IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

STUART W. RYAN, 

Plaintiff,

vs. CASE NO. 3:10-cv-336/RS-MD

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF 

THE UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA, 

Defendant.

_________________________________________/

ORDER

Before me are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) and Plaintiff’s Response 

(Doc. 13). 

I. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts, which 

accepted as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569, 127 S. Ct. 

1955, 1974 (2007). Granting a motion to dismiss is appropriate if it is clear that no relief 

could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the 

allegations of the complaint. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 

2229, 2232 (1984). In making this determination, the court must accept all factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. 

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 2182 (2003).
II. Background

Plaintiff, a male instructor employed by the Defendant, alleges that the Defendant 

“retaliated against [Plaintiff] and has denied him opportunities for employment and 

advancement on the basis of his having complained of gender discrimination (Doc. 1, p. 

3)” in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20003, et. seq., 

and the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Sections 760.01 et. seq.

III. Analysis

In the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant’s assertions concerning the 

exhaustion of administrative remedies, the timely filing of the lawsuit within 90 days of 

the EEOC dismissal, and the satisfaction of conditions precedent do not meet the standard 

required for a motion to dismiss. Quite simply, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to 

raise a triable issue. The Amended Charge of Discrimination (Doc. 14, Attach. 1) makes 

it plausible that Plaintiff’s administrative remedies were exhausted as to the retaliation 

claim. The lack of specifics regarding the delivery date of the EEOC Dismissal and 

Notice of Suit Rights makes plausible the timeliness of Plaintiff’s lawsuit. The

assertions in the complaint satisfy the pleading requirements for conditions precedent. 

The only real issue in this Motion concerns whether Plaintiff’s failure to request an 

administrative hearing bars his claims under Florida law. 

While Plaintiff asserts that he “exhausted all administrative remedies under Title 

VII and the FCRA (Doc. 14, p. 1),” Plaintiff does not specifically address Defendant’s 

contention that Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of FLA. STAT. § 
760.11(7). Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not request an administrative 

hearing within thirty-five days of FCHR’s finding of “no cause.” While this issue is 

important, it need not be resolved at this stage. Plaintiff’s contention that he satisfied the 

administrative requirements under Florida law are plausible. 

The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is DENIED. 

ORDERED on October 28, 2010

/S/ Richard Smoak 

RICHARD SMOAK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE