Filed 5/31/18

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH VEAMATAHAU,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A150689

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. SF398877A)

After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of, among other things, two 

misdemeanor counts of possession of personal identifying information and possession of 

a controlled substance, alprazolam (Xanax). On appeal, he argues the trial court 

erroneously denied his motion to dismiss both charges under Penal Code section 1118.1. 

He further contends his controlled substance possession conviction must be reversed 

because the prosecution’s expert conveyed inadmissible, case-specific hearsay to the jury.

In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude the prosecution’s expert’s 

testimony that he relied on a database to determine the contents of the pills found on 

defendant’s person was not case-specific hearsay under state law. We affirm the 

judgment. 

 

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is 

certified for publication with the exception of parts II.A. and II.B.4. 
2

I. BACKGROUND

On November 19, 2015, the district attorney filed an information charging 

defendant with six felonies and three misdemeanors.1 As relevant to this appeal, 

defendant was charged with misdemeanor possession of personal identifying information 

(Pen. Code,2 § 530.5, subd. (c)(1); count 7) and misdemeanor possession of alprazolam

(Xanax) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11375, subd. (b)(2); count 8).

On June 6, 2015, police sergeant Clint Simmont pulled defendant over in his 

vehicle for making a right turn from a stop sign without signaling. Sergeant Simmont 

searched defendant and his car. He found a cellophane wrapper containing 10 pills in 

defendant’s coin pocket, and 5 personal checks in his back pocket. Officers also found 

cocaine base in the pocket of the driver’s door. Defendant was arrested and transported 

to the police station. 

At the police station, defendant provided a statement to Sergeant Simmont, which 

was played for the jury at trial. In his statement, defendant said he takes four or five of 

the “Xanibar” pills found on his person every day, “[u]ntil [he] feel[s] good.” As to the 

checks found in his back pocket, defendant said he found them on the sidewalk and was 

going to “see what [he] could do with ’em.” He said he would try to cash them, but he 

doubted it would work because his name was not on them. Defendant said he did not 

know who signed the back of the checks, and he “found ’em like that.”

After trial, a jury found defendant guilty on four felony counts and counts 7 and 8. 

The trial court suspended imposition of sentence on defendant’s felony counts and placed 

him on three years of formal probation with one year of local custody. The court 

imposed concurrent 90-day jail terms for counts 7 and 8. 

 

1 Defendant pleaded no contest to two of the felonies and the prosecution 

dismissed a misdemeanor charge for driving without a valid driver’s license. (Veh. Code, 

§ 12500, subd. (a); count 9). 

2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
3

II. DISCUSSION

A. Possession of Personal Identifying Information 

After the close of the prosecution’s case, defendant moved under section 1118.1 to 

dismiss count 7 for possession of personally identifying information because there was no 

“information or . . . evidence with respect to the individuals, whether they’re real people, 

whether they gave consent. . . . The only evidence is that he possessed these checks.” 

The trial court denied the motion. 

We review “the denial of a section 1118.1 motion under the standard employed in 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. [Citation.] ‘In 

reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, . . . . we “examine the whole 

record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses 

substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that 

a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

[Citations.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier 

could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 

1186, 1215.) “Review of the denial of a section 1118.1 motion made at the close of a 

prosecutor’s case-in-chief focuses on the state of the evidence as it stood at that point.” 

(Ibid.)

The jury found defendant violated section 530.5, subdivision (c)(1), which

provides: “Every person who, with the intent to defraud, acquires or retains possession of 

the personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55, of 

another person is guilty of a public offense . . . .” “ ‘[P]ersonal identifying information’ ” 

is defined as “any name, address, telephone number, . . . checking account number . . . of 

an individual person, or an equivalent form of identification.” (§ 530.55, subd. (b).) A 

“ ‘person’ ” within the meaning of the statute is “a natural person, living or deceased, 

firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, company, corporation, limited 

liability company, or public entity, or any other legal entity.” (Id., subd. (a).) 

Defendant contends section 530.5 does not apply to “ ‘personal identifying 

information’ of a fictitious person or entity,” and therefore, for liability to attach, the 
4

prosecution must prove the personal identifying information in question belongs to a real 

person or entity. Defendant relies on People v. Barba (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 214

(Barba), which stated in dicta that the offense of forgery “may be committed by one who 

possesses either a real or fictitious check. Someone who commits the offense of forgery 

by using a fake check or similar instrument in which no real person or legal entity is 

identified would not be guilty of violating section 530.5, subdivision (a).”

3

 (Barba, at 

p. 225.) Barba did not, however, address whether a prosecutor charging a violation of 

section 530.5 must prove the personal information belongs to a real, as opposed to 

fictitious, person or entity. “[I]t is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions 

not considered.” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1176.) 

In any event, even assuming the prosecution must establish the information in 

defendant’s possession was that of a real person or entity, there was sufficient 

circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction. At the time the trial court heard 

defendant’s section 1118.1 motion, the five checks had been admitted into evidence. 

Each check was preprinted with identifying information (name, address, and checking 

account number)4 of a different person or entity on checks bearing the names of 

established financial institutions. Moreover, defendant told Sergeant Simmont he found 

the five checks on the sidewalk. Defendant’s statement he intended to cash the checks 

suggests he believed they belonged to real persons or entities. While hypothetically the 

checks defendant found could have been drawn in the name of fictitious persons, the jury 

could reasonably—and apparently did—reject that possibility. On this record, we 

conclude there was substantial evidence the checks found in defendant’s possession 

contained the information of real persons or entities. 

 

3 Barba concerned section 530.5, subdivision (a), rather than subdivision (c)(1) as 

in this case, but both subdivisions rely on the same definition of personal identifying 

information. Subdivision (c)(1) proscribes the acquisition or retention of personal 

identifying information of another person, while subdivision (a) proscribes its use to 

obtain credit, goods, services, real property or medical information without consent. 

4 Some checks also contained phone numbers. 
5

B. Possession of Alprazolam 

Defendant challenges his conviction for possession of alprazolam on two grounds: 

first, he contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because there 

was no evidence the pills he possessed were not counterfeit, and second, he argues the 

prosecution’s expert impermissibly conveyed case-specific facts to the jury about the 

chemical composition of the pills discovered on his person. We address the latter 

contention first in the published portion of this opinion. 

1. Factual Background

At trial, Scott Rienhardt, a forensic laboratory criminalist at the San Mateo County 

Sheriff’s Office, testified regarding the forensic examination of suspected controlled 

substances found on defendant’s person and in his car, including the pills located in his 

pocket. Rienhardt stated: “[W]ith pharmaceuticals, we just identify the tablet based on 

its logo. And we don’t do chemical testing on those unless requested.” Rienhardt

testified the rectangular tablets found in the cellophane wrapper “contain[ed] alprazolam. 

The generic name is Xanax.”

5 He identified their contents by “[u]sing a database that 

[he] searched against with [sic] the logos that were on the tablets.” He said such a search 

was the generally accepted method of testing for that substance in the scientific 

community, and the results of his test were valid and unexceptional. 

Two days after defendant’s conviction, the California Supreme Court issued its 

opinion in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686 (Sanchez), which held an expert 

cannot “relate as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are 

independently proven by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” 

 

5 Defendant notes this is incorrect because Xanax is the registered trademark for a 

drug which contains alprazolam, but offers no evidence or authority for this assertion. 

Because the issue is not pertinent to our resolution of the case, we take no position on the 

matter.
6

Defendant contends his conviction must be reversed because Rienhardt’s testimony 

relayed case-specific hearsay to the jury which was improper under Sanchez.

6

2. Forfeiture

We first address the Attorney General’s claim defendant forfeited the issue by 

failing to object below. We previously rejected a similar argument in People v. Jeffrey G. 

(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 501, 507–508 (Jeffrey G.). There we explained, “Under the law 

prevailing at the time of defendant’s hearing, an expert was permitted to testify relatively 

freely about the content of hearsay evidence relating to the circumstances at hand, if the 

evidence constituted a basis for his or her opinion.” (Id. at p. 506.) Given the liberal 

admissibility of such testimony, any hearsay objection most likely would have been 

overruled. Because reviewing courts “ ‘have traditionally excused parties for failing to 

raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile,’ ” and because parties 

are generally not expected to anticipate rulings that significantly change prevailing law, 

we concluded the defendant had not forfeited his claim. (Id. at pp. 507–508.) As in 

Jeffrey G., defendant’s trial took place before the Sanchez decision, and accordingly, he 

is not precluded from raising the issue on appeal despite his failure to object below.

7

 

 

6 Though Sanchez also addressed admission of testimonial hearsay in violation of 

the federal confrontational clause under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36

(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 679–686), defendant does not argue the database 

hearsay was testimonial. (See People v. Mooring (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 928, 941–942 

[data on Ident-A-Drug Web site about chemical composition of pharmaceutical products 

was not testimonial hearsay because primary purpose was not to gather or preserve 

information for use in criminal prosecution].) 

7 We acknowledge that California appellate courts have reached different 

conclusions about forfeiture of Sanchez hearsay objections in cases tried before the 

Sanchez opinion issued. (Compare People v. Blessett (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 903, 940–

941 [requiring counsel to raise objections in trial court to preserve confrontation clause 

claims on appeal did not place unreasonable burden on defendant to anticipate unforeseen

changes in the law]; People v. Perez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 201, 211–212 [Sanchez was 

not significant change in law that excused counsel’s failure to object to hearsay at trial] 

with People v. Flint (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 983, 996–997 [agreeing with Jeffrey G. and 

concluding defendant did not forfeit case-specific hearsay objections by failing to make 
7

3. Sanchez 

In Sanchez, our Supreme Court clarified the “traditional” distinction between “an 

expert’s testimony regarding his general knowledge in his field of expertise” and the 

expert’s testimony about “case-specific facts about which the expert has no independent 

knowledge.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 676.) The former, while technically 

hearsay, is admissible, but the latter is not. (Ibid.) Turning to the merits of the case

before us, we consider whether Rienhardt’s expert testimony was inadmissible, casespecific hearsay.

Defendant relies heavily on a factually similar case from a different division of 

this court, People v. Stamps (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 988 (Stamps), to argue for reversal 

here. In Stamps, the defendant was convicted of possession of drugs in a pill form. At 

trial, the expert criminalist identified the content of the drugs by visually comparing their 

appearance to pills on the “Ident-A-Drug” Web site. (Id. at p. 991.) “Based on the shape 

and color of the pills, their markings and their condition,” the expert determined they 

contained the alleged controlled substances. (Ibid.) The Stamps court concluded the 

expert’s testimony about the content of the Ident-A-Drug Web site was case-specific 

hearsay, and thus, inadmissible under Sanchez. (Stamps, at p. 997.) “We think it 

undeniable that the chemical composition of the pills Stamps possessed must be 

considered case specific. Indeed, the Ident-A-Drug hearsay was admitted as proof of the 

very gravamen of the crime with which she was charged.” (Ibid.) 

In this case, as did the expert in Stamps, Rienhardt told the jury he identified the 

contents of the tablets taken from defendant by comparing their appearance with 

information in a database. We respectfully disagree with Stamps, however, that the 

 

them below]; Conservatorship of K.W. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1274, 1283 [failure to 

make objection at trial did not forfeit Sanchez claim on appeal where objection “would 

have been clearly, and correctly, overruled”]; see In re Ruedas (May 24, 2018, G054523) 

___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2018 Cal.App. Lexis 483] [concluding Sanchez announced a new 

rule of law for purposes of retroactivity analysis and disagreeing with Perez to the extent 

applicable to retroactivity].) We follow our approach in Jeffrey G. and conclude 

defendant’s Sanchez claim was not forfeited. 
8

expert’s testimony was inadmissible. As we will explain, Rienhardt’s testimony 

comprised two distinct parts. His testimony about the appearance of the pills, though 

case specific, was not hearsay because it was based on his personal observation. His 

testimony about the database, while hearsay, was not case specific, but the type of 

general background information which has always been admissible when related by an 

expert. Thus, under our reading of Sanchez, both parts of Rienhardt’s testimony were 

admissible. 

We begin our analysis with the explanation offered by our high court: “The 

hearsay rule has traditionally not barred an expert’s testimony regarding his general 

knowledge in his field of expertise. ‘[T]he common law recognized that experts 

frequently acquired their knowledge from hearsay, and that “to reject a professional 

physician or mathematician because the fact or some facts to which he testifies are known 

to him only upon the authority of others would be to ignore the accepted methods of 

professional work and to insist on . . . impossible standards.” Thus, the common law 

accepted that an expert’s general knowledge often came from inadmissible 

evidence.’ [Citations.] Knowledge in a specialized area is what differentiates the expert 

from a lay witness, and makes his testimony uniquely valuable to the jury in explaining 

matters ‘beyond the common experience of an ordinary juror.’ [Citations.] As such, an 

expert’s testimony concerning his general knowledge, even if technically hearsay, has not 

been subject to exclusion on hearsay grounds.

“By contrast, an expert has traditionally been precluded from relating case-specific

facts about which the expert has no independent knowledge. Case-specific facts are those 

relating to the particular events and participants alleged to have been involved in the case 

being tried. Generally, parties try to establish the facts on which their theory of the case 

depends by calling witnesses with personal knowledge of those case-specific facts. An 

expert may then testify about more generalized information to help jurors understand the 

significance of those case-specific facts. An expert is also allowed to give an opinion 

about what those facts may mean. The expert is generally not permitted, however, to 
9

supply case-specific facts about which he has no personal knowledge.” (Sanchez, supra, 

63 Cal.4th at p. 676.)

In our view, the only “case-specific” fact here concerned the markings Rienhardt 

saw on the pills recovered from defendant. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 676 [“Casespecific facts are those relating to the particular events and participants alleged to have 

been involved in the case being tried.”]; People v. Meraz (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1162, 

1174–1175, review granted Mar. 22, 2017, S239442, opinion ordered to remain 

precedential.) His testimony about the appearance of the pills was not hearsay, however,

because it was based on his personal observation. (See Sanchez, at pp. 675, 685 [experts 

can relate and rely on information within their personal knowledge]; People v. VegaRobles (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 382, 413 [gang expert could testify regarding case-specific 

facts about which he had personal knowledge]; People v. Iraheta (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 

1228, 1248 [police officers’ testimony regarding tattoos and descriptions of gang activity 

based on their personal knowledge was not hearsay].) 

The information in the database, on the other hand, was not about the specific pills 

seized from defendant, but generally about what pills containing certain chemicals look 

like.8 Though it is clearly hearsay, it is the type of background information which has 

always been admissible under state evidentiary law.

9

(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 

pp. 676, 685 [“experts . . . can rely on background information accepted in their field of 

 

8

Indeed, defendant appears to acknowledge as much in his opening brief when he 

states in a footnote to a different argument: “[I]t is important to remember that the truth 

of the matter asserted in the database is only that a pill bearing a certain insignia purports 

to contain a specific chemical. It does not assert as a truth that any particular pill bearing 

that insignia actually does contain a specific chemical.” 

9 We express no opinion on the reliability of the database or the expert’s use of the 

database to identify the pills. Rienhardt testified his method was the generally accepted 

method for testing in the scientific community, and defendant did not object or explore 

the issue on cross-examination. In any event, the jury was free to reject Rienhardt’s 

testimony if it found his opinion unreliable. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 675 [jury 

may reject expert’s opinion if it is “unsound, based on faulty reasoning or analysis, or 

based on information the jury finds unreliable”].)
10

expertise under the traditional latitude given by the Evidence Code”]; Evid. Code, 

§§ 801, subd. (b) [expert may testify as to matter personally known to expert or made 

known to him or her before the hearing that is of a type on which expert may rely], 802

[expert may relate kind and source of “matter” upon which opinion rests].) As Sanchez

explained, “an expert’s background knowledge and experience is what distinguishes him 

from a lay witness, and . . . testimony relating such background information has never 

been subject to exclusion as hearsay, even though offered for its truth. Thus, our decision 

does not affect the traditional latitude granted to experts to describe background 

information and knowledge in the area of his expertise.” (Id. at p. 685.) Much as a 

physician might testify he or she consulted a treatise to identify a patient’s medical 

condition, Rienhardt consulted the database to reach an opinion about the chemical 

content of the pills he examined, and told the jury he did so. That was perfectly 

permissible.

In further support of this analysis, we look to one of several examples given in 

Sanchez to clarify the distinction between general background information and casespecific hearsay. The Supreme Court explained the fact that an associate of the defendant 

had a diamond tattoo would be a case-specific fact that could be established by a witness 

with personal knowledge or a photograph. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 677.) That a 

particular gang had adopted the diamond as a symbol would be background information 

about which an expert could testify. The expert could then opine that the presence of the 

tattoo shows the person belongs to that gang. (Ibid.) Similarly, here, the markings on the 

pills taken from defendant were case-specific facts about which Rienhardt had personal 

knowledge. The information from the database that pills with those markings contain 

alprazolam was background information he could convey to the jury. In turn, the

conclusion the pills defendant possessed contained alprazolam was not case-specific 

hearsay, but the proper subject of the expert’s opinion.

Because we determine Rienhardt’s testimony was not case-specific hearsay, we 

need not reach the Attorney General’s arguments (1) the testimony was admissible under 
11

the exception for a published list or compilation or (2) any Sanchez error was harmless 

under the circumstances of this case. 

4. Substantial Evidence 

Defendant also contends the trial court erred in denying defendant’s

section 1118.1 motion for acquittal of the possession of alprazolam count because 

Rienhardt’s opinion the tablets contained alprazolam was not substantial evidence. 

Specifically, defendant asserts Rienhardt assumed the tablets were not counterfeit and 

were produced by a pharmaceutical company that followed Federal Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA) regulations, an assumption unsupported by evidence in the record. 

On review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry 

“ ‘is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055.) “The record 

must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 

357.) “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon 

no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s 

verdict.” (Ibid.)

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish the essential elements of 

possession of a controlled substance. (People v. Mooring (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 928, 

943.) Here, Rienhardt, a drug identification expert, testified the pills contained 

alprazolam based on his visual inspection and comparison to information in a database, a 

method that was generally accepted in the scientific community. Sergeant Simmont, who 

had extensive training and experience in narcotics investigations, also described the 

tablets as Xanax. Further, defendant told Simmont he took the “Xanibar” pills “[e]very 

day” until he “feel[s] good.” Taken together, such evidence was sufficient circumstantial 

evidence the pills contained alprazolam. 
12

On cross-examination, Rienhardt admitted he assumed the markings on the pills 

were made by the FDA or the pharmaceutical company, but he did not actually know 

who put them there. Defendant points to that testimony and argues counterfeit drugs are 

typically sold on the street to users who suspect they are real, and accordingly, 

Rienhardt’s opinion was not substantial evidence. But defendant cites no evidence the 

pills were purchased on the street, nor was a “counterfeit pills” theory argued at trial. 

The jurors apparently rejected as unreasonable an inference that the pills were other than 

what they appeared to be, and on this record, that was a rational determination supported 

by sufficient circumstantial evidence.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

 
13

____________________________

Margulies, J.

We concur:

_____________________________

Humes, P.J.

_____________________________

Banke, J.

A150689

People v. Veamatahau
14

Trial Court: San Mateo County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Barbara J. Mallach

Counsel: 

Avatar Legal, Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, 

Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share and Huy T. Luong,

Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.