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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. CASE NO. 4:10cr47-RH/WCS

JOCELYN TANNAZY JOHN,

Defendant.

________________________________________/

ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE

INDICTMENT OR TRANSFER VENUE AND DENYING 

THE MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS

The indictment charges the defendant Jocelyn Tannazy John with making a

false statement to FBI agents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Ms. John has

moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2) to dismiss the

indictment for lack of venue. She says the allegedly false statement was made not

in this district but in the Southern District of Florida. If the case is not dismissed

for improper venue, Ms. John seeks a discretionary transfer of venue under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b). And Ms. John has moved for a bill of

particulars setting out the factual basis for the government’s position that venue

lies in this district. 

The government has responded to the motions. The response—which
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Case No: 4:10cr47

includes a proffer of the facts the government will rely on to establish

venue—asserts that venue is proper here because the allegedly false statement

related to and affected a criminal investigation that was proceeding in this district. 

The government also opposes the motion for a discretionary transfer under Rule

21(b). The motions have been fully briefed and orally argued. 

I. Venue

Venue is an “essential element of the government’s proof at trial.” United

States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 865 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Breitweiser,

357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004). To establish venue, the government must

show that the defendant committed the offense in the district where the case is

prosecuted. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. And for these

purposes, an offense is “committed” in any district in which it “was begun,

continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a); United States v. Cabrales, 524

U.S. 1, 7, 118 S. Ct. 1772, 141 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1998); United States v. Greene, 862

F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that venue is proper in a falsestatement case in a district where any part of the crime was committed); United

States v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1986) (same). 

When the offense is making a false statement in connection with an

investigation pending in a different district, courts have said that venue is proper
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Case No: 4:10cr47

not only in the district where the false statement was made, but also in the district

where the investigation was pending. See United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161,

167 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Ringer, 300 F.3d 788, 790-92 (7th Cir. 2002). 

See also United States v. Muench, 153 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding—in a

prosecution of a Texas resident for failing to send child-support payments to a

Texas court—that venue was proper in Florida, where the beneficiary ultimately

would have received the funds); United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 482 (2d Cir.

1985) (holding—in a prosecution for perjury and obstruction of justice—that

venue was proper in the district where the obstructed proceeding was pending,

even though the unlawful acts occurred elsewhere) (cited with approval by the

Eleventh Circuit in Muench, 153 F.3d at 1301). 

Whether the government will be able to meet its burden of proving venue

under the proper legal standards need not be determined at this time. The

government’s obligation is to establish venue at trial, not in response to a pretrial

motion to dismiss. An indictment is sufficient if it alleges—as this one does—that

the offense was committed in the district of prosecution; a dispute on that score

cannot properly be resolved on a pretrial motion to dismiss. See Snipes, 611 F.3d

at 865-66 (holding that venue was a question for trial because the indictment

clearly alleged that the offense was committed in the district of prosecution);
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Case No: 4:10cr47

United States v. Jensen, 93 F.3d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); see also United

States v. Salman, 378 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Because [the defendant]

was properly indicted, the government is entitled to present its evidence at trial and

have its sufficiency tested by motion for acquittal.”); United States v. Critzer, 951

F.2d 306, 307 (11th Cir. 1992) (“There is no summary judgment procedure in

criminal cases. . . . The sufficiency of a criminal indictment is determined from its

face.”). And this is so even if the facts relevant to venue are undisputed. See

Salman, 378 F.3d at 1268 n.5; Jensen, 93 F.3d at 669. 

This indictment alleges that the offense took place “in the Northern District

of Florida, and elsewhere.” ECF No. 1 at 1. If the allegation is true, venue lies in

this district. The motion to dismiss for lack of venue thus must be denied.

II. Discretionary Transfer

Under Rule 21(b), a district court has discretion to move a trial to another

district “for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of

justice.” Ms. John argues that transfer to the Southern District of Florida is

appropriate because she and the witnesses she plans to call reside there. But the

government’s witnesses reside in this district. There is no basis in this record for a

conclusion that the net overall convenience of the parties and witnesses would be

served by transferring the case to the Southern District. And the interest of justice
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will be served by proceeding to trial in this district as scheduled, thus avoiding

unnecessary delay and the need for these attorneys to travel or new ones to be

assigned. 

III. Bill of Particulars

The government’s proffer of facts in response to Ms. John’s motions

provides the information she asked for in a bill of particulars. The request for a bill

of particulars thus is moot, as she acknowledged at oral argument. 

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The motion to dismiss the indictment or to transfer venue, ECF No. 17, is

DENIED. 

2. The motion for a bill of particulars, ECF No. 18, is DENIED AS MOOT.

SO ORDERED on October 6, 2010.

s/Robert L. Hinkle 

United States District Judge