Page i

March 17, 2014

2012

30

Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies in Tanker Crash En Route to Grass Fire 

– Indiana 

Photo of the crashed tanker at the incident scene.

(Photo courtesy of the police department)

Executive Summary

On November 11, 2012, a 26-year-old male volunteer fire fighter (the Victim) was killed when the 

tanker he was driving crashed en-route to a grass fire. The Victim drove his personal vehicle to the 

fire department from his residence upon hearing his department dispatched to the scene of a grass fire. 

Upon arriving at the department, approximately seven minutes after other fire department members 

responded, he readied Tanker 64 to respond. He asked other members if they wanted to go with him 

but they declined saying enough resources were already en route. He boarded the tanker and left the 

station with lights and siren activated. The apparatus crashed approximately five miles from the 

department. The Victim was ejected and suffered fatal injuries. He was pronounced dead at the scene.

Contributing Factors

• Seat belt – an unrestrained driver risks losing control of the vehicle and being ejected 

• Speed - travelling too fast for required maneuvers such as turning, stopping, swerving

• Roadway intersection protocol - not coming to a stop and then proceeding with caution 

risks a collision

• Tanker weight and characteristics – high center of gravity and possible weight shifts 

affect turning maneuvers and stopping distance

• Unnecessary emergency response.
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A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

Key Recommendations

• Fire departments should ensure that all persons responding in emergency apparatus are 

wearing, and restrained securely by, seat belts at all times the vehicle is in motion

• Fire departments should provide training to driver/operators, incorporating specifics on 

rollover prevention and maintaining vehicle control

• Fire departments should ensure that all fire service vehicles are operated safely, taking into 

consideration the type of emergency and route of travel to the scene

• Fire departments should develop emergency response deployment protocols to 

prevent resources from unnecessarily responding, unplanned or unknown, to an 

emergency scene

• Fire departments should ensure that a thorough scene size-up is conducted, incident 

command is established, and risks are assessed and managed throughout an emergency 

incident

• Fire departments should develop policies and procedures that assist with determining 

replacement cycles for existing fire apparatus

• Fire departments should develop policies and procedures, mission and vision statements, and 

training programs, which promote an institutional safety culture that ensures that all 

members are empowered to report unsafe practices or actions.

 For further information, visit the program Web site at www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire or call toll free 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636)

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an institute within the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC), is the federal agency responsible for conducting research and making recommendations for the prevention of 

work-related injury and illness. In 1998, Congress appropriated funds to NIOSH to conduct a fire fighter initiative that resulted in the 

NIOSH “Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program” which examines line-of-duty-deaths or on duty deaths of fire 

fighters to assist fire departments, fire fighters, the fire service and others to prevent similar fire fighter deaths in the future. The 

agency does not enforce compliance with State or Federal occupational safety and health standards and does not determine fault or 

assign blame. Participation of fire departments and individuals in NIOSH investigations is voluntary. Under its program, NIOSH 

investigators interview persons with knowledge of the incident who agree to be interviewed and review available records to develop 

a description of the conditions and circumstances leading to the death(s). Interviewees are not asked to sign sworn statements and 

interviews are not recorded. The agency's reports do not name the victim, the fire department or those interviewed. The NIOSH 

report's summary of the conditions and circumstances surrounding the fatality is intended to provide context to the agency's 

recommendations and is not intended to be definitive for purposes of determining any claim or benefit.
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Report # F2012-30

Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies in Tanker Crash en-Route to Grass Fire –

Indiana

A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

Introduction

On November 11, 2012, a 26-year-old male volunteer fire fighter (the Victim) died when the 

tanker he was driving crashed while en route to a grass fire. On November 13, 2012, the U.S. 

Fire Administration (USFA) notified the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH) of this fatality. At the department’s request, the investigation was delayed until 

December 6, 2012, when an Occupational Safety and Health Specialist from the NIOSH Fire 

Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program traveled to Indiana to investigate the 

incident. 

The NIOSH investigator met with the Chief and Assistant Chief of the department who were on 

the scene of the grass fire and the Police Officer who investigated the crash. Police and fire 

department representatives accompanied the NIOSH investigator to view and photograph the 

scene of the crash and the location of the grass fire. The NIOSH investigator, accompanied by 

the Assistant Chief, visited the vehicle impound facility where the apparatus was being stored to 

inspect and photograph it. Copies of the city police department crash report, the department’s 

SOPs, training records, maintenance records, apparatus build sheet, witness statements, dispatch 

records, incident scene diagrams and photographs were reviewed by the NIOSH investigator.

Fire Department

The combination fire department involved in this incident serves a population of approximately 

7,500 residents in an area of about seven square miles of mostly small semi-rural communities 

and suburban residential dwellings. The fire department maintains one station, Station 60, and 

has 30 members; nine of whom are career and 21 members who volunteer. They respond to 

approximately 300 calls per year. The shifts are staffed by 3 career members working Monday 

through Friday 0600 to1800 hours, and one career member working the same shift on Saturday 

and Sunday. All 1800 to 0600 hours shifts are covered by volunteers who meet at the station 

when the department is dispatched to a call.

Housed at the station are two tankers (Tanker 63, Tanker 64), one engine (Engine 62), one ladder 

(Truck 67), one heavy rescue (Rescue 68), one basic life support ambulance (Emergency 65), 

two grass rigs (Grass Rig 69 and Grass Rig 66 - a 6x6 military vehicle), and a squad truck/SUV

(Squad 66). The Chief’s vehicle is Fire 61. The initial response to the grass fire from the 

Victim’s station included Fire 61, Tanker 63, Grass Rig 69 and Grass Rig 66. 

Emergency calls and interagency communications are handled by a single joint city-county 

communications center. Dispatch and fireground channels are inter-operable among all city and 

county emergency response entities and are monitored by a call center that is staffed continually 

by trained professionals. 
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Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies in Tanker Crash en-Route to Grass Fire –

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A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

The department had written standard operating procedures that addressed vehicle operations, 

driver/operator training, emergency response protocol, and the use of seat belts; however 

consistent enforcement was not evident.

Training and Experience

The state of Indiana has a fire fighter certification program that is applicable to the volunteer fire 

service as well as to career fire fighters. The purpose of the program is to measure the level of 

knowledge, skills, and abilities possessed by fire fighters, and to attest that each individual meets 

the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), nationally recognized Fire Fighter I and Fire 

Fighter II standards. However, the state has no specific licensing requirements for drivers of fire 

apparatus.

The State requires that a fire fighter successfully complete the minimum basic training 

requirements before the fire fighter may perform the duties of a certified fire fighter. A 

volunteer fire fighter who has successfully completed the minimum basic training requirements 

may be elected or appointed to membership in more than one volunteer fire department. The 

minimum basic training requirements include training in the following areas:

• Orientation

• Personal safety

• Forcible entry

• Ventilation

• Apparatus

• Ladders

• Self-contained breathing apparatus

• Hose loads

• Streams

• Basic recognition of special hazards.

A person who fulfills the certification requirements for NFPA Firefighter I and Firefighter II is 

considered to comply with the requirements. In addition to the minimum basic training 

requirements, training for career and volunteer fire fighters must include successful completion 

of an instruction course on vehicle emergency response driving safety.1

The Victim had been a fire fighter with the department for five years. He had successfully 

completed training in many courses including Fire Fighter I and II, Emergency Vehicle 

Operations Course (EVOC), Hazmat First Responder, Trench and Confined Space Rescue, 

Search and Rescue and Live Fire training. 

The department conducts driver/operator training at least once per year, and the Victim had 

participated in the training every year for the past five years. At the time of the incident, the fire 
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Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies in Tanker Crash en-Route to Grass Fire –

Indiana

A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

department involved had written standard operating procedures that addressed vehicle operations 

and driver/operator training. However driver/operator training did not include classroom and 

hands-on training specific to the apparatus each member may be called upon to operate. The 

total number is unknown, but prior to the crash the Victim had often driven Tanker 64.

Equipment and Personnel

Photo 1. Photo of a tanker that is similar to the one involved in the crash.

(Photo courtesy of the fire department.)

The apparatus involved in this incident, Tanker 64 (T64), was a 1979 diesel, three-axle 

tanker/pumper (see Photo 1). Maintenance records reveal that mileage was recorded at 26,171 in 

August of 2012. The ten tires were in good condition and the front and rear drum brakes were 

inspected regularly with no reported operational issues. An elliptical 3,500 gallon capacity

stainless steel water tank, equipped with transverse and longitudinal baffles, had been installed 

on the chassis in 1998 by an authorized tanker apparatus company. The tank was reported to be 

filled to capacity when it left the station on the evening of the incident and would have been 

within the 54,000-pound gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) requirement of the truck.

The police inspection did not identify any mechanical defects that would have caused or 

contributed to the events which led to the fatality. Maintenance records revealed that the tanker 

was inspected on a regular basis and all required work was performed in a timely manner by 

certified mechanics when required. The tanker was running with emergency lights and siren 

activated en route to the call on the evening of the incident.

Timeline

The timeline for this incident details all activities pertaining to the vehicle crash and is a summary of 

events that occurred as the incident evolved. Not all events are included in this timeline. Times are 

approximate and were obtained by studying dispatch records, witness statements, and other available 

information. In some cases, times are rounded to the nearest minute.
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Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies in Tanker Crash en-Route to Grass Fire –

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A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

2016 First 911 call came into dispatch for a “fire in the woods.”

2018 City fire department dispatched to fire, unable to locate; Once located, Engine 7

(city fire department) notified dispatch to call the county fire department 

(Victim’s department) as fire may be in their jurisdiction.

2024 Victim’s department dispatched to the grass fire

2025 Fire 61 (Chief, victim’s department) en route 

Truck 57 (county mutual aid) en route

2026 E7 (city fire department) on scene

2027 Grass 69 (two officers from Victim’s department) en route

2028 E6, Grass 17, Battalion 17 (city department) dispatched to grass fire

2029 Tanker 63 (driver/operator) en route

Grass Rig 66 (officer and fire fighter) en route

2031 Fire 61 on scene

2033 Fire 61 I’ll have command, keep everybody coming, move to white channel

2036 Truck 57 (county mutual aid) on scene

Tanker 64 (Victim) en route (20:36:53)

2037 E6 (city) reports to city command “the worst of the brush fire is knocked down

Tanker 63 on scene

2039 Tanker 153 (county mutual aid) en route

2042 Tanker 64 Victim radios “which way do you want me to come in?”

Incident Commander responded for him to take the “named” road which would 

bring him to the fire from the west (see Diagram).

2043 The first 911 call reporting the tanker crash.
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Report # F2012-30

Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies in Tanker Crash en-Route to Grass Fire –

Indiana

A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

Road and Weather Conditions

The two-lane asphalt roadway where the incident occurred runs north to south and is bordered by 

dirt shoulders. A white fog line is painted adjacent to the shoulders with a yellow line dividing 

the north/south lanes. At the northern approach to the intersection, the southbound lanes expand 

to include a left-turn-only lane with the right lane maintaining straight ahead forward passage 

through the intersection (see Photo 2). Collapsible lane control posts had been recently installed 

to the immediate south of the intersection to direct traffic flow into and out of a gas station that 

had been recently constructed on the southwest quadrant. There is an operational four-way 

traffic signal at the intersection. However, there were no witnesses who stated whether the 

signal for the Victim was red or green. There is a posted speed limit of 45 MPH in the area. The 

police crash investigation report did not list an estimated speed for the tanker at the time of the 

crash. 

The incident occurred at approximately 2043 hours. It was dark and slightly overcast. The 

ambient air temperature was approximately 61°F with 42% humidity, and winds were fairly 

steady at 16 mph. There had been no precipitation within 24 hours prior to the crash.2 Neither 

the roadway condition, nor the weather, appeared to be a factor in this fatality.

Investigation

At approximately 2016 hours on the evening of November 11, 2012, a passing motorist called 

911 to report a fire in the woods along a roadway. The call was originally routed to the city fire 

department and units, including Engine 7 (E7), were dispatched to the scene. Initially there was 

confusion as to the location of the fire, with the driver of E7 reporting that they could not locate 

the fire and were going back in service. However, dispatch advised that they had received 

several additional 911 calls reporting the fire; and upon further searching, E7 found that the fire 

was located to the south of the intersection and they had originally been searching to the north. 

Upon arriving at the fire scene, they reported to dispatch there was a grass fire, but they weren’t 

sure if the fire location was within the city or the county jurisdiction, and they requested that 

county fire be dispatched. At 2024 hours two county departments were toned out; the Victim’s 

department which was located north of the fire and another county department that was located 

farther south. 

At approximately 2015 hours several members and probationary trainees returned to the county 

fire station from a live fire training session and were cleaning equipment when the department 

was dispatched to the grass fire. The Victim did not participate in the training that day, and at 

the time the department was dispatched, was at his residence approximately eight miles from the 

station. The first unit to call en route was the Chief (Fire 61), followed by Grass Rig 69 with 

two officers, and Grass Rig 66 with an officer and fire fighter, and Tanker 63 with a 

driver/operator. All units were en route to the fire by 2029 hours.
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Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies in Tanker Crash en-Route to Grass Fire –

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A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

Photo 2. Intersection where crash occurred. 

(NIOSH photo.)
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Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies in Tanker Crash en-Route to Grass Fire –

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A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

At approximately 2030 hours, after all responding units had departed, the Victim arrived at the 

station in his personal vehicle. He donned his bunker pants and boots and proceeded to 

reposition an engine (E62) in order to reach Tanker 64 which was parked behind it. He asked if 

anyone wanted to go with him to the grass fire and was told by several members that sufficient 

personnel and apparatus were already en route or at the scene, and an additional tanker would not 

be needed. According to witness statements, he continued preparing to dispatch to the scene and 

proceeded out of the station with lights and siren activated. It was reported that he was advised 

to put his seatbelt on, but no one saw him buckle-up. He radioed that he was en route at 2036 

hours. The communication was acknowledged by county dispatch. Radio transmissions 

occurring after the Victim left the station indicate that the fire was close to being extinguished 

and some personnel were preparing to leave the scene. Radio traffic reveals that at 20:42:04 the 

Victim asked Fire 61 “Which way do you want me to come in?” Incident Command responded 

for him to come in from a road that runs west of the fire (see Diagram). At 20:43:43 the first 911 

call came into the dispatch center reporting a fire truck crash.

There were three witnesses who observed the crash. They were travelling north on the same 

road, and at the same time that the Victim was travelling south. They reported to police that as 

the tanker was travelling through the intersection, it appeared to attempt a right turn or 

maneuver. Theories are that the Victim may have swerved to the right to miss the newly 

installed lane control posts, or may have attempted to change direction at the last minute from 

making a right turn, to proceeding straight to take the road which would bring him to the fire 

from the west, as requested by Incident Command (see Photo 2 and Diagram). Following the 

attempted maneuver, the police report states that the tanker began to roll and struck curbing 

where it began to rotate before striking a utility pole. The tanker then continued to roll and 

struck a second utility pole before coming to rest off the west side of the roadway. The speed the 

tanker was traveling at the time of the crash was not indicated in the police report. 

The crash impact caused the water tank to dislodge from the truck frame. The Victim was 

ejected from the cab. He was found partially under the tank and was pronounced dead at the 

scene. His body was transported to a forensic center for an autopsy where the cause of death was 

identified as blunt force trauma due to a motor vehicle crash.
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Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies in Tanker Crash en-Route to Grass Fire –

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A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

Diagram. Depicts tanker path-of-travel, fire location, and crash scene.
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Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies in Tanker Crash en-Route to Grass Fire –

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A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

Contributing Factors

Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key 

events in a larger sequence of events that result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators 

identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident:

• Seat belt – an unrestrained driver risks losing control of the vehicle and being ejected 

• Speed - travelling too fast for required maneuvers such as turning, stopping, swerving 

• Roadway intersection protocol - not coming to a stop and then proceeding with caution 

risks a collision

• Tanker weight and characteristics – high center of gravity and possible weight shifts 

affect turning maneuvers and stopping distance

• Unnecessary emergency response.

Cause of Death

The medical examiner reported the cause of death as blunt force trauma.

Recommendations

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that all persons responding in 

emergency apparatus are wearing and restrained securely by seat belts at all times the vehicle 

is in motion.

Discussion: NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health 

Program states that all persons riding in fire apparatus shall be seated and belted securely by seat 

belts in approved riding positions at any time the vehicle is in motion. The standard further states 

that seat belts shall not be released or loosened for any purpose while the vehicle is in motion.3

Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce SOPs on the use of seat belts in 

accordance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) guidelines. Numerous nationally 

recognized fire service entities have guidance available on implementing a seat belt policy. The 

International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) provides guidance in their document Fire 

Department Vehicle Safety, Emergency and Non-Emergency Response, and Safe Emergency 

Operations on Roadways,

4 and recommends that all employees use seat belts at all times and

“All personnel shall ride only in regular seats provided with seat belts. The company officer and 

driver of the vehicle shall confirm that all personnel and riders are on-board, properly attired, 

with seat belts on, before the vehicle is permitted to move. This confirmation shall require a 

positive response from each rider.” The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), Guide 

to IAFC Model Policies and Procedures for Emergency Vehicle Safety, states that “The driver 

shall not begin to move the vehicle until all passengers are seated and properly secured. All 

passengers shall remain seated and secured as long as the vehicle is in motion.” 5 NFPA 1901, 

Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus, establishes requirements for the minimum length of 
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A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

seat belts, together with how they are measured. The standard also recommends that a seat belt 

warning device be installed to indicate when seat belts are not being properly used.6

Vehicle crashes have historically been the second leading cause of fire fighter line of duty 

deaths. Seat belts are not only important for protecting occupants in the event of a crash, but they 

may be useful in helping to avoid crashes. The U.S. Fire Administration’s Safe Operation of Fire 

Tankers states, “Some crash reconstruction specialists have speculated that particular incidents 

may have occurred after the unrestrained driver of a truck was bounced out of an effective 

driving position following the initial contact with a bump in the road or another object.”7 In the 

same publication, the USFA also cites a Department of Transportation (DOT) study of seat belt 

use which revealed the following statistics: 1) 75 percent of the people ejected from vehicles 

suffer fatal injuries; 2) 80 percent of fatalities in rollover incidents involve occupants being 

ejected from the vehicle; and 3) in a rollover incident, occupants are 22 times more likely to be 

thrown from the vehicle if they are not wearing their seat belts.

To increase the use of seat belts by fire fighters, the National Fire Service Seat Belt Pledge 

campaign was created.8 The United States Fire Administration, National Fallen Fire Fighters 

Foundation, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, International Association of 

Fire Chiefs, National Volunteer Fire Council, and the National Fire Protection Association 

support the campaign as a method of raising awareness of the importance of mandatory use of 

seat belts by all fire fighters.9 Fire fighters wearing seat belts are an essential component of 

efforts to ensure the safety of all occupants of apparatus or department vehicles. Fire fighters 

who take the pledge, and fire departments who achieve 100% pledge participation, show their 

individual and organizational commitment to fire fighter safety. 

In this incident the use of a seatbelt is not verified. However, since the Victim was ejected from 

the apparatus it is unlikely that he had been wearing a seatbelt. A properly worn seatbelt could 

have secured his position behind the wheel and possibly assisted him in maintaining greater 

control of the apparatus and reduce the likelihood of being ejected in a crash. 

Recommendation #2: Fire departments should provide training to driver/operators, 

incorporating specifics on rollover prevention and maintaining vehicle control.

Discussion: NFPA 1451, Standard for a Fire Service Vehicle Operations Training Program, 

states that fire department personnel must be trained in, and exercise, applicable principles of 

defensive driving techniques under both emergency and non-emergency conditions.

10 SOPs for 

driving fire department vehicles during non-emergency travel and emergency response should 

include, but not be limited to:

• principles of skid avoidance

• effects of liquid surge 

• load factors

• general steering reactions
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• speed

• the ways in which all factors impact vehicle control.

Common causes for loss of control are driving too fast for road design or conditions, failing to 

properly react to weight shifts of heavy emergency vehicles/apparatus, driver distraction, and 

failing to anticipate obstacles.

 

Driver training should incorporate vehicle characteristics, capabilities and limitations. Tankers, 

for example, tend to be heavier and to have a higher center of gravity than other fire vehicles. 

Both of these factors affect the driver’s ability to control a tanker. Based on simple physics and 

inertia, a top heavy vehicle, like a tanker, is inclined to tip over if driven through a curve at an 

unsafe speed or if the driver suddenly turns the steering wheel. The U.S. Fire Administration’s 

Safe Operation of Fire Tankers lists some vehicle rollover prevention points to increase a 

driver’s ability to maintain control of a vehicle.

7

Driver training should be documented and given in accordance with NFPA 1451, Standard for a 

Fire Service Vehicle Operations Training Program and NFPA 1002, Fire Apparatus 

Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications.

10,11 These standards state that departments should 

establish and maintain a driver training education program and each member should be provided 

driver training on each vehicle they may be called upon to drive, not less than twice a year. 

During this training, each driver should operate the vehicle and perform tasks that the 

driver/operator is expected to encounter during normal operations to ensure the vehicle is safely 

operated in compliance with all applicable State and local laws. 

The department conducts driver/operator training at least once per year, and the Victim had 

participated in the training every year for the past five years. At the time of the incident, the 

driver/operator training was not formalized to include classroom and hands-on training specific 

to the apparatus each member may be called upon to operate. Although the exact number is 

unknown, it was reported that the Victim had driven Tanker 64 many times prior to the fatal 

crash.

Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that all fire service vehicles are 

operated safely, taking into consideration the type of emergency and route of travel to the 

scene.

Discussion: Fire departments should consider developing programs using a risk benefit analysis 

to prioritize emergency vehicle response by auxiliary or fire support vehicles, and ensure that all 

department personnel who drive vehicles/apparatus understand the specific road-handling 

dynamics of each vehicle they may be called upon to drive. Following are excerpts taken from 

The IAFC Guide to Model Policies and Procedure for Emergency Vehicle Safety that provide 

guidance in developing a SOP for responding to incidents.

5
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"Fire department vehicle operations are classified as either emergency or non-emergency. During 

non-emergency operations, fire department vehicles shall comply with all of the traffic laws and 

rules of the road that apply to all other vehicles. The specific exceptions to traffic laws that apply 

to emergency vehicles shall only be exercised during authorized emergency operations. 

Emergency response creates an increased risk to firefighters and to other users of the roadways. 

The increased risk must be balanced against the potential benefits of faster response in situations 

where lives and/or property are at risk. Emergency response shall be limited to situations where 

prompt response is likely to reduce the risk of death, serious injury or disability, or preventable 

damage to property. 

Each response to an incident shall be classified as either emergency or non-emergency at the 

time of dispatch, based on the nature of the reported situation. The response classification shall 

be assigned according to pre-established criteria. The response classification may be changed by 

the communications center at the time of dispatch or while units are en route, based on the 

receipt of additional information. The change of response classification may apply to all units or 

only to specified units. The officer in charge of a department or unit that is en route to an 

incident is also authorized to change the response classification, based on reliable information 

that the change is appropriate. The communications center and all other responding units will be 

advised immediately of a change in response classification. 

When multiple units are responding in emergency mode, the officer arriving at the scene and 

assuming command of the incident shall determine if it is appropriate to downgrade the response 

of any units that are still en route. The additional units shall be directed to continue "at reduced 

speed" or non-emergency when the situation does not urgently require their presence at the 

scene. 

The determination of which types of calls justify emergency response must consider local factors 

and traffic conditions. In some cases, the difference between emergency response and nonemergency response could be measured in seconds, while in other cases the difference could be 

several minutes. In jurisdictions where traffic congestion is a major problem, a reduced speed 

policy could be implemented to reduce the risks of emergency response, while maintaining the 

ability to move through traffic.

Examples of incident classifications are provided below:

Emergency Response Classifications

• Smoke or fire in a building 

• Outside fire with exposures 

• Gas leak inside a building 

• Hazardous materials release with persons in distress 

• Critical medical incident 
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Non-Emergency Response Classifications 

• Automatic fire alarm system activation – no human report of smoke or fire 

• Residential smoke alarm sounding – no indication of smoke or fire 

• Carbon monoxide alarm – no indication of person(s) in distress 

• Outside fire without exposures 

• Smoke in the area – no indication of source 

• Outside gas leak 

• Electrical wires arcing 

• Hazardous materials release – no indication of person(s) in distress 

• Water leak 

• Unknown odor – no symptoms or persons in distress 

• Relieve units at the scene of an incident that is under control 

Fire departments should consider the adoption of policies that limit certain vehicles, such as 

tankers (water tenders), support units and large / heavy vehicles to non-emergency response 

mode while ensuring that response protocols limit apparatus to those identified as critical to each 

situation. The USFA publication Safe Operation of Fire Tankers concludes that by slowing the 

apparatus down during the response and knowing how to react in the event the right-side wheels 

leave the roadway will prevent a significant number of crashes from occurring.7

Emergency Response Driving

State traffic laws include specific provisions for emergency vehicles, while they are engaged in 

emergency operations. Department policies and procedures should specify when and how these 

exceptions will be applied by fire department members. Responding to emergency incidents does 

not in any manner reduce the responsibility to operate vehicles safely. While prompt response to 

emergency incidents is an organizational priority, safety is always a higher priority. The 

responding units must arrive safely at the location where they are needed before they can deliver 

the required services. Unsafe operation of an emergency vehicle creates an unacceptable risk to 

fire department members, to the public, and to the individuals who are in need of assistance.”5

A good rule to follow is to limit the use of lights and sirens, but when emergency response is 

required, ensure that at minimum two persons are responding in the apparatus. Additionally, 

always reduce the speed of vehicles and apparatus when approaching turns and/or bends in the 

roadway, remembering to come to a stop and proceed with caution when entering a roadway 

intersection. Always take into consideration that road surfaces may be worsened by weather 

conditions.12

In the State where the incident occurred, motor vehicle regulations provide exemptions for 

highway use of emergency vehicles. It states that the operator of any emergency vehicle may 

exceed the lawful speed so long as the driver does not endanger life or property. The section 
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further states that the provisions of this section shall not relieve the driver of an authorized 

emergency vehicle from duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons.13

Department SOP’s for response to grass, woods, or brush fire call for two tankers, two brush rigs 

and an engine. However, by the time the Victim departed the station, multiple emergency 

response apparatus were already at the scene of the grass fire with a tanker and rescue from a 

neighboring department en route. Radio transmissions occurring after the Victim left the station

indicate that the fire was close to being extinguished and some personnel were preparing to leave 

the scene. Given these circumstances, and the size of the grass fire, an emergency response by 

Tanker 64 may not have been needed (see Photo 3). 

Photo 3. Photo shows the grass fire area.

(NIOSH photo)

Recommendation #4: Fire departments should develop emergency response deployment 

protocols to prevent resources from unnecessarily responding, unplanned or unknown, to an 

emergency scene.

Discussion: The International Association of Fire Chiefs and the National Volunteer Fire Council 

discourage the practice of self-dispatch among emergency response personnel to emergency 

incidents without notification or request. They have issued a joint policy statement stating that, 

“Uncontrolled and uncoordinated arrival of resources at emergencies cause significant 

accountability issues as a result of personnel freelancing and creating additional safety risks to 
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firefighters, civilians and others who are operating within the parameters of the incident action 

plan. Chaos at the scene occurs, creating additional safety risks because these companies or 

individuals are not aware of the overall strategic plan. Further, unrequested emergency units and 

emergency personnel at incidents disrupt the accountability and incident management system.

An incident management system requires that a formal structure is utilized to determine the 

needs of an incident. The needs of the incident are in most cases directly related to personnel and 

equipment. When resources show up that have not been requested, the incident management 

system fails. Unplanned resources in many cases block roads, create traffic jams, restrict access 

and ultimately affect the safety of those fire fighters who are operating at the scene by denying

them needed resources. Freelancing of personnel and fire companies adversely impact incident 

management systems and require that the Incident Commander assign more personnel to control 

and coordinate these resources that were not requested.” 14 

It is not clear if the Incident Commander, or any other responders who were en route or at the 

scene, were aware that the Victim had taken the tanker and was on his way to the fire because he 

was not at the station when the initial apparatus responded. His radio transmission, when he left 

the station, was acknowledged by dispatch. It is possible that when the victim radioed, “which 

way do you want me to come in”, the IC may have thought that he was replying to the mutual aid 

unit that was responding from the south. 

Recommendation #5: Fire departments should ensure that a thorough scene size-up is 

conducted, incident command is established, and risks are assessed and managed throughout 

an emergency incident.

Discussion: The management of an incident involving multiple agencies can be difficult. There is 

always a possibility of disagreement when determining who is in charge of what. Pre-incident 

planning to identify each responding agency and their particular role and responsibility can avoid 

disagreements when an incident occurs. In addition, mutual aid agreements should be established 

that identify specific responses to deliver appropriate equipment and staffing for the incident. 

Depending on the size and complexity of the incident, the option of single command or Unified 

Command must be considered. Regardless, the Incident Command System (ICS) must be used as 

this process is a systematic tool for the command, control, and coordination of an emergency 

response. ICS allows agencies to work together using common terminology and operating 

procedures for controlling personnel, facilities, equipment, and communications at an incident 

scene. Additionally, the Incident Commander needs to be able to radio regular status reports to

dispatch so they in turn can advise any later responding units if they are needed at the scene. 

During incident response, the ICS allows the transition to large and/or multiagency operations 

with only minimal adjustment for the agencies involved. While the ICS structure may be small 

initially, its flexibility allows the structure to expand and adapt to real-time conditions at the 

scene. As in any other operation, accountability of personnel is mandatory. However in an 
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incident where multi-agencies have personnel and resources at the incident scene, accountability 

is even more difficult.15

In this incident, the city fire department was dispatched on the initial 911 call, followed by the 

county departments. There appeared to be some confusion beginning with the initial dispatch to 

the fire, and incident command may have been unaware of all apparatus en route to the scene.

Recommendation #6: Fire departments should develop policies and procedures that assist with 

determining replacement cycles for existing fire apparatus.

Discussion: It is a generally accepted fact that fire apparatus have a finite life. The length of that 

life depends on factors such as vehicle mileage, engine hours, preventative maintenance 

program, and driver/operator training. The tanker truck chassis involved in this incident was 33

years old and had a relatively low mileage of just over 26,000 miles. However, NFPA 1911, 

Standard for the Inspection, Maintenance, Testing, and Retirement of In-Service Automotive Fire 

Apparatus, 2012 edition, recommends that apparatus older than 25 years of age should be 

replaced.16

While it is important that fire departments seek constant improvements and upgrades to their fire 

apparatus and equipment through enhancements of their apparatus maintenance program and 

personnel training, some departments may not have the resources or programs to adequately 

maintain, upgrade, or replace their apparatus and equipment as often as they should. Alternative 

funding sources, such as federal grants, are available to purchase fire apparatus and equipment. 

Additionally, there are organizations that can assist fire departments in researching, requesting, 

and writing grant applications (see the Additional Information section of this report.)

Recommendation #7: Fire departments should develop policies and procedures, mission and 

vision statements, and training programs, which promote an institutional safety culture that 

ensures that all members are empowered to report unsafe practices or actions.

Discussion: Everyone Goes Home, Firefighter Life Safety Initiative #4 states that, “All 

Firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.” which means allowing the members 

of each department to speak up with regard to personal and organizational safety, without 

negative consequences for doing so (within a prescribed context), and without decentralizing the 

authority of the formal leader.17 The resources needed for all fire service organizations to 

institute Initiative #4, regardless of type or size, are already available to them, and are free. All 

that is required is for departments to develop policies and procedures that officers encourage and 

enforce, and fire fighters have the courage to help each other by speaking up.

In this incident, the victim responded to the fire station from his home after receiving the page. 

Several probationary/trainees, and one full department member were at the station having 

recently returned from a training session and were monitoring the incident radio traffic. Three
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apparatus had already departed the station by the time the Victim arrived. When he began to 

prepare Tanker 64 to respond to the fire, several members advised him that additional resources 

probably would not be needed at the scene due to sufficient apparatus already en route, as well as 

on the scene. He was also advised to put his seatbelt on, but no one saw him buckle-up. The 

Victim departed the station with lights activated engaging the siren once on the roadway. 

Although several members questioned the Victim as to the necessity of another unit responding 

to the incident scene, there was no discussion and he continued preparing to leave. A

departmental guideline was not in place that would give weight to their requests that he not 

proceed to the fire. Developing and enforcing departmental safety culture policies that describe

procedures for similar circumstances would help to define expected outcomes and provide all 

members with the knowledge of what is expected of them.

References

1. Information maintained by the office of code revision Indiana legislative services agency, IC 

36-8-10.5 Chapter 10.5. Minimum Training Requirements for Firefighters. 

http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title36/ar8/ch10.5.html Date accessed: September 2013

2. Weather Underground 

http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KFWA/2012/11/11/DailyHistory.html?req_cit

y=NA&req_state=NA&req_statename=NA

3. [2007]. NFPA 1500, Standard on fire department occupational safety and health program. 

Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

4. IAFF [2008]. International Association of Fire Fighters, Fire Department Standard Operating 

Procedure, Fire Department Vehicle Safety, Emergency and Non-Emergency Response, 

Safety Emergency Operations on Roadways.

http://iaff.org/hs/evsp/Vehicle%20Safety%20SOP.pdf Date accessed: September 2013.

5. IAFC [2007]. International Association of Fire Chiefs. Guide to IAFC Model Policies and 

Procedures for Emergency Vehicle Safety. 

http://www.iafc.org/associations/4685/files/downloads/VEHICLE_SAFETY/VehclSafety_IA

FCpolAndProceds.pdf Date accessed: September 2013.

6. NFPA [2009]. NFPA 1901, Standard for automotive fire apparatus. Quincy, MA: National 

Fire Protection Association.

7. U.S. Fire Administration [2004]. Safe operation of fire tankers. Emmitsburg, MD. Federal 

Emergency Management Agency FA-248
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8. TrainingDivision.com [2009]. NFS International Seat Belt Pledge 

http://www.firehero.org/resources/departments/seatbelt.html Date accessed: 

June 2013

9. US Fire Administration [2009]. NIOSH supports seat belt use by fire fighters, press release

http://www.usfa.fema.gov/media/press/2008releases/111808.shtm Date accessed: July 2013 

10. NFPA [2007]. NFPA 1451, Standard for a fire service vehicle operations training program. 

Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

11. NFPA [2009]. NFPA 1002, Standard on fire apparatus driver/operator professional 

qualifications. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

12. NIOSH [2001]. NIOSH Hazard ID: Fire fighter deaths from tanker truck rollovers.

Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2002-111. http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2002-

111/ Date accessed: September 2013.

13. State of Indiana emergency response laws. I.C. 9-21-1-8 (1991) Emergency Vehicles, As 

added by P.L.2-1991, SEC.9. Amended by P.L.145-2009, SEC.3. 

http://www.ai.org/legislative/ic/code/title9/ar21/ch1.html. Date accessed September 2013.

14. The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and the National Volunteer Fire Council 

(NVFC) Discourage the practice of self-dispatch among emergency response personnel to 

emergency incidents without notification or request; 

http://www.iafc.org/files/downloads/ABOUT/POLICY_STATES/IAFCpol_SelfDispatchAm

ongPersonnel.pdf

15. NFPA [2008]. NFPA 1561: Standard on emergency services incident management system. 

2008 ed. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

16. NFPA [2012]. NFPA 1911 Standard for the inspection, maintenance, testing, and retirement 

of in-service automotive fire apparatus. 2007 ed. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection 

Association.

17. Everyone Goes Home firefighter life safety initiatives program by the national fallen 

firefighters foundation; http://www.lifesafetyinitiatives.com/4/Initiative4.pdf. Date accessed: 

September 2013.
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Investigator Information

This incident was investigated by Virginia Lutz, Safety and Occupational Health Specialist, Fire 

Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Team, Surveillance and Field Investigations 

Branch, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH located in Morgantown, WV. This report was 

authored by Virginia Lutz. An expert technical review was conducted by Chief Richard 

Marinucci, Deputy Director of Fire Services, Northville Township Fire Department and the 

National Fire Protection Association, Public Fire Protection Division. 

Additional Information

Fire departments should be aware of programs that provide assistance in obtaining alternative 

funding, such as grant funding, to replace or purchase fire apparatus and equipment.

Discussion: While it is important that fire departments seek constant improvements and upgrades 

to their fire apparatus and equipment, some departments may not have the resources or programs 

to replace or upgrade their apparatus and equipment as often as they should. Alternative funding 

sources, such as federal grants, are available to purchase fire apparatus and equipment. 

Additionally, there are organizations that can assist fire departments in researching, requesting, 

and writing grant applications.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) 

Program

http://www.fema.gov/welcome-assistance-firefighters-grant-program

The primary goal of the Assistance to Fire Fighters Grant (AFG) Program is to provide critically 

needed resources such as emergency vehicles and apparatus, equipment, protective gear, training 

for responders, and other needs to help fire departments protect the public and emergency 

workers from fire and related hazards. FEMA grants are awarded to fire departments to enhance 

their ability to protect the public and fire service personnel from fire and related hazards. The 

Grant Programs Directorate of FEMA administers the grants in cooperation with the United 

States Fire Administration. This Web site offers resources to help fire departments prepare and 

submit grant requests. 

National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC), Grants & Funding

http://www.nvfc.org/hot-topics/grants-funding

The NVFC provides an online resource center to assist departments applying for various types of 

fire grants, including narratives from successful past grant applications and a listing of federal 

grant and funding opportunities.
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FireGrantsHelp.com

www.firegrantshelp.com

A nongovernmental group, FireGrantsHelp's mission is to provide firefighters and departments 

with a comprehensive resource for grant information and assistance. FireGrantsHelp.com 

provides an extensive database of information on federal, state, local, and corporate grant 

opportunities for first responders.

Additional resources related to staffing and training include:

FEMA, Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) Grants

http://www.fema.gov/welcome-assistance-firefighters-grant-program

SAFER grants provide funding directly to fire departments and volunteer firefighter interest 

organizations to help them increase the number of trained, front-line fire fighters in their 

communities and to enhance the local fire departments' abilities to comply with staffing, 

response, and operational standards established by NFPA and the Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration. 

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Safer Act Grant

www.nfpa.org/categoryList.asp?categoryID=999&itemID=24345

NFPA provides excerpts from NFPA 1710 and NFPA 1720 and other online resources to assist 

fire departments with the grant application process.

Federal Excess Personal Property Program

www.fs.fed.us/fire/partners/fepp

The Federal Excess Personal Property Program is administered by the US Forest Service. This 

program refers to Forest Service-owned property that is on loan to State Foresters for the purpose 

of wildland and rural fire fighting. Most of the property originally belonged to the US 

Department of Defense. Once acquired by the Forest Service, property is loaned to State 

Coordinators for fire fighting purposes. State Foresters may place property with local fire 

departments to improve local fire programs.

Department of Defense Firefighter Program

http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/partners/fepp/DODprogram/index.html

In cooperation with the US Forest Service, excess Department of Defense equipment is made 

available for wildland and rural fire fighting purposes through the Federal Excess Personal 

Property Program. 
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Rural & Volunteer Fire Assistance

http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/partners/vfa/

The US Forest Service, Volunteer Fire Assistance Program (VFA), formerly known as the Rural 

Community Fire Protection Program (RCFPP) can provide Federal financial, technical, and other 

assistance to State Foresters and other appropriate officials to organize, train, and equip fire 

departments in rural areas and rural communities to suppress fires. A rural community is defined 

as having 10,000 or less population. 

Disclaimer

Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by the National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). In addition, citations to Web sites external to NIOSH 

do not constitute NIOSH endorsement of the sponsoring organizations or their programs or 

products. Furthermore, NIOSH is not responsible for the content of these Web sites.

Acknowledgement

The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program would like to 

acknowledge the Fort Wayne Police Department for their assistance with this investigation.