The HONORABLE BRUCE M. VAN SICKLE, Senior United States *

District Judge for the District of North Dakota,

sitting by designation.

 The Honorable John B. Jones, Senior Judge, United States 1

District Court for the District of South Dakota, presiding.

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No. 95-3371

___________

Dorothy Jones, *

 *

 Appellant, *

 *

 * Appeal from the United States

 v. * District Court for the District

Shirley S. Chater, * of South Dakota.

Commissioner of the Social *

Security Administration, *

 *

 Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: May 15, 1996

 Filed: June 19, 1996

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, MAGILL, Circuit Judge, and VAN

SICKLE, Senior District Judge. *

___________

VAN SICKLE, Senior District Judge.

 Dorothy Jones appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment 1

in favor of the appellee, the Secretary. The district court affirmed the

conclusion of the Social Security Administration administrative law judge

("ALJ") to deny the appellant's application for benefits under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 401-433, 1381-1383c. We affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for benefits in June of 1993, claiming disability

due to arthritis, diabetes, kidney infections, high blood pressure, and

palsy. She had worked as a teacher's aide on the Rosebud Sioux reservation

from 1971 until May, 1993. Her job activities sometimes included lifting

heavy objects such as overhead projectors and computers. She also

volunteered, on a daily basis, to lift the children's chairs and place them

on the desks to ease the workload of the janitor. Plaintiff complained of

various ailments to the Public Health Service, but they appear to have been

treated with mild drugs, were not serious, or were not followed up by the

Plaintiff.

 A hearing was held on April 15, 1994 at which the claimant was present

and represented by counsel. The ALJ found that the plaintiff could perform

work "existing in significant numbers in the national economy" and was not

entitled to Social Security benefits. The ALJ believed that the ailments

with which the plaintiff was afflicted were not severe and the medication

which the plaintiff was taking did not cause any harsh side effects. The

plaintiff's pain precluded her from performing heavy work, but she has "the

residual functional capacity to perform at least the full range of light

work activities." While the plaintiff claimed that she lifted heavy

objects during the course of a work day, the job of teacher's aide, as

generally performed in the economy, only required light work. Therefore,

the ALJ found, the plaintiff would be able to return to her past relevant

work as a teacher's aide.

 The Social Security Appeals Council denied the plaintiff's request for

review of the ALJ's decision. Thus, the determination to deny benefits

became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981,

416.1481. The district court, on appeal of the Commissioner's denial of

benefits, held that there was substantial evidence to support the

commissioner's decision. The
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district court found that the plaintiff's evidence of anxiety, allegedly

from supervising children, was not disabling. The district court noted

that her past work as a teacher's aide "was not so unique as to render it

something other than the position described in the" Dictionary of

Occupation Titles ("DOT"). The plaintiff appeals the grant of the

Commissioner's motion for summary judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

 A claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving that

she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which is expected to

last for at least twelve months or result in death. 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3)(A); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1212 (8th Cir. 1993);

Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1983). Review of the

Secretary's decision to deny benefits is limited to a determination of

whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as

a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Evans v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 832, 833 (8th Cir.

1994). See Hutsell v. Sullivan, 892 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating

that ALJ's determination of claimant's credibility will be upheld if

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole). Substantial

evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support the Secretary's conclusion. Woolf, 3 F.3d at 1213. Even if there

is substantial evidence which would support a decision opposite to that of

the Secretary, this court must affirm her decision as long as there is

substantial evidence in favor of her position. Id.; Browning v. Sullivan,

958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992).

The Social Security Act sets out five steps for the ALJ to use when

reviewing a claimant's request for disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;

Evans, 21 F.3d at 833. The relevant step in this case is step four in

which the ALJ must consider whether a claimant's
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impairments keep her from doing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(e). See Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1993)

(following Tenth Circuit's decision in Alexander v. Richardson, 451 F.2d

1185, 1186 (10th Cir. 1971), 407 U.S. 911 (1972)), that in order to be

"disabled", one must possess both a medically determinable mental or

physical impairment and an inability to engage in gainful activity of which

both will continue for at least twelve months). If the ALJ cannot make a

decision based on current work activity or medical facts alone, he shall

evaluate a claimant's ability to do past relevant work based on a review

of the claimant's residual functional capacity and the physical and mental

demands of her past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e); Nimick

v. Secretary of Health and Human Svcs., 887 F. 2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1989).

See also Groeper v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1234, 1238-39 (8th Cir. 1991) ("The

ALJ must specifically set forth the claimant's limitations, both physical

and mental, and determine how those limitations affect the claimant's

residual functional capacity.").

 A claimant will be found to be not disabled if she retains the

residual functional capacity to perform:

"1. The actual functional demands and job duties of a particular

past relevant job; or

2. The functional demands and job duties of the occupation as

generally required by employers throughout the national

economy." Social Security Ruling ("S.S.R.") 82-61. See Martin

v. Sullivan, 901 F.2d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1990) (approving of

this S.S.R. 82-61 test and holding that a claimant who cannot

perform a particular past job may still be able to perform her

past relevant work under the second part of the test).

To determine what a typical job description is in the "national economy",

an ALJ may take notice of job information in the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles. Evans, 21 F.3d at 834. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1). The ALJ

must be careful not to characterize the specific work a claimant performed

too broadly by
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using a generic job description. See id.

An ALJ cannot reject a claimant's subjective complaints of pain

solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them.

Nunn v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 1984). The ALJ must consider

the claimant's prior work record as well as observations by third parties

regarding (1) daily activities, (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity

of pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage,

effectiveness and side effects of medication; and (5) functional

restrictions. Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 1992)

(citation omitted). While pain may be disabling if it precludes a claimant

from engaging in any form of substantial gainful activity, the mere fact

that working may cause pain or discomfort does not mandate a finding of

disability. Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 1989). The ALJ

may discount the claimant's allegations of pain when he explicitly finds

them inconsistent with daily activities, lack of treatment, demeanor, and

objective medical evidence. Hutsell, 892 F.2d at 750 (citing Long v.

Bowen, 866 F.2d 1066, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989)). See Dixon v. Sullivan, 905

F.2d 237, 238 (8th Cir. 1990) ("If an ALJ explicitly discredits a

claimant's testimony and gives a good reason for doing so, we will normally

defer to that judgment.").

 There is substantial evidence on the record as a whole to uphold the

decision of the ALJ, the Social Security Appeals Council, and the District

Court to deny the petitioner benefits. The petitioner was employed as a

teacher's aide at a school on the Pine Ridge reservation. In addition to

her duties as an aide, she voluntarily participated in lifting heavy

objects to reduce the workload of the custodial staff. There is little

evidence demonstrating that the petitioner experiences pain so debilitating

that she cannot perform light work nor so constant that it will last at

least twelve months. Even assuming that she was living through severe

pain, the job of teacher's aide should be viewed along the lines of what

this type of position entails nationwide.
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That she voluntarily performed duties beyond the scope of the position does

not entitle her to receive benefits for injuries possibly caused by this

extra assistance. As the ALJ correctly determined, the petitioner can

still perform the traditional duties of a teacher's aide. Therefore, the

decision of the lower tribunals and the District Court is affirmed.

A true copy.

 Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.