J-S73040-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

BRYAN PERRY, :

:

Appellant : No. 917 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on May 16, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Criminal Division, No. CP-22-CR-0002139-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, WECHT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2014

Bryan Perry (“Perry”) appeals from the dismissal of his amended 

Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We vacate the Order of the PCRA court, 

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum.

The PCRA court set forth the relevant procedural history and factual 

background in its Opinion, which we adopt herein for purposes of this 

appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/16/14, at 1-6. 

Perry’s court-appointed PCRA counsel filed an amended PCRA Petition. 

After an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court dismissed Perry’s amended 

Petition on May 16, 2014. Perry filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a courtordered Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. 

On appeal, Perry raises the following issues for our review:
J-S73040-14

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1. Whether the trial court erred by allowing unmarked evidence 

to be submitted to the jury?

2. Whether trial counsel[, Deanna Muller, Esquire (“Attorney 

Muller”),] was ineffective for failing to present a defense and 

for failing to call alibi witnesses?

3. Whether appellate counsel[, Andrea Haynes, Esquire 

(“Attorney Haynes”),] was ineffective?

Brief for Appellant at 5 (capitalization omitted, issues renumbered for ease 

of disposition).

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA 

level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court 

and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s 

ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal 

error. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

In his first issue, Perry contends that, during an ex parte

communication between the trial judge and the jury during their 

deliberations, the jury showed evidence to the trial judge. Brief for 

Appellant at 14. In response, Perry asserts, the trial judge responded “[y]ou 

weren’t even supposed to get that. They weren’t marked as part of the 

evidence.” Id. (citing N.T., 11/15/11, at 164). Perry asserts that the trial 

judge erred by failing to inform counsel of the ex parte communication or 

the fact that unmarked evidence was sent to the jury deliberation room. Id. 

at 15. Perry points out that the record does not reflect the nature of the 

unmarked evidence that the jury mistakenly received, and the trial judge 
J-S73040-14

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cannot recall the nature of the unmarked evidence. Id. (citing PCRA Court 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 6/30/14, at 3). Perry claims that he was entitled 

to a presumption of prejudice, which the Commonwealth failed to overcome, 

thereby entitling him to a new trial. Brief for Appellant at 15-16.

Perry failed to raise this issue in his Concise Statement. See 

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (stating that, if an 

appellant is directed to file a concise statement of matters to be raised on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), any issues not raised in that 

statement are waived). Further, Perry did not raise this issue in his 

amended PCRA Petition. Accordingly, Perry failed to preserve this issue for 

our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that issues not raised in the lower 

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Moreover, this claim is not cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2); see also id. § 9544(b) (stating that “an issue is 

waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at 

trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction 

proceeding”); Commonwealth v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 383-84 (Pa. 2005) 

(stating that any claims that have been waived by a petitioner are beyond 

the power of this Court to review). Thus, even if this claim had been 

preserved, Perry is not entitled to relief.

In his second issue, Perry contends that Attorney Muller led him to 

believe that an alibi defense would be presented at trial. Brief for Appellant
J-S73040-14

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at 10. However, Perry asserts, because Attorney Muller failed to file a notice 

of an alibi defense, the Commonwealth objected when she elicited testimony 

from Perry that he was at his girlfriend’s house at the time of the alleged 

crimes. Id. at 11. Perry claims that, because Attorney Muller had no alibi 

witness, she should not have asked Perry leading questions that implicated 

an alibi defense. Id. at 12. Perry asserts that Attorney Muller was 

ineffective for failing to present a defense and an alibi witness to support the 

line of questioning during trial. Id. Perry contends that Attorney Muller’s 

actions were not the product of a reasonable strategic decision, and he 

suffered prejudice as a result of her actions. Id. 

In its Opinion, the PCRA court set forth the relevant law, addressed 

Perry’s ineffectiveness claim regarding Attorney Muller, and concluded that it 

lacks merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/16/14, at 6-8. Based on our review 

of the record, we conclude that the PCRA court’s determination is supported 

by evidence of record and is free of legal error, and therefore affirm on this 

basis as to this issue. See id. 

In his third issue, Perry contends that he did not become aware that 

the jury had mistakenly received unmarked evidence until after he read his 

trial transcript. Brief for Appellant at 13. Perry claims that, although he told 

Attorney Haynes of this mistake, she did not include this claim in his direct 

appeal. Id. Instead, Perry asserts, the only issue that she raised in his 

direct appeal was that his sentence was excessive and unreasonable. Id. 
J-S73040-14

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Perry also contends that Attorney Haynes failed to raise the above-discussed 

issues of Attorney Muller’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal. Id. Perry 

asserts that, because Attorney Haynes had no reasonable basis for failing to 

raise Attorney Muller’s ineffectiveness in his direct appeal, Attorney Haynes 

was ineffective and prejudice can be presumed. Id. 

Initially, we observe that the PCRA court failed to address Perry’s 

claims regarding Attorney Haynes ineffectiveness in its dismissal Opinion, 

despite the fact that this issue was raised in Perry’s amended Petition. See

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/16/14, at 6-8; see also PCRA Court Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) Opinion, 6/30/14, at 2 (wherein the PCRA court acknowledged that 

it failed to address this issue in its dismissal Opinion). Nevertheless, 

because the issue of whether Attorney Haynes was ineffective for failing to 

raise the issue of Attorney Muller’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal is easily 

resolvable on the record and the briefs, we will address it. See 

Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 317 n.26 (Pa. 2010). 

Litigation of ineffectiveness claims is not generally a proper component 

of a defendant’s direct appeal, and is presumptively deferred for collateral 

attack under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 578 

(Pa. 2013) (establishing a deferral rule for ineffectiveness claims litigated 

after its decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002)). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the rule 
J-S73040-14

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that ineffectiveness claims should be deferred until collateral review, both 

falling within the discretion of the trial court:

First, we held that trial courts retain discretion, in extraordinary 

circumstances, to entertain a discrete claim of trial counsel 

ineffectiveness if the claim is both apparent from the record and 

meritorious, such that immediate consideration best serves the 

interest of justice. Second, we held that trial courts also have 

discretion to entertain prolix claims of ineffectiveness if there is a 

good cause shown and the unitary review thus permitted is 

accompanied by a knowing and express waiver by the defendant 

of the right to pursue a first PCRA petition.

Commonwealth v. Arrington, 86 A.3d 831, 856-57 (Pa. 2014). 

Perry has not argued that his ineffectiveness claims regarding Attorney 

Muller fall within either exception to the rule that such claims should be 

deferred until collateral review, such that Attorney Haynes could have raised 

them on direct appeal. Moreover, given our conclusion that Perry’s 

ineffectiveness claims regarding Attorney Muller lack arguable merit, 

Attorney Haynes cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise them in 

Perry’s direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Weiss, 81 A.3d 767, 783 

(Pa. 2013). Thus, based on our review of the record, we cannot grant Perry 

relief on this claim.

However, Perry’s claim that Attorney Haynes was ineffective for failing 

to raise, on direct appeal, the jury’s receipt of unmarked evidence cannot be 

resolved on the certified record. As recognized by the PCRA court, this issue 

was not pursued or addressed at the evidentiary hearing. See PCRA Court 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 6/30/14, at 2. Our review of the certified record 
J-S73040-14

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discloses that Attorney Haynes did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, and 

the record is devoid of her response to Perry’s claim that he had informed 

her of the jury’s receipt of unmarked evidence. See id. at 3. Nevertheless, 

the PCRA Court acknowledged that this claim was addressed in Perry’s briefs 

following the evidentiary hearing. See id. 

To enable appellate review, PCRA courts are required to provide a 

legally robust discussion, complete with clear findings of fact where required. 

See Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 884 (Pa. 2011). A factfinding court should support its holding with sufficient explanations of the 

facts and law to facilitate appellate review. See id. Where a petitioner has 

presented a claim to the PCRA court and that court has not addressed it, a 

remand is appropriate where the claim cannot be resolved on the record. 

See id. “[P]articularly in close cases, a developed post-conviction record 

accompanied by specific factual findings and legal conclusions is an essential 

tool necessary to sharpen the issues.” Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 

A.2d 1110, 1121-22 (Pa. 2008) (vacating an award of a new penalty hearing 

and remanding for further proceedings). Thus, we vacate the Order of the 

PCRA court and remand this matter to the PCRA court to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Attorney Haynes rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to raise, on direct appeal, the jury’s receipt 

of unmarked evidence.
J-S73040-14

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Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this Memorandum. Superior Court jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/30/2014
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I, 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURl;; OF COMMON PLEAS, 

DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

NO. 2139 CR 2011 

BRYAN PERRY CRIMINAL - PCRA 

TRIAL COURT MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Presently before this Court is Bryan Perry's (hereinafter "Petitioner") Motion for PostConviction Collateral Reliefpursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-9551. 

Procedural History 

Petitioner was arrested and charged with Criminal Attempt Homicide (2), Aggravated 

Assault (2), Carrying a Firearm, Recklessly Endangering Another Person and Persons Not' to 

Possess a Firearm. He was represented by Deanna Muller, Esquire, of the Dauphin County 

Public Defender's Office in a jury trial. He was found gililty of all charges except for one count 

of Criminal Attempt Homicide on November 15, 2011. He was sentenced on January 27,2012, 

to an aggregate of 25 - 30 years' incarceration. He was resentenced to 25 - 30 years on March 

15, 2012. On April 5, 2012, Andrea Haynes, Esquire filed a direct appeal. On December 20, 

2012, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment of sentence. 

Petitioner filed a timely pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on November 8, 2013. 

Jennifer Tobias, Esquire, was appointed on November 18, 2013, to represent Petitioner for 

PCRA purposes. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 16, 2014. 

Factual Background 

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On the night of April 5, 2011, Priest Hamilton (hereinafter "Mr. Hamilton") was with 

Derrick Mitterlehner (hereinafter "Mr. Mitterlehner") at Mr. Hamilton's mother.'s house. (N.T. 

15, 33, 53-54). Thereafter, Mr. Hamilton drove Mr.·. Mitterlehner to his house on Kensington 

Street. (N.T. 15). Mr. Hamilton stopped the vehicle in the middle of the street to talk with Mr. 

Mitterlehner. (N.T. 16,34-35,54). Then, Mr. Mitterlehiler exited the passenger front side of the 

vehicle and walked around to the backside of the vehicle. (N.T. 16,38,54,66). 

Roughly around the moment Mr. Mitterlehner was exiting the vehicle, Appellant 

appeared from the side of a house on the street nearest the passenger side of the vehicle and 

walked towards the vehicle. (N.T. 16, 18, 35, 37). Appellant stopped and stood about two to 

three feet in front of the vehicle, pulled out a gun, and :pointed it at Mr. Hamilton through the 

windshield. (N.T. 16, 21, 54, 67). Once Mr. Hamilton realized a gun was pointed. at him, but 

before a shot was fired, he put the vehicle in drive. (N.T. 16, 37-38, 41, 50, '54). Appellant 

jumped to the side of the moving vehicle and shot a bullet through the driver's side mirror; 

which exited through the front of the mirror, went through the driver's door window, and entered 

the top edge of the driver's sipe door. (N.T. 1~:-11, 23, 29-31, 92). After Mr. Hamilton put the 

vehicle in drive, he testified 4e hearq about three more shots fired. (N.T. 19). Further, he saw 

through the remainder of the driver's side mirror Appellant pointing the gun in [what he assumed 

to be] Mr. Mitterlehner's direction and then back at his vehicle. (N.T. 19-20, 42-44). Mr. 

Hamilton identified Appellant in Court as the man who stood in front of his vehicle with a gun. 

(N.T.21). Mr. Hamilton testified he did not know Appellant before that night. (N.T. 17,21,33-

34,37,51). Conversely, Appellant testified he knew Mr. Hamilton from seeing him around the 

neighborhood. (N.T. 136-139). Appellant stated he had no problems with Mr. Hamilton. (N.T. 

139-141). 

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Meanwhile, Mr. Mitterlehner was left in plain view of the individual with the gun, whom 

he testified he recognized as his neighbor; Appellant. (N.T. 55, 65-66, 68). Mr. Mitterlehner 

took off running. (N.T. 56, 68-69). Thereafter, he heard about two or three more shots fired. 

(N.T. 57, 68). Mr. Mitterlehner said he did not see the gun nor was he sure Appellant was 

shooting at him, but he knew Appellant had a gun because the sound was distinctive. (N.T. 57, 

68, 70, 73-74). Mr. Mitterlehner identified Appellant in Court as the individual he saw that 

night. (N.T. 55). Mr. Mitterlehner admitted there wasmction between himself an~ Appellant 

because he had sold Appellant's stereo equipment. (N.T. 65, 80). 

Officer Kirk Aldrich is employed by the Harrisburg City Police Department. (N.T. 84). 

He was dispatched to the 2000 block of Kensington Street the night of April 5, 2011. (N.T. 84). 

Officer Aldrich testified he photographed, among other things, the overall view of the scene, 

evidence that was found, and where the evidence was found in relation to the scene. (N.T. 85-

90). He agreed that the scene was darker than what was depicted in the photographs. (N.T. 96-

97). Officer Aldrich collected two shell casings and placed them in a sealed envelope. (N.T. 90-

91). At the police station, Officer Aldrich photographed Mr. Hamilton's vehicle. (N.T.91-94). 

He confirmed that part of the driver's side mirror was sti1l1ntact, but the hole from the bullet was 

visible. (N.T. 98). 

Detective Christopher Krokos, with the Harrisburg Police Department as part of the 

Special Operations Unit, was assigned to this case. (N.T. 99-100). Detective Krokos and 

Detective Iachini interviewed the two victims separately. (N.T. 101). Both victims separately 

identified Appellant in a photo line-up as the man who committed the crimes. (N.T. 23-24, 31-

32, 63-64, 102-108, 117; Cmwlth Exhibits 1, 2). Thereafter, Detective Krokos located Appellant 

in Camp Hill at his girlfriend's house and placed him under arrest. (N.T. 110). He searched the 

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house and found some clothing that was admitted into evidence. (N.T. 111-112, 141-142). 

Later, a neighbor contacted the police to report finding more shell casings. (N.T. 112-113). 

Detective Krokos testified that the two brass 9 millimeter casings found by the neighbor were the 

same caliber and brand as the other two casings that were located by Officer Aldrich. (N.T. 

113). The Pennsylvania State Police Regional Laboratory report confirmed that all four of these 

casings were shot from the same firearm; a 9 millimeter handgun. (N.T. 114). Further, 

Detective Krokos requested a report from the Pennsylvania State Police to check if Appellant 

had a license to carry a firearm. (N.T. 115). The parties stipulated to the results of the report: 

Appellant did not have a license to carry a fireann in Pennsylvania. (N.T. 115-117). However, 

the gun was never recovered by the police. (N.T. 122). 

At the evidentiary hearing held April 16, 2014, Attorney Muller and Petitioner testified as 

to several ineffective assistance of counsel claims Petitioner raised in his PCRA. Petitioner 

testified that he told Attorney Muller he was horne with his girlfriend and that s~e was available 

as an alibi witness for him (Notes of Testimony, PCRA hearing (hereinafter N.T. PCRA) 6-7). 

He further testified that he had met with Attorney Muller several times and spoke to her about 

having his alibi witness testify on his behalf. (N.T. PCRA 10). Attorney Muller testified that 

there were several issues with presenting the witness. (N.T. PCRA 28). First, according to the 

witness's statement to Officer Krokos, she had not been horne for several days and was highly 

medicated on the day in question due to an infection. (N.T. PCRA 28). Attorney Muller also 

spoke with the witness who again stated she was highly medicated that night. (N.T. PCRA 28). 

Attorney Muller determined that she could not call the witness and infonned Petitioner of this. 

(N.T. PCRA 29). 

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Petitioner also testified that Muller failed to properly cross-examine two witnesses and 

that they testified inconsistently. (N.T. PCRA 15). He indicated that they testified inconsistently 

with previous testimony and that Muller failed to impeach them, that they lied in court and that 

Muller should have brought in their criminal history. (N.T. PCRA 15, 18). Muller testified that 

she conducted extensive cross-examination on the issue of whether the witnesses could identify 

the shooter. (N.T. PCRA 30). This included :pointing out inconsistencies between the trial 

testimony and preliminary hearing testimony. (N.T. PCRA 30). Muller was unaware of any 

perjured testimony and she made argument at closing regarding the inconsistencies. (N.T. PCRA 

30-31). 

Petitioner also testified that counsel was ineffective for failure to object to a piece of 

evidence that was not marked went to the jury. (N.T. PCRA 11). Petitioner claims that counsel 

was ineffective for failing to object to tainted evidence going to the jury during deliberations. 

(N.T. PCRA 11). He first became aware of the evidence when he received his trial transcripts 

and acknowledged that he was not sure if counsel was aware of what happened. (N.T. PCRA 11). 

Petitioner could not tell from the transcripts what evidence was sent to the jury, but there was a 

conversation between this Court and the jury, without either counsel, about how the jury should 

not have received a piece of evidence. (N.T. 11, 13-14) 

The following occurred at 12:17 in the jury deliberation room, 

outside the presence of counsel and the defendant. 

THE COURT: Instead of dragging you all down, I figured I'd 

come up. You have requested to see both 9-1-1 transcripts. You 

have a copy? 

A VOICE. No. This is the only thing we got. 

THE COURT: You weren't even supposed to get that. They 

weren't marked as part of the evidence. So whatever is marked as 

evidence comes up to you. Otherwise, you have to use your 

recollection based on the trial. So that's the answer. All right? 

A VOICE: Thank you, Judge. 

50f9 
( Circulated 12/05/2014 03:57 PM

(N.T. 163, N.T. PCRA 13-14). 

Muller then testified that she was unaware of this conversation, and that she was unaware 

of any un admitted evidence accompanying the jury to deliberations until she was contacted by 

the District Attorney in preparation of the PCRA hearing. (N.T. 35-36). She also was unable to 

identify what piece of evidence was inadvertently sent with the jury. (N.T. 36). 

Petitioner's PCRA Motion 

Petitioner claims eligibility for PCRA relief premised upon: 

• Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so 

undennine the truth-detennining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place. 

Legal Discussion 

Since there is a presumption that counsel provided effective representation, the defendant 

bears the burden of proving ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1137 

(Pa. 2009) (citation omitted). To prevail on a claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, 

the appellant must overcome the presumption of competence by showing that: (1) hi~ underlying 

claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have 

some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but for counsel's 

ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged proceeding 

would have been different. Commonwealth. v. (Michael) Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001). 

Prejudice is established when the petitioner demonstrates that the chosen course of action 

had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings. Commonwealth v. Davis, 518 Pa. 77, 

541 A.2d 315 (1988). However, the inquiry ends if there exists a reasonable basis for the chosen 

course of action and counsel is deemed constitutionally effective. Commonwealth v. AbdulSalaam, 808 A.2d 558 (Pa. 2001). 

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The PelIDsylvania Supreme Court has stated that it "will not consider abs.tract allegations 

of ineffectiveness; a specific factual predicate must be identified to demonstrate how a different 

course of action by trial counsel would have better served Appellant's interest." Commonwealth 

v. (Clifford) Smith, 650 A.2d 863, 867 (Pa. 1994). Further, where the defendant asserts a 

general claim of ineffectiveness without reference to evidence of record or specific facts 

demonstrating prejudice by reason of counsel's error, relief will be denied on the grounds that 

the claim is waived. Commonwealth v. Bracey, 795 A.2d 935, 940, n.4 (Pa. 2001)("Such an 

undeveloped argument, which fails to meaningfully discuss and apply the standard governing the 

review of ineffectiveness claims, simply does not satisfy Appellant's burden of establishing that 

he is entitled to any relief."). 

Petitioner raises three main arguments for ineffective assistance of counsel in his PCRA. 

First, he claims that Muller failed to properly investigate and prepare a defense favorable 

for him as she did not raise the alibi defense he wanted. Muller could not raise the alibi defense 

in the first place because she discovered in her investigation that the possible alibi witness could 

not testify as to Petitioner's whereabouts on the night in question. Thus she could not file a 

notice of an alibi defense, nor was it strategically reasonable for her to try such a defense when 

the alibi witness would not be able to testify as to Petitioner's alibi. Thus Petitioner fails to 

establish that there was no reasonable basis in not pursing an alibi defense and is not eligible for 

relief under this argument. 

He further claims that she was ineffective for failing to fully cross examme 

Commonwealth witnesses. Petitioner's PCRA attorney felt that Muller did a proper crossexamination; however, it was placed on the record as Petitioner felt strongly that Muller was 

ineffective. Muller testified, and the trial transcript shows, that she did a thorough cross70f9 
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examination of all witnesses. She specifically addressed wither the witnesses could identify the 

shooter (N.T. PCRA 30) and she was unaware of any perjured testimony by any witness. (N.T. 

PCRA 31). Petitioner fails to point to specific testimony which Muller failed to pursue and as 

made a general accusation. As such he is not entitled to relief under this argument. 

Lastly, Petitioner argues that Muller was ineffective for failing to object to, or ask for a 

mistrial or arrest or judgment because of, unadmitted evidence being sent to the jury during 

deliberations. Muller testified that she was unaware of this happening and therefore unable to 

object to it or request a mistrial. (N.T. 35-36). As Muller was unaware that a piece of evidence 

mistakenly made its way to the deliberation room and thus could not reasonably address the issue 

she was not ineffective. 

Accordingly, we enter the following: 

8 of9 
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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, 

DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

NO. 2139 CR 2011 

BRYAN PERRY CRIMINAL - PCRA 

ORDER OF COURT 

AND NOW, this ~ day of May, 2014, upon consideration of the Supplemental 

Petition for Post Conviction Collateral Relief submitted by Petitioner's Attorney, the 

Commonwealth's Response thereto and an evidentiary hearing held April 16, 2014, said petition 

is hereby DISMISSED. 

Petitioner is hereby advised of his right to appeal this Order to the Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. The Clerk of Court is 

directed to send a copy of this Order to the petitioner by certified mail, return receipt 

requested. 

BY THE COURT: 

~'t,~ Deborah E. Curcillo, J. 

Distributioll: s-lQ-lt.t ~1!S 

Hon. Deborah E. Curcill~ 

Jennifer Tobias, Esq. PO Box 365, Stewartstown, PA 17363 (V.Jl.U 

Dauphin County Clerk of Courts ~ 

Joe Cardinale, Esq. Dauphin County District Attorney's Office J:o 

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