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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37526

FRANZ SUHADOLNIK and BETTY 

SUHADOLNIK, individually and as husband 

and wife,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SCOTT H. PRESSMAN, M.D., SCOTT H. 

PRESSMAN, M.D., a limited liability 

company, THE EYE ASSOCIATES, P.A., an 

Idaho corporation, and BUSINESS 

ENTITIES I through X, and JOHN DOE 

AND JANE DOE, husband and wife, I 

through X,

 Defendants-Respondents.

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Boise, May 2011 Term

2011 Opinion No. 58

Filed: May 25, 2011

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 

Idaho, Ada County. Honorable Patrick H. Owen, District Judge.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Pedersen and Whitehead, Twin Falls, for appellants. Jarom A. Whitehead argued.

Carey Perkins LLP, Boise, for respondents. Terrence S. Jones argued.

_____________________

J. JONES, Justice.

This is a medical malpractice case arising from a cataract operation performed by Dr. 

Scott Pressman on plaintiff-appellant Franz Suhadolnik. The Suhadolniks appeal the district 

court’s summary judgment order in favor of Respondents based on its determination that the 

Appellants’ expert, Dr. Hofbauer, failed to adequately inform himself on the local standard of 

care. We affirm.
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I.

Factual and Procedural History

Appellant Franz Suhadolnik argues that his cataract surgeon, Dr. Pressman, failed to 

adequately inquire about his prior use of the prescription drug Flomax,

1 which resulted in 

increased risks during surgery and a lack of informed consent. Suhadolnik further argues that, as 

early as 2005, there were indications in medical journals and an advisory from the Food and 

Drug Administration (FDA)2 that prior use of Flomax puts patients at risk of greater

complications during cataract surgery.

3

Suhadolnik met with Dr. Pressman at The Eye Associates in Boise, in October of 2005, to 

discuss the possibility of cataract surgery. During this visit, Dr. Pressman performed an eye 

exam, and informed Suhadolnik that he would need cataract surgery at some point in the future. 

Suhadolnik completed a medical history form during the visit, which did not list Flomax as a 

current medication. Suhadolnik testified that this description was accurate because he started 

taking the medication in December of 2005 (two months after the October visit), pursuant to a 

prescription from his personal care physician, Dr. Paris. After experiencing several ill side 

effects, Suhadolnik quit taking Flomax in approximately January of 2006, but resumed use of the 

prescription in a lesser dosage after the cataract surgery with Dr. Pressman. 

Suhadolnik elected to forgo cataract surgery until May of 2006, when he contacted The 

Eye Associates and was informed he needed a clearance for surgery from his physician. Dr. Paris 

performed this exam on May 25, 2006, and cleared him for surgery. The first page of the

document created during this exam lists “current medications” taken by Suhadolnik as: 

Simvastatin, Cyclocort, Lisinopril, and “FLOMAX 0.4MG, 1 TAB QD-days, 30, Ref: 11.” 

Flomax is also separately identified as a prescription on the second page. Dr. Pressman testified 

that this document was in his file, and presumably available to him prior to the surgery, but that 

he had no recollection of reviewing it prior to Suhadolnik’s surgery. 

On May 30, 2006, Suhadolnik went to The Eye Associates for a pre-operation visit. 

During this visit, Suhadolnik completed another medical history form, and signed consent forms. 

The medical history form asked the patient to “List all meds and dosages you use,” and only 

 1 Flomax is a medication that relaxes the muscles around the bladder to aid males with urination. 2 Appellants failed to include this FDA advisory in the record of this appeal. Therefore, we decline to consider its 

contents. 3 Dr. Pressman acknowledged some evidence of increased risks during cataract surgery as a result of prior use of 

Flomax, but stated that at the time of Suhadolnik’s surgery in 2006, this data was still inconclusive. 
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Zocor and Lisinopril were identified in response. The additional paperwork completed during 

this visit included an informed consent form for the cataract surgery, which warned that: 1) the 

results of the surgery could not be guaranteed; 2) complications of the surgery to remove the 

cataract could make vision in the eye worse; and 3) lens implantation may include loss of corneal 

clarity, infection, an inability to dilate the pupil, and dislocation of the lens and retina. Yet 

another form identified the risks of anesthesia. 

Dr. Pressman performed the cataract surgery on May 31, 2006. During the surgery, 

Suhadolnik’s lens capsule came out of position allowing vitreous fluid to come into the anterior 

chamber of the eye. Pressman removed the fluid and placed an intraocular lens in the anterior 

portion of the eye; however, the preferable position for the lens is in the posterior position of the 

eye. After the surgery, Dr. Pressman asked Suhadolnik about prior use of Flomax, or a similar 

medication, that could cause a floppy iris such as was experienced during Suhadolnik’s surgery.

According to Dr. Pressman, this was the first time he learned of Suhadolnik’s prior use of 

Flomax. Suhadolnik underwent additional surgery in 2007, but remains “legally blind in the 

affected eye.”

Franz and Betty Suhadolnik filed this action in May of 2008, alleging that the defendants 

provided negligent care in the performance of Suhadolnik’s cataract surgery. They also allege

that the defendants failed to obtain Suhadolnik’s informed consent as required by I.C. §§ 39-

4501 through 39-4507. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that: 1) Dr. 

Pressman’s affidavit was sufficient to shift the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate that a

material fact existed regarding a breach of the local standard of care; and 2) Dr. Pressman

obtained the requisite consent from Suhadolnik prior to surgery because the risks of Flomax were 

inconclusive at the time of the surgery. In response, the Suhadolniks submitted the affidavit of 

Dr. Hofbauer in support of their argument that Dr. Pressman failed to meet the local standard of 

care and failed to obtain Suhadolnik’s informed consent. However, the district court determined 

that Dr. Hofbauer’s affidavit was inadmissible because he failed to demonstrate actual 

knowledge of the local standard of care and, therefore, granted summary judgment to the 

defendants on both counts. The Suhadolniks appealed to this Court.
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II.

Issues on Appeal

I. Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. 

Hofbauer’s affidavit on the ground that he did not demonstrate actual 

knowledge of the local standard of care?

II. Whether the Suhadolniks waived any arguments concerning their 

informed consent claims because they failed to separately address them in 

briefing?

III. Whether the Respondents are entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

III.

Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Before determining whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact to preclude summary judgment, this Court must first address the admissibility of 

expert testimony. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816, 

819 (2002).

The admissibility of the expert testimony is an issue that is separate and distinct 

from whether that testimony is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact 

sufficient to preclude summary judgment. . . . The liberal construction and 

reasonable inferences standard does not apply, however, when deciding whether 

or not testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment is 

admissible. 

Id. (internal citations omitted). 

When analyzing whether testimony offered in connection with a motion for 

summary judgment is admissible, this Court applies an abuse of discretion 

standard. An abuse of discretion review requires a three-part inquiry: (1) whether 

the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 

court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 

legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached 

its decision by an exercise of reason. A district court’s evidentiary rulings will not 

be disturbed by this Court unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.

McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221-22, 159 P.3d 

856, 858-59 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
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B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Dr. Hofbauer failed to 

demonstrate actual knowledge of the local standard of care.

A precondition to the admission of testimony by a medical expert in a malpractice case is 

that the expert familiarize himself with the local standard of practice or care for the medical 

practice field at issue in the case. I.C. § 6-1013. The Suhadolniks contend that their medical 

expert, Dr. Hofbauer, adequately familiarized himself with the standard of care for 

ophthalmologists practicing in Boise by reviewing the deposition of Dr. Pressman. They point 

out that Dr. Pressman testified in his deposition that the standard of care requires the taking of an 

adequate patient history, keeping current with medical literature and FDA advisories and 

advising patients of the risks and complications of the surgical procedure at issue so that they 

may make an informed decision as to whether to proceed. They contend that Dr. Hofbauer based 

his testimony on these standards and that the district court erred in concluding otherwise. 

Furthermore, they point to inconsistencies between Dr. Pressman’s deposition testimony and 

statements in his affidavit, contending that the district court erred in failing to take the 

inconsistencies into account in determining the inferences to be drawn from his testimony. 

Respondents argue that Dr. Hofbauer failed to demonstrate how he familiarized himself 

with the local standard of care, pointing out that Dr. Pressman’s deposition did not provide 

sufficient information regarding any relevant standard of care. Respondents also argue that there 

is no evidence that a local standard has been replaced by state or federal regulatory standards

such that Dr. Hofbauer’s knowledge of the national standards would be sufficient to define the

local standard of care. Finally, Respondents argue that resolution of the question of the 

admissibility of expert testimony is a precursor to applying the liberal construction rules 

pertaining to a summary judgment motion, and that the district court did not improperly weigh 

conflicting evidence.

The district court determined that the defendants met their initial summary judgment 

burden by providing Dr. Pressman’s affidavit, wherein he testified that he was familiar with the 

local standard of care for ophthalmology and cataract surgery in May of 2006 and that he did not 

breach that standard.4 However, the court determined that the Suhadolniks’ affidavit, submitted

 4 While the Suhdolniks also argue that Dr. Pressman’s affidavit was too conclusory to meet Respondents’ initial 

summary judgment burden, this evidentiary issue was not separately raised as an issue on appeal. Furthermore, this 

Court has held that a moving party must support their summary judgment motion with evidence, but it is the adverse 

party that must come forward with specific facts to support their claim. See Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 893, 120 
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by Dr. Hofbauer, was inadmissible because Dr. Pressman’s deposition did not contain 

information regarding the local standard of care “concerning precautions due to past use of the 

medication Flomax.” The court specifically noted that Dr. Pressman testified in his deposition 

that he was not aware of a standard of practice regarding Flomax and was not aware of a 

standard requiring disclosure of increased risks for prior use of Flomax. Therefore, Dr. 

Hofbauer’s reliance on Dr. Pressman’s deposition was insufficient to familiarize himself with the 

local standard of care and his affidavit was inadmissible. Because no other evidence had been 

submitted, the court granted the Respondents’ motion for summary judgment on the medical 

malpractice claim. For the same reasons, the court also granted summary judgment to the 

Respondents on the informed consent claim.

5

In order to avoid summary judgment in a medical malpractice case, a plaintiff must 

provide expert testimony that the defendant doctor, or other health care provider, “negligently 

failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice.” Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164, 45 

P.3d at 820. In order for expert testimony to be admissible in a medical malpractice claim, the 

party must demonstrate:

(a) that such opinion is actually held by the expert witness; (b) that the expert 

witness can testify to the opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty; 

(c) that the expert witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise; and 

(d) that the expert witness has actual knowledge of the applicable community 

standard of care to which his expert opinion testimony is addressed. 

Id. (citing I.C. § 6-1013) (emphasis added). Additionally, I.C. § 6-1012 defines the community 

standard of care as:

(a) the standard of care for the class of health care provider to which the 

defendant belonged and was functioning, taking into account the defendant’s 

training, experience, and fields of medical specialization, if any; (b) as such 

standard existed at the time of the defendant’s alleged negligence; and (c) as such 

standard existed at the place of the defendant’s alleged negligence.

Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820 (citing I.C. § 6-1012) (internal citations omitted). 

 P.3d 278, 281 (2005). Therefore, Dr. Pressman’s affidavit, which demonstrated knowledge of a local standard of 

care, provided a description of that standard, and alleged compliance with that standard, was sufficient to shift the 

burden to the plaintiffs to establish the foundation for Dr. Hofbauer’s testimony. While there do appear to be 

inconsistencies between Dr. Pressman’s deposition and affidavit, the Suhdolniks have failed to show how those 

inconsistencies reflect upon Dr. Hofbauer’s knowledge of the local standard of care. 5 We express no opinion on this holding of the district court, as the informed consent issue has not been properly 

raised on appeal. See Part III.C. below.
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In addition to these foundational requirements, I.R.C.P. 56(e) requires that affidavits 

submitted on a motion for summary judgment must “set forth such facts as would be admissible 

in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 

stated therein.” I.R.C.P. 56(e). The affiant must have personal knowledge of the facts contained 

within the affidavit and statements within it cannot be conclusory or speculative. Dulaney, 137 

Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820. Therefore, in a medical malpractice action, an expert must show 

that he or she is familiar with the local standard of care for the relevant timeframe and specialty, 

and “must also state how he or she became familiar with that standard of care.” Id. 

An out-of-area expert can meet the foundational requirement of personal knowledge by 

inquiring of a local specialist regarding the standard of care. Id. (citing Perry v. Magic Valley 

Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000)). Additionally, when consulting 

with a local specialist, that specialist need not have practiced in the same field as the defendant, 

so long as the consulting specialist is sufficiently familiar with the defendant’s specialty. See 

Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 292, 127 P.3d 187, 195 (2005). The plaintiff’s expert can 

also make inquiries to another out-of-area specialist, so long as that specialist has had sufficient 

contacts with the area in question to demonstrate personal knowledge of the local standard. See 

Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 130, 75 P.3d 180, 184 (2003). 

Furthermore, where an expert demonstrates that a local standard of care has been 

replaced by a statewide or national standard of care, and further demonstrates that he or she is 

familiar with the statewide6 or national standard,

7 the foundational requirements of I.C. § 6-1013 

 6 For example, in Grover v. Smith, the plaintiff’s expert demonstrated that the local standard of care for dentists was 

replaced by a statewide standard because the state licensing board required a patient history and because the 

Legislature codified these standards in the State Dental Practice Act, I.C. §§ 54-901 to 54-924. 137 Idaho 247, 253, 

46 P.3d 1105, 1111 (2002). Further, the plaintiff’s expert demonstrated knowledge of these statewide standards 

because he was a professor of dentistry at Creighton University in Nebraska, had administered and observed the 

Idaho state licensing exam, and had spoken to local dentists about the applicable standard. Id. This Court 

specifically noted that because the expert observed the licensing exams and stated that failure to take a patient’s

history would result in a failure of the exam, the expert had actual knowledge that the local standard had been 

replaced by a statewide standard. Id. 7 An expert can meet the foundational requirements of I.C. § 6-1013 by demonstrating that a federal regulatory 

scheme has replaced the local standard of care and that the expert is familiar with this scheme. Hayward v. Jack’s 

Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 628, 115 P.3d 713, 719 (2005). In Hayward, the plaintiff’s out-of-area expert 

reviewed the depositions of the defendant-pharmacists, reviewed the plaintiff’s medical records, and spoke to a local 

pharmacist regarding the standard of care. Id. Not only did the depositions show that the local standard was the 

“start-low and go-slow” method for administering medication, but the local pharmacist confirmed this method and 

further stated that such standard was governed by state and federal regulations. Id. at 629, 115 P.3d at 720. Because 

the expert was familiar with these federal standards and had demonstrated that they replaced the local standard, this 

Court deemed the expert’s affidavit testimony admissible. Id. 
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have been met. Specifically, an out-of-area expert can demonstrate familiarity with a local 

standard by speaking to a local specialist and by reviewing deposition testimony that establishes 

that the local standard is governed by a national standard. Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 

828-29, 828 P.2d 854, 857-58 (1992). In Kozlowski, the plaintiff’s expert reviewed the 

defendant’s deposition testimony, wherein the defendant stated that the local standard was 

equivalent to the national standard and governed by a particular handbook. 121 Idaho at 829, 828 

P.2d at 858. Because the expert was familiar with the handbook mentioned as embodying the 

national standard, and was board-certified in the specialty area, the Court held the expert 

demonstrated sufficient knowledge of the local standard of care. Id. See also Perry, 134 Idaho at 

51-52, 995 P.2d at 821-22 (finding no abuse of discretion in the admission of expert testimony 

relying on the depositions of three hospital nurses and the review of a particular text, when the 

depositions identified that the local standard was equivalent to the national standard and 

governed by the text reviewed by the expert). Therefore, knowledge of a local standard can be 

established by reviewing deposition testimony and by speaking to local experts confirming that 

the standard has been replaced by a national standard.

Although Kozlowski and Perry are cited in subsequent decisions by this Court as 

providing a standard for the admissibility of expert testimony based on review of deposition 

testimony alone, this is an inappropriate characterization of the cases. See, e.g., Grover, 137 

Idaho at 251, 46 P.3d at 1109 (“An out-of-state expert can become familiar with the local 

standard of care . . . by ‘review of a deposition stating that the local standard does not vary from 

the national standard, coupled with the expert’s personal knowledge of the national standard.” 

(citing Perry, 134 Idaho at 51-52, 995 P.2d at 821-22)). In Kozlowski, the out-of-area expert 

reviewed not only deposition testimony, but also contacted a local practitioner to become 

familiar with the local standard of care. “In an effort to determine the local area standard of care, 

[plaintiff’s expert] read the deposition of [defendant ob-gyn] Rush, the depositions of several 

nurses, spoke to a board certified ob-gyn who was practicing in Pocatello at the same time 

Stephanie was born, and read the deposition of Dr. V. Gene Rufi who is another board-certified 

ob-gyn practicing in Pocatello.” 121 Idaho at 829, 828 P.2d at 858. Additionally, in Perry, the 

plaintiff’s expert “reviewed the depositions of three Hospital nurses; reviewed a standard nursing 

text . . . ; talked with the executive director of the Idaho Board of Nursing; and spoke with 

nursing faculty members at two Idaho nursing schools to determine whether the Twin Falls 
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standard for administering intramuscular injections differed in any way from the national or 

state-wide standard.” 134 Idaho at 51, 995 P.2d at 821. Therefore, the experts in Kozlowski and 

Perry clearly reviewed more than the defendant’s deposition testimony in order to become 

familiar with the local standard of care.

While this Court has never affirmed the admissibility of expert testimony based solely on 

an expert’s review of deposition testimony, we have stated that this may be sufficient. “[I]t may

be possible for an expert to become familiar with the local standard of care by reviewing the 

defendant doctor’s deposition . . . .” Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 212, 868 P.2d 1224, 

1228 (1994) (emphasis added). See also Newberry, 142 Idaho at 292, 127 P.3d at 195 (“Inquiring 

with a local specialist is ‘one method’ an expert witness may obtain such knowledge, but it is not 

the only method.”) (internal citation omitted). In Rhodehouse, the plaintiff’s expert based his 

knowledge of the local standard of care on the defendant’s deposition, 35 mm films, and hospital 

records. Id. at 212, 868 P.2d at 1228. Although the Court acknowledged that such a review might 

provide an adequate foundation for an expert’s knowledge of the local standard of care, it found 

the deposition in that case to be insufficient because the deposition “never stated that the local 

standard of care was the same as the national standard, nor in fact did [the defendant-doctor]

make any direct reference to the local standard of care.”8 Id. Therefore, while it may be 

acceptable for an expert to demonstrate knowledge of a local standard of care by reviewing 

deposition testimony, that testimony must clearly articulate the local standard for the particular

time, place and specialty at issue in order to meet the foundational requirements of I.C. § 6-1013. 

In this case, the Suhadolniks’ expert, Dr. Hofbauer, stated that the local standard of care 

for cataract surgery in Boise, Idaho, in May of 2006, required an ophthalmologist to: (1) be 

current on medical literature and FDA advisories; (2) take an adequate medical history; and (3) 

advise patients of risks and complications thereby allowing them to make an informed decision. 

Dr. Hofbauer also stated that “[t]hese standards of care are very basic standards of 

ophthalmologists. In my opinion the standards of care relevant to Dr. Pressman’s treatment of 

 8 The opinion in Rhodehouse goes on to state “that an expert cannot become familiar with the local standard of care 

merely by reviewing hospital records and the actions of a local physician.” 125 Idaho at 213, 868 P.2d at 1229. This 

does not mean, however, as both the district court and the Respondents contend, that review of these documents 

cannot add to the expert’s knowledge of the local standard in order to meet the foundation requirements of I.C. § 6-

1013. Nonetheless, Dr. Hofbauer’s review of Suhadolnik’s medical records in this case does not provide any 

information regarding the local standard of care. 
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Mr. Suhadolnik do not vary by locale and thus could be considered the same as national 

standards.” 

Dr. Hofbauer is a board-certified ophthalmologist currently practicing in Beverly Hills, 

California, with a multitude of experience in ophthalmology and cataract surgeries. Therefore, he 

is presumed to be knowledgeable of the class of specialists of which Dr. Pressman is a member. 

However, he must also demonstrate knowledge of the local standard of care in order for his 

testimony to be admissible. 

Dr. Hofbauer stated in his affidavit that his knowledge of the local standards was derived 

from the following sources:

I have actual knowledge of the standard of care as it existed in Boise, Idaho, 

during May of 2006 as it related to the provision of medical care to Franz 

Suhadolnik by Dr. Pressman. My knowledge comes from my experience and 

training, as well as from the testimony provided by Dr. Pressman in his deposition 

and of the medical records of Franz Suhadolnik.

While the district court acknowledged that an out-of-area expert can demonstrate knowledge of a 

local standard of care by reviewing deposition testimony, the court held that Dr. Pressman’s 

deposition did not contain sufficient evidence of the local standard to render Dr. Hofbauer’s 

affidavit admissible. Specifically, the court noted that: (1) Dr. Pressman testified that he was not 

aware of the standard of practice in 2006 for patients who were, or had been, on Flomax because 

the medical evidence was inconclusive at the time; and (2) Dr. Pressman never testified that the 

local standard was the same as the national standard. This determination is not an abuse of 

discretion because reliance on deposition testimony alone is already at the outer bounds of 

adequate foundational evidence, and because Dr. Pressman’s testimony is too inconclusive to 

provide a sufficient basis of knowledge for Dr. Hofbauer’s conclusions.

The facts of this case are similar to Rhodehouse, wherein an expert attempted to rely on 

deposition testimony without speaking to a local specialist, because Dr. Hofbauer did not rely on 

a conversation with a local practitioner in order to familiarize himself with the local standard of 

care. Although Idaho case law does not specifically require such a discussion, this fact alone 

distinguishes this case from Kozlowski (expert reviewed defendant’s deposition, the depositions 

of several nurses and spoke to a local specialist), Perry (expert reviewed the deposition 

testimony of three nurses and spoke to the executive director of the state nursing board, as well 

as several faculty members at Idaho schools), Hayward (expert spoke to local pharmacist, 
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reviewed depositions of defendant-pharmacists, and reviewed plaintiff’s medical records),

Grover (expert spoke to several local dentists, administered and observed state licensing exams 

and was familiar with national standards adopted in the state), and Shane (expert spoke to 

another out-of-area expert familiar with the standard of care), wherein all of the experts spoke to 

local specialists, or persons knowledgeable of the local standard, in order to familiarize 

themselves with the local standard of care. Dr. Hofbauer’s efforts to ascertain the local standard 

of care are further distinguishable from the efforts of the experts in Kozlowski, Perry, and 

Hayward, because each of those experts, in addition to speaking to a local specialist, also 

reviewed multiple depositions of persons knowledgeable of the local standard, whereas Dr. 

Hofbauer reviewed only one and it was inconclusive.

Furthermore, this case is also similar to Rhodehouse, where the reviewed deposition 

failed to identify the local standard of care or the existence of a national standard, because Dr. 

Pressman’s deposition gives no indication that the local standard had been replaced by a national 

standard and makes only vague references to a local standard of care.

Q [Mr. Pedersen]: When did you first become aware that Flomax could—the use 

of Flomax in a patient could increase the risks of a complication during cataract 

surgery?

A [Dr. Pressman]: Well, the first report[] in a peer review journal was in 2005. 

There were some non-peer reviewed articles in the throwaway journals that had 

talked about it. So in approximately 2005, there was some early indication that 

there was possible issues related.

...

Q: Before you retired and you were doing cataract surgeries, and you were aware 

that a patient was on—had taken Flomax, what did you tell a patient about 

Flomax, if anything?

A: Well, the data was not very conclusive in 2006. And I would have said 

something general, such as, there is a slightly increased risk of complications in 

people who are on Flomax.

Q: You would have said ‘slightly’?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Was it the standard of care to say ‘slightly’?

Mr. Jones: Object to Form.
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The Witness: I’m not aware of what the standard practice in the community was 

for that particular drug at that particular time. Because as I said, the data on 

Flomax was fairly recent and was not conclusive at that time.

...

Q [Mr. Jones]: Doctor, did the standard of practice in place in May of 2006 

require you to disclose that the medication Flomax carried with it any increased 

risk at all of complications?

A: No.

Q: Why not?

A: Flomax was—the association with any issues with cataract surgery was very

unclear at the time. It was just beginning to be noticed. And there was no clear 

definition of what those complications were, what the risks were. The risk rate of 

complications from Flomax in cataract surgery is very small, so—

Q: When you say “small,” how small are you talking?

A: Well, the complication rate of cataract surgery is small. And the number of 

patients on Flomax is small. And complications that are of any visual significance 

are very small. So very, very slight.

...

Q [Mr. Pedersen]: Before, you told me that if you’d have known about Flomax, 

you would have told the patient about it. Are you changing your testimony on 

that? You would have told him that there was an increased risk?

A: I would have said that there is a slight increased risk, yeah, typically.

Q: Regardless of what you said when your counsel asked you a question, that’s a 

fact, isn’t it? I mean, you’ve already said that’s true, isn’t it?

Mr. Jones: Object to form.

The Witness: I typically would have said that there was a slight increased risk, 

yes.

(emphasis added). Review of this testimony indicates that Dr. Pressman had no personal 

knowledge of a local standard of care regarding precautions to take with patients who had used 

Flomax or as to what information to provide such patients regarding the increased risks resulting 

from prior use of Flomax. Furthermore, although Dr. Pressman states that he personally would 
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have warned about the risks of Flomax, the definition of a standard of a care is an objective 

standard. Even if Dr. Pressman personally would have warned Suhadolnik regarding the risks of 

Flomax, if he was not aware of this practice being a community standard, the testimony cannot 

serve as a foundation for identifying the local standard of care. See I.C. § 6-1012. Additionally, 

Dr. Pressman’s deposition does not establish that the local standard has been replaced by a 

national standard because there is no mention anywhere in the deposition regarding a national 

standard. Consequently, Dr. Hofbauer’s statement that the standard of care is equivalent to a 

national standard is without foundation and inadmissible. McDaniel, 144 Idaho at 223, 159 P.3d 

at 860 (“Conclusory statements that an expert is familiar with the local standard because he is 

familiar with the national standard are insufficient to meet the requirement of Idaho Code § 6-

1013.”). Therefore, Dr. Hofbauer’s reliance on Dr. Pressman’s deposition does not meet the 

foundational requirements of I.C. § 6-1013.

The Suhadolniks argue that the district court erred in narrowing the standard of care to 

Flomax in particular, rather than allowing the general standard testified to in Dr. Pressman’s 

deposition regarding “adequate patient history” and “staying informed on medical journals” to be 

a sufficient basis for the local standard. 

In his deposition, Dr. Pressman stated: 

Q [Mr. Pedersen]: Well, for example, would you say it’s a standard practice to use 

sterile technique when you do an operation?

A [Dr. Pressman]: I would.

Q: Standard of practice to keep current on the medical literature in the field that 

you’re in?

A: Yes.

Q: Now, I want to make sure we go back to we’re here to talk about an operation 

that was performed on May 30th, ’06. You’re aware of that?

A: Correct.

...

Q: Was it the standard of practice back in May of ’03 in this community to take 

an adequate history before you did a cataract history?

A: In May of ’03, yes.
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Q: In May of ’06?

A: Oh, in May of ’06. Yes.

...

Q: And was it the standard of care to—I asked you before generally. But at this 

time, was it the standard of care to keep current in the medical literature in your 

field?

Mr. Jones: Object to form.

The Witness: Standard of practice is, in the community, is to keep current on 

recent medical journals, yes.

Q [Mr. Pedersen]: How did you go about doing that back in ’06?

A: We subscribe to many medical journals. We make use of the library at Saint 

Al’s primarily, although St. Luke’s also. We attend continuing medical education 

courses. We talk to peers.

Q: Do you keep track of what the FDA says about drugs?

A: We are advised about those, yes.

Q: Was it standard of practice to pay attention to those?

A: Yes.

Dr. Hofbauer used these general admissions as a basis for his standards regarding adequate 

patient histories and reviewing medical journals in paragraph 6(a), (b), and (d) of his affidavit. 

However, the district court identified the local standard of care as “concerning precautions due to 

past use of the medication Flomax” specifically and did not address Dr. Hofbauer’s reiteration of 

the more general standards of care.

The district court’s narrowing of the standard of care to Flomax particularly is not an

abuse of discretion because this Court generally identifies the standard of care in terms of the 

major facts appurtenant to the case. See Perry, 134 Idaho at 51, 995 P.2d at 821 (identifying the 

relevant standard of care as the administration of intramuscular injections); Kozlowski, 121 Idaho 

at 829, 828 P.2d at 858 (identifying the standard as requiring ob-gyns to “conduct a biophysical 

profile or use ultrasound to determine fetal size”); Grimes, 113 Idaho at 520, 746 P.2d at 979 

(identifying the standard of care for use of amniocentesis to diagnose amnionitis). It was
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therefore within the bounds of discretion for the district court to identify the local standard in 

terms of Flomax because it was the side effects and risks associated with this drug particularly 

that are alleged to have caused Suhadolnik’s injuries.

Finally, the Suhadolniks argue that even if Dr. Pressman’s deposition testimony is 

inadequate to establish a standard of care for taking a patient’s medical history, this standard is a 

statewide standard that has replaced the local standard of care. They argue that, like in Grover,

where statewide dental standards replaced any local standard for taking a patient’s medical 

history, I.C. §§ 54-1811 through 54-1834 similarly require an adequate patient history regardless 

of what is customary in a particular locale. The Suhdolniks fail to cite any text from these 

statutory provisions and fail to provide any argument as to how these provisions have replaced 

the local standard for taking a patient’s medical history. Rather, they cite to Grover as 

establishing a statewide mandate in every profession requiring an adequate patient history. 

However, the Court in Grover emphasized the power of the state licensing board of dentistry to 

implement statewide standards, specifically addressed the act adopted by the Legislature in 

implementing these standards, and identified the expert’s familiarity with these standards 

because of his administration and observation of the state licensing exam, in order to support the 

determination that the local standard of care had been replaced by a statewide standard of care.

9

There is no similar discussion in the Suhdolniks’ brief regarding the state medical licensing 

board adopting statewide standards, or the implementation of such standards in an act governing 

the entire field of ophthalmology. Additionally, Dr. Hofbauer never provided any foundation for 

his conclusion that adequate patient histories have been adopted as a statewide standard and there 

is no explanation as to what would constitute an “adequate” patient history. Therefore, the 

Suhadolniks have failed to demonstrate that Idaho has adopted a statewide standard in the field 

of ophthalmology for the administration of a patient’s medical history. 

The Court is cognizant of the fact that outside experts may encounter difficulty in 

locating a local practitioner who will cooperate in providing information regarding the standard 

of care prevailing in the community, particularly in smaller communities where practitioners live 

and work in rather close proximity with one another. On the other hand, the Court is also 

cognizant of the fact that increased communication and availability of medical information has 

 9 The dentist in Grover took no patient history so it was obvious that he breached the standard of care. Further, 

Grover did not deal with the question of what might constitute an “adequate” history.
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resulted in more standardization of practice between practitioners in urban centers and those in 

rural communities. As we noted in McDaniel, “Recent years have witnessed increasing 

standardization in the health care profession, due to a variety of factors.” 144 Idaho at 224, 159 

P.3d at 861. Those factors include governmental regulation, development of regional and 

national provider organizations, and greater access to the flow of medical information. We 

stated, “in the present medical care environment, there are a variety of ways that a medical 

malpractice plaintiff may be able to establish a local standard of care as being synonymous with 

a regional or national standard of care.” Id. As shown above, there are various avenues by which 

a plaintiff may proceed to establish a standard of care, with or without the cooperation of local 

practitioners. The record in this case does not reflect what efforts, if any, Suhadolnik or his 

expert made to learn the standard of care from a local practitioner (other than from Dr. 

Pressman’s deposition), but it isn’t too much to ask of a plaintiff that some effort be made. 

Failing that, Suhadolnik’s counsel could have made a more valiant effort to piece together a case 

from Dr. Pressman’s deposition and affidavit but failed to do so.10 As Respondents’ counsel 

noted during oral argument of this case before the Court, it is not up to the Court to make a 

plaintiff-appellant’s case for him.

Because the Suhadolniks have failed to establish Dr. Hofbauer’s actual knowledge of the 

local standard of care pertaining to cataract surgery, the district court acted within its discretion 

in holding his testimony to be inadmissible. We therefore affirm that holding.

C. The Suhadolniks waived their lack of informed consent argument.

The Respondents argue that the Suhadolniks waived any argument on appeal regarding 

their claim for lack of informed consent because it was not separately raised or briefed before 

this Court. The Suhadolniks only provide argument in their opening brief regarding the 

foundational requirements for a medical malpractice claim and fail to separately identify their 

informed consent claim as an issue on appeal.

 10 A fair reading of Dr. Pressman’s deposition indicates that there were standards of practice for his professional 

specialty in the medical community and that he adhered to those standards. He stated twice that he would have 

advised a patient of an increased risk of complications if the patient was on Flomax. Since Dr. Paris’ report was in 

his file and indicated that Suhadolnik was on Flomax, it can be inferred for summary judgment purposes that Dr. 

Pressman was aware of this information (even though the information was not correct). When asked at oral 

argument whether these facts would be indicative that a standard of care required Dr. Pressman to inform 

Suhadolnik of the increased risk, Suhadolnik’s counsel responded in the negative, saying that Dr. Pressman’s 

manner of practice could not establish the local standard of care. Whether or not these facts would be sufficient to 

establish the local standard of care, it might have been more helpful for counsel to have responded in the affirmative. 
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A medical malpractice claim is a cause of action separate and distinct from a claim for 

lack of informed consent. Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 894-95, 120 P.3d 278, 282-83 (2005).

The foundational requirements for expert testimony for an informed consent claim vary

somewhat from those in I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 1013. According to I.C. § 39-4506:

Consent, or refusal to consent, for the furnishing of hospital, medical, dental or 

surgical care, treatment or procedures shall be valid in all respects if the person 

giving or refusing the consent is sufficiently aware of pertinent facts respecting 

the need for, the nature of, and the significant risks ordinarily attendant upon, 

such a patient receiving such care, as to permit the giving or withholding of such 

consent to be a reasonably informed decision. Any such consent shall be deemed 

valid and so informed if the physician or dentist to whom it is given or by whom 

it is secured has made such disclosures and given such advice respecting pertinent 

facts and considerations as would ordinarily be made and given under the same or 

similar circumstances, by a like physician or dentist of good standing practicing in 

the same community. As used in this section, the term “in the same community” 

refers to that geographic area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at 

or nearest to which such consent is given.

In their opening briefs, the Suhdolniks make no mention of this or the other informed consent 

statutes, nor do they present argument as to how the district court may have erred in applying 

I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 1013 to the informed consent issue. Therefore, the issue is waived on appeal. 

D. Respondents are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

Respondents argue that they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to appellate 

rule 54(e)(1) and I.C. § 12-121. “Idaho Code § 12-121 permits an award of attorney fees in a 

civil action to the prevailing party if the court determines the case was brought, pursued or 

defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” Newberry, 142 Idaho at 292-93, 127 

P.3d at 195-96. Although Respondents prevail on appeal, the Suhadolniks’ arguments are not 

unreasonable. As previously discussed, the case law suggests that review of deposition testimony

alone can provide an appropriate foundation for expert knowledge of the local standard of care 

and the deposition relied on in this case identified several general standards used by Dr. 

Hofbauer. Although they are ultimately too general to identify the local standard of care, the 

Suhadolniks’ arguments are reasonable and, therefore, an award for attorney fees is inappropriate

in this case.
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III.

Conclusion

The Court affirms the district court’s exclusion of Dr. Hofbauer’s affidavit for failure to 

meet the foundational requirements of I.C. § 6-1013. Consequently, the Court affirms the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Respondents. Costs on appeal are awarded to 

Respondents.

Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.

Chief Justice EISMANN, specially concurring.

I concur in the majority opinion, but write only to add additional thoughts as to what is 

required to establish the local standard of care. “How an expert becomes familiar with that 

standard of care is a legal issue, not a medical issue.” Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 37, 156 

P.3d 533, 538 (2007). Thus, the medical expert needs assistance from counsel in knowing what 

is required to learn the applicable standard of care.

The applicable standard of care must be specific to the issues of care involved in the 

particular case. “The standard of care is simply the care typically provided under similar 

circumstances by the relevant type of health care provider in the community at the time and place 

of the alleged negligent act.” Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 130, 75 P.3d 180, 184 (2003).

In this case, Dr. Pressman answered “yes” to the questions of whether it was the standard 

of practice “to take an adequate history before you did a cataract history,” “to keep current in the 

medical literature in your field,” and to “pay attention to [what the FDA says about drugs].” 

General questions such as this do not establish the applicable standard of care, any more than a 

question such as, “It is the local standard of care not to commit malpractice?”