UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4766

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MELVIN SALEE LYNCH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,

Chief District Judge. (3:07-cr-00077-FDW-1)

Submitted: September 16, 2016 Decided: September 29, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Peter C. Anderson, BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, PC, Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States 

Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Melvin Salee Lynch appeals the district court’s order 

revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 5 months’ 

imprisonment and a subsequent term of 12 months’ supervised 

release. Lynch contends that the district court erred by 

modifying the conditions of his supervised release to require 

him to abide by the rules and regulations of a halfway house and 

by later revoking his supervised release for violating those 

rules and regulations. Finding no error, we affirm.

In a criminal case, a defendant must file a notice of 

appeal within 14 days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(b)(1)(A)(i). The district court may extend the time for 

noting an appeal by 30 days upon a finding of good cause or 

excusable neglect. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4). Although not 

jurisdictional, see United States v. Urutyan, 564 F.3d 679, 685 

(4th Cir. 2009), “[c]laim-processing rules” such as Rule 4(b) 

“are to be rigidly applied when invoked by a litigant,” Rice v. 

Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 810 (4th Cir. 2010). The Government has 

challenged this portion of the appeal on timeliness grounds.

Here, the district court entered amended orders modifying 

the terms of supervised release on June 25, 2015, and August 26, 

2015, but Lynch filed the instant appeal on December 8, 2015, 

approximately three months after the time to appeal the latest 

order expired. Neither this court nor the district court may 
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extend the time to file a notice of appeal beyond the 30-day 

excusable neglect period. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4), 26(b)(1). 

Therefore, because Lynch’s challenge to the modification orders

is untimely, we dismiss this portion of the appeal.

“We review a district court’s ultimate decision to revoke a 

defendant’s supervised release for abuse of discretion . . .

[and] review a district court’s factual findings underlying a

revocation for clear error.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 

370, 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015). The

district court need only find a supervised release violation by 

a preponderance of the evidence; “[t]his standard requires only 

that the existence of a fact be more probable than its 

nonexistence.” Id. at 374 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Our review of the entire record reveals no abuse of discretion. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART