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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

THERESA BOUIE et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CASE NO. 4:10cv236-RH/WCS

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS

AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

This is an employment-discrimination case. The plaintiff employees allege

that they suffered adverse treatment based on their race or nationality and in

retaliation for asserting or supporting claims of discrimination. The defendant

employer has moved to dismiss. I deny the motion.

I

The Supreme Court has set out the standards governing a motion to dismiss: 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only

“‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. [544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d. 929 (2007)] (quoting
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Case No: 4:10cv81-RH/WCS

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47[, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80]

(1957)). In addition, when ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss,

a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in

the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp., supra, at [555] (citing

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n.1[, 122 S. Ct. 992,

152 L. Ed. 2d 1] (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327[, 109

S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338] (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236[, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90] (1974)).

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007). 

The court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true “even if [the allegations

are] doubtful in fact.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

A complaint thus “does not need detailed factual allegations.” Id. Nor must

a complaint allege with precision all the elements of a cause of action. See

Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15 (rejecting the assertion that a Title VII complaint

could be dismissed for failure to plead all the elements of a prima facie case). 

But neither is a conclusory recitation of the elements of a cause of action

alone sufficient. A complaint must include more than “labels and conclusions, and

a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. A complaint must include “allegations plausibly suggesting (not

merely consistent with)” the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. Id. at 557. The

complaint must set forth facts—not mere labels or conclusions—that “render

plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.” Id. at 569 n.14. 

A district court thus should grant a motion to dismiss unless “the plaintiff
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Case No: 4:10cv81-RH/WCS

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (emphasis added). This is so

because

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. 

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . [Federal] Rule [of

Civil Procedure] 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the

hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not

unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more

than conclusions.

Id. at 1949-50 (emphasis added).

II

Based on these principles, the plaintiff in an employment-discrimination

case must allege facts that are either (1) sufficient to support a plausible inference

of discrimination or retaliation, or (2) sufficient to show, or at least support an

inference, that the plaintiff can make out a prima facie case under the familiar

burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. See, e.g., Ansley v.

Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 4:09cv161-RH/WCS, 2009 WL 1973548 (N.D. Fla.

July 8, 2009) (adopting this standard). Here the amended complaint is sufficient. 

The plaintiff Theresa Bouie alleges, among other things, that she is African
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American and was denied training opportunities that were provided to whites. She

alleges that the training would have increased her chances for a promotion. She

alleges that when she complained, she suffered retaliation, including an inaccurate

evaluation, placement on a performance-improvement plan, and eventual

termination. 

The plaintiff Juan Achurra alleges, among other things, that he is Hispanic

and was denied training opportunities that were provided to others. He alleges that

if he had received the training, he would have been promoted. He alleges that

instead, he was demoted, and that when he was listed as a witness in support of

Ms. Bouie’s discrimination claim, he suffered retaliation, including a negative

evaluation and reassignment to a less desirable job. 

One of course cannot know, based only on the amended complaint, whether

these allegations are correct. And the amended complaint includes other

allegations that bring to mind the Eleventh Circuit’s frequent reminder that a

federal court does not sit as a super-personnel board. But even after Twombly and

Iqbal, a district court cannot properly resolve a factual dispute based only on a

review of the complaint. Instead, “federal courts and litigants must rely on

summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims

sooner rather than later.” Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 122 L. Ed. 2d 517
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(1993).

III 

For these reasons,

IT IS ORDERED:

The defendant’s motion, ECF No. 10, to dismiss the first amended complaint

is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED on July 31, 2010.

s/Robert L. Hinkle 

United States District Judge