# CE2012390EN.01013901.xml

| 18.12.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 390/139 |
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18.12.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 390/139

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Thursday 23 June 2011Enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in euro area ***I

P7_TA(2011)0292

European Parliament amendments adopted on 23 June 2011 to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area (COM(2010)0525 – C7-0299/2010 – 2010/0279(COD)) (1)

1

2012/C 390 E/22

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

[Amendment No 2]

[Amendment No 2]

AMENDMENTS BY PARLIAMENT (2)

2

to the Commission proposal

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(1)  The matter was then referred back to committee pursuant to Rule 57(2), second subparagraph (A7-0182/2011).

1

(2)  Amendments: new or amended text is highlighted in bold italics; deletions are indicated by the symbol ▐.

2

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Thursday 23 June 2011REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 136, in combination with Article 121(6) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank

   (1)

  ,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (2),

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

| (-1) | The improved economic governance framework should rely on several inter-linked policies for sustainable growth and jobs, which need to be coherent with each other, in particular a Union strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus upon development and strengthening of the internal market, fostering international trade and competitiveness, an effective framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficit (the Stability and Growth Pact), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macro-economic imbalances, minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, enhanced financial market regulation and supervision. |
| --- | --- |

(-1)

The improved economic governance framework should rely on several inter-linked policies for sustainable growth and jobs, which need to be coherent with each other, in particular a Union strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus upon development and strengthening of the internal market, fostering international trade and competitiveness, an effective framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficit (the Stability and Growth Pact), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macro-economic imbalances, minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, enhanced financial market regulation and supervision.

| (-1a) | The Commission should have a stronger role in the enhanced surveillance procedure as regards assessments that are specific to each Member State, monitoring, missions, recommendations and warnings. |
| --- | --- |

(-1a)

The Commission should have a stronger role in the enhanced surveillance procedure as regards assessments that are specific to each Member State, monitoring, missions, recommendations and warnings.

| (1) | The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union
  should be developed in the context of the broad economic policy guidelines and the employment guidelines
  , as provided for by the Treaty, should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound
  and sustainable
  public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union
  should be developed in the context of the broad economic policy guidelines and the employment guidelines
  , as provided for by the Treaty, should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound
  and sustainable
  public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.

| (2) | Experience gained during the first decade of functioning of the economic and monetary union shows a need for improved economic governance in the Union, which should be built on stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more robust surveillance framework at the Union level of national economic policies. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Experience gained during the first decade of functioning of the economic and monetary union shows a need for improved economic governance in the Union, which should be built on stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more robust surveillance framework at the Union level of national economic policies.

| (2a) | Achieving and maintaining a dynamic Single Market shall be considered an element of the proper and smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union. |
| --- | --- |

(2a)

Achieving and maintaining a dynamic Single Market shall be considered an element of the proper and smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union.

| (3) | In particular, surveillance of the economic policies of the Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary surveillance to prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances and help the Member States affected devise corrective plans before divergences become entrenched
  and before economic and financial developments take a durable turn in an excessively unfavourable direction
  . This broadening should go in step with deepening of fiscal surveillance. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In particular, surveillance of the economic policies of the Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary surveillance to prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances and help the Member States affected devise corrective plans before divergences become entrenched
  and before economic and financial developments take a durable turn in an excessively unfavourable direction
  . This broadening should go in step with deepening of fiscal surveillance.

| (4) | To help address such imbalances, a procedure laid down in legislation is necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

To help address such imbalances, a procedure laid down in legislation is necessary.

| (5) | It is appropriate to supplement the multilateral surveillance referred to in Article 121(3) and (4)
  TFEU
  with specific rules for detection, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.
  It is essential that
  the procedure should be embedded in the annual multilateral surveillance cycle. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

It is appropriate to supplement the multilateral surveillance referred to in Article 121(3) and (4)
  TFEU
  with specific rules for detection, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.
  It is essential that
  the procedure should be embedded in the annual multilateral surveillance cycle.

| (5a) | Reliable statistical data is the basis for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. In order to guarantee sound and independent statistics, Member States should ensure the professional independence of national statistical authorities, which shall be consistent with the European statistics code of practice as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 223/2009. In addition, the availability of sound fiscal data is also relevant for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. This requirement should be guaranteed by the rules provided in this regard by Regulation (EU) No [.../...] on effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, in particular its Article 6a. |
| --- | --- |

(5a)

Reliable statistical data is the basis for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. In order to guarantee sound and independent statistics, Member States should ensure the professional independence of national statistical authorities, which shall be consistent with the European statistics code of practice as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 223/2009. In addition, the availability of sound fiscal data is also relevant for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. This requirement should be guaranteed by the rules provided in this regard by Regulation (EU) No [.../...] on effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, in particular its Article 6a.

| (5b) | Strengthening economic governance should include a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments. The competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned with a Council decision in accordance with Article 3 of this Regulation to participate in an exchange of views. |
| --- | --- |

(5b)

Strengthening economic governance should include a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments. The competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned with a Council decision in accordance with Article 3 of this Regulation to participate in an exchange of views.

| (6) | Enforcement of Regulation (EU) No [.../...] should be strengthened by establishing
  interest-bearing deposits in case of non-compliance with the recommendation to take the recommended corrective action which will be converted into a yearly fine in case of repetitive non-compliance with the recommendation to address excessive macroeconomic imbalances within the same imbalances procedure. These enforcement measures should be applied
  for Member States whose currency is the euro ▐.
  ▐ |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Enforcement of Regulation (EU) No [.../...] should be strengthened by establishing
  interest-bearing deposits in case of non-compliance with the recommendation to take the recommended corrective action which will be converted into a yearly fine in case of repetitive non-compliance with the recommendation to address excessive macroeconomic imbalances within the same imbalances procedure. These enforcement measures should be applied
  for Member States whose currency is the euro ▐.

▐

| (8) | In case of
  failure to comply with Council recommendations
  the interest-bearing deposit or the fine shall be imposed
  until the Council establishes that the Member State has taken corrective action to comply with its recommendations. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

In case of
  failure to comply with Council recommendations
  the interest-bearing deposit or the fine shall be imposed
  until the Council establishes that the Member State has taken corrective action to comply with its recommendations.

| (9) | Moreover, repeated failure of the Member State to draw up a corrective action plan to address the Council
  recommendation
  should be equally subject to a yearly fine as a rule, until the Council establishes that the Member State has provided a corrective action plan that sufficiently addresses its
  recommendation
  . |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Moreover, repeated failure of the Member State to draw up a corrective action plan to address the Council
  recommendation
  should be equally subject to a yearly fine as a rule, until the Council establishes that the Member State has provided a corrective action plan that sufficiently addresses its
  recommendation
  .

| (10) | To ensure equal treatment between Member States,
  the interest-bearing deposit and
  the fine should be identical for all Member States whose currency is the euro and equal to 0,1 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Member State concerned in the preceding year. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

To ensure equal treatment between Member States,
  the interest-bearing deposit and
  the fine should be identical for all Member States whose currency is the euro and equal to 0,1 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Member State concerned in the preceding year.

| (10a) | The Commission should also be able to recommend reducing the size of a sanction or cancelling it on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

(10a)

The Commission should also be able to recommend reducing the size of a sanction or cancelling it on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances.

| (11) | The procedure for the application of the
  sanctions
  on the Member States which fail to take effective measures to correct
  excessive
  macroeconomic imbalances should be construed in such a way that the application of the
  sanction
  on those Member States would be the rule and not the exception. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The procedure for the application of the
  sanctions
  on the Member States which fail to take effective measures to correct
  excessive
  macroeconomic imbalances should be construed in such a way that the application of the
  sanction
  on those Member States would be the rule and not the exception.

| (12) | Fines referred to in Article 3 of this Regulation shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 of the Treaty, and shall be assigned to stability mechanisms to provide financial assistance, created by Member States whose currency is the euro in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Fines referred to in Article 3 of this Regulation shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 of the Treaty, and shall be assigned to stability mechanisms to provide financial assistance, created by Member States whose currency is the euro in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole.

| (13) | The power to adopt individual decisions for the application of the
  sanction
  provided for in this Regulation should be conferred on the Council. As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council as specified in Article 121(1)
  TFEU
  , these individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the measures adopted by the Council in accordance with Article 121
  TFEU
  and Regulation (EU) No [.../...]. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The power to adopt individual decisions for the application of the
  sanction
  provided for in this Regulation should be conferred on the Council. As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council as specified in Article 121(1)
  TFEU
  , these individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the measures adopted by the Council in accordance with Article 121
  TFEU
  and Regulation (EU) No [.../...].

| (14) | Since this Regulation contains general rules for effective enforcement of Regulation (EU) No [.../...], it should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure referred to in Article 121(6) of the Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Since this Regulation contains general rules for effective enforcement of Regulation (EU) No [.../...], it should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure referred to in Article 121(6) of the Treaty.

| (15) | Since an effective framework for detection and prevention of macroeconomic imbalances cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because of the deep trade and financial inter-linkages between Member States and the spillover effects of national economic policies on the Union and the euro area as a whole and can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in the same Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives, |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Since an effective framework for detection and prevention of macroeconomic imbalances cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because of the deep trade and financial inter-linkages between Member States and the spillover effects of national economic policies on the Union and the euro area as a whole and can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in the same Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Subject matter and scope

1.   This Regulation
  lays down
  a system of
  sanctions
  for effective correction of
  excessive
  macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.

2.   This Regulation shall apply to Member States whose currency is the euro.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Regulation, the definitions set out in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No [.../...] shall apply.

In addition, the following definition shall apply:

‘exceptional economic circumstances’ means circumstances where an excess of a government deficit over the reference value is considered exceptional within the meaning of the second indent of Article 126(2)(a)
  TFEU
  and as specified in Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (3).

Article 3

Sanctions

1.   
  An interest-bearing deposit
  shall be imposed by
  a
  Council
  decision
  , acting on a
  recommendation
  by the Commission, if
  a Council decision on corrective action is adopted
  in accordance with Article 10(4) of ▐ Regulation
  (EU) No .../2011, where
  the Council ▐ concludes ▐ that the Member State concerned has
  not taken the recommended corrective action following a recommendation
  .

1a.
     
  A yearly fine shall be imposed by a Council decision, acting on a recommendation by the Commission, if:

| (a) | two successive Council recommendations in the same imbalance procedure are adopted in accordance with Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No [.../...], where the Council considers, that the Member State has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

two successive Council recommendations in the same imbalance procedure are adopted in accordance with Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No [.../...], where the Council considers, that the Member State has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan,

| (b) | two successive Council decisions in the same imbalance procedure are adopted declaring non-compliance in accordance with Article10(4) of Regulation (EU) No [.../...], |
| --- | --- |

(b)

two successive Council decisions in the same imbalance procedure are adopted declaring non-compliance in accordance with Article10(4) of Regulation (EU) No [.../...],

The fine shall be imposed by means of converting the interest-bearing deposit imposed into a yearly fine in accordance with Article 3(1).

1b.
     
  The decisions referred to in paragraph 1 and 1a shall be deemed adopted by the Council unless it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the recommendation within ten days of the Commission adopting it. The Council may amend the recommendation acting by qualified majority.

1c.
     
  The Commission recommendation for a Council decision shall be issued within twenty days of the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 and 1a being met.

2.   The
  interest-bearing deposit or the
  yearly fine to be
  recommended
  by the Commission shall be 0.1 % of the GDP of the Member State concerned in the preceding year.

3.   By derogation from
  paragraph 2
  , the Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within ten days of
  conditions
  referred to in
  paragraphs 1 and 1a being met
  , propose to reduce the amount of
  the interest-bearing deposit or
  the fine or to cancel it.

4.   If a Member State
  has constituted an interest-bearing deposit or
  has paid a yearly fine for a given calendar year and the Council thereafter concludes, in accordance with Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No [.../...] that the Member State has taken the recommended corrective action in the course of
  that
  given year,
  the deposit paid for the given year together with the accrued interest or
  the fine paid for the given year shall be returned to the Member State pro rata temporis.

Article 4

Allocation
  of the fines

Fines
  referred to in
  Article 3 of this Regulation shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 of the Treaty, and shall be
  assigned to the European Financial Stability Facility. By the moment another stability mechanism to provide financial assistance is created by Member States whose currency is the euro in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, the fines shall be assigned to that last mechanism
  .

Article 5

Voting within the Council

For the measures referred to in Article 3, only members of the Council representing Member States whose currency is the euro shall vote and the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.

A qualified majority of the members of the Council mentioned in the
  first
  paragraph shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty.

Article 5a

Economic Dialogue

In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union institutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to discuss decisions taken pursuant to Article 3 of this Regulation.

The competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned by such decisions to participate in an exchange of views.

Article 5b

Review

1.
     
  Within three years after the entry into force of this Regulation and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall publish a report on the application of this Regulation. That report shall evaluate, inter alia:

| (a) | the effectiveness of the regulation, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the effectiveness of the regulation,

| (b) | the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of economic performances of the Member States in accordance with the Treaty |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of economic performances of the Member States in accordance with the Treaty

2.
     
  Where appropriate, this report shall be accompanied by a proposal for amendments to this Regulation.

3.
     
  The report and any accompanying proposals shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and the Council.

Article 6

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in accordance with the Treaties.

Done at,

For the European Parliament

The President

For the Council

The President

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(1)  OJ C 150, 20.5.2011, p. 1.

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(2)  OJ C ....

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(3)  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.

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