UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

MARIO CABALLERO-ANAYA, a/k/a 

Ernesto Martinez, a/k/a Ernesto Caballero, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 19-1034 

(D.C. No. 1:18-CR-00035-REB-1) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, KELLY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Mario Caballero-Anaya appeals his conviction and sentence for illegal reentry 

after removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). He argues that the government has failed 

to establish his removal, an essential element of illegal reentry, because the date on 

his warrant of removal was later than his physical removal. He also appeals the 

substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, we affirm. 

 * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 31, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

I

 Caballero-Anaya has a long history of unlawfully entering and being removed 

from the United States. He was first ordered removed by an immigration judge on 

March 5, 1999, and was physically removed six days later. Between 1999 and 2016, 

he was removed six additional times: three times in 2000, and once each in 2002, 

2004, and 2010.1

 Prior to each removal, ICE reinstated the original 1999 order of 

removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.8.2

 From 2000 to 2014, Caballero-Anaya was 

convicted of illegal reentry four times. 

After his removal in 2010, Caballero-Anaya was again found in the United 

States on December 2, 2014. As it had six times before, ICE reinstated the original 

1999 order of removal, following the process required by § 241.8, and recorded the 

reinstatement on ICE Form I-871, “Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior 

Order” (“Reinstatement Decision”). Based on the reinstated order, Caballero-Anaya 

was physically removed from the United States by ICE agents at the Nogales port of 

entry “via afoot [sic]” on or about June 16, 2016. This physical removal was 

recorded on the second page of ICE Form I-205, “Warrant of Removal/Deportation” 

 1

 Before 2003, removals were executed by the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (“INS”). Since 2003, they have been executed by Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (“ICE”). See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 

§ 4, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 

2

 This section authorizes the removal of an alien who has illegally reentered 

the United States after “having been removed, or having departed voluntarily, while 

under an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal” by reinstating the prior order. 

§ 241.8. 
3 

(“Warrant”). An ICE official signed the first page of the Warrant on July 8, 2016, 

approximately 22 days after Caballero-Anaya’s physical removal. This discrepancy 

lies at the heart of his appeal. 

 After his June 2016 removal, Caballero-Anaya was again found in the United 

States on December 6, 2017. As a result he was indicted for illegal reentry after 

removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He waived his right to a jury trial and 

was tried by the district court. At trial, Caballero-Anaya stipulated to all four 

elements of § 1326(a): (1) that he was an alien; (2) that he had been removed from 

the United States on or about June 16, 2016;3

 (3) that he knowingly re-entered the 

United States and was found in the District of Colorado on or about December 6, 

2016; and (4) that he had not received consent of the proper legal authority to reapply 

for admission to the United States. He did not seek to withdraw his stipulations. 

Instead, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, Caballero-Anaya 

moved for a judgement of acquittal, arguing that the discrepancy between the date of 

his removal and the date on the Warrant negated the government’s proof on the first 

element of § 1326(a)—that he had “been denied admission, excluded, deported, or 

removed or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, 

or removal is outstanding.” He argued that § 1326(a) requires the prior removal to 

 3

 Before the district court, the government represented that Caballero-Anaya’s 

removal had occurred on July 17, 2016, despite the I-205 form’s indication that it 

occurred on June 16. The government does not address this issue on appeal. 

Because any discrepancy in the removal date does not affect the outcome of our 

analysis, we continue to refer to the date of removal as “on or about June 16, 2016,” 

consistent with Caballero-Anaya’s stipulation. 
4 

have been done “while an order of . . . removal is outstanding.” Before the district 

court and on appeal, Caballero-Anaya confusingly mischaracterizes the Warrant as 

the relevant order of removal under § 1326(a). He also contends that an error in the 

Warrant voids the order of removal under § 1326(a) and otherwise makes the removal 

unlawful. The district court rejected this argument and found him guilty of illegal 

reentry after removal. 

 The district court calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range at 15 to 21 

months but varied upwards because the “calculations simply do not reflect accurately 

or adequately the aggravated criminal history of the defendant.” The district court 

sentenced the defendant to 48 months’ imprisonment. 

This appeal focuses on the 2016 removal, which is the sole basis for 

Caballero-Anaya’s conviction. Although cast as a question of statutory 

interpretation, Caballero-Anaya’s fundamental claim is that the date discrepancy in 

the Warrant invalidates the 2016 removal from serving as the “removal” required for 

a conviction under § 1326(a)(1). We disagree.

II 

Caballero-Anaya challenges the district court’s interpretation of § 1326(a). 

Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. See United States v. 

Adame-Orozco, 607 F.3d 647, 652 (10th Cir. 2010). We also review de novo the 

district court’s denial of Caballero-Anaya’s motion for judgment of acquittal and his 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction. See United 

States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1115 (10th Cir. 2011). In reviewing the sufficiency 
5 

of the evidence, we determine whether “viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Government, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

defendant guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

A 

 To convict Caballero-Anaya of a violation of § 1326(a), the government must 

prove: “(1) that the alien has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed 

or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal 

is outstanding; and (2) that the alien thereafter has entered, attempted to enter, or is at 

any time found in, the United States.”4

 Adame-Orozco, 607 F.3d at 650-51 

(quotation omitted). 

Caballero-Anaya urges us to interpret the first element of § 1326(a)(1) to 

require the relevant removal or deportation underpinning the illegal reentry 

prosecution to have occurred while an order of removal is outstanding. The 

government responds that the statute requires an outstanding order only when the 

defendant is shown to have departed the United States, not when he or she has been 

“denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed.” Resolution of this issue is 

unnecessary to decide this appeal. Even assuming Caballero-Anaya’s interpretation 

is correct, he was removed while an order of removal was outstanding—the 1999 

order which was reinstated in 2014. 

 4

 Caballero-Anaya challenges his conviction only with respect to the “deported

or removed” element. He stipulated to the remaining elements at trial. 
6 

At trial the government presented uncontested evidence of reinstatement. 

When “an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed 

or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal 

is reinstated from its original date, . . . and the alien shall be removed under the prior 

order at any time after the reentry.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (emphasis added). 

Implementing this statute, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 authorizes reinstatement of a prior 

removal order if an immigration officer determines that: (1) the alien was subject to 

a prior removal order; (2) the alien is the same person who was removed under the 

prior order; and (3) the alien unlawfully re-entered the United States. Id. After the 

alien is given notice of and an opportunity to contest the determination, “the alien 

shall be removed under the previous order of exclusion, deportation, or removal in 

accordance with section [1231](a)(5) of the Act.” Id. 

On appeal, Caballero-Anaya does not challenge the 1999 removal order or the 

2014 Reinstatement Decision. Moreover, he stipulated at trial to the admission of a 

certified copy of his “Alien” or “A” file, which records “transactions involving an 

individual as he/she passes through the U.S. immigration and inspection process.” 

United States v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 855 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014). Caballero-Anaya’s 

“A” file includes the 2014 Reinstatement Decision.5 This reinstatement authorized 

Caballero-Anaya’s removal “at any time after the reentry.” § 1231(a)(5). 

 5

 The Reinstatement Decision shows that Caballero-Anaya did not object to the 

reinstatement and includes the immigration officer’s findings required to reinstate the 

1999 removal order. 
7 

Caballero-Anaya conflates the order of removal referred to in § 1326(a)(1) 

with the Warrant. His misapprehension does not create a statutory ambiguity that 

requires resolution. “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined 

by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is 

used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 

519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). The Immigration and Nationality Act “defines ‘order of 

removal’ as an administrative order concluding that an alien is removable or ordering 

removal.” Luna-Garcia v. Holder, 777 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing 8 

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A)).6 A reinstated removal order is a final order of removal. 

See id. at 1185. Further, under § 1231(a)(5), an order of removal is reinstated from its 

original date. The 2014 Reinstatement Decision reinstated Cabellero-Anaya’s 

original order of removal from its 1999 date. Because Caballero-Anaya was removed 

on June 16, 2016, while the reinstated removal order was outstanding, we do not need 

to determine if § 1326(a)(1) requires an outstanding order of removal only for 

departures. 

B 

Clinging to his argument that the date discrepancy on the Warrant nonetheless 

invalidates the 2016 removal, Caballero-Anaya argues that the “material factual 

inconsistenc[y]” between his removal and the date on the Warrant requires us to 

 6

 Although the “statutory definition refers to ‘order of deportation[,’ t]he terms 

‘order of removal’ and ‘order of deportation’ are coterminous when interpreting the 

statute.” Id. at 1184 n.5 (citation omitted). 
8 

conclude that the government has failed prove his prior removal—a requisite element 

of § 1326(a)(1). He further contends that because ICE’s implementing regulations 

require the issuance of a warrant and its execution, the deficient warrant in this case 

is insufficient to show an actual removal. 

His reliance on cases holding that a prior removal may be shown by an 

executed warrant is misplaced. Those cases recognize that there are many ways for 

the government to prove the required element of a prior removal, including a warrant; 

they do not stand for the proposition that a warrant is necessary. See United States v. 

Landeros-Mendez, 206 F.3d 1354, 1357-58 (10th Cir. 2000) (together with testimony 

of INS officers who expelled the alien, warrant is sufficient proof of prior removal); 

United States v. Anaya, 117 F.3d 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1997) (conviction sustained on 

basis of admitted warrant and testimony of agents that warrant was not signed until 

alien had been deported); United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1193-95 (5th Cir. 

1985) (warrant admissible and sufficient to satisfy the arrest requirement of the thenapplicable version of § 1326);7

 cf. United States v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 865 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (holding that authenticated verification of removal by officer removing 

alien is sufficient to prove prior removal). In Landeros-Mendez, the defendant 

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of his prior removal because the 

 7

 Section 1326(a)(1) was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and 

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 

3009, 3009-618 (1996). “Pursuant to this amendment, the phrase ‘arrested and 

deported or excluded and deported’ was replaced with ‘denied admission, excluded, 

deported, or removed.’” Landeros-Mendez, 206 F.3d at 1358 n.4. 
9 

government had not produced the order of removal, and instead relied on (1) a 

warrant, (2) its records of the defendant’s prior physical removal, and (3) testimony 

of two immigration agents that the warrant was prepared after the order of removal 

was finalized. 206 F.3d at 1357. The court held that the government was not 

required to introduce an order of removal to establish a violation of § 1326 and 

determined that the other evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Id. at 

1357-58. 

In this case, Caballero-Anaya contends that the fact he was removed 22 days 

before the Warrant was signed invalidates his actual removal on or about June 16, 

2016—a removal conducted pursuant to the reinstated order of removal and 

witnessed by the officer signing on page two of the Warrant. He claims that the date 

discrepancy alone results in a failure of proof of his actual June 16, 2016 removal. 

Construing his “failure of proof” allegation as a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence underlying his conviction, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have 

found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented at trial. 

Critically, Caballero-Anaya neglects to account for his stipulation that he “was 

deported from the United States on or about June 16, 2016.” A criminal defendant 

may stipulate “to elemental facts” and thereby waive the right to a trial on those 

elements. United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471, 472 (10th Cir. 1996). The “very 

nature of a defendant’s waiver is that it frees the government from the obligation to 

present any evidence regarding the element in question.” United States v. Smith, 472 
10 

F.3d 752, 753 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted). Further, a factfinder “does not 

have the lawful power to reject stipulated facts.” Mason, 85 F.3d at 473. 

When we consider his stipulation, we cannot conclude that no reasonable jury 

could find Caballero-Anaya guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This elemental 

stipulation augmented the evidence in his “A” file, which contained the 1999 removal 

order, the 2014 Reinstatement Decision, and the Warrant recording the circumstances 

of his 2016 removal. Based on this evidence, the district court found that the 

evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt “that pursuant to an extant, valid, 

and viable order of removal, the defendant had been deported or removed from the 

United States on or about June 16, 2016.” We decline to hold that an alleged clerical 

error on the Warrant negated the legal effect of Caballero-Anaya’s stipulation or the 

overwhelming evidence of his removal in 2016. 

We find further support for our conclusion in United States v. MendezCasillas, 272 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2001), which upheld a conviction for illegal reentry 

even though the warrant of deportation was unsigned. Id. at 1205. After determining 

that the arrest or warrant requirement in the version of § 1326 in force at the time was 

intended to provide notice, the Ninth Circuit held that “the missing signature did not 

vitiate the ‘arrest’ element of Mendez-Casillas’s § 1326 conviction.” Id. The court 

also rejected Mendez-Casillas’ contention that “the defective warrant effectively 

means that he was never validly ‘deported’ for § 1326 purposes,” id. at 1206, an 

argument similar to Caballero-Anaya’s. Interpreting United States v. MendozaLopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987), the Ninth Circuit rejected “the view that a deportation is 
11 

an element of the offense defined by § 1326 only if it is ‘lawful.’” It held that “only 

if the claimed illegality of deportation rises to the level of a due process violation—

specifically, the lack of meaningful judicial review of the INS administrative 

proceeding—may the deportation not be used to establish an element of a criminal 

offense.” Mendez-Casillas, 272 F.3d at 1206 (citation and quotation omitted). 

Caballero-Anaya makes no argument that the alleged error rises to the level of 

a due process violation. In any event, given Caballero-Anaya’s elemental stipulation 

and lack of challenge to the original 1999 removal order or its 2014 reinstatement, 

there is no due process violation. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction for illegal 

reentry under § 1326. 

III

Caballero-Anaya also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his 

sentence. We review such claims for abuse of discretion. United States v. Smart, 

518 F.3d 800, 805 (10th Cir. 2008). “[W]e afford substantial deference to the district 

court, and determine whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the 

circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 

United States v. Balbin-Mesa, 643 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation 

omitted). Under this deferential standard of review, “we deem a sentence 

unreasonable only if it is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly 

unreasonable.” United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1249 (10th Cir. 2012). 

Where, as in this case, the court varies from the Sentencing Guidelines, we “consider 

the extent of the deviation but give due deference to the district court’s decision that 
12 

the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” United States v. 

Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). 

At sentencing, the district court varied upward from the Guidelines range of 15 

to 21 months8

 and imposed a sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment. CaballeroAnaya argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because: the district 

court relied upon factors already included within the Guidelines, the incarceration of 

unlawful immigrants for immigration violations unreasonably uses taxpayer dollars, 

and the upward variance created unwarranted sentencing disparities. 

In imposing its sentence, the district court varied upward because the 

“guideline calculations simply do not reflect accurately or adequately the aggravated 

criminal history of the defendant.” It focused on Caballero-Anaya’s more than 25-

year “history of violating the immigration laws of this country,” coupled with his 

history of “numerous other convictions unrelated to immigration” while in the United 

States, including “not less than four convictions for driving under the influence and 

aggravated motor vehicle theft.” 

The court also addressed the need for deterrence, respect for the law, the 

danger to the community, and the characteristics of the defendant. For the court, the 

need for deterrence required the upward variance, given Caballero-Anaya’s four prior 

 8

 The district court sustained Caballero-Anaya’s objection to considering one 

prior felony conviction for purposes of increasing the offender characteristics, 

resulting in the corrected applicable Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months. Even after 

the corrected guideline calculation was established, the court twice reaffirmed its 

sentence and articulated its rationale that this sentence was appropriate even with the 

reduced Guidelines range. 
13 

federal criminal prosecutions, eight prior removals, and one prior voluntary departure 

after illegal entry. The court explicitly considered the escalating periods of 

incarceration for each subsequent illegal reentry: 45 days, six months, 15 months, 

and 21 months. It viewed this pattern, augmented by Caballero-Anaya’s immediate 

reentry, or reentry so quickly that he was still subject to court-imposed supervised 

release, as demonstrating his disregard for the laws of the United States and the 

inadequacy of the Guidelines range. 

The court also considered the danger to the community posed by CaballeroAnaya’s continued pattern of illegal acts, including repeated instances of driving 

under the influence. Finally, the court explicitly based its upward variance on the 

need “to reflect the seriousness of this offense” in context, to promote respect for the 

law, to deter the defendant and ‘those similarly situated and inclined,” and to provide 

just punishment to the defendant. This articulation directly related to specific 

§ 3553(a) factors: the need for deterrence, the nature of the offense and 

characteristics of the defendant, the danger to the community, and the need to 

provide just punishment for the crime. See § 3553(a)(1)-(2).

“District courts have broad discretion to consider particular facts in fashioning 

a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), even when those facts are already accounted 

for in the advisory Guidelines range.” United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 

F.3d 1208, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008). We have previously determined that a propensity 

to return and “near-immediate” return—both of which are amply demonstrated in this 
14 

record—support a district court’s decision to vary upwards. See United States v. 

Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2006). 

Caballero-Anaya also contends that the upward variance creates an 

unwarranted sentence disparity between similarly situated defendants. His focus on 

this factor is misplaced. “[Section] 3553(a)(6)’s consideration of unwarranted 

sentence disparities is but one factor that a district court must balance against the 

other § 3553(a) factors in arriving at an appropriate sentence.” United States v. 

Martinez, 610 F.3d 1216, 1228 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Moreover, 

“[d]isparate sentences are allowed where the disparity is explicable by the facts on 

the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). In this case, the court considered a number of 

§ 3553(a) factors pertaining to Caballero-Anaya’s history and characteristics and the 

nature and seriousness of the offense. These factors counterbalanced § 3553(a)(6)’s 

concern for sentence disparities. Under our deferential standard of review, we do not 

review the weight a district court assigns to each of the factors or the balance it 

ultimately strikes among them. See id. at 1229. Instead, giving due deference to the 

district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justify the extent of 

the variance, we affirm “[a]s long as the balance struck by the district court among 

the factors set out in § 3553(a) is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 

unreasonable.” Id. at 1229 (quotation omitted). We conclude that the district court’s 

sentence was not unreasonable. 
15 

IV

 Caballero-Anaya’s conviction and sentence for illegal reentry are 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge