UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CASEY CHESTER ROBERTS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 17-4021 

(D. Utah) 

(D.C. No. 2:15-CR-00161-TS-1) 

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.

This appeal grew out of a traffic stop. A highway-patrol trooper 

stopped Mr. Casey Roberts for a broken tail light and discovered 

contraband in the vehicle. Mr. Roberts unsuccessfully moved to suppress 

evidence of the contraband, arguing that the trooper lacked reasonable 

suspicion for the traffic stop. We disagree. 

 The parties agree on most of the underlying facts. Two highway 

patrol troopers (Trooper Neighbor and Trooper Harwood) thought that Mr. 

 

*

 Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 7, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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Roberts had a broken tail light and followed him in separate cars. This was 

the sequence of cars: 

After following for about a minute, Trooper Harwood thought that he saw 

the tail light illuminate, so he turned his car around and drove in the 

opposite direction. When he did, Trooper Neighbor moved directly behind 

Mr. Roberts, following for about eight seconds, which is captured on 

videotape. After about eight seconds, Trooper Neighbor initiated a traffic 

stop for a broken tail light.1

 Mr. Roberts challenged the stop on the ground 

that Trooper Neighbor could not have seen whether the tail light was out. 

 The district court rejected this challenge, finding that Trooper 

Neighbor had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. We review this 

finding under the clear-error standard. United States v. Beckstead, 500 

F.3d 1154, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 

1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that the clear-error standard applies to 

the review of factual findings “even when . . . there is video tape of the 

[traffic] stop”). To apply this standard, we view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the government. Beckstead, 500 F.3d at 1162. We can 

 

1

 Under Utah law, cars can be driven only if their lights are in proper 

condition. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1601(1)(a)(ii). 
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reverse only if the district court’s finding lacks any factual support or if 

the entirety of the evidence definitely and firmly convinces us that a 

mistake has been made. United States v. Cash, 733 F.3d 1264, 1273 (10th 

Cir. 2013). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, 

we conclude that the district court did not commit clear error. The district 

court could base its finding of reasonable suspicion on 

 testimony by Trooper Neighbor and Trooper Harwood, 

 testimony by an employee of a tow company, and 

 testing of the tail lights. 

 Trooper Neighbor testified that he could see the tail lights illuminate 

several times on the passenger’s side and the middle, but each time, the tail 

light on the driver’s side remained dark or dim. Trooper Harwood also 

testified that he had initially thought that the tail light on the driver’s side 

was out. But he changed his mind, thinking that the tail light was working 

even though it remained “extremely dim.” R. vol. 1, at 48. 

 After the stop, Mr. Roberts’s car was driven to an impound lot. The 

car was followed by Ms. Tonya Thomas, who worked for a towing 

company. She too observed that the tail light on the driver’s side was not 

working. 

 This observation was confirmed by testing of the tail lights by 

Trooper Neighbor and Ms. Thomas. During the traffic stop, Trooper 
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Neighbor told Mr. Roberts to tap his brakes to see if the tail lights worked. 

At first, the tail light on the driver’s side didn’t appear to work. But then 

Trooper Neighbor shielded his eyes from the sun and saw a faint glow 

inside the driver’s tail light. Similarly, Ms. Thomas checked the tail lights 

when the car was at the impound lot. She confirmed that the tail light 

sometimes worked and sometimes didn’t. 

Mr. Roberts contends that Trooper Neighbor could not have known 

whether the tail light on the driver side was working. For this contention, 

Mr. Roberts states that 

 Trooper Neighbor had been behind Trooper Harwood and 

 videotape of the pursuit does not show a broken tail light. 

We must uphold the district court’s finding unless it is “blatantly 

contradicted” by the video evidence. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 

(2007). 

The video evidence provides little help, for it shows only about eight 

seconds of the pursuit and does not necessarily show what Trooper 

Neighbor could have seen. For example, Trooper Neighbor testified that he 

had been able to see Mr. Roberts’s tail lights as the two cars went uphill, 

but the videotape does not show the uphill portion of the pursuit. And we 

cannot tell from the videotape whether Trooper Neighbor could have seen 

Mr. Roberts’s tail lights illuminate during the eight-second pursuit, for the 

videotape does not necessarily capture the entirety of Trooper Neighbor’s 
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field of vision.2 Thus, the videotape is inconclusive, failing to show 

whether Mr. Roberts’s tail lights would have been visible to Trooper 

Neighbor. In these circumstances, we do not regard the district court’s 

finding as clearly erroneous. 

 Affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

 Robert E. Bacharach 

 Circuit Judge 

 

2 Mr. Roberts testified that he had not used his brakes during this 

eight-second clip. But the district court could reasonably decline to credit 

this testimony. La Resolana Architects v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1180 

(10th Cir. 2009) (noting that a district court does not commit clear error 

simply by choosing to credit the testimony of one witness over another).