[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12611

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JARVIS WAYNE MADISON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cr-00015-RBD-LRH-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12611

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jarvis Madison, a federal prisoner counseled on appeal, appeals the district court's finding he was competent to stand trial before he pleaded guilty to interstate stalking, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2261a and 2261(b). Madison contends the district 

court erred when it limited its competency analysis to whether he 

could consult with his attorneys without considering whether he 

could rationally or relevantly testify, and that his inability to testify 

coherently and intelligently adversely impacted his ability to assist 

in his defense. 

The Government responds by moving for summary affirmance of the district court’s order and to stay the briefing schedule, 

asserting Madison abandoned any challenge to the district court’s 

acceptance of his guilty plea, so summary affirmance is warranted. 

It further contends because Madison does not argue on appeal that 

the district court erred in determining he was competent to plead 

guilty at the time he entered his guilty plea, it is irrelevant whether 

he was incompetent at some time before he pleaded guilty. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits 

the Government from trying an incompetent defendant. U.S. 

Const. amend. V; United States v. Rahim, 431 F.3d 753, 759 (11th 

Cir. 2005). For a defendant to be competent to stand trial, he must 

have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 

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21-12611 Opinion of the Court 3

reasonable degree of rational understanding and have a rational 

and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky 

v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). The defendant’s competency is an ongoing inquiry, and he must be competent at all stages 

of the trial. Rahim, 431 F.3d at 759. A district court must conduct 

a competency hearing when there is a bona fide doubt regarding 

the defendant’s competency. Id. The same competency standard 

applies to a defendant who wishes to plead guilty rather than stand 

trial. United States v. Rodriguez., 751 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 

2014). 

The district court’s competency determination is primarily 

factual in nature. United States v. Izquierdo, 448 F.3d 1269, 1278

(11th Cir. 2006). In Izquierdo, the record contained expert opinions 

that differed in their conclusions about the defendant’s competence. Id. We rejected the defendant’s argument the district court 

erred when it found him competent because there were two permissible views of the evidence. Id. at 1279.

Summary affirmance is appropriate because Madison abandoned the issue of whether he was competent to enter his change 

of plea and plead guilty, as he does not challenge his conviction on 

appeal based on that ground. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 

F.3d 1273, 1283 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating an issue on appeal 

must be plainly and prominently raised in the party’s brief, and the 

brief must devote a discrete, substantial portion of their argument 

to that issue, or the issue will be deemed abandoned). But, even if 

Madison did not abandon his right to challenge his guilty plea, the 

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Government’s position is still correct as a matter of law and summary affirmance is warranted. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969)1 (explaining summary disposition is appropriate where the position of one of the parties is 

clearly right as a matter of law so there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case). 

First, clear error review applies to the district court’s decision Madison was competent to stand trial and competent to enter 

his guilty plea. See Izquierdo, 448 F.3d at 1276 (reviewing a district 

court’s decision on a defendant’s competency to stand trial for clear 

error). The magistrate judge conducted an extensive three-day 

competency hearing where eight expert witnesses testified regarding Madison’s competency. Although Madison’s and the Government’s expert witnesses came to different conclusions about his 

competency, the district court cannot clearly err when deciding between two permissible views of the evidence. See id. at 1278. Likewise, the magistrate judge thoroughly explained in her report and 

recommendation (R&R) why she afforded more weight to the 

Government’s expert witnesses’ opinions over Madison’s expert 

witnesses, due in part to the frequency and recency of the Government’s witnesses’ evaluations of Madison. Additionally, the magistrate judge noted she observed Madison’s behavior and reactions 

1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), 

this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 

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21-12611 Opinion of the Court 5

at his competency hearings. She found he was able to communicate with his attorneys and he responded competently and appropriately to her questions. The district court reviewed the record de 

novo, considered the R&R, and concluded Madison was restored 

to competency and was competent to stand trial. Accordingly, the 

district court did not clearly err when it found that Madison was 

competent to stand trial. 

Second, after the district court found Madison competent to 

stand trial, he entered into a plea agreement with the Government. 

Plain error review applies because Madison did not raise the issue 

of his competency at his change of plea hearing. See Rodriguez, 

751 F.3d at 1251 (stating we review for plain error when a defendant fails to object to the district court’s determination that he is 

competent to plead guilty). Because a defendant’s competency is 

an ongoing inquiry, and because the district court did not clearly 

err when it found Madison was competent to stand trial, it did not 

plainly err when it again inquired into his competency when he 

changed his plea. At Madison’s change of plea hearing, the district 

court asked his counsel whether they were concerned about his 

competency, and counsel stated that Madison was competent and 

stated they did not wish to further pursue his competency. 

Also, Madison testified under oath he was voluntarily and 

freely entering the change of plea, he had full knowledge of the 

consequences, and there was a factual basis upon which the district 

court could accept the plea. Similarly, the district court noted Madison was alert and intelligent, understood the nature of the charges 

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-12611

against him and the possible penalties, the consequences of pleading guilty, that his plea was free, knowing, voluntary, and intelligently made, he understood the court’s questions and appropriately answered them, he did not exhibit any irrational behavior, 

and comported himself straightforwardly and professionally. Because the district court did not err when it accepted Madison’s 

guilty plea and found him competent at the change of plea hearing, 

he cannot establish plain error and the Government’s position is 

clearly correct as a matter of law. 

Thus, the Government’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law, no substantial question remains as to the outcome of the 

case, and summary affirmance is appropriate. See Groendyke 

Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. Therefore, we GRANT the Government’s motion for summary affirmance and DENY as moot its 

motion to stay the briefing schedule.

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