alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### EVERETT McKINLEY MOORE v. PAUL CROCKER.

(Filed 7 April, 1965.)

Automobiles §§ 54f, 55.1—

In the owner’s action to recover for damages to his car inflicted in a collision occurring when the owner was absent, nonsuit on the ground that the negligence of the driver of plaintiff’s ear was a proximate cause of the damage is improper when there is evidence that the driver of plaintiff’s car had borrowed it and was on a purely personal mission, since G.S. 20-71.1 merely takes the issue of agency to the jury, the burden of proof thereon remaining on defendant.

Appeal by plaintiff from *McConnell, J.,*October 1964 Civil Session of DAVIDSON.

This civil action grows out of a collision that occurred December 19, 1962, about 7:30 p.m., on N.C. Highway No. 64 between a 1953 Chevrolet operated by Franklin Small and a 1958 Ford operated by defendant. Both vehicles were proceeding west toward Lexington. When the collision occurred, Small was attempting to turn left into a dirt road and defendant was attempting to overtake and pass the Chevrolet Small was operating.

*234Plaintiff, the absent owner of said Chevrolet, alleged the collision and the damage to his car were proximately caused by the negligence of defendant. Answering, defendant denied negligence and pleaded, conditionally, the contributory negligence of Small, while acting as agent for plaintiff, in bar of plaintiff's right to recover.

Evidence was offered by both plaintiff and defendant. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court, on motion of defendant, entered judgment of involuntary nonsuit. Plaintiff excepted and appealed.

*Charles F. Lambeth, Jr., for 'plaintiff appellant.*

*Walser, Brinkley, Walser & McGirt for defendant appellee.*

PeR CuRiam.

There was plenary evidence that plaintiff was not present when the collision occurred; that Small had borrowed plaintiff’s Chevrolet; and that, when the collision occurred, Small was using the car for his own personal purposes.

In our view, there was sufficient evidence to support findings that the collision and plaintiff’s damage were proximately caused by the negligence of defendant and also by the negligence of Small. Whether the testimony of Small, plaintiff’s witness, discloses as a matter of law that negligence on his part was a proximate cause need not be decided. Assuming Small’s negligence was a proximate cause, unless defendant’s allegations of agency are established, such negligence of Small is not a bar to plaintiff’s right to recover. By reason of G.S. 20-71.1, the agency issue, the burden of proof being on defendant, was for determination by the jury under proper instructions. In this connection, see *Whiteside v. McCarson,*250 N.C. 673, 110 S.E. 2d 295.

The judgment of nonsuit is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial on all issues raised by the pleadings.

Reversed.
Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

BILLY ROGERS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 1:10-cv-00010-MP-AK

BELL, DAVIS, et al, 

Defendants.

_____________________________/

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Response to an Order to Show Cause,

wherein he complains about conditions at the correctional institution and that he had not

received the Court’s previous order instructing him to file his claims on the proper form and to

file a motion for leave to proceed as a pauper with the correct inmate account information. (Doc.

3). Consequently, the Clerk shall re-mail the previous order with attachments which he shall

complete, file and return on or before April 9, 2010.

DONE AND ORDERED this 23rd day of March, 2010

 s/Maurice M. Paul 

 Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge
**Exhibit32.1**

** **

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 200218 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

** **

In connectionwith the Annual Report of Hollywood Casino Shreveport and Shreveport CapitalCorporation (collectively, the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal yearended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission onthe date hereof (the “Report”), I, Kevin DeSanctis, Chief Executive Officer ofthe Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,18 U.S.C. Section 1350 that, to my knowledge:

######  

###### 1.            The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,as amended; and

######  

###### 2.            The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresult of operations of the Company.

 
|                | **Hollywood Casino Shreveport**                   |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
|                | **By:   HCS I, Inc., its Managing Partner;** |
|                | **Shreveport Capital Corporation; and**           |
|                | **HWCC-Louisiana, Inc.**                          |
|                |                                              |
|                |                                              |
| Date: April 6, 2004 | By:  /s/                                     | Kevin DeSanctis |
|                |                                              | Kevin DeSanctis |
|                |                                              | Chief Executive Officer |
|                |                                              |   |

 

----
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15

- 10295 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
ESTEBAN ALONZO

- GARCIA , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:14

- CR

- 141

- 1

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and PRADO , Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Esteban Alonzo

Garcia has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Alonzo

- Garcia h a s not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED February 17, 2016 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 15-10295 Document: 00513383132 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2016No. 15

- 10295

2 nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave
to wit hdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 15-10295 Document: 00513383132 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/17/2016
##### 



EXHIBIT 12.2 BARCLAYCARD FUNDING PLC
Certification Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 I, Paul Gerard Turner, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F, and all reports on
Form 6-K containing distribution or servicing reports filed in respect
of periods included in the year covered by this annual report, of
Barclaycard Funding PLC;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken as a
whole, does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made,
not misleading as of the last day of the period covered by this annual
report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing information
required to be provided to the trustee by the servicer under the
pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement, for inclusion in these
reports is included in these reports;4.
    
    I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
servicer under the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement and
based upon my knowledge and the annual compliance review required
under that agreement, and except as disclosed in the reports, the
servicer has fulfilled its obligations under that agreement; and5.
    
    The reports disclose all significant deficiencies relating to the
servicers compliance with the minimum servicing standards based upon
the report provided by an independent public accountant, after
conducting a review in compliance with the Uniform Single Attestation
Program for Mortgage Bankers or similar procedure, as set forth in the
pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement. By: /s/ Paul Gerard TurnerName:
    
    Paul Gerard TurnerTitle:
    
    DirectorDate:
    
    June 30, 2005
CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of SheerVision, Inc. (the
      “Company”) for the for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2007 filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Suzanne Lewsadder, Chief
      Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
      as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented
      and consolidated results of operations of the Company for the periods presented.




Dated:
                November 29, 2007By:
              /s/
                  Suzanne LewsadderSuzanne LewsadderChief
                  Executive Officer




This
      certification has been furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      SheerVision, Inc. and will be retained by SheerVision, Inc. and furnished to
      the
      Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
| 1.   | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the      Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the      dates presented and the consolidated result of operations of the Company      for the periods presented. |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|    By: |   /s/ Derek      Ivany                                                     |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  Name:           |  Derek      Ivany                                                               |
|  Title:          |  Principal      Executive Officer,Principal      Financial Officer and Director |
|  Date:           |  11/10/09                                                                       |
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#### STATE v. McNEIL

No. 47 PC.

Case below: 28 N.C. App. 347.

Petition for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 6 April 1976.
#### STATE v. McNEIL

No. 307 PC

Case below: 47 NC App 30

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 16 September 1980. Motion of Attorney General to dismiss appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question allowed 16 September 1980.
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

RUBEN C. FERNANDEZ-OLIVARES

 Plaintiff,

vs. 5:10cv55/RS/MD

PMI EMPLOYEE LEASING, INC..

 Defendants.

O R D E R

This case is before the court upon plaintiff’s notice to the court concerning service

of process filed in response to the court’s order of July 20, 2010. In his notice plaintiff

confirms that he personally served the documents on PMI. Although he states that this

was done “according to Fed.R.Civ.P.4(c)(2),” in fact that rule provides that “[a]ny person

who is at least 18 years old and not a party may serve a summons and complaint.” 

Therefore, service was improper for that reason.

1

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

If plaintiff wishes to proceed with this action, he should request a summons from the

clerk and have this action served in accordance with the relevant provisions of

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. 

He should endeavor to ensure that this second attempt at service is complete and

file proof thereof with the court within twenty-eight days from the date of this order. 

1There is insufficient information in the record for the court to determine whether Donna Johnson was

authorized to receive service in behalf of PMI pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(h).
Page 2 of 2

DONE AND ORDERED this 28 day of July, 2010. th

 /s/ Miles Davis

MILES DAVIS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case No: 5:10CV55/RS/MD
#### DAVID LLOYD WICKER v. NELLIE GRACE YOW WICKER.

(Filed 22 November, 1961.)

Divorce and Alimony § 14; Judgments § 30—

In a proceeding in *habeas corpus*to determine the right of custody of the children of the marriage as between husband and wife, a finding by ithe court that the wife had not committed adultery with any person is not *res judicata*on the question i-m a subsequent action by the husband for divorce on- the ground of adultery, it being required that in an action for divorce the ground for relief must be found by a jury. G.S. 50-10.

Appeal by defendant from *Carr, J.,*(on motion) at August 1961 Criminal Term, of Lee.

Civil action for absolute divorce on ground of adultery.

Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that on or about the 15th day of February, and on various other dates, the defendant committed adultery with a specified party, and that because of these adulterous acts, he is entitled to an absolute divorce.

Defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint, and alleged, as a further answer and defense, that the issues raised in this action— specifically defendant’s alleged acts of adultery— were raised, tried, and determined in defendant’s favor in a previous case, which case was appealed to Supreme Court and reported in *In Re Wicker,*253 N.C. 431, 117 S.E. 2d 13.

Whereupon, the defendant moved for a hearing on the plea in bar of *res judicata.*

Upon consideration of the stipulations of the parties and of the evidence offered, the court below was of the opinion that the order entered in the previous action is not *res judicata*to this action and therefore ordered that this action be tried upon its merits.

Defendant objects thereto and appeals to Supreme Court, and assigns error.

*Hoyle & Hoyle, Pittman, Staton & Betts for plaintiff appellee.*

*Gavin, Jackson & Williams for defendant appellant.*

*724Per Curiam.

The previous action, a *habeas corpus*proceeding to determine the custody of the children of the marriage involved in the instant case, was heard by the trial judge who, sitting without a jury, found as a fact, among other things, that Nellie Grace Yow Wicker had not committed adultery with any person, and entered judgment in accordance therewith.

G.S. 50-10 requires that, in a divorce action, the material facts as to the grounds for divorce must be- found by a jury. *Carpenter v. Carpenter,*244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E. 2d 617.

Thus, it is patent that the order entered in the *habeas corpus*proceeding based on facts found by the trial judge is not *res judicata*to this action for divorce upon the ground of adultery.

Hence, the order from which appeal is taken is

Affirmed.
AO 440 (Rev. 12/09) Summons in a Civil Action

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

__________ District of __________ 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff

v. Civil Action No.

Defendant

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

To: (Defendant’s name and address)

A lawsuit has been filed against you.

Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you

are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney,

whose name and address are:

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. 

You also must file your answer or motion with the court.

CLERK OF COURT

Date:

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

Case 1:10-cv-00071-MP -GRJ Document 4 Filed 04/21/10 Page 1 of 2
AO 440 (Rev. 12/09) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)

Civil Action No.

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)

was received by me on (date) .

’ I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)

on (date) ; or

’ I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)

, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,

on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or

’ I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is

 designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)

on (date) ; or

’ I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or

’ Other (specify):

.

My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date:

Server’s signature

Printed name and title

Server’s address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

Case 1:10-cv-00071-MP -GRJ Document 4 Filed 04/21/10 Page 2 of 2
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Humphreys, O’ Brien and Senior Judge Bumgardner

ROSA CRUZ-GONZALEZ

v. Record No. 0016-15-2

STAR VALLEY PAINTING CONTRACTORS AND TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY/ MEMORANDUM OPINION * THE HARTFORD PER CURIAM JUNE 9, 2015 RUFINO CRUZ CORTES

v. Record No. 0017-15-2

STAR VALLEY PAINTING CONTRACTORS AND TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY/ THE HARTFORD

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION (E. Wayne Powell; Powell Law Group, P.C., on brief), for appellants. (John S. Honeycutt; Penn, Stua rt & Eskridge, on brief), for appellees.

Rosa Cruz-Gonzalez and Rufino Cruz Cortes (claimants) appeal a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissi on finding their claims for work ers’ compensation benefits are barred by the settlements of their third-party suits without th e knowledge and consent of Star Valley Painting Contractors and Twin City Fire Insurance Company/The Hartford (collectively appellees). On appeal, claimants contend the commission erred in: (1) finding appellees carried their burden of proving their lack of knowledge and lack of c onsent to the settlement and prejudice to their lien; (2) denying claimants’ “Motion for Show Cause and to Exclude

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - Evidence” based on the failure of Star Valley Painti ng Contractors (Star Valley) to appear or to provide materials in response to subpoenas; (3) finding there was prejudice to Twin City Fire Insurance Company (Twin City) “when there was a pending settlement of one of two third-party claims of which [appellees] had knowledge, so th at the issue of prejudice was not ripe for determination;” (4) finding there was prejudice to Twin City when Twin City “did not accept its status as [Star Valley]’s carrier, and in fact contested both its res ponsibility to [Star Valley], and the compensability of the claims so that the i ssue of prejudice was not ripe for determination;” and (5) “allowing counsel to argue that The Hart ford was prejudiced when Twin City had been declared the proper carrier, and there [was ] no evidence of the corporate or insurance relationship between . . . The Hartford and Twin C ity, so that The Hartford did not have standing

in the case.”

We have reviewed the record and the comm ission’s opinion and fi nd that these appeals are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the commission in its final opinion. See Cortes v. Star Valley Painti ng Contractors, VWC File No. VA02000012553 (Dec. 8, 2014); Cruz-Gonzalez v. Star Valley Painti ng Contractors, VWC File No. VA02000012555 (Dec. 8, 2014). We dispense with oral argumen t and summarily affirm because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in th e materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process. See Code § 17.1-403; Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.