[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Innkeeper Ministries, Inc. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5104.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-5104

INNKEEPER MINISTRIES, INC., APPELLEE, v. TESTA, TAX COMMR., APPELLANT. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Innkeeper Ministries, Inc. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 

2016-Ohio-5104.] 

Taxation―Real property―Charitable-use exemption―R.C. 5709.121(A)(2)―

Recreational religious retreat designed for Christian leaders― Use 

restricted by religion―Property not eligible for exemption because use 

not made available on nondiscriminatory basis.

(No. 2014-0490—Submitted December 15, 2015—Decided July 27, 2016.) 

APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2010-2803. 

____________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 

(“BTA”), which reversed the tax commissioner’s denial of a charitable-use 

exemption to property owned by Innkeeper Ministries, Inc., and ordered that the 

exemption be granted. The property is extensive and contains two large 
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2

residential buildings along with various recreational amenities. Innkeeper’s 

mission is to invite religious leaders to stay at the property at no charge and enjoy 

the amenities, as well as free meals, as a type of spiritual retreat. 

{¶ 2} The tax commissioner has appealed, setting forth five propositions 

of law. Among other things, the tax commissioner contends that the use of the 

property as a residence by a caretaker couple and the lack of quantitive evidence 

of its use in connection with their ministry defeats the claim for exemption. We 

agree, and we therefore reverse on those grounds. Because we conclude that 

these points are dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach the tax commissioner’s 

other arguments. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The organization 

{¶ 3} Innkeeper Ministries, Inc., is an Ohio nonprofit with 501(c)(3) 

federal tax status. Robert Hartenstein is secretary/treasurer, Hartenstein’s son is 

president, and Don Kline is a member-at-large of the board. 

The property at issue 

{¶ 4} The property consists of 71.066 acres improved with two main 

buildings, the Chesed Inn and the Eagle’s Wing Manor. The Chesed Inn has 

seven bedrooms, the Manor an unspecified number; both buildings are used to 

accommodate guests. 

{¶ 5} There is a swimming pool, basketball court, fishing ponds, and a 

“prayer walk” through the wooded property. The properties were donated to the 

ministry in four increments from 2002 through 2006. In December 2007, the 

parcels were combined into a single tract for tax purposes. 

Residential use, ministry, and mission 

{¶ 6} Robert and Janet Hartenstein, the caretakers, reside permanently in 

part of the Chesed Inn. Two other relatives have lived there for lengthy periods as 

well. 
January Term, 2016 

3

{¶ 7} Innkeeper takes its mission from the parable of the Good Samaritan, 

Luke 10:29-37, in which a Samaritan takes pity on a wounded traveler, binds his 

wounds, and takes him to an inn, paying the innkeeper to look after him. 

Innkeeper makes its amenities available free of charge to any full-time pastor, 

parachurch leader, Christian school educator, or missionary, and their spouses as a 

retreat and place of “Sabbath rest” restorative to the spirit. In addition to the 

recreational amenities already discussed, there is also a cabin converted into a 

chapel. 

{¶ 8} Robert Hartenstein offers counseling in the form of listening to 

guests’ spiritual concerns and helping them to discern God’s will; he has no 

formal training and there are no formal sessions. The Hartensteins cook meals for 

all guests and take care of the premises; they accept their lodging there in lieu of 

monetary compensation. No charge is made for the services, but unsolicited 

donations are accepted. 

{¶ 9} The Hartensteins advertise the services offered at the property and 

make them available generally on a year-round basis. But they have not 

succeeded in filling all the rooms at any one time. The record contains 

testimonial letters in support of the understanding that worship occurs on the 

premises. 

{¶ 10} Although there is testimony and documentation relating to the 

mission and the hospitality offered at the property, the record does not contain 

financial statements or documentation of the numbers of persons served. The 

only mention of a number occurs when Mr. Hartenstein was asked, “Do you know 

how many have come seeking that type of need since the inception of the 

ministry?” Hartenstein replied, “We quit counseling [sic] at 11,000.” In context, 

it is not clear whether this number refers to the number of guests who stayed or 

the number of persons who inquired about the services. In any event, no 

supporting documentation was submitted.
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Proceedings before the tax commissioner 

{¶ 11} Innkeeper filed the exemption application in 2008, seeking 

exemption for that year. The application cites three statutes as grounds for 

exemption: R.C. 5709.07(A), 5709.12(B), and 5709.121(A). 

{¶ 12} The tax commissioner issued his determination on August 9, 2010, 

considering and denying exemption under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), which exempts 

houses used exclusively for public worship; R.C. 5709.07(A)(3), which exempts 

church-owned property used primarily for church retreats and camps; and R.C. 

5709.12(B) and 5709.121(A), which exempt property used exclusively for 

charitable purposes. 

{¶ 13} As for R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), the commissioner found that the 

property was not used to “facilitate public worship in a principal, primary and 

essential way.” Instead, the property offered only an indirect support of worship 

that did not qualify the property to be viewed as “used exclusively for public 

worship.” As for R.C. 5709.07(A)(3), the commissioner found that the property 

did not qualify as a church retreat because it was not owned by a church and it 

was not used for church retreats but for “sabbaticals” for pastors and church 

leaders. 

{¶ 14} As for charitable use, the commissioner cited the charity standard 

from two cases, Highland Park Owners, Inc. v. Tracy, 71 Ohio St.3d 405, 644 

N.E.2d 284 (1994), and Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Tax Commr., 5 Ohio St.2d 

117, 214 N.E.2d 222 (1966). The commissioner stated that the activity at issue 

here did not meet the standard because Innkeeper used the property “as a home 

site,” its facilities were “not open or available to the general public,” and “any 

benefit to the public or mankind generally is an indirect result of the applicant’s 

activity of providing pastors and other church leaders with a place for 

sabbaticals.” 

 
January Term, 2016 

5

Proceedings before the BTA 

{¶ 15} Innkeeper appealed to the BTA. At the hearing the BTA held on 

March 25, 2013, Innkeeper presented the testimony of Robert Hartenstein, the 

applicant for the exemption, a principal of Innkeeper, and permanent on-site 

resident on the property. In its brief at the BTA, Innkeeper abandoned its claims 

under R.C. 5709.07 and focused exclusively on obtaining an exemption for 

charitable use. 

{¶ 16} The BTA issued its decision on February 28, 2014. The BTA first 

found that “Innkeeper’s year round use of the subject property, in providing a 

place of respite for the physical and spiritual renewal of Christian leaders, without 

charge, [is] sufficiently charitable in nature to fall within the definition of charity 

set forth in Planned Parenthood [5 Ohio St.2d 117, 214 N.E.2d 222].” BTA No. 

2010-2803, 2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1305, 6-7 (Feb. 28, 2014). This finding was 

made in a paragraph discussing the standard for determining status of the owner 

as a “charitable institution,” and the BTA’s finding equates to a finding that 

Innkeeper so qualified. 

{¶ 17} Next, the BTA stated that “as a charitable institution, Innkeeper 

must qualify for exemption pursuant to the provisions of R.C. 5709.121(A)(2) 

* * *.” Quoting Cincinnati Community Kollel v. Testa, 135 Ohio St.3d 219, 

2013-Ohio-396, 985 N.E.2d 1236, ¶ 28, for the proposition that “ ‘the focus of the 

inquiry should be on the relationship between the actual use of the property and 

the purpose of the institution,’ ” the BTA concluded that the property qualified for 

exemption. The BTA found that Innkeeper used its property “in furtherance of or 

incidental to its charitable * * * purposes and not with the view to profit” within 

the meaning of R.C. 5709.121(A)(2). 

 
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THE RESIDENTIAL USE OF THE PROPERTY AND THE LACK OF QUANTITATIVE 

EVIDENCE OF CHARITABLE USE MILITATE AGAINST EXEMPTION

1. Ohio law provides a specific exemption for church retreats, but 

Innkeeper does not qualify 

{¶ 18} Earlier in these proceedings, the tax commissioner carefully 

considered and denied exemption under R.C. 5709.07(A)(3), which exempts 

“[r]eal property owned and operated by a church that is used primarily for church 

retreats or church camping, and that is not used as a permanent residence.” 

Innkeeper’s property at issue does not qualify under the plain terms of (A)(3) both 

because it is not owned by a church and because it is subject to substantial 

residential use by the Hartensteins. Indeed, at the hearing, Robert Hartenstein 

stated, “[W]e are not a church.” 

{¶ 19} Innkeeper’s claim and the BTA’s decision reflect a reading of the 

exemption for charitable use, R.C. 5709.12(B) and 5709.121, that is so expansive 

that it in effect grants an exemption for a residential property opened to guests 

with the goal of providing a spiritual retreat. The fact that an exemption exists for 

such retreats but only when owned by churches suggests that recognizing a 

charitable-use exemption here should be approached with caution. See Church of 

God in N. Ohio, Inc. v. Levin, 124 Ohio St.3d 36, 2009-Ohio-5939, 918 N.E.2d 

981, ¶ 30 (“we have recognized a general principle that a property owner may not 

evade the limitations imposed with respect to a specific tax exemption by 

claiming exemption under a broad reading of other exemption statutes”). 

2. Personal and permanent residential use militates against a finding of 

charitable use 

{¶ 20} The record demonstrates that the Hartensteins permanently reside 

on the property at issue. The tax commissioner correctly points out that 

“ ‘[r]esidence in a dwelling with a family must necessarily be a private use of the 

premises,’ ” and “ ‘[w]here the exercise of such private rights constitutes the 
January Term, 2016 

7

primary use of the property, [that] property is no longer used exclusively for 

charitable purposes.’ ” First Baptist Church of Milford v. Wilkins, 110 Ohio St.3d 

496, 2006-Ohio-4966, 854 N.E.2d 494, ¶ 21, quoting W. Res. Academy v. Bd. of 

Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133, 136, 91 N.E.2d 497 (1950). That logic has more 

recently been extended to the denial of an exemption for low-income housing 

furnished to tenants by a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, on the theory that the 

tenants’ residential use means that the property use cannot be characterized as 

“exclusively” charitable. See NBC-USA Hous., Inc.—Five v. Levin, 125 Ohio 

St.3d 394, 2010-Ohio-1553, 928 N.E.2d 715, ¶ 6-9. 

{¶ 21} In opposition, Innkeeper faults the tax commissioner’s reliance on 

First Baptist Church of Milford on the grounds that the exemption claim in that 

case was advanced solely under R.C. 5709.12(B) directly, without recourse to 

R.C. 5709.121. Under the expanded definition of “exclusive charitable use” 

provided by R.C. 5709.121, Innkeeper contends, residential use does not defeat 

exemption so long as such use qualifies as purely incidental to the charitable 

purposes of the property owner. See R.C. 5709.121(A)(2); Cincinnati Nature Ctr. 

Assn. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 48 Ohio St.2d 122, 357 N.E.2d 381 (1976); 

Cincinnati Community Kollel v. Testa, 135 Ohio St.3d 219, 2013-Ohio-396, 985 

N.E.2d 1236. While this argument is well grounded in the law, it sidesteps the 

most fundamental issue in this case: whether Innkeeper could qualify as a 

“charitable institution,” a prerequisite to applying R.C. 5709.121. 

{¶ 22} The flaw in Innkeeper’s argument, and in the BTA’s decision, is 

that Innkeeper cannot qualify as a “charitable institution” in this case unless its 

use of the property at issue, which is its only activity, can itself qualify as 

charitable. “The determination whether a property owner qualifies as a charitable 

institution under R.C. 5709.121 requires examination of the ‘core activity’ of the 

institution and determining whether that activity qualifies as charitable for 

property-tax purposes.” Rural Health Collaborative of S. Ohio, Inc. v. Testa, 145 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

Ohio St.3d 430, 2016-Ohio-508, 50 N.E.3d 486, ¶ 23, citing Dialysis Clinic, Inc. 

v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 215, 2010-Ohio-5071, 938 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 28-30; see also 

Northeast Ohio Psych. Inst. v. Levin, 121 Ohio St.3d 292, 2009-Ohio-583, 903 

N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 14-15. This circumstance distinguishes Innkeeper’s situation 

decisively from that of the claimants in Cincinnati Nature Ctr. and Cincinnati 

Community Kollel. 

{¶ 23} In Cincinnati Nature Ctr., the institution maintained a conservation 

center and working farm encompassing some 750 acres, and it educated thousands 

of students and teachers annually about ecology and the natural environment. 

Two houses on the property were used as residences by two naturalists who were 

full-time employees of the institution and as such were on call 24 hours a day to 

prevent damage to the property. Under the circumstances of that case, it was clear 

both that the institution through its activities could qualify as charitable and that 

the provision of housing was merely incidental to the overriding charitable 

purposes. 

{¶ 24} In Cincinnati Community Kollel, 135 Ohio St.3d 219, 2013-Ohio396, 985 N.E.2d 1236, we had in an earlier appeal determined that the Kollel 

qualified as an educational institution for purposes of applying R.C. 5709.121. 

See Cincinnati Community Kollel v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 138, 2007-Ohio-1249, 

863 N.E.2d 147. The remaining issue was whether the use of the property as 

residences for the Kollel’s students should be regarded as a use “in furtherance of 

or incidental to” the Kollel’s educational purposes within the meaning of R.C. 

5709.121(A)(2). Because the BTA had imported additional standards beyond 

those prescribed by the statute, we remanded for further proceedings. 

{¶ 25} Again we emphasize that Innkeeper cannot bootstrap itself into 

charitable status merely by claiming exemption under R.C. 5709.121 as well as 

under R.C. 5709.12(B) directly. 
January Term, 2016 

9

3. Given the residential use of the property, the BTA erred by failing to 

require proof of the primacy of charitable hospitality 

{¶ 26} Like exemption applicants generally, Innkeeper bore the onus of 

showing that “the language of the statute ‘clearly express[es] the exemption’ in 

relation to the facts of the claim.” Anderson/Maltbie Partnership v. Levin, 127 

Ohio St.3d 178, 2010-Ohio-4904, 937 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 16, quoting Ares, Inc. v. 

Limbach, 51 Ohio St.3d 102, 104, 554 N.E.2d 1310 (1990). That burden extended 

to demonstrating that its use of property lay within the ambit of what has been 

deemed charitable by the case law. See id. at ¶ 22 (property used by its lessee as a 

community school not within the scope of exemption permissible under Gerke v. 

Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874), because of the for-profit nature of the lease). 

The case-law authority already discussed is inimical to viewing residential use as 

charitable because that use is a private one not devoted to the good of the broader 

public, and “[w]here the exercise of such private rights constitutes the primary use 

of property,” the latter is “no longer used exclusively for a charitable purpose.” 

W. Res. Academy, 153 Ohio St. at 136, 91 N.E.2d 497. Thus, Innkeeper’s burden 

of proof required a clear demonstration of the primacy of the hospitality that is 

extended to others over the personal, familial, and residential use made of the 

property. 

{¶ 27} The BTA erred as a matter of law by failing to require the 

discharge of that burden of proof. Quite simply, any family can create a corporate 

entity and title the family residence to the corporation. But to entitle the property 

to exemption, an applicant must negate the inference that personal residence 

constitutes the primary use. The record here shows ownership by a 501(c)(3) 

entity, but that entity is controlled by the Hartensteins. Moreover, the 

accommodation of guests at no cost in a spacious residence cannot by itself turn 

the residence into a charity. 
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10 

{¶ 28} The record in this case falls well short of supporting the exemption 

claim because it does not quantify the hospitality extended by the Hartensteins. 

The record is silent on certain salient points. While there is evidence that 

Innkeeper advertised for guests in accordance with its spiritual mission, we are 

not informed how many answered that call, how many were accommodated, and 

how many were turned away. This kind of documentation would be expected of 

Innkeeper as part of its ordinary diligence as a 501(c)(3) entity and an alleged 

charitable institution; the documentation could then have been submitted in 

support of its claim for exemption in this case. Its absence means that Innkeeper 

cannot discharge its burden of proof. 

CONCLUSION

{¶ 29} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the BTA. 

Decision reversed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

O’DONNELL, J., dissents in an opinion that KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., 

join. 

_________________ 

O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 30} Respectfully, I dissent. 

{¶ 31} R.C. 5709.12(B) states that “[r]eal and tangible personal property 

belonging to institutions that is used exclusively for charitable purposes shall be 

exempt from taxation * * *.” And pursuant to R.C. 5709.121(A)(2), real property 

belonging to a charitable institution “shall be considered as used exclusively for 

charitable or public purposes by such institution” if it is “made available under the 

direction or control of such institution * * * for use in furtherance of or incidental 

to its charitable, educational, or public purposes and not with the view to profit.” 

We have stated that “[s]o long as an institution is operated without any view to 
January Term, 2016 

11 

profit and exclusively for a charitable purpose, it is a charitable institution.” Herb 

Soc. of Am., Inc. v. Tracy, 71 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 643 N.E.2d 1132 (1994). 

{¶ 32} Although the General Assembly has not defined what activities 

constitute “charitable purposes” for purposes of R.C. Chapter 5709, we explained 

in Bethesda Healthcare, Inc. v. Wilkins, 101 Ohio St.3d 420, 2004-Ohio-1749, 

806 N.E.2d 142: 

“In the absence of a legislative definition, ‘charity,’ in the 

legal sense, is the attempt in good faith, spiritually, physically, 

intellectually, socially and economically to advance and benefit 

mankind in general, or those in need of advancement and benefit in 

particular, without regard to their ability to supply that need from 

other sources, and without hope or expectation, if not with positive 

abnegation, of gain or profit by the donor or by the instrumentality 

of the charity.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 32, quoting Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Tax Commr., 

5 Ohio St.2d 117, 214 N.E.2d 222 (1966), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 33} Applying that definition, we have recognized that advancing 

religion is a charitable purpose. See, e.g., True Christianity Evangelism v. Zaino, 

91 Ohio St.3d 117, 120, 742 N.E.2d 638 (2001); Am. Commt. of Rabbinical 

College of Telshe, Inc., v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 156 Ohio St. 376, 378, 102 N.E.2d 

589 (1951). 

{¶ 34} In Rabbinical College, we considered the predecessor statute to 

R.C. 5709.12(B)—Section 5353 of the General Code—which stated: “Real and 

tangible personal property belonging to institutions used exclusively for charitable 

purposes, shall be exempt from taxation.” 121 Ohio Laws 241, 242. We 

observed that the statute reflected a change from the prior law, because “the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

words ‘institutions of purely public charity’ have now been replaced by the words 

‘institutions used exclusively for charitable purposes,’ ” and we concluded that “it 

is no longer necessary that an institution used exclusively for the lawful 

advancement of education and of religion be open generally to the public in order 

to have tax exemption of property owned and used by it exclusively for lawful 

educational or religious purposes.” (Emphasis added.) Id. 

{¶ 35} We therefore rejected the proposition that the charitable use 

exemption did not apply to an institution’s property that was “ ‘operated for those 

of the Jewish faith and race’ and was not ‘open to the public.’ ” Id. at 378. Thus, 

Ohio does not mandate that property be open generally to the public in order to be 

exempt from taxation. This has been the law in Ohio for more than six decades. 

{¶ 36} More recently, in Herb Soc. of Am., 71 Ohio St.3d at 376, 643 

N.E.2d 1132, we rejected the view that an organization is not charitable “because 

it restricts membership to selected individuals.” Following Rabbinical College, 

we explained that a charitable institution “need not be open generally to the public 

if it promotes the lawful advancement of the charitable purpose.” Id. 

{¶ 37} Notwithstanding long-standing precedent from this court, the 

majority concludes that the core activities of Innkeeper Ministries, Inc., are not 

charitable because its property is not open to the public generally. This analysis, 

however, is not only inconsistent with the General Assembly’s decision to 

broaden the charitable use exemption beyond “public charities” to include both 

“charitable institutions” and property “used exclusively for charitable purposes,” 

but also is contrary to the distinction we previously acknowledged in Herb Soc. of 

Am. and Rabbinical College. The change in statutory language reflects the 

legislative intent that a charitable organization is not required to be open to the 

public in general but rather can seek to benefit discrete groups in particular based 

on a specific need for charity. 
January Term, 2016 

13 

{¶ 38} In fact, making charity available only to a specific group may be 

essential to the core activity of the charitable institution, or it may be unavoidable 

due to the charity’s lack of resources. A decision by the Girl Scouts of America, 

for example, to restrict membership to females would not lead us to question its 

status as a charitable institution, see Girl Scouts-Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 

Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493, ¶ 20; nor does a food pantry such 

as the Mid-Ohio Foodbank lose its charitable exemption because it limits its 

charity to the poor and needy rather than opening its doors to the general public. 

{¶ 39} The majority reasons that residential use of property is necessarily 

a private, noncharitable use. This view, however, overlooks the fact that there are 

residential uses of property that are unquestionably charitable. For instance, 

homeless shelters and battered women shelters such as those run by the Friends of 

the Homeless in Columbus and the City Mission in Cleveland have received 

charitable exemptions notwithstanding the residential use of the property. 

Offering an individual a safe place to stay is an attempt to advance and benefit 

those in need of advancement and benefit and therefore is charity as defined by 

our decision in Bethesda Healthcare, 101 Ohio St.3d 420, 2004-Ohio-1749, 806 

N.E.2d 142, at ¶ 32. 

{¶ 40} Thus, reliance on cases involving subsidized low-cost housing or 

residences provided for the personal use of employees and their families is 

misplaced. Those cases are factually distinguishable, because those receiving a 

subsidy or housing as a benefit of employment are in effect paying a share of the 

rent for the private use of the property, and the exclusive use of the property is not 

charitable. See W. Res. Academy v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133, 136, 91 

N.E.2d 497 (1950) (explaining that property used for residences of faculty of a 

nonprofit academy was not tax exempt, because the housing was, in effect, 

provided in lieu of salary). But here, the property is used exclusively for a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

charitable purpose, and its incidental use as a residence for its caretakers serves to 

facilitate that purpose. 

{¶ 41} The accommodations for Innkeeper Ministries’ guests are provided 

at no cost—thereby meeting one part of the test for charity that we articulated in 

Bethesda Healthcare, i.e., that the service is provided without expectation of gain 

or profit, and the residential use of the property is charitable. 

{¶ 42} Moreover, in this case, the BTA noted that the charitable mission 

of Innkeeper Ministries is to advance religion by offering a place of “Sabbath 

rest” for the physical and spiritual renewal of church leaders through personal 

worship, prayer, meditation, reflection, and Bible study at no cost to guests and 

participants. BTA No. 2010-2803, 2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1305, 4-5 (Feb. 28, 

2014). The BTA credited Innkeeper Ministries’ belief that “ ‘Sabbath rest is most 

effectively achieved in a reclusive atmosphere such as that provided by 

Innkeeper’s 71 acres located in a remote rural setting.’ ” Id. at 5, quoting 

Innkeeper Ministries’ brief at 2. Sabbath rest cannot be achieved by opening the 

property to the general public or to those not in need of Sabbath rest. Thus, the 

fact that Innkeeper Ministries offers its facilities to church leaders is not indicative 

of a private use, but rather advances its goal of providing “ ‘services that 

encourage, support and edify Christian leadership, weary and, at times, wounded 

from their godly pursuits.’ ” Id. at 4-5, quoting the statutory transcript at 73. 

{¶ 43} The majority confuses the core use of the property—the mission to 

advance religion by offering a place for Sabbath rest—with its incidental use as a 

residence for the caretakers, the Hartensteins. Providing a place for Sabbath rest 

necessarily includes giving the guests a place to rest and sleep, which is the 

primary use of the property, and therefore, having the Hartensteins reside on site 

serves Innkeeper’s core purposes, because they cook meals for all guests, provide 

counseling, maintain the premises, and donate their time and energy to ensure that 

residents can achieve physical and spiritual renewal. More than 11,000 people 
January Term, 2016 

15 

have come to Innkeeper Ministries seeking Sabbath rest; the mission is a 24 hour 

a day, seven day a week ministry to ensure the opportunity for rest and spiritual 

renewal of the guests, and the Hartensteins’ residence on the premises is 

incidental to that mission. 

{¶ 44} In my view, this issue is enlightened by Cincinnati Nature Ctr. 

Assn. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 48 Ohio St.2d 122, 357 N.E.2d 381 (1976), where we 

held that providing naturalists housing on property used as a nature center was 

incidental to the institution’s overriding charitable purposes and therefore did not 

preclude the property from being tax exempt. In that case, employees lived on 

site to prevent damage to the property. But while allowing employees to live at a 

nature center that is closed to visitors after hours is only incidental to its charitable 

purpose of providing educational and nature experiences when it is open, the 

Hartensteins’ residence on the property is not only incidental to Innkeeper’s core 

purpose of advancing religion but also is essential to its purpose, because they 

tend to the needs of those seeking Sabbath rest, and unlike the nature center, 

Innkeeper is never closed. 

{¶ 45} Our caselaw has recognized that property is “used exclusively” for 

charitable purposes if the “primary use” is charitable. Girl Scouts-Great Trail 

Council, 113 Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493, at ¶ 19, citing True 

Christianity Evangelism, 91 Ohio St.3d at 120, 742 N.E.2d 638, and Moraine Hts. 

Baptist Church v. Kinney, 12 Ohio St.3d 134, 135, 465 N.E.2d 1281 (1984). And 

whether property is used for charitable purposes is a question of fact to be decided 

by the BTA, not this court. See Rural Health Collaborative of S. Ohio, Inc. v. 

Testa, 145 Ohio St.3d 430, 2016-Ohio-508, 50 N.E.3d 486, ¶ 24. 

{¶ 46} Although the majority recognizes that the property includes guest 

rooms, a chapel, and a prayer walk and does not dispute that the property serves 

spiritual objectives without a view to profit, it nonetheless substitutes its judgment 

for the BTA, disregarding the BTA’s factual finding that “providing a place of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

respite for the physical and spiritual renewal of Christian leaders * * * fall[s] 

within the definition of charity * * *.” 2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1305, 6-7. And in 

doing so, it also trivializes the value of Sabbath rest by suggesting that the 

property is in essence a place of recreation because recreational facilities are 

available for guests. In fact, Innkeeper Ministries provides not only recreation, 

but also spiritual opportunities for its guests. This is in keeping with our 

explanation of charity in Bethesda Healthcare, 101 Ohio St.3d 420, 2004-Ohio1749, 806 N.E.2d 142, at ¶ 32—the attempt in good faith spiritually and 

physically to advance and benefit those in need of advancement and benefit 

without expectation of gain or profit. By providing both religious and athletic 

facilities for its guests, Innkeeper Ministries meets our definition of charity. 

{¶ 47} Pursuant to R.C. 5717.04, our role in reviewing the BTA is to 

determine whether its decisions are reasonable and lawful. As we acknowledged 

in HealthSouth Corp. v. Levin, 121 Ohio St.3d 282, 2009-Ohio-584, 903 N.E.2d 

1179, “we do not sit as a ‘super BTA,’ ” id. at ¶ 35, but rather “we defer to the 

BTA’s factual findings if they are supported by reliable and probative evidence in 

the record,” Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. 

of Revision, 145 Ohio St.3d 115, 2016-Ohio-78, 47 N.E.3d 144, ¶ 16. The BTA 

in this case found that Innkeeper Ministries is a charitable institution and that its 

property is primarily used for charitable purposes and, therefore, it is exempt from 

real property taxes. In my view, reliable and probative evidence in the record 

supports these findings. Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the sound 

decision of the BTA. 

KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

 Jay C. Bennett, for appellee. 

 Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and David D. Ebersole and Barton 

Hubbard, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant. 
January Term, 2016 

17 

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