# EUR-Lex - 52011PC0654 - EN

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# 52011PC0654

**Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation /* COM/2011/0654 final - 2011/0297 (COD) */**

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1.
CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

Adopted in early 2003, the Market Abuse
Directive (MAD) 2003/6/EC introduced a comprehensive framework to tackle
insider dealing and market manipulation practices, jointly referred to as
"market abuse". The Directive aims to increase investor confidence
and market integrity by prohibiting those who possess inside information from
trading in related financial instruments, and by prohibiting the manipulation
of markets through practices such as spreading false information or rumours and
conducting trades which secure prices at abnormal levels.

In order to ensure the enforcement of Directive
2003/6/EC, Member States are required to ensure, in conformity with national
law, that the appropriate administrative measures can be taken or
administrative sanctions be imposed against the persons responsible where the
provisions adopted in implementation of the Directive have not been complied
with. This requirement is without prejudice to the right of Member States to
impose criminal sanctions.

The report by the High-Level Group on Financial
Supervision in the EU[1]
recommended that a "sound prudential and conduct of business framework for
the financial sector must rest on strong supervisory and sanctioning
regimes". To this end, the Group considers that supervisory authorities
must be equipped with sufficient powers to act and should be able to rely on
"equal, strong and deterrent sanctions regimes against all financial
crimes, sanctions which should be enforced effectively".

Effective enforcement requires that, in
accordance with article 14 of Directive 2003/6/EC, sanctions are available to
the competent authorities that are "effective, proportionate and
dissuasive In addition, effective enforcement also relates to the resources of
competent authorities, their powers and their willingness to detect and
investigate abuses. However, the High-Level Group considers that "none of
these is currently in place" and Member States sanctioning regimes are
regarded as in general weak and heterogeneous.

To this end, the Commission has published a
Communication[2]
with regard to sanction regimes in the financial sector. The Communication
argues that criminal sanctions, in particular imprisonment, are generally
considered to send a strong message of disapproval that could increase the
dissuasiveness of sanctions, provided that they are appropriately applied by
the criminal justice system. However, criminal sanctions may not be appropriate
for all types of violations and in all cases. The Communication concludes that
the Commission will assess whether and in which areas the introduction of
criminal sanctions, and the establishment of minimum rules on the definition of
criminal offences and sanctions may prove to be essential in order to ensure the
effective implementation of EU financial services legislation.

The proposal follows the approach set out in
the Communication of 20 September 2011 "Towards an EU criminal policy –
Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law"[3]. This includes an assessment,
based on clear factual evidence, an assessment of the national enforcement
regimes in place and the added value of common EU minimum criminal law
standards, taking into account the principles of necessity, proportionality and
subsidiarity.

In line with the Stockholm Programme and the
conclusions of the JHA Council of 22 April 2010 on economic crisis
prevention and support for economic activity[4],
the European Commission has assessed the application of the national rules
implementing the MAD and has identified a number of problems which have
negative impacts in terms of market integrity and investor protection. One of
the problems identified in the impact assessment is the fact that the sanctions
currently in place to fight market abuse offences are lacking impact and are
insufficiently dissuasive, which results in ineffective enforcement of the
Directive. In addition, the definition of which insider dealing or market
manipulation offences constitute criminal offences diverges considerably from
Member State to Member State. For example, five Member States do not provide
for criminal sanctions for disclosure of inside information by primary insiders
and eight Member States do not do so for secondary insiders. In addition, one
Member State does not currently impose criminal sanctions for insider dealing by
a primary insider and four do not do so for market manipulation. Since market
abuse can be carried out across borders, this divergence undermines the
internal market and leaves a certain scope for perpetrators of market abuse to
carry such abuse in jurisdictions which do not provide for criminal sanctions
for a particular offence.

Minimum rules on criminal offences and on
criminal sanctions for market abuse, which would be transposed into national
criminal law and applied by the criminal justice systems of the Member States,
can contribute to ensuring the effectiveness of this Union policy by
demonstrating social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature compared
to administrative sanctions or compensation mechanisms under civil law. Criminal
convictions for market abuse offences, which often result in widespread media
coverage, help to improve deterrence as as they demonstrate to potential
offenders that the authorities take serious enforcement action which can result
in imprisonment or other criminal sanctions and a criminal record. Common
minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences for the most serious
market abuse offences facilitate the cooperation of law enforcement authorities
in the Union, especially considering that the offences are in many cases
committed across borders.

Although the rules of preventing and fighting
market abuse offences are in place at EU level since 2003, experience shows
that the desired effect, i.e. contributing effectively to the protection of the
financial markets, has not been achieved by the current system. While proposals
to strengthen and ensure the coherence of administrative sanctions are included
in the proposal for a Regulation (EU) No...of the European Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation that also intends to remedy other major problems in the existing
system, this proposal lays down a requirement for Member States to provide for
minimum rules on the definition of the most serious market abuse offences and
on minimum levels of criminal sanctions attached to them.

2.
RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES
AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

The initiative is the result of consultations
with all major stakeholders, including public authorities (governments and
securities regulators), issuers, intermediaries and investors.

It takes into consideration the report
published by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) on
administrative measures and sanctions as well as criminal sanctions available
in Member States under the market abuse directive (MAD)[5]. It also takes into account the
results of the consultation launched by the Commission in its Communication on
reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector.

On 12 November 2008 the European Commission
held a public conference on the review of the market abuse regime[6]. On 20 April 2009, the European
Commission launched a call for evidence on the review of the Market Abuse
Directive. The Commission services received 85 contributions. The
non-confidential contributions can be consulted in the Commission website[7].

On 28 June 2010 the Commission launched a
public consultation on the revision of the Directive which closed on 23 July
2010[8]. The Commission services
received 96 contributions. The non-confidential contributions can be consulted
in the Commission website[9].
A summary is found in Annex 2 to the impact assessment report[10]. On 2 July 2010, the
Commission held a further public conference on the review of the Directive[11].

In line with its "Better Regulation"
policy, the Commission conducted an impact assessment of policy alternatives.
Policy options related to criminal sanctions were considered as part of this
preparatory work. The impact assessment concluded on this point that requiring
Member States to introduce criminal sanctions for the most serious market abuse
offences was essential to ensure the effective implementation of the Union
policy on market abuse. In combination with the preferred policy options
addressed in the proposal for a Regulation (EU) No...of the European Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation,
this will have a positive impact on investors' confidence and will further
contribute to the financial stability of financial markets.

3.
LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL
3.1.
Legal basis

The proposal is based on Article 83.2 of the
TFEU.

3.2.
Subsidiarity and proportionality

According to the principle of subsidiarity
(Article 5.3 of the TEU), action at EU level should be taken only when the aims
envisaged cannot be achieved sufficiently by Member States alone and can
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the EU.

Market abuse can occur across borders and harms
the integrity of financial markets which are increasingly integrated in the
Union. The divergent approaches to the imposition of criminal sanctions for
market abuse offences by Member States leave a certain scope for perpetrators who can often make use of the most lenient sanction
systems. This undermines both the deterrent effect of
each national sanction regime and the effectiveness of enforcement of the
Union's legislative framework on market abuse. EU-wide
minimum rules on the forms of market abuse that are considered to be a criminal
conduct contribute to addressing this problem.

Against this background EU action appears
appropriate in terms of the principle of subsidiarity.

The principle of proportionality requires that
any intervention is targeted and does not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives. This principle has guided the process from the
identification and evaluation of alternative policy options to the drafting of
this proposal.

3.3.
Detailed explanation of the proposal
3.3.1.
Criminal offences

Article 3 in conjunction with Article 2 of the
proposal defines the market abuse offences which should be regarded as criminal
offences by Member States and therefore be subject to criminal sanctions.

Two forms of market abuse conduct, namely insider
dealing and market manipulation, should be regarded as criminal offences if committed intentionally. The attempt to commit insider dealing and market manipulation
should also be punishable as a criminal offence.

The offence relating to inside information
should apply to persons who possess inside information of which they know that
it is inside information. The offence relating to market manipulation is
applicable to anybody.

3.3.2.
Inciting, aiding and abetting and attempt

Article 4 ensures that inciting as well as aiding
and abetting the defined criminal offences are also punishable in Member
States. The attempt to commit one of the offences defined in Articles 3 and 4
is also covered by the Directive with the exception of improper disclosure of
inside information and dissemination of information which gives false or
misleading signals, as it does not seem appropriate to define attempts to
commit these offences as criminal offences.

3.3.3.
Criminal sanctions

Article 5 requires Member States to take the
necessary measures to ensure that the criminal offences identified in Articles
3 and 4 are subject to criminal sanctions. These sanctions should be effective,
proportionate and dissuasive.

3.3.4.
Liability of legal persons

Article 6 requires Member States to ensure that
legal persons can be held liable for the criminal offences defined in Articles
3 and 4.

4.
BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

The proposal has no implications for the Union
budget.

2011/0297 (COD)

Proposal for a

DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL

on criminal sanctions for insider dealing
and market manipulation

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 83 (2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the
European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative
act to the national Parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the
European Economic and Social Committee[12],

,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1)
An integrated and efficient financial market
requires market integrity. The smooth functioning of securities markets and
public confidence in markets are prerequisites for economic growth and wealth.
Market abuse harms the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in
securities and derivatives.

(2)
Directive 2003/6/EC[13] of the European Parliament and
the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) required
Member States to ensure that competent authorities have the powers to detect
and investigate market abuse. Without prejudice to the right of Member States
to impose criminal sanctions, Directive 2003/6/EC also required Member States
to ensure that the appropriate administrative measures can be taken or
administrative sanctions be imposed against the persons responsible for
violations of the national rules implementing that Directive.

(3)
The report by the High-Level Group on Financial
Supervision in the EU recommended that a sound prudential and conduct of
business framework for the financial sector must rest on strong supervisory and
sanctioning regimes. To this end, the Group considered that supervisory
authorities must be equipped with sufficient powers to act and there should
also be equal, strong and deterrent sanctions regimes against all financial
crimes, sanctions which should be enforced effectively. The Group concluded
that Member States sanctioning regimes are in general weak and heterogeneous.

(4)
A well-functioning legislative framework on
market abuse requires effective enforcement. An evaluation of the national
regimes for administrative sanctions under Directive 2003/6/EC showed that not
all national competent authorities had a full set of powers at their disposal
to ensure that they could respond to market abuses with the appropriate
sanction. In particular, not all Member States had pecuniary administrative
sanctions available for insider dealing and market manipulation, and the level
of these sanctions varied widely among Member States.

(5)
The adoption of administrative sanctions by the
Member States has proven insufficient to ensure compliance with the rules
on preventing and fighting market abuse.

(6)
It is essential that compliance be strengthened
by the availability of criminal sanctions which demonstrate a social
disapproval of a qualitatively different nature compared to administrative
penalties. Establishing criminal offences for the most serious forms of market
abuse sets clear boundaries in law that such behaviours are regarded as
unacceptable and sends a message to the public and potential offenders that
these are taken very seriously by competent authorities.

(7)
Not all Member States have provided for criminal
sanctions for some forms
of serious breaches of national legislation
implementing Directive 2003/6/EC. These different
approaches undermine the uniformity of
conditions of operation in the internal market and may provide an incentive for persons to carry
out market abuse in Member States which do not provide for criminal
sanctions for these offences. In addition, until
now there has been no Union-wide understanding on which conduct is
considered to be such a serious breach. Therefore, minimum rules
concerning the definition of criminal offences committed
by natural and legal persons and of sanctions should be set. Common minimum
rules would make it also possible to use more effective methods of
investigation and effective cooperation within and between Member States. Convictions for market
abuse offences under criminal law often result in extensive media coverage,
which helps to deter potential offenders, as it draws public attention to the commitment
of competent authorities to tackling market abuse.

(8)
The introduction of criminal sanctions for the
most serious market abuse offences by all Member States is therefore essential
to ensure the effective implementation of Union policy on fighting market abuse,
in line with the requirements described in the Communication "Towards an
EU criminal policy – Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies
through criminal law"[14].

(9)
In order for the scope of this Directive to be
aligned with that of Regulation (EU) No...of the European Parliament and the
Council on insider dealing and market manipulation, trading in own shares for
stabilisation and buy-back programmes, as well as transactions, orders or
behaviours carried out for the purposes of monetary and public debt management
activities and activities concerning emission allowances in pursuit of the
Union's climate policy, should be exempt from this Directive.

(10)
Member States should be under the obligation to
subject the offences of insider dealing and market manipulation to criminal
sanctions according to this Directive only when they are committed with intent.

(11)
Due to the adverse effects attempted insider
dealing and attempted market manipulation have on the integrity of the
financial markets and on investor confidence in these markets, these forms of
behaviour should also be punishable as a criminal offence.

(12)
This Directive should also require Member States
to ensure that inciting as well as aiding and abetting the criminal offences
are also punishable. In this context, causing another person, on the basis of
inside information, to acquire or dispose of financial instruments to which
that information relates should be considered inciting to insider dealing.

(13)
This Directive should be applied taking into
account the legal framework established by the Regulation (EU) No...of the European Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation and its implementing
measures.

(14)
In order to ensure effective implementation of
the European policy for ensuring the integrity of the
financial markets set out in Regulation (EU)
No...of the European Parliament and the Council on
insider dealing and market manipulation, Member States
should also extend liability to legal persons, including, whenever possible,
criminal liability of legal persons.

(15)
As this Directive
provides for minimum rules, Member States are free to adopt or maintain more
stringent criminal law rules for market abuse.

(16)
Any processing of personal data undertaken in
the implementation of this Directive should be in compliance with Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data[15].

(17)
Since the objective of this Directive, namely to
ensure the availability of criminal sanctions for the most serious market abuse
offences across the Union, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States
and can therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of this Directive, be
better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In
accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article,
this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

(18)
This Directive respects the fundamental rights
and observes the principles recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union as enshrined in the Treaty. Specifically, it should be
applied with due respect for the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16),
the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Article 47), the
presumption of innocence and right of defence (Article 48), the principles of
legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties (Article 49),
and the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence (Article
50).

(19)
The Commission should assess the implementation
of this Directive in the Member States, also with a view to assessing a
possible future need for introducing minimum harmonisation of the types and
levels of criminal sanctions.

(20)
[In accordance with Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect
of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed to the Treaty, the United
Kingdom has notified its wish to participate in the adoption and application of
this Directive] OR [Without prejudice to Article 4 of Protocol (No 21) on the
position of the United Kingdom in respect of the area of freedom, security, and
justice, annexed to the Treaty, the United Kingdom will not participate in the
adoption of this Directive and is therefore not bound by or be subject to its
application.

(21)
[In accordance with Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect
of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed to the Treaty, Ireland
has notified its wish to take part in the adoption and application of this
Directive] OR [Without prejudice to Article 4 of Protocol (No 21) on the
position of Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security, and justice annexed
to the Treaty, Ireland will not take part in the adoption of this Directive and
is therefore not bound by it or be subject to its application.

(22)
In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol
(No 22) on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty, Denmark is not taking
part in the adoption of this Directive and is therefore not bound by it or
subject to its application.

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Article 1
Subject matter and scope

1.
This Directive establishes minimum rules for
criminal sanctions for the most serious market abuse
offences, namely insider
dealing and market manipulation.

2.
This Directive does not
apply to trading in own shares in buy-back programmes
or for the stabilisation of a financial instrument, where such trading is
carried out in accordance with article 3 of Regulation (EU) No...of the European
Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation, or to
transactions, orders or behaviours carried out for the purposes of monetary and
public debt management activities and activities concerning emission allowances
in pursuit of the Union's climate policy, in accordance with article 4 of
Regulation (EU) No...of the European Parliament and the Council on insider
dealing and market manipulation.

3.
This Directive shall also apply to behaviour or
transactions, including bids, relating to the auctioning of emission allowances
or other auctioned products based thereon pursuant to Commission Regulation No
1031/2010. Any provisions in this Directive referring to orders to trade shall
apply to bids submitted in the context of an auction.[16]

Article 2
Definitions

For the purposes of this Directive:

1.
"Financial instrument" means any
instrument within the meaning of Article 2(1)(8) of Regulation (EU) No...of the
European Parliament and the Council on markets in financial instruments.

2.
"Inside information" means information
within the meaning of Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No...of the European
Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation.

Article 3
Insider dealing

Member States shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that the following conduct constitutes a criminal offence,
when committed intentionally:

(a)
when in possession of inside information, using that
information to acquire or dispose of financial instruments to which that
information relates for one's own account or for the account of a third party.
This also includes using inside information to cancel or amend an order
concerning a financial instrument to which that information relates where that
order was placed before entering into possession of that inside information; or

(b)
disclosing inside information to any other
person, unless such disclosure is made in the lawful course of the exercise of duties
resulting from employment or profession.

Article 4
Market manipulation

Member States shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that the following conduct constitutes a criminal offence, when committed intentionally:

(a)
giving false or misleading signals as to the
supply of, demand for, or price of, a financial instrument or a related spot
commodity contract;

(b)
securing the price of one or several financial
instruments or a related spot commodity contract at an abnormal or artificial
level;

(c)
entering into a transaction, placing an order to
trade, or any other activity in financial markets affecting
the price of one or several financial instruments or a related spot commodity
contract, which employs a fictitious device or any
other form of deception or contrivance;

(d)
dissemination of information which gives false
or misleading signals as to financial instruments or related spot commodity
contracts, where those persons derive, for themselves
or another person, an advantage or profit from the dissemination of the
information in question.

Article 5
Inciting, aiding and abetting, and attempt

1.
Member States shall take the necessary measures
to ensure that inciting, aiding and abetting the criminal offences
referred to in Articles 3 and 4 are punishable as criminal offences.

2.
Member States shall take the necessary measures
to ensure that the attempt to commit any of the offences referred to in
Articles 3(a) and 4(a), (b) and (c) is punishable as a criminal offence.

Article 6
Criminal sanctions

Member States shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that criminal offences referred to in Articles 3 to 5 are
punishable by criminal sanctions which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

Article 7
Liability of legal persons

1.
Member States shall take the necessary measures
to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for offences referred
to in Articles 3 to 5 where such offences have been committed for their benefit
by any person who has a leading position within the legal person, acting either
individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, based on:

(a)
a power of representation of the legal person;

(b)
an authority to take decisions on behalf of the
legal person; or

(c)
an authority to exercise control within the
legal person.

2.
Member States shall also take the necessary
measures to ensure that legal persons can be held liable where the lack of
supervision or control, by a person referred to in paragraph 1, has made
possible the commission of an offence referred to in Articles 3 to 5 for the
benefit of the legal person by a person under its authority.

3.
Liability of legal persons under paragraphs 1
and 2 shall not exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons who are
involved as perpetrators, inciters or accessories in the offences referred to in
Articles 3 to 5.

Article 8
Sanctions for legal persons

Member States shall take
the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons held liable pursuant to
Article 7 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.

Article 9
Report

By [4 years after entry into force of this Directive], the
Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application
of this Directive and, if necessary, on the need to review it, in particular
with regard to the appropriateness of introducing common minimum rules on types
and levels of criminal sanctions.

The Commission shall submit its report accompanied, if appropriate,
by a legislative proposal.

Article 10
Transposition

1.
Member States shall adopt and publish, by [24
months after entry into force of this Directive] at the latest, the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those
provisions and a correlation table between those provisions and this Directive.

They shall apply those provisions from [24
months after entry into force of this Directive] and subject to and on the date
of the entry into force of Regulation (EU) No...of the European Parliament and
the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation.

When Member States adopt those provisions, they
shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference
on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine
how such reference is to be made.

2.
Member States shall communicate to the
Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in
the field covered by this Directive and a table indicating the correlation
between those provisions and this Directive.

Article 12
Entry into force

This Directive shall enter into force on the
twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of
the European Union.

Article 13
Addressees

This
Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaties.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament                       For
the Council

The President                                                 The
President

[1]               Report of the High-Level Group on Financial
Supervision in the EU, Brussels, 25.2.2009, p. 23.

[2]               European Commission, Communication on Reinforcing
sanctioning regimes in the financial sector, COM (2010) 716, 8 December
2010.

[3]               COM (2011) 573 final.

[4]               In its "Stockholm Programme – an open and secure
Europe serving and protecting citizens" of 2.12.2009, the European Council
emphasised the need to regulate financial markets and prevent abuse and invited
the Member States and the Commission to improve the detection of market abuse
and the misappropriation of funds. The JHA Council conclusions on economic
crisis prevention and support for economic activity, stressed that
consideration could be given to whether it is possible or, as the case may be,
appropriate to harmonise criminal laws regarding the handling of serious stock
market price manipulations and other misconduct relating to securities markets.
See Docc. 8920/10 of 22.4.2010 and 7881/10 of 29.3.2010

[5]               CESR/08-099, February 2008.

[6]               See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/abuse/12112008_conference_en.htm.

[7]               See
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2009/market_abuse_en.htm

[8]               See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/mad/consultation_paper.pdf

[9]               See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/mad_en.htm

[10]             The impact assessment report can be found on

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/abuse/index_en.htm

[11]             See Annex 3 of the impact assessment report for a summary
of the discussions.

[12]             OJ C , , p. .

[13]             OJ L 16, 12.4.2003, p.16.

[14]             COM (2011) 573 final.

[15]             OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.

[16]             Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 of 12 November
2010. on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse
gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European
Parliament and the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission
allowances trading within the Community, OJ L 302, 18.11.2010, p. 1.