United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-20133

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Steffen Thomas Savarino, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:19-CR-142-1

Before Barksdale, Costa, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Steffen Thomas Savarino was convicted of three counts of mailmatter theft by a postal employee, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1709. He was 

sentenced to time served and two years of supervised release. In May 2020, 

a few months after his sentencing, Savarino’s probation officer reported to 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 22, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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the district court that Savarino had been arrested for felony theft (more than 

$2500 and less than $30,000), on 28 April 2020. The court accepted the 

probation officer’s recommendation that no action be taken, pending 

disposition of the state charge. 

In February 2021, Savarino’s probation officer filed a petition, 

asserting Savarino violated the conditions of his supervised release by 

committing another felony theft, on 29 January 2021. The officer noted the 

still-pending felony-theft charge from Savarino’s April 2020 arrest also 

served as a basis for revoking his supervised release. In a superseding 

petition, Savarino’s probation officer contended Savarino also violated the 

conditions of his supervised release by failing to: submit to urine 

surveillance; and participate as directed in outpatient substance-abuse 

treatment.

The court revoked Savarino’s supervised release and imposed an 18-

month sentence, above the Sentencing Guidelines range. Savarino contests 

the sentence and asserts the district court erred in imposing it because the

court improperly considered, as dominant factors, the need for the sentence 

imposed to reflect the seriousness of Savarino’s new theft offenses and to 

provide just punishment for them.

Both parties contend the standard of review is plain error; but, of 

course, our court, not the parties, determines the appropriate standard of 

review. E.g., United States v. Torres-Perez, 777 F.3d 764, 766 (5th Cir. 2011). 

When defendant properly preserves an objection to his revocation sentence, 

a revocation sentence is reviewed under a “plainly unreasonable” standard. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (review of sentence); United States v. Miller, 634 

F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 2011) (adopting “plainly unreasonable” standard for 

revocation sentences). Unpreserved challenges are reviewed for plain error. 

United States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). A party can 

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preserve error by informing the court of the desired action or objecting to the 

court’s action and stating the grounds for the objection. Holguin-Hernandez 

v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 764 (2020). 

Holguin-Hernandez, however, stopped short of “decid[ing] what is 

sufficient to preserve a claim that a trial court used improper procedures in 

arriving at its chosen sentence . . . [or] when a party has properly preserved 

the right to make particular arguments supporting its claim that a sentence is 

unreasonably long”. Id. at 767 (emphasis omitted). And our court has 

declined to address the appropriate standard of review for specific assertions

supporting a substantive-unreasonableness claim that were not clearly raised 

before the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Holguin-Hernandez, 955 

F.3d 519, 520 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020) (pretermitting issue regarding appropriate 

standard of review because defendant could not even overcome “less 

deferential abuse of discretion standard”) (opinion on remand); United 

States v. Navarro-Jusino, 993 F.3d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 2021) (same); but see 

United States v. Cano, 981 F.3d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 2020) (reviewing for plain 

error contention district court relied on improper factor because defendant 

failed to raise issue). 

Savarino sought a lower sentence than the one imposed. At no point, 

however, did he assert the court improperly considered a factor when 

imposing his revocation sentence. Our court need not decide whether 

Savarino preserved his sentencing contention because it fails under either 

standard of review.

Reversal of a sentence imposed on revocation under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e) (modification of conditions or revocation) is required only if 

impermissible considerations, such as the seriousness of the violations and 

the need for just punishment, were dominant factors in the district court’s

sentencing decision. See United States v. Rivera, 784 F.3d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 

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2015). There is no error, however, when such a factor “is merely a secondary 

concern or an additional justification for the sentence”. Id.; see also United 

States v. Sanchez, 900 F.3d 678, 684 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining 

revocation sentences are proper if court does “not take account of 

retribution” (citation omitted)). 

The court’s statements, in context, demonstrate the court was 

primarily frustrated with Savarino’s pattern of noncompliance with the terms 

of his supervised release and chose the 18-month sentence to afford adequate 

deterrence and sanction Savarino for his breach of the court’s trust. These 

are permissible considerations in a revocation hearing. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B); United States v. Cano, 981 F.3d 

422, 426 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining “[a] sentence imposed on revocation of 

supervised release punishes a breach of trust for violating the conditions of 

supervision”(citation omitted)); U.S.S.G. Ch.7, Pt.A, intro. comment 3(b)

(U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2014) (explaining when imposing revocation 

sentence, court primarily sanctions defendant’s breach of trust). 

Accordingly, while the court may have considered retribution as an 

additional justification for the sentence, other permissible statutory factors 

were dominant. See Sanchez, 900 F.3d at 684 (affirming district court’s 

upward variance based on “defendant’s lack of respect for the law” (citation 

omitted)). Moreover, it is not clear under existing law that the court’s 

specific comments gave dominant weight to an impermissible factor, and any 

error is, therefore, not reversible under the plainly-unreasonable standard. 

See id. at 682 (explaining sentence vacated only if identified error “is not just 

unreasonable but plainly unreasonable” (emphasis in original)); United States 

v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2013) (“If we find the sentence 

unreasonable, we may reverse the district court only if we further determine 

the error was obvious under existing law”. (citation omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

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