A mining research contract final report

AUGUST 2007

SAFETY CULTURE 

ASSESSMENT IN 

UNDERGROUND COAL 

MINING

Contract No. 254-2006-M-17202

Human Performance Analysis, Corp.

200 Riverside Blvd., Suite 14L

New York, NY, 10069

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

The contents of this report are reproduced herein as 

received from the contractor. The opinions, findings, and 

conclusions expressed herein are not necessarily those of 

the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health, nor does mention of company names or products 

constitute endorsement by the National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health.
 

Safety Culture Assessment in Underground Coal 

Mining 

Conducted by 

Human Performance Analysis, Corp. 

For the 

National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 

Pittsburgh Research Laboratory 

Contract No. 254-2006-M-17202
 

Team Members: 

Dr. Sonja B. Haber, Human Performance Analysis, Corp., Team Lead 

Dr. Deborah A. Shurberg, Human Performance Analysis, Corp. 

Mr. Robert H. Peters, NIOSH, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory 

Mr. Calvin Garbowsky, NIOSH, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory 

August 24, 2007 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Sago Mine Disaster, on January 2, 2006, placed renewed focus on several different aspects 

of safety in the underground coal mining industry. One area which received increased attention 

since Sago and other underground coal mining events is the concept of Safety Culture. 

This report describes the results of a pilot Safety Culture Assessment implemented at a small 

Appalachian underground coal mine, hereafter referred to as the Mine. The purposes of this pilot 

assessment were to (a) evaluate the feasibility and usefulness of a methodology for assessing 

safety culture that had previously been developed for use within other industries, (b) to initiate an 

investigation into the understanding and defining of the existing safety culture of the 

underground coal mining industry, and (c) provide meaningful and useful recommendations for 

the participating mine for their consideration in their ongoing quest to enhance their existing 

safety culture. This pilot assessment was conducted in July 2007. The report provides 

information regarding the presence or absence of safety culture characteristics within the Mine. 

Observations regarding the characteristics of the Mine’s safety culture that should be sustained 

are presented. Areas in need of attention and management focus to improve the Mine’s safety 

culture are presented as well as recommendations for moving forward. 

Safety culture characteristics that are important for the existence of a positive safety culture have 

been identified to include: 

 Safety is a clearly recognized value in the organization. 

 Accountability for safety in the organization is clear. 

 Safety is integrated into all activities in the organization. 

 A safety leadership process exists in the organization. 

 Safety culture is learning driven in the organization. 

 A process for establishing a strong and effective Safety Conscious Work 

Environment (SCWE) is in place. 

Performance objectives are associated with each of the safety culture characteristics and 

particular behaviors and attitudes have been identified that can be measured to evaluate these 

objectives. 

Using a methodology originally developed with the support of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, an assessment of selected organizational behaviors and attitudes was conducted to 

evaluate the Mine in terms of these safety culture characteristics and their associated 

performance objectives. The methodology involves obtaining a variety of quantitative and 

qualitative information, using multiple data-gathering methods. The information collected is 

largely based upon the perceptions of the individuals in the organization. The evaluation is a 

‘point in time’ snapshot of the Mine, but cultural beliefs and assumptions do not change quickly. 

The feasibility and usefulness of the methodology was successfully demonstrated during this 

pilot assessment. All aspects of the methodology including functional analysis, structured 

interviews with accompanying behavioral scales, work observations, and the paper and pencil 

iii 
survey administration were implemented without any difficulties. Mine participants were able to 

provide all information necessary for the successful implementation of the methodology without 

any problems. Lessons learned from this implementation for future use of the methodology are 

discussed. 

The existing safety culture at the Mine was assessed against the characteristics identified to be 

important for the promotion of a positive safety culture. Initiatives and behaviors that are 

designed to facilitate and promote a positive safety culture and safety conscious work 

environment at the Mine were identified in the course of the assessment. These include: 

 Documentation that describes the importance and role of safety in the operation of the 

Mine exists and there are multiple mechanisms available to communicate the value of 

safety to all employees; 

 Individuals are held accountable for safety by the Company through various programs 

including, random drug testing, progressive discipline, and a corporate reward for 

safety incentive program; 

 Safety standards and norms exist for several different aspects of mine operations 

including maintenance and operation of equipment as well as the conduct of 

personnel; 

 Most individuals identified being satisfied with communication and believe that they 

are well informed about what is going on around the site; and 

 The majority of employees believe that they are responsible for identifying problems. 

The results of the assessment however also indicated that several of the behaviors associated 

with the safety culture characteristics need more management attention. These include: 

 While there are multiple mechanisms to communicate the value of safety to all 

employees, the lack of clear and consistent expectations and standards is evident in the 

variability of behavior with respect to safety. 

 Individuals at some levels in the organization are reluctant to accept personal 

responsibility and ownership for safety issues that they perceive to be someone else’s job. 

 There is a need for more strategic thinking about the integration of safety into all 

activities and processes and how behaviors important to safety can enhance the quality of 

all work to be done. 

 The multiple differences in attitudes and perceptions between the various crews and 

groups indicate that a safety leadership process is not internalized in the organization. 

 Efforts to learn from past performance have been addressed for some major industry 

events, but the process of learning from all aspects of day to day performance is not 

consistently or systematically conducted in the organization. 

 The behaviors important to creating an environment where concerns can be raised 

without fear of reprisal are not perceived to be present by a large percentage of the 

organization. In fact, the organization may have created an environment where things are 

not reported. 

Based on the conclusions of the Assessment Team with regard to the existing safety culture at 

the Mine, recommendations are presented for consideration for the continued enhancement of 

safety performance. 

iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. iii 

1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 

2 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 1 

3 SCOPE OF SAFETY CULTURE ASSESSMENT............................................. 3 

4 METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 5 

4.1 Functional Analysis ................................................................................. 5 

4.2 Structured Interview Protocol and Behavioral Anchored 

 Rating Scales (BARS).............................................................................. 6 

4.3 Behavioral Observations.......................................................................... 7 

4.4 Organizational and Safety Cultural Assessment...................................... 7 

5 RESULTS ....................................................................................................... 7 

6 CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................. 17 

7 REFERENCES .................................................................................................... 19 

v 
1 INTRODUCTION 

The Sago Mine Disaster, on January 2, 2006, placed renewed focus on several different aspects 

of safety in the underground coal mining industry. One area which received increased attention 

since Sago and other underground coal mining events is the concept of Safety Culture. Safety 

Culture has been identified as a contributing cause in many of the catastrophic events that have 

occurred across many industries in the recent past including Challenger, Chernobyl, Bhopal, the 

BP Texas Refinery Fire. Safety culture is defined as the characteristics of the work environment, 

such as the norms, rules, and common understandings that influence facility personnel’s 

perceptions of the importance that the organization places on safety. The National Institute of 

Occupational Safety and Health’s (NIOSH) Program for Mining Safety and Health Research has 

an interest in understanding and defining the existing culture of the underground coal mining 

industry. By so doing, the characteristics of the culture can be evaluated to determine which can 

be sustained and which need enhancement to effect long-term improvements in the industry’s 

safety performance. 

This report describes the results of a pilot Safety Culture Assessment implemented at a small 

Appalachian underground coal mine, hereafter referred to as the Mine. The purposes of this pilot 

assessment were to (a) evaluate the feasibility and usefulness of a methodology for assessing 

safety culture that had previously been developed for use within other industries, (b) to initiate an 

investigation into the understanding and defining of the existing safety culture of the 

underground coal mining industry, and (c) provide meaningful and useful recommendations for 

the participating mine for their consideration in their ongoing quest to enhance their existing 

safety culture. This pilot assessment was conducted in July 2007. The report provides 

information regarding the presence or absence of safety culture characteristics within the Mine. 

Observations regarding the characteristics of the Mine’s safety culture that should be sustained 

are presented. Areas in need of attention and management focus to improve the Mine’s safety 

culture are also presented. 

2 BACKGROUND

Since its inception, the concept of safety culture has been a key topic in discussions of safety 

across many industries. There is “a general recognition that while the importance of engineered 

safeguards and formal management systems to control risks is essential, it is equally important to 

win the commitment of the workforce to treat safety as a priority through a genuine corporate 

commitment to achieve high levels of safety” (INSAG-15, 2002). 

Evaluating the safety culture of a particular organization poses some challenges. Cultural 

assumptions, which influence behavior and, therefore, safety performance, are not always clearly 

observable. Schein (1992) presents a model of culture that helps in understanding how the 

concept can be assessed. In Schein’s model, culture is assumed to be a pattern of shared basic 

assumptions, which are invented, discovered or developed by an organization as it learns to cope 

with problems of survival and cohesiveness. 

According to Schein’s three-level model, an organization’s safety culture can be assessed by 

evaluating the organization’s artifacts, claimed values, and basic assumptions. On the first level 

1
 
of the model are the organization’s artifacts. Artifacts are the visible signs and behaviors of the 

organization, such as its written mission, vision, and policy statements. The second level 

consists of the organization’s claimed or espoused values. Examples of claimed values might 

include mottos such as, “safety first” or “maintaining a blame-free work environment.” The 

third level is comprised of the basic assumptions of the individuals within the organization. 

Basic assumptions are the beliefs and attitudes that individuals bring into the organization or that 

are developed as a result of experience within the organization. Examples of basic assumptions 

may include, “safety can always be improved” or “everyone can contribute to safety.” The 

organization’s basic assumptions regarding safety culture are less tangible than the artifacts and 

claimed values. They are often taken for granted within the organization that shares the culture. 

Artifacts, claimed values, and basic assumptions are evaluated to identify the presence or 

absence of the characteristics that have been found to be important for the existence of a positive 

safety culture (IAEA Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.1, 2006). 

These characteristics include: 

 Safety is a clearly recognized value in the organization. 

 Accountability for safety in the organization is clear. 

 Safety is integrated into all activities in the organization. 

 A safety leadership process exists in the organization. 

 Safety culture is learning driven in the organization. 

Performance objectives are associated with each of the safety culture characteristics. Particular 

behaviors and attitudes have been identified to evaluate the extent to which the organization has 

attained these objectives. The relationship between the five characteristics identified as 

important for promoting a positive safety culture, the performance objectives associated with 

each characteristic, and the organizational behaviors that can be measured to assess the safety 

culture characteristics is depicted in Figure 1. This framework provides the basis for the 

evaluation of safety culture that was conducted. 

A sixth characteristic was added to the framework to specifically evaluate the absence or 

presence of a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE). A Safety Conscious Work 

Environment is one in which individuals feel free to raise concerns of any type without the fear 

of reprisal. Therefore the framework also looks at whether: 

 A process for establishing a strong and effective SCWE is in place. 

The methodology described in this report was originally developed with the support of the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1991) to assess the influence of organization and management 

on safety performance within the nuclear power industry. The Canadian Nuclear Safety 

Commission used a modification of the methodology in the assessment of its licensees (Haber 

and Barriere, 1998) which included uranium mining facilities. The methodology has also been 

implemented at nuclear power plants in Spain in collaboration with the Spanish Research Center 

for Energy, Environment and Technology (CIEMAT). Recent implementations of the 

methodology have included assessments at facilities that have had significant events with the 

objective of trying to understand the elements of the safety culture that need enhancement. 

2
 
Overall the methodology has been implemented in over 40 different organizations, across 5 

different countries, representing industries as diverse as nuclear power, fossil energy, research, 

mining, transportation, health care, and chemical reprocessing. 

The methodology entails collecting a variety of information that is largely based upon the 

perceptions of the individuals in an organization, as well as conducting structured observations 

of individuals performing work activities. Perceptions are often reality when it comes to 

influencing behavior and understanding basic assumptions. Therefore, the data collected 

regarding individuals’ perceptions are critical to this type of evaluation. 

3 SCOPE OF SAFETY CULTURE ASSESSMENT 

The scope of this safety culture assessment was defined to include all of the functional areas at 

the participating Mine as well as a limited inclusion of relevant corporate functions of the parent 

company. The Assessment Team was on site from July 16 - 20, 2007 to administer an 

Organizational and Safety Culture Survey and to conduct interviews and observations. 

The on-site team was comprised of two consultants from Human Performance Analysis, Corp. 

(HPA) and two individuals from NIOSH who have extensive experience in underground coal 

mines. 

This Safety Culture Assessment is a ‘point in time’ snapshot of the participating Mine. Although 

the team recognizes that organizational and process changes to improve the Mine’s safety culture 

since the point in time at which the assessment was conducted may have occurred, the Team has 

not evaluated the impact of these actions. Therefore, changes that have occurred subsequent to 

the time of the assessment are not discussed in this report. 

3
 
Figure 1. Relationship between safety culture objectives, characteristics and organizational behaviors 

Performance Objectives 

• Documentation that describes importance and role of safety in operation of 

organization exists 

• Value clearly transmitted and understood by all personnel through multiple 

mechanisms 

• Decision-making that reflects value and priority of safety in timely and 

focused manner exists 

• Necessary allocation of resources including time, equipment, personnel and 

money, is being made 

• Roles and responsibilities clearly defined and understood • Delegation of responsibility with appropriate authority exists • Management commitment to safety is evident at all levels • Good housekeeping, material condition and working conditions exist • Quality of documentation and processes from planning to implementation and 

review, is good 

• Sets of performance indicators tracked, trended and evaluated • Integration of all types of safety is evident in organization • Knowledge and thorough understanding of work processes exists • Visibility and involvement of management in safety-related activities • Involvement and motivation of all staff in organization is evident • Change management process that promotes orderly transition is evident • Collaboration and teamwork is encouraged, supported and recognized • Impact of informal leaders is recognized • Use of organizational and operating experience, both internal and external to 

organization, is evident 

• The use of self-assessment is evident • Process to identify problems, develop and implement integrated corrective 

action plan, exists 

• Continuous development of staff, both professionally and technically, is 

evident 

Safety Culture 

Characteristics 

Organizational Behaviors 

Safety is a clearly 

recognized value. 

Accountability for 

safety in the 

organization is clear. 

Safety is integrated 

into all activities in the 

organization. 

• Attention to Safety • Decision-making • Goal Setting/Prioritization • Resource Allocation • Time Urgency • Roles and Responsibilities • Performance Quality • Management Emphasis on Safety • Employee Awareness of Risk • Coordination of Work • Formalization • Organizational Knowledge • Perception of Hazard • Onsite/Offsite Consequences • Organizational Culture 

A safety leadership • Constructive Style 

process exists in the • Communication 

organization. • Commitment 

• Job Satisfaction • Cohesion 

Safety culture is 

learning-driven in the 

organization. 

• Organizational Learning • Problem Identification and Resolution • Performance Evaluation • Personnel Selection • Training 

4 • A questioning attitude is evident at all organizational levels 
 

4 METHODOLOGY

The complete details of the methodology used in this evaluation are presented elsewhere (Haber 

and Barriere, 1998), but are briefly described in this section. Five methods are used to collect 

information on the organizational behaviors identified in Figure 1. These methods are: 

 Functional Analysis 

 Structured Interviews 

 Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (BARS) 

 Behavioral Observations 

 Organizational and Safety Culture Survey 

The use of multiple methods to assess any organizational behavior assures adequate depth and 

richness in the results obtained. In addition, confirming the results obtained through the use of 

one method with results obtained through the use of another method provides convergent validity 

for the results. 

A brief description of each method is provided below. 

4.1 Functional Analysis 

The purposes of the Functional Analysis were to: (1) clearly identify the organizational units of 

the Mine, (2) gain an understanding of each organizational unit’s functions and interfaces, (3) 

examine the way in which information flows among and within units, and (4) identify the key 

supervisory and managerial positions of each organizational unit. Information to support this 

activity was obtained primarily through the review of documentation as well as preliminary 

discussions with Mine staff. The organizational behaviors to be evaluated were identified from 

the information collected during this analysis. 

Documentation Review 

The following types of documents were received and reviewed by members of the team: 

 Corporate Safety Policies and Procedures; 

 Safety Incentive Program Material; 

 Organizational Structure Description; 

 Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) on-line database entries related to the Mine. 

Organizational Behaviors 

Based upon the results obtained from the Functional Analysis, the following organizational 

behaviors were identified for assessment: 

Attention to Safety – Attention to safety refers to the characteristics of the work environment, 

such as norms, rules, and common understandings that influence personnel’s perceptions of the 

5
 
 

importance that the organization places on safety. It includes the degree to which a critical, 

questioning attitude exists that is directed toward organizational improvement. 

Communication – Communication refers to the exchange of information, both formally and 

informally, primarily between different departments or units. It includes both the top-down 

(management to staff) and bottom-up (staff to management) communication networks. 

Formalization - Formalization refers to the extent to which there are well-identified rules, 

procedures, and/or standardized methods for routine activities as well as unusual occurrences. 

Goal Setting/Prioritization – Goal setting/prioritization refers to the extent to which facility 

personnel understand, accept, and agree with the purpose and relevance of goals. 

Organizational Learning – Organizational learning refers to the degree to which individual 

personnel and the organization, as whole, use knowledge gained from past experiences to 

improve future performance. 

Performance Quality - Performance Quality refers to the degree to which facility personnel take 

personal responsibility for their actions and the consequences of the actions. It also includes 

commitment to and pride in the organization. 

Problem Identification and Resolution – Problem identification and resolution refers to the extent 

to which the organization encourages facility personnel to draw upon knowledge, experience, 

and current information to identify and resolve problems. 

Training – Training refers to the degree to which personnel are provided with the knowledge and 

skills required to perform tasks safely and effectively. It includes personnel’s perceptions 

regarding the general usefulness of the training program. 

4.2 Structured Interview Protocol and Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (BARS) 

The Structured Interview Protocol was derived from a database of interview questions. A 

particular subset of questions can be selected to provide a predefined focus to an interview 

session. The Assessment Team members selected a set of questions to gather information related 

to the safety culture characteristics and to assess the organizational behaviors identified from the 

Functional Analysis. 

A total of 20 interviews were requested and 17 were conducted as part of the assessment. Each 

interview lasted approximately one hour. In addition, some less formal follow-up interviews 

were conducted to provide further clarification when necessary. 

The Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (BARS) were administered to 15 of the 17 individuals 

who participated in the structured interviews. Interviewees were administered the BARS 

belonging to four organizational behaviors. The BARS provided the opportunity to 

quantitatively summarize qualitative data associated with the interviewee’s perceptions of the 

organization. 60 BARS were collected representing the 8 organizational behaviors. 

6
 
4.3 Behavioral Observations 

 

The use of behavioral observations provides an unobtrusive assessment of particular 

organizational behaviors and structures observations of critical processes including things like 

shift turnovers, training, management and work unit meetings, and responses to planned or 

unplanned events. 

During the course of the evaluation, observations of 5 different work activities were made. The 

data represent observations of: 

 Ongoing work being conducted underground in the Mine 

 Initial Employee Training 

 Weekly Safety Meeting 

 Start of Shift Meeting 

 Employee orientation to safety incentive program. 

4.4 Organizational and Safety Cultural Assessment 

The primary purpose of administering a paper-and-pencil survey is to measure, in a quantitative 

and objective way, topics related to safety culture, coordination of work, job satisfaction, 

communications, work group cohesion, organizational commitment, perceived hazardous nature 

of work, environment, safety and health issues, and safety conscious work environment. By 

conducting a survey, a broad sample of the individuals in the organization can be obtained and it 

is possible to gather information from a larger number of personnel than can be reached through 

the interview process alone. 

The total population of 34 employees stationed at the Mine was invited to participate in the 

survey administration. A total of 32 individuals actually completed the survey, which represents 

a 94% response rate. This response rate is very acceptable for the purpose of drawing accurate 

conclusions regarding the perceptions of personnel. 

5 RESULTS 

The results presented below summarize the insights gained from the Assessment Team’s 

analyses of the structured interviews, BARS, observations, and survey data. The results are 

presented in terms of the six Safety Culture Characteristics and their associated Performance 

Objectives from Figure 1. Observations and Areas for Improvement related to each 

characteristic are presented. 

1. Safety is a clearly recognized value in the organization. 

7
 
Observations 

 Documentation that describes the importance and role of safety in the operation of the 

organization exists, e.g., a comprehensive set of corporate safety guidelines that cover 

federal and state regulations. 

 Memorandum and communications regarding the role of safety in various corporate 

policies and programs are issued regularly. 

 Multiple mechanisms exist to communicate the value of safety throughout the 

organization. These mechanisms include pre-shift safety talks, weekly safety meetings, 

postings on various boards around the site, safety handbooks, and company postcard 

mailings. 

 Artifacts related to safety are displayed and distributed throughout the organization, e.g., 

decals, posters. 

 A corporate wide reward for safety incentive program is viewed positively by most 

individuals. 

 Many employees describe a positive increase in the emphasis on safety. 

 Some behaviors are occurring which indicate that the value of safety is understood. 

o	 Increased training related to safety, e.g., Self Contained Self Rescuer (SCSR) 

smoke training, emergency evacuation plan training. 

o	 Many individuals indicate that it is not a problem to raise safety concerns. 

o	 Most interviewees indicated that they were never asked to do anything that was 

unsafe. 

 Examples of conservative decision-making with respect to safety discussed during this 

assessment included stopping production to insert cable bolts, reducing the distance when 

starting to cut the cross cuts prior to inserting roof bolts, using pizza pans to provide 

additional protection for continuous miner operators, and increasing the number of 

dedicated safety personnel across the company. 

 Investment has been made by the company for safety improvements including reflective 

material, man trip fencing (mesh curtains), and a new man trip. 

 Most interviewees describe the availability of budget to operate safely and successfully. 

 Results from the survey data indicate that the Production Crews understand the hazardous 

nature of their work and the need to pay attention to potential danger significantly more 

so than the Maintenance Crew. 

 The overall score for the mine’s employee population on the Attention to Safety Scale in 

the survey indicates that the general employee population at the Mine understands the 

behaviors important to safety in its work activities. In particular, behaviors identified as 

“being a reliable team member”, “being alert to the potential for serious accidents”, 

“paying attention to potential danger for others, and “learning from mistakes”, were 

perceived to be highly valued. 

 Results on the Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (BARS) for Attention to Safety 

indicated that most individuals perceived a high degree of attention to safety by the 

organization. 

8
 
Areas for Improvement 

 Performance on behaviors indicative of the value of safety must still be improved and 

consistently demonstrated and understood by all members of the organization. 

o	 Basic safety issues that exist with respect to housekeeping and material condition 

must still be addressed. Observations by the Assessment Team indicated areas in 

the mine where debris and waste were scattered about. 

o	 While personal protective equipment is required to be worn by all personnel, the 

consistent use of this equipment still needs to be enforced. 

o	 Safety messages, while regularly communicated during weekly safety meetings, 

may not always be immediately relevant to planned work activities and should be 

regularly reinforced to ensure importance. 

o	 Some interviewees describe a lack of attention to detail that needs to be improved, 

e.g., when ventilation curtains fall, they are not always put back up, corner bolting 

is not always immediately installed. 

o	 Attending to detail was one of the lowest ranked items on the Attention to Safety 

Scale on the survey. 

o	 Some interviewees indicated that a man trip was not always left at the face of the 

mine as required. 

o	 The Assessment Team observed and several interviewees corroborated that at 

least on the day that the Assessment Team went underground the length of the life 

line and outby reflectors from the face of the mine had been further (‘stretched’) 

than their required distance. 

o	 Although required to report all minor accidents, most interviewees indicated that 

they would not report band-aid type incidents. 

 Personnel have the perception that management places the value of safety over 

production, but certain policies and practices do not reinforce the perception and need to 

be better explained and communicated. 

o	 Salaried interviewees were not aware if compensation bonuses were tied to safety. 

o	 Safety has the equivalent percentage of production, cost and environmental 

compliance factors to the fixed annual bonus. 

o	 Interviewees could not recall celebrating a success for safety but only for 

production, e.g., month in which mine made profit. 

o	 Several interviewees perceive tactics used by management as threatening or 

intimidating to ensure continuous production, e.g., having corporate managers 

come to the site. 

o	 The Safety Department reports directly to the President of the Resource Group 

rather than to the Vice President of Safety and Training. 

o	 The company supports a mine rescue team but no one from this particular mine is 

assigned to it. 

o	 There is no representative from this mine on the company’s safety committee. 

 Most interviewees indicated that the number of personnel working at the mine was too 

few. 

o	 Many interviewees believed that they were spread too thin and trying to do too 

many different things on one shift. 

9
 
o	 Interviewees indicated that individuals had left for other companies and that it 

was difficult to find new employees. 

o	 Several interviewees indicated that tonnage mined is the benchmark by which the 

number of employees is determined and the Mine was currently not meeting its 

production quota for the number of employees it has. 

 Results on the Behavioral Anchored Rating Scale (BARS) for Goal Setting and 

Prioritization indicated that most individuals did not perceive the goals of the 

organization to be clear. This was more evident for Managers than Non-Managers. 

2. Accountability for safety in the organization is clear. 

Observations 

 Employees are trained that safety is the personal responsibility of everyone. 

 Individuals are held accountable for safety through a random drug testing program, a 

progressive discipline system, and a corporate wide reward for safety incentive program. 

 Interviewees indicated most people would admit mistakes, if they realized they made a 

mistake. 

 Foremen hold individuals accountable for safety by talking to them when they observe 

unsafe behavior, e.g., shuttle car operator going too fast. 

 Some interviewees indicated that people would appreciate individuals who admit 

mistakes caused through their own personal error especially if there are safety 

implications for others, e.g., shuttle car operators running over power cables or smashing 

against the rib. 

 Almost all interviewees describe the Mine Foreman’s commitment to safety as his top 

priority. 

 Interviewees describe seeing the Mine Superintendent underground at various times 

during the day shift. 

 Results on the Behavioral Anchored Rating Scale (BARS) for Performance Quality 

indicated that overall most individuals took pride and ownership in their performance. 

Areas for Improvement 

 Standards and expectations regarding taking personal responsibility and accountability 

for safety still need to be developed and communicated to all employees. Many 

interviewees indicated that the Mine Foreman and the Safety Department would worry 

about safety related items, e.g., life line placement, condition of the ribs. 

 To date, no formal performance appraisals are conducted for the organization’s 

employees. Thirty, 60, and 90 day evaluations are done for all new hires and the company 

is beginning to implement annual evaluations for hourly and salaried employees. 

However, performance is not tied to compensation. The lack of performance evaluation 

may be contributing to a lack of accountability for undesirable behaviors. 

 Safety performance is not currently a consideration in the awarding of contracts. 

10
 
 Results from the survey indicate that employees’ perceptions of how well informed they 

are of the risks in their work environment is generally lower here than seen in other 

organizations and also somewhat different between groups within the organization e.g., 

individuals with a high school education had a significantly more positive perception of 

how well informed they were about the risks in their work environment compared to 

those with a degree, individuals with the least amount of mining experience believed that 

they were well informed of the risks in their work environment compared to individuals 

with more mining experience. 

 Management emphasis on environmental issues was perceived to be low among all 

survey respondents in this organization and compared to other surveyed organizations. 

3. Safety is integrated into all activities in the organization. 

Observations 

 Safety standards and norms exist for several different aspects of mine 

including, 

o	 Personal protection equipment 

o	 Meters and tracers for detection of electrical currents 

o	 Proper methods to replace circuit breakers 

o	 Use of checklist for bolt machine prior to start up 

o	 Availability of man trip at face while someone is working 

o	 Reporting of all injuries including minor ones 

o	 The Mine Map is available on the section being worked 

o	 Emergency Medical Technician is required on each crew 

 Many individuals identified that the Corporate Safety Guidelines are a

they provide everything necessary to work safely. 

operations, 

 good tool and that 

 Interviewees identified that corner bolting is not required in the roof control plan but is 

being implemented in this mine as an industry best practice. 

 Data obtained on the Behavioral Anchored Rating Scale for Formalization indicated that 

personnel overall have a favorable perception of the company’s documentation and 

standardization process. 

 Responses on the Coordination of Work Survey Scale indicated that individuals who 

worked in the mining industry the longest had the most positive perception of the way 

that work was coordinated in this organization 

 Survey responses indicate that the Production Crews perceive the consequences of poor 

performance on the job significantly more than the Maintenance Crew does. New 

employees tended to have a lower perception of the consequences of poor performance 

than employees that have been working for at least 5 years. 

Areas for Improvement 

 Housekeeping and material condition in the mine needs some attention, e.g., rubbish on 

mine floor, untidy conditions around supply cabinet. 

11
 
 Interviewees indicated that they normally worked 15 – 20 hours of overtime each week. 

While they describe the overtime as voluntary, individuals are expected to work the time 

most of which is usually worked on Saturdays. 

 Some individuals indicated that the new regulatory requirements were overwhelming and 

that it seemed as if they were always doing some type of training. The reasons and 

expectations for this additional training need to be better communicated and understood 

by all personnel. 

 The expectations for standardizing common processes and procedures across different 

mines within the same company still needs to be formally established and communicated 

to mine personnel by company management. Individuals identified differences in the life 

lines used, e.g., hanging directional cones versus securely mounted cones, in the 

decisions regarding the choice and type of the new underground shelters, and in the 

purchasing procedures used by the different Resource Groups. This has raised some 

issues for those working across the different locations. 

 There is a need for more strategic and big picture thinking and understanding of 

integrating safety into all activities, e.g., lack of pedestrian crosswalks on the site 

property. 

4. A safety leadership process exists in the organization. 

Observations 

 Interviewees describe seeing Mine Management underground primarily 

shift. 

 Most individuals feel that they are well informed about what is going on 

 Several mechanisms are used to convey information including interactio

Section Foreman, the Mine Foreman, and the Mine Superintendent, whit

bath house, underground, and at the gate and the Company sending a ne

employees’ homes. 

 The survey results from this assessment indicate that respondents are ge

with communication with Salaried Employees slightly more satisfied tha

Employees. 

during the day 

around the site. 

n with the 

e boards in the 

wsletter to 

nerally satisfied 

n Hourly 

 Perceptions regarding organizational commitment and job satisfaction were also 

generally higher within the Salaried Workers Group. 

 Survey scores on the Work Group Cohesiveness Scale were higher among Hourly 

Employees than Salaried Employees. 

 Perceptions of organizational commitment, work group cohesiveness and job satisfaction 

were consistently higher for the Maintenance Crew than the Production Crews. 

 Scores on the Behavioral Anchored Rating Scale for Communication were consistent 

with the survey results indicating an overall satisfaction with communication across all 

respondents. 

 The very high response rate (94%) for completing the survey during this assessment is a 

positive indication of leadership’s commitment and interest towards safety for the 

organization. 

12
 
Areas for Improvement 

 The effectiveness of management involvement in all saf

communications. While there appears to be some satisf

results from this assessment indicate that differences do 

aspects of communication. These differences occurred 

and trust in communication. The Maintenance Crew and

higher scores on perceived accuracy of communication, 

had the higher scores on perceived trust in communicati

 Overall, survey respondents indicated that their desire fo

across the organization is low and the lowest among oth

 Several interviewees indicated that a good communicati

them. 

 Differences between Salaried and Hourly personnel wer

ety-related activities depends on 

action with communication, 

exist between groups on several 

primarily in the areas of accuracy 

 Hourly Employees had the 

while the Salaried Employees 

on. 

r interaction and communication 

er surveyed organizations. 

on system is still of concern to 

e largely in the direction that 

might be expected, with Salaried Employees typically having higher scores on the more 

positive types of behaviors than Hourly Employees. 

 Some individuals expressed concerns about not being too strict with enforcing some 

requirements because it is currently a miners’ job market and individuals could decide to 

leave and find employment relatively easily elsewhere. 

 The current process being used by Mine Management to effect behavioral change is an 

informal one. 

o	 Some of the differences observed between the groups in the Mine in this 

assessment may reflect an inconsistency of implementation of expectations and 

standards due to the absence of a more formal approach. 

o	 Effectiveness of changing behavior can only be accomplished if Corporate and 

Mine Management recognizes, understands, communicates, and takes ownership 

of the need for change. While the need for changing some behavior is 

acknowledged along with the difficulty in doing so, there is a lack of 

organizational infrastructure to support such change, e.g., performance 

management. 

5. Safety Culture is learning driven in the organization. 

s collected and distributed by 

meetings, and training. 

ave changed policies for all the 

ations. 

t for receipt and dissemination of all 

erational experience information 

into training was observed. 

 Ratings on the Organizational Learning Behavioral Anchored Rating Scale indicated that 

individuals from the Hourly Employees Group tended to perceive the organizational 

Observations 

 Information, both internal and external to the Mine, i

various mechanisms, e.g., internet, e-mails, reports, 

 Events at other mine locations within the Company h

locations, e.g., installation of fire valves and hose loc

 The Safety Department is the primary point of contac

relevant operational experience information. 

 During this assessment the effective integration of op

13
 
learning process in place at the Mine in a more favorable manner than the Salaried 

Employees Group did. 

 The Company has restarted the use of audit teams across locations and the Safety 

Directors are put on the teams. In house audits are also conducted. 

 A monthly meeting is conducted to go over accident reports, Lost Time Accidents, 

reportable events and minor accidents. 

 Immediate accident investigation reports help with tracking and trending of incidents. A 

yearly review broken down by category, trended by job position and location is 

conducted by the Safety Department. 

 The decision to conduct this independent Safety Culture Assessment indicates the 

Company’s desire to learn more about its’ behavior and will provide Mine Management 

with a tool to enhance future safety performance. 

 Most individuals express the belief that anybody throughout the organization can identify 

problems. 

 Individuals are encouraged to report problems through their line management and most 

indicated they would do so. 

 The use of ‘buddy checks’ is perceived as a positive way for individuals to learn from 

one another. 

 Most interviewees indicated that serious safety concerns get addressed quickly and that 

Mine Management is supportive when it is necessary to pull back and even out of the 

mine. 

 Ratings on the Behavioral Anchored Rating Scale for Problem Identification and 

Resolution indicated that all respondents perceive those processes favorably. 

 Training activities are generally perceived to be effective and plentiful by most 

individuals. Examples include: 

o	 Annual 8 hour retraining 

o	 Mentor program 

o	 Emergency evacuation training including use of SCSRs and primary escape way 

walk outs 

o	 Additional 8 hours of electrician training 

o	 Monthly supervisor training for regulatory updates 

o	 Use of every opportunity to provide training, e.g., if power goes out at mine 

 Several interviewees indicated that the Company would pay for individuals to receive 

Emergency Medical Technician Training and Certification. 

 Data obtained on the Behavioral Anchored Rating Scale for Training indicated that 

Hourly Employees had a more positive perception of training than all employees overall. 

Areas for Improvement 

 The effectiveness and role of operational experience information as part of a learning 

process at the Mine is not internalized based on the results obtained during this 

assessment. 

o	 While Mine Safety and Health Administration violations are posted in the Mine 

Office, several interviewees could not identify what they were and admit to not 

keeping up with them. 

14
 
o	 Communication and integration of operational experience information is not 

consistently conducted across the organization, e.g. daily meetings, pre-shift 

reviews. Many individuals had not heard from Mine Management about a 

significant event that had occurred a few days before. 

o	 Individuals indicated that there are no formal debriefs after the emergency 

evacuation and fire drills. 

o	 The communications specialist does not participate in the emergency drills. 

 Some individuals interviewed do not perceive that the organization learns from its 

mistakes. Examples of repetitive problems include: 

o	 Not installing corner bolts 

o	 Making cross cuts too wide 

o	 Not keeping water boxes filled and filters changed on roof bolting machines to 

prevent dust blowing out the back. 

o	 Not wearing all the appropriate personal protection equipment. 

 Problems with obtaining regulatory upgrades from vendors impede the rapid 

implementation of the upgraded safety features identified from previous mine events, 

e.g., SCSRs training units. 

 Many interviewees could not identify any celebrations for success in safety but only for 

production, e.g., when the mine posted a profit. 

 Although most interviewees expressed the belief that individuals were not afraid to raise 

problems, several organizational inhibitors to reporting mistakes are perceived to exist. 

The absence of this type of reporting does not facilitate the opportunities for the 

organization to learn from its mistakes. 

o	 While no disciplinary action is taken for filing an accident report, the structure of 

the corporate incentive for safety program may be deterring individuals from 

reporting. The program is reactive and only reduces incentives for behavior that is 

detrimental to production, e.g., extended absences, loss time accidents, rather than 

also rewarding for behavior that is proactive and positive for safety, e.g., wearing 

personal protection equipment, identifying mistakes and hazardous conditions. 

o	 Individuals are identified by name on the Lost Time Accident Board which is 

posted at the entry to the site. The name is not removed until the next Lost Time 

Accident occurs regardless of whether the first individual has returned to work. 

Almost all interviewees disagreed with this policy and identified the practice as 

intimidating. Examples were related of individuals that were injured but either did 

not report it or ensured that they could go back to work because they did not want 

their name on the board, e.g., burns, broken bones. 

o	 The ‘at risk worker’ program assigns points based upon the medical treatment that 

a worker requires. After an accumulation of a certain number of points the 

individual is assigned to training with Mine Management. 

 Results from the survey indicated the lowest ranked item with regard to helping perform 

a job safely was reporting mistakes. 

 While interviewees indicated that training is a high priority, some training issues are in 

need of attention. 

o	 During SCSR training for some individuals simulated smoke was not available 

during their training session. 

15
 
 

o	 Many individuals described never having inserted the SCSR mouthpiece during 

training. 

o	 Most interviewees indicated that there is no additional training after they receive 

their qualifications, e.g., black hat. 

o	 Many individuals expressed concerns that there has not been any communications 

training since the Sago Mine disaster over one and a half years ago. 

o	 Training is not typically based upon a systematic analysis of needs and therefore 

is not sensitive to the variability in knowledge, competency and skills of the 

population. 

o	 No formal management or supervisory soft skills training is conducted for mine 

personnel. 

o	 No formal process for assessing training effectiveness is consistently used across 

the organization. 

6. A process for establishing a strong and effective Safety Conscious Work 

Environment (SCWE) is in place. 

Observations 

 A hotline for raising safety concerns is available to all employees through the Mine 

Safety and Health Administration. Individuals are encouraged to first report concerns 

through their line management, then through the Safety Department, and finally through 

the hotline if they do not believe that their concerns are being addressed. 

 Most individuals (84%) expressed the belief that they are responsible for identifying 

problems. 

 The majority of personnel (78%) indicated that they believed they could approach 

management with concerns. 

 69% of survey respondents indicated that they believe that management wants concerns 

identified. 

Areas for Improvement 

 Only 53% of survey respondents indicated that they believed their concerns were 

addressed constructively. The Salaried Employees believed this to a greater extent than 

the Hourly Employees did. 

 In response to the question ‘I can openly challenge decisions made by management’ only 

56% of survey respondents indicated that they believed they could. In particular, Salaried 

Employees believed this to a significantly stronger degree than Hourly Employees did. 

The Maintenance Crew also believed this to be true slightly more than the Production 

Crews. 

 Concerns about retaliation being tolerated exist among members of the organization. 

More than half of the survey respondents (59%) indicated that they either believed or 

were uncertain that retaliation did or could occur. 

16
 
 Similarly, only 42% of the survey respondents indicated that they believed that helpful 

criticism was encouraged in the organization. The Maintenance Crew believed this to a 

greater degree than the Production Crews. 

6 CONCLUSIONS 

There were several purposes for conducting this pilot assessment. The conclusions around each 

of those purposes are discussed in this section. 

 

6a. Evaluate the feasibility and usefulness of the methodology for assessing safety 

culture in the underground coal mining industry. 

The safety culture of a Central Appalachian small underground coal mine was assessed against 

the characteristics identified to be important for the promotion of a positive safety culture using a 

systematic methodology that had been originally developed for use in other industries. All 

aspects of the methodology including functional analysis, structured interviews with 

accompanying behavioral scales, work observations, and the paper and pencil survey 

administration were implemented without any difficulties. Mine participants were able to provide 

all information necessary for the successful implementation of the methodology without any 

problems. 

Lessons learned from this pilot implementation of the methodology for future safety culture 

assessments in the underground coal mining industry include the importance of having team 

members with underground mining experience, the ability to observe underground mining 

activities, and having the cooperation and support of the corporate organization. These were all 

things that were available during this pilot assessment and contributed significantly to its 

successful implementation. 

6b. Initiate an investigation into the understanding and defining of the existing safety 

culture of the underground coal mining industry. 

The existing safety culture at this underground coal mine was assessed against the characteristics 

identified to be important for the promotion of a positive safety culture. Initiatives and behaviors 

that are designed to facilitate and promote a positive safety culture and safety conscious work 

environment at the Mine were identified in the course of the assessment. These include: 

 Documentation that describes the importance and role of safety in the operation of the 

Mine exists and there are multiple mechanisms available to communicate the value of 

safety to all employees; 

 Individuals are held accountable for safety by the Company through various programs 

including, random drug testing, progressive discipline, and a corporate reward for 

safety incentive program; 

 Safety standards and norms exist for several different aspects of mine operations 

including maintenance and operation of equipment as well as the conduct of 

personnel; 

17
 
 Most individuals identified being satisfied with communication and believe that they 

are well informed about what is going on around the site; and 

 The majority of employees believe that they are responsible for identifying problems. 

The results of the assessment however also indicated that several of the behaviors associated 

with the safety culture characteristics need more management attention. These include: 

 While there are multiple mechanisms to communicate the value of safety to all 

employees, the lack of clear and consistent expectations and standards is evident in the 

variability of behavior with respect to safety. 

 Individuals at some levels in the organization are reluctant to accept personal 

responsibility and ownership for safety issues that they perceive to be someone else’s job. 

 There is a need for more strategic thinking about the integration of safety into all 

activities and processes and how behaviors important to safety can enhance the quality of 

all work to be done. 

 The multiple differences in attitudes and perceptions between the various crews and 

groups indicate that a safety leadership process is not internalized in the organization. 

 Efforts to learn from past performance have been addressed for some major industry 

events, but the process of learning from all aspects of day to day performance is not 

consistently or systematically conducted in the organization. 

 The behaviors important to creating an environment where concerns can be raised 

without fear of reprisal are not perceived to be present by a large percentage of the 

organization. In fact, the organization may have created an environment where things are 

not reported. 

6c. Provide meaningful and useful recommendations for the Mine for their 

consideration in continuing to enhance safety performance. 

Based on the conclusions of the Assessment Team with regard to the existing safety culture at 

the Mine, the following recommendations are presented for consideration. 

 While there are multiple mechanisms for communication in the organization, the message 

that safety is a clearly recognized value must be more effectively transmitted and 

understood. Corporate and Mine Management need to reinforce the verbal 

communication of the message through appropriate modeling behavior using the 

standards and norms that are expected of all employees. 

 Employees must be held accountable to the expectations and standards. A rewards and 

sanction system that recognizes not only the immediate and short term consequences of 

behavior, but also the long-term consequences of actions needs to be implemented. 

Opportunities to recognize small wins and accomplishments along the path of 

improvement for safety performance so that desired outcomes, results, and behaviors can 

be rewarded need to be provided. 

 A working environment where employees are not concerned about negative repercussions 

for reporting mistakes, accidents, or events is the foundation for a learning environment. 

An organization must be aggressively seeking to know what it does not know so that it 

can be proactive about safety for future performance. Such an environment is created 

18
 
 

through employee involvement and ownership, trust and accuracy in communication, and 

a leadership team that will promote and facilitate those behaviors. 

7 REFERENCES 

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Commission, Research Report, Ottawa, Canada. 

Haber, S.B., O’Brien, J.N., Metlay, D.S., and Crouch, D.A. (1991). “Influences of 

Organizational Factors on Performance Reliability,” NUREG/CR-5538, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, D.C. 

International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, INSAG-15 (2002). “Key Practical Issues in 

Strengthening Safety Culture”, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria. 

International Atomic Energy Agency – Application of the Management System for Facilities and 

Activities, Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.1 (July 2006) 

Schein, E.H. (1992). “Organizational Culture and Leadership”, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. 

19