In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 20‐1295

SALLY GAETJENS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY OF LOVES PARK, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 16‐cv‐50261 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 27, 2021— DECIDED JULY 13, 2021

____________________

Before KANNE, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Sally Gaetjens sued various

local government officials for entering and condemning her

home and confiscating her thirty‐seven cats, all without a

warrant. She’s right that the Fourth Amendment would usu‐

ally prohibit such conduct. But emergencies breed excep‐

tions—and this case is littered with emergencies.  
2 No. 20‐1295

Namely, Gaetjens went missing in action, and Defendants

had reason to believe that she was experiencing a medical

emergency. Plus, when Defendants attempted to check her

home, they deemed it so noxious that it posed a public‐safety

risk. Given these exigencies, the Fourth Amendment did not

require Defendants to wait for judicial approval before acting.

We thus affirm the decision of the district court granting sum‐

mary judgment to Defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed and stated in the light

most favorable to Gaetjens as the nonmoving party. Wonsey v.

City of Chicago, 940 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Dayton

v. Oakton Cmty. Coll., 907 F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 2018)).

Gaetjens bred cats in her home in Loves Park, Illinois. On

December 4, 2014, she visited her doctor and was told to go to

the hospital because of high blood pressure. Later that day,

the doctor couldn’t locate Gaetjens, so she phoned Rosalie

Eads (Gaetjens’s neighbor who was listed as her emergency

contact) to ask for help finding her. Eads called Gaetjens and

knocked on her front door but got no response.

The next day, Gaetjens was still missing, so Eads called the

Loves Park police and told them that Gaetjens might be expe‐

riencing a medical emergency. Defendant Sergeant Allton

and another officer went to Gaetjens’s Loves Park home but

could not see anyone inside. They did, though, notice pack‐

ages on the porch, untended garbage, and a full mailbox.

The police then met up with Eads, who said she had a key

to the Loves Park house and confirmed what she had said on

the phone. With these facts before them, the police asked Eads

for the key so that they could enter to see if Gaetjens was in
No. 20‐1295 3

danger. Eads obliged but also said that she thought perhaps

Gaetjens was at her other home in Rockford.  

The police went into the home but didn’t get far. After

making it about ten feet, intense odors forced them back out.

Allton described the smell as a mix of urine, feces, and maybe

a decomposing body.  

The police then called on the Loves Park Fire Department

to enter the home with breathing devices. Defendant Fire

Chief Foley arrived first, and Allton told him the whole tale.

So Foley approached the cracked front door for himself and

got a whiff of something that could “gag a maggot.” Foley

thus temporarily condemned the home as not fit for human

or animal habitation by placing a placard on the front door

that read: “CONDEMNED[.] This Structure is Unsafe and Its

use or occupancy has been prohibited by the code administra‐

tor. It shall be unlawful for any person to enter such structure

except for the purpose of making the required repairs or re‐

moval.”

More firefighters soon arrived and went into the home to

look for Gaetjens. But instead of Gaetjens, they found thirty‐

seven cats.  

At that point, the responders summoned Winnebago

County Animal Services to round up the cats because Gaet‐

jens was not allowed inside the condemned house to care for

the clowder herself. Some of the felines proved more difficult

to catch than others. In particular, the male stud, Calaio,

looked ready to attack the workers. So they pulled out metal

“cat grabbers” to trap him.  
4 No. 20‐1295

In the end, Animal Services impounded the cats from De‐

cember 4 to December 13, 2014. Sadly, four cats, including

Calaio, died as a result of the impoundment.

Based on these events, Gaetjens—who unbeknownst to

the officers had been in the hospital all along—sued the City

of Loves Park, Winnebago County, and various employees of

each under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Relevant to this appeal, she al‐

leged that the individual Defendants (Allton, Foley, and three

Animal Services employees) violated her Fourth Amendment

rights by (1) entering her home, (2) condemning her home,

and (3) seizing her cats. She also alleged that the City of Loves

Park and Winnebago County are liable for these violations

under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978).

The district court granted summary judgment to all De‐

fendants on all claims. Gaetjens now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Wonsey, 940 F.3d at 399 (citing Dayton, 907 F.3d at

465). In this case, the district court determined that Gaetjens’s

Fourth Amendment claims fail because the individual de‐

fendants are entitled to qualified immunity. We agree that

Gaetjens’s claims fail, but for a more basic reason—the indi‐

vidual defendants did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States

through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects “[t]he right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

Const. amend. IV. This protection exists in both the criminal

and civil contexts. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 67 (1992).
No. 20‐1295 5

“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403

(2006) (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999); Katz 

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). “[S]earches and sei‐

zures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively un‐

reasonable.” Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559

(2004)). But this “warrant requirement is subject to certain ex‐

ceptions.” Id. (citing Flippo, 528 U.S. at 13; Katz, 389 U.S. at

357).

One such exception arises when “‘the exigencies of the sit‐

uation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that

[a] warrantless search [or seizure] is objectively reasonable

under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.

385, 394 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.

451, 456 (1948)) (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–

15 (1948)). In these situations, one principle governs—“[t]he

need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is jus‐

tification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exi‐

gency or emergency.” Id. at 392–93 (quoting Wayne v. United

States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).  

To determine whether an exigency permitted a warrant‐

less search or seizure in a home, we “conduct[] an objective

review, analyzing whether the government met its burden to

demonstrate that a reasonable officer had a ‘reasonable belief

that there was a compelling need to act and no time to obtain

a warrant.’” United States v. Andrews, 442 F.3d 996, 1000 (7th

Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 516 (7th

Cir. 1995)). This objective review looks at “the totality of facts

and circumstances ‘as they would have appeared to a reason‐

able person in the position of the ... officer—seeing what he saw,

hearing what he heard.’” Bogan v. City of Chicago, 644 F.3d 563,
6 No. 20‐1295

572 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054,

1057 (7th Cir. 1992)).  

The exigent circumstances doctrine applies equally to

warrantless searches of a home, seizures of a home, and sei‐

zures of private property within a home. See Sutterfield v. City

of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 558 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v.

Shrum, 908 F.3d 1219, 1231 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he warrantless

seizure of a home ... ‘is per se unreasonable, unless the police

can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of

exceptions based on the presence of “exigent circum‐

stances.”’” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,

474–75 (1971)) (citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403)); Siebert v.

Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 657 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Exigent circum‐

stances may justify a warrantless seizure of animals.” (citing

DiCesare v. Stuart, 12 F.3d 973, 977 (10th Cir. 1993))).

Here, all parties agree that Allton “searched” the Loves

Park home by entering it to look for Gaetjens. Likewise, all

agree that Foley “seized” the Loves Park home by placing a

condemnation placard on it and that the Animal Services

workers “seized” Gaetjens’s cats by capturing them. United

States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“A ‘seizure’ of prop‐

erty occurs when there is some meaningful interference with

an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”). Fi‐

nally, all agree that Defendants did not obtain warrants or any

other judicial or administrative approval before conducting

these searches and seizures.  

So, to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, Defendants’ war‐

rantless searches and seizures needed to fall into an exception

to the warrant requirement. They all did—each was justified

by an exigent circumstance.
No. 20‐1295 7

First, Allton (who searched the house) had an objectively

reasonable basis for believing that Gaetjens was experiencing

a medical emergency that required immediate action. Second,

Foley (who seized the house) had an objectively reasonable

basis on which to believe that the Loves Park home posed a

safety threat thatrequired immediate attention. Third, the An‐

imal Services employees (who seized the cats) reasonably de‐

termined that the cats were in imminent danger because they

could not be cared for in the home.

Last, because none of the individual defendants violated

Gaetjens’s Fourth Amendment rights, her Monell claims fail as

well.

A. The Home Entry

In an exigent circumstance often referred to as an “emer‐

gency‐aid” situation, government officials may enter a home

without a warrant “to ‘render assistance or prevent harm to

persons or property within.’” Sutterfield, 751 F.3d at 558 (quot‐

ing Sheik–Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1244 (7th Cir. 1994)).

In a recent concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh provided

“[a] few (non‐exhaustive) examples [that] illustrate” “some

heartland emergency‐aid situations.” Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S.

Ct. 1596, 1604 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The follow‐

ing example is particularly apt for this appeal:

Suppose that an elderly man is uncharacteristi‐

cally absent from Sunday church services and

repeatedly fails to answer his phone throughout

the day and night. A concerned relative calls the

police and asks the officers to perform a well‐

ness check. Two officers drive to the man’s
8 No. 20‐1295

home. They knock but receive no response. May

the officers enter the home? Of course.

Id. at 1605 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); accord United States v.

Tepiew, 859 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2017) (permitting police officers’

warrantless entry into a home on the basis of a report from a

child in the home that her one‐year‐old brother had sustained

a head injury and had a puffy face).

The home entry in this case likewise falls into the heart‐

land of emergency‐aid situations. It is undisputed that Allton

knew that (1) Eads and Gaetjens’s doctor were unable to get

in touch with Gaetjens; (2) the doctor’s office called Eads be‐

cause she was Gaetjens’s emergency contact; (3) Eads was

concerned that Gaetjens was experiencing a medical emer‐

gency; and (4) Gaetjens’s mail and garbage were piling up.

If, as Justice Kavanaugh posits, failing to come to church

and answer a phone provides an objectively reasonable basis

for believing that an occupant needs emergency assistance,

then this litany of concerning circumstances facing Allton

more than provided him with the same. His warrantless entry

of the Loves Park home thus did not violate the Fourth

Amendment.  

In response, Gaetjens makes much of the fact that Eads

told Allton that she believed Gaetjens was at her Rockford

home, not her Loves Park home. But that statement just gave

Allton a reason to also look for Eads in her Rockford house; it

in no way contradicted the above facts that gave Allton an ob‐

jectively reasonable basis to enter the Loves Park home.

B. The Condemnation

“The exigent circumstances doctrine [also] allows officers

to enter a home without a warrant ... to address a threat to the
No. 20‐1295 9

safety of law enforcement officers or the general public ... .”

Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1603 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing,

among other cases, Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 & n.4

(1984)). Two precedents guide our analysis of whether Foley

had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a safety

threat required him to condemn the Loves Park home without

a warrant.  

First, in Wonsey, building inspectors found thirty‐two

building code violations in the plaintiff’s home. 940 F.3d at

398. Based on the “dangerous conditions” that those viola‐

tions presented, the inspectors asked the police to help them

with “emergency evacuations.” Id. The police did so, and then

faced a § 1983 suit from an evacuee for violating her Fourth

Amendment rights. Id. We rejected that claim because the

“police entered her house ... to help with an evacuation given

an immediate safety concern.” Id. at 401.

Second, the Sixth Circuit addressed a similar scenario in

Flatford v. City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162 (6th Cir. 1994), which we

find persuasive. There, police officers evacuated a residential

apartment building after inspectors determined that it “posed

an immediate danger to its occupants and the public” because

of its dilapidated wooden structure and faulty electrical sys‐

tem. Id. at 171. The court determined that the officers were

entitled to qualified immunity for this warrantless evacuation

because they reasonably believed that their entry was justified

by exigent circumstances. Id. And the court noted that “[t]he

very point of the exigency exception under these circum‐

stances is to allow immediate effective action necessary to

protect the safety of occupants, neighbors, and the public at

large.” Id. at 170.
10 No. 20‐1295

This case aligns with both Wonsey and Flatford. Allton re‐

ported to Foley that the home was so noxious that the police

could not bear going in more than ten feet. Foley then probed

the front door himself and smelled a stench that could “gag a

maggot.” These circumstances gave Foley a reasonable basis

on which to conclude that the home’s “conditions posed an

immediate danger to its occupants and the public.” Id. at 171.

Thus his reflex to temporarily condemn the home and “pro‐

tect or preserve life” from such danger did not violate the

Fourth Amendment. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392–93 (quoting

Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212).

Gaetjens retorts that summary judgment on this claim is

inappropriate because the condition of the home was put in

dispute by the testimony of her friend, Joan Klarner, who tes‐

tified that she did not believe the home posed a health risk

when she visited it several hours before Defendants arrived.

But Klarner’s testimony doesn’t directly dispute the state of

the home as Defendants found it later on that day. More im‐

portant, even if the home was not as bad as Allton made it out

to be, Foley was nonetheless entitled to rely on Allton’s state‐

ments about the condition of the home because Allton had su‐

perior information after entering the home moments earlier.

Cf. Flatford, 17 F.3d at 170 (“[R]equiring officers to second

guess the more informed judgment of a building safety in‐

spector would hinder effective and swift action. Officers

should, therefore, have wide latitude to rely on a building‐

safety official’s expertise where that expert determination ap‐

pears to have some basis in fact.”).

C. Confiscation of the Cats

Last, “[e]xigent circumstances may justify a warrantless

seizure of animals” when an official reasonably believes that
No. 20‐1295 11

the animals are in “imminent danger.” Siebert, 256 F.3d at 657

(citing DiCesare, 12 F.3d at 977); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 469, 471 (Mass. 2014) (finding exigent cir‐

cumstances to seize dogs where the dogs were left out “in se‐

verely inclement winter weather” and “extremely emaci‐

ated”); Hegarty v. Addison Cnty. Humane Soc’y, 848 A.2d 1139,

1143 (Vt. 2004) (permitting the warrantless seizure of a horse

where officer reasonably believed that the horse’s “health was

in jeopardy and that immediate action was required to protect

her”).

The imminent danger to animals here was plain—Gaet‐

jens’s thirty‐seven cats could not be cared for in the Loves

Park home because the condemnation placard prevented

Gaetjens from entering the home for that purpose. Given this

situation, the Animal Services officials’ warrantless entry into

the Loves Park home and the seizure of her cats did not vio‐

late the Fourth Amendment.

Gaetjens argues in rebuttal that regardless of whether An‐

imal Services could seize her cats, they still violated the

Fourth Amendment by using excessive force when doing so.

Specifically, she alleges that the officials used a “cat grabber”

that injured and ultimately killed the stud Calaio.  

We have held before that “the use of deadly force against

a household pet is reasonable only if the pet poses an imme‐

diate danger and the use of force is unavoidable.” Viilo v. Eyre,

547 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Brown v. Muhlenberg

Township, 269 F.3d 205, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2001)). But that case,

and the cases from this circuit applying its rule, involved of‐

ficers shooting dogs with firearms. This case involved Animal

Services officials using a cat‐catching tool to catch a cat

(which, according to indisputable testimony, looked ready to
12 No. 20‐1295

“maul” the cat‐catcher). That Calaio died as a result of this

manifestly reasonable tactic is unfortunate, but it does not an

unreasonable seizure make.

Gaetjens also argues that even if the initial seizure of her

cats was lawful, Animal Services violated her Fourth Amend‐

ment rights by retaining the cats longer than necessary. This

argument fails because we have made clear that the Four‐

teenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment, provides the

appropriate basis for challenging post‐seizure procedures for

the retrieval of property. Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736,

741 (7th Cir. 2016).

As a final note, Gaetjens argues that the district court in‐

correctly granted summary judgment sua sponte to the Animal

Services officials. While Gaetjens is correct that this procedure

warrants caution, it is permissible when “the losing party is

given notice and an opportunity to come forward with its ev‐

idence.” Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 302 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir.

2002) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986);

Goldstein v. Fid. and Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 86 F.3d 749,

750 (7th Cir. 1996)). Gaetjens has not argued here that she re‐

ceived inadequate notice, nor has she shown that she was de‐

prived of an opportunity to marshal evidence to dispute the

facts relied on in this opinion.

We therefore conclude that the Animal Services workers,

like the other individual defendants, did not violate Gaet‐

jens’s Fourth Amendment rights.

D. Monell Liability

According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell, mu‐

nicipalities are sometimes liable for the constitutional viola‐

tions that their employees commit. 436 U.S. at 658. “But a
No. 20‐1295 13

municipality cannot be liable under Monell when there is no

underlying constitutional violation by a municipal em‐

ployee.” Sallenger v. City of Springfield, 630 F.3d 499, 504 (7th

Cir. 2010) (citing King ex rel. King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189,

496 F.3d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 2007); Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d

482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007)). That’s the case here. Gaetjens’s con‐

stitutional rights were not violated, and thus her Monell claim

cannot succeed.

III. CONCLUSION

Forthe foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court.