This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 DONACIANO SALVADOR ARMIJO, 7 Petitioner-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 29,947 9 KELLY LYNN ARMIJO, 10 Respondent-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SIERRA COUNTY 12 Edmund H. Kase, III, Judge 13 Filosa & Filosa 14 Mark A. Filosa 15 Truth or Consequences, NM 16 for Appellee 17 Grace B. Duran 18 Las Cruces, NM 19 for Appellant 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 VIGIL, Judge. 22 Wife appeals from an order of the distri ct court denying her motion to set aside 23 the marital settlement agreement she made with Husband on grounds that the district 242 court did not comply with Rule1-053.2 NMRA. Rule 1-053.2 and Buffington v. 1 McGorty , 2004-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 23-24, 136 N.M. 226, 96 P.3d 787 require the district 2 court to independently revi ew and decide a party’s obj ections to the recommendations 3 of a domestic relations hearing officer. The di strict court did so. We therefore affirm. 4 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 5 Representing themselves, Husband and Wife jointly filed a petition for 6 dissolution of marriage. At the same time, they also filed a verified marital settlement 7 agreement, which divided their community property and debts. The district court 8 approved the marital settlement agreement and incorporated it into the final decree of 9 dissolution of marriage. 10 Wife then obtained an attorney who filed a motion for relief from judgment 11 under Rule 1-060(B) NMRA and a motion fo r division of property pursuant to NMSA 12 1978, Section 40-4-20 (1993). Wife sought to set aside the marital settlement 13 agreement on grounds of duress, coercion and undue influence, and to reopen the 14 matter for an equitable division of the community property and debts under Section 15 40-4-20. Husband also obtained counsel and responded to Wife’s motion by denying 16 the material allegations of Wife’s moti on and by filing a motion to dismiss on grounds 17 that Wife was required to file a separate, independentaction under Section 40-4-20. 18 Husband followed this with a motion for summary judgment based on the same 193 grounds, supported by a memorandum of law. Wife’s response to Husband’s motion 1 to dismiss and motion for summary judgment was that a new case number could be 2 administratively assigned to her motion without dismissal. 3 The district court entered an order assigning the case to a domestic relations 4 hearing officer pursuant to Rule 1-053.2. The hearing officer first considered 5 Husband’s motion for summary judgment and determined that Wi fe was required to 6 file a separate, independentaction insofar as she was seeking relief under Section 40- 7 4-20. The hearing officer th erefore entered a proposed order, which the district court 8 approved, dismissing Wife’s Section 40-4- 20 motion without prejudice. Wife does 9 not challenge this order on appeal. 10 The hearing officer then conducted an ev identiary hearing, denominated a trial 11 on the merits, on Wife’s Rule 1-060(B) moti on. Husband and Wife each testified in 12 support of their respective positions aboutthe circumstances surrounding formation 13 of the marital settlement agreement and its validity. In addition, Husband and Wife 14 submitted written briefs in support of their respective positions. After hearing the 15 evidence and considering the written briefs, the hearing officer recommended an order 16 which granted Wife’s Rule 1-060(B) motion. The proposed order contains no 17 findings or grounds for granting the moti on and simply recite s, “The [Wife’s] 18 requested relief from judgment under Rule 1-060[(B)] NMRA is well taken and is 194 granted.” The district court approved the pr oposed order, and it wa s filed as an order 1 of the district court on August 8, 2008. 2 On August 13, 2008, Husband filed a “noti ce of appeal” in the district court 3 “pursuant to Rule 1-053.1.” The “notice of appeal” asserts that the decision of the 4 hearing officer is not s upported by substantial evid ence and that Husband cannot 5 specifically address the objections to th e findings “since there were no findings” 6 setting forth the basis of the hearing officer’s recommendation. The district court held 7 a status conference concerning the “notice of appeal,” wh ich was treated by the court 8 and the parties as an objection to the hearing officer’s recommendation. At the status 9 conference, the parties agreedthat a trial de novo was not required and that in order 10 to resolve Husband’s objection and make its own determination, the district court 11 should only review the evidentiary record made before the hearing officer. Wife’s 12 counsel specifically stated that the matter had been fully litigated and that no 13 additional evidence was needed for the distri ct court to independently decide the Rule 14 1-060(B) motion. It was therefore agreed th at a transcript of the evidentiary hearing 15 held before the hearing officer would be prepared and that the parties would file 16 requested findings of fact and conclusions of law for review by the district court. A 17 formal order was filed reflecti ng this agreement and understanding. 185 The district court reviewed the transcriptof the evidentiary hearing held before 1 the hearing officer, considered the proposed findings of fact filed by the respective 2 parties, and filed its decision. Based on its review of the transcript, the district court 3 entered its own independent findings of f act and conclusions of law and concluded 4 that Wife’s motion for relief under Rule1-060 was not supporte d by a preponderance 5 of the evidence. The district court further concluded that the relief requested by Wife 6 pursuant to Section 40-4-20 was precluded by the summary judgment. Wife’s 7 motions were therefore denied. 8 Wife filed a motion to reconsider. Wi fe asserted that Husband’s “notice of 9 appeal” was a misnomer because he should have filed an objection to the hearing 10 officer’s recommendation pursuant to Rule 1- 053.2. In addition, Wife’s counsel for 11 the first time asserted her belief that the transcript was going to be reviewed by the 12 hearing officer to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law since he heard the 13 testimony first hand. Wife asserted that Rule 1-053.2 was being incorrectly applied 14 since she was being denied a hearing befo re the district court and denied of an 15 opportunity to present evidence to the distri ct court. Husband’s response was that at 16 the status conference before the district court, the parties had agreed that the “notice 17 of appeal” was in fact an objection and that Wife was not prejudiced by the title of the 18 pleading; that Wife’s counsel had specifically agreed that the district court should 196 review the transcript of the hearing held before the hearing officer and make its own 1 decision; that Wife had been given an opportunity to present additional evidence to 2 the district court, which she declined; and that Wife had failed to demonstrate any 3 prejudice. Wife’s reply asserted that becau se the hearing officer had not filed findings 4 of fact and conclusions of law, when the district court ordered the parties to file 5 requested findings of fact and conclusi ons of law, the case should have been 6 “recommitted” to the hearing officer, w ho had heard the evidence, observed the 7 witnesses, and was in the best position to ev aluate their credibility. The district court 8 denied Wife’s motion to reconsider, and Wife appeals. 9 DISCUSSION 10 Wife asks that we remand the case to th e district court for a trial de novo based 11 on several contentions. First, Wife notes that the “notice of appeal” incorrectly cited 12 to Rule 1-053.1 NMRA, which deals with special commissioners for domestic 13 violence, instead of Rule 1-053.2, which is the applicable rule. Second, Wife asserts 14 that the “notice of appeal” should never have been accepted as an objection to the 15 hearing officer’s recommendation because th e “notice of appeal” did not address a 16 specific objection, as required by Rule 1- 053.2(G), but made only a vague claim that 17 the recommended decision was not supported by the evidence. Third, Wife contends 18 that because the hearing officer heard the testimony and observed the demeanor of the 197 witnesses, the hearing officer was charge d with the responsibility of making findings 1 of fact and conclusions of law. Instead, Wi fe argues, the district court made findings 2 of fact and conclusions of law without c onducting an appropriate hearing, and without 3 explaining why he rejected the hearing officer’s recommendation. Finally, Wife 4 asserts that because the district court did not engage in a “mean ingful review” before 5 entering its findings of fact and conclusi ons of law, her rights to due process were 6 violated. 7 We reject Wife’s assertions. As to th e inaccurate citation to Rule 1-053.1, Wife 8 makes no argument that she was prejudiced. Further, we note that the provisions of 9 the two rules are identical in prescribing how a party objects to the recommendations 10 of a domestic relations hearing officer. Rule 1-053.1(G); Rule 1-053.2(G). As to 11 Wife’s remaining claims, Wife agreed to the entire procedure fo llowed in the district 12 court. Specifically, Wife agreed to treat Husband’s “notice of appeal” as an objection 13 to the hearing officer’s report under Rule 1- 053.2(G); Wife agreed that a trial de novo 14 in the district court was not necessary; Wife agreed that a review of the transcript of 15 the evidentiary hearing held before the h earing officer was sufficient for the district 16 court to resolve Husband’s obj ections and make its own determination of Wife’s Rule 17 1-060(B) motion; and on this basis, Wifefiled requested findings of fact and 18 conclusions of law “in support of the decision” of the hearing officer. In conformance 198 with the agreement of the parties, the district court reviewed the transcript of the 1 evidentiary hearing, reviewed the requested findings of fact of the parties, specifically 2 noting those that were rejected, and base d on this review madeits own findings of 3 fact, conclusions of law, and decision. Only after the district court rendered its 4 decision against Wife did she object to th e procedure that was followed with her 5 agreement. She also asserted for the firs t time that she had thought the hearing officer, 6 rather than the district court, was going to enter findings of f act and conclusions of 7 law. Under these circumstances, we do not address Wife’s arguments. See Cnty. of 8 Los Alamos v. Martinez , 2011-NMCA-027, ¶ 15, ___N.M.___, ___P.3d___ (declining 9 to address appellant’s contention to the extent it was based on an argument that 10 paramedic training contracts were not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining 11 where the appellant did not oppose a motion for summary judgment on this basis, and 12 in fact conceded that such contracts were mandatory subjects of bargaining) (citing 13 Spectron Dev. Lab. v. Am. Hollow Boring Co. , 1997-NMCA-025, ¶ 32, 123 N.M. 170, 14 936 P.2d 852 (“We review the case litigated belo w, not the case that is fleshed out for 15 the first time on appeal.”) (alteration omitte d) (internal quotation marks and citation 16 omitted); So. Union Gas Co. v. Cantrell , 57 N.M. 612, 615-16, 261 P.2d 645, 647 17 (1953) (“Courts look with favor upon stipulations designed to simplify, shorten, or 18 settle litigation and save time and costs to th e parties, and such stipulations will be 199 encouraged by the courts, and enforced by them, unless good cause is shown to the 1 contrary.”). 2 Wife next argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for 3 reconsideration. “We review the denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of 4 discretion.” Wilde v. Westland Dev. Co. , 2010-NMCA-085, ¶ 35, 148 N.M. 627, 241 5 P.3d 628. 6 We conclude no abuse of di scretion was committed. In Buffington , we held that 7 a district court has an obligation to i ndependently consider a hearing officer’s 8 recommendations and make a record which adequately sets forth the basis for its 9 decision. 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31. Consistent with Buffington , Subsection (H) of Rule 10 1-053.2 provides: 11 H. District court proceedings. After receipt of the 12 recommendations of the domestic relations hearing officer: 13 (1) Review of recommendations. 14 (a) The court shall review the recommendations 15 of the domestic relations hearing o fficer and determine whether to adopt 16 the recommendations. 17 (b) If a party files timely, specific objections to the 18 recommendations, the court shall c onduct a hearing appropriate and 19 sufficient to resolve the objections. The hearing shall consist of a review 20 of the record unless the court determines that additional evidence will aid 21 in the resolution of the objections. 22 (c) The court shall make an independent 23 determination of the objections. 24 (d) The court may adopt the recommendations, 2510 modify them, reject them in whole or in part, receive further evidence, 1 or may recommit them to the domestic relations hearing officer with 2 instructions. 3 (2) Findings and conclusions; en try of final order. After 4 the hearing, the court shall enter a final order. When required by Rule 5 1-052 NMRA, the court also shall enter findings and conclusions. 6 The district court was required to review the hearing officer’s recommendation and 7 independently determine whether to adopt the recommendation. It was required to do 8 so regardless of whether there was an objec tion to the recommendation. In this case, 9 the parties also agreed to treat Husband’s “notice of appeal” as an objection to the 10 hearing officer’s recommendation, and the partie s further agreed that the district court 11 would decide Husband’s objection after revi ewing the transcript of the evidentiary 12 hearing held before the hearing officer and considering the parties’ requested findings 13 of fact and conclusions of law. This procedure for deciding Husband’s objection is 14 expressly permitted by Rule 1-053.2. The procedure agreed upon was followed, and 15 the district court made its independent d ecision to deny Wife’s Rule 1-060(B) motion, 16 supported by its own findings of fact and c onclusions of law. A complete rejection 17 of the hearing officer’s recommendation after reviewing the record is also expressly 18 permitted by Rule 1-053.2. Thus, the district court actions conformed with the 19 requirements of Rule 1-053.2, and it did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife’s 20 motion to reconsider. 21 Wife’s argument in the alternative is that the case should be remanded to the 22 district court to state its reasons for setting aside the hearing officer’s 23 recommendation. The basis for this argumen t is Wife’s contention that the district 2411 court erred in not following the standard of review set forth inNMSA 1978, Section 1 40-4B-8(D) (1993) (stating the district court will set aside the decision of a child 2 support hearing officer “only if the decision is found to be: (1) arbitrary, capricious 3 or an abuse of discretion; (2) not supporte d by substantial evidence in the record as 4 a whole; or (3) otherwise not in accordance with law”). We reject this argument. 5 Subsection (I) of Rule 1-053.2 expressly states, “The court and child support hearing 6 officers acting pursuant to the Child Support Hearing Officer Act (Sections 40-4B-1 7 through 40-4B-10 NMSA 1978) and domesticrelations hearing officers acting 8 pursuant to Subparagraph (3) of Paragraph C of Rule 1-053.2 NMRA shall comply 9 with this rule notwithstanding any contrary provision of the Child Support Hearing 10 Officer Act.” The district court was require d to act in conformity with Rule 1-053.2, 11 and it did. 12 Wife’s final argument is that the final decree of dissolution of marriage should 13 be set aside under Rule 1-060(B). In maki ng this argument, Wife argues the facts in 14 the light most favorable to this result. Ho wever, it is not our function to re-weigh the 15 facts on appeal. “The reviewing court may not re[-]weigh the evidence or substitute 16 its judgment for that of the trier of fact. The issue is not whether there is evidence to 17 support an alternative result but, rather, whether the trial court’s result is supported by 18 substantial evidence.” Nosker v. Trinity Land Co. , 107 N.M. 333, 338, 757 P.2d 803, 19 808 (Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted). Rather, our reviewis limited to determining 2012 whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Wife’s Rule 1-060(B) 1 motion to set aside the final decree of dissolution of marriage. See Click v. Litho 2 Supply Co. , 95 N.M. 419, 420, 622 P.2d 1039, 1040 (1981) (“Relief under Rule [1- 3 0]60 is discretionary with the trial judge and will be reviewed only for an abuse of that 4 discretion.”). Wife does not contend that the district court findings of fact are not 5 supported by substantial evidence. In light of those findings, which we do not repeat 6 here, we are not convinced the district c ourt abused its discretion in denying Wife’s 7 Rule 1-060(B) motion. 8 CONCLUSION 9 The order of the district court is affirmed. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11

______________________________ 12 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 13 WE CONCUR: 14

_________________________________ 15 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 16

_________________________________ 17 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 18