Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Sweeney v. City of Decatur, 2017 IL App (4th) 160492

Appellate Court 

Caption

BRADLEY L. SWEENEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF 

DECATUR, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. Fourth District 

Docket No. 4-16-0492

Filed March 24, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County, No. 16-L-18; the 

Hon. Albert G. Webber, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Jon D. Robinson (argued), of Bolen Robinson & Ellis, LLP, of 

Decatur, for appellant.

Jerrold H. Stocks (argued) and Edward F. Flynn, of Featherstun, 

Gaumer, Postlewait, Stocks, Flynn, Hubbard, of Decatur, for appellee.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justices Harris and Steigmann concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 In February 2016, plaintiff, Bradley L. Sweeney, filed a two-count complaint against 

defendant, the city of Decatur (City), his former employer, and Tim Gleason, the City’s 

manager. In April 2016, plaintiff filed an amended complaint against only the City. In 

response, the City filed a combined motion to dismiss the amended complaint under section 

2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2014)). After a June 

2016 hearing, the Macon County circuit court granted the City’s motion and dismissed with 

prejudice plaintiff’s amended complaint under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 

(West 2014)). 

¶ 2 Plaintiff appeals, contending the circuit court erred by dismissing his claim (1) brought 

under section 15(b) of the Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 174/15(b) (West 2014)) because that 

provision (a) only requires disclosure of suspected law violations to a government or law 

enforcement agency and (b) does not require the employee to also refuse to participate in the 

activity and (2) of common-law retaliatory discharge based on the public policy protecting 

(a) whistleblowing and (b) the freedom of speech under the first amendment (U.S. Const., 

amend. I). We affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 In the February 2016 complaint, plaintiff asserted a claim of common-law retaliatory 

discharge and a violation of the Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 174/1 et seq. (West 2014)) 

against the City and Gleason. The City and Gleason filed a section 2-619.1 motion to dismiss. 

After an April 2016 hearing, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss under section 

2-615 and allowed plaintiff to replead. 

¶ 5 Plaintiff’s April 2016 amended complaint again asserted retaliatory discharge and 

Whistleblower Act claims but only against the City. The amended complaint alleged that, in 

January 2015, Ryan McCrady, then the City’s manager, appointed plaintiff as the City’s police 

chief. As the police chief, plaintiff reported directly to the city manager. In March 2015, 

Gleason became the City’s manager. In May 2015, Gleason told plaintiff to provide a police 

car and uniformed officer to drive him to the St. Louis airport to catch a plane for a vacation 

after the City’s State of the City address. Plaintiff reported to Gleason his personal use of 

public resources was improper. Gleason then ordered plaintiff to have the car waiting at the 

City’s civic center to transport him to St. Louis. Plaintiff discussed the situation with the 

deputy chief of police, Jim Getz, who agreed Gleason’s personal use of the officer and police 

car was improper but volunteered to drive Gleason. While on duty, Getz drove Gleason to the 

St. Louis airport in his police vehicle. Plaintiff “involuntarily allowed,” but did not order, 

Gleason’s personal use of police resources. After Gleason returned from vacation, plaintiff 

again told Gleason his use of a police car and driver for his personal use was improper. While 

Gleason stated he understood plaintiff’s objection to his use of the officer and car, their 

relationship was difficult after the conversation. Plaintiff alleged Gleason’s actions violated 

(1) the official misconduct statute (720 ILCS 5/33-3 (West 2014)); (2) the City’s police 

department’s general order No. 11-03, which prohibits the use of departmental vehicles 

outside the City’s limits for personal business; (3) chapter eight of the City’s code, which 

prohibits a City officer or employee from the solicitation or acceptance of gifts prohibited by 

the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act (Ethics Act) (5 ILCS 430/1-1 et seq. (West 
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2014)); (4) the Ethics Act; and (5) article VIII, section 1(a), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 

(Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, § 1(a)), which provides “[p]ublic funds, property or credit shall be 

used only for public purposes.” Plaintiff contends Gleason knew or should have known his 

personal use of the police car and officer was improper because he was then a member of the 

Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board and a former police lieutenant. 

¶ 6 The complaint further alleged that, in January 2016, Gleason asked plaintiff to make a 

public statement supporting Gleason’s request for a new local motor fuel tax at the City council 

meeting. Plaintiff refused to make the requested public statement. Gleason responded with 

hostility and told plaintiff to leave his office. The complaint alleged matters of tax policy were 

outside the scope of plaintiff’s job duties as police chief.

¶ 7 On February 2, 2016, Gleason and the City department heads, including plaintiff, met at 

the City’s civic center. During the meeting, Gleason requested input from those present. When 

it came to his turn, plaintiff responded the City had other potential revenue sources and stated 

his opposition to a further tax increase. Gleason became furious and ordered plaintiff to leave 

the meeting. Later that day and the next day, Gleason asked plaintiff the following questions: 

“ ‘Do you know who you work for?’ and ‘Do you want to keep your job as Police Chief?’ ” On 

February 4, 2016, Gleason asked plaintiff to resign. When plaintiff refused to resign, he 

received a written notice of termination. 

¶ 8 As to his retaliatory discharge claim, plaintiff alleges his termination was in retaliation for 

his (1) “disclosure regarding Gleason’s personal use of a Decatur police car and uniformed 

officer”; (2) “refusal to make a public statement at the City Council meeting supporting 

Gleason’s proposed motor fuel tax”; and (3) “February 2, 2016 statement in opposition to 

increasing taxes when he believed other sources of income were available to the City.” He 

alleges his retaliatory termination violated on or more of the following clear mandates of 

public policy: 

“(1) enforcing the State’s criminal code and ethics regulations, (2) the policy of 

furthering investigation of a crime within a police department, (3) preventing the 

private use of public resources, in violation of Article VIII(1)(a) of the Illinois 

Constitution, (4) protecting the First Amendment rights of public employees to speak 

on matters of public concern outside the scope of their job duties, and (5) protecting the 

First Amendment right of a [sic] public employees to not be coerced by their 

government employers into engaging in political speech.”

¶ 9 Regarding his claim under the Whistleblower Act, plaintiff asserted he disclosed certain 

information to Gleason, who was his sole supervisor and authorized by the City to receive such 

information on behalf of the City. He had a reasonable belief the information disclosed to 

Gleason concerned violations of the Illinois Constitution, as well as state laws, rules, and ethics 

regulations. Moreover, plaintiff contends Gleason, acting for and on behalf of the City in his 

capacity as city manager, retaliated against him by terminating his employment due to 

plaintiff’s disclosure of information to Gleason, which plaintiff reasonably believed disclosed 

a violation of state law. 

¶ 10 In May 2016, the City filed a combined motion to dismiss the amended complaint under 

section 2-619.1 of the Code. The section 2-615 part of the motion asserted plaintiff’s 

retaliatory discharge claim should be dismissed for failure to state a clear mandate of public 

policy undermined by the discharge of an at-will employee. The City also argued both claims 

should be dismissed because they failed to allege whistleblowing activity. Moreover, the 
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section 2-615 motion to dismiss contended the allegations regarding the first amendment failed 

to state a cause of action and the element of causation was defeated. The section 2-619 portion 

of the motion asserted (1) the allegations in the amended complaint and Gleason’s affidavit 

establish a cause, other than a retaliatory one, for plaintiff’s termination; and (2) causation fails 

because plaintiff’s termination was remote from the date of the alleged whistleblowing.

¶ 11 On May 26, 2016, the circuit court held a hearing on the City’s motion to dismiss. After 

hearing the parties’ arguments, the court took the matter under advisement. On June 7, 2016, 

the court entered a lengthy docket entry, dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s amended 

complaint under section 2-615 of the Code. On June 30, 2016, plaintiff filed a timely notice of 

appeal in sufficient compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). 

Accordingly, we have jurisdiction of this appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. 

Feb. 1, 1994). 

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 In this case, the circuit court dismissed with prejudice plaintiff’s complaint under section 

2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014)). A section 2-615 motion to dismiss 

challenges the complaint’s legal sufficiency based on defects apparent on its face. Blumenthal 

v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 19. In ruling on such a motion, “a court must accept as true all 

well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts.” 

Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 19. The court must determine “whether the allegations of the 

complaint, when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish 

a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.” Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 19. This 

court reviews de novo the grant of a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. Blumenthal, 2016 IL 

118781, ¶ 19. We also review de novo an issue of statutory construction. Murphy-Hylton v. 

Lieberman Management Services, Inc., 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 17.

¶ 14 A. Whistleblower Act Claim 

¶ 15 Section 15(b) of the Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 174/15(b) (West 2014)) provides the 

following: “An employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information to a 

government or law enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe 

that the information discloses a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation.” Thus, to 

establish a cause of action under section 15(b), the employee must show (1) an adverse 

employment action by his or her employer, (2) which was in retaliation (3) for the employee’s 

disclosure to a government or law enforcement agency (4) of a suspected violation of an 

Illinois or federal law, rule, or regulation. See Taylor v. Board of Education of the City of 

Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 123744, ¶ 52, 10 N.E.3d 383. At issue in this case is whether 

plaintiff made a disclosure to a government or law enforcement agency. 

¶ 16 In Brame v. City of North Chicago, 2011 IL App (2d) 100760, ¶ 12, 955 N.E.2d 1269, the 

Second District construed section 15(b) of the Whistleblower Act to only require the employee 

to report the suspected violation to a government or law enforcement agency, and “no 

exceptions apply if a government or law-enforcement agency is also the employer.” The 

Brame court explained that, if the legislature had intended the Whistleblower Act not to apply 

to reports made to an employee’s own government or law enforcement agency employer, it 

would have expressly stated such a limitation. Brame, 2011 IL App (2d) 100760, ¶ 12, 955 

N.E.2d 1269. It further noted, “[i]t is difficult to perceive that the legislature did not intend the 
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[Whistleblower] Act to protect a police officer from retaliation for reporting the illegal conduct 

of fellow officers to his superiors in the department.” Brame, 2011 IL App (2d) 100760, ¶ 12, 

955 N.E.2d 1269. Additionally, the Brame court distinguished the federal cases, which held an 

employee’s reporting within the employee’s own company of an alleged criminal violation did 

not fall under section 15(b) of the Whistleblower Act, because the employers in those cases 

were not government or law enforcement agencies. Brame, 2011 IL App (2d) 100760, ¶ 12, 

955 N.E.2d 1269. The Brame case involved a lieutenant in the police department, who reported 

alleged criminal activity by the police chief to the mayor, who was the chief executive officer 

of the city and had general supervision and control of the police department. Brame, 2011 IL 

App (2d) 100760, ¶¶ 1, 7, 955 N.E.2d 1269. 

¶ 17 Even assuming, arguendo, Brame’s holding that the disclosure to an employer in a 

government or law enforcement agency falls under section 15(b) of the Whistleblower Act is 

correct, the facts alleged in plaintiff’s amended complaint are different from those in Brame. 

Here, plaintiff did not report Gleason’s alleged violation of Illinois law to Gleason’s superior. 

According to plaintiff’s amended complaint, when Gleason requested the use of a police car 

and officer to drive him to the St. Louis airport, plaintiff “reported to Gleason that this personal 

use of public resources would be improper.” After Gleason used the police car and officer, 

plaintiff “again disclosed to Gleason that his use of a police car and driver for his personal 

purposes was improper.” Plaintiff further alleges Gleason, as a member of the Illinois Law 

Enforcement Training and Standards Board and a former police lieutenant, knew or should 

have known his personal use of police car and officer was improper. Thus, we address whether 

telling the alleged government violator his acts are improper constitutes “disclosing 

information” under section 15(b) of the Whistleblower Act.

¶ 18 When presented with an issue of statutory construction, the reviewing court’s primary 

objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Murphy-Hylton, 2016 IL 

120394, ¶ 25. The statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning, best indicates the 

legislature’s intent. Murphy-Hylton, 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25. Moreover, we must evaluate the 

statute as a whole, “construing words and phrases in context to other relevant statutory 

provisions and not in isolation.” Murphy-Hylton, 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25. In doing so, we should 

not render any language superfluous. Murphy-Hylton, 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25. “Additionally, 

the court may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the 

purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another.” 

Murphy-Hylton, 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25.

¶ 19 The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the verb “disclose” as “to expose to view” or “to 

make known or public.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/disclose (last visited Feb. 3, 2017). Thus, the employee must have 

exposed to view or made known information. Informing the violator his or her actions are 

improper does not expose to view or make known the alleged improper activity. That 

conclusion is consistent with the First District’s explanation of the Whistleblower Act, which 

states: 

“The [Whistleblower] Act protects employees who call attention in one of two specific 

ways to illegal activities carried out by their employer. It protects employees who 

either contact a government agency to report the activity or refuse to participate in that 

activity. An employee who does not perform either of the specifically enumerated 

actions under the [Whistleblower] Act cannot qualify for its protections.” (Emphases 
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added.) Sardiga v. Northern Trust Co., 409 Ill. App. 3d 56, 62, 948 N.E.2d 652, 657 

(2011). 

Moreover, “the purpose of the Whistleblower Act is to protect statutorily defined employees 

who report violations of state or federal laws, rules, or regulations ‘because the reported 

wrongful conduct or unsafe condition affected the health, safety[,] or welfare of Illinois 

residents as a whole.’ ” (Emphases added.) Larsen v. Provena Hospitals, 2015 IL App (4th) 

140255, ¶ 47, 27 N.E.3d 1033 (quoting Sutherland v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 356 Ill. App. 

3d 620, 627, 826 N.E.2d 1021, 1027 (2005)). Simply having a conversation with the 

wrongdoer about the impropriety of his or her actions is not exposing the alleged improper 

activity, making it known, or reporting the wrongful conduct. The fact the violator is the 

employee’s boss does not alter the analysis, as the information is still not disclosed. We hold 

section 15(b) of the Whistleblower Act does not protect an employee who simply notes the 

impropriety of conduct with the alleged wrongdoer, as that does not constitute the disclosure of 

information under the Whistleblower Act. 

¶ 20 Since plaintiff alleges the disclosure of information was made to Gleason, the violator, we 

agree with the circuit court plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under the Whistleblower 

Act. Given our conclusion, we do not address the parties’ other arguments related to the 

Whistleblower Act. 

¶ 21 B. Retaliatory Discharge 

¶ 22 Plaintiff also challenges the circuit court’s dismissal of his common-law retaliatory 

discharge claim. In Illinois, a longstanding rule exists that an at-will employee, such as 

plaintiff, may be discharged by his employer at any time and for any reason. Michael v. 

Precision Alliance Group, LLC, 2014 IL 117376, ¶ 28, 21 N.E.3d 1183. In Kelsay v. Motorola, 

Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 181-82, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978), our supreme court recognized the tort 

of retaliatory discharge as a narrow exception to the aforementioned rule. “To sustain a cause 

of action for retaliatory discharge, an employee must prove: (1) the employer discharged the 

employee, (2) the discharge was in retaliation for the employee’s activities (causation), and 

(3) the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy.” Michael, 2014 IL 117376, ¶ 31, 21 

N.E.3d 1183. On appeal, plaintiff asserts his discharge violated the public policy protecting 

whistleblowing and freedom of speech. The City asserts plaintiff did not raise an issue on the 

dismissal of retaliatory discharge claim arising from whistleblower activity. We disagree, as 

plaintiff asserts in his brief that the circuit court ignored his whistleblowing allegations raised 

in his retaliatory discharge claim. 

¶ 23 While a precise definition of what constitutes a clearly mandated public policy does not 

exist, “a review of Illinois case law reveals that retaliatory discharge actions have been allowed 

in two settings: where an employee is discharged for filing, or in anticipation of filing, a claim 

under the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1992)); or where an 

employee is discharged in retaliation for the reporting of illegal or improper conduct, 

otherwise known as ‘whistleblowing.’ ” Michael, 2014 IL 117376, ¶ 30, 21 N.E.3d 1183. In 

those situations, “an employer could effectively frustrate a significant public policy by using 

its power of dismissal in a coercive manner.” Michael, 2014 IL 117376, ¶ 30, 21 N.E.3d 1183. 

Thus, the situations necessitate a cause of action for retaliatory discharge to vindicate the 

public policy underlying the employee’s activity and deter the employer’s conduct that is 

inconsistent with that policy. Michael, 2014 IL 117376, ¶ 30, 21 N.E.3d 1183. Additionally, 
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our supreme court has stated, “public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects 

the citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in the State’s constitution and statutes 

and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions.” Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 

85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981). 

¶ 24 1. Whistleblowing

¶ 25 The allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint regarding whistleblowing are the same 

ones he makes in his claim under the Whistleblower Act. As with his Whistleblower Act claim, 

plaintiff does not allege facts showing he reported or disclosed information about Gleason’s 

alleged violation of Illinois law. In other words, plaintiff did not blow the whistle on Gleason. 

The alleged facts in plaintiff’s amended complaint simply show plaintiff twice told Gleason his 

actions were improper. Thus, like with his claim under the Whistleblower Act, plaintiff has 

failed to plead facts supporting an instance of whistleblowing and cannot plead a violation of a 

clear mandate of public policy based on whistleblowing. 

¶ 26 2. Freedom of Speech

¶ 27 Moreover, on appeal, plaintiff alleges the circuit court erred by dismissing his retaliatory 

discharge claim based only on his statements in opposition to increasing taxes at a February 2, 

2016, staff meeting. As stated, our supreme court has only recognized retaliatory discharge 

causes of action in the areas of Workers’ Compensation claims and whistleblowing. See 

Michael, 2014 IL 117376, ¶ 30, 21 N.E.3d 1183. Plaintiff asserts Illinois law has also 

recognized a retaliatory discharge claim when an employee is discharged in retaliation for first 

amendment speech. However, the case cited by plaintiff recognized “a public policy favoring 

thorough investigation of police and fire department affairs and citizen compliance with such 

investigations.” Daniel v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 165 Ill. App. 3d 772, 775, 520 N.E.2d 

754, 756 (1987). There, the employee claimed she was fired for complying with an order from 

the board of fire and police commissioners to produce any documents relevant to a dismissal 

proceeding. Daniel, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 775, 520 N.E.2d at 756. The case only addressed the 

first amendment right to free speech in the context of a federal claim and not the retaliatory 

discharge claim. 

¶ 28 The Illinois Supreme Court has addressed whether the first amendment establishes a 

clearly mandated public policy in the context of a private employer. In Barr v. Kelso-Burnett 

Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 523, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1355 (1985), the employees sought to raise a claim 

of retaliatory discharge against their private employer based on, inter alia, their first 

amendment right to freedom of speech. Our supreme court concluded the employees’ 

discharge did not violate any clear mandate of public policy. Barr, 106 Ill. 2d at 526, 478 

N.E.2d at 1356. In reaching that conclusion, the court found “the constitutional guarantee of 

free speech is only a guarantee against abridgement by the government, Federal or State; the 

Constitution does not provide protection or redress against private individuals or corporations 

which seek to abridge the free expression of others.” Barr, 106 Ill. 2d at 526, 478 N.E.2d at 

1356. It also noted neither the Illinois Constitution nor the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. 

Stat. 1983, ch. 68, ¶ 1-10 et seq.) contain provisions mandating “the inclusion of the right of 

free speech into those rights which are applicable to the employer-employee relationship.” 

Barr, 106 Ill. 2d at 528, 478 N.E.2d at 1357. 
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¶ 29 In this case, plaintiff’s employer is a municipality, not a private employer. No Illinois case 

law has addressed whether the first amendment creates a public policy protecting speech made 

by public employees. The United States Supreme Court has recognized “the First Amendment 

protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing 

matters of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). In Garcetti, 547 

U.S. at 418, the Supreme Court established a two-step inquiry into whether a public 

employee’s speech is entitled to first amendment protection. The two-step inquiry was 

reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in its most recent case on the issue, Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 

___, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014). The two-step inquiry is as follows: 

“ ‘The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of 

public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of 

action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then 

the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises. The question becomes whether the 

relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee 

differently from any other member of the general public.’ ” Lane, 573 U.S. at ___, 134 

S. Ct. at 2378 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418). 

¶ 30 In his brief, plaintiff fails to set forth the two-step inquiry and explain how the facts alleged 

in his amended complaint satisfy that inquiry. Instead, he focuses on demonstrating his speech 

was on a matter of public concern. However, the main focus of the first step is distinguishing 

between employee speech and citizen speech. See Lane, 573 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2378. A 

matter of public concern is only part of the first inquiry and does not alone establish protected 

speech. Plaintiff fails to adequately argue and plead facts showing he was speaking as a citizen 

at Gleason’s department head meeting. Accordingly, we find plaintiff has failed to show the 

facts in his amended complaint establish a clearly mandated public policy protecting his 

speech at the February 2016 meeting. Thus, the circuit court’s dismissal with prejudice of his 

retaliatory discharge claim based on the first amendment was also proper. 

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 32 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Macon County circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 33 Affirmed.