### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -0000 3 -CV

Al e xa nde r Va lle

jo , A ppe lla nt
v. Texas Depart m ent of Fam ily and P rote ctive Service s , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- F M- 06- 0000 91 , HO NORAB LE SUZ ANNE COVINGTO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I ON
Al e xan de r V a lle

jo c ha lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r t e rm inatin g h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s. He doe s not challeng e the ter mination i t s el f; rathe r, he c halleng es the c ourt’s finding s that he
c omm itt e d c e rt a in a c ts o r o mis sio ns jus tif y ing te rm inatio n a nd that te rm inatio n is in the be st i nte re st of the c hild. Vallejo contends that , b ec ause he filed an a ffidavit of voluntar y relinquishment, the tr ia l c ourt ha d n o a uth or ity to m a ke tho se fi nd ing s. The De partment soug ht t er m i n at i o n of Va llejo’s pare ntal rig hts to A.V. After the termination hea

ring beg an, Va llejo executed an a ffidavit of voluntary relinquishment of his pare ntal rig hts. The cour

t proce eded to ter

m i n at e h i s pare ntal rig hts involunt arily , listi ng four ba ses and the best intere st of the child as set out in the statute:
The c ourt may order termination of the par ent-c hild relationship if the court f inds by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e:2 (1 ) t ha t th e pa re nt h a s: . . . ; (D ) k no wi ng ly pla c e d o r k

no wi ng ly a llo we d th e c hil d to re ma in i n conditions or surrounding s which enda ng er the phy sical or e motional well-be ing of

the child; (E) e ng ag ed in conduc t or knowing ly place d the chi l d wi th persons who eng ag ed in conduc t which endang ers the phy sical or e motional well-be ing of

the child; . . . ; (K) e x ecute d befor e or a fter the suit is fil ed an unr evoked or irrevoc able affidavit of relinquishment of pare ntal rig hts as provided in this chapter;

. . . ; [ o r ] (N) c onstructively

abandone d the chi l d who has be en in the perma nent or t e mp o r a

r y ma n a g in g conser

vatorship of the D epar

tment of Protective a

nd Reg ulatory

Service s or an a

uthorized ag ency

for not less than six months, and: (i ) t he de pa rtme nt o r au tho ri zed

a g e nc y ha s ma de re a so na

ble e ff or ts t o r e tur n th e c hil d to the pa

re nt; (ii) the par ent has not re g ularly visited or maintained signific ant contac t with the child; and (iii) the pare nt ha s demonstrated an inability to pro v i d e t he child with a safe environment; [and] (2) that ter

mination is i n the best intere st of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 ( West 2008). Vallejo does not cha l l eng e the suff iciency of the
e vid e nc e to s up po rt

the se fi nd ing s. I nd e e d, a t a po st- tr ia l he a ri ng , he c on c e de d th a t th e e vid e nc e is sufficie nt to support the findings unde r subsec tions (D) and ( E).3 Vallejo conte nds that the finding s under ( D) a nd (E) w ere u n wa rr an ted and unauthorized bec ause a ffidavits of voluntar y relinquishment of paren t al rights are eff ective on execution and ar e not subject to analy sis reg arding the best intere st of the child. See id. § 161.103 (West 2008). He c ontends that his voluntar y relinquishment rende red the involuntary termination aspec ts of the proc eedingmoot and stripped the district court of jurisdiction to determine whe ther any other g round for involuntary relinquishment exis ted. Vallejo r equests that this Court vaca te the aff irmative finding s that his actions or inactions enda ng ere d the childre n under subse ctions (D) a nd (E) be cause those deter

minations could affe ct his pare ntal rig hts to other children that he mig ht one day have. Se e id
. § 16 1. 00 1( 1) (M ). He a lso re qu e sts that we va c a te the fi nd ingtha t te rm inatio n is in A .V .’ s b e st i nte re st.

We do not find support for Va llej o ’s contention t hat the filing of an a ffidavit of voluntary relinquishment ends an involuntary termination proce edi ng and strips the trial cour t of jur isd ic tio n to a sse ss a lte rn a te ba se s f or te rm inatio n and

the be st i nte re st o f t

he c hil d. Th e statut e g overning such af

fidavits does not descr ibe how paren t al ri g hts are te rminated a fter e x ecution of the af fidavit, id . § 161.103, but the statute out l i n i n g t h e proc edure for involuntary termination of pa re nta l r ig hts e xpre ssl y

pr ov ide s th a t th e e xec uti on of a n a ff ida vit of vo lun tary

relin qu is hmen t, along with a finding that t h e t er m i nation is in the child’s best interest, supports termination of pare ntal rig hts. Id . § 161.001.

Family code c hapter

161 g overns term i n ati on of the pa rent-c hild relationship. See id . §§ 161.001-.201 (West 2008). The re a re se ven sections in a subchapte r entitled “G rounds.” SeeThe other sections apply t o specific situations such as the rig hts of an alleg ed biolog ical 1 fathe r, involuntary

termination based on inability to car e for

the child, termination of r ights a fter a prior denia l of a pe tition t o termi n at e, t ermination whe n the par ent is the petitioner, ter mination afte r abor tion, a nd termination when preg nancy results from a criminal act. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.002-.007 (West 2008). But see I n re B.B.F. , 595 S.W. 2d 87 3, 87 4 (T e x. Civ . App .— San A nto nio 19 80 , n o w ri t) 2 (holding that natu ra l pare nt who executed af fidavit of re linquishm ent was not e ntitled to service in termin at i o n s u i tb ec au s e “ [ a] ft er ex ec u t i n g an u n re v o k ed o r i rr ev o cab l e a ff idavit of relinquishment of par ental rig ht s , a n at u ral parent is no long er a n interested pa

rty in a suit to terminate the pa re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip ” ); se e als o B ro wn v . M c Le nn an Cou nty

Chi ldr e n’

s P ro tec tiv e Se rv

s. , 616 S.W .2d 699, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.—W aco 1981) , aff’d , 627 S.W .2d 390, 393 (Tex. 1982). Th is c a se is d ist inc t f

ro m B.B.F. and Br own in that those case s conce rned pa rties who had waived service who then soug ht to complain about not rec eiving service
. Br own , 616 S.W .2d at 701; B.B.F. , 595 S. W. 2 d

a t 8 7 4
. H e r e , b y

c o n tr a s t, w e h a v e a

p a rty w h o r e c e iv e d

s e r v ic e a n d w as participa ting in a trial, then filed an aff idavit of relinquishment, and now argues that his filing of the a ff ida vit ins tantl y de pr ive d th e c ourt

of jur isd ic tio n to a sse ss a

ny ground f

or te rm inatio n o f h is pa re nta l r ig hts oth e r t

ha n h is v olu nta ry re lin qu ish me nt. 4 id . §§ 161.001-.007. Se c tio n 1 61 .0 01 , e nti tle d Inv olu nta ry Te rm inatio n o f P a re nt- Chi ld 1 Re lati o n s h ip s tate s th a t a c o u rt ma y te r mi n a te p a r e n ta l r ig h ts if th e c o u rt f in d s by clea r and
c on vin c inge vid e nc e a t le a st o ne of se ve ra l ty

pe s o f a cts or

omi ssi on s b y

the pa re nt t hat su pp or ts termination and that ter

mination of pare ntal rig hts is in t he best interest of the child. Id . § 161.001. One ba sis for t er m i n at i o n i s if the par ent “e x ecute d befor e or a fter the suit is fil ed an unr evoked or irre vocable aff

idavit of relinq u i s h m en t o f par ental rig hts as provided in this chapter .” Id
. § 161.001 (1)(K). The re is no provision stating that the filing of an a ffidavit of voluntar y
re lin qu ish me nt en ds the tr ia l court ’s inq uir y a s to oth e r b a se s f

or te rm ina tio n o r r e g a rd ingthe be st interest of the child. 2

We find support for the vie w that the trial co u rt did not err by consideringbases for termination other than Vallejo’s a ffidavit of r elinquishment in the statute entitled “Ter mination5

When Parent is Petitioner.” Id
. § 16 1. 00 5. Th a t se c tio n pr ov ide s in re le va nt p a rt , “ A p a re nt m a y

fi le
a suit for termination of the petitioner’s pare nt-child rela tionship. The court may order termination if termination is in the best interest of the child.” Id. § 161.005(a) . The re q u i re m en t t h at a cour t
c on sid e ri ng a

pa re nt’ s p e tit ion

to t e rm inate mus t f

ind te rm inati on in the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st
un de rc uts Va llej o’s argum e nt t ha t th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y a sse ssi ng wh e the r t e rm inatio n o f h is pare ntal rig hts was in A.V.’s be st interest. We are not persua ded that a court must assess the child’s best interest whe n consideringa par ent’s petition to terminate, but err s by doing so w hen conside ring
a pa re nt’ s a ff ida vit of vo lun tary

re lin qu ish me nt. We f ind fu rt he r s up po rt for this v ie w i n Se c tio n 1 61 .1 03 , e nti tle d “ Af fi davit of Vol u n ta

r y Re li n qu is h me n t o f Pa

r e n ta l Ri g h ts
. ” T h is s e c ti o n , c o n ta in in g th e r e qu is it e s of a relinquishment aff

idavit, is in t he subcha

pter e ntitled “Procedur es.” I t states that the af fidavit may
c on ta in “ a

wa ive r o f p roce ss i n a

su it t o te rm inate the pa

re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip fi le d und e r t his chapte r or in a suit to terminate joined with a pe tition for adoption.” Id . § 16 1. 10 3( c ). I f a n a ff ida vit of voluntary

relinquishment vitiated a termination proce eding there would be no nee d for se rvice of proce ss or a waiver of t hat proc ess. I f an a ffidavit of r elinquishment does not prohibit the inception of a suit to terminate the pare nt-child relationship (for which pr ocess would be serve d), we see no ba sis fo r c on c lud ingthat an a ff ida vit of re lin qu ish me nt a

uto ma tic a lly

e nd s an o ng oin g c a se . N or is there support for Vallejo’s allegation that a volunt ary relinquishment obviates t he issue of the child’s best interest. Sec tion 161.103 requires a n alleg ation that termination is in the b est interest of the child. Id . § 16 1. 10 3( b) (6 ). Se c tio ns 16 1. 00 1 a nd 16 1. 10 3 a re c on sis te nt w itha sy ste m th a t pe rm its pa rents to v olu

nta ri ly re lin qu ish

the ir pa re nta l r ig hts , b ut r e qu ir e s c ourt a c tio n to te rm inate the ir6

pare ntal rig hts. See Te rre ll v . Ch am be rs , 630 S.W .2d 800, 803 (Tex. A pp.—Ty ler 19 8 2 ) (“The signing of an aff

idavit of relinquishment, howeve r, does not af fec t the require ment that the trial cour t
mu s t s ti ll f

in d u n d e r § 1 5
. 0 2 th a t t e r

mi n a ti o n is in

th e b e s t i n te r e s t o f

th e c h ild.”), a

f f ’d s ub nom. Cha mb e rs v . Te rre ll , 639 S.W .2d 451 (Tex. 1982).

Vallejo ar g ues that the provision p er m i t t ing a court to consider

a voluntary relinquishment aff

idavit during an involuntary termination proce eding is de signe d only to allow a
c ourt to c on sid e r t

ha t af fi davit wh e n th e a ff

iant s e e ks to r e vo ke that a ff ida vit . Wh ile c ourt s ma

y us e
a vo lun tary re lin qu ish me nt af fi davit fo r that re a so n, we fi nd no su pp or t f or the pr op os iti on

that th is i s t h e exclusive way

the af fidavit may

be used in a

n involuntary

termination proce eding . I nstead, the fa ct that af

fidavits are revoc able—e ven when initially sty led as irre vocable —supports the view that termination is not effe cted until the cour t makes it so. We are not pe rsuade d that the filing of an af fidavit of voluntary

relinquishment preve nts the trial cou r t f r o m m a k in g f in d in g s reg arding other bases f or involuntary

termination or the be st interest of the c hild. Th e a do pti on

statut e a lso su

pp or ts this int e rp re ta tio n. I t pr ov ide s in re le va nt p a rt :
I f an a ffidavit of r elinquishment of pare ntal ri gh t s contains a c onsent for the Depa rtment of Protec tive and R eg ulatory Service s or a lice nsed child-plac ing a g ency to place the child for ad o p t i on and appoints the de partment or a g ency manag ing c o n s e r v a to r o f th e c h il d , f

u rth e r c o n s e n t b y th e p a r e n t is n o t r e qu ir ed and the adoption order

shall terminate a ll rights of the pare nt without further ter min at ion pr oc e e din g s.
T e x . F a m . C o d e A n n . § 1 6 2
. 0 0 1 ( c ) ( W e s t2 0 0 8 )
. T h i s s t a tu t e d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a ts o m e a c t i o n b y a court is n ee d ed to terminate the par ent’s rig hts even in the fa ce of an af fidavit of re linquishm ent
a nd pe nd inga do pti on . I f, a s Va lle jo a rgue s, the a ff

ida vit of vo lun tary re lin qu ish me nt i mme diate ly7

and automatica lly

terminated pare ntal rig hts w ithout more , there would be no need f or the a doption order to terminat e the par ent’s rig hts. I n this case, whic h ended w ithout adoption, further ter mination proce eding s were still neede d.

When arg uing tha

t terminat i o n of par ental rig hts is automatic upon filing of an af fidavit of voluntary

relinquishm en t and that best intere st is not required, Va llejo relies on Texas De partment of Family ProtectiveServic es v. Alternative s in Motion, Inc. , 210 S.W .3d 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) . He c ontends that, when a voluntary relinquishment aff

idavit desig nates a licensed child-place ment ag ency as a ma nag ing c onservator, the a g e nc y

a uto ma tic a lly

ha s a ri g ht to po sse ssi on su pe ri or to t he pa re nt f ili ng the a ff

ida vit a nd be st int e re st a na ly sis a pp lie s o nly to co ns e rv a tor sh ip. We fi nd no statut or y su pp or t for the a rgume nt t o lim it the be st i nte re st a

na ly sis . V a lle

jo r e lie s o n th e fo llo wi ng pa ssa g e fr om AIM :
B e c a us e the be st i nte re st o f the c hil d mu st b e c on sid e re d, we c on c lud e tha t w hil e a p p o i n t m e n t o f a p ar ty d esig nated in an a ffidavit of r elinquishment in place of the p a r e n t w h o s e r ig hts are vo luntaril y terminated is au tom ati c for the pur pose of te rm inatio n p ro c e e din g s, a pp oin tme nt o f that par

ty a s man a g ingc on se rv a tor in a su it to d e te rm ine c on se rv a tor sh ip of the c hil d is su bje c t to pr oo f t

hat th e a pp oin tme nt i s in t he c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st.
21 0 S. W.3 d a t 80 4 ( e mph a se s a dd e d)
. Va lle jo ind ic a te s by the ita lic ize d w or ds tha t te rm inatio n is automatic upon voluntary relinquishment. I nstead, we are of t he view that what the c ourt held wa s automatic is the appointment of the pa rty desig n at ed as co n servator in the aff idavit, as shown by the words in bold.8 The languag e of V allejo’s af fidavit is consistent w i t h the interpre tation that the aff idavit alone does not e ffe ct termination of pa renta l rig hts and d o es not end the involuntary te rm inatio n s uit . A ft e r s ta te me nts re lin qu ish inghis pa re nta l r ig hts , th e a ff

ida vit pr ov ide s:
Ifully understand that a lawsuit has bee n filed in Travis County , to terminate for ever the pa re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip s b e tw e e n me a nd the a bo ve -n a me d Ch ild . I fu lly understand that the termination suit may or may not be combined with a suit to adopt my Chi ld. Iun de rs tand

that e ith e r w a y , o nc e the Court te rm inate s my pa re nta l r ig hts , Ihave no f

urther sa y conce rning my

Child, whether or not my child [i s] adopted then or at some late r time.

. . . . I do no t w a nt t o b e inf

or me d f ur the r a bo ut t he laws uit , a

nd Iwa ive a nd

g ive up my rig hts to be g iven notice about a ny thing g oing on in the la

wsuit. I specific ally

ag ree that a fina l hear ing in the lawsuit may be held at a time without further notice to me.

. . . . I FUL L Y UNDERSTAND THAT I WI L L NOT BE I NFO RME D F UR THER AB OUT THE TERMI

NATI ON SUI T.

. . . . Termination of the pare nt-child relationships between me a nd my Child, so that they may be pla c e d f

or a do pti on , is in t

he be st i nte re st o f t

he Chi ld. Iun de rs tand

that I ma ke thi s te rm inatio n p os sib le by e xec uti ng thi s A ff

ida vit
. Although V allejo ar g ues that these pa ssag es mere ly acknow ledg e that the suit will continue as to cons e r v a to r s h ip , th e s e p a s s a g e s a c kn o w le d g e th a t th e te r mi n a ti o n s u it h a s b e e n f il e d and wi ll c on tin

ue wi tho ut V a lle

jo’ s in vo lve me nt a ft e r t

he e xec uti on

of the a ff ida vit . T he state me nts that “once the Court terminates my pare ntal rig hts, Ihave no f urther sa y conce rning my

Child” and that execution of the af

fi d av it “make[s] the termination possible” a nticipates that, despite the9

e xec uti on of the a ff

ida vit , fu rt he r a c tio n wi ll be ne e de d to te rm inate Va lle jo’ s pa re ntal ri ghts. Al tho ug h th e a ffi dav it is no t law , it is c on sis te nt w iththe int e rp re ta tio n o f t he statut e s th a t a voluntary relinquishment aff idavit does not moot further pr ocee dings in a n involuntary

termination proce eding . I t does not strip the court of jurisdiction to consider other g rounds for te rmination, and do e s n ot p re ve nt t

he c ourt fr om a sse ssi ng the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st. We find further

support for the pr o p o s i t i o n that an af fidavit of voluntary
re lin qu ish me nt do e s no t a uto ma tic a lly a nd imm e diate ly te rm inate a pa re nta l re la tio ns hip in p ub lic po lic y . V a lle

jo’ s vie w that his ri g hts we re te rm inate d imm e diate ly up on e xec uti on of the a ff ida vit i s inconsistent with the revoc ability of some af

fidavits. Even whe n the af fidavit is irrevoc able, pu bli c po lic y

do e s n ot f

a vo r a llo wi ng imm e diate te rm inatio n if te rm inatio n is no t in

the c hil d’ s b e st int e re st. F or

ins tanc e , if

te rm inatio n w ou ld lea ve th e c hil d w ith ou t f ina nc ia l su pp or t f ro m a fi na nc ia lly c a pa ble bu t di sin te re ste d p a re nt, pu bli c po lic y

wo uld no t fa vo r le tti ng the pa

re nt d isp e ns e with his obli g ation on the par ent’s whim. Public policy also disfavors allowing a par ent to put the State to the ex pense of g ather ing a nd adducingevidenc e and, the n, to pree mpt the trial court fr om making finding s reg arding what it has hea rd. Th e statu te estab lis hin g the re qu isi te s o f a vo lun tary

re lin qu ish me nt a ff

ida vit contemplates tha t the involuntary termination proce eding will occur de spite the execution of the af fidavit. See Te x. F a m. Cod e An n. § 161 .1 03 (c ). Th e inv olu nta ry te rm inatio n s ta tut e e xpre ssl y state s th a t th e e xec uti on

of an af fi davit of vo lun tary

re lin qu ish me nt i s o ne of se ve ra l po ssi ble g rounds supporting termination. Id . § 161.001(1)( K). Ne ither statute states that the e x ecution of the af fidavit is sufficient a lone to support termination, and ne ither states that the e x ecution of a n10

aff idavit of voluntary relinquishment immediately and automatically conclude s a te rm i n ati on proce edi n g. Al though a

proper aff idavit must designate a per son or ag ency to act as ma

nag ing
conser vator a nd there by surre nder the pare nt’s superior r ight to possession, see id . § 161.103(a) (12),
we c onclude that it does not auto m at i cally , finally terminate pa

renta l rig hts. Both the af fidavit of
re lin qu ish me nt st atu te a nd the inv olu

nta ry te rm inatio n s ta tut e have pr ov isi on s r e la tin g to t he be st interest of the child—the af fiant must swear

that termination is in the child ’s best interest, id
. § 161.103(b)( 6), and the court must find t h at termination is in the child’s best intere st, id
. § 161.001(2). Neither statute prohibits the court from consideringother ba ses for te rmination, and neither statute prohibits the court from making a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. See id. §§ 161.001, .103. Rather, the aff idavit statute is silent reg arding such a f inding, a nd the i n voluntary

termination statute re quires a f inding that ter

mination of pare ntal rig hts is in t he child’s best intere st. See id.

Concluding that the trial court did not err by assessing bases for i n v o l untary termination o f parental rig hts other than Va llejo’s execution of an a ffidavit of voluntar y
re lin qu ish me nt a

nd by a sse ssi ng the be st i nte re st o f t he c hil d, we a ff

ir m the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: Mar ch 27, 2009