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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

TIMOTHY LEE QUALLS,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No.: 3:10cv54/MCR/MD

SANTA ROSA COUNTY JAIL, 

Defendant.

_____________________________________________________________________

ORDER and

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee currently confined at the Santa Rosa County Jail,

has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (doc. 1) and a motion

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (doc. 2). For the limited purpose of dismissal

of this action, leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Since plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court maydismiss the case

if satisfied that the action is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court must read

plaintiff’s pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92

S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). A complaint is frivolous under section 1915(e)

“where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Dismissals on this

ground should only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,”

Id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833, or when the claims rely on factual allegations that are

“clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733, 118

L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). Dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by the same
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standard as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d

1483, 1485 (11 Cir. 1997). In determining whether the complaint states a claim upon th

which relief may be granted, the court accepts all the factual allegations in the

complaint as true and evaluates all inferences derived from those facts in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11 Cir. th

1994). The complaint may be dismissed if the facts as pleaded do not state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

127 S.Ct. 1955, 1968-69, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (retiring the negatively-glossed

“no set of facts” language previously used to describe the motion to dismiss

standard and determining that because plaintiffs had “not nudged their claims

across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed”

for failure to state a claim). A complaint is also subject to dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) when its allegations--on their face--show that an affirmative defense bars

recovery on the claim. Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11 Cir.

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2001). 

Plaintiff states he was arrested on October 23, 2009. He claims his due

process rights have been violated because he has not been taken for a first

appearance before a judge or been interviewed by a pre-trial release officer. (Doc.

1, p. 6). Claiming mental anguish as a result of the alleged constitutional violations,

(id.), plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $250,000, dismissal of the

charges and release from incarceration. (Id., p. 7). 

Although plaintiff filed his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he seeks relief

in the nature of habeas corpus--he claims he is unlawfully confined as a result of the

alleged unconstitutional conduct, and seeks immediate release. The Supreme Court

stated in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439

(1973), that “Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy

for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement,

and that specific determination must override the general terms of § 1983.” Thus,

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when a prisoner, though asserting jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, is

challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he

seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or speedier release

from such imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. 

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500, 93 S.Ct. at 1841. Regardless of the label plaintiff may place

on this action, in order to challenge the validity of his incarceration on the grounds

that his constitutional rights have been violated, he must pursue his claims through

habeas corpus. Prather v. Norman, 901 F.2d 915, 918-19 n.4 (11 Cir. 1990) (per th

curiam); McKinnis v. Mosley, 693 F.2d 1054, 1057 (11 Cir. 1982). th

Furthermore, the allegations of the complaint establish that abstention is

required. Pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669

(1971) and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971),

federal courts should abstain from interfering with pending state criminal

proceedings absent a showing of: (1) evidence of bad faith prosecution, (2)

irreparable injury if abstention is exercised by the federal court, or (3) the absence

of an adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised.

Hughes v. Attorney General of Florida, 377 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11 Cir. 2004) (citing th

Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 53-54). Subsequent decisions have refined Youngerto state

that the exceptions occur only when the prosecution is brought expressly to harass

the defendant or otherwise in bad faith, or when the statute under which the

defendant is charged is clearly and flagrantly unconstitutional. See Trainor v.

Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 1919, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1977); Huffman

v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1212, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); The

News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1507-09 (11 Cir. 1991); Redner v. th

Citrus County, 919 F.2d 646, 650 (11 Cir. 1990). Furthermore, irreparable injury

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does not include injurywhich is incidental to everyprosecution brought lawfully and

in good faith. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123-25, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 1530-31, 44

L.Ed.2d 15 (1975) (citing Younger, 401 U .S. at 46). Irreparable injury exists if the

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statute under which a defendant is being prosecuted is “flagrantly and patently

violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and

paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made

to apply it” or if unusual circumstances exist that would call for equitable relief.

Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (citing Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402, 61 S.Ct. 962,

967, 85 L.Ed. 1416 (1941)). 

In the instant case, resolving plaintiff’s § 1983 claims would significantly

interfere with the pending state criminal proceeding. Plaintiff does not allege that

his prosecution was motivated bybad faith. Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to show

that he is entitled to review under the “irreparable injury” exception, or that there is

a lack of an adequate state forum in which to raise his claims. Therefore, plaintiff’s

complaint should be dismissed for failure tor state a claim upon which relief may be

granted and because the claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine.

An additional basis for dismissing plaintiff’s damages claims is that they are

barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides, “No

Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without

a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The Eleventh Circuit

addressed the implications of § 1997e(e) and concluded that “the phrase ‘Federal

civil action’ means all federal claims, including constitutional claims.” Napier v.

Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532 (11 Cir. 2002) (citing Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970,

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984-85 (11 Cir. 2000) (en banc)). This § 1983 action brought by plaintiff is a “Federal

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civil action” under this definition. Further, it is undisputed that plaintiff filed his 

complaint while imprisoned, and that the harm complained of occurred while he was

in custody. Plaintiff’s claims are based solely on violations of the constitutional

rights themselves and allege no physical injury caused by the defendant’s conduct. 

Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286-87 (11 Cir. 1999) (holding that “in order to th

satisfy section 1997e(e) the physical injury must be more than de minimis, but need

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not be significant.”), reh’g granted, opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11 Cir. 1999), th

opinion reinstated in pertinent part on reh’g, 216 F.3d 970 (11 Cir. 2000), cert. th

denied, 532 U.S. 1065, 121 S.Ct. 2214, 150 L.Ed.2d 208 (2001). Plaintiff’s complaint

cannot be liberally construed to request nominal damages. Therefore, under §

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1997e(e), his damages claims are due to be dismissed. See Douglas v. Yates, 535

F.3d 1316 (11 Cir. 2008) (holding that the district court has authority to sua sponte th

dismiss a complaint without prejudice under § 1997e(e)) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (doc. 2) is GRANTED for the

limited purpose of dismissing this action. 

And it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

That this cause be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and the clerk be directed to close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida this 4 day of March, 2010. th

 /s/ Miles Davis

MILES DAVIS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157 (11 Cir. 2003), does not

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apply here. Id., at 1162 (holding that § 1997e(e) does not bar suits by prisoners who have not alleged

a physical injury if they seek nominal damages). Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be liberally construed

as requesting nominal damages, because he specifically requests only $250,000 in compensatory

and/or punitive damages. See, e.g., Sears v. Rabion, No. 03-13558, 97 Fed.Appx. 906 (Table) (11 Cir.

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Feb. 18, 2004) (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal of complaint under § 1997e(e), noting

that plaintiff’s complaint could not be liberally construed as requesting nominal damages, because

he specifically requested compensatory and punitive damages).

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed

within ten days after being served a copy hereof. Any different deadline that may

appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only, and does not

control. A copy of any objections shall be served upon any other parties. Failure to

 object may limit the scope of appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11 Cir. 1988). th

Case No: 3:10cv54/MCR/MD