J-A10022-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

BENJAMIN ARTHUR PINK, BY JOYCE 

SMITH, HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

UPMC PRESBYTERIAN SHADYSIDE, 

T/D/B/A WESTERN PSYCHIATRIC 

INSTITUTE AND CLINIC, 

 Appellee No. 752 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division at No(s): NP. GD12-020560 

BENJAMIN ARTHUR PINK, BY JOYCE 

SMITH, HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

UPMC PRESBYTERIAN SHADYSIDE, 

T/D/B/A WESTERN PSYCHIATRIC 

INSTITUTE AND CLINIC, 

 Appellee No. 753 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order Entered April 27, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division at No(s): GD12-020560 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PANELLA, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 14, 2016

 Appellant, Benjamin Arthur Pink, by Joyce Smith, his attorney-in-fact, 

appeals from the order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, 
J-A10022-16 

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UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside t/d/b/a Western Psychiatric Institute and 

Clinic.1 After careful review, we affirm. 

 Appellant has been diagnosed with autism, mental retardation, and 

impulse disorder. Appellant’s Brief at 7. In 2009, Appellant moved into a 

group home “because he wanted to go and live independently or codependently....” N.T. Deposition of Joyce Smith, 9/24/14, at 13. On August 

24, 2010, he was involuntarily committed to Western Psychiatric Institute 

and Clinic (WPIC) under Section 7302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act of 

1976, 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503, (MHPA), for aggressive behavior and 

destruction of property. Id. 

 As summarized by the trial court in its opinion: 

The “known” facts in this case are substantially undisputed. 

[Appellant] alleges that he suffered two injuries while admitted 

as an in-patient at [WPIC]. On or about October 26, 2010, 

[Appellant] suffered an injury of unknown cause resulting in a 

non-displaced or incomplete fracture of the left patella as well as 

an injury to his left foot. On the afternoon of October 28, 2010, 

less than two days after the first fall, [Appellant] fell on his left 

arm, fracturing his elbow. [Appellant] is not competent to testify 

as to the cause of his own injuries, there are no witnesses to the 

circumstances that caused [Appellant’s] injuries, and no facts or 

____________________________________________ 

1

 We note that Appellant has also erroneously appealed from the order 

denying his motion for reconsideration. He then filed with this Court an 

Application for Consolidation, which we granted by per curiam order on June 

8, 2015. It is well-settled that “the refusal of a trial court to reconsider, 

rehear, or permit reargument of a final decree is not reviewable on appeal.” 

Provident National Bank v. Rooklin, 378 A.2d 893, 897 (Pa. Super. 

1977). Accordingly, we will address only the appeal from the order granting 

summary judgment. 
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records substantiating what negligent conduct, if any, by or on 

behalf of [Appellee] contributed to [Appellant’s] injuries. 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 5/22/15, at 1-2 (unpaginated) (citations to record 

omitted). 

Appellant instituted the underlying action on October 25, 2012, by Writ 

of Summons. On January 10, 2013, Appellant filed a complaint and 

certificate of merit, in which he alleged negligence on the part of Appellee 

and sought damages for the alleged injuries he sustained while admitted as 

an in-patient at WPIC. Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellee filed preliminary 

objections, followed by an answer and new matter, asserting immunity 

based on the MHPA. After a period of discovery, a jury trial was scheduled 

for March 13, 2015. On March 6, 2015, Appellee filed a motion for summary 

judgment, which was granted by the trial court on April 13, 2015. Appellant 

timely filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied Appellant’s 

motion on April 27, 2015, and on May 11, 2015, he filed a notice of appeal. 

 Herein, Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

I. Whether the lower court erred in granting [Appellee’s] 

motion for summary judgment and denying the motion for 

reconsideration where there were sufficient facts 

developed in the record which would allow a jury to find 

that [Appellee’s] psychiatric institution acted with gross 

negligence or willful misconduct in the care and treatment 

provided to [] Appellant resulting in his injuries and 

damages? 

II. Whether the report of Appellant’s expert witness sets forth 

within medical certainty a prima facie cause of action 

against [Appellee] for gross negligence? 

III. Whether the lower court erred in granting summary 

judgment and denying Appellant’s motion for 
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reconsideration where a jury based upon the evidence and 

the report of Appellant’s expert could find that the actions 

of [Appellee] caused the harm suffered by Appellant in 

accordance with Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 481 

Pa. 256 (Pa. 1978)? 

IV. Whether the lower court erred in denying Appellant’s 

motion for reconsideration of summary judgment where 

evidence available subsequent to the argument on 

[Appellee’s] motion showed that [Appellee’s] policy and 

practice of destroying staff notes concerning what 

happened over each twenty-four hour period effectively 

destroyed evidence that [] Appellant could have used to 

reconstruct the incident and its causation which should 

have entitled [] Appellant to an adverse inference 

instruction to the jury? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

 Our standard of review with respect to a trial court’s decision to grant 

or deny a motion for summary judgment is well-settled: 

A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial court only 

where it is established that the court committed an error of law 

or abused its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review 

is plenary. 

In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary 

judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the 

summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that 

where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment 

may be entered. Where the non-moving party bears the burden 

of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or 

answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a 

non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue 

essential to his case and on which it bears the burden of proof 

establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a 

matter of law. Lastly, we will view the record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved 

against the moving party. 
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Thompson v. Ginkel, 95 A.3d 900, 904 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations 

omitted). 

 Preliminarily, we note that the MHPA provides limited protection from 

civil and criminal liability to mental health personnel and their employees in 

rendering treatment. Farago v. Sacred Heart General Hospital, 562 

A.2d 300, 304 (Pa. 1989). Specifically, Section 7114 provides immunity as 

follows: 

(a) In the absence of willful misconduct or gross negligence, a 

county administrator, a director of a facility, a physician, a 

peace officer or any other authorized person who participates 

in a decision that a person be examined or treated under this 

act, or that a person be discharged, or placed under partial 

hospitalization, outpatient care or leave of absence, or that 

the restraint upon such person be otherwise reduced, or a 

county administrator or other authorized person who denies 

an application for voluntary treatment or for involuntary 

emergency examination and treatment, shall not be civilly or 

criminally liable for such decision or for any of its 

consequences. 

50 Pa.C.S. § 7114(a). 

Our Supreme Court has determined that the immunity provided 

by the MHPA extends to institutions, as well as natural persons, 

that provide care to mentally ill patients. Farago ..., 562 A.2d 

[at] 303 []. Additionally, our Supreme Court has interpreted § 

7114(a) to include not only treatment decisions, but also, “‘care 

and other services that supplement treatment’ in order to 

promote the recovery of the patient from mental illness.” Allen 

v. Montgomery Hospital, 548 Pa. 299, 696 A.2d 1175, 1179 

(1997). 

Downey v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 817 A.2d 517, 525 (Pa. 

Super. 2003). As a hospital that provides psychiatric care, we conclude that 

the MHPA most certainly applies to Appellee in this case. “Simply stated, 
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Appellant must prove willful misconduct or gross negligence to throw off the 

blanket of limited immunity which protects [Appellee]....” Albright v. 

Abington Memorial Hosp., 696 A.2d 1159, 1164 (Pa. 1997). 

 Here, Appellant does not dispute the protection provided to Appellee 

by the MHPA, but rather asserts that the trial court erred in finding, as a 

matter of law, that Appellant failed to establish gross negligence or willful 

misconduct. Appellant’s Brief at 9. In Bloom v. Dubois Regional Medical 

Center, 597 A.2d 671 (Pa. Super. 1978), this Court arrived at a definition of 

gross negligence for purposes of the MHPA. This definition was later 

adopted by our Supreme Court in Albright: 

It appears that the legislature intended to require that liability be 

premised on facts indicating more egregiously deviant conduct 

than ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference. 

We hold that the legislature intended the term gross negligence 

to mean a form of negligence where the facts support 

substantially more than ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, 

laxity, or indifference. The behavior of the defendant must be 

flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard of care. 

Albright, 696 A.2d at 1164 (quoting Bloom, 597 A.2d at 679). “Willful 

misconduct is conduct of such a nature that the actor desired to bring about 

the result that followed or at least was aware that it was substantially 

certain to follow.” Dudley v. USC Corp., 606 A.2d 916, 921-922 (Pa. 

Super. 1992). 

 In the present case, Appellant avers that the evidence establishes 

gross negligence on the part of Appellee for: 1) failing to protect Appellant; 

2) inflicting suffering on Appellant through delay in treatment; and 3) failing 
J-A10022-16 

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to supervise Appellant following his knee injury. Appellant’s Brief at 12-19. 

Appellant further avers that this matter should have been “determined by a 

jury and not as a matter of law.” Id. at 12. 

First, we note that we addressed the very issue of whether the jury 

has the sole right to determine gross negligence in Downey: 

While it is generally true that the issue of whether a given set of 

facts satisfies the definition of gross negligence is a question of 

fact to be determined by a jury, a court may take the issue from 

a jury, and decide the issue as a matter of law, if the conduct in 

question falls short of gross negligence, the case is entirely free 

from doubt, and no reasonable jury could find gross negligence. 

... 

To require mental health employees and their employers to 

defend jury trials on the issue of gross negligence where the trial 

judge finds as a matter of law that, at best, only ordinary 

negligence has been established, would gut the limited immunity 

provision of the Act of any meaning and unfairly subject such 

employees and facilities to protracted and expensive litigation. 

Downey, 817 A.2d at 525-526 (quoting Albright, 696 A.2d at 1164-65). 

In our review of the trial court’s conclusion that no reasonable jury could 

find gross negligence based on the evidence presented, we remain mindful 

that Appellee’s behavior must be determined to be flagrant and grossly 

deviating from the ordinary standard of care. See Downey, 817 A.2d at 

526. 

 Appellant asserts that during his course of stay at WPIC, he was 

involved in numerous altercations with other patients and that Appellee did 

nothing to protect him. Appellant’s Brief at 13. However, Appellant 

acknowledges that Appellee transferred an abusive roommate to another 
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room. Moreover, as we gleaned from the parties’ briefs and our review of 

the record, Appellant had an individualized treatment plan, was regularly 

monitored, and was examined daily by Dr. Russell M. Farr (“Dr. Farr”), the 

staff psychiatrist. He participated in group activities, which took place in an 

activity room with staff present, and spent time in the common lounge area 

located in front of the nurse’s station. 

 Appellant further claims that Appellee was grossly negligent in 

delaying treatment of his knee and by failing to supervise him following his 

injury. Appellant’s Brief at 17-18. More specifically, Appellant states that he 

was seen by Lori Lapina, P.A., at 3:00 p.m. on October, 26, 2010 for his 

knee injury. Appellant asserts that because of his limited mental capacity 

and verbal communication skills, he was unable to explain what happened. 

“He could only say that his knee ‘hurts a lot’ and he had difficulty walking. 

The P.A. noted an unsteady gait, unlike in the morning, and found swelling 

with a loss of bony landmarks in the left knee with bruising and warmth in 

the area of the knee. An x-ray of the knee was ordered at the same time 

which was approved by Dr. Farr.” Id. at 14. Appellant baldly asserts that 

after injuring his knee, Appellee made no provisions for his comfort and 

safety and concludes that Appellee’s “failure to assess and provide proper 

supervision of [Appellant] and others led to the injuries which began on 

October 26th.” Id. at 16. 

 The record belies Appellant’s assertion that Appellee was grossly 

negligent in delaying treatment of his knee. It is uncontradicted that 
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Appellant was examined at 3:00 p.m. on the date of the alleged incident. 

An x-ray was ordered during said examination and was then conducted at 

8:28 p.m. that same night. Dr. Farr, examined Appellant the next morning 

at approximately 8:30 a.m. At 12:20 p.m. on October 27, 2010, a 

consultation with orthopedics was ordered. Later that same day, 

orthopedics casted Appellant’s leg. As to the care of Appellant following his 

knee injury, we gleaned from the record that Appellant was using a walker 

and that the nursing staff encouraged Appellant to remain off his feet and 

placed him on “level 2” fall precautions, which is Appellee’s highest level of 

fall precaution. Appellant was clearly not “ignored” after his injury. 

 As delineated by the definition set forth above, gross negligence refers 

to conduct that goes well beyond ordinary negligence, carelessness, 

inadvertence, laxity or indifference. Here, Appellant has failed to establish 

any facts whatsoever to support his allegations that Appellee acted in a 

flagrant manner and grossly deviated from the standard of care. Thus, we 

conclude that Appellant’s claims in this regard are meritless. 

In further support of our conclusion that the facts in the present case 

do not substantiate a finding of gross negligence, we look to this Court’s 

decision in Downey. There, a mentally ill patient was admitted to a medical 

center where it was determined that she required supervision of her daily 

living activities, including bathing. Downey, 817 A.2d at 522. The medical 

center was sued by the patient’s estate after she drowned as a result of the 

center’s failure to directly supervise her while she was bathing. Id. This 
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Court held that “the alleged failure to supervise the decedent while bathing 

constituted nothing more than ordinary ‘carelessness, inadvertence, laxity or 

indifference.’” Id. at 526. In examining the record, the Downey Court 

noted that at no point did the expert report state what standard of care or 

procedures or policies were ignored or violated by the staff. Id. Moreover, 

a thorough review of the record led us to conclude that: “[T]he Decedent’s 

death, while unfortunate, was accidental. There was no indication of gross 

negligence ... [a]t most, their failure to supervise Downey for the entire 

period of bathing constituted ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity or 

indifference which fails to give rise to a cause of action under the MHPA.” 

Id. at 527 (emphasis added). 

Here, Appellant has failed to establish ordinary negligence,2 let alone 

gross negligence, as he does not show any causal connection between 

Appellee’s actions and his injuries. Based on our decision in Downey, even 

if Appellant were able to prove that his injuries were a direct result of 

Appellee’s failure to properly supervise him, that would at most give rise to a 

finding of ordinary negligence. See also Albright, 696 A.2d at 1159 

(applying immunity under the MHPA and holding that there was no gross 

negligence on the part of the hospital where a patient receiving outpatient 

____________________________________________ 

2

 “Negligence is established by proving the following four elements: (1) a 

duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal 

connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual 

damages.” Grossman v. Barke, 868 A.2d 561, 566 (Pa. Super. 2005). 
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care set fire to her home as a result of her mental health issues, and the 

hospital was aware, prior to the incident, that the patient had not been 

taking her medication, had missed her recent appointments, and that her 

mental condition was deteriorating, but failed to have the patient 

committed); Farago, 562 A.2d at 300 (affirming a finding that the MHPA 

immunity applied and holding that plaintiff failed to establish gross 

negligence where plaintiff claimed that she was sexually assaulted by 

another patient as a result of the hospital’s failure to adequately supervise 

and protect her). 

While it is unfortunate that Appellant sustained the two injuries 

described herein, he has failed to establish any facts whatsoever to support 

his allegations that his injuries were caused by a flagrant and gross deviation 

from the standard of care. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s finding that Appellant has failed to establish gross 

negligence. 

 Next, Appellant falsely equates corporate negligence with gross 

negligence and asserts a claim of corporate negligence against Appellee for 

its alleged lack of care for Appellant while residing as an in-patient in its 

facility. Appellant’s Brief at 19. “Corporate negligence is a doctrine under 

which the hospital is liable if it fails to uphold the proper standard of care 

owed the patient, which is to ensure the patient’s safety and well-being 

while at the hospital.” Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703, 707 

(Pa. 1991). The Thompson Court adopted the doctrine of corporate 
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negligence as a theory of hospital liability and noted “that for a hospital to 

be charged with negligence, it is necessary to show that the hospital had 

actual or constructive knowledge of the defect of procedures which created 

the harm.” Id. at 708. “Furthermore, the hospital’s negligence must have 

been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to the injured party.” 

Id. 

Appellant relies on the expert testimony of James R. Merikangas, M.D., 

a renowned psychiatrist, in support of his claim of corporate negligence.3 

Appellant argues that the expert report of Dr. Merikangas is sufficient to 

support a prima facie case for gross negligence, as it establishes that 

Appellee violated three of the corporate duties as set forth in the 

Thompson case. Appellant’s Brief at 21. However, we previously 

acknowledged an important distinction between Thompson and the present 

case. “In Thompson, the Supreme Court did not consider the difference

between negligence and gross negligence. Instead, the Court only needed 

to determine if material facts existed such that the hospital could be found 

negligent.” Potts v. Step By Step, Inc., 26 A.3d 1115, 1120 (Pa. Super. 

2011). Thus, we concluded “it is problematic to rely on Thompson for the 

proposition that the acts in that case could not qualify as gross negligence.” 

Id. In light of our conclusion herein that absent the finding of gross 

____________________________________________ 

3 See Expert Report of James R. Merikangas, M.D., attached as Exhibit “D” 

to Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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negligence, Appellee is subject to the immunity provided under the MHPA, 

we deem Appellant’s reliance on Thompson misguided and this issue 

without merit. 

In his third issue, Appellant avers that the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment and denying his motion for reconsideration where a 

jury, based on the evidence of record and the expert report of Dr. 

Merikangas, could have found that the actions of Appellee caused the harm 

Appellant suffered. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant mistakenly applies 

Section 323(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts4 and alleges that 

Appellee is liable under this section for the damages suffered by Appellant. 

Appellant further argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamil v. 

Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978) is controlling in this case. Again, 

Appellant fails to take into account that Appellee is protected by immunity 

____________________________________________ 

4

 Section 323 provides: 

 

§ 323. Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render 

Services. 

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration to render 

services to another which he should recognize as necessary for 

the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to 

liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure 

to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if 

(a) his failure to exercise care increases the risk of harm, or 

(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon 

the undertaking. 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965). 
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under the MHPA and, thus, cannot be held liable absent a finding of gross 

negligence. Section 323(a) and the decision in Hamil are based merely on 

a finding of ordinary negligence. Hence, this claim is also without merit. 

 Moreover, we note: 

It is well settled in the law that except in rare situations ... the 

mere occurrence of an injury does not prove negligence and that 

an admittedly negligent act does not necessarily entail liability; 

rather even when it is established that the defendant breached 

some duty of care owed the plaintiff, it is incumbent on a 

plaintiff to establish a causal connection between defendant’s 

conduct and the plaintiff’s injury. Stated another way, the 

defendant’s conduct must be shown to have been the proximate 

cause of plaintiff’s injury. Proximate cause is a term of art 

denoting the point at which legal responsibility attaches for the 

harm to another arising out of some act of defendant; and it 

may be established by evidence that the defendant’s negligent 

act or failure to act was a substantial factor in bringing about the 

plaintiff’s harm. The defendant’s negligent conduct may not, 

however, be found to be a substantial cause where the plaintiff’s 

injury would have been sustained even in the absence of the 

actor’s negligence. 

Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1284 (citations omitted). After careful review, we agree 

with the trial court’s finding that Appellant has failed to produce sufficient 

facts to establish any causal connection whatsoever between Appellee’s 

actions and Appellant’s injuries. 

 It is Appellant’s burden to establish causation through expert 

testimony: 

Normally a plaintiff may establish his case of causation with any 

evidence, direct or circumstantial, which tends to show 

defendant’s actions as the legal cause of his harm. Where, 

however, the ultimate determinations lie beyond the knowledge 

or expertise of the average layperson, expert testimony is 

permitted (and sometimes required) to aid the jury in its 
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understanding of the factors involved and the teaching of the 

pertinent discipline with respect thereto. ... [I]t is generally 

acknowledged that the complexities of the human body place 

questions as to the cause of pain or injury beyond the knowledge 

of the average layperson. For a plaintiff to make out his cause 

of action in such a case, therefore, the law requires that expert 

medical testimony be employed. In addition to its bearing on 

whether or not the defendant’s conduct was negligent, such 

testimony is needed to establish that the injury in question did, 

with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, stem from the 

negligent act alleged. 

Id. at 1285. The law provides that: 

[E]xpert testimony is incompetent if it lacks an adequate basis in 

fact. While an expert’s opinion need not be based on absolute 

certainty, an opinion based on mere possibilities is not 

competent evidence. This means that expert testimony cannot 

be based solely upon conjecture or surmise. Rather, an expert’s 

assumptions must be based upon such facts as the jury would be 

warranted in finding from the evidence. 

Gillingham v. Consol Energy, Inc., 51 A.3d 841, 849 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

 Appellant produced only the expert testimony of Dr. Merikangas. In 

his report, Dr. Merikangas summarized Appellant’s treatment plan and the 

facts set forth herein regarding Appellant’s two injuries. Dr. Merikangas 

concluded his report by opining that “[a]s a result of negligence and a 

reckless disregard for his safety [Appellant] suffered not one, but two falls 

resulting in injury, resulting in his condition and prospects to be substantially 

worse as a result o[f] his hospitalization at WPIC.”

5

 However, Dr. 

Merikangas failed to explain how Appellant fell, nor did he provide any 

____________________________________________ 

5

 Expert Report of Dr. Merikangas, attached as Exhibit “D” to Appellee’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment, at 3. 
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factual support for his conclusion that Appellee’s actions caused the injuries. 

Thus, this expert report contained mere conjecture and failed to meet 

Appellant’s burden of proof. 

Finally, Appellant claims that Appellee’s policy and practice of 

destroying staff notes concerning what happened over each twenty-four 

hour period effectively destroyed evidence that Appellant could have used to 

reconstruct each incident and its causation; thus, he was entitled to an 

adverse inference instruction to the jury. Appellant’s Brief at 24. In 

response, the trial court opined: 

[Appellant’s] reliance upon these missing notes does not support 

an adverse inference charge. There is no additional record 

evidence regarding the nature of the notes, how they are 

historically maintained, how they could have been properly 

maintained, or how they might have been improperly disposed of 

or destroyed in this case. There is nothing in the testimony 

available in this case to support a suggestion that [Appellee], in 

any way, uncharacteristically, improperly, or intentionally 

handled or destroyed these notes. Of course, because they are 

not available, we are without the benefit of [knowing] what 

information is provided in the specific notes; but, more 

importantly, the record does not reflect what type of information 

is generically provided in these notes so as to permit even a 

reasoned guess as to whether they might, or might not, be 

meaningfully expected to speak to the question of whether 

[Appellee] engaged in gross negligence and/or whether 

[Appellee’s] conduct in any way caused or contributed to 

[Appellant’s] injury. 

TCO at 3 (unpaginated). We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial 

court. Moreover, we note that the record includes daily Progress Notes 
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signed by Dr. Farr, which appear to include a summary of the staff’s daily 

notes regarding Appellant’s care and behavior.6 

 As Appellant failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact, we 

conclude that the trial court did not commit an error of law or abuse its 

discretion when it granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/14/2016 

____________________________________________ 

6

 See Progress Notes, attached as Exhibit “A” to Appellee’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment.