T he H o no rable R al p h R

. B ei st l i ne, C hi ef U ni t ed Stat es D i st ri ct Jud ge * f o r t he D i st ri ct of A l aska, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
W I L L EN A S T A RG ELL ,

Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 11-50392

D.C. No. 5:09-cr- 00005- TJ H-1
OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ce ntr a l D istri c t of

Ca lif or nia Terr y J . Hatter , Senior District J udg e, Presiding Argued and Submitted Ma rc h 7 , 2 01 3—Pa sa de na , Ca lif or nia Filed August 2, 2013
B e fo re : Sid

ne y R. T ho ma s, An dr e w D . H ur wi tz, C ir c uit J udg es, and Ralph R. B eistline, Chief District J udg e. *

Opinion by

J udg e B eistlineU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Crim inal L aw The pa nel af firmed a def endant’ s convictions and sentenc e for

fra ud by wi re af fec ting a financ ial instit ution, aiding and assisting in the prepa ration of a false r eturn, fr aud b y w ir e , an d

a g g r av a te d

id e n ti ty th e f t, ar is in g o u t o f

the defe ndant’s wor

k as a tax prepa

rer
. Th e pa ne l he ld that ne w or inc re a se d ri sk of lo ss is sufficie nt to establish that wire fr aud “a ffe cts” a financ ial instit ution within t he mea ning of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and that there was suff

icient evidence for a r ational jury to conclude that th e defe nd ant’ s f

ra ud ule nt r e tur

ns e xpos e d th e ba

nk s to an in c re a se d r isk

of los s.
Be cause the wire fr au d that was the pr edicate to the
a g g ra vate d ide nti ty the ft did no t oc c ur un til a ft e r 18 U.S .C. § 1028A’s ena ctment date, the panel reje cted the de fenda nt’s contention that the jury

may have c onvicted the de fenda nt ba se d s ole ly

on pr e -e na c tme nt c on du c t. The pa nel re jected the defe ndant’s contention t hat g overnme nt and t he dis trict court infringe d on the core of he r de fe ns e counse l’ s r ole , in vio latio n o f t

he de fe nd ant’ s Sixth Amendment rights, by

allowing the def

endant’ s former attorney to testify at sentenc ing r eg ardingthe loss and restitution calculations, wher e the f ormer attorney

was c alled by the defe ndant’s new attorney

. Be cause the fo rm erU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 3 attorney ’s t esti mo n yd id n o t c o n ta in p r iv ileg ed communications, the pane l rejec t ed the def endant’ s contention that ad m ission of the testimony violated the attorney -client privileg e.
Th e pa ne l hel d that the dis tr ic t court did no t cle arl y e rr in
c a lc ulatin g the los s and

re sti tut ion

amou nts

.

CO UN SEL
Marisa L . D. Conroy

(ar g u ed ), Encinitas, California, f or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.
And ré Bir ot te, J r., Uni ted S t a t es A tt orn ey ; A nt oi ne F. Ra ph a e l, A ssi sta

nt Unit e d St a te s A ttorne y , Jose phR. W i dm an , A s s i s t an tU n i t e d S t a t e s A t t o r

n e y , R y anWhit e (ar g ued), A ssistant United St ates Attorne y , Un ited States Attorney s’ Offic e, Riverside, California, for Pl aintiffAppellee

.

OP IN ION
BEI STL I NE, Chief District Judge:
Wil lena Starg ell appeal s her c onvictions of twelve felonies a rising out of her work as a tax prepa rer for va rious
c lie nts

. The super sedingindictment charg ed fr aud by wire aff ectinga fina

ncial instituti on (Coun ts 1 to 6); aiding a nd assisting in the pre paration of a fa lse retur n (Counts 7 to 12); fra ud by wire (Counts 13 to 15); and a g g ravated identity theftU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 4 (Counts 16 to 18). The district court dismissed Counts 6, 12, and 18 on the g overnme nt’s motion. After the district cour t g rante d her motion for acquittal on Counts 3, 9 , an d1 5, Starg e ll w a s c onvic te d on the re ma ini ngc ha

rg e s. She c la ims that the district court e rre d by : ( 1) failing to grant her motion f o r ju d g me n t o f a c qu itta l a s to Co un ts 1 , 2 , 4 , an d 5 of the
su pe rs e din g ind ic tme nt d e sp ite the g ov e rnme nt’ s f a ilur e to prove that the underlyin g conduct a ffe cted a financ ial instit ution; (2 ) permitti ng convictions on Counts 16 and 17 without ex cluding the possibi l i t y that they wer e base d on conduct that pr ece ded the e nact m en t of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A; (3) a llowing Starg ell’s forme r a t t o rn ey to testify

at the sentenc ing he aring ; and (4) imprope rly calc ulating loss and
re sti tut ion

amou nts

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C

. § 1291, and we
a ff ir m th e c onvic tio ns and

se nte nc e s.
I
A
Afte r completing a cour se on tax prepar ation and
rec eiving state ce rt ification, Starg ell beg an pre paringtaxes f o r L i b e r t y T a x S e r

v i c e ( “ L T S ” ) i nM o r e n o V a l l e y, California. L TS terminated Starge ll’s employ ment in 2003, and Starg ell beg an h er o wn tax prepara tion business, called L iberty Be ll Tax Service (“L BTS”)

. The e vidence at t rial established that while operating L BTS, Starg ell prepared f eder al income tax returns
c on ta ini ngfa lse state me nts and e ng a g e d in sc he me s to ob ta in
re fu nd anti c ipatio n loa

ns (“ RA L ” ) fr om ba

nk s ba se d o n th e se fra udulent returns. In some ins t an ces, the I RS detected theU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 5
fr a ud and de c lin e d to iss ue a ta x r e fu nd , r e su lti ngin a

los s to the banks that made the RAL s. The g overnme nt also proved that Starg ell eng ag ed in identity theft by using the names a

nd
so c ia l sec ur ity

numbe rs of

fo rm e r c lie nts or

oth e r i nd ivi du a ls, wi tho ut t he ir kn ow le dg e or

c on se nt, to f

ile ta x r e tur

ns and to re qu e st R AL s.
B
Be fore sentenc ing, the district court he ld two evidentiary hear ings to de termine loss and re stitut ion. At t h e latter hear ing, K ay

Otani, forme r counse l for Star gell, testified as a witness. St arge ll’s curre nt counsel, the district cour t, and the g overnme nt inquired as to Otani’s method of ca lculating loss a nd restitution, what documents he soug ht to obtain from the g overnme nt, how those documents would have assisted or dis a dv anta g e d him , and wh a t wa s ult imate ly pr ov ide d to him

. At the conclusion of t he hearing , the district court found an off ense le vel of twenty -two, a criminal hi story cate g ory of I , and an a dvisory

g uideline ra

ng e of forty -one to fif

ty -one months. The d i s t ri ct court imposed a $1200.00 specia l assessment, re stitut ion in the amount of $362,796.07, and incar cer ation for f

orty -two months. This appeal f ollowed.

II
A
Starg e ll c on te nd s th a t th e dis tr ic t court e rr e d in fa ili ngto g rant he r motion for ac quit t al as to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 be c a us e the g ov e rnme nt f

a ile d to pr ov e that su c h c ounts “affecte d a

fi na nc ia l in sti tut ion ” a s r e qu ir e d b y 18 U. S.C. § 1343. Starg ell’s ar g ument is unpersuasive.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 6

IR S m a inta ins tax re c o rd s a n d i n fo rm a tio n in its In te g ra te d D a ta 1 R e trieval Sys t em (“ ID R S” ). T he ID R S co nt ai ns i nf o rma t i o n regardi ng f i l ed t ax ret urns and inf o rma t i o n pro vi d ed by t hi rd p art i es, i ncl ud i ng em p l o yers an d f

i na nc i al i nsti t uti o ns. “Where a def

endant moves f

or ac quittal at the close of the g overnme nt’s evidenc e, we revie w d en o v o whether

sufficie nt evidenc e ex ists to support a guilty verdic t.” United States v. Ste war t , 420 F.3d 1007, 1 0 14–15 (9th Cir. 2005) (c iting Un ited Sta te s v . Ca rra nz a , 289 F.3d 634, 641 ( 9th Cir. 2002)). Ou r re view of the sufficie ncy of the e vidence supporting a

criminal conviction is to determine “ whether the
re c or d e vid e nc e could r e a so na bly su pp or t a fi nd ingof

g uil t beyond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 44 3 U .S. 307, 318 (1979). We do not ask whe ther we “belie v e[ ] t hat the e vid e nc e a t th e tr ia l e sta bli sh e d guil t be y on d a r e a so na ble doubt.” Id. at3 1 9 (q u o t i n g W oo db yv . I NS , 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966)) . “Instead, the r eleva nt question is whether, a fter viewingthe eviden ce i n the light most favor able to the prosec ution, any rational trier of fa ct could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea sonable d oubt.” Id. Special Ag ent J uan Mar q u ez of the I RS’s Crim inal Investig ations Division (“I RS-CI D”) testified as a summary witness pursuant to Ru l e 1006 of the F eder al Rules of Evidence . Ag ent Marque z presented a summary char

t based up on his re vie w o f 1 43 ta x re tur ns , all of which e ither listed 1 Starg ell as the tax pre pare r or wer e connec ted t o h er company , L BTS. The summary char t demonstrated that e ach of the 14 3 tax re tur

ns c on ta ine d e ith e r f

a lse wa g e or

fa lse wi thh old ingfi g ur e s, and

tha t th e va st ma

jor ity c on ta ine d b oth false w ag e and fa lse withholding figures. Eve ry return listed in the summa ry char

t sought a ref und, and the total re fundsU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 7

soug ht a mounted to $598,657.00. The I RS r ef u nded $2 76 ,3 31 .7 4 in

c onne c tio n w iththe se r e tur ns be fo re it sto pp e d th e re ma ini ngc la ime d r e fu nd s. Ag ent Marque z also testified that banks funde d a RAL for
e a c h o f th e tax r e tu

r n s li s te d in th e s u mm ar

y c h art. When a bank issued a RAL

and the I RS l ater

stopped the re fund for the re lat ed re turn, the bank w as not able to re coup the va lue of the RA Land

su ff e re d a fi na nc ia l lo ss.
To the g ov e rnme nt, the los t r e fu nd mon e y wa s th e ma in “ef fec t” that Starg ell ’s ac tions had on the banks. Ye t, the ba nk s on ly los t mon e y wi th re sp e c t to t wo of the fo ur c ounts of fra ud char g ed in the indictment: Count 1 ($4,995.22) and Count 4 ($6,013.00). The summary char t clear ly shows that the banks did not lose any ref und money

on the other two tax returns in que stion here. Ne vertheless, the g overnme nt argues that bec ause RAL s based on f raudule nt returns a

re riskier than RAL s based on non-fr audulent re turns, Starg ell’s fra ud scheme “af

fec ted” the ba

nks by expos ing the m to an incre ased r isk of loss. The banks we re a ffe cted by Starg ell’s fra ud scheme , the g overnme nt a rgues, reg ardle ss of whethe r the re wa s an a c tua l f

ina nc ia l lo ss. We ag ree . Our sister c ir cu i t s have de fined the te rm

“ a ff e c ts” wi thi n th e me anin g of a sim ila r s tatut e ,1 8 U .S. C. § 3293(2), to include ne w or incre ased r isk of loss to financial instit utions. See U

nited States v. Mullins , 613 F.3d 1273, 1278–79 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that a new or i n cr ea s ed risk of los s is su ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli shtha t w ir e fr a ud a ff e c ts a fi na nc ia l in sti tut ion ); United States v. Se rpico , 320 F.3d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 2003) (holdingthat fra ud aff ects a bank if the bank is e x posed to a

n incre ased r isk of loss, even if the ba nk
never suffe rs an actua l loss). Although § 3293( 2) and § 1343U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 8

are separ ate pr ovisi o n s

— the forme r extends the statute of limit ations to te n y ear s for offe nses that aff ect a f i n ancia l instit ution, while the latter de fines the of fense of wire fra ud—we se e no re ason why they should hold differe nt meaning s with respec t to the te rm “a ffe cts.” Ac cording ly , we ho ld that ne w o r i nc re a se d r isk of los s is su ff

ic ie nt t o establish that wire fraud “af fec ts” a fina

ncial instituti on within the meaningof 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
He re , th e re wa s su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e fo r a

ratio nal jur

y to conclude that Starg ell’s fra udulent returns e x posed the ba nks to an incre ased r isk of loss. The senior risk analy st for one of the b an k s t e s t i f

i e d th a t 7 9

. 9 % o f th e RA L s i s s u e d in
c onne c tio n w ithStarg e ll’ s fr a ud sc he me re su lte d in a

los s to the bank, c ompare d with a g ener al loss rate of less th an 1% for non- fra

udulent RAL s. There fore, there was suff icient evidenc e for

a rational jury

to conclude that Starg ell’s fra ud
sc he me a ff

e c te d th e ba

nk s w ith in t

he me anin g of

18 U. S.C. § 1343, reg ardle ss of whethe r the ba nks ul t imately

suffe red any actua l loss. The district court did not err in de nying Starg ell’s motion to acquit as to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.

B
Starg e ll c la ims fo r the fi rs t tim e on a pp e a l t hat be c a

us e the g overnme nt’s case reg ardingCounts 13 an d 14 (wire fr a ud , 1 8 U .S. C. § 13 43 )—

the pr e dic a te of

fe ns e s f or Counts 16 and 17 (a g g ravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A)— focuse d signific antly

on conduct that pre-dated the ena ctment of § 1028A on Ju l y

15, 2004, the jury

may have c onvicted Starg ell based solely

on pre- enac tment conduct. Ho weve r, beca use t he wire fra

ud did not occur until J anuar y 15 and 18, 2005, the predic ate offe nses for the ag g ravated identity theft transpire d well af

ter § 1028A’ s enac tment date.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 9

F o r p u rp o se s o f 1 8 U .S .C . § 1 0 2 8 A , th e ter m “a n y felo n y vio la tio n ” is 2 specif i cal l y de f

i ne d a s o ne o f

t he f el o ni es enumerated i n § 1 0 2 8 A (c). C o unt s 1 3 and 14 f

al l unde r § 1 0 2 8 A (c)( 5 ). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)( 1), “[w]hoever, during and in relation to any felony violation

. . . , kn ow ing ly tr ans fe rs , possesses, or use s, without lawful authority , a means of iden ti f ic a ti o n o f an o th e r p e r s o n s h a ll , in a d d it io n to the punishment provided for such felony , be sentenc ed to a term o f im p r is o n me n t o f

2 y e ar s
. ” ( e mp h a s is a dded). 2 Addi t i onally , under 18 U .S.C. § 1343, “[ w]hoever, having devised . . . a

n y s ch eme f

or obtainingmoney

or prope rty

by means of f

alse or f raudule nt pretense s, repr esentations, or promises, tr an sm its or ca uses to be tra

nsmitt ed by

means of wire, r adio, or tele vision com m u n ication in interstate or fore ign comm erc e, any

writing s . . . for the pur pose of
e xec uti ngsu c h s che me or art if ic e , s ha ll b e fi ne d und e r t his title or i m p risoned not more tha n 20 y ear s, or both.” (empha sis added).

In proving its c ase on wire fra ud and on t h e r el ated identity theft, the g overnme nt r efe renc ed Starg ell’s ongoing wire f raud sc heme star

ting in F ebrua

ry 2 0 0 4 and endingon approximately

J anuar y 27, 2005. Although t h e g overnme nt demonstrated that the schem e partially took place prior to the
enac tment date of § 1028A , t h e superse ding indictment clea rly shows that the tax re t urns in question were not filed,
and thu s we re not transmitted , until J anuar y 2005. Transmission is a require d element o f wi re f raud unde r § 1343. Consequently , the wire fra ud did not occur until the returns w ere filed i n J an uary 2005, a full six months after § 1028A was enac ted. The predic ate offe nses for Counts 16 and 17, th ere fore , happene d afte r § 1028A was e nacte d. Acc ording ly , the jury

was not wrongin convicting Starg ell ofU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 10

ag g r av a te d

id e n ti ty th e f t wh il e r e ly

in g o nth e p r e d ic a te wire fr a ud of fe ns e s.
C Starg ell argues, ag ain for the first time on appe al, that the g overnme nt and the district cour t infring ed on the core of her d e f e n s e c o un s e l ’ s r o l e b y a l l o w i n g S t ar g e l l ’ s f o r m e r a t t o r n e y, Otani, to testify

at sentenc ing r eg ardingthe loss and restitution calculations. Starg ell also contends that since she did not ex pressl y

consent to Otani g iving testimony , the attorney -client privileg e wa s violated. We disag ree
. 1
“Gove rnment violates the ri ght to effe ctive assistanc e when it interfe res in ce rtain wa y s with the ability

of counse l to make indepe ndent dec isions about how to conduct the defe nse.” Perry v . Leeke , 488 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1989) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). Ther e was no violation here be cause it was Peter Sw ar t h , Starg ell’s new de fe ns e a tto rn e y , w ho c a lle d St arg e ll ’s fo rm e r atto rn e y to testify at the sente ncinghear ing. Swa rth ex amined Otani
c on c e rn ingthe dis c ov e ry

of au di t f

ile s and oth e r d oc ume nts re qu e ste d f

ro m the I RS

. Th e tr ans c ri pt i s c le ar t hat Sw art h acte d independe ntly

in calling Otani to testify in the second sentenci ng hear ing a

nd that there was no interf ere nce or restric tion of any

kind with Swarth’s prese ntat i o n o f t he de fe ns e . B e c a

us e the re wa s no int e rf

e re nc e , St arg e ll’ s Sixth Amendment rig hts were not violated.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 11

2 Starg ell additionally

contends that the a dm ission of Otani’s testimony

viola t ed the attorney -client privileg e. Be cause Otani’ s testimony did not contain privileg ed
c omm un ic a tio ns , th e argume nt f a ils

. O t an i ’ s t e s t i m o ny d i d

n o ti n c l u d e p r o t e c t e d

a t t o r n e yclient communications of a ny kind. The majority

of Otani’s testimony dealt with audit documents re quested by Ot ani from the I RS t hroug h discovery wh i l e Otani wa s Starg ell’s d e f e n s e a t t o r

n e y. In t h e e n t i r e ty o f O t an i ’ s t e s t i m o n y, nothing he said or refer ence d came from Starg ell. There fore , the attorney -client privilege was not i mplicated. See U nited Sta te s v . R ue hle , 583 F. 3d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining the attorney -client privileg e only cover s c omm un ic a tio ns ma de in c on fi de nc e by the c lie nt) ; id. (“The fa c t th at a

pe rs on is a lawye r d oe s n ot m ake a ll communications with that person privileg ed.”) (interna l quotation marks and c itation omit ted).

D
St ar g e ll a ll e g e s th a t t

h e d is tr ic t c o urt c o mm itte d three e rr or s in c omp uti ngthe amou

nts of los s and re sti tut ion

in t his
c a s e
. F i r s t , s h e ar g u e s t h a tt h e d i s tr i c tc o urtn e v e r a c tu a lly made a finding reg ardingthe amount of loss. S ec ond, she
argue s th a t e ve n if

the dis tr ic t c ourt mad e a los s f ind ing , it s finding was unsupporte d by the evidenc e bec ause the amount should not have included qual i fied re funds. And third, she argues t h at the re stitut ion amount should not have included ref unds the taxpay ers wer e leg ally entitled to c laim. We f ind that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t c le arl y

e rr in c a lc ulatin g the los s and re sti tut ion

amou nts

.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 12
“A c alculation of the amount of loss is a fac tual finding revie wed f

or cl ea r error.” Un ite d S tates v . G arro , 517 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008). Under the clea rly -e rrone ous standard, a

revie wing court will not reve rse a lower court
mere ly beca use t he reviewing court “ ‘would have decide d the
case differ ently .’” Ea sle

yv . Cr om ar tie , 532 U.S. 234, 242 (200 1 ) (quotingAn de rso n v . B esse me r Ci ty , 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)) . “[A] reviewingcourt must ask whe ther, ‘on the entire e v i dence ,’ it is ‘left with the def inite and firm conviction that a mistake has been c ommitt ed.’” Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1 94 8) ). In s ho rt , th e c le arl y e rr on e ou s stand ard is “sig nificantl y

d efe rential.” N. Queen I nc. v. Kinnear , 298 F.3d 1090, 1095 ( 9th Cir. 2002).
1
Whe n de te rm ini ng a los s amou nt fo r s e nte nc ingpurp os e s, a dis tr ic t c ourt

mus t “ pr ov ide re a so nin g to e xpla in i ts deter mination of [s uch] loss.” Y eung , 6 7 2 F.3d at 604–05. “Althoug h the district court’s f indings . . . must be ‘e x press,’ they need only

state the c ourt’s re solution of the disputed issues.” United States v. Kar t erman , 6 0 F .3 d 5 76 , 5 83 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 5 )

. I f a d is tr ic t c o urt d o e s n o t p r o v id e s u c h a resol uti on , “ we mus t r e mand fo r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

to rec alculate and provide its reasoningfor th[e] award.” Y eung , 672 F.3d at 604–05. Starg ell argues t hat t he dis trict court should have made an
e xplic it f ind ingre g ard ingthe los s amou nt o r, a t a min imum, expli ci t l y adopted the g overnme nt’s loss posit ion. But the dis tr ic t c ourt did

a dopt th e g ov e rnme nt’ s su g g e ste d lo ss amount. The dist rict cour t stated, “It just appears to me that a s h a d b e e n s ug g e ste d b y y ou [the g ov e rnme nt] p re vio us lyU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 13
that us inge ith e r s tand ard that you’v e been able to mee t your burden . And i t v er y well m ay be that under

this set of circ umstances, that c l ea r and convincing w ould be prope r. A nd I’m sa tis

fie d wi th i t .” (e mphasis added) . The district court a dequate ly resolved the loss amount disput e in favor of the g overnme nt by

holding tha t the g overnme nt had established the loss amount by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. In to ta l, t he banks los t $107,931.96 in connec tion with the 14 3 f ra ud ule nt t a x re tur

ns lis te d in

the summa

ry c ha rt

. 2
S tar gell fu

rt he r a lle g e s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt mis take nly included in the loss amount the ref unds to which the af

fec ted taxpay ers were entitled. Starg ell’s arg ument is unpersuasive.
Un de r t he Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s, “ [i]f the of fe ns e inv olv e d tax ev a sio n o r a

fr a ud ule nt o r f a lse re tur n, state me nt, or other doc ument, the tax loss is the total amount of loss that was the object of the offense ( i.e., the loss t h a t w o u ld have
res u lte d h a d th e o ff e n s e b e e n s u c c es s

fu ll yc o m p le te d) .” U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(c) (1) ( emphasis adde d). He re, the g overnme nt rec ommended that the tax -loss amount equal the entire loss that would have resulted ha d Starg ell’s sche mes been suc cessf

ully c o mp le ted—in other wor ds, the total ref und amount claimed on all of the fra udulent returns. The district court a dopted the g overnme nt’s total loss figure

. Con c e rn ingthe ta x-lo ss a mou nt, a distr ic t c ourt

sh ou ld “make a re asonable estimate b as ed on the ava ilable fa cts.” U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 cm t

. n
. 1. Moreove r, if hig her tha n the actua l loss amount, the intended loss amount should be used. United States v. Riley , 1 4 3 F.3d 1289, 1291–92 ( 9th Cir. 1998). I t is not t he g o v er n m en t’s or the district cour t’sU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 14

A bs en t e v i den ce t o t h e con t r ar y , i t i s a l s o a r ea s on abl e pr es u mpt i on 3 t hat ea ch of

t he i nv ol ved t axpay er s woul d hav e h ad to f i l e a non fra u d u le n t re tur n in o rd e r to o b ta in a n y re fun d to w h ic h he o r she w o u ld responsibility

to establish that defe ndant’s filed returns we re entitled to refunds if n o entitled-re fund information was offe red by

the def en d ant. See U

nited States v. Bishop , 291 F.3d 1100, 1116 ( 9th Cir. 20 0 2 ) (“It is not t he g overnme nt’s or the c ourt ’s responsibi lity to establish the defe ndants’ itemized deduc t i ons, if no itemiz ed deduc tion information was of

fer ed by the def endants.” ).
Starg e ll f a ile d to pr ov ide any

su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e to support her contention that she g ave, or intended to give , the involved taxpay ers the r efunds to which the y wer e entitled. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c on c lus ion tha t Sta rg e ll intended

to keep the total amount of re funds claimed in the f raudule nt returns was re asonable based on the e vidence in the rec ord. L ike wi se, us in g th a t a

mou nt a s th e “ tot a l tax loss ” wa s a lso
rea sonable.
At sentenc ing, the onus was on Starg ell to establish a lower tax -loss amount based on the e ntitle d re fund, but she did not. See B ishop , 291 F .3 d at 111 6. Ev e n at th e a pp e llate level, Starg ell has neither pointed to any

evidenc e establishing that the involved tax pay ers we re e ntitled to a ref und nor provided an entit led-re fund amount by which the tax-loss fig ure should be de cre ased.
Ba sed on the re cord a

nd in light of the dearth of evide nce to the contra

ry , the district court’s a cce ptance of the g overnme nt ’s loss figur e—the total re fund amount cla imed
on a ll o f the fr a

ud ule nt r e tur

ns —w a s a

“ re a so na ble e sti mate based on the available fac ts.” U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 cmt. n.1. 3U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S T A RG ELL 15

h a v e b e e n e n tit le d . C a rr ying o u t S ta rg e ll’ s fra u d sc h e m e s to the ir
com pl et i on, t her ef

ore, woul d hav e r equi r ed t he I R S t o pay t he t ot al
amo un t of

r ef un ds cl ai med by St ar gel l i n h er 143 f r audul ent r et ur ns as w e ll as any po t ent i al ref und s f o r t he no n- f

raudulent ret urns f

i l ed by t he pers ons named i n St ar gel l ’ s ret ur ns , co nce i vabl y requi r i ng t he I R S t o pay a r ef un d t wi ce. 3 Starg ell also argues that the r e s ti tu ti o n a mount determined by the district court, l i k e the tax-loss amount, included ref unds that the aff

ecte d taxp ay ers we re pote ntially entitled to claim. A restitution a

mount c an be ca lculated f

rom “losses proxi mately

resu lt in g f r o m [ a def endant’ s] criminal conduct.” Y eung , 672 F.3d at 606. There fore , it was not err or for the district court to base Star g ell’s re stitut ion amount on the
ac tu al l o s s es m i nu s th e a m o un to f p ai d -i nwi th h o l d i n g.
III
For all the re asons above , we a ffirm the judg ment of the dis tr ic t c ourt

. AF F IRMED.