UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. CASEY CHESTER ROBERTS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 17-4021 (D. Utah) (D.C. No. 2:15-CR -00161-TS-1)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before HARTZ , BALDOCK , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.
This appeal grew out of a traffic stop. A highway-patro l trooper stopped Mr. Casey Roberts for a broken tail light and discovered contraband in the vehicle. Mr. Roberts unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of the contraband , arguing that the troop er lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffi c stop. We disagree. The parties agree on most of the underlying fact s. Two highway patrol troopers (Trooper Neighbor and Trooper Ha rwood) thought that Mr.

* Our order and judgmen t does not constitute bi nding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 7, 2017
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2- Roberts had a broken tail li ght and followed him in separate cars. This was the sequence of cars:

After following for abou t a minute, Trooper Harw ood thought that he saw the tail light illuminate , so he turned his car around and dr ove in the opposite direction. When he did, Troop er Neighbor move d directly behind Mr. Roberts, following for about ei ght seconds, which is captured on videotape. After about ei ght seconds, Trooper Ne ighbor initiated a traffic stop for a broken tail light. 1 Mr. Roberts challenged the stop on the ground that Trooper Neighbo r could not have seen whet her the tail light was out. The district court rejected this challenge, find ing that Trooper Neighbor had reasonable su spicion for the traffic stop. We review this finding under the clear-error standard. United States v. Beckstead , 500 F.3d 1154, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007); see United Stat es v. Simpson , 609 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010) (s tating that the clear-error standard applies to the review of factual findin gs “even when . . . there is vi deo tape of the [traffic] stop”). To apply this standard , we view th e evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Beckstead , 500 F.3d at 1162. We can

1 Under Utah law, cars can be driven only if their lights are in proper condition. Utah Code An n. § 41-6a-1601(1)(a)(ii).- 3- reverse only if the distri ct court’s finding lacks any factual support or if the entirety of the evidence definitely and firmly convinces us that a mistake has been made. United States v. Cash , 733 F.3d 1264, 1273 (10th Cir. 2013). Viewing the evidence in the light mo st favorable to the government, we conclude that the district court di d not commit clear er ror. The district court could base its findin g of reasonable suspicion on

 testimony by Trooper Neighbo r and Trooper Harwood,

 testimony by an employee of a tow company, and

 testing of the tail lights. Trooper Neighbor testified that he could see the tail lights illuminate several times on the passenger’s side and the middle, but each time, the tail light on the driver’s side remained dark or dim. Trooper Harwood also testified that he had ini tially thought that th e tail light on th e driver’s side

was out. But he changed his mind, thinking that the tail light was working even though it remained “extreme ly dim.” R. vo l. 1, at 48. After the stop, Mr. Ro berts’s car was driven to an impound lot. The car was followed by Ms. Tonya Thomas, who worked for a towing company. She too ob served that the tail light on the driver’s side was not working. This observation was confirmed by testing of the tail lights by Trooper Neighbor and Ms. Thomas. Du ring the traffi c stop, Trooper- 4- Neighbor told Mr. Robe rts to tap his brakes to s ee if the tail li ghts worked. At first, the tail light on the driver’s side didn’t appear to work. But then Trooper Neighbor shielded his eyes from the su n and saw a faint glow inside the driver’s tail light. Similarly, Ms. Thomas checked the tail lights when the car was at th e impound lot. She confir med that the tail light sometimes worked an d sometimes didn’t. Mr. Roberts contends that Troop er Neighbor could not have known whether the tail light on the driver si de was working. For this contention, Mr. Roberts states that

 Trooper Neighbor had been be hind Trooper Harwood and

 videotape of the pursuit does no t show a broken tail light. We must uphold the district court’ s finding unless it is “blatantly contradicted” by the video evidence. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007). The video evidence provi des little help, for it s hows only about eight seconds of the pursuit and does not necessarily show what Trooper Neighbor could have seen. For example, Trooper Nei ghbor testified that he had been able to see Mr. Roberts’s ta il lights as the tw o cars went uphill, but the videotape does not show the uphill portion of the pursuit. And we cannot tell from the videotape whet her Trooper Neighbor could have seen Mr. Roberts’s tail lights illuminate duri ng the eight-second pursuit, for the videotape does not necessa rily capture th e entirety of Trooper Neighbor’s- 5- field of vision. 2 Thus, the videotape is inconclusive, failing to show whether Mr. Roberts’s tail lights would have been visible to Trooper Neighbor. In these circum stances, we do not regard the district court’s finding as clearly erroneous. Affirmed. Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge

2 Mr. Roberts testified that he had not used his brakes during this eight-second clip. But the district court could reas onably decline to credit this testimony. La Resolana Architects v. Reno, Inc. , 555 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that a distri ct court does not commit clear error simply by choosing to credit the testimony of one witness over another).