Information Circular 9450

Behavioral and Organizational Dimensions

of Underground Mine Fires

By Charles Vaught, Ph.D., Michael J. Brnich, Jr.,

Launa G. Mallett, Ph.D., Henry P. Cole, Ed.D.,

William J. Wiehagen, Ronald S. Conti,

Kathleen M. Kowalski, Ph.D., and Charles D. Litton

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Public Health Service

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

Pittsburgh Research Laboratory

Pittsburgh, PA

May 2000
CONTENTS

Page

Introduction .............................................. 1

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Chapter 1.—Review of supporting research ..................... 5

Fire and human behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Collectivities and small groups ........................... 7

Decision-making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Chapter 2.—Overview of the underground environment and study

 settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

The organizational and technical nature of mining . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Mine dangers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

The training process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Outside organizations and the mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

The study settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Chapter 3.—Research design and sample profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

The nature of groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Research strategy and method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Profile of the sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Escape profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Chapter 4.—Examination of group behavior during mine fire escapes 50

Group characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Escape group formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Counterexamples to escape group behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Emergency evacuation ramifications of group behavior . . . . . . . . 58

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Chapter 5.—A model of the judgment and decision-making process

 in mine fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Using judgment and decision-making skills in a mine fire . . . . . . 61
iii

CONTENTS–Continued

Page

Fire in the mine as a nominal problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Perception of the nominal problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Options and choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Discussion and analysis of a particular case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Chapter 6.—Fire warnings and information uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Use of information in mine fire detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Discussion of fire detection at the three mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Warning information communicated to miners inby . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Discussion of communication of warning at the three mines . . . . 108

Improving fire warning systems in underground coal mines . . . . . 109

Fire warning with smoke detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Use of smoke sensors in underground mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Communication of fire warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Recommendations for an effective warning system . . . . . . . . . . . 114

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Chapter 7.—Smoke as an escape and behavioral environment . . . . . . . 116

Smoke measurement and visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Smoke hazards, visibility in smoke, and human response in smoke 117

Miners' emotional and physiological experiences in smoke . . . . . 120

Relationship between critical levels of smoke and CO . . . . . . . . . 127

Experiencing smoke density and physical discomforts . . . . . . . . . 131

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Chapter 8.—Wayfinding and escape behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

The mine as an ecological system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

How workers' ability will be analyzed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Ecological constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Interpersonal behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Conceptual content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
iv

CONTENTS–Continued

Page

Chapter 9.—Leadership in escape from underground mine fires . . . . . 166

Previous studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

Profile characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Chapter 10.—Formal learning from escape narratives through the

 creation and use of table-top simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

Complexity of escaping from a mine fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Need for research and training in mine escape decisions . . . . . . . 195

Utility of simulation exercises for fire escape decision training . . 197

The Escape from a mine fire (EMF) exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

Structure and design of the EMF exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Interactive latent-image format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Field evaluation of the exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Afterword.—Theoretical and practical implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

Appendix A.—Description of approximate escape routes taken by

 the groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

Appendix B.—Mine fire interview guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

ILLUSTRATIONS

2.1. The three sections affected by fire at Adelaide mine . . . . . . . . . 29

2.2. Area affected by fire at Brownfield mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2.3. Site of combustion source at Cokedale mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

5.1. A model of judgment and decision-making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

7.1. Depiction of experimental setup in A-drift at Lake Lynn

 Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
v

ILLUSTRATIONS–Continued

Page

7.2. Visibility measured as a function of CO level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

10.1. Section map of imaginary mine in problem booklet . . . . . . . . . 202

10.2. Question B with six decision alternatives in problem booklet . . 204

10.3. Latent-image answers that correspond to the decision alter-

 natives shown in figure 10.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

10.4. EMF exercise: percentage of sample by job category . . . . . . . . 205

10.5. EMF exercise: means and standard deviations by job category . 209

10.6. Question score means and standard deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

10.7. Percent of miners attaining various mastery levels on the EMF

 exercise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

TABLES

1.1 Types of group behavior in disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

3.1. Number of miners in each escape group and number in sample . . 45

3.2. Average ages and years of experience of miners in escape 

 groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

6.1. Approximate CO levels present at alarm threshold for flaming

 fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

7.1. Visibility as a function of CO level in smoldering fires . . . . . . 128

7.2. Visibility as a function of CO level in flaming fires . . . . . . . . . 128

7.3. Values of toxicity at indicated levels of optical density in

 smoldering fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

7.4. Values of toxicity at indicated levels of optical density in

 flaming fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

10.1. Miners' rating of exercise validity, relevance, quality, and

 utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

10.2. Proportion of answers discriminating positively, negatively, and

 not at all with the exercise total score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

10.3. Means and standard deviations for exercise total score by job

 category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

10.4. ANOVA results for exercise total score by job category . . . . . . 208
UNIT OF MEASURE ABBREVIATIONS

cfm cubic foot (feet) per minute m/sec meter(s) per second

fpm foot (feet) per minute m3

/sec cubic meter(s) per second

ft foot (feet) nm nanometer(s)

lb pound(s) ppm parts(s) per million

m meter(s) ppm@m part(s) per million meters

m-1 inverse meter(s)

ACRONYMS AND OTHER ABBREVIATIONS

ANOVA analysis of variance MSHA Mine Safety and

 Health Administration

CFR Code of Federal

 Regulations NIOSH National Institute for

 Occupational Safety 

CO carbon monoxide and Health

EMF Escape From a Mine PVC polyvinyl chloride

 Fire

SBR styrene-butadiene rubber

FSR filter self-rescuer

SCSR self-contained selfGIL general inside laborer rescuer

HCl hydrochloric acid USBM U.S. Bureau of Mines
1

BEHAVIORAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF

UNDERGROUND MINE FIRES

By Charles Vaught, Ph.D.,1 Michael J. Brnich, Jr.,2 Launa G. Mallett, Ph.D.,1

Henry P. Cole, Ed.D.,3 William J. Wiehagen,4 Ronald S. Conti,5

 Kathleen M. Kowalski, Ph.D.,6 and Charles D. Litton7

INTRODUCTION

How do people behave when they are trying to get out of a fire? Are escape

activities different in each incident, or will most actions be predictable across

events? Do persons make the same sorts of decisions whether they are responding as individuals or as group members?

Because the social costs of fire-related deaths and injuries are likely to continue to rise, societal pressure for greater safety will also undoubtedly increase.

There are, therefore, compelling reasons to further our understanding of action

in fires. If human behavior in fire is studied scientifically and predicted according to some well-defined principles, the benefits will be significant. Design

engineers could incorporate real-world findings into their plans. Equipment

manufacturers could gain from insights into how their technology is actually

used in fire emergencies. Safety personnel would have a better appreciation of

what constitutes adequate evacuation procedures. Trainers could upgrade the

content of their courses that teach escape skills. The result would be an overall

improvement in the quality of fire preparedness and safety.

1

Sociologist, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational Safety and

Health, Pittsburgh, PA. 2

Mining engineer, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational Safety

and Health, Pittsburgh, PA. 3

Professor, Department of Education and Counseling Psychology, University of Kentucky,

Lexington, KY. 4

Industrial engineer, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health, Pittsburgh, PA. 5

Fire prevention engineer, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Pittsburgh, PA. 6

Research psychologist, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health, Pittsburgh, PA. 7

Research physicist, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health, Pittsburgh, PA.
2

This book is part of a small but growing body of scientific literature that

examines the human experience in fire. Some of the first investigations were

conducted in the United Kingdom during the early 1970s. These and later

studies were directed, for the most part, by psychologists. Consequently, they

tended to address perceptions, attitudes and the behavior of individuals. Also,

they focused primarily on responses to fires in public structures such as hospitals

and nursing homes. The present work differs from those earlier efforts in two

ways. First, the research and analysis has been performed by an interdisciplinary

team of social scientists and engineers. In developing their analytic framework,

team members concentrated heavily upon organizational factors. This research,

then, complements the earlier work of psychologists by adding a group

perspective. Second, the sites studied are large underground coal mines. Thus,

an environmental consideration is introduced, because coal mine fires are

qualitatively different from structural blazes.

A review of Mitchell [1990] gives a few points supporting the distinctiveness of coal mine fires: (1) mine workers must evacuate long distances (sometimes miles) in smoke and darkness; (2) the seam height at an operation may be

anywhere from several feet down to 19 or 20 inches, meaning that at some mines

people must crawl out to escape; (3) access to underground workings is always

limited to a few (sometimes only two) openings; (4) a coal mine's roof and ribs

are impenetrable, lying hundreds of feet below the Earth's surface; (5) the coal

provides an inexhaustible supply of fuel; (6) potentially explosive and lethal

concentrations of gases may build up quickly in a mine fire; (7) there is no safe

place to vent pressures and smoke; and (8) firefighting logistics are difficult.

Given these variables, anyone who delays too long before beginning an escape

attempt, who is not able to use an emergency breathing apparatus properly, who

cannot travel the necessary distance to fresh air before his or her oxygen supply

runs out, or who gets lost in the maze of dark smoke-filled entries will likely die.

On December 19, 1984, 27 miners in Utah Power and Light's Wilberg

operation died as the result of a disastrous fire. Exactly what happened during

the attempted evacuation of that mine can only be hypothesized from the

locations, positions, and conditions of bodies found during the recovery. Those

hypotheses do not yield information about the decisions made or activities that

took place before these workers succumbed to the irrespirable atmosphere. This

disaster is, therefore, of limited value as a case study for learning about human

action and interaction during such events. Over the last 15 years, however,

scientists at the Pittsburgh Research Laboratory have interviewed 48 workers

who escaped from 3 burning coal mines. They have thus gained a unique

opportunity to study human behavior in this often deadly context.

The theoretical framework for this study is built on three bodies of technical

literature. Selected literature on fire and human behavior provides the first

source of background information. Included are the works of social scientists,
3

experts in firefighting, regulators, architects, and computer modelers whose

common goal was seeking to understand how people act and react during fire

emergencies.

The second building block for this study is social science literature on collectivities and small groups. Some organizational studies used directly for the

present research analyze groups in nonroutine situations.

The third area of literature concerns judgment and decision-making in operational settings. This literature helps to create a perspective from which the

data will be viewed, because escape behavior is a process of making decisions

and taking action.

The group cohesion of coal miners in their normal work environment is well

documented [Vaught 1991]. There is ample evidence that this social solidarity

also affects escape behavior, because emergency evacuation has been found not

to be an individualistic activity. The authors suggest that when a major fire occurs in an underground coal mine, a new type of group will be formed: an escape group. This group may be made up exclusively of members of a work crew

or it may be a gathering of individuals who have little or no previous experience

working together. Whether the membership is identical with an existing work

crew or not, the escape group must handle tasks very different from those that

are part of routine work activities. The physical environment and new emergency tasks will help define group dynamics and decision-making during an

escape.

The database of this study consists of information collected from 48 miners

during open-ended interviews. All interview sessions began by having the

workers discuss their actions and thoughts from the time they first became aware

that there might be a problem in their mine until they reached safety. Upon completion of these narratives, a second cycle of questioning focused on key

decisions and actions. The accounts were then assessed using a computerized

cross-indexing scheme. Researchers next placed reported actions within generalized categories of response. Team members discovered an array of decision

variables, which can be related to various aspects of individual and group

behavior during the escape process. Each major finding in relation to the events

has been incorporated into a behavior model of workers escaping from underground mine fires. The individual findings that make up this model are

treated as chapter topics in the book.

Because of the importance of this research, an attempt has been made to

address as wide an audience as possible. The book is written first for mining engineering students and people already in mining who must, at some point in their

careers, plan for and respond to fires. Second, it seeks to expand the knowledge

of system developers, who can benefit from insights into real-world emergency

decision-making. Finally, social scientists should gain from this exploration of

what is still a little understood area.
4

Since anticipated readership is varied, the content will address appropriately

diverse fields. For example, mining experts will read a discussion of social science methods while social scientists are given an overview of the underground

workplace. With this diverse audience in mind, the authors have kept jargon to

a minimum and presented relevant issues in a straightforward manner. It is

hoped that this approach will stimulate the sharing of ideas across the boundaries

of specialization.

References

Mitchell D [1990]. Mine fires: prevention, detection, fighting. Chicago, IL: Maclean Hunter

Publishing Company.

Vaught C [1991]. Patterns of solidarity: a case study of self-organization in underground

mining [Dissertation]. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, Department of Sociology.
5

CHAPTER 1.—REVIEW OF SUPPORTING RESEARCH

Human beings tend to organize their view of the world according to certain

generally accepted standards. Thomas Kuhn [1970] termed these shared viewpoints "paradigms." In relation to research, paradigms function much the same

way for science as they do for law: they contain canons for the collection of

evidence, determine what is admissible, establish rules for debate, and provide

guidance for judging merit. Paradigms, however, also tend to make people blind

to issues that fall outside their scope of authority. Thus, while paradigms help

to reveal some aspects of reality, they conceal others. Sometimes, though, there

is a perceived need so strong that it calls a paradigm into question. A likely

result is that someone will innovate and begin to address an issue from a new

perspective. The person who first threw a forward pass in football is an

example.

The paradigm that has governed thinking about firefighting dates from the

last century. During the Industrial Revolution and after, people came to see

technological development as a way to conquer their environment. The solution

to just about any problem lay in an application of natural science and

engineering [Canter 1990]. Conditions not amenable to a mechanical fix were

unthinkable. Such a mind-set was carried over into codes around the world,

where "people's safety is addressed exclusively in engineering terms" [Sime

1985]. This means that human volition has been left out of the equation, and

individuals are treated as inanimate objects about whom designers can determine

such things as Flow Capacity of Door Openings in Panic Situations [Peschl

1971]. In fact, designs based on such false assumptions about human beings are

not sound. For this reason, researchers are taking a closer look at how people

actually behave in panic situations.

Fire and Human Behavior

Writers have dealt with human behavior in fire for several years now. The

early literature was composed mostly of "anecdotal accounts [that] tended to

concentrate on the horrifying, 'panic' reactions" [Wood 1990]. Stevens' [1956]

article on the Church Oyster Roast fire panic is a good example. These items were

of interest to firefighting professionals and appeared in publications such as the

Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association. Some technical design

studies also included the human element, although in a very limited way. One

example of such work is Galbreath's [1969] Time of Evacuation by Stairs in High

Buildings. This study, published by the Canadian National Research Council's

Division of Building Research, focused on the movement of people while they

were evacuating buildings. It did not, however, look at factors that might influence

choices of direction, evacuation speed, or other response variables.
6

The first systematic investigation of human responses to fire threats was

completed in the United Kingdom during the early 1970s. Data for this project

were collected by interviewing approximately 2,000 individuals who had been

involved in almost 100 fires [Wood 1990]. Fire brigade officers did most of this

work, administering questionnaires at the fire scenes. In this descriptive study,

"behavior was examined both at a general level and with particular reference to

two specific behavioral variables, evacuation of the building and movement

through smoke." Variables such as age, sex, experience with fire, and prior

training were considered. Wood looked at what actions people took and who

took them, but did not attempt an explanation of those actions. To achieve such

an analysis, Wood suggested that "more intensive studies will have to look at

people's attitudes, knowledge and beliefs concerning fire."

After the completion of Wood's study, "there was an intensification of interest and effort, with some major, systematic studies and numerous smaller

ones...being carried out" [Paulsen 1981]. A U.K. anthology [Canter 1990] provides an overview of these studies containing chapters "written by scientists with

interests in: (1) specific settings in which fire may occur, (2) ideas related to

behavior in fire, and (3) building models of behavior in fires. A second edition

of the book was "edited to keep the original detailed case studies and to add

information about some major incidents that occurred since the first edition was

published." This volume remains the best available summary of the field of

human behavior in fire.

Four observations may be made about the research mentioned to this point.

First, data gathering was typically limited by the scattering of survivors after the

event or by the death of those with important information about an attempted

escape. Second, the sites studied were frequently structures such as hospitals or

hotels. Third, the only nonstructural setting investigated involved a fire in an

underground transportation station [Donald and Canter 1990]. While access to

the surface was limited in these tunnels, the affected area was small in comparison to mine fires. In any case, most people threatened by the blaze were

individuals who did not know each other or their surroundings very well.

Further, few had training in how to respond to such a situation. Finally, much

of the past work on how humans respond to fire only addressed the behavior of

individuals and did not consider group-level variables.

Only recently have researchers begun to consider the behavior of groups

during fire evacuations. Sime [1985] tested an "affiliative" model involving

patrons of the Summerland Leisure Centre, a seaside complex in the United

Kingdom, where 50 people died in a fire in August 1973. His model predicted

that people facing potential entrapment would move toward familiar places and

persons. Sime contrasted such a notion with the engineering assumption underlying escape route design. Designers, he argued, presume there is a deterministic relationship between an exit's location (assuming availability) and its
7

use in an emergency. In his study of the Marquee Showbar evacuation, Sime

found that two important factors other than proximity to an exit affected direction of movement. These were individuals' familiarity with a particular travel

route and their ties to others elsewhere in the building. Sime concluded that the

variable of affiliation is not addressed sufficiently by those who ought to be

concerned with how humans actually get out of structures.

Turner and Toft [1989] point out that during the Summerland Leisure Centre

fire individuals based their actions on family group membership: "Instead of immediately escaping themselves, therefore, many parents desperately looked for

their children frequently causing additional confusion and panic." Johnson

[1987] reported similar findings in a study of the evacuation of the Beverly Hills

Supper Club during a fire: "Throughout the...interviews are reports of a concern

by one primary group member for another and multiple reports of group members exiting together, often hand-in-hand." Even when family relationships were

not present, other forms of groups were evident: "Many...reported from the Empire Room that they were seated at tables with others from their workplace, and

both there and in the Crystal Rooms the frequent use of names of others in

descriptions of the escape indicated the presence of social bonds." This evidence of individuals reacting to the locations of others and staying with a

specific group of people points to the importance of understanding group actions

and interactions during various fire emergencies.

Collectivities and Small Groups

Attempts have been made to learn about the behavior of collections of

people in other stressful settings. One strategy has been to contrive a "panic" situation and observe the results. Researchers using this approach have created

laboratory fabrications of various emergency conditions that might affect small

groups or organizational components. Kelley et al. [1965] conducted experiments requiring mutual dependence during mock panic escapes. They found that

when members of a group took their cues from each other, one of two things

happened: if there was little optimism about escape, interaction proved to be

harmful; a high level of optimism, on the other hand, was reinforced by interaction. The authors further determined that public expressions of confidence

reduced anxiety and greatly increased the percentage of people who managed to

escape. Guten and Allen [1972] studied group panic behavior under varying

likelihoods of success. They concluded that the perceived chances of escape

influenced the intensity of their subjects' efforts. People tried harder when they

were uncertain about the outcome. In addition, individuals tended to panic more

in ambiguous predicaments than in those circumstances where danger was high

but the probability of escape was very low.
8

In an attempt to improve the chances of escape in emergency conditions,

Sugiman and Misumi [1988] directed two field experiments. One took place at

an underground shopping mall and the other was held in a fire school basement.

In both cases the problem involved evacuating several dozen participants

through one of two or three exits. In their investigation, the authors compared

a pair of emergency evacuation methods. The control method consisted of

having a leader indicate the direction of an exit with a loud voice and vigorous

gestures. This is the traditional approach used in evacuation drills. In the experimental method, a leader quietly chose an evacuee and asked that person to

follow along. It was found that this experimental method worked especially well

when the leader-to-evacuee ratio was fairly high. A subject directed by the

leader, and three or four people who saw what the leader was doing, would begin

heading toward an exit. Thus, an escape group formed. Individuals nearby gradually joined this emerging group without any direct influence from the leader.

Sugiman and Misumi concluded that more people were evacuated in less time

by using small groups as levers to activate the collectivity than by relying on

shouted directions.

Korte [1969] investigated the effects of group communication on male

subjects' willingness to give help in a staged medical emergency. Sixty sets of

three individuals—a true participant and two plants—were placed in small adjacent rooms interconnected by intercoms. Experimental conditions were varied

according to levels of responsibility (some subjects were told the other two

would be strapped down for monitoring) and communication patterns among the

confederates (none, minimal, or total). As an experimenter delivered instructions over the intercom, he pretended to have a severe asthma attack. The test

criterion was whether or not a subject would leave the room and locate the

victim to see if he needed help. Interestingly, 50% of those who believed they

were the only ones available to go to the stricken person's aid did so. Only 37%

of those individuals who thought the others were also free went to help. Regarding communication, the highest level of intervention (55%) occurred among

subjects who overheard no discussion over the intercom. Participants least likely to respond (35%) were ones who heard the confederates expressing concern

and trying to diagnose the problem.

Obviously, such experiments may be of questionable validity because they

are often far removed from the actual situations they intend to explore [Sime

1985]. Therefore, attempts have been made to bridge the gap between experimental and real-world conditions through realistic simulations. Drabek and Haas

[1969] put three teams of police communications personnel through a series of

exercises in order to assess organizational stress. First, they established a baseline by simulating three routine situations. Then, a mock disaster was held. The

authors found organizational stress to exist in terms of increased discrepancies

between demand for services and the system's capacity to respond. As a result,
9

decision-making processes changed. Officers, who under normal conditions

functioned autonomously, began to ask each other for information before making

decisions about how to handle calls. This teamwork evolved as the stress

mounted.

Reinartz [1993] conducted an empirical study to determine whether a

simulated nuclear powerplant incident might be a valid way to gain insight into

team behavior under stress. In addressing some of the methodological issues involved, she focused on a critical point concerning validity. There is one important feature of emergencies that simulations are unable to recreate. The lifeor-death consequences of one's actions. Noting that this matter is raised often

as a form of criticism, Reinartz [1993] offered a counterargument. The complexity of a task, its nonroutine nature and the associated time constraints are

stressors in themselves. She found support for this contention in certain behavioral attributes of team members. Individuals were observed to speak

rapidly, repeat themselves, show irritation, and pace aimlessly. Additionally,

there were performance-related characteristics such as the narrowing of attention. The author concluded that in those situations where direct observation

of group processes is not possible, simulations provide a reasonable alternative.

Many researchers are willing to sacrifice classical scientific rigor for a better

understanding of what happens in real events. After reviewing 15 years of research on observed behaviors "in actual crowd situations," McPhail and

Wohlstein [1983] reached several conclusions, two of which are pertinent here:

"First, there is growing evidence that...most individuals assemble and remain

with friends, family, or acquaintances. Those social units constitute sources of

instructions and sanctions for the individual's behavior. We must learn what

participants do; when, where, and with whom they do it; and at whose suggestion and with what sanctions they behave as they do...Finally, while we know

far more today than 15 years ago...much of what we know is that traditional

characterizations are inaccurate and traditional explanations will no longer

suffice."

Aveni [1977] is one of those who argued that existing approaches to the

study of behavior in crowds were inadequate. According to this author, most of

the literature dealing with collectivities has been based on individual levels of

analysis. Aveni collected data on persons in crowd situations and found that a

majority of the participants were actually interacting with others. Such findings

strongly suggest a need to give group-level variables more consideration when

thinking about how people act in mass events. A similar idea was put forth by

Shibutani [1955], who pointed out that people tend to adopt the outlook of

groups with which they identify. These perspectives influence and reinforce individual behavior in many circumstances that would otherwise be characterized

by confusion and indecision.
10

Levit [1978] reviewed disaster literature in order to abstract several principles of behavior in extreme situations. He listed some of these as generalizations. They are included here, along with a few illustrative points by other

authors:

(1) A distinct syndrome is associated with response to emergencies. Its

expression, however, differs by culture context. Jacobson [1973] described this

effect in her discussion of group reactions to confinement in a skyjacked plane.

(2) Individuals tend to perceive and interpret disaster cues in reference to

familiar aspects of their environment. Tornadoes, for instance, are thought to

sound like approaching trains [Taylor et al. 1970].

(3) People will see the initial problem in different ways and hence make

survival decisions that vary in quality. Spitzer and Denzin [1965] found that

one contributing factor, level of knowledge, varies widely among affected

populations.

(4) The incidence of nonrational behavior (panic) is much less prevalent

than popular accounts imply. In fact, it is hard to understand why this stereotyped image has hung on for so long. Sime [1990] speculated that the concept

has proven useful in minimizing responsibility when designs do not work as

expected.

(5) Good preparation leads to a more effective response. Experience really is the best teacher, according to Sorensen [1983]. The main point in Levit's

seven principles of behavior is that planning for emergencies must take into

account anticipated behavioral patterns of collectivities.

Dynes and Quarantelli [1968] connected what is known about real life

"unstructured" behavior with scientific theories of organization. Their rationale

was that much of the activity taking place in nonroutine events involves institutionalized behavior. The authors viewed group behavior in extreme situations as being one of four different types. They derived this typology from a

cross-classification of two variables: the nature of group tasks during a crisis

(regular or nonregular) and whether group structure is old or new. Each cell of

the resulting two-by-two matrix will characterize one type of group, as shown

in table 1.1.

Table 1.1.—Types of group behavior in disasters (after Dynes and Quarantelli [1968]).

REGULAR TASKS NONREGULAR TASKS

OLD STRUCTURE Type I - Established Type III - Extending

NEW STRUCTURE Type II - Expanding Type IV - Emergent
11

An example of type I is a police force directing traffic around the scene of

a disaster. Type II could be a group, such as Red Cross volunteers, that exists

only on paper until an emergency takes place. Type III is illustrated by a construction company using its workers and equipment in a rescue operation. Type

IV might be an ad hoc group running a command center. The concepts and

vocabulary developed with this typology have been used and extended in a

variety of related research projects [Bardo 1978; Drabek 1987; Johnston and

Johnson 1989].

One reason researchers have revised Dynes' and Quarantelli's typology is to

address the time element. For example, Drabek [1987] added phases used by the

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These phases are: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Another modification of the typology recognizes that some disaster tasks and structures may not be routine, but

also are not necessarily new. Bardo [1978] introduced the concept of latency.

Latent tasks and structures do not exist in day-to-day operations, but are in place

to be used when needed. For example, a safety department may have an emergency response plan that covers actions to take during any large-scale disaster.

As these events occur infrequently, tasks are not routine, but are defined in the

plan and used occasionally. They could, therefore, be considered latent when

not in use. A similar argument can be made for structures, e.g., the local Red

Cross chapter will be activated as a functioning emergency response organization when needed.

Several insights may be drawn here. First, emergency activities (including

escape) are not individualistic. They tend to be group responses. Therefore,

models based on assumptions of individual behavior will be inadequate for

certain purposes, such as in the creation of design features. Second, leaders can

have a significant impact on people's perceptions and subsequent behavior.

Thus, they may influence the group's survival chances. Third, individuals are

more likely to help others in some situations than in others. Generally, if the

responsibility is perceived as diffuse, a person is less apt to offer assistance.

Fourth, informal groups may emerge in organizations for the purpose of dealing

with nonroutine situations. Finally, team decision-making may become more

common under conditions of stress, even in organizations that do not encourage

teamwork.

Decision-Making

Much early work on decision-making was done by cognitive psychologists,

resulting in an individualistic orientation to the research. From this perspective,

the person is actively involved in a process characterized by a number of

elements: (1) the detection of a problem, (2) a definition or diagnosis, (3) consideration of available options, (4) a choice of what is perceived to be the best
12

option given recognized needs, and (5) execution of the decision based on what

has gone before [Flathers et al. 1982; Baumann and Bourbonnais 1982]. At any

moment in this process it is possible for a person to miss elements, either

because of external factors or because of his or her mental state. When this happens, solving the problem becomes more difficult and at some point will be

impossible.

Researchers have focused on a few variables that seem to have significant

impact on one's ability to solve complex problems under time constraints. These

are (1) an internal state [Hedge and Lawson 1979], which is the sum of an

individual's psychomotor skills, knowledge, and attitudes, (2) a condition of

uncertainty [Brecke 1982], caused by faulty or incomplete information received

from the environment, (3) stress [Biggs 1968; Jensen and Benel 1977], generated

both by the problem at hand and by any background predicament that might

exist, and (4) complexity, which refers to the number of elements that must be

attended to. These factors reflect the underlying demands on decision-makers

in most life-or-death situations. Whether the individual is an airline pilot,

a firefighter, a nurse, or a coal miner, an emergency event imposes the necessity

of dealing with an enormous quantity of sometimes faulty information in a very

short timeframe.

Kuipers et al. [1988] conducted a "thinking aloud" experiment to determine

how three expert physicians made decisions when choosing among difficult

diagnostic and treatment alternatives. The authors found that when these doctors

were faced with considerable uncertainty and risk, their thought processes did

not resemble a classic decision tree. Rather, decisions were constructed through

an incremental process of planning by refinement. Kuipers et al. [1988] noted

that early decisions were made using simplified, abstracted information about

alternatives. More specific data that might have had a bearing upon choices

were not considered until later. Additionally, the physicians tended to express

likelihoods not as numbers, but as symbolic representations. Conclusions

reached by these researchers suggest that humans use a more primitive category

system in their decision-making processes than a "rational man" model would

indicate.

Nakajima and Hotta [1989] studied information-seeking as it related to task

complexity. They examined several features of predecision behavior: (1) perceiving the existence of a decision to be made, (2) searching needed information,

and (3) evaluating and integrating this knowledge. There were 75 subjects, who

were required to choose among 3 or 6 alternatives described by 6 or

12 attributes. The investigators discovered that people shifted their search

processes to adapt to the environment. Moreover, their subjects were prone to

make a tradeoff between effort and error. More difficult tasks were tackled by

employing simplification strategies, even when it was obvious the resulting

decision might not be optimal.
13

Dorner and Pfeifer [1993] looked at strategic thinking behavior among

40 participants in a computerized forest firefighting game. Twenty of the

subjects were placed under conditions of stress involving disturbing "white

noise." The others were left free to focus on their tasks. Everyone then went

through five hour-long exercises having differing levels of difficulty. Dorner

and Pfeifer found that subjects under stress saved as much of their forests as did

those who were unhindered. However, behavior patterns were not the same.

Stressed persons worked with general outlines of the situation, while nonstressed

individuals relied more on in-depth analysis. As a result, stressed participants

made fewer errors in setting priorities. Nonstressed players, on the other hand,

were better able to control their firefighting operations.

Jaffray [1989] discussed findings from several experimental studies calling

the standard model of decision analysis (expected utility theory) into question.

Stated simply, the premise underlying this concept is that people attach units of

value to the probable outcomes of certain courses of action. Therefore, assuming rational behavior, a person will seek to maximize the value (utility) of

his or her efforts. The motive to act is based on some utility of that behavior's

outcome combined with a perceived chance of success. A problem, according

to this author, is that activities under risk do not fit the paradigm. Real-world

behavior is affected by factors such as shifting reference points, simplification,

and other biases that make attempts to equate rational behavior with utility

maximization very difficult. Jaffray closed his article with an expressed opinion

that the expected utility theory of decision-making under risk has lost its

dominance.

Using such a model to describe group decision-making is even more of a

stretch, because, as many social scientists realize, group behavior is the result of

more than aggregated individual motives. There are system properties that

people create through interaction [Tuler 1988]. Communication is one of these

properties that has received a considerable amount of attention recently. Jarboe

[1988] tested small group problem-solving effectiveness. Forty discussion

groups, composed of four subjects each, were set to work on a contemporary

issue. Their task was to report out a solution. One of Jarboe's most intriguing

and relevant findings involved the role of solidarity. Solidarity, formed in the

communication process, led to increased satisfaction with procedural details.

Jarboe concluded that too much solidarity, however, tended to affect productivity. It was in situations marked by a certain amount of tension (though not

stress) that the most ideas were generated.

Klein [1993] noted that stressors that affect individual decision-making may

have an even greater impact on team performance. He listed several of the more

common ones: (1) time pressure can throw off coordination; (2) ambiguity is

multiplied, because not only do individuals feel uncertain but no one can be sure

how others are interpreting events; (3) noise, which does not always affect
14

individual performance, may seriously degrade group communication; (4) team

members who feel responsibility could experience frustration since they have

less control; and (5) high work loads are a problem insofar as people have to

cope with coordination difficulties when tasks are not completed on time. In

Klein's opinion, much can be learned about team decision-making by considering

how it functions under stress conditions.

Tuler [1988] reviewed research on individual, group, and organizational

decision-making during technological emergencies. He identified four categories of factors that can affect performance and result in decision failures.

First, structural characteristics such as physical layout, organizational hierarchy,

and work rules can have a great impact on the interactions of people. Second,

workplace culture is very important. Human information processing and decision strategies depend heavily on subjective criteria. Third, communication

networks are critical. Recovery from a system failure may hinge on the ability

of information to flow quickly, accurately, and reliably. Finally, the kinds of

tasks that individuals must perform will have a bearing on their proficiency in

emergencies. Tuler concluded that scientists and engineers need a better understanding of behavior in real systems.

Discussion

There are three general themes in the literature reviewed above. The first

is that, as far as system design procedures are concerned, human behavior is a

"black box." This means that designers have assumed people will act in whatever way the system demands. At times, such an approach has led to disastrous

or nearly disastrous consequences [Klein 1993]. For example, at the Indian

Point No. 2 nuclear powerplant, one of two sump pumps blew a fuse and the

other developed a stuck float mechanism. Since these were redundant systems

designed not to fail at the same time, workers decided that an indicator light

showing high water in the sumps must be defective. In other words, confronted

with an obvious malfunction somewhere, personnel chose to render the simplest

explanation (a faulty indicator light), rather than believe a fail-safe system had

failed and act on that assumption. This allowed 100,000 gallons of water to accumulate at the bottom of the reactor vessel. It was only when another failure

required technicians to enter the building that the water buildup was discovered

and a catastrophe averted [Perrow 1984].

In fact, individuals are not limitlessly tractable. Their thinking is structured

and their behavior is patterned. They will bring their own interpretation and response to such things as warning indicators. This fact led Tuler [1988] to

comment: "Great attention should be given to developing systematic design and

implementation approaches that enhance the correspondence between the

behavior demanded of individuals...and the behavior of which they are capable."
15

A second general theme points to the fact that emergencies tend to involve

groups rather than individuals acting alone or in aggregate. Groups respond

differently than individuals. Group decision-making is not just a mental process;

it has a social element. "Social processes suggest that organizational, social, and

cultural values are important factors in behavior and error generation" [Tuler

1988].

A final theme regards rational choice which, insofar as designers incorporate

people into their plans, is the model used to explain human behavior. This theory

implies the existence of complete information, a set of utility functions attached

to alternatives, and individuals who make decisions according to maximization

rules. Even if persons acted in conformity with this model, "evidence suggests

that organizations [do not]" [Tuler 1988].

In the process of examining worker responses to underground mine fires,

this book explores significant areas that Tuler [1988] identified as needing

further research. They are (1) the effects of faulty or incomplete information on

decision-making, (2) ways in which knowledge bases and organizational

structure affect decision behavior and outcomes, (3) how communication

constraints can hinder strategic thinking, (4) the impact of time pressure on

group acts, (5) development of shared mental models, (6) how group think leads

to bad decisions, and (7) the role of simulations and other training in enhancing

respondents' proficiency and performance. These issues will be addressed from

a perspective that sees "little to be gained from proving one more time that the

model of rational choice is counter to mountains of evidence" and instead "views

processing of information as secondary and recognizes that the main context for

making decisions lies in...cultural, and above all, structural factors" [Etzioni

1992].

References

Aveni A [1977]. The not-so-lonely crowd: friendship groups in collective behavior.

Sociometry 40(2):96-99.

Bardo JW [1978]. Organizational response to disaster: a typology of adaptation and change.

Mass Emergencies 3(2-3):87-104.

Baumann A, Bourbonnais F [1982]. Nursing decision-making in critical care areas. J Adv

Nursing 7(5):435-446.

Biggs JB [1968]. Information and human learning. North Melbourne, Australia: Cassell

Australia Ltd.

Brecke FH [1982]. Instructional design for aircrew judgment training. Aviat Space Environ

Med 53(10):951-957.

Canter D [1990]. Fires and human behaviour. London, U.K.: David Fulton Publishers,

pp. xii, xiii, 2.

Donald I, Canter D [1990]. Behavioral aspects of the King's Cross disaster. In: Canter D, ed..

Fires and human behaviour. London, U.K.: David Fulton Publishers.

Dorner D, Pfeiger E [1993]. Strategic thinking and stress. Ergonomics 36(11):1345-1360.
16

Drabek T [1987]. Emergent structures. In: Dynes R, DeMarchi B, Pelanda C, eds. Sociology

of disasters: contributions of sociology to disaster research. Milan, Italy: Franco Angeli, p. 271.

Drabek T, Haas JE [1969]. Laboratory simulation of organizational stress. Am Sociol Rev

34(2):223-238.

Dynes R, Quarantelli EL [1968]. Group behavior under stress: a required convergence of

organizational and collective behavior perspectives. Sociol and Social Res 52(4):416-429.

Etzioni A [1992]. Foreword. In: Zey M, ed. Decision-making: alternatives to rational choice

models. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, pp. viii, ix.

Flathers GW, Giffin WC, Rockwell TH [1982]. A study of decision-making behavior of

pilots deviating from a planned flight. Aviat Space Environ Med 53(10):958-963.

Galbreath M [1969]. Time of evacuation by stairs in high buildings. Building Research Note

8. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: National Research Council of Canada, Division of Building Research.

Guten S, Allen V [1972]. Likelihood of escape, likelihood of danger, and panic behavior.

J Social Psychol 87(1):29-36.

Hedge A, Lawson BR [1979]. Creative thinking. In: Singleton WT, ed. The study of real

skills: compliance and excellence. Vol. 2. Baltimore, MD: University Park Press.

Jacobson SR [1973]. Individual and group responses to confinement in a skyjacked plane.

Am J Orthopsychiatry 43(3):459-469.

Jaffray JY [1989]. Some experimental findings on decision-making under risk and their

implications. Eur J Operational Res 38:301-306.

Jarboe S [1988]. A comparison of input-output, process-output, and input-process-output

models of small-group problem-solving effectiveness. Communication Monographs 55(2):121-

142.

Jensen RS, Benel RA [1977]. Judgment evaluation and instruction in civil pilot training.

Champaign, IL: University of Illinois.

Johnson N [1987]. Panic and the breakdown of social order: popular myth, social theory,

empirical evidence. Sociol Focus 22(1):171-183.

Johnston D, Johnson N [1989]. Role extension in disaster: employee behavior in the Beverly

Hills supper club fire. Sociol Focus 22(1):39-52.

Kelley HJ, Dahlke CA, Hill A [1965]. Collective behavior in a simulated panic situation.

J Exper Social Psych 1(1):20-54.

Klein GD [1993]. Naturalistic decision-making: implications for design. Dayton, OH:

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Crew System Ergonomics Information Analysis Center, pp. 132,

133.

Korte C [1971]. Effects of individual responsibility and group communication on help-giving

in an emergency. Human Relations 24(2):149-159.

Kuhn T [1970]. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago

Press.

Kuipers B, Moskowitz A, Kassirer J [1988]. Critical decisions under uncertainty:

representation and structure. Cognitive Sci 12(2):177-210.

Levit RA [1988]. Human behavior in extreme situations: generalizations from a review of

the disaster literature. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society, 22nd Annual Meeting

(Detroit, MI), pp. 125-128.

McPhail C, Wohlstein R [1983]. Individual and collective behaviors within gatherings,

demonstrations, and riots. Annual Rev Sociol 9(4):579-600.

Mitchell D [1990]. Mine fires: prevention, detection, fighting. Chicago, IL: Maclean Hunter

Publishing Company.

Nakajima Y, Hotta M [1989]. A developmental study of cognitive processes in decisionmaking: information searching as a function of task complexity. Psycholog Reports 64(1):67-79.

Paulsen RL [1981]. Human behavior and fire emergencies: an annotated bibliography.

Washington, DC: National Bureau of Standards, report No. NBSIR-81-2438. Elsevier Science

B.V.
17

Perrow C [1984]. Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies. New York, NY:

Basic Books.

Peschl IASZ [1971]. Flow capacity of door openings in panic situations. Bouw 26(2):62-67.

Reinartz S [1993]. An empirical study of team behavior in a complex and dynamic problemsolving context: a discussion of methodological and analytical aspects. Ergonomics 36(11):1281-

1290.

Shubutani T [1955]. Reference groups as perspectives. Am J Sociol 60(3):562-569.

Sime J [1985]. Movement toward the familiar: person and place affiliation in a fire

entrapment setting. Environ and Behav 17(6):697-724.

Sime J [1990]. The concept of 'panic.' In: Canter D, ed. Fires and human behavior. London,

U.K.: David Fulton Publishers.

Sorensen JH [1983]. Knowing how to behave under the threat of disaster: can it be

explained? Environ and Behav 15(4):438-486.

Spitzer S, Denzin NK [1965]. Levels of knowledge in an emergent crisis. Social Forces

44(2):234-237.

Stevens R [1956]. Church oyster roast fire panic. Quart Natl Fire Protection Assoc 49(4):

277-285.

Sugiman T, Misumi J [1988]. Development of a new evacuation method for emergencies:

control of collective behavior by emergent small groups. J Appl Psychol 73(1):3-10.

Taylor J, Zurcher L, Key WH [1970]. Tornado: a community responds to disaster. Seattle,

WA: University of Washington Press.

Tuler S [1988]. Individual, group, and organizational decision-making in technological

emergencies: a review of research. Ind Crisis Quart 2:109-138.

Turner B, Toft B [1989]. Fire at Summerland leisure centre. In: Rosenthal U, Charles M,

Hart P, eds. Coping with crises: the management of disasters, riots and terrorism. Springfield, IL:

Charles Thomas, p. 177.

Vaught C [1991]. Patterns of solidarity: a case study of self-organization in underground

mining [Dissertation]. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, Department of Sociology.

Wood P [1990]. A survey of behavior in fires. In: Canter D, ed. Fires and human behavior.

London, U.K.: David Fulton Publishers, pp. 83-94.
18

CHAPTER 2.—OVERVIEW OF THE UNDERGROUND

ENVIRONMENT AND STUDY SETTINGS

This chapter details the perspective from which collected data have been

examined. The first part, intended primarily for lay readers, discusses several

topics related to mining as an enterprise. Initially, the organizational functioning

of a typical large mine will be described. It is the formal structure above a miner

that decides the conditions of his or her work. A second point of concern is the

technology itself. An underground coal mine is a sociotechnical system, with

workers and machines organized in particular ways during production. Third,

general conditions and dangers underground will be described in detail. The

physical environment of an operation is a powerful factor in the work life of

miners. Fourth, a discussion of the process of formal training is given. During

this training, a new worker is taught what the organization expects of him or her

in the role of safe, productive, coal miner. Next, there are outside organizations

that act as significant forces in the workplace. Examples include the Mine

Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), State agencies, and the United Mine

Workers of America (UMWA). The roles of these entities will also be

examined. The second part of this chapter will depict each study site as a

concrete setting, so that findings can be interpreted in their proper context.

The Organizational and Technical Nature of Mining

A coal mine is a complex system. It is defined as all parts of a mining

plant's property (both underground and surface) that contribute, under one management, to the extraction or handling of coal [American Geological Institute

1997]. As suggested, many functions that must be carried out at an operation are

only indirectly related to coal mining and processing. Even the jobs that are directly related tend to be numerous and varied [Wallwork 1981]. According to

Palowitch [1982], the chief reason for this sophistication is that "after more than

two centuries of exploiting our coal resources, today's coal industry finds itself

saddled with a horrendous legacy of human impairments and environmental

damages which society demands be corrected." Now, the effects of government

regulation are evident in every aspect of the mining industry. Any operation, if

it is to survive, must be administered with an eye for social efficiency and accountability.

Long-range planning is needed to ensure that the mine produces coal in a

cost-effective manner. One of the first things that must be considered is location

and method of access. To extract coal from an underground mine, a coalbed (or

"seam") must be reached from the surface. The term "portal" is generally given

to any entrance that provides access to a coal mine. In hilly terrain, such as is

found in Appalachia, the coal may "outcrop" on a hillside. This allows direct
19

entry to the coal seam via a horizontal tunnel ("drift") opening. At other

locations where there is no outcrop, it may be possible to open a "slope" tunnel

that angles down from the surface and intersects with the coal seam. If the seam

is too deep for a slope to be feasible, a "shaft" must be constructed. This shaft,

which may be 20 ft or more in diameter, is opened vertically from the surface to

the coalbed and allows access via a large elevator.

During long-range planning there is a general focus on such essentials as

equipment type, deployment, utilization, and haulage. Laying out a mine also

involves auxiliary factors including ventilation arrangements, roof support plans,

power distribution, and communications. All of these planned systems are incorporated into a "projection map" that is developed by a team of technical

specialists. This team will include, at various times, mining engineers, electrical

engineers, industrial engineers, and company geologists, among others. The

mine map serves the same purpose for a person running an operation that an

architect's blueprint serves a building contractor. It provides an overview of the

project, shows where features should be located, helps management direct crews

effectively, and serves as a tool in the planning of everything from maintenance

schedules to capital expenditures for major equipment purchases.

Responsibility for translating the long-range plan into day-to-day operations

belongs to a mine superintendent. This person is in charge of the overall mine

complex, including surface facilities. An assistant superintendent helps the superintendent perform his duties and at some sites oversees all underground

operations. At least one general mine foreman reports to the assistant superintendent. This individual directs day-to-day underground operations. For each

working shift at the mine, there is at least one shift foreman ("shift boss") who

reports to the general mine foreman. The shift boss is in charge of miningrelated activities including coal extraction and service work. Each production

crew in the mine is placed under the direction of a section foreman ("face boss")

who manages mining operations on his or her section and who reports to the

shift boss. There are also supervisors who oversee specialized support work

underground. These foremen manage (1) maintenance, (2) belt installation,

(3) supply activities, and (4) track laying and repair. All of these individuals

report to the shift boss or the general mine foreman.

The long-range plan provides structure for a superintendent's short-range

planning. If coal is to be mined productively, it must be obtained systematically.

This requires the integration of several weekly plans into a smooth limited projection. One of the most important functions of a superintendent and his subordinates is to maintain an effective extraction cycle at the point of production.

To do this extraction, plans must incorporate the following factors: (1) a determination of the shift for each section at which coal production will take place,

(2) a decision about when the section will be idled so that belt and power moves

can be made, (3) the scheduling of regular equipment maintenance, (4) provision
20

for special projects such as the installation of belt head drives, and

(5) preparation for any tasks that cannot be accomplished during regular

workdays, such as shutting down and repairing the ventilation fan. The better

a mine superintendent is at planning for and taking care of all of these details,

the more smooth-running and efficient an operation will be.

After entering their portal and reaching the underground workings, a typical

production crew will board a self-propelled personnel carrier known as a

"mantrip" and travel to their "working section." This is where coal is extracted,

and may be miles from the portal. "Working faces" are the individual places on

a working section where mining activities take place. Here, sets of parallel

tunnels ("entries") are driven through the coal seam following a predetermined

plan developed by a mining engineer. Mine entries are 16 to 20 ft wide and as

high as the coal seam is thick. The number of entries being mined in a working

section varies from 2 to 10 or more depending on many factors. As parallel

entries are developed, they are connected by perpendicular tunnels ("crosscuts").

Like entries, crosscuts are also usually 16 to 20 ft wide and as high as the coal

seam is thick. Crosscuts, or "breaks" as they are sometimes called, allow workers and equipment to move between and among the entries. The walls of entries

and crosscuts are called "ribs," while the ceiling above is called the "roof" or

"top." The mine floor is typically called a "bottom."

As coal is mined, a working section advances toward the boundaries of the

coal property. This advancement is generally known as "development mining"

and follows a "room-and-pillar" mining plan. With a room-and-pillar plan,

entries and crosscuts are opened through the seam while large blocks of coal

("pillars") are left in place to help support the mine workings. In the United

States, most development mining following a room-and-pillar plan uses

"continuous mining" technology. Work crews on a continuous mining section

are usually composed of 8 to 10 individuals. A typical crew might consist of

(1) one face boss, (2) one continuous miner operator and a helper, (3) two roof

bolting machine operators, (4) two shuttle car operators, and (5) one mechanic.

These workers perform two operation cycles at the working face that include

(1) cutting and loading of coal and (2) support of the mine roof above the entry

or crosscut.

With continuous mining, operations progress sequentially at each face on a

working section. First, an area from which coal has already been extracted

(commonly called a "cut") must have its roof supported. The roof is "bolted" by

one or two miners who operate a "roof bolter." The roof bolter is a rubber-tired,

electrically powered machine with rotating drill heads. It puts holes in the mine

roof. Steel bolts (48 to 96 inches long) are then inserted into these holes and

tightened. They bind together layers of rock strata located above the cut. This,

in effect, creates a supporting beam between coal pillars and across entries and

crosscuts. Thus, the roof is prevented from collapsing. Next, a "continuous
21

miner" is "trammed" into the face. A continuous miner is an electrically

powered machine that moves along on crawler tracks similar to bulldozer treads.

The machine has a rotating drum ("ripper head") about 10 ft wide and 3 ft in

diameter, on which cutting bits are mounted. The ripper head rotates and cuts

coal from the face. A pair of mechanical gathering arms, located beneath the

ripper head, then sweeps the dislodged coal onto a short conveyor. This conveyor moves the coal to the rear of the machine, where it is dumped into a

shuttle car (or "buggy"). A buggy is a rubber-tired electrically powered haulage

vehicle that can carry 6 to 10 tons of coal. Usually, two buggies transport coal

from the face to a conveyor belt dumping point. From this dumping point on the

working section, coal is typically transported out of the mine via a series of

conveyor haulage belts. In some mines, however, coal is dumped directly into

small rail cars. Groups of these cars, known as "trips," are pulled by electrically

powered locomotives to a main underground dumping point. From there, the

coal is transported out of the mine via conveyor belt.

Once a mine (or a portion of it) is developed, the development sections may

then become "retreat" mining sections. In retreat mining, coal pillars that were

originally left in place for support of the mine entries and crosscuts are themselves extracted. The basic approach is to mine in a series of cuts, supporting

the roof with timbers, bolts, or a combination of both. As these pillars are removed completely, the mine roof they once supported collapses.

In many large mines, retreat mining has been replaced by longwall mining.

To establish a longwall, two parallel continuous miner sections, each consisting

of two to four entries, are advanced 5,000 ft or more to a predetermined point.

They are then turned and driven toward each other until they join. Once these

sections are joined, they have created a large block of coal, 600 to 1,000 ft wide

and approximately a mile long, that is known as a longwall "panel." Crews on

a longwall mining section are made up of 8 to 10 individuals. A crew might consist of (1) one supervisor, (2) two shearer operators, (3) two shield operators,

(4) one headgate operator, (5) one tailgate operator, and (6) one mechanic.

These workers run large specialized equipment, which has been dismantled on

the most recently mined longwall section, then brought in and set up at the new

face. Panel extraction consists of completely removing this large block of coal

that was created during the development process. Strata are allowed to cave

behind the longwall as coal is mined back in the direction from which the

parallel "setup" sections were started.

Longwall mining operations depend on the use of self-advancing hydraulic

roof supports called "shields." These are massive overhead steel structures supported by large multistage hydraulic jacks. The jack system allows shields to be

raised and lowered mechanically as a face is advanced. Shields are placed sideby-side in a row so that they form a protective canopy along the entire length of

the working face. Coal is removed from the face by a rotary drum shearing
22

machine or "shearer." This shearer rides on top of a flexible, segmented conveyor ("pan line") that runs along the face. It is attached to the front of the

shields by hydraulic jacks. The shearer has circular cutting heads mounted on

long arms that are affixed to each end of its main body frame. A cutting head

is equipped with carbide bits arranged in a spiral formation. The head rotates

to cut a strip of coal 30 to 40 inches deep from the longwall face as it is moved

across the panel. This extracted coal falls onto the pan line for transportation

across the face to the panel's belt conveyor. The panel conveyor then moves the

coal to the mine's main haulage belt for transport outside.

Fresh air must be supplied to all working areas of a mine. Air is drawn into

a mine from the outside by one or more propeller-type, axial-vane fans that may

be as large as 8 ft in diameter. These fans can move several hundred thousand

cubic feet of air per minute. Entries serve as "intake" (fresh) and "return" (contaminated) aircourses that channel the air through a mine. Intake and return

aircourses are separated by concrete block walls ("stoppings") that are built in

the crosscuts between entries. Where intake and return aircourses must cross

each other, air bridges ("overcasts") are used. Air moving through the mine and

sweeping across its working faces carries away smoke, dust, and accumulations

of methane gas. The intake and return aircourses also function as escapeways

for miners should a fire or other type of emergency occur. Federal mining law

requires that underground mines must maintain two separate and distinct

travelable passageways designated as escapeways from each working section.

At least one of these two escapeways has to be located in fresh air.

While an underground coal mine is in some respects like a factory, the working environment is very different. The only lighting, for instance, comes from

miners' battery-operated cap lamps or from localized sources on various equipment. At the face, production crews must contend with work areas that can be

dusty, or wet and muddy depending on the amount of water that may be present.

These places can also be extremely confined, especially in mines where the seam

thickness is not great. To extract coal, miners must operate large machines under

such conditions. Outby1

 support personnel are scattered through the labyrinth of

underground entries. They are needed to help maintain the many auxiliary subsystems found in the mine. Work done by these miners includes building and

maintaining air stoppings, installing supplemental roof supports, cleaning coal

spills around or under conveyor haulage belts, moving supplies, maintaining

electrical installations, and conducting hazard inspections. Generally, these support workers do their tasks singly or in small crews, usually without direct contact

with other miners, supervisors, or the outside world. They also have to deal with

poor footing due to uneven or muddy bottom. In sum, all miners must do their jobs

in an environment that is harsh and potentially dangerous.

1

"Outby" means away from the working face of the mine. The opposite is "inby," or toward

the face.
23

Mine Dangers

No matter which technical division of labor is being used, miners create a

void under the Earth's surface—a void that is potentially deadly, as Palowitch

[1982] has illustrated. To reduce the risks associated with mining, all face

equipment must meet permissibility standards set forth by MSHA. In addition,

all sources of open flame such as matches and cigarette lighters, welding equipment (except in designated areas), and unsealed lights are strictly prohibited.

Even in mines where these regulations are rigidly enforced, however, there is

still the danger of ignition from steel bits striking rock or pyrites, from sparks

caused by slabs of roof falling against metallic surfaces, or from willful violation

of the standards and prohibitions.

Increased mechanization and the introduction of greater numbers of

electrical machines have resulted in mine fires being ranked just behind explosions as a major cause of mine disasters. Of 877 mine fires that occurred

between 1952 and 1970, 351 happened at or near the working face, and the remaining 526 were at various spots throughout the mine. Sixty-nine percent of

the fires at or near the face were determined to have had an electrical source

[Palowitch 1982]. The origin of fires outby the face were most often frictional

ignition of conveyor belts, or spontaneous combustion in abandoned sections of

the mine [Kutchta 1978]. A survey of coal mine fire reports conducted by Allen

Corp. [1978] showed that the number of fires increased from 28 in 1951 to 184

in 1960, then decreased to 25 in 1977.

However, mine fires are still occurring, sometimes with disastrous consequences. An example is the fire disaster that took place at Emery Mining Co.'s

Wilberg operation on December 19, 1984. On that date, company officials informed miners on the Fifth Right longwall panel that the mine would attempt to

break a world record for 24-hour longwall production. On second shift, with the

record within reach, nine extra workers were sent to the section and eight

management people accompanied them to see the record broken. When fire

(ignited by a faulty compressor near the intake of Fifth Right) broke out, smoke

and carbon monoxide poured in on the 28 people on the section. Unable to don

their self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs), evidently because of lack of adequate

training, most of the miners attempted to escape barefaced down either the

intake or belt entry. They were quickly overcome, and died. Three miners tried

to get out through the tailgate return entry. That entry had been allowed to collapse several weeks before, and the cave-in made it impassable. The miners'

bodies were found at the blockage. The last survivor wriggled through a

"squeeze" in the bleeders where the roof had caved in and the floor had

heaved up. He made it into the clear and walked several hundred feet before

being overcome by carbon monoxide poisoning and dying, with an unopened

self-contained self-rescuer around his neck [Moore 1987].
24

There are several system failures implicit in the Wilberg disaster: (1) nonessential personnel were in attendance at a time when workers and equipment

were being pushed to break a production record; (2) the faulty air compressor

was allowed to run unattended in a nonfireproofed area; (3) at least some of the

miners died, not necessarily because there was a fire, but because entries running

off the tailgate of the longwall were blocked by a cave-in; (4) firefighting

preparedness was inadequate; and (5) the miners were not adequately trained in

how, and under what conditions, to employ nonroutine safety skills such as the

use of their emergency breathing apparatus.

The Training Process

All persons entering an underground coal mine must be trained. The type

of training required, and the amount individuals receive, depends on their status

and function in the mining environment. 30 CFR 48 stipulates that each operator

of an underground mine must file, for approval by MSHA, a plan that contains

programs for (1) training new miners, newly-employed experienced miners,

experienced miners assigned to new tasks, (2) annual refresher training, and

(3) hazard training for miners and visitors. The course content and minimum

hours of instruction for each of these programs vary. It has been argued that

U.S. miners may be comparatively poorly trained for many nonroutine events

they are likely to encounter. McAteer and Galloway [1980] summed this notion

up in a report comparing training in the United Kingdom, West Germany,

Poland, Romania, France, Australia, and the United States: "Training and supervisory certification requirements in the United States are less thorough than

those of any other nation studied."

New miner training, which is what people receive before reporting to work,

prescribes at least 40 hours of instruction in miners' rights under the law, the use

of self-rescue and respiratory apparatus, procedures for entering and leaving the

mine, transportation and communication, emergency evacuation and barricading,

roof and ground control, rock dusting program, hazard recognition, electrical

hazards, mine gases, health and safety aspects of assigned tasks, miner health,

and an introduction to the specific work environment. Each year, all miners

working underground must receive a minimum of 8 hours of annual refresher

training that covers many of the topics just listed. All training, in order to comply with 30 CFR, must be given by instructors who have been approved by the

Mine Safety and Health Administration, and is expected to be adapted to the

mining operations and practices in existence at the company whose workers are

being trained.

There is much technical information miners need, not only because of the

hostile physical environment they face, but because continuing technological and
25

organizational changes cause new problems in the workplace. An example may

be gotten from the use of longwall technology in this country. Wala and Cole

[1987] incorporated choices about where to place brattice curtains and take airflow

readings into paper-and-pencil simulations of longwall operations. The researchers

then administered the simulations to 90 mine workers responsible for making

ventilation arrangements during cut-throughs at their respective operations. Nearly

one-half of the respondents were shown to have potentially fatal misconceptions

about the behavior of airflow during longwall setup procedures.

A factor in miners' lack of proficiency regarding some aspects of their work

environment is that instructors often draw upon their stock of knowledge and

present discrete bits of information unconnected to any grounding that would

make them useful [Briggs and Digman 1980]. At times the training delivered

this way may not be very well thought out. An example of this is provided by

a segment of the hazard training offered to mine visitors under 30 CFR 48.11.

The self-contained self-rescuer (SCSR) instruction traditionally consisted of an

SCSR being shown by the mine's safety instructor, who would explain the

procedure for putting it on "at the first sign of smoke."

The weakness of this demonstration is apparent, especially when one stops

to consider the nature of SCSRs. First, SCSRs are complex closed-circuit

breathing devices. Improper use of compressed oxygen rebreathers (one type

operates on this principle) can lead to hypoxia and death. SCSRs that generate

oxygen chemically are more fool-proof, but still must be handled correctly to be

of any benefit in an unbreathable atmosphere. Second, unlike firefighting apparatus or mine rescue gear, which is donned and activated before the wearer

goes into danger, an SCSR is meant to be put on under extreme conditions such

as fires. From this perspective, it requires little imagination to understand that

the intended user should be thoroughly task trained. Yet, it was not until September 1987 that MSHA, citing research begun shortly after the Wilberg disaster

[Cole and Vaught 1987; Vaught and Cole 1987], promulgated regulations at

30 CFR 48 and 75 requiring hands-on instruction in the use of self-contained

self-rescuers.

Cole et al. [1986], after observing and participating in many training sessions, made several generalizations about how classes are conducted: (1) The

most commonly used technique of mine trainers is instruction for the rote

learning of information. (2) There is a heavy reliance on the same sets of training films and procedures from year to year. (3) Trainees frequently fail to pay

attention to the instruction, devoting their attention to what is going on around

them instead. (4) When games are used as teaching devices, they usually focus

only on factual recall of information and commonly detract from the content of

what is being taught. (5) In many classes, great amounts of time are wasted, in

the sense that it is not spent in instruction. (6) Segments of the day's program

may degenerate into gripe sessions, with little of a substantive nature being

accomplished. In short, the typical miner training class is not always effective.
26

Outside Organizations and the Mine

The U.S. Department of Interior's Bureau of Mines (USBM)2

 was created in

1910 as a legislative response to a seemingly interminable series of fires and

other disasters that touched communities from Franklin, WA, to Belle Ellen, AL,

to Wilkes-Barre, PA [Keenan 1963]. Although this was the Federal Government's first venture into mining regulation, it followed legislation enacted by the

various coal-producing States by 20 to 30 years [Palowitch 1982]. Moreover,

the USBM had no sanctifying authority. Its primary function was to conduct

mine safety research and issue reports. Mine disasters have historically driven

legislation, however, and following a rash of these disasters in 1940, the

U.S. Congress passed the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act, which granted the

USBM inspection authority, but only in order to gather and publish information

on safety conditions. After a further string of incidents, the U.S. Congress took

the next step: in the summer of 1952, the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952

(Public Law 82-552) was enacted. It contained section 209, which stipulated

that USBM inspectors could issue an order of withdrawal from portions of a

mine faced with imminent danger [National Research Council 1982].

The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Public Law 91-173)

was the first comprehensive plan to protect "the health and safety of persons

working in the coal mining industry of the United States." The Act provided for

each underground coal mine to be inspected four times per year. It also set forth

an array of interim mandatory safety standards covering roof support, ventilation, combustible materials, electrical equipment, blasting, transportation, and

communication, among others. It also set forth a hierarchy of penalties for individual and corporate violations of these standards. On July 1, 1973, the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration was formed within the U.S. Department of the Interior, but separate from the USBM. The USBM's inspection functions were vested in this new agency.

Federal regulations governing the mining of coal are currently contained in

the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-164). This act

was promulgated in the wake of yet another round of disasters including the

Sunshine silver mine fire. Perhaps the most significant innovation of the 1977

Act, besides the creation of an enforcement arm with enhanced rule-making and

sanctioning capabilities, was the establishment of mandatory health and safety

training. For the first time, the Federal Government was taking a proactive approach to removing "acts of God" as explanations of workplace accidents. There

has existed, since 1977, a total package of administrative rules, periodic inspections, workforce preparation, and technical assistance. This comprehensive

2

The safety and health research functions of the former U.S. Bureau of Mines were transferred

to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health in 1996.
27

package is aimed at not only correcting, but also preventing health and safety

hazards in the Nation's mines.

There is a second level of oversight at underground coal mines. State enforcement agencies station inspectors in districts around the coalfields. Beyond

writing citations, some States also provide technical support for mines needing

help in achieving and maintaining compliance. Finally, there may be a training

and education division whose staff conducts various training and certification

programs in the State. West Virginia and Kentucky have the most extensive education and certification programs for rank-and-file miners. For instance, all

new miners are required to complete a course of formal instruction followed by

an underground orientation, serve an apprenticeship, and pass an examination

(oral and/or written) to receive his or her "miner's papers" [McAteer and

Galloway 1980]. In essence, State and Federal regulations ensure a regular

presence by government officials at an underground mine.

After the National Recovery Act, the United Mine Workers of America

managed to insert safety and health provisions into the next several contracts.

These included "reasonable" rules for safety and health (1937), union inspection

of the mine (1939), establishment of safety committees (1941), clean working

conditions (1943), a protective clothing allowance (1945), benefits for long-term

injuries (1946), and the right to withdraw for safety and health reasons (1947).

During the period of rationalization, however, no new provisions were negotiated. It was not until the 1971 contract that safety and health clauses were

again added, largely as a response to specific sections of the 1969 Act [Short

1982]. Generally, there are now contractual provisions stipulating that at each

union mine there must be a Mine Health and Safety Committee and a Mine

(grievance) Committee.

The United Mine Workers of America has traditionally been a high-profile

entity at operations it has organized. Rank-and-file employees at the three mines

in this study were all members of the UMWA. Thus, the union was an organizational component that, along with Federal and State bodies, helped to

shape the nature of workplaces at these sites. The following section describes

each setting in turn, paying special attention to such things as personnel numbers, production figures, and technical layout. These sketches will provide readers a better understanding of the underground environments from which the

miners were required to escape.

The Study Settings

Adelaide Mine

Adelaide Mine was an underground operation established in 1903. This

mine was opened by six air shafts into the Pittsburgh Coal Seam, which had an
28

average thickness of 72 inches. A total of 327 workers were employed at the

operation; 278 worked underground and 49 had jobs on the surface. Coal was

mined on five production sections. Three of these conducted development

mining and two were on retreat. All working sections used continuous mining

technology and the room-and-pillar mining method. Entries were on centers of

approximately 70 ft with crosscuts on centers of approximately 90 ft. The

mining company ran two production shifts per day, 5 days per week. Average

coal output at this operation was just over 4,100 tons per day.

Coal was transported from the sections by 36- and 42-inch belts to an

underground storage bunker. It was then loaded into 10-ton mine cars for transportation to a skip hoist. A 10-ton capacity skip hoist was used to raise coal to

the surface. There, it was deposited into a raw coal silo to await processing at

the mine's preparation plant. Supplies and machinery were lowered into the

mine by an equipment hoist. Trolley locomotives were used to haul coal, supplies, and implements inside the mine. Trolley mantrips were used to transport

miners to and from the working sections. Three exhausting axial-vane mine fans

located on the surface provided ventilation to the workings. Permanent stoppings, overcasts, check curtains, and line brattices were used to control air flow

throughout the mine.

Three working sections were located inby the source of combustion at

Adelaide Mine. These are shown in figure 2.1.

2 Northwest

The 2 Northwest submains, where the fire occurred, was developed from the

Southwest Mains. As development of this section progressed, panels were driven off to the left and connected at the back end of the section with bleeder entries. At the time this fire occurred, mining in 2 Northwest and the two panels

driving off it was being done with two sets of face equipment. Machinery included continuous miners, shuttle cars, roof bolting machines, and batterypowered scoop tractors. An axial-vane exhausting mine fan located on the surface at Peterson shaft provided ventilation for all three sections in the

2 Northwest submains area of the mine.

At the mouth of 2 Northwest submains, entries were identified by numbers

1 through 8 (from left to right facing inby). Entries 1, 2, and 8 served as return

aircourses, with entries 2 and 8 designated as alternate escapeways. Entries 3,

4, 5, and 7 functioned as intake aircourses, with entry 7 designated as an intake

escapeway. The trolley haulage was located in No. 4 entry, with the conveyor

belt located in entry No. 6. As the section advanced from Southwest Mains,

a ninth entry was added at approximately 2,300 ft inby Southwest Mains. Entry

9 served as a return aircourse and became a designated alternate escapeway.

A 10th entry was added to the section at about 4,200 ft inby Southwest Mains.

This entry also became a return aircourse and designated alternate escapeway.
29

Figure 2.1–The three sections affected by fire at Adelaide Mine.

Because of a limited number of intake aircourses at the mouth of

2 Northwest, and since working sections were being advanced to greater

distances from the main ventilating fan at Peterson shaft, mine management

requested and received permission to use air from their belt entry also to

ventilate the active working places. As part of their approval plan to use belt air

for ventilation, the mine was required by MSHA to install a carbon monoxide

(CO) monitoring system. This system had to be capable of detecting CO at a

level of 1 ppm, using sensors installed in the belt entry every 1,000 to 2,000 ft

(depending on air velocity). The system also had to be equipped with audible

and visual alarms that activated automatically in the dispatcher's office and at the

underground dumper's shanty when one or more sensors detected CO
30

concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. Finally, the approval plan included a

provision for elimination of a requirement that the belt and trolley entries be

separated with stoppings. Separation of belt and trolley entries was continued

in the 2 Northwest and 1 Right sections but was discontinued on 3 Left.

3 Left

At the time of the fire, 3 Left was a retreat section. This panel, consisting

of nine entries, had been turned off 2 Northwest and driven approximately

3,500 ft to a point where the section connected with a set of bleeder entries.

After all entries had been connected with the bleeders, pillar extraction was

started. The section had retreated about 500 ft outby. Entries on this section

were numbered 1 through 9, left to right facing inby. Entries 1 and 9 served as

return aircourses, with No. 9 entry designated as the alternate escapeway.

Entries 2 through 8 functioned as intake aircourses. No. 8 entry was designated

as the primary escapeway and was separated from entries 7 and 9 by stoppings.

The belt conveyor was located in entry 5, and the trolley haulage was in entry

7. As mentioned earlier, the belt and trolley haulage entries on 3 Left were not

separated by stoppings.

1 Right

1 Right off 8 Left was a nine-entry development section that also turned off

2 Northwest submains. The section had been driven approximately 4,800 ft

before it was turned 90E to the right. Entries on this section were numbered 1

through 9, left to right facing inby. Entries 1 and 9 served as return aircourses,

with No. 9 also serving as the alternate escapeway. Entries 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8

functioned as intake aircourses, with No. 6 designated as the primary escapeway.

Trolley haulage was located in No. 3, and the belt conveyor was located in

entry 5.

Brownfield Mine

Brownfield Mine was opened by one slope and eight shafts into two underground coal seams, one above the other. Both the Upper Kittanning (or CN)

and Lower Kittanning (or B) Seam average 48 to 54 inches thick. At the time

of the fire, Brownfield Mine employed 869 workers. Of this number, 804

individuals worked underground and 65 worked at various locations on the

surface. There were 17 continuous mining units and 3 longwall sections that

produced an average 7,000 tons of coal each day during 3 production shifts.

Entries and crosscuts were developed 18 to 20 ft wide and were on centers of

from 60 to 120 ft. This operation was ventilated by six axial-vane, exhausting
31

mine fans located on the surface. Underground ventilation was controlled by

permanent stoppings, overcasts, regulators, check curtains, and line brattices.

Coal from the faces of working sections was transported by shuttle cars and

discharged onto conveyor haulage belts. A series of conveyor belts transported

coal from each section to a loading area where it was dumped into mine cars.

From this load point, coal was hauled in mine cars to a main rotary dump area

underground. From the dump area, coal was taken via conveyor belt out of the

mine to a cleaning plant for processing. Supplies and equipment were moved within the mine by rail using trolley locomotives. Trolley mantrips were used to transport miners to and from the working sections. On longwall panel development

sections, miners would dismount their rail mantrips at the mouth of the section.

They would then board rubber-tired personnel carriers and go to the faces.

6 West Mains

6 West Mains, where the fire occurred, had developed eight entries using

continuous mining technology and the room-and-pillar mining method. Entries

on 6 West Mains were numbered 1 through 8, left to right facing inby (figure

2.2). Entries 1, 2, and 3 served as return aircourses, with entry 3 designated as

the alternate escapeway. Entries 4, 6, 7, and 8 functioned as intake aircourses,

with entry No. 4 designated as the primary escapeway. Trolley haulage was

located in No. 6, and the conveyor belt was located in No. 5. As coal extraction

progressed in this area, longwall development panels were driven off to both the

left and right of 6 West. Two of these were situated inby the fire's location.

4 South

The 4 South section was a three-entry longwall development panel that had

been advanced approximately 2,000 ft from 6 West Mains. Entry 1 served as the

return aircourse for this section and was designated as their alternate escapeway.

No. 2 entry was the intake aircourse and functioned as a primary escapeway for the

section. A conveyor haulage belt, located in entry 3, was ventilated by a separate

split of intake air that moved from the section mouth inby to the belt tailpiece.

5 South

The 5 South section was also a three-entry longwall development panel that

had been advanced about 1,000 ft inby from 6 West Mains. On this section, entry 1 served as the intake aircourse and was also the primary escapeway. The

conveyor belt was located in entry 2 and was ventilated by a separate split of

intake air that moved from the mouth of the section inby to the tailpiece. Entry 3

was the return aircourse and served as a designated alternate escapeway for this

section.
32

Figure 2.2–Area affected by fire at Brownfield Mine.
33

Cokedale Mine

Cokedale Mine was originally started in 1944. At the time the Cokedale

Mine fire occurred, this operation was opened by one drift and eight shafts into

the Pittsburgh Coal Seam. Here, the Pittsburgh Seam averaged 66 inches thick.

A total of 408 persons were employed at the mine, 319 working underground on

2 production shifts and 1 maintenance shift per day, 5 days per week. The mine

operated seven active sections and had three spare sections. Workers produced

an average of 6,500 tons of coal per day. All sections were mined using the

room-and-pillar method, with coal extraction being done by continuous miners.

Entries and crosscuts were mined to a width of 16 ft. Entries were normally

developed on centers of 64 ft, with crosscuts mined on centers of 96 ft.

Coal was transported from the faces by shuttle cars and dumped onto belt

conveyors. These conveyor belts transported coal from the sections to underground loading tipples, where the coal was loaded into mine cars. From the

tipples, 37- and 50-ton track locomotives transported trips of loaded mine cars to

the surface, where coal was then processed at the mine's cleaning plant.

Ventilation to the mine was provided by six exhausting axial-vane mine fans

located on the surface. Intake air entered at the drift entrance and at seven intake

air shafts. Permanent stoppings, overcasts, and undercasts were used to control air

flow and provide the required separation between various aircourses. Permanent

stoppings were constructed of concrete blocks with mortared joints or blocks

plastered on one side. In areas of short production duration, steel panel stoppings

were used. Face ventilation was accomplished using auxiliary fans and tubing.

From Cokedale Mine's drift opening (pit mouth), a series of seven or eight

entries (main headings) were driven in a westerly direction. The fire at this mine

originated in the loaded track entry of these mains (figure 2.3). It started at a

point about 6 miles inby the pit mouth and 1,000 ft outby Steiner portal. At the

time, entries 1, 2, and 3 were functioning as return aircourses, while entries 6,

7, and 8 served as intakes. Near the fire, entries 4 and 5 were track entries and

accommodated Cokedale Mine's main trolley haulage from working sections to

the pit mouth. Entries 4 and 5 also served as intake aircourses, and air velocity

in these entries exceeded 250 fpm. They were developed before the Federal

Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, which limited air velocity around

trolley haulage systems to 250 fpm.

8 Face

 The 8 Face section consisted of nine entries and had been developed in the

mid-1950s to the left off the main headings. Entries 1 through 4 were intake airways, while entries 5 through 8 served as return aircourses. A series of eightentry panels were developed to the right of 8 Face. After development, these

butt panels were retreated back to 8 Face.
34

Figure 2.3.–Site of combustion source at Cokedale Mine.
35

7 Butt

In the late 1980s, a new series of nine entries, known as 7 Butt, were

developed to the left of 8 Face about 1,000 ft inby the main headings. These

entries were driven some 3,200 ft before the section was turned to the left. In

this section, entries 1, 8, and 9 were designated return aircourses, while entries 2

through 7 served as intake aircourses. After 7 Butt had been advanced approximately 1,000 ft, a set of seven entries, known as the 1 Left "free" entries, were

driven 90E off 7 Butt and connected with the haulage mains. The purpose for

driving this set of entries was to provide more air to the developing sections.

8 Face Parallels

Just outby the 1 Left "free" entries along 7 Butt, a series of nine entries were

developed 90E to the right. These entries, known as 8 Face Parallels, were being

driven parallel to the old 8 Face entries. For 8 Face Parallels section, the primary (intake) escapeway followed No. 7 entry to its intersection with 7 Butt.

The primary escapeway coming out of 7 Butt followed No. 8 entry out to the

intersection of 7 Butt and old 8 Face. The old 8 Face entries were developed

before the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969; as a result, the

intake escapeway from old 8 Face was routed onto the track entry. The alternate

(return) escapeway off 8 Face Parallels followed No. 9 entry to the intersection

with 7 Butt. The alternate escapeway off 7 Butt followed No. 9 entry to the

intersection with old 8 Face. At this point, the return escapeway crossed over

old 8 Face to the right-side return (No. 7 entry) of old 8 Face. The secondary

escapeway in old 8 Face followed No. 7 entry to the section mouth. From there,

the secondary escapeway followed the left-side return (No. 3 entry) of the main

headings to Crystal air shaft.

Discussion

This chapter has depicted an underground coal mine as a well-planned,

complex, and regulated system operating in a harsh environment. Additionally,

it profiled the three fire settings to be discussed later. Since mines contain numerous pieces of electrical equipment, have various friction sources, and possess

an almost inexhaustible supply of fuel, it is not surprising that they sometimes

catch fire. Actually, small fires are somewhat common. Those that force an

evacuation, however, are nonroutine events. While miners may be highly skilled

at their jobs, the task of responding to this type of emergency requires a different

set of proficiencies.

Earlier, it was suggested that safety training classes may not always give

miners competencies they need to face contingencies in their workplaces. This
36

brings up an interesting point as it relates to fire. Even though mines are

potentially dangerous, they are not emergency organizations. Their goal is to

extract a product—coal—and to do it profitably. Preparation for an event that

may never occur will obviously not be given the same priority in a mine that it

would merit on a naval combat vessel, for instance. What, then, is the

appropriate way to view behaviors that will be reported in the chapters to

follow? Workers at these operations did not display the discipline that welldrilled mine rescue teams would have, but is such an expectation realistic?

Perhaps the best way to approach this analysis is to note that some groups

responded much more effectively than others and to explore what factors led to

such variation. That way, any recommendations for improvement are likely to

remain in context, recognizing that mines are not emergency organizations.

References

Allen Corp. [1978]. An annotated bibliography of coal mine fire reports. Alexandria, VA:

Allen Corp. of America. U.S. Bureau of Mines contract No. J0275008.

American Geological Institute [1997]. Dictionary of mining, mineral, and related terms. 2nd

ed. Alexandria, VA: American Geological Institute.

Briggs G, Digman M [1980]. New miner and annual refresher training stories and examples.

Morgantown, WV: West Virginia University, Office of Research and Development.

Cole HP, Vaught C [1987]. Training in the use of the self-contained self-rescuer. In: Mining

Applications of Life Support Technology. Pittsburgh, PA: U.S. Department of the Interior,

Bureau of Mines, IC 9134, pp. 51-56.

Cole HP, Vaught C, Wasielewski R, Wiehagen W [1986]. Judgment and decision-making

in simulated mine emergencies. In: Proceedings of the 13th Annual Training Resources Applied

to Mining (Wheeling, WV), pp. 167-178.

Keenan C [1963]. Historical documentation of major coal-mine disasters in the United States

not classified as explosions of gas or dust. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior,

Bureau of Mines, Bulletin 616, pp. 1846-1962.

Kutchta J [1978]. Fire protection for mine conveyor belt systems in coal mine fire and

explosion protection. In: Coal Mine Fire and Explosion Prevention. Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, IC 8768, pp. 51-63.

McAteer J, Galloway L [1980]. A comparative study of miners' training and supervisory

certification in the coal mines of Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Poland,

Romania, France, Australia, and the United States: the case for Federal certification of supervisors

and increased training of miners. West Virginia Law Rev 82(4):937-1018.

Moore M [1987]. Fire in the intake. United Mine Workers J 98(7):11-17.

National Research Council [1982]. Toward safer underground coal mines. Washington, DC:

National Academy Press.

Palowitch E [1982]. The social efficiency of the coal industry [Dissertation]. Pittsburgh, PA:

University of Pittsburgh, pp. v, 73, 80.

Short J [1982]. The role of unions in occupational safety and health [Dissertation]. Salt Lake

City, UT: University of Utah, p. 147.

Vaught C, Cole H [1987]. Problems in donning the self-contained self-rescuer. In: Mining

Applications of Life Support Technology. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior,

Bureau of Mines, IC 9134, pp. 26-34.
37

Wala A, Cole H [1987]. Simulations that teach and test critical skills in mine ventilation. In:

Mutmansky J, ed. Proceedings of the Third Mine Ventilation Symposium at The Pennsylvania

State University. Littleton, CO: Society for Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration, Inc.

Wallwork G [1981]. Mining administration. In: Crickmer D, Zegeer D, eds. Elements of

practical coal mining. 2nd ed. New York, NY: American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and

Petroleum Engineers, pp. 741-770.
38

CHAPTER 3.—RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE PROFILE

Homans [1950] offered a working definition of group that is useful for this

research: "We mean by a group a number of persons who communicate with one

another often over a span of time, and who are few enough so that each person

is able to communicate with all the others, not at secondhand, through other

people, but face-to-face." This chapter begins with a discussion of the group

concept in reference to the hypothesized escape groups mentioned earlier. It

then moves to an examination of analysis techniques used by the authors.

Finally, the subjects themselves are profiled according to their demographic

characteristics.

The Nature of Groups

Warriner [1956] took a realist approach to understanding groups: "(1) the

group is just as real as the person, but (2) both are abstract, analytical units, not

concrete entities, and (3) the group is understandable and explicable solely in

terms of distinctly social processes and factors, not by reference to individual

psychology." Warriner's realist position merely holds that "group" occupies a

different domain in which it is no more or less concrete than "person." At this

group level the unit of analysis will be those relations that indicate social rather

than individual behavior. It is possible to investigate these group properties empirically—if a researcher avoids confusing conceptual entities with concrete

ones. Most people seem to accept that group attributes must somehow be

inferred, but think personal attributes will be directly manifested, requiring little

or no interpretation [Snizek 1979]. In other words, nobody would equate physical components of an underground working section with the actual work group,

yet social scientists (as well as laypeople) very often confuse real individuals

with notions of the person. In actuality, neither groups nor persons are directly

disclosed to the senses; both are inferred by experience and observation. One

can "see" a group just as clearly as one can "see" a person, given the proper perspective from which to do so. It is necessary, in developing this perspective, to

begin with a sound definition of the thing being examined.

Besides communication, or more generally, social interaction, Homans

[1950] included three other components of group makeup. "Sentiment" is characterized as the feelings people tend to form about one another when they

interact often. These feelings include not only friendliness and dislike, but attitudes such as approval or disapproval. A "norm" is an idea, held in common

by group members, that specifies how people ought to behave in given circumstances. In lay terms, norms are simply those informal rules individuals

abide by in order to get along together in social situations. Finally, "activity"

refers to those things persons do with others. In work groups, as an example,

many of the activities are cooperative and goal-directed.
39

Most underground mining activities are carried out as team work. Workers

at the face interact routinely to coordinate various tasks in the extraction cycle.

Crews that work outby also communicate and assist each other in order to do

their jobs. These reciprocal relations exist in a daily context of danger.

A mistake on one worker's part could injure or kill others. The need to deal with

this danger and predict what one's coworkers are likely to do in a given situation

has resulted in a complex of sentiments and rules governing individual behavior.

Simply stated, miners pressure each other to behave in terms of collective expectations and use a range of sanctions to ensure conformity [Smith and Vaught

1988]. A result is what Lee [1970] termed the "illusion of universality." This

is a general feeling that group members have the same outlook and tend to define

things similarly [Shibutani 1955]. Thus, a miner's attraction to his or her "buddies" is seen as right and proper, where "one's very self, for many purposes at

least, is the common life and purpose of the group...the simplest way of

describing this wholeness is by saying that it...involves the sort of sympathy and

mutual identification for which 'we' is the natural expression" [Cooley 1909].

For underground miners, the sentiment that "we must stick together" may be

a "sacred code" [Lucas 1969] so strong it has a bearing upon how individuals

behave toward each other during a fire. Johnston and Johnson [1988] noted that

an emergency does not necessarily signal the breakdown of social organization.

Rather, functional roles that already exist are merely adapted and extended into

the crisis. In a mine, where workers feel that survival under ordinary circumstances may well depend on "having a good buddy who watches out for you"

[Wardell et al. 1985], it is almost certain they will be trying to help each other

escape. How and under what circumstances this helping behavior occurs is a

concern of the research team. Since the literature reviewed in chapter 1 suggests

that group escape attempts may actually increase an individual's survival

chances, what then makes an effective escape group? At what point does a situation dictate that "it's every man for himself," as one respondent reported, and

how might this sentiment be avoided? To answer these and other questions

about escape behavior, it is necessary to explore the nature of those groups that

evacuated the three fires reported in this study.

Research Strategy and Method

A general case study strategy has been used in this research and the design

should not be confused with any particular method of data collection and

analysis. Nevertheless, such misunderstanding occurs frequently and tends to

cloud discussion [Platt 1988]. This issue can be clarified succinctly. Case studies are nothing other than a way to "explain wholistically the dynamics of a

certain historical period of a particular social unit" [Stoecker 1991]. In other

words, they set the boundaries of a research effort rather than determine how it
40

will be carried out. For the present study, each of the eight escaping groups is

treated as a separate case having unique aspects as well as certain commonalities. The time periods are well-defined, beginning with a warning and

ending when group members reached safety. Likewise, each social unit is

clearly identifiable: those miners who came out of their operation together. The

research task is to explain the dynamics of these different groups.

Analysis of each subject of interest was first done within the escape group.

"A single case can undoubtedly demonstrate that its features are possible and,

hence may also exist in other cases and, even if they do not, must be taken into

account in the formulation of general propositions" [Platt 1988]. A multiplecase design was used so that variations across cases could also be examined. "In

a multiple-case study, one goal is to build a general explanation that fits each of

the individual cases, even though the cases will vary in their details." [Yin

1984]. Multiple cases are not used as a sample of the population, but as replication of an analysis. Each case "(a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) produces contrary results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical

replication)" [Yin 1984]. In this study, the resulting explanations were based on

what was learned about each group, as an individual case, and about subjects of

interest as they were exhibited (or not exhibited) across the eight groups.

Information for the present study has been taken from various sources.

Existing literature was used to provide a theoretical notion of how escape groups

might be expected to function. Mine Safety and Health Administration investigative reports helped researchers build pictures of each fire situation. These narratives also provided insights about the efficiency of given escape efforts. The

main data source, however, is a set of open-ended responses collected during

interviews with workers who escaped through smoke in the three mines. Fortyeight miners, supervisors, and State or Federal inspectors gave accounts of their

experiences. "An account is the personal record of an event by the individual

experiencing it, told from his point of view " [Brown and Sime 1981]. Thus, the

focus of analysis are these qualitative data. Further, while some responses in the

database refer to individuals, only data that lead to a better understanding of the

group will be considered here. Each escape group will be portrayed through the

accounts of its members.

Quantitative methodologists often profess difficulty understanding how a

qualitative strategy and its related activities can be made legitimate. The use of

open-ended data, such as personal accounts, is frequently criticized by those who

are more familiar with experimental or quasi-experimental quantitative methods.

These scientists usually raise issues of reliability and validity when questioning

the soundness of qualitative research. In general, reliability denotes the tendency of a measuring procedure to behave in a constant manner each time it is

applied. The concept of validity is not quite so intuitive. Essentially, however,

a valid procedure is one that measures what it is supposed to measure. From a
41

traditional (or empirical) frame of reference, the type of information-gathering

that depends on subjective responses has some major flaws.

First, independent and dependent variables may not be well specified and

probably could not be measured accurately even if they were [Stoecker 1991].

Since reliability depends on the degree to which a finding "is independent of

accidental circumstances" [Kirk and Miller 1990], it is vital that any variable of

interest can be linked with an empirical indicator. It will then be possible,

through repeated trials, to determine the constancy of this indicator as a measurement tool. Consistent measurement is necessary if researchers are to separate

legitimate findings from accidental factors that introduce error [Carmines and

Zeller 1987]. Without this type of rigor, empiricists argue, potential bias would

be obscured and hence undetected. Thus, there could be no guarantee of internal

validity. Internal validity allows the researcher to conclude that it was a

specified independent variable, rather than some third factor, which caused

change in a dependent variable [Yin 1984]. Because it is very difficult to establish the reliability and internal validity of open-ended responses in a traditional sense, such data get labeled as "impressionistic" and unusable for causal

analysis.

A second shortcoming of qualitative research, according to quantitative

methodologists, is that data obtained under uncontrolled conditions do not allow

the use of probability statistics and therefore are not generalizable. This question of representativeness involves the problem of external validity: "To what

populations [and] settings...can this effect be generalized?" [Campbell and

Stanley 1966]. In situations where a proper sample has been taken, it is possible

to control statistically for interactions of factors that may have an impact on the

dependent variable. A researcher can then draw conclusions about some measured observation and infer how it will impact infinite similar circumstances.

Since the qualitative methodologist neither takes broad and random samples nor

calibrates responses, it is deemed there is no way to answer the question of

"whether the researcher sees what he or she thinks he or she sees" [Kirk and

Miller 1990]. This "nonquantitative" scholar is also viewed as being unable to

make any empirical leap from particular events to those universal axioms that

are the ultimate goals of science.

Yet qualitative methods, which became virtually ignored in most disciplines

following the rise of computer analysis and sophisticated statistical techniques,

have had a phenomenal resurgence in the past decade [Miles and Huberman

1994]. Perhaps the chief reason for this renewed interest in, and use of, openended data has been the growing recognition that quantitative science leaves

gaps in our attempts to answer "how" and "why" questions. Stoecker [1991]

listed three basic responses to the proponents of experimental or quasiexperimental research that suggest what some of the foibles are: "First,

probability samples and significance tests do not insure accurate explanation.
42

Second, the scientific method does not control for researcher bias. Third, the

survey research preferred by scientific method advocates is not useful for

applied questions." No matter how well a study is controlled, a scientist who

wishes to go beyond the immediate evidence and make statements about some

population or universe must assume he or she "knows the relevant laws"

[Campbell and Stanley 1966]. The strength of one's assumptions rests upon

knowledge, experience and creativity, i.e., any type of science is only as good

as its practitioners.

If there is a place in science for nonquantitative research, what might that

place be? Insofar as case studies are concerned, they usually are thought of as

exploratory or descriptive in nature. This is especially so for work that relies on

qualitative analysis (such as the present research). The appropriateness of a

particular strategy, however, should be decided not by its nature but by the

purpose for which it is being used. Yin [1984] listed three conditions that need

to be considered before choosing a research strategy: (1) the type of research

question being posed, (2) an investigator's extent of control over actual events,

and (3) whether the events being focused on are current or historical. Questions

that consider how or why certain contemporary events occur, but over which the

researcher has no control, are particularly amenable to a case analysis. Furthermore, a qualitative case study, used as an explanatory mechanism, "provides

evidence to show how both the rule, and its exceptions, operate" [Stoecker

1991].

The present qualitative research makes no effort to count something or

measure a quantity. Instead, team members have attempted to determine the

presence or absence of group behavior in a fire setting and then explain its

variability in those instances where it is seen to exist. The question relevant to

reliability, in this case, is whether group behavior was studied by the researchers

in a way that created a false reflection of it. Kirk and Miller [1990] suggested

the proper response to that question: "For reliability to be calculated, it is incumbent on the scientific investigator to document his or her procedure." As in

reports of quantitative research, the qualitative methodologist must make explicit

the way the study was designed and carried out. In so doing, he or she guarantees that other scientists can determine whether or not the methodology is

sound. They then have an occasion to replicate the techniques, if appropriate,

in other settings.

Validity, in the case of these three fires, involves an assumption that USBM

researchers did, in fact, observe or detect what they were attempting to investigate. In qualitative studies, the fundamental tools used are a researcher's

powers of observation or an ability to ask appropriate questions at the right time.

A qualitative researcher often gains confidence in findings by using a structured

instrument to examine an issue or variable of concern. The primary instrument

used to gather data during this research was an interview guide (see appendix B).
43

This guide requested individuals to provide an account of their personal

experiences in the fire from which they escaped. Brown and Sime [1981] addressed the appropriateness of such an approach: "Fundamental to the philosophy of an account methodology is the recognition that people can and do

comment on their experiences, and that these commentaries are acceptable as

scientific data." If a person making an observation is skilled and his or her instruments properly constructed, then any subsequent conclusions ought to be

considered valid. In reporting these results, of course, it is important to recount

the methods that were used. Their appropriateness and proper use can then be

evaluated by other researchers. Each of these scientists will ultimately decide

if the instrument was constructed correctly and if the researchers were skilled in

its use.

In each case, after hearing about an event, researchers involved in this study

contacted officials from both the affected company and the United Mine

Workers of America (the labor union that represented rank-and-file employees

at all three sites). Investigators requested management and labor's cooperation

with an ongoing study of miners' responses to underground mine fires. At

mines A and B, union officials agreed to set up interviews with miners who had

escaped their fires. One union and one management official set up the interviews that were conducted with those individuals who escaped the fire in

mine C. Worker accounts were gathered at locations convenient for the participating miners. Interviews of mine A workers were conducted in a room at

the local union hall. Individuals who escaped mine B were interviewed at a

motel close to the mine where they worked. The interviews at mine C were conducted in offices on mine property.

Nobody except one subject and two research scientists was permitted in the

room during an interview. The miner was first asked for permission to tape record his account. All subjects agreed to be taped. A written schedule (mentioned previously and shown in appendix B) with a series of open-ended

questions and related probes was used to guide every account. Each interview

began with an investigator reiterating that participation in the study was

voluntary and that the miner had an option of not answering any particular

question.

After obtaining general demographic information, an interviewer next asked

the miner to tell, without interruption, his story about escaping the fire. Followup questions were then used so that specific details about each escape could

be included. The sessions, which were 30 to 90 minutes long, ended when a

researcher had asked all questions on the interview guide and a miner did not

have any additional comments. These interviews were completed 1 to 6 months

after each fire had occurred.

The audiotapes were transcribed and stored on computer disks as text-based

data. This data set has been analyzed with the assistance of a program that acts,
44

in effect, as an electronic substitute for scissors and paste [Seidel et al. 1988].

The computer application allows files to be sorted by category and crossreferenced according to some predetermined coding scheme. This feature enables the easy retrieval and juxtaposition of specific categories during analysis.

Analysis can then begin with a series of coding passes. The first pass might

simply identify instances of situations in which a group property either exists or

explicitly does not exist. The next level of coding could include concepts such

as composition, stability, or interactions. The coding scheme can be further defined during this process and coding continued as needed. Findings may then

be used to create a group behavior model.

After the accounts were gathered, a comparative method of qualitative

analysis was employed [Glaser and Strauss 1967]. In the comparative approach,

a researcher develops as many categories as will clarify the problem. Next, he

or she starts integrating categories and the properties that make them up, beginning to connect concepts with their indicators [Claster and Schwartz 1972].

After integrating categories and properties, the researcher is then ready to move

toward simplicity and a broader scope [Glaser and Strauss 1967]. Over time,

a theory of the event under investigation will emerge and be modified as more

data are added. As the theory is streamlined, researchers are able to arrive at an

assessment of how typical those occurrences that went into its construction are

likely to be [Becker 1970]. The logic underlying this assessment is the same as

that which supports probability: instead of adopting an either/or stance about the

accuracy of particular assertions, one addresses the likelihood that his or her

conclusions are correct. The magnitude of evidence from various data sources

enables an observer to advance a particular conclusion with a greater or lesser

degree of confidence.

Profile of the Sample

Across the 3 mines and 48 subjects, 8 separate groups of workers escaped

through smoke. Table 3.1 shows the number of miners in each escape group and the

number who were actually interviewed. The sample includes workers from various

job categories. Forty-two of these individuals were rank-and-file miners who worked

throughout the mines. One mine inspector and five supervisors were interviewed.

These workers were 41.7 years old on average. They had a mean of 16.8 years of

experience in mining with about 15 years at the operation where they were working

at the time of their fire. The average age and number of years of experience for each

group are shown in table 3.2. All of the miners included in this sample were male.

One female did escape with a group from Adelaide, but she chose not to participate

in the study. To further define the context within which these people were required

to act, each escape group and its situation will be discussed briefly below.
45

Table 3.1.—Number of miners in each escape group

 and number in sample

Group Mine Population N

(total ' 65)

Sample N

(total ' 48)

1 . . . . . . . . . . A 10 8

2 .......... A 8 6

3 . . . . . . . . . . A 10 7

NAp . . . . . . . . A NAp 1

4 .......... B 8 7

5 .......... B 9 7

6 .......... B 3 1

NAp . . . . . . . . B NAp 1

7 .......... C 8 5

8 .......... C 9 5

NAp Not applicable.

Table 3.2.—Average ages and years of experience of miners in escape groups

Group Mine

Average

age

(N ' 42)

Average

years

 (total ' 16.8)

Average years

at this mine

(total ' 15.2)

1 . . . . . . . . . A 41.8 17.1 17.1

2 . . . . . . . . . A 39.3 14.3 14.0

3 . . . . . . . . . A 39.7 17.6 15.0

4 . . . . . . . . . B 41.7 17.2 16.7

5 . . . . . . . . . B 40.3 17.6 14.4

6 . . . . . . . . . B 56 25 15

7 . . . . . . . . . C 38.8 13.9 13.9

8 . . . . . . . . . C 40.0 14.7 13.9

 Total . . . . . — 41.8 16.8 15.2

Escape Profiles

Group 1 (1 Right - Adelaide) was a production crew. This group had a new

section foreman who was working his first shift in the mine after a 5-year

absence. He was not familiar with the affected area; As one worker put it: "The

boss, I can't blame the boss. This was the first time he was on the section in

5 years." Additionally, the crew had recently been "split up," and some regular

workers had been replaced with experienced miners from other sections. As a

result, at least three group members besides the foreman were unfamiliar with

this part of the mine. Group 1 started the evacuation riding their mantrip. This

mode of travel continued until the crew encountered heavy smoke. At that point

the driver stopped the vehicle and everyone got out: "We had two or three

running—everybody was panicked." After some initial confusion, the group

members gathered and started walking together out their intake escapeway.

They soon hit smoke in this entry as well. Group 1 moved into a return airway

and continued walking. Shortly thereafter, the group members encountered

smoke again. At this point, they donned their self-contained self-rescuers and

walked through smoke to safety.

Group 2 (2 Northwest - Adelaide) was also a production crew. These
46

workers had all been together for a significant amount of time. They had a section foreman who was very familiar with the affected area. One other resource

in this group was an individual who had been a mine rescue team member for

many years. "We had the boss and the mine rescue man set it up, the boss in

front, he was in the rear." Group 2 started to leave the mine on a mantrip. The

group members had only gone a short distance when they encountered smoke.

They did not leave the mantrip at this point, however. Instead, they rode back

up into the section to where they had started. They then got off the vehicle and

started walking down their intake escapeway until they encountered smoke.

Group 2 next moved into the return to avoid the smoke and continued walking.

When smoke was found in the return, this group donned the self-contained selfrescuers and proceeded for about 1 mile to reach safety: "We were about as

organized as you're going to get. We did real good." "We all stuck together real

well."

As with group 1, miners in group 3 (3 Left - Adelaide) had some new

members the night of their fire. Most, however, had worked together for several

years. At the beginning, everyone rode together until they encountered smoke.

As in the first group, they next started walking down their intake escapeway and

hit more smoke. They then moved into a return and walked until they got into

smoke, at which point they decided to don their self-contained self-rescuers.

The next phase of their escape, however, differs from group 1. They did not escape as a cohesive unit, instead spreading out to form three subgroups. While

walking through smoke, this crew became lost and was actually moving deeper

into the mine: "We went in a little circle and come back around." They had

gone approximately 200 ft when one of the miners recognized their mistake. At

that point, everyone turned around and this time successfully found their way out

of the mine.

When group 4 (4 South - Brownfield) gathered, smoke was already visible

in the intake entry. In addition to the section foreman and regular crew, group 4

contained a Federal mine inspector who had been on the section. This group,

unlike the others, did not choose the return as a second option. The group

thought that smoke would also be found in that entry: "The boss and the inspector was there, and they were discussing which way to go—which would be

the best way to get out. So they decided it would be down the belt. We all went

down the belt." However, the belt was not clear. Like group 3, group 4 spread

out, with some slower workers lagging behind, accompanied by the inspector.

They completed the escape in the belt entry through the smoke.

Group 5 (5 South - Brownfield), a production crew, was led out by its

section foreman with help from a rank-and-file miner who knew the affected

area well: "[The foreman] is our boss. He...done right. He got us on the right

track and kept us on the right track. Between him and [the other guy]." After

group 5 assembled, the group members walked down the intake entry until they
47

encountered smoke. Like group 4, they tried the belt entry next. The smoke

there was not as heavy at first. When it became heavy, they moved to the return.

The return was also smoke-filled, but they traveled on through the smoke. Some

of the workers had difficulty due to age or physical problems and slowed down.

The section foreman stayed with these people to make sure that everyone

reached safety.

Members of group 6 (6 West - Brownfield) included three individuals.

These were a maintenance foreman and a mechanic (who worked together

regularly) plus a State mine inspector. All three donned their self-contained selfrescuers as soon as they assembled at the intake escapeway. Even though their

haulage was clear initially, this group, influenced by input from the State mine

inspector, decided against attempting to travel in a vehicle. They started their

escape walking down the intake entry. When they reached heavy smoke, they

retreated and moved into a return: "I mean, the inspector, when I turned around

and said we got to go back, he says no, and I says, you can do what you want to

do, I'm going back." The men made a couple of turns, but basically followed the

return out of the smoke to clear air: "The markers (reflectors) were there.

I mean, I really wasn't looking for them...the return is double-timbered. I just

stayed between the props and went."

Group 7 (7 Butt - Cokedale) was a collection of individuals working in an

area on midnights, which was a maintenance shift at their mine. Here,

a construction foreman took charge and led them out of the mine: "I was a

foreman in charge of that area, and when I said to these people what we had to

do, there was no second guessing my decision." As with groups 1, 2, and 3,

these miners also started their escape by attempting to leave the section on

vehicles. When they judged the smoke to be too heavy for continuing safely,

everyone started walking in a return entry: "I felt pretty confident...because

I knew [the foreman] had been up there for a long time walking returns and...he

was real familiar with the area." In all, they walked through smoke for about

1.5 miles. Throughout their escape, respondents recalled, the construction

foreman displayed knowledgeable, decisive, and confident leadership.

 None of the individuals in group 8 (8 Face Parallels) were engaged in coal

production, because they were also working the maintenance shift at their

operation. Most of them were involved in such support work as construction and

supply activities. Additionally, two motormen were in the section when fire was

discovered. Everyone gathered and began their escape on foot. Like all of the

groups except 5 and 6, they started out in their primary intake escapeway:

"There was a lot of confusion...the boss couldn't figure out how to get into the

intake escapeway." When they encountered smoke there, the men turned around

and returned to the section, as group 2 did. They then attempted to travel down

a return entry. After walking about 0.25 miles, someone realized that they were

not in a designated escapeway: "The guys were more or less talking amongst
48

themselves and I said, you know, this is real serious and this boss if we're not

careful, he's going to get us killed." At this point, everyone returned to the

section for a second time. They then found a designated alternate escapeway

and followed it through smoke to safety.

Discussion

All eight of the escapes took place under potentially deadly conditions. The

miners traveled in smoke for thousands of feet. Individuals had to use selfcontained self-rescuers to protect their lungs as they moved through this smoke.

Some of the escape routes were objectively more complicated than others, but

all were difficult to traverse.

The summaries above give very general overviews of each escape in order

to suggest some of that associated complexity and difficulty. This is done to

help readers more fully identify with the study's context. In the chapters that

follow we will discuss at length details of each group and the area from which

it escaped. Subjective analyses of danger and the effects of those perceptions

on group behavior will be a large part of that discussion.

References

Becker H [1970]. Problems of inference and proof in participant observation. In: Filstead

W, ed. Qualitative methodology. Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing Company, pp. 189-201.

Brown J, Sime J [1981]. A methodology for accounts. In: Brenner M, ed. Social method and

social life. New York, NY: Academic Press, pp. 159-188.

Campbell DT, Stanley JC [1966]. Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research.

Chicago, IL: Rand McNally and Company, pp. 7, 17.

Carmines EC, Zeller RA [1987]. Reliability and validity assessment. Sage University Paper

series on Qualitative Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 07-017. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage

Publications.

Claster D, Schwartz H [1972]. Strategies of participation in participant observation. Sociol

Methods and Res 1(1).

Cooley C [1909]. Social organization. New York, NY: Charles Scribners' Sons, p. 23.

Glaser B, Strauss A [1967]. The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago, IL: Aldine

Publishing Company, pp. 101, 111.

Homans GC [1950]. The human group. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, and Company.

Johnston DM, Johnson NR [1988]. Role extension in disaster: employee behavior at the

Beverly Hills supper club fire. Sociol Focus 22:39-51.

Kirk J, Miller ML [1990]. Reliability and validity in qualitative research. Sage University

Paper series on Qualitative Applications in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage

Publications, pp. 20, 72, 121.

Lee S [1970]. Group cohesion and the Hutterian colony. In: Shibutani T, ed. Human nature

and collective behavior: papers in honor of Herbert Blumer. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,

p. 172.

Lucas R [1969]. Men in crisis. New York, NY: Basic Books, p. 6.
49

Miles MB, Huberman AM [1994]. Qualitative data analysis: an expanded sourcebook. 2nd

ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Platt J [1988]. What can case studies do? In: Burgess R, ed. Studies in qualitative

methodology, Vol. 1. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Inc. pp. 1-23.

Seidel JV, Kjolseth R, Seymour E [1988]. The ethnograph: a user's guide. Littleton, CO:

Qualis Research Associates.

Shibutani T [1955]. Reference groups as perspectives. Am J Sociol 60(6):562-569.

Smith D, Vaught C [1988]. Ius bituminous: solidarity and legal order in a dangerous work

environment. Deviant Behav 9:131-154.

Snizek W [1979]. Towards a clarification of the interrelationship between theory and

research: its form and implications. In: Snizek W, Fuhrum E, Miller M, eds. Contemporary issues

in theory and research. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Stoecker R [1991]. Evaluating and rethinking the case study. Sociol Rev 39(1):88-112.

Wardell M, Vaught C, Smith D [1985]. Underground coal mining and the labor process:

safety at the coal face. In: Bryant C, Shoemaker D, Skipper J, Snizek W, eds. The rural work

force: non-agricultural occupations in America. South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, pp. 43-58.

Warriner C [1956]. Groups are real: a reaffirmation. Am Sociol Rev 21:550-553.

Yin RK [1984]. Case study research: design and methods. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 16, 38, 48, 49, 108.
50

CHAPTER 4.—EXAMINATION OF GROUP BEHAVIOR

DURING MINE FIRE ESCAPES

It is suggested in chapter 1 that emergency activities (including escape) are

not individualistic. They tend to be group responses. If escapes from mine fires

are group activities, then preparation for such events must take group behavior

into account. This chapter explores the hypothesis that the miners who escaped

from the three mines under study did so as members of groups. For development

of this chapter, the database was examined for evidence of the existence of

escape groups and for instances when individualistic behavior was paramount.

Illustrations of group and/or individualistic behavior were analyzed and

representative examples are provided in the following discussion.

The nature of groups was discussed in chapter 3 and the following working

definition was offered: "We mean by a group a number of persons who communicate with one another often over a span of time, and who are few enough

so that each person is able to communicate with all the others, not at secondhand, through other people, but face-to-face" [Homans 1950]. To determine

whether or not groups existed during the fire evacuations, it is important that the

concept of group be clearly defined. Therefore, the discussion started in chapter

3 will be elaborated here. The defining characteristics of group given in chapter

3 were taken from Homans [1950]. They include size, person-to-person communication, feelings that members have for each other, explicit and implicit

rules for behavior, and common activities.

An additional characteristic that is sometimes used to define groups is cohesiveness. Kiesler and Kiesler [1970] state, "Cohesiveness would include not

only the attraction that the group holds for its members but also any other force

operating on the individual to stay in the group." Variables said to contribute to

cohesiveness include "(1) the attractiveness of a group for its members," and

"(2) the coordination of the efforts of the members" [Keisler 1970]. One source

of the attraction to a group occurs when "the goals or exterior tasks confronting

the group are consistent with those of the individual person, and can best be

handled by group action" [Cartwright and Zander 1968, in Davis 1969]. In other

words, a common goal and a coordinated effort mounted to achieve that goal

contributes toward the creation of a cohesive group.

As discussed in the earlier review of research (chapter 1), groups have

frequently been studied in laboratory or simulation settings. These methods allowed control over variables of interest. Kiesler and Kiesler [1970] state,

however, that they "find group variables conceptually imprecise and experimentally difficult to work with." Experimental control, in other words, is

difficult to achieve in the study of groups. The richness of the naturalistic mine

fire data may provide an opportunity for an examination of groups that cannot

be found in laboratories or simulations because this environment was not
51

contrived and the groups were not artificially created. While there are limitations in the data set, it provides an opportunity for examining naturally occurring

groups experiencing an extremely stressful situation. Furthermore, it offers

views of those groups developed from the perspective of potential group

members.

The remainder of this chapter will be organized into four sections. The first

section will focus on characteristics of the groups. The beginning of group

formation for each work crew will be examined in section two. The third section

will explore counterexamples or cases when individualistic behavior took precedence over group actions. The last section will be a discussion of the ramifications of the findings for mine evacuation preparedness.

Group Characteristics

To document the existence of the escape groups, group characteristics that

were defined earlier in this chapter will be considered. The most objective

measure is group size. All except one of the groups studied had 8-10 members.

The one outlier had only three members. These sizes would meet Homan's

[1950] criteria of being, "few enough that each person is able to communicate

with all the others, not secondhand, through other people, but face-to-face." The

following discussion will address each group in terms of its make-up and the

more subjective criteria.

The groups that were formed on each section varied in composition. Five

of the eight groups were made up of production crews. In two of these cases, the

crews from 2 Northwest at Adelaide and 5 South at Brownfield, stable work

groups had existed for quite some time and included a section foreman or

another miner with leadership capabilities. The 4 South crew at Brownfield

Mine was composed of a stable work group and a mine inspector who happened

to be on the section at the time of the fire. The inspector was, however, wellknown to the section foreman and was trusted as a capable individual. The

production crews from Adelaide Mine's 1 Right and 3 Left sections were

composed of new miners and/or supervisors. While these individuals were not

new to mining and the roles they assumed, neither were they familiar with each

other. The smallest group, which escaped from the 6 West section at

Brownfield, consisted of three individuals who were involved in the repair of a

piece of equipment. Two of them were well-known to each other and routinely

worked together. The third was a mine inspector who was conducting an inspection in that area. Two of the groups, from Cokedale Mine's 7 Butt and

8 Face Parallels, were formed during a maintenance shift. These groups contained collections of individuals who were performing construction and supply

activities on these sections. In both of these groups, foremen were present.

Some of the individuals in each group were familiar with each other, but others
52

were not. Similarly, some miners were familiar with the sections from which

they were required to escape while others were not. In all eight cases, regardless

of the prior affiliation between the people on each section or familiarity with the

work area, the first action taken when warning of an emergency was received

was to warn others on the section and for everyone to gather in one location.

It is not surprising that miners on a section would come together under some

conditions. Coal miners typically work in groups. Each production crew conducts

activities in the section with individuals filling various roles and being assigned to

certain jobs. During the accomplishment of those jobs, however, the members of

the crew may be dispersed throughout the section. For example, on a continuous

mining section, the miner operator and helper will be in one entry while the roof

bolter operator and helper are in another. The miners who are responsible for

transporting coal from the face to the section's dump point for haulage to the

outside will travel between the continuous miner and the dump point. Therefore,

while a person can think of a section as having one work group that together

complete the tasks necessary to mine coal, these miners are also doing discrete

tasks within a system that may or may not allow them to be in direct

communication with each other at any given time during the work shift. Casual

workers and visitors such as mechanics, bratticemen, supplymen, surveyors,

inspectors, and others may also be on the section. Workers were dispersed in this

way on each section when the mine fire threat began at each of the mines.

Regardless of their particular location on the section, miners have certain

understandings of their roles and expectations of other miners. In other words,

they have what was earlier termed "explicit and implicit rules for behavior."

Under these "rules," a miner is expected to come to the assistance of another

during a mine emergency if at all possible. When conducting a study in a community where a major mine emergency had occurred, Beach and Lucas [1960]

determined that:

In common with many mining communities, the norms shared by all

individuals guaranteed mutual help. The miners' code of rescue meant

that each trapped miner had the knowledge that he would never be

buried alive if it were humanly possible for his friends to reach him.

This code was so widely understood and unconsciously accepted that no

miner-rescuer was faced with serious role conflict. At the same time,

the code was not rigid enough to ostracize those who could not face the

rescue role.

These rules also include strong ties between a miner and a "buddy." It is

understood that these two workers hold a special relationship and are expected

to come to each other's aid. These implicit rules and role definitions existed at

the study mines.
53

When asked how concerned the workers on one section were when they first

gathered together, one miner explained that most were calm but one miner was

upset. "We had trouble with really only one guy on our crew, [he] just left his

buddy." Saying that the miner "left his buddy" was intended to show that this

individual was extremely upset. The miner's actions were explained by the

coworker's comment, "He's a nervous person." As Beach and Lucas found, the

expectation is that a miner will help other miners, especially a buddy, but it will

not be held against an individual who is not up to the task.

The excerpts presented throughout this book offer, again and again, examples of miners expressing versions of this code and discussing attempts to live

by it. It is within the context of such a code that the actions of individuals and

groups must be understood. Miners living by this code would therefore set goals

of not only self-protection during emergency situations, but also protecting other

miners whenever possible. Potential escape group members therefore, would

have an obvious common goal during the threatening situation of a mine fire.

Escape Group Formation

As mentioned earlier, production workers and other miners were scattered

throughout their sections in groups of two to four individuals when they

determined, by receiving warning or by their senses, that something was wrong

and some action should be taken. Details about the discovery of the fires and

how warnings were communicated will be discussed in chapter 6. For the

purposes of this chapter, however, it is important to note that upon learning some

kind of nonroutine problem existed, each miner was typically with only one or

two others.

The first thing that happened after the individuals or small groups learned

of a problem was the gathering of everyone in each section at one location. This

group formation occurred on all eight of the affected sections. The behavior was

displayed regardless of the form or content of the warning and across all job

titles and individual situations. This point, which will be expanded below, is of

consequence because it provides the foundation for the argument to be made that

evacuation procedures and related training should focus on group action and

interaction, as individual miners will naturally form such groups during

emergency escape attempts.

Providing warning to the other miners on the section was the initial priority

of those workers who first received word of a fire or who observed and

recognized the signs of a serious fire. In some cases the supervisor, usually a

section foreman, received a call or spotted smoke. It is not surprising, given the

responsibilities of their positions, that these individuals instructed the miners on

their sections to meet at a given location to begin evacuation. The foreman with

the crew from 7 Butt at Cokedale asked a miner to help give warning to the other
54

miners. He directed the miner to "just make sure everybody meets up here at the

[track] switch." It could be suggested that the supervisor in these situations has

responsibility for the other employees and is motivated by that responsibility to

warn them and to gather them together where they can be given any assistance

needed during the evacuation.

While it may be true that supervisors feel responsible for the safety of

miners during an emergency, this is not a complete explanation for the behavior

of gathering everyone in the section together before taking other actions. This

same behavior was exhibited by everyone who had earlier knowledge of the

problem regardless of that person's position or job title. When a roof bolter

operator answered a phone call and was told of the fire, he asked other miners

nearby to help him spread the word:

I said, "I'll go to the left side. You get the guys on the right side." So

I went up and told them, and we came down and the guys from the right

side came down...[to the load center].

In giving warning, it was assumed that everyone would meet somewhere on the

section before starting out of the mine. A shuttle car operator reported his

actions upon learning of the fire in his mine as follows:

I stopped at the bolters first and I told them that there's heavy smoke

coming up the intake and we're supposed to get out of here right away.

See you back at the power center. That's where the rescuers were.

When hearing of the potential danger, no one started his or her evacuation alone.

In every case, warning of the situation was given and instructions to join the

other miners at a specific location were given.

It should also be considered that miners routinely enter and leave their

working section as a group. Frequently their transportation to and from work

areas is via a mantrip, which workers ride into and out of the mine with the

others who work in that section. It is not remarkable, therefore, that miners went

to a given location to begin the process of leaving the mine. What is of interest,

however, is that in these far from routine situations, miners still adhered to this

pattern of leaving together. In fact, none of the miners interviewed gave any

indication that they considered starting their evacuations without the entire

group. They often spoke of the actions of the groups, at this early point, as if

they were of one mind:

We met at the dinner hole and all of us just went down to the mantrip

and all in a single file line and we got in the mantrip and we started out.

We all met down at the tool boxes. From there we walked down to the
55

self-rescuers and everything. Everybody picked up a self-rescuer. We

had a full crew. Everybody got a self-rescuer, and we checked to make

sure they were all good. We turned around and we were going to go

down the intake.

In most cases, the miners interviewed seemed not to question whether or not the

person notified of a danger would spread the warning throughout the section and

then wait at a given location, (formally or informally designated) for the rest of

the section members to arrive before proceeding out of the mine.

It is also interesting to note that miners at this early stage of group formation

remained with the group regardless of their personal opinions about the safety

of the groups' behavior. A utilityman told of beginning his escape riding a vehicle even though he did not think that was the best method.

[The boss] came back up and said, "Get all the fire extinguishers and

let's go. We'll get in the mantrip." I went down there. I really wanted

to go to the intake escapeway or something like that when he said there

was a fire. I'm going to go the other way. I don't want to go that way.

So we got in there and, gee, we only went a couple blocks.

The authority of the boss was not questioned, even in this potentially life and

death situation. The utilityman remained a part of the group, under the boss's

leadership. In another case, a similar situation arose for a miner who did not ride

a jitney even though he thought that was the best way to reach safety. In this

case, a mine inspector, who happened to be on that section, was the authority

figure to whom he deferred the decision.

[The fire boss] said there was a mine fire and I says okay, and then I run

and get my buddy and we went up the track entry. [There is no track

there at that point.] We went up and around, and I had to go over in the

belt entry to get the inspector. We got on our rescuers right there. And

we also took a spare rescuer with us. I was going to ride the jitney out

of there, but he [the inspector] wouldn't let us, so we went on foot.

What these actions say about leadership is discussed in chapter 9. However,

note that once the groups gathered together, individuals started their escapes

with those groups even when they felt the initial actions being taken were not the

best choices given the situations at hand.

Counterexamples to Escape Group Behavior

While each of the miners started evacuation with a group made up of

individuals who had been on the section at the time of warning, at times there
56

were situations when individualistic behavior took precedence over group

actions. As mentioned previously, miners accept the role of assisting others in

emergency situations, but also pardon those who cannot offer that assistance.

Instances of individualistic activities and of excusing others for lack of

assistance were recounted in the accounts of the mine fire escapes.

Individual decisions seemed to outweigh group behavior when the individual

was convinced that there was real danger and that the group's activities were not

the best response to the threat. An example is provided by the 6 West group at

Brownfield Mine. The group from this mine was composed of three individuals:

a maintenance foreman, a mechanic, and a mine inspector. The group started

together and even remained together when the maintenance foreman was not

convinced that the group's response was the best. However, as the maintenance

foreman perceived an increase in the danger of the situation, he decided to act

as an individual regardless of the choices made by the other group members:

When I turned around and said we got to go back, [the inspector] says

no. And I says, "You can do what you want to do, I'm going back."

I said, "You can follow me or do what you want." At that point I didn't

give a damn who followed me or who didn't. I was getting out of a

heavy concentration [of smoke].

The maintenance foreman affirmed his belief in the code of assistance, while at

the same time justifying his attitude regarding acting alone if necessary:

The only way I wouldn't stay with somebody was if they disagreed with

me and I knowed I had the right decision made; I mean the right escape

road or something. Then if they would give me any trouble, I would go.

The maintenance foreman suggested that the other group members should

follow his lead, but if they did not follow, then he would have no choice but to

act alone. In this case, he was not acting for self-interest at the expense of the

group good. Instead, the maintenance foreman was convinced that acting based

on his decision would be best for each member of the group, but if group

members chose not to follow his lead he was willing to act as an individual.

There is no evidence regarding whether or not the maintenance foreman would

have followed through with this behavior, because the other group members did

follow him at this point.

A more extreme example of group breakdown occurred in the group that

escaped from 4 South at Brownfield. At one point the group broke roughly into

two smaller groups. Later, one individual was left behind under life-threatening

circumstances. There was much information regarding these actions and the reasons for them volunteered during data-gathering interviews. These discussions

suggest a high level of concern regarding roles and the appropriateness of the
57

actions of the group members. The members of the 4 South group started their

evacuation together:

Then, like I said, they started separating from the pack, not waiting for

the pack, the faster ones. The slower guys, some were stopping 'cause

they just didn't have the wind. They were out of shape or whatever, and

they just wanted to stop and take a rest.

At that point, the section supervisor went ahead with the faster subgroup and a

mine inspector stayed back with the slower subgroup. There was also one

individual who was not clearly a part of either group.

I said, "Let's try to stay together," and the older man, I recall him saying

that he has to go at a steady pace, that he can't go fast, that he's just

going to stay out ahead of us [the slower subgroup] and try to hold a

slow place.

[A faster miner] comes by and says, "What's the matter old man, can't

you take it?" I says, "Hey, you just go ahead, you save your own ass,

don't worry about me." And that's just the way it was from there on out.

This miner remained in his position between the faster and slower subgroups and

safely escaped.

The event most distressing to group members occurred when an individual

in the group from 4 South became unable to continue his escape and was left

behind. The actions surrounding this situation exemplify the implicit rules

regarding miners' responsibilities to each other. At this point in the escape, three

miners (the miner operator, the mine inspector, and a mechanic) had formed the

slower subgroup and they were too far behind to communicate with the other

members of the 4 South group. The continuous miner operator found it increasingly difficult to continue, and the other two miners were trying to assist

him down the belt entry. "[The miner operator] said, 'I can't go no more.'" He

said, 'I'm just going to stay here.'" The mine inspector felt he should stay and

help, but perceived that the oxygen supply from his SCSR was becoming

dangerously low. He decided to leave the other two miners behind:

I looked at the mechanic and I said, "I got to go." I said, "There is no

sense in me staying." I don't know if I said that or not, but I thought

about it. I know I talked to myself, "There's no sense in me staying."

I said, "I can't breathe now." I said, "I know where I'm at. I can send

somebody back. I'll go out and get somebody."
58

As can be seen in his comments, the inspector stayed to help as long as he

thought was possible and then reasoned that he had to leave. He did not stop his

explanation there, however, and pointed out that he could offer further assistance

to the struggling miner by going for outside help. Eventually the mechanic also

made this decision and left the miner operator alone.

I felt so sorry for [the miner operator], and he was struggling too hard,

and I guess I made a decision there that he wasn't going to make it and

that you might as well leave him and you might make it.

The miner operator was eventually helped to safety by the mechanic and the

foreman who returned after they had reached fresh air.

All of the group members who knew about the miner operator's difficulties

did everything they thought possible to assist him. Two even went back into the

smoke after they had reached a safe area. The miner operator was asked about

that point during the escape when he was left alone. His response confirms that

the code allows reprieve for miners who cannot help others in need.

It don't bother me. I didn't expect—I kept telling the mechanic to keep

going, don't wait for me. I didn't expect anybody to stay behind for me.

I don't hold nothing against anybody.

In summary, the members of the 4 South group started their evacuation

together, but as environmental conditions deteriorated, the group split.

Eventually, one miner was even left to die. On the other hand, group members

returned and helped this individual to safety and he held no hard feelings about

the experience. This example of group behavior upholds the code of helping

each other whenever possible, but of releasing others from this obligation when

it cannot be fulfilled.

Emergency Evacuation Ramifications of Group Behavior

The findings reported in this chapter suggest that individuals will form a

group during an emergency situation and will often act with the group regardless

of personal opinions regarding the optimum response to the event. Furthermore,

miners will assist each other during emergency events whenever possible. This

assistance can take such forms as delaying the group's evacuation to wait for a

slower group member or individuals returning to a hostile environment after

reaching safety to search for a missing coworker. This does not mean, however,

that no individual action takes place. Sometimes individual safety does take

precedence over group safety. The individual seems to be more likely to act

outside of group behavior as the perceived danger increases and as options for

group action become limited.
59

In planning for emergency mine evacuation, group behavior should always

be considered. Since miners will probably gather as a group before beginning

their evacuation, issues such as time allotments for such activities, strategic

locations for gathering, and appropriate leadership should be examined. It is

also important to realize that miners will attempt to assist other miners who they

perceive to be in danger. Awareness of this response is especially relevant for

those who are trying to determine the location of missing miners during a rescue

attempt. In these situations, miners may not choose the most direct route out of

the mine, but may instead go toward an area where they think they may find a

fellow miner needing their assistance. In training miners for escape, it may be

appropriate to discuss the issues related to groups staying together versus

individuals and/or subgroups splitting from the main group. It is not clear that

either situation is always correct. It is clear, however, that both happen during

real events. It would be helpful if discussions of when each might be fitting

were conducted in a classroom setting.

In summary, emergency response planners must take into account that

miners will attempt to evacuate in groups when threatened by a mine fire.

Training for evacuations should take this fact into account and include the likely

group-related responses in any escape procedures.

References

Beach HD, Lucas RA, eds. [1960]. Individual and group behavior in a coal mine disaster.

National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, publication 834, p. 32.

Davis JH [1969]. Group performance. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,

p. 78.

Homans GC [1950]. The human group. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, p. 1.

Kiesler CA, Kiesler SB [1970]. Conformity. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing

Company, p. 65.
60

CHAPTER 5.—A MODEL OF THE JUDGMENT AND

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN MINE FIRES

Various aspects of judgment and decision-making are key themes in this book.

The model presented here serves as a loose structure for the chapters that follow this

one. The notion of a model is introduced because growing research interest in the

subjective aspects of group and individual behavior has led to a debate over whether

judgment is a skill that can be understood scientifically. A related point of

contention is whether such an understanding could lead to the development of

methods for estimating people's ability to make good decisions during an emergency.

There is some literature that supports the potential usefulness of this approach.

However, little agreement seems to have been reached on how to define and

operationalize even those basic concepts necessary to assess the soundness of

decisions from within their environmental and group contexts [Jensen and Benel

1977; Godden and Baddeley 1979; Baumann and Bourbonnais 1982; Brecke 1982;

Stone et al. 1985]. A look at the real-world process is clearly needed.

The need to attempt a better understanding of judgment and decision-making

properties stems from those occasions in the existence of an organization when

there is a lot at stake. The process of decision-making (which is part of the exercise of judgment) has been analyzed in situations such as corporate takeovers

[Janis and Mann1977], military combat [Begland1979], clinical emergencies

[Baumann and Bourbonnais 1982], and aviation events [Billings and Reynard1984]. The fundamental assumption of these analyses is that, while there

are untold successes, there are also notable numbers of failures resulting from

decisions that can be ascribed to one or more errors in judgment. From a cognitive perspective, any person engaged in decision-making (either alone or in a

group) is actively involved in a process characterized by certain elements. These

were mentioned in chapter 1, but are reiterated briefly at this point: (1) detection

of a problem, (2) definition or diagnosis, (3) consideration of available options,

(4) choice of what is perceived as the best option given recognized needs, and

(5) execution of the choice based on what has transpired [Flathers et al. 1982;

Baumann and Bourbonnais 1982]. At any moment in this process, there are

factors at play that have a large impact on one's ability to solve complex

problems in a limited time: (1) an internal state [Hedge and Lawson 1979] is the

sum of a person's psychomotor skills, knowledge, attitudes, etc.; (2) uncertainty

[Brecke 1982] is caused by faulty or incomplete information received from the

external environment; (3) stress [Biggs 1968; Jensen and Benel 1977] is

generated both by the problem at hand and any background problem that may

exist; and (4) complexity, as it is used here, refers to the number of elements

involved that must be attended to. These variables are depicted in figure 5.1,

and their relationship to each other and to an outcome is indicated. This schema

is designed to suggest interaction, because while the judgment and decisionmaking process may be conceptualized as discrete stages, experience tells us that

this is not the way people function in real-world situations.
61

Figure 5.1.–A model of judgment and decision-making.

The interactive model reflects underlying demands on decision-makers in

most life or death situations. Whether the individual is an airline pilot, a firefighter, a nurse, or an industrial worker, an emergency makes it necessary to deal

with an enormous amount of sometimes faulty information in a rather short timeframe. While (ideally) an understanding of judgment in the context of one event

should be generalizable to comparable circumstances in different environments

[Jensen and Benel 1977], judgment theorists have typically limited themselves

to more specific approaches. The method they have most often used to examine

empirically a given aspect of judgment is usually some variation of the situational technique. In situational exercises, the subject is presented with a problem taken from his or her area of competence (aviation, for example) and is

given the task of reaching a workable outcome. A majority of existing exercises

appear to focus on either one of two elements represented in figure 5.1: (1) an

individual's ability to reach a satisfactory diagnosis once he or she has become

aware that a problem exists, or (2) a person's choice response after a scenario has

been laid out and the diagnosis provided.

Using Judgment and Decision-Making Skills in a Mine Fire

This chapter, rather than reporting the results of subjects' performances on

a simulated problem, discusses instead how these eight case studies deal with the
62

complete process of peoples' judgment and decision-making during an actual

event (group escapes from a mine fire). Throughout each episode, workers engaged in an ongoing series of activities, some of which seem to have been well

thought out and others that (in hindsight) do not seem so logical. Yet, all the

while, they were attempting to solve the problem that confronted them. Such

behavior is in line with much of the recent literature dealing with human actions

in fires, which advances the argument that people engage in adaptive behavior

based on choices made from among those perceived to be available at any

particular time during the occurrence [Sime 1980; Lerup et al. 1980].

People seem to exercise judgment and make decisions during a fire, although

they oftentimes fail to perceive the fundamental problem adequately. This is

especially true if they are focused on a task, or are having some type of difficulty. An act that appears irrational when viewed with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight, therefore, might have seemed, to the actor in that situation, the most

sensible thing to do. Unfortunately for those interested in reaching a more objective understanding of the quality of those decisions, choices are usually

judged ex post facto depending on their outcomes. Accordingly, if a person survives, he or she is credited with making sufficient correct decisions and little

attention is paid to poor choices; if a victim dies, most second-guessing focuses

on what he or she might have done wrong and there is not much analysis of any

good decisions that were made.

The settings of this study seem particularly appropriate for an examination

of topics such as the quality of thought that goes into choices made during an

emergency. That is because mining lore is filled with accounts of tragic outcomes that could have been avoided. Many stories recount how escaping workers advanced to within a few feet of smoke-free air, yet chose to turn back and

barricade, perishing in the end [Cole et al. 1988]. The real question then becomes not one of whether the instrumentally "correct" choice was made (it is

known in retrospect that this was not the case), but whether those miners made

the best use of all evidence available to them in reaching the decision they implemented. To put this another way, outcomes might not always be linked mechanically to the quality of choices. This chapter will show how the qualitative

database is being used in the formation of a framework that ought to allow a

better understanding of miners' judgment and decision-making activities given

such a scenario.

Fire in the Mine as a Nominal Problem

In the model used here, a nominal problem is defined as an environmental

or system condition that can be characterized by the type of response it requires

[Pew 1994]. Fire is one of those events needing a high level of "situation

awareness." Endsley [1988] has identified this concept in terms of its three main

components: (1) perception of a situation's elements in time and space,
63

(2) comprehension of their meaning, and (3) projection of a near future status for

the condition in question. Endsley's notion of situation awareness closely parallels two stages (problem perception and diagnosis) shown in figure 5.1 and is

discussed below as part of the judgment and decision-making process. The

present section offers a brief description of the nominal problem at each study

site.

Adelaide Mine

At 9:08 p.m. during March 1988, Adelaide's second shift dispatcher was

alerted by a warning of 10.5 ppm on the mine's carbon monoxide monitoring

system. This warning cleared almost immediately. A few seconds later the

same sensor (at the end of 2 Northwest belt) registered a warning of 11.5, but

cleared in less than 30 seconds. The dispatcher continued his normal duties.

Sometime after 10:00 p.m., a third-shift supply boss arrived at Adelaide's surface

facility:

I always go to work early, I did all my life. I reported to the mine and

I put my dinner bucket down, and I went out to the lamp house to get a

cup of coffee. When I entered the lamp house area I heard this beeping

sound. It was coming out of the dispatcher's shanty...I walked in and

what it was was the CO monitor...I want to know what's goin' on. And

they says the monitor's been goin' off and on, and we think we got a fire,

but we're not sure. Well, I said, was the crews notified inby the fire

area? No we didn't notify anybody yet 'cause nobody contacted us. So

I said you better start calling these crews and get them out of the mine

whether you know it's a fire or not, you better get a hold of 'em.

At 10:30 I entered the mine. We got up there and they were already

trying to fight the fire. We fought it for a good while and we kept losing

ground continuously. It just kept going way ahead of us.

Workers continued to fight the fire, which was reported to be in or near the drive

head of 2 Northwest's "mother" belt (see figure 2.1), with small foam generators,

fire extinguishers, water, and rock dust. By that time, all section crews had been

notified to evacuate.

Brownfield Mine

Around 11:00 one summer morning in 1988, a "fire boss" (mine examiner)

was in the process of inspecting Brownfield's No. 38 belt conveyor. This belt

receives coal from sections being developed off 6 West Mains section and also

transports coal from 6 West Mains itself (see figure 2.2). He had arrived just
64

outby the "head drive" (terminus) of 5 South section's belt when he smelled smoke.

The fire boss first checked the 5 South belt head, and finding nothing wrong there,

walked approximately 600 ft along No. 38 belt to the 4 South head drive. At this

point, he detected smoke farther down the 38 belt toward the 3 South head.

Continuing along the 38 belt, the fire boss walked another 200 ft to the worked-out

4 North drive area, at which point he encountered heavy white smoke. Retreating

back along 38 belt to the 4 South head, the fire boss entered the track entry of

6 West Mains, where the smoke was somewhat less dense. The fire boss hurried

along the track back to the old 4 North area, and stopped at its head:

I could hear...a rumbling like a—at first I thought it was the welder in

there burning something and something happened in there...I yelled

for...the welder...I yelled about two or three times for him and there was

no answer...I run back over and I went through the overcast to go over

to the intake...which would be the right side of the track...When I got in

there, the smoke was real thick in there too, and I couldn't see...So

I dropped down on my knees and I turned around to get my W65 [filtertype self-rescuer] off of my belt...When I kneeled down, I could see the

yellow door...So I hurried up and went over to the door, opened that

door and got out through there and I was in the intake then...I was

coughing around and it really burned my chest at this time, so I probably

stayed there a couple minutes to get my bearings again and I went

down—I had to go to the intake to 3 South, so I run down the intake...

This is—we're talking 41⁄2 feet, so when I say run—I went down the

intake to 3...and I came out onto the track and it was clear...So I run up

the track then to 4 South and there was...a high spot where they took

rock...The smoke was like hanging there and it was clear outby the high

spot...The smoke was real thick, but along the left rib, I could see where

there was no—it was clear...So I crawled up along the rib, stayed real

low, and I crawled up along the rib, cause I still thought [the welder]

was in there and...something had happened...I thought there was a man

in there...I went up along the rib and I got my head around the corner

and I looked in and I yelled...a couple more times and I could see the

flames coming off the top—I could see that there was a motor sitting

there...I saw the flames coming off the top of the motor.

After seeing these flames, the fire boss disengaged the trolley power by opening

a cutout blade. He then called to warn his shift foreman and those miners

working in each of the three sections that would be affected by the fire. The fire

boss was soon joined by the mine foreman and general assistant mine foreman,

who helped him fight the fire. Meanwhile, the three affected section crews were

being warned to get out of the mine.
65

Cokedale Mine

At some time during an early morning in October 1990, a roof fall occurred

on one of the haulage tracks at Cokedale Mine. The operation differed from

most mines today because primary coal transport was still done by rail. One set

of rails was used to move loaded cars and adjacent tracks in a parallel entry were

employed for empties. Crossovers were located at intervals along the haulage

so that cars could be switched back and forth. It was at one of these crossovers

that a lead motorman, bringing a trip of empties into the mine, saw smoke. After

alerting his buddy in the trailing motor, this worker dismounted and went to find

what he believed was a burning trolley switch. The lead motorman had walked

only a few feet into that crosscut where the crossover and trolley switch were

located when he encountered heavy smoke.

The lead motorman retreated to his locomotive and attempted to clear the

track. Before he could push his 45-car train to the next crossover outby, power

went off and the motorman was forced to park his trip on the empty track. At the

train's rear, the trailing motorman cut his locomotive loose and was able to coast

into the crossover and onto the loaded track. As he drifted down this track, the

trailing motorman saw a roof fall with the trolley wire under it and flames

coming from the caved material (see figure 2.3). After calling outside to report

his discovery to the dispatcher, the trailing motorman grabbed a fire extinguisher

from his locomotive and went back to the burning cave-in. Near the fire site he

met the lead motorman and these two workers attempted to fight the blaze.

Meanwhile, the dispatcher was busy notifying those miners inby the source of

combustion that smoke was coming their way and relaying the fire's location to

them. The affected miners began an immediate evacuation.

Perception of the Nominal Problem

There are two ways in which any warning about the existence of a problem

may be conveyed to an individual: by means of some intermediary; or directly,

through the senses. In the first instance, a person is faced with the task of

deciding whether to believe the messenger and/or how to interpret the message.

In the second instance, a person is faced with the necessity of drawing

implications from what his or her senses are revealing without benefit (in many

cases) of corroboration. Under both of these conditions, perception is a process

that involves a varying degree of uncertainty. The process also requires time,

during which a perceiver attempts to get a fix on the problem and begin his or

her diagnosis. A lot depends on situational factors. In the model depicted by

figure 5.1, these situational factors are shown as a context filter. There were

aspects of the context at each operation that had a distorting effect on how the

nominal problem was perceived.
66

At Adelaide, the nominal problem was a fire on the mother belt. There were

two factors confounding a grasp of the true situation at this site. First, on the

night the fire occurred, affected sections had been plagued all shift by belt

stoppages. Second, recent technological developments at this mine caused the

initial message to be mishandled. Several weeks prior to the fire, new sensors

had been installed near the mouth of 1 Right. Maintenance people doing this

work drilled holes in the tops of the sensor boxes and secured them directly to

roof bolts. That action seems to have established some sort of ground potential

which was keyed by signals from passing trolley motors. This ground potential

in turn triggered alarms on the monitoring system outside. When the problem

was fixed by rehanging the sensor boxes, another predicament appeared. Some

sensors in the area were still giving false alarms. Further investigation showed

that new 19 gauge wire connecting those field data stations was defective. In

essence, because of technical problems, Adelaide's dispatcher had been

inundated with false alarms for some time preceding the event.

The nominal problem in Brownfield's case was the burning motor located

at 4 South, 6 West. A compounding factor, which no one knew at the time, was

that a door had been left open in the supply chute where the motor was parked.

This open door affected ventilation inby the blaze, and caused the smoke to

behave in ways that the miners did not anticipate. Because of their internal state,

made up in part by knowledge about how the ventilation system normally

functioned, these workers were led to misapply environmental elements in

making their diagnoses. The result was that many of the miners came to view

the problem as far worse than it actually was. Consequently, their decisions

were, in some instances, based on false assumptions and the resulting actions

were not as effective as they might otherwise have been.

At Cokedale, the nominal problem was a fire that started when fallen

material from the mine roof caused a trolley wire to arc. Although the person

who discovered this blaze contacted Cokedale's dispatcher and reported what he

was seeing, initial communications were misconstrued. The reason is that with

trolley haulage "hot hangers" occur fairly often. A hanger is an insulated

support bracket that suspends the trolley wire from a mine's roof. When an

insulator deteriorates, the support pipe that extends into the top will heat up. If

there is head coal in the mine roof, this coal may start smoking. In most

circumstances, a hot hanger will be dealt with by disconnecting the power,

prying down any head coal, and replacing the hanger assembly. Thus, when the

dispatcher began contacting people inby the fire source and, according to several

respondents, initially spoke of "a hanger burning" no one was particularly

alarmed.

Thomas [1923] argued that people's actions generally depend on their

definition of the situation. It has already been suggested that miners are

conditioned by both their physical and social environment to define situations
67

in certain ways. Danger is a taken-for-granted aspect of underground workplaces. It is necessary, then, for workers in such a setting to draw a distinction

between routine hazards and life-threatening occurrences. In other words, any

warning stimulus must make it through this sort of context filter in a manner

clear enough to cause a situation to be perceived as problematic. Mallett et al.

[1993] listed five characteristics of an effective warning: (1) it will be specific

about what the problem is (2) the warning's validity is acknowledged, (3) it gives

the nature and extent of danger to those who are threatened, (4) the warning will

be verifiable, and (5) it will contain some cues to help people prepare for further

action. The paragraphs that follow will discuss how initial warnings were

received at the three study sites.

1 Right - Adelaide

On Adelaide's 1 Right section, the message that there was a problem came

by telephone. Both shuttle car drivers were cleaning up around the feeder because their belt had been running erratically and finally went down entirely.

They first heard someone on a trolley pager trying repeatedly to contact another

section. Then, the 1 Right telephone began ringing:

I said, "There's something wrong, buddy...I better answer the telephone."

So I went to the telephone, I picked it up and I said, "Hello." Nobody

answered. So we waited there again to about five till [eleven]; the telephone rung again. I picked it up and I said, "Hello...Who is this?" And

it must have been the dispatcher because he told us, he said, "You got

a fire on the belt, get the men out of the section." I said, "This is

1 Right." He said, "Go get your men out of the section. You got a fire on

the belt."

The shuttle car drivers, joined by a bratticeman who had been helping them at

the feeder, set out to warn those workers at the faces. The bratticeman took the

left side, one driver went up the middle entries and the other took the right side

to warn 1 Right's miner operator and his helper.

The bratticeman found the two bolter operators in No. 3 entry. Since the

bolter was running, they had difficulty communicating:

Well, first we shut the machine off, because we couldn't hear him, what

he was saying, and then after he told us...there was a fire—or they said

there was a fire on the belt; that everybody was supposed to leave...I just

pulled my boom back and stopped everything, shut the power off, got

my coat and bucket, and went down to the load center.
68

The shuttle car driver who had taken the right side first approached his boss,

who was making a preshift face examination:

I told him the dispatcher said an alarm went off and there was a fire in

the mine and everybody had to get out. And he said, "Well, tell the

operators." He went and kept walking along the face. I think at this

time, we still didn't think it was a fire. We thought it was just an alarm.

Whether this attitude affected the manner in which the shuttle car driver

approached the operators is somewhat unclear, because he recounted that "I told

the operator, 'There's a fire in here, just back up and go.'" Both men on the

miner, however, remember this warning somewhat differently:

One of the buggymen come running out, and he was like three

breakthroughs behind us. All he did, he just hollered up and said,

"Hey...back the miner up, we're going home." I said, "What's the

matter?" He says, "I don't know; all I know is we're going out."

The miner operator and his helper, oblivious to the fact that an emergency was

developing, went through normal shutdown procedures and retrieved their

personal articles at the load center. They then strolled to the mantrip, where

everyone else was waiting impatiently to depart.

2 Northwest - Adelaide

Smoke, or the smell of smoke, arrived on 2 Northwest before the workers

could be contacted. One of the shuttle car drivers, who had prior experience in

fire as a mine rescue team member, was the first to sense something wrong. Like

the buggy operators on 1 Right, he and his buddy were not running because the

belt was down:

[While] we cleaned around the feeder, ...the other buggyman for that

night...was standing there with us talking and I told him, I says, "I smell

rubber."...I looked down the belt, and I...smelled the smoke then, and

I immediately went into, I think it was 4 or 5 [entry]...into the face...

That's where the boss was...and I told him..."We got a fire or something

went wrong with that belt again...Are you going to call?"...So he went

immediately to the phone and called, and he said..."We got a fire on the

belt."

Both shuttle car operators went to warn those workers still at the faces. Their

boss remained by the telephone. While the miner operator remembered only that
69

a buggyman started flagging him and said "smoke," everyone else was clear that

they had been informed there was a fire on the belt. All miners were also told,

they remembered, to gather fire extinguishers. Most of them did so and headed

to their dinner hole. From there, they boarded their personnel carrier for an

attempted trip out of the section.

3 Left - Adelaide

Workers on 3 Left reported that their section foreman was near the telephone

and, when it rang, started to answer. It stopped ringing:

 Then they rang right back again and he said, "Come on, let's go."

Everybody said, "Aw, we got to go down and shovel the belt..." So we

were moving kind of slow and disgusted. And then he yelled again,

"Come on—there's a fire on the belt—let's go!"

The boss notified all face workers and told them to back their equipment out and

shut it down. Power was knocked at the load center and everyone went to their

mantrip.

4 South - Brownfield

On 4 South, at Brownfield, one of the shuttle car drivers heard the pager as

he was dumping a load of coal on the feeder:

Fire boss was on the phone...He says, "...There's heavy smoke coming

into the intake...get out of there as soon as you can—get those men

out..." I didn't even finish unloading the buggy...I just turned around on

the seat and went back up to the miner...the bolters were in there and

I stopped at the bolters first and I told them that there's heavy smoke

coming up the intake and we're supposed to get out of here right away—

see you back at the power center—that's where the [self-contained selfrescuers] were.

When the bolters heard this warning, both of them surmised that it was only a

drill. They knew that a system for sensing fires was being installed and assumed

that fire drills would be planned to test the new system. The bolters further

reasoned that the presence of an inspector on their section made a drill more

likely: "We had that inspector in there and I thought it was like a fire drill, just

to see how long it took us to go to our meeting place...get our equipment and

stuff...I. wasn't that excited about it." The shuttle car driver next went to tell the

miner operator and his helper, who "backed the miner back...[and] went back to

the power center."
70

When the face workers arrived at their power center they found that the

section foreman, mechanic, and a Federal inspector had already gotten there.

These three were told about the fire boss's call. The section foreman had

realized that there was some sort of problem. He had accompanied the Federal

inspector and section mechanic to repair a scoop that was out of compliance and

parked in a crosscut outby the section's transformer:

I guess what was happening, smoke was coming up the intake and

everybody didn't realize it...it was going past us...we were so far back

into the crosscut...we were there working and I thought I smelled

something burning...I asked everybody if they smelled it and they said

yeah, they realized they did smell something...I went out to the

aircourse, No. 2 aircourse, and I could see the heavy smoke was already

up there, so I just told them there was a lot of smoke out there.

Thus, by the time the workers had assembled at the power center the section

foreman was able to corroborate the warning everyone else had gotten through

an intermediary. What was lacking was any information about the location and

magnitude of the problem.

5 South - Brownfield

On 5 South also, the first warning was delivered by means of the mine page

phone. The call to this section was taken by one of the shuttle car drivers:

I heard them calling 5 South on the phone, so I went and I answered the

phone...They asked if the boss was there...I said yeah...so they said tell

the boss to get everybody out of the section because they had heavy

smoke coming...I did get a little bit excited at first, and then I...called

back [to ask] them...where it was coming from...and didn't get no

answer.

The fire boss's message, already inadequate, was relayed by the shuttle car driver

to his section foreman:

The belt shut off...[the shuttle car driver] come over and said that [the

fire boss] called and said there's smoke coming up the belt line...[the

shuttle car driver] didn't wait...I asked him is it bad, and he said I don't

know...He just said we was supposed to get out.

The roof bolter operator and his helper, deciding to take a break while the belt

was down, were the next individuals to be informed: "My buddy and I...were
71

walking back to get a cup of coffee and the buggy runner [shuttle car driver]

hollered that there was smoke coming up." By the time the other shuttle car

driver received word of the fire, he had already been alerted by the smell of

smoke. He primarily wanted more information, which his fellow buggy runner

did not have:

We was loading in No. 2 entry...the belt went off...While [the shuttle car

driver] was answering the phone...I was over at the intake, and I could

smell the smoke coming in already...So then [the shuttle car driver]

come through the crosscut and told us things...[The fire boss] told him

there was going to be smoke coming and we better start out, but [the

shuttle car driver] didn't wait and see where the fire was and all that,

which he should have done.

It can be seen from these comments that the workers on 5 South, like those on

the other two sections, began their evacuation without an adequate perception

of the nominal problem upon which to base their diagnoses.

6 West Mains - Brownfield

On 6 West Mains section, where three people were working, the initial

warning came in the form of a page phone message taken by a maintenance

foreman. This individual was accompanying a mechanic and a State mine

inspector on an inspection:

"I heard the fire boss...and I recognized from his voice that he was really

desperate to get somebody to answer, so I went to the phone...and he

said there was a mine fire at 4 South, 6 West."

At that point, although the maintenance foreman had been told the fire's location,

he had no notion about its severity. Nor had the foreman gotten a chance to

reinforce the sense of desperation he detected in the fire boss's message through

the medium of his own senses.

Though he was predisposed to believe there really was an emergency and to

act upon that belief because of the urgency he discerned in the fire boss's voice,

the maintenance foreman still "didn't really think....it was anything to...get

concerned about." One reason he did not become concerned at the first warning

of fire was undoubtedly because of his internal state, which had been

conditioned by past experience with smoke in the mine. The foreman had seen

"lots of mine fires, small mine fires...I've been in where...belts slipped and burnt

halfways off the roller and stuff like that." Since smoke is fairly common in the

mining environment, miners do not always interpret its presence as an indication

that immediate action should be taken.
72

After hanging up the pager, the foreman first went to alert his mechanic.

This worker, because he was involved in the complex task that had made it

necessary for him to be on this section in the first place, was not paying attention

to what was going on around him:

I hollered to him from the phone and he didn't come...He said, "Wait a

minute..." and I went down to where he was and says, "Come on...

There's a fire in the mine down 4 South."...He said, "Just a minute."

Telling the mechanic not to wait any longer, the maintenance foreman then went

into the belt entry to inform the State inspector: "He was over there at the

feeder, and that's the first sign of smoke that I seen was outby the check at the

belt entry." Thus having the fire boss's warning substantiated, but still not knowing very many details, the men began their evacuation.

7 Butt - Cokedale

Initial warning came indirectly to 7 Butt when a construction foreman,

listening on his trolley phone, monitored talk between the lead motorman who

had been bringing in empties and Cokedale's haulage foreman:

I was sitting at old 8 Face and when he said about the trolley switch

burning I turned my light in the opposite direction, because the air

comes straight down...from the new intake aircourse and there was just

a solid wall of smoke behind me. So I called the dispatcher and told

[him] to get in contact with all the people in 8 Face Parallel and get

them out because all the smoke was going in on them.

The construction foreman then went into 7 Butt to alert a fire boss, two

mechanics, and four others working in the section. Because of the conversation

he had overheard, the construction foreman told those with whom he spoke that

a trolley switch was probably burning:

He...thought it was a wire fire, you know, like a trolley wire. We have

a lot of them down there, so you don't have to be worried about it too

much...Everybody took their time. So me and the mechanics...even took

the time to put the tools away.

This group, led by the construction foreman, elected to ride jeeps and a portal

bus out the track entry.
73

8 Face Parallels

A general foreman was with two men cleaning up a roof fall. Needing some

large reinforcing bolts, he had been scouting in the 8 Face area. After finding

the materials he needed, the foreman sent a worker to retrieve them. In the

meantime, he ate a sandwich and waited in the old section switch at 8 Face:

There's a phone there. I saw some smoke coming up the track entry.

I called the dispatcher...I said, "What we got here?...I'm getting some

smoke up in here." He told me at that time, he said, "Maybe a hanger

burning, or something."

The general foreman sent a worker into the 8 Face Parallels section to warn

everyone there and tell them to gather near his location. While he was waiting,

the foreman was joined by two motormen who were bringing a load of rails into

the area. In all, eight miners rendezvoused with the general foreman. These

men then attempted to walk out through their track entry.

In essence, miners in all eight groups received some sort of warning,

following the discovery of fire, telling them either that "smoke" was headed their

way or that they needed to leave the mine. At this point, however, most workers

seemed to be acting "as if" there was a problem that required action, but were

not too concerned about their chances of getting outside: "Well, at first nobody

really thought too much of it, you know." It was not until their perspective was

challenged by an unexpected occurrence that the miners began to diagnose their

problem as a serious one.

Diagnosis

It is axiomatic that people tend to interpret events from a normal perspective

as long as they can before starting to define the situation as abnormal [McHugh

1968]. This notion is illustrated by the initial misdiagnoses of those who

discovered the nominal problem at each study site. Adelaide's dispatcher, for

whom unreliable sensor readings had become routine, did not accord legitimacy

to the first actual warning he received: "I took it as a false alarm." The fire boss

at Brownfield also saw the event incorrectly when he initially encountered

smoke: "I stood up and I smelled smoke. I just kind of thought it was, you

know, maybe a bad roller, the belt was rubbing on the straps, or something like

that because we've had that before." The haulage foreman at Cokedale seemed,

to those who overheard his trolley phone exchanges, complacent about the

problem he was facing: "I even heard him talk to the people [outside]. He said,

"Look in my locker or by my locker and get another trolley switch.'" This

tendency to normalize circumstances also carried over to the way in which those

inby the sources of combustion came to diagnose their situations.
74

1 Right - Adelaide

The crew on 1 Right had their evacuation delayed due to miscommunication

between a buggyman and the operators he went to warn:

We were just taking our good old time...There was no smoke; you

couldn't smell anything...It was clear, you know...I said..."Really, what's

going on?"...And [a buddy] said, "I'm telling you, the place is on fire."

Actually, it was not until the workers encountered heavy smoke that they began

to realize they were in a potentially deadly situation. Group reliance upon

normalcy gave way at that point to a change in the way they construed their

condition [Kinston and Rosser 1980]. What had been considered a routine

evacuation became disrupted:

You could smell the coal actually, and we started pulling the selfrescuers out and passing them around...Three guys run over to the

intake...and they were just—we were running, you know, here and

there..."What do we do—what do we do?"

Very soon, however, the workers began to take stock of their predicament. At

this point they were actively seeking information that would let them make sense

of what was actually happening:

Common sense tells me if there's a fire, chances are the fire is going to

be in the belt entry. I'm also thinking if the fire is there, the fire wants

to go for fresh air. It can be fueled by fresh air [in the intake]. And

I didn't want to go the belt entry...Let's get into the return and find out

what we have.

As the group's evacuation turned into an escape, everyone tried to fill

information gaps with guesses about the fire's location and how best to proceed.

The way in which they filled these gaps would have an impact on the perceived

options as their escape progressed.

2 Northwest - Adelaide

There was no initial question of whether something might be wrong on

2 Northwest; rather, group members became concerned with the extent to which

something was wrong. On this section, even with the smoke that was present,

a few workers tended to downplay the seriousness of what their senses were

telling them. This behavior, normal for the early diagnosis stage, is typified in

a comment made by a bolter operator:
75

I figured, well, with all the safety features that are supposed to be built

in this, they got a little fire down there and the smoke coming up and

they want us the heck out of here, but I figured...we're going down with

fire extinguishers, I figured we'll ride down in a mantrip, come to it

and—we got the fire out, if there ain't somebody already down there to

get it out. It was my feelings.

The least amount of minimizing was done by the buggy driver who had voiced

an alarm originally. This person was a former mine rescue team member and

had experience in smoke:

I started to get a fire extinguisher off of the miner at that time, and the

smoke was getting pretty bad then. And so I said, well, to hell with the

fire extinguisher. I'm going to, you know, take care of myself.

As can be seen, even where individuals had smelled rubber, seen smoke, and

heard their section boss confirm they had a fire on their mother belt, there was

variability in how a diagnosis was reached.

3 Left - Adelaide

Like the bolter operator quoted above, one of the workers on 3 Left also

thought his crew was leaving the face to fight a manageable fire:

They said, "We got a fire on the belt. Back the machine out and let's

go." Well, I just felt we'd run down and put it out. I didn't think there

was any real major [problem], they said it was just a small [fire],

burning on the belt. Well, if that's all there was to it, we could have

took a fire extinguisher, run down there in the mantrip [and put it out].

When the group encountered heavy smoke they became disoriented and lost their

way momentarily. This added an element of uncertainty that made an accurate

diagnosis of their situation all the more difficult. That, combined with the fact

that they did not know where the fire was, prevented them from reaching a clear

picture of what was required for everyone to reach safety.

4 South - Brownfield

On 4 South, the workers had decided to travel down their belt, which was

isolated by stoppings from the intake and return entries:

I walked over to a door in the belt entry and saw that it was clear air...

There was no smoke coming up the belt...I just run that belt on the day
76

prior to this and I know the stoppings were intact...So the belt entry

should be clear if there was a problem in the intake.

Some of these miners expected to encounter light smoke in their belt line (because of a possible leakage through the stoppings). When this indeed appeared

to happen, a diagnosis of the real nature of their problem was confounded by

stress induced from having to deal with a relatively unfamiliar breathing

apparatus:

We stopped and everybody knelt down and started putting their [selfcontained] self-rescuers on...when I looked over and saw the...miner

operator, that's about the first time I started getting a little worried

because he was shaking somewhat severely...and I just thought...we are

going to have trouble because he's having a hard time even, you know,

getting his self-rescuer cover off.

I got the machine on and started down there and I wasn't getting the air

that I thought it was going to give me...So I took the mouthpiece out...

you need to breathe and you're not getting what you're supposed to.

Focusing on these perceived problems with their self-contained self-rescuers, the

workers did not anticipate meeting heavy smoke during their evacuation. Therefore, when the miners did encounter dense smoke in their belt line, they were

presented with an extra (and unexpected) experience.

This new occurrence, however, was one that stemmed from their environment rather than from a piece of technology. It was this second event that

caused them to begin diagnosing their situation as very serious indeed: "I was

thinking, I remember distinctly thinking to myself, all this smoke around...I can't

even see...You couldn't even see where you were going." Choices made by these

workers later in their escape, then, were based on the necessity of dealing with

apparatus that did not perform as expected in conditions the miners had not

foreseen.

5 South - Brownfield

The predicament of heavy smoke in areas that were supposed to be isolated

was also unanticipated by the workers who escaped 5 South:

We turned around and we were going to go down the intake and we

didn't get more than 50 feet when we could see the smoke coming in

towards us...one of the bratticemen said we'll get into the belt line 'cause

it's neutral air...Everybody got up in there and...we only went maybe
77

two, three hundred feet and the smoke was in there—the belt entry...

How it got in there, we don't know...We haven't figured that out yet.

This element of uncertainty stemming from a lack of information regarding the

fire source was exacerbated by the workers' internal state. In essence, these

individuals knew enough about the mine's environment to understand that (assuming a properly functioning ventilation system) only a large-scale fire would

cause contamination of all possible escape routes: "I tell you, panic hit, believe

me...'cause all the teaching and training—everything—these are all supposed to

be separate splits...Well, the first thing that goes through your mind is

everything's burning."

Once the miners determined there was not a smoke-free escape route, then

their particular knowledge of the ventilation system led them to diagnose the

problem as more serious than it actually was. Additionally, this misperception

about why the smoke was behaving as it did caused some of them to consider

giving up their escape attempt: "I sat down with those rock dust guys and

I figured...this is it...I was just going to say goodbye to the world." The stress

engendered by their inaccurate analysis of actual conditions influenced the

workers' subsequent choices and actions.

6 West - Brownfield

The men on 6 West Mains began their evacuation knowing that a fire existed

at 4 South and that there was some smoke already in their section. The

maintenance foreman did not diagnose this as a significant occurrence, though.

At the beginning, he had little concern regarding his chances of exiting the mine

safely. The maintenance foreman held this notion up to the moment he experienced heavy smoke: "I've encountered smoke [in the mine before], but nothing like this." When the amount of smoke presented irrefutable evidence that

things were out of the ordinary, the maintenance foreman stopped defining his

situation in terms of past instances when he had seen smoke in the mine. Such

a dense collection proved, in his opinion, that the present state could no longer

be diagnosed as commonplace. The maintenance foreman then began to perceive the scope of the evacuation problem differently: "Once I seen that smoke,

then I got pretty well shook." His subsequent choices came to be affected by

that new viewpoint.

7 Butt - Cokedale

On 7 Butt, the construction foreman told all seven people in his area that

"smoke was coming in" and they would have to leave. This initial warning did

not disturb any worker unduly, as one of the mechanics later recounted:
78

We were going to have to get out and—that was about it. We would

probably be coming back in after they got the hanger, the little hanger

fire put out.

The group, riding in four different vehicles, had not traveled far when they

encountered thick smoke in their track entry. Three of the four vehicles, two

jeeps and a tandem motor, collided because of poor visibility. The construction

foreman drew upon prior experience to reach a diagnosis of what faced them:

I set all the ventilation up down there, and I knew basically what was

going on with all the smoke. The intake escapeway would have been

full of smoke. So I told them we'll try to go out on power.

Everyone except three workers in the fourth vehicle, a portal bus, boarded the

lead jeep and continued on. After a short distance, however, those five men in

the lead collided with a parked vehicle. They and the miners following in their

portal bus were forced to choose an alternative plan that would entail escaping

on foot.

8 Face Parallels - Cokedale

Nine miners tried to walk out the track entry from 8 Face Parallels. When

they encountered heavy smoke on the track, they decided to get into their intake

escapeway. After traveling only a few hundred feet, they again found

themselves in thick smoke. There was little discussion at this point:

No, it was pretty much, you know, this is out. Let's try something else.

Well, naturally the next thing would be the return. So we decided to try

the designated return, at which point [the boss] did not know which was

the designated return.

The group entered their left return and went a short distance before discovering

they were not in their designated alternate escapeway. By this time the workers

were diagnosing their problem as a serious predicament: "That's when it came

into my mind...We're in bad shape." This sentiment was echoed by the other

group members. The difficulty these workers had in finding their way at the

start of their escape had an impact on how subsequent choices were made.

In each case, such a low level of concern exhibited by affected miners at the

beginning of their evacuation was due partially to uncertainty about the true

nature of the problem. This uncertainty, stemming from incomplete information,

allowed the workers to define their situation initially as normal (or at least as

nonthreatening). Further into the events, however, unexpected occurrences

began to challenge the miners' interpretation of their predicament:
79

"We just [put on self-contained self-rescuers] and everybody seemed

fairly calm at the time, but then...we got down to the thick stuff...and a

sense of panic [set in]...we weren't told where the fire was."

As it became impossible to interpret circumstances from a normal perspective,

many of the workers reacted and started to define the fire as perhaps worse than

it really was:

You got one thing in mind—death—believe me...I was scared...I don't

think there was a man there that would tell you that he wasn't...I really

didn't think I would be here.

Essentially, as can be seen, the miners lacked adequate information to accurately

assess the true nature of the problem they faced. Many workers' knowledge of

the environment and of how elements were supposed to behave in it combined

with their lack of information to mislead them. All of the individuals were in

danger, but the real danger was from smoke inhalation—not, as some thought,

because their entire mine was burning.

Options and Choices

After completing the diagnosis of a problem, a person must decide which

actions, if any, must be taken. This part of the decision-making process calls for

recognizing and evaluating available options and then choosing an action that is

determined to be best given the circumstances. A number of variables impact

a person's perception of particular choices and their appropriateness to his or her

situation. Analyses of decision-making therefore must focus not only on the

objective outcome of each action, but also (and perhaps more importantly) on

choices that were made given the impact of elements influencing the decisionmaker. The following paragraphs outline how options were viewed and choices

arrived at during the three fires.

1 Right - Adelaide

When the crew from 1 Right, attempting to evacuate on a mantrip, had to

stop because of poor visibility, they were faced with limited alternatives. Three

miners tried to cross the belt entry to check their main intake. When they

opened a door into the belt entry, these men found it to be contaminated:

And I told them, "Whoa, whoa, wait a second. If you got smoke on your

track and when [you] opened the door...I seen you have smoke on your

belt, you got smoke in your intake." One of the other guys on the crew,

...who was my buddy that night, says, "Why don't we go back to
80

Peterson [shaft] across the bleeder and come out?"...They didn't want to

go back to Peterson...I says, "If you don't want to go back to Peterson,

then if you have smoke on your intake, we were always taught to get

into your return, and then keep checking until you see clear intake."

The group decided their only option was to get into their left return. They found

a door and had to pry it open. Before entering this return, the face boss called

outside and told the dispatcher what they were planning to do. The crew then

started out in air that had not yet become smoky.

As the 1 Right group traveled their return, they were faced with several other

points at which decisions had to be made. First, the smoke that had been coming

in their intake made its way across the faces and caught up with them near the

mouth of 8 Left:

So we put the SCSRs on. Now one guy's SCSR wouldn't work, so [one

of the buggymen] gave him his spare one, and we started to come down

this return. And we came to these overcasts down here; you know, one

overcast we came on, it was hot and thick smoke was coming out. And

after looking at it, it was the belt that was going up to 3 Left, and I mean

you could feel the heat coming down it. [The buggyman's] SCSR didn't

work and he told me..."I'm not going through that. Mine doesn't work."

So, the buggy runner who had earlier given a spare SCSR to a buddy, now

having problems with his own, balked at crossing the overcast:

I made the decision I couldn't go in this smoke...I was like the third,

fourth one in line...and we went into that smoke and I couldn't breathe

and I was gagging on that self-rescuer. I couldn't breathe anything at all.

I don't know if it was psychological or what...I came back out...I did

know where I was because...I'd worked in that area a lot...The other

overcast that we just went over was over the intake...So I went back...

I went into the door and it wasn't too bad...And I thought I'll go down

this way, but then I said, no, if I don't go out with them guys, I know

they're going to be looking for me. If they get out, they'll be looking for

me and they'll think I'm lost. So I better go out with them guys. So

I went back into the return again...I went over an overcast where the

smoke was. I went over top of the overcast in the smoke and I couldn't

breathe...They were already gone through there. I couldn't see—

I couldn't tell where they were because you couldn't see anything over

there...I can't breathe. I'm going to die here, and I don't want to die.

I don't want to die here. Back into that intake again...So I went...over

the stopping—over two overcasts there and got into the intake

escapeway at 2 Northwest.
81

The rest of 1 Right crew continued out their return until they came to a door

leading onto 2 Northwest track at crosscut No. 10. At this point, they discovered

the shuttle car operator was not with them, and were faced with another

decision:

When we got outside that door, and it was just fresh air, and everybody

wanted to take off, that's when I told them..."Hey, [the buggyman] is

back there, his self-rescuer didn't work; he didn't come through that."

So that's when we went back in...You're not supposed to do it...They tell

you not to do that...But we felt, you know, when you work with a bunch

of guys, you become close...And [the miner helper] told the boss..."Hey,

I'm not leaving." Because the boss said, ..."Hey, let's go"...you know,

and [the miner helper] said..."We're not leaving [the buggyman]"...and

then we started going back in.

The buggyman, meanwhile, had traveled the 3 Left intake escapeway to an area

outby the fire. It was some time before the crew got back together.

2 Northwest - Adelaide

Choices required of the 2 Northwest group were affected by the fact they

had two experienced people with them. Their face boss knew the mine well and

one of the shuttle car operators had been a mine rescue team member. When the

crew entered heavy smoke on their track, a decision was made to stop the

mantrip:

The guy that was driving stated that he didn't think we'd better go any

more, so that was more or less a judgment call. We could have gone

down the line—you could have put your rescuers on and you could have

kept going out [on] the mantrip, but the pole...would have been off...I

don't know how many times, on the way out, that the poles were

jumping pretty frequently going out of there...So...we stopped the

mantrip and got the rescuers, took those and went back up to the section.

On the way back into their face area, the former mine rescue team member

helped everyone put on a self-contained self-rescuer:

This time we got everybody together and [the face boss] said, you take

the back, I'll take the front. Don't let anybody in back of you, you know,

and we'll keep everybody together.

The face boss led the group toward their intake escapeway. At the entrance to

this entry, crew members took additional SCSRs that were stored there. Then,
82

grouped together with their face boss leading and the shuttle car operator

bringing up the rear, everyone proceeded out the intake escapeway. After

traveling 500-600 ft, the group encountered dense smoke. The face boss then

decided to enter the right return, which was a designated secondary escapeway:

Every 3-by-3 door, [the face boss] would go check...We done this for,

I counted, my calculation was 55 breakthroughs.

When the men reached the No. 3 stopping, which was outby the fire, they found

the air to be clear. Finally, the face boss saw the shift foreman and notified him

that everyone from his section was out.

3 Left - Adelaide

A section foreman and nine crew members were on 3 Left, which was a

retreat section. The group started out on their mantrip. After traveling "four or

five breakthroughs," they entered smoke. At that time they made a decision to

backtrack toward the face and get into their primary escapeway. The group

walked two breaks and found a door leading into their intake escapeway:

So we went down the intake approximately, oh, I don't know, maybe

seven or eight breakthroughs, it's hard to say the number right now, but

it wasn't very far. And we were getting a lot of smoke in there and it

was rubber smoke. You could smell it just as plain as could be; it was

a belt burning.

A decision was then made to get into the alternate escapeway. The group had

not gone very far in this return entry when they again encountered smoke. At

this point the SCSRs were donned:

I remember thinking to myself, I said, "This is stupid, I know better than

to walk through smoke without putting that thing on because you don't

know how much CO's in it." And that's when we stopped and put them

on. And then, we kept on going out of the return. We got down to

where our overcasts was and there was an overcast there that we

couldn't cross. It was leaking so bad, and the smoke was so thick we

couldn't get over it.

The face boss, deciding to get back into the intake escapeway through a door in

the overcast, became disoriented temporarily:

And then we had to have a little team meeting there. We knew there

was an intake; the intake escapeway was still in that area if we could
83

find the right door to get into it...The subject of barricading was brought

up, but that's—what are you going to barricade if it's full of smoke

everywhere?

After figuring out the proper direction of travel, the face boss led everyone over

the overcast and out their intake entry. One of the roof bolter operators began

having trouble, presenting the group with another decision:

When [the roof bolter operator] went down, we was all single file and

I was last...I noticed no one turned around at that point...I spit out the

mouthpiece and I hollered as loud as I could...And only two people

come back...It made a mean feeling in me that it was every man for

himself at that point on.

Approximately three crosscuts from clear air, the group met Adelaide's shift

foreman, who had been traveling the entry looking for them. He helped

everyone get out from there.

4 South - Brownfield

The miners escaping from 4 South were troubled by some elements that

colored their abilities to make decisions. Awareness of past mine disasters (such

as a recent fire at Utah Power and Light's Wilberg Mine, in which 27 miners

died) revealed to these workers how deadly a mine fire could be. Such

knowledge made any uncertainty about the scope of this fire even more

problematic:

 We all encountered a panic situation where we didn't know where the

fire was, we didn't know the extent of it, and my personal thoughts were

that it was a Wilberg disaster, and that's all that was in my mind...Where

is that smoke coming from? How bad is it? Well, I panicked...I know

I did, I'll admit it...Everybody, I think, did.

A complex background problem also hindered an efficient escape. Although the

miners had received training on self-contained self-rescuers, few had any actual

experience wearing the apparatus. During their escape, they found the device

was difficult to breathe from and made communication almost impossible:

I was with [the miner helper] and [he] was having very difficult

breathing through it...He was gasping for air...[The inspector] was trying

to help [him] breathe...And then with the mouthpiece in, it's real hard to

communicate—you can't hear one another...Some of us took the
84

mouthpiece out to try to speak and then to even breathe...It was so hard

to breathe through that mouthpiece.

In addition to not knowing the location and extent of the blaze in their mine,

these side issues were on the workers' minds as they attempted to determine

options available and to choose the best course of action for themselves.

One miner had so much trouble that assisting him became, in itself,

a background problem that had to be dealt with, as evidenced by three different

perspectives:

Miner helper: The smoke started getting pretty thick...You couldn't

really see where you were going and I was having a lot of trouble

getting enough air...I'd go a ways and I'd stop and a couple guys [stayed

with me]...I was pretty shook up; I guess I panicked and a lot of stuff

went through my head...Hell, you didn't know where it was coming from

or anything...Finally...I just couldn't go anymore.

Inspector: I couldn't get him back up again...He looked at the

mechanic...I saw him look at the mechanic and he said, you guys go...

You just leave me here...I can't go no more...I'm just going to stay here...

I looked at the mechanic and I said I got to go...there is no sense in me

staying...I can't breathe now.

Mechanic: I didn't know my way out of there...I lost all orientation...

I knew my way out, but I forgot...It was just a panic thing...I thought,

well, [the miner helper's] not going to make it, I'm going to try and get

out...I was only about a hundred foot from [the miner helper] when

I came through the overcast and I opened the door and I saw No. 7 and

I thought [wrongly], good, this is fresh air...I thought well I'm going

back in to get [the miner helper].

Essentially, facing so much uncertainty about the fire, the miner helper gave up

because he had projected a worst case scenario in which the crew would have

to travel through smoke all the way out of the mine. The inspector, convinced

that his self-contained self-rescuer was about to fail and forgetting that he was

carrying a spare under his arm, wanted only to get out of the section. The

mechanic, believing himself to be in No. 7's intake aircourse, concluded that he

had left the miner helper only some 100 ft from safety, although the distance was

actually much farther. Based on his incorrect estimate, the mechanic decided to

go back for his buddy. In reality, all three men based their actions on

assumptions that were false when, if the facts had been clear, they might have

made other choices.
85

5 South - Brownfield

The old adage that "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing" seems to have

a particular relevance when it comes to perceiving and assessing one's options

at specific moments in a mine fire. Other times, however, a little knowledge can

be rather beneficial. As can be seen from the following comment about the

escape from 5 South, prior experience in an environment may afford a sound

basis for simplifying an individual's application of some elements in the

judgment and decision-making process:

 I know one thing I had going for me, when I first went up into that unit

it wasn't 3 days after that I went down the return with one of the

bosses...So if somebody had never went down it at all...I'm sure they're

probably more uptight about the situation than I was...At least I had an

idea where I was going...and then another good thing, we had

bratticemen with us and they knew their way down through there, and

the boss was there too.

Additionally, an ability to place the crisis cognitively in one's surroundings can,

by reducing uncertainty, foster a positive attitude:

So we went and then we run into two other guys coming down...and

then they told us where the fire was at...4 South sidetrack where the

motor was setting...So then we had an idea how far we had to go, so it

took a little bit of pressure off 'cause we knew we was goingCwe had

a pretty good chance now.

When knowledge acts to minimize sources of stress, therefore, it need not be

comprehensive to have a positive function.

6 West - Brownfield

Choices made during the escape of those three workers on 6 West Mains

were affected by stress along with any knowledge and skills brought by each

worker to the situation. The heavy smoke they encountered created stress by

impeding their ability to see and by forcing them to use relatively unfamiliar

oxygen-generating breathing apparatus. This in turn led to a level of anxiety that

hindered clear thinking:

I got down to 5 South...and couldn't find my way...the door wasn't there

where I knowed there was a door...but I mean, I didn't waste no time

hunting...Whenever I walked past and couldn't see the door or feel it,
86

I didn'tCI went back the next day and the door was there.

The miner's knowledge of his environment told him a door should be at a given

location and that he ought to go through it in order to continue his escape.

Because he could not find this door, the worker had to discover an alternative

route. In this instance, then, prior knowledge (of the door's location) was not an

element that was applied to aid the worker's evacuation.

In the maintenance foreman's opinion, cognizance of 6 West Main's

designated escapeways may actually have been misapplied and consequently had

a negative effect on decisions that were made during his attempt to evacuate the

section along with his two coworkers:

You try and pay as much attention in class as you can on your escape

routes and stuff, and I guess I panicked a little bit when I seen the

smoke in the belt line as heavy as it was...I could have went...back...

and...over and...down 6 aircourse and been scot free of everything...

I wouldn't have even needed to don my rescuer...But...you're trained to

follow your escape routes.

Although the objective outcome of considering only designated escapeways is

known (all three individuals on 6 West survived), it did limit those options

available to the escaping miners. As for the possibility that these men, in

adhering rigidly to their training algorithm for mine evacuation procedures, may

have overlooked a better route of travel: "I know if it ever happened again,

I would explore...all routes of exit before I made a real quick decision."

7 Butt - Cokedale

The decision-making on 7 Butt was done by the construction foreman, who

possessed a great deal of "mine wiseness" and who took charge immediately:

That was one of the things that I had to commend the people for. I was

a foreman in charge of that area, and when I said to these people what

we had to do, there was no second-guessing my decision. These people

were counting on my knowledge that this was right and there was no

second guessing it. I had no problem with these people as far as my

decision.

The construction foreman reported that he knew evacuation would be necessary

as soon as he saw the amount of smoke that was coming down their fresh air

intakes. He then had to choose between going into 7 Butt or 8 Face Parallels to

warn workers that they were in danger:
87

And I made the decision to go into 7 Butt to get these people because

they were far enough away from communications that somebody would

have to go and recover these people and being that I was there, I was the

one to go and get these people and get them out...But the dispatcher

could get in contact with [the 8 Face Parallel] people and tell them

that they had to evacuate because of the amount of smoke that was

coming in.

As mentioned previously, the construction foreman attempted to get everyone

out in vehicles. Looking back on that choice, he reported he would have taken

a different option if he could do it over:

As I brought these people out, we would have stopped when we got to

the smoke, and at that time everybody had their SCSRs on and then we

would have walked...I don't know if I told the dispatcher or not that

I was going out the return escapeway to Crystal. But I would have been

a little bit more organized the next time as far as my...communications...

to the surface, my travel, and how many people I had with me.

One reason the construction foreman made some decisions at the smoke that he

later second guessed himself on was because of a significant background factor:

I was anticipating the trolley switch burning out. There's quite a bit of

smoke with it...and I was assuming that if the trolley switch was

burning, from what I heard...that would be the main concentration and...

we would go through here. And it was like second-guessing instead of

coming to the smoke area, getting together, and then walking out.

Once the group got into their return escapeway, the construction foreman began

checking mandoors leading to the track entry. He did this in order to determine

when they had reached clear air. Upon getting outby the fire, the construction

foreman called outside and arranged for his crew to be picked up and transported

to the surface.

8 Face Parallels - Cokedale

Lack of knowledge was an important factor in perceived options and choices

that confronted the group from 8 Face Parallels. Initially, the nine miners there

tried to walk out their track entry. In a short time, however, they hit smoke and

had to make another choice. A general foreman who was with this crew decided

the next option should be to go out their intake escapeway: "You're always

trained intake, track, intake, return. I tried track, that was no good, tried intake."
88

The problem was that this intake did not extend to the shaft bottom. The only

person who seemed aware of this fact at the time was a trackman who had been

delivering a load of rails to the area. He was unfamiliar with that part of the

mine, however:

I was like the most greenhorn out of the group, so ICI pretty much kept

to myself what my thoughts were. The game plan [was] that they were

going to walk out the intake. Now at that point, I can't say how I knew

this, I obviously heard it from somebody at some point and it stuck with

me, but I was told that...the intake went out onto the track. According

to the old laws...they didn't have to [take] it to the shaft...And that stuck

with me, and when they decided they were going to walk the intake,

I specifically said to [the general foreman], "We can't go out the intake.

That's just gonna take us right under the smoke." No, we'll walk the

intake. Well, you know anarchy can't reign.

The group proceeded about six breaks in their intake and encountered heavy

smoke again. At that time they decided to return to the face and try to go out

their secondary escapeway. At the section loading point, another mistake was

made. Because of stress and unfamiliarity with the section, the men entered the

wrong return. After traveling a few breaks, someone realized there were no

reflectors indicating that this entry was an escapeway. The group was forced to

backtrack in order to reach the correct entry.

On their way out in the alternate escapeway, group members faced other

choice points. When they reached their section regulator, it was decided to stop

briefly. A general inside laborer, who had once been a maintenance foreman,

suggested to the general foreman that the two of them investigate conditions

ahead. Leaving everyone else at the regulator, these individuals went a few

hundred feet on. When the smoke became worse, the general foreman expressed

reservations about continuing that way:

He said, "We can't lose the smoke this way." I said, "I know...we have

to go through this—go out the return. Smoke, no smoke, or whatever,

we can't keep changing our minds—we'll be here forever." So he

agreed.

The general inside laborer then went back to get those workers waiting by the

regulator. Some of them were already discussing whether to put on their filter

self-rescuers (FSRs) or don their SCSRs. The general inside laborer and a

mechanic donned self-contained self-rescuers. Everyone else put on their filter

devices:
89

We were always trained [that] at the first sign of smoke you should [put

on your SCSR]. At the first sign of smoke I didn't put it on because, you

know, they were saying fairly confidently that it was probably just a

hanger burning...[Later] the instances that I pointed out...led me to

believe that this man wasn't going to get us out of there in a safe period

of time...You have an hour with that SCSR. Not knowing where I was,

that's the reason I didn't put it on immediately.

The group traveled for some time until the filter self-rescuers became hot. At

that point, the men knelt in a circle and donned their SCSRs. They then

proceeded outby in the return, checking through mandoors for fresh air.

It seems from the preceding comments there were two factors that had a

disproportionate impact on the choices miners made. The first was their internal

state, specifically their knowledge (or lack thereof) regarding how elements in

the environment were supposed to fit together. While all of the workers

generally understood what it means to have the haulage belt on a neutral split of

air, for instance, few seem to have considered the possibility that something as

simple as an open door, rather than a raging blaze, could explain the

contamination of this air. In the same vein, although the miners had internalized

an awareness of what their self-contained self-rescuers were supposed to do, not

many were prepared for the actual experience of breathing with one. The second

factor influencing the miners' choices concerns the amount of uncertainty

stemming from a lack of adequate information. Those workers who did not

know the fire's location, or its source, were inclined to believe the worst. Their

choices tended to be based on a perceived need to travel some miles with close

to zero visibility before the oxygen in their apparatus ran out. For the few

miners who had been told where the smoke was coming from and what was

causing it, the goal was simply to get outby some point inside their mine.

Actions

Once a choice is made it then can be executed. Any action taken by an

individual or group therefore has real consequences that are frequently used by

others as a basis for an analysis of the quality of this choice. The actual

decision-maker, however, aware of all those factors that affected the process,

may evaluate his or her choice using different criteria. Those who escaped from

the three fires discussed options they exercised and reflected on the quality of

their actions.

1 Right - Adelaide

The first action taken on 1 Right was a delayed one: "The phone was
90

ringing but we never answered it, you know, because usually the boss would

take care of that." This delay, combined with the holdup caused by a subsequent

miscommunication between the buggyman and miner operators, could have had

severe repercussions:

Another 5 minutes and we wouldn't have been able to come out the way

we did because that overcast did go and collapse. We'd have had to find

another route out of there. And it was already 45 minutes...I only had

15 more minutes on that self-rescuer because they said it only lasts an

hour. And we were just fortunate.

A second significant action was when the crew abandoned their mantrip. The

miner operator discussed an option that occurred to most of the groups but was

not executed successfully by any of them:

If we had known, we probably could have put the self-rescuer on [and

ridden] out in the mantrip. But then we thought about that, and when

you have a mine fire, you're [liberating] other gases too, and the pole on

this [mantrip] always jumps off. And what we were afraid of is [the

pole] jumping and a spark and having an explosion. You know, we were

a little concerned about that.

In view of these concerns, therefore, the group explored their possible choices

and decided the best course of action was to go out their left-side return airway.

A heroic but ill-advised action was undertaken when the crew reached fresh

air and found one of the buggymen missing. A bolter operator, the miner helper,

and a bratticeman volunteered to go back and look for him. The miner helper

borrowed the face boss's light so he could tie it to a water line that ran in the left

return. This light was to indicate the point at which the three men should make

a left turn to find the door they had come through. Leaving the bolter operator

at the water line, the miner helper and bratticeman continued on to the overcast

where the buggyman had separated from the group:

When I got to that overcast, as soon as I was going up on the

approachway, you could just feel something collapse. I mean, the

smoke, you couldn't even see your hand in front of you.

When the overcast blew out, the bratticeman, who had been holding onto the

miner helper's belt, drew him away from the approach. The two men then

retreated back along the water line, running over the bolter operator in the dense

smoke. All three individuals then crawled until they saw the light they had tied

to the water line. They turned left into the break and went back through the
91

mandoor to fresh air.

2 Northwest - Adelaide

Perhaps the most significant action on 2 Northwest took place at the

beginning of the miners' escape. The face boss quickly assigned the former mine

rescue team member to bring up the rear as everyone traveled out. The boss

stayed near the front and tried to keep the men from walking too fast—a tactic

that was appreciated by the utilityman:

No, he was like in back of me there and we just—we all stuck together

real well. You know, if I got too far or [the bratticeman who] was with

me, he'd get out in front of me and if we got out too far, the boss or

somebody just said, "Take a break." And the one guy was having

trouble and he said...that he needed to rest some, and we just stopped

and rested with him.

Because the face boss did not know the fire's exact location, he would open each

door in the stopping as the group progressed. This offered the workers another

opportunity to stop and catch their breath. Overall, as the data show clearly,

2 Northwest had the most orderly escape of any of the eight groups in this study.

3 Left - Adelaide

It was mentioned earlier that some of the 3 Left crew balked at crossing the

overcast at 3 Left junction. The face boss decided to get back into their intake

escapeway through a door in the overcast. At that point, according to the miner

helper:

We got confused and we started going back into the section till we run

into the first door, and we just made a complete circle and come right

back to that main overcast again...He made a right instead of a left the

first time.

The boss, coming through the door again, knew which way to go the second time

because he stopped a moment to feel the air current on his face. "Once we made

the left, we were in good shape."
92

4 South - Brownfield

On 4 South the seven miners and one Federal inspector started their escape

by going down the section's belt entry: "[The boss] had noticed there was some

smoke already coming up [the intake] and they figured the return would be filled

up too, so we couldn't go down [that] way...So they figured the belt would be the

best way to go." At the beginning of this evacuation, all eight individuals were

hurrying along the belt. Not all of these workers, however, had the ability to

keep up this rapid pace. Therefore, two groups were formed. The section

foreman went ahead in order to keep up with three workers who were moving

rapidly, leaving the inspector with slower members of the crew. This second

group was also divided as one person in it continued at a slow but steady pace,

essentially escaping alone. Those left behind were the miner helper who had

been having difficulty, along with the mechanic and inspector who were trying

to help him. Finally, these two individuals left the miner operator as well.

As was indicated previously, the mechanic, believing that he had entered

4 South's intake aircourse only a short distance from where he had abandoned

the miner helper, went back after him. The mechanic and section foreman, who

had by this time also returned, assisted the miner helper to the track entry. All

members of the crew then continued outby the burning motor.

The interview data show widely divergent opinions about the

appropriateness of 4 South workers' actions during their escape:

 The one thing we did wrong, it come out that we was two different

groups of four...We kind of split up and got ahead of each other.

I didn't want them splitting up...I was glad that the inspector was there

because I felt he's going to watch [the slower] people and I'm going to

watch the other group.

It's nice if we could have stayed together...but nobody knew where the

fire was and everybody was trying to get out as best they could...It didn't

bother me that I was left behind.

Actually, [having the whole crew stay back with the slowest person]

might have been worse...Everybody fumbling around...[The others]

weren't able to see this man in, I guess what you'd call a panic state and

maybe that's good for them.

It is interesting that the first statement, implicitly critical of some miners leaving

others, was made by a worker in the first group out. The last two quotes, which

suggest that leaving was at least understandable, were taken from miners in the
93

slowest group. During their interviews, most of the individuals from this section

reflected at length on their personal decisions to leave (or not to leave) others

behind. Obviously, the choices made by each miner were arrived at within a

context of extreme stress:

It did cross my mind a couple of times that we should be sticking

together and come out as one group...We had one man that sat down and

didn't want to go any further and there was four of us ahead...There

could have been four extra guys to at least help the guy, something...

You never know what you're going to do until you get in a situation...but

definitely we should have stayed together.

I didn't want to go to the head of the pack—I wanted to stay and know

where my people are...That was my first concern...I just didn't like the

idea, but I didn't want [the faster group] taking off the way they were...

I can't sit on them all...So long as [the inspector] would go with that

group, I'd go with the faster group.

I'm back here with this guy and he's having all this trouble breathing and

now I'm having trouble breathing...there's no sense in me staying...I can't

breathe now...I know where I'm at...I can send somebody back...I'll go

out and get somebody...If it's only to the main track, there will be

somebody, I hope, out there...I can send them back and I know exactly

where you're at.

As can be seen from their accounts, the trip off 4 South was very problematic for

these workers. Even though everyone lived through the experience, there was

little consensus as to whether or not the best choices had been made.

5 South - Brownfield

Like the miners on 4 South, those in 5 South crew began their evacuation

down the belt entry: "We said we couldn't go down the intake because that's

where the smoke was coming from...So everybody decided to go down the belt

line." These workers, who stayed close together throughout their escape, continued along the belt line until they hit heavy smoke and then crossed into the

return aircourse. They traveled down the return entry, checking through doors

for clear air as they went. At one point they finally detected fresh air, crawled

through this door, and it led them out onto the track.

An official investigation was conducted after the blaze. In this inquiry there

was some criticism of the workers' choice of escape routes. The belt entries

traveled by those miners from 4 South and 5 South had not been designated as
94

either primary or secondary escapeways. The Federal inspector who escaped the

fire addressed this criticism during his interview:

It had been suggested through the course of the investigation...that we...

didn't...follow the proper escape procedures because we didn't utilize the

return aircourse as an alternate escapeway...I promptly informed this

person...you had smoke coming up the intake, there's only one way for

that smoke to go and that's back down the return...the first thing I did

was check the belt...and the belt was clear...So I know the belt entry had

permanent stoppings...I had no reason to believe that that belt entry

should have been contaminated.

While the correctness of these miners' actions can be questioned, the inspector

was sure that, given his situation, the best escape route had been taken.

As was also suggested during the investigation, there may have been an

escape route for 5 South that was objectively better than the one they chose:

From what we were told...instead of going down the return, we could

have went up...Being [the fire was in] 6 West Mains (which we didn't

know at the time), we probably would have been better off going up the

hill to 6 West Mains and across.

This miner agreed that, with the advantage of hindsight, a better route of escape

might have been chosen. He went on to note that decisions being made by the

miners on 5 South during their escape were executed with incomplete information about the fire and the condition of the mine. So, without the luxury of

prescience, the workers used their best judgment.

6 West - Brownfield

After picking up their self-contained self-rescuers, the two miners and State

mine inspector who were working in 6 West Mains began their evacuation:

"I was going to ride the jitney out of there, but [the inspector] wouldn't let us, so

we went on foot." The men started down 5 South's intake aircourse, walked

approximately 50 ft and hit thick smoke: "When I turned around and said we got

to go back, [the inspector] says no, and I says you can do what you want to do,

I'm going back." All three did backtrack, entered the return, and continued their

retreat out of the section until they came to an overcast where the miners from

5 South were encountered: "then I was relieved a little bit because I knowed that

boss coming with that crew was real familiar with the mine." After crossing this

overcast, the miners began hunting for a door that would take them into the

intake aircourse. One miner from 5 South called and said that they had just
95

passed a door. Everyone returned to that door, went through it, and eventually

got into clear air.

During their interviews many of the miners speculated about the State

inspector's decision not to permit use of the jitney in the evacuation of 6 West

Mains section. Even though the inspector based his actions on the knowledge

that a mine fire can liberate potentially explosive gases and that these gases

might be ignited by an electrical motor, there was still extensive debate centered

upon whether or not the people on that section should have ridden out.

One of the miners who had been on 6 West Mains and who had complied

with the inspector's directive not to ride out, thought that the decision was

nevertheless a poor one: "I know one thing, if it ever happens again and there's

something to ride, I don't give a damn who—they can do with me what they want

when they get me outside, but I'm riding." Later in their escape, when the three

men hit heavy smoke, this miner refused to regard the inspector's initial refusal

to backtrack and enter the return aircourse: "I said, 'You can follow me or do

what you want.' At that point I didn't give a damn who followed me or who

didn't, I was getting out of a heavy concentration."

Even though it meant retracing their steps, the worker considered going back

in order to enter the return an appropriate choice:

When I encountered the really heavy smoke...We could have probably

made it down through there...I'd have probably made it just as quick or

quicker...because I [backtracked] and then we went further down [past]

4 South to come out [into fresh air] than I would have if I [had stayed

in] the intake...But I'm glad I went the way I did because we might have

went down further and encountered smoke...you wouldn't have knowed

where you was at...you might have went in circles.

While analyzing his actions, the miner pointed out that because of uncertainty

about the true condition of his intake aircourse, he had to assume that smoke in

this supposedly smoke-free entry meant there was possibly fire as well. The

thought that they very well might "run right into the fire" is what made this

worker seek alternative escape routes once he and his companions encountered

smoke in their primary escapeway.

7 Butt - Cokedale

The group from 7 Butt intended to ride out in vehicles. A mechanic, who

was in the lead, stopped his jeep as soon as he encountered heavy smoke and

began putting on his self-contained self-rescuer. The construction foreman, who

was following, collided with the stopped jeep. This caused the wireman who
96

was riding with him to lose his cap, cap lamp, and battery. A general inside

laborer, who was operating a tandem motor carrying himself and a trackman, ran

into the foreman's jeep. After retrieving the wireman's cap and other gear, all

five men boarded the mechanic's jeep and continued. They had not gone far,

though, when they collided with an abandoned locomotive. This time, the

wireman lost his cap, cap lamp, and battery for good. He then had to be helped

by the others. This is the point at which these members of the group got into

their return. They then waited for three people who had not followed them into

the smoke.

The remaining three workers in this group were traveling in a portal bus.

A mechanic and a general inside laborer had stayed on the section briefly to

rendezvous with a fire boss who was conducting his preshift examination. When

they encountered smoke, the fire boss, who was driving, backed the portal bus

out into clear air. They heard, over the mantrip's speaker phone, conversations

that ensued from the collisions up ahead. The three men decided to take another

route out:

So we put our self-rescuers on. We looked into the intake escapeway;

it was filled with smoke. So we crossed over to the return and there was

just starting to get smoke in there. And we started out there and we

went out the return and we tied back in with [the construction foreman]

and our group that left right before us 'cause we waited for the fire boss.

The eight workers proceeded out their return. Two individuals stayed close to

the wireman who had lost his cap and light, reassuring him and helping him

along until they came to the set of double doors through which everyone exited.

8 Face Parallels - Cokedale

Execution of decisions was a problem on 8 Face Parallels because the

group's familiarity with the area did not extend to their escapeways. The general

foreman addressed this issue in regard to his choice of their primary escapeway

even though the fire was in a track entry:

And it's my fault that I didn't know the...escapeway was dumping on the

track. Of course, I didn't know where the fire was at either.

Once the group reached their section regulator and the general foreman,

accompanied by a general inside laborer, explored ahead and saw more dense

smoke, they were faced with another decision to execute:

And we put [the filter self-rescuers] on at that point in time when the

guys came up to me and I signaled everybody. I already had mine on
97

and my clips on; everybody put them on...It was an old return that I'd

walked and we put those on and we may have made about a thousand

feet. We didn't make it anywhere near the mandoor to Steiner. And

boy, they were cooking. They were cooking and we all knelt down and

put the [SCSRs] on...We knelt in teams...helping each other and

checking everything. Maybe 3, 4 minutes. It's hard to tell.

This group proceeded on out under air from that location, eventually joining up

with the miners who had escaped out of 7 Butt.

Discussion and Analysis of a Particular Case

The interview data show that everyone who escaped from the three mine

fires experienced numerous episodes of problem recognition, evaluation,

decision-making, and action while being influenced by their internal state and

the environment. In order to understand the decision-making that was done by

these workers during their escapes, background variables were identified and

included in a model. This heuristic device was then used as a starting point for

analyzing the characteristics of decisions made during the emergency.

The escaping miners were continually processing information and acting

upon their perceptions of the mine environment. Though some of the workers

spoke of being in a state of "panic," they do not tell of any points at which they

were not actively evaluating their situation and attempting to continue to safety.

Even those miners who had the most difficulty and, in fact, could not escape

without assistance, were thinking through their available options. This can be

seen in the attempt by the 4 South mechanic to switch from a self-contained selfrescuer to a filter self-rescuer just before the others came back to help him. In

this extremely dangerous situation, the will and the ability to make decisions was

not lost. It is likely that the decision-making process will exist in all contexts

and, given the right techniques, will be available for study.

The authors of this chapter are not experts in either disaster management or

mine rescue. A group of mine rescue experts were, however, brought together

to review the reported actions of those miners on 4 South. They then worked

with a cognitive psychologist to develop a simulation problem based on the

event [Cole 1989]. This problem unfolds over time and only offers information

and alternatives that would have been present in the environment at a particular

choice point. From the simulation, then, it is possible to arrive at some insight

into what these experts agreed on that would be either a good decision or a poor

one in the context within which it occurred.

Perhaps the worst decision, in terms of any attempt to allay stress during

these workers' escape, was made by the shuttle car driver on 4 South. It will be

remembered that this individual hung up the page phone and went to warn his

buddies rather than stay on for another moment and try to get more information
98

about the fire's location and magnitude. Put simply, whether the fire boss

actually knew any more details than he was able to communicate is immaterial:

the shuttle car driver saved a minute—2 at most. Even coal mines do not burn

up in that space of time.

Interestingly enough, those experts who constructed the mine fire simulation

agreed with the Federal inspector that 4 South's belt line was the one good

escape route available. This inspector could not know that it would become

filled with smoke, nor could he foresee those difficulties encountered by a crew

member (which were made worse by cramped conditions along the belt). A poor

decision was to undertake travel down this entry without first calling outside to

inform someone that the workers would not be using either of their designated

escapeways.

Another bad decision was to move into the belt line without first donning

self-contained self-rescuers. Even smoke-free air can be contaminated by carbon

monoxide. In fact, since brattices tend to leak, there could have been more CO

in the "neutral" air along their belt than in the smoke-filled but rapidly moving

air of 4 South's intake entry. A good choice was to check through the mandoors

leading into the primary escapeway periodically, thus enabling crew members

to get into fresh air as soon as possible, since they were having problems with

their self-rescuers.

Regarding use of their emergency breathing apparatus, expert opinion was

that the crew members made some decision errors that could have killed them

had carbon monoxide levels been high. For one thing, they waited too long to

don their apparatus. Secondly, almost all of the workers "cheated" by taking the

mouthpiece out to breathe in areas where smoke was not so dense. This was

done despite the fact they had no way to check for carbon monoxide in their

atmosphere. Finally, two individuals used their devices to assist the miner

helper (these apparatus are approved for self-rescue only), when a better course

of action for them would have been to remain outby the fire and wait for a mine

rescue team to arrive. While there was some debate among the mine rescue

experts as to how filter self-rescuers and self-contained self-rescuers may be

employed optimally, they were in agreement about the notion of "self" rescue.

This led them to conclude that those four workers who left their slower-moving

comrades behind and continued outby the fire made a good decision. Their

reasoning was that since the self-contained self-rescuer has a finite supply of

oxygen (about an hour) and 4 South's crew had no idea where the fire was

located, to stay with the miner helper might well have spelled everyone's doom.

Furthermore, someone should have gone on outby in order to inform mine rescue

personnel where to look for those who could not make it (since they were not in

either the primary or secondary escapeway).

In summary, even though the assessments of decision-making quality

discussed above result from a consensus of experts, there is still room for debate.

The point here is that research that focuses on judgment must include scrutiny
99

not only of decisions that are made, but also of real-world variables that influence them. The quality of any decision may have little or no direct relationship to the eventual outcome of its execution in a given situation. This is

because a decision-maker is constrained not only by the stress of the situation

or personal knowledge and attitudes, but also because he or she can only weigh

information that is available. Acknowledging the complex context of concrete

decision-making environments is a first step to understanding the skill of

decision-making and learning to evaluate the abilities of decision-makers.

 References

Baumann A, Bourbonnais F [1982]. Nursing decision-making in critical care areas. J Adv

Nursing 7(5), pp. 435-446.

Begland RR [1979]. The analysis of "soft skills": a implementation strategy. In: Proceedings

of the 21st Annual Conference of the Military Testing Association. ED 190 648, pp. 328-336..

Biggs JB [1968]. Information and human learning. North Melbourne, Victoria, Australia:

Cassell Australia, Ltd.

Billings CE, Reynard WD [1984]. Human factors in aircraft incidents: results of a 7-year

study. Aviat Space Environ Med 55(10):960-965.

Brecke FH [1982]. Instructional design for aircrew judgment training. Aviat Space Environ

Med 53(10):951-957.

Cole HP, Berger P, Vaught C, Haley J, Lacefield W, Wasielewski R, et al. [1988]. Measuring

critical mine health and safety skills. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky. U.S. Bureau of

Mines contract No. H0348040, pp. 202.

Cole HP [1989]. Escape from a mine fire: a latent image simulation. Beckley, WV: U.S. Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration, National Mine Health and Safety Academy.

Endsley MR [1988]. Design and evaluation for situation awareness enhancement. In:

Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Human Factors Society. Vol. 1, pp. 97-101.

Flathers GW Jr., Griffin WC, Rockwell TH [1982]. A study of decision-making behavior of

pilots deviating from a planned flight. Aviat Space Environ Med 53(10):958-963.

Godden D, Baddeley AD [1979]. The commercial diver. In: Singleton WT, ed. The study of

real skills: Vol. 2. Compliance and excellence. Baltimore, MD: University Park Press, pp. 157-177.

Hedge A, Lawson BR [1979]. Creative thinking. In: Singleton WT, ed. The study of real

skills: Vol.2. Compliance and excellence. Baltimore, MD: University Park Press, pp. 280-305.

Janis I, Mann L [1977]. Decision-making: a psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and

commitment. New York, NY: Free Press.

Jensen RS, Benel RA [1977]. Judgment evaluation and instruction in civil pilot training.

Report No. FAA-RD-78-24. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois.

Kinston W, Rosser R [1980]. Disaster: effects on mental and physical state. In: Pugh M, ed.

Collective behavior: a source book. St. Paul, MN: West.

Lerup L, Cronrath D, Liu JKC [1980]. Fires in nursing facilities. In: Canter D, ed. Fires and

human behavior. Chichester: Wiley, pp. 155-180..

Mallett LG, Vaught C, Brnich MJ Jr. [1993]. Sociotechnical communication in an underground

mine fire: a study of warning messages during an emergency evacuation. Saf Sci 16:709-728.

McHugh P [1968]. Defining the situation. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.

Pew RW [1994]. Situation awareness: the buzzword of the '90s. Gateway 5(1):1-4.

Sime JD [1980]. The concept of 'panic.' In: Canter D, ed. Fires and human behavior.

Chichester: Wiley, pp. 63-81.

Thomas WI [1923]. The unadjusted girl. New York: Social Science Research Council,

pp. 41-44.

Stone RB, Babcock BS, Edmunds WW [1985]. Pilot judgment: an operational viewpoint.

Aviat Space Environ Med 56(2):149-152.
100

CHAPTER 6.—FIRE WARNINGS AND INFORMATION

UNCERTAINTY

The first steps in the process of mine evacuation are the recognition of a

problem and an attempt to communicate the problem to miners who may be

affected. This chapter will focus on the way that a problem, fire, came to the

attention of mine personnel and the messages that were sent to miners in the

affected areas. The concept of information uncertainty, which was introduced

in chapter 4, will be discussed as it influences problem perception and diagnosis.

Sociotechnical and interpersonal communications will be explored and suggestions for improving these systems will be offered.

It might seem that the first indication of a dangerous fire would motivate

individuals to take self-protective action, to evacuate the affected area or structure, and to provide clear warning to others who are in danger. Research has

actually shown that in most situations this does not occur. Instead, time is taken

to gather more information, confirm information that is provided, and consider

possible alternative explanations that could account for the given circumstances

[Canter 1990; Scanlon 1979; Bickman et al. 1977]. This process of confirmation

can lead to the loss of critical time. Canter [1990] summarizes the problem in

his book, which reports studies of a number of fire events: "As discussed

throughout this book, ambiguity and confusion, incoherent instructions and timewasting actions, lack of appropriate instructions and misunderstanding of the

nature of the event that is unfolding, are all hallmarks of fires and emergencies

that kill people." In this chapter, the detection of each mine fire and the communication of warning to endangered miners will be reviewed with an emphasis

on how those processes were affected by the availability and use of information.

Information can become available through a variety of mechanisms during

an emergency situation. First, cues may be taken directly from the environment.

Smoke is an obvious example. Secondly, mechanical devices, such as smoke detectors, may provide warning messages. A third source of information is interpersonal communications. These can occur face-to-face or through some mechanical device such as a telephone. With all three methods there is a possibility of miscommunication, misunderstanding, and misinterpretation. All of these

means of communication were used with varying degrees of success in the three

mine fires analyzed here.

A fire, like any nonroutine situation, engenders uncertainty about a diagnosis

and understanding of the problem [Mead 1938]. This uncertainty leads to delays

in realization of the seriousness of the situation and therefore in the proper response to it. Delay in action is an important concern in any fire setting, but is

even more at issue in underground coal mine fires. Mine fires are qualitatively

different from structural blazes: workers' escapeways may be miles long; the

seam height at many operations is so low that it is impossible to walk upright;

access to underground workings is always limited to a few (sometimes only two)
101

openings; the coal provides an inexhaustible supply of fuel; explosive concentrations of gases may build up quickly; and logistics are difficult [Mitchell 1990].

In these difficult circumstances, anyone who delays too long before beginning

an escape attempt or who gets lost in the maze of dark smoke-filled entryways

will likely die. Given such a scenario, it is easy to understand the increased importance of early detection and clear communication of warning.

When transmitted warnings or direct stimuli from the environment convince

people that danger exists and they perceive that options are available, they are

likely to take action. According to Nigg [1987], the tendency to believe a warning and take action is influenced by the credibility of the source of the warning

and the content of the message. The content will, however, be interpreted in

terms of what people expect to happen [Auf der Heide 1989]. Since fires or

other potential disasters are nonroutine events, the predisposition is to disbelieve

messages that could be interpreted as signs of such danger. Coupled with the

tendency toward disbelief is the inclination to interpret an occurrence from a

normal or usual perspective as long as possible [Meltzer et al. 1975]. In disaster

situations, unfortunately, potential victims are likely to put the best face on the

situation whenever possible and decide that response is unnecessary [Perry

1987]. Therefore, the more credible a source and the more unambiguous the

message, the more disposed individuals will be to switch their frame of reference

and believe that a nonroutine event is occurring [Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1991].

Even when the message appears to be clear, however, interpretation is a subjective phenomenon that will vary by individual and context because of personal

and social history [Duchon 1986]. Therefore, warning messages must be as

timely and unambiguous as possible. Regardless of the warning provided,

though, it must be anticipated that some people will respond more quickly and

more appropriately than others.

Use of Information in Mine Fire Detection

Like structure fires, underground mine fires can be detected by environmental cues, verbal warnings, or alarms from detection systems. Research conducted in the area of response to fire warnings shows that warnings given by any

of these means are not always effective. Canter [1990], for instance, explained

that in many fire settings environmental cues are not recognized as warnings:

"In every disaster that has been examined in this book, it has been found

that, in the early stages of fire growth, people have ignored or misunderstood the early cues indicating that a dangerous fire was

developing."
102

Canter [1990] then provided three reasons that traditional audible alarms are also

often ineffective:

1. A failure of people to differentiate fire alarms from other types of

alarm.

2. A failure of people to regard fire alarms as authentic warnings of a

genuine fire.

3. A failure of fire alarms to present information that will assist fire

victims in their attempts to deal with fire.

It is evident that these findings may be readily generalizable to the fire detection

and warning systems in a mine setting.

The following sections will describe how the fires were discovered at the

three mines. The means of detection differed at the three sites. In one location,

the fire was discovered when a resulting situation created a problem with

continuing routine work and the miners went in search of the cause of that

problem. In other words, the fire was not detected by a system designed for that

purpose, but instead was happened upon by personnel during the course of their

work. Systems for detecting dangerous conditions did come into play at the

other two sites. At one site, a mine examiner discovered the problem during a

routine check for hazards. The third site had installed a mine-wide monitoring

system that provided their initial warning. The stories of fire detection can

therefore be seen to range from the casual finding of smoke during routine tasks

to the use of sophisticated warning equipment. Details of each event will be

discussed in the following sections in order of increasing use of formal warning

systems. Each account is given from the perspective of the individuals who first

determined that a serious situation did exist.

Fire Detection at Cokedale Mine

The workday began to vary from routine at Cokedale Mine when workers

driving motors noticed fluctuations in power supplies to their vehicles:

When I went to put the power on, there was none, and I asked my buddy

if he had lost power, and he says, yeah, but it came back on. And then

I hit my controller and the power was back on again, and then I heard

[the haulage foreman] say, "Well, my power's on down here, but it's real

weak...My lights are real dim...I've got this thing on full power, and it's

hardly moving."

The two motormen and the foreman driving the affected vehicles then began to

search for the source of electrical power fluctuations that were impeding routine
103

work. First the dispatcher was called and asked to check the above-ground

substation. The dispatcher found that the automatic system had locked out the

power and called back to report this information. Meanwhile, one of the

motormen saw "about an inch of smoke along the roof." His initial diagnosis

was that a switch had burned out. The dispatcher explained why this diagnosis

was made: "I heard [the foreman] telling [the motormen] to check No. 1, which

we had a switch burned up once before down there. It was about the same way."

The motormen put the smoke into a framework that had been created by a past

event (which gave similar environmental cues) and went to the area of the earlier

problem to search for confirmation.

 About half the entry was filled with smoke. I ducked down and tried to

look around the corner and I wanted to see if that trolley switch was

burning, which was probably maybe 6 to 8 feet in...I couldn't really see

so I took a step into it, and it was just—black. I mean, everything right

now was black. It was nothing, and I couldn't even, I turned around and

I couldn't see anything.

At that point, the motorman determined that this situation was not a repeat of the

prior one, as he had been expecting. He called the dispatcher and reported what

he had found.

We got a problem down here...Something's burning and I don't know

what. I said, I don't think it's a trolley switch, there's too much.

The dispatcher realized the seriousness of the situation from this verbal communication and called to tell miners working inby the fire to evacuate the mine.

Fire Detection at Brownfield Mine

Detection of the fire at Brownfield Mine consisted of a process that involved

the experience of one individual. On the day of the fire, a mine examiner was

performing a preshift examination. A mine examiner's job is to routinely check

the mine for hazardous situations before and during shifts. He was walking a

beltline when he went through a door and then smelled smoke. Like the motorman at Cokedale, this miner assumed the smoke was the result of a situation that

occurred in the past: "I just kind of thought it was, you know, maybe a bad

roller. The belt was rubbing on the straps, or something like that." He continued

his examination, specifically checking the rollers to see if one of them was the

source of the smoke. As he walked on, the smell of smoke grew stronger, but

there was still no sign of the source of the problem. He began to hurry toward

an overcast because that was the location of a past problem. When he got to a
104

section belthead, "the smoke just seemed—it was there. I mean, all of a sudden

it was there." Even though the amount of smoke provided undeniable warning that

this was an abnormal situation, the mine examiner still wanted to confirm exactly

what was happening. Therefore, he started running through the entries searching

for the source of the smoke and for a safe passageway. He heard a rumbling,

which sounded to him like a welding torch. Again trying to understand his surroundings within a routine framework, he thought that maybe someone was

welding and a problem had resulted. "I yelled for [the welder]. I yelled about two

or three times for him and there was no answer or anything." At this point, the

mine examiner began having problems maneuvering through the smoke.

When I got in there, the smoke was real thick in there, too, and I couldn't

see, ...I was coughing around and it really burned my chest at this time,

so I probably stayed there a couple minutes to get my bearings again.

The mine examiner still had not reported the situation to anyone. He chose

instead to continue to search for the welder who he thought might be in jeopardy

in the smoke-filled area of the mine. He also was attempting to determine the

exact source of the problem so that he could take action in response to the threat.

I crawled up along the rib, 'cause I still thought [the welder] was in there

and had a fire or something had happened. I thought there was a man

in there. I went up along the rib and I got my head around the corner

and I looked in and I yelled for [the welder] a couple more times and

I could see the flames...coming off the top of the motor. I went back and

I knew that there was a cutout...in the high spot, but in the smoke

I couldn't see it, so I wasn't about to try and find that cutout, so...I run

back down to 6 Left and pulled the cutout blade.

When the mine examiner saw the flames coming off the motor, he knew that this

fire was a major problem. He determined that he could not find the welder, so

after he had taken the only response action that he felt was available to him,

cutting the power to the trolley wire, he called to report the fire to miners at inby

locations and to the shift foreman.

Fire Detection at Adelaide Mine

Warning of the fire at Adelaide Mine was given by a carbon monoxide (CO)

monitoring system. Adelaide's dispatcher was alerted by a CO warning of

10.5 ppm, which cleared from his computer screen almost immediately. A few

seconds later, the same sensor registered a warning of 11.5 ppm, but cleared in

less than 30 seconds.
105

I turned to the page where the alarm was and it dropped straight back off

the normal and I took it as a false alarm.

An element in how this particular warning got diagnosed was the fact that past

false alarms had strongly conditioned Adelaide's dispatcher to question the

legitimacy of each alarm. Due to his mistrust of readings provided by the monitoring system, the dispatcher did not follow a normal protocol for responding

to this first CO warning of the shift. Instead, he continued his ordinary routine

until he received an alarm that was more likely to be a true reading of an

abnormally high CO level. At that time the dispatcher looked for more information about the situation:

[The monitor reading] went 18, 20, 22. It just started going straight up.

I got on the phone and called the dumper's shanty...I told them I had a

high alarm at 23 stopping, to get up there now and check it out. I guess

it was like 5, 6 minutes later, he called me back and said I better get

some fire extinguishers up there fast, that there was a lot of smoke.

Upon confirmation of a serious blaze from the miners at the dumper shanty, the

dispatcher determined that miners in three areas of the mine were in danger and

must be evacuated.

Discussion of Fire Detection at the Three Mines

To those unfamiliar with the mining environment, it may be difficult to

understand how seeing unexpected smoke could be interpreted as normal.

During a study in which 214 miners from 8 mines were asked about mine fire

related experiences, however, 65% reported that they see or smell smoke in the

mines where they work at least once per month [Vaught et al., 1996].

Furthermore, 15% said that they had been surprised or caught off guard by the

smell or sight of smoke within the past month. There are a number of potential

sources for smoke underground that do not usually lead to large fires.

In all three cases, the miners who discovered the fires initially attempted to

interpret the messages they were receiving within a framework of normal mine

operation. In the first two mine fires discussed above, the miners who initially

discovered smoke attempted to attribute it to such sources. Like the miners in

the Vaught et al. [1996] study, they had past experience with smoke in the mine

that had not led to major fires. The suggested causes—a burned-out switch,

a hot belt roller, or a welding torch—would not necessarily create major

problems. In these first two cases, however, the environmental cues provided,

the amount of smoke, and/or a view of the flames, could not be explained within

the miners' normal frameworks. When they reached that conclusion, the initial

warning was received successfully.
106

In the third mine, initial detection came from a mechanical device instead

of directly from the environment. As discussed in the introduction to this section, for fire alarm systems to be effective they must be viewed as "authentic

warnings of a genuine fire" [Canter 1990]. Unfortunately, the dispatcher at

Adelaide had background filters that predisposed him to not take heed of the CO

monitor's warning. The system had in the past given multiple false alarms and

had thereby made false CO warnings a normal frame of reference:

It's just unbelievable. There was times that all I did was go back and

forth and back and forth, you know, just turn the other alarm off and hit

the next page. That's all I did. There was times where I would be talking and they'd be going off for like 30 or 40 seconds before I could get

over there and shut it off and check it.

The system had been put into service while still being finished. Unfortunately,

some of the monitors were attached to roof bolt plates, causing a short circuit.

The resulting false alarms seem to have lulled the dispatchers into complacency.

These false alarms were particularly problematic because of the way the system

was implemented at the mine. Adelaide's dispatchers had been placed in charge

of the monitoring terminal, but no analysis was performed to determine if this

job was complementary with their primary tasks—to "direct traffic and move

coal." The dispatcher occupied a key role: being able to recognize and communicate potential danger from readings of increased CO levels, but did not

view that as an important part of the job.

Another implementation problem was the lack of adequate training. The

system manufacturer's representatives conducted two formal training classes that

were attended by supervisors and maintenance personnel but not by the dispatchers: "I had no classes. It was just as they got things in, they told me little

bits and pieces." Mine management had allocated resources to the implementation of a sophisticated system which, if working properly, should provide early

warning of fire. However, the same attention was not given to the human-machine interaction that was a vital link in the system. When the dispatcher decided that this time the warning might be real, he still asked for confirmation

from miners who had to go and look for the alarm's source before he determined

that miners inby the fire were in jeopardy.

Communication of danger was delayed in all three mines because individuals tried to place the abnormal cues into normal unthreatening frameworks. Miners caught inby the fires could have begun their escapes earlier if

those who discovered the problems had risked making errors on the conservative

side and reported the potential danger as soon as the first cues were received.

In the first two cases, the environmental cues could have been somewhat ambiguous. One way to improve that situation would be to use mechanical devices
107

that could remotely provide more explicit information and clearer warnings.

While this could have helped in the interpretation of conditions in the first two

examples, the third case shows that implementation of technology without

careful consideration of how its messages will be interpreted will not be

successful.

Warning Information Communicated to Miners Inby

Regardless of the means used to detect a fire, after it has been discovered

any workers in the affected areas must be warned about the potential danger.

They must be given messages that will allow and encourage them to act

appropriately and escape efficiently. In these cases, eight separate groups of

miners were forced to escape from inby the three fires. In some cases, the

information they received assisted them with an effective egress from the

section. In other cases, little information was conveyed to the miners at risk.

Communication of the initial warnings will be discussed in the following

sections.

Warning Miners Inby at Cokedale

When the dispatcher at Cokedale heard confirmation of the fire from the

miners who discovered it, he attempted to communicate a warning to workers

who might be in danger. Miners were working or traveling in two areas that

could be blocked by smoke from a safe exit. In both sections, however, the dispatcher's message was not the first cue they had that something was not normal.

The miners who started looking for the reason for the power fluctuations discussed previously were communicating on an open channel. Individuals on the

sections, therefore, could overhear the conversations regarding the problem and

the speculations about a trolley switch burning. Miners in the inby sections got

another cue as they began to smell and/or see smoke. They began to think that

something unusual might be happening and looked for confirmation of that fear.

The dispatcher provided confirmation through phone calls in which he relayed

the information that a fire was burning underground and that they should evacuate the mine. Each section started evacuation after that message was received.

They began the trip, which would take them through thick smoke, knowing that

a fire was burning. The other information at their disposal was more vague,

however. From the overheard conversations, they had some notion of where the

miners were who had discovered the fire. They therefore could make a reasonable guess about the fire's location, but had no information about its severity.
108

Warning Miners Inby at Brownfield

The fire boss who discovered the fire at Brownfield called miners working

on the three sections at risk. The message given to two of the sections, 4 South

and 5 South, was that there was a belt fire and that they should evacuate the

mine. The fire boss, with the vision of hindsight, discussed what was lacking in

the warnings received by those miners.

So I called them and told them there was smoke coming out, they better

get out of there. But the one mistake I did make is, well, the man that

I talked to in both cases never—he never give me the opportunity to tell

them where the fire was at. It made it kind of a bad situation for those

guys coming out, cause they really didn't know where the fire was,

which was one thing I learned from the whole situation.

The stories of the miners who took the fire boss' calls confirm that, as the fire

boss reported, they did not wait for additional information after hearing that the

mine was burning. In both cases the miners were forced to make decisions about

their evacuation without knowing the fire's location. The third section, 6 West,

had more information available as they decided which way to go. The foreman

who took the call from the fire boss explained why: "I was the only one of all

the guys [who escaped] that knowed where the fire was. And the reason for that

is I took and asked [the fire boss] where the fire was." This miner had asked for

and received exact information about the fire's location and used it to make

decisions about evacuation.

Warning Miners Inby at Adelaide

As discussed in the section about detection above, the dispatcher at Adelaide

received warning of high carbon monoxide levels and sent the dumper to explore

the situation. When the dumper reported back that a fire was burning, the two

workers split the task of contacting miners inby. There were three sections affected and all three were told, either by the dispatcher or the dumper, that there

was a fire on the belt and that the mine should be evacuated. No information

about location or severity of the fire was provided and no further details were

requested by the miners who answered the calls. All of the miners inby the

Adelaide fire evacuated without knowing where the fire was and, therefore, how

far they had to travel.

Discussion of Communication of Warning at the Three Mines

Most of the miners who evacuated from the three mines did not have

information that would allow them to make decisions about efficient escapes.
109

The communication breakdown came from two directions: the individuals providing the warning did not offer details about the situations even though some

details were known, and the individuals who received the warnings did not ask

for clarification of the situation. As discussed in chapter 4, this lack of information allowed miners to continue attempting to place cues into normal

frameworks after they should have evaluated the situation as abnormal and

threatening. When the environment left no doubt that this was not a routine exit

from the mine, it was too late to gather more information because there was no

form of communication to the surface in those locations. Most decisions about

appropriate travel directions had to be made without the miners knowing where

the fire was, and therefore where the smoke was likely to be. Equally important,

the miners did not know whether they must face the extreme conditions for a

hundred yards or 5 miles. In the case of Cokedale, miners could guess where the

problem was from monitoring the radio calls. They could not be absolutely certain of its source, however, and they had no indication of its severity. As shown

in figure 5.1, uncertainty created by a lack of information increased stress on the

escaping miners and influenced their decision-making (and therefore their

actions).

Improving Fire Warning Systems in Underground Coal Mines

Data from the three fires studied show information that could have been

used to help with evacuation decision-making had it been provided to the miners

who were most in jeopardy. In all three cases, delays in activating the warning

communication system happened because the individuals who first determined

that an abnormal situation existed sought additional confirmation before communicating the cues they had received. Further delays occurred when the miners

inby also sought confirmation before evacuating, and often, even then, did not

believe that an emergency was in progress. The lack of reliable detection methods and standard protocols for emergency communication caused those miners

who were put in danger by the fires to delay their self-rescue attempts, and often

to act without needed information. The following sections will suggest methods

that could be used to address some of the causes of faulty communication that

occurred during these mine fire evacuations. First, technological advances in

fire detection will be discussed. Then, human interaction with technology and

human reaction to warning and risk communication will be explored. The last

section of this chapter will summarize issues that should be considered in the

design of a fire warning system.
110

Fire Warning With Smoke Detectors

The fire at Adelaide was detected initially by a mechanical device. Having

any mechanical device installed to provide early warning of a fire may allow

miners inby more time to escape. The CO detector system used at Adelaide,

however, may not be the best choice. Instead, a smoke detection system might

provide even more time for evacuation decision-making and actions before the

mine atmosphere becomes irrespirable. Data from fire testing indicate that a fire

will generate smoke reaching levels that will force evacuation, and make travel

difficult, significantly earlier than it will generate a toxic environment due to its

product gases [Litton et al. 1991]. This is significant because it implies that for

even moderate levels of smoke, the air is still breathable and life-supporting. It

is only when the levels of smoke begin to totally obscure visibility that the toxicity of the combustion products begins to play a role in the question of escape

and survivability.

As shown in chapter 7, smoke from a fire is a significant obstacle to escape.

The rapid detection of smoke at very low levels can increase the time miners

will have to escape before smoke obscures visibility completely. Such rapid

detection is possible because smoke is produced much earlier than other fire

signatures during the stages of fire growth and development, and smoke sensors

are extremely sensitive devices. Smoke sensors can respond to smoke levels

that are barely visible to the human eye. Furthermore, smoke sensors will alarm

while CO levels are often still near the ambient threshold of CO alarm sensors.

Since smoke may be the greatest impediment to survivability during a mine fire

escape, its early detection can optimize the chances of surviving.

Smoke Detection

In the United States, both Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., and Factory Mutual Research Corp. use standard tests for approving smoke sensors to be used

as early-warning fire sensors. Abroad, similar standard tests are employed for

approving smoke sensors (such as EN-54, used by the European community).

These standards are based on the optical density of the smoke. In very general

terms, a smoke detector passes the sensitivity tests if it alarms before the smoke

optical density reaches a value of 0.058 m-1. Many approved smoke sensors

typically alarm at optical densities of one-third to one-fourth of this value.

It has been proposed [Litton et al. 1991] that smoke sensors approved for use

in underground coal mines be classified more rigorously by defining two classes.

Class 1 smoke sensors are those which always alarm at smoke optical densities

less than 0.022 m-1. Class 2 smoke sensors are those which always alarm at

optical densities less than 0.044 m-1. Any smoke sensor that alarms at optical

densities greater than 0.044 m-1 would not be approved for use in underground
111

coal mines. For a class 1 smoke sensor, the range of visibility would exceed

40 m.

In determining which type of alarm system should be installed in underground mines, it is appropriate to compare the approximate levels of CO that

would be present at the alarm thresholds of class 1 and 2 smoke sensors. This

comparison is shown in table 6.1 (flaming). For a class 2 smoke sensor, the

average CO levels at smoke alarm are 5.7 ppm for flaming fires. For a class 1

smoke sensor, the CO levels at smoke alarm are 2.9 ppm. These numbers are

clear indications of the superiority of smoke sensors over CO sensors in

providing early warning of fire.

Table 6.1.—Approximate CO levels present at alarm 

threshold for flaming fires

Combustible ppm CO at smoke alarms

Class 1 Class 2

Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 11.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 3.4

SBR conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 3.8

PVC conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 8.2

Neoprene conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . 3.2 6.4

The earlier the warning given to miners who will be required to travel

through smoke, the better their chances of making a successful escape. Assuming the maximum time available for escape is that point at which visibility

in an escapeway becomes critical, it is possible to determine how much of this

time is available to miners warned by different types of sensors. In detection of

a fire in the belt entry, a reasonable time before smoke obscures visibility is

about 38 minutes. It is possible to determine when, during that time span, various types of sensors would alarm and therefore how much evacuation time

would be made available. For smoke sensors, 30 minutes (79% of the total time)

are estimated to be available; for 5-ppm CO sensors, 23 minutes (61%); for

10-ppm CO sensors, 19 minutes (50%); and for thermal sensors, 3 minutes (8%).

Such an analysis clearly shows that smoke sensors can provide earlier warning

than CO monitors.

Smoke Sensor Classifications

Smoke sensor classification systems are based on various criteria. Smoke

sensors are often classified according to their principle of operation. Smoke sensors are either ionization-type, photoelectric-type, or some combination of the

two. An ionization-type smoke sensor is one that uses a small source of radioactive material (usually americium 241) to produce molecular ions in the air

space between two electrodes. When a small voltage is applied to these electrodes, the ions produce a current. Smoke particles that enter the air space

between the electrodes serve to deplete the ions correspondingly by reducing the
112

flow of current. When the current loss is 10% to 20% of the total current, an

alarm is given.

Photoelectric-type smoke sensors, which are based on measurement of light,

may be divided into two subcategories. The first subcategory contains sensors

that measure the light that is scattered from smoke particles. This type of

detector is located to the side of a beam of light at some fixed angle (usually

around 45E from the forward direction). In the absence of smoke particles, this

detector receives no signal. When smoke enters the projected beam of light,

some of the light is reflected (scattered) into the detector producing a measurable

signal. When the detector signal reaches some preset level, an alarm is given.

The second subcategory contains sensors that measure the transmission of light

through a cloud of smoke. A light beam is projected into a detector, producing

a steady-state signal level. When smoke enters this light beam, it reduces the detector signal level and produces an alarm.

Smoke sensors may also be classified according to their use. Deployment

can be fixed-station, sampling, or open area. The most common sensor deployment method is called fixed-station sensors. These sensors are mounted on or

near the roof and are fixed into place. Another type of smoke sensor is a

sampling-type smoke detector. The sampling-type smoke detector usually employs a small axial-vane fan to convey a sample of air from some desired point

back to the sensor via plastic tubes. Very often, this type of smoke sensor draws

samples from several different monitoring locations (usually about 10 per detector). This allows 1 sensor to essentially replace 10 fixed-station smoke sensors, but also means that the 1 sampling-type detector must be more sensitive,

since smoke from any one location can be diluted by a factor of 10. As with

fixed-station use, either ionization-type or photoelectric-type can be employed

in sampling.

The final type of smoke sensor to be discussed here is the open area (or

projected-beam) detector. It requires the use of a photoelectric-type system. For

this system, a light source is located remotely from a light detector. The light

detector measures the transmission of the light beam through a cloud of smoke

particles. This type of smoke sensor can function at separations between light

source and light detector up to 90 m. It is intended for use in structures that are

relatively open on the inside, such as warehouses.

Use of Smoke Sensors in Underground Mines

Most smoke sensors that have been approved by a recognized testing

laboratory should perform reliably in an underground coal mine. The major obstacle to their effective use is dust. Both coal dust and rock dust are present,

often at elevated levels, in underground coal mines. Two problems can be

created by this condition. First, false alarms can be given when dust enters the
113

smoke sensors. Because dust is similar to smoke except that the dust particles

are larger, dust can cause smoke sensors to alarm. Second, dust may contaminate a smoke sensor causing the sensor to become more sensitive over time.

This is particularly true for ionization-type smoke sensors and those

photoelectric-type smoke sensors that use light attenuation as the means for

detecting the smoke. Increased sensitivity due to dust buildup eventually results

in an increasing frequency of random false alarms. For photoelectric-type smoke

sensors that use light-scattering to detect the smoke, dust accumulation can

eventually render them totally insensitive.

There is one fixed-station smoke sensor that is impervious to dust—the Becon

Mark IV ionization-type smoke sensor, manufactured by Anglo-American Electronics, Inc., of the Republic of South Africa. It achieves this result by using a radioactive source (Kr-85) that emits β-particles rather than the α-particles produced

from americium 241. This radioactive source has an activity level greater than the

exemption level specified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and special

licensing requirements are needed by a United States distributor before it could be

used extensively in underground mines in the United States.

Other than the Becon smoke sensor, sampling type smoke sensors offer the

greatest potential for reducing or eliminating the problems of dust in underground coal mine use. They use a forced flow to bring the sample of the mine

atmosphere to the detector for measurement. Dust particles are much larger than

smoke particles. Techniques exist for selectively filtering out these larger dust

particles from the flow and allowing only the much smaller smoke particles to

be transmitted to the detector for measurement. With current readily available

technology, the sampling type of detector seems to provide the best solution to

problems created by coal and rock dust.

Communication of Fire Warnings

Timely detection of fire is only one step in the fire warning process. As

shown by the activities that took place after the CO monitor alarmed at Adelaide,

proper response to mechanical detection devices is required for the warning

system to be activated. If the individual responsible for monitoring the alarm

system trusts that the sensors are reliable and valid, and if that person has been

trained in the proper actions to take when an alarm sounds, the warning system

is likely to be activated immediately upon receiving the first alarm. If, however,

the system has given multiple false alarms or the sensors are set inappropriately

and alarm to low levels of smoke, such as from welding, or to dust, then the

person monitoring the detector is likely to look for confirmation of a serious

problem before providing warning. Even when the alarm is believed or the

situation confirmed, if the individual has not been trained in the proper way to

relay warning, vital information is likely to be forgotten.

A person who is responsible for communicating warning information will
114

be doing so under stress. That individual is in the position of telling others that

their lives may be in jeopardy. In that situation, the person providing warning

must have a detailed protocol for relaying information that has been explained,

discussed, and practiced before the emergency occurs. At a minimum, the

protocol should include elements such as (1) identification of the individual

providing the warning, (2) the location of the situation, (3) definition of the type

of problem occurring, (4) severity of the problem if known, and (5) instructions

for those at risk. Information about changes to the environment or response to

protocol that have occurred because of the emergency should also be communicated. As discussed previously, none of the individuals who communicated

a message to evacuate the miners in this study relayed all of the pertinent

information available. In the worst cases, the miners inby were not told the location of the fire and therefore lacked information vital to planning an appropriate escape route.

For a warning system to be successful, the communicated message must also

be received appropriately. This requires that everyone underground be trained

in the proper way to gather information during a warning communication. In

many instances, workers who received warnings of the fires did not ask any

questions of the person telling them to evacuate the mine. In the worst case, one

person simply ran from the phone as soon as the beginning of the message was

relayed. Miners must be prepared to control their stress levels as they hear about

the potential threat and obtain as much information as possible so that later

decision-making can be done in an informed manner. At a minimum, they

should be trained to ask (1) the nature of the problem, (2) the location of the

problem, (3) the severity of situation, (4) which actions should be taken, and

(5) any details of the situation that would be relevant specifically to the people

in that area. If the person providing the warning and the person receiving it are

both trained in emergency communication protocols, the potential for an

effective warning system can be greatly enhanced.

Recommendations for an Effective Warning System

When an individual is warned of danger, that person will act if (1) he or she

believes the danger is real and (2) feels that there are options. A warning system

should be designed to provide the most information possible to comply with

those two needs. The detection of a problem, whether by mechanical or other

means, must be trusted so that warning can begin immediately upon discovery

of the problem, as opposed to waiting for confirmation. After discovery, warning must be provided to everyone who is in danger. Secondarily, warning must

be provided to those who will be called on to respond to the emergency, and in

such a way that it allows informed decisions to be made about what actions

should be taken. Training is needed for both giving and receiving warning

messages properly. Developing an effective warning communication system
115

should include—

1. Installing proper detection devices as appropriate to the situation.

2. Training personnel who will be monitoring the detection system and its

functioning.

3. Developing a warning message protocol to be used to provide warning.

4. Training personnel who will be monitoring the detection system in

proper protocol for providing warning when the system alarms.

5. Developing a receiving warning message protocol to be used when

receiving warning.

6. Training all personnel in the proper methods for use of the receiving

protocol to gather information when receiving a warning.

7. Incorporating this system within a general mine emergency response

plan.

References

Auf der Heide E [1989]. Disaster response: principles of preparation and coordination.

St. Louis, MO: C. V. Mosby Company.

Bickman L, Edelman P, McDaniel M [1977]. A model of human behavior in a fire emergency. Loyola University of Chicago. National Bureau of Standards Report No. NBS-GCR-78-

120. December. Final report.

Canter D, Breaux J, Sime J [1990]. Domestic, multiple occupancy and hospital fires. In:

Canter D, ed. Fires and human behavior. London, U.K.: David Fulton Publishers, pp. 117-136.

Duchon JC, Laage LW [1986]. The consideration of human factors in the design of a

backing-up warning system. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 30th Annual Meeting,

Vol. 1 (Dayton, OH), pp. 261-264.

Litton CD, Lazzara CP, Perzak FJ [1991]. Fire detection for conveyor belt entries.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, RI 9380.

Mead G [1938]. The philosophy of the act. In: Morris C, Brewster J, Dunham A, Miller D,

eds. Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.

Meltzer B, Petras J, Reynolds L [1975]. Symbolic interactionism: genesis, varieties, and

criticism. London, U.K.: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Mileti DS, Fitzpatrick C [1991]. Communication of public risk: its theory and its application.

Sociol Practice Rev 2(1):20-28.

Mitchell DW [1990]. Mine fires: prevention, detection, and fighting. Chicago, IL: Maclean

Hunter Publishing Company, p. vi.

Nigg JM [1987]. Communication and behavior: organizational and individual response to

warnings. In: Dynes RR, DeMarchi B, Pelanda C, eds. Sociology of disasters: contribution of

sociology to disaster research. Milan, Italy: Franco Angeli, pp. 103-116.

Perry R [1987]. Disaster preparedness and response among minority citizens. In: Dynes RR,

DeMarchi B, Pelanda C, eds. In: Sociology of disasters: contribution of sociology to disaster

research. Milan, Italy: Franco Angeli, pp. 135-151.

Scanlon J [1979]. Human behavior in a fatal apartment fire: research problems and findings.

Fire J 73(3):76-79, 122-123.

Vaught C, Fotta B, Wiehagen W J, Conti RS, Fowkes RS [1996]. A profile of workers’

experience and preparedness in responding to underground mine fires. Pittsburgh, PA: U.S.

Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, RI 9584.
116

CHAPTER 7.—SMOKE AS AN ESCAPE AND BEHAVIORAL

ENVIRONMENT

This chapter focuses on smoke as it relates to escape from underground mine

fires. Among the topics discussed are the measurement of visibility in smoke;

smoke-related hazards such as the production of CO, hydrochloric acid (HCl),

or other byproducts of combustion; and miners' personal experiences while

escaping through smoke.

Smoke Measurement and Visibility

In general, smoke consists of hundreds of thousands of very small particles.

These particles have some "size," usually expressed in terms of their diameters,

and they have some concentrations, usually expressed either in the number of

these particles per unit volume or the total mass of the particles per unit volume.

Humans cannot see individual smoke particles because they are too small.

Similarly, "umber concentrations" and "mass concentrations" of smoke particles

do not have much meaning to people unless they are trained technically. Still,

individuals know that they can see smoke, independent of all the technical jargon used to describe it. Also, they know that when the smoke level gets too

high, it is no longer visible. In fact, nothing is visible because the smoke absorbs

all of the light in its surroundings.

The eye is only sensitive to light in the wavelength region from about

400 nm to about 700 nm. The maximum sensitivity of the human eye is to light

that has a wavelength of about 555 nm. It is important to know how the eye

responds to light because if its response is known, it is possible to use a light

detector that has almost the same response as the eye. Such a detector can then

be used to quantify the visible characteristics of smoke because it responds in the

same manner as the human eye.

Smoke is visible because it either scatters or attenuates (diminishes) light. In

some instances, smoke is visible because the smoke particles reflect light which

is then detected by the eye. The eye actually "sees" an intensity of light that has

been reflected from a cloud of smoke particles. Imagine shining a flashlight into

a cloud of smoke. Someone off to the side can actually "see" the beam of light as

it traverses the smoke cloud. This is called scattering. Smoke is also visible because it attenuates light. Imagine having someone shine a flashlight into your eyes.

As smoke begins to build up along the beam of the flashlight, the light begins to

dim. The smoke is visible because it is now reducing the intensity of light that

falls upon the eye. As the smoke level increases, it is said to obscure our visibility.

When the beam is no longer visible, the smoke obscuration is said to be 100%. In

other words, none of the light energy from the flashlight makes its way through the

cloud of smoke. Another way of saying that the obscuration is 100% is to say that

the transmission of light through the cloud is zero.
117

D ' 1

L log 1T

Although it is possible to measure the light that is scattered by smoke, most

studies usually measure the amount of light that is transmitted through a cloud

of smoke. There are three basic reasons for measuring light transmissions rather

than the amount of light that is scattered. First, the intensity of scattered light

depends on many factors, such as the size of the smoke particles, the angle at

which one measures the scattered light relative to the direction of the light beam,

and also the attenuation of the scattered light in the space between the beam and

the light detector. Second, the amount that smoke obscures light is a direct

measure of a visibility hazard. Obscuration by smoke is one hazard that is

clearly evident in mines. Imagine a 100-watt lightbulb 3 m away. If the smoke

is dense enough so that the effective power of the bulb is only 1 watt, then the

obscuration would be 99%. If the cloud of smoke is so dense that obscuration

is total, then it becomes impossible to see. Smoke from an unwanted fire that

reaches this level of obscuration represents a critical, life-threatening situation

because it becomes impossible to use one's eyes to escape. Finally, the

measurement of light transmission allows for characterization of smoke by a

single parameter. This parameter is called the "optical density" and is derived

from the amount of light that is transmitted (T), at a given intensity, through a

smoke cloud over some path length (L):

Optical density is used to assess hazards of smoke and levels of detectability.

It is important to remember that this transmission is measured using a light

detector that matches the response of the human eye.

Smoke Hazards, Visibility in Smoke,

and Human Response in Smoke

The chemical composition of smoke particles depends, in part, on the

material that is burning. Some materials may produce gas, or gases that attach

to smoke particles, which can cause the eye to tear, even at moderate levels of

obscuration. Smoke from a fire is also breathed into the lungs, where some of

the smoke is deposited before it can be exhaled. The smoke and its chemical

composition can irritate the respiratory system and also contain elevated levels

of toxic gases or compounds that attach to the smoke particles. All of these

effects are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify because of the many

combustibles that can burn and produce adverse effects.

Several studies have been conducted to assess the effect of smoke on

humans, especially with regard to ability to escape from smoke-filled environments. Jin [1981] reported the results of a series of studies that investigated emotional instability of individuals in smoke from fires. Using human
118

subjects, Jin measured both physiological and psychological response to smoke

produced from smoldering wood that was uniformly introduced and dispersed

throughout a test room. For the experiments, individuals were seated one at a

time at a table in a test room with a floor area of 5 by 4 m (16.4 by 13.1 ft), with

no windows and one door. At the table, each person was asked to manipulate a

steadiness tester which consisted of a metal plate with four holes of graduated

sizes, and a metal stylus. Both of these devices were connected to recording instruments. Each person was told to thrust the stylus into the holes in a specific

order, but trying not to touch the sides of the holes with the stylus. The smaller

the diameter of the hole, the harder the subject had to concentrate to avoid

contacting the sides of the hole. After completing one cycle of operating the

steadiness tester, which required about 30 seconds, each person stood up from

the chair, walked to the other side of the room, pushed a button switch located

on another table, and then walked back to the table on which the steadiness tester

was located. The button switch ensured that test subjects walked to the other

end of the room after each cycle. Each person walked a total distance of approximately 10 m (33 ft).

In the experiment, Jin divided subjects into two groups. The first group,

composed largely of fellow researchers, received a pretest briefing in which

individuals were made familiar with the layout of the test room and were also

informed that the smoke being used was harmless. The second group, which

constituted subjects from the general public, was placed in the test room without

being familiarized with the area or informed of the smoke's nontoxicity. For

both groups, few individuals had previous experience with exposure to smoke

from fire.

Jin noted that as the smoke density increased, fear of the smoke coupled with

irritations of the eyes and throat impeded individuals' ability to concentrate on

the task of operating the steadiness tester. This resulted in increased frequency

of contacts between the stylus and edges of the holes. Human response levels

were correlated with the optical density of the smoke produced by assessing the

number of stylus contacts on the steadiness tester.

Results indicated that, for the general public, most individuals began to experience emotional effects when the smoke optical density reached 0.044 m-1.

In contrast, most subjects in the group of researchers began to show emotional

fluctuation at smoke densities of 0.15 to 0.24 m-1. It is interesting to note that,

while all individuals were told they would be advised when they could leave the

test room, 15 people out of the general population group fled the room to escape

the smoke before their test run was completed and prior to the smoke density

reaching 0.22 m-1.

Following these experiments, some of the participants were interviewed

regarding their experience. Jin generalized the comments for the general public

test subjects as follows:
119

Smoke itself didn't scare me much when it was thin...irritation to the

eyes and throat made me nervous, and when I thought of the smoke

getting still thicker...I was suddenly scared of what's going to happen

next.

Jin concluded that the data from these individuals could be treated as being equal

to data that would be obtained from a group of people who are unfamiliar with

the internal layout of a building.

 Among subjects from the group of researchers, most individuals became

more anxious about physiological factors such as throat and eye irritation rather

than the psychological element. As mentioned by one participant, "When I got

the signal to end the test, irritation and suffocation were near the limit I could

physiologically stand." Jin concluded that—

1. For a person unfamiliar with the escapeways and exits of a building,

that individual's ability to escape safely from a fire within that building is

severely reduced when the smoke optical density exceeds 0.066 m-1.

2. If an individual is familiar with the escapeways and exits of a building,

that person's ability to escape safely is severely reduced when the smoke optical

density exceeds 0.22 m-1.

During these tests, the levels of CO were continuously measured, reaching

a peak value of 50 ppm at the end of each test (D . 0.305 m-1), which equates to

an optical density/CO ratio (D/CO) of 6.10 × 10-3 (ppm@m)-1. At these levels of

optical density, smoke obscuration is severe enough to reduce visibility to near

zero levels. For instance, at D = 0.066 m-1, the range of visibility is about 13 m

(42.5 ft) while at D = 0.22 m-1, it is approximately 4 m (13 ft). Because of this,

Jin referred to these optical densities as critical values at which the smoke

becomes untenable due to the total impact of the smoke on the human response,

which includes reduction in visibility and other physiological and psychological

effects.

Other studies have chiefly focused on visibility in an effort to determine

critical limits for optical density in smoke. Rasbash [1975] conducted experiments in which subjects, wearing breathing apparatus, focused headlamps that

were held waist-high on a target. The target was a black letter "C" on a white

background. As smoke was introduced, visibility values were recorded based

on individuals' ability to see the target. Rasbash concluded that the visibility

limit in smoke occurs at an optical density value of 0.08 m-1, which corresponds

to a distance of about 10 m (33 ft). Babrauskas [1979] studied escape from

rooms containing burning furniture. Because of the short travel distance used

in these experiments, Babrauskas used an optical density of 0.5 m-1 as an obscurity criterion for escape. Heyn [1977] obtained similar results when
120

measuring the relation between smoke density and visibility at the Tremonia

Experimental Mine in Germany. For these experiments, Heyn conducted tests

using small conveyor belt fires which resulted in visibilities of only a few

decimeters.

Miners' Emotional and Physiological Experiences in Smoke

Miners who escaped the three mine fires experienced psychological and

physiological effects similar to those noted by Jin [1981], as well as visibility

problems like those noted by Heyn [1977] and others. One analysis of the data

revealed that a number of workers experienced trouble wearing their SCSRs

[Brnich et al. 1992]. Twenty-nine of the miners who escaped these fires (63%)

reported having difficulty breathing with their SCSRs, largely because they were

unfamiliar with how an SCSR worked. As a result, 27 of the 29 said they either

took the mouthpiece out to catch a breath or "breathed around" the mouthpiece

in smoke.

Many of the miners interviewed at each of the three mines had some prior

experience in dealing with fires underground. Often, though, these fires were

small ones, such as equipment cable fires, hot belt rollers, or hot trolley wire

hangers along the haulage. These types of fires generate heavy smoke in some

cases, but rarely result in the need for miners to escape through smoke-filled

entries. Consequently, many of the miners who were caught inby the three fires

had never escaped through smoke.

Most of the miners who escaped the fires at Adelaide and Cokedale Mines

were unfamiliar with the escapeways leading from their working sections.

About 3 weeks before the fire at Adelaide, the company realigned section crews

in an attempt to boost morale and improve productivity. Many miners were

assigned to sections they had never worked on before. As a result, a number of

these reassigned workers had not been given an opportunity to walk the escapeways from 1 Right, 2 Northwest, and 3 Left sections in order to become

familiar with them.

Personnel caught inby the fire at Cokedale Mine worked on a maintenance

shift and were not assigned to any particular section. On the night of this fire,

these miners were in the process of setting up a new production section in 8 Face

Parallels or doing maintenance work in 7 Butt. All individuals were working in

an area of the mine with which most were unfamiliar, and, like miners at Adelaide, many of them were not familiar with the escapeways leading from this

area of the mine. Unlike workers at the other two mines, miners who escaped

the Brownfield Mine fire were working on their regular sections and knew their

escapeways, but chose alternative routes in an attempt to elude heavy smoke.

As mentioned earlier, Jin [1981] concluded that a person's ability to escape

by an unfamiliar route is severely reduced when the smoke optical density
121

equates to a sight distance of about 42 ft. Persons familiar with escapeways

have their ability hampered when the smoke optical density equates to about

13 ft of visibility. Based on Jin's findings, it is reasonable to expect that miners

who were not familiar with their escapeways would have been at a disadvantage

compared to those who knew the travel routes. However, individuals who escaped the mine fires reported visibility distances that were often far below those

calculated from Jin's results. Consequently, familiarity with escapeways did not

necessarily help miners navigate, due to the overall poor visibility. Visibility

distances estimated by workers ranged from less than 2 ft in primary escapeways, track and belt entries (mean 7.3 ft) to as much as 60 ft in return

airways (mean 47.5 ft). In addition, some miners did not expect the smoke they

encountered to be as thick as it was. A wireman, who was moving a power

center in 7 Butt at Cokedale Mine when the fire occurred, described his

experience:

I didn't expect it to be that thick...they show you movies, you can get

down on your hands and knees and crawl out. I don't think you could do

that...you could see it coming right off the runaround.

Miners characterized smoke in various ways by both its color and thickness.

In areas where the smoke was lighter, a worker described it as having a bluishgray color and being "like...more just like a filtering smoke." Another miner,

traveling with his crew through a return airway, said he could see about 30 to

40 ft and that walking through the smoke was like walking through a light fog.

Other workers, however, encountered thick, heavy smoke as they escaped. Two

miners described the thickness of the smoke they encountered. A utilityman

from Adelaide Mine said:

You couldn't see...it was just like, I'll tell you what it reminded you of...

like riding in behind...a bulk duster for rock dusting.

Another utilityman, also from Adelaide Mine, was traveling with his buddies

through the secondary escapeway located in the right-side return aircourse of

3 Left. When they reached an overcast where the return crossed the intake, the

group encountered heavy smoke:

 I walked up there to the overcast and I stepped right into it. And it was

like a black wall. It was like burning 50 tires and trying to walk through

it...and I said, "We can't go that way." So we walked out and there was

some—I know there was doors in those overcasts. I said, "The intake's

here someplace. All we've got to do is find it." And you'd open up the

door and it'd just billow out; and you'd open another door and it would
122

billow out...we opened up [one] door, it looked like it was a black river

running by. That's how thick it was.

A miner from Brownfield Mine could not find the mandoor in a stopping

because of the thick smoke:

The [stopping] was probably on the other side of these props, but

I couldn't see it. I couldn't even see the door, that's how thick it was.

I put my hands out...and I couldn't see the end of my fingers.

For miners escaping in heavy smoke, navigating through the mine was difficult because of the poor visibility. At Brownfield Mine, the smoke was so

heavy that a foreman actually walked into the belt structure while attempting to

make his way to the other side of 6 West mains to check for fresh air in the No. 7

intake:

So I went out through this door, and I'll tell you the smoke's so thick

right here I walked into the belt. I couldn't see it.

Regardless of whether they followed designated escapeways or not, miners

used various (and in some cases highly creative) means to keep themselves

together to prevent becoming separated and to navigate through the smoke.

Workers escaping from the 7 Butt section at Cokedale Mine held on to one

another as they attempted to stay together while crossing through the track entry

to get into the return:

Smoke was coming on the tracks, we reentered on the tracks there by the

spray pump, smoke was real bad we had to hang on to each, one another

like a bunch of elephants.

To guide themselves, miners escaping through smoke followed objects they

encountered in the mine entries, such as stopping lines, rows of props, old track,

and water lines. At Adelaide, the 1 Right crew was led out by a utilityman who

was a former fire boss. He led his buddies down the left return airway of old

8 Left to the 2 Northwest left return and then continued outby. For the entire

distance, the utilityman followed the stopping line located between the intake

and return entries knowing that, by keeping the stoppings on the left, his crew

would be less likely to make a wrong turn. A maintenance foreman and mechanic, working in the 6 West section of Brownfield Mine, were following the primary escapeway from the section. Hoping that there would be lighter smoke in

the secondary escapeway, the two miners, along with a State electrical inspector,

went through a door into the left-side return aircourse. Although the group
123

encountered moderate to heavy smoke in the return, the foreman knew that the

return airway would lead them directly past the fire area. The foreman, therefore, decided to continue traveling in the return, since he could follow a row of

posts in this entry to guide himself. "I mean, the return is double-timbered.

I just stayed between the props and went." The crew from the 5 South section

at Brownfield Mine also traveled through the 6 West left return and used the

props to guide themselves:

We just stayed—we knew that the return went straight down because

we'd walked it before. So we just stayed in the 6-foot walkway between

the posts, and more or less we were walking from overcast to overcast.

 A group of miners who were escaping from the 8 Face Parallels at Cokedale

used a unique method to help them find their way. The crew, being led by a general inside laborer (GIL), made their way to the secondary escapeway located in

the right return aircourse of 8 Face. Because the escapeway followed entries

that were mined more than 35 years earlier, the passageways had deteriorated.

Miners had to cross over roof falls and contend with low clearances due to floor

heave and low crossbars. Although the escapeway was marked with reflective

signs, miners reported that it was difficult to see them due to the heavy smoke

and the fact they had to bend over to walk. To more easily navigate through the

escapeway in the smoke, the GIL who led his buddies from the 8 Face Parallels

area did not try to follow the reflective markings in the escapeway. He instead

followed the footprints left by fire bosses who had conducted prior hazard

examinations of the area, knowing that the footprints would lead him out of the

mine:

As you're walkin', you're not walkin' on a—you're goin' up and down

crawlin' [over falls] this and that—people were, you hear people goin'

"ow, ow" hit their head...And I just kept lookin' at the ground and

lookin' at footprints and I did catch I did see footprints. Reason I say

I was lookin' at footprints and not the signs was why keep bangin' your

head needlessly. If you can't see 2 feet, how are you gonna possibly see

that sign—I don't care whether it is red or green, you can't see it. The

footprint is the closest thing to you that also meant to me—these

[returns] have to be walked periodically. When I see footprints, I felt

better. Somebody was through there already there is only one set goin'

out. So chances are that if there was a return set of footprints, I would

think somebody had to turn around because it's blocked. Being there

was only one set, there's got to be an opening up ahead somewhere.
124

While some miners had the "luxury" of being able to follow markers or other

objects to guide themselves out of the mine, the smoke was so thick in some

cases that miners could not follow objects visually. Instead, they had to feel

their way along in places in order to find their way out. Miners felt their way

along water lines, posts, the mine's ribs, and other features in order to make their

way to safety. At Brownfield Mine, a Federal mine inspector was escaping with

the crew from 4 South and was part of a group of four miners making their way

off the section by traveling the belt entry. During their escape, the group began

to break up after a miner from the crew started having trouble walking. At this

point, fearing he would run out of oxygen in his SCSR, the inspector left the

group and continued on his own. When he reached the mouth of the section, the

inspector decided to go through a door in an overcast and check the intake

escapeway for smoke. Upon seeing that it was still filled with heavy smoke, he

came back into the belt entry, which also contained heavy smoke, and attempted

to continue his escape. Unable to see, the inspector felt his way along a machine

guard on the belt drive:

The belt drive is entirely guarded with chain link fence...as I come out

of the overcast area, it seemed like the first thing, I reached up as I came

out and the chain link fence was there. I really couldn't see but I just

hand over hand followed the chain link fence so I wouldn't trip on

anything.

In his experiments, Jin [1981] noted that as smoke density increased,

individuals began to fear the smoke and experienced physical irritation as well

as an elevated apprehension that severely hampered their concentration. Miners

who escaped the three mine fires reported psychological and physiological

effects similar to, and in some cases more dramatic than, those experienced by

participants in Jin's experiments. Of the 48 miners interviewed, nearly one-half

of them (48%) reported experiencing some level of emotional instability as they

made their way through the smoke-filled escapeways.

Several miners said that they became frightened when they first encountered

smoke. In some cases, fear of smoke severely hampered miners' ability to concentrate and perform motors tasks such as those associated with donning an

SCSR. The wireman, who had been in the 7 Butt section of Cokedale Mine, was

riding in a jeep with the section boss when they encountered smoke in the 8 Face

track entry:

We were in the jeep, and we hit smoke. I got all scared you know, all,

what the hell we going to do, you know, all this smoke...And I was on

the jeep, and [the boss] said, "Get your SCSRs on." And I...opened

mine up and I was like shakin' like a leaf, couldn't get the damn thing
125

open. And [the boss]...said, "Here, pop this, stick this in your mouth..."

I mean, I couldn't get the damned thing, I was so damned scared I didn't

know what else, I didn't know what the hell to do, you know.

Other miners said they began to fear the smoke when it became thick and

heavy. Apprehension about the smoke caused one of the shuttle car operators

at Adelaide Mine to experience difficulty breathing, even though he was wearing

an SCSR and was protected from the smoke. When his crew encountered heavy

smoke billowing from an overcast that they had to cross at the intersection of

3 Left and 2 Northwest Mains, this miner experienced tremendous anxiety:

We went into that smoke and I couldn't breathe and was gagging on that

self-rescuer. I couldn't breathe any at all...I couldn't go in [that smoke].

I guess it may be psychological or something about being in that smoke

or something. I couldn't breathe at all. In [the smoke] I was gagging but

as soon as I would come out of there, it seemed like I was breathing

better, a little bit better.

Because of his experience, the shuttle car operator chose not to follow his

buddies into the heavy smoke at the overcast. Instead, recognizing where he

was, he decided to follow another route that led him across 2 Northwest Mains

and down the right-side return escapeway to a point outby the fire. This decision

is significant because several of the miner's buddies, believing him to be lost,

risked their lives by going back to the overcast to look for him after everyone

had reached safety.

While some miners became afraid in the smoke, others became confused and

disoriented. This inhibited some miners' ability to think clearly and respond

functionally to the situation. The Federal mine inspector, who escaped from

4 South at Brownfield Mine, had conducted numerous inspections in the sections

off 6 West Mains and was moderately familiar with the layout of that portion of

the mine. Nevertheless, he reported becoming disoriented and confused in the

heavy smoke, especially toward the end of his ordeal as he made his way from

the belt entry to the track:

As soon as I found the crosscut, I went in because I didn't want to miss

it and I went to the end of the crosscut and run into a permanent

stopping. Well, I started looking for the door and it seemed like I was

lost. I wasn't lost but it seemed like I was lost because I got sort of that

feeling, well, I know that door is here but I just couldn't find it.

After getting into the track entry and traveling another crosscut, the inspector

reported seeing lights ahead of him, but he was not sure of their significance
126

"I could see lights ahead of me. I could see these lights...[but] the lights really

didn't mean anything to me."

The 4 South section mechanic was in the same escape group as the Federal

inspector. After the escape group broke up, the mechanic continued traveling

outby along the beltline. Even though the belt entry led directly out of the

section to 6 West mains, the mechanic became confused and disoriented in the

smoke:

I didn't know my way out of there. I lost all orientation how to get out

of there. I knew my way out, but I forgot. It was just a panic thing.

Jin [1981] noted in interviews with test subjects that, as the smoke became

thicker, some individuals became apprehensive as they wondered what would

happen next. Based on these findings from a controlled experiment, it is not

surprising that miners who escaped the fires experienced similar mental anguish

when thoughts of what lay ahead entered their minds. Miners who experienced

emotional instability reported thinking about many different things as they made

their way through the mine. The foreman of the crew escaping from 8 Face

Parallels said, "Your heart's thumping and all kinds of goofy crap's going

through your head." Some miners thoughts turned to their families. A bratticeman who escaped with the crew from 3 Left at Adelaide Mine said he thought

about never seeing his family again: "I kept thinking, I want to get out. I don't

want to die in here, I want to see my wife and kids."

Other miners experienced thoughts of not escaping the fire and dying in the

mine. The shuttle car operator, who left his crew at the overcast to explore

another escape route, said, "I thought I was going to die right there in that

smoke." Several miners said they thought about the Wilberg Mine disaster and

wondered to themselves if they were going to meet the same fate as their fellow

miners did in December 1984:

But what was in everybody's mind was the thing that happened at

Wilberg. Myself, I thought we wasn't going to go, to get out.

And my personal thoughts were that it was a Wilberg disaster, and that's

all that was in my mind.

While some miners only thought about the possibility that they were going

to die in the smoke-filled entries, others had virtually given up hope. After

checking the left-side intake of 6 West Mains at Brownfield Mine and seeing

that it was full of smoke, a roof bolter operator from 5 South made his way back

to where several other miners were waiting:
127

And there was a couple of rock dust guys right there. I sat down with

those rock dust guys and I figured this is where I bunk—this is it. I was

just going to say goodbye to the world. I couldn't see anything.

In another instance, the miner operator from 4 South at Brownfield Mine

reported being also ready to die. He had been evacuating with the section mechanic, the Federal inspector, and another miner. While traveling along the

4 South belt entry, the miner operator experienced great difficulty. He was

having problems breathing with his SCSR, became disoriented and unable to see

in the smoke, and kept falling down in the mud. After falling down for one last

time, and after his buddies had left him, the miner operator gave up:

So I was there by myself and I was down in the mud. I remember just

stopping a couple of times and just, you know, wishing it would get over

with, almost wishing I'd die or something, just to get it over with. It was

a horrible feeling.

It is evident from these accounts that miners experienced great emotional trauma

while escaping through the smoke-filled passageways. In some cases, miners'

ability to concentrate, make informed choices, and take appropriate actions

during their escape was severely hampered by the need to deal with emotional

effects of the smoke.

Besides having to cope with the psychological effects of smoke in their

escape environment, many miners had to contend with physiological elements

as well. Smoke clouds carry CO as well as sensory irritants, both of which are

byproducts of combustion. As mentioned earlier, Jin [1981] measured CO levels

and calculated the ratio of CO to optical density as D/CO. It is worth noting that

the ratio observed by Jin (D/CO = 6.10 × 10-3 (ppm@m)-1) is identical to the value

quoted by Litton [1989] for smoldering wood. Therefore, depending on a

person's familiarity with his or her surroundings during a fire, the levels of CO

that are present when smoke visibility reaches its critical level lies somewhere

between 10 and 35 ppm.

Relationship Between Critical Levels of Smoke and CO

In Jin's experiment, these critical levels of optical density were measured for

wood smoke. Depending on the actual material burning and the resultant characteristics (both physical and chemical) of the smoke produced, these critical

values could increase or decrease. Clearly, a critical level of optical density at

which the range of visibility is reduced to •1 m represents an upper limit. The

range of visibility is defined as the distance at which the light obscuration

exceeds 86% (or, the transmission is less than 0.14). At a 1-m visibility range,
128

the critical level of optical density is 0.92 m-1. This value should be considered

as an absolute maximum value based solely on reduced visibility.

Using the data of Litton for the ratio of CO to smoke optical density, it is

interesting to compare the expected levels of CO that would be present at the

values of optical density equal to 0.22 m-1 (the maximum critical level reported

by Jin) and 0.92 m-1 (the absolute maximum), discussed above. These levels are

shown in table 7.1 for smoldering fires and in table 7.2 for flaming fires.

Data have been acquired in full-scale tests at Lake Lynn Laboratory which

demonstrate the levels of visibility that occur as a function of the CO level. In

these tests (see figure 7.1), placards were placed at fixed distances from a

camera and irradiated by a white light. As time progressed during these tests,

the smoke level increased, eventually obscuring the placards. As these placards

disappeared in the smoke, the levels of CO at the times of their disappearance

were measured.

Figure 7.2 indicates the visibility (in meters) measured as a function of the

CO level (in parts per million). The solid line indicates the level of visibility

predicted from smoldering coal fires, while the dashed line indicates the level

of visibility predicted from flaming coal and styrene-butadiene (SBR) belt fires.

It is important to note that during the large-scale experiments, the initial levels

of CO and smoke come from a smoldering coal fire while the later levels come

from a flaming coal and conveyor belt fire. In figure 7.2, the level of CO at

which the coal fire ceases to smolder and begins to flame is indicated by the

arrow. The importance of these data is apparent: significant reductions in visibility occur at relatively low levels of CO (10-20 ppm).

Table 7.1.—Visibility as a function of CO level in smoldering fires

Combustible ppm CO at

D ' 0.22 m&1

ppm CO at

D ' 0.92 m&1

Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.0 150.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.0 38.0

SBR conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 10.5

PVC conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 12.5

Neoprene conveyor belt . . . . . . . 7.0 29.0

PVC line brattice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.0 46.0

Table 7.2.—Visibility as a function of CO level in flaming fires

Combustible ppm CO at

D ' 0.22 m&1

ppm CO at

D ' 0.92 m&1

Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 234

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 71

SBR conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . 19 79

PVC conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . 42 176

Neoprene conveyor belt . . . . . . . 32 143

Transformer fluid . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 31
129

Figure 7.1.—Depiction of experimental setup in A-drift at Lake Lynn Laboratory.

Figure 7.2.—Visibility measured as a function of CO level.
130

TOX ' ppm CO

1,500

% ppm HCl

100

Þ 1.0

Depending on the material burning, other toxic and irritating elements can

be produced. For conveyor belts, in particular, the generation of HCl vapor due

to chlorine in the belt, as either a component of the base polymer or as an additive to make the belt more flame-resistant, is an example of such an irritant and

also represents a potential toxic hazard in addition to the CO produced. Smith

and Kuchta [1973] have measured the levels of HCl and CO produced from

flaming SBR and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) conveyor belts. They found that the

ppm of HCl is equal to 0.105 times the ppm of CO for SBR belts and 0.205

times the ppm of CO for PVC belts. Similarly, for smoldering conveyor belts,

Egan [1992] finds that the ppm of HCl is 0.30 times the ppm of CO for SBR

belts; 0.40 for PVC belts; and 1.0 for neoprene belts.

For CO, the level quoted as being immediately dangerous to life and health

(IDLH) is 1,500 ppm; for HCl, 100 ppm [Mackinson et al. 1980]. If one uses

these numbers as critical values and assumes them to be additive, then a toxic

environment is produced downstream of a fire when the following condition is

satisfied:

Using the levels of HCl produced relative to the CO, tables 7.1 and 7.2 can be

used to generate values of TOX at the indicated levels of smoke optical density.

These are shown in tables 7.3 and 7.4.

Table 7.3.—Values of toxicity at indicated levels of optical density in smoldering fires

Combustible TOX at

D ' 0.22 m&1

TOX at

D ' 0.92 m&1

Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.024 0.100

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.006 0.025

SBR conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.009 0.038

PVC conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.014 0.059

Neoprene conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.075 0.313

Table 7.4.—Values of toxicity at indicated levels of optical density in flaming fires

Combustible TOX at

D ' 0.22 m&1

TOX at

D ' 0.92 m&1

Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.037 0.155

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.011 0.046

SBR conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.033 0.138

PVC conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.114 0.476

Transformer fluid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.005 0.021
131

Only a flaming PVC conveyor belt produces toxic products of CO and HCl

to such an extent that the combustion products begin to pose a severe toxic

hazard. This occurs at the maximum allowable level of optical density. It is

clear from tables 7.3 and 7.4 that the presence of smoke poses a more severe

impediment to survivability and eventual escape from fire than the toxicity of the

gases produced.

It is interesting to note several subjective observations regarding smoke

irritation made by Kissell and Litton [1992] during a conveyor belt fire test. In

levels up to 40 ppm CO, test subjects experienced some labored breathing and

mild eye irritation. When CO levels reached 80 ppm, individuals experienced

hard breathing and stinging of the eyes. At 160 ppm CO, subjects found it very

difficult to breathe and reported severe eye irritation. Participants also stated

that they could barely see. These results indicate that severe sensory irritation

can occur at CO levels below those that would cause carboxyhemoglobin danger.

Experiencing Smoke Density and Physical Discomforts

The studies reported here indicate that smoke density and the physical irritants produced pose a greater threat to escaping miners than the levels of CO

and other gases, which do not reach toxic levels when the critical optical density

is reached. In the three mine fires, however, some miners could have been in

danger had CO levels been high enough. The reason is that most of the miners

who escaped did not really understand the dangers that combustion products can

pose. Miners were asked if they thought about the presence of CO during their

escape. One miner provided his thoughts:

Well, the way I was thinking, we was on the intake side...and was just

starting to get some smoke. When we went in the return, it wasn't even

heavy as that, so why worry—you know what I mean—as long as you

can't see the smoke.

Although research has shown that the levels of CO and HCl do not appear

to always reach toxic levels in thick smoke, a number of miners reported

experiencing moderate to severe physiological effects, particularly sensory

irritation. Slightly more than one-third (34.8%) of the miners who escaped said

they experienced various problems such as choking, coughing, and eye irritation.

Some miners said that they traveled barefaced through smoke before donning

their SCSR and subsequently inhaled smoke. A mechanic at Cokedale, escaping

with his buddies from 8 Face Parallels, described his experience with smoke

inhalation:

 The section was really starting to fill with smoke, I had never had such

a dry mouth or throat; it's almost like you could spit dust. I mean it's so
132

dry, that's the one thing I remember vividly. And at that point, the

smoke had started to uh, to overcome me. I was choking, coughing, and

gagging and at that point, I took it upon myself to use my small [filter

self-] rescuer.

Some miners experienced eye irritation from particulates in the smoke.

A trackman who escaped from 7 Face at Cokedale said, "My eyes were affected

somewhat. They were extremely red when I got outside."

It is understandable why miners experienced emotional instability during

their escape through smoke from these fires. However, one might question why

more than one-third experienced physiological problems since miners would

have been offered respiratory protection from either their SCSR or FSR and eye

protection from the goggles contained in their SCSR. These problems are easily

explained: besides removing the mouthpiece to breathe, as mentioned earlier,

nearly 48% of the miners who escaped also took the mouthpiece out in smoke

to talk. Subsequently, miners inhaled smoke and various contaminants which

caused them to experience breathing discomfort. The interviews also revealed

that few miners wore the goggles supplied with their SCSR to protect their eyes.

Many of the miners said that the goggles fogged quickly and hampered their

vision. As a result, more than 63% of the escaping miners said they did not wear

the goggles for that reason.

One of the most interesting problems that affected miners' emotional

stability during escape was the unanticipated presence of smoke in certain areas

of the mine. Ventilation systems can be extremely complex and made up of four

or more air shafts, tens of miles of aircourses, and hundreds of stoppings and

overcasts. This is especially true in large, older mines such as Adelaide, Brownfield, and Cokedale, where air must travel several miles from an intake shaft

through intake entries to the working sections and back to the shaft via return

aircourses. Where air must traverse such considerable distances through older

aircourses, excessive air loss is common. Depending on the mine, it is not unusual to lose between 30% and 50% of the air before it ever reaches the working

sections [Mosgrove 1981; Stefanko 1983].

Air loss is due to a variety of reasons, including frictional resistance in the

aircourses and leakage across stoppings and overcasts. In a mine fire, air leakage across ventilation devices can result in significant amounts of smoke making

its way into escapeways and other entries. To demonstrate, a U.S. Bureau of

Mines investigation by Litton et al. [1991] studied the detection of conveyor

fires. For this experiment, researchers placed a pile of coal beneath a section of

SBR belt. Air velocity in the test tunnel, designed to simulate a single mine

entry, was 10 m/sec (200 fpm), while the air quantity was 7.6 m3

/sec (16,000

cfm). Researchers then monitored combustion products in the air 20 m (65 ft)

downstream as the pile of coal smoldered, burst into flame, and then set the SBR

belt on fire. Data obtained from this study were then used to calculate
133

Ce ' Cf

QL

Qe % QL

,

contaminant and visibility levels, resulting from air leakage across stoppings, in

a hypothetical escapeway that might be located adjacent to an entry containing

a fire [Kissell and Litton 1992]. These calculations reflect conditions

60 minutes into the fire. The concentration of contaminants in the escapeway

(Ce) was determined using the dilution equation:

where Cf

 is the contaminant concentration in the fire entry, QL is the quantity of

air leakage, and Qe is the quantity of air in the adjacent escapeway. Assuming

a Qe of 9.4 m3

/sec (20,000 cfm) in the escapeway, a CO concentration (Cf) of

2,700 ppm in the fire entry, and a QL of 0.94 m3

/sec (2,000 cfm) across the

stopping line, a CO concentration of 245 ppm was calculated for the escapeway.

A similar calculation was performed to determine the optical density in the

adjacent escapeway. Using the optical density value, a visibility of 0.3 m (1 ft)

was calculated. These results indicate that visibility reaches minimum acceptable limits at relatively low leakage levels.

The reason an unanticipated presence of smoke helped elevate workers'

apprehensiveness is that miners tended to have certain predisposed beliefs about

how the ventilation system should function and, consequently, where the smoke

should be encountered under "normal" conditions. In a normal situation, fresh

air comes into the mine via the intake air shaft, traverses the mine entries to the

section, sweeps the faces, and then makes its way back to the upcast air shaft via

the return aircourses. Ideally, air flow should occur with no air leakage across

stoppings and overcasts, provided all ventilation devices are intact and mandoors

are closed. However, minimal leakage is inevitable in any ventilation circuit

regardless of how well stoppings and overcasts are sealed. Typically, a certain

amount of air leakage will occur across mandoors, especially if they are left ajar.

As calculations reported by Kissell and Litton [1992] show, smoke will make

its way across ventilation devices into escapeways and other entries as a result

of leakage.

About 37% of the miners who escaped the fires at the three mines apparently

never considered the fact that air would leak across ventilation devices and

introduce smoke into entries that they assumed should be clear. Surprisingly,

some miners had misconceptions of how the smoke from the fires would travel.

As a result, some groups of workers decided not to continue their escape in the

smoke-filled intake escapeways or track entries and chose instead to move into

the return aircourses, believing that the smoke there would be lighter or nonexistent, since it would have to make its way to the faces before reaching the

return entries. A continuous miner operator at Adelaide Mine, who was

escaping with his crew from 1 Right section, elaborated on his crews' decision:
134

Then if you have smoke in your intake, we were always taught to get

into your return, and then keep checking until you see clear intake. So

we got in our left return. There was no smoke because it hadn't reached

up to the face and come back down the return.

At least one miner thought that by getting into the return, he and his crew would

be safe, again because of a belief that any smoke in the intake must travel to the

faces:

 We started in the intake escapeway, yeah. And whoever's decision it

was, I don't know, because when we hit smoke, we decided it was time

to get in the return because we figured all the smoke would have to go

up to the unit or the face and come down behind us. So we're clear and

out of all danger.

When miners encountered smoke in areas where they did not expect it, they

began wondering how the smoke got there. A bolter operator described his

thoughts:

 I think that was the thing that threw a lot of us off was when we came

to the return, we hit the smoke on the haulage, we went over and we hit

smoke in the belt entry, we got over into the return and it was still pretty

clear. Because we went down 10 or more blocks, 15 blocks, whatever.

That's when we starting hitting smoke [again]. Now, we got smoke in

all, all the escapeways, you know. What is wrong?

In some cases, miners who became emotionally distressed assumed the worst

when they encountered unexplained smoke. A utilityman quickly surmised that

the fire had burned completely across the section when his crew hit smoke in the

return:

We were in the return by then and it was filled up with smoke and

I knew we were in serious trouble then, we had a long way to go and we

were already full of smoke...At that time, I couldn't get through my mind

how we had smoke in the return escapeway that quick. I said, what did

it do, burn all the way across and we don't have any way out now?

In fact, there were plausible explanations why smoke was being found

unexpectedly in various locations at the three mines. As mentioned in an earlier

chapter, a large quantity of air was being used to ventilate the 2 Northwest belt

entry at Adelaide. Because this was a high-pressure entry, vast quantities of air

quickly leaked across ventilation devices into adjacent intake and track entries,

especially between the fire location and the mouth of 3 Left. As a result,
135

significant amounts of smoke bled into these adjacent entries and eventually into

the returns. This explains why the crews escaping encountered heavy smoke in

all entries including the returns.

Several crews who escaped the fire at Brownfield Mine experienced similar

situations, encountering smoke unexpectedly. Knowing that the beltline was on

a separate split of intake air, miners escaping from the 5 South section decided

to follow the belt, believing they would have clear air all the way out. When

they encountered smoke in the belt entry, however, miners became concerned:

We started down the belt because we figured the belt should have been

neutral, really, but by the time we got there, the smoke was already on

the belt line...we still can't figure out how the smoke got on the belt.

Nobody—our boss can't figure out how the smoke got on the belt line.

We should have been able to go down and get out the belt.

Misunderstandings about where smoke should be was not confined to rank-andfile miners. The mine inspector who escaped with the 4 South crew at Brownfield had a similar misconception. Knowing that smoke was already in the

intake escapeway, the inspector checked the belt entry and found it to be clear.

The section foreman, after conferring with the inspector, decided to take his

crew down the beltline. All the while, the inspector thought the belt entry would

be clear for the entire distance: "I really believed that the belt entry would be

clear the entire way."

Some individuals, though, did think about why they were encountering

smoke in certain locations and reasoned what was causing the problem. The

mine inspector who escaped from 4 South at Brownfield Mine hypothesized later

that a mandoor had to have been left open for there to be thick smoke in the belt

entry:

To this day we really didn't conclusively come up with an answer why

that belt got contaminated. We checked the [stoppings]. I understand

[stoppings] do leak somewhat but not to go from no smoke to thick

heavy smoke in a matter of minutes. [Stoppings] don't leak that much.

Someone left the doors open into that belt, also. I believe it.

At least one miner at Brownfield Mine was thinking clearly about why there was

so much smoke in the belt entry. He was traveling with his buddies from

5 South:

Thick smoke was in the belt lines before it was in the return...somebody

goofed and opened something and left that air in. My opinion is that

somebody opened the doors right across [4 South] ramp.
136

Finally, some miners at Cokedale Mine were perplexed by the way smoke

"behaved" in the mine air courses, especially the return escapeways. Miners

escaping from 8 Face Parallels were traveling in the return escapeway that led

to Crystal air shaft. The workers noticed that there were points where the heavy

smoke they were traveling in would suddenly lift and the air would become

moderately clear. The miners might then travel several crosscuts in this clearer

air until they encountered heavy smoke once again. A mechanic who was in the

group escaping from 8 Face Parallels describes this occurrence:

We headed out the return and we had gotten so far and it cleared a little

bit, and we were kinda relieved, but then for some reason we hit the

thick smoke again. It didn't clear completely but it looked like it was

gonna clear, but then we went a few more blocks and it got real thick

again. Why it was clear in that area I'm not really sure.

Because the smoke behaved in this manner, miners experienced a false sense of

security when they reached the clearer air, only to find that the heavy smoke

would return as they continued their egress. This undoubtedly helped to increase

workers' anxiety as they escaped from the mine.

Discussion

Research on human behavior in smoke has shown that (1) people not familiar with escapeways tend to experience higher levels of emotional instability,

and their ability to escape from a fire is severely reduced when the visibility falls

below 13 m and (2) subjects familiar with escapeways experience relatively

more problems with physiological effects of smoke, and their escape ability becomes hampered when the visibility falls below 4 m. Fire research data indicate

that smoke reaches levels of untenability significantly earlier than it takes the

fire to generate a toxic environment due to its product gases. It is only when the

levels of smoke begin to totally obscure visibility that the toxicity of the combustion products begins to play a role in the question of escape and survivability.

Most of the miners who were caught inby the fires discussed here had never

escaped through smoke. As a result, a number of workers experienced emotional

instability that resulted from the need to cope with smoke in their escapeways.

The psychological effects of smoke, in some instances, inhibited workers' ability

to think clearly, make correct choices, and take proper action during their

escape. In addition to suffering emotional upset during their escape, a number

of miners also experienced some physiological effects of smoke, including

smoke inhalation and eye irritation. In short, miners' ordeals in smoke when

escaping mine fires confirm the findings of the research.
137

While underground miners must receive retraining annually on topics

including mine ventilation, escapeways, emergency evacuation, and the use of

SCSRs, it is evident that workers who escaped these three mine fires still were

not adequately prepared to escape through smoke. In the future, mine operators

may wish to consider offering smoke training to their workers as part of their

annual retraining regime. Miners could don an SCSR training apparatus and

then traverse a manmade network of corridors filled with nontoxic smoke. This

type of training would allow miners to practice escaping through a smoke-filled

environment, plus experience breathing through an SCSR.

References

Babrauskas V [1979]. Full-scale burning behavior of burning chairs. Washington, DC:

National Bureau of Standards, Technical note 1103.

Brnich MJ Jr., Vaught C, Mallett LG [1992]. SCSR proficiency requires hands-on practice.

Coal July:52-54.

Egan MR [1992]. Smoke, carbon monoxide, and hydrogen chloride production from the

pyrolysis of conveyor belting and brattice cloth. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior,

Bureau of Mines, IC 9304.

Heyn W [1977]. Underground measurement of smoke density at the Tremonia experimental

mine in order to determine visibility in fire gases. In: Proceedings of the 17th International

Conference of Safety in Mines Research Institutes (Varna, Bulgaria).

Jin T [1991]. Studies of emotional instability in smoke from fires. J Fire and Flammability

12:130-142.

Kissell FN, Litton CD [1992]. How smoke hinders escape from coal mine fires. Mining Eng

Jan:79-82.

Litton CD [1989]. Relationships between smoke and carbon monoxide and their implication

toward improved mine fire detection. In: Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference of

Safety in Mines Research Institutes (Washington, DC, September 11-15, 1989). Pittsburgh, PA:

U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, pp. 77-82.

Litton CD, Lazzara CP, Perzak FJ [1991]. Fire detection for conveyor belt entries. U.S.

Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, RI 9380.

Mackinson FW, Stricoff RS, Partridge LJ Jr. [1980]. Pocket guide to chemical hazards.

Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers

for Disease Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH)

Publication No. 78-210.

Mosgrove JH [1981]. Ventilation and dust control. In: Crickmer D, Zegeer D, eds. Elements

of practical coal mining. Littleton, CO: Society of Mining Engineers, pp. 273-294.

Smith AF, Kuchta JM [1973]. Toxic products from burning of fire-resistant materials. Pittsburgh, PA: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, technical progress report (TPR) 66.

Stefanko R [1983]. Coal mining technology theory and practice. Littleton, CO: Society of

Mining Engineers.
138

CHAPTER 8.—WAYFINDING AND ESCAPE BEHAVIOR

The notion of wayfinding, as conceptualized by planners, geographers, and

psychologists, denotes the ability of an individual to move from one point to

another through physical space. In order to achieve this movement, a person

relies on a cognitive map of spatial representations [Passini 1984]. Which

features of this cognitive mapping will be stressed depend, in part, on the researcher's perspective. A planner, for instance, would tend to emphasize the

effect of physical structures on mobility. A psychologist, on the other hand,

might focus on individual differences in how human minds encompass and

represent physical space [Evans et al. 1984]. There is yet another dimension to

wayfinding that needs consideration, and it rests upon the idea that reality, as

experienced by human beings, is mediated: "[People] have preselected and

preinterpreted this world by a series of commonsense constructs...which help

them find their bearings in their natural and socio-cultural environment and to

come to terms with it" [Schutz 1967].

These "common sense constructs" are arrived at socially and constitute the

agreed-upon schemas that guide people's everyday activities. According to this

principle, cognition is governed by some nonlogical factors that reflect not only

individual procedures but collective ones as well. These group strategies, which

are shaped by shared rules and values, influence "the information gathered, the

ways it is processed, the inferences that are drawn, the options that are being

considered, and those that are finally chosen" [Etzioni 1992]. From this perspective, cognitive maps, rather than being individual-centered templates of

environmental images [Rovine and Weisman 1989] or representations of spatial

relationships [Evans 1980], are partially group-centered schematic processes.

As such, they are subject to reinterpretation, revision, and outside intervention

[Kaplan and Kaplan 1982].

As intermediaries between the environment and behavior, cognitive maps

serve as bases for decision-making. Traditionally, it has been assumed that good

maps facilitate correct decisions, which in turn leads to optimal performance

during wayfinding [Hunt 1984]. Given the argument that there is a social (noncognitive) facet to cognitive mapping, however, this image of a cognitive map

as some sort of static reference construct that motivates individual action is too

narrow and mechanistic. If cognition involves less a knowledge of the environment than it does the process of "giving it meaning through imposing an order

on it" [Rapoport 1976], then wayfinding behavior is not just a function of setting

and individual differences, but is also a function of one's "normative-affective"

structure [Etzioni 1992].

Rapoport [1976] used such an assumption as the base for a set of hypotheses

about the connection between "external demands" and "organismic factors."

One significant assertion deriving from Rapoport's ideas is that environmental
139

knowing, the way people order their spatial world and act within it, is partially

dependent on "cultural habit." Camic [1992], citing the 19th century French sociologist Emile Durkheim, underscored this function of cultural habit by noting

that as long as an equilibrium exists between the environment and individual

dispositions, action takes place without much reflection. That is because humans behave habitually. Furthermore, these habits are external to the individual

since they are a product of socialization, and constrain people by imposing

customary practices upon them.

An interesting implication becomes apparent at this point. Just as there are

supposed to be individual characteristics of spatial representations, there ought

to be cultural ones as well. In other words, every social group will share some

distinct cognitive categories that help its members order the world conceptually.

While these "noticeable differences" [Rapoport 1976] may be more pronounced

between a simple society and an industrial nation, it is logical to assume that a

certain amount of taxonomic differentiation will also exist within a populace.

Even researchers who do not engage in cross-cultural comparisons can still

contribute to a greater understanding of wayfinding behavior by focusing on the

immediate cultural context within which spatial problems are defined and

solved. This chapter intends to make such a contribution, while examining escape activities during the three underground coal mine fires that are the subject

of this book.

The Mine as an Ecological System

In effect, coal miners spend their working days encapsulated in a gigantic

maze that may lie a thousand feet below the Earth's surface. The floor of this

maze is composed of fire clay, its walls are unmined coal, and the ceiling is

made up of slate or shale. The height of a particular coal seam determines if

workers must crawl from place to place or whether they will be able to stand

upright and move around freely. Seam heights vary from less than 3 ft at one

operation to 12 ft (or more) at another. In either instance, workers' environs are

well-defined and rigidly bounded. This section contains a discussion of how the

process of extracting coal and the culture miners have created helps them make

sense of this environment.

Because underground coal mines are dangerous, rules have been promulgated to help support and protect workers. For instance, Federal regulations

(30 CFR 75) require that a routine communication system be installed in each

mine. This system must include a telephone (or some other two-way device)

connecting the surface with each working section. The regulations also mandate

installation of automatic fire warning devices on each underground belt

conveyor. These devices must furnish audible and visual signals at either of two

locations: (1) all work areas where miners may be endangered or (2) a staffed
140

location at which personnel have an assigned post and there is telephone or

similar communication with all workers underground who may be endangered.

Finally, the Federal code stipulates that underground operations have to maintain

separate and distinct passages, to be designated as escapeways, which are

properly marked by reflective signs and symbols. There must be at least two of

these travelable escapeways, one of which is to be ventilated with intake air,

extending from each working section to the mine's opening.

While formal rules are critical, the most immediate source of support and

protection miners have is their workplace culture. Social scientists recognized

early that work groups share some sort of informal structure, but have agreed on

neither its coherence nor overall importance [Roethlisberger and Dickson 1947;

Roy 1953; Stoddard 1968; Bryant 1972; Schwartzman 1986]. It has been argued

by those studying dangerous occupations, however, that a rather cohesive body

of beliefs, values, and behavioral norms exists in risky work settings. Furthermore, these cultural elements function to increase certainty of action by

subordinating individual will in order to realize larger group objectives [Hayner

1945; Janis 1968; Fitzpatrick 1974; McCarl 1976; Vaught and Smith 1980;

Smith and Vaught 1988]. These arguments are supported by the work of Kaplan

and Kaplan [1982], who pointed out that any culture, in order to be viable, must

be a mechanism for coping. The three avenues through which culture should

provide a template for individual cognition, according to Kaplan and Kaplan, are

(1) relating people to ecological constraints in their environment, (2) guiding

interpersonal behavior by enabling one to anticipate his or her cohort's likely

actions in a particular situation, and (3) orienting members to the larger world

that they might be expected to deal with.

The ecology of an underground coal mine is one in which humans are busily

creating a void beneath the Earth's surface. This act produces dust that is unhealthy, because some of it is respirable and dangerous. Explosive gases are

liberated during the mining process and water may seep in from disturbed

aquifers. Additionally, massive forces brought to bear upon the newly exposed

mine roof and coal pillars present the possibility of cave-ins or floor upheavals.

Men and women work routinely in the face of these hazards, because they can

draw upon a stock of accumulated knowledge intended to help them control such

situations. Mine workers believe that they will be able to grasp both obvious

and subtle cues about changing conditions and take action in time to prevent

mishap, which gives miners a feeling of mastery over their work environment

[Althouse 1974].

Workers underground recognize, of course, that nonroutine events do occur.

This is a major reason why they expend so much effort achieving mastery over

the social domain. An elaborate unwritten normative structure has evolved to

ensure group cooperation and individual predictability in the mine setting. The

details of miners' preoccupation with rules of interpersonal behavior and the
141

ritualistic sanctioning mechanisms they invoke to enforce these norms have been

discussed in other publications [Lucas 1969; Althouse 1974; Fitzpatrick 1976;

Douglass and Krieger 1983; Smith and Vaught 1988]. The point to be made

here is that in this environment, as in others where group survival is problematic,

there is little tolerance for personal aggrandizement. Rather, a lot of concern is

focused on the ideals of shared expectations and coordination of efforts.

The resulting consensus, based on workplace norms, implies that everyone

has approximately the same cognitive map of their underground world. According to Kaplan and Kaplan [1982], such uniformity is of benefit to the

members of any culture because, as they put it, "Sharing and affirmation...lead

to conviction, which in turn reduces...the confusing." This type of arrangement

is especially functional in coal mining, where section crews must labor as

cohesive units in order to perform their tasks safely [Vaught and Smith 1980].

Cohesion does not, however, imply rigidity. It should be obvious that no cognitive structure which did not provide a great deal of flexibility could serve as

a coping mechanism in the underground environment. Thus there exists, on an

individual level, a tension between control and complaisance. As will be seen

in the analysis, this contradiction is apparent when miners must draw upon

cognitive templates to devise escape strategies during emergencies.

How Workers' Ability Will Be Analyzed

It was stated in the section above that workers have roughly the same cognitive

map of their mine environment. That is to say, each miner carries an internalized

representation of direction, distance and material structures, which allows him or

her to interact and work cohesively with others in the setting. In an elaboration of

this notion that coherency is a requisite of crew functioning, workers' environmental cognition was depicted as orientation not only in natural space, but in a

nonphysical or social one as well. The process of wayfinding, then, may be characterized as "purposeful mobility" [Passini 1984] during which spatial problems

are solved on the basis of systemic images. Results will hence be discussed in

terms of how ecological constraints, interpersonal behavior, and conceptual

content affected information gathering, item processing, inferences drawn, options

considered, and choices made during the escapes under investigation.

Ecological Constraints

Ordinarily, the question of how to exit a familiar setting will have a straightforward solution based on environmental information recalled from past experience [Passini 1984]. In all three mines, the normal means of exit would be

travel by portal bus to the shaft bottom. The fires, however, presented an

unusual factor:
142

We had power on the mantrip, so we figured we can get out with the

mantrip. We started out in the mantrip, got out so far, and we hit...

smoke.

Upon finding they could not evacuate along their normal course of travel,

workers were faced with the necessity of generating alternative escape routes.

It was this exigency that changed the behavior at all of these sites from a more

or less automatic series of responses to the known (or expected) into actual

spatial problem-solving activities.

Adelaide

A physical characteristic of the affected sections at Adelaide that had

wayfinding implications was the ventilation setup. Because working sections

were being advanced farther from the main fan and there were a limited number

of intake aircourses going into the 2 Northwest area, it was decided to ventilate

active working places with belt air. The operator requested and was granted permission by the MSHA District Manager to make these modifications. Requirements contained in the approved request were made a part of Adelaide's existing

ventilation, methane and dust control plan. One of the requirements was that

management would install a carbon monoxide monitoring system and locate the

sensors in belt entries at distances of 1,000 to 2,000 ft (depending on air velocity). A second aspect of the plan allowed suspension of the requirement to

separate the belt and track entries with stoppings. In actuality, this had only

been done on 3 Left.

At the beginning of 2 Northwest, it was the belt and track entries that carried

most of the air. The belt was a high-resistence entry, however, and lost its air

rapidly. Most of this air went into the track and an adjacent intake entry. The

result was that perhaps as much as 60,000 cfm of air passed over the belt at the

fire site. Also, the belt entry at that point contained a velocity of more than

1,000 fpm. The fire therefore had enough oxygen to propagate rapidly, while the

smoke-filled air started dumping into the intakes within a few breaks. Thus,

when workers inby the source of combustion began evacuating, they found that

not only their track but all intake entries had been contaminated with smoke.

One of the crew members from 1 Right found a novel use for some of the

lids that were discarded when everyone put on their SCSRs in the smoke:

And when we first started out I was picking up the lids...Every time we

would turn I would drop one of those orange lids. Because I figure if we

get down there and we can't get out, because we didn't know where the

fire was, exactly...and we got to backtrack, I wanted to know where

I came from. And if I find one of them lids, I know that I had been there
143

and...follow my way back...I was saving them like Hansel and Gretl—

drop the little bread trail.

Another individual, the miner helper, made use of physical characteristics with

which he was familiar because he had worked as a fire boss for several years:

There was guys walking up this bleeder—the old bleeder...[There] are

reflectors in there. They were following the reflectors. I told them,

ignore the reflectors, because you're going to get lost. I said, "Keep the

stoppings to your left."

By using the stoppings to maintain their orientation, the group was able to travel

their left return to an area outby the fire.

The 2 Northwest crew had comparatively little trouble finding their way,

since their face boss was very familiar with the area. Because they did not know

the fire's location and were in such thick smoke, however, there were times when

they had problems. The former mine rescue team member recounted the effect

this smoke had on even one as experienced as he:

But from my experience...I thought...we were walking right into this

fire...I started to get a little upset, a little tight...And in our returns we

have reflectors...And it's a good idea if there's no smoke but...you ought

to have something in there to grasp a hold of [to] tell you...if you're

going the right direction. You fall down and you get up and you get

turned around, you know, if somebody doesn't know where you're going,

you could be crawling around down there.

Some of the group, being new to the section, had not walked their escapeways

and were dependent on either being able to see the reflectors or having someone

to help them: "I wasn't up on that section [very long] but I know that big man,

the boss, knew how to go and I figured I'm sticking with him." It was the face

boss who kept everyone together and led the group out.

3 Left, as mentioned previously, did not have belt stoppings all the way up.

As the crew was on its way out, they "just hit a wall of smoke" and had to stop

the mantrip. The group first went into their intake escapeway and, when they

encountered smoke after traveling only a few breaks, got into their return:

When we got to the return, why someone just took off, you know, never

waited on anybody...They panicked and got scared...That's the worst

thing in the world to do...Everybody should stick together and then

there's everybody in one place...They know where you're at; they know

if you're strangled out there.
144

The men who "just took off" were four buddies who had worked on that section

for several years and, as a result, knew the area well:

We were all...together because we're all real familiar with that escapeway...So we were more or less in the front, leading the way and the

foreman was back with some of the other people and I'm not sure who

was in—at dead rear...We were the ones that were picking the

escapeway out.

Those who had gone ahead were also the ones who balked at crossing the

overcast located at 3 Left junction, according to the face boss:

I could see lights coming back at me and they said they couldn't make

it over those overcasts; there was too much smoke. So we started back

because I noticed the 3-by-3 door in the return. So I wanted to get back

into the intake. Well, I couldn't find that 3-by-3 door and I knew I didn't

want to start running around in circles. So I sort of collected myself and

we started up over an overcast in the return and in the...sidewall of the

overcast there was a 3-by-3 door and one of my men opened it up and

said, "This is the intake escapeway." So everybody went out into the

intake escapeway...We started walking and we were in the intake

escapeway but something didn't look right to me...Around vacation time

they had dug the sump and you had a path—as you come out your intake

escapeway, the slate's on your left side and the path's on the right side

and...I'm walking along and I started thinking something's wrong

because that damned slate should be on my left side, not on my right.

When he realized his crew was headed back into 3 Left section, the face boss

decided to get back in the return. The crew discussed their next move, then traveled to the overcast once again, where, upon opening the mandoor into their

intake this time, the boss felt air movement on his face and was able to determine which direction the group should go from there.

Brownfield

A physical factor that affected group escapes from locations inby the fire at

Brownfield was a double set of doors in the 4 South supply chute. A door in the

second set was open to a width of approximately 6 ft. A locomotive parked in

the chute had been left with its controller set on first point. When the motor

overheated, smoke passed through the open door into the intake aircourse of

6 West Mains. In a short time, the intakes of 4 South and 5 South were

contaminated as well. This forced all miners inby the source of combustion to

evacuate through moderate to heavy "white smoke."
145

When smoke was discovered coming up the intake into 4 South, a Federal

inspector who was on this section quickly checked the belt entry. The inspector

and face boss decided to go out that way, because the belt was clear. Within a

few hundred feet, however, the group encountered smoke on the belt. After

donning their self-contained self-rescuers, the crew continued on down the belt

line. The face boss began looking for a way out of the heavy smoke:

I knew there was a crosscut—on 5 South it cut down into our belt line,

and I knew there was a wall there with a door. I thought, well, maybe

if we got to that door and went through it, maybe it would be clear in

there. That was just a future longwall face area; [there wouldn't] be

much smoke in it...So it got to the point where you had to feel the rib,

you couldn't see. You might see water line. I was feeling the rib just to

find out where that crosscut was and finally found the crosscut. We

went up through the brattice door.

The face boss and three men who were with him paused to get their breath and

formulate a plan for exiting the mine:

I told them since the smoke was in the belt line...and track, we were

going to have to get over into 7 aircourse [of 6 West] Main on the other

side...Maybe that one was clear. That's where I told them we would

probably be heading...And [the smoke] was all heavy, so we continued

across the main and we got out into the track area and it was the same

out there...There was no door to go over into...the intake on the other

side.

Unable to get into 6 West right intake, the face boss and his companions decided

to travel outby in the track entry. After going four or five blocks, they found

themselves past the burning locomotive:

I'm kind of glad there wasn't a door at 7, 'cause...I guess they opened the

door on that right side to help clear the smoke out...I would have been

worried if I had gone to 7 and saw smoke on that side, too, 'cause then

I would have known [mistakenly] we'd have a long way to go to get out.

In the next several minutes, the face boss was joined by others from 4 South and

learned that his miner operator was down up the belt line. He then went back

after this individual.

Although the 5 South group started to evacuate by way of their intake escapeway, they only traveled a hundred feet before deciding to enter the belt

entry. Unlike the crew from 4 South, however, they did not stay there. After

proceeding approximately 400 ft with the smoke increasing in density, the group
146

came to a steel door: "I don't know his name, the bratticeman, he was first. He

went into the return." The smoke was lighter here, so everyone continued down

their return until they reached a regulator at 6 West left-side return. At this point

the miners donned their self-contained self-rescuers. According to the face boss,

his crew was somewhat strung out by the time they had gotten outby to the

5 South intake overcast:

A couple guys had already come out and went over this way trying to

get to this door. 'Cause this is the belt line, track entry, then [6 West

right] intake. In my opinion, they did the right thing, you know, trying

this way. But then they got out to this intersection here, they couldn't

see...anything, so they turned around and come back to the door.

The face boss then decided to make an attempt to reach the 6 West right-side

intake himself. Telling those with him to wait, he opened the door and went into

the belt entry. The smoke was so thick he ran into the belt. The face boss

crossed it and came to a second door:

I opened this door and the power center's setting here. I couldn't even

see that from the door...Right then, I tell you, panic hit, believe me.

'Cause all the teaching and training, everything, these are all supposed

to be separate splits. Well, the first thing that goes through your mind

is everything's burning. In my opinion, there was no sense even trying

to get [to the right-side intake], so I come back. There's a bleeder pipe

that goes from this overcast over to the power centers and that's how

I found my way back over here. They waited for me. They made up

their minds that they was going to wait 10 minutes for me and then go.

When I come back, the smoke was getting a little bit heavier in the

return...I said, "You guys want to try to make it over there" and before

I said much more...the bratticeman said, "We're ahead of the smoke!

Let's go!" Well, right then—well, everybody seen the smoke here.

That's when there was not much control, you know, and everybody

started just going.

One of the masons, who thought his SCSR was not working properly, took it off

and threw it away. The face boss helped him don his filter self-rescuer. The

group, with "everybody stringing out pretty good [by] then," passed across the

overcasts at 4 South, the face boss checking doors as they went. He came to a

door outby the fire area, opened it, and found fresh air. The boss called

everyone back and they went through that door onto the track.

A maintenance foreman working on 6 West took the fire boss's call. He then

gave himself an advantage over members of the other two groups by discovering

the fire's location:
147

And I knowed I had to go down past 4 South here...I was the only one

out of all the guys that knowed where the fire was...And the reason for

that is I took and asked [the fire boss] where the fire was.

The maintenance foreman, a mechanic, and a State mine inspector met at the

beginning of the intake escapeway. The three men donned their SCSRs at that

time because they could see light smoke coming up the intake. The group

traveled down to 8 Left aircourse, where they encountered heavy smoke. About

50 ft past that point, unable to see, the maintenance foreman decided to

backtrack:

The smoke was so heavy you couldn't even find the mandoor at the

overcast. But I knowed if I went up one more crosscut and I went up

along the rib pretty close and went into the left and then come back a

crosscut [I'd get] into the return.

The men did this and went through a door into 6 West main return, which was

their alternate escapeway. They proceeded outby in that entry:

And we was probably halfway between 5 South and 4 South whenever

I heard the 5 South crew coming. I heard them coming over the

overcast, and then I was relieved a little bit because I knowed that boss

coming with that crew was real familiar with the mine.

Knowing that the fire was at the 4 South supply chute, the maintenance foreman

continued in the lead. He passed up a mandoor that would have brought his

group into clear air outby the chute, however, and was called back by the

5 South face boss. The 5 South and 6 West groups then entered the intake and

from there proceeded out onto the track.

Cokedale

One particular physical characteristic of that area of the Cokedale Mine where

both affected crews were located proved to have a significant impact on everyone's

wayfinding behavior. The primary (intake) escapeway, which in most mines

would have extended "separate and distinct" to an air shaft or portal, led instead

onto Cokedale's main haulage track. Since the source of combustion was on this

track, that meant the escapeway could rather quickly become smoke-filled. If anyone possessed a clear picture of the layout and was able to communicate this fact

to his group, no time would be wasted on attempts to evacuate down the intake

entry. Without knowledge of the source of combustion, however, this primary escapeway should be the first choice. Thus, what might have been a minor component of even the most comprehensive cognitive map became critical in this case.
148

After encountering smoke on their section track, the group from 8 Face

Parallels held "a small discussion as to where we were going to go, what we

were going to do." A trackman, who had just delivered a load of rails to the area

but who was unfamiliar with that part of the mine, recounted his reaction when

those supposedly more cognizant of their immediate surroundings began to

consider going out the intake escapeway:

According to the old laws they didn't have to [route] it to the shaft and

this fell under [the old laws] since it was an old established section...

And that stuck with me, and when they decided they were going to walk

the intake, I specifically said to [the general foreman], "We can't go out

the intake."

Regardless of this warning, the accounts show that "it was the consensus of

everybody [to] head for the intake." Additionally, the decision seems to have

been based not on any stock-taking but on a generalized training protocol that

suggests miners should always travel their primary escapeway if possible.

A problem arose immediately because "nobody seemed to know how to get

into the intake escapeway from where we were out at the mouth of the section."

The general foreman mentioned above, who had been leading this group

initially, decided to "go back [and] get into the intake from the face." The

workers then returned to the section in order to enter their primary escapeway.

Everyone walked across the face area, got into the designated intake entry, and

proceeded down it until "we came to an overcast and as we walked over top of

the...steps, you could see on the other side the smoke was coming in the intake."

At about this time "the guys started...making the decisions on what to do,"

although there was still little discussion taking place. Since there was only one

way out of the smoke—back up the entry to the face—the miners, led now by a

trackman, retreated in that direction.

Once again on 8 Face Parallels section, the group was faced with yet another

decision. Given the general instructions miners receive in training classes,

"naturally the next thing would be...the return [secondary escapeway]." Their

choice was made fairly quickly, and, while appropriate under the circumstances,

did not get translated into proper action. In fact, a procedural error was committed, further compounding the crew's earlier decision error:

So we decided to try the designated return, at which point [the general

foreman] did not know which was the designated return.

We headed out...on the right side and...went five or six blocks and...one

of the guys up front noticed there's no arrows; we're in the wrong return.

We're not in the return escapeway. So then the bratticeman from the
149

section, he said, "Oh, yeah—that's on the other side of the section." So

then we turned around.

For the second time, then, an important item in at least one person's cognitive

map was disregarded, causing the men to travel an additional thousand feet

before ending up back where they had started from.

Regrouping in the face area, several workers decided to gather information

before beginning the next attempt to find their way out. An individual

remembered the section map, which had been hanging in their dinner hole:

I stopped and got the map, read the map, and two other guys...they

stopped and was reading the map with me and...what we wanted to do

was see where it brought us out...and once we...saw where it brought us

out...we knew the smoke was coming down there so we knew...the fire

had to be fairly close.

Reassured by this knowledge, the miners entered their designated return escapeway and, led by a general inside laborer who had once been a foreman,

finally started their ultimately successful exit from the section.

Those on 7 Butt had a somewhat different experience. According to a general foreman who was with this group, "we all started out at the same time...and

we ran into that wall of smoke [on the track]." When they ran into the smoke

they also collided with a stopped vehicle. As a result, one person lost his hard

hat and cap lamp. He was assisted by his buddies as the general foreman

gathered everyone and planned their next step:

I [had] set all the ventilation up down there and I knew basically what

was going on with all the smoke. The intake escapeway would have

been full of smoke.

Informed by his cognitive map of the area, this individual was able to depict for

these miners some of the features that would be affecting their intended escape.

He first told crew members the location of a mandoor they should go through to

get into one of their return entries. Next, the general foreman assured everyone

that they would encounter less smoke by taking his course of action. Finally, he

provided a preview of their route:

The return that we started going out was not a return escapeway; it was

just a return airway. I told them...we go through the mandoor, follow

[the return entry], ...cross over the overcast, check the doors up there...

get into the return escapeway and follow it up to [the portal].
150

Thus, the workers all had at least a limited notion of where they were going and

how long it would take to get there. As the crew walked, the general foreman

was able to keep them updated:

Everybody was asking me where we were...what direction we were

headed. And with the information that I had...I knew first-hand...what

direction we were headed, ...where the mandoors were, ...[our] location

[in reference to] the motor road...and where I was gonna bring 'em out.

With these reassurances, the miners from 7 Butt were able to stay together and

exit their section in an orderly manner.

Interpersonal Behavior

Overall group performance largely depends on how well group members can

play their assigned roles. In nonroutine situations, difficulties may arise if someone who normally holds a leadership position is not prepared. The same may

be said of a person who, because of his or her experience or expertise, is considered to be "mine wise" but who does not use that wisdom. Workers still look

to these people for guidance. This complication stems from the fact that roles

which people enact during an emergency, instead of being expressly different

from their typical roles, are existing ones that have been carried over and

tailored to unusual circumstances [Best 1977; Johnston and Johnson 1988].

Worker accounts reveal clear differences in behavioral patterns within and

among the eight groups under discussion here. This section addresses some of

the ways these and other social phenomena began to have a bearing upon

individuals' use of cognitive maps and their subsequent wayfinding activities.

Adelaide

The section foreman on 1 Right had been recalled only recently to Adelaide.

While this might not have been too detrimental to his performance of duties at

the face, he encountered difficulty when he had to extend his leadership role

into emergency circumstances. The miner operator explained his attitude toward

the boss's performance:

The boss; I can't blame that boss...This was the first time he was on the

section in 5 years; he'd been laid off...He...didn't actually know just

where to go, but [the utilityman] was a fire boss at one time, so more or

less...took the lead.
151

The utilityman, who was working as 1 Right's miner helper that night, initially

wanted to lead this group through the bleeder system to Peterson shaft:

I told them if we get [back] in the mantrip and...go back to 35 stopping

or 36 stopping, there's a door in a left return. I said, "You can walk

across the bleeders to Peterson shaft." I said, "Let's all get in the

mantrip, we'll go back, and we'll get out of the mantrip, we'll call and

tell them that we're getting out and we're walking to Peterson; they'll

have a mantrip waiting for us at Peterson."...We was standing by the

mantrip, but they wouldn't get in it.

Having failed to convince his coworkers to backtrack, the utilityman then began

acting as advisor to the face boss and crew: "I don't know...They say I [took

charge] but I don't think so...I just knew where to go...that's all." Regardless, the

accounts show that this person's recognized "mine wiseness" and relationships

with other crew members played a significant part in how his group found its

way out of the mine:

And when we walked down through here, you had to watch because if

you followed the reflectors, you'd end up in this bleeder here or in the

gobs, because they had reflectors. And [the utilityman] kept telling

them, "Hey! Keep the stoppings on your left. If you veer off, you're

going to end up in a bleeder or gob." So twice he had to say, "Hey!

No, no! You're going the wrong way."

Thus, the utilityman apparently used his fire bossing experience to compensate

for the face boss's lack of familiarity with the area while refraining, in his view,

from actually assuming control.

On 2 Northwest, the section foreman moved quickly to control the situation,

drawing upon the experience of one of his buggy operators, who had been a

mine rescue team member:

We got everybody together and [the boss] said, "You take the back, I'll

take the front...we're going in single file...Don't let anybody in back of

you...and we'll keep everybody together." The boss took control...He

told them, "This is what we're going to do." There was no, well, I think

we ought to go here; I think we ought to go—we knew what we were

going to do...where we were going...I had confidence in him; everybody

did...And he had confidence in...me...being from mine rescue.

The behaviors of both individuals were consistent with their roles. 2 Northwest's

face boss was familiar with the area and continued to direct his crew. The buggy
152

operator performed according to certain expectations of his mine rescue role.

This group escaped without undue complications.

Leadership roles on 3 Left shifted during the course of their escape, with

individuals making suggestions or taking the lead at different moments:

I was the first one in line going over the second overcast and when

I seen that smoke coming up out of there, it was so bad, I told everybody

in line, "There ain't no way in hell I'm going...I'd rather have it coming

in my face [than] at my back." And we got back into our intake escapeway and had the smoke coming in our face.

Some of the miners attributed the vaguely defined leadership in this group to

panic. Another, and perhaps better, explanation stems from the fact that 3 Left

was a "split crew." Some of the miners were buddies who had been on the section for several years and knew the escapeways well. Others had been there only

a few days or weeks and were unfamiliar with the section. They were left behind by those who could more readily find their way. Unlike the foreman on

2 Northwest, who was able to take the head of the line because of help from a

person well-versed in mine rescue procedures, the foreman of 3 Left found it

necessary to stay with the workers who were having trouble. His ability to control the escape was therefore hampered.

Brownfield

There were two individuals on 4 South who possessed not only a certain

degree of "mine wiseness," but who were also in authority positions: the face

boss and a Federal inspector. As the group proceeded down their belt line, some

members began to get ahead of others. The inspector broached this problem to

the face boss:

I said, "Those guys are getting ahead and I don't think we can slow them

down. Someone better travel with those guys." There was never any

discussion on who was going to go with them. I said, "Why don't you

go down there and go with those guys and run them ahead and I'll stay

with these guys." I knew the mine quite well so I didn't have a problem

with where we were going or where the aircourses...[were].

Later in the escape, however, the inspector encountered difficulties of a different

sort. One of the two workers he was with (the miner operator) became unable

to continue. The inspector's knowledge of the mine, combined with his lack of

information about the fire's location, presented him with a predicament. Should

he continue his helping role or leave the victim behind in order to save himself?
153

I knew we were in the belt entry, but I didn't know where we were as far

as getting out to the main but here again, not knowing where the fire

was, I didn't know how far we had to go once we got to the main. Once

we got to the main...if we had to travel in smoke, I knew it would be at

least another hour to get to the portal. So it started to concern me, the

time element and getting out of this section.

The inspector did not immediately make a decision to depart. Rather, he kept

trying to assist until the victim himself suggested the others leave:

He looked at the mechanic. I saw him look at the mechanic and he said,

"You guys go. You just leave me here. I can't go no more. I'm just going to stay here." I looked at the mechanic and I said, "I got to go.

There is no sense in me staying...I can't breathe now...I can send

somebody back. I'll go out and get somebody. If it's only out to the

main track, there will be somebody, I hope, out there. I can send them

back and I know exactly where you're at..." Even when I told this man

I thought I was out of air, I got to go get help, I was still carrying an

extra self-rescuer and I guess I had taken enough smoke...I didn't realize

I had it.

The mechanic, left alone with the miner operator, soon became convinced there

was nothing further he could do:

I didn't know my way out of there. I lost all orientation how to get out

of there. I knew my way out, but I forgot. It was just a panic thing...so

anyway, I thought, "Well, [the miner operator's] not going to make it;

I'm going to try and get out. So I started out and I was only about a

hundred foot from [the miner operator] when I came through the

overcast and I opened the door and I saw No. 7 and I thought, "Good.

This is fresh air...the way out." I thought I was out to the track, but

I was only into No. 4 aircourse. So I thought, "Well, I'm going back in

and get [the miner operator]. I'm this close, we're going to get out of

here."

Buoyed by his mistaken belief that the victim was only a hundred feet from fresh

air, the mechanic went back to renew his rescue efforts. He was soon joined by

the face boss, who brought two replacement self-contained self-rescuers. The

face boss informed both men that fresh air was just 500 ft away. The mechanic

and face boss then got the miner operator on his feet and supported him as all

three made their way outby the burning motor.
154

The workers on 5 South stayed close together during the first part of their

escape. When asked how much planning was done before they left the face area,

the section foreman replied:

Actually, there was no real planning until we got down to this regulator.

We put our self-rescuers on, then we got down and couldn't get out here

[into 6 West right intake]—then everybody knew they was going down

the return. Everybody knew where they were then...and there is no turns.

Everything's straight in that return.

The section foreman finally came to a "void" in the smoke where he spotted the

door that led into fresh air. He then shouted for those group members who had

gotten ahead and the crew all exited into the intake and from there into the track

entry outby the fire source.

The maintenance foreman who took the mine examiner's warning call on

6 West asked him where the fire was located:

Well, he told me there was a fire at 7 Left ramp. He didn't know what

was burning, because he couldn't get in to it. But I knowed how far

I was from 7 Left and I traveled as fast as I could to beat it. Only you

don't beat those things. I found that out real quick.

The maintenance foreman reported that he walked ahead of the mechanic and

State mine inspector who were with him, looking back frequently to make sure

they were keeping up. There was little discussion among the three, because the

maintenance foreman was familiar with the area and knew what point the group

needed to reach in order to be outby the fire.

Cokedale

One early problem for 8 Face Parallels (8FP) stemmed from the fact that

Cokedale's dispatcher, whose functions may be envisioned as somewhat akin to

those of an air traffic controller, did not inform everyone of the fire's location:

He was trying to call the other section right away. So...I can

understand...what he has to go through trying to call everybody and try

to get them out, call the DER [State enforcement agency] and everything

else. He got his hands full.

Worker accounts indicate that the resulting uncertainty heightened this crew's

confusion and indecisiveness. Where they would ordinarily look to management

for direction, the miners had a general foreman who was as confused as they
155

were. Additionally, given Cokedale's authority structure and work rules, an

alternative leadership mechanism was not in place—one had to emerge. This

emergence was a process negotiated over an extended period of time, seemingly

at the expense of efficient wayfinding behavior.

It has already been stated that by the time 8FP began its final attempt to exit

the section, the workers were being led by a general inside laborer who had once

been a foreman. Researchers reached this conclusion by weighing various

responses to questions about who was actually making decisions at certain points

during the escape. While there was much agreement in everyone else's accounts,

the general inside laborer himself had a slightly different interpretation:

At that point in time me and [the boss] was close together—there was

nobody right there that could hear what I was saying. I say, "I didn't

bring the map, [but] we have to go out this return." Being as [the boss]

knows me, it was more a mutual agreement...He respects my knowledge

from mining and I respect his so...that he understood more or less what

I was talking about—that...we were running out of time. That wasn't the

time for no argument.

Thus, this worker cast himself in the role of advisor, deferring as much as

possible to his general foreman's authority and legitimate leadership position.

Also, the general inside laborer presented himself much the same way during

interactions with his buddies: "I was not in a foreman capacity, but I could see

things going on that was wrong...so I would say, 'I sure wouldn't [do that].'"

Eventually, the crew traveled outby to their section air regulator and

stopped. At this point the general foreman decided to explore ahead. The general inside laborer chose to accompany him, so both men went through the

regulator and proceeded some 100 ft farther outby:

You could see 50 feet and then you couldn't see 2 feet...[I thought] there

was a stopping blew out [or something] because [the air was] all mixed

up no matter which way you turned...[The boss] said, "We can't lose the

smoke this way." I said, "We have to go through this—go out the

return. Smoke or no smoke...we can't keep changing our minds...else

we'll be here forever."

After regrouping, the miners did continue out their return through smoke that

kept varying in density. This phenomenon concerned the general inside laborer

as he tried to orient himself, because "if something happened at one point [and]

you walk six, seven, eight hundred feet, then you could be in a better situation

or a worse situation—but that wasn't happening." The smoke's behavior confused everyone, and, as one motorman observed, caused a few individuals to

waste time looking for ways out of it where there obviously were not any:
156

We would come to places in the return where the bleeders were and

people would actually go and look over the wall at the bleeder—for

what purpose, I don't know...maybe they weren't familiar at all with

what the return looked like or whatever an old bleeder would be.

It was this person's opinion that the aimless search for alternative routes as they

traveled could have been curtailed by more forceful leadership.

Even though the men were wearing emergency breathing apparatus and were

not supposed to remove their mouthpieces, they did so in order to communicate.

As the general inside laborer's comments suggest, crew members seem to have

kept up a running commentary regarding their location:

Somebody mentioned..."We're going parallel to the track..." I'm

thinking, "Boy, that's a bright deduction after we walked all this way—

whoever said that's really thinking. If we ain't parallel to the track, we're

in a lot of trouble...what the hell's wrong with these people?"

What was wrong, in the motorman's opinion, involved a circumstance of past

experience and perspective:

Now I found...out after[ward] that the older fellow had worked in those

returns off and on [setting timbers] and things like that...But...one old

entry looks like another one...as far as I'm concerned.

The men therefore drew upon each other for support and continued to speculate

about their progress, since "we still didn't have the slightest idea where we were

or how long [we had been walking]."

The general inside laborer checked behind mandoors as the group came to

them. He eventually located one that opened into fresh air on the loaded track.

The miners crawled through onto this track and began to get their bearings:

My buddy immediately recognized where we were. He said, "We're

between 18 and 19 crossover." Because he'd run motors out there for so

many years...he could recognize where we were...We gathered ourselves. The elation was just unbelievable.

After resting a few moments the crew members made their way over to the

empty track and up it to 19 crossover, at which point they joined with workers

escaping from 7 Butt.

It has already been stated that the people from 7 Butt did not have as many

problems finding their way as did those from 8FP; nor did they waste time trying

to go out their intake escapeway, because the general foreman with this group

knew where that entry led. The workers still encountered some difficulties,
157

however. At one point, according to several accounts, the pace quickened

almost to a run. This proved particularly stressful for that individual who had

lost his hat and lamp in the vehicle collision and was depending on his buddies

to lead him:

My buddy in front...I held onto his belt all the way out...I followed their

lights plus held onto his belt...I lost him a couple of times. I kept

yelling...'cause everybody was running—everybody was in a hurry.

Aside from aiding their coworker, who began to "get excited," these miners' biggest concern was staying together and keeping themselves oriented. Although

there was little talking reported among this crew in comparison to the miners

from 8FP, several still queried the general foreman about their location as they

traveled.

The group proceeded out their main return, with the general foreman

checking through mandoors to see if they had yet reached a point where there

was fresh air in the track entry:

Every time he would check a door he had us stop to cut our breathing

down a little bit, which was nice—everybody kinda got a little rational...

I think we had to check maybe two or three.

The workers came finally to a set of double doors situated between 18 Face and

19 Face: "It...probably took about an hour, but...you weren't doing anything or

really thinking 'cause it was just basically following the leader at the time." The

general foreman led them through these doors into clear air, across the loaded

track entry, and into their intake. The men walked outby to 19 crossover, where

they met 8FP crew. Following a head count and brief telephone report to the

outside, these combined groups continued toward 20 Face, where mine

management had arranged mantrip buses to take everyone to a portal as yet

unaffected by smoke.

Conceptual Content

As Kaplan and Kaplan [1982] observed, "humans are inclined to be painfully

distressed by confusion and by helplessness." When they experience this anguish,

people most commonly resort to authority, either social or cultural. Social

authority involves the positions held by individuals and their expertise in playing

roles incumbent to a certain position. Cultural authority is derivative, following

from widely shared beliefs and values. An essential function of authority, in

whatever form it takes, is to convey certainty in an uncertain world. Thus, a great

deal of human effort is spent interacting with others for the purpose of evoking

authority in an attempt to achieve clarity and agreement upon matters that would
158

otherwise be disturbing or even disruptive. Such was the circumstance at the three

sites under study here. This section presents a brief overview of various ways in

which the miners strove to reach a consistency of perspective.

Adelaide

It was stated earlier that the utilityman on 1 Right suggested the crew, once

they encountered smoke on their track, retreat to 35 or 36 stopping and walk

across the bleeders to Peterson shaft. Evidently, he did not argue his point; at

least, this is what one of the roof bolter operators remembered: "Well, he kind

of mentioned it, see, then he just left it go." A missing piece of information, and

one that, in the opinion of the bolter operator, would have predisposed the group

to follow the utilityman's suggestion, was the fact that 2 Northwest had been

forced to abandon their mantrip near the mouth of 1 Right:

When they got into the intake...they called the dispatcher and told him,

"Hey, we're going in the intake. The smoke is too heavy at the mouth

of 1 Right." So when we called the dispatcher and told him we're going

in the return, he should have told us that 2 Northwest stopped down at

the mouth...the smoke may be too thick down there.

Instead, the 1 Right group, thinking they might soon be out of the worst of the

smoke, entered their return and traveled in increasingly worsening conditions.

According to one of the shuttle car drivers, the group engaged in some

discussion of where the fire was probably located:

We were going to try...getting to Peterson, but we didn't know exactly

where the fire was. We thought that the fire was at 3 Left. No. 2

transfer, the low spot, there's always a bad place the belts fall in and

everything else. So that was our idea...I wished we knew where the fire

was for one thing. It's like you're going into the unknown; you don't

know exactly where you're going.

Near the end of the crew's escape, this individual, recognizing his location from

a series of overcasts he had helped construct, left the group.

After the members of the group from 2 Northwest abandoned their mantrip,

they walked back into the face area in order to reach their intake escapeway:

The boss, he said, "We'll be all right." He said, "Everything'll be fine as

soon as we get up into the fresh air." So we was scooting along pretty

good and went back up the track, went over to the intake...It was smoke.

There wasn't any fresh air there. So that was the point there where we

all put on our rescuers.
159

The crew proceeded down their intake for a short distance and then decided to

get into the right return. According to one of the roof bolter operators there was

not a lot of conversation, although group members engaged in stock taking

during rest stops:

Yeah, we stopped different times—one guy fell down. I pulled him

back up. He fell down. He was a little red and hysterical there a little

bit of the time. And we stopped and the boss talked to him and calmed

him down. We stopped periodically if anybody was having problems.

We'd stop and check. Not long, but long enough to talk and see where

to go and calm down.

The right return was designated an alternate escapeway, so all that was required

of the 2 Northwest crew was that they stay in that entry until they were outby the

fire. Because group members did not know the fire's location, the face boss, who

was leading, would feel and open each mandoor they came to. At last he opened

the door in No. 3 stopping and encountered fresh air. The bolter operator quoted

above was one of the first through:

I know I went through it and hit that fresh air and I was hollering at the

other ones, because they was kneeling down there taking a little break.

I told them to get...over here and get out of there. We appreciated that

air more than you ever did.

After contacting the shift foreman and notifying him that everyone had gotten

off 2 Northwest, the face boss was given instructions to take his crew to the

surface.

The crew from 3 Left contained some members who had not been on the

section for very long. One of these was the bratticeman who, because he was

new, had been selected recently to walk the escapeways:

I walked that the first day I was there, 3 weeks before. My boss

wanted—he comes to me and says, "I want you to walk out with me and

I want to get a couple of other volunteers to walk out. So you'll know

in case something happens." But it's kind of—when you're walking out

and you know there's nothing wrong, you're just strolling through

because you have to do it. You know the reflectors are up there so you

really don't pay attention to the markings or anything other than the

reflectors and what door you go through; you know, where you go out.

At one point the group became disoriented and was actually headed back into

their section. The bratticeman recounted how this confusion raised the miners'

anxiety level:
160

We went down this breakthrough and we couldn't go through and we

come back, we come back like around the block and we got confused

and we sort of all just grouped together in one place trying to decide

what would be the best way to go out...We were walking down—we ran

into our shift foreman who said at six more breakthroughs, five or six,

make a right and you'll be out of this. That's when the two guys that

always seemed to be ahead really took off.

One individual who was having problems received help from the utilityman,

a shuttle car driver, and the shift foreman who had been looking for them. The

crew finally reassembled outby the fire and found transportation to take them out

of the mine.

Brownfield

4 South's face boss was able to take advantage of the Federal inspector's

presence during that group's escape:

So we started down the belt line and there was three guys that wanted

to take off. They ran like deer...I was trying to stay in the back being the

last one to make sure everybody was ahead of me. And it got to the

point where I could see these guys were going too quick. The Federal

inspector was back there with me, too, and I finally told him, I said that

if he would stay with the slower three guys or four guys, I was going to

go ahead with those faster guys, 'cause I didn't want them to walk into

something that they weren't ready for. I walk that belt line every day...

I didn't know what we had down there.

Near the mouth of 4 South the face boss led those workers who were with him into

a future longwall face area. His intention was to get them out of the worst of the

smoke and give everyone a chance to catch their breath. At this point he outlined

the route they would take to try to get into the right-hand aircourse of 6 West:

So everybody got settled again and we went back out and worked our

way down the belt line. It was a slow process. The smoke was so heavy

you just couldn't see.

The group members eventually arrived at 6 West track but were unable to find

a door that would let them into the intake entry they were trying to reach. At

that point, one miner left the others:

My supplyman, he had gotten ahead. He took off again. He was the

quickest one of the bunch, so when we got out into the high track,
161

I called for him 'cause I didn't know—he could have took a left, took a

right, fell down, I wouldn't have seen him. So I yelled—that's when the

people down below the fire yelled that there was fresh air down that

way.

After getting his small group outby 4 South supply chute, the face boss learned

that his miner operator had not made it out. He then went back into the smoke

in search of this individual.

A rapid pace was set by the bratticeman, who was leading initially as

5 South crew made its escape. One of the roof bolter operators recounted how

this put stress on everyone else:

To the best of my recollection, the bratticeman just took off running.

He says, "Come on—we got to get out this way." And he took off.

Well, he took off and he was leading the pack, okay. When we got

down to where the regulator was at and put the self-rescuers on, that's

when [the boss] took over. One of the things I told him later on, I says,

"You're the boss—one thing you got to do if this ever happens again,

you should have a man that's in charge that's going to take his time and

walk out of there slow and easy with his self-rescuer on."...[You go] six,

seven, eight hundred feet before you even try to put one of them things

on, you're winded. [Then], it's like trying to suck through a straw.

A shuttle car operator also discussed the difficulties group members were having

getting enough oxygen from their apparatus. Added to this concern was the fact

no one knew the fire's location at first:

So we went and then we run onto three other guys coming down from

6 West, too, which was the maintenance foreman and an inspector—and

a mechanic. Yeah. And then they told us where the fire was at. But we

was still up away from where it was at a good bit. But they told us it

was down at—what was it—4 South—4 South sidetrack where the

motor was sitting. But we had to go down below that, so then we had

an idea how far we had to go, so it took a little bit of the pressure off

'cause we knew we was going—we had a pretty good chance now.

5 South crew, together with the three individuals from 6 West, eventually came

out onto the track one door down from the burning locomotive.

The maintenance foreman on 6 West intended originally to ride out in his

three-wheeled jitney. He was dissuaded from doing so, however, by the State

mine inspector accompanying him:
162

Well, it could cause an explosion, he said, for one thing. I mean, I was

on the damn thing and so was [the mechanic] when he says no. I know

one thing—if it ever happens again and there's something to ride...I'm

riding.

The fact that he knew how far his group must travel in order to get outby the fire

influenced this person's approach to their escape. During their walk out, the

maintenance foreman kept an eye on his two companions and made sure all three

stayed together.

Cokedale

The workers from 8 Face Parallels apparently kept up an almost constant

stream of communication. At first, conversations were directed toward assuring

each other that nothing much was out of the ordinary:

The dispatcher started calling us, and...said that they had detected some

smoke and that we should come out. Well, this isn't real uncommon

because...belts or something might burn off a pump or...you can get a

hot hanger once in a while. So at that point we really weren't all that

concerned.

People's tendency to treat a nonroutine situation as normal until it is no longer

possible to do so is a well-documented phenomenon [McHugh 1968]. This fits

well with the notion that human beings have a predisposition to impose order on

their world as a way to minimize uncertainty. However, in events needing a

quick response, critical time may be lost. This is especially true in cases where

there is an effort to reach group consensus before action is taken.

As the escape off 8FP progressed, miners' talk shifted from efforts to normalize their situation and focused instead on a need for cohesive performance:

The older man...said, "Why don't you guys stay right here, and [we] will

take a walk up through and just see if...it looks passable." So those two

proceeded to walk—I couldn't tell you how long they were gone...And

they came back and they said, "This is definitely the return, and I think

we can get through, so we should try it."

To bolster this endeavor, which the workers were unsure would be successful,

they used various interpretive strategies [Kaplan and Kaplan 1982]. Chiefly, the

men seemed to seek information about their location and progress, even though

these actions did not always appear to make sense. A couple of cases in point

are the motorman's account of people looking over into old bleeders and the
163

general inside laborer's bemused reaction to an observation that his group was

walking parallel to the track. Additionally, however, some individuals imputed

expertise they did not have to someone else. For this group, their authority

became the general inside laborer, who had once been a boss and who had

"worked in those returns off and on."

7 Butt personnel were less distressed during their escape because there was

a convergence of formal authority and expertise in the general foreman who led

this group out. These workers seemingly devoted more effort to dealing

internally with their predicament than in information seeking:

I felt pretty confident...because I knew [the general foreman] had been

up there for a long time walking returns and this and that and he was

real familiar with this area.

Having someone in control, as they did, enabled group members to pose alternative scenarios based on properties of individual cognitive maps:

If I would have been left to my own devices, I knew that I could have

made it out following the track.

This activity undoubtedly had a calming effect on the person, but may also have

helped each worker establish a better grounding in relation to his environment

and how it could be negotiated.

Both groups, in essence, utilized strategies that differed according to their

circumstances. The 8 FP group focused more on information exchange and a

search for authority; the 7 Butt group tended to deal "intrapsychically" [Kaplan

and Kaplan 1982] with the situation that confronted them, getting their heads

straight by talking to themselves. In this event, the effects of social dynamics

can be seen in those coping mechanisms used. It is thus arguable, given these

divergent patterns of interaction and reaction, that individuals' conceptual content was shaped by their shared experience. Such a notion takes cognitive

mapping and wayfinding beyond the psychological domain and situates it within

a broader social science perspective. Also, this paradigm focuses on group

effects rather than positing personal differences as a variable of interest.

Discussion

What can be gained from introducing a diverse level of analysis to the

problem of wayfinding? First, it opens up a new realm of possible questions and

answers. As Simmel [1971] pointed out, each level of the social world provides

valid insights, but can only be understood in terms of its own unique rules of

evidence. Second, since the escape behavior discussed above clearly took place
164

in a group context, an individual differences approach would lack explanatory

power when applied to wayfinding in that situation. Clearly, broader analysis

is needed in relation to these mine fires. By considering the cultural and social

milieu of cognitive mapping and wayfinding behavior, social scientists will be

able to more readily explain how people in crisis go about deciding what to do

next when more than one person is likely to have input into the decision.

Several key points about wayfinding and cognitive mapping have been

raised in this chapter. First, the way human beings make sense of their

environment is, according to some theorists, socially mediated. In other words,

people's definition of even the most taken-for-granted elements, such as time or

distance, is a result of group consensus. Thus, mental maps are not wholly

idiosyncratic constructs. Second, cognitive mapping is a dynamic process. The

map one has in his or her mind can be acted upon by forces both internal and

external to the individual. As a wayfinding tool, then, a cognitive map acts

mutably rather than in some mechanistic fashion. Personal decisions about a

best course of action are therefore more problematic than they have sometimes

been portrayed as being. Third, it has been suggested that some settings in

modern society may be characterized by a sameness of cognitive maps. This

would help to ensure predictability in situations calling for close coordination

of action. Finally, wayfinding is a spatial problem-solving activity in which

factors external to the individual (such as ecology and interpersonal relations)

have a significant impact upon outcomes.

 The purpose of applying certain theoretical notions to real-world problems

is to attempt a better understanding of some empirical phenomenon or

phenomena. In the present case, the issue to be understood is how workers go

about moving from one point to another in a mine fire. The approach used here

should be highly generalizable, however. It is hoped that in the future, more

attention will be paid to those intersubjective factors once thought to have little

bearing on such "intrapsychic" processes as cognitive mapping. Social scientists

may benefit from new avenues of inquiry. In addition, planners and engineers

would almost certainly gain by having a deeper understanding of what variables

motivate the behavior of those who inhabit their structures.

References

Althouse R [1974]. Work, safety, and lifestyle among southern Appalachian coal miners.

Morgantown, WV: West Virginia University, Office of Research and Development.

Best R [1977]. Reconstruction of a tragedy: the Beverly Hills supper club fire. NFPA

No. LS-2. Washington, DC: National Fire Prevention and Control Administration.

Bryant C [1972]. The social dimensions of work. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Camic C [1992]. The matter of habit. In: Zey M, ed. Decision-making: alternatives to

rational choice models. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 197-201.

Douglass D, Krieger J [1983]. A miner's life. London, U.K.: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
165

Etzioni A [1992]. Normative-affective factors: toward a new decision-making model. In: Zey

M, ed. Decision-making: alternatives to rational choice models. Newbury Park, CA: Sage

Publications, p. 91.

Evans G [1980]. Environmental cognition. Psychol Bulletin 88(2), pp. 259-287.

Evans G, Skorpanich A., Garling T, Bryant K, Bresolin B [1984]. The effects of pathway

configuration, landmarks and stress on environmental cognition. J Environ Psychol 4:323-335.

Fitzpatrick J [1974]. Underground mining: a case study of an occupational subculture of

danger [Dissertation]. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University.

Hayner N [1945]. Taming the lumberjack. Am Sociolog Rev 10(2):217-225.

Hunt M [1984]. Environmental learning without being there. Environ and Behav 16:307-

334.

Janis E [1968]. Group identification under conditions of external danger. In: Cartwright D,

Zander A, eds. Group dynamics. New York, NY: Harper and Row.

Johnston D, Johnson N [1988]. Role extension in disaster: employee behavior in the Beverly

Hills supper club fire. Sociolog Focus 22(1):39-52.

Kaplan S, Kaplan R [1982]. Cognition and environment: functioning in an uncertain world.

Chicago, IL: Praeger Books, pp. 113, 132-137, 140.

Kirk J, Miller M [1990]. Reliability and validity in qualitative research. Newbury Park, CA:

Sage Publications.

Lucas R [1969]. Men in crises. New York, NY: Basic Books.

McCarl R [1976]. Smokejumper initiation: ritualized communication in a modern occupation.

J Am Folklore 89, January-March.

McHugh P [1968]. Defining the situation. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.

Passini R [1984]. Spatial representation, a wayfinding perspective. J Environ Psychol 4:153-

164.

Rapoport A [1976]. Environmental cognition in cross-cultural perspective. In Moore G,

Golledge R, eds. Environmental knowing: theories, research, and methods. Stroudsburg, PA:

Dowden, Hutchinson, and Ross, Inc., pp. 223, 232.

Roethlisberger F, Dickson W [1947]. Management and the worker. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

Rovine M, Weisman G [1989]. Sketch-map variables as predictors of way-finding

performance. J Environ Psychol 9:217-232.

Roy D [1953]. Work satisfaction and social reward in quota achievement: an analysis of

piecework inventive. Am Sociolog Rev 18(5):507-514.

Schutz A [1967]. The phenomenology of the social world. Chicago, IL: Northwestern

University Press, p. 5-6.

Schwartzman H [1986]. Research on work group effectiveness: an anthropological critique.

In: Goodman P and Associates, eds. Designing effective work groups. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass

Publishers.

Seidel J, Kjolseth R, Seymour E [1988]. The ethnograph: a user's guide. Littleton, CO:

Qualis Research Associates.

Simmel G [1971]. On individuality and social forms. In: Levine D, ed. Chicago, IL:

University of Chicago Press.

Smith D, Vaught C [1988]. Ius bituminous: solidarity and legal order in a dangerous work

environment. Deviant Behav 9, Spring, pp. 131-154.

Stoddard E [1972]. The informal code of police deviancy. Bryant C, ed. The social

dimensions of work. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Vaught C, Smith D [1980]. Incorporation and mechanical solidarity in an underground coal

mine. Sociol of Work and Occupations 7, May, pp. 159-187.
166

CHAPTER 9.—LEADERSHIP IN ESCAPE FROM

UNDERGROUND MINE FIRES

This chapter explores leadership behavior in a life-threatening situation—

fire in a coal mine. Previous chapters have discussed the database of interviews

with miners who escaped from underground fires. Researchers raised questions

such as: (1) Who led the miners out of the mine? (2) Did leadership make a difference in the escapes? (3) Was the escape leader the hierarchal leader?

(4) What, if any, characteristics did the escape leaders possess? Subsequently,

researchers analyzed the mine fire database from a group interaction perspective

to address the leadership questions posed.

Leadership has been one of the most researched topics of human behavior

in the twentieth century. Studies have ranged from individual characteristics of

leaders, to situational leadership, to interaction of leader and follower, suggesting different leadership techniques for different followers. The question that

emerges here is: Are there different types of leadership that "fit" different kinds

of situations? In a crisis situation like that examined in the present study, such

information about leadership may significantly improve the chances of escape.

To address these issues, the study team looked at the formal authority

structure before each fire, considered leadership behavior or lack of leadership

during the escapes, and examined those conditions associated with the emergence of leadership. According to Bardo [1978], "Emergent behaviors are those

forms of action, and the norms, values and beliefs governing those actions, that

rise out of the disaster situation." This chapter discusses previous studies in the

area of crisis leadership and examines the emergent behaviors of leaders under

duress during the mine fire escapes.

Previous Studies

The research on leadership during emergency situations has consisted

mainly of simulation and field studies, with the principal concern being escape

from building fires. During the 1980s, Hayashi [1988] created a computer simulation model to evaluate leader behavior in a fire. Although his purpose was

to aid in planning for disaster prevention, his findings are relevant because they

address the issue of situational leadership in crisis—where a leader changes his

or her behavior to fit the situation. Essentially, his simulation model was designed to judge the actions and thinking of leaders. The simulation was tried by

101 subject/leaders 4 times each. The simulation consisted of a maze containing

the leader, an informal leader, and 50 evacuees. Interestingly, the results indicated that the leader's actions were not dictated by circumstances. Any differences in behavior were attributed to the individual characteristics of each leader.

The study also showed that the worse the situation became, the less individual
167

differences emerged. Hayashi thus concluded that an evacuation plan should not

be based or rely on circumstance, but should consider the anticipated behavior

patterns of leaders.

Sugiman [1984] and Misumi [1988] conducted field tests comparing two

evacuation methods: the Follow-Direction Method and the Follow-Me Method.

The studies took place in an underground shopping mall with volunteer escapees

and confederate leaders. In the first method, the leader indicated the direction

of the exit in a loud voice and by bodily gesture as he moved toward the exit.

In the second, the Follow-Me Method, the leader told a few evacuees to follow

him and then actually proceeded to the exit. To make the evacuation more

complicated, two exits were set up, one not visible from where the evacuees

were located. In addition, the lights were turned off and a siren sounded for

20 seconds before evacuation.

In the first study, the researchers found that the Follow-Me Method

evacuated people more quickly than the Follow-Direction Method, because a

multiple number of small groups formed around each leader. A followup study

focused on leader-evacuee ratio, presuming that the formation of groups would

be different if there were fewer leaders. It was concluded that when each leader

had a small number of evacuees (a 1:4 ratio), the Follow-Me Method was more

effective than the Follow-Direction Method. With fewer leaders and a large

number of evacuees, e.g., a 1:8 ratio, the Follow-Me Method was not effective

because the instructions from the leader did not reach every evacuee.

Misumi and Sako [1982] analyzed leader behavior in emergencies using a

laboratory simulation with one confederate leader and four naive subjects. Results showed that if the leader first attempted to reduce tensions and then indicated the direction to take, the subjects followed more closely than if the

sequence of behaviors was reversed. These authors concluded that panic is reduced by introducing appropriate leadership.

Hodgkinson [1990] noted that panic typically influences behavior in fires.

He defined panic as nonsocial, blind, irrational behavior. His research into almost 1,000 fires, however, found that most people acted appropriately; a mere

5% behaved in such a manner as to increase risk. Johnston and Johnson [1988]

studied the behavior of workers in the 1977 Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in

Kentucky. They supported Hodgkinson's work in the conclusion that panic is

not "automatic" in a disastrous fire and that groups can indeed adjust to meet the

increased demands of a crisis.

Sime [1983] noted that most models of escape behavior support the panic

model of "every man for himself." The panic model says that people will revert

to highly emotional, primitive, self-preservation behavior. Researchers generally

have concluded that individuals will panic and try to save themselves at the expense of others only when a situation is extremely threatening. The panic model

"assumes that escape will involve a homogeneous population of individuals
168

concerned with self-preservation, competing with each other for limited exits"

[Sime 1983]. An alternative model studied by Sime focused on affiliation

behavior during escape from a building fire. His affiliative model predicts that

"individuals with close psychological ties will attempt to escape in groups of two

or more" [Sime 1983]. The affiliative model predicts that in life-threatening escapes individuals will be concerned not only with self-preservation, but will

experience a heightened concern for other group members.

It is clear that there are two different schools of thought on group interaction

in crisis—panic: "every man for himself" versus affiliation or attachment:

"united we are safer." During a simulation study [French 1944, in Sime 1983],

subjects were left in a room and after a short period smoke was leaked into the

room. The results showed that organized groups of sport teams responded more

quickly to the appearance of the smoke than unorganized groups. The presence

of other people, and the type of group threatened, influences responses. Further,

it has been suggested that attachment or affiliative behavior has survival value

[Bowlby 1973, in Sime 1983]. The function of attachment behavior is in gaining

proximity, and consequently, protection from the threat.

Sime studied the 1973 fire that occurred at the Summerland seaside leisure

complex in the United Kingdom. Of 3,000 vacationers, 50 died when a fire,

started by 3 boys playing with matches, engulfed the solarium area. Five hundred accounts of the event were collected by police. In analyzing the data, Sime

targeted four areas: group membership, attachment at cue (cue: signal of the

fire), nature of cue (example: ambiguous, unambiguous), and affiliation at exit.

The results strongly support the affiliation model. Sime concluded that:

In an entrapment setting people maintained as far as possible their ties

with close relatives during escape. In normal evacuations people are

likely to maintain primary group ties. These psychological ties will become even more important rather than disappear in a fire emergency.

Kelley et al. [1965, in Sugiman and Misumi 1988] demonstrated the importance of the emotional aspects of panic. Subjects were placed under a time

pressure and could avoid an electric shock by depressing an escape switch which

only worked if other members of the group were not pushing theirs. The researchers showed that a sign from one or more subjects indicating they would

wait for others to escape increased the number of successful escapes for the

group, i.e., cooperation increased the chances for effective escape. Hodgkinson

[1990] recognized that the interaction among people is important when there is

a choice of exits because people tend to follow the route others are using.

Familiarity behavior in disasters seems to extend beyond affiliation and

escape routes. Johnston and Johnson [1988] hypothesized that disaster roles assumed by individuals within an organization are extensions of the ordinary,
169

everyday roles they normally perform. Johnston and Johnston were interested

in what organizational roles could be expanded to include disaster-related

responsibilities. They concluded that the routine roles of individuals were extended in a crisis and thus the social order was maintained. Canter [1990] echoes this thought: "The social behavior and cognitive processing of individuals

stays remarkably close to what can be seen in ordinary, daily behavior." Thus,

familiarity with organizational roles affects the ability to survive.

Abe [1976] analyzed the behavior of survivors and victims of a fire in a department store in Japan. He discussed three behavior patterns each, of survivors

and victims. The analysis concluded that survival behavior can be more effective with prior knowledge of an area. The research also found that people often

return to the familiar and to habit in times of crisis (e.g., they will return to a

familiar area). This supports Sime's finding that the tendency of individuals and

groups to head towards a familiar route is likely to increase during fires. Abe

noted that, in a crisis situation, people lose flexibility. In addition, Abe found

that in an unfamiliar place, under dire circumstances, many subjects decided that

the only and best thing to do was to follow the person in authority. In this particular department store fire in Japan, this was an unfortunate decision that

resulted in the deaths of many subjects.

Although the majority of research has been on individual behavior under

stress, with group interaction as a secondary research focus, there is some

information on what happens to formal organizations versus small groups under

stress. Driskell and Salas [1991] suggest that organizations under stress tend to

centralize authority. Decisions move to the upper levels of the hierarchy. A study

of small groups under stress, however, found the opposite phenomenon: the group

leaders and group members became more receptive to information from others.

The research on the concept of leadership is vast. As Warren Bennis noted,

"Of all the hazy and confounding areas in social psychology, leadership theory

undoubtedly contends for top nomination. And, ironically, probably more has

been written and less known about leadership than any other topic in the

behavioral sciences. Always it seems the concept of leadership eludes us or

turns up in another form to taunt us again with its slipperiness and complexity

[Smyth 1985]."

Holsti [1990] wrote a chapter on crisis management in the book

Psychological Dimensions of War. Although the focus situations of the text

were political crises, not natural disasters or fires, Holsti's observations about

leadership in crisis are a propos to further understanding the leadership concept

as it applies to escapes from mine fires. The author cites observations of leaders

in action that "appear to confirm the conventional wisdom that in crisis decisionmaking, necessity is indeed the mother of invention." In the mining industry,

most underground workers can attest to the necessity of "invention" on a daily

basis in their dangerous work environment.
170

In a study on perceptions of leadership traits, Morris [1991] compared adolescent and adult leaders. He concluded that "integrity and knowledge or skills,

are traits of leadership highly valued" and that "effective leaders have positive

identities." He characterized them as self-assured, self-actualized, honest, open,

and trustworthy. Another valued trait was knowledge or skills. The adults in

this study considered consistency and flexibility important components of leadership, a finding that suggests a practical, pragmatic, and realistic approach to

problem-solving situations.

In conclusion, the research on leadership during crisis has shown that (1) the

importance of studying leader behavior patterns [Hayashi 1988], (2) leaders can

have a calming influence and be instrumental in helping others avoid panic

[Misumi and Sako 1982], (3) panic is not automatic and indeed individuals have

a tendency to follow the prevailing social order [Hodgkinson 1990; Johnston and

Johnson 1988], (4) people tend to follow the routes of others and familiar paths

[Hodgkinson 1990], (5) attachment/affiliation may have survival value [Sime

1983], (6) cooperation contributes to successful escape [Sugiman and Misumi

1984], (7) people lose flexibility in life-threatening situations [Abe 1976], and

(8) information/knowledge can be significant to survival [Abe 1976].

Finally, it is important for the reader to recognize that simulation exercises

on human crisis behavior raise ethical issues. Exposing subjects to the threat of

electric shock, or an appropriate degree of threat to evoke the panic and fear

necessary for accurate data collection is a concern in this type of research. Furthermore, disaster circumstances are unpredictable. Subjects who have faced

some type of threat subsequently must be questioned carefully because of the

possibility of emotional trauma coloring their responses. In analyzing the data

from the mine fires, researchers focused on the behavior and characteristics of

leaders from the view of the survivors, official reports, and circumstantial data

evaluated after the event.

Profile Characteristics

In the three mine fires studied, there were eight groups of miners that escaped. For each group, a profile of leadership in crisis emerged from the

analysis of the eight mine fire escape scenarios. The data suggest several

characteristics based on the behavior of the leaders. The leader of each escape

may be described as an aware, knowledgeable person or as an individual who

is alert to his environment, attentive, and discerning. Typically, this person

notices details—more so than do other people. The researchers believe that this

quality of discernment probably is not limited to the mine environment or to

crisis circumstances, but is a typical characteristic of these individuals in all

circumstances. Such persons may also excel at incidental learning. Each of the

leaders retained information that was instrumental to the escapes. They
171

"remembered" specific details and repeatedly referred to the fact that they

"knew" what they were doing through information or deduction.

A second generally shared characteristic of the leaders was the manner in

which they took charge. In groups where the regular authority led workers out

of the mine, leadership was a natural evolution of group dynamics. It was a

continuation of the social order before the fire. A similar dynamic occurred,

however, in groups where a definite leader emerged. These emerging leaders did

not "muscle in and take charge"; the leadership developed in a natural way.

Third, the leaders were decisive, yet flexible. They made decisions; yet if

circumstances changed they adapted.

Fourth, leaders were open to input from others. There is evidence that in

most of the escape groups there was a "second lieutenant," an individual who

offered worthwhile suggestions, support, and who served as a "sounding board."

In instances where there was emergent leadership, the leader usually began in a

consulting function to the regular authority.

Fifth, effective leaders seemed to have a calming effect on their group. They

were aware of others' fears and offered reassurance when it was needed. Miners

in each group had confidence in the leader's ability to direct them to safety.

Finally, there was a logic to the leadership. Decisions were appropriate and

congruent with available information.

Findings

Each of the group escapes was unique, but some consensus crisis leadership

characteristics emerged. Technical descriptions of each of the eight escapes are

contained in appendix A. Specific details relative to leadership issues are discussed and supporting evidence for the profile addressed above are organized

according to section and mine.

1 Right - Adelaide

This group was a production crew with a new section foreman who was unfamiliar with the affected area of the mine. In fact, the night of the fire was his

first night back in the mine after a 5-year absence. In addition, at least three

members of the crew were new to the section. While each of the new members

had many years of experience in mining, all had been assigned to this crew for

only 3 weeks.

The foreman, although the authority figure, did not lead their escape. His

behavior was initially appropriate in that he assembled everyone and called the

dispatcher with a proposed escape route. He also called back to the dispatcher

when the escape route was changed. As the group entered heavy smoke, the

foreman simply did not have the knowledge base to make appropriate decisions.
172

The group was accepting of the foreman's inability to lead in the situation

because it was obvious he could not possibly have the appropriate information

on his first night back at the mine. The miner operator from the section gave his

view: "The boss, I can't blame the boss. This was the first time he was on the

section in 5 years." A utilityman from the section expressed a similar sentiment:

"It wouldn't have been [the boss's] fault, it was [his] first day in the mine."

 It was also clear the crew was protective of this authority figure:

I'll say he [the boss] did all he could. He did the best he could. He led

us, you know, to the fresh air escapeway. He made sure we got through

into the return. But as far as being well-versed in the mine, I don't

know. There again, I'd really rather not have to make a statement.

On the night of the fire, a former fire boss was working as the continuous

miner helper on this section. The position of fire boss had required him to travel

throughout the mine, thereby becoming familiar with the mine layout, including

the escapeways. As the group's escape progressed, this former fire boss emerged

as the leader. Interviews with other members of the group documented this leadership. The former fire boss began his emergence as leader by consulting with the

authority figure, the section foreman, making suggestions and advising on

alternative actions. The fire boss viewed himself as working with the foreman.

When directly asked in his interview who led the group out, he responded that

although probably the other members of the group would suggest he did, actually

he and the foreman led the group out. A bratticeman indicated that the fire boss

"was saying what we could do" and the foreman was "like making the decisions."

When asked if there was any confusion among the men about leadership, the

bratticeman said, "It was pretty much follow [the fire boss] and the boss."

After sizing up the situation, the fire boss suggested that the group might

escape by traveling through the bleeder entries to Peterson Shaft on the other

side of the mine (see figure 2.1). This suggestion was not accepted by the group,

and he chose not to push the idea. Instead, the fire boss explored other possibilities with the group. His behavior at this point indicates decisiveness and

flexibility of thinking in crisis. The fire boss said:

You know, I was thoroughly against going down it. But like I said,

I knew, you know, I wasn't going to go by myself down there. If I'd

have had to, I would have. If I'd just been by myself, I would have went

across. But I knew half them guys would want to walk right into a

bleeder. I knew they would...and so I stuck with the guys.

In short, the fire boss tried to get the miners to go deeper into the mine to

explore another exit, but because they had only one frame of reference—to "get
173

out"—they could not conceptualize going farther into the mine. The continuous

miner operator said "[the fire boss] wanted to go back but nobody said, yeah,

let's do that. I think their main concern was, let's get out."

At this point, the group entered the left return airway of the section. Just

after getting into the return, the fire boss had trouble with his self-contained selfrescuer (SCSR) and told the group to go on ahead, figuring that they would

know where to go from there. A few moments later, several members of the

group got lost by following reflective markers they thought led to an escapeway,

but in fact marked a bleeder entry examination route which led to another part

of the mine. The fire boss had to reassemble the group and told them:

Keep the stoppings to your left...if you don't see one, go over till you do

find one, and then always have the stoppings to the left of you...I told

them, ignore the reflectors, because you are going to get lost.

This advice is an example of this leader's awareness of the mine environment.

It was clear by the conclusion of the group's escape that the fire boss was in

charge. When one miner did not come out into fresh air with the rest of the

group, it was the fire boss who said "we will go back for him" and went back

into the smoke with two other miners to look for their missing buddy. "You

couldn't see nothing...They [two other miners] said they wanted to go back with

me. So we went back." Because of the thick smoke, the fire boss told the two

miners with him to hang on to a water pipe as they worked their way back to

where they believed their buddy became lost. At strategic locations, the fire

boss positioned the other two miners with him so that they would know where

to make turns to get back out. Again, he took the responsibility of leader, utilizing his knowledge and giving directions. Everyone in this group successfully

evacuated the mine, even though the missing miner followed another route of

travel with which he was familiar.

2 Northwest Main - Adelaide

This group, a production crew, was alerted to the fire, gathered together

under the foreman's direction, and rode the mantrip until they entered heavy

smoke. At this point, the foreman decided to take the crew back to the section

and over to the intake escapeway. As they proceeded out the intake escapeway,

they encountered smoke again. The foreman then led the crew into the right-side

return aircourse, which was also the secondary escapeway. Again the crew encountered smoke. At this time they donned their SCSRs and proceeded out of

the mine on foot through the return escapeway. This crew epitomized the value

of correct procedures in evacuation and basically escaped without incident.

A bolter operator from the section summarized the group's experience:
174

We were about as organized as you're going to get. We did real good.

We have a mine rescue man that's been on mine rescue for years. He

was with us. He's our buggyman and we had the boss and the mine

rescue man set it up, the boss in front, he was in the rear. The crew was

in the middle. Worked fine, no problem at all.

The authority figure, the section foreman, was the leader and worked with

the "second lieutenant," the individual with mine rescue experience. The crew

viewed "the boss and the other guy" as the leaders, and the two men saw themselves as working in tandem. When asked who made the decision to put on the

SCSRs when they ran into smoke the second lieutenant answered:

Well, like I say, ...maybe we hit it together, simultaneously, let's say,

hey, ...we got to get these people on their oxygen now!

The only problem this group experienced occurred when the miners put on

their SCSRs. One miner felt his SCSR was not functioning. The leader dealt

with this problem by offering to trade SCSRs. The continuous miner operator

described the situation:

That one guy was nervous. He didn't think his worked right. I remember the boss saying, well, do you want mine then? Because there was

nothing much the matter with it. He was just being nervous.

Another man became panicky when his rescuer also appeared not to work. The

second lieutenant calmed him, blew into the apparatus to start it, and said, "It's

just like kissing you, you old bastard." The leader also made the group slow

down so that they did not need as much oxygen and would not overwork the

apparatus. A bratticeman described his experience:

And it seemed like the harder you used, you know, it seemed like you

wasn't getting the right amount of air out of them. But then [the boss]

said, just slow the pace down.

This knowledge of the operation of the SCSRs and consequent adaptability of

behavior is a quality of an aware individual.

The leader's behavior also had a calming effect on the crew. This calming

was evident in the interviews with the subjects from the group. When asked if

the group stopped along the way, several miners commented:

Yeah, we stopped different times—one guy fell down. I pulled him back

up. He fell down. He was a little red and hysterical there a little bit of the
175

time. And we stopped and the boss talked to him and calmed him down.

We stopped periodically, if anybody was having problems. We'd stop and

check. Not long, but long enough to talk and see where to go and calm

down.

And like I said, the boss, between him and whatcha-call-it, he more or

less kept everybody level-headed, you know, like, well, at least not have

no panic and everybody take off, you know.

The boss said, "We got to put these (SCSRs) on fellows. This is no

drill. Put them on but everybody stay calm, and we'll just take our time

and we'll walk out. We'll be all right."

We all stuck together real well. You know, if I got too far or [the miner

who] was with me, he'd get out in front of me and if we got too far, the

boss or somebody just said, take a break and the one guy was having

trouble and he said you know, that he needed to rest some and we just

stopped and rested with him.

The leader of the group who was also the authority figure was decisive, logical in his leadership behavior, had a calming influence, and was knowledgeable.

All members of this group evacuated the mine without undue difficulty.

3 Left - Adelaide

Most members of the production crew making up this group had been

working together for some time. There were three new members on the section

the night of the fire, but each was an experienced miner who had worked in other

sections of Adelaide Mine. A utilityman who had been with the crew since the

section was started noted:

We had some people come and people go, but the majority had been

together for at least probably 21⁄2 years.

Despite their history of working as a crew, these miners did not escape as one

cohesive group. Instead, they spread out forming a fast subgroup, a slow subgroup, and by the end of their evacuation there were two miners in the middle.

After learning of the fire, the section foreman warned the crew and they

gathered at the dinner hole. At this point, most of the miners did not think that

they were in danger:
176

That did come up, how it (the belt) could catch fire when it wasn't

running. You know, but still that hasn't sunk into us that it was burning

that hard.

In contrast to other groups where the foreman attempted to calm the miners

during the escape, this foreman tried to impress upon the group the seriousness

of the situation. According to the utilityman:

The foreman said, "Hey, look, this is serious shit. You know, we got to

get out of here." And then everybody started saying, well, maybe it is

burning that hard. But it was still hard to believe it was.

The crew began their escape by traveling outby on the mantrip. When they

encountered smoke in the track entry, the miners got off the mantrip, distributed

the SCSRs, and planned on going into the intake escapeway. At this point, some

miners "took off" and the group began to separate. One miner commented:

They started passing the self-rescuers out and everybody just started

taking one and that's how...we got spread out.

The front group saw themselves as leading the way:

So we were more or less in the front, leading the way and the foreman

was back with some of the other people...We were the ones that were

picking the escapeway out.

When the miners hit smoke in the intake escapeway, they moved to the right

return aircourse which was the secondary escapeway, but still had to contend

with heavy smoke. The crew continued down the return and crossed one overcast. At a second overcast, the group experienced fear beyond that of any other

escape group:

I was the first one there. I had like one guy on either side of me, walked

up there to the overcast and I stepped right into it. And it was like a

black wall. It was like burning fifty tires and trying to walk through it...

And I said we can't go that way. So we walked out and there was

some—I know there was doors in those overcasts. I said, the intake's

here someplace. All we've got to do is find it. And you'd open up the

door and it'd just billow out; and you'd open up another door, and it

would billow out. And that's when we had a little team meeting; that's

when people really started getting tight. It was like, which way do we

go?...And I remember asking the foreman as we opened up the door, it
177

looked like it was a black river running by. That's how thick it was.

And I said, "Was that the intake?" He said, "Yeah," and—it's not real

registered in my head—I remember, "It can't be! It couldn't have burned

through already!"

The amount of smoke in the intake and other aircourses led the miners to believe

that all exits were blocked by fire. In this case, knowledge about the mine and

its ventilation patterns hindered rather than helped those miners with this

information. It was later discovered that a door had been left open and the

smoke was not following the usual mine ventilation pattern. At the time of their

escape, however, the crew had no way of knowing this and logically assumed the

fire was blocking all exits.

The group then walked back into the mine, toward the faces, searching for

a door into another entry. Near the mouth of the section, the miners in the

became lost. The miner operator said:

We got confused and started going back into the section till we run into

the first door and we just made a complete circle and come right back

to that main overcast again.

It is important to note that the boss was not in the lead when the group got lost;

the group in the front had gone off in the wrong direction.

The crew stopped, realizing that they were lost. The foreman probably

figured at that point that the fire was between the crew and any chance of

escape. With a door left open, the smoke was entering areas of the mine that

"made no sense." In this situation, the foreman's knowledge of the mine confused him because seeing smoke in the return indicated to him that the whole

mine was on fire, or at least fire was blocking all of the exits. It appears that this

analysis made him too upset to make a clear decision on the direction to travel.

The miner operator yelled at the foreman, telling him to calm down so that he

could think about their escape:

Then I myself told the boss—I said, "[Boss], get your composure and

get us the hell out of here. We're all scared you know."

The miner operator continued, explaining that at this point the section foreman

pulled himself together and demonstrated his knowledge of the section and his

awareness of his surroundings, saying:

"This pile of dirt shouldn't be here." I think he said right or left—I don't

remember—but he said, "This pile of dirt shouldn't be here."
178

This information was all that was needed to point the group in the right

direction.

After getting back on track, the front subgroup took off again. The section's

utilityman seemed to take charge of this subgroup to some degree. He was the

individual who initially asked questions and made suggestions ("Can't we do

this, can't we do that?") and potentially could have filled the "second

lieutenant's" role, but did not. Instead, this person went with the faster miners

and left the foreman and slower people behind.

As mentioned before, the front group saw themselves as leading the way.

The slower group, however, did not see it that way. The miner helper said:

I told them come on, why don't you guys wait for...One of them said,

"This is every man for himself." People were scared, do you know what

I mean?

One of the bolter operators commented:

Everyone was together. Then when we got to the return, why someone

just took off, you know, never waited on anybody. They panicked and

got scared. That's the worst thing in the world to do. Everybody should

stick together.

Toward the end of the escape, one of the roof bolter operators was having

a great deal of difficulty and the slower group stayed behind with him. The

operator's buddy described what happened:

I was the last one in line and [the bolter operator], I don't know how old

he is, he's probably between 55 and 60 years old. I don't know, but

I could hear him starting to have trouble breathing in his device (SCSR).

And it sounded to me like he was hyper-ventilating himself. He was

trying to out-breathe the device. That's what it sounded like to me.

I talked to myself, this man is going to go down and when I started to

think that he did go down. He fell onto the ground and I spit out my

mouthpiece on my unit and I hollered as loud as I could, I need help

here. This man's down. Only two people came back. I said there was

either 9 or 10 of us going out in a single-file line and I was the last and

I hollered as loud as I could and only two people came back. That was

the boss and [another miner].

This splitting of the crew resulted in two miners finding themselves in the

middle, between the faster and slower groups. Neither heard the bolter operator

call for help and did not know a man was down. These miners continued on, as
179

did the faster group, unaware of the problem behind them. All of the miners

eventually continued out to fresh air.

The section foreman, the authority in the group, started out in control but

eventually lost it and never recovered the authority position with his group. The

utilityman characterized the foreman as:

Excitable...yeah...but he's not to the point of panic or anything like that.

He still keeps his composure about it but he's kind of a high-strung guy.

That would be more of a term to put on him.

Continuing later in his interview, the utilityman said:

I do remember the boss was quite excitable and I remember the miner

operator telling him, "Now, you're a foreman. Get your shit together.

Now where the hell are we at?"

Instead of any one person fulfilling the role of leader, various members of

the group displayed some of the characteristics of a leader. The foreman took

control of the situation initially and used his knowledge to get the group back on

track after they had become lost. The utilityman seemed to assume some leadership of the faster subgroup and directed them to don their SCSRs. When the

foreman seemed to be losing his ability to make logical decisions, the miner

helper calmed him down. At another point, one of the bolter operators took the

lead and went to explore the way over an overcast. A bratticeman on the section

that shift, one of the two miners in the middle, assumed the role of assisting the

other, who was older and having some difficulty.

The dynamics of the escape for this group were foreshadowed when the

SCSRs were distributed and people simply took off. One group member

explained the lack of discussion saying:

Our crew, most of them have a good bit of time in the mine and it was

just—as soon as we run into smoke, that was the first thing everybody

thought, get into the escapeway.

Throughout the escape, no one person was looked to as the leader. When

queried as to who was making the decisions, the miners of this group provided

various answers, resulting in no consensus.
180

4 South - Brownfield

This group consisted of a production crew plus a mine inspector who was

in the section the day of the fire. The authority figures in this escape group were

the section foreman and the mine inspector. As it happened, these two

individuals knew each other and jointly led the escape. The section supplyman

commented:

The boss and the inspector was there, and they were discussing which

way to go—which would be the best way to get out. So they decided it

would be down the belt. We all went down the belt.

This group, like the 3 Left crew at Adelaide Mine, had a split escape but with

dynamics and leadership characteristics dissimilar to those of 3 Left crew. The

major problem in the faster group, led by the foreman, was with breathing

through the SCSRs because they were moving so fast. The slower group, led by

the inspector, had a miner who experienced breathing problems and was

continually falling down. Toward the end of the escape, he fell a final time, was

left behind by the other miners, and was later rescued.

The foreman felt and assumed responsibility for the men but was

strengthened by the support of the inspector. An indication of how well the two

men worked together is found in both of their interviews. The inspector, when

asked who was in charge, replied:

I didn't feel like I was in charge, [he] is the section foreman but anything

either of us said or did, I've got a lot of respect for [him]. I know [him].

Anything he said I didn't question. Anything that it appeared I said, he

didn't question and anything that either of us said wasn't, like I said,

there was never once any talk. Even when it came down to who's going

to go with the fast men and who's going to go with the slow men, there

was never no discussion. It was just one of us said what we'll do, and

we did it.

Commenting on his leadership role, the section foreman noted:

Well, I'm responsible for them. I didn't want them splitting up. I was

glad the inspector was there because I felt he's going to watch these

people and I'm going to watch the other group...I wanted to stay in the

back and know where my people are. That was my first concern. I just

didn't like the idea, but didn't want them taking off the way they were.

I was afraid, you know. I can't sit on them.
181

The above explanation documents that the foreman was decisive, yet

flexible. During the escape, some of the men began to take off and the foreman

was concerned, yet aware enough to know how frightened the men were. The

inspector understood the dynamic too, and although against accepted

"evacuation policy" of not splitting up a group, considered the decision to allow

the faster men to go ahead with the supervisor.

The manner in which the inspector, who functioned as the "second

lieutenant" in the group, communicated the fire to one of the crew is evidenced

in the following comment from a bratticeman:

So I started to pick up my tools. He [the inspector] said, "leave the tools

behind, don't worry about them, let's get out of here," and with his

advice and his quickness and alertness, I became aware that it was

serious.

Initially, some of the miners took off immediately ("they ran like deer"), but

were stopped by the supervisor who "made them wait till everybody was there

so we had everybody before we started." Both leaders responded calmly.

It is interesting to note the behavior of the inspector when the man in the

slower group continued to fall:

I know at one point...I said let's stop and take a minute and the man is

sitting there and the mechanic was still with us and I recall looking at

my watch, and I thought we had been under oxygen, I believe, it was

20 minutes at this time and I knew we still had a ways to go.

The inspector was continually evaluating the situation and reasoning alternatives, similar to the other group leaders. This same individual made a prophetic

observation when the men were first putting on their SCSRs:

I looked around to make sure they were starting to put theirs on and

when I looked over and saw the bigger man—that's about the first time

I started getting a little worried because he was shaking somewhat

severely, his hands were, you know, very noticeably trembling and I just

thought to myself, "Oh, boy." I said, "I think we are going to have

trouble because he's having a hard time."

This miner was a large man who weighed in excess of 250 pounds. When

he went down the final time, the inspector was in a serious dilemma:

I don't recall how far, but I know I was struggling with this man and

I know he was making me tired and I hadn't had any problem up until
182

this point but when I looked down, I realized the bags in my SCSR were

flat and I know here again I thought, boy, there was no discussion about

it, but the section foreman and those other guys, they're probably way

ahead of us by now and here I'm back here with this guy and he having

all this trouble and now I'm having trouble breathing and breathing was

getting harder and harder. I didn't think to look at my watch, but I didn't

know, had I exhausted the machine (SCSR) or was I running the same

problems as this man? I was using more, you know, demanding more

out of the machine than it was giving. I knew I was working a lot harder

now and I started getting concerned about that now too and I guess we

continued. I continued with this man. We finally came to a high spot

and, like I said, I was still having—I was taking as much outside air in

as I was out of the machine...I realized how this man is now because my

machine is not giving me air or what, but when we got to the high spot,

I knew exactly where we were because from traveling the belt, I knew

we were at the intake over where they had cut the overcast for the intake

and the man that was having so much trouble, he's down again. He

looked at [the mechanic]. I saw him look at [him] and he said, "You

guys go. You just leave me here." He said, "I can't go no more." He

said, "I'm just going to stay here." I looked at the other guy and I said,

"I got to go." I said, "There is no sense in me staying"...I said, "I can't

breathe now." I said, "I know where I'm at. I can send somebody back.

I'll go out and get somebody."

In desperate circumstances, the inspector continued to follow what seemed to

him a logical path. In recounting his story, the inspector noted that although he

would like to have thought he was in control, he realized he was not. Each

leader had taken an extra SCSR. Although the inspector was running out of

oxygen, he forgot he was carrying an extra SCSR ("Maybe I'd taken too much

smoke.") This point emphasizes the severity of the situation. The inspector got

to fresh air, saw the foreman, and told him of the miner who was down. The

foreman said, "He's my boy," and went back in for him. In the meantime, the

miner who was down was left alone. The final person who had been trying to

assist this miner decided he was:

Not going to make it, I'm going to try and get out. So I started out and

I was only about a hundred foot from [him] when I came through the

overcast and I opened the door and I saw No. 7 and I thought, good, this

is fresh air, or this is a, you know, the way out...So I thought, "Well, I'm

going back in to get [him]."
183

Actually, this miner was mistaken about his location. However, while he was

trying to convince the miner who was down that they could reach safety, the

foreman arrived. Together they got the miner going again and out of the smoke.

Everyone was then accounted for.

 Several leadership questions emerge in relation to this group: Should they

have come out together? Should the leaders have insisted on more unity, or had

better control over the group to facilitate a cohesive group evacuation? The

inspector responded to the inquiry about split groups by stating that there were

two individuals who could show leadership and if you have two groups, "don't

hinder the one group because of the problems of the other group." Clearly,

despite the split escape, there was decisive leadership by both individuals in this

group.

5 South - Brownfield

The group, a production crew, was led out of the mine by their section

foreman and a roof bolter operator. A shuttle car operator remarked:

[The foreman] is our boss. He knew—he done right. He got us on the

right track and kept us on the right track. Between him and [the bolter

operator].

Again, the leadership in this group was basically the authority figure, with the

particular assistance of one of the men, a roof bolter operator, but with input of

others. This group, after an uneven beginning, ultimately stuck together, even

though there were several older miners in the group and one person who had

continual difficulties breathing with his SCSR.

After being alerted to the smoke, the crew assembled and began its

evacuation. Two miners, both bratticemen, ran ahead of the others in the group.

A bolter operator noted that one of the men said at this time:

"Come on, let's go. We got to get out this way." And he took off. Well,

he took off and went down like—and he was leading the pack, okay.

When we got down to where the regulator was at and put the selfrescuers on, you know, that's when [the boss] took over. But that's one

of the things that I told [him] later on, I says, "You're the boss. One

thing you got to do if this ever happens again, you should have a man

that's in charge that's going to take his time and walk out of there slow

and easy with his SCSR on."

In the course of the escape, the bolter operator assumed the role of advisor to the

foreman. One miner explained why the two men took the lead initially:
184

See, bratticemen know pretty much what's going on, where everything

is at. I'd say the two bratticemen up there pretty much took the lead

out—pretty much took us out.

When asked who took the lead in the group, one of the bratticemen said:

Well, me and my buddy, 'cause we knew everything, every place up

there. Some of the bosses don't know their way around, and I've been

in that place for eight—near nineteen years.

Both bratticemen felt they had the knowledge to lead, yet they took off, traveling

too fast for the group. They were unaware of the needs of other members of the

group and the surrounding circumstances. This behavior is not characteristic of

effective leaders. In this case, the foreman stayed in the back to assist the slower

individuals.

At one point, the foreman left the slower miners to check the mandoors

ahead hoping to find clear air. As the foreman opened one door, he saw thick

smoke:

Right then, panic hit, believe me. 'Cause all the teaching and training

everything, these are all supposed to be separate splits. Well, the first

thing that goes through your mind is everything is burning. In my

opinion, there was no sense in even trying to get [out, but] you're still

thinking—so I come back.

This leader, although voicing his consideration of giving up when he thought the

whole mine was on fire, rapidly moved on to explore alternatives ("you're still

thinking").

When the foreman returned to the group, the group members were panicky.

He felt everything was out of control at that moment and he knew the group was

in trouble. The men had decided that they would wait only 10 minutes for him

to return, indicative of the anxiety and the need to "do something".

I told the guys, I said, you guys want to try to make it over there and

before I said much more...the bratticeman said, "We're ahead of the

smoke. Let's go." Well, right then—well, everybody seen the smoke

here. That's when there was not much control, you know, everybody

started just going.

Again the group spread out somewhat, the foreman staying behind with the

slowest group members. The section foreman responded when one of the men

"took his self-rescuer off and threw it out. [The man] said he couldn't breathe
185

out of it, so I helped him get the little one (filter self-rescuer) off his belt and got

it open. He couldn't even open that one, but he got to breathing in it."

The leader of this group made sure everyone was supervised during the

escape by taking a position toward the back of the group. He was concerned

about the slower men and about someone going down. When the group entered

fresh air, everyone was accounted for.

6 West - Brownfield

This group consisted of three individuals, including a maintenance foreman

and a mechanic who usually worked together, plus a State mine electrical

inspector. The only interviewee from this escape group was the maintenance

foreman, who assumed the leadership role. The mine inspector, although an outsider, represented authority and at first exercised that authority. When apprised

of the fire, the maintenance foreman initially wanted to ride out on a mantrip, but

the inspector said no. When asked about the inspector's reason for this, the

maintenance foreman said, "Well, it could cause an explosion he said, for one

thing. I mean, we were on the damn thing when he says no."

The maintenance foreman, the authority in this group, went along with the

mine inspector until the group hit heavy smoke. He then decided the appropriate

escape route and "they never disagreed." When the group encountered the heavy

smoke they searched for a mandoor in an overcast but could not find it. The

maintenance foreman knew they had to go back and he told this to the other two

men:

I knowed where I was going here in this case, so I mean I knowed

exactly where I wanted to get to.

This was an important moment in the leadership dynamics of the group, a natural

evolution based on knowledge, logic, and decisiveness. The maintenance

foreman continued:

I mean, the inspector, when I turned around and said, "We got to go

back," he says, "No," and I says, "You can do what you want to do, I'm

going back." I said, "You can follow me or do what you want." At that

point I didn't give a damn who followed me or who didn't. I was getting

out of a heavy concentration.

It is interesting to note that the next day the maintenance foreman returned to the

area of the mine to find the door; it was there where he "knew" it should be.

The maintenance foreman did not lead thinking only of his own safety.

During the entire escape he was attentive to the rest of the group. He said:
186

I was in the lead all the while and I mean, I knowed they were in back

of me. I mean, if one of them would have dropped back, we would have

gone back and got him, or tried to anyway.

This leader had a critical piece of information that none of the other groups

had: he knew exactly where the fire was. When the fire boss called to alert

them about the fire, the maintenance foreman had asked where the fire was:

I was the only one out of the guys that knowed where the fire was...and

the reason for that is I took and asked [the fire boss] where the fire was.

The maintenance foreman was the only person in all eight groups who knew the

exact location of the fire and knew that the group had to travel past the fire to

escape. He also knew that the return aircourse was double timbered; there were

two rows of posts supporting the roof. He was aware that as long as they walked

between the timbers with the beltline on the left, they would pass the fire.

At one point in the escape, this group was passing under an overcast and

heard footsteps overhead. It was the crew from 5 South:

I heard them coming over the overcast, and then I was relieved a little

bit because I knowed that boss coming with that crew was real familiar

with the mine. I was familiar with it, but not like him.

Knowing that the other crew was going in the same direction increased the

maintenance foreman's confidence. The three individuals in this group then

continued down the 6 West return aircourse to safety.

7 Butt - Cokedale

This group, under the supervision of a construction foreman, was assigned

to relocate a power center on the section. The construction foreman, the authority figure, took charge and led the group out of the mine. Although this group

experienced some problems during their escape, the group members never lost

confidence in their leader and his ability to manage a successful escape. This

individual had set up the ventilation for the section and, according to a motorman on the section the night of the fire, the foreman "knew which way to go...we

just followed him 'cause he, he knew the area." A mechanic working in the

section said:

I felt pretty confident though because I knew [the construction foreman]

had been up there for a long time walking returns and this and that and

he was real familiar with the area.
187

The construction foreman was aware and knowledgeable as evidenced by the

comments of another mechanic on the section:

We were lucky because we had [the construction foreman] and he just

spent a whole, he probably just spent 6 months in that return, posting it

and cleaning it up, so we really didn't have any trouble with the return

and we basically had enough knowledge of the area.

The leader himself indicated his knowledge of the mine in that everybody:

Was asking me where we were at, what direction we were headed. And

with the information that I had, because the biggest part of this I set up;

the ventilation, the overcast and so on, the return escapeway. And

I knew first hand, you know what direction we were in, where the

mandoors were at.

The group's faith in the foreman continued even when some major problems

were encountered early in their evacuation. When notified of the fire, the construction foreman gathered the group together and the crew began their escape

in three vehicles: a lead jeep, the foreman's jeep, and a portal bus. When the

group encountered smoke in the track entry, they experienced two vehicle

wrecks, one of which actually knocked the construction foreman and another

miner off their vehicle. In the wreck, the miner lost his hard hat and cap lamp

and had to escape without them. This became a problem, since the miner was

continually hitting his head against the mine roof on the way out. In addition,

this miner pulled the SCSR that he was about to don out of its carrying case.

The SCSR could not be reattached to the case, resulting in the device having no

carrying straps. To help this miner carry the device, another miner used

electrical tape to fasten the SCSR to his buddy's chest. Since SCSRs tend to get

very warm with use, the miner also had to contend with this discomfort.

During the escape, the construction foreman remained aware of the condition of others in the group and responded to a miner who was having trouble

with his SCSR. When the construction foreman said to put on the SCSRs,

a wireman said:

I was like shakin' like a leaf, couldn't get the damn thing open. And he

finally come up to this control and said, "Here, pop this, stick this in

your mouth."

It is of interest to note that, whereas in some of the other groups there was

a "second lieutenant," in this group the construction foreman was totally in

charge:
188

I was a foreman in charge of that area, and when I said to these people

what we had to do, there was no second-guessing my decision. These

people were counting on my knowledge that this was right and there was

no second-guessing it. I had no problem with these people as far as my

decision...I didn't ask for information or input from anybody else. That

was my decision that we were gonna take this course to get out.

The foreman was authoritarian, but did not act as a dictator; he told the

group the what and why of his decisions. He remarked:

I think that once they knew where they were, the direction that they

headed, where they were going to come out at and get into a fresh air

area, it kinda eased their minds as to knowing. Basically, they knew

how long it would take to walk to these different locations and they

knew that there would be communications to the surface at these

locations. And it pretty much eased their minds.

Leadership of the group was decisive, informed, logical, and confident. All

group members safely evacuated the mine.

8 Face Parallels - Cokedale

This group was not normally a working group, and none of the members

were involved in coal production. Members of the group typically performed

maintenance or support tasks and were doing construction work and moving

supplies in the section at the time of the fire. In addition, there happened to be

two motormen in the section delivering rails when notified of the fire. Normally,

these individuals worked on their own across many areas of the mine.

 This group was effectively out of control most of the time during their

escape. The foreman, the authority figure, was not in control, and there was

considerable notation of blame and emotion evidenced in the interviews of this

group. The manner in which the group donned their SCSRs was indicative of

the lack of leadership. When asked who decided it was time to put them on,

a mechanic responded, "Well, I think everybody decided together but, you know,

I already had mine on." Another miner said he kept asking, "Should we put

these on?" and the foreman never answered. The regular authority figure, the

foreman, proved to be a poor leader. As a mechanic described:

The guys were more or less talking amongst themselves, and I said,

"You know, this is real serious and this boss if we're not careful he's

going to get us killed."
189

A trackman with the group was not familiar with the section and became

concerned:

I can understand how people could be excited and you know, improper

decisions could be made. But, you know, it kept snowballing. You

know, his improper decisions that he was making, you know. I was

getting more and more negative about following this man as we went...

I'm not saying that I was the only person that was cognizant that [the

boss] didn't know what he was doing. I believe everybody had some,

you know, at some level had that feeling. But the fear level was starting

to rise.

A mechanic remarked:

There was a lot of confusion...the [foreman] couldn't figure out how to

get into the intake escapeway...a lot of the guys started getting kind of

real, losing a lot of confidence in him.

A leader who fit the profile characteristics did emerge: he was knowledgeable and discerning, his leadership evolved, and he was responsive to

others in the group. The miner who emerged as leader began in the "second

lieutenant" position as an advisor. He "knew" based on an odor that there was

something wrong. There was an odor and some smoke and he said to another

miner, "Turn that machine off, there is something bad wrong here." This miner

was acutely aware and noted numerous details while continually processing

information. He could "hear that the power center was on," and that confused

him.

A general inside laborer (GIL) at the time of the fire, this miner was a former

maintenance foreman and knew that the power center should not be on. He was

one of the first to recognize the gravity of the situation while the rest of the

group were speculating what was on fire. The GIL knew by the amount of

smoke that the fire was not just a trolley wire hanger burning. He recognized

that the men were getting upset, and as he explained:

I am a personal friend of [the foreman] and...the situation, I wanted to

talk to [him] but I did not want other people to hear what I wanted to tell

him because people were getting upset right off the get-go...I was

thinkin' of people I can count on...I guess you would say that it was kind

of a feeling of if you were in an airplane and you had to count on

someone to hold that parachute for you could you count on that person.
190

During the group's escape, this miner was continually evaluating the

situation. A further example of this was when he discussed his concern that the

men were struggling:

If these guys start droppin', there is no way we, the three of us can pick

up three other guys and carry them and get through these old workings,

there's no way. So then I'm thinking well the next steps we're gonna

have to start barricading ourself, that's all.

The GIL told the interviewer that when the group was in the returns in heavy

smoke, he was looking for footprints. He knew that the returns had to be walked

periodically by the fire bosses who examine the area for hazards. The GIL said:

When I see footprints I feel better...Somebody was through here already,

there is only one set going out. So chances are that if there was a return

set of footprints, I would think somebody had to turn around because it's

blocked.

This route, in fact, led the group to safety.

The leader of this group was conscious of the behavior of other members

and careful in how he presented his advice to them. When some members of the

group left their lunch buckets behind, he was concerned.

How can I say it? Being a foreman for 8 years, it's hard not to say things

sometime...I could see things going on that was wrong, especially the

discarding [of the buckets]. So I would say, "I sure wouldn't throw that

away." I wouldn't say, "Don't throw that away, you don't know how

long we're going to be here or what's going to happen."

The statement above characterized this general inside laborer who had once

been a foreman. He presented himself as the foreman's helper during his

interview, whereas the other members of the group clearly indicated their

foreman was inept and that the GIL led them out. He placed himself in a peer

relationship with the group and a peer relationship with the foreman. In his

interview, the foreman quoted the GIL often and was resplendent with the

sentiment: "I should have." At one point the foreman stated, "I plain freely

admit, I screwed up."

Discussion

A comparison of the three mine sites revealed no evidence of differences

among the sites that would be relevant to this study. There were no appreciable
191

disparities in communication, emergency systems, firefighting response, safety

issues, or subject demographics. Leadership in the eight groups thus will be

compared across mines without bias.

Among the persons who led each of the eight groups to safety, five of the

group leaders were the regular person in charge (usually the foreman) and three

individuals emerged as leaders during the groups' escapes. As described

previously, analysis revealed consensus characteristics which, taken together,

create a leader profile. The individuals who assumed positions of leadership

during the underground mine fires fit a profile that included the following

characteristics:

• Aware, knowledgeable

• Decisive, yet flexible

• Open to input from others

• Calming influence; gained followers' confidence

• Logical decision-makers

• Allowed leadership to develop naturally

The reasons that leaders emerged other than the regular authority varied in

each of the three groups. In the case of the group from 1 Right at Adelaide, it

was the foreman's first night on the job. He maintained his authority in the

group but was recognized as incapable of leading because he was not familiar

with the mine. For the group from 3 Left at Adelaide, there was a split escape

and no clear leader emerged. The third emergent leader, found in the group that

escaped from 8 Face Parallels at Cokedale, took over when the hierarchal leader

panicked and was ineffective in making decisions.

In examining the instances where there was a lack of leadership from the

authority figures, two characteristics emerged. First, a lack of knowledge

contributed to an individual's inability to guide his group. Second, leaders "lost

personal control" and thus heightened anxiety in their groups. As shown in the

group from 1 Right, a lack of knowledge did not necessarily result in a loss of

authority. A lack of self-control, however, was more likely to have such an

outcome. This seems true even though no evidence of actual panic behavior was

found in any of the authority figures or leaders.

Throughout this analysis, support was found for the affiliation model of

emergency response, as opposed to the panic model. Although there was

evidence of "nonsocial, blind, irrational behavior" as defined by Hodgkinson

[1990], the study reported in this chapter found that the majority of subjects

behaved appropriately and within the accepted social framework. In fact, the

social structure was defended, in several instances beyond reasonable evidence

to the contrary, an example of which can be seen with the group from 8 Face

Parallels. In this group, the members initially continued to turn to the foreman
192

even after he had shown his indecision and evidenced his inability to lead the

escape.

The present study supports previous research in concluding that panic is

reduced by introducing appropriate leadership [Misumi and Sako 1982].

Effective leadership also increased the likelihood of efficient evacuation. As

found in earlier research [Hodgkinson 1990; Sime 1983; Abe 1976], the miners

tended to head for a familiar route and/or follow the route others were using. In

all cases, the group's first direction of travel and mode of transportation chosen

were those used in routine trips out of the mine. Numerous times throughout the

interviews, miners mentioned following the person ahead when the familiar

route became impassable. When a knowledgeable person was in the lead and the

followers had confidence in that person, the evacuation proceeded more

smoothly.

Future Research

Are characteristics identified in the profile presented required for an

individual to fulfill the role of leader during a crisis situation? What if an

individual has some, but not all of the noted characteristics? Some individuals

identified during this study evidenced several, but not all, of the profile

characteristics. Further analyses are needed to determine the fit of these

individuals in the group dynamics and their contributions to the successful

escapes. Another realm of crisis behavior only mentioned in this study is the

influence of leader/follower familiarity on the ability to lead. Is personal

relationship in crisis leadership a component of success or failure? Affiliation

theory suggests that familiarity influences behavior. However, analyses were

not completed to document relationships between leaders and followers prior to

their escapes.

This work supports Hayashi's [1988] emphasis on the study of the

anticipated behavior patterns of leaders as complementary to the study of the

circumstances of disaster escape. Training for response to mine emergencies,

and therefore to other emergency situations as well, should consider the likely

human behavior tendencies. Perhaps work crews should be evaluated to ensure

that at least one person can and would lead the group in the event of an

emergency. These potential leaders may, or may not, be the authority figure who

leads during routine production.

This research suggests that the quality of leadership shown during these

mine evacuations affected the responses of victims and the efficiency of their

escapes. Furthermore, a profile was developed based on the actions and words

of the most successful leaders. Perhaps these findings can be generalized to

other emergency situations. If so, it may be helpful to share the profile with

individuals who could be in positions of authority during a worksite emergency.
193

The profile could be used as a guide for training in leadership development.

Another important finding of this work is the need for explicit communication

about all facts known during an emergency. In these fires, increased knowledge

of the danger allowed better planning for evacuation and for more decisive

actions to be taken. Even in very dangerous situations, knowledge of the problem did not cause miners to panic and act irrationally; instead they continued to

think and act based on all the information available. It is therefore suggested

that training be given to all miners to promote effective leadership and to

reinforce the importance of detailed communication during mine emergencies.

References

Abe K [1976]. The behavior of survivors and victims in a Japanese nightclub fire:

a descriptive research note. Mass Emergencies 1:119-124.

Bardo JW [1978]. Organizational response to disaster: a typology of adaptation and change.

Mass Emergencies 3(2/3):87-104.

Canter D, ed. [1990]. Fires and human behavior. London, U.K.: David Fulton Publishers,

p. 3.

Driskell JE, Salas E [1991]. Group decision-making under stress. J Appl Psychol 76(3):473-

478.

Hayashi O [1988]. A simulation study of leaders behavior in a fire [Translation]. Tokyo,

Japan: Tokyo Institute, Department of Psychology.

Hodgkinson P [1990]. Ways of working with panic. Fire Prev June(23):35-38.

Holsti OR [1990]. Crisis management. In: Gald B, ed. Psychological dimensions of war.

Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 116-142.

Johnston DM, Johnson NR [1988]. Role extension in disaster: employee behavior at the

Beverly Hills supper club fire. Sociolog Focus 22(1):39-51.

Misumi J, Sako H [1982]. An experimental study of the effect of leadership behavior on

followers' behavior of following after the leader in a simulated emergency situation. Japanese J

Exp Social Psychol 22:49-59.

Morris BG [1991]. Perceptions of leadership traits: comparison of adolescent and adult

school leaders. Psycholog Reports 69:723-727.

Sime JD [1983]. Affiliative behavior during escape to building exits. J Environ Psychol 3:

21-41.

Smyth JW [1985]. An educative empowering notion of leadership. Educational Management

and Administration.

Sugiman T, Misumi J [1984]. Action research on evacuation method in emergent situations

II: effects of leader/evacuee ratio on efficiency of follow-direction method and follow-me method.

Japanese J Exp Social Psychol 23(2):107-115.

Sugiman T, Misumi J [1988]. Development of a new evacuation method for emergencies:

control of collective behavior by emergent small groups. J Appl Psychol 73(1):3-10.
194

CHAPTER 10.—FORMAL LEARNING FROM ESCAPE

NARRATIVES THROUGH THE CREATION AND USE

OF TABLE-TOP SIMULATIONS1

This book has employed miners' narratives to illustrate basic concepts about

the escape process. One of the most powerful means by which people make

sense of their experiences is through the telling and internalization of stories

[Bruner 1990]. By couching one's own and others' motives and actions in terms

of a coherent narrative, a person is able to learn from mistakes and plan future

behaviors that may help ensure survival. A growing body of research suggests

that decision-making skills used to deal with emergency situations can be taught

and assessed by simulations based on narratives from the real world [Bransford

et al. 1986; Brecke 1982; Brener 1984; Connolly et al. 1989; Halff et al. 1986;

Jones and Keith 1983; Lacefield and Cole 1986]. Such techniques have been

used to address the decision-making of medical personnel, civil and military

flight crews, and even people involved in broader life events such as political

and military situations [Babbott and Halter 1983; Dugdale et al. 1982; Farrand

et al. 1982; Gilbert 1975; McGuire 1985; McGuire et al. 1976; Flathers et al.

1982; Giffin and Rockwell 1984; Jensen 1982; Janis and Mann 1987]. Given the

validity of this method of study and the promise it holds for helping people

improve the quality of their responses to nonroutine occurrences, it is perhaps

surprising that there have been no studies of emergency decision-making among

blue-collar workers prior to those conducted by the present authors and their

colleagues.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe underground coal miners' decisionmaking performance on a table-top simulation whose problem structure is derived from interviews with a group of eight miners who escaped from the 5 Left

section at Brownfield Mine. The exercise was constructed by a panel of domain

experts (mine safety and rescue personnel) with the assistance of an educational

psychologist. The simulation includes actual predicaments with wise and unwise decision alternatives that, in the opinion of these domain experts, are

characteristic of such escapes. Results reported in this chapter are the scores of

a sample of experienced mine workers who completed the simulation. Because

the exercise is a series of objective performance tasks coupled with detailed and

immediate feedback, this simulation can be used to teach and refresh critical

escape skills, as well as to provide data concerning the proficiency of miners at

the time of exercise administration.

1

A revised version of this chapter has been published as: Cole HP, Vaught C, Wiehagen WJ, Haley JV,

Brnich MJ Jr. [1998]. Decision making during a simulated mine fire escape. IEEE Trans on Eng Management

45(2):153-162.
195

Complexity of Escaping From a Mine Fire

When a fire occurs, miners must make their escape to the surface by seeking

out and traveling accessible routes to a mine portal or shaft. The ventilation system that is designed to bring fresh air to the working faces, carrying away methane and dust in the process, now provides oxygen to a blaze that has a nearly

unlimited supply of coal. Fires therefore may produce very high temperatures,

dense toxic smoke, and, as they burn through stoppings and other ventilation

control devices, unpredictable changes in the direction and velocity of fresh air

moving into the mine. If the mine atmosphere is oxygen-deficient or contaminated with carbon monoxide, as is often the case, miners must promptly and

correctly don emergency breathing apparatus in order to stay alive.

The process of escaping from a mine fire presents myriad predicaments and

requires quick decisions in the face of uncertainty. Information about the location of the fire, conditions in the mine at points along various escape routes,

and the whereabouts and condition of other miners are often unknown. The

choice of evacuation methods may present dilemmas. For instance, riding out

on a mantrip can enable a rapid escape but could ignite a lethal methane explosion if there has been disruption to the ventilation system. Walking out may

forestall a methane explosion, but would require increased time and effort, and

might result in miners becoming lost. When escaping miners make decisions

about these sorts of concerns, many of their subsequent actions are irreversible.

Furthermore, the outcomes of these actions cannot be known until they are

completed. It is evident, therefore, that miners should be prepared to predict as

accurately as possible how future events will be influenced by their choices

among alternative actions.

Need for Research and Training in Mine Escape Decisions

In a review of decision-making theory and research, Halpern [1984] made

the following points: A decision always involves choosing among two or more

competing alternatives. Decisions are made in response to a recognized problem. Yet, unlike traditional academic problem solving, real-world decision-making involves dilemmas in which there is no clear "best" solution to a problem.

Inadequate or conflicting information about alternatives always exists. Risks are

associated with each choice, and these choices, once made, are often irreversible.

The difficulty lies in making judgments about which alternative action is best for

maximizing gain and minimizing loss. The decision-maker must attempt to predict how future events will be influenced by his or her choices and does so in an

atmosphere of uncertainty.

Halpern also noted two additional characteristics of decision-making as

determined from empirical studies. First, even highly trained professionals often
196

make errors in real-world decision-making. Second, when teaching decisionmaking there is a tendency to use case studies where the outcome of persons'

choices are known to those who review the case study, and where the choices of

the persons facing the problem are judged sound or unsound in light of the

outcome (often by reference to some algorithm). However, this type of instruction may be counterproductive, because during the dilemmas faced in realworld decision-making, the choices among alternatives must be made without

knowledge of their effects on outcomes. Good decisions depend on inference

and flexible use of heuristics rather than rigid application of algorithms based

on a post hoc analysis of events.

The information miners are given in their initial classroom training, required

annual refresher training, and mandatory fire drills tends to provide little opportunity for them to engage in problem solving and decision-making [Digman

and Grasso 1981; Cole et al. 1988a,b]. That is because traditional classroom

instruction tends to produce "inert" knowledge rather than "active" knowledge

[Bruner 1990; Cole et al. 1988a,b]. Generally, inert knowledge is presented in

the form of simple rules (algorithms) such as the following: "At the first sign of

smoke, don your FSR and proceed to the [mine evacuation] assembly point."

"Remember the location of the nearest cache of SCSRs (self-contained

self-rescuers) and when you get to them, immediately don an apparatus." "Stay

together at the designated assembly point until your section foreman orders an

evacuation from the mine." "Follow the primary escapeway and stay with the

other members of your group." "If the primary escapeway is impassable, exit

from the mine by the secondary escapeway." "If escape is not possible, find a

good place to barricade, then barricade and wait for rescue."

In actual emergency situations, many factors may prevent the simple application of these rules. For example, although miners are drilled that they

should all gather at designated assembly points to begin their evacuation, during

actual fires some workers are usually missing and do not arrive at the assembly

point. In this event, the gathered miners must decide whether to wait for their

missing coworkers, conduct a search, or leave without them. If and when all of

the workers are assembled on a working section, they must still decide which

routes and methods will be used to leave the mine. Miners are taught that they

should stay together when they evacuate, but if a section crew is forced to walk

out of the mine, the crew members may have to hurry or risk becoming trapped

by the fire. Often, travel is difficult because of low seam height, poor footing,

and heavy smoke. Because of individual differences in physical fitness, some

miners will always be able to travel faster than others, yet the possibility that

individuals may fall behind is rarely addressed in miner training classes, or

during fire drills in the mine.

When individual differences do enter the equation, what ought miners do?

Should the entire group travel as slow as the slowest crew member and thus risk
197

having their SCSRs run out of oxygen, or risk becoming trapped? Should the

group split up, allowing the most able to escape, and perhaps get help for their

slower coworkers? A confounding factor is that on many mining sections there

are only one or two persons who fully understand the complex escape routes out

of the workplace. During an escape, when the smoke becomes thick and the

crew is strung out along several hundred feet, what can be done to make sure the

persons at the front of the line and those at the rear all make correct turns at key

intersections of the giant maze that composes the mine?

The rather cut-and-dried rules that miners are usually taught concerning

evacuation and escape procedures do not address these types of questions.

Consequently, when workers are involved in actual mine fires, they may be illprepared to deal with the ambiguities and complex interactions of real-world

variables that turn what might appear to be a straightforward escape task into an

ill-defined problem.

Utility of Simulation Exercises for Fire Escape Decision Training

Active knowledge that helps workers become better problem solvers can be

facilitated by simulation exercises based on actual mine fires and escapes. These

exercises are one way to provide miners with more accurate and realistic

conceptualizations of escape procedures. Most workers will never experience

an escape from a mine fire. Yet all miners need a good understanding of what

such situations are like and how the basic escape rules in which they are drilled

must always be moderated by the types of situational factors described in the

previous section. Well-designed simulations can provide powerful vicarious

learning experiences that may better prepare miners to cope effectively with

actual mine emergencies. It is for this reason that the training of mine rescue

teams, military personnel, and firefighters routinely make use of both full-scale

field simulations and so-called "paper and pencil" (or "table-top") exercises. It

is the table-top simulation with which this chapter is concerned.

Table-top simulations are typically based on actual case materials. Unlike

case study reviews, however, table-top exercises do not present the outcome of

an emergency as a means for evaluating individual decisions made during the

course of the event. Rather, the simulation problem unfolds and requires decisions to be made among alternatives with incomplete information similar to the

process involved in an actual emergency. Good exercises will simulate the conceptual and emotional decision-making aspects involved in coping with an event.

Table-top simulations have some advantages over full-scale field problems,

or even participation in actual emergencies. First, a table-top exercise can foreshorten lengthy problem situations and long sequences of decision-making. An

event that might be days in the making can be concluded in 1 to 2 hours with a

table-top simulation. Second, errors made during a table-top simulation may be
198

embarrassing but are not dangerous. Similar errors in a full-scale field exercise

or during an actual emergency response could be dangerous or even fatal. Third,

table-top simulations can provide the learner with a system perspective on the

problem situation. During an actual mine fire an individual focuses on his or her

situation and role, and may not pay much attention to key relationships and interactions among the other personnel, physical factors, and equipment.

A simulation can show such relationships as well as reveal both the predictable

and capricious events that are always part of any emergency. This type of

overall comprehension of the "problem space" is thought to result in greater insight on the part of the participant. Fourth, table-top simulations provide individuals an opportunity to reflect upon, debate, and gain enhanced wisdom from

their decisions. In aviation circles, interactive table-top simulations of the paper

and pencil or computer-administered type are used to teach what is often referred

to as "air wiseness," with promising results [Flathers et al. 1982; Giffin and

Rockwell 1984].

The Escape From a Mine Fire (EMF) Exercise

The 5 Left crew at Brownfield Mine encountered extreme difficulty in

making its escape. The workers were located nearly 3 miles from the nearest

mine portal, and their first warning of the fire came when they observed smoke

being carried into their section by the mine ventilation system. The smoke was

coming through the intake entry, which was the section's designated primary

escapeway. The smoke made this escape route impassable. The return entry,

designated as the secondary escapeway, was also filled with smoke. The belt

entry, which was not a designated escape route, but which was the only entry not

filled with smoke initially, was selected by the miners as the most viable

alternative. This entry was constricted by a conveyor belt on one side and a

double row of roof support timbers on the other. These obstacles and the 48- to

54-inch seam height left a walkway approximately 3 ft wide, 4 ft high, and a

0.5 miles long (at which juncture the section connected with 6 West Mains, a set

of eight entries that eventually led out of the mine over an additional 2.5-mile

route).

The workers did not know the location of the fire, were not provided such

information by surface personnel, and did not make adequate attempts to obtain

this critical knowledge. During their escape, the eight miners worried that they

would exhaust the 1-hour supply of oxygen in their SCSRs, because they knew

it would take much longer than an hour to stoop-walk the nearly 3 miles to the

portal, and as far as they knew, the mine atmosphere could have been contaminated by smoke the entire distance. They therefore chose to "save" their

SCSRs by not donning them immediately. Thus, the workers traveled in

increasingly heavy smoke until it became impossible to proceed without the
199

breathing apparatus. All eight miners were in dense smoke before they donned

their SCSRs and might very well have died from carbon monoxide poisoning if

the smoke had been more toxic.

Once they donned their breathing apparatus, and after traveling only a short

distance (approximately 200 ft), two miners found that they could not keep up

with the group. One was physically unfit and the other old. The older miner

could travel, although slowly. The younger, unfit man soon became unable to

travel at all without help. The eight miners then made a decision to split up.

Four members of the crew who could move rapidly left the section. The older

miner followed these four at his own pace. Two fit individuals remained with

the disabled worker and attempted to half-carry and half-drag him from the

section. After falling down many times and stopping frequently, all three men

were exhausted, out of oxygen, and were exposed to smoke. One person then

left the other two. The disabled miner and his lone companion remained behind

in the smoke, with one man semiconscious and the other hoping they might be

rescued, but fearing they would die. The individual who left the section reported

being nearly overcome by carbon monoxide, and stated that he was incoherent

when he finally encountered fresh air approximately 1,000 ft outby the place

where he had left his two coworkers.

Structure and Design of the EMF Exercise

Given the widespread practice of longwall mining, the setting described

above is typical of many sections on which miners now work. Additionally, the

problems these workers encountered during their escape are characteristic of

those recounted by miners who have escaped other fires. Because of these two

factors, it was decided to construct a simulation exercise around the experiences

of workers on the 5 Left section. The initial simulation was developed by six individuals. One of these was a Federal inspector who happened to be on the

5 Left section that shift. This person escaped with the crew and subsequently

helped conduct an official investigation of the fire. Four other developers were

domain experts in mine safety or mine rescue who, collectively, represented a

wide range of mining conditions and methods. All five experts worked together

and in conjunction with an educational psychologist. The mine fire exercise was

designed to be both a teaching tool to improve miners' decision-making skills

and a research instrument to provide information about the proficiency of

workers in planning an escape. The domain experts agreed that data from an

administration of this problem applied to a large group of miners could help

direct future training as well as the design and deployment of mine monitoring

systems.

The structure of the Escape From a Mine Fire (EMF) exercise is based on

the theory of narrative thinking from Bruner [1990], Bower and Morrow [1990],
200

Sarbin [1986], and others. Bruner notes that there are two ways to understand

one's own behavior and the conduct of others. The first way is through narrative

thinking. The second is through formal analysis of behavior through logical

rules and systems. Persons generally make important personal decisions by reference to compelling stories that they have internalized, not by applying formal

logical rules. These life-directing narratives have been called "culture tales" and

"stories we live by " [Howard 1991]. Since the beginning of human culture,

stories and parables have been recognized universally as one of the most

effective forms of instruction [Vitz 1990]. On a personal level, lessons learned

and insights gained through stories also tend to be highly memorable and easily

generalizable to one's own circumstances and plights [Bruner 1990; Sarbin

1986].

The EMF exercise is presented as an interactive story. The content and

structure of the story are derived from the actual events that occurred in the mine

fire on which the simulation is based. The miners who work the exercise interact with each other and with characters in the story. The exercise is constructed so that each miner assumes the role of a character who must make

decisions as the story plot develops. The plot includes obstacles and predicaments that thwart the achievement of the goals (escaping from the fire,

staying together, and saving one's buddies). At key points throughout the unfolding story, the miners select from among alternative actions and strategies.

The consequences that follow each choice are subsequently presented as part of

the interactive story line. Thus, the narrative exercise simulates many of the affective and cognitive dilemmas experienced by miners who are involved in

similar decision-making when escaping from actual underground mine fires.

The paper and pencil exercise consists of a linear series of questions at each

major decision point. The first 10 questions interspersed in the narrative represent what the domain experts determined to be key decision points encountered by the 5 Left miners during their escape from the fire. The experience

of these miners provides the basis for the scenario. The last three questions ask

miners to make additional judgments about the merit of particular persons'

actions in the face of events that occur in the simulation. Twelve of the questions are followed by three to eight decision alternatives presented in a multiplechoice format. One requires a short written response in which the learner must

decide among four alternative actions. The alternatives consist of both correct

and incorrect actions (as indicated by expert consensus) at each major decision

point (question) in the scenario. The consequences of incorrect answers range

from useless to harmful or potentially lethal. These wrong alternatives were

compiled from case studies and the interviews of miners who escaped from real

fires, and represent judgment errors that workers actually made in such

situations (some reasons why they made these errors are echoed by subjects'

responses to the simulation questions).
201

Four of the questions or decision points have only one correct action among

the alternatives listed. However, the remaining questions have a combination of

two or three correct alternatives along with the incorrect ones. A miner's performance on a given major decision point is not scored dichotomously as a

0 or 1, but is awarded full or partial credit based on the total number of good

decision alternatives selected, and the total number of poor decisions avoided

(not selected). Finally, each decision point is weighted equally so that when the

13 question scores are added together the exercise total score is scaled from 0

to 100. Thus, the final observed total score for any given miner can be directly

interpreted as a percentage of mastery of the exercise skills and content.

The exercise consists of two parts: a problem booklet and a latent-image

answer sheet with an attached questionnaire. The problem booklet presents the

relevant background information that any miner who was at work in this mine

would know, e.g., information about the height of the coal seam, mine ventilation, location and distances of the portals, and the type of mining method and

equipment used. The miner working the exercise is directed to play the role of

the section foreman, and to make choices among decision alternatives at each

question in the exercise. The initial observation is then presented as the arrival

of smoke on the section where the crew is working. The booklet includes a

section map (see figure 10.1) that shows the number and layout of entries, the

location of the smoke, workers' positions, equipment locations, and the direction

and distance from this section to the mine's main entries (and to the portal where

the miners must exit). Each decision point (question) determined by the domain

experts to be a major one is presented in the problem at the rate of one frame

(page) at a time. After the miner examines the question and studies the alternatives, he or she then selects the "best" actions by using a special developing pen

to mark the appropriately numbered space on the answer sheet.

Each numbered space on the answer sheet corresponds to a numbered

decision alternative in that frame of the problem booklet. When the blank space

on the answer sheet is rubbed with the developing pen, the invisible ink or

"latent-image" answer immediately becomes visible. The message contains two

types of information: first, it tells if the decision was correct or incorrect (as

determined by the panel of domain experts); second, it provides additional

information related to the decision. For example, in question D (the sixth frame

and fourth major decision point in the exercise), miners are asked which actions

they should take as they prepare to leave the section on foot in the belt entry.

One of the eight decision alternatives for this question is:

Before you leave, send one miner to the pager (section telephone) to ask

for information about the location of the fire, and to report (to the

surface) that you are walking out.
202

Figure 10.1.—Section map of imaginary mine in problem booklet.

When the miner rubs the corresponding blank space between the brackets on the

answer sheet, the following message is instantly developed:

[Correct! But the miner returns and says the pager is no longer

working.]
203

Each frame in the problem booklet presents the scenario over a sequence of time

and contingencies. The miner working the exercise knows only what has happened to the point at which the problem has been worked. The correctness and

consequences of the decision alternatives selected for each question are also

known only as these choices are made. In this manner the trainee must work

through the problem as it unfolds, without knowing the outcome or the effects

of his or her decisions until after they have been made.

Figures 10.2 and 10.3 depict two frames in the problem booklet. Figure 10.2

shows question B with six decision alternatives; figure 10.3 shows the latentimage answers that correspond to the decision alternatives. The entire exercise

is constructed to teach and assess the choice of alternative actions at major

decision points like those encountered by the miners who experienced the fire.

The major decision points include (1) deciding what to do when the smoke

is first noticed, (2) ordering priorities in terms of alerting other miners versus

first donning emergency breathing apparatus, (3) seeking more information

about the fire, (4) choosing an escape route and method, (5) deciding what

equipment to take along during the evacuation, (6) modifying the escape plan

when heavy smoke reduces visibility to less than 2 ft and when two miners in the

crew are unable to keep up, and (7) deciding how best to rescue a worker who

had to be abandoned in a smoke-filled area of the mine. The options chosen by

those working the exercise are discussed in a section to follow.

Interactive Latent-Image Format

The paper problem booklet and latent-image answer sheet system were

chosen because they were inexpensive to develop and are easy to administer in

any setting with a minimum of equipment. Only a problem booklet, a specially

printed latent-image answer sheet, and a developing pen are needed. This combination of high technology instructional design with respect to exercise structure, combined with the low-technology latent-image delivery mode, provides

a very effective interactive simulation—a basic format which has, in fact, been

used for many years in medical education [Bollet 1984; Kacmarek et al. 1985].

Field Evaluation of the Exercise

After its construction, the EMF exercise underwent two rounds of field

testing. A preliminary round involved authentication of the exercise by a group

of 10 nationally recognized mine fire and mine rescue authorities using wellestablished mine rescue criteria. The criticisms, corrections, and comments of

these persons were used to revise the exercise before its formal field test. This

second round of field testing was conducted at four sites with six groups of

experienced miners from several States.
204

Figure 10.2.—Question B with six decision alternatives in problem booklet.

Figure 10.3.—Latent-image answers that correspond to the decision alternatives shown

in figure 7.
205

Figure 10.4.—EMF exercise: percentage of sample by job category (n = 134).

A total of 134 underground coal miners, including two females, were involved in formal field testing of the exercise. The mean age of these workers

was 41.1 years, with a standard deviation of 8.83. These miners averaged 15.9

years of experience in underground coal mining, with a standard deviation of

7.16. The persons in the sample represented three major job categories found

in the underground mining industry. These include (1) miners/laborers who are

hourly employees and who are engaged in the various jobs directly related to

extracting and transporting the coal out of the mine; (2) maintenance/technical

staff who are electricians, mechanics, health and safety inspectors, engineers,

surveyors, and other personnel who do not directly mine coal but who work

underground in and around the sections; and (3) supervisors/managers who are

salaried employees and who include the first-line supervisor (section foreman)

all the way up to the mine superintendent. Figure 10.4 presents the proportions

of these persons in the sample.

In the mining industry the job categories depicted in figure 10.4 are

associated with increasing levels of skill and knowledge. Mine foremen and

other supervisors must pass examinations and be certified in such areas as mine

maps, ventilation, health and safety, first aid, escape, and rescue procedures.

Similarly, mine maintenance and technical workers must be certified in their

specialties. In addition, their work often requires them to travel widely throughout the mine, usually in pairs. Because they have to be responsible for themselves as they work and travel about, maintenance/technical workers need to be

more aware of the mine layout, escape routes, and escape procedures than do the

typical miners/laborers.
206

This sample is somewhat older than and has greater experience than a more

typical sample of miners. In addition, miners/laborers are underrepresented in the

sample, while mine maintenance/technical personnel and supervisors are overrepresented. An earlier national sample of 3,658 underground coal miners from

12 States found a mean age of 37.2 years with a standard deviation of 9.0, and a

mean of 11.9 years of mining experience with a standard deviation of 7.2 [Cole

et al. 1988a,b]. Miners/laborers comprised about 50% of that much larger sample;

maintenance/technical personnel and supervisors comprised about 25% each.

Two important generalizations can be made about the field test sample.

First, this group of miners had more experience and better training in either

fighting or escaping from mine fires than would a representative grouping of

miners. Second, most of the working miners, technical personnel, and supervisors included here were attending regional health and safety meetings for

persons in the mining industry. These facts suggest that the exercise performance scores of this sample ought to be higher than the scores of miners from a

completely random selection.

Results

The results of the field test are presented in three parts. The first part presents miners' evaluation of the authenticity and utility of the simulation. The

second part analyzes psychometric properties of the exercise, including assessments of its validity and reliability. The third part describes the performance of

miners in choosing among the 63 alternatives contained in the 13 questions or

major decision points.

Miner Evaluation of the Exercise

Each person who worked the simulation was asked to complete a standard

10-item Likert scale rating form. The first three items on the form were designed to elicit the miner's evaluation of the authenticity of the problem and its

worth as a training device. The remainder of the items addressed the functionality of the exercise structure and design. Ratings of all miners on each of

these 10 items are presented in table 10.1. Even though this sample consisted

of highly experienced workers, all persons reported that the exercise was authentic and would help them remember important details. Additionally, nearly

94% reported that they learned something new from working the exercise.

Validity

Four estimates of exercise validity were obtained. First, the 10 experts who

reviewed the simulation during its authentication stage and in its final form
207

judged the content validity to be high. This is not surprising, since the problem

was based on the behavior and decision choices of miners who had escaped from

actual mine fires. Second, the 134 miners in the field test sample judged the face

validity of the exercise to be high, as can be seen from their ratings in the first

three items in table 10.1. Third, the 63 decision alternatives discriminated positively with respect to the exercise total score. When decision alternatives are

valid, the number of wrong alternatives selected should correlate negatively for

persons with high total scores, but correlate positively for persons with low total

scores. Likewise, the number of correct alternatives selected should correlate

positively for persons with high total scores, but negatively for persons with low

total scores. When multiple-choice test questions (or exercise alternatives) behave in this manner, they are said to discriminate positively among levels of

ability within the sample. Table 10.2 presents the proportion of exercise alternatives that positively and significantly discriminated with respect to high exercise

total score.

Table 10.1.—Miners' rating of exercise validity, relevance, quality, and utility

(frequency %, n ' 134)

Content

 4

(definitely

 yes)

 3 2 1

(definitely 

 no)

Mean Standard

deviation

Exercise is realistic/authentic 88.5 11.5 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.32

Helped me remember impor-

 tant things . . . . . . . . . . . . 62.3 37.7 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.49

Learned something new . . . 52.7 41.1 3.1 3.1 3.4 0.71

Exercise is too long . . . . . . . 3.1 7.0 29.5 60.5 1.5 0.76

Liked working the exercise . 60.6 31.5 6.3 1.6 3.5 0.69

Instructor's directions are

 clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64.9 29.1 1.5 0.0 3.7 0.51

Written exercise directions

 are clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62.2 35.4 1.6 0.8 3.6 0.57

Graphics are easy to under-

 stand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65.1 33.3 0.8 0.8 3.6 0.55

Scoring is easy to understand 43.1 44.8 6.0 6.0 3.3 0.82

Exercise is easy to read . . . 66.4 33.6 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.47

Table 10.2.—Proportion of answers discriminating positively, negatively,

 and not at all with the exercise total score (p<.05)

Positive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51/60 (85.0%)

Negative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2/60 (3.3%)

No relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7/60 (11.7%)
208

The final estimate of exercise validity was determined by conducting an

ANOVA of exercise total scores by job category. As explained earlier in the

section that described the sample, knowledge of mine rescue and escape skills

may be expected to increase across job categories from miners/laborers through

maintenance/technical workers to supervisors/managers. The analysis was run

on 106 persons for whom there was a complete vector of exercise question and

total scores, and for whom there was also a definitive job category assignment.

Table 10.3 presents means and standard deviations of the exercise total score for

these three groups, and table 10.4 presents the ANOVA results by job categories.

Figure 10.5 plots observed total score means and standard deviations for the

three job categories. Job category was found to account for approximately 29%

of the observed variance in exercise total scores.

Table 10.3.—Means and standard deviations for exercise 

total score by job category

Job n Mean, % Standard

deviation

Miners/laborers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 71.1 11.03

Maintenance/technical staff . . . . . . . . . . 48 79.9 7.47

Supervisors/managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 85.5 7.38

Table 10.4.—ANOVA results for exercise total score by job category

Source Degrees of

freedom

Sum of

squares

Mean

square F ratio p<

Between groups . . . . . 2 3,051.92 1,525.96 21.31 0.00

Within groups . . . . . . . 103 7,302.54 71.59 — —

Eta squared ' 0.293.

Reliability

The Cronbach alpha generalizability coefficient was calculated for the

exercise as an estimate of its internal consistency. The observed reliability of

0.74 might be expected to increase if a more heterogeneous sample of miners

were used to achieve a more symmetrical performance distribution on item and

total scores.

Question and Total Score Performance

Individual performance on each of the exercise questions was scored by

awarding full or partial credit based on the total number of good decision alternatives selected and the total number of poor decision alternatives avoided.

A mean percentage and standard deviation for each question score was then calculated. An ANOVA was carried out for each question score to determine

which of the 13 items significantly discriminated among the three job categories.
209

Figure 10.5.—EMF exercise: means and standard deviations by job category.

The ANOVA was based on the 106 persons who could be clearly identified as

belonging to one of the three categories. Figure 10.6 presents the pooled means

and standard deviations for each of the 13 questions for the entire sample of

134 miners who completed the exercise. The total exercise score (TS) and its

standard deviation are represented in the last column of the histogram. The

scoring metric is the percentage of correct responses, so that all question scores

and the exercise total score can be compared to one another in terms of difficulty. The eight questions that significantly discriminated among job categories

are marked with an asterisk.

Inspection of figure 10.6 reveals an important finding. Questions H and K

were the most difficult decision points in the exercise, as evidenced by the fact

that there was no significant difference among the scores on these items across

workers in the three job categories. Additionally, the mean score for question H

was 53.2%, with a standard deviation of 25.8. The mean for question K was

62.3%, with a standard deviation of 39.9. These means are well below the desirable proficiency level and the variance is very large. Questions H and K are

difficult because they have in common a dilemma, described below, that is encountered in actual escapes from mine fires (and that participants reported as a

rationale for their chosen options) but that is rarely discussed in training classes

because these classes tend to focus on escape algorithms and rules.
210

Figure 10.6.—Question score means and standard deviations. (An asterisk (*) indicates

a question that significantly discriminates among job categories (p#.05). TS = total exercise

score.)

In question H, the scenario has developed to a point at which the miners are

in heavy smoke wearing their SCSRs and having difficulty moving in the

narrow, low walkway along the belt entry. The unfit miner is unable to maintain

a pace needed to escape from the section before conditions become fatal. The

three decision alternatives include (1) trying to force the straggler to keep up and

having all of the other miners slow down, (2) letting the group split up and leaving the straggler on his own, and (3) having members of the crew take turns carrying the unfit miner. The weight of the straggler (260 pounds), his poor physical condition, the narrow and low walkway, and restrictions on heavy work

imposed by wearing an SCSR, make the first and third options difficult and

dangerous. The correct (but troubling) decision is to let the group split up so

that those miners who can travel rapidly have a chance to escape. Discussions

following the exercise suggest that this experienced group of miners understood

the dangers of the two incorrect alternatives and the logic of the correct decision.

Many persons in all three job categories, however, selected wrong alternatives

to this question.

Question K addresses an issue that arises when miners are missing in mine

fires and other workers wish to find and rescue them as soon as possible. Prior

to this point in the problem scenario, two of the escaping miners had tried to

help the straggler but were unable to do so. Finally, he was abandoned, semiconscious but still alive. All of the other miners had reached relative safety in

fresh air about 1,000 ft farther along the escape route. The question concerns

two miners who wish to don new SCSRs and reenter the smoke filled area to

search for and bring out the missing worker. The predicament arises from the

need (as perceived by the survivors in our interviews) for prompt rescue of the
211

missing miner if he is to live, and weighed against the dangers of using SCSRs

to attempt the rescue. The person working the exercise is asked to weigh the

merits of the two miners' rescue plan, and decide if rescue attempts should wait

until the fire is under control, fresh air is restored to the area being searched,

and/or a mine rescue team with proper breathing apparatus and related equipment arrives. Based on many accident investigations and interviews, such decision alternatives are known to be problematic for miners. Likewise, these decision alternatives proved difficult (as indicated by low scores and failure to

discriminate) for the persons who worked the simulation exercise. This outcome

was observed even though the sample was a highly knowledgeable and select

group who clearly understood the risks.

The issue centers around the design of SCSRs—they are designed for

self-rescue and escape. They do not provide an adequate supply of oxygen for

rescue work and are not mechanically and ergonomically suitable for such

activity. Yet, if a missing miner is not rapidly retrieved from the smoky area of

a mine, he or she may die from CO intoxication and smoke inhalation. The issue

of mounting rescue efforts with the aid of SCSRs is hotly debated by workers

involved in both the field tests of this simulation and other similar exercises.

While all persons recognize the good intentions of miners who want to use

SCSRs to rescue missing individuals, they disagree on the merit of such attempts. Experienced mine rescue personnel and other experts often argue that

it is very difficult to travel and work in smoke while wearing SCSRs, and that

the risks are too great to justify any attempt to rescue a trapped miner while

using the apparatus. Potential problems associated with such attempts, according to these individuals, include (1) would-be rescuers becoming lost or

disoriented, (2) workers having great difficulty finding, lifting, and moving a

disabled miner, and (3) potential rescuers displacing their SCSR mouthpiece or

nose clips, and/or running out of oxygen during the rescue attempt. Some or all

of these difficulties are very likely during the rescue attempt. Singularly or in

combination, these problems could easily result in serious injury or death for the

would-be rescuers.

Such an outcome would further complicate a rescue of the original missing

miner(s), and endanger additional lives because (1) more miners would be missing and need to be rescued, (2) fewer persons would be immediately available

at the scene to conduct the support work necessary for a successful rescue,

(3) those individuals who subsequently must attempt a rescue of the additional

victims would be endangered even when they were properly equipped with mine

rescue apparatus, and (4) rescue of the original victim(s) might be delayed, thus

increasing the probability of their death.
212

Figure 10.7.—Percent of miners attaining various mastery levels on the EMF exercise.

Mastery Levels

Each question score is weighted equally so that when the 13 subscores are averaged the exercise total score is scaled from 0% to 100% (figure 10.7). Each question score in figure 10.7 is also presented on a 0% to 100% scale. Thus, the final observed total score and the question scores for any given miner or group of miners can

be directly interpreted as the percentage of mastery of exercise skills and content.

Self-rescue skills like those presented in this simulation should be learned

to high levels of mastery in order to minimize errors that can be very costly in

terms of death, injury, economics, and public image. As a general rule, proficiency levels for these types of critical skills are set at a minimum of 90%

correct performance by at least 90% of the trained population [Cole et al. 1984].

Figure 10.7 plots the percentage of individuals in the sample who scored in one

of seven mastery level intervals. As shown, only 13.6% of the miners scored at

or above the 90% mastery level as assessed by total score performance. Nearly

50% of the sample performed below 80% mastery. A completely random sample of miners might be expected to perform at lower levels of mastery than did

this group of highly experienced and well-trained workers. If the exercise is

valid and reliable, this suggests that miners need additional training in the

decision-making that is involved when escapes from mine fires must be planned

and executed. Simulations like the Escape From a Mine Fire exercise may be

one cost-effective way to provide realistic practice in these critical nonroutine

skills.
213

Conclusion

The mean performance scores of groups in all three job categories fell well

below the 90% level of mastery for the self-rescue and escape skills presented

in the EMF simulation. However, the exercise total score discriminated

significantly among job categories (F = 21.314, p#0.0001), with supervisors

obtaining the highest mean score (85.8%), maintenance/technical workers an

intermediate mean score (79.9%), and miners/laborers the lowest mean score

(71.1%). The exercise total score also discriminated significantly (F=17.352,

p#0.0001) between those persons with mine rescue training (mean = 81.6%) and

those without such training (mean = 73.0%). For the dilemmas presented in

questions H and K, though, there are no significant differences in the mean

performance scores by job category or by mine rescue training level. This

finding suggests that the issues associated with having to abandon a helpless

miner, or engaging in unsafe rescue attempts of missing workers by using

SCSRs, are clearly problematic decisions for all miners regardless of training

level. Workers in all three job categories appeared to understand the potentially

lethal consequences of unsafe rescue attempts, but frequently chose unwisely in

the simulation. It should be noted that this also happens in real life, where a

significant proportion of deaths in confined spaces are would-be rescuers of

victims who are usually already dead [Manwaring and Conroy 1990].

We have observed that when miners and accident investigators alike discuss

actual escape or rescue attempts, the merits of workers' decisions are nearly always judged post hoc in relation to the outcome of their actions. If the decision

choices were successful, the miners are seen as brave and wise. If the decisions

were unsuccessful, and especially if more persons were injured or died, the

workers' actions may be seen as well intentioned but foolish (and perhaps

illegal). Nevertheless, this approach to reviewing the merit of actual decisions

in terms of prior knowledge of the outcomes may be counterproductive, because

it develops a mindset that cannot be effective in the decision-making required

during an actual mine emergency. When these types of decisions are made in

real life, the participants cannot know the outcome of their actions prior to the

action. Knowledge of the outcome cannot be the basis for the decision [Fischoff

1975]. Rather, such decisions must be based on the incomplete information that

is available at the moment, estimates of the feasibility of alternative actions and

their likelihood of success, and a weighing of the relative risks associated with

each alternative.

The simulation discussed in this chapter was designed to provide a vicarious

experience that would enable miners to confront the life and death choices involved in escaping from a mine fire. Undoubtedly the vicarious experience of

completing such an exercise is not sufficient to prepare a miner for such a realworld experience. However, it is almost certainly better to have studied and
214

debated the decisions encountered in such a simulation than to encounter them

for the first time in a field situation. The EMF exercise is not just a "story."

Rather, it is a composite of a type of emergency that too often claims workers'

lives. To the extent that such simulations accurately reflect the dilemmas and

decisions encountered in actual fires (and the present one is taken directly from

a real incident), they provide better training for these nonroutine events than the

more traditional method of teaching facts and escape algorithms. Likewise, they

are more effective than a post hoc analysis of case studies where the merits of

decisions are judged by knowing their outcomes a priori.

The EMF exercise is a dual teaching and testing device that presents a series

of decision tasks embedded in a text or narrative. These types of educational

materials have a long research tradition. Skinner [1965], Rothkopf [1966] and

many others independently developed instructional programs consisting of a

series of test items embedded in text. These programs were used to teach and

test knowledge and skills of military personnel and many other groups. More recently, simulation problems with embedded test items have been used to teach

and test proficiency among a wide range of technical personnel including health

professionals, veterinarians, military and civil aviators, and other groups [Cole

1994]. The EMF exercise teaches miners through immediate feedback about the

consequences and correctness of each decision they make. The immediate feedback reinforces correct knowledge and judgments and remediates incorrect decisions. At the same time, the objective nature of the exercise decision alternatives allows a performance score to be recorded and calculated for each individual. As demonstrated earlier, these performance data can be treated as test

scores. To the extent that the exercise is valid and reliable, performance scores

aggregated across groups of persons provide useful information about the degree

to which miners have mastered particular skills and concepts and where more

training is needed.

References

Babbott D, Halter WD [1983]. Clinical problem-solving skills of internists trained in the

problem-oriented system. J Med Education 58(12):947-953.

Bollet AJ [1984]. Harrison's principles of internal medicine patient management problems:

pretest self-assessment and review. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Bower GH, Morrow DG [1990]. Mental models in narrative comprehension. Science 247:

44-48.

Bransford J, Sherwood R, Vye N, Rieser J [1986]. Teaching thinking and problem solving:

research foundations. Am Psychologist 41(10):1078-1089.

Brecke FH [1982]. Instructional design for air crew judgment training. Aviat Space Environ

Med 53(10):951-957.

Brener ES [1984]. Paradigms and problem solving: a literature review. J Med Education

59(8):625-633.

Bruner JS [1986]. Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press.
215

Bruner JS [1990]. Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Cole HP [1994]. Embedded performance measures as teaching and assessment devices.

Occup Med: State of the Art Rev 9:261-281.

Cole HP, Berger PK, Vaught C, Haley JV, Lacefield WE, Wasielewski RD, et al. [1988a].

Measuring critical mine health and safety skills. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky. U.S.

Bureau of Mines contract No. H0348040.

Cole HP, Mallett LG, Haley JV, Berger PK, Lacefield WE, Wasielewski RD, et al. [1988b].

Research and evaluation methods for measuring nonroutine mine health and safety skills.

Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky. U.S. Bureau of Mines contract No. H0348040.

Cole HP, Moss J, Gohs FX, Lacefield WE, Barfield BJ, Blythe DK [1984]. Measuring

learning in continuing education for engineers and scientists. Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press.

Connolly TJ, Blackwell BB, Lester LF [1989]. A simulator-based approach to training in

aeronautical decision-making. Aviat Space Environ Med 60(1):50-52.

Digman RM, Grasso JT [1981]. An observational study of classroom health and safety

training in coal mining. Morgantown, WV: West Virginia University. U.S. Bureau of Mines

contract No. J0188069.

Dugdale AE, Chandler D, Best G [1982]. Teaching the management of medical emergencies

using an interactive computer terminal. Med Education 16(1):27-30.

Farrand LL, Holzemer WL, Schleutermann JA [1982]. A study of construct validity:

simulations as a measure of nurse practitioners' problem-solving skills. Nursing Res 31(1):37-42.

Fischoff B [1975]. Hindsight ... foresight: the effects of outcome knowledge on judgment

under uncertainty. J Exp Psychol: Human Perception and Performance 1:288-299.

Flathers GW Jr., Giffin WC, Rockwell TH [1982]. A study of decision-making behavior of

pilots deviating from a planned flight. Aviat Space Environ Med 53(10):958-963.

Giffin WC, Rockwell TH [1984]. Computer-aided testing of pilot response to critical in-flight

events. Human Factors 26(5):579-581.

Gilbert GG [1975]. The evaluation of simulation for skill testing in the American National

Red Cross first aid and personal safety course [Unpublished Dissertation]. Columbus, OH: Ohio

State University.

Glaser R, ed. [1966]. Teaching machines and programmed learning. Washington, DC: National Education Association, pp. 69-88. (Reprinted from J Psychol, Vol. 29, April 1950).

Halff HM, Hollan JD, Hutchins EL [1986]. Cognitive science and military training. Am

Psychologist 41(10):1131-1139.

Halpern DF [1984]. Thought and knowledge: an introduction to critical thinking. Chapter

7, Decision making. Hillsdale, NJ: Earlbaum.

Howard GS [1991]. Culture tales: a narrative approach to cross-cultural psychology and

psychotherapy. Am Psychologist 46:187-197.

Janis I, Mann L [1987]. Decision-making: a psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and

commitment. New York, NY: Free Press.

Jensen RS [1982]. Pilot judgment: training and evaluation. Human Factors 24(1):61-73.

Jones GL, Keith KD [1983]. Computer simulations in the health sciences. J Computer Based

Instruction 9(3):108-114.

Kacmarek RM, Hixon SJ, Assman DC [1985]. Clinical simulations for respiratory care

practitioners. Vol. 2. Chicago IL: Year Book Medical Publishers.

Lacefield WE, Cole HP [1986]. Principles and techniques for evaluating continuing

education programs. The Military Eng 78(511):594-600.

Manwaring JC, Conroy C [1990]. Occupational confined space-related fatalities: surveillance

and prevention. J Saf Res 21:157-164.

McGuire CH [1985]. Medical problem-solving: a critique of the literature. J Med Education

60(8):587-595.

McGuire CH, Solomon LM, Bashook PG [1976]. Construction and use of written simulations. New York, NY: Psychological Corporation.
216

Miller RM, Borda M [1988]. Report of investigation (underground coal mine): non-injury

machinery fire Cambria slope mine No. 33, ID No. 36 00840. Arlington, VA: U.S. Department

of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration.

Rothkopf EZ [1966]. Learning from written instructive materials: an exploration of the

control of inspection behavior by test-like events. Am Educational Res J 3:241-249.

Sarbin TR, ed. [1986]. Narrative psychology: the storied nature of human conduct. New

York, NY: Praeger.

Skinner BF [1965]. The technology of teaching. In: Proceedings of the Royal Society of

London. Vol. 162, pp. 427-443.

Vitz PC [1990]. The use of stories in moral development. Am Psychologist 45:709-720.
217

AFTERWORD.—THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL

IMPLICATIONS1

A major reason for the previously mentioned scarcity of systematic knowledge about social and behavioral aspects of fire is that most efforts to minimize

human and economic loss have focused on engineering solutions. Canter [1980]

argued that there is already enough evidence to support the argument that, as far

as "hardware" solutions are concerned, "such provisions are frequently insufficient and in many cases inappropriate...human aspects of the causes and developments of fire must be understood if its disastrous effects are to be minimized." According to Canter, what is known empirically about human response

to fire follows certain general themes that may be used as a base for understanding the phenomenon theoretically (and which, incidentally, also provide

some insights applicable to mining).

First, the literature asserts that the place of human action in the cause of fires

must be considered, even when arson is exempted. It is likely that many fires

start as the result of human error. For instance, according to a preliminary report

released by the Mine Safety and Health Administration [1987], the Wilberg

disaster originated with an electric air compressor whose overtemperature safety

shutdown switch had been bypassed. At Adelaide, while the cause of the fire is

in doubt, a contributing factor is not. A stopping near the head drive had been

knocked out because float dust was collecting behind it. This allowed

60,000 cfm of air to go across the belt. According to the account of the mine examiner who discovered the blaze, things got out of hand quickly. At Brownfield,

a trolley motor was left energized and on first point. In addition, a door in the

supply chute was left open. Thus, not only did combustion take place, the smoke

was quickly carried into the mine's primary escapeways.

A second theme in the literature deals with the fact that much informationgathering must take place before an individual comes to understand the nature

of the problem, his or her role, and the appropriate rules that should be followed

[Canter et al. 1980]. Given that a fire, at least in its early stages, is an uncertain

event, it can be seen that a lot of time may be lost in defining the situation. On

the night of the Adelaide fire, the dispatcher, who stated that the mine had "been

getting tons of those false alarms," engaged in a series of conversations with the

dumper underground. Following that, he (1) received a phone call from the face

boss on the section contacted by the dumper wanting to know what was going

on, (2) got through to another section and told the person who answered that

there was a fire on the belt and to "get your guys out of there," (3) contacted the

remaining section and "told the man on the phone to get the guys together," and

1

An earlier version of this discussion is contained in: Vaught C, Wiehagen WJ [1991]. Escape from a

mine fire: emergent perspective and workgroup behavior. J Appl Behav Sci 27(4):452-474.
218

(4) received a call 5 minutes later from the last section contacted wanting to

know what was going on. Only one worker (the maintenance foreman) at

Brownfield took time to learn where the fire at his mine was located.

The third theme involves people's reactions once the situation has been defined. Sime [1980], among others, has offered evidence that the concept of

"panic" does not apply to human behavior in fires. In fact, the reverse is more

nearly true; people continue to carry out their normal roles long after the time

for action has arrived. The severity of conditions at Adelaide was not communicated to the miners in such a way that they felt obliged to depart from normal routine—individuals who were operating equipment recounted how they

went through regular shutdown procedures, tramming back from the face, going

to the load center to kill the power, retrieving lunch buckets and coats, and

walking to the mantrip. This same tendency to normalize their situation was reported by workers at the other two sites.

A fourth theme involves what happens once the decision is made to take

action. Best [1977], in his account of the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire, illustrated the fact that even when people have entered an escape mode, their

behavior tends to take place within the organizational parameters that existed

prior to the emergency. For instance, waitresses at the restaurant showed their

patrons out of the building. One professional firefighter, who happened to be

dining at the club, allowed the waitress assigned to his table to lead the group to

safety, and then reentered the building to help fight the blaze. At Adelaide, leadership emerged more or less gradually out of an initial state of disorganization.

There was no previous determined gathering point in case of a fire like this one,

which occurred outby the section. Although an escapeway map was posted on

each section, no one thought to take it—despite the fact that there were miners

on all three sections who had not had an opportunity to walk the escapeways and

hence did not know the way out. At all three sites, the workers delayed donning

their self-contained self-rescuers an average 10-15 minutes after encountering

smoke—the reason most often given for this delay was "I knew these things

[SCSRs] only last for an hour, and I didn't know how long it would take me to

get out." Yet, no one thought to protect himself or herself in the meantime by

using the filter self-rescuer every miner carries on his or her belt. Individuals

took their mouthpieces out to talk or to get a deeper breath at points where the

smoke was less concentrated, despite the fact that there was no way to determine

how much CO might be in the atmosphere. Miners were disoriented by the

smoke, and on at least one section, misinterpreted cues and became momentarily

lost.

The final theme concerns the behavior of people once they have reached an

area of relative safety. Bryan [1977], in a cross-cultural comparison of two large

data sets, noted that fully a third of the individuals who made it to safety
219

subsequently reentered the fire site to look for others, to check on the progress

of the fire, to "do something" while waiting for firefighters, or to get personal

property. At Adelaide, three individuals went back to search for a miner they

believed to have "frozen up," but who had actually left the group and had come

out another way. These three miners placed themselves in great jeopardy. At

Brownfield, a mechanic put his own safety at risk in order to stay with a coworker who had given up and believed himself unable to travel farther. Finally,

a face boss jeopardized himself in a successful attempt to locate these two men.

In essence, there seems to be enough substantive agreement at this point to

suggest that it is possible to arrive at a scientific understanding of people's

activities in fire. The present analysis of worker behavior in mine fires supports

existing research regarding human responses to structural fires. At the same

time, however, it adds some complementary insights into individual and group

behavior in a type of social subsystem different from those usually studied. In

these mine fires, strong continuities between organized and collective behavior,

hypothesized to exist in all emergencies, induced the workers to help each other

negotiate thousands of yards of smoke-filled entryways to safety, and led them

to define any actions that seemed to violate the sacred code of "buddyhood" as

somehow needing explanation.

 Given that escape, for many of these workers, seems to have been a very

problematic group effort, this book can be used to increase an awareness of

some difficulties that may be encountered during any escape from a mine.

Readers should gain an appreciation for the following factors: (1) Initial

warnings are often unclear, sometimes due to the way technology behaves, and

sometimes due to faulty or incomplete communication. This can lead to different interpretations of the problem. (2) People frequently fail to gather the

right kinds of information which prevents them from making appropriate responses to the situation. (3) Once any decision is made, individuals respond

well to a leader. If leadership is lacking, however, people tend to become confused. (4) Apparatus used in mine emergencies, such as page phones and

self-rescuers, may not work as expected, or may fail. (5) Individuals become

disoriented very quickly in smoke. Additionally, smoke rises, obscuring markers

and landmarks in enclosed spaces.

Given these five factors, the following recommendations are offered to mine

safety specialists. It is expected they can be related back to procedures in place

at their operations:

Trainers should periodically review with workers the escape and evacuation

procedures at their mine(s). Include a description of (1) how warning messages

will be communicated, who will make the call, or how the warning will be conveyed; (2) what the content of the message will be; (3) what information to seek

when communicating with someone outby the fire area (location, distance to

fresh air, suggested escapeways, etc.); (4) mine rescue team support; (5) the
220

marking system for primary and secondary escapeways; (6) the storage plan for

SCSRs; (7) what equipment, supplies, and materials to take from the section; and

(8) the assembly points for workers on each section.

Research on fires in complex structures such as high-rise buildings (some

of which was cited earlier) shows that there is an overdependence on the telephone as an emergency warning device. Such was the case at the mines discussed in this book—miners at the operation did not routinely answer section

telephones. There are undoubtedly certain aspects of the warning and communications system at any mining operation that are taken for granted and, on

reflection, could be a problem. These attributes should be spelled out and, insofar as possible, made foolproof. For instance, a separate device such as a

flashing strobe could be mounted on or near the telephone to alert workers that

the incoming call is not routine. These features should then be spelled out

during training.

There seems to be too much dependence on engineering hardware solutions

without a concomitant understanding of how miners will use those systems. For

instance, state-of-the-art mine monitoring equipment may be installed without

providing adequate training to the dispatcher or communications person. In

many cases, a definition of what constitutes adequate training can only be accomplished by testing the system; thus, there is a need for emergency simulations and structured fire drills, activities that are not widely practiced in the

industry.

Once a decision is made to take action during a fire, people respond well to

leadership. If this leadership is lacking for some reason, they tend to become

confused. On Adelaide's 2 Northwest section the foreman took the lead and a

section utilityman, who was trained in mine rescue, brought up the rear. Everyone stayed together and had relatively little trouble during their evacuation of the

mine. Safety managers should compare this scenario with those situations on

some of the other sections at all three sites and develop a strategy allowing for

the most competent person (whether a supervisor or a rank-and-file miner with

specialized experience) to assume leadership early in an event.

As an emergency progresses, people who are less well-prepared tend to experience sensory overload. This causes them to focus on small parts of the

problem rather than trying to comprehend the entire situation. This point is illustrated by the miners' tendency to "save" their SCSRs until the smoke got

heavy, but not protect themselves from CO in the meantime by using their filter

self-rescuers. Miners should be assisted in developing a protocol for how they

will employ their emergency breathing apparatus—one that goes beyond the

trainer's rote "put on your SCSR at the first indication of fire or smoke," which

may be good advice but obviously is not heeded in actual situations.

Research on fires in buildings has shown that people frequently reenter a fire

site after reaching safety, often to search for someone they believe is still inside
221

the structure. This observation is borne out here as well. One of the miners

went back with two buddies to look for an individual who left the group.

Trainers should impress upon their workers some of the consequences of leaving

the group, either to help a buddy, or to escape on their own. If groups are to split

up, it should be according to a previously determined plan of action.

Finally, it is recognized that people become disoriented very quickly in

smoke. Unless one knows the escape route very well, such disorientation could

be fatal in a mine fire. It is suggested that safety managers review their site plan

for conducting fire drills. This review might be an opportunity to elicit renewed

commitment to a company's emergency preparedness program and procedures

for ensuring that miners walk their escapeways periodically. Measures could

then be enacted, if needed, to ensure these plans and procedures are implemented

in the manner intended by law.

References

Best R [1977]. Reconstruction of a tragedy: the Beverly Hills supper club fire. Washington,

DC: National Fire Prevention and Control Administration (NFPA No. LS-2).

Bryan J [1977]. Smoke as a determinant of human behavior in fire situations. Washington,

DC: National Bureau of Standards, Center for Fire Research (Report No. NBS-GCR-77-94).

Canter D [1980]. Fires and human behavior: an introduction. In: Canter D, ed. Fires and

human behavior. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley, pp. 1-12.

Canter D, Breaux J, Sime J [1980]. Domestic, multiple occupancy, and hospital fires. In:

Canter D, ed. Fires and human behavior. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley, pp. 117-136.

Mine Safety and Health Administration [1987]. Preliminary report of investigation:

underground coal mine fire (Wilberg mine). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Mine

Safety and Health Administration.

Sime J [1980]. The concept of 'panic.' In: Canter D, ed. Fires and human behavior.

Chichester, U.K.: Wiley.
222

APPENDIX A.—DESCRIPTION OF APPROXIMATE ESCAPE

ROUTES TAKEN BY THE GROUPS

Adelaide Mine

1 Right

This group boarded the rail-mounted mantrip and started to come out of the

mine. They traveled nearly 0.7 miles before encountering smoke. At this point

the crew stopped the mantrip, got out, and began walking off in various directions. The foreman and another miner got the crew back together. After reassembling, the crew decided to go to the intake escapeway and walk the rest of

the way out of the mine. After getting into the intake escapeway, the crew

traveled about 500 ft on foot before encountering smoke in this escapeway. The

crew then moved into the left-side return entry where they confronted smoke

again. After putting on their rescue breathing apparatus, group 1 continued for

about 0.3 miles before turning right. After turning right, this crew continued to

move through the smoke-filled return entry for another 0.8 miles before finally

getting past the location of the fire and reaching clear air.

2 Northwest

This group boarded the rail mounted mantrip and started to come out of the

mine. The crew traveled about 0.1 miles in the mantrip before encountering

smoke. At this point, the crew stopped the mantrip, got out, and decided to

move to the intake escapeway and continue to egress the mine on foot. The crew

traveled about 0.1 miles on foot in the intake escapeway before encountering

smoke. Upon being confronted with smoke, the crew moved to the right return

entry to continue their escape. After traveling several hundred feet more in the

return entry, this group encountered smoke again. At this point, the group put

on their rescue breathing apparatus and continued their escape, traveling about

0.4 miles in the return before turning right. After turning right, the group

traveled another 0.2 miles in the smoke-filled return entry. At this point, the

group became disoriented in the smoke and began to go the wrong way by walking back toward the working section. The group traveled about 200 ft in the

wrong direction before a miner in the group realized that they were going back

into the mine. At this point, the group turned around, and continued to egress

the mine, traveling an additional 0.4 miles before passing the location of the fire

and reaching clear air.
223

3 Left

This group boarded the rail-mounted mantrip and started to come out of the

mine. The crew traveled about 0.1 miles in the mantrip before encountering

smoke. At this point, the crew stopped the mantrip and decided to go back to the

section. The crew rode the mantrip back to the section, got off the mantrip,

proceed to the intake escapeway, and began walking out. This group walked

about 500 ft before encountering smoke in the intake escapeway. The crew then

moved into the right-side return entry and continued to proceed out of the mine.

After moving into the return entry, this group walked several hundred feet more

before running into smoke in the return. At this point, the miners put on their

rescue breathing apparatus and then continued on foot about 1 mile through

smoke before passing the location of the fire and reaching clear air.

Brownfield Mine

4 South

The foreman and mechanic with this group noticed smoke coming up the intake escapeway. This crew assembled at the section power center. This group

elected not to follow the intake escapeway since it was already filled with

smoke. Similarly, the miners chose to avoid the alternate escapeway in the return aircourse since they knew that it would be filled with smoke. The crew

decided to escape via the mine entry in which the conveyor haulage belt was

located, since they believed that this entry should have clear air. This group

walked the belt entry for about 600 ft when they encountered smoke. Group 4

traveled for about 0.4 miles in heavy smoke to the point where the conveyor belt

entry intersected with the main supply haulage track. Here, the group turned

right and moved into the haulage entry and followed the main haulage entry for

about 0.1 miles until they were past the fire location and in clear air.

5 South

This group assembled at the rescue breathing apparatus storage station in the

No. 1 intake entry. The group traveled on foot several hundred feet and, after

being confronted with heavy smoke, moved into the belt conveyor entry where

the smoke was lighter. This group traveled about 400 ft on foot in the belt entry

until they hit heavy smoke again. At this point, the group moved into the alternate escapeway entry and proceeded to travel the section and main return

aircourse through smoke for about 0.25 miles before passing the fire location

and reaching clear air.
224

6 West

These miners assembled at the beginning of the intake escapeway on the

working section. After putting on their rescue breathing apparatus, this group

traveled on foot for about 700 ft in the intake escapeway before being confronted

with heavy smoke. At this point, the group moved to the alternate escapeway

where the smoke was lighter. After moving to the alternate escapeway, the

group continued to travel on foot for about 0.25 miles before passing the location

of the fire and reaching clear air.

Cokedale Mine

7 Butt

Because the primary escapeway was filled with smoke, this group decided

to follow the alternate escapeway out of the section. These miners got into the

alternate escapeway in the left return aircourse of the section and traveled this

escapeway on foot for about 0.3 miles. The crew then made a right turn and

followed the escapeway for another 0.25 miles. At this point, the group turned

left and continued on foot for about 1 mile before reaching fresh air.

8 Face Parallels

These miners gathered at the beginning of the primary escapeway and proceeded to travel this escapeway on foot about 0.3 miles before being confronted

with heavy smoke. Upon hitting heavy smoke, the crew turned around and followed the primary escapeway back to the section. After returning to the section,

the group then got in the section's left return aircourse. The group followed the

left return aircourse for about 0.2 miles before realizing that they were not in a

designated escapeway. The group turned around and followed this aircourse

back to the section. At this point, the group crossed the section and made their

way into the right return airway (the designated alternate escapeway) and

followed it for 0.1 miles before turning left. After turning left, the group continued on foot through the alternate escapeway for about 0.2 miles before turning

right. After turning right, the group continued on foot for another 0.3 miles

before turning left into the main alternate escapeway. After turning into the

main alternate escapeway, the crew continued for about 1 mile before reaching

clear air.
225

APPENDIX B.—MINE FIRE INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Where were you when you first became aware that there might be a

problem in the mine, and how did you learn of it?

• Who told you?

• What were you doing? Did you finish?

• What were your feelings at this time?

• Did you think that there might be a problem in getting out of the

mine?

• Did you communicate with anyone? With whom?

2. What did you do after making sure that there was a problem?

• Walk with anyone? Where?

• Did you go anywhere to get anything after you left your equipment?

• Did you pick up anything on the section?

• Did you talk with anyone? About what?

3. Was there a point where the crew assembled?

• Where was the assembly point?

• Was this a designated point? Were you trained to go to it?

• What was the conversation about when you met up with the whole

crew?

• Does anything about the conversation stand out?

• How would you describe the feeling within the crew?

• Did you or anyone have any concerns about getting out?

• Was there any sign of smoke at this point?

4. When did you first encounter smoke?

• What was the crew's reaction?

• Did someone take charge?

• What was being said at this time?

• Was there any confusion or indecision?

• What were your thoughts at this point?

5. How was the plan of action to escape decided on?

• Did the crew meet to decide the course of action?

• Did anyone distribute assignments?
226

• Was there general agreement about what to do? Who disagreed?

How was that handled?

• What was the feeling within the crew?

• Would the crew have walked out the intake without donning their

SCSRs if it were smoke-free?

• How did you begin to go out?

• How much time passed between starting out and donning the

SCSR?

• How would you describe that period of time?

• Did you at any time feel that this was a life-threatening situation?

6. What was it like when you first began to don your SCSR?

• Who made the decision to don?

• What were the conditions? Could you see?

• Did anyone take a CO reading?

• Did you check the apparatus?

• Did you get more than one?

7. What part did you SCSR training play when you began donning the

apparatus?

• Which of the devices have you been trained on?

• What position were you in?

• Can you show us the steps you used to get the SCSR on?

• Did you have any problems? Did you see anyone else having

problems?

• Did anyone help you? Did you help anyone?

• Did you have confidence that the SCSR would work correctly?

• Did anyone experience any problems once the device was on?

What were they?

• How long did it take everyone to get ready to move out?

8. How did you go about actually escaping from the mine?

• Who made the decision?

• Did you escape alone or in a group?

• How was the escape route chosen and followed?

• Were markers visible?

• Were there communications along the way? What was it like?

• Were there problem, especially with the SCSR?

• Were you aware of any risks in taking out your mouthpiece?
227

• Did anyone advise you not to remove the mouthpiece?

• How many times did you or the crew stop to rest or talk?

• Did you get rid of anything along the way?

9. At what points were there strategic decisions in making your escape?

• What were the conditions?

• How was decision made? Who made it?

• Was there any disagreement or confusion?

• Did you feel other crews were in trouble?

• Where did you think the fire was?

10. Thinking back, what would have made your escape less complicated?

• Would you have done anything differently?

• Would you have taken anything else with you?

• Probe about walking the escapeways.

• Probe about SCSR donning.
228

INDEX

Adaptive behavior, 62

Affiliative model, 6, 168, 170, 191-193

Air leakage, 132, 133

Algorithms, 196, 209, 214

Alternate escapeway, 28, 30, 31, 35, 48, 78, 82, 88, 94, 147, 159, 223, 224

Alternative escape routes, 95, 142

Annual refresher training, 24, 36, 196

ANOVA, iv, v, 208, 209

Authority figure, 55, 171, 172, 174, 175, 183, 186, 188, 192

Authority structure, 155, 166

Barricading, 24, 83, 190

Beliefs, 6, 133, 140, 157, 166

Beverly Hills Supper Club, 7, 16, 48, 164, 165, 167, 193, 218, 221

Bleeder entry, 173

Bureau of Mines, v, 26, 36, 99, 115, 132, 137, 215

Carbon monoxide monitoring system, 63, 142

Case study, 2, 4, 17, 39, 40, 42, 49, 165, 196, 197

CO levels, iv, 106, 110, 111, 127, 131

CO sensors, 111

Cognition, 138, 140, 141, 165

Cognitive map, 138, 141, 147, 149, 164

Cognitive perspective, 60

Cognitive templates, 141

Cohesiveness, 50

Collectivities, i, 3, 7, 9, 10

Combustion, iii, 23, 28, 34, 65, 73, 110, 116, 127, 131, 132, 136, 142, 144, 147,

217

Commonsense constructs, 138

Conceptual content, ii, 141, 157, 163

Consensus, 93, 98, 141, 148, 162, 164, 171, 179, 191, 200

Contaminant concentration, 133

Context filter, 65, 67

Controlled experiment, 126

Convergence, 16, 163

Conveyor belt fire, 128, 131

Coping mechanisms, 163

Crisis leadership, 166, 171, 192
229

Cultural authority, 157

Cultural habit, 139

Culture, 10, 14, 139-141, 200, 215

Culture tales, 200, 215

Decision making, 194, 215

Definition of the situation, 66

Development mining, 20, 28

Disaster roles, 168

Domain experts, 194, 199-201

Ecological constraints, ii, 140, 141

Emergency breathing apparatus, 2, 24, 98, 156, 195, 203

Emergency response

organization, 11

planning, 11, 59, 115

simulations, 198

Emergent leadership, 171

Emotional instability, 117, 124, 126, 132, 136, 137

Environmental cues, 101, 103, 105, 106

Environmental knowing, 139, 165

Escape behavior, ii, 3, 39, 138, 163, 167

Escape environment, 127

Escape group, i, iv, 3, 8, 39, 40, 44, 45, 53, 55, 126, 176, 180, 185

Escape route, 6, 77, 94, 98, 114, 126, 171, 185, 198, 203, 210, 221, 226

Escape skills, 1, 194, 208

Escaping through smoke, 116, 122

Expected utility theory, 13

False alarms, 66, 105, 106, 113, 217

Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 26, 33, 35

Federal Coal Mine Safety Act, 26

Field problems, 197

Field testing, 203, 205

Filter Self-Rescuer

perceived problems in using, 89

training to don, 196

use in smoke, 98, 132, 218

used instead of an SCSR, 88, 96

used to replace defective SCSR, 97, 146, 185

Fire alarms, 102

Fire detection, ii, 101-105, 109, 115, 137
230

Fire fighting

apparatus, 25

personnel, 3, 5

response, 191

simulations, 13

Fire warning, ii, 109, 110, 113, 139

Fixed-station sensors, 112

Follow-direction method, 167, 193

Frame of reference, 41, 101, 106

Group behavior, i, iv, 3, 10, 13, 16, 42, 44, 48, 50, 55, 56, 58, 59, 219

Group context, 164

Group formation, i, 51, 53, 55

Group perspective, 2

Hazard training, 24, 25

Heuristics, 196

Hindsight, 62, 94, 108, 215

Hot hangers, 66

Human response to smoke, 118, 119

Hydrochloric acid, v, 116

Illusion of universality, 39

Individual behavior, 9, 11, 38, 39, 60, 169

Individual differences, 138, 164, 167, 196

Information gathering, 141

Information uncertainty, ii, 100

Initial warnings, 67, 107, 219

Interpersonal behavior, ii, 140, 141, 150

Interview guide, iii, 42, 43, 225

Ionization-type smoke sensor, 111, 113

Lake Lynn Laboratory, 128, 129

Latent image, 99

Leadership behavior, 166, 175, 193

Leadership role, 150, 180, 185

Mastery level, 212

Mine environment, 97, 141, 170, 173

Mine rescue, 25, 36, 46, 68, 75, 81, 91, 97, 98, 143, 151, 152, 174, 197, 199,

203, 208, 211, 213, 219, 220

Mine Safety and Health Administration, 18, 24, 40, 99, 216, 217, 221

Mine ventilation, 37, 137, 177, 198, 201
231

Mine wiseness, 86, 151, 152

Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration, 26

Miscommunication, 74, 90, 100

Multiple-case design, 40

Narrative thinking, 199, 200

National Recovery Act, 27

National Research Council, 16, 36, 59

New miner training, 24

Nominal problem, ii, 62, 63, 65, 66, 71, 73

Nonroutine events, 10, 24, 35, 101, 140, 214

Norm, 38

Normalize, 73, 162, 218

Normative structure, 140

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 113

Optical density, iv, 110, 117-121, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133

Panel extraction, 21

Panic

as a research variable, 7, 16, 17, 167, 168, 170

as a scientific concept, 10, 17, 99, 167, 193, 218, 221

during escape attempts, 45, 77, 79, 83, 84, 86, 92, 126, 143, 146, 153, 174,

175, 178, 179, 184, 191, 193

in anecdotal accounts, 5, 17, 97, 152

reduction factors, 167, 170, 192

Panic model, 167, 191

Paradigm, 5, 13, 163, 214

Physiological problems, 132

Polyvinyl chloride, v, 130

Post hoc analysis, 196, 214

Prescience, 94

Primary escapeway, 30, 31, 35, 82, 95, 96, 98, 122, 147, 148, 196, 198, 224

Probability statistics, 41

Problem perception and diagnosis, 63, 100

Problem scenario, 210

Problem space, 198

Proficiency, 14, 15, 25, 137, 194, 199, 209, 212, 214

Projection map, 19

Psychometric properties, 206
232

Qualitative data, 40, 49, 62

Qualitative research, 40-42, 48, 165

Quantitative science, 41

Reflective markers, 173

Reflective signs, 123, 140

Reflectors, 47, 88, 143, 151, 159, 173

Regulator, 88, 96, 146, 154, 155, 161, 183

Reliability, 40-42, 48, 165, 206, 208

Replication, 40

Retreat mining, 21

Role conflict, 52

Sampling-type smoke detector, 112

Second lieutenant, 171, 174, 181, 187, 189

Section map, iv, 149, 201

Self-Contained Self-Rescuer

design features, 25, 89, 98, 120, 174, 187, 198, 210, 211, 218

perceived problems in using, 57, 76, 80, 84, 97, 98, 120, 124, 125, 127, 132,

146, 173, 174, 180-183, 187

storage location, 69, 81, 94, 220

training to don, 25, 36, 83, 89, 137, 196

use in rescue attempt, 153, 210, 211, 213

use in smoke, 45-48, 79, 81, 82, 87, 89, 95, 97, 131, 142, 145-147, 173, 174,

176, 179, 182, 183, 188, 197, 199, 210, 218, 220

Self-preservation, 167, 168

Sensory irritation, 131

Sentiment, 38, 39, 78, 172, 190

Simulation exercise, 199, 211

Simulations, iii, 8, 9, 15, 25, 37, 50, 194, 197, 198, 212, 214, 215, 220

Situation awareness, 62, 63, 99

Situational factors, 65, 197

Situational leadership, 166

Smoke density, ii, 118, 120, 124, 131, 137

Smoke detection, 110

Smoke hazards, ii, 117

Smoke inhalation, 131, 136, 211

Social authority, 157

Social dynamics, 163

Social efficiency, 18, 36

Social order, 16, 169-171
233

Social unit, 39, 40

Socialization, 139

Sociotechnical communication, 99

Sociotechnical system, 18

Socio-cultural environment, 138

Spatial problems, 139, 141

Standard deviations, iv, 208-210

Strategic thinking, 13, 15

Stress, 8, 9, 11-16, 60, 76, 77, 85, 88, 93, 97, 99, 109, 114, 161, 165, 169, 193

Structure fires, 2, 6, 7, 100, 101, 112, 166, 168, 219-221

Styrene-butadiene rubber, v

Subjective phenomenon, 101

Summerland Leisure Centre fire, 6, 7, 168

Sunshine silver mine fire, 26

Survivability, 110, 131, 136

Survival behavior, 169

Toxic gases, 117

Tremonia Experimental Mine, 120, 137

Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 110

United Mine Workers of America, 18, 27, 43

Validity, iv, 8, 9, 40-42, 48, 67, 165, 194, 206-208, 215

Values, iv, 15, 119, 127, 128, 130, 138, 140, 157, 166

Variance, v, 208, 209

Ventilation devices, 132-134

Vicarious learning, 197

Visibility distances, 121

Warning communication, 109, 114, 115

Warning message protocol, 115

Warning system, ii, 109, 113-115

Wayfinding, 138, 139, 141, 142, 147, 150, 155, 163-165

White noise, 13

Wilberg disaster, 2, 25, 83, 126, 217

Workplace culture, 14, 140
234