Toward a Typology of Dynamic and Hazardous Work 

Environmentsa 

Ted Scharf,1* Charlie Vaught,2 Pamela Kidd,3 Lisa Steiner,2 Kathleen Kowalski,2 

Bill Wiehagen,2 Lynn Rethi,4 and Henry Cole5 

1Work Organization and Stress Research Section, Div. of Applied Research and 

Technology, NIOSH, Cincinnati, OH; 2Mining Injury Prevention Branch, 

Pittsburgh Research Lab, NIOSH, Pittsburgh, PA; 3College of Nursing, Arizona 

State University, Tempe, AZ; 4National Personal Protective Technology 

Laboratory, NIOSH, Pittsburgh, PA; 5Department of Educational and Counseling 

Psychology and Department of Preventive Medicine, University of Kentucky, 

Lexington, KY 

ABSTRACT 

The most hazardous work environments share one feature in common: constant change. Many different, but constantly changing hazards are found in 

agriculture, construction, mining, and transport. This dynamic feature of workplace hazards varies by: (1) degree of control, (2) predictability, (3) visibility, (4) 

movement, and (5) degree of speed and force. In some cases the actions of the 

dynamic hazards are required for production to take place, and in many cases, 

* Corresponding author: Ted Scharf, NIOSH, C-24, 4676 Columbia Parkway, Cincinnati, 

OH, 45226, USA; 513-533-8170, 513-533-8596 (fax); Tscharf@cdc.gov* 

a This paper is respectfully dedicated to the firefighters, police, and other emergency 

responders doing their jobs on September 11, 2001. In particular, we remember the 

hundreds of emergency workers who lost their lives while rescuing others in the collapse 

of the World Trade Center towers in New York City. We also remember the thousands 

of office workers, airline passengers and crew, and many others who were injured or 

killed on this tragic day. 

The opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in this paper are 

those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department 

of Health and Human Services), Arizona State University, or the University of Kentucky. * This manuscript is considered a work of the U.S. Government and is therefore not copyrighted. 
several different hazards may overlap and interact. Finally, whether intentional or 

unintentional, some dynamic hazards are human generated. These are some of 

the features that distinguish dynamic and hazardous work environments across a 

variety of industries. 

The authors propose a preliminary typology of dynamic and hazardous work 

environments, along with a schema to systematically observe the dynamic characteristics of these hazards. The implications of this typology are considered with respect 

to worker training, hazard awareness, and safe work practices. For example, the 

implementation of the Hierarchy of Control is shown to require active worker 

involvement at every level in the hierarchy, except where an environmental hazard 

has been completely eliminated. 

Key Words: dynamic and hazardous work environments, dynamic workplace hazards, 

constantly changing hazards. 

OBSERVATIONS 

Mining, fishing, logging, farming, construction, and transport: by most measures, 

these are the most hazardous jobs in the United States. These findings are regrettably consistent and robust (e.g., Figures 2-7 and 2-8, rates of fatal injuries by industry 

and occupation, 1980-1995, NTOF, NIOSH 2000). 

The basic data are familiar to readers of this journal: (1) drowning is the principal 

cause of death among fishers; (2) airplane crashes kill most pilots; (3) being struck 

by a tree or limb kills timber cutters; (4) falls from heights kill construction workers; 

(5) highway crashes kill truck drivers; (6) roof falls and heavy equipment strike and 

kill miners; and (7) tractor overturns kill farmers (Toscano and Windau 1998). 

These causes of death are some of the more ubiquitous and persistent examples of 

the seemingly intractable workplace hazards extant in these jobs. These causes of 

death provide a few examples of the tragedies that maintain mining, fishing, 

logging, farming, construction, and transport among the most hazardous jobs in the 

United States. 

Homicides during robberies, assaults on co-workers, terrorism, and other intentional human-made disasters (Kowalski and Vaught 1999) are the one recent exception to this consistent trend. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and 

the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 have made salient the extraordinary hazards 

and extreme risks taken on by firefighters, police, and other emergency responders 

every day that they report for work. Terrorism and the security measures necessary 

to prevent terrorism are beyond the scope of this paper. However, the characteristics of the dynamic and hazardous environments to which emergency personnel 

must respond are central to this discussion. 

Common Factors among the Most Dangerous Jobs 

What really makes a job dangerous? Death rates measuring traumatic fatalities 

provide a salient, but somewhat limited perspective. (See Toscano 1997 for a more 

general approach to this question.) The same jobs are ranked highest on fatalities 

year after year. Yet, the causes of these fatalities are related to each of the jobs in very 

specific ways and appear to have no relationship across different jobs and industries. 
Further, the highest-ranking causes of death seem to be particular to each occupation and industry. Thus while all of these work environments are hazardous, the 

specific types of hazards present are very different across the different industries. 

We hypothesize that there is one key feature present in all of these hazardous 

workplaces: the work environments are under constant change. The central thesis 

of this paper is that the requirement to continually adapt and respond to a dynamic 

and hazardous work environment places workers in these jobs at high risk, regardless of the specifics of the hazards. The constantly changing hazards require a skilled 

and vigilant workforce that can quickly adapt to the new hazards and changing risks. 

It is important to note that this is not a covert restatement of a “blaming-the-victim 

[worker]” hypothesis (Ryan 1976). Rather it is an attempt to identify commonalities 

in the interaction between environment and behavior, across a variety of dynamic 

and hazardous work environments. 

One of the earliest expressions of the interaction of environment and behavior 

in occupational safety and health was developed in mining. Sociotechnical Systems 

Theory was first hypothesized in British coal mining when the introduction of the 

longwall process changed the organization of work for the miners and produced a 

number of unintended consequences (Trist and Bamforth 1951; Trist et al. 1963). 

In a more recent example, the introduction of remotely operated mining machinery 

in the U.S. (a technological innovation) has placed the operators and other miners 

at risk of being struck by the equipment. Yet one of the principal reasons for 

converting to remote operation was to eliminate the risk to the operator of being 

trapped inside the machine by a roof fall (Steiner et al. 1997; Vaught et al. 1999). 

Informal observations from agriculture, construction, and mining suggest that workers evaluate changing hazardous situations in similar ways, even though the specific 

hazards may be quite different. Translated into a research hypothesis: Are there commonalities that can be identified across different, dynamic and hazardous work environments? More specifically, since the industrial hazards are very different: Are there 

common qualities about the dynamic nature of the hazards that can be identified? 

The term “hazard” is used in this paper to refer to features of the work environment. “Risk” refers to a worker’s degree of exposure to the hazards in the work 

environment. These terms refer to a large and complicated literature going back 

many decades (Haddon et al. 1964). The use of these terms in this paper is intended 

to clarify the distinction between (1) environmental features with the potential to 

cause harm: a hazard, and (2) the amount of potential harm to which a worker is 

exposed: his or her risk. For example, a building fire presents many hazards. 

However, a firefighter is not at risk, until he or she crosses the outside perimeter 

toward the fire. The dedication and willingness of firefighters to place their lives at 

risk to rescue others highlights one goal of this paper: to explore how we can reduce 

risk in a dynamic and hazardous work environment where the hazards cannot be 

removed, isolated, or completely controlled. 

TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF DYNAMIC AND HAZARDOUS WORK 

ENVIRONMENTS 

Two questions are implied: (1) What makes an environment hazardous? and (2) 

What makes a work environment dynamic? Known workplace hazards are usually 
eliminated or controlled during the engineering and design phase of a new manufacturing process. But the nearly 200-year history of industrialization in the U.S. shows that 

most hazards have been identified because workers were made ill, injured, or killed on 

the job (Stellman et al. 1998). Determining that anything that harms workers is a 

workplace hazard leads to a very dissatisfying tautology; there is no predictive value for 

improving worker safety or for identifying new hazards. Nevertheless, new manufacturing processes, machines, and chemicals are being introduced on a daily basis. Consequently, new workplace hazards are likely to continue to be identified empirically. Thus, 

whatever harms workers remains the principal response to the first question, above. 

A literature search for the terms, “dynamic work environment,” and “changing 

environment,” identified a number of references in management, organizational 

development, artificial intelligence, robotics, decision-making, environmental psychology and other areas. Most commonly, the term “dynamic environment” is used 

to imply a fast-paced and exciting business or managerial environment. 

The literature on risk and decision-making includes the concept of dynamic 

environments, but the emphasis appears to be focused on dynamic decision-making 

in response to a changing environment (Brehmer and Svenmarck 1995; Pascoe and 

Pidgeon 1995). The literature in environmental psychology provides a starting point 

for this investigation, (Sundstrom 1987). Environmental change is most often 

addressed through post-occupancy evaluations of indoor environmental design, 

which examine the effects of a one-time, major change in the office environment. 

However, the idea of a continuously changing environmental hazard does not 

appear to have been addressed in this literature. 

Only Steiner et al. (1997) and Karwowski (1991) have used the term “dynamic 

work environment” with reference to human/worker interaction with a physical 

work environment that is constantly changing. Steiner et al. (1997) has provided an 

important focus for the discussion and development of the ideas presented here. In 

addition, the present paper has its roots in a variety of separate investigations in 

agriculture, construction, and mining by one or more of the authors, going back 

more than ten years. This paper attempts to continue and expand this approach, 

including: (1) the properties of the physical environment undergoing constant 

change, and (2) the interactions of workers with this environment. The focus of this 

typology is on the changing nature of the physical environment and how these 

forces are controlled. A few key features regarding workplace hazards are proposed. 

Key Features of Dynamic and Hazardous Work Environments: 

1. Controllability and Degree of Control: Control has two, interrelated dimensions: (a) 

controllability, i.e., whether a hazard or process can be brought under full engineering 

control, and (b) the degree of engineering control that can be exercised over a hazard 

or process. Controllability reflects current technology. What is fundamentally uncontrollable today may come under engineering control sometime in the future. The 

degree of control refers to the level or proportion of engineering control over each 

identified hazard when the available controls are functioning properly. 

For example, underground mining applies engineering controls to moderate and 

restrict the forces of the earth, but these forces are fundamentally uncontrollable. The 

rock strata above an underground mine move in obedience to the geologic structure 

and stresses in the earth. We can study and try to predict earth movement. However, 
these estimates are limited by the current state of geologic science, including correct 

identification of hidden faults and other geologic structures deep within the earth, as 

well as the correct application of the available engineering controls (Beauchamp 1998). 

2. Predictability: The ability to predict future changes in an environment, especially 

changes in hazardous features of a setting, is a critically important corollary of control 

over those features. The general process and structure of an environmental hazard 

may be well understood, but a specific instance usually has too many variables for 

accurate prediction. To be useful, the predictions must be sufficiently specific that 

some intervention or avoidance is possible. Uncontrollable, dynamic environments 

may be partially predictable with respect to selected features, and they may be highly 

predictable at a very general level, e.g., through the application of chaos theory. But 

at a moment-by-moment level of analysis, such environments are often unpredictable. 

For example, describing a 33-knot wind, gusting to 40 knots, with 20-foot waves, and 

a period of 11 seconds, provides fairly precise information (NOAA 2001). However, 

these data from a marine buoy cannot be easily translated into the second-by-second 

pitch, roll, and yaw of the deck of a fishing boat working through such swells. 

3. Hidden, Obscured, Difficult to Detect, Unexpected: Hazards may be obscured by 

clutter or other equipment or may blend in with the background such that they 

disappear into the normal scene. Such environmental features are termed degraded 

hazards, i.e., the image of the hazard is obscured or degraded in some way (Kowalski 

et al. 1995; Perdue et al. 1994). Such hazards can cause the greatest problems when 

a worker sees what he or she expects to see and does not identify the hazard as a 

feature requiring focused attention. Unstable, unsupported, or cluttered ground or 

structures are important examples in many different settings. 

Not only may hazards be hidden and difficult to detect, they also may be unexpected, unlikely, and therefore difficult to predict. A veteran worker has learned to 

anticipate, seek out, and identify hidden and unexpected hazards. One problem is 

that this level of vigilance is difficult to maintain hour after hour. The occupation 

of truck driver is perhaps the best example of a job requiring extended vigilance. 

4. Moving or Movable — Fixed or Unrestricted Path: Most dangerous machinery in a factory is 

usually bolted down or permitted to move in a fixed track. By contrast, in construction some 

equipment may be set up, operate for a day or two, and then be moved to the next location. 

Such a movable hazard requires workers to adjust to the hazard’s location at the start of every 

work period. Different portions of the work environment may change without warning and 

at different rates of speed, requiring constant vigilance. Similarly, drivers generally follow the 

lane markers on a highway, but except on the new “smart highways,” there is no physical or 

engineering restraint to prevent a vehicle from leaving the marked path. In other words the 

potential exists for a vehicle to proceed unrestricted in any direction. 

5. Speed, Force, and Rate of Change: Severe weather can rapidly and unpredictably 

change speed and force. Wind shear has only recently been identified as a major 

hazard for aircraft. Ocean winds and waves can be predicted on average, but may 

exert great force unpredictably. 

6. A Dynamic Work Process as a Hazard: In some hazardous work environments, one 

or more of the hazards may be required as part of the production process: the 

hazard is necessary for the job or task to be completed. For example, in underground longwall mining, miners establish a dynamic tension such that the tremendous pressure of the unsupported but uncollapsed roof makes it easier to extract the 
coal. Without this pressure, the shearing drum will overheat and production must 

be periodically halted to allow the drum to cool. In this example, the unsupported 

roof is integral to the production process. 

It is also necessary that the unsupported roof collapse into the mined-out area at 

the proper rate. When there is insufficient roof collapse behind the shields and too 

much roof pressure is exerted on the longwall face, bursting of the coal face and 

other hazards may result. Whether confined to a small area or extending over a large 

section, outbursts of coal or rock are catastrophic events (Beauchamp 1998). A 

delicate, dynamic balance must be struck between a sufficient amount of roof 

compression on the face to facilitate the mining process while preventing coal 

outbursts and keeping the pressure on the shields (protecting the miners) within 

manageable limits. The hazard presented by the unsupported roof is required for 

the work to take place and is not separable from the task of mining the coal. For a 

general description of longwall mining, see: chap. 7, Stefanko (1983). 

Longwall mining uses the forces of the earth to facilitate the mining process. A 

more mundane example in which the dynamic hazard facilitates the work process 

can be found in every kitchen: a cook uses a gas flame or hot electric coil to prepare 

food. Regulated use of the hazard is integral to the food preparation process. 

7. Multiple, Interacting Hazards: Hazardous work environments may often contain a 

primary hazard, but most such environments contain additional hazards that must 

be managed as well. In addition, the work processes may change the nature or 

intensity of one or more hazards and may introduce new hazards into the work 

environment. Technology designed to eliminate one hazard may introduce new, 

unanticipated hazards (Vaught et al. 1999). 

Complications arise when the hazards interact and overlap. One hazard may 

require a certain set of safe work practices that constrain the response to the other 

hazards. For example, each construction worker is actively changing his or her 

environment. But when many different workers are all making changes simultaneously, unpredictable and unexpected hazards may be created. Constant vigilance 

is required just to remain aware of one’s immediate surroundings. 

8. Human-Generated Hazards: This category includes both intentional, volitional, humancaused hazards (e.g., criminal behavior) as well as the unintentional action by a co-worker 

or other person that might serve to exacerbate the impact or force of an existing hazard. 

The focus of this paper is on physical features of the work environment. The complex 

motivations and decisions of people, especially people considering violent crime, are 

beyond the scope of this paper. For example, the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, 

and the security issues raised by these events must be considered elsewhere. However, the 

rapidly changing and extremely hazardous environments created by this terrorism may be 

examined by the typology proposed here. Further, to whatever degree physical environments can be designed to prevent the consequences of unpredictable or violent human 

behavior, the approach may be similar to the control other workplace hazards. 

Haddon’s Matrix 

With respect to the classic Haddon matrix (Haddon 1968, 1980; Haddon et al. 

1964), the discussion in this paper focuses on the pre-event row (of the matrix), 

primarily on the physical and socio-economic environment, and on the environ­
mental agent. This paper also considers the interaction of the work environment 

with the host (i.e., the worker). To facilitate the discussion of the typology presented 

above, Table 1 describes two examples: (1) underground longwall mining — focusTable 1. Dynamic hazard typology. Sample Job Hazard Assessment. 
ing on hazards associated with roof falls, and (2) truck driving — focusing on 

hazards associated with highway crashes. These are very brief examples, presented 

to help illustrate the use of the typology. We have not attempted to address every 

possible hazard found in these occupations that may be relevant to the typology or 

to Haddon’s more comprehensive matrix. 

Dynamic Work Environments that are Extremely Hazardous 

This typology predicts that the most hazardous work environments will have the 

following features: 

1.	 low degree of control: engineering systems may attempt to manage the hazardous 

forces, but it is difficult or impossible to actually control the hazard; 

2.	 low predictability: the dynamic processes of the hazard may be understood in 

a general sense, but key elements of the hazard are not predictable; 

3.	 hidden, obscured, undetectable, unexpected: workers must consciously search or 

examine the environment for the presence of the hazards, all the while 

maintaining the work process; 

4.	 unrestricted movement: the hazard or hazardous process can move unpredictably in three dimensions; 

5.	 high speed, great force, and high acceleration: the hazards are powerful and 

sudden; 

6.	 a balance of dynamic hazards is required for the work process to take place; 

7.	 many different hazards are present and interacting with each other, thereby 

constraining the ability to respond to the requirements of individual hazards; 

and 

8.	 intentional, violent or criminal behavior that releases or exacerbates a hazard. 

Except in war, few hazardous work environments are likely to contain all of the 

worst components of the environmental features described in this typology. As we 

begin to consider what interventions and controls can be brought to bear upon these 

hazards, the fundamental inadequacy of such interventions becomes apparent. Wellknown to industrial engineers and hygienists, the classic hierarchy of control (Raterman 

1996; OTA 1985) prescribes a clear order of such interventions (see Table 2). 

THE HIERARCHY OF CONTROL 

The primary purpose of the hierarchy of control is to identify and promote 

engineering modifications to either eliminate or fully control hazards in the 

work environment. Administrative controls are secondary to engineering, and 

personal protective equipment (PPE) is a last resort when no other controls are 

possible (OTA 1985). Administrative controls and PPE are viewed as less desir­
Table 2. The hierarchy of control. 

I. Engineering Controls 

A. Eliminate the hazard 

B. Substitution of material, equipment, or process 

C. Isolation of hazard, e.g., barriers and/or removing the worker(s) 

D. Ventilation of airborne contaminants 

II. Administrative Controls to reduce exposure 

A. Reduced work hours 

B. Employee education and training 

1. Improved hazard recognition 

2. Improved work practices 

III. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 

Adapted from Raterman (1996) and OTA (1985). 

able solutions than engineering controls because they often focus on controlling 

worker exposure rather than on controlling the hazard itself. What is not well 

recognized is that worker education and training is required to operate and 

maintain virtually every type of control in the hierarchy, except where the work 

process has been re-designed to completely eliminate the hazard(s) from the 

environment. 

One of the key features of the types of work environments considered in this 

paper is that many of the dynamic hazards are fundamentally uncontrollable or 

cannot be adequately controlled. Engineering controls are certainly applied, but 

not in such a way as to eliminate or fully isolate the hazards. And workers must 

maintain the existing engineering controls. Thus, worker education and training 

(an administrative procedure in the hierarchy) is essential to operate the environmental controls that are available. Further, except where hazards can be fully 

isolated, personal protective equipment that is properly used and maintained is 

required to reduce worker exposure to the hazards. Realistically, worker participation is required at every level of the hierarchy, except where the hazard is completely 

eliminated. 

Expanding the Utility of the Hierarchy of Control 

As originally conceived and implemented, this is a fairly strict hierarchy. One 

selects a lower level of control when a higher level in the hierarchy has been shown 

to be unavailable or ineffective (OTA 1985). However, the examination of occupational environments described in this paper suggests that several levels in the 

hierarchy should be selected at the same time — more like a simultaneity than a 

strict hierarchy. In fact, except where a hazard can be completely eliminated from 

the work environment, it is likely that a number of the solutions proposed by the 

hierarchy will be required to function in concert. Engineering controls that restrict 
a hazard must be monitored and maintained in proper working order, requiring 

worker intervention. Workers may have to enter the hazardous area, requiring the 

use of PPE. New workers must be trained to control the hazards and to be aware of 

situations created by a possible breakdown in these controls. Where engineering 

control is limited or not available, workers must be trained to recognize and avoid 

the hazards. While the hierarchy lists a preferred order in developing engineering 

solutions to manage or control hazards, in practice it often does require a multifaceted approach that involves the workers in implementing just about every step. 

This brief discussion shows that the range of worker involvement in understanding, interpreting, and implementing safe work practices is extensive. In 

most work settings, workers are exposed to hazards while they are fully involved 

in completing a job assignment. A worker’s attention is often divided between 

the production processes and hazardous elements of the job even where the 

principal task is to monitor the work flow. Thus, to the degree that each worker’s 

attention is divided between production and hazard, he or she may be at 

increased risk. 

Maintaining safe work practices under hazardous conditions requires vigilance, 

focused attention on competing features of the environment, good judgment, quick 

decision making, and adherence to established practice within an acceptable range 

of variability. As the hazards change, the safe work practices must be modified. The 

traditional hierarchy of control does not address the issue of what may be an 

appropriate or acceptable degree of variability in response to hazards — particularly 

as those hazards undergo change. Perhaps most important, workers in these dynamic settings must be free to adapt their work practices to meet the changing 

requirements of the environmental hazards. 

An important corollary to the preceding is that the hierarchy of control addresses 

hazards one at a time. The implicit, untested assumption is that the workplace 

hazards, as well as the controls brought to bear on the hazards, are independent of 

one another. Yet, engineering controls that respond to one hazard may create a new 

hazard or exacerbate an existing one. As noted above, the introduction of remotely 

operated mining machines reduced the risk of being trapped in the machine by a 

roof fall and increased the risk to the operator of being struck by other mining 

equipment, including other remotely operated machines (Steiner et al. 1997; Vaught 

et al. 1999). 

In addressing hazards one at a time, the hierarchy of control also confines 

its focus almost exclusively to an individual worker. Hazards are typically 

considered with respect to their effects on individual workers, and the engineering solutions introduced are considered to be somewhat independent of 

the workforce. This may be an overgeneralization. Nevertheless, work group 

and organization-level processes are not simply the sum of the individual 

workers’ activities. Different work groups may have different reactions to a 

given workplace hazard and thus a different interaction with the engineering 

controls placed on that hazard. Organizational decisions can exert a major 

influence on how effective and safe the standard operating procedures turn 

out to be. To be effective, the hierarchy of control must consider that workplace hazards exist in a dynamic physical and social work environment. The 
controls selected for a given hazard must be responsive to these multilevel 

systems. 

This discussion suggests an additional measurement for the controllability feature in this typology: “What different means of control in the hierarchy are available 

with respect to a given hazard?” Since administrative controls concern standard 

operating procedures and other work practices, we see that this portion of the 

hierarchy of control is squarely situated within a worker –work environment interaction. 

THE INTERACTION OF ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR 

The hierarchy of control is not simply a checklist of engineering approaches to 

work environment hazards, it is a structured, ordered approach to maintaining 

safety under the conditions of a continuous worker-hazard interaction. Stokols et al. 

(2000) describe this interaction as “people-environment transactions,” albeit without focusing on hazardous settings. The use of the term “transaction” implies a 

dialectic of people-environment relations, which can change or transform the entire 

relationship. The authors note that these transactions may occur at the individual, 

organizational, and community or societal levels. 

The present examination of dynamic and hazardous work environments has not 

made any distinctions between individual, organizational, and community approaches 

to work tasks. The records of workplace fatalities referenced at the beginning of this 

paper describe individual events. Yet, many of these events may have been the result 

of a complex set of systemic- and individual-level failures. To investigate work 

organizations in sufficient detail, it seems appropriate to consider both the whole 

organization and the crew or work group within the organization, yielding four 

levels of analysis: (1) individual, (2) work group, (3) organization, and (4) community. 

The inclusion of a community level may seem problematic for most work 

settings. However, in rural communities (e.g., in many farming, fishing, logging, 

and mining regions) the work culture and safety climate of the industry may be 

shaped as much by the community as by the type of work performed, (Cole 2001; 

Cole et al. 2001). 

This focus on multiple levels of analysis suggests the possibility of a matrix to 

examine and rate workplace hazards using the typology of features in dynamic and 

hazardous work environments. By examining the hazards at multiple levels of 

analysis, we may begin to identify opportunities for safety and health interventions 

through these additional venues. 

Table 3 presents an example of this matrix applied to a farming community 

and focusing on the hazard of tractor overturns. Tractors may overturn quite 

suddenly: (1) when a stream bank falls away, (2) when a sharp turn is attempted 

at too high a speed, (3) during wet or icy conditions, (4) while towing a heavy 

load, (5) when encountering a hidden stump or other hazard, (6) during 

highway travel or as a result of a collision, (7) on steep slopes, and (8) under 

numerous other conditions. On highways, tractors towing equipment present 

unexpected hazards to automobile drivers who are unfamiliar with tractor operations (Murphy 1992). 
Table 3. Dynamic hazard assessment matrix. Example: tractor overturn.
 

(Table 3 continued on the next page.) 

There is no effective engineering control to prevent a tractor overturn. However, 

a Rollover Protective Structure (ROPS) — essentially a rollbar for a tractor — and a 

fastened seatbelt will help protect the tractor operator from serious injury. The ROPS 

is an injury prevention engineering control that establishes a zone of protection for 

the operator. The fastened seatbelt assures that the operator will remain inside the 

zone of protection during an overturn. Once a tractor tips to the point of no return, 

the overturn is usually completed in less than two seconds (Murphy 1992). 

Future Work 

The sample dynamic hazard assessment matrix (Table 3) provides a starting 

point for testing these hypotheses while investigating workplace injuries, fatalities, 

and “near-miss” events. Events can be examined with respect to the hazards that are 
Table 3. (continued)
 

present and the topics that are addressed in the matrix. The research question is, 

Can the components in this preliminary typology lead to greater insight into 

dynamic and hazardous work environments? Specifically, can this typology suggest 

more focused and detailed questions for injury investigations? 

This typology makes some specific predictions about the kinds of problems workers 

encounter in hazardous work environments. Further, although these predictions have been 

based on an examination of the four most hazardous industries in the U.S., the empirical 

tests proposed here can certainly extend to include a wide variety of hazardous work settings 

(e.g., manufacturing). Then, if investigations from several different hazardous industries 

begin to yield similar findings, there will be empirical evidence that workers face similar 

problems in dealing with very different workplace hazards. Such evidence may lead to a 

more precise understanding of the worker–work environment interaction that can place 

workers at risk. 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Larry Layne (NIOSH), Janice Windau (Bureau of Labor Statistics), and Elyce 

Biddle, Suzanne Marsh, Steve Brightwell, Ron Schuler, Larry Foster, Evelyn Palassis, 
Pauline Elliott, and Christina Beam (NIOSH) all provided invaluable assistance in 

the preparation of this paper. The authors thank Prof. A. John Bailer (Miami Univ., 

Oxford, OH), Dr. Barry Johnson (Emory Univ., Atlanta, GA), Dr. Kim Lim (Maine 

Dept. of Labor), and Jennifer Lincoln, Dr. Leslie MacDonald, Bob Peters, and Dr. 

James T. Wassell (NIOSH) for their constructive recommendations and feedback 

on earlier drafts of this paper. 

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