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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

JENNIFER ROBIN VANDERVEEN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:10cv124/RV/MD

SACRED HEART HEALTH

SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant,

 /

ORDER

The plaintiff has filed this action against the defendant, her former employer,

alleging three causes of action under the Family Medical Leave Act and the Florida

Private Whistleblower Act. The defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint (on

the grounds that it constitutes a “shotgun pleading” and/or fails to state a claim),

or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement (doc. 8). The plaintiff opposes

this motion. 

The threshold of sufficiency that a complaint must meet to survive a motion

to dismiss is “exceedingly low.” Ancata v. Prison Health Services., Inc., 769 F.2d

700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985). Dismissal is appropriate “only if it is clear that no relief

could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” Blackston v. State of Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994).

The Federal Rules do not require a plaintiff to set out in detail the facts upon which

she bases her claim. Rule 8(a) only requires a “short and plain statement” showing

that she is entitled to relief. Nevertheless, the factual allegations in the complaint

“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929

(2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed.

2d 868 (2009) (stating that Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’

but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation’”). Thus, to survive dismissal, the complaint must “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Iqbal, supra, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, supra, 550

U.S. at 570). The rule does not “impose a probability requirement at the pleading

stage.” Twombly, supra, 550 U.S. at 556. Rather, the proper test is whether the

complaint “succeeds in ‘identifying facts that are suggestive enough to render [the

claim] plausible.’” See Watts v. Florida Int’l University, 495 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, supra, 550 U.S. at 556).

Motions for a more definite statement are disfavored in the federal system

under Rule 8’s liberal notice pleading requirements. “A motion for a more definite

statement should only be granted when the pleading to which the motion is

directed is so ambiguous or vague that a party cannot be reasonably expected to

respond.” Eye Care Int’l, Inc. v. Underhill, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1316 (M.D. Fla.

2000). “Furthermore, a motion for more definite statement is not to be used as a

substitute for discovery.” Id. (collecting cases). Thus, a motion for a more definite

statement will be denied if the complaint gives adequate notice of the nature and

basis of the claim as well as a general indication of the type of litigation involved,

and contains “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Upon review of the complaint in this case, I find that the plaintiff has stated

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face and, further, that the allegations in the

complaint are not so ambiguous or vague that the defendant is unable to frame an

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adequate response.1 Moreover, many of the assertions by the defendant (e.g., its

implicit suggestion that the plaintiff’s back condition and/or her gastrointestinal

problems might not qualify as a “serious medical condition” under the FMLA) are in

the nature of summary judgment arguments after discovery and are not appropriate

for disposition on a motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a

more definite statement (doc. 8) must be, and is, DENIED. 

DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of July, 2010.

/s/ Roger Vinson 

ROGER VINSON

Senior United States District Judge

1

 The complaint here (which involves a single plaintiff and a single defendant

and consists of 3 causes of action set forth in 34 paragraphs) can be distinguished

from the “shotgun pleading” at issue in certain of the cases cited by the defendant

in its motion. See, e.g., Strategic Income Fund, LLC v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg

Corp., 305 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2002) (complaint was held “quintessential shotgun

pleading” where it involved multiple plaintiffs, multiple defendants, and contained 9

counts set out in 127 paragraphs). 

Case No. 3:10cv124/RV/MD