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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED September 24, 2015

v No. 319914
Gratiot Circuit Court JEFFERY JOE SHAW, LC No. 12-006627-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: R ONAYNE K RAUSE , P.J., and M URPHY and S ERVITTO , JJ.

R ONAYNE K RAUSE

, P.J. (concurring)

I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I re spectfully disagree with much of the majority’s reasoning. I conclude that the trial co urt erred only by failing to make an adequate record. While I believe it is reasonably inferable fr om the record that the trial court probably had an adequate basis for rescinding defendant’s asser ted right to represent himself, I am forced to conclude that, under the circumstances, that proba bility is simply not enough for
this Court to sustain the trial court’s decision.

It is readily apparent that the basis for the trial court’s re vocation of defendant’s right to represent himself was based on the trial court’s agreement with the prosecutor that defendant had a poor comprehension of the app licable substantive and procedur al law. The prosecutor expressed a concern that defendant would bring a surfeit of fri volous motions. The trial court opined that defendant had “a basic misunderstanding . . . of th e nuances of the law that he is charged with and the procedures and rules that apply in the con text of these proceedings,” which “compromise the defendant and his liberty.” The trial court th erefore found defe ndant unable “to adequately represent himself.” In other words, the trial court seemingly was concerned with defendant’s incompetence.

No defendant has an absolute ri ght to self-representation, and both our jurisprudence and our collective experience teaches us that representation by cou nsel is both the expected standard and usually best for everyone. Martinez v Court of Appeal of California

, Fourth Appellate Dist

, 528 US 152, 161; 120 S Ct 684; 145 L Ed 2d 597 (2000). The rig ht to self-representation does not extend to permitting a defendant to flout the substantive l aw or the rules of procedure. Faretta v California , 422 US 806, 834 n 46; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975). A defendant is not entitled to represent himself if the trial court finds t hat doing so would “disrupt, unduly inconvenience, and burden the court and the administration of t he court’s business.” People v-2- Russell , 471 Mich 182, 190; 684 NW2d 745 (2004). I believe that a fai r reading of the entire record suggests that the trial court would not have been out of line in concluding that, indeed, defendant showed every sign of proving to be an impermissible d isruption and burden; therefore, his right to represent himself would properly have been forfeit

.

However, I also believe that this Court is bound to the findin gs that the trial court actually made on the record . The trial court’s expressed ba sis for terminating defendant’ s right to self-representation was, as noted above, a concern that defe ndant was incompetent. As the majority observes, the United States Supreme Court has held tha t a defendant’s “technical legal knowledge” may simply not be considered a basis for determining the propriety of an asserted right to self-representation. Faretta , 422 US at 836. Nevertheless, I think it obvious that a defendant’s ignorance of law and procedure could ultimately hav e the effect of disrupting and burdening the administration of j ustice to the point of warrant ing a denial of the right to selfrepresentation.

A sufficiently bumbling and incoherent defense with more inter ruptions to address
irrelevancies than actual substance could turn a trial into a f arce and no court is obligated to
entertain that scenario. However , the trial court here never a rrived on the record at the conclusion that defendant would, in fact, be such a disruption, but rather only that he was inept. A necessary corollary of the righ t to self-representation is th at the defendant need not represent himself well, so long as it has been adequately established tha t the defendant is fully aware of what they are doing and can do so without making a mockery of t he courtroom and the law. Although I believe that the trial court could have found that defendant’s self-representation would have been impermissibly disruptive, the trial court did not . Because this Court is limited to correcting errors and the rec ord as it is, I therefore reluc tantly am compelled to join in the result reached by the majority. 1

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause

1 I also disagree with the majority ’s discussion of the trial co urt’s initial requirement that defendant consult with advisory c ounsel and I find it irrelevan t and am not considering it further.