In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-24-00187-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 67th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 067-330985-21

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker

JOHNATHAN COOPER, Appellant

V.

JAMES WARREN ST. JOHN, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Johnathan Cooper filed his “Plaintiff Premature Notice of Appeal”

with this court. In his notice, Cooper states that he filed his notice pursuant to Texas 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.1 “in [an] abundance of caution due to incarceration, 

no email, or access to receive up[-]to[-]date rulings by this court.” He prays that we 

act upon his notice “only on a detr[i]mental final or appealable order” against him. 

However, Cooper did not provide us with an appealable order.

1

 

Accordingly, we informed Cooper of our concern that we lacked jurisdiction

over this appeal. We requested the parties to, within twenty days, provide us with a 

copy of an appealable order and warned that the appeal would be dismissed for want 

of jurisdiction if no such order was furnished. Cooper responded to our letter and 

explained again that he had filed his premature notice of appeal “in [an] abundance of 

caution” so that he does not lose his right to appeal any future detrimental rulings

against him. Cooper is apparently incarcerated and has concerns that there might be a 

delay in mailing and processing his notice of appeal if he waits until an appealable 

1While this appeal was pending, the trial court clerk provided us with an 

“Interlocutory Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Defendant’s No Evidence 

and Traditional Motions For Summary Judgment.” In that order, the trial court 

partially granted summary judgment for Appellee James Warren St. John on certain of 

Cooper’s claims, but explicitly denied his motion for summary judgment as to 

Cooper’s pending contract claim. Thus, this order is not final and appealable nor is it 

an appealable interlocutory order. See Matter of Marriage of Davis & Luo, No. 07-23-

00396-CV, 2023 WL 8470633, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 6, 2023, no pet.)

(mem. op.).
3

order is eventually rendered against him. He reiterated that his premature notice of 

appeal “should only be in effect upon any final or appealable judgment against” him. 

Rule 27.1 provides, in civil cases, that “a prematurely filed notice of appeal is 

effective and deemed filed on the day of, but after, the event that begins the period 

for perfecting the appeal.” Tex. R. App. P. 27.1(a). However, this rule “does not 

contemplate an appellate place holder until there is a final appealable judgment.” 

Ganeson v. Reeves, 236 S.W.3d 816, 817 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied). 

Rule 27.1 does not serve to require an appellate court to “docket and hold an appeal 

open until there is an appealable judgment or order at some future date.” Id.; see Burns

v. Burns, No. 12-22-00051-CV, 2022 WL 1483623, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 11,

2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Cooper concedes that there is no appealable judgment or order in this case and 

instead asks us to use his premature notice of appeal as an indefinite place holder in

the event that such a judgment or order is eventually signed. But without a final 

judgment or appealable order, we have no jurisdiction over his appeal. See Burns,

2022 WL 1483623, at *2. Thus, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See

Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker

Justice

Delivered: June 13, 2024