United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Argued August 7, 2019 

Decided August 28, 2019 

Before 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1026 

MARIA A. POMPOSO LOPEZ, et al., 

Petitioners, 

v. 

WILIAM P. BARR, 

Attorney General of the United States 

 Respondent.

 Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals. 

Nos. A200-768-027, A208-296-669, 

A208-296-670 & A208-296-671 

O R D E R 

Maria Pomposo Lopez, a Mexican citizen, petitions, along with her three minor 

children, for review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s denial of her applications for 

asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (based 

on her membership in a social group of people subjected to familial abuse) and for 

withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The Board concluded 

that Pomposo Lopez did not establish harm that rose to the level of past persecution, a 

well-founded fear of future persecution based on a protected ground, or a likelihood 

that she would be tortured if removed to Mexico. We agree and deny the petition for 

review. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-1026 Page 2 

I. 

 Pomposo Lopez unlawfully entered the United States in 2010 with her three 

minor children, Eyvi, Aryela, and Andrea, who are also petitioners in this case. They 

settled in Columbus, Indiana with the children’s father. 

Pomposo Lopez and her partner testified to the following. When Aryela was ten 

years old, she confided in a school psychologist that she was being harassed and 

touched inappropriately by her 24-year-old cousin who lived with the family. The 

school contacted Aryela’s father, who took her to the police station to file a sexual 

misconduct report in May 2014. When the police questioned Aryela alone, she said that 

the sexual abuse did not occur, so they closed the case. Aryela’s father kicked out his 

nephew, who later moved to Utah. 

Months later, Pomposo Lopez began receiving threatening text messages 

purportedly sent on behalf of the estranged nephew. The messager identified herself as 

the nephew’s girlfriend and said that she knew where the family lived, that she was 

going to send someone to beat them up, and that Pomposo Lopez should be careful 

with her children. The girlfriend also taunted Pomposo Lopez, telling her that the 

nephew would boast of his abuse of Aryela. Pomposo Lopez twice reported the 

messages to the Columbus police, but they told her that she needed to receive more 

messages before they opened an investigation. 

In December 2014, Pomposo Lopez and her children returned to Mexico where 

the harm grew more serious. In February 2015, Pomposo Lopez was held at gunpoint 

by two unknown men with pistols, while a third man tried to abduct Aryela on the 

street where they lived. Aryela escaped, but the men restrained Pomposo Lopez and 

warned her that her partner should stop talking to the police. (In Pomposo Lopez’s 

absence, her partner—then in the United States—had reported to Columbus police that 

he had been receiving text messages, purportedly from the nephew and his girlfriend, 

that insulted Pomposo Lopez and Aryela.) Pomposo Lopez reported the incident at 

gunpoint to a nearby police patrol, who told her that incidents like this happen often 

and that she “needed to give them a little bit of money in order for them to help [her] 

find out what happened.” She did not pay and received no help. 

The family also received phone threats in Mexico. Pomposo Lopez’s mother, 

with whom the family was staying, received calls from unknown callers asking to speak 

with Pomposo Lopez. On the one occasion that Pomposo Lopez answered the house 
No. 19-1026 Page 3 

phone in May 2015, an unfamiliar female voice told her to be careful “because children 

can get lost and be found later without their organs.” Pomposo Lopez reported this call 

to the police, who again refused to help her if she did not pay. 

The next month, Pomposo Lopez and her children fled Mexico to escape the 

threats. Since they left, Pomposo Lopez and her partner have not received any 

threatening phone calls or text messages. But Pomposo Lopez’s father in Mexico 

continued to receive calls from an unknown caller, asking to speak with Pomposo 

Lopez. 

Pomposo Lopez and her children sought to reenter the United States in Laredo, 

Texas without visas and were stopped at the border. They were placed in removal 

proceedings and found removable. They applied for asylum and withholding of 

removal based on what they later identified as a social group comprising (1) individuals 

or family members of individuals unable to leave a familial, or similar, 

relationship/situation, and (2) individuals or family members of individuals who have 

reported crime/familial abuse. They also sought CAT protection. 

After a series of continued hearings, the immigration judge denied all their 

applications. The IJ found Pomposo Lopez credible but concluded that the past harm 

did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ did not discuss the proposed social groups 

but determined that any persecution was not based on a protected ground because the 

threats were based on a personal family dispute. The IJ further concluded that Pomposo 

Lopez had not established a well-founded fear of persecution that was objectively 

reasonable, in part, because no evidence reflected that Pomposo Lopez, her partner, or 

her relatives in Mexico had received threats in several years, and the police had closed 

the sexual abuse case against the nephew. Because Pomposo Lopez could not meet the 

standard for asylum, the IJ also determined that she could not meet the higher standard 

for withholding of removal. The IJ denied CAT protection, finding that there was no 

evidence that the Mexican government acquiesced or even knew of any harm and that 

the incidents that she described do not constitute torture. 

Pomposo Lopez appealed to the Board, which upheld the IJ’s decision. The 

Board agreed with the IJ that the harm did not rise to the level of past persecution. The 

Board also determined that the harm was based on a personal family dispute and that 

even if the particular social groups were cognizable, the IJ correctly concluded that the 

family would not be targeted in the future based on any protected group. Finally, the 

Board agreed with the IJ that the family was ineligible for CAT protection because they 
No. 19-1026 Page 4 

had not shown a likelihood of being tortured in Mexico with the acquiescence of the 

government. 

II. 

On appeal, Pomposo Lopez first contends that the Board erred by concluding 

that she did not demonstrate past persecution to support her claims of asylum and 

humanitarian asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). She argues that considered 

together, the repeated phone threats on behalf of the nephew, the attempted 

kidnapping of Aryela, and her own holdup at gunpoint all rise to the level of 

persecution. She emphasizes that the incident at gunpoint and the phone message—

warning her that her children may get lost and turn up without organs—are “credible 

threat[s] to inflict grave physical harm,” Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 

2011), of an “immediate or menacing nature.” Bejko v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 482, 486 

(7th Cir. 2006). 

 We review the Board’s decision under the deferential “substantial evidence” 

standard and will reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary finding. N.Y.C.C. v. 

Barr, 930 F.3d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 2019). The evidence to which Pomposo Lopez points 

does not compel a finding of past persecution. Persecution involves “the use of 

significant physical force against a person’s body” “or nonphysical harm of equal 

gravity.” Stanojkova, 645 F.3d at 948. A single, unsuccessful attempt to abduct Aryela at 

gunpoint and a series of threatening phone messages, without any physical harm or 

further attempts to carry out the threats, do not describe grave harm to compel a 

finding of past persecution. See I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); Mema v. 

Gonzales, 474 F.3d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 2007) (abduction at gunpoint followed by detention 

and physical abuse did not compel conclusion of past persecution); Hasanaj v. Ashcroft, 

385 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 2004) (single incident at gunpoint with no physical harm did 

not compel finding of past persecution). 

Moreover, “[t]hreats can constitute past persecution only in the most extreme 

circumstances, such as where they are of a most immediate or menacing nature or if the 

perpetrators attempt to follow through on the threat” but “[i]n the majority of cases” 

threats do not compel a finding of past persecution. Bejko, 468 F.3d at 486. A finding of 

past persecution can be compelled, however, if threats are accompanied by other 

incidents of severe violence. See Cecaj v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 897, 899–900 (7th Cir. 2006) 

(past persecution found after two detentions with beatings, gunshot intended to 

intimidate, threatening phone calls, child kidnapping, and another threat); Kantoni 
No. 19-1026 Page 5 

v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2006) (past persecution found in situation of 

“rape, the destruction of one’s business, threats, detention, more threats, and threatened 

seizure of one’s children”). Here, the gunpoint incident was fortunately an isolated 

occurrence, and there is no evidence that the perpetrators attempted to follow through 

on the threat. Although the incident occurred on the street near the family’s home, the 

family remained there for four more months without further encounters. Because 

Pomposo Lopez has not established past persecution, her claim for humanitarian 

asylum also fails. See Georgieva v. Holder, 751 F.3d 514, 523 (7th Cir. 2014). 

 Pomposo Lopez next attacks several grounds supporting the IJ’s conclusion that 

she lacks a well-founded fear of future persecution. First, she says that the IJ 

unreasonably concluded that she had not shown a well-founded fear because the family 

had not received any threats since fleeing to the United States. This conclusion is 

unreasonable, she contends, because it requires asylum applicants to demonstrate that 

threats are ongoing even after they have successfully fled danger—the very basis of 

their asylum claim. But the IJ’s reliance on the absence of any threats after Pomposo 

Lopez fled Mexico is reasonable given the nature of the threats in this case. 

Pomposo Lopez testified that the perpetrators of the threats and harm—the nephew 

and his girlfriend—reside in the United States and have family connections in both 

countries, and, thus, could reasonably access the family in either country. Indeed, the 

threatening phone messages began when Pomposo Lopez was in the United States. Yet, 

despite this access, no one in Pomposo Lopez’s family received any threats, in either 

country, after she fled Mexico. 

Pomposo Lopez counters that the IJ overlooked evidence from her declaration 

that her father received phone calls for her in Mexico after she fled. But the relevant part 

of the declaration reads: “My father is still receiving phone calls for me in Mexico. The 

numbers are marked private. We don’t know who is calling. My father tells them I am 

not there.” This evidence does not establish that her father received any threats, and 

thus does not undermine the IJ’s conclusion that no threats occurred since Pomposo 

Lopez left Mexico. 

Next, Pomposo Lopez challenges the IJ’s determination that she lacks a fear of 

persecution on grounds that Aryela withdrew her statements about the alleged sexual 

abuse and the police closed the case. It was only after the police closed the case, she 

contends, that the most significant harm occurred—the attempted kidnapping at 
No. 19-1026 Page 6 

gunpoint. The case’s closure, then, she insists, is not indicative of whether she would 

reasonably experience further harm for filing the police report. 

But substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Pomposo Lopez had no 

reason to fear future persecution. The IJ reasonably concluded that—because Pomposo 

Lopez and her partner had not heard from the nephew or his girlfriend in several years 

and there was no threat of criminal charges for the alleged abuse—the family had no 

reason to fear further threats from the nephew. The fact that Pomposo Lopez 

experienced serious threats months after Aryela filed and withdrew her sexual abuse 

complaint does not weaken the IJ’s determination that the fear of further threats several 

years later was objectively unreasonable given the absence of any threats in the 

intervening two years. 

Because we have concluded that the record does not compel a finding that 

Pomposo Lopez had a well-founded fear of future persecution, we need not address her 

arguments that any persecution was based on her membership in a particular social 

group. 

Pomposo Lopez also challenges the denials of her claims of statutory 

withholding of removal and withholding of removal under CAT. The standard for 

withholding of removal is more stringent than that for asylum. Boci v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 

762, 767 (7th Cir. 2007). To qualify for withholding of removal, an alien must 

demonstrate a clear probability that he or she will face persecution if removed. Id. 

Because Pomposo Lopez has not met the more lenient burden of proof for asylum, she 

does not qualify for withholding of removal. 

Finally, Pomposo Lopez seeks protection under CAT. To receive this protection, 

an applicant must show that “it is more likely than not that one would be tortured if 

removed to the proposed country of removal.” Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 653 

(7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Toure v. Holder, 624 F.3d 422, 429 (7th Cir. 2010)). “Torture” is 

defined as “severe pain or suffering” or an “extreme form of cruel and inhuman 

treatment” that is intentionally inflicted with the consent or acquiescence of a public 

official. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)–(2). Pomposo Lopez has provided no evidence of torture 

as defined by federal regulations, thus the record does not compel granting her relief 

under CAT. 

Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusions, we deny the 

petition for review.