IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-1160

Filed April 14, 2021

ADAM DUANE HAUGEN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

NIKI GREENWOOD,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Tamra Roberts, 

Judge.

The mother appeals the district court’s award of joint physical care. 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED. 

Chase Cartee of Cartee Law Firm, P.C., Davenport, for appellant.

Joshua J. Reicks and Trista M. Beise of Schoenthaler, Bartelt, Kahler & 

Reicks, Maquoketa, for appellee.

Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
2

GREER, Judge.

After awarding joint physical care of an unmarried couple’s three-year-old 

child, the mother, Niki Greenwood, appeals.1 First, Niki claims the district court 

erred in awarding joint physical care and argues she should be primary caretaker 

of the child. In support of this claim, Niki challenges testimony from a witness, 

D.B., arguing the court erred in finding her testimony credible.2 Second, Niki claims 

joint physical care is not in the best interest of the child because it would lead to

time apart from the child’s half-sister. Lastly, Niki requests we order the father, 

Adam Haugen, to pay her appellate attorney fees. Adam disputes Niki’s claim that 

joint physical care is not in the child’s best interests. He maintains D.B.’s testimony 

was credible. He also counters Niki’s request for appellate attorney fees with his 

own request for appellate attorney fees.

 

1 The district court ordered the following physical care schedule:

[T]he Court finds that the 3-3-2 rotation should be utilized; one 

parent of the child for three days, then the other parent of the child 

for three days, then the first parent for two days. The rotation will 

then start over with the second parent starting the rotation. This 

will give each parent weeknights and weekends with the child.

2 D.B.’s testimony at trial was particularly important considering the district court 

said: 

Each party presented several witnesses. They were character 

witnesses, and each could provide little insight into each person’s 

parenting. Some witnesses had only seen the parents both 

interact with the child three to four times a year or less. The 

witness that provided some of the best insight was [D.B.]. [D.B.] 

was previously a friend of Niki and had later supervised the visits 

between the child and the father when supervision was required. 

Her testimony was not biased, and comparable to what you would 

see from a guardian ad litem for a child. She was a voice for the 

child. She was credible.
3

I. Facts and Earlier Proceedings.

We begin by summarizing the parent’s relationship history and the events 

leading to this appeal. Niki and Adam began dating in late 2015 and moved in 

together in 2016. Nikki gave birth to their daughter, K.L.G.H., in September 2017. 

Niki and Adam got engaged in spring of 2017, but the engagement was later called 

off. Ultimately, Niki and Adam separated in June 2019 due to relationship issues,

and Adam moved out of the family home and in with his parents. Adam did not 

see the child for two months after the separation, and the parties dispute whether 

Niki prevented contact or if Adam lacked initiative to seek contact. Later on, per 

an out-of-court agreement, Adam began supervised visits with the child. Niki 

selected a friend, D.B., to supervise visits between the father and child in D.B.’s 

home. Only three of these visits occurred under this plan.

Then in July 2019, Adam petitioned the court to establish paternity, custody, 

visitation, and support.3 Simultaneously he applied for temporary custody and 

support. In his combined filing, Adam requested joint legal custody and physical 

care of the child with scheduled visitation for Niki. Niki answered with her own 

request for physical care of the child and a request for attorney fees.4 A temporary 

hearing took place in September 2019. The court awarded the parents joint legal 

custody of the child with temporary physical care in Niki. The order granted Adam 

unsupervised overnight visits every other weekend, but required Adam to refrain 

from the use of alcohol and secure all firearms while the child was with him. 

 

3 He later amended his petition on August 12, 2019.

4 Niki asked the court to order Adam “to pay temporary and permanent attorney 

fees and costs to . . . Niki . . . to defend this action.” The district court never 

addressed her request in its ruling.
4

Trial began in July 2020 to determine the permanent care arrangement for 

the child. Although Adam requested physical care of the child in his pleadings, at 

trial he also supported a joint physical care arrangement. While approving the joint 

custody status, Niki maintained she should be the physical caretaker of the child. 

After a two-day trial involving testimony from fourteen witnesses, including the 

parties, the district court awarded Adam and Niki joint physical care of the child. 

Parents’ Background. Niki is thirty-five years old. Besides her child with 

Adam, Niki has an older daughter from a prior relationship. She has an associate’s 

degree and is a licensed real estate agent in Iowa and Illinois. Niki is employed by 

Keller Williams Realty. The district court computed her annual income at $42,842. 

She describes her schedule as very flexible and works mostly from home but attends 

real estate showings or closings once or twice weekly. Due in part to her flexible 

work schedule, Niki has been the primary caregiver of the child since birth. 

Adam is thirty-two years old. His only child is his daughter with Niki. Adam 

works at ADM Construction in Clinton, Iowa as a supervisor and has remained 

employed with ADM Construction for almost fourteen years. He works forty hours 

a week on average, 6:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Thursday.5 Adam 

works occasional overtime, but less so since the outbreak of the COVID-19 

pandemic. Adam’s annual income is $88,000. 

Relationship Issues and Parenting Concerns. Nikki and Adam began 

experiencing relationship issues during the summer of 2017. Their primary 

 

5 Some evidence suggested Adam worked most Fridays, leaving home at 5:20 

a.m. and returning home from work at 3:00 p.m. His earnings from years before 

the pandemic exceeded $100,000. Adam earns $36.43 per hour. 
5

disagreements centered on Niki’s disapproval of Adam’s drinking habits, his 

anger, and his lack of involvement with the family. Concerning the drinking, 

Adam admitted he had a drinking problem in his early twenties, resulting in two 

convictions for operating while intoxicated by age twenty-three, but he 

maintained he no longer has a drinking problem. Addressing her assertions, 

Adam claims Niki did not want him to drink any alcohol and that she exaggerates 

his drinking. He testified he would have a couple of drinks at times after work 

but has no dependency on alcohol. Several witnesses gave testimony about

Adam’s drinking habits. The paternal grandmother testified that Adam would 

have a beer or two after work twice a week and described his drinking as 

responsible. She also confirmed Adam’s testimony that he had not drank in two 

and a half months at the time of trial. A mutual friend of Adam and Niki testified

he had “occasionally” seen Adam abuse alcohol but never saw him drink in the 

presence of the child. Other witnesses testified they believed Adam had a 

drinking problem, but this was based mostly on conversations with Niki rather 

than firsthand knowledge. But one witness observed Adam drinking whiskey at 

Niki’s baby shower and another heard him tell a story of how he drank so much 

on a fishing trip he did not know where he was. Adam downplayed the reports 

he made to his doctor about drinking and the doctor’s note of alcohol abuse. 

Niki also points to Adam’s anger and abusive behavior as contributing to 

the decline of their relationship. She said Adam struggled with anger and 

depression after the birth of their child, and she described angry outbursts where 

Adam would throw items and kick things, including the family dog. Niki said 

some of these incidents took place in front of their child, and she believed it 
6

terrified the child. There was a confirmed incident shortly after the child’s birth 

where Adam threw a box of DVDs and speakers down the basement stairs, and 

another where he threw a box of dishes.6 Adam acknowledges he experienced 

anger and mental-health issues during the relationship, and he confirmed 

threatening Niki with physical harm in the past. He denies ever threatening his 

child or Niki’s older child. Adam also confirmed threatening his own life during 

arguments with Niki. The parties did attend relationship counseling, and Adam 

participated in individual therapy.

Communication issues were also a persistent theme in the relationship 

from the summer of 2017 onward. For instance, Niki claimed Adam left the home 

for days or weeks at a time without warning and would not communicate with 

her during his absences. A daycare provider and friend of the family confirmed 

Adam was not home often late in the relationship. Niki also described tension 

with Adam’s family. She claimed Adam did not invite her to his family functions, 

including two Thanksgiving gatherings he attended while leaving her home with 

the child. Adam agrees that his relationship with his parents caused problems in

his and Niki’s relationship. When asked to elaborate, Adam said, “I don’t think 

Niki liked how close my mom and I were. My mom was helping out with a lot of 

my finances when I was younger, and [Niki] didn’t agree with that once her and I

moved into the household together. So I think that was some tension.”

Despite their issues, the parent’s relationship improved somewhat in early 

2019. At this point they mutually decided to work on their relationship and began 

 

6 Niki claims Adam threw the boxes at her both times; he admits to both incidents 

but maintains he did not throw anything in Niki’s direction.
7

attending couple’s counseling. Adam sought professional help for emotional 

issues and began taking medication for treatment. Still, the relationship ended 

when Adam moved out of the family residence and in with his parents in June 2019. 

At the time of trial, Niki resided in the family home and Adam continued his residence 

in his parents’ home.7

After the parents separated, Adam did not see the child for two months, 

although this was partially attributable to Niki. Niki admits she did not ask Adam to 

care for their daughter during her showings and closings following the separation. 

She did not want Adam to see the child at the time because of his behaviors. To 

help with their communication, Niki gave Adam pamphlets about co-parenting 

education, but as to his participation, Adam noted during cross-examination

Q. All right. So would it be fair to say that Niki, after your 

separation, wanted to try and improve the level of communication 

between the two of you? A. Yeah.

Q. She gave you resources to help improve those

communications? A. Yep.

Q. And you chose not to look into it, correct? A. Sure.

 

7 During the trial, there was a passing reference to a partition action filed by Adam 

involving the family home and real estate. In the ruling, the district court 

commented that relocation of either party “will not be classified as a substantial 

change in circumstances for purposes of modification of this order. It was well 

within the contemplation of this Court that the parties may live an hour apart or so.” 

While that question is not before us now, we note the district court’s position is in 

direct conflict with our holdings in other cases. See Thorpe v. Hostetler, 949 

N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (holding hour-long drive between homes made 

shared-care arrangement unworkable and was not in the best interests of the 

child); Teggatz v. Ellingson, No. 19-1816, 2020 WL 2065944, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Apr. 29, 2020) (holding the one-hour distance between parties’ homes was a 

“major obstacle” to a joint physical care plan); In re Marriage of Scurr, No. 11-1905, 

2012 WL 2122306, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 13, 2012) (declining to award joint 

physical care because a forty-five minute commute was not in the best interests of 

the child). 
8

Another point of contention between the two parents was the presence of firearms 

around the family home. Niki did not approve of the many firearms Adam owns, 

which she said he often kept unsecured around the house. 

Adam contends that Niki is controlling and works to deprive him of contact 

with their child. To support his position, he draws our attention to what he saw as 

her efforts to keep him off the birth certificate8 and to change the child’s last name 

without his knowledge or permission. Adam also argues Niki restricted his time with 

the child by initially requiring supervised visitation and not allowing him overnight 

visitation at his parents’ home. Niki asserts she restricted visitation to protect the 

child due to her concerns with Adam’s drinking, his mental health, and the access 

to loaded guns. 

II. Standard of Review and Error Preservation.

Cases involving physical-care arrangements are tried in equity, thus our 

standard of review is de novo. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 690 

(Iowa 2007). In the context of dissolution cases where physical care is contested, 

“[p]rior cases have little precedential value, except to provide a framework for 

analysis, and we must base our decision on the particular facts and circumstances 

before us.” In re Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Iowa 1992) (citing In re 

Marriage of Weidner, 338 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1983)). “Although we give 

weight to the factual findings of the district court, we are not bound by them.” In re 

Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). “We will disturb the district 

court’s ruling ‘only when there has been a failure to do equity.’” Thomas v. Stotts, 

 

8 Each party blamed the other for the fact Adam’s name does not appear on the 

child’s birth certificate.
9

No. 20-0659, 2021 WL 210985 at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021) (quoting In re 

Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 2005)). 

Adam argues Niki did not address error preservation in her appellate brief 

in violation of Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.903(2)(g), which requires 

appellate briefs to include “[a] statement addressing how [each] issue was 

preserved for appellate review.” Adam asks that we dismiss Niki’s appeal for 

failure to comply with the appellate rules. Niki contends there are numerous 

citations to the record showing how each issue was preserved on the question of 

physical care. While her brief is not a model of clarity as to error preservation, we 

agree the central physical-care issue was raised and considered in the district 

court, thus we decline to dismiss Niki’s appeal. See In re Estate of DeTar, 572 

N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (providing the failure to comply with the 

Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure can lead to summary dismissal of an appeal, 

but the court may still determine an appeal “as a matter of grace” if we believe we 

can do so without assuming the role of an advocate). 

Finally, the parties’ dueling requests for appellate attorney fees is left in our 

discretion. See Markey v. Carney, 705 N.W.2d 13, 26 (Iowa 2005). 

III. Analysis.

A. Joint Physical Care. 

The sole question is whether the district court’s award of joint physical care 

is appropriate. Both parties agree that joint legal custody is appropriate,9 but Niki 

 

9 Joint legal custody means:

[A]n award of legal custody of a minor child to both parents jointly 

under which both parents have legal custodial rights and 

responsibilities toward the child and under which neither parent has 
10

contends she should have physical care of the child. Adam finds the court-ordered 

plan acceptable. Joint physical care means:

[A]n award of physical care of a minor child to both joint legal 

custodial parents under which both parents have rights and 

responsibilities toward the child including but not limited to shared 

parenting time with the child, maintaining homes for the child, 

providing routine care for the child and under which neither parent 

has physical care rights superior to those of the other parent.

Iowa Code § 598.1(4) (2019). When awarding physical care, our overriding 

concern is the best interests of the child. Weidner, 338 N.W.2d at 356. Our 

determination is not based on “perceived fairness to the [parents], but primarily 

upon what is best for the child. The objective of a physical care determination is 

to place the child[ ] in the environment most likely to bring [her] to health, both 

physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d. at 695 

(citations omitted). Our analysis is guided by a non-exclusive list of factors 

enumerated in Iowa Code section 598.41(3).

10

 Our supreme court’s decision in 

 

legal custodial rights superior to those of the other parent. Rights 

and responsibilities of joint legal custody include but are not limited 

to equal participation in decisions affecting the child's legal status, 

medical care, education, extracurricular activities, and religious 

instruction.

Iowa Code §598.1(3). 

10 Section 598.41(3) provides:

In considering what custody arrangement . . . is in the best 

interest of the minor child, the court shall consider the following 

factors: 

a. Whether each parent would be a suitable custodian for the 

child.

b. Whether the psychological and emotional needs and 

development of the child will suffer due to lack of active contact with 

and attention from both parents.

c. Whether the parents can communicate with each other 

regarding the child’s needs.

d. Whether both parents have actively cared for the child 

before and since the separation.
11

Hansen also provides four non-exclusive factors to consider when making 

physical-care determinations: 

Factors often of importance in determining the viability of joint 

physical care include an overriding interest in stability and continuity, 

the degree of communication and mutual respect, the degree of 

discord and conflict prior to dissolution, and the extent to which the 

parties agree on matters involving routine care. While we believe 

that in many contested cases, the best interests of the child will not 

be advanced by joint physical care, the courts must examine each 

case based on the unique facts and circumstances presented to 

arrive at the best decision.

Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 700. We consider these factors in turn.

As for the first consideration, “[s]tability and continuity factors tend to favor 

a spouse who, prior to [separation], was primarily responsible for physical care.” 

Id. at 696. By all accounts, Niki has been primarily responsible for physical care 

of the child. Even Adam does not dispute this point. Hansen teaches that “joint 

physical care is most likely to be in the best interest of the child where both parents 

have historically contributed to physical care in roughly the same proportion.” Id. 

at 698. The district court noted physical care of the child has not been equal, “[i]f 

each parent’s caretaking were placed on a scale, Niki’s side would surely outweigh 

the other” but thought “it is balanced enough that the child would flourish under 

either parent’s care.” And Adam wants to be in the child’s life as much as possible. 

 

e. Whether each parent can support the other parent’s 

relationship with the child.

. . . .

g. Whether one or both parents agree or are opposed to joint 

custody.

h. The geographic proximity of the parents.

i. Whether the safety of the child, other children, or the other 

parent will be jeopardized by the awarding of joint custody or by 

unsupervised or unrestricted visitation. 
12

Adam’s mother, with whom Adam resides, testified she observed his parenting every 

weekend he has the child. She painted a picture of an attentive, caring father. 

Q. Who provides the care for [the child] at your house? Is it 

Adam, is it you, is it a combination? A. I would say the majority is 

Adam. He gets up, he gets her breakfast, gets her clothes changed. 

You know, he does take care of her daily needs. I might help if Adam

needs to be in the shower, you know, something like that, where we 

don’t want her wandering the house by herself, and so I do that while 

he’s showering. But the rest of it, he’s taking care of her, from the 

very first day she came to our house.

But Adam’s mother also noted his struggles with balancing work and childcare

duties before he moved in with her.

Q. Okay. How did you feel—or what did you observe? What did you 

think about how Adam was adjusting to his role as a new dad? A. I 

felt like he was doing okay with it, probably a little tired, a little 

stressed from lack of sleep, trying to work his 10- or 12-hour shifts 

sometimes. But the problem was 10-hour shifts and then a waking 

baby.

We agree with the Hansen proposition that “where one spouse has been the 

primary caregiver, the likelihood that joint physical care may be disruptive on the 

emotional development of the [child] increases.” 733 N.W.2d at 698. To be fair, 

Adam loves his child. But the role of caretaker requires more. Throughout the 

trial, witnesses contrasted Niki’s past involvement with Adam’s. We rely on the 

principle that, “in family law matters, past performance is a strong indicator of what 

is yet to come.” Hensch v. Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). 

Since the child’s birth, Niki handled the day-to-day routine, including preparing 

meals, staying with the child when sick, scheduling and attending the child’s doctor 

appointments, reading books and planning activities with the child, arranging 

playdates, bathing the child, and putting her to bed. Witnesses observed Adam 

being less involved. Before the parties separated, the daycare provider, who was 
13

in the home several times each week, testified that Adam was often on the couch 

with his phone, not engaging with the child. While he did pick up the child from 

daycare routinely, there were no other parental functions identified. Adam 

mentioned attending doctor appointments, but the record reflected he attended 

only one doctor appointment and was unable to name the child’s pediatrician. 

When the child was scheduled for a MRI scan, Adam did not believe it was 

necessary and said he was unable to go because of his work.11 And Adam’s ability 

to provide physical care without support from others is unproven. Adam, a thirtythree year old man, has lived with his parents since June 2019, and at times he

relied upon his mother to wake him for work and manage his finances.12

Finally, we note Niki’s flexible work schedule allows for more continuity in 

care. Adam leaves for work at 5:20 a.m. at least four days each week, returning 

home after a twelve-hour shift. In contrast, Niki can be anywhere at any time to 

handle the care of the child. There was no evidence presented at trial to address 

who would care for the child around Adam’s work schedule. Overall, the proven 

continuity and stability offered by Niki provides the best environment for the child’s 

continued development and growth. “[T]he factors of continuity, stability, and 

approximation are entitled to considerable weight.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 700.

So this factor weighs heavily in Niki’s favor. 

Under the next factor, we consider “the ability of spouses to communicate 

and show mutual respect.” Id. at 698. Both parents testified communication was 

 

11 The child had been stumbling so a scan was ordered.

12 This behavior occurred during the time Adam lived with Niki. Niki asked Adam’s 

mother to quit enabling Adam by handling his finances. 
14

a major issue in their relationship that progressively worsened leading up to the 

separation. They disagree on whether their ability to communicate and effectively 

co-parent can improve going forward. Adam acknowledges past and present 

communication issues, but he is optimistic that things have improved and will 

continue to do so. Niki remains highly skeptical based on history with Adam. 

Turning to events post-separation, Niki noted continuing issues

communicating with or even reaching Adam. She testified they had no 

communication for “two or three months” until two weeks before the trial date. 

Adam’s mother explained that Adam had no cell phone in April, May, and June 

2020 because he could not afford one even though Adam is living with his parents 

and making almost ninety thousand dollars annually. Niki alleged Adam ignored 

“probably twenty” of her text messages about the child since the separation. 

Again, Adam blamed the lack of communication on his inability to afford a phone. 

At trial, Adam confirmed he is open to “whatever means it might take . . . to 

effectively communicate with [Niki].” But his past conduct does not support this 

claim. Adam stated to Niki in 2017 that “he needed to get his shit together and 

grow up” now that he had a child. Yet during the relationship Adam would leave, 

disengage from the family, and avoid Niki when frustrated. Not prioritizing the need 

for a cell phone to allow for communication with the mother of your child when your 

goal is to split parenting duties evenly mitigates against Adam’s promise to do 

whatever it might take to effectively communicate with Niki. 

In our analysis of the first and second Hansen factors, we find joint physical 

care is not in the best interest of the child. And under the third factor, the degree 
15

of conflict between the parents, we observe that conflict now is low given the lack 

of communication between the parties. Id. at 700. The Hansen court noted:

Joint physical care requires substantial and regular interaction

between divorced parents on a myriad of issues. Where the parties’

marriage is stormy and has a history of charge and countercharge,

the likelihood that joint physical care will provide a workable

arrangement diminishes. It is, of course, possible that spouses may

be able to put aside their past, strong differences in the interest of

the children. Reality suggests, however, that this may not be the

case.

Id. at 698. Yet, we note the degree of conflict was previously high, and included 

aggressive behaviors by Adam due to “anger issues.”13 While there is no indication 

in the record that the parents are still fighting at that intensity, they speak 

infrequently. Thus, we have no assurance the parties have effectively addressed 

conflicts that might impede a shared-care schedule. 

Finally, we address “the degree to which the parents are in general 

agreement about their approach to daily matters” in raising the child. Id. at 699. 

The Hansen court noted:

It would be unrealistic, of course, to suggest that parents must agree 

on all issues all of the time, but in order for joint physical care to work, 

the parents must generally be operating from the same page on a 

wide variety of routine matters. The greater the amount of 

agreement between the parents on child rearing issues, the lower 

the likelihood that ongoing bitterness will create a situation in which 

children are at risk of becoming pawns in continued post-dissolution 

marital strife.

Id. at 699. This factor is difficult to gauge given Adam’s limited involvement in the 

day-to-day care of the child. We have full confidence the parties can communicate 

within the parameters of joint legal custody, but given our analysis above, we are 

 

13 In a text-message exchange, Adam’s mother acknowledged to Niki that Adam 

had mood swings and anger issues.
16

not convinced a joint physical care plan promotes the child’s long-term physical 

and emotional health. 

B. Separation of the Siblings.

In considering the best physical-care arrangement for the child, we also 

factor in the closeness of the sibling relationship here. Niki points to the child’s 

relationship with her older half-sister as cutting against an award of joint physical 

care. She argues

[the child’s] relationship with her sister is so close that the loss of part 

of that relationship would be very traumatic for [the child]. The court 

should grant Niki [physical] care with Adam receiving reasonable 

visitation to keep this very close sister relationship intact, as best as 

it can be.

We recognize “the presumption that siblings, including half-siblings, should not be 

separated.” Armstrong v. Curtis, No. 20-0632, 2021 WL 210965, at *7 (Iowa Ct. 

App. Jan. 21, 2021). That said, “[t]he rule is not ironclad . . . and circumstances 

may arise which demonstrate that separation may better promote the long-range 

interests of the child.” In re Marriage of Jones, 309 N.W.2d 457, 461 (Iowa 1981). 

The age difference between the two half-sisters is over ten years. Yet there 

was evidence the two are very close,

14 and testimony revealed Niki’s older 

daughter is involved in the child’s life and helps provide care. Even more, some 

of the care by the older sister occurred at the direction of Adam during times when 

it was his responsibility to provide care for the child. Several witnesses supported 

the evidence of the close relationship, and no one rebutted it. In some cases, the 

 

14 At trial, it was described that the child wakes her older sister every morning, and 

pre-pandemic, waited at the door to see her older sister come home from school. 

Likewise, the older sister attended to the needs of the child when Niki was doing 

other things in the home. 
17

age difference between siblings mitigates the harm of separation in the custodial 

decision. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brauer, 511 N.W.2d 645, 647 (Iowa Ct. App. 

1993) (noting the thirteen-year age difference between the half-siblings prevented

them from being play companions and likely meant they would not reside together 

for more than four or five years so that relationship would not trump awarding 

custody to the primary caregiver). But, we still examine the best long-term interest 

of the child and our strong interest in keeping children of broken homes together. 

In re Marriage of Orte, 389 N.W.2d 373, 374 (Iowa 1986). 

Here, the half-sister has been a constant in the child’s short life. We do not 

take the potential adverse effects of separating the siblings lightly, but we also lack

the benefit of the district court’s analysis of the relationship because the ruling is 

silent on the subject. We cannot say, on this record, that the separation of the 

siblings under a joint physical care arrangement will “better promote the long-range 

interests of the [child].” See In re Marriage of Kurth, 438 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 1989). The status quo over the past three years includes daily contact 

between the children, and given our analysis supporting physical care to Niki, we 

find the best interest of the child requires strong consideration of this special 

relationship. With that in mind, the factors supporting a joint physical care 

arrangement are not so strong as to require separating the half-siblings. 

Given the sibling relationship and because the factors do not support the 

parenting schedule ordered by the district court, we conclude the best interest of 

the child will be advanced by giving physical care to Niki rather than awarding joint 

physical care. To promote Adam’s role in the child’s life, we order liberal visitation. 

Adam shall have visitation every other weekend from Friday at 5:00 p.m. until 
18

Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Because Adam does not work on Fridays, he shall have 

visitation every Thursday overnight, starting at 5:00 p.m. and continuing until 

Friday at 5:00 p.m. on weeks he does not have weekend visitation. The spring 

break, holiday, and summer schedule developed by the district court shall remain 

in effect. 

We remand to the district court to determine the proper level of child support 

given the change in physical care and visitation, effective the date procedendo is 

issued. On remand, the district court should recalculate the obligation “based on 

the present financial circumstances of the parties and the child support guidelines.” 

See In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 37 (Iowa 2015). 

C. Reliance on Testimony of D.B.

Although we reverse the joint physical care decision, we address Niki’s 

concerns about a witness at trial. Niki claims the district court erred in relying on 

the testimony of D.B., arguing D.B. changed her tune in comparison to an affidavit 

she wrote for the temporary custody hearing in September 2019. Niki postures 

D.B. testified differently because their friendship soured. But, the district court 

relied heavily on D.B’s testimony in making its decision, stating “[h]er testimony 

was not biased, and comparable to what you would see from a guardian ad 

litem for a child. She was a voice for the child. She was credible.” Although 

we are not bound by the district court’s fact findings we give them weight, 

especially concerning witness credibility. Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d at 5. Even with 

this credibility finding, we are unconvinced the joint physical care arrangement 

is appropriate here. First, D.B. confirmed her opinion that Niki was the primary 

caretaker of the child:
19

Q. In your opinion, who was the primary caregiver while Adam 

and Niki were in a relationship? A. Niki was the primary caregiver. 

Her job allowed her to be at home more with the kids, so she did a 

lot of those things. 

Q. Do you think that Adam also provided care for the children? 

A. Yes, he did. But he also worked 12-hour shifts, so he wasn’t there 

as much. By the time he'd get home, you know, it’s supper, and then 

the nightly routine, you know.

D.B. did observe Adam’s visits with the child, and she testified Adam was prepared 

and engaged; he brought snacks and toys for the child and generally exhibited good 

parenting skills. Still, D.B. only observed three visits. We agree with D.B. that both 

Niki and Adam are good parents. But we also note the stark difference between 

D.B.’s trial testimony and the opinions she expressed in her affidavit15 for the 

 

15 In her affidavit, D.B. stated:

Since Adam has left their home in June, 2019, I have spent a lot 

of time with Niki . . . and [the child]. I have observed a mother 

living in fear for the safety of herself and her children. I was 

present when Niki received a threatening message from a friend 

of Adam’s. 

. . . . 

To date, I have supervised three visits between Adam 

Haugen and [the child]. On all occasions, I took [the child] out of 

her car seat and stood her on the ground so she was able to see 

Adam in the driveway. I expected [her] to say “daddy” and run to 

Adam with her big smile, but that wasn’t the case. [The child] didn’t 

move and seemed very hesitant. Adam had to come to her and pick 

her up. [ The child] didn’t cry, but was very quiet, which isn’t typical 

behavior for her.

During the first two visits, Adam cares for [the child]. He 

brought her food and drink, although she wouldn’t sit and eat dinner 

on either occasion. [The child] interacted with Adam, but also wasn’t 

her normal rambunctious self of an almost 2 year old.

. . . . 

To further ensure [the child] was comfortable at my house, 

Niki brought her over the day after her first visit with Adam. [The 

child] was very hesitant upon arrival and held tight to her big 

sister . . . . It took [her] several minutes to begin playing like she 

normally would at my home.

The day after the second visit between [the child] and Adam, 

I visited Niki and [the child] at their home. I observed [the child] . . . 
20

temporary custody hearing, before her relationship with Niki soured. In that same 

vein, D.B. sent text messages to Niki in September 2019, in which she said she did 

not think Adam should be alone with the child. D.B. confirmed saying that, but she

clarified that much of the information she was receiving about Adam’s drinking 

habits, mental-health issues, and abusive behavior was one-sided coming from 

Niki. So while D.B. offered helpful perceptions about the family, we also weigh the 

inconsistencies in her testimony in our de novo review.

D. Attorney Fees.

Both Niki and Adam request an award of appellate attorney fees. Under 

Iowa Code section 600B.26(2020), “In a proceeding to determine custody or 

visitation, or to modify a paternity, custody, or visitation order . . . the court may 

award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees.” Requests for appellate 

attorney fees are within the discretion of this court. Markey, 705 N.W.2d at 26. In 

deciding whether to award appellate attorney fees “we consider the needs of the 

party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party 

making the request was obligated to defend the trial court’s decision on appeal.” 

In re Marriage of Ask, 551 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 1996). Because Niki, the 

prevailing party, has sufficient income from which to pay attorney fees, we decline 

to award her appellate attorney fees. 

 

crying every time Niki walked out of her sight. This behavior is not 

typical for [her] when I am there. 
21

IV. Conclusion.

We modify the district court’s award of joint physical care of the child and 

remand for additional proceedings to determine the appropriate child-support 

obligation. We decline to award either party appellate attorney fees.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.