COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Overton and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

GREGORY A. MORRIS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2995-97-4 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF 

 JANUARY 12, 1999 

VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY 

Carleton Penn, Judge Designate 

 James E. Swiger (Swiger & Cay, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Louis E. Matthews, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; 

Michael K. Jackson, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Gregory A. Morris appeals a decision of the Circuit Court of 

Fauquier County ("circuit court") affirming a decision of the 

Virginia Retirement System ("VRS"). Morris contends the trial 

court erred in upholding VRS's determination that Code 

§ 51.1-157(C) is unambiguous and required VRS to reduce Morris's 

monthly VRS benefits by the amount of permanent partial 

disability ("PPD") benefits awarded to him by the Virginia 

Workers' Compensation Commission ("commission") pursuant to Code 

§ 65.2-503. Finding that the trial court erred in construing 

Code § 51.1-157(C), we reverse. 

 I. 

 In July 1993, while employed as a Virginia State Trooper, 

Morris sustained serious and permanent injuries caused by the 

discharge of a firearm during a training drill. Beginning in 
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July 1993, Morris received temporary total disability ("TTD") 

benefits pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act") in 

the amount of $451 per week. 

 After the commission awarded Morris workers' compensation 

benefits, he applied for state retirement benefits from VRS. VRS 

approved his application. Morris's full VRS benefit, before 

adjustment for workers' compensation payments, was $2,238 per 

month. VRS offset this amount, pursuant to Code § 51.1-157(C), 

by the $451 in TTD benefits received by Morris each week, a 

$1,954 per month reduction. As a result, Morris received $284 

per month from VRS ($2,238 minus $1,954). 

 On February 12, 1996, the commission awarded Morris PPD 

benefits pursuant to Code § 65.2-503, effective September 1, 

1995, in the amount of $451 per week for 276.5 weeks. These 

benefits were payable for sixty-eight percent loss of use of 

Morris's left leg and for ninety percent loss of use of his right 

leg. It is undisputed that these benefits were awarded for the 

permanent loss of use of the lower extremities and not for wage 

loss due to inability to return to work. 

 Contemporaneous with the PPD award, Morris also established 

an actual wage loss, an inability to return to his pre-injury 

work, entitling him to a weekly award of temporary partial 

disability ("TPD") benefits of $156.55 pursuant to Code 

§ 65.2-502. The combined TPD benefits and PPD benefits payable 

to Morris totalled $607.55 per week, for a total payment of 
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$2,633 per month. 

 Morris notified VRS by letter that the commission had 

reduced his lost wage benefits from $451 per week to $156.55 per 

week. As a result of reviewing the workers' compensation award, 

VRS notified Morris that it intended to reduce his VRS benefits 

to reflect what it contended to be an increase in the workers' 

compensation benefits he had been awarded. VRS combined the TPD 

benefits with the PPD benefits and offset those benefits against 

Morris's VRS benefits. The total workers' compensation benefits 

of $2,633 per month exceeded the VRS monthly benefit of $2,238. 

VRS notified Morris of its long-standing position that, pursuant 

to Code § 51.1-157(C), it was required to offset his VRS benefits 

by any workers' compensation payments he received. 

 On January 9, 1997, VRS requested an informal fact-finding 

hearing to determine if it should reinstate Morris's VRS 

payments, which had been eliminated as a result of the change in 

his workers' compensation award. On February 6, 1997, Morris 

waived his right to an evidentiary hearing because no facts were 

in dispute. On February 12, 1997, the appointed VRS fact finder 

ruled that the VRS benefits had to be offset by the TPD and PPD 

benefits received by Morris because Code § 51.1-157(C) requires 

that any payments under the Act must offset the VRS allowance. 

 In a February 25, 1997 letter, the Director of VRS issued 

the final agency decision that denied Morris's request that his 

VRS benefits not be offset by the amount payable to him under the 
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Act for the permanent loss of use of his lower extremities. 

Morris conceded that VRS was entitled to offset his VRS benefits 

with the amount he received as TPD benefits, but not with the 

amount he received as PPD benefits. 

 Morris filed a timely appeal to the circuit court. By 

opinion letter dated October 29, 1997, the circuit court denied 

the relief sought by Morris. The circuit court held that Code 

§ 51.1-157(C) is not ambiguous and that VRS did not err in ruling 

that Morris's VRS benefits should be reduced by the PPD benefits 

received by him pursuant to Code § 65.2-503. The circuit court 

entered its final order on November 18, 1997. This appeal 

followed. 

 II. 

 In the proceedings before VRS and the circuit court, the 

facts were stipulated. Therefore, the issue presented by this 

appeal is one of law, viz the interpretation of the applicable 

statutes. In Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 251 Va. 

398, 468 S.E.2d 905 (1996), the Supreme Court held as follows: 

 The sole issue involves a question of 

statutory interpretation. The issue does not 

involve "the substantiality of the evidential 

support for findings of fact," which requires 

great deference because of the specialized 

competence of the agency. Instead, when, as 

here, the question involves a statutory 

interpretation issue, "little deference is 

required to be accorded the agency decision" 

because the issue falls outside the agency's 

specialized competence. In sum, pure 

statutory interpretation is the prerogative 

of the judiciary. 

Id. at 404, 468 S.E.2d at 908 (citations omitted). 
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 Appellant contends that Code § 51.1-157(C) is ambiguous as 

applied to the facts of this case. We agree. That statute 

provides in its pertinent part as follows: 

 Any allowance payable to a member who 

retires for disability from a cause 

compensable under the Virginia Workers' 

Compensation Act shall be reduced by the 

amount of any payments under the provisions 

of the Act in effect on the date of 

retirement of the member and the excess of 

the allowance shall be paid to the member. 

When the time for compensation payments under 

the Act has elapsed, the member shall receive 

the full amount of the allowance payable 

during his lifetime and continued disability. 

 If the member's payments under the . . . Act 

are adjusted or terminated for refusal to 

work or to comply with the requirements of 

§ 65.2-603, his allowance shall be computed 

as if he were receiving the compensation to 

which he would otherwise be entitled. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 Taken literally, the language "any payments" under the Act 

would include payments for medical expenses and vocational 

rehabilitative services pursuant to Code § 65.2-603; payments of 

the twenty percent penalty for the late payments of compensation 

under Code § 65.2-524; payments for costs and attorney's fees 

under certain circumstances pursuant to Code § 65.2-713; and 

payments for cost of living supplements pursuant to Code 

§ 65.2-709. However, the record shows that none of these 

"payments" are considered by VRS in adjusting a beneficiary's 

entitlement. 

 VRS argues that "any payments" as used in the statute means 
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only those payments made directly to a claimant. Such argument 

might serve as the basis for not adjusting retirement benefits 

for medical expenses paid to health care providers but does not 

explain VRS's treatment of the twenty percent penalty assessed on 

benefits due to untimely payments (Code § 65.2-524) or for costs. 

 These benefits are payable directly to the claimant. 

 In Lee-Warren v. School Board of Cumberland County, 241 Va. 

442, 403 S.E.2d 691 (1991), the Supreme Court held that 

"[l]anguage is ambiguous when it may be understood in more than 

one way . . . . If the language is difficult to comprehend, is 

of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness, an 

ambiguity exists." Id. at 445, 403 S.E.2d at 692. 

 We hold that the term "any payments under the provisions of 

the Act" is ambiguous, at least as it relates to the treatment of 

PPD benefits. 

 III. 

 It is well settled that in construing the intent of Code 

§ 51.1-157(C), we must read the statute in pari materia with 

other statutes relating to the same subject matter. We determine 

the legislature's intention from the whole of the enactments. 

See Alger v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 252, 256, 450 S.E.2d 765, 

767 (1994). Code § 51.1-158 deals with the same subject matter 

as Code § 51.1-157 and provides as follows: 

 The retirement allowance (i) of any 

member retiring for disability from a cause 

compensable under the Virginia Workers' 

Compensation Act (§ 65.2-100 et seq.) or (ii) 

of any surviving spouse, minor child, or 
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parent, eligible to receive a benefit as a 

result of the death of a member from a cause 

compensable under the Virginia Workers' 

Compensation Act, who elects to receive a 

lump-sum settlement in lieu of periodic 

payments for disability or death compensable 

under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act 

shall be adjusted by an amount determined by 

dividing the workers' compensation benefit 

which such person would have received had the 

lump-sum settlement not been consummated, 

into the settlement actually accepted by the 

member, surviving spouse, child, or parent. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 Morris contends that if VRS is correct in its argument that 

the words "any payments" contained in Code § 51.1-157(C) include 

benefits for permanent loss of use of his legs, then he would be 

able to avoid the reduction of his VRS benefits simply by 

accepting a lump-sum settlement rather than the usual periodic 

payments over a fixed number of weeks. He argues that the 

payments for permanent loss of use of his legs are not payments 

for "disability or death." He contends this result could not 

have been intended by the legislature. We agree. Had the 

legislature intended that the phrases "any payments" in Code 

§ 51.1-157(C) and "periodic payments for disability or death" in 

Code § 51.1-158 meant the same thing, they would have used the 

same terms. See Campbell v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 33, 38, 

409 S.E.2d 21, 24 (1991). 

 IV. 

 Lastly, we turn to VRS's position that the obvious purpose 

of the two statutes is to prevent "double-dipping" or receiving 
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payment from two state agencies for the same loss. We agree that 

such is the purpose of the statutes but disagree that the 

payments for loss of use of the legs and the retirement benefits 

from VRS are for the same loss. 

 Retirement benefits are designed to replace, at least 

partially, wages lost by virtue of retirement. They have no 

relation to injury or ability to work. Most retirees drawing 

such benefits do so without injury or disability. 

 Benefits paid pursuant to Code § 65.2-503 of the Act for the 

loss of use of a body member are not payments for lost wages but 

for loss of what might be termed "human capital." These benefits 

are in no way contingent upon or related to a worker's capacity 

to work or income earned after return to work. In that regard, 

they are unique. 

 Double-dipping would occur if Morris were able to draw wage 

loss benefits (either total or partial) under Code §§ 65.2-500 

and 65.2-501 of the Act and at the same time draw unadjusted VRS 

retirement benefits. Morris makes no such claim. His contention 

is based on benefits paid under Code § 65.2-503 for loss of use 

of a body member. 

 Benefits payable under Code § 65.2-503 are unique in other 

respects. If Morris were to die from a cause not related to his 

July 19, 1993 gunshot wounds, his beneficiaries would be entitled 

to continued payments under Code § 65.2-503 until the full amount 

of the loss of use benefits was paid to his statutory dependents. 
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 We also note that the last sentence of Code § 51.1-157(C) 

states: "If the member's payments under the Virginia Workers' 

Compensation Act are adjusted or terminated for refusal to work 

or to comply with the requirements of § 65.2-603, his allowance 

shall be computed as if he were receiving the compensation to 

which he would otherwise be entitled." However, permanent loss 

of use benefits payable under Code § 65.2-503 cannot be adjusted 

or terminated for a refusal to work. This is a common-sensical 

result, inasmuch as a refusal to work does not affect the degree 

of permanent loss of use so as to prejudice the employer. 

Additionally, Code § 65.2-510 expressly states that if an 

employee refuses to accept employment procured for him or her, he 

or she shall only be entitled to the benefits provided in Code 

§ 65.2-503, permanent loss of use, and for benefits under Code 

§ 65.2-603, medical benefits, excluding coverage for vocational 

rehabilitation. 

 Accordingly, we hold that Code § 51.1-157(C) is ambiguous 

and that construing such section with Code § 51.1-158 utilizing 

the doctrine of in pari materia, the legislature intended that 

retirement benefits would be reduced by wage loss or death 

benefits paid to or on behalf of a claimant but would not be 

reduced for permanent loss of use benefits paid pursuant to Code 

§ 65.2-503. 

 The judgment appealed from is reversed, and VRS is directed 

to make payments to appellant in accordance herewith. 
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 Reversed.