IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 16–1228

Filed January 27, 2017

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

BRUCE A. WILLEY,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission reports respondent committed ethical 

misconduct and recommends a thirty-day suspension. LICENSE 

SUSPENDED.

Tara M. van Brederode and Amanda K. Robinson, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

Leon F. Spies of Mellon & Spies, Iowa City, for respondent.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (Board) filed 

a complaint charging an attorney with violations of four of our ethical 

rules based on his representation of two clients in a business

transaction. The Board and the attorney entered into a joint stipulation 

of facts and rule violations, and the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa (commission) found the attorney violated three 

ethical rules. The commission recommended a thirty-day suspension. 

Upon our de novo review, we conclude the Board proved by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence violations of Iowa Rules of Professional 

Conduct 32:1.7(a)(2) (concurrent conflict of interest) and 32:1.7(b)(4) 

(informed consent). We impose a sixty-day suspension for the rule 

violations.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Attorney Bruce A. Willey practices law at Willey O’Brien, L.C. in 

Linn County, Iowa. Willey was licensed to practice law in Iowa during 

the time of the conduct that gave rise to this disciplinary action. Willey 

is also a Certified Public Accountant (CPA).

David A. Wild (Wild) has been a client and business partner of 

Willey since at least 2006. In December 2006, Willey incorporated 

Synergy: Projects, Inc. (Synergy) on Wild’s behalf. At the time of 

incorporation, Wild was the president of Synergy and Willey was the 

original registered agent. Willey continued to serve in this capacity until 

April 2015. While the precise legal and business relationships between 

Wild and Willey are unclear from the record, by February 2007, conflicts 

of interests were apparent such that Wild and Willey executed a detailed 

consent and waiver form for the conflicts. The first paragraph of the 

form provides:
3

I, David Wild, am President of and otherwise involved with 

several corporations, including but not limited to, Evergreen 

Timber Corp., Global Resources, Inc., and Synergy: Projects, 

Inc. as well as member and manager of other Limited 

Liability Companies, related entities and subsidiaries 

(collectively “Wild Group”), do hereby acknowledge that I 

have been fully informed of the potential conflicts inherent in 

the representation of me and my company by Bruce A. 

Willey, Bruce A. Willey, P.C., Willey O’Brien, L.C. and its 

successors and assigns (collectively “Willey”).

Willey began providing legal services to Henry J. Wieniewitz, III 

(Wieniewitz) in 2008. Willey provided legal advice on corporate business 

structure and tax structure for companies owned by Wieniewitz. Willey 

also prepared income tax returns for Wieniewitz and advised him 

regarding companies he was exploring for purchase.

In June 2010, Willey and Wieniewitz met to discuss a business 

that Wieniewitz was considering purchasing. During this meeting, Willey 

learned that Wieniewitz was interested in possible investment 

opportunities. After discussing the original business purchase, Willey 

told Wieniewitz that he knew of another investment opportunity that 

might be available and he would let him know if there was space for an 

additional investor.

In July, Willey contacted Wieniewitz and told him that he could 

participate in the investment opportunity if he acted quickly. Willey told 

Wieniewitz that other clients of his had been involved with the same or 

similar investment opportunities and that it was a safe and common 

investment. Specifically, Willey emailed Wieniewitz, “[There] isn’t really 

risk related to that . . . .” Willey informed Wieniewitz that the minimum 

investment was $100,000. Wieniewitz decided to invest $100,000. Prior 

to forwarding the check to Willey, Wieniewitz told Willey, “I can afford to 

be out the liquidity 30–60 days, but could never afford to put the money 

in a place to potentially lose it.” Wieniewitz denies that Willey ever 
4

advised him prior to his investment that he was investing money with 

another client.

The investment opportunity was structured as a loan between 

Wieniewitz and Synergy. Wieniewitz wrote a check for $100,000 payable 

to Willey’s law firm. Willey prepared a promissory note on behalf of 

Synergy that reflected the agreement between Synergy and Henry and 

Amber Wieniewitz. Pursuant to the terms of the promissory note, this 

original investment would be repaid within forty-five days. Thereafter, 

Wieniewitz would receive $100,000 every forty-five days until the total 

amount paid to him equaled $400,000. The promissory note did not 

provide any security or collateral to Wieniewitz in exchange for the loan.

Willey deposited the check into his trust account and immediately

disbursed the money to Synergy. Willey did not bill any party for 

drafting the promissory note. However, Wild considered Willey to be 

acting on behalf of Synergy. In his personal statement to the Board, 

Willey stated that he believed he was acting only as an intermediary who 

was facilitating a business relationship between two sophisticated

business people.

Willey did not disclose his relationship with Wild or Synergy to 

Wieniewitz until much later. Willey never obtained informed consent

from Wieniewitz, nor confirmed in writing any potential conflict of 

interest with Wild and Synergy. Willey did not recommend Wieniewitz

consult with independent counsel regarding the concurrent conflict of 

interest.

At the outset of the transaction, Willey offered Wieniewitz the 

opportunity to meet with Wild to discuss the loan; however, Wieniewitz 

declined the offer. All communication regarding the loan and efforts to 

collect on the loan was made through Willey. Although Willey facilitated 
5

the loan and all of the communication between the parties, he had no 

independent information about the transaction other than what Wild told 

him. At the time Willey prepared the promissory note between Synergy 

and Wieniewitz, he had no knowledge of how Synergy would utilize the 

funds from Wieniewitz or the identities of the other parties or entities 

with whom Synergy was working. Willey had no direct financial interest 

in Synergy.

After the initial $100,000 investment, no payments were received 

as promised. Wieniewitz contacted Willey on multiple occasions to 

request information about the status of the loan repayment. Wieniewitz 

began emailing Willey in September 2010 expressing concern about the 

transaction. On September 20, Willey emailed Wieniewitz to update him 

that Wild had informed him of a “short delay” in disbursements. In an 

email on September 27, Wieniewitz wrote that he had expected to have 

his principal returned by then, as per the promissory note. He told 

Willey that his wife believed the entire transaction was a scam. Willey 

responded that he did not believe it was a scam, but Wild had been tied 

up with a family emergency and that may explain the delay. Later, Willey 

responded that he had spoken with Wild and Wild told him there was no 

problem with the transaction, but that the parties were “negotiating a few 

items behind the scenes and that [was] the reason for the delays.”

In October 2010, Wieniewitz again emailed Willey to ask about the 

status of the disbursements. Willey emailed him an update from Wild: 

“They are expecting funds to arrive at Singapore account tonight our 

time. The time has been used up getting through the system by trading 

bank, settlement bank and disbursement bank. Will be speaking again 

this coming night (US).” On November 18, Willey emailed Wieniewitz to 
6

tell him that Wild expected to have the funds that week, but was “[j]ust 

clearing up last of [the] paperwork necessary to allow release.”

In February 2011, Wieniewitz emailed Willey asking about the 

payments because he wanted to use the loaned funds to purchase some 

apartments. Willey responded that “some things have been going on 

behind the scenes and neither [Wild] nor [he] wanted to give out 

information before its time.” Willey again included a response from Wild 

that said the “funds are sold, just behind schedule.”

Wieniewitz emailed Willey again in March asking about the 

payments and was again forwarded a response from Wild:

The representation of platform manager is as follows:

All will be finished in the next 4 days regarding trade 

platform issues and should have no more problems.

[T]heir intent is to have liquidity available (overseas) this 

coming week. Thank you for your patience.

Wieniewitz did not receive any payment and followed up with an email to 

Willey on May 6. Willey responded,

Dave [Wild] reports that everything is moving well now, he is 

trying to pinpoint when funds will be available in US and 

expects update in 48 hours or so. He says there is good 

progress, shouldn’t be much longer, this will get done.

When no payments were received, Wieniewitz sent another email to 

Willey on September 18 asking for a realistic timeline on the return of his 

money. Wieniewitz also expressed frustration at repeatedly being told 

things were “close” but never receiving a disbursement. Willey 

responded and again told Wieniewitz the funds would be disbursed “in 

the next couple of weeks.”

On January 19, 2012—a year and a half after his original 

investment—Wieniewitz sent Willey a letter and an email demanding the 
7

money he invested be returned to him by January 23. Willey responded 

via email,

I don’t know that it works that way, though I understand 

your position and feelings. The ability to return the funds 

would be different if the principal were sitting in a bank 

account. It has been deployed and has not yet come back. I 

would be happy to arrange a call with Dave to discuss the 

situation and to obtain the most up to date information. I 

would be happy to visit with you and Amber as well. There 

has been some positive progress of late and it has been 

represented that things will clear up soon. We are just as 

frustrated as you are. Let me know if you would like to 

arrange a call with Dave so we can schedule.

Wieniewitz contacted another attorney about the transaction and his 

options for the return of his money.

Wieniewitz’s new counsel contacted Willey about the return of the 

money. Willey responded that he could not provide specifics about the 

transaction because the materials regarding the transaction were 

protected under a nondisclosure agreement. After multiple emails were 

exchanged, Willey continued to state that the funds were expected the 

next week. When no funds were received, Wieniewitz filed a complaint 

with the Board on April 16, 2012.

The Board filed its complaint against Willey on September 30, 

2015. In the complaint, the Board alleged violations of rules 32:1.7(a)(2) 

(concurrent conflict of interest), 32:1.7(b)(4) (informed consent), 32:1.8(b) 

(using client information), and 32:1.9(c) (duties to former clients). A 

hearing was set for April 28, 2016. On April 25, the Board and Willey

entered into a joint stipulation of facts and rule violations. Based on the 

joint stipulation, the Board and Willey agreed to waive a hearing and 

submitted the case to the commission based on the pleadings, 

stipulation, and briefs.
8

The commission filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation on July 18. Based on the stipulation, the commission

found Willey violated rules 32:1.7(a)(2), 1.7(b)(4), and 1.8(b). However, it 

found there was not a sufficient factual basis to find a violation of rule 

32:1.9(c). The commission met again to consider the parties’ briefs 

addressing the appropriate sanction for the rule violations. The 

commission considered mitigating and aggravating factors and 

recommended a thirty-day suspension. Willey filed a timely notice of 

appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

Our review of attorney disciplinary proceedings is de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stoller, 879 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 

2016). “The Board must prove attorney misconduct by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence, a burden greater than a preponderance of 

the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

(quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cross, 861 N.W.2d 

211, 217 (Iowa 2015)). While we give the findings and recommendations 

of the commission respectful consideration, we are not bound by them. 

Id. If we find the Board proved attorney misconduct by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence, we may choose to impose a sanction that 

is lesser or greater than the sanction recommended by the commission. 

Id.

III. Analysis.

While Willey stipulated that he committed certain rule violations, 

“[a]n attorney’s stipulation as to a violation is not binding on us.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kingery, 871 N.W.2d 109, 117 (Iowa 

2015) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kelsen, 855 

N.W.2d 175, 181 (Iowa 2014)). Even if an attorney’s stipulation concedes 
9

a rule violation, we will only find that a violation occurred if the facts are 

sufficient to support the stipulated violation. Id. Thus, we address each 

alleged rule violation in turn to determine whether the Board met its 

burden of proof. Id.

A. Rule 32:1.7(a)(2) Violation (Concurrent Conflict of Interest). 

Rule 32:1.7(a) provides that an attorney cannot represent a client if the 

representation of that client would involve a concurrent conflict of 

interest. Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.7(a). There are two types of 

concurrent conflicts of interest under this rule. Id. Under subsection 

(a)(1), a conflict of interest exists if an attorney’s representation of one 

client is “directly adverse to another client.” Id. r. 32:1.7(a)(1). Under 

subsection (a)(2), a concurrent conflict of interest exists if “there is a 

significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 

materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a 

former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” 

Id. r. 32:1.7(a)(2). The Board charged and the commission found a 

violation of rule 32:1.7(a)(2), the “materially limited” prong of the 

concurrent conflict of interest rule.

1. Background of rule 32:1.7. We utilize a two-step approach to 

determine whether an attorney has violated rule 32:1.7(a)(2). First, we 

must decide whether Willey’s representation of one client was affected by 

his “responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person.” 

Id.; see also Stoller, 879 N.W.2d at 207. If so, we next decide whether 

Willey’s representation of one client was materially limited by his 

representation of another. Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.7(a)(2); see also 

Stoller, 879 N.W.2d at 208.

The comments to the rule expand on the meaning of material 

limitation:
10

Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of 

interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s 

ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate 

course of action for the client will be materially limited as a 

result of the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests.

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.7 cmt. 8. The key questions a lawyer must 

ask are whether it is likely a difference in interests will occur between the 

clients and, if so, whether that difference in interests will interfere with 

the lawyer’s ability to offer independent, professional judgment to each

client. Id.

A material limitation is also defined in the Restatement (Third) of 

the Law Governing Lawyers. See Restatement (Third) of the Law 

Governing Lawyers § 121 cmt. c(ii), at 248 (2000). A “materially adverse 

effect” is defined “by reference to obligations necessarily assumed by the 

lawyer.” Id. These general obligations include the duty to “proceed in a 

manner reasonably calculated to advance a client’s lawful objectives,” the 

duty of competence, the duty of diligence, the duty to keep confidences, 

the duty to avoid conflicting interests among clients, the duty to deal 

honestly, the duty to not act in a manner adverse to a client’s interests, 

and the duty to fulfill all obligations to the client. Id. § 16, at 146. 

Likewise, our own rules require that a lawyer fulfill certain duties to 

clients: competence, diligence, and communication. Iowa Rs. Prof’l

Conduct 32:1.1, 1.3, 1.4. In determining whether an attorney’s 

representation was materially limited, we ask whether the attorney was 

able to fully perform all of these duties to each of his or her clients. See, 

e.g., Stoller, 879 N.W.2d at 209.

The comments to rule 32:1.7 also provide examples of material 

conflicts, one of which discusses joint ventures:

For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals 

seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially 

limited in the lawyer’s ability to recommend or advocate all 
11

possible positions that each might take because of the 

lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the others.

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.7 cmt. 8. When two clients enter into a joint 

venture, their positions are at odds from the outset, which prevents an 

attorney from adequately advising each party of all the available 

alternatives. See, e.g., Stoller, 879 N.W.2d at 209. Similarly, we have 

recognized that the positions of a landlord and tenant or a buyer and 

seller are at odds with each other in a transaction. See, e.g., id.

2. Disciplinary case examples. In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board v. Marks, we found an attorney violated our rules 

regarding conflicts of interest. 814 N.W.2d 532, 539 (Iowa 2012). The 

attorney had previously represented a client in a foreclosure action and 

thereafter represented his own wife when she sold a piece of property to 

the former client. Id. at 540. Marks failed to obtain informed consent, 

confirmed in writing from his former client. Id. at 541. We noted that 

the situation was analogous to those situations where an attorney enters 

into a business transaction with a current client. Id. Because there was 

no harm to the client, we concluded that a public reprimand was 

appropriate. Id.

In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Qualley, we 

found two attorneys violated rules 32:1.7 and 32:1.8. 828 N.W.2d 282, 

289 (Iowa 2013). Attorneys Qualley and Bleyhl represented Broadmoor 

Place Homeowners Association in collecting delinquent dues from a 

homeowner. Id. at 285. They began by sending the proper notice to cure 

default to the homeowner as a prerequisite to a foreclosure action and 

later filed the foreclosure petition on behalf of Broadmoor. Id. While the 

foreclosure action was pending, the homeowner filed for bankruptcy. Id. 
12

The attorneys continued to represent Broadmoor in the bankruptcy 

action. Id.

In the decree of foreclosure it obtained later, Broadmoor 

acknowledged a first mortgage existed on the property that was superior 

to their lien. Id. When the first mortgage holder initiated a foreclosure 

action, Qualley and Bleyhl continued to represent Broadmoor’s interests. 

Id. A sheriff’s sale was set, but the first mortgagor dismissed its 

foreclosure action one week before the sale. Id. at 286. Also before the 

sheriff’s sale, Bleyhl had sent an email to Broadmoor’s property manager 

informing her of the company’s right to purchase the property at the 

sale, but advising her against exercising that right. Id. The email also 

stated that Bleyhl and Qualley had found a potential buyer, but there 

was a potential conflict of interest because they would also be 

representing the buyer. Id.

Qualley and Bleyhl had a friend, Izaah Knox, with whom they had 

discussed entering into a business to “flip” real estate. Id. Qualley and 

Bleyhl approached Knox about buying the property at the sheriff’s sale 

because they believed they could flip it quickly and make a profit. Id. 

Knox agreed, and Qualley and Bleyhl organized a company named Elite 

Real Estate, L.L.C. Id. Knox provided the initial capital to Elite, and 

neither Qualley nor Bleyhl provided any financial contribution. Id.

After the first mortgagor on the property dismissed its foreclosure 

action, Qualley and Bleyhl failed to inform their client, Broadmoor. Id. 

While there was a factual dispute regarding whether Broadmoor was 

advised of Qualley and Bleyhl’s relationship with Elite, nothing was 

confirmed in writing nor was Broadmoor advised to seek independent 

legal advice based on this new development. Id. at 287. At the sheriff’s 

sale, Qualley provided a written bid of $6500 on behalf of Broadmoor, 
13

and then either Qualley or Bleyhl made an oral bid of $6900 on behalf of 

Elite. Id. Elite was issued the sheriff’s deed to the property that day. Id. 

We found that Qualley and Bleyhl violated rules 32:1.7 and 32:1.8. Id. at 

289. We suspended their licenses to practice law for a period of sixty 

days. Id. at 294.

In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. 

Wagner, an attorney entered into an agreement with Carl Oehl that he 

would assist in finding a buyer for his restaurant and represent Oehl in 

the sale in exchange for a commission of ten percent of the gross sale 

price of Oehl’s business. 599 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Iowa 1999). Shortly 

after this agreement, one of Wagner’s former clients, David Childers, 

consulted with Wagner about buying Oehl’s restaurant and starting his 

own business. Id. at 724. Wagner orally informed Childers that he 

represented Oehl in the sale of the restaurant and that Childers should 

seek independent counsel. Id. He did not inform Childers that he would 

receive a commission or why he was recommending Childers seek the 

advice of independent counsel. Id. We held that Wagner violated a 

provision of our old rules that prevented an attorney from entering into a 

business transaction with a client without disclosing the lawyer’s own 

self-interest. Id. at 727. We suspended his license for three months. Id.

at 729.

In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Wright, an 

attorney utilized funds from five clients to assist another client in 

attempting to obtain what he believed was an inheritance from a cousin 

in Nigeria. 840 N.W.2d 295, 297–98 (Iowa 2013). One of Wright’s 

clients, Madison, approached Wright to see if he would represent him in 

a transaction to obtain a large inheritance from a cousin in Nigeria. Id.

at 297. He informed Wright that he needed to pay $177,660 in taxes and 
14

then a sum of $18,800,000 would be released to him. Id. Wright 

approached five other clients to ask if they would consider loaning 

Madison funds for the purpose of paying taxes and fees on the purported 

Nigerian inheritance. Id. at 297–98. One client loaned Madison 

$12,000, payable to Wright, and Madison signed a document promising 

to repay the client $50,000 “upon receipt of [the] inheritance funds.” Id.

at 297. Another loaned Madison $25,000 in exchange for a promise from 

Madison to pay her $100,000 upon his receipt of the inheritance from 

Nigeria. Id. at 297–98. Three additional clients loaned Madison sums in 

the amount of $7000, $20,000, and $160,000. Id. at 298. None of the 

loans made to Madison were ever repaid. Id. at 299. We found Wright 

violated rules 32:1.1 (competence), 32:1.8(a) (business transaction with 

current client), and 32:8.4(c) (professional misconduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Id. at 299–302. 

Because of the severity of the harm to Wright’s clients and his prior 

history of discipline, we imposed a twelve month suspension. Id. at 303.

3. Willey’s conduct. In the transaction between Wieniewitz and 

Synergy, Willey represented two parties on opposing sides of a

transaction. The interests of Wieniewitz as the party loaning the money,

and Synergy as the party receiving the loan, were at odds from the 

beginning. That the two parties had competing interests is demonstrated 

throughout the transaction. Throughout the email correspondence, 

Willey was repeatedly caught between the interests of Wieniewitz and the 

interests of Wild. During the entire transaction, Willey continued to 

represent the interests of Wild and Synergy, charging and collecting tens 

of thousands of dollars in legal fees. At the same time, Willey was unable 

to adequately pursue the interests of Wieniewitz in obtaining the return 

of his original investment, let alone any of the future payments promised 
15

to him in the promissory note prepared by Willey on behalf of 

Synergy/Wild. Other than forwarding information from one client to 

another, Willey did nothing to advance the legal interests of Wieniewitz.

After Wieniewitz obtained new counsel, Willey expressed that he 

could not give certain information to Wieniewitz because of nondisclosure 

agreements and because dispersing the information could harm Wild. 

Clearly, Synergy was not in a position to return Wieniewitz’s money, and 

Willey was not able to adequately pursue Wieniewitz’s interest in 

obtaining a full refund of the money he provided under the promissory 

note. We agree with the finding of the commission and hold that the 

Board proved a violation of rule 32:1.7(a)(2) by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence.

B. Rule 32:1.7(b)(4) Violation (Informed Consent). If there is a 

concurrent conflict of interest, our rules provide a mechanism for the 

attorney to cure the conflict and continue to represent both clients. Iowa 

R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.7(b); see also Stoller, 879 N.W.2d at 210. If a 

concurrent conflict of interest exists, one of the steps an attorney must 

take to cure the conflict is to obtain “informed consent, confirmed in 

writing” from both clients. Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.17(b)(4). When 

the conflict exists at the outset of representation, the attorney must 

obtain the written consent before undertaking the representation. Id. r. 

32:1.7 cmt. 3.

Contrary to the position taken by Willey, he never informed 

Wieniewitz of the concurrent conflict of interest, and certainly not the 

extent of his relationship with Wild or his involvement with Synergy. 

Willey failed to obtain any informed consent, confirmed in writing, from 

Wieniewitz before continuing to represent both parties in the loan

transaction. We agree with the finding of the commission and hold that 
16

the Board proved a violation of rule 32:1.7(b)(4) by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence.

C. Rule 32:1.8(b) Violation (Using Client Information). Rule 

32:1.8(b) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not use information relating to 

representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the 

client gives informed consent.” Id. r. 32:1.8(b). Because it will not affect 

the sanction we impose, we decline to decide whether a violation of rule 

32:1.8(b) occurred under this set of circumstances. See, e.g., Wright, 840 

N.W.2d at 302.

D. Rule 32:1.9(c) Violation (Duties to Former Clients). Rule 

32:1.9(c) provides,

A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or 

whose present or former firm has formerly represented a 

client in a matter shall not thereafter:

(1) use information relating to the representation to 

the disadvantage of the former client except as these rules 

would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the 

information has become generally known; or

(2) reveal information relating to the representation 

except as these rules would permit or require with respect to 

a client.

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.9(c).

The commission found there was not a sufficient factual basis to 

find a violation of rule 32:1.9(c). Willey continued to represent Synergy

and to bill Wild for legal services during this entire transaction and

through 2015. We agree that there was not a sufficient factual basis to 

determine that either client was a former, rather than current, client of 

Willey’s at the time of the transaction and hold that the Board did not 

prove a violation of rule 32:1.9(c) by a convincing preponderance of the 

evidence.
17

E. Sanction. Although we consider our prior cases instructive 

when we determine a proper sanction, “[t]here is no standard sanction 

for [any] particular type of misconduct.” Stoller, 879 N.W.2d at 218 

(quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Blessum, 861 N.W.2d 

575, 591 (Iowa 2015)). We determine the appropriate sanction for a 

violation of our rules based on the particular circumstances of each case. 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morris, 847 N.W.2d 428, 435 

(Iowa 2014).

When crafting a sanction, we consider the nature of the 

violations, the attorney’s fitness to continue in the practice of 

law, the protection of society from those unfit to practice law, 

the need to uphold public confidence in the justice system, 

deterrence, maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a 

whole, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Stoller, 879 N.W.2d at 219 (quoting Blessum, 861 N.W.2d at 591). 

1. Range of sanctions. We find that Willey violated rules 

32:1.7(a)(2) (concurrent conflict of interest) and 32:1.7(b)(4) (informed 

consent). Each of the rule violations fall under the general category of a 

conflict of interest. In the cases discussed above, we found a range of 

sanctions for attorney misconduct arising out of conflicts of interest. In

Marks, we concluded a public reprimand was the appropriate sanction 

when there was no harm found to the client. 814 N.W.2d at 541–42. In 

Qualley, we suspended the attorneys’ licenses for sixty days for violations 

of rules 32:1.7 and 32:1.8. 828 N.W.2d at 289, 294. In Wagner, we 

suspended an attorney’s license for three months for entering into a 

business transaction with a client and not disclosing his own interest in 

the transaction. 599 N.W.2d at 727, 730. In Wright, we suspended an 

attorney’s license for twelve months after he convinced five clients to loan 

another client money for a loan scam. 840 N.W.2d at 299, 303.
18

2. Mitigating and aggravating factors. We must also consider any 

existing mitigating or aggravating factors. Stoller, 879 N.W.2d at 220–21. 

There are a number of both mitigating and aggravating factors present in 

this case.

Willey was cooperative with the Board’s investigation, which we 

consider a mitigating factor. Qualley, 828 N.W.2d at 294. In Willey’s 

personal statement, he expressed regret for his actions and the harm it 

caused to his clients. In the joint stipulation, Willey admitted to the 

ethical violations. We consider both remorse and the admission of 

wrongdoing to be mitigating factors. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Weiland, 885 N.W.2d 198, 215 (Iowa 2016) (considering remorse a 

mitigating factor); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Conroy, 795 

N.W.2d 502, 506 (Iowa 2011) (considering admission of wrongdoing a 

mitigating factor). We also note that Willey has not been the subject of 

prior disciplinary action, which we consider a mitigating factor. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bartley, 860 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Iowa 

2015). Finally, Willey has engaged in extensive community service, 

which we also consider a mitigating factor. Stoller, 879 N.W.2d at 221.

However, we must also consider the aggravating circumstances

surrounding this transaction. We consider harm to a client an

aggravating factor. Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 215. The $100,000 financial 

harm to Wieniewitz was significant. To this day, the Wieniewitzes have 

not received any money for their investment. The record also does not 

reflect that Wieniewitz is a sophisticated or wealthy business person who 

was in a position to lose his and his wife’s money. Prior to investing, 

Wieniewitz told Willey that he could only be out the money for no longer 

than the forty-five days reflected in the promissory note. Willey assured 

him the investment was safe. More significantly, the very structure of 
19

the investment was questionable from the beginning with an outrageous 

promise of a return on the investment. Within weeks, Wieniewitz’s wife 

was already questioning whether the transaction was a sham. No one 

could reasonably counsel a client that this was a sound investment 

opportunity. Willey was also an experienced attorney and CPA who had 

been practicing for many years. We consider the experience of an 

attorney to be an aggravating factor. Bartley, 860 N.W.2d at 339. In this 

same vein, it is clear that Willey was able to recognize a conflict of 

interest and knew what his ethical obligations were to his client, as he 

had Wild execute a consent and waiver of any conflicts of interest three 

years before.

We also note that “persistence . . . in perpetuating [a] falsehood is 

a remarkable aggravating factor.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Barnhill, 885 N.W.2d 408, 424 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 466 (Iowa 2014)). 

While failing to disclose the conflict of interest to Wieniewitz, Willey 

repeatedly represented to Wieniewitz that his payment was forthcoming 

“soon,” whether in a few days or the next week. Willey continued to tell 

Wieniewitz the payment would be coming “just next week” for nearly two 

years. It was only much later that Wieniewitz learned of the conflict of 

interest, and then Willey advised him to seek other legal counsel. In our 

de novo review of the record, and considering all of the mitigating and 

aggravating circumstances in this case, we find that the aggravating 

factors weigh in favor of a longer period of suspension. We conclude a 

sixty-day suspension is appropriate.

IV. Conclusion.

For the above reasons, we suspend Willey’s license to practice law 

with no possibility of reinstatement for sixty days from the filing of this 
20

opinion. The suspension shall apply to all facets of the practice of law. 

Iowa Ct. R. 34.23(3). Willey must comply with the notification 

requirements of our rules. Id. r. 34.24. Costs are assessed to Willey. Id.

r. 36.24(1). Unless the Board objects, Willey shall be automatically 

reinstated after the sixty-day suspension period on the condition all costs 

have been paid. Id. r. 34.23(2).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.