T en n. R

. C t

. A p p
. 1 0 st ates: 1

T h is C o u rt, w ith the c o n c u rr e n c e o f all ju d g e s p a rtic ip a ting in the c a se , m a y a ff irm , re v e rs e o r m o d ify t he act i o ns o f

t he t ri al co urt by me m o randum op i ni o n when a f o rma l op i ni o n w o u ld h ave no prec edent i a l v a l u e
. W h e n a c a s e i s de c i de d b y me mo r a n du m o pi n i on i t s h a l l be de s i g n at ed “M E M O R A N D U M O P IN IO N ,” s h a ll no t be pub l i shed, and s hal l not b e ci t ed or rel i ed on f o r any r eas on i n a ny un r el at ed cas e. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs Marc h 9, 200 7
RON ALD HOWSE v. TE NN ESSE E D EP AR TME NT OF CORREC TION

Appeal f rom the Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 03-3135-IVRichard Dinki ns, Chan cellor

No. M2004- 01497-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on Ju ly 23, 3007

I n 1982, Appellant p ri soner wa s sentence d to one twenty -five year deter minate sentenc e and f

our five-to- ten-y ear

indeterminate sentenc es, to run conse cutively . In 2003, Appellant fil e d a d e c la r a tor y jud g me nt a c tio n in th e David so n Co un ty Cha nc e ry Court , a lle g ingthat he ha d b e e n w ro ng fu lly denied the possibil i t y o f custodial parole. The tr ial court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of Ap pe lle e the Te nn e sse e De pa rtme nt o f C or

re c tio n. Ap pe lla

nt a pp e a ls s uc h r

uli ng . We a ff

ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed
W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined. Ronald C. Howse, pr o s e
. R o b e rtC o o p e r , A t t o r

n e y G e n e r a l an d

R e p o rt e r ; M i c h a e l M o o r e , S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l ; J e n n i f

e r L. R i l e y, Assistant Attorney

Gene ral, for

the appe llee, Te nnessee Depa rtment of Corre ction.

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION 1

I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND
On De c e mbe r 1 0, 19 82 , Ro na ld H ow se (“ Ap pe lla nt” ) w a s c on vic te d in

a Da vid so n Co un ty Criminal Court of one count of se cond degree murder, c arr ying a twenty -five year

sentenc e, and f

our counts of auto bur g lary , eac h car rying f ive- t o -t en -y ear

sentenc es. The se cond degree murderT hi s s ect i on ha s s i nce been s l i gh t l y r evi s ed, but i t s ef f ect r emai ns t he s ame. 2

A l t ho ugh A p p el l ant al l eges t hat s uch a p o l i cy exi st s wi t hi n t he T enness ee D ep art m ent of C o rr ect i o n, t hi s Co urt 3

c o u ld no t l o c a te the lan g u a g e c ited b y A p p e llan t with in a n y o f t h e p o licie s fro m the ti m e o f A p p e llan t’s sen te n c ing

. -2- sentenc e is classified as a Class X sentenc e and is de terminate, while the four c ounts of auto burg lary
are indeterminate

. All the sentenc es wer e to r un consec utively

. At the time of trial, Appe llant was an inmate at Riverbend Maximum Security Institut ion in Nashville.
At the t ime of Appellant’s sentenc ing, Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40-20-110 stated the following 2 in reg ard to pa

role:
40-20-110. Sente nce for separate off enses - P arole c onsid erat ions. (a ) I f a pe rs on be se nte nc e d fo r tw o (2 ) or mor e su c h se pa ra te of fe ns e s, se nte nc e sh a ll be pr on ounc e d f

or e a c h off e ns e , an d im

pr iso nme nt t

he re un de r m ay

e qu a l, b ut s ha ll not exceed, the total of the maxi mum terms provided by law for such off enses, whic h total shall, for the purpose of §§ 40-20- 107 - 40-20- 110, b e co n s trued a s one (1)
c on tin uo us te rm of imp ri so nme nt. (b) The depar

tment of corr ection shall notify the boar d of par ol es whe n inmates sentenc ed to conse cutive sente nces which re quir e cu stodial parole c onsideration,
rea ch par ole elig ibilit y

on their initial sente nces. The board of parole s shall determine when the inmate will beg in service of his consec utive sentenc e, provide d, howeve r, that no pa ro le c e rt if ic a te sh a ll be re qu ir e d a

nd the inm ate sh a ll b e he ard fo r p aro le when elig ible on his consecutive se ntence . A bona f ide offe r of e mploy

ment shall not be re quired for

custodial parole

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 20-110. F urther, A ppellant alleg es that at the time of sente ncing , Tenne ssee Depa rt me nt of Co rrect io n (“A pp ell ee”) p ol icy nu mb er 10 9. 01 st ate d t he f oll ow ing : “ Cus tod ia l pa

ro le will be require d if an off

ender h as co n s ec u t ive sentenc es involving a deter minate sentenc e with a sentenc e date afte r J uly 31, 1978.” Finally , Appellant included with his Com plaint for De clar atory 3 J udg ment a fe lony time computation workshee t used at a Ma y 11, 2001 Tenne ssee Assoc iation of C ri m i n al De fe n s e Law y er s C L E

. T h e p o rt i o nre l i edu p o nb y Ap p el l an ts t at es th e f

o l l o wi n g: Any sentenc e (I or D) consec utive to a deter minate sentenc e and f

inal prior to 7-31- 78 (Howe ll vs. T en n es see) , will be ag g reg ated/adde d toge ther for a total sentenc e. Any sentenc e (I , D, X, J ) consecutive to a determinate sentence a nd final af

ter 7-31- 78, will be held as unproc essed for custodial parole consideration. The consec utive sentenc e(s) will not be computed until the B oard of Probation and Paroles c onsiders the case and makes a dec ision as to when the conse cutive sente nce( s) will beg in t[ o] be ser ved, or the offe nder r eac hes Mandatory Parole or E x piration of Sentenc e. On April 11, 2003, Appe llant pe titioned Appe llee for a decla ratory ruling , reque sting (1) that his sentence be ca lculated a ccor ding to the law on consec utive sentenc es, includingcustodial parole ,-3-

(2) that the B oard of

Paroles (“ BO P”) be notified that he shoul d have been considered f or custodial pa ro le on a ll o f h is c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s, and (3 ) t ha t he be c on sid e re d e lig ibl e fo r c us tod ia l pa ro le at future p ar o l e h ea ri n g s. Appellee ref used to issue a de clar atory order , and instead infor med Appellant that his sentenc e ca lculations were corr ect. Appellant then fil ed a D ecla ratory J udg ment ac t i o n in the Davidson County Chance ry

Court on October

21, 2003, seekinga rulingon whether Appellee wrong fully

failed to notify the BOP that he wa s elig ible for c ustodial parole c onsideration. On Marc h 18, 2004, Appellee filed a Motion for Summary J udg ment. The Motion was a ccompa nied by a memorandum of law in suppor t of the Motion, a s well as the aff idavit of R o b er t a A n derson (“A nderson” ), appe aringin full below:

I , Roberta Ande rson, being duly sworn do her eby testify as follows, base d on knowledg e, information and belief: 1. Iam employ ed by

the Tenne ssee Depa

rtment of Corre ction in the Sentence I nformation Servic es sec tion. 2. Ihave r eviewe d thes e ntence information re g ardinginmate Ronald Howse, Depa rtment of Corre ction #97749. A copy of the inmate’ s sentenc e information contained on T OMI S (Tennesse e Of fende r Mana g ement Information Sy stem) and
c omp ile d b y

the Te nn e sse e De pa

rtme nt o f C or

re c tio n is a tta c he d a s c oll e c t ive e xhibi t A her eto. Inmate Howse ’s sentenc e re cords show:

a
. O nD e c e mb e r

1 0 , 1 9 8 2 , i n m a t e H o w s e r e c e i v e d a tw e n tyfi ve (2 5) y e ar, Cla ss Xse nte nc e fo r a Sec on d D e g re e Murd e r o ff e ns e in Davidson County

criminal ca se number D 0470--Cnt 002. b. On Dec ember

10, 1982, inmate Howse rec eived f our five (5 ) t o te n ( 10 ) ye ar se nten c e [s] fo r Auto B ur g lary of fe ns e s in Davidson County

criminal ca se numbers D 0470--Cnt 003, D0470-- Cnt 004, D0470--Cnt 005 and D0470-- Cnt 006. c. Mr. How se is serving an over all sentenc e structur e of 20 to 6 5 y e ar s
. C u s t o d i a l p ar o l e h e ar i n g s w e r e s c h e d u l e d f o r old de te rm inate se nte nc e s in

a c on se c uti ve str ing

. Th is do e s no t a pp ly to his sentence s t ru ct u re. Si nce he is serving a Class X sentenc e ty pe and indeter

minate ty pes, he is ineligible for custodial parole but was
e lig ibl e fo r p aro le he ari ng s. Mr . H ow se ha d a pa ro le he ari ngon

Ap ri l 15, 1992 which wa s continued t o De cembe r 7, 1992. He was declined pa

role c onsideration at that time. d. I nmate Ho ws e wa s n e xt co ns ide re d f or pa ro le consideration on September 23, 1997 at which time he w as dec lined for pa role.
e . Inmate Ho ws e wa s n ex t c on sid e re d f or pa ro le consideration on September 5, 2002 at whic h t i m e h e was declined for pa role, ba sed on the ser iousness of his offe nse. f. Inmate Howse ’s next parole hea ring is s et for the y ear 2010.-4- g
. I n mate H o w s e ’ s s e n te n c e f o r th e Cl a s s X o f

f e n s e of Second De g ree Murder

expired on November

12, 2000. h. I nmate Howse ’s sentenc e expires for the rema i ning offe nses in the y ear

2020. FURTHE R AFF I ANT SAI TH NOT.
On May 13 , 2 00 4, the tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d App e lle e ’s Mo tio n f or Sum mary

Judg me nt. Appellant appe als the sing le issue of whe ther the tria l co u rt proper ly denied his Petition for De c larator

y Judg me nt.
II. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW
Ac c or din g to T e nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 56 , a

pa rt y se e kin g summ ary

jud g me nt m

us t

“ sh owthat th e re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any mate ri a l fa c t and that the mov ing pa rt y is e nti tle d to a ju d gm en t as a matter of law .” The summary judgme nt standard, e stablished by the Tenne ssee Sup re me Court , is a s f

oll ow s:
Ac c or din g to R

ule 56 .0 3, summa

ry jud g me nt i s to be g ra

nte d if the “plea din g s, depositions, answers to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the aff idavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue as t o any materia l fac t and that the moving pa

rty is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.”

. . .

. . . . I n deter mining whe ther o r n o t a genuine issue of mater ial fac t exi sts for purp os e s o f s umm ary

jud g me nt,

. . . the tr ia l court mus t take the str on g e st l e g iti mate view of the evidenc e in favor of the nonmoving party , allow all rea sonable infe renc es in f avo r o f t hat pa rty , and di scar d a ll c ounte rv a ili nge vid e nc e . T he n, if the re is a dispute as to a

ny materia l f

act or any doubt as to the conc lusions to be drawn fr om that fac t, the motion mus t be denied. . . .

. . . . At t h e s u m m ary

j u d gm en ts t age th e j u d ge’ s fu n ct i o ni s n o th i m s el f t o we i gh the e vid e nc e and de te rm ine the tr uth of the matte r but to d e te rm ine wh e the r t he re is a g enuine issue f

or trial. . . .

. . . . [T] he issues that lie at the hear t of evaluating a

summary judgme nt motion are: (1) whether a fa ctual dispute exist s ; (2 ) whether the disputed fa ct is material to the outcome of the case ; and (3) whether the disputed fac t cre ates a g en u i ne issue for tr ia l. By rd v . H all , 847 S.W .2d 208, 210-214 (Te nn.1993) (c itations omi tted). This Court has stated the followingin reg ard to the s tandar d of review for summary judgme nt ru lin g s:-5-

Sum mary jud g me nt s e n

j o y n o p r e s ump tio n o f c or

re c tne ss o n a

pp e a l. Penley

v. Honda Motor Co. , 3 1 S. W.3 d 1 81 , 1 83 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Bu rre ss v . S an de rs , 31 S.W .3d 259, 26 2 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) . A c cord in g ly , a pp e llate c ourt s mu st m ake a fr e sh deter mination that the require ments of Tenn. R. Civ. P

. 5 6 have be en satisfied. Hu nte r v . B ro wn , 9 55 S.W. 2d 49 , 5 0- 51 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ; Mason v. Se aton , 942 S.W .2d 47 0, 47 2 (T e nn
. 19 97 ). We mus t c on sid e r t he e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to the non-moving party , and we must resolve all infere nces in the non-moving party ’s favor

. Mem

phis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson , 38 S.W .3d 504, 507 (Tenn. 2001) ; Te rry v. Niblack, 979 S.W. 2d

58 3, 58 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; Tam c o S up ply v . P oll ar d , 37 S.W .3d 905, 908 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Me rri ma c k

Mu tua l F ire In s. Co. v . B att

s , 59 S.W .3d 142, 147 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). “ The standa rd of re view for

a trial c ourt’s g rant of sum m ar y judgme nt is de novo with no presumption of
corr ectne ss.” Go dfr e

yv . R uiz , 90 S.W. 3d 69 2, 69 5 (T e nn .2 00 0)

. “ No pr e sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss a tta c he s to the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s in a summa ry jud g me nt c a se
. . . . We s ho uld no t a ff ir m a summa ry jud g me nt if any do ub t or unc e rt a int y e xists wi th r e g ard

to t he fa c ts o r t

he c on c lus ion s to b e dr aw n f

r o m th e f a cts.” B u r

gess v. Harle

y , 934 S.W .2d 58, 62 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) ( citations omitted).

III
. A N A L Y SIS Appellant maintains that Appellee failed to notify the B OP that Appellant was e ligible f or custodial parole under Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-20- 110 and Te nnessee De p ar t m en t of Correc tion po lic y numbe r 1 09 .0 1. Ap pe lla nt a lle g e s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d h is r ig ht t o c us tod ial p aro le
c on sid e ratio n b a se d u

po n A nd e rs on ’s a ff

idavit, st a tin g that si nc e Ap pe lla nt h a d “ fl a tte ne d” his twenty -five year

deter minate sentenc e, his sentenc e no long er involved a deter minate sentenc e.
I n 1978, the Supreme Court of T ennesse e dec ided the ca se of Ho we ll v . S tate , 569 S.W .2d 428 ( Te nn .1 97 8) . It sh ou ld b e no te d th a t Ho we ll a p p li e s o n ly

to c a s e s inv o lv in g c o n s e c u ti ve deter minate sentenc es, Ho we ll , 5 69 S.W. 2d a t 43 0; Slagle v. Re

ynolds , 845 S.W .2d 167, 170 (Tenn.1992) , and is very

instrumental in unde rstandingthe conc ept of c ustodial parole. In Fe bruar y of 1974, Howel l p l ed guilty to two char g es of f

irst deg ree murder a

nd was sente nced to two life
s en t en ce s
. T h e T en n es s ee S u p re m e C o urt en d o rs edco n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g, s t at i n g: Parole, unde r our statutes, is nothing more than a conditional suspension of sentenc e . See State ex rel. Neilson v. Harwood , supra [ 183 Tenn. 567, 194 S.W.2d 448], for a full discussion of the question. The se nte nc e of the ma n doe s n ot e x pir e be c au seof t

hepa ro le , nor during the pe ndency of the pa role. He du ring th is t im e is still in the custody of the penal authorities of the State and subjec t to the provisions upon which he ha s been pa roled. Sta te e

xre l. N ic ho lso n v . B us h , 136 Tenn. 478, 190 S.W . 453. . . .

. . . .-6- We think the concept of

consec utive sentenc ing, judiciously administered by tr ia l ju dg e s and re vie we d on a fa ir and me anin g fu l ba sis by

the a pp e llate c ourt s, is i n the public intere st. I t i s an esta blished part of our

sy stem of cr iminal jurisprudence and has b e c o me a

p art o f th e p u b li c p o li c y

o f o ur s tate , b o th

b y s tatuto r y and decisional law

. The theor y of conse cutive or cumulative sentenc ing is that where a cr iminal de fe nd ant h a s b e e n c on vic te d o f t wo or mor e of fe ns e s, his ma le fac tio ns may me ri t separ ate a nd cumulative pena lties. Bu nd yv . S tate , 176 Tenn. 198, 140 S .W.2d 154 (1940).

Ho we ll , 569 S.W .2d at 432-3.
Th e Court

fu rt he r a na ly zed a s f oll ow s:
Our solution to this troubl es ome problem, whe rein guidance is lacking and pr e c e de nt i s n ot c on c lus ive , d e ri ve s it s v a lid it y fro m th e fa c t th a t w e de a l w ith
se pa rate and dis tin c t de te rm inate se ntences w hic h th e tr ia l ju dg e ha s sp e c if ic a lly order ed to be serve d consec utively

. Our solution is further founded in the established le g a l pr op os iti on that a pa ro le do e s no t te rm inate the se nte nc e no r d oe s it te rm inate c us tod y . Pa ro le no rm a lly

te rm inate s c on fi ne me nt, but th e pa ro le e con tin

ue s in constructive c ustody

until the ex piration of the f ull term of his sentence

. I t is our duty

to harmonize these considerations with t he purpose of
consec uti v e s entences and to a rrive at a solution that sim ultaneously respe cts the int e re st o f the state and

pr ote c ts the ri g hts of

the de fe nd ant. I n d oin g so we re ite rate that the fa ct of sepa

rate convictions an d separ ate se ntence s is a controlling consideration. We hold that two consec utive deter minate sentenc es of thirty -five year s eac h
ar e s e r v e d t h u s l y: a. The first thirty five y ear sentenc e is serve d in 17 1⁄2 full y ear s, at the end of wh ic h th e pr iso ne r i s e lig ible for r egular pa role. (§ 40- 3612.) b. When parole is g rante d or the fir s t s en t ence is otherwise c ompleted, the second se ntence is commence d with ou t an inte rv e ning p e rio d o f re le as e
. c . D ur ingthe e ns uin g 17 1⁄2 y e ars , the pr iso ne r s imu lta ne ou sly se rv e s th e fi rs t portion of his s ec o n d sentenc e and, a s a re sident parolee , or ce ll-parolee , completes the r emainingportion of his first sentenc e. d. At the end of

the sec o n d 1 7 1⁄2 y ea r per iod he is elig ible for pa role a nd
r e l e a s e f r o mp h ys i c a l c u s t o dy. Gr a ph ic a lly , w e re a c h th e se re su lts : 17 1⁄2 y ear s 17 1⁄2 y ear s 17 1⁄2 y ear s-7-

I N PENI TENTIARY ONF I RST SEN TENC E CEL LPAROL EE

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- ON SECOND SEN TENC E ON PAROL E,

SEC ON D SENT EN CE

Ho we ll , 569 S.W .2d at 433.

Ho we ll decla red that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 2710 or Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20- 110 befor e the cur rent number ing sy stem was in pla ce, “has no application to determinate sentenc es.” Ho we ll , 569 S.W .2d at 431. In a similar ca se bef ore this Court i n 2005, the followinganaly sis further
su pp or te d th e lim itatio n o f T e nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 20 -1 10 to o nly ind e te rm inate se nte nc e s: First, he m ak es refer ence to Tenn.Code Ann. § 40- 20-110(b) (1) ( 2003), which requ i re s t he De partment to notify the B oard when a pr isoner bec omes elig ible for considerat i o n for c ustodial parole. How ever , Tenn.Code Ann. § 40- 20-110(b) (1)
a pp lie s o nly

to p ri so ne rs wh o a

re se rv ingtw o o r m or e ind e te rm inate se nte nc e s. Te nn .Co de Ann. § 4 0- 20 -1 10 (a ); Ho we ll v . S tate , 569 S.W .2d 428, 431 (Tenn.1978)

. W as hingto n v . Te nn . D e

p’ t of Cor r. , 2 0 0 5 WL 309359, at *3 (Te nn.Ct.App. Feb. 8, 2005) , 2005 Tenn. App. L EXI S 83, at *10-11 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 8, 2005). Therefor e, ac cordingto Ho we ll and W ashington , Appellant is not entitled to rely upon Tenn. Code An n
. § 4 0 -2 0 -110, as the section
a pp lie s o nly

to i nd e te rm inate se nte nc e s. Th e se nte nc e Ap pe lla nt seek s cus tod ia l pa

ro le fr om i s a deter minate sentenc e. Ap pe lla nt c ite s Tenn. Op. Atty. Ge n. No. 98-098 , 1998 WL 227249 (Tenn.A .G.) in support of his a sse rt ion

that he is e nti tle d to c us tod ia l pa ro le . T his op ini on

of the At to rney Ge ne ra l de a lt with a situation in which an off ender serve d the first of two c onsecutive se ntence s and sought to have
a re troac tive custodial parole hear ing unde r the fir st sentence

. Assuming the a naly sis of the Attorney Gene ral to be c orr ec t, no relief c an be a ffor ded Appe llant. The ana ly sis of the Attorney Gene ral state s:
I n th e sit

uat io n des c ri be d in

the re qu e st, an o ff

e nd e r h a s b e e n s e nte nc e d to two consec utive sentenc es. While serving the first sentenc e, we assume the of fende r would be elig ible for pa

role a nd to ear n sentenc e re duct i o n cr ed its based on g ood instit utional behavior a

nd/or satisfac tory

participation in assigned w ork, educ ation
or vocational training prog rams to re du ce t he off ender ’s re lease elig ibilit y and sentenc e expiration dates for that initial sentence. H oweve r, bec ause the second sentenc e is for multiple rape s or child rape , the offe nder is not elig ible for parole or sentenc e cr edits for the se cond consecutive sentence. The fir st sentence has expired. No custodi al parole hear ing was held for the first sentenc e and the offender has begun to se rv e t h e second consec utive sentenc e. I f a r etroa ctive custodial pa role he aring
wer e held a

nd custodial parole g rante d, the date that the offender beg an to serve the second se ntence would chang e.-8- The a uthority to make parole determination is vested e x clusively in the Boa

rd of Paroles, a n d its discretion is broad. When an off ender is servingconsec utive sentenc es, the B oard of

Paroles ca

n decide whether

to relea s e the offe nder on custodial parole , thus determining at what time the of fe n d er beg ins serving the second se ntence . An offe nder g rante d custodial parole is not rel ea sed in the
c omm un ity at th at time but is a ff or de d th e op po rt

un ity to b e g in s e rv inghis
c on se c uti ve se nte nc e a t an e arl ie r date

. Ad dit ion a lly , “ the bo ard ha s the a uth or ity to be g in c us tod ia l pa

ro le e ff e c tiv e on any

date on or a ft e r t he c us tod ia l pa

ro le e lig ibi lity date.” There is nothing that limits t he author it y o f t h e b o ar d to hold a custodial parole hear ing a fter the expiration of the sentenc e. B eca use the boa

rd has suc h wide latit ud e ov e r p aro le de te rm inatio n a nd by statut e the bo ard ha s th e a uth or ity to b e g in custodial parole on any

date a fter the custodial parole elig ibilit y date, it is the opinion of thi s o ff ic e tha t th e B oa rd ha s a uth or ity to h old a re tr oact ive c us tod ia l pa

ro le hear ing a fter the offe nder ha s serve d the entire sentenc e. Custodial parole, if grante d, chang es the date on which the of fende r beg ins to s erve the sec ond, consec utive sentenc e. Unde r no circ umstances is the offen d er elig ible for pa role or se ntence cre dits on the sentence the offe nder is ser ving pur suant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13- 523. Tenn. Op. Atty. Ge n. No. 98-098 , 1998 WL 227249 (Tenn.A .G.). Appel la n t d o e s n o t a s s e rt th a t h e is e n ti tl e d to r e le a s e f r o m c o n f in e me n t w h e n h e has four
consec utive five-to- ten-y ear auto burg lary sentenc es y et to be ser ved. He does not asser

t, nor does the Attorney

Gene ral opine that Appellant is entitled to custodial parole, a nd it is clea

r t hat s uch a de te rm inatio n w ou ld b e e nti re ly dis c re tio na

ry wi th t he B oa rd of Paro le s. The judg ment of the trial c ourt g rantingthe Motion f or Summary J udg ment is affirme d and
c os ts a sse sse d to Ap pe lla nt.

___________________________________ WI L L I AM B. CAI

N, J UDGE