J-S01009-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

IBRAHIM OUEDRAOGO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 549 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 9, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-14-SA-0000002-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JANUARY 13, 2022

Ibrahim Ouedraogo appeals from the judgment of sentence of a $300 

fine and costs following his conviction of a summary vehicle code violation. 

We affirm.

The trial court offered the following summary of the facts of this case:

On November 25, 2020, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper 

Jacob Brian Walker (“Trooper Walker”) was dispatched to the 

residence of Rick Allen Baer (“Baer”) to investigate property 

damage allegedly caused by a tractor trailer. Baer informed 

Trooper Walker that while in his residence, he heard the sound of 

a tractor trailer’s engine followed by loud popping and cracking

noises. Bear subsequently looked out of his window and saw a 

tractor trailer lodged against the pine trees that bordered his 

home. Baer testified that the tractor trailer had driven onto his 

property while attempting to make a left turn onto a narrow 

secondary road. The tractor trailer drove away as Baer 

approached the driver. In doing so, the tractor trailer broke 

approximately fifteen branches off of three pine trees and caused 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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significant damage to Baer’s lawn. Baer testified that as the 

tractor trailer fled the scene, he noticed the trailer’s Dollar General 

decal and was able to obtain a partial plate number.

Trooper Walker then contacted Werner Enterprises, who 

oversees Dollar General’s tractor trailers, and was informed that 

a Dollar General drop off had occurred at the Centre Hall Dollar

General on November 25, 2020 by Appellant. Trooper Walker 

spoke with Appellant on December 9, 2020. Appellant informed 

Trooper Walker that while en route to the Centre Hall Dollar 

General, his GPS took him to a “tight spot” that caused his right 

tires to go onto Baer’s yard. Appellant stated he did not report 

the accident out of fear that he would lose his newly obtained job 

with Werner Enterprises. Appellant further stated that he was 

unaware that any damage was done to Baer’s trees, as he could 

not hear any such noises over the sound of the tractor trailer’s 

engine.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/21, at 1-2 (cleaned up).

Upon this evidence, the trial court convicted Appellant of violating 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3745, which requires a motorist involved with an unattended vehicle 

or property to immediately stop and provide financial responsibility 

information to the owner. The trial court sentenced Appellant as indicated 

above, and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the 

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following question for our review: “Whether the 

[trial c]ourt erred in finding [Appellant] guilty where the admissible evidence 

was insufficient to prove every element of the charge.” Appellant’s brief at 3. 

We begin our consideration of Appellant’s question mindful of the following:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 
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a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

The statute at issue in the instant case provides as follows:

(a) General rule.--The driver of any vehicle which collides with 

or is involved in an accident with any vehicle or other property 

which is unattended resulting in any damage to the other vehicle 

or property shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the 

accident or as close thereto as possible and shall then and there 

either locate and notify the operator or owner of the damaged 

vehicle or other property of his name, address, information 

relating to financial responsibility and the registration number of 

the vehicle being driven or shall attach securely in a conspicuous 

place in or on the damaged vehicle or other property a written 

notice giving his name, address, information relating to financial 

responsibility and the registration number of the vehicle being 

driven and shall without unnecessary delay notify the nearest 

office of a duly authorized police department. Every stop shall be 

made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

(b) Penalty.--A violation of this section is a summary offense, 

punishable by a fine of $300 or imprisonment for not more than 

90 days, or both.
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75 Pa.C.S. § 3745. Further, as Appellant and the Commonwealth 

acknowledge, § 3745 is not a strict liability crime. A conviction under this 

statute requires not only proof of a collision and damage to unattended 

property, but also proof that the offender knew or should have known that 

such a collision occurred. See Appellant’s brief at 9-10; Commonwealth’s 

brief at 13. See also Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 470 A.2d 634 

(Pa.Super. 1983) (holding that, though not express, a prior statute penalizing 

leaving the scene of an accident involving unattended property contained the 

requirement that the driver “knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care 

should know” that he had been involved in such an accident); Hunt v. Com., 

Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety, 327 A.2d 392, 394 (Pa.Cmwlth. 

1974) (noting that “scienter is a necessary element in the proof of violation 

of” a predecessor to § 3745). 

The trial court offered the following explanation for its assessment that 

the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction:

Instantly, Appellant failed to negotiate a curve and caused 

damage to Baer’s property. Appellant admitted that he did not 

contact Baer to provide his information. Further, despite his 

obligation to do so, Appellant left the scene of the accident without 

contacting the police. Trooper Walker had to actively seek out 

Appellant and was only able to find Appellant by contacting his 

employer, approximately fourteen days after the incident 

occurred. Appellant testified that after being provided Trooper 

Walker’s phone number by his employer, he left several voicemails

which went unanswered; however, Trooper Walker testified he 

had not received any voicemails from Appellant. Upon speaking 

with Trooper Walker, Appellant stated that his right tires went 

through Baer’s property and that he wasn’t surprised he had hit 

the tree branches. Appellant stated he did not contact Baer or the 
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police following the incident out of fear he’d lose his job. At trial, 

Appellant again testified that he could not hear the sound of the 

tree branches breaking over the noise of the tractor trailer’s 

engine. The [trial] court found Appellant’s testimony credible; 

however, found it did not excuse Appellant from knowing whether 

his vehicle came into contact with other items. Appellant was 

aware that his tractor trailer had driven onto the property of Baer. 

Knowing there was, at minimum, damage to Baer’s lawn, 

Appellant should have made an effort to fully assess the damage 

he caused, especially when the sound of the tractor trailer’s 

engine made it more difficult for Appellant to fully assess the level 

of destruction he may have caused. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/21, at 4 (cleaned up).

Appellant does not dispute that he caused damage to Baer’s property 

during the incident in question. Rather, Appellant attacks the Commonwealth 

evidence concerning the mens rea element of the offense. Specifically, 

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he “knew, or 

in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that his vehicle had 

been involved in an accident.” Appellant’s brief at 11. Appellant contends 

that there was no evidence that suggested that he was alerted to the collision 

with the pine trees, such as testimony that the branches caused any 

movement of the tractor trailer, that the branches were visible in the truck’s 

mirrors, or that the breaking of the branches was audible above the sound of 

the vehicle’s engine. Id. Finally, Appellant argues that, while the trial court 

assumed that there was tire damage to Baer’s lawn, there was no evidence of 

actual damage to the lawn to support the trial court’s finding. Id. at 12. 

We disagree. First, contrary to Appellant’s contention on appeal, Baer 

indeed testified that Appellant’s large vehicle left tire marks in the lawn, up to 
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the wooden planters that surround the pine trees that are ten feet from the 

road. See N.T. Trial., 4/9/21, at 9-10, 12. Tire tracks on a lawn constitute 

damage to unattended property under the vehicle code. See Hunt, supra at 

394 (indicating that a violation of a predecessor statute was established by 

driver’s knowledge that he damaged a lawn). 

Second, although the trial court believed Appellant’s testimony that he 

did not have actual knowledge of the damage he caused to the trees because 

the vehicle’s engine was so loud, Appellant’s willful ignorance does not render 

him immune to a conviction under § 3745. In ruling that hit-and-run 

convictions may rest upon proof that a driver exercising reasonable care 

should have known of the accident, the Kauffman Court observed: “To hold 

otherwise would advise drivers to remain oblivious, howsoever unreasonably, 

to the effects of their driving on fellow motorists.” Kauffman, supra at 640. 

Baer testified that, from inside his house, he heard “loud popping 

cracking noises” and “snaps and cracks” when Appellant broke branches up to 

two inches in diameter and four and one-half feet in length from the three old 

pine trees that were over twenty feet tall. Id. at 6-11. Appellant’s vehicle 

trailed debris from the collision behind him as he pulled away, leaving damage 

that was “very prevalent.” Id. at 10-11. Had Appellant exercised reasonable 

care, he would have readily ascertained the damage he caused to the trees. 

Stated differently, Appellant’s decision to drive away under these 

circumstances without undergoing even a cursory inspection of what effect his 
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intrusion onto Baer’s land had was not reasonable. Hence, we conclude that 

the trial court’s finding that Appellant in the exercise of reasonable care should 

have known that he damaged Baer’s trees, as well as his lawn, is supported 

by reasonable inferences made from the Commonwealth’s evidence. 

Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to prove the mens rea element of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt and no relief is due.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/13/2022