REVISED September 22, 2016

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-51197

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JEREMIAH GRIEGO, also known as Jeremiah Greigo, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

Jeremiah Griego and two others were indicted on one count of aiding and 

abetting each other in making false statements. Griego pleaded guilty to the 

charge and was sentenced to ten months in prison and a three year term of 

supervised release. On appeal, Griego argues that his sentence is procedurally 

flawed and substantively unreasonable because the district court misapplied 

the sentencing guidelines. Because we find that the district court committed 

a significant procedural error in the application of the guidelines’ crossreference provision, we VACATE and REMAND for resentencing.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 15, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 15-51197

2

I.

By grand jury indictment, Griego was charged with aiding and abetting 

the making of a false statement to the United States Marshal’s Service, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(2) and (2). Griego entered a plea of guilty 

without a plea agreement. The presentence report (PSR) prepared by the 

probation office assigned a base offense level of fourteen pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 2J1.2, Obstruction of Justice. Griego objected to the application of § 2J1.2, 

arguing that the facts alleged in his indictment did not satisfy the 

requirements of any of the statutory offenses covered by the obstruction of 

justice guideline. He argued that § 2B1.1(a)(2), which sets forth a base offense 

level of six, was the guideline that appropriately covered his criminal conduct. 

The probation officer responded to the objection, agreed that the guideline to 

be used in calculating the sentencing range should be § 2B1.1, and filed an 

addendum to the PSR and revised the PSR. While the probation officer agreed 

that § 2J1.2 did not apply on its own terms, the revised PSR still calculated the 

base offense level as fourteen, pursuant to the cross-reference provision in §

2B1.1(c)(3). That provision provides that if “the defendant was convicted under 

a statute proscribing false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or 

representations generally (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 . . .)” and “the conduct set forth 

in the count of conviction establishes an offense specifically covered by another 

guideline,” that other guideline should apply. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(c)(3).

At sentencing Griego again objected to the PSR, arguing that the facts 

alleged in the indictment did not warrant the application of § 2J1.2. The 

district court overruled the objection and adopted the statements in the PSR 

and the response to Griego’s objection. The PSR calculated Griego’s guidelines 

range as ten to sixteen months, with a statutory maximum of five years. Had 

§ 2B1.1(a)(2) applied, Griego’s guidelines range could have been zero to six 

months. The district court sentenced Griego to ten months in prison and a 
No. 15-51197

3

three year term of supervised release. Griego objected to a condition of 

supervised release, but did not object to the sentence as substantively 

unreasonable. Griego timely filed a notice of appeal. 

II.

Pursuant to Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), we engage in 

a bifurcated review of the sentence imposed by the district court. United States 

v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 2009). First, we consider 

whether the district court committed a “significant procedural error,” such as 

miscalculating the advisory guidelines range. Id. If there is no error or the 

error is harmless, we may proceed to the second step and review the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 

751-53. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

interpretation and application of the guidelines, including any cross-reference 

provisions, de novo. United States v. Arturo Garcia, 590 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 

2009).

III.

Griego argues that the district court reversibly erred by overruling his 

objection to the application of § 2B1.1(c)(3), which provides a cross reference to 

§ 2J1.2. He asserts that the Government did not specify and the district court 

did not find that the facts alleged in the indictment supported any offense other 

than a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), and argues that the facts alleged in 

the indictment could not support any other offense. We agree.

In Garcia, we held that a district court may apply a cross-reference 

provision pursuant to § 2B1.1(c)(3) only if the facts alleged in the indictment 

establish the elements of another offense for which the other guideline is 

applicable. 590 F.3d at 315-16. In Garcia, the district court had not identified 

a specific statutory offense to which the cross-reference provision applied. We 

addressed the four criminal statutes that could have supported the application 
No. 15-51197

4

of the guidelines and ultimately affirmed the district court, concluding that one 

of the statutes “expressly cover[ed]” the conduct alleged in the count of 

conviction. Id. at 316. 

The Government argues that the facts alleged in Griego’s indictment 

would support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, which is covered by § 2J1.2 

and prohibits, inter alia, “corruptly . . . obstruct[ing], or imped[ing] or 

endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper 

administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had 

before any department or agency of the United States.” Specifically, the 

Government asserts that the indictment shows that Griego:

knew there was a pending proceeding . . . ; being conducted by 

officers from the U.S. Marshal’s Service (who interviewed [Griego]

more than once); and [Griego] willfully and knowingly made a false 

statement which impeded the investigation.

Yet while the Government acknowledges that the relevant portion of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1505 requires proof that the defendant acted “corruptly,” it wholly fails to 

explain how the facts alleged in Griego’s indictment satisfy this requirement. 

We have explained that “corruptly” in the context of § 1505 means 

“knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or undermine 

the due administration of justice.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 454 (5th 

Cir. 2007). By contrast, under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, “[t]he requirement that the 

false representation be made ‘knowingly and willfully’ is satisfied if the 

defendant acts deliberately and with the knowledge that the representation is 

false.” United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1986). The 

generalized mens rea required to violate § 1001 is not sufficient to prove the 

more specific mens rea required to violate § 1505. See United States v. Kim, 

95 F. App’x 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2004). Griego’s indictment for violation of § 1001

alleged that Griego “did knowingly and willfully make a false, fraudulent and

fictitious material statement and representation”; it did not allege that he 
No. 15-51197

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specifically intended to subvert or undermine the due administration of justice.

Because the facts alleged in the indictment do not support the application of 

U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, the district court erred in applying the cross-reference 

provision under U.S.S.G. § 2.B1.1(c)(3). See Garcia, 590 F.3d at 315-16.

Accordingly, we VACATE the sentence and REMAND for resentencing.