FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

May 15, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 08-13238

Non-Argument Calendar

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D. C. Docket No. 06-00107-CV-4-SPM

RICHARD SINGLETON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

_________________________

(May 15, 2009)

Before BIRCH, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Richard Singleton, a black man, appeals the judgment in favor of the State of

Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”) on his claim that employees of the

DJJ terminated him from his position as superintendent of a juvenile justice facility

because of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”). Singleton argues that the jury instructions

were plainly erroneous because they misled the jury and left the jury to speculate

on an essential point of the law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

At trial, the district court used Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions

(Civil), 1.2.1 and instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:

In this case the plaintiff makes a claim under the Federal Civil

Rights statutes that prohibit employers from discriminating against

employees in the terms and conditions of their employment because of

the employee’s race.

More specifically, the plaintiff claims that he was demeaned,

unfairly scrutinized and ultimately discharged from employment by

the defendant because of his race. When a governmental agency is

involved, of course, it may act only through people as its employees;

and, in general, a governmental agency is responsible under the law

for any of the acts and statements of its employees that are made

within the scope of their duties as employees of that governmental

agency.

The defendant denies that the plaintiff was discriminated

against in any way and asserts that all actions taken and decisions

made were for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons and that if any

actions or decisions included discriminatory motives, the same actions

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and decisions would have been taken anyway.

In order to prevail on his claim, the plaintiff must prove each of

the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence:

First: That the plaintiff was discharged from employment by the

defendant; and.

Second: That the plaintiff’s race was a substantial or motivating

factor that prompted the defendant to take that action.

. . .

. . .

On the other hand, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove

that the plaintiff’s race was the sole or exclusive reason for the

defendant’s decision. It is sufficient if the plaintiff proves that race

was a determinative consideration that made a difference in the

defendant’s decision.

If you find in the Plaintiff’s favor with respect to each of the

facts that the Plaintiff must prove, you must then decide whether the

Defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

Plaintiff would not have been discharged for other reasons even in the

absence of considerations of the Plaintiff’s race. If you find that the

Plaintiff would have been dismissed for reasons apart from the

Plaintiff’s race, then you will make that finding in your verdict.

The jury returned a verdict finding that “the fact that [Singleton] was black was

[not] a substantial or motivating factor that prompted the Defendant to fire [him].”

II.

When the parties do not dispute that the appellant failed to object to the jury

instructions before the jury’s deliberations, as here, we review the jury instructions

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for plain error only. See United States v. Massey, 89 F.3d 1433, 1442 (11th

Cir.1996). Under plain error review, we may correct an error if we finds (1) an

error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affected the appellant’s substantial rights, and

(4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial

proceedings. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005).

Specifically regarding jury instructions, “[p]lain error review is an extremely

stringent form of review” and “reversal for plain error will occur only in

exceptional cases where the error is so fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of

justice.” Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1329-30 (11th

Cir.1999). To demonstrate that jury instructions were plainly erroneous, an

appellant must prove that the challenged instruction was an incorrect statement of

the law, misled the jury, or left the jury to speculate as to an essential point of law.

Id. The incorrect statement must have been so prejudicial as to affect the outcome

of the proceedings. Id.

III.

Although Singleton does not argue as much, we initially note that, in all

relevant aspects, the jury instructions were not a misstatement of law, as they

tracked the language of the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil), 1.2.1.

See Farley, 197 F.3d at 1329-30. Although the final paragraph of instructions

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above contains an error, in that the district court should have instructed, “You must

then decide whether the Defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence

that the Plaintiff would have been discharged for other reasons even in the absence

of considerations of the Plaintiff’s race,” this error did not affect the outcome of

the trial because the jury found that Singleton had not shown that his race was a

factor in his termination and, therefore, never reached the part of its analysis that

required determining whether the DJJ would have made the same decision even

were it not motivated by his race. See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions

(Civil), 1.2.1; Farley, 197 F.3d at 1329-30.

Singleton first argues that the jury instructions misled the jury. He explains

that he presented evidence that John Tallon, his supervisor, recommended to upper

management that Singleton be fired and that upper management merely “rubber

stamped” Tallon’s recommendation. He asserts that the jury instructions did not

inform the jury that it must consider the discriminatory motives of all decisionmakers, rather than simply the final decision-makers, and created the impression

that the jury should find in favor of the DJJ if it found that upper management was

not itself racially motivated, even if it believed that Tallon was himself motivated

by race. However, the jury instructions instructed the jury that it must determine

whether the plaintiff’s race motivated “the defendant,” or the JDD, and explained

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that a governmental agency defendant, like the JDD, was responsible for any acts

or statements of its employees. Therefore, the jury instructions did not plainly

create an impression that upper management’s motivations were all that mattered

for deliberation. Instead, the jury instructions adequately advised the jury that its

deliberations should include the motivations of any relevant employee.

Singleton next argues that the jury instructions left the jury to speculate on

an essential point of law. Singleton explains that he presented evidence that Tallon

also demoted another black employee because of that employee’s race. Singleton

asserts that the jury should have been instructed to consider the role that race

played in Tallon’s decision to demote that other black employee as evidence that

he acted in a similar manner in recommending Singleton’s termination. However,

Singleton has not pointed to, and we cannot find, any case law deeming evidence

of other discriminatory acts an “essential” part of proving discriminatory

termination. Therefore, any error in this regard was not plain. See Rodriguez, 398

F.3d at 1298. Accordingly, because the jury instructions were not a miscarriage of

justice, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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