COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Beales, Causey and Senior Judge Petty

NAHHIME ARMONI SAWYER

MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1048-23-1 PER CURIAM

SEPTEMBER 24, 2024

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON

James C. Hawks, Judge

(Charles E. Haden, on brief), for appellant.

(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Andrew T. Hull, Assistant 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a jury trial, the Circuit Court of the City of Hampton convicted Nahhime 

Armoni Sawyer of possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance with the intent to distribute, 

in violation of Code § 18.2-248; possession of a firearm while possessing a Schedule I or II 

controlled substance with the intent to distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4; possession of a 

firearm by a convicted violent felon, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2; possession of a concealed 

weapon, in violation of Code § 18.2-308; and providing a false identity to a law enforcement 

officer, in violation of Code § 19.2-82.1. On appeal, Sawyer argues that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his convictions.1 After examining the briefs and record in this case, the 

panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue or issues 

have been authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be 

overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b).

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).

1 Sawyer, however, does not challenge his conviction for providing a false identity.

UNPUBLISHED
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BACKGROUND

“In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, [as] the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v. 

Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 

(2016)). “This principle requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of 

the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth 

and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 463, 467-68 

(2015) (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498 (1980)).

Detective A. Woolard of the Hampton Police Department testified at trial that on July 10, 

2021, he and Detective Bruner were on patrol when they saw a white Nissan “pass in front of us” 

that “did not have a front license plate.” The officers then initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle —

which was driven by Sawyer — for the license plate violation. Detective Woolard recounted, “So I 

approached the driver’s side door, and the driver did not roll down the window, which is unusual. 

And I stood there and monitored him while he was looking at the passenger.” Detective Woolard 

recalled, “Eventually, he [Sawyer] did open the door, which is, again, unusual for a normal traffic 

stop.” He noticed that Sawyer’s 

carotid artery on his neck was pulsating. He would not make direct 

eye contact with me. When I asked for his license and registration, 

he continued to keep his right elbow on the center console, the thing 

that you would lift up, and he tried to pull something out of his left 

pocket.

Detective Woolard also noticed “a large amount of US currency in that pocket.”

Detective Woolard further testified that Sawyer “was extremely nervous,” and he noted that 

Sawyer provided the officers with two false names and two different addresses. During the traffic 

stop, Sawyer spoke on the phone to his aunt, Simone Johnson, who Detective Woolard said “also 

provided me with a false name for the individual.” The officers determined that the vehicle was 
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registered to a rental company under the name of Sawyer’s aunt. Detective Woolard recounted that 

“after 17 minutes of trying to figure out who the driver was,” the officers “decided to remove him 

[Sawyer] from the vehicle because he was providing false information to police -- and he was going 

to be fingerprinted to determine his identity.” Detective Woolard then stated, “As soon as he 

removed his arm from the center console, I noticed that firearm half sticking out of the center 

console.” He noted that the passenger, who was cooperative during the traffic stop, had a separate 

firearm “in a holster, and it was on the dashboard in plain view.” Detective Bruner then searched 

the vehicle, and he found a plastic bag containing 22.96 grams of cocaine in the center console, 

along with the firearm. The officers also found $3,230 in cash sorted by denominations in Sawyer’s 

left pocket. Sawyer eventually provided his actual identity to the officers.

A Hampton grand jury indicted Sawyer on three felony charges of possessing a Schedule I 

or II controlled substance with the intent to distribute, possessing a firearm while possessing a 

Schedule I or II controlled substance with the intent to distribute, and possessing a firearm as a 

convicted violent felon. Sawyer was also charged with two misdemeanors: (1) possession of a 

concealed weapon and (2) providing a false identity to a law enforcement officer.

Detective E. Strano of the Hampton Police Department testified at trial as an expert in 

cocaine distribution. He described several factors that suggest cocaine distribution, such as “the 

weight of the cumulative narcotics recovered, how they are packaged, whether there is personal use 

equipment on scene, the presence of scales, cell phones, any firearms being present, currency in 

large amounts.” Detective Strano opined that the 22.96 grams of cocaine recovered from the center 

console of the vehicle driven by Sawyer “is a large amount with a street value of over $2,000. So 

this would be a lot, and we wouldn’t come across this amount just on a normal traffic stop often.” 

He surmised that the plastic bag of cocaine “was just picked up as a bulk purchase to later be broken 

down and distributed.” Given the large quantity of cocaine recovered, the large amount of cash 
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sorted into denominations, the rental car, the cell phone, the firearm, and the absence of any

smoking-related devices, Detective Strano concluded that the evidence was indicative of cocaine 

distribution rather than mere personal use.

After the Commonwealth presented its evidence, Sawyer’s counsel moved to strike the drug 

and firearm charges, arguing that “all we have here is one bag of cocaine. There were not other 

indicia you would typically see with distribution-type offenses.” He maintained that “a reasonable 

fact-finder, even in viewing that evidence in the light more favorable to the Commonwealth, could 

certainly find there was a possession of cocaine but could not find that that possession was with the 

intent to distribute it based on what we have here and what’s come into evidence.” He emphasized 

that “we have two people in the vehicle, both equidistant from where these items of contraband 

were found,” so there is reasonable doubt “as to who actually exercised dominion and control over 

those items at the time.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that “the Commonwealth has 

made a prima facie case as to all the charges, and we are left with a determination of fact, which is 

within the realm of the jury.”

Sawyer’s counsel renewed his motion to strike after choosing not to present any evidence, 

and the trial court denied the renewed motion to strike. The jury subsequently returned guilty 

verdicts on each of the charged offenses. Counsel for Sawyer then moved to set aside the verdicts. 

The trial court denied that motion, and it found Sawyer guilty of the charged offenses in accordance 

with the jury’s guilty verdicts. Sawyer appeals to this Court.

ANALYSIS

On appeal to this Court, Sawyer contends, “The trial court erred in denying Sawyer’s 

motion to strike.” He argues that “the evidence was insufficient to prove that Sawyer was in 

knowing constructive possession of the firearm or the drugs or that he exercised dominion and 

control over the items.” He also argues that “the Commonwealth failed to exclude the 
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reasonable hypothesis of innocence that the firearm and cocaine belonged to the other occupant 

of the rental car, without any possession or exercise of dominion and control by Sawyer.”

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is 

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself 

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the 

relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting 

Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the 

conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion 

might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 

Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

“A conviction for the unlawful possession of a firearm can be supported exclusively by 

evidence of constructive possession; evidence of actual possession is not necessary.” Smallwood 

v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 625, 630 (2009) (quoting Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 

148 (2008)). Constructive possession principles apply equally to considering possession of a 

firearm and possession of illegal drugs. See id. “Establishing constructive possession requires 

proof ‘that the defendant was aware of both the presence and character of the [item] and that it 

was subject to his dominion and control.’” Watts v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 217, 232-33 

(2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 474, 476 (1984)). 

“Although mere proximity to the contraband is insufficient to establish possession, it is a factor 

that may be considered in determining whether a defendant possessed the contraband.” Archer v. 
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Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 12 (1997). In addition, although “ownership or occupancy alone 

is insufficient to prove knowing possession of drugs located on the premises or in a vehicle,” it 

“is a circumstance that may be considered together with other evidence tending to prove that the 

owner or occupant exercised dominion and control over items in the vehicle or on the premises 

in order to prove that the owner or occupant constructively possessed the contraband.” Burchette 

v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 432, 435 (1992). The Commonwealth is not required to prove 

that the defendant’s possession was exclusive. Smallwood, 278 Va. at 630. The question of 

whether evidence is sufficient to prove constructive possession “is largely a factual one and must 

be established by evidence of the acts, declarations and conduct of the accused.” Id. at 631 

(quoting Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 743 (1970)).

As this Court has recognized, “Because direct proof of intent [to distribute drugs] is often 

impossible, it must be shown by circumstantial evidence.” Scott v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 

166, 172 (2009) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 

507, 524 (1988)). Factors that “may constitute probative evidence of intent to distribute a 

controlled substance” include “the quantity of the drugs seized, the manner in which they are 

packaged, and the presence of an unusual amount of cash, equipment related to drug distribution, 

or firearms.” McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 493 (2001). “Expert testimony, usually 

that of a police officer familiar with narcotics, is routinely offered to prove the significance of 

the weight and packaging of drugs regarding whether it is for personal use.” Ervin v. 

Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 495, 522 (2011) (en banc) (quoting Askew v. Commonwealth, 40 

Va. App. 104, 109 (2003)).

It is well-established that in considering a sufficiency challenge, “[c]ircumstantial 

evidence is competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence provided that the 

circumstantial evidence is sufficiently convincing.” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 
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(2017) (quoting Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 468 (2000)). The Commonwealth 

“need exclude only reasonable hypotheses of innocence that ‘flow from the evidence itself, and 

not from the imagination’ of the defendant.” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 629 

(2019) (quoting Pijor, 294 Va. at 512). “While no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, 

the combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances . . . may lead a reasonable 

mind irresistibly to a conclusion.” Pijor, 294 Va. at 512-13 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479 (2005)). In other words, “the accumulation of 

various facts and inferences, each mounting upon the others, may indeed provide sufficient 

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant’s guilty knowledge of contraband.” Ervin, 

57 Va. App. at 505.

Here, Detective Woolard testified that Sawyer — the driver of the vehicle that was rented 

under his aunt’s name — provided the officers with two false names and two different addresses 

during the traffic stop. He noted that Sawyer “was extremely nervous” during the traffic stop and 

that Sawyer would not make direct eye contact with him. Sawyer “continued to keep his right 

elbow on the center console,” and “[a]s soon as he removed his arm from the center console,” 

Detective Woolard “noticed that firearm half sticking out of the center console.” See Leonard v. 

Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 134, 149 (2002) (“[I]t is today universally conceded that the fact of an 

accused’s flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, 

and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.”

(emphasis added) (quoting Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 97, 102 (1991))). The 

firearm was found in the same center console as the bag of cocaine, suggesting that Sawyer 

knowingly possessed both the firearm and the cocaine. Sawyer’s counsel even conceded at trial,

while arguing his motion to strike, that the jury “could certainly find there was a possession of 

cocaine.”
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In addition, Detective Strano testified that the large quantity of cocaine was inconsistent 

with personal use. See Cole v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 342, 362 (2017) (“‘[Q]uantity, alone, 

may be sufficient to establish such intent [to distribute] if it is greater than the supply ordinarily 

possessed for one’s personal use,’ whereas ‘possession of a small quantity creates an inference 

that the drug was for the personal use of the defendant.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Dukes 

v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 119, 122 (1984))). Along with the cocaine and the firearm that were 

recovered from the center console, Sawyer was also found with $3,200 in cash and a cell phone, 

and the officers did not find any smoking-related devices in the vehicle that would point to 

personal use. Furthermore, unlike Sawyer, Sawyer’s passenger cooperated with the officers, and he 

possessed a separate firearm “in a holster, and it was on the dashboard in plain view,” making it 

unlikely that the passenger possessed two separate firearms. Therefore, considering the totality of 

the evidence, we cannot say that the evidence was insufficient to support Sawyer’s convictions 

for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, possession of a firearm while possessing 

cocaine with the intent to distribute, possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon, and 

possession of a concealed weapon.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, and we uphold each of 

Sawyer’s convictions.

Affirmed.