2017 IL 121413 

IN THE
 

SUPREME COURT
 

OF
 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
 

(Docket No. 121413) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 

MICHAEL BROOKS, Appellee. 

Opinion filed November 30, 2017. 

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and 

Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 The defendant, Michael Brooks, was charged with driving under the influence 

following a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. He filed a motion to suppress the 

results of blood-alcohol testing on the ground that the blood draw performed at the 

hospital after his accident was a governmental search conducted in violation of the 

fourth amendment. 
 

 

 

 

¶ 2 The circuit court granted defendant’s motion, and the appellate court affirmed 

(2016 IL App (5th) 150095-U). We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. 

Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the 

judgments of the lower courts. 

¶ 3 Background 

¶ 4 Defendant was charged in the circuit court of Effingham County with driving 

under the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2014)) following a 

single-vehicle motorcycle accident on August 14, 2014. On October 30, 2014, 

defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol analysis that was 

performed at St. Anthony’s Memorial Hospital (St. Anthony’s) on the night of the 

accident. 

¶ 5 In his motion, defendant briefly alleged that, after the accident, police officers 

forcibly “placed him in an ambulance and sent him to the hospital,” even though he 

had refused medical treatment. Citing People v. Armer, 2014 IL App (5th) 130342, 

the motion asserted that a blood draw subsequently performed at the hospital was a 

governmental search conducted without a warrant, without his consent, and in the 

absence of exigent circumstances. Thus, according to the motion, the blood draw 

violated defendant’s fourth amendment right to be free from an unreasonable 

search. Defendant’s motion did not challenge the legality of the police officers’ 

seizure of defendant when he was forced to go to the hospital. Rather, the motion 

contended only that the blood draw performed at the hospital was an unlawful 

search. 

¶ 6 On December 9, 2014, while defendant’s motion was pending, the State issued 

a subpoena duces tecum to St. Anthony’s directing it to produce “[a]ll lab results 

(‘blood work’)” originating from defendant’s admission on or about August 14, 

2014. The subpoena requested that the hospital produce the results of defendant’s 

blood work in a sealed, clearly marked envelope and send it to the Effingham 

County circuit clerk. A docket entry reflects the court received a sealed envelope 

from the hospital on December 12, 2014. 

¶ 7 Three days later, an evidentiary hearing was held on defendant’s motion to 

suppress. At the start of the hearing, the circuit court noted it was in possession of 

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an envelope from St. Anthony’s but that it had not been opened. Defendant’s 

counsel told the court he presumed the contents of the envelope were the subject 

matter of the motion to suppress. The State responded that it, too, presumed the 

envelope contained the results of medical blood work done on defendant when he 

went to the hospital. The parties, however, did not stipulate to the contents of the 

envelope, and the court did not open it. The hearing then began. 

¶ 8 Defendant called police officer Thomas Webb from the Effingham police 

department. Webb testified that, on August 14, 2014, at approximately 11:54 p.m., 

he was dispatched to the scene of a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. When he 

arrived, Webb observed a motorcycle on a bush in the front yard of a house. He also 

saw an open-top Jeep across the street, approximately 100 feet from the 

motorcycle, where three other Effingham police officers were gathered. Webb 

walked across the street to the Jeep, which did not belong to defendant, and 

observed defendant sitting in the passenger seat with the door closed. Although 

none of the officers had seen defendant operating a motor vehicle, two witnesses 

who were present informed Webb defendant had been driving the motorcycle. 

¶ 9 Webb spoke to defendant and, while doing so, noticed defendant’s speech was 

slurred, his eyes were red, and he had an odor of alcohol emitting from his mouth 

when he spoke or yelled at the police. According to Webb, defendant appeared 

agitated by the presence of law enforcement. Webb believed defendant’s leg was 

broken because his foot was “almost upside down.” Webb admitted he had little 

medical training and defendant was not bleeding, but he believed the injury was 

serious. When Webb asked defendant if he wanted to go to the hospital, defendant 

refused. Webb was concerned about defendant’s safety, as he appeared to not be 

thinking rationally because he was screaming and swearing at the police. 

¶ 10 Emergency medical services (EMS) personnel who were present at the scene 

told Webb defendant needed to go to the hospital and requested Webb’s assistance 

in getting him there. Although defendant continued to decline medical services, 

Webb ordered defendant out of the Jeep. Defendant refused. Thereafter, Webb and 

another officer physically removed defendant from the Jeep, placed him on a 

gurney, and assisted EMS personnel in putting the gurney into the ambulance. 

¶ 11 Webb reiterated that it was EMS personnel who wanted defendant to get 

medical treatment and that he did not direct anyone to treat defendant. When asked 

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why defendant was removed from the Jeep and forced to go to the hospital, Webb 

testified: “I briefly spoke with EMS and asked them if he was going to be 

transported to the hospital by them. Whenever a subject is intoxicated and a serious 

injury pursues, a lot of times or all the time in that case, ambulance services request 

or order basically that we assist them in removing a subject or putting them on the 

cot and transporting them to the hospital to make sure they get the medical attention 

that they need.” Webb was not in the ambulance when EMS personnel began 

transporting defendant to the hospital. 

¶ 12 Webb testified that the ambulance stopped after traveling one or two blocks 

because defendant was trying to get out. EMS personnel again asked the police to 

help in transporting defendant. Webb stated that he was concerned at this time for 

the safety of EMS personnel, defendant, and himself. Webb placed defendant on 

the gurney, handcuffed him, and rode in the ambulance the rest of the way to the 

hospital. Webb then assisted EMS personnel in taking defendant into the 

emergency room. 

¶ 13 At the hospital, Webb read the statutory “Warning to Motorists” to defendant 

and asked him to consent to blood or breath testing. Defendant refused. At that 

point, Webb issued defendant a citation for DUI. Webb stated he did not take a 

sample of defendant’s blood nor did he direct anyone at the hospital to do so. While 

Webb observed nurses working on defendant, he never spoke to them or any 

doctor. Webb stated he had no further contact with the hospital after he left and did 

not know whether defendant ever gave consent for a blood draw. 

¶ 14 Defendant then testified. Defendant briefly stated that, at the hospital, he never 

consented to have his blood drawn. Every time he was asked to have his blood 

drawn, he refused. Medical staff set his leg, which was broken. Altogether, 

defendant stated he spent approximately 12 hours at the hospital. 

¶ 15 Defendant rested, and the State called no witnesses. After hearing arguments, 

the circuit court took the matter under advisement and retained the sealed envelope 

from St. Anthony’s. Approximately one month later, the circuit court issued an 

order granting defendant’s motion to suppress. Citing Armer, 2014 IL App (5th) 

130342, the court concluded that a blood draw performed on defendant at 

St. Anthony’s was a governmental search that had been conducted without his 

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consent and that “the State failed to prove exigent circumstances were present to 

obtain a blood draw from Defendant absent a warrant.” 

¶ 16 Thereafter, the State filed a motion to reconsider. During a hearing on the 

motion, the State maintained that defendant had failed to prove that his blood had, 

in fact, been drawn at the hospital, as there was no evidence introduced at the 

hearing on the motion to suppress which established that fact. In addition, the State 

asserted that, even assuming defendant’s blood was drawn, there was no fourth 

amendment violation because any blood draw performed at the hospital was a 

private search, not a governmental one, and thus there was no State action. 

¶ 17 The circuit court rejected the State’s arguments. The court stated that under the 

circumstances, there was “some apparent agency” between the hospital and Webb 

and concluded that “the argument that somehow the State wasn’t responsible for 

the blood draw appears to me to be a form over substance argument.” Therefore, 

the court declined to modify its original order. The State filed a certificate of 

impairment and appealed (Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014)). The 

appellate court affirmed. 2016 IL App (5th) 150095-U. 

¶ 18 The appellate court first rejected the State’s argument that defendant had failed 

to prove any blood draw was actually performed. The court explained that 

defendant filed a motion to suppress and “both parties proceeded to argue the 

merits of the underlying motion, with the understanding a blood draw had been 

performed on the defendant.” Id. ¶ 17. 

¶ 19 The appellate court then addressed the State’s argument that the blood draw 

was a private search and not the result of State action. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. The court 

emphasized that, despite defendant’s refusal of medical treatment, Webb 

physically removed defendant from the Jeep, forcibly placed him on a gurney and 

into the ambulance, handcuffed him, rode to the hospital, and then assisted EMS 

personnel in delivering defendant to the emergency room. Id. ¶ 21. According to 

the appellate court, this was “ample evidence” that demonstrated “that the State 

participated in forcing defendant to receive medical treatment.” Id. The appellate 

court also noted that there were no exigent circumstances present. Id. ¶ 24. From 

this, the court concluded that “the warrantless blood draw violated defendant’s 

fourth amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search.” Id. ¶ 25 This 

appeal followed. 

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¶ 20 Analysis 

¶ 21 At issue before us is the correctness of the circuit court’s order granting 

defendant’s motion to suppress. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress evidence, we apply a two-part standard of review. People v. Cosby, 231 

Ill. 2d 262, 270-71 (2008). Under this standard, a circuit court’s factual findings are 

reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, while the 

court’s ultimate legal ruling as to whether suppression is warranted is reviewed 

de novo. Id. at 271. 

¶ 22 When a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence, he bears the burden of 

proof at a hearing on that motion. People v. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 298, 306 (2003); 

725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 2016) (“The judge shall receive evidence on any issue 

of fact necessary to determine the motion and the burden of proving that the search 

and seizure were unlawful shall be on the defendant.”). A defendant must make a 

prima facie case that the evidence was obtained by an illegal search or seizure. 

Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 306-07. A prima facie showing means that the defendant has 

the primary responsibility for establishing the factual and legal bases for the motion 

to suppress. People v. Berg, 67 Ill. 2d 65, 68 (1977). Where the basis for the motion 

is an allegedly illegal search, the defendant must establish both that there was a 

search and that it was illegal. Id. If a defendant makes a prima facie case, the burden 

shifts to the State to present evidence to counter the defendant’s prima facie case. 

Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 307. However, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the 

defendant. Id. 

¶ 23 The sole allegation raised in defendant’s motion to suppress is that his fourth 

amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search was violated by a blood 

draw conducted at St. Anthony’s. The State contends on appeal that the circuit 

court erred in holding that defendant established a prima facie case that any blood 

draw conducted at the hospital was an illegal search. We agree with the State. 

¶ 24 To make a prima facie case for suppression, defendant had to establish two 

things: first, that a search occurred in the form of a blood draw and, second, that the 

draw violated the fourth amendment. Defendant failed to establish either of these 

propositions. 

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¶ 25 Defendant presented no evidence that his blood was actually drawn at the 

hospital. Although this was a matter within his personal knowledge, defendant 

never testified that he was subjected to a blood draw. Instead, he stated only that he 

refused to consent to having his blood drawn. Officer Webb testified that he went 

with defendant to the hospital and observed nurses working on him but stated he 

had no knowledge of whether a blood draw took place and no knowledge as to 

whether defendant ever consented to have his blood drawn. In addition, defendant 

did not call any witnesses from the hospital to testify that a blood draw was 

performed. Further, while an envelope was sent to the circuit court from 

St. Anthony’s, the parties did not stipulate to its contents, and it was never opened. 

Thus, no evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that a blood draw was 

actually performed at the hospital. 

¶ 26 We cannot agree with the appellate court that, because defendant filed a motion 

to suppress evidence and the parties proceeded to argue the motion as if a blood 

draw was performed, defendant, in fact, established that a search took place. The 

mere filing of a motion is not proof that a search occurred. Defendant bore the 

burden at the suppression hearing of showing his blood was drawn but failed to 

offer any evidence to establish that fact. Accordingly, we conclude defendant failed 

to establish the first element of his prima facie case. 

¶ 27 Moreover, even assuming a blood draw took place, defendant failed to establish 

any fourth amendment violation. The fourth amendment to the United States 

Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV) protects the “right of the people to be secure 

*** against unreasonable searches and seizures.” There is no dispute that a blood 

draw is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Schmerber 

v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 

148 (2013). A search conducted without a warrant is considered per se 

unreasonable under the fourth amendment unless it falls within one of a limited 

number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 

513 (2004). No warrant was issued in this case, and the State does not contend that 

any exception to the warrant requirement is applicable. 

¶ 28 However, the constitutional prohibition “against unreasonable searches and 

seizures does not apply to searches or seizures conducted by private individuals.” 

People v. Heflin, 71 Ill. 2d 525, 539 (1978) (citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 

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465 (1921)). Where a person performs a search independently of the police, the 

search is considered a private one and, because state action is not present, the fourth 

amendment is not implicated. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, LaFave Search 

and Seizure § 1.8, at 356-57 (5th ed. 2012). 

¶ 29 Defendant’s argument in this case rests on the presumption that any blood draw 

conducted at the hospital was a governmental search, not a private one. 

“The relevant factors involved in determining whether or not a particular 

search should be attributed to the government have been frequently discussed 

by the Supreme Court of the United States. [Citation]. Where a search is 

conducted by a private individual, the search will be subject to constitutional 

guarantees when the individual conducting the search can be regarded as acting 

as an agent or instrument of the State ‘in light of all the circumstances of the 

case.’ (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 487 ***). 

Participation by the police in and of itself, then, does not automatically invoke 

the application of the guarantees against unreasonable government intrusions 

safeguarded by the fourth and fourteenth amendments.” Heflin, 71 Ill. 2d at 

539-40. 

¶ 30 Thus, to establish a fourth amendment violation in this case, defendant had to 

demonstrate, “in light of all the circumstances,” that the private individual who 

conducted the alleged blood draw acted as an agent or instrumentality of the State 

when doing so. Defendant did not meet this standard. 

¶ 31 Officer Webb testified he never asked anyone to draw blood. In fact, Webb 

stated he never spoke to any nurse or doctor and had no knowledge about the 

treatment defendant received. Thus, there was no evidence that Webb, or any other 

police officer, sought or encouraged a blood draw or was even aware that one had 

been done. Cf. Armer, 2014 IL App (5th) 130342 (state action was present where a 

police officer requested that hospital staff draw the defendant’s blood with a DUI 

kit). Further, and equally as important, defendant did not call any witnesses from 

the hospital to testify. Thus, there was no evidence that any individual who may 

have drawn defendant’s blood did so while acting at the behest, or under the 

influence, of the police. 

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¶ 32 The appellate court below stressed the fact that defendant was physically forced 

to go the hospital and reasoned that, because defendant was compelled to go to the 

hospital, then any hospital employee who drew defendant’s blood necessarily did 

so under the guise of state action. This analysis is misplaced. 

¶ 33 There is no question police forcibly seized defendant and helped transport him 

to the hospital. But defendant has never challenged the legality of the seizure. His 

challenge is only to the legality of a search, i.e., the blood draw that allegedly took 

place at St. Anthony’s. And, on this record, there is no evidence that a blood draw 

even took place, let alone that a hospital employee was acting as an instrumentality 

or agent of police when it was performed. 

¶ 34 Defendant also emphasizes that he had a right to refuse medical treatment and 

that he never consented to any blood draw. Therefore, defendant reasons, any 

hospital personnel who drew his blood acted illegally, and any blood draw was 

necessarily unlawful under the fourth amendment. This argument is without merit. 

The private search doctrine applies “ ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable 

one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or 

with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.’ ” (Emphasis 

added.) United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v. 

United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by 

Powell, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.)); see also, e.g., United States v. Malbrough, 922 

F.2d 458, 462-63 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding a search by a private citizen who 

trespassed on another person’s property and viewed marijuana). 

¶ 35 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, even assuming blood was drawn 

from defendant at St. Anthony’s, it was a private search that did not implicate the 

fourth amendment. Accordingly, for this additional reason, the circuit court erred in 

granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

¶ 36 Finally, we note that at the conclusion of the hearing held on the State’s motion 

to reconsider the circuit court’s suppression order, the circuit court briefly stated 

that it believed the State should not have been able to issue a subpoena duces tecum 

to St. Anthony’s. The court evidently concluded that, because any blood draw was 

the result of state action, the subpoena was improper. However, as we have 

explained, on this record, defendant failed to establish that any blood draw was 

conducted under the guise of state action. 

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¶ 37 Conclusion 

¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, we hold the circuit court erred in granting 

defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the 

circuit and appellate courts. The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

¶ 39 Appellate court judgment reversed. 

¶ 40 Circuit court judgment reversed. 

¶ 41 Cause remanded. 

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