IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

ABDULKADIR GARGAR,

Appellant.

No. 82749-9-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SMITH, C.J. — Abdulkadir Gargar asserts that he was unconstitutionally

seized when an officer blocked his running car into its parking spot after 

observing him unconscious in the driver’s seat. Gargar was prohibited by a 

previous court order from possessing a firearm but upon a search of his person 

and car, officers discovered a firearm and ammunition. A jury found Gargar 

guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. Gargar appeals, 

contending the trial court erred by concluding that Gargar was constitutionally 

seized when his car was blocked in by a patrol vehicle.

Because Gargar was constitutionally seized pursuant to the community 

caretaking exception to warrantless seizures, we affirm.

FACTS

On the morning of June 23, 2020, Officer Daniel Brom was conducting a 

routine patrol in the parking lot of the Sunset Motel in Kent, Washington, known 

to be a high-crime area. Noticing Abdulkadir Gargar in a car, apparently asleep, 
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Officer Brom stopped his patrol vehicle to exit and check on Gargar. Gargar’s 

car was backed in to a parking spot on an incline, with its front angled down 

toward the parking lot. Almost immediately after exiting his patrol vehicle, Brom 

noticed that Gargar’s car was running—a fact captured by video footage from 

Brom’s body camera. Brom then reentered his vehicle and parked it in front of 

Gargar’s car, preventing it from exiting the parking space. Brom testified that he 

did so to prevent the car from rolling away if Gargar “had left the [car] in drive and 

[his foot was] just sitting on [his] brake,” citing a concern for the safety of the 

various pedestrians in the parking lot that morning and for Gargar himself. 

After repositioning his patrol vehicle, Brom approached Gargar’s car to 

determine if it was in park and to check on Gargar. Looking into the car, Brom 

noticed an open can of Mike’s Hard Lemonade in the center console and a halfconsumed but capped bottle of vodka in the passenger seat. Brom called for 

backup before waking Gargar, and Officer Melvin Partido responded. Officers

Partido and Brom positioned themselves on the passenger and driver sides of 

Gargar’s car, respectively. Brom then awoke Gargar by tapping on his window. 

After Gargar rolled his window down at Brom’s request, Brom asked him several 

questions concerning his residence at the motel and the ownership of his car. 

Roughly a minute or so into this interaction, Brom noticed a gun in 

Gargar’s car, tucked between the driver’s seat and center console by Gargar’s 

right leg. Brom immediately asked Gargar to place his hands on the steering 

wheel, then to unlock the car, and eventually to exit the car. Gargar followed 

Brom’s instructions without incident. Brom placed Gargar in handcuffs, told him 
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he was detained, and read him his Miranda1rights. Upon retrieving and running 

Gargar’s identification, Brom discovered that Gargar had an outstanding warrant 

and arrested him. 

Gargar was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm in the first 

degree. Before trial, Gargar brought a CrR 3.6 motion to suppress all evidence 

following the moment Brom blocked his car, and the State brought a CrR 3.5 

motion to admit Gargar’s prearrest statements. The court heard testimony from 

Brom and Partido about their interaction with Gargar. Following their testimony, 

the court heard arguments on both motions. The court granted the CrR 3.5 

motion in part but excluded any statements Gargar made after Brom read him his 

Miranda rights. 

The court denied Gargar’s CrR 3.6 motion to suppress. During argument 

on the CrR 3.6 motion, Gargar claimed that he was unlawfully seized when Brom 

initially repositioned his car in front of Gargar’s and that Brom had no reasonable 

basis to suspect Gargar was engaging in criminal activity at that point. 

Therefore, Gargar contended, all fruits of the search following the moment Brom 

blocked Gargar’s car should be suppressed. The State maintained that Brom 

performed a valid community caretaking function when he initially blocked 

Gargar’s car. In addition, the State asserted that Gargar was not seized until 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694

(1966).
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awoken, at which point his seizure was permissible under the Terry2 stop 

exception to warrantless seizures.

In denying Gargar’s CrR 3.6 motion, the court stated that an unconscious 

individual “wouldn’t objectively know of any of the facts surrounding the 

encounter at that time until they actually gain consciousness,” and concluded that 

Gargar was therefore not seized until he was awoken by Brom. Over the course 

of argument, the trial court also made clear its impression that Brom’s motivation 

for blocking Gargar’s car in its parking spot was “exceedingly credible.” Brom 

testified that he blocked Gargar’s car out of a concern that it could have rolled 

forward into the parking lot had Gargar fallen asleep with his foot on the brake 

pedal. These concerns were heightened because Gargar’s car was running and

could have been in drive. Further, the court opined that if Brom had indeed 

wanted to seize Gargar from the onset of this interaction, “[t]hen he would have 

parked his car in front of Mr. Gargar’s the first time, but he didn’t.”

Because the court denied Gargar’s CrR 3.6 motion, the firearm evidence 

Brom and Partido collected during their search of Gargar and his car was 

admitted at trial. A jury found Gargar guilty of first degree possession of a 

firearm as a convicted felon. He appeals.

ANALYSIS

Gargar asserts that the court erred in concluding that he was 

constitutionally seized when Brom parked his patrol vehicle in front of Gargar’s

car. We conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined that Brom 

 

2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
No. 82749-9-I/5

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was acting in his capacity as a community caretaker when he reparked his patrol 

vehicle. We further conclude that at the moment Brom noticed open containers 

of alcohol in Gargar’s car, his community caretaking check transformed into a 

Terry stop, as Brom then possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion of 

criminal activity. 

Standard of Review

We review findings of fact entered after a suppression hearing using the 

substantial evidence standard to determine if they support the trial court’s 

conclusions of law.3 State v. Russell, 180 Wn.2d 860, 866, 330 P.3d 151 (2014). 

“Evidence is substantial when it is enough ‘to persuade a fair-minded person of 

the truth of stated premise.’ ” Russell, 180 Wn.2d at 866-67 (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 249, 207 P.3d 1038 

(2009)). Conclusions of law will be reviewed de novo. State v. Boisselle, 194 

Wn.2d 1, 14, 448 P.3d 19 (2019). Any unchallenged findings of fact are verities 

on appeal. State v. Johnson, 8 Wn. App. 2d 728, 737, 440 P.3d 1032 (2019). 

Exceptions to Warrantless Searches and Seizures

The Washington Constitution states: “No person shall be disturbed in his 

private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” Art. I, § 7. “This 

 

3

It should be noted that under CrR 3.6, the superior court “shall enter 

written findings of fact and conclusions of law” for appellate review if an 

evidentiary hearing is conducted. No such findings were entered. Failure to

enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law is error, but it is a harmless 

error “if the court’s oral findings are sufficient to allow appellate review.” State v. 

Miller, 92 Wn. App. 693, 703, 964 P.2d 1196 (1998). The court’s oral rulings are 

sufficient for appellate review. Additionally, Gargar did not raise any issue 

concerning the trial court’s lack of written findings and conclusions on appeal.
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provision protects ‘those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, 

and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a 

warrant.’ ” State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 694-95, 92 P.3d 202 (2004) (quoting

State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)). The United States 

Constitution also protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. Therefore, “if a police officer’s conduct or show of authority, 

objectively viewed, rises to the level of a seizure,” it must be lawfully justified 

under these constitutional protections. State v. Meredith, 1 Wn.3d 262, 590-91, 

525 P.3d 584 (2023) (quoting State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 576, 62 P.3d 489 

(2003)). Exceptions to these provisions are “ ‘narrowly and jealous[l]y drawn.’ ” 

State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 894, 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (quoting State v. 

Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 147, 720 P.2d 436 (1986)).

Two exceptions to the warrant requirement relevant in this case are Terry

investigative stops and instances in which police serve their role as community 

caretakers. State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 384-85, 5 P.3d 668 (2000).

The Community Caretaking Exception

Gargar claims that “the court erred in finding the officers were justified in 

blocking in [his vehicle] on the basis of public safety” and alleges that Brom’s 

invocation of the community caretaking exception to justify blocking Gargar’s car 

in was pretextual. We conclude that Brom did not act pretextually when he 

blocked Gargar’s car in but instead acted out of concern for the safety of Gargar 

and the pedestrians present in the parking lot. We further conclude that when 
No. 82749-9-I/7

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Brom initially blocked Gargar’s car, any seizure that may have occurred was 

constitutionally permissible. 

1. Pretext

As a threshold matter, we address Gargar’s assertion that any reliance on 

community caretaking here was pretextual. Gargar contends that the community 

caretaking exception does not apply in this case because Brom “was motivated, 

at least in part, by a desire to investigate possible criminal activity” when he 

initially reparked his patrol vehicle to block Gargar’s car. In other words, Gargar 

alleges that Brom used his role as a community caretaker pretextually. 

A pretextual search occurs when officers rely on some legal authorization 

as a mere pretense “ ‘to dispense with [a] warrant when the true reason for the 

seizure is not exempt from the warrant requirement.’ ” Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d at 15

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 358, 979 P.2d 

833 (1999)). “The community caretaking function exception may not be used as 

a pretext for a criminal investigation.” Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 394. “[W]hen 

determining whether a given search is pretextual, ‘the court should consider the 

totality of the circumstances, including both the subjective intent of the officer as 

well as the objective reasonableness of the officer's behavior.’ ” Boisselle, 194 

Wn.2d at 15 (quoting Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 359). It is imperative that “[t]he 

community caretaking function exception should be cautiously applied because 

of its potential for abuse.” Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 395.

Brom’s blocking of Gargar’s car was not pretextual. The trial court found 

that when Brom noticed Gargar’s car was running, “[h]e couldn’t tell or hear that 
No. 82749-9-I/8

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the car was on when he was driving.”4 It also found that Brom “initially park[ed] 

and he did not block the car at all. He initially parks, gets out and realizes the car 

is on, realizes that the person in the driver’s seat appears to be unconscious or 

asleep,” and subsequently “moves his [vehicle] for safety purposes.” Footage 

from Brom’s body camera admitted at the CrR 3.6 hearing confirms this, showing

that he only spent twelve seconds outside of his vehicle before realizing Gargar’s 

car was running. Brom’s body camera footage supports that he only saw the 

open containers in Gargar’s car after he reparked his patrol vehicle and 

subsequently approached Gargar’s car to see whether it was in park or not. 

Relying on these facts, we conclude that nothing about Brom’s interaction with 

Gargar would suggest that his reparking of his patrol vehicle was pretextual. His 

intent was purely to render aid. 

Gargar relies on the idea that Brom was patrolling a high-crime area when 

he first encountered Gargar to assert that he must have been acting with at least 

some intent to conduct a criminal investigation. This fact, however, is not itself 

determinative that no pretext existed—we must look to the totality of the 

 

4 This statement, like others relied on in this opinion, is arguably not a 

finding of fact because it was made by the court during argument, not after. But 

we nevertheless treat it as a finding for several reasons. First, it is clear from the 

tenor of discussion during and after argument on the CrR 3.5 and CrR 3.6 

hearings that the court held a single opinion throughout, unchanged by counsel. 

Second, at the beginning of its official oral findings on the CrR 3.6 motion, the 

court says “I am going to deny, as I think everyone figured out through the 

argument, the motion to suppress.” We treat this as incorporating the court’s 

statements during argument into its findings. Finally, Gargar does not assign 

error to any findings of fact. They are therefore treated as verities but we can 

also conclude that this failure also entitles us to assume that Gargar’s arguments 

are purely legal in nature.
No. 82749-9-I/9

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circumstances to determine whether the actual purpose of Brom’s initial contact 

with Gargar arose out of a desire to investigate criminal activity. Brom’s 

patrolling of a high-crime area was certainly the reason Brom was in a position to 

notice Gargar. But Gargar’s car was running, and Gargar was apparently asleep 

in the driver’s seat. The trial court found Brom’s motivation to repark

“exceedingly credible.” Brom testified his motivation was solely to prevent 

Gargar’s car from rolling out of its parking spot. The question here is whether 

Brom was acting pretextually when he blocked in Gargar’s car. We conclude that 

Brom’s patrolling of a high-crime area does not preempt the court’s finding that 

his actions were not pretextual.

2. Community Caretaking Analysis

Having concluded that Brom did not act pretextually, we next determine 

whether his blocking in of Gargar’s car was justified by the community caretaking 

exception to the warrant requirement. 

A seizure by an officer without a warrant is per se unreasonable. Kinzy, 

141 Wn.2d at 394. An exception, however, arises “when police are serving in 

their role as community caretakers.” Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 394. The community 

caretaking function exception was borne out of a recognition that “law

enforcement officers are ‘jacks of all trades’ and frequently engage in community 

caretaking functions that are unrelated to the detection and investigation of 

crime.” Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d at 10. Such functions include “ ‘delivering 

emergency messages, giving directions, searching for lost children, assisting 

stranded motorists, and administering first aid.’ ” Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d at 10
No. 82749-9-I/10

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(quoting Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 387). The community caretaking function is

categorized into “situations involving . . . emergency aid or routine checks on 

health and safety.” Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 386. Additionally, “[b]oth situations may 

require police officers to render aid or assistance.” Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 386. 

Here, Brom was employing the emergency aid function of his community 

caretaking role. The emergency aid function “ ‘arises from a police officer’s 

community caretaking responsibility to come to the aid of persons believed to be 

in danger of death or physical harm.’ ” Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d at 12 (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 396 n.39). Further, “the 

emergency aid function involves circumstances of greater urgency and searches 

resulting in greater intrusion” than routine checks on health and safety. Kinzy, 

141 Wn.2d at 386. In this case, the court found it credible that Brom acted out of 

a concern that either Gargar or one of the pedestrians in the parking lot faced 

imminent harm had Gargar’s car been in drive.

Washington has developed several alternative methods to analyze 

whether the emergency aid function of the community caretaking exception is 

justified, so the Boisselle court found it necessary to synthesize the competing 

formulations. Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d at 14. Additionally, courts must “ ‘cautiously 

apply the community caretaking function exception because of a real risk of 

abuse in allowing even well-intentioned stops to assist.’ ” State v. Moore, 129 

Wn. App. 870, 879, 120 P.3d 635 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 750, 64 P.3d 594 (2003)). The 

emergency aid function of the community caretaking exception applies when: 
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(1) the officer subjectively believed that an emergency existed 

requiring that he or she provide immediate assistance to protect or 

preserve life or property, or to prevent serious injury, (2) a 

reasonable person in the same situation would similarly believe that 

there was a need for assistance, and (3) there was a reasonable 

basis to associate the need for assistance with the place searched.

Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d at 14.

Additionally, “[i]f a warrantless search falls within the emergency aid 

function, a court resumes its analysis and weighs the public’s interest against 

that of the citizen’s.” Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d at 12. That weighing of interests 

involves balancing “a citizen’s privacy interest in freedom from police intrusion 

against the public’s interest in having police perform a ‘community caretaking 

function.’ ” Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d at 12 (quoting Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 394). 

Regarding the first Boisselle factor, we conclude, relying on the trial 

court’s determinations, that Brom subjectively believed that Gargar and the 

surrounding pedestrians required immediate assistance. The trial court found 

that it is “entirely consistent with [Officer Brom] being concerned about the safety 

of Mr. Gargar and others that he moves his car after he gets out and realizes that 

the car was on.” The court also found that Gargar was unconscious until Brom 

woke him up: “What . . . is peculiar or suspicious is to see someone slumped with 

their head at an odd angle. That is only consistent with someone that is either 

passed out or asleep.” 

Brom testified that he blocked the car “for safety of others,” and that 

“people were coming going [sic] down that hill all the time and going around our 

car.” On the basis of this testimony, the court concluded that Brom had a 

reasonable belief that Gargar and the surrounding pedestrians in the parking lot 
No. 82749-9-I/12

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required immediate assistance. Brom was worried that Gargar had fallen asleep 

or unconscious while his car was still in drive, and that his foot was merely 

resting on the brake. Brom’s actions were informed by his experience dealing 

with “vehicles that people had left the vehicle in drive and are just sitting on their 

brake,” and he testified that he acted to mitigate the “possibility of that person 

letting up off the brake in a vehicle driving forward.” Thus, Brom subjectively 

believed that immediate assistance would be required to ensure the safety of 

those around him. 

Regarding the second Boisselle factor, we conclude that a reasonable 

person in Brom’s position would believe there was a need for assistance. The 

trial court concluded that the facts of the case “are consistent with Officer Brom in 

particular being concerned for both Mr. Gargar’s safety and the safety of other 

people in the parking lot that there’s someone who is unconscious behind the 

steering well [sic] of a car that is on.” The court further held that an unconscious 

individual “behind the driver’s seat of a car that is on is a public safety threat.” 

We agree that the potential harm that a rolling car could cause in the parking lot 

would lead a reasonable person in Brom’s position to believe that Gargar 

required assistance.

Regarding the third Boisselle factor, we conclude that Brom had reason to 

associate the things Gargar claims he seized—Gargar and his car—with a need 

for assistance. It is important to note that while the third Boisselle factor only 

explicitly mentions “searches,” the community caretaking function has long 

excused both unwarranted searches and seizures. See Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 386
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(holding that “the community caretaking function exception [encompasses] . . . 

the ‘search and seizure’ of automobiles”). Since Brom’s primary concern when 

he reparked his patrol vehicle was to prevent Gargar’s car from rolling forward 

had it been in drive, he reasonably associated a need for assistance with Gargar 

and his car. Brom reasonably exercised the emergency aid function of the 

community caretaking exception. 

Finally, having concluded that the Boisselle emergency aid factors have 

been met, we turn to whether the public’s interest in Officer Brom performing a 

community caretaking check on Gargar outweighs Gargar’s own interest in 

freedom from police intrusion. We conclude that it does. On the one hand, the 

public possessed a significant interest in the safety of the pedestrians that were 

present in the Sunset Motel’s parking lot, the property located there, as well as 

Gargar’s own safety. On the other hand, while Gargar certainly possesses an 

interest in freedom from police interference, the potential safety threat he posed 

to the public means that this interest cannot overcome the public’s own interest in 

Brom performing a community caretaking function. This is particularly true 

because Gargar was asleep and did not even realize Brom had blocked his car in 

until Brom woke him up.

Therefore, even if we were to conclude that a seizure occurred when 

Brom initially parked his patrol vehicle in front of Gargar’s car, that seizure would 
No. 82749-9-I/14

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be permissible and not pretextual pursuant to Brom’s role as a community 

caretaker.5

The Terry Stop Exception

Gargar also asserts that Brom did not have a reasonable suspicion that he 

was engaging in criminal activity under the Terry stop exception to warrantless 

searches. We conclude that Gargar’s interaction with Brom began as a 

community caretaking function and shifted into a Terry investigative stop at the 

moment Brom noticed open alcohol containers in Gargar’s running vehicle.

Thus, throughout their interaction, an exception to the warrant requirement 

existed.

Terry stops are an exception to the warrant requirement. Johnson, 8 Wn.

App. 2d at 746. A Terry stop is permissible if an officer can articulate a 

reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts and the totality of the 

circumstances, that the person stopped has been or is about to be involved in 

criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. An analysis of the totality of the 

circumstances includes factors such as “the detaining officer’s experience and 

training, the location of the investigatory detention, and the suspect’s conduct.” 

Johnson, 8 Wn. App. at 747. Washington has incorporated Terry stops as an 

 

5 Gargar claims he was seized from the moment Officer Brom first 

reparked his vehicle in front of Gargar’s car. The State disagrees, asserting that 

Gargar could not be seized because he was asleep, and therefore unable to feel 

unfree to leave. We do not reach whether a seizure occurred when Gargar was 

asleep, because any seizure would be allowable due to the community 

caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.
No. 82749-9-I/15

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exception to the warrant requirement within our state jurisprudence. Kinzy, 141 

Wn.2d at 384-85. 

Here, Brom looked into Gargar’s car and saw two open containers of 

alcohol. Given that Gargar asleep in the driver’s seat of a running car, Brom had 

a reasonable articulable suspicion that Gargar had physical control over his car

while under the influence, in violation of RCW 46.61.504(1)(c). 

We affirm.

WE CONCUR: