Filed 2/2/23 Mooney v. Argus Realty Investors CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

LORELEI MOONEY, as Trustee, etc., et 

al.,

 Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

ARGUS REALTY INVESTORS et al.,

 Defendants and Appellants.

 G060440

 (Super. Ct. No. JCCP 4811)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

Peter J. Wilson, Judge. Affirmed.

Tencersherman, Philip C. Tencer and Jessica L. Mulvaney for Defendants 

and Appellants. 

Catanzarite Law Corporation, Kenneth J. Catanzarite, Nicole M 

Catanzarite-Woodward and Eric V. Anderton for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
2

Lorelei Mooney as trustee and on behalf of the Herbert and Helen 

Schweiger Trust, ARI-DFW East & West 9, L.P., Gary Lamm, and James Mieuli 

(Plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit in 2014 on behalf of themselves and a putative class. The 

action was dismissed six years later, on January 28, 2021, due to Plaintiffs’ failure to 

bring the action to trial within five years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310.) In a prior 

opinion, this court recently affirmed the dismissal. (Mooney v. Argus Realty Investors 

(Nov. 29, 2022, G060076) [nonpub. opn.] (Mooney).) 

After dismissing the lawsuit, the trial court awarded the prevailing parties a 

total of $100,604.41 in attorney fees and costs. This appeal challenges the court’s 

decision to award less in attorney fees than what was requested. We affirm the court’s 

postjudgment order.

FACTS

We incorporate by reference our detailed summary of the procedural 

history of this case set forth in Mooney, supra, G060076. Relevant to the issues raised in 

this appeal, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit (the Mooney Action) initially named over 20 defendants, 

but by 2021 all that remained were Argus Realty Investors, L.P., ARI Financial Services, 

Argus Realty, L.L.C., ARI Commercial Properties, Inc., Richard Gee, Maxwell B. 

Drever, Timothy E. Snodgrass, William Brian Candler, ARI-DFW, East & West, L.P., 

ARI-Barrett Office Center, LLC, ARI-Atrium Office Building, LLC, ARI-Powers Ferry 

Office Park, LLC, ARI Copley Business Center, LLC, ARI-Shoreview Corporate Center, 

LLC, ARI-Securities Centre One & Two, LLC, and ARI-Meridian Plaza, LLC. For ease 

of reading, we will refer collectively to these parties as Defendants. 

Although the action was initiated in 2014, Defendants did not actively 

defend themselves in the case until 2019, when they filed a demurrer to the third 

amended complaint (TAC). Thereafter, Defendants filed several other documents, 
3

including a response to a list of facts, an omnibus objection, documents requested by the 

trial court, and exhibit lists. Defendants filed a demurrer and answer to the fourth 

amended compliant before filing their motion to dismiss. 

After the lawsuit was dismissed, Defendants filed a motion for attorney fees 

and costs as the prevailing party requesting a total of $197,617.98. Their counsel, Philip 

C. Tencer, declared Defendants were invoiced $170,338.28 for attorney fees. He 

expected to invoice an additional two hours ($1,100) for time associated with the motion. 

He noted Defendants incurred $2,514 in attorney fees that had not yet been invoiced and

related to the motion to dismiss and for attorney fees and costs. Counsel itemized 

$23,665.70 for costs already invoiced plus an additional $2,514 not yet invoiced. Thus, 

Defendants requested a total of $171,438.28 for attorney fees and $26,179.70 in costs.

Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing the claim for over $170,000 in 

attorney fees was not credible because Defendants copied arguments from other parties 

appearing earlier in the action. They added Defendants’ own work was limited, 

straightforward, and non-complex. They maintained Defendants’ counsel needed to 

provide evidence of the rates charged, the hours worked, the attorney who did the work, 

and the types of issues addressed. Plaintiffs stated another reason a more detailed 

accounting was warranted was because Defendants’ briefing admitted the case was one of 

eight concerning the fraudulent investment scheme and they could have padded their fee 

request for services rendered in the other cases. And finally, Plaintiffs argued more 

information about the billing was required because of the need for apportionment. They 

noted the claims consisted of contract and non-contract claims, and the prevailing parties 

were not entitled to more than fees incurred on the contract. (Citing Santisas v. Goodin 

(1998) 20 Cal.4th 599, 615.) 
4

The rest of Plaintiffs’ arguments related to interpretation of the two 

contracts containing the attorney fee provisions. Specifically, they asserted neither

contract provision obligated all the individual plaintiffs in the lawsuit to pay attorney 

fees. In addition, they claimed certain parties were not entitled to the requested relief. 

Defendants filed a reply that focused on the contract interpretation issues. 

They argued Plaintiffs “brought breach of contract claims on the PSAS [Purchase 

Agreement and Escrow Instructions].” “This was the primary, if not exclusive, basis for 

the allegations in the litigation, including breach of contract.” They added, “Plaintiffs 

also sued for breach of contract on the Property Management Agreement (‘PMA’).” 

They concluded, “Plaintiffs cannot now claim that the basis for all of their claims for 

breach of contract . . . were sufficient to bring the breach of contract claims, yet are now 

insufficient to support an award of fees.” 

Defendants also addressed the claim the requested attorney fees were 

unreasonable. They argued the amount was justified because the trial court designated 

the case to be a complex matter and it required multiple rounds of amended pleadings and 

demurrers. Tencer submitted a declaration stating he was lead counsel and charged an 

hourly rate of between $500 to $550 per hour. He stated the case required multiple 

demurrers, communications with clients, appearances, production of documents, 

responses to discovery requests, and propounding of discovery. In a footnote, 

Defendants stated that if the court required additional evidence, counsel would provide 

copies of the invoices for in camera review. 

On May 6, 2021, the trial court issued a tentative ruling continuing the 

matter. It explained Defendants had not presented sufficient evidence to support their 

attorney fee request, “including the tasks performed and the number of hours worked.” 

The court added, “Defendants also failed to provide any or sufficient information to 
5

enable the [c]ourt to determine the possible allocation of fees and costs between contract 

and tort claims. (Italics added.) There [was] insufficient information to determine 

whether the fees requested are reasonable and necessary.” The court “permitted” the 

parties to submit supplemental briefing to address these points.

Defendants’ supplemental brief cited case authority holding it was not 

necessary to provide detailed billing timesheets to support an attorney fee award under 

the lodestar method. (Citing Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 

224, 254-255, overruled on other grounds by Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.

(2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 269.) They maintained an attorney’s testimony as to the number of 

hours worked, the tasks performed, and the reasonable hourly rate was all that should be 

required. Defendants submitted new calculations that increased the total amount billed to 

$184,435 and the sum unbilled to $6,572.50 (for a new total of $191,007.50). Defendants 

did not increase their request for costs.

Defendants explained Tencer spent a total of 77.3 hours at a rate of $500 

per hour ($38,650), an additional 26.9 hours at a rate of $525 per hour ($14,122.50), and 

finally 164.50 hours charged at a rate of $550 per hour ($90,475). Thus, he spent 268.7 

hours on the case, costing Defendants $143,247.50.

Tencer’s declaration offered a lot of details about his billing rate, repeatedly 

stating he charged Defendants less than what he billed other clients. Tencer recalled he 

was retained in 2012 by other parties in related matters, when his hourly rate was $500 

per hour. In 2015, he started working for Defendants in the instant matter, and he 

charged them $500 per hour, even though his hourly rate at the time was $550. In the 

beginning of 2019, he continued charging $500 but his hourly rate was $600. Starting in 

May 2019, he increased his rate to $525 and then to $550 per hour. 
6

He explained in general terms the type of work he performed on the case 

ranged from reviewing correspondence to outlining issues for demurrers. Rather than 

specifying the number of hours spent on each task, Tencer organized his declaration into 

separate paragraphs, each covering large chunks of time during which he performed 

numerous services. For example, paragraph 9 of his declaration stated that from “April 1, 

2019, through January 17, 2020, a total of 80.9 hours was spent in connection with work 

on this matter” and he personally spent 49.9 on 19 different tasks. 

In paragraph 9, Tencer described the nature of the work in general terms as 

follows: (1) receiving correspondence; (2) analyzing correspondence; (3) responding to 

correspondence; (4) outlining reply briefs; (5) researching reply briefs; (6) preparing 

reply briefs; (7) drafting supplemental declarations; (8) communicating with clients 

regarding declarations and reply; (9) reviewing all filings; (10) preparing for hearing on 

demurrer to the TAC; (11) preparing for demurrer; (12) appearing at hearing on 

demurrer; (13) reviewing documents and information related to PPMS and offering 

documents; (14) drafting responses to delayed discovery facts; (15) finalizing list of 

documents to provide to the court; (16) reviewing the final compilation of documents for 

production; (17) reviewing objections issued by Plaintiffs; (18) preparing for oral 

argument on the demurrer to the TAC; and (19) attending oral argument on the demurrer 

to the TAC. 

Tencer did not explain why his preparation and attendance at the hearing on 

the demurrer to the TAC was listed twice. Nor did he explain why his paralegal billed an 

additional 30.5 hours during the same nine months on the case. He simply noted the 

paralegal’s time was spent reviewing and compiling documents, drafting a documents 

list, comparing documents to the due diligence tables, revising documents, and 

“preparing, bates numbering, and finalizing submission to the court and serving on 
7

counsel.” 1 It is unclear if these documents related to the reply for the demurrer or 

something else. If the reply and related matters took 80.9 hours, it is interesting to note 

Tencer plus associates/paralegals billed over 50 hours drafting the demurrer (and other 

legal tasks such as correspondence described in paragraph 7). 

Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief asserted Defendants’ new request for over 

$190,000 was not credible. They asserted Defendants failed to comply with the trial 

court’s order, and only “offered a vague and conclusory supplemental declaration.” 

Plaintiffs submitted evidence proving large portions of Defendants’ demurrer to the TAC 

was identical to an earlier demurrer filed by co-defendants, highlighting multiple pages 

that appear to have been cut and pasted. They also provided proof Defendants’ demurrer 

to the fourth amended complaint failed to account for the absence of certain causes of 

action and was essentially a copy of the demurrer to the TAC. 

Plaintiffs reminded the trial court that it agreed with their argument 

Defendants must apportion their time between contract and non-contract claims. They 

noted Defendants “failed to provide information to enable Plaintiffs and the [c]ourt to 

determine allocation between contract and tort claims.” They concluded Defendants 

“utterly failed to satisfy their burden despite receiving a second opportunity to do so.” 

On June 3, 2021, the trial court issued a tentative ruling that became its

final order. The court stated that because there was no objection to the requested costs, it 

would award the full amount of $26,179.70. However, the court reduced the amount of 

1

Tencer’s description of the work performed by associates and paralegals 

was set forth in general terms and sometimes duplicated the description of his work. The 

breakdown of those costs was as follows: (1) 66.3 hours by senior associates (rate 

$325/hour) cost $21,457.50; (2) 40.2 hours by junior associates ($275/hour) cost 

$11,055; (3) .3 hours by a junior associate ($250/hour) cost $75; (4) 49.6 hours by senior 

paralegals ($125/hour) cost $6,200; and (5) 23 hours by junior paralegals ($95/hour) cost 

$2,185. These services totaled $40,972.50.
8

billed attorney fees from $184,435 to $135,704.42 (a difference of $48,730.58). The 

court explained it reduced the attorney fee bill “because there was insufficient 

information regarding the amount of time spent on certain tasks and because the overall 

amount of time incurred appeared to be excessive and unreasonable based on the minimal 

information provided regarding the tasks performed.” 

The trial court determined Defendants’ argument they did not need to 

provide details about billing was unpersuasive and Defendants were relying on factually 

distinguishable case authority. (Citing Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co. 

(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285 (Steiny).) It noted Steiny held invoices were not required 

because “the attorney declaration ‘included detailed evidence of hours spent, tasks 

concluded, and billing rates.’” It concluded the attorney declaration in this case was not 

sufficient. “In a case described by counsel as ‘practically identical’ to prior lawsuits . . . 

the [c]ourt here does not find that the boilerplate descriptions provided by counsel, many 

of which showed a duplication of tasks, and work on unfiled summary 

judgment/summary adjudication motions, constitute ‘detailed evidence of hours spent 

[or] tasks concluded.’” 

Next, the trial court allocated 50 percent of the billed fees to the contract 

claims and reasoned this was fair apportionment because the contract claims “comprised 

[three] of the [eight] causes of action against [Defendants].” The court noted Defendants 

were “expressly directed to address the question of an appropriate allocation between 

contract and tort claims [as stated in a prior minute order, and they] elected not to do so.” 

In summary, the trial court first reduced the requested sum of billed fees to $135,704.42,

and then cut this figure in half for a new subtotal of $67,852.21. The court added this 

figure together with the full amount requested for unbilled fees ($6,572.50) for a total of 

$74,424.71. 
9

DISCUSSION

The parties do not dispute Defendants were the prevailing party and they 

were entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717. This appeal concerns 

only two narrow issues regarding whether the court abused its discretion by 

(1) apportioning the fees in half to only cover litigation of the contract claims and not the 

tort claims, and (2) reducing the attorney fee award based on the conclusion the full 

amount was not supported by the evidence and appeared to be excessive. We address 

each claim separately.

A. Contract Versus Tort Causes of Action

In their briefing, Defendants assert there are two contract provisions that 

provide the basis for awarding attorney fees. They maintain the language in both 

provisions was broad enough to authorize a fee award in tort as well as contract actions. 

Defendants also maintain that because the case had not proceeded past the pleading stage 

before it was dismissed, it was not possible to apportion fees between the contract and 

tort claims. Due to the above two factors, Defendants conclude the court’s decision “to 

reduce the billed fees by half to only account for the contract causes of action is error and 

constitutes an abuse of discretion.” However, these contentions were not raised below or 

considered by the trial court. Defendants forfeited the issue. Moreover, we conclude the 

court correctly interpreted Defendants’ decision to ignore its request for briefing as a 

concession. Thus, there are two reasons why we need not consider Defendants’ new 

apportionment arguments.

In their opening brief, Defendants appear to have forgotten that they did not 

raise any arguments against apportionment below. They make no effort to persuade us to 

depart from the well-established rule that “appellate courts will ordinarily not consider 

errors that ‘could have been, but [were] not raised below.’ [Citations.]” (Findleton v. 
10

Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 565, 569.) “The rule applies 

to defenses as well as theories of liability, and to a ‘new theory for or against recovery’ of 

attorney fees. [Citation.] ‘The policy behind the rule is fairness.’ [Citation.] ‘Appellate 

courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an 

opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider. 

[Citation.] In our adversarial system, each party has the obligation to raise any issue or 

infirmity that might subject the ensuing judgment to attack. [Citation.] Bait and switch 

on appeal not only subjects the parties to avoidable expense but also wreaks havoc on a 

judicial system too burdened to retry cases on theories that could have been raised 

earlier.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 569-570.)

In their reply briefing, Defendants belatedly address the forfeiture issue for 

the first time, perhaps because Plaintiffs raised it in their briefing. Defendants assert their

claim for fees on both contract and tort claims was “property preserved” because (1) the 

attorney fee provision obviously covered both tort and contract claims, and (2) “it was 

clear that the entirety of the fees incurred for the defense of the action (for all claims—

tort and contract) was being sought pursuant to those fee provisions.” Alternatively, 

Defendants argue we should consider the issue because Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced. 

They explain Plaintiffs raised the same apportionment arguments on appeal as they did in 

their opposition below, and therefore, the issues are “well preserved” and there is no 

inequity or prejudice created on appeal. These arguments fail for several reasons.

First, we have no reason to disregard the general rule is “that ‘“points raised 

in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for 

failure to present them before . . . .”’ [Citations.]” (Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative 

Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 895, fn. 10.) Our Supreme 

Court has explained, “Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an 
11

issue raised initially in the reply brief of an appellant.” (Varjabedian v. City of Madera

(1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11.) Defendants did not provide any reasons for not 

discussing the issue of forfeiture before. This is not a case where Defendants would not 

have known waiver was a potential issue. When ruling, the trial court expressly pointed 

out Defendants “elected not” to address the court’s direct question about “an appropriate 

allocation between contract and tort claims.” 

Second, their arguments against allocation were not properly preserved by 

Defendants simply requesting an award of all billed attorney fees, covering both tort and 

contract claims. The record plainly shows Plaintiffs objected to Defendants’ all-inclusive 

request, asserting there was a clear need for apportionment. Plaintiffs maintained the 

contract provisions did not cover tort claims and cited to applicable case authority. 

Plaintiffs concluded the moving party’s request needed to “apportion fees as required.”

When Defendants failed to respond to these arguments in their reply brief, 

the trial court reasonably interpreted their silence as a concession on the need to 

apportion attorney fees. Thereafter, the court specifically asked Defendants to include in 

their supplemental briefing “sufficient information to enable the [c]ourt to determine the

possible allocation of fees and costs between contract and tort claims.” The court’s 

question was not whether to apportion attorney fees, but rather how much to apportion. 

If Defendants had responded by raising any arguments against apportionment or by 

answering the court’s question about what would be a fair apportionment, and the court 

had heard and rejected those arguments, the issues would have been properly preserved 

for appeal. Here, the court reduced the billed attorney fees after hearing no objection 

from Defendants. 

Third, if we assume for the sake of argument Plaintiffs were not prejudiced 

by Defendants’ failure to object to apportionment below, they were certainly prejudiced 
12

by Defendants’ new argument in their reply brief that equity requires consideration of 

their waived arguments. Plaintiffs did not have the opportunity to respond to Defendants’ 

theory this court should ignore the well-settled rule a party is precluded from arguing on 

appeal a point not raised in the trial court. In any event, prejudice is not the only reason 

we uphold the forfeiture rule. “‘Any other rule would “‘“permit a party to play fast and 

loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an 

objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a 

conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.”’

[Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846.) 

In conclusion, Defendants do not refute the fact they failed to raise any 

objection to Plaintiffs’ apportionment arguments below. Defendants have forfeited their 

right to claim the court abused its discretion when apportioning fees. The record also 

supports the court’s reasonable inference Defendants conceded the issue by electing not 

to respond to a direct request for briefing about apportionment. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co.

(1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 403 [doctrine of invited error “prevent[s] a party from misleading 

the trial court and then profiting therefrom in the appellate court”].)

B. Reduction of Fees

Defendants assert the court abused its discretion by reducing the amount of 

billed attorney fees because (1) there was ample evidence to support the full amount 

billed, (2) further specificity risked waiver of attorney client communication, 

(3) Defendants’ involvement in multiple identical cases would not justify a reduction in 

attorney fees actually billed, (4) the fees were reasonable because the claims were 

complex and involved multiple demurrers, and (5) it was immaterial some motions were 

not filed, or the case was dismissed before some motions were heard because those fees 
13

and costs were billed. We are not persuaded the trial court abused its discretion in 

reducing the attorney fee amount. 

California law requires that the trial court determine reasonable attorney 

fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in an action on a contract that provides for 

attorney fees. (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) “[T]he trial court has broad authority to 

determine the amount of a reasonable fee.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 

22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM Group).) “‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge 

of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of 

course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced 

that it is clearly wrong[”]’—meaning that it abused its discretion. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) 

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ 

i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” 

(PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) “The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, 

based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair 

market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid., italics added.) “The value of legal 

services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. 

[Citation.] . . . The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of 

factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill 

required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and 

other circumstances in the case. [Citations.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 

618, 623-624; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 [“[T]rial courts 

must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form 

of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation”].)

Here, Defendants’ moving papers contained only vague information about 

the time required to litigate the case. Defendants offered to provide copies of invoices for 
14

in camera review, if the court determined it required additional information. As it turns 

out, the court stated it needed more information. It explicitly ruled there was insufficient 

evidence from which to determine if the requested attorney fees were “reasonable or 

necessary.” It concluded, “Plaintiffs are correct that Defendants have failed to present 

sufficient information. Defendants do not identify any tasks performed or even the 

number of hours for these tasks.” Rather than accepting Defendants’ offer to produce

actual client invoices, the court gave them the opportunity to remedy the matter by 

submitting additional evidence in supplemental briefing.

Defendants began their supplemental brief with the following observation: 

“Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was the eighth such putative class action arising out of the sale of 

Tenant in Common (‘TIC’) interests in various properties by the . . . Defendants almost 

15 years ago. The case was not merely similar to the prior lawsuits, it was practically 

identical.” They noted Plaintiffs “brought identical legal claims,” “asserted many of the 

same factual allegations,” and were “represented by the same law firm.” Defendants 

reminded the trial court the matter was complicated and there was case law holding it was 

not necessary to provide detailed billing timesheets to support an award of attorney fees 

under the lodestar method. They concluded Tencer’s supplemental declaration 

sufficiently evidenced the reasonable hourly rate for services, the number of hours he 

spent on the case, and the tasks performed. (Citing Steiny, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th 285.)

The trial court disagreed, concluding Tencer’s supplemental declaration 

lacked the required specificity about the “amount of time spent on certain tasks” and 

because “the overall amount of time incurred appeared to be excessive and unreasonable 

based on the minimal information provided regarding the tasks performed.” The court 

correctly determined it could not properly evaluate whether the requested attorney fee 
15

was reasonable, or if there was padding, without evidence regarding the time spent on 

certain tasks. The record fully supports this conclusion. 

Tencer’s declaration grouped together multiple and often unrelated 

litigation services, taking place over large blocks of time. Some of the descriptions were

duplicative, and others are so lacking that one had to guess as to the nature of the task and 

if it was completed. For example, paragraph 3 of his declaration provided: “From July 6, 

2017[,] through November 30, 2017, I spent a total of 11.10 hours in connection with 

work on this matter. Those hours included . . . telephone conferences regarding litigation 

status, reviewing and analyzing correspondence, preparing for Case Management 

Conference, reviewing and analyzing the First Amended Complaint and exhibits, meeting 

and conferring regarding deficiencies in pleadings, and researching and drafting demurrer 

[sic] I charged an hourly rate of $500/hour, even though my regular hourly rate at the

time was $550/hour.” 

This explanation did nothing to address the court’s concern there was 

insufficient evidence of the time spent on certain tasks. The paragraph simply proved 11 

hours were spent on multiple seemingly unrelated tasks. And by including unqualifiable

tasks into the mix, such as reviewing correspondence, how was the court to evaluate if 

the time spent drafting a demurrer to the first amended complaint was reasonable? This 

unfiled demurrer could have taken 10 hours or as little as two hours. 

Because Tencer’s supplemental declaration did not address the court’s 

request for information about the time taken for specific tasks, it cannot be said the court 

abused its discretion in reducing the amount of billed attorney fees in the award. 

Contrary to Defendants’ contention, there was not ample evidence to support the full 

amount billed.
16

We also reject Defendants’ contention that further specificity risked waiver 

of attorney-client communications. Defendants make this claim without providing 

supporting case authority or legal analysis. Their reference to the Steiny case is

misplaced. That case does not involve a situation where a party refused to produce an 

invoice due to attorney-client privilege concerns. Moreover, Defendants have apparently 

forgotten the court declined the offer for an in-camera review of client invoices. It 

simply expected to see an attorney declaration that “included detailed evidence of hours 

spent, tasks concluded, and billing rates.” (Steiny, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 293.)

Defendants boldly assert the trial court erred by reducing attorney fees 

simply because Defendants were involved in multiple identical cases, or because some 

bills referred to unfiled motions. These were not the reasons the court gave for reducing 

the amount of attorney fees billed. The court mentioned these facts as simply creating a 

greater need for “detailed evidence of hours spent on tasks concluded.” The court was 

willing to award the full amount of billed fees if Defendants could show those hours 

reasonably represented the hours spent on tasks in this case, as opposed to the other 

identical cases. 

In fixing the amount of reasonably necessary fees, the court should consider 

whether “‘“counsel’s skill and effort were wisely devoted to the expeditious disposition 

of the case”’” or whether instead the matter was “overlitigat[ed].” (In re Marriage of 

Turkanis & Price (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 332, 356; Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 

1122, 1132 [reasonable compensation should not include “inefficient or duplicative 

efforts”].) The trial court reasonably concluded Tencer’s boilerplate descriptions of 

multiple tasks performed over long periods of time created an opportunity for padding. 

Defendants’ next contention relates to the complexity of the issues in this 

case and time needed to review the lengthy documents created for the investment scheme. 
17

There is no indication the trial court did not appreciate this case was difficult and 

complicated. It reduced the billed attorney fees approximately 24 percent from $184,435 

to $135,704. (The reduction by $49,000 was roughly the equivalent of 98 hours billed at 

$500/hour.) It awarded the full amount requested for the unbilled amount of $6,572.50, 

representing the work performed on the successful motion to dismiss as well as the 

attorney fee request. As stated earlier, the court explained its decision to reduce the 

attorney fees was due to Defendants’ failure to present sufficient evidence supporting 

their claims for attorney fees, not because the court concluded the case was simple to 

litigate.2

Based on all the above, we conclude there was ample evidence supporting 

the trial court decision to reduce the amount of billed attorney fees. As stated, “the trial 

court is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in its court” and 

Defendants have not convinced us that the court was clearly wrong in awarding $134,704 

instead of $180,000. (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 

1134.) “The only proper basis of reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if 

the amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that 

passion and prejudice influenced the determination.” (Ibid.) Such was not the case here.

2

This conclusion also answers Defendants’ assertion the court erred by

reducing attorney fees simply because the bills included unfiled motions or motions filed 

but not heard before the case was dismissed. Moreover, the latter contention is belied by 

the record. The court did not reduce any unbilled attorney fees relating to work 

performed after January 2021. 
18

DISPOSITION

The postjudgment order is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs 

on appeal. 

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, J.

MOORE, J.