IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

INNA MEDNIKOVA and VYACHESLAV AVADAYEV, Respondents,

MARE MORSE and MARTIN MORSE, Appellants. No. 70863-5- DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED FILED: August 18. 2014 o

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Cox, J. — Mare and Martin Morse (collectively "Morse") appeal the trial court's order denying her motion to set aside an order ofdefault. Morse also appeals the trial court's order ofdefaultjudgment, findings offact and conclusions of law, and the order denying her motion for reconsideration. Morse contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not set aside the order of default or vacate the defaultjudgment based on the fact that she believed her insurance company would respond to the summons and complaint. She also asserts that the defaultjudgment is not supported by substantial evidence.No. 70863-5-1/2
The decision on a motion to set aside an order ofdefault lies within the sound discretion ofthe trial court.1 Likewise, whetherto vacate a default 

### judgmentis also left to the sound discretion ofthe court.2 A trial court's decision 

### will not be disturbed unless it plainlyappears such discretion has been abused.3 "The reasonability ofthe damage award is a question offact reviewed for abuse ofdiscretion."4 Here, Mare Morse fails in her burden to show thatthe trial court abused its discretion in any respect. We affirm. On May 11, 2010, Morse caused an automobile collision which resulted in injuries to Inna Mednikova. Omni Insurance, Morse's insurer, conducted settlement negotiations with Mednikova's attorney from 2010 to 2013. The negotiations were not successful. As the three-year statute oflimitations approached, Mednikova commenced this action on May 7, 2013 by filing a summons and complaint. The 

### next day, a process server personally served Morse with copies ofthese documents. Morse failed to respond to the summons and complaintwithin the 20-day 

### period following service on May 8, 2013. Inher declaration, she testified that she did not "personally take any action after receiving the paperwork."

1 In re Estate ofStevens. 94 Wn. App. 20, 29, 971 P.2d 58 (1999). 2White v. Holm. 73 Wn.2d 348, 351, 438 P.2d 581 (1968). 3]a\ 4Aecon Bldas.. Inc. v. Vandermolen Constr. Co.. Inc., 155Wn. App. 733, 742, 230 P.3d 594 (2009).No. 70863-5-1/3 Mednikova moved for an order ofdefault, which the court granted on May 31,2013. This record reflects that Omni Insurance, Morse's insurer, "first became
aware that its insured, Mare Morse, had been served with the Summons and Complaint on or about June 13, 2013." Otherthan Morse's admission that she took no action after being served, there is nothing in this record to explain what happened between the May 8 date ofservice and the June 13 date on which Omni Insurance became aware of service on its insured. Omni Insurance then retained counsel for Morse, who filed a notice of appearance on June 21. Thereafter, Morse moved to set aside the order of default. At the hearing on this motion, the trial court also considered Mednikova's motion for entry of a defaultjudgment against Morse. The trial court denied Morse's motion to set aside the order of default. It also entered a defaultjudgmenttogetherwith findings offact and conclusions of law. Morse moved for reconsideration ofthese orders, which the trial court denied. Morse appeals. ORDER OF DEFAULT Morse argues that the trial court abused its discretion when itdenied her motion to set aside the order ofdefault. Because she failed to establish good cause, we disagree.No. 70863-5-1/4 The decision on a motion to set aside an order ofdefault lies within the sound discretion ofthe trial court.5 "That decision will not be reversed on appeal 

### unless itplainly appears that the trial court abused itsdiscretion."6 Atrial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on 

### untenable grounds or reasons.7 Under CR 55, "Ifthe defendantfails to appear, the plaintiff first obtains an 

### orderfinding the defendantto be in default, and then obtains a default judgment."8 "An order (or more accurately, a finding) of default is the official 

### recognition that a party is in default, and is a prerequisite to the entry of judgment

on that default."9 

### Under CR 55(c)(1), a court may set aside an order ofdefault upon a showing of good cause. To show good cause underthis rule, a party may 

### demonstrate excusable neglect and due diligence.10 Here, it is undisputed that Mednikova properly served Morse. It is also 

### undisputed that Morse didnothing with the summons and complaint after service.

5Stevens, 94 Wn. App. at 29. 6lcL 7idL 

### 814 Karl B.Tegland, Washington Practice: Civil Procedure § 9:23 (2d ed. 2013). 94 Karl B.Tegland, Washington Practice: Rules Practice CR 55 author's cmts. (6th ed. 2013). 10 Stevens, 94 Wn. App. at 30.No. 70863-5-1/5 Her declaration states that she "did not personally take any action after receiving the paperwork." This is the record that was before the trial court to determine whether Morse metthe burden ofestablishing good cause. Morse argues that the trial court abused its discretion when itrejected her argument that there was good cause to set aside the order ofdefault. She asserts that herfailure to appearwas based upon excusable neglect and that she was diligent in asking for relieffrom the order ofdefault. Ifwe determine there was no excusable neglect, we need not considerwhether she was diligent 

### inseeking relief.11 Inher declaration supporting the motion to set aside the order ofdefault, 

### Morse gave two reasons why she did not take any action after service ofthe
summons and complaint. First, she asserts the process servertold herthat she 

### "need not worryabout [the documents]" because they were "onlyfor a 'tort.'" This makes no sense. The plain language ofthe summons requires an answer 

### to the complaint within 20 days ofservice. Why Morse would ignore this plain language based on the alleged representation of a process serveris left unexplained. The trial courtwas reasonably entitled to rejectthis excuse as not establishing good cause. We also note that Mednikova submitted a declaration from the process server, which stated that he "never" tells any defendants thatthey should not 

### worryaboutthe documents he serves. The trial court was also reasonably

11 See id.No. 70863-5-1/6 entitled to believe the process server and disbelieve Morse to support its rejection ofthis first excuse. Second, Morse contends that she did not take any action because her 

### insurance company was handling the claim. Thus, she believed thatthe 

### insurance company would "continue to act on [her] behalfand to protect [her] interests." This excuse is also not persuasive. Why Morse would fail to do 

### anything withthe summons and complaint after service and think her insurer would not need to know about service is also left unexplained. Ifanything, 

### providing the insurerwith this new information would seem the more probable
course in view ofthe fact that itwas then acting on herbehalf. The trial court 

### was reasonably entitled to rejectthis excuse as lacking good cause. In Johnson v. Cash Store, Division Three reached a similar conclusion 

### regarding the entry of a defaultjudgment.12 There, the Cash Store's manager 

### was personally served with a summons and complaint.13 "Because she thought the documents were irrelevantto Cash Store business, [the manager] explained, 

### she never informed the company's administration or its legal counsel that she had received them."14 The manager also did not respond to the notice of the 

### default hearing, and there was nothing in the record to explain whatshe did with that notice.15



### 12 116 Wn. App. 833, 848-49, 68 P.3d 1099 (2003). 13jd, at 839. 14jd, at 848. 15 Id.No. 70863-5-1/7 The court explained that the manager's "failure to forward the summons and complaintto corporate counsel or to the
. . . administration—and her 

### unexplained failure to forward the notice ofthe default hearing—constituted at 

### least inexcusable neglect, ifnotwillful noncompliance."16 The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Cash Store's motion 

### to vacate the defaultjudgment.17 Like Cash Store, Morse's failure to forward the summons and complaintto 

### her insurance company amounted to inexcusable neglect. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when itrejected this excuse as lacking good cause. The cases on which Morse relies to argue good cause are distinguishable because the defendants in those cases showed that there was a 

### misunderstanding as opposed to the inexcusable neglect in this case. In Norton v. Brown, Division Three explained that "[a] genuine 

### misunderstanding between an insured and his insurer as to who is responsible for answering the summons and complaintwill constitute a mistake forpurposes 

### ofvacating a defaultjudgment."18 Thisprinciple has been stated in a number of other cases.19

16 hi at 848-49. 17 id, at 849. 

### 18 99 Wn.App. 118, 124, 992 P.2d 1019 (1999) (emphasis added). 19 See Akhavuz v. Moody. 178 Wn. App. 526, 538, 315 P.3d 572 (2013); 

### Gutz v. Johnson, 128 Wn. App. 901,919, 117 P.3d 390 (2005); Bergerv, Dishman Dodge. Inc., 50 Wn. App. 309, 312, 748 P.2d 241 (1987); Calhoun v. Merritt, 46 Wn. App. 616, 621, 731 P.2d 1094 (1986).No. 70863-5-1/8 In Norton, the court concluded that the defendant's failure to respond to a 

### summons and complaintwas excusable neglect.20 The court explained: [The defendant] was underthe impression that his interests were being protected by his insurer through settlement negotiations. His insurerdidnotwarn [the defendant]thata lawsuitwas being commencedorthathe shouldexpectservice ofa summons andcomplaintandthatthepaperworkshouldbe immediately forwarded to the insurer. The court concluded that [the defendant] was confused about what to do with the summons and complaint. This was a mistake on the part ofthe insurer and 

### excusable neglect on the part of [the defendant].[21] In Calhoun v. Merritt, a case that Norton cites, Division Three also concluded that a misunderstanding between an insured and insurer about what 

### to do with a summons and complaint "constituted a bonafide mistake."22 The court explained: As stated in [the defendant's] affidavit, the fact that his insurerwas 

### already involved inthe case and dealing with [the plaintiff's] attorney caused him to believe thatthe insurer knew ofthe lawsuit and would respond to it. While[the insurance adjuster]advised 

### [the defendant]to expectservice, there is no indication thathe toldhim what to do once service occurred.^ Here, unlike Norton and Calhoun, Morse's declaration does not explain 

### what the insurance company told or did not tellher aboutthe possibility of being served with a summons and complaint.24 There is simply nothing inthe record to

20 Norton. 99 Wn. App. at 124. 

### 21 [d (emphasis added). 2246Wn. App. 616, 621,731 P.2d 1094(1986). 

### 23 id, (emphasis added). 24 See Norton, 99 Wn. App. at 124; Calhoun, 46 Wn. App. at 621. 8No. 70863-5-1/9 determine whetherthere was any genuine misunderstanding between the insured and insurer. More importantly, the trial court was reasonably entitled to conclude that Morse's failure to forward the summons and complaint to her insurance company was inexcusable neglect for the reasons already discussed.25 Additionally, Norton and Calhoun can be traced backto the supreme court 

### case, White v. Holm,which is also distinguishable from this case.26 InWhite, the supreme court held that the trial court abused its discretion when itdenied the defendant's motion to vacate the defaultjudgment entered 

### against him.27 There, the defendantfailed to appear because there was a misunderstanding about who would representthe defendant until insurance 

### coverage was determined.28 The defendant believed that the insurance company would appear on his behalf, but the insurance company believed that a 

### personal attorney would representthe defendant.29 Notably, the defendant had been incommunication with the insurance company and "immediately relayed"

25 See Cash Store, 116 Wn. App. at 848-49. 

### 26 Norton, 99 Wn. App. at 125 (citing Calhoun, 46 Wn. App. at 621); 

### Calhoun, 46 Wn. App. at 621 (citing White v. Holm, 73 Wn.2d 348, 438 P.2d 581 (1968)). 27White, 73 Wn.2d at 357. 28 id, at 349-50. 29 Id.No. 70863-5-1/10 

### the summons and complaint to the insurance adjuster.30 The court concluded that vacation ofthe defaultjudgmentwas warranted because there was a "bona 

### fide mistake, inadvertence, and surprise" given the misunderstanding.31 Here, unlike White, Morse did nottake any action after receiving the legal 

### papers.32 There is no showing here of a "bona fide mistake, inadvertence, [or] surprise."33 Thus, the trial court was wellwithin its discretion when itconcluded that there was no good cause to set aside the order ofdefault. Morse argues that Mednikova's attorney failed to make the insurance company aware ofthe lawsuit despite two years ofcommunications and that Mednikova's attorney purposefully evaded communication with the insurance 

### company. As to the first point, there was no duty ofcounsel that we know of to separately advise the insurer ofthe lawsuit. Service on the insured was sufficient. As to the second point, even ifthis assertion is true (and we make no 

### determination of this point), the proper inquiry is whether Morse's failure to 

### appearwas excusable neglect. This inquiry isfocused on Morse's actions, not the actions ofother persons.34 There is simply no showing that counsel's actions had any impact on Morse's decision to ignore service ofprocess.

30 id, at 350. 

### 31 id, at 355. 32 See id, at 349-50. 33 Id. at 355. 

### 34 See Norton, 99 Wn. App. at 125 ("Asmentioned above, a review ofthe 

### transcript of the court's oral decision on reconsideration makes it clear that the courtfocused more on the insurance company's failure to contact [the defendant] 10No. 70863-5-1/11 To supportthe assertion that other persons' actions are relevant, Morse 

### cites Morin v. Burris.35 Butthat case is distinguishable and does not control. There, the plaintiffserved the defendantwith a summons and complaint afterthey were involved in a motor vehicle collision and could not reach a 

### settlement.36 The defendant promptly informed his insurance company aboutthe papers, and he assumed thatthe insurance company would take care ofthe 

### suit.37 When the insurance company contacted the plaintiff's attorney, the attorney's paralegal did not inform the insurance company that the plaintiffhad obtained an order ofdefault.38 The supreme court explained, "Ifthe [defendant's] representative acted with diligence, and the failure to appearwas induced by [plaintiff's] counsel's efforts to conceal the existence of litigation underthe limited circumstances we 

### have described above, then the [defendant's] failure to appearwas excusable



### than it did on any excusable neglect on [the defendant's] part. Because the case lawdoes not supportthe trialcourt's conclusion, this was an abuse of discretion."). 

### 35 Brief of Appellant at 12-13 (citing Morin v. Burris. 160 Wn.2d 745, 161 P.3d 956 (2007)). 36 Morin, 160 Wn.2d at 751. 37 id, 38 Id.
11No. 70863-5-1/12 

### underequity and CR 60."39 Because the trial court had not considered this issue, the supreme court remanded the case forfurther consideration.40 That case is factually distinguishable from this case because there is no showing that Morse promptly contacted her insurance company after she was served with the summons and complaint. She admits she did nothing with those papers. Additionally, Mednikova's attorney did not directly communicate with Morse's insurance company and lead it to believe that Mednikova had not already obtained an order ofdefault. Thus, Morin has no bearing on this case. The order ofdefault stands. DEFAULT JUDGMENT Morse next argues that the defaultjudgment should not have been entered because the order ofdefault is unenforceable. For the reasons we 

### previously discussed in this opinion, the orderofdefaultwas properly entered. It stands because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that there was no good cause to vacate it. 

### Morse also asserts thatthe defaultjudgment should be vacated under CR 60(b)(1) and White. We disagree. 

### Defaultjudgments are generally disfavored because the law favors determination ofcontroversies on their merits.41 "'But we also value an

39 Id, at 759. 40 id, 41 Akhavuz, 178 Wn. App. at 532.

12No. 70863-5-1/13 organized, responsive, and responsiblejudicial system where litigants acknowledge thejurisdiction ofthe courtto decide their cases and comply with 

### court rules.'"42 "When balancing these competing policies, the fundamental principle iswhetheror notjustice is being done."43 An appellate courtwill not reverse the trial court's decision on a motion to 

### vacate a defaultjudgmentunless "an abuse of discretion clearly appears."44 UnderWhite, a trial court must considerfourfactors when exercising its discretion.45 The primary factors are: (1) the existence ofsubstantial evidence to support, at least prima facie, a defense to the claim asserted; (2) the reason for the party's failure to timely appear, i.e., whether it was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 

### neglect. The secondary factors are: (3) the party's diligence in asking for relief following notice ofthe entry ofthe default; and (4) 

### the effect of vacating the judgment on the opposing party.[46] "These factors vary in dispositive significance."47 Ifa defendant has a strong defense, the otherfactors are notas significant.48 "But ifthe party can show only



### 42 Id,(quoting Little v. King, 160 Wn.2d 696, 703, 161 P.3d 345 (2007)); see also Morin, 160 Wn.2d at 759 ("[W]hen served with a summons and 

### complaint, a party must appear. There must be some potential costto 

### encourage parties to acknowledge the court'sjurisdiction."). 43 Akhavuz. 178 Wn. App. at 532. 44 Calhoun. 46 Wn. App. at 619. 45 id, (citing White, 73 Wn.2d at 352). 46 id, (citing White, 73 Wn.2d at 352). 47 Jd, 48 Id.
13No. 70863-5-1/14

a minimal prima facie defense, the courtwillscrutinize the other considerations 

### more carefully."49 Forthe first factor, Morse argues that she established a prima facie defense with respect to damages. She does not argue that she has a defense to liability. Morse cites Calhoun to support her argument regarding her defense to 

### damages.50 There, Division Three explained that it is difficult to establish a prima facie 

### defense to damages without the ability to conduct discovery.51 "Moreover, presenting a defense to damages for pain and suffering is always complicated by 

### the subjective as opposed to objective nature of such damages."52 The court concluded that itwas "inequitable and unjust to deny the motion to vacate the 

### damage portion ofthejudgment on the ground that [the defendant] did not 

### present a prima facie defense."53 Consequently, the court looked to the other three factors set out in White.54 Because Morse asserts that she has a defense to damages, like Calhoun,
we also look to the otherthree factors. Here, Morse's failure to establish the

49 id, 

### 50 Brief ofAppellants at 20-21 (citing Calhoun, 46 Wn. App. at 620-21). 51 Calhoun, 46 Wn. App. at 620. 

### 52 id, 53 id, at 620-21. 54 id, at 621.

14No. 70863-5-1/15 

### second factor is dispositive.55 For the second factor, Morse fails to establish that her untimely appearance was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglectfor the reasons already discussed. Even if Morse can establish the third and fourth factors—that she was diligent in asking for relieffollowing notice ofthe entry ofdefault and that Mednikova would not suffer a substantial hardship ifthe defaultjudgmentwas vacated—these secondary factors do not outweigh herfailure to establish the second factor, which is a primary factor. Given Morse's failure to establish the second factor, a primary factor, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to vacate the default judgment. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 

### Morse separately claims thatthe defaultjudgment is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. 

### As an initial matter and as previously noted, Morse expressly admitted to the trial court that she does not have a defense to liability. In her response to 

### Mednikova's motion to enter a defaultjudgment, Morse stated, "While DefendantMare Morse does nothavea primafacie defense as to liability 

### forcausing the motorvehicleaccident, [Morse does] have a defense to the 

### damages being asserted."56 In Morse's CR 59 motion for reconsideration, the

55 See Akhavuz, 178 Wn. App. at 540 (explaining that "[inexcusable 

### neglect is the dispositivefactor that should have guided thetrial court to deny the motion to vacate"). 56 Clerk's Papers at 92 (emphasis added). 15No. 70863-5-1/16 

### primary focus ofher assertions was that she has a defense to damages, not liability. Given these prior admissions regarding liability, Morse does not have a 

### defense to liability. Having presented no defense, the defaultjudgment regarding 

### liability must stand.57 The issue is whetherthe damages portion ofthejudgment is supported by substantial evidence. Under CR 55(b)(2), a defaultjudgment may be entered after an order of default as follows: "When Amount Uncertain. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account orto determine the amount ofdamages orto establish the truth of 

### any averment by evidence or to make an investigation ofany other matter, the court may conduct such hearings as are deemed necessary or, when required by statute, shall have such matters resolved by a jury. Findings offact and conclusions of law are 

### required underthis subsection."^ "[Fallowing default, the trial court must conduct a reasonable inquiry to 

### determine the amount of damages."59 "The reasonability of the damage award is a question of fact reviewed forabuse ofdiscretion."60

57 See Little, 160Wn.2d at 704. 58 Shepard Ambulance, Inc. v. Helsell. Fetterman. Martin. Todd & 

### Hokanson, 95 Wn. App. 231, 240, 974 P.2d 1275 (1999) (quoting CR 55(b)(2)). 59 Smith v. Behr Process Corp.. 113 Wn. App. 306, 333, 54 P.3d 665 (2002) (citing CR 55(b)(2)). 60 Aecon Bldgs., 155 Wn. App. at 742.
16No. 70863-5-1/17
In Shepard Ambulance. Inc. v. Helsell, Fetterman, Martin, Todd & Hokanson, this court explained that a trial court has "discretion to vacate the damages portion of a defaultjudgmenteven where no meritorious defense [to 

### liability] is established."61 That case involved a legal malpractice claimagainst the defendant's law firm for failing to timely file a motion to vacate a default 

### judgment.62 This courtexplained that the "standard for when to vacate damages 

### awards from defaultjudgments is the same as the standard for setting aside 

### awards ofdamages fromtrials."63 "Thus, the default award here could be vacated ifthere were not substantial evidence to support the award of 

### damages.'"64 "Evidence is substantial ifit is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, 

### rational person of the truth of the declared premise."65 Here, the trial court awarded the following damages:

3. Medical Bills: $15,063.47 

### 4. LostWages: $1,204 5. Pain and Suffering: $28,000



### 61 95 Wn. App. 231, 241, 974 P.2d 1275 (1999). 62 id, at 237. 

### 63 Fowler v. Johnson, 167 Wn. App. 596, 606, 273 P.3d 1042 (2012) (citingShepard, 95 Wn. App. at 241-42). 64 id, (quoting Shepard. 95 Wn. App. at 242). 65 Shepard, 95 Wn. App. at 242.
17No. 70863-5-1/18 6. Loss ofConsortium and Loss of Services: $14,000 7. Other Recovery (towing): $241.00 

### 8. Principal JudgmentAmount: $58,508.47t66] The medical bills show thatthey supportthat award. Mednikova 

### submitted a letter from her employer, which supports the lostwages award. She also submitted a towingbill, which supports "other recovery." We take thatto supportthe towing charge. 

### For the pain and suffering and loss of consortium and loss ofservice awards, Mednikova submitted a declaration that states: 

### Myfamily life suffered as well. Iam a wife, a mother, and a 

### grandmother to athree-year-old granddaughter. For many months afterthe accident, Iwas unable to cookfor my family, clean the 

### house, grocery shop and perform other household duties. Icould nottake care of mygranddaughter—itwas very hard to not be able 

### to playwith her. Notonly did myhusband have to do all of our household chores for months, but he also suffered from my inability 

### to perform my spousal duties for quite a long time. Iam an avid dancer. Ilove to take long walks. Prior to the accident, Iused to take 1 to 2 hour walks almostevery day. For a long time afterthe accident Iwas not able to continue with these activities, and even 

### now Ican'twalk for long periods of time. My dancing suffered as 

### well. Being in a car accident has interrupted the normal course of my life and caused me a lotof pain as well as financial and other 

### problems. Ibelieve thatIamentitled to afaircompensation bythe peoplewho caused my accident.[67] The determination of an award for pain and suffering and loss of consortium and 

### loss of services ishighly subjective.68 But, as counselproperly conceded atoral

66 Clerk's Papers at 235. 67 id, at 61. 68 See Calhoun, 46 Wn. App. at 620.
18No. 70863-5-1/19 

### argument of this case, there need not be a specification ofthe amount of damages soughtfor recovery for pain and suffering. Given the amount awarded here and Mednikova's declaration, we conclude thatthe pain and suffering award

was reasonable. Morse cites no authority that the awards inthis case are excessive. Rather, Morse contends thatthere is no evidence to supportthe pain and suffering and the loss of consortium and loss of services award. But, as previously discussed, Mednikova submitted a declaration to support these awards. Thus, the assertion that there was no evidence to support these awards is incorrect. Morse also asserts that there is no evidence to supportthe fact that Mednikova is legally married and thus entitled to a loss ofconsortium award. But


### as Mednikova correctly points out, Morse did not make this specific argumentto the trial court. Thus, the argument was not preserved for appeal. 

### Finally, Morse argues thatthere is not substantial evidence to supportthe medical bills and lost wages award. She contends that the bills are unauthenticated, and there is no evidence to prove the "reasonableness and 

### necessity" ofthe bills. Further, she asserts thatthe letter from Mednikova's 

### employer is not convincing because itdoes not state the reason for her absence. 

### Butthese arguments go to the weight of the evidence, not itsadmissibility. The evidence is substantial "if it is sufficientto persuade a fair-minded, rational

19No. 70863-5-1/20 

### person of the truth of the declared premise."69 As previously discussed, the evidence meets this standard for those awards. In sum, there is substantial evidence to support the amount of damages awarded. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in enteringjudgmentfor these amounts. ATTORNEY FEES Mednikova requests an award ofher reasonable attorney fees and costs associated with this appeal pursuantto RAP 18.1. But Mednikova provides no 

### legal basis for awarding attorneyfees. Thus, we deny her request. Costs are awarded to the prevailing party, subjectto compliance with the RAPs. 

### We affirm thejudgment and deny the requestfor an award ofattorney fees.

WE CONCUR: 

# I

69 Shepard, 95 Wn. App. at 242.
20 

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