Filed 3/19/15 In re J.G. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE
In re J.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B258811 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK66870)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
MICHELLE G.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Juvenile Cour t of Los Angeles County. Sherri Sobel,
Referee. Affirmed. Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mark J. Saladino, County Counsel, Dawy n R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel and Jeanette Cauble, Senior Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent. No appearance on behalf of Minor.

* * * * * *2 Michelle G. (mother) appeals the order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights to her son, J.G. Mother challenges the court’s finding that she did not establish an exception to adoption under We lfare and Institutions Code 1 section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Because we conclude that substa ntial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding, we affirm the order terminating parental rights.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND
J.G. was born in October 2006. DCFS previously provided mother with family
reunification and maintenance services. In October 2010, mother obtained a family law order giving her sole physical and legal custody of J.G. On October 11, 2011, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the Department) filed a petition pursuant to se ction 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), alleging that mother had a history of substanc e abuse and was a current abuser of methamphetamine; father had a history of s ubstance abuse and was a current abuser of alcohol; J.G. had previously be en a dependent of the court due to the parents’ substance abuse issues; and mother had failed to provide the child with adequate nutrition. At the detention hearing, the juvenile court orde red J.G. detained in shelter care. On November 10, 2011, DCFS filed an amended pe tition adding the allegation that J.G. was medically examined and di agnosed with “Failure to Thrive.” At the adjudication and disp osition hearing on January 9, 2012, the juvenile court sustained the allegations pursuant to secti on 300, subdivision (b) regarding the parents’ drug history and current abuse, and J.G .’s exposure to illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia. The parents were granted monitored visits. Mother was ordered to participate in an inpatient drug treatmen t program, random on-de mand drug testing, parenting classes, and individual counseling. Beginning in April 2012, mother had day-long monitored visits with J.G. on Sundays. J.G. also had day-long visits with father on Saturdays, a nd all-day visits with

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 his maternal grandmother one Saturday a mont h. The foster parent reported that J.G. started exhibiting angry behaviors after these family visits. Apparently the tension and discord in the family relationships was nega tively affecting the child. He would shut down and be angry and aggressi ve toward others and someti mes soil his pants, which his therapist opined may have been an indication he was feeling out of control. The social
worker recommended that J.G. re ceive therapy, and have shorter visits with his family
members. During the reunification period, mother completed a five-month inpatient drug program during which all of her drug tests were negative, and completed classes in substance abuse, relapse prevention, ange r management and chemical dependence
education. She also received individual counseling, engaged in outside community 12-step meetings, and enrolled in an outpatient program. Mother continued to test negative on her drug tests through July, Augus t and September of 2012. Her counselor remarked that mother “appears to have a willingness and commi tment to maintain
abstinence from substances . . . . [She] has made a comm itment to comp ly with her treatment program requirements and voices a st rong desire to continue building a life in a sober environment.” She was expected to co mplete the program in November 2012.
A contested six-month revi ew hearing was concluded on November 7, 2012. The juvenile court found that mother had regular ly and consistently vi sited and had contact with J.G., and had made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to J.G.’s
removal. The court ordered continued re unification services, including unmonitored
visits on the condition that mother continue to test clean, attend AA meetings three times per week, continue in counseling and not a llow her ex-boyfriend Dan to have contact
with J.G.. In December 2012, DCFS filed a section 388 petition, asking the juvenile court to modify its November 7, 2012 visitation or der because Dan was living with mother and there was no way to ensure that Dan had no c ontact with J.G. As a consequence of this petition, the parties agreed to a visitation plan , signed by all counsel, which provided that
mother’s unmonitored visits be held at a place other than her home.4 In February 2013, DCFS reported that mother had skipped drug tests on nine
occasions between October 2012 and Januar y 2013; she had test ed negative once in December and again in January. Mother conti nued to attend 12-step meetings. Also in February 2013, the paternal gr andparents, who lived in Louisi ana, expressed an interest in adopting J.G. if he were not reunified with father. In April 2013, J.G. was still in foster care. He had gone to Louisiana for three weeks with father, who was getting married ther e. While in Louisiana, J.G. connected with his paternal grandparents. By April 2013, moth er’s relationship with the social worker had deteriorated; she had contacted the social worker’s superi ors and the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to complain. Moth er stated that she was no longer going to drug test. Although mother continued to attend AA meetings, she had stopped seeing her psychiatrist in October 2012. J.G. was seen twice weekly by his th erapist because he continued to have tantrums. He reported to his therapist, fost er parents, and the social worker that he
wanted to live with father. On April 4, 2013, mother tested positive for methamphe tamine. Also on that day,
mother’s visitation with J.G. was can celled due to her erratic behavior. In June 2013, DCFS reported that mother had partially complied with court orders, but that she had a recent positive drug test and ongoing no ncompliance with further drug tests, and thus remained at risk of relaps e. J.G. continued to receive twice-weekly therapy, where he expressed his disappointment at mothe r’s missed visits and broken promises. The child’s therapis t believed that mother’s beha vior was negatively affecting J.G., and recommended that mother’s vi sits be changed to monitored. The juvenile court conducted a section 366 .22 review hearing on July 24, 2013. At this time, the court terminated mother’s reunification services a nd ordered J.G. placed with the paternal grandparents, who had an approved homestudy, in Louisiana. On August 7, 2013, J.G. flew to Louisiana to live with the pate rnal grandparents.5 In August 2013, moth er stated that she had been in an abusive relationship with
someone who would not leave he r alone and had caused her br uising. She had not taken her psychotropic medication for three months , and was having a hard time emotionally.
Mother had doubts about her ab ility to cope with J.G. being so far away, and planned to
move to Louisiana. She visited J.G. in Lo uisiana three times in November and December
2013. In its January 27, 2014 section 366.26 re port, DCFS stated that J.G. was living with his paternal grandparents, the prospectiv e adoptive parents, in Louisiana. J.G. no longer met the criteria fo r “Failure to Thrive.” He was enrolled in the first grade in the local elementary school where he received “a bove average grades” and, according to his teacher, “is a good student who tries ve ry hard at everything he does.” On January 27, 2014, the section 366.26 hearing was set for contest and continued to March 17, 2014. The hearing was agai n continued, to May 29, 2014, to permit mother’s newly appointed counsel to prepare for the contest. On May 10, 2014, mother was arrested for being under the influence of a
controlled substance. The section 366.26 hearing was co ntinued two more times, on May 29 and June 26, 2014, at mother’s request. In June 2014, J.G.’s therapist reported th at J.G. had adjusted positively in his new home environment and at school, where he was performing well ab ove average. His therapist reported that the pate rnal grandparents facilitated vis its between J.G. and father, which had strengt hened that relationship, but that he was unwilling to discuss visits with
his mother. The section 366.26 hearing was ultimately held on August 15, 2014, at which time mother failed to appear for th e contested hearing. At that time, mother’s counsel argued against termination of mother’s parental right s, stating “this would be detrimental to her
son.” The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that J.G. was adoptable, and that no exceptio n to adoption applied. With respect to the beneficial6 relationship exception to adoption, the court no ted that J.G. was now seven, and “doesn’t really even want to have any contact with [mot her] at all. And she has slowly but surely
seen him less and less and less.” The court te rminated parental rights and designated the paternal grandparents as the prospective adoptive parents. Mother timely appealed the termination of her parental rights, claiming that the court erred in finding that the beneficial relationship exception to adoption found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B )(i) does not apply to this case.

DISCUSSION
The substantial evidence standard of revi ew applies to the juvenile court’s ruling on the beneficial relationship exception to adoption. ( In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567; see also In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643.) When the sufficiency of the evid ence to support a juvenile court’s finding or order is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must determine if there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports it. ( In re Savannah M . (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393.) “If there is any substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, a reviewing court must uphold the trial court’s findings. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in support of the findings and the re cord must be viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order. [Citation.]” ( In re Jeannette S. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 52, 58.) As stated by one court, “[i]n reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evid ence to support the findings and or ders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favor able to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and cr edibility are the provin ce of the trial court. [Citation.]” ( In
re Heather A . (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there ar e sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ( In re Matthew S . (1988) 201 Ca 1.App.3d 315, 321.)7 For the exception to apply, the parent must have maintained regular visitation with the child, and the juvenile court must dete rmine that the paren t/child relationship “promotes the well-being of th e child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with ne w, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of th e natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and th e sense of belonging a new family would confer.” ( In re Autumn H. , supra , 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) A parent must establish more than merely some benef it to the child by continuing the parent/child relationship. That relationship must be “a substantial, positive emotional a ttachment such that the child would be greatly harmed” if the relationship were severed. ( Ibid .) To overcome the
benefits associated with a stable, adoptive family, the pa rent seeking to continue a relationship with the child must prove that se vering the relationship will cause not merely some harm, but great harm to the child. ( In re Brittany C . (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 853.) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), does not define the type of parent-child relationship that will trigger the exception. However, courts have re quired more than just “frequent and loving contact” to establish th e requisite benefit for this exception. ( In re
Brandon C . (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 15 30, 1534.) Mother was required to show that her relationship with J.G. contributed to his well- being “to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home.” ( In re Autumn H ., supra , 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) “Int eraction between natural parent and child will always confer
some incidental benefit to the child. . . . The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experi ences. [Citation.] The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits a nd contact have contin ued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attach ment from child to parent.” ( Ibid .) In other words, “If severing the natural parent/child relationshi p would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child woul d be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the na tural parent’s rights are not terminated.” ( Ibid .)8 The juvenile court found that the termin ation of the mother/child relationship in the present case would not be detrimental to the child because mother occupied the role of a friendly visitor, not a parental figure. From the time this dependency proceeding commenced in 2011, mother did not assume a meaningful, significant parental role in
J.G.’s life. J.G. was indiffe rent to having telephone contact with mother. When he was in California, he said that he did not want to talk to mother, a nd he would quickly end
their conversations. After he moved into the paternal grandparents’ home in August 2013, he would often refuse to speak to mothe r. Earlier in the dependency case, J.G. said
that he would like to live with fa ther or stay with his former foster parents, and later said that he wanted to stay with hi s grandparents. He never stated that he wanted to live with mother; rather, he was adamant that he did not want to. The Department also points out that afte r mother’s visits, J. G.’s behavior would regress. He had explosive temper tantrums, which included threats to the foster parents and other children in the home, a nd even threats to kill the dog. J.G. would also trash his room, break glasses and soil his pants. J.G. did not behave in a similar manner after
visits with his father. And when J.G. m oved to Louisiana, these behaviors subsided. In mother’s reply brief, her counsel argues that the fact that J.G. had tantrums and soiled his pants after visits with mother is evidence of the very strong bond the two shared. “Rather than exhibiting a ‘harmful ’ relationship between [mother] and J.G.,
J.G.’s anxious behaviors demons trated his extreme and inarticulable frustration at being separated from mother—to whom he was stro ngly bonded.” Mother concludes that “[t]hese behaviors evince the emotional de triment J.G. would suffer should he be permanently separated from his mother.” Howe ver, “[i]t is axiomati c that the arguments of counsel are not evidence.” ( Porterville Citizens for Resp onsible Hillside Development v. City of Porterville (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 855, 895, fn . 9.) And mother presented no evidence to the juvenile cour t to support her contention that J.G. would suffer great detriment if he no longer had to deal with his extreme anxiety after having visits with his
mother.9 In short, the record is devoid of evidence that J.G. would suffer a detriment if mother’s parental rights were terminated. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court did not err in finding that no exceptional s ituation existed to forego the statutorilymandated preference for adoption, and in terminating mother’s parental rights.

DISPOSITION The challenged rulings of th e trial court are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

GOODMAN, J. *

We concur:

TURNER, P. J.

MOSK, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.