Insights on Technology Transfer from the

Bureau of Mines Fred No Kissell

ABSTRACf. The U.S. Bureau of Mines was established in

1910 to reduce .the high accident rate in the nation's coal

mines. For 85 years, it conducted a wide variety of tasks

related to mining before it was abolished in 1995. The BOM

had many technology transfer successes in its lifetime, including more than a dozen "R&D100" awards. This essay identifies and discusses five "transfer factors" that can explain the

success (or failure) of many Bureau of Mines projects. These

five factors are termed "pressure, pitfalls, path, price, and

profit."

technology transfer successes and failures of its

mining research program.

The major technological accomplishments of

the BOM were identified in a report by the

National Research Council (NRC, 1990). Starting

in 1970, these were: (1) more complete coalbed

extraction technologies, (2) coal mine illumination, (3) methane drainage, (4) self-contained

self-rescuers, and (5) respirable dust control. I

examined the characteristics of these five accomplishments along with several dozen other technology transfer successes to generalize about key

"transfer factors"-those factors that influenced

the technology transfer success of specific projects.

The Bureau of Mines (BOM), a federal government agency, was established in 1910 to reduce

the high accident rate in the nation's coal mines.

The BOM conducted a wide variety of tasks related to mining for 85 years. Although abolished

in 1995, the BOM had considerable success with

technology transfer during its lifetime. For example, in recent years the Pittsburgh Laboratory

alone won 14 Research&Development"R&D100"

awards and 6 Pollution Engineering "PE 5STAR"

awards. Given the size of the Pittsburgh lab budget, this record is as good as the best research

laboratories in the nation. Over the 85-year lifetime of the BOM, the mining accident rate significantly improved, progress that no doubt contributed to the unfortunate demise of the organization. However there are few events entirely

devoid of opportunity, and the demise of the

BOM presents the chance for a frank and open

review of those factors that contributed to the

1. Transfer factors

An analysis of BOM projects reveals five factors

that create both opportunities and barriers to

successful technology transfer. These transfer factors are:

.Pressure-financial or legal pressure from external sources.

.Pitfalls-problems that seem obvious in hindsight.

.Path-the length of the path necessary to

transfer the technology.

.Price-the cost of the technology-

.Profit-how much the user can profit by using

the technology.

Each of these is discussed in more detail below.

Pressure.- External pressure was the first factor that influenced whether project results were

used by the mining industry. This pressure came

from many different sources, the most effective

N10SH Pittsburgh Laboratory

Cochrans Mill Road

Pittsburgh, PA 15236

E-mail: fak8@cdc.gov
When the result of research is a technique and

not a product, the chance of technology transfer

success was always higher for BOM projects because the path was shorter. For example, two of

the five major accomplishments listed by the NRC

were methane drainage and respirable dust control. Both were techniques. In the case of methane

drainage, if a mine operator wished to drain

methane from his coalbed, he only needed to hire

a driller. That driller followed a procedure that

started in BOM research-where to drill the hole,

what diameter, how deep, how to case it, what

fracture treatments were necessary, and so on. In

respirable dust control, the research was directed

toward simple techniques that mines could carry

out themselves.

Other BOM technology transfer successes involving techniques included engineering tools

{such as expert systems or ventilation software), a

coal mine roof rating system, a test procedure to

measure the gas in coal, criteria for evaluation of

explosion-proof seals, strategies for deployment

of carbon monoxide sensors, and a new conveyor

belt flammability test.

This success with techniques can be contrasted

with the success the BOM had in developing

instrumentation products. In the 1970's, the BOM

funded a contract to develop a dust monitor based

on forward light scattering. The result was GCA

Corporation's RAM-I monitor, a commercially

successful product. However, there have been

many that were not so successful-a diesel-discriminating fire smoke detector, a very novel carbon monoxide detector, and a remote methane

sensor. The BOM even had its own rock dust

meter that did not use radiation but still was not

used.

This lack of success with instrumentation occurred for several reasons. One was a perceived

lack of a market in the eyes of prospective manufacturers. Equipment purchases in a commoditybased industry like coal are often made to lower

the overall cost of doing business; for example, a

health and safety product purchase should result

in lower health and safety costs. In the eyes of

prospective manufacturers, many BOM instrumentation products simply did not meet this market test. Other important factors for prospective

being financial or legal. Two of the five accomplishments from the NRC report were coal mine

illumination and self-contained self-rescuers. Both

were required by coal mine health and safety

legislation. (In a heavily regulated industry like

mining, some impact of government regulations is

never far away.)

Mine air monitoring systems developed by the

BOM provide another example of how external

pressure can promote technology transfer. These

are electronic systems that monitor the quantity

and quality of ventilation air. Since mine safety

laws allow the use of substitute technologies that

improve safety, mine operators used monitoring

systems to gain relief from manpower-intensive

activities such as checking for explosive gas.

Pitfalls.- The second transfer factor is the

need to avoid pitfalls that come from not doing

the necessary homework. For example, a mining

research organization in Europe recently developed a rock dust meter that gives the percentage

of rock in the dust lying on the coal mine floor.

This percentage is important to know because it

changes the explosivity of the dust. Unfortunately, this rock dust meter contained a radiation

source. Because of regulations on radiation, it

meant that every coal mine wishing to use the

meter had to hire a new person responsible for

radiation safety. You can imagine what happened.

Relatedly, some BOM projects did not consider

infrastructure needs. For example, in the 1970s

BOM developed underground communications

systems two or three generations beyond those in

use, and for which most mines had no infrastructure to service and maintain. Failure to consider

such technology transfer pitfalls was a major barrier to the implementation of many research projects.

Path Length.-Path length is the third key

factor that can affect technology success. This

factor represents the length of the path necessary

to transfer the technology. The two basic paths

are those that lead to a technique and those that

lead to a product. The rock dust meter and mine

communications systems were products. These innovations required a longer path-involving the

participation of an intermediate party, a manufacturer-between the government and the user.
comes from coalbeds. That is a major technology

transfer success.

Much less successful was the BOM effort to

build a hydrogen-powered shuttle car. A shuttle

car is a truck-like vehicle that carries coal from

the mining machine to the conveyor belt system.

Most shuttle cars are powered by electric motors

-perhaps 10 percent are diesel-powered. The

diesels emit soot that could be a health hazard

but there were no regulations limiting soot.

Adoption by the industry would have required the

manufacture and sale of an expensive product

without any clear productivity benefits. There was

no infrastructure for the distribution of large

quantities of hydrogen, let alone transporting it

down a mine shaft several miles to where the

shuttle cars operate. While the emissions from a

hydrogen-fueled engine are harmless, there were

many safety concerns about the storage and handling of hydrogen. In summary, there was no

pressure to use a hydrogen-powered shuttle car.

It was a $250,000 product loaded with pitfalls and

offering no productivity increases.

2. Conclusions

manufacturers were the size of the investment

required and a perceived lack of adequate protection from patents and exclusive licenses.

Price.-Price was the fourth factor that influenced whether a BOM technology got used. In

the BOM dust control program where I worked,

price was the major factor. There was external

pressure from government regulations, and most

dust control developments were techniques rather

than products. With those two considerations

aside, what was adopted by industry depended on

the cost. This included purchase and operating

costs. For example, we had no success with high

pressure (1000 psi) water sprays as a technique

for dust control. Our research showed that high

pressure sprays lowered dust by 40 percent. However, the downside was a $150,000 price tag, some

operating problems, and a possible safety hazard

from high pressure hoses.

Protit.-The cost issue has another side that

represents the fifth transfer factor-profit. If the

BOM devised a safety product or technique that

was likely to raise productivity and increase profits, then the likelihood of implementation went

way up. For example, in the 1970s the BOM

developed a dust scrubber for continuous mining

machines. This device lowered the amount of dust

produced by the machine by 90 percent or more.

Although it found some use, widespread application lagged for a decade until mine operators

discovered that a dust scrubber permitted changes

in the mining cycle that yielded a 5-10 percent

gain in productivity. Today, most continuous mining machines have a dust scrubber.

It is instructive to examine two projects that

represent the opposite ends of the success spectrum. One of the most successful BOM research

projects was methane drainage; that is, the removal of methane gas from coalbeds before it

escapes into the mine air. The National Research

Council cited its success. Mining engineers from

other countries laud it. The transfer factors were

positive. For example, there was pressure to degas

coalbeds because methane gas in many deep

mines was creating an explosion hazard. The research resulted in techniques rather than products. Finally, tapping this source and selling the

gas offered the chance of profit. Today, 5 percent

of natural gas production in the United States

These experiences of the BOM are not particularly novel. Twenty years ago, A.D. Little conducted a study of six prominent federal programs

of the early 1970s-nuclear power, coal combustion, motor vehicle safety, urban mass transportation, soy protein, and biological pesticides. Four

of the six were rated poorly, but the study report

did point out that successful commercialization of

federally funded-R&D is nearly always accompanied by public policy measures that cause or

stimulate market demand.

However, the experience of the Bureau of

Mines illustrates that these market demand forces,

expressed more specifically as transfer factors,

operate even at a small project level scale. In

hindsight, when transfer factors are considered, it

is not difficult to see why the winning projects

won and the losing projects lost. Researchers who

consider pressure, pitfalls, path, price, and profit

in selecting their project work enjoy a more successful career than those who do not.
Acknowledgements

This analysis would have not been possible without the cooperation and insight of John Murphy,

Gerry Finfinger, Pawel Krystolic, George Bockosh, Prescott Greene, Bob Jankowski, Mike

Sapko, and Jay Colinet.

References

National Research Council, 1990, Competitiveness of the U.S.

Minerals and Metals Industry, Washington, DC: National

Academy Press.

Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1976, 'Federal Funding of Civilian

R&D', NBS-GCR-ETIP 76-03, Experimental Technology

Incentives Program, Washington, DC: National Bureau of

Standards.