IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2021 ND 97

State of North Dakota, by and through 

Workforce Safety and Insurance, Appellant

v.

Gloria Felan, application for death

benefits for Fred Felan, Appellee

and

KB & O Partnership, Respondent 

No. 20200354

Appeal from the District Court of Sargent County, Southeast Judicial District, 

the Honorable Mark T. Blumer, Judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice, in which Chief Justice Jensen and 

Justices VandeWalle and McEvers joined. Justice Tufte filed a dissenting 

opinion.

Jacqueline S. Anderson, Special Assistant Attorney General, Fargo, ND, for

appellant. 

Dean J. Haas, Bismarck, ND, for appellee.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

JUNE 3, 2021 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

WSI v. Felan

No. 20200354

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] WSI appeals from a judgment ordering payment of death benefits to 

Gloria Felan. WSI argues the administrative law judge (ALJ) misapplied the 

law in finding Gloria Felan proved a compensable injury. We reverse and 

remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.

I

[¶2] On September 14, 2017, Fred Felan was injured when driving a loaded 

truck that tipped on its side. Julie Schulz of KBO Farms, Fred Felan’s 

employer, arrived at the scene a short time later. Fred Felan declined an 

ambulance but agreed to allow Schulz to drive him to the hospital in Oakes. At 

the hospital Fred Felan complained of left chest and rib pain. Fred Felan had 

a normal heart rate, rhythm and sounds but had decreased breath sounds in 

his lower left and right chest and some breast tenderness. X-rays taken at the 

hospital did not reveal any fractures. Hydrocodone was prescribed for pain as 

well as a rib belt for comfort. 

[¶3] The morning of September 15, 2017, Schulz picked up Fred Felan from 

the hotel and brought him to eat. Schulz noted Fred Felan was falling asleep 

during the meal and expressed concern he should return to the hospital to get 

checked again. Fred Felan declined, responded he was fine, and informed 

Schulz he had taken five hydrocodone. When Schulz expressed concern about 

the amount of hydrocodone Fred Felan had taken, he responded he was a big 

man, that he had taken that many before, and declined to return to the 

hospital. 

[¶4] Fred Felan was discovered dead in his hotel room on September 16, 2017. 

WSI received information of Fred Felan’s death on September 20, 2017. On 

September 22, 2017, WSI accepted Fred Felan’s claim for injuries relating to 

his truck accident for contusion of thorax. Gloria Felan informed WSI she was 

unsure if the death was due to Fred Felan’s injury because he was doing alright 
2

after the accident, but that she was having an autopsy conducted. WSI also 

reported the death and stated it was not believed to be due to the work injury 

because Fred Felan had multiple health problems including some related to 

his heart and diabetes. The autopsy confirmed Fred Felan died of congestive 

cardiomyopathy and arteriosclerotic heart disease.

[¶5] In September of 2018, Gloria Felan filed a claim for death benefits. WSI

investigated and gathered information from Gloria Felan and KBO Farms. 

WSI denied the claim under N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(11)(a)(3). On December 13, 

2018, WSI issued its administrative order denying the claim for death benefits. 

[¶6] Gloria Felan requested an administrative hearing. A hearing was held 

November 7, 2019, with the only issue being “whether Claimant’s surviving 

spouse has proven by a preponderance of the evidence entitlement to payment 

of death benefits in connection with claim filed on September 15, 2017.” 

[¶7] On February 25, 2020, the ALJ issued its findings of fact, conclusions of 

law, and order reversing WSI’s administrative order. The ALJ found the 

following:

“Under North Dakota law, a claimant seeking WSI benefits 

has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the claimant had suffered a compensable injury and is entitled to 

benefits. A ‘compensable injury’ is defined in North Dakota 

Century Code section 65-01-02, Subd. 10 (now Subd. 11) as an 

injury by accident arising out of and in the course of hazardous 

employment which must be established by medical evidence 

supported by objective medical findings. The statute goes on to 

state that a compensable injury includes ‘Injuries due to heart 

attack or other heart-related disease, stroke, and physical injury 

caused by mental stimulus, but only when caused by the 

employee’s employment with reasonable medical certainty, and 

only when it is determined with reasonable medical certainty that 

unusual stress is at least fifty percent of the cause of the injury or 

disease as compared with all other contributing causes combined. 

Unusual stress means stress greater than the highest level of 

stress normally experienced or anticipated in that position or line 

of work.’ I note that the Legislature did not place ‘injuries due to 
3

heart attack or other heart-related disease’ in the paragraph that 

defines what is not a compensable injury, for example, pre-existing 

conditions. The Legislature could have, but did not, enact a law 

that ‘injuries due to heart attack or other heart-related disease is 

not compensable unless caused by the employee’s employment 

with reasonable medical certainty, and only when it is determined 

with reasonable medical certainty that unusual stress is at least 

fifty percent of the cause of the injury or disease as compared with 

all other contributing causes combined.’ 

“This ALJ reads the ‘heart attack’ portion of the statute as 

one that includes heart attacks and heart disease as being 

compensable if certain criteria are met as opposed to one that 

precludes heart attacks and heart disease if those criteria are not 

met, like the Legislature has done with pre-existing conditions. 

Therefore, a claimant who claims a heart attack or heart disease 

injury can still prove a compensable injury if they show ‘an injury 

by accident arising out of and in the course of hazardous 

employment which must be established by medical evidence 

supported by objective medical findings.’”

(Citations omitted.) 

[¶8] WSI appealed the ALJ’s decision to the district court. On November 2, 

2020, the district court affirmed the decision. WSI appeals from that judgment. 

II

[¶9] WSI argues the ALJ and the district court misapplied the law by failing 

to properly apply N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(11)(a)(3). 

[¶10] This Court under N.D.C.C. §§ 28-32-46 and 28-32-49 affirms an order of 

an administrative agency unless:

“1. The order is not in accordance with the law.

2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the

appellant.
4

3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in

the proceedings before the agency.

4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the

appellant a fair hearing.

5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a

preponderance of the evidence.

6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported

by its findings of fact.

7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently

address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.

8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently

explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any contrary

recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law

judge.”

[¶11] “When an independent ALJ issues final findings of fact, conclusions of 

law and order under N.D.C.C. § 65-02-22.1, courts apply the same deferential 

standard of review to the ALJ’s factual findings as used for agency decisions.” 

Bishop v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2012 ND 217, ¶ 6, 823 N.W.2d 257. 

However, no deference is given to an ALJ’s legal conclusions, and questions of 

law are fully reviewable on appeal. Id. “On appeal from the district court’s 

decision, we review the administrative agency’s decision in the same manner 

as the district court, giving due respect to the district court’s analysis and 

review.” Bergum v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 52, ¶ 8, 764 N.W.2d 

178. 

[¶12] Under N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(11)(a)(3), compensable injuries include:

“Injuries due to heart attack or other heart-related disease, stroke, 

and physical injury caused by mental stimulus, but only when 

caused by the employee’s employment with reasonable medical 

certainty, and only when it is determined with reasonable medical 

certainty that unusual stress is at least fifty percent of the cause 

of the injury or disease as compared with all other contributing 
5

causes combined. Unusual stress means stress greater than the 

highest level of stress normally experienced or anticipated in that 

position or line of work.”

[¶13] “Our primary goal when interpreting a statute is to determine the intent 

of the legislature by first looking to the plain language of the statute and 

attempting to give each word, phrase, and sentence its ordinary meaning.” 

State v. Long, 2020 ND 216, ¶ 6, 950 N.W.2d 178. This Court does not examine 

legislative history unless a statute is ambiguous. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05. When a 

provision is unambiguous, this Court looks only to the plain language of the 

statute to ascertain its meaning. Long, at ¶ 6. “A statute is ambiguous when it 

is susceptible to differing, but rational, meanings.” Schulke v. Panos, 2020 ND 

53, ¶ 8, 940 N.W.2d 303. 

[¶14] Here, the ALJ improperly applied N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(11)(a)(3). The 

statute makes clear that to prove a compensable heart injury or disease, it is 

insufficient to look only at the event claimed to have caused the condition. 

Instead, the statute requires that the claimant prove at least 50% of the cause 

of the injury or disease was unusual stress through their employment. The 

ALJ’s conclusion that the statute is one that “includes heart attacks and heart 

disease as being compensable if certain criteria are met as opposed to one that 

precludes heart attacks and heart disease if those criteria are not met,” is 

inconsistent with the statute. The words only when in N.D.C.C. § 65-01-

02(11)(a)(3) require that a claim for heart-related disease or injury be proven 

in one manner, and one manner only. The language is clear that any claim for 

an injury or disease relating to the heart must meet the criteria in order to 

qualify as compensable. The ALJ made no finding as to unusual stress as 

required by the statute and improperly applied N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(11)(a)(3).

The ALJ’s conclusion Gloria Felan was allowed to prove Fred Felan’s death

was compensable another way expands the statute in a way the legislature did 

not intend. That part of the judgment finding a compensable heart-related 

injury may be established in a manner outside the statutory requirements is 

reversed and remanded for application of the statute as consistent with this 

decision. 
6

III

[¶15] WSI argues the ALJ erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of what 

constitutes medical evidence supported by objective medical findings. WSI 

asserts the requirement specifically applies to the burden placed on the injured 

worker or beneficiary to prove a compensable injury. We will consider this issue 

because it is likely to arise on remand. See City of Bismarck v. Mariner Const., 

Inc., 2006 ND 108, ¶ 20, 714 N.W.2d 484.

[¶16] Section 65-01-02(11), N.D.C.C., requires an injury “be established by 

medical evidence supported by objective medical findings.” “[O]bjective medical 

evidence may include a physician’s medical opinion based on an examination, 

a patient’s medical history, and the physician’s education and experience.” 

Across Big Sky Flow Testing, LLC v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2014 ND 236, 

¶ 8, 857 N.W.2d 380 (quoting Swenson v. Workforce Safety & Ins. Fund, 2007 

ND 149, ¶ 25, 738 N.W.2d 892). 

[¶17] WSI argues the ALJ erred by failing to require medical evidence 

supported by objective medical findings of both an injury and that the injury 

was caused by unusual stress. To clarify, N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(11) only requires 

objective medical evidence to establish an injury occurred. In contrast,

N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(11)(a)(3) requires causation be established with

reasonable medical certainty. Notwithstanding that distinction, here the ALJ 

was provided with no objective medical evidence of the claimed injury. Gloria

Felan’s medical expert, Dr. Peretti, testified Fred Felan died of a cardiac 

arrhythmia caused by blunt force trauma to Fred Felan’s chest cavity. 

However, Dr. Peretti admitted there was no objective medical evidence that an 

arrhythmia occurred. Rather, the conclusion Dr. Peretti reached was a result 

of deductive reasoning. As our precedent indicates, objective medical evidence 

may be established by a physician’s medical opinion based on an examination, 

a patient’s medical history, and the physician’s education and experience. 

However, objective medical evidence may not be established solely by 

deductive reasoning. On this record, the ALJ erred in concluding there was 

objective medical evidence of a cardiac arrhythmia. 
7

IV

[¶18] We have considered any remaining issues and concluded they are either 

unnecessary to our determination or without merit. The judgment is reversed 

and remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision. 

[¶19] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. 

Gerald W. VandeWalle 

Daniel J. Crothers 

Lisa Fair McEvers 

Tufte, Justice, dissenting. 

[¶20] I agree with parts I, III, and IV of the majority opinion. For substantially 

the reasons given by the administrative law judge, I disagree with the 

majority’s analysis of the definition of “compensable injury,” and as a result, I 

respectfully dissent. 

[¶21] I believe the majority overlooks the words “caused by mental stimulus” 

in N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(11)(a)(3). As a result, the majority interprets the two 

chained “only when” clauses as applying to all heart attacks rather than only 

to heart attacks “caused by mental stimulus.” As explained by the ALJ, a heart 

attack not caused by mental stimulus falls under the provisions applicable to 

other injuries. There is evidence in the record that Fred Felan’s heart attack 

resulted from blunt force trauma to the chest during a work-related rollover 

truck accident. 

[¶22] I would apply our deferential review of the ALJ’s finding that there was 

a compensable injury and affirm.

[¶23] Jerod E. Tufte