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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

September 18, 2018

v No. 337427

Berrien Circuit Court

RONALD WESLEY JILES, LC Nos. 2016-002223-FC, 

2016-002224-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MURRAY, C.J., and CAMERON and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Ronald Wesley Jiles, appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of assault 

and battery, MCL 750.81; being a felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 

750.224f; carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle, MCL 750.227(2); resisting and obstructing a 

police officer, MCL 750.81d(1); injuring or harassing a police dog, MCL 750.50c; carrying a 

firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b; possession of less 

than 25 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v); possession of marijuana, MCL 

333.7403(2)(d); third-degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 257.602a(3)(a); reckless driving causing 

serious impairment of bodily function, MCL 257.626(3); second-degree fleeing and eluding, 

MCL 257.602a(4)(a); and operating a vehicle with the presence of a controlled substance in his 

system causing serious impairment of a bodily function, MCL 257.625(5)(a). We affirm.

This case arises out of a police chase involving a semitruck and several police officers on 

I-94 in Indiana and Michigan. Jiles, a truck driver, was making a delivery from his home state of

California to Uxbridge, Massachusetts. Jiles was spotted driving erratically on I-94 in Indiana 

and failed to stop when Indiana police officers signaled for him to pull over. After he entered 

Michigan, still pursued by the Indiana police officers, additional officers from several Michigan 

law enforcement agencies joined the chase. Jiles swerved at officers who attempted to pull their 

patrol cars next to the truck and officers who attempted to deploy “stop sticks” from the side of 

the road. Jiles eventually came to a stop on an exit ramp after a Michigan State Police trooper 

shot one of the semitruck’s rear tires. A blood test showed that Jiles had both methamphetamine 

and cocaine in his system.

Jiles first argues on appeal that he was denied his due process rights because the 

prosecutor made comments regarding his postarrest silence in closing arguments contrary to his 

Fifth Amendment rights, which also shifted the burden of proof to the defense. We disagree.
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Jiles failed to object to the prosecutor’s comments at trial.1 Therefore, this issue is 

unpreserved. Unpreserved issues of alleged prosecutorial misconduct2 are reviewed for plain 

error. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 110; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Under plain-error 

review, the defendant must demonstrate that “1) [an] error . . . occurred, 2) the error was plain, 

i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” People v Carines, 460 

Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “The third requirement generally requires a showing of 

prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id. “[T]he 

test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” 

People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Claims “of prosecutorial 

misconduct are decided case by case, and this Court must examine the entire record and evaluate 

a prosecutor’s remarks in context.” Id. at 64.

At trial, Jiles admitted to ingesting cocaine on the morning in question, but denied that he 

ingested any methamphetamine. He appeared to believe that someone put it in his coffee or that 

it was mixed with the cocaine that he purchased. On cross-examination, the prosecutor 

questioned Jiles regarding his claim that he did not intentionally ingest the methamphetamine:

Q. And all of this is the first time we’re hearing this about this; right?

A. What do you mean?

Q. The first time you’re claiming the meth, no idea about it or anything 

like that; right?

A. Yeah, I don’t—I don’t—I don’t get down on meth, period.

Q. Okay. This is the first time we’re hearing this.

[Defense Counsel]: Objection, you Honor. I don’t know who “we” are.

The Court: Sustained.

 1 During Jiles’s cross-examination, defense counsel objected when the prosecutor asked Jiles 

about the timing of his exculpatory assertions. However, the prosecutor’s closing arguments 

were not challenged below.

2 As recognized by this Court in People v Cooper, 309 Mich App 74, 87-88; 867 NW2d 452 

(2015), although the phrase “prosecutorial misconduct” is used as a term of art in criminal 

appeals, it is a misnomer when used to describe technical or inadvertent errors that do not 

involve illegal conduct or other activity violating the rules of professional conduct. Allegations 

of less extreme error—i.e., error that would not warrant discipline under the rules of professional 

conduct—are more accurately described as claims of “prosecutorial error.”
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[Prosecutor]: Thank you. Nothing further.[3]

In closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 

People today like things convenient. The defendant likes things 

convenient for him; convenient defense that he has. Convenient that “from the 

time of my criminal actions in Indiana and Michigan start, I can’t remember a 

thing until someone’s doing something wrong to me and putting me in cuffs.” 

Can’t remember a single thing; that’s what he’s claiming now. It’s convenient.

In addition, the prosecutor argued:

The other case involves the drugs, the possession of the drugs. He 

admitted to possessing them. He knowingly possessed those drugs. He claims 

now he didn’t know it was methamphetamine. I’d ask you to use your common 

sense in whether or not you believe that. He claims he absolutely knew it was 

cocaine, but he knew that was methamphetamine in there too. And he took both 

of them knowingly and willingly.

Finally, the prosecutor remarked: “And after seven months, what he tells you is that ‘I can’t 

remember anything from that time frame.’ So, in essence he cannot deny anything on the video 

or what the police officers testified.”

We disagree that these comments constituted an impermissible argument regarding Jiles’s

postarrest silence. Rather, we view them as an appropriate attack on the credibility of Jiles’s 

testimony. See People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 34; 650 NW2d 96 (2002) (“Any party 

may attack the credibility of a witness.”). The prosecutor did not expressly comment on 

defendant’s statements or lack of statement to the police before trial. Instead, the prosecutor 

focused on what defendant explained “now”—that is, at trial—and argued that defendant’s 

testimony was conveniently limited and unworthy of belief. Accordingly, we find no error in the 

prosecutor’s closing argument. See People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 

(1997) (“A prosecutor may, however, argue from the facts that . . . the defendant . . . is not 

worthy of belief.”).

Nor do we agree that the challenged comments shifted the burden of proof to Jiles to 

prove his innocence. “Although a defendant has no burden to produce any evidence, once the 

defendant advances evidence or a theory, argument on the inferences created does not shift the 

burden of proof.” People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 115; 538 NW2d 356 (1995). As a result, the 

prosecutor’s comments regarding the improbability of Jiles’s assertion that he did not remember 

the police chase and that he did not knowingly use methamphetamine did not shift the burden of 

proof to defendant to prove his defense. See id. at 116 (“When a defense makes an issue legally 

 3 To the extent that Jiles contends that the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection on 

Fifth Amendment grounds, we disagree. Defense counsel’s objection was clearly based on the 

ambiguous nature of the prosecutor’s use of the word “we” in questioning Jiles.
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relevant, the prosecutor is not prohibited from commenting on the improbability of the 

defendant’s theory or evidence.”). See also People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 635; 709 

NW2d 595 (2005) (“[A]ttacking the credibility of a theory advanced by a defendant does not 

shift the burden of proof.”).

Even if the prosecutor’s comments were improper, Jiles is not entitled to reversal under 

the plain-error rule because he cannot show prejudice. Carines, 460 Mich at 763. The trial court 

instructed the jury that the lawyer’s arguments were not evidence and that it should only accept 

the lawyer’s comments if supported by the evidence. “Jurors are presumed to follow their 

instructions, and it is presumed that instructions cure most errors.” People v Mahone, 294 Mich 

App 208, 212; 816 NW2d 436 (2011). More importantly, even if the prosecutor’s closing 

argument was construed as commenting on Jiles’s failure to assert an involuntary intoxication 

defense before trial, it is clear that Jiles was not prejudiced because the jury acquitted him on an 

additional charge of possession of methamphetamine. In any event, there was substantial police 

officer testimony and dashboard camera video that presented the events of the police chase to the 

jury. Jiles admitted that he could not dispute the officers’ testimony or the video. Based on 

Jiles’s own admissions and the strength of the evidence offered at trial, Jiles has failed to 

establish prejudice. Accordingly, he has not shown that the prosecutor’s comments constituted 

plain error affecting his substantial rights. See Carines, 460 Mich at 763. See also People v 

Borgne, 483 Mich 178, 201-202; 768 NW2d 290 (2009) (concluding that appellate relief was not 

warranted under Carines without proof of prejudice).

Jiles also asserts that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

prosecutor’s comments. However, this issue is not properly before this Court because it is 

outside the scope of Jiles’s statement of the question presented. MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v 

Mysliwiec, 315 Mich App 414, 420; 890 NW2d 691 (2016). Even if this issue had been properly 

presented, Jiles would not be entitled to appellate relief because he cannot establish an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this basis. To prevail on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that “(1) the performance of his counsel was 

below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and (2) a 

reasonable probability exists that, in the absence of counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of the proceedings would have been different.” People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich 

App 656, 659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). The prosecutor’s closing argument was not improper, and 

counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich 

App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). Furthermore, as already explained, Jiles was not prejudiced 

by counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s comments because he was acquitted of 

possession of methamphetamine, the jury was properly instructed that the attorneys’ arguments 

were not evidence, and there was substantial evidence of Jiles’s guilt as it related to the 

remainder of the charges. It is, therefore, unlikely that the outcome of the proceedings would 

have been different if defense counsel had successfully objected to the prosecutor’s argument. 

Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App at 659.

Finally, Jiles asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of 

condoms found during a search of his semitruck. We disagree.

“The decision whether to admit evidence is within the trial court’s discretion and will not 

be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.” People v McDaniel, 469 Mich 409, 412; 670 
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NW2d 659 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs “when the court chooses an outcome that falls 

outside the range of principled outcomes.” People v Douglas, 496 Mich 557, 565; 852 NW2d 

587 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As a general rule, we will not find an abuse 

of discretion when the trial court’s ruling involves a close evidentiary question. People v Sabin 

(After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 67; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). “A preserved error in the admission 

of evidence does not warrant reversal unless after an examination of the entire cause, it shall 

affirmatively appear that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” 

People v Burns, 494 Mich 104, 110; 832 NW2d 738 (2013) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

MRE 401 states that relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the 

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 

less probable than it would be without the evidence.” In addition, MRE 402 provides that “[a]ll 

relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 

States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, these rules, or other rules adopted by the 

Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” MRE 403 provides that 

“[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”

In this case, after testimony concluded on the second day of trial and outside of the 

presence of the jury, Jiles objected to the prosecution’s intent to admit evidence of condoms that 

the police discovered during the search of the semitruck. Jiles argued that the condoms were 

irrelevant to the charged offenses and that any limited relevance was outweighed by the risk of 

unfair prejudice. According to Jiles, the evidence was only offered to make him “look bad” 

because he was married and away from his wife. In response to the prosecutor’s assertion that 

the condoms were relevant to Jiles’s knowledge of the presence of the gun, Jiles argued that the 

prosecutor had sufficient, nonprejudicial evidence to establish knowledge. 

The trial court denied Jiles’s motion to exclude the evidence, stating that whether the 

prosecution had enough other evidence was not the proper test. Instead, the trial court had to 

examine the probative value of the proposed evidence. The trial court opined that there was a 

logical connection between the gun and the condoms in this case because the gun was in a 

Walmart bag and a receipt found in the semitruck indicated that Jiles had recently purchased 

condoms at Walmart. Thus, the trial court explained that the presence of the condoms in the 

truck was “some evidence” that Jiles knew the gun was in the truck. Further, the trial court 

explained that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the slight danger of unfair 

prejudice because people are encouraged to use condoms, which are often advertised on 

television and in print.

Based on the foregoing, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in 

allowing the evidence of the condoms to be presented at trial. Although Jiles eventually 

admitted that he possessed the gun in the semitruck, he pleaded not guilty to felon-in-possession, 

carrying a concealed weapon, and felony-firearm. As a result, the prosecutor was required to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jiles had possession of the gun, which could be established 

by evidence of constructive possession, i.e., knowledge of the firearm in a reasonably accessible 

location at the time of the offense. See People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 437-439; 606 
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NW2d 645 (2000). See also People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 389; 582 NW2d 785 (1998) 

(“Because the prosecution must carry the burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable 

doubt, regardless of whether the defendant specifically disputes or offers to stipulate any of the 

elements, the elements of the offense are always ‘in issue’ and, thus, material.”).

Police officers discovered the gun in the sleeping area of the semitruck, wrapped in a 

Walmart bag and placed between two pillows inside of a single pillow case. Officers also 

discovered several items—including the condoms—and a receipt showing that Jiles recently 

purchased those items at Walmart. Although the gun was placed in Jiles’s sleeping area, it was 

possible that Jiles would argue at trial that the gun was placed there without his knowledge. In 

fact, he testified that the truck belonged to his boss. As the trial court reasoned, the jury could 

infer from this evidence that Jiles purchased the condoms from Walmart, removed the condoms 

from the Walmart bag, placed the gun in the Walmart bag, and then placed it between the pillows 

on his bed. While we recognize that the same point could have been made without identifying 

the items that were purchased from Walmart, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s 

determination that the condoms were relevant to Jiles’s knowledge of the gun fell outside the 

range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Douglas, 496 Mich at 565. We also agree that the 

risk of unfair prejudice arising from this evidence was slight, especially in light of the fact that 

the condoms were mentioned by only one witness and not discussed by the prosecutor in closing 

arguments. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to exclude the 

evidence under MRE 403. Id. See also Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich at 67 (“[T]he trial 

court’s decision on a close evidentiary question . . . ordinarily cannot be an abuse of 

discretion.”).

Affirmed.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron 

/s/ Anica Letica