The HONORABLE ANDREW W. BOGUE, United States District Judge for 1 the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation. The H onorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for th e 2 Eastern District of Missouri. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-3302

___________ Sidney Knowles, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: February 13, 1998

Filed: April 23, 1998

___________ Before McMILLIAN and WO LLMAN, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE, District Judge. 1

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge. Sidney Knowles appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgmen t 2 in favor of defendant Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. in Knowles’ action alleging violations of the Veteran’s Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2027. We affirm.-2- I.

FromJune 1984 to October 1992, Knowles was employed in the collection s department at Citibank, F.S.B. in Miam i, Florida. His most recent job title at Citibank was that of recovery supervisor. As recovery super visor, Knowles was responsible for the direct negotiation and collection of debts and for the management of certain debtrelated litigation. Knowles was also a member of the Army National Guard.

At some point in 1992, Citibank’s parent company, Citicorp Bankin g Corporation (Citicor

p Banking), decided to close Citibank’s Miami office as part of a widespr ead downsizing of Citicorp-related entities. As Knowles was aware, thi s closing w ould ultimately result in the elimination of his position. Upon closing, th e resp onsibility for collecting outstanding accounts from the Miami office as well a s accounts from various other clo sing offices was to be assumed by a separate Citicorprelated entity, Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. (Citicorp) in St. Louis.
In August of 1992, Knowles was called to full time active duty with the National Guard in South Dade County, Florida, in order to provide assistance in the aftermath of Hurrican e Andrew. At this time, Knowles was still employed at Citibank’s Miami office. However, shortly after he was called to service, Citibank’s Mia mi office closed, thus eliminating his position. Knowles thereafter began seeking alternativ e employment with ot her Citicorp-related entities. In late August or early September of 1992 , Knowles met with Steve Halper, senior vice president of recovery at Citicorp, an d Robert Oleson, assistan t vice president of recovery at Citicorp, in order to discuss the possibility of obtaining employme nt at Citicorp’s St. Louis office. Because he was on active duty, Knowles wore his military uniform to the meeting. Halper and Oleso n informed Knowles that Citicorp was seeking to hire a collection-3-

supervi sor

to oversee collection of the various accounts that had recently bee n consolidated in St. Louis.
Shortly thereafter, while Knowles was s till involved with the Hurricane Andrew project, Citicorp offered him the position of collection supervisor. This decision was apparent ly made by Oleson and Halper, both of whom were aware of Knowles ’ ongoing military obligation. Citicorp informed Knowles that the positio n would be held open for himwhile he completed his emergency duties with the National Guard i n Florida. I n the meantime, Citicorp asked Harold “Hal” Atkinson, who had held a similar position in Citibank’s Dallas office, to perform the collection supervisor duties on an interim basis.

Dur ing this interim period, in September and early October of 1992, Knowle s alleges that he had two disturbing phone conversat ions with Oleson, who was to be his super visor at Citicorp. In the first conversation, Oleson told Knowles that he needed him in St. Louis right away, stating, “I don’t give a damn about the milit ary. I want you up here now.” In addition, Knowles claims tha t Oleson threatened to replace him if he did not report immediately and ended the conversation in a rude manner by abruptl y hanging up the phone. Acco rding to Knowles, the second conversation was similar in content to the first, and was c haracterized by Oleson “yelling and screaming” because Knowles was not in St. Louis working. K nowles apparently did not discuss the nature of these telephone conversations with anyone at Citicorp.
Knowles completed his duties with the National Guard in mid-October of 1992 and reporte d to Citicorp’s St. Louis office on October 19th. His employment with Citic orp would prove to be brief, however, for after only two weeks in St. Louis , Knowles tendered his resignation.-4-

The source of Knowles’ initial displeasure at Citicorp was the relocation p ackage that Citicorp had offered him. Knowles felt that the relocati on package was inadequate to fully comp ensate him for his moving expenses. Accordingly, he took steps toward seeking a more favorable package, speaking with Citicorp represen tatives in New York and also wi th Citicorp’s human resources department in St. Louis. These effort s proved to be unsuccessful.

Kn owles also encountered problems in his relationship with Oleson. Knowles contends that he was treated unfavorab ly by Oleson because of his status as a member of t he Army National Guard. In support of this contention, Knowles cites thre e separate in cidents that allegedly occurred during his initial week at Citicorp. First , Knowles w as confronted by a co-worker, Craig Page, who yelled at him and referred to him unpleasantly as “Mr. Boss.” When Knowles informed Oleson of thi s occurrence, Oleson laughed an d took no further action. Second, Oleson did not allow Knowles to hold meetings with the collectors he was hired to super vise because Oleson wanted Hal Atk

inson, who had been supervising the collectors on an interim basis, to hold the meetings. Finally, Knowles claims that Oleson told him during a privat e meeting that he did not want Knowles working for him, that he di d not like the military, and that the military “was not going to dictate to him about his people.” Brief o f Appellant at 8.
Despite his displeasure with these occurrences, Knowles returned to Citicorp for
a second w eek of work. During this second week, he began searching for a n alternative position at Citicorp. This search was unsuccessful. Finally, near the en d of his s econd week, Knowles met with Christa Nolfo, a Citicorp human resource s representative, and with Oleson. Knowl es informed Nolfo and Oleson that he was not going to remain in the collection supervis or position. Nolfo asked Knowles the reason he was leaving, but Knowles did not elaborate. N olfo then asked Knowles if he would be willing to explain his reasons for leaving the position in writing. In-5-

response to this request, Knowles co mposed a handwritten resignation letter that read, in its entirety: 10-29-92 To Christa Nolfo: I must refuse the position as a recovery supervisor only because of th e relocation package. Otherwise I would very much like the position. Sid Knowles Defendant’s Exhibit C, Joint Appendix at 144.

Knowles c laims that Oleson pressured him into writing this letter and that th e letter d oes not accurately reflect his true reason for declining the position. He argues that h is resignation was precipitated not by the inadequacy of his relocation package, but by the intolerable working environment to which he was subjected on account of his status as a member of the National Guard. Nevertheless, K nowles made no attempt to apprise anyone in Citicorp’s human resources department of his mistreatment, nor didhe discuss Oleson’s conduct with his fellow employees. Knowles does contend, however, that he discussed Oleson’s conduct with Steve Halper, Oleson’s immediate supervisor, and that Halper was unreceptive to his complaints.
Following his resignation, Knowles initiated this action, which alleged tha t Citicorp had violated the Veteran’s Reemploy ment Rights Act (VRRA) by: (1) failing to reemploy him upon the completio n of his active service duty; and (2) constructively discharging him because of his National Guard status. The district court grante d summary judgment in favor of Citicorp on both claims.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as that applied by the district court. See Rose-Maston v. NME Hospitals, Inc. , 133-6-

F.3d 1104, 1107 (8th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is proper if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to t he nonmoving party, demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.

Knowl es’ claim that Citicorp violated the VRRA by failing to reemploy hi m upon the conclusion of his active service with the Army National Guard is withou t merit. It is undisputed that Knowles was employed by Citibank in Miami, Florida, at the time he was called to full time duty with the National Guard. Equally undisputed is the fact that Knowles was not employed by Citicorp until after his National Guard obligations had

ceased. Citibank and Citicorp are each wholly-owned subsidiaries of Citicorp Banking, but they are nevertheless separate entities. Thus, because it did not employ Knowles prior to his assumption of full time National Guard duties, Citicorp was under no obligation to “reemploy” him upon the conclusion of such duties.
Moreover, Knowles hims elf testified in his deposition that Citicorp offered him
a posi tion as a collection supervisor in its St. Louis office and that the duties an d responsibilities of this position w ere essentially the same as those involved in his prior position with Citibank. Thus, even if the VRRA c ould be read to impose an obligation on Citicorp to reemploy Knowles, Citicorp fulfilled any such obligation.

III.

We t urn, then, to Knowles’ assertion that he was constructively discharged i n violation of

the VRRA. The law in effect at the time Knowles left Citicorp provided: “Any p erson who [is employed by a private employer] shall not be denied hiring , retention in employment, or any promotion or other incident or advantage o f employm ent because of any obligation as a member of the Reserve component of theIn 1981 , the Supreme Court set forth the “sole cause” standard whe n 3 interpreting 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3). See Monroe v. Standard Oil Co. , 452 U.S. 549, 559 (1981). The Court held that the VRRA “was enacted for the sign ificant but limited purpose of protecting the employee-reservist against discriminations like discharge and demoti on, motivated solely by reserve status.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Consisten t with th e Court’s decision, our subsequent cases have held that in order for a sectio n 2021(b)(3 ) claim to succeed, the plaintiff’s reserve status must have been the sol e motivat ionfor the adverse employment action. See Clayton v. Blachowske Truc k Lin es, Inc. , 815 F.2d 1203, 1205 (8th Cir. 1987). Although the Uniformed Service s Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b) replaced t he “sole cause” standard with a “motivating factor” standard, we have held that this provision is not to be applied retroactively. See Newport v. Ford Motor Co. , 91 F.3d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir. 1996). Thus, the “sole cause” test articulated in Monroe applies to Knowles’ 1992 claims. -7- Armed Forces.” 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3). Knowles contends that the circumstance s
surro unding the cessation of his employment at Citicorp amounted to a constructiv e discharge in violation of section 2021(b)(3). As Knowles concedes, his sectio n 2021(b)(3) claim is actionable only if he was in fact constructively discharged and if his National Guard status was the sole cause for his discharge. 3

A con structive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately renders a n employee’s working conditions intolerable with the intent of forcing the employee to leave the employment. See Bradford v. Norfolk Southern Corp. , 54 F.3d 1412, 1420 (8th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff can satisfy the intent requirement by demonstrating that his resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the employer’s actions. See Par rish v. Immanuel Med. Ctr. , 92 F.3d 727, 732 (8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, th e intolerability of the

working conditions is judged by employing an objective standard; conditions are considered intolerable “if a reasonable employee would find them a s such.” Bradford , 54 F.3d at 1420.-8-

We conclude that the evide nce presented by Knowles is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a constructive discharge. As we have repeatedly held, a n employee’s duty to act in a reasonable manner includes “an obligation not to assume the wor st and not to jump to conclusions too quickly.” Tidwell v. Meyer’s Bakeries, Inc , 9 3 F.3d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Gartman v. Gencorp, Inc. , 120 F.3 d 127, 130 (8th Cir. 1997). Thus, “[a]n employee who quit s without giving his employer
a reasonable chance to work out a problem has not been constructively discharged. ” Tidwell , 93 F.3d at 4 94; see also Hanenburg v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 118 F.3d 570, 575 (8th Cir. 1997); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 107 F.3d 568, 574 (8t h Cir. 1997); West v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc. , 54 F.3d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1995)

. Although we are not without sympathy for Knowles’ situation, we agree with th e district court ’s conclusion that Knowles jumped to conclusions too quickly and failed to afford Citicorp a reasonable chance to address his concerns.
Although Knowles argues that he exhausted all avenues of relief in seeking a solution t o his problems at Citicorp, the record reveals that, aside from discussin g Oleson’s comments with

Halper, he took few, if any, steps toward this end. Knowles neglected to so much as mention his concerns to anyone in Citicorp’s human resources department o r to any of his co-workers. Furthermore, he made no attempt to utiliz e Citicor p’s internal grievance procedures or even to inquire about the possibility o f doing so. See Boze v. Branstetter , 912 F.2d 801, 805 (5th Cir. 1990) (employe e alleging discrimination in performance evaluations did not act reasonably when h e resigned without pursuing internal grievance procedures).
Even when asked directly by Citicorp human resources representatives about his reason for resigning, Knowles failed to mention any problem with Oleson. Instead, he
e x plained in his resignation letter that he was leaving “only because of the relocation package” and that he “otherwise would very much like the position.” Defendant’ s Exhibit C, Joint Appendix at 144. Knowles now asserts that this letter-9-

was the prod uct of Oleson’s coercive conduct and that it does not represent his tru e
reasons for leaving. This characterization of Oleson’s conduct, however, seem s exaggerated. Moreover, even if we accept Knowles’ assertions, the resignation letter still serves as an example of his decision to forgo utilizing an y remedial procedures that might have afforded Citicorp a reasonable opportunity to rectify the situation.
During his brie f employment at Citicorp, Knowles was persistent in expressing his dissatisfaction with his relocation package. On more than one occasion, h e
co ntacted Citicorp representatives in New York or Citicorp Human Resource s representatives in St. Louis in an attempt to obta in a more generous renumeration. Yet Knowles f

ailed to take any similar steps to inform Citicorp of Oleson’s conduct

. Instead, Knowles simply resigned, offering a reason that is inconsistent with th e explanati on he now submits. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in ruling that Knowles was not constructively discharged.
The judgment is affirmed.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.