Filed 12/22/23 In re E.H. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re E.H. et al., Persons 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B328095

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 18CCJP06000B, D–H)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County. Gabriela H. Shapiro, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
2

Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________________

In this juvenile dependency appeal, M.M. (father) appeals 

the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to six of 

his children. Father raises one issue on appeal. He argues the 

juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (Department) failed to comply with

inquiry and notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 

1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California 

law. Father seeks a conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s 

orders terminating his parental rights and remand directing the 

juvenile court and the Department to comply with ICWA.

As discussed below, we conclude (1) although errors were 

made with respect to the Department’s initial duty of inquiry as 

to father’s side of the family, those errors were harmless and do 

not require remand, and (2) substantial evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s ICWA finding as to mother’s side of the family. 

Thus, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

1. The Family

Father moved to the United States in 2006. He met I.M.

(mother) in Indiana and later married her. At some point, they 

separated but continued to see each other. The status of their

relationship was unclear. Mother and father have seven children 

together, two of whom (twins) were born during the pendency of 
3

the underlying proceedings.

1 Mother also has one child from a 

different relationship (half sibling). Mother, half sibling, and one 

of mother and father’s older children are not parties to this 

appeal, although each was involved in the proceedings below.

Father’s parents and most of his siblings live in Guatemala. 

Two of his brothers, however, Henry and Boris (paternal uncles), 

live in Los Angeles. While the underlying proceedings were 

pending, father was at times incarcerated, living with paternal 

uncles, or living with a friend.

Mother has nine siblings, all of whom, along with mother’s 

mother (maternal grandmother), live in Indiana. Mother stayed 

in contact with maternal grandmother and all her siblings. 

Mother has no contact with her father (maternal grandfather). 

Mother’s support system included her sister Trina (maternal 

aunt) and brother Timothy (maternal uncle).

2. Brief Case Summary

Beside his ICWA arguments, father does not challenge the 

merits of the juvenile court’s rulings. Consequently, we include 

only a brief summary of them and the underlying facts here. 

This case began in September 2018, when the Department filed a

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of 

mother and father’s older children (the twins were not yet born) 

and half sibling (petition).

2 The petition alleged mother and 

father engaged in verbal and physical violence in the children’s 

presence, father had been arrested for injuring mother with a 

1 Mother and father have two sets of twins. In this opinion,

“twins” refers to their two youngest children.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
4

knife and his fists, and father and mother had physically abused 

two of their children. In July 2019, after the twins were born, the 

Department filed a similar petition on their behalf (twins’ 

petition). The juvenile court sustained amended petitions as to 

the children, all of whom were placed (some individually, some 

together) in foster homes.

On February 23, 2023, well over four years after the 

proceedings began, the juvenile court found the children were 

adoptable and likely to be adopted. The court terminated 

mother’s and father’s parental rights to six of their children. This

appeal followed.

3. Facts Relevant to ICWA

a. Contacts with Relatives

During the pendency of the proceedings below, in addition 

to speaking with mother and father, Department social workers 

spoke with paternal uncle Boris, maternal grandmother, 

maternal uncle, and maternal aunt (who at various times 

expressed interest in having the children placed with her in 

Indiana). The last contact the Department had with maternal 

aunt was in early 2021, when maternal aunt contacted the 

Department to inquire about the case. In March 2022, the 

Department attempted to contact maternal aunt, but the phone 

number the Department had for her was disconnected. The 

Department could not locate her. Of those four relatives

contacted, the Department asked only maternal grandmother 

and paternal uncle Boris about potential Indian ancestry.

By approximately late April 2020, the Department had lost 

contact with mother. Almost one year later, in February 2021, 

mother stated she was with maternal aunt in Indiana. Despite 
5

efforts to maintain contact, the Department eventually lost 

contact with mother altogether.

b. Father

Throughout the proceedings, father indicated he had no 

Indian ancestry. Paternal uncle Boris similarly denied Indian 

ancestry. At the September 2018 detention hearing regarding 

the petition, the juvenile court found it did not have a reason to 

know ICWA applied with respect to father’s side of the family.

c. Mother

i. ICWA Inquiries and Findings as to the 

Older Children

In connection with filing the petition in September 2018, 

the Department inquired of mother whether the children had 

Indian ancestry. For each child, the Department checked a box 

indicating, “The child has no known Indian ancestry.” However, 

on her “parental notification of Indian status” form (ICWA-020) 

filed the next day, mother checked the box indicating she “may 

have Indian ancestry,” specifically Cherokee.

At the September 2018 detention hearing, the juvenile 

court asked mother whether any member of her family was 

enrolled or registered with a Cherokee tribe. Mother responded, 

“No,” but also stated her grandmother (maternal great 

grandmother) “was Indian Cherokee.” Mother did not know if

maternal great grandmother was registered. The court ordered 

the Department to investigate mother’s claim of potential Indian 

ancestry and to file a report, which was to include “the details of 

who was interviewed, dates and places of birth of the relatives as 

far back as can be ascertained.” The court also ordered the 

Department “to notice the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Secretary
6

of Interior and the appropriate tribes,” and to submit those 

notices, return receipts, and any responses.

In its November 2018 jurisdiction and disposition report, 

the Department stated, “The Indian Child Welfare Act does or 

may apply.” The Department noted mother and maternal 

grandmother indicated maternal great grandmother (who was no 

longer alive) “has Black Indian Cherokee heritage.” Maternal 

grandmother “did not know if [the maternal great grandmother]

was a registered member or received any services from the tribe.”

Also in November 2018, the Department sent ICWA notices 

(form ICWA-030) to mother, father, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 

the Department of the Interior, the Cherokee Nation of 

Oklahoma, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the 

United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians (2018 notices). 

Those notices included the name, birthdate and birthplace for 

each of the older children (the twins were not born yet), mother, 

father, maternal grandmother, and maternal great grandmother. 

The 2018 notices indicated maternal grandmother and maternal 

great grandmother had Black Indian Cherokee heritage, while 

mother had “Possible Black Indian Cherokee” heritage. Mother 

and maternal grandmother were listed as “Not a member” of a 

tribe, and maternal great grandmother was listed as “Unknown” 

if she was a member of a tribe or received any services from a 

tribe. The notices stated, “Mother reported maternal great 

grandmother said ‘there’s a little Cherokee in all of us’ referring 

to the maternal family bloodline. Maternal grandmother 

reported the details of the family’s Native American heritage 

were not discussed with her.” Very limited information was 

included regarding maternal grandfather because mother had no 

contact with him. The 2018 notices indicated father had no 
7

known Indian heritage and his parents and grandparents were

born and lived in Guatemala.

In December 2018, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians 

wrote to the Department, stating the children were “neither 

registered nor eligible to register as a member of this tribe” and 

each child was “not considered an ‘Indian Child’ in relation to the 

Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians as defined in 25 U.S.C., 

Section 1903(4).” The tribe would not intervene in the matter. 

By late February 2019, the Department had not received 

responses from the other two tribes, although they, the 

Department of the Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs each 

had received the 2018 notices.

At the February 26, 2019, disposition hearing as to the 

older children, counsel for the Department stated the 

Department had received “the ICWA notices back” (referring to 

return receipts indicating the 2018 notices were received by their 

intended recipients) and “[t]hey are attached to today’s last 

minute [report].” At that hearing, the juvenile court found “No 

ICWA.” Although that finding is reflected in the reporter’s 

transcript for the hearing, it is not reflected in the court’s minute 

orders from the hearing. However, mother’s and father’s case 

plans state ICWA does not apply, which case plans were 

incorporated into the February 26, 2019 minute orders.

ii. ICWA Inquiries and Findings as to the 

Twins

In connection with the twins’ petition filed in July 2019, the 

Department checked the box that the twins “may have Indian 

ancestry.” The Department noted mother “declined to state or 

sign ICWA form” at the time. The next day, however, mother 

submitted an ICWA-020 form, on which she checked the box
8

stating, “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” At the 

July 16, 2019 detention hearing on the twins’ petition, the court 

stated it did not have reason to know the twins were Indian 

children, and did not order notice to any Indian tribe or the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs. Similarly, in its October 2019 minute 

order for the twins’ disposition hearing, the juvenile court stated 

“No ICWA.”

iii. Subsequent ICWA Discussions, Notices,

and Findings as to the Children

In a January 2021 report regarding the three youngest 

children, and although the juvenile court had already found 

ICWA did not apply, the Department stated the court’s ICWA 

findings as to mother were still pending with respect to the older 

children. The Department requested the court to make its ICWA 

findings. The Department reiterated this request in September 

and November 2021 filings.

In a September 2021 report, the Department stated, “On 

07/16/19, the Court found that the Indian Child Welfare Act does 

not apply for the minors, [twins]. [¶] Given that the Indian Child 

Welfare Act was found not to apply for the minors, [twins,] [t]he 

Department respectfully recommends for the Court to find that 

the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply as [to mother] for the 

[six older] minors.” The Department repeated this in March and 

April 2022 reports.

At a permanency planning hearing held in March 2022,

counsel for the Department asked the juvenile court to find ICWA 

did not apply to the older children. Counsel noted the Cherokee 

tribe previously had stated the children were not eligible for 

membership and, “subsequently at the disposition hearing [the 

court] proceeded as if the case was not ICWA. So I believe it 
9

appears to have just been an oversight on the part of the court to 

not make the formal ICWA findings on the record.” The court 

declined to make an ICWA order at that time, however, stating,

“[I]f at the start of a case a member of the family mentions a 

Native American tribe, even if the tribe has already responded, 

the court and the Department have an obligation to re-notice the 

tribe for the .26 hearing, and at the very least, inquire if they 

wish to intervene or if there is any additional information, at the 

time of the .26.” The court believed that the scheduling of a

permanency planning hearing may “trigger” a tribe that 

previously declined to intervene “to determine that they do want 

to participate. [¶] . . . I would just assume [sic] have all of this 

addressed before proceedings to a .26 hearing, and have the 

Department notify the Cherokee Nation.” The court stated, “[I]n 

the ICWA statutes, it’s an obligation to re-notice the tribes before 

the .26 in every instance when a tribe may be mentioned at an 

initial hearing, even if the tribes don’t intervene and ICWA does 

not apply, especially where tribes may not have responded to 

initial inquiries. Here, we have the Eastern Band responding to 

an initial inquiry, but the court is obligated to revisit ICWA at 

every .26 hearing. [¶] And, so, perhaps in an attempt to ensure 

that the tribe is aware that the case is at a .26 hearing, I would 

ask that the Department [inform the tribes] that we are 

proceeding with a .26 hearing.” Counsel argued repeat notice 

was not required “once . . . the tribe has indicated that the 

children are not eligible for membership.”

Thus, although at the March 2022 hearing the juvenile 

court found “[n]o reason to know the ICWA applies,” the court 

also ordered the Department “to send notices to the Eastern 
10

Band of Cherokee Nations Tribe as to the .26 hearing despite 

their prior response.”

In late June 2022, the Department sent by certified mail

ICWA notices (form ICWA-030) on behalf of each child, including 

for the first time the twins, to mother, father, the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs, the Department of the Interior, and the Eastern 

Band of Cherokee Indians (2022 notices). The Department 

referred to these as “courtesy ICWA notices for the WIC 366.26 

hearing.” These 2022 notices indicated the children may be 

eligible for membership in the “Cherokee – Eastern Band of 

Cherokee Indians” tribe. Unlike the 2018 notices, however, the 

2022 notices did not include information regarding relatives other 

than mother and father, and the information related to mother 

and father was sparse and outdated. The 2022 notices were not 

sent to the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma or to the United 

Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians. Based on the 2022 

notices, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Nations tribe determined 

the children were neither registered nor eligible to register as 

members of the tribe.

In January 2023, the juvenile court continued the 

permanency planning hearing again in part so that the 

Department could conduct a “full ICWA inquiry.” The court 

ordered the Department “to review their case file and provide a 

list of all extended family members and relatives that the agency 

has had contact with over the course of the case and evidence 

that ICWA inquiry was made of all of those individuals. That 

evidence should be included with the report submitted for the 26 

hearing. [¶] In addition, if [the Department] determines there 

are relatives or extended family members who have not yet been 
11

interviewed, [the Department] is to do so forthwith and comply 

with its ongoing ICWA obligations pursuant to CRC 5.481(a)(5).”

The next month, in February 2023, the Department 

reported it left multiple voicemail messages for mother and for 

maternal uncle asking them to call back. They did not. The 

Department also reported it had attempted to contact maternal 

aunt, but her phone number was no longer in service. A 

Department social worker spoke with father, who stated he had 

no Indian ancestry and “mother had never mentioned having 

Indian ancestry or being [a] member of a tribe.” The social 

worker also spoke with paternal uncle Boris, who stated he had 

no information that the children had Indian ancestry. The

Department did not contact maternal grandmother.

The permanency planning hearing was held on 

February 23, 2023, more than four years after the underlying 

proceedings began. At the hearing, the court asked the attorneys

present if they were “in agreement with the [Department’s] 

representation that the ICWA inquiry appears to be a complete, 

cohesive list of all relatives and their response to ICWA?” Each 

attorney was in agreement. The court found “the ICWA inquiry 

is complete. The Department has made diligent efforts to 

investigate and inquire of all known relativ[es] or non-related 

extended family members, and anyone with an interest in the 

child.” The court held, “The children are not Indian children, and 

the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply to them.”

DISCUSSION

1. Applicable Law

ICWA establishes minimum standards courts must follow 

before removing an Indian child from his or her family. Under

California law implementing ICWA, the juvenile court and the
12

Department “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire 

whether” a dependent child “is or may be an Indian child.” 

(§ 224.2, subd. (a); In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 

883.) For these purposes, an “ ‘Indian child’ ” is a child who (1) is 

“a member of an Indian tribe,” or (2) “is eligible for membership 

in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an

Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, 

subd. (a) [adopting federal law definition].)

Under ICWA as implemented in California, “the 

Department and juvenile court have ‘three distinct duties.’ 

[Citations.] The first duty is the initial ‘duty’ of the Department 

and the juvenile court ‘to inquire whether [a] child is an Indian 

child.’ (§ 224.2, subds. (a) & (b).) The Department discharges 

this duty chiefly by ‘asking’ family members ‘whether the child is, 

or may be, an Indian child.’ (Id., subd. (b).) This includes 

inquiring of not only the child’s parents, but also others, 

including but not limited to, ‘extended family members.’[

3] (Ibid.) 

For its part, the juvenile court is required, ‘[a]t the first 

appearance’ in a dependency case, to ‘ask each participant’

‘present’ ‘whether the participant knows or has reason to know 

that the child is an Indian child.’ (Id., subd. (c).)” (In re Dezi C.

(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 780, review granted Sept. 21, 2022, 

S275578 (Dezi C.).)

“The second duty is the duty of the Department or the 

juvenile court to ‘make further inquiry regarding the possible 

3 “Extended family members” include the dependent child’s 

adult “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-inlaw or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or 

stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, 

subd. (c) [adopting federal law definition].)
13

Indian status of the child.’ ([§ 224.2], subd. (e).) This duty of 

further inquiry is triggered if the Department or court ‘has 

reason to believe that an Indian child is involved’ because the 

record contains ‘information . . . suggesting the child is Indian’ 

(ibid.; [citations]), and, once triggered, obligates the Department 

to conduct further interviews to gather information, to contact 

the Bureau of Indian Affairs and state department of social 

services for assistance, and/or to contact the relevant Indian 

tribe(s). (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).)” (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 780–781, rev.gr.) This further inquiry must be made “as 

soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) “Contact” for purposes 

of further inquiry does not require the sharing of significant and 

detailed information on a child’s grandparents, greatgrandparents, and other direct lineal ancestors. (Compare 

§ 224.2, subd. (e) with §§ 224.2, subd. (f), and 224.3, 

subd. (a)(5)(C).) However, of course, biographical information 

that is accurate and as complete as possible is necessary for the 

tribes to make a determination as to a child’s tribal status.

“The third duty is the duty to notify the relevant Indian 

tribe(s). (§ 224.3, subd. (a); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) This duty is 

triggered if the Department or the court ‘knows or has reason to 

know . . . that an Indian child is involved.’ (§ 224.3, subd. (a).)” 

(Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 781, rev.gr.) “[T]he duty to 

provide notice to Indian tribes applies only when one knows or 

has a ‘reason to know . . . an Indian child is involved,’ and only 

‘for hearings that may culminate in an order for foster care 

placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive

placement, or adoptive placement.’ (§ 224.3, subd. (a).)” (In re 

Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 884.) For these purposes, a 

“reason to know” exists when the juvenile court has been 
14

informed of any of the following: (1) the child is an Indian child, 

(2) the child or parents live on a reservation or in an Alaska 

Native village, (3) information indicating that the child is an 

Indian child, (4) the child gives the court reason to know he or 

she is an Indian child, (5) the child is or has been a ward of a 

tribal court, or (6) the child or either parent has an identification 

card indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe. 

(§ 224.2, subd. (d).) When there is a reason to know an Indian 

child is involved, notices must comply with formal statutory 

requirements. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).)

2. Standard of Review

“ ‘[W]e review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the 

substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if 

reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports’ the court’s 

ICWA finding.” (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 777, rev.gr.) 

Even if substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s 

ICWA findings, we may not reverse unless we find that error was 

prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Dezi C., supra, 79 

Cal.App.5th at p. 777, rev.gr.)

3. Application

First, we address ICWA compliance as to father’s side of 

the family. We agree with father that the Department did not 

satisfy its duty of inquiry. Although the Department spoke with 

father and paternal uncle Boris, the Department never contacted 

father’s other brother, paternal uncle Henry, with whom paternal 

uncle Boris and father for a time lived in Los Angeles. There is 

also no indication the Department attempted to contact any of 

father’s family members who lived in Guatemala. Thus, the 

Department failed to satisfy its initial duty of inquiry as to 

father’s side of the family because it did not contact, or even 
15

appear to try to contact, extended family members. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 224.2, subd. (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 224.1, subd. (c).)

Given this error, we must consider whether it was 

prejudicial and requires remand. (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 777, rev.gr.) The record below does not contain information 

suggesting a reason to believe the children may be “Indian 

children” based on father’s ancestry. (Id. at p. 779.) Father

consistently denied Indian heritage. Paternal uncle Boris 

similarly denied Indian heritage. Father makes no proffer on 

appeal to change this assessment. (Ibid.) Thus, we conclude the 

error was harmless and remand is not warranted based on the 

inquiry error as to father’s side of the family. (Id. at p. 786.)

Second, we address ICWA compliance as to mother’s side of 

the family. As with father’s family, the Department failed to 

contact many of mother’s extended family members. Although

the Department spoke with mother and, early in the proceedings, 

with maternal grandmother, as well as with maternal aunt and 

uncle, it does not appear the Department contacted or attempted 

to contact any of mother’s other siblings. There is no indication 

mother’s siblings were difficult to locate. It was reported mother 

stayed in touch with her nine siblings and maternal 

grandmother, all of whom lived in Indiana. Under the 

Department’s initial duty of inquiry, it should have contacted or, 

at the least, attempted to contact mother’s extended family 

members including, for example, all of her siblings, to ask if the 

children may be Indian children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, 

subd. (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, 

subd. (c).) Thus, as with father, the Department failed to satisfy 

its initial duty of inquiry with respect to mother.
16

However, our analysis as to mother’s side of the family does 

not stop there. Once mother and maternal grandmother 

indicated there might be Cherokee heritage on their side of the 

family, there was reason to believe Indian children might be 

involved, thus triggering the duty to make further inquiry “as 

soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd (e).) Consequently, the

juvenile court and the Department were obligated to make 

further inquiries, including of those individuals they had already 

contacted, to gather information about mother’s claimed heritage. 

Although the Department made some unsuccessful attempts at 

further inquiry years after learning of mother’s claimed Indian 

heritage, the Department never tried to contact maternal 

grandmother again. Additionally, as already noted above, the 

Department never contacted the majority of mother’s siblings. 

Moreover, it is unclear why the Department waited so long to 

attempt further inquiry of maternal family members when it 

could and should have done so years earlier.

Nonetheless, despite these missteps, we conclude the

Department’s 2018 notices were sufficient and adequate contact

for purposes of the Department’s obligation to make further 

inquiry after learning of mother’s claimed Indian heritage; i.e., 

after having a reason to believe Indian children may be involved. 

The 2018 notices included names, birthdates, birth places, and 

addresses. They were received by the tribes and government 

agencies. Although information for the twins was not included in 

those notices (because they were not yet born), that is 

insignificant since it is not claimed that any one of the children is 

a member of a tribe. Because the children are all full biological 

siblings, if one is eligible to become a member of a tribe, so too 

would the others, and vice versa. Moreover, although on appeal 
17

father lists various inaccuracies in the 2018 notices, perfection is 

not required and the listed inaccuracies were not prejudicial for 

purposes of further inquiry. (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th

558, 570–571.) Because this case never became one in which 

there was reason to know an Indian Child was involved, formal 

notice to tribes was not required. (Ibid.)

Additionally, it was not necessary for the Department to renotice the tribes or the government agencies prior to the 

permanency planning hearing. Because this was not a reason-toknow case and because the juvenile court previously had 

determined ICWA did not apply, the 2022 notices were not 

required. (§ 224.3, subd (b).) Thus, the obvious inadequacy of the 

2022 notices was immaterial in that those notices were 

superfluous. To be clear, the 2022 notices were woefully 

insufficient. They included next to zero information, which is 

inexplicable given the Department had already compiled and 

used much of the family members’ identifying information in the

2018 notices. One wonders why the 2022 notices were even sent. 

Nevertheless, the 2022 notices do not detract from the sufficiency 

of the 2018 notices, as discussed above.

Finally, it is significant that, in its response to the 2018 

notices, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians declined to 

intervene in the case, stating the children were not considered 

Indian children. This, coupled with no responses from the other

two noticed tribes and the fact that mother and maternal 

grandmother stated they were not members of any tribe,

constitutes substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s 

finding that ICWA did not apply. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (a).)
18

In closing, we note the older children have been waiting for 

permanency for over five years, and the twins since they were 

born. Many of the children have lived most if not all of their lives 

outside the care of mother and father. We are confident our 

decision aligns with the importance the dependency law rightly 

affords to the safety, well-being, and best interests of dependent 

children.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s February 23, 2023 orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P.J.

We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.