alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE v. HORACE LEWIS WHALEY.

(Filed 29 March, 1967.)

Indictment and Warrant § 14; Criminal Law § 121—

By pleading not guilty to warrants in a court having jurisdiction of the offense charged, without any motion addressed to the validity of the warrants, defendant waives defects, if any, incident to the authority of the person who issued the warrants, both in regard to a motion to quash and in regard to a motion in arrest of judgment.

Appeal by defendant from *Peel, J.,*31 October 1966 Session of LENOIR.

Defendant was charged in a warrant with unlawfully and wil-fully operating an automobile upon the public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and was originally tried in the Kinston-Lenoir County Recorder’s Court upon a plea of “not guilty.” From a judgment of “guilty,” defendant appealed to the Superior Court.

Prior to entering a plea in Superior Court, defendant moved the court to quash the warrant, which motion was denied. Defendant then pleaded not guilty and the case came on for trial. The jury returned a verdict of “Guilty of operating an automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor,” and judgment was entered thereon. Prior to sentencing, defendant moved the court that judgment be arrested for the reason that the warrant under which defendant was tried was not signed by a judicial officer, as required by law, but was signed by an executive officer. This motion was denied, and defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.

*Attorney General Bruton and Deputy Attorney General McGal-liard for the State.*

*Turner & Harrison for defendant.*

Per Cueiam.

Defendant assigns as error the denial of his motion to quash the warrant and his motion made in arrest of judgment.

This case is controlled by *State v. Wiggs,*269 N.C. 507, 153 S.E. 2d 84, wherein Bobbitt, J., stated;

> “. . . Having pleaded not guilty to said warrants in the City Court of Raleigh, a court having jurisdiction of all offenses charged, in said warrants, defendant waived defects, if any, incident to the authority of the person who issued the warrant. ‘Decisions of this Court are uniform in holding that a motion to quash the warrant or bill of indictment, if made af*762ter plea of not guilty is entered, is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. The exercise of such discretion is not reviewable on appeal.’ *S. v. St. Clair,*246 N.C. 183, 186, 97 S.E. 2d 840, 842, and cases cited. See also *S. v. Furmage,*250 N.C. 616, 620, 109 S.E. 2d 563, 566. Too, in respect of defendant’s motions in arrest of judgment, such pleas waived defects, if any, incident to the authority of the person (s) who issued the warrants. *S. v. Doughtie,*238 N.C. 228, 77 S.E. 2d 642.’’

The Kinston-Lenoir County Recorder’s Court had jurisdiction of the offenses charged in the warrant. The defendant pleaded not guilty to said warrant in that court without any motion addressed to the validity of the warrant. Therefore, the defendant waived defects, if any, incident to the authority of the person who issued the warrant. The court’s actions in refusing the motion in arrest of judgment and to quash were correct. The judgment of the lower court is

Affirmed.
---

---

Exhibit 13.1

Certification of
Principal Executive Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,as adopted pursuant
to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

In connection with the annual report
on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 of ECtel Ltd. (the
Company) as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Commission) on the date hereof (the Report) and pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
I, Eitan Naor, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify that:

| | the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:  June 15, 2006
/s/ Eitan Naor
Eitan Naor
President and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)



---

---
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

MARCUS TYRONE BROADNAX,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:10cv21/MCR/EMT

BENJAMIN HARRISON,

Defendant.

__________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the court upon referral from the clerk. Plaintiff commenced this action

by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). By order of this court dated

March 4, 2010, Plaintiff was given thirty (30) days in which to file an amended complaint (see Doc.

8). Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint by the deadline; therefore, on April 5, 2010, the

court issued an order requiring Plaintiff to show cause, within twenty (20) days, why this action

should not be dismissed for failure to comply with an order of the court (Doc. 11). The time for

compliance with the show cause order has now elapsed and Plaintiff has failed to file an amended

complaint .

 Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

That this case be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with an

order of the court.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 14th day of May 2010.

/s/ Elizabeth M. Timothy 

ELIZABETH M. TIMOTHY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Page 2 of 2

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days after being served a copy thereof. Any different deadline that may appear

on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only. A copy of objections shall be

served upon all other parties. Failure to object may limit the scope of appellate review of

factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir.

1988).

Case No: 3:10cv21/MCR/EMT
<PAGE>

                                                                 Exhibit 32.1

                 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
                 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                       THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a)
and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each
of the undersigned officers of KV Pharmaceutical Company, a Delaware
corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify that, to the best of their
knowledge:

The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2004 (the
"Form 10-Q") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information
contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:  August 9, 2004                 /s/ Marc S. Hermelin
                                      -----------------------------------------
                                      Marc S. Hermelin
                                      Vice Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

Date:  August 9, 2004                 /s/ Gerald R. Mitchell
                                      -----------------------------------------
                                      Gerald R. Mitchell
                                      Vice President, Treasurer and Chief
                                      Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to KV Pharmaceutical Company and will be retained by KV
Pharmaceutical Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 1:10-cr-00006-MP/GRJ

ERIC LAMORE HARRIS, 

Defendant.

_____________________________/

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Doc. 35, a petition alleging a violation of

probation for failing to refrain from new law violations, in that between on or about May

12, 2012, and May 15, 2012, the defendant allegedly committed the offenses of dealing

in stolen property as evidenced by the defendant being charged for these offenses as is

outlined in Alachua County Sheriff's Report No. AS012ARR005042. The state charges

against Mr. Harris were dismissed via a "No Information" filed by the State in case

number 01-2012-CF-002521-A on July 10, 2012. 

An evidentiary hearing was held on the petition on October 18, 2012. I have

carefully considered the statements of all parties, the testimony of the witnesses, the

evidence presented and the information contained in the violation report. I now find that

the government has not met its burden of proving that the defendant violated the terms

and conditions of his probation. 

The evidence was undisputed that Mr. Harris did not steal the laptops himself. 

Also, the government presented no evidence that defendant was told that the laptops

were stolen. Indeed, the only testimony regarding statements to Mr. Harris concerning
the legality of the laptops involved Mr. Caudle. He testified that he checked if the

laptops were reported as stolen to the FDLE and informed defendant that they had not

been reported stolen. 

Additionally, the government failed to support its theory that the defendant should

have known the laptops were stolen due to their low purchase price. First, the

government offered no testimony as to the value of the laptops other than the

speculation by the detective who did not explain how he derived that value. Second,

the testimony of Mr. Caudle and the defendant was uncontradicted that the laptops had

significant functional and cosmetic problems. Finally, the Court cannot determine from 

the version of the conversation that Mr. Caudle testified he had with defendant whether

defendant was admitting to knowing the laptops were stolen all along or simply

indicating that he had later found out they were stolen. As such, the conversation is not

sufficient to meet the government's burden.

Accordingly, it is the judgment of the Court that defendant did not violate the

terms of his probation and that the defendant be continued on probation. All other

portions of the sentence and terms and conditions of probation previously imposed shall

remain in full force and effect. 

DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of October, 2012. 

S/ Stephan P. Mickle 

Stephan P. Mickle

Senior United States District Judge

Case No: 1:10-cr-00006-MP-GRJ
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

TIMOTHY FONSECA,

 Appellant, 

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 State.

§

 

§

 

§

 

§

 

§

 

No. 08-19-00227-CR

Appeal from the

243rd District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 20180D02567)

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the State’s third motion for extension of time within which to file the 

brief until April 27, 2021. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE 

THE STATE’S BRIEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

It is further ordered that the Hon. Yvonne Rosales, the State’s attorney, prepare the State’s 

Brief and forward the same to this Court on or before April 27, 2021.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of March, 2021.

PER CURIAM

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox and Alley, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
FOR ITS FISCAL QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       4,006,907
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  545,422
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     92,909
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,862,440
<PP&E>                                       6,407,168
<DEPRECIATION>                                 340,226
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              14,368,579
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          902,139
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       123,688
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                14,368,579
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,652,535
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,513,405
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               215,364
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              62,843
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                444,353
<INCOME-TAX>                                    63,073
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   381,280
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .031
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .031
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE v. KENNEDY

No. 53 PC.

Case below: 32 N.C. App. 234.

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 7 March 1977.
The Football Association Premier League Limited et al v. Youtube, Inc. et al Doc. 134

Dockets.Justia.com
Exhibit 99.1














In response to the SEC's issuance of Temporary Final Rule and Final Rule: Requirements for Arthur Andersen LLP
Auditing Clients, which was effective March 18, 2002, and in compliance with Temporary Note 3T we hereby include the following:

















[Neoforma Logo]











March 26, 2002











Securities and Exchange Commission


450 Fifth Street, NW


Washington, D.C. 20549





To Whom It May Concern:





Arthur Andersen LLP, as our independent public accountants, has represented to us that:





The audit of our financial
statements for the year ended December 31, 2001 was subject to Andersen's quality control system for the U.S. accounting and auditing practice to provide reasonable assurance that the engagement was conducted in compliance with professional
standards, that there was appropriate continuity of Andersen personnel working on the audit, and availability of national office consultation. Availability of personnel at foreign affiliates of Arthur Andersen is not relevant to this audit.





Neoforma, Inc.
**Exhibit
      31.2**





**RULE
      13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) CERTIFICATIONS**





I, **Zhong
      Ya Li** , certify
      that:





1.  I
      have
      reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of GFR Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the
      “Company”).





2.  Based
      on
      my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
      fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statement made,
      in
      light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
      with respect to the period covered by this report;





3.  Based
      on
      my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
      in this report, fairly present in all material respects, the financial
      condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for,
      the periods presented in this report;





4.  The
      Company’s other certifying officer(s) and I am responsible for establishing and
      maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
      Rules
      13a-15d-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and have:





(a)  Designed
      such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
      and
      procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
      information relating to the Company, including its consolidates subsidiaries,
      is
      made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period
      in which this report is being prepared;





(b)  Evaluated
      the effectiveness of the Company’s disclosure controls and procedures, and
      presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
      disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by
      this
      report based on such evaluation; and





(c)  Disclosed
      in this report any change in the Company’s internal control over financial
      reporting that occurred during the Company’s fourth fiscal quarter that has
      materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Company’s
      internal control over financial reporting; and





5.  The
      Company’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most
      recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Company’s
      auditors and the audit committee of Company’s board of directors (or persons
      performing the equivalent functions):





(a)  All
      significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
      of
      internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
      adversely affect the Company’s ability to record, process, summarize and report
      financial information; and





(b)  Any
      fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
      who
      have a significant role in the Company’s
      internal control over financial reporting.





Date:
      April 11, 2008




By:/s/Zhong
                  Ya Li**Zhong Ya Li**
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>    UT
<MULTIPLIER>                                     1,000
       

<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                      472,201
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                     30,257
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                         209,889
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                        85,312
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 797,659
<COMMON>                                        19,423
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                       37,188
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                            201,591
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                 258,202
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            1,960
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                           179,105
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                 102,500
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                   25,000
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                 230,892
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                  797,659
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                      199,667
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                             8,153
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     173,253
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     181,406
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                         18,261
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                                 867
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  19,128
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                         5,495
<NET-INCOME>                                    13,633
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                         24
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                   13,609
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                         5,794  
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                        3,853
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                         (35,398)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .78
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .78

<FN>
Capital-surplus-paid-in is net of $24,017 of treasury stock.






                                 Page 17
        

</TABLE>
Case 1:07-cv-03545-DAB     Document 28      Filed 04/11/2008     Page 1 of 1
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES A. FOX, and ALBERT R. SAMPSON,

Docket No. 5477.

Docket No. 5478.

(Filed 16 December, 1964.)

Constitutional Law § 30; Trespass § 10—

In accordance with mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, conviction of defendant of trespass in wilfully refusing to leave a restaurant after being requested to do so by the management, is reversed on the ground that the inspection form of the State Board of Health providing for toilet facilities separate for each race constitutes State action depriving the operator of the restaurant of freedom of choice as to patrons he could serve.

ON remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.

PER Cukiam.

Defendants, Negroes, were in April 1960 convicted in Wake County Superior Court of trespassing after being forbidden, a misdemeanor, G.S. 14-134. They appealed to this Court. We found “No Error.” See opinion filed 3 February 1961, reported. 254 N.C. 97, 118 S.E. 2d 58.

Defendants thereafter applied to the Supreme Court of the United States for *certiorari-.*That Court, on June 22, 1964, granted the writ, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case “to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for consideration in the light of *Robinson v. Florida,*... U.S. .., 12 L. Ed. 2d 771, 84 S. Ct..., decided this date.” 12 L. Ed. 2d 1032, 84 S. Ct. 1901.

The North Carolina State Board of Health, in 1958, exercising the authority given it by Art. 5, c. 72, of the General Statutes, promulgated an “Inspection Form for Restaurants and Food Handling Establishments.” This inspection report makes provisions for toilet facilities “for each sex and race.” It is, we think, apparent that the majority of the Supreme Court of the United States was of the opinion that the regulations promulgated by the North Carolina State Board of Health, like the regulations promulgated by the Florida State Board of Health, were sufficient to constitute state action depriving the operator of a restaurant of a freedom of choice with respect to the patrons he could serve.

The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of the United States is binding on us; hence we reserve the judgments rendered at the April 1960 Term of the Superior Court of Wake County, and hold the Superior Court erred in overruling defendants’ motions for nonsuit.

Reversed.