1

There is some dispute among the parties about whether fighting was

considered a lesser offense at the time of this incident. Because we conclude that

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 02-1646SI

_____________

Juan Gomez, *

*

Appellant, *

* On Appeal from the United

v. * States District Court 

* for the Southern District

* of Iowa.

L. W. Graves, Jr., *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: January 14, 2003

Filed: March 13, 2003 

___________

Before BOWMAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Juan Gomez is before this Court arguing that his due-process rights were

violated when he lost 365 days of good time after being found guilty of assaulting

another inmate at the Iowa State Penitentiary. The crux of his argument is that he was

guilty only of fighting, not assault. Because he maintains that fighting is a lesser

offense,1

 he believes he should have received a less severe sanction. We reject Mr.
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Gomez was guilty of

assault, we do not address this dispute.

2

The Hon. Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

3

The ALJ likewise found Mr. Martin guilty of assault and disobeying a direct

order. Mr. Martin received the same sentence.

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Gomez’s argument and affirm the District Court’s2

 denial of his petition for habeas

corpus.

I.

Mr. Gomez is a resident of the Iowa State Penitentiary in Fort Madison. At

approximately 7:30 a.m. on March 3, 1998, he was in the exercise pen with other

inmates. The prison officer charged with watching the exercise pen noticed that Mr.

Gomez was engaged in horseplay with another inmate named Luke Martin. As the

officer approached, the horseplay escalated into something more serious — the

inmates had begun to exchange punches. Mr. Gomez repeatedly punched Mr. Martin

in the face. After requesting, to no avail, that the prisoners cease, officers used a

chemical agent to break up the fight. Mr. Martin was escorted to the prison infirmary

because his face was bleeding. The officers wrote incident reports indicating that Mr.

Gomez had committed numerous rules violations, including fighting, assault, and

disobeying a direct order from an officer. 

Mr. Gomez was brought before the prison’s administrative law judge, Charles

Harper, for a disciplinary hearing. Mr. Harper concluded that Mr. Gomez had

committed two violations: assault and disobeying a direct order. To punish Mr.

Gomez, he ordered him confined to the prison’s maximum security block for one year

and ordered the loss of 365 days of good time.3

 Mr. Gomez appealed this decision

to the proper prison officials, but each of his appeals was rejected.
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Mr. Gomez then brought a post-conviction action in the state-court system

alleging that the loss of good time violated his due-process rights because there was

no evidence to support his conviction for assault. He argued that he was guilty only

of fighting, which he regarded as a less serious rules violation. This argument was

rejected by the state court, and review was denied by the Iowa Supreme Court. Mr.

Gomez then commenced this § 2254 action. The District Court denied his habeas

petition, finding that there was some evidence that Mr. Gomez had committed an

assault.

II.

Mr. Gomez now presses his argument that he was guilty only of fighting to this

Court. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s decision

that Mr. Gomez was guilty of assaulting Mr. Martin.

Because this case is before us on appeal from a denial of a habeas petition, our

review is limited. Mr. Gomez has already presented his argument to the state courts

with no success. We review the state courts’ decision only to determine whether that

ruling “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under well established Supreme Court precedent, a prison administrative

sanction will stand if there is some evidence to support the sanction. Superintendent

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Thus, courts are to give deference to prison

officials and should intercede in prison discipline cases only when the sanctions are

wholly unsupported by the record. Id. at 455-56 (“Ascertaining whether this standard

is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment

of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant
-4-

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”).

The crux of Mr. Gomez’s challenge is that he was guilty of fighting, not

assault. Under the prison rules, these were two different violations. The disciplinary

code indicates that “[a]n inmate commits assault when the inmate intentionally causes

or threatens to cause injury to another person or applies any physical force . . .,” while

“[a]n inmate commits fighting when the inmate engages in a physical altercation

including the exchange of blows, shoves, kicks, offensive physical conduct, or if

horseplaying, the physical conduct need not be in anger.” Iowa State Penitentiary

Disciplinary Policy and Procedure Handbook, Rules 2 & 13. Mr. Gomez maintains

that there was insufficient evidence to show that he was guilty of the former rather

than the latter. We conclude that there was some evidence to support the conclusion

that Mr. Gomez was guilty of assault. There was evidence that Mr. Gomez struck Mr.

Martin repeatedly in the face, actions that would support a conclusion that Mr. Gomez

intended to injure Mr. Martin. And, Mr. Martin was, in fact, sufficiently injured

during the altercation that his face was bleeding, and the officers had to escort him

to the prison infirmary. Mr. Gomez’s actions were thus sufficient, under the plain

language of the assault rule, to support the sanctions imposed on him.

Mr. Gomez maintains, however, that because this was mutual combat between

two individuals it should have been classified as fighting. But nothing in the rules

renders assault and fighting mutually exclusive — Mr. Gomez could, by the plain

language of the rules, have been sanctioned for either. Indeed, one of the corrections

officers indicated in his report that Mr. Gomez was guilty of both fighting and assault.

Mr. Gomez resists, however, by directing our attention to testimony of the ALJ during

a post-conviction hearing. The ALJ was asked to differentiate the two rules and

answered that one difference might be the mutuality of the conflict. He indicated that

a unilateral attack would constitute assault rather than fighting. We do not dispute

this testimony; however, we do not believe that Mr. Harper’s testimony should be
-5-

understood as exhaustive — he was giving only one example. Quite simply, one

could rationally view this incident as more than just a fight; Mr. Gomez struck Mr.

Martin repeatedly hard enough to make Mr. Martin’s face bleed, and Messrs. Gomez

and Martin disobeyed direct orders to stop fighting.

In light of these facts, the District Court properly concluded that the state

courts’ view that there was some evidence to support the sanctions imposed on Mr.

Gomez was not unreasonable. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.