STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

FILED 

In re: P.C. November 22, 2017 

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK No. 17-0647 (Cabell County 16-JA-124) SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Mother D.R., by counsel Abraham J. Saad, appeals the Circuit Court of Cabell 

County’s June 23, 2017, order terminating her parental and custodial rights to P.C.1 The West 

Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel S.L. Evans, filed a 

response in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem (“guardian”), Allison K. 

Huson, filed a response on behalf of the child in support of the circuit court’s order. On appeal, 

petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in finding that there was no reasonable likelihood she 

could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

In January of 2015, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition against petitioner and 

the fathers of her children that alleged the home was in an unacceptable condition and that 

petitioner engaged in domestic violence with one of the fathers in the children’s presence. 2 

According to the initial petition, the children confirmed the domestic violence issues. Further, the 

DHHR alleged that, even after having received services to address the issues in the home, 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W.Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W.Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W.Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 

W.Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

2

The child that is the subject of this appeal, P.C., was not born at this time. In regard to 

the children that were the subject of the DHHR’s initial petition, the proceedings moved forward 

until such time as the circuit court proceeded to disposition as to the older children in July of 

2016. According to the parties, petitioner’s parental rights to the older children were terminated 

at that time upon findings that she failed to (1) maintain stable and sufficient housing; (2) 

maintain consistent employment; (3) obtain psychiatric treatment and mental health counseling 

in a timely manner; (4) consistently attend domestic violence counseling; (5) make requisite 

changes in her parenting; and (6) distance herself from one of the children’s fathers. Petitioner 

did not appeal the dispositional order that terminated her parental rights to the older children. As 

such, they are not the subject of this appeal. 

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another domestic violence incident occurred in the presence of a service provider and the 

guardian. The petition made additional allegations of abuse and neglect in the home. 

In April of 2016, as the proceedings on the initial petition continued, petitioner gave birth 

to P.C., the child that is the subject of this appeal. That same month, the DHHR filed an amended 

petition that included child P.C. and alleged that petitioner had not remedied the conditions of 

abuse and neglect that necessitated the filing of the initial petition. In September of 2016, the 

circuit court adjudicated petitioner due to her neglect of P.C. The circuit court further granted 

petitioner an improvement period. 

During a review hearing in March of 2017, the circuit court heard evidence that petitioner 

had continued contact with one of the fathers against prior orders and that she attempted to file a 

petition for a domestic violence protective order against him. The circuit court continued the 

improvement period. Thereafter, during a multidisciplinary team (“MDT”) meeting, it was 

determined that the individual with whom petitioner was currently in a relationship had a history 

of domestic violence. 

In June of 2017, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing, during which it found that 

petitioner’s gravitation toward violent and inappropriate partners continued, despite extensive 

services to remedy this issue, including individualized parenting education, a domestic violence 

victim’s program, and individualized counseling. As such, the circuit court found there was no 

reasonable likelihood petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect 

and terminated her parental and custodial rights.3 It is from the dispositional order that petitioner 

appeals. 

The Court has previously established the following standard of review: 

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 

such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a 

reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply 

because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if 

the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record 

viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 

470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

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The parents’ parental rights to the child were terminated below. According to the 

guardian, the child is placed with her maternal great-aunt with a permanency plan of adoption by 

that relative. 

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Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W.Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Upon our review, the Court finds 

no error in the proceedings below. 

On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in finding that there was no 

reasonable likelihood she could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the 

near future because she complied with the services offered, including parenting and adult life 

skills education and counseling for domestic violence. Petitioner further argues that she was able 

to obtain employment and stable housing. Finally, she argues that there were no allegations of 

substance abuse made against her. We find, however, that the circuit court did not err in its 

findings. 

In determining that there was no reasonable likelihood petitioner could substantially 

correct the conditions of abuse and neglect, the circuit court heard extensive evidence about her 

continued association with inappropriate individuals. According to the record, petitioner 

continued her relationship with the father of P.C., despite the parties’ repeated confrontations 

about the inappropriateness of this relationship due to past instances of domestic violence. The 

record further shows that petitioner lied about contact with P.C.’s father in an attempt to conceal 

the same. The evidence also established that petitioner renewed her relationship with one of the 

other fathers during the proceedings, despite the fact that they also had a history of domestic 

violence incidents and that the father had a substance abuse problem and criminal history. Even 

more concerning, petitioner began a relationship with another individual, J.A., who also had a 

history of domestic violence. Following an MDT meeting wherein she was informed that this 

relationship was inappropriate, petitioner not only continued the relationship but became 

engaged to J.A. Finally, despite knowing that a service provider was monitoring her social media 

activity, petitioner had contact with inappropriate individuals online. 

While it is true that petitioner was compliant with certain aspects of her improvement 

period, it is clear that she failed to remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect sufficient to have 

the child returned to her care. “In making the final disposition in a child abuse and neglect 

proceeding, the level of a parent’s compliance with the terms and conditions of an improvement 

period is just one factor to be considered. The controlling standard that governs any dispositional 

decision remains the best interests of the child.” Syl. Pt. 4, In re B.H., 233 W.Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 

743 (2014). Here, the circuit court had sufficient evidence upon which to find that there was no 

reasonable likelihood petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in 

the near future because of her inability to implement the skills taught through the services 

offered, as evidenced by her continued association with inappropriate individuals. 

According to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(3), a situation in which there is no 

reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected includes 

one in which 

[t]he abusing parent . . . [has] not responded to or followed through with a 

reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts of social, medical, 

mental health or other rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce or prevent the 

abuse or neglect of the child, as evidenced by the continuation or insubstantial 

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diminution of conditions which threatened the health, welfare or life of the 

child[.] 

As set forth above, substantial evidence established that petitioner failed to respond to the 

reasonable family case plan, despite her participation in services. Based upon her failure to 

recognize that her continued association with inappropriate individuals threatened the child’s 

safety and wellbeing, we find no error in the circuit court’s finding in this regard. Moreover, the 

circuit court made findings addressing how termination of petitioner’s parental rights served the 

child’s best interests, including the fact that the child required stability. As such, it is clear that 

the circuit court had sufficient evidence upon which to find that there was no reasonable 

likelihood petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near 

future and that termination of her parental rights was necessary for the children’s welfare. 

Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(b)(6), circuit courts are directed to terminate parental 

and custodial rights upon such findings. 

We have also held that 

“[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the 

statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, W. Va.Code [§] 

49-6-5 [now West Virginia Code § 49-4-604]. . . may be employed without the 

use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no 

reasonable likelihood under W. Va.Code [§] 49-6-5(b) [now West Virginia Code 

§ 49-4-604(c)] . . . that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially 

corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980). 

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W.Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). Because the record is clear that 

the circuit court had ample evidence upon which to base its findings, we find no error in the 

termination of petitioners’ parental and custodial rights to the child. 

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

June 23, 2017, order is hereby affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: November 22, 2017 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

DISSENTING: 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

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