NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ALEXANDRA C., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Z.C., V.C., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0130

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD36904

The Honorable Lori Ash, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll Attorney at Law, Scottsdale

By Denise Lynn Carroll

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Emily M. Stokes

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 08-27-2020
ALEXANDRA C. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Chief Judge Peter B. Swann

joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Alexandra C. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

severing her parental rights to Z.C. and V.C. (“the children”).1 Mother 

argues the juvenile court erred in finding she substantially neglected or 

willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that caused the children to 

be in an out-of-home placement. Mother also argues severance was not in 

the children’s best interest. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

¶2 Mother is the biological mother of the children, who were 

born in 2014 (Z.C.) and 2015 (V.C.). Brett N. is the biological father of Z.C. 

Steven H. (“Father”) is the biological father of V.C. and considers himself a

father-figure to Z.C.

¶3 On January 11, 2019, the Department of Child Safety (“the 

Department”) took the children into care after Mother left them in the care 

of relatives approximately one week before Christmas with no plan to 

retrieve them. The Department began an investigation and discovered 

Mother and Father were both unemployed, their current home was filthy

and without electricity, and both parents had a history of substance abuse. 

Due to her long-term use of suboxone, Mother had entered a detoxification 

program in December 2018, but she was discharged before completing the 

program. The Department attempted to implement a present-danger plan 

that required both parents to submit to a rule-out drug test and submit to a 

1 The court also severed the rights of the children’s biological fathers. 

Only the severance of Mother’s rights is at issue in this appeal.

2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the 

juvenile court’s order. Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 

207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008).
ALEXANDRA C. v. DCS et al.

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3

home inspection. Both parents refused to submit to the drug test, and 

Mother refused to allow the Department in her home.

¶4 Soon thereafter, the Department initiated a formal 

dependency action. In April 2019, Mother pled no contest to the 

Department’s allegations. The juvenile court found the children dependent 

as to Mother and adopted a case plan of family reunification.

¶5 In February 2019, the Department submitted a referral to 

Terros for Mother for a substance-abuse evaluation and treatment. After 

multiple failed attempts at contacting Mother, a Department employee 

finally met with Mother at her home, where Mother agreed to schedule an 

evaluation appointment. Mother never scheduled an appointment,

however, and Terros closed the referral for lack of engagement. In April 

and June, the Department submitted second and third referrals for Mother, 

but they also resulted in closure due to a lack of engagement. In September, 

the Department made a fourth referral, and in October 2019—

approximately ten months after the children had been taken into the 

Department’s care—Mother participated in a substance-abuse evaluation.

¶6 At the evaluation, Mother admitted stealing Percocet from 

her mother when she was seventeen years old and later using suboxone. 

Terros recommended Mother complete standard outpatient services, and 

the recommendation was later upgraded to intensive outpatient services 

based on Mother’s positive tests for alcohol. At the time of the February 

2020 severance trial, Mother was participating in substance-abuse 

treatment at Terros, although she acknowledged she missed multiple 

sessions in December 2019 and was nearly closed out of treatment at that 

time.

¶7 The Department also referred Mother to Physician Services, 

Inc. in April 2019, so she could engage in consistent drug testing. However, 

her case manager testified that between the time of that April 2019 referral

and the severance hearing, Mother had eighty scheduled urinalysis tests,

missed approximately fifty-six of those tests, and tested positive for alcohol 

approximately seventeen times. At the time of trial, Mother acknowledged 

she continued to routinely drink alcohol, and she was still unable to be 

referred to a parent aide because she could not demonstrate thirty

consecutive days of sobriety.

¶8 The Department also became concerned about domestic 

violence when Mother advised her case manager in April 2019 that Father 

had become abusive. The concern escalated in August when Mother 
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obtained an order of protection against Father. Father repeatedly violated

the order, and to address this in part, the Department asked Mother to selfrefer for domestic-violence counseling. At the severance trial, Mother 

testified she did not attend the recommended counseling3 and instead

completed a five-hour on-line domestic-violence course; however, the 

certificate she submitted to the Department on December 29 was dated 

December 30, 2019. Mother’s case manager testified that, regardless of the 

certificate’s authenticity, a five-hour on-line course was insufficient to 

address the Department’s safety concerns.

¶9 In October 2019, Mother and Father reconciled, and the order 

of protection was quashed upon Mother’s request, even though neither 

parent had engaged in any required domestic-violence services. At trial, 

Mother insisted she only requested the order of protection so Father would 

participate in the Department’s services, although at the time she obtained 

the order of protection, she herself had not yet begun participating in Terros 

and was substantially noncompliant with other services.

¶10 In November 2019, the Department moved to sever Mother’s 

parental rights, alleging the statutory ground of nine months’ time-in-care. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(8)(a). By the time of the contested 

severance hearing in February 2020, the children had been in the 

Department’s care for more than a year. At the hearing, Mother explained 

she did not initially engage in services because she thought the whole thing 

was a “joke” or “game” initiated by her family. Mother also testified that,

since April 30, 2019, she had consistently visited the children. She 

admittedly did not visit them for the first five months they were out of her 

care, however, as she claimed she was too busy looking for suitable 

housing. Mother conceded, however, she was unemployed and not 

participating in any Department services during that time.

¶11 Mother’s case manager testified the children are in an 

adoptive placement with their maternal grandmother, who is meeting all 

their needs. Additionally, the case manager testified both children need 

permanency and are readily adoptable, as they are young, healthy, and 

without any special needs.

¶12 The juvenile court granted the Department’s termination 

motion and severed the parent-child relationship between Mother and the 

children. The court found the Department made a diligent effort to provide 

3 Mother testified she did not believe she would benefit from

domestic-violence counseling.
ALEXANDRA C. v. DCS et al.

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appropriate reunification services—including substance-abuse assessment, 

treatment, and testing; visitation; and transportation—but despite the array 

of services provided, Mother had substantially neglected or willfully 

refused to remedy the circumstances causing the children to remain in outof-home care for more than a year. The court also noted Mother never took 

the services seriously and did not engage in any substance-abuse 

assessment or treatment until October 2019, which was more than nine 

months after the Department took the children into care. In addition, 

Mother’s drug tests were sporadic and inconsistent. The court ultimately 

concluded that Mother’s recent attempts to engage in services were “too 

little, too late.” The court also found termination of Mother’s parental rights 

was in the children’s best interest.

¶13 Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. We have appellate 

jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-235(A) and Rule 103(A) of the Arizona 

Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.

ANALYSIS

 I. Standard of Review

¶14 A court may sever parental rights if it finds clear and 

convincing evidence of one of the statutory grounds for severance and finds 

by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the children’s best 

interest. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), -537(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 

281-82, 288, ¶¶ 7, 41 (2005).

¶15 As the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, the juvenile 

court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, 

judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Jordan C. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (quoting Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004)). Thus, the 

resolution of conflicts in the evidence is uniquely the province of the 

juvenile court, and we will not reweigh the evidence in our review. Jesus 

M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 12 (App. 2002). Instead, 

we review the court’s order to determine if reasonable evidence supports 

its factual findings. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, 

¶ 7 (App. 2010).

 II. Termination Pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a)

¶16 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that the 

children have lived in an out-of-home placement for nine months or longer 

or the adequacy of the Department’s reunification services; instead, Mother 
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challenges the court’s finding that she substantially neglected or willfully 

refused to remedy the circumstances that caused the children to be placed 

out of the home. She maintains that, by the time of the severance trial, she 

was mostly participating in services, had obtained a stable home, and just 

“needed additional time.” Accordingly, Mother contends that, at the time 

of trial, she was not willfully neglecting the services because she was doing 

“something” to reunite with her children.

¶17 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a) if the Department has made a diligent effort to 

provide the parent with reunification services and

[t]he child has been in an out-of-home placement for a 

cumulative total period of nine months or longer pursuant to 

court order or voluntary placement pursuant to § 8-806 and 

the parent has substantially neglected or wilfully refused to 

remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an outof-home placement.

¶18 A parent who makes an “appreciable, good faith effort[] to 

comply with remedial programs” provided by the Department will not be 

found to have substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances causing 

the child to be in an out-of-home placement. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. 

JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576 (App. 1994). However, if a parent “makes only 

sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy” the circumstances, the juvenile court 

is “well within its discretion in finding substantial neglect and terminating 

parental rights on that basis.” Id.

¶19 Here, reasonable evidence in the record supports the juvenile 

court’s finding that Mother substantially neglected or willfully refused to 

remedy the circumstances causing the children to be in an out-of-home 

placement. Moreover, the record also reflects Mother’s overstatement of

her level of participation in services at the time of trial.

¶20 Although Mother consistently visited the children late in the 

dependency, she did not begin her visits until approximately five months 

after she dropped the children off at a relative’s home. Further, despite 

receiving numerous referrals for Terros, Mother waited approximately nine 

months to begin substance-abuse assessment and treatment, and in late 

November 2019, she was “demoted” from a standard outpatient substanceabuse program to an intensive outpatient program based on her positive 

tests for alcohol. At the time of trial, she was still in the intensive outpatient 

substance-abuse program and was in danger of being terminated from the 
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program due to missed sessions. Mother also attended less than half her 

scheduled urinalysis tests (approximately twenty-four out of eighty), tested 

positive approximately seventeen times, continued to struggle with issues 

related to alcohol, and was unable to demonstrate sobriety for thirty 

consecutive days, causing her to continue to be ineligible to be referred to a 

parent aide.

¶21 In addition, Mother failed to attend domestic-violence 

counseling and continued to minimize or deny the existence of domestic 

violence between her and Father, despite Father’s criminal conviction and 

multiple arrests for repeated violations of the order of protection, and his 

refusal to engage in domestic-violence counseling or make any behavioral 

changes. Further, even assuming Mother obtained stable housing during 

the dependency,4 she was living with Father, despite the fact they had 

neither addressed nor resolved the issue of domestic violence between 

them. As the juvenile court noted, by the time of trial, Mother had not 

shown she “ever attempted to make meaningful behavioral changes and 

[never] took the services seriously, even after [she] did start to engage.” On 

this record, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that 

Mother substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the 

circumstances causing the children to be in an out-of-home placement.

 III. Best Interest

¶22 Mother next argues the Department failed to prove it was in 

the children’s best interest to sever her parental rights. She contends that

although the juvenile court believed the children were doing well with their 

maternal grandmother, “there is certainly no love better than a [m]other’s 

love, especially when the [m]other and children are bonded.”

¶23 To support a best interest finding, the Department must prove 

a child will affirmatively benefit from termination or be harmed by 

continuation of the relationship. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). The juvenile court must consider the totality 

of the circumstances existing at the time, and the best interest requirement 

may be met if, for example, the petitioner proves a current adoptive plan 

exists or the child is adoptable. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 

150-51, ¶¶ 13-14 (2018). The existence of a bond between a parent and child 

is also a factor, although not necessarily dispositive, when assessing a 

4 The case manager testified she had not received documented proof 

regarding housing from Mother.
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child’s best interest. Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98-

99, ¶ 12 (App. 2016).

¶24 As reflected in the severance order, the juvenile court 

determined Mother had not meaningfully addressed the safety concerns of 

substance abuse and domestic violence that put the children at risk of harm. 

The court also found the children’s placement with their maternal 

grandmother was meeting all their needs and was the least restrictive 

placement. Further, the court found the children were young, without any 

special needs, and adoptable. Although the court acknowledged Mother 

and the children were bonded, the court concluded that did not mean the 

children should have to “linger in care waiting for [Mother] to take this case 

seriously.” We agree and conclude reasonable evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s findings and conclusion that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights was in the children’s best interest.

CONCLUSION

¶25 The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to the children is affirmed.