FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

 OF FLORIDA 

 SECOND DISTRICT 

VIRGINIA HAMMOND a/k/a VIRGINIA ) 

HAMMOND KHAN, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case Nos. 2D13-4425 

 ) 2D13-4522 

KINGSLEY ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC, ) 

a limited liability company; NABEL ) 

MUHANNA, M.D., an individual; S.H.I. ) CONSOLIDATED 

HOLDINGS, LLC; KIRAN SHAILENDRA, ) 

an individual; RAHIM SABADIA, as ) 

cotrustee of the Sabadia Family Trust; ) 

I.A. KHAN; PHANI R. TUMMALA; ) 

MILLENIUM PARTNERS, LLC, a Georgia ) 

limited liability company; and KING ) 

ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES, INC., a ) 

Florida corporation, ) 

 ) 

 Appellees. ) 

 ) 

Opinion filed August 13, 2014. 

Appeals pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 

from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; 

William H. Burgess, III, Judge. 

Virginia Hammond, pro se. 

Luis Martinez-Monfort, Amanda M. Uliano, 

and Keith W. Meehan of Gardner Brewer 

Martinez-Monfort, P.A., Tampa, for 

Appellee Kingsley Asset Management, 

LLC. 
- 2 - 

E.A. "Seth" Mills, Jr., and Adam Denver 

Griffin of Mills Paskert Divers, P.A., Tampa, 

for Appellees Millenium Partners, LLC, and 

I.A. Khan. 

No appearance for remaining Appellees. 

DAVIS, Chief Judge. 

 In these consolidated appeals, Virginia Hammond, pro se, challenges the 

trial court's nonfinal orders denying her motion to dissolve a writ of garnishment entered 

against her and granting the garnishee's motion to deposit funds into the registry of the 

court. Because Kingsley Asset Management has not obtained a deficiency judgment in 

the underlying foreclosure proceeding, we reverse. 

 Kingsley brought a three-count action against Hammond and five other 

named defendants. Count one of the complaint was for foreclosure of a mortgage on a 

piece of commercial property in Pasco County and specifically sought a foreclosure sale 

and, "if the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to Plaintiff's claim, a Deficiency 

Judgment against Defendant." Count two was an action for damages on the promissory 

note. And count three alleged damages stemming from the guaranty agreements the 

defendants each signed. 

 Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a final judgment of 

foreclosure against Hammond in the amount of $13,953,990.32.1 That judgment 

specifically stated that the clerk was not to set the matter for a foreclosure sale until 

 1Based on the terms of the note, Hammond and her coinvestors were 

jointly and severally liable on the mortgage debt. 
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written application for such was made by Kingsley. On the breach of promissory note 

alleged in count two, the trial court entered a separate final judgment against Hammond 

in the same amount identified in the foreclosure judgment. This order specifically 

stated, "[L]et execution issue." Both of these orders were entered on the same day and 

in the same circuit court case number. 

 Kingsley subsequently applied for a foreclosure sale, and that sale was 

held May 22, 2013. Hammond's 15.75% interest in the property was sold at public 

auction to Kingsley for a credit bid of $1100. Kingsley did not seek a deficiency 

judgment below, and based on the record before us, none has been entered. 

 At the same time that the underlying cause was progressing below, 

Hammond and her ex-husband Ishtiaq Khan, who holds an interest in Kingsley, were 

engaging in binding arbitration in Georgia to settle postdissolution disputes arising from 

the terms of their divorce settlement. Following that arbitration, the Georgia arbitrator 

directed Khan to pay Hammond the lump sum of $1,164,595. 

 Subsequent to entry of that award, Kingsley filed its "Notice to Defendant 

of Service of Writ of Garnishment" and a motion for writ of garnishment naming Khan as 

the garnishee and seeking a response from Khan as to whether he was indebted to 

Hammond. The writ of garnishment was issued the same day. Khan then filed his 

answer, stating that he was indebted to Hammond in the amount of $1,164,595, and his 

motion to deposit those funds into the registry of the court. The trial court granted 

Khan's motion after an evidentiary hearing. Hammond then moved to dissolve the writ 

of garnishment, but the trial court denied the motion after evidentiary hearing. 

Hammond now challenges these two orders of the trial court. 
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 On appeal, Hammond first argues that the trial court erred in issuing the 

writ of garnishment in Kingsley's favor because Kingsley never obtained a deficiency 

judgment in the foreclosure proceedings. We agree. 

 Initially, we note that Kingsley is correct that it has the right to pursue both 

a claim for foreclosure of the mortgage and a claim for damages on the note. "It has 

long been the common law that, to collect money owed on a note, a mortgagee may 

pursue its legal and equitable remedies simultaneously, until the debt is satisfied." 

Royal Palm Corp. Ctr. Ass'n v. PNC Bank, NA, 89 So. 3d 923, 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). 

"[T]he reason that an action at law on a note may be pursued simultaneously with the 

equitable remedy of foreclosure is that the two remedies are not inconsistent." Id. at 

932. 

 However, Kingsley cannot rely on Royal Palm to support its conclusion 

that it need not obtain a deficiency judgment in the instant case. Although Royal Palm 

and the instant case share some factual similarities, the posture of the Royal Palm case 

is different than that presented here. 

 Royal Palm is similar to the instant case in that the plaintiff filed a 

multicount complaint seeking both to foreclose the mortgage and to receive damages 

for breach of the note. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff on both counts and 

did not set a sale of the mortgaged property, withholding the sale pending application by 

the plaintiff. On the damages count, the trial court in Royal Palm ordered the defendant 

to pay the designated amount, stating "for which let execution issue." So, similar to the 

instant case, the damages judgment in Royal Palm was final and collectible, but the 

foreclosure judgment was not "collectible" until the plaintiff requested a foreclosure sale. 
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It is at that point in Royal Palm that the defendant appealed, arguing that such was an 

improper procedure for the trial court. Accordingly, the only questions before the Fourth 

District in Royal Palm were whether the plaintiff could pursue both the equitable and 

legal remedy simultaneously and whether the trial court could rule on both issues. The 

Fourth District answered both those questions affirmatively because there was no 

danger of double recovery. 

 In the instant case, however, the final judgments for damages and 

foreclosure are not before us. Rather, the issue before us is whether, now that Kingsley 

has sought and obtained a foreclosure sale of the property, it can collect purely on the 

money judgment without first obtaining a deficiency judgment. We conclude that it 

cannot. 

 This case is analogous to Century Group, Inc. v. Premier Financial 

Services East, L.P., 724 So. 2d 661, 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), in which "[t]he question 

this court face[d] [wa]s the effect on a collection action if the party attempts to execute 

on a promissory note following a foreclosure sale rather than pursue the deficiency 

amount in a deficiency judgment hearing." In addressing that issue, this court stated: 

 It is axiomatic that a party can only recover 

once on the same debt. Thus, if Premier had pursued 

execution of the money judgment and recovered the 

entire judgment amount, then it could not pursue 

execution of the foreclosure judgment. If Premier 

pursued foreclosure, and the sale amounts satisfied 

the judgment, then Premier could not pursue its 

judgment on the note. Complications arise, however, 

if the proceeds resulting from the initial collection 

method, execution on the note or foreclosure, do not 

satisfy the entire debt. In that circumstance, a party is 

required to pursue another method of collection to 

obtain the entire amount of the judgment. 
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Id. at 662 (citation omitted). This court further noted that "[a]lthough a party may pursue 

both a foreclosure action and an execution on note, typically a party will follow a 

foreclosure sale by initiating a deficiency hearing to obtain a deficiency judgment." Id. 

This court reversed, concluding that 

Premier is attempting to execute on the promissory 

note to obtain the difference between the foreclosure 

sale amount and the amount of the judgment. 

Premier's collection efforts have the potential to result 

in an inequity. By executing on a promissory note 

and then setting-off the amount recovered at 

foreclosure, Premier avoids a hearing on the amount 

of deficiency between the foreclosure sale amount 

and the judgment amount pursuant to section 702.06, 

Florida Statutes. 

Id.; see also Flagship Bank v. Bryan, 384 So. 2d 1323, 1324 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) 

("[T]he indebtedness can be collected only once, and any payment on any of the 

judgments must be credited to the others."). 

 The same is true here. To avoid the possibility of a double recovery, 

before Kingsley can execute on the promissory note, the trial court must conduct a 

deficiency hearing to determine the amount of set-off from the foreclosure sale.2 We 

therefore reverse the trial court's order denying the motion to set aside the writ of 

garnishment. Accordingly, we must also reverse the trial court's order granting the 

garnishee's motion to place funds in the registry of the court pursuant to the writ of 

 2We also note that because Hammond is jointly and severally liable here, 

a deficiency hearing will allow the court to determine if Kingsley has collected on the 

debt from any of the other defendants. 
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garnishment.3 We remand with instructions to grant Hammond's motion to dissolve the 

writ of garnishment and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded. 

KELLY and LaROSE, JJ., Concur. 

 3Although on appeal both parties raise arguments as to whom the funds 

should then be dispersed, that issue has yet to be considered by the trial court and 

therefore is not before us.