NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

J. K. and J. C., on behalf of themselves and 

on behalf of K.K-R., a minor, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

MISSOULA COUNTY PUBLIC 

SCHOOLS, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-35687 

D.C. No. 9:15-cv-00122-RWA 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Richard W. Anderson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 9, 2018

Seattle, Washington

Before: M. SMITH and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and GORDON,** District 

Judge.

Plaintiffs-Appellants J.K. and J.C. bring this appeal on behalf of their 

daughter, K.K-R., asserting that the Missoula County Public Schools (“MCPS”) 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Andrew P. Gordon, United States District Judge for 

the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

FILED

FEB 23 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1400, et seq. when it failed to evaluate K.K-R. for special education services 

until 2013. After a 15-day administrative due process hearing, the hearing officer 

denied Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims, concluding that the IDEA’s two-year statute 

of limitations barred Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims before 2012, and that MCPS did 

not violate the IDEA. Plaintiffs-Appellants then filed suit in federal court, and the 

district court dismissed Plaintiffs-Appellants’ amended complaint and entered 

judgment for MCPS. Reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error, 

see N.B. v. Hellgate Elem. Sch. Dist. ex rel Bd. of Dirs., 541 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th 

Cir. 2008), we affirm. 

“[T]he IDEA’s statute of limitations requires courts to bar only claims 

brought more than two years after the parents or local educational agency ‘knew or 

should have known’ about the actions forming the basis of the complaint.” Avila v. 

Spokane Sch. Dist. 81, 852 F.3d 936, 937 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(f)(3)(C). The record supports the district court’s finding that PlaintiffsAppellants knew or should have known the alleged action forming the basis of 

their complaint by August 2009 when they first enrolled K.K-R. in middle school. 

Because Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to file their claims until October 1, 2014, their 

claims arising prior to October 1, 2012, are barred by the statute of limitations. 
3 

As a state entity receiving assistance under the IDEA, MCPS has an 

obligation to identify, locate, and evaluate all students with disabilities in its

boundaries. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A); see also, e.g., Compton Unified Sch. 

Dist. v. Addision, 598 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2010). The duty to evaluate a 

student arises when disability is “suspected,” or “when the district has notice that 

the child has displayed symptoms of that disability.” Timothy O. v. Paso Robles 

Unified Sch. Dist., 822 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir. 2016). MCPS knew in the spring 

of 2010 that K.K-R. was hospitalized for suicidal ideations, arguably triggering its

child find obligation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(defining “child with a disability” 

to include a child with “serious emotional disturbance”); see also L.J. by and 

through Hudson v. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 996, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 

2017) (finding that a student who exhibited behavioral issues and attempted suicide 

outside of school required special education services). Therefore, the district court 

may have erred in finding that MCPS did not violate its child find obligation in the 

spring of 2010. Nevertheless, because the two-year statute of limitations on this 

violation lapsed in the spring of 2012 and Plaintiffs-Appellants filed their claim in 

October 2014, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claim on this issue is barred. See 20 U.S.C. § 

1415(f)(3)(C); see also Avila, 852 F.3d at 937.

The record otherwise reflects that MCPS allowed Plaintiffs-Appellants to 

participate in developing K.K-R.’s educational plan and, contrary to Plaintiffs-
4 

Appellants’ claim, had not “predetermined” K.K-R.’s placement. See K.D. ex rel 

C.L. v. Dep’t of Educ., 665 F.3d 1110, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a 

school district violates the IDEA if it predetermines placement for a student before 

developing the child’s individualized education plan (“IEP”)). Additionally, the 

record supports the district court’s finding that MCPS developed an IEP that 

appeared “reasonably calculated” to enable K.K-R. to make progress in Missoula 

County schools. See Endrew F. ex rel Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty Sch. Dist. RE-1, 

137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017) (holding that “[t]o meet its substantive obligation under 

the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to 

make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”). Because MCPS 

complied with IDEA’s procedural and substantive requirements beginning in 

October 2012, Plaintiffs-Appellants are not entitled to reimbursement for the costs 

of placing K.K-R. at Maple Lake Academy. See W.G. v. Bd. of Trs. of Target 

Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1485–86 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that 

parents have an equitable right to reimbursement only if a school district has failed 

to offer a child free appropriate public education) superseded in part by statute on 

other grounds; see also Everett v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist., 28 F. App’x 683,

685 (9th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.