IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 16–1704

Filed January 27, 2017

Amended April 7, 2017

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

PAMELA ANN VANDEL,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission reports respondent committed ethical 

misconduct and recommends a one-year suspension. LICENSE 

SUSPENDED.

Tara van Brederode and Elizabeth Quinlan, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

Pamela Ann Vandel, Runnells, pro se.
2

WIGGINS, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a 

complaint against an attorney alleging multiple violations of the Iowa 

Rules of Professional Conduct. A division of the Grievance Commission 

of the Supreme Court of Iowa found the respondent’s conduct violated 

the rules and recommended we suspend her license to practice law with 

no possibility of reinstatement for a period of one year. On appeal, the 

Board urges us to reaffirm the recommendation. On our de novo review, 

we find the attorney violated numerous provisions of our rules, which 

require us to impose sanctions. Accordingly, we suspend the attorney’s 

license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for 

a period of six months from the date of filing this decision. 

I. Scope of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Ct. Rs. 

36.21(1), .22(4). The Board must prove ethical violations by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Crum, 861 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Iowa 2015). A convincing preponderance 

of the evidence is more than the standard in a typical civil case, but less 

than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Iowa 2011). While we 

respectfully consider the commission’s findings and recommendations, 

they are not binding on us. Crum, 861 N.W.2d at 599–600. Upon proof 

of an ethical violation, we may impose a greater or lesser sanction than 

the commission recommended. Netti, 797 N.W.2d at 595.

Additionally, because the attorney failed to respond to the Board’s 

complaint, we treat the allegations in the complaint as admitted 

pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 36.7. Crum, 861 N.W.2d at 599–600. 
3

II. Findings of Fact.

Upon on our de novo review of the record and the admitted 

allegations, we make the following findings of fact. In 1996, Pamela A. 

Vandel received her license to practice law in Iowa. 

On September 28, 2012, Vandel began representing Nichole 

Phillips in a custody, visitation, and child-support modification case. In 

2004, a dissolution decree was entered granting physical custody of a 

minor child to Nichole, and it provided her former husband, Floyd 

Phillips, with a specific visitation schedule. On September 20, 2012, 

attorneys Brian Witherwax and Tyler Johnston filed a petition for 

modification on behalf of Floyd, claiming a substantial change in 

circumstances warranted modification as to custody, visitation, and child 

support. Through his attorneys, Floyd also filed an application for rule 

to show cause, alleging Nichole placed the minor child on ADHD 

medication against medical advice and without informing Floyd, which 

was contrary to the terms of the decree. 

After Vandel entered her appearance on behalf of Nichole, she filed 

answers and counterclaims to Floyd’s petition for modification and 

application for rule to show cause. On April 10, 2013, Floyd’s attorneys 

filed a motion to withdraw. The court held a hearing on April 15 and 

granted Nichole’s request for designation of expert witness and addressed 

Floyd’s failure to obtain a psychological evaluation as previously ordered. 

After the hearing on April 15, Vandel advised Nichole to deny Floyd 

further visitation and filed a motion to suspend visitation. Based on 

Vandel’s advice, Nichole began denying Floyd visitation on April 17. 

Thereafter on April 22, Floyd’s attorneys filed an application for a rule to 

show cause asserting Nichole denied Floyd visitation on April 17. That 

application along with Witherwax’s and Johnston’s motion to withdraw, 
4

and the motion to suspend visitation were scheduled for hearing on 

May 9 at 1:30 p.m.

On the morning of May 9, Vandel called Floyd’s attorney, Tyler 

Johnston, and told him the hospital notified her she needed to go in for a 

blood transfusion that day and asked if he would agree to a continuance. 

After Johnston agreed to the continuance, Vandel called Judge 

Gunderson and indicated she was medically incapable of attending the 

hearing. Vandel followed up with an email expressing her gratitude to 

Judge Gunderson and Johnston for understanding her need for the 

transfusion. Due to Vandel’s representations concerning her need for a 

blood transfusion, the court continued the hearing to the date of trial on 

May 20. Despite her representations, Vandel did not receive a blood 

transfusion on May 9.

On May 13, Floyd, through his new attorney Jason Springer, filed 

an application for rule to show cause alleging that Nichole, based on the 

advice of Vandel, had denied Floyd visitation nine times between April 17 

and May 11, in violation of the dissolution decree.

The modification trial occurred May 20 through May 24 before 

Judge Blane. Prior to the start of the trial, counsel for both parties met 

with Judge Blane and agreed the court would consider, in addition to 

modification, Nichole’s counterclaim filed on October 1, 2012; Floyd’s 

application for rule to show cause filed on April 22, 2013; and Floyd’s 

application for rule to show cause filed on May 13. In order for the court 

to hear the application for rule to show cause filed on May 13, Vandel 

waived Nichole’s right to notice without consulting her. Nichole found 

out about the second application for rule to show cause on the third day 

of trial when Vandel showed her the application during a break.
5

During the modification trial, Nichole testified that Vandel told her 

three days before the trial she was going to withdraw as counsel on the 

first day of trial if Nichole did not pay her an additional $10,000. When 

Nichole told Vandel she was unable to pay $10,000, Vandel lowered the 

amount to $5000. Although Nichole did not make an additional 

payment, Vandel appeared for trial and did not file a motion to withdraw. 

However, throughout the trial, Vandel continued to tell Nichole that she 

was going to withdraw if she did not make an additional payment. 

Nichole explained to Judge Blane that Vandel’s threats to withdraw put 

her “under extreme stress,” and she felt like she was being “harassed . . . 

badgered, and . . . threatened.”

Additionally, on the first day of trial, Vandel presented Nichole with 

documents to sign in the form of a mortgage with a promissory note, 

attorney fee lien, assignment of income, judgment by confession, and 

assignment of wages. Vandel falsely told Judge Blane she did not 

present any documents for Nichole to sign during the trial. Further, 

when Vandel threatened to withdraw if she did not receive an additional 

payment, Vandel did not inform Nichole of the likelihood that the judge 

would grant or deny such a motion.

On May 28, Judge Blane found Vandel “guilty [beyond a 

reasonable doubt] of nine (9) counts of contempt of court by willfully

counseling, thereby aiding and abetting the violation of the Court’s 

Decree of May 19, 2004, pursuant to Iowa Code section 665.2(3).”1 

1Vandel filed a writ of certiorari challenging the district court’s ruling. The court 

of appeals sustained her writ, finding substantial evidence did not support the district 

court’s finding of contempt as to Vandel. However, we are unable to consider the court

of appeals decision because Vandel failed to answer the complaint filed by the Board; 

thus, admitting all the allegations of the Board for purposes of this disciplinary 

proceeding.

 
6

Judge Blane also filed a complaint with the Board against Vandel. On

June 6, Nichole filed a complaint with the Board against Vandel. In 

response to Nichole’s complaint, Vandel wrote a letter to the Board on 

July 2, continuing to claim she needed medical treatment on May 9. In 

Vandel’s appellate brief filed on April 8, 2014, she again asserted that 

she was unavailable for the hearing on May 9, 2013, because she “had to 

go in for a blood transfusion.” However, in a letter to the Board’s 

investigator on April 11, 2014, Vandel stated there were no medical 

records showing she had a blood transfusion on May 9, 2013.

During the period in which Vandel represented Nichole, she 

maintained an Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA). Between 

September 2012 and March 2013, Nichole made payments to Vandel of 

$3000, $3894, $4080.30, $5000, and $8000. They did not have a 

written fee agreement. The only information Nichole had regarding the 

scope of Vandel’s representation was that she would be charged $295 per 

hour for legal services.

As part of its investigation into the complaints against Vandel, the 

Board discovered Vandel did not deposit any of the payments by Nichole 

into her trust account, did not maintain a check register, did not perform 

monthly reconciliations of her trust account, and did not maintain client 

ledgers. However, Vandel falsely certified that she had deposited all 

retainers into her trust account and performed reconciliations of trust 

account balances with bank statement balances and client ledger 

balances on a monthly basis when she answered the 2013 and 2014 

Iowa Supreme Court Client Security Commission Questionnaires. 

On May 3, 2016, the Board filed a complaint alleging Vandel 

engaged in multiple violations of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, 

concerning false statements to a tribunal, conduct prejudicial to the 
7

administration of justice, failure to maintain a trust account, dishonesty, 

and misrepresentation. 

After Vandel failed to file an answer within the specified time, on 

June 16, the Board filed a motion to invoke Iowa Court Rule 36.7, asking 

the commission to deem the allegations in the complaint admitted. On 

June 23, Vandel filed a resistance to the motion, asserting she planned 

to hand-deliver her answer to the commission clerk on June 24. 

However, Vandel never filed the promised answer. The commission 

waited until July 5, and on that date held the allegations in the 

complaint admitted. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Conroy, 

795 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Iowa 2011) (“[T]he allegations of an ethics 

complaint are deemed admitted if the respondent fails to answer within 

the specified time.”); accord Iowa Ct. R. 36.7. Vandel did not request 

additional time to file an answer, nor did she show good cause for her 

failure to file a timely answer. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Attorney Doe No. 819, 888 N.W.2d 248, 259 (Iowa 2016) 

(“Respondents in disciplinary proceedings are admonished that the 

failure to timely respond to the Board’s complaint results in admission of 

the allegations that may be unraveled only if the respondent shows good 

cause for the delay.”). Therefore, this matter proceeded to hearing solely 

on the issue of determining the appropriate sanction. 

At the hearing, Vandel asked the commission to take into 

consideration the fact that she does not intend to practice law in the 

future and her history of providing pro bono legal services throughout 

her career. Following the hearing, the commission recommended we 

suspend Vandel’s license to practice law with no possibility of 

reinstatement for a period of one year. 
8

III. Violations.

A. Rule 32:1.4(b). Rule 32:1.4(b) provides “[a] lawyer shall 

explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 

to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:1.4(b). For a client to effectively participate in the 

representation, reasonable communication between the lawyer and client 

is necessary. Id. r. 32:1.4 cmt. 1. 

Vandel violated this rule when she repeatedly told Nichole she was 

going to withdraw if Nichole did not make an additional payment to her. 

Vandel did not explain to Nichole that in order to withdraw she would 

have to make a motion to the court to do so. Further, she did not 

explain the likelihood that a judge would grant such a motion on the first 

day of trial or during the trial. Vandel’s threats to withdraw caused 

Nichole extreme stress, and she felt harassed and badgered. 

Accordingly, Vandel’s failure to fully explain the circumstances left 

Nichole unable to make an informed decision regarding Vandel’s 

representation and effectively prepare for and participate in the trial. 

Thus, Vandel violated rule 32:1.4(b).

B. Rule 32:3.3(a)(1). Rule 32:3.3(a)(1) prohibits a lawyer from 

knowingly making “a false statement of fact . . . to a tribunal.” Id.

32:3.3(a)(1). The word knowingly requires an attorney to have “actual 

knowledge of the fact in question.” Id. r. 32:1.0(f). “We will not infer an 

attorney made a misrepresentation knowingly simply because the 

misrepresentation occurred.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d 466, 486 (Iowa 2014).

Vandel knowingly made a false statement of fact to a tribunal when 

she told Judge Gunderson that she was medically incapable of attending 

the hearing on May 9 due to her need for a blood transfusion. During 
9

the modification trial before Judge Blane, she continued to claim she had

a blood transfusion. Finally, in her statement of facts to the court of 

appeals, Vandel asserted that she was unavailable for the hearing on 

May 9 because she had to go in for a blood transfusion. Despite her 

representations to these tribunals, Vandel has no medical records 

showing she had a blood transfusion on May 9. We find Vandel made 

these statements knowingly due to the number of times she repeated it 

to various persons and entities.

Additionally, Vandel made another false statement to Judge Blane 

during the modification trial when she maintained that she never 

presented Nichole with any documents to sign in the form of a mortgage 

with a promissory note, attorney fee lien, assignment of income, 

judgment by confession, and assignment of wages. We find she also

made this statement knowingly.

Accordingly, Vandel knowingly made several false statements to 

tribunals and therefore violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1).

C. Rule 32:4.1(a). This rule prohibits a lawyer from knowingly 

making “a false statement of material fact . . . to a third person.” Iowa R. 

Prof’l Conduct 32:4.1(a). An attorney can violate this rule by making a 

false statement of material fact to opposing counsel. Iowa Supreme Ct.

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 885 N.W.2d 408, 421 (Iowa 2016).

Vandel violated this rule when she knowingly told her opposing 

counsel, Johnston, that she needed to go in for a blood transfusion on 

May 9 and asked if he would agree to a continuance. Despite her 

representation to Johnston, Vandel did not receive a blood transfusion 

on May 9. We find at the time she made the statement she knew it was 

false.
10

D. Rule 32:8.4(d). A lawyer violates rule 32:8.4(d) when a lawyer 

engages “in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa R. 

Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). We have said that “there is no typical form of 

conduct that prejudices the administration of justice,” but “actions that 

have commonly been held to violate this disciplinary rule have hampered 

‘the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems 

upon which the courts rely.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 373 (Iowa 2005)). 

We have consistently held that an attorney violates rule 32:8.4(d) 

when the “misconduct results in additional court proceedings or causes 

court proceedings to be delayed or dismissed.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal, 841 N.W.2d 114, 124 (Iowa 2013) (quoting 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 

180 (Iowa 2013)).

Based on Vandel’s false statement that she needed a blood 

transfusion, the court granted her request for a continuance of the May 9 

hearing. Although opposing counsel Johnston agreed to the continuance 

because of Vandel’s “medical emergency,” he noted in an email to Judge 

Gunderson and Vandel that the continuance would prejudice Floyd 

because his application for rule to show cause would not get resolved 

until a later date. Instead of the court considering his application on 

May 9, the court’s consideration of the application was delayed almost 

two weeks until the trial on May 20. Because Vandel’s false statement 

caused a delay in the proceedings, she violated rule 32:8.4(d).

E. Rule 32:3.4(c). Rule 32:3.4(c) provides “[a] lawyer shall not

. . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except 
11

for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.” 

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:3.4(c).

The Board alleged, after the hearing on April 15, Vandel advised 

Nichole to deny Floyd further visitation, and based on Vandel’s advice, 

Nichole began denying Floyd visitation on April 17, in violation of the 

2004 dissolution decree. Vandel admitted this allegation in this 

disciplinary proceeding because she failed to answer the complaint. 

Vandel knew that Nichole was obligated to follow the visitation 

order in the dissolution decree unless the court granted her motion to 

suspend Floyd’s visitation. Because Vandel knowingly disobeyed the 

visitation order in the dissolution decree and advised her client to 

disregard the order, she violated rule 32:3.4(c).

F. Rule 32:1.3. Rule 32:1.3 states “[a] lawyer shall act with 

reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Id. r. 

32:1.3. “This rule requires an attorney to handle a client matter in a 

‘reasonably timely manner.’ ” Netti, 797 N.W.2d at 598 (quoting Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 792 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa 

2010)). We have recognized violations “when an attorney fails to appear 

at scheduled court proceedings, does not make the proper filings, or is 

slow to act on matters.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Nelson, 838 N.W.2d 528, 537 (Iowa 2013); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ackerman, 786 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 2010) 

(holding the attorney violated rule 32:1.3 for the dilatory handling of 

estates, despite receiving notices and inquiries from beneficiaries); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hauser, 782 N.W.2d 147, 150–53 

(Iowa 2010) (finding the attorney violated rule 32:1.3 by failing to make 

filings and not appearing at the scheduled trial).
12

The Board contends Vandel violated rule 32:1.3 when she waived 

Nichole’s right to notice of Floyd’s application for rule to show cause filed 

on May 13, without obtaining her consent and without informing Nichole 

until the third day of trial. Although these facts are undisputed, we find 

they are unrelated to reasonable diligence or promptness in Vandel’s 

representation of Nichole. While Vandel’s conduct likely violated a rule of 

professional conduct, we do not find rule 32:1.3 applies.2 Thus, the 

Board has failed to prove a violation of rule 32:1.3.

G. Rule 32:1.5(b). This rule requires a lawyer to communicate 

with the client, preferably in writing, regarding “[t]he scope of the 

representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which 

the client will be responsible.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(b). An 

2See, e.g., Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4. Rule 32:1.4(a) provides a lawyer must

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance 

with respect to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required by 

these rules;

(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which 

the client’s objectives are to be accomplished;

(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 

matter;

(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 

and

(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the 

lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects 

assistance not permitted by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct or 

other law.

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a). Additionally, rule 32:1.4(b) states “[a] lawyer shall 

explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 

informed decisions regarding the representation.” Id. r. 32:1.4(b). When an attorney 

neglects to keep a client informed about the status of the case, it is a violation of rule 

32:1.4. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 537.

 
13

attorney’s failure to do so violates rule 32:1.5(b). Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 

538. Further, 

a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby 

services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when 

it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be 

required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the 

client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for 

further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or 

transaction.

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5 cmt. 5.

There was no written fee agreement between Vandel and Nichole. 

Vandel did not communicate to Nichole the scope of her representation 

other than to tell Nichole she charged $295 per hour for legal services. 

When Vandel demanded $10,000 from Nichole three days before trial, 

she referenced a nonexistent fee contract. Nichole, on the other hand, 

had an email from April 2013, in which she referred to Vandel’s 

agreement to accept $100-per-month payments. 

It is worth noting that the Board previously admonished Vandel for 

similar conduct in 2007, when four days prior to a hearing she 

demanded a client pay her an additional $3500 or she would not 

represent him further. The Board found her conduct violated rule 

32:1.16(b)(5) because the fee contract did not unilaterally allow Vandel to 

require an additional retainer. Here, Vandel did not adequately explain 

to Nichole the scope of her representation or that she would provide her 

services only up to a stated amount, and therefore, she violated rule 

32:1.5(b).

H. Rules 32:1.15(a), 32:1.15(c), and 32:1.15(f). We address 

these alleged violations together because they apply to the safekeeping of 

a client’s property, including retainer fees. Rule 32:1.15 provides, in 

relevant part,
14

(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third 

persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a 

representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. 

Funds shall be kept in a separate account. Other property 

shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. 

Complete records of such account funds and other property 

shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a 

period of six years after termination of the representation.

. . . .

(c) A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account 

legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to 

be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or 

expenses incurred.

. . . .

(f) All client trust accounts shall be governed by 

chapter 45 of the Iowa Court Rules.

Id. r. 32:1.15. This rule incorporates Iowa Court Rule 45.7, which 

directs how lawyers are to handle retainers. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d 596, 607 (Iowa 2012). Rule 

45.7(3) “requires a lawyer to deposit a retainer into a trust account and 

withdraw payments as the lawyer earns the fee or incurs the expense.” 

Id.; Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(3). It “also requires a lawyer, at the time of a 

withdrawal of a fee or expense, to notify his client in writing of the time, 

amount, and purpose of the withdrawal and provide a complete 

accounting.” McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d at 607; Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(4).

Vandel did not deposit any of Nichole’s payments into her trust 

account. Because she did not deposit any of the payments into the trust 

account, Vandel did not withdraw fees and expenses as she earned them, 

nor did she provide Nichole with contemporaneous notices. Therefore, 

Vandel violated rules 32:1.15(a), 32:1.15(c), and 32:1.15(f).

I. Rule 32:8.4(c). This rule is violated when a lawyer engages “in 

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Iowa 
15

R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). We “require some level of scienter that is 

greater than negligence to find a violation of rule 32:8.4(c).” Netti, 797 

N.W.2d at 605. We have previously found an attorney “engaged in 

knowing dishonesty” when he falsely represented that he regularly 

reconciled his client trust account when he answered the Iowa Supreme 

Court Client Security 2010 Combined Statement. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Morris, 847 N.W.2d 428, 435 (Iowa 2014).

During the hearing, Vandel stated she is not good at managing 

money and admitted to these trust account violations. We find Vandel 

engaged in knowing dishonesty when she falsely answered the 2013 and 

2014 Client Security Commission Questionnaires. Particularly, she 

falsely represented that she deposited all retainers into her trust account 

and that she performed monthly reconciliations of trust account 

balances. Thus, Vandel violated rule 32:8.4(c). 

IV. Sanctions.

In determining the appropriate sanction a lawyer must face for 

misconduct, 

we consider the nature of the violations, protection of the 

public, deterrence of similar misconduct by others, the 

lawyer’s fitness to practice, and the court’s duty to uphold 

the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public. We 

also consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances 

present in the disciplinary action.

Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 542 (quoting Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 769–70). 

Our primary purpose when imposing sanctions is to protect the public, 

not to punish the lawyer. Id. However, when an attorney violates 

multiple conduct rules, we may impose enhanced sanctions. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Alexander, 574 N.W.2d 322, 

327 (Iowa 1998). Further, when “considering the importance of honesty 
16

to our profession, we have stated that misrepresentation by a lawyer . . .

generally results in a ‘lengthy suspension.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d 812, 821 (Iowa 2007) (quoting 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d 

288, 294 (Iowa 2002)). 

In Vandel’s case, there are several aggravating factors we must 

consider when determining the appropriate sanction. First, an 

aggravating factor is Vandel’s prior discipline. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Baldwin, 857 N.W.2d 195, 214 (Iowa 2014). We 

consider both prior admonitions and prior public discipline. Id. 

Additionally, “[p]rior misconduct is more suggestive of increased 

sanctions when it involves the same type of conduct as the conduct 

currently subject to discipline.” Id.

The Board has previously admonished Vandel on two occasions. 

In 2004, the Board admonished her for representing both parties in a 

marriage dissolution matter. In 2007, the Board admonished her for 

similar conduct to the conduct in this case when she demanded a client 

pay an additional retainer for her continued representation four days 

before a hearing when the fee contract did not allow her to unilaterally 

require an additional retainer. In 2012, we publicly reprimanded Vandel 

for similar trust account violations.

Second, we consider substantial experience in the practice of law 

an aggravating factor affecting our determination. Morris, 847 N.W.2d at

436. Vandel has substantial experience as she has been practicing law 

in Iowa for twenty years. 

Third, it is significant that Vandel’s actions exposed her client to 

harm. See Netti, 797 N.W.2d at 606–07. Vandel’s repeated threats to 
17

withdraw prior to and during the trial caused Nichole extreme stress and 

prevented her from effectively participating in the trial.

Finally, an “attorney’s failure to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 

or her actions is an aggravating circumstance.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of 

Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83, 93 (Iowa 2004). On 

the other hand, “[a] mitigating factor is the attorney’s recognition of some 

wrongdoing.” Id. During the commission’s sanctions hearing, Vandel 

said she is not good at managing money and admitted to trust account 

violations. However, she never acknowledged that she repeatedly made 

false statements to the trial court, opposing counsel, the court of 

appeals, and the Board. Further, she adamantly denied her conduct 

caused any harm to Nichole.

We also take into consideration the mitigating factors present in 

this case. First, we acknowledge that Vandel was hospitalized for a 

severe illness near the time she requested a continuance for the hearing 

on May 9. Although Vandel did not have a blood transfusion on May 9, 

she was admitted to the hospital on May 7 for severe illness and pain. 

She left the hospital on the morning of May 8, despite being counseled 

against leaving because of the severity of her illness. “While personal 

illness will not excuse an attorney’s misconduct, such illnesses may 

influence our approach to discipline.” Netti, 797 N.W.2d at 606. 

Second, we note Vandel has provided substantial pro bono legal 

work throughout her career and routinely performs work for low-income 

clients. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 

N.W.2d 456, 467 (Iowa 2014) (stating community service is a mitigating 

factor).

In similar cases involving misrepresentations compounded with 

other misconduct, we have suspended an attorney’s license for as short 
18

as six months to as long as two years. In McGinness, we imposed a sixmonth suspension for making false statements to a tribunal; conduct 

that involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and 

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Id. at 462–63, 467.

In Morris, we imposed a six-month suspension on an attorney who 

falsely answered questions in the Client Security Combined Statement, 

had substantially and repeatedly failed to maintain a trust account, had 

twenty-five years of experience, and had three prior suspensions. 847 

N.W.2d at 436–37. 

In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Hearity, we 

suspended an attorney for one year for making a false statement to the 

court in addition to neglect, charging unreasonable fees, failing to 

properly terminate representation, failing to respond to the board, and 

practicing law without a license. 812 N.W.2d 614, 618–21, 623 (Iowa 

2012). 

In Netti, we suspended an attorney’s license for two years for 

multiple violations, including misrepresentations to the court, 

incompetent representation, conflict of interest, failure to properly 

communicate with clients, failure to maintain a trust account, taking 

fees without accounting for his time, failure to cooperate with the Board, 

and his unauthorized practice of law. 797 N.W.2d at 607. 

In light of Vandel’s multiple violations, the aggravating factors, and 

the mitigating factors, we conclude a suspension of six months is 

warranted in this case.

V. Disposition.

We suspend Vandel’s license to practice law in Iowa with no 

possibility of reinstatement for six months from the date of this opinion. 

This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct. 
19

R. 34.23(3). Vandel must also comply with the requirements of Iowa 

Court Rule 34.24 with respect to the notification of clients and opposing 

counsel. To establish her eligibility for reinstatement, Vandel must file 

an application for reinstatement meeting all applicable requirements of 

Iowa Court Rule 34.25. We tax the costs of this action to Vandel 

pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 36.24(1).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.