COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NOS. 02-09-00266-CR

 02-09-00268-CR

EX PARTE JOSEPH P. DANGELO

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FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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OPINION ON REHEARING

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We grant the State=s motion for rehearing, we withdraw the opinion issued 

in this case on June 17, 2010, and we substitute the following opinion in its place. 

In two points, appellant Joseph P. Dangelo appeals the trial court=s denials of his 

preconviction applications for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm in part and 

reverse and remand in part.
2

Background Facts

In 2004, a grand jury indicted appellant with four sex-related felony 

offenses against a child who was younger than fourteen years old. In February 

2008, appellant entered into a plea agreement in which he received written 

admonishments, waived statutory and constitutional rights, and pled guilty only to 

injury to a child, which is not by statutory language a sex-related offense and 

which, as charged in appellant=s amended indictment, is a third-degree felony.1 

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 22.04(a)(3), (f) (Vernon Supp. 2010). The trial court 

deferred adjudication of appellant=s guilt for injury to a child and placed him on 

community supervision for seven years.

The original terms of appellant=s community supervision prohibited him 

from contacting the complainant of his crime in any manner and precluded his 

unsupervised access to any child under seventeen years old (except for one 

specifically designated child); the terms did not require him to complete sex 

offender treatment.2 However, in May 2008, the trial court signed an amendment 

 

1Someone handwrote a fifth count on appellant=s indictment that contains 

language related to the injury to a child offense. Appellant and his counsel 

signed the indictment below the fifth count.

2A document titled AConditions of Community Supervision,@ which appellant 

signed and which was filed on February 26, 2008, states that the trial court could 

Aat any time during the period of community supervision alter or modify@ the 

conditions. Appellant=s brief does not contain an issue challenging the trial 

court=s general authority to modify his community supervision terms.
3

to appellant=s community supervision terms.3 The amendment included 

provisions that precluded his participation in several sex-related acts and 

required him to A[a]ssume responsibility for [his] offense,@ submit to a sex 

offender treatment evaluation Aas directed by the supervision officer,@ complete 

psychological sex offender counseling, and A[s]ubmit to . . . and show no 

deception on any polygraph examination . . . as directed by the Court or 

supervision officer.@ The trial court signed another amendment in January 2009 

that required appellant to restart his sex offender treatment Awith PSY as directed 

by the supervision officer@ but dismissed the State=s petition for the trial court to 

proceed to adjudication of his guilt.4 Appellant filed objections to the amended 

terms.

On March 4, 2009, appellant=s counsel sent a letter to Psycho Therapy 

Services; the letter stated in part,

Certainly we object to any required treatment programs which lie 

outside those required to and have no relationship to the crime 

which [appellant] pled to, or relate to conduct which is not itself 

criminal, or requires conduct that is not reasonably related to the 

 

3

The record does not show why the trial court amended appellant=s 

community supervision.

4

The State=s first petition to proceed to adjudication was filed in December 

2008. That petition is not contained in the record on appeal. In April 2009, the 

State filed a second petition, alleging that appellant=s community supervision 

should be revoked only because he has not completed sex offender treatment. 

Appellant filed a motion to quash the petition on grounds similar to those that he 

raised in the writ applications that are the subject of this appeal. The record does 

not contain any order resolving the State=s second petition.
4

future criminality of Mr. Dangelo and does not serve the statutory 

ends of his deferred adjudication.

. . . .

Mr. Dangelo has no objections to polygraph examinations 

which in the course of your program he may be subjected to. 

However, Mr. Dangelo has Fifth Amendment protection against 

making any incriminating statements and has a right to so state, 

relating to any conduct for which he has not pled or for which he is 

not on deferred adjudication. Thus, he will not answer any questions 

relating to sexual conduct which he did not commit and for which he 

has not been accused.

An affidavit from appellant was attached to the letter; the affidavit states that he 

had been told by one of Psycho Therapy Services’ employees that Aas part of the 

Sexual Treatment Program [appellant] was required to admit any sexual offense.@ 

The affidavit also explains that appellant had been notified that if he did not 

intend to answer questions regarding sexual offenses, he should not attend the 

therapy session.

On March 27, 2009, appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus, asking the court to Adismiss the added conditions of probation.@ In the 

application, he contended that the trial court=s community supervision conditions 

violate his rights against compelled self-incrimination under the Texas and 

federal constitutions and that the trial court=s requiring him to undergo sex 

offender treatment is not authorized by the code of criminal procedure because 

he did not plead guilty to a sex-related offense.

On July 10, 2009, the trial court declared that appellant=s bond was 

insufficient and ordered a warrant to be issued for his arrest because of his 
5

failure to submit to a polygraph exam; he was arrested the same day. Five days

later, appellant filed two more applications for writs of habeas corpus. Those 

applications asserted that he had a constitutional right not to answer the 

questions that were proposed to be asked in the polygraph exam.

Appellant attached a July 9, 2009 letter to both applications that was 

addressed from The Polygraph Science Center to a probation officer regarding 

appellant=s refusal to submit to the exam. The letter explained that appellant=s 

probation officer had referred him to the center for the exam and that appellant 

had arrived at the center but had refused to answer the following questions: 

(1) ASince you have been on probation, have you had [sic] violated any of the 

conditions?@; (2) ASince you have been on probation, have you had sexual 

contact with any persons younger than 17?@; (3) ASince you have been on 

probation, have you tried to isolate any child for sexual purposes?@; and 

(4) ASince you have been on probation, have you intentionally committed any 

sexual crimes?@

The State filed responses to appellant=s writ applications, attaching offense 

reports and other documents that detailed the sexually-related alleged facts that 

resulted in his original four sex offense charges. In June 2009, the State filed 

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the next month, the trial 

court adopted those findings and conclusions, denied appellant=s writ 

applications, and stated that his bond was insufficient and that he would be 
6

released from jail only to take the scheduled polygraph exam.5 Appellant filed 

notices of these appeals.

Standard of Review

Although appellant filed his writ applications under multiple constitutional 

and statutory provisions, we must review the applications under article 11.072 of 

the code of criminal procedure, which Aestablishes the procedures for an 

application for a writ of habeas corpus in a felony or misdemeanor case in which 

the applicant seeks relief from an order or a judgment of conviction ordering 

community supervision.@ Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, ' 1 (Vernon 

2005); see Ex parte Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d 391, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 

(A[I]t is clear that the Legislature intended Article 11.072 to provide the exclusive 

means by which the district courts may exercise their original habeas jurisdiction 

. . . in cases involving an individual who is either serving a term of community 

supervision or who has completed a term of community supervision.@).

Habeas corpus is an extraordinary writ used to challenge the legality of 

one=s restraint. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.01 (Vernon 2005); Ex parte 

Bennett, 245 S.W.3d 616, 618 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref=d). Absent 

a clear abuse of discretion, we must affirm the trial court=s decision on whether to 

 

5Because of a motion that he filed in this court during these appeals, the 

trial court has released appellant from confinement through a bond that requires 

him to report to his supervision officer once a week and be supervised on house 

arrest, among other conditions. Appellant=s release does not require dismissal of 

these appeals. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.35 (Vernon 2006).
7

grant the relief requested in a habeas corpus application. Ex parte Karlson, 282 

S.W.3d 118, 127–28 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref=d); Ex parte Bruce, 

112 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism=d). In reviewing 

the trial court=s decision, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

ruling and accord great deference to the trial court=s findings and conclusions. 

Karlson, 282 S.W.3d at 127; see Ex parte Amezquita, 223 S.W.3d 363, 367 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006).

Appellant=s Fifth Amendment Right

In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court=s decision to declare 

his bond insufficient (and to therefore incarcerate him) because he refuses to 

answer the questions that were proposed in the polygraph exam violates his right 

to remain silent and not incriminate himself under the Texas and federal 

constitutions. Trial courts have wide discretion to impose reasonable community 

supervision terms that are in the defendant=s, the victim=s, and society=s best 

interests. See Butler v. State, 189 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); 

Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (describing the 

granting of supervision as a Aprivilege, not a right@), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1088 

(2000); Belt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) 

(explaining that we review imposition of community supervision conditions under 

an abuse of discretion standard); see also Flores v. State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 130 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (stating that there Ais no fundamental right to receive 

probation@), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1050 (1996). Requiring a polygraph 
8

examination may be a reasonable condition of community supervision. See Ex 

parte Renfro, 999 S.W.2d 557, 560 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, 

pet. ref=d); see also Leonard v. State, 315 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—Eastland 

2010, pet. granted) (APolygraph examinations are regularly imposed as a 

condition of community supervision for sex offenders.@).

The Texas legislature has explained that the purpose of the community 

supervision statute is to remove Afrom existing statutes the limitations, other than 

questions of constitutionality, that have acted as barriers to effective systems of 

community supervision in the public interest.@ Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 

42.12, ' 1 (Vernon Supp. 2010) (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court=s broad 

authority to create community supervision terms does not extend to imposing 

terms that violate a defendant=s constitutional rights as balanced with the goals of 

the defendant=s probation. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 131 (examining the 

constitutionality of a trial court=s community supervision decision); Tamez v. 

State, 534 S.W.2d 686, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (invalidating a probation 

condition because it was unconstitutional); see also Briseño v. State, 293 S.W.3d 

644, 648 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (stating that a community 

supervision condition Ais not necessarily invalid simply because it affects [the 

defendant=s] ability to exercise constitutionally protected rights@) (quoting Lee v. 

State, 952 S.W.2d 894, 900 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no pet.) (en banc)). As the 

Supreme Court stated in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
9

To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of probationers (as 

we have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy Athe 

absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . 

conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special 

[probation] restrictions.@

These restrictions are meant to assure that the probation 

serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community 

is not harmed by the probationer=s being at large. . . . Supervision, 

then, is a Aspecial need@ of the State permitting a degree of 

impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied 

to the public at large. That permissible degree is not unlimited, 

however . . . .

483 U.S. 868, 874–75, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3169 (1987) (citation omitted) (quoting

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972)).

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no 

person Ashall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.@

6

U.S. Const. amend. V; see Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 418 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2008) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment applies in state court 

proceedings); Chapman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (AIt is a 

fundamental tenet of Texas and federal constitutional jurisprudence that every 

 

6Along with the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 

appellant cites a provision of the Texas constitution that states that an accused

Ashall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.@ Tex. Const. art. I, '

10. However, he does not cite authority to explain how this provision provides 

greater rights than its federal constitutional counterpart. Thus, we will examine 

appellant=s points under authority related to the rights granted by the federal 

constitution. See Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 612 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. 

denied, 522 U.S. 917 (1997); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 n.4 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1996); see also Carroll v. State, 68 S.W.3d 250, 253 n.3 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (op. on remand) (AThe self-incrimination clause of 

Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution gives no greater rights than does 

the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.@).
10

person has the right to avoid self-incrimination by exercising the privilege 

provided him by the Fifth Amendment and the Texas Constitution.@). The Fifth 

Amendment privilege not only extends to answers that would in themselves 

support a conviction, Abut likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in 

the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.@ Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 20, 

121 S. Ct. 1252, 1254 (2001) (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 

486, 71 S. Ct. 814, 818 (1951)).

The United States Supreme Court has examined a probationer=s Fifth 

Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.7 See Minnesota v. 

Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 422, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1139 (1984). The Court=s opinion 

revealed the following background facts.

Prosecutors charged Murphy for criminal sexual conduct, but he pled guilty 

to a reduced charge of false imprisonment, and the trial court placed him on a 

three-year probation term. Id. at 422, 104 S. Ct. at 1139. Conditions of his 

probation required him to participate in sex offender treatment and be truthful 

with his probation officer Ain all matters.@ Id. He eventually told a sex offender 

counselor that he had previously committed a murder that was unrelated to the 

charge he had pled guilty to, and the counselor told Murphy=s probation officer of 

the confession. Id. at 423, 104 S. Ct. at 1140. At Murphy=s next meeting with his 

 

7

Texas courts are bound by the United States Supreme Court=s 

interpretation of the federal constitution. Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673, 681 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1998).
11

probation officer, the officer informed Murphy about the information that she had 

received, and Murphy admitted that he had committed the murder. Id. at 424, 

104 S. Ct. at 1140. Based on the admission, a grand jury indicted him for 

murder. Id. at 425, 104 S. Ct. at 1141.

Murphy sought to suppress testimony about his confession on Fifth 

Amendment grounds, and although the trial court denied his motion to do so, the 

Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 425, 104 S. Ct. at 1141. In reversing 

the Minnesota Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court stated that the 

Fifth Amendment prohibition against compelled self-incrimination Anot only 

permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he 

is a defendant@ but also A>privileges him not to answer official questions put to 

him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the 

answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.=@ Id. at 426, 104 S. 

Ct. at 1141 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S. Ct. 316, 322 

(1973)). In the course of ultimately deciding the case on the ground that Murphy 

did not timely assert his Fifth Amendment rights, the Court explained,

A defendant does not lose [Fifth Amendment protection] by 

reason of his conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a defendant 

is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes incriminating 

statements, if those statements are compelled they are inadmissible 

in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that for which he has 

been convicted. . . .

. . . .

. . . If [a defendant asserts Fifth Amendment rights], he Amay 

not be required to answer a question if there is some rational basis 
12

for believing that it will incriminate him, at least without at that time 

being assured that neither it nor its fruits may be used against him@

in a subsequent criminal proceeding.

Id. at 426, 429, 104 S. Ct. at 1141–43 (quoting Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 

473, 95 S. Ct. 584, 598 (1976) (White, J., concurring)). 

While the Court therefore indicated that a probationer=s Fifth Amendment 

right against compelled self-incrimination would be violated by authorities 

requiring him to answer questions Athat would incriminate him in a pending or 

later criminal prosecution,@ it also stated,

The situation would be different if the questions put to a 

probationer were relevant to his probationary status and posed no 

realistic threat of incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding. 

If, for example, a residential restriction were imposed as a condition 

of probation, it would appear unlikely that a violation of that condition 

would be a criminal act. Hence, a claim of the Fifth Amendment 

privilege in response to questions relating to a residential condition 

could not validly rest on the ground that the answer might be used to 

incriminate if the probationer was tried for another crime. Neither, in 

our view, would the privilege be available on the ground that 

answering such questions might reveal a violation of the residential 

requirement and result in the termination of probation. Although a 

revocation proceeding must comport with the requirements of due 

process, it is not a criminal proceeding. Just as there is no right to a 

jury trial before probation may be revoked, neither is the privilege 

against compelled self-incrimination available to a probationer. 

It follows that whether or not the answer to a question about a 

residential requirement is compelled by the threat of revocation, 

there can be no valid claim of the privilege on the ground that the 

information sought can be used in revocation proceedings.

. . . [N]othing in the Federal Constitution would prevent a 

State from revoking probation for a refusal to answer that violated an 

express condition of probation . . . .
13

Id. at 435 & n.7, 104 S. Ct. at 1146 & n.7 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

Thus, if a condition of a defendant=s probation requires the defendant to admit to 

an offense that could lead to criminal charges independent of those that the 

defendant is serving probation for, the defendant has a Fifth Amendment right to 

not answer such questions.8 But to the extent that a state asks questions only 

about probation violations that do not comprise independent offenses, the 

defendant does not have a Fifth Amendment right to not answer those questions. 

Id.; see Chapman, 115 S.W.3d at 6 (stating that a probationer has a right 

Aagainst self-incrimination concerning statements that would incriminate him for 

some other offense@); Bridwell v. State, 804 S.W.2d 900, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1991) (citing Murphy for the proposition that the privilege against selfincrimination is Anot available to [a] probationer questioned by [a] probation 

officer@); see also United States v. Locke, 482 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2007) 

(holding that the defendant=s Fifth Amendment right against compelled selfincrimination had not been infringed because his answers to a polygraph 

examination Acould not serve as a basis for a future criminal prosecution. 

A probationer may only invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege if a truthful answer 

 

8A probationer could be compelled to talk about independent offenses if 

the State grants the probationer use-immunity. See Chapman, 115 S.W.3d at 7 

& n.28.
14

would incriminate the probationer by exposing him to prosecution for a different 

crime.@) (emphasis added).9

As explained above, appellant=s first point is based in part on the trial 

court=s incarcerating him because of his refusal to answer the following questions 

on Fifth Amendment grounds: (1) ASince you have been on probation, have you 

had [sic] violated any of the conditions?@; (2) ASince you have been on probation, 

have you had sexual contact with any persons younger than 17?@; (3) ASince you 

have been on probation, have you tried to isolate any child for sexual 

purposes?@; and (4) ASince you have been on probation, have you intentionally 

committed any sexual crimes?@ The first question asks only about community 

supervision violations, not about independent criminal activity, and appellant 

therefore does not have a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer the 

question. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n.7, 104 S. Ct. at 1146 n.7. Thus, to the 

extent that the trial court=s denials of appellant=s writ applications could be based 

on his refusal to answer the first question, we overrule appellant=s first point.

The State has conceded, and we conclude, that the second and fourth 

questions ask about independent crimes rather than mere community 

 

9Although they are not binding, we may rely on federal circuit decisions as 

persuasive authority. Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 256 n.13 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1998) (op. on reh=g), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070 (1999). Other states have 

also recognized the Fifth Amendment dichotomy of requiring a probationer to 

speak about matters related only to the conditions of his probation as opposed to 

matters related to different crimes. See State v. Lumley, 977 P.2d 914, 919 

(Kan. 1999).
15

supervision violations and that under the authority cited above, appellant has a 

Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer those questions. Thus, to the extent 

that the trial court=s denials of appellant=s writ applications may be based on his 

refusal to answer those two questions, we sustain appellant=s first point.10

The State argues that question three (isolation of a child for sexual 

purposes) inquires whether appellant committed Aa mere probation violation@ and 

that the question poses Ano realistic threat of incrimination.@ However, we 

conclude that question three exceeds asking only about a violation of appellant=s 

community supervision and provides at least a link in the chain to appellant=s 

responsibility for an independent offense.11 See Reiner, 532 U.S. at 20, 121 S. 

Ct. at 1254. The penal code states that a person commits the offense of criminal 

attempt Aif, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to 

 

10The trial court found, based on the letter from The Polygraph Science 

Center, that appellant was willing to answer the first question but not the other 

three questions. However, appellant=s writ applications do not concede that the 

first question is proper, and appellant has not yielded on appeal to the State=s 

position that it was proper. Instead, appellant contended during oral argument 

that a question that asks about probation violations triggers his Fifth Amendment 

right. The trial court=s findings of fact do not address appellant=s Fifth 

Amendment rights in relation to questions one, two, and four; rather, the trial 

court found that appellant=s refusal to answer question three was dispositive of 

the relief that he requested in the applications. We are addressing the first, 

second, and fourth questions because, as explained below, we disagree with the 

trial court=s conclusion that appellant does not have a Fifth Amendment right to 

refuse to answer question three.

11We also note that question three is limited time-wise to isolation of a child 

since appellant=s been on probation; thus, the question clearly relates to a 

potentially new offense.
16

more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the 

offense intended.@ Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 15.01(a) (Vernon 2003); see Yalch v. 

State, 743 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We conclude that Atr[ying] to 

isolate any child@ could qualify as an Aact amounting to more than mere 

preparation@ and that Afor sexual purposes@ could serve as Aspecific intent to 

commit an offense@ such as attempted indecency with a child, attempted sexual 

assault of a child, attempted sexual performance by a child, or other attempted 

offenses that involve a defendant=s act and sexual intent with regard to children. 

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 15.01(a), '' 21.11(a), 22.011(a)(2), 43.25(b) 

(Vernon Supp. 2010); cf. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 516, 522–23 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2009) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove attempted 

aggravated kidnapping when a defendant briefly grabbed a young girl by her 

waist and pulled her with the inferred purpose to secrete her).

Thus, even while giving great deference to the trial court=s conclusion that 

appellant cannot refuse to answer question three on Fifth Amendment grounds, 

we must overrule that conclusion. To the extent that appellant=s first point 

challenges the trial court=s denials of his writ applications as related to his refusal 

to answer question three, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying the applications and sustain the point.12

 

12Furthermore, appellant=s community supervision may not be revoked for 

simply asserting his Fifth Amendment right to not answer questions two through 

four. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 438, 104 S. Ct. at 1148 (AOur decisions have 

made clear that the State could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke 
17

Appellant also argues in his first point that the sex offender counseling 

program requires him to admit Ato the sexual crime for which the counselor 

believes he is being counseled.@ A term of appellant=s community supervision 

states that he must A[a]ssume responsibility for [his] offense.@ One of the trial 

court=s findings of fact states, AAs part of treatment, [appellant] is required to 

admit and discuss the facts of this offense.@ 

The State contends that appellant=s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination does not apply to him discussing the facts of the remaining four 

indicted offenses because further prosecution of the offenses is barred by double 

jeopardy and he has Ano realistic threat of future criminal prosecution@ on the 

facts comprising the alleged offenses. Furthermore, the State represents that 

appellant is Asafe from additional prosecution@ on the underlying facts of this 

case.

We view these statements as binding concessions that the State will never 

use the facts relating to the indicted offenses, if any, for a future criminal 

proceeding on the indicted offenses or new offenses.13 See, e.g., Bryant v. 

 

probation for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege.@); 

Chapman, 115 S.W.3d at 6.

13The State also represents that appellant Acannot now be prosecuted for 

any of the . . . indicted offenses.@ We note that the judicial estoppel doctrine 

prevents parties from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then 

relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase. See Schmidt v. 

State, 278 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Davidson v. State, 737 

S.W.2d 942, 948 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1987, pet. ref=d) (explaining that judicial 

estoppel prevents a Aparty who has taken a position in an earlier proceeding from 
18

State, 187 S.W.3d 397, 400–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that a 

defendant=s stipulation that was not entered into evidence was nonetheless a 

judicial admission that barred him from contesting evidentiary sufficiency). Thus, 

we conclude that appellant=s Fifth Amendment rights do not apply to him 

discussing the limited facts specifically related to counts one through four of his 

original indictment because the State may not use those facts in a subsequent 

criminal proceeding, and he cannot be incriminated based on those facts.14

See Chapman, 115 S.W.3d at 7 & n.28 (explaining that a defendant could be 

compelled to testify against himself if he was granted immunity that eliminated 

the threat of incrimination); Renfro, 999 S.W.2d at 561 (explaining that the Fifth 

Amendment privilege applies only when there is a Arealistic threat of selfincrimination@).

 

taking a contrary position at a later time,@ and therefore holding that a defendant 

was prohibited on appeal from contesting the cause of a victim=s death when the 

defendant=s counsel conceded at trial that the death was caused by gunshot 

wounds).

14In the trial court, within a response to one of appellant=s writ applications, 

the State claimed that sex offender conditions were appropriate for appellant=s 

community supervision, even though he did not plead to a sex-related offense, 

because the underlying facts of appellant=s case were sexual in nature. In an 

attempt to prove its claim, the State attached police reports, witness statements, 

and medical records specifically describing an event that allegedly occurred on 

July 14, 2004. We conclude that the State=s concessions preclude it from 

prosecuting appellant for any crimes (other than the crime to which he has pled 

guilty) related to the alleged facts occurring during that event on that date as 

described in those documents; consequently, appellant may be compelled to 

discuss only those alleged facts.
19

In summary, we hold that appellant may not be compelled, over the 

invocation of his Fifth Amendment right, to participate in any portion of the 

objected-to community supervision conditions, including the requirement of 

answering questions two through four of the planned polygraph examination, that 

would provide a link to his criminal prosecution for any offense unrelated to the 

injury to a child offense that he pled guilty to.15 We sustain appellant=s first point 

to the extent that the trial court=s community supervision conditions require him to 

so participate. But appellant may be compelled to discuss the facts particularly 

related to counts one through four of his indictment because the State may not 

use those facts in a future criminal prosecution. We overrule appellant=s first 

point to that degree.

Appellant=s Requirement to Attend Sex Offender Treatment

In the title of his second point, appellant argues that the trial court is 

denying him due process by requiring him to attend any part of sex offender 

counseling when he has not been convicted of a sex offense. However, the 

argument in appellant=s second point does not assert a constitutional due 

process denial but relates to whether Athe Legislature limited the right to impose 

 

15We do not express any opinion on whether a trial court=s requirement of a 

probationer to answer questions about independent criminal activity would be 

constitutional if the probationer agreed to answer such questions as a particular 

term of his plea bargain agreement and waived his Fifth Amendment rights at the 

time of the agreement.
20

sex offender counseling to persons convicted of a sex offense.@

16

 In other words, 

while relying on the text of article 42.12 of the code of criminal procedure, 

appellant argues that there is no statutory authority to support the trial court=s 

decision to require him to attend sex offender counseling when he pled guilty to 

injury to a child, which is not a sex-related offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

Ann. art. 42.12, ' 9A(2) (stating that a person who enters a plea of guilty to one 

of several specific statutes, not including the injury to a child statute, qualifies as 

a Asex offender@).

As explained above, appellant=s writ applications must be reviewed under 

article 11.072 of the code of criminal procedure. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 

11.072, ' 1; Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d at 397. AAn applicant may challenge a 

condition of community supervision under [article 11.072] only on constitutional 

grounds.@ Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, ' 3(c); see Ex parte Wilson, 

171 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (overruling a challenge in 

a habeas corpus appeal to requiring the defendant to participate in the 

Substance Abuse Felony Program as the result of a state jail felony guilty plea 

because the Achallenge d[id] not raise any constitutional issues, only statutory 

 

16Appellant=s writ applications in the trial court likewise do not contain 

argument specifically related to a violation of due process because of his 

required submission to sex offender counseling generally. A defendant may 

forfeit constitutional complaints by not raising them in the trial court. Fuller v. 

State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 904 

(2009); Alexander v. State, 137 S.W.3d 127, 130–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2004, pet. ref=d) (holding that a due process complaint was forfeited by 

failure to assert the complaint in the trial court).
21

ones. Therefore, article 11.072 preclude[d] appellant from bringing this complaint 

by habeas corpus@); see also Ex parte Watson, 601 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1980) (AIt is well-established that habeas corpus will lie only to review 

jurisdictional defects or denials of fundamental or constitutional rights.@).

Appellant=s complaint in his second point focuses on the trial court=s 

allegedly exceeding its statutory authority to impose community supervision 

conditions rather than on constitutional issues. Appellant does not cite any 

authority to contend that a trial court=s imposition of a community supervision 

term that is not authorized by article 42.12 of the code of criminal procedure 

qualifies as a constitutional violation.17 Thus, we hold that we do not have 

jurisdiction to consider appellant=s statutory complaint in these habeas corpus 

appeals. See Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d at 397; see also Burnett v. State, 88 

S.W.3d 633, 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (distinguishing between constitutional 

and statutory error); Ex parte Sadberry, 864 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 

 

17In his response to the State=s motion for rehearing, appellant contends 

that A[s]ubjecting a defendant to sex offender counseling and conditions absent a 

conviction for a sexual offense violates due process.@ But the sole case that 

appellant cites for that proposition contains a narrower holding. Specifically, it 

states that a parole board cannot impose sex offender conditions on someone 

who has not been convicted of a sex offense when those conditions are imposed 

without procedural due process such as an opportunity to contest the conditions 

at a hearing. Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2004), reh=g en 

banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 (2005); 

see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 

(AColeman=s holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee

before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender 

conditions may be imposed at all.@). Neither of appellant=s points directly 

challenge the procedure by which the trial court imposed sex offender conditions.
22

1993) (holding that a habeas corpus proceeding was not the proper avenue to 

address statutory noncompliance). We dismiss appellant=s second point.

Conclusion

Having sustained part of appellant=s first point, to the extent that the trial 

court=s decision to incarcerate appellant was based on his refusal to answer 

questions two through four of the polygraph examination, we reverse the trial 

court=s denial of his applications for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm the trial 

court=s denials of his writ applications in all other respects and remand this case 

to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

TERRIE LIVINGSTON

CHIEF JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and MCCOY, JJ.

DAUPHINOT, J. filed a concurring opinion.

PUBLISH

DELIVERED: December 16, 2010
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NOS. 02-09-00266-CR

02-09-00268-CR

EX PARTE JOSEPH P. DANGELO

----------

FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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CONCURRING OPINION ON REHEARING

----------

I agree with the conscientious majority’s holding that Appellant cannot be 

required to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. I,

nevertheless, remain concerned that the record before us does not describe the 

four discrete acts alleged in the indictment with sufficient specificity to prevent 

future prosecution and potential double jeopardy violations. My concern is based 

on the fact that when the State pleads that a sexual offense against a child 

occurred ―on or about‖ a specific date, the State may prove any such offense that 
2

occurred within the statute of limitations but before the return of the indictment.1 

Unless the State is required to elect specific offenses, or unless the State is 

judicially estopped from prosecuting Appellant for any offense that could fall 

within the conduct described in the indictment and that occurred within the 

statute of limitations but before the date the indictment was returned, then there 

is no way for a judge, an accused, a counselor, an attorney, or a polygrapher to 

know whether the questions that the majority requires Appellant to answer 

involve offenses that the State is judicially estopped from pursuing.

I agree that the State is judicially estopped from compelling participation in 

any condition of community supervision that would provide a link to his criminal 

prosecution for any offense other than the injury-to-a-child offense to which 

Appellant pled guilty. I also agree that the State is judicially estopped from 

prosecuting Appellant for the sexual offenses alleged in the indictment. 

Unfortunately, I have no idea how anyone will know which sexual acts those are. 

Because the law permits such temporal vagueness in pleading sexual offenses 

against children, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to determine 

whether Appellant is being required to answer questions concerning offenses for 

which the State could prosecute him as opposed to offenses which the State is 

judicially estopped from pursuing.

 

1Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 255–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
3

Because of these concerns that I have voiced, I concur in the thoughtful 

opinion of the majority.

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PUBLISH

DELIVERED: December 16, 2010