Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Goodwyn, and 

Millette, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 

VIRGIL MONGOLD, CO-EXECUTOR AND 

BENEFICIARY OF THE ESTATE OF 

NINA M. DOVE, DECEASED, ET AL. OPINION BY 

SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 

v. Record No. 081827 June 4, 2009 

TERRY V. WOODS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 

George F. Tidey, Judge Designate 

 This appeal presents questions concerning the interplay 

between theories of recovery based on promissory estoppel and 

quantum meruit. It also involves the determination of quantum 

meruit damages. 

Facts and Proceedings

 In accordance with familiar principles of appellate 

review, the facts will be stated in the light most favorable 

to the party prevailing in the trial court. Paul and Nina 

Dove, husband and wife, purchased a tract of land in 

Rockingham County as tenants by the entireties in 1985. They 

moved into a home on part of the property and conducted a 

chicken-raising business on another part, as well as raising 

sheep and cattle and growing a hay crop. Terry V. Woods had 

worked as a farm laborer for Paul Dove since Terry’s 

childhood, helping each summer with the hay crop on other land 

owned by the Doves. 
 In 1985, Woods was 21 years old and was employed in the 

chicken-raising operations of the Rockingham Poultry 

Cooperative. He had left school in the tenth grade. Paul 

Dove was employed elsewhere, but wanted to continue the 

chicken-raising operation already located on the farm he had 

acquired. He asked Woods to work for him, tending the 

chickens, mowing around the chicken houses, making some hay, 

and tending to the livestock. Paul Dove intended to continue 

with his employment until he qualified for full retirement, 

after which he would return and share with Woods the 

responsibilities of the chicken-raising operation. 

 The Doves paid Woods a salary of $7,850 in 1985. It was 

contemplated by the parties at the inception of the 

relationship that Woods’ duties would occupy 35 to 40 hours 

per week, with every other weekend off. In subsequent years, 

Woods received an annual raise, plus a cash bonus based on the 

year’s profit from the chicken-raising operation. 

 About six months after Woods began to work for the Doves 

on a salary in 1985, during the hay-making season it became 

apparent that Woods’ duties would consume far more that 40 

hours per week. He began to work every weekend. He worked 11 

hours a day, six days per week during the spring lambing 

season and 13 or 14 hours a day during the hay-making season. 

He had to work all night during the times when chickens were 

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being sold. He also worked six to eight hours on Sundays 

during these peak seasons. 

 The Doves had no children. They were very fond of Woods 

and, according to neighbors, treated him nearly like a son. 

At the time in 1985 when Woods’ duties nearly doubled, the 

Doves could not afford to increase his salary to compensate 

him fully for his work. Paul Dove, however, told Woods that 

he and his wife, having no children, would, if he “stayed and 

stuck with them . . . take care of [him].” Woods and his wife 

lived on an adjoining farm. Paul Dove had told him at the 

beginning: “75,000 chickens ought to be able to provide two 

families with a good, comfortable living.” 

 Woods’ employment by the Doves continued for the next 21 

years. About halfway through that relationship, Paul Dove 

became more specific as to his intentions, telling Woods that 

when he retired from raising chickens, he would turn the 

chicken houses over to Woods so that Woods could continue the 

operation and earn his living from them. Paul Dove also told 

Woods that the Doves would leave the entire farm property to 

him when they died. Woods, in reliance on that assurance, 

considered it his responsibility to perform extra work for the 

Doves, beyond that compensated by his salary, during their 

lifetimes. Woods, without further compensation, tended the 

sheep and cattle, sheared sheep, did gardening and landscaping 

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work around the Doves’ home, removed a wall in their house to 

enlarge a bedroom, cleaned the exterior of the house, built 

sheds, repaired fencing around the farm, and helped Paul Dove 

entirely fence a 180-acre tract of mountain land the Doves 

also owned. 

 Notwithstanding this additional workload, Woods’ salary, 

after annual raises, had only increased to $8.96 per hour for 

a 40-hour week by 2004.1 Woods testified that when Paul Dove 

discussed annual raises with him, he told Paul that he was 

making a living, and in view of his expectancy of inheriting 

the farm, “that’s all that I was concerned about.” 

 On March 11, 2005, Paul Dove died by accidental 

electrocution while working on a thermostat in one of the 

chicken houses. Woods was working elsewhere on the farm at 

the time. Paul died intestate and all the Dove property 

passed to his wife, Nina. 

 Nina Dove had suffered a stroke before her husband’s 

death and, although in poor health, outlived him by two years. 

After Paul Dove’s death, Woods continued to work for Nina, 

taking on the work Paul Dove had formerly done in addition to 

 1

 In 2004, the Doves paid Woods $12,508, representing 

$8.96 per hour for 50 weeks at 40 hours per week. It was 

assumed that Woods would be off work for two weeks during the 

hunting season each year. The 2004 salary was the highest 

Woods had ever received. 

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his usual duties. Nina told him that she did not want the 

expense and aggravation, or the income, from the chickenraising operation and that Woods should take it over. He paid 

for the electricity for her home and the propane to heat it. 

Nina was unable to walk, and Woods and his wife stayed with 

her night and day for about two weeks until her brothers and 

sisters made arrangements for her care. Nina told him that 

she had made a will leaving him everything except the mountain 

land.2

 Nina had a second stroke in late 2005 and went into a 

nursing home for rehabilitation. She returned home thereafter 

and her family members stayed with her, or employed others to 

care for her, until she died as a result of a third stroke in 

April 2007. On March 7, 2006, while Nina was in the care of 

her family members, Woods received a letter from Lorene 

Biller, Nina’s sister, writing as Nina’s attorney in fact, 

terminating his “use of the poultry houses.” After Nina’s 

death, her last will, dated January 12, 2006, was admitted to 

probate. It divided her entire estate among her brothers and 

sisters, with a bequest to her church. Woods was not 

mentioned in the will. Virgil Mongold and Donald E. Showalter 

(the Executors) qualified as co-executors under the will. 

 2

 A draft of such a will was introduced in evidence. It 

was undated and never executed. 

5
 Woods brought this action against the Executors and 

beneficiaries. His complaint contains two counts; the first 

count seeks to impose a constructive trust upon the estate 

based on a theory of unjust enrichment; the second seeks 

damages based on a theory of quantum meruit. Woods made no 

challenge to the validity of the will. 

 After hearing the evidence ore tenus, the circuit court, 

in a letter opinion, ruled that Woods’ evidence “does not rise 

to the level of clear and convincing evidence necessary to 

create a constructive trust on the property.” The court 

observed that Paul Dove had clearly intended to leave the 

property to Woods and had told Woods and other witnesses of 

his intention. The court found, however, that the property 

was not Paul’s to give, being held by husband and wife as 

tenants by the entireties, and Nina’s intentions were not 

sufficiently clear. Accordingly, the court denied relief on 

Woods’ first count and declined to impose a constructive 

trust. Woods does not appeal that ruling. 

 Nevertheless, the circuit court found by a preponderance 

of the evidence that Woods had established a valid claim for 

quantum meruit damages beginning in 1996 and continuing 

through 2004, including the value of the electricity and 

propane Woods furnished to the Dove home after Paul’s death. 

The court entered a final order awarding Woods a judgment in 

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the amount of $115,172.57. We awarded the Executors an 

appeal. We also awarded an appeal to Woods on his assignment 

of cross-error to the circuit court’s ruling that his right to 

quantum meruit damages did not accrue until 1996. 

Analysis

 The Executors present three assignments of error: (1) 

Woods’ claims are based on promissory estoppel, for which 

there is no cause of action in Virginia; (2) quantum meruit 

damages are not recoverable where, as here, there is an 

express contract of employment; and (3) Woods presented no 

evidence of the reasonable value of the services he rendered. 

A. Promissory Estoppel and Quantum Meruit

 Where it is available, the cause of action based on 

promissory estoppel consists of four elements, recently 

defined as: “(1) a promise, (2) which the promisor should 

reasonably expect to cause action by the promisee, (3) which 

does cause such action, and (4) which should be enforced to 

prevent injustice to the promisee.” Barnhill v. Veneman, 524 

F.3d 458, 475-76 (4th Cir. 2008). The Executors are correct 

in asserting that promissory estoppel is not a cognizable 

cause of action in Virginia. In a trio of cases decided on 

the same day in 1997, we observed that such a cause of action 

had never been held to exist in the Commonwealth and we 

expressly declined to create such a cause of action. W. J. 

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Schafer Associates v. Cordant, Inc., 254 Va. 514, 521, 493 

S.E.2d 512, 516 (1997). See Virginia School of the Arts v. 

Eichelbaum, 254 Va. 373, 377, 493 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1997); 

Ward’s Equipment, Inc. v. New Holland North America, Inc., 254 

Va. 379, 385, 493 S.E.2d 516, 520 (1997). We have not altered 

that position. 

 Promissory estoppel and quantum meruit are conceptually 

distinct. They require entirely different proof and result in 

entirely different remedies. 

 Where promissory estoppel is available, the promisee must 

prove, by the standard of evidence required in the 

jurisdiction, the four elements quoted above from Barnhill. 

If successful, the promisee is entitled to judicial 

enforcement of the promisor’s promise. If that remedy were to 

be applied to the present case, it would have required a 

conveyance of all the Dove property, less the mountain land, 

to Woods, if he had carried his burden of proof by clear and 

convincing evidence. 

 Quantum meruit recovery, by contrast, is based upon an 

implied contract to pay the reasonable value of services 

rendered. Hendrickson v. Meredith, 161 Va. 193, 198, 170 S.E. 

602, 604 (1933). See also Marine Development Corp. v. Rodak, 

225 Va. 137, 140-41, 300 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1983). This cause 

of action has been available in Virginia for many years. In 

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Rea v. Trotter, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 585, 592 (1875), this Court 

referred to it as “an undeniable principle of law.” There, we 

said, “Where service is performed by one, at the instance and 

request of another, and . . . nothing is said between the 

parties as to compensation for such service, the law implies a 

contract, that the party who performs the service shall be 

paid a reasonable compensation therefor." (Id.) The remedy 

available to the plaintiff is an award of damages amounting to 

the reasonable value of the work performed, less the 

compensation actually received for that work. Hendrickson, 

161 Va. at 201, 170 S.E. at 605. 

 A party may state in a pleading as many claims as he has, 

"regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or 

equitable grounds." Rule 1:4(k). The fact that Woods’ first 

count alleged facts that might have framed a cause of action 

for promissory estoppel, if such had been available, is 

immaterial to the claim made in his second count for damages 

based on quantum meruit. Therefore, we find no merit in the 

Executors’ first assignment of error. 

B. Quantum Meruit and Express Contract

The Executors point out that for a court to award a 

quantum meruit recovery, the court must conclude that there is 

no enforceable express contract between the parties covering 

the same subject matter. In such a case, the court will imply 

9
a contract between the parties to prevent inequity; when such 

an express contract exists, however, there is no need to imply 

one because the parties have already negotiated an agreement. 

Nedrich v. Jones, 245 Va. 465, 477, 429 S.E.2d 201, 207 

(1993). The Executors correctly state the rule, but the rule, 

according to its terms, applies only when there is an express, 

enforceable contract between the parties covering the services 

for which quantum meruit recovery is claimed. Id.; Royer v. 

Board of Supervisors, 176 Va. 268, 280, 10 S.E.2d 876, 881 

(1940). 

Implicit in the circuit court’s holding is the finding 

that Woods and Paul Dove had an unwritten agreement, beginning 

in 1985, that Woods would work between 35 and 40 hours per 

week for the Doves. In return for that labor, he was to be 

paid a salary as agreed between them annually, plus bonuses 

from the sales of chickens. That contract was fully performed 

and Woods makes no claim for its breach. Also implicit in the 

court’s holding is that when the first haying season began 

after the relationship was created, Woods’ workload nearly 

doubled, and remained far in excess of 40 hours per week until 

the end of the relationship. There was, in 1985, no express 

contract covering Woods’ compensation for the additional work 

except for the vague promise that the Doves, being unable to 

fully compensate him, would “take care of [him].” Later, Paul 

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Dove made a more specific promise as described above, but that 

promise was held by the circuit court not to constitute an 

enforceable contract. That holding was not appealed and is 

therefore the law of the case. Thus, the rule cited by the 

Executors has no application to Woods’ additional, 

uncompensated work. 

We will defer to the circuit court’s determination of the 

facts unless unsupported by evidence or plainly wrong because 

an appellate court lacks the fact-finder’s ability to hear and 

see the witnesses and assess their credibility. Patterson v. 

Patterson, 257 Va. 558, 564, 515 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1999). The 

record contains ample evidence to support the circuit court’s 

conclusion that no express, enforceable agreement existed 

between the parties as to Woods’ compensation for his work in 

excess of 40 hours per week. We cannot say that the circuit 

court’s conclusion from the evidence, that an implied contract 

was necessary to prevent injustice to Woods, was plainly 

wrong. 

C. Damages

The Executors’ final assignment of error is that Woods 

presented no evidence of the reasonable value of the services 

he rendered, an essential requisite of quantum meruit damages. 

See Virginia Fin. Assocs. v. ITT Hartford Group, 266 Va. 177, 

183, 585 S.E.2d 789, 792 (2003); Marine Development, 225 Va. 

11
at 140-41, 300 S.E.2d at 765-66; Hendrickson, 161 Va. at 200, 

170 S.E. at 605. Woods presented evidence of the approximate 

number of hours he worked each year from 1985 until the 

relationship ended in 2006. The circuit court accepted that 

number as a fact in awarding damages. 

The hourly rate the court applied to Woods’ additional, 

uncompensated work was the same as the parties agreed on each 

year as compensation for the 40 hours per week for which they 

had contracted. Woods asked for no wage rate higher than the 

parties had agreed upon each year as reasonable compensation 

for the 40 hours covered by their express contract. The 

circuit court could properly conclude from the evidence that 

the parties, being in a position to know the prevailing wage 

rates for farm labor in the vicinity and the work Woods was to 

perform, had agreed upon the reasonable value of Woods’ 

services for the originally-contemplated 40 hours per week. 

There was no evidence to suggest that the same rate was 

unreasonably high for his additional, uncompensated work.3 We 

conclude that Woods presented sufficient evidence of the 

reasonable value of his services. 

 3

 Instead, testimony suggested that the rate was lower 

than the value of Woods' work because Paul Dove could not 

afford to pay him a higher rate but intended to leave the 

property to him. Woods did not ask that a higher rate be used 

in the assessment of damages. Accordingly, the question 

whether the rate was too low is not before us on appeal. 

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D. Cross-Error

Woods contends that his uncompensated work, in excess of 

the 40 hours per week covered by his salary, began in 1985, 

when the haying season began some six months after the 

inception of his salaried employment with the Doves. The 

circuit court must necessarily have accepted that as a fact 

because there was no evidence of any substantial change in his 

workload thereafter until the end of the relationship, except 

for additional services he rendered to Nina Dove after Paul’s 

death. Woods argues that the circuit court erred in ruling 

that his entitlement to quantum meruit damages did not begin 

until 1996. 

Based on our review of the record, we agree with Woods. 

The circuit court stated in its opinion: “The evidence from 

[Woods] is that the relationship began in the middle of his 

employment. I will award [Woods] a judgment against the 

estate in the amount of $106,444.00 (1996-2004) plus the 

electric bills of $4,200.00 and the propane bills of 

$4,528.57.” That finding was based upon Woods’ testimony that 

it was “about midways through” his relationship with the Doves 

that Paul Dove told him that the Doves intended to leave the 

entire farm property to him when they died. The year 1996 was 

pertinent to Woods’ claim for a constructive trust on the farm 

property, but that claim was unsuccessful and is not before us 

13
in this appeal. The year 1996 is irrelevant to Woods’ claim 

for quantum meruit damages. 

The unrefuted evidence is that the relationship between 

Woods and the Doves began in 1985 with the agreement that he 

would work 40 hours per week, that about six months later 

Woods’ workload nearly doubled and remained at that level 

until 2006, and that he received no additional compensation 

for his services beyond 40 hours per week. We conclude that 

the circuit court’s determination that his entitlement to 

quantum meruit damages began only in 1996 was unsupported by 

the evidence. 

Conclusion

Because we find no merit in the Executors’ assignments of 

error, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court with 

respect to the questions presented by their appeal. Because 

we find error in the circuit court’s judgment with respect to 

its award of damages, we will reverse the judgment in part and 

remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion, limited to the issue of damages. 

Affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

 and remanded. 

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