COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Kelsey and Senior Judge Willis 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

TIMMY BROWN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1596-02-1 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 MARCH 18, 2003 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

Louis R. Lerner, Judge 

 Terry N. Grinnalds for appellant. 

 Jennifer R. Franklin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Timmy Brown was convicted in a bench trial of possession of 

marijuana. On appeal, he contends (1) that the trial court 

erred by denying his motion to suppress, and (2) that the 

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The 

Commonwealth has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because 

Brown has not been sentenced in the trial court, there is no 

final order upon which to base this appeal. We agree and 

dismiss the appeal. 

BACKGROUND

 On September 20, 2001, Brown was convicted in the Hampton 

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of possession of 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
marijuana. Because he had moved to Newport News, his case was 

transferred to the juvenile and domestic relations court of that 

jurisdiction, where final disposition occurred on January 10, 

2002. He moved back to Hampton and appealed his conviction to the 

trial court, which found him guilty and, in its March 14, 2002 

conviction order, "transferred [the] matter to the Hampton 

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for final 

disposition." Brown appeals from that order. 

Analysis

 Code § 17.1-406 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny 

aggrieved party may present a petition for appeal to the Court 

of Appeals from . . . any final conviction in a circuit court of 

a traffic infraction or a crime, except where a sentence of 

death has been imposed." (Emphasis added.) 

 It is well settled that in the absence 

of statute the pronouncement of sentence is 

a prerequisite to the finality of a 

judgment. Consequently, where an appeal is 

limited to a final judgment, an order 

wherein the pronouncement of sentence is 

suspended is ordinarily not appealable. 

Fuller v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 327, 330, 53 S.E.2d 26, 27 

(1949). The trial court convicted appellant but did not 

pronounce sentence. Instead, it transferred the case back to 

the juvenile court. 

 In pertinent part, Code § 16.1-297 provides: 

Upon the rendition of final judgment upon an 

appeal from the juvenile and domestic 

relations district court, the circuit court 

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shall cause a copy of its judgment to be 

filed with the juvenile court within 

twenty-one days of entry of its order, which 

shall thereupon become the judgment of the 

juvenile court. . . . [T]he circuit court 

may remand the child or adult to the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court for its 

supervision and care, under the terms of its 

order or judgment, and thereafter such child 

or adult shall be and remain under the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court in the 

same manner as if such court had rendered 

the judgment in the first instance. 

Because the trial court failed to render a final judgment, it 

transferred the case to the juvenile court prematurely. 

Likewise, this appeal is premature. Therefore, we dismiss the 

appeal without prejudice and remand the case to the trial court. 

Dismissed.

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