Page 1 of 7

Case No. 4:10cv30-RH/CAS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

EDDIE DEAN FORD,

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 4:10cv30-RH/CAS

KENNETH S. TUCKER,

Respondent.

_________________________________/

ORDER DENYING THE PETITION

A state court sentenced the petitioner Eddie Dean Ford to probation. The 

court later revoked Mr. Ford’s probation based on several alleged violations 

including giving a false name to a law enforcement officer who was investigating 

suspicious activity. By an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254, Mr. Ford challenges the revocation on several grounds, including 

his attorney’s allegedly ineffective assistance in failing to interview and present the 

testimony of Angela Thompson, Christopher Mitchell, and Eddie Miller. 

The case is here on the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, ECF 

No. 39, the objections, ECF No. 42, and additional filings relating to Mr. Mitchell 
Page 2 of 7

Case No. 4:10cv30-RH/CAS

and Mr. Miller, ECF Nos. 44, 46, 51, and 52. I have reviewed de novo the issues 

raised by the objections and the additional filings. This order adopts the report and 

recommendation as the court’s opinion and adds this additional discussion 

regarding Ms. Thompson, Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Miller. 

Mr. Ford asserts he gave the officer his correct name, not a false name. Mr. 

Ford also asserts the officer knew Mr. Ford’s actual identity. Mr. Ford says the 

officer telephoned Ms. Thompson—a person who was not at the scene—to verify 

Mr. Ford’s identity, and that she in fact verified his identity. Mr. Ford asserts that 

two witnesses who were at the scene—Christopher Mitchell and Eddie Miller—

would have given testimony supporting Mr. Ford’s version of events. 

It was not entirely clear, based on the record as compiled to the point when 

the report and recommendation was entered, what Mr. Ford asserted Mr. Mitchell 

and Mr. Miller would have said. On one reading of Mr. Ford’s papers, Mr. 

Mitchell and Mr. Miller would have said only that the officer knew Mr. Ford’s 

actual identity. Another possible reading, though, was that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. 

Miller would have said that Mr. Ford did not give the officer a false name.

 The state court rejected Mr. Ford’s claim that his attorney rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to interview or present the testimony of Ms. 

Thompson, Mr. Mitchell, or Mr. Miller. The court ruled further that the testimony 

of these witnesses could not have affected the outcome. The court correctly noted 
Page 3 of 7

Case No. 4:10cv30-RH/CAS

that a person commits a crime by giving an officer a false name, even if the officer 

knows the person’s actual identity. What matters is whether the person gave the 

officer a false name, not whether the officer was fooled.

Ms. Thompson could not have known what name Mr. Ford gave the 

officer—she was not there—so she could not have given testimony indicating Mr. 

Ford was not guilty of this charge. Mr. Ford’s contrary assertion is simply wrong. 

The state court properly denied relief based on the failure to interview Ms. 

Thompson or present her testimony.

The state court said that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Miller could not have testified 

to what the officer knew and that, even if they said the officer knew Mr. Ford’s 

actual identity, this would not have mattered. That is correct. But if Mr. Mitchell 

or Mr. Miller would have testified that they heard Mr. Ford give the officer his 

correct name right at the outset, it might have mattered. The state court did not 

address this, apparently reading Mr. Ford’s claim as insufficient to raise this issue.

The report and recommendation concluded that, under the standards set out 

in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the state court’s resolution of 

these issues—and of Mr. Ford’s other claims—should be upheld. That was correct 

if Mr. Ford’s claim was only that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Miller would have testified 

that the officer knew Mr. Ford’s actual identity. But if they would have said they 

heard Mr. Ford give the officer his correct name at the outset, the situation would 
Page 4 of 7

Case No. 4:10cv30-RH/CAS

have been different. An effective attorney would have investigated the possible 

availability of eye witnesses who would testify to facts showing Mr. Ford’s 

innocence.

I entered an order giving Mr. Ford an opportunity to clarify his allegations 

on this score and to support the allegations with evidence. The order also gave Mr. 

Ford an opportunity to explain any inability to provide evidence. Rules 4 and 7 of 

the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases allow a district court to enter an order of that 

kind establishing reasonable procedures for deciding whether a full evidentiary 

hearing is necessary.

Mr. Ford eventually said he was unable, because he was in custody, to 

obtain declarations from Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Miller. I appointed an attorney for 

Mr. Ford to address this issue. The attorney’s investigator determined that Mr. 

Mitchell is dead and that Mr. Miller does not recall these events. So there is not 

and never will be any evidence supporting Mr. Ford’s claim that Mr. Mitchell and 

Mr. Miller heard Mr. Ford give the officer his correct name, not a false name. An 

evidentiary hearing now to confirm these facts would serve no purpose.

An additional point is not a basis for this ruling but does indicate that a 

ruling in Mr. Ford’s favor would make no difference. If Mr. Ford’s petition was 

granted and he was afforded a new state-court hearing on the charge that he 

violated his conditions of probation by providing the officer a false name, the 
Page 5 of 7

Case No. 4:10cv30-RH/CAS

available testimony would be precisely the same testimony available at the last 

hearing. Neither Mr. Mitchell nor Mr. Miller would provide relevant testimony. A 

new hearing on precisely the same evidence as was presented at the original 

hearing would serve no purpose. 

For these reasons and those set out in the report and recommendation, the 

§ 2254 petition is unfounded.

Rule 11 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires a district court to 

“issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to 

the applicant.” Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability may 

issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-38 (2003); 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 

893 n.4 (1983); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-13 (2000) (setting 

out the standards applicable to a § 2254 petition on the merits). As the Court said 

in Slack:

 To obtain a COA under § 2253(c), a habeas prisoner must make a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a 

demonstration that, under Barefoot, includes showing that reasonable 

jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the 

petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the 

issues presented were “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.”
Page 6 of 7

Case No. 4:10cv30-RH/CAS

Slack, 529 U.S. at 483-84 (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n.4). Further, in 

order to obtain a certificate of appealability when dismissal is based on procedural 

grounds, a petitioner must show, “at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court 

was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. at 484. 

Mr. Ford has not made the required showing. This order thus denies a 

certificate of appealability. Because Mr. Ford has not obtained—and is not entitled 

to—a certificate of appealability, any appeal will not be taken in good faith. I 

certify under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) that an appeal will not be 

taken in good faith and that Mr. Ford is not otherwise entitled to proceed on appeal 

in forma pauperis. But for the requirement to obtain a certificate of appealability, 

leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis would be granted. 

For these reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The report and recommendation, ECF No. 39, is accepted. 

2. The clerk must enter a judgment stating, “The petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus is denied with prejudice.”

3. The motion for an evidentiary hearing, ECF No. 52, is denied. 

4. Any other pending motion is denied as moot. 
Page 7 of 7

Case No. 4:10cv30-RH/CAS

5. A certificate of appealability is denied.

6. Leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is denied.

SO ORDERED on January 14, 2013.

s/Robert L. Hinkle

United States District Judge