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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

LAUREL LEIGH KROTZINGER,

Petitioner, 

vs. Case No. 4:10cv214-MP/WCS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

Respondent. 

_________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS § 2241 PETITION

Petitioner Krotzinger, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. She was incarcerated in this district at the time

the petition was filed, doc. 1, p. 1, though she has since been transferred to Texas. 

Doc. 1, p. 1; doc. 7. 

An order to show cause was entered, discussing the apparent lack of merit to

Petitioner's claims. Doc. 5 (much of which is reiterated here). Petitioner filed a

response, which essentially repeats the allegations of the petition. Doc. 6. 

Petitioner is in custody pursuant to the judgment of the Southern District of Iowa,

case number 4:04cr307, and seeks credit against her sentence for time spent in a drug

treatment facility from December 29, 2004, to January 26, 2005, and for time spent in a

halfway house from January 27, 2005, to January 13, 2006 (the date of sentencing). 
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Doc. 1, pp. 3-4; doc. 5, p. 1; doc. 6, pp. 1-2. Petitioner claims her plea hearing and

sentencing were both rescheduled, thus extending her time in the treatment facility and

halfway house. Doc. 1, pp. 4-5; doc. 6, p. 2 and attached affidavit. She claims she

suffered restraints on her liberty while in court-ordered drug treatment and confinement

at a halfway house, which were similar or identical to conditions of incarceration and

official detention. Doc. 1, pp. 3-4; doc. 6, pp. 2-3 and attached affidavit. 

Petitioner alleges she exhausted administrative remedies with the Bureau of

Prisons. Doc. 1, p. 3; doc. 6, p. 3 and Ex. B. 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), "[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment commences

on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives

voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the

sentence is to be served." As relevant here, a defendant is entitled to sentence credit

"for any time [s]he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence

commences . . . as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed . . . that

has not been credited against another sentence." § 3585(b) (emphasis added); Reno v.

Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 55, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 2024, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) (quoting this

language with added emphasis).

In Reno, Court agreed that "the phrase 'official detention' in § 3585(b) refers to a

court order detaining a defendant and committing him to the custody of the Attorney

General for confinement." 515 U.S. at 56, 115 S.Ct. at 2024-25. A defendant awaiting

trial or awaiting imposition or execution of sentence may either be "released," subject to

a variety of conditions including placement in a treatment center, or "detained" without

bail pursuant to a detention order. Id., at 57-58, 115 S.Ct. at 2025 (citations omitted). 

Case No. 4:10cv214-MP/WCS
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The Court found reasonable the BOP's interpretation of "official detention" under §

3585(b) to require credit for time a defendant spent under a detention order, but not for

time spent under a release order, "no matter how restrictive the conditions" of release. 

Id., at 60, 115 S.Ct. at 2026-27 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 

The docket of Petitioner's criminal case is available in PACER (Public Access to

Electronic Records).1 Prior to sentencing in United States v. Krotzinger, case

4:04cr307-JEG-RAW in the Southern District of Iowa, Petitioner was "released" to

treatment at the Iowa Residential Inpatient Drug Treatment Center (IRTC), and later

"released" to a halfway house. Docs. 23 and 40 in that case. This is confirmed by the

response to Petitioner's administrative remedy appeal, reflecting that Petitioner was

"released to Pretrial Services supervision with a special condition to participate in

inpatient drug treatment" on December 29, 2004; and on January 26, 2005, was

"successfully discharged from treatment" with a requirement "to reside at CH INC.," until

sentencing. Doc. 6, Ex. B (p. 13 of doc. 6 as scanned in ECF) (Electronic Case Filing).

The § 2241 petition should be summarily dismissed as Petitioner is not entitled to

credit under § 3585(b) as interpreted in Reno. Petitioner’s response to the show cause

order does not change the analysis, and the cases relied on (doc. 6, p. 3) were decided

before the Supreme Court's ruling in Reno. 

Finally, Petitioner alleges in the petition, "I was not made aware that my time

spent in court ordered halfway house would not be credited to my sentence." Doc. 1, p.

4. No specifics are alleged and there is no argument as to why this would entitle

 1 Petitioner supplies a copy of docs. 57, 87, and an excerpt of the docket in that

case. Doc. 6, Ex. A (pp. 7-11 in ECF). 

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Petitioner to relief. Petitioner states by affidavit (attached to response to show cause

order) that she was never told that the time in drug treatment or the halfway house

would not be credited, and claims that if she had known she would have asked to be put

back in jail. Doc. 6, attached affidavit. She claims at the plea hearing on April 28, 2005,

the prosecutor wanted her in jail and her attorney argued for placement in the halfway

house, but “[t]he prosecutor stated she wanted me to be in-custody. The Judge stated

that he considered the halfway house to be in-custody.” Id., attached affidavit (pp. 1-2

of affidavit; pp. 4-5 in ECF). 

Whether or not the trial court considered Petitioner’s placement to be sufficiently

"in custody" for purposes of release pending sentencing does not, however, change the

legal status of Petitioner’s "release" to a halfway house for § 3585(b) purposes. Cf.,

Rodriguez v. Lamer, 60 F.3d 745, 749 (11th Cir. 1995) (discussing the “genuine legal

distinction” between the person "released" to home confinement and the person who

may satisfy an imposed term of imprisonment by home confinement) (relying on Reno,

rejecting equal protection challenge to different treatment). See also Cucciniello v.

Keller, 137 F.3d 721, 724-72 (2nd Cir. 1998) (due process does not require notice to

detainee that the time spent released to home confinement will not be credited against

subsequently imposed sentence). 

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It plainly appears that Petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this court, and it

is therefore respectfully RECOMMENDED that this § 2241 proceeding be SUMMARILY

DISMISSED. 

IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida on December 8, 2010.

 s/ William C. Sherrill, Jr. 

WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO PARTIES

Within 15 days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation, a party may

serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. A party

may respond to another party's objections within 10 days after being served with a copy thereof. 

Failure to file specific objections limits the scope of review of proposed factual findings and

recommendations.

Case No. 4:10cv214-MP/WCS