NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

PAUL ANTHONY CASTILLO, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0436 

FILED 4-25-2019 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-120583-001 

The Honorable Ronda R. Fisk, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee 

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Christopher Stavris

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. CASTILLO

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Paul Anthony Castillo appeals his convictions and sentences 

for three counts of aggravated assault and one count for leaving the scene 

of a serious injury accident, all felonies. Castillo argues: (1) the superior 

court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial during the

victim’s testimony; and (2) the superior court committed fundamental error 

when the court did not declare a mistrial sua sponte following the victim’s

testimony. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 On May 1, 2016, two of Castillo’s sisters met with Rosemary

(Castillo’s ex-girlfriend) and Kevin (Rosemary’s brother). After a brief, 

amicable discussion, Castillo arrived at the meeting. Kevin and Castillo

began arguing, and Rosemary attempted to hit Castillo. Rosemary’s mother 

Patricia and her husband then arrived. Patricia attempted to hit Castillo 

with a metal object as he tried to get back into his car. Eventually, Castillo 

got into the car and drove away as Patricia and Rosemary chased after 

Castillo on foot. 

¶3 Castillo abruptly turned around and headed toward Patricia 

and Rosemary. As he approached the women, he sped up and intentionally 

swerved into them. After the collision, Castillo left the scene with his sister 

following him in her car. Castillo eventually stopped and got into his 

sister’s car. She drove Castillo to a nearby Circle K where she called the 

police. 

¶4 When paramedics reached Patricia and Rosemary, Patricia 

could only remember her name; she did not know where she was, what had 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the 

verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Castillo. State v. Harm, 

236 Ariz. 402, 404, ¶ 2, n.2 (App. 2015) (citing State v. Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 

495 (App. 1996)). 
STATE v. CASTILLO

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3 

happened, or what day it was. The paramedics observed a fracture that 

penetrated through the skin on Patricia’s right ankle, instability in her right 

femur, and bruising to the right side of her abdomen. They also noted that 

Rosemary sustained injuries to her arms and hands.

¶5 The State charged Castillo with three counts of aggravated 

assault relating to Patricia (counts 1, 2, and 3), one count of aggravated 

assault relating to Rosemary (count 4), one count of leaving the scene of an 

accident resulting in serious injury concerning Patricia (count 5), and one 

count of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury relating to 

Rosemary (count 6). Before the trial, Castillo and the State agreed that the 

State would not introduce evidence of Castillo’s heroin use. The parties 

agreed that the State could elicit testimony regarding Castillo’s demeanor 

that day, but unless the officer had “some specialized training or 

experience,” he would not opine on whether Castillo was under the 

influence of heroin.

¶6 During the State’s case-in-chief, the State called numerous 

witnesses, including eye-witnesses, police officers, medical professionals, 

and Patricia. Patricia testified that she was married and had six children, 

but that one child had recently passed away. Patricia further testified that 

Rosemary was absent because she had recently lost a child during 

pregnancy. Patricia also testified regarding the extent of her injuries, 

indicating: she must use a “potty thing, because [she] can’t sit on a normal 

toilet;” she has screws in her knees that were “popping out;” and she was 

unable to walk for “[a]bout six months” following the incident. During 

Patricia’s testimony, the following exchange occurred: 

[State:] Do you remember much of that day?

[Patricia:] I just remember us going to church.

[State:] Okay.

[Patricia:] Then we went to the store, me and my 

husband. We were really happy. And I bought 

him some shoes because the dress shoes that he 

wears he has a bunion that he has to get surgery 

and he hasn’t gone and got it, and I bought him 

some really nice shoes and I put them on. We 

were happy. And then we came back to the 

neighborhood home, and all’s I remember is 

parking in front of the store and seeing my 

daughters. And I seen girls, but I don't know 
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who those people were, and I was just yelling at 

them, “What’s going on? What’s going on?” 

And they just kept walking. And I got up, and I 

went after them, “What’s going on? What’s 

going on?” And somebody yells, “It’s [Castillo]. 

He’s acting stupid.” And I said, “Oh, my god, 

he’s on heroin again,” and I got frustrated— 

¶7 Castillo objected and moved for a mistrial at a bench 

conference. The court excused the jury and heard argument on the mistrial

motion. Castillo argued that the witness’s non-responsive and “highly 

prejudicial” statement regarding heroin use required a mistrial. The court 

denied the motion but struck the statement and instructed the jury to 

disregard it. The court additionally directed Patricia to respond only to the 

questions asked, and the defense agreed to allow the State to ask leading 

questions. Finally, before deliberating, the court instructed the jury that

they could “not be influenced by sympathy or prejudice” and “[a]ny 

testimony stricken from the court record must not be considered.” 

¶8 The jurors found Castillo guilty of aggravated assault (counts 

1, 2, and 3) and leaving the scene of a serious injury accident (count 5) 

regarding Patricia. They found Castillo not guilty on the remaining two 

counts relating to Rosemary. Following an aggravation phase, the jury 

found aggravating factors on counts 1, 2, and 3. The court found Castillo 

had a historical prior felony conviction and sentenced him to 6.5 years on

count 1 and to 4.5 years each on counts 2 and 3 to be served concurrently.

Additionally, the court sentenced Castillo to 3.25 years relating to count 5 

to be served consecutively to counts 1, 2, and 3. Castillo timely appealed. 

We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution 

and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), -4031, and 

-4033(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION 

A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying 

Castillo’s Motion for a Mistrial Following the Testimony of the 

Victim.

¶9 Castillo argues that the superior court erred by denying his 

motion for a mistrial following Patricia’s testimony about his potential 

heroin use. We review the court’s decision to grant or deny a mistrial for an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 263 (1983). “[A] 

declaration of a mistrial is the most dramatic remedy for trial error,” and 
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should only be granted “when it appears that justice will be thwarted.” Id.

at 262. If a witness unexpectedly volunteers inadmissible evidence, “the 

trial court must decide whether a remedy short of mistrial will cure the 

error.” State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 304, ¶ 32 (2000). The superior court is 

afforded broad discretion because it “is in the best position to determine 

whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” Id.

¶10 The State did not elicit Patricia’s statement; instead, she 

spontaneously volunteered it. Immediately following the statement, the 

court heard argument whether a mistrial was necessary. The court 

considered remedies short of a mistrial and concluded that a curative 

instruction was appropriate. See Jones, 197 Ariz. at 304, ¶ 32 (the superior 

court may consider remedies short of a mistrial). The court gave the

curative instruction immediately upon the jury’s return to the courtroom. 

Also, before jury deliberation, the court instructed the jury to disregard any 

stricken testimony. We presume the jurors followed these instructions. See 

State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 450, ¶ 95 (2016). Neither Castillo’s arguments 

nor our review of the record reveals any reason that the presumption was

overcome here. Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion.

B. The Superior Court did not Commit Err by Failing to Declare a 

Mistrial Sua Sponte Following the Victim’s Testimony.

¶11 Castillo further alleges Patricia’s testimony about her son’s

death, the extent of her injuries, and the reason Rosemary was not present 

for the trial was irrelevant and created undue prejudice that warranted a 

mistrial. We disagree.

¶12 Castillo failed to request a mistrial on these grounds; 

therefore, we review only for fundamental error. State v. Henderson, 210 

Ariz. 561, 567, ¶¶ 19–20 (2005). Our supreme court has recently described a 

defendant’s burden on fundamental error review as follows:

A defendant establishes fundamental error by showing that 

(1) the error went to the foundation of the case, (2) the error 

took from the defendant a right essential to his defense, or (3) 

the error was so egregious that he could not possibly have 

received a fair trial. If the defendant establishes fundamental 

error under prongs one or two, he must make a separate 

showing of prejudice, which also “involves a fact-intensive 

inquiry.”

State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018) (quoting Henderson, 210 

Ariz. at 568, ¶ 26). Because mistrials raise issues of double jeopardy, a party 
STATE v. CASTILLO

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must ordinarily ask for a mistrial, State v. Laird, 186 Ariz. 203, 207 (1996), 

and the superior court must find a “manifest necessity” to declare one, State 

v. Dickinson, 242 Ariz. 120, 124, ¶¶ 16–17 (App. 2017). 

¶13 Castillo argues that the now-complained-of testimony was 

irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under Arizona Rule of Evidence 403, 

which required the superior court to declare a mistrial sua sponte. The 

superior court has broad discretion in deciding the admissibility of 

evidence. State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 28, 33. ¶ 21 (App. 1998). Further, the

court should use restraint before interjecting into witness’ testimony

because the defense “may have had tactical reasons” for moving forward 

and not objecting. Dickinson, 242 Ariz. at 126, ¶ 23. 

¶14 Here, the court did not err by failing to declare a mistrial sua 

sponte because the statements were arguably admissible. First, the death of 

Patricia’s son was not elicited by the prosecution; however, it did provide

background about the witness and helped explain her emotional state while 

testifying. Next, the State may elicit testimony why a victim is not present

if the testifying witness has personal knowledge of those reasons. See Ariz. 

R. Evid. 602 (requiring personal knowledge to testify). And finally, the

extent of the victim’s injuries is relevant and needed to establish aggravated 

assault under A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(3). See State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 280, 

¶ 11 (2014) (jury must decide, based on the evidence presented, whether 

injuries sustained qualify under A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(3)).

¶15 Castillo argues these unresponsive statements improperly 

made Patricia seem more sympathetic. However, as the State posits, her 

comments might also paint her as a “loose cannon.” The defense could have

had tactical reasons for not requesting a mistrial. See Dickinson, 242 Ariz. at 

126, ¶ 23. Additionally, the court instructed the jurors not to be “influenced 

by sympathy or prejudice.” We presume they followed this instruction 

concerning all witnesses. See Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 450, ¶ 95. Therefore, the 

superior court did not err. And because there was no error, we decline to 

address Castillo’s argument of unfair prejudice. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 

142, ¶ 21 (to obtain relief on appeal for fundamental error, a defendant must 

first prove error).
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CONCLUSION

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Castillo’s convictions 

and sentences.