Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 395

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION II

No. E-22-346

WILLIAM MORGAN

APPELLANT

V.

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF 

WORKFORCE SERVICES

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered September 20, 2023

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS 

BOARD OF REVIEW

[NO. 2021-BR-05558]

AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN

PART; VACATED IN PART

WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

William Morgan appeals the adverse decision of the Board of Review (Board) 

requiring him to repay unemployment benefits in the total amount of $5,058. We affirm in 

part, remand in part, and vacate in part.

The record indicates that Morgan received unemployment benefits for the weeks 

ending November 21 through December 26, 2020, totaling $486 and for the weeks ending 

January 16 through April 3, 2021, totaling $4,572. On August 20, 2021, the Division of 

Workforce Services (Division) issued a notice of agency determination disqualifying Morgan 

for these benefits under Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-513(a) (Supp. 2021) on the 

ground that he voluntarily left his last work without good cause connected with the work. 

The record reflects that Morgan appealed that determination to the Appeal Tribunal 
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(Tribunal), which affirmed the Division’s determination with no further action taken in the 

matter.

On September 24, 2021, the Division issued two notices of nonfraud overpayment 

determinations finding Morgan liable to repay the benefits under Arkansas Code Annotated 

section 11-10-532(b)(1) (Supp. 2021). The first notice found Morgan liable to repay $4,572 

for benefits he received for the weeks ending January 16 through April 3, 2021. Of that 

amount, $972 were state benefits, and $3,600 were Federal Pandemic Unemployment 

Compensation (FPUC) benefits. The second notice found Morgan liable to repay $486 for 

benefits he received for the weeks ending November 21 through December 26, 2020. All of 

the $486 were state benefits. The record reveals that Morgan appealed only the notice finding 

him liable to repay $4,572. The Tribunal affirmed the Division’s determination, and the 

Board affirmed the Tribunal’s decision. Morgan appeals the Board’s decision.

We do not conduct de novo reviews in appeals from the Board. Keener v. Dir., 2021 

Ark. App. 88, at 1, 618 S.W.3d 446, 448. Instead, we review the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings of fact.

Id., 618 S.W.3d at 448. We accept the Board’s findings of fact as conclusive if supported by 

substantial evidence, which is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Id., 618 S.W.3d at 448. Even when there is evidence on 

which the Board might have reached a different decision, our scope of judicial review is 

limited to a determination of whether the Board could have reasonably reached the decision 

rendered on the basis of the evidence presented. Id. at 1–2, 618 S.W.3d at 448. We defer 
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credibility determinations to the Board as the finder of fact as well as the weight to be 

accorded to testimony presented to the Board. Id. at 2, 618 S.W.3d at 448. While our role 

in these cases is limited, we are not here to merely ratify the decision of the Board. Id., 618 

S.W.3d at 448. Instead, our role is to ensure that the standard of review has been met. Id., 

618 S.W.3d at 448.

This court’s recent decision in Carman v. Director confirmed that, for purposes of 

overpayment of state unemployment benefits, the repayment may be waived “if the director 

finds that the overpayment was received as a direct result of an error by the Division of 

Workforce Services and that its recovery would be against equity and good conscience.” 2023 

Ark. App. 51, at 7, 660 S.W.3d 852, 857 (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 

2021)). Carman also holds that repayment of FPUC benefits may be waived if the state 

determines that the payment of the FPUC benefits was without fault on the part of the 

individual and that such repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience. Id. at 

8, 660 S.W.3d at 857–58 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2)).

With respect to the $4,572 overpayment in the present case, the Board found that it 

was a result of a final disqualifying Tribunal determination in the underlying case and that 

the overpayment was not received as a direct result of an error by the Division. We hold that 

there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings. Because Morgan fails to satisfy 

the first prong of his state unemployment-waiver analysis, we affirm the decision requiring 

him to repay the $972 in state unemployment benefits he received from January 16 through 

April 3, 2021.
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However, the Board failed to make any findings regarding the two prongs of the 

FPUC-waiver analysis outlined in Carman. If adequate findings of fact are not made on the 

issue presented, we remand to the Board for findings of fact and conclusions of law upon 

which to perform a proper appellate review. Pillow v. Dir., 2022 Ark. App. 341, at 4. We

therefore remand to the Board for findings of fact and conclusions of law, utilizing the 

FPUC-waiver analysis prongs, regarding repayment of the $3,600 in FPUC benefits Morgan 

received for the weeks ending January 16 through April 3, 2021.

Finally, with respect to the Board’s finding that Morgan is liable to repay $486 in 

unemployment-compensation benefits, the record demonstrates that Morgan did not appeal 

this finding to the Tribunal or to the Board. Therefore, we vacate the part of the Board’s 

decision finding Morgan was required to repay $486 in state benefits.

1

Affirmed in part; remanded in part; vacated in part.

BARRETT and THYER, JJ., agree. 

William Morgan, pro se appellant.

Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.

 

1The Division’s finding regarding this issue still stands.