IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

ALINA FAROOQ,

Appellant,

v.

AZEEM AHMED KHAN,

Respondent.

No. 80970-9-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

APPELWICK, J. —The trial court denied Farooq’s motion to quash a writ of 

garnishment. Farooq failed to meet her burden to prove she did not own the funds 

deposited in a joint bank account. And, Farooq did not identify a substantial injury 

resulting from a failure to comply with statutory garnishment procedures. The trial 

court acted within its discretion. We affirm.

FACTS

Following a 2017 family law hearing, the court entered an order denying 

Alina Farooq’s motions and awarding attorney fees of $1,500 to Azeem Khan. In 

June 2019, Khan applied for a writ of garnishment, stating that Farooq had not paid

the judgment and he had reason to believe that Wells Fargo Bank N.A. held funds 

in an account for Farooq. The court issued a writ of garnishment against Wells 

Fargo. Khan served the writ on Wells Fargo, the garnishee, and mailed certain 

documents, including the writ, to Farooq’s Atlanta, Georgia address. 
No. 80970-9-I/2

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On August 8, 2019, Wells Fargo answered the writ. The bank’s answer 

confirmed that Farooq maintained a financial account with Wells Fargo which held 

sufficient funds to satisfy the amount owed to Khan, the judgment creditor. 

Farooq did not file an affidavit to controvert the bank’s answer. See RCW 

6.27.210, .220. However, on August 15, 2019, represented by counsel, Farooq 

filed a motion to quash the writ of garnishment. She primarily argued that the court 

should set aside the writ because the garnished account contained only funds 

deposited by a third-party, Shahzaib Khan, the co-owner of the account.1 Farooq 

also claimed that Khan did not notify her of the writ within the timeframe established 

by the garnishment statute or provide her with a specific statutorily-mandated

document to apprise her of her rights. See RCW 6.27.130, .140. 

In support of her motion, Farooq provided, among other documents, the 

declaration of Shahzaib. Shahzaib stated that he had been the family nanny, that 

he was the only person who deposited funds in the garnished savings account, 

and that Farooq’s name was on the account so that “if anything happened, [she] 

could remove the money” and send it to his family in Pakistan. 

The court denied the motion to quash the writ, finding that Farooq was a 

“co-owner of [the] Wells Fargo account” and that her statements and those of 

Shahzaib were “not credible.”2 

 

1 Because Shahzaib Khan and Azeem Khan share the same last name, we 

refer to Shahzaib Khan by his first name for clarity.

2 The record on appeal does not include clerk’s minutes for an August 30 

hearing on the motion to quash the writ, but Farooq’s briefing indicates that the 

court held a hearing before denying her motion. 
No. 80970-9-I/3

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Acting pro se, Farooq filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s ruling.3 

She submitted new documentary evidence in support of her motion, including 

numerous bank statements. She claimed that she was added to the garnished 

savings account on July 3, 2019 and that no funds were deposited in the account 

at that time or thereafter. 

The court denied the motion. Farooq appeals.

DISCUSSION

The garnishment process is governed by statute. Chapter 6.27 RCW; 

Bartel v. Zucktriegel, 112 Wn. App. 55, 64, 47 P.3d 581 (2002). The garnishment 

statute’s purpose is to enforce a debtor’s obligations. See RCW 6.27.005. 

Garnishment involves three parties: a judgment creditor, a judgment debtor, and a 

garnishee, which holds property belonging to the debtor. RCW 6.27.080(3) (writs 

against financial institutions); Hinote’s Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Olney & 

Pederson, Inc., 40 Wn. App. 879, 886-87, 700 P.2d 1208 (1985). Once a judgment 

creditor obtains a writ of garnishment, the garnishee must answer the writ. RCW 

6.27.020, .190. The garnishee’s answer must provide information about the funds 

or property of the debtor in its control. RCW 6.27.190. The judgment debtor or 

judgment creditor may challenge the garnishee’s answer. RCW 6.27.210, .220.

 

3 Although titled a “Motion for Revision,” Farooq’s motion did not seek 

revision of a superior court commissioner’s decision under RCW 2.24.050 and 

appeared to be a motion for reconsideration under CR 59. 
No. 80970-9-I/4

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I. Funds Held in Joint Account 

As she argued below, Farooq contends that the trial court was required to 

quash the writ because all funds in the Wells Fargo joint account were deposited 

by Shahzaib and were, therefore, “owned” by him. For purposes of this appeal, 

we assume that the question of whether the joint account was subject to 

garnishment is a question of law that we review de novo. See Weyerhaeuser Co. 

v. Calloway Ross, Inc., 133 Wn. App. 621, 624, 137 P.3d 879 (2006) (reviewing 

de novo the question of whether liability insurer was required to honor writ of 

garnishment).

Farooq relies on RCW 30A.22.090(2), a provision of the Financial Institution 

Individual Account Deposit Act, which provides that funds deposited in a joint 

account, “belong to the depositors in proportion to the net funds owned by each 

depositor on deposit in the account.”

The statute “creates a rebuttable presumption that funds in a joint 

account with right of survivorship are owned by the depositors in 

proportion to the amount deposited by each.” Morse v. Williams, 48 

Wn. App. 734, 741, 740 P.2d 884 (1987). In other words, the mere 

fact funds are deposited into a joint account does not result in a 

present transfer of ownership even though the nondepositing party 

may have full rights to withdraw the funds.

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., v. Nw. Paving and Const. Co., Inc., 77 Wn. App. 474, 

476, 891 P.2d 747 (1985). Because “a creditor has no greater rights to a fund than 

his debtor,” garnishment of a joint bank account reaches only those funds owned 

by the debtor. Yakima Adjustment Serv., Inc. v. Durand, 28 Wn. App. 180, 184, 

622 P.2d 408 (1981). The burden of proving the ownership of funds rests with the 

joint depositors. Id. at 184-85. 
No. 80970-9-I/5

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Washington law supports Farooq’s argument that a creditor can garnish 

only property that is owned by the debtor. But, Farooq bore the burden to prove 

that she did not own or deposit any funds in the joint account. 

In support of her motion to set aside the writ, Farooq relied solely on her 

own self-serving statements and those of Shahzaib. Farooq provided no 

information about the joint account and simply claimed she would have to assume 

“considerable debt” to repay Shahzaib. Shahzaib asserted that all the funds in the 

account were his, and beyond explaining that Farooq was a co-owner for 

emergency purposes, similarly provided no details about the account. Farooq 

submitted no documents to substantiate her claims. The trial court did not err in 

concluding that the unsupported assertions Farooq relied upon did not satisfy her

burden of proof.

Farooq submitted additional evidence in support of her motion for 

reconsideration of the court’s ruling. We review orders on motions for 

reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Terhune v. N. Cascade Tr. Servs., Inc., 

9 Wn. App. 2d 708, 727, 446 P.3d 683 (2019), review denied, 195 Wn.2d 1004, 

458 P.3d 782 (2020). The superior court abuses its discretion when its decision is 

“manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or unsupported by the 

record.” Id. The court’s discretion extends to its decision whether to consider new 

evidence on reconsideration. Martini v. Post, 178 Wn. App. 153, 162, 313 P.3d 

473 (2013) (“The decision to consider new or additional evidence presented with 

a motion for reconsideration is squarely within the trial court’s discretion.”). 
No. 80970-9-I/6

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Farooq relied on new evidence submitted on reconsideration to argue that 

(1) she became a co-owner of Shahzaib’s account on July 13, 2019, and (2) apart 

from nominal interest, no funds were deposited into that account when she became 

a co-owner or thereafter. But, the documents purporting to establish that Farooq’s 

ownership began in July 2019 were application documents, not contracts of 

deposit with the bank. The documents were not signed by an agent of the bank

and there is no evidence to show that the bank added Farooq as an account holder

on the date indicated on the document. The evidence does not conclusively 

establish when Farooq’s co-ownership began. And, although Farooq submitted 

bank statements showing that Shahzaib regularly transferred funds into the joint 

savings account from his sole checking account, those transfers do not account 

for the entire balance. 

It was within the court’s discretion to decline to consider Farooq’s new 

evidence on reconsideration. And, even if the court considered that evidence, 

there was a tenable basis to conclude that Farooq failed to prove that she did not 

own any portion of the funds held in the joint account.

II. Compliance with Garnishment Procedures

Farooq also claims that Khan failed to notify her of the writ of garnishment 

within the timeframe required by RCW 6.27.130 and did not provide the mandatory 

form set forth in RCW 6.27.140. 
No. 80970-9-I/7

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RCW 6.27.130(1) outlines the timing and content of notice that the judgment 

creditor must provide to the judgment debtor:

(1) When a writ is issued under a judgment, on or before the date of 

service of the writ on the garnishee, the judgment creditor shall mail or 

cause to be mailed to the judgment debtor, by certified mail, addressed to 

the last known post office address of the judgment debtor, (a) a copy of the 

writ and a copy of the judgment creditor’s affidavit submitted in application 

for the writ, and (b) if the judgment debtor is an individual, the notice and 

claim form prescribed in RCW 6.27.140. In the alternative, on or before the 

day of the service of the writ on the garnishee or within two days thereafter, 

the stated documents shall be served on the judgment debtor in the same 

manner as is required for personal service of summons upon a party to an 

action.

(Emphasis added.) The statute requires that if the judgment creditor serves the 

judgment debtor by mail, the person who mails the required documents must file 

an affidavit of service. RCW 6.27.130(3). 

The statute also addresses the consequences of a judgment creditor’s 

failure to comply with procedural requirements:

(2) The requirements of this section shall not be jurisdictional, but (a) 

no disbursement order or judgment against the garnishee defendant shall 

be entered unless there is on file the return or affidavit of service or mailing 

required by subsection (3) of this section, and (b) if the copies of the writ 

and judgment or affidavit, and the notice and claim form if the defendant is 

an individual, are not mailed or served as herein provided, or if any 

irregularity appears with respect to the mailing or service, the court, in its 

discretion, on motion of the judgment debtor promptly made and supported 

by affidavit showing that the judgment debtor has suffered substantial injury 

from the plaintiff’s failure to mail or otherwise to serve such copies, may set 

aside the garnishment and award to the judgment debtor an amount equal 

to the damages suffered because of such failure.

RCW 6.27.130(2) (emphasis added).
No. 80970-9-I/8

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While Farooq’s motion alleged a failure to comply with RCW 6.27.130 and 

.140, her declaration did not mention the notice and explanation of rights form or 

describe any of the documents Khan mailed to her. The certification of mailing 

Khan filed in superior court indicates that he mailed several documents, including 

the prescribed notice and explanation of rights form set forth in RCW 6.27.140. 

Insofar as Farooq alleges a due process violation based on the failure to provide 

the required notice and explanation of rights form, her claim fails chiefly because 

the evidence in the record does not establish a failure to provide the document.

4

 

While Farooq maintains that Khan did not mail any documents to her until 

August 2, 2019, the evidence she submitted reveals a mailing date-stamp of July 

31, 2019. Khan contends that July 31 is also the date he served the writ on the 

garnishee. Yet, the documents he cites show only that the bank’s agent signed its 

answer to the writ on that date. And, the record indicates that Wells Fargo informed

Shahzaib and Farooq that Khan served the writ of garnishment on the bank two 

days earlier, on July 29. 

Therefore, the evidence in the record indicates that Khan did not mail the 

required documents to Farooq “on or before” the date he served the writ on the 

bank, as required by RCW 6.27.130(1). Nevertheless, this timing requirement is

 

4 To the extent that Farooq alleges that garnishment of the joint account 

violated Shahzaib’s due process rights, he is not a party to this proceeding. And,

if he were, Farooq would not be authorized to represent his legal interests. Farooq 

may act as her own attorney, but the right of self-representation applies “only if the 

layperson is acting solely on his own behalf” with respect to his own legal rights 

and obligations. Wash. State Bar Ass’n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 

91 Wn.2d 48, 57, 586 P.2d 870 (1978). 
No. 80970-9-I/9

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not “jurisdictional.” RCW 6.27.130(2). Khan’s noncompliance provided only a 

discretionary basis for the court to set aside the writ of garnishment upon a showing 

of “substantial injury.” RCW 6.27.130(2). Farooq alleged no substantial injury 

related to the timing of service. She consistently claimed that the garnishment

caused financial hardship because she was obligated to repay Shahzaib. Farooq 

argues on appeal that had Khan complied with the statute, she could have 

asserted a claim of exemption. See RCW 6.27.150 (exemption of earnings). This 

argument, however, directly contradicts her position that all funds in the account 

belonged to Shahzaib. 

It does not appear that Farooq was prejudiced, let alone substantially 

injured, by the two day delay. She could have filed her motion challenging the writ 

on August 15, within the time period for controverting the bank’s answer to the writ, 

had she chosen to do so. In light of Farooq’s failure to identify a substantial injury, 

the court acted within its discretion, under the express terms of the statute, in 

declining to quash the writ based on lack of compliance with the statute.5

Finally, Farooq requests attorney fees on appeal. She cites RCW 6.27.230, 

which provides for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party where the answer 

to the writ is controverted. Even assuming that the statute applies when the 

answer to the writ was uncontroverted, Farooq is not the prevailing party and 

establishes no basis for such an award. See In re Marriage of Brown, 159 Wn. 

 

5 Farooq makes vague and broad allegations of judicial misconduct. Absent 

any evidence in the record of bias or impropriety, her claims are unfounded. 
No. 80970-9-I/10

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App. 931, 938-39, 247 P.3d 466 (2011) (pro se litigant is generally not entitled to 

attorney fees). We deny the request.

We affirm.

WE CONCUR: