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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:10cv378/MCR/CJK

WEST CUSTOMER MANAGEMENT

GROUP, LLC,

Defendant.

_________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

In a Report and Recommendation entered on March 24, 2015, the undersigned

recommended that plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

be required to pay attorneys’ fees in the amount of $90,541.50 and nontaxable

expenses in the amount of $7,319.67 incurred by defendant West Customer

Management Group, LLC (“West”) from the date of the pretrial conference through

the conclusion of trial, which resulted in a verdict favorable to West (doc. 331). The

undersigned also recommended that Defendant’s Supplemental Motion for Award of

Attorneys’ Fees and Nontaxable Expenses (doc. 319) be granted and that the EEOC

be required to reimburse West the reasonable fees and expenses it incurred post trial

in litigating the attorneys’ fee issue. The district judge adopted the recommendation

over the EEOC’s objections (doc. 337). As directed in the order, West submitted
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affidavits in support of its claim, seeking supplemental attorneys’ fees in the amount

of $71,902.00 and nontaxable expenses in the amount of $2,077.33 (docs. 338, 339,

340). The EEOC responded in opposition to West’s submissions, urging the court to

reduce West’s supplemental attorneys’ fees by seventy-five percent and disallow any

nontaxable expenses, every bit of which the EEOC maintains are unreasonable (doc.

343).

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Local Rule 54.1 outlines the procedure to be followed with respect to motions

for attorneys’ fees. Pursuant to Rule 54.1, 

[i]n any proceeding in which any party is seeking an award

of attorneys’ fees from the opposing party pursuant to any

statute, contract, or law, the party seeking such an award of

attorneys’ fees shall:

(1) Maintain a complete, separate, and accurate record of

time (to the nearest 1/10 of an hour) devoted to the

particular action, recorded contemporaneously with the

time expended, for each attorney and each specific activity

involved in the action (i.e., not just “research” or

“conference”); and

(2) File electronically a summary of such time record with

the clerk by the fifteenth (15th) day of each month during

the pendency of the action, for work done during the

preceding month.

* * * 

(5) Failure to comply with these requirements will result in

attorneys’ fees being disallowed for the omitted period.

Local Rule 54.1(B). Once the court has awarded fees, the party to whom such fees

were awarded shall file “an affidavit setting out the requested amount and specifically

The EEOC points out that West’s “current request represents an amount nearly as much as that allegedly

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incurred by Defendant for the actual litigation of this case”and argues that West “provides no compelling reason to

support an expenditure of over 200 attorney hours and assignment of four (4) attorneys on a single, discrete attorney fee

issue.” As West stated in response, the period of time for which it previously received fees and expenses, from the

pretrial conference through trial, consisted of only two weeks. The parties have been litigating the attorneys’ fees issue

for nearly a year and a half.

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describing the requested rate of compensation and the numbers of hours spent in the

prosecution or defense of the case as are reflected in the monthly reports filed with

this court, with sufficient detail to identify the exact nature of the work performed.”

N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 54.1(E)(1). The party awarded fees must also “file and serve a

supporting affidavit from an attorney, familiar with the area of law involved, that the

requested rate for hourly compensation is in line with the prevailing market rate for

the work performed.” N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 54(E)(3). 

The reasonableness of attorneys’ fees is determined according to the wellestablished lodestar method, pursuant to which an award of attorneys’ fees

is“properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on

the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888

(1984); see also Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299

(11th Cir.1988). A reasonable hourly rate is based upon “‘the prevailing market rate

in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and reputation.’” Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d

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1393, 1396 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Norman, 836 F.3d at 1299). In calculating the

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, the court should exclude

excessive, unnecessary, and redundant hours, as well astime spent litigating “discrete

and unsuccessful claims.” Duckworth, 97 F.3d at 1397. “The fee applicant bears the

burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly

rates.” Norman, 836 F.2d 1292 at 1303. With respect to rates, an applicant may meet

To aid in the determination of an attorney's reasonable hourly rate, the court may also consider, to the extent

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relevant, the factors set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The

Johnson factors include: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) the degree

of skill necessary to serve the client properly, (4) the attorney's inability to accept other employment because he accepted

the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or

the circumstances, (8) the amount of damages involved and the relief or results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation,

and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the attorney's professional

relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Id. at 717. The going rate in the community, however, is

the most critical factor in setting the fee rate. Martin v. Univ. of S. Ala., 911 F.2d 604, 610 (11th Cir.1990).

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its burden by producing either direct evidence of rates charged under similar

circumstances or opinion evidence of reasonable rates. Id. at 1299. In addition, the

Eleventh Circuit has noted that “the court ... is itself an expert on the question [of

attorneys’ fees] and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning

reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or

without the aid of witnesses asto value.” Id. at 1303 (quotation and citation omitted).

West has complied with Local Rule 54.1 with respect to its claim for

supplemental attorneys’ fees and expenses. West submitted an affidavit from its

counsel, Julie A. Springer, setting forth her credentials as well as those of the other

lawyers and paralegals involved, the number of hours spent by the attorneys and

paralegals, the hourly rates, and the nontaxable expensesincurred. According to Ms.

Springer’s affidavit, West’s counsel spent a total of 245.30 hours on post-trial issues,

with an additional 21.8 hours of travel time billed at half-rate, generating a total of

$71,902.00 in fees. West incurred $2,077.33 in nontaxable expenses. As for the

rates, West requests that Ms. Springer and Geoffrey D. Weisbart be compensated at

a rate of $350.00 per hour for 69.10 and 26 hours of work, respectively; that Sara

Janes be compensated at a rate of $275.00 per hour for 84.70 hours of work; that

Nicole LeFave be compensated for 25.40 hours of work at a rate of $240.00 per hour;

and that two paralegals, Salena Yzaguirre and Jan Blair, be compensated at a rate of

$135.00 per hour for 31.80 and 8.30 hours, respectively. West submitted an affidavit

fromMichaelJ. Schofield, a local attorney who has practiced law for over thirty years

representing clients in a variety of matters, including labor and employment disputes. 

Mr. Schofield affirmed the reasonableness of the rates charged by West’s counsel, a

finding the EEOC does not challenge. It isthe number of hours for which West seeks

reimbursement that the EEOC disputes. 

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As the EEOC points out, “[f]ee applicants must exercise what the Supreme

Court has termed ‘billing judgment.’” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes,

168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434,

103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983)). “That means they must exclude

from their fee applications excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary [hours],

which are hours that would be unreasonable to bill to a client and therefore to one’s

adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of counsel.” Id. (internal

marks and citations omitted). “If fee applicants do not exercise billing judgment,

courts are obligated to do it for them, to cut the amount of hours for which payment

is sought, pruning out those that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary.’” Id. “Courts are not authorized to be generous with the money of

others, and it is as much the duty of courts to see that excessive fees and expenses are

not awarded asit isto see that an adequate amount is awarded.” Id. “Those opposing

fee applications have obligations, too. In order for courts to carry out their duties in

this area, objections and proof from fee opponents concerning hours that should be

excluded must be specific and reasonably precise.” Id. 

The EEOC urges the court to drastically reduce the amount of attorneys’ fees

and expenses awarded to West, arguing West’s counsel failed to exercise billing

judgment. Specifically, the EEOC argues that “given the simple and discrete issue

at litigation, i.e., attorneys’ fees, Defendant’s request for reimbursement for a total of

205.20 hours should be greatly discounted,” particularly the 110.10 hours of work

performed by non-lead attorneys, Sara Janes and Nicole LeFave, which the EEOC

claims is duplicative of work performed by Springer and Weisbart. According to the

EEOC, “neither of these attorneys have ever entered an appearance in this matter, nor

have they signed off, or been listed on any pleadings filed with the Court. It does not

appear that Janes and LaFave played any significant or identifiable role in this

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litigation and it is only now, in support of its excessive fee request, that West

identifies them as staff assigned to the case.” Under the circumstances, according to

the EEOC, in order to recover for Janes’ and LaFave’s time, West needed to establish

that the two possessed “specialized knowledge or experience that warranted their

involvement in the litigation on fees.” The EEOC avers “there is no clear distinct

contribution among any of the research and writing tasks billed by any of the four

attorneys and the Court should not permit recovery of these hours.” In addition, the

experience and expertise of Springer and Weisbart in Title VII litigation, including

attorneys’ fees, “should have resulted in a minimization of the number of hours

necessary to prepare for briefing and argument for fees against the Commission. Yet

it appearsthat for thissingle issue Defendant ‘doubled up’ on attorneys.” In sum, the

EEOC argues, West “fails to establish the necessity of four attorneys to work on

supplemental fee motion or stated alternatively, nothing about the fee issue at

litigation should have warranted the involvement of more than two attorneys with

combined experience of over 50 years.”3

The undersigned finds it entirely reasonable that four attorneys – two partners

and two associates – would work on the attorneys’ feesissue in this case, particularly

given the amount at stake and the unusually contentious nature of the litigation. The

undersigned likewise finds the number of hours reasonable. Based on the history of

this litigation, West has every reason to expect that the EEOC will vehemently

oppose anything West files; under the circumstances, it is entirely reasonable for

West to err on the side of caution. Moreover, although the EEOC argues that the

associates performed work repetitive of work performed by Springer and Weisbart,

it does not identify any time entry to substantiate this charge. It also has wholly failed

The EEOC does not mention that it, the leading expert on employment litigation, had five attorneys working

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on the attorneys’ fee issue.

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to demonstrate that attorneys must formally appear in a matter in order to work on the

case, and the undersigned is aware of no such rule. In fact, in the undersigned’s

experience, attorneys, particularly associates, routinely work on – and bill for – cases

in which they have not formally appeared. Similarly, although the EEOC suggests

that attorneys must have specialized knowledge or expertise in a field in order to be

compensated for their work in that regard, it has offered no support whatsoever for

such a proposition. The undersigned thus finds that no reduction should be made

with respect to the hours billed by Janes and LaFave. 

The EEOC next argues that West improperly seeks to recover for 3.7 hours

billed by Springer for work related to briefing the issue of supplemental attorneys’

fees. According to the EEOC, “[b]y including these activities in its motion for

supplemental fees, Defendant is attempting to recover for a third category of fees not

contemplated by the Court’s Order,” which the EEOC maintains “held that West was

entitled to recover for the fees it incurred in attempting to recover its original

litigation fees – ‘fees on fees.’” The EEOC states that “[t]his Court . . . did not find

that West was entitled to recover for the fees that West incurred in attempting to

secure its “‘fees on fees.’” The EEOC seems to have misinterpreted the court’s order. 

Indeed, Chief Judge Rodgers explicitly found that West was entitled to recover

“supplemental attorneys’ fees and nontaxable expenses incurred in litigating the

attorneys’ fee issue.” Doc. at pg. 5. In so finding, Judge Rodgers noted that the

undersigned recommended granting Defendant’s Supplemental Motion for Award of

Attorneys’ Fees and Nontaxable Expenses and the EEOC did not object to the

recommendation. In its supplemental motion, West specifically requested

“reasonable attorneys’ fees and non-taxable expenses for its post-trial efforts

litigating the fee issue . . . . ” Doc. 319 at pg. 1. The court thus will not disallow the

3.7 hours Ms. Springer spent briefing the supplemental fee issue. 

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The EEOC next argues that West improperly seeks to recover for 4.8 hours of

attorney time that was spent on “clerical” tasks. The time entries to which the EEOC

refers consist primarily of email and telephone communications and preparation and

review of court filings in connection with West’s motion for supplemental fees. As

Judge Rodgers found with respect to West’s initial motion for attorneys’ fees,

“attorney’s fee rates should not be charged for clerical tasks or work that is

unnecessary, excessive or duplicative,” but “tasks such as emailing witnesses and

preparing for witness meetings. . . are not strictly clerical in nature and therefore will

not be reduced as unreasonable.” Doc. 337 at pp. 2-3. The same is true of emails and

other correspondence with local counsel or potential local counsel, preparation and

review of court filings, and the other entries pertaining to preparation of West’s fee

request to which the EEOC objects. The undersigned therefore declines to reduce

West’s fee request by 3.7 hours of work the EEOC characterizes as clerical in nature. 

The EEOC further argues that West improperly seeks to recover 12.1 hours for

work that is not traditionally done by an attorney. As the EEOC states, paralegal fees

are recoverable only to the extent the paralegal performs work traditionally done by

an attorney. See, e.g., Gowen Oil Co., Inc. v. Abraham, 511 F. App’x 930, 936 (11th

Cir. 2013). The EEOC argues that the billing records of Yzaguirre and Blair include

multiple entries for work that has been found to be typically performed by legal

assistants and paralegals, not attorneys, including communications or preparation of

correspondence regarding court dates, logistic arrangements, and filings. The entries

to which the EEOC objects include the following:

DATE PERSON DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES HOURS

2/4/2014 SEY Confirm deadline to file motion for .1

an award of attorneys’ fees, per

 FRCP 54d (.1)

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2/12/2014 SEY Review and redact time record for filing 1.2

with court (.4); draft, revise and finalize 

Attorney and paralegal Time Reports Filed

Under Seal and Notice of Filing Same (.6); 

exchange mail with court clerk re court’s 

preference on whether to destroy or return 

trial exhibits, with permission (.2)

2/13/2014 SEY Review local rules re deadline to file Bill 1.7

of Costs (.2); email vendors to request copies

of invoices for expenses incurred in support of 

Bill of Costs (.5); review financial documents

and invoices and pull all relevant documents in

support of Bill of Costs (1.0)

2/14/2014 SEY Continue to email vendors, including court 2.4

reporters, process servers, copy services, hotel 

and former law firm to collect all invoices from

inception of case to support Bill of Costs (.9); 

telephone conference with court clerk to request

court costs paid by West and whether we can

supplement Bill of Costs with Invoices (.3); 

create spreadsheet of all expenses from inception

of case and categorize expenses type (1.2)

2/18/2014 SEY Draft, review and finalize Declaration of .7

J. Springer in Support of Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees (.7)

2/24/2014 SEY Review applicable local rules re deadline to .3

respond to objections and send email 

regarding same (.3)

3/18/2014 SEY Review and redact time record in 1.1

preparation for submission to the court (.4);

prepare and finalize Attorney and Paralegal

Time Report Filed Under Seal and Notice of

Same (.7) 

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3/19/2014 SEY Draft initial version of Declaration of J. .4 

Springer to Motion (.4)

4/3/2014 JMB Review local rules and confirm deadline (.2); .3

prepare email to J. Springer re deadline and 

communications with M. Schofield (.1)

4/14/2014 JMB Confer with Court re timing of affidavit .2 

filings and prepare email re same

5/13/2014 SEY Review email communication with court re .2 

oral argument on West’s Motion for Attorneys’

Fees (.1); confirm court date re same (.1)

5/28/2014 SEY Exchange email with clerk re time allotted for

hearing on docket and report same to

J. Springer (.1) ` .1

6/2/2014 SEY Telephone call from Donna Boland re status .4 

of transcript of Pam Thomas’ testimony and

report same to G. Weisbart (.2); review 

transcript (.2)

6/3/2014 SEY Review notice of Filing Transcript of Trial .1

Testimony of Pamela Thomas and Redaction

Requirements (.1)

6/16/2014 SEY Review and redact time record for submission 1.0

to the court (.3); prepare and finalize Attorney

and Paralegal Time Records Under Seal and 

Notice of Filing Same (.7)

7/15/2014 SEY Review and redact time record for submission 1.1

to the court (.4); prepare and finalize Attorney

and Paralegal Time Records Under Seal and 

Notice of Filing Same (.7)

7/28/2014 JMB Review Order and confirm deadlines .2

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8/8/2014 JMB Confer with Court clerk re timing for .6 

response given the EEOC’s objection (.1);

prepare email update re timing (.1); research

local rules re additional magistrate deadlines

and timing for response to objections (.2); 

confirm deadlines (.2)

The undersigned agrees that some of the paralegal time entries for which West

seeks to recover fees in fact reflect work not traditionally performed by an attorney

and thusshould be disallowed. Those entriesinclude the following: the February 12,

2014 entry; all but the portion of the February 13, 2014 entry that pertains to

reviewing the local rules; the February 14, 2014 entry; the March 18, 2014 entry; the

April 3, 2014 entry except for the portion pertaining to review of local rules and

confirming a deadline; the April 14, 2014 entry; the May 13, 2014 entry; the May 28,

2014 entry; the June 2, 2014 entry except for the portion pertaining to reviewing the

transcript of Pam Thomas’ testimony; the June 16, 2014 entry; the July 15, 2014

entry; and the August 8, 2014 entry except for the portion that pertains to reviewing

the local rules. Altogether, the undersigned concludes that reduction of 8.8 hours, or

$1,228.50, is appropriate.

The EEOC next complains that West seeks reimbursement for 21.8 hours

related to travel of Weisbart and Springer. Again, asJudge Rodgersindicated, “‘[t]he

EleventhCircuit has found that‘excluding out-of-town counsel’s travel time is proper

only if it was unreasonable not to hire qualified local counsel.’” Doc. 337 at pg. 4

(quoting Johnson v. Univ. College of Univ. of Ala., 706 F.2d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir.

1983)). Moreover, “‘district courtsin this Circuit have regularly held that reasonable

travel time is compensable at a regular hourly rate.’” Id. (quoting George v. GTE

Directories Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 2000)). Although there are

local attorneys qualified to handle this case, the undersigned finds, as did Judge

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Rodgers, that “there are no grounds for finding West acted unreasonably in relying

on two experienced out-of-state attorneys, one of whom has worked on its

employment matters for twenty years.” Doc. 337 at pg. 4. It also is worth noting that

West’s counsel charged only half-rates for travel time. The undersigned thus cannot

agree that the court should disallow fees for attorney travel time. 

Finally, the EEOC contests all of the expenses claimed by West. Despite both

the undersigned and Judge Rodgers having found such expenses reasonable, the

EEOC argues that West should not be allowed to recover the travel/lodging expenses

its counsel incurred in attending the hearing on West’s motion for attorneys’ fees in

the amount of $1,778.58 or Federal Express chargesin the amount of $172.65. West

has abandoned its claim for the Federal Express charges because it has been unable

to obtain a legible receipt. Having already determined that use of experienced, nonlocal counsel was not unreasonable, the undersigned will find the attorney

travel/lodging expenses reasonable. The last expense West seeks to recover is

$126.10 paid to a court reporter for a transcript of certain trial testimony West used

in support of its motion for attorneys’ fees. The EEOC objects to the extent West

seeks to recover for the “delivery, shipping, or handling” of the transcripts, which it

argues is an ordinary business expense and thus is not recoverable. The EEOC does

not dispute that costs of ordinary deposition transcripts are recoverable. Moreover,

it acknowledges that the cost of expedited transcripts is recoverable when it was

necessary to have the request expedited and necessary to the case. See, e.g., Barrera

v. Weiss & Woolrich So., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (noting that

costs for deposition transcripts necessarily obtained for use in a case are recoverable

under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2)). The EEOC argues, however, that West has failed to

demonstrate that expedited delivery was necessary in thisinstance. The undersigned

finds the transcript necessary to West’s case but is not convinced expedited delivery

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was required. West therefore shall recover the cost of the deposition transcript at the

regular rate of $3.65 per page, or $94.90. 

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 Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED as follows:

1. That West be awarded an additional $70,673.50 in attorneys’ fees and 

$1,873.48 in nontaxable expenses incurred in litigating post-trial issues. 

2. That the EEOC be required to submit payment in that amount to West, 

through its counsel, within fourteen (14) days ofthe date of the court’s order adopting

this report and recommendation. 

At Pensacola, Florida, this 23rd day of October, 2015.

/s/Charles J. Kahn, Jr. 

CHARLES J. KAHN, JR.

UNITEDSTATESMAGISTRATEJUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

ten days after being served a copy hereof. Any different deadline that may appear on

the electronic docket isfor the court’s internal use only, and does not control. A copy

of any objections shall be served upon any other parties. Failure to object may limit

the scope of appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; United States

v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

Donna Boland, the court reporter who prepared the transcript at issue, works for the court. She confirmed the

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cost of ordinary transcripts.

Case No: 3:10cv378/MCR/CJK