FATALITY ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL EVALUATION 

Equipment Operator Fatally Crushed by the Bucket of a Front-End Loader at a 

Scrap Yard 

Case #: 18NY019 

INCIDENT HIGHLIGHTS 

DATE: 

May 26, 2018 

TIME: 

9:17 a.m. 

VICTIM: 

27-year-old equipment operator 

INDUSTRY/NAICS CODE: 

423930/Recyclable Material 

Merchant Wholesalers 

EMPLOYER: 

Metal recycling company 

SAFETY & TRAINING: 

No safety training 

SCENE: 

Scrap yard 

LOCATION: 

New York 

EVENT TYPE: 

Crushed by front-end loader 

bucket

SUMMARY 

On May 26, 2018, a 27-year-old equipment operator at a 

metal recycling company was crushed and killed by the 

bucket of a front-end loader at the company’s scrap yard. At 

the time of the incident, the operator was using the frontend loader to consolidate a ferrous scrap pile. At 9:17 a.m., 

while the loader was backing away from the pile with the 

bucket in the raised position, some of the scrap slid down 

the pile. Read the report (p.2) 

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

Key contributing factors identifed in this investigation 

include: 

•	 Procedures for controlling hazardous energies, i.e. 

lockout/tagout or “LOTO” were not established for frontend loader operations. 

•	 Operators were not trained on installation of the lift arm 

lock. 

•	 The loader’s front wheel fenders were removed without 

consulting the manufacturer. 

Learn more (p.6) 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

NY FACE investigators concluded that, to help prevent 

similar occurrences, employers should: 

•	 Develop and implement a LOTO program for front-end 

loader operation to control hazardous energies and 

prevent crushing injuries. 

•	 Ensure that all equipment operators receive proper and 

adequate training on LOTO procedures. 

Learn more (p.6) 

www.health.ny.gov/WorkSafe
SUMMARY

On May 26, 2018, a 27-year-old equipment operator at a metal recycling company was crushed and killed by 

the bucket of a front-end loader at the company’s scrap yard. At the time of the incident, the operator was using 

the front-end loader to consolidate a ferrous scrap pile. At 9:17 a.m., while the loader was backing away from 

the pile with the bucket in the raised position, some of the scrap slid down the pile. A piece of scrap became 

wedged between the bucket lift cylinder and the right front wheel (from the driver’s point of view). The operator 

exited the loader without lowering the bucket. The manufacturer specifes that a lift arm lock must be installed to 

prevent the bucket from falling before a worker enters the “danger zone” under a raised bucket to troubleshoot 

or do maintenance work. The lift arm lock was not installed. The operator positioned himself underneath the 

raised bucket between the two front wheels, and he wiggled the jammed piece several times, trying to free 

it. The movement of the jammed metal pulled the pressurized hydraulic cylinder hose from its ftting. The 

bucket, which weighed over 2,000 pounds, fell to the ground immediately due to a sudden and complete 

loss of hydraulic pressure, crushing the operator. The yard staf called 911, and fre department paramedics 

arrived within minutes. A grapple (a material handler) was used to lift the bucket and free the operator, who was 

pronounced dead at the scene. 

INTRODUCTION

On May 26, 2018, a 27-year-old equipment operator of a metal recycling company was crushed and killed by 

the bucket of a front-end loader at the company’s scrap yard. New York State Fatality Assessment and Control 

Evaluation (NY FACE) staf learned of the incident from news media reports and initiated an investigation. A 

NY FACE investigator visited the incident site, met with employer representatives, observed the scrap yard 

operation, and examined the front-end loader that was involved in the incident. The case was discussed with the 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance ofcer who investigated the incident. This 

report summarizes the fndings of the NY FACE investigation.

EMPLOYER

The metal recycling company, a family-owned-and-operated business since 1938, employed approximately 

400 employees working in seventeen recycling centers in both New York and Pennsylvania. These recycling 

centers, open to both business and the public, received and processed the scrap materials including cans, 

insulated wire, automobiles, appliances, and machines, as well as scrap generated from industrial manufacturing 

processes. The scrap materials were sorted and processed before being shipped to the company’s main 

“shredder stations” where they were shredded and packaged, and the recovered metal was then sold to steel 

mills and iron foundries. The company processed approximately 1 million tons of ferrous and 125,000 tons of 

nonferrous metals annually. The employer was a member of the Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries, Inc. (ISRI). 

WRITTEN SAFETY PROGRAMS AND TRAINING

The metal recycling company required that all of its recycling centers implement a set of corporate safety 

programs and provide worker training. The recycling center where the incident occurred had not implemented 

the corporate LOTO program, including the component for controlling worksite-specifc hazardous energies. 

A job hazard analysis had not been conducted and there was no system set up to record and report safety 

incidents. The recycling center had not completed the weekly worker safety trainings that were required by 

the corporate ofce. Workers were asked to sign training completion sheets even though the training had not 

actually been provided.

WORKER INFORMATION

The operator began working at the recycling center in February 2018, three months before the incident. He 

was initially hired to work in the metal shop. He was quickly reassigned to be an equipment operator due to 

his previous experience: he had worked at another metal recycling company as an equipment operator for 

four years. The operator’s job duties included operating a front-end loader to unload trucks, transport recycled 

automobiles, clear ground by consolidating scrap piles, and plow snow. 

The recycling center did not provide the operator with any specifc training on the hazards associated with 

operating a front-end loader. An experienced equipment operator reportedly assessed the operator’s skill by 

2
Photo 2. This photo shows the location of the right lift cylinder, and its hydraulic hoses, 

between the right front wheel and the loader frame. 

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watching him operate a loader and concluded that “he was good”. There was no written documentation of the 

assessment. Although the operator’s primary language was Spanish, he was fuent in English and helped to 

translate for his Spanish-speaking co-workers.

MACHINERY INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT

The front-end loader was a Liebherr L538 (Photo 1). The company purchased the loader new in 2015. The loader 

was powered by a 4-cylinder (4.5 liter) turbo-charged diesel engine with 154 HP and 454 ft-lb of torque. The 

loader’s maximum operating hydraulic pressure was 5076 psi. The capacity of the loader bucket was 4.6 cubic 

yards and the bucket was 8-feet wide and weighed 2039 pounds (lb).

Photo 1. The front-end loader that was involved in the incident

The two lift arm cylinders and the cylinder hoses were located between the loader frame and the front wheels 

on each side (photo 2). The width of the space was approximately 11 inches. There were two hydraulic hoses 

attached to each cylinder: the pressurized hose that was attached to the cap end and the return hose that 

was attached to the piston rod end. The hydraulic hose fttings were crimp fttings that were connected to the 

cylinders through split fange fttings. 
4

The loader was originally equipped with front wheel fenders (Photo 3). The company confrmed that the loader 

was purchased with the fenders. When pushing scrap metal with the loader bucket, the metal constantly jammed 

between the wheels and the fenders. The fenders were soon removed with the recycling center management’s 

approval. 

Photo 3. The front wheel fenders that were missing at time of the incident were reinstalled after the incident. 

The manufacturer specifes in the Operator’s Manual that a lift arm lock must be installed to prevent the bucket 

from falling before a worker enters the “danger zone” under a raised bucket to troubleshoot or do maintenance 

work. Used correctly, the 13” X 4”X 4” metal lift arm lock can be placed over the piston rod of the lift cylinder to 

secure the bucket and prevent it from falling and crushing workers (photos 4 and 5). 

Photo 4. The lift lock, a metal piece (13” X 4”X 4”) with two 

cotter pins, was used to secure the bucket.

Photo 5. The lift lock is placed on the piston rod of the lift 

cylinder to secure the bucket and prevent it from dropping.

The manufacturer requires that all hydraulic parts, including hoses, hose lines, and threaded couplings be 

checked at least annually for leaks and visible signs of damage. The manufacturer also specifes that hose 

line use should not exceed six years and storage should not exceed two years. At the time of the incident, the 

employer was not aware of these requirements. The loader was maintained by an equipment maintenance 

contractor who had last performed a preventive maintenance three months prior to the incident. During this last 

maintenance, no work was performed on the vehicle’s hydraulics.
Photo 6. A scrap piece with a square plate became wedged between the lift cylinder and the wheel, 

and it pulled the hydraulic hose of its ftting. 

5

INVESTIGATION 

The incident occurred over Memorial Day weekend. There were 17 workers, including the operator, on-site that 

day. Employees were receiving scrap from the public, working in the metal shop, and operating equipment in 

the yard. Neither the site manager nor the assistant manager was on site that day. The scrap yard was busy with 

people standing in line waiting for their scrap to be processed. Scrap was piling up and spreading in the yard. At 

the time of the incident, the operator was operating the front-end loader to consolidate the scrap pile. The yard 

surveillance video showed that the loader was pushing the scrap upward and inward toward the center of the 

pile. 

Surveillance video footage at 9:17 a.m. shows that some of the scrap slid downward from the pile as the loader 

was backing away with the bucket in the raised position. A piece of scrap, composed of a square metal plate 

attached to metal tubing, fell and became jammed in the space between the right front wheel and the loader 

frame (from the driver’s point of view). While the tubing end was resting on the ground, the end with the square 

plate was wedged in between the lift cylinder and the wheel (Photo 6). The operator, being aware of the jam, 

attempted to rid the loader of the jammed piece. The loader frst moved in reverse and then forward slightly, 

before the operator exited the loader at 9:18 a.m. without lowering the bucket. 

The bucket may still have been operable with the jam. The exact reason why the operator did not lower the 

bucket remains unknown. Without installing the lift arm lock, the operator positioned himself underneath the 

raised bucket between the two front wheels. He lifted the jammed tubing and wiggled it several times, trying to 

free the piece. The movement of the jammed plate pulled the pressurized cap-end cylinder hose of its ftting. 

The sudden and complete loss of hydraulic fuid and pressure caused the bucket, which weighed approximately 

2000 lbs., to fall to the ground immediately, crushing the operator underneath. It was less than two minutes 

between the time when the jam occurred, and the time when the operator was crushed. 

Two customers were unloading scrap from a pickup truck, and another customer was unloading metal from a 

station wagon next to the front-end loader, when the incident happened. None of the three were aware of the 

incident. The incident was not noticed until fve minutes later, when a third car arrived. The driver of the third 

car saw the operator under the bucket and alerted yard staf, who called 911 immediately. Fire department 

paramedics arrived within minutes. A grapple was used to lift the bucket and free the operator, who was 

pronounced dead at the scene. 

CAUSE OF DEATH 

According to the death certifcate, the cause of death was compressive asphyxia due to blunt force trauma.
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a 

larger sequence of events. The NY FACE investigation identifed the following key contributing factors in this 

incident: 

• Procedures for controlling hazardous energies, i.e. lockout/tagout or “LOTO” were not established for frontend loader operations. 

• Operators were not trained on installation of the lift arm lock. 

• The loader’s front wheel fenders were removed without consulting the manufacturer. 

• Yard management was not available at the time of the incident. 

• No training on hazard identifcation was provided. 

• No job hazard analysis was conducted. 

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION 

Recommendation #1: Employers should develop and implement a LOTO program for front-end loader 

operation to control hazardous energies and prevent crushing injuries. 

Discussion: The front-end loader operator in this case often had to access the space under a raised bucket 

to clear jams, troubleshoot, or conduct machine inspections. The weight of a loader attachment, including the 

bucket, lift arms, and cylinders can weigh several thousand pounds. Employers should develop and implement 

a LOTO program to control hazardous energies by securing the raised bucket to prevent serious injuries and 

deaths. For this equipment, the manufacturer requires that a lift arm lock be installed on the piston of the lift 

arm cylinder prior to work underneath a raised bucket. In addition to following the manufacturer’s requirement, 

employers should assess and identify other necessary measures to secure the bucket and prevent fatal crushing 

injuries. Employers should provide employee training to make sure that all workers understand the hazards and 

the consequences of not following the LOTO procedure. Employers should also conduct periodic inspections to 

make sure that lockout/energy control procedures are being strictly followed. 

Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that all equipment operators receive proper and adequate 

training on LOTO procedures. 

Discussion: Employers should provide training to ensure that workers understand the hazards posed by 

uncontrolled energies, as well as how the LOTO program functions to control them. Workers should learn how to 

safely install and remove the lockout device during the training. When installing a lockout device, workers may 

be exposed to other hazards such as falling or being pinched or struck by the device. Standard procedures and 

training should also address these hazards, as well as prevention measures. 

For employers in the recycling industry who face labor shortages and high employee turnover, employee 

training can be challenging. An employer should not assume that an equipment operator with years of 

experience at another recycling company does not need additional training. Each yard has unique hazards 

associated with its specifc equipment, operations, and layout. For example, the lockout procedure for a 

Komatsu loader is diferent from that for a Liebherr loader. Therefore, it is critical for employers to provide site-, 

equipment-, and operation-specifc training and to ensure worker profciency in all hazardous energy control/ 

LOTO procedures. 

Recommendation #3: Employers should ensure that all equipment operates without missing parts, and that 

all equipment modifcations are approved by manufacturers. 

Discussion: In this case, the front wheel fenders were removed with management knowledge due to their 

interference with the task of pushing scrap metal. It is not possible to be sure that a fender would have 

prevented this jam. However, a fender may have provided protection to the hydraulics by defecting the scrap 

piece from this direction of fall. Employers should ensure that all equipment operates without missing parts and 

that all equipment modifcations are approved by manufacturers. 

6 
Discussion: Employers should conduct JHAs to identify hazards and develop specifc prevention measures. 

A JHA focuses on the relationship between the worker, the task, the tools, and the work environment so that 

the hazards associated with each component and each step of the task can be identifed before they occur. It 

is critical that one conducts a JHA on new or complex jobs, jobs with high injury or illness rates, jobs with the 

potential to cause severe or disabling injuries or illness, or jobs in which one simple human error could lead to 

a severe accident or injury. Based on the hazards identifed through a JHA, employers can then develop and 

implement appropriate control and prevention measures and standard safe work procedures for workers to 

follow. 

Employers should provide worker training in hazard recognition, avoidance of unsafe and hazardous conditions, 

and adherence to standard safe working procedures. Employee training should emphasize that under no 

circumstances should a worker circumvent the protection aforded by safety apparatus, such as guards or 

lockout devices, and that a worker should never risk physical harm to accomplish tasks. 

Discussion: Employers cannot implement individual compliance programs successfully without the backing of 

a SHMS. Although the metal recycling company in this case had developed OSHA-required safety and health 

programs at the corporate level, the program implementation was not consistent across recycling centers, and 

worker training was not provided at the recycling center where the fatal incident occurred. 

Without a SHMS, the approach to injury prevention tends to be reactive: problems are addressed only after a 

worker is injured or becomes sick, a new standard or regulation is published, or an outside inspection fnds a 

problem that must be fxed. Finding and fxing hazards before they cause injury or illness is a far more efective 

approach, which can only be achieved through implementing a SHMS. In addition to better worker protection, 

an efective SHMS also improves productivity, product quality, workplace morale, recruitment and retention, and 

company image and reputation among customers and in the community. 

Guidelines for setting up a SHMS are recommended by OSHA and are outlined in several major consensus 

standards such as ANSI Z10 and ISO 45001. Employers should incorporate key elements such as management 

7

Recommendation #4: Employers should ensure that hydraulic hoses and threaded couplings on front-end 

loaders are in safe and working condition.

Discussion: Front-end loaders are widely used in scrap yards to push scrap metal and consolidate metal piles. 

Scrap metal frequently jams between the wheels and the loader frame, causing wear and tear, as well as 

damage to the hydraulic parts. Although this investigation was not able to confrm whether the conditions of the 

hoses and hose connectors contributed to the incident, it is imperative that employers take measures to ensure 

that equipment hydraulics are in safe and working condition. 

Employers should ensure that hydraulics are inspected annually, and that damaged parts are replaced 

immediately. For the front-end loader involved in this incident, the manufacturer specifed that the hoses and 

hose lines should be replaced at least every six years. Employers should ensure that hoses and hose lines are 

replaced according to the manufacturer’s specifcations. Employers should also include inspection of hydraulics 

in daily equipment checklists. At the beginning of each shift, operators should check all hydraulic hoses, hose 

lines, and threaded couplings for leaks and visible signs of damage. Loaders with damaged hydraulic parts 

should be immediately removed from service and return to service only after repairs are made. 

Recommendation #5: Employers should develop and implement an equipment inspection program to ensure 

that front-end loaders are inspected daily and needed repairs and maintenance are done timely. 

Discussion: Employers should develop an equipment inspection program to ensure that front-end loaders 

are inspected at the beginning of each shift or on a daily basis. A safety checklist should be developed, and a 

system of recording and reporting for identifed issues and needed repairs should be established. Equipment 

with broken or missing parts should be taken out of service immediately. The equipment should not be returned 

to service unless the repairs are completed. 

Recommendation #6: Employers should conduct a Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) to identify high risk jobs and to 

determine appropriate employee training on recognized hazards and safe work procedures. 

Recommendation #7: Employers should establish a safety and health management system (SHMS) to 

efectively control and reduce workplace hazards, risks, and injuries. 
leadership, employee participation, worker participation, hazard identifcation and assessment, hazard 

prevention and control, education and training, and program evaluation and improvement into their SHMS. 

Recommendation #8: Front-end loader manufacturers should develop lift cylinder guards to protect cylinders 

and hydraulics from mechanical damage. 

Discussion: Metal recycling operations present unique operational needs and hazards to workers who perform 

these tasks. Equipment manufacturers should design and confgure the equipment not only to meet the special 

industry needs but also to ofer better worker protection. The front-end loader in this case had front wheel 

fenders, and scraps frequently jammed between the fenders and the wheels. The jammed metal can cause 

damage to the exposed hydraulics in this area, as well as serious worker injuries. Loader manufacturers should 

design tailored guards which shield the exposed hydraulics while not interfering with the task of pushing metal. 

DISCLAIMER 

Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by the NY FACE and NIOSH. In addition, 

citations of websites external to NY FACE and NIOSH do not constitute NY FACE and NIOSH endorsement 

of the sponsoring organizations or their programs or products. Furthermore, NY FACE and NIOSH are not 

responsible for the content of these websites. All web addresses referenced in this document were accessible 

as of the publication date. 

REFERENCES 

Liebherr-Werk Bischofshofen GmbH [2016]. Operator’s manual Wheel loader L538-1268 (USA/CAN). Liebherr 

Technical Documentation Department. 

Liebherr-Werk Bischofshofen GmbH [2015]. Liebherr specialist machines for waste management. Retrieved 

March 22, 2019 from https://www.liebherr.com/shared/media/corporate/images/events/intermat-2015/exhibitsintermat-2015/intermat-2015-material-handling-equipment/intermat-2015-material-handling-equipmentdownloads/liebherr-intermat-2015-liebherr-specialist-machines-for-waste-management-download-en.pdf. 

Michigan Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Program. “Farm Laborer Died When Struck by Front End 

Loader Bucket”. Retrieved March 22, 2019 from https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/pdfs/12MI008.pdf. 

NIOSH Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Program. “Solid Waste Compost Facility Worker Dies, Body 

Is Recovered in Digester Tube” Retrieved March 22, 2019 from https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/In-house/ 

full201001.html. 

NIOSH. Prevention through Design. Retrieved March 22, 2019 from https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/ptd/. 

OSHA. The control of hazardous energy (lockout/tagout). 29CFR1910.147. Retrieved March 22, 2019 from https:// 

www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.147. 

OSHA. Hazard Identifcation and Assessment. Retrieved March 22, 2019 from https://www.osha.gov/ 

shpguidelines/hazard-Identifcation.html. 

OSHA. Job Hazard Analysis. Retrieved March 22, 2019 from https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3071.pdf. 

OSHA Safety and health Program Management Guidelines. Retrieved April 4, 2019 from https://www.osha.gov/ 

shpmguidelines/SHPM_guidelines.pdf. 

ANSI. ANSI/ASSP Z10-2012 (R2017): Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems. 

ISO 45001: 2018 Occupational health and safety management system-Requirements with guidance for use. 

INVESTIGATOR INFORMATION 

This investigation was conducted by NY FACE, Bureau of Occupational Health and Injury Prevention, Center for 

Environmental Health, New York State Department of Health. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMEMENT 

The NY FACE Program would like to acknowledge the OSHA Albany Area Ofce for providing assistance and 

information for this investigation. 

8 
The New York State Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (NY FACE) is a research program funded by 

the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and administered by the New York State Department 

of Health. NY FACE collects information on work-related fatalities, investigates the incidents to identify the 

causes and contributing factors, proposes prevention measures, and shares the injury prevention information 

with employers, workers, and other organizations interested in promoting workplace safety. NY FACE does not 

determine fault or legal liability associated with a fatal incident. Names of employers, victims and/or witnesses 

are kept confdential. Additional information regarding the NY FACE program can be obtained from: 

New York State Department of Health FACE Program 

Bureau of Occupational Health and Injury Prevention 

Corning Tower, Room 1325 

Empire State Plaza 

Albany, NY 12237 

866-807-2130 

518-402-7900 

boh@health.ny.gov 

www.health.ny.gov/WorkSafe 

9