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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

---o0o---

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., dba AMERICAS SERVICING COMPANY, 

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MARIANNE S. FONG, Individually and as Trustee of the

Marianne S. Fong Revocable Trust Dated October 16, 2003, 

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant,

and

ONOMEA BAY RANCH OWNER’S ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Defendant.

SCWC-16-0000435

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-16-0000435; CIV. NO. 10-1-0097)

MAY 28, 2021

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-16-0000435

28-MAY-2021

11:43 AM

Dkt. 18 OP
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A bank seeking to foreclose on a mortgage and note bears 

the burden of establishing that the borrower defaulted under the 

terms of the agreements. In order to satisfy this burden and 

prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the bank must submit 

evidence which clearly demonstrates the borrower’s default.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo or Lender) sought 

a judicial foreclosure of the residence of Marianne S. Fong 

(Fong or Borrower). In order to prove that Fong had defaulted, 

Wells Fargo submitted a ledger without explaining how to read 

the ledger. In the absence of any explanation, the ledger is 

ambiguous and presents genuine issues of material fact. 

Furthermore, although the ledger indicates that Wells Fargo 

billed Fong for lender-placed insurance, there is only ambiguous 

evidence regarding whether Wells Fargo properly charged Fong for 

the insurance. Thus, there is also a genuine issue of material 

fact concerning whether Fong actually owed the amounts that 

forced her into the alleged default. The Intermediate Court of 

Appeals (ICA) consequently erred in affirming the Circuit Court 

of the Third Circuit’s (circuit court) order granting summary 

judgment.

This court therefore vacates the ICA’s judgment of 

February 12, 2020 and remands this case for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.
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I. Background

A. Factual Background

On March 12, 2007, Fong executed a promissory note

(Note) for $570,000 to MortgageIT, Inc. secured by a mortgage

(Mortgage) on her home in Pepeʻekeo on the island of Hawaiʻi. 

Wells Fargo ultimately obtained the Note from MortgageIt, Inc., 

and was also assigned the Mortgage. 

1. The Note

The Note obligated Fong to make “monthly payments” for 

thirty years beginning in May 2007. Under the terms of the 

Note, Fong was required to pay $3,087.50 per month for the first 

ten years, followed by $4,249.77 per month for the latter twenty 

years. 

The Note further provided that Fong would be in 

default if she “d[id] not pay the full amount of each monthly 

payment on the date it is due.” In the event that Fong 

defaulted on her payments, the Note included an acceleration 

clause authorizing Wells Fargo to seek the full amount owed 

under the Note. 

2. The Mortgage

In conjunction with the terms of the Note, the 

Mortgage obligated Fong to make “periodic payments” consisting 

of the monthly payments required by the Note, any additional 

charges required by the Note, and escrow items. As relevant 
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here, “escrow items” included “premiums for any and all 

insurance required by [Wells Fargo] under Section 5.” 

Under Section 5 of the Mortgage, Fong was required to 

insure the property “against loss by fire, hazards included 

within the term ‘extended coverage,’ and any other hazards 

including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which 

Lender requires insurance.” If Fong failed to purchase and 

maintain the required insurance, the Mortgage authorized Wells 

Fargo to “obtain insurance coverage, at [Wells Fargo’s] option 

and [Fong’s] expense.” “Any amounts disbursed by [Wells Fargo] 

. . . shall become additional debt of [Fong] secured by this 

[Mortgage]. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate 

from the date of disbursement and shall be payable, with such 

interest, upon notice from [Wells Fargo] to [Fong] requesting 

payment.” 

Lastly, Section 1 of the Mortgage also authorized 

Wells Fargo to “return any payment or partial payment if the 

payment or partial payments are insufficient to bring the Loan 

current.” If Fong was up to date on her payments, the Mortgage 

provided that her payments “shall be applied in the following 

order of priority: (a) interest due under the Note; 

(b) principal due under the Note; (c) amounts due under Section 

3 [for Escrow Items].” However, if Fong was delinquent, the 

Mortgage provided that a “payment may be applied to the 
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delinquent payment and the late charge. If more than one 

Periodic Payment is outstanding, Lender may apply any payment 

received from Borrower to the repayment of the Periodic Payments 

if, and to the extent that, each payment can be paid in full.” 

3. Loan History

Between July 2007 and February 2009, Fong regularly 

made payments exceeding $3,087.50 to Wells Fargo for each 

month’s payment.1 

At some time prior to September 10, 2007, Wells Fargo 

apparently determined that Fong did not obtain hail and 

windstorm (hurricane) insurance for the mortgaged property, as 

required under Section 5 of the Mortgage.2 On October 18, 2007, 

Wells Fargo purchased lender-placed hurricane insurance at the 

price of $13,067.20 for the time period from July 31, 2007 to 

July 31, 2008. On August 1, 2008, Wells Fargo purchased a 

second year’s worth of lender-placed hurricane insurance for 

 

1 It appears that Fong may have missed payments in January, October, and 

December 2008. Nevertheless, in months where there is no “Amount Received,” 

it seems that additional payments were made in the immediately following 

months that could have cured any resulting default. 

2 The record is devoid of any document explicitly indicating that the 

Mortgage required windstorm and hail insurance. However, this court notes 

that an extended coverage endorsement generally covers damage from 

“windstorm, hail, explosion (except of steam boilers), riot, civil commotion, 

aircraft, vehicles, and smoke.” See Extended Coverage (EC) Endorsement, 

International Risk Management Institute, Inc., 

https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/extended-coverage-endorsement

(last visited Apr. 27, 2021). Here, Section 5 of the Mortgage required Fong 

to insure the property against “hazards included within the term ‘extended 

coverage[.]’” 
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$13,067.20 for the time period from July 31, 2008 to July 31, 

2009. It is not clear from the record whether Wells Fargo 

notified Fong prior to either purchase that Wells Fargo would 

purchase and charge Fong for the cost of hurricane insurance if 

she failed to obtain a policy. 

On July 26, 2009, Wells Fargo mailed Fong a letter 

asserting that she was in default (Default Letter). The Default 

Letter stated that Fong owed Wells Fargo $22,763.16 in past due 

payments, and that there was a total delinquency of $22,932.53. 

The Default Letter notified Fong that if she did not make her 

payments current by August 25, 2009, Wells Fargo would 

accelerate the Mortgage and potentially foreclose on the 

property. 

It appears that Fong stopped making consistent 

payments after receiving the Default Letter. 

B. Procedural Background

On March 23, 2010, Wells Fargo filed a complaint 

seeking foreclosure in circuit court.3 

Over five years later,4 Wells Fargo filed the Motion at 

issue on October 27, 2015. Wells Fargo contended that it was 

 

3 The Honorable Greg K. Nakamura presided.

4 At Fong’s request, the circuit court placed the case into the 

Foreclosure Mediation Pilot Project. Although mediation was initially 

(continued . . .)
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entitled to foreclosure because its evidence demonstrated 

(1) the existence of the Mortgage and Note; (2) the terms of the 

Mortgage and Note; (3) that Fong defaulted under the terms of 

the Mortgage and Note; and (4) that it provided Fong with the 

requisite notice of foreclosure. As evidence of Fong’s 

purported default under the terms of the Mortgage and Note, 

Wells Fargo submitted a loan account history (Loan History).5 

On November 23, 2015, Fong filed a pro se response

(Response) to Wells Fargo’s Motion. In a two-page memorandum, 

Fong asserted that she was not in default. Instead, Fong stated

that she attempted to make payments, but Wells Fargo returned 

her payments. Fong also indicated that any alleged default was 

caused by Wells Fargo’s imposition of lender-placed hurricane 

insurance without providing Fong notice. Fong attached several 

 

(. . . continued)

scheduled for November 12, 2010, Wells Fargo requested multiple continuations 

until May 2014. The parties were not able to reach an agreement, and the 

circuit court discharged the case from the Foreclosure Mediation Pilot 

Project on February 13, 2015. 

Wells Fargo then filed a motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2015, 

which was struck due to Wells Fargo’s failure to file a certificate of 

service with its Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 667-17 Attorney Affirmation. 

5 Wells Fargo’s attachments to its Motion consisted of a declaration of 

indebtedness signed by April J. Linn, a declaration by Robert M. Ehrhorn, 

Jr., an HRS § 667-17 Affirmation, the Note, the Mortgage, the mortgage 

assignment from MortgageIt, Inc. to Wells Fargo, the Default Letter, the Loan 

History, a judgment worksheet, a litigation guarantee and endorsement, a 

quitclaim deed conveying the property from Fong to a personal trust, a 

collection letter, and a document showing Fong was not an active service 

member. 
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documents to her Response to support her claims. However, Fong 

did not include a declaration or affidavit attesting to her 

claims or certifying her documents. 

On December 7, 2015, Wells Fargo asserted in its reply 

that it had established Fong’s default through the Loan History. 

However, Wells Fargo did not explain how the Loan History showed

Fong’s default. Wells Fargo also argued that the Note “allow[ed 

Wells Fargo] the right to accelerate and require payment of the 

full amount of Principal which has not been paid and all the 

interest that is owed on that amount. Any payment of less than 

the full amount due does not have to be accepted and refunded 

[sic].” 

On December 10, 2015, Fong submitted an “Addendum to 

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 

November 23, 2015” (Addendum). In the Addendum, Fong reiterated 

her claims from her Response. Fong also stated that she 

obtained her own hurricane insurance policy at an approximate 

rate of $557.00 per year, as opposed to Wells Fargo’s $13,067.20 

per year policy. 

On December 17, 2015, the circuit court held a hearing 

on Wells Fargo’s Motion. During the hearing, the circuit court 

stated it would grant Wells Fargo’s Motion. 

On May 2, 2016, the circuit court entered its 

“Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting 
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Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Decree of 

Foreclosure Against all Defendants on Complaint filed March 23, 

2010” (Order). The circuit court found that Wells Fargo 

established the four elements required by Bank of Honolulu v.

Anderson, 3 Haw. App. 545, 551, 654 P.2d 1370, 1375 (1982), and 

was entitled to foreclosure. In particular, the circuit court 

found that, as an “undisputed fact[],”

Defendant MARIANNE S. FONG defaulted in the observance and 

performance of the terms, covenants and conditions set 

forth in the Note and Mortgage in that said Defendant 

failed and neglected to pay the principal sum thereof and 

the interest thereon at the times and in the manner therein 

provided, and failed and neglected to pay the additional 

Mortgage expenses, advances and charges incurred or made 

pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Mortgage.

However, beyond stating that it “reviewed the pleadings, 

declarations and the files and records herein,” the circuit 

court did not address Fong’s arguments that she was not in 

default because Wells Fargo rejected her payments and because 

Wells Fargo improperly charged her for lender-placed hurricane 

insurance. The circuit court entered its judgment the same day. 

Before the ICA, Fong asserted that the circuit court 

erred in granting Wells Fargo’s Motion because Fong presented 

genuine issues of material fact, namely whether (1) Fong 

actually was in default; (2) the lender-placed hurricane 

insurance violated Section 5 of the Mortgage, including whether 

(a) Wells Fargo should have provided notice before purchasing 

the insurance, (b) Wells Fargo provided such notice, and 
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(c) Wells Fargo could back date the coverage; (3) Wells Fargo 

properly increased Fong’s mortgage payments; (4) Wells Fargo 

misapplied Fong’s payments under Section 2 of the Mortgage; and 

(5) the doctrine of unclean hands should have prevented Wells 

Fargo from foreclosing on the Mortgage. 

In a summary disposition order, the ICA determined 

that Wells Fargo satisfied its burden of production such that 

Fong bore the burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. The ICA acknowledged Fong’s arguments 

that “she did not default under the Mortgage and Note and that 

the reason for her alleged default was the increase in cost from 

the lender-placed hurricane insurance, which she claims she was 

unaware of at the time.” However, the ICA rejected Fong’s 

assertions because “the record is devoid of any accompanying 

declaration or affidavit to support Fong’s allegations or her 

submitted exhibits.” The ICA consequently affirmed the circuit 

court’s judgment. 

II. Standard of Review

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary 

judgment is reviewed de novo. Thomas v. Kidani, 126 Hawaiʻi 125, 

127-28, 267 P.3d 1230, 1232-33 (2011) (citing Fujimoto v. Au, 95 

Hawaiʻi 116, 136, 19 P.3d 699, 719 (2001)).
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[S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fujimoto, 95 Hawaiʻi at 136, 19 P.3d at 719.

The burden is on the party moving for summary judgment 

(moving party) to show the absence of any genuine issue as 

to all material facts, which, under applicable principles 

of substantive law, entitles the moving party to judgment 

as a matter of law.

French v. Hawaii Pizza Hut, Inc., 105 Hawaiʻi 462, 470, 99 P.3d 

1046, 1054 (2004) (quoting GECC Fin. Corp. v. Jaffarian, 79 

Hawaiʻi 516, 521, 904 P.2d 530, 535 (App. 1995)).

This court reviews the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. 

Thomas, 126 Hawaiʻi at 128, 267 P.3d at 1233. When a movant’s 

evidence is subject to conflicting interpretations, or 

reasonable people might differ as to its significance, summary 

judgment is improper. Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Kanahele, 144 

Hawaiʻi 394, 401-02, 443 P.3d 86, 93-94 (2019) (quoting Makila 

Land Co., LLC v. Kapu, 114 Hawaiʻi 56, 67, 156 P.3d 482, 493 

(App. 2006)).

III. Discussion

A. The ICA erred in affirming the circuit court’s order 

granting summary judgment because the Loan History is 

subject to interpretation and therefore a genuine issue of 

material fact exists.

A party seeking to foreclose on a mortgage and note 

must prove (1) the existence of the agreements, (2) the terms of 
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the agreements, (3) a default under the terms of the agreements, 

and (4) delivery of the notice of default. Bank of America, 

N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaiʻi 361, 367, 390 P.3d 1248, 1254 

(2017) (citing Anderson, 3 Haw. App. at 551, 654 P.2d at 1375). 

The parties dispute whether Wells Fargo established 

that Fong had defaulted under the terms of the agreements. 

Pursuant to the terms of the Note, Fong would be in default 

“[i]f [Fong] do[es] not pay the full amount of each monthly 

payment on the date it is due[.]” The Mortgage does not include 

any relevant modifications to the Note’s definition of default.6 

Wells Fargo insists that Fong defaulted because she “failed to 

make the payments required under the Note and Mortgage, and 

failed to pay the additional Mortgage expenses, advances, and 

charges that were incurred under the terms of the Mortgage.” To 

support this argument, Wells Fargo pointed out that the Loan 

History shows that the loan was due for the February 1, 2009 

payment. By contrast, Fong argued that she did not default 

because she made all payments required by the Note. 

Under the circumstances, the Loan History actually 

presents conflicting evidence regarding Fong’s payment status, 

 

6 The Mortgage adds that default may occur if either (1) Fong, or Fong’s 

agent(s), “gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or 

statements to Lender . . . in connection with the Loan,” or (2) any civil or 

criminal action that could result in forfeiture of the property is begun. 
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rendering summary judgment inappropriate. First, the Loan 

History appears to indicate that Fong made her monthly payments 

through February 2009, the alleged default date. During the 

time frame relevant to these proceedings, the Note obligated 

Fong to make monthly payments of $3,087.50. The Loan History 

seems to show that Fong made payments exceeding $3,087.50 for 

every month between July 2007 and February 2009.7 Thus, it is 

not clear that Fong defaulted by failing to make the $3,087.50 

payments required by the Note between July 2007 and February 

2009.

Second, the Loan History is largely silent on the 

amount the Mortgage obligated Fong to pay, and thus it is 

unclear whether Fong actually failed to make Mortgage payments 

between the execution of the Mortgage and February 2009. The 

Mortgage required Fong to make periodic payments consisting of, 

inter alia, the monthly payments due under the Note as well as 

payments for escrow items. In comparison to the Mortgage’s 

silence on the specific amounts required to satisfy each 

periodic payment, the Loan History only seems to identify the 

periodic payments due for January 1, 2008; November 1, 2008; and 

 

7 To the extent the Loan History shows that there is no “Amount Received” 

for January, October, and December 2008, the Loan History also seems to 

indicate that Fong may have cured those defaults by submitting additional 

payments in the immediately following months. 
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February 1, 2009. Despite this ambiguity, the Loan History 

appears to indicate that Fong made payments to satisfy the

periodic payments due between July 2007 and February 2009, 

including the ones identified by the Loan History. 

To the extent Wells Fargo argues that it was entitled 

to reject or redirect Fong’s payments, this argument assumes 

what Wells Fargo must prove – that Fong had actually defaulted. 

Wells Fargo claimed on appeal that it can reject or redirect any 

payment merely because it was less than the amount purportedly 

due. However, the terms of the Mortgage only permit Wells Fargo 

to reject or redirect payments that are “insufficient to bring 

the Loan current.” Thus, in order to exercise this authority, 

Wells Fargo must first establish that Fong was not current on 

her payments. But as previously discussed, the Loan History 

does not unambiguously show that Fong failed to make the 

payments required by the Note or Mortgage such that she was not 

current on her payments by February 1, 2009.

In light of the foregoing, the Loan History is subject 

to interpretation and does not necessarily demonstrate that Fong 

defaulted under the terms of the Note and Mortgage. Thus, there 

is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Fong 

defaulted. Wells Fargo consequently was not entitled to summary 

judgment. Fujimoto, 95 Hawaiʻi at 136, 19 P.3d at 719; see also
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Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaiʻi at 367, 390 P.3d at 1254; Kanahele, 144 

Hawaiʻi at 401-02, 443 P.3d at 93-94.

As the party seeking summary judgment, Wells Fargo 

bore the burden of proof to establish all necessary elements. 

French, 105 Hawaiʻi at 470, 99 P.3d at 1054. Consequently, Wells 

Fargo should have provided sufficient information for the courts 

to parse its ambiguous ledger. Going forward, Wells Fargo must 

at least submit evidence identifying how much Fong was required

to pay under the terms of the Mortgage and that Fong failed to 

make the requisite payments. Wells Fargo may use this evidence 

to demonstrate that Fong was not current on her loan such that 

the Mortgage authorized Wells Fargo to reject or redirect Fong’s 

payments. To the extent this information is contained within 

the Loan History, Wells Fargo may alternatively submit an 

affidavit or declaration explaining how to interpret the data 

contained therein.

B. The ICA erred in affirming the circuit court’s order 

granting summary judgment because additional evidence is 

needed to support the Loan History’s purported amounts due, 

creating a genuine issue of material fact.

Fong additionally argues that she did not default, but 

rather that Wells Fargo improperly forced her into default by 

improperly charging her for lender-placed hurricane insurance. 

Wells Fargo simply responds that the Mortgage “expressly allowed 

for lender-place [sic] insurance” and that “Fong did not dispute 
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that she did not have hurricane coverage as required under the 

Mortgage.” Wells Fargo’s post hoc argument is unavailing.

When adjudicating a motion for summary judgment, trial 

courts must “carefully scrutinize the materials submitted by the 

moving party[.]” See Miller v. Manuel, 9 Haw. App. 56, 66, 828 

P.2d 286, 292 (App. 1991).

Wells Fargo’s Motion filings raised significant 

questions regarding the validity of the purported amounts due. 

The Loan History indicates that on October 18, 2007, Wells Fargo 

issued a check in the amount of $13,067.20 to “WNCWD.” The Loan 

History also shows that Wells Fargo issued a second check for 

the same amount to “WNCWD” on August 1, 2008. However, none of 

Wells Fargo’s Motion filings explained what these two checks 

were for. Instead, it was Fong who pointed out that the two 

payments were for lender-placed hurricane insurance. In 

identifying the payments, Fong asserted that Wells Fargo 

purchased and billed Fong for the lender-placed insurance 

without notice. Wells Fargo did not reply to Fong’s lack of 

notice assertion during the Motion proceedings. 

Again, as the party seeking summary judgment, Wells 

Fargo bore the burden of proving that Fong had defaulted under 

the terms of the Note and Mortgage. French, 105 Hawaiʻi at 470, 

99 P.3d at 1054. Wells Fargo was therefore responsible for 

showing that Fong defaulted by failing to make all payments 
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required by the Note and Mortgage. French, 105 Hawaiʻi at 470, 

99 P.3d at 1054; Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaiʻi at 367, 390 P.3d at 

1254; By submitting only the Loan History, Wells Fargo skipped 

the step of proving that it was entitled to all the payments it 

claimed were due – and which led to Fong’s alleged default when 

Wells Fargo redirected her payments. In the absence of any 

explanation, Wells Fargo’s implication that it was entitled to 

charge Fong for the cost of these two checks is suspect.

Even if Wells Fargo had explained during the Motion 

proceedings that the payments were for lender-placed insurance,8

none of Wells Fargo’s submissions demonstrated that Wells Fargo 

properly charged Fong for the lender-placed insurance. On 

appeal, Wells Fargo countered that “[t]he Mortgage expressly 

allows for lender-placed insurance” and that “[t]he lenderplaced insurance did not violate the Mortgage.” Wells Fargo is 

correct that under the terms of the Mortgage, “[i]f [Fong] 

fail[ed] to maintain any of the [required insurance coverages], 

[Wells Fargo] may obtain insurance coverage, at [Wells Fargo’s] 

option and [Fong’s] expense.” However, Wells Fargo disregards 

the Mortgage’s limitation that the insurance cost “shall be 

 

8 Although Wells Fargo acknowledged Fong’s claim regarding the lenderplaced insurance before the circuit court, Wells Fargo did not explain that 

these payments were for lender-placed hurricane insurance until it filed its 

answering brief to the ICA. 
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payable . . . upon notice from [Wells Fargo] to [Fong] 

requesting payment.” (Emphasis added). Thus, unless Wells 

Fargo had provided notice requesting payment to Fong, the cost 

was not yet payable. However, Wells Fargo’s filings were devoid 

of any evidence that it notified Fong before demanding payment. 

To the extent Wells Fargo relies on Fong’s submissions 

as evidence that Wells Fargo provided Fong notice before billing 

her for the lender-placed insurance, Fong’s filings were 

ambiguous. In its ICA answering brief, Wells Fargo argued that 

Fong’s evidence showed that she was given notice that Wells 

Fargo would purchase lender-placed insurance. However, Wells 

Fargo did not address whether such notice included notice that 

Wells Fargo would bill Fong for the lender-placed insurance. 

Nevertheless, the March 2009 letter on which Wells Fargo relied

indicates both that Wells Fargo provided notice and that Fong 

did not receive notice before Wells Fargo billed Fong. Fong’s 

filing therefore did not support Wells Fargo’s claim.

As a part of identifying how much the Mortgage 

obligated Fong to pay, Wells Fargo bore the burden of 

establishing that it was entitled to the identified amount. 

French, 105 Hawaiʻi at 470, 99 P.3d at 1054; see also ReyesToledo, 139 Hawaiʻi at 367, 390 P.3d at 1254. Here, the only 

evidence in the record regarding whether Wells Fargo was 

entitled to charge Fong for the lender-placed insurance was 
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inconclusive. A genuine issue of material fact regarding 

whether Wells Fargo could charge Fong for the lender-placed 

insurance therefore remains. In turn, there is also a genuine 

issue of material fact regarding whether Fong defaulted when 

Wells Fargo apparently redirected her payments to cover the cost 

of lender-placed insurance.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the ICA erred in affirming 

the circuit court’s May 2, 2016 Order when genuine issues of 

material fact remained.

Therefore, we vacate the ICA’s February 12, 2020 

judgment on appeal, which affirmed the circuit court’s May 2, 

2016 “Judgment on Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 

Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Decree of 

Foreclosure Against All Defendants on Complaint Filed March 23, 

2010,” and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

Al Thompson for 

petitioner/defendant-appellant 

Marianne S. Fong

Edmund K. Saffery 

and Deirdre Marie-Iha 

for respondent/plaintiffappellee Wells Fargo Bank, NA

dba Americas Servicing Company

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

/s/ Todd W. Eddins