[Cite as State v. Illing, 2022-Ohio-4266.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

PATRICK ILLING,

Defendant-Appellant.

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APPEAL NO. C-220166

TRIAL NO. B-2104768

O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 30, 2022

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Stier, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Rubenstein & Thurman, L.P.A., and Scott A. Rubenstein, for Defendant-Appellant.
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BOCK, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Patrick Illing appeals the trial court’s judgment, 

arguing that (1) his plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, (2) he 

received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) the trial court’s sentence was not 

supported by the record. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

I. Facts and Procedure

{¶2} Illing was indicted for rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), sexual battery 

under R.C. 2907.03(A)(2), and sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(3). The victim, 

N.R., was 19 years old, a friend of Illing’s son, and Illing’s employee. Illing was accused 

of providing N.R. with a substantial amount of alcohol and sexually assaulting N.R. 

while he was passed out from intoxication in Illing’s basement. Illing pled guilty to 

sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(2), a third-degree felony. The state dismissed 

the remaining counts. 

{¶3} The court engaged in the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, pausing after each factor 

to confirm that Illing understood. The court informed Illing that his guilty plea meant 

that he was admitting the facts of the offense as true and his full guilt. It advised Illing 

of the constitutional rights that he was foregoing by pleading guilty. The court 

explained the minimum and maximum sentences, fines, postrelease control,

consequences of violating postrelease control or being indicted on a new felony, and 

Illing’s requirement to register as a Tier III sex offender. 

{¶4} The court asked Illing if anyone had made promises or threats that 

would induce or force him to plead. He responded, “No, sir.” The court stated, “Do you 

understand that there’s no promise of a particular sentence, and the Court could 
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proceed with judgment and sentence you immediately after your plea?” Illing 

responded, “Yes, sir,” and entered his guilty plea. 

The trial court sentenced Illing

{¶5} Illing asked for the court’s “leniency” and “mercy,” requesting a period 

of probation and home incarceration and noting that “the Ohio legislature codified this 

offense not to have a presumption of prison for a reason.” Illing argued that he should 

not be subject to prison time as he had no criminal record, was fully cooperative with 

police, had made a full confession, and “felt extreme remorse.” 

{¶6} Illing told the court that he runs a successful business where his 

employees described him as a “great boss” that they “deeply care about” and were “also 

joining in our request for probation.” Illing had engaged in therapy “[b]efore [the 

parties] reached this plea agreement,” which he “was doing all * * * on his own” despite 

“facing mandatory time” to address the sexual abuse that Illing had “suffered from as 

a child” and his “self-coping mechanisms.” Illing said that his sons could attest that 

Illing’s therapy had “affected their entire family for the better.” Illing admitted that he 

reached out to N.R. during the pendency of the case and said it was inappropriate to 

do so.

{¶7} Detective Ruwe, who investigated the case, stated that, although Illing 

was cooperative, it did not “change what happened.” Ruwe emphasized that Illing not 

only recorded the act, but also retained the recording and still shots of it on his phone 

“over a year later,” which told Ruwe that “he didn’t want to get rid of it.” Ruwe stated, 

“Yes, once we arrested him, he wanted to get rid of it, but by then it was a little too late. 

There were other pictures on his phone that were disturbing. He enjoyed taking 

pictures of [his employees], and not full-body photos, just certain areas * * * employees 
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either bent over * * * and things like that.” He added that the victim “obviously had no 

idea about this until it was brought to his attention” and described N.R.’s reaction as 

an “entire range of emotions for him,” “upset,” “scared,” and “nervous” after seeing 

the recording “over a year later.” 

{¶8} N.R.’s grandmother stated that N.R. had tried to commit suicide after 

discovering that he had been sexually assaulted. She added that N.R. had been bullied 

at school before and abused by his previous stepfather. She further stated that N.R. 

trusted Illing and now has to deal with the effects of this emotional and physical abuse 

“for the rest of his life also.” 

{¶9} N.R. did not address the court. The state explained that Illing was in a 

position of trust to N.R. because he was N.R.’s employer and the father of N.R.’s friend. 

The state reported that N.R. had gone to sleep in Illing’s basement when Illing 

assaulted him. The state echoed Detective Ruwe’s statements regarding “multiple 

other photos on the iPad or iPhone that were troubling.” 

{¶10} The court explained to Illing the purposes and principles of sentencing, 

stating that it is to “protect the public from future crime, to punish the defendant, but 

also to promote the effective rehabilitation of the defendant” by using minimum 

sanctions to accomplish the statute’s purposes. The court found that, while Illing had 

no criminal record, it had to look at the seriousness factors in R.C. 2929.12(B). It noted 

that N.R. had suffered “serious psychological harm” and would carry the effect of 

Illing’s actions for the rest of his life. 

{¶11} The court pointed to the “position of trust” that Illing had with N.R. and

that Illing had recorded the act and kept the recording for more than a year. It stated

that the victim-impact statement reflected that Illing had groomed N.R., and 
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therefore, Illing intended to commit the act. The court found that these factors 

outweighed Illing’s risk of recidivism and imposed a 24-month sentence in the Ohio 

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. 

II. Law and Analysis

A. Illing’s plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

{¶12} To determine whether a plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily, “an appellate court examines the totality of the circumstances through a 

de novo review of the record.” State v. Foster, 2018-Ohio-4006, 121 N.E.3d 76 (1st 

Dist.), quoting State v. Tutt, 2015-Ohio-5145, 54 N.E.3d 619, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). 

{¶13} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires the trial court to determine whether the 

defendant is entering the plea voluntarily, with an understanding of the effect of the 

plea, knows that the court may proceed to judgment and sentencing, and understands 

the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty involved. The term “maximum 

penalty” refers to “[t]he heaviest punishment permitted by law.” State v. Fikes, 1st 

Dist. Hamilton No. C-200221, 2021-Ohio-2597, ¶ 6, quoting Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1314 (10th Ed.2014). 

{¶14} A trial court must strictly comply with the constitutional notifications

contained in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). State v. Green, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170477, 

2019-Ohio-1428. 

{¶15} A trial court must substantially comply with the nonconstitutional

notifications required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 

176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 14. “Substantial compliance means that 

under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the 

implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” Id.; see State v. Nero, 56 Ohio 
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St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). “Literal compliance with Crim. R. 11 is certainly 

the preferred practice, but the fact that the trial judge did not do so does not require 

vacation of the defendant’s guilty plea if the reviewing court determines that there was 

substantial compliance.” Nero at 108. Moreover, a defendant who challenges his guilty 

plea on the basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made must 

show a prejudicial effect. State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 93, 364 N.E.2d 1163

(1977). The test for prejudice is whether the plea would have otherwise been made.

Veney at ¶ 15.

{¶16} In his first assignment of error, Illing argues that the trial court erred by 

accepting his plea where it was based on counsel’s assurance that Illing would receive 

probation. This argument is without merit. The court advised Illing of the sentence 

that he was facing, asked him if he understood the terms of the sentence, and asked 

whether he had been promised anything or threatened into pleading. Illing stated that 

he understood the sentence and that he had not been promised anything or threatened 

to make the plea. 

{¶17} The trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) 

and strictly complied with Crim.R. 11 (C)(2)(c). Further, Illing had admitted his 

culpability to police and later pled guilty to sexual battery, adding nothing to the facts

as they were read into the transcript. Illing did not object to the sentence when the 

court announced it. He did not argue before the trial court that his counsel promised 

probation. And on appeal, while Illing argues that his plea was “predicated on trial 

counsel’s assurances regarding the anticipated sentence,” he does not assert that 

absent those assurances, he would not have pled guilty. Accordingly, the trial court 
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correctly determined that Illing entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily. We overrule Illing’s first assignment of error.

B. Illing received the effective assistance of counsel.

{¶18} A defendant who pleads guilty waives all appealable issues, including 

the right to assert an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, except that the defendant 

may claim ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that counsel’s deficient 

performance caused the plea to be less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State

v. Miller, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2019CA00046, 2019-Ohio-4275, ¶ 13. In such a case, a

defendant may prevail only by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have pled guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial. (Citations omitted.) Id.

{¶19} “To warrant reversal, ‘[t]he defendant must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 

136, 142, 538 N.E.2d 373, (1989), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

{¶20} The appropriate remedy for allegations of ineffective assistance of 

counsel based on facts in the record is an appeal from the verdict. State v. Mallory,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 49389, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 7256, *2 (Oct. 3, 1985). In an 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, an appellant must show (1) that counsel’s 

performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense, thereby depriving the appellant of a fair trial. Strickland at 687. “A 

defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to 
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consider the other.” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000).

{¶21} In Illing’s second assignment of error, he argues that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel allegedly advised Illing that probation 

was guaranteed. Illing does not argue on appeal that there is a reasonable probability 

that he would not have pled guilty but for this alleged promise. Instead, he merely 

states that his counsel “cause[d] substantial prejudice” without further explanation or 

showing how the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s alleged 

deficiency.

{¶22} Moreover, the record is devoid of evidence, testimony, or filings 

suggesting that Illing pled guilty based on the alleged promise. As such discussions 

were not a part of the record, and cannot be added to the record on appeal, Illing 

cannot demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was deficient. We overrule Illing’s 

second assignment of error.

C. The trial court’s sentence was proper

{¶23} Illing’s third assignment of error argues that the trial court imposed his 

prison sentence without properly considering the purposes and principles of 

sentencing or any of the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11(A)-(B) and 2929.12(A)-(E). 

Illing asserts that the trial court failed to consider his own trauma as “substantial 

grounds” to mitigate his conduct, or the fact that the victim-impact statement 

contained statements from the victim’s mother and grandmother, but not the victim. 

{¶24} We review criminal sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which allows 

appellate courts to increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence, or to vacate the 

sentence and remand the matter for resentencing if it clearly and convincingly finds 

that either the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under relevant 
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statutory provisions, or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. State v. Conley, 1st 

Dist. Hamilton No. C-200144, 2021-Ohio-837, ¶ 20. 

{¶25} In State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, 

the Ohio Supreme Court held, “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) clearly does not provide a basis 

for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it concludes that the record 

does not support the sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 because * * * R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutes listed in the provision.” Id. at ¶ 31.

Moreover, a trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 were not reviewable

under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) because “an appellate court’s conclusion that the record

does not support a sentence under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12 is not the equivalent of a

conclusion that the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is used in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2)(b).” Id. at ¶ 34. The court concluded that “[n]othing in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the

record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence

that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 42. 

{¶26} R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not fact-finding statutes, and, absent an 

affirmative demonstration to the contrary, we presume that the trial court considered 

them. State v. Mimes, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200122, 2021-Ohio-2494, ¶ 9. 

{¶27} The trial court imposed the 24-month sentence after considering Illing’s 

actions and the impact that his actions had on the victim and the community. The 

court explained the principles and purposes of sentencing in detail to Illing. Further, 

the court generally acknowledged counsel’s arguments in favor of probation over 

prison but imposed its sentence after “looking at the seriousness factors in 2929.12(B)” 
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and noting that the victim “suffered serious psychological harm,” and “mental 

suffering is considered a physical harm” under R.C. 2929.01(A)(5). 

{¶28} The court further stated that Illing “held a position of trust” and “of 

authority,” which was a “relationship with the victim that facilitated the offense.” 

Further, the victim-impact statement indicated that Illing “had groomed the victim, 

shows the requisite mental intent to commit the act.” The court also noted that, 

although Illing was a sexual-abuse survivor, he “knew better” than to perpetrate the 

offense on another person who will “carry it with him his whole life.” 

{¶29} Illing has not shown that the trial court failed to consider the statutory 

factors. And under Jones, this court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that 

of the trial court “concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649,

at ¶ 42. We overrule Illing’s third assignment of error.

III. Conclusion

{¶30} Illing made his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The trial 

court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) and strictly complied

with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). Illing did not show that his counsel was ineffective. Finally,

Illing did not show that the trial court improperly sentenced him. We affirm the trial

court’s judgment. 

Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., andWINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.