## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### FEB 18 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk 

### PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. SALVADOR HINOJOS, JR., Defendant-Appellant, No. 96-5127

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 93-CR-33-E)

Submitted on the briefs: Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney and Kenneth P. Snoke, Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-App ellee. Stephen J. Knorr, Federal Public Defender and Steph en J. Greubel, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defen dant-Appellant.

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, PORFILIO and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

SEYMOUR , Chief Judge.1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

-2- Salavador Hinojos, Jr., appeals the district court’ s denial on remand of his motion to suppress evidence seized following a traf fic stop. Mr. Hinojos was convicted of possession of drugs with intent to dis tribute and of possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug offense. He appealed, contending, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. This court held the initial stop to be valid, but remanded for furt her development of the record on the issue of the validity of additional questioning and detention unrelated to the stop. See United States v. Hinojos , No. 93-5242, 1996 WL 16823 (10th Cir. Jan. 18, 1996). The district court received additional evidence and again denied the motion to suppress. Mr. Hinojos appeals and we aff irm. 1 Mr. Hinojos was stopped for speeding by Oklahoma hi ghway patrol trooper Paul Lankster, who was patrolling Interstate 44 in Tulsa County. Trooper Lankster had previously heard a police broadcast st ating that two Hispanic men were transporting drugs in a teal-colored Chevroletpickup, and providing the truck’s tag number. As he continued patrolling, Tr ooper Lankster saw a speeding vehicle containing two men approaching him in the e astbound lane. He verified the speed with radar, made a U-turn and followed th e truck, which matched the-3-

vehicle described in the dispatch. After ascertain ing that the truck’s Texas tag number matched that given in the bulletin, Trooper Lankster stopped the truck and issued a speeding ticket to Mr. Hinojos, who wa s driving. Mr. Hinojos stated that he lived in Odessa, Texas, as shown on his dri ver’s license, and was going to Illinois to work for a short time. While Trooper L ankster was in the process of preparing a speeding ticket, he questioned Mr. Hino jos about drug trafficking. He then asked for and received permission from Mr. Hin ojos to search the truck. The search revealed a gun and a plastic bag containing one half pound of cocaine. A subsequent tip led to the discovery of twelve pound s of marijuana in the truck’s spare tire. Mr. Hinojos moved to suppress the resu lts of the search and the district court denied the motion, ruling that the c onsent was voluntary. Mr. Hinojos appealed, contending his consent was tainte d because the stop was pretextual. At the time of the first suppression hearing, the i ssue of pretext was relevant to determining the constitutionality of a traffic stop. See United States v.Guzman , 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988). By the tim e of the first appeal, however, Guzmanhad been overruled by United States v. Botero-Ospi na , 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc), under which the pre sence of pretext no longer invalidates a traffic stop based upon an observed v iolation. Accordingly, we held in the first appeal that the initial stop was valid . We also held that Trooper-4-

Lankster’s detention and further questioning of Mr. Hinojos was proper only if justified by the bulletin. We pointed out that a T erryinvestigation in reliance upon a police bulletin is justified only if the bul letin itself is based on reasonable suspicion, see United States v. Hensley , 469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985), or is augmented by independent police corroboration, see Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 329-32 (1990). The testimony at the first sup pression hearing was directed to the issue of pretext and was therefore not devel oped on this issue. That hearing did not reveal the source of the bulletin, describe the contents of the bulletin in any detail, or provide other informatio n relevant to the reasonable suspicion inquiry. Consequently, we remanded to al low the district court to revisit the issue. On remand, the district court held another hearing, at which Trooper Lankster testified that the broadcast described the vehicle as a 1992 teal green Chevrolet pickup truck occupied by two males and carrying a substantial amount of cocaine. The broadcast further advised that the truck had Texas tags, giving the tag number, that the truck was traveling from O dessa, Texas, giving the time that it had left, and that the truck would be headi ng eastbound on the Turner Turnpike. The government also presented testimony from DorseyShannon, a former DEA agent, who had received the information about t he truck from Kansas DEA-5-

Agent Larry Nichols and had in turn asked the Oklah oma Highway Patrol to issue the bulletin to its troopers. Mr. Shannon testifie d Agent Nichols told him the information had come from an informant who had dire ct detailed knowledge about the truck, its illegal contents, and the name s of its occupants. Mr. Shannon recalled that the basis of the informant’s informat ion was direct observation. Mr. Shannon testified that “my sense of it was that [Ag ent Nichols] believed the information was very reliable and I don’t know if that was because the informant was claiming firsthand knowledge or whether it was based on some working relationship. I assumed it was based on a working relationship because he was getting the information by telephone from someone w ho was removed from Wichita, Kansas.” Rec. vol. III at 16. In Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, the Supreme Court addressed the standard for determining when an informant’s tip can provide reasonable suspicion. The tip in that case is very similar to the bulletin received by Trooper Lankster here; it described a vehicle in detail, id entified the driver and her point of origin and destination, and stated that she woul d be in possession of drugs. See id. at 327. The tip in White was anonymous and the Court pointed out that an anonymous tip alone can rarely provide the reasonab le suspicion necessary for a Terrystop because it seldom demonstrates the informant’ s honesty, reliability or basis of knowledge. See id. at 329. Significantly, the Court held that an-6-

anonymous tip such as the one at issue there would not be sufficient to support a Terrystop without corroboration. Id. at 329-31. As in White , the tip here identified only the vehicle, its occupants, its ori gin and direction of travel. White compels the conclusion that if the tip in this case had been given to DEA Agent Nichols in Kansas anonymously, it would not be suff icient to support reasonable suspicion without corroboration. The record reveals little about Agent Nichols’ rece ipt of the tip because Agent Nichols did not testify. Mr. Shannon, who re ceived the information from Agent Nichols and passed it on to the Highway Patro l, testified Agent Nichols told him the informant’s information was based uponpersonal observation. Mr. Shannon further testified he felt Agent Nichols bel ieved the information to be reliable. In addition, Mr. Shannon assumed the inf ormant and Agent Nichols had a working relationship because the informant’s tip was based on direct observation, presumably in Texas, and phoned in to Agent Nichols in Kansas. Mr. Shannon apparently believed an anonymous tipste r would not phone a tip in to a Kansas agent about illegal activity observed i n Texas. The district court did not decide whether, in light of the additional evid ence presented at the second hearing, the tip itself provided reasonable suspici on, ruling instead that the tip had been sufficiently corroborated by Trooper Lanks ter. We agree with this conclusion.-7-

Even if the tip standing alone were not reliable en ough to establish reasonable suspicion, Trooper Lankster corroboratedthe reliability of the information. Reasonable suspicion is to be determi ned by considering the “‘totality of the circumstances--the whole picture. ’” White , 496 U.S. at 330 (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of relia bility, more information will be required to establish the requi site quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were mo re reliable. . . . [We must take] into account the facts known to the officers from personal observation, and giv[e] the anonymous tip the weight it deserve[s] in light of its indicia of reliability a s established through independent police work. Id. Although the corroboration here was supplied by the officer who relied on the bulletin rather than the officer who received the t ip and initiated the bulletin, we have held under the “fellow officer” rule that law enforcement officers may pool their information and that reasonable suspicion is to be determined on the basis of the collective knowledge of all the officers involv ed. See United States v. Morgan , 936 F.2d 1561, 1569 (10th Cir. 1991). This rule applies to an officer’s corroboration of information received by radio disp atch. See United States v. Cutchin , 956 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 ( D.C. Cir. 1992). In White , the Court held that the anonymous tipster’s descr iption of the car, its occupant, and its location were not significantindicia of reliability in themselves because they were facts existing at the time the tip was called in that-8-

anyone could have observed. They therefore did notshow that the tipster had inside information about the presence of illegal ac tivity. However, the Court did find significant the fact that the caller predicted the future conduct of the subject of the tip. 496 U.S. at 331-32. It was the tipste r’s ability to predict future behavior that demonstrated inside information and f amiliarity with the subject’s affairs, and thus demonstrated reliability. In the instant case, in addition to providing a det ailed description of the vehicle and its occupants, the tip also predicted t hat the truck would leave Odessa, Texas, at a particular time and travel east bound through the Tulsa area. Trooper Lankster observed that Mr. Hinojos’ truck m atched the description in the bulletin, and that Mr. Hinojos was acting as the bu lletin had predicted. In our view, this corroboration provides adequate addition al indicia of reliability, especially when considered together with the testim ony concerning the source of the tip. Accordingly, we AFFIRM Mr. Hinojos’ conviction.