2024 IL App (1st) 230735-U

FIRST DIVISION

March 25, 2024

No. 1-23-0735 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in 

the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

____________________________________________________________________________ 

OLUBUNMI OWAGBORIAYE, )

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

RAJASHREE SEN and ATLAS REALTY )

GROUP, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County.

No. 2021 M1 300807 

The Honorable

John Simon, 

Judge Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the 

court. 

Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

 HELD: This appeal is dismissed because of the appellant’s failure to comply with 

the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 

2020). 

¶ 1 Plaintiff-Appellant Olubunmi Owagboriaye (plaintiff) appeals, pro se, from a trial court 

order granting defendants-appellees Rajashree Sen and Atlas Realty Group’s (defendants or 

as named) motion to debar her arbitration award rejection and denying her motion to vacate 

the judgment award. She contends that the court erred in granting the debarment because she 
No. 1-23-0735 

2 

did her best in pursuing her case. She asks that we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings, including a trial. For the following reasons, we dismiss the instant cause due to 

plaintiff’s failure to comply with the rules governing appellate briefs and the numerous 

defects in the record, which preclude consideration of her appeal.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 From the sparse record before us, we have gleaned the following relevant facts and 

procedural history. 

¶ 4 In June 2022, plaintiff filed, pro se, a personal injury lawsuit against defendants, the 

landlord and property management company of a building, alleging she fell on some “thick 

ice,” was transported via ambulance to a local hospital, and sustained injuries. Defendants, 

represented by counsel, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Illinois 

Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (see 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)). The matter proceeded 

to arbitration and on October 11, 2022, an award was entered in favor of defendants and 

against plaintiff, with plaintiff therefore receiving $0. 

¶ 5 On October 25, 2022, plaintiff filled out a preprinted court form entitled “Notice of 

Rejection of Award.” Although she filled out the top of the form providing the date of the 

award, her contact information, and her signature, she left the Proof of Service section 

completely blank. Accordingly, she did not reference counsel for defendants, she did not 

provide a date upon which she served counsel with her notice of rejection, she did not 

indicate the method by which she served counsel, and she did not obtain the signature of a 

notary public—all information required to be supplied and attested to in the form. 
No. 1-23-0735 

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¶ 6 On November 28, 2022, upon a motion filed by counsel for defendants, the trial court 

issued a Judgment on Award of Arbitration. In its written order, the court noted that the 

award had, again, been in favor of defendants and against plaintiff, that it had been filed with 

the court, and that “a notice of rejection has not been filed” by plaintiff. 

¶ 7 On December 2, 2022, plaintiff filed more preprinted court forms. Among these was a 

motion form wherein she stated only that she was seeking a “new date & time” for a “court 

date” she “missed due to unforeseen circumstances;” it is wholly unclear to what she is 

referring. In the Proof of Delivery section, she stated she was sending the motion to counsel 

for defendants; however, instead of doing so via email, she checked the box marked “mail or 

third-party carrier” under the instructions to do so only if a party does not have an email 

address;

1 she also failed to sign the bottom portion certifying that everything in the Proof of 

Delivery section was true and correct and she failed to provide her name, address, contact 

information or any attachment. In a second form, plaintiff filled in blanks stating that “The 

hearing for the Motion I filed is scheduled for: * * * 12/19/2022 at 11:00am.” (Emphasis in 

original.) In the Proof of Delivery section, she stated she was sending notice to counsel, but 

she did not check any of the boxes regarding method of delivery and, although she checked 

the last option stating she “completed an Additional Proof of Delivery form” (emphasis in 

original), she did not attach any documents. 

1 Counsel for defendants made clear at the outset of the litigation her email information and 

included it in all court documents; plaintiff utilized that email address in certain pleadings. Plaintiff never 

stated in any court document that she did not have access to email. In fact, the record demonstrates that 

she listed “internet” as an expense in her application for waiver of court fees, she wrote her email address 

on certain pleadings (but later crossed it out), and she used her email address in documents filed in the 

instant appeal.
No. 1-23-0735 

4 

¶ 8 The record next reveals that a hearing was held in the trial court on December 19, 2022, 

as plaintiff had requested. However, no corresponding transcript or bystander’s report is 

included here. The trial court’s written order states that counsel for defendants was present, 

but plaintiff was not, and the court struck plaintiff’s motion.

¶ 9 On December 20, 2022, plaintiff filed a series of motions and notices. One was a motion 

to “compel discovery;” she provided no other content or explanation. Despite knowing 

defendants were represented, plaintiff stated in the Proof of Delivery section that she was 

sending a copy of the motion to defendants via personal hand delivery. She accompanied 

this with a Notice of Court Date for Motion form, wherein she wrote that a hearing on her 

motion would take place on January 6, 2023. Again, she listed only defendants in the Proof 

of Delivery section. Another motion she filed was entitled “Vacate Judgment Awarded.” In 

the Proof of Delivery section, she again stated was sending the motion to defendants via 

personal hand delivery. 

¶ 10 Eventually, defendants filed a motion to debar plaintiff’s rejection of the arbitration 

award for lack of proper service. In her response, plaintiff admitted that when she filed her 

motions on December 20, 2022, she sent the notices to defendants rather than their counsel

despite knowing they were represented “because the defendant’s [sic] lawyer’s contact 

address was not handy then.” 

¶ 11 The trial court held a hearing on the parties’ open motions. There is no transcript or 

bystander’s report in the record. In its written order, dated April 4, 2023, the court 

acknowledged that both plaintiff and counsel for defendants were present. It then denied

plaintiff’s motion to vacate judgment award and granted defendants’ motion to debar. The 
No. 1-23-0735 

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court stated that plaintiff’s notice of rejection had not been served on counsel for defendants 

and that she had failed to file a certificate of service of the notice of rejection as required by 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule (Rule) 93(a). Accordingly, the court ordered that the judgment 

on award entered by the arbitrators in favor of defendants and against plaintiff “shall stand.” 

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, plaintiff seemingly, and solely, argues that the trial court erred in granting 

defendants’ motion to debar because she did her best and had no “purposeful improper 

intent” in failing to provide notice to their counsel of the various motions she filed during this 

litigation and in failing to abide by our supreme court rules. 

¶ 14 As a threshold matter, we note for the record that defendants filed in our Court a motion 

to strike plaintiff’s brief on appeal for violations of Rules 321, 341 and 342. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 

321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021); Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); Ill. S. Ct. R. 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 

2019). That motion was taken with the case, and we address it now.

¶ 15 It is indisputable that plaintiff’s brief, which can at best be described as cursory, fails to

comply with the supreme court rules governing appellate review. For example, Rule 

341(h)(6) states that the appellant’s statement of facts “shall contain the facts necessary to an

understanding of the case, stated accurately * * *, and with appropriate references to the 

record on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Similarly, Rule 341(h)(7) 

directs that the appellant’s arguments be supported by citation to relevant legal authority and 

by “the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1. 2020). 

Additionally, it is well established that a reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly 

defined with “cohesive arguments” presented and pertinent authority cited. Obert v. Saville, 
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253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993). “The failure to elaborate on an argument, cite persuasive 

authority, or present a well-reasoned argument violates Rule 341(h)(7) and results in waiver 

of that argument.” Sakellariadis v. Campbell, 391 Ill. App. 3d 795, 804 (2009). “The 

purpose of the rules is to require parties before a reviewing court to present clear and orderly 

arguments so that the court can properly ascertain and dispose of the issues involved.” Hall

v. Naper Gold Hospitality, LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7. 

¶ 16 In the instant cause, plaintiff’s brief fails to meet a great majority of the requirements 

mandated by these rules. For example, there is no Table of Contents or Points and 

Authorities section and no introductory paragraph regarding the Nature of the Case or 

Statement of Jurisdiction. While she provides a Statement of Facts section, there is not a 

single citation to the record on appeal. Indeed, plaintiff repeatedly includes “facts” she 

insists occurred and references items like photographs, legal communications with attorneys, 

and appearances before “the Judge” that we are wholly unable to locate, and thus verify, 

anywhere in the record before us. Further, she does not provide a standard of review and her

Argument section comprises less than a page; it is barely developed and does not contain any 

citation to legal authority. And, she fails to provide an Appendix or the contents required in 

one, such as the judgment appealed from, any pleadings, or her notice of appeal. 

¶ 17 Compliance with Rule 341 is not an inconsequential matter. Supreme court rules “ ‘ “are 

not aspirational. They are not suggestions. They have the force of law, and the presumption 

must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.” ’ ” Rodriguez v. Sheriff’s Merit 

Commission of Kane County, 218 Ill. 2d 342, 353 (2006) (quoting Roth v. Illinois Farmers 

Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d 490, 494 (2002) (quoting Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 
No. 1-23-0735 

7 

(1995))). Where an appellant’s brief fails to comply with the supreme court rules, this Court 

has the inherent authority to strike the brief and dismiss the appeal. See McCann v. Dart, 

2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12; see also Epstein v. Galuska, 362 Ill. App. 3d 36, 42 (2005); 

Coleman v. Windy City Balloon Port, Ltd., 160 Ill App. 3d 408, 419 (1987) (“without 

adequate support in the record, an allegation included in the statement of facts contained in 

an appellate brief lies outside the record [citation]; * * * [and] should be stricken and not 

considered on appeal”).

¶ 18 While we recognize that plaintiff here is proceeding pro se, we note that this status does 

not relive her of the obligation to comply with the Rules. To the contrary, our courts have 

repeatedly held that “a pro se litigant * * * is not entitled to more lenient treatment than 

attorneys.” Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 78. Thus, parties choosing to 

represent themselves without a lawyer must comply with the same rules and are held to the 

same standards as licensed attorneys. See Voris v. Voris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103814, ¶ 8 

(compliance with rules governing briefs on appeal is compulsory regardless of a party's 

status); Matlock v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 2019 IL App (1st) 180645, ¶ 

14, and Wing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11 (content and 

formatting rules are mandatory, pro se litigants are not absolved from these requirements); In

re Estate of Pellico, 394 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2009) (“pro se litigants are presumed to 

have full knowledge of applicable court rules and procedures and must comply with the same 

rules and procedures as would be required of litigants represented by attorneys”). It is a 

choice pro se litigants make to proceed on their own, and they are charged with the risks they 

assume by doing so, whatever they may be. See Matlock, 2019 IL App (1st) 180645, ¶ 14, 
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and Wing, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11 (a reviewing court may choose to dismiss an 

appeal upon the failure to abide by rules regarding briefs on appeal); Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 

141291, ¶ 12; see also Marriage of Petrik, 2012 IL App (2d) 110495, ¶ 38 (reviewing court 

has every right to strike an appellant’s brief and dismiss her cause when her rule violations 

impede review).

¶ 19 Accordingly, we grant defendants’ motion taken with this case and, in our discretion, we 

strike plaintiff’s brief and dismiss this appeal. See Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12; 

accord Matlock, 2019 IL App (1st) 180645, ¶ 14, and Wing, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11. 

¶ 20 That said, we observe that even if we were inclined to consider the appeal on the merits, 

defects in the record preclude us from doing so. See In re Estate of Jackson, 354 Ill. App. 3d 

616, 62-21 (2004). Plaintiff’s pro se brief alleges that the trial court erred in entering the 

final order in this cause, namely, in granting defendants’ motion to debar and denying her 

motion to vacate judgment award. She asserts, without more, that the court “reversibly 

erred” in doing so because “the facts at hand did not support” its decision. Fatal to plaintiff’s 

contentions, however, is the fact that the record on appeal is devoid of any information from 

which we could determine whether the arguments in her pro se brief have any merit. 

¶ 21 Specifically, from what we can glean within the sparse record that is presented, there 

were at least two hearings conducted by the trial court. One took place on December 19, 

2022, as requested by plaintiff herself. It is wholly unclear what prompted that hearing; all 

that is clear is that plaintiff did not attend and the trial court struck whatever motion she had 

filed to obtain that court date. The second hearing (we do not know for certain its date) 

resulted in the trial court’s April 4, 2023 written order. This order confirmed the parties were 
No. 1-23-0735 

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present, and it denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate judgment award and granted defendants’ 

motion to debar, declaring that the judgment on award entered by the arbitrators in favor of 

defendants and against plaintiff “shall stand.”

¶ 22 Clearly, the record on appeal does not contain any report of the proceedings below, nor 

any acceptable substitute such as a bystanders’ report, or an agreed statement of facts, as 

authorized under Rule 323 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 323 (eff. Dec. 13, 2005)). Without such a report of 

the proceedings, we have no basis of knowing what evidence, testimony, or arguments were 

presented at these hearings, on what basis the trial court entered the order granting 

defendants’ motion to debar, and whether such judgment was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. Similarly, we have no way of knowing what testimony plaintiff presented in 

support of her motion to vacate judgment award, and whether she offered any evidence of her

reasonable efforts or “best intentions” to abide by court rules in pursuing this appeal, which 

seem to be the crux of her argument before us. As such, we can only speculate as to the trial 

court’s reasons for denying her motion. 

¶ 23 Plaintiff, as the appellant here, had the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete 

record of the proceedings below to facilitate meaningful review of her claims. See In re 

Alexander R., 377 Ill. App. 3d 553, 557 (2007); see also Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc.,

217 Ill. 2d 144, 156 (2005); Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001); Foutch v. 

O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). “[A] reviewing court is not simply a depository into 

which a party may dump the burden of argument and research.” People ex rel. Illinois

Department of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56; accord Petrik, 2012 

IL App (2d) 110495, ¶ 38 (citing Kic v. Bianucci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 23, and Thrall 
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Car Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719 (1986)). “Reviewing courts 

will not search the record for purposes of finding error * * * when an appellant has made no 

good-faith effort to comply with the supreme court rules governing the contents of briefs.” 

Estate of Parker, 2011 IL App (1st) 102871, ¶ 47; see also People v. Universal Public 

Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 073303–B, ¶ 50 (it is “neither the function nor the 

obligation of the Appellate Court to act as an advocate or search the record for error”). 

Without an adequate record preserving the claimed error, a reviewing court must presume the 

trial court’s order had a sufficient factual basis and that it conforms with the law. See

Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 157; Illinois Neurospine Institute, P.C. v. Carson, 2017 IL App (1st)

163386, ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Carter, 2015 IL 117709, ¶ 19); accord In re Marriage of 

Gulla, 234 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2009) (“we cannot review the circuit court’s finding * * * 

because there is no record to review the basis of the circuit court’s finding”).

¶ 24 Ultimately, then, even if we did not dismiss plaintiff’s appeal based on her violations of 

Rule 341, we would be unable to address her claims because they are not supported by the 

record on appeal. 

¶ 25 CONCLUSION

¶ 26 Accordingly, we exercise our discretion, grant defendants’ open motion which was taken 

with the case, strike plaintiff’s brief, and dismiss her appeal.

¶ 27 Appeal dismissed.