2023 IL App (1st) 220813-U 

Order filed: July 13, 2023 

FIRST DISTRICT

FOURTH DIVISION

No. 1-22-0813 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Lampkin and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.

 

ORDER

Held: Second-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition is reversed, and this 

matter is remanded for further proceedings, where defendant overcame the 

presumption of reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel created by 

counsel's filing of a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c).

¶ 1 Defendant-appellant, George Sanders, appeals from an order of the circuit court which 

granted the State's second-stage motion to dismiss his petition for relief under the Post–Conviction 

Hearing Act (Act). 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018). Defendant claims postconviction 

counsel failed to provide a reasonable level of assistance, as required by Illinois Supreme Court 

Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). For the following reasons, we reverse the dismissal of defendant's 

postconviction petition and remand for further proceedings. 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

GEORGE SANDERS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County.

No. 14 CR 11098

Honorable 

James B. Linn,

Judge, presiding. 

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¶ 2 Defendant was charged by indictment with—inter alia—attempted first degree murder, 

aggravated battery with a firearm, and being an armed habitual criminal. The counts generally 

alleged that on or about June 7, 2014, defendant shot Greg Stewart with a firearm, having been 

previously convicted of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon. The matter proceeded 

to a November 2015 jury trial on those charges.

¶ 3 The trial proceedings and the evidence presented at trial were fully set out in a prior order

entered on defendant’s direct appeal and need not be fully restated here. See People v. Sanders, 

2018 IL App (1st) 160637-U. For purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient to note that the evidence 

at trial included the testimony of Stewart’s girlfriend, Sheena Johnson. She testified that on June 

7, 2014, she was walking with Stewart when she observed defendant and another man, Cheves 

Dembry, drive past two times. On the second time, defendant was driving the vehicle and she 

observed multiple shots fired toward Stewart from the driver’s side of the vehicle. On crossexamination, Johnson testified that she observed two other people standing nearby that she 

recognized from the area. Johnson did not know their names. 

¶ 4 The jury was also presented with the testimony of Dembry, who at trial disavowed a written

statement implicating defendant that he had provided to Assistant State’s Attorney Becky Walters 

and Detective John Salemme on the day after the shooting. Walters then testified at trial that in the 

written statement, Dembry stated that a man named “Archie Cannon” was standing near the car at 

the time of the shooting.1 The statement was entered into evidence at trial and published to the 

jury. 

1 Mr. Cannon’s first name is variously identified in the record as Archie, Archer and Arthur.
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¶ 5 At the conclusion of trial, the jury acquitted defendant of attempted murder and aggravated 

battery with a firearm, finding him guilty only on the charge of being an armed habitual criminal.

Defendant’s posttrial motion was denied and he was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.

Thereafter, defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence was denied and he filed a direct appeal. 

¶ 6 On direct appeal, defendant claimed: “(1) that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that defendant had actual or constructive possession of the gun that was the subject of his 

conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by giving a pattern jury instruction on possession where 

the instruction included constructive possession and the State failed to present evidence on 

constructive possession; and (3) that the trial court committed first-prong plain error where it failed 

to ask potential jurors whether they understood and accepted the Zehr principles and the case was 

closely balanced.” Sanders, 2018 IL App (1st) 160637-U, ¶ 54. This court rejected these arguments 

and affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. Id. ¶ 81.

¶ 7 On April 22, 2019, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition raising several claims 

of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. These included a claim that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to subpoena “Archer Cannon” and call him to testify at trial. Defendant 

claimed that he was “prejudiced because, given the closeness of the case, there was a reasonable

probability that the additional witness would have raised a reasonable doubt of guilt.” Plaintiff’s 

petition concluded by stating that “the facts stated in this petition are true and correct in substance 

and in fact,” along with plaintiff’s notarized signature. No affidavits were attached to defendant’s

pro se petition.

¶ 8 The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition 92 days after it was filed, on July 23, 

2019. Defendant filed a prior appeal from that dismissal, and on September 16, 2020, this court 

entered an order granting defendant’s “Agreed Motion for Summary Disposition.” In that order 
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we noted that the petition had been improperly summarily dismissed over 90 days after it was filed 

and docketed, and we therefore vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded for secondstage proceedings and the appointment of counsel to represent defendant.

¶ 9 Upon remand, postconviction counsel was appointed and counsel appeared on behalf of 

defendant for the first time on November 9, 2020. The matter was continued to January 26, 2021, 

at which time postconviction counsel stated: “I've gone through the transcripts and looked at his 

petition. There may be one issue about just looking up a possible witness that—there's no affidavit 

in the petition, but there is his name. And I would just like a date to look into that.” After two 

continuances, postconviction counsel indicated at a hearing on June 3, 2021, that: “We are in the 

midst of investigation about some individual that should have been contacted by counsel but 

wasn't. We hope to wrap that up soon.” The matter was once again continued. 

¶ 10 On August 3, 2021, postconviction counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Therein, counsel averred that he had: (1) communicated with 

defendant by “phone, mail electronic means or in person to ascertain his or her contentions of 

deprivation of constitutional rights;” (2) reviewed the record; and (3) “prepared a supplemental 

petition for post-conviction relief, augmenting petitioner's pro se petition. In combination, they 

adequately present petitioner's contentions and claims of deprivation of his constitutional rights.” 

Counsel also filed a supplemental postconviction petition in which he asserted that trial counsel’s 

“failure to investigate Archer Cannon and possible witnesses to the incident, and then failing to 

call Arthur Cannon and the possible witnesses at trial constituted ineffective assistance of 

counsel.” No affidavits were attached to the supplemental petition.

¶ 11 The State responded by filing a motion to dismiss both defendant’s pro se petition and the 

supplemental petition filed by postconviction counsel. Therein, the State first asserted the petitions 
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should be dismissed because “[e]ven with the assistance of counsel, petitioner has neglected to file 

a verification affidavit pursuant to section 122-1 of the Act, or an information affidavit pursuant 

to section 122-2 of the Act.” The State also argued that some of defendant’s claims were barred 

by res judicata because they had been raised and rejected on direct appeal. With respect to Cannon, 

the State argued that defendant could not establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel “because 

he has not even made clear what specific aspect of trial counsel’s performance was deficient. He 

has provided no information to indicate that trial counsel was not already aware of the existence 

of *** Cannon” and simply did not call him as a witness as a matter of trial strategy. The State 

also asserted that it was impossible to ascertain if defendant was prejudiced by the failure to call 

Cannon as a witness without an affidavit indicating what his testimony might have included. 

Postconviction counsel did not file a written response to the State’s motion.

¶ 12 At the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss, postconviction counsel began by noting 

that several of defendant’s claims “were already brought to the attention of the appellate court on 

direct appeal and were dealt with there.” Counsel then noted that Dembry stated in his written 

statement that Cannon was present at the time of the shooting and Johnson testified at trial that she 

observed two other people standing nearby at that time. After noting that defendant’s petition 

raised a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Cannon or call him to 

testify at trial, the following colloquy occurred between postconviction counsel and the circuit 

court: 

 “DEFENSE COUNSEL: And just that even with the level of investigation the 

officers did, there was nothing more to be found about Arthur Cannon. 

THE COURT: Did you get an affidavit from Arthur Cannon? 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: No. I don't. This is an informal conversation. Nothing that 
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would help the petition. 

THE COURT: You talked to him but you did not secure an affidavit, is that what 

you are saying? 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I did not talk to Arthur Cannon, just those with the office 

staff. It was eight years ago regarding what happened. 

THE COURT: There is no affidavits from Arthur Cannon that he might say

something inculpatory [sic] and that's it? 

 DEFENSE COUNSEL: No. There isn't.

THE COURT: That's it. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: The only other thing—yeah. I would just say there was a 

cross-examination of another witness, Sheena Johnson. She mentioned there were two 

other people and does not mention Arthur Cannon. 

And it is not clear to me that once the defense counsel heard that, I don't think there

was brand new information that could have reinforced anything that the office may have 

done to look into Arthur Cannon's presence but that's the only other thing. 

And it is not clear to me if that could have led to even more investigation once we 

knew there were two other people and we didn't know that until her cross-examination.” 

¶ 13 The State responded by asserting again, as it had in its motion, that the petitions did not 

contain either a verification affidavit or an information affidavit. The State also argued that there 

was no evidence that trial counsel knew about Cannon before trial, and that without an affidavit 

from Cannon as to what his testimony might be and “because Strickland requires proof of

ineffective of assistance both in the performance prong and in the prejudice prong, we don't have 

enough information to establish trial counsel's ineffective performance at all.” 
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¶ 14 The circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss after concluding that: (1) some of 

defendant’s claims had been addressed on direct appeal, and (2) prejudice could not be established 

without an affidavit from Cannon indicating what testimony he could have provided at trial. 

Defendant thereafter timely appealed.

¶ 15 On appeal, defendant does not contest the dismissal of his petition on the merits. Rather, 

defendant argues that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance under Supreme 

Court Rule 651(c). 

¶ 16 The Act provides a mechanism for a criminal defendant to challenge his conviction or 

sentence based upon a substantial constitutional violation. People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 354 

(2010). The Act provides for a three-step process. Id. At the first stage, the trial court must evaluate 

the petition and determine within 90 days of its filing whether it is frivolous or patently without 

merit. Id. A petition which survives the first stage advances to the second stage where the trial 

court appoints counsel to represent defendant, and the State may move to dismiss the petition. 

People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115, 126 (2007).

¶ 17 Under the Act, counsel appointed at the second stage must provide a reasonable level of 

assistance. People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2007). To provide a reasonable level of assistance, 

Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017), provides that postconviction counsel must: (1) consult with 

defendant to ascertain his claims of deprivation of constitutional rights; (2) examine the trial 

record; and (3) amend the pro se petition where necessary for an adequate presentation of 

defendant's contentions. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 42. Postconviction counsel's compliance with 

Supreme Court Rule 615(c) is mandatory and generally shown by the filing of a certificate averring 

to such performance. People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 50 (2007).

¶ 18 The filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that 
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postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance during second-stage proceedings under the 

Act. People v. Jones, 2011 IL App (1st) 092529, ¶ 23. The burden is on the defendant to overcome 

this presumption by demonstrating that postconviction counsel failed to substantially comply with 

the duties imposed by Rule 651(c). Id. The presumption of compliance may be rebutted by the 

record. People v. Marshall, 375 Ill. App. 3d 670, 680 (2007). Where postconviction counsel fails 

to comply with the requirements of Rule 651(c), the proper remedy on appeal is to remand for 

further postconviction proceedings. See Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 47 (recognizing that our supreme 

court “has consistently held that remand is required where postconviction counsel failed to fulfill 

the duties of consultation, examining the record, and amendment of the pro se petition, regardless 

of whether the claims raised in the petition had merit.”). Our review of postconviction counsel's 

compliance with Rule 651(c) is de novo. Jones, 2011 IL App (1st) 092529, ¶ 19.

¶ 19 Here, we agree with defendant that the rebuttable presumption that his postconviction 

counsel provided reasonable assistance during the second-stage proceedings below, created by the 

filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate, is rebutted by the record.

¶ 20 Before continuing further, we pause to note that section 122-1(b) of the Act requires that a 

postconviction petition be “verified by affidavit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2018). The 

verification affidavit, “like all pleading verifications, confirms that the allegations are brought 

truthfully and in good faith.” People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 67 (2002). In its motion to dismiss, 

the State asserted that defendant’s petition should be dismissed on the basis that no such affidavit 

was attached. While the circuit court did not explicitly rely upon this argument below in dismissing 

the petition, on appeal defendant contends that: (1) the State’s argument was incorrect, where 

defendant’s petition concluded by stating that “the facts stated in this petition are true and correct 

in substance and in fact,” along with plaintiff’s notarized signature, and (2) to the extent 
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defendant’s petition was faulty in this regard, postconviction counsel’s failure to remedy this error 

was an example of unreasonable assistance of counsel. However, the State has conceded on appeal 

that the notarized statement at the end of defendant’s petition was sufficient to satisfy the 

requirements of section 122-1(b) of the Act. We therefore need not consider this issue further.

¶ 21 In continuing to review the rest of postconviction counsel’s performance, we initially find 

that counsel failed to properly amend defendant’s pro se petition as necessary for an adequate 

presentation of defendant's contentions, as required by Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Specifically, 

postconviction counsel failed to attach an affidavit from Cannon or explain its absence in the 

supplemental petition, apparently due to his failure to make a sufficient effort to contact Cannon

and obtain such an affidavit.

¶ 22 Postconviction petitions must comply with section 122-2 of the Act, which provides that 

“[t]he petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its 

allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2018). As such, 

where defendant raises a postconviction claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel based on the 

failure to call a witness, the claim must be supported by an affidavit from the proposed witness, or 

other evidence showing that the witness could have provided testimony favorable to defendant 

(People v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307) or shall state why the affidavit or other evidence was not 

attached (725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2018)). The Act provides no standard by which we should judge 

defendant's explanation for why an affidavit is absent. However, our supreme court has stated that 

the absence of the supporting affidavit must be “adequately” or “sufficiently” explained to

preclude dismissal, thereby indicating that the Act requires something more than a cursory 

explanation for the affidavit's absence. See People v. Smith, 40 Ill. 2d 562, 564 (1968); People v. 

Curtis, 48 Ill. 2d 25, 27-28 (1971). The failure to attach the necessary supporting material or 
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explain its absence is “fatal” to a postconviction petition and by itself justifies the petition's 

dismissal. People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 66 (2002). 

¶ 23 Here, the pro se petition filed by defendant did not include either an affidavit from Cannon 

or any explanation for its absence. Postconviction counsel had an obligation to amend the pro se

petition to rectify this inadequacy pursuant to Rule 651(c). Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 42. However, 

while a supplemental petition was filed raising defendant’s claims as to Cannon, postconviction 

counsel similarly failed to include either an affidavit from Cannon or any explanation for its 

absence. This failure was “fatal” to defendant’s claims regarding Cannon, and this failure alone 

amounted to unreasonable assistance of counsel.

¶ 24 Moreover, considering the requirements of the Act our supreme court has recognized that 

postconviction counsel “has an obligation to attempt to contact those witnesses who might provide 

information needed to support a potentially meritorious claim raised in the post-conviction 

petition.” People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 248 (1993). “In the ordinary case, a trial court ruling 

upon a motion to dismiss a post-conviction petition which is not supported by affidavits or other 

documents may reasonably presume that post-conviction counsel made a concerted effort to obtain 

affidavits in support of the post-conviction claims, but was unable to do so.” Id. at 241. This 

presumption may be overcome, however, when it is “flatly contradicted by the record.” Id. 

¶ 25 The record here flatly contradicts any presumption that postconviction counsel made a 

concerted effort to contact Cannon and obtain his affidavit. It is true that the record reflects that 

postconviction counsel asked for several extensions prior to filing the supplemental motion to

allow time to “investigate” a potential witness that “should have been contacted by [trial] counsel 

but wasn't.” However, at the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss, postconviction counsel 

admitted that he never spoke to Cannon and that his investigation into this matter consisted of an 
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unspecified “informal conversation” with “office staff” about an investigation that occurred “eight 

years ago.” Postconviction counsel identified no other investigatory steps he undertook to locate 

Cannon. The record is thus clear that the failure to provide an affidavit from Cannon or to 

“adequately” or “sufficiently” explain its absence was due to postconviction counsel’s failure to 

fulfill his obligation to make a concerted effort to contact Cannon. This failure too amounted to 

unreasonable assistance of counsel.

¶ 26 We also find that postconviction counsel improperly undermined defendant’s petition in 

two respects. As this court has previously recognized: “Postconviction counsel is not required to 

advance frivolous or spurious claims and ‘ “is only required to investigate and properly present 

the petitioner's claims.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[E]thical obligations prohibit counsel from doing so if the 

claims are frivolous or spurious.’ [Citation.] ‘The question remains what should counsel do if 

counsel investigates the claims but finds them without merit.’ [Citation.] Illinois case law provides 

options: (1) ‘stand on the allegations in the pro se petition and inform the court of the reason the 

petition was not amended’ or (2) withdraw as counsel. [Citation.] ‘In both of these scenarios, the 

allegations in the pro se petition remain[ ] to proceed according to the parameters of the Act.’ ” 

People v. Perry, 2017 IL App (1st) 150587, ¶ 26; People v. Shortridge, 2012 IL App (4th) 100663, 

¶¶ 13-16 (same).

¶ 27 What postconviction counsel is not permitted to do in such circumstances is to continue to 

represent a defendant and either take “affirmative action that damage[s] defendant's claims” 

(Perry, 2017 IL App (1st) 150587, ¶ 26), “confess the State's motion to dismiss” (Shortridge, 2012 

IL App (4th) 100663, ¶ 14), or “tacitly” agree with the State's motion to dismiss a postconviction 

petition at the second stage (Perry, 2017 IL App (1st) 150587, ¶ 39). Such actions are not permitted 

because they: (1) fail to comport with the requirements of Rule 651(c); and (2) fail to provide a 
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defendant with an opportunity to respond to his counsel's actions prior to dismissal of a 

postconviction petition. Id.

¶ 28 In its motion to dismiss, the State argued that some of defendant’s claims were barred by

res judicata because they had been raised and rejected on direct appeal. At the hearing on the 

State’s motion to dismiss, the circuit court began by asking postconviction counsel: “Tell me what 

your claims are and why you think your client is entitled to post-conviction relief.” Rather than 

advance defendant’s claims at that point, postconviction counsel began by noting that several of 

defendant’s claims “were already brought to the attention of the appellate court on direct appeal 

and were dealt with there.” The circuit court then dismissed defendant’s petition in part on this 

basis, and without defendant having any opportunity to respond to his counsel’s actions. 

Postconviction counsel’s statement could potentially be viewed as merely an effort to inform the 

court of the reason the petition was not amended with respect to these claims. However, we find 

that in this context and under the specific facts of this case, these comments were improper as they 

either confessed to or tacitly agreed with this portion of the State's motion to dismiss. 

¶ 29 Postconviction counsel also improperly undermined defendant’s claims as to Cannon at the 

hearing. While the pro se and supplemental petitions asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to investigate Cannon and call him to testify at trial, postconviction counsel directly 

undercut that argument in two ways at the hearing. 

¶ 30 First, and apparently in reference to either the original police investigation or trial counsel’s 

investigation, counsel commented that “even with the level of investigation the officers did, there 

was nothing more to be found about Arthur Cannon.” Then, counsel opined that trial counsel only 

learned of Johnson’s observance of two additional potential witnesses during her crossexamination at trial, and offered his own opinion that “it is not clear to me that once the defense
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counsel heard that, I don't think there was brand new information that could have reinforced 

anything that the office may have done to look into Arthur Cannon's presence *** it is not clear to 

me if that could have led to even more investigation.” These comments directly undercut 

defendant’s contention that trial counsel should have done more to investigate Cannon and present 

his testimony at trial. Rather than advocate for defendant’s position, postconviction counsel took 

affirmative action to damage defendant’s claim by opining that under the circumstances there was 

nothing more that trial counsel could have done.

¶ 31 Defendant had no opportunity to respond to any of these comments, and we conclude that 

they also violated postconviction counsel’s obligations under Rule 651(c). Where postconviction 

counsel is found to have engaged in such activity, the proper remedy on appeal is to “reverse the 

dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition and remand for new second stage proceedings on 

his original pro se * * * postconviction petition with new counsel appointed to represent defendant. 

New counsel will have the opportunity to review defendant's petition and the record and either 

proceed in his or her representation or move to withdraw, allowing defendant an opportunity to 

respond.” Perry, 2017 IL App (1st) 150587, ¶ 39. 

¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this order.

¶ 33 Reversed and remanded.