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 IN T H E U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

BILLY CLIFTON STEWART,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 5:09cv285/RS/CJK

FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC. & 

VOCATIONAL REHAB. DIV., et al., 

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed a fourth amended

civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 38) Upon review of the

amended complaint, the court concludes that plaintiff has not presented an actionable

claim, and that dismissal of the case is warranted.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, BillyClifton Stewart (“Stewart”), initiated thislawsuit on August 17,

2009 (doc. 1), naming as defendants the Florida Department of Education (“DOE”),

its Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (“DVR”), and Bill Palmer (“Palmer”), the

Director of DVR. Plaintiff alleged violations of his rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, 18 U.S.C. § 245, and

29 U.S.C. §§ 705(20)(a) and 722(c)(1). On September 2, 2010, plaintiff filed a fourth

amended complaint, Doc. 38, naming as additional defendants Brian Mingo

(“Mingo”), Edward Jordan (“Jordan”), Fred Poteat (“Poteat”), and Melinda Miguel

(“Miguel”). Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $2,500,000. 

In support of his claims, plaintiff alleges that he was a client of DVR in

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September 2007 and had expressed a desire to become a public school teacher.1

Plaintiff appeared on September 19, 2007, in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, for an

interview with DVR counselor Brian Mingo. Mingo thereafter terminated DVR’s

services to plaintiff and closed his case file. (Doc. 38, 14) According to plaintiff,

Mingo closed the case because plaintiffrefused Mingo’s demand that plaintiff change

his employment goal from teaching in a public school to teaching in a prison program

or other adult education program. (Doc. 38, 14) Mingo signed a letter formally

advising plaintiff that his case file had been closed, which letter was mailed to

Stewart in October 2007.

Having been advised of his right to appeal the adverse determination to cease

services and close his case file, plaintiff timely requested an administrative hearing,

which was held on March 13, 2008. On June 3, 2008, an administrative law judge

(“ALJ”) issued a Recommended Order upholding DVR’s determination. DOE

Commissioner Eric Smith (“Smith”) rendered a Final Order on August 12, 2008,

thereby adopting the ALJ’s Recommended Order. Plaintiff declined to exercise his

right to seek judicial review under § 120.68, Florida Statutes.

DISCUSSION

Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court may dismiss the

case if satisfied that the action is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court must read

plaintiff’s pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

Although plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint is a bit rambling and largely conclusory, the court 1

has expended effort to comprehend Stewart’s allegations and present them in a fair and coherent

manner. The facts as presented have been gleaned from the various complaints plaintiff has filed

in this case.

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520-21 (1972). Dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by the same

standard as FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v. Farcass,

112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). In determining whether the complaint states

a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court accepts all factual allegations in

the complaint astrue and evaluates all reasonable inferences derived from those facts

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d

1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994). The complaint may be dismissed if the facts as pleaded

do not state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562-63, 570 (2007) (retiring the negatively-glossed “no set

of facts” language previously used to describe the motion to dismiss standard and

dismissing plaintiffs’ case for failure to state a claim, because plaintiffs had “not

nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible”). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 

Under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain

a “short and plain statement of the claimshowing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

As the Supreme Court reiterated in Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, although RULE 8 does

not require detailed factual allegations, the rule does demand “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” The mere possibility

that the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive dismissal for failure to

state a claim. See id. Rather, the complaint must include “[f]actual allegations . . .

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” that is, “across the

line from conceivable to plausible . . . .” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. 

A complaint is also subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim when the

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allegations—on their face—show that an affirmative defense bars recovery on the

claim. See Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001); see

also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (reiterating that principle and

providing, as an example, that if a complaint’s allegations show that relief is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for

failure to state a claim).

Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity 

Pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, “[t]he Judicial power of the

United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another

State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” See U.S.CONST. amend. XI. 

“[I]n the absence of consent[,] a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or

departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” 

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). “[A] suit

against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official

but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “As such, it is no different from a suit against the State

itself.” Id. 

Notwithstanding the bar to damage suits against the statesin federal court, this

immunity may be overcome in one of two ways: (1) “Congress may abrogate the

state’s immunity by explicit Congressional enactment through its legislative powers

granted to it by the states in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment” or (2) “the state itself

may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity and, thereby, consent to suit in federal

court.” See Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1512

(11th Cir. 1986). Notably, “§ 1983 . . . has been held not to be a Congressional

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abrogation of the states’ immunity from damage suits . . . .” Id. (citing Quern v.

Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674-77 (1974)). 

Given these interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine of

sovereign immunity operatesto bar plaintiff’s claims for money damages against the

Department of Education and its Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, both of which

are agencies or departments of the state of Florida. See Halderman, 465 U.S. at 100

(recalling the Eleventh Amendment’s proscription of suits “in which the State or one

of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant”). The Eleventh

Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court also bars recovery of money

damages in an official capacity action against defendants Palmer, Mingo, Miguel,

Jordan, and Poteat. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (explaining that a suit against a state

official in her official capacity operates in effect as “a suit against the official’s

office,” such that the state enjoys immunity from suit under the Eleventh

Amendment). 

Plaintiff has not argued either that Congress abrogated the state’s immunity by

explicit enactment or that the state waived its sovereign immunity and, thereby,

consented to this suit for damages in federal court. Plaintiff, therefore, has identified

no legal theory that might lift the bar of sovereign immunity, which precludes

recovery of damages from any defendant in an official capacity. Plaintiff is thus

limited to sue for damages on a theory of individual liability, which is significant

because plaintiff relies solely on the assertion that each defendant, with the exception

of Mingo, is culpable merely by virtue of his or her status as a state official. In other

words, plaintiff does not allege that any defendant, save Mingo, took affirmative

action to cause him constitutional harm. Accordingly, but for the Mingo claim,

plaintiff’s individual capacity allegations could be dismissed, without further

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analysis, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Kentucky

v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (“Personal-capacity suits seek to impose

personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state

law.”). The only viable claim that would then remain is one against Mingo in his

personal capacity. In an abundance of caution, however, the court will nevertheless

2

address plaintiff’s claims in toto.

Count I

Plaintiff alleges in count I that Palmer, the Director of DVR, violated his

Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process of law, thereby impugning

his reputation, diminishing his health, and depriving him of the opportunity to

“financially benefit from working.” (Doc. 38, 28) Palmer, plaintiff asserts,

perpetrated the alleged constitutional violation by “forcing the [p]laintiff to request

a hearing in order to contest multiple improper case file closures . . . .” (Doc. 38, 28) 

The rule is clear that a state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. But “[t]he

requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” 

Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Significantly,

“injury to reputation, by itself, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty or

property interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Behrens v. Regier,

422 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02,

712 (1976)); see Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) (“Defamation, by itself,

Although plaintiff does not distinguish between official and individual capacity claims, in 2

accordance with its directive to read pro se allegations in a liberal fashion the court will construe the

complaint as raising a claim against each defendant in both his or her official and personal capacity. 

See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21. 

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is a tort actionable under the laws of most States, but not a constitutional

deprivation.”). 

To the extent plaintiff alleges injury to his reputation, the Supreme Court has

not extended the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause to

such harms. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233. More importantly, plaintiff has failed to

identify facts tending to show that Palmer played any role in the administrative

proceedings that upheld the decision to close plaintiff’s case file: Mingo took the

initial step of closing the file, the ALJ recommended that the decision be upheld, and

DOE Commissioner Smith rendered a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s

recommendation. In other words, Palmer simply did not participate in the process

with which plaintiff now takes issue. Inexplicably, except insofar as plaintiff may

rely upon director Palmer’s official capacity, plaintiff assertsthat Palmer violated his

Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by “forcing” him to engage

the very administrative processes employed in the interest of ensuring procedural due

process of law. Because the facts as pleaded do not state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face, this allegation should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Count II

For his second claim, plaintiff alleges that Palmer violated his right to petition

for redress of grievances under the First Amendment by ignoring his “attempts to

have his grievances addressed . . . .” (Doc. 38, 29) “The right to petition the

government for redress of grievances is grounded in the [F]irst [A]mendment, and

generally includes the right of every citizen to access to the courts.” Gillard v.

Norris, 857 F.2d 1095, 1101 (6th Cir. 1988). “The clause also guarantees every

citizen the right to petition for redress of grievances, through available procedures,

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any department of the government, including state administrative agencies.” Id.

Here, plaintiff declined to exercise his right to appeal the adverse administrative

determination, choosing instead to forego the process of judicial review as provided

for under § 120.68(1), Florida Statutes. Having failed to take an appeal or show that

the state affirmatively prevented him from petitioning, plaintiff cannot now

demonstrate that Palmer deprived him of his First Amendment right to petition for

redress of grievances. See Gillard, 857 F.2d at 1101. This First Amendment

allegation should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, because the facts as

pleaded do not state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570.

Further, plaintiff contends that Palmer failed to recognize “such obvious factual

flaws” in the ALJ’s Recommended Order and thereby violated the provisions of 42

U.S.C. § 1985 and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 38, 29) “Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against otherwise handicapped individuals

in ‘any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .’” Jones v.

Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 681 F.2d 1376, 1377 (11th Cir. 1982). “Section

504's provisions extend only to ‘otherwise qualified individual[s] with a disability.’” 

Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). 

“An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program’s

requirements in spite of his handicap.” Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406

(1979). Here, plaintiff alleges that Palmer violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,

but does not describe any conduct or decision of Palmer’s that could have effectuated

such a violation as defined in the statutory framework. Moreover, the facts do not

permit the inference that Mingo—toward whomthis claimprobably should have been

directed—closed plaintiff’s case file solely by reason of disability. Rather, even

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plaintiff concedes that Mingo did not believe him temperamentally qualified to

pursue a career as a public school teacher. In other words, plaintiff has not alleged

facts sufficient to establish his standing as an “otherwise qualified individual” within

the meaning of § 504. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 406. For these reasons, this allegation

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

Section 1985 prohibits a conspiracy to deprive a person of equal protection of

the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws. See Tilton v. Richardson,

6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993). Essential to a claim under § 1985 is the existence

of a conspiracy. See id. In the instant matter, plaintiff alleges no facts tending to

support his claim that Palmer acted in confederation with another to exclude Mr.

StewartfromDVR’s vocational rehabilitation program. The court need not recognize

the veracity of legal conclusions masquerading as assertions of fact. See Papasan v.

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (“Although . . . we must take all the factual

allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”). Plaintiff offers merely the bare

assertion that “two high level executive type administrators” conspired to terminate

his participation in the rehabilitation program. (Doc. 38, 29) Without more, plaintiff

cannot make out a plausible claim for relief under § 1985, and this allegation should

be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

Count III

Plaintiff alleges in count III that “[b]y not offering . . . inner (sic) agency due

process or the protections of the legislation governing DVR activities this action of

full knowledge of what was going on executive oversight by Bill Palmer was a clear

violation of Section 504 of the Rehab Act, Section 202 of the Disabilities Act, and of

the Civil Rights Act as Amended in 1991 . . . .” (Doc. 38, 30) To the extent this

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procedural due process allegation tracks the substance of count I, the claim does not

require further analysis: the facts as pleaded do not state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face, making dismissal the appropriate result. 

Likewise, plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim under the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213. Pursuant to § 202 of the

ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason

of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination

by any such entity.” To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must

show, inter alia, that he was discriminated against because of his disability. See

Pritchard v. So. Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff apparently

sought services from DVR to address a disability, but has not alleged facts tending

to show that he was excluded from participation in the vocational rehabilitation

program because of that disability. Rather, plaintiff asserts that his case file was

closed for lack of cooperation after he refused counselor Mingo’s recommendation

that plaintiff change his vocational goal from a public school teacher to another

vocation because Mingo was concerned about plaintiff’s mental health status. Such

conclusory allegations will not satisfy the “heightened pleading requirements” for

civil rights cases. See Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003); see

also Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001)

(“[U]nsupported conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law have long been

recognized not to prevent a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.”); Fullman v. Graddick, 739

F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[A] complaint will be dismissed as insufficient

where the allegations it contains are vague and conclusory.”). Bolstered only by

plaintiff’s threadbare conclusions, this allegation should be dismissed for failure to

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state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiff does not specify the provision

of the statute under which he claims a violation. Plaintiff, in effect, fails to put the

defendants on notice of the nature of the injury alleged. Consequently, this claim

cannot survive. See GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th

Cir. 1998) (holding that the complaint must allege the relevant facts “with some

specificity”); Graddick, 739 F.2d at 556 (“In civil rights and conspiracy actions,

courts have recognized thatmore than mere conclusory notice pleading isrequired.”). 

Because the facts as pleaded do not state a plausible claim for relief, plaintiff’s

allegations under the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be dismissed for

failure to state a claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

Count V3

In count V, plaintiff alleges that Palmer failed to protect his privacy rights and

“did collude with DVR attorneys and DVR counselors to condone violations of the

Privacy Act [and] . . . violated Article I, Section 24, of the Florida Constitution and

. . . condoned violations of Chapter 119 Florida Statutes dealing with Public

Records.” (Doc. 38, 31) In support of this claim, plaintiff asserts that Fred Poteat,

an administrator with DVR, took plaintiff’s case files to his personal residence and

divulged plaintiff’s Social Security number to a physician in December 2002. (Doc.

38, 19 & 30) 

The Privacy Act of 1974 (“Privacy Act”), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), “imposed upon

federal agencies an array of record-keeping obligations to prevent unauthorized

disclosures of confidential information.” See Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and

Plaintiff appears to have omitted count IV from the fourth amended complaint. In the interest 3

of consistency, plaintiff’s original numbering is preserved. 

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Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1381 (11th

Cir. 2010). As a corollary, however, the private right of action created by the Privacy

Act only applies to federal agencies. See Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th

Cir. 2003) (holding that non-disclosure obligations under the Privacy Act apply only

to federal agencies). In light of DVR’s undisputed status as a state agency, plaintiff

has not articulated a plausible claim for relief under the Privacy Act.

Similarly, Florida Constitution article I, § 24(a), which establishes the right to

inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official

business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, is not applicable under

the circumstances. Whereas article I, § 24(a) merely creates a right to inspection,

plaintiff here alleges that his privacy was violated by the improper release of public

records. The constitutional provision upon which plaintiff relies is, therefore,

inapposite. Consequently, plaintiff cannot state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face. Likewise, plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim to relief under § 119.071,

Florida Statutes, because that statutory provision simply delineates the general

exemptions from inspection or copying of public records. Having articulated no

plausible basis for relief, the privacy rights claims cannot survive. See Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570.

Count VI

Plaintiff alleges in count VI that Palmer, in conjunction with Eric J. Smith

(former Commissioner of Education), Ed Jordan (Inspector General, Florida

Department of Education), and Melinda Miguel(Chief Inspector General of Florida),

violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (relating to nondiscrimination under federal grants and programs). In support of this claim, plaintiff

contends that the named defendants ignored his “notifications . . . that case files had

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been closed without due process” and in so doing violated his First Amendment right

to petition for redress of grievances. (Doc. 38, 31) To sustain such a constitutional

claim, plaintiff must show that the state “affirmatively prevented” him from

petitioning. See Gillard, 857 F.2d at 1101. As discussed in the analysis of count II,

the facts as pleaded do not indicate that anyone at DVR prevented plaintiff from

pursuing judicial or administrative remedies. On the contrary, plaintiff, by his own

admission, took an administrative appeal but declined to seek judicial review. In light

of these facts and the burden of proof set forth in prevailing case law, plaintiff cannot

articulate a plausible claim for relief. 

Count VII

In count VII, plaintiff alleges that Mingo “violated the ADA, Section 504 of

the Rehab Act[,] and Title 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) and violated the [p]laintiff’s 14th

Amendment right to due process.” (Doc. 38, 33) In support of this claim, plaintiff

asserts that Mingo closed his case file without “prior warning” or “agency due

process.” (Doc. 38, 33) Mingo, according to plaintiff, thus deprived him of valuable

services, his sense ofsecurity, professional employment opportunities, and his health

and well-being. These allegations bear close resemblance to those raised in count I

against Mr. Palmer. “A § 1983 action alleging a procedural due process clause

violation requires proof of three elements: a deprivation of a

constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; state action; and

constitutionally inadequate process.” Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175 (11th Cir.

1994). Save for the unsupported conclusion of law that the process afforded him was

constitutionally deficient, plaintiff does not offer argument as to the adequacy of the

procedures in place. Having failed to even address this essential element of a

procedural due process claim, defendant cannot state a plausible cause of action for

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violation of due process. Consequently, this allegation should be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Count VIII

Plaintiff alleges in count VIII that Jordan and Miguel conspired “to deprive .

. . [him] of his right to equal protection of the law . . . .” (Doc. 38, 33) “In order to

state an equal protection claim, the plaintiff must prove that he was discriminated

against by establishing that other similarly-situated individuals outside of his

protected class were treated more favorably.” Amnesty Int’l USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d

1170, 1180 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Thus, the identification of these individuals comprised

a part of the claim itself.”). In this instance, plaintiff has not identified anyone else

receiving servicesfrom DVR, let alone one who wastreated more favorably. For this

reason, plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the equal

protection clause. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

To the extent the allegations comprising count VII may also be construed as

arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (prohibiting conspiracy to deprive persons of civil

rights or privileges), the claims fare no better. To state a claim under § 1985(3), a

plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that defendants engaged in a conspiracy. See Jimenez

v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff cannot satisfy

even thislow bar, as nothing set forth in Stewart’s fourth amended complaint permits

the inference that Jordan and Miguel colluded in any manner to deprive plaintiff of

the equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immunities under the laws. 

Supported only by plaintiff’s vague and conclusory accusations, the conspiracy claim

cannot withstand scrutiny under § 1915(e)(2)(B) and should be dismissed for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Graddick, 739 F.2d at 557 (“A

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complaint may justifiably be dismissed because of the conclusory, vague and general

nature of the allegations of conspiracy.”).

Although phrased in quasi-legalese spread across multiple counts, plaintiff’s

grievance is not complex–he objectsto the Florida Department of Education’s failure,

through its Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, to see him through the process

toward gaining certification as a school teacher. Yet, everyone, even in this country,

who does not get what he wants from government, has not suffered statutory or

constitutional deprivation. The very processes implicit in plaintiff’s unsuccessful

efforts suggest quite strongly that Florida has considerable mechanisms in place to

assist those in need of vocational rehabilitation, and failing a favorable outcome,

allows an administrative appeal and, finally, judicial review. With all respect to Mr.

Stewart, this matter has come to an end, and this court should acknowledge that.

Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

1. That plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICEunder 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

2. That the clerk be directed to close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 28th day of March, 2012.

/s/Charles J. Kahn, Jr.

CHARLES J. KAHN, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days after being served a copy hereof. Any different deadline that may

appear on the electronic docket is for the court's internal use only, and does not

control. A copy of any objections shall be served upon any other parties. Failure to

object may limit the scope of appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. §

636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

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