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ANDA WEYHER v. HARRY F. WEYHER III

(AC 37538)

Gruendel, Alvord and West, Js.*

Argued January 19—officially released April 19, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, S. Richards, J.)

Harry F. Weyher III, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Gary I. Cohen, with whom, on the brief, was Yakov

Pyetranker, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, Harry F. Weyher III,

appeals from the trial court’s ruling on his postjudgment

motion to correct, modify or vacate an arbitration

award that divided personal property in the marital

estate between him and his former spouse, the plaintiff,

Anda Weyher. On appeal, the self-represented defendant claims that the court(1)‘‘erred ab initio in unilaterally ordering binding arbitration [with] respect [to] the

division of [the parties’] personal property’’ in the July

12, 2013 judgment of dissolution,1

(2) improperly concluded that he failed to prove that the arbitration proceeding was not conducted in accordance with chapter

909 of the General Statutes, as required by General

Statutes § 46b-66 (c),2

(3) improperly concluded that he

failed to prove that the arbitrator exceeded his authority

in the allocation of the assets, and (4) demonstrated

bias against him that deprived him of a key witness at

the hearing on his motion. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our review of the defendant’s claims. Following

a contested trial, the court, S. Richards, J., dissolved

the parties’ twenty-nine year marriage. There were significant assets in the marital estate. In its memorandum

of decision,the courtissued orders with respect to, inter

alia, the marital residence, alimony, and postsecondary

educational support for their daughter. With respect to

the parties’ personal property, the dissolution judgment

provided as follows: ‘‘The personal property of the parties consisting of furniture and furnishings shall be

divided by agreement between the parties within thirty

(30) days from the date hereof. If the parties are not

able to agree, then ownership of any disputed assets

shall be decided by binding arbitration to be conducted

by Roger Grenier or some other independent arbitrator

appointed by the court, with the fees therefor to be

divided equally between the parties. The plaintiff shall

retain her personal jewelry free and clear of any claim

by the defendant. The defendant shall retain his grandmother’s diamond, his mother’s Piaget watch and gold

necklace and other inherited paintings, sculptures and

antiques free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff.’’

The parties, who were represented by counsel, did not

appeal from the dissolution judgment.

One month after judgment was rendered, the parties

entered into a stipulation agreement that was submitted

to and approved by the court, Hon. Stanley Novack,

judge trial referee, on August 13, 2013. In paragraph 9

of the parties’ stipulation, they agreed to the following:

‘‘The parties agree to divide their personal property,

household furniture and furnishings as ordered by the

court in its Memorandum of Decision. For the avoidance of doubt, it is acknowledged by the parties that

items inherited or gifted from their respective families
will inure to the benefit of that party.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) On November 12, 2013, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion for contempt and for an order to

compel arbitration against the plaintiff, claiming that

she ‘‘knowingly and willfully violated’’the court’s orders

‘‘by refusing to actively participate with the binding

arbitration being conducted by Roger Grenier in order

to effectuate the division of the parties’ personal

property.’’

The parties thereafter proceeded to arbitration conducted by Grenier, and the defendant withdrew his

motion for contempt. Grenier issued his arbitration

award on January 21, 2014. On February 19, 2014, the

defendant, now a self-represented party, filed a motion

to correct, modify or vacate the arbitration award. The

defendant’s primary claim was that the arbitrator

exceeded the scope of his authority as set forth in the

memorandum of decision and stipulation ‘‘by considering and accounting for property already awarded to the

defendant by the court and then making an adjustment

in the plaintiff’s favor . . . .’’ Specifically, the defendant claimed that he was deprived of his mother’s Ebel3

watch.4 The defendant’s motion acknowledged that the

plaintiff had disposed of the watch prior to the arbitration proceeding, and, therefore, he requested that ‘‘a

new watch of the same or similar value and model be

procured by the plaintiff . . . .’’ The defendant did not

argue in his motion that the court’s order requiring

binding arbitration was void or invalid.

A hearing on the defendant’s motion, and the plaintiff’s opposition to that motion, was held before the

court, S. Richards, J., on September 2, 2014. At that

time, the defendant raised the issue of the court’s

authority to order binding arbitration with respect to

the parties’ personal property in its July 16, 2013 memorandum of decision. The defendant argued: ‘‘[T]he court

was not empowered to order arbitration. The parties did

not agree to have the court delegate its responsibility to

an arbitrator. There was no arbitration agreement, and

it does require the consent of both parties per Section

46b-66 in family matters in the Connecticut General

Statutes.’’ The defendant’s second argument was that

‘‘the proceedings did not constitute arbitration. There

were no established arbitration rules from the outset

during, after, implemented at any time during this process. There was no agreement to arbitrate as required

by [§] 52-410 of the statutes. There was no arbitration

agreement setting forth the conditions and parameters

of the arbitration.’’ His final argument was that the

‘‘outcome’’ of the proceeding was ‘‘flawed’’ because the

arbitrator’s award was contrary to the orders contained

in the court’s July 16, 2013 memorandum of decision

and the August 13, 2013 court-approved stipulation with

respect to the Ebel watch.5 When the court asked the

defendant whether he had any evidence regarding the

valuation of any of the assets in dispute, including the
watch at issue, he responded: ‘‘None whatsoever.’’

The plaintiff argued that the balance of the arbitration

award was adjusted by the arbitrator to account for the

property previously awarded to the defendant. Further,

she claimed that the court’s orderfor binding arbitration

was set forth in the dissolution judgment, which was

never appealed by the defendant.Atthattime, the defendant was represented by counsel. He could have challenged the judgment or availed himself of other

available procedural remedies. Moreover, the plaintiff

stated that the defendant had agreed to binding arbitration in the August 13, 2013 court-approved stipulation.

Finally, the plaintiff argued that the division of the disputed assets by the arbitrator was proper because the

memorandum of decision and the stipulation did not

require that the allocation be based on the value of

the items.

The court issued its decision denying the defendant’s

motion to correct, modify or vacate the arbitration

award on December 19, 2014. The court stated that the

signatures on the judgment file and the August 13, 2013

stipulation indicated that ‘‘the parties intended to . . .

resolve their differences relating to their personal property by way of binding arbitration.’’ The court further

stated that ‘‘[a]lthough the defendant’s motion alleges

numerous claims of error, the defendant’s evidence was

insufficient to prove that the arbitration award should

be vacated or that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.’’ On January 5, 2015, the defendant filed a motion

for articulation, requesting further clarification of the

court’s order. The defendant also filed an appeal from

the court’s December 19, 2014 order at that time.

On June 5, 2015, the court issued a memorandum

of decision in response to the defendant’s motion for

articulation. Again the court referenced the procedural

history relating to the parties’ stipulation and the defendant’s motion to compel the arbitration. The court additionally noted that the defendant failed to challenge the

authority of the court to order binding arbitration in

his motion to correct, modify or vacate the arbitration

award. Nevertheless, the court recognized its failure to

obtain the parties’ consent to binding arbitration prior

to the rendering of the dissolution judgment: ‘‘Notwithstanding the foregoing, the court is well aware of the

requirements enumerated in Gen[eral] Statutes § 46b66 that pertain to instances in which the parties have

agreed to binding arbitration in an action for dissolution

of marriage and surmises that it must have inadvertently

ordered binding arbitration in said memorandum of

decision, the original one and as corrected, after

reviewing the parties’ proposed orders, briefs and other

voluminous exhibits.’’ With respect to the remainder of

the defendant’s requests, the court declined to address

them and relied on its prior rulings in its December 19,

2014 decision.
I

We first address the defendant’s claim that the ‘‘trial

court erred ab initio in unilaterally ordering binding

arbitration [with] respect [to] the division of personal

property’’ in the July 13, 2013 dissolution judgment, as

corrected by the court’s July 16, 2013 memorandum

of decision. The defendant emphasizes that the court

admitted that it ‘‘inadvertently’’ included the order for

binding arbitration in the judgment, and he argues that

it was ‘‘beyond the authority of the court to mandate

binding arbitration.’’ See General Statutes § 46b-66 (c).

We note that the defendant, who was represented by

counsel throughout the dissolution proceedings,

advanced no objection whatsoever to the binding arbitration order until the arbitrator issued the arbitration

award. In the defendant’s proposed orders filed prior

to the court’s dissolution judgment, the defendant

expressly requested the following order: ‘‘The parties

shall equitably divide theirremaining personal property.

If the parties are unable to reach agreement regarding

such equitable division within thirty (30) days after

judgment, the matter will be submitted to a neutral

arbitrator for binding arbitration, whose fees shall be

paid equally by the parties. The court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce and effectuate this provision.’’ The

plaintiff’s proposed orders contained a similar request:

‘‘The personal property of the parties, consisting of

furniture and furnishings, shall be divided by agreement

between the parties within 30 days. If they are not able

to agree, then ownership of any disputed assets shall

be decided by binding arbitration to be conducted by

Roger Grenier or some other independent arbitrator

appointed by the court, with the fees therefor to be

divided equally between the parties.’’ The court’s judgment of dissolution incorporated the parties’ requested

arbitration language from their proposed orders with

respect to effectuating the division of their personal

property.

We also note, as emphasized by the trial court, that

the defendant signed the August 13, 2013 stipulation

that required the division of the personal property ‘‘as

ordered by the court . . . .’’ Furthermore, when the

plaintiff initially failed to proceed with arbitration, the

defendant promptly filed a motion for contempt against

her and sought a court order compelling her to proceed

with the arbitration. The record indicates that the defendant voluntarily attended the arbitration and participated in the proceedings. Only after the arbitration

award was issued did the defendant claim that the court

had no authority to order the binding arbitration, this

argument first surfacing at the September 2, 2014 hearing on his motion to correct, modify or vacate the award.

Despite the parties’ embracing the tool of binding

arbitration throughout their dissolution submissions,
the defendant is correct that the court failed to comply

with § 46b-66 (c) when it included the binding arbitration provision in the dissolution judgment. Section 46b66 (c) sets forth the procedure to be following by the

trial court when the parties in a dissolution proceeding

agree to binding arbitration. Any agreement to arbitrate

is subject to the provisions of chapter 909 of the General

Statutes provided the court makes a thorough inquiry

and is satisfied that each party has entered into the

agreement voluntarily and without coercion, that the

agreement is fair and equitable under the circumstances, and that the agreement does not include issues

related to child support, visitation and custody. If the

court is satisfied that those requirements have been

met, any such arbitration award shall be confirmed,

modified or vacated in accordance with the provisions

of chapter 909. Chapter 909 of the General Statutes,

entitled ‘‘Arbitration Proceedings,’’ contains additional

requirements, including, inter alia,the need for a written

agreement, the meeting of time deadlines, and the procedure for confirming, modifying or vacating an arbitration award. It is undisputed that there was no

compliance with § 46b-66 (c) or chapter 909 of the General Statutes.

It also is undisputed, however, that the defendant did

not appeal from the dissolution judgment that included

the court’s order for binding arbitration to effectuate

the division of the parties’ disputed personal property.

The defendant first raised the issue of the authority of

the court to issue such an order at the September 2,

2014 hearing, which was more than one year after the

dissolution judgment was rendered. Unless the court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction as claimed by the

defendant,6 he cannot now collaterally attack that

judgment.

‘‘[D]issolution courts are not vested with the authority to order parties to submit to arbitration absent a

voluntary agreement. . . . Pursuant to . . . § 46b-66

(c), parties may agree, with the court’s permission, to

pursue arbitration to resolve certain issues related to

their dissolution. A court does not, however, have the

authority to order parties to submit such issues to arbitration absent a voluntary arbitration agreement executed between the parties. Arbitration is a creature

of contract and without a contractual agreement to

arbitrate there can be no arbitration. . . . [T]he basis

for arbitration in a particular case is to be found in the

written agreement between the parties. . . . Parties

who have contracted to arbitrate certain matters have

no duty to arbitrate other matters which they have not

agreed to arbitrate. Nor can the courts, absent a statute,

compel the parties to arbitrate those other matters.’’

(Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Barcelo v. Barcelo, 158 Conn. App. 201,

224–25, 118 A.3d 657, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 910, 123

A.3d 882 (2015).
Even though the defendant is correct that the court

lacked the authority to order binding arbitration in the

dissolution judgment, absent an executed agreement

by the parties, it does not follow that the court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction when it rendered that judgment. ‘‘Although the court and the parties repeatedly

use the term ‘jurisdiction’ during the proceedings, we

note that the distribution of personal property postdissolution does not implicate the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction but, rather, its statutory authority.’’

McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 157 Conn. App. 568, 575–76

n.5, 118 A.3d 64 (2015).7 Accordingly, although the court

acted improperly when it included the provision requiring binding arbitration, the court did not lack jurisdiction when it rendered its judgment including that

provision. See Budrawich v. Budrawich, 156 Conn.

App. 628, 649–50, 115 A.3d 39, cert. denied, 317 Conn.

921, 118 A.3d 63 (2015).

The time for the defendant to have challenged the

statutory authority for the court’s order with respect to

binding arbitration was when the dissolution judgment

with that provision was rendered by the court. The

defendant’s attempt to raise the issue now is a collateral

attack upon the dissolution judgment rendered on July

12, 2013. ‘‘Unless a litigant can show an absence of

subject matter jurisdiction that makes the prior judgment of a tribunal entirely invalid, he or she must resort

to direct proceedings to correct perceived wrongs

. . . . A collateral attack on a judgment is a procedurally impermissible substitute for an appeal.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Urban Redevelopment Commission v. Katsetos, 86 Conn. App. 236, 244, 860 A.2d

1233 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 919, 866 A.2d

1289 (2005).

The defendant did not exercise his opportunity to

appeal that judgment, and there are no facts before us

to warrant a conclusion that there has been a miscarriage of justice.8 Accordingly, the defendant’s first

claim fails.

II

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

determined that he failed to prove that the arbitration

proceeding was not conducted in accordance with

chapter 909 of the General Statutes, as required by

§ 46b-66 (c). The defendant argues that he proved that

the award was not timely rendered, that it was not

signed by the arbitrator, that the arbitrator failed to

state the factual basis for his award, and that the arbitrator failed to file the decision with the clerk of the court.

See General Statutes § 52-416; Practice Book § 23-64.

As previously discussed, the trial court did not enter

the binding arbitration order pursuant to § 46b-66, and,

accordingly, the arbitration proceedings did not follow

the procedures set forth in chapter 909 of the General
Statutes. We therefore look to the language of the subject provision in the dissolution judgment to determine

whether the court properly denied the defendant’s

motion to correct, modify or vacate the arbitration

award.

The court’s binding arbitration order simply requires

the parties to divide by agreement their personal property consisting of furniture and furnishings within thirty

days of the dissolution judgment. If the parties are not

able to agree, ownership of any disputed assets is to

be decided by binding arbitration to be conducted by

Grenier or another independent arbitrator. The defendant presented no evidence to demonstrate that the

court’s order was not followed. Accordingly, this

claim fails.

III

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

concluded that he failed to prove that the arbitrator

exceeded his authority in the allocation of the assets.

Specifically, the defendant argues that the court had

awarded him his mother’s Ebel watch in the dissolution

judgment, and that the arbitrator failed to consider that

order of the court when he issued his arbitration award.

The defendant claims that the award ‘‘illustrates the

unbalanced allocation by the arbitrator of tangible

assets due to his consideration of nonallocable assets.

. . . The arbitrator specifically awarded to the plaintiff

a diamond watch that the court had expressly awarded

to the defendant . . . .’’

We have reviewed the arbitration award. Grenier’s

‘‘Personal Property Allocation’’ is detailed and thorough. The award expressly states that the Ebel watch,

which Grenier acknowledged had been allocated to the

defendant in the dissolution judgment, had been sold by

the plaintiff and no longer was available for distribution.

Accordingly, Grenier allocated the watch to the plaintiff

and presumably took this allocation into account when

he divided the numerous remaining assets. In any event,

the defendant did not demonstrate that the personal

property allocation was unfair orinequitable. Moreover,

it is significant that the court’s order did not require

that the allocation be based on the value of the disputed

items. We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the defendant failed to prove

that Grenier exceeded the scope of his authority in his

allocation of the disputed assets.

IV

The defendant’s final claim is that the court demonstrated bias against him that deprived him of a key

witness at the hearing on his motion. The following

additional facts are necessary to resolve this claim.

The defendant, as a self-represented party, decided

that he wanted Grenier to testify at the September 2,

2014 hearing on his motion to correct, modify or vacate
the arbitration award. The defendant claims that the

court required service of the subpoena to Grenier to

be made in hand by the marshal. The defendant argues

that the court’s ‘‘more stringent standards of service of

process’’ allowed Grenier to evade being served. Consequently, the defendant claims that he ‘‘was deprived of

due process owing to the arbitrary, onerous and biased

requirements of the court.’’

The defendant does not claim that he raised the issue

of judicial bias at any time during the course of the

proceedings. He could have requested that the judge

recuse herself. ‘‘Claims alleging judicial bias should be

raised at trial by a motion for disqualification or the

claim will be deemed to be waived. . . . A party’s failure to raise a claim of disqualification at trial has been

characterized as the functional equivalent of consenting

to the judge’s presence at trial.’’(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wendt v. Wendt, 59 Conn.

App. 656, 692, 757 A.2d 1225, cert. denied, 255 Conn.

918, 763 A.2d 1044 (2000).

Instead, the defendant waited until after the court

rendered its decision on his motion. ‘‘Our Supreme

Court has criticized the practice whereby an attorney,

cognizant of circumstances giving rise to an objection

before or during trial, waits until after an unfavorable

judgment to raise the issue. We have made it clear that

we will not permit parties to anticipate a favorable

decision, reserving a right to impeach it or set it aside

if it happens to be against them, for a cause which was

well known to them before or during the trial.’’(Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 693.

Nevertheless, we will address the defendant’s claim

given the grave nature of his accusation. ‘‘Because an

accusation of judicial bias or prejudice strikes at the

very core of judicial integrity and tends to undermine

public confidence in the established judiciary . . . we

. . . have reviewed unpreserved claims of judicial bias

under the plain error doctrine. . . . Plain error exists

only in truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the erroris so obvious that it affects the fairness

and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial

proceedings.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Doody v. Doody, 99 Conn. App. 512,

523, 914 A.2d 1058 (2007).

At the beginning of the September 2, 2014 hearing, the

court inquired as to the whereabouts of the defendant’s

witness. The defendant responded that the marshal was

unable to serve him personally with the subpoena. The

defendant followed that representation with the statement: ‘‘I’m prepared to move forward without his testimony to alleviate some of the congestion in your court

today.’’ After some discussion relative to the binding

arbitration order in the dissolution judgment and the

court-approved stipulation, the court returned to the

issue of the defendant’s witness. The court addressed
the defendant: ‘‘You’ll keep trying to serve the witness

that you’d like to call . . . unless you want to go forward today.’’ The defendant responded: ‘‘I’d like to go

forward today, Your Honor.’’ Thus, the court itself gave

the defendant the option of continuing the matter so

he could procure the attendance of his witness. The

defendant did not avail himself of that opportunity. At

no time during the hearing did the defendant claim that

the court had imposed unreasonable requirements for

service of process or that the court was biased

against him.

The record is devoid of any indication that the court

was in any way biased against the defendant. We conclude that this claim is totally without merit and is a

groundless assault on the integrity of the trial court.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 The court issued a corrected memorandum of decision on July 16, 2013.

The corrections do not affect our analysis of the claims in this appeal.

2 General Statutes § 46b-66 (c) provides: ‘‘The provisions of chapter 909

shall be applicable to any agreement to arbitrate in an action for dissolution

of marriage under this chapter, provided (1) an arbitration pursuant to such

an agreement may proceed only after the court has made a thorough inquiry

and is satisfied that (A) each party entered into such agreement voluntarily

and without coercion, and (B) such agreement is fair and equitable under

the circumstances, and (2) such agreement and an arbitration pursuant to

such agreement shall not include issues related to child support, visitation

and custody. An arbitration award in such action shall be confirmed, modified or vacated in accordance with the provisions of chapter 909.’’

3 The July 16, 2013 memorandum of decision misidentified the watch as

being a Piaget watch, but it is undisputed that it was an Ebel watch.

4 Although the defendant claims that the arbitrator improperly awarded

property to the plaintiff that the court previously had awarded to the defendant, the Ebel watch is the only property identified by the defendant in the

pleadings and transcript of the September 2, 2014 hearing as being improperly awarded by the arbitrator to the plaintiff.

5

It was clear at the September 2, 2014 hearing that the defendant’s primary

concern was the disposition of the Ebel watch: ‘‘But, at minimum, I want

that watch replaced. It has become a matter of principle. I don’t like coming

here four times, but it’s that important to me. And that concludes my

remarks.’’

6 The plaintiff argues that the defendant waived this claim by his conduct

before the trial court. ‘‘[W]aiveris [t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment—express or implied—of a legal right or notice. . . . In determining

waiver, the conduct of the parties is of great importance. . . . When a party

consents to or expresses satisfaction with an issue at trial, claims arising

from that issue are deemed waived and may not be reviewed on appeal.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Hara v. Mackie, 151 Conn. App. 515,

522, 97 A.3d 507 (2014).

We do not address the plaintiff’s claim of waiver because the defendant

argues that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the binding arbitration

order. Our Supreme Court recently has restated the well settled rule that

‘‘[t]he subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any

party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any

stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531–32, 46 A.3d 102 (2012).

7

‘‘[A]lthough related, the court’s authority to act pursuant to a statute is

different from its subject matter jurisdiction. The power of the court to hear

and determine, which is implicit in jurisdiction, is not to be confused with

the way in which that power must be exercised in order to comply with

the terms of the statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jose B.,

303 Conn. 569, 573–74, 34 A.3d 975 (2012).

8 Even if we were to assume arguendo that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction at the time it included the order for binding arbitration in the

dissolution judgment, we would conclude that consideration of the defendant’s claim is not warranted under the facts and circumstances of this

case. ‘‘It often is stated that a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction can

be raised at any time and that [o]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of

a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is

presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding with

the case. . . .

‘‘Our Supreme Court, however, has stated that there are boundaries to

challenges concerning the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. As we have

only recently observed . . . [t]he modern law of civil procedure suggests

that even litigation about subject matterjurisdiction should take into account

the importance of the principle of the finality of judgments, particularly when

the parties have had a full opportunity originally to contest the jurisdiction of

the adjudicatory tribunal. . . . Under this rationale, at least where the lack

of jurisdiction is not entirely obvious, the critical considerations are whether

the complaining party had the opportunity to litigate the question of jurisdiction in the original action, and, if he did have such an opportunity, whether

there are strong policy reasons for giving him a second opportunity to do

so.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Urban Redevelopment Commission v. Katsetos, supra, 86 Conn.

App. 240–41.

‘‘Litigation about whether subject matter jurisdiction exists should take

into account whether the litigation is a collateral or direct attack on the

judgment, whether the parties consented to the jurisdiction originally, the

age of the original judgment, whether the parties had an opportunity originally to contest jurisdiction, the prevention of a miscarriage of justice,

whether the subject matter is so far beyond the jurisdiction of the court as

to constitute an abuse of authority, and the desirability of the finality of

judgments. Connecticut Pharmaceutical Assn., Inc. v. Milano, 191 Conn.

555, 468 A.2d 1230 (1983) . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Morris v. Irwin, 4 Conn. App. 431, 434, 494 A.2d 626 (1985).