NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0764n.06 No. 09-3996 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, ) ) P laintif f-App ellee, ) ) O N A P P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED v. ) S TA TES DI STR IC T C OU RT F OR THE ) S OU THER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O ANTHONY DIXON, ) ) Defendan t-Appellant. ) BEF OR E: KEN NE DY , C OLE, and R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. CORNELIA G. KENN EDY, Circuit Judge. Def endant Anthony

Dix on was a

passeng er in a ca r driven with only

one wor king he adlig ht. After O ffice r Jos hua F risby of the Da y ton Poli ce Depa rtment stopped the ca

r for this violation and re moved Dixon from the vehicle, he observe d a pa rt of Gl oc k’ s h and g un

in t he c ar u nd e r a fl oo r m a t and

arr e ste d Di xon. Di xon s ou g ht t o s up pr e ss the Glock, but the district cour t held that the handgun was in plain view of the arr esting office r and was prope rly

seized. Dix on pleade d g uilty to one count of possession of a fire arm by

a convic ted fe lon in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 2( g ), pr e se rv inghis ri g ht t o a pp e a l th e den ial of hi s mo tio n to suppress the se arc h. On appe al, Dixon arg ues that his detention by Of fi ce r Fr isby

was inappropriately

prolong ed bey ond the s cope of the t raf fic stop by an im proper pat s ear ch in violation of his Four

th Amendment rig hts, that the Glock wa s only observe d beca use of this pat searc h, and that it should have there fore been suppr essed a s fruit of the poisonous tree . For t h e re as o ns that fo llo w, we AF F I RM.2 F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND At about 6:45 p.m. on November 16, 2008, Offic er F ri s b y wa s on routine patrol tra veling westbound whe n he obser ved an a utomobile being dr iven ea stbound with only one hea dlight illumi nated. This is a tra ffic violation in Ohio. See Ohio Revised Code § 4513.04( A)

. Offic er F ri sb y re sp on de d b y

tur nin g aro un d to ini tiate a tr a ff ic sto p. Of

fi c e r F ri sb y

ob se rv e d tw o o c c up a nts in the vehicle, the driver, L etitia Rose, and, seated in the front pa sseng er se at, def endant Dixon. Offic er F risby

approa ched the vehicle on the driver’s s ide, identified himself, e x plained to Rose why he had stoppe d the vehicle, and asked he r for identification and pr oof of insura nce. O ffice r F risby also reque sted identification fr om Dix on. Offi c e r F r is b y te s ti f ie d th a t h e th e nr e tu

r n e d to h is c r u is e r to is s u e a

c it a ti o nan d

u p on enter ing his c ru iser, inputted the information he had obtained f rom Rose and Dixon int o the

c omp ute r i n h is c ru ise r, which pro vi de d th e ir c ri min a l hi sto ri e s a

nd B ur e a u o f M oto r V e hic le

rec ords. Acc ording to Office r F risby , the computer repor ted that Dix on had re cently been a rre sted

sever al times for c arr

y ing c oncea led wea

pons and trafficking in drug s. Offic er F risby testified that this infor mation ma de him unc omfortable, but that he did not call for backup beca use hi s cr uiser computer indicated that all of his colleagues we re a lrea dy occupie d at other loc ations. Whi le he wa s in t he c ru ise r o bta ini ngthe inf or ma tio n r e g ard ingRos e and Di xon, Of

fi c e r D ixon t e sti fi e d to wi tne ssi ng“ a

lot of mov e me nts ” wi thi n th e c ar, tho ug h h e did no t me nti on the se mov e me nts in h is po lic e re po rt

. Offic er F risby

returne d to the vehicle a

nd approa ched D ix on on the passeng er’ s side of the

ve hic l e . O f

f i c e r F r i s b y t e s t i f

i e d t h a t h e a s k e d D i xo n t o s t e p o u t o f t h e c ar s o t h a t h e c o u l d t a l k to him. Dix on complied, leavingthe passeng er door open. Of fice r F risby

asked D ix on to put his hands3

on the ve hic l e an d b e g an a p a t s e ar c h o f D i xo n t o e n s u r e t h a t h e d i d n o t h a v e a w e a p o n o n h is person. While Offic er F risby was pat sear ching Dix on, he saw a pistol protruding fr om under the fl oo r m a t on

the pa sse ng e r’ s si de of the ve hic le . O ff

ic e r F ri sb y

te sti fi e d that

a pp ro xima te ly one-qua rter of the butt of the pistol and its sli de ra il could be see n sticking out fr om under the f loor mat and that he was able to r ecog nize the g un as a Glock beca use that is the model of fire arm that he had pr eviously

car ried throug hout his five y ear s as a police office r. Of fice r F risby

did not

manip ulate the fl oo r m at or mov e any

thi ngto s e e the Gl oc k. Of fi c e r F ri sb y

the n p la c e d D ixon i n handcuf fs and r etrieve d the handgun from the a utomobile. On Novembe r 25, 2008, Dix on was indicted in the Southern District of Ohio on one c ount of possession of a f

irea rm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1)

. Dix on filed a motion to suppress the handgun. The district cour t held an evidentiary hear ing on the m otion and subsequ e n tl y d e n ie d it

. D ixo n e n te r e d a p le a o f g u il ty , p r e s e r v in g h is r ig h t to a

p p e a l th e district court’s de cision denying his mot i o n t o s u p p ress. Dixon was sentenc ed to seve nty -two months incar cer ation. Dix on timely appea led the district cour t’s ref usal to suppress the Gloc k. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW

“ We r e vie w the den ia l of a mot ion to s up pr e ss de novo , but will acce pt the district court’s fac tual finding s unless they are clea rly err oneous.” United States v. Garrido , 467 F .3 d 971 , 9 77 (6 th Cir. 2006). “A f

actua l finding ‘is clea

rly err oneous when the re viewing court on the e ntire evide nce is left with the definite a

nd firm conviction that a mistake has bee n committed.’” Id

. (q u o t i n g Tran v. Gonzales , 447 F.3 d 9 3 7 , 943 (6th Cir. 2006)). “ ‘The e vidence must be considere d in the light most favora

ble to the par

ty that preva iled in the court below—in t his case , the gover nment.’” United Sta te s v . S mi th , 5 9 4 F. 3 d

5 3 0 , 5 3 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 1 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Garrido , 467 F.3d at 977).4 DI SCU SSIO N Dix on argues on appe al that his de tention by Offic er F risby

was prolong ed beyond the point jus tif ie d b y the tr a ff ic sto p in or de r to pat se arc h him , that it wa s the re fo re ill e g a l un de r t he F ourt h Amendment, and that the evidenc e seized during this prolonge d detention—the Glock f ound in the vehicle—must be suppr essed a s fruit of the poisonous tre e. Dixon further a rg ues that the plain-vie w doctrine doe s not apply

beca use Of fi ce r Frisby ’s observation of the handgun occur red dur ing a

n illega lly prolong ed dete ntion. We beg in, as t he dis trict court did, by concludingthat Offic er F risby unquestionably

had the authority to stop the vehicle Rose was driving

. I t is a traff ic violation in Ohio to drive with only one headlig ht. See Ohio Revised Code § 4513.04(A). As we rec ently held, “[w]hen law enfor ceme nt office rs witness a tra ffic violation, they may stop the d ri v er an d h i s car . . . . [T] here is nothing ‘unre asonable ’ about stopping a vehic le whose dr iver ha s just commit ted a traff ic vi olation.” United States v. Street , 614 F.3d 228, 232 ( 6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). I t is established law that a tra ffic stop must “last no longe r than is ne cessa ry to effe ctuate the purpose of

the stop.” Florida v. Roye r , 4 60 U. S. 4 91 , 5 00 (1 98 3) ; United States v. Pe rez , 440 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 2006) (“ Once the purpose of an ordinary traff ic stop is completed, the offic er ma y not ‘ further detain the vehicle or its occupants unless something that occur red dur ing the traff

ic stop gen er at edt h e n ec es s ary

re as o n ab l e s u s p i ci o nt o j u s t i fy a f u rt h er d et en t i o n . ’” (q u o t i n g United States

v . M esa , 62 F .3 d 15 9, 16 2 (6 th Cir

. 19 95 )) ). He re , h ow e ve r, Of fi c e r F ri sb y

ha d n ot c omp le te d h is traff ic stop wh en he re quested that Dixon ex it the vehicle be cause Offic er F risby had not y et completed his ac tions in connection with the issuance or non-iss u an ce o f a c itation to R ose for driving a vehic le with only a sing le operative headlig ht. There fore , our prior de cisions discussing5

imp ro pe r prolon g a tio ns of tr a ff ic sto ps are no t im

pli c a te d; O ff

ic e r F ri sb y

wa s w ith in h is r ig hts to reque st that Dix on exit the ca r for safe ty rea sons while in the course of issuing a citation, even if

the citation could have b ee n i s sued with Dix on rema ining within the ca r and e ven thoug h removing Dix on from the car prolong ed the traff ic stop by approximately thirty seconds, a s timed by a video

rec ordin g o f the e ncounter . “In the cour se of a stop premised on a tra ffic violation, police ma y instruct the driver

or occ upant to exit the vehicle .” Street , 6 1 4 F. 3 d at 2 3 2

. (c i t i n g Pennsylv ania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977)) . “In Mimms , the Court held that ‘onc e a motor ve hicle has been la wfully detained f

or a traff ic violation, the police off icer s may order the driver

to ge t out of the vehicle without violating the F ourth Amendment’s pr oscription of unre asonable s ea rche s and seizures.’” Arizona v. Johnson , 1 2 9 S

. C t

. 7 8 1 , 7 8 6 (2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Mimms , 434 U.S. at 111 n.6). This brig ht line rule exists beca use “[t] raf

fic stops a re fra ug ht with dang er to police office rs, and the Four th Amendment per

m its officer s to conduct an othe rwise- leg itimate stop on their own terms—whethe r by

keeping the driver (and occupa nts) in the car or by asking them to exi t the car , d ep en d i n g on what they

perc eive a s safe r.” Street , 6 1 4 F

. 3 d a t 2 3 2 ( in te r

n a l q u o tati o nma

r k s and citations omitt ed). H ere , while in the proc ess of iss u i n g a t ra ff i c citation to R ose, Off

icer Fr isby pe rc e ive d it

to b e ne c e ssa

ry fo r h is sa fe ty to h a ve Di xon e xit th e c ar. Th is d e c isi on wa s w ith in h is discretion. Be cause Offic er F risby

order ed Dixon fr o m t h e car and stood in close proximit y to the pa sse ng e r si d e c ar

d o o r , h e w a s a

b l e t o s e e t h e G l o c k

w i t h i nt h e v e h i c l e . T h i s i s qu i n t e s s e n t i a l ly what the plain- view doctr ine per mits. “Under o rd i n ar y

circ umstances, the pla in view exception permits the war

rantless seizure of

an objec t provided that (1) the office r i s lawfully positioned in a pla c e fr om wh ic h the ob

je c t c an be pla inl y vie we d; (2 ) the inc ri min a tin g c ha ra c te r o f t he ob je c t is6

immediately

appar ent; and, (3) the office r has a lawful rig ht of ac cess to the objec t itself.” United States v. Bishop , 338 F.3d 623, 626 ( 6th Cir. 2003). All of the prong s of the plain-vie w test wer e satisfied in this c ase. Offic er Fr isby was in a lawful position out side the open pa sseng er door of the

ve hic le . T he fi re arm

wa s im me diate ly

re c og niza

ble a s con tr a

ba nd : unde r Oh io l aw, it i s il le g a l to store a f irea rm under the floor mat of a vehicle, see Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2923.12(A)( 2); 2923.16(C). “The final re quirement, that the of fice r have a lawf

ul rig ht of ac cess to the objec t, is meant to gua rd ag ainst warr antless entry

onto premises wheneve r contraband is viewed f rom off the premises in the absenc e of e x ige nt circumstanc es, but does not bar the seizure of ev i d en ce in a parke d car . The differ ence betwee n ‘lawf

ully positioned’ and ‘lawful right of acce ss’ is thus that the former re fer s to where the offic er stands w hen she se es the item, and the latter to whe re she must be to retrieve the item.” Bo on e v . S

pu rg ess , 385 F.3d 923, 928 (6th Cir. 2004) (c itations omi tted). Ther efor e, Of fice r Fr isby proper ly seized the fire arm pursua nt to the plain-view doc trine. We a g re e wi th t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

that th e pat se arc h w a s ir

re le va nt to the se izur e of

the fi re a rm . We need not, ther efor e, conside r the law fulness of the pat searc h or whe ther, a s the Gover nment

asser ts, the exclusionary

rule is inapplicable to the Glock’s seizure bec ause the re w as no ca usal, or “but-for ,” conne ction betwee n the pat sea rch a nd its discovery

. S

e e U n it e d S ta te s v. Pearc e , 531 F.3d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable wher e evide nce ha s been obta ined by

means suff

iciently separ ate f

rom the illeg al ac tivity

to be fre e of a

ny taint). CO NC LU SION B e c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t e rr in d e nying Di xon’ s motio n to su pp re ss, we AF F I RM.