Expectations Training for Miners Using Self-Contained 

Self-Rescuers in Escapes from Underground Coal Mines 

Kathleen M. Kowalski-Trakofler, Charles Vaught, and Michael J. Brnich Jr. 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 

Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 

Address correspondence to: Kathleen M. Kowalski-Trakofler, 

NIOSH-DPRB, P.O. Box 18070. Pittsburgh, PA 15236-0070; e-mail: 

kkowalski@cdc.gov. 

The findings of this report are those of the authors and do 

not necessarily represent the views of the National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health. 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health researchers conducted a study to investigate the human response 

issues related to wearing a self-contained self-rescuer (SCSR). 

The goal was to develop training to educate miners on what 

they could expect from their units during an escape. Subjects 

included miners who had experience wearing SCSRs, manufacturers, and researchers. Results identified nine key areas 

of concern: (1) starting the unit, (2) unit heat, (3) induction 

of coughing, (4) unit taste, (5) difficulty in breathing while 

wearing the unit, (6) quality of the air supplied, (7) nose 

clips, (8) goggles, and (9) the behavior of the breathing bag. 

In addition, researchers reviewed the literature on human 

response under duress. This article describes the expectations 

training program, which comprises the findings of the SCSR 

study and what is known about the normal human response in 

an emergency. The authors present background on SCSRs and 

the SCSR switchover procedure mandated in the recent federal 

Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006, 

which provided the impetus for the expectations training. 

Keywords	 disaster, escape, mining, self-contained self-rescuer, 

training 

INTRODUCTION 

Self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs) provide the wearer 

with a 1-hr oxygen supply as mandated by U.S. government regulations. SCSRs were developed in the late 1970s 

and deployed in U.S. mines in the early 1980s for use by 

coal miners during emergencies, such as fires, explosions, or 

gas inundations in which the ambient atmosphere becomes 

toxic. As their name implies, SCSRs are meant to serve one 

purpose—to allow a miner to self-rescue by escaping the mine. 

They are not intended to be used for other purposes, such as fire 

fighting. As with other oxygen-supplying apparatuses such as 

the closed-circuit breathing units worn by mine rescue teams, 

SCSRs are fairly complex devices and thus require detailed 

analysis. 

There are two types of SCSRs produced and sold. Both are 

closed-circuit breathing apparatuses; that is, the units do not 

exhaust CO2 but remove it from the breathing circuit internally. 

One type of SCSR stores O2 as a compressed gas and uses 

a chemical bed of lithium hydroxide (LiOH) to absorb CO2 

as the miner exhales. It is started by opening a valve on the 

oxygen cylinder that fills a breathing bag. The other type uses 

potassium superoxide (KO2, a solid chemical that reacts with 

moisture in the breath) to generate O2, with LiOH used to 

remove much of the CO2 from the breathing circuit. 

This study focused on the problematic use of SCSRs by 

miners who attempted to escape the Wolf Run Mining Company’s Sago Mine in West Virginia following an explosion. 

The particular SCSR used by miners at the Sago Mine was 

a combination unit in terms of providing oxygen. The initial 

oxygen is provided by a small compressed oxygen cylinder 

that yields 7 to 8 liters of oxygen. When the oxygen cylinder is 

activated, the wearer receives an initial supply of oxygen that 

is sufficient until the potassium superoxide begins to generate 

oxygen. If the oxygen cylinder fails, the device can be “cold 

started” by the miner expelling several breaths to inflate the 

breathing bag. A SCSR’s complexity requires some level of 

training by miners to ensure correct use. Figure 1 depicts 

miners wearing compressed oxygen SCSRs during a mock 

escape drill. Federal mining regulations require that every 

person entering an underground coal mine in the United States 

has to be furnished with an SCSR.(1) 

In 1981, SCSR devices were introduced into U.S. mines. 

Although much time, effort, and money had gone into the 

development of these engineered devices, very little effort was 

spent in teaching people how to use them. More recently, selfrescuer training was included as one of several mandatory 

courses in Title 30 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 48 

and 75.(1) Specifically, SCSR training was implemented into 

the broader, required course on self-rescue and respiratory 

devices, such as respirators. However, this course was one of 

12 covered during a single 8-hr day. It called for instruction and 

demonstration in the use, care, and maintenance of self-rescue 
 

and respiratory devices employed at the mine. Thus, training 

consisted of a short demonstration of the donning procedure 

once a year. Few miners ever had the opportunity to actually 

put on an apparatus and see what it felt like to use one. Further, 

miners had no notion of what to expect when wearing the SCSR 

in an escape situation. 

FIGURE 1. Miners wearing compressed oxygen SCSRs during 

a simulated escape 

BACKGROUND 

I

n 2006, several major incidents occurred at underground 

coal mines in the United States, resulting in 19 worker 

fatalities. These included a fire at the Aracoma Coal Company, 

Inc., Alma No. 1 Mine in West Virginia, in which 2 miners died; 

an explosion at the Kentucky Darby Coal Company Darby No. 

1 Mine, where 5 miners died; and the explosion at the Sago 

Mine in which 12 miners died. For illustrative purposes, the 

authors focus here on the Sago disaster because of the number 

of fatalities and the relevance of SCSRs to this case. 

On Monday, January 2, 2006, at approximately 6:30 a.m., 

an explosion occurred at the Sago Mine, leading to the death of 

12 miners. Thirteen miners were working in the vicinity of the 

explosion. Twelve were members of a coal production crew. 

Of this group, 11 of the 12 perished from carbon monoxide 

poisoning. The thirteenth miner was working alone about 

1500 feet from the other 12; he was killed by the force of the 

explosion. The sole survivor of the production crew was able 

to give testimony in the ensuing investigations conducted by 

the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA)(2) and the 

West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training 

(OMHST).(3) The survivor devoted many of his statements 

to the functioning of the crew’s SCSRs, the type that uses 

potassium superoxide to generate oxygen. This article is based 

on the OMHST Report of Investigation, which is rich in detail 

and devotes an entire section to SCSR use. When appropriate, 

verbatim quotes are given to represent exact detail from this 

report. As might be expected, there are some inconsistencies 

in the testimony, so the authors present both sides of the issue 

when apparent contradictions occur. 

Following the explosion, the crew started out of the mine on 

their track-mounted personnel carrier. They soon encountered 

debris on the track that made it impassable. The crew then 

entered their primary escapeway, a tunnel that could lead them 

out of the mine. They walked approximately 305 m (1000 ft) 

through a potentially deadly atmosphere before donning their 

SCSRs. “While it is unclear the location at which the selfrescuers were donned, [the survivor] stated that the attempt to 

walk out was aborted by the section foreman because three of 

the twelve rescuers were not functioning.”(3) At another point 

in the report, however, there is a different interpretation of the 

attempt to walk out of the mine: “Finding their way blocked 

by smoke and debris, the crew was forced to return to [their 

workplace], gathering materials to build a barricade as they 

went.” What is not at issue in either statement is the fact that 

three individuals were convinced that their SCSRs were not 

working. 

Once back in their workplace, the crew began to erect a 

barricade of plastic sheeting that would provide some protection from the smoke and, they hoped, from carbon monoxide. 

The miners took off their SCSRs while they were building 

the barricade.(3) After the barricade was finished, all 12 men 

went behind it to wait for rescue teams to arrive. The survivor 

reported that there were not enough SCSRs to go around, since 

after a time, four miners were not able to make theirs work. 

Individuals shared with each other, trading off SCSRs between 

them. Besides removing and replacing mouthpieces while 

sharing the apparatuses, members of the crew also removed 

their mouthpieces to talk. The OMHST Report of Investigation 

concluded that “The cumulative exposure to carbon monoxide 

before, during, and after their SCSRs apparently stopped 

producing oxygen exposed the individuals to levels that were 

fatal.” 

It is extremely unlikely that 4 of the 12 devices would 

malfunction (three initially and the fourth later). All models of 

SCSRs on the market undergo extensive and rigid laboratory 

testing prior to being certified for use in underground mines. 

Title 42 CFR Part 84 charges NIOSH and MSHA with jointly 

reviewing and issuing certifications for respirators used for 

mine emergencies and mine rescue, including SCSRs. Title 

42 CFR Part 84 also delineates minimum design criteria for 

apparatus, testing criteria for apparatus, and other provisions. 

Within NIOSH, the National Personal Protective Technology 

Laboratory (NPPTL) in Pittsburgh, Pa., is responsible for 

evaluating and certifying SCSRs for use in underground 

mines. NPPTL has extensive protocols in place for testing and 

certification of respiratory devices including SCSRs. 

Twelve SCSRs were recovered from behind the barricade 

at Sago; after which, “MSHA took custody of the SCSRs and 

placed them in sealed plastic bags for transfer to NIOSH’s 

National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory [NPPTL] 
in Bruceton, PA.”(3) Investigators at the NPPTL evaluated all 

12 recovered units, concluding that “All had been deployed and 

examination of the chemicals inside the canisters indicated that 

they all had started producing oxygen.” None of the SCSRs, 

however, had been used to anywhere near full capacity. In fact, 

the average amount of potassium superoxide spent was only 

38.2%. The SCSRs of the three victims who the survivor stated 

wore malfunctioning units initially had produced as much O2 

as the others, and one showed evidence of moisture in the 

canister. 

Because of the way SCSRs were handled during the building 

of the barricade, it is apparent that they were not used correctly, 

at least not in that instance. Lack of knowledge of how the 

devices work may have had something to do with their misuse, 

especially if the miners took the mouthpieces out or shared 

the devices as reported by the surviving miner. In turn, this 

may have led to CO poisoning, which would have affected 

the miners’ reasoning and decision-making abilities, leading 

to further misuse of the SCSRs. 

The OMHST report(3) detailed some of the complex characteristics of the chemical-oxygen unit that workers need to know 

but typically do not. First, cold starting the device may entail a 

considerable amount of time. It can take as long as 7 min for the 

apparatus to build up to 19.5% oxygen, which is reason enough, 

from a trapped miner’s point of view, to think the unit is not 

working. Thus, when the survivor tried to cold start his buddy’s 

SCSR at one point during the disaster, he might not have given it 

enough time. Second, breathing hard and rapidly moves more 

carbon dioxide and moisture through the canister. Trying to 

push or pull a greater volume of air through the chemical 

bed than it was designed to handle will generate breathing 

resistance. As noted earlier, miners might then remove their 

units to seek more breathing comfort, which is what happened 

when the crew members were building their barricade. Third, 

while the chemical reaction is progressing, it is generating 

heat, which keeps the KO2 in a molten state. If the wearer 

removes the SCSR for a few minutes, as the victims did with 

theirs, the canister cools and the KO2 solidifies. Once solid, the 

KO2 forms a hard coating around the potassium superoxide, 

making it very difficult to restart the device. The result could 

be an SCSR with only a small portion of the potassium 

superoxide expended, as in the units recovered from behind the 

barricade. 

In response to the mining incidents of 2006, on December 8 

of that year, MSHA promulgated a new rule on emergency mine 

evacuation. The rule states: “MSHA is concerned that miners 

may not be able to recognize when an SCSR is functioning 

properly. This may have caused miners to remove their SCSRs 

prematurely, thinking that the device was not working when 

breathing became difficult. Also, miners need the skills and 

knowledge to initiate (cold start) an SCSR if it fails to start 

automatically after the starting sequence is initiated.”(4) 

At MSHA’s request, NIOSH developed expectations training that will address the above concerns. The present study 

was conducted to determine problems and issues that miners 

and investigators have voiced based on past experience. 

Basic human responses under duress have been reviewed and 

included in the training. The expectations training focused on 

what miners could expect from their SCSR, as well as what 

to expect from themselves and others in an escape situation. 

For this article, the authors define expectations training as 

training that provides the trainees with sufficient physical, 

cognitive, psychological, and behavioral information (beyond 

the necessary technical information and hands-on experience) 

to allow them to understand any potential symptoms they might 

experience while performing a task or action. 

Earlier Studies 

Although there have been few studies regarding how to 

teach miners what to expect when using SCSRs, the notion 

that there ought to be expectations training for miners has been 

discussed for years. The fact that miners need to be educated 

about how the devices perform and what to expect from themselves when under duress is borne out in NIOSH interviews 

with 48 miners who escaped fires at three underground coal 

mine operations in western Pennsylvania in 1988 and 1990. 

As an example, from the miners’ comments, a majority of 

them were unaware that (1) there is breathing resistance when 

SCSRs are used, and (2) this resistance increases the longer 

the apparatus is worn. Consequently, when they encountered 

breathing resistance, the miners thought their SCSRs were not 

working properly. As a result, more than half of them either 

took their mouthpieces out or breathed around them while 

remaining in a potentially deadly atmosphere.(5–7) 

Accounts of incidents such as these have brought the reliability of SCSRs into question among members of the mining 

community. Concern over a crisis of confidence that was not 

based on empirical data led the Joint Government, Labor, 

and Industry Task Group on Person Wearable Self-Contained 

Self-Rescuers to suggest that expectations training could be 

employed to restore miners’ confidence in the units. The task 

group devoted 12 pages to discussions of how to improve 

donning training and introduce expectations training. One 

observation particularly germane to this article came from an 

individual who noted that his company believes that one of the 

training objectives should be to educate the user regarding the 

kinds of stressors and performance expected from the SCSR. 

Whether lack of confidence played a part in the 2006 

tragedies, there have been numerous instances in which miners 

died, but subsequent laboratory tests established that their 

apparatus was not used up.(3,8) This presents a perplexing 

problem for investigators, one that has no easy answers. The 

Report of Investigation by MSHA into the Sago Mine disaster 

illustrates this point very well. 

Previous studies outside the mining industry have concluded that individuals’ behavior and decision making is 

influenced by prior experiences and training.(9) In addition, 

other investigators have recommended that training on SCSRs 

should include mention of common complaints aired about the 

units.(10) 
A study evaluating test protocols for smoke divers working in the heat was conducted with nine male subjects 

(firefighters).(11) Firefighting activities involve strenuous physical work that is often performed in a hot and hostile 

environment with similarities to the exertion during escape 

under apparatus from a serious mine explosion and fire. It 

is known that the combination of physical activity, heavy 

clothing, and thermal stress results in increased physiological 

and psychological stress.(12) The study showed that strenuous 

smoke diving efforts at 130◦C produce greater thermal stress 

and result in a perception of greater effort than at lower 

temperatures. The stress is greater during longer tests, and the 

authors conclude that this may have implications for individual 

decision-making ability and the ability of workers to behave 

rationally with regard to their own safety and awareness of 

their limitations. 

Another study related the use of realistic previews to 

training outcomes.(13) The authors note that little attention 

has been given to how employee point of view relates to 

expectations, attitudes, or decisions in the selection of training 

programs. They examined two variables that could affect a 

worker’s entry into a training program: (1) the type of prior 

information offered about the program, and (2) the amount of 

freedom the worker had to take the program. Of interest to the 

present study was the type of prior information offered to the 

potential trainees. Trainees who received a realistic training 

preview were more likely to benefit from training and show 

commitment to their decision to attend the training; in addition, 

they were more motivated to learn. The authors conclude that 

it is becoming increasingly clear that understanding a trainee’s 

point of view is critical to attaining positive training outcomes 

and to the overall success of training interventions. 

Another interesting study looked into the effects of optimistic vs. realistic previews of training programs on selfreported transfer of learning. Sixty-four participants were 

divided into two groups: one group received informative, 

optimistic previews of the training; the other group received 

a realistic (positive and negative) preview. Findings showed 

that the optimistic preview had more positive impact on 

expectations, motivation, learning, attitudes, and transfer of 

learning.(14) Thus, according to this study, previewing training 

in an optimistic, positive manner will result in higher motivation and increased transfer of learning from the classroom 

to the workplace. It is important to note that this study was 

limited in that the subject sample was small; nevertheless, it 

raises a point to consider in training. 

METHOD 

This study involved 11 male subjects: four miners (two 

of whom had worn SCSRs during an escape from 

an underground coal mine, and two others had extensive 

in-mine experience with the apparatus); CEO/presidents of 

three SCSR manufacturing companies; one general manager 

of safety and training from a major U.S. mining company; and three government researchers who had served 

as laboratory subjects in the testing of SCSRs. Subjects 

were informed that their participation was voluntary and 

anonymous. 

Each subject was interviewed in person or in a scheduled 

phone interview by the principal investigator—a research 

psychologist. Interviews lasted from 15 min to an hour. 

Subjects were asked questions about the human aspect of 

wearing an SCSR. The interview began with asking the subject 

to describe his history of experience wearing an SCSR. After 

understanding the subject’s background, open-ended questions 

were asked, such as: What was it like wearing the SCSR? 

Which unit did you wear, or have you worn? Subjects were 

prompted by the interviewer as appropriate: Did it have a 

taste? Did it have a smell? What did it feel like on your chest 

... on your nose? What concerned you while wearing the unit? 

What should other miners know about how these units feel and 

perform? 

Responses were recorded by the assistant researcher as 

written notes that were later transcribed, compared with, 

and integrated with the research psychologist’s notes and 

observations. From this data, a list of issues regarding the 

wearing of the SCSRs was determined by analyzing individual 

interview responses. The individual issues were then compared 

with the responses of all interviewees to determine key 

issues and note consensus. NIOSH researchers also reviewed 

targeted psychological literature to determine important issues 

to include in relation to the expectations of self and others 

during escape.(15,16) 

Limitations of this study: This study may be viewed as 

limited due to the small number of subjects interviewed. The 

authors interviewed a variety of experienced subjects—miners, 

manufacturers, and researchers—to saturation, which refers to 

the point in a study when the researchers are hearing nothing 

new. The nine key areas of concern were confirmed many times 

by the subjects. 

RESULTS 

SCSRs 

It was noted that there are some differences between 

chemical-oxygen units and compressed oxygen units with 

respect to user expectations, emphasizing the importance for 

the miner to be trained on the specific unit used at his/her mine. 

There were nine key concerns resulting from the data analysis 

related to wearing an SCSR: 

1.	 Starting the unit. Miners must start all types of units 

by either pulling a cord or opening a valve. Chemicaloxygen SCSRs may be cold started by the wearer 

exhaling into the unit until the bag is full. 

2.	 Heat. All units grow hot to the touch. SCSRs employ 

chemical beds that generate oxygen (using potassium 

superoxide) and/or scrub carbon dioxide (using lithium 

hydroxide) from exhaled air. The chemical reactions 

that take place during breathing generate heat. Thus, 

the miner may experience discomfort on his/her chest 
from the heat generated. It was suggested that miners 

use their clothing, a glove, or even an empty rock dust 

bag as protection between chest and unit. 

3.	 Induction of cough. Most units are packed with a dustlike 

substance (talc/cornstarch) to prevent the hoses from 

sticking together or to absorb saliva. The resultant 

coughing by the wearer may last a few minutes. Miners 

are advised not to remove the mouthpiece but to cough 

directly into the unit. Subjects stated doing that may 

produce a gag reflex. 

4.	 Taste. Miners have reported a variety of different 

tastes—from no taste to rubbery, bitter, metallic, or salty 

taste. A cornstarch taste was noted most frequently. 

5.	 Resistance to breathing. All SCSRs have some level 

of breathing resistance associated with them simply 

because of their design. The breathing hoses, due to their 

design and size, present initial resistance. Chemicaloxygen units can be the most difficult to breathe 

through. As mentioned earlier, chemical-oxygen SCSRs 

use chemical beds to generate oxygen and/or to scrub 

carbon dioxide from exhaled air. As these chemical beds 

are gradually expended, there is less space for air to 

move through them, which causes breathing resistance 

to increase with time. Under normal circumstances the 

unit will continue to work as resistance builds up. Some 

miners have described that breathing through the units 

feels like breathing through a straw. 

6.	 Quality of breathed air. In chemical-oxygen units the 

air is generally hot and dry. It may take a while for the 

chemical reaction to start. The harder the miner breathes, 

the greater the chemical reaction induced. Some subjects 

reported that their throat and tongue became dry, making 

it difficult to swallow. Compressed oxygen units were 

found to be hot and very humid. 

7.	 Nose clips. Subjects usually reported that the unit’s nose 

clips were uncomfortable, taking some time for wearers 

to get used to breathing through the mouth. Mouth 

breathing also may cause saliva to accumulate around 

the mouth. Excessive saliva may cause miners to remove 

the mouthpiece briefly to expel the saliva. Salvia can also 

enter the breathing circuit on chemical-oxygen units and 

accelerate the oxygen production process. 

8.	 The goggles. Goggles protect the eyes from smoke and 

toxic gases. Subjects reported that the goggles fog up or 

can fill with sweat, which is uncomfortable and makes 

it difficult to see. 

9.	 The bag. Bags on different units do not behave the same. 

It is important for miners to know how the bag functions 

on the specific unit they are using. 

Miners should understand that once the chemical-oxygen 

units are activated, the chemical reaction will produce more 

oxygen than the wearer needs. The excess oxygen will cause 

the breathing bag to fill up and overflow out the relief valve. 

For the SCSRs used by the Sago miners, the main chemical 

reaction begins 15 to 20 min after the unit is activated. Until the 

chemical reaction kicks in, the breathing bag will not be full. 

Miners must also understand that their oxygen demand may 

be higher than the amount produced by the SCSR. In this case, 

the miner is “outbreathing” the SCSR. An escaping miner must 

slow down his or her activity level to reduce their oxygen need. 

As long as the miner is able to inhale and exhale, the fullness 

of the bag is immaterial. Once all the oxygen is released by 

the chemical reaction, the breathing bag will get smaller and 

smaller until the miner can no longer take a breath. 

With compressed oxygen units, the volume of the breathing 

bag does not matter as long as there is pressurized oxygen in 

the cylinder. If more oxygen is needed than the constant flow 

provides, and the bag is emptied in the middle of a breath, the 

demand valve will open and pull what is needed directly from 

the cylinder. When the pressure gauge reads zero, the cylinder 

is empty. 

In all SCSRs, there may never be an outward sign such as 

bag inflation, relief valve operation, increased resistance, or 

high temperature to indicate the unit is working. If the miner 

can breathe while wearing the unit, then it is supplying oxygen 

and thus functioning. 

Psychological Response 

The review of literature on human response to emergencies 

provided the following advice to the miners as part of their 

expectations training. 

It is normal to experience an emotional reaction during 

an emergency escape. You are experiencing stress and likely 

what is sometimes referred to as the fight or flight response. 

This is the survival instinct that we are all born with; it 

prepares us to fight or run. This response prepares the 

body to help you in your escape. Psychologists call an 

incident like an emergency escape from a mine a “traumatic 

incident” and we know what some of the normal human 

reactions are to traumatic incidents. 

Responses to a traumatic incident include physical, 

mental, emotional, and behavioral changes. Remember that 

strong reactions and emotions are normal reactions in an 

extra-ordinary situation. Individuals are different and report 

any or all of the following symptoms: Rapid heartbeat, Dry 

mouth, Sweaty palms, Increased anxiety, Fear, Sweating 

profusely, Feeling confused, Feeling overwhelmed, Shallow breathing, Nausea, Disorientation. 

These are ordinary human responses to an extraordinary 

situation. 

What you can do. Be conscious of slowing your breathing down. Walk at a steady pace. Stay with your buddy 

or crew. Watch out for each other. Think forward – think 

about getting out of the mine. Focus on the escape. Do not 

remove the mouthpiece to talk. Do not remove your unit 

until you are in fresh air or ready to switch to a new unit. 

Think forward. 

Walk at a steady pace. Stay calm. Regulate your 

breathing. 
At the beginning of this section, the authors noted nine 

characteristics of SCSR behavior based on data from the study. 

In addition, by discussing the psychological response, the 

authors provided some information as to what miners might 

expect from themselves and how to cope in an escape scenario. 

There have been few studies in the mining industry on how to 

prepare oneself for emergencies. Yet, it is logical to assume 

that what is known about physical and psychological responses 

to traumatic incidents can be incorporated into a coping 

strategy that can be applied for the purpose of escape. A wellformulated strategy may help the individual think beforehand 

what he or she is likely to face in an actual emergency. 

The question is then what part does the above advice play 

in building a strategy useful in preparing an individual to face 

a situation he or she has probably never faced before? After 

all, the tips appear innocuous. The answer is that these tips 

make up a type of advance organizer, one which links existing 

knowledge to that which is unknown.(17) Whereas there are 

several types of advance organizers, those that provide new 

information to the individual (for example, the fact that SCSRs 

get hot with use) are called expository organizers.(18) Research 

has suggested that expository organizers work best when there 

is no prior knowledge involved, since the advance organizer 

itself becomes the individual’s prior knowledge. Thus, the 

earlier discussion of psychological response, although brief, is 

critically important in developing an effective coping strategy. 

DISCUSSION 

The integration of expectations training into SCSR training 

is timely and important in light of the 19 mining fatalities 

in 2006 and the previous studies conducted by NIOSH. 

Researchers conducting interviews in 1988 reported that 

miners did not know how to don their SCSRs and were unaware 

of what to expect from them. For example, miners were not 

aware that the units got hot against the chest and that there 

would be increasing resistance to breathing over time. In 1993, 

a joint government, labor, and industry task group on SCSRs 

concluded that expectations training needed to be introduced 

into emergency training. Studies outside the mining industry 

have concluded that decision making can be affected positively 

in individuals exposed to infrequent, high-impact situations 

if they have had prior experience and training. The mining 

industry may wish to consider realistic, optimistic training that 

has been shown to promote commitment in training, better 

transfer of learning from classroom to work environment, and 

a more positive attitude and motivation to learn. 

The list of expectations developed from this study was given 

to MSHA to meet its urgent need to use this information as part 

of the new mandated SCSR training for teaching miners to 

switch from one SCSR to another in the event they need more 

than one unit to escape. The need for a training regimen for 

switching from one SCSR to a second unit was mandated by the 

Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 

(MINER Act),(19) Because of the urgency to meet the mandates 

of the MINER Act, the authors were operating under severe 

time constraints. They relied, therefore, on their expertise as 

trainers who have extensive knowledge of SCSRs to develop 

a curriculum that they judged to be useful for its intended 

purpose. They then trained a small convenience sample of other 

experts who were in a position to evaluate the content of the 

curriculum, and who found it to be logical and well constructed. 

There was no time to conduct a training field test with a sample 

of miners. However, questions of its applicability are now moot 

because every underground coal miner in the United States 

is trained quarterly using the curriculum developed by the 

authors. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Over the years there have been repeated calls for SCSR expectations training because a significant number of 

miners who have had to use the devices in an emergency 

maintained that the units did not work. This article presents 

the results of a small study undertaken at the request of MSHA 

to address this issue. 

The authors began by framing the problem historically, then 

focusing on the Sago disaster of 2006, which is illustrative of 

how SCSRs have typically been used and misused by miners 

in emergency situations. The fact that three individuals were 

convinced that their apparatuses were not working undoubtedly 

had some bearing on their decision to return to the workplace 

and barricade after initiating an escape attempt through a mine 

tunnel. 

With these issues as background, the authors next reviewed 

the few relevant studies that address expectations training in 

general. Although scarce, the existing research does indicate 

that prior experience and training influence individuals’ behavior during events that occur infrequently but have a high 

consequence—a description that fits mine disasters perfectly. 

The study involved 11 subjects with disparate backgrounds, 

some of whom had worn the SCSR extensively. The aim was 

to develop, as fully as possible, a list of characteristic issues 

relevant to the apparatus when in use. The result was nine key 

concerns that were generally agreed on by the subjects. These, 

combined with an assessment of psychological responses, 

made up the core of a training document that was turned over 

to MSHA for its use. 

The ultimate conclusion for the mining industry from the 

research reported thus far is that expectations training for 

SCSRs is long overdue. There is a pressing need for much 

attention to this issue from both researchers and the industry 

in general. 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The authors wish to thank the interviewees who shared 

their time and experiences in support of miner safety. 

The authors also thank Melissa Silva, University of TexasSan Antonio, student intern; and Nicholas Kyriazi, NIOSH, 

for their contributions to this study. 
REFERENCES 

1. “Mineral Resources,” Code of Federal Regulations Title 30, Parts 48 and 

75, 2006. 

2. “Report of Investigation: Fatal Underground Coal Mine Explosion, 

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