J-A23007-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JOSEPH LOOMIS AND JANAN 

LOOMIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 

ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE 

OF LEAH LOOMIS, DECEASED 

Appellants

v.

MIA BOMBA, GINA BOMBA, WILLIAM 

FARBER, JR.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 367 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2018-00930

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 1, 2021

Plaintiffs/Appellants Joseph and Janan Loomis, individually and on 

behalf of the estate of Leah Loomis (the Loomises), appeal from the judgment 

entered in favor of Defendants/Appellees Mia Bomba, Gina Bomba, and 

William Farber, Jr. (collectively Appellees), following a jury trial. Upon review, 

we affirm.

The trial court detailed the underlying facts as follows:

This action arose from a tragic boating incident that occurred at 

Newton Lake on September 26, 2017, when defendant, Mia 

Bomba (“Mia”), was operating a motorboat that was co-owned by 

her mother Gina Bomba, (“Gina”), and William Farber, Jr. 

(“Farber”). ... In August 2017, Gina and Farber purchased the 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A23007-21

- 2 -

subject motorboat ... and prior to the boating accident on 

September 26, 2017, Mia operated the motorboat on more than 

20 occasions. 

On the afternoon of September 26, 2017, Mia requested her 

mother’s permission to use the motorboat with her friend and 

classmate, Leah Loomis (“Leah”), and Gina granted her consent 

provided that Leah first secured the permission of “[Leah’s] 

mother or father.” Mia contacted another friend, Alexis Igneri 

(“Igneri”), who joined Mia and Leah at Newton Lake for the boat 

ride. The motorboat was equipped with a passenger seat to the 

right of the operator, a transom bench seat situated directly 

behind the operator, and front seats with grab rails positioned in 

the front (bow) section which faced towards the operator. When 

the motorboat departed from its dock on September 26, 2017, 

Mia was driving, Igneri was positioned behind her on the transom 

bench seat, and Leah was seated in the front seat while facing 

Mia. 

Mia and her passengers intended to drive one lap around 

the lake in a counterclockwise direction, as required by Newton 

Lake rules, dock the boat in the center of the lake, and swim in 

that area. At the time, Newton Lake did not have nor enforce a 

speed limit for the operation of motorboats. A Newton Lake 

resident, William Dunstone, observed Mia and her passengers 

drive by at a “cruising speed” of 20 to 25 miles per hour that was 

“just fast enough to get the boat on plane.” Jeff Williams, who 

was pulling his motorboat into its dock as Mia and her passengers 

passed behind him, estimated their speed to be 35 to 40 miles per 

hour.

As Mia’s motorboat was completing its first turn and starting 

to straighten while it continued its lap around the lake, Leah 

“suddenly” positioned herself on her knees on the front seat 

cushion, faced away from Mia and towards the bow and lake, and 

was “striking a pose” on her knees and with outstretched arms “as 

if flying on the bow of the boat.” As the boat simultaneously 

approached a wave or wake, which Mia believed had been caused 

by the travel of the motorboat before its turn, Mia reduced the 

speed of the boat while it “started to bounce,” and once the 

motorboat hit the wave or wake, Leah fell over the front of the 

boat and into the water “more towards the right side.” Mia 

instinctively turned the boat to the left to avoid Leah, but heard 

the boat make contact with Leah. 
J-A23007-21

- 3 -

Mia immediately stopped the boat, jumped in the lake to 

search for Leah, and told Igneri to call 911. Since Mia could not 

find Leah and Igneri appeared to be in shock and unable to 

communicate with the 911 operator, Mia climbed back into the 

boat to speak to the operator on Igneri’s cellphone while Mia also 

attempted to contact her mother, Gina, on her own cellphone. Mr. 

Dunstone heard someone scream “help” and observed two young 

women “waving their hands and yelling for help,” so he and his 

father boarded their boat and drove to their location. Mr. Williams 

likewise heard their screams, and backed his boat out of its dock, 

“drove around to the other side” of the lake, and arrived to find 

Mia and Igneri who “were pretty hysterical.” 

* * *

Upon arriving at Mia’s boat, Mr. Dunstone threw an anchor and 

lifejacket into the water to designate the spot where Leah was last 

seen[.] . . . Emergency personnel promptly arrived via a pontoon 

boat, and advised Mr. Dunstone to drive Mia and Igneri to the 

shoreline in Mia’s boat. Leah was not found by nightfall, but her 

deceased body was discovered and recovered the following day. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/12/21, at 2-6 (record citations and footnotes omitted).

On July 24, 2018, the Loomises filed a complaint against Appellees 

alleging negligence under the Wrongful Death and Survival Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 8301-8302. A trial was held in October 2020, after which the jury found

in favor of Appellees. On October 19, 2020, the Loomises filed post-trial 

motions, which the trial court denied on March 12, 2021. This timely appeal 

followed.1

____________________________________________

1 The Loomises and trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. As the trial 

court noted, the Loomises raised four issues in their post-trial motion, but 

“their statement identifies 15 alleged errors that they intend to assert on 

appeal.” Supplemental Order Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 5/10/21, at 1 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A23007-21

- 4 -

In their brief, the Loomises present two questions for our review:

1. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to instruct the jury on

the applicable sections of the Pennsylvania Boating Handbook[?]

2. Whether the Trial Court erred in concluding that Trooper Ives’

testimony regarding [the] hearsay statement of Alexis Igneri was 

admissible under the course of conduct exception[?]

Loomis Brief at 4.

In their first issue, the Loomises contend the trial court erred in failing 

to instruct the jury on the authoritative nature of the Pennsylvania Boating 

Handbook.

2

 The Loomises claim they were prejudiced by the court’s denial of 

their request to read excerpts from the Handbook to the jury, in conjunction 

with Pennsylvania Standard Civil Jury Instruction 13.110, which states:

[A] [An] [insert regulation or standard] in effect at the

time the accident occurred provided:

[quote relevant regulatory provisions]

[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] violated this 

[regulation] [standard]. If you find that [name of defendant] 

violated the [regulation] [standard], then [name of defendant]’s 

violation of this [regulation] [standard] is evidence you must

consider, along with all other evidence, in deciding whether [name 

of defendant] was negligent.

Pa. SSJI (Civ) 13.110. See Loomis Brief at 25-26.

____________________________________________

(citations omitted). The court concluded—and we agree—that to the extent 

the Loomises assert issues that were not properly preserved, those issues are 

waived on appeal. Id. at 2 (citations omitted).

2 The Pennsylvania Boating Handbook is published by the Pennsylvania Fish 

and Boating Commission and serves as the text for the Commission’s eighthour boating course. Pennsylvania Boating Handbook, 3/17, at 2.
J-A23007-21

- 5 -

We are not persuaded by the Loomises’ argument. It is well-settled 

that,

We review the trial court’s jury instructions for an abuse of 

discretion or legal error controlling the outcome of the case. A 

jury charge will be found to be adequate unless, when read in its 

entirety, the charge confused the jury, misled the jury, or 

contained an omission tantamount to fundamental error. “[I]t 

must appear that the erroneous instruction may have affected the 

jury’s verdict.” Consequently, the trial court has great discretion 

in forming jury instructions.

Meyer v. Union R. Co., 865 A.2d 857, 862 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations 

omitted). Trial courts are not required to use the language of requested jury 

charges, but may utilize different formulations so long as they “adequately 

and clearly” cover their subjects. Buckley v. Exodus Transit & Storage 

Corp., 744 A.2d 298, 306 (Pa. Super. 1999). The court may refuse to submit 

for the jury’s consideration a point for charge that is not strictly in accordance 

with the facts in evidence or the law in the case. Id.

Here, the Loomises allege the trial court’s failure to give the requested 

verbatim charges impacted the jury’s verdict. Specifically, they contend the 

court erred in denying their charges quoting the Pennsylvania Boating 

Handbook as follows:

4. A standard in effect at the time the accident occurred

provided:

Boat operators are responsible for:

● the safety of all passengers in the boat

● the boat’s wake and any damage caused by it
J-A23007-21

- 6 -

● maintaining a proper lookout and operating at a safe speed for 

conditions;

● using good seamanship which is the foundation of the navigation 

rules

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Mia Bomba violated this standard.

If you find that Defendant Mia Bomba violated the standard, then 

Defendant Mia Bomba’s violation of this standard is evidence you 

must consider, along with all other evidence, in deciding whether 

Defendant Mia Bomba was negligent.

Pa. SSJI (Civ) 13.110.

Pennsylvania Boating Handbook

5. A standard in effect at the time the accident occurred provided:

Boating operators are responsible for the actions of all 

persons on board their boats.

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Mia Bomba violated this standard.

If you find that Defendant Mia Bomba violated the standard, then 

Defendant Mia Bomba’s violation of this standard is evidence you 

must consider, along with all other evidence, in deciding whether 

Defendant Mia Bomba was negligent.

Pa. SSJI (Civ) 13.110.

Pennsylvania Boating Handbook 2015 and 2017 edition

8. A standard in effect at the time the accident occurred provided:

Boats must be operated at a rate of speed that does not

endanger the life or property of any person

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Mia Bomba violated this standard.

If you find that Defendant Mia Bomba violated the standard, then 

Defendant Mia Bomba’s violation of this standard is evidence you 

must consider, along with all other evidence, in deciding whether 

Defendant Mia Bomba was negligent.

Pa. SSJI (Civ) 13.110.
J-A23007-21

- 7 -

Pennsylvania Boating Handbook 2015 and 2017 edition

9. A standard in effect at the time the accident occurred provided:

To ensure a safe and problem free boating experience, make a 

checklist and use it before each trip

* * *

● Conduct an onboard safety discussion with passengers: 

Everyone on board needs to know in advance what is 

expected of them and where they can find needed 

equipment. The discussion should include information on 

the location and proper use of life jackets (PFDs), fire 

extinguishers, visual distress equipment and first-aid kit. Explain 

emergency procedures; rules prohibiting discharging waste 

overboard; basic operation of the marine radio (if one is installed); 

other items such as boat operation, weather and/or water 

conditions, anchoring procedures, docking and line handling, and 

the dangers of falling overboard and being struck by the 

propeller.

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Mia Bomba violated this standard.

If you find that Defendant Mia Bomba violated the standard, then 

Defendant Mia Bomba’s violation of this standard is evidence you 

must consider, along with all other evidence, in deciding whether 

Defendant Mia Bomba was negligent.

Pa. SSJI (Civ) 13.110

Pennsylvania Boating Handbook

See Loomis Brief at 26-29 (emphases in original).

In response, the trial court explained its denial of the requested charges, 

stating:

Many of the boating handbook’s provisions contained in the 

Loomises’ proposed points for charge were addressed in the 

prepared instructions based upon Pa. SSJI (Civ.) §§ 13.100 and 

13.110 (5th ed.). For example, the requested instructions in Nos. 

4 and 5 concerning the operator’s responsibility for the safety and 

actions of passengers, maintaining a proper lookout, operating at 
J-A23007-21

- 8 -

a safe speed, and using good seamanship were discussed in the 

prepared instructions based upon 30 Pa.C.S.A. § 5501(b) and 58 

Pa. Code §§ 103.4 — 103.5. Proposed point for charge No. 8 

quoting the handbook’s language regarding the proper “rate of 

speed” was covered in the distributed instructions with respect to 

58 Pa. Code. §§ 103.16, 105.3(2). Consequently, the only boating 

handbook comments that were not discussed in the drafted 

instructions were . . . the pre-departure “checklist” in No. 9. In 

that regard, it is noteworthy that no lay or expert witness ever 

mentioned the operator’s alleged duty with respect to a checklist 

as to life jackets, weather, float plan, fuel, battery, fire 

extinguishers, or boat maintenance.

 During the charge conference, the Loomises requested jury 

instructions ... based on their proposed points for charge No.s. 4-

5, 8-9. In response, it was announced that such an instruction 

would be provided based upon the Fish and Boat Commission’s 

regulations, but not on any provisions contained in the handbook 

that were not reflected in a regulation. To that end, an 

observation was made that the Suggested Standard Civil Jury 

Instructions “Subcommittee Note references Section 286 of the 

Restatement (Second) of Torts,” [] states that such an instruction 

is warranted only with “an administrative regulation.” ... The 

Loomises were advised that they were at liberty to reference any 

provision in the handbook and argue “that [it] was part of the 

standard of care,” but would not be granted “a specific instruction” 

advising the jury that it was “a government regulation standard 

of care” under Pa. SSJI (Civ.) § 13.110 (5th ed.). 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/12/21, at 27-29 (citations and footnote omitted).

Upon review, we agree that with the exception of requested charge 9 

(the boating checklist), the trial court’s charges, as given, encompassed the 

Loomises’ requests. N.T., 10/9/20, at 10-12.3 In their argument, the 

____________________________________________

3 Pertinently, the trial court charged the jury:

Now, what are the duties under the law for an operator of a boat 

in Pennsylvania? Section 5501 Sub-paragraph B of the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A23007-21

- 9 -

Loomises do not discuss the charge as given, or explain how the court’s 

decision not to use the verbatim language from the Boating Handbook was 

improper. See Loomis Brief at 31-37.

____________________________________________

Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Code states that no person shall 

operate a watercraft upon water in a negligent manner. And that 

a person operates a watercraft negligently if he or she operates 

the watercraft without due regard for the safety of other persons 

in, upon or along the water. [The Loomises] claim that Defendant 

Mia Bomba violated this law. If you find that Defendant Mia 

Bomba violated this law, then you must find her negligent. If you 

find that Defendant Mia Bomba did not violate this law, then you 

must still decide whether she was negligent because she failed to 

act as a reasonably careful person would under the circumstances 

established by the evidence in this case. The Fish and Boat

Commission has promulgated regulations establishing rules of the 

road so-to-speak for boat operators in Pennsylvania. Section

103.4 of those regulations states that every boat operator shall 

maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing in order to make 

a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. Section 

103.5 provides that every boat must proceed at a safe speed so 

that it can take proper and effective action to avoid a collision and 

to be stopped within a distance appropriate for the prevailing 

circumstances and conditions. Section 103.16 states that no 

person may operate a watercraft at a speed greater than is 

reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, having regard 

for the actual and potential hazards then existing nor at a speed 

greater than will permit the operator to maneuver the boat with 

safety. Section 105.3 Subsection 2 states that an operator of a 

boat less than 20 feet in length shall not operate at a greater than 

slow no wake speed while a person is standing on a boat. [The 

Loomises] claim that the Defendant Mia Bomba violated those Fish 

and Boat Commission regulations. If you find that the Defendant 

Mia Bomba violated any of those regulations, then her violation of

that regulation is evidence you should consider along with all other 

evidence in deciding whether she was negligent.

N.T., 10/9/20, at 9-12.
J-A23007-21

- 10 -

Without citing applicable legal authority, the Loomises claim the 

language in Boating Handbook constitutes “boating regulations” and 

“governmental and industry standards.” Loomis Brief at 30-31. They argue 

it was reversible error for the court to not charge the jury with the verbatim 

language, and cite this Court’s decision in Wood v. Smith, 495 A.2d 601 (Pa. 

Super. 1985), and the Commonwealth Court’s decision in PennDot v. Weller, 

574 A.2d 728 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).4 We find both cases distinguishable.

In Wood, a homeowner was killed after falling off scaffolding erected 

by masons outside his home. The jury entered a defense verdict, and on 

appeal, the plaintiff/estate argued the trial court erred in only charging the 

jury on negligence generally, and “by refusing to explain the legal significance 

of government and industry standards which had been testified to during the 

trial.” Id. at 603. In finding the trial court’s charge to be misleading, this 

Court stated:

We find that in the context of the entire charge and in view of 

the fact that the jurors were presented with two standards of 

conduct, the above quoted charge is an insufficient explanation of 

the degree of care required by the defendants. Without further 

explanation, the jury may very reasonably have assumed that 

since the defendants were not required by law to adhere to the 

OSHA [Occupational Health and Safety Act] or ANSI [American 

National Standards Institute] standard, their failure to do so was 

irrelevant. As it reads, the charge seems to indicate that the 

defendants’ conduct need only be measured against that generally 

used in the trade and not against the more stringent OSHA and 

ANSI standards. The customary method of performing work could 

____________________________________________

4 As a Commonwealth Court case, Weller is not binding on this Court. See 

Commonwealth v. Ortega, 995 A.2d 879, 885 (Pa. Super. 2010).
J-A23007-21

- 11 -

be a negligent method despite the fact that it was in general use 

in the trade and could, if the evidence warranted it, be found so 

by the jury.

Id. at 603-04 (citations and footnotes, emphasis added).

Here, the Loomises do not allege error in the trial court’s general 

negligence charge, or that the jury was presented with contradictory 

standards of conduct which needed clarification as in Woods. Reading the 

court’s charges “in context,” we do not find Woods useful.

In the Loomises’ next case, Weller, the plaintiff sued the Department 

of Transportation, claiming negligence relating to snowplowing. Weller, 574 

A.2d at 729. On appeal, the DOT claimed the trial court erred in charging the 

jury that the DOT’s winter maintenance manual was a regulation. Id. at 731. 

The Commonwealth Court rejected this argument. It explained:

The manual is not a formal regulation adopted under the 

Commonwealth Documents Law in order to have the force of law. 

However, Arthur Battistone, a DOT assistant maintenance 

manager in Washington County and Harry Byrd, Jr., a DOT 

foreman in Washington County, both referred to the manual as 

“the Bible”. Specifically, Battistone stated “[i]t’s what we are to 

follow”. No evidence in the record indicates otherwise.

In context, the trial judge used the word “regulations” in a generic 

sense, rather than in the specific Commonwealth Documents Law 

sense; in the charge, as quoted above, we note that he labeled 

the manual’s contents simply as “policies and procedures,” not as 

provisions of a law. Because DOT’s own witnesses testified as to 

the definitive authority of the manual, the charge was not 

prejudicial. 

Id. at 731-32.

We must review each case and charges independently and in context. 

Unlike Weller, there was no testimony in this case by employees of a state 
J-A23007-21

- 12 -

agency — or otherwise — regarding the authoritative nature of the Boating 

Handbook, and the trial court charged the jury using language from the actual 

and applicable Pennsylvania Boating Regulations. See N.T., 10/9/20, at 10-

12; see also 30 Pa.C.S.A. § 5501(b) and 58 Pa. Code §§ 103.4-103.5. The 

Loomises have provided no support, either evidentiary or legal, for their 

contention that the Pennsylvania Boating Handbook constituted regulatory 

authority or an industry standard; likewise, there is no evidence regarding 

policies and procedures based on the Handbook.

The Handbook states:

PLEASE NOTE: This handbook was prepared to provide 

boaters with information they need to know when 

operating watercraft in Pennsylvania waterways. It reviews 

the Commission’s boating regulations and includes information 

and tips to follow while boating. It does not present the actual 

laws and regulations. This handbook is the text for the 

Commissioner’s Pennsylvania Basic Boating 8-hour boating 

course. 

Pennsylvania Boating Handbook, 3/17, at 2 (some emphasis added). By its 

express language, the Handbook does not “present the actual laws and 

regulations.” Accordingly, we are not persuaded by the Loomises’ argument 

that the trial court’s denial of their requested jury charges “likely confused the 

jurors as to the state of the law” or misled the jury. Loomis Brief at 35-36.

In their second issue, the Loomises claim the trial court erred in 

admitting hearsay testimony from Pennsylvania State Trooper Carl Ives to the 

effect that Alexis Igneri “gave a statement consistent with the statement of 

Mia Bomba.” Loomis Brief at 37. After the Loomises’ counsel objected to the 
J-A23007-21

- 13 -

trooper’s testimony, Appellees’ counsel indicated Ms. Igneri would testify. 

However, she did not testify. Preliminary, we could find this claim waived.

Decisions regarding admissibility “are within the sound discretion of the 

trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or 

misapplication of law. In addition, for a ruling on evidence to constitute 

reversible error, it must have been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining 

party.” Phillips v. Lock, 86 A.3d 906, 920 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Trooper Ives testified about investigating the accident and interviewing 

Mia Bomba and Alexis Igneri. N.T. 10/6/20, at 12-14. The following exchange 

occurred:

[Defense Counsel]: And the statement that Alexis Igneri gave you 

is consistent with the statement you obtained from Mia Bomba, 

correct?

[Trooper Ives]: It is consistent. The only difference was the 

position of Miss Igneri.

[Defense Counsel]: In what regard?

[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Just note an objection your Honor, to Miss 

Igneri’s statement since it’s hearsay.

The Court: The objection is on the basis of hearsay?

N.T., 10/6/20, at 16.

The Loomises’ counsel did not respond to the trial court’s question 

before the court, sua sponte, determined it would instruct the jury that they 

could only consider Trooper Ives’ testimony “regarding the statement from 
J-A23007-21

- 14 -

Miss Igneri not for the truth of what’s contained in the statement.” N.T., 

10/6/20, at 16-17. 

As shown above, the Loomises’ counsel did not immediately object to 

Appellees counsel’s question as to whether Alexis Igneri’s statement was 

consistent with that of Mia Bomba, or to Trooper Ives’ answer; the Loomises’ 

counsel objected only after Appellees’ counsel asked “in what regard” Ms. 

Igneri’s statement was different. Thus, we could find waiver. See Lockley 

v. CSX Transp., Inc. 66 A.3d 322, 325 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“It is axiomatic 

that [i]n order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make 

a timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of the proceedings 

before the trial court. Failure to timely object to a basic and fundamental 

error will result in waiver of that issue.”) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted; emphasis added).

However, in the absence of waiver, this issue lacks merit. Hearsay is a 

statement which:

(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current 

trial or hearing; and

(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted in the statement.

Pa.R.E. 801(c).

Here, Trooper Ives’ testimony was not hearsay. Trooper Ives did not 

quote or relate what Alexis Igneri said, he simply characterized it. Trooper 

Ives did not testify about truthfulness, but merely described Alexis Igneri’s
J-A23007-21

- 15 -

statement as “consistent” with the statement of Mia Bomba, with the 

exception of “the position.” Finally, even if viewed as hearsay, the trial court 

advised the jury that they should not consider the statement for truthfulness. 

Accordingly, we discern no error in the trial court’s admission of Trooper Ives’ 

statement.

Judgment affirmed.

P.J. Panella joins the memorandum.

P.J.E. Stevens files a dissenting statement.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/1/2021