### The HONORABLE BRUCE M. VAN SICKLE, Senior United States * 

### District Judge for the District of North Dakota, sitting by designation. The Honorable John B. Jones, Senior Judge, United States 1 

### District Court for the District of South Dakota, presiding. ___________ No. 95-3371

___________ Dorothy Jones, * * Appellant, * * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the District Shirley S. Chater, * of South Dakota. Commissioner of the Social * Security Administration, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: May 15, 1996
Filed: June 19, 1996

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, MAGILL, Circuit Judge, and VA N SICKLE, Senior District Judge.

*

___________ VAN SICKLE, Senior District Judge. Dorothy Jones appeals the distri ct court's grant of summary judgment 1 in favor of the appel lee, the Secretary. The district court affirmed the conclusion of the Soc ial Security Administration administrative law judge ("ALJ") to deny the appellant's application for benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, 1381-1383c. We affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for benefits in Ju ne of 1993, claiming disability due to arthritis, diabetes, kidney infections, high blood pressure, an d palsy. She had worked as a teacher's aide on the Rosebud Sioux reservatio n from 1971 until May, 1993. Her job activities sometimes included lifting heavy ob jects such as overhead projectors and computers. She als o volunteered, on a daily basis, to lift the children's chairs and place the m on the desks to ease the workload of the janitor . Plaintiff complained of various ailments to the Public Health Service, but they appear to have bee n treated with mild dru gs, were not serious, or were not followed up by the Plaintiff.

A hearing was held on April 15, 1994 at which the claimant was presen t and represented by counsel. The ALJ found that the plaintiff could perfor m work "existing in significant numbers in the nat ional economy" and was not entitled to Social Se curity benefits. The ALJ believed that the ailments with which the plaint iff was afflicted were not severe and the medication which the plaintiff w as taking did not cause any harsh side effects. The plaintiff's pain precluded her from performing heavy work, but she has "th e residual functional capacity to perform at least the full range of light work activities." While the plaintiff claimed that she lifted heav y objects during the course of a work day, the job of teacher's aide, a s generally performed i n the economy, only required light work. Therefore, the ALJ found, the pl aintiff would be able to return to her past relevant work as a teacher's aide.

The Social Security Appeals Council denied the plaintiff's request fo r review of the ALJ's decision. Thus, the determination to deny benefit s became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. The district court, on appeal of the Commissioner's denial of benefi ts, held that there was substantial evidence to support th e commissioner's decision. The

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district court found that the plaintiff's evidence of anxiety, allegedly fro msupervising children, was not disabling. The district court note d that her past work as a teacher's aide "was not so unique as to render it someth ing other than the position described in the" Dictionary o f Occupati on Titles ("DOT"). The plaintiff appeals the grant of th e Commissioner's motion for summary judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

A claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving that she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinabl e physical or mental impairment which is expected to last for at least twelve months or result in death. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 c(a)(3)(A); Woolf v. Shalala , 3 F.3d 1210, 1212 (8th Cir. 1993) ; Nettles v. Schweiker , 714 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1983). Review of th e Secretary's decision to deny benefits is limited to a determination o f whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Evans v. Shalala , 21 F.3d 832, 833 (8th Cir. 1994). See Hutsell v. Sullivan , 892 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1989) (statin g that A LJ's determination of claimant's credibility will be upheld i f supported by substant ial evidence on the record as a whole). Substantial evid ence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate t o support the Secretary 's conclusion. Woolf , 3 F.3d at 1213. Even if there is substantial evidence which would support a de cision opposite to that of the Secretary, this court must affirm her decision as long as there i s substantial evidence in favor of her position. Id. ; Browning v. Sullivan , 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992).

The Socia l Security Act sets out five steps for the ALJ to use when reviewi ng a claimant's request for disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 ; Evans , 21 F.3d at 833. The relevant step in this case is step four i n which the ALJ must consider whether a claimant's

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impairmen ts keep her from doing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520( e). See Titus v. Sullivan , 4 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1993 ) (following Tenth Circuit's decision in Alexander v. Richardson , 451 F.2d 1185, 11 86 (10th Cir. 1971), 407 U.S. 911 (1972)), that in order to b e "disab led", one must possess both a medically determinable mental o r physical impairment and an inability to engage in gainful activity of whic h both will continue fo r at least twelve months). If the ALJ cannot make a decision based on current work activity or medical facts alone, he shall evaluate a claimant's ability to do past relevant work based on a review of the claimant's residual functional capacity a nd the physical and mental demands of her past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e); Nimick

v. Secretary of Health and Human Svcs. , 887 F. 2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1989)

. See also Groeper v. Sullivan , 932 F.2d 1234, 123 8-39 (8th Cir. 1991) ("The ALJ must specifically set forth the claimant's limitations, both physical and me ntal, and determine how those limitations affect the claimant' s residual functional capacity.").

A claimant will be found to be not disabled if she retains th e residual functional capacity to perform:

"1. The actual functional demands and job duties of a particula r past relevant job; or 2. The functional demands and job duties of the occupation a s gen erally required by employers throughout the nationa l economy." Social Security Ruling ("S.S.R.") 82-61. See Martin v. Sullivan , 901 F.2d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1990) (approving o f this S.S.R. 82-61 test and holding that a claimant who cannot perform a particular pas t job may still be able to perform her past relevant work under the second part of the test).
To determine what a t ypical job description is in the "national economy",

an ALJ may take notice of job information in the Dictionary of Occupationa l Titles. Evans , 21 F.3d at 834. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1). The ALJ must be careful not to characterize the specific work a claimant performed too broadly by

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using a generic job description. See id. An ALJ cannot reject a claimant's subjective complaints of pai n solely because the objective medical evidence do es not fully support them. Nunn v. Heckler , 732 F.2d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 198 4). The ALJ must consider the claimant's prior work record as well as observations by third parties regarding (1) daily activities, (2) the duration , frequency, and intensity of pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage , effect iveness and side effects of medication; and (5) functiona l restric tions. Robinson v. Sullivan , 956 F.2d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 1992 ) (citation omitted). While pain may be disabling if it precludes a claiman t fromengaging in any form of substantial gainful activity, the mere fact that work ing may cause pain or discomfort does not mandate a finding o f disability. Cruse v. Bowen , 867 F.2d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 1989). The ALJ may discount the claimant's allegations of pain when he explicitly finds them inconsistent wit h daily activities, lack of treatment, demeanor, and objective medical evidence. Hutsell , 892 F.2d at 750 (citing Long v
. Bowen , 866 F.2d 1066, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989)). See Dixon v. Sullivan , 905 F.2d 237 , 238 (8th Cir. 1990) ("If an ALJ explicitly discredits a claimant's testimony and gives a good reason for doing so, we will normall y defer to that judgment.").

There is substan tial evidence on the record as a whole to uphold the decision of the ALJ, the Social Security Appeals Council, and the District Court to deny the petitioner benefits. The petitioner was employed as a teacher's aide at a s chool on the Pine Ridge reservation. In addition to her duties as an aide, she voluntarily participated in lifting heav y objects t o reduce the workload of the custodial staff. There is littl e evidence demonstrating that the petitioner experiences pain so debilitatin g that sh e cannot perform light work nor so constant that it will last a t least twelve months. Even assuming that she was living through sever e pain, the job of teacher's aide should be viewed along the lines of what this type of position entails nationwide.

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That she voluntarily performed duties beyond the scope of the position doe s not entitle her to receive benefits for injuries possibly caused by this extra assistance. As the ALJ correctly determined, the petitioner ca n still perform the tra ditional duties of a teacher's aide. Therefore, the decision of the lower tribunals and the District Court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.