In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 99-2638 & 99-2640

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DEBORAH WALTON

and KENNETH MARSALIS,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 CR 320--John F. Grady, Judge.

Argued April 12, 2000--Decided June 14, 2000

 Before CUDAHY, COFFEY and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

 COFFEY, Circuit Judge. On June 4, 1998,

Defendants-Appellants Deborah Walton ("Walton")

and Kenneth Marsalis ("Marsalis") were indicted

and charged in a two count indictment, charging

each of them with conspiring to carry and take

away and carrying and taking away, with intent to

steal, approximately $90,500.00 from a Citibank

branch’s automatic teller machine ("ATM")./1

Walton and Marsalis were both convicted on each

count by a jury, and their separate motions for

a new trial were summarily denied. The court on

June 17, 1999 sentenced Walton to ten months’

imprisonment on each count and ordered each of

her sentences to run concurrent with each other.

The court sentenced Marsalis to twenty-seven

months’ imprisonment on each count, and also

ordered each of his sentences to run concurrent

with each other. Each of them were also sentenced

to three years supervised release and ordered to

pay restitution in the amount of $90,500.00. The

court directed that the order of restitution be

paid jointly and severally by Walton, Marsalis

and Golliday.

 Marsalis appeals, arguing that the judge: (1)

erred when he found that the government’s

peremptory strike of a prospective juror was not

based on racial discrimination; (2) abused his
discretion when he excluded evidence regarding a

similar ATM theft at the same location that

occurred just four months prior to the instant

offense and (3) abused his discretion when he

denied his motion for a new trial based on the

government’s failure to produce the remaining

telephone records that he requested until the

second day of trial. Walton also appeals, arguing

that the court committed error when in its

restitution order, it directed that she be held

jointly and severally liable for the full amount

of restitution. We AFFIRM Marsalis’ conviction and

sentence, AFFIRM Walton’s conviction, and REVERSE AND

REMAND Walton’s sentence with respect to the order

of restitution.

I. BACKGROUND

 At approximately 10:32 p.m. on June 7, 1996,

Marsalis, Walton and Golliday drove in separate

cars to the Citibank branch located at 8650 South

Stony Island in Chicago, Illinois, to commit a

theft from the bank’s drive-up ATM. Acting as the

"look-out," Walton parked her car nearby so that

she could flash her headlights as a warning

should she observe anything that might interfere

with the execution of the crime as planned.

According to the plan, Golliday entered the

bank’s premises to access the bank’s interior ATM

and engaged the bank security guard in

conversation and distracted him, claiming that

she was having trouble retrieving money from the

machine. With the guard’s attention diverted to

Golliday’s problem, Marsalis drove-up to the ATM

located outside the bank, gained entry into the

machine and stole approximately $90,500.00.

 The theft was not discovered until the next

morning when a bank security guard noticed that

the drive-up ATM door was open. The FBI and the

company responsible for replenishing the ATM,

Wells Fargo, discovered upon investigation that

the evidence pointed to an "inside job" as there

were no signs of forcible entry into the ATM and

the ATM’s burglar alarm system was turned off.

Also, the bank’s surveillance video tapes were

reviewed and revealed that about the time of the

theft, Golliday can be observed on the video in

the interior ATM area occupying the attention of

the bank security officer and focusing her eyes

in the direction of the drive-up ATM. Still

photos of Golliday were taken from the video tape

and copies of her picture were distributed

throughout the local Wells Fargo branch that was

responsible for servicing the ATM. Thereafter, a

secretary at Wells Fargo recognized Golliday as

a former Wells Fargo employee, resulting in

Golliday being arrested and charged with the

theft.
 When FBI agents questioned Golliday about the

crime, she readily confessed to her involvement

in the episode, agreed to cooperate and

identified the other partners involved as

Marsalis and Walton, both of whom were also

former Wells Fargo employees. She went on to

describe how they jointly planned and carried out

the heist and based on this information, Marsalis

and Walton were arrested. Prior to issuing the

indictment and upon request by the government,

the grand jury issued a subpoena for various

telephone records, including the home phone

records of Marsalis, Walton and Golliday which

reflected an unusually high number of calls

placed between the defendants on the day of the

theft. Prior to trial, defense counsel requested

and the government produced the subpoenaed

telephone records, but neglected to produce the

phone records relating to the government’s

investigation into a prior ATM theft at the same

address that occurred just four months earlier.

After another request by defense counsel for

these particular records, the prosecution turned

over the remaining phone records on the second

day of trial.

 During jury selection, the government exercised

a peremptory strike upon a prospective AfricanAmerican juror, explaining that they based their

strike on her "inattentiveness" during the

proceedings. In an attempt to ascertain whether

the government’s strike was race-neutral in light

of the fact that both Marsalis and Walton are

also African-American, the court sua sponte

conducted a voir dire concerning the asserted

reason given by the government in support of its

strike. In response, the government offered the

testimony of the FBI agent assigned to the case

whose observations formed the basis of the

government’s strike. After hearing the case

agent’s testimony and the arguments of counsel,

the court concluded that the government’s

peremptory strike of the juror was race-neutral.

 At trial, Marsalis and Walton offered to

introduce evidence relating to the February 1996

unsolved ATM theft but the court refused to admit

the offer, ruling that it was irrelevant and

might conceivably be prejudicial to the

defendants as it might serve to suggest that the

defendants also committed the unsolved ATM theft.

Following their convictions, Marsalis filed a

motion for a new trial based on the government’s

tardy production of the missing phone records,

which was in turn denied by the court. As

previously mentioned, the court proceeded to

sentence Walton and Marsalis to ten and twentyseven months’ imprisonment respectively, and held

Walton, Marsalis and Golliday each jointly and
severally liable for restitution in the amount of

$90,500.00. Marsalis and Walton appealed.

II. ISSUES

 On appeal, Marsalis claims that: (1) the judge

erred when he found that the government’s

peremptory strike of the African-American juror

was not pre-textual for racial discrimination;

(2) the court abused its discretion when it

excluded evidence of a prior ATM theft at the

same location that occurred four months prior to

the instant offense; and (3) the court abused its

discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion

for a new trial despite the government’s failure

to produce the remaining telephone records until

the second day of trial. Walton on appeal argues

only that the court erred when it held her

jointly and severally liable for the full amount

of the restitution.

III. DISCUSSION

 A. Marsalis’ Batson Challenge

 Marsalis initially argues that the court erred

when it ruled that the government’s peremptory

strike of a prospective African-American juror

based on her "inattentiveness" during the

proceedings was proper. Specifically, Marsalis

contends that the court "clearly erred by failing

to perform a thorough analysis of whether [the]

stricken juror . . . was treated differently from

similarly-situated prospective jurors," and thus,

the prosecution’s strike was actually based on

race. Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-

98 (1986), allegations of racially-based

peremptory challenges are evaluated under a

three-part analysis: (1) the defendant must make

a prima facie showing that the government

exercised the challenge because of race; (2) the

government must next proceed to articulate a

race-neutral reason for the challenge; and

thereafter (3) the court must determine whether

the defendant has carried his burden of proving

purposeful discrimination. See Morse v. Hanks,

172 F.3d 983, 985 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120

S. Ct. 129 (1999). Because both Marsalis and the

government concede that the first two steps were

satisfied, we turn our focus to the third step.

United States v. Evans, 192 F.3d 698, 699-700

(7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he trial judge’s finding

that the government offered a race-neutral

explanation . . . moots the preliminary question

whether [the defendant] established a prima facie

case of discrimination.")

 Under the third step of the analysis (whether

the defendant has carried his burden of proving

purposeful discrimination), "the persuasiveness
of the justification becomes relevant" and "the

ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial

motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the

opponent of the strike." Purkett v. Elem, 514

U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curium). Thus,

"[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in

the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered

will be deemed race neutral." United States v.

Marin, 7 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 1993) (brackets

in original) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500

U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)).

 The court sua sponte conducted a voir dire of

the government’s asserted reason for the strike

and received the testimony of the assigned FBI

case agent whose observation formed the basis of

the government’s peremptory strike. When asked to

describe the "inattentiveness" of the stricken

juror and compare her with the other jurors he

had an opportunity to observe, the agent

testified:

 THE FBI AGENT: Specifically what I noticed was

her . . . staring out . . . [the] window and not

looking back over at the Judge when he was

speaking . . . .

. . .

 THE COURT: Did this juror in terms of her

attentiveness or inattentiveness strike you as

acting differently from the other 13 jurors you

could see in the box?

THE FBI AGENT: Yes, sir. I think that is why I

noticed her. I had nothing else to do at the time

but observe what I could, and . . . everyone else

was slanted towards you even if they had to turn

their chairs, and she was facing the other way,

which is why I initially noticed her.

 After considering the testimony of the case

agent regarding his observations of the stricken

juror and the other prospective jurors, as well

as the arguments of counsel, the judge was

convinced that the government’s peremptory

challenge was race-neutral:

There can be no doubt that inattentiveness is a

legitimate basis for challenging a juror. If

anything is required of a juror aside from

impartiality, it is the willingness and ability

to pay attention and retain what is seen and

heard during the trial. So inattentiveness is a

major objection of the most legitimate kind to a

juror who displays that characteristic. . . .

Considering all the circumstances, I conclude

that the defendants have failed to carry their

burden of proving that the government’s reason

for challenging [the juror] is motivated in any

degree by race.
 Contrary to Marsalis’ assertions, the record is

clear that the judge engaged in an exhaustive

inquiry into the government’s peremptory strike

of the African-American juror. See Coulter v.

Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912, 921 (7th Cir. 1998). We

also are convinced that Marsalis failed to carry

his burden of establishing that the government’s

peremptory strike was motivated by race because

a juror’s inattentiveness during the proceedings

is a valid, race-neutral basis for executing a

peremptory strike. See, e.g., United States v.

Changco, 1 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding

that inattentiveness is a proper race-neutral

basis for striking a juror); United States v.

Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1988)

(holding that striking a juror because she

appeared "inattentive or uninterested" did not

violate Batson). Thus, in light of the court’s

thorough review and fact-finding, our deference

to "[t]he trial court’s determination about the

ultimate question of discriminatory intent," and

the absence in the record of any evidence to

support the defendant’s claim, we conclude that

there was no error, much less clear error, in the

court’s finding that the government’s strike of

the African-American juror was race-neutral. See

Evans, 192 F.3d at 700.

 B. Marsalis’ Evidentiary Challenge

 We next turn to Marsalis’ claim that the court

abused its discretion when it excluded the

reception of evidence dealing with an unsolved

ATM theft from the same bank that occurred just

four months prior to the date of the instant

offense. We review a trial judge’s determination

of the admissibility of evidence under the abuse

of discretion standard. See United States v.

Johnson, 137 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 1998). "We

afford great deference to the trial court’s

determination of the admissibility of evidence

because of the trial judge’s first-hand exposure

to the witnesses and the evidence as a whole, and

because of the judge’s familiarity with the case

and ability to gauge the impact of the evidence

in the context of the entire proceeding." United

States v. Van Dreel, 155 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir.

1998). Indeed, 

"[a]ppellants who challenge evidentiary rulings

of the district court are like rich men who wish

to enter the Kingdom: their prospects compare

with those of camels who wish to pass through the

eye of the needle." United States v. Coleman, 179

F.3d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal

quotations omitted) (brackets in original).

Because we give "special deference" to the

rulings of the trial judge[,] [a defendant]
obviously "carries a heavy burden." Palmquist v.

Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1339 (7th Cir. 1997). In

this context, we will not reverse unless "the

record contains no evidence on which [the

district court] rationally could have based [its]

decision, or where the supposed facts found are

clearly erroneous." Id. (internal quotes

omitted). Moreover, if an error in the admission

or exclusion of evidence was committed during the

trial, the court will grant a new trial only if

the error had a "substantial influence over the

jury," and the result reached was "inconsistent

with substantial justice." Id. (internal quotes

omitted).

Agushi v. Duerr, 196 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir.

1999).

 Sometimes referred to as "reverse 404(b)"

evidence, "[e]vidence regarding other crimes is

admissible for defensive purposes if it ’tends,

alone or with other evidence, to negate [the

defendant’s] guilt of the crime charged against

him.’" Agushi, 196 F.3d at 760 (quoting United

States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1404 (3d Cir.

1991)). But of course, a court "should balance

the evidence’s probative value under Rule 401

against considerations such as prejudice, undue

waste of time and confusion of the issues under

Rule 403." Id.

 Here, the court concluded, and we agree, that

the evidence regarding the unsolved February 1996

ATM theft was irrelevant because it was unsolved

and occurred four months prior to the instant

theft and neither tended to prove nor disprove

the defendants’ involvement in the charged

offense, and also that the evidence might

conceivably be interpreted as prejudicial to the

defendants because it might have suggested to

some that the defendants also committed the

unsolved ATM theft:

[U]nless there is evidence tending to show that

[the defendants] were not involved in the

February occurrence, all this evidence that you

propose to offer would suggest that somebody,

including [the defendants] as a very real

possibility, committed a similar offense back in

February. That doesn’t tend to show that they are

not guilty of the offense charged here.

(Emphasis added).

 Because "we give great deference to the

district court’s evidentiary rulings" and because

of the obvious lack of relevance and prejudicial

nature of the evidence relating to the unsolved

ATM theft, we are convinced that the trial judge

did not abuse his discretion in excluding this
evidence. See United States v. Mancillas, 183

F.3d 682, 705 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120

S. Ct. 1271 (2000).

 C. Marsalis’ Motion for a New Trial

 Turning to Marsalis’ claim that the court

abused its discretion when it denied his motion

for a new trial, Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 33 provides that "[o]n a defendant’s

motion, the court may grant a new trial to that

defendant if the interests of justice so

require." We review a court’s decision to deny a

new trial for abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1437 (7th Cir.

1996).

 Specifically, Marsalis contends that he was

entitled to a new trial because the prosecution

violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

by failing to turn over all of the phone records

that were subpoenaed in a timely fashion. In

order for the defendant to be entitled to a new

trial as a result of an alleged Brady violation,

he must establish that: (1) the prosecution

suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence allegedly

suppressed was favorable to the defense; and (3)

the evidence was material to an issue at trial.

See United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777,

786 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.

1117 (1999). Under the third prong, evidence is

material only if there is a "reasonable

probability" that the disclosure of the allegedly

suppressed evidence would have changed the result

of the trial. United States v. Silva, 71 F.3d

667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995). A "reasonable

probability" exists if the suppression of

evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of

the trial. See id. Because we conclude that the

third step of the analysis is dispositive, we

turn our attention to whether there is a

"reasonable probability" that timely disclosure

of the missing phone records would have changed

the result of Marsalis’ trial.

 Here, Marsalis has failed to establish how the

timely disclosure of the missing phone records

relating to the unsolved ATM theft impacted his

trial because the records became immaterial at

the moment the judge excluded any evidence that

related to the government’s investigation into

the unsolved ATM theft. But even if the missing

phone records could properly be classified as

material (i.e., exculpatory evidence), these

records were turned over on the morning of the

second day of trial, well before the prosecution

had finished presenting its case. In spite of

Marsalis’ claim that he was harmed by the

government’s delayed production, it is
interesting to note that he failed to move for

either a continuance, an adjournment or a

mistrial. See, e.g., United States v. Higgins, 75

F.3d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Disclosure even

in mid-trial suffices if time remains for the

defendant to make effective use of the

exculpatory material. . . . If counsel needed

more time, she had only to ask; yet she did not

seek a continuance. Nothing more need be said.");

United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172, 178 (7th

Cir. 1984) ("[O]ur standard of review limits us

to determining whether the government’s

disclosure came so late as to prevent appellant

from receiving a fair trial. We cannot say that

disclosure came too late in this case. After

appellant’s counsel viewed the reports at trial,

he could have asked for a continuance to contact

the other owners and call them to testify, or he

could have asked the court to make the reports

part of the record.") (citations omitted). Thus,

we are of the opinion that the government’s

delayed disclosure of the remaining phone records

did not come so late as to deny Marsalis of the

evidence’s "effective use" at trial, had he

chosen to do so.

 Accordingly, we are not convinced that there is

a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of

his trial was prejudiced by the government’s

alleged delayed production of the immaterial

phone records. We conclude that the trial judge

did not abuse his discretion in denying Marsalis’

motion for a new trial based on the alleged Brady

violation.

 D. Walton’s Challenge to the Restitution Portion

of her Sentence

 Lastly, the government concedes, as Walton has

asserted, that the district court committed plain

error because according to the transcript of the

proceedings, the court was under the mistaken

impression that it was "required" to order her

jointly and severally liable for the entire

amount of the restitution of $90,500.00./2 At

the conclusion of Walton’s sentencing hearing,

the court ordered:

 THE COURT: A condition of the supervised release

is that she make restitution. I think I am

required to impose the full amount these days; is

that correct?

 [Marsalis’ Attorney]: Yes, your Honor.

 [The Government]: You are Judge.

 THE COURT: 90,000 and how many dollars?
 [The Government]: 500.

 THE COURT: $90,500 within the period of

supervised release. . . .

(Emphasis added). Walton contends that under the

law, the court was not "required to impose the

full amount," but instead, had the option of

apportioning the restitution amount among the

defendants and weighing factors into the fixed

restitution figure, such as her "contribution to

the victim’s loss" and her "economic

circumstances."

 Under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act

("MVRA"), enacted in 1996, a court must award the

full amount of restitution to each victim of a

property crime. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3663A(a)(1),

(c)(1)(A)(ii); sec. 3664(f)(1)(A). The MVRA "does

not permit a district court to exercise

discretion as to whether it imposes restitution

upon a defendant; the statutory language clearly

states that it must." See United States v.

McIntosh, 198 F.3d 995, 1004 (7th Cir. 2000). The

statute also provides that where more than one

defendant has contributed to the victim’s loss,

the court may make each defendant liable in full

or "apportion liability among the defendants to

reflect the level of contribution to the victim’s

loss and economic circumstances of each

defendant." 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(h)./3 

 Because the MVRA affords the sentencing court

discretion in apportioning liability where

multiple defendants are involved, our previous

holdings interpreting the Victim Restitution Act

remain instructive here. In McIntosh, we stated

that because "the Victim Restitution Act provides

district courts with discretion when ordering

restitution," when a court "chooses to impose an

order [of restitution] and simultaneously waives

a fine because of the defendant’s economic

circumstances," an explanation of its reasoning

is necessary. McIntosh, 198 F.3d at 1004.

 Thus, when a court orders restitution under 18

U.S.C. sec. 3664(h) but the record fails to

"sufficiently support [the court’s] conclusions

or clarify its reasoning, then we ask that the

court provide us with that information, including

its specific findings of fact, to facilitate our

review." United States v. Menza, 137 F.3d 533,

538 (7th Cir. 1998); cf. United States v. Boula,

997 F.2d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 1993).

 Upon review of the judge’s statements in the

record, we are not convinced that the court was

aware that it had the option of either ordering

Walton liable for the full amount of the

restitution or apportioning her liability to

reflect the level of Walton’s contribution to the
victim’s loss and her economic circumstances./4

We also are left in limbo and can only speculate

as to why the court waived Walton’s fine and the

interest "due to [her] financial inability to

pay" and ordered her restitution payments to be

made "in monthly installments equal to 10% of her

monthly cash flow," but for reasons unexplained,

chose not to apportion her liability based upon

her economic circumstances as it had the

authority to do so under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(h).

 Thus, we vacate and remand the restitution

portion of Walton’s sentence and ask the court to

make clear that it has considered whether Walton

should be liable "for payment of the full amount

of restitution" or for an apportioned amount

"reflect[ing] [her] level of contribution to the

victim’s loss and economic circumstances." 18

U.S.C. sec. 3664(h). We leave to the judgment of

the court to determine whether our aforementioned

conclusions warrant a reevaluation of the

restitution portions of Marsalis’ and Golliday’s

sentences as well.

 In conclusion, we agree that the trial judge

did not abuse his discretion when he found that

the government struck the African-American juror

for race-neutral reasons, precluded evidence of

the unsolved February 1996 ATM theft and denied

Marsalis’ motion for a new trial. We vacate the

restitution portion of Walton’s sentence and

remand the case to the trial court to make

specific its findings in support of its order of

restitution, while also considering whether or

not she should be held liable for the full amount

of restitution or for an amount reflecting her

contribution to the victim’s loss and her

economic circumstances, and whether the

restitution portion of Marsalis’ and Golliday’s

sentences should also be reevaluated.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM Marsalis’ conviction and

sentence, AFFIRM Walton’s conviction, and REVERSE

only with respect to Walton’s restitution order

and REMAND the sole issue of restitution to the

district court for proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART AND

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

/1 One Larita Golliday ("Golliday") was also named

and charged in both counts of the indictment,

pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and

cooperated with law enforcement authorities in

the investigation and prosecution. The court

sentenced Golliday to two years probation on

Count one and found her, along with Marsalis and
Walton, jointly and severally liable for the

total amount of the restitution. On motion of the

government, the court dismissed Count two of

Golliday’s indictment.

/2 The government and Walton agree that Walton’s

attorney’s forfeited this argument on appeal by

failing to raise the issue to the court’s

attention at sentencing, but the respective

parties also agree that the error is serious

enough to constitute plain error and warrant

remand of the restitution portion of Walton’s

sentence.

/3 The MVRA also provides that upon determination of

the amount of restitution owed to each victim,

the court must specify in the restitution order

the manner and schedule in which the restitution

is to be paid, taking into consideration the

"financial resources and other assets,"

"projected earnings and other income" and "any

financial obligations of the defendant." 18

U.S.C. sec. 3664(f)(2). Indeed, the court may

even "direct the defendant to make nominal

periodic payments if the court finds from facts

on the record that the economic circumstances of

the defendant do not allow the payment of any

amount of a restitution order, and do not allow

for the payment of the full amount of a

restitution order in the foreseeable future under

any reasonable schedule of payments." 18 U.S.C.

sec. 3664(f)(3)(B).

/4 But we also feel obligated to point out that the

government and the respective counsel for each of

the defendants contributed to the sentencing

court’s mis-apprehension. In response to the

court’s inquiry, "I think I am required to impose

the full amount [of restitution] these days; is

that correct?", the government and Marsalis’

attorney each replied in the affirmative, while

Walton’s attorney remained silent. Nonetheless,

because both the government and Walton agree that

the court’s error was plain and the record

reflects the same, we grant remand.