In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2094

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RAKESH WAHI,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 11-CR-30043 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 10, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 2, 2017

____________________

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Circuit precedent holds that a district 

court has inherent authority to reopen a closed criminal case 

to consider a request to expunge the judicial record based on 

an equitable balancing test that weighs the public and 

private interests at stake. See United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 

737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Janik, 10 F.3d 470, 472 

(7th Cir. 1993). We’re asked to decide whether this precedent 

is sound in light of Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of 
2 No. 15-2094

America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994). Kokkonen clarified that ancillary 

jurisdiction exists for two limited purposes: (1) to permit 

claims that are factually interdependent to be resolved in a 

single proceeding; and (2) to enable the court to “manage its 

proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Id. at 380.

Ancillary jurisdiction is the formal name for the inherent 

power recognized in Flowers and Janik. But a petition for 

equitable expungement satisfies neither of Kokkonen’s criteria 

for the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction. Because Flowers

and Janik cannot be reconciled with Kokkonen, they are 

overruled.1 This holding brings our circuit into conformity 

with a growing appellate consensus: Every circuit that has

specifically addressed this question in light of Kokkonen has

held that the district court lacks ancillary jurisdiction to hear

requests for equitable expungement. Doe v. United States, 

833 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Field, 756 F.3d 

911, 916 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 

52 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Meyer, 439 F.3d 855, 859–60

(8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 479

(3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014

(9th Cir. 2000). These decisions recognize that expungement 

authority is not inherent but instead must be grounded in a 

jurisdictional source found in the Constitution or statutes.

Here, however, the district judge was bound by existing 

circuit precedent. She acknowledged the force of Kokkonen 

 1 Because this opinion overrules circuit precedent, we have circulated it 

to all judges in active service in accordance with Circuit Rule 40(e). No 

judge voted to hear the case en banc.
No. 15-2094 3

but nonetheless took jurisdiction over Rakesh Wahi’s expungement petition, weighed the equities under the balancing test approved in Flowers and Janik, and concluded that 

his circumstances did not warrant expungement. We vacate

that decision and remand with instructions to dismiss the 

petition for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background

Drs. Gautam Gupta and Rakesh Wahi operated nutrition 

clinics throughout Illinois. In 2011 they were indicted on 

charges of mail fraud, healthcare fraud, and conspiracy to 

defraud Medicaid, private insurers, and their patients. 

Gupta fled the country, but Wahi faced the charges. After 

more than a year of pretrial proceedings, the government 

learned that during the execution of a search warrant for 

electronic records, an FBI Special Agent had inadvertently 

accessed emails that might have contained communications 

covered by the attorney-client privilege. A prosecutor advised the court that although the breach was “likely minimal 

and unintentional,” it was “impossible at this stage” to 

determine whether the agent’s access to privileged communications had “spread in any manner to others on the prosecution team.”

Because the prejudice to Wahi’s case was unknown, the 

government moved to dismiss the indictment. The judge 

granted the motion, dismissed the indictment, and ordered 

the government to file all discovery materials with the clerk 

under seal. The judge retained jurisdiction for the limited 

purpose of monitoring the government’s compliance with 

the turnover order. The government promptly complied and 

the case was closed.
4 No. 15-2094

More than two years later, Wahi filed a pro se petition for

expungement of the judicial and FBI records related to his

case.2 He alleged that the public information about the case

was inhibiting his ability to obtain employment in the 

medical profession commensurate with his education and 

experience. Relying on Kokkonen, the government resisted

the petition on jurisdictional grounds. In light of circuit 

precedent, however, the government also addressed the 

petition on the merits, arguing that Wahi’s circumstances 

didn’t warrant the exceptional remedy of expungement.

The judge approached Wahi’s petition in two steps. First, 

she acknowledged that our caselaw—namely, Flowers and 

Janik—supports jurisdiction over requests to expunge judicial

records but not records maintained by the executive branch. 

Flowers, 389 F.3d at 738–39; Janik, 10 F.3d at 472. She also 

acknowledged that Flowers and Janik may be on shaky 

ground under Kokkonen. Bound by circuit precedent, however, the judge proceeded to the merits, but only to the extent 

that Wahi sought expungement of the judicial records in his 

case; she did not take jurisdiction over his request to expunge FBI records.3 In the second step, the judge held a 

hearing, applied the balancing test described in Flowers and 

Janik, and concluded that Wahi’s circumstances did not 

justify the extraordinary remedy of expungement.

 2 To be clear, Wahi sought expungement of the publicly available FBI

records in his case (i.e., records regarding his arrest and indictment). He 

did not seek expungement of the FBI’s nonpublic files.

3 Wahi has abandoned his quest to expunge FBI records; he does not 

challenge the judge’s refusal to take jurisdiction over this aspect of his 

expungement petition.
No. 15-2094 5

Wahi appealed, initially representing himself, as he had 

in the district court. After briefing was completed, however, 

counsel appeared on his behalf and sought leave to file a 

supplemental brief. We granted the motion and also allowed 

the government an opportunity to respond. So we have the 

benefit of counseled adversarial briefing on both the jurisdictional and merits questions. As we’ll explain, our cases

regarding the district court’s inherent power to expunge 

judicial records are inconsistent with Kokkonen and thus 

require reconsideration.

II. Analysis

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They 

possess only that power authorized by Constitution and 

statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” 

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (citations omitted). We begin our 

analysis by noting what is probably obvious: The district 

court’s statutory original criminal jurisdiction cannot support Wahi’s petition for expungement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 

(“The district courts of the United States shall have original 

jurisdiction ... of all offenses against the laws of the United 

States.”). The charges against Wahi had long since been 

dismissed when he filed his petition; the entry of final 

judgment in the case ended the court’s § 3231 jurisdiction.

A handful of statutes give the court expungement authority, but only for certain types of records and in special 

classes of cases not relevant here. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1565(e) 

(requiring expungement of DNA records if a military conviction is overturned); 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d) (allowing expungement of FBI DNA records if a conviction is overturned); 

18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) (permitting expungement motions in 

certain drug-possession cases). No statute vests the court 
6 No. 15-2094

with the general power to expunge the judicial record of a 

criminal case on purely equitable grounds.

That leaves ancillary jurisdiction as the only possible 

source of jurisdiction for Wahi’s expungement petition. The 

term “ancillary jurisdiction” refers to the court’s power to 

hear claims that are closely linked to other claims over which 

the court’s jurisdiction is otherwise secure. As the Supreme 

Court explained in Kokkonen, the doctrine holds that the 

federal courts have a limited inherent authority to assert

jurisdiction “over some matters (otherwise beyond their 

competence) that are incidental to other matters properly 

before them.” 511 U.S. at 378.

The precise question in Kokkonen was whether the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction authorized a district court to 

hear a postjudgment motion to enforce a settlement agreement when the court’s dismissal order neither incorporated 

the agreement’s terms nor reserved jurisdiction to enforce it. 

Id. at 376–77. The original lawsuit in Kokkonen was filed in 

state court, alleged only state-law claims, and was removed 

to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 

376. The parties eventually settled the case, and the district 

judge entered an order of dismissal that made no mention of 

the settlement agreement. Id. at 377. When a dispute arose 

over one party’s compliance with its obligations under the 

agreement, the counterparty returned to court and asked the 

judge to enforce the agreement. Relying on “inherent power,” the district judge issued an order of enforcement, and

the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id.

The Supreme Court reversed, id. at 382, observing that a 

motion to enforce a settlement agreement “requires its own 

basis for jurisdiction,” id. at 378. The district court’s invoca-
No. 15-2094 7

tion of “inherent power” could only have been understood 

as a reference to ancillary jurisdiction. The Court explained 

that this form of jurisdiction exists for “two separate, though 

sometimes related, purposes: (1) to permit disposition by a 

single court of claims that are, in varying respects and 

degrees, factually interdependent, and (2) to enable a court 

to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, 

vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Id. at 379–

80 (citations omitted).

“Neither of these heads,” the Court said, “supports the 

present assertion of jurisdiction.” Id. at 380. First, the facts of 

the original suit and the facts of a claim for breach of the 

settlement agreement “have nothing to do with each other; it 

would neither be necessary nor even particularly efficient 

that they be adjudicated together.” Id. Second, the power to 

adjudicate an alleged breach of a settlement agreement “is 

quite remote from what courts require in order to perform 

their functions.” Id. The judgment in the underlying case 

consisted of a simple dismissal order, “a disposition that is 

in no way flouted or imperiled by the alleged breach of the

settlement agreement.” Id. Instead, the postjudgment dispute was a garden-variety contract claim. The facts to be 

determined in a claim for breach of a settlement agreement

“are quite separate from the facts to be determined in the 

principal suit, and automatic jurisdiction over such contracts 

is in no way essential to the conduct of federal-court business.” Id. at 381.

The case would be “quite different,” the Court observed,

if the dismissal order had retained jurisdiction to enforce the 

settlement agreement or incorporated its terms. Id. “In that 

event, a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the 
8 No. 15-2094

order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement 

would therefore exist.” Id. But the dismissal order in 

Kokkonen—written by the parties themselves—did neither of 

these things, and “[a]bsent such action, ... enforcement of 

the settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is 

some independent basis for federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 382.

Kokkonen’s clarification of the permissible scope of ancillary jurisdiction requires us to revisit Flowers and Janik, our 

equitable-expungement cases. Like the lower courts’ assertion of jurisdiction in Kokkonen, our treatment of jurisdiction 

in these opinions rests on unexamined assumptions about 

the district court’s inherent authority.

Flowers is our most recent opinion on the subject; it postdates Kokkonen but does not mention the case. Indeed,

Flowers skims over the jurisdictional question without much 

discussion at all, simply citing Janik for the proposition that 

although district courts lack jurisdiction to expunge 

executive-branch records, the “district courts do have jurisdiction to expunge records maintained by the judicial 

branch.” 389 F.3d at 738–39. Beyond that, Flowers is silent on 

the jurisdictional issue; the rest of the opinion is devoted to 

the balancing test for equitable expungement. Id. at 739–40.

Relying again on Janik, Flowers explains that “[t]he test for 

the expungement of judicial records is a balancing test: ‘if 

the dangers of unwarranted adverse consequences to the 

individual outweigh the public interest in maintenance of 

the records, then expunction is appropriate.’” Id. at 739 

(quoting Janik, 10 F.3d at 472). But Flowers added a thumb on 

the scale: The court held that because the public has a strong 

interest in maintaining “accurate and undoctored records,”

the balance “very rarely tips in favor of expungement.” Id.
No. 15-2094 9

Janik, for its part, draws on two earlier cases—Scruggs v. 

United States, 929 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1991), and Diamond v. 

United States, 649 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1981)—neither of which 

directly addresses the court’s authority to expunge judicial 

records. Scruggs involved a request to expunge an arrest

record; we explained that no statute authorized the district 

court to expunge arrest records, and “even if” the court had 

the authority to do so, the district judge had not abused his 

discretion in declining the request. 929 F.2d at 307.

Along the way to this holding, Scruggs clarified that

while “some cases” (including our own circuit’s decision in

Diamond) contain loose language about the district court’s 

“inherent powers to obliterate arrest records,” the court’s

inherent authority actually doesn’t reach that far. Id. at 306. 

Whatever else might be said about the scope of inherent 

power, it is plainly limited to “the management of judicial 

business” and does not include “supervisory powers over 

the behavior of the Executive Branch of the government.” Id.

This part of Scruggs is in significant tension with Diamond, 

which authorized district judges to expunge arrest records 

using a case-specific balancing test without ever addressing

the source of the court’s authority over records held by the 

executive branch. 649 F.2d at 499. Although Scruggs noted 

this flaw in Diamond, the case remains on the books, and the 

balancing test it approved is carried forward to Janik and 

Flowers. And again, neither Scruggs nor Diamond has anything to say about the source of the court’s authority to 

expunge judicial records. 

It should be clear from this brief survey that Flowers and 

Janik are built on a weak foundation, resting as they do on a

series of unexplained assertions—what we’ve described 
10 No. 15-2094

elsewhere as “the judicial equivalent of a rumor chain.”

Thomas v. Clements, 797 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2015). Perhaps 

it goes too far to characterize them as “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” lacking in any precedential effect whatsoever. 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998); see 

also Magruder v. Fid. Brokerage Servs. LLC, 818 F.3d 285, 289

(7th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n unreasoned assertion of jurisdiction 

lacks precedential value.”). Still, there is good reason to 

revisit the jurisdictional issue that both decisions treated so 

perfunctorily. Neither opinion addresses the effect of the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Kokkonen. (Janik predates it; 

Flowers overlooks it.) When an intervening Supreme Court 

decision unsettles our precedent, it is the ruling of the Court 

that sits on 1 First Street that must carry the day. See De Leon 

Castellanos v. Holder, 652 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Cir. 2011); Reiser 

v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 

2004).

Starting afresh and applying Kokkonen, we now conclude

that the district court’s ancillary jurisdiction does not stretch 

so far as to permit the assertion of jurisdiction over a petition 

to expunge the judicial record in a criminal case on purely 

equitable grounds. First, a request for equitable expungement is not factually dependent on the underlying criminal 

case in any sense that matters. Instead, it will always turn on

facts collateral to or arising after the case is over—in short, 

matters external to the criminal case itself. For example, here

Wahi alleges that he has been unable to secure professional 

employment because of the reputational taint associated 

with the public record of his indictment and arrest. In another case a defendant might claim that his postjudgment good 

behavior justifies expungement. Other scenarios can be 

imagined. The material point is that expungement based on 
No. 15-2094 11

an equitable balancing test that weighs the public and 

private interests in maintaining the judicial record is a 

wholly collateral inquiry based on new facts and, frankly, a 

policy choice. As such, it is not incidental to anything 

properly before the court and “requires its own basis for 

jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378. 

Second, the power to expunge judicial records on equitable grounds is not incidental to the court’s ability to function 

successfully as a court. Equitable expungement is not needed

to enable the court to “manage its proceedings” for the 

simple reason that the criminal proceedings are over. Id. at 

380. Nor is expungement authority needed to enable the 

court to “vindicate its authority” or “effectuate its decrees.” 

Id. Expungement is not a remedial tool to enforce a ruling in 

the underlying criminal case. In short, equitable expungement “is in no way essential to the conduct of federal-court 

business.” Id. at 381.

Properly understood, then, ancillary jurisdiction does not

include a general equitable power to expunge judicial records in a criminal case. Expungement authority must instead

have a source in the Constitution or statutes. In light of 

Kokkonen, Flowers and Janik are overruled. To the extent that 

any language in Scruggs or Diamond suggests that the district 

court has inherent power to order expungement of judicial 

records, that language is withdrawn.

With this holding we join five of our sister circuits, each 

of which has read Kokkonen to preclude the assertion of 

ancillary jurisdiction over a request to expunge judicial 

records on purely equitable grounds. See Doe, 833 F.3d at 

199; Field, 756 F.3d at 916; Coloian, 480 F.3d at 52; Meyer, 

439 F.3d at 859–60; Dunegan, 251 F.3d at 479; Sumner, 
12 No. 15-2094

226 F.3d at 1014. No circuit has rejected this understanding 

of Kokkonen. Our status as an outlier is another compelling 

reason to overrule. See Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 

570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that circuit

precedent may justifiably be overruled “when our position 

remains a minority one among other circuits [or] when the 

Supreme Court issues a decision on an analogous issue that 

compels us to reconsider our position”) (citation omitted).

Here, the district judge faithfully followed existing circuit 

precedent, as she was required to do, and denied Wahi’s 

expungement petition on the merits using the balancing test 

approved in Flowers and Janik. We VACATE that decision and 

REMAND with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.