SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NOS. A-5576-17T3

 A-5579-17T3

 A-5581-17T3

RANDAL ALLEN and GINA ALLEN,

MICHAEL ANELLO and KRYSTAL

ANELLO, ROBERT ANICIC and

GRETCHEN ANICIC, MATTHEW

ARREDONDO and MARIA ARREDONDO,

NARESH ARULAMPALAM and 

MELANTHI ARULAMPALAM, MEREDITH

BARNES and NATHAN BARNES,

STEPHEN BARONE and DONNA BARONE,

KIM CIFONE and MARK CIFONE, JULIUS

COLINA and JENNY COLINA, PATRICK

CLUNE and JENNIFER CLUNE, WILLIAM

CRAIG and STACEY CRAIG, CHERIE 

DAVIS and KEVIN DAVIS, JOHN 

DISTEFANO and SHERRI DISTEFANO,

BRIAN DOUGHERTY and JOSIE

DOUGHERTY, ERIC HALLMAN and

DAWN HALLMAN, LAUREN HARFST,

KATIE HOMOLA and JASON HOMOLA,

ROBERT HOSSLER and VALERIE

HOSSLER, STEPHEN M. JENKINS and

ANNA L. JENKINS, MICHAEL KISSEL

and PATRICIA KISSEL, JOSEPH LOFTIS,

MICHAEL MCCABE and LYNNE MCCABE,

AJIT K. NAIR and MAYA NAIR, ROBERT

SCIARROTTA and JEANNA SCIARROTTA,

JAMES WILKES and LAUREN WILKES,

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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RICHARD YOUNG and CHERIE YOUNG,

CRAIG SCHINDEWOLF and

ROSEMARIE SCHINDEWOLF,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

BEAZER HOMES CORPORATION,

d/b/a BEAZER HOMES GROUP,

Defendant-Respondent.

_________________________________________

MICHAEL CAPRIOTTI and AMY CAPRIOTTI,

MARK CONNOLLY and TRACY CONNOLLY,

JEFFREY HAYES, ELLIOTT HUDAK and

ARLENE HUDAK, MARY KELLEY and

ROBERT KELLEY, KIM MCNALLY and

RYAN MCNALLY, MICHAEL PECORILLI

and GINA PECORILLI, MARY KATE

RACOBALDO and SALVATORE RACOBALDO,

CHRIS REUTER and BRIDGET REUTER,

LESLEY RHOADES, BILL STRINGER and

CHERYL STRINGER, ROBERT SULLIVAN and

JODI SULLIVAN, LEILA TAGLIERI and

PAUL STENNIE, JAMES D. VAITES and 

THERESA VAITES, CINDY VOLKMANN

and RON VOLKMANN, GEORGE WANG

and KATHY WU, NORA ZACIERKA and

MICHAEL ZACIERKA, ROBERT THOMPSON

and MARY CHRIS THOMPSON, SEAN

SWEENEY and JILL SWEENEY, KATHY

KOENIG-LEE, DAN MARZANO and SHERRY

MARZANO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
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v.

BEAZER HOMES CORPORATION,

d/b/a BEAZER HOMES GROUP,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________________________

MICHAEL COCOZZA and BROOK

COCOZZA, KIM NEGRO and ANTHONY

NEGRO, LORI PASSEHL and GEOFFREY

PASSEHL, SANJAY PATEL and KRISTI

PATEL, KURT RIEPEN and TRACY

RIEPEN, BRIAN RIGGS and JENNIFER

RIGGS, KEITH TARTAGLIONE and

LYNDSEY TARTAGLIONE, and BYRON

WELLS and KIMBERLY WELLS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

BEAZER HOMES CORPORATION,

d/b/a BEAZER HOMES GROUP,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________________________

Submitted September 10, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Fisher, Gilson and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Gloucester County, Docket Nos. L-0057-16, 

L-005-16 and L-0012-16.

Salmon Ricchezza Singer & Turchi LLP, and 

MoreMarrone LLC, attorneys for appellants (Joseph L. 

September 24, 2019
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Turchi and Michele L. Weckerly, of counsel; Thomas 

M. Marrone, on the brief). 

Archer & Greiner PC, attorneys for respondent 

(William Leo Ryan and Benjamin D. Morgan, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiffs in these three consolidated actions bought homes in Gloucester 

County that were constructed and sold to them by defendant Beazer Homes 

Corporation. Their three complaints allege a single cause of action, which 

asserts that Beazer violated the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -210, 

by concealing information about the homes' septic systems. Some plaintiffs 

voluntarily dismissed their claims. The claims of another group of plaintiffs 

were dismissed through application of the statute of repose, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1. 

And the claims of the remaining plaintiffs were dismissed by way of summary 

judgment; the motion judge concluded these plaintiffs failed to show that Beazer 

committed an unlawful business practice or that they suffered an ascertainable 

loss. We find no error in the disposition of these claims and affirm.

Factually, plaintiffs alleged that Beazer never disclosed it had installed 

infiltrator systems, which had only been in use in the industry for twenty years,

instead of stone and pipe systems, which allegedly can be expected to last a 

minimum of twenty-five years and up to fifty or more years. In their complaints, 
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plaintiffs contended that because of the considerable expense of replacing a 

septic system, the failure to disclose the type of septic system installed was 

material to their decision to purchase.

Plaintiffs' three complaints were filed on December 24, 2015. The parties 

stipulated the homes of forty-seven plaintiffs were completed more than ten 

years before the suits were filed, so Beazer argued these claims were barred by 

the statute of repose, which prohibits the commencement of an action based on 

a "deficiency in the design . . . or construction of an improvement to real 

property . . . against any person performing or furnishing the design . . . or 

construction of such improvement to real property . . . more than 10 years after 

the performance or furnishing of such services and construction." N.J.S.A. 

2A:14-1.1. Plaintiffs contend the motion judge misconstrued or misapplied this 

statute. We disagree and affirm the order granting Beazer's motion for summary 

judgment as to forty-seven plaintiffs on this ground substantially for the reasons 

set forth by Judge Richard J. Geiger in his thorough and well-reasoned written 

decision. We add just a few comments.

Even though plaintiffs alleged only a CFA violation – thereby focusing on 

what they claim was an unlawful sales practice rather than on a faulty design or 

construction defect – the statute of repose still applies because it is the design 
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and installation of what plaintiffs allege is a less than desirable septic system 

that lies at the heart of their claims. In enacting the statute of repose, the 

Legislature sought to "limit" what it found to be an undesirable course the law 

had taken in applying the discovery rule, abandoning the completed-andaccepted rule, and otherwise expanding the liability of contractors, builders, 

planners and designers. Horosz v. Alps Estates, Inc., 136 N.J. 124, 128 (1994); 

see also Ebert v. So. Jersey Gas Co., 157 N.J. 135, 138 (1999). In examining 

the legislative intent, the Supreme Court determined that the statute of repose 

should apply broadly. Horosz, 136 N.J. at 129; Newark Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. 

Gruzen & Partners, 124 N.J. 357, 363 (1991). We are satisfied this broad scope 

should also envelope a CFA action that emanates from the design or construction 

of the item sold in the challenged transaction. Indeed, the very language of the

statute of repose supports a broad application regardless of how a plaintiff 

couches the cause of action because the Legislature declared that "[n]o action, 

whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise" may be brought regarding such an 

alleged defect more than ten years after the completion of construction. N.J.S.A. 

2A:14-1.1 (emphasis added). In applying these principles, Judge Geiger 

correctly dismissed the claims of those plaintiffs whose homes were constructed 

more than ten years before they filed their complaints.
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After further discovery, Judge James R. Swift granted summary judgment 

in favor of Beazer on the remaining claims. In his written decision, the judge 

recognized that even though two of the remaining plaintiffs had replaced their 

septic systems and three other systems required minor repair, not one of these 

plaintiffs produced an expert report to support a claim that the originally 

installed system was defective. He also determined that the other plaintiffs had 

not presented any problem at all with their systems, which, at the time of his 

decision, were between eight and twelve years old. Other than the generalities 

alleged by plaintiffs' expert about the comparative life expectancies of stone and 

pipe systems and infiltration systems, the expert found no fault in the design, 

installation or function of the systems Beazer installed.

The judge also recognized that plaintiffs provided no expert report or other 

evidence to demonstrate that homes with an infiltration system of the type 

installed by Beazer have a diminished value when compared to those with stone 

and pipe systems. Plaintiffs did provide an expert report that estimated the cost 

of replacing plaintiffs' existing systems with a "traditional" system, but no 

expert opined that such a replacement should occur.

Like the motion judge, we find plaintiffs' claim that Beazer had a duty to 

inform them of the nature of the septic system similar to a CFA claim we found 
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wanting in Perkins v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 383 N.J. Super. 99 (App. Div. 

2006). Beazer constructed and sold a home with a system designed by a licensed 

engineer and approved for use in this State. It had no obligation to inform the 

buyers of the type of system installed.

For these reasons, and substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge 

Swift in his comprehensive and thoughtful written decision, we conclude that 

plaintiffs' CFA claims were properly dismissed.

Affirmed.