IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

GAINESVILLE DIVISION 

SHERRIE RUSSELL-BROWN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 USCA Case No. 10-14328-D 

v. 

USDC Case No. 1:09-cv-00257-MP-GRJ 

THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 

THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, 

LEVIN COLLEGE OF LAW, and 

ROBERT H. JERRY, II, in his 

individual and official capacities as 

Dean of the University of Florida, 

Levin College of Law, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

___________________________________/ 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

AMENDED NOTICE, pursuant to F.R.App.P. 4(a)(4) and (5), is hereby given that PlaintiffAppellant Sherrie Russell-Brown in the above-captioned action, hereby appeals to the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit from an Order (Doc. 141), entered August 19, 2010, 

dismissing her case and from an Order (Doc. 155), entered September 27, 2010, disposing of a 

motion for attorney’s fees, although the District Court acknowledged in its Order (Doc. 155) that 

“[n]ormally, the filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction over all matters 

covered in the appeal and transfers jurisdiction over those matters to the court of appeals.” 

First, the basis for Plaintiff-Appellant’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal, Without Prejudice 

(Doc. 129) was that she believed she could not have a full and fair hearing on the merits of her case 

before the District Court. In retaliation, the District Court imposed conditions on the voluntary 

dismissal without prejudice, which severely circumscribe Plaintiff-Appellant’s freedom to pursue a 

later suit. The conditions imposed on the voluntary dismissal of the above-captioned action amount 

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to legal prejudice. Given the nature of the conditions assessed by the District Court, the dismissal is 

only nominally a voluntary dismissal “without” prejudice, but effectively is a dismissal “with” 

prejudice for purposes of appeal. 

The District Court imposed two conditions on granting Plaintiff-Appellant’s motion for 

voluntary dismissal, without prejudice: 1) Plaintiff-Appellant was “compelled” to answer the 

Defendants-Appellees’ state law breach of contract Counterclaim, filed April 26, 2010 (Doc. 51); 2) 

Plaintiff-Appellant’s immediate payment of all costs and attorney’s fees to the Defendants-Appellees, 

incurred not only in the above-captioned action but in a previous action, 1:09-cv-23. 

Regarding the District Court’s condition “compelling” Plaintiff-Appellant to answer the 

Defendants-Appellees’ state law breach of contract Counterclaim, the Counterclaim itself is the 

subject of a pending Title VII, ADA and Rehabilitation Act charge of discrimination and retaliation, 

currently under investigation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). As 

Plaintiff-Appellant explained to the District Court, the Defendants-Appellees’ Counterclaim seeks 

the enforcement of a General Release, which the EEOC has already determined to be unlawful and 

retaliatory, in violation of Title VII. The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has jurisdiction to 

bring suit against the Defendants-Appellees, if the EEOC determines that their Counterclaim 

violates federal anti-discrimination, anti-retaliation statutes. Consequently, the District Court 

conditioning dismissal on “compelling” Plaintiff-Appellant to answer a Counterclaim she is 

challenging as unlawful and retaliatory before the EEOC, severely limits her pursuit of a new lawsuit. 

The District Court may enter judgment on the Counterclaim, barring Plaintiff-Appellant from 

pursuing a new lawsuit against the Defendants-Appellees, before the EEOC and the DOJ are able to 

complete their required investigations. On the contrary, there are no statute of limitations issues. 

Therefore, withdrawing the condition, pending the completion of the Government’s required 

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investigation of the Defendants-Appellees’ Counterclaim under Title VII, the ADA and the 

Rehabilitation Act, would not prejudice the Defendants-Appellees. 

Regarding the District Court conditioning voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, on PlaintiffAppellant’s immediate payment of all costs and attorney’s fees to the Defendants-Appellees, incurred 

not only in the above-captioned action but in a previous action, 1:09-cv-23, the Defendants-Apellees 

were never joined in, were never served with the Complaint in 1:09-cv-23. More importantly, given 

that Plaintiff-Appellant has been unemployed since her constructive discharge from the DefendantsAppellees, December 31, 2007, under the circumstances, the condition is so onerous that it would 

bar Plaintiff-Appellant from pursuing another suit. Further, in support of imposing the condition, 

the District Court cited to Plaintiff-Appellant “vexatiously” delaying the above-captioned action. 

However, on March 26, 2010, three days after Plaintiff-Appellant filed her Complaint (Doc. 45), the 

District Court referred the case to mediation (Doc. 49), which would have spared both parties 

significant attorney’s fees and costs. The District Court never appointed a Mediator. As a result, the 

Defendants-Appellees were required to respond to Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint and to proceed 

with the litigation. Moreover, the examples the District Court provided of Plaintiff-Appellant 

“vexatiously” delaying the case, i.e. the unavailability of Plaintiff-Appellant’s counsel, motions by 

Plaintiff-Appellant’s counsel to extend time or cancel hearings, “meritless” motions interposed by 

Plaintiff-Appellant’s counsel, are all conduct by Plaintiff-Appellant’s counsel not by PlaintiffAppellant. Although the District Court could have, at the time, denied any requests for extensions 

or cancellations and imposed Rule 11 sanctions for requesting too many extensions, for cancelling 

too many hearings or for filing “meritless” motions, notably, the District Court never did. The 

District Court has abused its discretion by punishing Plaintiff-Appellant for the alleged conduct of 

her counsel, particularly given her financial circumstances. And the Court’s award of all costs and 

attorney’s fees to the Defendants-Appellees is for work performed which is not a wasted effort, but 

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which the Defendants-Appellees can use in a later suit. Under the American Rule, each party bears 

its own costs in litigation. None of the exceptions to that Rule are applicable here. 

Finally, although acknowledging that “[n]ormally, the filing of a notice of appeal divests the 

district court of jurisdiction over all matters covered in the appeal and transfers jurisdiction over 

those matters to the court of appeals,” subsequent to the filing and docketing of the Notice of 

Appeal (Docs. 146, 147) in the above-captioned action, in an Order (Doc. 155) entered September 

27, 2010, the District Court disposed of the Defendants-Appellees’ motion for attorney’s fees, a 

matter which is specifically covered in Plaintiff-Appellant’s pending appeal (USCA Case No. 10-

14328-D). Further as the District Court is aware (Doc. 141, p. 9), on July 22, 2010, although the 

undersigned interrupted his schedule in order to file this Amended Notice of Appeal, undersigned 

counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Notice of Unavailability (Doc. 110), notifying the District 

Court that he would be unavailable for proceedings in the above-captioned action, between 

September 20, 2010 – October 1, 2010. 

DATED this 28th day of September, 2010. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Lennox S. Hinds

Lennox S. Hinds 

New York Bar No. 8196 

Stevens, Hinds & White, PC 

116 West 111th Street 

New York, NY 10026-4206 

(212) 864-4445 

(212) 222-2680 (fax) 

lawfirmshw@yahoo.com 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 28, 2010, the foregoing has been filed with the 

Clerk of the Court and served electronically by using the CM/ECF system, upon the following: 

Ian S. Marx, Esq. 

Greenberg Taurig, LLP 

200 Park Avenue 

Florham Park, NJ 07932 

Richard C. McCrea, Jr., Esq. 

Greenberg Taurig, LLP 

Courthouse Plaza, Suite 100 

625 East Twiggs Street 

Tampa, FL 33602 

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 

/s/ Lennox S. Hinds

Lennox S. Hinds 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 

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