In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2470

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROSIVITO HOSKINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond

Division.

No. 99-CR-117--Rudy Lozano, Judge.

Argued February 22, 2001--Decided March 21,

2001

 Before BAUER, COFFEY, and MANION, Circuit

Judges.

 COFFEY, Circuit Judge. Rosivito Hoskins

was convicted for being a felon in

possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. sec.

922(g)(1), and sentenced to 293 months

imprisonment and five years supervised

release. Hoskins appeals, arguing that he

was denied his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel at sentencing when the district

court refused to appoint substitute

counsel after Hoskins discharged his

appointed counsel. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On August 19, 1999, a federal grand jury

indicted Rosivito Hoskins for being a

felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1).

Hoskins went to trial on November 29,

1999, with Mr. Michael W. Bosch as his

court-appointed counsel. On December 2,

1999, the jury informed the trial judge

that they had been unable to reach a

unanimous verdict at the time, and

shortly thereafter the court granted the

government’s motion for a mistrial. A

second trial commenced on December 10,
1999, and the jury returned a verdict of

guilty. The trial court scheduled

sentencing for March 9, 2000.

 On March 6, 2000, Hoskins filed pro se

a motion entitled "Emergency Notification

of ineffective assistance of counsel"

that included complaints about his

appointed attorney and objections to the

presentence investigation report (PSIR).

Hoskins asserted that his appointed

counsel, Mr. Bosch, "failed to object to

various parts of the report which . . .

[were] inaccurate, . . . and that there

[were] legal objections . . . that

counsel should [have] pursued." In

response to Hoskins’s motion, the

district court held a hearing March 7,

2000, on Hoskins’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. At the outset of

the hearing, the court engaged in

thefollowing colloquy with Hoskins:

 THE COURT: Mr. Hoskins, I will tell you

now that when I appoint an attorney, it

does not guarantee a result, number one.

Number two, when I appoint an attorney,

that does not guarantee that I will give

you another attorney. Do you understand?

 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

 THE COURT: If you discharge your

attorney and I will tell [you] if you

discharge him, you have complete control

over that. You can fire him, but I may

not give you another attorney; and you

may have to represent yourself pro se. Do

you understand me?

 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

 After warning Hoskins that he might have

to proceed pro se if he chose to

discharge his attorney, the court asked

him why he wanted to terminate Mr.

Bosch’s services. Hoskins responded only,

"because he’s not in my best interests."

The court then asked Hoskins on what was

he basing his belief, and Hoskins stated

that he had been "sitting over in MCC for

almost eighty days, and this is the first

time [he had] seen" Mr. Bosch since the

conclusion of the trial. Despite further

inquiry, the trial judge was unable to

elicit any other information from Hoskins

as to the reasons for his dissatisfaction

with his appointed attorney.

Nevertheless, the court offered to grant

Hoskins a continuance in order that he
might talk further with Mr. Bosch,

specifically about his objections to the

PSIR, but Hoskins responded stating that

he "doubt[ed]" that would satisfy him. 

 The court continued its attempt to

determine the basis for Hoskins’s

dissatisfaction with his appointed

attorney, Mr. Bosch, apart from Mr.

Bosch’s failure to visit Hoskins after

his conviction. But Hoskins only repeated

that he didn’t "think [counsel] has the

best of interest to defend me." When

asked for the specific basis for his

opinion, Hoskins responded "[b]ecause

that’s the way I feel." The court

described Hoskins’s motion as "a stall

tactic." Accordingly, because Hoskins had

provided no reason for the appointment of

substitute counsel, the court denied his

request for new counsel as untimely. 

 After the court denied Hoskins’s request

for other counsel, it proceeded to

discuss the ramifications of discharging

his present-appointed counsel. The court

explained to Hoskins that he had denied

his motion for a new attorney, and that

it was his choice now between

representing himself or keeping Mr. Bosch

as his counsel. The court further advised

Hoskins that he would be far better off

being defended by a trained lawyer and

that it would be "unwise" to defend

himself because of the complexity of the

legal issues involved. The court then

asked him if he had ever studied the law

or applied the Sentencing Guidelines, and

Hoskins responded that he had not.

Although Hoskins responded that he was

"not going to represent [himself,]" he

persisted in expressing his desire to

discharge Mr. Bosch. At this time, the

court repeated its offer to grant Hoskins

a continuance to allow him to talk with

Mr. Bosch and reconsider his decision.

Hoskins accepted the continuance, and the

trial judge continued the hearing on

Hoskins’s motion to March 15, 2000.

 At the continued hearing, the court

again informed Hoskins that his choices

were to proceed pro se or to continue

with Mr. Bosch as his appointed counsel.

The court also provided Hoskins still

another opportunity to explain why he was

not satisfied with Mr. Bosch, but Hoskins

only repeated the same arguments he had

made at the March 9 hearing. Ultimately,

when faced with the choice between
proceeding with Mr. Bosch and

representing himself, Hoskins stated that

he "want[ed] to fire [Mr. Bosch] and go

pro se." Accordingly, the court

discharged Mr. Bosch, but also granted a

second continuance, now rescheduling the

sentencing hearing for April 21, 2000, so

that Hoskins might retain counsel. 

 On April 21, 2000, Hoskins asked the

court for another continuance so that his

mother could obtain a loan on her house

and apply those proceeds to obtain

counsel. The court granted this

continuance, but warned Hoskins that the

sentencing would proceed on May 23, 2000,

regardless of whether Hoskins had

successfully obtained counsel. Hoskins

agreed to "be ready to go with or

without" counsel. On May 23, 2000, the

court conducted Hoskins’s sentencing

hearing. Hoskins advised the court that

he had been unable to retain substitute

counsel, and thus proceeded to represent

himself pro se. The court sentenced

Hoskins to the maximum allowed in the

Sentencing Guidelines, 293 months

imprisonment and five years supervised

release.

II. ISSUES

 Hoskins asserts on appeal that the

district court’s refusal to appoint new

counsel after it discharged his appointed

counsel denied him his Sixth Amendment

right to counsel at sentencing because

Hoskins claims that: 1) he had not waived

his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and

2) even if he had waived his right to

counsel, he did not do so knowingly and

intelligently. We review de novo the

district court’s finding of a waiver of

the right to counsel. United States v.

Altier, 91 F.3d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 1996).

III. DISCUSSION

 Hoskins was entitled to counsel during

sentencing. Rini v. Katzenbach, 403 F.2d

697 (7th Cir. 1968). Like other

constitutional rights, the right to the

assistance of counsel can be waived.

United States v. Sandles, 23 F.3d 1121,

1126 (7th Cir. 1994). If a criminal

defendant seeks to waive his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, he must do so

knowingly and intelligently. United

States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816, 828 (7th

Cir. 2000). In determining whether a
defendant has knowingly and intelligently

waived his right to counsel, we will

"’indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver.’" United States v. Goad,

44 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting

United States v. Belanger, 936 F.2d 916,

919 (7th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted)).

It is not necessary, however, "’that the

defendant verbally waive his right to

counsel; so long as the district court

has given a defendant sufficient

opportunity to retain the assistance of

appointed counsel, defendant’s actions

which have the effect of depriving

himself of appointed counsel will

establish a knowing and intentional choice.’"

Irorere, 228 F.3d at 828 (quoting United

States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 642 (7th

Cir. 1989)).

 Hoskins initially argues that he never

unequivocally waived his right to

counsel. In support Hoskins points to his

desire to retain counsel and to the

portion of his colloquy before the

district court wherein he stated, "I’m

not going to represent myself pro se."

But although Hoskins claims that he made

it clear he wanted substitute counsel, he

also clearly signaled his willingness to

proceed pro se if Bosch were his only

choice. During the colloquy, Hoskins

stated that he "want[ed] to fire [Mr.

Bosch] and go pro se." Further, the trial

judge repeatedly warned Hoskins that he

might not appoint other counsel if

Hoskins chose to fire Mr. Bosch.

Moreover, the trial judge explicitly

ruled that it would not appoint

substitute counsel before Hoskins decided

whether to discharge Mr. Bosch. Thus,

Hoskins was fully aware when he made his

decision to discharge Mr. Bosch that he

would have to proceed pro se unless he

retained counsel. See Oimen v.

McGaughtry, 130 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir.

1997) (defendant’s insistence on

discharging counsel held to be a waiver

of the right to counsel where he was

warned that he might not get new

counsel). Accordingly, Hoskins made his

choice "with eyes open," United States v.

Avery, 208 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

806, 835 (1975)), and his hope to retain

counsel does not make his waiver

equivocal.

 Hoskins next argues that, even if he did

waive his right to counsel, his waiver
was not knowingly and intelligently made.

We examine four factors in considering

whether a defendant’s waiver was knowing

and intelligent: 1) the extent of the

court’s inquiry into the defendant’s

decision; 2) other evidence in the record

that establishes whether the defendant

understood the dangers and disadvantages

of self-representation, 3) the background

and experience of the defendant, and 4)

the context of the defendant’s decision

to proceed pro se. United States v. MoyaGomez, 860 F. 2d 706, 735-36 (1988);

Sandles, 23 F.3d at 1126. The district

court is in the best position to assess

whether a defendant has knowingly and

intelligently waived counsel, and we will

most likely uphold the trial judge’s

decision to honor or deny the defendant’s

request to represent himself where the

judge has made the proper inquiries and

conveyed the proper information, and

reaches a reasoned conclusion about the

defendant’s understanding of his rights

and the voluntariness of his decision. 

Goad, 44 F.3d at 588 (quoting United

States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1383

(7th Cir. 1991)).

 Based on our review of the record, we

are satisfied that the district court

made an adequate inquiry into Hoskins’s

understanding of the advantages and

disadvantages of proceeding pro se. In

this case, the district court engaged in

a lengthy colloquy, over the course of a

two-day hearing, with Hoskins before

discharging Mr. Bosch. In that colloquy,

the district court "advised [Hoskins]

about . . . the benefits associated with

the right to counsel, the pitfalls of

self-representation, and the fact that it

is unwise for one not trained in the law

to try to represent himself." Goad, 44

F.3d at 586 (quoting Berkowitz, 927 F.2d

at 1383). The district court repeatedly

warned Hoskins of the consequences of

proceeding pro se and advised him against

it. It discussed the complexity of the

Sentencing Guidelines and Hoskins’s lack

of familiarity with them. Further, the

court granted a continuance in the

hearing on Hoskins’s motion in order that

Hoskins might confer with Mr. Bosch and

reflect further upon his stated decision.

Finally, the district court explicitly

informed Hoskins that it would not

appoint a substitute counsel before
Hoskins fired Mr. Bosch. Accordingly, we

are convinced that the record as a whole

supports our holding that Hoskins was

provided with sufficient information to

make a knowing and intelligent waiver of

his right to counsel; indeed, we are of

the opinion that the district court did

everything in its power to convince

Hoskins to reconsider his decision to

proceed pro se. 

 The judgment and sentence of the

district court is AFFIRMED.