alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 12 - 00288 - CR JEFFREY BOYCE JONES APPELLANT
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- Appellant Jeffrey Boyce Jones appeals his felony convictions for two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child by contact. Appell ant pled guilty to all three counts pursuant to an open plea, and the trial judge assessed his punishment at thirty

- five years’ confinement for each aggravated sexual assault count and twenty years’

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2 confinement for the indecency with a child count , all to run concurrently . We affirm. Appellant ’ s court
- appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel avers that, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel ’ s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California , by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. 386 U.S. 738, 744

– 45, 87 S. Ct. 1396 , 1400 (1967) ; see In re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d 403, 406

– 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

. We gave a ppellant

an opportunity to file a pro se brief, but he has not done so. Likewise, t he State has not filed a brief. Once an appellant’ s court
- appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders , we

are obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State , 904 S.W.2d 920, 922

– 23 (Tex. Ap p. — Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may we grant counsel ’ s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 82

– 83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’ s brief. We agree with counsel that the appeal is w holly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 827

– 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State , 206 S.W.3d3 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordin gly, we grant counsel ’ s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court ’ s judgment

.

TERRIE LIVINGSTON CHIEF JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GABRIEL, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: September 19, 2013
Case 1:07-cv-03496-WHP Document 36-9 Filed 07/11/2007 Page 1 of 3
Case 1:07-cv-03496-WHP Document 36-9 Filed 07/11/2007 Page 2 of 3
Case 1:07-cv-03496-WHP Document 36-9 Filed 07/11/2007 Page 3 of 3
# C_2011177EN.01000201.xml

| 17.6.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 177/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.6.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 177/2

---

Notice for the attention of the entities to which restrictive measures provided for in Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2011/332/CFSP, and in Council Regulation (EU) No 204/2011, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 572/2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya apply

2011/C 177/03

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

The following information is brought to the attention of entities that appear in Annex IV to Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2011/332/CFSP (1), and in Annex III to Council Regulation (EU) No 204/2011, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 572/2011 (2) concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya.

1

2

The Council of the European Union has decided that the entities that appear in the above mentioned Annexes should be included in the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2011/137/CFSP and in Regulation (EU) No 204/2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya. The grounds for designations of those entities appear in the relevant entries in those Annexes.

The attention of the entities concerned is drawn to the possibility of making an application to the competent authorities of the relevant Member State(s) as indicated on the websites in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) No 204/2011, in order to obtain an authorisation to use frozen funds for basic needs or specific payments (cf. Article 7 of the Regulation).

The entities concerned may submit a request to the Council, together with supporting documentation, that the decision to include them on the above mentioned list should be reconsidered, to the following address:

| Council of the European Union |
| --- |
| General Secretariat |
| TEFS Coordination |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

TEFS Coordination

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

The attention of the persons concerned is also drawn to the possibility of challenging the Council's decision before the General Court of the European Union, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 275, second paragraph, and Article 263, fourth and sixth paragraphs, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

---

(1)  OJ L 149, 8.6.2011, p. 10.

1

(2)  OJ L 159, 17.6.2011, p. 2.

2

---
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

STEVEN L. BADER

, Appellant,

v.

MARINA BAY APARTMENTS

, and JUAN CARLOS MARTINEZ

, Appellee s

.

No. 4D 21

- 1170

[ August 4, 2021 ]

Appeal from the C ounty Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm

Beach County ; Reginald R. Corlew , Judge; L.T. Case No.

502020SC002632XXXXSB

.

Steven L. Bader, Delray Beach, pro se.

No appearance for appellees.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed. See Fla. R. App. P. 9

. 315(a).

C IKLIN

, K UNTZ and A RTAU

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-15-00684-CR

Ricardo YANES,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law, Medina County, Texas

Trial Court No. 30085

Honorable Vivian Torres, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION, JUSTICE ALVAREZ, AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED.

SIGNED July 20, 2016.

_____________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-QSB of Lancer
Orthodontics, Inc. for the annual period ended May 31, 2002 (the
Report) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof, I, John Dodge, Director of Financial Planning,
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
     13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
     all material respects, the financial condition and results
     of operations of the Company.








/s/ John Dodge
    John Dodge
    Director of Financial Planning
## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

April 12, 2024 SC-2024-0090 Ex parte David Otto Jacobson PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: David Otto Jacobson v. State of Alabama) (Etowah Circuit Court: CV-23-92; Criminal Appeals: CR-2023-0984). CERTIFICATE OF JUDGMENT WHEREAS, the petition for writ of certiorari in the above referenced cause has been duly submitted and considered by the Supreme Court of Alabama and the judgment indicated below was entered in this cause on April 12, 2024: Writ Denied. No Opinion. Stewart, J. -- Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur. NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 41, Ala. R. App. P., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court's judgment in this cause is certified on this date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, unless otherwise ordered by this Court or agreed upon by the parties, the costs of this cause are hereby taxed as provided by Rule 35, Ala. R. App. P.

I, Megan B. Rhodebeck, certify that this is the record of the judgment of the Court, witness my hand and seal.

Clerk, Supreme Court of Alabama
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 200 (Wednesday, October 17, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 58832]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-5116]



[[Page 58832]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary


Membership of the Performance Review Board

AGENCY: Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    This notice announces the appointment of the members of the 
Performance Review Board (PRB) of the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service. The publication of PRB membership is required by 5 U.S.C. 
4314(c)(4).
    The Performance Review Board (PRB) provides fair and impartial 
review of Senior Executive Service performance appraisals and makes 
recommendations regarding performance ratings and performance scores to 
the Director, DFAS.

DATES: Effective Date: November 27, 2007.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jerry Hovey, DFAS SES Program Manager, 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Arlington, Virginia, (863) 815-
3709.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 4314(c)(4), the 
following executives are appointed to the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service PRB: Teresa A. McKay, Patrick T. Shine, Leon J. 
Krushinski, Jerry S. Hinton, Kathleen D. Noe.
    Executives listed will serve a one-year renewable term, effective 
November 27, 2007.

    Dated: October 11, 2007.
L.M. Bynum,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, DoD.
[FR Doc. 07-5116 Filed 10-16-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-M
Case 7:07-cv-03302-KMK-LMS Document 37 Filed 06/25/2007 Page 1 of 1
Case 1:07-cv-03496-WHP Document 20 Filed 06/26/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:07-cv-03496-WHP Document 20 Filed 06/26/2007 Page 2 of 2
Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

DAVID EUGENE GRAHAM,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 5:10-cv-65-RS-GRJ

J T WITALEC, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

O R D E R

This case is before the Court on Doc. 39, Defendants’ motion for an extension of

time to respond to the Third Amended Complaint. Upon due consideration, the motion

is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

That Defendants shall respond to the Third Amended Complaint on or before

May 13, 2011.

DONE AND ORDERED this 14 day of April 2011. 

th

s/Gary R. Jones 

GARY R. JONES

United States Magistrate Judge
#### J. M. Nunez & Company, plaintiffs in error, *vs.*The Southern Express Company, defendant in error.

(By two judges.) — Where a new trial is granted, and the judgment of the Court granting a new trial is excepted to, the plaintiffs in error cannot assign error upon the charge of the Judge to the jury.

Where the Judge of the Court trying the cause granted anew trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, his discretion will not be controlled, unless it is manifest it has been abused. March 5th, 1872.

New trial. Before Judge Johnson. Muscogee Superior Court. May Term, 1871.

The necessary facts are in the opinion.

M. H. Blanford, R. J. Moses, for plaintiffs in error.

Smith *&*Alexander, for defendants.

Montgomery, Judge.

This was a suit against the defendant in error for a failure to transport fruit from Columbus to New York within the time required by special contract, by which failure plaintiffs allege loss by reason of the fruit rotting and by non-delivery of seven boxes of the fruit.

The contract proven differed in some essential particulars from that set out in the declaration. The Court charged the *315jury, that “the plaintiff declares on a special contract, and unless the contract is proven, as set out in the declaration, the plaintiff cannot recover.”

The jury found for plaintiff, and defendant moved for a new trial; first, because the verdict was contrary to law and the charge of the Court; secondly, because the verdict was contrary to evidence. The Judge granted a new trial, and plaintiff excepted to the order granting a new trial, and to the charge of the Court to the jury.

Of course, if a new trial is granted because the verdict is contrary to the charge of the Court., and the verdict is right and the charge wrong, the judgment granting the new trial will be reversed. Rut if the new trial be granted because the verdict is contrary to evidence, the plaintiff cannot complain of the charge to the jury, for two reasons; first, he was not hurt by it; secondly, it is no final decision from which a writ of error lies. If the judgment granting the new trial, on the ground that the verdict is against evidence, is correct, it is not even a decision to which the plaintiff is obliged to file a bill of exceptions *pendente lite.*The granting of the new trial necessarily re-opens the whole case. If the judgment granting the new trial, on the ground that the verdict is against the evidence, is incorrect, a reversal for this reason will answer every purpose of plaintiff in error.

Taking into view the evidence, and the charge of the Court, it is apparent the new trial is granted on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, though the Judge does not so say in the order granting the new trial. This Court has repeatedly decided that where a Judge grants a new trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, his discretion will not be interfered with unless manifestly abused. We see no abuse of it in the present case.

Judgment affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 24, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-41223

c/w No. 02-41225

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSE ALEJANDRO SANCHEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. B-02-CR-233-1

USDC No. B-02-CR-402-1

--------------------

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jose Alejandro Sanchez appeals his guilty-plea conviction

and sentence for illegal reentry following a prior deportation

and the revocation of supervised release on his conviction for

conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine. He asserts that the sentence-enhancing provisions

contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are facially unconstitutional in
No. 02-41223 c/w No. 02-41225

-2-

light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Sanchez

acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres

v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but seeks to preserve the

issue for further review. 

 Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). 

Sanchez also seeks to challenge the constitutionality of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b) in light of Apprendi. Because a

challenge under Apprendi is not jurisdictional, he may not

present this claim in an appeal following the revocation of

supervised release. See United States v. Teran, 98 F.3d 831, 833

n.1 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Longoria, 298 F.3d 367, 372

(5th Cir. 2002)(en banc). Moreover, as Sanchez concedes, his

Apprendi argument is foreclosed by United States v. Slaughter,

238 F.3d 580, 582 (5th Cir. 2000). The judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

* * T he pane l unani m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T GERARDO LEAL- CANETE , P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 08- 71935 A ge nc yN o. A 096- 346- 384 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

an O r de rof

the B o ar do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d S e pt e m be r13, 2010 ** B efo re: S IL V E R M A N , C A L L A H A N , an dN . R . S M IT H , C i rcu i tJu d g es. G e r ar do L e a l - C ane t e , ana t i ve and c i t i z e n of M e xi c o, pe t i t i ons f

orr e vi e w of the B oard of Im m i grat i on A pp ea l s’ order di sm i ss i ng hi s app ea l fr om an i m m i grat i on j ud ge’ s dec i si on denyi ng hi s app l i cat i on for c ance l l at i on of re m ov al an dd e n y i n g h i s r e qu e s tf o rac o n t i n u an c e . W e h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r8 U . S. C. 

# FI LED SEP 21 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS08- 71935 2 § 1 25 2. W e r evi ew for abu se of di sc re t i on the deni alof a r equestfor a cont i nu ance an dw e r e v ie w d e n o v o c la im s o f du e p r o c e s s v io la tio n s in im m ig r a tio n p r o c e e d in g s . Sa ndoval-L un a v. Mukasey , 5 2 6 F .3 d1 2 4 3 , 1 2 4 6 ( 9 th C i r . 2 0 0 8 ) . We d e n yi n p artan dd i s m i s s i n p artth e p e t i t i o n f o rr e v i e w. T he a ge nc ydi d notabus e i t s di s c r e t i on byde ny i ng L e a l C ane t e ’ s r e que s tf or ac o n tin u an c e b e c au s e h e d idn o t e s tab lis h g o o dc au s e f o rth e c o n tin u an c e . See Ba i r es v . I

NS , 8 5 6 F .2 d8 9 , 9 2 - 9 3 ( 9 th C ir . 1 9 8 8 ) . L e a l C an e te ’s du e p r o c e s s c la im th e r e f o r e f a ils . Se e La ta v . I

NS , 204 F . 3d 1241, 1246 ( 9th C i r . 2000) ( r e qui r i ng prej ud i ce and err or t o p re vai l on a c l ai m of du e proces s) . T h e a g e n c yw a s n o t r e qu ir e dto r e a c h th e is s u e o f p h y s ic a l p r e s e n c e , a s its d e c is io n o n h ar d s h ip w a s d is p o s itiv e . See 8 U . S . C . § 1 22 9b (b)( 1). W e l ac k j uri sdi ct i on t o revi ew the agency’ s deni alof cancel l at i on of re m ov al o n h ar d s h ip g r o u n d s . See M art i nez-R osas v. G on zales , 42 4 F . 3d 92 6, 93 0 (9th C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) .P E T IT IO N F O R R E V IE W D E N IE D i n p art; D IS M IS S E D i n p art .
CERTIFICATION

I, Samir N. Masri, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Lincoln International
Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this
quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the
Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and

6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this
quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

                                    /s/ SAMIR N. MASRI
                                    --------------------------------------------
                                    Name:  Samir N. Masri
                                    Title: Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
                                    Date:  August 22, 2005