The Honorable Amy J. St. Eve, District Judge for the United 1

States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, sitting by

designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-2046

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

AARON MICHAEL LINZY, SR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 08-CR-40009—Michael M. Mihm, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 2010—DECIDED APRIL 27, 2010

Before FLAUM and WOOD, Circuit Judges, and ST. EVE,

District Judge.

1

ST. EVE, District Judge. On January 29, 2008, a federal

grand jury indicted Defendant Aaron Michael Linzy, Sr.

and his co-defendant Jarvell Jones with one count of
2 No. 09-2046

In his appellate brief, Linzy also challenged the district 2

court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. At oral

argument, defense counsel conceded that the district court’s

decision under the circumstances was proper under Illinois

v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d

842 (2005).

conspiracy to distribute various controlled substances,

namely, crack cocaine, methylenedioxy-methamphetamine

(ecstasy), and marijuana (Count I), and one count of

unlawful possession with intent to distribute crack

cocaine, ecstasy, and marijuana (Count II). See 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A, C, D), 846. On October 15, 2008,

a jury convicted Linzy on both counts of the Indictment,

and on April 17, 2009, the district court sentenced Linzy

to a term of life imprisonment on both counts, to run

concurrently, ten years’ supervised release, and a $200

special assessment. On appeal, Linzy challenges his

conviction arguing that the district court abused its

discretion in restricting defense counsel’s cross-examination of his co-defendant Jones. We affirm the 2

district court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In early 2007, Linzy and two other men, Deshawn

Hemphill and Marquis Gentry, lived in an apartment in

Charles City, Iowa from which they sold crack, ecstasy,

and marijuana. In April 2007, Jarvell Jones, who was

living in Elgin, Illinois, contacted Hemphill and said he

needed to get out of the Chicago area because there was
No. 09-2046 3

a warrant for his arrest on first-degree murder charges.

At Hemphill’s suggestion, Jones joined Hemphill, Gentry,

and Linzy in the Charles City apartment and soon

started selling drugs with them. Jones’ girlfriend,

Jasmine Spates, also moved into the Charles City apartment later that year.

Linzy, Hemphill, Gentry, and Jones worked in shifts

selling drugs. Together, the four men sold about 63 grams

or 1/16 of a kilogram of crack a week. When their crack

supply was running low, Hemphill contacted his crack

supplier, a man named “Kane,” who lived in Maywood,

Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, to obtain another “63”.

Because Linzy was the only one in the group with a

driver’s license, he often traveled to Maywood to pick up

the crack.

In early November 2007, Jones went to Chicago for a

friend’s birthday. While he was there, Jones purchased

ecstasy and marijuana to take back to Iowa. On November 6, 2007, Hemphill called Jones in Chicago informing

him that Linzy was coming to Chicago to “cop some” and

that Jones could ride back to Iowa with Linzy. Around

10:30 p.m. on November 6, 2007, Linzy, accompanied

by Jones’ girlfriend Spates, arrived in Chicago and

picked up Jones at the house where he was staying. They

then drove to Kane’s house in Maywood. Upon arrival,

Linzy and Jones went into the house where Linzy

paid Kane approximately $1,200 and received a quantity

of crack from him. After going to Kane’s house, Linzy,

Jones, and Spates made another stop in Chicago

where Jones picked up a red suitcase that contained his
4 No. 09-2046

clothes, along with the ecstasy and marijuana that Jones

previously had purchased. Thereafter, Linzy put the

crack in Jones’ red suitcase, which was in the trunk of

Linzy’s silver Cadillac. Linzy, Jones, and Spates then

began to drive back to Iowa.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 7, 2007, while driving

westbound on Interstate 80 in Rock Island County, Illinois,

State Trooper Jared Steen observed a silver Cadillac

with Iowa license plates improperly crossing over a

lane line in violation of Illinois law. Trooper Steen

followed the Cadillac because he was concerned the

driver might be under the influence of alcohol. He also

activated his in-vehicle video camera and used his onboard computer to run the silver Cadillac’s registration

information. From his computer inquiry, Trooper Steen

learned that the Cadillac was registered to Linzy, who

lived in Charles City, Iowa. Trooper Steen also learned

that Linzy had a valid Iowa driver’s license, but that

his driving privileges in Illinois had been suspended.

As Trooper Steen continued to follow the silver

Cadillac, he saw it improperly cross over the line separating the driving lane from the passing lane for a

second time. At that point, Trooper Steen turned on his

emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. After the

Cadillac pulled over, Trooper Steen approached the

driver who identified himself as Linzy. Trooper Steen

then saw that the Cadillac had two passengers, a woman

in the front and a man in the back. Thereafter,

Trooper Steen asked Linzy for his driver’s license and

registration. Linzy provided Trooper Steen with the
No. 09-2046 5

requested documents and answered Trooper Steen’s

questions “in an almost frantic manner.”

After he obtained Linzy’s driver’s license and registration, Trooper Steen returned to his squad car, radioed

his headquarters, and confirmed that Linzy’s Illinois

driving privileges had been suspended. Trooper Steen

went back to the Cadillac, arrested Linzy for driving on

a suspended license, and placed him in the back of the

squad car. Trooper Steen asked Linzy if either of his

passengers had a driver’s license. Linzy answered

that they did not and then Trooper Steen spoke to the

passengers. The woman identified herself as Jasmine

Spates. The man, who was later determined to be Jarvell

Jones, identified himself as “Deeric Mosley.” Neither

Spates nor “Mosley” had a driver’s license. Because

neither passenger could drive Linzy’s car, Trooper

Steen called another trooper for assistance to transport

the passengers from the roadside. Trooper Steen also

called for a tow truck.

Approximately fifteen minutes later, Trooper Dan

Erickson, who was a K-9 handler, arrived at the scene

to assist with transporting the passengers. Troopers

Steen and Erickson decided to have Erickson’s dog,

who was certified to detect the odor of drugs, conduct

a “free air sniff” of Linzy’s car. At the car’s trunk, the

dog alerted to the presence of drugs. Trooper Steen

then searched the trunk and found the red suitcase containing crack, ecstasy, and marijuana.

On June 11, 2008, Jones pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge in Count I of the Indictment pursuant to
6 No. 09-2046

a plea agreement. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), the government agreed to cap

Jones’ sentence at the mandatory minimum sentence of

20 years. In return, Jones agreed to cooperate fully with

the government, including to testify at Linzy’s trial.

Before trial, Linzy moved in limine to impeach Jones

with his use of the alias “Deeric Mosley” and with the

fact that he had an active arrest warrant and a pending

first-degree murder charge in Cook County, Illinois. The

district court ruled that Linzy could question Jones about

the alias, but could only refer to the pending murder

charge as a “very serious felony charge.”

At Linzy’s jury trial, Jones testified that he had pleaded

guilty to participating in a federal drug conspiracy and

that pursuant to his plea agreement, he agreed to

cooperate with the government. Jones further testified

that he called Hemphill in Iowa in April 2007 because

he had an active arrest warrant and was trying to get

out of Chicago. Jones admitted that he sold drugs in

Charles City, Iowa starting in April 2007 and that he

sold drugs with Linzy. In addition, Jones testified that

Kane, who lived in the Chicago suburb of Maywood,

supplied their crack. He further stated that his source

for ecstasy was in Chicago.

Moreover, on direct examination, Jones conceded that

he smoked marijuana every day and used ecstasy and

drank alcohol on the weekends or special occasions. He

further admitted to using PCP (phencylidine) during

the November 2007 weekend in Chicago before he was

arrested. Jones stated that his drug use did not affect
No. 09-2046 7

his ability to testify. He also testified that he had a prior

felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance. In addition, Jones explained the details leading

up to his and Linzy’s arrest, admitting that he gave

Illinois State Trooper Steen the false name, Deeric

Mosley. He also testified that he had an outstanding

warrant for a “serious felony offense back in Chicago”

and that this was a separate case from the federal drug

case. Jones was not promised and did not expect any

benefit as part of his cooperation deal with the government in connection with this “serious felony offense.”

On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned

Jones about his 2002 felony offense of a controlled substance in Cook County, to which he pleaded guilty and was

sentenced to probation. Counsel specifically questioned

Jones about using and selling drugs while he was on

probation to which Jones admitted. Defense counsel also

questioned Jones about his guilty plea to the conspiracy

charge, including the sentencing cap at the mandatory

minimum of 20 years. In addition, defense counsel impeached Jones about his drug and alcohol use because

he told the United States Probation Officer that he had

used different amounts of drugs than what he testified

to on direct examination. Furthermore, when defense

counsel asked Jones why he did not turn himself in

when there was a warrant out for his arrest on a very

serious felony charge, Jones replied that he did not want

to go to jail. Counsel also questioned Jones about his

alias, and Jones explained that Deeric Mosley was his

cousin. Jones conceded that he gave Trooper Steen a

false name and date of birth because he wanted to
8 No. 09-2046

avoid being arrested on the outstanding warrant. Jones

further admitted that when he first decided to cooperate

with federal law enforcement officers, he gave the alias

Deeric Mosley to the officers. Finally, Jones admitted

on cross-examination that he was a truthful person

“sometimes.”

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Linzy challenges the district court’s restriction of Jones’ testimony and cross-examination regarding his active arrest warrant for first-degree

murder charges in Cook County. Linzy specifically

argues that Jones was a material government witness

whose testimony was essential to the government’s

case, and thus the defense theory required that counsel

attack Jones’ credibility “with every weapon at hand.”

A criminal defendant’s right to confront witnesses is

a fundamental right essential to a fair trial as guaranteed

by the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S.Ct. 1431,

89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-04,

85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). Under the Sixth

Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, a district court

must allow effective cross-examination. See Davis v.

Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347

(1974) (“We have recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important

function of the constitutionality protected right of crossexamination.”). “[W]hen deciding whether limits on

cross-examination are permissible, we must first distin-
No. 09-2046 9

guish between the core values of the Confrontation

Clause and more peripheral concerns which remain

within the trial court’s ambit.” United States v. Reyes, 542

F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2008). “If the ‘core values’ of the

Confrontation Clause remain intact, we merely ensure

that the district court’s exercise of its wide discretion

in limiting cross-examination was not abusive.” Id.; see

also United States v. Recendiz, 557 F.3d 511, 530 (7th Cir.

2009) (“A judge has broad discretion to place reasonable

limits on cross-examination, based on concerns of, inter

alia, confusion of the issues and relevance.”). In determining whether the district court abused its discretion

by limiting cross-examination, we must examine whether

the jury had sufficient details about the witness to

assess the witness’ motives and biases. See Recendiz, 557

F.3d at 530-31. On the other hand, where the limit

imposed on cross-examination implicates the core values

of the Confrontation Clause, we review the limitation

de novo. See id. at 530; United States v. Khan, 508 F.3d

413, 418 (7th Cir. 2007).

In Recendiz, we explained that “[o]ne such core value

is the ability to expose a witness’s motivation for

testifying, his bias, or his possible incentives to lie,” but

“once a trial court permits a defendant to expose a witness’s motivation, ‘it is of peripheral concern to the

Sixth Amendment how much opportunity defense

counsel gets to hammer that point home to the jury.’ ” Id.

at 530 (citation omitted). We further explained that the

“right to confrontation is not implicated where ‘limitations on cross-examination did not deny the defendants

the opportunity to establish that the witnesses may
10 No. 09-2046

have had a motive to lie; rather, the limitations denied

them the opportunity to add extra detail to that motive.’ ”

Id. (emphasis in original, citation omitted). In other

words, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an

opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to

whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ ” Kentucky v.

Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d

631 (1987) (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106

S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis

in original)).

Here, defense counsel conceded that we would have

to extend Davis and its progeny to find the core values

of the Confrontation Clause at issue. We are not willing

to do so given the peripheral concerns implicated by

the limitation. Based on Jones’ trial testimony, Linzy’s

counsel was given ample opportunity to establish Jones’

motivation for lying and to attack Jones’ credibility. See

Davis, 415 U.S. at 317. In particular, defense counsel

questioned Jones about his 2002 felony offense for possession of a controlled substance in Cook County to

which he pleaded guilty. Defense counsel further questioned Jones about using and selling drugs, his guilty

plea in the present matter, his use of an alias, and the

warrant for his arrest concerning a “serious felony

offense back in Chicago.” The specific nature of the felony,

namely, first-degree murder, may have added “extra

detail” to Jones’ motive to lie, but its omission did not

deprive Linzy of his opportunity to effectively crossexamine Jones. See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739; Recendiz, 557

F.3d at 530. Defense counsel throughly cross-examined
No. 09-2046 11

Jones. Because the jury had abundant evidence to

appraise Jones’ motivation for testifying, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in limiting Jones’ cross-examination concerning the nature of his arrest warrant. See

Recendiz, 557 F.3d at 530-31. In sum, “there was no

shortage of cross-examination exposing [Jones’] motive

to lie.” United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir.

2006).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of

the district court.

4-27-10