alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE v. KARBAS

No. 49 PC.

Case below: 28 N.C. App. 372.

Petition for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 6 April 1976.
#### STATE v. ROOK

No. 39.

Case below: 26 N.C. App. 33.

Motion of Attorney General to dismiss appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question allowed 25 August 1975.
#### Thomas Blackman, plaintiff in error, *vs.*E. W. Clements, deputy sheriff, defendant in error.

That a third person, not the defendant, has taken a homestead on land, against which a mortgage *fi. fa.*has issued, will not excuse the sheriff for failing to sell, when such *fi. fa.*is placed in his hands for levy and sale; and where he sets up such fact as his only excuse, in answer to a rule to shew cause why he should not be compelled to pay the amount of the *fi. fa.*to the plaintiff, a rule absolute will be granted against him for the value of the land, if such value he less than the amount of the *fi. fa.,*otherwise for the amount of the execution.

Rule against sheriff. Measure of damages. Before Judge Harvey. Polk Superior Court. August Term, 1871.

The opinion gives the necessary facts.

Alexander & Wright, for plaintiff in error.

Blance, Dodd *&*King, by J. W. H. Underwood, for defendant.

Montgomery, Judge.

This was a rule against the sheriff for not selling a tract of land levied on under a foreclosure of a mortgage for the *293purchase-money. The sheriff’s excuse was that the mortgagor had sold to a third person, and that such third person claimed a homestead, and that he did not know the mortgage was for purchase-money.

The Court refused to make the rule absolute, but ordered the sheriff to proceed with the sale. "We think the rule absolute should have been granted for the value of the land or the amount of the execution, whichever was the less amount, under the decision of this Court, in *Baker vs. Brown, sheriff,*decided September 12th, 1871. Judgment reversed.
#### STATE v. HORACE ANDERSON.

(Filed 23 September, 1964.)

1. Criminal Law § 26—

Where sentence is vacated on *habeas corpus*on the ground that defendant’s constitutional rights were not protected in the trial, the State may try him for the second time for the same offense.

2. Criminal Law § 131—

Upon conviction for the same offense upon retrial after sentence in the original trial has been vacated, defendant is not entitled to credit on the last sentence for-the'time served on "the first. '

Appeal by defendant from *Froneberger, J.,*February, 1964 Criminal Term, BuNCOMbe Superior Court.

The defendant was indicted in the Superior Court of Buncombe County upon a.charge.of rape. At the December Term, 1961, he entered a plea of guilty of assault with intent to commit rape. This plea the State accepted. The court imposed a prison sentence of not less than 12 nor more than 15 years.

The defendant by *habeas corpus,*applied to the United- States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina for release upon the ground his constitutional rights had been denied him in his State court trial. The District Court vacated the sentence and ordered that the case be retried within a reasonable time or dismissed. The case is reported in Federal Supplement 221, page 930. The State elected to retry the defendant.

At the retrial on the original indictment, the defendant, represented by counsel when arraigned, again entered a plea of guilty of assault with intent to commit rape. The State accepted the plea. The court imposed a prison sentence of five years. The defendant appealed.

*T. W. Bruton, Attorney General, Harry W„ McGalliard, Deputy Attorney General for the State.*

*W. M. Styles for defendant appellant.*

PeR Cueiam.

The defendant raises two questions on this appeal: (1) Having placed the defendant on trial and failed to protect his constitutional rights, may the State try him for the second time for the same offense? (2) In case of a conviction and sentence at the second trial, is the defendant entitled to credit on the last sentence for the time he served under the first sentence?

*492This Court, in *State v. White,*262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E. 2d 205, answered both questions. The answer to the first question is, yes. The answer to the second question is, no.

In the trial below, we find

No error.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

LAMAR PENNY,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 329 WAL 2021

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 5th day of April, 2022

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
Case 1:07-cv-03545-DAB Document 2 Filed 05/03/2007 Page 1 of 1
#### McKINLEY MEARS v. JASON F. CRIBB.

(Filed 27 September, 1961.)

Appeal by defendant from *Paul, J.,*April Civil Term 1961 of New Hanovee.

Civil action to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff, a pedestrian, while crossing Dawson Street at the intersection of said street and Seventh Street, in the city of Wilmington, North Carolina, about 6:00 p.m. on 24 January 1958. Plaintiff was struck by an automobile operated by defendant in a westerly direction on Dawson Street, and was seriously injured.

From a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff, the defendant appeals, assigning error.

*423
      *Addison Hewlett, Jr., and Solomon B. Sternberger for plaintiff ap-pellee.*

*B. S. McClelland, L. Bradford Tillery, W. Allien Cobb for defendant appellant.*

Per Curiam.

A careful consideration of defendant’s exceptive assignments of error, leads us to the conclusion that they are without sufficient merit to disturb the verdict below.

In the trial below, we find

No error.
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 189 (Monday, October 1, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 55788]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-4821]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES


National Institutes of Health; National Institute Of Child Health 
And Human Development; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development Special Emphasis Panel, Global Network For Women's And 
Children's Health Research.
    Date: October 25, 2007.
    Time: 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Gaithersburg Hilton, 620 Perry Parkway, Gaithersburg, MD 
20877.
    Contact Person: Sathasiva B. Kandasamy, PhD, Scientific Review 
Administrator, Division Of Scientific Review, National Institute of 
Child Health, and Human Development, 6100 Executive Boulevard, Room 
5B01, Bethesda, MD 20892-6680, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#d9aab2b8b7bdb8aab899b4b8b0b5f7b7b0b1"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1a69717b747e7b697b5a777b737634747372">[email protected]</span></a>,gov.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.864, 
Population Research; 93.865, Research for Mothers and Children; 
93.929, Center for Medical Rehabilitation Research; 93.209, 
Contraception and Infertility Loan Repayment Program, National 
Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: September 21, 2007.
Jennifer Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy
[FR Doc. 07-4821 Filed 9-28-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M


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Exhibit 12.1
 Certification Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Pemex Finance Limited;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented
in this report;4.
    
    As the companys certifying officer, I am responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Rules
13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) for the company and have:
     5.
    
    As the companys certifying officer, I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the companys auditors and the
audit committee of the companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
    /s/ Eduardo R. Calvo Barbeau

Eduardo R. Calvo BarbeauPresident
#### STATE v. HAIR

No. 42P82.

Case below: 55 N.C. App. 267.

Petition by defendant for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 4 May 1982.
#### ADAMS v. INSURANCE CO.

No. 10 PC.

Case below: 11 N.C. App. 678.

Petition for writ of *certiorari*to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 7 September 1971.
<PAGE>


                                                                   EXHIBIT 32.2

               CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                   AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

    Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and in connection
with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of The Enstar Group, Inc. (the
"Corporation") for the period ended June 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, the
Chief Financial Officer of the Corporation, certifies that:

    (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

    (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Corporation.

/s/ Cheryl D. Davis
-----------------------------------------------------
Cheryl D. Davis
Chief Financial Officer, Vice President of Corporate
Taxes, and Secretary
August 9, 2004

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to The Enstar Group, Inc. and will be retained by The Enstar Group,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.




                                      28
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                           1,115,151
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   21,312,904
<ALLOWANCES>                                       499,759
<INVENTORY>                                     14,121,690
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,540,481
<PP&E>                                          65,273,594
<DEPRECIATION>                                  30,273,381
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  77,531,060
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,761,125
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                         8,931,960
<OTHER-SE>                                      24,397,702
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    77,531,060
<SALES>                                        116,075,990
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               116,075,990
<CGS>                                           88,583,489
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   88,583,489
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                19,149,439
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 533,791
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,809,271
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,697,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,112,271
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,112,271
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                         1.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         0.99
        

</TABLE>
DOCSNY-271686v01 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

----------------------------------------------------------------X 

IN RE WORLD TRADE CENTER LOWER 

MANHATTAN DISASTER SITE LITIGATION 

: 

: 

: 

: 

21 MC 102 (AKH) 

----------------------------------------------------------------X 

DAVID REYNOLDS (AND WIFE, KATHERINE 

REYNOLDS), 

 Plaintiff, 

 - against - 

ALAN KASMAN DBA KASCO, et al.,

 Defendants. 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

07-CV-3446-AKH 

APPEARANCE 

ELECTRONICALLY FILED 

----------------------------------------------------------------X 

To the Clerk of this Court and all parties of record: 

Enter my appearance as counsel in this case for: 

MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC. 

I certify that I am admitted to practice in this court.

Dated: New York, New York 

 October 3, 2007 

 By:

DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP 

 /s/ Judith R. Cohen___ 

Judith R. Cohen (JC-8614) 

1177 Avenue of the Americas 

New York, New York 10036 

Phone: (212) 277-6500 

Fax: (212) 277-6501 

Attorney for Defendant 

MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC. 

Case 1:07-cv-03446-AKH Document 23 Filed 10/03/2007 Page 1 of 1
Case 1:07-cv-03580-DLC Document 46 Filed 07/13/2007 Page 1 of 1
CERTIFICATIONSExhibit 31.2I, Raymond L. Carr, certify that:1.
I have reviewed the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Kentucky Investors, Inc.;2.
Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;3.
Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;4.
The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant, and we have:(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared,(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this quarterly report based on such evaluation, and(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and5.
The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors:(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial information; and(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.Date: August 11, 2004
By: /s/ Raymond L. CarrRaymond L. CarrChief Financial Officer -- Vice President
Case 1:07-cv-03583-LBS-RLE     Document 27-13      Filed 05/22/2008     Page 1 of 8

Case 1:07-cv-03583-LBS-RLE     Document 27-13      Filed 05/22/2008     Page 2 of 8

Case 1:07-cv-03583-LBS-RLE     Document 27-13      Filed 05/22/2008     Page 3 of 8

Case 1:07-cv-03583-LBS-RLE     Document 27-13      Filed 05/22/2008     Page 4 of 8

Case 1:07-cv-03583-LBS-RLE     Document 27-13      Filed 05/22/2008     Page 5 of 8

Case 1:07-cv-03583-LBS-RLE     Document 27-13      Filed 05/22/2008     Page 6 of 8

Case 1:07-cv-03583-LBS-RLE     Document 27-13      Filed 05/22/2008     Page 7 of 8

Case 1:07-cv-03583-LBS-RLE     Document 27-13      Filed 05/22/2008     Page 8 of 8
atel_Ex4_1


		
			Exhibit 4.1
		

		
			 
		

		
			DESCRIPTION OF COMPANY MEMBERSHIP INTEREST (“UNITS”)
		

		
			Fast Act Exhibit 4(vi) “Description of registrant’s securities”
		

		
			 
		

		
			Summary
		

		
			 
		

		
			The following description summarizes certain important terms of ATEL 16, LLC’s (the “Company”) membership interests (the “Units”). This description summarizes the provisions that are included in the Company’s Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement (the “Operating Agreement”).  This summary will not provide all the information relevant to the Units. For a complete description of the Units,  please refer to the applicable provisions of Company’s Operating Agreement and relevant California governing law.
		

		
			 
		

		
			Outstanding Units
		

		
			 
		

		
			4,274,486 Units have been subscribed by the members of the Company as of December 31, 2019.
		

		
			 
		

		
			General
		

		
			 
		

		
			Liquidity. The Units were offered and sold pursuant to registration under the Securities Act of 1933, and subsequently registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  However, the Units are subject to significant restriction on transferability in order to preserve the tax characterization of the Company and tax consequences for Unit holders.  Accordingly, the Units are not traded on any securities exchange and have limited liquidity.  Please review the rights of Unit holders for transfer of shares under the Operating Agreement.
		

		
			 
		

		
			Voting Rights. The holders of Units are entitled to one vote per share on any matter to be voted upon by holders of Units in the Company’s Operating Agreement. Certain rights may only be exercised upon receiving at least a majority of the votes entitled to be cast by Unit holders
		

		
			 
		

		
			Distributions.  The holders of Units are entitled to distributions on a pro rata basis, if, as, and when distributed by the Manager.
		

		
			 
		

		
			Other Rights. No holder of Units has any priority or preemptive right as to the Units.  
		

		
			 
		

		
			Dissolution and Winding Up.  Upon any voluntary or involuntary liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of the Company, the Unit holders are entitled to share ratably in all assets remaining after payment of creditors.
		

		
			 
		

		
			Transfer Agent and Registrar. The transfer agent and registrar of the Units is Conduent Inc.
#### William E. Bowen *vs.*The Dorchester Ice Company.

Suffolk.

February 23, 1926.

February 26, 1926.

Present: Rugg, C.J., Crosby, Pierce, Carroll, & Wait, JJ.

*Corporation,*Dissolution.

An action, begun in 1917 against a Massachusetts corporation which was dissolved by Spec. St. 1916, c. 112, which took effect on February 21, 1916, must be dismissed upon the fact, that no judgment therein had been rendered, being called to the attention of the court in 1925, the period named in St. 1903, c. 437, § 52, having passed and the provisions of St. 1920, c. 165, not applying.

Contract. Writ dated July 25, 1917.

In the Superior Court, the action was referred to an auditor on June 13, 1918. The auditor’s report was filed on May 12, 1922. On July 1, 1925, the action was reported by *Lawton,*J., to this court for determination, the parties agreeing: “(1) That each party waives trial by jury. (2) That the auditor’s findings of fact be final and his report treated as findings of the court without jury reserving questions of law for the determination of the Supreme Judicial Court. (3) That such questions of law and the questions raised by the defendant’s dissolution be reported to said court. . . . that the dissolution of said corporation, with its resultant effects, is to be the primary question presented for decision to the Supreme Judicial Court.”

The case was submitted on briefs.

*F. Juggins & M. M. McChesney,*for the plaintiff.

*L. B. King,*for the defendant.

By the Court.

This action at law against a Massachusetts corporation was commenced on July 25, 1917. The defendant was dissolved by Spec. St. 1916, c. 112, which took effect on February 21, 1916. That act contained no provision extending an action like the present. It is provided by St. 1903, c. 437, § 52, subject to the terms of which the defendant was dissolved, that it shall “be continued as *160a body corporate for three years after the time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it.” That period expired on February 21, 1919. The defendant came to an end on that date. *Boston Tow Boat Co.*v. *Medford National Bank,*228 Mass. 484, 486.

A proviso was added to said § 52 by St. 1920, c. 165, to the effect that *“the*corporate existence of such a corporation, for the purposes of any suit brought by or against it within said period of three years, shall continue beyond said period for a further period of sixty days after final judgment in the suit.” That act was prospective only in operation. It did not apply to the case at bar. *Hanscom*v. *Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co.*220 Mass. 1, 3, 4.

*Action dismissed, not on the merits, but because of dissolution of corporate existence of defendant.*