****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************NORMA I. CRUZ v

. VISUAL PERCEPTIONS, LLC, ET AL. (SC 19015)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Vertefeuille, Js. Argued October 31, 2013—officially released February 11, 2014 David R. Makarewicz, with whom was Richard D. Carella, for the appellants (defendants). ProloyK. Das, with whom wasAndrewL. Houlding, for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion ROGERS, C. J. The issue that we must resolve in this certified appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that a letter agreement between the parties plainly and unambiguously constituted a contract for
adefinedperiodoftimeor, instead, theletteragreement reasonably could be interpreted as governing the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s at-will employment.1 The plaintiff, Norma I. Cruz, brought an action against the defendant Visual Perceptions, LLC,2 alleging that she and the defendant had entered into a letter agreement for a fixed term of employment of thirtysix months and that the defendant had violated the agreement by terminating her employment before the term expired, without good cause. After a trial to the court, the trial court concluded that, on its face, the letter agreement explicitly provided that the plaintiff’s employmentwasforafixeddurationandthatthe defendant had breached the agreement by terminating the plaintiff without good cause. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and awarded her compensatory damages. The defendant then appealed to the Appellate Court claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly had concluded that the parties had entered into an employment contract for a fixed term. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Cruzv. VisualPerceptions, LLC, 136 Conn. App. 330, 342, 46A.3d 209 (2012). We then grantedthe defendant’s application for certification to appeal to this court on the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial court’s determination that the plaintiffwas acontractemployeeforadefinedperiodof time and was discharged in violation ofthat contract?’’ Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, 306 Conn. 903, 903– 904, 52 A.3d 730 (2012). We conclude that both the Appellate Court and the trial court improperly determinedthat, on its face, the letter agreement constituted
acontractforadefinite term. Instead, we conclude that the letter agreement was ambiguous on this point and, therefore, the trial courtshouldhave considered extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment ofthe Appellate Court and conclude that the case must be remanded to the trial court for further factual findings in a new trial.
The Appellate Court’s majority opinion sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. ‘‘The plaintiffwashiredasalaboratorymanagerbythe defendantinFebruary, 2006. OnFebruary2, 2006, theplaintiff and [Robert W. Aube, Jr., the defendant’s principal] signed a document that included the plaintiff’s rate of compensation, commission opportunities, benefits and workschedule. Thereafter, onApril 6, 2006, theplaintiff and Aube signed a second document that revised the termsoftheplaintiff’semployment,providingforaraise in her salary.‘‘In February, 2007, the plaintiff provided Aube with
a handwritten list ofupdated terms ofher employment wherein she requested anotherraise. On March 1, 2007, the plaintiff and Aube signed a third document, stating ‘[t]his will cover the [thirty-six] month period starting April 1, 2007 and ending March 31, 2010.’3 Aube terminated the plaintiff’s employment [with the defendant]
on October 16, 2008, and [this] litigation followed. ‘‘On January 6, 2010, the plaintiff filed a revised amended complaint.4 Count one alleged that the March 1, 2007 document constituted an employment contract betweenthe plaintiffandthe defendantforafixedterm ofthirty-six months, and that hertermination breached that contract. Counts two and three sought an accounting and payment of commissions for the term of the alleged employment contract againstthe defendant and Aube, respectively. The [defendant and Aube] filed an
answer denying the existence of an employment contract and claiming, by way of special defenses, rescission, payment, and accord and satisfaction as to all counts of the revised amended complaint. The [defendant and Aube] also claimed that Aube could not be liable personally pursuant to General Statutes § 34-134
as to count three. The defendant asserted a counterclaimagainsttheplaintiffforbreach ofcontract, breach ofthe covenant ofgoodfaith andfairdealing, and statutory theft pursuant to General Statutes § 52-564. ‘‘The matter was tried to the court

. . . . In its memorandum of decision, the court first determined that the March 1, 2007 document constituted a contract of employment for a definite term and was terminable only for good orjust cause.’’ (Footnotes altered.) Cruz

v. VisualPerceptions, LLC, supra, 136 Conn. App. 332– 33. Specifically, the trial court stated that ‘‘[o]n its face, the March 1, 2007 document contains the terms and conditions that were essential to the plaintiff’s employment [by the defendant]. The document contains the plaintiff’s job title and description, schedule, salary, conditions for the receipt of a bonus, health insurance andretirementcontributionbenefits. Mostsignificantly, the document explicitly states the duration ofthe plaintiff’s employment: thirty-six months, fromApril 1, 2007, to March31, 2010. Becausethe March 1, 2007 document is definite and certain as to its terms and requirements, it constitutes a valid and binding term employment contract.’’5
‘‘The court then determined that because the [defendant and Aube] did not present evidence to support a finding ofgood orjust cause to terminate the plaintiff’s employment, the plaintiff was discharged in violation of the contract [and the court therefore found for the plaintiffon counts one and two ofthe revised amended complaint].6 The court found that the plaintiffwas entitled to damages from the date of her termination through the end date of the term of the contract. OnDecember 6, 2010, the court awarded the plaintiff $60,964.11, representing the plaintiff’s lost wages, less unemploymentcompensation, withtheadditionofmedical expenses incurred due to aloss ofhealth insurance coverage and an underpaid bonus.’’ (Footnote added.) Cruzv. VisualPerceptions, LLC, supra, 136 Conn. App. 333. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on counts one and two of the revised amended complaint.
The defendant then appealed to the Appellate Court. A majority of that court concluded that ‘‘the plain language ofthe contractunambiguouslydemonstratesthat the parties intended to create a contract for a definite duration of thirty-six months. It specifically provides how many personal days would be allocated to the plaintiff for the duration of the contract and provides that any increase in health insurance premium would be absorbed by the defendant ‘for the duration of the contract.’ ’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) Id., 337. The Appellate Court concluded that, because ‘‘the language ofthe contract is unambiguous, the contract must be given effect according to its terms.’’ Id., 337 n.3. Accordingly, the Appellate Court held that ‘‘the [trial] court’s finding that the March 1, 2007 document
was an employment contract for a definite term is not clearly erroneous.’’7 Id., 337. The Appellate Courttherefore affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 342. This certified appeal followed.
The defendant claims on appeal that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the language of the March 1, 2007 document (letter agreement), on its face, plainly and unambiguously demonstrates that the parties intended to create a contract for a definite term of thirty-six months.8 The defendant contends that the language of the letter agreement was ambiguous because itreasonablycouldbe interpretedas governing the terms and conditions of the defendant’s at-will employment of the plaintiff. Accordingly, it contends, the trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. It further contends that, although the trial court did not consider it, the extrinsic evidence clearly demonstrates that the parties did not intend to enter into a contract for a definite term of employment. The plaintiff contends that, to the contrary, the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court’s determination that the letter agreement, on its face, was a contract for a definite term. We concludethatthe letteragreementwas ambiguous on its face as to whether it created a contract for
a definite term or, instead, governed the terms and conditions ofthe defendant’s at-will employment ofthe plaintiff. We further conclude that the trial court must consider the extrinsic evidence and make factual findings as to the parties’ intent.
We begin with our standard ofreview. The defendantcontends that, because the trial court relied exclusively upon the language ofthe letter agreement to determine the intent of the parties, its interpretation of the contractis subjecttoplenaryreview. Theplaintiffcontends that, to the contrary, because the question of contract interpretation, being a question of the parties’ intent, is a question of fact, the Appellate Court properly subjectedthe trial court’s interpretation to review for clear
error. We conclude that, because the trial court relied solely on the language of the letter agreement, which itdeterminedtobeplainandunambiguous, andbecause the parties disagree onthat issue, the first questionthat this court must address is not whether the trial court’s substantive interpretation of the contract was correct, butthe more fundamental question ofwhetherthe relevantlanguagewasplainandunambiguous. Weconclude that that determination is a question of law subject to plenary review. ‘‘When the language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination ofthe parties’ intent is a question offact

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net ofthe Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 13, 938 A.2d 576 (2008). ‘‘[W]here there is definitive contract language, [however] the determination ofwhat the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v

. Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., 252 Conn. 479, 495, 746 A.2d 1277 (2000);
see also id., quoting 11 S. Williston, Contracts (4th Ed. 1999) § 30:6, pp. 77–83 (‘‘[t]he interpretation and construction of a written contract present only questions of law, within the province of the court

. . . so long
as the contract is unambiguous and the intent of the parties can be determined from the agreement’s face’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, 232 Conn. 223, 230, 654 A.2d 342 (1995) (‘‘because the trial court relied solely upon the written agreements in ascertaining the intent ofthe parties, the legal inferences properly to be drawn from the documents are questions of law, rather than fact’’). It is implicitinthisrulethatthe determinationasto whether contractual language is plain and unambiguous is itself
a question of law subject to plenary review.9 United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 259 Conn. 665, 669–70, 791 A.2d 546 (2002) (determination
as to whether contract is ambiguous is subject to de
novo review).10 Accordingly, we must consider de novo whether the languageintheletteragreementwasplainandunambiguous. ‘‘In determiningwhetheracontractis ambiguous, the words of the contract must be given their natural and ordinary meaning.

. . . A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise intent.

. . . The court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no
room for ambiguity.

. . . Moreover, the mere fact thatthe parties advance different interpretations ofthe language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 670.
‘‘In contrast, a contract is ambiguous if the intent of the parties is not clear and certain from the language ofthe contract itself.

. . . [A]ny ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used by the parties.

. . . The contract must be viewed in its entirety, with each provision read in light ofthe other provisions

. . . and everyprovision mustbe given effect ifit is possible to do so.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 670–71. ‘‘Ifthe language ofthe contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the contract is ambiguous.’’ Id., 671.
Weconcludethatthelanguageoftheletteragreement at issue inthe present case reasonablymaybe interpreted as evincing either an intent to create a definite term of employment or an intent to set the terms and conditions ofan at-will employment contract. First, the sentence providing that ‘‘[t]his will cover the [thirtysix] month period starting April 1, 2007, and ending March 31, 2010’’—a sentence on which both the trial court and the Appellate Court relied on heavily in support oftheirinterpretation—is, onits face, entirely consistent with eitherintent. The sentence does notplainly and unambiguously provide that the duration of the plaintiff’s employment will be thirty-six months or that she could not be terminated within that period, except for good cause, but reasonably can be interpreted as providing that the terms and conditions set out in the letter would apply during that period if the plaintiff continued to be employed by the defendant

. Similarly, the portion ofthe letter agreement providing that any increase in health insurance premiums would be absorbed by the defendant ‘‘for the duration of the contract’’ does not plainly and unambiguously indicate what the parties intended the duration of the agreement to be. The contractual language reasonably could be interpreted as contemplating that the agreement would terminate either when the plaintiff voluntarily left employment or was terminated by the defendant, or at the end ofthe thirty-six month period. The same reasoning applies to the provision governing the paid personal days that the plaintiff would receive in eachyearduringthe thirty-sixmonthperiod. Accordingly, we concludethatthe letteragreementwas ambiguous.11 CompareSlifkinv. Condec Corp., 13 Conn. App. 538, 548, 538 A.2d 231 (1988) (language in employment contract providing that employee ‘‘would be afforded
an opportunity to continue in the employ of [the employer] for a sufficient number of years to qualify for 100 [percent] vestingineach ofthe employerbenefit plans’’ plainly and unambiguously constituted contract of employment for specified period [internal quotationmarks omitted]).12
When contractual language is plain and unambiguous, ‘‘to permit oral testimony, or prior or contemporaneous conversations, orcircumstances, orusages [etc.], in order to learn what was intended, or to contradict what is written, would be dangerous and unjust in the extreme.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v

. Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., supra, 252 Conn. 502. Parol evidence is admissible, however, ‘‘to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 277, 819 A.2d 773 (2003); see also id. (‘‘[t]he parol evidence rule does not of itself, therefore, forbid the presentation ofparol evidence, that is, evidence outside the four corners of the contract

. . . but forbids only the use of such evidence to vary or contradict the terms of

. . . a contract’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Because the letter agreement was ambiguous as to whether it was intended to constitute a contract of employment for a definite term or, instead, was intended to set the terms and conditions of an at-will employment contract, the trial court was required to resolve this ambiguity by considering the extrinsic evidence and making factual findings as to the parties’ intent. It is elementary that neither this court nor the Appellate Court can find facts in the first instance. Holley v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 62 Conn. App. 170, 180, 774 A.2d 148 (2001) (‘‘[a]n appellate court cannot find facts or draw conclusions from primary facts found, butmayonlyreviewsuchfindingstoseewhether they might be legally, logically and reasonably found’’ [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that the letter agreement plainly and unambiguously evinced the parties’ intent that it would be for a definite term, and the case must be remanded to the trial court so that the court may resolve the ambiguity as to the parties’ intent on the basis of the extrinsic evidence.13 Finally, because it is likely to arise on remand, we address the plaintiff’s claim that, under the rule ofcontra proferentum, the letter agreement should be construed against the defendant because it drafted the contract. ‘‘After the court has examined all ofthe other factors that affect the search for the parties’ intended meaning

. . . and the only remaining question is which of two possible and reasonable meanings should be adopted, the court will often adopt the meaning that is less favorable in its legal effect to the party who chose the words. This technique is known as contraproferentum.

. . . The

. . . rule has been described as being applicable only as a last resort, when other techniquesof interpretation and construction have not resolved the questionofwhich oftwo ormorepossible meanings the court should choose. One court wrote that the rule is a tie breaker when there is no other sound basisfor choosingonecontractinterpretationoveranother

. The rule is not applicable at allifonly one reasonable meaning is possible.

. . . [The rule] directs the court to choosebetweentwo ormorepossiblereasonablemeanings on the basis of their legal operation, i.e., whether they favor the drafter or the other party.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.)Montoyav. Montoya, 91 Conn. App. 407, 420– 21, 881 A.2d 319 (2005), rev’d in part on other grounds, 280 Conn. 605, 909 A.2d 947 (2006). Thus, thetrialcourtinthepresentcase shouldinvoke the rule of contra proferentum only as a last resort if it is unable to resolve the ambiguity in the letter agreement by considering the extrinsic evidence. It would make absolutely no sense to require the trial court to construe the agreement against the defendant ifthe extrinsic evidence showed that it was more likely than not that the parties had a contrary intent.14
Thejudgment ofthe Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to
reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand the case to that court for a new trial.
In this opinion PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

1 ‘‘Employment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 697–98, 802 A.2d 731 (2002).

2 The plaintiff’s complaint also named as a defendant Robert W. Aube, Jr., a doctor of optometry, who was the principal of Visual Perceptions, LLC. The trial court concluded that Aube was not personally liable to the plaintiff. Accordingly, Aube was not aggrieved by the trial court’s decision;

see Cadle Co. v. D’Addario, 268 Conn. 441, 443 n.1, 844 A.2d 836 (2004) (partywho prevails intrial court is not aggrieved); and neitherthe Appellate Court nor this court had appellate jurisdiction over his claims on appeal. See State v. Scott, 139 Conn. App. 333, 338, 55 A.3d 608 (2012) (proof of aggrievement is essential prerequisite to Appellate Court’s jurisdiction); State v. Preston, 286 Conn. 367, 373 n.4, 944 A.2d 276 (2008) (proof of aggrievement is prerequisite to this court’sjurisdiction). We note, however, that Aube and Visual Perceptions, LLC, filed a joint brief and none of the claims raised on appeal apply only to Aube. Because Visual Perceptions, LLC, was aggrieved by the decisions of the trial court and the Appellate Court, this court has jurisdiction to consider the claims. All references to the defendant in this opinion are to Visual Perceptions, LLC.

3 The March 1, 2007 document provided: ‘‘Norma Cruz Employment Contract: ‘‘This will cover the [thirty-six] month period starting April 1, 2007 and ending March 31, 2010. Your [t]itle would be Optical Lab Manager. You

are responsible for all the eyeglasses produced from this office. You are responsible for the maintenance ofthe lens lab. You are responsible for the dispensary and all the related products and issues. ‘‘You would work Monday (9:00–5:30), Tuesday (9:00–5:30), Wednesday (9:00–5:30) andThursday (9:00–7:30); andthenalternating Friday (9:00–5:30) and Saturday (9:00–12:30). You will be compensated [$2300] per two weeks ([$59,800] per year). You are a salaried employee and any overtime is included in your salary. Ifyourwork dayfalls on amajor holiday, you would be paid for the day. You would receive an adjusted bonus of 1 [percent] of net receipts in amonth minus [$650], paidinthe firstpayroll afterthe monthends. (Ifthe monthly production is less than [$65,000], then no bonus). You will have matching 3 [percent] for the Simple IRA (at least $69 per pay period, [$1794] a year**) and health and dental insurance (Medical/Dental $341.61 per month, $4099.32 per year). Any increase in health insurance premiumwillbe absorbedby [the defendant] forthe durationofthe contract. ‘‘Total Compensation will be $65,693.32 plus potential monthly bonus. ‘‘You will have [ten] paid personal days in 2007 that can be used for vacation/sick time. Once the [ten] days are used up your salary would be reduced $250 per day for any days missed. The days will be counted from January 1 to December 31, and reset to zero on January 1. You will have [twelve] days in 2008 and [fourteen] days in 2009 and [fifteen] days in 2010. ‘‘**You need to put 3 [percent] into the IRA to get the matching funds, which you are currently doing. (3 [percent] of [$2300] equals [$69] and any bonus would increase the IRA matching funds.)’’

4 ‘‘The revised amended complaint contains six counts. Counts four and five [seeking an accounting and payment of precontractual commissions from, respectively, the defendant andAube] were withdrawn bythe plaintiff following argument held on July 6, 2010. Count six [alleging a violation of General Statutes § 46a-60 (a) (1), discriminatory employmentpractices] was dismissed by the court at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief.’’ Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, supra, 136 Conn. App. 332 n.2.

5 Because the trial court concluded that the March 1, 2007 document was ‘‘definite and certain as to its terms and requirements,’’ and it cited no extrinsic evidence in support of its determination that the contract constituteda‘‘validandbindingtermemployment contract,’’ itis clearthatthetrial court’s interpretation was premised on a determination that the contractual language was plain and unambiguous.

6 With respect to count three ofthe revised amended complaint, the court held that Aube could not be held personally liable.

7 Judge Lavine issued a dissenting opinion in which he contended that the evidence presented to the trial court supported the conclusion that the March 1, 2007documentwasnotacontactforadefinitetermofemployment, but was a ‘‘compensation agreement.’’ Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, supra, 136Conn.App. 342.Accordingly, hewouldhavereversedthejudgment of the trial court and directed a judgment for the defendant. Id. ( Lavine, J., dissenting).

8 At oral argument before this court, the defendant conceded that, if this court concludes that the letter agreement was a contract for a definite term, the defendant could not terminate the plaintiff’s employment without good cause.
9 The plaintiff in the present case appears to claim that the trial court’s interpretation is subject to review only for clear error even though the trial court and the Appellate Court relied solely on the language of the letter agreement in support of their interpretation. In support of this claim, she cites Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Lighthouse Landings, Inc., 279 Conn. 90, 109, 900 A.2d 1242 (2006), in which this court observed that, in ‘‘themajorityofthe casesconsideringcontractinterpretationamatteroflaw, the disputed agreement was a commercial contract between sophisticated commercial parties with relatively equal bargaining power.’’ The plaintiff contends that because the letter agreement at issue in the present case was not such a contract, the trial court’s interpretation cannot be subject to plenary review. This court merely observed in Connecticut Light & Power Co., however, that courts are more likely to find commercial contracts betweensophisticatedpartiestobeplainandunambiguous. See id. (because ‘‘the lease was entered into by sophisticated parties, represented by competent counsel regarding the commercial interests of both parties, each with relatively equal bargaining power,’’ trial court concluded that ‘‘the parties meant what they said and said what they meant in language sufficiently definitive to obviate any need for deference to the trial court’s factual findings as to the parties’ intent’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 259 Conn. 665, 670, 791 A.2d 546 (2002) (‘‘apresumptionthatthe language used is definitive arises when

. . . the contract at issue is between sophisticated parties and is commercial in nature’’). These cases do not support the proposition that

atrial court’s finding that contractual language is so plain and unambiguous

as to obviate the need for extrinsic evidence of contractual intent is subject to plenary review only ifthere was a commercial contract between sophisticated parties.

10 To the extentthatthe Appellate Courtheldthatthe trial court’s determination that the language ofthe letter agreement was plain and unambiguousor its interpretation ofthe written contractual language were factual issues subject to review for clear error, any such holding was incorrect and is hereby overruled.

11 The plaintiff contends in her brief to this court that, even if this court concludes that the language of the letter agreement is ambiguous, ‘‘[t]he only question for this court is whether it is reasonable to conclude that a document that: (1) is expressly titled ‘Norma Cruz Employment Contract’; (2) is signed by both the plaintiff and [Aube]; (3) expressly states that it

covers a ‘thirty-six month period’ with precise starting and ending dates; (4) contains othertermsandconditionsessentialtoanemploymentcontract; and (5) provides that any health insurance premium increases would be absorbed bythe defendant forthe ‘duration ofthe contract’; was an employment contract for a determinable period of time.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiff makes no claim, however, that the trial court relied on any evidence outside the four corners of the letter agreement in reaching this conclusion. We can conceive ofno reason why this court should give deference to the trial court’s ‘‘reasonable’’ interpretation of ambiguous written contract language in contravention ofthe bedrock legalprinciplesthat, first, the interpretation of a written document is a question of law; see, e.g., United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, supra, 259 Conn. 669–70 (determinationastowhethercontractuallanguageisplainandunambiguous is question of law subject to plenary review); School District No. 8 v. Lynch, 33 Conn. 330, 333 (1866) (‘‘[t]he construction of a written document is a matter of law, where the meaning is to be ascertained from the document itself; butwhere the meaning canbe understood onlyfrom extrinsic facts, the construction is generally a question offact for thejury’’); and, second, whencontractlanguageisambiguousandthereis extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent, the trial court must consider that evidence. Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 277, 819 A.2d 773 (2003).
12 The dissenting justice states that, ‘‘[a]lthough the contract

. . . does not specifically provide that the plaintiff could be terminated only for good cause, there was no need to so provide in light of well settled law

. . . recognizing that such a condition is implied in a contract for a definite term.’’ We cannotpresume an intent to create an employment contract for

a definite term ifthe contractlanguage is ambiguous onthatpoint, however, especially in light of the presumption under Connecticut law that employment is at will unless the employment contract provides to the contrary. See Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 697, 802 A.2d 731 (2002) (‘‘[i]n Connecticut, an employer and employee have an at-will employmentrelationship inthe absence ofacontractto the contrary’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). The dissentingjustice has provided no authority for the proposition that contractual language like that at issue in the present case—i.e., ‘‘[t]his [letter agreement] will cover the [thirty-six] month period starting April 1, 2007 and ending March 31, 2010’’—unambiguously rebuts the presumption of at-will employment. Indeed, the cases that he cites support our conclusion that it does not. See Taravella v. Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129, 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2010) (letter agreement that ‘‘established the terms of [the plaintiff’s] employment for a one-year period’’ was ambiguous

as to whether plaintiff employee could be terminated only for cause within that period when agreement contemplated possibility oftermination due to change ofmayoral administrationandprovidedthatplaintiffcouldterminate employment with ten days notice); see also id., 143 (Straub, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority that agreement providing that ‘‘[t]he term of the agreement shall be one year from [the] date of [the] signature’’ was ambiguous as to whether plaintiff could be terminated only for cause within that period [internal quotation marks omitted]); Wilkerson v. Carriage Park Development Corp., 130 N.C. App. 475, 477–78, 503 S.E.2d 138 (verbal representations by defendant employer during employment negotiations that it contemplatedbuilding 500 houses andthatplaintiffemployee would receive bonus for each house built did not constitute verbal agreement thatplaintiff would be entitled to work until all 500 houses were completed), review denied, 349 N.C. 534, 526 S.E.2d 478 (1998). Although, as the dissenting justice points out, the presumption ofat-will employment can be overcome eitherby an express provision inthe employment contractthat employment

canbe terminated onlyforcause orbyan express provisionthatthe employment contract is for a definite term, if either provision is ambiguous, the ambiguity must be resolved with extrinsic evidence.

13 Ifthe trial court concludes onthebasis ofthe extrinsic evidence thatthe partiesintendedto create anemploymentcontractwithadefinite duration, it need not readdress the issue ofwhetherthe defendant terminated the plaintiff for cause. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on that issue inthe first trial, its ruling on the issue was affirmed by the Appellate Court, and the defendant has not challenged the Appellate Court’s resolution of the issue on appeal to this court. Accordingly, it is the law of the case.
14 The plaintiffpoints outthat this court has statedthat contracts between employers and employees should be construed against employers, in light of their superior bargaining power in drafting the contracts. See Assn. Resources, Inc. v. Wall, 298 Conn. 145, 184, 2 A.3d 873 (2010) (‘‘[w]e agree withtheplaintiffthatthe defendant, as drafterofthe employmentagreement, could have exercised its superior bargaining position to draft a more favorable provision’’); Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies, Inc., 285 Conn. 716, 741, 941 A.2d 309 (2008) (noting ‘‘the superior bargaining power of an employer that enters into an employment contract with an employee’’ given ‘‘the economic compulsion facing those in search of employment’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Even if that is the case, the trial court should apply this rule only after determining that the ambiguity in the contract cannot be resolved by considering extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.