UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4060

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

HASSAN GENELL HINES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:07-cr-00323-BO-1)

Submitted: May 6, 2010 Decided: May 27, 2010

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Jude Darrow, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, 

Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Hassan Hines of conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846 (2006); possession of a firearm after having previously 

been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006); possession with 

intent to distribute marijuana, cocaine, and cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006); maintaining a residence

for distributing controlled substances, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 856 (2006); and possession of a firearm in relation to 

a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 

(2006). The district court sentenced Hines to a total of 480 

months of imprisonment and he now appeals. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

Hines first argues that comments the district court 

made during his testimony and the court’s extensive questioning 

of witnesses deprived him of a fair trial. A trial court is 

specifically authorized by the Federal Rules of Evidence to 

“interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 614(b). On appeal, this court will afford a 

measure of deference to the decision by a district court to 

exercise its authority under Rule 614(a) to question a witness. 

United States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 333 (4th Cir. 2006). As 

with other matters of trial management, the decision to question 
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a witness is quintessentially within the province of the 

district court. Smith, 452 F.3d at 332.

As Hines did not object to the district court’s 

statements during his testimony or to the court’s questioning of 

the witnesses, this issue is reviewed for plain error. United 

States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 679 (4th Cir. 2001); see United 

States v. Moore, 11 F.3d 475 (4th Cir. 1993). To prevail on a 

claim of unpreserved error, Hines must demonstrate that 

(1) there was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error 

affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Furthermore, even if Hines satisfies this 

standard, this court will exercise its discretion to notice the 

error only “if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude 

that Hines has failed to satisfy these standards. Even if we 

assume that the district court committed error that was plain, 

Hines fails to demonstrate that the error affected his 

substantial rights as the evidence of his guilt presented at 

trial was compelling and overwhelming. See Godwin, 272 F.3d at 

680. 

Hines next argues that his counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 
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U.S. 668, 687 (1984), to prove a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s performance 

was deficient,” and (2) “that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense.” With respect to the first prong, the 

defendant must show that counsel’s performance “fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. In 

addition, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be 

highly deferential.” Id. at 689. Under the second prong of the 

test, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 

694. Moreover, this court may address a claim of ineffective 

assistance on direct appeal only if the lawyer’s ineffectiveness 

conclusively appears from the record. United States v. 

Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). 

Hines contends that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the court’s statement and requesting a 

mistrial, failing to call his brother as a witness, and failing 

to argue that the court’s statement was improper in his Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 29 motion. We conclude, however, that Hines has failed 

to demonstrate that ineffective assistance conclusively appears 

from the record. We accordingly decline to consider this claim 

on direct appeal.
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Finally, Hines argues that the admission of statements 

made by a confidential informant violated his Sixth Amendment 

right to confront witnesses against him. In Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004), the Supreme Court held that 

the Confrontation Clause bars the “admission of testimonial 

statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he 

was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior 

opportunity for cross-examination.” The Court explained, 

however, “[t]hat the [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar 

the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than 

establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Id. at 59 n.9 

(citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).

Here, a government witness testified to information 

provided by the confidential informant to explain why the 

authorities undertook an investigation into Hines. Accordingly, 

as this information was not offered for its truth, the 

introduction of these statements did not violate the 

Confrontation Clause. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. With 

respect to the remainder of the confidential informant’s 

statements, defense counsel elicited this information during 

cross-examination and, therefore, the admission of these 

statements “provides no basis for reversal.” United States v. 

Neal, 78 F.3d 901, 904 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding error invited by 

the defendant not to require reversal of conviction).
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED