### FILED July 29, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF T ENNESSEE AT KNOXVI LLE

TERRY W. H OLTS CLAW , * C.C.A. # 03C01-9904-CR-001 43 Appellant, * WASHINGTON COUNTY VS. * Hon. Lynn W. Brown, Judge STATE OF TENNESSEE, * (Habeas corpus) Appellee. *

For Appellant : For Appellee : Terry W. Holtzclaw, p ro se Paul G. Summ ers NECC Annex Attorney General & Reporter P.O. Box 5000 Mountain City , TN 37683 Michael J. Fahey, II Assistant Attorne

y General Criminal Justice Division 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243

OPINION FILED: ____________________

AFFIRMED--RULE 20

GARY R. WADE, PRESID ING JUDGE2 OPINION The petitioner has appealed the trial court's summa ry dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Cou rt of Criminal Appeals. R ule 20 allows for summary affirmance when "an opini on would have no precedenti al value" and "no error of law requir

ing a reversal .. is apparent on the record." Id. The state notes that the judgment in this case is not a determination of guilt, no m aterial facts are in dispute, there is no error of law requiring reversal, and the evi dence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial judge.
In May of 1996, the petitioner pleaded guilty to agg ravated sexual battery and the trial co urt imposed a nine-year s entence. On December 18, 1998, the peti tioner f iled a pet ition fo r writ of ha beas corp us. He alle ged inef fective assistance of counsel in that trial counsel misinformed him that he would serve only thirty percent of his sentence when, in actuality, he maintains he will serve at least eighty-five percent

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i) (no release eligibil ity for aggravated sexual battery committed on or after July 1, 1995). He contends that his plea was coerced because he was allowed only

three minutes to consider the plea offer and that he was threatened w ith a twenty-five year sentence if he chose not t o accept the offer. The petitioner asserts tha t the trial court erroneously accepted his guilty plea whi ch was not supported by sufficient evidence.
The trial court summarily denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus, as follows: The petitioner alleges that the State and court contriv ed to "punish" defendant under their ow n agenda. Petitioner further alleges that he w as denied effective assistance o f counsel. The grounds alleged can be raised in the trial co urt, on direct appeal, or by pos t-conviction wr

it. None of the3 allegations made by the pet itioner are grounds for habeas c

orpus r elief.

In this state, a writ

of habeas corpus may be grante d only when a petitioner has established l ack of jurisdiction for the or der of confinement or that he is otherwise entitl ed to immediate release because of the ex piration of his sentence. See Ussery v. Avery , 432 S.W.2d 656 (Tenn. 1968); State ex rel. Wade v. Norvell , 443 S.W.2d 839 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1969). A "person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, ... may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment...." Tenn. Code Ann.§ 29-21-101. The writ of habeas corpus, how ever, is availabl e only when it appears on the face of the judgment or the record t hat the trial court wa s without jurisdic

tion to convict or sentence the defendant or that the sentence of imprisonment has otherwis e expired. Archer v. State , 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993); Potts v. State , 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992). Unlike the pos t-conviction petition , the purpose of a habeas corpus petition is to conte st void and not merely voidable judgments. See State ex rel. Newsom v. Hen derson , 424 S.W.2d 186, 18 9 (Tenn. 1968). "If the court rendering a judgment has j urisdiction of the person, the subject-matter, and has the authority to make the chall enged judgment, the judgment i s voidable, not void . ..." Passarella v. State , 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

In this case, the petitioner 's sentence has not expir ed and the trial court did not lack juri sdiction. The petitioner pl eaded guilty in 1996. If he began serving the sentence immediately after he was sentenced, his nine-year sentence would not expire unti l the year 2004. Moreov er, the other claims asser ted by the petitioner, including i neffective assistance of counsel and the involuntary natur

e of his guilty plea, if true, would render his sentence voidable rather than void. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial cour t's determination that the4 petitioner's sentences hav e not expired and that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the trial cour t was without jur

isdiction.
We decline to rule on any issue rega rding parole eligi bility. A challenge to the propriety of a release eligibility date or questions about parole or sentence credits have no bear ing upon the validity

of the convictions. Because the Department of Correction is an agency of the state gov ernment, questions such as these should be addressed throug h the Administrative Pr ocedures Act. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-101 to -324. Thereafter, any judicial revi ew must be initiated in t he chancery court. Brigham v. Lack , 755 S.W.2d 469, 47 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-323.

Accordingly, the judgment dismissing the writ of habeas corpus is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20.

________________________________ Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge CONCUR:

_____________________________ Joseph M. Tipto n, Judge

_____________________________ Norma McGee Ogle, Judg e