[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-11193 

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:11-tp-60013-JIC-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROGER A. BROWNE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(December 27, 2012)

Before WILSON, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Roger A. Browne, M.D., appeals pro se the denial of his motion to terminate 

his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Browne argues that he should 

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have been allowed to resume employment in the medical profession and that the 

district court failed to provide a sufficient explanation for its decision. We affirm.

We review the denial of a motion to modify supervised release for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Under the abuse of discretion standard, “[w]e will reverse only if we have a 

definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of 

judgment in the conclusion it reached.” United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 

1137 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). We 

review for plain error any argument not initially presented to the district court. 

United States v. Gresham, 325 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2003). To satisfy that 

standard, the defendant must prove that there was an error that was plain, affected 

his substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness of the judicial 

proceedings. Id.

Browne was convicted of conspiring to distribute oxycodone and served a 

30-month term of imprisonment. Browne was released to serve three years of 

supervised release, during which time he was prohibited from engaging in the 

medical profession. After his release, Browne failed to report to his probation 

officer within 72 hours of his release, and it took officers four months to locate 

him. Although Browne signed a form acknowledging the conditions of his release, 

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he failed to comply with the standard condition to obtain a job. Browne moved to 

terminate his supervised release to resume employment in the medical field.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Browne’s motion to 

terminate his supervised release. Section 3583(e)(1) permits a district court to 

“terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant” if, “after 

considering the [statutory] factors for sentencing,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court is 

“satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released 

and the interest of justice.” Id. § 3583(e)(1). Supervised release is intended to 

facilitate training and rehabilitation, Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 709, 

120 S. Ct. 1795, 1805 (2000), and to achieve the statutory goals of sentencing to 

account for the nature and circumstances of the offense, to deter future similar 

crimes, and to protect the public, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court 

reasonably determined, based on the statutory purposes of sentencing and 

Browne’s refusal to satisfy the standard terms of his supervised release, that his 

continued exclusion from the medical profession would shield Browne from the 

temptation to reoffend and protect the public from the dangers inherent in the 

distribution of controlled substances. After Browne had twice violated the 

conditions of his release, the district court had ample reason to deny summarily his 

motion to terminate his supervised release.

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We AFFIRM the denial of Browne’s motion to terminate his supervised 

release.

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