UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1501

JOHN D. HATCHER, individually and as members of the 

Architectural Committee of Mill Creek Estates; RACHEL 

SHALULY, individually and as members of the Architectural 

Committee of Mill Creek Estates; JAMES F. GILBERT, 

individually and as members of the Architectural Committee 

of Mill Creek Estates; MOLLY A. MILLER, individually and as 

members of the Architectural Committee of Mill Creek 

Estates; MICHAEL STEHNEY, individually and as members of 

the Architectural Committee of Mill Creek Estates,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

RON FERGUSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Greenville. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. 

(6:15-cv-05032-TMC)

Submitted: October 31, 2016 Decided: November 15, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and AGEE and THACKER, Circuit 

Judges.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.
2

Ron Ferguson, Appellant Pro Se. Rodney M. Brown, RODNEY M. 

BROWN, PA, Fountain Inn, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

This appeal arises from a civil action filed in April 2013 

in South Carolina state court by John D. Hatcher, Rachel 

Shaluly, James F. Gilbert, Molly A. Miller, and Michael Stehney, 

individually and as members of the Architectural Committee of 

Mill Creek Estates (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), against 

Defendant “Ron Ferguson.”* Following two unsuccessful attempts 

to remove the case to federal district court, Ferguson again 

removed the action in December 2015, purportedly on the basis of 

diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C §§ 1332, 1441 (2012). 

Plaintiffs moved to remand the case again to state court and 

sought an order prohibiting Ferguson from further remand 

attempts. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation to grant Plaintiffs’ motion. Ferguson now seeks 

to appeal the district court’s order, challenging both the 

court’s decision to remand and its prohibition on future 

removals. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal in 

part and affirm the district court’s order in part.

 * We note that the record and Ferguson’s appellate briefs 

give rise to some question as to the identity of the properly 

joined parties to this action. Although we rely on the party 

designation assigned by the district court, we note that our 

disposition is unaffected by this dispute, regardless of whether 

the proper defendant is Ronald E. Ferguson, Susan Ferguson, 

Ronald J. Ferguson, or some combination of these individuals.
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“Congress has placed broad restrictions on the power of 

federal appellate courts to review district court orders 

remanding removed cases to state court.” Things Remembered, 

Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995). Remand orders 

generally are “not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012). However, the Supreme Court has 

explained that the restrictions on appellate review described in 

“§ 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with [28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(c) (2012)], so that only remands based on grounds 

specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d).” 

Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 127. Thus, § 1447(d) prohibits 

appellate review only of remand orders “based on (1) a district 

court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in 

removal other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction that was 

raised by the motion of a party within 30 days after the notice 

of removal was filed.” Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, 

Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see Doe v. Blair, 819 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir. 

2016).

“[A] district court’s mere citation to § 1447(c) is 

insufficient to bring a remand order within the purview of that 

provision.” In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 

576, 584 (4th Cir. 2006). Before exercising appellate review 

over a remand order, we first must evaluate the order’s 
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substantive reasoning “to determine whether it was issued based 

upon the district court’s perception that it lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction.” Blair, 819 F.3d at 67 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Here, the district court remanded the action after 

concluding that it could not exercise diversity subject matter 

jurisdiction because the parties were not completely diverse at 

the time of removal. The defect identified by the district 

court is not a defect in subject matter jurisdiction, but 

instead a procedural defect based on Ferguson’s failure to meet 

the statutory requirements of § 1441(a). See Grupo Dataflux v. 

Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 574 (2004); Caterpillar 

Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 73 (1996). Because we conclude 

Plaintiffs adequately identified and relied upon this defect in 

their timely motion to remand, we conclude we lack jurisdiction 

to review the court’s decision to remand. Further, insofar as 

Ferguson attempts to challenge the district court’s alternative 

holding that remand was warranted because the removal notice was 

untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (2012), we conclude the issue 

is moot and decline to address it.

While review of the district court’s remand order is 

precluded under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), that statute does not 

preclude our review of the portion of the court’s order 

prohibiting future removals. See Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive 
6

Co., 772 F.3d 1001, 1008-09 (4th Cir. 2014). We review a 

district court’s decision to impose sanctions for abuse of 

discretion. See Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 

812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004); Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 

410 (4th Cir. 1999). In so doing, we may affirm for any reason 

appearing from the record. See United States v. Basham, 789 

F.3d 358, 379 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1449 

(2016). 

The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012), permits 

federal courts to “limit access to the courts by vexatious and 

repetitive litigants.” Cromer, 390 F.3d at 817; see Chambers v. 

NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991). Although this “drastic 

remedy” is to be used only sparingly to confront exigent 

circumstances, filing limitations may be appropriate to address 

“a litigant’s continuous abuse of the judicial process” through

“meritless and repetitive” filings. Cromer, 390 F.3d at 817.

As the district court recognized, the removal statutes 

should not be manipulated to permit “strategic delay interposed 

by a defendant in an effort to determine the state court's 

receptivity to his litigating position.” Lovern v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 121 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1997). The record of the 

proceedings in state court and this court amply supported the 

district court’s determination that Ferguson’s repeated removals 

were intended to manipulate the removal process for strategic 
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reasons. Ferguson was provided notice of the proposed sanction 

and an opportunity to respond, and the court’s prohibition was 

narrowly tailored to the circumstances at hand. See Cromer, 390 

F.3d at 818-19. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in 

the district court’s decision to prohibit Ferguson from future 

attempts to remove the same state court action.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in part, insofar as it 

seeks review of the district court’s decision to remand the 

action to state court. We affirm the district court’s order in 

part, insofar as it bars Ferguson from future removal attempts. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART;

AFFIRMED IN PART