### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

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NO. 03-04-00379- CV

Edwar ds A quife r Aut hor it y; G r e go r y M . El lis , G e ne r al M ana ge r of t he Aut hor it y, in his offic ialc apa c it y; and C ar ol P at te r so n, M ic hae l Be ldo n, Le vi J ac kso n, R afae l Z e nde ja s, Susa n Hug he s, Do ug M ill e r , K e n Bar ne s, Bai le y Ba r to n, H unt e r Sc hue hle , Lua na Buckn er, Br uce G illeland , Rogelio Munoz, G eorge Rice, Johnny A. Rodriguez, Jr., and Cheryl Gilpin, in their off icial capacities, Appellants
v. Chem ical Lime , Ltd., App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COM AL COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. C2002- 0547 A, HO NORAB LE CHARLES R. RAMSAY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
We de ny appellants’ motion for rehe aring , withdraw our opinion and judgme nt dated J une 2, 2006, and substitute the following in its pl ace .

I n th e 1993 Edwa

rds Aquife r Authority

Act (EA A Act) , the leg islature esta blished
a new regulatory scheme to g overn use of g roundwater from the aquife r and a new ag ency , appellant Edwar ds Aquifer

Authority

(t h e Authority), to administer the re g ime. The leg islature g rante d a pref ere nce unde r the EAA Act’s permitting reg ime to exis ting use rs of a quifer w ater . To obtain the pref ere nce, the EAA Ac t provided that exis ting users had to file with the Authority a dec laration of2

historical use by Marc h 1, 1994—exactly six months after the EAA Ac t’s eff ective date. I nterve ning leg al developments barr ed implementation of the EAA Act until af ter the supreme cour t re

jected
c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e s to the EA A A c t and va c a te d a

n inj unc tio n a g a ins t it s e nf or c e me nt i n Barshop v. Me d

in a Co u n ty

U nderground W

ater Conservation District , 925 S.W .2d 618 (Tex. 1996). I n lieu of th e then-expi red 1994 statutory deadline, the Authority , relying on a n interpre tation of Barshop , set by

rule a deadline of

Dec ember

30, 1996—six months after the Barshop opinion was issued—for e x isting user s to file decla rations of historica l use. Appellee Chemical L ime, L td., whose Ne w B raunf

els plant h ad u s ed aquifer wate r since the ear ly 1900s, filed its declar ation on J anuar y 17, 1997. Over

three y ear s l at er , t h e Authority reje cted Chemica l L ime’s dec laration for being untimely

filed, there by

depriving Chemical L ime of pre fer ence as an e x isting user
. Chemical L ime soug ht a dec laration in dis trict co u rt that the Authority ’s filing deadline r ule was not authorized by the EAA Act and Barshop , and, in the alter native, that Chemica l L ime had substantially

complied with the filing require ments. The district cour t rende red judg ment inv a lid a tin g the ru le and

de c lare d b oth

that Ch e mic a l L ime ’s de c laratio n ha d be e n time ly fi le d a s a matter of la

w and that Chemical L ime had substantially complied with the filing require ments even if the Authority ’s d ea d l i n e was proper . I t also awa rded Chemica l L ime attorney ’s fe es. The Autho ri ty a pp e a ls this jud g me nt. C o n s t ru i n g Barshop in light of the standa rds g overningwhen a

ppellate c ourt judgme nts rever sing lowe r cour t judgments take eff

ect, we af

fi rm the district court’ s judgme nt invalidating the Authority ’s filingdeadline a nd decla ring Chemical L ime ’s historical use de clar ation to be timely

filed. As this g round alone supports the d i s t ri ct court’s judgme nt, we do not re achThe “ chemica l” re fer ence in the company ’s name r efle cts the g rade of lime it pr oduces, not 1 its use or cre ation of che micals. I t makes lim e b y q u ar ry ing limestone, c rushing it, and applying heat, using only limestone, a heat source , and water in this proce ss. The he at comes f rom a mix ture of c oa l and pe tr ole um c oa l, a

ug me nte d b y

natur a l g a s. 3 Chemical L ime’s issues conc erningthe district court’s a lternative substantial c omplian ce gr ound. We also aff

irm the district court’s a

war d of attorne y ’s fe es to Chemical L ime.
BACK GR OUND As its n am e s u ggest s, Chemical L ime produce s lime, a product use d in road construction, stee l manufac ture, water tre atment, and the r emoval of sulfur co m p ounds from emissions fr om c oal-fir ed plants. I n 1999, Chemical L ime boug ht A PG L ime, inclu d i n g a l i m e- 1 pr od uc tio n p lant i n N e w B ra un fe ls. Th is pl ant , in o pe ra tio n s inc e 19 07 , u se s w a te r f or lim e proce ssing, dust suppre ssion, the c ooling of equipment, drinking water , and sanitation. The plant’s sole wate r source i s well water from the Edwar ds Aquifer , an under g round sy stem of wate r-be aring formations that includes a ll o r p a r ts of Atasc osa, B exar, Caldwell, Comal, Guada lupe, Hay s, Medina, and Uva lde counties. See B arshop , 925 S.W .2d at 624-25.

The Edwar ds Aquifer Authority is a conser vation and re clamation district cr eate d by the leg islature in 1993 and e mpowere d to regulate g roundwater withdra wals by we l l from the aquife r. See Act of May 30, 1993, 73d L eg ., R.S., ch. 626, §§ 1.02, 1.14, 1.41, 1993 Tex. Gen. L aws 23 50 , 2 35 0- 23 72 (E AAAc t) ; see Tex. Cons t. ar t. XVI , § 59(a) . Be cause this appeal c oncer ns pr oc e dura l r e qu ir e me nts re la tin g to t he Autho ri ty ’s regul ati on of the a qu if e r, it i s h e lpf

ul f ir st t o
e xami ne the se re qu ir e me nts —a nd vario us le g a l de ve lop me nts tha t ul tim a te ly

de lay e d th e ir imp le me ntatio n— in o rd e r t o p la c e the Autho ri ty ’s a pp e llate iss ue s in

c on te xt.Wells producing no mor e than 25,000 g allons per day for domestic or livestock purpose s 2 wer e exempted from the c aps and the permit sy stem. See Act of Ma y 30, 1993, 73d L eg ., R.S., ch. 626, §§ 1.16(c) , 1.33, 1993 Tex. Gen. L aws 2350, 2361, 2366 (E AA Ac t).
4 The Ed wards Aquif

er A uthority Act Am o n g other limitations, the EAA Act imposed aquif er- wide limits on water wi thd ra wa ls b y no n- e xemp t w e lls and

e mpo we re d th e Autho ri ty to a llo c a te the caps a

mon g we lls throug h a per

mit sy stem. EAA Ac t § 1.14(b), (c) . The leg islature g ave “ exis ting use rs” pr efe renc e

2 under the permit sy stem. Se e id . § 1.16. “Exist ing use rs” we re de fined a s persons who withdrew and benef icially used underg round water from the aquife r on or be fore J une 1, 1993. Id
. § 1.03(10). “An e x isting user

may apply for an initial regular pe rmit by filing a decla ration of historica l use of underg round water withdra wn from the a quifer dur ing the histo ri cal pe riod from June 1, 1972, throug h M ay 3 1 , 1 9 9 3
. ” Id . § 1.16(a) . The Authority was a uthorized init ially

to gr ant re g ular permits solely

to exi sting user s who proper ly filed a de clar ation of historical use a nd who established “by convincingevidenc e bene ficial use of und er gro und water

from the a quifer.” Id
. § 1.16(d). Ex isting user s were entitled to an amount of water equal to the ir maxi mum be nefic ial use of water during any

one ca lendar

y ear of the historical period unless the total a mount of such maxim ums by all exis ting use rs in the aquife r excee ded 450,00 0 acr e-f eet pe r y ear

throug h the y ear

2007 and 400,000 acr e-f

eet pe r y ear

there afte r. Id
. § § 1
. 1 4 (b ), (c ), 1
. 1 6 (e ). I f t o t al m ax i m u m h i s t o ri ca l u s age exceede d this level, the leg islature required the Authority to reduc e propor

tionately the amounts of withdrawa ls under the pe rmits as nece ssary to meet the ca

p. Id . § 1.16(e)
. Conversely , to the extent that unallocate d water

within the cap r emained afte r the issuance of permits to exi sting user s who5

proper ly applied, the Authority was authorized to issue additional regular pe rmits, subject to the cap. Id
. § 1.18(a)
. As orig inally enac ted, the EAA Act required ex isting users to file their “de clar ation of historical use” on or bef ore Ma rch 1, 1994. Id
. § 1.16(b). This date was e x actly six months after the orig inal eff

ective date of the EAA Act, September 1, 1993. Se e id
. § 4 .0 2. Un til the Autho ri ty actua lly beg an g ranting regular permits, exis ting users could continue to beneficia lly withdraw a

nd benef icially use water, provide d it was not wasted. Id
. § 1.17.
The Barsh op litigation an d other delays

The EAAAct also provide d that the Authority ’s b o ar d of direc tors would be appointed by

various g overningbodies aff ecte d by the Authority
. Id . § 1.09. This appointment proce dure w as re quired to be submitt ed to the United States De partment of Justice for a dminist rative prec lear ance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West 2003). The Depa rtment ref used prec lear ance on the basis that the EAA A ct contemplate d appointive rather than elec tive selec tion of t he Authority ’s boar d. This made the a ppointment provision unenforce able. Se e id
. T h e le g islature did no t att e mp t t o r e me dy th e E A A A c t’ s s e c ti o n5 p r o b le m u n ti l i ts n e xt
re g ula r s e ssi on in 1 99 5. Thus , th e EA A A c t’ s o ri g ina l Se pte mbe r 1 , 1 99 3 effect iv e date a nd its M ar ch 1 , 1 9 9 4 d ea d l i n e fo r ex i s t i n g u s er s t o fi l e d ec l ar at i o n s o f h i s t o ri ca l u s e b o t h p as s edd u ri n g a period in which the EAA Ac t was made unenfor cea ble by fede ral law
. I n 1 9 95, the leg islature ame nded the EA A Act to cha ng e the boa

rd’s sele ction method from appointment to elec tion. Ac t of May 29, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 261, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen.We w i l l h er ea ft er refe r to both the EAA Ac t and the ame ndments to the EAA Ac t 3 c oll e c tiv e ly

a s th e EA A A c t e xce pt w he re ne c e ssa ry to d ist inguis h s pe c if

ic a me ndme nts
. 6 L aws 25 05 , 2 50 5- 17 (a me ndme nts to t

he EA A A c t)
. Th e legi sl a tur e pr ov ide d th a t th e se 3 amendmen t s wo u ld take ef fec t on Aug ust 28, 1995, and the De partment of Justice prec lear ed the amende d EAA. Id . at 25 17 ; Barshop , 925 S.W .2d at 625. Howe ver, the leg islature did not amend the EA A A c t’ s o ri g ina l Ma rc h 1 , 1 9 9 4 h i s t o ri c a l us e de c lara tio ns fi lin g de a dli ne or

oth e rw ise a dd

re ss how this ex pired de adline wa s to be adjusted.

Six day s befor e the amendments to t h e E AA Ac t were to take e ffe ct, a loca l underg round water c onservation dist rict, later joined by other local water districts a nd ag ricultural int e re sts , b ro ug ht a de c larator y jud g me nt a c tio n c ha lle ng ingthe c on sti tut ion a lity of the EA A A c t in the district court of Medina County . The plaintiffs obtaine d a tempora ry restra ining or der a

nd then a tempora ry injunction barringthe Act’ s administration and enfor ceme nt, speci fica lly prohibiting the promulg ation of any

new r ules, setting o f fees, re ceipt of a ny decla rations or a

pplications for permits, and “in a

ny way car rying out the d u t i es, rig hts, obligations or func tions described in [the Act].” The effe ctive date of the EAAAct, as a mended, pa ssed while this injunctive relief rema ined in effe ct. The district c ourt ultimately rende red judg ment decla ring the EAA A ct unconstitutional and per manently enjoining the State from implementing and enf orcingit. Barshop , 925 S.W .2d at 625. The district cour t’s judgme nt was appeale d direc tly to the Texas Supreme Court. The defe ndants soug ht, but were denied supe rsede as. On June 28, 1996, the supreme c ourt rende red jud g me nt r e ve rs ingthe dis tr ict cou rt ’s ju dg me nt, de c lari ngthat th e EA A A c t w a s c on sti tut ion a l,I n our initial opinion, we stated t hat t he supre me cour t issued its m andate on Aug ust 31, 4 1996. We relied on a

n asser tion in the Authority ’s comments to its proposed rules g overning de c laratio ns of

his tor ic a l us e , d isc us se d b e low . T he pr e c ise date of th e mand a te wa s ir re le va nt t o our analy sis beca

use we held that the EAAAct bec ame e nforc eable when the supr eme c ourt rende red judgme nt in Barshop
. B e c a us e the pr e c ise date of

the mand a te is s ig nif

ic ant t o o ur

c ur re nt a na ly sis , we have ve ri fi e d th e c or

re c t date wi th t

he su pr e me c ourt
. 7 dissolving the district cour t’s injunction, and rem an d i ng the ca use to the district court f or consideration of whether

attorney ’s fe es should be aw arde d to either pa rty
. Id . at 637-38. The supre me cour

t in Barshop reje cted the pla intiffs’ ar g ument that the EAA A ct
e ff e c te d a n unc on sti tut ion a l ta

kin g of e xistin g us e rs ’ p ro pe rt

y ri g hts by imp os inga

the n- imp os sib le Marc h 1, 1994 deadline to f ile the historical use de clar ation. Id
. at 628. Eschew in g a l iteral interpre tation of the dea dline provision, the supreme c ourt construe d it as merely “dire ctory” rather than “mandatory .” Id . at 628-30. The statutory deadline, in other

words, mer ely

manifested the broade r leg islative intent “that dec l ar at i o n s o f historical use [are ] t o be filed six mont hs after the Authorit y become s eff

ective.” Id . at 63 0. Th e c ourt e xpla ine d th a t th e le g isl a tur e “ ob vio us ly intended that existi ng users would have pref ere nce ove r future users” and thus “provide d exis ting users the opportunity to file t heir declarations with the Authorit y afte r t he effec tive date of the Act but before allocation of w ater to other potential user s.” Id . at 629. Havingconstrued the statutory deadline to pr ovide exist ing use rs an opportunity to file historical use de clar ations, the supreme court held that the EAAAct did not eff ect a taking
. Id . at 630. Th e su pr e me c ourt de nie d re he ari ng of its jud g me nt on Au g us t 16 , 1 99 6. I ts m a nd a te did not issue until Fe bruar y 10, 1997. 4“A de clar ation is an application for initial reg ular p er m i t, and is to be filed with the 5 A u th o r it y in a c c o r d an c e w it

h th is c h a p te r . ” 2 1 T e x. Re g . 1 1 3 7 7 , 1 1 3 8 3 ( 1 9 9 6 ) ( c o d if ie d a t 3 1 T e x. Admin. Code § 701.12) (a dopted Nov. 22, 1996). 8 Response to Barsh op

I n the aftermath of the Barshop opinion a nd judgme nt, but befor e the supreme court’s
mand a te iss ue d, the Autho ri ty purp or te d to be g in its op e ra

tio ns and pr omu lg a te d ru le s se tti ngfo rt h the proc edure s g overningthe filing of dec larations of historical use. See 2 1 T e x. Re g . 1 1 377, 5 11377-84 (1996) (codifie d at 31 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 701.1-.5, .11-.13, .15-.19, .21- .22) (a dopted Nov. 22, 1996). The Authority published proposed rules on September 3, 1996, id . at 13784, and final rules on O ctober

31, 1996, with an effec tive date of November 21, 1996. Id . T he pr op os e d r ule set a de adline of D ece mber 28, 1996, a Saturday , for e x isting user s to file their dec larat i o ns of historical use. Id . at 11382. The Authority chose that date base d on its int erpr etation of Barshop
. Id . at 1137 8. I t un de rs too d th e su pr e me c ourt

to h old tha t th e de a dli ne fo r e xistin g us e rs to f ile de c laratio ns of

his tor ic a l us e wo uld

be six mo nth s a ft e r t

he date the EA A A c t ha d b e c ome “ fu lly eff ective.” Id
. The Authority posited that the EAA A ct had be come e ffe ctive on June 28, 1996, the same date the supre me cour t issued the Barshop opinion and judgme nt. I t rea soned that the implementation of the ame nded EAAAct had be en suspende d by a dis trict court injunction but that the “injunction was dissolved by the Texas Supreme Court on June 28, 1996, and the Ac t thereby beca me ef fec tive on that date.” Id
. I n r e sp on se to c omm e nts , th e Autho ri ty mov e d th e de a dli ne to D e c e mbe r 3 0, the fi rs t Monday following the 28th, to addre ss conce rns t hat i ts office s otherwise w ould have be en close d on the Saturday

deadline. Id
. at 1138 1. F or e sh a do wi ngthe iss ue s in thi s a pp e a l, t he Autho ri tyFor merly , the Texas Water B oard a nd curr ently

the Texas Commi ssion on Environmental 6 Q u a l i t y. 9 reje cted a rg uments that the dea dline should be based not on the date the Barshop opinion was issued bu t on su bs e qu e nt e ve nts in t

he a pp e a l:
A c omm e ntator

c on te nd e d th a t th e fi lin g date sh ou ld be F e br ua ry 28 , 1 99 7, wh ic h is six months after the date the Texas Supreme Court issued its mandate on August 31, 1996 in Barshop
. . . sending the case back to the trial court. The filing date state d in the rule is Dec ember 3 0 , 1 9 9 6 , six months after the Texas Supreme Court dissolved the trial court injunction that had blocked the Act from taking eff ect. The staff a dhere s to the Dec ember date, be cause the Act became fully eff ective on J une 28, 1996, when the injunction wa s dissolved. The dissoluti on of the injunction was immediately

eff ective, a nd was not dela

y ed b y s u b s equent pr ocedur al steps in the Sup re me Court
. Th e sta ff re c omm e nd s a g a ins t a do pti ngthe F e br ua ry date be c a us e it is in c o n s is te n t w it

h th e L e g is latu

r e ’ s in te n t to r e qu ir e f

il in g o f d e c la

r a ti o n s of historical use six m onths after the actua l e ffe ctive date of the Act. Adopting the later date wo uld

a lso e xpos e tho se a

pp lic ants wh o wo uld fi le a ft e r De c e mbe r 3 0, 19 96 , to l i t i g a t i o na t t a c k i n g t h e f

i l i n g s a s u n t i m e l y.
Id
. Chem ical Lime fi les its perm it appl ication

Fr om at least 1992, the New Br aunfe ls plant now owned by Chemical L ime had bee n repor ting its monthl y wa t er usag e to the Te x as Natural Resourc e Conservation Com mission (TNRCC). I n November 1996, J ohn Kre t, the plant manag er, r ece ived by mail an “Application for 6 I nitial Regula

r Permit and Dec laration of Historical Use” from the Author ity . Kre t ga ve the f orm to J im J ohnson, the plant manag er, to c omplete and f ile with the Authority . Be cause J ohnson tho ug ht t hat th e inf or ma tio n r e qu e ste d w a s si mil ar t o th e inf or ma tio n Che mic a l L ime ha d p re vio us ly been r equire d to file with the TNRCC, which was also due at the end of the y ear , J ohnson decide dJohn so n c ou ld n ot re me mbe r Kip p’ s nam e . Kr e t re po rt e d th a t John so n to ld h im h e r n a me 7 at the time. Kipp, an Authority employ ee, testified that she did not remembe r this conver sation but she also could not deny

that it could have ha

ppened. Rick I llgne r, at the time ac ting g ener al manag er of the Authority , and Steven Walthour, a 8 supe r v i s o r y g e o l o g i s tw i t h t h e A u t h o r i t y , a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a ta p p l i c an t s c o u l d

s u p p l e m e n tt he ir applications af

ter De cembe r 30. Walthour testified t h at t h e reason the Author ity would allow su pp le me nts to a

pp lic a tio ns wa s th a t it

re c og nize d th a t th e re wa s a sh or t pe ri od of tim e fo r p e op le to g ather the nec essar

y information. They

both testified that the Authority would not consider ne w applications filed a fter D ece mber 30. 10 to fill out bot h form s at the same time. Only later did Johnson di scer n that the Authority

was reque sting twe nty -one y ear s o f b ack data; the TNRCC require d only one y ear of data . J ohnson te sti fi e d th a t, i n mi d- De c e mbe r 1 99 6, he c a lle d the Autho ri ty to inq uir e if the y ne e de d “ g oo d” data or if he c ould provide estimates. He co u l d n o t re m ember the name of

the per son with whom he spoke, but he c laimed that he identified himself to a n Authority employ ee, who informed him that the Authority

neede d actua l data fr om all y ear s in the twenty -one y ear period, not estimates. J ohnson then attempted to re cover the data r equeste d but was unable to find all the
rec ords for the y ear s reque sted. Sometime be tween Dec ember 25 and De cembe r 30, he a g ain ca lled the Autho ri ty . H e te sti fi e d th a t he sp ok e wi th G ay le Ki pp and tol d h e r t hat he wo uld

no t be a ble to 7
su bmi t a c omp le te a

pp lic a tio n by

De c e mbe r 3 0 unle ss h e wa s a ble to s up ply

e sti ma te d d a ta

fo r s ome y ear s. He testified that Kipp told hi m to “g et it in when y ou g et it—when y ou g et that data on it.” Acc ording to Kipp’s testimony , Authority staff ha d instead bee n instructed that the a pplications could be submitted without complete water use data and that data could be filed afte r the dea dline. 8 J ohnson filed the application with the Authority on J anuar y 17, 1997. I t was incomplete be cause he
wa s n ot a ble to f ind data fo r a ll o f t

he re qu e ste d y e ars .Th e Autho ri ty a ttr ibute s it s su dd e n revers al to its d isc ov e ry , in 20 00 , o f a

n e rr or in i ts 9 “coding ” of Chemica l L ime’s application in its database
. Be cause of this error , the application was no t c od e d a s havin g be e n fi le d a ft e r the De c e mbe r 3 0, 19 96 de a dli ne , a nd thu s e sc a pe d n oti c e . T his err or wa s not discovere d until 2000.
11

I n Fe bruar

y 1997, the Authority

sent Chemical L ime a letter “ac knowledg [i ng ] t he
rec eipt o f y o u r application for initial reg ular pe rmit.” I t also stated that Chemical L ime’s “applica tion is admini stratively

complete dur ing the initial adminis trativ e re v i ew proce ss.” The Authority beg an proc essing applications sometime in Marc h. Kipp conducte d a fie ld inspection of the Ne w B ra

un fe ls f a c ili ty in Jun e . In D e c e mbe r, the Autho ri ty a dv ise d Ch e mic a l L ime that it

“ pr e lim ina

ri ly fo un d th a t y our a

pp lic a tio n p ro vid e s su ff

ic ie nt c on vin c inge videnc e to s ub sta nti a te y our dec laration of historical use.” It determined a n amount of Chemical L ime’s “maximum benef icial use of water without waste” and st ated that Authority staff “will be recommending that y ou rec eive a permit acc ording to your application.” I n April 1998, the Authority notified Chemical L ime that “ the te c hn ic a l re vie w of the a pp lic a tio n wa s c omp le te d on 3/2 1/9 8, ” and , o n Apr il 2 4, it iss ue d Ch e mic a l L ime an “ I nit ia l Re g ula r P e rm it” to wit

hd ra w wate r fr om t

he Aq uif e r, “ su bje c t to final ac t i o n o f t h e Bo ard of Direc tors of the Authority .” Thus, Chemica l L ime was still not y et
e nti tle d to be g in w ith dr awi ngwate r u nd e r a pe rm it. At

the Autho ri ty ’s re qu e st, Che mic a l L ime provided fur

ther infor mation in support of its application in May 2000. I n November

2000, the Authority

reje cted Chemica l L ime’s application, f inding that its de c laratio n o f h ist or ic a l us e wa s n ot fi led timel y (b e fo re De c e mbe r 3 0, 19 96 ) and that it s 9 historical withdraw als wer e not place d to a bene ficial use f or i rrig ation, municipal, or industrial use. Chemical L ime then filed its notice of pr otest in Dece mber. Seve ral Chemical L ime employ ees me tSee B arshop v. Medina County Under g round Water Conser vation Dist., 925 S.W .2d 618, 10 632-33 (Te x . 1996). 12 with Walthour in J anuar

y 2001 to disc uss the reje ction of the application. W althour told them that they wou l d n ee d to schedule a n “informa l meeting ,” which w as later set for O ctober

2001. The Authority also sent Chemical L ime a letter in May , scheduling an “informal meeting ” in Octobe r as

“ an o pp or tun ity to pr ov ide e vid e nc e to s up po rt the ir pr ote st. ” Th e Autho ri ty sta ff a tto rn e y wi th whom they

met in October s t ated that he did not have author ity to make dec isions concer ning applications, and so a

nother mee ting wa s scheduled with G reg ory Ellis, the Gene ral Mana g er of the Authority , for late r in the month. At that meeting , Ellis requested more infor mation in support of C h e m i c a l Li m e ’ s a

p p l i c a t i o n , w h i c h C h e m i c a l Li m e f i l e d w i t h t h e A u t h o r i t y i n D e c e mb e r 2 0 0 1
. In May 20 02 , E lli s r e

je c te d Ch e mic a l L ime ’s re qu e sts
.
P roce edings b elow

Chemica l L im e f

il e d s u it in d is tr ict court see king de clar ations that: (1) the Authority ’s rule establishing a Dec ember 30, 1996 filing deadline was invalid a nd that Chemical L ime’s initial regular pe rmit application was f iled timely

on J anuar y 17, 1997; (2) the EAA Ac t—specifica lly , the leg islature’s r epea l of section 1.11(h) of the EAAAct, which ha d made the E AA s u bject to the Administrative Procedur e Ac t—violated constitutional protections of due course of law, sepa ration of powe rs, open courts and jury trial beca use it a ffor ded inadequate judicial revie w of the Authority ’s de te rm inatio ns ; (3 ) the EA A’ s “ un lawf ul a c tio ns ” e ff

e c te d an un c on sti tut ion a l takin g ; and (4 ) i n 10 the alter native, assuming that t he EAA ’s Dec ember 30, 1996 filing de adline wa s valid, Chemical L ime had substantially

complied with it. See T ex . C iv. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.01113

(We st 1 99 7 & Sup p. 20 04 -0 5)
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt se ve re d th e takin g s c la im. Th e de a dli ne va lid ity issue and re maining c onstitut ional claims wer e tried to the district c ourt on sti p u l at ed facts. The substantial-compliance issue was tried to a jury , which found in Chemical L ime’s favor. The district court re ndere d judgme nt that the Authority ’s Dec ember 30, 1996 deadline w as invalid and Chemica l L ime’s I RP application wa s t i mely filed. I t held in the alternative that Chemical L ime had substantially

complied with the application requi re m en t s and that “the Authority ’s denial of Chemical L i m e’ s I R P ap p lication on the g rounds that it was not timely is invalid, im proper , and illega l.” Howe ver, the district court re ndere d judg me nt t h at the leg islature’s r epea l of section 1.11(h) did no t vi olate the c on sti tut ion a l pr ote c tio ns of du e c ours e of

law, se pa ra tio n o f p ow e rs , o pe n c ourt s, and jury trial. Finally , the district c ourt awa rded Chemical L ime attorney ’s fe es and c osts, and later made f indings of f

act a n d co nclusions of law re g ardingthis portion of the judgme nt. This appeal followed.
DI SCU SSIO N

The Authority

prese nts four issues on appe al. I t first contends that the district c ourt
err ed in invalidating the Authority ’s rule se tting a D ece mber 30, 1996 de adline for filing de clar ations of historical use. It urg es that the e ffe ctive date of the EAA Act was J une 28, 1996, the date of the Barshop jud g me nt, and

that Barshop and the leg islative intent underlying the EAA Ac t compelled the ag ency to set its deadline, Dece mber 30, the f irst business day

following six months after June 28 . T he Autho ri ty

ne xt ch a lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a lte rn a tiv e ho ldi ngth a t Ch e mic a l L ime substantially

c o mp li e d w it h a D e c e mb e r

3 0 d e a d li n e . I nit s s e c o n d is s u e , th e A u th o r it

y c o n te n ds that, as a matter of law , a party cannot be in “substantial complianc e” w ith a filing de adline whe nI n its briefing , the Authority contende d that its c hoice of the Dec ember 30, 1996 deadline 11 is e n t i t l ed to defere nce. It abandone d this posit ion at oral a rg ument, howeve r, conc eding that our sta nd ard of re vie w r e g ard ingthi s is su e is de novo
. 14 there is no dispu t e t h at the par ty failed to file a

ny portion of the filing until after that de adline. Predicated on this arg ument, the Authority asser ts in it s third issue that there i s n o ev i d en ce that Chemical L ime substantially complied with the Dec ember 30, 1996 deadline. I n its fourth issue, t h e Aut hority prese nts two arg uments challeng ing the district court’s a war d of attorne y ’s fe es. I t beg ins with the assertion t hat Chemical L ime cannot r ecove r attorney ’s fe es under

the UDJA beca

use the water code pr ovides Chemical L ime with its ex clusive
reme dies and doe s not provide for a ttorney ’s fe es. See Te x. Wat e r Cod e Ann. §§ 36 .2 51 -. 25 4 ( Wes t 20 00 ); Ha

ge ma n v . Lu th , 150 S.W .3d 61 7 , 6 2 7 (T ex . App.—Austin 2004, no pet.); Strayhorn v. Raytheon E- Sys., Inc

. , 1 01 S.W. 3d 55 8, 57 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 03, pet . de nie d) ; Y

oung Chevrolet v. Tex as Motor Vehicle B d. , 974 S.W .2d 906, 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied)
. Second, the Author ity

asser ts that, if it prevails on the merits of its first three issues, an award of attorney ’s fe es to the Authority is mandatory
. See Tex. Water Code Ann. § 36.066(g ) (West Supp. 2005).
Barsh op and t he de adl ine for filing a de c lar at ion of his to r ic al u se

I n it s f ir st i ssu e , th e Autho ri ty

a sse rt s th a t it s D ecem ber 30 , 1 99 6 h ist or ic a l us e decla ration filing deadline is a uthorized under the EA A Ac t , as co nstrued in Barshop . This issue prese nts pure questions of law , which we revie w de novo
. See I n re Entergy

Corp. , 142 S.W .3d 11 316, 322 (Tex. 2004); In re Hum phreys , 880 S.W .2d 402, 404 (Tex. 1994).Both pa rties (a nd even the supreme c ourt in Barshop ) refer intercha ng eably to the EAA’s 12
“ e ff e c tiv e date ” and the date the Ac t be c a me e nf or c e a ble , p e rh a ps imp lyingthat th e e ff

e c tiv e date was postponed by

the sec tion 5 precle ara

nce pr oblems and the Barshop in j u n ct i o n . T hat did not oc c u r i n a l i t e r a l s e n s e . T h e E A A A c t t o o k e f f e c t o n t h e d a t e t h e l e g i s l a tu r e s p e c i f i e d

— on ly its implementation and enforce ment wer e delay ed by intervening leg al developments. Specifica lly , the EAA Ac t orig inally

took effe ct in 1993, but its i mplementation and enf orce ment wer e bar red by section 5 of the V oting Rig hts Act. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 19 7 3 c (W es t 2 0 0 3 ). Subsequently , the leg islature ame nded the EA A Act to addr ess the pre clea ranc e issues and ma de this new version eff ective on Aug ust 28, 1995. Act of May 29, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 261, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. L aws 2505, 2517. Prior to that date , the Barshop district court tempora rily restra ined and e njoined the implementation and enf orce ment of the amended EAAAct. The amende d EAA Ac t took effe ct while this injunction remained in eff ect. The district court later rende red judg ment decla

ring the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its implementation and enforce ment. See B arshop , 925 S.W .2d at 625. The district c ourt denied supe rsede as and this judg ment rema ined in eff ect while the d i re ct ap p ea l wa s p en d i n g.

The sec tion 5 delay s and the district cour t’s injunctive relief did not chang e the date the leg islature spec ified for

the EAA Act to take e ffe ct, but mere ly barr ed the Ac t’s enfor ceme nt once it took effec t. See Tex as Highway Comm’n v. W est Tex. Dril ling, Inc. , 3 6 6 S. W. 2 d 2 4 2 , 2 4 4 ( T e x. Civ . App .—

Au sti n 1 96 3, wr it re f’ d n .r .e .) (i nju nc tio n p re ve nts e nf

or c e me nt o f s ta tut e ); see also T e x. Const. art. I , § 28 (suspension of l aw only within power of le g islature); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c. Simi larly , the district court’s f inal judgme nt declar ing the EAA Act unconstitutional did not impact the Ac t’ s e ff

e c tiv e date , but ins te a d pla c e d outs ide the po we rs of g ov e rnme nt ( i.e. , rende red void) its e nf or c e me nt. Te x. Cons t. art . I , § 29 ; City of Beaumont v. Bouillion , 896 S.W .2d 143, 148-49 (Tex. 1995).

Considering this contex t, we believe that the supreme court in Barshop us e d su c h te rm s as “e ffe ctive date ” and “ date the Authority become s eff

ective” not in their l i t er al s ense but a s shorthand re fer ence s to the date on whic h the leg al impediments to the EAA Ac t’s implementation and enf orce ment wer e fina lly

remove d. We construe the pa rties’ a rg uments acc ording ly
. 15 Th e Au tho ri ty ’s a rgum ent res ts up on tw o s ub si di ary pro po si ti on s. First , th e Au tho ri ty int e rp re ts Barshop to hold that the historical use de clar ation filing de adline is six months after the EA A Act be c a me e nf

or c e a ble
. Se c on d, the Autho ri ty c on te nd s th a t th e EA A A c t be c a me 12
e nf or c e a ble on June 28 , 199 6, a t the mom e nt wh e n th e su pr e me c ourt

iss ue d it s Barshop opinion and judgme nt. There fore , the Authority conclude s, its rule setti n g a fi l i n g deadline of Dec ember

30,The pa rt i es do not dispute that the code c onstruction act’ s method of counting months 13 g overns he re. See Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 311.014(c) (West 2005). Unde r t h i s m ethod, if the number of months is to be computed by counting the number of

mont h s from a spe cific da y , the period ends on the same numerica l da y in the concludingmonth as the day of the month from whic h the computation beg an. Id . Also, if the last day of a pe riod end s o n a Saturda y , Sunday , or leg al holiday , the per iod is ex tended to the next day that is not a Saturday , Sunday , or leg al holiday
. Id
. § 311.014(b). Her e, beca use the six -month period expired on Dec ember 28, 1996, a Saturda

y , the Authority extended the dea dline to the following Monday , Dec ember 30. 16 19 96 is w ith in i ts s ta tut or

y po we rs , and Che mic a l L ime ’s Janu ary 17 , 19 97 fi lin g is un tim e ly a s a 13 matter of la

w. Che mic a l L ime dis pu te s tha t the EA A Ac t took e ff e c t im me diate ly

up on the su pr e me court’s judg ment in Barshop . Ch e mic a l L ime argue d in its bri e f t hat th e EA A A c t di d n ot b e c ome eff ective until at lea st Aug ust 16, 1996, the date the supr eme court denied rehe aringin Barshop , be c a us e the c ourt ’s jud g me nt w a s n ot f ina l un til that date . D ur ingor a l argume nt, Che mic a l L ime sug g ested t

h a t the date the supr eme c ourt issued its mandate in Barshop —Fe bruar y 10, 1997—might also control. Six months after the se date s would have be en Feb ru ary 16, 1997, or August 10, respe ctively , making the Authority ’s rule inva lid.

Assuming that the E AA Ac t did become e nforc ea b l e o n J une 28, 1996, Chemica l L ime questions whether Barshop mandated a historical us e declaration filing dea dline of six months there afte r, sug g esting that the cor rec t deadline intende d by the leg islature and the Barshop court wa s six mo nth s a ft e r t

he Autho ri ty ha d impl e me nte d it s r ule s g ov e rn ing

the se fi lin g s and

the re by a c tua lly be c a me c a

pa ble of a c c e pti ngthe m. Whil e re qu ir ing e xistin g us e rs to f ile his tor ic a l us e de c laratio ns , the EAA A ct was silent conce rning the procedure s g overningthese filing s or what they must contain; rathe r, the leg islature mandated that the Authority would promulg ate f

orms detailing the information17

that wo u l d b e required a nd set any

filing f ees. EA A Act § 1.16( b). The Authority did not promulg ate proposed r

ules delineating these require ments until S eptember 3, 1996, and these rules did no t take e ff

e c t un til No ve mbe r 21 , 19 96
. I f the se date s we re wh e n the Auth ori ty “beca me eff ective” under Barshop , the Act’ s filing de adline would have been May 21, 1997, or Mar ch 3 at the ea rliest, and the Author ity ’s rule se tting an e arlier deadline w ould have be en invalid. We concl ude that the EA A Act did not “be come e ffe ctive,” a s the supreme court contemplated in Barshop , until the court’s mandate issued on Fe bruar y 10, 1997. I n our orig inal opinion, we conc luded that the EAAAct bec ame e nforc eable on J une 28 , 1 99 6, wh e n th e su

pr e me cou rt iss ue d it s Barshop opinion and judgme nt. We relied on authorities establishing that a par ty cannot e x ecute o r en force a lowe r cour t judgment a fter a

n
a pp e llate c ourt

re ve rses it , regard le ss o f w he the r t he a pp e llate c ourt ’s jud g me nt i s f ina l or its mandate ha s issued. Flanary v. W ade , 11 3 S .W
. 8, 10 (T e x. 19 08 ); Humble Ex ploration Co. v. W alker , 641 S.W .2d 941, 943 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1 9 8 2 , orig . proce eding ) (a ppellate c ourt order
vacating r ece ivership oper ated instantly ; theref ore, tria l court wa s without jurisdi ction to continue
re c e ive rs hip ); se e als o I

n r e Bo ha rt , 7 43 F .2 d 3 13 , 3 19 -2 1 ( 5th Cir . 1 98 4)
. Th e se a

uth or iti e s w ou ld be dispositive if, as we a ssumed in our orig i n al opinion, our sole conc ern w as whe n the Barshop district court’s injunction ce ased to be enfor cea ble by contempt. As Chemical L ime has convinc ed
u s o nr e h e ar in g , th e is s u e is mo r e c o mp le x.

The Barshop district court’s judg ment contained not only an injunction barr ing the EAA Ac t’s implementation and enf orce ment, but also a dec laration t h at t he EAAAct wa s unconstitutional. The district c ourt ref used superse deas and its judg ment rema ined in e ffe ct pending18

direc t appea l to the supreme c ourt. On J une 28, 1996, the supreme court rende red its opinion and jud g me nt r e ve rs ingthe dis tr ic t c ourt , d iss olv ingthe inj un c tio n, and de c lari ngthe c on sti tut ion a lity of the EA A A c t. F ro m th a t ti me fo rw ard , th e dis tr ic t c ourt c ou ld n ot e nf

orce it s in

junc tio n w ith contempt power , se e Flan ar y , 1 13 S.W. a t 10 ; Humble Exploration Co. , 6 41 S.W. 2d a t 94 3; In re Bo ha rt , 743 F.2d at 319-20, but this does not me an that the supre me cour t’s judgme nt declar ing the EAA Ac t constituti onal and r ever sing the district court’s contrar y decla ration also bec ame e ffe ctive at that time. The supre me court h as emphasiz ed the sig nificanc e of the mandate in de termining when an appellate court judgment bec omes enfor cea ble in a lower

court. The mandate is the f ormal command fr om an appe llate cour t commanding the lower

court to comply

with the appellate court’s judgme nt. See Tex. R. Ap p . P
. 5 1.1(b), 65.2; In re Gr os sn ic k le , 1 1 5 S. W. 3 d

2 3 8 , 2 4 3 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 03 , o ri g . p ro c e e din g ); Le we lli ng v . B os wor th , 8 4 0 S. W. 2 d 6 4 0 , 6 4 2

- 4 3 ( T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 199 2, or ig . p ro c e e din g ); Dixie Gas &Fuel Co. v. Jac obs , 6 6 S. W. 2 d 4 4 6 , 4 4 8 ( T e x. C i v . Ap p . — Be au m o n t1 9 3 3 , wr i td i s m ’dw. o . j
. ) ( ci t i n g B l a ck v. Epperson , 40 Tex. 162, 172-73 (T e x. 18 74 ))
. A na

p p e l l a t e c o u rtj u d g m e n ti s n o te n f o r c e a b l e i nt h e l o w e r

c o u rtb e f o r e m a n d a te issues. See I

n re Long , 9 84 S.W. 2d

62 3, 62 5- 26 (T e x. 19 99 ); se e als o Stacy Obenha us, It Ain’t Ove r

‘ T i l I t ’ s O v e r : T h e A p p e l l a t e M a n d a t e i n T e x a s C o u rts , 1 5 T he Appe llate Advoca te: State Ba

r of Texas Appellate Sec tion Report 4, 5-8 (2003). I n Long , f o r e xa mp le , th e d is tr ic t clerk ha d been enjoined by

the district court fr om collecting cer tain filing fee s and appea led that injunction. Long , 984 S.W .2d at 624. The dist rict court later found the clerk in contempt for violating the injunction and issued fine s, and the c lerk a ppeale d. Id
. The supreme court noted that the cler k’s orig inal noticeAs on e c omm e ntator pu t it : 14 I n c on sid e ri ngthe de lay that the app ell ate mand a te bu ild s in to t he a pp e llate proce ss, one might think in terms of the a rt of baking
. When one re moves a hot cake fre sh from the ove n, one has to let it cool a bit befor e cutting and f rosting it—else it may

be ruine d—and one ma

y even ne ed to re tu rn t hat cake to the o v e na f t e r p r o b i n g i t an d d e t e r

m i n i n g t h a ti t ’ s n o tqu i t e d o n e ye t
. B y a n a l o g y, the delay in the issuance of the m andate allows the parties to assess the c ourt’s wo rk pr od

uc t, to te st it, and

pe rh a ps e ve n to c or

re c t it be fo re the fi na l oe uv re is placed o n the table f

or consumption. Such an intent is appar ent from the time limi ts contained in the a ppellate r ules, wher eby the mandate doesn’t issue until a considera

ble per iod of time a fter the date the court issues its judgme nt or af ter the ove rruling of a timely motion for rehe aring . I f th e ap p el l ate c lerk c omp lie s wi th tho se tim e lim its and wa its the a llo tte d tim e . . . the mand a te wi ll not issue until a party

has for g one the oppor

tunity to file a petition for re view in a civil case
. . . . Stacy Obenha us, It Ai n’ t O v e r ‘ Til I

t’ s O v e r: TheAp

pel la te Mandat e in T

e x as Cou rts , 15 The Appellate A dvocate : State Ba r of Te x as Appe llate Section Report 4, 8 (2003)
.

19 of appea l ha d functioned as a supe rsede as bond. Id
. at 626. I t then held that “the Clerk c ould not be held in conte mpt for violating the injunction u n til all appeals re lating to the judg ment wer e exhausted and a ma

ndate e nforc ing the injunction was issued.” Id .; see also Saudi v. Brieven , 176 S.W .3d 108, 116-17 (Te x . App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)
.

Ordinar ily , the mandate issues only afte r the a

ppellate c ourt’s judg m ent bec omes final. Se e ge ne ra lly

Tex. R. App. P . 18.1. I n the supreme court, for example, mandate issues a fter the expiration of ten day s following the deadline to file a moti on to ext end time to file a motion for
re h ea ring , if no extension or rehea ring motion is timely

filed. Id
. 1 8
. 1 ( b )
. T h i s p e r i o d s e r v e s to
a ff or d the c ourt

and pa rt ie s th e op po rt

un ity to c or re c t an a pp e llate jud g me nt b e fo re c omm and ingits
e xec uti on and e nf or c e me nt i n th e low e r c ourt
. B ut th e mand a te may iss ue e arl ie r i n c e rt a in 14
c ir c ums tanc e s. I n a c c e le rate d a pp e a ls, the a

pp e llate c ourt

may iss ue the mand a te wi th t he jud g me nt.20

Te x. R. A pp . P. 18 .6
. Th e mand a te may a lso iss ue e arl ie r i f t

he pa rt ie s so a g re e “ or

fo r g oo d c a

us e on the motion of a par

ty .” Id. 18.1(c) . The Stat e did not seek to expedite the Barshop mand a te
e ith e r w hil e re he ari ngwa s p e nd ingor duri ngthe a lmo st s e ve n mo nth s th e reafter b e fo re it f ina lly issued. I n our initial opinion, we distinguished Long and the sig nif ic ant r ole of

the mand a te on the basis that “we are not c oncer ned with the enfor cea

bility of an appellate judgme nt in the trial court . . . but with the enforce ability of a lower court j udg ment once an appellate court rever ses it.” W e ar e n o w per suaded that, in fact, we are conce rned w ith both. Although the Barshop d istric t
c ourt ’s jud g me nt c e a se d to be c a pa ble of e nf or c e me nt by inj un c tio n a

nd c on te mpt on c e the su

pr e me court re ndere d judgme nt reve rsing it, the district court’s under ly ing, uns u p er s eded judgment de c lari ngthe EA A A c t un c on sti tut ion a l r e ma ine d p e nd ingun til the su pr e me c ourt

i s s u e d it s ma

nd a te commanding enfor ceme nt of its judgment re versingthat decla ration. We express no opinion reg ardingthe leg al s tatus or validi ty of acts perf ormed unde r color of the EAA Act between the J une 28, 1996 supre me cour t judgment in Barshop and the c ourt’s issuance of

its mandate. We hold only that, for pur

poses of de termining the EAA A ct’s dea dline for filing historica l use decla

rations under that statute and Barshop , the Act c annot be c onsidered to have “bec ome effec tive” unti l Fe bruar y 10, 1997, when the supreme c ourt’s mandate issued in Barshop
. Th a t is the fi rs t da

te on wh ic h a ll l e g a l im

pe dim e nts to t

he EA A A ct’ s enforc e a

bil ity we re fi na lly
remove d and is the cl o s es t an al o g to the EAA Ac t’s orig inal eff ective date. See B arshop , 925 S.W .2d at 629-30.We n ote that th e Autho ri ty ’s pr e de c e sso r e nti ty , th e Ed wa rd s U nd e rg ro un d Wate r

D i s t r i c t, 15 continued in ef

fec t until t he EAAAct and Authority beca me eff ective, wher eupon rules adopte d by the Edwa rds Under g round Water District be came rules of the Authorit y until amended or r epea led. See EA A Ac t § 1 .4 1( e ); see also id. § 1.41(c) (whe n Act took eff ect all of District’s re al and pe rsonal proper ty , lease s, rig hts, contrac ts, staff, and oblig ations were transfe rre d to Authority), (d) (whe n Act took effe ct all of District’s unoblig ated, une x pended f unds were transfe rre d to Authority), (f) (upon Act’s e ffect i v e d at e, Authority was a utomatically

substitut ed for

District in any

judicial or administrative proc eedingto which District was pa rty ). 21 Six months after Febr

uary 10, 1997, was August 10, 1997. By setting a Dec ember 30 , 1 99 6 f

i l i n g d e a d l i n e , t h e A u t h o r i t y e xc e e d e d i t s s t a tu t o r y p o w e r s , an d w e h o l d t h a t i t s r u l e is invalid. We also hold that Chemical L ime’s J anuar y 17, 1997 decla

ration wa s timely

filed as
a ma tte r o f l aw. Whil e Che mic a l L ime ’s fi lin g and the Autho ri ty ’s rule s g ov e rn inghis tor ic a l us e decla rations bot h prec eded the date the EAA Act “bec ame effe ctive,” we believe t his made the filing and rule s prematur e, b u t not void. I n eff ect, the E AA Ac t, the Authority , the rules g overning 15 historical use de clar ation filings, and Chemical L ime’s filing all beca me fully eff ective on F ebrua

ry 10, 1997. This also rende rs irre levant the distinction Chemical L ime u rge s betwee n the date the EAA Ac t beca

me enf orce able a

nd the date the Authority actual l y beca me ca pable of acc epting his tor ic a l us e de c laratio ns .

We o v e r r u le th e A u th o r it

y ’ s f ir s t is s u e . B e c a

u s e th is h o ld in g a lo n e s u pports the district co u rt’s judg ment, we do not re ach the Authority ’s issues conc erningthe district court’s
a lte rn a tiv e “ su

bs tanti a l c omp lia

nc e ” g ro un ds
.22

Attor ney’s fees

Th e dis tr ic t c ourt awa

rd e d a tto rn e y ’s fe e s un de r the Un if or m De c lara

tor y Judg me nts Act (U DJ A) be cause Chemical L ime was the prevailing party and because it found that such awa rd
was re asonable and just. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 37 .0 09 (We st 19 97 ). I n its fo ur th issue, the Authorit y prese nts two challeng es to the district court’ s awa rd. F irst, the Authority

argues that Chemical L ime could not rec over attorney ’s fe es u n der the UDJA because a dec laratory judgme nt action was not a proper vehicle f or bring ing its cla ims. I nstead, it contends that the w ater code pr ovides the sole reme dy and that the water code does not suppor t a n awa rd of attorney ’s fe es to Chemical L ime. Second, the Author ity urg es that, as the pr evailing party , an aw ard of attorney ’s fee s to it is now mandatory under the water

code. See Te x. Wat e r Cod e Ann. § 3 6. 06 6( g ). B e c a us e we hold that Chemica l L ime is the preva iling par ty , we r ejec t the Authority ’s sec ond argument and need c onsider only

whether Chemical L ime is lim ited to the reme dies in the wate r code
. Attor ne y ’s fe e s ar e re c ov e ra

ble on ly wh e n pro vid e d for by statut e or by the pa rt ie s’ ag ree ment. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Sev en Inv . Co. , 835 S.W. 2d 75 , 7 7 ( Te x. 19 92 ). I n th is
case , t h e d i s p u t e cente rs on which statutory provision, the UDJA or water code se ction 36.066 controls. Statutory

construction matter s prese nt questions of l aw that we revie w de novo
. Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth. , 7 1 S. W.3 d 729 , 734 (T e x. 20 02 ). I n co ns tr uin g a statut e , o ur

ob je c tiv e is to d e te rm ine and

g ive e ffect to th e le g isl a tur e ’s int e nt. Te x as De p’ t of Pr ote c tiv e & Re

gu lator y Servs. v . Mega Child Care, Inc. , 1 45 S.W. 3d 17 0, 17 6 ( Te x. 20 04 ); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.005 (West 2005). I f the statutory t ex t i s u nambig uous, we “ must adopt the interpre tation supported by

the statute’s p l ain l ang uag e unless that interpr etation would lead to a bsurd re sults.”23

Mega Child Care, Inc. , 1 45 S.W. 3d a t 17 7. L e g isl a tiv e int e nt i s d e ri ve d f ro m th e e nti re a c t, n ot j us t its isol ated por

tions. City of San Antonio v. Ci ty of Boerne , 111 S.W .3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003). G e n e r a ll y , a

p arty p r o c e e d in g u n d e r

th e U D JA ma

y r e c o v e r it s a tt o r

n e y ’ s f e e s . T e x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 37. 00 9. Th e g ra nt or de nia l of

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s und e r t

he UD JA is within the di s t ri ct cour

t’s discretion, and its orde r will not be reve rsed on a ppeal a bsent a c lear showing that the cour

t abused its discretion. O a k e v . C o l l in C ou nty , 69 2 S. W. 2 d

4 5 4 , 4 5 5 ( T e x. 1985); Del Valle Inde

p. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez , 8 63 S.W. 2d 50 7, 51 3 ( Te x. App .— Austin 1 99 3, wr it denied) . The leg al principle e ncompassed in the term “abuse of discretion” conce rns a lega l error
c omm itt e d b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt in its awa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s that inj ur e d or pr e jud ic e d a pp e lla nts
. Lopez , 863 S.W .2d at 513. We revie w a question of leg al er ror de novo
. State v. He al , 917 S.W .2d 6, 9 ( Te x. 19 96 ); Maybe rry v. Tex as Dep’t of Agric. , 948 S.W .2d 312, 314 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. denied)
. I t is an abuse of discretion to awa

rd attorne y ’s fe es under

the UDJA when the re lief soug ht is no gre ater

than re lief that otherw ise exist s by ag ree ment or statute. See Tex as State Bd. of Plumbing Exam’ rs v. Associated Plumbing-H eating-Cooling Cont ractors of Tex., Inc. , 31 S.W .3d 750 , 753 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. dism’d by ag r.); University of Tex. v . Ables , 914 S.W .2d 71 2, 71 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 96 , no wr it)
. To e sta

bli sh jur isd ic tio n un de r t

he UD JA, a

pa rt y mus t ple a d th e e xiste nc e of

an “ un de rl y ingc on tr ov e rs y ” wi thi n th e sc op e of sect ion 37 .0 04 of

the c ivi l prac tice and r emedies c ode. See Kadish v. Pe nnington A s s o cs., L .P. , 9 4 8 S. W. 2 d 3 0 1 , 3 0 4 ( T e x. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). W h en a statute provides a n avenue for attacking an
a g e n c y o r d e r , a d e c l ar a t o r

y j u d g m e n ta c t i o nw i l l n o tl i e t o p r o v i d e r e d u n d an tr e m e d i e s. B eacon24

Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Montemay or , 8 6 S
. W
. 3 d 2 6 0 , 2 6 7 (T ex . Ap p . — Au s t i n 2 0 0 2 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Y oung Chevrolet, Inc . v. Texas M otor Vehicle Bd. , 9 7 4 S
. W
. 2 d 9 0 6 , 9 1 1 ( T e x. A p p . — A u s tin 19 98 , p e t. denied) ). “The re is no basis for dec l ar at o ry

relief when a party is seeking in the same a ction a differ e n t, e n f

o r c e a b le r e me dy , an d

a ju d ic ia l d e c la

r a ti o nw o u ld

a d d n o th in g to w h a t w o u ld

be implicit or ex press in a f inal judgme nt for the e nforc eable reme dy .” Un i ve r s al Printing Co. v. Premier Vic torian Homes, Inc

. , 7 3 S. W.3d 2 83 , 2 96 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 01 , p e t. denied)
. I t is an abuse of

discretion, ther efor e, to awa rd attorne y ’s fe es under

the UDJA when the statut e is r e lie d u

po n s ole ly

a s a ve hic le to r e c ov e r atto rn e y ’s fe e s. Texas State Bd. o f P l u mb ing Ex am ’r s , 31 S.W .3d at 753. We first consider whether Chemical L ime’s challeng e to the Authority ’s rules is an
a c tio n th a t mu st b e br ou g ht u nd e r c ha pte r 3 6 o f th e wate r c od e . T he le g isl a tur e sp e c if ic a lly permitted suits ag ainst a w at er d i s t ri ct under c hapter 36 of the water c ode. See Tex. W ater Code Ann. § 36.066(a ). Section 36.251 states that A person , f

ir m, c o r p o r a ti o n , o r

a s s o c iati o no f

p e r s o n s a f

f e c te d b y an d d is s a ti sfied wi th a ny pr ov isi on or wi th a ny ru le or or de r ma de by a dis tr ic t is e nti tle d to f ile a su it ag ainst the district or its directors to cha lleng e the validity of t he law, rule, or or der. The suit shall be filed in a c ourt of compe tent jurisdiction in any county in which the dis tr ic t or a

ny pa rt of the dis tr ic t is loc ate d. Th e su it m ay on ly be fi le d a ft e r a ll a dmi nis tr a tiv e a

pp e a ls t o th e dis tr ic t are fi na l.
See id. § 36.251 (West 2000)
. Section 36.254 clar ifies that the re medies ava ilable under chapte r 36 “do not aff

ect other leg al or equitable remedies that may be ava ilable.” Id. § 36.254 (West 2000). Thus, the claimant’ s remedie s under c hapter 36 are cumulative, not exclusive, and the c hapter doesTh e re pe a l of se c tio n 1.1 1( h) of

the EA A A c t w a s th e ba sis fo r C he mic a l L ime ’s c la ims 16 that the Act affor ded inade quate judicial r eview of the Authority ’s deter

minations and violated c on sti tut ion a l pr ote c tio ns of du e c ours e of

law, se pa

ra tio n o f powers , ope n c ourt s, and jur y tr ia l. Che mic a l L ime do e s n ot a pp e a l th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a dv e rs e jud g me nt o n th e se c la ims
.

25 not bar Chemica l L ime from pursuing decla ratory relief

, including attorney ’s fe es, under the UDJA. See id. Fur

thermore , the re medies Chemical L ime soug ht under the U DJ A wer e not
re dund ant b e c a

us e in 2 00 1 s e c tio n 1 .1 1( h) of the EA A A c t—w hic h h a d ma de the EA A su bje c t to the Administrative Proce dure A ct—was r epea led. See Act of Ma y 30, 1993, 73d L eg ., R.S., ch. 626, § 1.11(h), 1993 Te x . Gen. L aws 2350, 2359, repeale d by Act of May 27, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch. 96 6, § 6. 03 , 20 01 Te x. Ge n. L aws 19 91 , 2 07 5; see also Barshop , 925 S.W .2d at 632-33 (noting that former § 1.11(h) of the EAA Act provided for judicial revie w of Authority ’s dec isions). Thus, when Chemic a l L im e f

il e d it s s u it in 2 0 0 2 , it d id n o t h a v e th e o p ti o n o f a s s e rti n g it s c la im u n d e r the Ad min istrativ e Pr oc e dure Ac t. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 2001.001-.902 (West 2000 & Supp. 16 2005). Additionally , the supreme court ha s stated t hat private parties may seek de clar atory
re l i ef aga inst state officials who a lleg edly act without leg al or statutory authority
. Te

x a s Na tural Res. Conservation Comm’n v . IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002); see also Texas Educ

. Agenc y v. Le eper , 8 93 S.W. 2d

43 2, 44 5 ( Te x. 19 94 ) ( de c lara tor y jud g me nt s uit

c ha lle ng ingstate offici a ls ’ c o n s tr

u c ti o no f c o mp u ls o r

y s c h o o l- a tt e n d an c e la

w a s a p p li c a b le to h o me - s c h o oled
c hil dr e n) . H e re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ha d ju ri sd ic tio n to c on sid e r Che mic a l L ime ’s c on sti tut ion a l c la ims and its challeng e to the validity of the de adline imposed by the Authority ’s rule inter preting the EAA Act. See IT-Davy , 7 4 S. W.3 d at 85 5; see also Leepe r , 893 S.W .2d at 445.26 Be cause section 36.254 of the water c ode does not for eclose the ava ilability of “othe r leg al or e quitable re medies that may be ava ilable,” a

nd beca use the re medies sou gh t we re not
r e d u n d an t , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n aw ar d i n g a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s u n d e r t h e U D JA to Chemical L ime. See Tex. W ater Code Ann. § 36.254; Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009. We overrule the Authority ’s fourth issue.
CO NC LU SION We a ffirm the district c ourt’s judgme nt inva lidating the Authority ’s filing deadline, de c lari ngChe mi c a l L ime ’s his tor ic a l us e de c lara tio n to be tim e ly

fi le d, and awa rd inga tto rn e y ’s fe e s.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Affir med Filed: September

14, 2006