### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 15, 200 4
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JOSEP H D . T AY LOR
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Marshall County No. 15,233 Charles Lee , Judge

No. M2004- 01606-CCA -R3-C D - F iled May 19, 2005

The a ppellant, J oseph D. Ta y lor, was c onvicted of attempted rape , attempted se x u al b at tery , and ag g ravated kidnapping

. After a sentenc ing hearing, the appellant wa s sentence d as a c are er of fende r to fifteen ( 15) y ear s for attempted rape , eleve n (11) months and twe nty -nine (29) day s for attempted sexual battery , and twelve (12) y ear s as a violent off ender for a g g ravated ki d n ap p i n g. On direc t
app e a l, this Cou rt

a ff ir me d th e c on vic tio n fo r a tte mpt e d ra pe a nd re ve rs e d the oth e r t wo c on vic tio ns
. Se e Sta te v. Tay lor , 6 3 S. W.3 d 4 00 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 01 ). Th e app e lla nt f ile d a pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction re lief, which was denied by the t rial court after a hea ring . On appe al, this Court set aside the appe llant’s sentenc e for at t empted ra

pe bec ause he was improperly sentenc ed as a

car eer offe nder. See J oseph D. Tay lor v. State, No. M2003-00138-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 W L 350641, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Fe b. 20, 2004). On re mand, the trial c ourt sentenc ed the a ppellant to fifteen ( 15) y ear s as a Rang e I I I offe n d er . A timely

notice of a

ppeal wa s filed. The a

ppellant challeng es hi s sentenc e, arg uing that his sentence violate s Blake ly v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004), be ca u s e t h e trial c ourt improperly applied enhanceme nt fac tors that wer e not admitted by

the appe llant or determined by a jury . After

a re view of the rec ord, we aff irm the judgme nt of the trial court pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t i s A ffirm e d P ur sua nt to Rul e 20 , R ule s o f the Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als
. J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E V E R E T T W ILL IA M S and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined. N. Andy Myrick, Jr., Fay etteville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, J oseph D. Ta y lor.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & R eporte r; Preston Shipp, Assist ant Attorney Gene ral; Mike McCowen, District Attorney Gene ral; Weakley

E. Ba rnar d, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.-2- M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION

Fa ctual B ackg round

On J une 23, 1999, the a ppellant was indicte d by the Marsha ll C o u nty

Gra nd J ury

for attempted ra

pe, attempted se x ual battery , and two counts of a g g ravated kidn a p p in g
. Following a jury trial, the appe llant was convic ted of attempt to commit sexual battery , attempt to commit rape, a nd
a g g ra va te d kidn app ing . T he fa c ts s ur ro un din g the app e lla nt’ s con vic tio ns we re su mma ri zedby thi s Cou rt on dir e c t app e a l in Sta te v. Ta y lor , 6 3 S. W.3 d 4 00 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 01 ) a s f oll ow s:
De fe nd a nt m e t th e vic tim , thirte e n- y e ar- old A. S., wh ile he liv e d n e xt doo r t o the vic tim ’s fa mil y on Park Str e e t in L e wi sb ur g , Te nn e sse e
. (T he min or vic tim wi ll be ref err ed to he rein by his initials.) On May 16, 1999, approximately three to four
wee ks after

Def endant moved to a nother house in the s ame neighbor hood, A.S. rode his bic y cle past Def

endant’ s new a ddress. He stopped to say “Hi” w hen he notice d Def endant wor

king on his c ar in the driveway
. Def endant informed A.S. that he wa s planning to drive to Shelby ville to visi t a frie nd and, if A.S. came ba ck at 11:00 a.m., he c ou ld a c c omp a ny

De fe nd a nt on the tr ip. De fe nd a nt a lso tol d A .S. that hi s p are nts did not need to know of the ir plan.

In t h e m e a n t i m e , A

. S

. w e n tt o l o o k f o r h i s s i x t e e n
- ye ar
- o l d b r o t h e r , T i m o t h y, wh o w a s fis hin g in a ne arb y c re e k. B e c a us e Ti mothy wo re a watc h, A. S. a sk e d h im to keep him informed of the t ime so A.S. could return to Defe ndant’s house at 11:00. Ti mothy didno t c omp ly wi th his re qu e st. Whe n A.S. arrive d a t D e fe nd a nt’ s h ou se twenty mi n u te s late , D e f e n d a n t to ld h im th e trip w a s o f f a n d in v it e d h im in to the house to watc h television instead. A.S. acc epted.

The tele vision was in Defe ndant’s bedr oom, and they sta r te d watching a sca

ry prog ram. I nitially , A.S. sat on one end of Def endant’ s bed and Def

endant sat on the oth e r. Ap pr oximate ly

fi ft e e n mi nu te s late r, Defen da nt s tart e d “ sc oo tin g ” c los e r t o A.S. Eventually , when they wer e sitting only

inches a part, De fenda nt placed his ha nd
on A.S.’s be ll y

n e ar h is b e ll y b u tt o n a n d b e g a n to ru b it in a c ir c u la r mo tion. Def endant told A.S. that “ he liked g irls, but he liked boy s, too” and that, “ if [A.S.] f-- -ed him, he w ould buy [A.S .] anything.” A.S. started to cry . He told Def endant he “w asn’t like that” and pushed him away . A.S. was sca red at this poi nt and dec ided to leave. B ut before he could take m ore than five steps toward the door, De fenda nt pic ke d him up b y

the wa ist wi th b otharm s a nd“ sla mme d” him on to the be d. A. S.-3-

la nd e d o n h is b a c k a ndhis he a d hit the wa ll. De fe nd a nt p inn e d A .S. do wn wi th h is body and told him to st op crying- -he “ didn’t have to be scar ed.”

A. S. w a s u na

ble to m ov e his arm s with De fe nd a nt on top of him , an d h e did
no t st op c rying e ve n a ft e r D e fe nd a nt o rd e re d h im t o sto p. Whe n D e fe nd a nt t oldA. S. that “he mig ht as well f- -- [him] now bec ause he knowed [sic] t hat [A.S.] was g oing to go home and tell mom and dad,” A .S. started cry ing e ven har der. D efe ndant let him sit up then, but stay ed rig ht beside him on the bed. The y wer e sitting only

inches
apa rt , a ndthe te le vis ion wa s st ill on . Wh e n D e fe nd a nt turne d his he a d to loo k a t it , A.S. saw his chanc e for esca pe and “took off running ” as fa st as he could. Onc e out the fr on t do or , A .S. le ape d o nto his bic y c le a nd ro de a way
. He te sti fi e d th a t he did not look back and w as unaw are whether or not Def

endant c hased him.

After A.S. arrive d home, he immediately found his brother, T imothy , who
was ne x t door at the ne ighbor ’s house. Timothy t es t i fied that A.S. wa s crying and up se t. A ft e r A. S. tol d h im tha t D e fe nd a nt “ tr ie d to ra pe him ,” Ti mothy

ma de A. S. te ll the ir fathe r, Jame s, wh a t hap pe ne d. Jame s took A. S. with h im t o f indDe fe nd a nt. S h o rt ly there afte r, they

discovere d Def

endant a s they

wer e driving to his house. Defen dan t w as h eaded in th e op po si te d ir ect io n an d s mi led at th em as he pas sed . By the time James turned the car around, Def endant was g one. James proce eded to the police depa

rtment and re ported the inc ident. The police arr ested De fenda nt ear ly the next day , betwee n 2:00 and 3:00 a.m.
At trial, A.S. further

testified that he ha d visited Defe ndant on other oc casions bu t T imo thy

wa s o rd ina

ri ly wi th hi m. T he y

us ua lly on ly stay e d f if te e n o r t we nty minutes and watc hed television or talke d about ca rs and baseba ll c ards. The y often
sa t in De fe nd a nt’ s b e droo m be c a us e it w a s th e on ly ro om w ith a

te le vis ion . A .S. test if ied tha t, p ri or

to this inc ide nt, De fe nd a nt h a d n e ve r g ive n h im a re a so n to be lie ve that he a ndDe fe nd a nt w e re no t f ri e nd s.
Be th Rhoton, an investigator with the L ewisburg Police Depa rtment, testified that she usually

worke d case s where sex ab u s e wa s involved. Rhoton int ervie wed A. S. o n M a y

16 , 1 99 9, be tw e e n a

pp ro xima te ly

5:0 0 a nd6:3 0 p .m. A. S

. wa s st ill shaking , and appear ed very nervous a nd scar ed. On c ross-examination, Rhoton testified that A.S. did not require me dical tre atment. Tay lor, 63 S.W .3d at 404-05.

F oll ow ing a

se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ou rt se nte nc e d the app e lla nt to e le ve n ( 11 ) m on ths , twenty -nine (29) day s for his attempted se x ual battery conviction, fiftee n (15 ) y ea rs as a ca ree r offe nder f or his attempted ra

pe convic tion, and twelve ( 12) y ear s as a violent 100% R ang e I offe nder for his a g g ravated kidnapping conviction. The tria l court orde red tha t the appellant’ s conviction for attempted sexual battery

be mer g ed with his c onviction for attempted r ape, and his conviction forP rio r to th e p o st-co n v ic tio n h e a rin g , th e S ta te s tip u la te d th a t t h e a p p e llan t’s p rio r c o n v ic tio n s c o n siste d o f six 1 C l as s E f el oni es an d one Cl as s D f el ony wh i ch r emo ved h i m f r om cons i dera t i on as a c ar eer offender for t he at t emp t ed
r ape conv i ct i on. T he t r i al co ur t , however , co ncl uded t hat t he i s s ue of t he appel l ant ’ s s ent enc i ng as a c ar eer offender ha d b e e n p re v io u sly d e te rm ine d o n d ire c t ap p e a l.
-4- attempted ra

pe be me rg ed with his conviction for ag g ravated kidnapping . On appe al, the appe llant arg ued that the e vidence was insufficient to support his convictions on all three offe nses. I n addition, the appe llant challeng ed his sentenc e, ar g uing that the trial court f ailed to g ive prope r consider ation to the mitigating fac tor provided in Te nnessee Code Annotated section 39-13-304( b)(2) , and that the trial court e rre d in sentencing him as a car eer offe nder f

or the a ttempted rape conviction bec ause the Sta te fa ile d to pr ov idea de qu a te no tic e that it wa s se e kin g a n e nh a nc e d p un ish me nt. Th e Sta te ap p ea l ed t h e m er gero f t h e a p p el l an t ’s co n v i ct i o n s i n t o a s i n gl e c o n v i ct i o n fo r a ggrava ted kidnapping and re quested that this Court reinstate the a ppellant’s sepa

rate co nvictions and order consec utive
s en t en ci n g.
On direc t appea l, this Court concluded that the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support appe llant’s three convictions. Tay lor, 63 S.W .3d at 405-09. Ba sed on the fa cts prese nted in the ca se, howe ver, the pane l concluded that dual convictions for attempted sexual battery and attempted r ape c ould not be sustained and reve rsed and dismiss ed the appellant’ s conviction for attempted sexual battery . The panel a lso concluded tha t the appellant’ s offe nse of a g g rava ted kid n ap ping w as incidenta l to the offe nse of attempt to commit rape under State v. A nthony , 817 S.W .2d 299 (Tenn. 1991) . There fore , pursuant to Anthony , the pane l reve rsed the tri al court’s me rg er of the appe llant’s conviction for attempted ra

pe into his convictionfor a g g ravated kidnapping ; reve rsed a nd dismiss ed the a g g ravated kidnapping conviction; and re instated the petitioner’ s conviction and sente nce for attempted rape

. Tay lor, 63 S.W .3d at 403-04.

Subs e q u e n tl y , th e ap p e ll a n t f il e d a p e ti ti o n f

o r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f

. T h e p e ti tion was denied, a nd the appe llant appea led to this Court arg uing that he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of
c ou ns e l be c a us e c ou ns e l: ( 1) fa ile d to a de qu a te ly me e t with the app e lla nt p ri or to t ri a l; ( 2) faile d to int e rv ie w a ndc a ll c e rt a in w itn e sse s to te sti fy ; ( 3) faile d to re qu e st a jury ins truc tio n o n a ssa

ult a s a lesser- included off

ense of attempted rape ; and (4) failed to obje ct to the appellant’ s classification as
a c are e r o ff e nd e r w he n th e tr ia l c ou rt

se nte nc e d th e app e lla nt f

or a tte mpt e d r ape . T he app e lla nt a lso arg ued that his a

ppellate lawy er rende red ineffe ctive assistance of counsel whe n he fa iled to appea l the classific ation of the pe titioner as a care er offende r for the purposes of sentencing

. On re view 1 of the de nial of the post-c onviction petition, a panel of this Court determined that the conduc t of the
app e lla nt’ s tria l c ou ns e l in fa ili ng to ens ur e that th e app e lla nt w a s se nte nc e d in a c c or da nc e wi th statut ory g uid e lin e s f

e ll b e low the rang e of

c omp e te nc e dem and ed of a tto rn e y s in c ri min a l c a se s. J oseph D. Tay lor, 2004 WL 350641, at *8. As a result, the panel set aside the sentence for attempted rape and re manded the c ase f or a ne w sentenc ing he aring . I d. at *11.

On re ma nd , th e tr ia l c ou rt he ld a se nte nc ing he ari ng
. Ho we ve r, bo th p art ie s a g re e d to re ly on the testimony

and evide nce pr esente d at the orig inal sentenc ing he ari n g in lieu of holding a n e nti re ly ne w h e aring. At th e concl us ion of the he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ou rt se nte nc e d th e app e lla nt t o-5-

fiftee n (15) y ear s as a Rang e I I I offe nder, f

inding that the f

ollowing e nhance ment fac tors applied: (1 ) the app e lla nt h a d a

pr e vio us his tory

of c ri min a l c on vi ctio ns or

be ha vio r i n a dd iti on to tho se nece ssary to establish the appropriate rang e, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2); (2) the appellant ha d
a h i s t o r y o f f

a i l i n g t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a s e n t e n c e i n v o l v i n g r e l e a s e i n t o t h e c o m m u n i t y, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(9) ; and (3) the appellant committed the offense to g ratify his desire for pleasure or excitement, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 8). The appellant filed a timely notice of appea l, challeng ing his sente nce ba sed on B lakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___,124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), a nd arg uing that the trial court err ed in apply ing e nhance ment fac tor (8) be cause the trial
c ou rt “ didno t art ic ulate wh a t f a c ts w e re be ing re lie d u po n in app ly ing the e nh a nc ing [sic ] fa c tor in question.”

Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt re c e ntl y de te rm ine d that B lake ly

didno t a nn ou nc e a

ne w r ule of law a nd that “t he Te nnessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t does not authorize a sente ncing proce dure wh i ch violated the Six th Amendment rig ht to jury trial.” State v. Gome z, ___ S .W.3d

___ , N o
. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 1 2 0 9

- S C

- R 1 1

- C D , 2 0 0 5 W L 8 5 6 8 4 8 , a t* 1 7 n
. 1 6 ( T e n n
. A p r
. 1 5 , 2 0 0 5 )

. In Gomez, the court de termin ed t h at d es pite the ability of trial judg es to set sentenc es above the presump ti v e s e n te n c e b a s e d o n th e f in d in g o f e n h a n c e me n t f a c to r s n e ith e r f

o u n d b y a ju r y

or admitted by a d efe ndant, Tenne ssee’ s sentencing structure does not violate the Six th Amendment and does n o t c o n f

li c t w ith th e h o ld in g s o f

B la k e ly v
. Wa s h in g to n , 5 4 2 U

. S.

___, 1 2 4 S. Ct

. 2 5 31 (2004), United States v. Booke r,

___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), or U nited States v. Fa nFa n, the c a se c on so lid a te d w ith B oo ke r, be c a us e “th e Ref orm A c t [of

Te nn e sse e ] au tho ri zes a discretionary , non-manda tory sentenc ing pro cedur e and r equire s trial judge s to consider the principles of s e n te n c in g an d to eng ag e in a qua litative analy sis of enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors

. . . a ll o f w hic h s e rv e to g uide tr ial jud g e s in e xer c isi ng the ir dis c re tio n to se le c t a n a

pp ro pr ia te sentenc e within the ra ng e set by th e L egi slature.” Gomez, ___ S.W .3d at ___, 2005 WL 856848, at *27. Thus, the appellant’ s arg ument that the trial court err ed in a pply ing e nhance ment fac tors that
wer e neither

admitted by

the appe llant nor determined by a jury is without m erit.

Further, the tria l court did not err in apply ing e nhance ment fa ctor (8) . “When re viewing sentenc ing iss u es . . . , the a ppellate c ourt shall conduct a de novo re view on the r ecor d of such issues. Such review shall be conduc ted wi t h a p re s u m p tion that the determinations made by the court fr om which the appeal is taken a re c orre ct.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(d). “ Howeve r, the presumption of cor

rec tness which ac companies the trial court’ s action is conditioned upon the
a ff ir ma tiv e sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t the tr ia l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll
r e l e v a n tf

a c t s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s
. ” S t a t e v
. A s h b y , 8 2 3 S

. W

. 2 d 1 6 6 , 1 6 9 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 1 )

. In conducting our re view, we must consider the de fenda nt’s potential for r ehabilit at ion, the trial and sentenc ing he aring evidenc e, the pr e-se ntence report, the sentenc ing principles, sen t encing
a lte rn a tiv e arg ume nts , th e natur e a ndc ha ra c te r of the of

fe ns e , the e nh a nc ing a ndmit ig a tin g fa c tor s, and the de fenda nt’s statements. Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 40-35-103( 5), -210( b); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 16 9. We a

re to a lso re c og nize that the de fe nd a nt be a rs “ the bu rd e n o f s ho wi ng that th e se nte nc e is improper.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.-6-

In t h e c a s e h e r e i n , t h e ap p e l l a n t w a s c o n v i c t e d o f a t t e m p t e d r ap e , w h i c h i s a C l a s s C f e l o n y. Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 12 -1 07 (a ); 39 -1 3- 50 3( b) . T he app e lla nt d oe s n ot d isp ute his
c la ssi fi c a tio n as a Rang e I I I of fe nd e r, so the rang e of

pu nis hme nt i s te n ( 10 ) t o f if te e n ( 15 ) y e ars
. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( c)( 3). The presumptive sentenc e for a Class C felony is the minim um sentenc e in the rang e if there are no enhanc ement or mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(c)

. Thus, in or der to de termine a defe ndant’s sentenc e, a trial court starts at t h e p resumpti ve sentenc e, enhanc es the sentenc e within the r ang e for exis ting e nhance ment fac tors, and then r educe s the sentenc e within the ra ng e fo r exis ting mitigating f actor s in acc ordanc e with Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-210( e). No particula r weig ht f or eac h fac tor is pr escribed by the statute; the we ig ht g ive n to e a c h f a c tor is l e ft to the dis c re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt a s lo ng a s it

c omp orts w ith the sentenc ing principles and purpose s of our Code a nd as long as its findings a re supported by

the
rec ord. See State v. Santiag o, 914 S.W .2d 116, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. The trial c ourt sentenc ed the a ppellant t o fi ft ee n (15) y ear s, the maxi mum sentence in the
ra ng e , b a se d o n its app lic a tio n of the abo ve state d e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s. On app e a l, a pa rt fr om h is Blakel y ar gument which has a lrea dy been disc ussed above , the appe llant challeng es only the
app lic a tio n o f e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor (8 ). Th e tr ia l c ou rt

state d th a t it wa s nor ma lly re luc ta nt t o a pp ly fac tor (8) in a n attempted ra pe ca se, but rea soned that the fa ctor “ can a pply in a sexual offense if

the circ umstances surr ounding the offe nse go bey ond that which one would normally associate with sex
ac t s
. ” T h e t ri al co u rt d et er m i n ed t h at t h e a p p e l l a n t w a s “ap re d at o r” wh o s e “ s ex u al av er s i o n s go bey ond th a t p o in t

. . . th a t h is o f f e n s e s w e r e c o mm it te d n o t ju s t f o r s e xu a l g r a ti f

ic a ti o n , but for g ratif ic a tio n o f a

de vio us na tur e .” Th e e vid e nc e sh ow e d th a t, w hil e the app e lla nt and the vic tim
wer e watching a movie in the appe llant’s bedroom, the appellant “sc oot[ ed]” within inches of the victim. The appe llant put his hand on the vi ctim’s belly and st arte d rubbing it in a circula r motion. the appe llant told that victim that he was “g ay .” The victim testified that, as he r ubbed the victim’s belly , the appellant “said he liked g irls, but he liked boy s, too.” The appellant told the victim that if h e “ f u c k e d h im , ” h e w o u ldb u y h im a n y th in g
. Wh e n th e v ic ti m t r ie d to le a v e , th e appellant g ra bb e d h im a nd“ slu ng ” him on to the be d. Th e app e lla nt he ld the vic tim do wn on the be d a ndsa id h e “ m i gh tas we l l f-

-- [ t h e v i ct i m ] n o w be ca u s e h e k n o we d [ s i c] t h at [ t h e v i ct i m ] wa s go i n g t o go ho me a nd te ll [his] mom an d da d. ” Th e app lic a tio n o f e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor (8 ) r e qu ir e s th e Sta te to prove obje ctive evide nce of the def e n d an t’ s mo ti v ati o nto seek ple asure or excitement throug h sexual
assa u l t

. State v. Arne tt, 49 S.W .3d 250, 262 (Tenn. 2001) . I t has bee n determined that fac tor (8) may be applied wher e there is “ evidenc e including , but not lim ited to, sex ually expli cit rema

rks and
ov e rt se xua l di sp lay s mad e bythe de fe nd a nt, su c h a s f on dli ng or

kis sin g a vic tim or oth e rw ise behaving in a

sexual manner, or r emar

ks or beha vior demonstrating the def endant’ s enjoy ment of the shee r violence of the rape .” I d. The rec ord here in supports the application of this enha nceme nt fac tor.
Rul e 20 , Ru le s o f the Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls p ro vid e s in te r a lia : The Court, with the concur renc e of all judge s participating in the case , when an opinion would have no prec edential value, m ay aff irm the j udg ment or ac tion of the trial court by

memorandum opinion rathe r than by formal opinion, when:-7- The judg ment is render ed or the action is taken in a proce eding befor e the tr ia l ju dg e wi tho ut a

jury , a ndsu c h j udg me nt o r a c tio n is no t a de te rm inatio n o f g uil t, andthe e v i d e n c ed o e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t the finding of the trial judg e . . . .
We de te r mi n e th a t th is c a s e me e ts th e c r it e r ia o f th e ab o v e
- q u o te d ru le a n d , th e r e f o re, w e aff irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt in acc ordanc e ther ewith.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE