SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

290 

CA 12-00789 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

WILLIAM J. THYGESEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NORTH BAILEY VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY, INC., 

WARREN HOLMES, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS 

CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF NORTH BAILEY 

VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY, INC., DAVID HUMBERT, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS FIRE CHIEF 

OF NORTH BAILEY VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY, INC., 

DANIEL STROZYK, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY 

AS INVESTIGATOR FOR NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF 

STATE POLICE AND NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF 

STATE POLICE, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

HOGAN WILLIG, AMHERST (STEVEN M. COHEN OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

UNDERBERG & KESSLER LLP, ROCHESTER (ELIZABETH A. CORDELLO OF COUNSEL),

FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS NORTH BAILEY VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY, INC., 

WARREN HOLMES, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF NORTH

BAILEY VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY, INC. AND DAVID HUMBERT, INDIVIDUALLY

AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS FIRE CHIEF OF NORTH BAILEY VOLUNTEER FIRE

COMPANY, INC. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Donna M.

Siwek, J.), entered January 25, 2012. The order granted in part the

motion to dismiss of defendants North Bailey Volunteer Fire Company,

Inc., Warren Holmes and David Humbert. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously modified on the law by denying that part of the motion

seeking dismissal of the first and third causes of action against

defendants North Bailey Volunteer Fire Company, Inc., Warren Holmes

and David Humbert and reinstating those causes of action, and as

modified the order is affirmed without costs. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff, a former member of defendant North Bailey

Volunteer Fire Company, Inc. (Fire Company), commenced this action

alleging, inter alia, that defendants discriminated against him and

violated his privacy and civil rights when they expelled him from

membership in the Fire Company. Plaintiff also commenced a CPLR

article 78 proceeding challenging the Fire Company’s determination to

expel him, and we confirmed that determination and dismissed the
-2- 290 

CA 12-00789 

petition (Matter of Thygesen v North Bailey Volunteer Fire Co., Inc.,

100 AD3d 1416). In the instant action, North Bailey Volunteer Fire

Company, Inc., Warren Holmes and David Humbert (defendants) moved to

dismiss the complaint against them pursuant to CPLR 3211 alleging,

inter alia, that plaintiff had never served a notice of claim as

required by General Municipal Law § 50-e and that plaintiff was not an

employee of the Fire Company. Supreme Court granted the motion in

part, dismissing the first, third, fifth and sixth causes of action

against defendants. Plaintiff now appeals. 

Plaintiff contends that General Municipal Law § 50-e does not

apply to the instant action because the Town of Amherst (Town) is not

a named defendant, and the Fire Company is a not-for-profit

corporation (see N-PCL 1402 [e] [1]), not a municipality or a fire

district. We reject that contention. Pursuant to Town Law § 170, a

town is authorized to establish a fire district, fire alarm district

or fire protection district for the benefit of the town residents (see

Cuddy v Town of Amsterdam, 62 AD2d 119, 120; see also Miller v Savage,

237 AD2d 695, 696). A fire district is a separate legal entity whose

members are employees of the fire district, not of any political

subdivision (see § 174 [7]; Nelson v Garcia, 152 AD2d 22, 25). In

contrast, “a fire protection district is simply a geographic area,

with no independent corporate status, for which the town board is

responsible for providing for the furnishing of fire protection” (1981

Ops St Comp No. 81-1; see § 184; Miller, 237 AD2d at 696; Nelson, 152

AD2d at 24-25). Members of the fire departments or companies

established within a fire protection district “are deemed officers,

employees, or appointees of the town[,] and the town is liable for any

negligence on the part of such members” (Nelson, 152 AD2d at 24; see

General Municipal Law §§ 50-a [1]; 50-b [1]; 205-b; Town Law § 184

[1]; N-PCL 1402 [e] [1]; Miller, 237 AD2d at 696; Miller v Morania Oil

of Long Is., O.C.P., 194 AD2d 770, 771). 

It is undisputed that, in 1958, the Town established the North

Bailey Fire Co., Inc., Fire Protection District No. 18 (Fire

Protection District). The Town, acting on behalf of the Fire

Protection District, contracted with the Fire Company for fire

protection services within the Fire Protection District. Where an

action is commenced against an officer, appointee or employee of a

public corporation such as the Town of Amherst, “service of the notice

of claim upon the public corporation shall be required . . . if the

corporation has a statutory obligation to indemnify such person under

this chapter or any other provision of law” (General Municipal Law §

50-e [1] [b]), and that is the case here. 

Having determined that General Municipal Law § 50-e is implicated

by this action, we now address its application to the four causes of

action dismissed by the court. We conclude that the court erred in

granting those parts of the motion with respect to the first and third

causes of action, alleging violations of the Human Rights Law

(Executive Law § 296 et seq.), and properly granted those parts of the

motion with respect to the fifth and sixth causes of action, alleging

defamation. We therefore modify the order accordingly. 
-3- 290 

CA 12-00789 

It is well settled that the notice of claim requirements of

General Municipal Law § 50-e do not apply to discrimination causes of

action under the Human Rights Law inasmuch as those causes of action

are not “founded upon tort” (General Municipal Law § 50-e [1] [a]; see

Mills v County of Monroe, 89 AD2d 776, 776, affd 59 NY2d 307, cert

denied 464 US 1018; Margerum v City of Buffalo, 63 AD3d 1574, 1580;

Grasso v Schenectady County Pub. Lib., 30 AD3d 814, 816; Picciano v

Nassau County Civ. Serv. Commn., 290 AD2d 164, 170; Sebastian v New

York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 221 AD2d 294, 294-295). Thus, based

on the limited issues raised by the parties (cf. County Law § 52; Town

Law § 67 [1], [2]; Scopelliti v Town of New Castle, 210 AD2d 308,

309), we conclude that defendants were not entitled to dismissal of

the first and third causes of action based on plaintiff’s failure to

serve a notice of claim. 

We reach a different conclusion with respect to the fifth and

sixth causes of action, however, which are “founded upon tort”

(General Municipal Law § 50-e [1]). The fifth cause of action alleges

the tort of defamation against defendants Warren Holmes and David

Humbert, and the sixth cause of action alleges the tort of defamation

against Humbert. Both Holmes and Humbert were sued individually and

in their capacity as members of the Fire Company. Inasmuch as the

Town would be obligated to indemnify both men (see Miller, 237 AD2d at

696; Nelson, 152 AD2d at 24), the Town was entitled to a notice of

claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (1), and plaintiff’s

failure to serve that notice of claim is fatal to the fifth and sixth

causes of action.

Defendants also sought dismissal of the first and third causes of 

action against them, alleging violations of the Human Rights Law, on

the ground that plaintiff could not be deemed an employee covered by

that statute. “It is well settled that the federal standards under

title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are applied to determine

whether recovery is warranted under the Human Rights Law” (VanDeWater

v Canandaigua Natl. Bank, 70 AD3d 1434, 1435, citing Forrest v Jewish

Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 n 3). The question before us on

this appeal is whether plaintiff may invoke the protections of the

Human Rights Law, i.e., whether he was an “employee” of defendants. 

“ ‘[T]he question of whether someone is or is not an employee under

Title VII usually turns on whether he or she has received direct or

indirect remuneration from the alleged employer’ ” (York v Association

of Bar of City of N.Y., 286 F3d 122, 125-126, cert denied 537 US 1089,

reh denied 537 US 1228, quoting Pietras v Board of Fire Commrs. of

Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F3d 468, 473). Pursuant to the decision

of the Second Circuit in York, “the following factors [are] indicative

of ‘financial benefit’: salary or other wages; employee benefits,

such as health insurance; vacation; sick pay; or the promise of any of

the foregoing” (id. at 126). The benefits received “must meet a

minimum level of ‘significance,’ or substantiality, in order to find

an employment relationship in the absence of more traditional

compensation” (id.). In accord with the federal decisions, “a nonsalaried volunteer firefighter’s employment status under Title VII is

a fact question when that firefighter is entitled to significant
-4- 290 

CA 12-00789 

benefits” (Pietras, 180 F3d at 473 [emphasis added]). 

The record establishes that plaintiff received $440 per month as

a result of the Service Award Program. While defendants contend that

such amount represents a retirement benefit, not remuneration, there

is a split of authority on the question whether such a benefit raises

a triable issue of fact on the issue of employment (compare E.E.O.C. v

Incorporated Vil. of Val. Stream, 535 F Supp 2d 323, 328-329, with

Keller v Niskayuna Consol. Fire Dist. 1, 51 F Supp 2d 223, 231-232). 

Plaintiff identified additional benefits he received, including death

benefits, eyeglass coverage and hearing aid coverage, as well as

benefits he was afforded pursuant to General Municipal Law § 208-b,

which include a death benefit payable to, inter alia, the spouse or

dependent children of a regular member of a fire department. “Because

compensation is not defined by statute or case law, . . . [the

determination whether those benefits received constituted compensation

could not] be found as a matter of law. The . . . court must leave to

a factfinder the ultimate conclusion whether the benefits represent

indirect but significant remuneration as [plaintiff] contends or

inconsequential incidents of an otherwise gratuitous relationship as

[defendants contend]” (Haavistola v Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun,

Inc., 6 F3d 211, 221-222; see Pietras, 180 F3d at 473; E.E.O.C., 535 F

Supp 2d at 328-329). We thus conclude that the court erred in

determining as a matter of law that the benefits plaintiff received

were insufficient to constitute compensation and that plaintiff

therefore was not defendants’ employee as a matter of law.

Entered: May 3, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court