II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2394 

To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the expiration 

of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 31, 2019 

Mr. VAN HOLLEN (for himself and Mr. YOUNG) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating 

to the expiration of the New START Treaty, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Richard G. Lugar and 

5 Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nu6 clear Forces’’. 

7 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

8 Congress makes the following findings: 

9 (1) Since the end of World War II, the United 

10 States has relied on a robust and effective nuclear 


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1 deterrent as part of its national defense, particularly 

2 against the Soviet Union and its successor state, the 

3 Russian Federation. 

4 (2) The United States nuclear arsenal must re5 main safe, secure, and reliable such that it can effec6 tively ensure the security of the United States and 

7 its allies. 

8 (3) Along with its nuclear deterrent, the United 

9 States has pursued a number of arms control, disar10 mament, and nonproliferation agreements with the 

11 Soviet Union and Russia to ensure strategic stability 

12 and the protection of the United States homeland, 

13 such as— 

14 (A) the Interim Agreement Between the 

15 United States of America and the Union of So16 viet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures 

17 with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Of18 fensive Arms, done at Moscow May 26, 1972 

19 (commonly referred to as ‘‘SALT I’’); and 

20 (B) the Treaty Between the United States 

21 of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

22 Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions, 

23 done at Moscow July 31, 1991 (commonly re24 ferred to as ‘‘START I’’). 


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1 (4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet 

2 Union, the United States continues to rely on a com3 bination of nuclear deterrence and strategic arms 

4 control to help protect the United States from nu5 clear attack. 

6 (5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and 

7 Russia signed the Treaty between the United States 

8 of America and the Russian Federation on Measures 

9 for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Stra10 tegic Offensive Arms (commonly referred to as ‘‘New 

11 START Treaty’’). 

12 (6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated 

13 December 2, 2010, former Secretaries of State 

14 Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. 

15 Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin L. 

16 Powell urged the Senate to ratify the New START 

17 Treaty, stating that it was in ‘‘the national interest 

18 to ratify’’. 

19 (7) During the ratification process, the New 

20 START Treaty garnered bipartisan support, and the 

21 United States Senate approved the Treaty on De22 cember 22, 2010, by a 71–26 vote. 

23 (8) The New START Treaty entered into force 

24 on February 5, 2011, placing numerical limits on 

25 United States and Russian strategic systems, includVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:38 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394

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1 ing intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine 

2 launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, as 

3 well as warheads. 

4 (9) On February 5, 2018, the Treaty’s central 

5 limits on strategic arms took effect. 

6 (10) Through the New START Treaty’s 

7 verification regime, which includes short-notice, on8 site inspections at military bases and facilities, the 

9 United States is able to verify the data provided by 

10 the Russian Federation regarding its strategic nu11 clear arsenal. The verification regime provides both 

12 countries insight into each other’s strategic nuclear 

13 delivery systems, warheads, and facilities, as well as 

14 data exchanges to track the status and makeup of 

15 nuclear weapons systems. 

16 (11) During a February 26, 2019, hearing on 

17 nuclear deterrence requirements of the Committee 

18 on Armed Services of the Senate, Commander of the 

19 United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 

20 General John Hyten voiced his support for the Trea21 ty, saying he was ‘‘a big supporter of the New 

22 START agreement’’ and stating, ‘‘The New START 

23 treaty’’ provides ‘‘insights into the Russians capa24 bilities. Those are hugely beneficial to me.’’. 


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1 (12) During a March 2017 hearing on nuclear 

2 deterrence requirements of the Committee on Armed 

3 Services of the House of Representatives, Air Force 

4 General Paul Selva, the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

5 Chiefs of Staff, also endorsed the New START 

6 Treaty, saying the Treaty is ‘‘a bilateral, verifiable 

7 agreement that gives us some degree of predict8 ability on what our potential adversaries look like’’. 

9 (13) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the 

10 Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deter11 rence and Nuclear Integration, asserted that the 

12 New START Treaty was of ‘‘huge value’’ to United 

13 States security. 

14 (14) During a September 2018 hearing before 

15 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, 

16 Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy David 

17 Trachtenberg stated that ‘‘the transparency and 

18 verification requirements of the New START Treaty 

19 are a benefit’’ to the security of the United States 

20 and, in response to a question regarding missile de21 fense, asserted that the Treaty had ‘‘no’’ effect on 

22 limiting United States missile defense capabilities. 

23 (15) In a March 2017 hearing of the Strategic 

24 Forces Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 

25 Services of the House of Representatives, Retired 


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1 Air Force General and former commander of United 

2 States Strategic Command Robert Kehler stated, ‘‘I 

3 think that we have gotten tremendous benefit out of 

4 those kinds of agreements with the Russians over 

5 the years, provided that the Russians comply,’’ re6 garding the importance of the New START Treaty. 

7 (16) The Department of State confirmed in 

8 February 2018 that the Russian Federation had met 

9 the Treaty’s central limits on strategic arms and 

10 stated that ‘‘implementation of the New START 

11 Treaty enhances the safety and security of the 

12 United States’’. 

13 (17) The Nuclear Posture Review states that 

14 arms control agreements can ‘‘foster transparency, 

15 understanding, and predictability in adversary rela16 tions, thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding 

17 and miscalculation’’. 

18 (18) The New START Treaty strengthens 

19 United States nuclear security and strategic stability 

20 by reducing the number of strategic systems in the 

21 Russian Federation’s nuclear arsenal and provides 

22 the United States with the inspection and moni23 toring tools necessary to confidently verify Russian 

24 compliance with the Treaty. 


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1 (19) The New START Treaty does not restrict 

2 United States nuclear modernization programs or 

3 limit United States missile defense efforts. 

4 (20) If the New START Treaty is not extended 

5 or replaced before it expires in 2021, the United 

6 States runs the risk of having no legally binding, 

7 verifiable limits on the Russian Federation’s stra8 tegic nuclear arsenal for the first time since 1972. 

9 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

10 It is the sense of Congress that the United States 

11 should seek to extend the New START Treaty from its 

12 initial termination date in February 2021 to February 

13 2026, as provided for under Article XIV of the Treaty, 

14 unless the President determines and informs the appro15 priate congressional committees that— 

16 (1) the Russian Federation is in material 

17 breach of the Treaty; or 

18 (2) the United States and the Russian Federa19 tion have entered into a new arms control agreement 

20 to replace the Treaty that provides equal or greater 

21 constraints, transparency, and verification measures 

22 with regard to the Russian Federation’s nuclear 

23 forces. 


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1 SEC. 4. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS. 

2 (a) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESS3 MENTS.— 

4 (1) RELATING TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION NU5 CLEAR FORCES.—Not later than 180 days after the 

6 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 

7 National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate 

8 congressional committees an intelligence assessment 

9 based on all sources of the national security and in10 telligence implications of the expiration of the New 

11 START Treaty without the United States and the 

12 Russian Federation having entered into a new arms 

13 control agreement to replace the Treaty that pro14 vides equal or greater constraints, transparency, and 

15 verification measures with regard to the Russian 

16 Federation’s nuclear forces. The assessment shall be 

17 submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain 

18 a classified annex, and shall include the following 

19 elements: 

20 (A) A description of the size and posture 

21 of the Russian Federation’s nuclear forces and 

22 strategic delivery vehicles, as well as predicted 

23 force levels through February 2026 under each 

24 of the following potential scenarios: 


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1 (i) The Treaty expires in February 

2 2021 without such a replacement agree3 ment. 

4 (ii) The Treaty is extended until Feb5 ruary 2026. 

6 (B) An assessment of how strategic sta7 bility would be impacted if the Treaty is not ex8 tended or such a replacement agreement is not 

9 concluded. 

10 (C) An assessment of the impact on 

11 United States allies if the limitations on the 

12 Russian Federation’s nuclear forces are dis13 solved if the Treaty is not extended or such a 

14 replacement agreement is not concluded. 

15 (D) A description of the intelligence collec16 tion benefits of the Treaty. 

17 (E) An assessment of how the United 

18 States intelligence community’s confidence in 

19 its assessments of the Russian Federation’s 

20 strategic nuclear arsenal and future nuclear 

21 force levels would be impacted if the Treaty is 

22 not extended or such a replacement agreement 

23 is not concluded. 

24 (F) An assessment of what specific capa25 bilities the United States intelligence commuVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:10 Aug 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2394.IS S2394

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1 nity would have to develop, deploy, or realign to 

2 ensure no loss of collection capability occurs if 

3 the Treaty is not extended or such a replace4 ment agreement is not concluded. 

5 (2) RELATING TO PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF

6 CHINA NUCLEAR FORCES.—Not later than 180 days 

7 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Di8 rector of National Intelligence shall submit to the 

9 appropriate congressional committees an assessment 

10 of the relative size and posture of the strategic nu11 clear forces of the People’s Republic of China com12 pared to that of the United States and the Russian 

13 Federation. The assessment shall be submitted in an 

14 unclassified form, but may contain a classified 

15 annex, and shall include the following elements: 

16 (A) An assessment of the size, force struc17 ture, and operational status of the People’s Re18 public of China’s long-range nuclear-capable de19 livery vehicles that meet the definitions of sys20 tems counted under the New START Treaty. 

21 (B) An assessment of the number of nu22 clear warheads that the Government of the Peo23 ple’s Republic of China possesses. 

24 (C) A description of the efforts of the Gov25 ernment of the People’s Republic of China to 


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1 modernize and modify its nuclear force struc2 ture. 

3 (D) A description of the potential changes 

4 to the nuclear force structure and posture of 

5 the People’s Republic of China if the United 

6 States and Russian Federation are no longer 

7 bound by the limits in the New START Treaty. 

8 (b) SECRETARY OF STATE.— 

9 (1) RELATING TO NATO, NATO MEMBER COUN10 TRIES, AND OTHER UNITED STATES ALLIES.—Not 

11 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 

12 of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 

13 with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report, 

14 which shall be in an unclassified form, but may con15 tain a classified annex, and provide a briefing to the 

16 appropriate congressional committees that includes 

17 an assessment of the likely reactions of the North 

18 Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO mem19 ber countries, and other United States allies to a 

20 United States decision not to extend the New 

21 START Treaty or enter into a new arms control 

22 agreement with the Russian Federation to replace 

23 the Treaty that provides equal or greater con24 straints, transparency, and verification measures 

25 with regard to Russia’s nuclear forces. 


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1 (2) RELATING TO OTHER MATTERS.—Not later 

2 than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 

3 Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the New 

4 START Treaty is extended or expires, the Secretary 

5 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De6 fense, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 

7 congressional committees that includes the following 

8 elements: 

9 (A) A description of any discussions with 

10 the Russian Federation on the Treaty or a 

11 similar agreement on the reduction and limita12 tion of strategic offensive arms at the Assistant 

13 Secretary, Ambassadorial level or higher. 

14 (B) The dates, locations, discussion topics, 

15 agenda, outcomes, and Russian Federation 

16 interlocutors involved in those discussions. 

17 (C) An identification of the United States 

18 Government departments and agencies involved 

19 in the discussions. 

20 (D) The types of systems, both nuclear 

21 and nonnuclear, discussed by either side in such 

22 discussions. 

23 (E) Whether an offer of extension of the 

24 Treaty, of any length of time, has been offered 

25 by either side. 


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1 SEC. 5. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION IN EVENT OF EXPI2 RATION OF NEW START TREATY. 

3 If the New START Treaty is allowed to expire before 

4 the United States and the Russian Federation enter into 

5 a new arms control agreement to replace the Treaty that 

6 provides equal or greater constraints, transparency, and 

7 verification measures with regard to the Russian Federa8 tion’s nuclear forces, not later than 30 days after such 

9 expiration the President shall submit to the appropriate 

10 congressional committees— 

11 (1) a justification for why the New START 

12 Treaty was allowed to expire; and 

13 (2) a certification that extending the Treaty 

14 was not in the national security interest of the 

15 United States. 

16 SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS. 

17 In this Act: 

18 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT19 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com20 mittees’’ means— 

21 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

22 Committee on Armed Services, and the Perma23 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

24 House of Representatives; and 


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1 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

2 the Committee on Armed Services, and the Se3 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 

4 (2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term 

5 ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given 

6 that term in section 3 of the National Security Act 

7 of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 

8 (3) NEW START TREATY; TREATY.—The terms 

9 ‘‘New START Treaty’’ and ‘‘Treaty’’ mean the 

10 Treaty between the United States of America and 

11 the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 

12 Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 

13 Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into 

14 force on February 5, 2011. 

Æ 


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