Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 29, 2005 / Notices 71491 

NNSA should prepare an EIS for the 

operation of the BSL–3 Facility. For 

these reasons, NNSA has decided to 

prepare a separate EIS for operation of 

the BSL–3 Facility. The SWEIS will 

evaluate all activities at LANL and will 

incorporate the results of related 

environmental impact analyses from 

other NEPA documents. The impacts 

identified in other NEPA documents 

will be combined with impact analyses 

performed specifically for the SWEIS. 

The impacts of the alternative selected 

by any decision regarding operation of 

the BSL–3 Facility would be included in 

the analysis of cumulative impacts 

prepared for the SWEIS. 

The facility is a single-story, 3,200- 

square foot stucco building with a metal 

roof, housing a BSL–2 laboratory and 

two BSL–3 laboratories. Biosafety Level 

2 is suitable for work involving agents 

of moderate potential hazard to 

personnel and the environment. 

BSL Level 3 is required for clinical, 

diagnostic, teaching, research, or 

production facilities in which work is 

done with indigenous or exotic agents 

that may cause serious or potentially 

lethal disease as a result of exposure by 

inhalation. Laboratory personnel have 

specific training in handling pathogenic 

and potentially lethal agents, and are 

supervised by competent scientists who 

are experienced in working with these 

agents. 

The facility is located on a site 

adjacent to Sigma Road and the paved 

parking area southwest of the Sigma 

Building north of the intersection of 

Pajarito Road and Diamond Drive. No 

operations of any type have been 

conducted in the facility. 

Issues to be analyzed in the EIS 

include: Additional seismic analysis; 

safety of laboratory operations; public 

health and safety; handling, collection, 

treatment, and disposal of research 

wastes; other risks; pollution 

prevention; and potential impacts on air 

quality, biological resources, cultural 

resources, water resources, land use, 

and socioeconomic resources. The EIS 

will evaluate several alternatives: a 

‘‘Proposed Action Alternative’’

analyzing operation of the BSL–3 

Facility at LANL at the level permitted 

by CDC guidelines for a BSL–3 Facility; 

a ‘‘BSL–2 Alternative’’ analyzing 

operation of the facility at the level 

permitted for a BSL–2 Facility; and a 

‘‘No-Action Alternative,’’ under which 

the constructed facility would not be 

operated. Additional alternatives, 

including potential facility 

modifications, may be identified during 

the scoping process. 

Public Scoping Process: The scoping 

process is an opportunity for the public 

to assist NNSA in determining, among 

other things, reasonable alternatives and 

issues for analysis. The purpose of the 

scoping meetings is to receive oral and 

written comments from the public. The 

meetings will use a format to facilitate 

dialogue between NNSA and the public. 

NNSA welcomes specific comments or 

suggestions on the content of these 

alternatives, or on other alternatives that 

the public wishes NNSA to consider. 

The list of issues discussed above for 

consideration in the BSL–3 Facility EIS 

is tentative and intended to facilitate 

public comment on the scope of this 

EIS. It is not intended to be allinclusive, nor does it imply any 

predetermination of potential impacts. 

The BSL–3 Facility EIS will analyze and 

describe the potential environmental 

impacts of the alternatives, using 

available data where possible and 

obtaining additional data where 

necessary. NNSA has invited the 

Department of Homeland Security to 

participate as a cooperating agency in 

the preparation of this EIS. 

Copies of written comments and 

transcripts of oral comments will be 

made available at the following 

locations: the Los Alamos Outreach 

Center, 1350 Central Avenue, Suite 101, 

Los Alamos, New Mexico, 87544; and 

the Zimmerman Library, University of 

New Mexico, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, 87131. 

EIS Preparation Process: The process 

for preparing the BSL–3 Facility EIS 

begins with the publication of this 

Notice of Intent in the Federal Register. 

After the close of the public scoping 

comment period, NNSA will begin 

preparing the draft EIS. NNSA expects 

to issue a draft BSL–3 EIS for public 

review in the spring of 2006. Public 

comments on the draft will be accepted 

during a comment period of at least 45 

days following publication of the Notice 

of Availability, by the United States 

Environmental Protection Agency. The 

Notice of Availability published in the 

Federal Register will provide the 

deadline for comments on the draft 

document. Other notices placed in local 

newspapers also identify dates and 

locations for public hearings on the 

draft BSL–3 Facility EIS. Issuance of the 

final BSL–3 Facility EIS is scheduled for 

late 2006. 

Issued in Washington, DC, this 22 day of 

November, 2005. 

Linton F. Brooks, 

Administrator, National Nuclear Security 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. 05–23455 Filed 11–28–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

National Nuclear Security 

Administration 

Record of Decision: Final Site-wide 

Environmental Impact Statement for 

Continued Operation of Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory and 

Supplemental Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Programmatic 

Environmental Impact Statement 

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security 

Administration, Department of Energy. 

ACTION: Record of decision. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of 

Energy (DOE), National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA), is 

issuing this Record of Decision (ROD) 

regarding its plan for continued 

operation of the Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory located 

approximately 40 miles east of San 

Francisco in Alameda and San Joaquin 

Counties; and for use of plutonium, 

other fissile materials, fissionable 

materials and lithium hydride in 

experiments to be conducted at the 

National Ignition Facility (NIF). In 

making its decisions NNSA considered 

the ‘‘Final Site-wide Environmental 

Impact Statement for Continued 

Operation of Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (DOE/EIS–0348) 

and Supplemental Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management 

Programmatic Environmental Impact 

Statement (DOE/EIS–0236-S3) (LLNL 

SW/SPEIS)’’ and other information, 

including programmatic mission needs 

and cost. NNSA has decided to 

implement the Proposed Action 

Alternative as described in the LLNL 

SW/SPEIS with the exception of the 

Energetic Materials Processing Center 

Replacement and High Explosives 

Development Center Project. This 

alternative includes the continued 

operation of LLNL; an increase in 

administrative and material-at-risk 

limits for plutonium and tritium; and 

the use of plutonium, other fissile 

materials, fissionable materials, and 

lithium hydride in experiments 

conducted at the NIF. NNSA’s 

implementation of the individual 

components of the Proposed Action 

Alternative during the next decade is 

subject to its continuing assessment of 

its mission needs and of LLNL’s role in 

meeting those needs. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

further information on the LLNL SW/ 

SPEIS or the ROD, or to receive a copy 

of the LLNL SW/SPEIS or ROD, contact: 

Thomas Grim, Document Manager, U.S. 

Department of Energy, Livermore Site 

71492 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 29, 2005 / Notices 

Office NNSA, 7000 East Avenue, 

Livermore, CA 94550–9234, (925) 422–

0704. 

For information on the DOE National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 

process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, 

Director, Office of NEPA Policy and 

Compliance (EH–42), U.S. Department 

of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, 

SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586–

4600, or leave a message at (800) 472–

2756. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

NNSA prepared this ROD pursuant to 

the regulations of the Council on 

Environmental Quality (CEQ) for 

implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 

1500–1508) and DOE’s NEPA 

Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 

1021). In making its decisions NNSA 

considered the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS 

dated March 2005 and other 

information, including programmatic 

mission needs and cost. 

LLNL consists of two sites: an 821- 

acre site in Livermore, California 

(Livermore Site), and a 7,000-acre 

experimental test site near Tracy, 

California (Site 300). Most LLNL 

operations are located at the Livermore 

Site, which is situated about 40 miles 

east of San Francisco in southeastern 

Alameda County. Site 300 is primarily 

a test site for explosives and nonnuclear weapons components; it is 

located about 15 miles southeast of 

Livermore in the hills of the Diablo 

Range. Most of Site 300 is located in San 

Joaquin County; the western edge of the 

site is in Alameda County. 

The continued operation of LLNL is 

critical to NNSA’s Stockpile 

Stewardship Program and to preventing 

the spread and use of nuclear weapons 

worldwide. LLNL maintains core 

competencies in activities associated 

with research, development, design, and 

surveillance of nuclear weapons, and 

with the assessment and certification of 

their safety and reliability. In response 

to the end of the Cold War and changes 

in the world’s political regimes, the 

emphasis of the United States’ nuclear 

weapons program has shifted from 

developing and producing new weapons 

designs to dismantling obsolete 

weapons and sustaining a smaller 

weapons stockpile. Programs at LLNL 

support a number of DOE and NNSA 

missions. These missions include 

nuclear weapons stewardship, 

nonproliferation, preventing the spread 

of weapons of mass destruction, energy 

security and meeting long-term energy 

needs, environmental assessment and 

management, bioscience, fundamental 

sciences, and developing applications 

for new technology. LLNL also supports 

other Federal agencies such as the 

Department of Defense, the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC), the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA), and the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

The LLNL SW/SPEIS evaluates the 

use of plutonium, other fissile materials, 

fissionable materials, and lithium 

hydride in experiments at the NIF and 

updates the analysis of the 

environmental impacts of operation of 

the NIF as described in the Final 

Programmatic Environmental Impact 

Statement for Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management (SSM PEIS) (DOE/EIS–

0236). 

NNSA expects to continue its support 

of new projects and facilities at LLNL 

subject to its continuing assessment of 

its mission and LLNL’s role in that 

mission. Any new projects or facilities 

would be considered in programmatic 

or project-specific NEPA reviews as 

appropriate. Subsequent NEPA reviews 

for projects or activities at LLNL would 

make reference to, and be based on, the 

LLNL SW/SPEIS. 

Alternatives Considered 

The alternatives evaluated in the 

Final LLNL SW/SPEIS represent a range 

of operation from minimum levels that 

maintain core capabilities (Reduced 

Operation Alternative) to the highest 

reasonable activity levels that could be 

supported by current facilities, as well 

as the expansion and construction of 

new facilities for specifically identified 

future actions (Proposed Action). The 

No Action Alternative would continue 

operation of current LLNL programs in 

support of assigned missions, and 

includes approved interim actions and 

facility construction, expansion or 

modification, and decontamination and 

decommissioning for which NEPA 

analysis and documentation already 

exist. The Proposed Action includes 

operations evaluated in the No Action 

Alternative as well as construction of 

new facilities and expanded operations 

in support of future NNSA mission 

requirements. The Reduced Operation 

Alternative represents a 30 percent 

reduction of the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program as analyzed in the No Action 

Alternative. The Reduced Operation 

Alternative maintains full operational 

readiness for NNSA facilities and 

operations, but does not include the 

level of operation needed to perform 

tasks assigned to the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program at LLNL. NNSA 

identified the Proposed Action as the 

preferred alternative in the Final LLNL 

SW/SPEIS. A discussion of the 

alternatives is provided in the following 

sections. 

No Action Alternative 

The No Action Alternative was 

analyzed as required by CEQ’s NEPA 

implementing regulations (40 CFR Parts 

1500–1508) to provide a baseline against 

which the impacts of the Proposed 

Action and Reduced Operation 

Alternatives could be compared. Under 

the No Action Alternative, LLNL would 

continue to support major DOE and 

NNSA programs such as defense 

programs, environmental management, 

nuclear nonproliferation, and energy 

research. The No Action Alternative 

represents the level of operations that 

would occur in the absence of new 

decisions regarding activities at LLNL. 

The changes in facilities and operations, 

including those that are currently under 

construction or planned in the near 

future, are completion of NIF; the 

BioSafety Level 3 Facility; the Terascale 

Simulation Facility; the Container 

Security Testing Facility; facility 

modifications, upgrades and 

decontamination and decommissioning; 

and full implementation of Stockpile 

Stewardship Programs in the LLNL 

Plutonium and Tritium facilities. 

As noted in the Final LLNL SW/ 

SPEIS, NNSA decided to remove the 

Advanced Materials Program from this 

and other alternatives in response to 

public comments and a reassessment of 

program needs. 

Proposed Action Alternative 

The Proposed Action would result in 

an increase in LLNL operations to 

support reasonably foreseeable mission 

requirements. This includes the 

expansion or modification of current 

facilities and construction of new 

facilities, as well as those projects, 

activities, and facilities described in the 

No Action Alternative. The proposed 

changes in facilities and operations are: 

(1) Conduct experiments at the NIF 

using plutonium, other fissile materials 

(such as uranium 235), fissionable 

materials (such as thorium 232), and 

lithium hydride. 

(2) Construct and operate a neutron 

spectrometer as part of the NIF core 

facility diagnostics capability. 

(3) Increase the administrative limit 

for plutonium to 1,400 kilograms from 

the existing 700 kilograms. The limit for 

enriched uranium would remain 

unchanged at 500 kilograms. 

(4) Increase the plutonium materialat-risk limit from 20 to 40 kilograms of 

fuel-grade equivalent plutonium in each 

of two rooms of the Plutonium Facility. 

(5) Increase the Tritium Facility 

administrative limit for tritium from 30 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 29, 2005 / Notices 71493 

to 35 grams and the material-at-risk at 

a single workstation from 3.5 to 30 

grams. 

(6) Upgrade existing materials 

fabrication, characterization, and testing 

facilities supporting NNSA’s national 

security mission as part of the Materials 

Science Modernization Project. 

(7) Perform research and development 

activities on a variety of biodetector 

technologies in the Physics Facility and 

the Microfabrication Laboratory at the 

Livermore Site as part of the Chemical 

and Biological Nonproliferation 

Program Expansion. 

(8) Install and operate a petawatt laser 

prototype in the Inertial Confinement 

Fusion Laser Facility. 

(9) Physically consolidate security 

services to improve functionality, 

efficiency, and effectiveness of security 

operations as part of the Consolidated 

Security Facility. 

(10) Change waste management 

activities to accommodate increased 

waste generation and improve overall 

operational methods. 

(11) Accept 5 drums of mixed 

transuranic waste from the Lawrence 

Berkeley National Laboratory. 

(12) Upgrade LLNL facilities to meet 

current seismic and utilities standards, 

and decontaminate and decommission 

other facilities at LLNL. 

(13) Increase the highly enriched 

uranium administrative limit for the 

Radiography Facility from 25 to 50 

kilograms to support Stockpile 

Stewardship Program activities. 

As noted in the Final SW/SPEIS, 

NNSA decided to remove the Integrated 

Technology Program from this 

alternative in response to public 

comments and a reassessment of 

program need. 

Reduced Operation Alternative 

The Reduced Operation Alternative 

includes reductions in LLNL operations 

supporting the NNSA Stockpile 

Stewardship Program. This alternative 

represents a 30 percent reduction in 

operations for the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program as compared to 

the No Action Alternative. Under this 

alternative, NNSA would maintain full 

operational readiness of NNSA facilities 

and operations, but would not conduct 

operations at the level needed to fulfill 

all of the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program tasks assigned to LLNL. 

However, LLNL operations would not 

be reduced beyond those required to 

maintain safety and security activities, 

such as managing nuclear materials, 

explosives, and other hazardous 

materials safely. 

This alternative considers and 

analyzes reasonable proposals for the 

reduction or cessation of specific 

operations to reduce potential adverse 

impacts. For this LLNL SW/SPEIS, 

NNSA did not analyze in detail the 

complete closure, decontamination, and 

decommissioning of the Livermore Site 

or Site 300 because the continued 

operation of these sites is critical to 

NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program 

and to prevention of the spread and use 

of nuclear weapons. Reductions include 

a decrease in the annual yield from NIF 

ignition experiments, fabrication of 50 

percent fewer engineering 

demonstration units during pit 

surveillance activities, and fabrication 

of nearly 50 percent fewer subcritical 

assemblies. Other reductions include 

operation of the Terascale Simulation 

Facility computer at 60 percent capacity 

and conducting fewer experiments 

using tritium at Site 300. 

Preferred Alternative 

The preferred alternative is the 

alternative that NNSA believes would 

fulfill its statutory missions and 

responsibilities giving consideration to 

economic, budget, environmental, 

schedule, technical and other factors. In 

the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS, NNSA 

identified the Proposed Action as the 

preferred alternative for continued 

operations of LLNL. 

Environmentally Preferable Alternative 

After considering impacts to each 

resource area by alternative, NNSA has 

identified the Reduced Operation 

Alternative as the environmentally 

preferable alternative, which is the 

alternative with the lowest level of 

operations. The Reduced Operations 

Alternative has lower socioeconomic 

impacts because of the reduced number 

of workers, reduced hazardous and 

radioactive waste, and reduced 

radiological exposure to workers and 

the public. 

Environmental Impacts of the 

Alternatives 

The following section compares the 

potential impacts to environmental 

resources associated with the continued 

operation of LLNL under the No Action 

Alternative, the Proposed Action, and 

the Reduced Operation Alternative. The 

resource areas discussed below are 

listed in two sections: those with 

potentially major environmental 

impacts and those with minor impacts. 

Resource Areas With Major 

Environmental Impacts 

The major impacts occur in three 

areas; materials and waste management, 

human health and safety, and 

radiological accidents. 

Materials and Waste Management 

Waste generation for both routine and 

nonroutine wastes would be higher 

under the Proposed Action than under 

the No Action Alternative or Reduced 

Operation Alternative. 

Differences in the amount of waste 

generated include routine low-level 

waste, which would increase from 170 

cubic meters per year under current 

(2002) conditions to 200 cubic meters 

per year under the No Action 

Alternative. It would increase to 330 

cubic meters per year under the 

Proposed Action Alternative, primarily 

due to differences in the operation of 

the NIF, and increase slightly to 180 

cubic meters per year under the 

Reduced Operation Alternative. Routine 

transuranic waste would increase from 

35 cubic meters per year to 50 cubic 

meters per year under the No Action 

Alternative and the Proposed Action, 

and increase to 45 cubic meters per year 

under the Reduced Operation 

Alternative. 

Differences in nonroutine waste 

generation cover all major waste 

categories across the alternatives, with 

the highest waste generation under the 

Proposed Action and lowest under the 

Reduced Operation Alternative. Levels 

of waste generation are within the 

capacities for treatment, transportation, 

or storage either onsite or at waste 

repositories such as the Waste Isolation 

Pilot Plant (WIPP). In addition, LLNL is 

implementing cost effective pollution 

prevention techniques to reduce waste 

generation. 

Human Health and Safety 

Under the No Action Alternative, the 

occupational (involved) worker ionizing 

radiation dose would increase from 28 

person-rem per year to 89 person-rem 

per year due to the increase in 

operations. These operations include 

increases in NIF and stockpile 

stewardship activities and the packaging 

of excess plutonium in the Plutonium 

Facility. The dose under the Proposed 

Action Alternative would increase to 93 

person-rem per year, mostly from the 

use of proposed materials in 

experiments at the NIF. Under the 

Reduced Operation Alternative, worker 

dose would increase to 38 person-rem 

per year. Latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) 

calculated from these exposures would 

be 5.3 × 10¥2, 5.6 × 10¥2, and 2.3 × 

10¥2 per year of exposure under the No 

Action Alternative, Proposed Action, 

and Reduced Operation Alternative, 

respectively. Worker exposure will be 

maintained as low as reasonably 

achievable. 

71494 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 29, 2005 / Notices 

The ionizing radiation dose to the 

general public under all three 

alternatives would increase from 0.5 

person-rem per year to 1.8 person-rem 

per year at the Livermore Site, and 

would increase from 2.5 person-rem per 

year to 9.8 person-rem per year at Site 

300. The corresponding LCFs for all 

three alternatives would be 1.1 × 10¥3

at the Livermore site, and 5.9 × 10¥3 at 

Site 300. The projected dose at both 

sites is within the ranges of doses 

observed within the past 5 years. 

The maximally exposed individual 

(MEI) dose at the Livermore Site from 

ionizing radiation would increase from 

0.023 millirem per year (which yields 

1.4 × 10¥8 LCFs) to 0.30 millirem per 

year (which yields 1.8 × 10¥7 LCFs) 

under the No Action Alternative. The 

MEI dose for the Proposed Action and 

the Reduced Operations Alternatives 

would be 0.33 millirem per year (which 

yields 2.0 × 10¥7 LCFs) and 0.22 

millirem per year (which yields 1.3 × 

10¥7 LCFs) respectively. The MEI dose 

at the Site 300 from ionizing radiation 

would increase from 0.021 millirem per 

year (which yields 1.3 × 10¥8 LCFs), to 

0.055 millirem per year (which yields 

3.3 × 10¥8 LCFs) for the No Action and 

the Proposed Action Alternatives. The 

dose under the Reduced Operations 

Alternative would be 0.054 millirem per 

year (which yields 3.3 × 10¥8 LCFs). 

Accidents 

The LLNL SW/SPEIS analyzed 

potential accidents at all major facilities. 

Potential LCFs in the offsite population 

for median meteorological conditions 

were used to identify bounding 

radiological accidents for nuclear 

material handling and waste 

management operations. 

In making thee decisions announced 

in this ROD, NNSA considered the 

accidents analyzed in the Final LLNL 

SW/SPEIS and reviewed the data and 

methodology used to identify bounding 

site accidents. This review found that 

all bounding site accidents were 

accurately identified; however, minor 

discrepancies were found in a few 

analyses of non-bounding site scenarios. 

Information concerning these 

discrepancies is available from Thomas 

Grim, the NNSA Document Manager for 

the LLNL SW/SPEIS, at the address and 

phone number included at the 

beginning of this ROD. These 

discrepancies are negligible and the 

LLNL SW/SPEIS adequately evaluates 

the potential impacts of the alternatives. 

The bounding radiological accident 

for nuclear material handling under the 

Proposed Action is a fire involving 

radioactive material in the Plutonium 

Facility in which emissions are released 

without high-efficiency particulate air 

filtration. Such an accident would result 

in 0.112 LCFs in the offsite population. 

The exposure to noninvolved workers 

would result in 0.372 LCFs from this 

accident. The calculated annual 

frequency for this accident is 3.9 × 10¥7, 

which is less frequent than once in a 

million years. Under the No Action and 

the Reduced Operation Alternatives, the 

bounding accident for nuclear material 

handling in the Plutonium Facility is a 

small aircraft crashing into the building, 

which would result in 0.058 LCFs in the 

offsite population, and with a 

probability of 6.1 × 10¥7 per year, 

which is also less than once in a million 

years. 

The bounding radiological accident 

for waste management operations is a 

small aircraft crashing into the 

Radiological and Hazardous Waste 

Storage Facility, which would result in 

1.21 LCFs in the offsite population 

under the Proposed Action. The 

exposure to noninvolved workers from 

such an accident would result in 0.055 

LCFs. The estimate of LCFs for the same 

accident under the No Action and the 

Reduced Operation Alternatives is 0.397 

LCF. The calculated annual frequency of 

an aircraft crashing into the building 

with subsequent gasoline pool fire is 6.1 

× 10¥7, which is less frequent than once 

in a million years. The aircraft accident 

scenario evaluated at the Radiological 

and Hazardous Waste Storage Facility is 

very conservative in that it assumes the 

facility is loaded to its physical limit 

with containers of transuranic waste, 

each container holding its maximum 

allowable curie limit. Therefore, the 

consequences discussed above are 

calculated using what would be 

considered the maximum allowable 

inventory in the Radiological and 

Hazardous Waste Storage Facility under 

the facility’s operational procedures. It 

is unlikely that the facility would ever 

contain this large of an inventory. 

Bounding accident scenarios for 

chemical, explosive, and biological 

accidents are the same among all three 

alternatives and are unlikely to result in 

fatalities to the general public or 

workers except for the bounding 

explosives accident, which could result 

in 20 worker fatalities. 

Resource Areas With Minor 

Environmental Impacts 

The following resource areas have 

some small environmental impact 

differences among the alternatives or are 

of a particular concern to the public 

based on comments. 

Socioeconomic Characteristics and 

Environmental Justice 

The socioeconomic impacts from 

continued operations at LLNL would 

vary under the three alternatives, and 

would primarily affect Alameda and 

San Joaquin counties. For the No Action 

Alternative, LLNL employment would 

increase by 300 workers to 10,650 at the 

Livermore Site and increase by 10 

workers to 250 at Site 300 compared to 

the 2002 employment levels. For the 

Proposed Action, the worker population 

would increase, over the No Action 

Alternative, by 500 workers to 11,150 at 

the Livermore Site and would remain at 

250 workers at Site 300. For the 

Reduced Operation Alternative, worker 

population would decrease from the No 

Action Alternative by 880 workers to 

9,770 at the Livermore Site and decrease 

by 20 workers to 230 at Site 300. The 

number of housing units affected would 

be proportional to the changes in worker 

population in both counties. 

Community Services 

The only notable impact for 

community services would be the 

generation and disposal of 

nonhazardous solid waste. For the No 

Action Alternative, it is estimated that 

4,600 metric tons per year of 

nonhazardous solid waste would be 

generated at the Livermore Site. Under 

the Proposed Action, the Livermore Site 

would generate 4,900 metric tons per 

year of nonhazardous solid waste. 

Under the Reduced Operation 

Alternative, nonhazardous solid waste 

generation at the Livermore Site would 

be reduced to 4,200 metric tons per 

year. Nonhazardous waste generation at 

Site 300 would be 208 metric tons per 

year under both the No Action and 

Proposed Action alternatives and 

reduced to 191 metric tons per year for 

the Reduced Operation Alternative. The 

local Altamont Landfill is estimated to 

have sufficient capacity to receive waste 

until the year 2038. The current total 

daily permitted throughput is 11,150 

tons per day. 

Aesthetics and Scenic Resources 

Changes to the offsite views of the 

Livermore Site would be similar under 

all alternatives. At Site 300, the 

Proposed Action would have little or no 

impact on aesthetics and scenic 

resources. The existing character of 

LLNL would not change at either site 

under any of the alternatives. 

Biological Resources 

NNSA completed a biological 

assessment (included as Appendix E of 

the LLNL SW/SPEIS) and has requested 

formal consultation with the U.S. Fish 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 29, 2005 / Notices 71495 

and Wildlife Service pursuant to 

Section 7 of the Endangered Species 

Act. NNSA will implement any new or 

additional mitigation measures, and will 

carefully consider implementation of 

conservation recommendations 

contained in the Fish and Wildlife 

Service’s Biological Opinion when it is 

issued. 

The effects of the Proposed Action at 

the Livermore Site were considered on 

the California red-legged frog, a 

federally listed threatened species. The 

biological assessment concludes that 

construction related projects, facility 

maintenance, landscaping, grounds 

maintenance, herbicide application, and 

vehicular traffic may affect, but are not 

likely to adversely affect, this species. 

The frogs may be adversely affected 

during the Arroyo Las Positas 

Maintenance Project; however, the 

overall Proposed Action would have a 

near-term positive effect on the frog 

population and habitat. The demolition 

of facilities at the Livermore Site would 

result in a long-term indirect benefit to 

the California red-legged frog. 

Although six federally listed 

threatened or endangered species occur 

or potentially occur at Site 300, based 

on habitat assessments, field studies, 

and distribution data, the California redlegged frog, Alameda whipsnake, and 

California tiger salamander were 

identified in the biological assessment 

as either having the potential to occur 

or as occurring at the project areas at 

Site 300 that would be affected by the 

Proposed Action. These areas include 

formerly designated critical habitat for 

the Alameda whipsnake and proposed 

critical habitat for the California redlegged frog. Appendix E concludes that 

the Proposed Action may affect, but is 

not likely to adversely affect, the 

California red-legged frog, Alameda 

whipsnake, and California tiger 

salamander. 

Radiological Air Quality 

There are differences among the 

alternatives regarding the potential 

radiological air quality impacts, all of 

which would be low both in relative 

and absolute terms. Once the NIF is 

operating, the MEI would be located due 

east of the NIF. The MEI doses for the 

Livermore Site would be 0.1, 0.13, and 

0.09 millirem per year under the No 

Action, Proposed Action, and Reduced 

Operation Alternative, respectively. 

These doses are approximately two 

orders of magnitude below the EPA 

standard (40 CFR part 61.92), which 

requires that the maximally exposed 

member of the public not receive a dose 

exceeding 10 millirem per year. The 

population dose for the Livermore Site 

would be 1.8 person-rem per year under 

all three alternatives. At Site 300, the 

MEI would be west-southwest of Firing 

Table 851, the only outdoor firing 

facility that would use tritium. The MEI 

dose at Site 300 would be 0.055 

millirem per year under the No Action 

Alternative and the Proposed Action, 

and 0.054 under the Reduced Operation 

Alternative, which are over two orders 

of magnitude under the EPA standard. 

The population dose for Site 300 would 

be 9.8 person-rem per year under all 

three alternatives. The potential impacts 

of these exposures are included in the 

results discussed in Human Health and 

Safety for each of the alternatives. 

Traffic and Transportation 

Traffic at the Livermore Site would be 

directly affected by changes in worker 

population under each alternative. 

Under the No Action Alternative, traffic 

would increase slightly as a result of the 

increase in worker population by 300 

workers (22,600 total vehicle trips per 

day) compared to current (2002) 

conditions. Traffic volume would 

increase further under the Proposed 

Action due to the addition of 500 

workers (23,700 total vehicle trips per 

day). Traffic volume would decrease 

under the Reduced Operation 

Alternative due to the loss of 880 

workers (as compared to the No Action 

Alternative) at the Livermore Site 

(21,000 total vehicle trips per day). At 

Site 300, the impact to traffic due to 

changes in the number of workers 

would be negligible under any of the 

alternatives. Construction projects 

would result in temporary increases in 

commuter traffic and deliveries. 

Transportation of radioactive 

materials offsite would increase under 

the No Action Alternative and Proposed 

Action. Under the No Action 

Alternative, offsite shipments would 

result in a collective dose of 7.4 personrem per year. Under the Proposed 

Action, offsite shipments would result 

in a collective dose of 9.0 person-rem 

per year. This dose would decrease 

under the Reduced Operation 

Alternative to 1.7 person-rem per year. 

The potential cancer risk from 

shipments of radioactive materials from 

the Livermore Site would be low under 

all alternatives. The calculated potential 

LCFs under the No Action and the 

Proposed Action Alternatives would be 

4 × 10¥3 and 5 × 10¥3, respectively. 

Under the Reduced Operation 

Alternative, the LCF would fall to 1 × 

10¥3. Under the Proposed Action, the 

amount of explosive materials 

transported to Site 300 would increase 

slightly from the No Action Alternative. 

Under the Reduced Operation 

Alternative, transportation of these 

materials would decrease. 

Utilities and Energy 

Under the No Action Alternative, the 

projected peak electrical demand at 

LLNL would be 82 megawatts and the 

annual total use would be 446 million 

kilowatt-hours. In 2004, the State of 

California projected the statewide peak 

demand to be 53,464 megawatts and 

projected a growth in peak demand of 

about 2.4 percent per year. LLNL’s 

projected peak demand in 2004 was 0.1 

percent of total demand in California. 

There would be virtually no change in 

the peak demand under the Proposed 

Action and the Reduced Operation 

Alternative. Annual electric use among 

the No Action, Proposed Action, and 

Reduced Operation Alternatives would 

be 446, 442, and 371 million kilowatthours, respectively. The decrease in 

electricity usage from the No Action 

Alternative to the Proposed Action is 

due to a cumulative reduction of LLNL 

floor space under the Proposed Action. 

For the same reason the Livermore Site 

would experience a decrease in water 

consumption and sewage discharges 

under the Proposed Action. 

Site Contamination 

Areas of soil and groundwater 

contamination exist at the Livermore 

Site and Site 300. These are primarily 

the result of past waste management 

practices, some of which took place 

during the 1940s when the Livermore 

Site was a naval air station. Although 

there is no immediate or long-term 

threat to human health from this 

contamination, there is localized 

degradation of groundwater. 

Remediation systems are currently 

operating to reduce the concentrations 

and extent of contamination. 

Appropriate cleanup measures 

implemented with the concurrence of 

regulators would continue regardless of 

the alternative selected. 

Increased site activities under the No 

Action Alternative or Proposed Action 

could increase the likelihood of soil 

contamination with corresponding 

increases in the potential for accidental 

releases. However, minimal deposition 

of contaminants is expected because of 

spill prevention and control procedures. 

Under the Reduced Operation 

Alternative a lower likelihood of soil 

contamination would be expected. 

Comments on the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS 

NNSA received three letters 

concerning the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS 

after distributing approximately 500 

copies of it to Congressional members 

and committees, the state of California, 

71496 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 29, 2005 / Notices 

other Federal agencies, American Indian 

tribal governments, local governments, 

nongovernmental organizations, and 

interested individuals. Tri-Valley 

CAREs (Communities Against a 

Radioactive Environment) submitted 

two letters and the EPA submitted one. 

The EPA indicated that it was pleased 

that the issues identified in its review of 

the Draft LLNL SW/SPEIS had been 

addressed in the final version of the 

document. 

In an August 3, 2005 letter to NNSA, 

Tri-Valley CAREs asked why the Final 

LLNL SW/SPEIS does not contain any of 

the 36 attachments that Tri-Valley 

CAREs submitted with its 63-page letter 

of comments on May 27, 2004. It 

asserted that its ‘‘attachments provided 

supporting material for many of the 

substantive comments that were 

included in our May 27, 2004 Comment 

Letter’’, and that the omission of these 

attachments might violate NEPA. 

Volume IV of the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS 

includes all of the 63 pages of 

substantive comments in Tri-Valley 

CAREs’ Comment Letter, as well as 

comment summaries, responses, and a 

detailed cross-reference between 

comments and summaries. NNSA did 

not include copies of the 36 attachments 

because NNSA included the entirety of 

the 63-page Comment Letter itself, 

which includes Tri-Valley CAREs’

substantive comments. Although not 

included in the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS, 

NNSA reviewed the attachments and 

considered the relevant material in them 

during its preparation of the Final LLNL 

SW/SPEIS. The attachments are 

included in the administrative record 

for the LLNL SW/SPEIS as part of the 

comment letter. 

A May 31, 2005, letter from Tri-Valley 

CAREs reiterated its comments on the 

Draft LLNL SW/SPEIS and provided 

additional information, including 

comments on the recent stand-down at 

the LLNL Plutonium Facility. The 

comments provided by Tri-Valley 

CAREs on the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS 

did not lead NNSA to conclude that it 

should change any of the analyses of the 

alternatives. NNSA responded to 

comments from Tri-Valley CAREs on 

the Draft LLNL SW/SPEIS in Volume IV, 

Chapter 3 of the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS. 

The following is a brief summary of the 

Tri-Valley CAREs’ comments from the 

May 31, 2005, letter including the standdown of the Plutonium Facility. 

(1) The LLNL SW/SPEIS did not 

address comments from Tri-Valley 

CAREs and others that the purpose and 

need is critical to identifying the range 

of alternatives. Therefore, the range of 

alternatives analyzed in the LLNL SW/ 

SPEIS is too narrow. NNSA should have 

analyzed a broader range of alternatives 

that included the reduction of nuclear 

weapons activities, many of which are 

duplications of programs at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory or limit nuclear 

weapons modernization programs. 

Response: The range of reasonable 

alternatives is provided in Volume I, 

Chapter 3 of the LLNL SW/SPEIS. As 

described in Section 3.4, the range of 

alternatives analyzed in the LLNL SW/ 

SPEIS is reasonable and appropriately 

responds to the programmatic purpose 

and need. Additional information is 

provided in Comment Responses 7.01, 

8.01, 8.02 and 8.03. Comment Response 

8.01 states that significant reductions or 

consolidations of the weapons 

laboratories beyond those analyzed in 

the Reduced Operations Alternative are 

unlikely and therefore not reasonable 

alternatives because they would not 

allow NNSA to maintain core 

competencies or to develop new 

technologies necessary to ensure 

continued high confidence in a safe and 

reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. 

Alternatives that would cease work 

involving the use of nuclear materials 

and the eventual removal of all nuclear 

materials were considered. However, 

none of these alternatives would meet 

Presidential Decision Directives or 

comply with Congressional guidance, or 

national security policy, all of which 

require the continued viability of all 

three NNSA nuclear weapons 

laboratories. 

(2) Adequate purpose and need were 

not provided for many program 

activities at LLNL such as producing 

tritium targets at the Tritium Facility 

and developing plutonium production 

technologies that will be used in a 

proposed modern pit facility. 

Response: The purpose and need are 

provided in Volume I, Chapter 1 of the 

LLNL SW/SPEIS for the major programs 

and projects at LLNL. Chapter 3 

provides additional information on 

specific projects at LLNL that support 

the Stockpile Stewardship Program 

(SSP) including the Tritium Facility 

Modernization Project and support for 

pit manufacturing. Chapter 3 of Volume 

IV, Comment Response 37.01, addresses 

comments on plutonium production 

technologies for pit manufacturing and 

Comment Response 34.01 addresses 

comments on tritium operations. 

Increased limits on the use of tritium 

will make it possible to fill targets for 

high-energy density physics 

experiments and to provide diagnostic 

systems for test readiness, which are 

required to fulfill the requirements of 

the Enhanced Test Readiness Program. 

(3) DOE should not increase the 

plutonium limit in the Plutonium 

Facility because the facility is currently 

in a ‘‘stand down’’ mode due to safety 

problems. 

Response: LLNL initiated a 

programmatic stand down of operations 

in the Plutonium Facility in order to 

resolve issues and findings from a 

January 6, 2005, report issued by the 

DOE Office of Independent Oversight 

and Performance Assurance. NNSA will 

verify the adequacy of corrective actions 

taken to resolve the issues prior to any 

increase of Plutonium Facility 

operations. Once the Plutonium Facility 

is fully operational, NNSA and DOE 

will continue to oversee and inspect its 

operations to ensure they are performed 

according to requirements. 

To support SSP missions, NNSA has 

determined that it will need to increase 

the plutonium administrative limit from 

700 kg to 1400 kg for the Plutonium 

Facility and increase the plutonium 

material-at-risk limit from 20 to 40 

kilograms of fuel-grade equivalent 

plutonium in each of two rooms of the 

Plutonium Facility. Under the Proposed 

Action, NNSA will review and approve 

the appropriate documentation and 

procedures required to implement these 

new limits. 

(4) The increase in the plutonium 

administrative limits in the Plutonium 

Facility creates storage, transportation, 

management, accident, and security 

concerns that were not adequately 

analyzed. Rather than analyzing an 

increase in the administrative limits the 

LLNL SW/SPEIS should have analyzed 

the removal of all special nuclear 

material from LLNL. 

Response: Comment Response 33.01 

provides information on the purpose 

and need for increasing the plutonium 

limits. NNSA continues to rely on LLNL 

to meet its SSP mission objectives, 

which require increasing the quantity of 

plutonium. NNSA continues to work on 

a solution for disposal of plutonium, but 

no pathway for LLNL to dispose of 

excess plutonium currently exists. The 

increase in plutonium administrative 

limits is analyzed in Volume I, Chapter 

5. The impacts of transportation of 

radioactive materials, specifically 

plutonium, are analyzed in Section 

5.3.11. Additional specific information 

on transportation of these materials is 

provided in Appendix J. Section 5.3.13 

analyzes waste generated from 

plutonium operations and Section 

5.3.14 analyzes exposure to workers and 

the public from these operations. 

Accidents involving the storage and use 

of plutonium are analyzed in Section 

5.5. The impacts of security concerns 

are analyzed as part of the accident 

analysis in Section 5.5. Comment 

Response 25.01 provides specific 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 29, 2005 / Notices 71497 

responses to many of the question raised 

concerning accidents involving the use 

of plutonium at LLNL. 

(5) The former Secretary of Energy 

announced in 2004 that DOE would 

study removal of special nuclear 

material from LLNL. The omission of 

this and other information provided in 

attachments to the comments on the 

draft LLNL SW/SPEIS undermines the 

legal sufficiency of the EIS. 

Response: As indicated in Comment 

Response 08.02, the removal and 

relocation of nuclear materials to 

another DOE/NNSA laboratory is not 

considered a reasonable alternative as it 

would not respond to the programmatic 

purpose and need for stockpile 

stewardship missions at LLNL. Section 

3.5 of the LLNL SW/SPEIS explains why 

this alternative is unreasonable and was 

eliminated from detailed analysis. 

NNSA considers the storage and use of 

this material at LLNL to be safe and 

secure. 

The Secretary of Energy did agree to 

conduct a comprehensive review of the 

nuclear weapons complex during 

testimony on March 11, 2004, to the 

House Appropriations Subcommittee on 

Energy and Water. The Nuclear 

Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task 

Force was asked to conduct this review 

and submitted its draft report titled 

Recommendations for the Nuclear 

Weapons Complex of the Future on July 

13, 2005, to the Secretary of Energy 

Advisory Board (SEAB). The draft final 

report is currently undergoing public 

review. The full SEAB will meet in the 

fall of 2005 to review the comments and 

the draft final report; it will thereafter 

submit its recommendations, which 

may differ from those of the task force, 

to the Secretary of Energy. 

(6) Accident analysis for the increase 

in the use and storage of plutonium is 

not given an adequate level of study. 

The accident scenarios did not evaluate 

the impacts of a commercial airliner 

hitting the laboratory; the document 

only considered impacts of planes 

originating from the Livermore 

Municipal Airport. The accident 

analysis did not use the correct leak 

path factor or consider other concerns 

for releases during an accident in the 

Plutonium Facility. Additionally, the 

unfiltered fire scenario does not address 

concerns such as alarms, security doors, 

emergency equipment and supply 

pressure for water. 

Response: A discussion of Plutonium 

Facility accidents is provided in 

Chapter 5, Section 5.5 and in Appendix 

D, Section D.2.3. In addition, Comment 

Response 25.08 provides information on 

potential aircraft crash scenarios for 

LLNL facilities for all types of aircraft, 

including commercial aircraft. The 

methodology in DOE Standard 3014 

‘‘Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash 

into Hazardous Facilities’’ was used for 

this evaluation. The calculated 

frequency of a commercial aircraft 

crashing into the LLNL Plutonium 

Facility is 1 × 10¥8 per year. NNSA does 

not consider this accident to be 

reasonably foreseeable and thus it is not 

evaluated in detail in the LLNL SW/ 

SPEIS. 

As indicated in Comment Response 

25.07, the values used in the accident 

analysis, such as the leak path factors, 

are based on careful consideration of the 

material present in the facility, potential 

initiating events and their probabilities, 

and potential pathways through which 

material could escape to the 

environment. The unfiltered fire 

scenario assumed that all of the 

radioactive material in the room was 

involved in the fire and the material was 

released using a leak path factor of 0.05 

for this accident. Alarms, doors, 

emergency equipment and water 

pressure were not considered in the 

unfiltered fire scenario because the 

analysis assumes that the fire is of 

sufficient magnitude that all the 

radioactive material is engulfed in the 

fire, and that the fire burns long enough 

to release the material from storage 

containers to the glovebox, room, and 

the environment. Therefore, there are no 

reasonably foreseeable accidents with 

greater consequences. 

(7) It is improper for NNSA to not 

fully incorporate the City of Livermore’s 

General Plan into the LLNL SW/SPEIS. 

The city’s plan rezones the land around 

LLNL as high density residential and 

this information was not considered in 

all sections of the LLNL SW/SPEIS. As 

a result DOE is not in full compliance 

with the NEPA directive to include 

written and actively pursued plans in an 

EIS. Additionally, the LLNL SW/SPEIS 

states that LLNL and much of the 

surrounding area is designated for 

industrial uses which is in direct 

conflict with figures in the other 

sections of the LLNL SW/SPEIS. 

Response: Chapter 4, Section 4.2 of 

the LLNL SW/SPEIS, was changed to 

reflect the City of Livermore’s General 

Plan. The city also submitted comments 

on the Draft LLNL SW/SPEIS. NNSA 

evaluated these comments and made 

appropriate changes in the Final LLNL 

SW/SPEIS as indicated in Comment 

Response 9.02. Based on comments 

from the City of Livermore, which 

reflect its current planning, Figures 

4.2.1.1–1 and 4.2.2.1–1 were revised to 

indicate residential use consistent with 

the city’s General Plan. The City of 

Livermore comments are addressed in 

Comment Responses 8.03, 9.01, 9.02, 

9.03, 12.01, 17.02, 17.03, 20.03, 26.03, 

and 33.01. 

(8) The radiation dose to involved 

workers does not account for releases 

due to minor accidents, decaying 

facilities, and workers encountering 

unexpected radiation sources in areas 

that were not properly recorded. 

Response: Chapter 5, Section 5.3.14, 

analyzes the radiation dose to workers 

for the Proposed Action. Comment 

Response 23.05 provides information on 

the health impacts to workers and the 

public. Health impact analysis is 

performed using a broad range of 

available information and models 

developed by regulatory agencies and 

data drawn from experience. In the case 

of existing operations, worker doses are 

based on exposure records, which take 

into account all exposure pathways. In 

the case of new operations, worker 

doses are based on models that simulate 

exposure for the operations to be 

performed. Exposure from all accidents 

at LLNL is taken into consideration 

when developing worker exposure 

estimates. These exposures are bounded 

by the accident analysis provided in 

Chapter 5, Section 5.5 and Appendix D. 

Information on past accidents is also 

provided in Appendix C, Section 3.2. 

(9) Information was not provided in 

the LLNL SW/SPEIS about what 

activities or programs are contained in 

facilities that are identified to have 

unacceptable seismic risks. Information 

was not provided to indicate what 

facilities were undergoing renovation or 

what facilities would remain 

operational after an earthquake. 

Updated information on California 

seismic risk provided by Tri-Valley 

CAREs was not considered. 

Response: Chapter 4, Section 4.8, and 

Appendix H provide detailed analysis of 

the seismic faults in the Livermore 

Valley and their potential effect on 

LLNL facilities and operations. 

Comment Response 14.03 explains that 

all facilities at LLNL have been 

evaluated against modern seismic 

criteria, current and planned use, and 

building population and inventory. 

These evaluations allowed for ranking 

of the facilities by the amount of retrofit 

that could be required. This evaluation 

is used as part of the overall planning 

for LLNL to determine if buildings 

should be replaced, their use changed, 

or their structural integrity improved. 

Based on comments received, updated 

information was added in Appendix H 

on the seismic upgrades of Buildings 

141, 151, 298, 321, and 511. It is not 

possible to determine what specific 

facilities would remain operational after 

an earthquake. This would depend on a 

71498 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 29, 2005 / Notices 

wide range of variables at the time of the 

earthquake. A seismic event at LLNL 

was analyzed in Appendix D of the 

LLNL SW/SPEIS and the impacts for all 

potentially affected buildings are 

included. Information provided by 

individuals was considered. However, 

as indicated in Comment Response 

14.01, information from the U.S. 

Geological Survey on seismic risk for 

the San Andreas, Calaveras, and 

Greenville faults was used because its 

analyses represent the best knowledge 

currently available for the seismic risk 

associated with these faults. 

(10) A declassified security analysis 

should be provided that includes a 

summation of the efforts that went into 

the security study and the account of 

how the conclusions drawn from the 

study were integrated into the LLNL 

SW/SPEIS analysis. 

Response: Chapter 5, Section 5.5, and 

Appendix D provide detailed analysis 

on potential accidents that could occur 

at LLNL. Comment Response 30.01 

provides information on security 

concerns and indicates that it is not 

possible to predict whether intentional 

attacks would occur at LLNL or at other 

critical facilities, or the nature of the 

types of attacks that might be made. 

Nevertheless, NNSA reevaluated 

scenarios involving malevolent, 

terrorist, or intentionally destructive 

acts at LLNL in an effort to assess 

potential vulnerabilities and identify 

improvements to security procedures 

and response measures in the aftermath 

of the attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Security at NNSA and DOE facilities is 

a critical priority for the Department, 

and it continues to identify and 

implement measures designed to defend 

against and deter attacks at its facilities. 

Substantive details of terrorist attack 

scenarios and security countermeasures 

cannot be released to the public, as 

disclosure of this information could be 

exploited by terrorists to plan attacks. 

(11) The use of fissile and fissionable 

materials in NIF experiments would 

take NIF in a new direction that would 

give it increased applicability for 

weapons design, and this work was not 

analyzed. The 1995 NIF NonProliferation Study does not address the 

use of these materials and therefore is 

not adequate for determining if the use 

of these materials is in compliance with 

the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

Response: A review of the treaty 

obligations and proliferation aspects of 

NIF was conducted and new 

information provided in Chapter 1, 

Section 1.3.1. of the Final LLNL SW/ 

SPEIS. As Comment Response 01.01 

states, NIF is an integral part of the SSP 

and as such was considered during 

NNSA’s review of compliance with 

treaty and proliferation aspects of the 

SSP. Appendix I of the SSM PEIS 

provided an evaluation of the 

construction and operation of the NIF. 

As indicated in Chapter 1 of Appendix 

I, one of the objectives of the SSP is 

‘‘Ensurance that the activities needed to 

maintain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent 

are consistent with the Nation’s arms 

control and nonproliferation 

objectives.’’ Nonproliferation issues 

regarding NIF were evaluated in a 

December 19, 1995, study, The National 

Ignition Facility and the Issue of 

Nonproliferation. The study, prepared 

by the DOE Office of Nonproliferation 

and National Security and coordinated 

with the Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency, Central 

Intelligence Agency, the Departments of 

Defense and State, concluded that (1) 

the technical proliferation concerns 

regarding NIF are manageable and 

therefore are acceptable, and (2) NIF can 

contribute positively to U.S. arms 

control and nonproliferation policy 

goals. As stated in Comment Response 

01.01, NNSA has determined that the 

use of fissile material, fissionable 

material, and lithium hydride in NIF 

experiments is consistent with treaty 

obligations and the proliferation aspects 

of conducting these experiments are 

manageable. 

(12) It is inappropriate to use a 

bounding accident scenario study for 

the BioSafety Level-3 (BSL–3) Facility 

that is out-of-date and based on a 

facility not at LLNL. 

Response: Chapter 5, Section 5.5.4, 

and Appendix D, discuss the analysis of 

a biological accident. As indicated in 

Comment Response 25.04, for purposes 

of the LLNL SW/SPEIS, NNSA selected 

a representative facility accident that 

was previously analyzed by the U.S. 

Army in the Final Programmatic 

Environmental Impact Statement 

Biological Defense Research Program 

(April 1989). NNSA believes that this 

accident scenario is comparable to and 

bounds potential accident scenarios 

associated with the BSL–3 Facility at 

LLNL. NNSA reviewed more recent 

environmental impact statements, 

including the U. S. Army’s Chemical 

and Biological Defense Program Final 

Programmatic Environmental Impact 

Statement (May 2004) and the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security’s 

Final Environmental Impact Statement 

for Construction and Operation of the 

National Biodefense Analysis and 

Countermeasures Center (NBACC) 

Facility (December 2004) and concluded 

that these EISs incorporate the same 

bounding accidents and identify the 

same environmental impacts as the U.S. 

Army’s earlier EIS issued in 1989 (i.e., 

the Final Programmatic Environmental 

Impact Statement Biological Defense 

Research Program [April 1989]). 

(13) The impact analysis focused on 

LCFs in general rather than the 

population that is immune-suppressed 

as a result of LLNL operations. 

Additionally, radiological dispersal 

could result in measurable increases in 

cancer mortality for decades following 

an accident. Information was not 

provided on economic loss of farmland, 

loss of vineyards, and impacts on the 

local economy and property values. 

Response: The human health effects 

on the general population around LLNL 

from radiation exposure in the Proposed 

Action are analyzed in Chapter 5, 

Section 5.4.14. As indicated in 

Comment Response 25.05, health effects 

other than LCFs could result from 

environmental and occupational 

exposures to radiation. These include 

nonfatal cancers among the exposed 

population and genetic effects in 

subsequent generations. Previous 

studies have concluded that these 

effects are less probable than fatal 

cancers as consequences of radiation 

exposure. Dose-to-risk conversion 

factors for nonfatal cancers and 

hereditary genetic effects (0.0001 per 

person-rem and 0.00013 per person-rem, 

respectively) are substantially lower 

than those for fatal cancers. The LLNL 

SW/SPEIS presents estimated effects of 

radiation in terms of LCFs because that 

is the major potential health effect from 

exposure to radiation. Any additional 

increases in cancer mortality or 

morbidity from exposure to residual 

environmental contamination from an 

accident would be minor considering 

that the increase in LCFs for the 

population exposed to the accident 

(highest concentrations) would only be 

1.21 LCF under the bounding analysis. 

In addition, there is no evidence that the 

population surrounding LLNL is 

‘‘immune suppressed’’ as a result of 

LLNL operations. 

As indicated in Comment Response 

25.06, NNSA focused the accident 

analysis on human health impacts 

among LLNL workers and the general 

public near LLNL. Secondary impacts 

could also result from the postulated 

facility accidents, such as loss of farm 

production, contamination, land usage, 

and ecological harm; however, they 

would not be significant within the 50- 

mile radius, which was analyzed in the 

LLNL SW/SPEIS. These secondary 

impacts were determined not to be a 

major discriminator among alternatives; 

therefore, they were not assessed in 

detail. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 29, 2005 / Notices 71499 

(14) The LLNL SW/SPEIS analysis 

does not address whether programs to 

modernize U.S. nuclear weapons are in 

compliance with international law. The 

LLNL SW/SPEIS should analyze all of 

the current and proposed activities at 

LLNL and their relationship to the NPT. 

The LLNL SW/SPEIS should analyze 

foreseeable plans for new nuclear 

weapons development including the 

Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, the 

Reliable Replacement Warhead 

program, the Modern Pit Facility, and 

Enhanced Test Readiness. 

Response: A review of the treaty and 

nonproliferation aspects of LLNL 

operations was added to Chapter 1, 

Section 1.3.1. As indicated in Comment 

Response 02.01, it is the United States 

policy for DOE to develop and produce 

the nation’s nuclear weapons and to 

ensure their safety and reliability. With 

the end of the Cold War, DOE has been 

developing strategies for appropriate 

adjustments to its missions and 

activities consistent with current 

national security policies that reflect 

post-Cold War realities and threats. 

Some of these adjustments reflect a 

smaller weapons stockpile. However, 

even after the—Cold War, threats 

remain and nuclear deterrence will 

continue to be a cornerstone of U.S. 

national security policy for the 

foreseeable future. The Proposed Action 

is consistent with the NNSA mission 

assigned to LLNL and does not 

adversely affect the United States’

compliance with any international law. 

(15) A nonproliferation study should 

be conducted to determine if biodefense 

work at LLNL could undermine the 

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 

Collocating bio-defense work at topsecret military labs could complicate 

negotiations of verification and 

enforcement protocols for the BWC. The 

LLNL SW/SPEIS does not respond to 

concerns that the BSL–3 Facility will be 

used to aerosolize and genetically 

modify biological agents and also have 

a large-capacity fermentor nearby. 

Response: As stated in Comment 

Response 35.01, the United States is a 

signatory to the BWC, which prohibits 

the development and production of 

bioweapons. The BWC does not prohibit 

activities using biological agents that are 

for prophylactic, protective or other 

peaceful purposes. The operation of the 

BSL–3 facility would be consistent with 

the BWC as its activities will conform to 

treaty obligations. The facility is 

designed to accommodate work on 

detection and counterterrorism 

technologies, and will provide for 

environmentally safe and physically 

secure manipulation and storage of 

infectious microorganisms. Operations 

at this facility will not combine 

biological research and nuclear weapons 

activities. Verification requirements 

established by the Biological and Toxin 

Weapons Convention will be met with. 

The BSL–3 facility will be used for 

many operations with biological 

infectious agents; however, all 

biological agents would be managed in 

accordance with the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention BioSafety in 

Microbiological and Biomedical 

Laboratories Guidelines. 

(16) An environmental analysis 

should be done on the manufacturing of 

tritium targets and on the Tritium 

Facility Modernization Project. 

Response: The manufacture of tritium 

targets and the Tritium Facility 

Modernization Project were analyzed in 

preparation of the LLNL SW/SPEIS. 

Chapter 3, Section 3.3.5, provides 

information on the new activities that 

are considered under the Proposed 

Action such as the high-energy density 

physics target fill and the Test 

Readiness Program. Chapter 5, Section 

5.3.8, provides an analysis of the 

increased use of tritium to support SSP 

activities in the Tritium Facility. 

Comment Response 34.01 provides 

information on the environmental 

analysis of proposed programs in the 

Tritium Facility including filling of 

tritium targets, the Test Readiness 

Program and the Tritium Facility 

Modernization Project. Comment 

Response 26.04 also provides 

information on high-energy density 

physics target fabrication at the Tritium 

Facility and includes the resulting 

environmental impacts. Comment 

Response 31.09 provides additional 

information on the Tritium Facility 

Modernization Project. 

(17) Additional information should be 

provided on the likelihood and 

consequences of shifting from 

TRUPACT II to TRUPACT III containers 

for shipping transuranic waste. Analysis 

should be conducted on the increased 

rate of public exposure to transuranic 

waste, the heightened risk of 

transportation accidents, and the 

TRUPACT III Containers greater 

susceptibility to terrorist attacks. 

Response: Chapter 3, Section 3.3.15 

discusses the use of TRUPACT II 

containers for shipment of transuranic 

waste. As indicated in Comment 

Response 20.05, the proposed 

TRUPACT–III shipping package would 

be a Type B container as defined by 

Department of Transportation and the 

NRC. Accordingly, it will be required to 

meet the same stringent safety and 

performance standards as the 

TRUPACT–II. Should NRC certify this 

package and should DOE propose to use 

it for waste shipments from LLNL, the 

package would be used in compliance 

with its certification and safety analysis 

report. NNSA has not evaluated its use, 

and prior to the certification of the 

package, cannot state whether any LLNL 

transuranic waste would be shipped in 

a TRUPACT–III. The transuranic waste 

transportation accident analysis in the 

LLNL SW/SPEIS was performed under 

the assumption that a TRUPACT–II 

would be used. Given that the 

TRUPACT–III would also be required to 

meet all requirements for a Type B 

container, it is unlikely that results 

would change if NNSA were to use a 

TRUPACT–III container. Should DOE 

adopt the TRUPACT–III, DOE will 

ensure that its use remains within the 

safety envelope of previous analyses for 

the TRUPACT–II. 

Mitigation Measures 

CEQ’s NEPA regulations require that 

an EIS include a discussion of means to 

mitigate adverse effects. As described in 

the LLNL SW/SPEIS, NNSA and LLNL 

operate under existing laws, programs, 

and controls, including regulations, 

policies, and contractual requirements; 

many of these requirements mandate 

actions that would mitigate potential 

adverse affects. Examples include the 

Environment, Safety and Health 

Manual, emergency plans, Integrated 

Safety Management System, pollution 

prevention/waste minimization 

program, several protected species 

programs, and energy and water 

conservation programs. To date, NNSA 

has not identified additional mitigation 

measures for resource areas evaluated in 

the LLNL SW/SPEIS. It will continue to 

implement existing procedures and 

controls, or appropriately updated ones, 

during implementation of the Proposed 

Action. For biological resources, NNSA 

will implement the reasonable and 

prudent measures necessary to avoid or 

minimize incidental taking of listed 

species and will carefully consider 

implementation of conservation 

recommendations determined as a result 

of consultation with the U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service. For cultural resources, 

NNSA will implement agreed-upon 

treatment strategies to preserve historic 

properties determined through 

consultation with the California State 

Historic Preservation Office. 

Decisions 

The impacts identified in the LLNL 

SW/SPEIS were based on conservative 

estimates and assumptions. In this 

regard, the analyses bound the impacts 

of the alternatives evaluated in the 

LLNL SW/SPEIS. The Proposed Action 

would result in an increase in LLNL 

71500 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 29, 2005 / Notices 

operations to support reasonably 

foreseeable mission requirements. This 

includes the expansion or modification 

of current facilities and construction of 

new facilities, as well as those projects, 

activities, and facilities described in the 

No Action Alternative. The LLNL SW/ 

SPEIS and the analyses it contains may 

support additional programmatic or 

project decisions in the future. The 

implementation of these decisions and 

the schedules for implementation 

depend on funding levels and allocation 

of the DOE/NNSA budget. 

NNSA’s review of the data and 

methodologies used in accident 

analyses verified that the LLNL SW/ 

SPEIS correctly identifies bounding site 

accidents and estimates their potential 

consequences. This review found a 

small number of minor discrepancies on 

non-bounding site accident scenarios. 

Information concerning these 

discrepancies is available from Thomas 

Grim, the NNSA Document Manager for 

the LLNL SW/SPEIS, at the address and 

phone number included at the 

beginning of this ROD. These 

discrepancies are negligible and the 

LLNL SW/SPEIS adequately evaluates 

the potential impacts of the alternatives. 

NNSA has decided to implement the 

preferred alternative, the Proposed 

Action with the exception of the 

Energetic Materials Processing Center 

Replacement and High Explosives 

Development Center Project. With the 

issuance of this ROD, NNSA will begin 

to expand operations at LLNL critical to 

NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship 

Program. The major decisions are 

increasing the administrative and 

material-at-risk limits for plutonium in 

the Plutonium Facility and increasing 

the administrative and material-at-risk 

limits for tritium in the Tritium Facility. 

NNSA will review and approve the 

appropriate documentation and 

procedures required to implement the 

increase to a 1,400 kilogram 

administrative limit for plutonium and 

the 40 kilograms of fuel-grade 

equivalent plutonium material-at-risk 

limit for two rooms for the Plutonium 

Facility. NNSA will conduct 

experiments at the NIF using 

plutonium, other fissile materials, 

fissionable materials, and lithium 

hydride. These decisions are discussed 

in more detail in the following 

paragraphs. 

NNSA continues to rely on LLNL to 

meet its Stockpile Stewardship Program 

objectives. These objectives include 

campaigns relating to pit manufacturing 

and certification, advanced radiography, 

dynamic materials properties, materials 

shelf life experiments, and enhanced 

surveillance research, which contribute 

to the need for long-term storage of 

plutonium. These campaigns and 

programs require increasing use of 

plutonium. NNSA continues to work on 

a solution for disposal of plutonium, but 

no pathway for disposal of the excess 

plutonium at LLNL currently exists, 

requiring an increase in the plutonium 

administrative limits. A July 2005 report 

issued by the Government 

Accountability Office, Securing U.S. 

Nuclear Materials, discusses some of the 

problems that need to be solved in order 

to develop a disposal path for excess 

plutonium. These problems have not yet 

been resolved and the amount of 

plutonium stored at LLNL will increase 

as NNSA continues to operate the 

Plutonium Facility. Therefore, NNSA 

has decided to increase the 

administrative limit for plutonium to 

1,400 kilograms. The inventory will 

continue to be stored in robust vaults in 

the facility. 

NNSA has decided to increase the 

plutonium material-at-risk limit from 20 

to 40 kilograms of fuel-grade equivalent 

plutonium in each of two rooms of the 

Plutonium Facility. The material-at-risk 

limit for all other rooms would remain 

at 20 kilograms fuel grade equivalent 

plutonium. The increases are needed to 

meet future Stockpile Stewardship 

Program objectives such as the casting 

of plutonium parts. These activities 

support campaigns for advanced 

radiography, pit manufacturing, and 

certification. 

NNSA has decided to increase the 

tritium administrative limit for the 

Tritium Facility from 30 to 35 grams 

and the material-at-risk at a single 

workstation from 3.5 to 30 grams. These 

increases are needed to support future 

planned Stockpile Stewardship Program 

activities such as the high-energy 

density physics target fill and the Test 

Readiness Program. 

NNSA has decided to use plutonium, 

other fissile materials, fissionable 

materials, and lithium hydride in 

experiments at the NIF as evaluated in 

the LLNL SW/SPEIS. This decision is 

based on the need for a variety of 

experiments using fissionable and fissile 

material at the NIF. NIF will perform 

experiments with plutonium or highly 

enriched uranium without ignition to 

study the equation of state of these 

materials. Experiments will be 

conducted to measure fundamental 

nuclear physics properties using 

plutonium or highly enriched uranium 

that require ignition. Experiments will 

be conducted with lithium hydride, 

which is not a special nuclear material, 

with and without ignition. These are 

materials physics and equation of state 

experiments designed to address 

fundamental physical behavior of this 

material and to allow benchmarking of 

physical models of the material. 

Experiments will be performed with 

depleted uranium with ignition. These 

experiments require materials with high 

atomic numbers collocated on the 

ignition target to enhance the 

conversion of laser light to x-rays for 

inertial confinement fusion 

experiments. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

NEPA, its implementing procedures and 

regulations, and DOE’s NEPA 

regulations, I have considered the 

information contained in the LLNL SW/ 

SPEIS and public comments received in 

response to the both the Draft and Final 

LLNL SW/SPEIS. Being fully apprised 

of the environmental consequences of 

the alternatives and other information 

relevant to these decisions, I have 

decided to continue operations at LLNL 

as described in the Proposed Action 

with the exception of the Energetic 

Materials Processing Center 

Replacement and High Explosives 

Development Center Project. This 

decision will help enable the 

Department to maintain the core 

intellectual and technical competencies 

of the United States in nuclear weapons, 

and maintain a safe and reliable nuclear 

weapons stockpile. In making this 

decision, all practicable means to avoid 

or minimize environmental harm from 

implementation of the Proposed Action 

will be adopted. NNSA will consider 

changes in its programmatic needs prior 

to implementing Proposed Action 

projects. The implementation of these 

decisions and the schedules for their 

implementation depend on funding 

levels and allocation of the DOE/NNSA 

budget. Their implementation also 

depends on the results of NNSA’s 

continuing assessment of its mission 

needs and of LLNL’s role in meeting 

those needs. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on November 

22, 2005. 

Linton F. Brooks, 

Administrator, National Nuclear Security 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. 05–23457 Filed 11–28–05; 8:45 am] 

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