Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 23-0111

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In re Maria Teresa Ramirez Morris, and

Texas Alliance for Life, Inc.,

Relators

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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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JUSTICE YOUNG, joined by Justice Devine and Justice Blacklock, 

dissenting. 

Today the Court refuses to remedy a clear violation of the Election 

Code. It offers a host of salutary reasons. I agree with them all—when

they apply. But none of the Court’s stated reasons apply here because 

they all depend on the same mistaken premise: the existence of a lawfully

ordered special election. If such a special election had been properly 

called, each of these hoary principles would be relevant: 

• “our longstanding commitment to avoid undue interference 

with elections,” ante at 2; 

• our preference to act “without disturbing [an] election from 

going forward,” id. at 5; 

• our historical practice of not “enjoin[ing] elections altogether,” 

id. at 6; see also id. at 11;
2

• the obligation of the judiciary never to “deprive the voters of 

an election,” id. at 6; and 

• the need “to facilitate elections, not to stymie them,” id. at 16.

Each of those important values, however, depends on a common premise 

that is missing here: a lawfully ordered election. The Court’s reliance 

on those values requires it to assume the answer to the very issue that 

is in dispute—whether any special election for May has been validly 

ordered at all. Using doctrines that protect elections to protect events 

that are not elections is bootstrapping. When a purported election is not 

a real election, saying so does not “interfere” with an election; stating 

the correct date to hold an election does not “disturb” that election; 

telling the City when the law allows it to hold an election does not 

“enjoin” or “stymie” or “deprive” anyone of an election. These steps 

instead “facilitate” holding the election. Following the law of Texas can 

never be regarded as against the interests of the People of Texas. 

Texas law provides strict requirements for calling special elections,

including how to order them and when they may or must include 

petition-initiated proposed city-charter amendments. One such 

requirement is that, to hold a special election, a city council must order 

it at least 78 days beforehand. The city council clearly failed to follow that

binding legal requirement here. The legislature expressly authorizes 

Texas courts to enforce such election requirements, which protect all 

voters. The courts should provide pre-election relief when, as here, the 

core of the protection will be lost forever if not vindicated before the 

election and when the request for relief is timely. The need for that relief 

is amplified in this case because other serious issues are also present, 
3

such as when, whether, and how the courts can address the contention 

that the proposed charter amendment violates the Local Government 

Code’s single-subject requirement. All the Court needs to address now, 

however, is the timing violation. It can and should do so by granting 

partial relief that directs the City to hold the special election in 

November, not May. 

In my judgment, the Court’s refusal to do so is mistaken and lacks 

substantial legal support. My disagreement does not connote disrespect. 

The Court’s decision does not follow from any improper motive. To the 

contrary, it expresses a most praiseworthy motivation—the determination

to allow the People to govern themselves through the electoral process. I

share that commitment and disagree only as to how the judiciary properly

serves that foundational principle. I cannot agree that the judiciary is 

limited to post-election relief in the narrow circumstances before us. I 

therefore must respectfully dissent. 

I

I begin with how this case came to us and why the law warrants 

granting partial relief.

A

As the Court describes, a lengthy citizen-initiated petition in the 

City of San Antonio—dubbed the “Justice Policy Charter Amendment”—

seeks to amend the city’s charter through a variety of mechanisms 

concerning a host of policy issues, all related in some way to the 

enforcement of local, state, and federal law within the city.1 This 

1 The Court briskly summarizes the proposed amendment, see ante at 

2, which is even more dramatic than the brief summary suggests. Broadly 

speaking, the proposed amendment seeks to regulate or outright prohibit the 
4

litigation commenced based on relators’ contention that the proposed 

amendment’s scope violated the single-subject requirement of Texas 

Local Government Code § 9.004(d).2 Whether the proposed amendment 

is otherwise substantively or procedurally improper, however, is 

immaterial to the question before us now: whether there is any lawfully 

called special election at all. 

The timeliness issue emerged after the city council scheduled a 

vote on February 16 for the purpose of ordering the May 6 election. That 

scheduling choice left only one extra day before the last possible day to 

comply with state law, which requires special elections to “be ordered 

enforcement of abortion crimes, drug offenses, and theft (to name a few). More 

specifically, it would bar sharing specified information with other governmental 

agencies unless doing so would advance the proposed amendment’s preferred 

policy goals (like “defend[ing] the patient’s right to abortion care or the 

healthcare provider’s right to provide that care”). It would regulate how the 

police enforce warrants; restrict police authority to seek so-called “no knock” 

warrants from a court; and limit what the police may take as evidence incident 

to a search. The proposed amendment would bar the use of “chokeholds” by 

the police and require that police release (rather than arrest) certain categories 

of alleged offenders—those charged with theft of property worth less than 

$750, those who bring contraband into a jail or prison, and those charged with 

various other crimes. The proposed amendment would also have its 

non-enforcement scheme overseen by a newly appointed “Justice Director,” 

who would work with the city council and provide impact statements for any 

decisions affecting the city’s budget or law enforcement. All that and far more.

2 That contention, and its companion argument that such a multifaceted

proposed amendment violates the requirements of Local Government Code 

§ 9.004(e), warrant more analysis—including whether those provisions entail 

judicially enforceable rights and, if so, whether they protect voters at the polls 

(so that pre-election review is proper) or only those affected by enforcement of 

a voter-approved charter amendment (so that only post-election review is 

proper). See infra Part III (discussing how granting partial relief based on 

timing would have allowed the Court to consider these questions without the 

rush of emergency litigation).
5

not later than the 78th day before election day.” Tex. Elec. Code 

§ 3.005(c). Shortly before the vote, this Court ordered the parties to 

provide status reports regarding what action, if any, the city council took 

with respect to the proposed amendment, and what effect the city 

council’s action had on the pending request for relief. The parties 

subsequently informed the Court that the ordinance ordering the special 

election passed by a vote of 7-0-3: seven voted to order the election; none 

voted against doing so; and three abstained from the vote. 

All parties agree that, under the city charter, the ordinance could

not take effect until February 26—ten days from February 16, when it 

passed—because it received fewer than eight votes. See San Antonio, 

Tex., City Charter art. II, § 15; ante at 3 & n.2.3 Thus, the ordinance 

could only effectively “order” an election on February 26—69 days before 

the scheduled election. 

B

Yet the law requires 78 days, not 69. That 78-day requirement is 

clear and unambiguous. Tex. Elec. Code § 3.005(c).4 Likewise clear and 

3 Delaying the effective date of a newly enacted law is common practice 

and courts must respect that aspect of legislation as much as any other. Cf., 

e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 257 (1994) (“A statement that 

a statute will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest 

that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date.”). 

4 The legislature expressly eliminated any conceivable doubt that might 

be generated from other sources of law: “This section supersedes a law outside 

this code to the extent of any conflict.” Id. § 3.005(b). The legislature’s focus 

on timeliness is illustrated by its repeated amendments to lengthen the time 

required. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 1, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 84, § 3 (expanding 

the requirement from 70 days to 78 days); In re Woodfill, 470 S.W.3d 473, 480 

n.11 (Tex. 2015) (noting this recent statutory elongation).
6

unambiguous is the city council’s violation of it—a point the Court does 

not dispute. The only question, then, is what to do about it. 

Nothing is one possible answer. It is the answer that the Court 

adopts by relying on the general principle of restraint in the context of 

elections as its justification. See ante at 5–6. I readily agree that electionrelated claims warrant a jaundiced judicial eye, especially when parties 

ask the courts to disrupt an ongoing election. See, e.g., In re Khanoyan, 

637 S.W.3d 762, 764–65 (Tex. 2022). But traditional judicial reluctance 

to disrupt an ongoing election is limited to just that: an ongoing election. 

There has been no lawfully ordered election in this case, so the principles 

of restraint that the Court ably summons today have no relevance here. 

Thus, far from merely applying our precedents and the separation-ofpowers principles on which they are built, the Court unduly expands them 

to hold that we must idle by during an election that is no election at all. 

Indeed, we have said that “[i]n some circumstances, litigants could

present the courts with a clear violation of ministerial duties imposed 

by law, which—especially if brought early enough to avoid harm to the 

larger election—could lead to prompt judicial correction.” Id. at 767. 

The present case surely qualifies. In the face of an objective basis to 

deem a special election invalid ab initio because of something as basic 

and clear-cut as the calendar,5 the Court should say so without delay. 

5 I agree with the Court that the general election would proceed as 

planned regardless of what happens with respect to the special election. See 

ante at 12 n.30. A general election is an election, “other than a primary election,

that regularly recurs at fixed dates,” Tex. Elec. Code § 1.005(6), whereas a 

special election is simply one “that is not a general election,” id. § 1.005(18). A 

general election will elect the mayor and council members, for example. Special

elections include discretionary or irregular matters, like proposed charter 
7

The violation is holding the election prematurely, not enforcing the 

election’s results. The proper relief when a voter is asked to vote at the 

wrong time is to direct the city to hold the election at the right time, a 

pre-election remedy. By contrast, when a voter fears the outcome of an 

election, the voter must first await the election to see what the outcome 

even is before challenging it as legally infirm.6 

Consider an analogous situation: violations of the doublejeopardy clause. The core right protected by that clause is immunity 

from standing trial a second time. That right will be destroyed if the 

courts force a defendant through a second trial on the theory that any 

conviction is speculative and can be reversed after the fact. That is why 

both federal and Texas courts allow extraordinary pre-trial relief through

amendments. The planned May 6 election is, as is common, a joint general and 

special election. 

6 The Court contends that post-election relief would allow relators to 

“fully present their claims in a trial court” and notes that “the law is typically 

better served when the lower courts review a legal issue before this Court does.” 

Ante at 8 (quoting Rattray v. City of Brownsville, ___ S.W.3d. ___, ___, 2023 WL 

243892, at *6 (Tex. Mar. 10, 2023)). I certainly vouch for the general proposition. 

But the Court places far too much weight on the word “typically.” For one 

thing, in exceptional and time-sensitive circumstances like these (in which our 

rules expressly permit parties to seek relief directly from this Court, see Tex. 

R. App. P. 52.3(e)), the law certainly cannot be “better served” by condoning a 

violation of it. And for another, post-election relief is by definition inadequate 

for an injury that is complete at the time of the election. Cf. In re Petricek, 629 

S.W.3d 913, 917 (Tex. 2021) (holding that a post-election remedy is inadequate 

“[i]f the ballot can be corrected before the election”). The Court fails to 

distinguish between (a) a challenge to the substance, in which—if a ballot item 

passes and would otherwise become enforceable—a party who objects to it can 

contend that the ballot item is nonetheless bereft of force and (b) a challenge 

to how the election is to be held, which has nothing to do with whether the 

ballot item passes or not and indeed could be brought by a voter regardless of 

that voter’s support for or opposition to the underlying substantive proposition.
8

an appeal authorized by the collateral-order doctrine, see, e.g., United 

States v. Hollywood Motorcar Co., 458 U.S. 263, 266 (1982), or through 

a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus, see, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 

552, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Likewise here: voters’ core statutory 

right to be called only to properly authorized elections will be irretrievably 

harmed if we await the election before vindicating the right. 

The Court seems to suggest that the 78-day requirement is no 

match for a petition-generated initiative. I cannot see why. The reason 

a proposed charter amendment is placed on the ballot is because state 

law requires it. The law channels ballot access in many ways. For 

example, for a proposed charter amendment to be placed on the ballot, 

the law has long required petition signatures only of the smaller of 5% 

or 20,000 of the qualified voters, even in our largest cities. See Tex. Loc. 

Gov’t Code § 9.004(a). If the only basis for including a proposed 

amendment on the San Antonio ballot was that 19,000 signatures had 

been obtained, I find it hard to believe that the Court would not intervene

to protect the voters from being convened to exercise their franchise 

without legal authority. I thus fail to see why 19,000 voters instead of 

20,000 would be dramatically different than 69 days instead of 78. Both 

are necessary conditions for calling this special election. 

Other existing requirements that channel authority to amend a 

charter include the frequency of doing so—a city may not amend its 

charter “oftener than every two years.” Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5. This 

Court (by refusing a writ of error) has enforced that restriction on voting. 

See State v. City Comm’n of San Angelo, 101 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. 

App.—Austin 1937, writ ref’d). Despite the requisite number of 
9

signatures for a proposed charter amendment, the Court agreed that it 

was not lawful to hold an election that would violate the frequency 

requirement. Id. at 360–61. 

The 78-day mandate is a comparable requirement that we should 

enforce when it has clearly been violated. The Court implies that we 

should simply ignore the requirement because the city council was 

“arguably” bound to call the election. Ante at 8. I doubt that the casting 

of such votes was purely ministerial, and I think that the law confirms 

as much by providing for how to achieve ballot access if a city council, 

for reasons of principle or otherwise, proves unwilling to call an election 

or put a proposed amendment on the ballot. But regardless of any duty

to have acted timely, the city council did not do so. In such instances, 

may courts retroactively deem the 78-day requirement to be satisfied 

even when it is not, thus judicially striking the 78-day requirement from 

the statute? 

A better way to approach a situation like this one is to simply 

apply the provisions of the law, which are readily harmonized. Both 

state law and the San Antonio city charter provide for a two-step process 

in which the city council retains a proper but limited role. Under the 

law, the city council must have the first crack, but if it fails to act, the 

proposed charter amendment will be presented at the next available 

election—a specific right that the courts may enforce. See Tex. Loc. 

Gov’t Code § 9.004(b); San Antonio, Tex., City Charter art. IV, § 41 

(providing that if the city council “fails to pass an ordinance proposed by 

initiative petition . . . the proposed or referred ordinance shall be 

submitted to the electors on the next authorized uniform election date 
10

that allows enough time to hold the election in the manner required by 

law” (emphasis added)). 

In other words, we need not regard the city council as a potted 

plant or an automaton, as the Court does by recognizing nothing but a 

ministerial role for the council.7 If there were such an utter lack of 

discretion, then mandamus relief certainly should have been forthcoming

in San Angelo, where the city refused to place a proposed charter 

amendment on the ballot. 101 S.W.2d at 360–61. The legislature could 

have eliminated any role for city councils but instead has left it to city 

councils both to call special elections and to “prescribe the wording of a

proposition that is to appear on the ballot.” Tex. Elec. Code § 52.072(a). 

These are not examples of pointless political theater; they are part of the 

process. A city council’s failure or refusal to act leads to a different 

remedy, which is also part of the process: granting the proposed 

amendment automatic access to the ballot in the “next” available 

election, enforceable if necessary by a court.

For this reason, we need only follow the law to preserve the rights 

of all parties (and, most importantly, the people of San Antonio) by 

recognizing that May 6 is no longer available for a special election. 

Contrary to the Court’s assumption, May 6 is not “the earliest lawful

opportunity” to hold a special election. Ante at 8 (emphasis added). That 

ship has sailed; it is no longer possible to comply with the 78-day 

7 Remarkably, despite one of the Court’s bases for denying relief—that 

it may not intrude upon the prerogatives of the political branches—the Court 

castigates the three abstaining members of the city council as law-breakers 

because they did not cast their votes the way the Court concludes they were 

bound to do. Ante at 8–9 (suggesting that mandamus could lie for a court to 

order members to vote in a particular way). 
11

requirement (or to order the city council to do so). Absent any other 

legally cognizable objection to the proposed charter amendment, however,

the city council will no longer be in the position to foreclose the 

amendment from appearing on the November 2023 ballot. 

The Court, however, denies all mandamus relief, casting the city 

council’s ordinance ordering the special election as pure ceremony and 

conscripting San Antonio’s voters into the same playbill—but at a cost. 

Allowing manifest violations of the law is bad enough. Inviting a costly 

and corrosive post-election challenge no matter what happens is 

unfortunate, too.8 But perhaps most serious of all, if the charter 

amendment passes, San Antonians will be blocked from making any 

other amendments to their charter until 2025. See Tex. Const. art. XI, 

§ 5(a). As a result of the special election that should not have happened, 

other opportunities that would have been available for charter 

amendments will be gone forever. Ironically, the Court’s resolution of 

this petition creates the very risk it purports to eliminate: the risk that 

the voters of San Antonio will be unable to vote on charter amendments 

they desire. I fear that today’s decision will undermine the very right to 

vote the Court seeks to protect. 

8 Suppose that the proposed charter amendment fails. While those who 

oppose it, like relators, may be content to let bygones be bygones, what about 

someone who supports it? I take no position on whether such a person could 

bring a post-election challenge on the ground that the charter amendment 

should have been placed on the November ballot instead of the May ballot—

but failing to address the timing problem now makes future litigation more 

likely even if the voters reject it. 
12

C

The Court’s opinion portrays denial of relief here as tantamount 

to preserving the right to vote. If that truly were the question, I would 

gladly join the Court. The opposite is more nearly true, however, 

because the real question is whether there even is any valid election to 

which the voters can be summoned. Requiring voters to exercise their 

electoral authority when the law does not provide for it undermines our 

system of elections. Setting a special election is—or at least should be—

a solemn act of self-government, not a casual event. If the Court is 

unwilling to protect electoral regularity even in the face of an open, 

obvious, and objective violation of legal standards, it will be hard for the 

Court to stop lawlessness of other sorts in future abuses of our system. 

Denying relief today does not protect that system but makes it more 

vulnerable. Forcing unlawful elections diminishes the respect we have 

for the rules governing them. Granting limited relief would have 

prevented these real and unfortunate consequences. 

I now turn to the Court’s rationale for why it refuses to act.

II

As I see it, the Court invokes three main grounds to justify denying

relators the pre-election relief they seek: two based on precedent and one

based on statutory construction. None of the three, in my view, supports 

the Court’s decision. 

A

First, the Court embraces as a chief authority our decision in City 

of Austin v. Thompson, 219 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. 1949). After citing the 

statutory provisions that empower courts to grant mandamus and 
13

injunctive relief to prevent Election Code violations, the Court invokes 

Thompson to claim that, “[h]istorically . . . the Court has not enjoined 

elections altogether, even elections ‘called without authority and 

therefore absolutely void.’” Ante at 6 (quoting Thompson, 219 S.W.2d at 

59). “Historically” is the correct adverb, because Thompson relied 

exclusively on the traditional “power of a court of equity.” 219 S.W.2d at 

59. Neither the majority nor the dissent in that 5–4 decision mentioned 

any statutes at all. For good reason: not until two years after this Court 

declined to exercise its ordinary equitable authority in Thompson did 

the legislature confer the express statutory authority to grant either 

mandamus or injunctive relief to prevent Election Code violations.9 See

Act of May 30, 1951, 52d Leg., R.S., ch. 492, § 1, art. 7, 1951 Tex. Gen.

Laws 1097, 1098.

The statutory authority is no makeweight. As the Court notes 

(ante at 10 n.30), we recently observed in In re Stetson Renewables 

Holdings, LLC that “an express statutory deadline . . . does not 

necessarily mean that the legislature intended for courts to enforce the 

deadline.” 658 S.W.3d 292, 296 (Tex. 2022) (internal quotations omitted). 

But the Court does not complete the narrative, because we specifically 

9 One wonders if one (or all) of the five members of the Thompson 

majority, if armed with the statutory authority we now possess, would have 

joined the four dissenters to direct the City of Austin not to proceed with its 

“election.” Regardless, that case was a strange one, turning purely on the 

Court’s construction of Austin’s city charter, which the Court unanimously 

read to forbid elections to fill unexpired city council positions. The election was 

not even really an election because the council used it as a way to invite the 

public to “advise” the council on whom the council should choose to fill the open 

spot. Whatever else Thompson means, it does not mean anything about Texas 

courts’ authority after the legislature has acted. 
14

juxtaposed the area of law at issue in Stetson with “election cases,” 

where (again, “with extreme caution”) courts indeed “may play a more 

active part” because “there is ample and express statutory authority for 

a judicial role.” Id. (citing Tex. Elec. Code § 273.061). 

B

The Court’s other lead authority is more recent and relevant: 

Coalson v. City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 1980). See ante 

at 9–10. The Court cites Coalson for two main propositions that only 

show how different this case is. Reaffirming Coalson does not remotely 

require denying relief today.

First, Coalson “held that any opinion on the constitutionality of 

the amendment before the election was held would be purely advisory 

because voters may disapprove the amendment.” Ante at 10; see id. at 7 

n.16. Quite right. The whole basis for the city council in Victoria refusing

to put a proposed amendment on the ballot was the city council’s view of 

whether the amendment, if passed, would have been legal. This is why 

the Court emphasized that the council members’ declaratory-judgment 

action “seeks an advisory opinion” and why “[t]he election [would] 

determine whether there is a justiciable issue.” Coalson, 610 S.W.2d at 

747. By definition, such an unripe claim must await the election’s outcome. 

No such claim appears in this case, of course. True, relators (and 

apparently the city attorney and several members of the council) believe 

that, if passed, the proposed charter amendment would violate state 

law—but that is not the basis of their petition and not the basis on which 

I would grant relief. Instead, relators complain of a procedural injury 
15

that materializes whether or not the proposed amendment passes: being 

forced to vote in an untimely ordered special election.

Second, the Court quotes Coalson for this accurate statement: 

“The City Council’s duty [to order an election on a citizen-initiated 

amendment] is clear, and its compliance with the law is ministerial in 

nature.” Ante at 8 n.23 (quoting 610 S.W.2d at 747). Again, quite right. 

In Coalson, a timely and properly ordered special election was ongoing. 

“The election process had been lawfully put in motion,” the Court 

expressly observed. 610 S.W.2d at 747 (emphasis added). Unlike the 

special election here, the special election there contained other ballot 

items. See id. at 746. The only question was whether the city council 

could order a special election but exclude a validly proposed charter 

amendment that it disliked. Here, of course, that antecedent question, 

which was not at issue in Coalson, is precisely what the parties dispute: 

whether any “lawful” special election has been called, given the open 

violation of Election Code § 3.005(c). 

The Court in Coalson was thus certainly correct to have held that 

the city council members violated their ministerial duties by attempting 

to block a proposition from the special election—after all, the election 

had been ordered without any challenge to any statutory (or other) 

prerequisite for doing so. Id. at 747. Likewise, it is obvious that the 

properly ordered special election was the “next” such election. The city 

council did not have a leg to stand on. 

Worse yet, the very fact that (unlike here) the special-election 

order in Coalson was entirely valid explains why this Court was so 

focused on the detrimental consequence that would flow from excluding 
16

the ballot initiative: the voters would have faced “a two-year delay before 

another charter election” could be held on it or any other proposed 

amendment. Id. at 746 (citing Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5). In a touch of 

irony, then, today’s denial of relief yields the exact result Coalson sought 

to prevent: the threat to voters’ ability to bring charter amendments 

within two years. 

Coincidentally, the Court in Coalson cited State v. City 

Commission of San Angelo—the case I mentioned in Part I.B, supra—

for this very point. San Angelo likewise involved a proposed charter 

amendment, but there “the city officials refused to call the election, on 

the sole ground that the charter of said city had [already] been amended 

by an election” less than two years ago, in violation of the frequency 

limitation on such amendments. 101 S.W.2d at 361. In the ensuing 

mandamus petition, supporters of the proposed amendment—observing 

the requisite number of signatures—sought to compel the calling of a 

special election despite the timing problem. Unlike the Court’s ruling 

today, the holding in San Angelo was that officials did not have the 

authority, much less obligation, to call an unlawfully timed special 

election. If such a ministerial duty on the part of the council existed, 

then it would not have been “an example of typical judicial restraint,” 

ante at 12 n.35, but an example of judicial unwillingness to protect the 

core rights of the People that the Court today so frequently invokes.

Said differently, the demanded election in San Angelo—just like 

today’s—suffered from a threshold requirement that made it unlawful. 

In San Angelo, it was inconsistency with the Texas Constitution’s twoyear requirement; here, it is inconsistency with the Texas Election Code’s
17

78-day requirement. San Angelo did not say “well, who knows, maybe 

it won’t even pass—if it does, we’ll take it up then.” Coalson cited San 

Angelo approvingly: it was because of San Angelo’s correct holding (that 

another election with charter amendments would be improper even with 

sufficient signatures) that Coalson deemed it so important to allow the 

proposed Victoria amendment onto the ballot at once. See Coalson, 610 

S.W.2d at 746. 

But the sum and substance of today’s decision is to invert San 

Angelo by holding, counterintuitively, that we must nevertheless press 

ahead in the face of such procedural infirmities. This approach is simply 

the election equivalent of the “certify now and worry later” approach we 

have forcefully rejected in the class-action context. E.g., Sw. Refin. Co. 

v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000). 

C

The Court’s third key argument for denying relief is, in essence, 

a misunderstanding of the Election Code. That code simultaneously

imposes deadlines for calling special elections and denies special elections 

the immunity from validity challenges granted to general elections. See

Tex. Elec. Code § 3.007 (“Failure to order a general election does not 

affect the validity of the election.” (emphasis added)). 

Under our ordinary rules of interpretation, the very fact that the 

legislature went out of its way to say that an untimely order would not

affect a general election’s validity quite clearly implies that it would do 

so for a special election. Otherwise, we would have both expressio unius 
18

and surplusage problems—canons of construction we have applied in 

case after case.10 

But, in addition to its unduly narrow view of election deadlines

generally,

11 the Court dismisses this consequence of § 3.007 (the “savings 

clause”) by contending that “the savings clause [for general elections] 

predates statutory deadlines for special elections.” Ante at 10 n.30. I 

fail to see how that matters. Looking to statutory history to see how a 

word was used is one thing; slicing up an integrated code to deny its 

provisions the usual semantic cohesion is quite another. We have always

construed statutory text “as a whole,” In re Ford Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 

265, 280 (Tex. 2014) (quoting TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 

340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011)), and presumed that the legislature acts 

“with complete knowledge of the existing law and with reference to it,” 

Acker v. Tex. Water Comm’n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990). Those 

two principles have practical force here, where the legislature—when 

codifying the Election Code—added the deadline for ordering elections 

literally just two sections before it incorporated the preexisting savings 

clause for general elections—and maintained that it would be only for 

10 For surplusage, see, e.g., In re CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC, 

629 S.W.3d 149, 159 (Tex. 2021); Waak v. Rodriguez, 603 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tex. 

2020); Randol Mill Pharmacy v. Miller, 465 S.W.3d 612, 617 (Tex. 2015). For 

expressio unius, see, e.g., ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopman, 547 S.W.3d 858, 877 

(Tex. 2018); Johnson v. Second Inj. Fund, 688 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1985); 

James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tex. 1982); State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 

175 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1943); Collingsworth County v. Allred, 40 S.W.2d 

13, 15 (Tex. 1931). 

11 As noted above, the Court cites Stetson (rather expansively) for the 

proposition that courts need not enforce the Election Code’s statutory deadlines. 

See ante at 10 n.30; supra Part II.A (explaining why Stetson said the opposite 

of this in the election context).
19

general elections. See Act of May 13, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 211, § 1, 

1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 802, 809 (adding newly codified §§ 3.005–.007).

In short, the Court’s chief authorities do not support the denial of 

partial relief. I fear instead that the deployment of these authorities 

will harm the coherence of our election law and indeed of our general 

approach to statutory construction. 

III

The issue that originally divided—and still divides—the parties 

is not the election’s timeliness. Rather, it is whether, when, and how 

the courts can vindicate the requirement that a charter amendment 

“may not contain more than one subject,” along with the corresponding 

mandate that “[t]he ballot shall be prepared so that a voter may approve 

or disapprove any one or more amendments without having to approve 

or disapprove all of the amendments.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 9.004(d), 

(e). The parties vehemently disagree about whether the lengthy proposed

charter amendment violates these statutory requirements.12 

We ought to prefer not to resolve on an emergency basis such a 

fraught question. Nor would it be necessary: granting partial relief on 

the ground of untimeliness would carry the added benefit of allowing the 

Court adequate time to consider the single-subject question. After 

12 The City repeatedly asserts in its filings that mandamus relief is 

unnecessary and improper because of an available post-election remedy should 

the amendment pass. Given the Court’s resolution, the City certainly could 

not challenge the procedural availability of a post-election remedy with respect 

to the single-subject requirement. See Ferguson v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of 

Am., 295 S.W.3d 642, 643 (Tex. 2009) (“Judicial estoppel precludes a party who 

successfully maintains a position in one proceeding from afterwards adopting 

a clearly inconsistent position in another proceeding to obtain an unfair 

advantage.”).
20

directing the election to be held in November, as the law requires, I 

would direct merits briefing so that our ultimate resolution of the singlesubject question could deliver on two promises that our law makes to 

voters: that they can vote on what they wish and that they will not be 

asked to do so in the face of noncompliance with important legal 

requirements. 

Taking that opportunity now would be sensible. For one thing, 

the single-subject question is unlikely to disappear no matter what 

happens in the May election because the timing issue will likely keep it 

alive.13 For another, the question of whether a single-subject claim is 

properly brought before an election will be hard to answer after an 

election, and granting partial relief now would give us an unusual 

opportunity to do so with comparative leisure. There are at least three 

important questions we will have to address at some point.

First, is the Local Government Code’s single-subject requirement 

judicially cognizable? Even if courts properly can reach it, we must be 

persuaded, among other things, that we have access to judicially 

administrable standards. Otherwise, the dispute might constitute a 

nonjusticiable political question. See, e.g., Van Dorn Preston v. M1 

Support Servs., L.P., 642 S.W.3d 452, 465 (Tex. 2022) (concluding that 

the presence of judicially manageable standards meant that courts could 

adjudicate the case at issue); see also Jeffrey S. Sutton, Who Decides? 

States as Laboratories of Constitutional Experimentation 258–60 (2022) 

13 I agree that, if the special election had been timely called, and if the 

proposed amendment were to be defeated at the polls, then the single-subject 

question would become moot. With the untimely special election, though, any 

hope of mootness will likely be, at best, long deferred by litigation. 
21

(“The nature of the single-subject [requirement] does not demand 

judicial enforcement,” id. at 258, because it “faces a soaring level of 

generality problem,” id. at 260.). The parties’ comparatively cursory 

briefing on this point reflects a divergence about what the single-subject 

requirement means.14 

14 Notably, the Texas Constitution includes a single-subject provision 

similar to that of Local Government Code § 9.004(d). Compare Tex. Const. art. 

III, § 35(a) (“No bill . . . shall contain more than one subject.”), with Tex. Loc. 

Gov’t Code § 9.004(d) (“An amendment may not contain more than one 

subject.”). Chief Judge Sutton’s observation quoted above was primarily 

directed to such constitutional requirements, which are common among 

American states. Whether our Constitution allows courts to enforce the 

single-subject requirement against the legislature, a coordinate branch of state 

government, asks a very different question than whether a statute requires the 

courts to enforce its provisions against cities, which are administrative units 

of the State. 

In addition to this structural difference, there is a textual distinction: 

the Constitution says that a “bill” (not a statute) may not contain more than 

one subject. That distinction at least suggests that the constitutional singlesubject requirement is “directed at the legislature’s own process for enacting 

laws,” Sutton, supra, at 258, so the legislature itself (especially, perhaps, the 

other house) and not the judiciary must enforce it. By contrast, the Local 

Government Code focuses both on the end product, as § 9.004(d) makes clear, 

and on the process leading to it, as § 9.004(e) shows. The latter provision states 

that “[t]he ballot shall be prepared so that a voter may approve or disapprove 

any one or more amendments without having to approve or disapprove all of 

the amendments.” No comparable constitutional provision exists to limit the 

legislature. 

So perhaps the legislature borrowed the Constitution’s language but 

imposed a different single-subject standard, at least with respect to justiciability, 

on municipalities. Similar language can convey different meanings in the 

constitutional context. The U.S. Supreme Court has long given markedly 

different meanings to the nearly identical text of Article III and (what is now) 

28 U.S.C. § 1331, both of which describe “arising under” jurisdiction. Compare

Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823–25 (1824) (construing 

the constitutional grant expansively enough to reach any case with a mere 

federal “ingredient,” including a potential ingredient), with Louisville & 

Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (construing the same 
22

Second, if the question is justiciable, what are its doctrinal 

boundaries, and what is the proper level of deference that will allow 

courts to distinguish between (a) a single issue with related subparts 

and (b) multiple separate issues? Perhaps § 9.004(e) will assist. If the 

legislature aims to protect voters from having to make impossible or 

unfair choices, as § 9.004(e) provides, then § 9.004(d)’s single-subject 

requirement might still require substantial deference to city councils (or 

citizens promoting initiatives). Perhaps further analysis would confirm 

(or refute) the instinct thus far reflected in some lower-court opinions.15

Third, if the courts can address the question, may they do so 

before or only after an election? There is at least a plausible argument 

that single-subject scrutiny, if permissible at all, should be done as soon 

as possible. The requirements of § 9.004(d)–(e) appear designed to protect

the very act of voting. If the goal is to ensure that voters spend their 

time and civic energy only on properly framed ballot items, it seems 

language as a statutory matter to authorize jurisdiction only when a federal 

question is on the face of a well-pleaded complaint).

15 See, e.g., City of Galena Park v. Ponder, 503 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). I express no view regarding whether any 

part of that opinion was correct but note that the case suggested that a “single 

subject” could encompass integrated policy changes that would not be feasible 

to pursue except as a unit. At issue there were proposed “rules governing the 

appointment and qualifications for police chief and fire chief [that] are part of 

the subject of how the city’s emergency services departments are to be 

organized.” Id. at 635. When reticulated provisions depend on one another, 

such that courts must defer to municipalities, the question may be whether the 

proposed amendment’s provisions here are in any real sense mutually 

dependent or are only vaguely related. If the latter, providing guidance to 

reliably inform local governments about how attenuated a relationship can be 

before § 9.004(d) is implicated may be challenging. Further briefing would 

clearly assist in devising a proper starting point. 
23

suitable—when possible, see Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 764–66—to 

provide pre-election relief.16 Indeed, if § 9.004(d)’s single-subject 

requirement aims to facilitate the voter’s right in § 9.004(e), then the 

single-subject requirement would logically be one that, when timely 

presented, should be vindicated before votes are cast. 

I take no position on any of those questions yet, much less 

determine how the answers to those questions would apply here. But it 

should be self-evident that answering them will be a very serious 

endeavor. These thoughts, I hope, explain why I believe that we should 

have accepted the opportunity that partial relief would have afforded us 

to consider each question without undue haste. 

IV

I could better understand the Court’s denial today if it was 

predicated on the concern that granting this mandamus petition would 

break the dam and create an influx of similar pre-election challenges 

across the second largest State in the Union. This Court cannot sit as a 

court of first instance whenever someone is aggrieved. There are only 

nine of us in a State with 254 counties and 30 million residents. We sit 

en banc in every case. But given the unusual posture of this dispute—

saddled with not only a single-subject issue but also with a violation of 

the 78-day election-order requirement—we should not be worried about 

the limited ramifications that might follow from a partial grant of relief. 

If the city council has indeed violated the 78-day election-order 

16 By contrast, a challenge to the legal substance of a properly framed 

ballot item could not be challenged ex ante; no one asks the Court to reject the 

proposed amendment here on the ground that its provisions might be unlawful, 

even though some parties clearly believe that to be true.
24

requirement, which it clearly has, I suspect our saying so would lead 

more municipalities to dutifully observe their deadlines. Even the 

occasional blown deadline in the future would lead to relief in the lower 

courts in light of an unequivocal and easily followed precedent from this 

Court. Granting partial relief today would open no floodgates.

* * *

The right to vote is unquestionably fundamental. It is how we 

remain a self-governing people. See Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 763. But 

the People of Texas also have chosen to guard their electoral role by 

enacting comprehensive legislation that ensures the propriety of elections

that are called. The People also have given their courts broad authority 

to enforce compliance with “any duty imposed by law in connection with 

the holding of an election” through the issuance of writs of mandamus. 

Tex. Elec. Code § 273.061(a). We should use that authority sparingly—

but we should use it when it is warranted, as it is here.

Respondents are wrong to suggest that following the law would 

“thwart the will of thousands of San Antonio voters.” Following the law 

would implement the will of all the voters of San Antonio—and of Texas. 

Likewise, I disagree with the Court that following the law would 

“disrupt[] the settled expectations of the people of San Antonio.” Ante 

at 2. The People’s settled expectations are that the law will be 

followed—that they will be called to the polls when the law so requires 

but not otherwise. 

The Court summarizes its holding with a troubling statement: 

that “[c]ourts must not lightly usurp [the] power” of placing popular 

initiatives on local ballots. Ante at 16. I propose a different rule: courts 
25

should never usurp any power in any context—not lightly, not 

hesitantly, but never. When power does belong to the courts, as the 

authority to enforce election law unquestionably does, we should 

cautiously exercise that power. Cautiously discharging the judicial role 

here requires granting modest partial relief: holding that there is no 

lawful authority for a special election in May.

I respectfully dissent.

Evan A. Young

Justice

OPINION FILED: March 17, 2023