article info abstract

Article history:

Received 13 March 2014

Received in revised form 14 July 2014

Accepted 13 September 2014

Keywords:

Multilevel theory and methods

Strategic management

Health and safety management systems

Safety climate

Safety culture

Multilevel and strategic management theory and research methods are presented and applied to current

issues in occupational health and safety (H&S), the primary goal being to better understand health and

safety management systems (HSMS) from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Through these perspectives, a strategic HSMS may be understood as a construct that exists objectively at the strategic level

of the organization—its objective content often distinct from the implemented practices and procedures

within a workgroup and from worker perceptions and interpretations of its content. These nuances highlight the types of biases that can arise when choosing a level of measurement to assess the HSMS and

techniques that can be used to minimize measurement error and increase the validity of inferences made.

These nuances also illuminate the contingencies important for the success of a strategic organizational

HSMS. The contingencies are discussed from a theoretical perspective and presented in a conceptual

HSMS model.

Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Safety Science 72 (2015) 221–228

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Safety Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Review

Health and safety management systems through a multilevel and

strategic management perspective: Theoretical and empirical

considerations

Patrick L. Yorio ⇑, Dana R. Willmer, Susan M. Moore

U.S. CDC-NIOSH, Office of Mine Safety and Health Research, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

Contents

1. Introduction . . . ................ ...................................................................................... 221 
 

2. Health and safety management systems in practice, theory, and research . . . . . . . . . . ............................................. 222 
 

2.1. HSMS in practice . . . . . . . ......................................................................................... 222 
 

2.2. HSMS theory and research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................................................................... 222 
 

2.3. HSMS through a multilevel perspective. . . . . ......................................................................... 223 
 

2.4. Assessing the content of a strategic HSMS: biases and techniques to increase measurement validity . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ... ... ... ... 224

3. A conceptual model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................................................................................... 224 
 

3.1. Workgroup leadership . . ......................................................................................... 225 
 

3.2. Organizational values . . . ......................................................................................... 225 
 

3.3. Worker perceptions and interpretations of an HSMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................................................... 226 
 

4.	 Conclusion and suggestions for future research. . . . . . . . . . . . . ................................................................ 226 
 

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................................................................................... 227 
 

References . . . . ...................................................................................................... 227 
 

1. Introduction

As defined by available system standards (e.g. ANSI/AIHA Z-10;

OHSAS 18001; Responsible Care; ILO-OSH-2001), a health and

⇑ Corresponding author at: CDC-NIOSH, Office of Mine Safety and Health

Research, 626 Cochrans Mill Road, PO Box 18070, Pittsburgh, PA 15236, USA.

E-mail address: pyorio@cdc.gov (P.L. Yorio).

safety management system (HSMS) is a set of institutionalized,

interrelated, and interacting strategic H&S management practices

designed to establish and achieve occupational safety and health

goals and objectives. Because of the potential importance of an

HSMS in occupational injury and illnesses prevention, it has

emerged as an important research topic in the H&S academic

community. To date, however, empirical measurement of an

organizational HSMS for the purpose of understanding its effect

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.09.011

0925-7535/Published by Elsevier Ltd.
222 P.L. Yorio et al. / Safety Science 72 (2015) 221–228

on other important H&S phenomena in research studies has taken

on different forms. Robson et al. (2007) conducted a systematic

review of the empirical literature that explored the effectiveness

of an HSMS and found that common limitations across studies

were a lack of consistency in HSMS measurement techniques and

an underreporting of the potential biases that the technique

introduced.

These limitations are problematic from both a research and policy perspective. First, the distinct HSMS measurement approaches

used within the H&S academic literature imply very different operational definitions of the construct. Importantly, valid inferences

about the effect of an HSMS on specific outcomes (e.g., injuries

and illnesses) require that the content of the HSMS in place be

accurately measured. Secondly, given that occupational standard

setting bodies throughout the world (e.g., the United States, ILO,

Canada, Australia, and the European Union) have made and continue to make efforts toward mandatory HSMS-related standards,

valid empirical research of HSMS effectiveness is increasingly

important.

In what follows, multilevel and strategic management theories

are used to distinguish between a strategic HSMS (a top-down

construct that exists at the level of the organization and is a key

part of its structure), HSMS implementation (the behaviorally executed policies and practices that often exist within organizational

workgroups), and worker perceptions and interpretations of the

HSMS. Through these basic lines of delineation, two important

developments related to HSMS theory and research are illuminated. First, the types of biases, measurement error, and construct

validation issues relevant to empirical assessment of an HSMS for

use in research models becomes apparent. Second, contingencies

important to the success of a strategically designed organizational

HSMS can be theoretically developed, providing insight into

important research questions that may be answered in future

studies.

2. Health and safety management systems in practice, theory,

and research

2.1. HSMS in practice

As noted above, an HSMS can be broadly characterized as a set

of institutionalized interrelated and interacting strategic elements

designed to establish and achieve occupational H&S goals and

objectives. Makin and Winder (2008) defined a comprehensive

HSMS as a system that is comprised of purposefully distinct but

complementary H&S management practices. These ideas can be

briefly illustrated through the ANSI/AIHA Z-10 HSMS consensus

standard. ANSI/AIHA Z-10 advocates the following elements: topmanagement leadership and employee participation; planning;

implementation and operation; evaluation and corrective action;

and management review. Each of these elements has a distinct

function within the HSMS but all have the same objective: to prevent occupational injuries and illnesses. Numerous policies, practices, and procedures can be listed under each element and each

of the practices listed under an element fundamentally aligns with

the element’s function. For example, the top-management leadership and employee participation element can include: a written

H&S policy that articulates H&S management commitment,

employee participation in risk management activities, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations; appropriate resource

allocation; defining H&S roles and responsibilities and an accompanying accountability system; design of employee feedback

systems; and integrating aspects of employee involvement into

various practices that make up the HSMS (e.g., accident investigation, H&S inspections and audits, etc.).

From a practical perspective, the decision as to which elements

to include within an HSMS (and practices aligned under those elements) can be challenging. As an HSMS is a strategically designed,

context-specific organizational asset, there are various activities

that can be administered and a variety of ways that the activities

can be designed. However, consistent with the arguments of

Makin and Winder (2008), the building blocks of an effective HSMS

should include practices related to creating a ‘safe place’ (e.g.,

access/egress, electrical, noise, hazardous substances, preventative

and predictive maintenance, housekeeping, etc.), sustaining ‘safe

people’ (e.g., H&S training, psychosocial risk management, health

surveillance, performance appraisals, etc.), and continuous

improvement (e.g., recordkeeping, management review, etc.).

2.2. HSMS theory and research

Within the H&S academic literature, HSMS have been traditionally conceptualized to exist as an artifact of or manifestation of an

organization’s safety culture (Edwards et al., 2013; Cooper, 2000;

Guldenmund, 2007; Mearns and Flin, 1999). Thus, current HSMS

research work has been shaped by overarching organizational

and safety culture themes. Although, efforts to clarify the distinct

space between them have been made (Edwards et al., 2013;

Guldenmund, 2010; Zohar, 2008), the theoretical development of

HSMS as a safety culture artifact has seemingly created some confusion within the safety research community as to where to draw

the methodological lines between these constructs (Reiman and

Rollenhagen, 2013). It is suspected that this confusion has led, in

part, to a loose operational definition and measurement of an organizational HSMS in H&S empirical studies.

Table 1 suggests that in H&S empirical investigations, two general approaches are commonly used to assess an HSMS in relation

to important organizational and individual level outcomes.

The first approach (Worker Level Measurement) entails asking

individual workers to provide perceptions of the elements and/or

practices used within the HSMS. These gathered observations can

then be aggregated upward to the group level or, as is common

in the existing research, used at the individual level in research

models. The second approach (Manager Level Measurement)

entails asking managers and/or supervisors to supply information

on the organization’s HSMS and using this data to derive estimates

of its effect on important H&S outcomes. As reflected in Table 1, the

first approach suggests that an HSMS is operationally a bottom-up,

worker-derived perceptual construct. Conversely, the second measurement approach suggests that an HSMS is a top-down, management derived, structural construct.

As an HSMS is often regarded as a component of safety culture,

and safety culture is considered an emergent construct by many

H&S theorists (Guldenmund, 2007, 2010; Christian et al., 2009),

the bottom-up measurement approach has some appeal. There

are, however, potential limitations when the resulting empirical

inferences are reported to correspond to the practices and policies

as formally specified by top organizational managers. First,

because the responsibility to develop, implement, monitor and

improve the HSMS policies and practices is fundamentally within

the sphere of management, the bottom-up approach may not accurately reflect their actual development and function within an

organization. Second, worker perceptions and interpretations of

an HSMS may not accurately reflect the codified practices developed through strategic management processes. Perceptions of

HSMS are limited, not only by bounded rationality and important

cognitive, social, and psychological biases (Podsakoff et al., 2003;

Hoyt, 2000), they are often filtered through various contingencies

involved with the sometimes imperfect implementation of the

HSMS. Because of the importance of workgroup supervisors and

an organization’s internal value systems in shaping the perceptions
P.L. Yorio et al. / Safety Science 72 (2015) 221–228 223

Table 1

Common HSMS measurement approaches in the H&S empirical literature.

HSMS level of measurement HSMS level of analysis Empirical operationalization Example studies

Worker level Worker level Bottom-up, worker-derived perceptual construct Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010)

Dejoy et al. (2004)

Frazier et al. (2013)

Arboleda et al. (2003)

Manager level Organizational or work-group level Top-down, organizationally derived structural construct Fang and Wu (2013)

Fernandez-Muniz et al. (2009)

Macdonald et al. (2000)

Arocena and Nunez (2010)

of the strategically developed and codified HSMS policies, practices, and procedures, an objective assessment of HSMS attributes

through worker perceptions is more consistent with the theoretical

nature of safety climate1 than the objective content of the strategic

HSMS.

2.3. HSMS through a multilevel perspective

Given the multilevel nature of an organizational HSMS (and

other important H&S phenomena such as safety culture, climate,

and safety outcomes), there is much that can be gleaned about it

through multilevel theory. The H&S academic community has recognized the importance of multilevel theory in the study of workplace H&S. For example, Zohar (2008) suggested that multilevel

theory is one of the fastest growing fields in management research

and that ‘‘it is important that safety climate research becomes integrated in such developments, benefiting from the conceptual,

methodological, and statistical rigor of the framework’’ (p. 385).

The same may be said of other topics important to H&S research,

including HSMS. Similarly both Cooper (2000) and Guldenmund

(2010) have suggested that with the recognition that important

 

nature comes the responsibility to ensure they are measured in

accordance with current multilevel methodological approaches.

contingencies within the safety culture model are multilevel in

The theme which underpins the multilevel approach is that

organizations are comprised of a series of nested structural

arrangements. In a hypothetical nested organizational arrangement individual workers are nested within workgroups, workgroups are nested within departments, and departments are, in

turn, nested within the greater organization. The basic assumption

behind this perspective is that outcomes (e.g., behavior, performance, knowledge, efficacy, etc.) exist at different levels within

an organization (i.e., at the level of the individual, workgroup,

department, and/or division) and these outcomes can be influenced by phenomena that exist at a different level within the same

organization. Through this perspective, for example, hypotheses

can be generated in which a construct at a given level influences

an outcome at the same level (e.g., the relationship between workgroup safety climate and the number of injuries and illnesses the

group collectively experienced) while also encouraging hypotheses

in which a higher level construct can influence an individual level

outcome (e.g., the relationship between workgroup safety climate

and worker safety behavior).

Hitt et al. (2007) traced the historical impact that multilevel

theory has had on traditional organizational theory and research.

With the development of the multilevel perspective, traditional

psychologists began to recognize the importance of context in

shaping and constraining behavior that takes place within organizations and groups (Hitt et al., 2007; Johns, 2006). For traditional

economists and sociologists, this perspective highlighted the

importance of the individual in shaping and creating the context

of organizations (Hitt et al., 2007; Schneider, 2006). A multilevel

perspective has, then, helped to clarify and refine the nature of

context in organizations—the different types of contextual variables and the various mechanisms through which they can be

formed.

A byproduct of this perspective is a classification scheme and

typology of distinct multilevel constructs; each distinct type having its own theoretical and methodological idiosyncrasies. Important to this classification scheme is the recognition of the

difference between the level of measurement and the level of analysis (Klein et al., 1994; Rousseau, 1985). Rousseau (1985) defined

the level of measurement as ‘‘the [organizational] unit to which

the data are directly attached’’ and the level of analysis as ‘‘the

[organizational] unit to which the data are assigned for hypothesis

testing and statistical analysis’’ (p. 4). With this recognition comes

the realization that a higher level theoretical construct (one that

exists at the level of the workgroup, department, division, etc.)

can be measured at the individual level and then aggregated up

to the higher level for analysis purposes (emergent, bottom-up

constructs), or measured and analyzed at the higher level (global,

top-down constructs) (Chen et al., 2004; Kozlowski and Klein,

2000; Klein and Kozlowski, 2000). Each of these general types of

higher level constructs has distinct methodological and construct

validity concerns.

Global constructs can be described as objective, descriptive, and

observable characteristics of a group (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000).

Distinct from bottom-up processes which form emergent constructs, global constructs do not originate (nor emerge) from individual characteristics. Rather, they are independent of individual

perceptions, attitudes, behaviors, or other characteristics and can

be seen as a representation of the collective group. For global constructs, the level of measurement and analytical inference are consistent and both exist at the level at which hypotheses are derived

(Chen et al., 2004). Global constructs can be further conceptualized

as those that can vary between groups but not within groups

(Bliese and Jex, 2002).

Considering the HSMS definition (i.e., a set of commonly purposed and complementary H&S management practices, policies,

and procedures) and its prominent characteristics (e.g., a topdown, controllable phenomena that must be proactively developed

and administered by organizational leaders) an HSMS may be more

consistent with a global construct than an emergent one. Based on

the most fundamental properties that all strategically designed

organizational HSMS share, an HSMS may be most appropriately

studied as a structural aspect of the organization which provides

a context for how work is performed. The choices as to which elements and corresponding policies, practices, and procedures make

up the HSMS may indeed be informed through the values of executives and top-managers and/or through the influence of workers;

however, the codified choices exist independently of them (Mearns

et al., 2003).

1 Where safety climate can be generally defined as socially construed indications of

desired role behavior originating from interpretations of the organizational health

and safety management policies, procedures, and programs (Zohar and Luria, 2005).
224 P.L. Yorio et al. / Safety Science 72 (2015) 221–228

This view is consistent with recent developments in the theory

that underpins safety culture (Edwards et al., 2013). Edwards et al.

(2013) argued that, to improve its understandability, the concept

of safety culture should be viewed in terms of its three fundamental components: normative, anthropological, and pragmatic elements. The normative element reflects the readily controllable

attributes of the organization such as the policies and procedures

contained within the HSMS. The anthropological element reflects

the beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions that support the

implementation of the normative attributes. And the pragmatic

aspects of safety culture incorporate the observable behaviors

and norms and, therefore, the implementation of the policies, procedures, and practices contained within the HSMS.

Thus, consistent with the strategic management literature

(Becker and Huselid, 2006), HSMS may be studied within organizations as two district constructs: the strategically developed HSMS

and HSMS implementation. The strategically developed HSMS represents the decreed and codified practice content designed by the

strategic leaders and top managers of the organization. Its implemented counterpart is comprised of the actual front-line supervisor and worker H&S related behaviors based on perceptions and

interpretations of the strategic system. This proposition is consistent with Zohar and Tenne-Gazit (2008) suggestion that the

...assessment of [H&S] policies, procedures, and practices can

be quite complex, requiring, among other things, the establishment of differences between formally declared policies and procedures and their enforced counterparts. Formal policy is

explicit, relating to overt statements and formal procedures,

while enforced policy or enacted practices are tacit...(p. 376).

Seemingly then, the validity of the inferences derived from an

empirical study depend, in one respect, on who within an organization (e.g., top leaders and/or managers, front-line supervisors,

or workers) is asked to provide information regarding the HSMS

content. As opposed to measuring a strategic HSMS by asking

workers to provide their perceptions (which may vary from one

person to the next), the strategically designed and developed HSMS

may be most appropriately assessed through the use of archival

data and/or key informants who hold the responsibility of its strategic design, development, and continuous improvement. Similarly, when empirical investigations are designed to study HSMS

implementation, behavioral norms may be observed or inquiries

made from workgroup front-line supervisors.

2.4. Assessing the content of a strategic HSMS: biases and techniques

to increase measurement validity

Just as multilevel theory can be used to illuminate the importance of organizational levels when measuring the content of a

strategic HSMS, it can also be used to illuminate the most important sources of measurement error and threats to construct validity

when the level of measurement and inference are appropriate.

To the extent that the strategic HSMS is objective and easily

observable, a single expert (or key informant) can be the appropriate source of data (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). Key informants

should be chosen based on their specialized knowledge or position

and be used to provide information on the structural properties of

the HSMS as opposed to their feelings or opinions (Chen et al.,

2004; Kozlowski and Klein, 2000; Bagozzi et al., 1991). Various

types of archival data and/or information provided by key informants (via surveys with various response options, interviews, log

books, journals) are all sources of evidence that can be used to

measure an HSMS for empirical research purposes.

However, as organizations change and evolve, informal changes

in the strategic HSMS may be more or less inconsistent with

archival data and/or may be imprecise in the minds of the top organizational leaders and managers. Given these dilemmas, method

variance is a potentially important form of measurement error in

the assessment of an HSMS as well as other organizational management systems (Gerhart et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2000). Method

variance has been described as a systematic source of measurement error that is due to the measurement method rather than

to the construct of interest and its sources can include inaccurate

or outdated archived records, limitations of key informants, as well

as informant biases (Bagozzi et al., 1991).

In short, even when the level of measurement and inference

are consistent, method variance can lead to an inaccurate assessment of the strategic HSMS, thereby calling into question the

validity of the inferences drawn from empirical tests related to

it. Given such high stakes, it is important that empirical H&S

researchers take steps to counteract the potential influence of

method variance and provide validity evidence for the HSMS. A

classic approach to address the potential negative influence of

method variance that has been previously applied is the multiple

measures-multiple methods approach (Bagozzi et al., 1991;

Wright et al., 2000). As an example, Chen et al. (2004) recommend

the use of one or more key informants which can be combined

with archival data to measure global constructs. Through a multiple measures-multiple methods approach, various forms of

construct validity evidence can be derived using psychometric,

correlational, ANOVA, and/or factor analysis approaches (e.g. estimates of reliability and inter-rater agreement indices, convergent/

discriminant analyses, and variance partitioned into sources of

error).

The use of more sophisticated methods to validate a global construct depends, to some extent, on the existing evidence that

method variance is an issue in a particular study. Over the last decade within the strategic human resource management (SHRM) literature, theorists and researchers have debated the extent to

which method variance affects the measurement of objective,

SHRM policies, practices, and procedures. Gerhart et al. (2000)

called into question the traditional, single-source key informant

method to measure SHRM practices and policies when they argued

that using a single organization-level manager introduces unacceptable levels of method variance due to rater bias. In contrast,

Huselid and Becker (2000) argue that a single key informant can

be used to accurately measure SHRM practices.

Huselid and Becker (2000) suggest that in lieu of the multiple

key informant and supporting psychometric evidence, sufficient

construct validity evidence can be provided through organizational

contextual variables that suggest method variance may not be an

issue. They suggest that increases in employee count and complex

internal and external structures (e.g. union status, layers of management, number of divisions/departments, subsidiary status)

can increase the potential for method variance when measuring

SHRM policies and procedures. In the absence of such moderating

conditions, however, they argue that a single key informant is

capable of providing an accurate assessment.

3. A conceptual model

Consistent with the discussion thus far, Fig. 1 presents a

conceptual HSMS model that differentiates between its strategy

and its implementation. The model suggests that the top organizational leadership is responsible for strategically developing,

articulating, recording, and communicating the strategic organizational HSMS. HSMS implementation represents the execution of

the policies and practices contained within the strategic organizational HSMS. It is through the behaviorally enacted policies,

practices, and procedures contained within the HSMS (HSMS

implementation) at the workgroup and worker level that the
HSMS Implementaton 

(A pragmatc cultural 

atribute) 

H&S outcomes: 

decrease in 

injuries, illnesses, 

H&S incidents 

Organizatonal 

leadership 

values 

Strategic HSMS 

(A normatve 

cultural atribute) 

Enacted safety policies, 

practces, procedures 

Workgroup 

leadership 

Organizatonal values 

(an anthropological cultural atribute) 

Worker perceptons 

and interpretatons of 

the strategic HSMS 

P.L. Yorio et al. / Safety Science 72 (2015) 221–228 225

Fig. 1. HSMS conceptual model.

benefits of decreased injuries, illnesses, and H&S incidents are

expected to be realized.

The argued distinctions between the strategic HSMS and its

implementation illuminate the prominent, somewhat generalizable contingencies that determine the extent to which HSMS

implementation preserves the H&S practices, procedures and programs contained in the strategic HSMS as intended. Based on a

review of the strategic management literature, we identified three

distinct theoretical constructs that can moderate or mediate the

relationship between the organizational HSMS, its implementation

and overall success: workgroup leadership, organizational values,

and worker perceptions and interpretations of the HSMS. Each of

the three contingencies important to the success of the HSMS is

discussed in more detail below.

3.1. Workgroup leadership

Numerous theoretical and empirical works have positioned

group H&S leadership to be a critical component to the success

of an organizational HSMS. Naumann and Bennett (2000) suggest

that the importance of workgroup leadership at the supervisory

level is paramount to orchestrating and shaping individual perceptions of organizational characteristics. Theory suggests that HSMS

are most likely to be effective when the codified management

practices are administered and managed by quality leaders in a

consistent and disciplined manner with unwavering attention to

the values that informed the HSMS choices (Denison, 1996). Visible

leadership (Naumann and Bennett, 2000), informing leadership

(Gonalez-Roma et al., 2002), transformational leadership

(Zacharatos et al., 2005; Zohar and Tenne-Gazit, 2008), constructive leadership (Zohar, 2002a), and leader-member exchange

(LMX) (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999) have all been found to be

associated with favorable perceptions of HSMS.

As reflected in the model, the leadership contingency is not

integral to the strategically designed organizational HSMS. From

a strategic management perspective, the selective appointment

of individuals who have displayed desirable leadership characteristics is the extent to which strategy has direct control over this

HSMS implementation contingency. Significant components of

leadership exist as person-based, inherent to the personality and

the idiosyncratic experience of the individual leader (Judge and

Bono, 2000). Further, prominent concepts of leadership suggest

that worker perceptions of strategic management and safety

management practices are shaped through unique leader-member

interactions that take place (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Graen

and Uhl-Bien, 1995). Thus, once a workgroup leader has assumed

his/her role, workers within the workgroup will necessarily look

to him/her for cues as to how to interpret the content and the

importance of the HSMS. Therefore individual interpretations of

HSMS policies, practices, and procedures are derived in part from

workgroup leadership, and in some cases, the leaders of other

proximal groups.

In line with this argument, many strategic HSMS models

include leadership elements and practices that are believed to

develop more effective H&S leaders, managers, and supervisors.

For example, the National Mining Association’s Health and Safety

Management System (CORESafety)—a strategic organizational

HSMS designed for the mining industry—incorporates ‘leadership

development’ administrative practices such as: identification and

communication of desired leadership competencies; the use of

360 degree feedback systems for leadership development

purposes; and personal development plans for leaders.

3.2. Organizational values

In addition to workgroup leadership, organizational values, an

aspect of anthropologic safety culture (Edwards et al., 2013), are

an important source of information that workers use to make sense

of the enacted HSMS polices, practices, and procedures. Values at

work have been defined as evaluative standards relating to work

or the work environment by which individuals discern what is

right/wrong and the importance of competing preferences when

making decisions (Finegan, 2000). Health and safety academic

research suggests, for example, the organizational values related

to organizational loyalty, open communication, trust, high quality

social relationships, learning, continuous improvement, safe work,

work demands, job control/autonomy, and how to handle safety

incidents are critical for safety performance success (Edwards

et al., 2013; Hale et al., 2010; Colley et al., 2013; Zammuto et al.,

2000).

As implied in the model (reflected by the one-headed arrow

from organizational values to worker perceptions and interpretations of the HSMS) and consistent with previous research, a direct,

independent influence of organizational values on worker perceptions and interpretations of the HSMS is hypothesized. Zohar and

Tenne-Gazit (2008) suggest that individuals engage in active
226 P.L. Yorio et al. / Safety Science 72 (2015) 221–228

communication with other organizational members in an attempt

to arrive at some mutual understanding and interpretation of the

organizational context. They further suggest that, as uncertainty

increases, individuals may seek to model the construed values

and perceptions of others in a way that aligns with their selfinterpretations.

Also, as implied in the model, values that exist within the organization can change (albeit slowly) through the influence of the

organizational leaders. The extent to which organizational leaders

can influence these values depends on their degree of contact,

communication, and visibility within the organization (thus, the

arrow that reflects the influence of top organizational managers

on organizational values is dashed). Further, shared organizational

values can change over time via the consistently implemented, and

eventually institutionalized, practices and policies within the

HSMS (reflected by the one-headed arrow from HSMS implementation to organizational values). Consistently implemented HSMS

practices and policies over time can bridge weak ties, foster H&S

cooperation, create formal and informal opportunities for H&S

communication and trust building between coworkers, and

enhance norms around organizational learning thereby having a

direct influence on the values that exist within the organization

(Evans and Davis, 2005). Finally, given that workgroup leadership

has direct and frequent interactions with workers, workgroup

leaders are most likely to influence and be influenced by the organizational values (reflected by the two-headed arrow between

workgroup leadership and organizational values).

3.3. Worker perceptions and interpretations of an HSMS

The place of worker perceptions and interpretations of the

HSMS as the proximal antecedent of HSMS implementation is consistent with the Neal and Griffin (2002) model of safety performance in which they theorized that safety climate precedes

safety behaviors. Thus, individual or aggregated worker perceptions and interpretations of the HSMS may be considered to be

an indicator of the effectiveness of the set of strategic organizational HSMS policies, practices, and procedures chosen.

As an indicator of HSMS effectiveness (and from an empirical

research perspective), worker perceptions of an HSMS can be used

in numerous ways. Perceptions of HSMS can be left at the worker

level and analyzed for practical or empirical purposes. When

aggregation of the individually measured perceptions is desired,

the degree of variance among worker perceptions within a group

is an important consideration. Low variance among a distribution

of perceptual ratings2 can be used to justify aggregation of the

individually measured perceptions of an HSMS to a workgroup or

organizational level as an emergent construct (most often operationalized as a component within a safety culture model or as safety

climate). Multilevel theory suggests these emergent models can be

categorized as consensus and referent shift composition models of

emergence3 (Chen et al., 2004; Kozlowski and Klein, 2000; Klein

and Kozlowski, 2000). When the conditions of agreement and

reliability for the group of worker’s HSMS perceptions have been

satisfied, the average perceptual score is then a meaningful representation of the group and can be subsequently used as an indicator

2 As demonstrated through satisfactory levels of within group agreement and

reliability using statistical indexes such as the rWG, aWG, ADM, ADmd, and intraclass

correlations-ICC(1) and ICC(2). For a complete review of these measures and their

suggested cutoff values see LeBreton and Senter (2008). 3 Where the difference between consensus and referent shift models is reflected in

the reference for the items used to capture worker perceptions. Consensus models are

evaluated at the individual level using measurement items that refer to the individual

in question (e.g., ‘Safety is my priority at work’). Referent shift models shift the

referent to the collective level prior to measurement (e.g., ‘Safety is a priority in my

work group’).

of HSMS effectiveness for management review purposes and/or in

empirical research models.

In addition to the preceding approach to aggregation, there is

growing interest in using the dispersion among perceptions of

HSMS as an important indicator of HSMS effectiveness. This is

accomplished through the use of, for example, the standard deviation of the perceptions of HSMS rather than the average. The

degree of dispersion among individual perceptions of organizational safety policies, practices, procedures, and goals is commonly

referred to as the ‘strength’ of HSMS perceptions (sometimes

operationalized as ‘safety climate strength’).

Theories of perceptual strength are grounded in Mischel (1973)

distinction between strong and weak contexts. Mischel (1973)

argues that contexts are powerful to the extent that they: (1) lead

all individuals within the group to construe the particular context

in the same way; (2) induce uniform expectancies regarding the

most appropriate response pattern; and (3) instill the skills necessary for satisfactory construction and execution. Mischel (1973)

goes on to argue that individuals have increasing control over personal responses when a given context is weak and unstructured

(i.e., where situational variables are unstructured, any personal

response is equally likely and variance of individual differences

will be greatest). Conversely, when situational variables are strong

and structured, a limited number of reinforced responses are

appropriate and variability between personal responses will be

minimized. Theory and research within the strategic management

and organizational behavior disciplines suggest that the perceptual

strength may be a fundamentally important indicator of management systems effectiveness and an important contingency within

the management system-organizational performance link (Bowen

and Ostroff, 2004).

The notion of strength within perceptions of HSMS suggests

that there is a distinction between groups of individuals that all

share similar interpretations of the organization’s H&S policies,

practices, procedures, goals, and behavioral expectations (e.g., a

strong safety climate) and groups of individuals who do not share

similar interpretations (e.g., a weak safety climate). As strength

increases, the heterogeneity in individual responses can be used

to form the basis of hypotheses related to individual and collective

outcomes. For example, strong perceptions of the HSMS within a

group that has a high ‘level’ (or average score) should hypothetically lead to uniform safety behaviors and increased group safety

performance. Because HSMS are designed to mitigate all risk an

organization is exposed to (including both human and hardware

factors), perceptions of the HSMS serve as one of the many metrics

that can be used by H&S executives and top-managers to determine how effective the HSMS is performing.

4. Conclusion and suggestions for future research

Throughout this manuscript, a detailed discussion of the application of multilevel and strategic management theory and methods to relevant issues within occupational H&S theory and

research was presented—the primary goal being to provide an

operational definition of a strategic HSMS and to discuss the

sources of measurement error and construct validation issues relevant to HSMS for research purposes. Because both measurement

error and construct validity are critical components to the validity

of inferences made for any empirical study, the methodological

processes advocated within the multilevel framework arguably

provide the prospect for more accurate empirical estimates of

effect. Thus, based on the findings and recommendations of

Robson et al. (2007) this article may serve to bring the H&S academic community one step closer to a homogeneous approach to

empirical measurement of an HSMS and provide insight to the
P.L. Yorio et al. / Safety Science 72 (2015) 221–228 227

potential measurement biases and limitations to the approach chosen. Through the operational definition, and by distinguishing

between the strategic and implementation aspects of an HSMS,

contingencies important to the success of the overall system were

also discussed. The potential benefits of these arguments, and the

corresponding conceptual model presented, include stronger H&S

theory development opportunities and a broader range of hypotheses that can be generated.

The conceptual model enables research questions to be developed regarding which aspects of the strategic HSMS may be important to its success and worthy of future theoretical development

and empirical investigation. The conceptual HSMS model presented suggests that the strategically designed organizational

HSMS must pass through several ‘barriers’ prior to its implementation. Therefore, characteristics related to the content and communication of it can be important determinants of its success. Based

on a review of the broader strategic management literature

(Bowen and Ostroff, 2004; Delery and Shaw, 2001; Way, 2002),

the potential effectiveness of an HSMS may depend on: (1) the

consistency among the strategically developed practices; (2) the

representativeness and relevance of the practices to the actual

workplace risk; and (3) the visibility and understandability of the

organizational HSMS.

Advancement of the conceptual HSMS model and empirical

attempts to answer the future research questions noted above

are encouraged. Obtaining answers to these important research

questions not only requires that the content of the HSMS be accurately assessed, but it also requires that creative and innovative

research designs be utilized. Appropriate research designs include

well thought out quantitative and/or qualitative, cross sectional or

longitudinal, field observations within or across organizational

units (e.g., Arocena and Nunez, 2010; Hale et al., 2010;

Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010; Yorio and Wachter, 2014) as well

as innovative field experiments where interventions can be manipulated across experimental and control units (Grant and Hofmann,

2011; Zohar, 2002b; Zohar and Polachek, 2014). It is hoped,

through this fundamental effort to better understand an organizational HSMS as an independent construct within the H&S

discipline, we will begin to more fully understand the important

role it can serve in injury and illness prevention.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Paul Bliese for constructive and

insightful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. The

findings and conclusions in this report are those of the author(s)

and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Institute

for Occupational Safety and Health. Mention of any company

name, product, or software does not constitute endorsement by

NIOSH.

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