### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE O ct obe r 25, 200 5 S es sio n
THOM AS AL VIN CA RTE R v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for MonroeCounty No. 04-002 Car roll L. Ross, Jud ge

No. E2005-00625-CC A-R3- P C - F iled Janu ary 23, 2006

The pe titioner, Thomas Alvi n Carter , appea ls from the Monroe Count y Criminal Court’s dism issal of his petition for post-conviction re lief fr om his guilty plea to thef

t over $500 but less than $1000, a Class E fe lony . He c ontends that his gu i l t y p l ea was unknowing and involuntary and that he
re c e ive d th e ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt Aff irm ed

J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., joined.

Robert L . J olley , J r., Knoxvil le, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Thomas Alvin Carter

. Paul G

. Summers, A ttorney Gene ral and Reporter ; B lind Akr awi, Assistant A ttorney Gene ral; Jerry N. Es te s, Di stric t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; a nd Cha

rl e s W. Pop e , Jr. , A ssi sta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

Th is c a se ari se s f

ro m th e pe tit ion e r’ s c on vic tio n f or thef t of a Me rc ury Ma rq uis fr om a Wendy ’s par

king lot in Monroe Count y

. On J une 9, 1999, the victim saw his car being driven out
o f t h e p ark i n g l o t b u t c o u l d n o t i d e n t i f y t h e t h i e f

. O f

f i c e r s l a t e r r e c o v e r e d t h e c ar i n B l o u n tC o u n t y, and a f inge rprint expert matched f inge rprints found in the ca r to the petitioner. Of

fice rs locate d the lic e ns e plate fr om the vic tim ’s c ar o n a no the r c ar i n Ro a ne Cou nty , in w hic h th e y a lso fo un d it e ms belong ing to the petitioner. The items inc luded a cell phone application and a letter to “Tommy .”B eca us e t he r ecor d on ap peal d oes not i ncl ude a copy of t he i ndi ct ment , a c op y of t he pl ea agr eement , or copi es 1

o f t h e ju d g m e n ts, we d o no t kn o w w h a t the ind ic tm e n t fo r t h e first c o u n t c h a rg e d

. H o w e v e r, the tra n sc rip t o f t h e p o stc o n v ic tio n he a rin g c o n ta ins a sta te m e n t b y the a tto rn e y tha t o n e o f t h e o ff e rs he ha d w ritten d o w n w a s “‘sh o p lif ting ;’

.

. . ‘co u n t o n e , cla ss E , t w o ye a rs a t 3 5 % , $ 7 0 0 .0 0 re stitutio n

. . . ‘ T h e ft o f ca r,’ .

. . C o u n t t w o , cla ss D , f o u r ye a rs to
s er ve and r es t i t ut i on. ’ ” B as ed on t he r ecor d bef ore us , we bel i eve t he f i r s t coun t ch ar ged t hef

t over $50 0 but l es s t han $ 1 ,0 0 0 , a C la ss E felo n y.
-2- A M on ro e Cou nty

g randjury

ind ic te d th e pe tit ion e r o n tw o c ou nts , in c lud ing on e c ou nt of a Cla ss E felony and one cou n t o f t h eft over $1,000, a Class D fe lony

. Pursuant to a plea a g ree ment 1 neg otiated on the day the petitioner’s case was set for trial, the state ente red a nolle prosequi to the Class E felony

and the pe titioner pled g uilty to one count of t heft over $500 but less than $1000, a
re d u ce d ch ar ge f

ro mt h e t h ef

to v er$ 1 , 0 0 0

. T h e p et i t i o n er agr ee d t o a t h re e- y ea r s en t en ce as a R an ge I I offe nder, c onsecutive to a n eig ht-y ear sentenc e he w as ser ving in a nother c ase. At the g uilty plea hearing , the t rial court informed the pe titioner about his constituti onal rig ht 1) t o a jury trial, 2) t o appea l if he we nt to trial, 3) to call witnesses on his own beha lf, 4) to conf ront and cr oss-examine witnesses ag ainst him, 5) to have the co urt issue subpoenas c ompelling the attendanc e of w itnesses, 6) to re main silent or to testify , and 7) to for ce the state to prove e very element of

the crime bey ond a reasonable doubt. The assistant district attorney announce d the plea ag ree ment and g ave the fac tual basis for the ple a. The trial cour t as k ed t h e petitioner if he was satisfied with the plea

and if he wanted to e nter into th e agr ee m en t

. The pe titioner stated he wa s sa tis fi e d w ith the a g re e me nt andwa nte d to e nte r the ple a . T he pe tition e r a c kn ow le dg e d th a t hi s a tto rn e y re pr e se nte d h im a ndthat hi s a tto rn e y ha d e xpla ine d h is rig hts a ndthe a g re e me nt t o h im.

On Dec ember

29, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleg ing that he ente red his g uiltyplea involuntarily and that he r ece ived the inef fec tive assistance of counse l.

After appointment of counsel, the petitioner filed an amende d petition a lleg ing one a d d i t i o nal g round: that the petitioner did not knowing ly enter his guilty plea because his attorney did not inform him about his sentencing options.

At the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng , th e pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt ha d a pp oin te d h im an attorne y . He sa id his attorney filed a motion see king to w ithdraw from repr esenting him before he ente red his guilty plea. He said that he and his attorney never g ot along and that he wa s happy when his attorney filed t he mot ion beca use he thought he would g et a new attorney

. He sa id the trial
c ou rt tol d him tha t he co uld hir e his ow n att orne y if he wa nte d a new on e bu t tha t the c ou rt wo uld not appoint him another attorne y . He sa id the attorney continued to re prese nt him “under for ce.”

Th e pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d tha t just be fo re his tr ia l wa s to be g in, his a tto rn e y tol d h im a

bo ut s ome office rs who saw the stolen car being driven down the i nterstate with two people in it. He sa id the attorney never investigated the allegation because he did not know about it until the day of trial. He
sa id h i s a t t o r n e y t a l k e d t o h i m v e r y l i t t l e ab o u t t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e a n d c o e rc e d h im i nto
acc epting the plea be cause then they could “g et it over with.” He sa id that if the court would ha ve g ive n h im a no the r atto rn e y , he wo uld ha ve pr oc e e de d to tr ia l. T he pe tit ion e r s a id that a lth ou g h h is-3-

attorney had re commended he g o to t ri al, he decided to take the plea be cause he did not trust the attorney . He sa id he did not trust his attorney beca use he did not communicate well with him and beca use the attorney thought he was g uilty

. He also said he was not ca pable of repr esenting himself.

T h e p et i t i o n ert es t i fi ed t h at h i s at t o rn eyd i d n o t ex p l ai n t o h i m wh at i t m ea n t t o b e aR an ge I I offe nder. H e said he should ha ve been sentenc ed as a Rang e I offe nder beca use he had only

been in trouble once befor e t h i s ar re s t , when he was c onvicted of auto thefts ten y ear s ag o. He sa id he enter ed the g uiltyplea be cause his attorney was not pre pare d fo r t ri al and he could not repr esent himself. He sa id he would have g one to trial if he ha d been confide nt in his attorney . He sa id that he wa s n ot a wa

re of a ny e vid e nc e c on ne c tin g him to the sto le n c ar in Mo nr oe Cou nty a ndthat hi s at t o rn eyn ev erd i s cu s s ed v en u e w i t h h i m

. He s ai d h i s at t o rn eyo n l y t o l d h i mh e w as fa ci n g a sentenc e of twe lve y ear s or more at six ty perc ent.

On c ro ss- e xami natio n, the pe tit ion e r t esti fi e d th a t th e fi rs t pr os e c uto r andfi rs t de fe ns e attorney involved in his case wer e re moved from the c ase be cause they “had attitude problems.” He
sa id h e e nte re d th e ple a be c a us e it wa s muc h be tte r than the tw e lve y e ars a t sixty pe rc e nt h e wo uld have r ece ived had he g one to trial. He acknow ledg ed spea king to the a ssistant dist rict attorne y about the plea on the day his tria l w as schedule d to be g in but asserted the assistant district attorney initiated the c o n v e r s a ti o n

. H e a d mi tt e d h e k n e w ab o u t th e f in g e rp r in t e v id e n c e b e f

o r e th e tria l d a te

. He acknow ledg ed he enter ed the plea ag ainst the advice of his attorney , but he said it was bec ause he could not trust him.

On re direc t examinati o n , t h e p etitioner testified that he had “f ired” his attorney

a dozen tim e s. He sa id the at to rney told h im h e ha d to stay on the c a se un til the tr ia l c ou rt tol d h im otherwise.

Th e a tto rn e y

te sti fi e d th a t he ha d w or ke d in the pu bli c de fe nd e r’ s o ff ic e fo r t we lve y ears. He too k th e pe tit ion e r’ s c a se a ft e r b e ing app ro a c he d b y the Publi c Defen de r b e c a us e the Pub lic Def ender and the pe titioner were not ge tting along . He sa id he communicate d with the p et i t i oner a t th e c ou rtho us e a ndthr ou g h le tte rs . H e sa id the pe tit ion er wa s u nc oo pe rativ e in p re pa ri ng his defe nse.
Th e a tto rn e y

te sti fi e d th a t he didno t r e c a ll a ny ne w e vid e nc e be ing dis c los e d the da y of tr ia l. He sa id O ff

ic e r S c ott Web b’ s of

fe ns e re po rt wa s pa

rt of the dis c ov e ry he ini tia lly re c e ive d. He sa id that it wa s his pr a c tic e to g o ove r dis c ov e ry wi th ev e ry c lie nt an d tha t he w e nt o ve r d isc ov e ry wi th the petitioner. He said he did not know t he name of the L oudon Countydeputy who saw the stolen Me rc ur yM ar q u i s o n t h e i n t e r s t a t e b u th e d i d t a l k t o O f f i c e r S c o t tW e b b , w h o w r o t e t h e o f f e ns e report, about the statements by the L oudon Countydeputy . He sa id he di d not believe the description g iven by the L oudon Countydeputy matched the petitioner, bec ause the petitione r was a g e thirty -five at the time of the offense and the deputy described the people in the car as two white male s betwee n the ag es of e ighte en and thirty . He sa id he re quested e x culpatory evidenc e from the state but neve r rec eived the name of the de puty . He sa id he filed a m otion to withdraw as petitioner’ s counsel beca use the p et i t i o n er had thre atene d to kill hi m. He said he did not have animosity toward the-4-

petitioner and w anted the c ase to g o to trial. He said he told the pe titioner the state filed notice that he was a care er offende r. He sa id he went ove r the c onvictions list ed in the state’ s notice with the petitioner but did not remember the date that he did. He said that afte r looking over the notice, he thought the sta te could ar g ue that the pe titioner w as a Range I I I offe nder but that he did not
reme mber discussing it with the petitioner. He said e very time he discussed t h e ca s e wi th the petitioner, the pe titioner told him he wa nted to g o to trial.

The a ttorney

testified that on the day

set for the trial to beg in, Aug ust 19, 2003, the petitioner asked to spea

k to the assistant district attorney . He sa id he advised the petitioner ag ainst speaking to the assistant district attorney but the petitioner y elled down the hallway to the assist an t d istrict attorney , “What’s y our best off er? ” He said he told the petitioner they should try

the ca se but that the pe tit ion e r s a id h e wa s a n id iot a ndthe pe tit ion e r w a s n ot g oin g to lis te n to him

. Th e a tto rn e y sa id the state made an off

er to the pe titioner and the petitioner responded, “Deal.” He sa id that he did not dis c us s th e of

fe r w ith the pe tit ion e r b ut t oldhim it w a s n ot a

g oo d o ff e r. He a lso sa id that in Au g us t 20 02 , th e pr e vio us a tto rn e y fo r the state of fe re d the pe tit ion e r fo ur y e ars to ru n c on c ur re ntl y wi th h is other sentences but the petit ioner re jected it. He said he ne ver informed the court that the petitioner worke d out the plea of

fer himself. He sa id he did discuss the plea f orms, the petitioner’s rights, a nd the total rang e of punishment with the petitioner.

On cr oss-examination, the attorney acknow ledg ed that the assistant district attorney talked with the petitioner and him only afte r the pe titioner reque sted it. He said he believed t he petitioner knowing ly

enter ed the plea . He sa id he thoug ht the petitioner wa s k nowledg eable about the plea proce eding s. He said the pe titioner enjoy ed coming to court bec ause he could put on a show.

F oll ow ing the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng , the tr ia l c ou rt dis mis se d th e pe tit ion fo r p os tconv i ct i o n relief . Reg arding the voluntariness of the plea, the trial court found the petitioner wa s fu lly a wa re of the c ha rg e s, sig ne d a ll the ne c e ssa ry pap erwo rk, ini tiate d th e ple a , a nde nte re d it voluntarily . The trial c ourt also found the plea repre sented a “voluntary and intellige nt choice a mong the alternative cour ses of a ction open to the [petitio n er ]

. ” Reg arding the ineff ective a ssistance of
c ou ns e l, the tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th e pe tit ion e r o ff e re d n o e vid enc e a t th e he ari ng to s up po rt his contentions that he wa s prejudice d by his attorney ’s performanc e and that he would not have ple d g ui l t y an d would have g one to trial. The trial court noted tha t ag ainst his attorney ’s advice , the pe tit ion e r c a lle d o ut t o th e a ssi sta nt dis tr ic t a tto rn e y in the ha llw a y be fo re tr ia l a nda sk e d f

or his be st offe r. The trial court a lso noted that t h e at t o rn eywanted to take this case to trial but that the petitioner insisted they

neg otiate a plea . The trial c ourt fo u n d that no newly discovere d evidenc e exis ted that could have made a differ ence in the petitioner’s plea

. The burde n in a post-conviction procee ding is on the pe titioner to prove his g rounds for r elief by clea r and convincing evidenc e. T.C.A. § 40-30-110( f). On appea l, w e are bo u n d b yt h e trial
c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t un le ss w e c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e in the re c or d prepo nd erat e s a g a ins t those finding s. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456-57 (Tenn. 2001). Be cause they relate to mix ed questions of l aw an d fa ct , we r eview the trial court’ s conclusions as to whethe r counse l’s pe rf orma nc e wa s d e f

i c ie nt andwh e the r that de fi c ie nc y wa s p re jud ic ia l un de r a

de no vo sta nd ardwi th-5-

no presumption of corr ectne ss. I d. at 457. Post-conviction relief may only be g iven if a c onviction or sentenc e is void or voidable bec ause of a violation of a c onstitut ional rig ht. T.C.A. § 40-30-103.

I. G UI LTY P LEA

Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd s t

h at h ee n t e r e d

h i s g u i l ty ple a un kn ow ing ly

a ndinv olu nta

ri ly be c a us e he wa s not “ repr esente d” by counsel and did not rec eive Fa retta w arning s. See F are tta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. C t. 2525 (1975). He also contends the ple a wa s unknowi n g and involuntary beca use on the da y

of his plea, he rec eived ne w information about a L oudon County deputy , who had seen two individuals in the stolen ca r. He asserts he was una

ble to ma ke an investigation into t he L o u d o n C o u n t y

d ep u t y ’s s t at em en t s

. He al s o co n t en d s h e re ce i v ed n o i n fo rm at i o n ab o u ts en t en ci n g. The state a sserts that the petitioner f ully u n d er s tood the plea a g ree ment and the se ntence that he would rec eive. The state also asse rts the petitioner’s attorney proper ly advised the pe titioner about the senten ci n g rang es. The state contends the transcript of the g uiltyplea he aring shows the petitioner voluntarily

and knowing ly

enter ed his g uiltyplea.
When evaluating the knowing and voluntary nature of a g uiltyplea, the U nit ed States Supreme Court ha s held that “[t] he standa rd wa s and re mains whether the plea r epre sents a voluntary
a ndint e lli g e nt c ho ic e a mon g the a lte rn a tiv e c ou rs e s o f a c tio n o pe n to the d e fe nd a nt. ” No rth Carolina v. Alford , 4 0 0 U. S

. 2 5 , 31, 91 S. Ct . 160, 164 (1970). The court re viewing the voluntariness of a g uilty plea must look to the totality of the circ umstances. SeeState v. Turner , 919 S.W .2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . The c ircumstance s include

the re la tiv e int e lli g e nc e of the de fe nd a nt; the de g re e of his famil iari ty with criminal proce eding s; whether he was repre sented by competent counsel a nd had the opportunityto confe r wit h counsel a bout the options available to him; the ext ent of a dvice f rom counsel a nd the
c ou rt c on c erni ng the c ha

rg e s a g a ins t hi m; a ndthe re a so ns fo r h is de c isi on to p le a d g uil ty , in c lud ing a de sir e to a vo id a g re a te r p e na lty that mi g ht r e su lt f

ro m a jury tr ia l.

Bla nkenship v. State, 858 S.W .2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Ca udill v. J ag o, 747 F.2d 1046, 10 52 (6 th C ir . 1 98 4) ). A p le a re su lti ng fr om ig no ranc e , mi su nd e rs ta nd ing , c oe rc ion , in du c e me nt, or threats is not “voluntary .” I d.

The trial c ourt is char g ed with determining if the g uiltyplea is “know ing” by questioning the de fe nd a nt to ins ur e that he or sh e fu lly un de rs ta nd s th e ple a a ndits c on se qu e nc e s. Sta te v. Pe ttu s, 986 S.W .2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) ; Blanke nship, 85 8 S

. W

. 2 d at 904. I n Boy kin v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court stated that certain constitu t i o nal rig hts are implicate d in a plea of g uil ty , n a me ly , th e ri g ht to a tri a l by jury , the ri g ht to co nf ro nt wit ne sse s, a ndthe privi le g e a g a ins t
c omp e lle d s e lf

-i nc ri min a tio n, a nd that it wo uld no t pre su me a wa ive r o f the se thr e e imp orta nt rig hts from a silent rec ord. 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969). Rule 11(c ) of the T ennesse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e du re ou tli ne s a dv ic e to b e g ive n to a de fe nd a nt e nte ri ng a ple a a nde xplic it-6-

proce dures f

or ensuring on the reco rd t h at g uiltypleas a re voluntarily

and under standing ly

made. Howeve r, only

the constitutionallyg rounded rights stated in Boy kin are addre ssable, per

se, under the Post-Conviction P roce dure A ct. See State v. Prince , 781 S.W .2d 846, 853 (Tenn. 1989)

. A. Failure to Warn

Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t he e nte re d h is g uil ty p l e a u n kn o w i n g l y

an d i nv olu nta ri ly be c a us e he didno t ha ve the a ssi sta nc e of c ou ns e l. H e c la ims his la c k of trus t in his a tto rn e y , c on fl ic t w ith his attorney , his attorney ’s re quest to the trial court to be removed fr om the case , and his attorney ’s ins uf fi c ie nt inv e sti g a tio n eq uate d to th e de fe nd a nt b e ing wi tho ut r e pr e se ntatio n. He c la ims he c ho se to pr o ce ed pro se without being questioned about g iving up his rig ht to counsel in violation of Fa retta. He claims that beca use hi s attorney

was not an e ffe ctive advoc ate, he proce eded pr o se and
e nt e r e dh i s p l e a

u n k n o w i n g l y

a n d i n v o l u n t ar i l y

. T h e s t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a tt h e p e t i t i o n e r k n o wi ng ly and voluntarily

enter ed his g uiltyplea.

A criminal defenda nt has a rig ht to be repr esente d by counsel under both the United States and Te nnessee Constit utions. S ee U .S. Const . Amend. VI ; Tenn. Const. art. I , §9. A criminal de fe nd a nt a lso ha s a

Sixth A me nd me nt rig ht to pr oc e e d pro se

. F are tta , 422 U. S. at 81 9, 95 S. Ct

. a t 2533 ; St a t e v

. N o r t h i n g t o n , 6 6 7 S

. W

. 2 d 5 7 , 6 0 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 4 )

. I n o r d e r t o i n v o k e t h e r i g h tto proce ed pro se , a def

endant must meet thre e re quirements: 1) the de fenda nt must t imely assert the ri g ht t o s e lf

-r e pr e se ntatio n, 2) the re qu e st m us t be c le ar and un e qu ivo c a l, a nd3) the de fe nd a nt mus t knowing ly

and intellige ntly

waive the rig ht to the assistance of counsel. State v. Her rod, 754 S.W.2d 627, 629-30 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Rule 44(a) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Cri m i n al P ro ce d ure states that “[e]very

indige nt def

en d ant shall be e ntitled to have assig ned counse l in all matters
ne c e ssa ry to the de fe ns e a nda t e ve ry sta g e of the pr oc e e din g s, un le ss the de fe nd a nt e xec ute s a written wa iver.”
The following colloquy

relating to the pe titioner’s claim that he w as not repr esen t ed by
co u n s el o cc u rr ed at t h e p et i t i o n er ’s gu i l t y p l eah ea ri n g:

THE COURT: For the re cord, y ou ’r e re p re s en t ed b y [ co u n s el ] , is that
c or re c t? [PET I TI ON ER]: Rig ht, ri g ht.

. . . .
THE COURT: Sir, y ou’re repr esente d by [counsel]

. Are y ou

satisf i ed with this pl ea that he’s wor ked out t h i s m o rn i n g? [PET I TI ON ER]: Ye a h, y e a h, I a m.-7-

I n Pry or v. Sta te , th e pe tit ion e r i nforme d th e c ou rt that he wa nte d th e tw o atto rn e y s o n h is c a se remove d and to be appointed new counsel, but he never requested to procee d pro se. 632 S.W.2d 570, 570 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). This c ourt conclude d the petitioner never reque sted to proce ed pro se. I d. “A trial judge is not require d sua sponte to a dvise an acc used of h i s ri gh t t o s elfrepr esentation.” I d. The pe titioner’s “a ssertion must be unequivoca l.” I d. (empha sis a dded). The
rec ord re flec ts the petitioner never reque sted to pr ocee d pro se and never filed a w ritten waive r of his right to re prese ntation. The petitioner is not entitled to relief on this iss ue. B. Exculpatory

Evidence

The petitioner contends that he ente red his g uiltyplea unknowing ly and involuntarily . He
a sse rt s th a t on the da y set f or tr ia l, the state dis c los e d in fo rm a tio n a bo ut a L ou do n Co un ty

de pu ty who had se en two individuals in the st o l en ca r t en m i n utes afte r the victim reported it stolen. He
asserts that although he was una ble to investigate this e vidence , it would have shown that he did not commit the theft. He a lso a sserts that if the information had be en investig ated, he would have g one to trial. The state contends that the pe titioner’s plea w as knowing and voluntary . I t asserts that the pe tit ion e r’ s a tto rn e y

re c e ive d th e of

fe ns e re po rt wi th the L ou do n Co un ty de pu ty ’s state me nts in dis c ov e ry a nd that the pe tit ion e r’ s a tto rn e y we nt o ve r d isc ov e ry

wi th the pe tit ion e r. We a g re e wi th the state.
The pe titioner prese nts this i ssue as a n involuntary g uilty plea c laim but then addre sses it as a cla im for the inef

fec tive as s i s t an ce of

counsel. We will addre ss this i ssue as a n ineffe ctive assistance claim subsequently but will first a ddress the issue of whe ther the g uiltyplea wa s voluntary
an d k n o wi n g.
The substanc e of the petitioner’s posit ion appea rs t o be that the t iming of the di sclosure of the L oudon County deputy ’s obs ervations resulted in the petitioner making an unknowing decision in pleading g uilty . Howeve r, the pe titioner’s attorney testified he r ec ei v ed Of

fi cer Scott W ebb’s report containing the statements made by t h e L o u d o n Countydeputy with discovery . The petitioner’s attorney also testified he went over discovery with the petitioner we ll before the day set fo r tr ia l. Th ou g h the pe tit ion e r d isp ute d th a t hi s a tto rn e y inf orme d h im a

bo ut the L ou do n Co un ty deputy , he admitted that he ha d knowledg e of it bef ore e ntering his guilty

plea.
At the g uiltyplea h ea ri n g, t he petitioner told the trial c ourt that he kne w he wa s testify ing under oath and that he under stood his right to a jury trial, rig ht to subpoena and c onfront witnesses
a g a ins t hi m, andri g ht a g a ins t se lf -i nc ri min a tio n. Th e pe tit ion e r s a id h e wa s e nte ri ng the ple a of his own fre e will and had not be en thr ea t en ed o r promised a ny thing. He said he unde rstood the plea ag ree ment that his attorney went over

with him. Onlythe constitutional rights stated in Boy kin are addre ssable under

the Post-Conviction Proce dures Act. See Prince, 781 S.W .2d at 853. The r ecor d ref lects that the B oykin require ments were satisfied. We conc lude that the petitioner’ s g uiltyplea was knowing , voluntary , and intellige nt. The petitioner is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.-8-

C. Sentencing

Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t he e nte re d h is g u i l ty p l e a u n kn o w i n g ly

a ndinv olu nta

ri ly be c a us e he re c e ive d n o in fo rm a tio n o n s e nte nc ing . T he pe tit ion e r a sse rt s h is atto rn e y faile d to inv e sti g a te his prior c ri min a l r e c or d to de termi ne hi s cla ssi fi c a tio n r a ng e . T he pe tit ion e r a lso a sse rt s th a t hi s attorney and the state told him that he would fac e a twelve- y ear sentenc e as a car eer offe nder if he went to trial. The sta te contends tha t the petit ioner’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily

enter ed. Th e state a sse rt s th e pe tit ion e r u nd e rs too d the g uil ty ple a pr oc e e din g s a ndwa s f

ull y a dv ise d b y

his attorney about the plea

ag ree ment and the r amifica tions of the plea.
The pe titioner also prese nts this i ssue as a n involuntary g uiltyplea c laim but then addre sses it as a cla im for the inef

fec tive assistance o f co u nsel. We will address this issue as an inef fec tive assistance claim subsequently but will first address the issue of whether the g uilty plea wa s voluntary
an d k n o wi n g.
The tr anscript of the g uiltyplea he aring ref lects that the trial c ourt did not inform the pe ti ti o n e r ab o u t th e mi n imu m a n d ma xim u m p e n a lt ie s o f h is c h ar g e

. H o w e v e r , th e plea pe tition
c on ta ine d th e rang e of

pu nis hme nt an d the pe tit ion e r ac kn ow le dg e d g oin g thr ou g h the pe tit ion wi th his attorney

and under standing it.

T H E C O U R T : Sir, I ’ve now been submitted sever al

documents purport i ng to contain y our sig natur e . H a ve y ou g on e ov er the se d o c u m e n t s w i t h yo u r

a t t o r n e y?

PETI TI ONER: Uh-huh (a ffirma tive).

T H E CO U RT : For t h e r ec o rd , y o u ’r e r ep re s en t ed by [co un se l], i s th a t c or

re c t?

PET I TI ON ER: Rig ht, ri g ht.

T H E C O U R T : S i r , d o yo u r e a d a n d w r i t e o k a y?

PETI TI ONER: Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay

. Did y ou understand what he went over

with y ou?

PETI TI ONER: Yes, sir, I did.

TH E CO UR T: I s th is y ou r s ig natur e on the se do c ume nts ?-9- PET I TI ON ER: Ye s, sir , it is.
The pe titioner’s attorney

testified at the post-c onviction hearing that he explained the ra ng es of punishment to the petitioner while g oing thr oug h the plea petition before the petitioner e ntere d his plea.

A: Right her e (indicating) on the third pag e, I believe it is, the thi rdpa g e , it

ta lks abo ut the rang e of

pu nis hme nt.
Q: And what r ang e did y ou put down?

A: I pu t do wn fo r thef

t ov e r 1 00 0, the rang e of pu nis hme nt, “Two to four

y ear s at 30% to 12 y ear s at 60%.”
Q : Okay

. M e a n in g th a t [t h e p e ti ti o n e r ] c o u ld f a c e 1 2 y e ar s at 60%.

A: That wa s, y ou know, at ra ng e I it’s two to four y ear s at 30%. The top of the r ang e is 12 y ear s at 60%.

Ba sed on the totality

of the c ircumstance s, we conclude that the petitioner was informed about the sentenc ing r ang es for

this of fe n s e, t h at he re prese nted to the court that he under stood the plea ag ree ment, and that he voluntarily enter ed the g uiltyplea. The petitioner has failed t o prove by clea r and convinc ing e vidence that his guiltyplea wa s involuntary or unknowing . The pe titioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

II. THE I NE F F EC TIV E A SSIST AN CE OF CO UN SEL

The petitioner contends that he rec eived the ineffe ctive assistance of couns el , t h ere by rende ring his guilty

plea unknowing and involuntary . He a sserts his attorney did not investigate a potential witness or the pe titioner’s sentenc ing r ang e and f ailed to inform him about sentenc ing. T he state conte nds the petitioner fa iled to prove his attorne y ’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt.

Under the Six th Amendment, when a claim of inef

fec tive assistance of counsel is ma de, the burden is on the pe titioner to show that 1) counsel’ s perf ormanc e was defic ient and 2) the de ficienc y was pre jud i cial in t erms of r endering a rea sonable proba

bilitythat the re sult of the trial was unreliable or the proc eeding s fundamenta lly unfair. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct . 2052, 2064 (1984); see L ockhart v. Fretwe ll, 506 U.S. 364, 368-72, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842- 44 (1993). In other words, a showing that counsel’s pe rformance fell below a rea sonable standa

rd is not e noug h; r ather , the petitioner must a lso show that but for the substandar d perf ormanc e, “the result of the proce eding would have been differ ent.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct . at 2068. The Strickland standa

rd has be en applied to the right to c ounsel under A rticle I , section 9 of the Tenne ssee Constitution. S tate v. Melson, 772 S .W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989) . When a petitioner-10-

claims that the ineff

ective a ssistance of counsel resulted in a g uilty plea, the pe titioner must prove that counsel pe rformed def iciently and that but for c ounsel’s er rors, the pe titioner would not have ple d g uil ty

a ndwo uldha ve ins ist e d u po n g oin g t o tr ia l. H ill v. L oc kh art , 4 74 U. S. 5 2, 59 , 1 06 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985).

I n Ba x ter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), our su p reme court de cided that attorney s should be held to the g ener al standar d of whe ther the s ervic es re ndere d wer e within the rang e of c o mpetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s. The court stated that the ra ng e of competenc e wa s to be measur ed by the duties and c riteria se t forth in B easle y v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 ( 6th Cir. 1974), and United States v. De Coster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1 2 0 2 -0 4 (D

. C. Cir. 1973). Ba x t er , 523 S.W .2d at 936. Also, in review ing c ounsel’s conduc t, a “f air a ssessment of attorney perf ormanc e re quires that eve ry eff ort be made t o eliminate the distorting e ffe cts of hindsight, to rec onstru ct the circ umstances of counsel’s c halleng ed conduc t, and to evaluate the conduct f rom counsel’ s perspe ctive at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; see Hellar d v. State, 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)

.
I n its order de ny ing the petition for post-conviction re lief, the trial c ourt stated:

Th e c ou rt fi nd s th a t th e Pe tit ion e r o ff e re d n o e vid e nc e a t hi s he ari ng that w ou ld s up po rt his c on te nti on that

“ he wa s a c tua lly prejudice d by

his attorney ’s per fo rm an ce, [and] that but for the counsel’s ine ffe ctiveness that g uiltyplea would not have been a g ree d to.”

I t bear s m en t i o ning onc e ag ain that it was the Petitioner, ag ainst counsel’s advice, who ca lled out to the state in the hallway be fo re tr ia l a nd a sk e d the m fo r the ir be st of fe r. F urthe r la st minu te neg otiations then occurr ed, which resulted in the plea being acc epted by the Petitioner.
A. Exculpatory

Evidence
The pe titioner contends that the state did not disclose Office r Scot t Webb’s offense report until the day

he ente red his plea

and that his attorney

failed to investig ate the inf ormation other than to confirm the report ha d been ma de. The petitioner asse rts the information in the re port showed he did not commit t he thef

t in Monroe County . The state c ontends that the petitioner f ailed to prove by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e t h at h i s attorney ’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt. I t asserts the attorney discussed discovery

with the petitioner, re quested ex culpatory evidenc e, and w anted to take the c a se to t

ri a l.
When a petitioner c ontends that his trial counsel fa iled to d i scover , interview, or prese nt witnesses in support of his defe nse, these w itnesses should be pre sent ed bythe petitioner a t the evidentiary

hearing. B lack v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757-758 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). This is t he-11-

only way for a petitioner to prove by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that “the failure to discover or interview a

witness inured to his prejudice ” or that the failure to “ca ll the witness t o the stand resulted in the de nial of critical evidenc e.” See id. at 757. Neither the trial court nor this court may speculate on what a witness’s t estimony might have been if introduced by counsel. I d. The re cord is devoid of any

testimonyby

either O ffice r Scott Webb or a L oudon County deputy

. There fore , the petitioner has f

ailed to prove by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that he w as denie d critica l evidence , and he is not entitled to relief

. B. Sente ncing
The pe titioner cont en d s t h at his attorney failed to investig ate his criminal recor d and wa s unfamiliar with his sentenc ing r ang e. He contends his attorne y and the state advised him that if he
we nt t o tria l he wo uldbe fa c ing a se nte nc e of

tw e lve y e ars a s a career offe nd e r. He a sse rt s th is of fe ns e oc c ur

re d be fo re the c a se fo r wh ic h he wa s se rv ing a n e ig ht- y e ar se nte nc e . H e a lso a sse rt s his onlyother a

rre sts occurr ed ten y ear s befor e this c ase. The state contends that the petitioner fa iled to p ro ve by

c le ar and c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that hi s a tto rn e y ’s pe rf orma nc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. I t a sse rt s the a tto rn e y

a dv ise d th e pe tit ion e r o f the state ’s no tic e to s e e k e nh a nc e d p un ish me nt.

The re cord r efle cts that the state g ave notice it would seek enha nced punishment be cause the petitioner wa s a ca

ree r off ender . T h e re co rd also ref lects the pe titioner’s attorney discussed the notice for enhanc ed punishment w ith the pe titioner. Howeve r, the pe titioner’s attorney testified he could not rec all discussing the petitioner’s a ctual rang e with him but believed the state could ar g ue that he wa s a Rang e I I I offe nder. The rec ord ref lects that befor e entering his plea, the pe titioner’s attorney explained to him t he sente ncing rang es for a Class E fe lony , which were listed on pag e thre e of the ple a pe tit ion . T he pe tit ion e r w a s se nte nc e d to thr e e y e ars a s a Ra ng e I I of fe nd e r. Th e on ly
ev i d en ce p re s en t ed at t h e p o s tco n v i ct i o n h ea ri n g ab o u tt h e pe t i t i o n er ’s ac t u al cl as s i fi ca t i o n ra n ge incl u d e d : 1 ) th e a tt o r n e y ’ s te s ti mo n y th a t th e s tate h a d f

il e d n o ti c e th a t i t w o u lds e e k e n h a n ced punishment be cause the petitioner wa s a ca ree r off ender , 2) the attorney ’s testimony that he believe d the state c ould have a

rg ued the petitioner wa s a Rang e I I I , persistent off ender , and 3) the petitioner’s testimonythat he believe d he wa s a Rang e I , standard of fende r. At the post conviction hea ring , the petitioner testified a bout his prior criminal re cord.

THE COURT: What we re y our prior, wh at wa s y o u r p rior

conviction?
[PET I TI ON ER]: I

ha d a the ft , s ome the ft , th e ft

c ha rg e s.

TH E CO UR T: Wer e the y the ft s o f a

uto s?
[P ETI TI ONER]: Theft of 10,000, y eah.

THE COURT: Of auto?-12- [P ETI TI ONER]: Yeah.

Ba sed on the pe titioner’s testimony , we a re una ble to determine the petitioner’s c lassification ra ng e. The pe titioner failed to introduce a copy of his crimi nal re cord f

or the trial c ourt’s re view or f or revie w on appe al. It is unclear f rom the re cord if the petitioner had one prior theft co n v i cti on or mul tip le prior the ft c on vic tio ns ; the re fo re , we are un able to d e te rm ine if the pe tit ion e r w a s a c tua lly prejudice d. The burde n in a post-conviction proc eeding is on the petitioner to prove his g rounds for relief by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See T .C.A. § 40-30-110( f). We conc lude that the petitioner has fa iled to prove by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that his attorney ’s failure t o investigate his prior criminal re cord r esulted in prejudice and that but for his attorney ’s fa ilure to investigate that he
wo uldno t ha ve ple d g uil ty bu t w ou ld h a ve g on e to t ri a l.

CONCL USI ON

Ba sed on the for eg oing and rec ord as a whole, we aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE