15-653-cv
Lawson v. Hilderbrand

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRON IC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the
14 th day of March, two thousand sixteen.

Present: AMALYA L. KEARSE, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, ROBERT D. SACK, Circuit Judges

.

_____________________________________________________

DUNCAN LAWSON, JANE DO E, a minor child, PPA DUNCAN LAWSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

,

v. 15-653-cv

TIMOTHY HILDERBRAND, GARY HOFFKINS, RICHARD STOOK, JOSEPH RONDINI, FREDERICK QUEZADA,

Defendants-Appellants

,

TOWN OF GREENWICH,

Defendant.

_____________________________________________________
Appearing for Appellants: Andrew M. McPh erson, Goldstein & Peck, P.C. (William J. Kupinse, Jr., on the brief ) Bridgeport, CT.

Appearing for Appellees: William S. Palmieri, New Haven, CT.2 Appeal from the United States District C ourt for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J. ).

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of said Dist rict Court be and it hereby is REVERSED

.

Timothy Hilderbrand, Gary Hoffkins, Ri chard Stook, Joseph Rondini, and Frederick Quezada (together, “Defendants”) appeal from th e February 23, 2015 order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J .) denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the theory that Defenda nts were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ search and seizure claims in the first count of the complaint. Lawson v. Hilderbrand

, 88 F. Supp. 3d 84 (D. Conn. 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specifi cation of issues for review.

Qualified immunity shields government official s from civil suits for damages “insofar as
their conduct does not violate clea rly established statut ory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Ordinarily, an appeal from the denial of a moti on for summary judgment is not permitted as that decision is not a final judgment. O’Bert ex rel. Estate of O’Bert v. Vargo , 331 F.3d 29, 38 (2d Cir. 2003). Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is immediately appeal able where the district court
denied the motion as a matter of law. Jones v. Papineau , 465 F.3d 46, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2006). However, defendants may only take an appeal if they accept as tr ue plaintiff’s version of the facts for purposes of the appeal. Id. We review the district court’ s law-based deni al of summary judgment on the issue of qua lified immunity de novo. See Finigan v. Marshall , 574 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 2009).

When a government official charged with violating federal constitutional rights seeks summary judgment on the ground of qualified imm unity, the Court may first consider whether there was a “violation of clearly established la w before turning to the more difficult question
whether the relevant facts make out a constitutional question at all.” Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 239 (2009). Here, we conclude that th e lack of clearly established law barring the police actions entitles the Defenda nts to qualified immunity for their actions. The police entered the home with Duncan Lawson’s consent, and when that consent was revoked it was objectively
reasonable for the defendants to believe that exigent circumstances made their continued presence in the house, and their confinement of the residents to th e living room, lawful. See Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011). As “the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence has long been recognized as a suffi cient justification for a warrantless search,” id. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted) it follows th at the need to preven t the destruction of evidence provides sufficient justification for the less intrusive act of securing the premises until a
search warrant is obtained.3 We have considered all of the plaintiffs’ ar guments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court he reby is REVERSED, and this matter remanded for further proceedings consiste nt with this order.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk