FILED 

JULY 11, 2017 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

In the Matter of the Parentage and Support of ) 

) No. 34975-6-111 

N.R.M. ) 

) 

Child, ) 

) 

KAYLA VALLEE, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

DUANE MOORE, ) 

) 

Appellant. ) 

KORSMO, J. - Duane Moore, representing himself, appeals the outcome of the 

trial determining the visitation and support obligations for N.R.M., his child with 

respondent Kay la Vallee. The appeal presents numerous arguments concerning the 

support obligation, the parenting plan, a sanction imposed on Mr. Moore at trial, and the 

denial of reconsideration. Addressing the arguments by the four topics noted above, we 

affirm. 1 

1 In addition to ordering the claims differently than the parties do, we reformulate 

several of the appellant's arguments. 
No. 34975-6-III 

Vallee v. Moore 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY2 

The parents sometimes lived together and sometimes maintained separate 

households during their relationship. After the relationship ended, the couple was unable 

to communicate productively or agree on visitation terms, although both parents 

recognized the importance of the other parent in the baby's life. On one occasion, Moore 

took the child home from daycare and denied Vallee access to the 18 month old, telling 

her to obtain a parenting plan. She then filed suit. 

The matter ultimately went to trial before the Honorable Bryan Chushcoff after 

failed attempts at negotiating a resolution of the case. Each party asked the court to adopt 

their respective proposed parenting plan. At the conclusion of the trial, the court took the 

matter under advisement. The following week, Judge Chushcoff filed a parenting plan 

and a support order. The court also imposed $2,000 in sanctions against Mr. Moore for 

intransigence during the failed settlement negotiations. 

Mr. Moore sought reconsideration on several bases, including a contention that the 

trial judge had not properly weighed the strength of his bond with the child. He reiterated 

his request for greater weekend visitation with the child. The court corrected some minor 

2 Most of the facts concerning the relationship and the trial court's ruling are not 

relevant to this appeal, but additional facts will be discussed as necessary in conjunction 

with our discussion of some of the issues. 

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No. 34975-6-III 

Vallee v. Moore 

typographical errors in the order, but otherwise denied reconsideration. Mr. Moore then 

filed this appeal. 

ANALYSIS 

We will address the claims raised by Mr. Moore in accordance with the subject 

matter of his arguments. First, we will address the support obligation order before 

turning to the parenting plan, sanction, and reconsideration arguments. 

Initially, it is appropriate to remember these words of wisdom concerning the 

importance of finality in domestic relations rulings: 

We once again repeat the rule that trial court decisions in a 

dissolution action will seldom be changed upon appeal. Such decisions are 

difficult at best. Appellate courts should not encourage appeals by 

tinkering with them. The emotional and financial interests affected by such 

decisions are best served by finality. The spouse who challenges such 

decisions bears the heavy burden of showing a manifest abuse of discretion 

on the part of the trial court. 

In re Marriage of Landry, 103 Wn.2d 807,809,699 P.2d 214 (1985). This emphasis on 

finality and moving forward is reflected in the well-settled standards that govern review 

of domestic relations cases. Discretion is abused when it is exercised on untenable 

grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 

P.2d 775 (1971). A court acts on untenable grounds when its factual findings are not 

supported by the record; it acts for untenable reasons if it uses an incorrect standard of 

law or the facts do not meet the requirements of the standard oflaw. State v. Rundquist, 

79 Wn. App. 786, 793, 905 P.2d 922 (1995). 

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No. 34975-6-III 

Vallee v. Moore 

Support Obligation 

Mr. Moore contends that the trial court erred in entering the support order by (1) 

including information from a different case, (2) failing to grant a deviation, and (3) 

calculating the obligation on the basis of evidence presented at trial instead of using posttrial information. These contentions lack merit. 

The law governing these challenges is clearly settled. Child support is set by 

statute and the statutory scheme divides the support obligation proportionately to the 

parents' respective income levels. RCW 26.19.001, .080(1). The statutes allow the trial 

court to deviate from the standard schedule and provide a nonexclusive list of reasons for 

deviation. RCW 26.19.075. One of those reasons, relied on by Mr. Moore here, is a 

support obligation to children from another relationship. RCW 26.19.075(l)(e). That 

basis for deviation is permitted only if the parent is actually paying the support 

obligation. RCW 26.19.075(l)(e)(iii). The parent seeking the deviation also must show 

that the support obligation is judicially enforceable. In re Parentage of O.A.J., 190 Wn. 

App. 826, 835, 363 P.3d 1 (2015). We review the court's deviation ruling for abuse of 

discretion. RCW 26.19.075(4); In re Marriage of Rusch, 124 Wn. App. 226,236, 98 

P.3d 1216 (2004), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Marriage of McCausland, 

159 Wn.2d 607, 152 P.3d 1013 (2007). 

Mr. Moore's first argument is that because the order entered by the trial court 

contained the dates of birth of another couple whose marriage was dissolved in Pierce 

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No. 34975-6-111 

Vallee v. Moore 

County, the trial court somehow "merged" the two cases together. This argument is 

utterly without merit. The birthdates were corrected as a result of the motion for 

reconsideration. Nothing in the records of the case suggests that the trial court applied 

the wrong financial information in setting the support obligation. If such had happened, 

Mr. Moore easily would have been able to demonstrate the error on the record. 

Mr. Moore also argues that the trial court should have granted him a deviation 

down due to his support obligation for an older child. There are several problems with 

this argument. He did not present it at trial. 3 His request during reconsideration came too 

late. More importantly, our record does not support any factual basis for granting the 

request. Nothing in the evidence presented at trial suggests that Mr. Moore was subject 

to a formal support obligation or that he was paying that obligation. Nor did the motion 

for reconsideration mention any evidence in the record that would have supported the 

deviation. This argument lacks support in the record. 

Finally, Mr. Moore claims that the court miscalculated his income and submitted a 

letter from his employer, written four months after the trial, which states Moore works 

less than 80 hours per pay period. However, this court does not consider evidence that 

was not before the trial court. RAP 9.1 l(a). More importantly, the evidence contradicted 

Mr. Moore's own trial testimony that he did work 40 hours per week. The trial court 

3 While Mr. Moore argues that the request was in his written materials presented to 

the trial court, he did not designate those documents on appeal and they are not before us. 

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No. 34975-6-III 

Vallee v. Moore 

understandably ruled on the basis of the evidence before it and could not possibly err in 

failing to anticipate a later occurring change. 

The trial court had very tenable bases for rejecting Mr. Moore's arguments. There 

was neither error nor abuse of discretion in the rulings concerning the support obligation. 

Parenting Plan 

Mr. Moore challenges several aspects of the parenting plan. Many of these 

challenges are based on his personal view of his relationship with N.R.M. and his 

personal view of the child's best interests. He again fails to demonstrate error. 

Parenting plans are individualized decisions that depend on a wide variety of 

factors, including "' culture, family history, the emotional stability of the parents and 

children, finances, and any of the other factors that could bear upon the best interests of 

the children.'" In re Parentage of Jannot, 149 Wn.2d 123, 127, 65 P.3d 664 (2003) 

(quoting In re Parentage of Jannot, 110 Wn. App. 16, 19-20, 37 P.3d 1265 (2002)). The 

combination of relevant factors and their comparative weight are different in every case 

and no rule of general applicability can be effectively constructed. See Jannot, 110 Wn. 

App. at 20. The trial court is better suited than an appellate court to weigh these varied 

factors on a case-by-case basis. Id.; In re Marriage of Maughan, 113 Wn. App. 301, 305, 

53 P.3d 535 (2002). In large measure this results from the trial court's unique 

opportunity to observe the parties and thereby determine the best interests of the child. In 

re Marriage of Timmons, 94 Wn.2d 594, 600, 617 P.2d 1032 (1980). Accordingly, this 

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No. 34975-6-111 

Vallee v. Moore 

court reviews a parenting plan for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 

Wn.2d 795,801,854 P.2d 629 (1993); In re Marriage of Jensen-Branch, 78 Wn. App. 

482, 490, 899 P .2d 803 ( 1995). 

The trial court expressly told the parties at the conclusion of argument that 

because the parents "don't work well with each other," it would be necessary to 

implement "a straightforward fairly simple parenting plan" that minimized parental 

contact. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 269. To that end, the court designated Ms. Vallee 

as the primary residential parent and gave her authority to make daycare decisions, while 

leaving the parents to jointly make all other major decisions. The court also directed that 

Mr. Moore would have custody of the child every other week from Thursday at 6:00 p.m. 

to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 80, 84-85. 

Mr. Moore contends that the trial court erred in not giving him 50 percent of the 

child's time, arguing that the schedule should give him N .R.M. every week instead of 

every other week, just as the temporary parenting plan had done. He contends that the 

court's order is not in the best interests of the child. He also argues that the court erred in 

not considering him the primary parent, erred in giving Ms. Moore the daycare decisionmaking authority, and showed bias against him by applying the "friendly parent" 

standard in favor of Ms. Vallee. Since there is nothing in the record to suggest that the 

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No. 34975-6-111 

Vallee v. Moore 

court applied the friendly parent doctrine, we do not further discuss that claim. 4 We will 

address the other contentions in the order stated. 

The primary objection is that the final parenting plan did not follow the temporary 

parenting plan's schedule and, instead, allowed visitation only on alternate weekends. At 

trial, Mr. Moore asked for a plan that left the child with him on the first, third, and fourth 

weekends of every month, while leaving N.R.M. with his mother and his brothers5 on the 

second weekend and any fifth weekend that might occur. RP at 149-150. In its oral 

remarks, the court rejected Ms. Vallee's request for co-parenting counseling because the 

parties could hardly talk to each other. The judge noted that both parents were more 

interested in being right than in communicating with each other. RP at 268-269. To that 

end, the court believed a simplified relationship was in order. 

Mr. Moore cites to the public policy that a child's best interests ordinarily are 

served by maintaining the existing patterns of child-parent interaction. RCW 26.09.002.6 

That policy, however, also recognizes that those patterns will be altered "to the extent 

necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents." Id. Even Mr. Moore's trial 

testimony asked for a different plan than the temporary parenting plan, although he was 

4 Washington law does not recognize the "friendly parent" doctrine. See In re 

Marriage of Rossmiller, 112 Wn. App. 304,311, 48 P.3d 377 (2002); In re Marriage of 

Lawrence, 105 Wn. App. 683, 687, 20 P.3d 972 (2001). 

5 Ms. Vallee has three sons from an earlier relationship. 

6 Of course, the original interaction pattern was disrupted when the couple no 

longer lived together. 

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No. 34975-6-111 

Vallee v. Moore 

only conceding one weekend a month to Ms. Vallee. The trial court recognized that coparenting was not possible given the failure of the couple to work together. This was a 

tenable basis, recognized by statutory policy, for settling on the final parenting plan. It 

was not in N .R.M. 's best interests to see his parents fight any more frequently than was 

necessary. 7 

Mr. Moore also argues that the court improperly weighed8 the strength of his 

relationship with N.R.M., an error that he believes impacted both the weekend visitation 

schedule and the designation of Ms. Vallee as the primary residential parent. In his mind, 

Mr. Moore believes his ties with N.R.M. are stronger than those between the child and 

Ms. Vallee. The trial court, however, found that both adults were good parents to the 

child. RP at 268. There was no finding that Mr. Moore had a stronger relationship. If 

7 Mr. Moore also fails to explain why the temporary parenting plan should have 

been given any weight in setting the final plan. The whole purpose of a temporary 

plan-which typically is entered without background information or by the agreement of 

the parties-is to have some rules in place while the court considers what is in the child's 

long-term best interests. The fact a temporary plan had been entered did not somehow 

bind the trial court in the future. RCW 26.09.191(5). 

8 Although one of his argument captions alleges that the court failed to analyze the 

RCW 26.09.187(3)(a) factors, he does not argue that point in the brief. Instead, he 

focuses on the facts that support his view that he had the stronger relationship with the 

child, RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(i), the most important of the factors. See RCW 

26.09.187(3)(a). A trial court should make a record of its consideration of these factors. 

E.g., In re Parenting & Support of CT, 193 Wn. App. 427,443,378 P.3d 183 (2016). 

The record provided us does not show that consideration, but the failure to argue the 

point precludes us from determining that it did not happen. Even on reconsideration, Mr. 

Moore did not claim that the trial judge failed to apply the statute. He simply disagreed 

with the result of the weighing. 

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No. 34975-6-III 

Vallee v. Moore 

Mr. Moore believed he had a stronger relationship, he was free to prove the point. He did 

not. This court is not in the business of weighing evidence and making its own factual 

determinations. E.g, Quinn v. Cherry Lane Auto Plaza, Inc., 153 Wn. App. 710, 717, 225 

P.3d 266 (2009). This argument has no factual support in the record. 

The designation of Ms. Vallee as the primary custodial parent was not an abuse of 

discretion. The child was principally living with her and the other children. Even the 

parenting plan proposed by Mr. Moore left N.R.M. with Ms. Vallee the greater share of 

the week. In such circumstances, she was understandably recognized as the primary 

custodian. 

Mr. Moore next complains that Ms. Vallee was given control over the daycare 

decision making. Again, we see no abuse of discretion in leaving that decision to the 

primary custodial parent. It was understandably desirable to keep Ms. Vallee's children 

together and it was appropriate for her to be able to have convenient daycare. The 

demonstrated lack of ability to get along with each other on this very issue9 was an 

obvious reason to not leave Mr. Moore with equal control over this important 

determination--particularly where that decision would also impact the other children. 

9 See the example discussed in the following section. 

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No. 34975-6-III 

Vallee v. Moore 

The inability of the parents to work together was a legitimate basis for the court to 

consider when finalizing the parenting plan. Minimizing the conflict between the two 

was in the child's best interests. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

Sanction 

Mr. Moore next argues that the court erroneously sanctioned him for intransigence 

during the settlement negotiations. There was no abuse of the trial court's considerable 

discretion in this ruling. 

The decision to impose sanctions is one within the trial court's discretion. In re 

Marriage of Mattson, 95 Wn. App. 592,604,976 P.2d 157 (1999). Here, the trial court 

expressly found: 

The court finds that Moore altered settlement documents and intentionally 

failed to disclose that fact to the Petitioner's counsel in an apparent attempt 

to deceive Petitioner to have this court enter documents to resolve this 

matter on terms that were not, in fact, agreed to by Petitioner. 

CP at 92. The record amply supports this determination. Ms. Vallee testified to the 

alterations and the altered documents were introduced at trial for the sole purpose of 

demonstrating the alterations. Mr. Moore did such things as insert the word "not" into 

statements in the settlement form. For example, he altered the proposal that "the child 

shall attend daycare with the mother's other children" into "the child shall not attend 

daycare with the mother's other children." RP at 68. While there are many other 

examples, this one is typical. Mr. Moore altered the meaning of key provisions of the 

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No. 34975-6-111 

Vallee v. Moore 

settlement document, signed it, and then attempted to deceive Ms. Vallee and her counsel 

into believing that he had agreed to their proposal. 

Ms. Vallee's attorney indicated that she expended attorney fees totaling $2,040 in 

attending the settlement hearing and in seeking sanctions for Mr. Moore's misbehavior in 

that forum. CP at 130-131. The trial court awarded $2,000 of that sum. CP at 92. 

There was a clear basis for finding Mr. Moore intransigent. He was free to not 

agree with the settlement proposals. However, he could not alter those proposals and 

then attempt to deceive the other side by claiming to have agreed to the original 

proposals. This was a waste of time that demonstrated that his interest in settlement was 

a sham. It was appropriate to reimburse Ms. Vallee for the costs imposed on her by Mr. 

Moore as a result of this fruitless exercise. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

Reconsideration 

The only remaining contention is the argument that the court erred in stating in its 

order denying reconsideration that "the parties agreed it was inappropriate for the 

Respondent to have residential time every weekend as had been the case pending trial." 

CP at 119 (alteration in original). Mr. Moore contends that he did not agree that it was 

inappropriate. 

As with the other issues presented by this appeal, we review a court's order on 

reconsideration for abuse of discretion. City of Longview v. Wallin, 174 Wn. App. 763, 

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No. 34975-6-III 

Vallee v. Moore 

776,301 P.3d 45 (2013). While this challenged recitation was of little moment since the 

court did not err in setting the visitation schedule, it also did not amount to an abuse of 

discretion. Both parties filed parenting plans that permitted the other to have some 

weekend time with N.R.M. That fact permitted the trial court to infer that the parties 

agreed that it was not appropriate for one parent to have every weekend. 

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

j 

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