12-323 Miller v. Phillip



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**



## SUMMARY ORDER

**R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT**  **. C**  **ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED**
**ON OR AFTER J** **ANUARY 1,**  **2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY**  **F EDERAL**  **R ULE OF**  **A PPELLATE**  **P ROCEDURE**  **32.1 AND THIS COURT**  **’ S**  **L OCAL**  **R ULE**  **32.1.1. W**  **HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A**
**DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT ,**  **A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F**  **EDERAL A** **PPENDIX OR AN**
**ELECTRONIC DATABASE (**  **WITH THE NOTATION “**  **SUMMARY ORDER ”).**  **A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST** 
**SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan** 2 **United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of** 3 **New York, on the 13 th** **day of December, two thousand twelve.** 4 5 **PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,** 6 **Chief Judge ,**  7 **RALPH K. WINTER,** 8 **Circuit Judge ,**  9 **LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN,** 10 **District Judge**

**.** ***** 11 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 13 **RICHARD MILLER,** 14 **Petitioner-Appellant ,**  15 16 **-v.- 12-323** 17 18 **WILLIAM E. PHILLIP, Superintendent,** 19 **Green Haven Correctional Facility,** 20 **Respondent-Appellee ,**  21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 22 23

* Judge Laura Taylor Swain, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

1**FOR APPELLANT:** BARBARA ZOLOT (Robert S. Dean, 1 on the brief ), Center for 2 Appellate Litigation, New York, 3 New York. 4 5 **FOR APPELLEE:** PATRICIA CURRAN (Susan Gliner, 6 on the brief ), Assistant 7 District Attorneys
, forCyrus R. 8 Vance, Jr., District Attorney 9 for New York County, New York, 10 New York. 11 12 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 13 Court for the Southern District of New York (Sweet, J. ). 14 15 **UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED** 16 **AND DECREED**that the judgment of the district court be 17
**AFFIRMED**

. 18 19 Petitioner-Appellant Richard Miller appeals from the 20 judgment of the United States District Court for the 21 Southern District of New York (Sweet, J. ), denying Miller’s 22 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Miller claimed 23 ineffective assistance of counsel, based on his counsel’s 24 failure to object to certain jury instructions at trial. We 25 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, 26 the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. 27 28 We review a district court’s denial of a writ of habeas 29 corpus de novo . Jenkins v. Artuz , 294 F.3d 284, 290 (2d 30 Cir. 2002). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 31 Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), “[w]hen the state court has 32 adjudicated the merits of the petitioner’s claim . . . we 33 may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court’s 34 adjudication ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 35 application of, clearly established Federal law as 36 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 37 Dolphy v. Mantello , 552 F.3d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 2009) 38 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 39 40 “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness 41 must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 42 functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot 43 be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland 44 v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). We are to assess 45 whether “counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable,” 46 Brown v. Greene , 577 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2009), and in 47

2doing so, “we must indulge a strong presumption that 1 counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 2 professional assistance . . . ,” Aparicio v. Artuz , 269 F.3d 3 78, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 5 In rejecting Miller’s ineffective assistance of counsel 6 claim, the state courts determined that Miller’s failure to 7 object to the challenged instructions fell within the wide 8 range of reasonable professional assistance. Given the law 9 at the time, we cannot disturb that determination. The 10 challenged jury instructions, given by Justice Edward J. 11 McLaughlin of the New York County Supreme Court, are nearly 12 inscrutable, potentially confusing, and certainly 13 undesirable. Nonetheless, the jury charge as a whole made 14 clear to the jury that it was the State’s responsibility to 15 prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the 16 appropriate standards, we cannot find that the state courts 17 unreasonably applied established Supreme Court law. This 18 Court recently affirmed the denial of writs for habeas 19 corpus in two cases involving nearly identical jury 20 instructions. SeeJones v. Poole , 403 F. App’x 617, 619-20 21 (2d Cir. 2010); Brown , 577 F.3d at 110-14. 22 23 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in 24 Miller’s other arguments, we hereby **AFFIRM** the judgment of 25 the district court. 26 27 FOR THE COURT: 28 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 29 30 31

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