Interim Decision #2438 

MATTER OF TRILLERA 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-20357073 

Decided by Board October 14, 1975 

(1) Assuming, arguendo, the Service learned of respondent's presence and location in the 

United States by some unlawful means, the affidavit executed by respondent during the 

course of an interview with a Service investigator (and which constitutes the primary 

basis of a finding of deportability; is free of any possible taint, since it is the product of 

respondent's %oluntary acts. 

(2) Even assuming the Service became aware of respondent's presence and location in the 

United States as a result of some sort of communication from either the Department of 

Labor or the :)epartment of State, there was no impropriety in such assumed interagency cammrnieation No rights of respondent, a nonimmigrant visitor who was and 

who remains unlawfully in the United States, could have been violated by such assumed 

communication. Hence, respondent's allegations that the Service unlawfully learned of 

her presence in this country are unfounded; her motion to suppress was properly 

denied. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(2) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2))—Nonimmigrant visitor—

remained longer. 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT; William H. Oltarsh, Esquire 

225 Broadway 

New York, New York 10007 

In a decision dated July 31, 1975, the immigration judge found the 

respondent deportable, but granted the respondent's application for 

voluntary departure. The respondent has appealed the finding of 

deportability, contending that the evidence introduced to establish deportability should have been suppressed by the immigration judge. The 

appeal will be dismissed. 

Exhibit 4 of the record is an affidavit signed by the respondent on 

December 13, 1974, during the course of an interview before a Service 

investigator. The respondent has acknowledged that she signed the 

affidavit, and she does not dispute the accuracy of the information 

contained therein. Primarily on the basis of this affidavit, we find that 

the responde nt is a native and citizen of Colombia who entered the 

United Staters as a nonimmigrant visitor, and that she has remained 

474 
Interim Decision #2438 

beyond the authorized length of her stay. The evidence is clear, convincing and unequivocal that she is deportable as charged by the Service. 

The respondent does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of 

deportability. She does, however, contend that that evidence should not 

have been employed in determining deportability. The respondent basically argues that the Service unlawfully obtained knowledge of her 

presence in the United States, and that it was on the basis of this 

knowledge that she was requested. to appear for the interview at which 

she executed the damaging affidavit. 

We note that the respondent made a conscious voluntary decision to 

meet with a representative of the Service and then voluntarily provided 

the Service with the requested information. The record indicates that 

the respondent was represented at the interview by either present 

counsel or someone acting in behalf of present counsel (Tr. pp. 10-11; 

Exh. 5). Even assuming that the Service learned of the respondent's 

presence and location in the United States by some unlawful means, the 

affidavit executed on December 13, 1974 is free of any possible taint 

because it is the product of the respondent's voluntary acts. Cf. Mims 

v. INS, 361 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 

We are also convinced that the respondent's allegations regarding 

unlawfully obtained evidence are unfounded. The respondent contends 

that she was erroneously denied access to the Service's records which 

pertain to her. Counsel for the respondent sought to review these 

records in an attempt to determine how the Service became aware of the 

respondent's presence in the United States. Counsel argues that the 

Service probably received inforthation regarding the respondent from 

either the Department of Labor or the Department of State. It appears 

that both of these departments had information relating to the respondent because she had submitted an application for a labor certification, 

which was subsequently approved and forwarded to the United States 

consulate in her home country. 

Although counsel's request for discovery was denied by the immigration judge, 1we shall assume for the purpose of this appeal that counsel's contentions regarding the method by which the Service acquired its 

information on the respondent are correct. We therefore assume that 

the Service learned of the respondent as a result of some sort of communication from either the Department of Labor or the Department of 

State. 

Counsel contends that this assumed communication violated the respondent's rights. We initially disagree with counsel's assertion that 

' Counsel also made a written request to the Service, which he claims was under the 

Freedom of Information Act, for this information. The record does not disclose the 

disposition of that written request. The Service's trial attorney did refuse counsel's oral 

request for the information during the course of the hearing (Tr. p. 11). 

475 
Interim Decision #2438 

these departments have no powers relating to the entry of aliens into 

the United States. See section 212(a)(14) and section 104, Immigration 

and Nationality Act. Furthermore, the Act specifically provides for 

liaison between the Service and the Department of State. Section 105 

and section 104(b), Immigration and Nationality Act. We know of no 

right possessed by the respondent, a nonimmigrant visitor who was and 

who remains unlawfully in the United States, which could have been 

violated by such a communication. 

We find no impropriety in the assumed interagency communication. 

Counsel's motion to suppress was properly denied. There was no infringement on any rights possessed by the respondent, even if counsel's 

factual contentions are correct. The decision of the immigration judge 

was correct. 

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 

Further order: Pursuant to the immigration judge's order, the respondent is permitted to depart from the United States voluntarily 

within 31 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that 

time as may be granted by the district director; and in the event of 

failure so to depart, the respondent shall be deported as provided in the 

immigration judge's order. 

476