NO. 4-02-0498

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

In re: R.B., a Minor,

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

          Petitioner-Appellee,

		v.

GASTON BUTLER,

          Respondent-Appellant.	)

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)

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)	Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Champaign County

No. 01JA90

Honorable

Ann A. Einhorn,

Judge Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

		JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

		In December 2001, the State filed a petition, alleging

that R.B. (born October 2, 1999), the minor child of respondent,

Gaston Butler, was a neglected minor under section 2-3(1)(b) of the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West

2000)) because her environment was injurious to her welfare when

she resided "with [her parents] Sonja Caston and/or Gaston Butler

in that said environment exposes" R.B. to the risk of domestic

violence.  Following adjudicatory hearings in February and March

2002, the trial court found that R.B. was a neglected minor. 

Following a May 2002 dispositional hearing, the court adjudicated

R.B. a ward of the court, appointed the Department of Children and

Family Services (DCFS) as her guardian, and ordered her removed

from the custody of both Caston and Butler.  

		Butler appeals, arguing that the trial court (1)

improperly accepted Caston's stipulation as evidence against him;

(2) violated his fourteenth amendment right to fundamentally fair

procedures; and (3) made a decision that was contrary to the

manifest weight of the evidence.  We affirm.

	I. BACKGROUND

		R.B. was the two-year-old daughter of Butler and Caston

when the State filed its December 2001 neglect petition.  In

response to that petition, the trial court appointed counsel for

R.B., directed the circuit clerk to issue summons for all parties,

and allotted the case for a January 22, 2002, admonition hearing. 

The court also set the case for an adjudicatory hearing on February

26, 2002. 

		At the January 22, 2002, admonition hearing, Caston

appeared personally, but Butler did not.  The trial court (1)

received a new address for Butler, (2) amended the neglect petition

accordingly, (3) allotted Butler's admonition hearing for February

21, 2002, and (4) directed new summons to issue for Butler with the

new admonition hearing date.  The court also granted Caston's

motion for appointed counsel and reaffirmed February 26, 2002, as

the date for the adjudicatory hearing.  

		On February 21, 2002, the trial court called the case for

Butler's admonition hearing, but neither Butler nor anyone on his

behalf appeared.  The court directed alias summons to issue for

Butler and reaffirmed the February 26, 2002, date for the

adjudicatory hearing.

	A. The Initial Phase of the Adjudicatory Hearing

		On February 26, 2002, when the trial court called the

case for adjudicatory hearing, the following people were present:

Caston, Caston's counsel, R.B.'s counsel, the prosecutor, and

Butler, who appeared for the first time.  The court's discussion

with Butler revealed that one of the notices sent to him at his address in Matteson, Illinois, successfully reached him.  The court

informed Butler of the allegations in the State's neglect petition

and appropriately explained the State's burden of proof and

Butler's rights during the proceedings.  The court also informed

Butler that he had the right to be represented by counsel and that

one would be appointed for him if he could not afford to hire an

attorney of his own choice.  Butler stated that he was not able to

hire an attorney and would like to have one appointed for him.  The

court granted his request and appointed an assistant public

defender to represent him.  However, that counsel was not then

present in court.  

		The following discussion then occurred between the trial

court, Butler, and some of the other parties:

			"THE COURT:  Mr. Butler, you did not

appear previously, and so this is the first

time that you are here.  This is the date set

for that adjudicatory hearing for the presen

tation of evidence; you understand that?

			[BUTLER]:  Yes, ma'am.

			THE COURT:  Are you able to go forward

today even though your counsel cannot be here

because I've just appointed him, he had no

advance notice of this?

			[BUTLER]:  I don't believe that I could

because I don't know what rights or anything

that I do have, and I would like to speak with

somebody to get counsel.  

			[THE PROSECUTOR]:  People object to the

motion to continue.

			THE COURT:  And--

			[CASTON'S COUNSEL]:  For the record I

would also object[, noting] that [Caston] is

eight months pregnant and she's come from the

Chicago area, notwithstanding the weather.

						* * *

			THE COURT:  I note the somewhat unusual

circumstances in this [case].  I note that

extensive efforts were made to try and contact

Mr. Butler so that he could be here previ

ously.

			And in fact the court had ordered summons

to issue, also ordered notice by publication

early on in case that notice, in case the

summons could not be served.

			I take note of the circumstances.  The

court is going to deny the motion for a con

tinuance, and I rely particularly on the

efforts of [Caston] to be present today, in

spite of what was close to blizzard-like

conditions, the court taking note of the

weather conditions outside.  Mr. Butler, at

this point I'm going to proceed.  The court

will treat liberally any motions your attorney

may feel are necessary after the fact, and I note also the subpoenaed witnesses are pres

ent.  I'm going to allow [the prosecutor] to

proceed at this time."

	B. The Factual Basis for Caston's Admission and Stipulation

		Later during the adjudicatory hearing, Caston offered to

admit and stipulate to the neglect allegation in the State's

petition.  In support of Caston's offer, the prosecutor presented

as a factual basis People's exhibit No. 1, which consisted of the

reports of two Champaign police officers regarding an incident they

responded to on September 17, 2001.  The State offered that exhibit

to demonstrate that the environment in which R.B. resided when she

lived with Caston and Butler exposed her to the risk of domestic

violence.  The prosecutor noted that the officers whose reports

made up People's exhibit No. 1 were present in court and ready to

testify if needed.  The prosecutor also indicated that to further

show a factual basis, the parties agreed that the trial court could

consider the verified petition Caston signed following the

September 17, 2001, incident, in which she sought an order of

protection against Butler.  The court accepted Caston's admission

and stipulation and accepted as a factual basis for it the police

reports in People's exhibit No. 1 and Caston's sworn statement in

the order of protection case.  (We note that although the court

referred to Caston's sworn statement, it is not contained in the

record on appeal.)

		The first police report stated that on the date in

question, Champaign police officer Randy Beech responded to a

domestic disturbance call at Caston and Butler's residence.  Caston stated that she, R.B., and J.A., who was Caston's 10-year-old

daughter by another man, were watching television when Butler

walked into the back bedroom and asked where his belongings were. 

She told him that she had packed them up because she wanted him to

move out.  He said he was not going to leave, started to argue with

her, and then choked her until she blacked out.  She did not awaken

until the police were present.  Caston informed the officers that

she feared for her life and was afraid of Butler.  The officers saw

scratches and marks on her neck.  When Beech arrived, J.A. was in

the apartment and "crying uncontrollably." 

		The report of Champaign police officer Russell Beck was

substantially similar to Beech's report, but it contained some

additional details.  It noted that (1) Caston was then six - to -eight

weeks pregnant; and (2) the police were called when J.A. went to a

neighbor's house at Caston's direction to call the police.  When

Beck arrived, Caston was still unconscious, and he called for

medical personnel.

	C. The Second Phase of the Adjudicatory Hearing

		After accepting Caston's admission and stipulation, the

trial court addressed Butler, who remained present throughout the

proceedings relating to Caston's admission and stipulation, and

stated the following:

			"THE COURT:  Mr. Butler, you just heard

Ms. Caston admit and stipulate to *** this

petition.  Earlier you made a motion to con

tinue this matter, do you recall?

			[BUTLER]:  Yes.

			THE COURT:  And at this time the court is

going to reconsider, and I am going to con

tinue [the case] so that you can consult with

your lawyer as to how you wish to proceed.  

			If you wish to proceed with an eviden

tiary hearing as to you, then your lawyer will

inform me.  I'm going to give you [a] date and

time, and I'm also going to set it for

dispositional hearing as to Ms. Caston.

			Do you understand what I'm doing?

			[BUTLER]:  Yes."

		The trial court allotted the dispositional hearing for

April 5, 2002, and directed DCFS to conduct an investigation and

make a report for that hearing.  The court then informed Butler

that it was setting the adjudicatory hearing as to him for March 1,

2002. 

		On March 1, 2002, the court reconvened with all parties

present, including Butler and his counsel, and the following

discussion took place:

			"THE COURT:  ***  When we were in court

on [February 26, 2002,] [Caston] admitted and stipulated to count I of the petition, and the

court continued this so that [Butler] could

have the advice of counsel as to how he wished

to proceed. 

	* * * 

			[BUTLER'S COUNSEL]:  We're ready, your Honor.

			THE COURT:  *** Anything that you wish to

tell the court in terms of Mr. Butler's wishes

to proceed.

			[BUTLER'S COUNSEL]:  He would like a

trial on this matter.

			THE COURT:  Then the court does call this

for hearing on the petition, seeking a finding

of neglect as to the respondent minor, [R.B.]" 

	 	The prosecutor then asked the trial court to take additional notice of Caston's stipulation at the February 26

hearing, as well as People's exhibit No. 1, the police reports,

which were part of that stipulation, and Caston's verified petition

for an order of protection.  Butler's counsel objected, arguing

that matters Caston stipulated to should not be considered by the

court against Butler, nor should any sworn statement she made about

the order of protection.  Butler's counsel pointed out that because

Caston did not pursue the matter, the order of protection case was

dismissed.  

		The trial court overruled Butler's objections, explaining

as follows:  

			"The allegation in this petition is not

whether or not one person or the other caused

the domestic violence; the question is was

there any domestic violence and were the

children exposed to it, and that is count [I]

[on] which the State is proceeding []***.  It's important that Mr. Butler understand that,

there was a stipulation, and the stipulation

so far as the two police reports go, was not

as to any legal conclusion as to whether what

the officers were saying was the truth or not,

the stipulation offered was that the officers,

if called to testify, would testify consistent

with the contents of the report.

			The contents of the report describing

what they report as to an episode of domestic

violence, the court took note of those police

reports as a factual basis for accepting

[Caston's] stipulation to the petition.

			Two separate questions.

			The court today takes note of [Caston's]

stipulation to the petition acknowledging that

there was an episode of domestic violence. 

Please note again for [Butler's] benefit, not

assigning who was responsible for what in that

episode, that stipulation acknowledges that

there was an episode of domestic violence to

which the children were exposed.

			*** The court takes note of her *** sworn

statement as to the petition for the order of

protection. [Butler's counsel] raises the

question of being able to examine those wit

nesses as it pertains to her client.  And that is the nut of it and [Butler's counsel] is

correct in that sense, and the court will give

her leave and in fact the court will, if

necessary, continue this if [Butler's counsel]

wishes to call witnesses.

			I think I am compelled to perhaps sim

plify all that verbiage. [Butler's counsel],

what I've said in brief is that I take note of

[Caston's] stipulation.  I take note of the

factual basis on which she rested, tendered it

for her purposes as it pertained to [her]. 

	* * *

			As to [Butler][,] what is relevant is

[Caston's] stipulation that yes, there was an

incident of domestic violence, as would have

been testified to by the police officers if

they were called to testify."

		The State then rested, relying on Caston's admission and

stipulation and accompanying factual basis, and Butler offered no

evidence.  The State argued that (1) it had the burden to prove

that R.B. was a neglected child because her environment was

injurious to her welfare in that she had been exposed to the risk

of domestic violence when living with her parents, Caston and

Butler; and (2) Caston's admission and stipulation, coupled with

its factual basis, was sufficient to prove that R.B. was a

neglected child.  Butler's counsel argued that the evidence was not

sufficient to prove his client "guilty" of child neglect.  During her argument on Butler's behalf, his counsel twice referred to the

evidence being insufficient "to find him guilty." 

	D. The Trial Court's Decision

		The trial court initially responded to Butler's counsel

by explaining that in this proceeding, "it is not a question of

guilt, this is not a criminal trial, this is a civil proceeding,

and the essence of the proceeding is whether or not [R.B.] is a

neglected minor."  The court further pointed out that the allega

tion of child neglect did not require proof that the domestic

violence was against R.B., nor did the allegation specify who

committed the domestic violence.  Thus, the court explained, the

State was not required to specify or prove who was responsible for

the domestic violence, as would be required in a criminal case, but

simply to establish whether or not the environment is one in which

domestic violence places R.B. at risk.  The court further explained

as follows: 

			"In this matter[,] the court previously

accepted [Caston's] stipulation that yes,

there was domestic violence in the environment

when [R.B.] was residing with her and/ or with

Gaston Butler.  As a factual basis for accept

ing [Caston's] stipulation, the court accepted

the stipulation to the police reports, and

also took judicial notice of sworn statements

entered in another proceeding."

		The trial court concluded its remarks by noting that it

could rely on Caston's admission and stipulation, which was sufficient for the State to sustain its burden of proof that R.B.

was a neglected minor by reason of being a minor under 18 years of

age whose environment is injurious when she resides with Caston

"and/or Butler" because she is exposed in that environment to the

risk of domestic violence.

		In May 2002, the trial court conducted a dispositional

hearing, formally adjudicated R.B. a ward of the court, and

appointed DCFS as her guardian.  The court also ordered her removed

from the custody of both Caston and Butler.  

		This appeal followed.

	II. ANALYSIS	

		Butler argues that the trial court (1) improperly

accepted Caston's stipulation as evidence against him; (2) violated

his fourteenth amendment and statutory rights to fundamentally fair

proceedings; and (3) made a decision that was contrary to the

manifest weight of the evidence because, absent Caston's stipula

tion, the record contained no evidence against him.  In support, he

cites (1) section 2-18(6)(b) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-18(6)(b)

(West 2000)), which prohibits a court from taking judicial notice

if doing so would result in admitting hearsay evidence at a hearing

where it would otherwise be prohibited; (2) People v. Long, 316 Ill. App. 3d 919, 928, 738 N.E.2d 216, 222 (2000), which holds that

police reports are generally inadmissible hearsay; and (3) section

1-5(1) of the Act, which provides that a respondent has a right to

be present at all judicial court proceedings and to cross-examine

any witnesses (705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2000)).  Although Butler

purports to raise three issues on appeal, in essence he raises just one:  the procedural inappropriateness of the adjudicatory hearing

the trial court conducted as to him.  That inappropriateness

allegedly occurred when the court considered Caston's stipulation

as evidence, thereby violating Butler's statutory and constitu

tional rights.

		In response, the State asserts the following:

			"The sole admission of a custodial par

ent, [(Caston)], as to the allegation of the

neglect petition was sufficient to sustain the

finding of neglect.  Therefore, whether the

court considered hearsay evidence at the

respondent father's adjudicatory hearing is

irrelevant; reversal is not required.  The

trial court's finding of neglect was based

upon the stipulation of facts entered into by

the minor's mother, a custodial parent.  Her

stipulation alone is sufficient to support the

finding of neglect by the court and its adju

dication of wardship.  Furthermore, the issue

at the adjudicatory hearing was whether [R.B.]

was neglected and not the fitness of her

parents to care for her.  705 ILCS 405/2-18(1)

(West 2000)."

We agree with the State.  

		To address Butler's argument, we must analyze the purpose

of the adjudicatory hearing and the issue it is intended to

resolve.

	A. The Purpose of the Adjudicatory Hearing

		Initially, we agree with the trial court that Butler's

argument--that the evidence was not sufficient "to prove him

guilty" of child neglect--does not apply to juvenile court

proceedings in which the issue is whether the respondent minor was

neglected.  Instead, Butler's argument would apply if he were

standing trial on a criminal charge that he had injured R.B.  In

that situation, the State would have to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt Butler's criminal culpability.  At the adjudicatory hearing

stage in the present case, his criminal culpability is no issue at

all.

		Section 1-2(1) of the Act declares that the Act's purpose

"is to secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance

*** as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and

physical welfare of the minor ***."  705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 2000). 

To achieve this purpose, the Act empowers juvenile courts to

intervene on behalf of a child when that child's condition warrants

intervention, not when the conduct or "guilt" of a parent or

guardian warrants it.  Accordingly, section 2-1 of the Act,

entitled "Jurisdictional facts," states that "[p]roceedings may be

instituted under the provisions of the [the Act] concerning boys

and girls who are abused, neglected[,] or dependent, as defined in

[s]ections[] 2-3 or 2-4 [of the Act]."  705 ILCS 405/2-1 (West

2000).  Section 2-1 contains no mention of conduct or "guilt" of a

parent or guardian.

		Thus, the purpose of juvenile court proceedings is to 

determine the status of the child on whose behalf the proceedings are brought, not to determine any particular person's criminal or civil liability.  Specifically, at an adjudicatory hearing

involving an allegation of neglect or abuse, the issue before the

trial court is whether the particular child is neglected or abused

as alleged in the State's petition and as defined in section 2-3 of

the Act.  705 ILCS 405/2-3 (West 2000).  

		Section 2-3 of the Act defines neglected children as

those who live under certain conditions, such as, in the present

case, a minor under 18 years of age "whose environment is injurious

to his or her welfare" (705 ILSCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2000)), or, in

another case, a minor "who is not receiving the proper or necessary

support" (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2000)).  These definitions

do not address the question of who may be responsible for such

adverse conditions because, in the first instance, that question

does not matter.  What matters initially is only whether the child

is neglected because these conditions exist.  After all, the Act's

mandate is to protect children, not to assign blame to parents.  If

the State proves the neglect allegation, then causation--and

remediation--can and should be addressed by the trial court at the

dispositional hearing.

		The reason that causation is irrelevant at the

adjudicatory hearing, where the trial court determines whether a

child is neglected, becomes clear when the following hypothetical

scenarios are considered.  First is the case in which the State has

alleged that a child was neglected because he was not receiving

proper medical care.  705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2000).  No court

would recognize as a defense to that charge the State's inability to prove precisely which parent or guardian should have been

providing the proper medical care but failed to do so.  Assuming

total uncertainty regarding where the blame may lie, the child

would be no less neglected if he, in fact, were not receiving

proper medical care.

		Consider another case in which the State alleged that a

three-year-old child was neglected because his environment was

injurious to his welfare in that he was found on multiple occasions

wandering about at night in a partially clothed condition.  The

child would be no less neglected if the State had difficulty

proving precisely which parent or guardian was at fault for

permitting the child to wander about in such a condition.  Not only

would the State not have to prove who was at fault, it would not be

a relevant inquiry.

		Last, consider the case in which the State alleges that

a 1- 1/2-year-old child is abused because she suffered physical

injury, by other than accidental means, which caused impairment of

her physical health.  The State's petition alleges the child

suffered multiple and deep bruises, as well as welts, over several

months, indicative of excessive corporal punishment.  Assume

further that because the State does not know who inflicted this

punishment, its abuse petition merely alleges that it was inflicted

"by a parent or immediate family member or any other person who is

in the same family or household as the child."  See 705 ILCS 405/2-

3(2) (West 2000).  Further, assume at the adjudicatory hearing that

the State is able to prove, through medical testimony, the

allegation that this 1- 1/2-year-old child suffered multiple and deep bruises and welts over several months but is not able to prove

who caused the child's injuries.  Each parent and the other members

of the household testify that they were not responsible for the

child's injuries.  Consistent with Butler's argument in this case,

the respondent parents in this hypothetical could argue to the

trial court at the adjudicatory hearing that they should not be

found "guilty" of child abuse.  Yet, on these facts, the State

would have proved to a moral certainty that this child was an

abused minor under section 2-3(2)(i) of the Act because (1) the

child suffered the injuries as alleged and (2) someone who is a parent, immediate family member, or other member of the child's

household is responsible for these injuries.  

		Surely, the legislature that drafted section 2-3 of the

Act--as well as the public--would be outraged and view as bizarre

a trial court's ruling at the conclusion of the adjudicatory

hearing in this hypothetical case that the child involved was not

an abused minor because the State had not proved who was responsi

ble for the abuse.  The fact that the State cannot prove causation

makes the child no less abused and no less needful of court

intervention to both protect her and assure that the abuse stop.  

	B. Application of Adjudicatory Hearing Analysis 

	to the Present Case

		At issue in this case was the State's claim that R.B. was

a neglected minor as defined in section 2-3(1)(b) of the Act

because her environment was injurious to her welfare.  705 ILCS

405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2000).  Under the foregoing analysis, Caston's

admission and stipulation properly addressed the only issue pending at the adjudicatory hearing stage of this juvenile court

proceeding--namely, the status of R.B.  The trial court appropri ately ruled that Caston's admission and stipulation, with its

accompanying factual basis, was admissible on this issue.  In so

ruling, the court did not admit Caston's admission and stipulation

as "evidence against Butler," as Butler contends.  Instead, the

court ruled that the admission and stipulation of Caston, the

custodial parent, coupled with the underlying factual basis, was

sufficient to prove R.B.'s status--namely, that R.B. was a

neglected minor as the State alleged--given the absence of any

persuasive evidence to the contrary.  The court properly considered

the factual basis in determining the weight to be given to Caston's

admission and stipulation.  

		A custodial parent's admission and stipulation, by itself, may be sufficient to support a finding of abuse or neglect.  However, a trial court must consider the factual basis therefor

because a situation could arise in which neither the custodial

parent nor any other credible person has personal knowledge of the

circumstances alleged in the State's petition, thereby rendering

that parent's admission and stipulation less persuasive than the

admission and stipulation of Caston, who was present and an active

participant in the incident alleged in the State's petition.

		Although it is true that Butler possessed various

procedural rights, such as the right to be present during the

proceedings, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses,

these procedural rights did not change the nature of the proceed

ings from one concerned about the status of R.B. to one in which Butler was an accused party and the State bore the burden of

proving him responsible for R.B.'s neglect.  

		We also note that Butler never offered any evidence

challenging the information regarding the domestic violence that

was before the court through Caston's admission and stipulation and

was the basis of the State's neglect petition.  Butler was given

the opportunity to attack the reliability of Caston's admission and

stipulation and its factual basis by either testifying himself or

calling Caston or the police officers to testify, but he failed to

do so.  And, if Butler had requested, the trial court might have

permitted him to cross-examine all of these witnesses anew as if

the State had called them as its witnesses.  Butler's position

appears to be that he was deprived of his procedural right to

cross-examine the police officers (who were present in court when

Caston made her admission and stipulation), but he provides no

suggestion as to how that cross-examination might have impeached

the officers' reports about the serious domestic violence that

occurred in the presence of R.B. and J.A. in their home on the date

in question.  

		Assuming arguendo that such cross-examination might have demonstrated that (1) Butler's behavior was not as bad as it

appeared in the officers' reports and (2) Caston seriously provoked

him in some way so as to mitigate (at least in Butler's eyes) his

violent acts, neither of those points would be relevant to the

question before the court:  whether R.B. was a neglected minor for

the reasons set forth in the State's petition.  Accordingly, we

conclude that the trial court's error, if any, in proceeding as it did and not again requiring the police officers to appear to be

cross-examined by Butler, was a mere procedural error that did not

prejudice Butler because no change in the ultimate outcome would

have occurred. 

		The trial court found that the State had proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that R.B. was a neglected minor.  We

conclude that its decision was not contrary to the manifest weight

of the evidence.  See In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 204, 688 N.E.2d 642, 652 (1997) ("The circuit court's finding on whether abuse or

neglect occurred will not be disturbed on appeal unless contrary to

the manifest weight of the evidence"). 

		Our holding in this case is hardly unique.  In In re Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1014, 429 N.E.2d 1364, 1372 (1981), the court wrote the following:  "The sole admission of the

custodial parent as to the allegations of the neglect petition may

be sufficient to sustain a finding of neglect by the trial court." 

In Johnson, the court concluded that the trial court's error at the adjudicatory hearing--of appointing for the respondent father an

attorney who had a conflict of interest--did not require reversal

of the trial court's adjudication that the child was a neglected

minor.  The court held that the respondent mother had stipulated to

the charge of neglect and "[h]er stipulation alone is sufficient to

support the finding of neglect by the court and its adjudication of

wardship."  Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 1014, 429 N.E.2d at 1372.

		More recently, in In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242-43, 760 N.E.2d 85, 99 (2001), the First District addressed the

situation in which one of the respondent parents in a case in which three children were alleged to be abused (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2) (West

2000)) argued on appeal that the trial court erred by accepting her

admission and stipulation to the State's abuse allegations.  The

appellate court rejected that argument on various grounds, one of

which was to note that the respondent father entered into the same

stipulation of facts, and his "stipulation alone would have

provided a sufficient factual basis for the trial court to make its

findings of abuse."  April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 242, 760 N.E.2d at 99.  In so concluding, the court cited Johnson for the proposi tion that a respondent parent's stipulation of facts can provide a

sufficient basis by itself for a trial court's finding of neglect. 

April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 242-43, 760 N.E.2d at 99.  

	III. CONCLUSION	

		For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's

judgment.

		Affirmed.

		KNECHT and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.