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[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2394 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2394

 To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the 
      expiration of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 31, 2019

  Mr. Van Hollen (for himself and Mr. Young) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the 
      expiration of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Richard G. Lugar and Ellen O. 
Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nuclear Forces''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since the end of World War II, the United States has 
        relied on a robust and effective nuclear deterrent as part of 
        its national defense, particularly against the Soviet Union and 
        its successor state, the Russian Federation.
            (2) The United States nuclear arsenal must remain safe, 
        secure, and reliable such that it can effectively ensure the 
        security of the United States and its allies.
            (3) Along with its nuclear deterrent, the United States has 
        pursued a number of arms control, disarmament, and 
        nonproliferation agreements with the Soviet Union and Russia to 
        ensure strategic stability and the protection of the United 
        States homeland, such as--
                    (A) the Interim Agreement Between the United States 
                of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
                on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of 
                Strategic Offensive Arms, done at Moscow May 26, 1972 
                (commonly referred to as ``SALT I''); and
                    (B) the Treaty Between the United States of America 
                and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
                Strategic Offensive Reductions, done at Moscow July 31, 
                1991 (commonly referred to as ``START I'').
            (4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
        United States continues to rely on a combination of nuclear 
        deterrence and strategic arms control to help protect the 
        United States from nuclear attack.
            (5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and Russia signed 
        the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
        of Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly referred to as ``New 
        START Treaty'').
            (6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated December 2, 
        2010, former Secretaries of State Henry A. Kissinger, George P. 
        Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin 
        L. Powell urged the Senate to ratify the New START Treaty, 
        stating that it was in ``the national interest to ratify''.
            (7) During the ratification process, the New START Treaty 
        garnered bipartisan support, and the United States Senate 
        approved the Treaty on December 22, 2010, by a 71-26 vote.
            (8) The New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 
        2011, placing numerical limits on United States and Russian 
        strategic systems, including intercontinental ballistic 
        missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and heavy 
        bombers, as well as warheads.
            (9) On February 5, 2018, the Treaty's central limits on 
        strategic arms took effect.
            (10) Through the New START Treaty's verification regime, 
        which includes short-notice, on-site inspections at military 
        bases and facilities, the United States is able to verify the 
        data provided by the Russian Federation regarding its strategic 
        nuclear arsenal. The verification regime provides both 
        countries insight into each other's strategic nuclear delivery 
        systems, warheads, and facilities, as well as data exchanges to 
        track the status and makeup of nuclear weapons systems.
            (11) During a February 26, 2019, hearing on nuclear 
        deterrence requirements of the Committee on Armed Services of 
        the Senate, Commander of the United States Strategic Command 
        (STRATCOM) General John Hyten voiced his support for the 
        Treaty, saying he was ``a big supporter of the New START 
        agreement'' and stating, ``The New START treaty'' provides 
        ``insights into the Russians capabilities. Those are hugely 
        beneficial to me.''.
            (12) During a March 2017 hearing on nuclear deterrence 
        requirements of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives, Air Force General Paul Selva, the Vice 
        Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also endorsed the New 
        START Treaty, saying the Treaty is ``a bilateral, verifiable 
        agreement that gives us some degree of predictability on what 
        our potential adversaries look like''.
            (13) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force 
        Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear 
        Integration, asserted that the New START Treaty was of ``huge 
        value'' to United States security.
            (14) During a September 2018 hearing before the Committee 
        on Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
        for Policy David Trachtenberg stated that ``the transparency 
        and verification requirements of the New START Treaty are a 
        benefit'' to the security of the United States and, in response 
        to a question regarding missile defense, asserted that the 
        Treaty had ``no'' effect on limiting United States missile 
        defense capabilities.
            (15) In a March 2017 hearing of the Strategic Forces 
        Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives, Retired Air Force General and former commander 
        of United States Strategic Command Robert Kehler stated, ``I 
        think that we have gotten tremendous benefit out of those kinds 
        of agreements with the Russians over the years, provided that 
        the Russians comply,'' regarding the importance of the New 
        START Treaty.
            (16) The Department of State confirmed in February 2018 
        that the Russian Federation had met the Treaty's central limits 
        on strategic arms and stated that ``implementation of the New 
        START Treaty enhances the safety and security of the United 
        States''.
            (17) The Nuclear Posture Review states that arms control 
        agreements can ``foster transparency, understanding, and 
        predictability in adversary relations, thereby reducing the 
        risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation''.
            (18) The New START Treaty strengthens United States nuclear 
        security and strategic stability by reducing the number of 
        strategic systems in the Russian Federation's nuclear arsenal 
        and provides the United States with the inspection and 
        monitoring tools necessary to confidently verify Russian 
        compliance with the Treaty.
            (19) The New START Treaty does not restrict United States 
        nuclear modernization programs or limit United States missile 
        defense efforts.
            (20) If the New START Treaty is not extended or replaced 
        before it expires in 2021, the United States runs the risk of 
        having no legally binding, verifiable limits on the Russian 
        Federation's strategic nuclear arsenal for the first time since 
        1972.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the United States should seek to 
extend the New START Treaty from its initial termination date in 
February 2021 to February 2026, as provided for under Article XIV of 
the Treaty, unless the President determines and informs the appropriate 
congressional committees that--
            (1) the Russian Federation is in material breach of the 
        Treaty; or
            (2) the United States and the Russian Federation have 
        entered into a new arms control agreement to replace the Treaty 
        that provides equal or greater constraints, transparency, and 
        verification measures with regard to the Russian Federation's 
        nuclear forces.

SEC. 4. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS.

    (a) Director of National Intelligence Assessments.--
            (1) Relating to russian federation nuclear forces.--Not 
        later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
        Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees an intelligence assessment 
        based on all sources of the national security and intelligence 
        implications of the expiration of the New START Treaty without 
        the United States and the Russian Federation having entered 
        into a new arms control agreement to replace the Treaty that 
        provides equal or greater constraints, transparency, and 
        verification measures with regard to the Russian Federation's 
        nuclear forces. The assessment shall be submitted in an 
        unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, and 
        shall include the following elements:
                    (A) A description of the size and posture of the 
                Russian Federation's nuclear forces and strategic 
                delivery vehicles, as well as predicted force levels 
                through February 2026 under each of the following 
                potential scenarios:
                            (i) The Treaty expires in February 2021 
                        without such a replacement agreement.
                            (ii) The Treaty is extended until February 
                        2026.
                    (B) An assessment of how strategic stability would 
                be impacted if the Treaty is not extended or such a 
                replacement agreement is not concluded.
                    (C) An assessment of the impact on United States 
                allies if the limitations on the Russian Federation's 
                nuclear forces are dissolved if the Treaty is not 
                extended or such a replacement agreement is not 
                concluded.
                    (D) A description of the intelligence collection 
                benefits of the Treaty.
                    (E) An assessment of how the United States 
                intelligence community's confidence in its assessments 
                of the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear arsenal 
                and future nuclear force levels would be impacted if 
                the Treaty is not extended or such a replacement 
                agreement is not concluded.
                    (F) An assessment of what specific capabilities the 
                United States intelligence community would have to 
                develop, deploy, or realign to ensure no loss of 
                collection capability occurs if the Treaty is not 
                extended or such a replacement agreement is not 
                concluded.
            (2) Relating to people's republic of china nuclear 
        forces.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
        shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an 
        assessment of the relative size and posture of the strategic 
        nuclear forces of the People's Republic of China compared to 
        that of the United States and the Russian Federation. The 
        assessment shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may 
        contain a classified annex, and shall include the following 
        elements:
                    (A) An assessment of the size, force structure, and 
                operational status of the People's Republic of China's 
                long-range nuclear-capable delivery vehicles that meet 
                the definitions of systems counted under the New START 
                Treaty.
                    (B) An assessment of the number of nuclear warheads 
                that the Government of the People's Republic of China 
                possesses.
                    (C) A description of the efforts of the Government 
                of the People's Republic of China to modernize and 
                modify its nuclear force structure.
                    (D) A description of the potential changes to the 
                nuclear force structure and posture of the People's 
                Republic of China if the United States and Russian 
                Federation are no longer bound by the limits in the New 
                START Treaty.
    (b) Secretary of State.--
            (1) Relating to nato, nato member countries, and other 
        united states allies.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a 
        report, which shall be in an unclassified form, but may contain 
        a classified annex, and provide a briefing to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that includes an assessment of the 
        likely reactions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
        (NATO), NATO member countries, and other United States allies 
        to a United States decision not to extend the New START Treaty 
        or enter into a new arms control agreement with the Russian 
        Federation to replace the Treaty that provides equal or greater 
        constraints, transparency, and verification measures with 
        regard to Russia's nuclear forces.
            (2) Relating to other matters.--Not later than 60 days 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
        thereafter until the New START Treaty is extended or expires, 
        the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Defense, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that includes the following elements:
                    (A) A description of any discussions with the 
                Russian Federation on the Treaty or a similar agreement 
                on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive 
                arms at the Assistant Secretary, Ambassadorial level or 
                higher.
                    (B) The dates, locations, discussion topics, 
                agenda, outcomes, and Russian Federation interlocutors 
                involved in those discussions.
                    (C) An identification of the United States 
                Government departments and agencies involved in the 
                discussions.
                    (D) The types of systems, both nuclear and 
                nonnuclear, discussed by either side in such 
                discussions.
                    (E) Whether an offer of extension of the Treaty, of 
                any length of time, has been offered by either side.

SEC. 5. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION IN EVENT OF EXPIRATION OF NEW START 
              TREATY.

    If the New START Treaty is allowed to expire before the United 
States and the Russian Federation enter into a new arms control 
agreement to replace the Treaty that provides equal or greater 
constraints, transparency, and verification measures with regard to the 
Russian Federation's nuclear forces, not later than 30 days after such 
expiration the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees--
            (1) a justification for why the New START Treaty was 
        allowed to expire; and
            (2) a certification that extending the Treaty was not in 
        the national security interest of the United States.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the Senate.
            (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
            (3) New start treaty; treaty.--The terms ``New START 
        Treaty'' and ``Treaty'' mean the Treaty between the United 
        States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for 
        the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
        Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on 
        February 5, 2011.
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