ENCOURAGING SELF-PROTECTIVE EMPLOYEE BEHAVIOR:

WHAT DO WE KNOW?

Robert H. Peters

U.S. Bureau of Mines

Pittsburgh Research Center

Pittsburgh, PA

INTRODUCTION

 How can employees be stopped from engaging

in unsafe work practices? It is often easier to

prevent employees from performing unsafe acts

through manipulations of the work environment

than through various training or motivational

programs. Therefore, it is important that

accident prevention programs seek to identify the

reasons for the unsafe behavior and to redesign

tasks and the work environment (e.g., tools,

equipment, physical surroundings) in order to

remove employees from sources of harm and to

prevent situations from arising that would

prompt them to perform unsafe acts. 

Unfortunately, in the mining industry the work

environment is often innately hazardous, rapidly

changing, and difficult to predict, making it very

difficult, perhaps impossible, to fully protect the

employee by environmental manipulations. 

Therefore, it is important that effective methods

be identified for influencing mine employees to

work safely.

 Various strategies have been used to convince

employees to avoid unsafe acts and/or adopt selfprotective behaviors. The intent of this article is

to provide guidance to mine operators

concerning the use of four techniques for

influencing mine employees to work safely: (1)

employee surveys, (2) incentives, (3) fear

communications, and (4) disciplinary actions. 

 The usual techniques for discouraging miners

from performing unsafe acts appear to be limited

to verbal warnings made during safety talks

about the dangers of various unsafe acts and

conditions, and in some cases, threats concerning

disciplinary actions that might be taken if

employees violate certain safety rules. However,

these techniques have some significant

drawbacks. The effects of verbal warnings to

avoid dangerous acts or conditions are often of

short duration. After employees have heard

these warnings a couple of times, further

repetitions of the warning probably have little or

no impact. Supervisors are often reluctant to use

formal disciplinary actions because they wish to

avoid interpersonal conflicts and various other

undesirable responses. Also, due to the physical

layout of many mining operations, it is

impossible for supervisors to be able to closely

monitor whether their employees are complying

with the safety rules. This suggests that

admonitions and the creation of regulations or

policies that threaten miners with punishment for

violating safety rules are not a totally sufficient

answer. We need to examine other options as

well.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Employee Surveys

 There is virtually unanimous agreement

among safety experts that employees should be

frequently consulted for ideas about improving

their safety, and that they should be given a say

in establishing new safety procedures and

policies. Because they are the ones most familiar

with their working environment, miners are in a

good position to understand what types of

situations arise that make it tempting to disregard

safety rules. Therefore, mine employees should

be asked to identify situations that are likely to

tempt people to violate safety rules and to

suggest what might be done to prevent these

situations from occurring. This could be

accomplished through interviews, questionnaires,

or small group discussions. 
 Employee surveys often help to reveal aspects

of equipment, work procedures, or policies that

may be inadvertently encouraging employees to

violate safety rules. Employees can often

identify some simple and effective ways to

change equipment, work procedures, or policies

so that situations do not arise in which people are

tempted to violate safety rules.

 Empirical evidence. Several studies have

attempted to identify organizational and safety

program characteristics that differentiate between

companies with good and poor safety records

(Cohen and Cleveland, 1983; National Academy

of Sciences, 1982; Simonds and Shafai-Sahrai,

1977; Smith, Cohen, Cohen, and Cleveland,

1978). A consistent finding of these studies is

that good safety performance is more often found

where there is an open and two-way

communication system between labor and

management and where management encourages

employees to participate in the identification and

control of hazards. 

 O’Green, Peters, and Cecala (1992) report on

the impact of American Electric Power's (AEP)

attempts to reduce back injuries among

employees at their underground coal mining

operations. The primary components of AEP’s

intervention included conducting a survey of the

workforce and forming employee problem

solving groups. The intervention began in 1990. 

In comparison to the number of back injuries

reported in the years 1987, 1988 and 1989, there

was not much change in 1990. However, a rather

substantial reduction was observed in 1991. The

average number of back injuries per year for

1987-89 was 71.3. The number of back injuries

reported in 1991 was only 42, which represents a

41% reduction in back injuries. According to

AEP officials, the number of back injuries

among their miners has declined even further

since 1991 (T. Sands, personal communication,

April 18, 1995).

 A study by the National Institute of

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) also

found that there can be substantial safety benefits

to increased employee participation (Lin and

Cohen, 1983). The study entailed using an

employee-based system of hazard recognition,

reporting, and problem solving at a community

hospital. Over a 12-month period of evaluation,

the hazard reporting rate was one report for every

three full-time hospital workers, indicating

substantial employee involvement. Although the

bulk of this response occurred at the outset of the

program, the reporting rate suggested a stable

level of participation ranging from 5 to 10 new

reports being filed each month from a work force

numbering nearly 1,000. More than 80% of the

employee suggestions for correcting reported

hazards were in fact adopted during the 12-

month monitoring phase of this demonstration. 

A comparison of the injury/illness rate during

this period with the rate during the preceding 12-

month period indicated a declining rate

coincident with the introduction of most of the

corrective measures. 

 Pasmore and Friedlander (1982) report on the

results of an attempt to improve safety through

increased employee involvement at a large plant

where consumer electronic products were

manufactured. The intervention included a

survey of the work force and the formation of

employee problem-solving groups. During the

year prior to the intervention, 75 injuries had

been reported. The number of injuries declined

dramatically during the two year intervention,

and remained at fewer than 20 injuries per year

during the two years following the end of the

intervention. 

 Conclusions. Aside from the studies cited

above, there is not a great deal of empirical

evidence concerning the effects of employee

surveys on safety performance. However, the

available evidence strongly suggests that

employee surveys and problem solving groups

are likely to yield some good ideas regarding the

elimination of unsafe employee behaviors. Mine

safety professionals who are interested in using

interviews to learn more about what motivates

unsafe behavior may want to review Bureau of

Mines Information Circular 9300 (Peters and

Randolph, 1992). This report documents how an

interview technique was used to gain a better
understanding of why some coal miners go inby

roof supports, and what can be done to prevent

this dangerous behavior.

Incentives

 According to operant learning theory,

behavior is a function of the person's

environment and can be modified by rearranging

the consequences of the behavior (Skinner,

1953). Behavior with positively reinforcing

consequences (e.g., increased earnings or

reductions in amount of effort required to do a

task) tends to increase in frequency, whereas

behavior with punishing consequences (e.g.,

disciplinary actions) tends to diminish in

frequency. 

 How does this theory relate to safety

practices? Sulzer-Azaroff (1982) argues that

many unsafe employee practices probably persist

because they are in some way naturally

reinforced. The task may be completed faster,

perhaps resulting in higher earnings or praise and

admiration from peers or supervisors. Quick

completion may also signal the end of a less

preferred task, which in turn permits a shift to a

more preferred activity such as going home,

doing a different job, or break time. It is also

reinforcing to accomplish a given task with less

effort. For example, coal miners should set

temporary roof supports (e.g., safety jacks or

posts) if they need to work in areas where

permanent forms of roof support have not yet

been installed. Setting an adequate number of

temporary supports may require a substantial

amount of effort, and in certain circumstances

some employees neglect to perform this

precautionary action. A frequently cited reason

for neglecting to set temporary supports is that

the person is fatigued or in a hurry, and wishes to

avoid expending the effort and time required to

take this self-protective action. 

 There are also natural punishments for unsafe

practices, such as accidents, injury, damage,

disapproval from others or oneself ("It really isn't

very smart of me to be doing this. One day it

might catch up with me"). But the natural,

negative consequences may be weak, delayed,

and infrequent. The likelihood of an accident

occurring following a particular unsafe act may

be very low. 

 Another problem with relying on the natural

consequences of employees' behavior to keep

them safe is that the performance of a safe work

practice, rather than some unsafe alternative,

often does not result in any type of meaningful

positive reinforcement. What are the natural

consequences of safe practices? Is it the absence

of injury or damage? This is hardly an effective

reinforcing event, since the absence of a rare

event is apt to exert little influence. The absence

of the damage or injury needs to be

supplemented by tangible rewards such as money

or prizes, or by others ("Good. You set posts to

protect yourself from being harmed by a roof

fall"). 

 An analysis of consequential conditions of

both safe and unsafe acts requires that a number

of factors be considered: whether they are

positive, aversive, or potentially very dangerous;

whether they are immediate or delayed; whether

they occur frequently or infrequently; and

whether they are mild or intense. When natural

conditions are such that an unsafe act regularly

results in immediate, strong positive

reinforcement and that any potential punishing

events are irregular, delayed, and generally not

very intense, people are apt to get hurt. SulzerAzaroff (1982) suggests that in cases where all or

some of those conditions prevail, it is advisable

to arrange consequences by design. This might

be accomplished by making the safe practice

more reinforcing by presenting powerful,

positive consequences regularly and with

minimal delay. Alternatively, an effective

punishing approach would be regularly to present

intense negative consequences immediately

following unsafe acts. Or these two approaches

could be combined. (The use of negative

consequences is discussed in the section on

disciplinary actions.) 

 Empirical evidence. A large number of

studies have been performed on the use of
incentives, often in combination with feedback

about safety performance, to increase employees'

compliance with safety rules. Three reviews of

the growing body of empirical evidence on the

use of incentives have been published (McAfee

and Winn, 1989; O'Hara, Johnson, and Beehr,

1985; Sulzer-Azaroff, 1982). All three have

concluded that, when properly performed, this

intervention is quite likely to bring about

significant positive changes in compliance with

safety rules. 

 The most recent review, by McAfee and Winn

(1989), summarizes the findings of 24 studies

that have examined the effectiveness of using

positive reinforcement and feedback. All 24

studies found that incentives or feedback were

successful in improving at least one measure of

safety conditions or reducing accidents. McAfee

cites only two studies in which at least one of the

safety-related behaviors being monitored did not

exhibit improvement (Cohen and Jensen, 1984;

Hopkins, Conrad, Dangel, Fitch, Smith, and

Anger, 1986). Hopkins et al. (1986) found that

training and praise improved the respirator usage

of only one of four sprayers in a gel-coating

department. Apparently, respirator usage was

disagreeable to the other three workers because

of the discomfort and inconvenience involved. 

Similarly, Cohen and Jensen (1984) found that

lift truck operators did not show improvement in

2 of 14 behaviors targeted for change. These

exceptions suggest that, although incentives are

often very effective, they are not a panacea.

 One of the most critical self-protective

behaviors for those who operate surface mine

mobile equipment is the use of safety belts

(Aldinger and Keran, 1994). Mine operators

interested in promoting this behavior should

review the work of Dr. E. Scott Geller. Geller,

Rudd, Kalsher, Streff, and Lehman (1987)

present the results of attempts to motivate safety

belt use through employer-based incentive

programs at seven different sites. They report

that substantial increases in employees' safety

belt use occurred at all 7 of the sites they studied. 

These increases ranged from 77 to 229 percent

above the baseline levels of belt usage. Several

others have also reported very substantial shortterm increases in safety belt use following the

introduction of an incentive program (Kalsher,

Geller, Clarke, and Lehman, 1989; Campbell,

Hunter, and Gemming, 1983; Campbell, Hunter,

Stewart, and Stutts, 1982; Elman and Killebrew,

1978; Horne and Terry, 1983; Spoonhour, 1981).

 Conclusions. It appears that incentives can be

effective in improving compliance with safety

rules. A rather large number of successes have

been reported in the literature. Safety incentive

plans are relatively simple to operate. However,

if they are not set up properly, they are apt to be

ineffective. Cohen, Smith, and Anger (1979)

note that the use of safety incentives can arouse

increased worker and company interest in job

safety. However, they caution that these

incentive plans are no substitute for hazard

control programs having well-established safety

training, housekeeping, safety inspection, and

reporting functions. Rather, the incentive

approach is most effective when used to provide

an added spur to an already well-designed hazard

control program. 

 Recommendations. What does research on

safety incentives suggest regarding their use to

encourage self-protective employee behavior?

(1) Find a baseline by looking at data from prior

time periods, e.g., the preceding month.

(2) Establish a specific criterion of success for

earning the reward.

(3) Give rewards for small but significant

improvements in performance.

(4) Rewards should be relatively small and

should be given relatively often, e.g., monthly.

(5) Use charts to give employees daily feedback

on their progress toward achieving rewards.

(6) Rewards might include: exchangeable tokens

(e.g., trading stamps), ball caps, penknives,

stickers, promotional items, public

commendations, written commendations,

certificates, stock in the company, money, a

chance to win contests, and work-related

privileges.

(7) Supplement the incentive program with

training. Explain why it is important to avoid the

unsafe act, cite accident statistics, show how to
perform various tasks without exposing oneself

to a hazard, etc. 

 One criticism of safety incentive programs is

that they may encourage employees to fail to

report relatively minor types of accidents and

injuries in order to avoid loosing all or a portion

of the reward being offered. One approach to

avoiding this potential outcome is to exclude

incidents that would be easy to hide as a basis for

earning or failing to earn rewards. These

incidents usually consist of near misses and

relatively minor types of accidents and injuries. 

Even though these types of incidents may

produce little if any significant harm, it is

important that they be reported so that actions

can be taken to prevent similar occurrences

which may cause great harm.

Fear Messages

 A substantial amount of empirical research has

been conducted on the effectiveness of fear

messages as a means of encouraging selfprotective behaviors. Leventhal's (1970) model

of the effects of fear messages assumes that a

highly threatening communication will produce

multiple responses: a high level of fear, highly

favorable attitudes toward protective acts, strong

intentions to execute the acts, and a high

probability that protective action will be taken. 

The model also suggests that the strength of this

association will change with the passage of time. 

The changes will depend on the presence or

absence of various factors that stimulate fear and

the presence or absence of factors that encourage

danger control. 

 Empirical evidence. The research evidence is

quite clear in showing that fear communications

can be effective in persuading people to modify

their attitudes and intentions toward adopting

some form of preventive act or treatment in order

to avoid an unwanted outcome (Leventhal, 1970;

Sutton, 1982). Leventhal (1970) cites over 20

empirical studies in which fear messages

produced significant changes in attitudes toward

taking various types of precautionary measures. 

However, only a few studies indicate that the fear

communication produced a statistically

significant increase in adoption of the

recommended preventive action. An even

smaller number of studies have involved

collecting data on actual behavioral changes as a

result of fear communications over a sustained

period of time. According to McGuire (1985),

many researchers have failed to establish an

empirical relationship between various types of

attitudes and behaviors. Thus, one cannot

assume that a change in reported attitude toward

a hazard or a precautionary behavior will result

in a behavior change. Workers who have a longstanding habit of performing unsafe acts often

fail to modify their behavior after exposure to

fear messages, and those who do, often revert to

their old routine after a short period of time.

 Cohen, Colligan, and Berger (1985) identify

several factors other than the content of the

message that also appear to have an important

impact on the effectiveness of attempts to

communicate warnings to employees. They

categorize them as communicator, mode, and

receiver factors. 

 The communicator. Cohen et al. (1985) argue

that the source needs to be perceived as credible,

knowledgeable, and someone whom employees

can identify. In many cases, it is the first line

foreman who best possesses these characteristics. 

There is, in fact, some evidence that the safety

level of a work crew is directly related to the job

safety attitudes of its supervisor (Crisera, Martin,

and Prather, 1977; Vandenput, 1970). When the

supervisor believes that job accidents are

avoidable through exercising proper safeguards,

his/her work crew is more likely to experience a

low accident rate. On the other hand, when the

supervisor accepts work accidents as an

inevitable part of the job, his/her crew is more

likely to have a poor safety record. 

 Communication mode. Cohen et al. (1985)

note that the bulk of evidence suggests that the

spoken word has more persuasive impact than

the written one, and that informal face-to-face

communication is superior to any media

transmission. The greater effectiveness of face-
to-face communication is considered to stem

from its feature of being two-way, eliciting

greater activity from the receiver, and probably

commanding more attention than would be the

case for other media communication. Two-way

communications appear to be more effective in

gaining worker acceptance of safe job practices

than one-way communications, which are

considered more appropriate for presenting

safety directives or warnings (Schlesinger, 1973). 

 Receiver factors. Group perceptions of mass

communication have been shown to greatly

pressure a member individual into message

acceptance (McGuire, 1985). This finding

suggests that social support can be a critical

factor in gaining worker compliance with safe

work practices. Cohen et al. (1979) suggest that

if companies directed safety appeals to workers'

families, it might help to increase the workers'

safety consciousness. Likewise, Nelson (1988)

argues that training programs oriented toward

promoting safety belt use should include efforts

not only to influence the target individual's

attitudes about the use of safety belts, but also

the attitudes of significant others, including

family, peers, or co-workers whose attitudes,

behaviors, and expectations reinforce safety belt

use and, as a significant other, motivate the

individual to comply. 

 Internal versus external motivation. When

fear messages are successful at motivating selfprotective employee behavior, they have an

important advantage over the use of rewards and

punishments imposed by other persons. 

Consider two employees, Al and Bill. Al's

attitude toward wearing safety glasses is: "I will

wear them because my boss wants me to,

however, I really don't think anything bad would

happen if I did not wear them." Through

training, seeing someone else receive an eye

injury, or experiencing a close call of his own,

Bill's attitude has become: "I will wear safety

glasses because I am afraid that my eyes are

going to be seriously hurt." Bill's motivation to

wear safety glasses comes from within, not from

some external agent who punishes or rewards. 

This means that Bill is going to wear them

regardless of whether he is being offered a

reward or threatened with punishment, regardless

of whether anyone is watching, regardless of

whether it would sometimes be more convenient

to work without them, etc. On the other hand,

Al's actions are influenced by many situational

factors. Situations will arise in which he decides

that there really is no good reason to wear safety

glasses. If he is caught working without them

and is in some way punished, he is apt to become

frustrated and hostile toward his supervisor and

management because he feels that he really didn't

do anything wrong. In comparing internal with

external control systems, the one that functions

more effectively is clearly the former. 

 Conclusions. There is also a substantial

amount of empirical evidence to suggest that fear

communications can convince individuals that

they should perform self-protective behavior. 

Unfortunately, many studies have found that this

technique failed to motivate employees to

actually adopt the desired behavior. These

failures may reflect the fact that it is often

difficult to change long-standing habits. Thus,

fear messages may be more effective when used

with new miners rather than miners who have

already been performing their job long enough to

form unsafe work habits. Fear messages may

also be particularly appropriate when they pertain

to behaviors that are very hazardous, but at the

same time, could be viewed as innocuous by new

employees, e.g., going inby roof supports.

 Recommendations. What does research on

fear communications suggest regarding their use

to encourage self-protective employee behavior?

(1) The message should attempt to evoke a high

(versus low) level of fear--high fear of personal

injury or death due to a particular type of

accident and high fear of the consequences of

one's death or disability on one's family.

(2) The suggested preventive actions should be

relatively detailed and specific. The message

needs to show exactly what types of tasks are

considered dangerous and how these tasks can be

performed without making oneself vulnerable to

an accident.

(3) The preventive actions should be presented in
a block, rather than interspersed with information

designed to elicit fear.

(4) It should be made clear that the suggested

preventive actions are an effective deterrent to

being harmed.

(5) The source of the communication should

have high credibility.

(6) Face-to-face, two-way forms of

communication should be employed (as well as

other forms).

(7) Efforts should be made to promote

acceptance of the message by significant others,

e.g., co-workers, supervisors, family.

Disciplinary Actions

 Punishment is defined as the presentation of

an aversive event or the removal of a positive

event following a response, which decreases the

probability of that response (Kazdin, 1975, pp.

33-34). For employees, the potential aversive

consequences of performing an unsafe act

include physical injury, various forms of

disciplinary action, verbal expressions of

disapproval from co-workers or supervisors, fear

of experiencing an accident, etc. 

 Empirical evidence. Many companies

combine safety training with the threat of

disciplinary actions designed to encourage safe

behaviors. However, little evidence exists

regarding the extent to which organizations

actually use these disciplinary procedures to

improve safety or whether this approach is

effective. Nevertheless, various State and

Federal laws require companies to provide

employees with safe and healthy working

conditions, and it is likely that disciplinary action

or at least the threat of disciplinary action is

widely used as a way of discouraging unsafe acts. 

 While many articles have been written

containing "how-to" tips concerning the best way

to set up and use organizational disciplinary

systems, the majority of these tips are not based

on any solid research evidence. Sulzer-Azaroff

(1982) reviewed the empirical evidence on the

effectiveness of punishment to suppress or

eliminate unsafe employee behavior. She cites a

few studies in which the use or threatened use of

punishment brought about significant

improvements in safety performance. However,

she argues that most attempts to improve safety

through the application of aversive consequences

are not very effective because the reinforcement

conditions are less than optimal. "The aversive

consequences are too infrequent, intermittent,

delayed, and often of mild intensity. If aversive

consequences are to be used, then they can be

applied far more effectively than is commonly

the case." Unfortunately, the most effective

application of aversive consequences requires

monitoring individuals continuously in order to

catch each unsafe act and apply aversive

consequences. Obviously, in many work

settings, it would be difficult and expensive to do

this. Nevertheless, some interesting attempts

have been made to improve safety through the

use of aversive consequences. 

 Larson, Schnelle, Kirchner, Carr, Domash and

Risely (1980) performed a study for the

Nashville, TN, police department. The Nashville

police department identified high accident rates

and negligent use of police cars as a serious

problem, and placed a tachograph in each police

vehicle. A tachograph is a clock-driven

recording device that provides a permanent

record of vehicle speed, distance traveled,

nonmovement, and other functions. Officers

were threatened with dismissal for

noncompliance with rules, regulations, and

policies, including safe driving practices. In

actuality, however, no disciplinary action

occurred during the period of the study as a

direct result of the tachograph program

procedures. When the tachograph charts were

inspected by the officers in the higher chains of

command and feedback was delivered to drivers,

there was a major, systematic reduction in speed,

accidents, and injuries across different vehicular

units. Vehicle repair costs were also

substantially reduced, saving many thousands of

dollars over a 1-1/2-year period. 

 Kalsher, et al. (1989) evaluated the use of a

"disincentive" strategy for promoting safety belt

use at a naval base. The base police issued
warning tickets to those who were not buckled. 

Before the intervention began, the baseline rate

of safety belt use was 55%. However, by the end

of the 3 week program, safety belt use had

increased to 79%. 

 A few laboratory investigations have found

that aversive consequences are an effective

deterrent to the occurrence of simulated

accidents (McKelvey, Engen, and Peck, 1973;

Leslie and Adams, 1973; Rubinsky and Smith,

1973). For example, McKelvey (1973)

performed a well-controlled laboratory study of

the impact of a disincentive on rate of behaviors

that were defined as "unsafe" by the

experimenter. He investigated subjects' care in

manipulating a power tool in a simulated

working environment under various incentive

conditions. Subjects operated a punch press that

permitted accidents to occur and be recorded. 

These accidents were rendered harmless through

the addition of special protective parts. It was

found that in comparison with an hourly wage

system, a piece-rate pay system resulted in

significantly higher production, as well as a

significantly higher rate of unsafe behaviors. 

However, in the experimental condition where

subjects' equipment was shut down for 5 minutes

after each instance of an unsafe act (depriving

them of the opportunity to increase the number

of pieces produced), the rate of unsafe acts was

significantly lower. In fact, it was nearly

identical to the accident rate for subjects working

in the hourly pay condition. 

 This suggests that (a) economic penalty might

be effective in reducing unsafe work behaviors

and (b) production-based pay systems, unless

provisions are made for penalizing unsafe

behavior, may increase the rate of unsafe acts. 

Of course, additional research on this issue is

needed before coming to any firm conclusions. 

 Arvey and Jones (1985) reviewed studies that

have examined the influence of discipline on

employees' compliance with various types of

organizational rules. They report that (a) only a

few studies have investigated the effects of

punishment on behaviors that the organization

wished to suppress or eliminate, (b) the majority

of these studies have been concerned with

reducing employee absenteeism, and © the

predominant finding is that punitive systems to

control employee absenteeism are generally

effective when these tactics are used in

combination with a reward system of some type

(Kempen and Hall, 1977; Kopelman and

Schneller, 1981; Baum, 1978). 

 Conclusions. There appears to be little

empirical research on the use of disciplinary

actions or other aversive consequences to

improve employee safety performance. Research

suggests that aversive consequences can be

effective in discouraging other types of undesired

employee behaviors (e.g., absenteeism) when

properly applied. However, with so little

empirical evidence available, it is impossible to

make any confident predictions about the effects

of aversive consequences on safety-related

behavior. 

 Although disciplinary actions may be

effective in stopping an undesirable behavior,

they sometimes result in other behaviors that are

just as detrimental as the behavior being

punished. Therefore, in most instances, it is

probably not appropriate to view disciplinary

actions as the best way to initially respond to

unsafe employee behavior. However,

disciplinary actions may be viewed as

appropriate in situations where an employee or

co-worker is at high risk of being seriously

harmed if the employee's behavior is not changed

quickly. In some cases, a better option may be to

transfer those who persist in violating safety

rules to a job in a more inherently safe

environment. 

 Recommendations. Some recommendations

concerning the use of negative consequences to

motivate employee compliance with safety rules

are listed below:

(1) Solicit input from representatives from the

hourly work force in formulating policies about

how to deal with people who violate safety

requirements. Employees may be less likely to

object to the use of disciplinary actions when
representatives from the work force have had an

opportunity to help develop the policy and have

voiced their support for it.

(2) An unambiguous policy on the organization's

expectations concerning employee safety-related

behavior is needed. This policy should (a)

clearly delineate the conditions under which

various negative sanctions will be applied, (b)

explain why it is important to both the company

and the employee that safety rules not be

violated, and © be communicated to the work

force on a regular basis.

(3) Supervisors should be trained in the proper

procedures for correcting unsafe employee

behavior. They should be shown role models

interacting with employees who have violated a

safety rule and should participate in role-playing

exercises on how to handle these situations. It

should be explained to supervisors how

important it is to never ignore employees that

violate safety rules.

(4) The disciplinary action should be applied

fairly and consistently--consistent from situation

to situation and from person to person.

SELECTING STRATEGIES

 Effectiveness. One important consideration

in selecting a method to encourage selfprotective behavior is its effectiveness in

producing the desired behavior. The amount of

evidence regarding the effectiveness of each

strategy varies a great deal. The literature

contains only a few studies regarding the effect

of employee surveys on employee self-protective

behavior. However, the limited evidence

currently available strongly suggests that

employee surveys can be very effective. There is

a substantial amount of evidence to suggest that,

when used appropriately, incentives can be quite

effective in encouraging self-protective behavior. 

There is also a substantial amount of empirical

evidence to suggest that fear communications

can convince individuals that they should

perform self-protective behavior. Although

some studies have found that fear messages

resulted in increased self-protective behavior,

these studies are few in number. Several studies

have reported that although a fear

communication produced changes in attitudes

toward a self-protective behavior, it failed to

produce any change in performance of the

desired behavior. Although many organizations

use the threat of disciplinary action as a means of

discouraging unsafe employee behavior, almost

no empirical research has been conducted to

determine whether or not this is an effective

deterrent.

 Cost. Another important consideration in

selecting a method to encourage self-protective

behavior is the cost. The costs associated with

soliciting input from the work force include the

time and effort required to develop and

administer interviews or questionnaires, compile

the survey results, and hold meetings with

employees to discuss the survey findings and

their implications. The cost of using incentives

can vary a great deal. In some cases, incentives

such as verbal praise for performing the desired

behaviors and charts presenting feedback on

improvements in self-protective behaviors can be

very effective. Yet, these forms of reward are

quite inexpensive. However, Cohen, et al.

(1979) argues that, if the self-protective behavior

requires considerable effort, if employees are

only mildly concerned about the aversive

consequences, or if the unsafe work habits are

well established, it may be necessary to use more

costly rewards to motivate the desired behavior. 

The costs involved in this strategy include the

cost of the rewards or privileges being offered as

incentives, the time required to take periodic

measurements of performance on the target

behaviors or conditions, and the time required to

provide feedback. 

 The costs associated with fear messages are

often quite minimal if suitable training materials

are available off-the-shelf. However, suitable

fear communications may not be available if the

hazard or self-protective behavior in question is

unique to a specialized industry or industrial

process. In such cases, it may be necessary to

generate new materials, which can be rather

costly--especially from the standpoint of a small

employer. 
 The costs associated with using disciplinary

action include: the time and resources needed to

formulate the disciplinary action policy and

communicate it to the work force; the costs

associated with training supervisors; monitoring

employee behavior; finding and training

replacements for employees who are disciplined

through suspension, termination, or transfer to a

different job; and the costs associated with the

reactions of those who believe they have been

unfairly disciplined (sabotage, work slowdowns,

grievances, absenteeism).

 The best approach to encouraging employee

self-protective behavior in a specific work setting

depends on several factors in addition to

effectiveness and cost. They include the nature

of the work performed, social and physical

aspects of the work environment, the availability

of resources, and management and labor's

attitudes and priorities. The following are some

propositions concerning when it would be

advisable to use each type of strategy:

(1) Employee surveys: The larger the facility

and/or the more difficult for employees or work

groups to communicate with each other or with

management about issues affecting safety, the

more effective this strategy.

(2) Incentives and disciplinary actions: The

easier it is to reliably measure performance of the

critical behaviors, the more effective these

strategies.

(3) Fear messages: The less intuitively obvious

is the relationship between the behavior and the

aversive outcome, the more effective this

strategy. Fear communications are more

effective with new employees. The more

difficult it is to use external means to control

employee behavior, the more important it is to

use techniques (such as fear messages) to instill

internal motivation to perform self-protective

behaviors.

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