# THE ATI‘ORNEY GENERAL OF TexAs
AUIITIN. - 78711 aOBN L. BItaL August 13, 1973
The Honorable Bevington Reed The Honorable Joe Resweber The Honorable George L. Thompson The Honorable David Wade, M. D. The Honorable Henry Wade Opinion No. H-82 Re: Senate Bill 123

Gentlemen: The 63rd Legislature adopted Senate Bill 123, sometimes knownas “The l# Year Old Bill”
. Itwill become effective August 27, 1973 and each of you has asked our opinion as to matters connected with it. Senate Bill 123; in its entirety, is as follows: “AN ACT providing thata person who is at least 18years of age has all the rights, privileges, and obligations of a person who is 21years of age; containing a provision that a custodian of certain property of a minor may elect not to have the provisions of this Act apply to such property; and declaring an emergency.

“BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: “Section 1. The purpose of this Act is to extend all the rights, privileges, and obligations of majority to all persons who are at least 18years of age. It shall be construed liberally to accomplish that purpose. “Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any statutory or decisional law, or any rule, regulation, or ordinance of this state or of any political subdivision or incorporated city or townof this state, a person who is at least 18yearsof age has all

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the rights, privileges, and obligations of a person who is 21years of age. A law, rule,regulation, or ordinance which extends a right, privilege, or obligation to a person onthebasis of a minimum age of 21, 20, or 19years shall be interpreted as prescribing a minimum age of 18years.

“It is specifically provided, however, thatwith respect to property held by a custodian under the Texas Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, as amended (Article 5923- 101, Vermn’s Texas Civil Statutes), on effective date hereof andthe proceeds and reinvestments thereof, the

, , -:’ custodian may elect not.to.have the provisions of this ACt

apply by so notifying the minor inwriting, but such election may be revoked at the election of the custodian. “Sec. 3. The importance of this legislation and the crowded condition ofthe calendars inbothhouses create an emergency and an imperative public necessity thatthe constitutional role requiring bills tobe read on three several days in each house be suspended, andthis rule is hereby suspended, and that this Act take effect andbe inforce from and after its passage, and it is so enacted. ” We have been asked, first, whether or notthe Bill is constitutional under Article 3, 536 of the Texas Constitution. Ifwe answer inthe negative, the other questions become moot. Article 3, 536 of the Constitution is:

“No law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title; but in such case the act revived, or the section or sections amended, shall be re-enacted andpublished atlength. ” Also tobe considered is the effect of Article 3. 535which provides:

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“No bill, (except general appropriations bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account ofwhich moneys are appropriated) shall contain more thanone subject, which shall be expressed in its title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall notbe expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof, 

### as shall notbe so expressed. “ The initial inquiry must be whether Senate Bill 123 is an original act, complete in itself, or anamendatory act. No section or sections of any other Act are re-enacted or published at length by it, 

### asArticle 3, 536 commands be done if an act amends other enactments. InlA, Sutherland Statutory Construction, (4th Ed. 1972) 022.01, p. 106 it is said:

“In determining whether an act is original or

amendatory in form the controlling test is whether itpurports tobe independent of existing statutory provisions. Itmay, infact, add new regulations to fields already extensively regulated by legislation and tothat extent amend or supplement them or it may establish new and inconsistent procedures which by the doctrine of implied repeal may supersede and repeal the existing law, but so long as it is not specifically identified as an amending or repealing act itwill be treated as an original act and. courts will not apply constitutional standards for amendment and repeal to it even thoughthat is the consequence and effect of the act. ” We think the foregoing passage well states the law inTexas. See Clark v. Finley, 54 S.W. 343 (Tex. 1899); Consolidated Underwriters v. Kirby Lumber co., 267s. W. 703 (Trx. Comm., 1924); Realty Trust Co. v. Lindsey, 105 S.W. 2d 210 (Tex. 1937); Baker v. State, 158 S. W. 998 (Tex. Crim. 1913); 

### Ex parte Wilson, 213 S.W. 984 (Tex. Crim. 1919); Terre11 v. State, 228 S.W. 240 (Tex. Crim. 1921); Davis v. State, 246 S. W. 395 (Tex.Crim;. 1922); Southwestern Gas & Electric Co. v. State, 190S.W. 2d 132 (Tex. Civ.App., Austin, 1945, aff’d. 193 S.W. 2d 675); Thompson v. United Gas Corp., 190S.W. 2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App., Austin, 1945).

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Inour opinion, as an original act and notan amendatory act, it is unnecessary thatSenate Bill 123meet the requirements of Article 3, 536. The purpose of the requirements of $35 of Article 3of the Constitution is to give notice through the title of the Bill, bothto the Legislature andthe people of the State, of the subject of the proposed law and thereby to prevent the passage of a law on one subject under the guise of a title which expresses another. Lee v. State, 352 S.W. 2d 724 (Tex. 1962); Fletcher v. State, 439 S.W. 2d 656 (Tex. 1969); Harris County Fresh Water Supply District .No. 55v. Carr, 372 S.W. 2d 523 (Tex. 1963); C. Hayman Construction Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 471 S. W. 2d 564 (Tex. 1971); Stun v. State, 208 S.W. 2d 633 (Tex. Crim. 1948). Inour opinion the title to Senate Bill 123 is sufficient to give notice of its purpose andit does meet the requirements of Article 3, $35. Prior to the effective date ofthe Probate Code in 1956, Article 4104, V. T. C.S., provided that: “Females under twenty-one years of age who have never been married andmales under said age are minors. ” This statute was repealed by adoption of the Probate Code which contained, among its definitions in $3, a definition of minors in 53(t) as: ”
. . . all persons under twenty-one years of age who have never been married, except persons under that age whose disabilities of minority have been removed generally, except as to the right tovote, in accordance with the laws of this State.” The title to the Probate Code (Acts 1955, 54th Leg., ch. 55) does state that one of the purposes of theAct is to define the meaning of certain words, etc. It does not, however, state that it intends to amend all statutes of the State having to do with minors andminority. Nevertheless, whenthe question was raised in Pittman v. Time Securitiqs301 S.W. 2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App., San Antonio, 1957, nowrit hist. )as towhether $3(t) ofthe Probate Code was an act of general application or limited to the Code itself, the court said that it was one of general application andthat married males under 21years of age, were adults for all purposes, notjust for thepurpose of the Probate Code. The decision was reaffirmed andfollowed inWard v. Lavy, 314S.W. 2d 381(Tex. Civ. APP. 3Eastland, 1958, nowrit) and in Travelers Indemnity Company V. Mattox, 345 S.W. 2d 290 (Tex. Civ.App., Texarkana, 1961, err. ref’d., n.r. e. ). Just as the definition of “minor” contained in 03(t) of the Probate Code was held toprovide a definition for all purposes, even though it did not specifically amend any other statute, so too we are of the opinion that Senate Bill

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123 does not operate to amend but rather is a general law creating an additional class ofpeople (18, 19, and 20 year olds) who, without regard to marriage orjudicial removal of disabilities, are entitled to the same rights, privileges, and obligations previously reserved to those of another class (persons 21years of age andover), except as specifically provided otherwise in Senate Bill 123. Henceforth, 53(t) of the Probate Code as applied by Pittman. supra, and Senate Bill 123murt be read together and applied generally in all instances which condition limitations or privileges onthe minority or majority status of an individual. The intent of the 63rd Legislature in making the age of majority 18 is further evidenced in the enactment of Titles 2 and 3of the Family Code (Senate Bills 168and 111respectively) andthe amendments to Title 1of the Family Code (House Bill 103). The Family Code now considers all persons as children or minors insofar as biological age is concerned if they are under 18years old. Section 404 of the Probate Code pertains to the closing of estates of decedents andthe guardianship of the persons and estates of wards. It specifically provides in Subsection (b)l that the guardianship of a minor shall be settled andclored when he dies or becomes an adult by becoming 21years of age or by removal of disabilities of minority or by marriage. Senate Bill 123 effects the removal of disabilities of minority of those 18years of age or older. After its effective date, when a person becomes 18years of age, by the specific terms of $404 of the Probate Code, his estate shall be settled and closed. There is no conflict. Senate Bill 123does not require that “21 years of age” in these tvo sections of the Probate Code be replaced by “18years of age”
. It is tobe read with but &es notamend these,two sections. Mr. Alton Griffin has posed questions concerning the effect of the Bill uponthe Jury Wheel Law, Article 2094, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes. Article 2133 as amended in 1969 (Acts 1969, 61st Leg., p. 1364, ch. 412) provides that “all persons both male and female over twenty-one (21) years of age are competent jurors. unless disqualified under some provisions of this chapter

. . . . ‘I This, inour opinion, extends a right, privilege or obligation to a person 21years of age, anduder the specific provisions of Senate Bill 123, persons 18 years of age or older will be, therefore,

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qualified jurors. Article 2094 ae amended in 1971provides that between the firrt and fifteenth days ofAugust of each year thejury wheel shall be reconstituted “using ahe ale ad mandatory source, all names on the voter registration lists from all precincts in the county.” Inour opinion the names of all r:egistered voters, including 18year olds andthose older, should be included in re,constituting thejury wheel this year. If called to serve before Senate Bill 123becomes effective, those under 21years shouldbe excused from jury duty. Attorney General Opinion M-911 (1971) is overruled; the law has changed. Dr. Wade has asked:

“In what respect, if any, will the provisions of Senate Bill 123. 63rd Legislature, affect the liability ofparents under theprovisions of Section 21, Article 3871b? ” The section cited (amended in 1967 )provides, inpart:

“(a) The parents of a mentally retarded person under twenty-one years of age who is a student in a state school operated by the Texas Department of Mental Health andMental Retardation shall pay, if able to do so, suchportions of the cost and support andmaintenance of the mentally retarded person ar may be applicable under the following formula: [dependent uponnettaxable income]

. . . .

‘l(b) Parents of a mentally retarded person who is twenty-one years of age or older shall not be required to payfor his support and maintenance ina state school as a student, butthe mentally retarded person andhis estate shall be liable for his support and maintenance regardless of his age . . . .”

. . . “Unpaid charges for support and maintenance accruing after the effective date of this amendment due byparents for the support andmaintenance of

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mentally retarded 

### persons who are minors andstudents in state schools shall be a claim in favor of the state for such support andmaintenance, but only to the following extent:
. . . “After a mentally retarded person who is a student in a state school reaches 21years ofage the cost of his support and maintenance may be determined under rules and regulations adopted bythe Texas Board ofMental Health andMental Retardation provided that charges for support and maintenance shall not exceed the actual cost of such support

### and maintenance andthe costs determined under such rules and regulations shall constitute a claim by the state against the entire estate or any property of the mentally retarded person including but notlimited to any share he may have by gift, descent or devise in his parents’ estates or any other person’s estate. ” It is obvious from a reading of the statute that theamount bywhich the retarded person’s estate can be made liable for his care while atthe school literally depends uponhis age. The dividing line is 21years. When he reaches that age the obligations ofhis estate change. Senate Bill 123 operates to charge a person in like circumstances, butwho is 18years old rather than 21, with the same obligations as the 21year old. The liability of persons for the cost of care for incompetents at State institutions is purely a matter of statute; the common law imposes no dutyuponparents (or uponthe estates of incompetents)to reimburse the State for the cost of caring for incompetent children, under age or not, at State institutions. See Wiseman v. State, 94 S.W. 2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App. , SanAntonio, 1936, writ ref’d. ); State v. Stone, 271 S.W. 2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App. , Beaumont, 1954, nowrit); State v. Morris, 303 S.W. 2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App., Eastland, 1957,wrt r&d). Also see State of California v. Copus, 309 S.W. 2d 227 (Tex. 1958). In other words, unless Article 3871b, §21 specifically makes it so, the liability ofparents for the cost of care for their incompetent children in State institutions does not depend uponthe legal infancy of the child.

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Before the statute was amended [Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p.1935, ch. 725 § 11, itwas clear thatparents were liable regardless of the age or status of the child. Section 21then read (in part):

“The parents, spouse andthe estate of a mentally retarded person . . . shall pay, if able to do so, for the support, maintenance and treatment ofthe person . . . .” When 521was amended in 1967, a new clause specified that as to charges accruing after the effective date of the amendment,‘unpaio c~harges due by parents for the support and mainienance “‘of mentally, retarded.persons who are minors” would be a claim in favor, of the State only to the.extent they could be collected from the property or estate of the retarded person. Unless itwere intended that “under 21years of age”, as used in the amended statute have the same meaning as “legal infant”, then charges would be due by aparent for the support andmaintenance of a retarded son or daughter aged 17years of age who was married (and thus, not a minor), which charges be a claim infavor of the State against persons or property other than the property or estate of the incompetent (the parents). Whereas, if the 17year old son or daughter had never been married (a minor), anyunpaid charges for his or her care could be a claim only against the child’s property or estate. We do notthinkthe Legislature intended to place a more onerous burden upontheparents of children who have lost their disabilities because of marriage, or byjudicial removal. than onparents of minor children. We are compelled to think the words “minors” and “persons under 21years of age” are used interchangeably in Article 387lb. 521 to signify that different treatments are to be accorded parents andtheir children, depending uponthelegal capacity of the child. Even before Senate Bill 123was enacted, therefore, ambiguous language in Article 3871b, $21 required construction. Senate Bill 123 did not make the construction necessary and does not change it. Without reference to Senate Bill 123, inour opinion, thewords “21 years of age” in that context have reference to “legal infancy”
. Inasmuch as “legal infancy” will be differently defined after Senate Bill 123becomes effective, the effect of Article 3871b, $21will be changed to that extent. Inour opinion,

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parents of incompetent children 18years of age or more will have no obligation to the State for their support while in State schools, and the cost of their support and maintenance may be determined under rules and regulations by the Texas Board of Mental Health andMental Retardation, as provided. Dr. Reed, Commissioner of the Coordinating Board, Texas College and University System, has asked for an interpretation of the non-resident tuition provisions of Subchapter B of Chapter 54. The tuition for institutions ofhigher education described by 554.&N of the Education Code is made to depend, inmost instances, uponthe residence of the student. Residence, in turn, is governed by the provisions of 554.052. The presidential status of individuale under 21years of age is made to depend uponthe residence of their families, but that of individuals 21years of age or older depends upontheir own circumstances. Assuming the constitutionality of a distinction between a person who has been a resident twelve months and one whohas been a resident for alesser period d time, it is our opinion thatthese statutes extend rights andprivileges depending upona minimum age andthatthe provisions of Senate Bill 123 operate to apply the same standards, rights and obligations to persons at least 18years of age as are by those sections of the Education Code applied to persons 21year8 of age. Finally, the county attorney of Harris County has asked whether a county clerk may issue a marriage license to a male eighteen years of age without parental consent after Senate Bill 123becomes effective. Section 1.51of the Family Code, as itpresently exists, provides that except withparental consent, a county clerk will not issue a.marriage license to a male applicant under 19years of age or a female applicant under 18. House Bill 103 of the 63rd Legislature has amended this, effective January 1, 1974, to the effect that the county clerk shall not issue a marriage license if either applicant is under 18years of age. Inaddition, Article 1.52 ofthe Family Code presently provides that if the male applicant is under 19years of age the county clerk will issue thelicense ifparental consent is given. It,too, was anended by House Bill 103to authorize issuance of a license withparental consent to minors over 16butunder 18years ofage.

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Marriage without parental consent is a right or privilege, and since here it is presently made contingent upon a minimum age of nineteen, it is our opinion that Senate Bill 123would affect the age atwhich persons may marry without parental consent. It is our answer then toMr. Resweber’s question that the county clerk may issue a marriage license to :nales 18years of age without parental consent after Senate Bill 123 becomes effective. SUMMARY Senate Bill 123 is not an amendatory act but is an original and complete enactment which complies with all constitutional requirements. Ithas the effect of emancipating all persons aged 18years or more from disabilities of infancy to the same extent thatother law emancipates older persons; it co-exists with other emancipatory statutes but is independent of them. After its effective date, August 27, 1973, persons who are 18years old will be adults for all purposes, save for eligibility to remain beneficiaries under the Texas Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. All other inconsistent laws or parts of laws which make distinctions of legal infancy on a different basis are repealed by necessary implication. Very truly yours,

Attorney General of Texas

DAVID M. KENDALL. Chairman Opinion Committee p. 379