alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### IN RE MENTAL HEALTH CENTER

No. 9 PC.

Case below: 42 N.C. App. 292.

Petition by Mental Health Center for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 25 September 1979.
#### LOWERY v. NEWTON

No. 263 PC.

Case below: 52 N.C. App. 234.

Petition by defendants for reconsideration of the denial of discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 6 October 1981.
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 180 

To streamline the oil and gas permitting process and to recognize fee ownership for certain oil and gas drilling or spacing units, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 17, 2019 

Mr. HOEVEN (for himself and Mr. LEE) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources 

A BILL 

To streamline the oil and gas permitting process and to 

recognize fee ownership for certain oil and gas drilling 

or spacing units, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. COMPLIANCE WITH BLM PERMITTING. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi5 sion of law but subject to any State requirements, a Bu6 reau of Land Management drilling permit shall not be re7 quired under the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Manage8 ment Act of 1982 (30 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) or section 

9 3164.1 of title 43, Code of Federal Regulations (or a sucVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:01 Jan 26, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S180.IS S180

pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 180 IS

1 cessor regulation), for an action occurring within an oil 

2 and gas drilling or spacing unit if— 

3 (1) less than 50 percent of the minerals within 

4 the oil and gas drilling or spacing unit are minerals 

5 owned by the Federal Government; and 

6 (2) the Federal Government does not own or 

7 lease the surface estate within the boundaries of the 

8 oil and gas drilling or spacing unit. 

9 (b) EFFECT.—Nothing in this Act affects the right 

10 of the Federal Government to receive royalties due to the 

11 Federal Government from the production of the Federal 

12 minerals within the oil and gas drilling or spacing unit. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1



SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Vision Bancshares, Inc. (the
Company), hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that the Companys Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Dated March 18, 2004



By:

/s/ J. Daniel SizemoreJ. Daniel Sizemore,Chief Executive Officer
Case 1:07-cv-02262-WHP Document 2 Filed 04/05/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:07-cv-02262-WHP Document 2 Filed 04/05/2007 Page 2 of 2
ex10-1.htm


Exhibit 10.1

CHANGE IN TERMS AGREEMENT






	
Principal

$300,000.00
	
Loan Date

08-26-2009
	
Maturity

11-01-2009
	
Loan No.

0000011001
	
Call/Coll

182/802
	
Account

E0000085385
	
Officer

MCKOC
	
Initials

 




References in the boxes above are for Lenders use only and do not limit the applicability of this document to any particular loan or item.

Any item above containing "**" has been omitted due to text length limitations.






	
Borrower:
	
ADCO Surgical Supply, Inc.
	
Lender:
	
KeyBank National Association

	  	
1292 Hammond Street
	  	
ME-CBB-Bangor Kay Plaza

	  	
Bangor, ME 04401
	  	
23 Water Street

	  	  	  	
Bangor, ME 04401









 


	Principal Amount: $300,000.00	 Date of Agreement: August 26, 2009



 

DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING INDEBTEDNESS. Obligor No.: 85385.

Obligation No.: 11001.

 

Original Promissory Note dated April 9, 2008, in the principal amount of $300,000.00, including any and all amendments thereto.

 

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE IN TERMS. The maturity date of the Loan is hereby extended to November 1, 2009.

 

CONTINUING VALIDITY. Except as expressly changed by this Agreement, the terms of the original obligation or obligations, including all agreements evidenced or securing the obligation(s), remain unchanged and in full force and effect. Consent by Lender to this Agreement does not waive Lenders right to strict
performance of the obligation(s) as changed, nor obligate Lender to make any future change in terms. Nothing in this Agreement will constitute a satisfaction of the obligation(s).  It is the intention of Lender to retain as liable parties all makers and endorsers of the original obligation(s), including accommodation parties, unless a party is expressly released by Lender in writing. Any maker or endorser, including accommodation makers, will not be released by virtue of this Agreement.  If
any person who signed the original obligation does not sign this Agreement below, then all persons signing below acknowledge that this Agreement is given conditionally, based on the representation to Lender that the non-signing party consents to the changes and provisions of this Agreement or otherwise will not be released by it. This waiver applies not only to any initial extension, modification or release, but also to all such subsequent actions.

 

PRIOR TO SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, BORROWER READ AND UNDERSTOOD ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. BORROWER AGREES TO THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

 

BORROWER:

 

ADCO SURGICAL SUPPLY, INC.





By:  /s/ Mark Dumouchel                                                                                

  Mark Dumouchel, President of ADCO Surgical Supply, Inc.
#### STATE v. BROWN

No. 169 PC.

Case below: 54 N.C. App. 693.

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 30 March 1982. Motion of Attorney General to dismiss appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question allowed 30 March 1982.
#### Frank Weiss *vs.*Jack Newman & others.

Suffolk.

March 3, 1926.

March 4, 1926.

Present: Rugg, C.J., Crosby, Pierce, Carroll, & Wait, JJ.

*Equity Pleading and Practice,*Master: findings; Appeal.

A defence to a suit in equity for an accounting, based on a contention of the existence of a partnership, was disposed of by a finding by a master that no partnership existed, and a final decree for the plaintiff was affirmed on appeal.

Bill in equity for an accounting, begun in the Superior Court by a writ of trustee process dated October 23, 1923.

The suit was referred to a master. Material facts found by him are stated in the opinion. By order of *Morton,*J., there were entered an interlocutory decree overruling exceptions by the defendants to the master’s report and confirming the report, and a final decree establishing a debt of $2,751.45 and interest due to the plaintiff from the defendants and directing the issuance of an execution therefor against the defendants and the trustees named in the writ. The defendants appealed.

*L. G. Stone,*for the defendants, submitted a brief.

No argument nor brief for the plaintiff.

By the Court.

The master finds that there was no partnership between the plaintiff and the defendants and that the debt of the defendants to the plaintiff is established. Since the evidence is not reported, these findings must stand and be accepted as true unless they are inconsistent with other facts found. *Glover*v. *Waltham Laundry Co.*235 Mass. 330. A careful examination of the record shows that there is no such inconsistency. There is no error apparent on the record'. *Rosenblum*v. *Springfield Produce Brokerage Co.*243 Mass. 111.

*Decree affirmed with costs.*
Case 1:07-cv-03542-LAK Document 5 Filed 06/21/2007 Page 1 of 2Case 1:07-cv-03542-LAK Document 5 Filed 06/21/2007 Page 2 of 2
First Union Mortgage Corporation
NC1087
201 South College Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28244-1087
704 374-6787


(LOGO) FIRST UNION

MANAGEMENT'S ASSERTION

As of and for the year ended December 31, 1999, First Union Mortgage Corporation
has complied in all material respects with the minimum servicing  standards set
forth  in  the  Mortgage  Bankers   Association  of  America's   Uniform  Single
Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers. As of and for the year ended December
31, 1999,  First Union  Mortgage  Corporation  had in effect a fidelity bond and
errors and  omissions  policy in the  amount of $200  million  and $20  million,
respectively.

Debra M. Warren, President / Chief Executive Officer
February 11, 2000
Date

Debbie Craig, Senior Vice President / Chief Financial Officer
February 11, 2000
Date

Karin Patrick, Senior Vice President / Director of Servicing
February 11, 2000
Date

Joesph F. DeDomincis, Vice President / Operational and Credit Risk Manager
February 11, 2000
Date
Exhibit 32.2



SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Vision Bancshares, Inc. (the
Company), hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that the Companys Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Dated March 18, 2004



By:

/s/ William E. BlackmonWilliam E. Blackmon,Chief Financial Officer
**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 24**  **- 0151**  SCOTT LARSEN AND KAREN LARSEN , Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. KEITH SAYERS AND DANIELLE SAYERS , Defendants and Appellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) **ORDER**

Pursuant to Appellants’ mo tion fo r extension of t ime, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants are granted an extension of time up to and including **September 10,**  **2024** , in which to file their reply brief in this matter. No f urther extensions will be granted. **ELECTRONICALLY SIGNED AND DATED BELOW**

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 20 2024

08/20/2024

Case Number: DA 24-0151
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-23-00229-CR

MICHAEL DAVID CORONADO,

Appellant

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS

§

§ 

§ 

§ 

§

On Appeal from the 372nd District 

Court

of Tarrant County (1672326) 

July 11, 2024

Memorandum Opinion by Justice 

Bassel

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By /s/ Dabney Bassel 

 Justice Dabney Bassel
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 JUNE 28, 2011

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 09-14856

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 08-21544-CV-WMH

ARCH CREEK YACHT SALES, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE

COMPANY OF NEW YORK,

a New York corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(June 28, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and EVANS, District Judge.

*

PER CURIAM:

After business hours, a person employed by Arch Creek Yacht Sales (“Arch

Creek”) stole a boat from the company. This person ran the boat aground, and it

sank. Citing an insurance-policy exclusion for losses caused by “any dishonest act

on the part of the insured[’s] . . . employees,” Great American Insurance Company

denied coverage. The district court denied Arch Creek’s motion for summary

judgment for breach of contract and granted the insurer’s motion for summary

judgment on the applicability of the policy exclusion; we affirm the judgment.

The issue in this case is whether under these facts the word “employee”--not

defined in the insurance-policy exclusion--covers a person whom the company has

in its service and pays a salary but who at the pertinent time is acting after business

hours and outside the scope of the business.

For an insurance contract, interpreted under New York law as the parties’

contract requires, “unambiguous provisions must be given their plain and ordinary

meaning.” Sanabria v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 508 N.Y.S.2d 416, 416 (N.Y.

Honorable Orinda Evans, United States District Judge for the Northern District of *

Georgia, sitting by designation.

2
1986). Applying the tests of “common speech” and “the reasonable expectation

and purpose of the ordinary businessman,” MDW Enters., Inc. v. CNA Ins. Co.,

772 N.Y.S.2d 79, 82 (N.Y. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), we agree

with the district court that the word “employee” in the policy exclusion is

unambiguous and plainly describes the boat thief here. Both common speech and

the expectations of an ordinary businessman dictate that someone who was in fact

employed full time for a salary by Arch Creek would--at all times--be described

accurately as an Arch Creek “employee.”

1

AFFIRMED.

 Arch Creek argues that different jurisdictions, other than New York, have interpreted

1

the word “employee” differently from one another where after-hours conduct is involved, thus

making “employee” ambiguous and requiring that that word’s meaning be construed against the

insurer/drafter. But under New York law, the mere existence of such a split in judicial authority

is not sufficient to create contract ambiguity. See Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 413 N.Y.S.2d

352, 355 (N.Y. 1978) (citing Hartigan v. Cas. Co. of Am., 124 N.E. 789, 790 (N.Y. 1919)).

3
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.1

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Dean Weber, the Chief Executive Officer of One Voice Technologies, Inc. (the
"Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1)      the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the year ended
         December 31, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements
         of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
         U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

(2)      the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by section 9.06 has been
provided to One Voice and will be retained by One Voice and furnished to the
Securities Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



Dated: March 30, 2004

                                       /s/ Dean Weber
                                       -----------------------------
                                       Name: Dean Weber
                                       Title: President, Chief Executive Officer
                                              and Director
#### ERVIN E. WHALEY v. HENRY JACKSON MARSHBURN. and REGINALD R. QUINN v. HENRY JACKSON MARSHBURN.

(Filed 21 October, 1964.)

1. Automobiles § 41a —

In these actions by a passenger to recover for injuries sustained when the driver failed to follow a curve, hit the shoulder, and lost control of the vehicle, the evidence *is held*sufficient to be submitted to the jury on authority of *Randall v. Rogers, ante,*544.

2. Appeal and Error § 42—

Mere technical error does not warrant a new trial, but appellant must show not only error but that it was of such prejudicial nature as to amount to a denial of a substantial right.

Appeal by defendant from *May, J.,*August 1964 Session of LeNOik.

In these actions, consolidated for trial, plaintiffs’ allegations and evidence are to the effect they were passengers in an automobile owned and operated by defendant on December 24, 1961, about 1:00 a.m.; that defendant, driving westwardly on a rural paved road from Potter’s Hill, N. C., to Pink Hill, N. C., reached a curve to the left as the road approaches a bridge over Beaver Dam Creek; that defendant failed to follow this curve, hit the shoulder, lost control, jumped the creek to the right of the bridge and stopped when his car crashed into a tree on the west bank of the creek; and that, as a result, plaintiffs sustained personal injuries. In each action, the issues raised by the pleadings, namely, negligence and damages, were answered in favor of plaintiff, and judgments in accordance with the verdicts were entered. Defendant appealed.

*Jones, Reed & Griffin for plaintiff appellees.*

*White & Aycock for defendant appellant.*

Per Cueiam.

The only evidence was that offered by plaintiffs. It was sufficient to require submission for jury determination of issues as to the alleged actionable negligence of defendant. In accordance with legal principles stated in *Randall v. Rogers, ante,*544, 138 S.E. 2d 248, and cases cited, defendant’s motions for judgment of nonsuit were properly overruled.

Assignments of error relating to the charge have been carefully considered. Conceding technical error, when the charge is construed contextually, the assignments, in our view, do not show error of such prejudicial nature as to amount of a denial of a substantial right and jus*624tify the award of a new trial. Strong, N. C. Index, Appeal and Error § 42. Hence, the verdicts and judgments will not be disturbed.

No error.
Exhibit 10.24


 









     


     


    

 









     


     


    

 









     


     


    

 









     


     


    

 









     


     


    

 









     


     


    

 









     


     


    

 









     


     


    

 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this
Escrow Agreement to be duly executed and delivered as of the day and year first written above.


 


	 	Pubco:
	 	 
	 	International General insurance Holdings LTD.
	 	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Pervez Rizvi
	 	 	Name: 	 Pervez Rizvi
	 	 	Title:	Chief Financial Officer and Director


 


	 	The Escrow Agent:
	 	 
	 	Continental stock transfer & trust company, as
    escrow agent
	 	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Margaret B. Lloyd
	 	 	Name: 	 Margaret B. Lloyd
	 	 	Title:	Vice President


 


	 	Seller Representative:
	 	 
	 	International General insurance Holdings LTD.
	 	 	 
	 	By: 	/s/ Wasef Jabsheh
	 	 	Wasef Jabsheh, solely in the capacity as the Seller Representative




 


 


 


[Signature
Page to Escrow Agreement]






 









     


     


    

 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this
Escrow Agreement to be duly executed and delivered as of the day and year first written above.


 


	 	Purchaser Representative:
	 	 
	 	Lagniappe Ventures, LLC, solely in the 

capacity as the Purchaser Representative
	 	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Michael Gray
	 	 	Name: 	Michael Gray
	 	 	Title:	Managing Partner


 


 


 


[Signature
Page to Escrow Agreement]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                      11,219,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               86,398,000<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                109,652,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           236,686,000
<PP&E>                                     164,626,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              30,638,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             484,235,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       98,497,000
<BONDS>                                    162,883,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       32,900,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     9,822,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 142,312,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               152,134,000
<SALES>                                    126,429,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           126,429,000
<CGS>                                       86,285,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              120,756,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                53,000<F2>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,771,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,849,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   997,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,852,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,490,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   $ 0.18
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   $ 0.18
<FN>
<F1>Net of allowance for doubtful accounts.
<F2>Includes equity in income of other operations to be disposed of,
 ( $ 272,000).
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Anna M. McCullough, as Administratrix of the Estate of Ward McCullough, Deceased, Appellant, *v.*The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Respondent.

*McCullough*v. *Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,*177 App. Div. 952, affirmed.

(Argued May 17, 1918;

decided June 4, 1918.)

Appeal from a judgment" of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department entered April 16, 1917, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a verdict directed by the court in an action to recover for the death of plaintiff’s intestate alleged to have been occasioned through the negligence of the defendant. The intestate was struck by one of defendant’s trains at its crossing at Olean street in the village of East Aurora. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on the decision of *542the Appellate Division on a former appeal (176 App. Div. 900) which held that “ If' plaintiff's intestate was aware of the approach of the train to the crossing, then absence of signals was n.ot a cause of the accident. If intestate was not aware of the approach of the train, then he was negligent in failing to look.”

*W. H. Ticknor*for appellant.

*H. J. Adams*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Hiscock, Ch. J., Cuddeback, Cardozo, Pound, McLaughlin, Crane and Andrews, JJ.
#### McLEAN v. ROADWAY EXPRESS

No. 212PA82.

Case below: 56 N.C. App. 451.

Petition by plaintiff for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals allowed 13 July 1982.
#### PEELE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION

No. 256P82.

Case below: 56 N.C. App. 555.

Petition by plaintiff for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 13 July 1982.