FILED

August 7, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JULY SESSION, 1998

RICKIE D. REESE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9707-CC-00314

)

Appellant, )

)

) BEDFORD COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. CHARLES LEE

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE

)

Appellant. ) (Post-Conviction Relief)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

RICKIE D. REESE JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Pro Se Attorney General and Reporter

SCCC - Apollo A - 218

P. O. Box 279 CLINTON J. MORGAN

Clifton, TN 38425-5346 Counsel for the State

425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

MIKE MCCOWN

District Attorney General

ROBERT CRIGLER

Assistant District Attorney 

One Public Square, Ste. 100

Shelbyville, TN 37160

ORDER FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
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ORDER

Appellant Rickie D. Reese pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated rape.

He was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to fifteen years incarceration

with the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant presents the following

issue for our consideration on this appeal: whether the trial court erred in

dismissing Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief.

After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

Appellant filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief in the Bedford

County Circuit Court on May 30, 1997. On July 7, 1997, the trial court dismissed

Appellant's petition, determining that the petition was time barred and that it failed

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In his petition, Appellant

alleges that he has been incarcerated for five years and fourteen days. He

contends, inter alia, that he is being illegally restrained beyond the lawful period

of incarceration because the Tennessee Board of Paroles denied his release until

March 2000. He further claims that the trial court neglected to apprise him that

the plea agreement could be violated at a later date and that the stipulated

condition as to his thirty percent release eligibility date was discretionary and not

mandatory.

Prior to the adoption of the recent Post-Conviction Procedure Act, petitions

like the present one had to be filed within three years of the date of the final

action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal was taken. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (1995, Repl.). However, the new Post-Conviction

Procedure Act, which took effect on May 10, 1995, subsequently shortened the

three-year statute of limitations to one year. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et

seq. (Supp. 1996). Appellant's statute of limitations for the filing of a petition for
- 3 -

post-conviction relief began to run in 1992, the year in which he avers that he

pleaded guilty. Under either the old or the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act,

Appellant's petition is time barred because he filed the petition five years after the

date of his conviction. We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the

May 30, 1997 petition as being barred by the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Court of

Criminal Appeals Rule 20. 

____________________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE

___________________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE