2019 IL App (2d) 180598 

No. 2-18-0598 

Opinion filed April 16, 2019 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

LISA R. PECK, ) of McHenry County. 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

and ) No. 09-DV-128 

) 

ROBERT A. PECK, ) Honorable

) Mark R. Facchini, 

Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Zenoff and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 The marriage of petitioner, Lisa R. Peck, and respondent, Robert A. Peck, was dissolved 

in 2011. In 2018, petitioner filed a petition to revive the dissolution judgment under section 2-

1602 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1602 (West 2016)). Respondent 

filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code (id. § 2-615), which the trial court 

granted. Petitioner now appeals, arguing that her petition to revive was not subject to dismissal 

under section 2-615 and that, even if it were, dismissal was not warranted. We affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
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¶ 3 The parties’ marriage was dissolved on May 12, 2011. Paragraph H of the dissolution 

judgment addressed the allocation of certain property, located at 11538 Smith Drive in Huntley 

(property), as follows: 

“[Respondent] has discharged any obligation he has as to the debt on the property. Both 

parties are entitled to any equitable interest in the property. [Respondent’s] parents, who 

appear to be obligors on the note and mortgage on the premises, have been paying on the 

note, mortgage and obligations on the premises since about June, 2010. [Respondent] 

shall have sole right to the premises subject to his discharge in bankruptcy and the note, 

mortgage and other obligations thereon. Any personal property in that premises shall be 

his.” 

¶ 4 On June 1, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the trial court to 

divide the equitable interest in the property. 

¶ 5 On June 30, 2011, following a hearing, the trial court modified paragraph H of the 

judgment to add the following: 

“The equitable interest on [the property] is divided 50-50 between the parties, subject to 

repayment of any loans on the premises and subject to any existing guarantees for which 

actual payment has actually been made.”

¶ 6 On June 1, 2018, petitioner filed a petition to revive the modified judgment under section 

2-1602 of the Code (id. § 2-1602). Petitioner asserted that “[a]s of May 25, 2018, [petitioner’s] 

equitable interest in [the property] is still due and owing under the Judgment. In addition, post 

judgment interest has accrued thereon at an annual rate of 9%.” 

¶ 7 Respondent moved to dismiss the petition, under section 2-615 of the Code (id. § 2-615), 

arguing that petitioner failed to state a cause of action for revival under section 2-1602. 
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Respondent argued that section 2-1602 required that “ ‘the petition shall include a statement as to 

the original date and amount of the judgment.’ ” See id. § 2-1602(b). Thus, according to 

respondent, because the trial court’s order, awarding the parties equal shares of the equitable 

interest in the property, did not provide an amount owed from one party to the other as a debt or 

obligation, it could not be revived under section 2-1602. 

¶ 8 Petitioner argued in reply that, because a petition under section 2-1602 is not a pleading, 

it is not subject to dismissal under section 2-615. In addition, petitioner argued that her petition 

complied with section 2-1602, as “50% of the [property]” is “a discernible amount.” Petitioner 

argued alternatively that, if the petition was not proper under section 2-1602, the trial court 

should treat it as a motion to enforce the judgment.

¶ 9 On June 28, 2018, following a hearing,1 the trial court dismissed the petition “pursuant to 

2-615.” 

¶ 10 Petitioner timely appealed.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition, because a petition to 

revive a judgment is not a pleading and, thus, is not subject to dismissal under section 2-615 of 

the Code (id. § 2-615). Petitioner argues further that, even if the petition was subject to dismissal 

under section 2-615, petitioner’s failure to state a specific judgment amount did not warrant 

dismissal. In response, respondent argues that, even if section 2-615 is inapplicable, the trial 

court’s property allocation is not subject to revival under section 2-1602 of the Code (id. § 2-

1602). We agree with respondent. 

 1

 The record does not contain a transcript of the proceedings. 
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¶ 13 First, we note that we need not consider petitioner’s first argument, because the issue here 

is whether the petition to revive sets out a basis for revival. If it does not, then we may affirm 

the trial court’s judgment regardless of whether the judgment technically should be considered 

the dismissal of a pleading or the denial of a motion. See In re Marriage of Loomis, 348 Ill. 

App. 3d 972, 974 (2004) (a reviewing court may affirm the trial court’s ruling for any reason 

supported by the record regardless of the basis relied upon by the trial court). 

¶ 14 We now consider whether plaintiff’s petition established a right to revival, or more 

specifically, whether the trial court’s order, awarding the parties equal shares of the equitable 

interest in the property, falls under the provisions of section 2-1602. This requires us to interpret 

the statute. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Elementary School District 

159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 144 (2006). The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to 

ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Id. The plain language of a statute remains 

the best indication of the legislature’s intent. Id. When the statutory language is clear, it must be 

given effect without resort to other aids of interpretation. Village of Chatham v. County of 

Sangamon, 216 Ill. 2d 402, 429 (2005). 

¶ 15 Section 2-1602 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1602 (West 2016)) provides as follows: 

“(a) A judgment may be revived by filing a petition to revive the judgment in the 

seventh year after its entry, or in the seventh year after its last revival, or in the twentieth 

year after its entry, or at any other time within 20 years after its entry if the judgment 

becomes dormant and by serving the petition and entering a court order for revival as 

provided in the following subsections. The provisions of this amendatory Act of the 96th 

General Assembly are declarative of existing law.
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(b) A petition to revive a judgment shall be filed in the original case in which the 

judgment was entered. The petition shall include a statement as to the original date and 

amount of the judgment, court costs expended, accrued interest, and credits to the 

judgment, if any. 

(c) Service of notice of the petition to revive a judgment shall be made in 

accordance with Supreme Court Rule 106. 

(d) An order reviving a judgment shall be for the original amount of the judgment. 

The plaintiff may recover interest and court costs from the date of the original judgment. 

Credits to the judgment shall be reflected by the plaintiff in supplemental proceedings or 

execution.

(e) If a judgment debtor has filed for protection under the United States 

Bankruptcy Code and failed to successfully adjudicate and remove a lien filed by a 

judgment creditor, then the judgment may be revived only as to the property to which a 

lien attached before the filing of the bankruptcy action. 

(f) A judgment may be revived as to fewer than all judgment debtors, and such 

order for revival of judgment shall be final, appealable, and enforceable.

(g) This Section does not apply to a child support judgment or to a judgment 

recovered in an action for damages for an injury described in Section 13-214.1, which 

need not be revived as provided in this Section and which may be enforced at any time as 

provided in Section 12-108. 

(h) If a judgment becomes dormant during the pendency of an enforcement 

proceeding against wages under Part 14 of this Article or under Article XII, the 

enforcement may continue to conclusion without revival of the underlying judgment so 
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long as the enforcement is done under court supervision and includes a wage deduction 

order or turn over order and is against an employer, garnishee, or other third party 

respondent.” 

¶ 16 As indicated by section 2-1601 of the Code, section 2-1602 is the statutory replacement 

for “[s]cire facias.” See id. § 2-1601. Scire facias was “[a] judicial writ directing a debtor to 

appear and show cause why a dormant judgment against him should not be revived.” Black’s 

Law Dictionary 1346 (6th ed. 1990). Similarly, section 2-1602 refers throughout to a judgment 

in a particular amount against a judgment debtor. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1602(b) (West 2016) 

(“amount of the judgment”), (d) (“original amount of the judgment”), (e) (“judgment debtor”), 

(f) (“judgment debtors”). Indeed, section 2-1602(b) expressly provides that “[t]he petition shall 

include a statement as to the original date and amount of the judgment, court costs expended, 

accrued interest, and credits to the judgment, if any.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 2-1602(b). Thus, 

the plain language of the statute makes clear that the purpose of section 2-1602 is to revive a 

specific judgment debt owed by the judgment debtor to the petitioner. See, e.g., Department of 

Public Aid ex rel. McGinnis v. McGinnis, 268 Ill. App. 3d 123 (1994) (allowing revival of a 

judgment that awarded party $6100 in support). 

¶ 17 We therefore interpret section 2-1602 as applying only to money judgments against 

judgment debtors. Here, as respondent points out, petitioner did not include an amount of the 

judgment and accrued interest. The reason for this omission is obvious: petitioner is seeking to 

revive a judgment that does not impose a debt on a judgment debtor but rather declares only an 

allocation of property between the parties.2

 Petitioner does not cite a single case that applies 

section 2-1602 to any judgment other than a money judgment against a judgment debtor. 

 2 Indeed, although petitioner sought interest accrued “at an annual rate of 9%,” she 
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¶ 18 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s division of the equitable interest in the 

property, without more, is not a judgment subject to the provisions of section 2-1602 of the 

Code. To the extent that the interest assigned to petitioner even requires revival, any such 

revival is not available under section 2-1602. Along those lines, respondent unequivocally 

conceded at oral argument that the dissolution judgment remains enforceable after seven years. 

Respondent thus concedes that revival is not required here. 

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County 

dismissing petitioner’s petition for revival of judgment.

¶ 21 Affirmed.

 

asserted that the interest had accrued not on any judgment debt owed by respondent but on her 

half of the “equitable interest” awarded by the trial court.