Information Circular 9232 

Review of Recent Research on 

Organizational and Behavioral 

Factors Associated With Mine 

Safety 

By Robert H. Peters 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Manuel lujan, Jr., Secretary 

BUREAU OF MINES 

T S Ary, Director 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data: 

Peters, Robert H. 

Review of recent research on organizational and behavioral factors associated with 

mine safety / by Robert H. Peters. 

38 p. cm.-(Information circular / Bureau of Mines; 9232) 

Bibliography: p. 15 

Supt. of Docs. no.: I 28.27:9232. 

1. Mine safety. 2. Mineral industries-Personnel management. 3. Miners-Psychology. 4. Mine safety-Research-United States. 5. Mineral industries-Personnel management-Research-United States. 6.Miners-Psychology-Research-United 

States. I. Title. II. Series: Information circular (United States. Bureau of Mines); 

9232. 

TN295.U4 622 s-dc20 [622'.8] 89-600152 CIP 
CONTENTS 


Page 

Abstract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

.............................................................. 

................................................ 

............................................................ 

1 


Introduction 2 


Review of research fmdings 2 


Organizational factors 4 


Training for miners 4 


Training for managers and supervisors 5 


Management planning 5 


Management commitment to safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

............................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

............................................................ 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5 


Production competition between crews ................................................ 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6 


Production pressure 6 


Equipment availability 6 


Safety and health equipment maintenance 6 


Safety-production incentive program 6 


Safety disciplinary actions 6 


Size of mine 6 


Feedback and praise 7 


Night shift work 7 


Employee control 7 


Worker participati

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

............................................... 

...................................................... 

...................................................... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

................................................... 

on in problem solving 7 


Worker autonomy ............................................................... 

................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

....................................................... 

..................................................... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

.......................................................... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8 


Decentralized decision making 8 


Management-labor relations 8 


Overall labor relations climate 8 


Management concern for labor 9 


Labor support for safety discipline 9 


Supervisor-employee interaction 9 


Reporting hazards to supervisor 9 


Employee development 9 


Praise fo~ w~rking saf~ly 9 


CommumcatlOns to mmers 9 


Individual miner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

................................................................... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

10 


Absenteeism 10 


Coworker relations 10 


Role ambiguity 11 


Role overload 

...

.................................................................. 

................................................................ 

.................................................. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

....................................................... 

........ 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

11 


Role conflict 11 


Age ................... , .......... " . .. . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

11 


Overview of findings and their limitations 12 


Recommendations for improving mine safety 12 


References 15 


Appendix.-Annotated bibliography 16 


TABLES 

1. Description of empirical studies of organizational and behavioral factors affecting mine safety 3 


2. Summary of organizational and behavioral variables associated with mine safety 4 


A-I. Injury rates for companies using versus not using each safety policy 25 


A-2. Lost-time accident frequency rates before and after institution of nonmonetary safety incentive program . 26 

UNIT OF MEASURE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT 


ft foot mt metric ton 

ff/min cubic foot per minute pct percent 

h hour st short ton 

mm minute yr year 
REVIEW OF RECENT RESEARCH ON ORGANIZATIONAL AND 


BEHAVIORAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH MINE SAFETY 


By Robert H. Peters1 

lResearch psychologist, Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 

ABSTRACT 

This report presents a literature review conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Mines. The review 

summarizes what has been learned from recent empirical studies ofthe relationship between mine safety 

and characteristics of miners, mine management, and mining companies. The review is based on 

literature published in the United States during the period from 1976 to 1988. In addition to 

summarizing the empirical findings, this report discusses the implications and limitations of these studies, 

and gives recommendations for improving mine safety. An annotated bibliography section appears in 

the appendix. 
2 

INTRODUCTION 


2Italic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 

preceding the appendix at the end of this report. 

Research on organizational and behavioral factors in 

the mining industry represents a promising approach to the 

improvement of miners' safety. Such research projects are 

usually very expensive and often require several years to 

perform. Because they are so costly, it is important that 

researchers begin their studies by reviewing any work that 

has already been performed. Learning what others have 

done improves their understanding of the problem and 

their ability to design an effective study. 

The purpose of this U.S. Bureau of Mines report is to 

provide researchers and mining industry officials with a 

review of the recent United States research literature 

concerning the relationship between mine safety and 

characteristics of miners, mine management, and mining 

companies. Using computer literature search services, it 

was found that 17 empirical studies on this topic had been 

published in the United States during the years 1976 

through 1988. For a review of the foreign literature on 

this topic, see Peters (23).2 

The body of this report is organized into three major 

sections. The fIrst section reviews the research fmdings 

concerning 16 company-level variables; three variables 

concerning the amount of control employees have over 

what happens on the job, three variables related to management-labor relations, four variables related to supervisor-employee interactions, and six variables pertaining to 

individual miners. The second section presents an overview of the fmdings, and makes some statements concerning the use of caution in interpreting the fmdings given the 

nature of the experimental designs and research methods 

that were used in most of these studies. The third section 

presents recommendations about improving mine safety 

that were given by the authors of the 17 studies reviewed 

in this report. This report also contains an appendix, 

which gives the following information about each of the 17 

studies: the references for publications concerning the 

study, the study's objective, the methods used to perform 

the study (including a brief description of experimental 

interventions and data analysis procedures), the results, 

and (where applicable) major conclusions. 

REVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 


Table 1 lists the studies included in this review and 

indicates the following about each: the experimental 

design, the type of ore mined, whether surface or underground, the number of mines or companies from which 

data were collected, and the marmer in which mine safety 

was measured. 

The experimental design. The studies that look for 

naturally occurring relationships between variables and 

measures of mine safety by collecting data at only one 

point in time are labeled correlational. One study used a 

cross-lag panel design (27). Data were collected at two 

points in time, and the effect of changes in the correlates 

on changes in safety measures were examined. This is a 

relatively good design because it allows one to make better 

inferences about the direction of causality. In the correlational and cross-lag panel studies, the effects of planned 

changes on mine safety were not studied. Other studies, 

labeled interventions, involve observing the effects of some 

planned change (e.g., a new training program) on indexes 

of mine safety. Measures of mine safety are taken before 

and after the intervention is introduced, and inferences are 

made about the role of the intervention in producing 

observed changes in safety. Unfortunately, given the 

frequent lack of adequate control sites, and the complexity 

of the interventions, it is often quite difficult to determine 

precisely what was responsible for the observed improvements in safety. In instances where control sites are 

used, this design allows one to make relatively strong 

inferences about the existence of causal relationships 

between variables. 

A technique often used in performing research on 

company-level determinants of employee safety is to look 

for factors that differentiate between companies that have 

established records of good versus poor safety performance 

(7). This type of study is labeled the contrast design. 

Typically, data are collected on a very large number of 

factors, and statistical tests are performed to see which 

factors differentiate between the two groups of companies 

at a statistically significant leveL There are some important limitations to this type of study: (1) When considering 

a large number of factors, one should expect to observe a 

certain number of statistically significant relationships 

between variables that, in reality, are not related to one 

another; (2) one cannot specify the direction of causality, 

or the extent to which two variables are influencing each 

other in a reciprocal manner; (3) one carmot rule out the 

possibility that the observed relationship might be because 

of the influence of some unmeasured variable that is highly 

correlated with the ones measured. In other words, it may 

be the case that the measured variable is not the true 

cause of differences in safety performance; rather, the true 

cause influences both safety performance and the variable 

found to be correlated with safety performance. 
3 

Table i.-Description of empirical studies of organizational and behavioral factors affecting mine safety (1976-1988) 

Investigator 

and reference 

Design Mine type Sample size Safety index 

Althouse (1) ..... . 

Bell (3) ......... . 

Bennett (4) ...... . 

DeMichiei (9) .... . 

Edwards (10) .... . 

Fiedler (12) ..... . 

Gaertner (14) .... . 

Goodman (16) 

Goodman (17) 

Goodman (18) .... 

NAS (21): 

1st data set .... 

2d data set . . . . . 

3d data set . . . . . 

Peters (24) . . . . . . . 

Do ........... 

Do ........... 

Pfeifer (25) . . . . . . . 

Rhoton (26) ...... 

Sanders (27) ..... 

Uslan (30) ....... 

Wagner (31) . . . . . . 

Contrast ...... . 

Intervention .... . 

Correlational ... . 

Contrast ...... . 

Intervention .... . 

.. do ....... . 

Correlational ... . 

Intervention .... . 

.. do ....... . 

Correlational ... . 

. . do ....... . 

. . do ....... . 

Contrast ...... . 

Intervention .... . 

.. do ....... . 

.. do ....... . 

Contrast ...... . 

Intervention .... . 

Cross-lag panel .. 

Intervention .... . 

Correlational ... . 

Underground coal .... . 

Underground silver ... . 

Underground coal .... . 

.. do ............ . 

Surface coal ........ . 

Underground trona ... . 

Underground coal .... . 

. . do ............ . 

.. do ............ . 

.. do ............ . 

.. do ............ . 

.. do ............ . 

.. do ............ . 

Surface gold ........ . 

Surface coal ........ . 

Underground coal .... . 

. . do ............ . 

.. do ............ . 

.. do ............ . 

Underground salt .... . 

Surface iron ........ . 

29 mines ..... . 

1 mine ....... . 

All U.S. coal ... . 

40 mines ..... . 

1 mine ....... . 

.. do ....... . 

10 companies .. 

1 mine ....... . 

4 mines ...... . 

5 mines ...... . 

All U.S. coal .... 

19 companies .. 

12 mines ..... . 

1 mine ....... . 

2 mines ...... . 

.. do ....... . 

28 mines ..... . 

1 mine ....... . 

22 mines ..... . 

4 mines ...... . 

10 mines ..... . 

Not available. 

Lost time. 

Lost time, non-lost time.! 

Not available. 

All. 

All, violations. 

Do. 

All, violations.2 

Lost time. 

All. 

Multiple? 

Do.3 

Lost time. 

All, hazards. 

Do. 

Do. Not available. 

Hazards. 

Lost time. 

Selected.4 

Days lost. 

NAS National Academy of Sciences. 

!Dependent variable was a dichotomous indicator of whether the injury was considered a lost-time or non-lost-time incident. 

2Five measures from Government safety inspectors were used: total MSHA violations per section, total State violations per section, number 

of times section was closed down, quarterly global ratings of section safety by Federal inspectors, and quarterly global ratings of section safety 

by State inspectors. 

3Rates for several categories of injuries and accidents were computed, including fatalities, lost-time incidents, non-lost-time incidents, and 

serious incidents. 

4Total number of eye, head, hand, and back injuries per month. 

3Although none of the studies in this review used it, another 

potentially useful measure of accident severity would be an index that 

normalizes the number of workdays lost by the number of hours 

worked, e.g., number of lost workdays per 200,000 employee hours. 

Safety indexes. The most commonly used measure of 

mine safety is the rate of lost-time injuries reported to 

the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) per 

200,000 employee hours of exposure. Some studies used 

the rate of total injuries reported to MSHA per 200,000 

employee hours of exposure. This measure is designated 

by "all". Some critics argue that the lost-time injury rate 

is a more valid index for assessing differences in safety 

performance than the "all" injury rate because there could 

be significant variations in the extent to which mine operators actually report non-lost -time injuries to MSHA. 

Some studies have defmed the measure of safety more 

narrowly, and have used the rate of injuries to selected 

body parts, etc. Another measure of safety commonly 

used is the severity of the injury. Severity is operationally 

defined as the number of workdays missed fonowing the 

injury.3 Another measure of safety is the number of 

violations issued by mine inspectors. Finally, some studies 

have defmed safety in terms of the number of hazardous 

conditions or instances of unsafe work practices observed 

during periodic inspections of the worksite. 

Except for the studies by Edwards (10), Goodman (IS18), Peters (24), and Uslan (30), all these studies used data 

provided by MSHA to compute rates of accidents, injuries, 

and violations, and to defme injury severity. Severity is 

usuany defmed as the number of days away from work 

following the injury. With the exception of the studies 

by Bennett (4), Edwards (10), and Rhoton (26), all the 

studies were funded by agencies of the U.S. Government, 

primarily the Bureau. 

Table 2 lists the organizational and behavioral variables 

that have been found related to some measure of mine 

safety at the probability (p) < 0.05 level of statistical significance. Positive relationships to mine safety should be 

interpreted as: increases in variable X (or the presence or 

use of X) are associated with a better safety record. Negative relationships to mine safety should be interpreted as: 

increases in variable X (or the presence or use of X) are 

associated with a poorer safety record. The variables are 

organized into five categories: organizational, employee 

control, management-labor relations, supervisor-employee 

interaction, and individual miner. The empirical evidence 

concerning each of the variables listed in table 2 is discussed in the following pages. 
4 

Table 2.-Summary of organizational and behavioral variables associated with mine safety 

Variable Investigator and Association 

reference direction 

Orga~iz.ation: . 

Training for miners .............................. . DeMichiei (9) ............. . 
 Positive. 


Do ........................................ . 
 Pfeifer (25) ............... . 
 Do. 


Training for managers and supervisors ................. . 
 Fiedler (12) ............... . 
 Do.! 

Do ........................................ . 
 Peters (24) ............... . 


Do ........................................ . 
 Uslan (30) ................ . 


Do.! 

00.1 

Management planning ........................... . 
 DeMichiei (9) ............. . 
 Do. 

Management commitment to safety ................. . 
 .. do ................. .. 
 Do. 

Do ........................................ . 
 Pfeifer (25) .............. .. 
 Do. 

Production competition between crews ............... . 
 .. do ................. .. 
 Negative . 


Production pressure ............................. . 
 .. do .................. . 
 Do. 


Do ........................................ . 
 Sanders (27) .............. . 
 Do. 


Equipment availability ........................... . 
 DeMichiei (9) ............. . 
 Positive. 


Safety & health equipment maintenance .............. . 
 Pfeifer (25) ............... . 
 Do. 


Safety-production incentive program ................. . 
 Gaertner (14) ............. . 
 Do. 


Safety disciplinary actions ........................ . 
 .. do ................. .. 
 Do. 


Size of mine ................................... . 
 NAS (21) ................. . 


Feedback and praise ............................ . 
 Rhoton (26) .............. . 


Do. 


00.1 

Night shiftwork ................................. . 
 Wagner (31) .............. . 
 Negative? 

Employee control: 


Worker participation in problem solving .............. . 
 Edwards (10) ............. . 


Do ........................................ . 
 Bell (3) .................. . 


Positive.1 

00.1 

Do ........................................ . 
 DeMichiei (9) ............. . 
 Do. 


Worker autonomy ............................... . 
 Goodman (16) ............ . 
 Do.! 


Do ........................................ . 
 Sanders (27) .............. . 
 Do. 


Decentralized decision making ..................... . 
 DeMichiei (9) ............. . 
 Do. 


Management-labor relations: 


Overall labor relations climate ...................... . 
 Gaertner (14) ............. . 
 Do. 

Management concern for labor ..................... . 
 DeMichiei (9) ............. . 
 Do. 

Do ........................................ . 
 Pfeifer (25) ............... . 
 Do. 

Labor support for safety discipline .................. . 
 DeMichiei (9) ............. . 
 Do. 

Supervisor-employee interaction: 


Reporting hazards to supervisor .................... . 
 Pfeifer (25) ............... . 
 Do. 

Employee development .......................... . 
 Sanders (27) .............. . 
 Do. 

Praise for working safe ........................... . 
 Pfeifer (25) ............... . 
 Do. 

Do ........................................ . 
 Uslan (30) ................ . 
 Do. 

Communications to miners ........................ . DeMichiei (9) ............. . 
 Do. 

Individual miner: 

Absenteeism ................................... Goodman (18) ............. Negative. 

Do ......................................... 
 DeMichiei (9) .............. Do. 

Do ......................................... 
 Pfeifer (25) ................ Do. 

Coworker relations ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Positive. 


Role ambiguity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Negative. 


Do ......................................... 
 Althouse (1) ............... Positive. 


Role overload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pfeifer (25) ................ Negative. 


Role conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Do. 


Do ......................................... 
 Sanders (27) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Do. 

Age .......................................... 
 NAS (21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Positive. 

!Variable was only one of several changes introduced more or less simultaneously as part of a complex organizational intervention. It is 

not clear how much, if any, of the observed effects on safety should be attributed to this variable. 

2Accidents experienced on night shift are more severe than those experienced on day or afternoon shifts. 

ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 

This category of variables includes factors other than 

management-labor relations that characterize or that affect 

the entire mining operation or company, such as the size 

of the operation, management's emphasis on achieving 

various objectives, use of safety policies and practices, 

company-wide training programs, etc. These variables 

describe organizational level characteristics (as opposed to 

characteristics of individuals or workgroups within the 

organization) that have been examined in studies of mine 

safety performance. 

Training for Miners 

DeMichiei (9) made the following observations of 

significant differences in the mean responses of mine 

managers and safety officials from high- versus lowaccident rate mines: (a) new miners in high-accident rate 

mines were less informed on how to do their jobs than 

new miners in low-accident rate mines, (b) supervisors at 

high-accident rate mines did not provide the same degree 

of instruction and guidance to miners as did supervisors in 

low-accident rate mines. 
5 

Pfeifer (25) made the following observations of significant differences in the mean responses of miners from 

high- versus low-accident rate mines: (a) there is a consistent tendency for training on various topics to be rated 

as better by underground miners at low-accident mines, 

(b) good training in how the electrical power system 

works, dealing with hazards (such as gases, coal dust, and 

noise), and how to use tools and equipment is more prevalent in mines with lower accident rates, and ( c) lack of 

training in the proper use of safety and health equipment 

was more frequently cited as being an important reason 

for not using the equipment by miners at high-accident 

mines. 

Training for Managers and Supervisors 

A major focus of three intervention studies that produced significant improvements in safety was the provision 

of training for managers and supervisors. Fiedler (11) 

used a training intervention called the Leader Match 

program. This program teaches individuals to diagnose 

their own leadership styles, as well as to diagnose the 

leadership situations. The leaders are given detailed 

instruction on various methods for modifying the situations 

to match their particular management approaches and 

personalities. The instruction is provided by a trainer, who 

uses a detailed manual, aided by videotaped illustrations, 

slides, and/or transparencies. Videotaped vignettes in 

actual and staged settings were used to teach supervisors 

how to deal with specific problems with employees including: reinforcing safe behavior, correcting an employee, 

overcoming resistance to change, handling an irate employee, and creating a cooperative workteam. 

The training intervention reported by Peters (24) 

entailed (a) conducting 8 h of training for subordinate 

managers and supervisors in loss-control fundamentals; 

(b) providing 8 h of training to supervisors and workers 

selected by the top manager in the use of an accident 

investigation methodology developed by the Bureau; and 

(c) furnishing available materials for training mobile 

equipment operators and assisting in task training course 

development. 

The training intervention reported by Uslan (30) was 

called positive motivational safety training (POMOST). 

This training provides supervisors with "an understanding 

about behavior and a process by which they can improve 

performance; increase safe work behaviors, help the 

employee feel better about himself, the company, and his 

job; and generally establish a work environment which is 

positively supportive." The principal reinforcer used 

in POMOST is praise, i.e., positive verbal feedback. 

POMOST instructs trainees how and when to praise their 

employees. The program was taught in 22 to 40 h, depending on need. The program objectives were as follows: 

How to recognize unsafe behaviors. 

How to develop behavior baselines. 

How to determine what behaviors to change. 

How to communicate behavior change to employees. 

How to shape behaviors. 

How to maintain a safe work behavior program. 

This training discourages the use of punishment. 

Rather, emphasis is placed on the first line supervisor 

focusing the employees' attention on the appropriateness 

of their behavior. The existence of inappropriate behavior 

is not ignored, but perceived as a training problem. 

Approximately 100 managers and supervisors from four 

plants were trained in the use of positive reinforcement for 

occurrences of safe behavior. Each supervisor was also 

provided manuals and other supportive materials. Additionally, following training, all supervisors were provided 

some coaching experience to keep the knowledge and 

capabilities gained during training from being lost. 

Management Planning 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that in 

comparison with low-accident rate mines, there was a 

greater tendency for management to put off making important decisions and more worktime was lost through poor 

scheduling and planning at high-accident mines. 

Management Commitment to Safety 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire data suggest that in comparison with miners in high-accident mines, miners in lowaccident mines felt that keeping good safety records and 

upholding the company safety record were significantly 

more important to their companies. 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that management at high-accident rate mines provided less support 

for decisions made by section supervisors concerning safety 

than did management at low-accident rate mines. 

DeMichiei (9) makes the following observations regarding information provided to him through interviews with 

mine managers and safety officials: (a) in five high-accident rate mines, the mine superintendents had no direct 

involvement in the mine's safety and health program; 

(b) responsibility for implementing the program was 

mainly the safety department's; and (c) safety department 

personnel at these five high-rate mines identified the lack 

of upper management involvement in safety matters as a 

serious impediment to improving safety and health conditions at the mine. 
6 

Production Competition Between Crews 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that in comparison with miners in high-accident mines, miners in lowaccident mines felt that having competition among workcrews was significantly less important to their companies. 

Production Pressure 

Pfeifer's (25) study suggests that in comparison with 

supervisors in high-accident mines, supervisors in lowaccident mines are significantly less inclined to push hard 

for production or to cut corners on safety. 

Sanders' (27) findings, based on a cross-lagged panel 

design, suggest that a causal relationship exists between 

increased levels of production pressure and increases in 

the rate of lost-time injuries. Sanders states, "Production 

pressure appears to lead to an increase in disabling injuries 

which in turn results in a decrease in production pressure." 

Equipment Availability 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire study suggests that 

miners in low-accident rate mines are better provided with 

supplies, equipment, and the tools necessary for job accomplishment than are miners at high-accident rate mines. 

Safety and Health Equipment Maintenance 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results indicate that miners 

in low-accident rate mines cite poor maintenance of health 

and safety equipment as being an important reason for 

not using it significantly more often than miners in highaccident rate mines. 

Safety·Production Incentive Program 

Although the specific terms of combined safety-production incentive plans vary, they all have the same basic 

structure. These plans payout some form of bonus for 

production above a specified target, provided the number 

of accidents does not exceed some specified maximum 

number. Ifmore than the maximum number of accidents 

occur, then bonuses are not paid for exceeding the production target, or the amount of the bonus is reduced 

according to some predetermined formula. 

Gaertner (14) compared coal companies using a combined safety-production incentive program with companies 

not using such a program. He found that the average rate 

oflost-time injuries was lower for the companies that were 

using the combined safety-production incentive program. 

Likewise, Page (22) performed a case study of the characteristics common to high producing underground coal 

mines and found that 18 out of 25 of them had some form 

of combined safety-production incentive program. 

Gaertner (14) also compared coal companies using an 

incentive program based on safety performance alone with 

companies that had no type of incentive program, and 

found that the average rate of injuries was essentially the 

same for the two groups of companies. Likewise, Goodman (17) found that the rate of accidents was NOT significantly affected by the introduction of a safety incentive 

program at any of the four different coal mines included 

in the study. 

The reasons for the observed difference in safety 

performance between companies using combined safetyproduction incentive programs versus those using an incentive program based on safety performance alone are not 

entirely clear. Gaertner offers the following speculation 

concerning his results: 

Safety incentives not tied to production tended to 

be relatively inexpensive and symbolic (T-shirts, caps, 

decals) and generally did not indicate a serious commitment by management to safety in the eyes of the 

foremen and hourly employees. Rather they were 

usually intended as "reminders to the men, to keep 

thinking about safety," as one manager put it. Combined production-safety incentives seem more effective, and generally more costly. In one company, the 

cost of the production-safety incentives was 25 cents 

per ton; in another it was 81 cents per ton. As one 

foreman put it, the incentive program in place in his 

company "made management put their money where 

their mouth was." 

Safety Disciplinary Actions 

Some coal companies have (and use) disciplinary 

actions applied to safety violations by miners and supervisors. Gaertner (14) compared companies using such a 

policy with companies not using such a policy, and found 

that the rate of injuries was lower at companies that used 

a safety discipline policy. 

In Braithwaite's (5) case study of the five major coal 

companies with the best safety records during the early 

1980's, he notes that there was considerable variation in 

their use of punitive actions for violation of safety policies. 

Two of the five companies used punitive measures much 

more often than the other three. 

Size of Mine 

The National Academy of Sciences (21) analyzed 

MSHA's data concerning aU lost time injuries that occurred in U.S. underground coal mines during the 3-yr period 

1978 through 1980; such injuries numbered nearly 40,000, 

including fatalities. One of the variables, which emerged 

as highly correlated with rate of fatalities, was mine size. 

It was found that the fatality rate for mines with 50 or 

fewer employees (0.14) was about three times that of 

mines with over 250 employees (0.05), and almost twice 

that of mines with 51-250 employees. Small mines « 50) 

accounted for 15 pet of total employee-hours, but 40 pct of 

all fatalities. 
7 

Feedback and Praise 

Rhoton (26) was successful in virtually eliminating 

MSHA ventilation violation notices at a coal mine that, 

prior to the intervention, had been experiencing an average 

of 2.6 such violations per month. The intervention was 

conducted by the company's safety inspector, and consisted 

of: praising face crews and their supervisors for being in 

compliance with the target behaviors; posting graphic 

feedback charts of the ventilation violation notices in the 

mine office; delivering verbal feedback at biweekly safety 

meetings with the supervisors; and when a section was 

found to be noncompliant, the company safety inspector 

would stop coal production until the hazardous condition 

was corrected. Each section was observed once per week 

on a random basis. 

Night Shift Work 

Research by Andlauer (2) suggests that workers performing routine tasks during periods of low alertness and 

arousal will tend to introduce few errors into these tasks. 

However, the inhibited state of psychological arousal 

coupled with a narrow conscious focus on the routine task 

at hand may not allow the employee to respond properly 

to emergencies, thereby promoting the causation of relatively severe accidents. 

Wagner (31) examined this issue by comparing the 

average severity of night shift accidents that involved the 

operation of heavy mining equipment versus accidents 

involving miners performing other types of activities-ones 

that presumably require less vigilance to perform the job 

safely. The data for this study consisted of accidents 

reported to MSHA from 10 surface iron ore operations 

over a lO-yr period. These mines all worked an identical 

shift rotation schedule for that full 10-yr period. 

Accidents were broken down according to the shift (day, 

afternoon, night) and according to whether the accident 

occurred during equipment operation (selected accidents) 

or during the course of performing some other type of 

activity (nonselected accidents). The average number of 

days lost per accident was used as the measure of accident 

severity. 

Wagner (31) found that the average length of time to 

recover from mobile equipment accidents was significantly 

greater for accidents experienced during the night shift 

than for accidents experienced during the day or afternoon 

shifts. Among nonselected accidents, night shift accidents 

are also more severe, but by a much smaller margin compared with the other two shifts. These data appear to 

confIrm fmdings by Andlauer (2) and others regarding 

automatic behavior and employees' inability to respond 

adequately in emergency situations during times such as 

the night shift when vigilance is difficult to maintain. 

EMPLOYEE CONTROL 

Three variables have been studied that concern the extent to which employees have the opportunity to influence 

what happens to them on the job: (1) worker participation 

in problem solving, (2) worker autonomy, and (3) decentralized decision making. Although the meaning of worker 

participation in problem solving is rather self-evident, the 

latter two variables may not be as easily understood. 

Definitions of autonomy include: the amount of control 

employees have over what happens on the job; the extent 

to which employees see themselves as free to do what they 

want in accomplishing their work; perceived self-determination (13). One way of increasing perceived autonomy 

is by increasing employees' opportunity to influence decisions that affect them. 

Although the notion of decentralization can be applied 

to hourly employees, it is more typically used to characterize decision making at higher levels in the organization. 

Webber (32) refers to decentralization as the extent to 

which higher executives delegate authority to make decisions to subordinate managers. 

Worker Participation In Problem Solving 

Bell (3) reports that injury rates at an underground 

silver mine were significantly lower following the institution of an organization development effort. A primary 

feature of this intervention was the formation of problem 

solving teams. A series of meetings took place in which 

high-priority issues facing the team were systematically 

examined and resolved. These meetings usually were conducted with the aid of a consultant who acted as a facilitator. Problems were defined and clarified, alternative 

solutions were evaluated, preferred solutions were implemented, and the effects of actions were monitored for 

desired results. Team-building meetings began at the top 

of the organization, involving the president and those 

reporting to the president. During the last phase of the 

project, team-building meetings were held with shift bosses 

and their workcrews. 

Similarly, Edwards (10) reports that the introduction 

of quality circles at a large surface coal mining operation 

brought about a significant reduction in the accident rate. 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results (based on the 

responses of mine managers and safety officials) suggest 

that good ideas fostered by miners get more serious consideration from management at low-accident rate mines 

than at high-accident rate mines. 

DeMichiei (9) makes the following three observations 

based on interviews with miners: 

(1) At low-accident rate mines, miners indicated that 

individuals in key management positions were receptive 

and responsive to miner requests and frequently solicited 

input from the miners concerning mine policies and 

procedures. 

(2) At several low-accident rate mines, miners indicated that management earnestly encouraged interaction 

between themselves and labor representatives. Management at most of the low-accident rate mines recognized 

the importance of labor safety and health committees and 
8 

actively sought out their participation in resolving safety 

and health problems. 

(3) Miners at several high-accident rate mines believed management to be one-sided since they had little 

input into the decision making process. 

Worker Autonomy 

The results of the autonomous workgroups experiment 

at Rushton Mining Co., Osceola Mills, PA, suggests that 

increasing miners' autonomy may have been responsible 

for the improvements that were observed in mine safety. 

Although this intervention entailed making a number of 

changes to the organization, one of the most notable 

changes was the creation of self-managing coal mine face 

crews. These crews were given the entire responsibility 

for making all the decisions pertaining to the day-to-day 

production of coal from their sections. Crew supervisors 

were no longer involved in making production decisions. 

Their primary responsibility was to maintain the safety of 

the crew. 

It is actually very difficult to determine what role 

autonomy played in producing the safety improvements. 

Goodman (16) notes that any of the following changes 

could have been responsible for the safety improvements: 

(1) The experimental group received more formal 

training about safety practices and the law. 

(2) The experiment introduced a new reward system 

to motivate the workers toward good safety practices. 

Intrinsic rewards were increased: The workgroup had 

been restructured to provide the workers greater opportunities for feelings of responsibility and accomplishment if 

safety levels improved. Extrinsic rewards were also increased through formal feedback sessions for the workers 

concerning their performance on such activities as safety. 

(3) The supervisors in the experimental section were 

no longer caught in the conflict between production and 

safety. They could expend all their energies on safety. 

Supervisors in the nonexperimental sections had continuany to balance production and safety demands. 

Sanders' (27) fmdings, based on a cross-lagged panel 

design, suggests that a causal relationship exists between 

greater decentralization of decision making (down to the 

miners' level) and a lowering of the rate of lost -time 

injuries. He states, "mines in which miners are given 

decision responsibility and autonomy tend to have a lower 

incidence of injuries than other mines." 

Decentralized Decision Making 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results (based on the 

responses of mine managers and safety officials) suggest 

that section supervisors at high-accident rate mines did not 

have as much freedom to make decisions concerning 

health, safety, and production as did section supervisors at 

low-accident rate mines. 

Braithwaite's (5) case study of five coal companies with 

outstanding safety records suggests that decentralization of 

decisions regarding safety is a characteristic that is common among the large mining companies with better safety 

records. 

These results concerning a positive association between 

decentralized decision making and mine safety do not 

contradict those discussed earlier concerning the value of 

upper management's interest and commitment to ensuring 

their miners' safety. As Gaertner (14) points out, upper 

management can express this commitment through setting 

safety-oriented policies and showing support for those 

charged with the responsibility for seeing to it that safety 

policies are being implemented and adhered to, as well as 

by frequently reviewing safety performance and generally 

keeping abreast of what is being done to maintain and 

improve safety. However, this does not mean that upper 

management should be running the show. Braithwaite 

notes that in mining companies with better safety records, 

upper management tends to delegate the responsibility for 

implementation and adherence to safety policies to line 

management. The fact that upper management delegates 

this function does not mean that they are not keeping a 

close watch on safety performance or that they are disinterested in employee safety. 

MANAGEMENT-LABOR RELATIONS 

This category includes the variables: overall labor relations climate, management concern for labor, and labor 

support for safety disciplinary actions. A considerable 

amount of evidence is accumulating to suggest that there 

is a significant positive association between the favorableness of the management-labor relationship and mine 

safety. Part of this association reflects the tendency for 

good labor relations to result in a safer environment and 

better employee compliance with safety rules. However, 

part of this association may reflect the tendency for 

changes in safety to produce changes in management -labor 

relations. For instance, a deterioration in safety could tend 

to cause a deterioration in management-labor relations. 

No doubt there is a reciprocal relationship between these 

two factors. Given the type of research evidence available, 

it is not possible to specify the predominant direction of 

causality. Nevertheless, the fact that a consistent positive 

association between these two factors has been identified 

is worth noting and has important implications for the 

achievement of a safer mining industry. 

Overall Labor Relations Climate 

Gaertner's (14) analysis of factors correlated to coal 

companies' safety performance indicates that the injury 

rate in companies with a negative labor relations climate 

is almost double that of the rate in companies with a 

positive climate. He also compared the two groups of 

companies in terms of the average annual rate of MSHA 
9 

citations per mine for significant and substantial safety 

violations. Gaertner found that the rate for companies 

with positive labor relations was only about a third as high 

as the rate for companies in which the labor relations 

climate was relatively negative. 

As part of the National Academy of Sciences (21) study, 

interviews were conducted with miners and mine managers 

at twelve large underground coal mines (150 workers or 

more). These mines were selected partially because they 

represented the extremes of safety performance, i.e., seven 

had quite low injury rates and five had quite high injury 

rates. The researchers note the following concerning the 

labor relations climate at these two groups of mines: "at 

all seven mines with low injury rates there appeared to be 

a cooperative attitude between management and labor; an 

adversarial attitude was observed in three of the five mines 

with high injury rates." 

Both Gaertner (14) and the National Academy of 

Sciences (21) researchers point out that managers at mines 

with favorable labor relations usually had an open door 

policy, i.e., they were more accessible to hourly employees. 

Management Concern for labor 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that 

management at high-accident rate mines is less interested 

in the welfare of workers both on and off the job than 

management at low-accident rate mines. These results are 

based on the perceptions of salaried employees (includes 

mine superintendents, section supervisors, and mine safety 

department personnel). 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that supervisors in low-accident rate mines "more often show real 

concern for workers' welfare." These results are based on 

the perceptions of underground hourly employees. 

labor Support for Safety Discipline 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that section supervisors in low-accident rate mines received more 

support from safety committeepersons when reprimanding 

miners for unsafe acts. Based on interview data with 

miners he states, 

A significant finding at 11 high-accident rate mines 

was statements made by safety and health committees concerning their reluctance to support management's decision to reprimand miners for unsafe acts, 

even though such actions were justified. They stated 

that if such support was given to management, the 

rank and file miners usually reacted in a hostile manner. Management believed that such reaction by 

labor representatives prevented a good faith effort on 

the part of both parties to promote health and safety 

at the mines. 

This same issue was examined in the part of the 

National Academy of Sciences (21) study that compared 

underground coal mines with either very low- or very highaccident rates. The researchers note that at all of the 

seven low-injury rate mines the union generally supported 

the company's enforcement of safety rules. 

SUPERVISOR-EMPLOYEE INTERACTION 

The miners' immediate supervisor has a great deal of 

impact on the extent to which safe working conditions 

exist and the extent to which miners comply with safety 

regulations. Variables dealing with the supervisor-employee relationship that have been addressed by mining 

industry safety researchers include: reporting hazards to 

supervisor, employee development, praise for working 

safely, and communications to miners. No doubt many of 

the variables listed in the other categories are also heavily 

influenced by the immediate supervisors' behavior, e.g., 

management-labor relations and role conflict. 

Reporting Hazards to Supervisor 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that miners 

in low-accident rate mines reported small accidents and 

safety and health hazards to the supervisor more often 

than miners in high-accident rate mines. Similarly, 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that miners 

contacted section supervisors regarding unsafe conditions 

more often at low-accident rate mines than at highaccident rate mines. 

Employee Development 

Sanders' (27) questionnaire results suggest that supervisors at mines with low-accident rates did more to 

instruct, guide, coach, and develop their employees' talents 

and abilities than supervisors at mines with high-accident 

rates. 

Praise for Working Safely 

Although the intervention involved several other 

changes, one of the primary things Uslan (30) taught the 

supervisors of salt mine employees to do was to systematically praise their employees for working safely. A 

significant reduction in the rate of eye, head, hand, and 

back injuries took place following the intervention. 

Similarly, Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest 

that in comparison with high-accident rate mines, supervisors in low-accident rate mines were more likely to give 

miners a pat on the back when they followed safety 

procedures. 

Communications to Miners 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that there 

is more conflict or misunderstanding over directions and 

job assignments given at high-accident rate mines. 
10 

INDIVIDUAL MINER 

Each of the variables in this category characterize a 

single person or a single person's workrole. Variables in 

this category that have been addressed by safety researchers in the mining industry include: absenteeism, coworker 

relations, role ambiguity, role overload, role conflict, and 

age. No doubt the three variables concerning the individual's role are also heavily influenced by the immediate 

supervisor and by some of the variables listed under the 

organizational category, e.g., training, feedback, and management planning. 

Absenteeism 

Goodman (18) examined the effects or consequences of 

absenteeism on accidents. His central premise is that lack 

of familiarity leads to more dangerous conditions that, in 

the absence of compensatory changes in the level of care 

taken by a miner, would contribute to higher rates of 

accidents. Unfamiliarity can affect three types of people 

in coal mining: 1) miners who have just returned to the 

mine after being absent, 2) miners assigned as a replacement for a miner who is absent, and 3) adjacent miners. 

In a typical crew configuration, most mining activities 

require coordination among pairs of individuals who work 

closely together: the miner operator and the helper, the 

roof bolter and the helper, and the two shuttle car operators. Considering such dyads, the worker adjacent to the 

replacement may also be placed in a more dangerous situation because of lack of familiarity with the replacement's 

mining practices, and resulting difficulties in coordinating 

activities in an inherently dangerous environment. Hence, 

this adjacent worker or partner of a replacement is expected to have a higher probability of having an accident. 

A data set was created that kept daily records on 

absences, replacement policies, and accidents. Information 

from five mines on these variables was obtained during 

approximately 70,000 miner days worked. This corresponds to roughly 60 production crews observed for an 

entire year. Using multiple regression analyses, accident 

rates were computed and comparisons made between each 

of the following 11 dyad-familiarity categories: 

A Two regulars, neither absent previous day. 

B Two regulars, one absent previous day. 

C Two regulars, both absent previous day. 

D Two replacements, neither absent previous day. 

E Two replacements, one absent previous day. 

F Two replacements, both absent previous day. 

G One regular, one replacement, neither absent previous day. 

H Regular absent previous day, replacement present 

previous day. 

I Regular present previous day, replacement absent 

previous day. 

J One regular, one replacement, both absent previous day. 

K One miner working without partner. 

Goodman (18) found that in comparison with category 

F, the accident rates for categories A, C, and D were each 

significantly lower. Most of the other expected differences 

between pairs of accident rates were in the expected direction, but were relatively small in magnitude. Goodman 

concludes that prior day absences have the effect of increasing accidents, and that regular miners have lower 

accident rates than replacement miners. 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that 

absenteeism is much more of a problem at high-accident 

rate mines than at low-accident rate mines. 

Absenteeism was one of the issues examined in the 

part of the National Academy of Sciences (21) study that 

compared underground coal mines with either very low- or 

very high-accident rates. The researchers note that the 

five mines with high-injury rates tended to have considerably higher absenteeism rates. 

The responses miners and supervisors gave in Pfeifer's 

(25) questionnaire study of the differences between highand low-accident rate mines suggest that miners in lowaccident mines had to take care of absentees' jobs significantly less often than miners in high-accident mines. 

Coworker Relations 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that in comparison with the high-accident mines, miners in low-accident mines are more apt to believe that miners get along 

with each other and that they can depend on each other. 

On the basis of interviews with miners, DeMichiei (9) 

reports that in comparison with low-accident mines, more 

miners at high-rate mines indicated that they were troubled by some of their coworkers' behavior. These complaints were centered around "freeloaders who often took 

advantage of disability compensation, individuals who 

failed to pull their share of the workload and persons who 

abused absentee policies for personal gain."4 

4DeMichiei did not perform statistical tests on differences between 

the interview responses of various personnel from high- versus lowaccident mines. Therefore, such differences are not included in table 2. DeMichiei did perform statistical tests on differences between 

the guestionnaire responses of various personnel from high- versus lowaccident mines, and those differences found significant (p < .05) are 

listed in table 2. 
11 

Role Ambiguity 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that in 

comparison with the low-accident mines, miners in highaccident mines spend more time working without clear-cut 

duties. 

Althouse's (1) fmdings suggest just the opposite. He 

collected data concerning the extent to which coal miners 

experience 30 separate dimensions of job stress from the 

same sample of mines that Pfeifer (25) studied. Very little 

evidence of any differences in the self-reported levels of 

stress experienced by miners employed at high- versus lowaccident rate mines was found. However, contrary to the 

hypothesis-that miners at high-accident rate mines would 

report higher levels of perceived role ambiguity than 

miners at low-accident rate mines-Althouse (1) found just 

the opposite. The low accident, rather than the highaccident sample reported significantly higher levels of role 

ambiguity. In other words, miners in low-accident mines 

were more likely to report that the clarity of responsibility 

and certainty of objectives on their jobs was ill-defined. 

Obviously, more research evidence is needed in order to 

form any conclusions about the relationship between 

miners' role ambiguity and safety. 

Role Overload 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that in 

comparison with the high-accident mines, significantly 

fewer miners at low-accident mines report that they are 

expected to do too many things in too little time. 

Role Conflict 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that in 

comparison with the high-accident mines, significantly 

fewer managers in low-accident mines felt that miners had 

to answer to more than one person. 

One of the variables considered in Sanders' (27) crosslag panel study of mine safety was miners' ratings of the 

consistency of the orders they were being given. Sanders 

(27) found that increases in the lost -time injury rate 

tended to bring about increases in the rated consistency of 

orders, which then appeared to decrease the lost-time 

injury rate (p < .10). 

These fmdings concerning miners' perceptions of role 

ambiguity, overload, and conflict may all be indications of 

insufficient management planning at the high-accident rate 

mines. 

Age 

The National Academy of Sciences (21) study looked at 

the relationship between age and various accident rates for 

15 of the largest underground coal producing companies in 

the United States. These companies provided data to the 

researchers concerning the age of their work force, and the 

accident data came from the reports these companies filed 

with MSHA concerning lost-time injuries that occurred in 

their mines during the 3-yr period 1978 through 1980. The 

researchers found that there is no evidence of an age trend 

with respect to fatality rates or permanent disability injury 

rates. However, there is a very marked correlation between age and lost -time injury rates. Miners between the 

ages of 18 and 24 have a lost -time injury rate nearly twice 

that of miners 25 to 34, who have a rate about 25 pct 

higher than miners 35 to 44, who in turn have a rate over 

40 pct higher than miners who are at least 45 yr of age. 

Hence, a young miner (18-24) is about three times more 

likely to be injured than is a miner 45 yr of age or older, 

about twice as likely to be injured than is a miner 25-44. 

This relationship is consistent across the 15 companies 

that provided data on the age of their work force, as well 

as for each of the years 1978, 1979, and 1980. Furthermore, the strong association between age and lost-time 

injury rate was apparent for each of the major categories 

of accident types that cause injuries. 

Findings of nonsignificant relationships to mine safety. 

Many examples of nonsignificant relationships between 

mine safety and various organizational and behavioral 

variables have been reported. Because these variables are 

so numerous, they will not all be listed. The interested 

reader should examine the results of the analyses of 

responses to questionnaire items reported in the large 

survey studies conducted by DeMichiei (9), Pfeifer (25), 

and Sanders (27). 

Two variables have been examined in a relatively 

thorough manner and very little evidence was found to 

suggest that they are related to differences in mine safety 

performance: (1) Althouse (1) found that self-reported 

levels of job stress and psychological strain were NOT 

significantly different for miners at 14 high- versus 14 lowaccident rate coal mines. (2) Goodman (17) found that 

the rate of accidents was NOT significantly affected by the 

introduction of a safety incentive program at four different 

coal mines. Likewise, Gaertner (14) found that there was 

essentially no difference between the injury rate for companies using versus not using a safety incentive program. 

It may be that safety incentive programs need to be designed differently than those examined by Goodman (17) 

and Gaertner (14) in order to have a significant impact on 

miners' injury rates. Goodman suggests several ways that 

the plan studied could have been made more effective. It 

may be well worth having a safety incentive program even 

if it does not by itself cause statistically significant reductions in the injury rate. Safety incentive programs represent one of several mechanisms that management could 

use to communicate their concern for employees' welfare 

and the fact that they want their employees to focus on 

working safely. For a discussion of mine operators' views 

on safety incentive programs see Miles (19). 
12 

OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 

Given the nature of the experimental designs and the 

data collection methods used to conduct most of the 

research presented in this review, there are some serious 

limitations to what can be safely concluded from anyone 

study about how an organizational or behavioral factor 

influences mine safety. In most of these studies several 

alternative explanations exist for the observed correlations 

or for the observed changes in safety performance. Future 

studies of mine safety should seek to use longitudinal 

designs, control groups, and multivariate analyses. Two 

significant limitations to performing the types of research 

that would yield the most convincing results are (1) the 

length of time allowed for completing research projects is 

typically insufficient to permit analyses to be performed 

that are based on a longitudinal experimental design, and 

(2) it is difficult to fmd companies that are willing to 

participate in the research, especially if the research will 

require extensive data collection or entails significant 

changes to wen-established practices. 

Another limitation of the current set of research findings concerns the extent to which these fmdings can be 

generalized to all segments of the mining industry. The 

bulk of the research has been conducted at large underground coal mines and large coal mining companies. 

Therefore, it may be inappropriate to assume that these 

results would also be true of smaller mining operations, 

surface mining operations, or noncoal mining operations. 

The best management practices for achieving a good safety 

record at large mining operations may not be feasible or 

practical for relatively small mines. Conversely, the best 

management practices for achieving a good safety record 

at small mining operations may not be practical for relatively large operations. Future research should be performed to discover why the fatality rate is so much higher 

at small operations, and to discover what accounts for 

differences between small mine operations that have, 

versus those that have not been successful at maintaining 

a good safety record. 

Certain variables are emerging as statistically significant 

correlates of mine safety in multiple studies involving different samples of miners and different research methods. 

For instance, it appears that better labor-management 

relations, greater employee involvement in decision making, and lower absenteeism all exert a positive influence 

on mine safety. Several aspects of first line supervisors' 

interactions with miners also appear to be important, as 

well as management's ability to communicate to the miner 

that they truly consider the employees' safety and welfare 

as a top priority. Undoubtedly, a clearer picture of the 

factors important for achieving good safety performance 

will emerge as more research evidence accumulates. 

Another reason that these research findings are noteworthy is that most of the variables which appear to be 

playing a significant role in achieving a good mine safety 

record are within management's ability to control. The 

next section of this report lists some of the recommendations that the authors of these studies have made concerning strategies for improving mine safety. One should 

bear in mind that these recommendations are based on 

research findings that are subject to the above mentioned 

limitations. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING MINE SAFETY 


Many of the articles and reports cited in this review list 

specific recommendations for mine operators and other 

mining officials concerning the achievement of a good 

safety record. These recommendations mostly fall into one 

of the following nine categories: safety programs and their 

directors, labor-management interaction, industry commitment, top management commitment, training, employee 

motivation and/or incentives, supervisor-employee interactions, management planning, and absenteeism. The 

recommendations made concerning each of these topics 

are listed below. They vary widely in terms of the specificity of recommended action. 

1. Safety programs and their directors 

DeMichiei (9): 

• Management must establish a formal safety and health 

program, effectively communicate that program to employees and seek labor's active participation in a joint implementation of the program. 

• Management should commit the funds and peoplepower 

necessary to establish a safety department and give its 

personnel the authority to implement the safety and health 

program effectively. 

Pfeifer (25): 

• Safety directors' jobs should be redesigned to provide 

for more time in developing company safety programs. 

• Safety directors should be given more authority in the 

area of safety. 

2. Labor-management interaction 

DeMichiei (9): 

• Management and labor must establish open lines of 

communication so that problems affecting health and 

safety can be freely discussed and mutually resolved. 

Open lines of communication must exist between all levels 
13 

of management and labor so that unsafe conditions or 

practices can be corrected and employees can feel free to 

discuss safety issues without fear of adverse action. 

• Management and labor must both recognize that safety 

and health is a joint responsibility, which will only be 

achieved through cooperative efforts. Management and 

labor representatives must take the lead in cultivating a 

cooperative atmosphere at the mine via joint informational 

meetings, safety inspections of workplaces, and increased 

interaction with the general work force. 

• Management should actively involve representatives of 

labor on issues concerning safety, health, and production. 

• Labor representatives must support mine management 

when it is necessary to reprimand miners for unsafe acts. 

• Labor representatives must instill a sense of responsibility and accountability in the work force for their actions 

and resultant impact those actions may have on fellow 

workers. 

• Management should solicit the assistance of labor in 

identifying and correcting unsafe conditions and practices. 

Conversely, labor should accept the joint responsibility in 

this endeavor. 

• Management should periodically review and solicit the 

opinions of miners concerning established mine policies 

and procedures to determine their effect on the miners' 

morale. 

National Academy of Sciences (21): 

• There is a need to establish joint labor-management 

safety committees at each mine. 

Pfeifer (25): 

• Miners need to be able to better communicate to management problems affecting their health and safety. 

• Miners should be given a hand in the establishment 

of new company safety procedures, or, at a minimum, 

the reasons for new safety procedures should be better 

explained to miners. 

3. Industry commitment 

National Academy of Sciences (21): 

• Encourage industry leaders to reinforce the value and 

importance of safety. 

. .. saving lives and minimizing injuries are deeply 

held social values. However, it may be necessary for 

industry leaders to remind their peers that safety is 

as important a value to uphold as is producing coal 

at the lowest cost per ton. 

• Encourage publication of annual rankings of companies 

by their injury rates. 

• Publicize the evidence that productivity and safety can 

be positively related. 

The common denominator in achieving both a good 

safety record and high productivity is competent management. A management that can plan well to increase 

production can also plan well to improve safety. Moreover, a management that shows concern about safety 

signals to its employees that it is concerned about their 

well-being, and, thus, deserves their contributions of 

skill and energy in improving productivity. Finally, a 

management that is willing to listen to employees' ideas 

for improving safety (which the researchers found 

associated with effective programs) is also likely to 

listen to employees' ideas for improving productivity. 

4. Top management commitment 

Pfeifer (25): 

• Coal companies need to formalize safety as an organizational goal. 

• Coal companies should communicate to workers both 

verbally and through the behavior of management the 

importance of safety as an organizational goal. 

• Coal companies need to place more emphasis on keeping good safety records and upholding the company safety 

record. 

5. Training 

DeMichiei (9): 

• When formulating new training programs or revising 

existing programs, greater input should be solicited from 

labor by mine management. A thorough review by mine 

management, labor, and MSHA of existing training programs will ensure that such plans are tailored to individual 

mine needs. 

• First line supervisors should be provided instruction 

and sufficient time for administering task training to 

subordinates. 

• The means to measure the effects of both classroom 

and on-the-job training should be incorporated into training programs. 

National Academy of Sciences (21): 

• A major upgrading of the educational and training 

requirements that new and experienced miners, and also 

supervisors, must meet is needed. 
14 

Pfeifer (25): 

• In addition to better training for miners, better training 

is needed for mine management beginning at the level of 

supervisor. Supervisors must be made aware that they 

serve as models for the miners working under them, and, 

consequently, they must follow all safety procedures. 

Sanders (27): 

• Training mine management in basic supervisory employee relations and planning skills would significantly 

impact on the injury rates of the mines. 

6. Employee motivation and/or incentives 

Pfeifer (25): 

• Miners' jobs need to be redesigned in order to provide 

for satisfaction of miners' intrinsic needs such as recognition, responsibility, and variety of job tasks, and, so that 

they do not have to do many things at the same time, they 

do not have to work without clear-cut duties, and they do 

not have to answer to more than one person. 

• Programs providing positive reinforcement for a variety 

of identifiable safe job behaviors need to be established for 

both underground miners and supervisors. Techniques, 

which should be used in providing incentives for safe job 

behavior, include making safety an integral part of worker 

performance evaluation and publicizing outstanding safety 

performance. 

• Care must be taken in employing competition among 

workcrews to be sure that safety is included in the criteria 

of good job performance. 

Goodman (17): 

Goodman presents a great deal of advice regarding the 

appropriate design of bonus plans for improving underground coal mine productivity and safety. 

7. Supervisor-employee interactions 

Uslan (30): 

• Supervisors can affect employee motivation to perform 

their jobs safely by: (1) encouraging employees to buy 

into explicit safety performance goals that are consistent 

with organizational objectives, (2) arranging conditions so 

that employees can accomplish goals, (3) determining 

rewards that employees desire and making these rewards 

contingent on high levels of safety performance, and 

(4) ensuring that employees understand the relationship 

between safety performance and the receipt of rewards. 

DeMichiei (9): 

• Management should periodically monitor on-the-job 

work procedures to ensure that labor has the necessary 

experience or qualifications to recognize adverse 

conditions. 

8. Management planning 

DeMichiei (9): 

• Management should formulate, implement, and enforce systematic mining cycles and standardized work 

procedures. 

• Management should develop a comprehensive approach 

for mine development that includes activities such as 

materials handling, transportation and installation of 

equipment parts, etc. "Many times such activities are not 

considered as an integral part of the production." 

• Management, labor, and MSHA must ensure that mine 

plans incorporate measures necessary to adequately control the physical environment. "Too often management 

continues to implement minimum plan requirements when, 

in fact, additional measures are necessary." 

Pfeifer (25): 

• Coal companies should establish better programs for 

maintenance of equipment. 

9. Absenteeism 

DeMichiei (9): 

• Management should establish and implement an absentee policy that is firm, but fair, taking into consideration 

extenuating circumstances that could adversely affect mine 

personnel. 

Goodman (18)-strategies for coping with mller 

absenteeism: 

• Coal mine operators could better cope with absent 

members of underground coal mining crews by increasing 

familiarity among replacements for absent miners. This 

can be accomplished by organizing pools of replacement 

workers, and by giving special on-the-job training to a 

replacement and to the adjacent worker before work 

begins, in order to help familiarize each miner with the 

practices of its partner. Pools of replacement workers 

could be organized by job categories. For example, certain 

replacements would work as miner helpers, others as car 

operators. The pool could be further organized by mine 

sections; i.e., when possible, certain workers would always 
15 

be assigned to certain work areas with which they are 

relatively familiar. 

Goodman (15)-strategies for reducing miner absenteeism: 	

• Improve hiring practices through use of better selection 


procedures and realistic job previews. 

• Institute employee assistance programs, health education. programs, and selected types of in-house medical 

servIces. 


• Maintain a record of each employees' daily attendance 

and post it somewhere for employees to see. 

• Train supervisors in what they can do to prevent 

chronic absenteeism. 

• Use positive reinforcement programs. 


• Ensure consistency in the use of progressive disciplinary 


procedures. 


REFERENCES 

1. Althouse, R, and J. Hurrell. An Analysis of Job Stress in Coal 


Mining. NIOSH (DHEW) 77-217, 1977, 145 pp.; NTIS PB 274-796. 


2. Andlauer, P., and B. Metz. Le Travail en Equipes Alternates 

(Work By Rotating Teams). Physiologie du Travail-Ergonomie 

(Physiology of Work-Ergonomics), ed. by J. Sherrer, Masson (Paris), 

1967, pp. 272-281. 

3. Bell, C. The Hecla Story: Organization Development in the 


Hard-Rock Mining Industry. Paper in Human Engineering and 


Human Resources Management in Mining. Proceedings: Bureau of 


Mines Technology Transfer Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, July 7-8, 1987; 


St. Louis, MO, July 15-16, 1987; and San Francisco, CA, July 21-22, 


1987, compo by staff. BuMines IC 9145, 1987, pp. 138-148. 


4. Bennett, J., and D. Passmore. Probability of Death, Disability, 

and Restricted Work Activity in United States Underground Bituminous 

Coal Mines, 1975-1981. J. Saf. Res., v. 15, No.2, 1984, pp. 69-76. 

5. Braithwaite, J. To Punish or Persuade: The Enforcement of 


Coal Mine Safety. State Univ. NY Press (Albany), 1985, 206 pp. 


6. Buller, P., and C. Bell. Effects of Team Building and Goal 


Setting on Productivity: A Field Experiment. Acad. Manage. J., v. 29, 


No.2, 1986, pp. 305-328. 


7. Cohen, A. Factors in Successful Occupational Safety Programs. 

J. Saf. Res., v. 9, No.4, 1977, pp. 168-178. 

8. Dejoy, D. Attributional Processes and Hazard Control Management in Industry. J. Saf. Res., v. 16, No.2, 1985, pp. 61-71. 

9. DeMichiei, J., J. Langton, K. BullOCk, and T. Wiles. Factors 

Associated With Disabling Injuries in Underground Coal Mines. 

MSHA, June 1982, 72 pp. 

10. Edwards, S. Quality Circles Are Safety Circles. Natl. Saf. News, 

June 1983, pp. 31-35. 

11. Fiedler, F. Structured Management Training in Underground 


Mining-Five Years Later. Paper in Human Engineering and Human 


Resources Management in Mining. Proceedings: Bureau of Mines 


Technology Transfer Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, July 7-8, 1987; St. Louis, 


MO, July 15-16, 1987; and San Francisco, CA, July 21-22, 1987, compo 


by staff. BuMines Ie 9145, 1987, pp. 149-153. 


12. Fiedler, F. E., C. H. Bell, Jr., M. H. Chemers, and D. Patrick. 


The Effectiveness of Organization and Management Training on Safety 


and Productivity in Metal/Non-Metal Underground Mining (contract 


J0387230, Perceptronics, Inc.). BuMines OFR 191-84, 1983, 296 pp.; 


NTIS PB 85-163285. 


13. Filley, A., R House, and S. Kerr. Managerial Process and 


Organizational Behavior. Scott Foresman, 1976, 558 pp. 


14. Gaertner, G. H., P. D. Newman, M. S. Perry, G. P. Fisher, and 

K. Whitehead. Determining the Effects of Management Practices on 


Coal Miners' Safety (contract J0145029, Westat, Inc.). BuMines 


OFR 39-88, 1987, 348 pp.; NTIS PB 88-221445. 


15. Goodman, P. S. Analysis of Miners' Job Attendance Behavior 


and Its Relationship to Miners' Accidents and Injuries-Final Report 


(contract J0328033, Carnegie-Mellon Univ.). BuMines OFR 60-86, 


1985, 278 pp.; NTIS PB 86-216306. 


16. ___. Assessing Organizational Change: The Rushton Quality 


of Work Experiment. Wiley, 1979, 391 pp. 


17. Goodman, P. S. Determining the Effect of Incentive Programs 


on the Occurrence of Accidents, Injuries, and Productivity-Final Report 


(contract J0145012, Carnegie-Mellon Univ.). BuMines OFR 47-88, 


1987, 143 pp.; NTIS PB 88-234257. 


18. Goodman, P., and S. Garber. Absenteeism and Accidents in a 

Dangerous Environment: Empirical Analysis of Underground Coal 

Mines. J. App!. Psych., V. 73, No.1, 1988, pp. 81-86. 

19. Miles, W. Incentive Programs Get Varied Response From Management. Natl. Saf. Counc. Min. Newslett., Mar.-Apr., 1986, pp. 1-3. 

20. Mills, T. Altering the Social Structure in Coal Mining: A Case 


Study. Mon. Labor Rev., V. 99, No. 10, 1976, pp. 3-10. 


21. National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. 


Toward Safer Underground Coal Mines. NAS, 1982, 190 pp. 


22. Page, S., J. Volkwein, and F. Kissel!. Some Continuous Sections 

Can Cut More Than 1,000 Tons Per Unit. Coal Age, Jan., 1987, 

pp.51-55. 

23. Peters, R Foreign Literature on Environmental and Personal 

Factors Affecting the Safety and Productivity of Miners: A Topical 

Listing and Annotated Bibliography of Recent Research. BuMines 

OFR 198-83,1983,91 pp.; NTIS PB 84-127687. 

24. Peters, R, and L. Schaffer. Field Tests of a Model Health and 


Safety Program for the Mining Industry. BuMines IC 9075, 1986, 36 pp. 


25. Pfeifer, c., J. Stefanski, and C. Grether. Psychological, Behav­


ioral, and Organizational Factors Affecting Coal Miner Safety and 


Health (DHEW contract HSM 99-72-151). DHEW, 1976, 319 pp.; NTIS 


PB 275 599. 


26. Rhoton, W. A Procedure To Improve Compliance With Coal 

Mine Safety Regulations. J. Organizational Behav. Manage., V. 2, No.4, 

1980, pp. 243-249. 

27. Sanders, M., T. Patterson, and J. Peay. The Effect of Organizational Climate and Policy on Coal Mine Safety (contract H0242039, 

U.S. Dep. Navy). BuMines OFR 108-77, 1976, 180 pp.; NTIS PB 267 


781. 

28. Schaffer, L., and D. Atchison. Research To Improve Health 


and Safety Programs in the Mining Industry. Volume II (contract 


H0308076, Woodward Assoc., Inc.). BuMines OFR 6-85, 1983, 197 pp.; 


NTIS PB 85-151017. 


29. Trist, E., G. Susman, and G. Brown. An Experiment in Autonomous Working in an American Underground Coal Mine. Hum. Relat., 

v. 30, No.3, 1977, pp. 201-236. 

30. Uslan, S., H. Adelman, and R Keller. Testing the Effects of 


Applied Behavioral Analysis and Applied Behavioral Management 


Techniques on the Safe Behaviors of Salt Mine Personnel (contract 


J0166137, Salt Inst.). BuMines OFR 44-80, 1978,44 pp.; NTIS PB 80­

171309. 


31. Wagner, J. Time-Of-Day Variations in the Severity of Injuries 


Suffered By Mine Shiftworkers. Paper in Proceedings of the 32nd 


Annual Meeting of the Human Factors Society. Anaheim, CA, 1988, 


11 pp.; available upon request from J. Wagner, BuMines, Minneapolis, 


MN. 


32. Webber, R Management: Basic Elements of Managing Organi­


zations. Irwin, 1975, 775 pp. 

16 

APPENDlX.-ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Althouse, R., and J. Hurrell. An Analysis of Job Stress in 

Coal Mining. mOSH (DHEW) 77-217, 1977, 145 pp.; 

NTIS PB 274-7%, 

OBJECTIVE 

This research examined how much job stress and 

psychological strain underground coal miners experience, 

and how levels of job stress and strain reported by miners 

who work in mines with high-accident rates compares with 

the stress and strain reported by miners who work at 

mines with low-accident rates. 

METHODS 

The data for this study were collected in conjunction 

with another mOSH supported study by Pfeifer (25V 

lItalic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 

preceding the appendix. 

The data for the study were based on questionnaire responses from a sample of 486 miners and mine supervisors 

employed in nine different States. The sample included 14 

matched pairs of coal mines, with one high-accident mine 

and one low-accident mine in each pair. 

Analyses were conducted to address the hypothesis: 

mines exhibiting high rates of accidents adversely affect 

the experiences and attitudes of their employees compared 

with miners working in lower accident environments. 

Measures of job stress pertain to characteristics of the 

miners' work environment, which pose a threat either as 

demands which they may not be able to meet or as insufficient supplies to meet their needs, such as, underutilization 

of abilities, participation, role conflict, inequity in pay, 

social support, and so forth. 

A strain refers to any deviation from normal responses 

in a person. Among the indicators of psychological strain, 

three types of job satisfaction were measured (boredom, 

workload dissatisfaction, and general job dissatisfaction), 

and indices of somatic complaints and affective states 

(anxiety, depression, and irritation) were also included in 

the questionnaire. 

RESULTS 

Overall, there was surprisingly little difference between 

the high and/or low accident mines in terms of reported 

levels of stress and strain. With regard to job stress, the 

data indicate that there are few differences in job stresses 

between the high and/or low accident mine samples. Only 

one stress measure, Responsibility for Things, differed 

significantly between supervisors. As expected, the supervisors in high-accident mines were less satisfied than the 

supervisors in the low-accident mines with the amount of 

responsibility they have for seeing that the equipment 

being used is safe and well maintained, that various projects are carried out properly, and that budgets are well 

prepared and are adhered to. 

Among the 30 separate job stresses associated with the 

reported experiences of miners, only three discriminated 

significantly between high and/or low accident underground miners; namely, fairness at work, role ambiguity, 

and responsibility for things. However, contrary to expectations, the data show that the low accident, rather than 

the high accident sample was significantly higher on those 

stresses. In other words, miners in low-accident mines 

were the ones who felt that the clarity of responsibility 

and certainty of objectives on their jobs were ill-defined, 

perceived less of a share in the opportunities to use their 

skills, abilities, and ideas, and experienced a significantly 

greater discrepancy between the actual amount of responsibility for setting projects and controlling the maintenance 

and safety of equipment than what they would have liked 

to have had. 

With regard to psychological strains, the authors also 

found very little difference between the responses of 

miners working at high and/or low accident rates mines. 

The authors state that with one exception, the differences 

revealed were largely trivial ones. The authors suggest 

that the one reported difference (greater amount of 

personal energy off-the-job) probably reflects differences 

in the age of the miners in the two samples, and not the 

mine environments. 

Althouse points out that this study is based on actual 

safety, not miners' perception of safety. This is an important point because the Pfeifer (25) results (based on the 

same sample of miners) indicate that not only did most of 

the miners from ALL the mines sampled actually perceive 

their mines to be safe ones, but that there was no significant difference in perception of safety between high 

and/or low accident mine environments among the underground miners, surface employees, or supervisors. One 

might expect that miners in high-accident mines would 

experience increased stress only if they perceived their 

mine as less safe, but this was not the case. Therefore, 

Althouse concludes: 

until more information is available, some healthy 

skepticism is warranted with respect to manifest, 

objective classification of mines by accident level and 

an easy inference that subjective job stresses are 

coincidental with that classification. 

Althouse also points out that his findings do not necessarily mean that miners do not experience considerable 

psychological strain in both high-and low-accident mines. 

The researchers compared the reported stress and strain 

of coal miners with other nationally sampled blue-collar 

workers, and found that miners fared better than average 

on most measures of job stress, and, in fact, were low in 

subjective job stress experiences. 
17 

With respect to strain, however, miners were much 

more irritated than other blue-collar employees. They also 

experienced greater than average anxiety, depression, and 

had more physical complaints. However, on the average, 

they expressed higher job satisfaction, lower workload 

dissatisfaction, and less boredom than other blue-collar 

workers. Althouse concludes that miners were higher in 

their affective psychological strain, but lower than the 

average blue-collar worker on behavioral strain indicators. 

Bell, C. The Hecla Story: Organization Development in 

the Hard-Rock Mining Industry. Paper in Human Engineering and Human Resources Management in Mining. 

Proceedings: Bureau of Mines Technology Transfer 

Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, July 7-8, 1987; St. Louis, MO, 

July 15-16,1987; and San Francisco, CA, July 21-22,1987, 

compo by staff. BuMines IC 9145, 1987, pp. 138-148. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to determine the effects 

of a team-building and problem-solving organization 

development (OD) intervention on productivity and safety 

at an underground hard-rock mine. 

METHODS 

The OD program was instituted at the Hecla Mining 

Co.'s Lucky Friday Mine. This mine extracts an ore containing silver, lead, and zinc. It is located in the Coeur 

d'Alene Mining District of Idaho, and employs about 180 

underground workers. Hecla also operates the Star Mine, 

which is located in the same area and employs about 270 

miners. The two mines operate in the same geological 

formation, use essentially identical mining technology, and 

draw from the same labor pool. The Star Mines, which 

received no intervention during the time of the study, 

served as a comparison mine with the Lucky Friday Mine. 

The primary intervention was through team-building 

and problem-solving meetings in which a boss and the 

immediate subordinates identified and resolved major 

problems to make their unit more effective. Some of the 

assumptions that underlie team building are as follows: 

(1) Workteams are the basic building blocks of an organization; (2) Effective team functioning requires good 

leader-member relations, clear team goals, clarification of 

role expectations, and individual and group problemsolving skills; (3) Teams can improve their performance 

by systematically solving the major problems that confront them; and (4) Enhancing workteam performance 

makes individuals more competent and organizations more 

successful. 

The classic or team-building and problem-solving 

approach introduced at Hecla was governed by several 

principles: 

1. Start team building and problem solving at the top 

of the organization and work through all levels, 

2. Focus attention on intact workteams consisting of 

superiors and subordinates, 

3. Focus on getting the job done; i.e., fmd better ways 

to accomplish the team's mission by solving major problems and seizing opportunities, 

4. Be data based; i.e., discover problems, opportunities, and solutions through fact-fmding and diagnostic 

procedures, 

5. Be interaction oriented; i.e., develop and implement action plans to cause desired changes. Followup 

and evaluate actions to ensure a general team-building 

and problem-solving framework, but use additional OD 

techniques as they are appropriate. 

The technique of team building involved a series of 

meetings in which high-priority issues facing the team were 

systematically examined and resolved. These meetings 

usually were conducted with the aid of a consultant who 

acted as a facilitator. Problems were defined and clarified, 

alternative solutions were evaluated, preferred solutions 

were implemented, and the effects of actions were monitored for desired results. Team building had two expected 

outcomes: the team's mission would be better accomplished, and work relationships among team members 

would be improved. 

The effort began with five, day-long, team-building 

meetings with the president and staff. The outcome of 

these meetings was a formal statement of company philosophy and goals. An agreement on corporate strategy 

related to safety and productivity was developed. A statement of each department's goals, functions, responsibilities, 

and authority was also drawn up. 

Next, team-building meetings were held with the topmanagement team at the Lucky Friday Mine, as well as 

with the operations team that included the shift bosses. 

After that, meetings were held involving the mine manager, mine superintendent, mine supervisors, shift bosses, 

and auxiliary support supervisors. These meetings dealt 

more intensively with issues of organizational coordination, 

communication, and cooperation. For example, support 

units were not delivering the needed services; some 

individuals and work units were not meeting others' 

expectations of what they should be accomplishing. The 

outcomes of these meetings were improved methods for 

getting the job done and detailed strategies for reducing 

mine accidents and injuries. 

During the last phase of the project, team-building 

meetings were held with shift bosses and their workcrews. 

The meetings addressed four main questions: 

1. What's preventing the crews from doing the job in 

the way they think it ought to be done? 

2. What are the crews doing that helps them get the 

job done? 
18 

3. How can the crews get the job done more safely? 

4. How can the crews make this a better place to 

work? 

Other aspects of the intervention were as follows: a 

new performance appraisal system, a supervisory skills 

training program, and a review and critique of Hecla's 

safety program. The organization's safety functions were 

analyzed in various team-building meetings. These activities resulted in specific changes, including: 

1. Reassignment of responsibility for the safety engineering, and safety inspection and enforcement. 

2. Upgrade the mine safety-person position from 

supervisor to shift boss rank. 

3. Commitment to give safety training to each new 

supervisor. 

4. Commitment to develop a year-long schedule of 

safety incentive programs at the Lucky Friday Mine. 

The effects of the intervention were assessed by comparing productivity and safety before and after the intervention at the Lucky Friday mine. Data were also collected on the productivity and safety performance of other 

nearby silver mines including one (the Star Mine) that was 

owned by the same company. These mines served as 

control sites. 

RESULTS-SAFETY 

During 1981, the fIrst year following the intervention, 

Lucky Friday's injury rate fell to 12.9 injuries per 200,000 

employee-hours: almost half of what it had been during 

the preceding 3 yr. This brought Lucky Friday's injury rate 

down to almost exactly the same level as the Star Mine 

and other nearby mines. 

Since 1981, the injury rate increased somewhat in 1982, 

decreased again in 1983, and increased in 1984. But the 

injury rates remained well below rates experienced prior 

to the OD intervention. The average of the injury rates 

for the period from 1981 to 1984 is 38.2 pct below the 

average for the 3 yr prior to the intervention. The injury 

rate for the fIrst 6 months of 1985 is extremely good. 

During this period, the employees at the Lucky Friday 

Mine went 88 working days without a lost-time injury: 

which is an all time record for this mine. 

RESULTS-PRODUCTIVITY 

The annual average tons of ore mined per production 

shift at the Lucky Friday Mine varied between 11 and 12 

short tons per shift during the period from 1979 to 1982. 

Using the pre-intervention years of 1979 and 1980 as a 

basis of comparison, tons per employee-shift was 1.4 pct 

lower in 1981, and 4.5 pct lower in 1982. However, 

beginning in 1983, productivity began to improve. In comparison with the pre-intervention years, tons per employeeshift was 18 pct higher in 1983, 37 pct higher in 1984, 

and 54 pct higher during the fIrst half of 1985. The impact 

of the OD program was not immediately reflected in 

improvements in stope miner productivity. Rather, there 

was a delay of over a year before increases began to 

materialize. One explanation for this may be that the 

company and the miners were engaged in a dispute over 

the administration of the contract system in late 1981 and 

1982, with a slow down staged by the miners in 1982. The 

issues were resolved in late 1982 and productivity started 

on a steady rise. 

CONCLUSIONS 

To summarize, it appears that the OD team building 

intervention at Hecla was highly effective at improving 

both safety and productivity. The effects of the interventions were not a transient phenomenon. Data were 

collected for about 5 yr after the intervention was begun, 

and it appears that the initial improvements in safety and 

productivity have been maintained. . 

Bell estimates that to install an OD program in another 

mine similar to the Lucky Friday would require approximately 100 employee days of consulting plus expenses (i.e., 

from $80,000 to $150,000 over a 2 to 3 yr period), as well 

as the time periods which mine managers and miners 

would spend in team-building and problem-solving activities (approximately 25 h per person). For further details 

about this intervention, see Fiedler (12) and Buller (6). 

Bennett, J., and D. Passmore. Probability of Death, Disability, and Restricted Work Activity in United States 

Underground Bituminous Coal Mines, 1975-1981. J. Saf. 

Res., v. 15, No.2, 1984, pp. 69-76. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to examine the correlates 

of injury severity in United States bituminous coal mines. 

METHOD 

Data were obtained from MSHA on all coal mining 

accidents and injuries during the period from 1975 to 1981. 

Data were eliminated from any mine other than an 

underground bituminous coal mine, from injured people 

under 18 and over 65 yr of age, from injuries at surface 

areas of underground mines, and from accidents that did 

not result in injuries. This left data on 82,945 injuries for 

analysis. 

The criterion variable was binary. It was coded 1 if the 

injury resulted in death, permanent total or permanent 

partial disability, days away from work only, days away 

from work combined with days of restricted work activity, 

and days of restricted work activity only. It was coded 0 if 

the injury was so minor that it did not result in one of the 

above situations. 
19 

The variates studied were as follows: mining method, 

miner age, total mining experience, job experience, specific 

mine experience, job classification, time elapsed from start 

of work to accident, location of accident in mine, and year 

of accident occurrence. 

The 14 variates that describe the mine and the injured 

miner were regressed on the categorical criterion variable 

using logistic regression techniques. 

RESULTS-MINER CHARACTERISTICS 

1. Age and experience. For practical purposes, none 

of the age and experience variates was related to the 

severity of injuries. Older miners with more experience in 

mining, at a particular task, and in a specific mine have the 

same chances for severe injuries as younger, less experienced miners. Bennett notes that previous studies of 

employee safety have reported both negative and positive 

correlations between age and injury incidence. 

2. Job classification. Previous reports indicate that 

mobile equipment operators, supervisors, and maintenance 

workers ranked high in mine injury incidence. However, 

Bennett's fmdings for injury severity do not follow the 

same trend as those reporting injury incidence. Supervisors and maintenance workers were less likely to have 

serious injuries than all other job classifications (trackworker, beltworker, bratticeworker, and general laborer). 

Mobile equipment operators and all other job classification 

have the same probability of serious injury. 

Bennett concludes that the potential for severe injuries has been underestimated for all other jobs that provide service and support activities (trackworker, beltworker, bratticeworker, and general laborer), and that 

training programs need to give greater attention to miners 

performing the service duties normally believed less 

dangerous. 

RESULTS-OTHER VARIATES 

1. Method of mining. Bennett found no statistically 

significant difference in the severity of injuries in conventional continuous, and longwall mining. 

2. Location of accident. Both intersections and other 

locations in the mine had the same likelihood as the face 

for severe injuries. The area least likely to have had 

serious injuries is the shaft and slope. Bennett concludes 

that because safety training has focused traditionally on 

the face area, there has been an underestimation of the 

potential hazards in other locations of the mine. 

3. Time elapsed since beginning of shift. No relationship was observed between the degree of injury and the 

shift time elapsed. Although the potential for fatigue 

increases as shift time passes, injury severity was distributed relatively evenly throughout each shift. 

4. Year. The probability of injuries resulting in death, 

disability, or restricted work activity has been greater for 

each succeeding year from 1975 to 1981. Bennett concludes that current approaches to safety training have not 

reduced injury severity. 

CONCLUSION 

Bennett states the main implication of this study is that 

severe injuries can occur over a range of mine and miner 

characteristics: not merely with miners working at the 

face, as is commonly believed. 

DeMichiei, J., J. Langton, K Bullock, and T. Wiles. Factors 

Associated With Disabling Injuries in Underground Coal 

Mines. MSHA, June 1982,72 pp. 

OBJECTIVE 

Information was gathered so that a comparative analysis 

could be made between two populations of underground 

coal mines: those that had experienced an exceptionally 

high nonfatal days lost (NFDL) accident rate (N = 21) 

and those that had experienced an exceptionally low NFDL 

accident rate (N = 19). 

METHOD 

Four criteria were used in the selection of mines. First, 

the mines employed at least 150 underground miners. 

Second, the mines had experienced either an exceptionally 

high or an exceptionally low NFDL accident rate over a 

period of 3 yr (1977 through 1979). Third, an effort was 

made to insure that the mines geographically represented 

the bituminous coal producing areas of the nation, and 

fourth, the sample represented both union and nonunion 

operations. Information pertaining to employment figures 

and accident rates was furnished by MSHA's Health and 

Safety Analysis Center. A sample of mines agreed to 

participate in the study that included 21 mines with an 

exceptionally high NFDL accident rate and 19 mines that 

had experienced an exceptionally low NFDL accident rate. 

Three approaches were used to collect information: 

observing the mining methods and physical environment 

of the mine, interviewing miners, and administering 

questionnaires to individuals familiar with the mine's 

operation, i.e., mine superintendents, face supervisors, 

mine safety department personnel, mine safety and health 

committee members, and federal mine safety and health 

inspectors. The questionnaire included many rating scale 

items. The statistical significance of the difference between the mean responses of persons from high- versus 

low-accident rate mines was computed for each questionnaire item. 
20 

INTERVIEW RESULTS 

1. Training 

DeMichiei notes that in many cases classroom size 

was too large, ranging from 50 to 200 students. Miners 

indicated on-the-job training is the most effective training 

received, and section supervisors were often the individuals 

responsible for such training. 

At low-accident rate mines, miners indicated that 

individuals in key management positions were receptive 

and responsive to miner requests and frequently solicited 

input from the miners concerning mine policies and procedures. The miners perceived management as being 

totally committed to ensuring safety and health. For 

example, section supervisors were given latitude and 

flexibility and encouraged to take additional precautions, 

when in their judgment, such a response was deemed 

necessary. Miners at low-accident rate mines often described management-labor relations as being one of cooperation. Management-labor relations were good not only 

between individual section crew members on the same 

shift, but also evident between these crews and section 

crews on other shifts. 

At many high-accident rate mines, while relations 

appeared good between individual crew members and 

between other crews on the same shift, such a relationship did not extend to section crews on other shifts. 

Often they found conditions that should have been corrected by the preceding shift. Miners felt that upper 

management failed to recognize the effects this situation 

had, not only on the section supervisors, but also on the 

accident rate. 

Unlike the low-accident rate mines, miners at several 

high-accident rate mines believed management to be onesided since they had little input into the decision making 

process. At these same high rate mines, miners indicated 

that management lacked a systematic approach to decision 

making. Management's failure to plan resulted in conflicting job assignments, since neither the men nor the 

materials necessary to perform the job were available. 

The miners indicated situations such as these caused 

frustration, often leading to open hostility between management and labor. 

In the majority of high-accident rate mines, the lack of 

communication was identified as a primary cause for poor 

management-labor relations. Miners in general and, more 

specifically, labor representatives indicated their opinions 

and suggestions were never seriously considered by upper 

management. 

At several low-accident rate mines, miners indicated 

that management earnestly encouraged interaction between 

themselves and labor representatives. Management at 

most of the low-accident rate mines recognized the importance of labor safety and health committees and actively 

sought out their participation in resolving safety and health 

problems. 

2. Morale 

In seven high-accident rate mines, miners stated that 

poor morale was attributed to management's inability to 

plan effectively. Many times job assignments were conflicting, tools and materials necessary were not available, 

and management was not receptive to miners' concerns. 

In the majority of high-accident rate mines, the miner's 

morale was negatively affected by management's failure to 

fairly and equitably enforce established company policies 

including absenteeism, job assignment, and standard 

operating procedures. 

Miners at high-accident rate mines were troubled by 

some of their coworkers' behavior: freeloaders who often 

took advantage of disability compensation, individuals who 

failed to pull their share of the workload, and persons who 

abused absentee policies for personal gains. Management's reluctance to deal forcefully with these issues 

caused frustration, and a general disrespect towards mine 

management. While some of these problems did exist at 

low-accident rate mines, they existed to a much lesser 

extent. 

Low-accident rate mines seemed to recognize that labor 

relations could be negatively influenced by inflexible 

company policies. When a company policy was causing 

conflict at the mine, management sought alternative solutions to the problem. For example, safety and health 

incentive programs were restructured to ensure more 

equitable accountability, vacations were scheduled to 

accommodate the miners, and absentee policies provided 

for being off work for extenuating circumstances. Moreover, policies were developed in conjunction with labor 

and, once established, were equitably enforced. 

3. Safety 

In five high-accident rate mines, the mine superintendents had no direct involvement in the mine's safety and 

health program. Responsibility for implementing the program was mainly the safety department's. Safety department personnel at these five high-accident rate mines 

identified the lack of upper management involvement in 

safety matters as a serious impediment to improving safety 

and health conditions at the mine. While safety personnel 

were given the responsibility, they lacked the authority to 

require operating personnel follow standard work procedures. Their role was one of mainly correcting unsafe 

conditions and the means to prevent them. 

In seven high-accident rate mines, safety personnel 

stated it was virtually impossible to perform effectively due 

to the lack of safety personnel. Miners working on shifts 

other than the day shift stated safety department personnel 

very seldom, if ever, made underground visits during other 

shifts. Any involvement by the safety department personnel with miners was restricted to the shift the safety department worked. Miners further stated this lack of commitment was a disregard by management for their safety. 
21 

A significant finding at 11 high-accident rate mines was 

statements made by safety and health committees concerning their reluctance to support management's decision to 

reprimand miners for unsafe acts, even though such 

actions were justified. They stated if such support was 

given to management, the rank and file miners usually 

reacted in a hostile manner. Management believed that 

such reaction by labor representatives prevented a good 

faith effort on the part of both parties to promote health 

and safety at the mines. At these same mines there appeared to be a general mistrust regarding miners' motives 

related to health and safety issues, i.e., a suspicion that 

miners might be using safety as a means to gain contractual concessions. 

On the basis of the interview results DeMichiei concludes that: Many of the problems observed and 

discussed during interview sessions, with the exception of materials handling, do not account for a large 

number of disabling injuries. On the other hand, the 

existence of such conditions and practices may be 

indicative of the underlying causal factors that distinguish safe mines from unsafe mines. 

QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 

A questionnaire was administered to specific personnel 

groups other than miners (mine superintendents, section 

supervisors, mine safety department personnel, mine safety 

and health committee members, and federal mine inspectors) to gather information to supplement the data from 

observations and interviews conducted underground. 

1. Training 

Significant differences (p < .05) in mean responses 

to questionnaire items suggest that new miners in highaccident rate mines were less informed on how to do their 

jobs than new miners in low-accident rate mines, that 

supervisors at high-accident rate mines did not provide the 

same degree of instruction and guidance to miners as did 

supervisors in low-accident rate mines, and that the overall 

safety programs were not as effective. 

2. Management quality 

Questionnaire results suggest that section supervisors at 

high-accident rate mines did not have the same degree of 

freedom to make decisions concerning health, safety, and 

production as did section supervisors at low-accident rate 

mines. Management put off making important decisions 

and lost more worktime through poor scheduling and 

planning at high-accident rate mines more often than at 

low-accident rate mines. Furthermore, management at 

higher-accident rate mines provided less support for 

decisions made by section supervisors concerning safety 

than did management at low-accident rate mines. 

3. Management-labor relations 

Questionnaire results suggest that management at highaccident rate mines is less interested in the welfare of 

workers both on and off the job than management at lowaccident rate mines. Additionally, there is more conflict 

or misunderstanding over directions and job assignments 

given at high-accident rate mines. Moreover, good ideas 

fostered by miners get more serious consideration from 

management at low-accident rate mines. 

4. Physical environment 

Questionnaire results suggest although adverse conditions were generally found in both high- and low-accident 

rate mines, management made more of an effort to control 

adverse conditions at low-accident rate mines than at highaccident rate mines. Furthermore, miners contacted section supervisors regarding unsafe condition more often at 

low-accident rate mines than at high-accident rate mines. 

5. Safety 

Questionnaire results suggest that miners in lowaccident rate mines are better provided with supplies, 

equipment, and the tools necessary for job accomplishment 

than are miners at high-accident rate mines. Responses 

also indicated that miners at low-accident rate mines 

participate much more conscientiously in a personal 

protection plan for the feet, eyes, and head. It was also 

indicated that miners at low-accident rate mines would 

more readily contact their supervisor when unsafe conditions or acts were observed and that management more 

often provided safety manuals to the miners. Finally, 

section supervisors in low-accident rate mines received 

more support from safety committeepersons when reprimanding miners for unsafe acts. 

6. Other findings 

Union-Nonunion status. According to management 

and labor responses at the five (relatively large) nonunion 

mines that participated in the study, the reasons for the 

low accident and injury experience was the flexibility 

afforded management and labor in dealing with issues 

affecting safety and health, production, and other matters. 

For instance, all employees in these mines could be task 

trained in the operation of all mine equipment and subsequently operate this equipment when qualified. This 

permitted employees to freely exchange job assignments 

when mutually agreeable. It was claimed that these 

policies alleviated boredom, created more job satisfaction, 

and fostered cooperation and camaraderie between and 

among mine employees. Additionally, management at 

nonunion mines structured vacation periods, created innovative sick leave policies, and introduced profit sharing 

plans, all of which were tailored to meet the employees' 
22 

personal and economic needs. This interest on the part of 

mine management in the well-being ofthe mine employees 

was thought to be responsible for high worker morale and 

positive attitudes toward safety and health. 

Productivity and accident rates. Initial results for the 40 

mines indicated that the low-accident rate mines produced 

significantly more short tons per worker day than the highaccident rate mines. After adjusting the data for the 

imbalance in geographic distribution and nonunion affiliation, the disparity still existed, but to a lesser extent. 

Absenteeism. Survey results indicated that absenteeism 

was much more of a problem at high-accident rate mines 

than at low-accident rate mines. DeMichiei reports that 

the average rate of absenteeism at the 21 high-accident 

rate mines was approximately 16 pet. On the other hand, 

at the 19 low-accident rate mines, the average was approximately 8 pct. 

Edwards, S. Quality Circles are safety circles. Natl. Saf. 

News, June 1983, pp. 31-35. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to report the impact of 

quality circles (QC's) on safety at a large surface coal 

mine. 

METHODS 

The Captain Mine is located in southwestern Illinois. 

The mine had more than 500 United Mine Workers of 

America(UMWA) and company employees at the time of 

the intervention. One person was sent to a week-long QC 

facilitator training course. The facilitator, four department heads, and two union representatives from the mine 

committee were chosen to serve as a steering committee. 

This committee established general goals and ground rules 

for the QC's. They decided that items of a contractual 

nature would be off limits. 

In the four departments selected for initial QC's, over 

80 pct of the employees volunteered to participate. Members were randomly selected from this pool of volunteers. 

Each QC group consisted of approximately five to eight 

persons. In addition to the four quality circle groups, the 

mine safety comitteepersons also agreed to go through the 

circle training. All the circles focused on problems that 

genuinely affect production or job performance. The types 

of problems the circles identified are those that would be 

expected at most mines: tool shortages, lack of support 

equipment, unavailability of parts or supplies, poor communications, inadequate housekeeping, inefficiencies in 

work place layout, and so on. 

QC meetings were usually held on shift for 1 h per 

week. Members first received training in circle techniques 

and processes. Training included such subjects as brainstorming, data collection and graph formats, and general 

group dynamics. During and immediately after their 8 h 

of training, the members used brainstorming to draw up a 

list of possible problems they would like to analyze and try 

to solve. Circle members voted and chose a problem they 

wanted to solve. They collected data on the problem. 

Once the problem was clearly delineated, they brainstormed possible solutions and projected how cost-effective 

solutions might be. When the analysis of a problem was 

completed, a proposed solution, or recommendation, was 

agreed upon. If the solution required higher level action, 

a management presentation was made. 

RESULTS 

A very important benefit of QC's at Captain Mine, not 

initially anticipated, was improvement in the accident 

rate of circle members. When comparing the number of 

accidents reported 6 months prior to the QC training with 

the number of accidents reported 6 months after the QC 

training, it was found that, for the overall mine, accidents 

decreased by 17 pct; for departments with circles, accidents decreased by 18 pet; and for the members of QC's, 

accidents decreased by 41 pet. Prior to their involvement 

in the circle program, circle members had 58 pet of the 

accidents on their shift. In the 6 months after circles 

began, members had only 31 pct of the accidents on their 

shift. 

None of the circle projects involved what might be 

classified as strictly a safety problem. Yet, inherent in all 

the circles' projects, because they dealt with workplace 

layout or work procedures, was the potential for achieving 

a safer work environment. 

The author concludes that "QCs quite possibly may provide a framework for employee input that helps improve 

safety and production, as workers not only identify a 

problem but become actively involved in the solution." 

Fiedler, F. Structured Management Training in Underground Mining-Five Years Later. Paper in Human Engineering and Human Resources Management in Mining. 

Proceedings: Bureau of Mines Technology Transfer 

Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, July 7-8, 1987; st. Louis, MO, 

July 15-16,1987; and San Francisco, CA, July 21-22,1987, 

compo by staff. BuMines IC 9145, 1987, pp. 149-153. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to determine the effects 

of a structured management training intervention on productivity and safety at an underground trona mine. 

METHODS 

Fiedler's structured management training intervention 

was instituted at Texasgulf's trona mining operation in 

Granger, WY. The intervention consisted of highly structured training in leadership and supervisory skills for managers and supervisors, using prepackaged and relatively 

standardized leadership and supervisory skills training 

programs, with relatively little interaction between the 

training consultant and company employees. 
23 

This underground mine is at the 1,300 ft level. Miners 

use continuous mining equipment and the room-and-pillar 

method of ore extraction. About 500 persons are employed at this mining operation, with half of the work 

force engaged in underground operations. Most of the 

surface work force is employed in the ore mill, which 

processes the trona, and in administrative positions. Training was conducted for managers and supervisors of the 

mine and ore mill. The Texasgulf Mine is located within 

a lO-mile radius of the other three major trona mines in 

the United States (Allied Chemical, Food Machinery 

Chemical (FMC), and Stauffer Chemical). These three 

mines provided an excellent basis for comparison since 

they share with Texasgulf the same geological conditions, 

the same labor pool, and compete in the same market. 

The intervention began with a series of interviews to 

(a) familiarize the consultants with the organization, 

(b) identify the major goals of management and supervisors, and ( c) develop a list of critical behaviors to construct a performance evaluation scale for assessing the 

effects of the intervention. The training program itself 

consisted of four basic elements, described below. 

1. Objective supervisory performance appraisal. A performance appraisal system was designed so that managers 

and supervisors could become aware of their own strengths 

and weaknesses, and those of their subordinates. The 

rating scales concentrated on supervisory behaviors: how 

the supervisors act, and how they can change ineffective 

behaviors. This type of performance evaluation has been 

found effective by other industries in motivating employees 

to improve their behavior at work. 

2. Leadership training. The intervention used a program developed by Fiedler called Leader Match. This 

program is based on a generally accepted view in the 

literature on leadership that the performance of leaders or 

managers depends both on their personalities and on the 

specific situations in which they operate. The method 

further assumes that it is generally much easier to change 

critical components of the leadership situation, than one's 

personality or deeply ingrained habits of interpersonal 

interactions with subordinates. 

Leader Match teaches individuals to diagnose their own 

leadership styles, as well as to diagnose the leadership 

situations. The leaders are given detailed instruction on 

various methods for modifying the situations to match their 

particular management approaches and personalities. The 

instruction is provided by a trainer who uses a detailed 

manual, aided by videotaped illustrations, slides, and/or 

transparencies. 

3. Supervisory skills training. This training method 

used videotaped vignettes in actual and staged settings that 

taught the supervisor how to deal with specific problems 

with employees. Some of the problems addressed included: reinforcing safe behavior, correcting an employee, 

overcoming resistance to change, handling an irate employee, and creating a cooperative workteam. 

4. Institutionalization. Finally, to assure that the training would actually be used and would remain a permanent 

part of the organization, key personnel in the Texasgulf 

training department learned to administer the training 

methods. 

Altogether, the Leader Match, supervisory skills, and 

employee motivation training are about 20 h in length. 

The effects of the intervention were assessed by comparing productivity and safety before and after the intervention at the Texasgulf mine. Data were also collected 

from MSHA concerning the productivity and safety performance of three nearby trona mines. These mines 

served as control sites. 

RESULTS-PRODUCTIVITY 

The intervention began in February 1979. In terms 

of average short tons per employeehour during the years 

from 1978 to 1981, the productivity of the Texasgulf mine 

was higher than the industry average throughout all 4 yr. 

However, what is especially noteworthy is the DIFFERENCE between Texasgulf and the industry average is 

greater for each of the 3 yr following the intervention than 

it was during the year BEFORE the intervention. The 

difference is especially large during 1980, the first full year 

following the intervention. Texasgulfs productivity was 21 

pct higher than the remainder of the trona industry during 

that year. 

The annual average number of short tons of trona 

mined per machine shift at Texasgulf has increased steadily during 1982 to 1984. Unfortunately, comparable data 

for the remainder of the trona industry during this time 

period are unavailable. Although it is possible that the 

observed increases in productivity (relative to the industry 

average) could partially reflect changes other than the 

training intervention, Texasgulf managers recently reported 

they do not believe that any such changes have taken place 

at their company. 

RESULTS-SAFETY 

Prior to the training program, Texasgulfs safety record 

was considerably worse than other mines in the trona 

industry. In terms of number of injuries per 200,000 

employeehours during the years from 1978 to 1981, the 

injury rate at Texasgulf was higher than the industry 

average throughout all 4 yr. However, it is also clear that 

1981 represents a significant improvement over 1978 in 

both relative and absolute terms. The rate for Texasgulf 

in 1981 was almost half of what it was in 1978. Also, there 

are DIFFERENCES between the rates for Texasgulf and 

for the remainder of the industry. In 1978, the rate for 

Texasgulf was twice as high as the industry average. 

However, in 1981, the two rates are almost identical. 

The rate has dropped dramatically from its high of 

almost 14 in 1978, as compared with the rates during the 

years 1983 and 1984, which were both below the level of 

four incidents per 200,000 employeehours. Again, recent 
24 

interviews with Texasgulf managers suggest that they 

believe the reduction in accident rates is largely due to 

the structured management training program, and that 

other than the intervention, no changes have occurred 

which could account for the improved safety record. 

CONCLUSIONS 

To summarize, it appears that the structured management training intervention at Texasgulf was highly effective 

at improving both safety and productivity. The effects of 

the intervention were not a transient phenomenon. Data 

were collected for about 5 yr after the intervention was 

begun, and it appears that the initial improvements in 

safety and productivity have been maintained. 

Fiedler estimates that to install the structured management training program of the type developed for the 

Texasgulf mine would cost from $4,000 to $10,000 for 

duplicating the already available training materials, and 

for consultant time required to train company personnel 

in administering the training program and to cover travel 

and other incidental expenses. This estimate does not 

take into account the cost of the time which the mine 

managers and supervisors would have to devote to the 

training sessions. For additional details also see Fiedler 

(12). 

Gaertner, G. H., P. D. Newman, M. S. Perry, G. P. Fisher, 

and K Whitehead. Determining the Effects of Management Practices on Coal Miners' Safety (contract J0145029, 

Westat, Inc.). BuMines OFR 39-88, 1987,348 pp.; NTIS 

PB 88-221445. 

OBJECTIVE 

This study presented comparisons of the safety performance of underground coal mining companies using versus 

not using various types of management practices thought 

to affect safety. 

2In the 1983 the national average rate of injuries in underground 

coal mines was 10.07 per 200,000 h of exposure. 

METHOD 

Data were collected from 10 underground coal mining 

companies that volunteered to participate in the research. 

There was considerable variation between these companies 

in injury rates, productivity, and size of mine work force. 

Some companies had excellent safety records and some 

had injury rates exceeding the national average.2 Three of 

the ten companies were nonunion and the other seven 

were union. Data were collected from mines in eight 

different States (Virginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, 

Ohio, Illinois, Kentucky, Alabama, and Colorado). 

Data were collected from company and mine records, 

and from interviews conducted with company- and minelevel personnel, including top level company officials, 

supervisors, and hourly employees. The interviews dealt 

with company safety policies, management's commitment 

to safety, and labor relations. Data were requested from 

MSHA on injuries, safety violations, production, and 

employment for the 62 mines being operated by the 10 

companies in this study. MSHA provided data on these 

variables for the 5-yr period from 1980 to 1984. 

The impact of selected safety policies was examined by 

looking at differences in safety indices between companies 

using a particular policy versus those NOT using that 

policy. Five policies were examined: 

1. Whether the company had formal investigations of 

lost-time accidents more extensive than those required by 

law. 

2. Whether the company had (and used) disciplinary 

policies applied to safety violations against miners and 

supervisors. 

3. Whether the company had special programs for 

miners suffering repeated accidents. 

4. Whether safety incentives (monetary or awards) 

were offered. 

5. Whether combined safety-productivity incentives 

were offered. 

Each company's use of safety policies was determined 

from the interviews conducted with both management and 

hourly employees. Since the injury rates being considered 

are for the period from 1980 to 1984, the researchers 

attempted to verify that the various policies under consideration (where they existed) had been established before 

1980. At each company where one of the above mentioned policies existed, it was found that the policy had 

been put in place sometime prior to 1980. 

RESULTS-SAFETY POLICIES 

Table A-I lists each of the five policies that were 

considered and shows the rate of injuries experienced by 

companies using versus not using each policy. It was 

found that in companies that DO conduct special accident 

investigations beyond legal requirements, the rate of 

injuries per 200,000 hr is 3.87 lower than the corresponding rate for companies that do NOT conduct such special 

investigations. 
25 

Table A-1.-lnjury ratesl for companies using versus 

not using each safety policy 

Policy Used Not used 

Rate Sample Rate Sample 

Special accident investigations 6.32 3 10.19 6 

Safety discipline policies ... 8.20 5 9.88 5 

Accident repeaters program . 10.15 5 7.93 5 

Safety incentives ......... 9.04 7 9.04 3 

Combined safety-production 

incentives ............. 5.64 3 10.50 7 

llnjuries per 200,000 h of exposure. 

Companies were compared on the basis of whether or 

not they had safety discipline policies. When present, 

such policies seem to have a positive effect on safety (the 

difference in incidence rates between companies with and 

without special discipline policies was 1.68 per 200,000 h 

annually.) Gaertner notes that the importance of the disciplinary policy seemed to be less punitive than indicative 

of top managerial commitment to safe operations. 

A policy element that did not appear to reduce injuries 

was programs for accident repeaters. Companies that had 

special programs to deal with repeaters actually had somewhat higher injury rates than companies which did not 

(10.15 versus 7.93). It may be that companies with severe 

injury problems are driven to undertaking repeater programs. Managers at companies supporting such programs 

frequently cited the costs of compensation as reasons for 

the programs. 

Safety incentives-by themselves-appear to make no 

difference in terms of injury rates. The rates for the two 

sets of companies were identical (9.04). However, there 

was quite a difference between companies that had combined safety-production incentives and those that did not. 

This is somewhat surprising given the relative lack of 

effect of safety incentives alone. Companies with combined safety and production incentives averaged only 5.64 

reported injuries per 200,000 h annually. Companies 

WITHOUT combined production-safety incentives averaged an 86 pct higher rate annually (10.50). 

Gaertner attempts to explain why there is such a difference between the safety incentives versus the combined 

safety-productivity incentives. Safety incentives not tied to 

production tended to be relatively inexpensive and symbolic (T-shirts, caps, decals), and generally did not indicate 

a serious commitment by management to safety in the eyes 

of the supervisors and hourly employees. Rather they 

were usually intended as "reminders to the men, to keep 

thinking about safety," as one manager put it. Combined 

production-safety incentives seem more effective, and 

generally more costly. In one company, the cost of the 

production-safety incentives was 25 cents per short ton; in 

another it was 81 cents per short ton. 

Although the above data suggest that using incentive 

programs may be an effective way to improve safety performance, other data reported in this study suggest that 

such programs may not actually be reducing accidents to 

the extent one might think. There may be a tendency for 

incentive plans to inadvertently encourage miners to work 

injured to avoid reporting injury and losing their incentive 

pay. 

RESULTS-TOP MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT 

Gaertner notes that there were differences in the ways 

which top management expressed its commitment to 

employee safety. First, as previously discussed, there were 

differences in the use of safety policies. Second, there was 

a difference in the company's choice of vehicles for stressing safety. There was a tendency for companies with 

better safety records to rely heavily on one or two means 

of promoting safety. In one company the means was 

training and the use of computerized technology. In a 

second company, it was in applying engineering knowledge 

to production and safety problems. In a third company, it 

was a regular formal program of management audits of 

safety performance combined with regularized formal 

contacts. There did not appear to be one best vehicle for 

promoting safety, but all had several features in common: 

• Employee participation. The work force was involved 

in implementing the vehicle and evaluating its feasibility. 

• Pride in the vehicle. The vehicle for stressing safety 

was often perceived as being invented at and being unique 

to the company. 

• Vehicle was promoted by well-situated company advocate (not necessarily the company president or safety 

director). The vehicle seemed to be an effective way of 

illustrating to the work force that management considered 

safety to be a high priority. 

RESULTS-LABOR RELATIONS CLIMATE 

Based on information from interviews with management 

and the hourly work force, companies were categorized as 

having either a relatively positive or negative labor relations climate. Next, the rates of injuries and citations at 

companies with a positive climate were compared with the 

corresponding rates at companies with a relatively negative 

climate. 

Companies with a positive versus negative labor relations climate were compared on two measures of safety. 

It was found that the injury rate in companies with a 

negative labor relations climate is almost double that of 

the rate in companies with a positive climate (11.50 versus 

6.70). Companies were also compared in terms of the 

average annual rate of MSHA citations for significant and 

substantial safety violations per mine. The rate of such 

violations for companies with a positive labor relations 

climate was only about a third of the rate for companies in 

which the labor relations climate was relatively negative 

(12.73 versus 3.94). 
26 

Gaertner notes that in most companies where the labor 

relations climate was positive, the following conditions 

were observed: 

• an available and often used open-door policy to upper 

management (hourly interviewees said they spoke directly 

with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or superintendent 

and that they got a perceived positive response); 

• a fair percentage of time spent underground by company management (hourly employees appreciated underground contact with upper level management, and informal 

conversation let others know that visits had been made); 

• a feeling of pride on the part of employees and supervisors in working for the company; 

• multiple communication vehicles were in existence in 

companies with a positive climate (newsletters; numerous 

communications on bulletin boards in the bath-house; 

letters sent to the employee's house; informal meetings 

with individuals and groups of miners). 

Gaertner cautions that the statistics presented above 

should be viewed as only tentative and preliminary evidence concerning the true effects these variables have on 

mine safety. They are based on data from only a very 

small sample of companies, and they are based on a 

correlational (single point in time) versus a longitudinal 

(across time) analysis of the relationships. 

Goodman, P. S. Determining the Effect of Incentive 

Programs on the Occurrence of Accidents, Injuries, and 

Productivity-Final Report (contract J0145012, CarnegieMellon Univ.). BuMines OFR 47-88, 1987, 143 pp.; NTIS 

PB 88-234257. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of 

a safety incentive plan on the occurrence of injuries at 

four underground coal mines. 

METHOD 

Goodman collected data on the lost-time accident 

frequency rate for 4 yr (from 1980 to 1983) from four 

underground coal mines owned by the same company and 

represented by the UMWA. These mines all instituted a 

nonmonetary safety bonus plan at the end of 1981, and the 

program continued until the end of 1983. 

The basic structure of the bonus program was as follows. All employees with 1 yr or more of service can 

participate. Each month all employees without a lost-time 

accident receive a safety star for their hard hat. Each 

quarter employees without a lost -time accident are eligible 

for a drawing to win a major appliance. Employees must 

work 90 pct of scheduled workdays. At the end of the 

calendar year, each employee who has not had a lost-time 

accident will receive a safety prize. 

Mines 1 and 2 are somewhat similar and located in the 

same mining area of West Virginia. Mines 3 and 4 are 

together and located in southern Illinois. Mine 4 was shut 

down after 1982. 

RESULTS 

A review of the data in table A-2 shows remarkable 

variability in lost-time accident frequency rate in the baseline years, 1980 and 1981. 1980 is more comparable with 

the rates in 1982 and 1983. 

Table A-2.-lost-time accident frequency rates! before 


(1980-81) and after (1982-83) institution 


of nonmonetary safety incentive program 


Year Mine 1 Mine 2 Mine 3 Mine 4 

1980 6.58 5.64 7.14 5.22 

1981 21.75 19.41 24.50 52.30 

1982 

1983 

...... 

...... 7.96 

5.68 

6.80 

5.18 

12.45 

5.87 

10.28 f) 

!Lost-time accidents per 200,000 h of exposure. 

2Shut down. 

In 1981 the rates are particularly high. Since 1981 was 

a strike year these high rates may reflect distractions surrounding pre- and post -strike activities. In any case, if the 

1981 period is considered special, there does not appear 

to be a connection between the nonmonetary incentive 

scheme and reduced accidents (1980 versus 1982-83). 

To get a more complete picture of the effects of the 

plan, data on miners' perceptions of this bonus plan were 

collected from miners at one of the mines (mine 2). 

Workers were asked about their perceptions of the safety 

program. These data are very important because they give 

some picture of the effectiveness of this safety bonus 

program. Solely looking at fmal incident data can be 

misleading. Miners' responses to the following interview 

question shows that a majority, but not all of the miners 

knew there was a safety bonus plan: 

"Is there a safety bonus at this mine?" 

CATEGORY LABEL (pet) 

Yes 75.7 

No 20.0 

Don't know 4.3 

100.0 

Miners' responses to the following two interview questions 

suggest that the plan had not affected their safety consciousness or safety related behavior very much: 
27 

"How has the safety bonus plan affected your safety 

consciousness?" 

CATEGORY LABEL (pct) 

Increase 11.6 

No effect 86.5 

Decrease 1.9 

100.0 

"Has the safety bonus plan had an effect on your safety 

related behavior?" 

CATEGORY LABEL (pct) 

Increase 11.5 

No effect 86.6 

Decrease 1.9 

100.0 

Miners' responses to the following interview question 

suggest that the safety bonus had very little or no effect 

on improving how the crew works on safety issues: 

"What effect has the safety bonus plan had on your making 

certain that everyone on this crew works safely?" 

CATEGORY LABEL (pct) 

Increase 7.7 

No effect 90.4 

Decrease 1.9 

100.0 

CONCLUSIONS 

Goodman concludes, "The basic picture is that the 

safety program has had little effect on workers perceptions 

or motivation. Unless the program can change worker 

beliefs and behavior, it is not likely to lead to major 

changes in accidents." Goodman believes that such programs are not very effective because they do not identify 

critical safety behaviors and there is not a close connection 

between behavior and rewards. "The quarterly reward was 

on a lottery, and only one employee wins. The annual 

reward was over such long periods as to attenuate the 

relationships between behavior and rewards." 

Goodman, P. Assessing Organizational Change: The 

Rushton Quality of Work Experiment. Wiley, 1979, 

391 pp. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to determine the impact 

of an intervention on safety, productivity, quality of employee work-life, and several other outcome measures. 

The major points of the intervention were as follows: 

1. An experimental section called the "South" section 

was established in the mine, comprising 27 volunteers, 9 

to a shift. 

2. Every worker in the experimental section was on 

top pay. This meant the experimental section would cost 

at most $324 more each week than other sections, not a 

prohibitive cost factor to the mine's management. 

3. All members of each crew were trained by the company to be capable of performing any job in the section, 

from continuous miner operation to roof bolting. The 

entire crew was also given special training in State and 

Federal mine safety laws, so each miner would know what 

constitutes a violation. 

4. Each of the three crew supervisors in the section 

had responsibility and authority primarily for the safety of 

the crew. The responsibility to management for the dayto-day production of coal by the crew was transferred to 

the entire team of nine workers. 

5. Grievances by any member of the section would be 

dealt with primarily by the crew involved, in what is sometimes called peer discipline. If the crew couldn't cope with 

a grievance itself, it would then be processed through the 

local union's formal grievance machinery. 

METHOD 

Rushton is a medium-sized mine in central Pennsylvania. There were approximately 180 employees when the 

experiment began late in 1973. Of these, 35 were managerial, the remainder were nonexempt and members of 

the UMWA. At the beginning of the evaluation, there 

were three working sections in the mine, a maintenance 

group, a general labor group, and the cleaning plant. 

The changes which were hoped to facilitate improvements in safety were as follows: (1) the experimental 

group received more formal training about safety practices 

and the law; (2) the experiment introduced a new reward 

system to motivate the workers toward good safety practices. Intrinsic rewards were increased: the workgroup 

had been restructured to provide the workers greater 

opportunities for feelings of responsibility and accomplishment if safety levels improved. Extrinsic rewards were 

also increased through formal feedback sessions for the 

workers concerning their performance on safety and other 

activities. (3) The supervisors in the experimental section 

were no longer caught in the conflict between production 

and safety. They could expend all their energies on safety. 

Supervisors in the nonexperimental sections had continually to balance production and safety demands. 

Safety was measured by the number and type of accidents, the number and type of violations, ratings on the 

quality of safety made by independent observers, as well as 

by the union and management, and by qualitative reports 

from the on-site observers. The experimental sections 

were compared with control group sections on these 

measures both before and after the intervention. 
28 

RESULTS 

The accident data provide no conclusive evidence on 

whether the intervention had an effect. However, the 

accident data are not a particularly good measure of the 

intervention's effectiveness because the experimental 

section exhibited a very low accident rate before the 

intervention even began. (For accident rate data see 

Goodman (1979), table 12.1, p. 214.) 

Analyses of the responses to interview questions suggest 

that most respondents viewed the program as positively 

affecting safety. If one divides union respondents into 

experimental and control, both groups endorse the positive 

effects of the intervention on safety over time. Members 

of management, many of who were not strongly committed 

to the program, also reported that safety practices had 

improved. 

Analyses based on federal safety violations indicate that 

in the frrst experimental period (the first year following the 

intervention), there was a slight drop in violations in the 

South section (-7 pct) and a significant increase in the 

other two sections ( +121 pct and +250 pet). (See Goodman, table 12.4, p. 220.) 

Analyses based on the number of shifts lost by each 

section due to inspectors closing down a section indicate 

that at the baseline the sections are the same. In the frrst 

experimental period all sections show an increase, but the 

experimental section shows the smallest increase. In the 

remaining periods (December 1974 to December 1976), 

the number of shifts lost decreases virtually to zero. (See 

Goodman, table 12.5, p. 221.) 

In the frrst experimental period the number of state 

violations in the South section is less than in the other 

sections and less than its own baseline. No differences 

were observed among sections in the remaining periods. 

Goodman concludes, "Overall there is a slight improvement in the experimental section (relative to the others) 

with respect to violations in the frrst 11 months of operation." (See Goodman, table 12.6, p. 222.) 

Analyses based on quarterly global ratings of section 

safety by federal and state inspectors indicate that the 

experimental section's overall safety record was better than 

the other two sections, although the East section was 

virtually identical to the South section in the last half of 

1976. (See Goodman, table 12.7, p. 223.) 

CONCLUSIONS 

Regarding the effects of the intervention on safety, 

Goodman writes: 

The overall fmding is that the experimental intervention did lead to an improvement in safety practices ... 

the experiment did affect safety behaviors, that is, 

the men in the South section put into effect safety 

practices that would prevent accidents. They were 

more pro-active toward safety than they had been 

prior to the experiment. 

The structure of the program provided knowledge about 

safety practices that previously was not available. Making 

the supervisor's role safety, rather than production, "minimized the negative reinforcement workers sometimes 

received from their bosses when they wanted to do safety 

work." Periodic meetings with the miners provided them 

with formal feedback on how safety behavior matched 

safety goals; they were a problem-solving arena where new 

safety practices were developed, and offered a direct 

opportunity to reinforce good safety behavior. This is 

absent in most traditional safety programs. Lastly, the 

autonomous workgroup concept increased workers' feelings of responsibility for achieving high safety levels. 

The mine president and many miners wanted the intervention to be expanded to the other three sections of the 

mine, and in August 1975 this proposal was put to a union 

vote. The proposal was rejected by a very narrow margin 

(79 versus 75). Many reasons have been proposed for the 

rejection, including the possibility that miners who were 

not in the experimental South section had become envious 

of the freedom, flexibility, and higher pay of the experimental section. By the end of 1977 the intervention efforts 

had entirely disappeared. 

For further details see Trist (29) and Mills (20). 

Goodman, P. S. Analysis of Miners' Job Attendance 

Behavior and Its Relationship to Miners' Accidents and 

Injuries-Final Report (contract J0328033, CarnegieMellon Univ.). BuMines OPR 60-86, 1985, 278 pp.; NTIS 

PB 86-216306. 

OBJECTIVE 

This study examined the effects or consequences of 

absenteeism on mining accidents. 

METHOD 

The concept of familiarity was introduced to explain the 

impact of absenteeism on accidents. Familiarity refers to 

the level of specific knowledge one has about the unique 

aspects of the workplace. This includes knowledge about 

the unique characteristics of particular machinery, materials, physical environment, people, and programs that exist 

in a particular mine section at a particular time. The 

central premise is that lack of familiarity leads to more 

dangerous conditions that, in the absence of compensatory 

changes in the level of care taken by a miner, would contribute to higher rates of accidents. 

Unfamiliarity can affect three types of people in coal 

mining. 

1. Because the physical characteristics of a mine 

section change from day to day, an absent worker, on 

returning to the mine will be less familiar with the 

workplace, and, ceteris paribus, will have a higher 

probability of having an accident. 
29 

2. When a miner is absent another miner is generally 

assigned as a replacement. Such a person is generally less 

familiar with the work setting and, ceteris paribus, more 

likely to have an accident. 

3. In a typical crew configuration, most mining activities require coordination among pairs of individuals who 

work closely together: the miner operator and the helper, 

the roof bolter and the helper, and the two shuttle car 

operators. Considering such dyads, the worker adjacent to 

the replacement may also be placed in a more dangerous 

situation because of lack of familiarity with the replacement's mining practices, and resulting difficulties in 

coordinating activities in an inherently dangerous environment. Hence, this adjacent worker or partner of a replacement is expected to have a high probability of having 

an accident. 

Data were gathered from production crews in five 

underground coal mines. A unique data set was created 

that traced on a daily basis the absence event, the company's policy on replacement, and the occurrence of an 

accident. Information on these variables was obtained 

during approximately 70,000 miner days worked, corresponding to roughly 60 production crews observed for an 

entire year. During these 70,000 miner days, the number 

of reported accidents was approximately 340, or about one 

accident every 205 miner days worked. 

The following strategy was applied to each of the five 

mines: 

(a) Define various mutually exclusive categories 

among which the degree of familiarity is expected to differ 

importantly. 

(b) Assign every miner day to one of these categories 

and count the number of miner days worked in each of 

these situations (Le., measure the level of exposure to 

danger). 

(c) Count the number of accidents experienced by 

miners assigned to each of these categories. 

(d) Compute accident rates (i.e., numbers of accidents 

per 200 miner days of exposure). 

(e) Assess quantitatively the differences in accident 

rates across the familiarity categories. 

Eleven dyad-familiarity categories were defined as follows: 

A Two regulars, neither absent previous day. 

B Two regulars, one absent previous day. 

C Two regulars, both absent previous day. 

D Two replacements, neither absent previous day. 

E Two replacements, one absent previous day. 

F Two replacements, both absent previous day. 

G One regular, one replacement, neither absent previous day. 

H Regular absent previous day, replacement present 

previous day. 

I Regular present previous day, replacement absent 

previous day. 

J One regular, one replacement, both absent 

previous day. 

K One miner working without partner. 

Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the 

effects of familiarity on accident rates. An observation is 

a dyad-familiarity category for a particular mine, and thus 

the sample size (with five mines and 11 dyad-familiarity 

categories) is 55. Accident rates are the dependent variable. Inter-mine differences were statistically controlled 

for, and a weighing procedure was used to adjust for large 

differences in miner days of exposure used in calculating 

the accident rates. 

RESULTS 

Working alone is the safest of the 11 categories of 

familiarity. 

Categories A versus F. The hypothesis that two regulars, neither absent on the previous day have lower accident rates than two replacements who were both absent 

on the previous day received considerable quantitative 

support. The accident rates in the extreme high-familiarity 

category are estimated to be, on average, less than those 

for the extreme low-familiarity category by about 0.7 

accidents per 200 miner days worked, with inter-mine 

differences and the varying levels of exposure taken into 

account. When compared with the average accident rate 

for the entire sample of 0.98 accidents per 200 miner days 

worked, this estimate of 0.7 suggests an impact of considerable importance. 

Categories D versus F. The hypothesis that two replacements, neither absent previous day, have lower rates 

than two replacements both absent previous day received 

substantial quantitative support-the estimated difference 

is about .75 accidents per 200 days. 

Categories C versus F. The hypothesis that two regulars who were both absent on the previous day have lower 

rates than two replacements who were both absent on the 

previous day received quite strong support, with an estimated differential of about .6 accidents per 200 days. 

Most of the other expected differences between pairs 

of accident rates were in the expected direction, but were 

relatively small in magnitude. 
30 

CONCLUSIONS 

The fmdings suggest that prior day absences have the 

effect of increasing accidents, and that regular miners have 

lower accident rates than replacement miners. Goodman 

states that although it seems clear that absences are not 

among the primary factors related to mining accidents, 

they may be important among those factors that can be 

addressed by mine policy. Thus, absenteeism appears to be 

one factor to be considered in programs designed to reduce accidents. 

National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. Toward Safer Underground Coal Mines. NAS,1982, 

190 pp. 

OBJECTIVES 

The purpose of this study was as follows: 

1. Look for correlations between various factors and 

variations in the rate of lost -time accidents experienced in 

United States underground coal mines. 

2. Look for factors that might account for variations 

in the rate of lost-time accidents experienced at the 19 

underground coal mining companies producing the most 

coal in the United States. 

3. Look for differences between mines that have an 

extremely high rate of lost-time accidents versus mines 

that have an extremely low rate of lost-time accidents. 

Different sets of data were analyzed in order to achieve 

these three objectives. 

METHOD-FIRST DATA SET 

These data are based on the information mine operators provide to MSHA concerning accidents, employment, 

and productivity. Data on every lost-time injury that were 

reported to have occurred in a United States underground 

coal mine during the 3-yr period 1978 through 1980 were 

included in the analyses; such injuries numbered nearly 

40,000 including fatalities. These data were analyzed for 

correlations between injury rates by mine and company 

and such factors as type of accident, mine size, seam 

thickness, union status, productivity, geographical location 

(by state), and age of miners. Fifteen large coal mining 

companies provided the researchers with data on the age 

of the underground miners in their entire work force. 

RESULTS-FIRST DATA SET 

MINE SIZE.-The fatality rate for mines with 50 or 

fewer employees (0.14) is about three times that of mines 

with over 250 employees (0.05), and almost twice that 

of mines with 51-250 employees. Small mines « 50) 

accounted for 15 pct of total employeehours, but 40 pct of 

all fatalities. 

PRODUCTIVITY - SAFETY.-The researchers conclude that the (cross-sectional) association between productivity and disabling injury rates, while perhaps slightly 

negative, is sufficiently weak to be disregarded as an 

important factor in explaining differences between injury 

rates in mines. 

AGE OF MINER.-There is no evidence of an age 

trend with respect to fatality rates or permanent disability 

injury rates. However, there is a very marked correlation 

between age and disabling injury rates. Miners between 

the ages of 18 and 24 have an injury rate nearly twice that 

of miners 25 to 34, who have a rate about 25 pct higher 

than miners 35 to 44, who in turn have a rate over 40 pct 

higher than miners who are at least 45 yr of age. Hence, 

a young miner (18-24) is about three times more likely to 

be injured than is a miner 45 yr of age or older, about 

twice as likely to be injured than is a miner 25-44. This 

relationship is consistent across the 15 companies that 

provided data on the age of their work force, as well as for 

each of the years 1978, 1979, and 1980. Furthermore, the 

strong association between age and disabling injury rate 

was apparent for each of the major categories of accident 

types that cause injuries. 

METHOD-SECOND DATA SET 

The second data set consisted of a subset of the first 

data set. Analyses were performed on the data for 19 of 

the 20 largest bituminous coal producing companies in the 

United States in 1978. (One company went out of business 

shortly after 1978.) 

RESULTS-SECOND DATA SET 

The researchers found large and persistent differences 

between the injury rates of the major companies that control underground coal mines in the United States. Such 

differences could not be explained by physical, technological, or geographical factors that were included in the 

analyses. The researchers conclude that "these differences 

are due, apparently, to factors internal to the companies." 

This issue was examined in greater detail in the third data 

set. 

METHOD-THIRD DATA SET 

Twelve large mines (150 workers or more) were visited 

by the research team. These mines were selected partially 

because they represented the extremes of safety performance, i.e., some had quite low injury rates and others had 

quite high injury rates. The research team developed a set 

of 28 questions to serve as a guide, but the teams were 

encouraged to follow their own course in conducting interviews with miners and management personnel. Three 
31 

major types of characteristics thought to be associated with 

mine safety were investigated: (1) the quality of labor 

relations, (2) the extent of management's commitment to 

safety (as reflected by a proper balance between production and safety, safety meetings and contacts, rewards for 

safety, and good housekeeping in the mine), and (3) absenteeism rate. 

RESULTS-THIRD DATA SET 

The researchers state: 

All seven mines with low injury rates appeared to 

have a cooperative attitude between management 

and labor; an adversarial attitude was observed in 

three of the five mines with high injury rates. It is 

also apparent that the mines with higher injury rates 

tended to have higher absenteeism rates. In three of 

the five mines with high injury rates, at least one of 

the above mentioned aspects of management commitment to safety was found to be lacking. 

The researchers conclude that differences in the injury 

rates of these 12 mines appear to be due in part to the 

d~gree of a company's cooperation with employees in its 

mmes. 

At the seven mines with low injury rates that were 

visited, good relations between management and 

labor were apparent and were considered by the 

employees as being important to safety. Among the 

commonly recognized elements of these relations 

were an open-door policy at the manager's office and 

a willingness to accept suggestions re safety. At 

these mines the union generally supported the company's enforcement of safety rules. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Based on their visits to underground coal mines, their 

case studies of coal companies, and their discussions with 

industry, union, and government officials, the researchers 

conclude that among the most important factors influencing mine safety are as follows: (1) management's commitment, as reflected by the attention and resources it 

devotes to improving safety, (2) cooperation between 

management and labor in developing and implementing 

safety programs, and (3) the quality of training of employees and managers. 

Peters, R., and L. Schaffer. Field Tests of a Model Health 

and Safety Program for the Mining Industry. BuMines IC 

9075, 1986, 36 pp. 

OBJECTIVES 

The objectives of this research were to better define the 

essential features of effective health and safety programs 

for the mining industry, to develop a health and safety 

program that incorporates these essential features, and to 

evaluate the effectiveness of the model program at a coal 

mining and a gold mining company. 

METHOD 

Based on a review of the safety literature, and what is 

known about the mining industry, a model program was 

defined in terms of five fundamental conditions: 

1. There must be no separation of production and safety and health in the management of the mining operations. 

2. There must be an honest commitment by the top 

managers to constantly improve the operation's health and 

safety performance. 

3. Managers and supervisors at all levels must receive basic training in safety, health, and loss control 

management. 

4. Management emphasis on health and safety in staffing and performance evaluation. 

5. Feedback mechanisms that have reliable and readily 

detectable safety and health components should be used, 

e.g., investigation of all accidents and near misses, safety 

audits, and job performance sampling. 

A written model program tailored to the two companies' circumstances and needs was developed and the 

following agreement was reached between the researchers 

and the top company manager at each company: 

1. The top company manager accepted the program as 

conceptually sound and agreed to put it into effect in the 

company. 

2. The researchers agreed to complete an initial health 

and safety audit of the company's operations and, from the 

information obtained, to define a program tailored to the 

company's circumstances and needs. The researchers and 

top company managers agreed that the model program 

would contain specific recommendations for management 

action. 

3. The top company manager agreed to consider each 

recommendation carefully and advise the researchers of 

the decision regarding acceptance. If the decision was to 

not accept a recommendation, the researchers would be 

informed of the reason so they could record the information for use in the final evaluation of the program. 

4. The researchers agreed to assist the manager in 

implementing the program by: (a) conducting 8 h of training for subordinate managers, supervisors, and shift bosses 

in loss control fundamentals; (b) providing 8 h of training 

to supervisors and workers selected by the top manager in 

the use of an accident investigation methodology developed 
32 

by the Bureau; (c) furnishing available materials for training mobile equipment operators and assisting in course 

development to improve the company's task training; 

(d) providing health and safety technical literature and 

other information related to the company's loss control 

problems; (e) visiting the company's operations once a 

month for a calendar year, or longer, to assist in program 

implementation and obtain evaluation data (and the manager agreed to permit the researchers unrestricted access 

to all elements of the operation for observation and to all 

available information related to occupational injuries, 

illnesses, accidents, near misses, and incidents of any kind 

that produce loss); (f) providing the company management 

periodically with an oral report on observations made, 

additional management actions recommended, and countermeasure options suggested for consideration; (g) at the 

end of the evaluation period, presenting an oral report 

covering all of the model program research at the company's operations. 

In short, the model program was implemented primarily 

by providing training on loss control and accident investigation, and by providing technical assistance with health 

and safety problems. 

The coal mining company was located in easter Kentucky. It operated two underground low coal drift mines 

using continuous miners and two surface mines using 

mountain top removal techniques. In 1982, the company's 

total salable production of coal was nearly 800,000 mt, 

of which 65 pct was from surface operations. Average 

employment during 1982 was 340. All of the hourly 

employees were represented by a union local. 

The gold mining company was located in central 

Nevada. Ore was mined by power shovels and trucked to 

a crusher at the mine site. In 1982, this single mine moved 

approximately 2.203 million mt of overburden and other 

waste and 0.743 million mt of ore. There was no union. 

The average number of employees in 1982 was 113. 

In order to assess the effectiveness of the program, 

monthly statistics were generated on the rate of occupational injuries and accidents, and the severity of injuries 

(as measured by the number of days of work lost during 

recovery), and employees were observed performing a 

large number of randomly selected jobs on several occasions throughout a 15-month period. The purpose of these 

observations was to estimate the proportion of the work 

force that was working in the presence of one or more of 

three types of safety deficiencies: 

Type A-individual job performance deficiencies, which 

could be corrected by the employee along, e.g., an employee is observed not to be wearing a seatbelt. 

Type B-individual job performance deficiencies, which 

could be corrected only through employer action beyond 

the control of the individual employee, e.g., an employee 

is observed driving a truck that does not contain a usable 

seatbelt. 

Type C-deficiencies that were common to several jobs 

of the same kind, or various kinds, and correctable only 

through substantial changes by the employer in mining 

plan, operating policies, or job structuring, e.g., allowing 

deviations from the approved roof control plan. 

RESULTS 

During the 15 months of observation at the coal mining 

operation, the following improvements were noted: a 

gradual decrease in the rate of injuries per month, a 

substantial decrease in the severity of injuries (from 105 

days lost per month to 10 days), and a substantial 

reduction in the proportion of sampled jobs with one or 

more safety deficiencies (from 74.3 pct to 36.6 pct). 

Although the proportions of all three types of safety 

deficiencies were reduced, the greatest reduction was in 

type A, e.g., failure to use personal protective equipment 

and messy work areas. 

During the period in which the gold mining operation 

was observed, three types of improvements were noted. 

First, although there was no downward trend of significance in the rate of injuries per month, the severity of 

injuries decreased substantially-only one-third of the total 

days lost due to accidents in 1982 are attributable to 

accidents which occurred in the last half of that year. 

Second, the proportion of jobs with one or more safety 

deficiencies decreased substantially (86.4 to 19.1 pct). As 

at the coal company, the proportions of jobs having each 

of the three types of safety deficiencies were reduced. 

Substantial improvements in type C deficiencies occurred 

at the maintenance yard, crushing facility, mill and maintenance shop, and on the haul roads. Third, the incidence 

of accidents resulting in equipment and/or facility damage 

(but no injuries) was reduced by about 50 pct. This reduction in accidents is quite noteworthy, considering that the 

uninsured loss (cost of parts and labor for repairs) associated with the 56 noninjury accidents reported at this 

mine during 1982 was $235,950. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The researchers believe that it would take a minimum 

of 9 to 12 months to achieve full implementation of the 

model program in most mines, and that the model program can be implemented with minimal outside help. 

They suggest that because implementation is inexpensive 

and the loss reduction is very substantial, the benefit -tocost ratio is quite favorable. 

For additional details also see Schaffer (28). 

Pfeifer, c., J. Stefanski, and C. Grether. Psychological, 

Behavioral, and Organizational Factors Affecting Coal 

Miner Safety and Health (DHEW contract HSM 99-72­

151). 1976, 319 pp.; NTIS PB 275 599. 
33 

OBJECTIVE 

Information was gathered so that a comparative analysis 

could be made between two populations of underground 

coal mines: those that had experienced an exceptionally 

high-accident rate and those that had experienced an 

exceptionally low-accident rate. 

METHODS 

Questionnaire data were collected from 14 matched 

pairs of coal mines, with one high-accident mine and one 

low-accident mine in each pair. Data were collected from 

54 union officials, 102 supervisors, 27 safety directors, 

32 mine managers, 77 miners' wives, 157 above-ground 

miners, and 612 underground miners. The topics covered 

in the survey were as follows: attitudes toward safety and 

accident causes, major problems in the mine, general 

company attitudes, general miner attitudes, physical and 

psychological problems, safety and health equipment, use 

of health programs, training, job behaviors, job satisfaction, company safety programs, and perceptions of outside 

organizations. The questionnaire included many rating 

scale items. The statistical significance of the difference 

between the mean responses of persons from high-versus 

low-accident rate mines was computed for each questionnaire item. 

RESULTS 

1. Attitudes toward safety and accident causes 

The data indicate that differences in concern for safety 

practices from mine to mine are perceived by the personnel working at the mines, and that, in general, companies 

which are viewed to have a greater concern for safety 

practices do in fact have better safety records. 

In comparison with the rating scale responses from 

miners in high-accident mines, miners in low-accident 

mines felt that keeping good safety records and upholding the company safety record were significantly more 

important to their companies, and that having competition 

among workcrews was significantly less important to their 

companies. 

Mine personnel were asked the extent to which 18 

different items were related to accidents in the mine. Four 

items were seen as related to accidents to a significantly 

greater degree in high-accident mines: dust, lighting, 

supervisors, and faulty equipment. 

2. Major problems in the mine 

All six groups of mine personnel felt that too much 

absenteeism was a problem in their mine. Labor groups 

felt that lack of management training and poor equipment 

maintenance were very often problems in their mine. 

Management groups, on the other hand, felt that too low 

worker productivity and too high job turnover were problems more often than not. There were no statistically 

significant differences between the responses of mine 

personnel from high-versus low-accident mines. 

3. General company attitudes 

Although managerial groups feel that more emphasis is 

placed on safety by the company than on production, this 

emphasis is not communicated to miners, who feel that the 

company places more emphasis on production. Pfeifer 

believes these results suggest that coal companies could 

communicate company policy and philosophy to miners in 

more effective ways than they have in the past. No significant differences were observed between the responses of 

high and low accident mine personnel to the questions in 

this section. 

4. General miner attitudes 

Underground miners appear to be much less fatalistic 

than has been assumed in the past. Responses to several 

independent questions confirm that miners do feel that 

they have some control over their safety. 

Supervisors and management were asked the extent to 

which each of 12 miner attitudes contributed to accidents 

in their mines. Of the 12 items listed, three were rated 

by both supervisors and management as causing accidents 

relatively more frequently than other items. These items 

were just being careless and not following safety rules, just 

not giving a damn, and not using good common sense and 

judgement. 

This appears to support Dejoy's (8) arguments concerning the existence of a biased tendency for supervisors to 

perceive workplace accidents as caused by factors internal 

to the worker (as opposed to themselves or to the worker's 

environment). He states: 

The supervisor is likely to explain the poor safety 

performance of people in his or her department in 

terms of employee carelessness or lack of effort. 

Attributing responsibility for poor safety performance to factors internal to the employees also tends 

to absolve the supervisor of direct blame. 

In comparison with the low-accident mines, managers 

in high-accident mines felt that accidents were caused 

more often by miners worrying about debts, being upset 

about marriage problems, bad health and feeling bad, and 

hurrying to begin a vacation. 

5. Safety and health equipment 

As a group, underground miners felt that the two primary reasons for not using safety and health equipment 

were that it is uncomfortable, and that it gets in the way 

of working. Underground miners did not feel that other 
34 

miners making fun of persons wearing equipment was a 

reason for equipment not being used. Significant differences were found in several instances between mean 

responses of personnel in low-accident mines and highaccident mines. Poor equipment maintenance, lack of 

training, and the fact that equipment isn't any good were 

cited as being important as reasons for not using equipment by underground miners in high-accident mines. On 

the other hand, the fact that there is no need for it and 

that it is difficult to get were cited as being more important as reasons for not using equipment by underground 

miners in low-accident mines. 

6. Training 

There is a consistent tendency for training on various 

topics to be rated as better by underground miners at lowaccident mines. Results emphasize the importance of good 

training. Good training in how the electrical power system 

works, dealing with hazards (such as gases, coal dust, and 

noise), and how to use tools and equipment is more 

prevalent in mines with lower accident rates. Although 

safety training is reportedly offered to all employees, and 

a variety of training techniques are used, Pfeifer notes that 

"it apparently quite often misses the mark." 

7. Safe job behaviors of miners and supervisors 

Miners in low-accident mines reported that other 

miners wear safety glasses and cleanup the work area 

more often, and they bridge the circuit breaker when a 

circuit overloads less often than miners in high-accident 

mines. 

In the underground miners group, significant differences were observed between mean responses in highversus low-accident mines on 6 of the 12 items. Miners in 

low-accident mines reported that miners get along with 

each other, can depend on each other, and report small 

accidents more often than did miners in high-accident 

mines. On the other hand, workcrews apparently try to 

outdo other crews, and miners get mad if another miner 

w?rks too fast or too slow more often in high-accident 

mmes. 

Miners in low-accident mines reported that they wear 

safety glasses, report safety and health hazards to the 

supervisor, and go to the doctor when they are sick significantly more often than miners in high-accident mines. 

Surprisingly, miners in low-accident mines also reported 

that they take chances or cut corners and smoke in the 

mine significantly more often than miners in high-accident 

mines. 

According to the responses of underground miners, the 

following behaviors of supervisors occur more often in lowaccident mines: 

1. Allowing miners to work at their own speed. 

2. Giving miners a pat on the back when they follow 

safety procedures. 

3. Wearing respirators in dusty conditions. 

4. Reminding miners of safety and health practices. 

5. Showing real concern for workers' welfare. 

Miners' responses also suggest that supervisors in lowaccident mines also refrain from the following activities: 

1. Asking miners to do things that are against miners' 

better judgment. 

2. Cutting corners on safety. 

3. Pushing hard for production. 

Miners in low-accident mines indicated that they had to 

do three activities significantly less frequently than miners 

in high-accident mines: doing a lot of things at the same 

time, working without clear-cut duties, and taking care of 

absentees' jobs. Supervisors in low-accident mines felt that 

miners had to take care of absentees' jobs significantly less 

often than in high-accident mines. In comparison with 

high-accident mines, significantly fewer managers in lowaccident mines felt that miners had to answer to more than 

one person. 

8. Company safety programs 

Safety directors ranked the relative effectiveness of five 

types of safety incentives as follows: 

• inclusion of safety attitude and behavior m worker 

performance evaluations. 

• publicity of outstanding safety performance. 

• running tally of accident-free employee-hours. 

• recognition awards. 

• cash awards and/or prizes (least effective). 

Safety directors were asked what changes they would 

suggest to make their positions more effective. The most 

frequent response, given by eight safety directors, was that 

they should be given more authority in safety matters. 

9. Perceptions of union influence on safety 

Underground miners in low-accident mines reported 

that the umon bargained with management for safer and 

healthier mines and discussed safety and health topics in 

union meetings to a significantly greater extent than underground miners in high-accident mines. Union officials in 

low-accident mines felt that the umon took care of injured 

miners and their families to a significantly greater extent 

than union officials in high-accident mines. 
35 

CONCLUSIONS 

Pfeifer concludes: 

results of the survey seem to underline the fact that 

future improvements in accident records are dependent mainly on behavioral techniques. It appears 

that training is the behavioral technique considered 

most often by miners and management alike as a 

way of dealing with human error. However, other 

behavioral techniques as well appear promising on 

the basis of survey results. These techniques include 

OD techniques, work organization, programs to increase the frequency of safe job behaviors, improvements in company safety programs, redesign of 

safety equipment, and programs to reduce occupational stress. 

Rhoton, W. A Procedure To Improve Compliance With 

Coal Mine Safety Regulations. J. of Organizational Behav. 

Manage., v. 2, No.4, 1980, pp. 243-249. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to determine the effects 

of an intervention on the rate of MSHA ventilation violation notices. 

METHOD 

Data were collected from crews of unionized, underground coal miners. Coal was produced in each of four 

sections, during two out of three shifts. Each section 

had one supervisor who was responsible for the production and safety performance of the crew. Every section 

had between six and nine production employees, as well 

as several maintenance and support crews working. 

There was a total of 195 union employees and 30 exempt 

employees. 

The experimenter was a health and safety inspector 

from within the company's safety department. The outcome measure was the number of ventilation violation 

notices issued per month by MSHA inspectors. The 

experimenter's goal was to receive zero violation notices 

during the intervention phase. On a random basis, there 

was one inspection every week. During each inspection, 

five criti-cal performance variables were monitored: 

(a) making a methane gas check at the working face every 

20 min; (b) maintaining a flow of at least 3,000 fefmin of 

intake air behind the line brattice; ( c) maintaining proper 

calibration of equipment methane monitors; (d) keeping 

the line brattice to within 10 ft of the working face; and 

(e) keeping the area behind the line brattice free of accumulation of loose coal dust. 

When the target behaviors were in compliance, the crew 

members and the supervisors were praised. Furthermore, 

graphic feedback of the ventilation violation notices were 

presented in the mine office. To supplement these graphs, 

verbal feedback was delivered biweekly by the experimenter during regular safety meetings with the supervisors. 

When a section was found to be noncompliant, the experimenter would stop production of coal until the hazardous 

condition was corrected. 

RESULTS 

During a 3-month baseline period, the mean number 

of ventilation citations issued per month was 2.6, based 

upon a mean of 13.3 inspection days per month. During 

the intervention phase, the mine operated for 10 consecutive months without a single ventilation citation. In the 

14th month of the investigation, there was a brief return to 

baseline. At that time, a citation was issued during each 

of two consecutive MSHA inspections. These inspections 

coincided with the week in which the experimenter was 

absent due to illness. With the return of the experimenter to work, and consequent resumption of the systematic 

control mechanisms, the citations measure returned to 

zero. 

CONCLUSION 

The results of this study suggest that compliance with 

safety requirements can be increased with the use of 

frequent observation, contingent positive feedback, and 

praise. However, the relative contribution of each these 

components to producing the observed outcome is open to 

question. 

Sanders, M, T. Patterson, and 1. Peay. The Effect of 

Organizational Climate and Policy on Coal Mine Safety 

(contract H0242039, U.S. Dep. Navy). BuMines OFR 

108-77, 1976, 180 pp.; NTIS PB 267 781. 

OBJECTIVE 

This study examined the causal influence of organizational climate and policy on underground coal mine safety. 

METHOD 

Data on total injuries and employment hours per mine 

were obtained from the Bureau. Mines in five States 

(Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and 

Ohio) having at least 80 employees for 1972 and 1973 and 

working 1,600 employeehours per employee were selected 

to form a sampling pool. After percentile ranking of 10sttime injury rates, mines in the top and bottom 30 pct of 

the industry for the two report years were proportionately 

selected within each state to insure a wide differential in 

accident rates. Percentile criteria were relaxed until a 

sufficient number of mines needed in each State had 

agreed to cooperate. 
36 

A total of approximately 250 miners from 22 mines 

completed questionnaires assessing 21 organizational 

climate, structure, and function dimensions on two occasions approximately 7 months apart. The responses for 

each item on the questionnaires were averaged across 

miners within each mine. The item means were then 

combined to yield climate scale scores for each mine. The 

21 dimensions were as follows: achievement motivation, 

autonomy, consistency of orders, cooperation among 

workgroups, decision decentralization"continued employee 

development, identification with company, innovative 

flexibility, feedback, management receptiveness, morale, 

new worker development, performance reward dependency, management planning, production pressure, shared 

authority, social relations among workers, structure, support for workers, decision timeliness, and concern for 

working conditions. 

The association of the questionnaire data to the rates of 

lost-time injuries during 1972-1973 was assessed using a 

cross-lagged panel design. 

RESULTS 

The results strongly suggest that: 

1. When decisions are decentralized, when management is flexible and innovative in trying new procedures 

and programs, and when morale is high, disabling injuries 

decrease. 

2. As disabling injuries increase, feedback, continued 

employee development, and consistency of order improve, 

which then appear to decrease injuries. 

3. Production pressure appears to lead to an increase 

in disabling injuries, which in turn results in a decrease in 

production pressure. 

4. Mines in which management plans effectively tend 

to have a lower incidence of injury than other mines. 

5. Mines in which miners are given decision responsibility and autonomy tend to have a lower incidence of 

injuries than other mines. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Sanders concludes that, because his analyses are based 

on a cross-lagged panel design, there is clear evidence that 

organizational climate and management practices do affect 

the injury experience in underground coal mines, and are 

not simply the consequence of changes in the injury experience. Sanders also proposes that training mine management in basic supervisory employee relations and planning 

skills would significantly impact on the injury rates of the 

mlDes. 

Uslan, S., H. Adelman, and R. Keller. Testing the Effects 

of Applied Behavioral Analysis and Applied Behavioral 

Management Techniques on the Safe Behaviors of Salt 

Mine Personnel (contract JOl66137), Salt Inst.). BuMines 

OFR 44-80,1978,44 pp.; NTIS PB 80-171309. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of the study was to demonstrate the effect 

of a training intervention (to teach use of positive social 

reinforcement) on the frequency of eye, hand, and back 

injuries at four salt mines. 

METHOD 

The intervention was called positive motivational safety 

training (POMOST). This training provides supervisors 

with: 

... an understanding about behavior and a process by 

which they can improve performance; increase safe 

work behaviors, help the employee feel better about 

himself, the company, and his job; and generally 

establish a work environment which is positively 

supportive. 

The principal reinforcer used in POMOST is praise, i.e., 

positive verbal feedback. POMOST instructs trainees in 

when and how to praise their employees. The program 

was taught in 22 to 40 h, depending on need. The 

program objectives were as follows: 

How to recognize unsafe behaviors. 

How to develop behavior baselines. 

How to determine what behaviors to change. 

How to communicate behavior change to employees. 

How to shape behaviors. 

How to maintain a safe work behavior program. 

This training discourages the use of punishment. Rather, 

emphasis is placed on the fIrst line supervisor focusing the 

employees' attention on the appropriateness of their behavior. The existence of inappropriate behavior is not 

ignored, but perceived as a training problem. 

Approximately 100 managers and supervisors from four 

plants were trained in the use of positive reinforcement 

for occurrences of safe behavior. Each supervisor was 

also provided manuals and other supportive materials. 

Additionally, following training, all supervisors were 

provided some coaching experience to keep the knowledge and capabilities gained during training from being 

extinguished. 
37 

Because of the high frequency of eye, head, hand, and 

back injuries, supervisors were asked to concentrate on 

shaping the following behaviors: 

SIMPLE BEHAVIORS-wear safety devices, lift correctly, 

drive safely, use tools properly, and maintain housekeeping 

standards. 

MORE COMPLEX BEHAVIORS-suggest better work 

methods, identify unsafe conditions, self-enforce safety 

practices, assist fellow workers who need help lifting, 

driving, loading, etc. 

A pre-training baseline was determined for each plant 

that identified rates of various types of accidents and 

injuries. The design was a before and after time series 

design. All the months prior to the onset of training 

represent the total number of premeasures; those subsequent to training represent all the measures of the post 

period. A 2 by 2 chi square contingency table was constructed which compared the pre and post periods for the 

number of months in which the totals were above and 

below the means. 

In addition, a pre-training mean was computed separately for each site. Each post training total was then 

compared to determine the number of monthly totals 

which were above or below the pre-training mean. 

RESULTS 

Injury data were adjusted for total manhours at three of 

the four sites. The rates at two of these three sites show 

statistically significant decreases in injury rate frequencies, 

while the other site shows no change. In terms of frequencies unadjusted for hours of exposure, three experimental 

sites showed a decrease in injury frequency from pre to 

post training periods while the fourth showed an increase. 

The mean injuries of each of the four sites for the 

pre versus post periods were combined and an average 

of those means was computed. The average for the preintervention period was 10.83 injuries per month and 

the post intervention average was 9.28 injuries per month. 

Wagner, 1. Time-Of-Day Variations in the Severity of 

Injuries Suffered By Mine Shiftworkers. Paper in Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Human 

Factors Society. Anaheim, CA, 1988, 11 pp.; available 

upon request from J. Wagner, BuMines, Minneapolis, 

MN. 

OBJECTIVE 

This study examines the hypotheses that (1) the average 

severity of accidents experienced by operators of heavy 

mining equipment would be greater than for other types of 

mine employees, and (2) that this difference would be 

especially pronounced on the night shift. 

METHOD 

Based on the studies of industrial shiftworkers in 

France, Andlauer (2) suggests that accidents on the night 

shift are less frequent, but of greater severity than day 

shift accidents. It is argued that there may be an etiological relationship between accidents and greater nervous 

activity: at times of hyperactivity (or excitability) accidents 

are more frequent and less serious, while at times of hpyoactivity (or inhibition) accidents are less frequent, but 

more serious. Therefore, it is hypothesized: 

A worker performing automatically, especially during 

periods of low alertness and arousal, will tend to introduce few errors into his or her routine tasks, thereby 

limiting the likelihood of suffering an accident. However, the inhibited state of psychological arousal coupled with a narrow conscious focus on the routine task 

at hand does not allow the employee to respond properly to emergencies, thereby promoting the causation 

of relatively severe accidents. 

Wagner examined this hypothesis by comparing the 

average severity of accidents that involved the operation of 

heavy mining equipment versus accidents involving miners 

performing other types of activities-ones that presumably 

require less vigilance to perform the job safely. 

Accidents from 10 taconite3 

:J.raconite is a low-grade iron ore. 

operations over a 10 yr 

period were considered. These surface mines and associated ore processing plants are all located in northern 

Minnesota and Michigan. All of the 10 mining operations 

were similar in terms of equipment, mining and hauling 

techniques, work force requirement, and management 

approach. Most importantly, all worked an identical shift 

rotation for the fu1l10-yr period, a rotation which required 

weekly shift rotation with a run of night duty (7 nights) 

which always started on a Thursday night after 56 h of 

free time. 

Accidents were broken down according to the shift (day, 

afternoon, night) and according to whether the accident 

occurred during equipment operation ( selected accidents) 

or during the course of performing some other type of 

activity (nonselected accidents). The average number of 

days lost per accident was used as the measure of accident 

severity. 

RESULTS 

The day shift accounted for 4,103 accidents, compared 

with 1,572 for afternoon, and 814 for night shift. Data 

are unavailable for normalizing these number, i.e., it was 

impossible to compute rates of accidents per employee 

hours of exposure. 
38 

It was found that among selected accidents, the night 

shift accidents are more severe (24.38 days lost) than the 

accidents experienced on the day shift (19.% days lost) or 

the afternoon shift (17.84 days lost). Among nonselected 

accidents, night shift accidents are also more severe, but 

by a much smaller margin compared with the other two 

shifts. These data appear to confIrm findings by Andlauer 

(2) and others regarding automatic behavior and employees' inability to respond adequately in emergency situations during times such as the night shift when vigilance is 

difficult to maintain. 

In contrast to Wagner's fmding that mobile equipment 

operators experience more severe accidents than other 

mine employees, Bennett (4) found that mobile equipment 

operators in the underground coal mining industry had the 

same probability of suffering a serious (lost time) injury as 

all other job classifications. There are several potential 

explanations for this discrepancy in findings. Wagner was 

looking at data from miners in the iron ore mining industry who were all working the same rotating shift schedule, 

whereas Bennett was comparing miners throughout the 

underground coal industry who were using different types 

of mobile equipment and who were working on a wide 

variety of different types of work schedules. Also, the 

two studies used different approaches to operationally 

defme accident severity. 

; u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 611-012100,126 INTBU.OF MINES,PGH.,PA 29003