1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISON 

TAYLOR PARKER,

CASE NO.: 1:10-cv-00146 SPM

Plaintiff,

vs. 

THE CITY OF GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA,

A municipal corporation, and OFFICER

DAVID REVEILLE, in his individual capacity, 

Defendant.

________________________________/

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OF THE DEFENDANT DAVID REVEILLE

AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW

COMES NOW the Defendant, David Reveille, in his individual capacity, by and 

through his undersigned attorneys, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and 

Northern District of Florida Local Rule 56.1, and moves this Honorable Court for an 

order of summary judgment in his favor on the claims filed against him by the Plaintiff, 

Taylor Parker, and says:

1. On July 27, 2010, the Plaintiff, Taylor Parker (“Parker”) filed her 

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, to which the Defendant, David Reveille (“Officer 

Reveille”) filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses on September 21, 2010. (Doc. 2; 

Doc. 22.) The Complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged claims against Officer 

Reveille for false arrest and false imprisonment on the date of her arrest, September 13, 

2007, in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 29-33.) 

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 1 of 15
2

2. Several depositions have been taken in the case, including the Plaintiff’s, 

and a mediation is scheduled for February 28, 2011. (Doc. 35.) As ordered by the Court, 

the discovery cutoff was February 11, 2011, and trial is set on the June 6, 2011, docket. 

(Doc. 31.) 

3. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a Statement of Material Facts in support of this 

motion, which is incorporated herein. Also attached are additional exhibits incorporated 

herein, including:

Exhibit 2: The September 13, 2007, Arrest Affidavit of the Defendant, David 

Reveille, prepared in the regular course of business pursuant to his employment on that 

date by the Gainesville Police Department;

Exhibit 3: The February 23, 2011, affidavit of David Reveille;

Exhibit 4: Excerpts from the November 23, 2010, deposition of the Plaintiff, 

Taylor Parker.

4. Officer Reveille was acting under color of law as an officer of the 

Gainesville Police Department and within his discretionary authority when he arrested 

Parker and is entitled to qualified immunity. As discussed more fully in the following 

Memorandum of Law, he had probable cause or arguable probable cause for the arrest, so 

did not violate her Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, as alleged in the Complaint. 

THEREFORE, Officer Reveille requests a summary judgment in his favor on the 

§ 1983 claims made against him by the Plaintiff, Taylor Parker.

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 2 of 15
3

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. (2010). In making this determination, the court must view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Samples on behalf of 

Samples v. Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). The initial burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests on the moving party.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 

(1986). Once the moving party meets the initial burden, the non-moving party “bears the 

burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence of every element that he or she must 

prove.” Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). In order to 

meet this burden, the non-moving party “must go beyond the pleadings” and establish 

“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 

106 S. Ct. at 2553.

The applicable substantive law determines which facts are material. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). 

A material fact is one which “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law...” Id. A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant’s position does not 

create a jury question; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for 

that party. Id., 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512. Irrelevant or unnecessary factual 

disputes will not be counted. Id., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510. The mere existence 

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 3 of 15
4

of an alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a properly supported 

motion for summary judgment; there must be a genuine issue of a material fact. Id., 477 

U.S. at 247-48, 106 S. Ct. at 2510 (emphasis in original).

II. FOURTH AMENDMENT AND PROBABLE CAUSE

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes the right of 

the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable seizures and states no 

warrants shall be issued except upon probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A 

warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Constitution and forms the basis for 

a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1990) 

(citations omitted). However, the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a 

claim of false arrest. Id. at 1505-06; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 

S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). As the Eleventh Circuit stated in Marx:

"Probable cause [to arrest] exists where 'the facts and 

circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of 

which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] 

sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 

caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being 

committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-

76, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)

(brackets in original) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 

U.S. 132, 162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 288, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925)); 

Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 1985). 

Probable cause does not require overwhelmingly 

convincing evidence, but only "reasonably trustworthy 

information," Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 

225, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964), and probable cause "must be 

judged not with clinical detachment but with a common 

sense view to the realities of normal life." Wilson, 757 F.2d 

at 1235. When the facts are not in dispute, whether 

probable cause existed is a question of law, and summary 

judgment is appropriate. See White v. Pierce County, 797 

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 4 of 15
5

F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1986); Wille v. Raymond, 487 So.2d 

1211, 1214 (Fla.App. 1986). 

Id. at 1506.

The subsequent acquittal of the arrested person or the dropping of the charges 

against her have no bearing on the validity of the arrest. Id. at 1507. In addition, 

allowance must be made for reasonable mistakes on the part of an arresting officer acting 

on facts leading reasonably to his conclusions of probability. Id. When considering a 

qualified immunity defense, an officer does not need to have had actual probable cause 

for the arrest, but is protected from liability if he had an arguable probability. See

Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Von Stein v. Brescher, 

904 F.2d 572, 579 (11th Cir. 1990)). The test becomes whether a reasonable officer in the 

same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the arresting officer could 

have believed that probable cause existed. Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1324. Furthermore, if

the officer had probable cause or arguable probable cause for one of the charges made, 

the arrest is valid as to the other charges and he is entitled to qualified immunity. See

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S. Ct. 588, 594, 160 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2004).

In fact, the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the officer’s subjective reason for 

making the arrest is not the criminal offense for which the known facts provide probable 

cause. See id.

III. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND PROBABLE CAUSE

Presumably, Parker’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officer Reveille is for 

false imprisonment, alleging an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty without due 

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 5 of 15
6

process, based on the allegedly false arrest. See Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1330 

(11th Cir. 2009) (citing Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1527 (11th Cir. 1996)). 

However, probable cause or arguable probable cause is a bar to a § 1983 false 

imprisonment claim just as it is to a false arrest claim. See Case, 555 F.3d at 1330.

IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Qualified immunity offers complete protection from suit for a law enforcement 

officer sued in his individual capacity, if his conduct did not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). 

It applies regardless of whether, if the officer made an error, that error was the result of a 

mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact. 

See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) 

(citations omitted). Once it is established the officer was within the course and scope of 

his discretionary authority, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to show the defense 

is not appropriate. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). The United 

States Supreme Court has set out a two-part qualified immunity analysis process in 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001), which may be 

applied in whatever order is most appropriate for the case, Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818. 

One of the Saucier inquiries is whether, if the plaintiff’s allegations are true, there 

has been a constitutional violation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S. Ct. at 2156. If the 

court determines no violation occurred, no further inquiry is necessary. Id. The other 

inquiry is whether, if a violation could be found on a favorable view of the plaintiff’s 

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 6 of 15
7

submissions, the right was clearly established in the specific context of the case. Id. In 

the case at bar, the arrest of Parker was within Officer Reveille’s discretionary authority, 

so the burden of proof shifts to Parker to show that qualified immunity is not applicable.

See Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004); Kesinger v. 

Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2004); Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. 

V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ENTERED FOR

OFFICER REVEILLE ON THE BASIS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Parker’s Complaint admits she was arrested by Officer Reveille of the Gainesville 

Police Department on September 13, 2007, and charged with (1) driving while license 

suspended, and (2) resisting arrest without violence. (Doc. 2, ¶ 11.) The Complaint 

alleges that when she returned to her residence in her vehicle, in response to a request 

from Officer Reveille, who was investigating a noise complaint, she was seated in the 

front passenger seat. (Doc. 2, ¶ 13.) Thus, she claims no probable cause or arguable 

probable cause existed for her arrest. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 20-21.) Her § 1983 claim against 

Officer Reveille for “false arrest and imprisonment” is contained in Count I of the 

Complaint. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 29-33.) 

Officer Reveille’s sworn Arrest Affidavit, prepared in the regular course of 

business, states that he observed Parker driving her vehicle when it approached her 

house, where he had been dispatched about 2:15 a.m. in response to an excessive noise 

complaint. He saw her park the vehicle in the driveway and exit from the front driver’s 

seat. When she produced a Florida Identification Card, he discovered through a computer 

check that her driver’s license was suspended, and told her she was under arrest. (Exh. 2.)

An additional affidavit of Officer Reveille, dated February 23, 2011, attesting to these 

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 7 of 15
8

events and to what he observed that evening is also included in the exhibits attached 

hereto. (Exh. 3, ¶¶ 4-6.) 

When Officer Reveille attempted to detain Parker while he confirmed that 

information by teletype, she became agitated and began to struggle. He ordered her not to 

resist and to place her hands behind her back for handcuffing. She refused, and continued 

to struggle by pulling her arms away from the officer and placing them in front of her. 

After struggling for several minutes (during which a friend of Parker attempted to 

interfere), Officer Reveille got Parker rear handcuffed. Then, when he attempted to place 

her in the back seat of the patrol car, she refused to comply, even after being given verbal 

commands to stop resisting. It was necessary for the officer to physically place Parker in 

the patrol car. (Exh. 2; Exh. 3, ¶¶ 7-9.) 

Excerpts from Parker’s November 23, 2010, deposition are attached as Exhibit 4.

In that sworn testimony, Parker stated that prior to the arrest date of September 13, 2007,

she had two DUI convictions and had been arrested for driving with a suspended license 

during the period between the DUI arrests. (Exh. 4, p. 5-13.) On the evening of 

September 13, 2007, after she got home from work, she was out with three friends when 

another friend, who was at her house, phoned and said a police officer was there 

regarding a noise violation and wanted her to come meet with him. About thirty minutes 

later, she and her friends arrived at her house, after stopping off on the way so one of the 

friends could pick up some clothes for work the next day. Parker stated that a friend, 

“Charlie,” who had a cast on his broken left arm, was driving her vehicle. She said she 

was seated in the rear seat on the driver’s side. When they arrived at her house, the 

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 8 of 15
9

officer was parked in front of the house. Parker testified she exited the vehicle from the 

back door of the vehicle and walked to the house. Officer Reveille requested her driver’s 

license, and she went into the house and got her state identification card. (Exh. 4, p. 28-

29, 33-36, 120-122.)

Parker said the officer took the identification card to his patrol car and sat inside it 

checking her name and information. He then came back to her and said to turn around 

and put her hands behind her back, that she was under arrest. Parker said she asked him 

what she was being arrested for and pulled her hands away. He said for driving on a 

suspended license. She argued with the officer, telling him she was not driving the 

vehicle, that Charlie was driving, and she pointed at Charlie. She was arrested,

handcuffed, and taken to jail, where she was incarcerated overnight. (Exh. 4, p. 39-41, 

46-47, 55-56 .)1

Officer Reveille is not arguing there is no dispute regarding whether Parker was 

driving the vehicle when she returned to her residence that evening. However, under the 

circumstances of this case, that question is not one of a material fact. See Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. at 247-28, 106 S. Ct. at 2510. The case turns on whether Officer Reveille 

had probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest Parker, and qualified immunity 

from this lawsuit is available to Officer Reveille on at least two bases.

First, Officer Reveille’s Arrest Affidavit and his affidavit in support of the Motion 

for Summary Judgment both aver that he saw Parker driving the vehicle and saw her get 

out of the driver’s seat. When he ran her identification card through the computer and 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 The deposition of Charles Haines, whom Parker claimed was driving her vehicle, was 

not taken in the case. 

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 9 of 15
10

saw that her license was suspended, it was objectively reasonable for him to conclude he 

had probable cause to arrest her on the charge of driving with license suspended. No 

evidence suggests that Officer Reveille did not possess the belief that he saw Parker 

driving the vehicle. See German v. Sosa, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21026, *5, *7 (11th Cir.

Oct. 12, 2010) (officer believed he saw cannabis in the suspect’s mouth that he was 

chewing and swallowing to destroy evidence). For Officer Reveille, his observation was 

“reasonably trustworthy” information to consider in determining if probable cause 

existed. See Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L. Ed. 

1879 (1949). Great deference is given to the judgment of a trained law enforcement 

officer on the scene. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205-06, 121 S. Ct. at 2158. 

In addition, Parker’s allegations on this point are contradictory. The Complaint 

states she was in the front passenger seat, yet she testified at deposition she was in the 

back seat on the driver’s side and got out of that car door. (Exh. 4, p. 33, 121.) These 

conflicting allegations should relieve the Court of its obligation to take her assertions as 

true on a motion for summary judgment. See Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 

(11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (when reading the record in the nonmovant’s favor on a motion 

for summary judgment, the court owes the nonmovant no duty to disbelieve her sworn 

testimony in the case); Fernandez v. Metro Dade Police Dep’t, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 

16505, *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2010) (court may only draw inferences in the nonmovant’s 

favor to the extent they are supportable by the record) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 

371, 381 n.8, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 n.8, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007).

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 10 of 15
11

If an officer may base probable cause on the observations of an eyewitness, it 

stands to reason he may certainly base it on his own observations. As pointed out by the 

court in Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, a Seventh Circuit case in which eyewitnesses reported 

they saw the plaintiff strike his wife: whether he struck his wife was not material to the 

determination of probable cause. Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1247 (7th Cir. 

1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128, 115 S. Ct. 937, 130 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1995). Rather, the 

test is an objective one, and it is “what the police know, not whether they know the truth, 

that matters.” Id. (quoting Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028, 107 S. Ct. 1952, 95 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1987).

Even if Officer Reveille was mistaken in his observation, which he is not 

conceding, his belief that Parker was driving was reasonable under the circumstances of 

this case. See U.S. v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1005-06 (11th Cir. 1992) (officer’s 

mistaken belief of fact can properly contribute to a probable cause determination and can 

count just as much as a correct belief as long as mistaken belief was reasonable in light of 

the circumstances).2 The events occurred outside Parker’s house in the early morning 

hours and she stated in deposition that she exited the car from the back seat on the 

driver’s side. Officer Reveille, who was in front of her house, believed he saw her drive

up to the house and exit the vehicle from the driver’s door. Thus, he had arguable 

probable cause if an officer on the scene making the same reasonable observation and 

then checking the status of Parker’s driver’s license could reasonably have believed he 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 2 See also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800, 111 L. Ed. 2d 

148 (1990) (an officer’s mistaken belief is not necessarily unreasonable; the many factual 

determinations regularly made by officers do not always have to be correct, just 

reasonable).

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 11 of 15
12

had probable cause for the arrest. See Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1324; Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 

815. “Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that 

probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 

112 S. Ct. 534, 536, 116 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1991). 

Because Officer Reveille had probable cause or arguable probable cause for the 

charge, there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and qualified immunity applies. See

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S. Ct. at 2156. Probable cause also bars the Fourteenth 

Amendment false imprisonment allegation, and Officer Reveille is entitled to qualified 

immunity on that claim. See Case, 555 F.3d at 1330.

The second basis for qualified immunity is attributable to Officer Reveille’s 

affidavits and Parker’s own deposition testimony showing that she pulled her hands away 

and resisted the handcuffing, and also argued with the officer. There is no dispute about 

these actions, which gave Officer Reveille probable cause for the charge of resisting an 

officer without violence. When an officer has probable cause for one of the charges 

made, that is sufficient for an arrest, even if there is a question about probable cause for 

other charges. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, 125 S. Ct. at 594; Lee, 284 F.3d at 1196 

Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1089 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 917, 

125 S. Ct. 45, 160 L. Ed. 2d 201 (2004).

Florida Statute 843.02, pursuant to which this charge was made, provides that a 

person resisting, obstructing, or opposing an officer in the execution of any legal duty 

without doing violence to the officer’s person is guilty of a first degree misdemeanor. § 

843.02 Fla. Stat. (2007). To support a charge under that statute, the state must prove (1) 

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 12 of 15
13

the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty, and (2) the defendant’s 

action constituted obstruction or resistance of the lawful duty. See Slydell v. State, 792 

So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 

Clearly, investigating the excessive noise complaint was a legal duty of Officer 

Reveille. See Ruizdelatorre v. City of Miami Beach, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116922, *26

(S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (legal duty prong of § 843.02 satisfied where officers were 

investigating a neighbor’s noise complaint); Sullivan v. City of Pembroke Pines, 161 Fed. 

Appx. 906, 909 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2006) (officer performing a legal duty where he was 

investigating a domestic disturbance complaint). The statute does not require that the 

officer be attempting to arrest a suspect. See Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1071 

(11th Cir. 2008) (citing Jacobson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1282, 1287 (Fla. 1985).

Refusing to cooperate with an officer’s handcuffing efforts is “resisting” under § 

843.02. See Williams v. City of Daytona Beach, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5766, *36 (M.D. 

Fla. Feb. 15, 2006) (failing to present one’s hands for handcuffing is sufficient evidence 

to establish probable cause for a resisting without violence charge) (citing Savage v. 

State, 494 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (one can resist, obstruct, or oppose an 

officer without committing a battery by refusing to present one’s hands for handcuffing, 

refusing to put one’s hands behind one’s back, or refusing to get in a patrol car), review 

denied, 506 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1987). No genuine issue of material fact exists regarding 

the establishment of the elements of this offense, for which Officer Reveille arrested 

Parker, and he had probable cause.

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 13 of 15
14

As previously discussed, probable cause is a complete defense to both false arrest 

and false imprisonment. Because Officer Reveille had probable cause to arrest Parker on 

the resisting charge, there was no Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment violation and he is 

entitled to qualified immunity. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S. Ct. at 2156.

The probable cause or arguable probable cause for either charge on which Parker 

was arrested is sufficient to resist a Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the 

remaining charge. Since Officer Reveille did not violate Parker’s constitutional rights, 

that prong of the Saucier qualified immunity inquiry is satisfied, and it is unnecessary to 

inquire whether there was existing law addressing these specific circumstances which 

would have given Officer Reveille notice that his actions would violate her rights.

Furthermore, it is doubtful that existing law would have advised him he did not have 

probable cause for either of the charges for which she was arrested.

Parker’s Complaint, particularly in the two counts against the Gainesville Police 

Department, attempts to create an inference some issue exists in the case because of 

unprofessional behavior by Officer Reveille. However, the probable cause inquiry is an 

objective one, and the arresting officer’s motivations are irrelevant. See Rushing v. 

Parker, 599 F.3d 1263, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). Moreover, at her deposition, Parker 

testified that she saw Officer Reveille on several other occasions when he was on duty,

besides the evening of her arrest. Although asked repeatedly, she testified that he never 

engaged in what she considered to be unprofessional or improper behavior on that 

evening or at any other time. (Exh. 4, p. 54, 60-61, 64-65, 67-69, 71-72.) This is a nonissue with no bearing on the claims against the officer. 

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 14 of 15
15

VI. CONCLUSION

Officer Reveille had probable cause or arguable probable cause for the charges on 

which he arrested the Plaintiff, Taylor Parker. That constitutes a complete defense to the 

claims of false arrest and false imprisonment. Under those circumstances, there was no 

violation of Parker’s Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, and a summary judgment

should be entered by the Court in his favor, based on qualified immunity. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 23, 2011, I electronically filed the 

foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/EMF system which will send notice 

of electronic filing to the following: Robert A. Rush and John W. Jolly, Jr. I further 

certify that I sent the foregoing document and the notice of electronic filing by U.S. Mail 

to the following non-CM/EMF system participants. N/A.

Linda L. Winchenbach

Florida Bar No. 0749249

John M. Green, Jr., P.A.

125 N.E. First Ave., Ste. 2

Ocala, Florida 34470

Tel: (352) 732-9252

Fax: (888) 545-7282 – Toll Free

lwinchenbach@jgreenattorney.com

Attorneys for Defendant, David Reveille, in 

his individual capacity 

Case 1:10-cv-00146-SPM-GRJ Document 39 Filed 02/23/11 Page 15 of 15