IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-11130

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

AHMAD DARNELL DENSON,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CR-23-1

Before BARKSDALE, ELROD, and HO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ahmad Darnell Denson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 84-

months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. As part of its 

judgment, the district court imposed a standard condition of supervised release 

that requires Denson to “permit a probation officer to visit [him] at any time 

at home or elsewhere”. 

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 19, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 18-11130 Document: 00515002846 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/19/2019
No. 18-11130

2

Denson challenges the constitutionality of § 922(g), the sufficiency of his 

factual basis offered in support of his guilty plea, and the constitutionality of 

the above-described condition of supervised release. Because Denson did not 

raise these issues in district court, review is only for plain error. E.g., United 

States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir. 2012). 

Under that standard, Denson must show a forfeited plain (clear or 

obvious) error that affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 

556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he makes that showing, we have the discretion to 

correct such reversible plain error, but generally should do so only if it 

“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings”. Id. 

Denson contends the court plainly erred by accepting the factual basis 

offered in support of his guilty plea. He asserts: § 922(g) does not permit 

prosecutions for the possession of firearms that traveled in interstate 

commerce in the distant past; and, if § 922(g) does allow such convictions, it is 

unconstitutional. He further contends the statute requires the Government to 

prove he knew: he possessed a firearm; he was a felon; and the firearm was 

in, or affecting, interstate commerce. 

As Denson concedes, these contentions are foreclosed by our court’s 

precedent. See United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145–46 (5th Cir. 2013)

(rejecting assertion that National Federation of Independent Business v. 

Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), affected our prior jurisprudence rejecting 

challenges to constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Daugherty, 264 

F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding constitutionality of § 922(g) under 

Commerce Clause); United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81–82 (5th Cir. 1988)

(holding § 922(g)(1) conviction requires proof defendant knew he possessed a 

firearm, but does not require proof he knew it had an interstate nexus); see also 

 Case: 18-11130 Document: 00515002846 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/19/2019
No. 18-11130

3

United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695, 705–06 (5th Cir. 2009) (determining Dancy

remains good law after Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009)). 

Therefore, the court did not plainly err by accepting Denson’s factual basis. 

Denson contends the above-quoted condition of supervised release is 

“unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, [un]constitutionally overbroad 

and vague, statutorily unreasonable, and a greater deprivation of liberty than 

is reasonably necessary”, and at least requires the district court to explain the 

reasons for its imposition. Our court, however, “ordinarily do[es] not find plain 

error when [it has] not previously addressed an issue”. United States v. Evans, 

587 F.3d 667, 671 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). To that end, we have declined to find plain-sentencing error where, 

inter alia, “this court’s law was unsettled”. United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 

415 F.3d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Palmer, 456 F.3d 

484, 491 (5th Cir. 2006) (“A ‘plain’ error is one which is clear under current 

law.”). As a result, and because it had not previously addressed the issue, our

court recently held imposition of the same condition challenged in this appeal 

was not plain error. United States v. Cabello, 916 F.3d 543, 544 (5th Cir. 2019).

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 18-11130 Document: 00515002846 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/19/2019