alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
PATCH ENERGY INC.



April 3, 2003



Fairchild International Corporation
Suite 600- 595 Hornby Street
Vancouver, B.C.
V6C 1A4

Dear Sirs:

Re:	Participation Agreement dated February 10, 2003
	(the "Participation Agreement")

Further to earlier communications with you, we confirm that Patch has now clarified the terms of its ongoing participation in the drilling of wells on the Farmout Lands (as that term is defined in the Participation Agreement).  In this regard, it has now been confirmed that Patch's ability to continue to earn a 12.5% interest in any wells drilled on the Farmout Lands is contingent upon Patch paying 15.625% of the costs associated with such wells.  Therefore, this letter will serve to confirm that, for good and valuation consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is acknowledged by you, it has been agreed to amend the terms of the Participation Agreement so that the reference to the "Costs" shall be to 2.5%, the costs associated with the Second Program (as that term is defined in the Participation Agreement).

We confirm that the Participation Agreement, as amended by this letter agreement, continues in full force and effect.

Accepting that the above accurately details your understanding of our agreement in this regard, would you please execute this letter where indicated and return same at your early convenience.

Yours truly,

PATCH ENERGY INC.

/s/ David Stadnyk
Per:	
	Authorized Signatory
ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED TO THIS 7TH DAY OF APRIL, 2003.

FAIRCHILD INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

/s/ George Tsafalas
Per:	
	Authorized Signatory
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Defense

###### Office of the Secretary

          - [Transmittal Nos. 08-04]

# AGENCY:

 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense.

# ACTION:

Notice. 

# SUMMARY:

The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164 dated 21 July 1996.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 601-3740.

The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittals 08-04 with attached transmittal, policy justification, and Sensitivity of Technology.

Dated: October 11, 2007.

L.M. Bynum,

OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

      ( print page 58819)          ( print page 58820)          ( print page 58821)          ( print page 58822)    

BILLING CODE 5001-06-M

[FR Doc. 07-5113 Filed 10-16-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5001-06-C
ex418





  EXHIBIT
4.18







	


Extension of Debenture Maturity Date


 


	

TO


 

	

Intellipharmaceutics
International Inc. (the “Company”)


 


	

RE:


 

	

Debenture
dated May 1, 2019, with an original face amount of US$1,050,000
issued by the Company to Dr. Isa Odidi and Dr. Amina Odidi (the
“Debenture”) and
the Maturity Date (as defined in the Debenture) of such
Debenture


 







 


The
undersigned hereby agree that the Maturity Date of the Debenture
(currently November 1, 2019) is extended to December 31,
2019.

 


DATED
effective November 1, 2019.

 


	/s/
Isa Odidi
	
 /s/ Amina
Odidi



	
Isa Odidi


	Amina Odidi
**Exhibit
      31.1**





**RULE
      13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) CERTIFICATIONS**





I, **Zhao
      Yan Ding** ,
      certify
      that:





1.  I
      have
      reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of GFR Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the
      “Company”).





2.  Based
      on
      my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
      fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statement made,
      in
      light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
      with respect to the period covered by this report;





3.  Based
      on
      my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
      in this report, fairly present in all material respects, the financial
      condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for,
      the periods presented in this report;





4.  The
      Company’s other certifying officer(s) and I am responsible for establishing and
      maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
      Rules
      13a-15d-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and have:





(a)  Designed
      such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
      and
      procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
      information relating to the Company, including its consolidates subsidiaries,
      is
      made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period
      in which this report is being prepared;





(b)  Evaluated
      the effectiveness of the Company’s disclosure controls and procedures, and
      presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
      disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by
      this
      report based on such evaluation; and





(c)  Disclosed
      in this report any change in the Company’s internal control over financial
      reporting that occurred during the Company’s fourth fiscal quarter that has
      materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Company’s
      internal control over financial reporting; and





5.  The
      Company’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most
      recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Company’s
      auditors and the audit committee of Company’s board of directors (or persons
      performing the equivalent functions):





(a)  All
      significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
      of
      internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
      adversely affect the Company’s ability to record, process, summarize and report
      financial information; and





(b)  Any
      fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
      who
      have a significant role in the Company’s internal control over financial
      reporting.





Date:
      April 15, 2008


By:/s/Zhao
                Yan Ding**Zhao Yan Ding**
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-8193

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JORGE ROMERO-ALARCON, a/k/a Ramiro Ortiz, a/ka Ramiro OrtizTobias,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

District Judge. (3:04-cr-00008-FDW-CH-3; 3:08-cv-00567-FDW-1)

Submitted: September 16, 2010 Decided: October 4, 2010

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jorge Romero-Alarcon, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jorge Romero-Alarcon seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2010) motion. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. We have independently reviewed the record 

and conclude that Romero-Alarcon has not made the requisite 

showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability 

and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
3

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
Case 1:07-cv-03345-RJS Document 32-43 Filed 09/04/2008 Page 1 of 3
Case 1:07-cv-03345-RJS Document 32-43 Filed 09/04/2008 Page 2 of 3
Case 1:07-cv-03345-RJS Document 32-43 Filed 09/04/2008 Page 3 of 3
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-40358

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

SAMUEL E. BAKER, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:05-CR-705-1

Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Samuel E. Baker, Jr., raises

arguments that under the law of the case doctrine are foreclosed. See United

States v. Agofsky, 516 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 64 (2008).

The appellant’s unopposed motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and

the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 20, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
#### STATE v. THACKER

No. 6 PC.

Case below: 13 N.C. App. 299.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals allowed 14 March 1972.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                         408,049
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  374,741
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (50,070)
<INVENTORY>                                  1,597,484
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,357,173
<PP&E>                                       3,919,888
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,664,757
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,687,840
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       16,573,646
<BONDS>                                      2,299,352
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    924,525
<COMMON>                                       286,723
<OTHER-SE>                                (16,396,406)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,687,840
<SALES>                                        537,315
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               537,315
<CGS>                                        1,215,383
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,782,418
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               175,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             472,179
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,717,282)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,717,282)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,717,282)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.13)







</TABLE>
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

LETHERIA A WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 4:10-cv-00001-MP-WCS

MICHAEL J ASTRUE,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court on Doc. 37, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant

to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, in the total amount of $4,926.30,

representing 28.1 hours of attorney time from 2009 to 2011. Defendant has no objection to

Plaintiff’s request.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s attorney fees to be reasonable and that the $125.00 statutory

cap should be increased to account for increases in the cost of living, which have occurred since

§ 2412(d)(2)(A) was amended in 1996.1

 The Plaintiff’s counsel expended a reasonable number

of total hours.

Defendant will inquire with the Department of Treasury as to whether or not the Plaintiff

has a debt owed to the United States. If such a debt is owed, the EAJA fee award is subject to

offset for the debt owed. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2524 (2010). Defendant will

1

In 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) was amended to provide for attorney's fees at

$125.00 per hour. In 2009, the value of $125.00 in 1996 dollars adjusted for inflation per the

Consumer Price Index was $172.25. In 2001, the value of $125.00 in 1996 dollars adjusted for

inflation per the Consumer Price Index was $175.13. In 2011, the value of $125.00 in 1996

dollars adjusted for inflation per the Consumer Price Index is $179.50.

Case 4:10-cv-00001-MP-WCS Document 39 Filed 09/02/11 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

request, following that offset, that the Department of Treasury make payable directly to the

Plaintiff any remaining amount beyond what is owed to the United States. If no debt is owed to

the United States, Defendant will request that the Department of Treasury make the EAJA fees

payable to the assignee. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees under EAJA in the amount of $4,926.30, subject to any

offsetting debt owed by the Plaintiff to the United States. If the agreement between

Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel is such that these fees are assigned to Plaintiff Counsel,

any fees or partial fees received by the Plaintiff are to be considered held in trust for, and

payable to, Plaintiff's Counsel.

DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of September, 2011

 s/Maurice M. Paul 

 Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge

Case No: 4:10-cv-00001-MP-WCS

Case 4:10-cv-00001-MP-WCS Document 39 Filed 09/02/11 Page 2 of 2
# C_2011114EN.01000701.xml

| 12.4.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 114/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.4.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 114/7

---

Communication from the Commission on the quantity of certain products in the milk and milk products sector available for the second half of 2011 under certain quotas opened by the Union

2011/C 114/04

When import licences were allocated for the first half of 2011 for certain quotas mentioned in Commission Regulation (EC) No 2535/2001 (1), the licence applications covered quantities less than those available for the products concerned. Consequently, the quantity available for each of the quotas concerned for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2011 should be calculated taking account of the unallocated quantities resulting from import licence applications lodged between 20 and 30 November 2010 for butter originating in New Zealand under quotas 09.4195 and 09.4182 and for milk products originating in the Republic of Moldova under quota 09.4210.

1

The quantities available for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2011 for the second half of the year of importation for certain quotas mentioned in Commission Regulation (EC) No 2535/2001 are set out below.

---

(1)  OJ L 341, 22.12.2001, p. 29.

1

---

ANNEX

| Products originating in the Republic of Moldova |
| --- |
| Quota number | Quantity (kg) |
| 09.4210 | 1 500 000 |

Products originating in the Republic of Moldova

Quota number

Quantity (kg)

09.4210

1 500 000

| Butter originating in New Zealand |
| --- |
| Quota number | Quantity (kg) |
| 09.4195 | 27 881 000 |
| 09.4182 | 33 612 000 |

Butter originating in New Zealand

Quota number

Quantity (kg)

09.4195

27 881 000

09.4182

33 612 000

---
#### J. A. Hayden, administrator, plaintiff in error, *vs.*Benjamin McKnight, defendant in error.

(By two judges.) — When the maker and indorser of a note are sued in the same action by the administrator of the indorsee, and the maker is dismissed from the action on account of his having received his discharge in bankruptcy, and the issue was whether the indorser was discharged by indulgence granted by the indorsee to the maker, the maker is a competent witness in behalf of the indorser to prove that the indorsee, in his lifetime, gave such maker indulgence on said note for a valuable consideration. 12th March, 1872.

Evidence. Witness. Before Judge Green. Henry Superior Court. October Term, 1871.

The facts are in the opinion.

Clark & Pace, for plaintiff in error.

J. J. Floyd; J. R. Nolan, for defendant.

Montgomery, Judge.

This was a suit on a note given for $1,350, dated February 13th, 1860, and payable December 21st after date, signed by S. R. Weems, as maker and Benjamin McKnight, as indorser. The maker having produced in Court his certificate of discharge in bankruptcy, an order was taken dismissing him from the case.

He was then offered by his late co-defendant as a witness to prove that the intestate of plaintiff, who was the payee of the note had, in his lifetime, granted him indulgence for a valuable consideration. Plaintiff objected to the witness on the ground that his intestate, one of the original parties to the contract was dead, and relied on *Stamper’s case,*37 *Georgia Reports,*118; *Ibid*586, *623;*39 *Georgia Reports,*186; 42 *Georgia Reports,*120; Code, section, 3798. The Court overruled the objection and plaintiff excepted.

The case most nearly analogous to the present *is Stamper’s*case, 37 Geargia Reports, 118. We think, however, there *148is a marked distinction between the two cases. Stamper, in the case in 37 Georgia Reports, was a party to the record in whose favor the verdict, if plaintiff recovered, must necessarily go. He “ was a necessary party; the recovery could be had alone in his name, and, therefore, he was offered as a witness to testify in his own favor.” Here the witness is not a party to the record, and is not offered “ *to testify in his own favor.”*This would seem to be the touchstone under the statute if he is not called to testify in his own favor,” he is competent. And, even when called to testify in his own favor, if he is not called against the interest of deceased party to the contract, this Court has decided him competent, *Hodnett vs.*Perry, 38 Georgia, 106.

Judgment affirmed.
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEE D. ATKINSON

No. 101

(Filed 7 September 1971)

Rape § 7; Criminal Law § 135— rape — death sentence — remand for sentence of life imprisonment

Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, a rape case in which the defendant received the death sentence is remanded to the superior court with direction that the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment in the State’s prison.

Justices Higgins and Lake dissenting.

On remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.

HUSKINS, Justice.

At the trial of defendant, Dee D. Atkinson, at August, 1970 Criminal Session of the Superior Court of JOHNSTON County, North Carolina, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of rape and thereupon the court pronounced judgment which imposed a death sentence. Upon defendant’s appeal, this Court found “No error” in the trial and judgment, 278 N.C. 168, 179 S.E. 2d 410. On June 28, 1971, upon its consideration of defendant’s petition for writ of *certiorari,*the Supreme Court of the United States entered the following order: “The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment, insofar as it imposes the death sentence, is reversed, *United States v. Jackson,*390 U.S. 570 (1968), *Pope v. United States,*392 U.S. 651 (1968), and the case is remanded for further proceedings.” *Dee D. Atkinson, Petitioner v. North Carolina,*403 U.S. 948, 29 L. Ed. 2d 861, 91 S.Ct. 2292 (1971).

Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, this cause is remanded to the Superior Court of Johnston County with directions to proceed as follows:

1. The presiding judge of the Superior Court of Johnston County will cause to be served on the defendant, Dee D. Atkinson, and on his attorneys of record, notice to appear during a session of said superior court at a designated time, not less than ten days from the date of the order, at which time, in open court, the defendant, Dee D. Atkinson, being present in person and being represented by his attorneys, the presiding judge, based on the verdict of guilty of rape returned by the jury at *386the trial at the August, 1970 Criminal Session, will pronounce judgment that the defendant, Dee D. Atkinson, be imprisoned for life in the State’s prison.

2. The presiding judge of the Superior Court of Johnston County will issue a writ of *habeas corpus*to the official having custody of the defendant, Dee D. Atkinson, to produce him in open court at the time and for the purpose of being present when the judgment imposing life imprisonment is pronounced.

Remanded for judgment.

Higgins and Lake, Justices, dissent for the reasons stated in their separate dissenting opinions filed this day in *State v. Hill, ante*371, 183 S.E. 2d 97 (1971).
#### GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY, CECIL’S, INC., and FAIRWAY PROPERTIES, a Limited Partnership

No. 113

(Filed 13 June 1977)

On *certiorari*to the Court of Appeals to review its decision, reported in 31 N.C. App. 749, 230 S.E. 2d 702, reversing the judgment entered by *McLelland, J.,*at the 23 April 1976 Session of Alamance, dismissing the action as to United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim against that defendant upon which relief could be granted. The Superior Court ordered further that the motion of the said defendant for dismissal as to it be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and that final judgment for the said defendant be entered from which an immediate right of appeal would lie.

*692*Vernon, Vernon & Wooten, P.A. by John H. Vernon III for General Electric Company.*

*Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey and Leonard by L. P. McLendon, Jr., and W. Daniel McGinn for USF&G.*

LAKE, Justice.

In all respects material to this appeal the facts in this case are the same as those in Case No. 111, *RGK, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, et al.,*decided this day. The cases were consolidated for argument in this Court and but one brief was filed by each party. The single question presented upon this appeal is the same as that presented in that case and, for the reasons there stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the Superior Court and remanding the matter for further proceedings is

Affirmed.