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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 16a0092p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

BROOKE TASKILA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 15-2224 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. 

No. 2:14-cv-12674—Nancy G. Edmunds, District Judge. 

Decided and Filed: April 15, 2016 

Before: SUTTON and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; OLIVER, District Judge.*

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ON BRIEF: Joshua L. Moore, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. John J. Engel, SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Boston, Massachusetts, for Appellee. 

_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

 SUTTON, Circuit Judge. An administrative law judge denied Brooke Taskila’s request 

for disability benefits after the ALJ determined that she could perform a significant number of 

jobs in the national economy. The district court held that substantial evidence supports this 

decision, and so do we. 

 *

The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., Chief United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, 

sitting by designation. 

>
No. 15-2224 Taskila v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 2 

 Taskila, now thirty-seven, has faced a number of health issues. She was involved in 

several serious car accidents, crashing into a ditch in 1996, a tree in 2006, and a deer in 2010. 

On top of that, she underwent successful treatment in 2011 for a mass in her breast and sought 

treatment for knee pain not long after. All of this has taken a toll on her health. Taken together, 

she claims, the injuries have led to unremitting pain in her neck and back, to anxiety and 

depression, to memory problems, to incontinence, to carpal tunnel syndrome, to an inability to 

work. 

 Taskila sought Social Security disability insurance and supplemental security income. 

An initial disability examiner denied her applications. After a hearing, an ALJ did the same. 

The appeals council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the 

Commissioner. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 & n.2 (2000). The district court rejected 

Taskila’s petition for review of the ALJ’s decision. 

 The federal courts review the Commissioner’s factual findings for substantial evidence 

and give fresh review to its legal interpretations. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 

876 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 811 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir. 2016). 

 To establish eligibility for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, Taskila had to 

show that she could not “engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to a long-lasting 

“impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); see Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 

212, 217 (2002). The Social Security Administration processes applications for relief by asking 

five questions: (1) Does the claimant show she is not engaged in “substantial gainful activity”? 

(2) Does the claimant have a severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet any one of the 

items on a “list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled”? (4) Can the 

claimant perform her past jobs? (5) Can the claimant perform other jobs that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy? Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24–25 (2003); see 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

Taskila made it through the first four inquiries but failed the fifth. The case comes down 

to whether Taskila could perform “any . . . kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the 

national economy” that is consistent with Taskila’s “age, education, and work experience.” 
No. 15-2224 Taskila v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 3 

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). “[W]ork which exists in the national economy,” the 

statute clarifies, “means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where 

[Taskila] lives or in several regions of the country.” Id.

 Whether a claimant’s limitations allow her to perform other work is “left to the trial 

judge’s common sense in weighing the statutory language as applied to a particular claimant’s 

factual situation.” Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 275 (6th Cir. 1988). Among the criteria that 

may inform this determination are the extent of a “claimant’s disability; the reliability of the 

vocational expert’s testimony; the reliability of the claimant’s testimony; the distance claimant is 

capable of travelling to engage in the assigned work; the isolated nature of the jobs; [and] the 

types and availability of such work.” Id. 

 Taskila testified that she could not complete several basic tasks of daily living, relying 

instead on her family and roommate to handle them. She did little during the day, she said, had 

practically no social life or hobbies, and had fallen behind in her school work at the University of 

Michigan, where she is a student. Documentary evidence, such as medical reports, supported the 

existence of some ongoing medical limitations. But she relied primarily on her own testimony to 

show what she could and could not do each day. 

The ALJ did not find her testimony credible with respect to these limitations in daily 

activity based on the following evidence. In 2011, Taskila told her doctor she could perform 

daily activities and walk without difficulty for forty-five minutes. An evaluator determined 

around the same time that Taskila was “generally functioning pretty well.” R. 9-2 at 20. The 

evaluator noted that Taskila maintained a B average in University of Michigan coursework, 

“g[ot] together” with “friends,” and had several interests. R. 9-7 at 71. “[T]he claimant’s 

allegations,” the ALJ concluded, “are out of proportion with the evidence presented in this case.” 

R. 9-2 at 22. That evidence gave “a physical basis for her complaints of pain” and supported 

“some functional limitations” but showed Taskila could “perform[] a modified range of 

sedentary, unskilled work.” Id.

Based on his assessment of Taskila’s medical limitations and remaining capacity to work, 

the ALJ relied on a vocational expert’s testimony to determine the kinds of jobs that Taskila 
No. 15-2224 Taskila v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 4 

could perform. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(e), 416.966(e). The expert testified that someone 

with Taskila’s limitations could do at least two jobs: “callout operator” and “system surveillance 

monitor.” R. 9-2 at 65. Those two jobs, he concluded, accounted for 200 positions in Michigan, 

where Taskila was living, and 6000 nationally. The ALJ found this testimony credible and 

determined that, all things considered, Taskila could perform “work that exists in significant 

numbers in the national economy.” Id. at 24. 

Substantial evidence review comes to this: Did the ALJ use “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”? Richardson v. Perales, 402 

U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation omitted). The above analysis satisfies this modest standard, one 

that puts a premium on whether the ALJ asked the right questions and provided reasonable 

answers, not on whether we would have given the same answers. Taskila in short did not meet 

her burden of establishing eligibility for disability benefits. 

Taskila responds that 6000 jobs nationwide does not amount to “significant numbers” of 

available jobs. But caselaw, here and elsewhere, cuts the other way. Six thousand jobs in the 

United States fits comfortably within what this court and others have deemed “significant.” See, 

e.g., Nejat v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 F. App’x 574, 579 (6th Cir. 2009) (2000 jobs); Liskowitz 

v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases to conclude “it appears to be wellestablished that 1,000 jobs is a significant number”); Jenkins v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 1083, 1087 (8th 

Cir. 1988) (500 jobs); Barker v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 882 F.2d 1474, 1479 (9th Cir. 

1989) (1266 jobs). 

The deeper flaw in this argument is that it tries to transform the significant-numbers 

inquiry from a fact question reviewed for substantial evidence into a legal question reviewed as a 

matter of statutory interpretation. See Smith, 482 F.3d at 876. The evolution of the Social 

Security Act shows why it is a fact question. 

Ever since Congress first provided for disability benefits in 1956, it has made them 

available only to those who are unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to an 

“impairment.” Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, sec. 103(a), 

§ 223(c)(2), 70 Stat. 807, 815. Taking their cues from an opinion by Judge Friendly, courts at 
No. 15-2224 Taskila v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 5 

first generally interpreted this language to require that, if a claimant showed he could not do his 

past job, he was disabled unless the government proved he “could in fact obtain substantial 

gainful employment” near home. Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916, 921 (2d Cir. 1960) 

(emphasis added); see also Hall v. Flemming, 289 F.2d 290, 291 (6th Cir. 1961). This claimantspecific inquiry triggered substantial evidence review. See Hall v. Flemming, 289 F.2d at 291; 

Kerner, 283 F.2d at 921. 

Congress rejected this approach—in part. It clarified that “substantial gainful 

employment” refers to “work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where [the 

claimant] lives or in several regions of the country,” “regardless of whether such work exists in 

the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or 

whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. 

L. No. 90-248, sec. 158(b), § 223(d)(2)(A), 81 Stat. 821, 868 (1968) (emphasis added); see

Liskowitz, 559 F.3d at 742 n.5. This language survives today. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 

1382c(a)(3)(B). “Disability insurance,” we have since explained, “is not available to fund [a 

claimant’s] decision to live far from his job.” Harmon v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 289, 292 (6th Cir. 

1999) (quotation omitted). 

While the frame of reference has changed, the standard of review has not. The current 

inquiry—focused on nationwide jobs, not just jobs in the claimant’s locale—is no less claimantspecific than the one Judge Friendly adopted. Whether a claimant can perform “significant 

numbers” of jobs nationally is merely part of the overall question of whether she can “engage in 

any substantial gainful activity” despite her limitations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(a)(3). It 

is impossible to say she can—and thus impossible to determine the number of jobs that is 

“significant” enough—without taking into account her individual circumstances. 

Consider three claimants, each with medical limitations that prevent her from doing 

anything other than sedentary work. Consider also that, for the second, her limitations prevent 

her from driving or working at night and that, for the third, her limitations prevent her from 

working more than part-time. An ALJ must consider these “intrinsic” effects because they 

prevent the claimant from accessing certain jobs in the local or national economy. Harmon, 

168 F.3d at 292; see also Lopez Diaz v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 585 F.2d 1137, 1140–
No. 15-2224 Taskila v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 6 

42 (1st Cir. 1978). Whereas one of these hypothetical individuals may be able to fill any 

sedentary job, the second may need a day-shift sedentary job, and the third may need two parttime sedentary jobs, each with flexible hours. What is “significant” enough to show each of 

these claimants can still work varies widely and thus will depend on individual circumstances. 

That an ALJ must tailor the determination of what is significant to the facts of each 

claimant’s case is why we have said that ALJs “should consider many criteria in determining 

whether work exists in significant numbers.” Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d at 275. It is why we have 

said “we cannot set forth one special number which is to be the boundary between a ‘significant 

number’ and an insignificant number.” Id. And it is why substantial evidence review applies. 

See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under that standard, the ALJ did not commit a reversible 

error. For substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Taskila could perform at least two 

jobs that are meaningfully available locally (200 jobs) and nationally (6000). 

Taskila’s other arguments fare no better. Mackins v. Astrue, a district court case, does 

little for her cause. 655 F. Supp. 2d 770 (W.D. Ky. 2009). Mackins held that 60,000 jobs 

nationally did not constitute significant numbers. Id. at 773. It did so, however, because it 

doubted that the occupation for which the ALJ thought the claimant was qualified was consistent 

with the claimant’s functional limitations. Id. at 778; cf. Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 390 

(9th Cir. 2012). Mackins also doubted whether, in view of changes in the economy, 60,000 jobs 

even existed within the identified occupation. 655 F. Supp. 2d at 773; cf. Browning v. Colvin, 

766 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2014). Neither criticism applies here, and Taskila does not argue 

otherwise. 

Taskila also contends that the ALJ violated the agency’s procedures. He did not. The 

Social Security Administration publishes an “internal manual[]” for its employees, the Program 

Operations Manual System (often called POMS). Ferriell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 614 F.3d 611, 

618 n.4 (6th Cir. 2010). It instructs officials to cite “three occupations” that a claimant can 

perform to support a finding that the claimant is not disabled. POMS § DI 25025.030, Appellate 

R. 12-2 at 2. The ALJ in this case pointed to two. The manual, however, allows ALJs to “cite 

fewer than three occupations when it is clear that jobs exist in significant numbers within fewer 
No. 15-2224 Taskila v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 7 

than three occupation(s).” Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(b), 416.966(b). That is just what 

the ALJ did.

 For these reasons, we affirm.