FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JOSE PABLO JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-50069 

D.C. No. 

3:19-cr-04034-

TWR-1 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Todd W. Robinson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 19, 2023

Pasadena, California

Filed March 25, 2024

Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Danielle J. Forrest, 

Circuit Judges, and Richard D. Bennett,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Forrest;

Partial Dissent by Judge Bennett

* The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for the 

District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
2 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed Jose Jimenez-Chaidez’s jury 

conviction for knowingly importing cocaine and 

methamphetamine, vacated his sentence, and remanded for 

resentencing.

The panel held that the district court properly admitted 

evidence of Jimenez’s prior drug transports. The panel 

concluded that this prior-act evidence was admitted for the 

proper purpose of showing knowledge and intent under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2), and the evidence was 

not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. 

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in allowing an FBI agent to testify about the 

extraction of data from a cellphone as a lay witness rather 

than an expert witness because the agent’s testimony did not 

require specialized knowledge. 

The panel held that the district court erred by not making 

an explicit reliability finding related to an expert’s testimony 

about the value of the drugs found in Jimenez’s vehicle when 

he was arrested, but this error was harmless. 

The panel vacated Jimenez’s sentence and remanded for 

resentencing in line with recent authority clarifying the 

process for conducting a mitigating role inquiry under 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 3 

District Judge Bennett concurred with the majority with 

respect to its holdings that the prior-acts evidence was 

properly admitted, that any error as to drug value was 

harmless, and that the case must be remanded for 

resentencing. Dissenting in part, Judge Bennett would hold 

that the district court abused its discretion in treating the 

testimony regarding cellphone data as lay testimony because 

this testimony was clearly expert testimony within the ambit 

of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 

COUNSEL

Jessica Agatstein (argued), Elana R. Fogel, and Sara M. 

Peloquin, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Federal 

Defenders of San Diego, San Diego, California, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Daniel E. Zipp (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, 

Appellate Section Chief, Criminal Division; Derek Ko, 

Assistant United States Attorney; Deborah E. Bercovitch, 

Special Assistant United States Attorney; Randy S. 

Grossman, United States Attorney; United States 

Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office, San 

Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
4 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

Jose Jimenez-Chaidez drove large amounts of 

methamphetamine and cocaine into the United States from 

Mexico. He appeals his drug importation conviction and 

resulting sentence, arguing that the district court 

(1) admitted improper propensity evidence, (2) erroneously 

allowed an FBI agent to testify about the extraction of data 

from a cellphone as a lay witness rather than an expert 

witness, (3) failed to determine the reliability of a drugvaluation expert, and (4) applied the wrong legal standard in 

denying him a minor-role sentencing reduction under 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We affirm Jimenez’s conviction, but we vacate his 

sentence and remand for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

In September 2019, Jimenez was living in Tecate, 

Mexico and had been working at a bakery in Southern 

California. He crossed the United States/Mexico border five 

to six days a week. On September 10, Jimenez entered the 

United States through the Tecate Port of Entry. In the postprimary screening area, a border patrol canine indicated that 

drugs were present in Jimenez’s car. Officers found cocaine 

and methamphetamine hidden in the trunk and the modified 

gas tank. Jimenez was charged with knowingly importing 

cocaine and methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960.

At trial, Jimenez’s counsel argued that Jimenez did not know 

the drugs were in his car, and he was just a “blind mule.”
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 5

A. Evidence of Prior Smuggling

Before Jimenez’s trial, the Government interviewed 

Alejandro Ramos, a prisoner who had pleaded guilty to 

importing methamphetamine. Ramos stated he worked as a 

“scout” in the same organization as Jimenez and, on several 

prior occasions, including multiple times in May 2019, had 

met Jimenez in the United States to unload drugs from 

Jimenez’s car. The Government moved in limine to admit 

Ramos’s testimony, border crossing records, and evidence 

from Ramos’s phone to demonstrate Jimenez’s knowledge 

and intent to import drugs on the day he was arrested. After 

thorough argument, the district court granted the 

Government’s motion, finding that the evidence made 

“[Jimenez]’s relevant knowledge and intent more probable 

than it would be without the other act evidence.” The district 

court also concluded that the danger of unfair prejudice from 

the evidence of Jimenez’s other smuggling activity did not 

substantially outweigh its probative value.

At trial, Ramos testified that he knew Jimenez from a 

garage in Tecate, Mexico where cars were modified to carry 

drugs across the border. Jimenez left his car at the garage and 

picked the car up after its gas tank was modified to carry 

drugs. Ramos also testified that he worked as a scout 

approximately ten times when Jimenez drove drugs across 

the border, including multiple times in May 2019. Ramos 

would arrive at Jimenez’s workplace in the United States 

where Jimenez’s car was parked and contact Jimenez to

exchange car keys. Ramos would then drive Jimenez’s car

to another location, unload the drugs, and then return the car 

to Jimenez’s work. Jimenez was paid for the transport when 

he returned to Tecate.
6 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

In addition to Ramos’s testimony, the Government 

introduced records showing that Ramos and Jimenez crossed 

into the United States within 90 minutes of one another on 

May 21, May 22, and May 30, 2019, and that Ramos’s cell 

phone was near Jimenez’s workplace on these dates during 

the time Jimenez was working. It also introduced evidence 

of the significant value of the drugs found in Jimenez’s car 

to suggest it was unlikely Jimenez did not know they were 

present.

To corroborate Ramos’s testimony, the Government 

called FBI Special Agent Edasi to testify about location data 

extracted from Ramos’s cellphone. Jimenez objected to

Agent Edasi’s testimony because the Government failed to 

disclose him as an expert witness before trial. In response, 

the Government explained that it was offering Agent Edasi 

only as a lay witness “in his capacity as a forensic examiner 

who looked at a phone and found some items.” The district 

court clarified: “So he plugged in the phone and it 

downloaded, and he’s going to say what was on the phone?”

The Government responded affirmatively, and Jimenez’s 

counsel dropped her objection.

Agent Edasi testified that he extracted data from 

Ramos’s phone using a software tool called Cellebrite. He 

explained that Cellebrite is used for performing data 

extractions, and it also has tools for “analyzing and parsing 

data,” or interpreting digital code “in a language that’s easy 

to understand.” Following this discussion, Jimenez’s 

counsel objected to Agent Edasi’s testimony about the 

examination under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 161

1 This rule governs the government’s disclosure obligations for expert 

witnesses. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G).
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 7

and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

2 The district court 

overruled the objection. 

Agent Edasi explained that he retrieved Ramos’s cell

phone from evidence, isolated it from network connections, 

and then connected it to Cellebrite “to extract the data.”

After connecting the phone to Cellebrite, the data was parsed 

and analyzed to create a report. Agent Edasi testified that the

Cellebrite report could be understood without any 

knowledge of software. The report contained information 

about Ramos’s phone, including his Apple ID and phone 

number; information about the contacts saved in the phone; 

and location data showing where the phone had been. The 

location-data report contained time-stamped GPS 

coordinates from a frequently visited locations database.

Agent Edasi explained that he entered the GPS coordinates

from the report into Google Maps to identify the location and 

that the coordinates showed that Ramos’s phone was near 

Jimenez’s workplace on May 21, 22, and 30, 2019, during 

Jimenez’s shifts.

B. Drug Value

FBI Special Agent Lewenthal testified about the value of 

the drugs found in Jimenez’s vehicle when Jimenez was 

arrested. The Government intended for Agent Lewenthal to 

testify as an expert witness but failed to properly disclose 

him as an expert before trial. The district court conditionally 

allowed Agent Lewenthal’s testimony but gave defense 

counsel “wide latitude” to examine Agent Lewenthal before 

the court determined if he was qualified as an expert. Agent 

Lewenthal testified to his extensive law enforcement 

2 This rule governs the admissibility of expert opinion testimony. Fed. R. 

Evid. 702.
8 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

experience: nearly thirty years working for Border Patrol and 

Homeland Security, specific drug training, and participation 

in 600–700 narcotics investigations. He also testified that he 

calculated the wholesale and retail value of the drugs in 

Jimenez’s car by speaking to one informant and three law 

enforcement officers working in the area and by consulting 

a publication that compiled drug prices reported by law 

enforcement. After Jimenez’s counsel questioned Agent 

Lewenthal about his qualifications, the district court 

designated him an expert, and Agent Lewenthal offered his 

opinion regarding the value of the drugs: over $60,000 of 

methamphetamine and nearly $250,000 of cocaine. Jimenez 

later renewed his objection to Agent Lewenthal’s 

qualification as an expert and questioned the method by 

which he calculated drug values. The district court declined 

to strike Agent Lewenthal’s testimony based on the

Government’s failure to provide an expert disclosure.

C. Sentencing

The jury found Jimenez guilty. At sentencing, Jimenez 

argued that he qualified for a minor-role reduction under 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The district court considered the five 

factors listed in the Guidelines and declined to grant Jimenez 

the requested reduction. The district court sentenced Jimenez 

to 86 months’ imprisonment with five years of supervised 

release. Jimenez timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Prior Acts

Jimenez first argues that the evidence of his prior drug 

transports in May 2019 was improper propensity evidence.

Courts may not admit evidence of a defendant’s prior acts to 

suggest that the defendant is more likely guilty of the 
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 9

charged crime because of his past behavior (i.e., the 

“propensity inference”). Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But the 

same evidence may be admissible for other purposes, 

including to prove knowledge and intent. Fed. R. Evid.

404(b)(2). To admit evidence of prior acts, courts proceed in 

two steps. First, the court determines whether the prior-act 

evidence is admissible for a proper purpose under Rule 

404(b)(2). United States v. Holiday, 998 F.3d 888, 895 (9th 

Cir. 2021), vacated, 142 S. Ct. 2857 (2022), aff’d in 

pertinent part, 53 F.4th 501 (9th Cir. 2022). Second, if the 

evidence is admissible for a non-propensity purpose, the 

court determines whether the evidence nonetheless should 

be excluded under Rule 403 as unduly prejudicial. Id. We 

review the district court’s “[e]videntiary rulings admitting 

evidence of other acts under Federal Rule of Evidence 

404(b) . . . for an abuse of discretion,” although we review 

whether such evidence is relevant to the crime charged de 

novo. United States v. Rodriguez, 880 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th 

Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “We review the district court’s 

admission of evidence under Rule 403 for an abuse of 

discretion.” United States v. Cox, 963 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 

2020). 

1. Rule 404(b)

Prior-acts evidence must satisfy four requirements to be 

admissible under Rule 404(b)(2): (1) it must tend to prove a 

material issue; (2) the prior acts must not be too remote in 

time; (3) there must be sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

jury to conclude that the defendant committed the prior acts; 

and (4) when used to show knowledge and intent, the prior 

acts must be sufficiently similar to the charged offense.

Rodriguez, 880 F.3d at 1167; United States v. PlancarteAlvarez, 366 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2004).
10 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

Initially, we note that the second and third requirements 

are satisfied. The smuggling incidents that the Government 

introduced occurred within five months of Jimenez’s arrest.

Cf. United States v. Lozano, 623 F.3d 1055, 1059–60 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (evidence that the defendant had possessed drugs 

eight months before the charged offense was not too remote).

The Government also introduced sufficient evidence for the 

jury to reasonably conclude that Jimenez had smuggled 

drugs in May 2019, including testimony from Ramos, 

corroborating cellphone data, and border crossing records.

To satisfy the first and fourth requirements (relevance 

and similarity), we have emphasized that the government 

must show a “logical connection” between the defendant’s 

knowledge obtained from commission of the prior acts and 

the knowledge at issue in the current case. Rodriguez, 880 

F.3d at 1167; United States v. Ramos-Atondo, 732 F.3d 

1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013). The logical connection “must be 

‘supported by some propensity-free chain of reasoning.’”

Rodriguez, 880 F.3d at 1168 (quoting United States v. 

Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc)).

Jimenez argues that the evidence of his prior smuggling and 

his knowledge in the current case can only be logically 

connected through improper propensity reasoning. We 

disagree.

With regard to relevance, “[w]e have consistently held 

that evidence of a defendant’s prior possession or sale of 

narcotics is relevant under Rule 404(b) to issues of intent 

[and] knowledge” in drug importation cases. United States 

v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United 

States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 1982)); 

see also United States v. Rubio-Estrada, 857 F.2d 845, 848–

49 (1st Cir. 1988) (collecting cases). Moreover, whether 

Jimenez knew there were drugs in his car is an element of 
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 11

his charged offense. 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960. Thus, we easily 

conclude that the evidence that the Government presented

regarding Jimenez’s prior smuggling made his knowledge 

that he was smuggling on the day of his arrest more probable

and is, therefore, relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 401.

Jimenez’s prior acts were also sufficiently similar to his 

charged conduct to satisfy the fourth requirement. The 

Government presented evidence that Jimenez left his car at 

a garage where it was modified to carry drugs, and that he

had previously crossed the border at the same time of day, at 

the same location, driving the same car, wearing the same 

work uniform, and storing drugs in the same location in his 

vehicle. Cf. Plancarte-Alvarez, 366 F.3d at 1062 (admission 

of a prior smuggling incident “close in time and remarkably 

similar” supported “the government’s position that [the 

defendant] was engaged in purposeful and repetitive 

criminal behavior and was not . . . an innocent victim”). 

The logical connection between the prior acts of 

smuggling and the charged smuggling does not require 

propensity reasoning to establish knowledge and intent. 

Jimenez does not argue that there were no drugs in his 

vehicle when he was arrested; he argues that he did not know 

the drugs were there. And it is not merely that Jimenez 

previously engaged in drug smuggling that evidences he 

knew drugs were in his vehicle, which would be 

impermissible propensity evidence. It is how the prior and 

subject smuggling occurred. The Government’s evidence 

established that Jimenez took his vehicle to a garage in 

Mexico, where it was modified to hide drugs. The evidence 

further established that, on multiple prior occasions, Jimenez

left his vehicle at the garage where it was loaded with drugs, 

drove across the border, and let another person drive his 

vehicle away while he was at work and then return it. There 
12 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

is no apparent innocent explanation for why Jimenez 

repeatedly engaged in this pattern and allowed Ramos to 

drive his car during his workday, nor has Jimenez offered 

one. We have previously recognized that similar pattern 

evidence can permissibly show that a defendant knew there 

were drugs in his vehicle. See United States v. Beckman, 298 

F.3d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding Rule 404(b) permitted 

testimony that a defendant previously smuggled marijuana 

across the border in the same fashion as the charged 

conduct). Simply stated, the jury could conclude from the 

evidence of the May 2019 events that Jimenez knew there 

were drugs in his vehicle because the circumstances of his 

prior acts indicated knowledge, as opposed to simply 

concluding that Jimenez knew he was smuggling drugs 

because he had done so in the past.

2. Rule 403

Even if prior-acts evidence is admissible under Rule 

404(b), district courts should exclude it if the danger of 

unfair prejudice “substantially outweigh[s]” the evidence’s 

probative value. Cox, 963 F.3d at 925 (quoting United States 

v. Banks, 514 F.3d 959, 976 (9th Cir. 2008)). Jimenez argues 

that the district court abused its discretion because the prior 

acts evidence dominated the trial and invited the jury to 

engage in propensity reasoning. Jimenez compares his case 

to a First Circuit decision, United States v. García-Sierra, 

994 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2017). There, the government 

introduced evidence that the defendant had smuggled drugs 

via boat from South America into Puerto Rico to show that 

he knew he was smuggling drugs by the same means two 

years later, for which he was charged. Id. at 24–25. As we 

do here, the First Circuit found the prior-acts evidence 

admissible under Rule 404(b) to show knowledge. Id. at 31

(“If credited, this evidence would tend to decrease the 
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 13

likelihood that [defendant] was ignorant of the illicit purpose 

of the sea voyage on which he had embarked . . . .”). But it 

concluded that the district court nonetheless abused its 

discretion under Rule 403 by admitting the evidence. Id. at 

32. The court noted several facts: that the government’s 

other evidence of knowledge was so strong that the probative 

value of the prior acts was diminished; the defendant was not 

clearly tied to the earlier smuggling incident; and the 

“omnibus” jury instruction listing all the permissible uses for 

prior-acts evidence under Rule 404(b)(2) failed to 

adequately narrow the jury’s focus on the purposes actually 

at issue. Id. at 33–35.

García-Sierra is distinguishable from the present case. 

Here, the Government’s evidence of Jimenez’s prior 

smuggling had substantial probative value. The Government 

did not have other evidence clearly demonstrating Jimenez’s 

knowledge that drugs were in this vehicle during the incident 

for which he was tried. Ramos was not involved in that 

transfer, and there was no other direct evidence of Jimenez’s 

knowledge. Indeed, Jimenez argued before the district court 

that the evidence was prejudicial because it was so central to 

the Government’s proof of his knowledge. Unlike in GarcíaSierra, Ramos’s testimony directly tied Jimenez to the May 

2019 incidents. And the district court here sufficiently 

narrowed the jury’s focus by instructing it to consider the 

prior-acts evidence for “intent, plan, preparation, and 

knowledge, and for no other purpose.” In contrast to the

over-encompassing instruction in García-Sierra, 994 F.3d at 

34, we have found more limited instructions like the one 

given in this case sufficient to remedy the potential prejudice 

from evidence of prior drug activity, Vo, 413 F.3d at 1017, 

1019 (approving a jury instruction to consider evidence of a 
14 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

prior drug conviction for “intent, knowledge, absence of 

mistake, and for no other purpose”).3

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 by concluding that 

the evidence of Jimenez’s prior smuggling activity was more 

probative than prejudicial and by admitting this evidence. 

B. Cellphone Extraction

Next, Jimenez argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by allowing Agent Edasi to testify as a lay witness

about extracting and “parsing” location data from Ramos’s 

cellphone; and about his interpretation of the GPS 

coordinates and time stamps recovered from the cellphone. 

Lay witnesses may testify to opinions that are rationally 

based on their perceptions, but they may not testify to 

opinions based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. A witness must testify as an 

expert if offering opinions that require “demonstrable 

expertise,” United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 

1246 (9th Cir. 1997), or go “beyond the common knowledge 

of the average layman,” United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 

1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). A district court’s decision to 

admit lay testimony under Rule 701 “will be overturned only

if it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. 

3 To the extent Jimenez argues the district court failed to adequately 

explain the grounds for its decision, the record as a whole establishes that 

the district court weighed the proper considerations. United States v. 

Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1978) (“As long as it appears 

from the record as a whole that the trial judge adequately weighed the 

probative value and prejudicial effect of proffered evidence before its 

admission, we conclude that the demands of Rule 403 have been met.”).

The district court heard and actively participated in extensive argument 

regarding the content of the evidence, its relevance to the charged crime, 

and Jimenez’s concerns of unfair prejudice.
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 15

Barragan, 871 F.3d 689, 704 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United 

States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1209 (9th Cir. 2014)).

It follows from these principles that a lay witness may 

testify to the information extracted from a phone so long as 

the testimony does not require “specialized knowledge.”

Fed. R. Evid. 701(c); accord United States v. Williams, 83 

F.4th 994, 995 (5th Cir. 2023) (“When law enforcement uses 

Cellebrite to pull information from a phone and a lay juror 

would require no additional interpretation to understand that 

information, the party does not need to introduce the 

evidence through an expert.”). Here, Agent Edasi testified 

that he connected Ramos’s cellphone to a Cellebrite device, 

used the Cellebrite software to extract and “parse” the data

into reports, reviewed the time-stamped GPS coordinates

listed on the location-data reports, and entered those 

coordinates into Google Maps to identify where the 

cellphone had been. GPS information is readily available 

and understandable to the general public, see, e.g., United 

States v. Brooks, 715 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 2013) 

(“Commercial GPS units are widely available, and most 

modern cell phones have GPS tracking capabilities.”), and 

the Cellebrite report that contained this information was in a 

format that was easily understandable to anyone familiar 

with GPS coordinates. Agent Edasi’s testimony about this 

information and how it was obtained largely was not opinion 

testimony, and to the extent it was, it was based on his 

perception and not specialized knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 

701; cf. United States v. Montijo-Maysonet, 974 F.3d 34, 47 

(1st Cir. 2020) (a government witness was not required to 

testify as an expert when “all she did was to read from the 

[extraction] report”).

Jimenez suggests that Agent Edasi did more than simply 

extract data when he testified that he parsed and analyzed the 
16 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

data to create a report. This argument misunderstands the 

record. Agent Edasi testified that “parsing” means 

presenting digital code in a legible format and that Cellebrite 

is used for “analyzing and parsing data” and can create 

reports that are easily understood without technical 

knowledge. Our task here is limited to determining whether 

the district court committed a “clear abuse of discretion” in 

allowing Agent Edasi’s testimony. Barragan, 871 F.3d at 

704. In context, the district court could plausibly have 

inferred that Agent Edasi used Cellebrite and that Cellebrite 

analyzed and parsed the data to create the report, not that 

Agent Edasi personally parsed and analyzed the data. This 

inference is all the more plausible because neither the 

Government nor Jimenez elicited testimony from Agent 

Edasi about how the data was parsed, the technical process 

for how Cellebrite parses and analyzes data, or the reliability 

of the Cellebrite software. Cf. Williams, 83 F.4th at 997 (“At 

no point did he speak to the reliability of the software, except 

that he double-checked some of the report by looking 

directly at the source material in the phones themselves.”); 

Montijo-Maysonet, 974 F.3d at 48 n.12 (“Perez ‘offered no 

assurances about how well [the extraction software] 

performed.’” (quoting United States v. Chavez-Lopez, 767 F. 

App’x 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2019))). Contra United States v. 

Wehrle, 985 F.3d 549, 554 (7th Cir. 2021) (requiring a 

witness to testify as an expert when her testimony concerned 

“technical concepts,” including “reliability and 

safeguards”). 

The dissent suggests that the Government knew Agent 

Edasi had to be presented as an expert and only sought to 

recharacterize him as a lay witness because the prosecutor 

failed to properly disclose him as an expert. It may be that 

the Government originally intended to present Agent Edasi 
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 17

as an expert, but that is not determinative of whether he had 

to be presented that way. The content of the testimony 

dictates the answer to that question. See Fed. R. Evid. 701–

02 (classifying testimony as lay or expert based on the 

characteristics of the testimony, not the witness); see also 

United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 

2002) (“[W]itnesses need not testify as experts simply 

because they are experts—the nature and object of their 

testimony determines whether the procedural protections of 

Rule 702 apply.”). And here, Agent Edasi did not opine on 

Cellebrite’s technical methodology or reliability, nor did 

Jimenez-Chaidez raise a challenge related to those issues. 

Rather, Agent Edasi described that he plugged the cellphone 

into Cellebrite and that Cellebrite extracted data from the 

phone and generated reports that were understandable to a 

lay person. Thus, the district court’s conclusion that Agent 

Edasi properly testified as a lay witness was not “illogical, 

implausible, or without support in inferences that may be 

drawn from facts in the record.” United States v. Hinkson, 

585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

4

4 The dissent also suggests that cellphone location data must be 

introduced by expert testimony. At trial, Jimenez did not object to the 

location data itself (as opposed to the extraction of that data), so we 

review its admission for plain error. Tan Lam v. City of Los Banos, 976 

F.3d 986, 1006 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 103(e)). It is 

common knowledge that smartphones track users’ location using GPS. 

See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 428 (2012) (Alito, J., 

concurring) (“[N]ew ‘smart phones,’ which are equipped with a GPS 

device, permit more precise tracking [than cell towers].”); United States 

v. Duggar, 76 F.4th 788, 795 (8th Cir. 2023) (a witness was not required 

to explain how iPhone photos are tagged with GPS locations because 

GPS’s “accuracy and reliability are not subject to reasonable dispute” 

(internal quotations omitted)); see also Location Services & Privacy, 

Apple, http://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/location-services/
18 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

Our decision today does not foreclose that there may be 

cases involving Cellebrite or other similar technology that 

do require expert testimony, particularly where the 

functionality or reliability of the technology is challenged or 

otherwise at issue. That simply is not this case. The 

Government limited the scope of Agent Edasi’s testimony to 

his use of the Cellebrite software and his perceptions of the 

data that the software produced that are readily 

understandable without having him opine about the 

software’s technical processes or reliability or other issues 

that require specialized knowledge. 

C. Drug Value

Finally, Jimenez argues that the district court erred by 

not making an explicit reliability finding related to Agent 

Lewenthal’s expert testimony about the value of the drugs 

found in Jimenez’s vehicle when he was arrested. We agree 

that failing to make this finding was error, but this error was 

harmless. 

A court may admit expert testimony when the testimony 

is helpful, based on “sufficient facts or data,” and produced 

by “reliable principles and methods,” reliably applied to the 

facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. That is, expert testimony

is properly admitted when it “rests on a reliable foundation

and is relevant to the task at hand.” Primiano v. Cook, 598 

F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell 

(last visited Mar. 14, 2024) [http://perma.cc/85ZM-JTGQ] (iPhone’s 

Location Services uses GPS and Bluetooth where available). And it is 

also well known that cellphones store some location data. A Google 

search for “iPhone location stored,” for example, leads to several 

different websites instructing users how to access historic location data 

on their phones. The district court did not plainly err in admitting the 

location data from Ramos’s phone. 
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 19

Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)). District 

courts have wide discretion in determining whether expert 

testimony is reliable, but they cannot avoid making that 

determination. United States v. Valencia-Lopez, 971 F.3d 

891, 898 (9th Cir. 2020). “A district court cannot be silent 

about reliability when challenged.” United States v. Holguin, 

51 F.4th 841, 854 (9th Cir. 2022).

Though Jimenez never used the magic word “reliability” 

in objecting to Agent Lewenthal’s testimony, he did object 

under Rule 702, explaining: “based on what the agent said 

today . . . the way he came about the numbers in this 

particular case . . . one informant, three people that he talked 

to and one publication certainly doesn’t seem like a large 

sample size or body of work . . . .” Cf. United States v. 

Ruvalcaba-Garcia, 923 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir. 2019) (per 

curiam) (applying the abuse of discretion standard where the 

defendant “object[ed] to the qualifying [of the witness] as an 

expert”). This was sufficient to trigger the district court’s 

obligation to analyze the reliability of this evidence and state 

its finding on the record. Holguin, 51 F.4th at 854–55.

Nonetheless, we will not reverse the district court if the 

government shows that, more likely than not, “the error did 

not materially affect the verdict.” United States v. GonzalezFlores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United 

States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 

banc)). The government can show harmlessness in two ways.

First, an error is harmless when “the admitted expert 

testimony was relevant and reliable under Daubert based on 

the record established by the district court.”

Ruvalcaba-Garcia, 923 F.3d at 1190 (cleaned up). Second, 

an error is harmless if the jury more likely than not would 

have reached the same verdict even without the expert 

testimony. Id. 
20 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

Here, Jimenez concedes that Agent Lewenthal was 

qualified to testify as an expert. He challenges only the 

reliability of Agent Lewenthal’s methods for calculating 

American and Mexican drug prices. As to the wholesale and 

retail prices for drugs in the United States, Agent Lewenthal 

testified that he spoke with an informant, consulted three 

other law enforcement officers working in the area, and 

referenced a publication that other law enforcement officers 

rely on for drug pricing. In light of his extensive experience, 

and his reliance on sources trusted by others in the field, the 

record shows that his testimony regarding drug prices in the 

United States was reliable. Cf. United States v. Alatorre, 222 

F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2000) (an agent was qualified to 

testify to drug value based on experience, training, and 

knowledge gained through investigations). And even if 

Agent Lewenthal’s testimony regarding Mexican drug 

prices was unreliable because the publication he relied on 

does not cover Mexico, this evidence likely did not 

materially impact the jury’s verdict. The high American 

price of the drugs and their substantial quantity support the 

inference that such valuable cargo would not be entrusted to 

an ignorant courier. See, e.g., United States v. Recio, 371 

F.3d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The substantial value of 

the cocaine and marijuana involved in this case supports an 

inference that drug smugglers would not have entrusted the 

pick-up’s cargo to an unknowing outsider.”). Thus, we 

conclude that the district court’s error in not making an 

explicit reliability finding related to Agent Lewenthal’s 

testimony was harmless error.

D. Sentencing

Finally, Jimenez argues that the district court erred in not 

granting him a minor-role sentencing reduction. After the 

district court sentenced Jimenez, we clarified the process for 
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 21

conducting the “mitigating role” inquiry under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.2. “The relevant comparison is to the other 

participants in the defendant’s crime, not to typical 

defendants who commit similar crimes.” United States v. 

Dominguez-Caicedo, 40 F.4th 938, 960 (9th Cir. 2022); 

United States v. Klensch, 87 F.4th 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 

2023). We outlined a three-step analysis for weighing 

relative culpability. Klensch, 87 F.4th at 1163–64 

(discussing Dominguez-Caicedo, 40 F.4th at 960). Because 

the district court did not have the benefit of recent decisions 

on this issue, we vacate Jimenez’s sentence and remand for 

resentencing in line with our recent authority. 

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED, and REMANDED.

BENNETT, District Judge, dissenting in part: 

I concur with the majority with respect to the 

admissibility of prior acts evidence under Rule 404(b) and 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion under 

Rule 403. I further concur that any error as to drug value was 

harmless. Furthermore, I concur that this case be remanded 

to the district court for resentencing in light of developments 

in this Court’s jurisprudence with respect to the process for 

conducting the “mitigating role” inquiry under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.2. However, the district court erred in allowing 

Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent David 

Edasi to proffer testimony regarding the data from Ramos’s 

cellphone. The record before this Court makes clear that 

Edasi’s testimony exceeded the scope of Fed. R. Evid. 701 

and was clearly expert testimony within the ambit of Rule 

702. The decision to treat Edasi’s testimony as lay testimony 

deprived Jimenez of important protections provided to 
22 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

criminal defendants under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. Because I 

would find that the district court abused its discretion in 

admitting Edasi’s testimony and the error was not harmless, 

I respectfully dissent. Jimenez’s conviction should be 

vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.

Before Jimenez’s trial began, the Government filed a 

Motion in Limine to admit, among other things, the expert 

testimony of Special Agent Eric Sajo, a “Computer 

Forensics Analyst.” The Government indicated that Sajo 

would “testify as to the process used to extract information” 

from a cellphone seized from Jimenez, “the reliability of the 

obtained data,” and “may offer an expert opinion that the 

data was recorded, taken, or made on the date and time 

reflected in the cellphone extraction report or related 

[cellphone] summary charts.” The Government stated that 

Sajo “[would] base his opinion on his background, 

education, training, and experience, along with his 

knowledge and use of accepted cellphone data extraction and 

analysis.” Special Agent Sajo was the only such expert 

mentioned in that motion, but he did not testify at trial. 

However, during the third day of trial, the Government 

called Special Agent Edasi to testify concerning location 

history data that he had extracted from a cellphone 

connected to Alejandro Ramos—a key witness in the 

Government’s case—to support the veracity of Ramos’s 

testimony as to Jimenez’s prior, uncharged acts of 

smuggling. Defense counsel objected under Fed. R. Crim. P. 

16 and Fed. R. Evid. 702. The prosecutor stated that the 

Government could “solve this problem,” explaining that it 

did “not intend[] to tender Mr. Edasi as an expert,” but rather 

that he was just going to “testify in his capacity as a forensic 

examiner who looked at a phone and found some items.” 
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 23

However, it is clear from the record that the Government did 

elicit expert testimony from Edasi. 

The testimony began with Special Agent Edasi 

explaining his role as a computer forensics agent, the 

functions of that role, and his background and training in 

digital evidence analysis. Edasi testified that he had 

experience using Cellebrite, a mobile device data extraction 

and recovery software, and further explained that he had 

gained additional experience “in the area of digital forensics 

since [his] train[ing],” stating that he had completed 

“[a]pproximately 350” mobile device examinations. Edasi 

defined certain digital forensic analysis terms that he would 

use during his testimony. He explained that “extraction” is 

“taking digital evidence and retrieving it off of a 

device . . . kind of like making a copy.” He explained that 

“parsing” is “another way to say that you are interpreting the 

evidence and putting it in a language that [is] easy to 

understand from a digital code to a legible end-user 

language.” 

Special Agent Edasi recounted that on October 1, 2019, 

he examined an Apple iPhone 7-plus with an International 

Mobile Equipment Identifier of 359216072458515. When 

the prosecutor asked Edasi to “describe the process of how 

[he] conducted [his] examination,” defense counsel objected 

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 and Fed. R. Evid. 702. After the 

district court overruled the objection, Edasi explained: 

Typically what I do is I retrieve the device 

from our evidence storage facility. I open up 

the sealed evidence bag and take photos of 

the device. . . . I isolate the device from any 

network connections, which we put in 

something called a stronghold box . . . [that] 
24 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

doesn’t allow any cellular, WiFi or Bluetooth 

signals to enter. I verify that the device is in 

airplane mode, and then at that point, I would 

connect the device to a software tool to 

extract the data. Once that is done, then I 

would parse the data, analyze it and create a 

report.

Edasi confirmed he used Cellebrite for this specific 

examination. 

During his testimony, the prosecutor asked whether 

“device locations” “were . . . parsed as part of [the] 

examination,” and Edasi indicated “[t]hey were.” Edasi 

explained that “[d]evice locations are historical entries for 

location data on the phone, so places that the phone had 

been.” He testified that these entries produced “GPS 

coordinates and locations that were on the device.” Edasi 

stated that he checked the location represented by these 

coordinates by putting them into Google Maps to “generate 

a map.” According to Edasi, these entries showed that the 

cellphone had been near Jimenez’s workplace on several 

dates in May 2019. The prosecutor asked Edasi where he 

found the locations, and Edasi explained “in a database that 

is used for frequently visited locations.” The Government 

further inquired whether Edasi “also parse[d] the device’s 

log entries as part of [his] examination,” and Edasi replied: 

“I did.” After the Government moved to introduce the log 

entries into evidence, defense counsel renewed the Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 16 and Fed. R. Evid. 702 objection “as to the 

content of [the log entries] and the ability to explain them 

without that basis,” which the district court overruled. 

In its closing argument, the Government relied on 

Edasi’s testimony to demonstrate that the cellphone was at 
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 25

the locations which he identified at the times at which he 

testified. The Government explained that this data was “just 

an entry in the phone that none of us would ever see, unless 

somebody did a deep dive like this on our phones.” The 

Government recounted Edasi’s testimony that the “phone 

shows up at Ne-Mo’s from 10:36 to 10:44” on 

May 21, 2019, “from 10:12 to 10: 21” on May 22, 2019, and 

from “10:13 to 10:20” on May 30, 2019. The prosecutor 

emphasized that this data shows that “a guy [drove] all the 

way from Tecate to [a] place in Escondido for seven 

minutes.” “That’s how you know,” the prosecutor 

emphasized, that Ramos was honest about “what [he] and 

[Jimenez] were doing together.” The majority accepts the 

Government’s recharacterization at oral argument as to 

Special Agent’s Edasi’s process in analyzing the phone.1

This is contrary to the description provided by Edasi himself, 

as explained in the record before this Court and as presented 

to the jury. 

This Court has recognized that the distinction between 

lay and expert testimony and the proper application of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence are vital to ensuring a fair trial 

because expert testimony has a “powerful nature” with 

“potential to mislead the jury.” United States v. Rincon, 28 

F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 1994). Depending on the 

circumstances, law enforcement testimony may be both 

1 During oral argument before this Court, the Government conceded that 

Special Agent Edasi “was an expert, [and] he was intended to be called 

as an expert . . . [until the Government] realized [it] had not turned over 

the CV and . . . decided to present him as a lay witness at trial.” The 

Government then asserted that Edasi mischaracterized what he did, and 

that his testimony implied “more expertise than what he was actually 

doing.” 
26 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

expert and lay testimony, United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 

900, 922 (9th Cir. 2009), but this Court has cautioned: 

While witnesses who testify as an expert may 

receive “unmerited credibility” for their lay 

testimony, because expert testimony is 

“likely to carry special weight with the jury,” 

the converse is not true: a lay witness’s 

testimony carries no special weight, even if at 

points the lay witness has recourse to relevant 

background and training.

United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 903 

(9th Cir. 2007)). 

The Advisory Committee Notes on the 2000 

Amendment to Rule 701 stress this exact concern:

Rule 701 has been amended to eliminate the 

risk that the reliability requirements set forth 

in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple 

expedient of proffering an expert in lay 

witness clothing. . . . [T]he amendment also 

ensures that a party will not evade the expert 

witness disclosure requirements set forth 

in . . . Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 by simply calling 

an expert witness in the guise of a layperson. 

Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 

amendments.2 This Court recognized this important 

2 In affirming the district court’s decision to admit Special Agent Edasi’s 

testimony as lay under Rule 701, the majority also obfuscates the gravity 

of the Government’s failure to adhere to the requirements of Fed. R. 
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 27

principle in United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241 

(9th Cir. 1997): “The mere percipience of a witness to the 

facts on which he wishes to tender an opinion does not trump 

Rule 702. Otherwise, a layperson witnessing the removal of 

a bullet from a heart during an autopsy could opine as to the

cause of the decedent’s death.” Id. at 1246. 

Here, Special Agent Edasi’s testimony crossed the 

threshold into “expert” territory when he discussed the 

technical aspects of data parsing and analysis and when he 

explained his findings therefrom. This is because the process 

of and conclusions drawn from digital evidence analysis 

required “demonstrable expertise.” Id. Indeed, Edasi 

testified that he underwent substantial training in order to 

perform data analysis. Moreover, Edasi testified that 

cellphone analysis required him to “interpret[] the evidence”

and translate it “from a digital code to a legible end-user 

language.” This information is not within “the common 

knowledge of the average layman.” United States v. Finley, 

301 F.3d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). The Government 

acknowledged during its closing argument that the data was 

of a sort that no layperson “would ever see, unless somebody 

did a deep dive like this on our phones.” 

The majority has cited the opinion of the United States 

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. 

Montijo-Maysonet, 974 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2020), emphasizing 

the court’s finding that the use of forensic software to copy 

information from a cellphone and display it on paper did not 

Crim. P. 16, which include disclosure timelines “to provide a fair 

opportunity for each party to meet the other side’s expert evidence.” Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes to 2022 amendments. Simply 

stated, the Government deprived Jimenez of these important protections 

when it failed to provide Edasi’s qualifications to the defense.
28 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

render the testimony expert when all the witness did “was [] 

read from the [extraction] report.” Id. at 47–48. However, a 

closer reading of that opinion makes clear that the facts of 

that case are distinguishable from the facts of this case. In

considering a second piece of the same officer’s testimony, 

the First Circuit noted it faced a “closer call” because the 

testimony “arguably ‘require[d] a technical understanding’ 

of the government’s forensic tools and their capabilities.” Id.

at 49. While the court did not reach a conclusive 

determination on this question, instead finding any error

harmless, id., the reasons supporting this finding are

instructive. The court explained that the officer’s further

testimony “made it pellucid that she had no ‘training in

forensic tools,’” and “[t]hose clarifications dampened the 

risk that the jury gave determinative weight to her

description of the government’s forensic capabilities.” Id. 

That is clearly not the situation in this case.

Here, Special Agent Edasi testified that “historical

entries for location data on the phone” are “places that the 

phone had been.” While this may appear to be a mere lay

perception, Edasi’s statement proposes something more

conclusory: that the data stored in the phone and extracted

by Cellebrite demonstrates that the phone was where the data

placesit. As suggested in Montijo-Maysonet, this conclusion 

required a technical understanding of both cellphone 

location logging and storage, as well as the Government’s 

forensic tools’ capabilities to extract that data. 

In contrast to the officer’s testimony in

Montijo-Maysonet, Edasi specifically testified to his 

extensive training in using forensic tools like Cellebrite. As 

the Seventh Circuit has explained, “an officer testifies as an 

expert when he brings ‘the wealth of his experience as [an] 

officer to bear on those observations and ma[kes] 
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 29

connections for the jury based on that specialized 

knowledge.’” United States v. Gaytan, 649 F.3d 573, 582 

(7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 

593, 603 (7th Cir. 2007)). Viewing the presentation of 

Special Agent Edasi’s testimony in its entirety, it appears 

clear that he did exactly this. Thus, Edasi’s testimony should 

have been subject to scrutiny under Rule 702 because it was 

based on “technical or specialized knowledge acquired 

through [his] education and experience” as a forensic 

examiner, and “therefore failed to satisfy Rule 701(c).” 

United States v. Millan, 730 F. App’x 488, 489 (9th Cir. 

2018).

The errors presented by the expert presentation of 

Special Agent Edasi’s testimony are further compounded by 

a second assertion made by the Government: the inner 

workings of the location data. The use and presentation of 

data derived from cell towers requires expert testimony. See, 

e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 

(2018) (explaining that testimony about cell-site data was 

offered as expert testimony); United States v. Baker, 58 F.4th 

1109, 1125 (9th Cir. 2023) (noting that the prosecution had 

proffered the testimony of an expert who explained how 

information about the cell towers to which the defendant’s 

phone connected to on the night of the crime allowed him to 

discern the phone’s movement toward the scene of the crime 

and away from it afterward). Even setting aside this 

oversight, the Government has at no point explained how, 

and to what extent, data that may be purely “GPS” data is 

distinct from cell tower location data. These reliability 

concerns are not unfounded. See, e.g., Aaron Blank, The 

Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cell Site 

Data to Track the Location of A Cellular Phone, 18 RICH.

J.L. & TECH. 3, 7 (2011) (describing various factors 
30 USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

impacting the accuracy of cellphone geographic location 

data). 

Lastly, the Government fails to acknowledge that the 

data evidence is not relevant in the absence of establishing 

foundation underlying the data. As the Supreme Court 

explained in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 

579 (1993), evidence or testimony must be relevant to the 

extent that it will “assist the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Id. at 591 (quoting 

Fed. R. Evid. 702). “[I]f the prosecution cannot muster any 

independent admissible evidence to prove the foundational 

facts that are essential to the relevance of the expert’s 

testimony, then the expert’s testimony cannot be given any 

weight by the trier of fact.” Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 

81 (2012). In this case, the foundational facts required to 

establish relevancy include the identity of the person in 

possession of the phone at the relevant times and, central to 

this appeal, whether the stored location history accurately 

demonstrates the location of the phone.3 If the location data 

3 It is notable that during Agent Edasi’s testimony, the district court 

explained to counsel that “this witness examined a cellular telephone that 

has not been connected to this case whatsoever,” and consequently, that 

“there is no relevance as to any of this information so far.” Defense 

counsel explained that her “suspicion is that the government is 

introducing these location points to corroborate the evidence of what 

they are suggesting” and that although “they had an opportunity” to 

“make this point with their witness,” they did not, and therefore “should 

not now be allowed to introduce a phone that we don’t know exactly its 

province.” Defense counsel also explained that “it’s for the government 

to show Alejandro Ramos is present at Ne-Mo’s Bakery” and that they 

“don’t know . . . that he had this phone as this time.” The district court 

agreed that “the link has not been established.” Nonetheless, after the 

Government elicited testimony from Edasi that the iPhone was registered 

to two Apple IDs—one with a name similar to Ramos and the other 
USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ 31

is inaccurate or unreliable, it has no probative value. Thus, 

in order to be probative as to Jimenez’s case, the cellphone’s 

location history data must be shown to demonstrate where 

the phone has actually, or even probably, been. In other 

words, testimony as to the GPS coordinates identified 

through cellular data extraction, whether one terms it expert 

or lay, is entirely irrelevant without expert testimony as to 

the underlying meaning and reliability of those extracted 

coordinates. No such showing was made during Jimenez’s 

trial. 

Accordingly, if Edasi’s testimony is lay under Rule 701, 

Special Agent Edasi’s testimony should have been excluded 

as irrelevant, as unsubstantiated and uncontextualized data 

points are not “helpful to . . . determining a fact in issue.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 701(b). Alternatively, the inescapable 

conclusion is that Edasi’s representation that the “historical 

entries for location data on the phone” extracted by 

Cellebrite are, indeed, “places that the phone has been,” 

constituted an expert opinion as to the reliability and 

meaning of the data. The district court’s admission of this 

testimony under Rule 701, despite the Government’s clear 

attempt to sidestep Rule 16 and expert nature of the 

testimony, warrants a reversal and remand of this case for a 

new trial.

Because I would find that there was clear error in the 

admission of expert testimony proffered by Special Agent 

Edasi with respect to the extraction of data from Ramos’s 

cellphone, I respectfully dissent. 

representing the name of Ramos’s girlfriend—the district court 

concluded that the testimony cleared the “very low hurdle to make it 

relevant under [Fed. R. Evid.] 401.”