N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT JUAN SOLIS-DIAZ, Plaintiff - Appe lle e , v. SC OTT TOM PKINS, Polic e Offic e r, La s Ve ga s M e tropolita

n Polic e De pa

rtm e nt, De fe nda

nt - Appe lla

nt, And LAS VEGAS M ETR OPOLITAN POLIC E DEPAR TM ENT, De fe nda

nt. No. 14-16402 D.C . No. 2:12-c v-00619-JADGW F
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of Ne v a da Je nnife r A. Dorse y , Distric t Judge , Pre s iding Argue d a nd Subm itte d M ay

10, 2016 San Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : NOONAN, W

ARD LAW , a

nd PAEZ, C irc uit Judge s. 

# FIL ED JUL 06 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S

. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3.La s Ve ga s M e tropolita n Polic e De pa

rtm e nt offic e r Sc ott Tom

pkins a p pe a ls the d istric t c o urt’ s de nia l of his m otion for sum m ary judgm e nt in this 42 U.S.C
. § 1983 a c tion brought by

Jua n Solis-Diaz . W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C
. § 1291, a nd we a ffirm
. W e re vie w a distric t c ourt’ s de nia l of sum m a ry judgm e nt de novo, Espinosa
v . C ity & C nty
. of S.F. , 598 F.3d 528, 532 (9th C i r. 2010), vie w ing the fa c ts a nd

“ draw[ing] re a sona

b le infe re nc e s” in the light m ost fa vora ble to the non-m oving pa rty “ to the e xte nt supporta

b le by the re c ord,” S

c o tt v . Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378, 381 n.8 (2007) (e m

pha sis om itte d). 1. Exc e ssive forc e c l a im s a re gove rne d by

the Fourth Am e ndm e nt’ s

“ obje c tive re a sona

ble ne ss sta

nda rd,” whic h re quire s a

“ c are ful ba la

nc ing of the
nature and qua lity

of the intrusion on the

individual’ s Fourth Am e ndm e nt inte re sts
a ga inst thec o unte rva iling gove rnm e nta l inte re sts a t sta ke .” Graham v

. C

onnor , 490 U.S. 386, 388, 396 (1989) (inte rna l quota tion m arks om itte d). “ An offic e r’ s
use of de adly forc e is re a sona ble only if ‘ t he offic e r ha s proba

ble c a use to be lie ve that the suspe c t pose s a

signific ant thre a t of de a th or se rious phy sic a l injury to the offic e r or othe rs.’ ” Sc o t t v . He nric h , 39 F.3d 912, 914 (9th C ir. 1994) (quoting Te nne sse e v . Garne r , 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985)). W e m u st judge the re a sona

ble ne ss of
a pa rtic ula r use of forc e “ from

the pe rspe c t ive of a

re a s ona b le offic e r on the 2sc e n e ,” c are fully c onside ring “ the fa c ts a

n d c irc um sta

nc e s of e a c h pa

rtic ula r c a se , inc l uding these v e rity

of the c rim e a t issue , whe the r the suspe c t pose [d] an im m e diate thre a t to the sa fe ty of the offic e rs or othe rs, a nd whe the r he [wa ] s
a c tive ly re sisting a

rre st or a tte m pting to e v a d e arre st by flight.” Graham , 490 U.S.
a t 396. “ The c a l c ulus of re a sona ble ne s s m ust e m b ody a llowa nc e for the fa c t tha

t polic e offic e rs a

re ofte n forc e d to m ake split-se c o nd judgm e nts— in c irc um sta nc e s that are te nse , unc e rta in, a

nd ra pidly e volving— a

b out the am ount of forc e tha t is
ne c e ssa ry in a pa rtic ula r situa tion.” Id. at 396–97. Ge ne ra lly , “ [t] he m e re fa c t tha t
a suspe c t posse sse s a

we a pon doe s not justify

de a dly forc e , ” though “ thre a te ning
an offic e r with a

we a pon doe s . . . .” Hay e

s v . C nty . of San Die

go , 736 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th C ir. 2013) (inte rna l quota tion m arks om itte d). Vie wing the e vide nc e in the light m o st fa vora b le to Solis-Dia

z , Solis-Diaz
wa s not c om

m itting a ny c rim e a t the tim e of the inc ide nt, nor wa s he a tte m pting to
e va de arre st. In a d d ition, the re is a ge nuine dispute of fa c t a s to whe the r it wa s obje c tive ly

re a sona b l e for Tom

pkins to be l ie ve Solis-Diaz pose d a n im m e diate thre a t to him se lf or othe rs, in pa rt be c a use it is unc l e ar whe the r Solis-Dia z e ve r pointe d his we a

pon a t Tom p kins. W hile Solis-Diaz a gre e d tha t his gun ra ise d “ slightly ” whe n he kne lt to look out from be ne a th his ga

ra g e door, Tom

pkins sta te d tha t whe n he sa

w Solis-Diaz 3c rouc h ing down Solis-Dia z wa s “ not point[ing] ” his rifle a t Tom p kins. Inste a d, Tom pkins sta te d tha t he c ould se e the profile of Solis-Diaz ’ s we a pon. Solis-Dia

z sta te d tha t whe n he stood up, he

he ld his gun pointing “ stra ight down” in his right ha nd. W hile Solis-Diaz initia lly

re s ponde d to Tom

pkins’ s c om

m and to drop his
we a pon with profa

nity , he sta

te d tha t he ne ve rthe l e ss prom

ptly a tte m p te d to obe y the c om m and by lifting his le ft ha

nd in the a ir pa lm

out, a nd le aning ove r to pla c e the g un on the ground with his right ha n d. De spite this a

ppa re nt e ffort to
surre nde r, Tom

pkins ope ne d fire , shooting Solis-Dia z first in theha

nd a nd the n in the u ppe r le ft buttoc k a s Solis-Dia z a tte m pte d to e sc a

pe Tom pkins’ s gunfire
. B e c a use Solis-Diaz ’ s m e re posse s sion of a n a ssa ult rifle tha

t he did not point
a t Tom pkins would ha

ve be e n insuffic ie nt re a son for Tom pkins to utiliz e de a dly forc e , se e id. a t

1233–34, wec annot c onc lude ba s e d on the a bove fa c ts tha

t Tom pkins’ s use of de a dly

forc e wa s obje c t ive ly re a sona ble a s a m a tte r of la

w. In a ddition, e ve n a ssum ing it we re re a sona ble to be lie ve Solis-Diaz pose d a thre a t to Tom

pkins, it is unc le ar whe the r it wa s obje c tive ly re a sona b le for Tom pkins to c ontinue firing a

t Solis-Dia

z a fte r he turne d to fle e . While it is true that onc e a de a dly thre a t ha s be e n e sta

blishe d, “ offic e rs ne e d not stop shooting until thethre a t ha s e nde d,” P lumhoff v . Ric k ard , 134 S. C t. 2012, 2022 (2014), in this c a s e , a jury

c ould find tha

t any pe rc e ive d thre a t

pose d by Solis-Diaz e n de d a s 4soon a s he (1) stood up a nd he ld his fire arm

in one ha nd pointe d stra ight down towa rd the ground; (2) ra ise d one ha nd in surre nde r while a tte m pting to se t down his gun with the

othe r; or (3) ra ise d

both ha nds a n d turne d to fle e in a

n e ffort to
e sc a pe Tom pkins’ s gunfire
. Whe the r Tom pkins wa s re a sona

ble in c o ntinuing to fire a fte r the se a tte m

p ts by Solis-Diaz to surre n de r is thus a que stion of fa c t be st le ft to a jury
. Se e Santos v . Gate

s , 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th C ir. 2002) (holding tha t
sum m ary judgm e nt in e xc e s sive forc e c a s e s should begrante d spa ringly ). 2. Qua lifie d im

m un ity prote c ts gove rnm e nt offic ia ls from lia bility whe n the i r c o nduc t doe s not viola te c le arly e sta b lishe d c onstitutiona

l or sta t utory rights. Hope v . Pe lze r , 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). The qua lifie d im

m unity inquiry proc e e ds in two pa

rts: (1) “ whe the r the fa c ts tha t a pla i ntiff ha s a lle ge d . . . or shown . . . m ake out a

viola tion of a c onstitutiona

l right;” and (2) “ whe the r the right a t issue wa s ‘ c le arly

e sta blishe d’ a t the tim e of de fe nda nt’ s a lle ge d
m isc o nduc t.” Pe arson v . C a llahan , 129 S. C t. 808, 815–16 (2009). B e c a use we find tha

t m a te ria l issue s of fa c t e xist with re ga rd to whe the r Tom pkins’ s use of de a dly

forc e viola

te d Solis-Diaz ’ s Fourth Am e ndm e nt rights,
and the se “ unre solve d issue s of fa c t a re a lso m a te ria l to a

prope r de te rm ination of the re a sona

ble n e ss of [Tom

pkins’ s] be lie f in the le ga lity of [his] a c tions,” Espinosa , 598 F.3d a

t 532, we c annot de te rm ine whe t he r Solis-Dia z ’ s rights we re 5c le arly

e sta blishe d. 1 Tom

pkins is there fore not e n title d to sum m ary judgm e nt on the b a sis of qua lifie d im

m unity
. Pe arson , 129 S. C t. at 815–16. AFFIRM E D.

1 For e xam

p le , if a jury we re to de te rm ine tha

t Solis-Dia

z obje c tive ly pre s e nte d no thre a t to Offic e r Tom pkins, a nd Offic e r Tom

pkins wa s obje c tive ly unre a s ona

ble in c o nc l uding othe rwise , shooting a t Solis-Dia

z nine tim e s a

nd wounding him

on his ha n d an d buttoc k would viola

te c le arly e sta blishe d la w. Se e , e .g. , C urnow v . Ridge c re

st Polic e , 952 F.2d 321, 324–25 (9th C ir. 1991). This c a se thus diffe rs from C

.V. v . C ity of Anahe im , No. 14-55760 (9th C i r. M ay 25, 2016), be c a

use he re a jury c ould find tha

t Solis-Dia

z ha d a lre a dy

droppe d his gun and ra ise d

his ha nds whe n Offic e r Tom

pkins fire d, a

nd thus pre se nte d no thre a t. M ore o ve r, the only

jury to ha ve he ard the two a c c ounts pre se nte d he re a c quitte d Solis-Diaz of ha

v ing a s sa ulte d Offic e r Tom

pkins, a lbe it unde r a

stric te r sta

nda rd of proof. 6