1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

______________________________

)

NUEVOS DESTINOS, LLC, et al., )

 )

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 15-cv-1846 (EGS)

)

SAMUEL PECK, et al., )

 )

 Defendants. )

______________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction 

This action arises out of an alleged racketeering scheme 

spanning about eight years whereby defendants—twenty-two 

companies and individuals—purportedly used otherwise legitimate 

business entities to defraud plaintiffs by making false promises 

to sell agricultural goods. Plaintiffs sue defendants for: (1) 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)(“RICO”); (2) violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1962(d) (conspiracy to violate RICO); (3) conspiracy to 

commit fraud; (4) fraud; and (5) breach of contracts. Pending 

before the Court are several motions: (1) nine defendants’ eight 

motions to dismiss; (2) one defendant’s motion to strike certain 

declarations; (3) plaintiffs’ two motions to allow alternate 

service for seven defendants; (4) plaintiffs’ motion for 

jurisdictional discovery. 
2

The Court has carefully considered the pending motions, the 

opposition memoranda, the replies thereto, the entire record

herein, and the applicable law. The Court concludes that it 

lacks personal jurisdiction over the nine defendants and 

therefore GRANTS the eight pending motions to dismiss. The Court 

also concludes that jurisdictional discovery is not warranted

and DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for jurisdictional discovery. 

Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over the relevant

defendants, it DENIES AS MOOT plaintiffs’ motions for service 

and the motion to strike plaintiffs’ declarations. 

II. Background

The Court credits the complaint, which it must at this 

stage of the proceedings. This matter arises out of an alleged 

racketeering scheme, largely organized by two defendants, to 

defraud plaintiffs by making false promises to provide 

agricultural goods sold to and bought by plaintiffs. See 

generally Compl., ECF No. 1. The Court first describes the 

parties and then elaborates on the purported scheme. Because 

most of the defendants have not entered an appearance in the 

case, the Court focuses its discussion on the nine defendants

with pending motions to dismiss. 

A. The Parties

Plaintiffs are two corporate entities and one individual. 

First, Nuevos Destinos, LLC (“NDL”) is a company registered in 
3

Florida with its principal place of business in the District of 

Columbia (at the time of the injury) and Virginia (presently). 

Id. ¶ 9. It purchases agricultural products from Peru “for 

export from Peru and delivery to the United States and other 

countries.” Id. Plaintiff Nuevos Destinos Peru, S.A.C. (“NDP”)

is a company organized in Peru with its principal place of 

business in the District of Columbia (at the time of the injury) 

and Virginia (presently). Id. ¶ 10. It is the Peruvian 

“affiliate” of NDL and “serves as the purchasing agent” for NDL 

in Peru. Id. Finally, plaintiff William P. Cook (“Mr. Cook”) is 

a United States citizen who lives in the Commonwealth of 

Virginia. Id. ¶ 11. He and his wife are the principals of NDL, 

id. ¶ 9, and he “personally financed all of the agricultural 

transactions by which plaintiffs were defrauded,” id. ¶ 11. 

Defendants include one United States citizen, one United 

States corporation, and seven Peruvian citizens and 

corporations. The “central mastermind” of the scheme is Ignacio 

Harten Rodriguez Larrain (“Ignacio”). Id. ¶ 13. He is a Peruvian 

citizen who, “upon information and belief,” presently lives in 

the United States. He was the General Manager of Agricola 

Peruana Del Sol, S.R.L. (“APS”), a Peruvian company that 

processed and exported agricultural products from Peru to other 

countries, including the United States. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. Neither 

Ignacio, nor APS has entered an appearance in the case. The 
4

other central figure, according to plaintiffs, is defendant 

Samuel Peck (“Mr. Peck”), who was a founder and majority 

shareholder of APS. Id. ¶ 12. Mr. Peck is a United States 

citizen residing in Colorado. Id. During the relevant time, Mr. 

Peck was also the Vice President and chief buyer for defendant 

SKE Midwestern (“SKE”), a United States corporation registered 

and located in North Dakota. Id. ¶¶ 12, 17. SKE is a “beans 

broker, supplier, importer, processor and shipper” with over 

twenty years’ experience in international markets, including 

Peru. Id. ¶ 17. Defendant Emilio Farah (“Mr. Farah”) is a 

citizen of Peru and an alleged principal of two other defendant 

Peruvian corporations, Convalor, S.A.C. (“Convalor”) and 

Confactor, S.A.C. (“Confactor”). Id. ¶ 16. Mr. Farah sought to 

buy, process, and sell agricultural products with NDL and 

introduced plaintiffs to Ignacio. Id. 

Defendant Jorge Harten Costa, Sr. (“Jorge, Sr.”) is 

Ignacio’s father and is also a Peruvian citizen. Id. ¶ 20. He 

was a designated agent of APS. Id. Defendant Jorge Emilio Harten 

Rodriguez Larrain, Jr. (“Jorge, Jr.”) is also a Peruvian citizen 

and Ignacio’s brother (and Jorge, Sr.’s son). Id. ¶ 21. He was 

also a designated agent of APS. Id. Defendant Ofelia Maria 

Rodriguez Larrain Salinas de Harten (“Ofelia”) is also a 

Peruvian citizen. Id. ¶ 22. She is Jorge, Sr.’s wife and 

Ignacio’s mother. Id. Ofelia also became the “nominal public 
5

head of” Peruvian Organic International Trading, S.A.C. 

(“POIT”), another defendant Peruvian company that became the 

“successor in interest” to APS. Id. POIT has been “continu[ing] 

the fraudulent schemes of APS and [Ignacio].” Id. ¶ 23. POIT has 

not entered an appearance in the case. Finally, defendant Javier 

Rodriguez Larrain Salinas (“Javier”) is a Peruvian citizen and 

Ignacio’s uncle (Ofelia’s brother). Id. ¶ 24. When discussing 

these four defendants collectively, the Court will refer to 

Jorge, Sr.; Jorge, Jr.; Ofelia; and Javier as the “Harten 

family.”1

B. The Scheme

According to plaintiffs, the racketeering organization

essentially functioned as a Ponzi scheme, id. ¶ 96, whereby 

individual defendants—including the Harten family, Mr. Peck, 

SKE, Convalor, Confactor, and Mr. Farah—would “vouch” for 

Ignacio and APS, posing as uninterested parties, see id. ¶¶ 12-

30. In reality, these individual defendants had been defrauded 

by Ignacio and APS and were seeking to recoup their losses by 

recruiting new investors to defraud. See id. The new investors’ 

funds would not be used to purchase agricultural products, as 

 1 As mentioned, the Court omitted details about the defendants 

who have not entered an appearance in the case unless such 

information was necessary for context. 
6

the investors intended and Ignacio and APS promised, but would

rather be used to pay off the debts. See id.

In 2007, Ignacio and Mr. Peck, on behalf of SKE, created 

APS, which sold agricultural products internationally. Id. ¶ 67. 

At some point, SKE and Mr. Peck purchased significant amounts of 

products from APS. APS began “defaulting” on its promises to 

provide SKE with its agricultural products. Id. ¶ 70, see id. ¶¶ 

71-74. By 2011, APS owed SKE $3.6 million. Id. ¶ 74.

Accordingly, SKE’s President told Mr. Peck that “his job was on 

the line” and he had to do “whatever it took to get the 

Company’s money back from APS and [Ignacio].” Id. ¶ 74. At that 

point, Mr. Peck and Ignacio devised a scheme “whereby [Mr.] Peck 

would issue facially valid purchase orders on behalf of SKE and 

then [Ignacio] would shop them around to financing sources in 

Lima and abroad.” Id. ¶ 76. Mr. Peck and Ignacio then sold the

purchasing orders to investors, including the Harten family and 

Mr. Farah. Id. ¶¶ 79-82. By 2012, Mr. Peck and Ignacio owed the 

other defendants millions of dollars. See id. According to 

plaintiffs, these defendants sought to recover their lost 

investments by vouching for Ignacio and APS with the aim to

recruit new investors. See id. ¶ 96.

While this scheme was ongoing, NDL was looking to expand 

its business beyond financing exporting companies in Peru. In 

2012, it sought to buy products directly from Peruvian 
7

agricultural producers to sell and export. Id. ¶ 31. In April 

2012, Mr. Farah introduced plaintiffs to Ignacio in Peru. Id. ¶¶

32, 103 (meeting in Bujama, Peru). Mr. Farah said that Ignacio 

was “one of the largest exporters of bean products in Peru” and 

was “honest [and] well-connected.” Id. ¶ 31. In May 2012, 

plaintiffs met Mr. Peck at a lunch organized by Ignacio in Peru. 

Id. ¶ 88. In an effort to retain plaintiffs’ business, Mr. Peck 

told plaintiffs that “he had worked for a long time with 

[Ignacio]” and that he was “very pleased with the relationship.” 

Id. He also emphasized that APS was a “top exporter” and 

confirmed that the purchase order NDL was considering financing

was “for real,” and that SKE had “committed to purchase” the 

products at issue. Id. ¶ 89. Mr. Peck did not disclose the debt

that APS owed SKE, nor did he mention his ownership stake in 

APS. Id. ¶ 91. A month later, plaintiffs also met with Jorge, 

Sr. in Peru. Id. ¶ 106. Jorge, Sr. also recommended his son’s 

company and did not disclose APS’ debts. Id. In August 2012, 

Ignacio and his wife traveled to the District of Columbia to 

meet with plaintiffs in person. Id. ¶ 33.

On those recommendations and references, NDL began 

transacting with APS in May 2012. Id. ¶¶ 36, 100-102 (stressing 

the importance of the recommendations to plaintiffs’ decision to 

work with Ignacio and APS). NDL entered into several contracts 

with APS for various agricultural products. Ultimately, it 
8

provided over $1.5 million for about 1,500 metric tons of 

products. Id. ¶¶ 36, 37. Ultimately, APS only delivered about 64 

of the 1,500 tons of products. Id. The amounts “disbursed by NDL 

to APS for [agricultural] products . . . were solely for the 

benefit of NDL or its customers; or for customers for whom 

[Ignacio] led NDL to believe APS had specific purchaser orders, 

including SKE (which NDL later found out to be largely false).” 

Id. ¶ 37. Despite its many efforts, plaintiffs have been unable 

to “get a full and complete accounting of where its money went.” 

Id. ¶ 128. Plaintiffs have also been unsuccessful in recovering 

the money that they allege they are owed. See, e.g., id. ¶ 145 

(alleging to have received $48,540 of the $1.7 million owed).

After plaintiffs uncovered the defendants’ scheme, the 

Harten family created POIT, the company that succeeded APS, in 

2014. Id. ¶ 144. According to plaintiffs, defendants have 

continued the same racketeering activity through POIT. See id. 

¶¶ 83-84, 136-141.

III. Analysis 

In their eight pending motions to dismiss, the nine 

defendants challenge the complaint on several grounds. See 

Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mots.”), ECF Nos. 35, 36, 37, 

38, 45, 50, 52, 54. All nine defendants argue that the Court 

lacks personal jurisdiction over them pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). See id. Five of the defendants 
9

challenge the plaintiffs’ choice of forum pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and the forum non conveniens 

doctrine. See Defs.’ Mots., ECF Nos. 45, 50, 52, 54. Seven of 

the defendants also argue that they were improperly served 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). See Defs.’ 

Mots., ECF Nos. 35, 36, 37, 38, 50, 52. Finally, five of the 

defendants argue that plaintiffs failed to state a RICO claim 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Defs.’ 

Mots., ECF Nos. 45, 50, 52, 54. Because the Court agrees that it 

lacks personal jurisdiction over all nine defendants, it need 

not reach their other arguments. See Galvan v. Fed. Prison 

Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999)(“Jurisdiction 

must be established before a federal court may proceed to any 

other question.”)(citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998)).

A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendants

The nine defendants submit similar arguments in their eight 

motions to dismiss. See Defs.’ Mots., ECF Nos. 35, 36, 37, 38, 

45, 50, 52, 54. Essentially, the defendants argue—and the Court 

agrees—that this case is a Peruvian dispute about activities 

that occurred in Peru and injuries that were caused in Peru. 

See, e.g., Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 54-1 at 1-2 (“The complaint . . 

. describes an ordinary business dispute between two Peruvian 

companies . . . . [t]he conduct described in the complaint takes 
10

place almost entirely in Peru”). First, because none of the 

defendants reside here, all argue that the Court lacks general 

jurisdiction as they are not essentially “at home” in the 

District of Columbia (American defendants) or in the United 

States (Peruvian defendants). See Defs.’ Mots., ECF Nos. 35, 36, 

37, 38, 45, 50, 52, 54. The Peruvian defendants, including the 

Harten family, Confactor, Convalor, and Mr. Farah, also argue 

that the Court cannot establish jurisdiction over them by way of 

the RICO statute because it only provides for nationwide service 

of process on domestic defendants. Defs.’ Mots., ECF Nos. 35, 

36, 37, 38, 50, 52. The American defendants, SKE and Mr. Peck, 

also argue that the Court cannot acquire jurisdiction over them 

via the RICO statute because the Court does not have 

jurisdiction over at least one of the defendants in the 

enterprise, as it must. See Defs.’ Mots., ECF Nos. 45, 54. 

Finally, all of the defendants contend that the purportedly 

unlawful conduct occurred in Peru, and thus, the Court cannot 

acquire specific jurisdiction over them pursuant to the District 

of Columbia’s long arm statute or Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(k)(2) because there is no “substantial connection” 

between the defendants and the forum. See Defs.’ Mots., ECF Nos. 

35, 36, 37, 38, 45, 50, 52, 54. As such, the defendants conclude 

that exercising jurisdiction would violate due process. See id. 
11

Much of plaintiffs’ briefing regarding personal 

jurisdiction focuses on each defendant’s role in the RICO scheme 

and is therefore largely irrelevant to the Court’s 

jurisdictional analysis. Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 8-43.2 That 

said, plaintiffs respond that personal jurisdiction lies in this 

Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), known 

as the “federal long arm statute.” Id. at 9-15. Plaintiffs 

contend that jurisdiction is proper because “each of the 

defendants herein, had more than fair warning that the 

activities of APS and POIT would subject them to the 

jurisdiction of the U.S” because all the defendants had 

“personal knowledge” of the purported “business plan”: to 

defraud “U.S.-based customers.” Id. at 12.3 Moreover, plaintiffs 

argue that the defendants purposefully directed their activities 

at the forum by soliciting plaintiffs, citizens of the forum at 

the time, and encouraging investment in APS. See id. at 13-14. 

“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a factual basis 

for personal jurisdiction.” Canuto v. Mattis, No. 16-2282, 2018 

 2 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 

filed document.

3 “The Court may consider the jurisdictional allegations raised 

in [the plaintiffs’] opposition.” McIntosh v. Gilley, 753 F. 

Supp. 2d 46, 58 (D.D.C. 2010)(citation omitted).
12

WL 3213318, at *4 (D.D.C. June 30, 2018)(citing Okolie v. Future 

Servs. Gen. Trading & Contracting Co., W.L.L., 102 F. Supp. 3d 

172, 175 (D.D.C. 2015); Crane v. N. Y. Zoological Soc'y, 894 

F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). To meet that burden, the 

plaintiff “‘must allege specific acts connecting [the] defendant 

with the forum.’” Okolie, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 175 (quoting Second 

Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 

(D.C. Cir. 2001)). “In assessing whether this showing has been 

made, facts asserted by the plaintiff . . . [are] presumed to be 

true unless directly contradicted by affidavit,” AGS Int'l 

Servs. S.A. v. Newmont USA Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 2d 64, 81 (D.D.C. 

2004)(quotations and citations omitted), but a Court “‘may 

receive and weigh affidavits and other relevant matter to assist 

it in determining the jurisdictional facts,’” Okolie, 102 F. 

Supp. 3d at 175 (quoting Buesgens v. Brown, 567 F. Supp. 2d 26, 

31 (D.D.C. 2008)).

The Court assumes, for the purposes of resolving personal 

jurisdiction only, that defendants were properly served.4

However, “service of process does not alone establish personal 

jurisdiction.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 

 4 The Peruvian defendants all argue that they have not been 

properly served pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

4(f). See Defs.’ Mots., ECF Nos. 35, 36, 37, 38, 50, 52. Because

the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over the 

defendants regardless of whether they were properly served, it 

need not address this argument.
13

2005). “Before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 

defendant, there must be more than notice to the defendant.”

Omni Capital Intern., Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S.

97, 104 (1987). There must also be “authorization for service of 

summons on the defendant,” and a “constitutionally sufficient 

relationship between the defendant and the forum.” Id. Thus, 

“[t]wo requirements must be met for a District of Columbia court 

to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant.” Bradley v. 

DeWine, 55 F. Supp. 3d 31, 39 (D.D.C. 2014). “First, the 

defendant must qualify for either general or specific 

jurisdiction under the relevant . . . statutes.” Id. “Second, 

the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must comply with 

the Due Process Clause . . . .” Id. at 39-40 (citations 

omitted). 

Assessing whether a court may exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a defendant “typically implicates a state’s 

jurisdictional statute or rule.” Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., 

LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2014) (quotations and 

alterations omitted). Therefore, this Court has personal 

jurisdiction over the defendants if a District of Columbia court 

could exercise personal jurisdiction over them. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 4(k)(1)(A); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 

(2014)(“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in 

determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”).
14

However, the Court may also exercise personal jurisdiction if it 

is authorized by a federal statute or rule. See, e.g., Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C). Plaintiffs contend that the Court has 

jurisdiction over the defendants because it is authorized by the 

RICO statute, by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), and by 

the District of Columbia long arm statute. See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF 

No. 64 at 8-43. The Court will assess each offered basis for 

personal jurisdiction in turn.

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2)

Plaintiffs’ central argument is that the Court has personal 

jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

4(k)(2). See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 9-15. Rule 4(k)(2) 

provides jurisdiction for a claim under federal law when a 

defendant has been served and (1) “the defendant is not subject 

to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction”; 

and (2) “exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United 

States Constitution and laws.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). Rule 

4(k)(2) therefore “allows a district court to acquire 

jurisdiction over a foreign defendant which has insufficient 

contacts with any single state but has ‘contacts with the United 

States as a whole.’” In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 94 F.

Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2000)(quoting Advisory Comm. Note to 

1993 Amendment).
15

Because SKE and Mr. Peck are subject to jurisdiction in 

other states, see Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 12 (Peck is domiciled in 

Colorado), 17 (SKE is domiciled in North Dakota), the Court may 

obtain jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(k)(2) only over the 

Peruvian defendants, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)(A). As to the 

Peruvian defendants, plaintiffs have met the first three 

requirements of Rule 4(k)(2): (1) plaintiffs’ claims include 

RICO claims, which arise under federal law, see 18 U.S.C. § 

1962; (2) the Court assumes, but does not decide, that the 

defendants were properly served; and (3) the defendants are not 

subject to the jurisdiction of any single state court, see 

generally Defs.’ Replies, ECF Nos. 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82 (not 

arguing that jurisdiction exists in another state); Mwani, 417 

F.3d at 11 (“so long as a defendant does not concede to 

jurisdiction in another state, a court may use 4(k)(2) to confer 

jurisdiction”) (citations and quotations omitted). Thus, 

jurisdiction depends on the final element of the analysis: 

whether the exercise of jurisdiction is “consistent with the 

Constitution.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)(B). This inquiry “turns 

on whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the nation 

as a whole to satisfy due process.” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11. 

The Court may exercise one of two types of personal 

jurisdiction: “general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific 

or case-linked jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
16

S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). The existence of 

general jurisdiction permits the Court to hear “any and all 

claims” brought against the defendant, while “specific 

jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving 

from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes 

jurisdiction.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

The Court first evaluates whether there is general 

jurisdiction over each of the Peruvian defendants pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). Concluding there is 

not, the Court analyzes whether there is specific jurisdiction 

over each with respect to the particular claims in this action. 

a. General Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs do not explicitly argue that there is general 

jurisdiction over any defendant. See generally Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF 

No. 64; Pls.’ Mot. for Jurisdictional Discovery (“Mot. for 

Discovery”), ECF No. 63. However, in arguing that the Court has 

jurisdiction, plaintiffs point to the Peruvian defendants’

general connections to the United States. See generally id. 

Because most of these alleged connections are unrelated to 

plaintiffs’ claims—and the specific jurisdiction analysis 

focuses on the defendant’s suit-related connections to the 

forum, see Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014)—the Court 

will assume that plaintiffs argue that the Court has general 

jurisdiction over those defendants. 
17

To establish general jurisdiction, plaintiffs must 

demonstrate that the Peruvian defendants’ contacts with the 

United States are “so constant and pervasive as to render [them] 

essentially at home in” the United States. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 

122 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). Plaintiffs have not done 

so. For example, plaintiffs do not allege that any of the

Peruvian defendants are domiciled, incorporated, or have a

principal place of business in the United States. See id. at 137

(“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of 

general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a 

corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the 

corporation is fairly regarded as at home. With respect to a 

corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of 

business are paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.”) 

(citations and quotations omitted). To the contrary, the 

complaint alleges that: (1) Mr. Farah is domiciled in Peru, id. 

¶ 16; (2) Jorge, Sr. is domiciled in Peru, id. ¶ 20; (3) Jorge, 

Jr. is domiciled in Peru, id. ¶ 21; (4) Ofeila is domiciled in 

Peru, id. ¶ 22; (5) Javier is domiciled in Peru, id. ¶ 26; (6)

Convalor is a “Peruvian compan[y],” id. ¶ 16; and (7) Confactor 

is also a “Peruvian company[y],” id; see also Defs.’ Affs., ECF 

Nos. 35-1 (Javier), 36-1 (Jorge, Sr.), 37-1 (Jorge, Jr.), 38-1 

(Ofelia), 52-1 (Farah and Convalor), 82-1 (Farah and 
18

Convalor)(all swearing that they do not reside in the United 

States). 

While not entirely clear, plaintiffs seem to argue that the 

Court may nonetheless exercise general jurisdiction over the 

Peruvian defendants due to their various connections with the 

United States. See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 63 at 8-43. However,

various connections to a jurisdiction that are not otherwise

continuous and systematic cannot confer general jurisdiction. 

See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (“only a limited set of 

affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to 

all-purpose jurisdiction”). Indeed, a defendant’s connections to 

the United States must render that defendant essentially at home 

in the United States such that “all-purpose” jurisdiction is 

warranted. See Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 

30 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, 851 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2017). For 

instance, in Livnat v. Palestinian Authority, Judge KollarKotelly found that the Palestinian Authority was not 

“essentially at home” in the United States even though it 

allegedly had “many connections” to the country, including “the 

performance of fundraisers, community outreach, cultural events, 

and lectures, as well as certain governmental services, 

particularly consular services.” Id. So here too. Assuming the 

Peruvian defendants’ alleged various connections to the United 

States are true, plaintiffs cannot establish that they are 
19

“essentially at home” in the United States solely on that basis. 

Indeed, the fact that the Peruvian defendants must travel to the 

United States and obtain visas suggests that they are not at 

home in the United States. See id. (finding that the many 

connections in fact suggested the defendant was not at home in 

the United States). 

To illustrate, plaintiffs suggest that the Court has 

general jurisdiction over Jorge, Sr. because he is a partner in 

a Peruvian law firm that does “extensive work and advertises in 

the United States” and he has several clients located in the 

United States. Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 15-16. He is also 

allegedly a director of an airline that flies to several cities 

in the United States. Id. at 16; see also Cook Decl., ECF No. 

64-1 at 15-16. Plaintiffs also suggest that the Court has 

jurisdiction over Jorge, Sr. because he is a lawyer and advisor 

to APS, which “did substantial business” with United States 

citizens: Mr. Peck and SKE. Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 17.

However, the fact that Jorge, Sr. did business with United 

States citizens and is a “frequent business and personal 

traveler to the U.S.” holding “multiple, re-entry B1/B2 visitor 

visa[s],” id. at 16, does not render him “essentially at home” 

in the United States such that the Court may exercise “allpurpose” jurisdiction over him, Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122; see 

also Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 30-31 (finding the defendants’
20

general affiliations with the United States were not so 

continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home). 

Likewise, plaintiffs argue that the Court has jurisdiction 

over Ofelia because she “visited the United States regularly, as 

recently as September 2015, according to the Facebook page of 

her daughter.” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 27; see also Cook 

Decl., ECF no. 64-1 at 16. Plaintiffs similarly contend that the 

Court has jurisdiction over Jorge, Jr. because “he has visited 

the United States regularly,” may have made visits to the 

District of Columbia, and may have conducted business in the 

United States. Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 29; see also Cook 

Decl., ECF no. 64-1 at 15. Plaintiffs argue that the Court has 

jurisdiction over Javier because he is also a partner of the 

Peruvian law firm with American clients and is the director of 

several companies that do business in the United States. Pls.’ 

Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 30-31. Plaintiffs posit that it is likely 

that Javier’s work has “taken him repeatedly to the United 

States.” Id. at 31; see also Cook Decl., ECF No. 64-1 at 15.

Plaintiffs also contend that Javier has travelled “extensively” 

in the United States for business, pleasure, and to “receive 

medical treatments for a serious illness.” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 

64 at 32. As with Jorge, Sr., assuming such allegations are 

true, these limited connections and general affiliations do not 

allow the Court to exercise general jurisdiction. See Livnat, 82 
21

F. Supp. 3d at 30. The Court cannot find that traveling to the 

United States or doing business with United States’ citizens 

renders these defendants “essentially at home” in the United 

States. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122.

Plaintiffs offer similar, non-persuasive arguments for Mr. 

Farah. For example, they argue that he is a “principal” in a 

textile company that may advertise in the United States, Pls.’ 

Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 34; that he has “quite a few direct 

connections with the United States, including the fact that he 

has visited the District of Columbia several times,” id. at 36; 

and that he has a daughter who attends college in the United 

States, id. at 36-37; see Cook Decl., ECF No. 64-1 at 3-4. These 

arguments fail for the same reason: limited connections to the 

United States do not render a foreign defendant essentially at 

home in the forum. See Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 30. However, 

plaintiffs also posit that Mr. Farah owns another home in the 

United States. See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 37; Cook Decl., 

ECF No. 64-1 at 3. Ultimately, the Court need not determine 

whether such alleged homeownership renders Mr. Farah “at home” 

in the United States. First, if Mr. Farah did own a home in the 

United States, he would not fall within the reach of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2)(A)(requiring that the defendant 

not be subject to jurisdiction in any state’s court of general 

jurisdiction). Moreover, Mr. Farah denies owning a home in the 
22

United States in his sworn declaration. See Farah Decl., ECF No. 

82-1 ¶ 2 (“I do not own any interest in any real property, 

apartment, or condominium in the United States . . . . I 

mentioned to Mr. Cook once that I thought about purchasing an 

apartment for my daughter to live in while she attended college 

in the U.S., but I never made such a purchase.”). In light of 

this sworn declaration, the Court may not exercise general 

jurisdiction based solely on plaintiffs’ unsubstantiated 

speculation. See NBC-Housing, Inc. Twenty-Six, v. Donovan, 774 

F. Supp. 2d 277, 293-94 (D.D.C. 2011)(refusing to accept 

plaintiff’s speculation in light of the defendant’s sworn 

declaration when determining whether to exercise personal 

jurisdiction). As for Convalor and Confactor, plaintiffs do not 

attempt to argue that the Peruvian companies have any 

connections to the United States separate from Mr. Farah. See 

id. at 33-38; Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, (1980)(holding that 

the test for personal jurisdiction must be met “as to each 

defendant”).

Because none of the Peruvian defendants are essentially at 

home in the United States, the Court cannot exercise general 

jurisdiction over any of the Peruvian defendants pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).
23

b. Specific Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs also suggest, without specifically arguing, that 

the Court has specific jurisdiction over the Peruvian defendants 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). See Pls.’ 

Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 8-43. In evaluating specific jurisdiction, 

“[t]he question is whether the . . . defendants have sufficient 

minimum contacts with the United States so as not to offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice as 

required under the Due Process Clause.” Oceanic Expl. Co. v. 

ConocoPhillips, Inc., No. CIV 04-332, 2006 WL 2711527, at *14 

(D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2006)(citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474). As 

here, “[w]here a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction 

over [a foreign] defendant who has not consented to suit there, 

[the] fair warning requirement is satisfied if the defendant has 

purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum,” 

and “the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out 

of or relate to those activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472. 

The question, then, is whether the Peruvian defendants 

purposefully directed their activities at the United States, 

such that they could reasonably expect to be subject to 

litigation here, and whether the plaintiffs’ injury arises out 

of that contact. See Mwani, 417 F.3d at 13 (finding the 

plaintiffs made a prima facie showing that the defendants 

“purposefully directed their activities at residents of the 
24

United States” and that “this litigation results from injuries 

to the plaintiffs that arise out of or relate to those 

activities”; as such, defendants had a “fair warning that their 

activities would subject them to the jurisdiction of the United 

States”)(quotations and citations omitted).

Plaintiffs contend that the defendants had “more than fair 

warning that the actions of APS and POIT would submit them to 

the jurisdiction of the U.S.” See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 12. 

Their argument is that the defendants all knew about the APS’ 

“business plan” to recruit and defraud investors from the United 

States. See id. at 12-15. Thus, plaintiffs argue that, because 

the defendants knew about APS’ actions, the defendants

“solicit[ed] business relationships” with plaintiffs and other 

American victims to generate APS funding. Id. at 12-13. In so 

doing, plaintiffs claim that the defendants facilitated the RICO 

scheme. Id. at 14. 

The Peruvian defendants all move to dismiss on similar 

grounds. They each argue that their alleged wrongdoing occurred 

in Peru and, as such, they did not direct any activity toward

the United States. See, e.g., Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 35 at 14-15. 

For example, the defendants point to the fact that that each are 

alleged to have “vouched” for Ignacio’s honesty and APS’ 

legitimacy while meeting with plaintiffs in Peru. See id.

Moreover, the defendants contend that plaintiffs conflate APS’ 
25

and Ignacio’s wrongdoing with their own, while their contact 

with the United States must be assessed separately. See, e.g., 

id. at 13-14, 16. Ultimately, defendants argue that asserting 

jurisdiction over them would violate due process because they 

did not direct any activity toward the forum or the United 

States. See, e.g., id. at 14-18. As such, it was not foreseeable 

that they could be hauled into court in the United States.

In order to establish specific jurisdiction, plaintiffs 

must show that each individual defendant purposefully directed 

his or her activities at the United States; the plaintiffs’ 

injuries “must proximately result from actions by the defendant 

himself that create a substantial connection with the forum 

State.” Thompson Hine, LLP v. Taieb, 734 F.3d 1187, 1190 (D.C. 

Cir. 2013)(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475)(emphasis in 

original); see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 

781 n.13 (“Each defendant’s contacts with the forum . . . must 

be assessed individually.”). Plaintiffs first argue that the 

defendants had “fair warning” that they could be subject to 

specific jurisdiction in the United States because they knew 

that: (1) APS and POIT sought to solicit American investors; (2) 

APS and POIT intended to do business in the United States, and; 

(3) APS and POIT shipped products to the United States. See 

Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 12-14. This argument is unavailing. 

Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the defendants themselves
26

shipped products to the United States, solicited American 

investors, or sought entry to American markets. See generally 

id.; Compl., ECF No. 1. Indeed, the thrust of their argument is 

that the nine defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of this 

Court based on other defendants’ actions. See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF 

No. 64 at 12 (arguing that defendants had “fair warning that the 

actions of APS and POIT would submit them to the jurisdiction of 

the U.S”)(emphasis added); see also Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 45, 47, 

65, 124 (alleging, among other injurious conduct, that APS and 

Ignacio, and not the other defendants, entered into contracts 

with plaintiffs). The Court cannot assert personal jurisdiction 

over the nine defendants based on APS’ or Ignacio’s alleged 

connection to the United States, as due process protects 

individuals from being subject to binding judgments in forums 

where the individual has no meaningful connection. See Burger 

King, 471 U.S. at 471-72. 

Plaintiffs also argue that certain defendants had 

sufficient contact with the United States because they were 

officers or employees of APS when it did “substantial business” 

with SKE and Mr. Peck, both American citizens. See Pls.’ Opp’n, 

ECF No. 64 at 17 (Jorge, Sr.), 29 (Jorge, Jr.). This argument is 

similarly unavailing. Again, the Court cannot assert 

jurisdiction over individual defendants based on another 

defendant’s actions. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. Even if 
27

some of the Peruvian defendants were officers of APS or POIT, 

and even if the Court indeed has jurisdiction over APS and POIT,5

a court cannot assert jurisdiction over a corporation’s officers 

or employees by mere virtue of its jurisdiction over the 

corporation. See Mouzon v. Radiancy, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 3d 361, 

371 (D.D.C. 2015)(stating that the defendant’s contacts with the 

forum “must be assessed based on his actions—separately from the 

corporation’s contacts with the forum”). Plaintiffs have not 

argued that any Peruvian defendant is “more than an employee,” 

warranting exception to the fiduciary shield doctrine. Id. at 

371-72 (“Under the fiduciary shield doctrine, personal 

jurisdiction over a corporate officer may not be asserted based 

on contacts with the forum that are exclusively in relation to 

the defendant's corporate responsibility.”)(citations and 

quotations omitted); see generally Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64. 

Thus, the Court may not exercise jurisdiction over the 

individual Peruvian defendants based only on APS’ or POIT’s 

actions.6

 5 APS and POIT have not entered an appearance in this case. Thus, 

the Court need not address whether jurisdiction may be exercised 

over them. 

6 For the same reason, plaintiffs’ attempted “stream of commerce” 

argument fails. Plaintiffs only allege that APS and POIT caused

agricultural products to be shipped into the United States. 

Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 14. They do not allege that the 

Peruvian defendants themselves shipped agricultural products 

into the United States. See id. 
28

Similarly, plaintiffs do not allege that the Peruvian 

defendants themselves solicited plaintiffs or any other United 

States citizens. Instead, plaintiffs allege that it was Ignacio 

and APS who solicited their business. See, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 

1 ¶¶ 45, 47, 65, 124. Plaintiffs claim that the Peruvian 

defendants merely “vouched” for APS and Ignacio when meeting 

with plaintiffs in Peru. See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 24 

(Jorge, Sr.), 32 (Javier), 35 (Farah), 36 (Farah acting on 

behalf of Convalor). In vouching for the company, plaintiffs 

allege that the Peruvian defendants did not disclose that they 

lost money investing in APS or that Ignacio was committing 

fraud. See id. at 24; see also Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 88-90, 106, 

158. Plaintiffs do not allege that the Peruvian defendants 

themselves sought investors in the United States. See generally 

id. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ reliance on Citadel Investment

Group, LLC v. Citadel Capital Co. is unavailing. Pls.’ Opp’n, 

ECF No. 64 at 13 (discussing 699 F. Supp. 2d 303 (D.D.C. 2010)

for the proposition that a court may have jurisdiction over a 

foreign defendant when the foreign defendant solicits business 

relationships with residents of the United States). In that 

case, the court found that it had jurisdiction over the 

defendant because it had admittedly “actively solicit[ed] 

wealthy investors in the United States” and in doing so, 

“purposefully sought meaningful contacts, ties, or relations 
29

with the United States by seeking investors in the United 

States.” Citadel, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 315. Not so here. Unlike 

the Citadel defendants, the Peruvian defendants here lacked

“fair warning that [their] activities would subject [them] to 

the jurisdiction of the United States” because they did not 

purposefully seek business relationships with investors in the 

United States. Id. (quoting Mwani, 417 F.3d at 13)(alterations 

omitted).

Nevertheless, plaintiffs suggest that “vouching” for APS 

and Ignacio, or in Mr. Farah’s case, “introducing” plaintiffs to 

Ignacio and APS, constitutes purposefully directing activities 

at the United States. See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 8-43. As 

discussed, the Peruvian defendants all allegedly vouched for 

Ignacio and APS while meeting with plaintiffs in Peru. See 

Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 32, 103 (Farah), 106 (Jorge, Sr.); Pls.’ 

Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 24 (Jorge, Sr.), 32 (Javier), 35 (Farah), 

36 (Farah acting on behalf of Convalor). Because all of the 

Peruvian defendants’ allegedly injurious conduct occurred 

abroad, “jurisdiction is proper only if the defendant has 

‘purposefully directed’ [his or her] activities towards the 

forum and if defendant's ‘conduct and connection with the forum 

State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being 

[hauled] into court there.’” Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian 
30

Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Burger 

King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472, 474). 

The fact that defendants “vouched” for APS and Ignacio in 

Peru does not create minimum contacts with the United States. 

Rather than directing their activities toward the United States, 

the Peruvian defendants are alleged to have directed their 

injurious activity toward plaintiffs, who happen to be United 

States citizens. See, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 32, 103 

(Farah), 106 (Jorge, Sr.); Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 24 (Jorge, 

Sr.), 32 (Javier), 35 (Farah), 36 (Farah acting on behalf of 

Convalor). Such contact is insufficient. In Walden v. Fiore, the 

Supreme Court held that a defendant's actions outside the forum 

did not create sufficient contacts with the forum simply because 

the defendant directed his conduct at residents of the forum. 

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285-86, 288-89 (2014)(“Such 

reasoning improperly attributes a plaintiff's forum connections 

to the defendant and makes those connections ‘decisive’ in the 

jurisdictional analysis.”). The Court must “look[] to the 

defendant's contacts with the forum . . . itself, not the 

defendant's contacts with persons who reside there.” Id. at 285; 

see also id. (“But the plaintiff cannot be the only link between 

the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s 

conduct that must form the necessary connection . . . .”).

Plaintiffs have simply not alleged that the Peruvian defendants’ 
31

course of conduct occurred in or was directed at the United 

States and that such conduct caused plaintiffs’ injuries. See 

generally Compl., ECF No. 1; Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64; see 

Walden, 571 U.S. at 289 (concluding the “proper lens” for 

viewing jurisdictionally relevant contacts is “whether the 

defendant’s actions connect him to the forum”)(emphasis in 

original). As such, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction.

Finally, any allegations about the defendants’ general 

connections to the United States, as discussed previously supra 

Sec. III.A.1.a, cannot create specific jurisdiction because such 

connections to the United States are unrelated to plaintiffs’ 

injuries. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (clarifying that specific 

jurisdiction “focuses on the relationship among the defendant, 

the forum, and the litigation . . . . to exercise jurisdiction 

consistent with due process, the defendant's suit-related

conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum”) 

(emphasis added). Indeed, none of the defendant’s alleged 

connections to the United States is suit-related. See Pls.’ 

Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 8-43 (discussing the defendants’ unrelated 

business ventures that involve American clients, leisure or 

health visits, and irrelevant family connections to the United 

States); Cook Decl., ECF No. 64-1 (same). 
32

In sum, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction 

over the Peruvian defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(k)(2). 

2. District of Columbia Long Arm Statutes

Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege that the Court has 

jurisdiction under the District of Columbia long arm statute. 

Instead it alleges that personal jurisdiction is proper under 

RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1965. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 3. Nevertheless, 

plaintiffs suggest in their omnibus opposition memorandum that 

personal jurisdiction may exist pursuant to the District of 

Columbia long arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423. See generally 

Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 8-43. Plaintiffs do not identify 

which provision(s) of the long arm statute are applicable. See 

generally id. (citing “D.C. Code § 13-423” without identifying a 

subsection); Pls.’ Mot. for Discovery, ECF No. 63 (same). The 

Court is left to guess. 

D.C. Code § 13-423 authorizes the exercise of specific 

jurisdiction under certain enumerated circumstances, including 

when an entity or individual (1) transacts any business in the 

District; (2) contracts to supply services in the District; (3) 

causes tortious injury in the District by an act or omission in 

the District; (4) causes tortious injury by an act outside the 

District if the entity or individual regularly does business in 

the District, engages in a persistent course of conduct in the 
33

District, or derives substantial revenue from goods or services 

used, consumed, or rendered in the District; or (5) has an 

interest in, uses, or possesses real property in the 

District. D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1)-(5)(omitting other plainly 

irrelevant subsections). If jurisdiction over a person or entity 

is based solely on the statute, only a claim for relief arising 

from acts enumerated in the statute may be asserted against the 

person or entity. Id. § 13-423(b). “While the long arm statute 

is interpreted broadly and factual disputes are to be resolved 

in favor of the plaintiff, plaintiff must allege some specific 

facts evidencing purposeful activity by the defendant in the 

District of Columbia by which it invoked the benefits and 

protections of the District's laws.” FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX 

Markets, Ltd., 479 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39 (D.D.C. 2007), aff'd, 529 

F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2008)(quotations and citations omitted).

Subsections (a)(2),(3), and (5) are obviously inapplicable 

here, as plaintiffs have not alleged that any of the nine 

defendants supplied services in the District of Columbia, 

committed an act or omission in the District of Columbia, or has 

an interest in or possesses real property in the District of 

Columbia.7 See generally Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64; Cook Decl., ECF 

No. 64-1; Compl., ECF No. 1.

 7 While plaintiffs speculate that Mr. Farah owns property the 

United States, they do not state that he owns property in the 
34

Subsection (a)(1) is also inapplicable because plaintiffs 

do not allege that the defendants transacted business in the 

District of Columbia. See generally id. Accepting plaintiffs’ 

allegations as true, the Peruvian defendants’ injurious conduct 

included “vouching” for APS and Ignacio in Peru, causing 

plaintiffs to invest in the company. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 

32, 103, 106; Cook Decl., ECF No. 64-1 ¶¶ 41-43 (describing 

meetings in Peru). This activity occurred in Peru. See id.

Because none of the operative events occurred in the District of 

Columbia, the Court cannot find that the Peruvian defendants 

were “transacting business in the District of Columbia.” See FC

Inv. Grp. LC, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41 (finding that the 

defendants were not transacting business in the District of 

Columbia because London was the “locus” of the “overwhelming 

number of operative events”). 

As for SKE and Mr. Peck, plaintiffs seems to allege that 

they transacted business in the District of Columbia because

they “entic[ed] buyers such as plaintiffs to enter into the 

fraudulent transactions with APS and SKE” by “providing APS 

numerous phony purchase orders for products that SKE had no 

 

District of Columbia. See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 37. More 

importantly, Mr. Farah’s sworn declaration establishes that he 

does not. See Farah Decl., ECF No. 82-1 ¶ 2 (“I do not own any 

interest in any real property, apartment, or condominium in the 

United States”).
35

intention of purchasing, but which Ignacio and APS would then 

use to induce victims . . . .” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 41. 

This activity also occurred in Peru. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 

94, 99; see id. ¶ 76 (“Peck soon thereafter cooked up a scheme 

with Harten whereby Peck would issue facially valid purchase 

orders . . . and then [Ignacio] would shop them around to 

financing sources in Lima and abroad. At one point, [Ignacio] 

and Peck had 6 purported SKE purchase orders hanging on a board 

in the APS office in Lima, visible on entry to the office by . . 

. plaintiffs.”); see also Cook Decl., ECF No. 64-1 ¶¶ 49-53, 57. 

Moreover, to the extent plaintiffs argue that the Court has 

jurisdiction over SKE and Mr. Peck because they too “vouched” 

for APS and Ignacio, such conduct also occurred in Peru. See id.

¶¶ 88-91 (“NDL first met Peck at a lunch organized by [Ignacio] 

in Lima, Peru [at which he vouched for APS and Ignacio]”); see 

also Cook Decl., ECF No. 64-1 ¶ 49 (describing meeting with Peck 

in Peru). The fact that the defendants’ actions in Peru induced 

plaintiffs, who happened to be District of Columbia citizens, 

cannot confer jurisdiction, as the defendants did not direct any

conduct at the forum. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 285 (“But the 

plaintiffs cannot be the only link between the defendant and the 

forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the 

necessary connection . . . .”); see also Novak–Canzeri v. Al 

Saud, 864 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D.D.C. 1994)(“The claim itself must 
36

have arisen from the business transacted in the District of 

Columbia or there is no jurisdiction.”). 

D.C. Code § 13-423 subsection (a)(4) is also inapplicable. 

Pursuant to that subsection, the Court may exercise personal 

jurisdiction even if the injurious conduct occurred outside the 

District of Columbia. However, to invoke the subsection, the 

defendant must regularly do business in the District, engage in 

a persistent course of conduct in the District, or derive 

substantial revenue from goods consumed or services rendered in 

the District. D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4). Plaintiffs have not 

alleged any facts to suggest that any of the defendants meet 

these requirements. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1; Pls.’ 

Opp’n, ECF No. 64; Cook Decl., ECF No. 64-1. Despite reading the 

lengthy briefing and complaint closely, the Court is unable to 

identify any activity or conduct that occurred in the District 

involving the nine defendants,8 beyond receiving a few emails or 

phone calls, such that the Court could assume the defendants 

regularly do business or engage in a persistent course of 

 8 Plaintiffs allege that there was a single meeting that occurred 

in the District of Columbia between Ignacio, his wife, and 

plaintiffs. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 33. As previously discussed, 

the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the nine 

defendants based on another defendant’s meeting. See Walden, 571 

U.S. at 284 (“[T]he relationship [between the forum and the 

defendant] must arise out of the contacts that the defendant 

himself creates with the forum State.”)(quotations and citations 

omitted). 
37

conduct in the District. See Compl., ECF No. ¶¶ 60 (receiving a 

telephone call from Mr. Peck), 178-181 (receiving emails from 

APS and Ignacio); Cook Decl., ECF No. 64-1 ¶¶ 45(receiving an 

email on which Jorge, Sr. was copied), 57 (receiving a telephone 

call from Mr. Peck). Sending emails or making phone calls to 

District residents does not constitute conducting “regular 

business” or engaging in a “persistent course of conduct” in the 

District of Columbia. See Naegele v. Albers, 110 F. Supp. 3d 

126, 153 (D.D.C. 2015)(finding that making calls and sending 

emails to plaintiffs located in the District of Columbia “do 

not, standing alone, constitute a persistent course of conduct”

pursuant to the long arm statute)(citing FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d 

at 1095 n. 9 (finding that even regular calls from the London 

defendant to the District were insufficient to establish long 

arm jurisdiction under sections (a)(1) and (a)(4)); Houlahan v. 

Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d 86, 89-90 (D.D.C. 2013)(concluding that 

an email sent to a resident in the District of Columbia does not 

constitute a persistent course of conduct in the District of 

Columbia)); see also Tavoulareas v. Comnas, 720 F.2d 192, 194 

(D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding making calls to the District does not 

constitute acts “in the District” as pursuant to subsection 

(a)(4)). Moreover, plaintiffs do not allege that any of the nine 

defendants derived substantial revenue from goods consumed or 
38

services rendered in the District. See generally Compl., ECF No. 

1; Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64; Cook Decl., ECF No. 64-1.

Finally, while not invoking a particular statute, 

plaintiffs seem to argue that the Court has general jurisdiction 

over SKE based on its potential “continuous and systemic” 

contact with the District of Columbia market. Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF 

No. 64 at 39. Plaintiffs contend that SKE advertises to District 

of Columbia residents via its website. They argue that its 

agricultural products “quite likely end up, after travelling 

through the flow of commerce, in the District of Columbia.” Id. 

“D.C. Code § 13–334(a) permits courts to exercise general 

jurisdiction over a foreign corporation as to claims not arising 

from the corporation's conduct in the District if the 

corporation is doing business in the District.” FC Inv. Grp., 

529 F.3d at 1901 (quotations and alterations omitted). “Under 

the Due Process Clause, such general jurisdiction over a foreign 

corporation is only permissible if the defendant's business 

contacts with the forum are ‘continuous and systematic.’” Id. at 

1091-92 (quoting Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 

506, 510 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 

Plaintiffs seem to suggest that SKE’s contact with the 

District of Columbia is continuous and systematic because it 

maintains a website that District of Columbia residents are able 

to access and its products may likely end up in the District of 
39

Columbia. Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 39-43. “Under certain 

circumstances, a foreign corporation's maintenance of a website 

that is accessible in the District can satisfy general 

jurisdiction requirements.” FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at 1092

(citations omitted). However, the “mere accessibility” of a 

website cannot establish general jurisdiction. Id. Instead, the 

website must be (1) “interactive” and (2) District of Columbia 

residents “must use the website in a continuous and systematic 

way.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted); see also 

Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52 

(D.D.C. 2003) (“[T]he question is not whether District of 

Columbia residents ‘can’ transact business in the District with 

the non-resident defendant through the defendant's website, but 

if they actually ‘do’ engage in sustained business activities in 

a continuous and systematic way.”)(citing Gorman, 293 F.3d at 

512-13). Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to suggest that 

District of Columbia residents use SKE’s website in a continuous 

and systematic way. See generally Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at 39-

43. Indeed, plaintiffs essentially allege that SKE has a website 

that is generally accessible to District of Columbia residents, 

and nothing more. See GTE New Media Services Inc. v. BellSouth 

Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[P]ersonal 

jurisdiction surely cannot be based solely on the ability of 

District residents to access defendants' websites, for this does 
40

not by itself show any persistent course of conduct by the 

defendants in the District.”). 

Moreover, the fact that SKE products could eventually end 

up in the District of Columbia does not confer general 

jurisdiction. Assuming plaintiffs are invoking a “stream of 

commerce” argument, “the Supreme Court has made clear that ‘the 

placement of a product into the stream of commerce ... do[es] 

not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum 

has general jurisdiction over a defendant.’” Pinkett v. Dr. 

Leonard's Healthcare Corp., No. 18-cv-1656 (JEB), 2018 WL 

5464793, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2018)(quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. 

at 132)(emphasis in original). Moreover, plaintiffs cannot rely 

on this steam of commerce argument to suggest that the Court has 

specific jurisdiction over SKE because plaintiffs’ injuries do 

not arise from SKE’s placement of agricultural products in the 

District of Columbia. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (“specific 

jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving 

from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes 

jurisdiction.")(quotations and citations omitted). 

As such, plaintiffs cannot exercise jurisdiction over any 

of the nine defendants pursuant to the District of Columbia long 

arm statutes.
41

3. RICO

Plaintiffs also argue that the Court has personal 

jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to RICO. Compl., ECF 

No. 1 ¶ 3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) and (b)). The RICO statute 

“provides for nationwide personal jurisdiction over all domestic 

defendants to ensure that all co-conspirators can be brought 

before one judge in a single forum, regardless of the 

defendants' contact with the forum state.” Oceanic Expl. Co, 

2006 WL 2711527, at *12 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1965). Indeed, “as 

long as one defendant is subject to service in [the forum], 

additional parties residing in other districts may be brought 

before the forum court” when the “ends of justice require.” Id. 

(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b)).

The RICO statute, however, cannot be used to obtain 

personal jurisdiction over the Peruvian defendants because it 

only provides for nationwide service of process. See AGS Int'l 

Servs. S.A. v. Newmont USA Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 2d 64, 86 (D.D.C. 

2004)(“Sodexho Alliance and Sodexho Peru also are not subject to 

personal jurisdiction here because they were served abroad and 

therefore were not served properly under the RICO statute.”).

Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Peruvian defendants were 

served in the United States. See, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1; Pls.’ 

Opp’n, ECF No. 64; Cook Decl., ECF No. 64-1.
42

Additionally, the Court cannot exercise personal 

jurisdiction over the United States’ defendants, SKE and Mr. 

Peck, because it does not have jurisdiction over any other 

defendant. “[F]or nationwide service to be imposed under section 

1965(b), the court must have personal jurisdiction over at least 

one of the participants in the alleged multidistrict conspiracy 

and the plaintiff must show that there is no other district in 

which a court will have personal jurisdiction over all of the 

alleged co-conspirators.” FC Inv. Grp, 529 F.3d at 1099-1100 

(quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiffs have not 

established that the Court has personal jurisdiction over any 

other defendant and thus, it cannot exercise RICO jurisdiction

over SKE and Mr. Peck. 

In sum, the Court agrees that this case is essentially a 

dispute about activities that took place almost entirely in 

Peru. As such, plaintiffs have not established a basis for this 

Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over any of the nine 

defendants. 

B. Jurisdictional Discovery 

Finally, plaintiffs seek jurisdictional discovery “in order 

to contest and test the allegations made by defendants that 

there is [sic] insufficient jurisdictional ties.” Pls.’ Mot. for 

Discovery, ECF No. 63 at 2. Plaintiffs contend that 

jurisdictional discovery is warranted because the record is 
43

inadequate as to the defendants’ contacts with the District of 

Columbia. Id. at 5. In support, plaintiffs reiterate verbatim

the same arguments already rejected regarding the defendants’ 

contacts with the United States and the District of Columbia. 

See id. at 5-27. Plaintiffs seek “focused jurisdictional 

discovery in the form of interrogatories, requests for 

production, requests for admissions, and possibly [] 

deposition[s]” to establish “sufficient contacts with the United 

States, and possibly with the District of Columbia.” See id. at 

9 (Jorge, Sr.), 11-12 (Ofelia), 14 (Jorge, Jr.), 17 (Javier), 21 

(Mr. Farah and Convalor), 22 (Confactor). Plaintiffs seek the 

same information to establish the American defendants’ 

connections to the District of Columbia. See id. at 27 (SKE and 

Mr. Peck).

The defendants all submit similar arguments in response. 

Defs.’ Discovery Opp’ns, ECF Nos. 68, 69, 70, 71, 85 (Harten 

family). The defendants argue that plaintiffs have not 

demonstrated that discovery can supplement their jurisdictional 

allegations because their request is based on mere conjecture. 

See, e.g., ECF No. 68 at 4. As such, defendants contend that it 

is inappropriate to subject them to the burden and expense that 

accompanies jurisdictional discovery, especially the broad 

discovery requested. See, e.g., id. at 4-5. Defendants also 

argue that plaintiffs have not identified the specific 
44

information they hope to discover and how they propose to 

discover it. See, e.g., ECF No. 69 at 1-3.

“It is well established that the ‘district court has broad 

discretion in its resolution of discovery problems.’” FC Inv. 

Grp., 529 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Naartex Consulting Corp. v. 

Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). As such, “[w]hether 

to permit jurisdictional discovery rests in the discretion of 

the district court.” In re Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG Litig., 

590 F. Supp. 2d 94, 101 (D.D.C. 2008)(citations omitted). “In 

order to engage in jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff must 

have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will 

enable it to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over 

the defendant.” FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at 1093-94 (quotations 

and citations omitted). Although discovery should be “granted 

freely, it can be denied when the plaintiff has failed to 

present facts that could establish jurisdiction.” Williams v. 

ROMARM, 187 F. Supp. 3d 63, 72 (D.D.C. 2013), aff'd sub nom., 

756 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2014)(citing Caribbean Broad. Sys. Ltd. 

v. Cable & Wireless, PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1089–90 (D.C. Cir.

1998)(affirming district court's denial of discovery motion 

because plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence of 

jurisdiction); Savage v. Bioport, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62–

63 (D.D.C. 2006)(denying jurisdictional discovery motion because 

the plaintiff did not allege contacts sufficient to establish 
45

general or specific jurisdiction)). Moreover, “a request for 

jurisdictional discovery cannot be based on mere conjecture or 

speculation.” FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at 1094 (citing Bastin v. 

Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 104 F.3d 1392, 1396 (D.C. Cir.

1997)). A plaintiff may not use jurisdictional discovery to 

“conduct a fishing expedition in the hopes of discovering some 

basis of jurisdiction.” In re Papst, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 101 

(quotations and citations omitted). To that end, “a plaintiff 

must make a detailed showing of what discovery it wishes to 

conduct or what results it thinks such discovery would produce.” 

Williams, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 72 (quotations and citations 

omitted).

Here, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they can 

“supplement [their] jurisdictional allegations through 

discovery,” Shaheen v. Smith, 994 F. Supp. 2d 77, 89 (D.D.C. 

2013), because they offer “no specifics of any facts that could 

establish jurisdiction,” App Dynamic ehf v. Vignisson, 87 F.

Supp. 3d 322, 330 (D.D.C. 2015). For example, plaintiffs’ motion 

for discovery merely repeats the arguments they raised in 

opposition to the motions to dismiss; those arguments have been 

rejected. See generally Pls.’ Mot. for Discovery, ECF No. 63. 

Plaintiffs cannot and do not point to any additional facts 

that could be discovered and would establish personal 

jurisdiction over any of the nine defendants. See App Dynamic 
46

ehf, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 330 (denying request for jurisdictional 

discovery because plaintiff “offers no specifics of any facts 

that could establish jurisdiction”); Gorman, 293 F.3d at 513 

(noting jurisdictional discovery should have been granted 

because plaintiff demonstrated it could “supplement its 

jurisdictional allegations through discovery”).

First, plaintiffs do not establish that there are any

additional facts that could establish general jurisdiction over 

any defendant. See generally Pls.’ Mot. for Discovery, ECF No. 

63. Any further information about the Peruvian defendants’ 

alleged general connections to the United States—such as 

personal and business travel to the United States, work for 

companies that do business in the United States, or family 

members located in the United States—would not warrant 

exercising general jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) as the Peruvian defendants are not 

essentially “at home” in the United States. See Livnat v. 

Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 30 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d,

851 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2017). For the American defendants, Mr. 

Peck is domiciled in Colorado and SKE is headquartered and 

incorporated in North Dakota. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 12 (Peck), 17 

(SKE). They are not at home in this forum.

Second, plaintiffs have not established that discovery 

could lead to specific jurisdiction over the defendants.
47

Plaintiffs contend that discovery will reveal the extent to 

which the defendants had connections to either the forum 

(American defendants) or the United States (Peruvian 

defendants). However, as with their opposition memorandum, most 

of the facts alleged in plaintiffs’ motion for jurisdictional 

discovery attempts to establish the defendants’ connections to 

the alleged RICO scheme, not the defendants’ connections to the 

forum or to the United States. See generally Pls.’ Mot. for 

Discovery, ECF No. 63. Moreover, as extensively discussed, 

practically all of the allegedly injurious conduct occurred in 

Peru. See supra Secs. III.A.1,2. Plaintiffs have not identified 

any basis to believe that there are additional facts that could

reveal that the nine defendants purposefully directed their 

activities to either the United States (Peruvian defendants) or

the District of Columbia (SKE and Mr. Peck). See generally Pls.’ 

Mot. for Discovery, ECF No. 63; see App Dynamic ehf, 87 F. Supp. 

3d at 330 (denying request for jurisdictional discovery because 

plaintiff “offers no specifics of any facts that could establish 

jurisdiction”).

Moreover, plaintiffs do not assert how they can supplement 

their allegations through discovery or what information they 

seek to uncover. They assert only that discovery will “likely 

establish sufficient contacts with the United States, and 

possibly with the District of Columbia, to justify personal 
48

jurisdiction” over each defendant. See Pls.’ Mot. for Discovery, 

ECF No. 63 at 9, 11-12, 14, 17, 22; see also id. at 27 (arguing 

that discovery will “conclusively establish sufficient contacts 

with the District of Columbia, to justify personal jurisdiction 

over SKE and Peck”). Plaintiffs do not make a “detailed showing 

of what discovery it wishes to conduct,” as they must. 

Atlantigas Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (quotations and 

citations omitted). Instead, they offer a vague and general list 

of the type of discovery sought. Plaintiffs summarily request 

“focused jurisdictional discovery in the form of 

interrogatories, requests for production, requests for 

admissions, and possibly a deposition.” See, e.g., Pls.’ Mot. 

for Discovery, ECF No. 63 at 9. Plaintiffs repeat this broad and 

vague request verbatim for all nine defendants. See id. at 9, 

11-12, 14, 17, 22, 27. Such “generalized” requests and 

“predictions are not enough to justify jurisdictional 

discovery.” Atlantigas Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 53. Because 

plaintiffs have not specified the targeted information sought or 

established that jurisdictional discovery will help them 

“discover anything new, it is inappropriate to subject 

defendants to the burden and expense of discovery.” Id.

(quotations, citations, and alterations omitted); compare with 

GTE New Media, 199 F.3d at 1349-51 (allowing jurisdictional 

discovery, even though the record was “plainly inadequate” and 
49

there was “absolutely no merit” to plaintiff’s claim of 

jurisdiction because the plaintiffs cited the specific 

information and facts they would target to establish 

jurisdiction).

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that it 

lacks personal jurisdiction over the nine defendants who moved 

to dismiss. The Court therefore GRANTS the nine defendants’ 

eight motions to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 35, 36, 37, 38, 45, 50, 

52, 54. Defendants Mr. Peck; SKE; Mr. Farah; Convalor; 

Confactor; Jorge, Sr.; Jorge, Jr.; Ofelia; and Javier are 

DISMISSED from this action. The Court further DENIES plaintiffs’ 

motion for jurisdictional discovery. See ECF No. 63. Because the 

Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the 

defendants, it need not resolve plaintiffs’ motions for orders 

allowing alternative service, see ECF Nos. 62 and 89, and SKE’s 

motion to strike certain declarations and exhibits, see ECF No. 

76. Those motions are therefore DENIED AS MOOT. An appropriate 

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

January 2, 2019