NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-2628

___________

LATIFULLAH OBEDULLAH,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent

____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A093-330-060)

Immigration Judge: Honorable Dorothy Harbeck

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 19, 2012

Before: SCIRICA, VANASKIE and COWEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 28, 2013)

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM

Latifullah Obedullah petitions for review of a decision of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA). For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review.

Obedullah, a native of Afghanistan, entered the United States in May 2008 as a 
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nonimmigrant visitor. In March 2009, he was charged as removable for overstaying his 

admission period and failing to comply with the conditions of his nonimmigrant status. 

He conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He asserted that he would be persecuted 

in Afghanistan based on his father’s military history and opposition to the Taliban. After 

a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief after finding Obedullah not credible. 

Obedullah filed an appeal and a motion to remand.

The BIA dismissed Obedullah’s appeal. It found no clear error in the IJ’s adverse 

credibility finding and concluded that Obedullah had not met his burden to establish 

eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. A.R. at 5. As for the motion to remand, 

the BIA determined that Obedullah had not shown that the evidence he submitted was not 

previously available or would change the outcome of his case. Obedullah filed a timely 

petition for review.

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. To establish eligibility for asylum, 

Obedullah needed to demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 

persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion. See Wang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 2005). To 

establish eligibility for withholding of removal, he needed to demonstrate that it was 

more likely than not that his life or freedom would be threatened in Afghanistan on 

account of a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). To be eligible for withholding 

of removal under the Convention Against Torture, he needed to demonstrate that it is 
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more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to Afghanistan. 8 C.F.R. § 

1208.16(c)(2). We may not reverse the BIA’s decision unless the record evidence would 

compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Obedullah had met his burden. I.N.S. v. 

Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). We must uphold the adverse credibility 

finding unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 

contrary. Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen.

Obedullah argues that the adverse credibility determination was not supported by 

substantial evidence. First, he contends that the BIA wrongly concluded that he had 

omitted from his original declaration a significant incident in which he secured his 

father’s release from the Taliban. However, the declaration he cites to in support of this 

argument is from his supplemental declaration. His original declaration made no mention 

of the incident. The BIA noted that:

, 411 F. 3d 135, 153 (3d Cir. 2005).

When asked to explain the omission, the respondent first stated that the 

person assisting him with his application would select the incidents for him.

Later, he explained that he only remembered the incident when he 

completed his application, but that it was emotionally difficult to discuss.

Later, he stated that there was only so much he could tell his attorney in 1-2

hours.

A.R. at 4 (citations omitted). The BIA also noted that Obedullah’s father did not mention 

this incident in his affidavit. The affidavit of Obedullah’s psychotherapist is not 

corroborative because it is not based on personal knowledge; she was merely relating 

what Obedullah told her. The BIA did not err in relying on this omission in upholding 

the adverse credibility finding.
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Next, Obedullah contends that the BIA failed to properly consider his explanation 

for an inconsistency between his testimony and his written statement regarding whether 

he had ever been arrested. The BIA observed:

For instance, the respondent also stated in his 1-589 application that he had 

never been arrested. However, on direct, the respondent testified that he 

was arrested and detained when he was 8-years-old. The respondent first 

explained the inconsistency by stating that he was only asked for 

information from the last ten-years, then he stated that his attorney told him

he did not have to include every event, later he stated that he did not 

include the arrest because he was not “doing so well [emotionally]” in 

detention.

A.R. at 4 (citations omitted). Obdeullah points to statements by his psychotherapist and 

Naser Moborez as corroboration. However, the psychotherapist merely states that 

Obedullah reported this incident to her. Moborez’s statement was submitted to the BIA 

with Obedullah’s motion to remand; it was not before the IJ. Furthermore, Moborez does 

not state that he has any personal knowledge as to the incident, only that the attempts 

made against Obedullah and his family are common knowledge. It was not improper for 

the BIA to rely on this inconsistency in upholding the adverse credibility finding. 

Finally, Obedullah asserts that the BIA failed to meaningfully consider his posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in evaluating his credibility. The BIA rejected 

Obedullah’s argument that the IJ failed to consider his PTSD. A.R. at 4 n.2. The IJ 

thoroughly summarized the testimony of the clinical social worker who evaluated 

Obedullah. A.R. at 74-76. In discussing the credibility determination, the IJ explicitly 

noted Obedullah’s testimony on cross-examination that some inconsistencies were 
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because events were “emotionally difficult” and he was “not doing well” in detention 

when he completed his application. A.R. at 82.

Obedullah argues that the BIA failed to consider the attempts his counsel made to 

have his witnesses testify telephonically from the embassy in Afghanistan. However, in 

his brief before the BIA, Obedullah admitted that the IJ stated that while it would be 

optimal if the witnesses testified from the embassy, Obedullah could let the IJ know if 

that was an impossibility. She indicated that she would still listen to the witnesses 

telephonically but would need to know why they could not go to the embassy. App. at 

30-31. The BIA noted the IJ’s observation that Obedullah was in contact with his father 

and could have reasonably arranged to have him testify telephonically.

Obedullah also challenges the BIA’s determination that he failed to supply 

corroborating evidence. He also contends that the BIA did not discuss the corroborating 

evidence that he submitted. He asserts that he submitted documents from the President of 

Afghanistan, a Governor, and a member of the Ministry of the Interior. 

The IJ noted that Obedullah had submitted several letters concerning his father’s 

position in the military and his fighting against the Taliban. She determined that these 

documents were unreliable and noted that Obedullah had not presented his father for 

telephonic testimony. A.R. at 78-79. The IJ gave the documents minimal weight because 

they were unauthenticated, obtained solely for the purpose of the hearing, and the authors 

were not subject to cross-examination. Moreover, the IJ concluded that this evidence did 

not establish that the Taliban persecutes family members of military figures. As noted by 
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the IJ, Obedullah admitted that his siblings, wife, and other family have lived in 

Afghanistan unharmed. A.R at 87. 

After upholding the adverse credibility finding, the BIA concluded that Obedullah 

could not carry his burden of proof without credible evidence. After agreeing with the IJ 

that Obedullah had not met his burden on his claims for relief, the BIA noted that it need 

not reach Obedullah’s remaining arguments. We have previously explained that the BIA 

is not required to “write an exegesis on every contention. What is required is merely that 

it consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a 

reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Filja v. 

Gonzales

With respect to the motion to remand, Obedullah argues that the BIA refused to 

consider the entirety of the evidence submitted with the motion. He challenges the 

BIA’s determination that evidence of his working for a company that provides assistance 

to the United States military would not change the outcome of his case. A motion to 

remand is the functional equivalent of a motion to reopen. 

, 447 F.3d 241, 256 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Obedullah has not shown 

that his evidence would compel a finding that he was credible or entitled to relief.

Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 

F.3d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 2005). We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of 

discretion. Filja

The BIA observed that Obedullah had not explained how the new evidence would 

change the IJ’s credibility determination. A.R. at 6. In his motion to remand, Obedullah 

simply stated that if the Taliban knew of his work, it would be an additional basis for 

, 447 F.3d at 251. 
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persecution. However, he did not point to any evidence in the record supporting a claim 

that the Taliban targets those who have worked with the United States military. As for 

the affidavit of Naser Moborez, the BIA noted that Obedullah had not presented any 

argument as to why the affidavit was not previously available except to state that 

Obedullah was not in contact with Moborez. Obedullah contends that the BIA ignored 

other evidence submitted with the motion to remand; however, the BIA noted that 

Obedullah had submitted documents previously considered by the IJ. Obedullah himself 

admitted in the motion to remand that the documents had already been submitted. 

Obeduallah has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to 

remand. 

For the reasons above, we will deny the petition for review.