### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y

9, 200 2 STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. FREDE RIC K SLE DGE
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 92-04081 Jam es C. Beasley, Jr ., Judge

No. W2001-02402-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Janu ary 6, 2003

The de fenda

nt was convic t ed of f

irst deg ree murder a

nd espec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry

and wa s orig inally sentenc ed to death and twenty y ear s, respe ctively . The trial c ourt order ed the se ntence s to b e se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly . O n a pp e a l, t his c ourt a ff ir me d bo th c on vic tio ns bu t re ve rs e d the de a th senten c e an d r e ma

n d e d it f o r r e s e n te n c in g
. O n r e ma n d , th e d e f

e n d an t w a s s e n te n c e d

to life imprisonmen t af

t er a new

sentenc ing he aring . The life se ntence was orde red to be serve d consec utively

to the orig inal twenty -y ear sentenc e for

espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry . The only issue raised on this appe al is whether , on rema nd, the trial cour

t erre d b y n o t re co n s ideringthe issue of consec utive sentenc ing w hen re sentenc ing the defe ndant for the murder c onviction. We affirm the sentenc e as imposed on r emand by the trial cour

t. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed
A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.
Paula Skahan a

nd Ger ald Skahan, Me mphis, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Fr eder ick Sledg e. Pa ul G. Sum me rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Da

vid H. F ind le y , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and J err y Har ris and John W . Campbell, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
BACK GR OUND
On Dec ember

10, 1991, the def

endant shot and killed sixt y -four -y ear -old J ohnny Har ris. The shooting oc curr ed duringa robbe ry committed by the def

endant a nd two others. Ac cordingto the defe ndant’s stateme nt, he and two othe rs t ra cked the victim from a g roce ry store to his apar

tment wher e he de manded money from the victim. The v ictim gave the de fenda nt his wallet, which contained six or seven dollars. The de fenda nt rummag ed throug h the victim’s pockets a nd then shot-2-

him once throug h the hear t a nd once throug h the knee. The victim wa s found dead, ly ing on his ba ck wi th h is p oc ke ts t

ur ne d in sid e -o ut. Subsequently , the def

endant wa s convicted of

first deg ree murder and espe cially ag g ravated robber y for whic h he re ceive d a sente nce o f d ea t h and twenty y ear s, respe ctively . The sente nces wer e orde red to be serve d consec utively . On appe al, this court af firmed both convic tions but reve rsed a

nd rema nded the de ath sentenc e for rese n t en ci n g. S ee State v. F redr ick Sledg e, No. 02C01-9405-CC-00089, 1997 WL 730245 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 1997) , perm. to appe al g rante d (T en n. Mar. 1, 1999) . Our supre me cour t affir med. See State v. Sledg e, 15 S.W.3d 93 (Tenn.) (modified on other grounds) , cer t. denied, 531 U.S. 889, 121 S. Ct. 211, 148 L

. Ed. 2d 149 (2000).
At his resente ncing hear ing, the defe ndant pre sented evidenc e rele vant to this appeal. The defe ndant g rewup impoverished in rura l Missi ssippi and had little contac t with his father . His father phy sically

abused his mother during her pr eg nancy . He ha d a close relationship wit h his gr eat a unt wh o d i edwh en h e w as s ev en t ee n
. T h e de fe n d an t h as t wo s o n s wi t h wh o m h e is i n co n t ac t

. At age sevente en or e ighte en, he moved to Me mphis a nd, within two months of his arriva l, committed the ins tant o ff

e ns e s. Witn e sse s f

or the de fe nd ant t e sti fi e d th a t he ha d ma tur e d a nd ha d r e ma ine d in contac t with his family

since his incar cer ation.
F oll ow inga

re mand , a

jur y re se nte nc e d th e de fe nd ant t o li fe imp ri so nme nt. Th e de fe ns e argued both at the c onclusion of the re sentenc ing he aring , and at a subsequent hear ing, that the trial court orde r that the de fenda nt’s two sentenc es be se rv ed co n curr ently . Howeve r, the trial c ourt d ec l i n edt o re co n s i d er

t h e m at t er , ex p l ai n i n g i t s re as o n i n g: That issue, i n m y

opinion, has been uphe ld by the cour t of criminal appe als as beinga valid rulingby the trial cour

t. The mitigating fac tors that y ou’re talking a bout, with refe re n ce t o the se nte nc inghe ari ngin t

his c a se, we re pr e se nte d to a jur y ; ob vio us ly the jury felt there was appar ently some merit to thos e mi tigating c ir c ums tanc e s, and

re tur ne d a ve rd ic t of

lif e imp ri so nme nt.
I t would b e thi s Court’s opinion that the prior ruling by the origi n al t ri al cour

t with reg ard to how those se ntence s should be ser v e d , w o u ld s ti ll s ta

n d

. T h a t is s u e h a s b e e n d e te r mi n ed by the appellate court to have been a proper sentenc ing he aringwher e we ’re makin g a – w e ’r e us ingthe te rm

se nte nc inghe ari ng , a

nd it’ s p ro ba bly improper whe n it refe rs to thi s particular case . This case was the sentenc ing pha se of the murder trial, but the trial judge , the orig inal trial judg e, . . . has pre viously deter mined at a se ntencinghear ing that has bee n upheld that th e espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry

should be se rv e d c on se c uti ve wi th the mur de r. Th e on ly iss ue fo r t

his Cou rt to-3- deter mine was what was the punishment in the murder case . That punis hme nt h a s b e e n e sta bli sh e d a s li fe imp ri so nme nt.
So it would be my opinion, based on the ruli ng by the cour t of c ri min a l a pp e a ls, the a ff

ir matio n of that rul ingby

the su pr e me c ourt , that the sentenc es in this case should be he ld consec utively or ser ved consec utively

as previously order ed by [t he orig inal trial judge ], and Iwould so rule.
Idon’t see, nor do Ithink that it’s necessar y to have a nother hear ing t o d etermine whether the sentenc es should be ser ved concur rently or conse cutively

. Obviously , that is a n issue that can be deter mined and rule d upon on appea l, if I ’m incorre ct, but it would be my opinion that the law of the c ase has been e stablished by the cour t of cr iminal a p p ea l s and the supre me cour t, that being that the sentenc e is, in the espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry and the murde r and t h e p r i o r a g g r a v a t e d

r o b b e r i e s w e r e t o b e s e r

v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y. Th e o nly iss ue be fo re thi s c ourt

wa s w hat w a s th e punis hme nt, and for that rea son, I will de ny the Motion to have the sente nces r un concur rently as havingbeen pr eviously deter mined.
AN AL YSI S
The sole issue on a

ppeal is whe ther the tria l court wa s require d to revisit the issue of whe ther the new mur der se ntence was to run c onsecutive to, or concurre nt with, the original robbery sentenc e when the c ase w as re manded f or a ne w sentenc i n g h ea ri ng . The de fenda nt argues that common se ns e wo uld re qu ir e the iss ue to h a ve be e n r e c on sid e re d at th e re se nte nc inghe ari ng . H ow e ve r, it i s the Sta t e ’ s p o s i t i o nt h a tt h e i s s u e o f c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c i n g w a s f i n a l i z e d i nt h e d e f

e n d an t ’ s f i r st appea l and nee d not be re visited. On his first appea l, the defe ndant ar g ued that the imposition of consec utive sentenc es wa s imp ro pe r. Sle dg e , 1 99 7 WL 73 02 45 , at *3 2. Th is c ourt re sp on de d:
The t ri al co urt found that the de fenda nt had an e x tensive history of c ri min a l a c tiv ity

and that he wa s a

da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r who se beh av i o r indicates little or no re spect for human life. See T.C.A. § 40- 3 5

- 1 1 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) an d

( 4 )

. T h e d e f

e n d an t' s c o n te n ti o n s a s to the impropriety

of these f indings a re w ithout merit. The de fenda nt cites no a uth or ity in s up po rt

of his pr op os iti on that the te rm " e xten siv e " is unconstitutiona l l y

vague. The trial court pr operly considere d the defe ndant' s prior cr iminal activity as beingextensive. Though the de fe nd ant m ay

no t ha ve any pr ior juv e nil e c on vic ti on s, the s tatut e-4- does not state that t h er e m ust be a c onviction, just prior criminal activity . Fur

thermore , State v . Stockton , 733 S.W .2d 111, 112-13 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) , sug g ests that the trial cou rt ca n revie w j u v e n i l e r e c o r d s w h e nm a k i n g a s e n t e n c i n g d e t e r

m i n a t i o n
. F i n a l l y, the def endant wa s prope rl y classified a s a dang erous of fende r. See State v. Wil kerson

, 9 05 S.W .2d 933, 935-39 (Te nn. 1995). Acc ording ly , this iss ue is without merit.
I d. This court then c oncluded:

I n consideratio n o f the for eg oing a nd the re cord a s a whole, w e h o ld th a t t h e f ir s t d e g r e e mu

r d e r c o n v ic ti o nis a f

f ir me d b u t tha t th e s e n te n c e is r e v e r s e d

. We a f f ir m t h e ju d g me n t o f

c o n v ic ti o nf

or the espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry
. The case is remanded to the tria l court for a new sentenc ing he aringfor the f irst deg ree murder a

nd the entry of a judg ment of con v i ct i o n under c ount two of Case No. 92- 04081.
I d. at *33. The T en n es s ee Supreme Court modified this court’s de cision on other g rounds and aff irmed with respe ct to the re maining issues, inc luding se ntencing . Sledge , 15 S.W .3d at 96.
The de fenda

nt contends t hat neither this court nor our supreme court e x pressly limit ed the scope of the re sentenc ing he aringon rema nd to precl u d e a new ruling on the issue of c onsecutive sentenc ing. T here fore , he re asons, the issue wa s prop er l y befor e the tria l court duringthe re se nte nc inghe ari ng . How e ve r, sim ply be c a us e the de fe nd ant wa s bei ng re se nte nc e d in on e of his case s did not erase the fa ctors upon which the trial court ha d based its ea rlier order that the sentenc es be se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly , w hic h th is c ourt a ff ir me d o n a pp e a l.
I n State v. J eff

erson, 31 S.W .3d 558 (Tenn. 2000), our supre me cour t expl ained the “ law of the ca se” doc trine:
“The phrase ‘law of the ca se’ r efe rs to a leg al doctrine which g ener ally prohibits reconsider ation of issues that have alre ady been decide d in a prior a

ppeal of the same case
. I n other wor ds, under the law of the case doctrine, an appe llate cour t's de cision on an issue of law i s b ind ingin l a te r tr ia ls and a pp e a ls o f t

he same c a se if

the fa c ts on the se c on d tr ia l or a

pp e a l ar e su

bs tanti a lly

the same a s th e fa c ts i n the fi rs t t rial or a

ppeal. The doctrine a

pplies to issues that were actua lly befor e the a

ppellate c ourt in the first appea l and to issues that we re ne c e ssa

ri ly de c ide d b y

imp lic a tio n. Th e do c tr ine do e s no t a pp ly to dicta.
Th e law o f t he cas e do c tr ine is n ot a c on sti tut ion a l ma

nd a te-5- nor a limitation on the power of a court. Rather , it is a longstanding discretionar

y rule of judicial prac tice which is ba sed on the c ommon s e n s e r e c o g n i t i o nt h a ti s s u e s p r e v i o u s l y l i t i g a t e d an d d e c i d e d

b y a c ourt of c omp e te nt j ur isd ic tio n o rd ina ri ly ne e d n ot be re vis ite d. Th is ru le pr omo te s th e fi na lity and e ff ic ie nc y of the jud ic ia l pro c e ss, avoids indefinite re litigation of the s am e issue, foster s consistent results in the same litigation, and assure s the obedienc e of lowe r courts to the dec isions of appellate c ourts. There fore , when an i n i t ial appea l results in a rema nd to the trial court, the de cis i o n of the a ppellate c ourt establishes the law of the ca se which g ener ally must be followed upon re mand by the trial court, a nd by an appe llate cour

t if a sec ond appea l is taken from the judgme nt of the trial cour t en t er ed afte r re mand. Ther e ar e limited circ umstances whic h may justify rec on sideration of a

n issue which was [an] iss ue dec ided in a prior appea l: (1) the evidenc e off ere d at a trial or he aringafte r re mand was substant i al l y differ ent from the e vid e nc e in t

he ini tia l pr oc e e din g ; ( 2) the pr ior rul in g wa s c le arl y err oneous and w ould result in a manifest injusti ce if allowed to stand; or (3) the prior decision is contra ry to a cha ng e in the contr olling law which has oc curr ed betwe en the f irst and sec ond appea l.”
I d. at 560-61 (quotingMemphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenne ssee Petrole um Underg round Storag e Ta nk Bd., 975 S.W .2d 303, 306 (Tenn. 1998) ).
Th is c ourt

a ff ir me d the tr ia l c ourt ’s imp os iti on of c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing , r e mand ingto deter mine the sentenc e for

the first deg ree murder conviction. Whil e not an ex plicit lim itation of the scope of the rema

nd, the implication of the rema nd was that the issue of

consec utive sentenc ing ne ed not be re visited. The law of the ca se doctrine pr oscribes r econside ration of the issue. N one of the limit ed exceptions to the law of the case doctrine a pply . Our supreme cour

t affir med this decision. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the tr ial court’s r efusa l to reconsider the issue was n o t error . The defe ndant’s ar g ument is without m erit.
The de fenda

nt a lso a rg ues that new evidenc e was pre sented at the rese ntencinghear ing that require d the trial cour

t to revisit the issue of consec utive sentenc ing. T estifying on be half of the de fe nd ant at th e re se nte nc inghe ari ngwe re his un c le , Mic ha e l Ho wa rd ; his c ou sin , Ve lda Smith; h is fo rm e r g ir lf

ri e nd , M e lvi a

B ro wn ; and his mot

he r, Minnie Sle dg e . T he y te sti fi e d, g e ne ra lly , a s to his difficult bac kg round and his ef forts to maintain contac t with his family and his children.
Th e de fe nd ant c ha

ra c te ri zes the te sti mony

fr om t he re se nte nc inghe ari nga s “ [e]v ide nc e in mitigation.” How ever , the trial court is only require d to consider mitigating e vidence in determining se n te n c e le n g th

an d s e n te n c in g a lt e r

n a ti v e s
. Se e T e n n
. Co d e A n n
. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 3 , Se ntencing Commi ssion Cm ts.; S tate v. B aker , 751 S.W .2d 154, 167 (Tenn. Cri m
. Ap p
. 1 987) (holding that-6-

mitigating fac tors are not involved in the de termination of whether sentenc es ar e to run c onsecutive or c on c ur re nt) . F ur

the rm ore, a c c or din g to s tatut e , th e or de ri ngof c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s is pure ly dis c re tio na

ry ; ne ve rt he le ss, the tr ia l c ourt

mus t f ind by the p re po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that at le a st on e of se ve n c ri te ri a

is m e t. S e e Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 35 -1 15 (b ). Here, the tr ia l c ourt c or re c tly applied cr iteria (2) , “[t] he def endant is an of

fende r whose r ecor d of cr iminal activity is ex tensive,” and (4) , “[t] he def

endant is a dang erous of

fende r whose be havior indicates littl e or no r eg ard f or human l ife, and no hesitation about commi tting a crime in which the risk to human life is high.” I d. § 40-35-115( b)(2) , (4). None of the e vidence the def endant pr esente d at the re senten ci n g hear ing rebuts the a

pplication of those two fa ctors. Ac cording ly , we c annot conc lude that the trial c ourt e r r e d i nr e f u s i n g t o r e v i e w t h e p r i o r

o r d e r t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e s b e s e r

v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y. CO NC LU SION
Ba sed on the for eg oing a

uthorities and re asoning , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

___________________________________ AL AN E. GL ENN, JUDGE