FOURTH DIVISION                                             DECEMBER 26, 19961--93--3108EDWARD ALLEN, SIMEON T.       )    Appeal fromBAMGBAIYE, ELMER BUSCH,       )    the Circuit CourtJEWEL McLAURIN, CHARLES E.    )    of Cook CountyWALTON, and ROBIN E.          )WASHINGTON, JR.,              )                                            )     Plaintiffs-Appellants,   )                              )               v.             )                              )THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF      )COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT    )NO. 508; COOK COUNTY;         )REYNALDO GLOVER, and          )NELVIA BRADY,                 )    Honorable Edward                              )    C. Hofert, Judge     Defendants-Appellees.    )    Presiding.          JUSTICE CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:     Plaintiffs, Edward Allen, Simeon T. Bamgbaiye, Elmer Busch,Jewel McLaurin, Charles E. Walton, and Robin E. Washington, Jr.,appeal from the entry of summary judgment by the circuit court ofCook County in favor of defendants, the Board of Trustees ofCommunity College District No. 508; Reynaldo Glover, chairman ofthe Board; Nelvia Brady, chancellor of the City Colleges ofChicago; and Cook County.  Plaintiffs argue that theirresignations as tenured city-college teachers were involuntaryand that they were not afforded due process.  We affirm.                                 I.  Facts     Plaintiffs resigned after charges were made that theyawarded grades to students who were registered but who neverattended any classes.  Plaintiffs' complaint alleged theviolation of their constitutional rights, including wrongfuldischarge in violation of due process.       The following facts were established upon defendants filinga motion for summary judgment.  In 1988, defendants received aletter from a Malcolm X College student charging that aninstructor attempted to extort money from students.  Defendantsinvestigated whether instructors were properly adhering to theattendance and grading procedures; instructors were required toreport which students were not in attendance.  The report of theinvestigation revealed that some of the instructors, includingthree of the plaintiffs, were suspected of not reporting studentswho did not attend classes and were also awarding grades to them. Phantom students were enrolled in classes for the 1989 springsemester but never attended class.  The college administratorsapproved the plan to enroll persons who agreed they would neverattend classes at this college.       Of the 24 faculty teachers who had phantom students enrolledin their classes, 16 truthfully reported students not attendingclasses while all six plaintiffs awarded passing grades to thephantom students.  If an instructor does not have a sufficientnumber of students to teach a class, the class is closed and theinstructor is not paid for teaching that class.     On March 28, 1989, plaintiffs were served with writtennotice that the chancellor was considering a recommendation thatthey be dismissed for cause.  The written notice advisedplaintiffs that an informal hearing would be held on March 31,1989.  The proposed charges detailed violations of school policy,including plaintiffs' certifying the attendance of the phantomstudents and giving them midterm grades.     The chancellor directed that the findings about plaintiffs'conduct be reported to the United States Attorney.  Defendants'representatives told plaintiffs' union representatives thatplaintiffs faced indictments and probable convictions underfederal law; that, if convicted, plaintiffs would forfeit alltheir pension rights; and that plaintiffs should be told to giveup their right to a hearing on the charges, resign, and acceptvoluntary retirement, which defendants were willing to extend inexchange for prompt resignation and retirement.  Dr. JudgeWatkins, Jr., vice president of the Cook County College TeachersUnion, repeated this information from defendants'representatives.  Plaintiffs contend that defendants requestedfederal criminal action although defendants knew that plaintiffsdid not commit any federal crimes because defendants were carefulnot to seek any federal funding based on the attendance of thesham students.  Plaintiffs did not talk to defendants or to anymember of the board of trustees of the college.         The union passed a resolution agreeing to provide plaintiffslegal representation for "due process purposes" only.  Watkinsadvised plaintiffs that they should seek criminal attorneys. Watkins contacted a union attorney, Gilbert Feldman, who met witheach plaintiff.  Plaintiffs appeared at the scheduled hearingswith Feldman and asked for rescheduling until April 4, 1989.  Therequests were granted.       On April 4, 1989, plaintiffs did not participate in thehearings but instead submitted letters of resignation. Plaintiffs contend that they resigned and retired as a result ofthe threat of federal prosecution, discharge, and loss ofpensions.       The trial court granted defendants' motion for summaryjudgment.  After the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion forreconsideration, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal.                              II.  Discussion     Plaintiffs first argue on appeal that they had aconstitutional right not to be discharged without due process oflaw and that their resignations were involuntary becausedefendants, with intent to extort involuntary resignations,knowingly made the deliberate misrepresentation that plaintiffsviolated criminal laws.  Plaintiffs further argue that their dueprocess rights were violated because threats caused them to bedismissed without a hearing.  Defendants do not dispute thatplaintiffs were entitled to due process but argue that theresignations were voluntary.       A motion for summary judgment is to be granted if "thepleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with theaffidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to anymaterial fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgmentas a matter of law."  735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 1994).  Thepleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file mustbe construed against the movant and in favor of the opponent ofthe motion.  Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Leydig, Voit & Mayer (1994),158 Ill. 2d 240, 249, 633 N.E.2d 627.  Summary judgment is adrastic means of disposing of litigation, and so the right of themoving party to obtain summary judgment must be clear and free ofdoubt.  Jackson, 158 Ill. 2d at 249.  Where doubt exists as tothe right of summary judgment, the wiser judicial policy is topermit resolution of the dispute by a trial.  Jackson, 158 Ill.2d at 249.     Duress is measured by an objective, and not a subjective,test.  Illinois ex rel. Schoepf v. Board of Education of MortonHigh Schools, District 201, 606 F. Supp. 385, 390 (N.D. Ill.1985).  Duress is a condition where one is induced by a wrongfulact or threat of another to make a contract under circumstancesthat deprive one of the exercise of free will.  Enslen v. Villageof Lombard, 128 Ill. App. 3d 531, 533, 470 N.E.2d 1188 (1984).  Aresignation that is given to avoid a dismissal that has at leasta prima facie disputed basis is not considered to be given underduress.  Enslen, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 533 (complaint was properlydismissed under allegations that petitioner resigned under duressin response to fire chief's threats to dismiss him for inhalingnitrous oxide while on duty and to tell newspapers thatpetitioner was alcoholic).  A resignation can be voluntary if itis submitted to avoid criminal prosecution.  Pitt v. UnitedStates, 420 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (Ct. Cl. 1970).         There was evidence that the college issued writtendirectives to the faculty cautioning them that they must notcount persons as their students unless they actually attendedclasses.  Defendants had school records showing that plaintiffscounted the phantom persons as their students even though thepersons never attended classes, and in addition, plaintiffs gavethe persons passing grades.  Defendants therefore presentedsufficient evidence, which was not controverted, that they couldprove that they had lawful grounds to discharge  plaintiffs. Because defendants had a prima facie basis to dischargeplaintiffs, their resignations given to avoid dismissal cannot beconsidered to have been given under duress.  Enslen, 128 Ill.App. 3d at 533.     Plaintiffs claim that the college board of trustees, itschairman, and its chancellor falsely stated that plaintiffs'midterm reports listing the names of sham students hadconstituted federal crimes and that each plaintiff would sufferconviction, discharge, and pension forfeiture.  Plaintiffs claimthat because defendants did not request federal or state fundsfor the sham students, defendants knew that plaintiffs could notbe convicted of any federal crimes.  Plaintiffs claim thatbecause of material falsehood and threats of federal prosecution,their resignations were extorted and their due process rightswere violated by defendants.       There is no evidence that defendants falsely held theirbelief that plaintiffs might have committed crimes and thatdefendants acted to deceive plaintiffs.  Defendants had evidencethat plaintiffs were paid for teaching students who neverattended classes but nevertheless were given passing grades. Robert Eygenhuysen stated in his affidavit that one of thereasons plaintiffs gave grades to students who never attendedclass was to enable plaintiffs to teach classes that would havebeen closed because of the failure to meet the college's minimalattendance standards.  But for the false certification, theinstructors would not have received payment, and therefore theycommitted a crime.     In addition, defendants had the prior investigation report,which revealed the deceitful conduct on the part of several ofplaintiffs that preceded the plan to enroll phantom students. The allegations of the prior report did involve the possiblemisuse of government funds for teaching students who neverattended classes.  Each instructor who falsified attendance andgrade records might have committed crimes for which they couldhave been prosecuted.  Defendants had a right to inform thefederal authorities of all the information they had gatheredregarding plaintiffs' misconduct.  Defendants voiced theiropinion to the teachers' union representative that criminalindictments and convictions of plaintiffs would be forthcoming. Even if defendants' belief that federal crimes were committed wasincorrect, we hold that as a matter of law plaintiffs were notcoerced into resigning but voluntarily resigned.  Defendants hadan indisputable basis for bringing dismissal proceedings, andplaintiffs were given a choice between resigning or contestingthe charges.       In contrast to the employees in cases cited by plaintiffsthat involved misrepresentations as to employee rights (Scharf v.Department of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1983);Covington v. Department of Health and Human Services, 750 F.2d937 (D.C. Cir. 1984)), it was unreasonable for plaintiffs to relyon defendants' statements that plaintiffs violated criminal laws. Plaintiffs instead should have obtained the advice of criminalattorneys on whether their conduct possibly violated criminallaws.  Furthermore, whether plaintiffs' deceitful conduct wascriminal is not a matter of fact.  We believe that the opinionheld by defendants regarding the deceitful conduct of defendantscannot be considered a misrepresentation (Snelten v. SchmidtImplement Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 988, 996, 647 N.E.2d 1071 (1995)(one element of fraudulent misrepresentation is a false statementof material fact)).       Due process for a tenured public employee requires oral orwritten notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer'sevidence, and an opportunity to present her side of the story. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 84L. Ed. 2d 494, 506, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1495 (1985).  The Loudermillcourt pointed out the due process requirements in discharging atenured public employee:          "The essential requirements of due process,          and all that respondents seek or the Court of          Appeals required, are notice and an          opportunity to respond.  The opportunity to          present reasons, either in person or in          writing, why proposed action should not be          taken is a fundamental due process          requirement.  ***  The tenured public employee          is entitled to oral or written notice of the          charges against him, an explanation of the          employer's evidence, and an opportunity to          present his side of the story.  ***  To          require more than this prior to termination          would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the          government's interest in quickly removing an          unsatisfactory employee."  Loudermill, 470          U.S. at 546, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 506, 105 S. Ct.          at 1495.               Plaintiffs here received written notice that the chancellorwas considering a recommendation of dismissal.  Plaintiffs alsoreceived a copy of the proposed charges and a bill of particulars. Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to respond at apredetermination hearing.  Instead of proceeding with the hearing,plaintiffs chose to resign.  As we have found that plaintiffs werenot coerced into giving up the right to respond to the charges atthe hearing, plaintiffs were not deprived of due process.       Under federal civil rights law, every "person who, undercolor of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ofany State *** subjects *** any *** person *** to the deprivationof any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by theConstitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.  42U.S.C.A. � 1983 (West 1994).  Governing bodies and localofficials sued in their official capacities can be sued directlyunder section 1983 where the action that is alleged to beunconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted orpromulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said torepresent official policy.  Monell v. New York City Department ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 638, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38 (1978).        In their complaint plaintiffs allege they were injuredbecause of unconstitutional policies of defendants college andits officials.  Plaintiffs allege the facts that defendantsenrolled sham students in their classes; the defendantsthreatened to discharge plaintiffs for giving grades to shamstudents they counted as attending classes; they knew that thecollege did not receive federal or state funds for these studentsand that no federal crimes were committed; the acts of defendants wrongfully extorted the resignations of plaintiffs;and defendants communicated false charges to the United StatesAttorney and made threats of conviction, discharge, and pensionforfeiture.     Plaintiffs had to allege facts, which if true, show that thegovernmental entity deprived them of a constitutionally protectedright and that the deprivation was caused by a governmentalcollege policy or custom.  Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166,87 L. Ed. 2d 114, 122, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985).  We findthat plaintiffs have not alleged, nor did they show proof of, theexistence of any custom or college policy or of a causalconnection between such policy or custom and constitutionalinjuries.  Nor do any of the facts alleged give rise to such aclaim.  We find the federal claims to be factually and legallydeficient.  See Leahy v. Board of Trustees of Community CollegeDistrict No. 508, 912 F.2d 917, 922 (7th Cir. 1990) (in theabsence of an allegation of the existence of a municipal policy,dismissal of section 1983 claim is justified).  Defendants wereentitled to summary judgment.     The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.     Affirmed.     TULLY, P.J., and GREIMAN, J., concur.