## FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT S : ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE : Attorney for U.S . Dept. of Treasury, IRS BRADL E Y J. BUCHHEIT CURTIS C. PETT Tucker Hester Baker & Krebs, LLC Department of Justice, Tax Division Indianapolis , Indiana Washington, D.C. 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
VICTOR W. GOODMAN and ) JACQUELYN C. BURKE , ) ) Appellant s - Plaintiffs , ) ) vs. ) No. 55A01

- 1304

- PL

- 176 ) STEVEN L. SERINE, SUZANNE M. SERINE, ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ) INTERNAL REVENU E SERVICE, ROBERT J. ) DeGRAZIA, MARY ANN DeGRAZIA, ) a nd all their Husbands, Wives, Widowers, ) Widows, Heirs, Devisees, Successors, Assignees, ) and all other Persons claiming any right, title, or ) interest in the within described real property by, ) through, or under them or any other person or ) entity, including John Doe and Jane Doe, the names ) of whom are unknown to Plaintiff. ) ) Appellee s - Defendants

. )

A PPEAL FROM THE MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT T he Ho nor able Matthew G. Hanson , Judge Cause No. 55C0 1

- 1203

- PL

- 6 6 4 March 31, 2014 OPINION
- FOR PUBLICATION MAY, Judge2

Victor Goodman and Jacquelyn Burke (collectively, “Goodman”) appeal a summary judgment in favor of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) . The court granted summary judgment after finding t ax liens remained on property Goodman bought even though a bankruptcy court had ordered the property could be sold free and clear of all liens. As the trial court was not the proper forum for the resolution of that matter, we vacate its judgment
and direc t it to dismiss Goodman’s complaint to quiet title.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Steven and Suzanne SeRine owned a parcel of land in Morgan County

. The SeRines had not paid their federal income tax liabilities for 2003, 2005, and 2006 , an d on March 10,
2008 , the IRS filed tax liens against the property

. The SeRines filed for bankruptcy on July 22, 2008 , and they listed the parcel as an asset. The IRS filed a proof of claim for the unpaid

taxes. On August 11, 2008, Goodman and t he SeRines executed a land contract for the sale of the parcel 1 to Goodman for $150,000. The contract provided Goodman would pay $20,000 when the contract was executed, $10,000 at an unspecified later date, and the

1 O n March 25, 2008, before the bankruptcy filing, Goodman and the SeRines purported to enter into a “conditional real estate sales contract,” (App. at 66), that referred to an eleven

- acre parcel identified only by the address 2140 Plummer Road, Martinsville, Indiana 46151. The conditional sales contract did not include a legal description. It provided “[t]he down payment of $20,000 is to be paid immediately,” ( id .), and a handwritten notation says “3

- 26

- 08

– Rec’d $10,000.” ( Id . at 67.) The parcel th at is the subject of the trial court’s judgment and this appeal is a 12.76 acre parcel the SeRines purported to convey to Goodman on August 11 , 2008, after the bankruptcy filing, via a “land contract,” ( id . at 72) , that did include a legal description. Th e “land contract” referred to the property by the same address, 2140 Plummer Road, but did not refer to any prior agreement to sell the property. The existence of IRS tax liens was acknowledged in the post

- bankruptcy “land contract” but not in the pre

- ban kruptcy “conditional real estate sales contract.”3

balance through monthly payments over ten years. The contra ct w as explicit that there were encumbrances on the parcel, including the IRS tax lien s . On the day the contract was
executed t he SeRines “executed and delivered the Deed.” (App. at 185.) The quitclaim deed was not recorded until February 1, 2010.
On July 8, 2009, t he SeRines moved in the bankruptcy court for permission to sell
Goodman the same parcel free and clear of all liens. The SeRines ’ motion asserted they still owned the parcel and did not disclose the August 11, 2008 , land contract and deed
conveyance. The SeRines represented in their motion that the IRS consented to the sale, but the record reflects there was no “particular individual who consented to the Bankruptcy Motion” on behalf of the IRS. ( Id . at 192.) The bankruptcy court granted the motion on August 5, 2009, but no sale occurred after that date.
The SeRines ’ bankrup t cy case was dismissed October 1, 2009. In March of 2012,
Goodman brought a complaint in the Morgan Circuit Court to quiet title to the parcel, naming
IRS as a de fendant and asserting the IRS liens were extinguished by the bankruptcy court’ s order. I n the motion Goodman noted the quitclaim deed from t he SeRines had bee n recorded in 2010, after the bankruptcy court’ s order, but Goodman did not acknowledge the lan d

contract execution and deed conveyance had already happened before the bankruptcy court’s order the parcel could be sold free and clear of the tax liens.
Both Goodman and the IRS moved for summary judgment , and the trial court granted
the IRS motion. It noted that on “August 11, 2008, t he SeRines sold said property to the Plaintiffs and gave them a deed which consummated the sale and delivery of said property,”4

( id . at 9), and determined title to the parcel passed from t he SeRines to Goodman “no later than August 11, 2008.” ( Id. at 10.) Therefore, it held, “the elimination of liens within [the 2009 bankruptcy court order] is of no effect.” ( Id . at 11.) DISCUSSION AND DECISION
As b ankruptcy law is federal law, it preempts state law pursuant to the supremacy clause

. Hammes v. Brumley , 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1027 (Ind. 1995) , reh’g denied

. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) provides that federal courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction in all bankruptcy

matters. Our Indiana Supreme Court has noted “t here should be no legitimate question about the legislative intent to vest the [federal court] with a complete, pervasive, jurisdiction over
all matters that have to do with a ban kruptcy case. ” Id . (quoting George Treister, Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Law § 2.01 (2d ed. 1988) )

. T he jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is exclusive of all other courts. Id

. When the bankruptcy court addresses a specific issue bearing on a state claim, we should apply the bankruptcy court ’ s finding unless doing so would compromise In diana ’ s legal framework. Brewer v. EMC Mortgage Corp. , 743 N.E.2d 322, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) , reh’g denied,
trans. denied

. 11 U.S.C. § 541 provides that the commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an

estate , and which estate includes “ all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case. ” As the purported transfer to Goodman took place after the SeRines filed for bankruptcy, the property presumably was part of the bankruptcy estate. Whether any interest cou ld have been transferred to Goodman, or the nature of any such5

interest, are questions of bankruptcy law that must be resolved by the bankruptcy court , not by our state court s . That the SeRines’ bankruptcy case was ultimately dismissed does not change th at conclusion. Dismissal of a bankruptcy proceeding normally results in dismissal of related proceedings because fed eral jurisdiction is premised on the nexus between the underlying bankruptcy case and the related proceedings

. Matter of Statistical Tabul ating Corp., Inc. , 60 F.3d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1995) , cert. denied sub nom. LaSalle Bank Lake View v. U nited States, 516 U.S. 1093 ( 1996 ). B ut that general rule is not without exceptions. I d. “ S ection 349 of the Bankruptcy Code lists the various effect s of dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case; conspicuously absent from that list is automatic termination of jurisdiction of related cases.” Id . (quoting In re Carraher, 971 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1992) )

. In the case of adversary proceedings, juris diction is not automatically terminated with the dismissal
of the unde rlying bankruptcy case, and bankruptcy courts have discretion to retain jurisdiction over adversary proceedings. Id

. The rationale for retention of jurisdiction over an adversary proce eding is that some cases have progressed so far that judicial interference is needed to unravel or reserve the rights of parties. Id.
In Statistical Tabulating , there was a live controversy between two creditors when the bankruptcy court dismissed the u nderlying bankruptcy , and t he dismissal did not fully resolve
or otherwise render moot the issue on appeal. Id. at 1290. The Seventh Circuit accordingly
held the bankruptcy court should have revisited the agreed order as the district court had
directed. Id

. As the issues in the cas e before remain subject to bankruptcy court jurisdiction,6

we vacate the trial court’s judgment and di rect it to di smiss the quiet title action

. Judgment vacated and cause remanded

. BAILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.