HETA 91-0190-2491 NIOSH INVESTIGATORS:

FEBRUARY 1995 Gregory M. Kinnes, M.S., C.I.H.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION Scott Deitchman, M.D.

 OF FIRE FIGHTERS (IAFF)

JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY

 I. SUMMARY

On April 16, 1991, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

(NIOSH) received a request for a health hazard evaluation from the International

Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), on behalf of fire fighters from the Jersey City

Fire Department (JCFD), to assess the health and safety practices used during a

response to a fire at an illegal dumpsite on April 10-12, 1991, in Jersey City, New

Jersey. The IAFF reported that over 300 fire fighters and other response personnel

were involved in the incident and that approximately 90 had reported chemical

exposure injuries.

In response to this request, NIOSH investigators conducted a site visit to the JCFD on

April 22-24, 1991. Several meetings were held with representatives from several of

the responding agencies, and a tour of the fire scene was conducted. Incident reports,

air sampling results, medical records, and other pertinent reports from the responding

agencies were reviewed. A copy of the JCFD incident command system was also

obtained for review. In addition, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

collected and analyzed samples of fire fighter turnout gear to address decontamination

issues. The results of this analysis were provided to NIOSH for review. 

The fire suppression activities during this incident were hampered by high winds and

several directional wind shifts. During the incident, several fire fighters reportedly

did not wear their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or depleted their supply

of air cylinders. Air monitoring performed by the New Jersey Department of

Environmental Protection (NJDEP) during the incident indicated that methylene

chloride may have been present in the smoke plume at concentrations reaching 400

parts per million (ppm). Numerous fire fighters were treated on site by the

responding emergency medical services (EMS) for dizziness, mucosal irritation, and

elevated blood pressure. EMS personnel also noted abnormalities on the field cardiac

monitors among several fire fighters. According to the EMS records, 171 fire fighters

were transported to 8 area hospitals, and 3 were eventually admitted. However, the

JCFD report stated that 68 fire fighters received incident related injuries. 

Representatives from the responding agencies indicated that there were several

instances of coordination and communication difficulties. These difficulties led to

confusion concerning incident classification (debris fire or hazardous materials

incident) and command structure (single versus unified). Other problems that were

encountered included the exchange of information between responding agencies, the

use of SCBAs by the fire fighters, the delegation of authority to deputies in areas such

This Health Hazard Evaluation (HHE) report and any recommendations made herein are for the specific facility evaluated and may not be universally

applicable. Any recommendations made are not to be considered as final statements of NIOSH policy or of any agency or individual involved.

Additional HHE reports are available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/reports

This Health Hazard Evaluation (HHE) report and any recommendations made herein are for the specific facility evaluated and may not be universally

applicable. Any recommendations made are not to be considered as final statements of NIOSH policy or of any agency or individual involved.

Additional HHE reports are available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/reports

This Health Hazard Evaluation (HHE) report and any recommendations made herein are for the specific facility evaluated and may not be universally

applicable. Any recommendations made are not to be considered as final statements of NIOSH policy or of any agency or individual involved.

applicable. Any recommendations made are not to be considered as final statements of NIOSH policy or of any agency or individual involved.

Additional HHE reports are available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/reports
On the basis of the information obtained during this investigation, the NIOSH

investigators were unable to determine a definitive environmental cause to explain the

adverse health affects experienced by numerous fire fighters during this incident, even

though possible acute exposures to methylene chloride may have been a contributing

factor. However, several limitations regarding the application of incident command

and safety procedures were identified. Recommendations regarding these procedures

are presented in Section IX of this report.

as incident safety, and the establishment of a staging area. The EPA analyzed the fire

fighter turnout gear for the presence of metals, pesticides, herbicides, polychlorinated

biphenyls, dioxins, and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons. This analysis was

performed to address decontamination issues; however, the results were inconclusive.

KEYWORDS: SIC 9224 (Fire Protection), fire fighters, firefighters, methylene

chloride, dump fire, waste, incident command system, health effects,

electrocardiogram, self-contained breathing apparatus.
Page 3 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

II. INTRODUCTION

On April 16, 1991, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

(NIOSH) received a request for a health hazard evaluation from the International

Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), on behalf of fire fighters from the Jersey City

Fire Department (JCFD), to assess the health and safety practices used during a

response to a fire at an illegal dumpsite on April 10-12, 1991, in Jersey City, New

Jersey. The IAFF reported that over 300 fire fighters and other response personnel

were involved in the incident and that approximately 90 had reported chemical

exposure injuries. The IAFF requested that NIOSH review the response procedures,

characterize the potential exposures that may have occurred during this incident,

including post-incident decontamination, and review the medical monitoring provided

to all exposed fire fighters.

In response to this request, NIOSH investigators conducted a site visit to the JCFD on

April 22-24, 1991. On April 22, an opening conference was held to discuss the

incident and the nature of the request with representatives of the JCFD, the Jersey

City Mayor's office, the IAFF (Locals 1066 and 1064), the Jersey City Medical Center

(JCMC), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the State of New

Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP). During the remainder of

the site visit, individual meetings were held with representatives from several of the

responding agencies, and a tour of the fire scene was conducted. Incident reports, air

sampling results, medical records, and other pertinent reports from the responding

agencies were reviewed. A copy of the JCFD incident command system was also

obtained for review. In addition, the EPA collected and analyzed samples of fire

fighter turnout gear to address decontamination concerns. The results of this analysis

were provided to NIOSH for review. The EPA analyzed the fire fighter turnout gear

for the presence of metals, pesticides, herbicides, polychlorinated biphenyls, dioxins,

and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons. Samples were collected from: (a) one set of

turnout gear used by a fire fighter during this incident, and (b) a set of turnout gear

that was not used during this incident.

This report summarizes work practices as they affected the health and safety of the

fire fighters, including the incident command system, safety management, and the

arrangements for medical services; discusses decontamination; and provides

recommendations.
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III. BACKGROUND

On April 10, 1991, the JCFD responded to a fire at the New Jersey Turnpike Dump

#5 located in Jersey City, Hudson County, New Jersey. The approximately 16-acre

site is comprised of three lots owned by the Municipality of Jersey City. The site

contained large amounts of industrial and demolition debris and reportedly included

illegally disposed waste. The debris included large quantities of tires and partially

buried drums containing unknown materials. The site was not listed on the EPA's

National Priorities List (NPL) but had been the subject of investigations by the EPA

and the NJDEP and numerous fire responses. A brief history of the site is included in

Appendix A.

At 1331 hours (military time), on April 10, 1991, the JCFD received a 911 telephone

call reporting a fire at the New Jersey Turnpike #5 dumpsite. The first fire fighters

arrived on the scene at 1335 hours. A second alarm was issued at 1350 hours, and

seven additional alarms were issued from 1417 to 1600 hours, including recalls of offduty fire fighters. The response to the alarms included 22 engine companies, 6 aerial

apparatus units, and 9 other vehicles. The majority of the fire fighters were from the

JCFD; however, fire fighters from the cities of Hoboken and New York were also

involved. In addition, several federal, state, county, and local response personnel

were involved with the incident. A list of the organizations that responded to the fire

are included in Table I. Fire fighting efforts were hampered by 25- to 30-mile-perhour (mph) winds with gusts up to 50 mph and several directional wind shifts. In

addition, a thick, black plume of smoke emitted by burning tires migrated across the

Hudson River and into Manhattan. Numerous fire fighters experienced some degree

of smoke inhalation and were either treated on-site or sent to a hospital. According to

the JCFD fire report, 150 personnel responded to the fire and 68 fire fighters received

incident-related injuries. The fire was brought under control at approximately

1600 hours on April 10, but continued to burn until the morning of April 11. All of

the responding JCFD companies had returned to their stations by 1218 hours on April

13.
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IV. METHODS 

The incident response and medical information was collected from several sources. 

This information was used to reconstruct events and procedures used during the

incident response, to characterize potential exposures encountered by the fire fighters,

and to review fire fighter symptoms associated with the incident. Reports of the

incident chronology and fire fighter health effects were provided by JCFD and JCMC

representatives during the opening conference on Monday, April 22. Additional

meetings or telephone interviews were also conducted with representatives from

several agencies or organizations regarding their activities during the incident. 

Medical interviews were conducted with representatives of the Jersey City Medical

Center emergency room, the Jersey City Emergency Medical Services (EMS),

attending physicians for the fire department, and community physicians who treated

fire fighters after the incident. When possible, these interviews included reviews of

medical records for the treated fire fighters.

To address decontamination issues, NIOSH investigators reviewed the results of

turnout gear sampling performed by the EPA. On April 30, 1991, EPA personnel

collected fabric samples from two sets of JCFD turnout gear. One set was used

during the dump fire; the other set was used during previous fires but not during the

dump fire. Two-inch by two-inch swatches were collected from the right knee, the

right cuff of the pants, and the tail of the jacket from each set of turnout gear. The

remainder of the gear used at the dump fire was then cleaned with a commercially

available cleaning solution and additional swatches from the knee and jacket tail were

collected. This was done to determine if regular decontamination procedures used

after the fire on the rest of the JCFD's gear had any effect on the level of suspected

contamination. All the samples were analyzed for metals, pesticides, herbicides,

polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and both dioxins and polynuclear aromatic

hydrocarbons (PAHs) using U.S. EPA methods 7471, 8150, 8080, and 8290,

respectively.

V. EVALUATION CRITERIA

Fire fighters work in varied and complex environments that increase their risk of onthe-job death and injury. Every day, fire fighters in the United States are injured in

the line of duty.1

 In 1993, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, fire fighters

incurred a relatively small number of fatalities (39), as compared to other dangerous

occupations, but their rate of fatal injury on the job, 16 fatalities per 100,000

employed, was three times the national rate and was highest among the protective

service occupations.2

 In addition, there were 101,500 fire fighters injured in the line
Page 6 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

of duty in 1993.1

 According to 1992 National Safety Council data, the occupational

injury and illness incidence rate for fire fighters was 8.2 cases per 100 full-time

employees, with 3.5 cases per 100 employees involving days away from work and

deaths.3

 Fire fighters face many health hazards, including: inhalation of a wide

variety of toxic combustion products; chemical exposures by direct skin and eye

contact; physical hazards, including heat, cold, noise and falling objects; and exposure

to carcinogenic chemicals or combustion products. In over 200 residential fires in

Boston, air monitoring (which focused on a small fraction of the possible combustion

products) found varying air concentrations of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide,

hydrogen cyanide, benzene, nitrogen dioxide, hydrogen chloride, and acrolein.4,5

Other toxic components of smoke can include ammonia, acrylonitrile, halogen acids,

sulphur dioxide, aldehydes, isocyanates, methylene chloride, particulates, and

hydrocarbons.6-8

Exposures to respiratory irritants such as acrolein, hydrogen chloride, and nitrogen

dioxide may lead to acute and chronic respiratory problems. Disability due to

pulmonary disease has long been recognized as a potential work-related hazard for

fire fighters.9 There is increasing concern about a fire fighter's exposures to

carcinogens released from the combustion of synthetic materials used in building

construction.9

 This concern has been compounded by mortality and morbidity studies

of fire fighters, which, although they have produced inconsistent evidence, have

raised the possibility of increased risks from cardiovascular disease, respiratory

disease, and cancers of the nervous, hematopoietic/lymphatic, respiratory, and

gastrointestinal systems, which may be attributable to exposures to the components of

smoke.10-25 Several recent studies have suggested an increased risk of: brain cancer

among Washington fire fighters; brain, prostrate, colon, and lung cancer among

Los Angeles fire fighters; and digestive tract cancers.19,21,23,26 Further studies are

needed to better define these risks.

Many toxic chemical compounds may be generated and released during fires, and

these can vary from fire to fire.9

 Many variables control the resulting byproducts of

combustion, the most important being the composition of the burning material.27,28

Other key factors include the temperature at which pyrolysis or combustion occurs,

the concentration of oxygen present, and the efficiency of combustion.27,28

At the New Jersey Turnpike Dump #5 fire, the burning materials consisted primarily

of tires, construction debris, and drums containing unknown materials. Transformer

scraps and soil soaked with PCB-contaminated oil were also present and burning. Air

sampling performed by the NJDEP during the incident indicated that methylene

chloride was present within the smoke plume. Other constituents were also detected,
Page 7 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

but these were not present at comparable concentrations. The possible health effects

associated with exposure to methylene chloride are discussed below. 

Methylene Chloride

Methylene chloride, also known as dichloromethane, is a halogenated solvent. In

industry, methylene chloride is used for degreasing, paint stripping, manufacturing

photographic film, textiles, and plastics, and to extract food additives.29 The odor of

methylene chloride can be detected at levels of 150 to 500 parts per million (ppm) in

air and becomes obvious by 800 ppm.30 Like other organic solvents, methylene

chloride can cause depression of the central nervous system. The central nervous

system symptoms of acute intoxication from methylene chloride become more severe

with exposure to increasing levels of the solvent; they can range from subtle

impairment of intellectual function or coordination revealed by tests of neurologic

function to obvious intoxication or death. In human research studies, volunteers

exposed to 250 ppm for up to 7.5 hours showed no effects, while those exposed to

300 to 800 ppm for at least 40 minutes showed altered responses to tests of neurologic

function. Subjects experienced light-headedness when inhaling 500 to 1000 ppm for

1 or 2 hours; more severe effects would result from higher exposures. Although

subjects reported neurologic symptoms after repeated exposures of 75 to 100 ppm,

these could not be confirmed by neurologic, psychologic, or cardiac tests.31 

In addition to its neurologic effects as a solvent, methylene chloride may affect the

heart. Some chlorinated solvents make the muscle of the heart become more sensitive

to adrenaline (epinephrine), sometimes resulting in an arrhythmia, and this has been

suggested as a possible effect of high exposures to methylene chloride as well.29 

When methylene chloride is absorbed into the body (primarily by inhalation), the

body's metabolic breakdown of methylene chloride creates carbon monoxide as a

byproduct. In the body, carbon monoxide binds to hemoglobin, the substance in the

red blood cell which normally transports oxygen and carbon dioxide, to form

carboxyhemoglobin (COHb). Thus, a person exposed to methylene chloride may have

an elevated level of COHb. The COHb can persist for hours after the person is

removed from exposure while accumulated methylene chloride is released from fat

and other tissues.31 The occupational health literature contains conflicting opinions

about the significance of COHb accumulation and cardiac sensitization resulting from

methylene chloride exposure.29 Some authors state that exposure to methylene

chloride at 600 ppm may result in COHb levels as high as 12%,32 a level which has

been associated with symptoms such as headache.33 Others feel that the risk of

adverse effects from COHb in this situation is likely to be a problem only for older
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workers or those with pre-existing coronary heart disease; these authors consider the

neurologic effects of methylene chloride to be the most likely acute adverse effects.31

The risk of cancer from exposure to methylene chloride has been examined in animal

studies. In a 1986 study, mice exposed for 2 years to 2000 or 4000 ppm of methylene

chloride showed increased incidence of tumors of the lung and liver. There were also

increased occurrences of benign tumors of the mammary glands in rats. It appears,

however, that the carcinogenicity of methylene chloride is related to the way the

chemical is metabolized (chemically changed) in the body, and that this process in

mice differs from that in man. For this reason, some researchers feel that it may not

be appropriate to predict human risks of cancer from methylene chloride based upon

studies of mice.31

The effects of long-term exposure to methylene chloride in humans have been

examined in epidemiologic studies of workers who were exposed for years in

industry. Some of these studies showed weak evidence that older workers had

increased risk of coronary heart disease, but methylene chloride was only one of

several solvents to which the workers were exposed. Other studies did not show any

increased risk of heart disease.29 Although most studies have not shown an excess of

cancer, one study showed more cases of pancreatic cancer than expected in a group of

workers exposed to an average of 26 ppm for 23 years during the manufacture of

photographic film. When the study was continued, no additional cases were found.31

Based on the animal and human studies, NIOSH concluded that there was enough

evidence to consider methylene chloride as a potential human carcinogen and to

recommend that exposures to methylene chloride be kept at the lowest

concentration.34 The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists

(ACGIH) has established a Threshold Limit Value (TLV) of 50 ppm, as an 8-hour

time-weighted average (TWA), for methylene chloride.35 The ACGIH has also listed

methylene chloride as a suspected human carcinogen.35 The Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA) has established a Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL)

of 500 ppm as an 8-hour TWA.36 OSHA has also established an acceptable ceiling

concentration of 1,000 ppm and a maximum peak concentration of 2,000 ppm.36

VI. INCIDENT FINDINGS

The fire was initially reported at 1331 hours on April 10, 1991, with second alarms

sounded at 1350 hours. The fire chief arrived on scene shortly after the second alarm

and surveyed the area. The fire consisted of burning tires and mounds of other debris

and was being spread by the gusting winds. A large, black plume of smoke evolved

from the fire. At that time, fire fighting activities were directed at protecting propane
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tanks located towards the east and the nearby manufacturing buildings. The initial

command posts were located on Jersey Avenue near the fire and then at the

intersection of Grand and Jersey Avenues. The command post was later moved to an

upwind location away from the smoke plume, located at the end of Aetna Street under

the turnpike bridge. Several additional alarms were sounded because the fire fighting

efforts were hampered by the high winds and shifts in wind direction, and an

evacuation of nearby residents was ordered.

Representatives from both the NJDEP and the EPA arrived on scene at approximately

1440 hours and began to coordinate their activities with the JCFD. Upon arrival, the

NJDEP recommended that the current command post be moved to an area upwind of

the smoke plume and that all fire fighters wear their self-contained breathing

apparatus (SCBAs). The JCFD had already ordered the use of SCBAs, but several

fire fighters were observed not using them. The NJDEP then began to coordinate air

monitoring activities with the EPA and the Hudson Regional Health Commission

(HRHC). As of 1600 hours, there were five NJDEP and three HRHC teams

performing air monitoring. The EPA technical assistance team (TAT) arrived on site

at approximately 1730 hours to assist with the air monitoring. The air monitoring

results indicated that methylene chloride was detected at concentrations as high as

400 ppm in the immediate vicinity of the fire. Additional air monitoring was

conducted to check for acid gases, carbon monoxide, hydrogen chloride, oxides of

nitrogen, and cyanides. Of these, only traces of acid gases and oxides of nitrogen

were detected. All these samples were collected using colorimetric indicator tubes,

which are not as accurate as other air sampling methods and subject to interferences. 

Air samples collected by the EPA-TAT on charcoal tubes and analyzed by gas

chromatography/mass spectrometry detected benzene and toluene at concentrations up

to 0.055 ppm. Trace concentrations of other hydrocarbons were also detected. 

Additional surface and air monitoring by the EPA from locations surrounding the fire

site did not indicate the presence of any dioxins, pesticides, herbicides, or PCBs. Air

samples collected by the City of New York Department of Environmental Protection

from locations in New York had no detectable PAHs, chlorinated hydrocarbons, or

aromatic hydrocarbons.

Emergency medical services were provided mainly by the JCMC, with the assistance

of other EMS units. The JCMC has been privately operated since 1989, and EMS

units are provided under a contract with Jersey City. An ambulance is routinely

dispatched by request from the JCFD to all active fires. Upon receipt of the initial

alarm at 1331 hours, an ambulance was dispatched to the scene of the incident and

arrived near the area of Aetna and Johnston streets. About the time of the second

alarm (1350 hours), the EMS supervisor, who had arrived at the site, requested

additional units and the disaster bus. A treatment center was established where the
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bus was positioned on Aetna Street. Due to wind shifts, this treatment center was

moved to a more upwind location closer to the command post. However, the disaster

bus could not be moved because it was blocked by fire hoses. Several fire fighters

experiencing symptoms still reported to the bus but were directed to the treatment

area by EMS personnel who remained at this location. A transport area was

established under the turnpike bridge between 1500 and 1530 hours. In addition, a

second treatment center was established at approximately 1900 hours to care for fire

fighters working the north side of the fire. This center was located near the

intersection of Grand, Colden, and Varick Streets. The EMS operations were

terminated at approximately 1500 hours on April 11.

Fire fighters reported symptoms of dizziness and mucosal irritation. According to

reports from both EMS personnel and hospital emergency room staff, many fire

fighters examined on site or in hospital emergency rooms were noted to be

hypertensive, with reported diastolic blood pressures up to 110 mm Hg. The EMS

representatives differentiated this observation from typical fire site presentations of

exhaustion, tachycardia (unusually rapid heart rates), and normal blood pressure. 

Some fire fighters had field cardiac monitoring using Lead II on Lifepack 10

defibrillator/monitors. The EMS representative noted some tracings showing T-wave

inversions and/or ST segment elevations. Whether this finding represented poor

tracing quality frequently encountered in field settings, or actual signs of cardiac

ischemia, is unclear. However, none of the fire fighters with these potentially

abnormal tracings complained of chest pain, a typical symptom of individuals with

cardiac ischemia.

The EMS staff also reported that many of the fire fighters who reported to their

station for treatment had apparently been exposed to smoke without wearing their

SCBAs. The evidence for this was the presence of soot and ash over a fire fighters'

entire face, rather than only along the outlines of a respirator facial seal.

According to the EMS records, 171 fire fighters were transported to 8 area hospitals. 

However, the JCFD report stated that 68 fire fighters received incident-related

injuries. The majority of these fire fighters (135, or 79%) were transported to Jersey

City Medical Center. Only 3 fire fighters were admitted to the hospital after

evaluation in the emergency room, and all had been released by the time of the

NIOSH site visit. Although COHb levels were determined on fire fighters with

symptoms suggestive of smoke inhalation (e.g., cough, headache), the impressions of

the two emergency room physicians on duty at the time were that the fire fighters

were not experiencing severe illness and responded well with oxygen therapy. 

Carboxyhemoglobin levels were higher in cigarette smokers and those fire fighters

reporting greater exposure to smoke at this fire; however, the highest COHb level
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observed was 6.2%, which is not typically associated with carbon monoxide

poisoning symptoms, such as headache and nausea, or known to cause abnormal

electrocardiogram findings. This elevated COHb level was observed in a fire fighter

who recovered after treatment with 100% oxygen on a rebreathing mask. Symptoms

from carbon monoxide poisoning in acute settings typically require COHb levels

greater than 15%, while ST segment and T-wave changes in electrocardiograms

require levels greater than 25% COHb.

The names of six fire fighters who were reportedly the most severely affected during

the fire were provided by union representatives. The NIOSH investigators contacted

and interviewed the area physicians who treated these six fire fighters after the

incident. As a result of these interviews, an additional fire fighter who sought postincident medical care was also identified. Acute chemical bronchitis or pneumonitis

were diagnosed in several fire fighters on the basis of pulmonary function tests and

other examinations. One physician reported that his patients had typically felt well on

the day of the fire, then developed symptoms over the next two to three days. The

observed changes in pulmonary function tests were typically reductions in forced vital

capacity, with the accompanying reading of restrictive or mixed restrictive and

obstructive airway patterns. Patients were treated with bronchodilating drugs or

steroids, and were either completely resolved or improving at the time of the

interview.

Of interest were reports of health symptoms in some of the emergency room health

care workers who had cared for the fire fighters. These workers complained of

headaches, and some also reported diarrhea. Some of the emergency room staff with

whom we spoke reported smelling a "chemical smell" on the fire fighters' clothing. 

These health care workers ascribed their symptoms, which persisted up to several

days after the incident, to exposure to chemicals which were present on the fire

fighters' clothing. The NIOSH investigators were told that symptoms had resolved in

most employees, although four were still reporting a gastrointestinal disturbance,

described as an urgent need to defecate immediately after meals, with poorly formed

stools. The affected employees were not available for interview on the day NIOSH

investigators visited the hospital.

The EPA collected swatches from two sets of fire fighter turnout gear and analyzed

them for the presence of metals, pesticides, herbicides, PCBs, dioxins, and PAHs. 

Swatches collected from the turnout gear used at the incident were termed "dirty",

while the swatches collected from the turnout gear used at other fires but not at this

incident were termed "clean." The garment used at the incident was also cleaned with

a commercially available cleaning solution, and additional swatches from the dirty
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knee and jacket tail were then analyzed to determine if effective decontamination was

feasible.

The amounts of analytes detected on several dirty swatches was greater than the

amounts detected on the clean swatches; however, the analysis also indicated that

several analytes were present at higher levels on the clean swatches. The analysis

detected the presence of 2,4-dichlorophenoxy acetic acid (2,4-D), 2,4,5-

trichlorophenoxy acetic acid (2,4,5-T), benzene hexachloride (b-BHC), 2,3,7,8-

tetrachloro dibenzo-p-dioxin (2,3,7,8-TCDD), and several metals, including

antimony, chromium, copper, lead, nickel, and zinc. Detectable amounts of PCBs and

PAHs were not found on any of the samples. The analysis of the samples that were

cleaned with a commercially available solution indicated that analyte concentrations

were generally lower on the cleaned gear than the dirty gear. This was most apparent

for the analysis of metals on the knee sample. However, the analyte concentrations on

some of the cleaned samples were greater than those observed on the dirty samples. 

Some of these concentration differences may be attributed to variations in analyte

concentrations between swatches because it was not possible to analyze the same

swatch twice to determine the pre- and post-cleaning analyte concentration.

The analysis performed by the EPA of the swatches collected from the two sets of fire

fighter turnout gear indicated some interesting results; however, the results could not

be used to formulate definitive conclusions concerning garment contamination. In

addition, the results can not be used to infer the occurrence of any potential exposures

from wearing the gear. However, the analysis of the cleaned swatches indicated that

it may be possible to effectively reduce the concentrations of some of the

contaminants. The results for this turnout gear analysis are provided in the EPA

report located in Appendix B.

VII. DISCUSSION

A. Organizational Issues

Representatives of the responding agencies indicated that there were several

instances of coordination and communication difficulties due to the lack of a

site-specific emergency response plan. These difficulties created problems and

confusion for the responding agencies. One problem encountered was whether

or not the incident should be considered a hazardous materials (hazmat)

situation. Initially, some of the responding agencies treated the incident as only

a tire/debris fire while others considered it a hazmat situation. From discussions

with JCMC officials, the EMS units did not know that the incident could be
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considered a hazmat situation until well into their response. Review of records

also indicated that the JCFD hazmat vehicle was never brought to the scene of

the incident. Once an incident has been declared a hazmat situation, only

individuals specifically trained in hazmat procedures would be involved in the

direct response where contact with the hazardous materials could occur. All

other personnel would only be involved in support of the hazmat activities. In

addition, the need for, and use of, decontamination procedures would also be

addressed in all hazmat operations.

Since there were several responding agencies, there was also confusion

concerning whether the command structure would be single or unified, a

concept which is discussed below. Other problems that were encountered

included the exchange of information between responding agencies, the use of

SCBAs by the fire fighters, the delegation of authority in areas such as incident

safety, and the establishment of a staging area. There were also concerns raised

regarding the medical monitoring and care provided to the exposed fire fighters. 

These problems can be addressed through the Incident Command System (ICS).

1. Management of the Fire Incident

Management of fire department day-to-day activities is usually vested in a

Fire Chief or other titled person who serves as the commander of the fire

suppression forces and their activities, including the safety of operating

fire fighters.37

To assist in the management (especially in the operation, coordination, and

effectiveness) of wide-scale fire suppression activities, a system was

developed for controlling personnel, facilities, equipment, and

communications. This system is known as the ICS.38 A further refinement

of the ICS by fire service organizations addressed all types of emergency

incidents and included performance criteria for the components of a

system that incorporated specific safety and health objectives. This has

been developed into a nationally recognized standard known as the

Incident Management System (IMS).39 The National Fire Protection

Association has documented the consequences of operating without such

an Incident Management System, resulting in numerous deaths and

injuries of fire fighters.39,40

The JCFD has established an ICS based on the IMS. Review of the JCFD

ICS training manual indicated that it addresses JCFD command

procedures but does not adequately address the issue of interagency

coordination or mutual aid command procedures. The IMS requires a plan
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to coordinate operations with other agencies that have jurisdiction at the

incident scene. This plan includes a standard procedure to designate one

incident commander or to establish unified command. The IMS states that

this is best accomplished by developing an integrated system in

cooperation with all of the agencies that would be expected to work

together at routine or large scale incidents. It is possible that other

agencies would not be willing to develop fully integrated incident

management systems with the JCFD. In these circumstances, the JCFD

should utilize its own capabilities to develop and implement an IMS that

meets the intent of this standard. The IMS also provides another approach

that may be employed where different agencies have specific jurisdiction

over different aspects of an incident. The "lead agency" concept dictates

that one agency would assume overall command of the incident, while

other agencies fulfill their jurisdictional responsibilities under coordination

of the lead agency's incident commander. If plans are not established in

advance, the authority for overall command of the incident could be in

doubt.

In addition, it was reported by a responding agency that briefings were not

regularly conducted at the incident and that, when conducted, their

representative was not allowed to attend. If true, this would indicate

incomplete implementation of the IMS, which dictates that the incident

commander shall determine the overall strategy for the incident and

communicate this strategy to all supervisory levels of the incident

management structure. The incident commander should ensure that any

change in strategy is communicated to all supervisory levels. This is

generally accomplished by conducting routine briefings with

representatives of all the responding agencies.

2. Safety Management and IMS

In establishing and utilizing IMS, the first priority must be life safety.38,41

The responsibility for this priority issue is that of the officer in command

of the emergency incident.40,41 The incident commander is responsible for

the overall safety of all members and all activities occurring at the scene. 

The Fire Chief, however, bears the ultimate responsibility for the safety

and health of all members of the Department.

The IMS encourages the delegation of authority, but not responsibility, for

the safety function at an incident to a fire fighter or other competent

person, who is specially trained and knowledgeable in safe emergency
Page 15 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

operations.38,42 The failure to delegate may cause conflict between the

positions of command and safety. IMS guidelines generally recommend

that the command officer, who is responsible for managing the incident on

the strategic level, establish and operate from a stationary command post

as soon as possible after arriving on the scene.41 In contrast, the delegated

safety officer must routinely observe operations at the scene of an incident. 

This means he must have full authority to move around the incident scene

(fire ground) to observe and control safety concerns.41 Based on the

investigation of this incident, the NIOSH investigators found that there

was some confusion as to who was in authority and free to assist the fire

fighters in recognizing, evaluating, or controlling fire ground hazards. As

outlined in the JCFD's ICS training manual, a safety officer would have

been able to ensure that all fire fighters were properly wearing their

SCBAs and that there was a sufficient number of filled, spare bottles on

the scene. During this incident, there were a sufficient number of spare air

cylinders available with the response of the air van; however, there was no

established mechanism to resupply air bottles to the fire fighters actively

involved in fire suppression operations.

3. Staging Area

The IMS dictates that fire departments should develop a standard system

to manage reserves of personnel and other resources at or near the scene of

the incident.41 The JCFD's ICS training manual addresses the

establishment of a staging area to aid incident operations; however, it was

reported that a formal staging area was never established. The apparent

lack of a staging area created confusion about how many off-duty fire

fighters actually responded to the recall alarms, where and when they were

assigned, and how long they were involved at the scene. There was also

confusion as to how many fire fighters were actually treated by the EMS

units or ultimately transported to a hospital for treatment. Reported

problems with the control of responding vehicular traffic could also be

attributed to the lack of a staging area. 
Page 16 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

4. Medical Services

Medical services should be provided and staffed by the most highly trained

emergency medical personnel on the scene. At a minimum, these should

be Emergency Medical Technician-A (Basic Life Support) personnel.41

Their responsibility is to evaluate vital signs and examine fire fighters,

provide an initial assessment, treat the personnel, and determine if they

should return to duty, be rehabilitated on the scene, or be transported to a

medical facility. Rehabilitation treatment should consist of additional

monitoring of vital signs, removing personal protective equipment,

allowing rest, providing oxygen therapy, and giving forced rehydration if

necessary.41 Additionally, these evaluations should be recorded on

standard forms along with the patient's identity and health complaints and

should be signed, timed, and dated.43

The EMS units that responded to the incident encountered some

difficulties in tracking the treatment of fire fighters. Attempts to tag and

monitor every fire fighter did not account for some fire fighters that sought

treatment but returned to fire suppression activities, as well as others that

were ultimately transported to a hospital for further treatment. In addition,

EMS personnel reported several difficulties in coordinating their efforts

with the incident command.

B. Exposures and Health Effects

The interpretation of exposure events, such as the fire at the Jersey City site, is

always difficult. Responders report signs and symptoms which span a broad

range in both type and severity. It is difficult to characterize the exposures

incurred by these responders because they generally occurred out-of-doors, so

that the exposure in any particular place varies with wind direction and

intensity. The chemicals in the smoke exposure may vary as the fire burns

different areas containing different substrates, and the products of combustion

also vary with the temperature of the fire. Environmental samples may not be

collected by the time the first responders arrive on the scene. Even when

samples are collected, it is seldom possible to collect them from every site

where responders are working and incurring exposures. In addition, most of the

environmental samples were collected using colorimetric indicator tube

methods, which have an accuracy of ±25% and are subject to interferences. The

presence of other constituents in the smoke, such as carbon monoxide,

petroleum hydrocarbons, and/or other halogenated hydrocarbons, may have

influenced the colorimetric tube sample results by further reducing their
Page 17 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

accuracy. The data collected do not represent every possible exposure that

could have been incurred. In addition, an individual responder's exposure to a

specific contaminant may have been significantly higher or lower than the

sampled levels at a particular time and place.

Nonetheless, even with all these uncertainties, the environmental sampling data

suggest that fire fighters in some locations may have been acutely exposed to

levels of methylene chloride which have been associated with reports of

neurologic symptoms. The highest reported level of methylene chloride was

350-400 ppm on the corner of Jersey Avenue and Grand Street at 6:16 p.m. It is

possible that some fire fighters may have been exposed to higher levels, but it is

not possible to determine either the highest peak level or the time-weighted

average exposure. It is therefore possible that neurologic symptoms may have

been associated with the direct effect of methylene chloride, although the

retrospective nature of this investigation makes it impossible to be certain. 

Some of the COHb seen in blood samples collected in the emergency rooms

may have resulted from methylene chloride exposure or from exposure to

carbon monoxide produced by combustion. However, given that the highest

measured level of COHb was only 6.2%, it is unlikely that the reported

symptoms were caused by carbon monoxide intoxication. 

The ECG findings described as "T-wave inversions or ST segment elevations"

are often considered to be signs suggesting that the heart is not receiving enough

oxygen, particularly when seen during exercise testing or during a heart attack. 

Usually that occurs because there is not enough oxygen-carrying blood reaching

the heart through the coronary arteries that supply blood to the heart muscle. 

The most common cause is that the coronary arteries have become narrowed due

to atherosclerosis. A patient with this condition may be comfortable at rest, but

vigorous activity will cause increased blood flow throughout the body, requiring

increased work by the heart to increase the rate of blood pumping. Under these

conditions the heart muscle needs more oxygen. If the need exceeds the supply,

the patient may feel chest pain, called angina. During exercise or an attack of

angina, ECG findings such as changes in the T-wave or ST segment may be

seen, but may revert to normal when patients cease the vigorous activity. Some

patients will have these abnormalities without chest pain. Still, the NIOSH

investigators share the puzzlement expressed by the EMS staff that none of the

fire fighters with observed ECG abnormalities reported chest pain. The

admitting physicians and the emergency room records also did not indicate

concern about heart problems. ECG changes are also seen in the normal heart

with vigorous exercise. This can include inversion of the T-wave in some wire
Page 18 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

combinations, and can be seen in well-trained athletes or others without heart

disease.44,45 In summary, the reports of abnormal cardiac monitor tracings from

fire fighters at the Jersey City fire are difficult to interpret due to single lead

placement and demanding field conditions. In the absence of chest pain or

remarkable cardiac findings in the emergency room, there is little reason to

suspect exposure-related effects to the heart.

The pulmonary effects described in the most severely affected fire fighters can

reasonably be attributed to smoke inhalation. The EMS reports that affected fire

fighters had soot on their faces in areas normally covered by SCBA facepieces

indicate that fire fighters were not always protected from smoke exposure. 

Although there is a case report in the literature of pulmonary effects following a

brief, high exposure to methylene chloride, this was described as pulmonary

edema, or fluid accumulation in the lungs, that resolved within 18 hours.31

The NIOSH investigators are unable to explain the reports that fire fighters

responding to this incident experienced higher blood pressures than those

typically observed by Jersey City emergency medical workers during previous

fires. The medical literature on methylene chloride exposure that was reviewed

does not specifically discuss the effects of methylene chloride exposure on

blood pressure. Methylene chloride is one of the halogenated solvents capable

of depressing central nervous system function. One of the effects associated

with solvent-induced central nervous system depression is dilation of the blood

vessels, resulting in falling blood pressure.30 But it seems unlikely that such a

marked effect on blood pressure would occur unless central nervous system

depression were so severe that other obvious changes in neurologic function

(altered coordination, changes in mental status, etc.) were present. In summary,

methylene chloride exposure would be expected to cause lowered, rather than

elevated, blood pressure; but, even so, the effect would not be expected in the

exposure situation at the Jersey City fire.

The NIOSH investigators are also unable to explain the symptoms experienced

by the health care workers who cared for fire fighters in the emergency room. 

One could hypothesize that acute exposure to some toxin emitted from the fire

fighters or their clothing could have caused acute symptoms such as headache in

exposed health care workers, though there was no exposure documentation by

which to identify a causative agent. It is even more difficult to explain the

persistent gastrointestinal complaints which were described to the investigators,

as these do not correspond to any descriptions of the effects of methylene

chloride, or to the other agents which were detected at markedly lower exposure

levels.
Page 19 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the information obtained during this investigation, the NIOSH

investigators were unable to determine a definitive environmental exposure to explain

many of the adverse health affects experienced by numerous fire fighters during this

incident, even though possible acute exposures to methylene chloride may have been

a contributing factor to some of them. However, several limitations regarding the

application of incident command and safety procedures were identified.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on the findings of this investigation, as

well as previous NIOSH investigations pertaining to fire fighting activities, and are

offered to help prevent fire fighter injuries.

1. The JCFD should review their current hazard communication program to ensure

that emergency response pre-planning has been conducted for all sites, where

such pre-planning is warranted, within their jurisdiction. These sites would

include all businesses and properties where there is a presence of hazardous

materials. The emergency response plans should be developed by each site's

responsible party and reviewed by the JCFD. In addition, the JCFD should

investigate the existence of emergency response plans for sites outside their

jurisdiction where there is a probability of receiving a request for mutual aid. 

These efforts should be coordinated with the fire departments of neighboring

communities which have mutual aid agreements with the JCFD.

2. The JCFD ICS should be reviewed and supplemented to take into account

complex fire scenes where there are multiple fire companies and equipment,

mutual aid responses, and/or multi-jurisdictional elements. This should include

a plan to coordinate operations with mutual aid responders and other agencies

that have jurisdiction at the incident scene and procedures for creating an

appropriate command structure (single, unified, or "lead agency" command). 

Standard operation procedures should be developed which define the roles and

responsibilities for members assigned to the command staff once the appropriate

command structure has been established. This should include procedures to

delegate a safety officer, create and manage the staging area, and coordinate

EMS activities.
Page 20 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

3. The positions of command and safety should be separated at complex fire scenes

where there are multiple fire companies and equipment, mutual responses,

multiple exposures from a fire ground covering a large area, and so forth. Such

separation will allow the Safety Officer to function in a manner consistent with

the duties recognized as appropriate and as established by departmental standard

operating procedures. The Safety Officer would be responsible for ensuring the

proper use of protective equipment, including SCBAs, by fire fighters involved

in all fire suppression activities.

4. Fire fighters operating at emergency incidents must always operate in teams of

two or more (buddy system). A buddy system allows two fire fighters to

observe each other for signs of medical emergencies and to provide assistance to

each other if needed. All fire fighter team members operating in hazardous

areas must be in communication with each other and with incident command

through visual, audible, physical, electronic, or other means in order to provide

assistance in case of emergency.

5. To aid in the overall management of the fire scene, and to assist the fire ground

commander and fire fighter teams in recognition and control, personal markings

to ensure positive identification of individuals, such as fluorescent and reflective

name tags, letters, or other markings should be affixed to protective coats,

helmets, or equipment.

6. Standard operating procedures should be established for the response of the air

van. These procedures should include active mechanisms to ensure that air

cylinders are supplied to fire fighters involved in all fire suppression activities,

including those in which the fire ground encompasses large areas.

7. Procedures concerning on-site rehabilitation of fire fighters should be included

in the department's standard operation procedures. These procedures should

include guidelines for initiating and enforcing rehabilitation efforts and

managing the resources and personnel within the rehabilitation sector. The

responsibility for initiating the appropriate rehabilitation efforts should belong

to the incident commander. These efforts should take into account the incident

size, level of physical exertion, and environmental conditions. The

rehabilitation sector should be located in an area outside the operational activity

area, where protective equipment and clothing can be safely removed and

resources appropriate to the incident can be employed.
Page 21 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

8. Although definitive conclusions could not be derived from the analysis of the

turnout gear, the results seemed to indicate that further investigation into

appropriate cleaning of fire fighter turnout gear, especially after incidents of this

type, may be warranted.
Page 22 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

X. REFERENCES

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Journal, November/December. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection

Association, pp. 57-66.

2. Toscano G, Windau J [1994]. The changing character of fatal work injuries. 

Monthly Labor Review, October. Washingtion, D.C.: Bureau of Labor

Statistics, pp. 19-20.

3. NSC [1993]. Accident Facts, 1993 Edition. Itasca, IL: National Safety

Council, pp. 51.

4. Treitman RD, Burgess WA, Gold A [1980]. Air contaminants encountered

by firefighters. Am Ind Hyg Assoc J, 41:796-802.

5. Gold A, Burgess WA, Clougherty EV [1978]. Exposure of firefighters to

toxic air contaminants. Am Ind Hyg Assoc J, 39:534-539.

6. Boettner EA, Ball G, Weiss B [1969]. Analysis of the volatile combustion

products of vinyl plastics. J Appl Polymer Sci, 13:377-395.

7. Montgomery RR, Reinhardt CF, Terrill JB [1975]. Combustion toxicology. 

J Fire Flammability Combustion Tox, 2:179-185.

8. Hartzell GE, Packham SC, Switzer WG [1983]. Toxic products from fires. 

Am Ind Hyg Assoc J, 44:248-255.

9. Committee on Fire Toxicology [1986]. Fire and smoke: understanding the

hazards. Washington: National Academy Press.

10. Mastromatteo E [1959]. Mortality in city firemen, II: a study of mortality in

firemen of a city fire department. AM A Arch Ind Health, 20:227-233.

11. Barnard RJ, Gardner GW, Diaco NV, et al. [1975]. Near-maximal ECG

stress testing and coronary artery disease risk factor analysis in Los Angeles

city firefighters. J Occup Med, 17:693-695.

12. Bates JT [1987]. Coronary artery disease deaths in the Toronto fire

department. J Occup Med, 29:132-135.
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13. Unger KM, Snow RM, Mestas J, et al. [1980]. Smoke inhalation in firemen. 

Thorax, 35:838-842.

14. Peabody H [1977]. Pulmonary function and the firefighters. J Combustion

Tox, 4:8-15.

15. Peters J, Theriault G, Fine L, et al. [1974]. Chronic effect of firefighting on

pulmonary function. N Engl J Med, 291:1320-1322.

16. Sparrow D, Bosse R, Rosner B, et al. [1982]. The effect of occupational

exposure on pulmonary function: a longitudinal evaluation of firefighters and

non-fighters. Am Rev Respir Dis, 125:319-322.

17. Douglas DB, Douglas RB, Oakes D, et al. [1985]. Pulmonary function of

London firemen. Br J Ind Med, 42:55-58.

18. Sidor R, Peters JM [1974]. Prevalence rates of chronic non-specific

respiratory disease in fire-fighters. Am Rev Respir Dis, 109:255-261.

19. NIOSH [1976]. Occupational mortality in Washington State 1950-71. 

Vol. III. Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare, Public Health Service, Center for Disease Control, National Institute

for Occupational Safety and Health, DHEW (NIOSH) Publication No. 76-

175-C.

20. Enterline P, McKiever M [1963]. Differential mortality from lung cancer by

occupation. J Occup Med, 5:283-290.

21. NIOSH [1980]. Occupational mortality in the State of California 1959-1961. 

Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public

Health Service, Center for Disease Control, National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 80-104.

22. Feuer E, Rosenman K [1986]. Mortality in police and firefighters in

New Jersey. Am J Ind Med, 9:517-527.

23. Lewis SS, Bierman HR, Faith MR [1983]. Cancer mortality among

Los Angeles City firefighters: report to the Los Angeles fire department. 

Beverly Hills, CA: Institute for Cancer and Blood Research.
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24. NIOSH [1983]. Hazard evaluation and technical assistance report: Chester

Fire Department, Chester, PA. Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health

and Human Services, Public Health Service, Center for Disease Control,

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, NIOSH Report No.

HETA 83-360-1495.

25. Abrams JL [1974]. Occupational mortality among professional firefighters

[Dissertation]. Oklahoma City, OK: University of Oklahoma.

26. Demers PA, Heyer NJ, Rosenstock L [1992]. Mortality among firefighters

from three Northwestern United States cities. Br J Ind Med, 49:664-670.

27. Terrill JB, Montgomery RR, Reinhardt CF [1978]. Toxic gases from fires. 

Science, 200:1343-1347.

28. Zapp JA, Jr. [1951]. The toxicity of fire. Chemical Center, MD: Chemical

Corps, Medical Division, (Special rep No 4.).

29. Wilcosky TC, Simonsen NR [1991]. Solvent exposure and cardiovascular

disease. Am J Ind M, 19:569-586.

30. Barceloux DG [1992]. Halogenated solvents. In Sullivan JB, Krieger GR,

eds. Hazardous materials toxicology. Baltimore, MD: Williams and

Wilkins, pp. 732-747.

31. Hathaway GJ, Proctor NH, Hughes JP, Fischman ML [1991] Chemical

hazards of the workplace. 3rd ed. New York, NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold,

pp. 393-395.

32. Holmberg B, Zenz C, Dodson VN [1994]. The polymer industry: main

toxicologic and occupational health effects. In: Zenz C, Dickerson OB,

Horvath EP, eds. Occupational medicine. St. Louis, MO: Mosby, pp. 719-

753.

33. Benowitz NL [1992]. Cardiac toxicology. In Sullivan JB, Krieger GR, eds. 

Hazardous materials toxicology. Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins,

pp. 168-178.
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34. NIOSH [1992]. NIOSH recommendations for occupational safety and health. 

Compendium of policy documents and statements. Cincinnati, OH: U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers

for Disease Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,

DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 92-100.

35. ACGIH [1994]. Threshold limit values and biological exposure indices for

1994-95. Cincinnati, OH: American Conference of Governmental Industrial

Hygienists.

36. Code of Federal Regulations [1992]. OSHA Table Z-2. 29 CFR 1910.1000. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Federal Register.

37. NFPA [1989]. Recommendations for developing fire protection services for

the public. Boston, MA: National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1201-

1989.

38. NFA [1987]. The incident command system. Emmitsburg, MD: National

Fire Administration, NFA-ICS-SM.

39. NFPA [1990]. Standard on fire department incident management system. 

Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1561-1990.

40. NFPA [1987]. Standard on fire department occupational safety and health. 

Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1500-1987.

41. NFPA [1987]. Fire command. Boston, MA: National Fire Protection

Association.

42. Oklahoma State University [1983]. Incident command system. 

Stillwater, OK: Oklahoma State University.

43. Grant H, Murray R [1989]. Emergency care. Bowie, MD: Brady.

44. Marriott HJ [1983]. Practical electrocardiography, 7th ed. Baltimore, MD:

Williams and Wilkins, pp. 402-422.

45. Goldberger AL [1994]. Electrocardiography. In Isselbacher KJ, Braunwald

E, Wilson JD, Martin JB, Fauci AS, Kasper DL, eds. Principles of internal

medicine, 13th ed. New York, NY: McGraw Hill, pp. 954-966.
Page 26 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

XI. AUTHORSHIP AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Report Written by: Gregory M. Kinnes, M.S., C.I.H.

Industrial Hygienist

Industrial Hygiene Section

Scott Deitchman, M.D.

Medical Officer

Medical Section

Report Prepared by: Kate L. Marlow

Office Automation Assistant

Originating Office: Hazard Evaluations and Technical

 Assistance Branch

Division of Surveillance, Hazard

 Evaluations, and Field Studies
Page 27 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 91-0190

XII. DISTRIBUTION AND AVAILABILITY OF REPORT

Copies of this report may be freely reproduced and are not copyrighted. Single copies

of this report will be available for a period of 90 days from the date of this report from

the NIOSH Publications Office, 4676 Columbia Parkway, Cincinnati, Ohio 45226. 

To expedite your request, include a self-address mailing label along with your written

request. After this time, copies may be purchased from the National Technical

Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161. 

Information regarding the NTIS stock number may be obtained from the NIOSH

Publications Office at the Cincinnati address.

Copies of this report have been sent to:

1. International Association of Fire Fighters

 Department of Occupational Health and Safety

2. IAFF, Locals 1064 and 1066

3. City of Jersey City Fire Department

4. City of Jersey City

5. Jersey City Medical Center

6. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region II

7. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

8. OSHA, Region II

For the purpose of informing affected employees, copies of this report shall be

posted by the employer in a prominent place accessible to the employees for a

period of 30 calendar days.
29

Table I

Organizations Responding to the Fire at the New Jersey Turnpike #5 Dumpsite

Jersey City, New Jersey

HETA 91-0190

April 10-12, 1991

Bell and Siren Club

Hoboken Fire Department

Hudson County Office of Emergency Management

Hudson County Police Department

Hudson Regional Health Commission

Jersey City Health Department

Jersey City Engineering Department

Jersey City Office of Emergency Management

 Jersey City Mayor

Jersey City Fire Department

Jersey City Medical Center - Emergency Medical Services

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection - Emergency Response

Program

New Jersey Turnpike Authority

New Jersey State Police - Office of Emergency Management

New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice.

New York City Fire Department

New York City Mayor's Office

New York City Department of Environmental Protection

New York City Department of Health

New York City Emergency Medical Services

North Bergen Fire Department

O.H. Materials (EPA Technical Assistance Team)

U.S. Coast Guard

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

University of Medicine and Dentistry - Emergency Medical

 Services, Mass Casualty Unit
A-1

Appendix A

Brief History of the New Jersey Turnpike #5 Dumpsite

The New Jersey Turnpike Dump #5 is located in Jersey City, Hudson County, New Jersey, in an

urban residential/light industrial area adjacent to the New Jersey Turnpike. The 16 acre site is

comprised of three lots (Block 60, Lots 19H, 19Q, and 19R) owned by the Municipality of Jersey

City. 

Block 60, Lot 19H

In 1930, Lot 19H was purchased from Central Valley Railroad by Lehigh Valley Railroad. The

Municipality of Jersey City purchased the lot in 1941 and leased the property to the Greenwich

Corporation, a cooperage supplies business, in 1955. The Greenwich Corporation operated on

the property until a 1984 fire destroyed several buildings. However, due to various legal reasons,

the corporation's lease remained in effect until 1987.

Block 60, Lots 19Q and 19R

In 1984, Lots 19Q and 19R were purchased by Jersey City from Central Jersey Industries,

formerly Central Railroad of New Jersey, which owned the property since 1894. This site was

vacant but had been reported to contain hazardous wastes by the Hudson Regional Health

Commission in 1981.

Specific Events Related the New Jersey Turnpike Dump #5

In July 1982, when Jersey City was planning to purchase Lots 19Q and 19R as part of a proposed

development project, an engineering firm was contracted by the city to perform a site analysis

and determine the environmental condition of the site. During July and August, soil and water

samples were collected and analyzed according to EPA guidelines. In a September 1982 report,

the engineering firm stated that it was obvious that a variety of materials had been dumped on the

surface of the property and that there was evidence of the disposal of liquid or powdered wastes

in the form of a purple dye and from metal drums. However, the firm concluded that there was

no environmental reason why the purchase of the property could not be completed by the city,

since the concentration of the detected pollutants were of little environmental concern.

In February 1983, the NUS Corporation performed an inspection of the site for the EPA. The

investigators found evidence of oily and powdered waste, reviewed the report from the previous

investigation, and concluded that the site had a medium priority for further action. Since the site

was scheduled for cleanup in the spring of 1983 by Jersey City in preparation for commercial

development, a follow-up analysis was recommended after cleanup of the site was completed. 

However, this cleanup was never initiated.
A-2

In April 1986, the Hudson Regional Health Commission reported that a large number of drums

and transformer scraps were present at the site. A soil sample was collected from an area that

was "grossly oil soaked" in June 1986. The results of this sample indicated that the site was

potentially contaminated with PCBs because 1380 parts per million of Aroclor 1254 was

detected.

In May 1987, NJDEP notified Jersey City and the Greenwich Corporation that the site poses a

danger to the public health and environment and issued a directive to have the site properly

remediated.

On January 30, 1989, the NJDEP referred the clean-up of the site to the EPA. A removal site

evaluation and a preliminary assessment were conducted in the spring of 1989. The EPA

recommended that CERCLA/SARA funds be authorized to perform a removal action at the site.
B-1

Appendix B

Results of Turnout Gear Analysis Performed by the EPA