*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

1

 We note that it is apparent from the record that the first defendant’s last

name is “Lyon,” rather than “Lyons.” We have, however, captioned the case as it

appeared in the district court.

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 17, 2007*

Decided November 5, 2007

Before

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 06-4371

JOSEPH L. BELL, Appeal from the United States 

Plaintiff-Appellant, District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin

v.

No. 04 C 926

RICK LYONS, GLENDA MEEKS,

BILL JOHNSON and MARK ZBIERANEK,1

 Charles N. Clevert, Jr.,

Defendants-Appellants. Judge.

O R D E R

Joseph Bell claims in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the defendants,

three Wisconsin parole agents and their supervisor, violated his constitutional

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance 

with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-4371 Page 2

rights by detaining him while investigating suspected violations of his parole

without first permitting him to take a polygraph. The district court granted

summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that Bell, whose parole has since

been discharged, had no right to a polygraph before any detention. We agree and

affirm the judgment.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Bell robbed and strangled a woman in

her home and in 1987 was convicted of second-degree murder and robbery. He was

paroled in 1995, but his parole was revoked three years later. Within two years of

his return to prison, Bell reached his mandatory release date, a statutorily

determined date by which a Wisconsin inmate must be paroled. See WIS. STAT. 

§ 302.11. Bell was released again subject to compliance with standardized Rules of

Community Supervision. One of those rules, Rule 17, states that the parolee “shall

submit to the polygraph (lie detector) examination process as directed by your agent

in accordance with Wisconsin Administrative Code 332.15.” Four times during the

term of his parole, which ended in December 2005, Bell was detained for suspected

violations of his parole conditions. After two of the detentions, he admitted the

suspected violations and was released upon agreeing to additional conditions. After

the other two detentions, he was released because the suspected violations could not

be confirmed. 

Bell claimed, based on his reading of Rule 17, that the defendants were

required to administer a polygraph to verify their suspicions before detaining him. 

The defendants responded, and the district court agreed, that Rule 17 does not

confer on any parolee a right to insist on taking a polygraph, and that, in any case,

the rule allows polygraphs only “in accordance with Wisconsin Administrative Code

332.15,” which governs sex offenders. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 332.15. Bell is

not a sex offender, the court explained, so Rule 17 did not even apply to him. 

Morever, the court continued, the defendants on each occasion had reasonable

suspicion to believe that Bell had violated the conditions of his parole and thus were

justified in detaining him.

On appeal, Bell continues to insist that Rule 17 vested him with a right to

insist on taking a polygraph before he could be detained on suspicion of violating his

parole. Bell’s reading of the rule is not only untenable, as the district court noted,

but it is also irrelevant because the rule’s interpretation is purely an issue of state

law. In any case, parolees have liberty interests more limited than those of the

general population, and the defendants needed only reasonable suspicion that Bell

had violated the terms of his parole to take him into custody. See Knox v. Smith,

342 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2003); State v. Goodrum, 449 N.W.2d 41, 44-45 (Wis. Ct.

App. 1989); cf. Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Police are

entitled to act on information that may be inaccurate and let the courts determine

whether to credit a suspect’s claim of innocence.”). The district court concluded that
No. 06-4371 Page 3

the defendants had reasonable suspicion each time they detained Bell, and Bell

does not challenge that finding on appeal.

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.