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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

THOMAS CLEVELAND WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 5:10-cv-83-RS-GRJ

LT. KARLA JO BROCK,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff initiated this case by filing a pro se, in forma pauperis, prisoner civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is proceeding pursuant to an Amended

Complaint. Doc. 21. Plaintiff is an inmate presently in the custody of the Federal

Bureau of Prisons. The Defendant, Lt. Brock, is the administrator of the Washington

County Jail. Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated his constitutional rights in

connection with a probation violator sentence imposed in Washington County, and that

Defendant’s actions caused Plaintiff to serve more than 150 extra days in state prison

following the expiration of his sentence. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant

failed in her duty to correctly certify the number of days of jail credit he was supposed to

receive following his VOP hearing. Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment, Doc. 70. The Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition

to the motion, Doc. 77, and this matter is now ripe for decision. For the reasons

discussed below, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s motion be granted
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and this case dismissed with prejudice. 1

Summary Judgment Standard of Review

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the entry of summary

judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that “there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” In applying this standard, the Court must examine the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits and other

evidence in the record “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Samples on

Behalf of Samples v. Atlanta, 846 F. 2d 1328, 1330 (11 Cir. 1988). As the Supreme th

Court held in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the moving party bears the

initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a triable issue of fact. If the movant is

successful on this score, the burden of production shifts to the non-moving party who

must then come forward with “sufficient evidence of every element that he or she must

prove.” Rollins v. Techsouth, 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). The non-moving

party may not simply rest on the pleadings, but must use affidavits, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, or other admissible evidence to demonstrate that a material

fact issue remains to be tried. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250

(1986); Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 785-86 (11 Cir. 2005). th

Summary Judgment Evidence and Plaintiff’s Claims

The following facts regarding Plaintiff’s custodial history are undisputed. Plaintiff

was convicted of second degree murder and arson in Washington County, and was

The Court previously denied the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. See Docs. 1

58, 59.

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sentenced to 12 years imprisonment and five years of probation. Plaintiff entered the 2

Department of Corrections (DOC) on this sentence in July 1993. He was released on

July 1, 1999, and his Washington County probation commenced. Doc. 70, Exh. A & B.

On May 7, 2001, the Washington County Sheriff’s Office issued an arrest

warrant charging Plaintiff with violating the conditions of probation (the “VOP warrant”)

by failing to submit a monthly report, failing to pay the cost of supervision, failing to

obtain consent to change his residence, and failing to provide proof of community

service. Id. Exh. C. 

On July 14, 2002, Plaintiff was arrested in Pasco County on drug and arson

charges, and also on the Washington County VOP warrant. He was arraigned on all

charges, including the VOP, and was committed to the custody of the Sheriff of Pasco

County. Id. Exh. D & E.

On September 27, 2002, the U.S. Marshal Service (USMS) notified the Pasco

County Jail of a detainer stemming from controlled-substance and firearms offenses in

the Middle District of Florida. Id. Exh. F. Plaintiff was released to the USMS on

December 13, 2002, and the USMS was advised of the Washington County hold on

Plaintiff. Id. Exh. G & H. 

On May 2, 2003, Plaintiff was sentenced to 97 months in federal prison. On

August 19,2003, the Washington County Sheriff s Office requested that a hold be

placed on Plaintiff. He was released on February 20, 2009. Plaintiff was transported to

Washington County Jail, where the VOP warrant was executed on February 21, 2009. 

It appears that Plaintiff’ s sentence w ould be characterized as a “ probationary split 2

sentence,” meaning a period of incarceration follow ed by a period of probation. See, e.g., M oore v.

Stephens, 804 So2d 575, 577 (Fla. 5 DCA 2002). th

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Id. Exh. I, J, K. 

Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the VOP charges, pursuant to a plea agreement that

provided for “credit for prior prison and jail time.” Doc. 50, Exh. I. Plaintiff was

adjudicated guilty on February 26, 2009, and sentenced to three years in state prison,

with credit for time served. Doc. 49, Exh. K. The court stated its belief that Plaintiff had

“done your time,” and would be taken to the Department of Corrections “but from the

way I understand it, it will probably be a process in and process out.” Id. Exh. M. The

court completed a Uniform Commitment to Custody of Department of Corrections

(UCC-DOC) form on February 26,2009 awarding the Plaintiff an unspecified amount of

original jail credit and directing the Department of Corrections to "apply the original jail

time credit and to compute and apply credit for time served and the gain time awarded

pursuant to section 944.27 5 , Florida Statutes. (Pre October l, 1989)". Id. Exh. N. 

Plaintiff was returned to Washington County Jail to await transfer to state prison. 

Defendant’s affidavit reflects that as Jail Administrator, she is responsible for

certifying to the DOC, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 92I.16I, Florida Statutes, the number of

days an inmate was incarcerated in county jail after being sentenced and before being

delivered to the DOC. Doc. 70., Exh O. She is advised of the date of an inmate's

sentence upon receipt of the UCC-DCC from the Washington County Clerk of Court. 

Id. The UCC-DCC form, which is completed by the court during the sentencing hearing,

records the judgment and sentence, and provides for the award of credit for time served

in jail and prison on the relevant charges. Id. "Original jail credit" as referenced on the

form means the number days an inmate was incarcerated in county jail between the

date of arrest as a violator and the date the sentence was imposed. Id.

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If, as in this case, the number of days of original jail credit awarded is not

specified by the Court on the UCC-DOC form, Defendant is responsible for calculating

the amount of original jail credit based on a review of the inmate's Florida criminal

history check. Id. The criminal history check provides the date the inmate was arrested

in Washington County, or in another county pursuant to a Washington County warrant. 

Id. Defendant calculates the number of days the inmate spent incarcerated in county

jail between the date of arrest and the date the sentence was imposed and specifies

that number on the UCC-DOC form. Id.

On February 27,2009, Defendant received the UCC-DOC for Plaintiff. Because

the number of days of original jail credit was blank, Defendant ran a criminal history

check on the Plaintiff which reflected that he was arrested on Washington County

warrant No. 92-254-CF on February 21,2009. Id. Defendant also determined that

Plaintiff was originally incarcerated in county jail on that arrest on February 2I, 2009. Id. 

Plaintiff’s criminal history check did not reflect that he was arrested in Pasco County on

Washington County warrant No. 92-254-CF in July 2002, nor did it reflect that Plaintiff

had been arrested by Zephyrhills P.D. on charges of manufacturing methamphetamine

or arson in July 2002. Id. On February 27, 2009, Defendant completed a Sheriff’s

Certificate pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 92I.16I, indicating that the Plaintiff was arrested on

the VOP warrant on February 21, 2009, was originally incarcerated in county jail on

February 21,2009, and was convicted and sentenced on February 26, 2009. Id. Since

the number of days of “original jail credit" awarded to the inmate was not determined by

the Court, Defendant certified that Plaintiff was entitled to 6 days of original jail time

credit based on these dates. Id. 

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Plaintiff was processed into the DOC on March 2, 2009, but was not immediately

processed out. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that after he entered DOC custody he

learned that Defendant had made an error in computing the credits on his sentence. 

Doc. 21. On May 5, 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion to correct illegal sentence in

Washington County Circuit Court, arguing that he had not received all credit toward his

sentence that the court had intended. Doc. 50, Exh. I. The court granted the motion at

a hearing on August 10, 2009, and amended Plaintiff’s judgment and commitment by

handwriting “plus other prison time not awarded 2412 days,” next to the paragraph

directing the DOC to apply original jail time credit and compute and apply credit for time

served and gain time. The amended judgment also reflects that Plaintiff was entitled to

“6 days” of “original jail credit”. Plaintiff was returned to the Washington County Jail, his

paperwork was finalized, and he was released. Doc. 70, Exh. O, Q.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that as a consequence of Defendant’s actions

he served 162 days in prison from March 2, 2009, through August 10, 2009, beyond the

time that he should have served for the VOP sentence. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

violated his “rights to freedom and everything that comes with that right.” For relief,

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Doc. 21. 

DISCUSSION

In any section 1983 action, the initial inquiry must focus on whether two essential

elements are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a

person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether the conduct deprived a person

of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other

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grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-331 (1986); see also Duke v.

Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1403 (11th Cir.1993) (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535). There is

no dispute that Defendant was a person acting under color of state law. The critical

factor in this case is what standard governs Defendant’s conduct for purposes of

determining whether she should be held liable for any violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.

Plaintiff’s underlying constitutional right is well-established. When a prisoner's

sentence has expired, he is entitled to release. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781,

791 (5th Cir. 1969) (“There is no privilege in a jailer to keep a prisoner in jail beyond the

period of his lawful sentence.”) (citations omitted); Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d

1558, 1562–63 (11th Cir.1993), modified 15 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir.1994) (finding “[t]he

constitutional right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been

known that the detainee was entitled to release” a well recognized § 1983 claim)

(citations omitted); Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir.1980) (stating

“[d]etention of a prisoner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the

absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due

process.”).

Courts are divided as to whether this right is founded in the Fourteenth

Amendment’s due process clause or the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel

and unusual punishment. See McCurry v. Moore, 242 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1178-80 (N.D.

Fla. 2002) (discussing cases). In Cannon, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit held that a

§ 1983 claim for false imprisonment may be made under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

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Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1562 (“[C]ontinued detention in the face of repeated protests will

deprive the accused of liberty without due process.”). However, as the court pointed

out in McCurry, Cannon concerned a pretrial detainee who was detained based upon a

misidentification. In the instant case, as in McCurry, Plaintiff was a sentenced prisoner

and therefore the Eighth Amendment would be applicable to his claims. See McCurry,

242 F.Supp.2d at 1179; Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1989);

Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9 Cir. 1985). Under either a due process th

or Eighth Amendment analysis, “[t]he threshhold for liability . . . is the same,” the

Plaintiff must establish subjective culpability on the part of the Defendant. McCurry,

242 F.Supp.2d at 1180; see Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1563 (“a showing of deliberate

indifference is required to establish a violation of substantive due process rights

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 

In Sample, the Third Circuit assessed a similar claim under the Eighth

Amendment, stating “[w]e think there can be no doubt that imprisonment beyond one’s

term constitutes punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Sample,

885 F.2d at 1108. As to whether such punishment is “cruel and unusual,” the Court

concluded that “detention for a significant period beyond the term of one’s sentence

inflicts a harm of a magnitude similar to that involved in [Estelle v. Gamble].” Id. at

1109. “Accordingly, we hold that there can be no Eighth Amendment liability in this

context in the absence of a showing of deliberate indifference on the part of the

defendant to whether the plaintiff suffers an unjustified deprivation of his liberty.” Id. at

1110. The Court assessed the Eighth Amendment claim in that case against the

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following test:

To establish § 1983 liability in this context, a plaintiff must first

demonstrate that a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem

and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be,

inflicted. Second, the plaintiff must show that the official either failed to act

or took only ineffectual action under circumstances indicating that his or

her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to

the prisoner's plight. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal

connection between the official's response to the problem and the

infliction of the unjustified detention.

Id.

Sample provides an appropriate framework for the analysis of Plaintiff’s claims in

this case. 

Defendant’s summary judgment evidence establishes that Defendant did not

have subjective knowledge that Plaintiff’s DOC sentence might be calculated incorrectly

after Defendant left the custody of the Washington County Jail. The information

available to Defendant upon receipt of the UCC-DOC reflected that Defendant was

arrested on the VOP warrant on February 21, 2009, confined at Washington County

Jail, and then committed to the custody of the DOC on February 26, 2009. The state

court’s judgment specifically directs the DOC – not Defendant – to apply the original jail

time credit and to compute and apply credit for time served and gain time awarded to

Plaintiff during his term of incarceration for the Washington County conviction. Thus,

the undisputed evidence reflects that Defendant was not aware of the risk that Plaintiff

would be confined by the DOC beyond the sentence intended by the state court. 

Plaintiff has come forward with no competent summary judgment evidence that refutes

Defendant’s evidence that she lacked such knowledge. On this record, the

undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claim fails on the first

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element of the Sample analysis. Such subjective culpability is the threshhold for liability

on a deliberate-indifference claim. See Sample, 885 F.2d at 1108; McCurry, 242

F.Supp.2d at 1180; Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1563. 3

RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, Doc. 70, should be GRANTED, and this case should be dismissed with

prejudice. 

IN CHAMBERS this 11 day of January 2013. th

s/Gary R. Jones 

GARY R. JONES

United States Magistrate Judge

Even if Plaintiff established the threshhold for liability and that Defendant acted 3

or failed to act with the requisite deliberate indifference, on this record Plaintiff has not

shown that there is a causal connection between Defendant’s actions and his detention

by the DOC beyond the expiration of the sentence intended by the state court. It was

the DOC’s obligation to determine the date that Plaintiff would be released from DOC

custody, after awarding him credit for time served on his original sentence and any

gain-time. See Doc. 70 Exh. P. As Defendant asserts, even if she had determined that

Plaintiff was entitled to “original jail credit” for the time spent in the Pasco County Jail

following his Pasco arrest until he was taken into federal custody (for a total of 158

days), it was the DOC’s determination of his time credits that resulted in his continued

detention. 

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

A party may file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations within 14 days after being served with a copy of this report and

recommendation. A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14

days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to file specific objections

limits the scope of review of proposed factual findings and recommendations.

Case No: 5:10-cv-83-RS-GRJ