SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4522-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RONALD B. GREENE, a/k/a/ 

RONALD B. GREEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted February 10, 2021 – Decided April 21, 2021

Before Judges Alvarez and Sumners.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 12-02-0302.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Dianne Glenn, Designated Counsel, and on 

the brief).

Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for

respondent (Ian C. Kennedy, Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief; Catherine A. Foddai, Legal 

Assistant, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Ronald B. Greene appeals the Law Division order denying him 

post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

To resolve the issues raised on appeal, we need not detail the trial evidence 

and procedural history, which are detailed in our unpublished decision State v. 

Greene, No. A-4674-13 (App. Div. Nov. 9, 2016), certif. denied, 229 N.J. 13 

(2017), affirming defendant's convictions for second-degree conspiracy to 

commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; third-degree distribution of 

a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and -5(b)(5); 

second-degree conspiracy to distribute CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 35-

5(a)(1), and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1); third-degree possession with intent to 

distribute an imitation drug, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11; first-degree armed robbery, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; two counts of second-degree possession of a weapon for an 

unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); two counts of second-degree unlawful 

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); fourth-degree possession of 

prohibited devices (defaced firearm), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d); two counts of 

second-degree possession of a firearm while committing a drug offense, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a); third-degree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-

3(b)(1); fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4); and seconddegree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). We did, 
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however, remand for the trial court to explain its reasons for imposing

consecutive sentences resulting in an aggregate thirty-five-year prison term with 

twenty-one years and three months without parole. Greene, slip op. at 7, 20. 

Instead, we focus on contentions before us. 

Defendant argues the PCR judge erred in barring claims because he found 

they were previously adjudicated on direct appeal or could have been raised on 

direct appeal. Rule 3:22-5 provides that "[a] prior adjudication upon the merits 

of any ground for relief is conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting 

in the conviction or in any post-conviction proceeding . . . or in any appeal taken 

from such proceedings." Defendant asserts his claims fall under the exception 

of Rule 3:22-4(a), which provides:

(1) that the ground for relief not previously asserted 

could not reasonably have been raised in any prior 

proceeding; or

(2) that enforcement of the bar to preclude claims, 

including one for ineffective assistance of counsel, 

would result in fundamental injustice; or

(3) that denial of relief would be contrary to a new rule 

of constitutional law under either the Constitution of 

the United States or the State of New Jersey.

He maintains his claims focus on the inattention of counsel and were not 

previously decided and could not have been raised on appeal, citing State v. 
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Damon, 286 N.J. Super. 492, 496 (App. Div. 1996). We disagree and affirm 

substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Robert M. Vinci's written 

decision. 

Before us, defendant renews his contention that trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a motion to suppress weapons 

purportedly found at the scene because the State did not establish a chain of 

custody. Judge Vinci decided that defendant should have but did not argue on 

direct appeal that the chain of custody of the weapons was not established. 

Nevertheless, the judge rejected defendant's argument on its merits 

because there was uncontroverted testimony placing the weapons at the scene. 

The judge reasoned there was "photograph[ic] [evidence] of the weapons at the 

scene, testimony of the [police] officer who took the photographs," and 

testimony by another police officer identifying "the handgun that defendant 

pointed at his head. . . ." He further explained there was testimony by an 

additional police officer "regarding his observation of defendant placing that 

handgun on the ground in the area of the parked vehicles." Additionally, officers 

testified that the weapons were collected from the "scene after they were 

photographed." Because there "was more than sufficient [evidence] to establish 

the admissibility of the weapons," the judge relied upon the principle espoused 
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in State v. Worlock, 117 NJ. 596, 625 (1990), that counsel cannot be ineffective 

for filing a motion that would have been unsuccessful. 

Defendant also contends that both trial and appellate counsel failed to 

raise crucial issues on his behalf, causing him to file two pro se motions, and 

pro se supplemental trial and appellate briefs. Defendant's motions sought to 

dismiss the indictment based upon the prosecutorial misconduct and insufficient

evidence, and to obtain an acquittal notwithstanding the verdict on the robbery 

and drug charges. The motions were denied. 

Defendant's pro se brief point headings argued: (1) "[p]rosecutorial 

misconduct during grand jury proceedings"; (2) "[t]he State failed to present 

evidence from which the jury could draw inference to conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that defendant conspired to commit robbery and possessed 

CDS [with] intent to distribute"(second alteration in original); (3) "the trial court 

failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of [first-degree robbery]"; (4) 

"[t]he State failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury could 

conclude first[-]degree [robbery] beyond a reasonable doubt"; and (5) "[t]here 

was insufficient evidence of the existence [of] heroin . . . to sustain a conviction"

on any of the CDS charges. Greene, slip op. at 8-9. We decided that the trial 

court properly denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because 
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"there was ample evidence whereby a reasonable jury could find defendant 

guilty of conspiracy to distribute heroin." Id. at 17. As for defendant's other 

appellate pro se arguments, this court applied Rule 2:11-3(e)(2), holding they 

"lack[ed] sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion." Id., at 20. 

Judge Vinci found defendant's contentions were not viable for PCR

merely because he alleged that counsel was deficient and that they could not 

have been raised before the trial and appellate courts. The judge held "defendant 

cannot establish that [trial and appellate counsels'] . . . failure to [raise issues] 

changed the result of, or undermined confidence in, the outcome of the 

proceedings because the arguments were, in fact, presented to those courts." 

Defendant contends trial counsel failed to properly object to hearsay 

testimony by several police officers and failed to obtain supplemental police 

reports regarding the handguns and defendant's purported actions. The judge 

determined the contentions were nothing more than bald allegations premised 

on questions concerning trial strategy. Defendant provided no proof "that . . . 

supplemental reports may have contained discrepancies or that additional or 

different cross-examination of the officers may have been fruitful." The judge 

also found there was no requirement that the State "provide written summaries 

of the officers' anticipated testimony prior to trial." 
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In denying PCR, the judge applied the well-settled two-prong test set forth 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), adopted by our Supreme 

Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), that a defendant must first show 

"that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment," Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687); and second, he must prove that he suffered 

prejudice due to counsel's deficient performance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 

691-92. The judge found that under State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 

170 (App. Div. 1999), some of defendant's contentions were nothing more than 

bald assertions lacking factual support, and thereby failing to establish a prima 

facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Our review of the record fully substantiates Judge Vinci's ruling that 

defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Hence, we cannot find he abused his discretion in denying defendant's 

request for an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 

(1992); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (holding an evidentiary hearing 

need only be conducted if there are disputed issues as to material facts regarding 

entitlement to PCR that cannot be resolved based on the existing record). 
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To the extent we have not specifically addressed defendant's arguments,

they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.