinfluence or misrepresentation). 4
{4} Wife also objects to our proposed revers al of the district court’s action of 5 stripping Husband of the Lexus and awarding thatvehicle to Wife to be sold, in order 6 to satisfy an award of attorney fees previ ously made to Wife. Wife argues that it was 7 not necessary for her to obtai n a separate lien or judgmen t against Husband’s property 8 in order to execute on it, and that it was also not necessary to strictly follow the 9 procedures set out in the statutory provisions governing executions on judgments. 10 [MIO 4] She contends that Husband suffere d no prejudice as a result of the procedure 11 employed by the district court, and cites to Armstrong v. Csurilla , 1991-NMSC-081, 12 112 N.M. 579, 817 P.2d 1221, in support of her argument. We agree that Armstrong 13 held that strict adherence to all of the statutory judgment-lien-foreclosure procedures 14 is not always necessary, as long as no party is prejudiced as a result. Id. ¶ 21. We 15 disagree, however, that Husband was notprejudiced by the procedure employed in 16 this case. It should be noted that in Armstrong , the procedures followed by the district 17 court resulted in a judicial sale of the property, which is the approved statutory 18 method for selling property following execution. Id. ¶¶ 10, 21-22; NMSA 1978, § 39- 195 5-1 (1895). Such a sale allows a judgment debtor to take action to increase the sale 1 price of the property, by obtaining potential customers or other means. Id. ¶ 22 2 (pointing out that judgment debtors could havetried to cause the price at the judicial 3 sale to be bid up for their economic benef it). In this case, on the other hand, the 4 district court simply awarded the Lexus to Wife with instructions to sell it, and 5 accepted her representations as to how much was still owed on the Lexus and how 6 much she could sell it for [RP 95, 111]. Th is action provided no opportunity for the 7 public auction that is required by Section 39-5-1 for the protection of the judgment 8 debtor. See § 39-5-1 (requiring that the sale be at a “public vendue,” which is a public 9 auction, following notice of the sale by publication and posting). 10
{5} We find that the lack of a sale by public auction is sufficient prejudice in this 11 case to overturn the procedur e followed by the district court. We therefore do not 12 address the additional possible source of pr ejudice discussed in the notice of proposed 13 summary disposition, concerning Husband’s lack of an opportunity to assert a 14 homestead exemption as a defens e to the execution on his Lexus. 15
{6} We now address Husband’s memorandum in opposition. The only portion of 16 our notice that Husband objects to is the discussion concerning the award of attorney 17 fees to Wife. Husband splits the fees in to two amounts---the $5,000 that was awarded 18 in the original divorce decr ee, and an additional $2,000 that was awarded following 196 the hearing on Wife’s motion requesting that the Lexus be awarded to her to satisfy 1 the attorney fees award. [M IO 6] As we stated in th e notice, following remand the 2 district court will have the ability to adjustthe attorney fees awarded to account for 3 the parties’ relative success during the litigati on, as well as other factors. In doing so, 4 the court should take into account the fact that $2,000 of the fees were awarded as a 5 result of Wife’s legally-unjustified requestto circumvent the statutory procedures 6 concerning enforcement of judgments. At this time, however, since the fees issue will 7 be subject to adjustment on remand, we decline to decide whether any particular 8 portion of the fees awarded should be reversed. 9
{7} We note Husband’s request th at he not have to return to district court to 10 continue litigating this matter. [MIO 6, 9] However, this is unavoidable; there are 11 factual issues to be resolved concerni ng reimbursement for pay-down of debts owed 12 on separate property, as well as the proper remedy for the lack of a judicial sale of the 13 Lexus. This Court is not a fact-finding body but can only review those facts 14 determined by the district courts. N.M. Cons t. art. VI, § 29. We also note Husband’s 15 request that he not have to appear before the same distri ct judge who presided over the 16 proceedings below. Husband’s evidence of bias is not sufficient, however, to allow 17 us to find that the district judge must recuse himself following remand; although 18 Husband complains that the judge was impatient with him and refused to listen to 197 certain of his arguments, it does not appear that Husband raised this issue with the 1 district judge by, for example, aski ng the judge to recuse from the case. See Rule 12- 2 216 NMRA (requiring a party to raise an issue in the districtcourt in order to preserve 3 it for purposes of appeal). We are confident th at the district court will be fair to both 4 Husband and Wife in any proceedings thatmay occur in the future. {8} Based 5 on the foregoing as well as the discussion set out in the notice of proposed summary 6 disposition, we affirm in part and reverse inpart as discussed in the notice. On remand 7 the district court shall strictly apply th e terms of the PMA, including the provisions 8 for reimbursement when debt owed on separate property is reduced due to 9 contributions made by the other spouse. In a ddition, the district court shall fashion a 10 remedy for the deprivation of Husband’s separate property that occurred as a result 11 of the circumvention of the execution-and-sale statutes. 12
{9} IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

______________________________________ 14 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge 15
WE CONCUR: 16

____________________________ 17 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 188 ____________________________ 1 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 2