J-S54009-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEVEN BRADY HALL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 771 MDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 1, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0002735-2015

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MAY 24, 2021

Appellant Steven Brady Hall appeals pro se from the order dismissing

his timely first petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA). Appellant 

claims that the trial court imposed illegal fines without considering his ability 

to pay. Appellant also challenges his registration requirements under the 

Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act2 (SORNA). We affirm in part 

and reverse in part, vacate the judgment of sentence to the extent it imposed 

fines, and remand as set forth below.

We adopt the PCRA court’s summary of the facts. See PCRA Ct. Op., 

7/15/20, at 1. Briefly, on March 9, 2017, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty 

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41 (eff. 2012, subsequently amended 2018). 
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plea to charges of aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, unlawful 

conduct with a minor, and corruption of a minor, all of which occurred in 2008. 

Plea Agreement, 3/9/17, at 1-2; Guilty Plea Hr’g, 3/9/17, at 1-2. Appellant’s 

plea agreement set forth an agreed-upon sentence of four to eight years’

incarceration followed by a consecutive five years’ probation, with “fines,

cost[s] . . . left to the discretion of the” trial court. Plea Agreement at 1-2; 

accord N.T. Guilty Plea Hr’g at 2-3. Following an evaluation, Appellant was 

found not to be a sexually violent predator (SVP). N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 

5/11/17, at 2.3

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3 Appellant was also informed that he was considered a Tier III offender and 

would be subject to lifetime registration requirements under SORNA. At the 

time of Appellant’s original SVP and sentencing hearing, SORNA I was in 

effect. On July 19, 2017, our Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. 

Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), which held that SORNA I’s registration 

requirements were “punitive in effective.” Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1128. As such, 

the Court concluded that SORNA I violated ex post facto principles when 

applied to individuals who, like Appellant, committed a sexual offense before 

December 20, 2012, the effective date of SORNA I. See id. at 1223; see 

also Commonwealth v. Lippincott, 208 A.3d 143, 150 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(en banc). Subsequently, the General Assembly amended SORNA I and 

passed SORNA II, in part to address Muniz. SORNA II divides sex offender 

registrants into two distinct subchapters: Subchapter H and Subchapter I. As 

relevant here, Subchapter I governs individuals who were convicted for an 

offense that occurred “on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 

2012,” and whose registration requirements had not yet expired. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.52. On July 21, 2020, our Supreme Court held that 

Subchapter I “is nonpunitive and does not violate the constitutional prohibition 

against ex post facto laws.” Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 

605-06 (Pa. 2020).
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On May 31, 2017, the trial court imposed the agreed-upon sentence and 

also ordered Appellant to pay a fine of $50 for each of the four charges, for a 

total of $200. Order, 5/31/17.4 However, the trial court did not inquire as to 

Appellant’s ability to pay those fines. Appellant did not appeal.

On May 11, 2018, the PCRA court docketed Appellant’s pro se first timely 

PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed Shannon Sprow, Esq., as Appellant’s 

PCRA counsel, and she filed a motion to withdraw on July 16, 2018. Attorney 

Sprow’s motion to withdraw noted that Appellant had requested that she raise 

a claim that the retroactive application of SORNA was unconstitutional. Mot. 

to Withdraw, 7/16/18, at ¶ 17. Counsel opined that the claim lacked merit. 

Id.

On July 18, 2018, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, 

which advised that (1) Appellant had a right to file a response, (2) counsel’s 

motion to withdraw complied with Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 

(Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988), 

and (3) it would grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. Rule 907 Notice, 

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4 The trial court’s original sentencing order, entered May 11, 2017, imposed a 

sentence of forty-eight years’ imprisonment instead of the agreed-upon 

sentence of four to eight years’ imprisonment. Order, 5/11/17. On May 31, 

2017, the trial court issued an amended sentencing order with the correct 

sentence. Order, 5/31/17. We add that although the record does not specify 

whether Appellant’s fines were mandatory or non-mandatory, none of 

Appellant’s convictions called for a mandatory fine.
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7/18/18.5 Appellant did not file a response to the Rule 907 notice, and the 

PCRA court took almost two years to issue its final order dismissing Appellant’s 

first PCRA petition. Order, 4/30/20.6

Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal and a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant 

claimed that SORNA was improperly applied to him retroactively in violation 

of ex post facto principles. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 6/24/20, at 1-2 

(unpaginated) (citing Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017)

(plurality), and Commonwealth v. Moore, 222 A.3d 16 (Pa. Super. 2019), 

vacated, 240 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2020)). The PCRA court filed a responsive Rule 

1925(a) opinion on July 15, 2020, which stated, in relevant part, that 

Appellant waived the illegal fine issue and that his SORNA claims were

meritless. PCRA Ct. Op. at 4.

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5 The trial court’s Rule 907 notice, somewhat confusingly, stated that “notice 

is hereby given of this court’s intention to dismiss [Appellant’s] PCRA petition 

and grant court-appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw,” which tends to 

suggest that the court intended to grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. Rule 

907 Notice, 7/18/18. No party, however, disputes that Attorney Sprow was 

granted permission to withdraw.

6 Meanwhile, before the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s first PCRA petition, 

the PCRA court docketed pro se Appellant’s second PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court appointed Wendy Grella, Esq., as counsel, and Attorney Grella filed a 

petition to withdraw, to which Appellant filed a pro se response. On August 

10, 2020, the PCRA court issued an order stating that Appellant’s second PCRA 

petition “shall not be entertained” as it was premature because the instant 

appeal was before this Court. Order, 8/10/20. The order also granted 

Attorney Grella permission to withdraw. Id.
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On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues, which we have 

reordered as follows:

1. Where [Appellant] bargains for [and] agrees to pay a fine 

as part of a negotiated plea agreement, must the sentencing 

court conduct a separate [inquiry] into [Appellant’s] ability 

to pay the fine?

2. Did the trial court err by subjecting [Appellant] to register 

as a sex offender under SORNA for a crime that happened 

before SORNA’s effective date[?]

3. Did the trial court err by forcing [Appellant] to sign 

registration requirements that included mandatory 

minimums for sex offenders, when Megan’s Law II had no 

mandatory minimums unlike SORNA[?]

4. Did the trial court err by forcing [Appellant] to register with 

the [Pennsylvania State Police (PSP)] in which the PSP 

dissemination of personal information to the public when 

Megan’s Law II only forced sexually violent predators to 

public notifications[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 9-10 (unpaginated) (formatting altered).

Appellant’s first issue is that the trial court erred by failing to inquire 

into his ability to pay the fine included in the negotiated guilty plea. Id.

Although Appellant does not argue this claim in his brief, he subsequently filed 

a letter with this Court acknowledging that his “brief may be incomplete,” and 

requesting that this Court consider the fact that he was moved to a prison 

dormitory and no longer has the privacy to work on his case. Letter, 

10/21/20.

In reviewing Appellant’s claim, we are guided by the following principles:

[O]ur standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is 

limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is 
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supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal 

error. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when 

supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we 

apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

When a defendant claims that the trial court imposed nonmandatory 

fines without conducting an ability-to-pay hearing, it constitutes a 

nonwaivable challenge to the legality of the sentence. See Commonwealth 

v. Ford, 217 A.3d 824, 831 (Pa. 2019). “Challenges to the legality of a 

sentence—even a sentence resulting from a negotiated guilty plea—are 

cognizable under the PCRA.” Id. (citations omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Gentry, 101 A.3d 813, 819 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating 

that “a criminal defendant cannot agree to an illegal sentence, so the fact that 

the illegality was a term of his plea bargain is of no legal significance”). 

Further, as long as this Court has jurisdiction over the matter, an illegal 

sentencing claim is reviewable, cannot be waived, and may be raised by this 

Court sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800, 801 (Pa. Super. 

2014); Commonwealth v. Jones, 932 A.2d 179, 182 (Pa. Super. 2007).

When a trial court orders a defendant to pay nonmandatory fines 

without making a record of a defendant’s ability to pay those fines, the 

sentence is illegal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(c); Ford, 217 A.3d at 829 (stating that 

“the plain language of [Section 9726(c)] is clear: trial courts are without 
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authority to impose non-mandatory fines absent record evidence that the 

defendant is or will be able to pay them”); Commonwealth v. Snyder, ---

A.3d ---, 2021 WL 1324388, at *10-11 (Pa. Super. filed Apr. 9, 2021) 

(vacating the imposition of fines because “the law is clear that the [c]ourt 

must consider a defendant’s ability to pay fines prior to their imposition”).

7

Here, the record confirms that the trial court did not inquire into 

Appellant’s ability to pay before imposing $50 fines on each of the four counts 

included in the negotiated plea agreement. As such, that portion of 

Appellant’s sentence is illegal. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(c); Ford, 217 A.3d at 

828; Snyder, 2021 WL 1324388, at *10-11. We therefore vacate the portion 

of the sentence imposing court fines and remand for the trial court to 

determine the appropriate amount of fines, if any, in accordance with Section 

9726. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(c); Ford, 217 A.3d at 828; Snyder, 2021 WL 

1324388, at *10-11.8

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7

In contrast to Ford, which addressed fines, in Commonwealth v. Lopez, -

-- A.3d ---, 2021 WL 1096376 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 23, 2021) (en banc), an 

en banc panel of this Court resolved whether the trial court was required to 

hold a hearing under Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(C) to determine the defendant’s ability 

to pay before imposing court costs at sentencing. See Lopez, 2021 WL 

1096376, at *1. The Lopez Court held that although the trial court has the 

discretion to hold an ability-to-pay hearing at sentencing, Rule 706(C) only 

requires the trial court to hold such a hearing when the defendant faces 

incarceration for failure to pay court costs that were previously imposed. Id.

8

In Ford, the defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea which included an 

agreed-upon term regarding the amount of non-mandatory fines. See Ford, 

217 A.3d at 827. On appeal, this Court concluded that the fines were illegal 
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Appellant’s remaining issues challenge his registration requirements 

under SORNA. First, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by requiring 

Appellant to register as a sex offender under SORNA for a crime that occurred 

before SORNA’s effective date. Appellant’s Brief at 9-10 (unpaginated). 

Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred by requiring Appellant to sign 

registration requirements that included mandatory minimum sentences for 

non-compliant sex offenders when Megan’s Law II had no such mandatory 

minimum sentences. Id. Finally, Appellant argues that he should not be 

forced to register with the Pennsylvania State Police when, under Megan’s Law 

II, only SVPs were required to register. Id.

Initially, we note that Appellant does not include any argument in 

support of these issues in his brief. As noted above, Appellant acknowledged 

his brief was incomplete but essentially requested leniency. See Letter, 

10/21/20.

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because the trial court failed to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing pursuant to

Section 9726. Id. at 828. Therefore, we vacated the portion of the 

defendant’s sentence that imposed the illegal fines and remanded the matter

for resentencing in accordance with Section 9726. Id. Our Supreme Court 

later reversed, explaining that “[b]ecause selectively vacating specific 

conditions of a plea agreement threatens to upset the parties’ underlying 

bargain, the better remedy is to put both sides right back where they started, 

at which point they can begin plea negotiations anew or proceed to trial.” Id.

at 831. Here, unlike in Ford, there was no agreement regarding the amount 

of fines. Instead, the parties left that determination to the discretion of the 

trial court. Under these circumstances, where the specific fines do not affect 

the basis of the parties’ plea bargain, it is not necessary to vacate Appellant’s 

entire judgment of sentence. Cf. id.
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When an appellant fails to properly develop issues on appeal, this Court 

will not consider the merits of those claims. See Commonwealth v. Knox, 

50 A.3d 732, 748 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that an appellant’s failure to cite 

legal authority in support of his argument results in waiver); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring that an argument section contain discussion and 

citation of pertinent authorities); Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (stating that “if the defects 

are in the brief . . . are substantial, the appeal or . . . may be quashed or 

dismissed”). Here, Appellant has failed to develop his issues in any 

meaningful fashion capable of review. Therefore, they are waived. See Knox, 

50 A.3d at 748.

In any event, we note that Appellant appears to challenge his

Subchapter I registration requirements based on his claim that SORNA is more 

punitive than Megan’s Law II and cannot be retroactively applied to him. 

However, even if Appellant properly developed this claim, he would not be 

entitled to relief. See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 605-06 (noting that the 

appellant was not entitled to relief from SORNA II based on Muniz, which 

applied to SORNA I and holding that that Subchapter I “is nonpunitive and 

does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws”).

In sum, we conclude that the PCRA court erred as a matter of law in 

denying relief on Appellant’s claim regarding the illegal fine. See Sandusky, 

203 A.3d at 1043-44; see also Ford, 217 A.3d at 829. Accordingly, we affirm 

in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing solely for a determination 
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regarding the amount of non-mandatory fines in accordance with Section 

9726. 

Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of sentence 

vacated with respect to fines. Case remanded for resentencing on fines.

9

 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/24/2021

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9 Appellant is entitled to counsel for resentencing, unless he wishes to proceed 

pro se.