Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinion s filed Ma y 30 , 2024
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 22

- 00383

- CR

PATRICIA LYNN SWARTZ , Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee
On Appeal from the 405th District Court Galveston County, Te xas Trial Court Cause No. 20

- CR

- 2075

M A J O R I T Y O P I N I O N A jury convicted appellant Patricia Lynn Swartz of the third

- degree felony of possession of a controlled substance, p enalty group one , in an amount of one gram or more but less than fou r g rams

. Texas Co ntrolled Substa nces Act , Tex. Health & Safety Co d e § 481.115(c)

. Appellant pleaded true to two previous felony convictions for possession of a controlled substance, which enhanced her s entence. The jury assess ed punishment at impr i so nment for twelve y ear s. Tex. Penal Co de2 § § 12. 3 3 (a) , .34(a), .4 2( a )

. The trial court signed a judgment of conviction consistent with the jury ’ s verdict.
A ppellan t argu es that the tr ial court erred by : (1) submitt ing an err oneous instruction to the j ury ; (2) overruling her best

- evidence objection; (3) ove rr uling her hea rs ay objection ; and (4) even if such errors are harmless i n dividually , t he i r cumulative impact ma n dates reversal. W e a ffirm

. B ackgrou nd
In 202 0, Deputy Breann Boone was di s patched to a re cr eati onal

- ve hicle pa rk with a n all

- night laundromat in San L e on because there were rep orts of a suspicious vehic le

. On a rriva l, Deputy Boone found appellant and her companion sitting in their vehicle outside the laundromat

. After approac hing the ve h icle, Deputy Boone r eque s ted di sp atch to search for any warrants relating to app e l lant and her comp anion. Dep uty Boone was told there w as an a ctive warrant f or appellant ’ s arrest for a previous burglary of the coin

- operated mac hine a t the laundromat where t h e vehicle was parked , as wel l as an out

- o f

- state warrant from North Carolina. During h e r search of appellant incid ent to arrest, Deputy Boone f o und meth amphe tamine hidden in appellant ’ s b ra

. A ppellant also had a bag of p ills in her mouth , which she was attemptin g to hide and s wallow

. V ari ous d ru g paraphernalia were found in the vehicle. Appellant w as indic ted for inte ntionally possessi ng met hamphetamine

— a cont rolled substance

— of more th an one gram but less than four grams

. At trial, appellant ’ s counsel focused on the lack o f justi fi cati on for appellant ’ s arrest. Counsel argued that the State never produced a valid warr an t or affidavit demonstrating probable cause to arrest her

. And with out a v alid war rant , none of3 the drugs found on appellant ’ s person were admissible. App ella nt elected t o make her exc lu si onary argume n t to the jury instead of fi ling a motion to sup press

. See Roberts v. State , 545 S.W.2 d 157, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ( “ The defendant ’ s counsel may either file a pretrial motion to suppress evidence or he ma y wai t until th e trial on the me ri ts and object when the alleged unlawfull y obtained evidence is offered. ”); Johnson v. State , 743 S. W

. 2d 307, 309

- 10 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1987, pet. ref ’ d) ( “ Failure to file a pretrial motion does not waive a complaint of impr operly obtained evidence. ”)

. Although the judge provided instruct i on regarding im properly obtained evidence, the jury foun d appellant guilt y
. A p pellant timely appealed. Analysis
A. J u risdic tion
W e first address o ur dissenting colleague ’ s co ntention t hat we lack jurisdiction ove r this appeal . According to th e dissenting ju stice, there exists no fi na l judgment because the trial court failed to p ro nounce sentence

. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.03, § 1(a) (“sentence shall be pronounced in the defend ant’s presence”).
A f ter the jury deliberated on punishmen t , t he following transpir ed:
THE COURT: Madam foreman, I understand the jury has reached a verdict in punishment.
THE FOREPERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Please stand, Ms. Swartz. This is Cau se No. 20

- CR

- 2075, The State of Texas v. Patricia Swartz

. Th e verdict in the enha ncement paragraphs: We, the jury, find the allegations in Enhancement Paragraph 1 to be true.4 We, the jury, find the allegation in Enhancement Paragraph 2 to be true. We, the jury, having found allegations in Enhancement Paragraph 1 an d Enhancement Paragra ph 2 are true, assess the defendant ’ s punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a period of 12 years and
assess a fine in the amount of zero. That ’ s signed by the forema n.
I s this the verdict of each and every member of the jury? (The jury as a whole responded “ yes. ” )
THE COURT: Patricia Swartz, the jury, having found you guilty and found the allegatio ns in Enhancem ent Paragraph 1 and Enha n cement Paragraph 2 to b e true, as se ss your punishment a t 12 years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Do you have anything to say, ma ’ am, as to why sentence should not now be pronounced agains t you? [Appellant ’s c ounsel ]: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT : H aving nothing further to say, it is the order of this Court that you be remanded to the custody of the Galveston County sheriff to be transported to the authorities of the Texas Department of Crim inal Justice to obey a n d carry out the orders of this se nt en ce.
T he trial judge s igned a ju dgment of conviction by jury the same day , which was consistent with the jury ’ s verdict. The judgment states that appellant was convicted by a jury, that the punish ment im posed is twelve years confinement, and that the s en te nce commences on Ap ri l 27, 2022 ( the dat e on which the events quoted above occurred). The judgment ord ers appellant “ punished in accordance with the jury ’ s verdict ” and orders appel lant ’ s sentenc e ex ecuted. We disagree with our coll e agu e that t h e trial judge failed to pronounce appellant ’ s sentence. N o set formula is required

. Williams v. State , No. 05

- 05

-5 00648

- CR , 2005 WL 3163784 , at *1 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Nov. 29, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., no t des ignated f or publication) (conc l udin g tr ial cour t complied with article 42.03 when assessing punishment)

. At most, the present record can be construed as ambiguous

. E ven assuming that the judge ’ s oral pronouncement is unclear , we are to construe the verdict, the oral pronouncement, an d the jud gment
to g ether to resolve the ambiguity. E.g. , Cuellar v. State , No s . 07

- 20

- 00057

- CR, 07

- 20

- 00058

- CR ; 2020 WL 5931048 , at *3 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo Oct. 6 , 2020, no pet

. ) (mem. op. , n o t designated for publication); Morris v. State , Nos. 07

- 12

- 0 0409

- CR, 07

- 12

- 0 0410

- CR, 2013 WL 1 668222, at *1

- 2 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo Apr. 16, 2013, pet. ref ’ d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ; Aguilar v. State , 202 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2006, pet. ref ’ d) ; see also Men dez v. State , Nos. 07

- 19

- 00028

- CR, 07

- 19

- 00029

- CR, 07

- 1 9

- 00030

- C R , 2019 WL 6885026 , at *2 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo Dec. 17, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not des ignated for publication)

. W e also consider the context of the court ’ s utterances

. Cuellar , 2020 W L 593 1048, at *3 ; Mendez , 2019 WL 6885026, at *2

. In ad diti on to co rrectly stati ng in appellant ’ s presence the punishment found by the jury, the court also asked appellant, as is required, w hether she knew of any reason the sentence should not “ now ” be pronoun ced. She a nswered that she did not. There

was no conf usion on appellant ’ s part , as she filed a notice of appeal the same day and does not complain on appeal that the court failed to pronounce senten ce

. Mo r eover, r ecitations in the judgment create a bindi ng presumption of regularity in the absence of dire ct p roof of t heir falsity. Johnson v. State , 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Breazeale v. State , 683 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 84) (op. on reh ’ g). This presumption will not be set asi de unless the record affirmatively shows the contra ry. Breazea l e , 683 S.W.2d at 450

. The judgment reflects that appellant was convicted and sentenced to twelve years6 confineme nt in the Texas Depart ment of Corrections

— I n stitutional Division

. Although the trial court stated that it woul d “ assess your punishment ” rather than that it was “ sentencing ” appella nt , v iewing the court ’ s complete statements in
context w e conclude that the record is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity and truthf ulness carried by the for mal judgment ’ s recitation that
ap p ellant was convicted and sentence d cons istent with the jury ’ s verdict

. Accordingly, considering the verdict, the court ’ s statements, and the judgment, we conclude that the present re cord sufficient ly reflects the trial cour t ’ s intent to sentence a ppellant to a term of twelve years confinement and that the judge pronounced that sentence in appellant ’ s presence consistent with article 42. 03

. Because the written judgment clearly expresse s that intent, we resolve any lack of clarity i n the pro nouncement of sentence in fa v or of appellat e jurisdiction

. B. J ury instruction
In issue one , appellant argue s the tr ial court er red by including a good

- fa ith

- excep t i on instruction in the jury c harge

. Befor e trial , appellant requested the court in struct the jury to disregard any evid e nce obtained in violation of the law

. A ppellant sought the instruction to support her argument that the evidenc e of drug possession was o bt ained without a valid arrest warrant. Altho ugh the trial court denied appella nt ’ s request ed instruction, the court include d an instruction in the charge ba sed o n Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23. 1

1 The Code of Crimi nal Pro cedure provides that : “ N o evidence obta ined by an officer or other p erson in violation of any pro visions of the Constitutio n or laws of the S tate of Texa s , or of the C onstitution or law s of the Uni ted States of A merica, shall be a dmitted in evidenc e aga inst the accused on the t rial of any crimi nal case. ” Tex. Code Crim. Pr oc. art. 38.23 (a )

. In any case

“ wh ere the evid ence raises an issue hereunder, ” the jury sh all be instru cted that if it bel ieves, or has a reas o nable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of article 38.23, “ it shall disregard any such e vidence obtained. ” Id

.7 1. Ar ticle 38.23 instruc t i on The jury charge cont ai ned the follow ing ins t ruction : You have he ard evidence obtai ned as a re su lt of a n arrest of PATRICIA SWARTZ by Deputy Boone. Specifically, you have heard Depu ty Boone arrested the Defendant for an open warrant and that during tha t arrest, Deputy Boone d is covered methamphet amin e o n the person of PA TRI CIA SWARTZ. You may consid er this e vidence only if you resolve a prelimi n ary question in favor of the state. No e vi dence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any prov i s ions of the Constituti on or laws of the st ate of Texas, or of the C on stitution or law s of the Un it ed Stat es of America, shall be used against t he accused on the trial of any criminal ca se. Th e state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the evidenc e was not obtained in vi ol ation of the law.
The cha rge also contained an additio nal ins truction , c ommonly r eferred to as the “good

- f aith excepti o n , ” which provides that an exception to th e mandator y - exclusion provision is made if the law enforcement office r was “acting in objecti ve good faith relian ce upon a warrant issued b y a neutral magis trate based on proba ble cause. ” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23(b). The court instructed t he jury as follows: A police officer may, under the l aw, arrest a person if s he has a goo d faith belie f that there is a valid war rant for arrest o f that individual. Befo re you ma y consider the evidence obtained as a result of Dep uty Boone ’ s arrest of PATRI CIA SW ARTZ, you must all agree that the state has p r o ven , beyond a reasonab le doubt, that the officer had a
r easonable b elief tha t there was a va lid warrant for her arr est. If yo u find that fact beyond a reasonable d oubt, the n you may consider all of the e vidence obtained as a result of Deputy Boone ’ s arres t of the Defendant. If y ou do not find that fact be yond a reasonable doubt , th en you will di sregar d all evidence obtained as a result.8 A ppellant objected to the in c lusion of an i nstruction on the good

- fa i th exception a rgu ing it was not raised by the eviden c e

. Because the State ne ve r produced t he a rrest warrant and supporting affidav it demonstrat ing probable cause , appel lant main ta ined there was no warran t that supp o rted her arrest or the in clusion of a “ g ood f aith exception ” instruction

. 2. Applicable law
The Court of Criminal Appeals and t his court ha ve repeatedly c oncluded that i f the Sta t e seeks to justify an a rr est based on an arrest warrant, t h e warrant an d

s uppor t ing probable

- cause affida vit must be pr oduced to the court for ins pection to ensure that th e arrestee ’ s rights have been protected

. Weems v. St ate , 167 S.W.3d 350, 35 6

- 5 7 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [14th Dist.] 2005, p et. ref’d) (citing Miller v. State , 736 S.W. 2 d 643, 648 (Te x
. Crim. App. 1987) ); se e Ether idge v. State , 903 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Te x
. Crim. Ap p. 19 94) , cert. denied , 516 U.S. 920, 116 S. Ct. 314, 133 L.Ed.2d 217 (1995) ; Dorsey v. State , 964 S. W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref ’ d) ; Myles v. St ate , 946 S.W.2d 630, 6 36 (Tex. App.

— Houst on [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) ; Torres v. State , 933 S.W. 2 d 339, 339 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14t h Dist.] 1996, no pet.).
Th e State may be excuse d from producing th e warrant and probable

- c ause affid avit , howe v er , “i f the State in troduces suff icient evidence or testimony to permit the trial cou rt to determine the existence of probable ca use to e ffect t he
arrest. ” Weems , 1 67 S.W.3d at 3 5 6 ; see Dorsey , 964 S. W.2d at 70 3

. This court explained in Dorsey , “ [t] he r u le requiring the State to produce the arrest warrant was originally imposed to protect arrestee ’ s rights by forcing the trial court to inspect d ocuments and determine whether probable cause existed. However, wh ere probable cause is otherwise established t hrough evidence and testimony, th e arrestee ’ s rights are still protected. ” Dorsey , 964 S.W.2d at 70 4 (citations9 omitted). T h is showing may be accomplished i n a variety of ways. Wee ms , 1 67 S.W.3d at 357. R eco nstitu ted do cu me nts , for example, can be suf f

icient to establish prob a ble caus e for a rrest if the in formatio n on which the magistrate relied
to determine there was pr ob able cause was availa ble for review by the trial court. See Myles , 946 S.W.2d at 6 36 ( a lthough origi nal warrant was no longer avai l a ble , officer who completed paperw ork for warrant testified at tr ial as to probable cause alleged in affidavit )

. The validity of an arrest may a lso be sho wn by testimony of the co mpla inant or officer who furnis h ed the bas is for t he pro bable

- cause aff idavi t supporting the arre st warrant. See Do rsey , 964 S.W.2 d at 704 (t es t imony of officer who provided pro bable

- cause affidavit); Torres , 933 S.W. 2 d at 340

- 41 (testimony from complaining w itness and arresting officer sufficient to show probable cause for arres t ) ; see also Garrett v . State , 791 S.W.2d 137 , 141 (Te x. Crim. App. 1990 ) ( holding arrest vali d ba sed on existence of ou tstanding warrant togethe r with testimony of parole work er).
3. Application
The State called David Payne, the manager of the property wh e re the laundromat and coin

- operat ed machine a re located. Payne testified that the laundromat is monitored by sec urity cameras, which he can acc ess remo tel y from his phon e. He said t hat people have “ mes sed with ” the equi pment on th e property. He recalle d a specific incident occurring on July 8 , when people broke into the coin

- operated machine in the laundromat. He ha d a securi ty video recordi ng of that event and reported th e inciden t to the po lice . He al so reported the license plat e of a vehicle he saw on th e property that was associ ated with the break

- in. An

ar rest warrant was issued for appellant for bur glary of a co in

- operated machine

occ urring on July 8

.10 Eleven days later, on July 19, Payne iden tified the same vehicle he recognized from the July 8 break

- in par ked a t the la undrom at. Payne recognized appellant from the July 8 break

- in

. He c alled 9

- 1

- 1 . A record ing of Payne ’ s 9

- 1

- 1 call was admitted into evidence and played fo r the ju ry

. In the re cordi ng, Payne

s tate d that he rec ei ved repor ts f rom residents that the occupants of that car were dealing drugs . He gave the dispatcher a de scriptio n o f the car and it s license plat e number and stated that he reported th e car on J uly 8 in connection wit h the b rea k

in. H e recognized the car ’ s occup ants as the people who broke into the c oin

operated machine. He said he had a video recording of the July 8 incident.

I n response to Payne ’ s July 1 9 9

- 1

- 1 call, Deputy Boone was sent to t he property. Deputy Boone spoke to a resident , who said he was in volved in the prio r police report of Ju ly 8. The residen t told Deputy Boone that there was a video of appellant breaking into the coin

- operated machi n e on the property. Deputy Boone

con fir med that the lic en se pla te number on the car matched the license n umber

a ssociated with the July 8 report . Deputy Boone spoke to appellant, who was sitting in the c ar ’ s passenger seat. Deputy Boone told appellant t hat she was
susp ected of previously atte mpting to rob the co in mac hine

. Appellant denied it. Deputy Boon e condu cted a records check on appel lan t with the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the Te x as Crime Information Center (TCIC) , which r eveal ed two ac tive arrest warrants f or appell ant

— one in Texas and the other in North Carolina. T he Texas warra nt w as f or the allege d burglary of the coin

- ope rated machine at the same laundry facility

. De puty Boone arrested appellant. Du ring a search inci dent to the arrest, Depu ty Boon e f o und the d rugs that le d to t h e charge at issue

. When Deputy Boone arrived at th e p olice s tation, she printed th e w arrant workshe e t as par t o f her arre st do cumentation but nev er actually re v i ewed the original warrant or support ing af fidavits

.11 Beca use t h e State did not produce the actual arr est warrant or a supporting probable

- cause aff idavit, we examine whether sufficient e vidence or testimony permit ted the trial cou rt to determine if probable ca use existed to arres t appellant

. See Weems , 1 67 S.W.3d at 3 5 6 ; Dorsey , 964 S. W.2d at 703

. Prob able cause exists when the facts and circumstan ces are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that, more likely than not, a particular suspect has committed the c rime. See Muniz v. State , 851 S.W.2d 23 8, 251 (Tex. Crim . App. 19 93).
W e conclude that the testimony summarize d above supplied the court with facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that appellant committed the offense of burg lary of a coin

- operated machine o n July 8

. Payne was th e complainant whose July 8 report led to issuance of t he arrest warrant f or appe llant. Payne recognized appell ant ( and the car she occupied ) as a person (and v ehicle) he had previou sly reported as associated with the machine break

- i n, captured on video

. C om parable testimony has been held sufficient to support a conclusion t ha t

an ar rest war rant was supported by probabl e cause when the S t ate had not produced the warrant or a ffidavit

. See, e.g. , Dorsey , 964 S. W.2d at 70 4; Torres , 933 S.W.2 d at 340

- 41 ; see also Ether idge , 903 S.W. 2d at 18

- 19 (testi mony of magistrate and officer)

. We h old, t herefore, that although the State d id not produce the arres t warrant, the trial court could have rea sonably concluded that probabl e cause existed to supp ort app ellant ’ s a rrest

. The court had su fficient facts from which it could reasonably con clu de t hat app ellant ’ s rights were protected. T he challenged jury instruction was not harmful error. W e overrule appellant ’ s first issue.

B
. B est

- Evid e nc e Ob jection

In her second is sue , ap pell ant argues th e trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimo ny from Deputy Boone about the information she rece ived from12 disp atch regardi ng the return of active w arrants for appellant based on a NCIC/TCIC re cords check

. Appellant argue s the best

- evidence r u le app lied and the S tate sho uld have produced the w arrant s

. The bes t

- evidence rule requires that if the contents of a writing are to be proved, it must be by the production, if possible, of the ve ry writing itself. Te x. R. Evid. 1002 ; see Ortiz v. State , 6 5 1 S.W

. 2d 764, 766 (Tex. Cri m. A pp . 1983)

. However , t he b est

- evidence rule is inapplicable here. Deputy Boone ’ s testim ony tha t dispatch advised there were open warrants for appellant ’ s a rre st from Texas and North Caro lina was not of fere d to prove th e conten ts of th e wa rr ants. Rather, Dep uty Boone ’ s testi mony wa s offered to explain her justification for appellan t ’ s arres t and the sequence of events

. Because Deputy Boone was not testifying a s to t he contents of the war rants or any pu blic records, we conclude the be st

- evid e nc e ru l e is inapplicable here. Se e Tex. R. Evid. 1002;

c f. Dansby v. State , 530 S. W.3d 213, 229 (Tex. A pp.

— Tyle r 2017, pet. ref ’ d) (best

- evidence rule did not allow peace o ffice r to testify to content s of v ehic le

re gistration databases ).

In any event, any error in admitting the challenged eviden ce is harmless because , as w e have held, the trial court ha d ad equate opportunity to assess probable cause supporting the arrest war r ant based on other testi mon y and evidence described a bove

. See Gar rett , 791 S.W.2d at 140

. We overrule issu e two

. C. Hear say objection
In issue three , appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by

over ruling h er hearsay objection to Deputy B oone ’ s testimony about the i nformation she rece i ved from disp atch re garding the active warrants for appellant.13 Appellant a rgues t he t ru t h of the report was r elevant to the determination of the
goo d

- faith exception. In r esponse, the State argues that it did not solicit any testimo ny from Deputy Bo one regarding the co ntents of t he w arrant

. The record reflects the follo wing exc hange: Q. ( Counsel fo r the State ) Okay. So did you approach the vehicle and ask what happened? A. Yes. I wanted t heir side, as well. Q. Cou ld you tell me what happened next? A. Whenever I approached, they ha d said that they weren ’ t on the property; bu t the male I talked to e ar l ier said th ere had been video. Q. Okay. A. So at that point, I ran both o f them through TCI C, NCIC. Q. What came back ? A. It showed that he was c lear, as in he had no warrants; and she had two war rants out of Texas and out of Nor th Ca rolina. Q. Were th e y b oth current ly active warrants? A. Yes.

. . . . Counsel for Appe llant : It ’ s hearsay as to wh atever the contents may be

. The Court : Overruled. Hear say is a statement, other than one made by the decl arant while testifying at trial, that is offe red to prov e t h e truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d)

. Hearsay is inadmiss ible unless an exc eption created by statut e or the Texas Rules of Evid ence appl ies

. Tex. R. Evid. 802

. A ppel l ant obje cted that De puty Boone ’ s testimony was h earsay as to the c ontents of t he warra nt. However, De puty Bo one did not t estify as to the contents of the w arrant s , only to
t h e inf ormatio n provided to her regarding their exi stence

. In fact, one o f the ma jor theme s of appella nt ’ s cross
- examination of De p u t y Bo one was that s he did not find14 or r ev i ew the T exas arrest warrant

. Because Deputy Boone ’ s testim ony was no t offered to establish the truth of the contents of th e warr ant s , we overrule issue three

. 2

D. Cum ulative error
In issue four , appellant argues that even if this co ur t conc ludes that each of the alleged errors asserted i n issues one through three were harmless ; taken together, they create d cumulative, r eversi ble er ror. See Estrada v. St ate , 313 S. W.3d 274, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ( quoting Uni ted Sta tes v. Be ll , 367 F.3d 452, 471 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The cumulative error doctrine provides relief only when constitutional errors so ‘fatally infect the trial’ that they vi olated the trial ’ s ‘fundamental fairness.’ ”) ). We need not addres s this issue be cause w e have not con c luded that the trial court committed any error as asserted in appellant ’ s first three issues

. See Chamberlain v . Sta te , 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex . Crim. App. 1999) (“ we are aware of no authority holding that non

- errors may in their cu mulativ e effe ct cause error”). W e over r ule issue four.

2 To t he extent t hat appellant argues on appe al t hat her he arsa y objection was as to the existence of act ive w arrants, that argument wa s not the basis of her objections at trial. Regardles s, the information received by Deputy Boone also constitutes “informa tion acted on ,” a hearsay except ion. See Poinde xte r v. State , 153 S. W.3d 402, 408 n.21 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2005), abrogat ed on other grounds by Robinso n v. State , 466 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 15) ( testimony from police officer generally explaining her behavior and act ions is not hearsa y) ; Schaffer v . Sta te , 777 S.W.2d 111 , 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (pol ice officer sho u ld be allowed some exp lanation of her presence and conduct)

. Although Deputy Boone co uld not testify as the information in the warrant d atabase, she wa s allowed to test ify in ex planat ion of he r arrest of appellant.15 Conclusion
W e affirm the trial court’s judgment

.

__ __ _

_

/s/ Kevin Jewell

_

_

____ _

_

_

__ Kevin Jewell J usti c e

Panel consists o f Justices Jewell , Spain , and Wi lson

. (Spain, J., dissentin g).
Pub lish

— Tex. R . A pp. P. 47.2(b).