UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

WILLIAM HENRY DEASE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

AMANDA WEBB, in her individual 

capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at Joseph 

Harp Correctional Center and in her 

official capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at 

Joseph Harp Correctional Center; 

ALLISON GIBSON, in her individual 

official capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at 

Joseph Harp Correctional Center and in her 

official capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at 

Joseph Harp Correctional Center; 

ALLISON GIBSON, in her individual 

official capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at 

Joseph Harp Correctional Center and in her 

official capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at 

Joseph Harp Correctional Center; SAM 

PRESTON, in his individual capacity, Unit 

Manager in Unit J at Joseph Harp 

Correctional Center and in his official 

capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at Joseph 

Harp Correctional Center; SERGEANT 

PAGE, in his individual and official 

capacity, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 19-6068 

(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-00282-F) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

November 7, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 William Henry Dease, a former Oklahoma state prisoner appearing pro se,1

appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. He also requests 

permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“ifp”). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, we affirm and deny his ifp request. 

Mr. Dease sued under federal and state law concerning his treatment by 

officials (“Defendants”) at the Joseph Harp Correctional Center (“JHCC”). In a 

disciplinary hearing, JHCC officials found Mr. Dease guilty of “menacing staff.” 

ROA, Vol. 2 at 122. He received 30 days of disciplinary segregation, 90 days of 

canteen restriction, and 90 days of telephone restriction. 

In his second amended complaint, Mr. Dease alleged the Defendants (1) 

brought a “bogus” misconduct charge against him, (2) improperly denied his right to 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Mr. Dease appears pro se, we afford his filings a liberal construction, 

but we do not craft arguments or otherwise advocate for him. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 

F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
3 

obtain and present evidence, (3) conspired and were biased against him in the 

disciplinary proceedings, (4) retaliated against him, (5) improperly transferred him to 

another prison, (6) improperly demoted his good time credits,2

 (7) seized and/or 

destroyed his legal materials, and (8) violated the Oklahoma Open Records Act and 

the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). 

The district court dismissed all of Mr. Dease’s claims based on a magistrate 

judge’s recommendation. As to claims (1), (2), (3), (4), and (7), the court converted 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion 

based on failure to exhaust these claims.3

 As to claims (5) and (6), the court dismissed 

them under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).4

 It also dismissed Mr. Dease’s FOIA claim 

because FOIA does not apply to state governments. Finally, it dismissed Mr. Dease’s 

state law claim under the Oklahoma Open Records Act after declining to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

 2

 “Under Oklahoma law, the accrual of good time credits may result in the 

prisoner’s early release.” Ali v. Franklin, 554 F. App’x 702, 703 n.1 (10th Cir. 2014) 

(unpublished). A credit-level demotion refers to losing accrued credits. See Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 138(C). 

3

 The district court converted Defendants’ motion because they relied on 

materials outside the second amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 

4

 Although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) refers to “prisoners,” this court has 

concluded the statute “applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings.” Getachew v. 

Google, Inc., 491 F. App’x 923, 925 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished); see also 

Williams v. United States, 2019 WL 2373557, at *2 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019) 

(unpublished). 
4 

On appeal, Mr. Dease has filed a five-page brief. We have reviewed the 

456-page record. He fails to show how the district court erred. He continues to 

present allegations against Defendants in his appellate materials, but he has not 

addressed the grounds on which the district court dismissed his complaint. An 

appellant must “explain what was wrong with the reasoning that the district court 

relied on in reaching its decision.” Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 

1366 (10th Cir. 2015). His failure to explain why the district court’s order was 

wrong waives any argument for reversal. See Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 

F.3d 1184, 1194 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (“An issue mentioned in a brief on appeal, but 

not addressed, is waived.”); Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 

841 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he inadequacies of Plaintiff’s briefs disentitle him to 

review by this court.”). 

We affirm the district court’s judgment. Because Mr. Dease has failed to show 

the “existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the 

issues raised,” Buchheit v. Green, 705 F.3d 1157, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012), we deny his 

motion to proceed ifp. 

Entered for the Court 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge