In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: February 21, 2023

S22G0030. WS CE RESORT OWNER, LLC v. HOLLAND et al.

 PINSON, Justice.

A resort community in North Georgia includes a golf course 

next to a subdivision. The current owner of the resort wants to 

redevelop the golf course into a residential property, and several 

homeowners in the subdivision sued to stop it. The trial court 

concluded that the homeowners had an easement in the golf course 

and granted a permanent injunction preventing the course from 

being put to any other use, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

We granted certiorari and now vacate the Court of Appeals’ 

decision and remand for further proceedings. Both courts below

concluded that the homeowners acquired an easement in the golf 

course because their lots were bought with reference to a subdivision 

plat that designated a “golf course” next to the subdivision. That 
2

conclusion relied on a long line of our decisions recognizing that

easements in features like streets, parks, and lakes could be 

acquired on this basis, which amounts to an easement by express 

grant. But golf courses are different. Given the wide range of 

interests that an easement in a golf course could possibly include—

interests in a view, access, use, or enjoyment, to name a few—merely 

designating a “golf course” on a subdivision plat and selling lots with 

reference to the plat cannot give reasonable certainty as to the scope 

of a claimed easement. And unlike with streets and parks, we are 

not aware of longstanding and settled expectations about golf 

courses from which intent to grant easements of reasonably certain 

scope may be inferred. So, although subdivision owners might be 

able to acquire an easement in a given adjacent golf course, the 

intent to convey such an interest must be shown through evidence 

based in the relevant documents taken as a whole, rather than 

presumed based on the golf course’s mere designation on a plat. For 

these reasons and more set out below, we vacate the contrary 

decision below and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
3

this opinion.

1. Background

(a) The Land

In 1993, Fountainhead Development, Inc. developed the 

Chateau Elan resort property, which is currently owned by 

appellant WS CE Resort Owner, LLC (the “resort owner”). Chateau 

Elan includes hotels, a spa, a winery, a tennis center, an equestrian 

center, residential subdivisions, and four golf courses, including the 

nine-hole “Par 3 Course” at issue here. The Par 3 Course is adjacent 

to a residential subdivision known as the “Manor Homes” division.

In 1995, a surveyor, Donald Jones, prepared “The Final Plat 

for Executive Estates – Block A.” The Plat was a representation of 

the Manor Homes subdivision, and also noted the owners and uses 

of some adjacent properties. On the other side of one boundary of the 

subdivided area, the plat listed “Fountainhead Development, Inc. 

(Golf Course).” The adjacent properties were noted on the Plat only 

generally, with no delineation of boundary lines, specification of 

acreage, or identification of reference points. Jones stated in an 
4

affidavit that listing adjacent property owners was “typical for plats 

and [per] local subdivision regulations,” but that he did not survey 

the adjacent golf course and did not intend to include the golf course 

as part of the Plat.

A realtor for Chateau Elan, Ben Harrison, testified that within 

the Chateau Elan development, residential lots were known for 

having either a wooded view or a golf course view, with the golf 

course views being more expensive. As part of Harrison’s pitch to 

prospective buyers, he would share with them the Master Site Plan, 

which showed three 18-hole golf courses and the nine-hole Par 3 

Course, as well as wooded-view and golf course-view residential lots.

He also showed them a marketing brochure for the Manor Homes 

subdivision, which noted various amenities of the Chateau Elan 

property, including the golf courses. The brochure explained that 

“[t]his year we will be introducing an exciting new ‘Manor Home’ 

development of smaller homes overlooking the Par 3 golf course.” 

(b) The Homeowners

Evelyn and John McCarthy (with Harrison’s help) purchased a 
5

lot in the Manor Homes subdivision in 1995. Evelyn testified that 

the couple were “especially interested” in the lot “because it was 

adjacent to an existing Par 3 Golf Course and had a good view of the

golf course from its back yard,” and that that particular lot’s 

proximity and access to the course was the “sole reason” for their 

purchase. In purchasing their home, the McCarthys relied on the 

Master Site Plan and marketing brochure provided to them by 

Harrison. The McCarthys paid a $15,000 site premium for their lot,

which they understood to be because of its proximity and access to 

the course. The couple played golf on the Par 3 Course, enjoyed their 

view daily, and also received a free discount card for the course “by 

virtue of being a homeowner.”

Thomas and Connie Holland (with the help of Harrison and the 

president of Fountainhead) purchased a lot in the Manor Homes 

subdivision in 1996. Thomas testified that the couple were

“especially looking for a home in a golf community.” He noted that 

“[t]he Par 3 Golf Course was an essential part of the concept [of 

buying a home in Manor Homes]...We were very much drawn to the 
6

Manor Homes because of the Par 3 Golf Course.” The Hollands paid 

a $15,000 site premium for their lot, which they understood to be 

because of its proximity to the course. The Hollands relied on the 

Plat’s depiction of the Par 3 Course as adjacent to the Manor Homes. 

(c) Proposed Redevelopment of the Par 3 Course

According to the resort owner, the Par 3 Course is not 

profitable. As a result, the resort owner applied to rezone the Par 3 

Course to enable its conversion into a residential development. After 

its rezoning application was granted, Evelyn McCarthy1 and the 

Hollands (collectively, the “homeowners”) sued the resort owner in 

Barrow County Superior Court, seeking (1) an interlocutory 

injunction to enjoin the resort owner from “taking any action to 

change use of Par 3 Course”; (2) a declaratory judgment that (a) the 

Par 3 Course is subject to a use restriction limiting the use to 

operation as a golf course, (b) the use of the property as a golf course 

cannot be eliminated, and (c) the Par 3 Course cannot be converted 

to residential uses or any uses other than that as a golf course; and 

 1 John McCarthy passed away in 2008.
7

(3) attorney fees. 

(d) Decisions Below

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial 

court granted summary judgment to the homeowners, finding that 

they had established an implied easement that required the resort 

owner to keep the Par 3 Course operating as a golf course. The court 

found that an easement had been created by two different methods, 

which it called the “common-grantor” and “oral assurances” 

methods, relying on Peck v. Lanier Golf Club, Inc., 315 Ga. App. 176 

(726 SE2d 442) (2012).

Applying Peck’s common-grantor method, the trial court looked 

to the plat and other evidence to determine whether the Par 3 

Course was “set apart” for the homeowners’ use. The court concluded 

that it was, noting that the plat included “Fountainhead 

Development, Inc. (Golf Course)” as a description of property 

adjacent to the subdivision, McCarthy’s status as a homeowner in 

the Manor Homes gave him a special use discount on the course, and 

the homeowners had paid a premium price to “purchase[] an 
8

adjacency and proximity” to the course.

Applying Peck’s oral-assurances method, the trial court also

found that Fountainhead had made oral assurances to the 

homeowners that the Par 3 Course would remain a golf course. The

court pointed out that Fountainhead’s marketing materials 

advertised the Manor Homes as “overlooking the Par 3 Course,” and 

that Fountainhead told buyers they would be buying lots “in a golf 

course community” and that they could use the course.

Based on these findings, the trial court held that the 

homeowners were entitled to a permanent injunction “preventing 

[the] Par 3 [C]ourse from being put to any other use.”

The resort owner appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that an easement 

had been created under Peck’s common-grantor method. See WS CE 

Resort Owner, LLC v. Holland, 360 Ga. App. 720, 725-732 (860 SE2d 

637) (2021). The court explained that the homeowners purchased 

their lots according to a recorded plat that showed the Par 3 Course 

next to the Manor Homes subdivision, and that the homeowners
9

paid a site premium for that proximity to the course, which, the 

court held, was enough to acquire an easement. See id. The Court of 

Appeals also upheld the injunction, concluding that the trial court 

order had sufficiently described the Par 3 Course and the acts to be 

restrained in relation to it. See id. at 732-735.

We granted certiorari.

2. Analysis

(a) Speaking generally, an easement is an interest in land 

owned and possessed by another. See, e.g., Hollomon v. Bd. of Educ. 

of Stewart County, 168 Ga. 359, 364 (147 SE 882) (1929) (“[a]n 

easement is a right in the owner of one parcel of land, by reason of 

such ownership, to use the land of another for a special purpose not 

inconsistent with the general property in the owner”) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). See also Southern Ry. Co. v. Wages, 203 Ga. 

502, 503 (1) (47 SE2d 501) (1948) (holder of an easement has an 

interest in “realty” but “is not the owner or occupant of the estate 

over which the right extends”); Daniel F. Hinkel, 1 Pindar’s Ga. Real 

Estate Law & Procedure § 8:1 (7th ed., Apr. 2022 update)
10

(“Pindar’s”); Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of 

Easements & Licenses in Land § 1:1 (Aug. 2022 update). That

interest, which can be created in a number of ways, see OCGA § 44-

9-1, typically amounts to some limited right to use the land—

common examples include the right to access utilities (like power or 

gas lines), see Simpson v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 269 Ga. 520, 521 (2) 

(499 SE2d 634) (1998) (gas utility had easement in its gas pipelines 

across homeowners’ property); Georgia Power Co. v. Leonard, 187 

Ga. 608, 609 (1 SE2d 579) (1939) (electric utility held easement 

giving it “the privilege of erecting and maintaining a power line 

over” subject property while landowner reserved “the right of 

cultivation and ingress and egress”), or to access other land, see 

Sadler v. First Nat’l Bank of Baldwin County, 267 Ga. 122, 122 (475 

SE2d 643) (1996) (bank held easement in access road across other 

property).

This case concerns a kind of easement specific to residential 

subdivisions. Georgia law has long recognized that when a developer 

conveys lots with reference to a subdivision plat, the grantees may 
11

receive easements in certain features—mostly streets and parks—

that are designated on the plat. See Stanfield v. Brewton, 228 Ga. 

92, 94-95 (1) (a)-(b) (184 SE2d 352) (1971) (citing Schreck v. Blun, 

131 Ga. 489 (62 SE 705) (1908)) (explaining that “[w]here the owners 

of a tract of land subdivide it into lots, record a map or plat showing 

such lots, with designated streets and a public park, and sell lots 

with reference to such map or plat,” the purchasers “have an 

easement in these public areas”); East Atlanta Land Co. v. Mower, 

138 Ga. 380 (75 SE 418) (1912); Ford v. Harris, 95 Ga. 97, 101 (22 

S.E. 144) (1894) (“If the owner of land lays out streets and alleys, 

and afterwards sells lots bounding upon them, . . . the purchasers of 

those lots acquire the right to have the strips designated as streets 

remain open for their use as a perpetual easement over the ground 

for ingress to and egress from their property.”); 1 Pindar’s § 8:15.

Our early decisions recognizing the rights of subdivision lot 

owners in streets and parks designated on their plats were often 

grounded in a theory of estoppel. The reasoning went that 

subdivision developers include features like streets and parks to 
12

“mak[e] the residence lots more desirable to prospective 

purchasers,” Caffey v. Parris, 186 Ga. 303, 306 (1) (197 SE 898) 

(1938), and conveying those lots with reference to a unified plan that 

integrates and designates those basic features is a “representation” 

that the features are meant for the grantees’ future use and 

enjoyment. Schreck, 131 Ga. at 492. Because “it is just to presume 

that purchasers paid the added value” for the benefits of living next 

to a park or within a convenient network of streets, Adair v. 

Spellman Seminary, 13 Ga. App. 600, 606 (79 SE 589) (1913), the 

purchaser had “a right to rely upon the plan which the grantor 

promulgated, and on which he acted,” Schreck, 131 Ga. at 491

(explaining that “[s]ome of the considerations inducing the 

purchase” of a lot with reference to a subdivision plat that 

designated a street “may have been the probability of having 

neighbors, particular uses to which the purchased premises might 

be put because of the street, and the prospect of an advance in value 

from buildings to be erected on other lots”). See also Adair, 13 Ga. 

App. at 606 (“[c]ertainly, as every one knows, lots with convenient 
13

cross streets are of more value than those without”); 1 Pindar’s § 

8:15 (“The fact that a lot is surrounded by a network of streets and 

alleys is generally considered as greatly increasing its market value 

through added accessibility, availability of public utilities and 

services, and the attraction of desirable neighbors.”). So, when a 

subdivision owner sold lots with reference to a plat that designated 

streets or parks, we would hold that the seller was “estopped from 

asserting a claim adverse to the right of the purchasers” to use the 

streets and parks and have them kept open for their use. Caffey, 186 

Ga. at 306 (1). See Tietjen v. Meldrim, 169 Ga. 678, 697 (151 SE 349) 

(1930) (“When a grantor sells lots of land . . . shown upon a plat . . . 

referred to [in the deeds] as laid out in a subdivision of the grantor’s 

land, he is estopped to deny the grantee’s right to use the streets 

delineated in such plat.”); Mower, 138 Ga. at 388 (“[I]f the lots were 

sold with reference to the plats which contained a delineation of the 

parks, and the original purchasers bought with reference thereto, 

the seller is estopped from setting up a claim adverse to the right of 

private individuals, or their assigns, who so bought.”); Schreck, 131 
14

Ga. 489; Ford, 95 Ga. 97. See also Law of Easements & Licenses in 

Land § 4:30 (explaining that easements implied from deed 

descriptions may be grounded in an estoppel theory, citing Hamil v. 

Pone, 160 Ga. 774 (129 SE 94) (1925), among other decisions).

This estoppel theory, however, has given way in our decisions

to the view that these interests in streets and parks acquired by 

owners who buy lots with reference to subdivision plats are in fact 

easements acquired by “express grant.” Walker v. Duncan, 236 Ga. 

331, 332 (223 SE2d 675) (1976). The rationale is mostly the same: it 

still starts with the understanding that conveying lots with 

reference to a subdivision plat that integrates features like streets 

and parks can represent that they are “set apart for” the grantees’ 

use. Id. And this inference is still strengthened by the commonsense 

presumptions that developers include these features to induce 

buyers to buy, and pay more for, their property. See, e.g., Higgins v. 

Odom, 246 Ga. 309, 309-310 (271 SE2d 211) (1980) (in holding that 

the sale of lots by reference to a subdivision plat with “a lake area 

designated on it” granted an easement in the lake, explaining that
15

“[t]he availability of the lake constitutes a material part of the value 

of the adjoining property, and is often the principal incentive for its 

purchase”) (citation omitted); Walker, 236 Ga. at 332 (explaining 

that “[t]he property owners were enticed into purchasing their lots, 

and presumably paid a greater price for them, by the implied 

promise of the developer to preserve this lake area as a park”). This 

inference, however, is more than a basis for estoppel: because the

plat in these cases is a graphical representation of the plan the

purchaser is buying into, we have recognized that the grantees who 

buy with express reference to the plat have “as effectively acquired 

an easement [in the streets or parks designated on the plat] as if the 

deed had specifically granted it.” Westbrook v. Comer, 197 Ga. 433, 

439 (29 SE2d 574) (1944). See also Tietjen, 169 Ga. 678; Law of 

Easements & Licenses in Land § 4:31 (putting Georgia decisions in 

category of cases that “suggest that such easements are really 

express servitudes because they are graphically represented on the 

plat” (citing, among other decisions, Sadler, 267 Ga. 122; Fairfield 

Corp. No. 1 v. Thornton, 258 Ga. 805 (374 SE2d 727) (1989); Smith 
16

v. Gwinnett County, 248 Ga. 882 (286 SE2d 739) (1982); Walker, 236 

Ga. 331)).

(b) Of course, not every word or mark that designates property

on a subdivision plat grants an easement to lot owners. For example, 

subdivision plats routinely identify or describe the various lots in 

the subdivision as well as neighboring properties, but no one would 

seriously suggest that a lot owner who buys with reference to the 

plat gets an easement in all of their neighbors’ property merely 

because it is labeled.2 Instead, the question is whether we can infer 

from the designation on the subdivision plat a “clear intent” to set 

apart the designated area for the lot owners’ use or enjoyment. 

Miller v. Wells, 235 Ga. 411, 416 (219 SE2d 751) (1975), disapproved 

on other grounds, Wheatley Grading Contractors, Inc. v. DFT Invs., 

Inc., 244 Ga. 663 (261 SE2d 614) (1979). See also Goodyear v. Tr. Co. 

Bank, 247 Ga. 281, 285 (2) (276 SE2d 30) (1981) (declining to 

recognize that lot owners in beach subdivision had a recreational 

 2 Georgia’s standards for property surveys require plats to include “[t]he 

names of adjacent property owners on all lines” of the plat. Ga. Comp. R. & 

Regs., r. 180-7-.07 (d) (14). 
17

easement in beach because the plats in question “do not indicate any 

intent on the part of the developer to create” such an easement); 

Rolleston v. Sea Island Properties, Inc., 254 Ga. 183, 184 (1) (327 

SE2d 489) (1985) (explaining that in Goodyear, “the crucial inquiry

was to look at the intent of the parties at the time of the conveyances 

to determine if any recreational easement had been conveyed”); 

Smith v. Bruce, 241 Ga. 133, 143 (1) (244 SE2d 559) (1978) (focusing 

inquiry on the “intent of the subdivider to grant easements in this 

open area”); Walker, 236 Ga. at 332 (“It is well-established that 

where a developer sells lots according to a recorded plat, the 

grantees acquire an easement in any areas set apart for their use.”).

(i) For a small category of features, designating them 

appropriately on the subdivision plat is enough, absent contrary 

evidence based in the plat or deed, to demonstrate clear intent to 

grant an easement in the features to lot owners who bought with 

reference to the plat. Our decisions have included in this category 

(1) streets designated and laid out on the subdivision plat, see 

Schreck, 131 Ga. 489; Ford, 95 Ga. 97; (2) parks, see Caffey, 186 Ga. 
18

303; Mower, 138 Ga. 380; and (3) lakes, which we have equated to 

parks, see, e.g., Higgins, 246 Ga. 309; Walker, 236 Ga. 331. 

These features share two related things in common. First, 

there is simply a well-settled understanding, reflected in more than 

a century of our decisions, that when these basic features are 

designated on a subdivision plat, there is ordinarily no reason to 

doubt that they are included as part of the unified plan for the 

subdivision and meant for the lot owners’ use. See, e.g., Hendley v. 

Overstreet, 253 Ga. 136, 136 (318 SE2d 54) (1984) (“It is well settled 

that when a subdivision contains an attraction such as a park or 

lake which renders the lot more desirable, the sale of lots in 

reference to a plat showing the attraction will create an irrevocable 

easement in such an area for the lot owners.”). Second, these are the 

sort of features for which designation or delineation on the plat alone 

can give reasonable certainty about the scope of the easement 

granted. See Macon-Bibb County Indus. Auth. v. Cent. of Ga. R.R. 

Co., 266 Ga. 281, 283 (3) (466 SE2d 855) (1996) (“An express grant 

of an easement must contain language sufficient to designate 
19

with reasonable certainty the land over which it extends.” (quoting 

1 Pindar’s § 8:18)); Howard v. Rivers, 266 Ga. 185, 186 (2) (465 SE2d 

666) (1996) (“The description of an easement is sufficient if it 

provides a key so that the land where the easement is located can be 

identified.”). When a subdivision plat designates a strip of land as a 

street, it conveys with reasonable clarity that purchasers would 

acquire a right to have the strip “remain open for their use . . . for 

ingress to and egress from their property”—that is, to use it as a 

street. Ford, 95 Ga. at 101. The same goes for a park or lake: when 

these open and passive recreational features are delineated on a 

plat, the designation itself identifies with reasonable certainty an 

easement for recreational use that extends across the delineated 

area. See, e.g., Mower, 138 Ga. at 391 (“The word ‘Park,’ written 

upon a block of land designated upon a map, is as significant of a 

dedication, and of the use to which the land is dedicated, as is the 

word ‘street,’ written upon such map. The word carries with itself 

the idea of an open or enclosed tract of land for the comfort and 

enjoyment of the inhabitants of the city or town in which it is 
20

located, and is so defined by lexicographers. . . . In London, as well 

as in any city in this country, the term ‘park’ signifies an open space 

intended for the recreation and enjoyment of the public, and this 

signification is the same, whether the word be used alone or with 

some qualifying term, as Hyde Park, or Regent’s Park, or, as in the 

present case, ‘Central Park.’” (quoting Archer v. Salinas City, 28 P. 

839, 841 (Cal. 1892)); Higgins, 246 Ga. at 310 (lake designated on 

plat “should be regarded as in effect a dedication of the lake as a

recreational area for the benefit of all adjoining owners”). In other 

words, settled expectations rooted in more than a century of practice 

and the relative ease with which the scope of an easement in these 

features can be discerned support a strong presumption that 

designating these features on a subdivision plat conveys an intent 

to grant an easement to lot owners who buy with reference to the 

plat.

(ii) For other kinds of features, however, our decisions have not 

accepted mere designation on a subdivision plat as sufficient indicia 

of intent to grant an easement. 
21

In a series of decisions involving asserted easements in 

beaches, rather than simply noting that lots were sold with 

reference to a subdivision plat that designated the beach areas in 

question, we looked to the plat as a whole (and the deed referencing 

the plat) for evidence of the developer’s intent to grant easements. 

See Rolleston, 254 Ga. at 183-184 (1); Goodyear, 247 Ga. at 285 (2); 

Smith, 241 Ga. at 141-143 (1). In Smith, for example, we concluded 

that a sale with reference to a plat granted easements in the beach 

designated on it based on a list of clues from the plat that established 

the requisite intent, including 

“[t]he naming of the subdivision, ‘East Beach 

Subdivision’; the subdividing of practically all of the land 

area owned except the beach area; the designating of the 

front or easternmost street as ‘Beach Drive’; the leaving 

of an open area between an area designated as ‘smooth, 

hard beach’ and ‘Beach Drive’ without any reservations; 

the entering on the plat ‘Atlantic Ocean’; the failure to 

afford otherwise any reasonable means of access from the 

lots and streets in East Beach Subdivision to the smooth, 

hard beach and ocean; the designation of a line as ‘mean 

high water line’ between the area designated as smooth, 

hard beach and ‘Beach Drive’; and the selling of one or 

more lots referring to such area in the recorded plat.” 

 

Id. at 142 (1). And we reached the opposite conclusion in Goodyear
22

because the plats in question included “express reservation[s]” as to 

the beach and did not otherwise “indicate any intent on the part of 

the developer to create a recreational easement.” 247 Ga. at 285 (2). 

See also Rolleston, 254 Ga. at 183-184 (1) (pointing out that “the 

crucial inquiry” in Goodyear “was to look at the intent of the parties 

at the time of the conveyances to determine if any recreational 

easement had been conveyed” and reaffirming conclusion that plats 

in those cases did not show intent to convey easement in beach areas 

in question). 

We also rejected the simplified plat-designation-as-intent 

analysis that we had applied to streets and parks in concluding that 

subdivision lot owners did not have an easement in a “commercial 

boating and swimming venture.” Altman v. Quattlebaum, 253 Ga. 

341, 342 (1) (320 SE2d 179) (1984). The venture had been in 

existence (and owned by the subdivision developer) when it was 

designated on the subdivision plat as a “Recreational Center.” Id. In 

denying the lot owners’ easement claims, we pointed out that while 

the venture was in operation, “subdivision lot owners, as well as 
23

members of the general public, were charged fees for boating and 

swimming privileges” there; the tract “was under fence, except for 

the lake frontage, and it was closed each year to everyone from after 

Labor Day until early April”; “[n]o subdivision lot owner ever 

complained of having to pay use fees, or of being excluded during the 

fall and winter seasons, or of exclusion from the tract while used by 

the YMCA, or when it was closed later to all uses”; and “[t]here were 

no deed covenants, plat restrictions, or property association 

agreements in reference to the tract.” Id. Although there was 

“testimony that some subdivision lot owners had used picnic 

facilities without charge,” the evidence as a whole did not establish 

any “right to use the tract” in favor of the lot owners. Id.

We did not explain in these decisions why we required a 

demonstration of intent to convey an easement based on the deed 

and plat as a whole rather than the simplified analysis used for 

streets, parks, and lakes. But the distinction we identify today is 

reasonable. We are aware of no longstanding or entrenched 

expectations about beaches or active businesses like those 
24

animating our decisions recognizing easements-by-subdivision-plat 

in streets, parks, or lakes. That difference alone seems enough to 

decline to extend the near-automatic recognition of such easements 

to other features. In addition, at least for the swimming and boating 

venture (and other active businesses open to the public), designation 

or delineation on the plat alone would not normally provide enough

certainty about the nature or scope of the easement granted as 

would designating a passive feature like a street, park, or lake. 

Simply put, it is not clear or obvious to us what property interests a 

lot owner’s “easement” in an adjacent business might include, and 

such uncertainty cuts against recognizing such an easement based 

on only the business’s mere designation on a plat.3

*

In sum, our easement-by-subdivision-plat decisions have 

distinguished between easements in two kinds of features. 

 3 We acknowledge that beaches do not seem all that different from parks 

or lakes in this regard, but the lack of well-settled expectations about beaches 

as integrated features of subdivisions, at least as far as our decisions show, is 

enough to distinguish them from streets, parks, and lakes.
25

Historically, easements in basic features like streets, parks, and 

lakes that are integral parts of a unified subdivision plan, the scope 

of which typically can be ascertained with reasonable certainty from 

their mere designation on the plat, can be granted by such 

designation plus sale of lots with reference to the plat. Before 

recognizing easements in other features, by contrast, our decisions 

have required a more traditional showing of intent inferred from 

evidence based in the relevant documents taken as a whole.

(c) Do golf courses fall into the limited category of features for 

which recognizing an easement-by-subdivision-plat is nearautomatic? We cannot reject the idea out of hand. As with streets, 

parks, and lakes, developers almost certainly include golf courses in 

subdivision plans to induce buyers to buy, and pay more for, lots in 

those subdivisions, and those buyers might reasonably expect the 

promised golf course to be built, maintained, and operated for their 

use or enjoyment for years to come. These sound like some of the 

reasons our past decisions have given for recognizing easements-bysubdivision-plat as a general matter. 
26

But the reasons for recognizing easements in streets, parks, 

and lakes based on plat designations alone—rather than the more 

typical showing of intent we have required for other features—do 

not apply to golf courses. First, whatever assumptions based in 

common sense or experience one might have about golf course 

subdivisions, they pale in comparison to the longstanding and 

widely accepted understanding about the meaning of designating 

streets or parks on a subdivision plat. The ease with which our 

decisions have recognized easements in these features based on 

mere plat designations comes in large part from more than a century 

of settled expectations about the intent that can be inferred from

such designations. See Ford, 95 Ga. at 101; Mower, 138 Ga. at 391. 

We are not aware of (and the parties have not identified) any even 

remotely similar set of longstanding expectations about golf courses.

Second (and related to the first reason), merely designating a 

golf course on a plat, without more, typically does not give 

reasonable certainty about the scope of any easement in it. See 

Howard, 266 Ga. at 185 (2); 1 Pindar’s § 8:18. The difficulty is that 
27

there is much more to a golf course than a mere strip of land or open 

area. Even at its most basic, a golf course is an area of land that is 

laid out and actively maintained in a configuration and condition 

that allows someone to play the game of golf on it. See, e.g., Golf 

course, Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 

https://unabridged.merriamwebster.com/unabridged/golf%20course (last visited January 25, 

2023) (“an area of land laid out for the game of golf with a series of 

9 or 18 holes each including tee, fairway, and putting green and 

often one or more natural or artificial hazards”). Anyone familiar 

with golf courses would likely also expect one to include basic 

supporting amenities: golf carts, a clubhouse with restrooms and

locker rooms, a pro shop, and even some kind of food and beverage 

service. And as far as we know, developing and maintaining all of 

these things that make up a typical golf course requires an ongoing 

business.4

 4 This brief description of a generic golf course and its expected features 

should not be taken as an opinion, authoritative or otherwise, about the 
28

This relative complexity means it is not at all obvious what an 

easement in any given golf course might look like. Would it give a 

lot owner merely the right to a view of something that looks like a 

golf course, or a greater right to access or even play golf on the 

course? If the interest includes access, could the lot owner traverse 

the entire property? This is not to say that lot owners could never 

acquire an easement in a golf course. But it does mean that, in 

contrast to streets, parks, and lakes, merely printing the phrase 

“golf course” on a subdivision plat does not provide reasonable 

certainty as to the scope of a claimed easement in the golf course. 

The range of possible property interests a lot owner might desire or 

expect from such an easement is too wide, and no longstanding or 

settled expectations exist to narrow or fix the interests in question.

 

fundamental characteristics of a “golf course” or the game of golf. We leave 

such questions to the proper authorities. Cf. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 

661, 700 (121 SCt 1879, 149 LEd2d 904) (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 

(declaring (with no small amount of sarcasm) that “[i]t has been rendered the 

solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United States, laid upon it by 

Congress in pursuance of the Federal Government’s power ‘to regulate 

Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,’ to decide What 

Is Golf.” (cleaned up)).
29

The bottom line is that golf courses do not fall into the limited 

set of features for which a plat designation alone presumptively 

demonstrates the clear intent needed to recognize an easement in 

those features. Instead, the necessary intent must be demonstrated 

case-by-case through evidence based in the deed and plat as a whole. 

See Smith, 241 Ga. at 142 (1); Goodyear, 247 Ga. at 285 (2); Altman, 

253 Ga. at 342.

(d) Here, the Court of Appeals concluded that the lot owners 

acquired an easement in a golf course based only on a showing that 

the lot was purchased with reference to a recorded subdivision plat 

that “depicted” the course adjacent to the subdivision and paid a 

premium for the lot’s proximity to the course. See WS CE Resort 

Owner, LLC, 360 Ga. App. at 725-726. That conclusion was 

understandable: our body of easement-by-subdivision-plat decisions 

is old and messy, and the distinction between the simplified platdesignation-plus-sale analysis and the broader intent analysis was, 

until now, implicit. But because our holding today rejects the former

analysis for golf courses, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision 
30

and remand for further proceedings.5

On remand, the key question is simply whether the intent to 

grant an easement in the golf course was shown with sufficient 

clarity. Our past decisions addressing that question outside of the 

special cases of streets, parks, and lakes offer some guidance. In 

those decisions, we looked to evidence based in the deed and plat as 

a whole and considered, for example, how integral to the subdivision 

the feature in question appeared, see Smith, 241 Ga. at 142 (1)

(noting centrality of beach to subdivision based on names of 

 5 We also disapprove the Court of Appeals’ earlier decision in Peck v. 

Lanier Golf Club, Inc., 315 Ga. App. 176 (726 SE2d 442) (2012), to the extent 

that it applied the same plat-designation-plus-sale analysis to golf courses.

We further note that some decisions of the Court of Appeals appear to 

have required proof that a lot owner actually paid a premium for her lot as a 

prerequisite for recognizing an easement by subdivision plat. See WS CE 

Resort Owner, LLC, 360 Ga. App. at 727-728; Camp Cherokee, Inc. v. Marina 

Lane, LLC, 316 Ga. App. 366, 369 (729 SE2d 510) (2012) (concluding that no 

implied easement existed for lake access, where the lake was not set apart for 

the lot owners’ use when there was no evidence that the owners paid premiums 

for their lots and the lots were not adjacent to the lake); Peck, 315 Ga. App. at 

179 (explaining that to establish an implied easement in a subdivision golf 

course, plaintiff had to show that he purchased lot according to plat and that 

he “paid more” for a “golf course lot”). Although our decisions recognizing such 

easements have noted that lot owners paid or “presumably paid” a premium 

for lots that reflects the enhanced value created by including features like 

streets, parks, or lakes, we see no basis in those decisions for requiring specific 

proof of such higher payments to establish that an easement was granted. We 

disapprove these decisions to the extent they impose such a requirement.
31

subdivision and street, among other things); whether the feature 

was included without any express reservations, see Smith, 241 Ga. 

at 142 (1) (open beach area noted on plat “without any 

reservations”); Goodyear, 247 Ga. at 285 (2) (noting “express 

reservation” made to use and title in the soft sand beach in 

question); and whether the plat provided for other reasonable access 

to the feature, see id.

Other questions may inform this intent analysis for a golf 

course. For example, North Carolina courts addressing whether lot 

owners had an easement-by-subdivision-plat in a golf course have 

looked to how precisely the golf course was depicted on the plat: in 

their view, plats did not show that a developer “clearly intended” to 

grant an easement in the golf course when they (1) included a 

“dotted line location of the golf course greens and fairways” with no 

metes and bounds, Friends of Crooked Creek, L.L.C. v. C.C. Partners, 

Inc., 802 SE2d 908, 914 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017); (2) showed “golf course 

holes . . . depicted adjacent to some of the residential lots” with the 

“outer boundaries” of the golf course “either not marked at all or . . . 
32

depicted with dotted lines” with no metes and bounds, Home Realty 

Co. & Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Red Fox Country Club Owners Assn., Inc., 

852 SE2d 413, 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020); or (3) did not “depict the 

entire Subject Property, complete with a metes and bounds 

description, being used as a golf course” but only “label[ed] or 

illustrate[d]” some of the holes of a golf course and did not 

“demarcate between areas labeled as a golf course” and other “future 

development,” Cape Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Southern Destiny, 

LLC, 876 SE2d 568, 576 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022). The second of these

decisions explained that “because nothing on the plat or referred to 

therein would enable a title attorney to determine the precise 

boundaries of the area burdened with the [golf course] easement, the 

plat is not capable of describing or reducing an easement in the golf 

course to a certainty.” Red Fox Country Club Owners Assn., 852 

SE2d at 427 (cleaned up). Although we do not suggest that North 

Carolina easement-by-subdivision-plat law is identical to Georgia’s, 

we agree that looking to how precisely the golf course is described 

and depicted on the plat is relevant to the intent analysis required 
33

by our law, particularly given the need to provide reasonable 

certainty as to the nature and scope of any claimed easement in the 

golf course. See Macon-Bibb County Indus. Auth., 266 Ga. at 283 (3);

Howard v. Rivers, 266 Ga. 185, 185 (2) (465 SE2d 666) (1996). But 

see Murdock v. Ward, 267 Ga. 303, 303 (1) (477 SE2d 835) (1996) 

(“[T]he law does not require perfection in the legal description of an 

easement.”).

A final point about evidence. Our easement-by-subdivision-plat 

decisions have largely focused only on the plat itself (and the deed 

that references the plat) to determine whether an easement has 

been granted. See, e.g., Goodyear, 247 Ga. at 285 (2) (explaining that 

homeowner did not have easement to soft sand portion of beach 

because the “plats [did] not indicate any intent...to create a 

recreational easement as to the entire soft sand beach”); Smith, 241 

Ga. at 141-142 (1) (describing plat and concluding that “the sale of a 

single lot with reference to the plat would complete the granting of 

an easement”); Caffey, 186 Ga. at 306-307 (1) (referring to plat 

showing land subdivided into streets, residential lots, and parks, 
34

and concluding that homeowner who purchased lot “with reference 

to the plat” acquired easement in park); Schreck, 131 Ga. at 491-492 

(holding that where landowner sells land “with reference to” a plat, 

the purchaser “has a right to rely upon” an easement shown on the 

plat). This approach seems to us most consistent with the rationales

for recognizing this kind of easement, and it is supported by the

practical concern that a title attorney, unaware of extrinsic evidence 

like marketing materials or oral assurances made decades ago, still 

needs to be able to discern the existence of this kind of easement 

through a careful title search. See, e.g., Neeley v. Fields, __ Ga. App. 

___ (879 SE2d 728) (2022) (attorneys did not commit malpractice by 

drafting warranty deed that stated property was subject to “Utility 

Easements, of record, if any,” without specifying any such 

easements, because title search would have revealed existing

easement); Smith v. Tolbert, 211 Ga. App. 175, 176 (438 SE2d 655) 

(1993) (sellers of land not required to defend purchasers against 

easement-holder’s claim to possess easement in fee simple, when

purchasers’ title search revealed existence of easement and 
35

purchasers did not include easement in list of matters to be resolved 

before closing). See also Merlino v. City of Atlanta, 283 Ga. 186, 188-

189 (1) (657 SE2d 859 (2008) (holding that purchaser acquired land

free of an easement when neither title search nor land survey nor 

other “ordinary diligence” revealed its existence). 

That said, in a couple of these decisions, we have also 

considered evidence from beyond the plat and deed. See Altman, 253 

Ga. at 342 (1) (considering historical limitations on homeowners’ 

ability to access and use the commercial boating and swimming 

venture at issue, including that they paid fees, that the tract was 

fenced except for the lake frontage, and that the business was closed 

altogether in the fall and winter); Miller, 235 Ga. at 413-416 (when 

plat designated “reserved” strip of land behind residential lots but 

was ambiguous as to whether land was reserved for original grantor 

or adjacent lots, considering testimony about history of use). We did 

not explain in those decisions why we considered such evidence. 

Perhaps we applied the rule we have set out for express easements, 

which allows consideration of parol evidence if the written 
36

instrument is ambiguous. See Irvin v. Laxmi, Inc., 266 Ga. 204, 205

(1) (467 SE2d 510) (1996). That rule makes sense for construing a 

true express easement, where the grant of an easement is clear—so 

a title search could discover it—and the ambiguity in question would 

concern the easement’s scope. See, e.g., Crabapple Lake Parc Cmty. 

Assn., Inc. v. Circeo, 325 Ga. App. 101, 105-106, 109 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 

866) (2013) (applying ordinary rules of contract construction to 

determine scope of express easement and considering parol evidence 

to resolve ambiguity). See also Mun. Elec. Auth. of Ga. v. Gold-Arrow 

Farms, Inc., 276 Ga. App. 862, 866-867 (1) (625 SE2d 57) (2005) 

(explaining that construing the language in express easements is 

governed by rules of contract construction, including the 

consideration of parol evidence if “the written instrument is 

ambiguous”). Or, maybe this question of what evidence is properly 

considered to determine the existence of an easement-bysubdivision-plat simply was not raised. In any event, we are 

skeptical that evidence from outside the plat and deed is properly 

considered, at least as a general matter, in determining whether an 
37

easement is created by the sale of a lot with reference to a 

subdivision plat rather than with express language in a deed.

The above guidance is just that. The ultimate inquiry cannot 

be reduced to a multi-factor test, but rather asks simply whether the 

evidence, taken as a whole, demonstrates clear intent to grant an 

easement in the property in question. See Miller, 235 Ga. at 416; 

Smith, 241 Ga. at 142; Goodyear, 247 Ga. at 285 (2); Altman, 253 

Ga. at 342. We leave it to the courts below to answer this question 

in the first instance.6

Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur.

 6 We leave for remand the question whether any material issues of 

disputed fact preclude summary judgment on this question. And because we 

vacate and remand the decision below for further proceedings as to the 

existence of an easement in the golf course, we also do not reach any questions 

about the appropriateness or scope of the trial court’s injunction against the 

resort owner. We further express no opinion on whether the trial court 

correctly found that an easement was granted under Peck’s oral-assurances 

method, although we note that Peck indicates that such method could establish 

an “implied covenant,” not an easement. See Peck, 315 Ga. App. at 178, 181 

(explaining that the lot owner claimed an “easement or an implied covenant in 

the golf course” and citing as support for the “oral assurances” method only 

Knotts Landing Corp. v. Lathem, 256 Ga. 321 (348 SE2d 651) (1986), an 

“implied covenant” decision).