Blasting Injuries in Surface Mining with Emphasis on Flyrock and

Blast Area Security

 by T. S. Bajpayee, T. R. Rehak,

 G. L. Mowrey, and D. K. Ingram

T. S. Bajpayee

NIOSH Pittsburgh Research Laboratory

P.O. Box 18070

Pittsburgh, PA 15236-0070

(412) 386-6636 voice

(412) 386-6561 fax

email - TBajpayee@cdc.gov
Blasting injuries in surface mining with emphasis on flyrock and blast area security

Abstract

Problem: Blasting is a hazardous component of surface mining. Serious injuries and fatalities

result from improper judgement or practice during rock blasting. This paper describes several

fatal injury case studies, analyzes causative factors, and emphasizes preventive measures. 

Method: This study examines publications by MSHA, USGS, and other authors. The primary

source of information was MSHA’s injury-related publications. Results: During the 21-year

period from 1978 to 1998, the mean yearly explosive-related injuries (fatal and nonfatal) for

surface coal mines was 8.86 (95% CI: 6.38 -11.33), and for surface metal/nonmetal mines 10.76

(95% CI: 8.39 - 13.14). Flyrock and lack of blast area security accounted for 68.2% of these

injuries. This paper reviews several case studies of fatal injuries. Case studies indicate that the

causative factors for fatal injuries are primarily personal and task-related and to some extent

environmental. A reduction in the annual injuries in surface coal mines was observed during the

ten-year period of 1989 - 1998 [5.80 (95% CI: 2.71 - 8.89) compared to the previous ten-year

period of 1979 - 1988 [10.90 (95% CI: 7.77 - 14.14)]. However, such reduction was not noticed

in the metal/nonmetal sector, i.e., 9.30 (95% CI: 6.84 - 11.76) for the period 1989-1998

compared with 11.00 (95% CI: 7.11 - 14.89) for the period 1979-1988. Discussion: A

multifaceted injury prevention approach consisting of behavioral/educational,

administrative/regulatory, and engineering interventions merits consideration. Impact on

industry: The mining community, especially the blasters, will find useful information on

causative factors and preventive measures to mitigate injuries due to flyrock and lack of blast

area security in surface blasting. Discussion of case studies during safety meetings will help to

mitigate fatal injuries and derive important payoffs in terms of lower risks and costs of injuries.

Keywords: Blasting; Mining; Explosives; Injuries; flyrock; blast area security
1. Introduction

Mining is a hazardous occupation. The average annual rate of fatal injuries (number of fatal

injuries per 100,000 workers) in the mining industry (30.3) exceeds that of all other industries,

such as agriculture, forestry, and fishing (20.1), construction (15.3), transportation and public

utilities (13.4), and manufacturing (4.0). In addition, the average number of days lost (ADL) per

incident in the mining industry exceeds the ADL of all other industries (NIOSH, 2000). While

cognizant of the inherent dangers, explosives are essential in breaking rock. Surface mines in

the coal and metal/nonmetal sectors rely extensively on explosives to uncover mineral deposits. 

The mining industry considers blasting an essential component for the success of their

operations.

1.1. Explosives used in surface mine blasting

More than 90% of the domestic explosive and blasting agent formulations generally used are

ammonium nitrate (AN) based (USGS, 2000). A mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil,

commonly known as ANFO, gained acceptance for blasting at surface mines. The major

advantages of ANFO are related to safety, economy, and ease of handling when compared to

nitroglycerine (NG)-based high explosives. Various forms of NG-based high explosives were

used in surface blasting before the introduction of ANFO. During the past two decades, ANFO

formulations have undergone numerous innovations to improve performance, shelf life, density,

porosity, specific energy, and water resistance. Since its introduction, ANFO has replaced many

grades of dynamites and other high explosives. Hundreds of patents related to improvements of

ANFO and its loading procedures have been filed at the U.S. Patents Office. ANFO-based

explosives are now available in various sizes, styles, and consistencies. Because of the diverse

mechanical and geological properties of rock and the unique conditions at each blast site, a wide

variety of products are available. Free-flowing dry blasting agents, with the addition of finely

divided, flaked, or even granular aluminum, can be mechanically loaded in dry holes for

improved performance. A variety of emulsified and gelled products are specifically designed for

wet blastholes. Ingredients have been developed to improve density, rheology, sensitivity, water

resistance, and detonation velocity of packaged and bulk products.

Between 1990 and 1999, roughly 22.3 billion kg of explosives were used by the mining,

quarrying, construction, and other industries in the United States (USBM, 1991; USBM, 1992;

USBM, 1993; USBM, 1994; USGS 1995; USGS, 1996; USGS, 1997; USGS, 1998; USGS,

1999; USGS, 2000). Out of this, coal mining used 66.4%, nonmetal mining and quarrying

13.5%, metal mining 10.4%, construction 7.1%, and all other users 2.6%.

1.2. Generic protocol for loading and firing of explosives in surface mines

Blasting is a complex activity demanding special skills on the part of the blaster and other crew

members. It requires a careful coordination of tasks between the blasting crew and other

employees working in the vicinity of the blast site. Before loading explosives in a borehole, the

blaster will generally examine the drilling logs to identify potential problem areas such as

presence of mud seams, voids, or geological anomalies. This is followed by a visual inspection

of the highwall face and bench top. The blaster should look for presence of overhangs, back
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breaks, softer stratum, and other irregularities. Laser profiling data, if required, is examined at

this time. Based on the approved blasting plan and the results of examination, the blaster will

calculate the charge weight, geometry, stemming, and other parameters. Safety considerations

dictate that employees not associated with loading and blasting operations should leave the blast

site. Blast sites should be secured and warning signs posted before loading boreholes. The

blasting machine or the firing key should be securely kept by the blaster during the entire

process of loading and hook up to prevent any unintentional detonation. The Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR), Title 30, Part 56.6306 prohibits driving vehicles and equipment over

explosive material or initiating system. The rise of an explosive column in a borehole should be

checked during the loading process. The blaster should know and adhere to safe operating

procedures. The blaster or a designated employee should connect the individual holes to the

firing line. It is a good practice to walk along the firing line to reexamine the connections. If

any instrumentation for recording ground vibration and air blast has been deployed, it should be

checked and set at this time. 

Next, the blaster should clear all employees from the blast area, post guards at all entrances to

the blast area, and communicate to the mine foreman about the impending blast. The blaster

(and helpers, if any) should go outside the blast area or stay inside a blasting shelter. Upon

receiving clear and unambiguous feedback from the guards and mine foreman, blast signals are

sounded and the shot is fired. Rock blasting releases a tremendous amount of energy in a very

short time span. It is imperative to establish an effective protocol to maintain blast area security. 

Before sounding an all-clear signal, the blaster should conduct a visual inspection of the blast

site and check for undetonated explosives, misfires, and other problems. The blasting log should

be finalized at this time. Finally, all unused explosives should be returned to the magazine.

1.3. Hazards of surface blasting

The hazards of surface blasting are primarily due to lack of blast area security, flyrock,

premature blast, and misfire (Verakis & Lobb, 2001). Blasting generally entails two purposes: 

rock fragmentation and displacement of the broken rock. The displacement of the broken rock

depends on the shot-design parameters, geological conditions, and mining constraints. 

Fragmented rock is not expected to travel beyond the limits of the blast area. The blaster

determines the bounds of the blast area and is responsible for complying with safety laws. 

Langefors & Kishlstrom (1963), Roth (1979), and Persson et al. (1994) have developed theories

to compute flyrock range. A blaster may use such concepts, in conjunction with past experience,

to determine the size of a blast area.

The Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) defines flyrock as the rock propelled beyond the

blast area by the force of an explosion (IME, 1997). An injury due to flyrock is sustained when

it travels beyond the blast area and injures someone. The major factors responsible for flyrock

are insufficient burden, improper blasthole layout and loading, anomaly in the geology and rock

structure, insufficient stemming, and inadequate firing delays. Injuries due to lack of blast area

security are caused by failure to use proper blasting shelter, poor communications, and

inadequate guarding of the blast area (Rehak et al., 2001). 
Use of brand names is for informational purposes only and does not imply endorsement 1

by NIOSH.

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2. Methods

Mining injury and accident information was obtained from several sources. Mine Safety and

Health Administration’s (MSHA) injury-related publications were used as the primary source of

data. Reporting requirements for injuries, illness, and workplace exposures are stipulated in the

Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and the Federal Mine Safety and Health

Amendments Act of 1977. MSHA’s accident investigation reports were used to gather

information on fatal injuries. MSHA has categorized mining injuries in 21 classes based on the

circumstances which contributed most directly to the accident (MSHA, 1997). Table 1 provides

a list of categories used by MSHA for accident classification. Blasting-related accidents are

listed under class 4 (Explosives and Breaking Agents).

All pertinent information on loading and firing protocol of explosive charge was critically

examined during field visits. Published information identified during the initial search was

screened using the criteria: (1) new technology and review of recent developments to mitigate

blasting injuries; (2) general information related to flyrock and blast area security; and (3)

reports of accident investigations. Several publications by the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM)

and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) were used for information relative to domestic explosive

consumption.

3. Results

3.1. Blasting injuries in surface mining

Forty-five fatal injuries were caused by explosives in surface mines between 1978 and 1998. 

Coal mines accounted for 19 (42.2%) of the fatalities; metal/nonmetal 26 (57.8 %). A total of

367 nonfatal injuries occurred during the same period, averaging about of 17.5 injuries per year. 

Coal mines accounted for 167 (45.5%) of the injuries; metal/nonmetal 200 (54.5%). Table 2 and

figure 1 show the annual distribution of fatal and nonfatal injuries for surface blasting in the coal

and metal/nonmetal sectors. During the 21-year period from 1978 to 1998, the mean yearly

injuries (fatal and nonfatal) for coal mines was 8.86 (95% CI: 6.38 -11.33), and for

metal/nonmetal mines 10.76 (95% CI: 8.39 - 13.14). 

The annual injuries for the ten-year period from 1979 to 1988 (Period-A) was compared with the

following ten-year period from 1989 to 1998 (Period-B) using GraphPad Software , Inc.’s 1

(2002) online calculator for t-test. The purpose was to examine if there was any reduction in the

annual injuries during the later period.

The mean annual injuries during the Period-A in coal sector was 10.90 (95% CI: 7.77 -14.14)

and 5.80 (95% CI: 2.71 - 8.89) for the Period-B. The null hypothesis is based on the premise

that there is no difference in the annual injuries between these two ten-year periods. The results
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of unpaired t-test for these two periods (DF = 18) are: p = 0.0190, t = 2.5770, and mean of

(Period-A minus Period-B) = 5.10 (95% CI: 0.94 - 9.26). Therefore, the null hypothesis is

rejected. The analysis indicates a statistically significant decrease in the annual injuries during

the Period-B compared to Period-A.

A similar unpaired t-test analysis was done for the surface metal/nonmetal mines, i.e., the mean

annual injuries during the Period-A in metal/nonmetal sector was 11.00 (95% CI: 7.11 -14.89)

and 9.30 (95% CI: 6.84 - 11.76) for the Period-B. The results of unpaired t-test for these two

periods (DF = 18) are: p = 0.4141, t = 0.8361, and mean of (Period-A minus Period-B) = 1.70

(95% CI: -2.57 - 5.97). The null hypothesis can not be rejected. The resultant analysis does not

support any significant difference in the annual injuries during these two periods.

Table 3 illustrates the contribution of flyrock and lack of blast area security in surface mine

blasting. Out of 412 blasting injuries (coal and metal/nonmetal), flyrock and lack of blast area

security accounted for 281 (68.2%) injuries. 

MSHA reported ten fatal injuries due to flyrock and lack of blast area security in surface coal

and metal/nonmetal mines during the period from 1990 to 1999. Appendix A provides brief case

study information about all these fatalities.

3.2. Lessons learned from the fatal injuries

The energy released by an explosive charge in a borehole crushes the rock in the immediate

vicinity of the borehole, fractures the rock beyond the crushed zone, generates seismic waves,

creates airblast, and displaces the broken rock. Any mismatch between the distribution of the

explosive energy, geomechanical strength of the surrounding rock mass, and confinement creates

a potential for flyrock. Flyrock originates from the vertical highwall faces and also from the

bench tops.

Although the circumstances of each incident varied, some important similarities were observed. 

Deficiency or lack of attention to personal, task, or environmental factors has the potential to

cause injury. Figure 2 provides a list of factors which play a role in successful blasting.

3.2.1. Personal factors The personal factors include education, job training, experience on the

job, experience on a related job, prior injury history, visual perception, overwork, load and blast

in a hurry, and work-stress among others. However, education, job training, and experience

play vital roles. In case study 8, the victim had three days mining experience and very little

blast-hazard recognition training. This employee placed himself and the visitor in harms way

due to lack of knowledge. 

A blaster should not be in a hurry or take any short cuts. Taking short cuts or avoiding safe

operating procedures can result in serious injuries and often death. In case study 2, we find that

the blaster took a short cut and went underneath a truck to detonate the blast. After a misfire, the

blaster decided to detonate the shot from a closer distance. A truck should not be considered as a

blasting shelter.
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3.2.2. Task factors Rock blasting necessitates an excellent coordination of a series of tasks. 

Some of the tasks are performed by the blaster while others are performed by the blasting crew

under the supervision of the blaster. Several tasks are also performed by crews not related to

blasting. The blaster should coordinate loading and firing activities with the mine foreman to 

ensure safety and efficiency. Failure to properly coordinate the tasks can result in serious injury

or death. The list of tasks includes examination of the driller’s log, inspection of the highwall,

and review of laser profiling data, if any. The boreholes are examined for spacing, burden,

inclination, and general layout. Case study 1 emphasizes the importance of these tasks. The

next task is clearing the blast site before priming, loading, and stemming the boreholes. Once

the blastholes are loaded and ready, employees should be removed from the blast area or be

inside a blasting shelter. Case studies 2, 4, 6, and 9 indicate the importance of using blasting

shelters. These fatal accidents could have been prevented by using blasting shelters. 

Guards should be posted at the entrance to all access roads leading to the blast area. In case

study 5, an access road leading to the blast area was not guarded and an area resident

inadvertently entered the blast area. This was a preventable accident. Depending on the local

conditions, there may be additional requirements. From the case studies, it was apparent that

poor implementation or coordination of tasks can cause a fatality.

3.2.3. Environmental factors The mining environment is often very harsh. In addition to noise,

smoke, dust, and uneven ground it presents numerous other environmental hazards. Movement

of large equipment such as draglines, shovels, dumpers, dozers, drills, and service vehicles

create distractions. Often the blaster’s visibility is impeded due to large piles of overburden,

dirt, or blasted material. Our study indicates that on several occasions, the blaster could not see

the blast area from the firing station and that resulted in fatal injuries. An important

environmental factor, often overlooked, is geological anomalies. Case studies 3, 7, and 10

illustrate the role of geological anomaly in causing flyrock injury.

4. Discussion

During the ten-year period from 1989 to 1998 a reduction in fatal and nonfatal blasting injuries

in surface coal mines was observed compared to the previous ten-year period. However, in the

surface metal/nonmetal mining sector such reduction was not observed.

The accident data indicate that careless or improper blasting often caused fatal injuries. The

injury prevention approach is invariably multifaceted. This includes interventions conducted

through training and education, engineering controls, and administrative and regulatory

guidance. 

4.1. Behavioral/educational interventions Blaster training and education programs are

considered effective by many professionals. In addition to initial training, a typical blaster

attends refresher training at regular intervals. 30 CFR, Part 955 mandates blaster training to

address safety issues related to storage, transportation, and use of explosive products. The

course also focuses on blast design for different types of rocks commonly encountered in mining
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operations. In addition, the training course provides information relative to the regulatory

requirements of explosives and blasting.

Several mining and blasting companies have instituted training programs for their employees. 

International Society of Explosives Engineers (ISEE) is in the process of completing several

training modules for blasters. Modules for level one training are currently available and modules

for level two and three will be available soon. A quality training program should address aspects

of modern blasting technology and explosive safety issues.

4.2. Administrative/regulatory interventions Federal and state regulatory agencies have

imposed strict requirements related to flyrock and blast area security issues. 30 CFR Part

56.6000 defines ‘Blast Area’ as the area in which concussion (shock wave), flying material, or

gases from an explosion may cause injury to persons. The CFR also states that the blast area

shall be determined by considering the following factors:

• Geology of material to be blasted,

• Blast pattern,

• Burden, depth, diameter, and angle of the holes,

• Blasting experience of the mine personnel,

• Delay systems, powder factor, and pounds per delay,

• Type and amount of explosive material, and

• Type and amount of stemming.

30 CFR Part 77.1303 requires that ample warning shall be given before blasts are fired, and all

persons shall be cleared and removed from the blast area unless suitable blasting shelters are

provided to protect persons endangered by concussion or flyrock from blasting. 

30 CFR Part 817.67 (c) requires that flyrock traveling in the air or along the ground shall not be

cast from the blasting site –

• More than one-half the distance to the nearest dwelling or other occupied structure,

• Beyond the area of control, or

• Beyond the permit boundary.

Mining and blasting companies have instituted rigorous policies for flyrock control and blast

area security.

4.3. Engineering interventions Favreau & Favreau (2002), Preece & Chung (2001, 2002),

Dare-Bryan, Wade & Randall (2001), and Katsabanis & Liu (1997) have used numerical

simulation techniques to predict blast results by computing the interaction of rock and explosive. 

A blaster may be able to improve the design of a blast by using such simulation techniques.

Proprietary software developed by explosive manufactures are often available for consultation. 

Most of these design codes are capable of addressing variability of the rock type, depth,

diameter, delay, and spacing of boreholes. In addition, some software programs will predict the

trajectory of the muckpile. Sensitivity analysis and model studies, using computer simulation,

should be pursued prior to field blasting. This would help the blaster examine the expected

outcomes and modify loading parameters, if necessary.
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Engineering interventions are well understood by the blasting community and work well. Dick

et al. (1983), D’Andrea & Bennett (1984), and Fletcher & D’ Andrea (1986) advocated the use

of portable blasting shelters. The shelter is cylindrical in shape and constructed of heavy gauge

sheet metal and able to withstand potential impact from flyrock. This portable shelter is

mounted on wheels or skids for ease of towing from one blast area to another. The blaster enters

the shelter and closes the door prior to firing the shot.

5. Conclusions

Blasting releases a tremendous amount of energy for fragmenting and displacing rocks within a

very short time. The blast should be designed so that the energy released by detonation performs

useful work. Any imbalance between the distribution of the explosive energy, geomechanical

strength of the surrounding rock mass, and confinement creates a potential hazardous condition

by channeling the energy through the path of least resistance. Such imbalance can propel

flyrock beyond the blast area and create a potential for serious injuries and fatalities. Case

studies listed in Appendix A underscore this issue. Blasters should follow procedures required

by local, state and federal statutes to guard against catastrophic consequences. 

The principal factors attributed to the fatalities were personal, task and environmental. 

Intervention programs in the realm of behavioral/educational, administrative/regulatory, and

engineering merit serious attention. During the ten-year period from 1989 to 1998 a reduction in

fatal and nonfatal blasting injuries in surface coal mines was observed compared to the previous

ten-year period (1979-1988). However, in the surface metal/nonmetal mining sector such

reduction was not observed.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge Richard J. Mainiero for his supervision and guidance since the

inception of this project. The authors thank Thomas E. Lobb, MSHA, and Barbara Fotta of

NIOSH for providing information related to blasting incidents. 
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Table 1. MSHA Accident Classification

Class Source of Injury

1. Electrical Accidents in which the electric current is most directly responsible for the

resulting accident.

2. Entrapment Accidents involving entrapment of persons.

3. Exploding Vessels Under

Pressure

Accidents involved with bursting of air hoses, air tanks, hydraulic lines,

hydraulic hoses, standpipes, etc., due to internal pressure.

4. Explosives and Breaking

Agents

Accidents involving the detonation of manufactured explosives; includes

Airdox or Cardox.

5. Falling, Rolling, or Sliding

Rock or Material of Any Kind

Accidents caused directly by falling material other than materials from the roof

or face. Or, if material was set in motion by machinery, by haulage, by hand

tools, or while being handled or disturbed, etc., the force that set the material

in motion determines the classification. For example, where a rock was pushed

over a highwall by a bulldozer and the rock hit another rock that hit and

injured a worker—the accident is classified as machinery; machinery (a

bulldozer) most directly caused the resulting accident.

6. Fall of Face, Rib, Pillar,

Side, or Highwall (from in

place)

Accidents in this classification include falls of material while barring down or

placing props; also, pressure bumps and bursts. Not included are accidents in

which the motion of machinery or haulage equipment caused the fall either

directly or by knocking out support.

7. Fall of Roof, Back, or Brow

(from in place)

Underground only - Accidents that include falls while barring down or placing

props; also, pressure bumps and bursts. Not included are accidents in which

the motion of machinery or haulage equipment caused the fall either directly or

by knocking out support.

8. Fire Accidents related to uncontrolled burning of material or mineral in the mine

environment. Not included are fires initiated by electricity or by explosion of

gas or dust.

9. Handling Material Accidents related to handling packaged or loose material while lifting, pulling,

pushing, or shoveling.

10. Hand tools Accidents related to nonpowered tools.

11. Nonpowered Haulage Accidents related to the motion of nonpowered haulage equipment. Included

are accidents involving wheelbarrows, manually pushed mine cars, timber

trucks, etc.

12. Powered Haulage Accidents related to the motion of powered haulage equipment. Included are

accidents involving conveyors, front-end loaders, forklifts, shuttle cars, loadhaul-dump units, locomotives, railroad cars, haulage trucks, pickups,

automobiles, and personnel carriers.

13. Hoisting Accidents involving cages, skips, ore buckets, and elevators. The accident

results from the action, motion, or failure of the hoisting equipment or

mechanism. Included are equipment such as cranes and derricks only when

used in shaft sinking; also, suspended work platforms in shafts. Not included is

equipment such as chain hoists, come-alongs, and winches.
Class Source of Injury

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14. Ignition or Explosion of

Gas or Dust

Accidents resulting as a consequence of the ignition or explosion of gas or

dust.

15. Impoundment Accidents caused by an unstable condition or failure of an impoundment,

refuse pile, or culm bank requiring emergency preventative action or

evacuation of an area.

16. Inundation Accidents caused by inundation of a surface or underground mine by a liquid

(or semisolid) or a gas.

17. Machinery Accidents related to the motion of machinery. Included are all electric and airpowered tools and mining machinery such as drills, tuggers, winches, slushers,

draglines, power shovels, loaders, and compressors.

18. Slip or Fall of Person

(from an elevation or on the

same level)

Accidents include slips or falls while getting on or off machinery and haulage

equipment that is not moving, and slips or falls while servicing or repairing

equipment or machinery.

19. Stepping or Kneeling on

Object

Accidents are classified in this category only where the object stepped or

kneeled on contributed most directly to the accident.

20. Striking or Bumping This classification is restricted to those accidents in which an individual, while

moving about, strikes or bumps an object, but is not handling material, using

hand tools, or operating equipment.

21. Other Accidents not elsewhere classified.

Source: MSHA (1997)
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Table 2. Blasting injuries in surface mines, 1978-98

Year

Coal mines Metal/nonmetal mines

Fatal Nonfatal Total Fatal Nonfatal Total

1978 0 19 19 2 21 23

1979 2 14 16 0 12 12

1980 1 14 15 2 16 18

1981 2 10 12 3 8 11

1982 1 5 6 2 6 8

1983 0 7 7 0 5 5

1984 1 16 17 3 18 21

1985 0 3 3 0 4 4

1986 3 9 12 0 8 8

1987 1 9 10 0 14 14

1988 0 11 11 0 9 9

1989 2 13 15 3 11 14

1990 2 6 8 3 13 16

1991 1 5 6 0 11 11

1992 1 8 9 3 3 6

1993 1 2 3 0 7 7

1994 1 7 8 2 8 10

1995 0 2 2 1 7 8

1996 0 4 4 1 6 7

1997 0 1 1 1 5 6

1998 0 2 2 0 8 8

Total 19 167 186 26 200 226

Source: Verakis & Lobb (2001)
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Table 3. Trends in flyrock and lack of blast area security injuries in surface mining, 1978-98

Activity or cause

Fatal and nonfatal injuries

1978-81 1982-85 1986-89 1990-93 1994-97 1998 Total

Lack of blast area security 51 28 43 25 17 3 167

Flyrock 26 22 29 24 10 3 114

Total 77

(61.1%)1

50

(70.4%)

72

(77.4%)

49

(74.2%)

27

(58.7%)

6

(60.0%)

281

(68.2%)

 The numbers within the parenthesis indicate the flyrock and lack of blast area security injuries as a percentage of 1

injuries reported in the Table 2 for the corresponding 4-year period.

Source: Verakis & Lobb (2001)
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Figure 1. Blasting injuries in surface mines, 1978 - 1998
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Environmental Factors

• geological anomaly

• smoke, dust, gases

• uneven ground

• equipment movement

• drilling noise

• movement of explosive truck

• movement of service vehicles

• obstruction of visibility

• lightning

• securing access roads

• misfires

Task Factors

• examine driller’s log

• examine laser profile

• examine highwall

• examine bench top

• clear blast site

• supervise loading

• supervise stemming

• sequence delays

• contact mine foreman

• clear blast area

• secure blast area

• connect lead-in line

• go to a blasting shelter

• sound warning signal

• fire the blast

• examine the blast site

• sound all-clear signal

Personal Factors

• education

• training

• job experience

• related experience

• visual perception 

• load and blast in a hurry 

• overwork

• prior injury history

Figure 2. List of factors involved in blasting

 Personal

 Factors

 Task 

Factors

 Environmental

 Factors
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Appendix A. Fatality case studies related to flyrock and/or blast area security (1990-1999)

The incidents are arranged chronologically for coal mines followed by nonmetal mines.

Case 1 - Coal Mine, Walker County, AL On September 22, 1990, flyrock projected from a

surface coal mine blast fatally injured the owner of a logging company (MSHA, 1990c). He was

in the process of preparing access roads for future logging operations and was outside the mine

property.

Fifty-four holes, in six rows, 22.9-cm diameter, 12.2-m deep, on a 5.5- by 5.5-m pattern were

loaded with emulsion explosive. Each hole contained about 392 kg of explosives. The

stemming length was 3.0 m. The pit area was cleared and the shot was fired. The blast projected

flyrock about 275 m and fatally injured the victim. Several large boulders, scattered over an area

near the accident site, were noticed. The MSHA investigation report indicated that a blown out

shot caused the flyrock. This incident emphasizes the importance of paying attention to task

factors such as blast design, highwall inspection, determination of the bounds of the blast area,

and blast area security. 

Case 2 - Coal Mine, Mingo County, WV On February 1, 1992, a blaster was fatally injured in a

surface coal mine by a 43- by 89- by 22-cm flyrock (MSHA, 1992). Eighty boreholes, 22.9-cm

in diameter, on a 5.5- by 5.5-m pattern were loaded with 16,064 kg of explosives. The stemming

length was 3.0 m. Sixty-two holes were 9.1m deep and each hole was loaded with 212.3 kg of

bulk ANFO. Eighteen holes were 6.1m deep and each was loaded with 159.2 kg of bulk ANFO. 

Drill cuttings were used for stemming. 

On the day of this incident, the blaster and helper loaded eighty holes. Upon clearing the blast

area and securing access roads, the shot was fired from a distance of 457 m. A misfire was

noticed and after 15 minutes, the blaster returned to the blast site, examined the shot area, and

reconnected the lead-in line in preparation of firing the remaining holes. The blaster positioned

himself under a Ford 9000, 2-1/2-ton truck and fired the shot from a distance of 229 m. Upon

firing the shot, the blaster was fatally injured by flyrock. He was treated for collapsed lungs,

multiple rib fractures, fractured mandible, dislocated left shoulder, and serious head injuries.

The MSHA investigation report indicated that the blaster was within the limits of the blast area

and did not use a proper blasting shelter. This tragedy could have been avoided by using a

proper blasting shelter. The space under a truck should not be used as a blasting shelter. This

incident underscores the importance of personal and task factors.

Case 3 - Coal Mine, Campbell County, TN On June 4, 1993, a 16-year-old passenger in a car

driven by his parent on interstate 75 (I-75), was fatally injured by flyrock originating from an

overburden blast in a nearby coal mine (Shea & Clark, 1998). The closest blasthole was within 

22.9 m of the Right of Way (RoW) and 68.6 m from the I-75 pavement.

Twenty-eight blastholes, in four rows, on a 5.5- by 5.5-m pattern, 18.4-cm diameter, were loaded

with ANFO. Each hole contained 259.9 kg of explosive and was stemmed with 3.4 m of drill
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cuttings. The length of explosive column in each hole was about 9.8 m. Unlike previous blasts,

explosive charges were not decked during this blast.

The investigation report (Shea & Clark, 1998) indicated that this blast was not designed

according to the specifications approved in the permit document. Instead of decking explosive

charges in two columns and priming separately, the entire charge was loaded in one column. 

Hole diameter and blast pattern used were different from the approved plan. The I-75 traffic was

not monitored. The presence of a 2.4-m thick layer of clay on the top of the sandstone

overburden was considered a contributory factor. 

The causative factors were single decking of holes instead of double decking on separate delays

and a change in the geology of the overburden. Preventive measures should include paying close

attention to drillers’ log and watching for any abrupt changes in the geology or rock structure. 

Blast design parameters should not be changed without a critical review of its impact. This

incident underscores the importance of task and environmental factors. In addition, the I-75

traffic should have been temporarily stopped immediately prior to blasting.

Case 4 - Coal Mine, Greene County, IN On April 25, 1994, a 34-year-old driller/loader was

fatally injured by flyrock in a surface coal mine (MSHA, 1994a). Coal was mined from a 1.5-m

thick seam having a shale parting at the middle. One hundred and seventeen holes, 17.1-cm

diameter, 3.4- m deep were drilled on a 3.4- by 3.4-m pattern. Each hole was backfilled with

about 0.3 m of dirt and loaded with 19.4 kg of emulsion-type explosive. The length of stemming

varied from 2.3 to 2.4 m. There were nine rows with 13 holes per row. Some of the holes

contained water. 

The blasting crew notified the superintendent of an impending blast and cleared other employees

from the pit area. The victim and another employee working under the direction of the blaster

were about 72 m from the blast area. Upon firing the blast, the victim was fatally injured by

flyrock.

The MSHA investigation report indicated that the accident was caused by failure to use an

adequate blasting shelter. This incident emphasizes the importance of using proper blasting

shelters for employees whose presence is required in the blast area. This incident focuses

attention to personal and task factors.

Case 5 - Coal Mine, Pike County, KY On February 15, 1999, a 55-year-old area resident rode an

all-terrain vehicle (ATV) from his residence to an access trail leading to the mine site (MSHA,

1999a). He parked his ATV about 30.5 m from the edge of the blast site and started walking

toward the blast site. Shortly after he started walking, a blast was detonated. Later, his body

was found close to the perimeter of the blast site. Mining was conducted on privately-owned

land including land owned by the victim.

A total of 212 holes, 17.1-cm diameter, loaded with 5,900 kg of explosive, were detonated. Of

these, 164 holes were 4.0 m deep, and 48 holes were 7.0 m deep. The blastholes were drilled on

a 4.0- by 4.6-m pattern. The blast area and the access trail leading to the blast area were
-16-

examined about five minutes before the blast. The MSHA investigation report indicated that

guards were not posted at the access trail, and the blaster did not have a clear view of the access

trail from the firing station. A Ford F-250 pickup truck was equipped with two electromechanical horns. However, on the day of the incident only the low-pitch horn was operational

and the high-pitch horn was found to be disconnected. The access trail was in a valley, and it

was probably difficult for the victim to hear the signal.

This incident underscores the need for effective blast area security and focuses attention

primarily on the task factors.

Case 6 - Nonmetal mine, Caldwell County, KY On July 5, 1990, a blaster was fatally injured by

flyrock while standing in the open about 154 m from the blast site. The blaster was standing on

the highwall about 61 m above the blastholes. Flyrock measuring 23-by18-by13-cm and

weighing about 6.4 kg, traveled over the highwall and injured the blaster (MSHA, 1990a).

On the day of this incident, blasters were assigned to blast a toe round. The toe round consisted

of 23 holes ranging in depth from 0.9 to 1.5 m. The holes were loaded with 6.4 cm diameter

packaged explosive product. A total of 79.8 kg of explosive, averaging 3.4 kg per hole, was

used. 

This incident could have been prevented by using a blasting shelter and emphasized the

importance of task factors.

Case 7 - Nonmetal Mine, Livingston County, IL On July 11, 1990, flyrock from a limestone

quarry traveled about 284 m and fatally injured a resident who was mowing grass on his property

(MSHA, 1990b).

On the day of this incident, thirty-six holes in three rows, twelve holes per row, were loaded with

1,160 kg of ANFO. The holes were 12.1-cm in diameter and 6.6-m deep. The spacing and

burden were 4.1m and 2.7 m respectively. The upper 1.5m of each hole was stemmed with drill

cuttings and crushed stone. One of the holes near the center of the front row was found to be

overloaded. 

The MSHA investigation report indicated that an overloaded hole in the front row was a

contributory factor for this incident. Overloading creates an imbalance between the available

explosive energy and the rock resistance. Such situations can create problems in the front row of

blastholes. A blaster should observe the rise of explosive column while loading a borehole to

control loss of powder in voids, mud seams, or crevices (Fletcher & D’Andrea, 1986). If a void

is encountered, it should be filled with inert material (Dick, et al., 1983). This incident focuses

attention to task factors.

Case 8 - Nonmetal Mine, Luna County, NM On October 12, 1990, a visitor sustained severe

injuries and a drill/blast helper was fatally injured by flyrock in a surface silica flux mine

(MSHA, 1990d). The visitor was hospitalized for broken ribs and internal injuries and the

drill/blast helper was pronounced dead. The drill/blast helper had three days mining experience
-17-

and had little training in blast hazard recognition. The visitor wanted to take a photograph of the

blast.

The ore was mined by drilling and blasting from shallow multiple benches. The mining

company used a blasting contractor for loading and firing the shots. The blast round consisted of

49 holes, 7.6-cm diameter, 3.7-m deep, on a 1.8-m spacing. Some of the holes were stemmed

with 0.6 m of drill cuttings. Several holes were completely filled with ANFO. A detonating

cord trunk line was used to tie each hole without any firing delay. The trunk line was tied to a

cap and fuse assembly. 

The visitor and the drill/blast helper were about 46 m from the edge of the blast. Upon firing the

shot, the drill/blast helper was fatally struck on the back side of his head. The MSHA

investigation report indicated that poor blasting practice (such as, overcharging boreholes, lack

of stemming, and absence of delays) was exhibited during this shot. The employee was not

properly trained and was too close to the blast. This accident emphasizes the significance of

personal and task factors such as hazard recognition training, proper blast design, and

deployment of blasting shelters.

Case 9 - Nonmetal Mine, Madison County, IL On May 23, 1994, a crane operator was fatally

injured by flyrock which struck him in the back (MSHA, 1994b). He was 21 years old and had

1-1/2 months mining experience at this mine. Forty-one holes, 8.9 cm diameter, 3.7 m deep,

were loaded with ANFO. The bench height was 3.4 m. The length of stemming was about 0.9

m and crushed limestone was used for stemming. The stemmed holes were covered with

blasting mats of 0.9-by 0.9-m size. Pails containing crushed stone were placed over the mats.

On the day of this incident, the crane operator helped in stemming the holes, and placing blasting

mats over the holes. The victim and the blaster moved to a top bench behind the blast and were

standing in the open about 37 m from the nearest blasthole. Upon initiation of the blast one of

the holes threw flyrock toward the victim. The MSHA investigation indicated that the crane

operator did not use a blasting shelter. This incident emphasizes the importance of personal and

task factors.

Case 10 - Nonmetal Mine, Lancaster County, PA On December 21, 1999, a 32-year-old

equipment operator was in a pickup truck guarding an access road to the blast site (MSHA,

1999b). The pickup truck was about 244 m from the blast site. Flyrock entered the cab through

the windshield and fatally struck the victim. The victim had seven years mining experience as

an equipment operator at this mine.

The highwall face was about 15.2 m high and the depth of holes ranged between 14.9 and

16.5 m. The blast round consisted of 22 holes drilled on a 4.9- by 4.9-m pattern. Approximately

4,352 kg of explosives were used in this round and the length of stemming varied from 2.7 to

11.0 m. The weight of explosive used in each blasthole was not recorded. Some of the holes

were slanted up to 25° toward the highwall. This was done to compensate for irregularities in

the highwall face. Drill records indicated that several blastholes were broken and contained

voids. The MSHA investigation indicated that at least one of the blastholes blew out causing
-18-

flyrock. This incident emphasizes several issues, such as, blast design, loading of voids, burden,

confinement, and record keeping which are task factors.
-19-

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