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*********************************************** 
BRUCE M. FELDER v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(AC 43214)

Alvord, Cradle and Alexander, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted of larceny in the first degree and

larceny in the second degree, filed a second petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. At the request of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, the habeas court issued an order, pursuant to statute (§ 52-470

(e)), directing the petitioner to show cause why the petition should be

permitted to proceed in light of the fact that he filed it outside of the

two year limitation period set forth in § 52-470 (d) for the filing of a

successive petition challenging the same conviction. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing, during which the petitioner argued that

his petition was timely because he filed it within two years of the final

judgment that was rendered by a federal District Court denying a habeas

petition that he previously had filed in that court. The petitioner claimed

that the term ‘‘prior petition’’ in § 52-470 (d) was not limited to habeas

petitions filed in state court and that, even if his second petition was

untimely, he established good cause for the delay in filing it because

he was not aware of the limitation period in § 52-470 (d), as his counsel

in his first state habeas action terminated representation of the petitioner

before § 52-470 (d) took effect and, thus, could not have advised him

of the limitation period. The habeas court dismissed the petition under

§ 52-470 (e), concluding that it was untimely filed and that the petitioner

failed to establish good cause for the delay. The court determined that

the final judgment on the federal habeas petition did not reset the

prescribed time limits in § 52-470 (d) to file a subsequent habeas petition,

and that the petitioner failed overcome the presumption of unreasonable

delay in § 52-470 (e) because everyone is presumed to know the law

and ignorance of it excuses no one. On the granting of certification, the

petitioner appealed to this court. Held:

1. The petitioner’s habeas petition was untimely, as the phrase ‘‘prior petition’’ in § 52-470 (d) is limited to habeas petitions that are filed in state

court, and, thus, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the final judgment

on his federal habeas petition did not reset the time limits prescribed

in § 52-470 (d) to file a subsequent habeas petition challenging the same

conviction: because the phrase ‘‘prior petition’’ occurs within a statutory

framework that concerns state procedures for state habeas petitions,

it must be read in the context of a body of laws that are limited to

state habeas proceedings, and the statute’s silence as to whether ‘‘prior

petition’’ includes a federal habeas petition indicates that it does not;

moreover, the phrase ‘‘prior petition’’ is plain and unambiguous, and,

although it is not defined in § 52-470 (d), the only reasonable interpretation of it is that it is limited to a prior state petition, and that construction

would not produce an absurd or unworkable result, as it is consistent

with the purpose of the legislature’s habeas reforms in 2012 to expedite

the resolution of habeas cases.

2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the

petitioner failed to establish good cause for the delay in filing his second

habeas petition and properly dismissed it pursuant to § 52-470 (d) and

(e): the only evidence the petitioner presented to support his contention

that he was unaware of the filing deadline in § 52-470 was his testimony

that he lacked personal knowledge of the deadline and had never been

informed of it by his previous habeas counsel, and, although it was

unclear whether the habeas court credited the petitioner’s assertion,

the court properly concluded that a mere assertion of ignorance of the

law, without more, was insufficient to compel a conclusion that the

petitioner met his burden to establish good cause.

Argued October 20, 2020—officially released February 2, 2021

Procedural History
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where

the court, Newson, J., rendered judgment dismissing

the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting

of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Jennifer Bourn, supervisory assistant public defender,

for the appellant (petitioner).

Laurie N. Feldman, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, former

state’s attorney, and Leah Hawley, senior assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The petitioner, Bruce M. Felder, appeals

from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his

successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to General Statutes § 52-470 (d) and (e).1 On appeal, the

petitioner first claims that the habeas court improperly

determined that his petition was untimely under § 52-

470 (d) on the ground that it was not filed within the

statutorily prescribed time limits, as measured from the

date of the final judgment on his prior state court habeas

petition, and that a habeas petition he previously had

filed in federal court was not a ‘‘prior petition’’ within

the meaning of § 52-470 (d) so as to reset the statutorily

prescribed time limits to file a subsequent habeas petition challenging the same conviction. Alternatively, the

petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly

determined that his purported ignorance of the filing

deadline set forth in § 52-470 (d) and his belief that he

could litigate his federal habeas petition before

returning to state court were insufficient to demonstrate good cause within the meaning of § 52-470 (e)

to overcome the statutory presumption of unreasonable

delay. We disagree with the petitioner and, accordingly,

affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The procedural background underlying this appeal is

as follows. After a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of one count of larceny in the first degree in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (3), and one

count of larceny in the second degree in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (3). On June 16, 2004,

the trial court, Koletsky, J., sentenced the petitioner to

a total effective term of thirty years of incarceration.

On May 9, 2006, this court affirmed the judgment of

conviction on direct appeal. State v. Felder, 95 Conn.

App. 248, 250, 897 A.2d 614, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 905,

901 A.2d 1226 (2006). On June 29, 2006, our Supreme

Court denied the petitioner certification to appeal from

this court’s decision. State v. Felder, 279 Conn. 905, 901

A.2d 1226 (2006).

After exhausting his direct appeal, the petitioner filed

a state court petition for a writ of habeas corpus (first

state habeas petition) on June 13, 2006, challenging his

conviction.2 On September 15, 2011, following a trial

on the merits, the habeas court, Nazzaro, J., denied

the petition; Felder v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial

district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-06-4001113-S (September 15, 2011); and the petitioner appealed to this

court. On February 28, 2012, this court dismissed the

petitioner’s appeal by memorandum decision. Felder v.

Commissioner of Correction, 133 Conn. App. 908, 36

A.3d 308, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 661 (2012).

On May 9, 2012, our Supreme Court denied the petitioner certification to appeal.3 Felder v. Commissioner

of Correction, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 661 (2012).
In 2012, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in the United States District Court for

the District of Connecticut (federal habeas petition)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.4 On June 1, 2015, the District Court denied the federal habeas petition and

declined to issue the petitioner a certificate of appealability. Felder v. Commissioner of Correction, United

States District Court, Docket No. 3:12-cv-00650 (MPS)

(D. Conn. June 1, 2015).

On May 18, 2017, the petitioner filed the present state

court petition for a writ of habeas corpus (second state

habeas petition).5 On December 20, 2018, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a request

with the habeas court pursuant to § 52-470 (e) for an

order directing the petitioner to appear and to show

cause why his second state habeas petition should be

permitted to proceed in light of the fact that he filed

it well outside of the deadline for successive habeas

petitions set forth in § 52-470 (d). In his request, the

respondent argued that the petitioner’s second state

habeas petition was untimely because the petitioner

did not file it until May 18, 2017, far exceeding the

October 1, 2014 statutory deadline as measured from

the final judgment on his first state habeas petition.6

The habeas court, Newson, J., issued an order to show

cause and on March 8, 2019, conducted an evidentiary

hearing. The only evidence presented at the hearing

was the testimony of the petitioner. The respondent

chose not to cross-examine the petitioner or to present

any other evidence at the show cause hearing. The court

also heard legal arguments from both parties.

The petitioner testified that his former state habeas

counsel terminated their representation in 2012, after

final judgment on the first state habeas action. The

petitioner testified that he filed a federal habeas petition

in 2012 that came to final judgment in June, 2015. The

petitioner further testified that, prior to having counsel

appointed for him in the second state habeas action,7

he was not aware of § 52-470 or the requirements set

forth therein.

The petitioner’s counsel first argued that the second

state habeas petition was in fact timely because it was

filed within two years of the final judgment on the

federal habeas petition and, therefore, within the meaning of ‘‘prior petition’’ under § 52-470 (d). In support of

his argument, the petitioner’s counsel noted that § 52-

470 (d) does not state that the phrase ‘‘prior petition’’

is limited to a state petition but, rather, that § 52-470

(d) states, two years ‘‘after the date on which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment . . . .’’ Second, he argued that, if the petition

was untimely, the petitioner showed good cause for the

delay in that he was not aware of the deadline. Counsel

maintained that, because the petitioner’s former coun-
sel in the first state habeas action terminated their representation before § 52-470 (d) took effect, the former

counsel could not have advised the petitioner of the

statutorily prescribed time limits, ‘‘[s]o, he either had

to know about it on his own, or he would have no other

way of knowing about it.’’

The respondent then reiterated his argument that the

petitioner’s second state habeas petition, as a petition

successive to his first state habeas petition that reached

final judgment on May 9, 2012, should have been filed no

later than October 1, 2014, and was therefore untimely

under § 52-470 (d). The respondent further argued that

the petitioner’s federal habeas petition was not a ‘‘prior

petition’’ within the meaning of § 52-470 (d) and that

final judgment on the federal habeas petition therefore

did not reset the statutorily prescribed time limits to

file a subsequent habeas petition challenging the same

conviction. With respect to the petitioner’s evidence of

good cause for his delay, the respondent argued that

any ignorance of the deadline on the part of the petitioner did not excuse noncompliance and that the petitioner’s testimony as to his ignorance was self-serving.

On May 21, 2019, the habeas court issued a decision

dismissing the petitioner’s second state habeas action.

In its decision, the court rejected both of the petitioner’s

arguments. First, it determined that the petition was

untimely because final judgment on the petitioner’s federal habeas petition did not reset the statutorily prescribed time limits to file a subsequent habeas petition

under § 52-470 (d). The court stated: ‘‘The petitioner

argues that the two year period in § 52-470 (d) should

be calculated from June 1, 2015, when a federal habeas

corpus petition he was litigating on this same conviction

was disposed of, which would mean the applicable

deadline did not run until June 1, 2017, fourteen days

after this petition was filed. This argument, however,

is explicitly contradicted by the statutory language in

§ 52-470 (d), which states in pertinent part: ‘The time

periods set forth in this subsection shall not be tolled

during the pendency of any other petition challenging

the same conviction’ . . . .

‘‘The term ‘any other petition’ is not limited in any

way within subsection (d) or elsewhere in § 52-470. To

read an exception into that language tolling the two

year time period while a petitioner was engaged in

federal habeas litigation would be contradictory to the

plain and unambiguous language of the statute and

apparent intent of the legislature.’’ (Citation omitted;

emphasis in original.)

Second, the habeas court concluded that the petitioner failed to establish good cause for the delay within

the meaning of § 52-470 (e), stating that, ‘‘ ‘everyone is

presumed to know the law, and that ignorance of the

law excuses no one . . . .’ State v. Surette, 90 Conn.

App. 177, 182, 876 A.2d 582 (2005). On the meaning of
‘good cause,’ our Appellate Court has held that ‘good

cause has been defined as a substantial reason

amounting in law to a legal excuse for failing to perform

an act required by law . . . .’ Langston v. Commissioner of Correction, 185 Conn. App. 528, 532, 197 A.3d

1034 (2018), appeal dismissed, 335 Conn. 1, 225 A.3d

282 (2020). The petitioner has failed to present any

‘good cause’ in the present case for filing this petition

nearly three years beyond the [statutory] deadline.’’

Accordingly, the habeas court dismissed the petition.

The court subsequently granted the petitioner certification to appeal, and this appeal followed.

I

The petitioner first claims that the habeas court

improperly determined that his petition was untimely

under § 52-470 (d). The petitioner does not dispute that

the filing of his second state habeas petition would be

considered untimely if the statutorily prescribed time

limits were calculated from the final judgment on his

first state habeas petition. Rather, the petitioner argues

that his second state habeas petition was in fact timely

because it was filed within two years of final judgment

on his federal habeas petition, which, he contends, is

included within the meaning of ‘‘prior petition’’ under

§ 52-470 (d). In support of his argument, the petitioner

maintains that ‘‘the plain and unambiguous language of

subsection (d) does not exclude a federal petition from

constituting ‘a prior petition challenging the same conviction’ ’’ and that the legislature could have used language specifying a ‘‘prior state petition’’ had it intended

that limitation. He further argues that limiting ‘‘prior

petitions’’ to state petitions would produce the absurd

and unworkable result of requiring petitioners to file

subsequent state petitions while their federal petitions

remain unresolved, which, he contends, would be

inconsistent with the legislature’s intent to reduce

unnecessary litigation and to expeditiously resolve

habeas cases. The respondent maintains that the petitioner’s federal habeas petition was not a ‘‘prior petition’’ within the meaning of § 52-470 (d) and that the

petitioner’s second state habeas petition, as a petition

successive to the first state habeas petition that reached

final judgment on May 9, 2012, was therefore untimely.

We agree with the respondent.

The issue before this court is whether the term ‘‘prior

petition’’ in two phrases in § 52-470 (d) is limited to

prior state petitions or includes prior federal petitions.

This presents a question of statutory interpretation over

which our review is always plenary. See, e.g., Kelsey v.

Commissioner of Correction, 202 Conn. App. 21, 35,

A.3d (2020). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur

fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to

the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other

words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner,

the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the
facts of [the] case . . . . In seeking to determine that

meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship

to other statutes.8

If, after examining such text and

considering such relationship, the meaning of such text

is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or

unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When

a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look

for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and

circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its

relationship to existing legislation and [common-law]

principles governing the same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d

1 (2013).

We begin our analysis by examining the text of § 52-

470. Section 52-470 (d) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In

the case of a petition filed subsequent to a judgment

on a prior petition challenging the same conviction,

there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing

of the subsequent petition has been delayed without

good cause if such petition is filed after . . . [t]wo

years after the date on which the judgment in the prior

petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to the

conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the

time for seeking such review . . . . The time periods

set forth in this subsection shall not be tolled during

the pendency of any other petition challenging the same

conviction. Nothing in this subsection shall create or

enlarge the right of the petitioner to file a subsequent

petition under applicable law.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The text of § 52-470 does not define ‘‘prior petition.’’

The petitioner argues that the statute’s silence as to

whether ‘‘prior petition’’ includes federal habeas petitions renders the statute ambiguous. ‘‘It is well settled,

however, that [statutory] silence does not necessarily

equate to ambiguity. . . . Rather, [i]n determining

whether legislative silence renders a statute ambiguous,

we read the statute in context to determine whether

the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted). State v. Ramos, 306 Conn. 125, 136, 49

A.3d 197 (2012).

In light of the text of § 52-470 and its relationship to

other statutes, we conclude that the term ‘‘prior petition’’ as used in § 52-470 (d) is plain and unambiguous,

and that the only reasonable interpretation of the statutory language is that the term ‘‘prior petition’’ is limited

to a prior state petition. The respondent argues on

appeal that ‘‘§ 52-470 is part of a cohesive body of

habeas corpus regulation that is entirely, albeit never

explicitly, focused on state habeas processes.’’ In support of his argument, the respondent notes that, ‘‘[t]his
body of law is codified in title 52 of the Connecticut

General Statutes, civil actions, which opens with the

phrase, ‘[t]he Superior Court may administer legal and

equitable rights . . . .’ General Statutes § 52-1 . . . .’’

(Emphasis altered.) Thus, the respondent contends that

these statutes are established within provisions governing Connecticut state court proceedings. With specific

regard to habeas matters, the respondent notes that

‘‘General Statutes § 52-466 (a) (1) provides at the threshold that ‘[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus

. . . shall be made to the superior court, or to a judge

thereof, for the judicial district in which the person

whose custody is in question is claimed to be illegally

confined or deprived of such person’s liberty.’ . . .

Words such as ‘state,’ ‘state habeas corpus’ and ‘state

custody’ do not appear in this provision.’’ (Emphasis

added.) Likewise, § 52-470 (a) provides in relevant part

that ‘‘[t]he court or judge hearing any habeas corpus

shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts

and issues of the case . . . .’’ The respondent argues

that ‘‘[s]ubsection (a) does not and need not state that

it regulates only state judges hearing state petitions

regarding state habeas corpus of state prisoners, and

does not purport to address how federal habeas courts

should consider habeas petitions.’’ We agree with the

respondent that the phrase ‘‘prior petition’’ in subsection (d) therefore must be read in the context of a body

of laws limited to state habeas proceedings alone, and

not including habeas proceedings in the federal court

system.

In that vein, the respondent argues that ‘‘the statute

[governing habeas corpus petitions] repeatedly uses a

word at issue here, ‘petition,’ to mean a state petition,

without so specifying.’’ In support of his argument, the

respondent references § 52-470 (b) (1), which provides

that, after the close of the pleadings, the habeas court

‘‘shall determine whether there is good cause for trial

for all or part of the petition.’’ (Emphasis added.) See

also General Statutes § 52-470 (b) (3) (if ‘‘the petition’’

and exhibits submitted by petitioner do not establish

good cause to proceed, habeas court must hold hearing

and, if it finds there is not good cause for trial, it must

dismiss all or part of ‘‘the petition’’); General Statutes

§ 52-470 (c) (rebuttable presumption that filing of ‘‘a

petition challenging judgment of conviction’’ is delayed

without good cause if ‘‘such petition’’ is filed after certain time periods). We agree with the respondent that

the word ‘‘petition’’ in these provisions refers to a petition in a state habeas proceeding, the subject of the

statute. The respondent further maintains that, ‘‘given

the intrastate context of the statute, ‘‘the lack of specification [of the word ‘petition’] in subsection (d) does

not point toward a different treatment.’’ ‘‘An identical

term used in [statutory provisions] pertaining to the

same subject matter should not be read to have differing

meanings unless there is some indication from the legis-
lature that it intended such a result.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 78, 836

A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct.

1614, 158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004). We agree with the respondent that, because § 52-470 (d) occurs within a statutory

framework concerning state procedures for state

habeas petitions, the statute’s silence as to whether a

‘‘prior petition’’ includes a federal petition therefore

indicates that it does not.

Contrary to the petitioner’s argument, a statutory

construction of § 52-470 (d) that limits ‘‘prior petitions’’

to state petitions would not produce an absurd and

unworkable result. Rather, such a construction is consistent with the purpose of the legislature’s 2012 habeas

reforms to expedite the resolution of habeas cases. See

Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 711,

717, 189 A.3d 578 (2018) (explaining that ‘‘[t]he 2012

amendments are significant . . . because they provide

tools to effectuate the original purpose of ensuring

expedient resolution of habeas cases’’). The respondent

argues that, ‘‘[g]iven the priority [that] the statute places

on expedient resolution and finality where reasonably

possible, it [logically can] be construed to promote an

approach by which, if there is a need to bring a subsequent petition, it be brought as soon as the claim

becomes apparent rather than after the conclusion of

federal review of claims raised and denied in prior state

petitions.’’ We agree with the respondent that this statutory construction is consistent with the purpose of the

statute and, therefore, would not produce an absurd or

unworkable result.

We conclude that the term ‘‘prior petition’’ in § 52-

470 (d) is limited to prior state petitions. Accordingly,

final judgment on the petitioner’s federal habeas petition did not reset the statutorily prescribed time limits

to file a subsequent habeas petition challenging the

same conviction, and his second state habeas petition

was therefore untimely under § 52-470 (d).

II

The petitioner next claims that the habeas court

improperly determined that he failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate good cause within the

meaning of § 52-470 (e) to overcome the statutory presumption of unreasonable delay. The petitioner argues

that he established good cause for the delay in light of

his testimony that he was unaware of the statutorily

prescribed time limits and that there was ‘‘reasonable

confusion’’ as to the impact of his federal habeas petition on the deadlines. The respondent contends that

the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating good cause to overcome the statutory presumption of unreasonable delay. We agree with the respondent.

‘‘[T]o rebut successfully the presumption of unreasonable delay in § 52-470, a petitioner generally will be
required to demonstrate that something outside of the

control of the petitioner or habeas counsel caused or

contributed to the delay. Although it is impossible to

provide a comprehensive list of situations that could

satisfy this good cause standard, a habeas court properly may elect to consider a number of factors in

determining whether a petitioner has met his evidentiary burden of establishing good cause for filing an

untimely petition. . . . [F]actors directly related to the

good cause determination include, but are not limited

to: (1) whether external forces outside the control of

the petitioner had any bearing on the delay; (2) whether

and to what extent the petitioner or his counsel bears

any personal responsibility for any excuse proffered for

the untimely filing; (3) whether the reasons proffered

by the petitioner in support of a finding of good cause

are credible and are supported by evidence in the

record; and (4) how long after the expiration of the

filing deadline did the petitioner file the petition. No

single factor necessarily will be dispositive, and the

court should evaluate all relevant factors in light of

the totality of the facts and circumstances presented.’’

Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 202

Conn. App. 34–35.

‘‘[A] habeas court’s determination of whether a petitioner has satisfied the good cause standard in a particular case requires a weighing of the various facts and

circumstances offered to justify the delay, including an

evaluation of the credibility of any witness testimony.’’

Id., 35–36. ‘‘[W]e will overturn a habeas court’s determination regarding good cause under § 52-470 only if it

has abused the considerable discretion afforded to it

under the statute. In reviewing a claim of abuse of

discretion, we have stated that [d]iscretion means a

legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the

spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not

to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. . . .

In general, abuse of discretion exists when a court could

have chosen different alternatives but has decided the

matter so arbitrarily as to vitiate logic, or has decided

it based on improper or irrelevant factors. . . . [Reversal is required only] [i]n those cases in which an abuse

of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to

have been done . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 38.

In Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 202

Conn. App. 27–28, this court concluded that the habeas

court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing a

successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the

ground that the petitioner’s alleged lack of knowledge

of the filing deadline set forth in § 52-470 was insufficient to demonstrate good cause to overcome the statutory presumption of unreasonable delay. In that case,

the habeas court conducted a show cause hearing pursuant to § 52-470 (e), during which the petitioner testified that his former habeas counsel failed ‘‘to inform
him of the time limitations of § 52-470, he was unaware

of the deadline for filing his second habeas petition, and

this lack of knowledge necessarily established ‘good

cause’ for any delay.’’ Id., 40. This court held that ‘‘the

petitioner has failed to demonstrate on appeal that the

habeas court abused its discretion by dismissing his

untimely successive petition.’’ Id., 43. In support of our

conclusion, we noted that, ‘‘[r]egardless of whether the

court credited the petitioner’s claim of ignorance of

§ 52-470, it nevertheless went on to conclude that the

petitioner’s own ignorance of the law did not satisfy

his burden to establish good cause for the untimely

filing. This reasoning is legally sound. The familiar legal

maxims, that [everyone] is presumed to know the law,

and that ignorance of the law excuses no one, are

founded upon public policy and in necessity, and the

[principle underlying] them is that one’s acts must be

considered as having been done with knowledge of the

law, for otherwise its evasion would be facilitated and

the courts burdened with collateral inquiries into the

content of men’s minds.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted). Id., 41.

Here, as in Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 202 Conn. App. 41, we are not persuaded that the

petitioner’s alleged lack of knowledge of the deadlines

contained in § 52-470 is sufficient to compel a conclusion that he met his burden of demonstrating good

cause for the delay. The only evidence the petitioner

presented to support his contention that he was

unaware of the filing deadline in § 52-470 was his own

testimony that he lacked personal knowledge of the

deadline and that he was never informed of it by his

previous habeas counsel. Although it is unclear whether

the habeas court credited the petitioner’s assertion, the

habeas court properly concluded that a mere assertion

of ignorance of the law, without more, is insufficient

to establish good cause. We conclude that the habeas

court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

the petitioner failed to establish good cause for the

delay in filing his successive habeas petition. Accordingly, we conclude that the habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner’s second habeas petition pursuant

to § 52-470 (d) and (e).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 52-470 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) The court or

judge hearing any habeas corpus shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts and issues of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments

in the case, and shall inquire fully into the cause of imprisonment and

thereupon dispose of the case as law and justice require. . . .

‘‘(d) In the case of a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior

petition challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without

good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the following: (1) Two

years after the date on which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed

to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) October 1, 2014; or (3)

two years after the date on which the constitutional or statutory right
asserted in the petition was initially recognized and made retroactive pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court or Appellate Court of this state or

the Supreme Court of the United States or by the enactment of any public

or special act. For the purposes of this section, the withdrawal of a prior

petition challenging the same conviction shall not constitute a judgment.

The time periods set forth in this subsection shall not be tolled during the

pendency of any other petition challenging the same conviction. Nothing in

this subsection shall create or enlarge the right of the petitioner to file a

subsequent petition under applicable law.

‘‘(e) In a case in which the rebuttable presumption of delay . . . applies,

the court, upon the request of the respondent, shall issue an order to show

cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed. The petitioner or,

if applicable, the petitioner’s counsel, shall have a meaningful opportunity

to investigate the basis for the delay and respond to the order. If, after such

opportunity, the court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated good

cause for the delay, the court shall dismiss the petition. For the purposes

of this subsection, good cause includes, but is not limited to, the discovery

of new evidence which materially affects the merits of the case and which

could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence in time to

meet the requirements of subsection . . . (d) of this section. . . .’’

2

In his first state habeas petition, the petitioner claimed that his criminal

trial counsel, Attorney Donald O’Brien, was ineffective for having failed to

cross-examine a police officer about a particular line of inquiry.

3 The petitioner submits that, on May 8, 2013, he filed a subsequent state

petition for a writ of habeas corpus that may be relevant to the procedural

history of this case. On July 1, 2013, the habeas court dismissed the petition

for lack of jurisdiction. Felder v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district

of Tolland, Docket No. CV-13-4005417-S (July 1, 2013). The petitioner did

not appeal from that dismissal, which rendered that judgment final as of

July 21, 2013. See General Statutes § 52-470 (d) (1) (two year period for

filing subsequent petition runs from conclusion of appellate review or ‘‘the

expiration of the time for seeking such review’’); Practice Book § 63-1 (providing twenty days within which to file appeal).

We are unable to determine from the record whether the petitioner’s May

8, 2013 state habeas petition challenged the conviction at issue here or other

convictions of the petitioner. It is immaterial, however, whether the May 8,

2013 state habeas petition challenged the same conviction at issue here

because the present state habeas petition would be untimely whether the

statutorily prescribed time limits are measured from either the date of final

judgment on his first state habeas petition (May 9, 2012) or the date of final

judgment on his May 8, 2013 state habeas petition (July 21, 2013). Therefore,

for the purposes of determining the date of final judgment on the petitioner’s

prior state habeas petition, as required by § 52-470 (d), we consider the

petitioner’s present habeas petition to be successive to his first state

habeas petition.

4 Title 28 of the United States Code, § 2254 (a), provides: ‘‘The Supreme

Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain

an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.’’

In his federal habeas petition, the petitioner claimed that the state had

presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction of larceny in the

first degree, and that his conviction of larceny in the first degree and larceny

in the second degree violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution. See Felder v. Commissioner of

Correction, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:12-cv-00650 (MPS)

(D. Conn. June 1, 2015).

5

In his second state habeas petition, the petitioner claimed that his criminal trial counsel, Attorney Donald O’Brien, was ineffective in that he failed

to seek a bill of particulars and to object to a jury instruction on a lesser

included offense. Further, the petitioner claimed that his first state habeas

counsel, Damon A. R. Kirschbaum, was ineffective in that he failed to raise

an ineffectiveness claim regarding criminal trial counsel’s failure to seek a

bill of particulars, attempted to file a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and deprived the

petitioner of his right to present a defense.

6 Final judgment was rendered on the petitioner’s first state habeas petition

on May 9, 2012. See General Statutes § 52-470 (d) (‘‘In the case of a petition

filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the same
conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the

subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause if such petition

is filed after the later of the following: (1) Two years after the date on which

the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to

the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review; [or] (2) October 1, 2014 . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)).

7 The habeas court, on May 22, 2017, granted the petitioner’s request that

counsel be appointed for him.

8 General Statutes § 1-2z provides: ‘‘The meaning of a statute shall, in the

first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its

relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and

does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the

meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’