THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Ex Parte Ninth Judicial Circuit Solicitor Scarlett A. 

Wilson, Petitioner. 

In re Bradley Rowland Marshall, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2017-001951 

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 

Opinion No. 27919 

Submitted August 15, 2019 – Filed September 25, 2019 

JUDGMENT DECLARED 

Benjamin Chad Simpson, of Charleston, for Petitioner. 

Bradley Rowland Marshall, of Mt. Pleasant, pro se. 

PER CURIAM: We agreed to hear this declaratory judgment action in our 

original jurisdiction to determine whether Respondent has engaged in the 

unauthorized practice of law (UPL). The matter was referred to a Special Referee 

to take evidence and issue a report containing proposed findings of fact and 

recommendations to the Court. Following a hearing, the Special Referee issued a 

report concluding Respondent engaged in UPL. Respondent has filed exceptions 

to the Report. We hold Respondent has engaged in UPL and enjoin him from any 

further UPL. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNDERLYING FACTS 

Respondent was disbarred by the Washington Supreme Court on October 1, 2009,1 

by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on May 25, 2010,2 and by the United States 

Supreme Court on December 13, 2010.3 He is no longer licensed to practice law in 

any state. 

Respondent is currently the sole proprietor of Chartmans, Inc. According to the 

company's website, Chartmans "serves as a legal consultant to federal workers, 

contractors, foreign states, statesmen and companies doing business abroad. In 

today’s world, legal representation is essential. Whether it is in U.S. 

administrative hearings, before international tribunals, foreign courts, or in 

mediations and arbitrations abroad, CHARTMANS ensures its clients continue to 

grow through compassionate problem-solving, pragmatic negotiations and 

unwavering litigation." The website further states, "If you are a federal contractor 

or employed by a federal agency, department or entity in the United States or 

overseas and are dealing with an employment dispute, you need adequate legal 

representation. Any problem you may run into in dealing with employment 

discrimination, work-place disputes or business problems in the States or overseas, 

Chartmans is prepared to provide comprehensive and compassionate 

representation." Respondent's biographical information on the website states, "Mr. 

Marshall is a conciliator, broker and litigator" and indicates he has "considerable 

experience as an American lawyer, cleric and foreign legal and business 

consultant." Chartmans' letterhead indicates the company specializes in 

"Longshore and Federal Worker Claims." 

Pursuant to the regulation in effect at the time of Respondent's actions, 29 C.F.R. 

§18.34(g)(2) (2011),

4 any citizen who is not an attorney was permitted to appear in 

a representative capacity in an adjudicative proceeding before the Department of 

Labor's Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ). Claims under the 

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Longshoremen's Act) 

are decided by the OALJ. After his disbarment, Respondent represented numerous 

1 In re Marshall, 217 P.3d 291 (Wash. 2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1008 (2010). 

2 In re Marshall, Case No. 07–80092 (9th Cir. 2010). 

3 In re Marshall, 562 U.S. 1105 (2010). 

4 The current regulation defining attorney representatives and non-attorney representatives is 29 

C.F.R. §18.22 (West 2019). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

clients in Longshoremen's Act claims before the OALJ. 

On November 2, 2011, United States Department of Labor Administrative Law 

Judge Jennifer Gee disqualified Respondent from appearing before the OALJ in a 

case arising under the Longshoremen's Act because he was an attorney as defined 

by 29 C.F.R. § 18.34(g)(1) and, therefore, could not appear as a non-attorney as 

defined by 29 C.F.R. § 18.34(g)(2). Subsequently, United States Department of 

Labor Administrative Law Judge Stephen Purcell issued a Notice of Judicial 

Inquiry and Order to Show Cause why the OALJ should not afford reciprocal 

effect to Washington's disbarment of Respondent. On December 8, 2011, Judge 

Purcell issued an order denying Respondent the authority to appear in a 

representative capacity before the OALJ. The United States District Court 

dismissed Respondent's action challenging the orders of Judge Gee and Judge 

Purcell under the Administrative Procedures Act and denied his motion for 

reconsideration. Marshall v. Purcell, No. 2:12–cv–00084–RMG (D.S.C. Jan. 2, 

2013). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Marshall v. Purcell, 521 F. 

App'x 200 (4th Cir. 2013). 

LAW 

The United States Supreme Court has held a state may not enforce attorney 

licensing requirements that give the state's attorney licensing authority "a virtual 

power of review over the federal determination that a person or agency is qualified 

and entitled to perform certain functions, or which impose upon the performance of 

activity sanctioned by federal license additional conditions not contemplated by 

Congress." Sperry v. State of Fla. ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963). 

Pursuant to Sperry, when a state licensing law excludes a lawyer from practice that 

federal rules expressly allow, the two rules conflict, and the state law is preempted 

by the federal law. Id. However, if the authorization to practice before federal 

agencies and courts is withdrawn, the practice becomes subject to this Court's 

authority to regulate the practice of law in South Carolina. See S.C. Const. art. V, 

§ 4 ("The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice 

of law and the discipline of persons admitted."); S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-10 (2011) 

(recognizing the inherent power of the South Carolina Supreme Court to regulate 

the practice of law); In re Lite Ray Realty Corp., 257 B.R. 150, 153 (Bankr. 

S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding the ability to practice in federal court depends on the 

extent of the "federal exception" to the unauthorized practice of law, which 

insulates a lawyer, acting within the scope of an authorization to practice before a 

federal court, from the charge of violating state restrictions on the unauthorized 

practice of law); People v. Shell, 148 P.3d 162, 175 (Colo. 2006) (holding in the 

absence of preemption by the federal courts, the state court has the power to 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

sanction an individual for the unauthorized practice of law in a federal action); In 

re Amalgamated Dev. Co., Inc., 375 A.2d 494, 497 (D.C. 1977) (holding if the 

federal government has not granted a license to practice in an area, a state is free to 

enforce its own licensing regulations because the state is not interfering with any 

federal purpose); In re Lyon, 16 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Mass. 1938) ("[W]e see no reason 

why our policy or statute should give way in favor of persons who seek to escape 

State regulation of the practice of law on the ground that their practice is within the 

field of Federal jurisdiction, when they are not authorized to [practice] in that 

jurisdiction."); Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Boyd, 859 N.E.2d 930, 932 (Ohio 2006) 

(holding except to the limited extent necessary to protect peculiarly federal 

objectives, the state may enjoin the unauthorized practice of law before federal 

courts in Ohio); In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by S.C. Bar, 

309 S.C. 304, 305, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124 (1992) (noting the South Carolina 

Supreme Court has the duty to regulate the practice of law in South Carolina). 

Because whether Respondent's representation of Longshoremen's Act clients 

before the OALJ prior to the orders prohibiting him from appearing before the 

OALJ constituted UPL is a question for federal determination, we express no 

opinion as to the propriety of that representation. However, we hold any 

representation of clients by Respondent in actions before the OALJ after he was 

prohibited from appearing before the OALJ constitutes UPL and enjoin 

Respondent from any further representation of clients before the OALJ. 

Respondent's provision of advice to clients, negotiation of settlements, and general 

case management of claims under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act 

without the supervision of a licensed attorney; participation in the drafting of 

settlement agreements and other agreements affecting title to real property; 

negotiation of legal rights and responsibilities on behalf of other individuals; and 

provision of advice to individuals on the desirability of settlement offers or 

contract terms under South Carolina law also constitutes UPL and may be 

regulated by this Court. See Rogers Townsend & Thomas, PC v. Peck, 419 S.C. 

240, 244, 797 S.E.2d 396, 398 (2017) ("Generally, the practice of law includes 'the 

preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special 

proceedings, and the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of 

clients before judges and courts.'" (quoting State v. Despain, 319 S.C. 317, 319, 

460 S.E.2d 576, 577 (1995))); State v. Buyers Serv. Co., 292 S.C. 426, 430, 357 

S.E.2d 15, 17 (1987) ("The practice of law is not confined to litigation, but extends 

to activities in other fields which entail specialized legal knowledge and ability."). 

Accordingly, we enjoin Respondent from any further actions of this nature. 

JUDGMENT DECLARED. 
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.