In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 05-4225

LEON WASHINGTON and

CLARA WASHINGTON,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

JAMES HAUPERT, JOEL SLYGH and

FRED ROGERS,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 03 C 96—Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.

____________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 14, 2006—DECIDED MARCH 27, 2007

____________

Before CUDAHY, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. Leon and Clara Washington

were arrested for domestic battery by the defendant police

officers on January 30, 2001. The plaintiffs claim that

they were simply play-fighting when Clara Washington

mistakenly called 911. In January 2002, the plaintiffs

brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the City of Fort

Wayne, Officer James Haupert, Officer Joel Slygh and

Sergeant Fred Rogers (collectively, “the officers”). The

plaintiffs argue that the officers violated their Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure by

arresting them without probable cause. Officer Haupert,
2 No. 05-4225

Officer Slygh and Sergeant Rogers filed a motion for

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

The district court denied the officers’ motion for summary

judgment, and they now appeal. We affirm.

I. Background

On January 30, 2001, Clara and Leon Washington along

with other family members returned home to Fort Wayne

from Mississippi, where they had attended the funeral of

Clara’s brother. After arriving home, in an attempt to

cheer Clara, Leon threw a few snowballs at Clara. Their

two sons joined in, and Clara also threw some snow back

at Leon. The family moved some furniture into the house

and then went inside. Leon went upstairs to take a shower

and rest. In 2001, Leon and Clara were not residing

together in the same home; however, Clara offered Leon

her room for the evening since she planned on staying

downstairs that night.

At some point later in the evening around 9:00, Clara

called up to Leon and asked him to come downstairs. She

then called out to Leon offering him a glass of juice. Leon

put his hands on her back to let her know that he had

come downstairs. At that point, the plaintiffs claim that

they playfully dashed a small amount of juice and water

on each other. Clara then went to pick up a chair that

had been knocked over earlier in the day. Leon, then,

jokingly grabbed the chair and threatened Clara with it.

Clara then said something to the effect of “Put it down or

I’ll call 911.” Leon let go of the chair and went back

upstairs to go to bed.

According to Clara, her sister then called from Mississippi. Clara and her sister discussed their brother’s death

and the possibility that it might have been a murder.

Clara then decided to call the Fort Wayne police to discuss
No. 05-4225 3

her brother’s death and dialed 911. She claims that she

hung up, though, realizing that she should not have called.

The 911 operator called back, and Leon answered the

phone. According the Clara, she told the operator that

there was no problem. To this, the operator responded that

she was going to send a police car out in any event.

The following transcript of the 911 call provides a

slightly different account.

Q: 911, what is your emergency?

A: Uh, would you get a car up to 2222 Drexel

Avenue, please.

Q: 2222 . . . (beep) Hello . . . (rustling noise)

Hello . . . . . . . (beep) Hello (beep, ringing).

Male: Hello.

Q: Hello. Can I speak to the woman that I was

just speaking to please . . . hello?

A: Hello.

Q: Ma’am.

A: Yes.

Q: What’s the problem on Drexel?

A: Uh, my husband, uh, tryin’ to fight me.

Q: Has he hit you?

A: No.

Q: Is he the one that hung up?

A: Uh, no the . . . yeah yeah.

Q: Does he have any weapons?

A: No.

Q: Does he . . . has he been drinking?
4 No. 05-4225

A: No.

Q: Alright [sic] we are going to send the police

out. If anything happens before they get there

call us back.

A: Ok.

Q. Thank you.

A. Bye.

Officers James Haupert and Joel Slygh responded to the

call. According to Clara, when the officers arrived, she

explained to them that she was depressed about her

brother’s death. She also told them that she and her

husband had been playing around earlier, specifically

mentioning that they had dashed juice and water on each

other. At that point, one of the officers went upstairs to

talk with Leon. According to Leon, he was awakened as

Officer Haupert was coming up the stairs. The officer

asked him if he had a gun, to which Leon responded no.

Officer Haupert then proceeded to question him about

the situation and why the 911 call had been placed. Leon

told him that there was nothing going on and that he did

not know 911 had been called. Officer Haupert then asked

him to come downstairs.

According to the plaintiffs, the officers continued to ask

them about what had happened. At some point, Clara

asked if they were going to jail for calling 911, to which

Officer Slygh responded, “No, you ain’t going to jail.”

Officer Haupert added, “But if you ever do something like

this again, you will go to jail.”

The officers provide a vastly different account of the

conversation with the Washingtons leading up to their

arrest. According to the officers, Clara Washington said

that she and her husband had been arguing and had

thrown water and juice on each other during the argu-
No. 05-4225 5

ment. Clara also told them that Leon had grabbed her

shoulders with both hands and pushed her into the

kitchen. Clara then told the officers that she had grabbed

a chair and tried to hit Leon with it in an attempt to

defend herself. Clara then said that Leon had held the

leg of the chair across her chest and neck and hurt her

with it. She claimed that it was painful when Leon choked

her with the chair.

According to Officer Haupert, Leon reported that he had

been asleep upstairs when Clara came up to the bedroom

and began to argue with him. Both officers report that

Leon told them that Clara jumped on Leon and said,

“You wanna fight mother f_ _ _ _ _!” Leon also told the

officers that Clara had scratched him on the back of his

neck. Leon then reported that he had gone downstairs

with Clara. He told the officers that he and his wife

began wrestling over a chair, and Clara scratched his

hand and face. Leon reported that it was painful when

Clara scratched him. The police officers took nine photographs of the Washington’s home and of Leon Washington’s face, neck and hand.

At some point, the officers went outside. They returned

some time later with Sergeant Fred Rogers. According to

the plaintiffs, Rogers said that they were offering conflicting stories and inquired as to what was going on.

According to Clara, she then said, “Officer, I’m telling the

truth.” To which, Sergeant Rogers responded along the

lines of, “How you telling the truth when this guy here

is scratched up?” Clara then said something like, “Apparently you have a problem with ladies.” At that point,

according to the plaintiffs, Sergeant Rogers ordered Officer

Haupert to arrest Clara. Leon then asked, “You’re not

taking her to jail for this, are you?” To which Rogers

allegedly responded, “Yeah, and you’re going, too.” At that

point, Leon Washington was also placed under arrest.
6 No. 05-4225

According to the defendants, after Sergeant Fred Rogers

arrived, Clara told him that she had been scratched.

At that point, the decision was made to make a dual arrest

for domestic battery.

The Information for Domestic Battery, listing Clara

Washington as the defendant, provides that she “did

knowingly or intentionally touch Leon Washington . . . [i]n

a rude, insolent or angry manner, to wit: by scratching,

and/or hitting said Leon Washington.” The Information

was signed by “J. Haupert 1652F.” The Information for

Domestic Battery, listing Leon Washington as the defendant, provides that he “did knowingly or intentionally

touch Clara G. Washington . . . [i]n a rude, insolent or

angry manner, to wit: striking her.” This record was

signed by “Joel C. Slygh #1655F.” The domestic battery

charges were dismissed by the state on October 5, 2001.

On January 29, 2003, Leon Washington and Clara

Washington filed the present lawsuit against Officer

Haupert, Officer Slygh, Sergeant Rogers and the City of

Fort Wayne in state court, alleging a violation of their

Fourth Amendment right to be free from false arrest

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims under

state tort law. The defendants removed the lawsuit to

federal court. On July 15, 2005, the defendants filed a

motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were

entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted

the motion as to the City of Fort Wayne on the grounds

that it did not maintain an unconstitutional policy or

custom (see Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768

(7th Cir. 1985)) but denied the motion as to the individual defendants. Officer Haupert, Officer Slygh and Sergeant Rogers appeal.
No. 05-4225 7

II. Discussion

We review a district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds de novo. Leaf v.

Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1077 (7th Cir. 2005). Summary

judgment should be granted where the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence and all inferences that

reasonably can be drawn from the evidence are construed

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, here,

the plaintiffs. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255 (1986).

Governmental actors performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity and are “shielded

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001), the Supreme

Court defined a test to determine whether a government actor is entitled to qualified immunity. First, the

plaintiff must present evidence that, taken in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, would allow a reasonable

fact finder to determine that he has been deprived of a

constitutional right. Id. at 201. If the plaintiff meets

that burden, the court must determine whether the

particular constitutional right was clearly established at

the time of the alleged violation. Id. If the right was

clearly established, the government actor is not entitled

to qualified immunity.

The plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated their

Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable

seizure. In order to survive summary judgment, the
8 No. 05-4225

plaintiffs first must present evidence which would allow

a reasonable fact finder to determine that they were

arrested without probable cause. See Booker v. Ward, 94

F.3d 1052, 1057 (7th Cir. 1996). The Fourth Amendment

permits warrantless arrests only if the arresting officer

has probable cause to believe that a crime has been

committed. Thompson v. Wagner, 319 F.3d 931, 934 (7th

Cir. 2003). “In order to have probable cause for an arrest,

law enforcement agents must reasonably believe, in

light of the facts and circumstances within their knowledge at the time of the arrest, that the suspect had

committed or was committing an offense.” Payne v. Pauley,

337 F.3d 767, 776 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Beck v. Ohio,

379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Reasonableness turns on what

the officers knew, not whether they knew the truth or

whether they should have known more. Gramenos v. Jewel

Companies, 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986); see also

Thompson, 319 F.3d at 934.

The Washingtons were arrested for domestic battery,

which Indiana defines as:

A person who knowingly or intentionally touches an

individual who:

(1) is or was a spouse of the other person;

(2) is or was living as a spouse of the other person as provided in subsection (c); or

(3) has a child in common with the other person;

in a rude, insolent, or angry manner that results in bodily injury to the person described in

subdivision (1), (2), or (3) commits domestic

battery, a Class A misdemeanor.

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a) (2006). Here, in order to allege

a constitutional violation, the Washingtons must present

sufficient evidence that would allow a jury to conclude

that the officers unreasonably believed that the Wash-
No. 05-4225 9

ingtons had knowingly or intentionally touched each other

in a rude, insolent or angry manner that resulted in

bodily injury.

In reviewing a denial of summary judgment on the

basis of qualified immunity, we adopt the facts as specified

by the district court. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317

(1995); Leaf, 400 F.3d at 1078; McKinney v. Duplain, 463

F.3d 679, 688 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court assumed

the following facts for purposes of determining the defendants’ summary judgment motion. “Clara had juice in her

hands and playfully dashed it on Leon.” Washington v. City

of Fort Wayne, No. 1:03-CV-96-TS, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ind.

Nov. 2, 2005). “Leon then playfully picked up a chair to get

back at her, but she threatened to call 911.” Id. “Clara

accidentally called 911 and hung up.” Id. “The operator

asked Clara if there was a problem at her home, and Clara

responded, ‘Uh, my husband, uh, tryin’ to fight me.’ ” Id.

“Clara told them [Officers Haupert and Slygh] that Leon

was asleep, that there was no trouble, and that she and

Leon had been playing around.” Id. “They [Haupert and

Slygh] questioned him [Leon] and he confirmed Clara’s

story.” Id. In response to Sergeant Rogers’ inquiry, “Clara

said, ‘Officer, I am telling the truth,’ to which Sergeant

Rogers said, ‘How you telling the truth when this guy

here is scratched up.’ ” Id. at 5. “When Leon asked them,

‘You’re not taking her to jail for this, are you?’ Sergeant

Rogers ordered his arrest as well.” Id.

Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could find it

was not reasonable for the officers to believe that Leon

and Clara Washington had committed a crime, namely

domestic battery. The plaintiffs described their interactions as “playful,” in no way implying that they had

touched each other in a “rude, insolent, or angry manner.”

Moreover, besides a passing reference to being scratched,

the plaintiffs did not mention any claims of bodily injury
10 No. 05-4225

to the officers. Cf. Simmons v. Pryor, 26 F.3d 650, 654 (7th

Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendant police officer had

probable cause to arrest the husband for domestic battery where officers witnessed the couple “passing licks

with open hand,” the wife told the officer about the

violence which was corroborated by other witnesses and

the officer knew of the wife’s previously obtained order

of protection).

Typically, cases in which we have affirmed the grant of

summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to

police officers involve arrests in which a witness, most

commonly the putative victim, provides sufficient support

to justify the officer’s decision. See Beauchamp v. City of

Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The

complaint of a single witness or putative victim alone

generally is sufficient to establish probable cause to

arrest unless the complaint would lead a reasonable officer

to be suspicious, in which case the officer has a further

duty to investigate.”); see also Woods v. City of Chicago,

234 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir. 2000); Guzell v. Hiller, 223

F.3d 518, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2000); Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135

F.3d 510, 516 (7th Cir. 1998); Gerald M. v. Conneely, 858

F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1988); Gramenos, 797 F.2d at 439.

But, importantly, in the present case, there are no witnesses offering testimony to support the officers’ version of

the Washingtons’ arrests. Both Clara Washington and

Leon Washington deny any physical altercation which

would qualify as domestic battery under Indiana law, and

they claim that they told the officers they were simply

play-fighting.

The defendants attempt to rebut the Washingtons’

account of their arrest by couching it in a couple of legal

arguments, both of which fail. First, the officers argue

that the facts offered by the Washingtons, and relied on

by the district court to find that genuine issues of material
No. 05-4225 11

1 The “undisputed facts” as described by the defendants are as

follows:

The undisputed facts show that the police officers were

called by Clara Washington to the Appellees’ residence

because of a domestic problem. The undisputed facts

show that there was a chair overturned in the kitchen.

Officer Haupert took photographs of the chair. The undisputed facts show that Clara Washington told the police

officers that Leon Washington had put his hands on her

shoulders and scratched her. She told the police officers

that she and Leon Washington had dashed juice on each

(continued...)

facts exist, are irrelevant or immaterial, and therefore

should not preclude summary judgment. Appellant’s

Opening Br. at 12. The parties dispute the contents of the

conversation leading up to their arrest on the night of

January 30, 2001. What was conveyed to the officers goes

to the heart of probable cause, and therefore, these facts

are relevant and material to this motion. Second, relying

on Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the defendants also contend that

the plaintiffs must provide “more persuasive evidence to

support their claim” since the “factual context renders

the claims asserted by the party opposing summary

judgment implausible.” See Appellant’s Opening Br. at 12.

Matsushita does not apply to the present case since its

holding is limited to antitrust law. And, more importantly,

whether the Washingtons’ story is “implausible” rests

on whether they are credible, and we are not in a position

to make that assessment. See Payne, 337 F.3d at 770-71

(holding that a court may not make “credibility determinations” at the summary judgment stage).

The defendants offer an account of the “undisputed

facts,” which differs from that relied on by the district

court in two important ways.1

 The defendants rely on
12 No. 05-4225

1 (...continued)

other. The undisputed facts show that Leon Washington had

several scratches on him. Officer Haupert took photographs

of the scratches.

Appellant’s Opening Br. at 12.

2 Judge Manion, writing separately, argues that this court

must accept the facts as set forth by the district court and

therefore should not consider the photographs or the 911

transcript. Since the transcript of the 911 call was in fact

considered by the district court, we address only the photographs. In Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), the Supreme

Court affirmed this court’s decision to dismiss an appeal for lack

of jurisdiction because the appellants, police officers appealing

the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified

immunity grounds, asked this court to determine a question of

sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 313. The Court stated that

“[w]hen faced with an argument that the district court mistakenly identified clearly established law, the court of appeals can

simply take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed

when it denied summary judgment for that (purely legal)

reason.” Id. at 319 (emphasis added). The appellate court is not

required to accept the facts as described by the district court,

although in most instances it is appropriate to do so. But, in

cases, such as the present one, where the appellants are not

asking the court to resolve factual disputes or determine whether the evidence is sufficient, it is appropriate for this court to

look beyond the factual account of the district court to all

undisputed evidence.

photographs taken by Officer Haupert of the Washingtons’

kitchen, most notably of an overturned chair, and of Leon

Washington’s face, hand and neck. The district court did

not include a discussion of these photographs in its

account of the facts, which it should have.2 See Green v.

Carlson, 826 F.2d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that

when qualified immunity turns on the defendant’s

actual conduct “the district court should consider not only

the plaintiff’s allegations, but all the undisputed facts
No. 05-4225 13

3 Incidentally, assuming arguendo that the photographs of the

scratches on Leon Washington were sufficient to establish

probable cause, the officers only would have had probable cause

to arrest Clara Washington, since the photographs only support

bodily injury suffered by her husband.

in the record when deciding whether the defendant’s

conduct violated clearly established legal principles”).

Regardless, these photographs do not change the outcome

of the decision to deny summary judgement to the defendants, since neither the photograph of the overturned chair

nor the photographs of Leon Washington establish probable cause for the Washingtons’ arrest.

As for the overturned chair, according to the

Washingtons, the chair was overturned when they were

moving their things in from the truck. Even if that explanation was not conveyed to the officers, the overturned

chair, in light of the Washingtons’ account of their conversation with the officers, does not alter our conclusion

that the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to allow a

reasonable jury to find that the officers lacked probable

cause to arrest them. Although the overturned chair

itself may not be in dispute, the facts surrounding it

certainly are.

The other “undisputed fact” offered by the defendants

is the alleged scratches on Leon Washington, which

Officer Haupert photographed.3

 The photographs certainly

show abrasions of some kind on Leon Washington’s chin

and hand; any mark on his neck is more difficult to make

out. However, we must credit the plaintiffs’ story. See

Payne, 337 F.3d at 777. The photographs, in light of the

Washingtons’ account of the night of their arrests, do

not alter our conclusion that the plaintiffs have alleged

sufficient facts for a reasonable factfinder to conclude

that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest them. A
14 No. 05-4225

jury should consider what weight, if any, should be given

to these photographs in determining whether the defendants had probable cause to arrest the Washingtons. Cf.

Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 435 (7th

Cir. 1993) (“To the extent that the presence or absence of

probable cause turns on the resemblance of Maxwell to the

descriptors and photograph of the fugitive Moore, the

question necessarily becomes a factual one for the jury.”)

In asking this court to reverse the district court’s denial

of summary judgment, the officers are asking us to make

credibility determinations, which as previously discussed,

is an inappropriate request. “On summary judgment a

court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the

evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the

facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.” Payne, 337 F.3d at

770 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986)). However implausible the Washingtons’

account might seem, it is not our place to decide who

is telling the truth. “Where the parties present two vastly

different stories—as they do here—it is almost certain that

there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute.”

Payne, 337 F.3d at 770; see also Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d

949, 953 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[S]ummary judgment is only

appropriate when there is no room for a difference of

opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable inferences

to be drawn from them.”). Viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Washingtons have

alleged sufficient facts for a jury to find that they suffered a constitutional violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 by being subjected to unreasonable seizure.

We are now required to examine whether the contours

of the alleged constitutional violation were clearly established at the time of the incident. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

If not, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

“To be ‘clearly established,’ the right in question must

be ‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
No. 05-4225 15

understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ ”

Miller v. Jones, 444 F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). According to the plaintiffs, the police officers fabricated a police

report in order to justify their arrests. A reasonable officer

would have understood that what he was doing violated

their right to be free from unreasonable seizure. See

Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, 298 F.3d 622, 652 (7th Cir.

2002) (holding that “innumerable decisions . . . have

clearly established the right to be free from arrest without probable cause”).

Summary judgment is not appropriate when the facts

are disputed as they are here. “[I]f the question of probable

cause arises in a damages suit, it is a proper issue for the

jury if there is room for a difference of opinion concerning

the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from

them.” Maxwell, 998 F.2d at 434; see also Moore v. Marketplace Rest., Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1347 (7th Cir. 1985);

Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 715 (7th Cir. 1987).

Since we are not in a position to “resolve swearing contests between litigants,” we must affirm the district

court’s denial of summary judgment. Payne, 337 F.3d at

770.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.
16 No. 05-4225

MANION, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur. On interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, this

court must accept the facts as set forth by the district

court. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995). In this

case, the district court stated that under the facts as

alleged by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs “never accused each

other of battery or otherwise gave an impression to the

officers that they were involved in a domestic dispute.”

District Court Opinion at 6. This factual finding seemingly

conflicts with the content of the 911 tape, as summarized

in the district court opinion, as well as the physical

evidence presented to the district court in the form of

photographs of an overturned chair and scratches on

Leon’s face. The 911 call indicated that Leon had committed domestic battery and the scratches on Leon indicated

that Clara had committed that same offense. And the

overturned chair supports the view that a domestic dispute had been under way. Even if the Washingtons

disclaimed any dispute once the officers arrived, the

officers could still have reasonably disbelieved the Washingtons’ story. Thus, it would seem that even accepting

the Washingtons’ version of the facts, the officers would

be entitled to qualified immunity. But the district court

read the record differently, stating that the Washingtons

never “gave an impression to the officers that they were

involved in a domestic dispute.” District Court Opinion at

6. On interlocutory appeal, contrary to the court’s statement that an “appellate court is not required to accept

the facts as described by the district court . . .”, see supra

at 12 n.2, that is precisely what we must do. On appeal

from the denial of qualified immunity, this court lacks

jurisdiction to review the record to determine whether the

district court’s summary of the facts is supported by the

record evidence. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319-20 (“For these

reasons, we hold that a defendant entitled to invoke a

qualified immunity defense may not appeal a district
No. 05-4225 17

court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order

determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a

‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.”). See also Via v. LaGrand,

469 F.3d 618, 625 (7th Cir. 2006) (“However, on interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity, this court

generally lacks jurisdiction to review the full record.

Instead, we may only consider whether the defendant is

entitled to qualified immunity given the factual disputes

found by the district court.” (footnote omitted)). Therefore,

given the district court’s recital of the facts, I agree that

affirmance is appropriate.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—3-27-07