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NON
- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION
- SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES STYNE HASKINS

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 163 WDA 2023 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 6 , 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP

- 02

- CR

- 0008050

- 2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: November 7, 2023
James Haskins (Appellant) appeals from the January 6, 2023, judgment

of sentence entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, after the

t rial c o urt convicted A ppellant of one count of r esisting ar rest. 1 On appeal,

A ppellant solely challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, alleging the
Commonwealth failed to prove that he intended to prevent a public serv a nt from conducting a lawful arrest . Based on the following, we affirm.

I. Facts & Procedural History

The underlying facts concerning the A ppellant’s conviction are taken

from the trial testimony and are summarized as follows:

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.J

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On the evening of October 3, 2021, Tarentum Borough Police Officer
Jeremy Belusar, was on routine patrol and stopped at a red light in the right

lane

. See N.T., 10/5/ 22, at 17. Officer Jeremy Belusar observed Appellant’s
car, a gold s e dan, stopped two car lengths behind him in the left lane. Id. at

1 6

. Noting this behavior, Officer Belusar ran the vehicle’s registration and

discovered there was an arrest warrant for the owner of the vehicle

– James

Haskins

. Id. Upon learning of the warrant, Officer Belusar initiated a traffic
stop. Id. The officer “confirmed that the driver was in fact Appellant.” Trial
Ct. Op. at 3

. Officer Belusar then notified dispatch that he would be initiating the stop
and requested additional units as backup

. See N.T at 17. Officer Belusar
activated his overhead lights. Appellant’s vehicle abruptly stopped before
continuing to the nearest parking lot. A ppellant exited his vehicle and “began
yelling and advancing aggressively toward [Officer Belusar’s] position.” Id.

at 18. The officer observed A ppellant clench his fist s at his sides and pace
back and forth between the two vehicles, demanding to know the reason for
the stop. Id. Officer Belusar ordered Appellant to “ get back in his vehicle [,] ”

and later , “to get on the ground several times.” Id. Appellant repeatedly
ignored all these commands

. Id. Consequently, Officer Belusar engaged his

taser which had little effect on A ppellant

. Id. at 19. Appellant was able to rip

the cords from hi s body and resumed yelling and pacing angrily. Id. ShortlyJ

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thereafter, other officers arrived to assist , including Officer Bajack , 2 who
commanded Appellant to get down on the ground. Id. at 19

- 20. Appellant
again refused to comply, and the officer discharged his taser, which also did
not incapacitate Ap pellant. Id. at 19

- 20

. Eventually, the officers tackled Appellant to the ground, “advising him
multiple times to put his hands behind his back.” N.T. at 20. Appellant pushed
off the ground numerous times, but ultimately , the officers took him into
custody. See i

d.
Subsequently, Officer Belusar charged Appellant with r esisting a rrest ,

o bstructing a dministration of la w or o ther g overnment f unction , d isorderly

c onduct , and c areless d riving

. 3
On October 5, 2022, A ppellant, appeared before the Honorable Bruce R.

Beemer for a n on - j ury trial. Officer Belusar and Appellant both took the stand

and testified. In his defense, Appellant stated he exited his vehicle and “put
[his] h ands outstretched ” while repea tedly asking the officers why he was
pulled over. N.T. at 28. At first, Appellant testified that he did not make any
attempts to strike the officers, but later admitted that he exited his vehicle
against the officer’s direction and advanced toward the officer , in order to
“stand his ground.” Id. at 30, 32. Appellant reasoned that he was emotional

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

2 Officer Bajack’s first name does not appear in the record.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § § 5101, 5503(a)(4); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714

.J

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given the fact that his vehicle was undergoing repairs and he had a limited

amount of pow er steering fluid left

. See i d. at 27

- 28. He also indicated that

he was not aware there was a warrant out for his arrest. See i d. at 31.
At the conclusion of the trial, t h e t rial c ourt found Appellant guilty of
resisting arrest , explain ing its rationale as follows : [O]nce the lawful stop is effectuated and the officers had the information that [Appellant] has an active warrant for another county out for him, [he] simply cannot engage in the act that he did

-- which, by his own admission, he di d

-- which is[:] get out of his vehicle, approach the officer and essentially demand the information that he was looking for, and thereby, not engage in lawful compliance, get on the ground to engage in th e other type of questions. . . . And the officer w as placed in a position of having to deploy a taser, to gain control of the s ituation ; particularly, when he was isolated as a single officer before the second officer arrived, it’s clear that they had to employ means that justified or to overcome their re sistance in this case.
I found the testimony credible that he was not compliant. He didn’t comply with the orders to get on the ground. Now, maybe in his own mind, he felt he didn’t get an answer to a question that he wanted, but they discharged a tas er, it didn’t cause him to get on the ground and be compliant, it caused him to remove the cords, and he ended up getting tased a second time. And then, when they had to take him to the ground, he was pushing off of the ground, he wouldn’t put his hand s b ehind his back. The fact that the officers were not injured does not mean that there was not a substantial risk of bodily injury that was created for one or both of the officers.

N.T. at 42

- 43 (paragraph break added)

. The court acquitted him of the
remaining charges.J

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On January 6, 2023, t he t rial c ourt sentenced Appellant to a term of 18
months’ probation. Appellant did not file any post

- motions but did file a timely
notice of appeal. 4

II. Issue
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant argues there was insufficient

evidence to support a finding that he intended to prevent his own arrest. See
Appellant Brief at 11. Appellant points out that while he “did not comply with
the officer’s orders to get back in his vehicle or to get on the ground[,]” he
did not “advance toward Officer Belusar, aggressively or otherwise .” Id. at

12

- 13. He alleges that when the officer wantonly shot him with the taser, he

maintains he was merely pacing back and forth and focuses on the fact that

he was never told the reason for the stop, stating:
[T] he mere fact that [Appellant] persistently asked Officer Belusar why he had been pulled over did not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he intended to prevent the officer from discharging his duties. Although [Appellant] was clearly frustrated and upset at the time of the inc ident, these emotions were not evidence of his defiance and resistance. This is particularly true given the fact that Officer Belusar admitted that [Appellant] was stopped not because of hazardous driving behavior, but because of an unrelated arrest warra nt. Furthermore, Officer Belusar admitted that he never told [Appellant] why he had been stopped. Consequently, even in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence failed to sufficiently prove that it was [Appellant]’ s conscious object to

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

4 On February 10, 2023, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed on a timely concise statement on March 3, 2023. The trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925( a ) opinion on April 25, 2023.J

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cause the result of preventing police from effectuating the arrest. [He] was not even aware of the reason for being pulled over.

Id. (record citation omitted).
Moreover, Appellant contends the trial court’s reliance on

Commonwealth v. McDonald , 17 A.3d 12 82 (Pa. Super. 2011), is misplaced

and its analysis is flawed because the sufficiency issue in McDonald

concerned the substantial force element of resisting a r rest and failed to

account for the intent element. See Appel lant Brief at 12. Appellant also
juxtaposes his conduct with instances where defendants attempted to strike

or pulled and pushed away from officers

. See id. at 14, citing

Commonwealth v. Schlier , 206 EDA 2020 (unpub. mem o .) (Pa. Super

. Oct.
7, 2020) and Commonwealth v. Albano , 166 EDA 2021 (unpub. mem o .)
(Pa. Super. Nov. 10, 2021). Appellant argues these defendants demonstrated
a “specific intent,” unlike the instant case, where “there was no evidence that
[Appellant] intentionally mov ed away from the police.” Appellant’s Brief at 13.

III. Standard of Review
Our standard of review concerning a sufficiency argument is well

settled.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every ele ment of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As an appellate court, we may not re

- weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact

- finder. Any question of doubt is for the fact

- finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusiveJ

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tha t as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Martin , 297 A.3d 424, 434 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation
omitted).

IV. The Elements of Resisting Arrest 

### A person commits the crime of r esisting arrest , in relevant part, when

“ with the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest
or discharging any other duty, [ the ] person creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means
justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance. ” 18

Pa.C.S. § 5104

. “Section 5104 criminalizes two types of conduct intended to
prevent a lawful arrest: the creation of a substantial risk of bodily injury to
the officer or anyone else or means justifying or requiring a substantial force

to overcome.” Commonwealth v. Clemens , 242 A.3d 659, 666 (Pa. Super.
2020) ( citation & inte rnal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, we note that
evidence of “passive resistance requiring substantial force to overcome” has
previously been held to provide sufficient evidence to support a resisting arrest

conviction. Commonwealth v. Thompson , 922 A.2d 926, 928 (Pa. Super.
2007)

. Because Appellant adv ances an argument that focuses on his alleged

lack of intent , we note the following:

As a general rule, therefore, it is not criminal merely to flee arrest. However, where the circumstances of the flight exposeJ

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the pursuing officers to substantial danger a conviction for resisting arrest is proper. The statute, it is clear, does not require the aggressive use of force such as a striking or kicking of the officer.

Commonwealth v. Miller , 475 A.2d 145, 146 ( Pa. Super. 1984) ( citations &
quotation marks omitted). “ [I] ntent can be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct or from the attendant

circumstances. ” Commonwealth v. Rahman , 75 A.3d 497, 503 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citation & quotation marks omitted).

V. Analysis

The trial court explained its rationale for finding Appellant guilty of
resisting arrest as follow s : Appellant does not dispute that Officer Belusar conducted a lawful traffic stop on October 3, 2021 after learning that Appellant had an active warrant. Nor does Appellant contest that he acted in the manner described by Officer Belusar. It is clear from the record, that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verd ict winner, the evidence was sufficient to establish the crime of resisting arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. From the moment Appellant exited his vehicle he created an aggressive and tension

- filled situation. Despite multiple orders and the display and deployment of a taser by Officer Belusar, A ppellant persisted in his actions because of his desire to find out why he was pulled over. Appellant never changed his stan ce , even after Officer Be lus ar later displayed his firearm and an assisting officer also deployed his taser. All efforts to force Appellant to comply and to gain control over the situation failed, for no other reason than Appellant’s continued aggressive behavior. Even as multiple officers physically took Appellant to the ground, he continu ed to resist by refusing to place his hands behind his back. See Commonwealth v. McDonald , 17 A.3d 1282 (Pa. Super. 2011) (Conviction for resisting arrest affirmed where the actor was wrestled to the ground by multiple officers, refused commands, and phys ically resisted while under threat of being tasered, resulting in the ultimate deployment of the taser.)J

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Trial Ct. Op. at 5

- 6

. We agree with the trial court’s determination. Appellant does not

contest the circumstances surrounding the incident, including the fact that he
was lawfully stopped based on an outstanding warrant or that he behaved in
an aggressive manner towards the officers

. Rather, he claims he lacked the
necessary intent largely by blaming Offi cer Belusar for not tell ing him why he
was pulled over

. See Appellant Brief at 13. Additionally , h e attributes his

conduct to frustrations stemming from a purported l ack of steering fluid to
operate his car

. Id. Appellant’s portrayal that he never intentionally
exercised aggressi ve behav ior or moved away from the police is misplaced.

A review of the record reveals that once Officer Belusar initiated the
traffic stop, Appellant immediately exited his vehicle and “began yelling and
advancing aggressively toward ” the officer. N.T. at 18. Officer Belusar
repeatedly ordered Appellant to “get back in his vehicle[,]” and “to get on the

groun d[,] ” which Appellant ignored. Id. Officer Belusar engaged his taser , but Appellant was able to rip the c ords from his body and resumed yelling and
being noncompliant

. Id. Additionally, Officer Bajack commanded Appellant
to get down on the ground , to which Appellant again refused to comply

. Id.

at 19

- 20. Officer Bajack also discharged his taser, which did not disable
Appellant. Id. T he officers then tried to tackle Appellant to the ground,
“advising him multiple times to put his hands behind his back [,] ” but even then, he pushed off the ground numerous times. See id. at 20. Appellant’sJ

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intent “ ma y be inferred ” from his act ions and “ the attendant circumstances.”

Rahman , 75 A.3d at 503

. He repeated ly ignored the officers’ instructions and

their attempts to immobilize him with taser guns — in essence, his intent was

to prevent them from effectuating a lawful arrest. With respect to Appellant’s argument regarding the trial court’s reliance

on McDonald , supra, we find that it is erroneous. While the intent element
was not specifically at issue in McDonald , it is evident the trial court cited to

th at case because it had a similar set of facts and the court wanted to point

out that this Court previously upheld a resisting arrest conviction based on
comparable circumstances

. Furthermore, h is reference to Schlier , 206 EDA

2020 (unpub. memo.) , and Albano , 166 EDA 2021 (unpub. memo.) , as distinguishable because he did not possess any specific intent to strike or
physically assault the officers is misplaced. W e observe that while the incident
may have not created “a substanti al risk of bodily injury to [ Officer Belusar]
or anyone else [,]” the office rs had to resort to “ 

### substantial force to overcome
[Appellant’s] resistance.” See Clemens , 242 A.3d at 666 ; 

### 18 Pa.C.S. §

5104. Therefore, the Commonwealth was not required to show specific intent

to aggressively harm the officers. See Miller , 475 A.2d at 146

. Moreover,
Appellant’s actions amount ed to “passive resistance [,] ” which necessitated the

substantial force taken by the officers to overcome his actions

. See
Thompson , 922 A.2d at 928 ( defendant resisted arrest when she “interlocked
her arms and legs” with her husband and “held her arms tightly beneath” theJ

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officer when he commanded her “several times to put her ha nds behind [her]
back” and officers deployed pepper spray )

. Accordingly, even though
Appellant may not have possessed the specific intent to physically attack the
officers, his conduct in preventing the officers from restraining him by use of

tasers and other methods provided sufficient evidence to sustain his

conviction.

We also point out that Appellant relies on selective testimony in
presenting his version of the incident. However, i t is clear that the trial court,
as finder of fact, had exclusive jurisdiction to weigh all of the evidence,
determine the credibility of the witnesses, and resolve any inconsistencies in
their testimony. Here, it found Officer Belusar’s testimony regarding
Appellant ’ s conduct credible. See N.T. at 42

- 43; see also Martin , 297 A.3d

at 434. Appellant ’ s arguments would have this Court supplant the trial court ’ s credibility determinations with our own, which we cannot to do. See id.
Viewing the evid ence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we
agree with the trial court ’ s determination that the Commonwealth presented
sufficient evidence that Appellant resisted arrest. See id

. Judgment of sentence affirmed.J

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11/7/2023