IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–0235

Filed May 25, 2017

Amended August 21, 2017

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

SAYVON ANDRE PROPPS,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. 

Blane II, Judge.

A juvenile challenges his sentence as unconstitutional under the 

Iowa Constitution. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED;

WRIT ANNULLED.

Amy Pellegrin (until withdrawal) and Gregory T. Racette of Hopkins 

& Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis Sloven, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

A juvenile was sentenced to four consecutive, indeterminate 

sentences of ten years in prison for four counts of willful injury causing 

serious injury. No mandatory minimum sentence was imposed. 

However, because the crime of willful injury causing serious injury is a 

forcible felony, the sentencing judge was unable to consider a deferred 

judgment or probation as a sentencing option. The juvenile now 

challenges, by means of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, the 

forcible felony sentencing statute under the Iowa Constitution. He 

argues that the mandatory nature of the prison sentence is 

unconstitutional given the Iowa Constitution and our precedents in the 

area of juvenile sentencing. For the reasons set forth below, we find that 

Iowa Code section 907.3 is not unconstitutional under the Iowa 

Constitution as applied to juvenile offenders. We vacate the decision of 

the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On February 27, 2011, Derek Carr was standing outside his home

when Troy Lee Mure Jr. drove up in a vehicle in which Sayvon Propps 

was a passenger. Propps exited the vehicle, fired four shots into Carr, 

and got back in the vehicle. Mure immediately drove away from the 

scene. Carr was hit in his back, buttocks, and leg. He was transported 

to the hospital where he remained hospitalized for three weeks before he 

was discharged. Propps was seventeen years of age at the time of the 

crime.

On April 20, the State charged Propps with attempted murder in 

violation of Iowa Code section 707.11 (2011). Propps entered into a plea 

agreement with the State whereby he agreed to plead guilty to four 

counts of the lesser charge of willful injury causing serious injury. The 
3

State then amended the trial information to charge Propps with four 

counts of willful injury causing serious injury in violation of Iowa Code 

section 708.4(1). Because willful injury causing serious injury is a 

forcible felony, probation is not an option under Iowa law. See Iowa Code 

§ 702.11(1); id. § 907.3.1

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the district court sentenced 

Propps to indeterminate sentences not to exceed ten years on each of the 

four counts. The district court ordered each of the sentences to run 

consecutively to the others for a maximum sentence of forty years. There 

were no mandatory minimum sentences of incarceration associated with 

any charge, and no individualized sentencing hearing was conducted.

On July 31, 2014, Propps filed a motion to correct an illegal 

sentence. Propps argued that, based on recent federal and state caselaw, 

the sentence imposed constituted cruel and unusual punishment under 

the Iowa Constitution. Further, Propps argued that the district court 

was required to conduct an individualized sentencing hearing even 

though his sentence contained no mandatory minimum period of 

incarceration. Propps takes this position due to the evolution of our law 

surrounding the sentencing of juveniles. The State resisted the motion, 

claiming that Propps did not receive an illegal sentence in this case. The 

district court denied the motion, reasoning,

As the State points out, the crime—Willful Injury—to which 

the Defendant pled and was sentenced, does not implicate a 

mandatory minimum sentence. Since the Defendant is 

eligible for parole and may be released at any time, the 

sentences, whether consecutive or concurrent, are not cruel 

 1In pertinent part, section 901.5 provides the standards for when a district court 

may impose a deferred judgment, deferred sentence, or suspended sentence. Iowa Code 

§ 901.5. However, in the case of a forcible felony, the section does not apply. Id.

§ 907.3.
4

and unusual, do not violate the federal or state 

constitutions, are therefore not illegal and Defendant is not 

entitled to a correction of his sentence or resentencing.

Propps appealed the decision of the district court, and we transferred the 

case to the court of appeals.

On appeal, Propps argued that “all juveniles, especially those who 

have been sentenced to a lengthy term of years, must undergo an 

individualized sentencing hearing regardless of whether or not the 

sentence has a mandatory term of years.” He asserted that 

individualized sentencing applied because, as with mandatory 

minimums, the district court had no choice but to sentence him to a 

term of imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s 

denial of Propps’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. Propps appealed,

and we granted further review.

II. Jurisdictional Argument.

The State raises the issue of whether we have jurisdiction to hear 

this appeal. Since the district court ruling is on a motion to correct an 

illegal sentence, the State argues that Propps cannot appeal the denial of 

his motion to correct an illegal sentence because the ruling denying such 

a motion is not a “final judgment of sentence” under Iowa Code section 

814.6(1). We requested supplemental briefing to address this 

preliminary issue.

Subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is conferred either 

constitutionally or statutorily. De Stefano v. Apts. Downtown, Inc., 879 

N.W.2d 155, 164 (Iowa 2016). Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.103(1) 

provides that “[a]ll final orders and judgments of the district court 

involving the merits or materially affecting the final decision may be 

appealed to the supreme court, except as provided in this rule, rule 
5

6.105, and Iowa Code sections 814.5 and 814.6.” Iowa R. App. 

P. 6.103(1).2

Iowa Code section 814.6 contains the standards for subject-matter 

jurisdiction for the review of a criminal defendant’s appeal. Iowa Code 

§ 814.6. Pertinent to this case, a criminal defendant has the “right of 

appeal” from “[a] final judgment of sentence.” Id. A previous version of 

the statute provided that “[a]n appeal can only be taken from the final 

judgment, and within sixty days thereafter.” Iowa Code § 793.2 (1954). 

The statute was thereafter amended to include the clarifying language 

“judgment of sentence.” Iowa Code § 814.6 (1983) (emphasis added). 

This language continues today. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a) (2017).

This is consistent with the general rule that the “[f]inal judgment in 

a criminal case means sentence.” Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d 

591, 595 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156, 127 

S. Ct. 793, 798 (2007)); see also State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 146 

(Iowa 2003). “In criminal cases, as well as civil, the judgment is final for 

the purpose of appeal ‘when it terminates the litigation between the 

parties on the merits’ and ‘leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by 

execution what has been determined.’ ” State v. Aumann, 236 N.W.2d 

320, 321–22 (Iowa 1975) (quoting State v. Klinger, 259 Iowa 381, 383, 

144 N.W.2d 150, 151 (1966)). In contrast, “decisions, opinions, findings, 

or verdicts do not constitute a judgment or decree.” Iowa W. Racing 

Ass’n v. Iowa Racing & Gaming Comm’n, 578 N.W.2d 663, 664 (Iowa 

 2Iowa Code section 814.5 provides the rules for the right of appeal when the 

State is the appellant or applicant. Iowa Code § 814.5. Rule 6.105 provides the rules 

for appeals tried as small claims actions. Iowa R. App. P. 6.105. Neither section is 

pertinent to our analysis of this case, and we confine our discussion to section 814.6.
6

1998) (quoting Wilson v. Corbin, 241 Iowa 226, 228, 40 N.W.2d 472, 474 

(1950)).

The final sentencing order in this case was entered on August 16, 

2011. Propps brought a motion to correct an illegal sentence on July 31, 

2014, and the district court denied the motion on January 13, 2015. In 

the ruling denying Propps’s motion, the district court neither disturbed 

the underlying sentence nor entered a new judgment of sentence. An 

appeal as of right under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a) on the grounds of 

appealing a “final judgment of sentence” was improper in this case. The 

final judgment of sentence occurred three years prior. However, this 

does not resolve the jurisdictional issue here.

A criminal defendant may challenge an illegal sentence at any time 

under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a); 

see also State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009). A 

defendant may appeal the denial of a motion to correct an illegal 

sentence by applying for discretionary review under either Iowa Code 

section 814.6(2)(e) or Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.106. Iowa Code 

§ 814.6(2)(e) (allowing discretionary review of “[a]n order raising a 

question of law important to the judiciary and the profession”); Iowa R. 

App. P. 6.106 (“An application for discretionary review may be filed to 

review certain orders specified by statute which are not subject to appeal 

as a matter of right.”). A defendant may also appeal the denial of a 

motion to correct an illegal sentence by petition for writ of certiorari 

under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.107. Iowa R. App. P. 

6.107(1)(a) (“Any party claiming a district court judge . . . exceeded the 

judge’s jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally may commence an original 

certiorari action in the supreme court by filing a petition for writ of 

certiorari.”). Because section 814.6(1)(a) does not apply to a defendant’s 
7

motion to correct an illegal sentence, one of these actions would have 

been the proper method for bringing such a challenge.

However, a “court has inherent power to determine whether it has 

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings before it.” Klinge 

v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Tigges v. City of 

Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Iowa 1984)). Discretionary review is 

available under section 814.6 to orders “raising a question of law 

important to the judiciary and the profession.” Iowa Code § 814.6(2)(e). 

Additionally, if a case is initiated by a notice of appeal, but another form 

of review is proper, we may choose to proceed as though the proper form 

of review was requested by the defendant rather than dismiss the action. 

Iowa R. App. P. 6.108. Accordingly, we will treat Propps’s notice of 

appeal and accompanying briefs as a petition for writ of certiorari, as we 

conclude that appeals from a motion to correct an illegal sentence are 

most appropriately fashioned in this manner. We grant the petition for 

writ of certiorari.

III. Standard of Review.

An unconstitutional sentence is an illegal sentence, and therefore 

may be corrected at any time. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Iowa 

2014); see also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a). While we ordinarily review 

challenges to illegal sentences for correction of legal errors, our standard 

of review for an allegation of an unconstitutional sentence is de novo. 

Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 382.

IV. Analysis.

A. Indeterminate Sentencing and Parole. A determinate 

sentence imposes a specific number of years of imprisonment on a 

defendant, while an indeterminate sentence is one in which the 

legislature has set a range of the minimum and maximum amount of 
8

years deemed appropriate for the crime. See, e.g., 6 Wayne R. LaFave et 

al., Criminal Procedure § 26.1(c) (2016). Indeterminate sentences are 

parole eligible, while determinate sentences are not. Id. In this case, the 

district court sentenced Propps to four indeterminate sentences with no 

mandatory minimum sentence, making Propps immediately eligible for 

parole.

Once an incarcerated individual is eligible for parole, the Iowa 

Board of Parole is required to hold yearly file reviews. Iowa Code 

§ 906.5(1)(a); see also Iowa Board of Parole, FAQ/Information, 

http://www.bop.state.ia.us/BoardFaq (last visited Mar. 20, 2017) 

(stating the board of parole is required to hold yearly reviews for every 

eligible offender) [hereinafter Iowa Board of Parole, FAQ/Information]. 

When the board of parole reviews a file, it may choose to give the 

offender work release, deny release, or set up an interview. Iowa Code 

§ 906.3, .5. If the board sets up an interview, it uses the interview to 

determine whether the individual offender should be released to the 

community under parole supervision for the remainder of the sentence. 

Id. When making the decision to release an inmate on parole, the board 

considers a number of factors, including

a. Previous criminal record;

b. Nature and circumstances of the offense;

c. Recidivism record;

d. Convictions or behavior indicating a propensity for 

violence;

e. Participation in institutional programs, including 

academic and vocational training;

f. Psychiatric and psychological evaluations;

g. Length of time served;

h. Evidence of serious or habitual institutional misconduct;

i. Success or failure while on probation;

j. Prior parole or work release history;
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k. Prior refusal to accept parole or work release;

l. History of drug or alcohol use;

m. A parole plan formulated by the inmate;

n. General attitude and behavior while incarcerated;

o. Risk assessment. 

Iowa Admin. Code r. 205—8.10.

This is consistent with the provisions of Iowa Code section 

906.5(3), which provides that

the board shall consider all pertinent information regarding 

the person, including the circumstances of the person’s 

offense, any presentence report which is available, the 

previous social history and criminal record of the person, the 

person’s conduct, work, and attitude in prison, and the 

reports of physical and mental examinations that have been 

made.

Iowa Code § 906.5(3).

B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Juvenile Sentencing. 

Both the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution prohibit 

cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Iowa Const. 

art. I, § 17. In recent years, both the United States Supreme Court and 

this court have addressed whether certain juvenile sentencing practices 

violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

The Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for 

crime should be graduated and proportioned’ to both the offender and 

the offense.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 

2463, (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S. Ct. 

1183, 1190, (2005)). Proportionality is key in an Eighth Amendment 

analysis, and we view proportionality according to “the evolving 

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id.

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290 (1976)).
10

In 2005, the Supreme Court held in Roper that the sentence of 

capital punishment when imposed upon a juvenile violates the 

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth 

Amendment. 543 U.S. at 560, 126 S. Ct. 1190. In 2010, the Supreme 

Court held in Graham v. Florida that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 

the imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 

juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses. 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S. Ct. 

2011, 2030 (2010). Finally, in 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller 

that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole when 

imposed on juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment. 567 U.S. at 489–

90, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. Miller requires a sentencing court to make 

individualized sentencing decisions that take into consideration an 

offender’s age and age-related characteristics before imposing “the 

harshest possible penalty for juveniles” of a life sentence without the 

possibility of parole. Id.

Following the Miller decision, Governor Branstad commuted the 

sentences of all juveniles in Iowa serving mandatory life-without-parole 

sentences to sentences of sixty years without parole and with no credit 

for earned time. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2013). 

We then heard a trio of cases that considered both the Miller case and 

the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Iowa Constitution. 

In Ragland, we held that Miller applied retroactively. Id. at 117. 

We then went on to hold that the governor’s commutation had the same 

effect as a life sentence without the possibility of parole, and therefore 

the Miller requirement of individualized sentencing applied. Id. at 119, 

122. In determining that Miller applied to the commuted sentences, we 

noted that
11

the original sentence imposed on Ragland by the district 

court was a mandatory sentence. The sentencing court had 

no other option but to impose the one sentence provided by 

law. This result is important in the analysis because it goes 

to the heart of Miller, which states that “children are 

constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 

sentencing,” and a mandatory life sentence without parole 

imposed on juveniles means young offenders “die in prison 

even if [the sentencing judge] would have thought that his 

youth and its attendant characteristics . . . made a lesser 

sentence . . . more appropriate.” Importantly, the mandatory 

penalty component totally precludes the sentencing court 

from taking the critical aspects of youth into account in the 

imposition of a sentence.

Id. at 119 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 470–72, 132 S. Ct. at 2460,

2464). The commutation did not cure the absence of an individualized 

sentencing hearing because “Miller protects youth at the time of 

sentencing.” Id.

In State v. Null, we considered the cruel and unusual punishment 

clause of the Iowa Constitution. 836 N.W.2d 41, 70 (Iowa 2013); see also

Iowa Const. art. I, § 17. We held that a lengthy term-of-years sentence—

in this case a 52.5 year sentence—triggered the protections of a Miller

individualized sentencing hearing. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71. We reasoned 

that “geriatric release” after a lengthy term-of-years sentence does not 

provide a juvenile a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their 

maturity and rehabilitation. Id. Similarly, in State v. Pearson, we held 

that a minimum sentence of thirty-five years triggered a Miller

individualized sentencing hearing. 836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013). 

After the Ragland—Null—Pearson trio, we went on to consider 

juvenile sentencing under the Iowa Constitution in a number of other 

cases. In Lyle, we held that all mandatory minimum sentences of 

imprisonment for juveniles are unconstitutional under article I, section 

17 of the Iowa Constitution. 854 N.W.2d at 400. We also summarized 

the background of change in the area of juvenile sentencing reform and 
12

touched on the topic of parole briefly. Id. at 399–400. We noted that the 

United States Supreme Court has recognized that the opportunity for 

parole lessens the severity of a sentence. Id. at 399; see also Rummel v. 

Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280–81, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1142–43 (1980)

(recognizing the opportunity for parole, “however slim,” mollifies the 

severity of the sentence). We ultimately concluded that the “heart of the 

constitutional infirmity with the punishment imposed in Miller was its 

mandatory imposition, not the length of the sentence.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 

at 401. We confirmed that the Iowa Constitution applied to mandatory 

sentences of prison without the opportunity for parole, regardless of the 

length of the sentence. Id. 

[I]f mandatory sentencing for the most serious crimes that 

impose the most serious punishment of life in prison without 

parole violates article I, section 17, so would mandatory 

sentences for less serious crimes imposing the less serious 

punishment of a minimum period of time in prison without 

parole.

Id. 

In State v. Louisell, we addressed the question of whether Louisell 

truly had a “meaningful opportunity for parole” during resentencing or 

whether her eligibility for parole was simply illusory. 865 N.W.2d 590, 

601 (Iowa 2015). Louisell argued that, even with a sentence of life with 

the possibility of parole, her parole eligibility was illusory because only 

one of Iowa’s thirty-eight juvenile offenders originally sentenced to life 

without parole had actually been granted parole by the time of her 

resentencing. Id. This single inmate was granted parole on conditional 

release to hospice care for cancer treatment, and the parole board 

specifically reserved the right to reconsider its decision if her health 

improved. Id. We declined to address the question of whether Louisell 

had been wrongfully denied parole. Id. at 602. However, we did take the 
13

opportunity to “reaffirm that under both the United States Constitution 

and the Iowa Constitution, juveniles convicted of crimes must be afforded 

a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 

maturity and rehabilitation’—if a sentencing judge, exercising discretion, 

determines parole should be available.” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 

75, 130 S. Ct. at 2030). We also noted that the factors utilized by the 

parole board to determine parole eligibility do not “account for the 

mitigating attributes of youth that are constitutionally required 

sentencing considerations.” Id.

In State v. Seats, we expanded on our previous cases to clarify the 

factors a district court should consider when faced with a case in which

it had the discretion to sentence a juvenile to life in prison without the 

possibility of parole. 865 N.W.2d 545, 556–57 (Iowa 2015). Finally, we 

recently categorically banned the imposition of life-without-parole 

sentences for juveniles in State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 

2016). We noted that part of the justification for the categorical ban on 

juvenile life-without-parole sentences is that the Miller individualized 

sentencing hearing is insufficient in that context since “we are asking the 

sentencer to do the impossible, namely, to determine whether the 

offender is ‘irretrievably corrupt’ at a time when even trained 

professionals with years of clinical experience would not attempt to make 

such a determination.” Id. at 837. We found that it was the parole board

that was best situated to discern which offenders are irreparably corrupt 

and which have benefited from opportunities for maturation and 

rehabilitation. Id. at 839.

C. Application to the Present Case. Propps argues that Iowa’s 

forcible felony sentencing provision is unconstitutional because it does 

not allow the sentencing judge the option of probation and therefore,
14

mandates a prison sentence, however short, for juveniles. See Iowa Code 

§ 907.3 (2011).3 Although the sentencing statute allows for 

indeterminate sentences, Propps argues that the sentencing structure 

does not allow the sentencing judge to “consider the mitigating factors of 

the offender, specifically a juvenile offender, upon conviction of this 

crime.”

Propps seeks to expand Lyle to cases such as his, even though he 

has no mandatory minimum period of incarceration and he is 

immediately eligible for parole. We decline to do so. Completely 

eliminating the mandatory imposition of a prison term, even when the 

term is indeterminate and the individual is immediately eligible for 

parole, would not serve the proportionality concept we have addressed in 

our previous juvenile sentencing cases. In those cases, we sought to 

eliminate the mandatory nature of mandatory minimums and sentences 

that were the functional equivalent of life without parole because those 

sentences did not offer juveniles a “meaningful opportunity” to 

demonstrate their rehabilitation before the parole board. See, e.g., Lyle, 

854 N.W.2d at 402–03; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 75; Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 

97; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121. Our goal was not to excuse the 

 3In 2013, the legislature adopted the following provision:

14. Notwithstanding any provision in section 907.3 or any other 

provision of law prescribing a mandatory minimum sentence for the 

offense, if the defendant, other than a child being prosecuted as a 

youthful offender, is guilty of a public offense other than a class “A” 

felony, and was under the age of eighteen at the time the offense was 

committed, the court may suspend the sentence in whole or in part, 

including any mandatory minimum sentence, or with the consent of the 

defendant, defer judgment or sentence, and place the defendant on 

probation upon such conditions as the court may require.

Iowa Acts ch. 42, § 14 (codified at Iowa Code § 901.5(14) (2014)). Propps does not argue 

that this provision applies to his resentencing.
15

behavior of juveniles, but rather to impose punishment in a way that was 

consistent with the lesser culpability and greater capacity for change of 

juvenile offenders. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 398, 402–03; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 

75 (“[W]hile youth is a mitigating factor in sentencing, it is not an 

excuse.”). We were concerned that offering “geriatric release” or the 

geriatric opportunity for parole was not consistent with the concept of 

proportionality. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71.

This is in stark contrast to the situation presented here. In this 

case, Propps was immediately eligible for parole and able to demonstrate 

by his own actions his maturation and rehabilitation. When a one-sizefits-all mandatory minimum is imposed, an arbitrary amount of time 

spent in prison dictates when a juvenile will be released. See, e.g., 

Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122. In contrast, when an indeterminate 

sentence is given that contains no mandatory minimum sentence and 

allows a juvenile to be immediately eligible for parole, the juvenile 

defendant’s behavior in prison dictates when parole will be available—

with the potential for immediate parole if rehabilitation, maturity, and 

reform have been demonstrated. See, e.g., Louisell, 865 N.W.2d at 601.

It is true that immediate eligibility for parole is not the same as 

immediately coming before the parole board for review. See Iowa Code 

§ 906.5(1). We require the board of parole to review the status of 

individuals eligible for parole on an annual basis. Id. However, in our 

juvenile sentencing cases, we have never required that release on parole 

be immediate. See, e.g., Louisell, 865 N.W.2d at 602 (establishing that 

the opportunity for parole need only be realistic and meaningful). We 

have instead required that juvenile defendants must be given a realistic 

and meaningful opportunity to demonstrate maturity and 

rehabilitation—if a sentencing judge, exercising discretion, determines 
16

parole should be available. Id. at 601. Propps’s immediate eligibility for 

parole, upon the parameters outlined in section 906.5, is both realistic 

and meaningful. 

The analysis undertaken by the parole board for parole eligibility is 

an individualized analysis that considers the juvenile’s past, in addition 

to current psychiatric and psychological evaluations, the time already 

served on the sentence, any reports of misconduct or good behavior, and 

the inmate’s attitude and behavior while incarcerated. See Iowa Code 

§ 906.5(3). We noted in Louisell that the factors utilized by the parole 

board to determine parole eligibility may not “account for the mitigating 

attributes of youth that are constitutionally required sentencing 

considerations.” 865 N.W.2d at 602. However, more recently, we noted 

that the Miller individualized sentencing hearings are insufficient in the 

context of life-without-parole sentencing. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 837 

(“[W]e are asking the sentencer to do the impossible, namely, to 

determine whether the offender is ‘irretrievably corrupt’ at a time when 

even trained professionals with years of clinical experience would not 

attempt to make such a determination.”). In our most recent case, 

Sweet, we found that the parole board was best situated to discern which 

juvenile homicide offenders have benefited from opportunities for 

maturation and rehabilitation. Id. at 839. The parole board has the 

benefit of seeing the individual offender’s actual behavior, rather than 

having to attempt to predict chances at maturity and rehabilitation 

based on speculation.

Further, allowing a sentencing judge to grant a suspended 

sentence for a forcible felony may not further the purpose of 

rehabilitation. While juveniles may be more prone to reform and 

rehabilitation because of their age and the attendant characteristics of 
17

youth, they must also understand the severity of their actions. See Lyle, 

854 N.W.2d at 398–99. Harm to a victim is not lessened because of the 

young age of an offender, and “[t]he constitutional analysis is not about 

excusing juvenile behavior, but imposing punishment in a way that is 

consistent with our understanding of humanity today.” Id. at 398. 

Allowing a sentence of merely probation for forcible felonies may excuse 

the criminal behavior of the juvenile offender and disproportionately 

weigh this equation to only consider the age and culpability of the 

offender without the harm he or she caused to a victim. Because an 

indeterminate sentence allows for immediate eligibility for parole, a 

juvenile is able to demonstrate to the parole board whether he or she 

appreciated the harm done and utilized the options available for reform. 

If rehabilitation has not yet occurred, the parole board may make the 

decision to continue incarceration until the juvenile has demonstrated 

through his or her own actions the ability to appreciate the severity of 

the crime. This is consistent with the approach of our prior holdings in 

the area of juvenile sentencing, because it allows for a realistic and 

meaningful opportunity for parole upon the juvenile’s demonstration of 

maturity and rehabilitation. We find that there is no constitutional 

infirmity in Iowa Code section 907.3. This provision does not violate the 

Iowa Constitution under a cruel and unusual punishment analysis.

D. Gross Disproportionality. Having determined that the 

sentence for willful injury survives a categorical challenge, we now turn 

to Propps’s claim that the sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him, 

which we analyze for gross disproportionality. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 

812 N.W.2d 636, 647 (Iowa 2012). In his brief in support of his motion 

to correct an illegal sentence, Propps did not specifically distinguish 

between the argument that his sentence was grossly disproportionate as 
18

applied to him and the argument that the sentencing structure was 

categorically unconstitutional. The district court decided the case on a 

categorical basis and did not address the question of gross

disproportionality. On appeal, Propps argued his sentence was 

unconstitutional as applied to him, and the court of appeals considered 

and rejected the argument.

While we generally do not decide cases based on grounds not 

raised in the district court, in Bruegger we allowed a defendant to 

continue with an as-applied challenge when his brief did not clearly 

distinguish between a categorical or as-applied attack on his sentence. 

773 N.W.2d at 884. Because Propps’s brief was likewise unclear, we will 

continue with the analysis under an as-applied framework.

When we determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate 

to an offender’s crime, we utilize a three-step analysis. Oliver, 812 

N.W.2d at 647. The first step in this analysis is a threshold question, 

and if the first step is not satisfied, we need not proceed to steps two and 

three. Id. Our first step is to determine whether Propps’s sentence leads 

to the inference that it was grossly disproportionate. Id. “This 

preliminary test involves a balancing of the gravity of the crime against 

the severity of the sentence.” Id. (quoting Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873). 

Step two requires an intrajurisdictional analysis in which we “compar[e] 

the challenged sentence to sentences for other crimes within the 

jurisdiction.” Id. Step three requires an interjurisdictional analysis, and 

we “compar[e] sentences in other jurisdictions for the same or similar 

crimes.” Id.

We now turn to the threshold inquiry to determine whether 

Propps’s sentence leads to an inference of gross disproportionality to his 

crime. When we consider this first step, we have established a few 
19

general principles to guide our analysis. Id. at 650. First, we give 

substantial deference to the legislature when it establishes punishments 

for certain crimes. Id. Second, “it is rare that a sentence will be so 

grossly disproportionate to the crime as to satisfy the threshold inquiry 

and warrant further review.” Id. Third, a recidivist offender is more 

culpable than a first-time offender and therefore more deserving of a 

longer sentence. Id. Last, a case can have unique features that may 

“converge to generate a high risk of potential gross disproportionality” 

and so we must consider the unique facts of the case. Id. (quoting 

Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 884).

In this case, Propps’s challenge to his sentence is not the rare 

sentence that survives the first step of our analysis. Propps was 

sentenced to four indeterminate sentences not to exceed ten years each 

for four counts of willful injury causing serious injury, and he was 

immediately eligible for parole. The legislature has determined that there 

are certain crimes that are so severe that a defendant should not be 

eligible for a sentence of probation. See Iowa Code § 907.3. Forcible 

felonies such as willful injury causing serious injury are among those 

crimes the legislature has deemed severe. Id. § 702.11(1); id. § 708.4(1); 

id. § 907.3. We give deference to the legislature’s determination that 

these crimes are more deserving of sentences of incarceration rather 

than probation. Additionally, the gravity of Propps’s crime was high. 

Propps fired four shots at his victim and fled the scene. His actions 

required a lengthy hospital stay for Carr. In contrast, his sentence was 

not severe. Propps was sentenced to four indeterminate sentences, 

making him immediately eligible for parole review. The gravity of 

Propps’s crime was high, and the severity of his sentence was low. See, 

e.g., Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 647. This was not the rare case that satisfies 
20

our threshold inquiry and requires us to continue to steps two and three 

of the analysis. We hold that Propps’s sentence was not unconstitutional 

under a gross disproportionality analysis.

E. Miller Hearing. Because we determine that the sentence 

Propps received is not categorically unconstitutional, and thus there is 

no constitutional infirmity with the statute, we decline to extend the 

requirement of a Miller individualized sentencing hearing to juvenile 

defendants who are not subject to a mandatory minimum period of 

incarceration. Propps is therefore not entitled to a Miller individualized 

sentencing hearing. He has received a meaningful, reasonable, and 

immediate opportunity for parole, which is all that is required under our 

decision in Lyle and the United States and Iowa Constitutions.

V. Conclusion.

We hold that the forcible felony sentencing statute, Iowa Code 

section 907.3, is not unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders. 

Additionally, in considering a motion to correct an illegal sentence, the 

district court is not required to conduct a Miller individualized sentencing 

hearing. We therefore annul the writ.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; WRIT 

ANNULLED.

Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., join this opinion. Cady, C.J., files a 

concurring opinion in which Wiggins, J., joins. Appel, J., files a 

dissenting opinion in which Hecht, J., joins.
21

#15–0235, State v. Propps

CADY, Chief Justice (concurring specially). 

I concur in the result reached by the majority.

We have taken important steps in recent years to recognize 

constitutional protections in the sentencing of juvenile offenders. While 

the nature of some criminal acts committed by juveniles can be 

indistinguishable to those of adults and can challenge faith in humanity 

just the same, the scientific understanding of the human brain has 

evolved to give greater shape to the constitutional prohibition against 

cruel and unusual punishment. See State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 54 

(Iowa 2013) (“[D]evelopments in social psychology and neuroscience have 

reinforced traditional notions that juveniles and adults are, in fact, quite 

different.”). This constitutional standard now sees juveniles as less 

culpable than adults and recognizes their significantly greater capacity 

for rehabilitation. Id. at 74–75. Juveniles are less culpable because they 

lack maturity and a sense of responsibility, are more prone to impulsive 

behavior, and are more vulnerable to negative influences. See State v. 

Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 393, 398 (Iowa 2014) (“[T]he time when a 

seventeen-year-old could seriously be considered to have adult-like 

culpability has passed.”). Personality traits of juveniles are less fixed 

than adults, and this difference gives juvenile offenders a greater chance 

for reform. See id. at 400 (“Given the juvenile’s greater capacity for 

growth and reform, it is likely a juvenile can rehabilitate faster if given 

the appropriate opportunity.”). With this understanding, the penological 

justifications for a fixed mandatory sentence of imprisonment collapse 

and our constitution demands that we judge juveniles by a different 

sentencing process than adults. 
22

If the sentencing protections we have recognized for juvenile 

offenders under our Iowa Constitution were derived solely from their 

diminished culpability, my view would be more aligned with the dissent 

in this case. But scientific evidence of lesser culpability is not the single 

driving force behind our new protections. The constitutional protections 

we have recognized do not target mandatory incarceration of juvenile 

offenders, but mandatory incarceration of juvenile offenders with no 

opportunity during the period of incarceration to show the greater 

likelihood of rehabilitation and reform has occurred. Id. at 403 (“A 

statute that sends all juvenile offenders to prison for a minimum period of 

time under all circumstances simply cannot satisfy the standards of 

decency and fairness embedded in article I, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution.” (Emphasis added.)). The cruel and unusual punishment 

that is mandatory minimum sentencing of juveniles lies in the total 

failure to account for the underdeveloped brain of a juvenile. It lies in 

treating a juvenile like an adult. But the brain development of a juvenile 

is a process tied to the passage of time, often years. See State v. Sweet, 

879 N.W.2d 811, 838 (Iowa 2016) (“Social science suggests reliable 

answers to these questions come only with the benefit of time and 

completion of brain development.”). Thus, the constitutional protection 

plays out within the process of parole, not probation. It plays out in our 

constitutional standard of cruel and unusual punishment, not only 

because of juveniles’ diminished culpability, but also because of 

personality changes that accompany their maturity with adulthood. The 

constitutional standard relies on time for this rehabilitation to occur. It 

requires only an opportunity for these changes to be considered as 

directed by the advancements of science. 
23

Our constitutional standards need to grow along with our greater 

understanding, but no further. 

Wiggins, J., joins this special concurrence. 
24

#15–0235, State v. Propps

APPEL, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

Iowa Code sections 702.11 and 907.3 (2011) mandate that a 

district court impose prison time for all persons convicted of forcible 

felonies, thereby precluding the possibility that a juvenile might be 

placed on probation. The mandatory prison term is automatically 

imposed on adults and juveniles alike. The question in this case is 

whether these automatic, one-size-fits-all statutes may be applied 

equally to adults and to juveniles notwithstanding the observations of the 

United States Supreme Court and this court that because of their 

reduced moral culpability, children are “constitutionally different from 

adults for sentencing purposes” and this constitutional difference is not 

“crime-specific.” State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 65 (Iowa 2013) (quoting 

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470–73, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–65 

(2012)).

I. Recent Caselaw Related to the Application of the Cruel and 

Unusual Punishment Clauses of the United States and Iowa 

Constitutions to Juvenile Offenders.

A. Overview of Recent United States Supreme Court Cases. In 

a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has considered the 

application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the United 

States Constitution to sentencing children convicted of crimes committed 

while under the age of eighteen. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 

2455; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v. 

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). In the now familiar 

trilogy of Roper, Graham, and Miller, the United States Supreme Court 

outlined a number of features of youth, concluding that children are 
25

“constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing” and 

that these differences were not “crime-specific.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 470–

73, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S. Ct. at 

2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.

The United States Supreme Court based its determination that 

children are “constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 

sentencing” because of the characteristics of youth. Miller, 567 U.S. at 

470–72, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. Among other things, the United States 

Supreme Court noted that youth have less developed judgment, that 

children do not manifest the same level of responsibility or maturity as 

adults, that they are more susceptible to negative influences and outside 

pressures—including peer pressure, and that the character and 

personality of a child are not developed to the same extent as an adult. 

Miller, 567 U.S. at 470–72, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 

130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70, 125 S. Ct. at 1195–96. 

As a result, juvenile offenders generally have less moral culpability for 

their crimes than adult offenders. Miller, 567 U.S. at 470–73, 132 S. Ct. 

at 2464–65. The United States Supreme Court emphasized that its 

observations about the diminished culpability of youth were not “crimespecific” but are generally applicable. Id. at 472–73, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.

Applying the above principles, the United States Supreme Court 

held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the United States 

Constitution (1) categorically prohibited the imposition of the death 

penalty on juvenile criminal offenders, Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79, 125 

S. Ct. at 1200; (2) categorically prohibited the imposition of life without 

the possibility of parole to juveniles for nonhomicide offenses, Graham,

560 U.S. at 82, 130 S. Ct. at 2034; and (3) prohibited the imposition of 

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for homicide offenses 
26

unless a court determined, after an evidentiary hearing, that the juvenile 

was one of those uncommon juveniles who demonstrated irretrievable 

depravity, Miller, 567 U.S. at 489–90, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.

In reaching these conclusions, the Roper–Graham–Miller trilogy 

relied, at least in part, on neuroscientific developments, indicating a 

willingness to consider the scientific developments in evaluating 

constitutional issues.4 Further, in Miller particularly, the Supreme Court 

moved away from its reliance on societal consensus in evaluating claims 

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 

Amendment and toward reliance on the Court’s own independent 

judgment. 567 U.S. at 485–87, 132 S. Ct. at 2473; see John F. 

Stinneford, Youth Matters: Miller v. Alabama and the Future of Juvenile 

Sentencing, 11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 1, 4–5 (2013). The United States 

Supreme Court also cited international norms, noting, for instance, that 

the United States was the only country in the world to give official 

sanction to the juvenile death penalty. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575, 125 

S. Ct. at 1198.5

 4For a summary of the scientific developments, see Elizabeth Scott, et al., 

Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 675, 684–

87 (2016).

5Aside from sentencing, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the 

differences between juveniles and adults in other criminal justice contexts. On two 

occasions, the Supreme Court has barred the use of confessions obtained under 

circumstances that would have led to a different result if the suspect were an adult. 

Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 1213 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 

U.S. 596, 601, 68 S. Ct. 302, 304 (1948). Further, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the 

Supreme Court held that a determination of whether a minor is in custody should take 

into account the age of the suspect. 564 U.S. 261, 265, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011); 

see generally Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to AgeAppropriate Sentencing, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 457, 488–89 (2012) (noting that 

J.D.B. “mark[ed] a return to special protections for youth that characterized the Court’s 

confession suppression caselaw more than half a century ago”).
27

A fundamental question after Miller has been whether the 

principles announced therein should be given a broad or narrow gloss. 

Initially, the battle lines were drawn over the question of whether the 

holding in Miller was merely procedural or substantive. The question 

was important, as procedural caselaw developments are generally not 

given retroactive effect, while substantive changes are generally applied 

retroactively.

Some courts took a narrow view of Miller, suggesting that it was 

only a procedural decision and therefore the decision was not retroactive. 

The general notion espoused by these courts was that Miller required 

only a hearing, but that the substance of the law changed little. See, 

e.g., People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 825 (Mich. 2014), vacated sub nom.

Davis v. Michigan, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1356 (2016); Chambers v. 

State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328–31 (Minn. 2013), overruled by Jackson v. 

State, 883 N.W.2d 272, 279 (Minn. 2016). We joined other courts in 

viewing Miller broadly as substantive in nature. See State v. Ragland,

836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013); see also People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 

722 (Ill. 2014); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y, 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013).

The United States Supreme Court settled this particular question 

in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). In 

Montgomery, the Supreme Court held that Miller was substantive and 

should be given retroactive effect. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 736. In 

particular, the Court in Montgomery emphasized that the decision in 

Miller was not just a matter of process, but a matter of substance, 

namely, that because of the distinctive characteristics and the lessened 

culpability of youth, only in extremely rare cases could children be 

subject to life sentences without the possibility of parole even in cases 

involving homicide. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 733–34. The Montgomery
28

Court suggested that states could meet the constitutional requirement of 

Miller by simply enacting statutes that eliminated juvenile life sentences 

without the possibility of parole. See id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 736.

After Montgomery, however, the battle lines moved but the fight 

continues. Some seek to find ways to limit the scope of Roper, Graham, 

and Miller by asserting, for instance, that the principles apply only in the 

death penalty or life-without-the-possibility-of-parole contexts and do not 

apply to aggregate sentences that may add up to lengthy prison terms.

Proponents of a narrow reading of Roper, Graham, and Miller tend 

to minimize the statement in Miller that children are “constitutionally 

different” and the declaration that the principles enunciated in Roper and 

Graham are not “crime-specific.” See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 124, 130 

S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the Court’s opinion 

affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the 

possibility of parole.”); United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 214 (2d 

Cir. 2013) (“Much less does a five-year sentence equate to one of ‘the 

law’s most serious punishments’ so as to raise the constitutional 

concerns identified in Miller v. Alabama about the mandatory application 

of life without parole to all juveniles.” (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 482–83, 

132 S. Ct. at 2471)); Silva v. McDonald, 891 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1131 

(C.D. Cal. 2012) (“Notwithstanding the holdings in Roper, Graham, or 

Miller, this Court is not aware of any controlling Supreme Court 

precedent which holds, or could be construed to hold, that the sentence 

at issue here of 40-years-to-life with the possibility of parole, for a 

juvenile . . . violates the Eighth Amendment.”).

Proponents of a broad view believe the principles of Roper, Graham, 

and Miller apply outside the factual confines of the cases. For instance, 

in Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, the Connecticut Supreme 
29

Court applied the Roper–Graham–Miller trilogy to a fifty-year sentence 

without the possibility of parole, a term of years, even though Roper,

Graham, and Miller involved only death or life-without-the-possibility-ofparole sentences. 115 A.3d 1031, 1045, 1048 (Conn. 2015). A number 

of commentators have stressed the general applicability of the Roper,

Graham, and Miller principles to criminal justice settings involving 

juveniles. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 Iowa L. 

Rev. 1787, 1789 (2016) (characterizing Miller as “a revolutionary 

decision” that “portends a tremendous shift in juvenile justice policy and 

practice”); Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, 

Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, 

and the Youth Discount, 31 Law & Ineq. 263, 317 n.287 (2013) 

(“[Adolescents’] crimes may be the same as those of adults, but these 

offenders simply are not adults and should not be sentenced as if they 

were.” (quoting ABA, The State of Criminal Justice 329 (2007)); Martin 

Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate 

Sentencing, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 457, 458 (2012) [hereinafter 

Guggenheim] (arguing that, after Graham, “juveniles have a substantive 

constitutional right to be sentenced as juveniles and that mandatory 

sentencing schemes designed for adults may not be automatically 

imposed on juveniles without courts first conducting a sentencing 

hearing at which prosecutors must bear the burden of proving that the 

juvenile deserves the sentence”); Elizabeth Scott et al., Juvenile 

Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 675, 

676 (2016) [hereinafter Scott] (“[M]any lawmakers have concluded that 

the analysis and principles at the heart of the Supreme Court’s 

constitutional framework have important implications for juvenile 
30

sentencing and parole regulation beyond the death penalty and [life 

without the possibility of parole].”).

Those viewing Miller as establishing broad principles of law draw 

support from Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Miller. In his dissent, he 

agreed with those who saw the larger application of Miller principles. 

Miller, 567 U.S. at 499–503, 132 S. Ct. at 2481–82 (Roberts, C.J., 

dissenting). According to Chief Justice Roberts, by emphasizing that 

children are different, the majority in Miller announced a general 

principle of reduced culpability that applies not only to the crimes at 

issue in the cases but generally to the criminal conduct of young 

offenders. Id.; see also Scott, 88 Temp. L. Rev. at 681. As will be seen 

below, our cases agree with the Chief Justice’s assessment.

B. Overview of Recent Iowa Supreme Court Cases. We have 

considered the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Roper, 

Graham, and Miller in a series of juvenile cases in which challenges to 

sentences were raised under the cruel and unusual punishment 

provision of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. State v. Sweet, 

879 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa 2016); State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 

2016); State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 

107; State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2013); Null, 836 N.W.2d 41. 

These cases generally demonstrate a broad and consistent application of 

the Roper–Graham–Miller principles under article I, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution.

We began our response to Roper, Graham, and Miller in Ragland, 

836 N.W.2d 107. In Ragland, we held that a life-without-the-possibilityof-parole sentence, even if commuted to a mandatory term of sixty years, 

violated the Roper–Graham–Miller principles under article I, section 17 of 

the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 122. In doing so, we explained that the 
31

substantive nature of the Miller holding limited the ability of the state to 

impose life without the possibility of parole without an individualized 

hearing. Id. at 114–17.

In Null, we modestly extended the approach in Ragland to a case in 

which a juvenile was sentenced to a mandatory term of 52.5 years. 836 

N.W.2d at 45. In Null, we recognized that his 52.5-year sentence might 

not technically be life without the possibility of parole, but emphasized 

the application of the principles of Roper, Graham, and Miller. Id. at 72–

73. Specifically, we stated “the notions in Roper, Graham, and Miller that 

‘children are different’ and that they are categorically less culpable than 

adult offenders apply as fully in this case as in any other.” Id. at 71.

We thus recognized that the teaching of Roper, Graham, and Miller

is not crime specific. Id. at 72–73. In Null, we held that the Roper–

Graham–Miller principles apply to lengthy prison terms imposed as a 

result of consecutive sentencing. Id. at 74.

Similarly, in Pearson, a seventeen-year-old offender convicted of 

two counts of first-degree robbery and two counts of first-degree burglary 

received a total cumulative sentence of fifty years and was not eligible for 

parole for thirty-five years. 836 N.W.2d at 91, 93, 96. As in Null, we 

noted that because “ ‘children are constitutionally different from adults,’ 

they ordinarily cannot be held to the same standard of culpability as 

adults in criminal sentencing.” Id. at 95 (quoting Null, 836 N.W.2d at 

74). We concluded the Roper–Graham–Miller principles applied and that 

it should be “rare or uncommon” for children to receive a lengthy prison 

term without the possibility of parole for the crimes committed in the 

case. Id. at 96. We remanded the matter to the district court for 

resentencing. Id. at 97.
32

In Lyle, a seventeen-year-old offender convicted of robbery in the 

second degree was sentenced to a ten-year prison sentence with a 

mandatory minimum of seven years. 854 N.W.2d at 381. We held that 

the Roper–Graham–Miller principles applied, vacated the sentence, and 

remanded the case to the district court for a Miller-type hearing. Id. at 

404. We concluded,

Miller is properly read to support a new sentencing 

framework that reconsiders mandatory sentencing for all 

children. Mandatory minimum sentencing results in cruel 

and unusual punishment due to the differences between 

children and adults. This rationale applies to all crimes, and 

no principled basis exists to cabin the protection only for the 

most serious crimes.

Id. at 402.

We further stated that “the sentencing of juveniles according to 

statutorily required mandatory minimums does not adequately serve the 

legitimate penological objectives in light of the child’s categorically 

diminished culpability.” Id. at 398. We noted that individualized 

sentencing requires the sentencer to “look[] behind the label of the crime 

into the details of the particular offense and the individual circumstances 

of the child.” Id. at 400–01. We again noted that the principles of Roper,

Graham, and Miller are not crime specific. Id. at 399.

Since Lyle, there have been two additional juvenile cruel and 

unusual punishment cases under article I, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution. In Seats, we emphasized that in the context of a Miller-type 

hearing the district court was to consider the features of youth outlined 

in Roper, Graham, and Miller as mitigating factors, and we required 

specific factual findings before a juvenile was sentenced to a mandatory 

term. 865 N.W.2d at 555–58. In Sweet, we held that life without the 
33

possibility of parole was categorically prohibited under article I, section 

17 of the Iowa Constitution. 879 N.W.2d at 839.

All the above cases emphasize several common themes drawn from 

Roper, Graham, and Miller. First, we have repeatedly stated that for 

purposes of the cruel and unusual punishment provision of article I, 

section 17, “children are different.” Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96; Null, 836 

N.W.2d at 71. Second, we have repeatedly emphasized that the 

differences between children and adults are not “crime specific.” Lyle, 

854 N.W.2d at 401; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70.

We have thus not limited Roper, Graham, and Miller to their 

specific factual context of life without the possibility of parole, as some 

have urged, but have instead applied the principles to mandatory prison 

terms of sixty years, 52.5 years, thirty years, and seven years. Further, 

we have emphasized that youth is a mitigating factor and that district 

courts should engage in detailed fact-finding before coming to the 

conclusion that adult sentences may be appropriate for juvenile 

offenders. Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 557–58; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70. 

Finally, we have repeatedly emphasized that the fact that a youth is 

approaching eighteen years of age does not defeat application of the 

Roper–Graham–Miller principles. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 831; Null, 836 

N.W.2d at 55.

II. Application of Principles Under Article I, Section 17 of the 

Iowa Constitution.

In this case, the offender has been convicted of offenses involving a 

forcible felony. The legislature has determined that these offenses tend 

to be more serious than nonforcible offenses and, as a result, a 

mandatory prison term is required for all offenders, including juvenile 

offenders.
34

The problem, however, is that under these statutes, juveniles and 

adults are treated the same. There is no recognition that juveniles are 

“constitutionally different” from adults and there is no recognition that 

this difference is not “crime specific.” Thus, two of the bedrock principles 

of Roper, Graham, and Miller, as applied in our cases, are offended by the 

undiscriminating nature of the statutes. See, e.g., Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 

at 96; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71–72.

Further, the application of the statutes, in this and every case, 

amounts to a de facto mandatory minimum prison term. Under these 

statutes, a juvenile offender will serve what amounts to a mandatory 

prison term of some length. Although formally eligible for parole from 

day one, it is clear, as a practical matter, that no action will be taken 

until the offender has been incarcerated for some period of time. It 

amounts to a de facto mandatory minimum sentence of undetermined 

length.

It is, of course, true that the offender is eligible for parole from day 

one. But this is form over substance. We have crossed the form over 

substance bridge before. In Ragland, the argument was made that a 

sixty-year mandatory prison term was not life without the possibility of 

parole and thus was outside the Roper–Graham–Miller principles. 836 

N.W.2d at 121. We rejected the claim, noting that the reasoning in 

Graham applies to life without the possibility of parole and to terms that 

are its practical equivalent. Id.

A mandatory minimum prison term of six months applied 

indiscriminately to juveniles and adults would certainly violate Lyle

principles. An indefinite mandatory prison term applied to both juveniles 

and adults suffers from the same kind of infirmity. Under the 

circumstances, we think the better approach is to allow a juvenile 
35

offender the opportunity to demonstrate why he or she should be treated 

differently than an adult.

Under the teaching of Roper, Graham, and Miller as implemented in 

the Ragland–Null–Pearson–Lyle–Seats–Sweet line of cases, the features of 

youth—namely, the impetuousness, the recklessness, the susceptibility 

to peer pressure, the lack of judgment—are not crime specific. They are 

applicable to all crimes. In Lyle, we declared application of these 

principles prevents the legislature from categorically imposing a 

mandatory minimum prison sentence that treats all juvenile offenders as 

if they were adults and refuses to allow a court to recognize the 

decreased culpability of youth. 854 N.W.2d at 402. Thus, in Lyle, we 

held that a seven-year mandatory minimum sentence could not be 

imposed without a hearing to consider the impact of the characteristics 

of youth in lessening criminal culpability. Id.

The defect of the statutes in this case is that they mandatorily 

apply to all juveniles and adults. They focus solely on the crime and 

prohibit in all cases consideration of the diminished culpability of a 

juvenile offender. See Guggenheim, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 490–91 

(“When the only inquiry made by the sentencing court is to consult the 

legislature’s mandatory punishment for the crime, without any further 

inquiry into whether the punishment is appropriate for a juvenile, for no 

other reason that it is appropriate for an adult, the Constitution requires 

more.”). Juveniles generally have less culpability than adults, and if that 

is true, they generally should receive lesser punishment for the same 

crime.

Further, there may well be circumstances, for instance, in which a 

juvenile offender is convicted of aiding and abetting under circumstances 

in which the offense occurred but was not intended by the juvenile, the 
36

juvenile had no direct involvement in the crime, and the Roper–Graham–

Miller factors weigh strongly in favor of diminished culpability. As we 

noted in Lyle, “A forcible felony can be the product of inane juvenile 

schoolyard conduct just as it can be the product of the cold and 

calculated adult conduct most people typically associate with a forcible 

felony . . . .” 854 N.W.2d at 401.

Could a mandatory prison term be automatically imposed on 

Propps without an opportunity to show diminished culpability in a Millertype hearing? I think not. Under our cases, and particularly under Lyle, 

a juvenile offender is entitled to a judicial determination that an 

indefinite period of incarceration for the individual defendant is not so 

disproportionate as to result in cruel and unusual punishment.

I recognize there are alternative theories that could affirm the 

district court in this case. For instance, it could be argued that the only 

automatic or mandatory result of the statutes is a relatively short period 

of confinement before a juvenile is considered for parole and that, in the 

case of forcible felonies, such a relatively brief period of mandatory 

imprisonment is constitutional as applied to all juvenile offenders. This 

rationale has some appeal. Yet, the mandatory nature of incarceration is 

much more appropriate for adults than for children with categorically 

diminished culpability. Further, some forcible felonies may be very 

serious offenses, while others less so. Finally, the difference between 

incarceration for a few months and potential probation is substantial and 

more than just a mere matter of calendar time. A prison term even for a 

relatively short period of time is crossing of a major Rubicon for the 

juvenile offender. A trip to the big house, no matter how brief, is not a 

de minimis event.
37

Another possibility would be to short circuit the Miller procedure in 

this case because of the unattractive nature of the facts so far developed. 

At the age of seventeen, Propps shot a person four times. No one would 

argue that the conduct of Propps amounted to inane schoolyard 

misconduct. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 401. These facts alone make him 

a strong candidate for incarceration as reflected in the district court’s 

imposition of four consecutive ten-year sentences.

Yet, Propps is entitled to attempt to make his Miller case before the 

district court. We do not deprive criminal defendants of procedural 

rights merely because of their perceived lack of merit. Just as a 

seemingly obviously guilty defendant is entitled to demand a fair trial, a 

juvenile offender is entitled to attempt to show that his diminished 

culpability recognized in Roper, Graham, and Miller requires that he or 

she be treated differently than adults for sentencing purposes. In short, 

we are confronted in this appeal with a question of law and procedure, 

not a question focusing on the specific facts and circumstances of Propps 

and his crimes.

I would thus remand this case to the district court for further 

proceedings. Nothing in this opinion, of course, precludes an 

appropriate prison sentence for Propps. What is precluded, under our 

approach to the Roper–Graham–Miller principles, is a statutory scheme 

imposing mandatory prison terms that categorically treat children the 

same as adults without affording an opportunity to show the diminished 

culpability of youth requires a different outcome. I would decide this 

case on this narrow, but important point.

For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent.

Hecht, J., joins this dissent.