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###### Department of Justice

###### Antitrust Division 

                    Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment, Stipulation, and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in                     *United States of America*                     v.                     *AT&T Inc. and Dobson Communications Corporation*, Civil Action No. 1:07-cv-01952. On October 30, 2001, the United States filed a Complaint alleging that the proposed acquisition by AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”) of Dobson Communications Corporation (“Dobson”) would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, by substantially lessening competition in the provision of mobile wireless telecommunications services in seven (7) markets. The proposed Final Judgment, filed at the same time as the Complaint, requires the divestiture of: (1) Dobson's mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses in certain markets in Kentucky and Oklahoma; (2) AT&T's minority interests in entities operating mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses in certain markets in Texas and Missouri; and (3) all of Dobson's right, title and interest in Cellular One Properties, LLC, in order for AT&T to proceed with its $2.8 billion aquisition of Dobson. The Competitive Impact Statement filed by the United States describes the Complaint, the proposed Final Judgment, the industry, and the remedies available to private litigants who may have been injured by the alleged violation.                 

                    Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents  Group, 325 7th Street, NW., Room 215, Washington, DC 20530 (                    *telephone:*                     202-514-2481), on the Department of Justice's Web site at                     *http://www.usdoj.gov/​atr*, and at the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Copies of these materials may be obtained from the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the copying fee set by the Department of Justice regulations.                 

                    Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this notice. Such comments, and responses thereto, will be published in the                     **Federal Register**                     and filed with the Court. Comments should be directed to Nancy Goodman, Chief, Telecommunications and Media Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1401 H Street, NW., Suite 8000,                           ( print page 65061)                        Washington, DC 20530 (                    *telephone:*                     202-514-5621).                 

J. Robert Kramer II,

Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.

## In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 

### United States of America Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H Street, NW., Suite 8000, Washington, DC 20530, Plaintiff, v. AT&T Inc., 175 East Houston, San Antonio, Texas 78205; and  Dobson Communications Corporation, 14201 Wireless Way, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73134,  Defendants. 

####                     Civil No. 1:07-CV-01952, Assigned: Rosemary M. Collyer,                     *Filed:*                     October 30, 2007                 

## Complaint 

The United States of America, acting under the direction of the Acting Attorney General of the United States, brings this civil action to enjoin the merger of two mobile wireless telecommunications service providers, AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”) and Dobson Communications Corporation (“Dobson”), and to obtain other relief as appropriate. Plaintiff United States alleges as follows: 

1. AT&T entered into an agreement to acquire Dobson, dated June 29, 2007, under which the two companies would combine their mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses (“Transaction Agreement”) and AT&T would acquire the Cellular One brand name and associated rights. The United States seeks to enjoin this transaction because it likely will substantially lessen competition to provide mobile wireless telecommunications services in several geographic markets where AT&T and Dobson are each other's most significant competitor or where AT&T competes against mobile wireless telecommunications services providers that sell services under the Cellular One brand name. 

2. AT&T provides mobile wireless telecommunications services in 50 states and serves in excess of 63 million subscribers. Dobson provides mobile wireless telecommunications services in seventeen states and serves approximately 1.6 million subscribers. The combination of AT&T and Dobson likely will substantially lessen competition for mobile wireless telecommunications services in five geographic areas in Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and Texas where businesses owned in whole or part by AT&T and Dobson currently operate. As a result of the proposed acquisition, residents of these mostly rural areas will likely face increased prices, diminished quality or quantity of services, and less investment in network improvements for these services. Additionally, in two relevant geographic areas in Pennsylvania and Texas, competition likely will be substantially lessened to the detriment of consumers because AT&T will have the incentive and ability to limit, or eliminate, a primary competitor's right to use the Cellular One brand name effectively. 

## I. Jurisdiction and Venue 

3. This Complaint is filed by the United States under Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 25, to prevent and restrain defendants from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18. 

4. AT&T and Dobson are engaged in interstate commerce and in activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections 15 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 25, 26, and 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337. 

5. The defendants have consented to personal jurisdiction and venue in this judicial district. 

## II. The Defendants and the Transaction 

6. AT&T, with headquarters in San Antonio, Texas, is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Delaware. AT&T is the largest communications holding company in the United States and worldwide, measured by revenue. AT&T is the largest mobile wireless telecommunications services provider in the United States, measured by subscribers, provides mobile wireless telecommunications services in 50 states, and serves in excess of 63 million subscribers. In 2006, AT&T earned mobile wireless telecommunications services revenues of approximately $37.53 billion. 

7. Dobson, with headquarters in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Oklahoma. Dobson is the ninth largest mobile wireless telecommunications services provider in the United States, measured by subscribers and provides mobile wireless telecommunications services in 17 states. It has approximately 1.7 million subscribers. Dobson also owns Cellular One Properties, LLC, an Oklahoma limited liability company, engaged in the business of licensing the Cellular One brand and promoting the Cellular One service mark and certain related trademarks, service marks and designs. In 2006, Dobson earned approximately $1.3 billion in revenues. 

8. Pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated June 29, 2007, AT&T will acquire Dobson for approximately $2.8 billion. If this transaction is consummated, AT&T and Dobson combined would have approximately 65 million subscribers in the United States, with $37.54 billion in moble wireless telecommunications services revenues. 

## III. Trade and Commerce 

### A. Nature of Trade and Commerce 

9. Mobile wireless telecommunications services allow customers to make and receive telephone calls and obtain data services using radio transmissions without being confined to a small area during the call or data session, and without the need for unobstructed line-of-sight to the radio tower. Mobility is highly valued by customers, as demonstrated by the more than 233 million people in the United States who own mobile wireless telephones. In 2006, revenues from the sale of mobile wireless telecommunications services in the United States were over $125 billion. To meet this desire for mobility, mobile wireless telecommunications services providers must deploy extensive networks of switches and radio transmitters and receivers and interconnect their networks with the networks of wireline carriers and other mobile wireless telecommunications services providers. 

10. The first mobile wireless voice systems were based on analog technology, now referred to as first-generation or “1G” technology. These analog systems were launched after the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) issued the first spectrum licenses for mobile wireless telecommunications services. In the early to mid-1980s, the FCC issued two cellular licenses (A-block and B-block) in each Metropolitan Statistical Area (“MSA”) and Rural Service Area (“RSA “) (collectively, “Cellular Marketing Areas” or CMAs”), with a total of 734 CMAs covering the entire United States. Each license consists of 25 MHz of spectrum in the 800 MHz band. 

                    11. In 1995, the FCC licensed additional spectrum for the provision of Personal Communications Services (“PCS”), a category of services that includes mobile wireless telecommunications services comparable to those offered by cellular licensees. These licenses are in the 1900 MHz and are divided into six blocks: A, B, and C, which consist of 30  MHz each; and D, E, and F, which consist of 10 MHz each. Geographically, the A and B-                          ( print page 65062)                        block 30 MHz licenses are issued by Major Trading Areas (“MTAs”). C, D, E, and F-block licenses are issued by Basic Trading Areas (“BTAs”), several of which comprise each MTA. MTAs and BTAs do not generally correspond to MSAs and RSAs.                 

12. With the introduction of the PCS licenses, both cellular and PCS licensees began offering digital services, thereby increasing network capacity, shrinking handsets, and extending battery life. In addition, in 1996, one provider, a specialized mobile radio (“SMR” or “dispatch”) spectrum licensee, began to use its SMR spectrum to offer mobile wireless telecommunications services comparable to those offered by other mobile wireless telecommunications services providers, in conjunction with its dispatch, or “push-to-talk,” service. Although there are a number of providers holding spectrum licenses in each area of the country, not all providers have fully built out their networks throughout each license area. In particular, because of the characteristics of PCS spectrum, providers holding this type of spectrum have found it less attractive to build out in rural areas. 

13. Today, more than 98 percent of the total U.S. population lives in counties where three or more mobile wireless telecommunications services operators offer digital service. Nearly all mobile wireless voice service has migrated to second-generation or “2G” digital technologies, GSM (global standard for mobility, a standard used by all carriers in Europe), and CDMA (code division multiple access). Even more advanced technologies (“2.5G” and “3G”), based on the earlier 2G technologies, have been deployed for mobile wireless data services. 

### B. Relevant Product Market

14. Mobile wireless telecommunications services is a relevant product market. Mobile wireless telecommunications services include both voice and data services provided over a radio network and allow customers to maintain their telephone calls or data sessions without wires, such as when traveling. There are no cost-effective alternatives to mobile wireless telecommunications services. Because fixed wireless services are not mobile, they are not regarded by consumers of mobile wireless telecommunications services to be a reasonable substitute for those services. It is unlikely that a sufficient number of customers would switch away from mobile wireless telecommunications services to make a small but significant price increase in those services unprofitable. Mobile wireless telecommunications services accordingly is a relevant product market under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.

### C. Relevant Geographic Markets 

15. A large majority of customers use mobile wireless telecommunications services in close proximity to their workplaces and homes. Thus, customers purchasing mobile wireless telecommunications services choose among mobile wireless telecommunications services providers that offer services where they live, work, and travel on a regular basis. The number and identity of mobile wireless telecommunications services providers varies among geographic areas, as does the quality of services and breadth of geographic coverage offered by providers. Mobile wireless telecommunications services providers can and do offer different promotions, discounts, calling plan, and equipment subsidies in different geographic areas, varying the price for customers by geographic area. 

16. The United States comprises numerous local geographic markets for mobile wireless telecommunications services. The geographic areas in which the FCC has licensed mobile wireless telecommunications services providers often represent the core geographic areas in which an individual consumer would use mobile wireless telecommunications services, those being the areas in which an individual customer resides, works and plays. The relevant geographic markets in which this transaction will substantially lessen competition in mobile wireless telecommunications services are effectively represented, but not defined, by FCC spectrum licensing ares. 

17. The relevant geographic markets, under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, where the transaction will substantially lessen competition for mobile wireless telecommunications services are represented by the following FCC spectrum licensing areas: Kentucky RSA-6 (CMA 448); Kentucky RSA-8 (CMA 450); Missouri RSA-1 (CMA 504); Oklahoma RSA-5 (CMA 600); Pennsylvania RSA-5 (CMA 616); Texas RSA-9 (CMA 660); and Texas RSA-11 (CMA 662). It is unlikely that a sufficient number of customers would switch to mobile wireless telecommunications services providers in a different geographic market to make a small but significant price increase in the relevant geographic markets unprofitable. 

### D. Anticompetitive Effects

#### 1. Overlap Areas

#### a. AT&T/Dobson Overlap Markets

17. Currently, AT&T and Dobson each own a business that offers mobile wireless telecommunications services in three relevant geographic areas: Kentucky RSA-6 (CMA 448); Kentucky RSA-8 (CMA 450); and Oklahoma RSA-5 (CMA 600). 

18. In each of these three relevant geographic areas, either AT&T or Dobson has the largest share of subscribers and the other defendant is a particularly strong and important competitor: the companies controlled by AT&T and Dobson collectively account for between 63 percent and 97 percent of subscribers in these areas. As measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”), which is commonly employed in merger analysis and is defined and explained in Appendix A to this Complaint, concentration in these markets ranges from over 3100 to more than 7900, which is well above the 1800 threshold at which the Department considers a market to be highly concentrated. After AT&T's proposed acquisition of Dobson is consummated, the HHIs in the relevant geographic markets will range from over 5200 to over 9400, with increases in the HHI as a result of the merger ranging from over 1400 to over 2300, significantly beyond the thresholds at which the Department considers a transaction likely to cause competitive harm.

#### b. AT&T Minority Interest Markets

20. In two relevant geographic areas, Missouri RSA-1 (CMA 504) and Texas RSA-9 (CMA 660), Dobson owns a business that offers mobile wireless telecommunications services and AT&T has a minority interest in a competing business. In Missouri RSA-1, AT&T's minority equity interest is in Northwest Missouri Cellular Limited Partnership's business and in Texas RSA-9, AT&T's minority equity interest is in Mid-Tex Cellular, Ltd. 

21. In these two relevant geographic areas, either Dobson or the business in which AT&T has a minority interest has the largest share and the other defendant is a particularly strong and important competitor in all, or a large part, of the RSA. In each area, the businesses in which AT&T and Dobson have an interest collectively account for in excess of 70 percent of subscribers. 

                    22. Although the minority equity interest in each situation is small, AT&T has significant rights under the relevant partnership agreements to control core business decisions, obtain critical                           ( print page 65063)                        confidential competitive information, and share in profits at a rate significantly greater than the equity ownership share upon a sale of the partnership. Post-merger, the merged finn would likely have the ability and incentive to coordinate the activities of the wholly-owned Dobson wireless business and the business in which it has a minority stake, and/or undermine the ability of the latter to compete against the former. Such activity would likely result in a significant lessening of competition.                

#### c. AT&T/Cellular One Overlap Markets 

23. In two relevant geographic areas, Pennsylvania RSA-5 (CMA 616) and Texas RSA-11 (CMA 662), AT&T owns a business that offers mobile wireless telecommunications services, and a competing mobile wireless telecommunications business operates under the Cellular One brand name that AT&T would acquire from Dobson pursuant to the proposed transaction. 

24. In these two relevant geographic areas, AT&T has the largest share of subscribers and the mobile wireless telecommunications business operating under the Cellular One brand name is a particularly strong and important competitor. In each area, AT&T and the Cellular One licensee collectively account for in excess of 65 percent of subscribers. 

25. The Cellular One brand name was first used in 1984. In 1989, the Cellular One Group partnership was formed to maintain and promote the Cellular One brand, a licensed trade name. In 1995, the partnership offered to license the brand to all A block cellular providers.  Presently, approximately nine mobile wireless telecommunications services providers in addition to Dobson license the Cellular One brand and offer services to their customers under that brand. Through its planned purchase of Dobson, AT&T will acquire the rights to the Cellular One trademarks, trade names, service marks, service names, and designs for the Cellular One brand name, as well as the agreements to license the Cellular One brand to other mobile wireless telecommunications services providers. 

26. The providers that continue to license and use the Cellular One brand have invested considerable resources in developing and building the brand. The Cellular One brand is thus an important input to these firms' provision of mobile wireless telecommunications services. If their ability to use the brand were to be impaired or eliminated, they would suffer considerable costs and effective competition in these markets would be harmed. 

27. Because AT&T offers and markets wireless services under its own AT&T brand, it has little or no incentive to use or maintain the Cellular One brand. In the two relevant geographic areas where a Cellular One licensee is a primary competitor to AT&T in the mobile wireless telecommunications services market, AT&T would have the incentive and ability to impair the effectiveness of the Cellular One brand, or even deny a license to the current licensee entirely, since by doing so, it could reduce competition by significantly increasing costs to a primary competitor at little or no cost to itself. 

#### 2. Competitive Impact

28. In all seven relevant geographic markets, the mobile wireless telecommunications businesses wholly or partially owned by AT&T and Dobson, and/or the Cellular One licensee, own all or most of thel800 MHz band cellular spectrum licenses, which are more efficient in serving rural areas than 1900 MHz band PCS spectrum. As a result of holding the cellular spectrum licenses and being early entrants into these markets, the networks wholly or partly owned by AT&T, Dobson, or the Cellular One licensee provide greater depth and breadth of coverage than their competitors, which are operating on PCS spectrum in these relevant geographic markets, and thus are more attractive to consumers. A mobile wireless telecommunications services provider with limited coverage in a geographic area typically does not aggressively market its services in that area because it can service customers only through a roaming arrangement with a more built-out competitor under which it must pay roaming charges to, and rely on, its competitor to maintain the quality of the network. The mobile wireless businesses wholly or partly owned by AT&T or Dobson in five of the relevant areas, and by AT &T and the Cellular One licensee in the other two relevant areas, accordingly, are, for a large set of customers, likely closer substitutes for each other than the other mobile wireless telecommunications services in these markets provided by firms who own only PCS spectrum. 

29. Competition between the businesses wholly or partly owned by AT&T and Dobson, or between AT&T and the Cellular One licensee, in the relevant geographic markets has resulted in lower prices and higher quality in mobile wireless telecommunications services, than would otherwise have existed in these geographic markets. In these areas, many consumers consider businesses wholly or partly owned by AT&T, Dobson, or the Cellular One licensee to be the most attractive competitors because other providers' networks lack coverage or provide lower-quality service. 

30. If AT&T's proposed acquisition of Dobson is consummated, (a) the relevant market for mobile wireless telecommunications services will become substantially more concentrated in the three AT&T/Dobson overlap geographic markets, and competition between AT &T and Dobson in mobile wireless telecommunications services will be eliminated in these markets; (b) competition in mobile wireless telecommunications services between Dobson and the businesses partly owned by AT&T will be substantially curtailed in the two AT&T minority ownership geographic markets, and (c) AT&T's acquisition of the rights to the Cellular One brand is likely to diminish the Cellular One licensees' ability to competitively constrain AT&T in the two AT&T/Cellular One overlap geographic markets thereby lessening competition substantially to the detriment of consumers. In all seven relevant geographic areas, the merged firm will have the incentive and ability to increase prices, diminish the quality or quantity of services provided, and refrain ITom or delay making investments in network improvements. 

#### 3. Entry

                    31. Entry by a new mobile wireless telecommunications services provider in the relevant geographic markets would be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive, requiring the acquisition of spectrum licenses and the build-out of a network. Although a number of other firms own 1900 MHz PCS spectrum in the relevant geographic markets, the propagation characteristics of 1900 MHz PCS spectrum are such that signals using those frequencies extend to a significantly smaller area than 800 MHz cellular signals. The relatively higher cost of building out 1900 MHz spectrum, combined with the relatively low population density of the areas in question, suggest that competitors with 1900 MHz spectrum are unlikely to build out their networks to reach the entire area served by AT&T and Dobson. Although additional spectrum has been and will be made available through FCC auctions, it is unlikely that additional mobile wireless telecommunications services based on this spectrum will be deployed in the near future in the relevant geographic areas. Therefore, new entry in response to a small but significant price increase for mobile wireless telecommunications services                           ( print page 65064)                        by the merged firm in the relevant geographic markets would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to thwart the competitive harm resulting from AT&T's proposed acquisition of Dobson, if it were to be consummated.                 

## IV. Violation Alleged 

32. The effect of AT&T's proposed acquisition of Dobson, if it were to be consummated, may be substantially to lessen competition in interstate trade and commerce in the relevant geographic markets for mobile wireless telecommunications services, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.

33. Unless restrained, the transaction will likely have the following effects in mobile wireless telecommunications services in the relevant geographic markets, among others: 

a. Actual and potential competition between AT&T and Dobson will be eliminated; 

b. Actual and potential competition between Dobson and businesses in which AT &T holds a minority interest will be lessened; 

c. Actual and potential competition between AT&T and Cellular One brand licensees will be lessened; 

d. Competition in general will be lessened substantially; 

e. Prices are likely to increase; 

f. The quality and quantity of services are likely to decrease; and 

g. Incentives to improve wireless networks will be reduced. 

## V. Requested Relief 

The United States requests:

34. That AT&T's proposed acquisition of Dobson be adjudged to violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18; 

35. That defendants be permanently enjoined from and restrained from carrying out the Agreement and Plan of Merger dated June 29, 2007, or from entering into or carrying out any agreement, understanding, or plan, the effect of which would be to bring the wireless services businesses of AT&T and Dobson under common ownership or control;

36. That the United States be awarded its costs of this action; and

37. That the United States have such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: October 30, 2007.

Respectfully Submitted,

FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

_ /s/ ___

Thomas O. Barnett,

*Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division*.                    

_ /s/ ___

Deborah A. Garza,

*Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division*.                    

_ /s/ ___

J. Robert Kramer II,

*Director of Operations, Antitrust Division*.                    

_ /s/ ___

Nancy Goodman,

*Chief, Telecommunications & Media Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division*.                    

_ /s/ ___

Laury Bobbish,

*Assistant Chief, Telecommunications & Media Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division*.                    

_ /s/ ___

Hillary B. Burchuk (DC Bar No. 366755),

Lawrence M. Frankel (DC Bar No. 441532),

Rebekah P. Goodheart (DC Bar No. 472673),

*Attorneys, Telecommunications & Media Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division*, U.S. Department of Justice, City Center Building, 1401 H Street, NW., Suite 8000, Washington, DC 20530.                         *Phone: (202) 514-5621 Facsimile: (202) 514-6381*.                    

## Appendix A 

### Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 

                    “HHI” means the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. For example, for a market consisting of four firms with shares of 30, 30, 20, and 20 percent, the HHI is 2600 (302                     + 302                     +202                     + 202                     = 2600). (                    **Note:**                     Throughout the Complaint, market share percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number, but HHIs have been estimated using unrounded percentages in order to accurately reflect the concentration of the various markets.) The HHI takes into account the relative size distribution of the firms in a market and approaches zero when a market consists of a large number of small firms. The HHI increases both as the number of firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in size between those firms increases.                 

                    Markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 points are considered to be moderately concentrated, and those in which the HHI is in excess of 1800 points are considered to be highly concentrated.                     *See Horizontal Merger Guidelines*                     ¶ 1.51 (revised Apr. 8, 1997). Transactions that increase the HHI by more than 100 points in concentrated markets presumptively raise antitrust concerns under the guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.                     *See id*.                 

## In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 

### United States of America, Plaintiff, v. AT&T Inc. and Dobson Communications Corporation, Defendants.

#### Case No.___

#### Filed:___

## Final Judgment

*Whereas*, plaintiff, United States of America, filed its Complaint on October 30,2007, United States and defendants, AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”) and Dobson Communications Corporation (“Dobson”), by their respective attorneys, have consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and without this Final Judgment constituting any evidence against or admission by any party regarding any issue of fact or law;                 

*And whereas*, defendants agree to be bound by the provisions of this Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;                 

*And whereas*, the essence of this Final Judgment is the prompt and certain divestiture of certain rights or assets by defendants to assure that competition is not substantially lessened;                 

*And whereas*, the United States requires defendants to make certain divestitures for the purpose of remedying the loss of competition alleged in the Complaint;                 

*And whereas*, defendants have represented to the United States that the divestitures required below can and will be made and that defendants will later raise no claim of hardship or difficulty as grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the divestiture provisions contained below;                

*Now therefore*, before any testimony is taken, without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law, .and upon consent of the parties, it is                     *ordered, adjudged and decreed*:                 

## I. Jurisdiction 

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and each of the parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted against defendants under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 18). 

## II. Definitions 

As used in this Final Judgment: 

A. “Acquirer” or “Acquirers” means the entity or entities to whom defendants divest the Divestiture Assets. 

                    B. “AT&T” means defendant AT&T Inc., a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in San Antonio, Texas, its                           ( print page 65065)                        successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships and joint ventures, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.                 

C. “Cellular One” means Cellular One Properties, LLC, an Oklahoma limited liability company, with its headquarters in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, engaged in the business of licensing the Cellular One brand and promoting the Cellular One service mark and certain related trademarks, service marks and designs. 

D. “Cellular One Assets” means all legal and economic interests Dobson holds in Cellular One. Cellular One Assets shall include all right, title and interest in trademarks, trade names, service marks, service names, designs, and intellectual property, all license agreements for use of the Cellular One mark, technical information, computer software and related documentation, and all records relating to the divestiture assets. If the acquirer of the Cellular One Assets is not the acquirer(s) of the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets, defendants will grant the acquirer(s) of the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets a license to use the Cellular One service marks on terms generally available at the time the merger agreement was entered and make the transfer of the Cellular One Assets subject to continuation of these licenses. 

E. “CMA” means cellular market area which is used by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to define cellular license areas and which consists of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“MSAs”) and Rural Service Areas (“RSAs”). 

F. “Divestiture Assets” means the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets, Minority Interests and the Cellular One Assets, including any direct or indirect financial ownership or leasehold interests and any direct or indirect role in management or participation in control therein. 

G. “Dobson” means defendant Dobson Communications Corporation, an Oklahoma corporation, with its headquarters in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, its successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships and joint ventures, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees. 

H. “Minority Interests” means the equity interests and any management or control interests owned by AT&T in the following entities that are the licensees or operators of the mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses in the specified RSAs: 

(1) Mid-Tex Cellular, Ltd., covering Texas RSA-9 (CMA 660); and

(2) Northwest Missouri Cellular Limited Partnership, covering Missouri RSA-1 (CMA 504).

As an alternative to the divestiture of the Minority Interests as required by Section IV of this Final Judgment, upon approval of the United States, defendants may withdraw, from the Minority Interest partnerships pursuant to the applicable provisions in the governing partnership agreement. 

I. “Multi-line Business Customer” means a corporate or business customer that contracts with Dobson for mobile wireless telecommunications services to provide multiple telephones to its employees or members whose services are provided pursuant to a contract with the corporate or business customer. 

J. “Transaction” means the Agreement and Plan of Merger among Dobson, AT&T and Alpine Merger Sub, Inc., dated June 29, 2007. 

K. “Wireless Business Divestiture Assets” means each mobile wireless telecommunications services business to be divested under this Final Judgment, including all types of assets, tangible and intangible, used by defendants in the operation of the mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses to be divested. “Wireless Business Divestiture Assets” shall be construed broadly to accomplish the complete divestiture of the entire business of Dobson in each of the following RSA license areas as required by this Final Judgment and to ensure that the divested mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses remain viable, ongoing businesses: 

(1) Kentucky RSA-6 (CMA 448); 

(2) Kentucky RSA-8 (CMA 450); and 

(3) Oklahoma RSA-5 (CMA 600)

provided that Dobson may retain all of the PCS spectrum it currently holds in each of these RSAs and equipment that is used only for wireless transmissions over this PCS spectrum. 

The Wireless Business Divestiture Assets shall include, without limitation, all types of real and personal property, monies and financial instruments, equipment, inventory, office furniture, fixed assets and furnishings, supplies and materials, contracts, agreements, leases, commitments, spectrum licenses issued by the FCC and all other licenses, permits and authorizations, operational support systems, cell sites, network infrastructure, switches, customer support and billing systems, interfaces with other service providers, business and customer records and information, customer contracts, customer lists, credit records, accounts, and historic and current business plans which relate primarily to the wireless businesses being divested, as well as any patents, licenses, sub-licenses, trade secrets, know-how, drawings, blueprints, designs, technical and quality specifications and protocols, quality assurance and control procedures, manuals and other technical information defendant Dobson supplies to its own employees, customers, suppliers, agents, or licensees, and trademarks, trade names and service marks or other intellectual property, including all intellectual property rights under third-party licenses that are capable of being transferred to an Acquirer either in their entirety, for assets described in (a) below, or through a license obtained through or from Dobson, for assets described in (b) below; provided that defendants shall only be required to divest Multi-line Business Customer contracts if the primary business address for that customer is located within any of the three license areas described herein, and further, any subscriber who obtains mobile wireless telecommunications services through any such contract retained by defendants and who are located within the three geographic areas identified above, shall be given the option to terminate their relationship with defendants, without financial cost, at any time within one year of the closing of the Transaction. Defendants shall provide written notice to these subscribers within 45 days after the closing of the Transaction of the option to terminate. 

The divestiture of the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets shall be accomplished by: 

(a) Transferring to the Acquirers the complete ownership and/or other rights to the assets (other than those assets used substantially in the operations of Dobson's overall wireless telecommunications services business which must be retained to continue the existing operations of the wireless properties that defendants are not required to divest, and that either are not capable of being divided between the divested wireless telecommunications services businesses and those not divested, or are assets that the defendants and the Acquirer(s) agree, subject to the approval of the United States, shall not be divided); and 

                        (b) Granting to the Acquirer(s) an option to obtain a nonexclusive, transferable license from defendants for a reasonable period, subject to the approval of the United States and at the election of an Acquirer, to use any of Dobson's retained assets under paragraph (a) above used in operating the mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses being divested, so as to enable the Acquirer to continue to operate the divested mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses without impairment. Defendants shall identify in a schedule submitted to the United States and filed with the Court as                               ( print page 65066)                            expeditiously as possible following the filing of the Complaint, and in any event prior to any divestiture and before the approval by the Court of this Final Judgment, any and all intellectual property rights under third-party licenses that are used by the mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses being divested that defendants could not transfer to an Acquirer entirely or by license without third-party consent, the specific reasons why such consent is necessary, and how such consent would be obtained for each asset.                     

## III. Applicability 

A. This Final Judgment applies to defendants AT&T and Dobson, as defined above, and all other persons in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise. 

B. If, prior to complying with Section IV and V of this Final Judgment, Defendants sell or otherwise dispose of all or substantially all of their assets or of lesser business units that include the Divestiture Assets, they shall require the purchaser to be bound by the provisions of this Final Judgment. Defendants need not obtain such an agreement from the acquirers of the assets divested pursuant to this Final Judgment. 

## IV. Divestitures 

A. Defendants are ordered and directed, within 120 days after consummation of the Transaction, or five (5) calendar days after notice of the entry of this Final Judgment by the Court, whichever is later, to divest the Divestiture Assets in a manner consistent with this Final Judgment to an Acquirer or Acquirers acceptable to the United States in its sole discretion, or, if applicable, to a Divestiture Trustee designated pursuant to Section V of this Final Judgment. The United States, in its sole discretion, may agree to one or more extensions of this time period not to exceed 60 calendar days in total, and shall notify the Court in such circumstances. With respect to divestiture of the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets by defendants or the Divestiture Trustee, if applications have been filed with the FCC within the period permitted for divestiture seeking approval to assign or transfer licenses to the Acquirer(s) of the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets, but an order or other dispositive action by the FCC on such applications has not been issued before the end of the period permitted for divestiture, the period shall be extended with respect to divestiture of those Wireless Business Divestiture Assets for which FCC approval has not been issued until five (5) days after such approval is received. Defendants agree to use their best efforts to accomplish the divestitures set forth in this Final Judgment and to seek all necessary regulatory approvals as expeditiously as possible. This Final Judgment does not limit the FCC's exercise of its regulatory powers and process with respect to the Divestiture Assets. Authorization by the FCC to conduct the divestiture of a Divestiture Asset in a particular manner will not modify any of the requirements of this decree. 

B. In accomplishing the divestitures ordered by this Final Judgment, defendants shall promptly make known, if they have not already done so, by usual and customary means, the  availability of the Divestiture Assets. Defendants shall inform any person making inquiry regarding a possible purchase of the Divestiture Assets that they are being divested pursuant to this Final Judgment and provide that person with a copy of this Final Judgment. Defendants shall offer to furnish to all prospective Acquirers, subject to customary confidentiality assurances, all information and documents relating to the Divestiture Assets customarily provided in a due diligence process except such information or documents subject to the attorney-client or work product privileges. Defendants shall make available such information to the United States at the same time that such information is made available to any other person.  Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, with the consent of the United States in its sole discretion, the defendants may enter into exclusive negotiations to sell the divestiture assets and may limit their obligations under this paragraph to the provision of information to a single potential buyer for the duration of those negotiations. 

C. Defendants shall provide the Acquirers and the United States information relating to the personnel involved in the operation, development, and sale or license of the Wireless  Business Divestiture Assets and Cellular One Assets to enable the Acquirer(s) to make offers of employment. Defendants will not interfere with any negotiations by the Acquirer(s) to employ any defendant employee whose primary responsibility is the operation, development, or sale or license of the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets or the Cellular One Assets. 

D. Defendants shall permit prospective Acquirers of the Divestiture Assets to have reasonable access to personnel and to make inspections of the Divestiture Assets; access to any and all environmental, zoning, and other permit documents and information; and access to any and all financial, operational, and other documents and information customarily provided as part of a due diligence process. 

E. Defendants shall warrant to the Acquirer(s) that (1) the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets will be operational on the date of sale, (2) every wireless spectrum license is in full force and effect on the date of sale, and (3) the Cellular One Assets will be unencumbered and not judged invalid or unenforceable by any court or similar authority on the date of sale. 

F. Defendants shall not take any action that will impede in any way the permitting, licensing, operation, or divestiture of the Divestiture Assets. 

G. Defendants shall warrant to the Acquirer(s) of the Divestiture Assets that there are no material defects in the environmental, zoning, licensing or other permits pertaining to the operation of each asset and that following the sale of the Divestiture Assets, defendants will not undertake, directly or indirectly, any challenges to the environmental, zoning, licensing or other permits relating to the operation of the Divestiture Assets. 

H. Unless the United States otherwise consents in writing, the divestitures pursuant to Section IV, or by a Divestiture Trustee appointed pursuant to Section V, of this Final Judgment, shall include the entire Divestiture Assets, and with respect to the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets shall be accomplished in such a way as to satisfy the United States in its sole discretion that these assets can and will be used by the Acquirer(s) as part of a viable, ongoing business engaged in the provision of mobile wireless telecommunications services. Divestiture of the Divestiture Assets may be made to one or more Acquirers, provided that in each instance it is demonstrated to the sole satisfaction of the United States that the Divestiture Assets will remain  viable and the divestiture of such assets will remedy the competitive harm alleged in the Complaint. The divestiture of the Divestiture Assets, whether pursuant to Section IV or Section  V of this Final Judgment, 

(1) Shall be made to an Acquirer or Acquirers that, in the United States's sole judgment, 

(a) With respect to the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets, has the intent and capability (including the necessary managerial, operational, technical, and financial capability) of competing effectively in the provision of mobile wireless telecommunications services; and 

                    (b) With respect to the Cellular One Assets, has the intent and capability                           ( print page 65067)                        (including the necessary managerial, operational, technical, and financial capability) of maintaining and promoting the intellectual property, including trademarks and service marks.                 

(2) Shall be accomplished so as to satisfy the United States, in its sole discretion, that none of the terms of any agreement between an Acquirer(s) and defendants shall give defendants the ability unreasonably to raise the Acquirer's costs, to lower the Acquirer's efficiency, or otherwise to interfere with the ability of the Acquirer to compete effectively. 

I. At the option of the Acquirer(s) of the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets, defendants shall enter into a contract for transition services customarily provided in connection with the sale of a business providing mobile wireless telecommunications services or intellectual  property licensing sufficient to meet all or part of the needs of the Acquirer for a period of up to one year. The terms and conditions of any contractual arrangement meant to satisfy this provision must be reasonably related to market conditions. 

J. To the extent that the Divestiture Assets use intellectual property, as required to be identified by Section II.K, that cannot be transferred or assigned without the consent of the licensor or other third parties, defendants shall use their best efforts to obtain those consents. 

K. Defendants shall not obtain any additional equity interest in any Minority Interest entity. 

## V. Appointment of Divestiture Trustee 

A. If defendants have not divested the Divestiture Assets within the time period specified in Section IV.A, defendants shall notify the United States of that fact in writing, specifically identifying the Divestiture Assets that have not been divested. Upon application of the United States, the Court shall appoint a Divestiture Trustee selected by the United States and approved by the Court to effect the divestiture of the Divestiture Assets. The Divestiture Trustee will have all the rights and responsibilities of the Management Trustee appointed pursuant to the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order, and will be responsible for: 

(1) Accomplishing divestiture of all Divestiture Assets transferred to the Divestiture Trustee from defendants, in accordance with the terms of this Final  Judgment, to an Acquirer(s) approved by the United States, under Section IV.A of this Final Judgment; 

(2) Exercising the responsibilities of the licensee of any transferred Wireless Business Divestiture Assets and controlling and operating any transferred Wireless Business Divestiture Assets, to ensure that the businesses remain ongoing, economically viable competitors in the provision of mobile wireless telecommunications services in the three license areas specified in Section II.K, until they are divested to an Acquirer(s), and the Divestiture Trustee shall agree to be bound by this Final Judgment; and 

(3) Exercising the responsibilities of the licensee of any transferred Cellular One Assets and controlling and operating any transferred Cellular One Assets, to ensure that the business remains ongoing and that the obligations of Cellular One under the Cellular One license agreements are fulfilled, until they are divested to an Acquirer(s), and the Divestiture Trustee shall agree to be bound by this Final Judgment. 

B. Defendants shall submit a proposed trust agreement (“Trust Agreement”) to the United States, which must be consistent with the terms of this Final Judgment and which must receive approval by the United States in its sole discretion, who shall communicate to defendants within 10 business days its approval or disapproval of the proposed Trust Agreement, and which must be executed by the defendants and the Divestiture Trustee within five business days after approval by the United States. 

C. After obtaining any necessary approvals from the FCC for the assignment of the licenses of the Divestiture Assets to the Divestiture Trustee, defendants shall irrevocably divest the remaining Divestiture Assets to the Divestiture Trustee, who will own such assets (or own the stock of the entity owning such assets, if divestiture is to be effected by the creation of such an entity for sale to Acquirer(s)) and control such assets, subject to the terms of the approved Trust Agreement. 

D. After the appointment of a Divestiture Trustee becomes effective, only the Divestiture  Trustee shall have the right to sell the Divestiture Assets. The Divestiture Trustee shall have the power and authority to accomplish the divestiture to an Acquirer(s) acceptable to the United States, in its sole judgment, at such price and on such terms as are then obtainable upon reasonable effort by the Divestiture Trustee, subject to the provisions of Sections IV, V, and VI of this Final Judgment, and shall have such other powers as this Court deems appropriate. Subject to Section V.G of this Final Judgment, the Divestiture Trustee may hire at the cost and expense of defendants the Management Trustee appointed pursuant to the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order and any investment bankers, attorneys or other agents, who shall be solely accountable to the Divestiture Trustee, reasonably necessary in the Divestiture Trustee's judgment to assist in the divestiture. 

E. In addition, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, the United States, in its sole discretion, may require defendants to include additional assets, or with the written approval of the United States, allow defendants to substitute substantially similar assets, which substantially relate to the Divestiture Assets to be divested by the Divestiture Trustee to facilitate prompt divestiture to an acceptable Acquirer. 

F. Defendants shall not object to a sale by the Divestiture Trustee on any ground other than the Divestiture Trustee's malfeasance. Any such objections by defendants must be conveyed in writing to the United States and the Divestiture Trustee within 10 calendar days after the Divestiture Trustee has provided the notice required under Section VI. 

G. The Divestiture Trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of defendants, on such terms and conditions as the United States approves, and shall account for an monies derived from the sale of the assets sold by the Divestiture Trustee and all costs and expenses so incurred. After approval by the Court of the Divestiture Trustee's accounting, including fees for its services and those of any professionals and agents retained by the Divestiture Trustee, an remaining money shall be paid to defendants and the trust shall then be terminated. The compensation of the Divestiture Trustee and any professionals and agents retained by the Divestiture Trustee shall be reasonable in light of the value of the Divestiture Assets and based on a fee arrangement providing the Divestiture Trustee with an incentive based on the price and terms of the divestiture, and the speed with which it is accomplished, but timeliness is paramount. 

                    H. Defendants shall use their best efforts to assist the Divestiture Trustee in accomplishing the required divestitures, including their best efforts to effect all necessary regulatory approvals. The Divestiture Trustee and any consultants, accountants, attorneys, and other persons retained by the Divestiture Trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books, records, and facilities of the businesses to be divested, and defendants shall develop financial and other information relevant to the assets to be divested as the Divestiture Trustee may reasonably request, subject to reasonable protection for trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information. Defendants shall take no                           ( print page 65068)                        action to interfere with or to impede the Divestiture Trustee's accomplishment of the divestitures.                 

I. After its appointment, the Divestiture Trustee shall file monthly reports with the United States and the Court setting forth the Divestiture Trustee's efforts to accomplish the divestitures ordered under this Final Judgment. To the extent such reports contain information that the Divestiture Trustee deems confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the public docket of the Court. Such reports shall include the name, address, and telephone number of each person who, during the preceding month, made an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, entered into negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an inquiry about acquiring, any interest in the Divestiture Assets, and shall describe in detail each contact with any such person. The Divestiture Trustee shall maintain full records of all efforts made to divest the Divestiture Assets. 

J. If the Divestiture Trustee has not accomplished the divestitures ordered under the Final Judgment within six months after its appointment, the Divestiture Trustee shall promptly file with the Court a report setting forth (1) the Divestiture Trustee's efforts to accomplish the required divestitures, (2) the reasons, in the Divestiture Trustee's judgment, why the required divestitures have not been accomplished, and (3) the Divestiture Trustee's recommendations. To the extent such reports contain information that the Divestiture Trustee deems confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the public docket of the Court. The Divestiture Trustee shall at the same time furnish such report to the United States, who shall have the right to make additional recommendations consistent with the purpose of the trust. The Court thereafter shall enter such orders as it shall deem appropriate to carry out the purpose of the Final Judgment, which may, if necessary, include extending the trust and the term of the Divestiture Trustee's appointment by a period requested by the United States. 

K. After defendants transfer the Divestiture Assets to the Divestiture Trustee, and until those Divestiture Assets have been divested to an Acquirer or Acquirers approved by the United States pursuant to Sections IV.A and IV.H, the Divestiture Trustee shall have sole and complete authority to manage and operate the Divestiture Assets and to exercise the responsibilities of the licensee and shall not be subject to any control or direction by defendants. Defendants shall not use, or retain any economic interest in, the Divestiture Assets transferred to the Divestiture Trustee, apart from the right to receive the proceeds of the sale or other disposition of the Divestiture Assets. 

L. The Divestiture Trustee shall operate the Divestiture Assets consistent with the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order and this Final Judgment, with control over operations, marketing, sales and Cellular One licensing. Defendants shall not attempt to influence the business decisions of the Divestiture Trustee concerning the operation and management of the Divestiture Assets, and shall not communicate with the Divestiture Trustee concerning divestiture of the Divestiture Assets or take any action to influence, interfere with, or impede the Divestiture Trustee's accomplishment of the divestitures required by this Final Judgment, except that defendants may communicate with the Divestiture Trustee to the extent necessary for defendants to comply with this Final Judgment and to provide the Divestiture Trustee, if requested to do so, with whatever resources or cooperation may be required to complete divestiture of the Divestiture Assets and to carry out the requirements of the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order and this Final Judgment. Except as provided in this Final Judgment and the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order, in no event shall defendants provide to, or receive from, the Divestiture Trustee, the mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses, Minority Interests or the Cellular One business under the Divestiture Trustee's control, any non-public or competitively sensitive marketing, sales, pricing or other information relating to their respective mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses. 

## VI. Notice of Proposed Divestitures 

A. Within two (2) business days following execution of a definitive divestiture agreement, defendants or the Divestiture Trustee, whichever is then responsible for effecting the divestitures required herein, shall notify the United States in writing of any proposed divestiture required by Section IV or V of this Final Judgment. If the Divestiture Trustee is responsible, it shall similarly notify defendants. The notice shall set forth the details of the proposed divestiture and list the name, address, and telephone number of each person not previously identified who offered or expressed an interest in or desire to acquire any ownership interest in the Divestiture Assets, together with full details of the same. 

B. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of receipt by the United States of such notice, the United States may request from defendants, the proposed Acquirer(s), any other third party, or the Divestiture Trustee, if applicable, additional information concerning the proposed divestiture, the proposed Acquirer(s), and any other potential Acquirer. Defendants and the Divestiture Trustee shall furnish any additional information requested within fifteen (15) calendar days of the receipt of the request, unless the parties shall otherwise agree. 

C. Within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the notice or within twenty (20) calendar days after the United States has been provided the additional information requested from defendants, the proposed Acquirer(s), any third party, and the Divestiture Trustee, whichever is later, the United States shall provide written notice to defendants and the Divestiture Trustee, if there is one, stating whether or not it objects to the proposed divestiture. If the United States provides written notice that it does not object, the divestiture may be consummated, subject only to defendants' limited right to object to the sale under Section V.F of this Final Judgment. Absent written notice that the United States does not object to the proposed Acquirer(s) or upon objection by the United States, a divestiture proposed under Section IV or Section V shall not be consummated. Upon objection by defendants under Section V.F, a divestiture proposed under Section V shall not be consummated unless approved by the Court. 

## VII. Financing

Defendants shall not finance all or any part of any divestiture made pursuant to Section IV or V of this Final Judgment. 

## VIII. Preservation of Assets 

Until the divestitures required by this Final Judgment have been accomplished, defendants shall take all steps necessary to comply with the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order entered by this Court and cease use of the Divestiture Assets during the period that the Divestiture Assets are managed by the Management Trustee. Defendants shall take no action that would jeopardize the divestitures ordered by this Court. 

## IX. Affidavits 

                    A. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint in this matter, and every thirty (30) calendar days thereafter until the divestitures                           ( print page 65069)                        have been completed under Section IV or V, defendants shall deliver to the United States an affidavit as to the fact and manner of its compliance with Section IV or V of this Final Judgment. Each such affidavit shall include the name, address, and telephone number of each person who during the preceding thirty (30) calendar days, made an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, entered into negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an inquiry about acquiring, any interest in the Divestiture Assets, and shall describe in detail each contact with any such person during that period. Each such affidavit shall also include a description of the efforts defendants have taken to solicit buyers for the Divestiture Assets, and to provide required information to prospective Acquirers, including the limitations, if any, on such information. Assuming the information set forth in the affidavit is true and complete, any objection by the United States to information provided by defendants, including limitation on information, shall be made within fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of such affidavit.                 

B. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint in this matter, defendants shall deliver to the United States an affidavit that describes in reasonable detail all actions defendants have taken and all steps defendants have implemented on an ongoing basis to comply with Section VIII of this Final Judgment. Defendants shall deliver to the United States an affidavit describing any changes to the efforts and actions outlined in defendants' earlier affidavits filed pursuant to this section within fifteen (15) calendar days after the change is implemented. 

C. Defendants shall keep all records of all efforts made to preserve and divest the Divestiture Assets until one year after such divestitures have been completed. 

## X. Compliance Inspection 

A. For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with this Final Judgment or whether the Final Judgment should be modified or vacated, and subject to any legally recognized privilege, authorized representatives of the United States Department of Justice (including consultants and other persons retained by the United States) shall, upon written request of an authorized representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to defendants, be permitted: 

(1) Access during defendants' office hours to inspect and copy, or at the United States' option, to require defendants to provide hard copy or electronic copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts, records, data and documents in the possession, custody, or control of defendants, relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment; and 

(2) To interview, either informally or on the record, defendants' officers, employees, or agents, who may have their individual counsel present, regarding such matters. The interviews shall be subject to the reasonable convenience of the interviewee and without restraint or interference by defendants. 

B. Upon the written request of an authorized representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, defendants shall submit written reports or response to written interrogatories, under oath if requested, relating to any of the matters contained in this Final Judgment as may be requested. 

C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in this section shall be divulged by the United States to any person other than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the United States or, pursuant to a customary protective order or waiver of confidentiality by defendants, the FCC, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United States is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as otherwise required by law. 

D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by defendants to the United States, defendants represent and identify in writing the material in any such information or documents to which a claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and defendants mark each pertinent page of such material, “Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” then the United States shall give defendants ten (10) calendar days notice prior to divulging such material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding). 

## XI. No Reacquisition 

Defendants may not reacquire or lease any part of the Divestiture Assets during the term of this Final Judgment, provided however that defendants shall not be precluded from entering into agreements with the Acquirer of the Cellular One Assets to license those assets for use for a period not to exceed one (1) year from the date of the closing of the Transaction. 

## XII. Retention of Jurisdiction 

This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to enforce compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions. 

## XIII. Expiration of Final Judgement 

Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment shall expire ten years from the date of its entry. 

## XIV. Public Interest Determination 

Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies available to the public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact Statement, and any comments thereon and the United States's responses to comments. Based upon the record before the Court, which includes the Competitive Impact Statement and any comments and response to comments filed with the Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.

Date:

Court approval subject to procedures of Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16.

United States District Judge.

## In the United States District Court for The District of Columbia

### United States of America, Plaintiff, v. AT&T Inc. and Dobson Communications Corporation, Defendants.

####                     Case Number 1:07-CV-01952, Assigned to: Rosemary M. Collyer,                     *FILED:*                     October 30, 2007.                

## Competitive Impact Statement 

Plaintiff United States of America (“United States”), pursuant to Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (“APPA” or “Tunney Act”), 15 U.S.C. l6(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry in this civil antitrust proceeding. 

## I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding

Defendants entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated June 29, 2007, pursuant to which AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”) will acquire Dobson Communications Corporation (“Dobson”). 

                    Plaintiff filed a civil antitrust Complaint on October 30, 2007 seeking                           ( print page 65070)                        to enjoin the proposed acquisition. The Complaint alleges that the likely effect of this acquisition would be to lessen competition substantially for mobile wireless telecommunications services in seven (7) geographic areas in the states of Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Texas, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. This loss of competition would result in consumers facing higher prices, lower quality service and fewer choices of mobile wireless telecommunications services.                 

At the same time the Complaint was filed, plaintiff also filed a Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order and proposed Final Judgment, which are designed to eliminate the anti-competitive effects of the acquisition. Under the proposed Final Judgment, which is explained more fully below, defendants are required to divest (a) Dobson's mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses and related assets in three (3) markets (“Wireless Business Divestiture Assets”); (b) AT&T minority interests in other mobile wireless telecommunications services providers in two (2) markets (“Minority Interests”), and (c) Dobson's Cellular One Assets, which include the Cellular One service mark and related assets, (“Cellular One Assets”) (collectively the “Divestiture Assets”). Under the terms of the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order, competition will be maintained, and defendants will take certain steps to ensure that, while the ordered divestiture is pending the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets and Cellular One Assets are preserved as competitively independent, economically viable and ongoing businesses. In addition, AT&T will not exercise any rights associated with its Minority Interests to control or influence the operations of the competing mobile wireless telecommunications services provider. 

Plaintiff and defendants have stipulated that the proposed Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations thereof. Defendants have also stipulated that they will comply with the terms of the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order and the proposed Final Judgment from the date of signing of the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order, pending entry of the proposed Final Judgment by the Court and the required divestitures. Should the Court decline to enter the proposed Final Judgment, defendants have also committed to continue to abide by its requirements and those of the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order until the expiration of time for appeal. 

## II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation 

### A. The Defendants and the Proposed Transaction 

AT&T, with headquarters in San Antonio, Texas, is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Delaware. AT&T is the largest communications holding company in the United States and worldwide, measured by revenue. It also is the largest mobile wireless telecommunications services provider in the United States, measured by subscribers, providing mobile wireless telecommunications services in 50 states and serving in excess of 63 million subscribers. In 2006, AT&T earned approximately $37.53 billion in mobile wireless telecommunications services revenues. 

Dobson, with headquarters in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Oklahoma. Dobson is the ninth largest mobile wireless telecommunications services provider in the United States, measured by subscribers, and provides mobile wireless telecommunications services in 17 states. It has approximately 1.7 million subscribers. Dobson also owns Cellular One Properties, LLC, an Oklahoma limited liability company, engaged in the business of licensing the Cellular One brand and promoting the Cellular One service mark and certain related trademarks, service marks and designs. In 2006, Dobson earned approximately $1.3 billion in revenues. 

Pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated June 29, 2007, AT&T will acquire Dobson for approximately $2.8 billion. If this transaction is consummated, AT&T and Dobson combined would have approximately 65 million subscribers in the United States, with $37.54 billion in mobile wireless telecommunications services revenues. The proposed transaction, as initially agreed to by defendants, would lessen competition substantially for mobile wireless telecommunications services in seven (7) relevant geographic markets. This acquisition is the subject of the Complaint and proposed Final Judgment filed by plaintiff. 

### B. Mobile Wireless Telecommunications Services Industry 

Mobile wireless telecommunications services allow customers to make and receive telephone calls and use data services using radio transmissions without being confined to a small area during the call or data session and without the need for unobstructed line-of-sight to the radio tower. More than 233 million people in the United States own mobile wireless telephones and annual revenues from the sale of mobile wireless telecommunications services in the United States were over $125 billion in 2006. To meet this strong demand for mobility, mobile wireless telecommunications services providers must deploy extensive networks of switches and radio transmitters and receivers and interconnect their networks with the networks of wireline carriers and other mobile wireless telecommunications services providers. 

First-generation mobile wireless voice systems based on analog technology, now referred to as “1 G” technology, were initially launched after the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) issued the first spectrum licenses for mobile wireless telecommunications services in the early to mid-1980s. The FCC issued two cellular licenses (A-block and B-block) in each Metropolitan Statistical Area (“MSA”) and Rural Service Area (“RSA”) (collectively, “Cellular Marketing Areas” or “CMAs”), with a total of 734 CMAs covering the entire United States. Each license consists of 25 MHz of spectrum in the 800 MHz band.

In 1995, the FCC licensed additional spectrum for the provision of Personal Communications Services (“PCS “), a category of services that includes mobile wireless telecommunications services comparable to those offered by cellular licensees. These licenses are in the 1900 MHz band and are divided into six blocks: A, B, and C, which consist of 30 MHz each; and D, E, and F, which consist of 10 MHz each. Geographically, the A and B-block 30 MHz licenses are issued by Major Trading Areas (“MTAs”), and C, D, E, and F-block licenses are issued by Basic Trading Areas (“BTAs”), several of which comprise each MTA. MTAs and BTAs do not generally correspond to MSAs and RSAs. 

                    With the introduction of the PCS licenses, both cellular and PCS licensees began offering digital services. The use of digital technology enabled providers to increase network capacity, develop smaller handsets, and extend handset battery life. In addition, in 1996, one provider, a specialized mobile radio                           ( print page 65071)                        (“SMR” or “dispatch”) spectrum licensee, began to use its SMR spectrum to offer mobile wireless telecommunications services comparable to those offered by other mobile wireless telecommunications services providers, in conjunction with its dispatch, or “push-to-talk,” service. Although there are a number of providers holding spectrum licenses in each area of the country, not all providers have fully built out their networks throughout each license area. In particular, because of the characteristics of PCS spectrum, providers holding this type of spectrum have found it less attractive to build out in rural areas.                 

The vast majority of U.S. consumers have multiple choices for mobile wireless telecommunications service, with more than 98 percent of the total population residing in counties where three or more mobile wireless telecommunications services operators offer digital service. Nearly all mobile wireless voice service has migrated to second-generation or “2G” digital technologies, GSM (global standard for mobility, a standard used by all carriers in Europe), and CDMA (code division multiple access). Even more advanced technologies (“2.5G” and “3G”), based on the earlier 2G technologies, have been deployed for mobile wireless data services. 

### C. The Competitive Effects of the Transaction on Mobile Wireless Telecommunications Services 

Mobile wireless telecommunications services allow customers to maintain their telephone calls or data sessions without wires when they are moving from place to place and include both voice and data services provided over a radio network. There are no cost-effective alternatives to mobile wireless telecommunications services. Because fixed wireless services do not allow customers to maintain their calls or data sessions while moving and do not permit the placement and receipt of calls from different locations, they are not regarded by consumers as a reasonable substitute for mobile wireless telecommunications services. It is unlikely that a sufficient number of customers would switch from mobile wireless telecommunications services so as to make a small but significant increase in the price of those services unprofitable. 

A large majority of customers use mobile wireless telecommunications services in close proximity to their workplaces and homes. Thus, customers purchasing mobile wireless telecommunications services choose among mobile wireless telecommunications services providers that offer services where they live, work, and travel on a regular basis. The number and identity of mobile wireless telecommunications services providers varies among geographic areas, as does the quality of services and breadth of geographic coverage offered by providers. Mobile wireless telecommunications services providers can and do offer different promotions, discounts, calling plans, and equipment subsidies in different geographic areas, thereby varying the price charged by geographic area. 

The United States comprises numerous local geographic markets for mobile wireless telecommunications services. The geographic areas in which the FCC has licensed mobile wireless telecommunications services providers often represent the core areas in which an individual consumer would use mobile wireless telecommunications services, those being the areas in which an individual customer resides, works, and travels. The relevant geographic markets in which this transaction will substantially lessen competition in mobile wireless telecommunications services are effectively represented, but not defined, by the following FCC spectrum licensing areas: Kentucky RSA-6 (CMA 448); Kentucky RSA-8 (CMA 450); Missouri RSA-1 (CMA 504); Oklahoma RSA-5 (CMA 600); Pennsylvania RSA-5 (CMA 616); Texas RSA-9 (CMA 660); and Texas RSA-11 (CMA 662). It is unlikely that a sufficient number of customers would switch to mobile wireless telecommunications services providers in a different geographic market to make a small but significant price increase in the relevant geographic markets unprofitable. 

The seven (7) geographic markets of concern for mobile wireless telecommunications services were identified by plaintiff via a fact-specific, market-by-market analysis that included consideration of, but was not limited to, the following factors: the number of mobile wireless telecommunications services providers and their competitive strengths and weaknesses; AT&T's and Dobson's market shares, along with those of the other providers; whether additional spectrum is, or is likely soon to be, available; whether any providers are limited by insufficient spectrum or other factors in their ability to add new customers; the concentration of the market, and the breadth and depth of coverage by different providers in each market; the likelihood that any provider would expand its existing coverage or that new providers would enter; whether AT&T or Dobson own rights to control or influence the competitive operations of another provider in the market; and the particular rights associated with any such minority interests. 

#### 1. Overlap Areas 

#### a. AT&T/Dobson Overlap Markets 

AT&T and Dobson each own a business that offers mobile wireless telecommunications services in three relevant geographic areas: Kentucky RSA-6 (CMA 448); Kentucky RSA-8 (CMA 450); and Oklahoma RSA-5 (CMA 600). In each of these areas, either AT&T or Dobson has the largest share of subscribers and the other defendant is a particularly strong and important competitor. The companies controlled by AT&T and Dobson collectively account for between 63 percent and 97 percent of subscribers in these areas. As measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”), which is commonly employed in merger analysis and is defined and explained in Appendix A to the Complaint, concentration in these markets ranges from over 3100 to more than 7900, which is well above the 1800 threshold at which the Department considers a market to be highly concentrated. After AT&T's proposed acquisition of Dobson is consummated, the HHls in the relevant geographic markets will range from over 5200 to over 9400, with increases in the HHI as a result of the merger ranging from over 1400 to over 2300, significantly beyond the thresholds at which the Department considers a transaction likely to cause competitive harm. 

#### b. AT&T Minority Interest Markets 

In two relevant geographic areas, Missouri RSA-1 (CMA 504) and Texas RSA-9 (CMA 660), Dobson owns a business that offers mobile wireless telecommunications services and AT&T has a minority interest in a competing business. In Missouri RSA-1 , AT&T's minority equity interest is in Northwest Missouri Cellular Limited Partnership's business. In Texas RSA-9, AT&T's minority equity interest is in Mid-Tex Cellular, Ltd. In these areas, either Dobson or the business in which AT&T has a minority interest has the largest share and the other firm is a particularly strong and important competitor in all, or a large part, of the RSA. In both areas, the businesses in which AT&T and Dobson have an interest collectively account for in excess of 70 percent of mobile wireless subscribers. 

                    Although AT&T's minority equity interests in Northwest Missouri Cellular LP and Mid-Tex Cellular, Ltd. are small,                           ( print page 65072)                        AT&T has significant rights under each relevant partnership agreement to control core business decisions, obtain critical confidential competitive information, and share in profits at a rate significantly greater than the equity ownership share upon a sale of the partnership. Post-merger, AT&T would likely have the ability and incentive to coordinate the activities of the wholly-owned Dobson wireless business and the business in which it has a minority stake, and/or undermine the ability of the latter to compete against the former. Such activity would likely result in a significant lessening of competition.                 

#### c. AT&T/Cellular One Overlap Markets 

In two relevant geographic areas, Pennsylvania RSA-5 (CMA 616) and Texas RSA-11 (CMA 662), AT&T owns a business that offers mobile wireless telecommunications services, and a competing mobile wireless telecommunications business operates under the Cellular One brand name that AT&T would acquire from Dobson pursuant to the proposed transaction. In these areas, AT&T has the largest share of subscribers and the mobile wireless telecommunications business operating under the Cellular One brand name is a particularly strong and important competitor. In each area, AT&T and the Cellular One licensee collectively account for in excess of 65 percent subscribers. 

The Cellular One brand name was first used in 1984. In 1989, the Cellular One Group partnership was formed to maintain and promote the Cellular One brand, a licensed trade name. In 1995, the partnership offered to license the brand to all A block cellular providers. Presently, approximately nine mobile wireless telecommunications services providers in addition to Dobson license the Cellular One brand and offer services to their customers under that brand. Under the terms of the Cellular One licensing agreements it has entered into with other mobile wireless telecommunications services providers, it is required to promote and maintain the value of the mark. Through its planned purchase of Dobson, AT&T will acquire the rights to the Cellular One trademarks, trade names, service marks, service names, and designs for the Cellular One brand name, as well as the agreements to license the Cellular One brand to other mobile wireless telecommunications services providers. 

The providers that continue to license and use the Cellular One brand have invested considerable resources in developing and building the brand. The Cellular One brand is thus an important input to these firms' provision of mobile wireless telecommunications services. If their ability to use the brand were to be impaired or eliminated, they would suffer considerable costs and effective competition in these markets would be harmed. Because AT&T offers and markets wireless services under its own AT&T brand, it has little or no incentive to use or maintain the Cellular One brand. In the two relevant geographic areas where a Cellular One licensee is a primary competitor to AT&T in the mobile wireless telecommunications services market, AT&T would have the incentive and ability to impair the effectiveness of the Cellular One brand, or even deny a license to the current licensee entirely, since by doing so, it could reduce competition by significantly increasing costs to a primary competitor at little or no cost to itself. Although current Cellular One licensees could, in theory, re-brand their mobile wireless service in response to such conduct, not only would such a process be difficult, expensive, and disruptive, but it is unlikely that another brand could be obtained that would be as widely-recognized or as effective in promoting mobile wireless telecommunications services as the Cellular One brand. 

#### 2. Competitive Impact 

In all seven relevant geographic markets, the mobile wireless telecommunications businesses wholly or partially owned by AT&T and Dobson, and/or the Cellular One licensee, own all or most of the 800 MHz band cellular spectrum licenses, which are more efficient in serving rural areas than 1900 MHz band PCS spectrum. As a result of holding the cellular spectrum licenses and being early entrants into these markets, the networks wholly or partly owned by AT&T, Dobson, or the Cellular One licensee provide greater depth and breadth of coverage than their PCS-based competitors. A mobile wireless telecommunications services provider with limited coverage in a geographic area typically does not aggressively market its services in that area because it can service customers only through a roaming arrangement with a more built-out competitor under which it must pay roaming charges to, and rely on, its competitor to maintain the quality of the network and to support new features. The mobile wireless businesses wholly or partly owned by AT&T or Dobson in five of the relevant areas, and by AT&T and the Cellular One licensee in the other two relevant areas, accordingly, are, for a large set of customers, likely closer substitutes for each other than the other mobile wireless telecommunications services in these markets provided by firms who own only PCS spectrum. 

Competition between the businesses wholly or partly owned by AT&T and Dobson, or between AT&T and the Cellular One licensee, in the relevant geographic markets has resulted in lower prices and higher quality in mobile wireless telecommunications services, than would otherwise have existed in these geographic markets. In these areas, many consumers consider businesses wholly or partly owned by AT&T, Dobson, or the Cellular One licensee to be the most attractive competitors because other providers' networks lack coverage or provide lower-quality service. 

Competition will be substantially lessened to the detriment of consumers if AT&T's proposed acquisition of Dobson is consummated without the required divestitures: (a) Competition between AT&T and Dobson in mobile wireless telecommunications services will be eliminated in the three AT&T/Dobson overlap geographic markets and the relevant markets for mobile wireless telecommunications services will become substantially more concentrated; (b) AT &T would have the incentive and ability to diminish competition in mobile wireless telecommunications services between Dobson and the businesses partly owned by AT&T in the two AT&T minority ownership geographic markets; and (c) AT&T's acquisition of the rights to the Cellular One brand would give AT&T the incentive and ability to diminish the Cellular One licensee's ability to compete effectively in the two AT&T/Cellular One overlap geographic markets. In all seven relevant geographic areas, the merged firm will have the incentive and ability to increase prices, diminish the quality or quantity of services provided, and refrain from or delay making investments in network improvements. 

#### 3. Entry 

                    Entry by a new mobile wireless telecommunications services provider in the relevant geographic markets would require the acquisition of spectrum licenses and the build-out of a network, and thus would be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. Although a number of other firms in the relevant geographic areas own 1900 MHz PCS spectrum, the propagation characteristics of that spectrum are such that signals extend to a significantly smaller area than do 800 MHz cellular signals. The relatively higher cost of building out 1900 MHz spectrum, combined with the relatively low                           ( print page 65073)                        population density of the areas in question, make it unlikely that competitors with 1900 MHz spectrum will build out their networks to reach the entire area served by AT&T and Dobson. Although additional spectrum has been and will be made available through FCC auctions, it is unlikely that additional mobile wireless telecommunications services based on this spectrum will be deployed in the near future in the relevant geographic areas. Therefore, new entry in response to a small but significant price increase for mobile wireless telecommunications services by the merged firm in the relevant geographic markets would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to thwart the competitive harm resulting from AT&T's proposed acquisition of Dobson, if it were to be consummated.                 

For these reasons, the United States concluded that AT&T's proposed acquisition of Dobson will likely substantially lessen competition, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, in the provision of mobile wireless telecommunications services in the seven relevant geographic markets alleged in the Complaint. 

## III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment 

The divestiture requirements of the proposed Final Judgment will eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in mobile wireless telecommunications services in the seven (7) geographic markets of concern. The proposed Final Judgment requires defendants, within one hundred twenty (120) days after the consummation of the Transaction, or five (5) days after notice of the entry of the Final Judgment by the Court, whichever is later, to divest the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets, the Minority Interests and the Cellular One Assets. The Wireless Business Divestiture Assets are essentially Dobson's entire mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses in the three (3) markets where AT&T and Dobson are each other's closest competitors for mobile wireless telecommunications services. These assets must be divested in such a way as to satisfy plaintiff in its sole discretion that they will be operated by the purchaser as a viable, ongoing business that can compete effectively in each relevant market. Defendants must take all reasonable steps necessary to accomplish the divestitures quickly and shall cooperate with prospective purchasers. 

In requiring the divestitures, plaintiff seeks to make certain that the potential buyer acquires all the assets it may need to be a viable competitor and replace the competition lost by the merger.  The 25 MHz of cellular spectrum that must be divested is sufficient to support the operation and expansion of the mobile wireless telecommunications services businesses being divested, enabling the buyer to be a viable competitor to the merged entity. Plaintiff is not requiring the divestiture of the 10 MHz of PCS spectrum held by Dobson in the three (3) divestiture markets because that spectrum is not essential to the viability of the business to be divested. Moreover, in none of the three markets does Dobson's PCS spectrum holdings cover all counties in the RSA. 

In the two relevant geographic markets where AT&T owns a minority interest in another mobile wireless services provider, the proposed Final Judgment requires defendants to divest or withdraw from these Minority Interests. The informational and control rights associated with the minority interests created concerns that allowing the merged firm to continue to hold its existing interest and rights would diminish competition in markets where Dobson and the firm in which AT&T holds an interest were particularly strong, close competitors. Requiring AT&T to relinquish its ownership and control rights in these entities, through divestiture or withdrawal, would eliminate the combined company's ability and incentive to limit competition between itself and the entities in which it owns minority interests. 

The Cellular One Assets consist of all right, title and interest in trademarks, trade names, service marks, service names, designs, and intellectual property, all license agreements for use of the Cellular One mark, technical information, computer software and related documentation, and all records relating to the Cellular One Assets. The proposed acquisition raised concerns that in two (2) markets, AT&T would have the incentive and ability to substantially impair the ability of its primary competitor, a Cellular One licensee, to compete effectively. Under the proposed Final Judgment, the defendants are required to divest the Cellular One Assets to a buyer with the intent and capability to maintain and promote the Cellular One brand such that the current Cellular One licensees can continue to effectively use the brand to compete. 

### A. Timing of Divestitures 

In antitrust cases involving mergers or joint ventures in which the United States seeks a divestiture remedy, it requires completion of the divestitures within the shortest time period reasonable under the circumstances. Section IV.A.g of the proposed Final Judgment in this case requires divestiture of the Divestiture Assets, within one hundred twenty (120) days after the consummation of the Transaction, or five (5) days after notice of the entry of the Final Judgment by the Court, whichever is later. Plaintiff in its sole discretion may extend the date for divestiture of the Divestiture Assets by up to sixty (60) days. Because the FCC's approval is required for the transfer of the wireless licenses to a purchaser, Section IV.A provides that if applications for transfer of a wireless license have been filed with the FCC, but the FCC has not acted dispositively before the end of the required divestiture period, the period for divestiture of those assets shall be extended until five (5) days after the FCC has acted. This extension is to be applied only to the individual Wireless Business Divestiture Assets affected by the delay in approval of the license transfer and does not entitle defendants to delay the divestiture of any other Divestiture Assets for which license transfer approval is not required or has been granted. 

The divestiture timing provisions of the proposed Final Judgment win ensure that the divestitures are carried out in a timely manner, and at the same time will permit defendants an adequate opportunity to accomplish the divestitures through a fair and orderly process. Even if all Divestiture Assets have not been divested upon consummation of the transaction, there should be no adverse impact on competition given the limited duration of the period of common ownership and the detailed requirements of the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order. 

### B. Use of a Management Trustee 

The Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order, filed simultaneously with this Competitive Impact Statement, ensures that, prior to divestiture, the Divestiture Assets are maintained, the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets remain an ongoing business concern, the Cellular One Assets remain economically viable, and defendants will not exercise any legal or equitable rights it may have in the Minority Interest entities. The Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order is designed to ensure that the Divestiture Assets will be preserved and remain independent of defendants, so that competition is maintained during the pendency of the ordered divestiture. 

                    The Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order appoints a management                           ( print page 65074)                        trustee selected by plaintiff to oversee the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets and the Cellular One Assets in the relevant geographic markets. The appointment of a management trustee in this situation is required because the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets are not independent facilities that can be held separate and operated as stand-alone units by the merged firm. Rather, the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets are an integral part of a larger network and, to maintain their competitive viability and economic value, they should remain part of that network during the divestiture period. A management trustee is necessary to oversee the continuing relationship between defendants and these assets, to ensure that these assets are preserved and supported by defendants during this period, yet run independently. The management trustee will also preserve and ensure the viability of the Cellular One Assets. The management trustee will have the power to operate the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets and the Cellular One Assets in the ordinary course of business, so that they will remain independent and uninfluenced by defendants, and so that the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets remain an ongoing and economically viable competitor to defendants and to other mobile wireless telecommunications services providers. The management trustee will preserve the confidentiality of competitively sensitive marketing, pricing, and sales information; ensure defendants' compliance with the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order and the proposed Final Judgment; and maximize the value of the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets and the Cellular One Assets so as to permit expeditious divestiture in a manner consistent with the proposed Final Judgment. Because defendants have agreed in the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order to forego exercising any rights they may have with respect to the Minority Interests pending disposal of those interests, and defendants do not have an active day-to-day role in managing the businesses of the Minority Interest Entities, it is unnecessary for the Minority Interests to be operated by the Management Trustee.                 

The Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order provides that defendants will pay all costs and expenses of the management trustee, including the cost of consultants, accountants, attorneys, and other representatives and assistants hired by the management trustee as are reasonably necessary to carry out his or her duties and responsibilities. After his or her appointment becomes effective, the management trustee will file monthly reports with plaintiffs setting forth efforts taken to accomplish the goals of the Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order and the proposed Final Judgment and the extent to which defendants are fulfilling their responsibilities. Finally, the management trustee may become the divestiture trustee, pursuant to the provisions of Section Y of the proposed Final Judgment. 

### c. Use of a Divestiture Trustee 

In the event that defendants do not accomplish the divestiture within the periods prescribed in the proposed Final Judgment, the Final Judgment provides that the Court will appoint a trustee selected by plaintiff to effect the divestitures. As part of this divestiture, defendants must relinquish any direct or indirect financial ownership interests and any direct or indirect role in management or participation in control. Pursuant to Section V of the proposed Final Judgment, the divestiture trustee will own and control the Divestiture Assets until they are sold to a final purchaser, subject to safeguards to prevent defendants from influencing their operation. 

Section V details the requirements for the establishment of the divestiture trust, the selection and compensation of the divestiture trustee, the responsibilities of the divestiture trustee in connection with the divestiture and operation of the Divestiture Assets, and the termination of the divestiture trust. The divestiture trustee will have the obligation and the sole responsibility, under Section V.D, for the divestiture of any transferred Divestiture Assets. The divestiture trustee has the authority to accomplish divestitures at the earliest possible time and “at such price and on such terms as are then obtainable upon reasonable effort by the Divestiture Trustee.” In addition, to ensure that the divestiture trustee can promptly locate and divest to an acceptable purchaser, plaintiff, in its sole discretion, may require defendants to include additional assets, or allow defendants to substitute substantially similar assets, which substantially relate to the Divestiture Assets to be divested by the divestiture trustee. 

The divestiture trustee will not only have responsibility for sale of the Divestiture Assets, but will also be the authorized holder of the wireless licenses, with full responsibility for the operations, marketing, and sales of the wireless businesses to be divested, and will not be subject to any control or  direction by defendants. Defendants will no longer have any role in the ownership, operation, or management of the Divestiture Assets other than the right to receive the proceeds of the sale.  Defendants will also retain certain obligations to support to the Divestiture Assets and cooperate with the divestiture trustee in order to complete the divestiture. 

The proposed Final Judgment provides that defendants will pay all costs and expenses of the divestiture trustee. The divestiture trustee's commission will be structured, under Section V.G of the proposed Final Judgment, so as to provide an incentive for the divestiture trustee based on the price obtained and the speed with which the divestitures are accomplished. After his or her appointment becomes effective, the divestiture trustee will file monthly reports with the Court and plaintiff setting forth his or her efforts to accomplish the divestitures. Section V.J requires the divestiture trustee to divest the Divestiture Assets to an acceptable purchaser or purchasers no later than six (6) months after the assets are transferred to the divestiture trustee. At the end of six (6) months, if all divestitures have not been accomplished, the trustee and plaintiff will make recommendations to the Court, which shall enter such orders as appropriate in order to carry out the purpose of the Final  Judgment, including extending the trust or term of the trustee's appointment. 

The divestiture provisions of the proposed Final Judgment will eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the transaction in the provision of mobile wireless telecommunications services. The divestitures of the Wireless Business Divestiture Assets and Minority Interests will preserve competition in mobile wireless telecommunications services by maintaining an independent and economically viable competitor in the relevant geographic markets. The divestiture of the Cellular One Assets will ensure that the Cellular One brand will be preserved and maintained so that the current Cellular One licensees can continue to compete effectively. 

## IV. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants

                    Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither impair nor                           ( print page 65075)                        assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action. Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against defendants.                 

## v. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment 

The United States and defendants have stipulated that the proposed Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the provisions of the APPA, provided that the United  States has not withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public interest. 

                    The APPA provides a period of at least sixty (60) days preceding the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any person may submit to the United States written comments regarding the proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this Competitive Impact Statement in the                     **Federal Register**                     or the last date of publication in a newspaper of the summary of this Competitive Impact Statement, whichever is later. All comments received during this period will be considered by the Department of Justice, which remains free to withdraw its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at any time prior to the Court's entry of judgment. The comments and the response of the United States will be filed with the Court and published in the                     **Federal Register**                    .                 

*Written comments should be submitted to:*                     Nancy M. Goodman Chief, Telecommunications and Media Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1401 H Street, NW., Suite 8000, Washington, DC 20530.                

The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains jurisdiction over this action, and the parties may apply to the Court for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification, interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment. 

## VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment 

Plaintiff considered, as an alternative to the proposed Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against defendants. Plaintiff could have continued the litigation and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against AT&T's acquisition of Dobson. Plaintiff is satisfied, however, that the divestiture of assets and other relief described in the proposed Final Judgment will preserve competition for the provision of mobile wireless telecommunications services in the relevant markets identified in the Complaint. 

## VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for the Proposed Final Judgment 

The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be subject to a sixty-day comment period, after which the Court shall determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment “is in the public interest.” 15  U.S.C. 16(e)(l). In making that determination, the court, in accordance with the statute as amended in 2004, is required to consider: 

(A) The competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public interest; and 

(B) The impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.

15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B);                     *see generally United States*                     v.                     *SBC Commuc'ns, Inc.,*                     489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2007) (concluding that the 2004 amendments “effected minimal changes” to scope of review under Tunney Act, leaving review “sharply proscribed by precedent and the nature of Tunney Act proceedings”).[1] 

                    As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held, under the APPA a court considers, among other things, the relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations set forth in the government's complaint, whether the decree is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, and whether the decree may positively harm third parties.                     *See United States*                     v.                     *Microsoft Corp.*, 56 F.3d 1448, 1458-62 (D.C. Cir. 1995). With respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by the decree, a court may not “engage in an unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public.”                     *United States*                     v.                     *BNS, Inc.*, 858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing                     *United States*                     v.                     *Bechtel Corp.*, 648 F.2d 660,666 (9th Cir. 1981));                     *see also  Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1460-62. Courts have held that:                 

                        [t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General.  The court's role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but whether the settlement is “                        *within the reaches of the public interest.*                        ” More elaborate requirements might undermine the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.                     

*Bechtel*                    , 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).[2]                                          In making its public interest determination, a district court “must accord deference to the government's predictions about the efficacy of its remedies, and may not require that the remedies perfectly match the alleged violations because this may only reflect underlying weakness in the government's case or concessions made during negotiation.”                     *SBC Commc'ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17;                     *see also Microsoft,*                     56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the need for courts to be “deferential to the government's predictions as to the effect of the proposed remedies”);                     *United States*                     v.                     *Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.*, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1,6 (D.D.C.  2003) (noting that the court should grant due respect to the United States' prediction as to the effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market structure, and its views of the nature of the case).                 

                    Court approval of a consent decree requires a standard more flexible and less strict than that appropriate to court adoption of a litigated decree following a finding of liability. “[A] proposed decree must be approved even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own, as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is ‘within the reaches of public interest.' ”                     *United  States*                     v.                     *Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982)                           ( print page 65076)                        (citations omitted) (quoting                     *United States*                     v.                     *Gillette Co.*, 406 F. Supp. 713,716 (D. Mass. 1975)),                     *affd sub nom. Maryland*                     v.                     *United States,*                     460 U.S. 1001 (1983);                     *see also United States*                     v.                     *Alcan Aluminum Ltd.*, 605 F. Supp. 619,622 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving the consent decree even though the court would have imposed a greater remedy). To meet this standard, the United States “need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.”                     *SBC Commc'ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17.                 

                    Moreover, the Court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the Court to “construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree against that case.”                     *Microsoft*,  56 F.3d at 1459. Because the “court's authority to review the decree depends entirely on the government's exercising its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place,” it follows that “the court is only authorized to review the decree itself,” and not to “effectively redraft the complaint” to inquire into other matters that the United States did not pursue.                     *Id.*                     at 1459-60. As this  Court recently confirmed in                     *SBC Communications*, courts “cannot look beyond the complaint in making the public interest determination unless the complaint is drafted so narrowly as to make a mockery of judicial power.”                     *SBC Commc'ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.                 

                    In its 2004 amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees in antitrust enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to intervene.” 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). The language wrote into the statute what the Congress that enacted the Tunney Act in 1974 intended, as Senator Tunney then explained: “[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the consent decree process.” 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Senator Tunney). Rather, the procedure for the public interest determination is left to the discretion of the court, with the recognition that the court's “scope of review remains sharply proscribed by precedent and the nature of Tunney Act proceedings.” SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.[3] 

## VIII. Determinative Documents 

There are no determinative materials or documents within the meaning of the APPA that were considered by plaintiff United States in formulating the proposed Final Judgment.

**Dated:**                         October 30, 2007.                    

Respectfully submitted,

Hillary B. Burchuk (D.C. Bar No. 366755),

Lawrence M. Frankel (DC Bar No. 441532),

Rebekah P. Goodheart (DC Bar No. 472673),

                        Attorneys, Telecommunications & Media Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, City Center Building, 1401 H Street, NW., Suite 8000, Washington, DC 20530. (202) 514-5621,                         *Facsimile:*                         (202) 514-6381.                    

# Footnotes

1.                             The 2204 amendments substituted “shall” for “may” in directing relevant factors for court to consider and amended the list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to address potentially ambiguous judgment terms.                         *Compare*15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2004), with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006).                    
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2.                                                     *Cf BNS*, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court's “ultimate authority under the [APPA) is limited to approving or disapproving the consent decree”);                         *United States*                         v.                         *Gillette Co.*, 406 F. Supp.  713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the court is constrained to “look at the overall picture not hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's reducing glass”).                         *See generally Microsoft,*                         56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing whether “the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the ` reaches of the public interest' ”).                     
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3.                                                     *See United States*                         v.                         *Enova Corp.*, 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the “Tunney Act expressly allows the court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the competitive impact statement and response to comments alone”); S. Rep. No. 93-298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1973) (“Where the public interest can be meaningfully evaluated simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments, that is the approach that should be utilized.”);                         *United States*                         v.                         *Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc.*, 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (“Absent a showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge its duty, the Court, in making its public interest finding, should * * * carefully consider the explanations of the government in the competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the circumstances.”).                    
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[FR Doc. 07-5719 Filed 11-16-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-11-M