IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

ROGER BELLERIVE and LINDSAY 

BELLERIVE, husband and wife,

No. 49565-1-II

Respondents/Cross Appellants,

v.

EOR INC., a Washington Corporation, d/b/a 

RUSDAL CONSTRUCTION; and CBIC, Bond 

No. SC8150, a Washington Corporation,

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellants/Cross Respondents.

Lee, A.C.J. — EOR, Inc. appeals the trial court’s award of reasonable attorney fees to and 

judgment in favor of Roger and Lindsay Bellerive. The Bellerives cross-appeal the amount of 

attorney fees awarded to them by the trial court and the trial court’s conclusion that they failed to 

prove breach of contract.

We hold that the trial court erred in determining the Bellerives were entitled to reasonable 

attorney fees for their unjust enrichment claim. We further hold that the trial court did not err in 

determining that the Bellerives failed to prove breach of contract. Accordingly, we reverse the 

trial court’s award of reasonable attorney fees to the Bellerives for unjust enrichment, affirm the 

trial court’s conclusion that the Bellerives failed to prove breach of contract, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

April 10, 2018
No. 49565-1-II

2

FACTS

A. THE AGREEMENT AND DISPUTE

In November 2013, the Bellerives entered into a “Residential Real Estate Purchase and 

Sale Agreement” (the Purchase Agreement) with EOR for the purchase of property and the 

construction of a single family house on that property (the Home) by EOR. Clerk’s Papers (CP)

at 155. The Purchase Agreement stated that any changes must be mutually agreed upon and in 

writing. And if the Bellerives disapproved of any part of the plans and specifications, or EOR 

intended to modify the plans and specifications and increase the purchase price, the change had to 

be mutually agreed upon in writing. The Purchase Agreement also provided for reasonable 

attorney fees and expenses to the prevailing party if the Bellerives or EOR “institute[d] suit against 

the other concerning [the Purchase] Agreement.” CP at 155.

After EOR began construction, the Bellerives purchased appliances and invested time and 

labor into the Home. Later, a dispute arose over the purchase price of the Home. The Bellerives 

and EOR settled the dispute by written agreement (the Settlement Agreement). The Settlement 

Agreement established the purchase price and the closing date for the Home. The Settlement 

Agreement stated that

[i]n addition to any and all other remedies available under this Settlement 

Agreement or by law, if any arbitration proceeding or litigation is commenced to 

enforce this Settlement Agreement because of an alleged dispute, breach, default 

or misrepresentation in connection with any of the provisions of this Settlement 

Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s 

fees and other costs incurred in that action or proceeding (including those incurred 

on appeal), in addition to any other relief to which it or they may be entitled.

CP at 153. Shortly thereafter, the Bellerives experienced financing issues, and the purchase and 

sale of the Home did not close by the agreed upon date. EOR sold the Home to a different buyer. 
No. 49565-1-II

3

B. THE COMPLAINT AND PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE

On June 26, 2015, the Bellerives filed a complaint against EOR, alleging breach of the 

Purchase Agreement. The Bellerives asserted claims for breach of contract/quantum meruit for 

specific performance, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and violation of the Consumer 

Protection Act (CPA) for damages. The Bellerives also filed a lis pendens on the Home. EOR 

responded and asserted a counterclaim for slander of title.

EOR subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the Bellerives’ 

claims. The trial court granted EOR’s motion in part, dismissing the Bellerives’ promissory 

estoppel and CPA claims with prejudice. The trial court also ordered the release of the lis pendens 

on the Home. 

The Bellerives then filed an amended complaint, which included all of its previous claims1

in addition to claims for conversion of chattel, conversion of money, constructive trust, and for 

return of appliances purchased under prejudgment writ/replevin. 

C. TRIAL AND AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES

The case proceeded to a bench trial. After trial, the court concluded that EOR was unjustly 

enriched by the appliances the Bellerives purchased and the labor the Bellerives provided. The 

trial court found that the appliances were worth $10,000 and their labor was worth $3,160. The 

trial court also concluded that the Bellerives failed to prove their claims for specific performance, 

 

1

In its answer to the Bellerives’ amended complaint, EOR challenged the inclusion of the CPA 

claims dismissed by the trial court, but did not challenge the inclusion of the previously dismissed 

promissory estoppel claim on that basis. 
No. 49565-1-II

4

breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violation of the CPA. And the trial court concluded 

that EOR’s counterclaim for slander of title failed. 

The Bellerives subsequently moved for an award of attorney fees and costs for successfully 

prosecuting their claims and defending against EOR’s counterclaim. EOR responded and argued 

that there was no basis for an award of attorney fees, the Bellerives were not the substantially 

prevailing party, the Bellerives could only claim attorney fees related to the successful claim, and 

the attorney fees claimed were excessive. 

The trial court entered findings and conclusions, awarding reasonable attorney fees and 

costs to the Bellerives. The trial court found:

11. The Purchase Agreement contained provisions governing the procedure for 

the parties to memorialize by written change order their agreement for an upgrade 

or other change in construction of the Home resulting in an increase in price.

. . . .

22. [EOR] has been unjustly enriched by virtue of its continued possession of 

the appliances purchased by the Plaintiffs and sale of the same to a third party; and, 

the value of the labor provided for the benefit of the construction of improvements 

on the home, which has been sold to a third party.

. . . .

24. Fair, just and equitable compensation for the appliances and labor provided 

by the Plaintiff is $10,000.00, which appliances they had an ownership interest in; 

and, $3,160.00 for labor provided for the construction of improvements for a total 

award of $13,160.00.

25. The Bellerives incurred and were awarded reasonable attorney’s fees of

$75,000.00 in this matter. However, after applying a proportional offset in the 

amount of $25,000.00 attributable to attorney’s fees incurred in [sic] by [EOR] in 

defense of claims of which the Bellerives did not prevail, the Bellerives were 

awarded a net attorney’s fee award in the amount of $50,000.00 as the prevailing 

party in the matter.
No. 49565-1-II

5

CP at 214, 216. The trial court concluded:

2. The Bellerives failed to sustain their burden of proof on their claim for 

specific performance under the parties’ Purchase Agreement, and the same shall be 

dismissed with prejudice.

3. The Bellerives sustained, by a preponderance of the evidence, their burden 

of proof on their claims for damages unjust enrichment and compensation in equity. 

However, the Bellerives failed to sustain their burden of proof on their claims for 

damages under [sic] for breach of contract, promissory estoppel and violation of 

the Consumer Protection Act; and the same shall be dismissed with prejudice.

4. The Bellerives have demonstrated damages, in equity, in the total gross sum 

of $13,160.00, and the Bellerives shall be allowed Judgment in the principal amount 

of $13,160.00 and interest from June 23, 2016, at the statutory rate.

5. [EOR] failed to sustain their burden of proof on their counterclaim for 

slander of title, and the same shall be dismissed with prejudice.

6. There were three (3) major issues central in this matter: (i) the Bellerives’

claim for specific performance, (ii) the Bellerives’ claim for damages, and (iii) 

[EOR’s] claim for slander of title (the “Major Issues”). As the party prevailing on 

two (2) of the three (3) Major Issues and the party successfully defending [EOR’s]

counterclaim to a finding of non-liabilty and receiving an affirmative money 

judgment, the Bellerives were the prevailing party in the matter.

. . . .

8. The Settlement Agreement and Purchase Agreement were central to the 

Major Issues and the corresponding claims of the Bellerives and [EOR]. Thus, an 

award of attorney fees and costs for claims other than breach of contract is 

appropriate in this matter because the contracts are central to the existence of the 

claims, i.e., the dispute actually arose from the agreements. Deep Water Brewing, 

LLC v. Fairway Resources, Ltd., 152 Wn. App. 229, 215 P.3d 990 (2009).

9. For purposes of a contractual attorney’s fee and costs provisions, the Major

Issues constitute an actions [sic] on a contract because they arose out of the parties’

Settlement Agreement and Purchase Agreement, the contracts central to the parties’

dispute. Seattle First Nat. Bank v. Washington Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 116 Wn.2d 398, 

413, 804 P.2d 1263, 1270 (1991); Hill v. Cox, 110 Wn. App. 394, 411, 41 P.3d 495, 

505 (2002).
No. 49565-1-II

6

10. RCW 4.84.330 makes an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs 

mandatory as it provides in relevant part: “. . . [T]he prevailing party . . . shall be 

entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to costs and necessary 

disbursements.” Further, the statutory definition for “. . . ‘prevailing party’ means 

the party in whose favor final judgment is rendered.” RCW 4.84.330.

. . . .

12. In the court’s exercise of discretion, based on the above findings of fact and 

the pleadings and arguments presented on the motion for an award of attorney’s 

fees, the Court concludes that the Bellerives shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s 

fees in the amount of $75,000.00 in this matter.

13. However, after applying a proportional offset in the amount of $25,000.00 

attributable to attorney’s fees incurred in [sic] by [EOR] in defense of claims of 

which the Bellerives did not prevail, the Court concludes that the Bellerives are 

awarded a net attorney’s fee award in the amount of $50,000.00 as the prevailing 

party in the matter which shall be included on the judgment in favor of the 

Bellerives entered in this case.

CP at 216-19. Accordingly, the trial court awarded to the Bellerives unjust enrichment damages 

in the amount of $13,160, attorney fees in the amount of $50,000 after a $25,000 offset, and 

statutory costs in the amount of $306. 

EOR appeals and the Bellerives cross-appeal. 

ANALYSIS

A. AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO THE BELLERIVES

EOR argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the Bellerives were the

prevailing party and entitled to reasonable attorney fees. EOR also argues that the trial court erred 

in the amount of its attorney fees award. We disagree that the trial court erred in concluding that 

the Bellerives were the substantially prevailing party, but we agree that the Bellerives were not 

entitled to reasonable attorney fees for their unjust enrichment claim.
No. 49565-1-II

7

1. Substantially Prevailing Party

EOR argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the Bellerives were the 

prevailing party.2 We disagree.

We review whether a party is a “prevailing party” under an error of law standard. Dave 

Johnson Ins., Inc. v. Wright, 167 Wn. App. 758, 782, 275 P.3d 339, review denied, 175 Wn.2d 

1008 (2012). The prevailing party is the one that receives an affirmative judgment in its favor. Id. 

at 782-83. If neither party wholly prevails, determining the substantially prevailing party depends 

on the extent of the relief accorded. Id. at 783.

Here, the Bellerives were the substantially prevailing party. The Bellerives filed suit 

against EOR, including a breach of contract claim based on the Purchase Agreement and 

Settlement Agreement; several equitable claims for unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, 

constructive trust, and replevin; a CPA claim; and several tort claims for conversion of chattel and 

money. EOR then filed a counterclaim for slander of title. The trial court denied all claims except 

for the Bellerives’ unjust enrichment claim. Because the Bellerives were the only party that 

prevailed on an issue and received an affirmative judgment, they were the substantially prevailing 

party.

EOR argues that because the Bellerives only received a fraction of the award they sought 

at trial and prevailed on “only one of their 14 direct cost claims,” they cannot be the substantially 

 

2 EOR argues that the trial court “created a flawed framework” for its attorney fees analysis by 

grouping the Bellerives’ claims into “three major issues.” Br. of Appellant at 9. But EOR fails to 

provide any legal authority or support for its argument regarding the trial court’s “flawed 

framework” for its analysis of the substantially prevailing party. Therefore, we decline to address 

this claim. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 

P.2d 549 (1992).
No. 49565-1-II

8

prevailing party. Br. of Appellant at 16. However, EOR fails to provide any persuasive legal 

authority or support for this argument.

EOR cites to Marassi v. Lau, 71 Wn. App. 912, 859 P.2d 605 (1993), abrogated by, 165 

Wn.2d 481 (2009), to argue that a proportionality approach should be applied when multiple and 

distinct claims are at issue. However, Marassi’s proportionality approach is only applicable when 

claims are multiple and distinct contract claims. 71 Wn. App. at 917. 

EOR also cites to Rowe v. Floyd, 29 Wn. App. 532, 629 P.2d 925 (1981), to argue that 

when both parties are afforded some relief, neither party is entitled to attorney fees. But in Rowe, 

both parties equally prevailed: the plaintiff succeeded on one claim and the defendant succeeded 

on defending another. 29 Wn. App. at 535-36. Here, the Bellerives successfully pursued their 

claim for damages and defended against a counterclaim. Thus, both parties did not equally prevail. 

Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err when it determined the Bellerives were the 

substantially prevailing party.

2. Entitlement to Reasonable Attorney Fees

EOR also argues that the trial court erred when it determined that an award of reasonable 

attorney fees to the Bellerives was appropriate because the claims arose out of the agreements and 

the agreements were central to the claims. We agree.

Whether a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees is a question of law and is reviewed 

de novo. Durland v. San Juan County, 182 Wn.2d 55, 76, 340 P.3d 191 (2014). “The general rule 

in Washington is that attorney fees will not be awarded for costs of litigation unless authorized by 

contract, statute, or recognized ground of equity.” Id. 
No. 49565-1-II

9

a. Basis in contract

“A prevailing party may recover attorney fees pursuant to a contractual fee-shifting 

provision if the action involves claims on the contract.” Boyd v. Sunflower Properties, LLC, 197 

Wn. App. 137, 150, 389 P.3d 626 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n action is on a 

contract for purposes of a contractual attorney fees provision if the action arose out of the contract 

and if the contract is central to the dispute.” Edmonds v. John L. Scott Real Estate, Inc., 87 Wn. 

App. 834, 855, 942 P.2d 1072 (1997), review denied, 134 Wn.2d 1027 (1998) (emphasis added) 

(quoting Tradewell Group, Inc. v. Mavis, 71 Wn. App. 120, 130, 857 P.2d 1053 (1993)). When 

an action in tort is based on a contract containing an attorney fee provision, the prevailing party is 

also entitled to attorney fees. Douglas v. Visser, 173 Wn. App. 823, 835, 295 P.3d 800 (2013).

Here, the Purchase Agreement stated that if the Bellerives or EOR “institute[d] suit against 

the other concerning this Agreement the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees 

and expenses.” CP at 155. The Settlement Agreement also stated that if “litigation is commenced 

to enforce this Settlement Agreement because of an alleged dispute, breach, default or 

misrepresentation in connection with any of the provisions of this Settlement Agreement, the 

prevailing party” would be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. CP at 153. However, 

the Bellerives prevailed on a claim of unjust enrichment, which existed outside of and did not 

involve the agreements. The Bellerives’ equity claim was based on the fact that the Bellerives had 

purchased appliances and invested labor into the Home. This claim did not arise out of the 

agreements nor were the agreements central to this claim; no consideration of the agreements were 

necessary. Thus, the unjust enrichment claim was not based on a contract.
No. 49565-1-II

10

The Bellerives argue that their entire relationship with EOR arose from the agreements, 

and thus, the agreements gave rise to their action for unjust enrichment, and that the basis for their 

damages is in the agreements. But these claims are unpersuasive. Although the Bellerives’ 

relationship with EOR stems from the agreements, it does not mean the claim on which they 

succeeded actually arose from the agreements and gave rise to the claim for unjust enrichment. 

Courts have rejected such “but for” arguments. See Burns v. McClinton, 135 Wn. App. 285, 310-

11, 143 P.3d 630 (2006), review denied, 161 Wn.2d 1005 (2007).

3

 Here, the Bellerives’ unjust 

enrichment claim arose outside of the agreements in equity, and the agreements were not central 

to this equitable dispute. 

The Bellerives also argue that they prevailed on a cause of action that arose from the 

contract, and thus, they were entitled to reasonable attorney fees. In doing so, they cite Hill v. Cox, 

110 Wn. App. 394, 411, 41 P.3d 495, review denied, 147 Wn.2d 1024 (2002), for the proposition 

that “if a tort action is based on a contract central to the dispute including an attorney fee provision, 

the prevailing party may receive attorney fees.” But the Bellerives’ unjust enrichment claim was 

not a tort action based on a contract. The unjust enrichment claim was based in equity and was 

independent of the contract.

 

3

In Burns, Division One of this court held:

The D & D partnership agreement was the background out of which the disputes 

arose, but it was not central to them. Because the claims in question were not 

brought to enforce the partnership agreement and the agreement was not central to 

the dispute, the trial court correctly concluded that the agreement does not provide 

a basis for awarding prevailing party attorney fees to Burns.

135 Wn. App. at 311.
No. 49565-1-II

11

Furthermore, EOR’s tort claim for slander of title also was not on the contract. That 

claim arose from the Bellerives filing a lis pendens encumbering the Home. Thus, the slander of 

title claim did not arise from the agreements nor were the agreements central to that claim.

The claim that the Bellerives prevailed on was unjust enrichment, which was based on the 

amounts they expended in purchasing appliances and the value of the labor they invested into the 

Home. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred when it concluded that the agreements were 

central to the existence of the claims, arose out of the agreements, and awarded reasonable attorney 

fees to the Bellerives.

b. Basis in equity

Recognized equitable grounds for which attorney fees may be awarded include “bad faith 

conduct of the losing party, preservation of a common fund, protection of constitutional principles, 

and private attorney general actions.” Dave Johnson, 167 Wn. App. at 784. None of these grounds 

are present in this case.

Here, the trial court concluded that the Bellerives sustained their burden of proof on “their 

claims for damages unjust enrichment and compensation in equity” and awarded the Bellerives 

$13,160 in equity damages. CP at 217. Unjust enrichment is not a recognized equitable ground 

upon which attorney fees would be awarded. David Johnson, 167 Wn. App. at 784. As a result, 

while the Bellerives may have been the substantially prevailing party, they were not entitled to 

reasonable attorney fees for their unjust enrichment claim.

The Bellerives argue that when an action in tort is based on a contract containing an 

attorney fees provision, the prevailing party is also entitled to reasonable attorney fees. However, 

the Bellerives did not prevail on a tort claim, which would have been their claims for conversion. 
No. 49565-1-II

12

Instead, the Bellerives prevailed on a claim for unjust enrichment, which lies in equity. Bill v.

Gattavara, 34 Wn.2d 645, 650, 209 P.2d 457 (1949). Thus, the Bellerives were not entitled to 

reasonable attorney fees.

Because the Bellerives prevailed on an equitable ground that is not recognized in equity,

and no basis in contract or statute exists, they were not entitled to reasonable attorney fees. 

Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred when it awarded reasonable attorney fees to the 

Bellerives. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s award of reasonable attorney fees to the Bellerives 

and remand for the trial court to award them statutory attorney fees and costs.4

B. BREACH OF CONTRACT – CROSS APPEAL

The Bellerives argue that the trial court erred when it concluded that they failed to sustain 

their burden of proof on their claim for damages under breach of contract because EOR did not 

issue written change orders for the appliances purchased and the labor provided by the Bellerives. 

We disagree.

1. Legal Principles

To prevail on a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff must show the elements of duty, 

breach, causation, and damages. Baldwin v. Silver, 165 Wn. App. 463, 473, 269 P.3d 284 (2011). 

If the duty allegedly breached is not in the contract, the claim of breach of contract cannot be 

sustained. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Dally, 148 Wn. App. 739, 745-46, 201 P.3d 1040 (2009). 

 

4 Because we hold that the trial court erred in awarding reasonable attorney fees to the Bellerives

without a basis in contract, statute, or recognized ground in equity, we do not reach the issue of 

whether the trial court erred in the amount of attorney fees awarded or in applying a proportional 

offset in calculating attorney fees.
No. 49565-1-II

13

When the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law after a bench trial, we

review whether the court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, if so, whether the 

findings support the conclusions. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Justus, 199 Wn. App. 435, 448, 

398 P.3d 1258, review denied, 189 Wn.2d 1026 (2017). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities 

on appeal. Id. We also review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo to determine whether 

they are legally correct. Id.

2. No Breach of Contract

The Bellerives argue that the trial court found the Purchase Agreement required EOR to 

execute written change orders for changes to the Home during construction and that EOR failed to 

execute written change orders for the Bellerives’ expenditures for appliances and the value of their 

time and labor invested into the Home.

5

 However, the Bellerives misstate the record. The trial

court only found that the “Purchase Agreement contained provisions governing the procedure for 

the parties to memorialize by written change order their agreement for an upgrade or other change 

in construction of the Home resulting in an increase in price.” CP at 214. The court did not make 

any finding about EOR failing to issue change orders. While the Purchase Agreement required 

 

5 The Bellerives only challenge the trial court’s finding that 

The Bellerives incurred and were awarded reasonable attorney’s fees of $75,000.00

in this matter. However, after applying a proportional offset in the amount of 

$25,000.00 attributable to attorney’s fees incurred in [sic] by [EOR] in defense of 

claims of which the Bellerives did not prevail, the Bellerives were awarded a net 

attorney’s fee award in the amount of $50,000.00 as the prevailing party in the

matter.

CP at 216. But as discussed above, the Bellerives are not entitled to reasonable attorney fees. See

Section A. The trial court’s remaining findings of fact are unchallenged, and thus, they are verities 

on appeal. State Farm, 199 Wn. App. at 448. 
No. 49565-1-II

14

written agreement on changes, the agreement did not specifically impose a duty on EOR to create 

change orders. 

As to the trial court’s unchallenged findings relating to the breach of contract claim, the 

trial court found that the Bellerives and EOR executed two written change orders and that the 

parties “intended the change order work to be agreed upon and executed outside of the Purchase 

Agreement.” CP at 214. The court further found that EOR did not prevent the Bellerives from 

procuring the financing they needed nor did EOR refuse to extend the closing date for the sale and 

purchase of the Home in bad faith. 

The Bellerives further argue that the trial court ascribed value to EOR’s breach in the 

amount of $13,160. But the trial court did not find that the $13,160 was an amount of damages 

resulting from a breach of contract by EOR. Instead, the trial court awarded $13,160 in equity for 

the appliances the Bellerives purchased and for the labor they expended on the Home. The trial 

court did not award damages for breach of contract.

The Bellerives also argue that the trial court “effectively granted the contractual remedy of 

restitution” and derived the damages considering the Purchase Agreement. Br. of Resp’t at 20. 

The Bellerives claim that “[r]estitution is an alternative remedy to damages for breach of 

contract.”6 Br. of Resp’t at 19. This argument is unpersuasive because restitution is not only a 

contractual remedy. A court may prescribe a certain remedy, including restitution, in many types 

of actions. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 486, 490, 191 P.3d 1258 (2008) (noting 

that “‘unjust enrichment’ is founded on notions of justice and equity whereas ‘quantum meruit’ is 

 

6 Citing Bailie Commc’ns, Ltd. v. Trend Bus. Sys., 53 Wn. App. 77, 81, 765 P.2d 339 (1988), 

review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1025 (1989).
No. 49565-1-II

15

founded in the law of contracts,” and holding that defendants were entitled to restitution based on 

their counterclaim for unjust enrichment). 

Here, the trial court awarded damages in equity for unjust enrichment. The trial court did 

not award the damages based on a breach of the Purchase Agreement and calculated the amount 

of damages based on the actual value of the appliances and labor. The trial courts unchallenged 

findings of fact support its conclusion that the Bellerives failed to sustain their burden of proving 

breach of contract. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err.7

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

EOR and the Bellerives both request attorney fees on appeal. RAP 18.1 permits a party to 

recover attorney fees on appeal where authorized by applicable law. Contractual authority 

providing for an award of attorney fees at trial also supports such an award on appeal under RAP 

18.1. W. Coast Stationary Engineers Welfare Fund v. City of Kennewick, 39 Wn. App. 466, 477, 

694 P.2d 1101 (1985). 

Here, the agreements between EOR and the Bellerives provide for reasonable attorney fees 

to the prevailing party, including on appeal. And because EOR has successfully defended against 

 

7 The Bellerives also argue that EOR breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. The 

Bellerives assert that EOR was required to issue written change orders in order to retain without 

repayment, any investments by the Bellerives in the Home. However, as the Bellerives note, the 

“duty of good faith and fair dealing arises when the contract gives one party discretionary authority 

to determine a contract term.” Rekhter v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 180 Wn.2d 102, 113, 323 

P.3d 1036 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). And here, the provisions regarding 

memorializing mutually agreed upon changes did not give EOR discretion to determine whether 

payment for changes was non-refundable. In fact, the Bellerives fail to provide any citation to the 

record that evidences such a requirement.
No. 49565-1-II

16

the Bellerives’ breach of contract cross-appeal, EOR is entitled to reasonable attorney fees. 

Therefore, we award attorney fees to EOR on appeal.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s award of reasonable attorney fees to the Bellerives for unjust 

enrichment, affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the Bellerives failed to prove breach of contract, 

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

Lee, A.C.J.

We concur:

Worswick, J.

Sutton, J.