NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 11a0108n.06 No. 08-3073 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

SAM UE LKI RI AZ I S, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,

v. VI NCENT POL I TO, Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

T H E N O R T HE RN DI STRI CT OF OH I O

B EF OR E: SI L ER, MO OR E, and GR I F F I N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Samuel Kiriazis appeals the district c ourt’s denia l of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 pe tition for habea s relief . We affir

m. I. The c ircumstance s g iving r ise to this case be g an whe n Detect i v e J o h n Graves re ceive d a

c omp la int that a man na

me d “Sam” wa s runnin g an esc or t ser vic e ou t of

32 37 Wes t 25 th S tr e e t in Cleveland, Ohio. De tective Gr aves w as g iven a phone number; he called the phone number ; and he sp ok e to “ Sa m.” “ Sa m” re a d De te c tiv e Gr a ve s “so me de sc ri pti on s of som e fe ma le s” and tol d h im that the fe e wa s $150 per hour for “full service .” Graves understood “full service” to mean oral sex or sexual intercourse . Graves booked an appointment with “Sam,” and D etec tive Ted Thomas, w ho was pa rt of the police team investig ating the complaint, went to the West 25th S tree t addre ss whereNo. 08-3073

Kir iaz is v . P oli to

- 2 - he met with Kiriazis and a woma n. The woman took Thomas to a be droom and told him that the fee

wo uld be $5 0 f or se xua l in te rc ours e ; ho we ve r, sh e qu ick ly be c a me c on c e rn e d th a t T ho ma s w a s a police off icer and told him to leave. De te c tiv e Ne il H utc hin so n th e n c a lle d “ Sa m” ; w a s li ke wi se inf or me d th a t the fe e fo r “ fu ll service ” wa s $150; and was a sked to leave his numbe r and told that someone would c all him back. Eventually , Hutchinson was instructe d to g o to 2092 West 95th Street in Cleveland, Ohio, whe re he met a woman na

med J ennine Toma zic. Tomazi c took him to a bedroom, reque sted pay ment, and Hutc hin so n g a ve he r $ 15 0. To ma zic the n d ia le d th e same numbe r H utc hin so n h a d d ia le d, sp ok e to someone she c alled “Sam,” and stated on the phone that “ [h] e’s not a c op.” Onc e she w as off the phone, Tomazic and H u t chinson discussed the de tails of their anticipated sexual encounter , and Hutchinson g ave the sig nal to the takedow n unit. Tomazi c subseque ntly informed De tective Hutchinson that she made $100 per da y for se x ual ac tiviti es with clients set up by Kiriazis, and that she would pay

Kiriazis $50 for ea ch appointment. The police next went to the W est 2 5 t h S t re et location whe re the y wer e invited inside by Ki ri a zis. A s e arc h o f t

he re sid e nc e re ve a le d n ote bo ok s w ithinf or ma tio n r e g ard inga

pp ro xima te ly forty -five w omen, their phy sical cha rac teristics, sexual prefe ren ce s , and telephone numbers; an

a pp oin tme nt n ote bo ok ; and a no te bo ok

wi th i nf or ma tio n r e g ard ingc us tom e rs , in c lud ingthe ir telephone numbers. I n the appointment notebook, De tective Hutc hinson’s first name, “ Neil,” wa s lis te d w ithhis ph on e numbe r a nd the no ta tio n “ $1 50 ” ; and , in ano the r n ote bo ok , th e Wes t 95 th location was listed next to “Dave” and “$170.” The poli ce a lso confiscated a c ell phone, which ha dNo. 08-3073

Kir iaz is v . P oli to

- 3 - the numbe r f

ro m w hic h H utc hin so n h a d c all ed Kir ia zis, a s w e ll a s th e numbe r f or To ma zic , in

its call history . Kiriazis admitted that he had been running the business for a fewmonths, that he knew the women we re ha

ving se x , and that he r ece ived $50 for e very encounte r betwee n the women a nd their customer s. Kiriazis was indicted by a gra nd jury on one count of

Promoting Prostituti on under O hio Rev. Cod e (“ O. R.C .” ) § 29 07 .2 2 fo r op e ratin g a br oth e l and on on e c ount of Pos se ssi ngCr imi na l T oo ls in violation of O.R.C. § 2923.24. He was found guilty and sente nced to six m onths inactive pr ob a tio n. Ki ri a zis a

pp e a le d, arguin g that w hil e the e vid e nc e may have be e n s uf

fi c ie nt t o s us ta in his c on vic ti on s for op erat inga br oth e l and

po sse ssi ngc ri min a l to ols a t th e loc a tio n o n We st 2 5th Street, it was insuffic ient to sustain his convicti o n s fo r t he same crimes at the West 95th S tree t location as identified i n the bi ll of particulars. The state appellate court a ffirme d, Sta te v . Ki ria zis , No. 82887, 2004 WL 231478 (Ohio C t. App. Feb. 5, 2004), and the Supreme Court of O hio declined discretionar

y revie w. Sta te v . Ki ria

zis , 810 N.E.2d 968 (Ohio 2004). Kiriazis subseque ntly filed a petition for habe as cor

pus, which the district cour t dismi ssed. He now

timely appea ls. II. We reviewthe district court’s ha beas de cision de novo. Souter v. J ones , 395 F.3d 577, 584 (6 thC i r . 2 0 0 5 )

. U n d e r

t h e A n t i t e r

r o r i s m an d

E f f e c t i v e D e a t h P e n a l t y

A c to f 1 9 9 6 , f e d e r a l c ou rt s

may on ly g ra

nt an a pp lic a tio n f

or a wr it o f h a be a s c or pu s f or c la ims a dju dic a te d o n th e me ri ts i n s ta te court proc eeding s where the state c ourt proce eding : “(1) r esulted i n a decision that was contra ry to, or involved an unr easona b le application of, clea

rly established F eder al law, a s determined by theNo. 08-3073

Kir iaz is v . P oli to

- 4 - Sup re me Court

of the Un ite d Stat e s; or (2 ) re su lte d in a dec isi on that wa s bas e d o n a n unr e a so na

ble deter mination of the fac ts in li g ht of the evi d en ce presente d in the State court proc eeding .” 28 U. S.C. § 2 25 4( d) ; Aye rs v. Hudson , 6 23 F .3 d 3 01 , 3 07 (6 th C ir . 2 01 0) ; ac c or d W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 4 0 5 (2000). A state cour t adjudication is “contra

ry to” Supreme Court pre cede nt under § 2254( d)(1) “if the state co urt arr ives at a c onclusion opposite to that reac hed by [t he Sup re me ] C ourt on a qu e sti on of law[, ]” or “ if the state c ourt c on fr on ts fa c ts that are mate ri a lly in d is ti n g u is h a

b le f r o m a r e le van t S u

p r e me Co u rt p r e c e d e n t a n d ar r iv e s a t [ ano p p o s it e r e s u lt

. ]” Taylor , 529 U.S. at 405. Under the “unr easona

ble application” clause of § 2254(d) (1), ha beas r elief is a va ila ble if “ the state c ourt

ide nti fi e s th e c or

re c t g ov e rn ingle g a l pri nci pl e from [th e Sup re me Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the f acts of the prisoner’ s case [,] ” or if a “ state cour

t decision either unr easona bly extends or unrea sonably ref uses to ext end a le g al principle fr om the Supreme Court pre cede nt to a new c ontext .” Ha rri s v . H ae be rli n , 526 F.3d 903, 909 (6th Cir. 2008) (c itations and internal quotation marks omitted). III

. Kiriazis arg ues that he is entitled to habe as re lief bec ause the s t at e appellate cour t

unrea sonab l y ap p l i ed cle arly established fe dera l law when it conc luded that there was suff icient

e vid e nc e that he op e rate d a br oth e l and po sse sse d c ri min a l too ls f or op e ratin g a

br oth e l a t th e Wes t 95 th Str e e t loc a tio n. He a lso su g g e sts that the state a pp e llate c ourt ’s de c isi on wa s c on tr ary to c le a rl y established fe dera l la

w beca use the prosec ution a lleg edly constructively amende d the indictment by introducing evidenc e of his West 25th St ree t brothel-oper ating activities and possession of c riminalNo. 08-3073

Kir iaz is v . P oli to

- 5 - tools in vi olation of his rig ht to due proce ss. We address these arguments in turn. A. Kiriazis f irst c halleng es as an unrea sonable application of clea rly established fede ral lawthe state c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t th e re wa s su ff ic ie nt ev ide nc e to sup po rt his c on vic tio ns . He c la ims that there was insuffic ient evidenc e that he ope rate d a brothe l at the West 95th S tree t location beca use “usinga building on one particula r occasion does not ca

use that building to be come a ‘brothel’ ”; “the police admitted that they had deve loped no evidenc e to show that Mr. Kiria zis had any control or interest in the West 95th S tree t property . . . .”; “[a]s far a s the police we re c oncer ned, any brothel wa s located at W est 25th Street, wher e Mr. Kir iazis was believed to have operated a pr os tit uti on bu sin e ss” ; and

the e vid e nc e int

ro du c e d a t tr ia l di d “ no thi ngto r e fute the ve ry re a so na ble possibili ty

that a prostitute workingwith Mr. Kiriazis chose to work out of her own residenc e, and, perha ps on only

one occ asion.” He also rea sons that, be cause there was insuffic ient evidenc e that he oper ated a

brothel at the Wes t 9 5 t h S t re et location, he c ould not have bee n convicted of possessing c riminal tools for operating that br othel. To deter mine whether

the state c ourt unrea sonably applied the suff

iciency -of- the-e vidence standard of J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307 , 319 (1979), “ [f] irst, we must ask whethe r the evidenc e itself wa s sufficient to convic t . . . . [ and] [ t] he inqui ry en d s i f t h e panel deter mines that there was suff

icient evidenc e.” Stewart v. W olfenbarger , 595 F.3d 647, 653 (6th Cir. 2010) (c itation omi tte d) . Se c on d, “ [i]f w e fi nd tha t th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o c on vic t, we m us t the n a pp ly AEDPA def

ere nce a nd ask whe ther the state court was ‘objec tively unrea sonable’ in c oncluding thatNo. 08-3073

Kir iaz is v . P oli to

- 6 - a r a ti o n a l tr ie r o f f

a c t c o u ld f

in d [p e ti ti o n e r ] g u il ty b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b le d o u b t. ” Id. (citation omitted). The re sult of this doubl e def ere nce is that “ habea s corpus re lief is appropriate base d on ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e on ly

wh e re we fi nd , a ft e r v ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the pr os e c uti on , th a t no ra tio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fou nd

the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me bey ond a re asonable doubt.” Parker v . Renico , 506 F.3d 444, 448 ( 6th Cir. 2007). I n this case, the O hio Court of Appea ls determined on dire ct re view that the e vidence was

su ff ic ie nt t o s us ta in K ir ia zis’ s convic tio n for op e ratin g a br oth e l at the Wes t 95th Str e e t loc a tio n in vio la tio n o f O .R. C. § 29 07 .2 2, a s w e ll a s h is c on vic tio n f or po sse ssi nga sso c ia te d c ri min a l to ols in violation of O.R.C. § 2923.24(A). Addre ssing Kiriazis’s c laim that the location on West 95th S tree t was not a bro t h el , and that he did not oper ate it as such, the court obser ved that bec ause the word “brothe l” was not de fined by the Ohio statute, it was to be “ construed a ccor d i n g t o t h e ru les of g rammar and common usag e.” Kir iaz is , 2 0 0 4 W L 2 3 1 4 7 8 at * 3 (c i t i n g State v. Poirier , 2 0 0 2 WL 1889590 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)). The court then define d “brothe l” as “a building in which prostitutes

are available .” Id. (q u o ting Me rriam Webster’ s Collegiate Dictionary 146 (10th ed. 1996)) . And it concluded that “ [a] ny rational trier of fac t c ould ha ve found that throug h the use of note books and

a c e ll ph on e , a

pp e lla nt op e rate d a br oth e l ou t of bo th the Wes t 25 th and Wes t 95 th loc a tio ns ” beca use there was e vidence that Kiriazis used the not ebook and c ell phone to coor dinate prostitution at ea ch of those building s. Id. at *3. We a g r e e . Co n tr ar

y to K ir ia zi s ’ s c o n te n ti o n , th e s tate d id n o t h a v e to p r o v e th a t he had a proper ty interest in the West 95th St ree t building; nor did the st ate have to prove that the buildingNo. 08-3073

Kir iaz is v . P oli to

I na smu c h a s K ir ia zis a

pp e ars to s ug g e st t

hat th e state c ourt

wr on g ly int e rp re te d “ br oth e l” 1 for pur poses of the state statute, we are not in a position to second g uess that dec ision. See G all v. Parker , 231 F.3d 265, 303 (6th Cir. 2000) (super seded by statute on other g rounds) (“ Principles of comity and fina lity equally command that a habe as cour t can not re visit a state court’s inter pretation of state law , and in par

ticular, instruct that a

habea s court accept the inter pretation of state law by the hig hest state cour

t on a petitioner’s dire ct appe al.”)

. - 7 - was used f

or prostitution on more than one oc casion, thoug h the jury could re asonably

have f ound th a t i t w a s . T h e s tate h a d to s h o w o n ly

th a t K ir ia zi s “ e s ta

b li s h[e d ], ma in ta in [e d ], o p e r a te [d ], manag e[d] , supervise[ d ] , control[ led], or ha[d] an intere st in” a “building in which prostitutes are available ,” O.R.C. § 2907.22(A)( 1), Kir iaz is , 2004 WL 231478 at *3, and that he “possessed” or had “contr ol” of the note book s or ce ll phone “with purpose to use [t hem] criminally .” O.R.C. § 1 2923.24. I t did. I n the light most favor able to the pr osecution, the rec ord ref lects that Kiriazis had dozens of prostitutes working for him, admitted that he ha d b ee n operating the busine ss for a f ew months, and had ar

rang ed for

at least two c lients to meet with prosti t u t es at the West 95th S tree t location, and for at least one client to me et with a prostitute at the West 25th Street location whe re Kiriazis kept the associate d notebooks and cellular phone. Be cause , on this recor d, any rational trier of fa c t c ou ld h a ve c on vic te d, the state c ourt ’s de c isi on wa s not er ro ne ou s, le t alo ne an unr e a so na ble application of the standard se t forth in J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. at 319. B. Ki ri a zis a lso su g g e sts tha t th e state a

pp e llate c ourt ’s de c isi on was c on tr ary to c le a rl y established federa l law because the prosec ution alleg edly constructively

amende d the indictment by introducing evidenc e of his West 25th St ree t brothel-oper ating activities and possession of c riminalNo. 08-3073

Kir iaz is v . P oli to

- 8 - tools. He notes that the West 25th St ree t location was not include d i n t h e bill of particular s and claims that, much like in Sta te v . V ita le , 645 N.E.2d 1277 (Ohio C t. App. 1994), the introduction of the West 25th S tree t evidence cre ated “ a g rave risk . . . that [he] was c onvict ed

. . . of a f elony on

e vid e nc e tha

t w a s n ot p re se nte d to the g ra nd jur y ” in v iol a tio n of hi s ri ght to du e pr oc e ss. (A p p el l an t ’s Br

. , p . 7 ) ( ci t i n g Vi tal e , 645 N.E.2d at 1279). W e disag ree . Unlike Vi tal e , this is not

a ca se involving a

constructive a

mendment to the indictment – for whic h prejudice is presumed – but a case involving a va

rianc e – for

which pre

judice must be prove d. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . P ic c olo , 72 3 F .2 d 1 23 4, 12 39 (6 th Cir

. 19 83 ). Whil e the lin e se pa ratin g a c on str uc tiv e a me ndme nt f

ro m a

v ar i an c e i s o f

t e nb l u r r y, see U nited States v. Beasle

y , 583 F.3d 384, 389 ( 6th Cir. 2009), our de cision of Geboy v. Brigano , 489 F.3d 752 ( 6th Cir. 2007), is inst ructive. I n Geboy , a

ha be a s p e tit ion e r c ha lle ng e d th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e in s up po rt

of his Ohio state-c ourt convictions for g ross sexual impos ition, felonious sex ual pene tration, and ra pe. Id. at 756-57. The victim was the petitioner’s da ug hter, a nd the bill of particular s listed “the home of the Def endant and victim” as the spec ific location where the cr iminal offense s at issue occ urre d. Id. at 758. The e vidence at trial, howe ver, pointed to c riminal sexual activity at sever al other loc ations and did not include much, if a ny , evidenc e of suc h criminal sex ual conduct at t he fa mily home. Id. at 758-60. The petitioner in Geboy there fore argued that the e vi d en ce ad duced at trial was insufficient to suppor

t his convictions for the crimes char g ed at the location identified in the bill of particula rs; and, by

the same toke n, he ar g ued that he c ould not have bee n convicted f or his criminal

c o n d u c t a t t h e o t h e r l o c a t i o n s p r o v e d a t t r i a l w i t h o u t c o n s t r u c t i v e l y a m e n d i n g t h e i n d i c tme nt i nNo. 08-3073

Kir iaz is v . P oli to

- 9 - violation of his right to due pr ocess. Id. at 757, 760. We reje cted these claims. We expl ained t h at t h e reason the claims fa iled is that, while the bill of particular s listed a location wher e the c harg ed off enses a lleg edly

occur red, loc ation was not an e lement of the of fense , and the indictment did not identify or re strict the location wher e the char g ed offe nses occur red. Id. at 757, 762. We emphasized that “the sor ts of details supplied in a bill of particula rs ty pically do not qualify as ele ments of the offe nses char g ed in a n underly ing indictment” and that “pr ovid[ ing] more de ta ile d a lle g a tio ns in a bil l of part ic ula rs that dif fe r fr om the e vid e nc e a t tr ia l, .

. . do e s n ot e le vate these a dditional details into ‘elements’ that must have be en included in the indictment.” Id. at 762- 6 3 (c i t i n g State v. W

ebb , 5 96 N. E. 2d 48 9, 49 1 (O hio Ct. Ap p. 19 91 )) (o the r ci ta tio ns omi tte d) . T hu s, we h el d t h at “the discrepa ncy [between the loc ation wher e the c riminal conduct oc curr ed as identified i n t h e bill of particular s and as e vidence d at trial] is properly char acte rized as a mer e varia nce, a nd the re levant question is whether the def endant wa s prejudice d by this variance .” Id. (citations omitted). T h e s am e r ea s o n i n g ap p l i es i nt h e p re s en tca s e. Lo c a t i o ni s n o tan el em en to f o p er at i n g a brothel in violati o n of O.R.C. § 2907.22(A)( 1) (“ [n] o person sha ll knowingly . . . [e] stablish, maintai n , o p e r a te , ma

n a g e , s u p e r v is e , c o n tr o l, o r

h a v e anin te r e s t i na

b r o th e l” ) o r

o f p o s s e s sing criminal tools in violation of O.R.C

. § 2 9 2 3

. 2 4 (“[n]o person shall possess or have under the person’ s control any

substance, de vice, instrument, or a rticl e, wi t h purpose to use it cr iminally ”). Acc ording ly , the fa ct that the evide nce at trial included more than just the West 95th S tree t location

was a varia nce, a nd, to preva il, Kiriazis must demonstrate pr ejudice. See G eboy , 489 F.3d at 763-64;No. 08-3073

Kir iaz is v . P oli to

- 10 - Un ite d S tat es v . H

ar t , 70 F.3d 854, 860 ( 6th Cir. 1995) (c i t at i o n and interna l quotation marks omi tte d) (“ [A] va

ri anc e is i mmate ri a l if

it d oe s n ot i mpa ir

the de fe nd ant’ s a

bil ity to d e fe nd him se lf thr ou g h fa ili ng to ide nti fy the natur e of th e charg e .” ); cf. United States v. M iller , 471 U.S. 130, 13 4- 35 (1 98 5) (s ta tin g that a va ri anc e a ff

e c ts the de fe nd ant’ s su

bs tanti a l r ig hts wh e n h e is prejudicia lly

surprised or

the fa irness of his trial is prejudice d.). Kiriazis does not arg ue that he w as pre judiced by t h e v ar i an ce; nor could he succ eed if he had. The investigation a

nd the criminal conduct related to the West 95th Street a nd West 25th S tree t locations wer e thoroughly intertwined: Kiriazi s arr ang ed mee tings be tween me n and prostitutes at both locations, and Kiriazis was ar rested at the West 25th S tree t location, along with the notebooks

and c e ll p ho ne he us e d to ru

n th e e nti re op e ratio n. Ki ri a zis the re fo re kn e w h is a c tiv iti e s at th e Wes t 25 th S tr e e t lo c a tio n w ou ld b e the su bje c t of te sti mony

a t tr ia l, a

nd he had th e oppo rt

un ity to

c ro ss- e xami ne the thr e e de te c tiv e s who we re inv olv e d in the inv e sti g a tio n. Ac c or din g ly , w e ho ld that the s tate’s failure to list the W est 25th Street addr ess in the bill of particular s, while introducing evidenc e re lated to that addr ess at trial, wa s not prejudicial. Cf. U n i t ed States v. Puttick, 2 88 F. App’x 242, 245-46 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding t hat “Put tick

. . . has not shown that he wa s prejudice d by [a va ri anc e ]” be c a

us e he “ ha d a mpl e no tif

ic a tio n of the c ha

rg e s a g a ins t him

. . . . ” ); United States

v . A rn old , 890 F.2d 825, 829 ( 6th Cir. 1989). I V. For these re asons, we a ffirm the judg ment of the district cour t.