UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ WILLIAM HENRY DEASE, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. AMANDA WEBB, in her individual capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at Joseph Harp Correctional Center and in her official capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at Joseph Harp Correctional Center; ALLISON GIBSON, in her individual official capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at Joseph Harp Correctional Center and in her official capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at Joseph Harp Correctional Center; ALLISON GIBSON, in her individual official capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at Joseph Harp Correctional Center and in her official capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at Joseph Harp Correctional Center; SAM PRESTON, in his individual capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at Joseph Harp Correctional Center a nd in his official capacity, Unit Manager in Unit J at Joseph Harp Correctional Center; SERGEANT PAGE, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants - Appellees. No. 19-6068 (D.C. No. 5:18- CV-00282-F) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 7, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , McKAY , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ William Henry Dease, a former O klahoma state prisoner appearin g pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s dism issal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. He also requests permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“ ifp ”). Exercising jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm and deny his ifp request. Mr. Dease sued under federal and state law concerning his treat ment by officials (“Defendants”) at the J oseph Harp Correctional Center (“JHCC”). In a disciplinary hearing, JHCC offi cials found Mr. D ease guilty of “menacing staff.” ROA, Vol. 2 at 122. He received 30 days of disciplinary segreg ation, 90 days of canteen restriction, and 90 da ys of telephone restriction. In his second amended complaint, M r. Dease alleged the Defendan ts (1) brought a “bogus” misconduct char ge against him, (2) improperly denied his right to

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in t he determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is t herefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgme nt is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, howev er, for its persuasive value c onsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Mr. Dease appears pro se , we afford his filings a libe ral construction, but we do not craft arguments or otherwise advocate for him. See Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).3 obtain and present evidence, (3) conspired and were biased agai nst him in the disciplinary proceedings, (4) ret aliated against him, (5) impro perly transferred him to another prison, (6) improperly demoted his good time credits, 2 (7) seized and/or destroyed his legal materials, a nd (8) violated the Oklahoma Op en Records Act and the Freedom of Inform ation Act (“FOIA”). The district court dismissed a ll of Mr. Dease’s claims based on a magistrate judge’s recommendation. As to claims (1), (2), (3), (4), and ( 7), the court converted Defendants’ motion to dismiss to a motion for su mmary judgment and granted the motion based on failure to exhaust these claims. 3 As to claims (5) and (6), the court dismissed them under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 4 It also dismissed Mr. Dease’s FOIA claim because FOIA does not apply to state governments. Finally, it dismissed Mr. Dease’s state law claim under the Oklahoma Open Records Act after decli ning to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

2 “Under Oklahoma law, the accru al of good time credits may resu lt in the prisoner’s early release.” Ali v. Franklin , 554 F. App’x 702, 703 n.1 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). A credit-level demotion refers to losing accrued credits. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 138(C).

3 The district court converted Def endants’ motion because they r elied on materials outside the sec ond amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

4 Although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B ) refers to “prisoners,” this court has concluded the statute “applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings.” Getachew v. Google, Inc. , 491 F. App’x 923, 925 n. 2 (10t h Cir. 2012) (unpublished); see also Williams v. United States , 2019 WL 2373557, at *2 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished).4 On appeal, Mr. Dease has filed a five-page brief. We have revi ewed the 456-page record. He fails to show how the district court erred . He continues to present allegations against Def endants in his appellate materia ls, but he has not addressed the grounds on which th e district court dismissed his complaint. An appellant must “explain what was wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision.” Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015). His failure to explain why the district court’s order was wrong waives any argument for reversal. See Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth , 439 F.3d 1184, 1194 n.2 (10t h Cir. 2006) (“An issue mentioned in a brief on appeal, but not addressed, is waived.”); Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005) ( “[T]he inadequacies o f Plaintiff’s briefs disentitle him to review by this court.”). We affirm the district court’s judgment. Because Mr. Dease has failed to show the “existence of a reasoned, n onfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised,” Buchheit v. Green , 705 F.3d 1157, 1161 ( 10th Cir. 2012 ), we deny his motion to proceed ifp

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Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge