(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2020 1 

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. BRIGGS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ARMED FORCES

No. 19–108. Argued October 13, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020*

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) has long provided that a 

military offense, “punishable by death, may be tried and punished at 

any time without limitation.” 10 U. S. C. §843(a). Other military offenses are subject to a 5-year statute of limitations. §843(b). Respondents are three military service members, each convicted of rape. When 

they were charged, the UCMJ provided that rape could be “punished 

by death.” §920(a) (1994 ed.). Because this Court held that the Eighth 

Amendment forbids a death sentence for the rape of an adult woman, 

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, respondents argue that they could not, 

in fact, have been sentenced to death, and therefore the UCMJ’s 5-year 

statute of limitations applies and bars their convictions. Agreeing, the 

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces set aside their convictions.

Held: Respondents’ prosecutions for rape under the UCMJ were timely. 

Pp. 2–9.

 (a) Respondents contend that the UCMJ phrase “punishable by 

death” means capable of punishment by death when all applicable law 

is taken into account. By contrast, the Government sees the phrase as 

something of a term of art, meaning capable of punishment by death 

under the penalty provisions of the UCMJ. Pp. 2–3.

 (b) For three reasons, the phrase’s context—appearing in a statute 

of limitations provision for prosecutions under the UCMJ—weighs 

heavily in favor of the Government’s interpretation. Pp. 3–9.

 (1) First, the UCMJ is a uniform code. As such, a natural referent 

for a statute of limitations provision within the UCMJ is other law in 

—————— 

*Together with No. 19–184, United States v. Collins and United States

v. Daniels (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same 

court.
2 UNITED STATES v. BRIGGS

 

Syllabus

the UCMJ itself. The most natural place to look for Congress’s answer 

to whether rape was “punishable by death” within the meaning of 

§843(a) is §920’s directive that rape could be “punished by death.” 

That is so even if the UCMJ’s separate prohibition on “cruel or unusual 

punishment,” §855, would have been held to provide an independent 

defense against the imposition of the death penalty for rape. Pp. 3–4.

 (2) Second, respondents’ interpretation of §843(a) is not the sort of 

limitations provision that Congress is likely to have chosen. Statutes 

of limitations typically provide clarity, see United States v. Lovasco,

431 U. S. 783, 789, and it is reasonable to presume that clarity is an 

objective when lawmakers enact such provisions. But if “punishable 

by death” means punishable by death after all applicable law is taken 

into account, the deadline for filing rape charges would be unclear. 

That deadline would depend on an unresolved constitutional question 

about Coker’s application to military prosecutions, on what this Court 

has described as “‘evolving standards of decency’” under the Eighth 

Amendment, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U. S. 407, 419, and on whether 

§855 of the UCMJ independently prohibits a death sentence for rape. 

Pp. 4–7.

 (3) Third, the ends served by statutes of limitations differ sharply 

from those served by provisions like the Eighth Amendment or UCMJ 

§855. Factors legislators may find important in setting a statute of 

limitations—such as the difficulty of gathering evidence and mounting 

a prosecution—play no part in the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis. Thus, it is unlikely that lawmakers would want to tie a statute of 

limitations to judicial interpretations of such provisions. Pp. 8–9.

No. 19–108, 78 M. J. 289; No. 19–184, 78 M. J. 415 (first judgment) and 

79 M. J. 199 (second judgment), reversed and remanded. 

 ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except BARRETT, J., who took no part in the consideration or 

decision of the cases. GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

Opinion of the Court

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notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

Nos. 19–108 and 19–184

_________________ 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

19–108 v.

MICHAEL J. D. BRIGGS

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

19–184 v.

RICHARD D. COLLINS

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

v.

HUMPHREY DANIELS, III

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

 [December 10, 2020] 

 JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

We must decide in these cases whether, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a prosecution for a 

rape committed during the period from 1986 to 2006 had to 

be commenced within five years of the commission of the 

charged offense or whether such a prosecution could be 

brought at any time, as is the rule at present. The Court of 

Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), reversing its prior 

decisions on this question, held that the statute of limitations was five years and that it therefore barred the rape 

convictions of respondents, three military service members. 

See 78 M. J. 289 (2019); 78 M. J. 415 (2019); 79 M. J. 199 
2 UNITED STATES v. BRIGGS

 

Opinion of the Court

(2019). We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ___ (2019), and now 

reverse. 

I 

The question before us is important, and there are reasonable arguments on both sides, but resolving the question 

does not require lengthy analysis. During the period at issue, Article 120(a) of the UCMJ provided that rape could be 

“punished by death,” 10 U. S. C. §920(a) (1982 ed.); §920(a) 

(1994 ed.), and Article 43(a), which was amended in 1986, 

provided that an offense “punishable by death” could be 

tried and punished “at any time without limitation,” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, 100 

Stat. 3908; see 10 U. S. C. §843(a) (1988 ed.). The crux of 

the question before us is the meaning of the phrase “punishable by death” in the latter provision. Respondents contend—and the CAAF held—that the phrase means capable 

of punishment by death when all applicable law is taken 

into account. See United States v. Mangahas, 77 M. J. 220, 

224 (2018). Because this Court held in Coker v. Georgia, 

433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977), that the Eighth Amendment forbids a death sentence for the rape of an adult woman, respondents argue that they could not, in fact, have been sentenced to death, and therefore the statute of limitations for 

their crimes (committed in 1998, 2000, and 2005) was the 

5-year statute that generally governed non-capital offenses. 

See 10 U. S. C. §843(b)(1) (1994 ed.); §843(b)(1) (2000 ed.). 

By contrast, the Government argues that Article 43(a)’s reference to “punishable by death” means capable of punishment by death under the penalty provisions of the UCMJ, 

and since Article 120(a) provided (despite Coker) that rape 

could be punished by death, it follows that there was no 

time limit for filing rape charges against respondents.

The interpretation advocated by respondents and 

adopted by the CAAF finds support at first blush in contemporaneous dictionary definitions of the term “punishable.” 
Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

Opinion of the Court

See 12 Oxford English Dictionary 845 (2d ed. 1989) (“Liable 

to punishment; capable of being punished. . . . Of an offence: Entailing punishment”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1843 (1986) (“deserving of, or liable to, 

punishment: capable of being punished by law or right”); 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1110 (5th ed. 1979) (“Deserving of 

or capable or liable to punishment; capable of being punished by law or right”); Random House Dictionary of the

English Language 1165 (1966) (“liable to or deserving punishment”). But upon inspection, definitions shed little light 

on the dispute because they largely re-raise the question 

over which the parties divide: capable of being punished under what law? In essence, the Government sees the term 

“punishable” in Article 43(a) as something of a term of art 

that is defined by the specification of the punishments set 

out in the penalty provisions of the UCMJ.

II

On balance, we find the Government’s interpretation 

more persuasive. The meaning of a statement often turns 

on the context in which it is made, and that is no less true 

of statutory language. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 662

(2001); Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 132 (1993); 

A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 167 (2012). And in 

these cases, context is determinative. The phrase “punishable by death” appears in a statute of limitations provision 

for prosecutions under the UCMJ, and for at least three reasons, that context weighs heavily in favor of the Government’s interpretation.

A 

First, a natural referent for a statute of limitations provision within the UCMJ is other law in the UCMJ itself. 

The UCMJ is, after all, a “uniform code,” one that reformed 

and modernized the old system of military justice “from top 

to bottom.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 141 (1953). No 
4 UNITED STATES v. BRIGGS

 

Opinion of the Court

one would read Article 43’s references to “offense[s]” to include those under state law, for example. Rather, the 

UCMJ establishes the jurisdiction of general courts-martial 

“to try persons subject to this chapter for any offense made 

punishable by this chapter.” 10 U. S. C. §818 (1982 ed.). 

Courts-martial may then “adjudge any punishment not forbidden by this chapter, including the penalty of death when 

specifically authorized by this chapter.” Ibid. “[T]his chapter” is the UCMJ, §801 et seq., and during the relevant time 

period, provisions within that chapter like Article 120 specifically authorized the death penalty for certain serious offenses, see, e.g., §894 (mutiny or sedition); §899 (misbehavior before the enemy); §900 (subordinate compelling 

surrender); §901 (improper use of countersign); §902 (forcing a safeguard); §904 (aiding the enemy); §906 (spies); 

§918 (murder). When amending Article 43(a), the 1986 

Congress appears simply to have saved itself the trouble of 

maintaining a long list of such offenses. Cf. §843(a) (1982

ed.) (listing “aiding the enemy, mutiny, or murder”). In the 

context of the UCMJ, therefore, Article 120’s directive that 

rape could be “punished by death” is the most natural place 

to look for Congress’s answer to whether rape was “punishable by death” within the meaning of Article 43(a). We 

think that is so even if, as respondents argue, the separate 

prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment” in Article 55 

of the UCMJ would have been held to provide an independent defense against the imposition of the death penalty for 

rape. 10 U. S. C. §855 (1982 ed.).

B 

Second, one principal benefit of statutes of limitations is 

that typically they provide clarity, see United States v. 

Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 789 (1977) (“[S]tatutes of limitations . . . provide predictable, legislatively enacted limits on 

prosecutorial delay . . . ”); Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 
Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

Opinion of the Court

U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 19) (noting that one “primary purpos[e]” of limitations statutes in the civil context 

is “preventing surprises” to defendants (internal quotation 

marks omitted)), and it is therefore reasonable to presume 

that clarity is an objective for which lawmakers strive when 

enacting such provisions. Other things being equal, certainty in statutes of limitations generally serves the interests of all concerned, and that is certainly true with respect 

to the statute of limitations for rape. For prosecutors handling such cases, it is obviously helpful to know the deadline 

by which charges must be filed. For persons who know they 

may be under investigation, a known statute of limitations 

provides a date after which they may no longer fear arrest 

and trial. And for rape victims, who often wrestle with the 

painful decision whether to identify their attackers and 

press charges, a clear deadline allows them to know by 

when they must make that choice.

If “punishable by death” in Article 43(a) means punishable by death under the penalty provisions of the UCMJ, 

the rule regarding the latest possible date for commencing 

a rape prosecution is clear: The prosecution may be brought 

“at any time without limitation.” By contrast, if “punishable by death” meant punishable by death after all applicable law is taken into account, the deadline for filing rape 

charges would be unclear. The deadline would depend on 

the answer to an unresolved constitutional question about 

which the parties in these cases vigorously disagree. Respondents argue that the logic of the decision in Coker applies equally to civilian and military prosecutions, but the 

Government contends that the military context dictates a 

different outcome. Among other things, the Government 

argues that a rape committed by a service member may 

cause special damage by critically undermining unit cohesion and discipline and that, in some circumstances, the 

crime may have serious international implications.

That also appears to have been the view of Congress and 
6 UNITED STATES v. BRIGGS

 

Opinion of the Court

the Executive. After Coker was decided in 1977, Congress 

changed the maximum penalty for rape in civilian cases 

from death to life imprisonment, see Sexual Abuse Act of 

1986, 100 Stat. 3663, but it made no such change in the 

UCMJ. On the contrary, in 2006 Congress noted that death 

would remain an available punishment for rape “[u]ntil the 

President otherwise provide[d].” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 119 Stat. 3263. And Presidents continued until 2016 to provide for death as a permissible punishment for rape under the UCMJ. See Exec. 

Order No. 13740, 3 CFR 510 (2016).

If Article 43(a) meant what respondents claim and what 

the CAAF held, Congress would have adopted a statute of 

limitations provision without knowing with certainty what 

it would mean. Indeed, Congress would have adopted a 

statute of limitations provision the meaning of which would 

not be settled until this Court decided the disputed question 

of Coker’s applicability to the military, and there was no 

reason to think at the time of Article 43(a)’s amendment in 

1986 that this Court would resolve that question any time 

soon. We have never considered a direct Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence of death for rape under the 

UCMJ. And it was predictable that we would not reach the 

statute of limitations question until cases like those now 

before us came up for review—that is, until we had occasion 

to consider cases in which defendants were convicted after 

being charged more than five years after the commission of 

the offense. That state of affairs virtually guaranteed that 

the statute of limitations for rape under the UCMJ would 

be up in the air for years.

And the uncertainty would not end there. This Court has 

held that the Eighth Amendment incorporates “‘evolving

standards of decency.’” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U. S. 

407, 419 (2008) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 

(1958) (plurality opinion); emphasis added). Thus, even if 

we were to hold that rape could be punished by death in the 
Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2020) 7 

Opinion of the Court

military context, the evolving-standards test could later 

lead to a different result and thus a different statute of limitations at some point in the future. Such evolution has 

been held to have occurred on a number of past occasions. 

Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 321 (2002)

(Eighth Amendment prohibits death penalty for defendant 

described as mentally retarded), with Penry v. Lynaugh, 

492 U. S. 302, 340 (1989) (Eighth Amendment permits 

death penalty for such a defendant); compare also Roper v. 

Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, 574–575 (2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits death penalty for crime committed by person under 18 years of age), with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 

U. S. 361, 380 (1989) (Eighth Amendment permits death 

penalty for defendants who are at least 16 years of age).

Finally, if “punishable by death” under Article 43(a) 

meant punishable by death when all applicable law is taken 

into account, the statute of limitations would also turn on 

whether, as respondents now maintain, Article 55 of the 

UCMJ independently prohibits a death sentence for rape. 

Article 55 forbids “cruel or unusual punishment[s],” 10 

U. S. C. §855; §855 (1982 ed.), and here again respondents 

and the Government offer different interpretations. Respondents argue that Article 55 of its own force applies 

Coker’s rule to the military, while the Government maintains that Article 55 cannot reasonably be read to forbid a 

punishment that another provision of the UCMJ specifically authorizes.

In short, if we accepted the interpretation of Article 43(a) 

adopted by the CAAF and defended by respondents, we 

would have to conclude that this provision set out a statute 

of limitations that no one could have understood with any 

real confidence until important and novel legal questions 

were resolved by this Court. That is not the sort of limitations provision that Congress is likely to have chosen.
8 UNITED STATES v. BRIGGS

 

Opinion of the Court

C 

Third, the factors that lawmakers are likely to take into 

account when fixing the statute of limitations for a crime 

differ significantly from the considerations that underlie 

our Eighth Amendment decisions. We therefore should not 

lightly assume that Congress tied the meaning of the statutes of limitations in Article 43 to the Eighth Amendment. 

One factor that legislators may find important in setting 

the statute of limitations for a crime is the difficulty of gathering evidence and mounting a prosecution for that offense. 

This factor may have been influential in calibrating the 

statutes of limitations for rape and other sexual offenses in 

more recent years. The trauma inflicted by such crimes 

may impede the gathering of the evidence needed to bring 

charges. Victims may be hesitant for some time after the 

offense about agreeing to testify. Thus, under current federal law, many such offenses are subject to no statute of 

limitations. See 18 U. S. C. §3299 (permitting prosecution 

at any time for felonies under §§2241–2248, 2251–2256, 

2258–2260A, and 2421–2429); see also 10 U. S. C. §843(a) 

(expressly setting no limitations period under UCMJ for 

prosecuting rape, sexual assault, and rape or sexual assault 

of a child).

This factor—the difficulty of assembling evidence and 

putting together a prosecution—obviously plays no part in 

our Eighth Amendment analysis. As noted, in deciding 

whether the Eighth Amendment permits a death sentence 

for a particular category of offenses or offenders, the Court 

has looked to evolving societal standards of decency and has 

also rendered its own independent judgment about whether 

a death sentence would aptly serve the recognized purposes 

of criminal punishment in certain categories of cases. See 

Kennedy, 554 U. S., at 419–421, 441–446; Roper, 543 U. S., 

at 561, 571–575; Atkins, 536 U. S., at 318–321. Some Justices have eschewed aspects of those approaches and have 

looked instead to the original understanding of the Eighth 
Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2020) 9 

Opinion of the Court

Amendment. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48, 99–

102 (2010) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U. S., at 

348–349 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 

487 U. S. 815, 864, 872–873 (1988) (same); cf. Glossip v. 

Gross, 576 U. S. 863, 894, 898–899 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). But under either method, the inquiry is quite different from the one that a lawmaker might make in fixing 

a statute of limitations. Accordingly, since the ends served 

by statutes of limitations differ sharply from those served 

by provisions like the Eighth Amendment or Article 55 of 

the UCMJ, it is unlikely that lawmakers would want to tie 

a statute of limitations to judicial interpretations of such 

provisions. 

* * * 

Viewing Article 43(a) in context, we are convinced that 

“punishable by death” is a term of art that is defined by the 

provisions of the UCMJ specifying the punishments for the 

offenses it outlaws. And under this interpretation, respondents’ prosecutions were timely.

The judgments of the CAAF are reversed, and the cases 

are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

It is so ordered.

 

 JUSTICE BARRETT took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. 
Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

GORSUCH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

Nos. 19–108 and 19–184

_________________ 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

19–108 v.

MICHAEL J. D. BRIGGS

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

19–184 v.

RICHARD D. COLLINS

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

v.

HUMPHREY DANIELS, III

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

 [December 10, 2020] 

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring.

I continue to think this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear 

appeals directly from the CAAF. See Ortiz v. United States, 

585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (ALITO, J., dissenting). But a majority of the Court believes we have jurisdiction, and I agree 

with the Court’s decision on the merits. I therefore join the 

Court’s opinion.