J-S33017-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES STYNE HASKINS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 163 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 6, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0008050-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: November 7, 2023

James Haskins (Appellant) appeals from the January 6, 2023, judgment 

of sentence entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, after the 

trial court convicted Appellant of one count of resisting arrest.1 On appeal, 

Appellant solely challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, alleging the

Commonwealth failed to prove that he intended to prevent a public servant 

from conducting a lawful arrest. Based on the following, we affirm.

I. Facts & Procedural History

The underlying facts concerning the Appellant’s conviction are taken 

from the trial testimony and are summarized as follows:

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.
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On the evening of October 3, 2021, Tarentum Borough Police Officer 

Jeremy Belusar, was on routine patrol and stopped at a red light in the right 

lane. See N.T., 10/5/22, at 17. Officer Jeremy Belusar observed Appellant’s 

car, a gold sedan, stopped two car lengths behind him in the left lane. Id. at 

16. Noting this behavior, Officer Belusar ran the vehicle’s registration and 

discovered there was an arrest warrant for the owner of the vehicle – James 

Haskins. Id. Upon learning of the warrant, Officer Belusar initiated a traffic 

stop. Id. The officer “confirmed that the driver was in fact Appellant.” Trial 

Ct. Op. at 3.

Officer Belusar then notified dispatch that he would be initiating the stop 

and requested additional units as backup. See N.T at 17. Officer Belusar 

activated his overhead lights. Appellant’s vehicle abruptly stopped before 

continuing to the nearest parking lot. Appellant exited his vehicle and “began 

yelling and advancing aggressively toward [Officer Belusar’s] position.” Id.

at 18. The officer observed Appellant clench his fists at his sides and pace 

back and forth between the two vehicles, demanding to know the reason for 

the stop. Id. Officer Belusar ordered Appellant to “get back in his vehicle[,]” 

and later, “to get on the ground several times.” Id. Appellant repeatedly 

ignored all these commands. Id. Consequently, Officer Belusar engaged his 

taser which had little effect on Appellant. Id. at 19. Appellant was able to rip 

the cords from his body and resumed yelling and pacing angrily. Id. Shortly 
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thereafter, other officers arrived to assist, including Officer Bajack,

2 who

commanded Appellant to get down on the ground. Id. at 19-20. Appellant 

again refused to comply, and the officer discharged his taser, which also did 

not incapacitate Appellant. Id. at 19-20.

Eventually, the officers tackled Appellant to the ground, “advising him 

multiple times to put his hands behind his back.” N.T. at 20. Appellant pushed 

off the ground numerous times, but ultimately, the officers took him into 

custody. See id.

Subsequently, Officer Belusar charged Appellant with resisting arrest,

obstructing administration of law or other government function, disorderly 

conduct, and careless driving.

3

On October 5, 2022, Appellant, appeared before the Honorable Bruce R. 

Beemer for a non-jury trial. Officer Belusar and Appellant both took the stand 

and testified. In his defense, Appellant stated he exited his vehicle and “put 

[his] hands outstretched” while repeatedly asking the officers why he was 

pulled over. N.T. at 28. At first, Appellant testified that he did not make any 

attempts to strike the officers, but later admitted that he exited his vehicle 

against the officer’s direction and advanced toward the officer, in order to 

“stand his ground.” Id. at 30, 32. Appellant reasoned that he was emotional 

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2 Officer Bajack’s first name does not appear in the record.

3

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101, 5503(a)(4); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714.
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given the fact that his vehicle was undergoing repairs and he had a limited

amount of power steering fluid left. See id. at 27-28. He also indicated that 

he was not aware there was a warrant out for his arrest. See id. at 31.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of 

resisting arrest, explaining its rationale as follows: 

[O]nce the lawful stop is effectuated and the officers had the 

information that [Appellant] has an active warrant for another 

county out for him, [he] simply cannot engage in the act that he 

did -- which, by his own admission, he did -- which is[:] get out 

of his vehicle, approach the officer and essentially demand the 

information that he was looking for, and thereby, not engage in 

lawful compliance, get on the ground to engage in the other type 

of questions. . . . And the officer was placed in a position of having 

to deploy a taser, to gain control of the situation; particularly, 

when he was isolated as a single officer before the second officer 

arrived, it’s clear that they had to employ means that justified or 

to overcome their resistance in this case. 

I found the testimony credible that he was not compliant. 

He didn’t comply with the orders to get on the ground. Now, 

maybe in his own mind, he felt he didn’t get an answer to a 

question that he wanted, but they discharged a taser, it didn’t 

cause him to get on the ground and be compliant, it caused him 

to remove the cords, and he ended up getting tased a second 

time. And then, when they had to take him to the ground, he was 

pushing off of the ground, he wouldn’t put his hands behind his 

back. The fact that the officers were not injured does not mean 

that there was not a substantial risk of bodily injury that was 

created for one or both of the officers.

N.T. at 42-43 (paragraph break added). The court acquitted him of the 

remaining charges. 
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On January 6, 2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of 18 

months’ probation. Appellant did not file any post-motions but did file a timely 

notice of appeal.4

II. Issue

In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant argues there was insufficient 

evidence to support a finding that he intended to prevent his own arrest. See

Appellant Brief at 11. Appellant points out that while he “did not comply with 

the officer’s orders to get back in his vehicle or to get on the ground[,]” he

did not “advance toward Officer Belusar, aggressively or otherwise.” Id. at 

12-13. He alleges that when the officer wantonly shot him with the taser, he 

maintains he was merely pacing back and forth and focuses on the fact that

he was never told the reason for the stop, stating:

[T]he mere fact that [Appellant] persistently asked Officer Belusar 

why he had been pulled over did not establish, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that he intended to prevent the officer from 

discharging his duties. Although [Appellant] was clearly frustrated 

and upset at the time of the incident, these emotions were not 

evidence of his defiance and resistance. This is particularly true 

given the fact that Officer Belusar admitted that [Appellant] was 

stopped not because of hazardous driving behavior, but because 

of an unrelated arrest warrant. Furthermore, Officer Belusar 

admitted that he never told [Appellant] why he had been stopped. 

Consequently, even in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence failed to 

sufficiently prove that it was [Appellant]’s conscious object to 

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4 On February 10, 2023, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Appellant filed on a timely concise statement on March 3, 2023. The trial court 

issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on April 25, 2023. 
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cause the result of preventing police from effectuating the arrest. 

[He] was not even aware of the reason for being pulled over.

Id. (record citation omitted).

Moreover, Appellant contends the trial court’s reliance on 

Commonwealth v. McDonald, 17 A.3d 1282 (Pa. Super. 2011), is misplaced 

and its analysis is flawed because the sufficiency issue in McDonald

concerned the substantial force element of resisting arrest and failed to 

account for the intent element. See Appellant Brief at 12. Appellant also

juxtaposes his conduct with instances where defendants attempted to strike 

or pulled and pushed away from officers. See id. at 14, citing

Commonwealth v. Schlier, 206 EDA 2020 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. Oct. 

7, 2020) and Commonwealth v. Albano, 166 EDA 2021 (unpub. memo.) 

(Pa. Super. Nov. 10, 2021). Appellant argues these defendants demonstrated 

a “specific intent,” unlike the instant case, where “there was no evidence that 

[Appellant] intentionally moved away from the police.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. 

III. Standard of Review

Our standard of review concerning a sufficiency argument is wellsettled.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every 

element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As an appellate 

court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of doubt is for 

the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive 
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that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from 

the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Martin, 297 A.3d 424, 434 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation 

omitted). 

IV. The Elements of Resisting Arrest

A person commits the crime of resisting arrest, in relevant part, when 

“with the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest 

or discharging any other duty, [the] person creates a substantial risk of 

bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means 

justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 5104. “Section 5104 criminalizes two types of conduct intended to 

prevent a lawful arrest: the creation of a substantial risk of bodily injury to 

the officer or anyone else or means justifying or requiring a substantial force 

to overcome.” Commonwealth v. Clemens, 242 A.3d 659, 666 (Pa. Super.

2020) (citation & internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, we note that

evidence of “passive resistance requiring substantial force to overcome” has 

previously been held to provide sufficient evidence to support a resisting arrest 

conviction. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 922 A.2d 926, 928 (Pa. Super.

2007).

Because Appellant advances an argument that focuses on his alleged

lack of intent, we note the following:

As a general rule, therefore, it is not criminal merely to flee 

arrest. However, where the circumstances of the flight expose 
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the pursuing officers to substantial danger a conviction for 

resisting arrest is proper. The statute, it is clear, does not require 

the aggressive use of force such as a striking or kicking of the 

officer.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 475 A.2d 145, 146 (Pa. Super. 1984) (citations & 

quotation marks omitted). “[I]ntent can be proven by direct or circumstantial 

evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct or from the attendant 

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Rahman, 75 A.3d 497, 503 (Pa. Super.

2013) (citation & quotation marks omitted). 

V. Analysis

The trial court explained its rationale for finding Appellant guilty of 

resisting arrest as follows:

Appellant does not dispute that Officer Belusar conducted a lawful 

traffic stop on October 3, 2021 after learning that Appellant had 

an active warrant. Nor does Appellant contest that he acted in 

the manner described by Officer Belusar. It is clear from the 

record, that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence was 

sufficient to establish the crime of resisting arrest beyond a 

reasonable doubt. From the moment Appellant exited his vehicle 

he created an aggressive and tension-filled situation. Despite 

multiple orders and the display and deployment of a taser by 

Officer Belusar, Appellant persisted in his actions because of his 

desire to find out why he was pulled over. Appellant never 

changed his stance, even after Officer Belusar later displayed his 

firearm and an assisting officer also deployed his taser. All efforts 

to force Appellant to comply and to gain control over the situation 

failed, for no other reason than Appellant’s continued aggressive 

behavior. Even as multiple officers physically took Appellant to 

the ground, he continued to resist by refusing to place his hands 

behind his back. See Commonwealth v. McDonald, 17 A.3d 

1282 (Pa. Super. 2011) (Conviction for resisting arrest affirmed 

where the actor was wrestled to the ground by multiple officers, 

refused commands, and physically resisted while under threat of 

being tasered, resulting in the ultimate deployment of the taser.)
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Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6.

We agree with the trial court’s determination. Appellant does not 

contest the circumstances surrounding the incident, including the fact that he 

was lawfully stopped based on an outstanding warrant or that he behaved in 

an aggressive manner towards the officers. Rather, he claims he lacked the 

necessary intent largely by blaming Officer Belusar for not telling him why he 

was pulled over. See Appellant Brief at 13. Additionally, he attributes his 

conduct to frustrations stemming from a purported lack of steering fluid to 

operate his car. Id. Appellant’s portrayal that he never intentionally 

exercised aggressive behavior or moved away from the police is misplaced. 

A review of the record reveals that once Officer Belusar initiated the 

traffic stop, Appellant immediately exited his vehicle and “began yelling and 

advancing aggressively toward” the officer. N.T. at 18. Officer Belusar 

repeatedly ordered Appellant to “get back in his vehicle[,]” and “to get on the 

ground[,]” which Appellant ignored. Id. Officer Belusar engaged his taser, 

but Appellant was able to rip the cords from his body and resumed yelling and 

being noncompliant. Id. Additionally, Officer Bajack commanded Appellant 

to get down on the ground, to which Appellant again refused to comply. Id.

at 19-20. Officer Bajack also discharged his taser, which did not disable

Appellant. Id. The officers then tried to tackle Appellant to the ground, 

“advising him multiple times to put his hands behind his back[,]” but even 

then, he pushed off the ground numerous times. See id. at 20. Appellant’s 
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intent “may be inferred” from his actions and “the attendant circumstances.” 

Rahman, 75 A.3d at 503. He repeatedly ignored the officers’ instructions and

their attempts to immobilize him with taser guns — in essence, his intent was

to prevent them from effectuating a lawful arrest.

With respect to Appellant’s argument regarding the trial court’s reliance 

on McDonald, supra, we find that it is erroneous. While the intent element

was not specifically at issue in McDonald, it is evident the trial court cited to

that case because it had a similar set of facts and the court wanted to point 

out that this Court previously upheld a resisting arrest conviction based on 

comparable circumstances. Furthermore, his reference to Schlier, 206 EDA 

2020 (unpub. memo.), and Albano, 166 EDA 2021 (unpub. memo.), as 

distinguishable because he did not possess any specific intent to strike or 

physically assault the officers is misplaced. We observe that while the incident 

may have not created “a substantial risk of bodily injury to [Officer Belusar]

or anyone else[,]” the officers had to resort to “substantial force to overcome 

[Appellant’s] resistance.” See Clemens, 242 A.3d at 666; 18 Pa.C.S. § 

5104. Therefore, the Commonwealth was not required to show specific intent 

to aggressively harm the officers. See Miller, 475 A.2d at 146. Moreover, 

Appellant’s actions amounted to “passive resistance[,]” which necessitated the 

substantial force taken by the officers to overcome his actions. See

Thompson, 922 A.2d at 928 (defendant resisted arrest when she “interlocked 

her arms and legs” with her husband and “held her arms tightly beneath” the 
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officer when he commanded her “several times to put her hands behind [her] 

back” and officers deployed pepper spray). Accordingly, even though 

Appellant may not have possessed the specific intent to physically attack the 

officers, his conduct in preventing the officers from restraining him by use of 

tasers and other methods provided sufficient evidence to sustain his 

conviction.

We also point out that Appellant relies on selective testimony in 

presenting his version of the incident. However, it is clear that the trial court, 

as finder of fact, had exclusive jurisdiction to weigh all of the evidence, 

determine the credibility of the witnesses, and resolve any inconsistencies in 

their testimony. Here, it found Officer Belusar’s testimony regarding 

Appellant’s conduct credible. See N.T. at 42-43; see also Martin, 297 A.3d 

at 434. Appellant’s arguments would have this Court supplant the trial court’s 

credibility determinations with our own, which we cannot to do. See id.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we 

agree with the trial court’s determination that the Commonwealth presented 

sufficient evidence that Appellant resisted arrest. See id.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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 11/7/2023