NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

F2019-16 ME 

Captain Killed and Six 

Firefighters Injured at a Propane 

Explosion in an Office BuildingMaine
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Summary 

• On September 16, 2019, a 68-year-old captain was killed in a propane 

explosion and six firefighters were injured. 

Destruction of the propane explosion. This photo shows Side Alpha/Side Delta of 

the building. The white debris is insulation and papers from the building.

(Photo courtesy of the Fire and Rescue Department)
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Summary

• (0750 hours) A maintenance employee was moving table from the 1st

floor to the basement. After trips to the basement, the maintenance 

employee became light-headed. He mentioned this to the maintenance 

supervisor.

• (0805 hours) The maintenance supervisor looked at the propane tank, 

which was located outside near the Side Bravo/Side Charlie corner of the 

building. There was frost on the bottom of the tank and the ground.

• (0806 hours) The maintenance supervisor called the fire chief and 

requested the fire and rescue department respond to the facility due to a 

possible propane leak in the building.

• (0807 hours) The fire chief called the county dispatch center. He 

requested the fire and rescue department be dispatched to the facility 

for a possible propane leak.

• (0808 hours) The fire and rescue department was dispatched to an office 

building for a possible propane leak.

• Car 1 (PAR 1), Engine 2 (PAR 3), and Tower 3 (PAR 3) dispatched. 
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Summary

• (0817 hours) The captain of Tower 3 was in the basement with the 

maintenance supervisor, the firefighter from Tower 3, and the chauffeur 

from Engine 2 when the explosion occurred. 

• Car 1 and the captain from Engine 2 were on the 1st floor of the office 

building on Side Charlie.

• (0818 hours) A sergeant from the police department arrived on scene 

and informally assumed Command.

• (0821 hours) A mass casualty response was dispatched.

• (0829 hours ) The captain of Engine 2 was pronounced deceased by EMS 

personnel.

• (0858 hours) All patients were transported by EMS.

• One firefighter was treated and released. The other five firefighters were 

transported by air or ground to various hospitals throughout the state. 
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Contributing Factors

• Lack of locating and marking 

of underground utilities prior 

to digging or excavation.

• Installation of vertical 

protective posts (bollards) 

that severed the propane 

supply line. 

• Lack of pressure testing an 

empty tank by the propane 

company. 

• Odorant fade or scrubbing of 

ethyl mercaptan by soil and 

concrete.

Photo. The bollards (red circles) that were placed to protect the air 

conditioning units in the parking lot on Side Bravo of the office building. When 

the bollards were driven into the ground, one of the bollards severed the 

propane supply line.

(Photo courtesy of the Maine Office of the State Fire Marshal)
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Contributing Factors

• Lack of scene size-up 

and risk assessment

• Lack of incident 

management

• Lack of understanding 

a multi-gas monitor’s 

capability

• Improper gas 

sampling, monitoring, 

and detection 

• Lack of hazardous 

materials training and 

recertification

Diagram shows the changes that were made to the structure during 

the renovation project. 

(Diagram courtesy of the Maine Office of the State Fire Marshal)
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Recommendations

• Fire departments 

responding to a 

hazardous materials 

incident should ensure 

that a scene size-up 

and initial risk 

assessment are 

performed. In addition, 

fire departments 

should establish 

isolation zones and 

ensure a continuous 

risk assessment is 

conducted throughout 

the incident. 

The ambulance is located at the triage, treatment, and transportation unit after 

the explosion. All patients were transported to the hospital from this location. 

(Photo courtesy of the Maine Office of the State Fire Marshal)
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Recommendations

• Fire departments should ensure incident 

commanders initiate a defensive strategy and 

communicate the incident action plan (tactics) 

during initial operations of a hazardous materials 

incident. The strategy and IAP are revised based 

upon the tactical objectives taken to mitigate the 

hazard.

• Fire departments should ensure firefighters are 

trained to understand the scrubbing or odorant 

fade of ethyl mercaptan from propane. This training 

includes the use of multi-gas detectors to 

determine if a potentially explosive atmosphere is 

present
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Recommendations

• Fire departments should ensure that firefighters wear 

proper PPE including SCBA when entering an IDLH 

environment involving propane and natural gas.

• Fire departments should have a SOP/SOG (standard 

operating procedure/standard operating guideline) for 

conducting sampling, detection, and monitoring at 

propane and natural gas emergencies. 

• Fire departments should ensure that firefighters are 

properly trained and certified to understand the 

capabilities of the department’s multi-gas detectors, 

especially catalytic LEL combustible gas senor 

performance. 
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Recommendations

• Fire departments should ensure that multi-gas detectors 

are properly maintained per the manufacturer’s 

recommendations. 

• Fire departments that respond to propane and natural 

gas emergencies should comply with the requirements 

of 29 CFR Part 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and 

Emergency Response.

• States should ensure anyone (including homeowners) 

using power tools or other digging equipment that will 

penetrate the ground call “811 or 811 Dig Safe” three 

business days (72 hours) prior to digging to identify if any 

buried utilities are present and mark their location(s). 
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Recommendation

• Local and state 

enforcement agencies 

should ensure that a 

leak test of the piping 

system is conducted 

in accordance with 

the requirements of 

NFPA 54, National 

Fuel Gas Code, and 

NFPA 58, Liquefied 

Petroleum Gas Code, 

whenever propane 

service is initiated or 

restored.

Drone footage of the office building and surrounding area after the explosion. A 

mobile home park was located to the south of the building property.

(Photo courtesy of the Maine Office of the State Fire Marshal)
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NIOSH FFFIPP Safety Advisory

Odor Fade in Natural Gas and 

Propane

The odor of ethyl mercaptan fades 

or is scrubbed due to oxidation, 

adsorption, or absorption. Leaking 

natural gas or propane from 

underground lines loses the odor 

of ethyl mercaptan as it passes 

through soils and concrete. 

Materials such as drywall, plywood, 

and new piping for natural gas or 

propane will also adsorb the odor 

until the material becomes 

saturated. 
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ICS 208 HM

Site Safety and Control 

Plan

Responders take direction action on 

the material, container, or equipment 

involved. This is a hazmat technician 

level operation, and a Site Safety 

Control Plan (ICS 208 HM) must be 

completed.
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CONTACT US

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch

Division of Safety Research

NIOSH 1000 Frederick Lane, MS 1808

Morgantown, West Virginia 26505-2888

FFFIPP Webpage

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