15-653-cv 

Lawson v. Hilderbrand

 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the 

14th day of March, two thousand sixteen. 

Present: AMALYA L. KEARSE, 

 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 

 ROBERT D. SACK, 

 Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________________________ 

DUNCAN LAWSON, JANE DOE, a minor child, 

PPA DUNCAN LAWSON, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

 v. 15-653-cv 

TIMOTHY HILDERBRAND, GARY HOFFKINS, RICHARD STOOK, 

JOSEPH RONDINI, FREDERICK QUEZADA, 

 Defendants-Appellants, 

TOWN OF GREENWICH, 

 Defendant. 

_____________________________________________________ 

 

Appearing for Appellants: Andrew M. McPherson, Goldstein & Peck, P.C. (William J. 

Kupinse, Jr., on the brief) Bridgeport, CT. 

Appearing for Appellees: William S. Palmieri, New Haven, CT. 
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 Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.). 

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the order of said District Court be and it hereby is REVERSED. 

 Timothy Hilderbrand, Gary Hoffkins, Richard Stook, Joseph Rondini, and Frederick 

Quezada (together, “Defendants”) appeal from the February 23, 2015 order of the United States 

District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.) denying Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on the theory that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on 

plaintiffs’ search and seizure claims in the first count of the complaint. Lawson v. Hilderbrand, 

88 F. Supp. 3d 84 (D. Conn. 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, 

procedural history, and specification of issues for review. 

 Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil suits for damages “insofar as 

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

Ordinarily, an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not permitted as that 

decision is not a final judgment. O’Bert ex rel. Estate of O’Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29, 38 (2d 

Cir. 2003). Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, the denial of a motion for summary 

judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is immediately appealable where the district court 

denied the motion as a matter of law. Jones v. Papineau, 465 F.3d 46, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2006). 

However, defendants may only take an appeal if they accept as true plaintiff’s version of the 

facts for purposes of the appeal. Id. We review the district court’s law-based denial of summary 

judgment on the issue of qualified immunity de novo. See Finigan v. Marshall, 574 F.3d 57, 61 

(2d Cir. 2009). 

When a government official charged with violating federal constitutional rights seeks 

summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, the Court may first consider whether 

there was a “violation of clearly established law before turning to the more difficult question 

whether the relevant facts make out a constitutional question at all.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223, 239 (2009). Here, we conclude that the lack of clearly established law barring the 

police actions entitles the Defendants to qualified immunity for their actions. The police entered 

the home with Duncan Lawson’s consent, and when that consent was revoked it was objectively 

reasonable for the defendants to believe that exigent circumstances made their continued 

presence in the house, and their confinement of the residents to the living room, lawful. See 

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011). As “the need to prevent the imminent destruction 

of evidence has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search,” id. at 

460 (internal quotation marks omitted) it follows that the need to prevent the destruction of 

evidence provides sufficient justification for the less intrusive act of securing the premises until a 

search warrant is obtained. 

 
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 We have considered all of the plaintiffs’ arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is REVERSED, and this matter remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this order. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk