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Health Hazard

Evaluation 

Report .........-­

HETA 83-326-1535 

LIQU IDDISPOSAL INCORPORATED 

SHELBYTOV!NSH IP J Ml CH IGA:t

­
PREFACE 


The Hazard Evaluations and Technical Assistance Branch of NIOSH conducts field 

investigations of possible health hazards in the.workplace. -These 

investigations are conducted under the authority of Section 20{a)(6) of the 

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 669(a){6) which 

authorizes the Secretary o·f Health and Human Services, following a written 

request from any employer or authorized representative of employees, to 

determine whether any substance normally found in the place of employment has 

potentially toxic effects in such concentrations as used or found. 

The Hazard Evaluations and Technical ·Assistance Branch also provides, upon 

request, medical, nursing, and industrial hygiene technical and consultative 

ass.istance (TA) to Federal, state, and loca.1 agencies; labor; industry and 

other groups or individuals to control occupational health hazards and to 

prevent related trauma and disease. 

Mention of company names or products does not constitute endorsement by the 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. 
HETA- 83-326-1535 NIOSH INVESTIGATOR: 

NOVEMBER 1984 Kern E. Anderson 

LIQUID DISPOSAL INCORPORATED 

SHELBY TOWNSHIP , MICHIGAN 

I. Summary 

On June 20, 1983 the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH) received a request to evaluate possible health effects among 

firefighters following a fire that occurred on June 15,1983 at l iquid Disposal 

Incorporated (LOI), a storage site for waste oils, volatile and semivolatile 

wastes, located in a Detroit suburb. The request also asked NIOSH to advise 

fire officials on decontamination procedures for personal protective gear, 

clothing and equipment that may have been exposed to toxic chemicals during the 

fire. 

On July 12-13, 1983 NIOSH surveyed firefighters and police officers involved 

with the fire using self-administerd medical questionnaires. Additionally, the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) collected environmental samples following 

the fire that were analyzed for dibenzo-p-dioxins and dibenzofurans. These 

samples included the water used to decontaminate various firefighter gear and 

equipment, a composite sample of the waste oil lagoon, samples from two fly ash 

piles, samples of soil collected a few miles from the site, and background 

water and soil samples as contr ols. 

Generally, firefighters and other personnel involved with the fire experienced 

only minor health effects associated with smoke and fumes. One firefighter was 

treated for smoke inhalation . There were no other major health problems, and 

none of the firefighters were hospitalized . 

Of all the EPA samples, the compound of most concern was 

2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD). TCDD was not detected in any of 

t he samples submitted for analysis. 

Although the rinse water used to wash some firefighter gear and equipment was 

analyzed and found totally negative for TCDD, the cost of analyzing all the 

clothing, gear and equipment far outweighed the cost of replacing the items. Thus, EPA authorized complete replacement of personal protective clothing, gear 

and equipment used at t he fire . ~ 

.,...--~~~~~~---------------------~------------------------------------------------------------. 

On the basis of the data obtained during this investigation, i t was concluded 

t hat there were no apparent serious health effects resulting from exposures to ~ emicals at the fire. It was further concluded that based upon the technology ' available, decontaminating the firefi ghters' clothing, gear and equipment was 

: impractical and too costly . We agree with EPA's decision to replace the 

:, clothi ng, gear and equipment. Recommendations pertaining to on-going medical 

: . surveillance, care of work uniforms and fire fighting equipment, and an 


educa t ion program about toxic chemicals are presented in Secti on VII of this 


report. 


KEYWORDS : SIC 9224 fire fighters , chemical fires , hazardous waste storage sites, 

chemical decontamination 
Page 2 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No . 83-326 

II. Introduction 

On June 15, 1983, police and firefighters from three communities 

responded to a fire at Liquid Disposal Incorporated (LOI) - a hazardous 

waste storage site located in Shelby Township, Michigan - a suburb of 

Detroit. LOI was under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency ' s (EPA) SUPERFUND at the time of the fire. 

On June 20, 1983, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and · Health (NIOSH) received a request from the International Association of 

Firefighters (IAFF) to evaluate possible health effects among 

firefighters who were at the LOI fire and to advise fire officials on 

procedures for cleaning personal protective gear, clothing and other 

firefighting equipment which may have become contaminated by chemical 

wastes during the fire . 

On June 23, 1983, a NIOSH investigator met with fire and township 

officials from Shelby Township, along with representatives from Local 

1338 of the IAFF and several firefighters who were at the scene of the 

fire. Preliminary information was obtained about the fire and the gear 

clothing and other firefighting equipment in question were examined. (The items had been placed in plastic trash bags and del i vered to one 

of the fire department sub-stations near LDI where they were being 

stored, waiting for final disposition by EPA.} The NIOSH investigator 

also visited the LDI dump site and met with EPA's On-Scene-Coordinator 

(OSC) to obtain a list of chemicals known to be contained in the site 

and to discuss alternatives for dealing with the firefighters' gear 

clothing and equipment. 

On July 12-13, 1983, NIOSH surveyed the firefighters and police 

officers involved with the fire, usi ng self-administered 

questionnaires. The questionnaires solicited information to 

characterize exposures and subsequent symptoms experienced by 

individuals at the scene, as well as other pertinent epidemiologic data . 

III . Background 

A. The Dump Si te 

Liquid Disposal Incorporated began operating as a commercial 

incinerator for waste oils, volatile and semi-volatile wastes in 

1968. The site is located on 6.8 acres of land in an area that has 

an automobile junkyard adjacent to the site, a mountainous trash 

dump a short distance away and a major landfill site nearby as 

well. The northern boundary of LDI is adjacent to the 

Rochester-Utica State Game and Recreation Area with the Clinton 

River one quarter mile away. Approximately 1,000 people living within one mile of LOI , are served by well water, with the closest 

well located within one quarter mi le of the site. The now abandoned 

site formerly consisted of: two lagoons {a deep waste oil lagoon 

with a thick sludge bed and a relatively shallow sett ling pond 

called a "scrubber" lagoon) a st aged drum storage area (where 
Page 3 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 83-326 

approximatf!ly 1,000 waste filled drums were stacked) , a centrally 

located incinerator and pit containing runoff water from the entire 

sitf! and twelve large volume (17,300-50,000 gallons) storage tanks, 

eight of which are underground. 

During its years of operation, LOI had numerous problems. Frequent 

seepage from the lagoons operating overcapacity threatened 

groundwater. Compromised structural integrity of the dike system 

presented constant threats of mass releases of wastes into the 

Clinton River, had the system failed. Constant complaints from 

nearby residents about obnoxious odors resulted in many violations 

of air quality standards and the site has had three major fires. 

Since 1982, major problems at LOI required three emergency actions 

by EPA and forced the closing of the site by the Michigan 

Department of Natural Resources (MDNR). The first incident 

occurred on January 13, 1982 when a release of hydrogen sulfide gas 

killed two workers. (on January 14, 1982 MDNR ordered the facility 

closed.) A second emergency recovery action was required in April 

1982, when PCB-contaminated oil was released into the 

Rochester-Utica State Game and Recreation Area. The third 

emergency action was initiated in July 1982 to stabilize hazards 

on-site from high lagoon levels and open flammable tanks. The 

sequence of events and the constant threats to human health and the 

environment earned LOI , MDNR's designation as the "second" worst 

hazardous waste site in the state of Michigan and was ranked 26th 

by EPA for remedial actions. EPA and MDNR maintained site 

surveillance over the next several months pending further cleanup. 

In the early spring of 1983, accumulation of water from heavy rains 

along with further deterforation of dikes and leaking. drums 

prompted EPA to initiate an "immediate removal action" to stabilize 

the site. Work was completed on the site in the fall of 1983. The 

two lagoons were dewatered, solidified and "capped . " Deteriorating 

drums were "overpacked" then removed from the site with the rest of 

the drums. The cost of the stabilization project was approximately 

$2 million . The site is currently waiting for remedial action by 

E.PA 

B. The Fire 

Beginning on June 3, 1983, feasibility tests were conducted by EPA 

on the sludge in the waste oil lagoon to determine if lime 

solidification would be an appropriate process to convert the 

liquid wastes into solid form. On June 8, 1983, larger scale 

testing of the sludge produced acceptable results. Thus, on June 

13, 1983 EPA began adding lime directly to the waste oil lagoon. 

This process produced large white clouds of lime dust and 

subsequent complaints from nearby residents. On June 14, 1983, EPA 

began injecting the lime beneath the surface of the lagoon in an 

effort to minimize the large emissions of lime dust. This 

procedure seemed to be effective, so on June 15, 1983, subsurface 

injection of lime continued - without incident throughout the 

morning. At approximately 12:40 p.m. , lime injection was abruptly 
Page 4 - Health Hazard 	Evaluation Report No. 83-326 

ordered to a halt by 	the OSC when a large white cloud was seen 

coming off the lagoon. An MDNR air qua1ity engineer arrived shortly 

thereafter and informed the OSC that odors and lime dust were 

evident in a location approximately one mile from the site. The 

OSC and the engineer went to investigate that area as well as other 

locations nearby, however, the cloud had disappeared. Shortly 

after they returned to LDI (at approximately 1:15 p.m. ), the white 

smoke coming off the lagoon turned black and the lagoon was 

observed to be on fire, apparently the result of an exothermic 

reaction. The blaze grew in size and the fire department was 

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summoned. When firefighters arrived, the OSC advised them of the 

lagoon contents: waste oils, benzene; toluene, xylene and lli?. PCBs .

The OSC established a 11 hot line 11 approximately 100 yards from the 

lagoon, where firefighters set up their equipment. Firefighters 

entering the area beyond this point were required to wear 

Self-contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBAs). The OSC and a fire 

official monitored the 11 hot line" to ensure that no one entered the 

area without a SCBA. 

Although most of the 	constituents in the lagoon were adequately

known, there was the question of unknown chemical constituents and 

the potential of hazards from the smoke and fumes from the fire. 

Although the smoke traveled up and over the recreation area in a 

relatively vertical path, it still was traveling in the general 

direction of nearby residential areas. As a precautionary measure, 

a voluntary evacuation of nearby residents was initiated and

subsequently, the entire area surrounding LOI was sealed-off. 

Firefighters suppressed the fire using foam and at approximately 

3:00 p.m., with the flames out, the Fi re Chief declared the fire 

under control and the evacuation was cancelled. One firefighter was 

treated for smoke inhalation at a nearby hospital when his air tank 

malfunctioned at the lagoon. There were no other casualties 

although several firefighters were examined at the hospital after 

the fire. 

IV. EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODS 

A. Environmental 

NIOSH was asked to advise fire officials about procedures for 

cleaning personal protective gear, clothing and other firefighting 

equipment which may have become contaminated by chemical wastes

during the fire. Appropriate methods of decontamination must be 

based upon the nature of the chemicals the gear, clothing and 

equi pment were exposed to, the degree of contamination or

compromised integrity of the item, availability and efficacy of

known decontamination methods and the costs of decontaminating methods versus replacing the gear, clothing and equipm~nt . 

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Page 5 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 83-326 

Based upon exposure information available at the time and due to 

the large number of chemicals that wer~ involved, EPA authorized 

complete replacement of personal protective clothing (

11 turnout" 

coats, boots, gloves and helmets), some air masks and webbing and 

straps for SCBAs and some fire hoses. 

EPA also collected the following environmental samples subsequent 

to the fire: 

samples of water, used to wash and decontaminate some of the 

firefighting equipment 

a composite sample of the waste oil lagoon 

off-site samples of soil, collected a few miles from LOI 

samples from the two fly ash piles and 

background water and soil samples to serve as controls. 

These samples were analyzed for tetra through octachlorinated 

dibenzo-p-dioxins and dibenzofurans 

B. Medical 

Self-administered medical questionnaires were distributed to 

thirty-five firefighters and six police officers involved with the 

LOI fire to determine the extent of ill health effects suffered by 

the those individuals . 

V. EVALUATION CRITERIA 

A. Environmental Criteria 

As a guide to the evaluation of the hazards posed by workplace 

exposures, NIOSH field staff employ environmental evaluation 

criteria for assessment of a number of chemical and physical 

agents. These criteria are intended to suggest levels of exposure 

to which most workers may be exposed up to 10 hours per day, 40 

hours per week for a working lifetime without experiencing adverse 

health effects. It is, however, important to note that not all 

workers will be protected from adverse health effects if their 

exposures are maintained below these levels. A small percentage 

may experience adverse health effects because of individual 

susceptibility, a pre-existing medical condition, and/or a 

hypersensitivity· (allergy). 

In addition, some hazardous substances may act in combination with 

other workplace exposures, the general environment, or with 

medications or personal habits of the worker to produce health 

effects even if the occupational exposures are controlled at the 

level set by the evaluation criterion. These combined effects are 
Page 6 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 83-326 

often not considered in the evaluation criteria. Also, some 

substances are absorbed by direct contact with the skin and mucous 

membranes, and thus potentially increase the overall exposure . Finally, evaluation criteria may change over the years as new 

information on the toxic effects of an agent become available. 

The primary sources of environmental evaluation criteria for the 

workplace are : 1) NIOSH Criteria Documents and recommendations, 2) 

the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists' 

(ACGIH) Threshold Limit Values (TLV's), and 3) the U.S. Department 

of Labor (OSHA) occupational health standards. Often, the NIOSH 

recommendations and ACGIH TLV's are lower than the corresponding 

OSHA standards. Both NIOSH recommend·ations and ACGIH TLV' s usually 

are based on more recent information than are the OSHA standards. 

The OSHA standards also may be required to take into account the 

feasibility of controlling exposures in various industries where 

the agents are used; the NIOSH-recommended standards, by contrast, 

are based primarily on concerns relating to the prevention of 

occupational disease. In evaluating the exposure levels and the 

recommendations for reducing these levels found in this report, it 

should be noted that industry is legally required to meet only 

those levels specified by an OSHA standard. 

A time-weighted average (TWA) exposure refers to the average 

airborne concentration of a substance during a normal 8- to 10-hour 

workday . Some substances have recommended snort-term exposure 

limits or ceiling values which are intended to supplement the TWA 

where there are recognized toxic effects from high short-term 

exposures. 

VI. RESULTS 

A. Environmental 

Results of EPA's samples analyzed for tetra through octachlorinated 

dibenzo-p-dioxins and dibenzofurans are presented i n Table I. The 

compound of most concern, 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin 

(TCDD) was not detected in any of the samples submitted for 

analysis. The limits of detection in these analyses ranged from 

0.004-0.001 parts per billion (ppb) depending upon the detection 

limits calculated for individual tests . 

NIOSH obtained a list from EPA of the chemicals known to be present 

in both the scrubber and waste oil lagoons as of May 1983. The 

composition of the "scrubber" lagoon was described as; waste water, 

oil and suspended sediments containing toluene (280 ug/l), xylene 

(490 ug/l), 1, 1,1,-trichloroethane (260 ug/1), trichloroethylene (160 u g/1), perchloroethylene (55 ug/l), oil (160 ug/l), cadmium 

(120 ug/1), chromium (90 ug/1), copper (890 ug/1}, nickel (800 

ug/1), lead (310 ug/l), zinc (210 ug/1), and iron (4,800 ug/l) . The composition of the waste oil lagoon was des~ribed as oil, water 

and sediments containing; toluene (95,000 ug/l), xylene (5,000 
Page 7 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 83-326 

ug/l), styrene (7,800 ug/l), 1,1.1.-trichloroethane (34,000 ug/1), 

trichloroethylene (15,000 ug/l), perchloroethylene (3,500 ug/l), 

polychlorinated biphenyl in water Cl ppm), polychlorinated biphenyl 

in oil (190 ppm), cadmium (5,000 ug/l), chromium (94,000 ug/l), 

copper (33,000 ug/l), zinc (87,000 ug/l), iron (530,000 ug/l), 

phenols (3,200 mg/kg) and numerous other organics. There may have 

been other unknown chemicals present in the waste oil lagoon and 

new chemicals may have been formed by the interaction of chemicals 

and the heat of the fire. 

Although the firefighters protective gear, clothing and equipment 

were potentially exposed to many substances, visual examination of 

some boots, gloves and turnout coats revealed that dried mud and 

lime dust were the only obvious contaminants. Stains from oils or 

other liquids were not apparent and the items appeared to be free 

of holes and other damage that could compromise their protective 

features. 

Al though the samples of water used to rinse the equipment after 

decontamination procedures were entirely negative for TCDDs, EPA 

authorized replacement of the protective gear, clothing and 

equipment when it became apparent that the costs of ~nalyzing all 

of the items for so many compounds would greatly exceed the cost of 

replacing them. 

B. Medical 

Self-administered medical questionnaires were obtained for forty o.f 

the forty-one individuals involved with the LOI fire. Generally, 

both the firefighters and the police officers who were at the scene 

of the fire experienced only minor health effects from .exposures 

associated with smoke and fumes. Significant exposure to smoke and 

fumes was documented by one firefighter whose air tank 

malfunctioned at the burning lagoon. This individual was treated 

for smoke inhalation at a nearby hospital and released. Nose and 

throat irritation lasting more than six hours after the fire was 

reported by fifteen individuals, Cough and shortness of breath were 

reported by eight individuals and five individuals respectively. 

Nine individuals reported that liquid wastes or sludge penetrated 

their clothing resulting in prolonged skin contact. Four of these 

individuals reported experiencing skin irritation or a slight 

rash. One person, who was not at the fire, reported experiencing a 

slight rash on his hands after washing some of the air tanks that 

were used during the fire. After the fire, twenty-five individuals 

sought medical attention at the emergency room of a nearby 

hospital. Within this group, nine persons reported no symptoms at 

all and four persons reported nose and throat irritation as their 

only symptom. A history of smoking cigarettes was reported by 

twenty-nine persons, fifteen who currently still smoke. No other 

epidemiologic data were reported . 
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Page 8 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 83-326 

VII. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 

The results of the investigati on indicate that the individuals involved 

with the fire suppression activities at the LOI fire experienced only 

·minor symptoms and irritations resulting from exposures during the 

fire. No one was hospitalized and with the exception of the one 

firefighter who was treated for smoke inhalation, none of the other 

firefighters required respiratory therapy. At the time of the medical 

survey, which was almost one month after the fire, prolonged health 

effects were not reported. Onset of delayed health effects would not 

expect to occur based upon the type of exposure and the minor acute 

symptoms reported. Exposure to liquid chemicals contained in the 

lagoon was minimal and exposure to smoke ·and fumes were minimized based 

upon the vertical ascending path of the ·smoke, its movement away from 

the firefighters and the use of breathing apparatus by firefighters at 

the burning lagoon. The minor ski n irritations experienced by some of 

the ffrfighters was most likely attributable to skin contact with lime 

dust and residue. 

The issues surrounding the replacement of the clothing, protective gear

and equipment are very complicated and require some clarification . In 

the absence of specific decontamination procedures, each -incident such 

as this, must be addressed separately . In the case of the LOI fire,

decontamination of the clothing, protective gear and equipment was 

complicated by the large number of potential chemicals involved, the 

absence of rapid testing methods and the high cost of existing testi ng 

methods. When weighing the cost of decontamination procedures versus 

the cost of replacing the clothing, gear and equipment, it appears t hat 

from the cost effectiveness point of view , that EPA made an appropriate 

decision , by authorizing complete replacement. This decision, however, 

seemed to be interpreted by some individuals as EPA's agreement that 

the clothing, gear and equipment was, in fact contaminated and

therefore unusable. This was not necessarily the case . Replacing t he 

clothing, gear and equipment was authorized because of the ex.cessive 

time and expense that would have been required to test for the large 

variety of chemicals known to be contained in the dump, the possibility 

of the existence or formation of unknown chemical compounds and the 

length of time firefighters would have ha.d to rely upon backup (and

possibly inferior) gear, while waiting for final judgement on their 

first line-gear. Nevertheless, many individuals expressed a great deal 

of concern that they might risk serious health effects later-on as a 

result of having been present at the LOI site during the fire and from 

continued use of gear and clothing used to suppress the fire. Whi l e the 

concern regarding exposures to hazardous wastes is understandable , i t 

is not possible to predict long-term health outcomes from any of these 

exposures . Additionally, the precautionary measures implemented by the 

OSC and the Fire Chief (the establishment of the "hot-line" and 

required use of SCBA's) may ha.ve significantly reduced the opportunity for firefighters to have been exposed to toxic wastes. 
Page 9 - Health Hazard Evaluation Report No . 83-326 

Concern and reactions regarding risk of exposure to hazardous wastes 

was 	 not limited to the firefighters. In another incident related to 

the 	LOI fire, an employee of the township's water department was 

tal king to a police officer at the intersection of the main road and 

the 	access road to LOI when he suffered what appeared to be a heart 

attack . Emergencey medical personnel took the employee to the 	 . I 

emergency room of a nearby hospital. Moments after the person was taken 

in to the emergency room, he was taken back outside on a stretcher by 

two 	 attendants who removed all but his undershorts, then proceeded to 

wash the man down with cold water from a garden hose, before taking him 

back into the emergency room. Medical personnel,thinking the man posed 

some degree of risk to other individuals because he was "contaminated" 

from having been at LOI, authorized this procedure. Not only was this 

measure extreme, but probably unnecessary as well. The man had not 

been exposed to anything at the LOI site. Additionally, had 

contamination occurred, rinsing the man with cold water alone, may not 

have been sufficient to reduce this contamination. 

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. 	 A routine medical screening/surveillance program should be 

established for firefighters. This program should foc~s on 

periodic assessment of cardiac and pulmonary systems and include 

thorough medical histories, physical examinations, 

electrocardiograms, pulmonary function tests and chest X-rays when 

needed. (The hospital emergency room should only be used, when 

necessary, by firefi ghters who suffer immediate, acute symptoms 

from exposures during the course of suppressing a fire . The 

practice of routinely visiting the hospital emergency room by 

firefighters who are asymptomatic, should be discontinued unless 

specific chemical exposure or other information indicate the need 

for 	medi cal evaluati on . ) · 

2. 	 Because many firefighters expressed concern about smoke and other 

substances on their work uniforms affecting family members, 

firefighters should launder and keep work uniforms at the fire 

station . Uniforms should be laundered routinely using a separate 

washer and dryer from the ones used to launder bed linens and 

towels . For those occasions when firefighters respond to fire 

alarms from their homes, a backup uniform should be kept at home. 

3. 	 Fire hoses and other fire fighting equipment should be cleaned 

routinely according to the manufacturer's recommendations. To 

minimize personal exposures from substances on the hoses or 

equipment and to minimize skin irritations from detergents used 

during the cleaning procedures, elbow or arm length rubber gloves can 	be worn. 

4. 	 Future consideration for replacing clothing, gear and equipment, 

believed to be contaminated by harmful chemicals shoulq be based 

upon: evidence of contamination; damage, limiting or compromisirrg 

the safety qualities of the clothing, gear or equipment; knowledge 

of the chemicals and efficacy of known decontamination methods; and 

the cost of decontamination procedures versus ·replacement of the articles . 
Page 10 - Health 	Hazard Evaluation Report No . 83-326 

5. 	 Because of the expressed concerns and questions regarding hazardous 

wastes, an education program about toxic chemicals should be 

established. The focus of this program should include how chemicals 

move through the environment, understanding how risks to human 

health occur, and a perspective on dump sites. This program shoul d 

be made available to firefighters, police officers, health care 

personnel, township and other community officials and to the 

general public. A subsequent training program on fighting chemical 

fires should also be estabished . 

IX . REFERENCES 

1. 	 Occu ational Diseases : A Guide to Their Reco nition . National 

nstitute for Occupational Safety and Healt • DHEW {NIOSH) 

Publication No. 77-181, June, 1977. 

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2. Casarett and Doull, Toxicology 2nd . Edition Macmi l lan Publishing 

Company, New York, New York, 1980 . 

3. Hazard Evaluation and Technical Assistance Report (HETA) 

82-115-1101 Fire Department Poughkeepsie, New York, April, 1982 

4. 	 HETA 80-118, Chemical Control Facility, Elizabeth , New Jersey, 

April , 1980. 

IX . AUTHORSHIP AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

Report Prepared by: Kern E. Anderson 

Public Health Advisor 

Originating Office: Hazard Evaluati ons and Technical 

Assistance Branch 

Division of Surveillance, Hazard 

Evaluations, and Field Studies 

X. DISTRIBUTION AND AVAILABILITY OF REPORT 

Copies of this report are currently available upon request from NIOSH, 

Divisi on of Standards Development and Technology Transfer, Publications 

Dissemination Section, 4676 Columbia Parkway, Cincinnati, Ohio 45226. 

After 90 days, the report will be available through the Nationa l 

Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal, Springfield, 

Virginia 22161. Information regarding its availability through NTIS 

can be obtained from NIOSH Publications Office at the Cincinnati 

address. Copies of this report have been sent to: 

1. 	 Shelby Township Fire Department 

2. 	 International Association of Fire Fighters 

3. 	 NIOSH, Region V 

4. 	 OSHA, Region V 

For the purpose of informing affected employees, copies of this report 

shall be posted by the employer in a prominent place accessible to the 

employees for a period of 30 calendar days. 
TABLE 1 

LIQUID DISPOSAL INC . , SHELBY TOWNSHIP, MICHIGAN 

RES UL TS OF HRGC-LRMS ANALYSES OF EXTRACTS OF EPA/REGION V SAMPLES SUBMITTED FOR 


TETRA THROUGH OCTACHLORINATED OIBENZO-p-DIOXINS AND DIBENZOFURANS 


samples analyzed ty Wrfght State Unfversity 


(results recorded in parts per billion (ppb)) 


HETA: 83-326 


PARAMETER Blank 	

(Con tro1) 

1/4 mile 

SW of 

Dequfndre 

Rd. on 

Hamlin Rd 

(Control) 	

1/8 mfle 

NH of 

Shelby Rd . on 22 Mi • 

SW corner 

22 Mf. Rd 

& S.helby Road 

Composite 

Waste Of 1 

Lagoon 

Bkgrd 

Rinse 

Water 

(Centro 1} 

~/ash Twp 

Fire Dept. 

Rfnse 

Water 

Shelby 

Twp. Ffre 

Dept. 

Rfnse 

Hater 

Sterling 

Hgts. Fire 

Dept.

Rfnse 

Water 

East Fly 

Ash Pile 

West Fly 

Ash Pfle 

SAMPLE NUM&ERS 83EP10S05 83EP10S01 83EP10S02 83EP10S03 83EP10S04 83EP10S06 83EP10S07 83EPIOS08 83EP10S09 83CY02S44 83CY02S45 


TCDF's 

TCDD's 

PCDF's 

PC DD's 

HxCDF 's 

HxCOO's 

HpCOF's 

HpCDO's 

OCDF's 

OCDO's 

ND = NOT 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

DETECTED 

ND 

ND 

~JD 

NO 

ND 

ND 

liD 

0. 10 

NO 

0.23 

* NOT DUE 

ND 

ND 

ND 

NO 

ND 

NO 

NO 

0.12 

ND 

0.28 

TO 2 ,3,7,fl 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

0.07 

NO 

0.02 

- TCOD ISOMER 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

NO 

11.0 

2.0 

29.0 

ND 

ND 

NO 

ND 

ND 

NO 

ND 

NO 

NO 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

llD 

ND 

NO 

NO 

NO 

ND 

MD 

ND 

ND 

ND 

1!0 

ND 

IJD 

ND 

tJD 

ND 

l.5* 

NO 

ND 

ND 

ND 

NO 

NO 

ND 

NO 

ND 

1.1* 

ND 

ND 

ND 

ND 

1.6 

5.6 

1.3 

6.9 

llD 

ND 

IJD 

ND 

ND 

1.4 

4.7 

2. 3 

11.4 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


ROBERT A. TAFT LABORATORIES 


~76 COLUMBIA PARKWAY. CINCINNATI. OHIO 45226 


OFFICIAL BUSINESS Third Class Mail 

POSTAGE ANO FEES PAID 

PEN!'LTV FOR PRIVATE use. $300 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HHS 

. HHS398 

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