[Cite as Cleveland Hts. v. Reid, 2011-Ohio-5839.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 96402 

CITY OF CLEVELAND HEIGHTS

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

TOBIAS R. REID

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cleveland Heights Municipal Court 

Case Nos. CRB 1002414 and TRD 1016321 

BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Jones, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 10, 2011 

 
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FOR APPELLANT

Tobias R. Reid, Ph.D., pro se 

1586 Larchmont Drive 

Cleveland, Ohio 44110 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

John Gibbon 

Law Director 

By: Brendan D. Healy 

Assistant Director of Law 

And: Elizabeth Cullivan 

Legal Intern 

City of Cleveland Heights 

40 Severance Circle 

Cleveland Heights, Ohio 44118 

Kim T. Segebarth 

City Prosecutor 

City of Cleveland Heights 

40 Severance Circle 

Cleveland Heights, Ohio 44118 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Tobias R. Reid, appeals his convictions entered in the 

city of Cleveland Heights Municipal Court. Appellant argues that those convictions 

were against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm 

the judgment of the trial court. 

{¶ 2} Appellant was arrested on December 13, 2010 and charged with resisting 
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arrest in violation of R.C. 2921.33(A), disorderly conduct in violation of Section 509.03 

of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Cleveland Heights, and walking in the roadway 

in violation of Section 371.05 of same. Appellant pled not guilty to the charges, and the 

case proceeded to a bench trial on February 10, 2011. At trial, Cleveland Heights police 

officer James Hood testified that on December 13, 2010 at 3:45 a.m. it was snowing 

heavily and that he was traveling northbound on Taylor Road near the intersection of 

Taylor and Greyton when he observed appellant walking southbound in the center of the 

northbound curbside lane, approximately ten to 15 feet from the curb, and that he was 

wearing dark clothing. Portions of the sidewalks along Taylor had been cleared, and 

Officer Hood stopped his patrol car to ask appellant to walk on the sidewalk or “at least 

get out of the middle of the road and proceed more towards the curb.” (Tr. 5.) 

{¶ 3} Appellant initially ignored Officer Hood and he then exited his vehicle to 

confront appellant. At that time, appellant began using vulgarities and screaming at the 

officer and refused to show him any identification. Eventually appellant confronted him 

face to face with balled fists. Officer Hood radioed for backup, and appellant began to 

walk away. Officer Hood testified that he placed appellant under arrest for disorderly 

conduct when he began yelling vulgarities and became threatening to him. Appellant 

was uncooperative in being arrested and swung his arm in a manner that required Officer 

Hood to avoid being struck. Officer Hood took appellant to the ground and handcuffed 

him with the help of a responding officer. 
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{¶ 4} Appellant initially testified that he was not walking in the street. (Tr. 39.) 

 He later testified that he was walking in the street, stating, “[n]ow at that point I was 

walking in the street. The city sidewalks had not been plowed, nor had the side street 

been plowed by the city of Cleveland Heights. The officer approached me and he 

approached me with a tone of ‘hey you, get over here.’” (Tr. 40.) When asked to 

clarify this inconsistency, appellant testified that he was not walking in the street when 

Officer Hood approached him, but was later walking in the street while crossing 

Greyton. (Tr. 57.) 

{¶ 5} Appellant’s version of events differed significantly from Officer Hood’s 

testimony. Appellant denied using vulgar language with Officer Hood and testified that 

Officer Hood kicked the cart that he was pulling and made racist comments. He also 

testified that Officer Hood kicked his legs out from under him. 

{¶ 6} The trial court found appellant not guilty of resisting arrest and guilty of 

disorderly conduct and walking in the roadway. The trial court imposed a $35 fine for 

disorderly conduct and a $25 fine for walking in the roadway. Appellant brought the 

present appeal raising the following four assignments of error: 

{¶ 7} I. “The trial court erred in finding Defendant Tobias R. Reid, Ph.D. not 

guilty of resisting arrest and guilty of walking in the street and disorderly conduct.” 

{¶ 8} II. “The trial court erred accepting Officer James Hood’s inconsistent 

testimony as to the exact location of Defendant when asked for identification.” 
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{¶ 9} III. “The conviction of walking in the street is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence.” 

{¶ 10} IV. “The trial court erred in convicting Defendant Dr. Tobias R. Reid, 

Ph.D. of disorderly conduct as defendant[’s] conduct was in the ordinary course of law.” 

{¶ 11} We begin by noting that appellant has failed to cite to any legal authority to 

support any of his assignments of error. An appellate court may disregard an 

assignment of error pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2) if an appellant fails to cite to any legal 

authority in support of an argument, as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). State v. Martin 

(July 12, 1999), Warren App. No. CA99-1-03, citing Meerhoff v. Huntington Mtge. Co. 

(1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 164, 658 N.E.2d 1109; Siemientkowski v. State Farm Ins., 

Cuyahoga App. No. 85323, 2005-Ohio-4295. “If an argument exists that can support 

this assigned error, it is not this court’s duty to root it out.” Cardone v. Cardone (May 

6, 1998), Summit App. Nos. 18349 and 18673. 

{¶ 12} Although appellant’s failure to cite to any legal authority allows this court 

to disregard his arguments, App.R. 12(A)(2) and App.R. 16(A)(7), we find it to be in the 

best interest of the parties to address the sole legal issue raised in appellant’s brief; that 

his conviction for walking in the street was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 13} Section 371.05 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Cleveland 

Heights provides in relevant part: 

“(a) Where a sidewalk is provided and its use is practicable, no pedestrian shall 

walk along and upon an adjacent roadway.” 
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“(b) Where a sidewalk is not available, any pedestrian walking along and upon 

a highway shall walk only on a shoulder, as far as practicable from the edge of the 

roadway.” 

“(c) Where neither a sidewalk nor a shoulder is available, any pedestrian 

walking along and upon a highway shall walk as near as practicable to an outside 

edge of the roadway, and, if on a two-way roadway, shall walk only on the left 

side of the roadway.” 

{¶ 14} In evaluating a challenge based on manifest weight of the evidence, a court 

sits as the thirteenth juror and intrudes its judgment into proceedings that it finds to be 

fatally flawed through misrepresentation or misapplication of the evidence by a jury that 

has “lost its way.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 

541. As the Ohio Supreme Court declared: 

“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of 

credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the 

other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will 

be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall 

find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be 

established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on 

its effect in inducing belief.’ 

“ * * * The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines 

whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed 

and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be 

exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily 

against the conviction.” (Internal citations omitted.) Id. at 387. 

{¶ 15} This court is mindful that weight of the evidence and the credibility of 

witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact, and a reviewing court must not reverse a 
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verdict where the trier of fact could reasonably conclude from substantial evidence that 

the state has proven the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 

Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212, at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. The goal of 

the reviewing court is to determine whether a new trial is mandated. A reviewing court 

should only grant a new trial in the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs 

heavily against a conviction.” (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio 

St.3d 479, 2000-Ohio-465, 721 N.E.2d 995. 

{¶ 16} In reviewing the entire record of the case sub judice, we cannot say that the 

trial court lost its way in convicting appellant of walking in the roadway. The trier of 

fact is in the best position to weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. As the 

reviewing court, we find that the trier of fact could reasonably conclude from the 

substantial evidence presented that the state had proven the charge of walking in the 

street beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial court lost 

its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the convictions must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered. 

{¶ 17} Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶ 18} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 
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pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, J., CONCUR