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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

WILLIAM FIELDS,

 Plaintiff,

vs. Case No: 5:10cv16/MCR/MD

STATE OF FLORIDA, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the court upon transfer from the Middle District. (Docs.

3, 4). Pending is plaintiff’s pro se civil rights complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

(doc. 1), and his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, (doc. 2). For the limited

purpose of dismissal of the complaint, leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be

granted.

Plaintiff is a resident of Clearwater, Florida. He sues the State of Florida and

three Florida Department of Corrections’ (“DOC”) employees, claiming that one

Tyrone Fields, apparently a sibling, was “kidnapped” by the State of Florida and is

being confined unconstitutionally within the DOC. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that

the State of Florida acquired custody of Tyrone Fields through a fugitive warrant,

then “gave him 10 extra years” without allowing him to see a judge. Plaintiff

additionally complains that DOC officials stripped Tyrone Fields of his clothing, took

a DNA sample without his permission, denied him his right to vote in the 2009

presidential election, lied during Tyrone Fields’ court proceeding in Gulf County

Circuit Court Case Number 08-180,1

 and denied him permission to attend his

1The docket sheet of Gulf County Circuit Court Case number 08-180 indicates that this was a habeas

case filed by Tyrone Fields in April of 2008. See www.gulfclerk.com.
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mother’s funeral. Plaintiff also claims that the judge presiding over Tyrone Fields’

habeas case “made a rule retroactively that did not apply to him [Tyrone Fields],”

namely Rule 33-602.101 of the Florida Administrative Code.2

 In the “Statement of

Claims” section of the complaint, plaintiff identifies his claims as follows: 

“kidnapping by State of Florida and others, intention inflection [sic] of emotional

distress, conspirecy [sic], violation of right to due process of law, abuse of process

of law, denided [sic] right to vote in 2009 president [sic] election, resufeing [sic] to

prevent neglect, involutary [sic] slavery force on [sic].” As relief, plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive damages. (Doc. 1).

“A federal court not only has the power but also the obligation at any time to

inquire into jurisdiction whenever the possibility that jurisdiction does not exist

arises.” Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1328 n. 4 (11th Cir.

1999). “Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed

prior to and independent of the merits of a party’s claims.” Bochese v. Town of

Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir. 2005). The inquiry whether a court has

standing “is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy

requirement of Article III” of the United States Constitution. Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). To have standing, 

the plaintiff must show: (1) that he suffered an actual or threatened injury, (2) that the

injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that the

injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.” Cuban American Bar Ass’n v.

Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121

(11th Cir. 1994); accord Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for

Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d

700 (1982)). With respect to the first requirement, the plaintiff generally must assert

that his own legal rights or interests have been injured as opposed to those of third

parties. Harris, 20 F.3d at 1121 (citing Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687,

2Rule 33-602.01 of the Florida Administrative Code is the Department of Corrections’ rule pertaining

to the care of inmates. It provides regulations concerning uniforms, clothing, footwear, and grooming,

and also provides generally for food, housing and medical care. 

Case No: 5:10cv16/MCR/MD
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690 (11th Cir. 1987). In limited instances, a litigant may present a third party claim

when three criteria are met: 

the litigant must have suffered an “injury-in-fact,” thus

giving him or her a “sufficiently concrete interest” in the

outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a

close relation to the third party; and there must exist some

hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her

own interests.

Harris, 20 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409-12, 111 S.Ct. 1364,

1370-71, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991)). With respect to the third factor, the court must ask

“whether it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are

asserted to present their grievance before any court; if that is the case, then the

reasons which underlie the rule denying standing to raise another’s rights, which is

only a rule of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights

which would be denied otherwise.” Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, FL,

529 F.3d 1043-44 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations marks omitted) (citing Barrows

v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed.1586 (1953)). The party invoking

federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561,

112 S.Ct. 2130. 

In the instant case, plaintiff has not alleged that his own constitutional rights

were, or will be violated, or that he has suffered any injury-in-fact. To the extent he

seeks third party standing to assert claims on behalf of Tyrone Fields, he has not

made the requisite showing. First, as already noted, plaintiff has not sufficiently

alleged that he has a concrete interest in the outcome of this dispute. Furthermore,

he has made no showing of a hindrance preventing Tyrone Fields from bringing his

claims on his own behalf. The fact that Tyrone Fields is incarcerated and has been

unsuccessful in obtaining his own release does not establish the requisite

“hindrance” to allow third-party standing. As plaintiff lacks standing to present his

federal claims, this suit should be dismissed. 

To the extent any of plaintiff’s claims can liberally be construed as arising

under state law, the undersigned recommends that the court, in its discretion

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

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any state law claims. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,

726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED;

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (doc. 2) is GRANTED for the

limited purpose of dismissing this action.

And it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

1. That plaintiff’s federal claims be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

2. That any state law claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

3. That the clerk be directed to close the file. 

At Pensacola, Florida this 1st day of February, 2010.

 /s/ Miles Davis

MILES DAVIS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed

within fourteen days after being served a copy hereof. Any different deadline that

may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only, and does not

control. A copy of any objections shall be served upon any other parties. Failure to

object may limit the scope of appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. §

636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

Case No: 5:10cv16/MCR/MD