IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 23S-MI-345

Angela Y. Smith, Dylan Williams, and $11,180 in 

United States Currency,

Appellants

–v–

State of Indiana,

Appellee

Argued: February 19, 2024 | Decided: April 30, 2024

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court

No. 49D03-2009-MI-33278

The Honorable Gary L. Miller, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals

No. 22A-MI-2910

Opinion by Chief Justice Rush

Justices Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter concur.
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Rush, Chief Justice.

Civil forfeiture laws have been around since before our country’s 

founding. But they are broader and far more widespread today, providing 

law enforcement with a “highly profitable” tool1 that allows the State to 

seize property involved in criminal activity—particularly drug offenses.

This tool has broad remedial characteristics, such as creating an economic 

disincentive to continue engaging in illegal drug activity and permitting

law enforcement to defray expenses incurred in the battle against drugs. 

But it also has significant criminal and punitive characteristics, such as

permitting the seizure of property absent a criminal charge and punishing

those whose property is confiscated. As a result, there is an inherent 

tension between the State’s use of civil forfeiture and citizens’ rights and 

interests. And so, to ensure a proper balance, civil forfeiture actions must 

strictly comply with the laws our Legislature has carefully crafted.2

Here, the State seized $11,180 found during a search of Dylan 

Williams’s apartment. The State then initiated forfeiture proceedings

against the money. Williams did not answer the State’s complaint, but his 

aunt successfully moved to intervene and filed an answer asserting that 

she owned the money and that it was not tied to any criminal activity. 

Following a hearing, the trial court entered judgment for the State.

We reverse and remand. In reaching that decision, we clarify the 

procedural framework for when the State seeks forfeiture of money and 

who constitutes an “owner.” We then apply that framework and hold that 

the State’s evidence fails to support the trial court’s forfeiture order. And 

we hold that the money must be returned to the aunt because she alone 

claimed ownership, she presented uncontradicted evidence establishing 

the $11,180 belongs to her, and the trial court neither concluded she was 

not the owner nor made any findings or statements questioning her 

credibility.

1 Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848–49 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari).

2 We held oral argument in this case during our first “Night Court for Legislators.” We 

sincerely thank the legislators and their staffs who attended this special event.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-MI-345 | April 30, 2024 Page 3 of 14

Facts and Procedural History

Dylan Williams was on parole in September 2020 when he was notified 

during a scheduled meeting that he had tested positive for illegal drugs.

Because of the positive test, agents decided to search Williams’s apartment 

pursuant to his parole agreement. They brought Williams to the 

apartment, and he let them inside where they encountered his cousin who 

was visiting from Chicago. The agents recovered a digital scale from the 

cousin’s pocket and found what they believed to be crack cocaine in a 

closet. They then contacted a police detective to assist, and he applied for 

and was granted a search warrant for the apartment.

While executing the warrant, law enforcement recovered illegal drugs, 

packaging materials, and $11,180 in cash—$3,500 in various 

denominations from inside Williams’s wallet and $7,680 in various 

denominations secured by a rubber band from a dresser in his bedroom.

As a result, the State charged Williams with Level 3 felony dealing in a 

Schedule I controlled substance, Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic 

drug, and Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. 

Williams ultimately pleaded guilty to the Level 6 felony possession 

charge, and the State dismissed the other two counts.

Meanwhile, the State sought forfeiture of the $11,180, alleging the 

money “had been furnished or was intended to be furnished in exchange 

for a violation of a criminal statute, or is traceable as proceeds of a 

violation of a criminal statute.” Williams did not answer the complaint.3

But his aunt, Angela Smith, who lived in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, moved to 

intervene under Trial Rule 24(A)(2), asserting the money is her “exclusive 

property.” The trial court granted that motion, and Smith filed a timely

answer responding to the complaint. She stated that the money belonged 

to her and that it was neither “proceeds of a violation of a criminal statute, 

3 We are concerned that the record does not confirm Williams was ever personally served 

with the forfeiture complaint and summons. See Ind. Code § 34-24-1-3(d). In fact, our review 

of the record and other documents on Odyssey suggest that he was never personally served.
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nor furnished or intended to be furnished for a violation of any criminal 

statute.”

In December 2022, the court held a hearing at which the parties 

presented competing explanations for the $11,180. The State argued that

“[t]he way the money was stored” and “the denominations that were 

found all indicate that there was criminal activity.” In support, the State

presented testimony from one witness, Detective Ryan Graber, who 

helped search the apartment. He testified that he “saw some cash . . . in a 

couple different locations” and that he “observed some narcotics in there 

as well.” But he did not identify what “narcotics” were found, and he did 

not know where officers found “the particular narcotic drug” that led to 

Williams’s conviction.

Smith then testified, explaining that she withdrew $29,000 in June 2020

because her physically and emotionally abusive boyfriend regularly stole 

money from her and forced her to give him money. Later that month, 

about three months before the State’s seizure, Smith said she met Williams 

at his mother’s house where she gave him $15,000 in cash “to hold for” her

so she could “hide the money” from her abuser. She kept the other $14,000 

with her, “[u]nfortunately” carrying it in her purse every day. Smith 

corroborated her testimony with bank records, a police report, 

photographs of head injuries her boyfriend inflicted on her, and a 

protective order she obtained and renewed against him. 

After the hearing, the trial court entered judgment for the State, 

concluding that “the currency in question is subject to forfeiture . . . and 

the State has met its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the currency should be seized.” Smith appealed, and our Court of 

Appeals affirmed. Smith v. State, No. 22A-MI-2910, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. July 

24, 2023) (mem.). We then granted Smith’s petition to transfer, vacating 

the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

This appeal implicates two standards of review. We interpret the civil 

forfeiture statutes de novo. Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1080 (Ind. 
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2022). But in applying that interpretation, we consider only the evidence 

favorable to the trial court’s judgment and any reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom without reweighing the evidence or assessing witness 

credibility. Lipscomb v. State, 857 N.E.2d 424, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

Discussion and Decision

Civil forfeiture is a legal fiction that authorizes “action against 

inanimate objects for participation in alleged criminal activity.” Abbott, 183 

N.E.3d at 1079 (quotation omitted). Participation is all that’s required; 

property can be seized and forfeited “regardless of whether the property 

owner is proven guilty of a crime—or even charged with a crime.” Serrano 

v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1139, 1140 (Ind. 2011). In the context of illegal drug 

activity, forfeiture actions “are designed to be a relatively efficient means 

to remove, from its owner, property used to further illegal trafficking in 

drugs.” Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Ind. 1995). Yet, despite that 

laudable design, civil forfeitures “are not favored” due to their 

“significant criminal and punitive characteristics.” Hughley v. State, 15 

N.E.3d 1000, 1005 (Ind. 2014) (quotation omitted).

In these ways, actions under Indiana’s civil forfeiture statutes implicate 

unique characteristics—they can deter illegal activity, but they can also 

provide the State with financial incentives that encumber property 

owners. See State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 38 (Ind. 2019). Both our 

Legislature and our Court have recognized these competing 

characteristics in recent years. Indeed, the General Assembly has amended 

the forfeiture statutes in seventeen of the last twenty years. Those changes 

include expanding property that is subject to forfeiture, providing 

innocent owners with the ability to petition for the release of certain 

property during the pendency of an action, and reducing the State’s time 

to file a forfeiture complaint. We have likewise been active in this area. For 

example, we have held that forfeiture actions may be subject to the Eighth

Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, id. at 23, and that the right to a jury 

trial under Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution attaches when 

the State seeks to confiscate money, State v. $2,435 in U.S. Currency, 220 

N.E.3d 542, 544 (Ind. 2023). These decisions, among others, reflect our role 
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to apply the law as written and enforce civil forfeitures “only when within 

both the letter and spirit of the law.” Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1005 (quotation 

omitted).

Turning to that law, the civil forfeiture statutes permit forfeiture in a 

contested action if the State shows by a preponderance of the evidence at a 

hearing that the seized property falls within one of several categories. Ind. 

Code § 34-24-1-4; see also id. § -1. The State generally makes that showing 

by establishing a “substantial connection,” or “nexus,” that the property 

“was used to commit one of the enumerated offenses under the statute.” 

Serrano, 946 N.E.2d at 1140, 1143. As is relevant here, the statute provides

two avenues for the State to seek forfeiture of money. I.C. § 34-24-1-1(a)(2), 

(d). One creates a rebuttable presumption that money is subject to 

forfeiture. Id. § -1(d). But the other does not, id. § -1(a)(2), imposing a 

heightened burden on the State at a hearing. Here, the State proceeded 

only under this latter avenue, and thus the rebuttable presumption does 

not apply. This case, however, allows us to clarify and apply the proper 

procedure, including the State’s burden under both avenues.

We first analyze the relevant statutes and outline the procedural

framework when the State seeks the forfeiture of money in a contested

action. Within that discussion, we clarify who constitutes an “owner” of 

money if the State fails to meet its burden. And we then apply those 

principles to this forfeiture action in reviewing the trial court’s order.

I. In a contested action, the State’s burden depends 

on the alleged criminal offense that subjects the 

money to forfeiture.

The parties dispute the State’s burden at a contested hearing. In the 

State’s view, there is “no need” for a trial court “to address the merits of 

the forfeiture” if an intervenor fails to establish that they own the money.

In Smith’s view, the State must always establish the money is subject to 

forfeiture, and the court need only determine ownership if the State 

doesn’t meet its burden. Analyzing the relevant statutes confirms Smith is 

correct.
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When bringing a forfeiture action, the State must timely file a 

complaint “in the jurisdiction where the seizure occurred.” I.C. § 34-24-1-

3(a). At that point, an “owner” or “any person whose right, title, or 

interest is of record” has twenty days to file an answer. Id. § -3(d). If, after 

that time, “there is no answer on file,” then the court on the State’s motion 

“shall enter judgment” in the State’s favor and order the money 

distributed according to law. Id. § -3(e). But when there is an answer on 

file, a hearing is triggered at which the contesting party “may appear.” Id.

§ -3(d). And at that hearing, the State “must show by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the” money is “subject to seizure.” Id. § -4(a). But how 

this burden is met turns on the statute the State relied on in its complaint.

One statute, Section 34-24-1-1(a)(2), allows the State to seize money if 

it was (1) “furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in 

exchange for an act that is in violation of a criminal statute,” (2) “used to 

facilitate any violation of a criminal statute,” or (3) “traceable as proceeds 

of the violation of a criminal statute.” Id. § -1(a)(2). This “violation of a 

criminal statute” language implicates a broad array of offenses, including 

low-level drug offenses. See id. (permitting seizure of money that is 

“commonly used as consideration for a violation of IC 35-48-4,” which is 

titled “Offenses Relating to Controlled Substances”). At a hearing in a 

forfeiture action invoking Section 34-24-1-1(a)(2), the State must identify 

the applicable criminal statute that was violated and establish a

substantial connection between the seized money and that crime. See

Katner, 655 N.E.2d at 348; Serrano, 946 N.E.2d at 1140; Lipscomb, 857 N.E.2d 

at 428–29; Gonzalez v. State, 74 N.E.3d 1228, 1231–32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); 

Brown v. Eaton, 164 N.E.3d 153, 161–63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. 

And if the trial court finds the State has made these showings by a 

preponderance of the evidence, the court enters judgment for the State

and orders the money distributed accordingly. I.C. § 34-24-1-4(c).

The other statute, Section 34-24-1-1(d), creates a rebuttable

presumption that money is subject to forfeiture if it was “found near or on 

a person who is committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to 

commit” one of sixteen listed drug offenses. Id. § -1(d). Each is a serious 

drug offense for dealing, manufacturing, or possessing significant 

quantities. Id. At a hearing in an action invoking this statute, the State 
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must identify the listed offense and establish that the seized money was 

found either near or on a person committing, attempting to commit, or 

conspiring to commit that crime. At that point, the money “is presumed 

forfeitable—period.” Lipscomb, 857 N.E.2d at 428 (quoting Caudill v. State, 

613 N.E.2d 433, 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)). The burden then shifts to the

contesting party to rebut the State’s showing. And if the trial court finds 

the party failed to rebut that showing, the court enters judgment for the 

State and orders the money distributed accordingly. I.C. § 34-24-1-4(c).

The preceding two paragraphs raise a question—what happens to the 

money if the State fails to meet its burden? In that event, the “court shall 

order the property released to the owner.” Id. § -4(b). And an owner may 

be an individual or other entity. See Olympic Fin. Grp., Inc. v. State, 176 

N.E.3d 571, 575, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). But unlike an owner of a vehicle 

or real property, the owner of money is not always readily identifiable, 

particularly if the party contesting the forfeiture is not the person from 

whom the money was seized.

Since the Legislature has not defined “owner” under the civil

forfeiture statutes, we interpret the term in its “plain, or ordinary and 

usual, sense,” I.C. § 1-1-4-1(1), by turning to general-language dictionaries,

Performance Servs., Inc. v. Randolph E. Sch. Corp., 211 N.E.3d 508, 512 (Ind. 

2023). One such dictionary defines “owner” in relevant part as “one who 

has the legal or rightful title to something,” and “one to whom property 

belongs.” Owner, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/owner (last visited Apr. 30, 2024). Until the 

Legislature tells us otherwise, we adopt these definitions and understand
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that, for purposes of the civil forfeiture statutes, an owner of money refers

to the person to whom it belongs.4

And so, when the State fails to meet its burden at a forfeiture hearing, 

the trial court must order the money released to the person to whom it 

belongs. When the money was seized from the person contesting the 

forfeiture, the court will release the money to that person. But when 

someone else contests the forfeiture, that party must produce evidence 

showing the money belongs to them. The court must then determine 

whether that person has established ownership. If so, the court must order 

the money returned to that person. But if that person has not established 

ownership, the court must order the money returned to the person from 

whom the money was seized.

With this procedural framework in hand, we now determine its effect 

on this forfeiture action.

II. The State failed to establish the requisite

substantial connection, and Smith established the 

money belongs to her.

In alleging the $11,180 was subject to forfeiture, the State’s complaint 

relied on only Section 34-24-1-1(a)(2), and thus the rebuttable presumption 

in Section 34-24-1-1(d) does not apply. Smith then successfully moved to 

intervene under Trial Rule 24(A), which required her to “claim[] an 

interest relating to a property” that “is the subject of the action.” Ind. Trial 

Rule 24(A)(2). At that point, she adequately asserted her interest as a

potential “owner of the seized property.” I.C. § 34-24-1-3(d). And since she 

4 Other states that define “owner” in their civil forfeiture statutes use similar definitions. Haw. 

Rev. Stat. § 712A-1 (“a person . . . who has an interest in property”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-

4102(j) (same); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-702(3) (same); Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. § 12-

101(k)(1) (“a person having a legal, equitable, or possessory interest in property”); N.M. Stat. 

Ann. § 31-27-3(J) (“a person who has a legal or equitable ownership interest in property”); 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.01(6) (“a person who claims an equitable or legal 

ownership interest in property”).
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timely answered the State’s complaint, the trial court held a hearing at

which the State was required to prove its allegations by a preponderance 

of the evidence. In entering judgment for the State, the trial court did not 

determine that Smith was not the owner, concluding instead that “the 

currency in question is subject to forfeiture . . . and the State has met its 

burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the currency 

should be seized.”

In reviewing that decision, we first conclude that the State neither

specifically identified an applicable criminal statute that was violated nor

established a substantial connection between that crime and the money. 

We thus hold that the forfeiture order must be reversed. And we then 

hold that the money must be released to Smith. As the only person to 

claim ownership, she presented uncontradicted evidence that the money 

belongs to her. And the trial court neither concluded she was not the 

owner nor made any findings or statements questioning her credibility.

A. The forfeiture order is not supported by sufficient 

evidence.

The State failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

$11,180 was forfeitable because the State did not identify a criminal statute 

that was violated and did not produce evidence showing a substantial 

connection between the money and any underlying offense.

In fact, both in the trial court and on appeal, the State has never tied the 

money to a specific, applicable offense. The complaint broadly alleged that 

the money either “had been furnished or was intended to be furnished in 

exchange for a violation of a criminal statute” or was “traceable as 

proceeds of a violation of a criminal statute.” Then, at the hearing, the 

prosecutor simply stated that “the State’s case is just that money received 

from an apartment where crimes were being committed. And the most 

highest explanation for that cash being present there is that Mr. Williams 

committed the crimes being committed.” Though the State introduced 

evidence that Williams was convicted of Level 6 felony drug possession 

and was charged with two other counts that were dismissed, the State 

never identified an applicable statutory violation that subjected the money 
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to forfeiture. The only explicit mention of any violation during the hearing 

came from Smith’s counsel when he thrice mentioned Williams’s Level 6 

felony conviction. And on appeal, the State simply asserts “the evidence 

allowed the trial court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Williams possessed the seized money as part of [a] drug operation.” Thus, 

on this record, it is unclear which drug offense in Indiana Code chapter 

35-48-4 rendered the money forfeitable under Section 34-24-1-1(a)(2).

But assuming the underlying drug offenses are those for which 

Williams was charged, the State’s evidence at best establishes an 

“incidental or fortuitous connection between” those crimes and the 

money. Katner, 655 N.E.2d at 348–39. At the hearing, the State relied on the 

sole testimony of Detective Graber, and he did not provide any evidence 

showing a substantial connection between the $11,180 and drug 

possession or dealing. He did not identify the type of drugs recovered 

from Williams’s apartment, the quantity of those drugs, or the location 

where they were found. He also confirmed that he did not find any 

ledgers in the apartment and that the only scale found was recovered from 

the visiting cousin’s pocket. As for the money, the State introduced 

photographs of the cash both behind a TV on Williams’s bedroom dresser 

and in his wallet. Detective Graber confirmed he saw the money in these 

locations and explained that, consistent with narcotics trafficking, the 

money on the dresser was “banded up” and in “different denominations.” 

But it is well-settled that “[t]he possession of large amounts of cash is not 

in and of itself illegal.” Brown, 164 N.E.3d at 161. And the fact that a large 

sum of money in different denominations is held together by a rubber 

band does not alone create a substantial connection between that money 

and illegal drug activity.

By not establishing the requisite nexus between the money and an 

applicable offense, the State failed to meet its burden under the civil 

forfeiture statutes. And thus, the trial court’s forfeiture order falls outside 

the “letter and spirit of the law.” Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1005. We therefore 

reverse the forfeiture judgment and now turn to determine ownership.
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B. Smith’s uncontradicted sworn testimony and

corroborating exhibits establish that she is the owner of 

the money.

As stated above, the trial court did not conclude that Smith failed to 

establish she owns the $11,180. Though we could remand for the court to 

determine ownership, we decline to do so in the interest of judicial 

economy for three reasons: (1) only Smith claims to own the money; (2) 

she presented uncontradicted sworn testimony and corroborating exhibits 

establishing the money belongs to her; and (3) the court did not make any 

findings or statements to the contrary.

At the hearing, Smith testified that she was in a “horrible . . . abusive” 

relationship with a man who regularly stole money from her and forced 

her to withdraw money and give it to him. She explained that criminal 

charges had been filed against her abuser and that she was scheduled to 

be a witness at the upcoming trial. And she introduced a police report 

detailing an assault by him for which she had to have brain surgery, 

pictures from the hospital after the surgery, and a protective order she 

obtained and renewed against him. Though these incidents occurred 

about a year after she gave Williams the money, Smith testified that the 

physical abuse was just as severe when she made the exchange.

As for that exchange, Smith stated—and introduced corroborating bank 

statements—that she withdrew $29,000 “to hide the money” from her 

abusive boyfriend. Later that month, Smith met with Williams at his 

mother’s house, about three months before the money was seized, where 

she gave him an envelope that included $15,000 in various denominations 

“to hold for” her. She clarified that she gave the money to Williams 

because the two had been close “throughout his childhood,” and she

“[a]bsolutely” believed she could trust him. And she explained that she 

was not comfortable giving the money to other family members or friends 

because she didn’t want them to “know that [she] was being abused; [she] 

was ashamed of what was going on.” Smith also added that she was 

“bothered” when she learned that only $11,180 of the $15,000 had been 

found. The State did not introduce any evidence contradicting Smith’s 

sworn testimony or corroborating exhibits.
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Yet, on appeal, the State presents three arguments for why we should 

conclude Smith is not the owner—each of them fails. The State first points 

to the detective’s testimony that Williams did not mention Smith when 

asked about the source of the money. But he could have declined to 

mention his aunt for several reasons. The State next asserts that 

“[f]orfeiture should still result in a case like this where the person found in 

possession of the property makes no claim and an intervenor fails to 

establish ownership.” Yet, for reasons explained above, this argument

conflicts with the plain language of the statute. See I.C. § 34-24-1-4(a), (b). 

Finally, the State points to Williams’s failure to appear at the hearing, 

asserting Smith “presented no testimony from Williams nor documents 

that directly substantiate any of [her] claims.” To the latter point, as 

addressed previously, Smith produced ample documents supporting her 

claims. And to the former point, the State could have issued Williams a 

subpoena if it believed his testimony was important, but it did not. In fact, 

a close review of the record supports Smith’s assertion that Williams was 

never “personally served with the Complaint and summons.”

All in all, the uncontradicted evidence presented during the hearing 

establishes that Smith is the owner of the $11,180. And the trial court 

neither concluded she was not the owner nor made any findings or 

statements questioning her credibility. Accordingly, under Section 34-24-

1-4(b), the money must be released to her.

Conclusion

For the reasons articulated above, we reverse the trial court’s forfeiture 

order and remand for the court to order the money released to Smith.

Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT SMITH

Stephen G. Gray

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana