1

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:

JOHN PATRICK STOKES,

Debtor.

BAP No. MT-21-1113-BGT

Bk. No. 9:21-bk-90013-JDP

MEMORANDUM∗

JOHN PATRICK STOKES, 

Appellant.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the District of Montana

Jim D. Pappas, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: BRAND, GAN, and TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judges.

John Patrick Stokes appeals an order denying his motion to recuse the 

bankruptcy judge from his case, which is the fifth bankruptcy case Stokes has 

filed since 2009. The primary basis for Stokes's most recent bankruptcy filings 

in 2018 and 2021 is a dispute over what is known as the Raven Way Property, 

which LSF8 Master Participation Trust ("LSF8") purchased at a trustee's sale in 

2016.

The Hon. Jim D. Pappas was assigned to Stokes's 2018 bankruptcy case. 

In that case, Judge Pappas granted LSF8 relief from the automatic stay to 

∗ This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for 

whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential 

value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.

FILED

FEB 1 2022

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
2

continue with its eviction efforts against Stokes. Thereafter, the state court 

awarded LSF8 possession of the Raven Way Property. Stokes's 2021 

bankruptcy case preempted the possession judgment. Despite contrary 

rulings from the bankruptcy court, this Panel, and the state court, Stokes 

continues to assert that he is the owner of the Raven Way Property, not LSF8.

Judge Pappas was also assigned to the 2021 bankruptcy case. Stokes 

filed an "Affidavit of Prejudice" requesting that Judge Pappas disqualify 

himself from the case. Stokes's reasons for seeking recusal centered on events 

and court rulings from his 2018 case. After a hearing, Judge Pappas denied the 

recusal motion, determining that Stokes's allegations of bias or prejudice were 

unsupported and that he failed to establish any basis for recusal.1

Stokes does not contend that Judge Pappas applied an incorrect legal 

standard for recusal. Rather, he argues that Judge Pappas has an "extreme 

bias" against him, and that it was error for him to preside over this case or 

issue any orders.

Stokes did not present any evidence in the bankruptcy court, nor any 

reasoned argument in this appeal, that would support recusal under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455.2 His claims of alleged bias, prejudice, or lack of impartiality all involve

procedural or substantive rulings the judge made during the course of the 

1 The 2021 bankruptcy case has been dismissed. The order denying recusal became a 

final appealable order once the bankruptcy court entered the final order dismissing the 

case. See Seidel v. Durkin (In re Goodwin), 194 B.R. 214, 221 (9th Cir. BAP 1996).

2 Stokes did not even address the recusal motion at oral argument. After oral 

argument, he filed a letter to the Panel. We generally do not consider filings after an appeal 

has been submitted. However, even if we did consider it, the letter requests relief on 
3

proceedings which Stokes perceived as adverse. That the judge later referred 

to Stokes as a "squatter" in granting LSF8 retroactive annulment from the stay 

did not demonstrate bias or prejudice; it was simply the judge's assessment of 

a fact based on the possession judgment issued by the state court.

Stokes clearly disagrees with some of Judge Pappas's prior rulings and 

wishes to relitigate them. However, bias, prejudice, or lack of impartiality 

cannot be challenged by a litigant on the basis that the litigant disagrees with 

the judge's rulings or orders. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); 

Com. Paper Holders v. Hine (In re Beverly Hills Bancorp), 752 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th 

Cir. 1984) (adverse rulings alone are legally insufficient to require recusal, 

even when the number of such adverse rulings is extraordinarily high on a 

statistical basis). The vehicle for challenging such disagreements or purported 

errors is an appeal, a procedure with which Stokes is familiar. See F.J. Hanshaw 

Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001) 

("Judges are known to make procedural and even substantive errors on 

occasion. The errors alleged here would be the basis for appeal, not recusal.").

Because Stokes did not demonstrate any bias, prejudice, or lack of 

impartiality, Judge Pappas did not abuse his discretion in denying the recusal 

motion. See In re Goodwin, 194 B.R. at 220 (order denying a motion to recuse is 

reviewed for abuse of discretion).

We AFFIRM.

matters that are not properly before us.