2016 WI 34

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2014AP1213

COMPLETE TITLE: Cheryl M. Sorenson,

 Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,

 v.

Richard A. Batchelder,

 Defendant-Appellant,

United Healthcare Insurance Company,

 Defendant.

REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

(No Cites)

OPINION FILED: May 12, 2016

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: January 20, 2016

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: Circuit

COUNTY: Milwaukee

JUDGE: Michael Guolee

JUSTICES:

CONCURRED:

DISSENTED: ABRAHAMSON, J., joined by BRADLEY, A. W., J.

NOT PARTICIPATING: 

ATTORNEYS:

For the For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were 

briefs by Timothy W. Schelwat, Jason F. Abraham and Hupy and 

Abraham, S.C., Milwaukee. Oral argument by Jason F. Abraham.

For the defendant-appellant, the cause was argued by 

Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, assistant attorney general, with whom 

on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.
2016 WI 34

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2014AP1213 

(L.C. No. 2013CV5012)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

Cheryl M. Sorenson,

Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,

v.

Richard A. Batchelder,

Defendant-Appellant,

United Healthcare Insurance Company,

FILED

MAY 12, 2016

Diane M. Fremgen

Clerk of Supreme Court

Defendant.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. 

¶1 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. We review an 

unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed an 

order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court2 denying defendant 

Richard A. Batchelder's (Batchelder) motion to dismiss for 

improper service of notice of claim.

 

1 Sorenson v. Batchelder, No. 2014AP1213, unpublished slip 

op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2015). 

2 The Honorable Michael D. Guolee of Milwaukee County 

presided. 
No. 2014AP1213 

2

¶2 After sustaining property damage and personal injury 

in a car accident occasioned by State employee Batchelder, 

Cheryl M. Sorenson (Sorenson) delivered notice of claim to the 

attorney general by personal service and subsequently instituted 

a negligence action against Batchelder. Batchelder moved to 

dismiss, arguing that Sorenson did not strictly comply with Wis. 

Stat. § 893.82 (2013-14),3 which requires service of notice of 

claim on the attorney general by certified mail. 

¶3 The central issue before us is whether Sorenson's 

personal service of notice of claim satisfies Wis. Stat. 

§ 893.82 such that her claim against Batchelder may be 

continued. We conclude that personal service does not comply 

with the plain language of § 893.82(5) because it requires 

service of notice of claim on the attorney general by certified 

mail. As § 893.82(2m) mandates strict compliance with 

requirements of § 893.82 in order to institute an action against 

a state employee, and Sorenson's service failed to so comply, we 

affirm the dismissal of Sorenson's claim against Batchelder. 

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On October 28, 2010, Batchelder was operating a motor 

vehicle in his capacity as an employee of the Wisconsin 

 

3 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 

the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2014AP1213 

3

Department of Administration (DOA).4 Batchelder's vehicle rearended the vehicle of a third party, causing that vehicle to 

rear-end Sorenson's vehicle. Sorenson alleges property damage, 

as well as personal injury, resulting from the accident. 

¶5 On January 18, 2011, Sorenson served notice of claim 

on the attorney general by personal service at the attorney 

general's office in the capitol in Madison, Wisconsin. Personal 

service was accepted by a state employee, who acknowledged its 

receipt at the time of delivery. The notice of claim was then 

forwarded to the attorney general's Main Street office in 

Madison where it was processed and endorsed by another state 

employee on January 19, 2011; thereafter, it was returned to 

Sorenson's attorney's office. 

¶6 On February 28, 2011, after investigating Sorenson's 

claim, the Bureau of State Risk Management issued a check to 

Sorenson in the amount of $241.45 as payment in full for the 

damage sustained by her vehicle as a result of the accident.5 

The Bureau of State Risk Management also issued a letter to 

Sorenson, stating that "[t]his payment does not represent an 

admission of any liability on the part of the state, or any of 

 

4 The record shows that Batchelder is an employee of the 

Wisconsin Department of Health Services. For purposes of the 

motion to dismiss, however, we assume Sorenson's facts to be 

true as alleged. State ex rel. Shroble v. Prusener, 185 Wis. 2d 

102, 108, 517 N.W.2d 169 (1994). 

5 Sorenson had previously submitted a property damage 

estimate reflecting this amount to the State of Wisconsin's 

insurer. 
No. 2014AP1213 

4

its employees or agents, and is not a waiver of any defenses the 

state, or any of its employees or agents, may have."6

¶7 On May 28, 2013, Sorenson instituted a negligence 

action against Batchelder,7 who filed a motion to dismiss due to 

improper service of notice of claim. Specifically, Batchelder 

argued that Sorenson did not satisfy Wis. Stat. § 893.82, which 

requires service by certified mail and, because Sorenson 

employed personal service, she did not strictly comply with the 

statute. The circuit court denied Batchelder's motion to 

dismiss, concluding that service was proper because the attorney 

general received notice of claim and, therefore, received all 

that was required. 

¶8 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the 

plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) requires service by 

certified mail and that Sorenson failed to strictly comply with 

the statute by personally serving notice of claim. 

¶9 We granted Sorenson's petition for review. 

 

6 In her brief, Sorenson fleetingly raises a waiver argument 

with no supporting law. Waiver was not mentioned in Sorenson's 

petition for review. Accordingly, we do not address it. Jankee 

v. Clark Cnty., 2000 WI 64, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 612 N.W.2d 297

("Generally, a petitioner cannot raise or argue issues not set 

forth in the petition for review unless this court orders 

otherwise.") 

7 Sorenson's suit also joined the Department of 

Administration (DOA) and Secretary of the DOA as defendants; 

however, the circuit court dismissed both of these additional 

defendants, and Sorenson has not appealed their dismissal.
No. 2014AP1213 

5

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶10 Batchelder's motion to dismiss requires us to 

interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 893.82. Interpretation and 

application of a statute present questions of law that we review 

independently, while benefitting from the analyses of the 

circuit court and court of appeals. Pool v. City of Sheboygan, 

2007 WI 38, ¶9, 300 Wis. 2d 74, 729 N.W.2d 415.

B. General Principles of Statutory Interpretation 

¶11 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 

of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 

ordinarily stop the inquiry.'" State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 

Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 

N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 

Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659). Plain meaning may be ascertained 

not only from the words employed in the statute, but also from 

the context.8 Id., ¶46. We interpret statutory language in the 

context in which those words are used; "not in isolation but as 

part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 

closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 

unreasonable results." Id. Statutory history aids in a plain 

 

8 "[S]cope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a 

plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long 

as the scope, context, and purpose are ascertainable from the 

text and structure of the statute itself." State ex rel. Kalal 

v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶48, 271 Wis. 2d 

633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
No. 2014AP1213 

6

meaning analysis. Adams v. Northland Equip. Co., 2014 WI 79, 

¶30, 356 Wis. 2d 529, 850 N.W.2d 272.

¶12 "If the words chosen for the statute exhibit a 'plain, 

clear statutory meaning,' without ambiguity, the statute is 

applied according to the plain meaning of the statutory terms." 

State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 

769 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46). However, where the 

statute is "capable of being understood by reasonably wellinformed persons in two or more senses[,]" then the statute is 

ambiguous. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47. Where the language is 

ambiguous, we may then consult extrinsic sources, such as 

legislative history. Id., ¶50. "While extrinsic sources are 

usually not consulted if the statutory language bears a plain 

meaning, we nevertheless may consult extrinsic sources 'to 

confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation.'" Grunke, 311 

Wis. 2d 439, ¶22 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51). 

¶13 Ultimately, we bear in mind that "[s]tatutory 

interpretation involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a 

search for ambiguity." Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47 (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2003 

WI 28, ¶25, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656). With these 

general principles in mind, we turn to our review of Wis. Stat. 

§ 893.82. 

C. Wis. Stat. § 893.82

¶14 Wisconsin Stat. §893.82 applies to claims brought 

against state employees. Section 893.82(2m) provides that "[n]o 

claimant may bring an action against a state officer, employee 
No. 2014AP1213 

7

or agent unless the claimant complies strictly with the 

requirements of this section."

¶15 With regard to notice, Wis. Stat. § 893.82(3) 

provides, in relevant part, that: 

[N]o civil action or civil proceeding may be brought 

against any state officer, employee or agent for or on 

account of any act growing out of or committed in the 

course of the discharge of the officer's, employee's 

or agent's duties . . . unless within 120 days of the 

event causing the injury, damage or death giving rise 

to the civil action or civil proceeding, the claimant 

in the action or proceeding serves upon the attorney 

general written notice of a claim stating the time, 

date, location and the circumstances of the event 

giving rise to the claim . . . .

¶16 With regard to service of notice of claim, Wis. Stat. 

§ 893.82(5) requires that "[t]he notice under sub. (3) shall be 

sworn to by the claimant and shall be served upon the attorney 

general at his or her office in the capitol by certified mail. 

Notice shall be considered to be given upon mailing for the 

purpose of computing the time of giving notice." 

¶17 Finally, Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1) provides that the 

purposes of the section are to:

(a) Provide the attorney general with adequate 

time to investigate claims which might result in 

judgments to be paid by the state. 

(b) Provide the attorney general with an 

opportunity to effect a compromise without a civil 

action or civil proceeding.

(c) Place a limit on the amounts recoverable in 

civil actions or civil proceedings against any state 

officer, employee or agent. 
No. 2014AP1213 

8

¶18 Having set forth the text of the statutory provisions 

at issue, we now turn to the parties' arguments with respect to 

Wis. Stat. § 893.82. 

D. Parties' Positions

¶19 The parties do not dispute that the plain language of 

Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) requires that notice of claim be served 

by certified mail. There is likewise no dispute that the plain 

language of § 893.82(2m) requires strict compliance with the 

statute in order to bring a subsequent action against a state 

employee. 

¶20 The dispute between the parties arises out of their 

disagreement about what constitutes strict compliance with the 

certified mail requirement. Batchelder argues that strict 

compliance with Wis. Stat. § 893.82 cannot be accomplished 

without serving notice of claim by certified mail as the words 

of § 893.82(5) provide. According to Batchelder, Sorenson's 

personal service is not service by certified mail and, as such, 

she failed to strictly comply with § 893.82(5), which required 

dismissal of her claim. 

¶21 Sorenson argues that, although the words of the 

statute direct strict compliance, literal compliance with the 

words of the statute is not required. Rather, according to 

Sorenson, her delivery of the notice of claim to the attorney 

general by personal service fulfilled the purpose of Wis. Stat. 

§ 893.82 and provided the attorney general with actual notice of 

her claim more effectively than delivery by certified mail. 

Sorenson also argues that her personal service should be held to 
No. 2014AP1213 

9

satisfy the statute because to hold otherwise would lead to an 

absurd result; namely, the dismissal of her otherwise viable 

claim in spite of her fulfillment of the statutory purpose. We 

will address these arguments in turn. 

E. Interpretation and Application of Wis. Stat. § 893.82 

1. Literal compliance 

¶22 As set forth above, the plain language of Wis. Stat. 

§ 893.82(5) requires service of notice of claim on the attorney 

general by certified mail, and § 893.82(2m) requires strict 

compliance with provisions of § 893.82. Contrary to Sorenson's 

argument that strict compliance does not require literally 

complying with the words of the statute, it has been repeatedly 

stated that requirements of § 893.82 are not general guidelines 

but, rather, a claimant must strictly comply with the words in 

the statute in order to proceed with his or her claim. Kellner 

v. Christian, 197 Wis. 2d 183, 195, 539 N.W.2d 685 (1995) 

(concluding that a claimant "must adhere to each and every 

requirement in the statute"); Modica v. Verhulst, 195 Wis. 2d 

633, 641-42, 536 N.W.2d 466 (Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that 

strict compliance with § 893.82 is required; substantial 

compliance is insufficient). 

¶23 Moreover, Wisconsin courts have equated strict 

compliance with literal adherence to the words used in the 

statute. Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶14, 

356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 N.W.2d 866 (comparing a "strict literal 

interpretation" with statutory interpretation that furthers 

legislative purposes); Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶56 (equating 
No. 2014AP1213 

10

"strict" with "literal" statutory interpretation); Bar Code Res. 

v. Ameritech Info. Sys., Inc., 229 Wis. 2d 287, 291, 294, 599 

N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that Wisconsin service 

statutes are "literally read and strictly applied"); see also

Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Certificate of Acknowledgement, 1 Am. 

Jur. 2d Acknowledgments § 29 (database updated Feb. 2016) 

(equating strict compliance with literal compliance and 

distinguishing substantial compliance). 

¶24 Therefore, we enforce literal compliance with the 

plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) unless such enforcement 

would lead to an absurd result. Hines v. Resnick, 2011 WI App 

163, ¶16, 338 Wis. 2d 190, 807 N.W.2d 687. It necessarily 

follows that, in order to strictly comply as § 893.82(2m) 

requires, a claimant must literally follow the words of the 

statute. This requires a claimant to serve notice of claim on 

the attorney general by certified mail pursuant to the plain 

language of § 893.82(5). Kelly v. Reyes, 168 Wis. 2d 743, 747, 

484 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that service by regular 

mail did not strictly comply with the certified mail requirement 

even though the attorney general received actual notice). 

Sorenson's choice of personal service is simply not service by 
No. 2014AP1213 

11

certified mail.9 Consequently, we conclude that Sorenson did not 

strictly comply with § 893.82(5).

2. Fulfilling statutory purposes (substantial compliance)

¶25 Sorenson next contends that, without serving notice of 

claim by certified mail, she strictly complied with the statute 

because she fulfilled its stated purposes, and the attorney 

general received actual notice of her claim. Sorenson contends 

that she met the purposes set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1), 

which are to "[p]rovide the attorney general with adequate time 

to investigate claims . . .[,] [p]rovide the attorney general 

with an opportunity to effect a compromise without a civil 

action . . .[,] [and] [p]lace a limit on the amounts recoverable 

in civil actions." 

¶26 Sorenson emphasizes that, through personal service, 

notice of claim was processed by the attorney general's office 

in the same manner in which it would have been processed if 

notice of claim had been delivered by certified mail. Namely, 

although notice of claim was personally served at the attorney 

general's capitol office, it ultimately was received at the 

attorney general's Main Street office, acknowledged, and 

returned to counsel, indicating that notice of claim had been 

 

9 Black's Law Dictionary defines certified mail as "[m]ail 

for which the sender requests proof of delivery in the form of a 

receipt signed by the addressee. The receipt . . . must be 

signed before the mail will be delivered." Black's Law 

Dictionary, 1038 (9th ed. 2009). Personal service, on the other 

hand, is defined as "[a]ctual delivery of the notice or process 

to the person to whom it is directed." Id. at 1259.
No. 2014AP1213 

12

received by the attorney general. Therefore, according to 

Sorenson, the statute's purposes were fulfilled by personal 

service of notice of claim because the attorney general received 

the required notice and took action with respect to her claim. 

We are not persuaded. 

¶27 Sorenson appears to argue that she strictly complied 

with Wis. Stat. § 893.82 by substantially complying with it. As 

set forth above, strict compliance requires exactly following 

the words of the statute. Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 194-95. 

Substantial compliance, on the other hand, provides that 

statutory directives may be met where the purpose underlying the 

statute has been fulfilled notwithstanding the words chosen by 

the legislature. Andrews Constr., Inc. v. Town of Levis, 2006 

WI App 180, ¶11, 296 Wis. 2d 89, 722 N.W.2d 389 (explaining that 

"substantial compliance contemplates actual compliance in 

respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective 

of the statute." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nicolazzi, 138 Wis. 2d 192, 200, 405 

N.W.2d 732 (Ct. App. 1987))). Stated otherwise, in the context 

of a notice statute such as Wis. Stat. § 893.82, where the 

underlying purpose is to effect notice, a claimant may be able 

to substantially comply by effecting actual notice to the 

respondent. See Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 195-96 (examining the 

distinction between substantial compliance and strict compliance 

by comparing § 893.80 and § 893.82 (citing Figgs v. City of 

Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 53, 357 N.W.2d 548 (1984))).
No. 2014AP1213 

13

¶28 While we do not dispute that the attorney general 

received actual notice through Sorenson's personal service, it 

is well established that Wis. Stat. § 893.82 is not simply an 

actual notice statute. Id. It is not enough to substantially 

comply with the statute by effecting actual notice, thereby 

fulfilling the underlying purposes of § 893.82(1). Simply 

stated, Sorenson cannot strictly comply with the plain language 

of § 893.82(5) by substantially fulfilling the purposes of 

§ 893.82 because the legislature has chosen not to permit 

substantial compliance by requiring strict compliance with the 

terms of the statute. Wis. Stat. § 893.82(2m). 

¶29 To aid in our plain meaning analysis, we briefly 

examine statutory history. A prior version of Wis. Stat. 

§ 893.82 provided "[t]he provisions of this section shall be 

liberally construed to effectuate [its] intent." § 893.82(1)(b) 

(1989-90).10 Because the intent of the notice of claim statute 

is to give notice to the attorney general, and the legislature 

mandated liberal construction, substantial compliance with 

§ 893.82 previously was sufficient to institute a claim against 

a state employee. Daily v. Univ. of Wis., Whitewater, 145 

Wis. 2d 756, 761, 429 Wis. 2d 83 (Ct. App. 1988), superseded by 

statute as stated in Modica, 195 Wis. 2d at 641. 

¶30 However, Wis. Stat. § 893.82 subsequently was amended 

to its current form that directs strict compliance with the 

 

10 1983 Wis. Act. 27, § 1782. 
No. 2014AP1213 

14

terms of the statute.11 Wis. Stat. § 893.82(2m). In Modica, the 

court of appeals concluded that with this amendment, the 

legislature intended to "negat[e] [the] ruling in Daily that 

substantial compliance with § 893.82(3) was sufficient." 

Modica, 195 Wis. 2d at 641-42. Accordingly, strict compliance 

through certified mail is required, as § 893.82(2m) plainly 

states. See id. at 642. 

¶31 Moreover, we note that strict adherence to the 

certified mail requirement promotes a "simple, orderly, and 

uniform way of conducting legal business." Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d 

at 195 (citing Kelly, 168 Wis. 2d at 747). Furthermore, if we 

were to allow substantial compliance rather than enforcing 

strict compliance as mandated by Wis. Stat. § 893.82(2m), the 

certainty created by the requirement of certified mail would be 

undercut by costly case-by-case determinations of whether notice 

of claim was timely sent and received and whether the lack of 

procedural compliance affected the purposes of the notice 

statute. Kelly, 168 Wis. 2d at 747. 

¶32 Although the attorney general received actual notice 

here, such a determination may not be so easily made in the next 

case. Condoning a deviation from the certified mail requirement

could therefore encourage "[a] new level of litigation [to] be 

added to suits against state employees." Id. In light of this 

reality, Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) must be strictly enforced even 

 

11 1991 Wis. Act 39, § 3579.
No. 2014AP1213 

15

though enforcement produces harsh consequences that are of 

concern to us. J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wis. State Bldg. Comm'n, 114 

Wis. 2d 69, 83, 336 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1983). 

3. Stricter compliance 

¶33 Sorenson also argues that she satisfied the strict 

compliance requirement of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(2m) because 

personal service constitutes "stricter compliance," or more 

effective service, than certified mail. Sorenson relies on 

Patterson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 103 

Wis. 2d 358, 360-61, 309 N.W.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1981), for the 

proposition that "stricter compliance than the statute demands 

is not necessarily a failure to strictly comply." 

¶34 In Patterson, the court of appeals examined an 

entirely different statutory scheme, Wis. Stat. § 227.16(1)(a) 

(1979-80), which at that time required that service be 

accomplished either by personal service or certified mail.12 Id.

at 359. Rather than complying with the statute, the claimant 

served by registered mail. Id. Although the court of appeals 

noted that strict compliance with ch. 227 procedures is 

required, it held that registered mail constituted a "form of 

certified mail" as the only difference between the two is that 

registered mail requires a receipt of delivery, whereas 

certified mail gives the option of a delivery receipt to the 

sender. Id. at 360-61. Because service by registered mail and 

 

12 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.16(1)(a) (1979-80) was renumbered 

to Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a). 1985 Wis. Act 182.
No. 2014AP1213 

16

certified mail are identical as far as the recipient is 

concerned, the court of appeals held that registered mail may be 

substituted for certified mail under § 227.16(1)(a) (1979-80). 

Id. at 361. 

¶35 A federal court extended the Patterson decision to 

hold that personal service constitutes "stricter compliance" 

with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.82 than does service 

by certified mail. Weis v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. 

Sys., 837 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979 (E.D. Wis. 2011). Relying on 

Patterson, the federal court stated that the "use of personal 

service fulfills the purpose behind the certified mail 

requirement in the notice of claim statute, and the [defendants] 

have failed to explain how the service effected in this case 

differs, other than in name, from the form of service specified 

in the statute." Id. We are not persuaded by the federal court 

decision; its reliance on Patterson is misplaced. 

¶36 In addition to the stated purposes under Wis. Stat. 

§ 893.82(1), we note that there is a "more specific purpose of 

the certified mailing requirement in Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5)[, 

which] is to 'allow[] the attorney general's office to easily 

identify mail whose contents are legal in nature and require 

immediate attention.'" Hines, 338 Wis. 2d 190, ¶26 (second 

alteration in original) (quoting Kelly, 168 Wis. 2d at 748). 

¶37 Of course, Sorenson's chosen method of service did not 

permit use of the procedure for receiving notices of claim 

developed by the attorney general because the notice of claim 

did not arrive by mail at all. See id., ¶9 (explaining attorney 
No. 2014AP1213 

17

general's procedure for receiving notices of claim by certified 

mail at Post Office Box, which are then forwarded to the Main 

Street office). Rather, Sorenson's notice of claim arrived at 

the capitol office by personal service and had to be forwarded 

to the Main Street office. Therefore, unlike the situation in 

Patterson, personal service on the attorney general is not 

identical to service by certified mail to the attorney general 

and did not fulfill the foregoing objective of the statute. 

Moreover, unlike registered mail, personal service is not simply 

a "stricter form of certified mail" because it is an entirely 

different mode of service. Patterson, 103 Wis. 2d at 360. 

¶38 Furthermore, holding that personal service constitutes 

"stricter compliance" than service by certified mail would 

require us to override the statute's plain language when the 

legislature has so clearly chosen the mode of service necessary 

to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5). We decline to do so. As the 

court of appeals properly noted, there are numerous statutes 

under which the legislature has chosen to include both certified 

mail and personal service as acceptable modes of service. 

Sorenson v. Batchelder, No. 2014AP1213 at 4, unpublished slip 

op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2015). See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 

§ 32.05(4); Wis. Stat. § 48.978(2)(c)2.; Wis. Stat. 

§ 66.0217(4)(b); Wis. Stat. § 109.09(2)(b)2.; Wis. Stat. 

§ 196.135(3); Wis. Stat. § 707.38(4)(b); Wis. Stat. 

§ 766.588(4)(b); and Wis. Stat. § 895.07(1)(j).

¶39 Furthermore, where the legislature decides personal 

service is sufficient, the legislature is clearly capable of 
No. 2014AP1213 

18

enacting a statute to reflect that choice. State v. Hemp, 2014 

WI 129, ¶31, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811 (explaining that we 

do not read language into the statute that the legislature 

omitted). Consequently, we decline to override the plain 

meaning of the statute and the choice of the legislature by 

declaring that personal service is more effective than service 

by certified mail. Braverman v. Columbia Hosp., Inc., 2001 WI 

App 106, ¶24, 244 Wis. 2d 98, 629 N.W.2d 66 ("[O]ur role is not 

to justify the legislative action or to substitute our judgment 

for that of the legislature."). Accordingly, we conclude that 

Sorenson's personal service does not constitute service pursuant 

to the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5). 

4. Absurd result

¶40 Finally, Sorenson argues that dismissing her otherwise 

viable claim would constitute an absurd result since she 

fulfilled the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.82 by effecting 

notice on the attorney general. As set forth above, the plain 

language of § 893.82(2m) requires claimants to strictly comply 

with the certified mail requirement of § 893.82(5), and Sorenson 

failed to so comply. We must require strict compliance. Hines, 

338 Wis. 2d 190, ¶16 (enforcing strict compliance unless strict 

compliance is impossible). Strict compliance was not impossible 

for Sorenson to accomplish.

¶41 However, we recognize that "[o]ne of the few 

exceptions to this sound principle is that [we] will seek to 

avoid a truly absurd or unreasonable result." State v. 

Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶39, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832. We 
No. 2014AP1213 

19

previously have recognized that an absurd result may arise where 

"an interpretation would render the relevant statute 

contextually inconsistent or would be contrary to the clearly 

stated purpose of the statute." Grunke, 311 Wis. 2d 439, ¶31 

(footnotes omitted). 

¶42 Requiring notice of claim to be served by certified 

mail as plainly stated in Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) does not bring 

about an absurd result. First, Sorenson points to no internal 

inconsistencies created by the plain meaning of the statute, and 

we perceive none. Moreover, enforcing the plain language of 

§ 893.82(5) is not contrary to its stated purposes. Rather, 

service by certified mail is wholly consistent with the purposes 

of the statute; namely, to effect service and to "[p]rovide the 

attorney general with adequate time to investigate claims 

. . .[,] [p]rovide the attorney general with an opportunity to 

effect a compromise without a civil action . . .[,] [and] 

[p]lace a limit on the amounts recoverable in civil actions." 

Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1). 

¶43 Simply because another mode of service seemingly would 

fulfill these stated purposes does not give rise to an absurd 

result. The legislature specifically chose the acceptable mode 

of service, Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5), and we may not second guess 

its choice. State ex rel. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Mortensen, 

224 Wis. 398, 401, 272 N.W. 457 (1937) (explaining that we are 

not justified in rewriting the statute to "substitut[e] the 

judgment of the court for that of the legislature as to what is 

sound or absurd"); see also Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty. 493 
No. 2014AP1213 

20

U.S. 20, 27 (1989) (explaining that federal service statutes 

require strict, literal compliance, and the Court is "not at 

liberty to create an exception where Congress has declined to do 

so"). 

¶44 Sorenson easily could have served notice of claim on 

the attorney general by certified mail. See Hines, 338 Wis. 2d 

190, ¶16 (holding that enforcing strict compliance where strict 

compliance is impossible would lead to an absurd result). 

Accordingly, we must enforce the statute as written, which 

dictates the dismissal of Sorenson's claim. Hamilton, 261 

Wis. 2d 458, ¶45 ("We exceed our authority when we ignore the 

clear language of a statute and attempt to surgically 

reconstruct the statute to accommodate alternative public 

policies."). 

¶45 Although the result in this case is harsh, and we are 

sympathetic to Sorenson's unfortunate situation, her remedy 

simply does not lie with us. See Mannino v. Davenport, 99 

Wis. 2d 602, 615, 299 N.W.2d 823 (1981) (enforcing strict 

compliance because we are not free to ignore the import of a 

statute's plain meaning even where we do not "enthusiastically 

endorse the result" that enforcement causes); see also

Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 21 (acknowledging harsh result, but 

refusing to excuse failure to strictly comply with federal 

statutory service requirements on unfairness grounds because 

lawsuits are conducted by trained lawyers). Rather, Sorenson's 

remedy lies with the legislature. See Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 
No. 2014AP1213 

21

458, ¶49 (calling on legislature to adjust statutory scheme if 

so desired); Mannino, 99 Wis. 2d at 615-16 (same). 

III. CONCLUSION 

¶46 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that delivering 

notice by personal service does not comply with the plain 

language of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5), which requires service of 

notice of claim on the attorney general by certified mail. As 

§ 893.82(2m) mandates strict compliance with requirements of 

§ 893.82 in order to institute an action against a state 

employee, and Sorenson's service failed to so comply, we affirm 

the dismissal of Sorenson's claim against Batchelder.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 

affirmed. 
No. 2014AP1213.ssa

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¶47 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting). Wisconsin 

Stat. § 893.82 requires an individual, prior to filing suit 

against a "state officer, employee or agent," to serve a "notice 

of claim"1 on the attorney general in his office in the Capitol 

by certified mail. See Wis. Stat. §§ 893.82(2m), (3), (5) 

(2013-14).2 

¶48 No one can literally (or "strictly," see Wis. Stat. 

§ 893.82(2m)) comply with the statute. The attorney general no 

longer receives certified mail in his office in the Capitol.3 

The majority is not perturbed. See majority op., ¶37. The 

majority does not require strict compliance with this aspect of 

the statute. Rather the majority adjusts its reading of the 

statute to fit the facts and to make practical sense. 

¶49 The majority does not, however, adjust its reading of 

the statute to allow notice of a claim to be delivered by a 

person in a sheriff's uniform or other process server's uniform 

rather than by a person in a United States postal uniform. The 

majority opinion implicitly concludes that the uniform of the 

 

1 An example of a notice of claim is available on the 

Department of Justice's website at 

https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/dls/notice-ofinjury-and-claim-form.pdf. 

2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 

the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.

3 Hines v. Resnick, 2011 WI App 163, ¶14, 338 Wis. 2d 190, 

807 N.W.2d 687 ("[T]he undisputed facts in this case establish 

that service by certified mail to the attorney general's capitol 

office never occurs, and cannot occur, regardless of how a 

claimant addresses a notice, or what physical location the 

claimant has in mind as its destination."). 
No. 2014AP1213.ssa

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person delivering a notice of claim is key to whether the notice 

was validly served. If a notice of claim is not sent by 

certified mail, and thus delivered by someone in a U.S. postal 

uniform, the majority opinion concludes the notice was 

improperly served, and the claimant's case should be dismissed. 

¶50 The record demonstrates that Sorenson's notice of 

claim, although served by a process server, was processed at the 

attorney general's office by the same individuals in the same 

manner as notices of claim served by certified mail. 

¶51 I agree with the concerns of Judge Posner, who 

recently decried dismissal of a litigant's viable claim based on 

counsel's harmless procedural gaffe. The concerns he expressed 

are pragmatic, but rest on the principles of fairness and 

justice upon which our legal system is based. These concerns 

should guide the court in the present case. Judge Posner wrote:

I find myself increasingly uncomfortable with basing 

dismissals with prejudice on harmless procedural 

bobbles. The only argument in favor of such summary 

justice that I can imagine is that by punishing 

parties for their lawyers' mistake we improve the 

quality of the bar; the lawyers who disserve their 

clients attract fewer new clients and eventually 

perhaps are forced to leave the practice——an example 

of the positive effect of competition on the quality 

of goods and service that a market provides. But 

while this is plausible in theory, I have to say that 

in more than 33 years as a federal court of appeals 

judge I have not noted any improvement in the average 

quality of the lawyers who appear before us. I find 

it difficult to believe that punishing [the plaintiff] 

and his lawyer by in effect a "fine" of $925,000 will 
No. 2014AP1213.ssa

3

promote the quality of legal representation in the 

courts of this circuit.4

¶52 I disagree with the majority's conclusion that 

personal service in the instant case does not comply with the 

statutory service requirement and that only service by certified 

U.S. mail counts. 

¶53 I write separately to make two points: 

(1) A court scrutinizes the text of a statute in view 

of the purposes of the statute. "Words are given 

meaning to avoid absurd, unreasonable, or 

implausible results and results that are clearly 

at odds with the legislature's purpose." Force 

ex rel. Welcenbach v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 

2014 WI 82, ¶30, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 N.W.2d 866. 

Personal service fulfills the express purposes of 

the notice of claim requirement. 

(2) Personal service is a stricter form of service 

than certified mail, and "stricter compliance 

than the statute demands is not necessarily a 

failure to strictly comply." See Patterson v. 

Bd. of Regents, 103 Wis. 2d 358, 361, 309 

N.W.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1981); Weis v. Bd. of Regents, 

837 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979 (E.D. Wis. 2011). 

¶54 Because, in my opinion, personal service fulfills the 

purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.82 and is a stricter form of 

 

4 See Reserve Hotels PTY Ltd. v. Mavrakis, 790 F.3d 738, 745 

(7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J., dissenting).
No. 2014AP1213.ssa

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service than certified mail, interpreting Wis. Stat. 

§ 893.82(2m) to bar an action against a state officer, employee, 

or agent simply because the notice of claim was served 

personally by a process server rather than by a U.S. postal 

worker delivering certified mail would lead to the absurd result 

of dismissing an otherwise viable claim for a "harmless 

procedural bobble[]."5 

¶55 As a result, I dissent and write separately. 

I

¶56 I begin with the text of Wis. Stat. § 893.82, which 

states (in relevant part and with emphasis added) the purposes 

of the section and the requirements the legislature has set 

forth:

(1) The purposes of this section are to: 

(a) Provide the attorney general with adequate 

time to investigate claims which might 

result in judgments to be paid by the state. 

(b) Provide the attorney general with an 

opportunity to effect a compromise without a 

civil action or civil proceeding.

. . . . 

(2m) No claimant may bring an action against a state 

officer, employee or agent unless the claimant 

complies strictly with the requirements of this 

section. 

(3) Except as provided in sub. (5m), no civil action 

or civil proceeding may be brought against any 

state officer, employee or agent for or on 

 

5 See Reserve Hotels, 790 F.3d at 745 (Posner, J., 

dissenting).
No. 2014AP1213.ssa

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account of any act growing out of or committed in 

the course of the discharge of the officer's, 

employee's or agent's duties, . . . unless within 

120 days of the event causing the injury, damage 

or death giving rise to the civil action or civil 

proceeding, the claimant in the action or 

proceeding serves upon the attorney general 

written notice of a claim stating the time, date, 

location and the circumstances of the event 

giving rise to the claim for the injury, damage 

or death and the names of persons involved, 

including the name of the state officer, employee 

or agent involved. . . . 

. . . .

(5) The notice under sub. (3) shall be sworn to by 

the claimant and shall be served upon the 

attorney general at his or her office in the 

capitol by certified mail. Notice shall be 

considered to be given upon mailing for the 

purpose of computing the time of giving notice. 

¶57 As Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1) explains, the purpose of 

requiring a claimant to serve a notice of claim on the attorney 

general is twofold: (1) to provide the attorney general with 

notice of claims against the state and time to investigate; and 

(2) to provide the attorney general time to reach a settlement 

prior to litigation. 

¶58 In Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5), the legislature specified a 

method of service for notices of claim: certified mail. 

Certified mail is "[m]ail for which the sender requests proof of 

delivery in the form of a receipt signed by the addressee." 

Black's Law Dictionary 1096 (10th ed. 2014). 

¶59 The court of appeals has articulated a twofold purpose 

for requiring service on the attorney general by certified mail: 

(1) to "allow[] the attorney general's office to easily identify 

mail whose contents are legal in nature and require immediate 
No. 2014AP1213.ssa

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attention"; and (2) to ensure that delivery of the notice of 

claim can be verified. See Kelly v. Reyes, 168 Wis. 2d 743, 

747-48, 484 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1992); Patterson v. Bd. of 

Regents, 103 Wis. 2d 358, 360, 309 N.W.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1981). 

¶60 Personal service (by a process server) of a notice of 

claim serves both the express statutory purposes for notice of 

claim contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1) and the purposes of 

requiring notices of claim be served on the attorney general by 

certified mail identified in the case law. 

¶61 A personally served notice of claim, like a notice of 

claim served by certified mail, informs the attorney general of 

claims against the state and gives him or her an opportunity to 

reach a settlement prior to litigation. Moreover, personal 

service (by a process server) of a notice of claim, even more 

than service by a U.S. postal worker by certified mail, clearly 

identifies the notice as legal in nature and provides an easily 

verifiable means of confirming that the notice was actually 

served and when it was served. 

¶62 In sum, there is no reason "why signing a receipt for 

an envelope delivered by a U.S. Postal employee is different 

from signing an acknowledgement of receipt on a copy of a notice 

of claim delivered by a deputy sheriff or other process server." 

Weis v. Bd. of Regents, 837 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979 (E.D. Wis. 

2011).6 

 

6 The Weis court wrote that the State defendant argued 

that 'the certified mail requirement facilitates the 

identification of that particular type of legal 

(continued)
No. 2014AP1213.ssa

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¶63 The dismissal of an otherwise viable claim should not 

depend on whether notice of that claim was delivered by someone 

in a sheriff's uniform rather than a U.S. postal uniform. To 

hold otherwise, as the majority opinion does, is to elevate form 

over substance and countenance an absurd result——dismissal of a 

viable claim based on a harmless procedural gaffe. See Hamilton 

v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶39, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832 

("[A] court will seek to avoid a truly absurd or unreasonable 

result.") (citations omitted). 

II

¶64 The absurdity of dismissing Sorenson's otherwise 

viable claims based on personal service of the notice of claim 

by a process server rather than service by a U.S. postal worker 

by certified mail is underscored by the fact that personal 

service is, in fact, a stricter form of service than certified 

mail. 

¶65 In dismissing Sorenson's otherwise viable claims, the 

majority opinion relies on the requirement in Wis. Stat. 

§ 893.82(2m) that a claimant "compl[y] strictly with the 

requirements of [Wis. Stat. § 893.82]." See majority op., ¶24. 

 

filing' . . . but offer no explanation why signing a 

receipt for an envelope delivered by a U.S. Postal 

employee is different from signing an acknowledgment 

of receipt on a copy of a notice of claim delivered by 

a deputy sheriff or other process server. Seeing no 

difference between the two, I conclude that Plaintiffs 

strictly complied with the notice of claim statute.

Weis v. Bd. of Regents, 837 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979 (E.D. Wis. 

2011).
No. 2014AP1213.ssa

8

¶66 In an analogous context——the statute required service 

by registered mail and service was by certified mail——the court 

of appeals noted that "[a]lthough we agree that strict 

compliance . . . is required . . . we conclude that a stricter 

compliance than the statute demands [here, by certified mail] is 

not necessarily a failure to strictly comply. Such a reading 

would lead to an absurd and unjust result, and we reject such a 

construction." Patterson, 103 Wis. 2d at 360-61. 

¶67 Relying on Patterson's observation that stricter 

compliance is not necessarily a failure to strictly comply, the 

federal district court in Weis v. Board of Regents, 837 

F. Supp. 2d 971 (E.D. Wis. 2011), rejected the same argument the 

State makes in the instant case. 

¶68 In Weis, the plaintiffs personally served notice of 

claim on the attorney general. Weis, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 979. 

The defendants in Weis argued that because notice of claim was 

not served by certified mail, the plaintiffs' claims should be 

dismissed. Weis, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 979. 

¶69 Noting that the plaintiffs' notice of claim was 

received and acknowledged by the attorney general, the Weis

court concluded there was no meaningful difference between 

service by certified mail and service by process server. Weis, 

837 F. Supp. 2d at 979. As a result, the federal district court 

held that the plaintiffs strictly complied with Wis. Stat. 

§ 893.82. Weis, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 979-80. 

¶70 The reasoning in Patterson and Weis is, in my opinion,

more persuasive than that of the majority opinion. Service of 
No. 2014AP1213.ssa

9

process by a sheriff or process server is reliable, verifiable, 

and almost universally accepted. "Certainly, the gold standard 

of notice is service of process by the sheriff or other process 

server . . . ." Schlereth v. Hardy, 280 S.W.3d 47, 52 n.4 (Mo. 

2009) (en banc). For this reason, Wis. Stat. § 801.11(3) 

requires personal service on the State to be made by delivering 

a copy of the summons and complaint to the attorney general or 

leaving them at the attorney general's office in the Capitol 

with an assistant or clerk. 

¶71 If service of a notice of claim by certified mail 

strictly complies with Wis. Stat. § 893.82, then the "gold 

standard" of service——personal service by a sheriff or process 

server——complies even more strictly. 

¶72 In sum, because personal service fulfills the purposes 

of Wis. Stat. § 893.82 and is a stricter form of service than 

certified mail, interpreting Wis. Stat. § 893.82(2m) to bar an 

action against a state officer, employee, or agent simply 

because notice of claim was served by a process server rather 

than by a U.S. postal worker via certified mail would lead to an 

absurd result: dismissing an otherwise viable claim for a 

"harmless procedural bobble[]." Reserve Hotels, 790 F.3d at 745 

(Posner, J., dissenting). 

¶73 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and write 

separately. 

¶74 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 

BRADLEY joins this dissent.
No. 2014AP1213.ssa

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