Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

In re Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re Z.J., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, PetitionerAppellee, v. Lisa A.J., Respondent-Appellant).

District & No. Second District 

No. 2-19-0824

Filed March 26, 2020

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 14-JA-361; 

the Hon. Francis Martinez, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Gary D. McGuane, of DeKalb, for appellant.

Marilyn Hite Ross, State’s Attorney, of Rockford (Patrick Delfino, 

Edward R. Psenicka, and Diane Campbell, of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Birkett and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment 

and opinion.
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OPINION

¶ 1 I. INTRODUCTION

¶ 2 Respondent, Lisa A.J., appeals from an order of the circuit court of Winnebago County, 

finding that she was an unfit parent and that it was in the best interests of her minor biological 

son, Z.J., that her parental rights be terminated. On appeal,1 respondent raises four principal 

issues. First, she contends that the trial court’s finding that she was unfit was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence because “virtually all of the evidence offered by the state 

consisted of multi-level hearsay” for which the State laid “no proper foundation.” Second, she 

challenges the trial court’s finding that it was in Z.J.’s best interests to terminate her parental 

rights, arguing again that virtually all of the State’s evidence consisted of multilevel hearsay 

and that the remaining, admissible evidence was insufficient to sustain the State’s burden of 

proof. Third, respondent maintains that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. 

Fourth, respondent argues that her due process rights were violated because the judge who 

presided over the proceedings leading up to the filing of the motion to terminate her parental 

rights also presided over both the unfitness and best interest phases of the termination hearing. 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

¶ 3 II. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Z.J. was born on October 24, 2004, and has been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder 

(autism), disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder 

(ADHD). Respondent identified Edward D. as Z.J.’s putative biological father, but Edward did 

not participate in the underlying proceedings and is not a party to this appeal. On October 21, 

2014, the State filed a three-count petition alleging that Z.J. was a neglected and abused minor. 

The first two counts alleged that Z.J. was neglected based on an injurious environment, thereby 

placing him at risk of harm in that respondent’s paramour, Daniel A., struck Z.J. with an object 

(count I) and grabbed Z.J., causing bruising (count II). 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2014). 

Count III alleged that Z.J. was an abused minor in that Daniel created a substantial risk of 

physical injury to Z.J., other than by accidental means, which would be likely to cause death, 

disfigurement, impairment of emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function, 

by grabbing Z.J., causing bruising. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 2014).

¶ 5 A. Shelter Care and Neglect Adjudication

¶ 6 The matter proceeded to a shelter-care hearing on October 21, 2014, which respondent 

attended. The court appointed an assistant public defender to represent respondent and a 

guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent Z.J.’s interests. The State submitted a statement of facts 

that provided in relevant part as follows. On October 17, 2014, the Illinois Child Abuse Hotline 

received a call that Z.J. was observed with “two blue bruises *** larger than a quarter” on the 

front of his chest. Z.J. had told the caller that on October 15, 2014, his “stepfather,” Daniel A., 

grabbed him “very hard in the chest” because he did not finish his homework. Z.J. further 

1

Justice Michael J. Burke participated in this appeal but has since been appointed to the Illinois 

Supreme Court. Our supreme court has held that the departure of a judge prior to the filing date will 

not affect the validity of a decision so long as the remaining two judges concur. Proctor v. Upjohn Co., 

175 Ill. 2d 394, 396 (1997).
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related that respondent was present when the incident occurred. The caller represented that 

Daniel was a registered sex offender. When a child protection investigator subsequently met 

with Z.J., respondent, and Daniel, Z.J. told the investigator that the bruises developed when 

Daniel “grabbed his shirt and pulled it up so high that *** his belly was showing” after Z.J. 

refused to do his homework. Z.J. confirmed that respondent was present when Daniel grabbed 

him. Respondent denied that Daniel touched Z.J. and accused the Illinois Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) and others of harassing her. According to Daniel, when 

Z.J. refused to do his homework, Daniel put Z.J. “in a corner.” Daniel denied grabbing Z.J. by 

his shirt. Z.J. was taken into protective custody and placed in the home of a relative.

¶ 7 After providing respondent with several admonishments, the court recessed to allow the 

parties to discuss the matter. When the hearing resumed, the State announced that respondent 

had agreed to waive her right to a temporary custody hearing and also agreed that (1) there was 

probable cause to believe that Z.J. was abused and neglected, (2) there was urgent and 

immediate necessity to remove Z.J. from his home, (3) DCFS used reasonable efforts in 

removing Z.J., (4) temporary guardianship and custody would be placed with DCFS, which 

would have discretion to place Z.J. with a responsible relative or in traditional foster care, and 

(5) visitation between Z.J. and respondent would take place at the discretion of DCFS. The 

court accepted the parties’ agreement and entered a temporary custody order, a protective 

order, and a supplemental protective order in accordance therewith. At a subsequent hearing, 

the trial court assigned a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) to the case and scheduled 

an adjudicatory hearing. On January 14, 2015, respondent appeared before the court and 

factually stipulated to count II of the neglect petition, based on the original statement of facts. 

The State dismissed counts I and III of the petition with the understanding that any services 

would be based on all three counts. 

¶ 8 On March 25, 2015, the parties appeared for a dispositional hearing. At the commencement 

of the hearing, the trial court noted that it had received two reports for the hearing, one from 

the caseworker assigned to the family and one from the CASA. The court then recessed the 

proceeding to allow the parties to confer. Thereafter, the State announced that “the parents are 

going to be found unfit or—well, unable to care for the minor at this time.” The parties further 

agreed that (1) DCFS would retain guardianship and custody with discretion to place Z.J. with 

a responsible relative or in traditional foster care, (2) visitation between respondent and Z.J. 

would be at the discretion of DCFS, and (3) all prior orders would remain in place. The State 

explained that the factual basis for the agreement was “the court report that had been prepared 

for today.” The court accepted the parties’ agreement and entered an order in accordance 

therewith.

¶ 9 B. Permanency Review Hearings and Motion to Terminate Parental Rights

¶ 10 In the months and years that followed the dispositional hearing, the trial court held 10 

permanency review hearings. During this time, Z.J. had various placements, including with 

relatives, in foster care, and at hospitals. Because of aggressive behavior, however, Z.J. was 

moved in March 2016 to the Cunningham Children’s Home (Cunningham) in Urbana. The 

record indicates that, while at Cunningham, Z.J. has been involved in many incidents of 

physical and verbal aggression, including biting himself and staff members, hitting and kicking 

staff members, and using racial slurs toward staff and other residents.
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¶ 11 At each permanency review hearing, the court received from the caseworker then assigned 

to the family a report detailing the family’s progress. The reports included the family’s service 

plans, which identified several tasks for respondent, including (1) participation in parenting 

classes, (2) participation in individual counseling, (3) participation in couple’s counseling, 

(4) participation in educational groups for children with autism or developmental disabilities, 

(5) compliance with agency recommendations, and (6) participation in family therapy. 

Respondent was also asked to draft a safety plan for Z.J.’s return home and maintain visitation 

with Z.J.

¶ 12 The first permanency-review hearing was held on July 21, 2015. In her report to the court, 

caseworker Megan Grooms-Alberto noted that respondent had begun parenting classes, had 

been cooperative with the agency managing her case (Children’s Home and Aid), and had 

expressed a willingness to participate in other tasks identified in the service plan, including 

individual counseling and educational groups for children with autism and developmental 

disabilities. Grooms-Alberto indicated that she would refer respondent (and Daniel) to couple’s 

therapy when respondent’s therapist deemed it clinically appropriate. Although GroomsAlberto opined that respondent had made reasonable efforts during the review period and 

recommended a permanency goal of “return home within 12 months,” she voiced concern that 

respondent had not developed a safety plan. At the hearing, the parties and the GAL agreed to 

stand on the caseworker’s report. The court agreed that respondent had made reasonable efforts 

and that a goal of return home within 12 months was appropriate.

¶ 13 Over the course of the next five review periods, Grooms-Alberto was succeeded as the 

family’s caseworker, first by Ashley Trosper and then by Cammarie Mayzes, who was 

assigned to the family in December 2016. The caseworkers’ reports during this time reflected 

that, while respondent was generally cooperative with the agency and completed certain tasks 

identified in the service plans, she struggled with or did not participate in other tasks. For 

instance, while respondent completed parenting classes and an initial round of individual 

counseling, she failed to attend training for children with autism and struggled to develop a 

safety plan. Respondent was found to have made reasonable efforts and/or reasonable progress 

during some of the review periods, but not all of them. Throughout this period, the trial court 

maintained the permanency goal of return home.

¶ 14 At the seventh permanency review hearing, on January 24, 2018, Mayzes and respondent 

testified. Mayzes testified that she had asked respondent to engage in autism-support services 

with Easter Seals and attend more visits with Z.J., but respondent refused both requests. 

Respondent told Mayzes that work obligations prevented her from engaging in services with 

Easter Seals, but she did not provide a reason for refusing to attend more visits with Z.J. 

Mayzes also testified that there had been some complications related to the visits, culminating 

in a staffing with DCFS in July 2017. As a result of the staffing, DCFS recommended that 

Daniel not participate in the visits and that respondent not mention Daniel during her visits. 

Mayzes explained that this was because respondent “push[es] Daniel onto [Z.J.],” sometimes 

resulting in Z.J.’s behaviors becoming “escalated.” Although this was explained to respondent, 

she continued to talk about Daniel during visits. Mayzes noted that, because respondent was 

married to Daniel, Z.J. would have to “get comfortable” with Daniel in order to return home. 

Mayzes testified that the agency wanted respondent to complete counseling and a 

psychological assessment before determining that returning home was not a viable option.
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¶ 15 Respondent testified that she attended services through Easter Seals but stopped going five 

or six months earlier because of work obligations. Respondent planned to reengage in services 

when her work schedule allowed. Respondent attributed her failure to visit Z.J. more often to 

the cost of driving to Urbana. She noted that, although the agency provided her with “gas 

cards,” they did not cover the entire cost of the trip. She testified that, if she were to receive 

additional financial assistance, she would visit more frequently. Respondent acknowledged 

that, if Z.J. returned home, he would require constant supervision. She testified that she had a 

babysitter in place to watch Z.J. after school while she was at work. Respondent initially 

testified that the babysitter could provide “one-on-one supervision” for Z.J. However, she 

could not remember the babysitter’s name and later acknowledged that the babysitter would 

be caring for up to 12 children at a time.

¶ 16 The trial court concluded that respondent had not made reasonable efforts or reasonable 

progress during the review period. The court remarked that Z.J.’s needs were “great” and 

“extraordinary” but that respondent did not seem to understand “exactly what we are dealing 

with here.” The court elaborated:

“I mean the testimony is that the care plan is a baby-sitter whose name she doesn’t 

know, who has got a license to take care of 12 kids. Well, it’s obvious as the nose is on 

her face this child can’t be in a facility where 1 person or 2 people are caring for 12 

children, he being 1. That’s not going to happen. I don’t believe that I have been shown 

that [respondent] has a grasp as long as this case has been going on with exactly how 

dire [Z.J.’s] circumstances are. Perhaps with more education we will figure that out, 

but [Z.J.], it would be easier to return an infant than [Z.J.], who presents greater 

challenges to the average family than an infant would *** present.”

The court stated that it was not prepared to change the permanency goal until respondent 

underwent a psychological assessment, but it acknowledged that a goal of return home was “a 

very bleak prognosis.” As a result, the court kept the permanency goal at return home within 

12 months.

¶ 17 In February 2018, respondent underwent a psychological evaluation by Dr. Valerie 

Bouchard. Mayzes received the assessment in May 2018 and noted the following. Respondent 

presented with a WAIS-IV full-scale IQ score of 76, representing intellectual functioning in 

the “borderline range.” Respondent reported that she had not completed autism training with 

Easter Seals, because “the program expected too much of parents who needed to work to 

support their families in order to have a home for a child to return.” Respondent did not 

adequately understand autism and, specifically, the limitations of Z.J.’s functioning. 

Respondent did not have an adequate care plan for Z.J. if he were to be returned to her. 

Respondent minimized concerns about Daniel and his interpersonal difficulties with Z.J. 

Respondent’s judgment and insight were poor. Respondent exhibited significant dependency. 

Respondent did not take personal responsibility for the circumstances that led to Z.J. coming 

into care, instead blaming others for his removal. Dr. Bouchard diagnosed respondent with 

dependent personality disorder, adjustment disorder with depressed mood, and borderline 

intellectual functioning. Dr. Bouchard opined that respondent’s prognosis for successful 

progress toward reunification was poor. Dr. Bouchard’s recommendations for respondent 

included the following: (1) completing Easter Seals programs for training on autism; 

(2) following through with the visitation plan for Z.J. and informing him that she is making the 
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choice to be with him, even when Daniel cannot attend visits; and (3) participating with Daniel 

in couple’s therapy to work on understanding Z.J.’s issues due to his autism.

¶ 18 The eighth permanency review hearing took place on June 25, 2018. In her report, Mayzes 

concluded that the permanency goal of return home could not be achieved because 

respondent’s mental health issues had to be addressed. Further, respondent and Daniel needed 

to engage in services offered by Easter Seals and complete individual counseling, couple’s 

therapy, and a class that focuses on parenting children with mental health and autism issues. 

Mayzes noted that respondent had failed to engage in needed services, had denied any physical 

abuse of Z.J., and had been inconsistent in visitation and phone contact with Z.J. Moreover, 

respondent continued her relationship with Daniel, who denied that he had done anything 

wrong and said that corporal punishment was appropriate for Z.J. Mayzes noted that 

respondent had made no progress in over a year toward Z.J.’s return home. As such, the 

caseworker recommended a goal of return home within 12 months pending a legal screen by 

DCFS.

¶ 19 At the hearing, the State stood on the caseworker’s report and argued that respondent had 

not made reasonable efforts or reasonable progress. The State believed that returning home 

was not in Z.J.’s best interests or a viable option in the near future, given how long the case 

had been open. As to the appropriate permanency goal, the State represented that this presented 

“a bit of a Catch 22.” The State explained that Z.J. was placed at a residential facility and that 

it was “hesitant” to recommend termination of parental rights without Z.J. being in a foster 

home. However, to find Z.J. a foster home, the goal must be changed to “at least substitute care 

or adoption.” Accordingly, the State recommended a permanency goal of substitute care 

pending a court determination on termination of parental rights. The State indicated, however, 

that it did not intend to begin proceedings to terminate respondent’s parental rights until it had 

“some idea of possibility of placements.”

¶ 20 Respondent’s counsel argued that, because the psychological assessment was “so new” and 

respondent had been diagnosed with “significant mental health issues,” the agency should 

receive additional time to provide services to respondent. Respondent’s counsel therefore 

asked the court to find that respondent had made reasonable efforts, defer a finding of 

reasonable progress, and keep the permanency goal at return home within 12 months.

¶ 21 The GAL also argued that respondent had not made reasonable efforts or reasonable 

progress during the review period. The GAL recommended changing the permanency goal to 

substitute care pending a court determination on termination of parental rights. In support of 

this recommendation, the GAL noted that, from February 2018 until the date of the hearing, 

respondent had visited Z.J. only twice, she had not completed training relative to coping with 

the behaviors of an autistic child, she continued to deny that Z.J. came into care because of 

Daniel’s physical abuse of Z.J., and she continued to be in a relationship with Daniel, who saw 

nothing wrong with using corporal punishment for an autistic child.

¶ 22 The court concluded that respondent had failed to make reasonable efforts or reasonable 

progress during the review period and that it was appropriate to change the permanency goal 

to substitute care pending a court determination of termination of parental rights. The court 

explained its decision in relevant part as follows:

“The case is *** three years old. *** And it appears to be the consensus except 

from the parents, of course, but—that the prognosis for reunification because of the 
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condition of the child and the ability of the parents, the prognosis is rather dim. It 

doesn’t appear that—It doesn’t appear that further services are going to be successful.

It’s not—It’s not fun to do this sort of thing. But I will—I will change the goal. I 

know there’s not been a screening. [DCFS] has correctly said that the legal screening 

simply is the legal department’s position or their own agency as to whether there is 

clear and convincing evidence of unfitness and best interests and a preponderance of 

the evidence. I think the court can also in a sense do that screening based on the history 

of the case. That’s why the court has the ability to change the goal. And it does appear 

that that’s the case.

Now whether we wish to proceed given the condition of the child, that’s a different 

story.

* * *

I am not really basing my decision on the visitation issue. Visitation is certainly 

data. But—Well, I guess let me put it this way. The lack of visitation certainly is a 

negative. But visitation if it had been diligent is not necessarily curative of all of the 

other problems. It doesn’t work both ways. Really I am really noting just the 

inability. . . I am not using the word failure but the inability to grasp the parenting skills 

that are necessary to reunify these parties.”

¶ 23 On December 7, 2018, the State filed a motion for termination of parental rights. The State 

alleged that respondent was an unfit parent in that she failed to (1) maintain a reasonable degree 

of interest, concern, or responsibility as to Z.J.’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)), 

(2) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that caused Z.J.’s removal, during 

the periods from February 16, 2017, through November 16, 2017, and September 25, 2017, 

through June 25, 2018 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2018)), and (3) failed to make 

reasonable progress toward Z.J.’s return home during the same two periods (750 ILCS 

50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)).

¶ 24 Meanwhile, the ninth permanency review hearing was held on December 10, 2018. Mayzes 

reported that since the permanency goal was changed to substitute care pending a court 

determination on termination of parental rights, neither respondent nor Daniel were involved 

in any services, communicated with the agency, or attended agency meetings. Respondent did 

visit Z.J. for one hour each month during the review period, except for November. Mayzes also 

noted that the agency had made special arrangements so respondent could visit Z.J. on his 

birthday but that respondent arrived late and missed his party. Mayzes opined that respondent’s 

conduct demonstrated “the lack of investment in [Z.J.’s] life and putting his needs first.” 

Mayzes reported that, during phone conversations, Z.J. would lead the conversation and 

respondent did not seem interested. Moreover, during the last visit supervised by Mayzes, 

respondent brought up Daniel, prompting Mayzes to redirect the conversation. Mayzes 

reported that, since respondent had decreased her involvement with Z.J., he had been involved 

in fewer incidents at Cunningham. Mayzes recommended that the court terminate respondent’s 

parental rights. The State informed the court that Z.J. was still residing at Cunningham and that 

the State was “holding off” on moving forward with the termination as it “tr[ied] to figure out 

placement.” Accordingly, the trial court stated that it would not move forward on the motion 

to terminate parental rights, and it kept the goal at substitute care pending a court determination 

on termination of parental rights.
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¶ 25 At a status hearing on February 19, 2019, Mayzes submitted a report on Z.J.’s placement. 

Mayzes noted that respondent’s contact with Z.J. and the agency continued to be inconsistent. 

Z.J.’s therapist recommended suspending respondent’s visits because respondent’s 

inconsistency had impacted Z.J. emotionally. In this regard, Mayzes noted that, during the 

review period, Z.J.’s incidents of physically aggressive behavior had increased. Mayzes also 

indicated that a permanent home had not been found for Z.J. Mayzes contacted a woman 

considered “fictive kin” 2 in Colorado, but she did not return Mayzes’s call. Mayzes was 

awaiting a response from a placement in Rockford. Z.J. had been placed on the Adoption 

Listing Service, but no matches had been found.

¶ 26 The tenth permanency review hearing was held on May 14, 2019. In her report to the court, 

Mayzes noted that, during the review period, respondent and Daniel had not engaged in any 

services toward Z.J.’s return home. Further, respondent had not returned Mayzes’s calls, emails, or letters; she denied that Z.J. had been physically abused; she had been inconsistent in 

visiting and calling Z.J.; she ceased cooperating with the agency; and she continued her 

relationship with Daniel, who continued to deny that he has done anything wrong and that 

corporal punishment was inappropriate for Z.J. Mayzes also expressed concern about 

respondent’s ability to safely protect Z.J. Mayzes recommended a permanency goal of 

substitute care pending a court determination on termination of parental rights, noting that, 

while Z.J. did not have a placement at the time, having a “concrete answer/goal of what is 

going to happen in his future ([respondent’s] rights being terminated) could provide a form of 

closure.” The trial court noted that it did not need to “grade” respondent and Daniel, as the 

permanency goal had previously been changed to substitute care pending a court determination 

on termination of parental rights.

¶ 27 C. Unfitness Hearing 

¶ 28 The unfitness phase of the termination hearing was held on July 17, 2019. Although 

respondent did not attend, her attorney was present and participated in the proceeding. Mayzes 

was the sole witness called by the State. She identified People’s exhibits one through eight as 

copies of the family’s service plans, and she testified that the exhibits “fairly and accurately 

reflect the copies [of the service plans] maintained in the [agency] file,” the service plans were 

created in the regular course of business, and she retained copies of the service plans in her 

file. The trial court admitted the service plans without objection.

¶ 29 Mayzes noted that Z.J. had been diagnosed with various disorders, including autism and 

ADHD. Mayzes explained that because of these disorders, Z.J. had “fixations” and could 

become physically and verbally aggressive. As a result, whoever cared for Z.J. must know how 

to “appropriately parent” him. Mayzes testified that various services were recommended for 

respondent, including parenting classes, individual counseling, couple’s counseling, family 

therapy, and an educational group for parents of children with autism. In addition, respondent 

was asked to cooperate with the agency, visit Z.J., and obtain stable housing and income. 

2

“Fictive kin” is a term used to refer to individuals who are not related to another individual by 

either birth or marriage but have an emotionally significant relationship with that individual that would 

take on the characteristics of a family relationship. “Fictive Kin Law and Legal Definition,” USLegal, 

https://definitions.uslegal.com/f/fictive-kin/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2021) [https://perma.cc/XA2XUUBZ]. 
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Mayzes testified that, prior to December 2016, respondent had completed the parenting classes 

and individual counseling. Respondent and Daniel had been assessed for couple’s counseling. 

In April 2017, respondent, Z.J., and Daniel began family therapy focused on how to parent Z.J. 

Family therapy was discontinued, however, because no progress was made when Daniel was 

present. The therapist told Mayzes that Daniel “wasn’t fully engaged” and would make 

inappropriate comments, such as that “corporal punishment should be allowed.”

¶ 30 After a clinical staffing in July 2017, several recommendations were made, including 

(1) the suspension of visits between Z.J. and Daniel, because Z.J.’s “behaviors increased” 

following contact with Daniel, (2) participation by respondent and Daniel in couple’s 

counseling with a focus on how to parent Z.J., (3) a psychological evaluation of respondent, 

(4) participation by respondent in Easter Seals education focused on parenting children with 

autism, and (5) continuation of family therapy, without Daniel. Mayzes testified that, in 

January 2018, she referred respondent to reengage in individual counseling and that, in March 

2018, respondent resumed individual counseling. Respondent and Daniel began couple’s 

counseling in March 2018, but, after two or three sessions, the therapist recommended that 

respondent complete individual counseling before continuing couple’s counseling. Thereafter, 

respondent and Daniel never reengaged in couple’s counseling. Mayzes noted that, although 

respondent completed the recommended psychological evaluation, she did not engage in 

education for parenting children with autism after the July 2017 staffing. Moreover, while 

family counseling proceeded with just respondent and Z.J., the therapist reported that 

respondent “just wasn’t getting the concepts or getting exactly how to parent.” As of April 

2018, respondent had not completed individual therapy, education for parenting children with 

autism, or family therapy. After the goal changed from return home to substitute care pending 

a court determination on termination of parental rights, respondent told Mayzes that she was 

not going to participate in any services.

¶ 31 On cross-examination by respondent’s attorney, Mayzes acknowledged that respondent did 

not attend classes for parenting children with autism, because the agency wanted her to first 

complete individual counseling, couples counseling, family therapy, and the psychological 

evaluation. Mayzes further explained that, although respondent finished one “phase” of 

individual counseling, a second “phase” was recommended because respondent was still 

experiencing “issues” with respect to herself, her relationship, and her parenting.

¶ 32 On cross-examination by the GAL, Mayzes testified that Z.J. came into care because he 

was physically abused by Daniel. Respondent was present during the abuse. At the time, Daniel 

was respondent’s boyfriend, but the couple married in February 2017. Mayzes noted that 

Daniel’s status as a registered sex offender raised other concerns about Daniel being around 

Z.J. Respondent and Daniel had told Mayzes that one reason they got married was so that 

Daniel could be around Z.J. unsupervised. Mayzes further testified that respondent and Daniel 

were consistent in their belief that corporal punishment was not a problem, adding that Daniel 

had repeatedly indicated to his therapist and the agency that corporal punishment “within 

limits” was fine. According to Mayzes, one of the reasons Daniel and respondent were 

repeatedly referred for similar services was their failure to accept and process that corporal 

punishment is not an appropriate form of discipline for a minor with Z.J.’s diagnoses. Daniel 

and respondent were referred for similar services also because, upon completing the first phase 

of individual counseling, they stated that they understood why Z.J. came into care but later 

indicated that they did not understand why and insisted that the agency “was against them.”
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¶ 33 On redirect examination, Mayzes testified that, with respect to the round of services 

recommended after the July 2017 staffing, there was a progression of individual counseling, 

couple’s counseling, family therapy, and parenting education. Although she wanted respondent 

to complete individual counseling, couple’s counseling, and family therapy before attending 

the class for parenting children with autism, respondent also was supposed to attend 

educational groups through Easter Seals throughout the course of the case. Mayzes testified 

that respondent did not consistently attend the second round of referrals, much less the 

educational groups through Easter Seals.

¶ 34 On re-cross examination, Mayzes acknowledged that, to the best of her knowledge, Daniel 

was fully compliant with the sex offender registry. Mayzes testified that, although she was not

aware of respondent attending any educational groups through Easter Seals, respondent did 

have “contact” with an Easter Seals representative. However, Mayzes was unaware of the 

capacity in which this contact occurred.

¶ 35 Following Mayzes’s testimony, the court took judicial notice, without objection, of the 

neglect petition, the adjudication order, the dispositional order, and the orders following the 

permanency review hearings on January 24, 2018, and June 25, 2018. Neither respondent’s 

attorney nor the GAL called any witnesses or sought the admission of any evidence.

¶ 36 After arguments by the State, respondent’s attorney, and the GAL, the trial court found that 

the State had met its burden of proving respondent unfit by clear and convincing evidence on 

all three counts of its motion. First, the court concluded that the State established by clear and 

convincing evidence that respondent failed to show a reasonable degree of responsibility as to 

Z.J.’s welfare. In this regard, the court noted that when the case began respondent was engaging 

in services. However, it became clear that Z.J.’s mental health condition required a higher level 

of understanding to create a safe environment for him. The court found that this was where 

respondent “fail[ed] miserably.” The court determined that no reasonable person could find it 

appropriate to administer corporal punishment to a child with Z.J.’s diagnoses. Yet, the court 

noted, respondent consistently agreed with Daniel that corporal punishment would be 

“perfectly acceptable.” The court concluded that this demonstrated that respondent “did not 

assimilate *** any of the parenting skills necessary to take care of a child of this nature.” 

Second, the court found that respondent was not prohibited from engaging in classes for 

parenting children with autism. Rather, she failed to fulfill the prerequisites required to engage 

in such classes. As such, the court concluded, respondent “abandoned any desire to engage in 

and learn the skills of parenting a child with autism by not engaging in the round of services 

necessary.” Third, while recognizing that a person has a fundamental right to marry, the court 

found it “curious” that the purpose of respondent’s marriage was to circumvent supervised 

visitation. The court also found Daniel’s presence problematic for two more reasons. The court 

noted that Daniel was a registered sex offender and that, while Daniel complied with his 

registration, the court did not know whether he complied with any therapy or treatment that 

would authorize unsupervised visits with Z.J. Additionally, the court noted that Daniel 

perpetrated substantial physical abuse of Z.J.

¶ 37 The court also found that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent 

failed to make reasonable efforts or reasonable progress. In support, the court noted that 

respondent failed to engage in parenting education with Easter Seals. The court explained that, 

although respondent might have had some “contact” with an Easter Seals representative, 

“contact isn’t engagement.” The court also noted that it changed the permanency goal to 
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substitute care pending a court determination on termination of parental rights because 

respondent “clearly was not meeting the goals that she needed to meet in order to go toward 

reunification.” The court acknowledged that respondent did engage in the first round of 

services, but it found that respondent failed to engage in the second round, which were the 

services necessary for a special-needs child such as Z.J.

¶ 38 D. Best Interests Hearing

¶ 39 The court held the best interest hearing on September 17, 2019. Again, respondent did not 

attend the hearing, but her attorney was present, and Mayzes was the State’s sole witness. 

Mayzes testified that Z.J. was 14 years old and had mental health issues, including autism, 

“disruptive disorder,” and ADHD. Mayzes testified that, since coming into care in 2014, Z.J. 

had been placed with fictive kin, in traditional foster care, and at hospitals. However, due to 

his mental health and behavioral issues, he was eventually moved to Cunningham. Mayzes 

testified that Z.J.’s tentative discharge date from Cunningham was January 2020. Once 

discharged, Z.J. would reside with a traditional foster family located through the Adoption 

Listing Service. 

¶ 40 Mayzes testified that the prospective foster mother had been fostering children for more 

than 25 years and had worked extensively with children who are on the autism spectrum. 

Mayzes testified that she visited the prospective foster home and found it to be safe and 

appropriate. Mayzes further testified that a transition plan was in place that provided for Z.J. 

to have contact with the prospective foster mother, including daily telephone calls and full-day 

in-person visits. Mayzes testified that the phone calls and visits had gone “very well.” Z.J. told 

Mayzes that he “loves” his foster mother and was excited to be placed with her. The foster 

mother indicated that she intended to integrate Z.J. into her family “right away.” While not 

specifically using the word “adoption,” Mayzes told Z.J. that the foster mother “can potentially 

be his forever home.” Mayzes indicated that Z.J. expressed excitement about the possibility. 

Mayzes testified that she was in the process of getting Z.J. “linked” to service providers in the 

foster family’s neighborhood. The foster mother indicated that she had identified activities 

through the park district that would help Z.J. with “the social aspect.”

¶ 41 According to Mayzes, no one else has come forth as willing and able to parent Z.J. when 

he is discharged from Cunningham. Mayzes noted that, while Z.J. does have adult siblings, her 

attempts to contact them had been unsuccessful. Moreover, Z.J. maintained contact with 

respondent but it was supervised because respondent had been inappropriate over the phone. 

For instance, respondent blamed the agencies for Z.J. being unable to return home, and she had 

told Z.J. that she will never see or speak to him again. When asked how Z.J. felt about having 

contact with respondent, Mayzes responded, “He’s okay, but it’s one of those things that, if 

talking to [respondent] is not on his daily plan, he doesn’t talk to her. So as far as [respondent], 

sometimes they can go maybe like a few weeks without talking.” Mayzes opined that it was in 

Z.J.’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 42 On cross-examination by respondent’s attorney, Mayzes admitted that, throughout the bulk 

of the case, respondent did attempt to visit Z.J. She also acknowledged that she observed a 

bond between respondent and Z.J. during their visits. On cross-examination by the GAL, 

Mayzes testified that the last two visits occurred in October 2018 and May 2019. Mayzes 

testified that Z.J. did not talk about respondent unless he had a phone call with her on his 

schedule.
- 12 -

¶ 43 On redirect examination, Mayzes testified that respondent was in a relationship with 

Daniel. Mayzes testified that Z.J. came into care because Daniel “put two bruises about a 

quarter size on [Z.J.’s] chest because he refused to do his homework.” Mayzes noted that 

Daniel had participated in some services. However, Z.J. did not feel safe around Daniel.

¶ 44 Following Mayzes’s testimony, the trial court took judicial notice, without objection, of 

the evidence from the unfitness hearing as well as Mayzes’s best-interest report. The court also 

took judicial notice of the CASA report filed that day. Respondent’s attorney presented no 

evidence.

¶ 45 Following argument by the parties, the court determined that the State established by a 

preponderance of the evidence that it was in Z.J.’s best interests that respondent’s parental 

rights be terminated. The court noted that Z.J. was quickly bonding with the prospective foster 

family and appeared excited about his prospective adoptive home. The court further noted that 

Z.J. and the foster mother spoke every day, which was “far more communication than goes on 

with [respondent] who continues to live and be married to [Daniel] who Z.J. does express fear 

[of].” On September 19, 2019, respondent filed a notice of appeal.

¶ 46 III. ANALYSIS

¶ 47 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) sets forth a bifurcated procedure for the involuntary 

termination of parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2018). Under this procedure, the 

State must make a threshold showing of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. 

705 ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2018); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 337 (2010); In re Adoption 

of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 277 (1990); In re Antwan L., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1119, 1123 (2006). If a 

court finds a parent unfit, the State must then show by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination of parental rights would serve Z.J.’s best interests. Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 277; 

Antwan L., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1123; In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d 883, 891 (2004). In this 

case, respondent argues that the trial court’s finding that she was unfit was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, because “virtually all of the evidence offered by the state consisted of 

multi-level hearsay” for which the State laid “no proper foundation.” Respondent further 

contends that the trial court erred in finding that it was in Z.J.’s best interests that her parental 

rights be terminated, again citing the alleged multilevel hearsay but also arguing that the 

remaining, admissible evidence was insufficient to sustain the State’s burden of proof. 

Respondent also asserts that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that her due 

process rights were violated, because the trial judge who presided over the proceedings leading 

up to the filing of the motion for termination of parental rights also presided over both the 

unfitness and best interests phases of the termination hearing. We address each argument in 

turn.

¶ 48 A. Unfitness

¶ 49 First, respondent argues that the State did not meet its burden of proving her unfit on any 

count because “virtually all of the evidence offered by the state consisted of multi-level 

hearsay” for which the State laid “no proper foundation.” Specifically, respondent asserts that 

the only evidence on the issue of unfitness consisted of multiple levels of hearsay in the eight 

service plans admitted and the testimony of Mayzes. Respondent concedes that service plans 

are admissible at fitness hearings under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see 

705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018); In re Kenneth J., 352 Ill. App. 3d 967, 983 (2004)), but 
- 13 -

she asserts that the State here failed to lay a foundation for the exhibits and that Mayzes’s 

testimony was based on descriptions of the contents of those reports. As such, respondent 

insists, the trial court’s unfitness findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence and 

should be reversed.

¶ 50 We note first that the service plans were admitted at the termination hearing without 

objection by respondent and that she did not object to any aspect of Mayzes’s testimony. Thus, 

we find that respondent has forfeited on appeal any argument regarding the admission of the 

service plans or Mayzes’s testimony. See In re N.T., 2015 IL App (1st) 142391, ¶ 41 

(“Generally, an issue that was not objected to during trial *** is forfeited on appeal.”); In re 

Jaber W., 344 Ill. App. 3d 250, 256 (2003) (holding that the failure to object to the admissibility 

of evidence on hearsay grounds at trial results in waiver of argument on appeal); In re April C., 

326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242 (2001) (noting that, where a party fails to make an appropriate 

objection in the court below, he or she fails to preserve the issue for review). Respondent 

acknowledges that she did not object to the admission of the service plans or Mayzes’s 

testimony, but she requests that we consider this issue under the plain error doctrine.

¶ 51 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) provides that “[p]lain errors or 

defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the 

attention of the trial court.” The plain error doctrine is a limited and narrow exception to the 

forfeiture rule. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). The doctrine allows a reviewing 

court to consider an unpreserved error where either (1) a clear or obvious error occurs and the 

evidence is so closely balanced that such error threatens to tip the scales of justice against the 

accused, regardless of the seriousness of the error or (2) a clear or obvious error occurs and the 

error is so serious that it affects the fairness of the trial and challenges the integrity of the 

judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 

551, 565 (2007). Before we determine whether plain error occurred, however, we must first 

determine whether any error occurred at all. People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189 (2010). 

This requires a substantive review of the issues raised on appeal. People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 

113, 125 (2009). If clear or obvious error did not occur, no plain error analysis is necessary. 

People v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 87; Walker, 232 Ill. 2d at 124-25. In this case, we need 

not engage in a plain error analysis, as we find that no error occurred with respect to the 

admission of the service plans or Mayzes’s testimony.

¶ 52 1. Foundation for Service Plans

¶ 53 Respondent initially contends that, although service plans are generally admissible as 

business records pursuant to section 2-18(4)(a) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 

2018)), the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the eight service plans 

at issue here.

¶ 54 Termination proceedings under the Act employ the general rules of civil practice and the 

provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure unless the Act specifically governs the procedure at 

issue. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2018); In re S.J., 407 Ill. App. 3d 63, 69 (2011) (finding it 

proper to apply rules of evidence under the Act to a hearing involving the termination of 

parental rights); In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227, 234 (1999) (same). The Act specifically 

provides for the admission of business records into evidence if the statutory foundational 

requirements are satisfied. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018); A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 234-

35. Specifically, section 2-18(4)(a) of the Act provides:
- 14 -

“(4)(a) Any writing, record, photograph or x-ray of any hospital or public or private 

agency, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum 

or record of any condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event relating to a minor in 

an abuse, neglect or dependency proceeding, shall be admissible in evidence as proof 

of that condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the court finds that the 

document was made in the regular course of the business of the hospital or agency and 

that it was in the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act, 

transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. A certification 

by the head or responsible employee of the hospital or agency that the writing, record, 

photograph or x-ray is the full and complete record of the condition, act, transaction, 

occurrence or event and that it satisfies the conditions of this paragraph shall be 

prima facie evidence of the facts contained in such certification. A certification by 

someone other than the head of the hospital or agency shall be accompanied by a 

photocopy of a delegation of authority signed by both the head of the hospital or agency 

and by such other employee. All other circumstances of the making of the 

memorandum, record, photograph or x-ray, including lack of personal knowledge of 

the maker, may be proved to affect the weight to be accorded such evidence, but shall 

not affect its admissibility.” 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018).

“Business records are considered reliable, and thus admissible, because of the regular, prompt, 

and systematic manner in which they are kept and the fact that they are relied upon in the 

operation of the business.” A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 235.

¶ 55 Respondent argues that the eight service plans here were not accompanied by a certification 

of either kind described in the statute. Our review of the record confirms this lack of 

certification, and the State does not assert otherwise. Absent certification, the State could 

satisfy the statute’s foundational requirements by establishing that the writings were made 

(1) as a memorandum or record of the event, (2) in the regular course of business, and (3) at 

the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 

2018); In re J.Y., 2011 IL App (3d) 100727, ¶ 13; A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 235. The author of 

the writing does not need to testify or be shown to be unavailable. J.Y., 2011 IL App (3d) 

100727, ¶ 13; A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 235. Instead, anyone familiar with the business and its 

procedures may testify about how the writing was prepared. In re J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 

110861, ¶ 26; J.Y., 2011 IL App (3d) 100727, ¶ 13; A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 235. We review 

the admission of evidence pursuant to section 2-18(4)(a) for an abuse of discretion. See People 

v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89-90 (2001); J.Y., 2011 IL App (3d) 100727, ¶ 13; People v. Hall, 

314 Ill. App. 3d 688, 697-99 (2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s 

decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or when no reasonable person would agree with 

the position taken by the trial court. Control Solutions, LLC v. Elecsys, 2014 IL App (2d) 

120251, ¶ 38.

¶ 56 Respondent does not dispute that the service plans constituted memoranda or records of 

the events described therein or that the State elicited testimony that the service plans were 

made in the regular course of business of the agency that prepared them. According to 

respondent, however, the State did not ask, and Mayzes did not testify, whether the entries in 

the service plans were made “at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within 

a reasonable time thereafter.” 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018). Further, respondent 

insists that no dates are given from which it could be determined that the service plans were 
- 15 -

made at or within a reasonable time after each act or occurrence. Respondent contends that the 

State’s omission did not constitute just a minor defect, given that each service plan covered a 

period of six months to one year and that the eight service plans together covered a period of 

fifty-one months. Respondent argues that, because the service plans do not meet the 

foundational requirements of section 2-18(4)(a) of the Act, they should not have been admitted 

at trial. We disagree.

¶ 57 The eight service plans here were dated March 12, 2015, October 1, 2015, April 6, 2016, 

April 1, 2017, September 29, 2017, March 23, 2018, October 10, 2018, and March 25, 2019. 

Thus, except for the service plan dated April 1, 2017, a new service plan was prepared 

approximately every six months. Each service plan identified various tasks and task-related 

“action steps” for each participant to complete during the relevant review period. Each plan 

also listed establishment and evaluation dates for each task, start and evaluation dates for each 

“action step,” an evaluation narrative for each task and “action step,” and a summary of the 

family’s progress since the last review.

¶ 58 Thus, for instance, the first service plan identified the following five tasks for respondent: 

(1) comply with agency recommendation, (2) participate in couple’s counseling, 

(3) participate in educational groups for parents of children with autism or developmental 

delays, (4) participate in individual counseling, and (5) participate in parenting classes. The 

establishment and evaluation dates for the first task listed above were, respectively, October

17, 2014, and March 12, 2015. Similarly, each “action step” within the first task had a start 

date of October 17, 2014, and an evaluation date of March 12, 2015. The evaluation narrative 

for the first task provided that respondent had “been cooperative with the agency thus far” and 

“expressed a willingness to engage in services.” The evaluation narrative for the “action steps” 

within the first task noted that the agency had no reason to suspect substance abuse by 

respondent, respondent had been cooperative with signing all necessary releases of 

information, respondent had been cooperative with all home visits, respondent had been 

cooperative with all agency recommendations, respondent had maintained communication 

with the caseworker, and referrals for parenting classes and counseling had been completed.

¶ 59 The establishment and evaluation dates for the first service plan’s four remaining tasks 

were January 21, 2015, and March 12, 2015, respectively. Likewise, each “action step” within 

those tasks had a start date of January 21, 2015, and an evaluation date of March 12, 2015. The 

evaluation narrative for these tasks indicated that (1) the caseworker would refer respondent 

for couple’s therapy once deemed clinically appropriate by respondent’s individual therapist, 

(2) respondent expressed a willingness to engage in educational classes for children with 

autism and developmental delays, (3) a referral for individual counseling was being completed 

and respondent expressed a willingness to engage in individual counseling, and (4) respondent 

had begun parenting classes and was participating appropriately. The summary of the family’s 

progress expounded upon the details in the evaluation narrative, specifying, for instance, that 

respondent began parenting classes in February 2015, with an estimated completion date of 

April 2015. The service plan also detailed respondent’s and Z.J.’s visits and the family’s 

housing and financial situations.

¶ 60 The second service plan identified the same five tasks for respondent and added a sixth 

task, family counseling. The family counseling task had a proposed establishment date of 

October 16, 2015, and each “action step” related thereto had the same proposed start date. The 

establishment date of each of the five remaining tasks and the start date of each “action step” 
- 16 -

related to the remaining five tasks were the same as those in the first service plan. However, 

each task and associated “action step” had an evaluation date of October 1, 2015. The 

evaluation narratives for the various tasks noted that (1) respondent had been cooperative with 

the agency during the review period, (2) respondent had completed parenting classes, with no 

recommendations made, (3) respondent had begun individual counseling in June 2015, but she 

reported only feelings of helplessness related to agency involvement, (4) respondent had not 

participated in any educational groups for parents of children with autism and developmental 

delays, and (5) respondent began couple’s counseling in September 2015, but the therapist 

recommended that she continue to work on individual counseling before continuing with 

couple’s counseling. The summary of the family’s progress since the last permanency review 

indicated that respondent completed parenting classes in April 2015 and began individual 

counseling in June 2015. The service plan also included an update on visits, housing, and 

financial stability. 

¶ 61 We need not document the details of the remaining six service plans. Suffice it to say, each 

subsequent plan includes an evaluation of respondent’s progress (or lack thereof) on each 

identified task and task-related “action step” since the plan preceding it. To be sure, the plans 

do not document the exact date of every task or “action step” set out therein. Nevertheless, 

each service plan clearly builds upon the previous plan by detailing the extent, if any, of 

respondent’s participation in and progress on the tasks and “action steps” identified therein 

over the approximate six-month period preceding the date of the plan. This constitutes

sufficient evidence from which it could be determined that the plans were made at or within a 

reasonable time after each act or occurrence recorded in the service plans. See In re Nylani M., 

2016 IL App (1st) 152262, ¶ 40 (finding that passage in letter specifying that the minor “ ‘has 

been showing a lot of aggressive behavior lately’ ” suggested that the described events 

occurred within a recent time period) (emphasis in original)); Kenneth J., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 

983 (finding that the requirements for admission of “Parenting Assessment Report” under 

section 18(4)(a) of the Act were satisfied where evidence at hearing showed that document 

was prepared in the regular course of the agency’s business and the document “was clearly 

made contemporaneously with the events the Report recorded”); see also A.B., 308 Ill. App. 

3d at 235-36 (holding that service plans were properly admitted under section 18(4)(a) of the 

Act where each witness testified that the plans were prepared in the regular course of business 

and were made contemporaneously with the events they purported to record). Thus, we reject 

respondent’s claim that the State failed to lay a foundation for admission of the service plans 

at the termination hearing, and we hold that their admission did not constitute an abuse of 

discretion.

¶ 62 2. Foundation for Mayzes’s Testimony

¶ 63 Respondent next contends that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for Mayzes’s 

testimony. In particular, respondent asserts that Mayzes testified primarily with respect to the 

services plans, including what services respondent did or did not complete, but that “no 

foundation was laid for her having personal knowledge that [sic] occurred with respect to 

[respondent’s] services.” As such, respondent contends that Mayzes’s testimony, with the 

exception of that regarding her own conversations with respondent, should have been excluded 

as hearsay. As noted above, we review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. 

See Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d at 89-90; Hall, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 697-99. 
- 17 -

¶ 64 The only authority respondent cites in support of her position is A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227. 

In that case, the reviewing court held that allowing lengthy testimony regarding the contents 

of service plans by witnesses who did not prepare them constituted error because “[t]he 

witnesses had secondhand knowledge, at best, of the events that led to the conclusions 

contained in the service plans.” A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 237. In other words, the court 

determined that it was improper for the trial court to allow the testimony because the witnesses 

did not author the documents. A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 237. That is not what happened in this 

case. Mayzes was the family’s caseworker since December 2016, and she prepared the last five 

service plans. Much of the information in those five service plans was based on Mayzes’s direct 

knowledge. As such, Mayzes could provide firsthand testimony of her interactions with 

respondent as well as respondent’s progress or lack thereof with respect to the tasks she was 

assigned. Further, while the A.B. court held that it was error to allow the testimony about the 

service plans, it determined that the error did not constitute reversible error, because “client 

service plans alone, without the aid of the supporting testimony, are sufficient to establish at 

least one ground of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.” A.B., 308 Ill. App. 

3d at 237. Therefore, even if the trial court erred in admitting portions of Mayzes’s testimony 

that were not based on her personal knowledge, the admission did not constitute error, as it 

was “mere surplusage.” A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 237. Considering the foregoing, we conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mayzes to testify about the contents 

of the service plans.

¶ 65 3. Multilevel Hearsay

¶ 66 Next, respondent contends that the eight service plans here contain “multilevel hearsay,” 

i.e., hearsay within hearsay. As noted previously, respondent does not dispute that the exhibits 

themselves were admissible pursuant to section 2-18(4)(a) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) 

(West 2018)) if the statute’s foundational requirements were satisfied. She contends, however, 

that “second, third, and fourth hand hearsay” is not transformed into admissible evidence 

merely because it appears in an otherwise admissible report. She argues that another hearsay 

exception must apply to the hearsay statements in the services plans before they may be 

admitted. To this end, respondent cites Illinois Rule of Evidence 805 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), which 

provides that “[h]earsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each 

part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in 

these rules.” She also directs us to People v. McCullough, 2015 IL App (2d) 121364, ¶ 113, 

stands for the proposition that “multilevel hearsay is not admissible unless each layer of 

hearsay is excused by its own exception.” Respondent maintains that “section 405/2-18(4)(b) 

[sic], properly read, is consistent with this strong public policy in restricting the admission of 

hearsay” and requires the State “to show that each item of multilevel hearsay within an 

admitted report meets the same foundational requirements as a business record as the document 

itself.” Respondent contends that the State failed to comply with this process and that therefore 

any multilevel hearsay within the service plans was improperly admitted. We disagree.

¶ 67 As noted above, section 2-18(4)(a) of the Act provides in relevant part as follows:

“Any writing, record, photograph or x-ray of any hospital or public or private 

agency, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum 

or record of any condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event relating to a minor in 

an abuse, neglect or dependency proceeding, shall be admissible in evidence as proof 
- 18 -

of that condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the court finds that the 

document was made in the regular course of the business of the hospital or agency and 

that it was in the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act, 

transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. *** All other 

circumstances of the making of the memorandum, record, photograph or x-ray, 

including lack of personal knowledge of the maker, may be proved to affect the weight 

to be accorded such evidence, but shall not affect its admissibility.” (Emphasis added.) 

705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018).

In light of this language, respondent’s multilevel hearsay objection is not well founded. Quite 

simply, the lack of knowledge of the maker of the documents at issue is, in accordance with 

the statute, a matter of weight rather than admissibility. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018). 

Indeed, as noted above, the legislature deemed it proper to admit DCFS records and the 

information contained therein, as long as the information was made of record in the regular 

course of the agency’s business and at the time of the event or within a reasonable time 

thereafter. It is only logical that such records are admissible and may be considered, because 

assessing a parent’s compliance with service plans is included in a determination of whether 

the parent has made reasonable progress or has maintained a reasonable degree of interests, 

concern, or responsibility as to a minor’s welfare. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216-17 (2001) 

(reasonable progress); In re B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31 (reasonable degree of 

interest, concern, or responsibility). Thus, the trial court here properly could consider the 

service plans and attribute to them whatever weight they were due, taking into account their 

hearsay nature.

¶ 68 Respondent insists that an opposite conclusion is dictated by two recent cases, In re 

Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971, and In re G.V., 2018 IL App (3d) 180272. In Zariyah, 

2017 IL App (1st) 170971, ¶ 86, the respondent argued that the trial court erred “by admitting 

and relying on hearsay evidence concerning the results of her mental health *** assessments.” 

The alleged hearsay consisted of testimony from the respondent’s caseworker that the 

respondent suffered from bipolar disorder. The GAL responded that the admission of the 

caseworker’s testimony was, at most, harmless error because the respondent’s mental health 

status was mentioned in two reports prepared by the caseworker and the reports were properly 

admitted as business records under section 2-18(4)(a) of the Act. The reviewing court 

disagreed, stating, “even if we agree that the foundational requirements of *** section [2-

18(4)(a)] were met, that argument could only address the first layer of hearsay—the document 

itself.” Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971, ¶ 93. Respondent’s reliance on Zariyah A. is 

misplaced, however, as that court did not reference, much less discuss, the language in section 

2-18(4)(a) that the lack of knowledge of the maker is a matter of weight rather than 

admissibility. Respondent contends that the court in G.V. concluded that “double and triple 

hearsay in a DCFS report could not be deemed admissible simply by characterizing it as an 

indicated report.” See G.V., 2018 IL App (3d) 180272, ¶ 32. Respondent’s reliance on this 

authority is also misplaced because the G.V. court did not reference section 2-18(4)(a) at all.

¶ 69 Respondent also insists that the language in section 2-18(4)(a) regarding the weight to be 

accorded documentary evidence “does not mean that any manner of third and fourth level 

hearsay in the document should be considered as admissible once the document is determined 

to be a business record.” Rather, he asserts, the language “simply means that the *** employee 

who observed the act, transaction, occurrence or event need not be the same as the employee 
- 19 -

who created the record.” However, respondent does not cite any authority in support of this 

narrow interpretation of the language. Indeed, respondent’s interpretation ignores the plain 

language of the statute, which clearly specifies that, once a foundation is properly laid, all other 

circumstances surrounding the making of the document affect the weight to be accorded the 

evidence, but do not affect its admissibility. See In re Jose A., 2018 IL App (2d) 180170, ¶ 18 

(noting that the language of a statute should be given its plain and ordinary meaning). Thus, 

respondent’s position is not well taken.

¶ 70 Respondent also suggests that, because section 2-18(4)(a) provides that “acts or 

occurrences appearing in the record ‘shall be admissible in evidence as proof of that condition, 

act, transaction, occurrence or event’ ” (emphasis supplied by respondent), the state “has to 

show that each item of multilevel hearsay within an admitted report meets the same 

foundational requirements as a business record as the document itself.” However, nothing in 

the passage respondent cites alters the language stating that the maker’s lack of personal 

knowledge constitutes a matter of weight. 

¶ 71 Respondent also cites case law reflecting that wholesale judicial notice of all documents or 

events that occurred prior to an unfitness hearing is “unnecessary and inappropriate.” In re 

J.G., 298 Ill. App. 3d 617, 629 (1998). However, the court here did not take judicial notice of 

the service plans. Rather, it admitted the reports into evidence without objection by respondent.

¶ 72 For the reasons set forth above, we reject respondent’s argument that the multilevel hearsay 

within the eight service plans was inadmissible and hold that the trial court was entitled to 

consider the exhibits and attribute to them whatever weight they were due, taking into account 

their hearsay nature. Respondent challenges the unfitness findings only on the ground that 

virtually all of the State’s evidence consisted of the multilevel hearsay present in the service 

plans and Mayzes’s testimony, for which the State failed to lay a proper foundation. Having 

rejected the premises underlying respondent’s argument, we cannot agree that the trial court’s 

unfitness findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Hence, we affirm the trial 

court’s findings that, on all three grounds alleged in the State’s petition, respondent was unfit 

to parent Z.J.

¶ 73 B. Best Interests

¶ 74 Next, respondent challenges the trial court’s finding that it was in Z.J.’s best interests to 

terminate respondent’s parental rights. As noted earlier, once a trial court finds a parent unfit, 

it must determine whether termination of parental rights is in Z.J.’s best interests. B’yata I., 

2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 41. As our supreme court has noted, at the best-interests phase, 

“the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s 

interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). The State bears 

the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best 

interests of a minor. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366; In re Deandre D., 405 Ill. App. 3d 945, 953 (2010). 

Section 1-3(4.05) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018)) sets forth various factors 

for the trial court to consider in assessing a minor’s best interests. These considerations include 

(1) the minor’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the minor’s identity; (3) the 

minor’s familial, cultural, and religious background; (4) the minor’s sense of attachment, 

including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of relationships with parental figures; 

(5) the minor’s wishes and goals; (6) community ties; (7) the minor’s need for permanence; 

(8) the uniqueness of every family and every child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and 
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(10) preferences of the person available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 

2018). The trial court need not explicitly reference each best-interests factor in rendering its 

decision. In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 262-63 (2004). We review the trial court’s bestinterests finding under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. B’yata I., 2014 IL App 

(2d) 130558-B, ¶ 41. 

¶ 75 Here, the record supports the trial court’s finding that termination of respondent’s parental 

rights was in Z.J.’s best interests. Z.J. is a 14-year-old minor with multiple mental health issues. 

The record shows that Z.J. was bonding with the prospective foster mother, was excited about 

his prospective adoptive home, spoke with the prospective foster mother daily, and had begun 

in-person visits with her. Moreover, the prospective foster mother had been fostering children 

for more than 25 years, had worked extensively with children on the autism spectrum, intended 

to quickly integrate Z.J. into her family, and had identified activities for him. Mayzes testified 

that she visited the prospective foster home and that it offered a safe and appropriate living 

environment for Z.J. While there is undoubtedly a bond between respondent and Z.J., the 

evidence presented at the best interests hearing demonstrated that respondent did not maintain 

regular contact with Z.J. and that the contact she did maintain was supervised because 

respondent’s conduct had been inappropriate. Moreover, Z.J. had expressed fear of Daniel. 

Given this record, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding that it was in Z.J.’s best interests 

to terminate respondent’s parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 76 Respondent complains of the hearsay nature of some of the evidence, specifically, 

contending that, by taking judicial notice of the evidence presented at the unfitness phase of 

the hearing, the trial court relied on “the same inadmissible evidence offered on fitness.” 

However, respondent has forfeited this argument by failing to object to this evidence at trial. 

See Jaber W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 256; April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 242. Anticipating a finding 

of forfeiture, respondent requests that we review this issue under the plain error doctrine. 

Nonetheless, we find no error, much less plain error, and we conclude that respondent’s 

argument lacks merit for the reasons set forth in the preceding section. We also observe that 

the formal rules of evidence do not apply at the best interests phase of termination proceedings. 

In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1070 (2009). Rather, at the best interests phase, the trial 

court may rely on “[a]ll evidence helpful [(in the trial court’s judgment)] in determining these 

questions” to the extent of its probative value. 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 2018); Jay H., 395 

Ill. App. 3d at 1070. Hence, to the extent that the trial court considered the evidence presented 

at the unfitness hearing, it was proper to do so, because such evidence was probative of the 

best interests factors. Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1070. We find no error.

¶ 77 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 78 Next, respondent argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

admission of the eight service plans and Mayzes’s testimony, on the bases of lack of foundation 

and hearsay. Respondent also faults trial counsel for failing to object to “the trial court’s basing 

its decision on fitness on the court’s prior rulings at a permanency hearing regarding 

[respondent’s] efforts and progress.”

¶ 79 Although there is no constitutional right to counsel in proceedings pursuant to the Act, a 

parent has a statutory right to counsel in a proceeding to terminate his or her parental rights. 

705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2018); In re Ca. B., 2019 IL App (1st) 181024, ¶ 41. To adjudicate 

a parent’s claim that he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel in such a proceeding, 
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we apply the dual-prong standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984). Ca. B., 2019 IL App (1st) 181024, ¶ 42. Thus, to prevail on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a parent must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for the 

error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Ca. B., 2019 IL App (1st) 181024, 

¶ 42 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694). Strickland requires a showing of actual 

prejudice, not mere speculation as to prejudice. People v. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d 122, 135 (2008). 

Moreover, both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied. Ca. B., 2019 IL App (1st) 

181024, ¶ 42. Hence, the failure to satisfy either prong precludes a finding of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Ca. B., 2019 IL App (1st) 181024, ¶ 42. With these principles in mind, 

we address respondent’s claim.

¶ 80 We reject respondent’s arguments concerning trial counsel’s failure to object to the 

admission of the evidence at issue. As previously discussed, although the failure to object did 

contribute to forfeiture of those arguments on appeal, the evidence either was properly 

admitted under the Act or did not result in prejudice. Hence, the failure to object was not 

objectively unreasonable, as any objection would not have been successful. See People v. 

Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d 436, 454 (1994) (failing to interpose a futile objection is not 

ineffectiveness); People v. Holmes, 397 Ill. App. 3d 737, 745 (2010) (same).

¶ 81 Respondent also maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to “the 

trial court’s basing its decision on fitness on the court’s prior rulings at a permanency hearing 

regarding [respondent’s] efforts and progress.” In finding respondent unfit, the court remarked 

in part as follows:

“And the—certainly, the order of [the permanency review hearing on] December 11th 

of 2018 [sic], which I have taken judicial notice of, which found that mother had not 

made reasonable efforts or progress was a judicial finding to that effect. So she clearly 

was not meeting the goals that she needed to meet in order to go toward reunification. 

And that’s why the Court changed the goal, because reunification appeared at that point 

to be a very slim possibility.”

Respondent contends that a finding at a permanency review hearing is not relevant to an 

unfitness determination because the state’s burden of proof at such a hearing is clear and 

convincing evidence whereas there is no burden of proof at a permanency hearing. Thus, he 

suggests, trial counsel should have objected to the court’s ruling. Respondent, however, does 

not indicate when trial counsel could have raised an objection. For instance, respondent does 

not suggest that it would have been appropriate for trial counsel to interrupt the court midruling to challenge the court’s rationale. Indeed, it seems to us that it would have been more 

appropriate to challenge the trial court’s rationale on direct appeal. In any event, we note that, 

since the grounds for finding unfitness are independent, a reviewing court may affirm an 

assessment of parental unfitness if the evidence supports it on any one of the grounds alleged. 

B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 30. Our reading of the record in this case indicates 

that the trial court’s comments were in reference to its findings that respondent failed to make 

reasonable efforts or reasonable progress, not to its finding that respondent failed to show a 

reasonable degree of responsibility as to Z.J.’s welfare. Thus, even if trial counsel’s failure to 

object to the trial court’s remarks fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 

respondent has failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that respondent failed to establish 
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that trial counsel was ineffective.

¶ 82 D. Judicial Bias

¶ 83 Finally, respondent argues that she was denied due process, because the judge who presided 

over both the unfitness and best interests phases of the termination hearing also presided over 

the proceedings leading up to the filing of the motion to terminate. Respondent contends that, 

by the time of the fitness hearing, the judge had presided over years of hearings and reviewed 

hundreds of pages of multilevel hearsay. Respondent suggests that judges often make rulings 

at permanency review hearings based entirely on inadmissible evidence. Respondent reasons 

that 

“[o]nce a judge has ordered a change from return home to termination of parental rights, 

it is difficult to see how that judge can then forget the often years of conferences and 

proceedings, and hundreds of pages of reports, on which he [or she] based that goal 

change, despite his [or her] best attempts to do so.” 

Respondent urges this court to adopt a rule that the judge presiding over termination 

proceedings should not be the judge who has presided over the hearings leading up to those 

proceedings when that judge has ordered a change of the permanency goal to termination of 

parental rights. 

¶ 84 Respondent’s appellate counsel concedes that he has “found no case on point, the closest 

being” the concurrence of Justice Steigmann in In re A.T., 197 Ill. App. 3d 821 (1990). There, 

Justice Steigmann wrote:

“If neither DCFS nor the appropriate State’s Attorney’s office acts promptly to seek to 

terminate parental rights when that action is called for, then, as a last resort, the trial 

court must alert these agencies to the need to do so. *** I seriously doubt that it would 

ever need to take the extraordinary (and probably unwise) step of directing the State’s 

Attorney to file a petition to terminate parental rights, assuming that the court even had 

the authority to do so under section 2-13(1) of the *** Act *** (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 

37, par. 802-13(1)). Of course, when a judge has indicated there is a need for a petition 

to terminate parental rights to be filed, that judge must thereafter recuse himself or 

herself from any proceedings on that petition once it is filed.” (Emphasis in original.) 

A.T., 197 Ill. App. 3d at 835 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring).

Respondent focuses on the last sentence, attempting to analogize it to a trial court changing the 

goal from return home to substitute care pending a court determination on termination of 

parental rights. However, the situation referenced by Justice Steigmann in A.T. is not what 

happened here. Justice Steigmann was contemplating sua sponte action by a trial court. In this 

case, although a legal screen by DCFS had not been completed prior to the trial court’s decision 

to change the permanency goal, the trial court did so in response to a request by the State (to 

which the GAL concurred) that it do so. In the former circumstances, the trial judge is 

essentially acting as an advocate for the minor. In the latter, the judge retains his or her neutral 

role and passes upon a party’s request. Respondent’s reliance on Justice Steigmann’s special 

concurrence in A.T. is of limited relevance here.

¶ 85 Moreover, although our research has not identified any case directly on point, the authority 

that does exist does not favor respondent’s position. For instance, a trial judge is presumed to 

consider only admissible evidence and disregard inadmissible evidence. People v. Naylor, 229 
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Ill. 2d 584, 603 (2008). This presumption is rebutted only “if it affirmatively appears from the 

record that improver evidence was considered by the court.” People v. Dobbs, 353 Ill. App. 3d 

817, 824 (2004). Further, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 903 (eff. March 8, 2016) provides that 

“[w]henever possible and appropriate, all child custody and allocation of parental 

responsibilities proceedings relating to an individual child shall be conducted by a single 

judge.” Thus, our supreme court has expressed a preference for the same judge to hear all 

proceedings involving child custody and the division of parental responsibilities. Indeed, this 

is similar to the supreme court’s proclamation in the criminal context that “the same judge who 

presided over the defendant’s trial should hear his post-conviction petition, unless it is shown 

that the defendant would be substantially prejudiced.” People v. Hall, 157 Ill. 2d 324, 331 

(1993). The per se rule advocated by respondent would be contrary to the supreme court’s 

admonition that “[t]o conclude that a judge is disqualified because of prejudice is not, of 

course, a judgment to be lightly made.” People v. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d 171, 179 (1979). We decline 

to announce such a rule based only on a special concurrence that is only somewhat analogous.

¶ 86 IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 87 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago 

County, finding that respondent was an unfit parent and that it was in Z.J.’s best interest to 

terminate her parental rights. 

¶ 88 Affirmed.