1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) ERICK LITTLE, et al. , ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) Civil No. 14-1289 (RMC) v. ) (consolidated with 15-98, 15-114, ) 15-1298, and 17-168) WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al. , ) ) ) Defendants. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter came before the Court following a fairness hearing for final approval of a proposed class settlement ( Settlement) embodied in a Class Action Settlement Agreement (Settlement Agreement), dated as of November 22, 2017, between the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) and Erick Little, Gerald Tucker, Fitzgerald Stoney, Marcello Virgil, Leroy Quarles, Timothy McC lough, Leon McKenzie, and Lou ia McKenzie (collectively, Class Representatives) on behalf of themselves and the respecti ve class(s) of which they are Class Representatives; Sidney Davis; an d D.W., a minor child of Lawre nce Whitted, who i s deceased, and Joyce Short, D.W.’s next friend (collectively, Ms. Short). A c opy of the Settlement Agreement was submitted to the Court as part of the motion to approve the Settlement. Capitalized terms used and not otherwise defined i n this Memorandum Opinion and a ccompanying Order shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Settlement Agreement. Having read, reviewed, and consider ed the papers filed with thi s Court in support of final approval of the Settlem ent, including any declarations submitted, oral arguments of counsel, the Settlement Agreem ent, and the pleadings filed in t his action; having conducted a2 fairness hearing with regard to the Settlement and approval the reof; being fully informed regarding the facts surrounding t he proposed Settlement; and ba sed upon this information and the record as a whole; the Cour t will grant final approval of t he Settlement, attorneys’ fees, and service awards.
I. BACKGROUND A complete explanation of the background and claims raised in t his case can be found in this Court’s opini on on class certification. See Opinion [Dkt. 186]. The Court includes a brief summary here. Plaintiffs brought a class-acti on suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the District of Columbia Hu man Rights Act (DCHRA), D.C. Cod e § 2.1401.01 et seq alleging that a criminal background check (Policy 7.2.3), see Notice of Second Am. Compl., Ex. C, Policy 7.2.3 [Dkt. 200-4], use d by WMATA to screen candidate s and employees, was facially neutral but had a disparate im pact on African Americans. WMATA ’s Policy 7.2.3 governed how and when individuals with cri minal convictions could obtainor continue employment with WMATA and its contractors and sub contractors. WMATA at all poi nts has argued that it adopted Policy 7.2.3 as a business necessity and that it did no t have a discriminatory impact on African Americans. Policy 7.2.3 i ncluded four appendices which specified the background check criteria for different types of positions. Plaintiffs mo ved for class certification and on March 31, 2017, the Court certified three classes under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2): Appendix A Class, Appendix C Class, and Appendi x F Class/MetroAccess Class

. See Opinion at 46-47. The Court did not certify a damages class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23( b)(3). See id . at 41, 44-45.3 Following class certification the pa rties began merits discover y and also engaged in extensive settlement negotia tions. The parties met in perso n on multiple occasions and participated in two formal media tion settlements with a neutral mediator. See Mem. in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Final Approval of Proposed Class Action Settleme nt (Final Class Settlement Mot.) [Dkt. 240] at 5-6. On November 22, 2017, the parties memoriali zed the terms of the Settlement Agreement. See id . at 6. The Settlement Agreement provides that WMATA shall pay $6.5 million into a Class SettlementFund to be distributed to Class Counsel for payment of fees and costs, a Claims Administrator for its work in administering the Fund, eligible class members that submit short or long claims form s, and Class Representatives fo r their assistance in the litigation. See id . at 6-8. Additionally, WMATA agr eed to maintain a new policy (2017 Policy), adopted in 2017, which provides for individual ized assessments after an ap plicant fails the background check rather than presumptive di squalification, fo r at least on e year after the date of the Court’s final order approving the Settlement Agreement. See id . at 9. On December 7, 2017, this Court gran ted preliminary approval of the proposed class-action Settlement between t he Class Representatives and W MATA. See Preliminary Approval Order [Dkt. 230]. The P reliminary Approval Order orde red that notice of the proposed Settlement be sent by first-cla ss mail to a Settlement Class co nsisting of individuals, determined by Class Counsel from records provided by third party First Cho ice Background Screening, Inc. (First Choice) 1 who: (i) failed a criminal b ackground screening under the Bac kground Screening Policy since February 23, 2012; (ii) were denied employment, te rminated, or otherwise permanently separated from their position, suspended from emplo yment with or without pay,

1 First Choice is the WMATA cont ractor that conducted the backgr ound screenings under Policy 7.2.3.4 and/or denied employment with W MATA or a contractor or subcontr actor of WMATA as a result of the Background Screeni ng Policy; and (iii) either wer e identified in the First Choice records as African American or h ad not been identified in the F irst Choice records as having a particular race. The notice was sent in this manner to ensure that all members of the Settlement Class were notified. On April 6, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Final Approval of the Proposed Class Action Settlement and a Mot ion for Approval of Service Pa yments. Final Class Settlement Mot. [Dkt. 240]; Mot. for Appr oval of Serv. Payments [Dkt. 241] . WMATA also filed a Memorandum in Support of Plainti ffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Lawsuit Settlement Agreement. WMATA Mem. in Su pp. of Class Action Settlement [Dkt . 245]. The Court also received objections from six indi viduals and reviewed and consi dered each objection despite some untimely filing. See Objections [Dkts. 232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 239, 244, 246, and 252]. On April 18, 2018, the Court held a f ormal fairness hearing to consider whether to grant final approval of the Settlement. See 4/18/2018 Minute Entry. The Court heard and considered argument from the pa rties and the following individu als who elected to appear to voice their support for, or objec tion to, the Settlement: Gale n Pendergrass, Bernhard Levi, Thomas Hall, Tiffany Burke, Kay e Lawton, and Sterling Pickett.
II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Final Approval of Class Settlement Under Federal Rule of Civil Pro cedure 23(e), in order to grant final approval of a settlement, the Court must find t hat “the settlement is fair, a dequate and reasonabl e and is not the product of collusion between the parties.” Thomas v. Albright , 139 F.3d 227, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Greenberg v. Colvin , No. 13-1837 (RMC), 2015 WL 4078042, at *3 (D.D.C. July 1, 2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).5 “In this Circuit, there is no si ngle test for evaluating a prop osed settlement under Rule 23(e).” Stephens v. US Airways Group, Inc. , 102 F. Supp. 3d 222, 226 (D.D.C. 2015). “District courts consider the f acts and circumstances of the ca se, and examine the following factors: (a) whether the settle ment is the result of arms-leng th negotiations; (b) the terms of the settlement in relation to the s trength of plaintiffs’ case; (c) the stage of the lit igation proceedings at the time of settlement; (d) the reaction of the class; and ( e) the opinion of experienced counsel.” Id . (quotations and citation omitted). In analyzing these factor s, the Court’s role is a limited one: It is well-established that courts assume a limited role when reviewing a proposed class action settlement. They should not substitute their judgment for that of counsel who negotiated th e settlement. Rather, courts favor the resolution of disputes th rough voluntary compromise, and, therefore, strongly encourage settlements. In the context of class actions, settlement is pa rticularly appropriate given the litigation expenses and judicial resource s required in many such suits. A bsent evidence of fraud or collu sion, such settlements are not to be trifled with. Osher v. SCA Realty I, Inc. , 945 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D.D.C. 1996) ( citations and quotations omitted).
B. Reasonableness of Attorneys’ Fees Award In the D.C. Circuit, the “per centage of the fund” method of cal culating attorneys’ fees is the “proper measure” of “contingent counse l fees in cla ss actions resulting in the creation of a common fund payabl e to plaintiffs.” Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala , 1 F.3d 1261, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The common fun d doctrine “allows a party who creates, preserves, or increases the value of a fund i n which others have an ownership interest to be reimbursed from that fund for litigation expense s incurred, including counsel f ees. It is by now well established that ‘a litigant or lawyer who r ecovers a common fund for the b enefit of persons other than6 himself or his client is entitle d to a reasonable attorney’s fe e from the fund as a whole.’” Id. at 1265 (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert , 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)). The percentage of the fund approach “helps to align more closel y the interests of the attorneys with the int erests of the parties.” Democratic Cent. Comm. of the Dist. of Columbia v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n , 3 F.3d 1568, 1573 (D.C. Cir. 1993). This method also “discourage[s] inflati on of attorney hours and promot[es] ‘efficient prosecution and early resolution of litigation, which c learly benefits both litigants and the judicial system.’” In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig. , 953 F. Supp. 2d 82, 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Trombley v. Nat’l City Bank , 826 F. Supp. 2d 179, 205 (D.D.C. 2011)). In addition, the percentage of t he fund method “is less demandi ng of scarce judicial resources tha n the lodestar method.” Swedish Hosp. Corp. , 1 F.3d at 1269. Unlike with the lodestar method, which require s the reviewing court to “rev iew attorney billing information over the life of a com plex litigation and make a determination about whether the time devoted to the litigation was necessary or r easonable,” the percentage of the fund method allows for a much simpler, more efficient fee calculation. Id . at 1269-70. “Given the complexity of many class action lawsuits, . . . lodestar calc ulation is likely to cause significant delay be tween the creation of a common fund and remuneration of class counsel,” whereas “application of a percentage-ofthe-fund methodology is relatively s traightforward and much les s time consuming.” Id . at 1270. “Courts have a duty to ensure tha t claims for attorneys’ fees a re reasonable, in light of the results obtained.” In re Black Farmers , 953 F. Supp. 2d at 87 (citing Trombley , 826 F. Supp. 2d at 204; In re Dep’t of Veterans Affairs (VA) Data Theft Litig. , 653 F. Supp. 2d 58, 60 (D.D.C. 2009)). “Fee awards in c ommon-fund cases may range fro m fifteen to forty-five percent.” Wells v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 557 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2008). To determine the7 reasonableness of the percentage of the common fund requested b y class counsel, courts in this Circuit have considered sev eral factors, including: (1) the size of the fund created and the number of persons bene fitted; (2) the presence or absence of s ubstantial objections by member s of the class to the settlement terms or fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the complex ity and duration of the litigation; (5) t he risk of nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the case by pl aintiffs’ counsel; and (7) the awards in similar cases. Id . at 6-7. C. Reasonableness of Service Awards It is common for courts to approve incentive awards in class-ac tion litigations, especially when there is a co mmon fund created to benefit the e ntire class. See In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig. , 205 F.R.D. 369, 400 (D.D.C. 2002). I n fact “courts routinely approve incentive awards to compe nsate named plaintiffs for the services they provided and the risks they incurred during the c ourse of the class action litig ation.” In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig. , No. 99-0790, 2003 WL 22037741, at *10 (D.D.C. June 16, 2003). Courts in this Circuit have use d several factors when deciding whether to grant service awards for named plainti ffs in class actions cases invo lving a common fund. Such factors include “the actions t he plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of t he class, the degree to which the class benefitted f rom those action[s], and the amo unt of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation.” Lorazepam , 2003 WL 22037741, at *10 (quoting Cook v. Niedert , 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998)).8 III. ANALYSIS A. Final Class Settlement Approval 1. Adequacy of Notice The Court finds that the appr oved notice and claim form were se nt in accordance with the Court’s Preliminary A pproval Order to all persons who likely would be potential Settlement Class members as determined by Class Counsel. See Final Class Settlement Mot. at 12-13. Potential Settlement Class members was determined by Cl ass Counsel from records provided to WMATA from First Choice identifying the individuals who failed a criminal background screening under the Background Screening Policy duri ng the relevant time period. The approved notice and claim forms were mailed to each such in dividual using the address for that individual contained in the First Choice records. Notices were also sent after January 6, 2018 to other individuals who were not listed in the First Choi ce records but were considered by Class Counsel to be potential cl ass members based on other disc overy. Notice given to the members of the Settlement Class was reasona bly calculated to apprise potential Settlement C lass members of (1) the pendency of this action, (2) all material elements of the Settlement, (3) t heir opportunity to exclude th emselves from, object to, or comment on the Settlement, and (4) their opportunity to appear at the final fairness hearing. Class Counsel also established a website containing pertinent i nformation regarding the Settlement. The Claims Administrator m ailed out over 4,100 notices. Nine h undred and thirty-one (931) individuals submitted timely claims, including 354 long forms and 738 short forms. See Final Class Settlement Mot. a t 10 (describing the long and sho rt forms); see also Suppl. Statement in Supp. of Mot. f or Final Approval of Settlem ent [Dkt. 250] at 1. The Claims Administrator has tentativel y approved 386 short forms for a fl at short form award of $2,000 and9 254 long forms for “awards ranging from $2,000 to $40,000 and a n average long form award of $22,389.81.” Id . The short form claims will be paid out first and, if the rem aining long form awards exceed the remaining bala nce in the Settlement Fund, the n the Claims Administrator will make a pro rata adjustment to the long form awards. See id . at 2. Notice to the Settlement Class was completed in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the Cou rt’s Preliminary Approval Order . The notice given to the members of the Settlement Class , which set forth the principal terms of the Settlement Agreement and other matters, was the best practicable notice un der the circumstances. The notice process prescribed by the Settlement Agreement and the C ourt’s Preliminary Approval Order, and as actually implement ed by Class Counsel, was reason able and provided due and adequate notice to all persons e ntitled to such notice about th ese proceedings, the terms of the Settlement, and the matters set forth therein. The Court finds that the notice satisfied all the requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Constit ution of the United States, the rights of the members of the Set tlement Class to due process, a nd all other applicable laws. A full opportunity to be heard has be en afforded to all members o f the Settlement Class and other persons wishing to be heard. Notice of the Settlement and the previously filed Settlement Ag reement was also sent on December 15, 2017 via certif ied mail to the Attorneys G eneral of the United States, District of Columbia, Virginia , Maryland, and twe nty-three (23) other states where one or more of the potential class members re sided, as determined from reco rds produced by First Choice, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2006). No such Attorney General has appeare d or filed a pleading c ontesting the Settlem ent. Such notice contained all10 information required by the Class Action Fairness Act. The Cou rt finds that the parties have complied with the notice requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1715.
2. Adequacy of Settlement Before approving a class action settlement the Court must find that it “is fair, reasonable, and adequate,” and is not the product of collusion between the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). To make that finding, the Court considers (1) whethe r the parties engaged in armslength negotiations, (2) the ter ms of the settlement compared t o the strength of Plaintiffs’ case, (3) the stage of the litigation when the settlement is proposed , (4) the reaction of the class to the proposed settlement, and (5) the opinion of experienced counsel

. See Stephens , 102 F. Supp. 3d at 226. The parties provided a detailed de scription of the settlement n egotiations, which took place over a two-year period and included multiple days of discussions with an experienced, neutral mediator. During the s ettlement negotiations, Class Co unsel also provided WMATA with feedback on its 2017 Policy, w hich resulted in WMATA inclu ding an individualized assessment process for those i ndividuals who are initially disq ualified for employment due to a criminal background check. After a preliminary settlement agre ement was reached, the parties continued to negotiate for weeks to determine the language of t he Settlement Agreement. The Court finds the parties engage d in extensive, good-faith, arms- length negotiations to reach a Settlement Agreement. Next, the Court weighs the benefits from the Settlement Agreeme nt against the strength of the Plaintiffs’ case. Through each stage of this l itigation, both Class Counsel and counsel for WMATA argued passion ately and effectively for their positions. It has been evident to the Court from the beginning tha t this is not an easy case a nd would be hard fought from both11 sides. To achieve a final deci sion in their favor and be award ed damages, Plaintiffs would first have to prevail on the merits of t heir argument that WMATA’s Po licy 7.2.3 had a disparate impact on African Americans. 2 Once Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits, each individual clas s member would have had to demonstrate their monetary damages in a Teamsters hearing. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States , 431 U.S. 324 (1977). A positive outcome for Plaintiffs, if they continued with the litig ation, was in no way certain an d would have taken years. The Settlement Agreement provid es compensation now for eligible class members who submitted timely short or long claim forms and incl udes nonmonetary relief because WMATA will continue its 2017 Policy for at least a year after the Court approves the Settlement Agreement. Therefore, class members can reapply to WMATA and receive an individualized assessment of t he results of their background ch eck, rather than simply being disqualified for employment due to a past conviction. The Cour t notes that Class Representative Erick Little has al ready successfully r eapplied, gone through t he individualized assessment process, and been hired by WMAT A as a bus driver. When weighin g the terms of the Settlement against the strength of Plainti ffs’ case, the Court finds this factor supports approval of the Settlement Agreement. Additionally, the Settlement Agr eement was reached after discov ery, briefing, and a decision on class certificati on, after most of fact discovery was completed, but before additional funds were expended on e xpert discovery or summary j udgment briefing. At this point in the litigation the parties have conducted over 50 depo sitions and exchanged almost 300,000 pages of discovery. While, as in all settlements, both sides would have liked to come

2 The Court notes, without ma king any findings on the issue, tha t WMATA has consistently and adamantly proclaimed that Po licy 7.2.3 was developed and utiliz ed for legitimate business purposes and overcoming those arguments would have been a signi ficant challenge for Plaintiffs.12 away with more favorable terms, t he Court finds that the partie s each had significant knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of their cases and came to a fa ir Settlement at a stage of the litigation which also allowed the parties and the Court to be s pared expending extensive resources on additional discove ry, summary judgment briefing, a nd trial. The Court also considers the re action of class members to the S ettlement Agreement. Although the Court re ceived and considered objectio ns from six individuals, the overall response was positive. The objections primarily involv ed challenges to the total amount of monetary damages or the eff ectiveness of the 2017 Policy at WMATA. This litigation and Settlement Agreement do not cover the 2017 Policy and, therefor e, the Court will disregard objections of that nature. The C ourt also finds that objection s to the adequacy of the monetary award were made by few individua ls and are not a sufficient rea son to deny a benefit to the remaining hundreds of individuals t hat will receive monetary aw ards. The Court heard from a number of individuals at the Fairness Hearing on April 18, 2018 who supported the settlement and were thankful to have the c ase finally resolved. The Court notes that a few of those individuals expresse d interest and hope a bout the possibility o f reapplying to WMATA under the 2017 Policy. The overall positive reaction of the class is ano ther factor that w eighs in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement. Finally, the Court considers th e opinion of experienced counsel , which in this case includes Class Counsel and counsel for WMATA. Both sides submi tted extensive memoranda urging the Court to approve the Settlement and explaining why t hey believe it is in both the best interests of the class members , because of the monetary and non monetary relief as well as the certainty of some relief, and of W MATA, for the finality of the litigation and the resolution of all other pending or potential clai ms regarding Policy 7.2.3 (excep t as related to the two individuals13 who opted out of the class). The C ourt finds the opinions of the experienced counsel in this case also weigh in favor of approving t he Settlement Agreement. Having read, reviewed, and consider ed the papers filed with thi s Court in support of final approval of the Settl ement, the objections filed with the Court, oral arguments of counsel, presentations by intereste d class members made at the Fairness Hearing, the Settlement Agreement, and the pleadings file d in this action, and being fu lly informed regarding the facts surrounding the proposed Settlem ent, and based upon this inform ation, the Court has determined that there is a bona fide disput e between the parties concernin g issues of liability, equitable relief, and damages, and that the proposed Settlement should be approved as lawful, fair, adequate, and reasonable. The C ourt will approve the Settlemen t. B. Attorneys’ Fee Award Class Counsel request an awar d of 25% of the Class Settlement F und, or $1.625 million, to cover attorneys’ fees and costs. Of this amount, $ 950,000 will go toward covering the costs paid by Class Counsel to litigate the case, including fee s paid to experts during class certification. The remaini ng $675,000 (11% of the Class Settle ment Fund) will be awarded as attorneys’ fees. A “percenta ge of the fund” methodology is pre ferred in this Circuit because it discourages attorneys from inf lating hours and promotes efficie ncy in litigation. See Swedish Hosp. Corp. , 1 F.3d at 1263. The Court also finds that an a ward of 25% of the Class Settleme nt Fund to cover both costs and fees, or 11% of the Class Settlement Fund to cov er fees, is reasonable and commensurate with fee awards in other common-fund cases. See, e.g. , Wells , 557 F. Supp. 2d at 6 (“Fee awards in common-fund cas es may range from fifteen to f orty-five percent.”); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Acti on Settlements and Their Fee Awards , 7 J. Empirical L. Stud. 811, 833-35 (2010) (f inding that similar per centages of common funds were14 awarded to class counsel in laborand employment cases nationwi de—a mean of 28% and a median of 29%). As discussed above, Class Counsel d emonstrated exceptional skil l in litigating an extremely difficult case and obtaini ng class certification for liability purposes. The case has already lasted approximately f our years and, due to its complex ity, was destined to continue for additional years before a final resolution would be reached. C lass Counsel devoted significant time, more than they will ultima tely be compensated for, and at all times faced a significant risk of nonpayment if the claims were not ultimately successful. Th eir effort resulted in a substantial Class Settlement Fund of $6.5 m illion, which is intended to ben efit a substantial class of between 3,500 and 4,000 individuals. The response from class members t o the Settlement Agreement was overwhelmingly positive and about 640 individuals will rece ive an award ranging from $2,000 to $40,000. For all of these rea sons, the Court will aw ard Class Counsel $1.625 million in attorneys’ fees and costs. C. Service Payment Award Finally, Plaintiffs move to award $70,000 in service payments t o the eight Class Representatives—Erick Little , Timothy McClough, Gerald Tucker, Leroy Quarles, Fitzgerald Stoney, Marcello Virgil, Leon McK enzie, and Louia McKenzie—and Sidney Davis and Joyce Short. 3 Each of the Class Represent atives would receive $7,500 and Mr . Davis and D.W., through Ms. Short, would receive $5,000. Courts routinely compensate name d plaintiffs for the services p rovided and the risks incurred during class act ion litigation. To assess wheth er a service payment is reasonable,

3 Ms. Short is next-friend to D.W ., successor in claims to Lawre nce Whitted, an original named Plaintiff in this litigation.15 courts often consider “the acti ons the plaintiff has taken to p rotect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class benef itted from those actions, and th e amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursu ing the litigation.” In re Lorazepam , 2003 WL 22037741, at *10. As discussed above, the Settlemen t Agreement provides a signifi cant benefit to the class members through mone tary and nonmonetary concessions. Each of the Class Representatives and Messrs. Davis and Whitted played a signific ant role in the litigation and represented the intere sts of the absent class members. They at tended multiple in-person group meetings to discuss the litigation, participated in telephone c onferences, met individually with Class Counsel, and provided documen ts in response to Defendants ’ document requests. All of the Class Representatives and M r. Davis were deposed during cla ss certification discovery and met with Class Counsel prior t o their depositions to prepare. Additionally, the i nformation they shared was often very personal, a s it dealt with prior criminal convictions that caused them to be denied employment by WMATAor its contractors. Therefore, the Court finds a service payment award of $70,000 i s necessary and reasonable and will grant Plaint iffs’ Motion for Approval of Se rvice Payments.
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ Moti on for Final Approval of Proposed Class Ac tion Settlement, Dkt. 240, and gra nt Plaintiffs’ Motion for Approval of Service Payments, D kt. 241. A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: April 27, 2018 /s/ ROSEMARY M. COLLYER United States District Judge