Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-TP-2007| April 1, 2020 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jill A. Sidorowicz

Noonan & Lieberman, Ltd.

Chicago, Illinois 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Jon L. Orlosky

Muncie, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ColFin Bulls Funding A, LLC,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

GRTN, LLC,

Appellee-Petitioner.

April 1, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-TP-2007

Appeal from the Porter Circuit

Court

The Honorable Mary R. Harper, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

64C01-1710-TP-9802

Friedlander, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-TP-2007| April 1, 2020 Page 2 of 6

[1] In November of 2011, MB Financial Bank assigned its mortgage and interest in 

a property located at 5463 U.S. Highway 6, Portage, Indiana (the “Property”) 

to ColFin Bulls Funding A, LLC (“ColFin”). On November 11, 2011, an 

assignment of that mortgage was recorded in the Porter County Record of 

Deeds listing ColFin’s principal place of business at “c/o Colony Capital 

Acquisitions, LLC, 2450 Broadway 6th Floor, Santa Monica, California 90404” 

(the “Colony Capital Address”). Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 62.

[2] On October 14, 2016, GRTN, LLC purchased the tax sale certificate to the 

Property. In April of 2017, GRTN attempted to provide ColFin with notice of 

the sale prior to filing its petition for a tax deed as required by Indiana Code 

section 6-1.1-25-4.5 (2016) by sending a notice via certified and first-class mail 

to the Colony Capital Address. Both notices were returned to GRTN labeled 

“RETURN TO SENDER ATTEMPTED – NOT KNOWN UNABLE TO 

FORWARD” and “RETURN TO SENDER NOT DELIVERABLE AS 

ADDRESSED UNABLE TO FORWARD[,]” respectively. Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II, p. 113.

[3] In October of 2017, GRTN petitioned for a tax deed for the Property. GRTN 

attempted to provide ColFin with notice of its petition as required by Indiana 

Code section 6-1.1-25-4.6 (2016) by sending two notices via certified and firstclass mail to the Colony Capital Address.1

Both notices were again returned to 

1 Neither notice was required to be sent via first-class mail under Indiana Code sections 6-1.1-25-4.5 or 6-1.1-

25-4.6. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-TP-2007| April 1, 2020 Page 3 of 6

GRTN labeled “RETURN TO SENDER ATTEMPTED – NOT KNOWN 

UNABLE TO FORWARD[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 17. On December 

7, 2017, the trial court ordered the Porter County Auditor to issue a tax deed to 

GRTN for the Property. In December 2018, ColFin moved to vacate the tax 

deed after becoming aware of it from a title report that it had obtained. On 

April 1, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the matter and ultimately denied 

ColFin’s motion on June 18, 2019. This appeal followed.

[4] ColFin contends that although GRTN provided notice as required under 

Indiana law2via certified mail, it failed, upon learning that said notice was 

2

Indiana Code section 6-1.1-25-4.5 provides, in relevant parts, that 

(a) Except as provided in subsection (d), a purchaser or the purchaser’s assignee is 

entitled to a tax deed to the property that was sold only if: 

[...]

(3) not later than six (6) months after the date of the sale: 

(A) the purchaser or the purchaser’s assignee

[...]

gives notice of the sale to the owner of record at the time of the sale and any 

person with a substantial property interest of public record in the tract or item of 

real property. 

[...]

(d) The person required to give the notice under subsection (a), (b), or (c) shall give the 

notice by sending a copy of the notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to:

[...]

(2) any person with a substantial property interest of public record at the address 

for the person included in the public record that indicates the interest. 

Indiana Code section 6-1.1-25-4.6 provides, in relevant parts, that 

(a) After the expiration of the redemption period specified in section 4 of this chapter but 

not later than three (3) months after the expiration of the period of redemption: 

(1) the purchaser, the purchaser’s assignee, the county executive, the county 

executive’s assignee, or the purchaser of the certificate of sale under IC 6-1.1-24-

6.1 may

[...]

file a verified petition in accordance with subsection (b) in the same court in which the 

judgment of sale was entered asking the court to direct the county auditor to issue a tax 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-TP-2007| April 1, 2020 Page 4 of 6

undeliverable and/or unclaimed, to take additional reasonable steps to 

effectuate notice as required under the Due Process Clause. “Before a State 

may take property and sell it for unpaid taxes, the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner notice 

and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Jones v. 

Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 1712, 164 L. Ed. 2d 415 (2006)

(internal quotations omitted). Due process, however, does not entitle the 

property owner to receive actual notice before the State may take his property.

Id. Rather, due process requires that the State provide “notice reasonably 

calculated, under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties of the 

pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 

objections.” Id. at 226, 126 S. Ct. at 1713-14. A mortgagee possesses a 

substantial property interest that is significantly affected by a tax sale.

Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 77 L. Ed. 2d 

180 (1983). “Since a mortgagee clearly has a legally protected property interest, 

he is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax 

sale.” Id. at 798, 103 S. Ct. at 2711. The United States Supreme Court has 

concluded that when a mortgagee is identified in the publicly recorded

deed if the real property is not redeemed from the sale. Notice of the filing of this petition 

shall be given to the same parties as provided in section 4.5 of this chapter, except that, if 

notice is given by publication, only one (1) publication is required. The notice required 

by this section is considered sufficient if the notice is sent to the address required by

section 4.5(d) of this chapter. Any person owning or having an interest in the tract or 

item of real property may file a written objection to the petition with the court not later 

than thirty (30) days after the date the petition was filed. If a written objection is timely 

filed, the court shall conduct a hearing on the objection. If there is not a written objection 

that is timely filed, the court may consider the petition without conducting a hearing.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-TP-2007| April 1, 2020 Page 5 of 6

mortgage, constructive notice by publication is not adequate notice but, rather, 

“must be supplemented by notice that is either mailed to the mortgagee’s last 

known address, or by personal service.” Id. at 798, 103 S. Ct. at 2711.

[5] ColFin directs our attention to Jones, 547 U.S. 220, 126 S. Ct. 1708. In that 

case, the Court held that “when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned 

unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide 

notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do 

so.” Id. at 225, 126 S. Ct. at 1713. Under the circumstances in that case, the 

Court found additional reasonable steps that were practicable for the State to 

take, namely, sending notice via regular mail, posting notice on the front door, 

or addressing otherwise undeliverable mail to “occupant.” Id. at 234-35, 126 S. 

Ct. at 1719. The Court, however, did not require the State to search for Jones’s 

new address in the phonebook or in other government records such as income 

tax rolls as Jones suggested, concluding that that imposed a significant burden 

on the State compared to the other options it had outlined. Id. It is not the 

courts’ function to specify the form of service that the government should 

adopt, but “if there were no reasonable additional steps the government could 

have taken upon the unclaimed notice letter, it cannot be faulted for doing 

nothing.” Id. at 234, 126 S. Ct. at 1718.

[6] While we believe that Jones provides guidance, its circumstances differ from 

those in this matter. Here, GRTN provided notice via certified mail, satisfying 

the notice requirements under Indiana law. GRTN also provided additional 

notice via first-class mail. The fact that GRTN sent the first-class mail notice at 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-TP-2007| April 1, 2020 Page 6 of 6

the same time it sent the certified mail notice rather than waiting until the 

certified mail was returned unclaimed is a distinction without a difference, as it 

would have been returned undeliverable either way. Moreover, it is undisputed 

that the Property does not contain a habitable structure, which makes posting 

notice on a door impracticable, to say the least.

[7] Last, ColFin believes that GRTN should have been required to have “easily, 

and without undue effort or expense, searched the Delaware Secretary of State’s 

website for ColFin’s address. That search would have provided it with a valid 

registered agent address in which to send notice to ColFin . . . .” Appellant’s 

Br. p. 13. We disagree, finding that process to be similar to searching the phone

book or government records, which the United States Supreme Court did not 

require in Jones. By attempting to send ColFin notices via certified and firstclass mail, we conclude that GRTN used the practicable and reasonable steps 

available under these circumstances to effectuate notice and therefore cannot be 

faulted for doing nothing more. ColFin has failed to establish that it was denied 

due process.

[8] Judgment affirmed.

Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.