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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

March 23, 2017 

v No. 330071 

Arenac Circuit Court 

WALTER FRANK STEENBERGH, LC No. 15-003908-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: KELLY, P.J., and STEPHENS and O’BRIEN, JJ. 

STEPHENS, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

 I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in regards to the admissibility of 

nurse Threadgill’s testimony under MRE 803(4). I also agree that defense counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to object to Threadgill’s testimony based on the ground that it was 

inadmissible hearsay. 

 I respectfully disagree with the majority as to defendant’s remaining ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim because I find that defense counsel’s failure to retain or consult with 

a single expert witness constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 The United States and the Michigan Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to 

counsel, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, which encompasses the right to effective 

assistance of counsel. People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 459; 812 NW2d 37 (2011). “To 

be constitutionally effective, counsel’s performance must meet an ‘objective standard of 

reasonableness.’ ” People v Ackley, 497 Mich 381, 388; 870 NW2d 858 (2015) quoting People v 

Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). “In determining whether defense 

counsel met this threshold, . . . the defendant bears the burden of proving that, in view of the 

totality of the circumstances, counsel's performance was deficient and so serious as to deprive 

the defendant of a fair trial.” People v Armendarez, 188 Mich App 61, 74–75; 468 NW2d 893 

(1991). “[F]ailure to investigate adequately and to attempt to secure suitable expert assistance in 

the preparation and presentation of [a] defense” may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Ackley, 497 Mich at 383. While “[a]n attorney’s decision whether to retain witnesses, including 

expert witnesses, is a matter of trial strategy,” People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 

NW2d 714 (2009), “counsel’s strategy must be sound, and the decisions as to it objectively 

reasonable,” Ackley, 497 Mich at 388-389. “[A] court must determine whether the ‘strategic 

choices [were] made after less than complete investigation,’ and any choice is ‘reasonable 
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precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 

investigation.’ ” Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 52 quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 

690-691; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). Counsel has a “duty to make reasonable 

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 

unnecessary.” Hinton v Alabama, 134 S Ct 1081, 1088; 188 L Ed 2d 1 (2014), quoting 

Strickland, 466 US at 690-691. 

 Failure to call a witness constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel if it deprives a 

defendant of a substantial defense. Payne, 285 Mich App at 190. “A substantial defense is one 

that might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial.” People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 

524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). A defendant asserting that a substantial defense was lost by 

counsel’s failure to secure an expert witness must offer proof that an expert witness would have 

testified favorably if called by the defense. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 455; 669 

NW2d 818 (2003). In this case, because no supplemental hearing was held, review is limited to 

mistakes apparent from the record. People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566 NW2d 649 

(1997). Defendant acknowledges his duty under Ackerman to provide proof that an expert would 

testify favorably, and while failing to produce an expert affidavit, instead relies on the record to 

establish the factual predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance.1

 

 I find, that in this case, the record does support the assertion that an expert witness in 

clinical psychology, forensic interviewing or child memory and suggestibility, would have aided 

defendant and that consultation with an expert “might have made a difference in the outcome of 

the trial.” Kelly, 186 Mich App at 526. The prosecution correctly notes that this is not a case 

where the prosecution’s theory was heavily reliant on expert opinion. It was, as many CSC cases 

are, a case that focused on the complainant’s credibility. However, the unfortunate history of the 

complainant who was a victim of a prior sexual assault when she was a toddler should have 

compelled defense counsel to consult with an expert. If counsel in Ackley, supra, who was 

rebuffed by one expert, should have sought a second, counsel here was ineffective for not 

seeking even one. 

 TB testified that she was the victim of a prior assault at age three or four and participated 

in counseling as a result. She, also, intertwined the specifics of the prior assault with the instant 

case. In particular, she gave testimony regarding her fear of reporting the assault because of a 

threat to her family but admitted that this defendant never threatened her family. Instead, she 

earnestly admitted that she was transferring the threat made to her when she was assaulted as a 

toddler to the current case. It is noteworthy that TB did not disclose any information about the 

assault in this case until her parents informed her of an open investigation. Shortly thereafter, the 

child was seen by Threadgill. Threadgill’s testimony also implicates the need for expert 

 

1

 Cf. People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 369; 649 NW2d 94 (2002) (“Here, defendant claims 

that his counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to call the codefendants, Hamill, or 

defendant’s mother as witnesses. However, the record does not suggest how any of these 

witnesses would have benefited defendant’s case, and defendant has not provided this Court with 

affidavits indicating what the proposed testimony of the codefendants or Hamill would have 

been.) 
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consultation by competent counsel. Threadgill acknowledged that she did not do a forensic 

interview and that she made no inquiry into any prior assault. However, the bulk of her 

testimony was not about the spontaneous information TB gave her, but about the child’s answers 

to very specific questions posed to her about the details of the assault at issue. In fact, Threadgill 

knew nothing of a prior assault and therefore her testimony of TB’s response to her questions, 

which elicited details not announced by TB before, made no distinction between the two assaults. 

Defense counsel was aware of the prior assault early on, having filed a motion for discovery for 

“information of the prior allegation” that was later withdrawn after defense counsel was provided 

the “information.” We are unaware of the exact “information” he received. The record in this 

case is devoid of any questioning of TB or Threadgill regarding the effect of the prior assault and 

subsequent counseling on TB’s memory. 

 Consultation with a clinical psychologist would have educated defense counsel about the 

type of counseling TB would have received at age three or four, and how TB would have 

processed that information. Although the first assault occurred at a very young age, TB retained 

memory of it. A child of three to four years of age is highly susceptible. An investigation of 

what TB retained from that incident or from the counseling she received thereafter would have 

assisted defense counsel in formulating questions to determine any effect on her memory of the 

instant assault. I cannot surmise under what circumstances it would be reasonable for defense 

counsel to not at least consult with an expert and pursue how the prior assault would complicate 

the details of the current assault in the mind of a young child. 

 There are known difficulties involved when interviewing children. People v Tesen, 276 

Mich App 134, 144; 739 NW2d 689 (2007). “[C]hild-sexual-abuse cases present ‘special 

considerations’ given ‘the reliability problems created by children’s suggestibility.’ ” People v 

Musser, 494 Mich 337, 357; 835 NW2d 319 (2013) quoting People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 

371; 537 NW2d 857 opinion amended on denial of reh 450 Mich 1212; 548 NW2d 625 (1995). 

Defense counsel’s cross-examination of Threadgill leads me to believe that defense counsel was 

unaware of this issue. There was no examination into the wording of Threadgill’s questions or 

prompts, or responses to TB’s answers. There was no examination into whether Threadgill 

followed-up on TB’s understanding of terms used by Threadgill. The suggestibility of 

Threadgill’s questions was left unchallenged. An expert on forensic interviewing or child 

suggestibility would have assisted defense counsel in targeting any issues of unreliability in TB’s 

statement to Threadgill. 

 The prosecution’s arguments against a finding of ineffective assistance are untenable. 

True, defense counsel’s closing focused on the inconsistencies in TB’s testimony however, I 

cannot agree with the prosecution that the same approach would have been taken if defense 

counsel had consulted with or secured an expert to testify in defendant’s defense. The 

prosecution contends that there was no need for a defense expert because Threadgill did not offer 

any opinion testimony that would have precipitated the need for a counter expert. Defense 

counsel is not limited to defensive tactics. Zealous representation incorporates offensive 

strategy, where counsel anticipates a case’s challenges and knows its weaknesses so that he or 

she is prepared to meet them. Expert assistance would have advanced defendant’s theory before 

the jury. “Had it been fortified by adequate investigation, it would have shown the weakness in 

the prosecutor’s case, and it could have made a difference in the verdict.” People v Grant, 470 

Mich 477, 492; 684 NW2d 686 (2004). Furthermore, nowhere in the review of an ineffective 
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assistance of counsel claim based on the failure to engage an expert witness is defendant’s claim 

for an expert contingent upon whether the prosecution has an expert. 

 Defendant’s case is not like Ackley, supra, or Agar, supra, in that here no request was 

even made for an expert. I can find no objectively reasonable basis to have not made such a 

request. The lack of a request to consult or retain an expert in this case was not sound trial 

strategy in any form. Accordingly, I conclude that in this case counsel’s failure to consult with 

or attempt to secure an expert witness to assist in the preparation and presentation of defendant’s 

defense fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The record does indicate that an 

expert witness would have aided defendant and that there was a reasonable probability that but 

for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

 In People v Agar, 500 Mich 891; 886 NW2d 717 (2016)2, our Supreme Court ordered 

that the defendant’s case be remanded so that the defendant could offer “proof indicating how 

the expert’s testimony would be material and favorable to the defense.” In Agar, defense 

counsel was denied a request for an expert in computer forensics.3

 Our Supreme Court further 

directed the trial court on remand to “address in writing whether the absence of a defense expert 

sufficiently prejudiced the defendant such that a new trial is warranted.” Agar, 500 Mich at ___. 

As with the defendant in Agar, I cannot, at this stage, make a finding as to whether prejudice 

resulted from counsel’s failure sufficient to warrant a new trial. Accordingly, I would remand 

for further proceedings related to the retention of an expert. 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

 

2

 “Supreme Court orders that include a decision with an understandable rationale establish 

binding precedent.” People v Giovannini, 271 Mich App 409, 414; 722 NW2d 237 (2006). 

3 People v Agar, 314 Mich App 636; 887 NW2d 662 (2016) rev’ in part and vacated in part 500 

Mich 891; 886 NW2d 717 (2016).