### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00536- CR

Da na P ie r c e , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WILLI AMSO N COUNTY , 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 02-6 15- K2 6, HO NORAB LE BI LLY RAY STUB B LEF IELD, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A j ury c on vic te d D ana

L y nn e Pie rc e of

mur de r a nd a sse sse d p un ish me nt at si xty y ear s in prison. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 19.02( b) (West 2004). Pierc e does not de ny killing Shawn Rendon or c halleng e the suff icienc y o f t h e ev idence to support her c onviction, but
co mp l ai n s o nap p ea l t h at t h e c o u rt erre d b y al l o wi n g t h e S t at e t o i n v ad e h er at t o rn ey -c l i en tp ri v i l ege
on cross-e x amination by

asking her a

bout the fre quency

of her contac t w ith her attorne y and whe ther she wa s being “coa ched
. ” S he fur ther a sserts that the cour

t erre d by admitting ce rtain evide nce. Pierce also contends that she was de nied ef fective assistance of counse l. We will affirm the jud g me nt.2 BACK GR OUND Pie rc e ha d k

no wn Re nd on fo r e ig ht y e ars and

liv e d with him fo r ab ou t thr e e y e a rs . At the time of the e vents g iving r ise to Pierce ’s conviction, their re lationship was deter iorating and they wer e planningto move apar t. Pierce blamed Rendon’s mood swi n gs an d sexual desires and pr a c tic e s. Ac c or din g to P ie rc e , Re nd on fo rc e d h e r t o h a ve ana l se x the da y be fo re sh e sh ot h im. She testified that she had been g reatly disturbed by

the episode, a

nd was fur

ther upset whe n he for ced her to pe rfor

m oral sex on him t he next morning. P i er ce later w orked up the coura g e to conf ront Re n d o n an d te ll h im th a t s h e w an te d to s e e k c o u n s e li n g f o r h e r f e e li n g s a b o u t th e an a l s e x. She te sti fi e d th a t Re nd on

in si st ed th at sh e no t ta lk a bo ut t he ma tte r w ithany on e be c a us e it w ou ld eventua lly

be disclosed and harm his re putation. I nstead, Pierc e re counted, Rendon w anted to have sex ag ain, this time with va rious sexual a ids. Pi erc e re fused a nd ang ere d Rendon by

repe ating that she wa nted to talk to some one about the ana l sex episode. Pierc e said that she tr ied to walk aw ay from him, but he blocked he r path, y elled at he r, pushed he r into a shelf, and swung her into a mirr or. She fea red he was g oing to f

orce h er t o h av e s ex ag ain. Rendon then pushed he r down into the closet, ca using he r to brea

k a shoe r ack a

nd knock over

a shotg un. Pierce picked up the gun and asked him to let her le ave.

P i er ce testified that they

strug g led and that Rendon g rabbe d her by the hair. She thought he was g oing to kill her. She r ecounte d that, at s ome point, the g un fired. A t this j uncture , R en don still blocked he r path a nd leane d toward he r. Pierce initially did not remember

a sec ond3

shot, but concede d that it might have ha ppened. When Rendon f el l o n t h e floor in the adjace nt kitchen, she sa id she ca lled 911.

Peace office rs re sponding to the sc ene f ound Rendon dead. T hey conclude d that he had bee n shot once while in the bedroom and once whil e in or near the a djace nt kitchen. A bloodspatter e x pert testified that the second shot wa s fired w hile Rendon was on his kne es in the kitchen, possibly trying to u s e t h e t el ep h one. A f irea rms expert testified that the first shot was f ired fr om t h r e e t o e i g h tf

e e taw ay f r o m R e n d o n , an d t h e s e c o n d s h o tw a s f i r e d f r o m l e s s t h ans i x i n c h e s a w a y. There was e vidence of a time lagbetwee n the two shots, and evidenc e that one shel l fa iled to fire in the bedroom, supporting the State’s theory that Pierce fired once, ha d a misfire, the n fired the third shot in the kitchen.

Many other witness es t es t i fi ed
. Nu m er o u s wi t n es s es t es t i fi ed that R endon had a bused Pierce verba lly , emotionally , and psy cholog ically , and that Pierc e wa s passive and a fra id of Rendon. Pierce testified that she in t en d ed o n l y to hurt Rendon, and shot him beca use she ha d no choice
. Pierce ’s experts testified t hat s he ex hibited classic signs of being a bused and that she did not intend to kill R endon, only

to protect he rself. The State c alled severa l rebuttal witnesses who challeng ed Pierc e’s de scription of herse lf, her c apac ity to te ll the truth, and her descr iption of Rendon as abusive. Some a lso describe d Pierce ’s debts rising into the tens of thousands, including a debt to Rendon. Evidence also showed Pierce was ser

ved with a law suit on one of those debts only day s befor e she killed Rendon. During the g uilt-innocence phase of trial, the district court c ha r g ed the jury

on murder and self- defe nse, as we ll as the offe nses of sexual a ssault a nd ag g ravated kidnapping , from which4

Pierce might have defe nded her self with dea dly forc e. See Tex
. P en. Code Ann. § 9.32( a)( 3)(b) (West 2003). The jury

found her g uilty of m urder , implicitl y reje cting her claim of self-defe nse. At the punis hme nt p ha se , th e c ourt ins tr uc te d th e jur

y re g ardi ng su dd e n p a ssi on and c omm un ity supervision. The jury

expressly

did not find that Pi erc e murde red R en d o n under the influence of sudden passion. The jury assessed sentence at s ix ty y ear s in prison, viti ating her r equest that the jury
rec ommend she be pla ced on c ommunity supervision.
DI SCU SSIO N Pie rc e ra ise s si x issu e s o n a pp e a l. She c omp la ins that th e c ourt a llo we d th e State to invade the attorney -client privileg e on cr oss-examination by asking her a

bout the fre quency

of her
c on ta c t w ithhe r atto rn e y

and wh e the r s he ha d be e n co a c he d. She a dd s tha t the c ourt a dmi tte d s ome evidenc e that improper ly

attacke d her chara cter for truthfulness and other evidenc e that conc erne d the ir re le va nt s ub je c ts o f h e r int e re st in por no g ra ph y and of Willi a mso n Co un ty ’s his tor y of ra re ly placingmurdere rs on community supervision. She also complains t h at h er counsel re ndere d ineffe ctive assistanc e.
Invasion of attorney-c lient privilege

By her f irst issue, Pierce c ontends that the cour t erre d by overr uling her objec tions to questions by

the State that she c ontends invad ed t h e att orney -client privileg e. She complains about a se ries of q u es t i o n s by the State that she a

rg ues implied that her attorney s coac hed her te sti mony bo th be fo re and duri ng tr ia l. Wh ile a tte mpt ingto i mpe a c h Pi e rc e us ingpr ior state me nts inconsistent with her testimony , the State ask ed , “Over the pa st severa l months, Ms . Pierce , how5

much time have you spent with y our attorne y s? ” Af ter the c ourt overr

uled Pierce ’s objection to that questio n , th e St a te a s k e d f o u rte e n mo r e qu e s ti o n s ( o n ly o n e o f w h ic h w a s o b je c te d to ) a

b o u t the fr e qu e nc y , d

ur a tio n, loc a tio n, and

re c e nc y of Pie rc e ’s c on ta c ts w ith he r a tto rn e y , c ulm inatin g wi th the State asking if Pierce and her attorney had established a mea ns of communicatingabout the y ear in w hic h s ome thi ngoc c ur re d: “ So, if

pe op le in t

he a ud ie nc e have ob se rv e d th a t it a pp e are d th a t if the y ear was 2000, Ms. Davis-J ones made some sort of a c ircle w ith her hand if the y ear was 2001 there was some pointing that went on—.” Pier ce inter rupted a nd denied being coac hed, say ing that
s h e f i g u r e d o u tt h e ye ar

w i t h o u ts i g n a l s f

r o m h e r a t t o r n e y. The rule establishing attorney -client privilege provides, in rele vant part, that a client may ref use to disclose and ma

y preve nt the disclosure of confide ntial c ommunications ma de for the purpose of

fac ilitating the re ndition of professional leg al servic es to the client among the client, her repr esentatives, her lawy er, and her lawy er’ s repr esentatives. See Tex. R. Evi d. 503(b)( 1). A c lient in a criminal case also may preve nt he r lawy er or her lawy er’ s repr esentatives from disclosing a ny other fa ct which c ame to the knowle dg e of the lawy er or the lawy er’ s repr esentative by rea son of the attorney -client re lat i onship. Se e id . 5 03 (b )( 2) . T he purp os e of the a tto rn e y -c lie nt p ri vil e g e is t o promote communication between attorney and client unr estraine d by fea r that these c onfidenc es may later be reve aled. Au sti n v . S tat e , 934 S.W .2d 672, 673 (Tex
. C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 96). Statements and
a d v ic e o f th e a tt o r n e y ar e ju s t a s p r o te c te d

a s th e c o mm

u n ic a ti o n s of t he client. Id . But the lawy er- client privileg e is only an exclusionary

rule of e vidence , not a p ri nciple of c onstitut ional proportions. Str on g v . S

tat e , 773 S.W .2d 543, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Thus, if the tr ial court
err ed, we may

reve rse only

if the er ror a ffe cted substantial rig hts. See Tex. R. App. P . 44.2(b).6 I n this case, no e rror

was c ommitt ed. We find no authority for the pr oposition t hat the State c a n n o t in qu ir e w h e th e r , h o w o f te n , h o w lo n g , an d h o w r e c e n tl y Pi e r c e h a d me t w it h her
a tto rn e y s. F ur

the r, in th e qu estiona

bo ut h and

signa ls, the State wa s a sk inga bo ut h and

sig na ls purporte d ly o b s e r

v e d in o p e n c o u rt w h il e Pi e r c e w a s o n th e s ta n d ; it d id n o t c a ll f

o r d is c lo s u re of confide ntial communications. Pierce’ s answer , moreove r, did not disclose any co n fi d ential
c omm un ic a tio ns be c a

us e sh e fl a tly

de nie d th a t he r atto rn e y

ma de any ha nd g e sture s, did

no t di sc los e any u n d er l y i n g communications, and did not imply that she had pa

rticipated in a

ny discussions intended to shape her te stimony . We overrule her f irst issue.
Evi de nc e of c har ac te r for tr ut hfulne ss

By her se cond issue, Pierc e complains that the d i strict court e rre d by admitting evidenc e of spe cific instanc es of c onduct re g ardingher chara cter for truthfulness. Although Pier ce
me nti on s nume ro us ins tanc e s in whic h the State a sk e d Pi e rc e a bo ut s pe c if

ic ins tanc e s o f c on du c t, these for m merely the bac kg round of he r appe llate co m plaint beca use she did not object to any such questions posed to her . I nstead, she focuse s on testimony by J ody Wil lis, a one-time fr iend and
co-w orker . Pierce objected w hen the State a sked Will is, “At some point did y ou come to for m an opinion about the Def

endant’ s capa city

for truthfulne ss? ” Pierc e objec ted:
Couns e l kn ow s the pr op e r wa y to imp e a c h a pe rs on ’s re pu ta tio n, and thi s is c le arl y no t it. Al l this te sti mony is dup lic a tiv e . Th e De fe nd ant h a s te sti fi e d a nd no w M iss —M s. Mc Cow n is just g oin g ov e r wh a t wa s re pe a te d to peo ple . N owthi s is jus t a wa y to s me ar h e r ch ara c te r, and we ’r e g oin g to h e ar m or e of it b e fo re the da

y is o ut, Ifea r.7

T h e S t at e ar gu ed at t h e be n ch t h at P i er ce h adp u th er t ru t h -t el l i n g cap ac i t y

at i s s u e. W i t h o u tru l i n g, the C ou rt r e s p o n d e d , “ We ll , if y o u ’ ll s ti c k

to ar e a s w h e r e th is w it

n e s s c anc o n tr a d ic t p r e vious testimony of the De fenda

nt. As Iunderstand it, howe ver, reputation evidence is ver y formulaic a

nd specific instances a

re not pe rmissible.” The State arg ued that opini on evidenc e is permissible if a defe ndant puts her truth-telling abilit y at i ssue by testify ing. The court replied, “ Okay . L et’s stick to those two are as.” The State did not repe at its request for Wil lis’s opinion on P ierc e’s c apac ity for tr uth fu lne ss, bu t pr omp te d Wil lis to d isc us s h owhe r fr ie nd sh ip w ithPie rc e dis sip a te d a s Wil lis c a me to d isb e lie ve so me of

Pie rc e ’s re pr e se ntatio ns . We r e vie w the a dmi ssi on

of e vid e nc e fo r an a

bu se of dis c re tio n, and

c an r e ve rs e on ly if the court’s ruling is so clea rly wrong that it lies outside the z one of rea sonable disagr eeme nt. See Mo ntgom e ry

v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 199 0 ) (o p . o n reh’ g ). A witness’s char acte r for

truthful n es s cannot be impeache d by specific instances of

conduct other

than convictions for crimes. See Tex. R. Evid. 608(b). To prese rve e rror , an appe llant must show that sh e ma de the c omp la int

to t he tr ia l c ourt

by tim e ly ob

je c tio n that state d the g ro un ds fo r ru lin g wi th sufficie nt specificity

to alert the tria l court to the basis of the c omplaint. See Te x. R. A pp . P. 33 .1 (a )( 1)
. An a

pp e lla nt mus t a lso sh owthat th e tr ia l c ourt e ith e r r ule d o n th e ob

je c tio n e xpre ssl y
o r i mplicitly

or that the a

ppellant objecte d to the ref usal to rule. Id
. 3 3
. 1 ( a ) ( 2 )
. A complaint on appea l must comport with the trial objection or nothing is pre sented for revie w. Se e Re

za c v . S tat e , 78 2 S. W.2 d 8 69 , 8 70 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ); Bu nto n v. Sta te , 1 3 6 S. W. 3 d 3 5 5 , 3 6 4 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref ’d).8 Pierce did not complain at trial that the evide nce w as inadmissible under Rule 608. Pierce complained that the State was not impeac hing he r prope rly , but the only specific basis stated was duplicativeness. This objection did not alert the c ourt to her a ppellate c omplaint that the qu e sti on s im

pr op e rl y c on c e rn sp e c if ic ins tanc e s o f c on du c t re g ard ing he r c ha ra c te r f or tr uth fu lne ss. Fur ther, the c ourt did not ex pressly rule on the obje ction; the court discussed the o b j ection and pro v id e d g u id an c e to th e St a te r e g ar d in g th e c o u r s e o f qu e s ti o n in g . F in a ll y , th e St ate did not reiter ate the que stion about Willis’s opinion on Pierce ’s capa city for truthfulness af ter the obje ction and discussion, and Willi s did not answer it. We find no re versible e rror prese rved on this issue.
Evi de nc e of int e r e stin po r nog r aphy

By her third issue, Pierc e conte nds that the district court erre d by admitting evide nce reg ardingher a lleg ed intere st in pornogr aphy . She complains of the a dmission of an e-mail fr om Pie rc e to R e nd on

e nti tle d “ Yummy

Pic s. ” Atta c he d w e re se ve ra l pi c tur e s e xplic itl y sh ow ingor a l,
va g ina l, a nd ana l se x invo lvi ngpe rs on s o the r t ha n Pi e rc e and

Re nd on . T he e -m a il w a s d a te d Apr il 30, 2001—over a

y ear befor e Pierc e killed Rendon on May 15, 2002. Pierce contends that these photogr aphs we re irr el evant and that any rele vance was substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er o f u n fair pr ejudice. See Tex. R. Evi d. 401, 403. Pierce
a dmi tte d in

he r d ir e c t te sti mony

that sh e fo rw ard e d s e xua lly e xplic it p ic tur e s to Re nd on via e -m a il. She also descr ibed a se x life with him that gr ew more experimental, roug her, unple asant, a nd
nonconsensua l. She testified that she for wa rd ed p o rn og raphic pictures to Rendon only if she inadver tently found them in the computer afte r his internet explorations. She argues that the imag es9

did not make any

contested f

act more or less proba

ble. She contends that the fact that she for war ded the ph oto s d oe s n ot m e an th a t sh e loo ke d at th e m, muc h les s enj oy e d the m. She argue s th a t th e on ly purpose wa s the hig hly

prejudicia l intent to portray her a s sexually

depra ved and a liar. The State re sponds that it offere d the messag e to counter act t h e i m p ression P ierc e
c re a te d d ur inghe r t e sti mony

that sh e wa s a

n unw ill ingpa

rt ic ipa nt in vari ou s sexua l a c ts w ith Re nd on . T he State argue s th a t he r s e nd ing the ima g e s to Re nd on sh ow s that sh e wa s int e re ste d in the ac ts depicted ther ein.

I n weig hing the probative va lue of offe red evidenc e under Rule 403, the district court
c on sid e rs fa c tor s in c lud ing(1 ) t he e vid e nc e ’s inh e re nt pr ob a tiv e va lue ; ( 2) its po te nti a l to imp re ss the jury in some irrational but indelible wa y ; (3) the amount of t ime the proponent needs to develop the evidenc e; and (4) the proponent’s need f or the e vidence
. W

he e le r v . S

tat e , 67 S.W .3d 879, 888 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ). Ev e n r e le va nt e vid e nc e mus t be e xclu de d w he n th e re is a c le ar d isp a ri ty betwee n the degr ee of prejudice of t he offere d evidenc e and its probative value. J on es v . S tat e , 944 S.W .2 d 6 42, 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We review the court’s c onclusion for a n abuse of discretion. Mo ntgom e ry , 810 S.W .2d at 390.

We c on c lud e tha

t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n b y fi nd in g th is evidenc e re levant and a dmissibl e. Pierc e pre sented a defe nsi v e t h eo ry that she wa s subject to a
c a mpa ig n o f i nc re a sin g ps y c ho log ic a l do min a tio n a n d s e xu a l d e v i a

n c y o r c h e str a te d b y

Re nd on . T his t h eo ry fo rm edt h e b ac k gro u n d

fo r he r co n t en t i o n t h at h e ra p ed h er an al l y t h e da y b ef

o re t h e s h o o t i n g, and supported her theory of the dispute she had with Re ndon and provide d the basis for he r fe ars f or her sa fety on t h e d ay

of the shooting . Although f orwa rding the photos did not necessa rily show10

Pierce ’s approval of the a ctivities depicted, the jury could infer

that the e- mail undermines her g e ne ra l de fe ns ive the or

y that she wa s an u

nw ill ingpa

rt ic ipa nt i n a ny of the a c tiv iti e s—

pa rt ic ula rl y
w h e nth e p h o to s ar e v ie w e d in c o n ju n c ti o nw it

h th e ti tl e of her e-ma il: “ Y u mmy Pi c s . ” We emphasize that sending these photos does not prove acquie scenc e to beingrape d or to participation in any of the other

specific activities she say s she did not consent to perf orming
. Bu t the district court did not abuse its discre tion by concludingthat the e-ma il a nd photos relate to Pierc e’s de piction of the le ve l of

he r v olu nta ry inv olv e me nt i n th e g e ne ra l c ours e of the ir se xua l ac tiv iti e s and

the ir rela tio n s h ip , w h ic h a ls o b e ar s o nh e r v e r s io no f

e v e n ts o nth e d ay

o f th e s h o o ti n g
— in c lu ding
w h e t h e r t h e y h a d a d i s p u t e a b o u tt h e s e a c t i v i t i e s w h i l e s h e f e ar e d f o r h e r s a f e t y. We further

conclude that the di strict court did not abuse its discre tion by decidingthat the pr ob a tiv e va lue of

the e vid e nc e wa s n ot s ub sta nti a lly ou tw eighe d by

its po te nti a l un fa ir prejudicia l effe ct. Although the photogr aphs mig ht have be en shockingor unplea sant to view for some of the juror s, the acts depicted therein are less unusual and violent than some of the ac tiviti es in which Pierce had testified she was for ced to pa rticipate; this context diminis hes the likelihood that the photos would influence the jurors in an irr ational, indelible way . This evidence did not take much time to introduce, and the State ne eded the evidenc e to counter Pierce ’s testimony

that she wa s
an un wi lli ngpa

rt ic ipa nt i n a c tiv iti e s li ke tho se de pic te d in the ph oto s. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt re a so na bly could have conclude d that the risk of unfa ir prejudice did not substantially outweig h the probative value of this evidenc e. We conclude that the di strict court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence
.11

Evid ence about com m uni ty supervision i n Will iam son Coun ty

By her f ourth issue, Pierce contends that the c ourt err ed by adm i t ting e vidence
c on c e rn ingWilli a mso n Co un ty ’s his tor y of ra re ly pla c ingc on vic te d mu

rd e re rs on c omm

un ity supervision. At the punishment phase, Pierce called Rick Z insmey er, the direc tor of the Willi amson Cou nty C o m m u n i t y

S u p e r v i s i o na n d

C o r r e c t i o n s D e p art m e n t , t o d i s c u s s h o w c o m m u n ity
su pe rv isi on wo rk e d. On

c ro ss- e xami natio n, the State a sk e d h im i f a ny mur de rers co nv ic te d in Wil liamson County

wer e cur rently on community

supervision; he re sponded, “I don’t think so, but Ididn’t chec k. Ijust found out I was g oing to be here 20 minutes ag o. But we’ve ha d some in the past.” The State then asked him to talk about particula r people who ha d been pla ced on pr obation for murde r; afte r an obje ction, the State aske d wh et h er he rec alled someone being place d on probation for a shot g un killing. Pierce ag ain obj ecte d to the refer ence to a specific ca se, ar g uing that it wa s no t re le va

nt to Pie rc e . Th e c ourt ov e rr ule d th e ob

je c tio n, and

Z ins me y e r t e sti fi e d a s f

oll ow s: “I don’t know what kind of firea rm was used. And the one that jumps out at me was in 1977, and I —Ifee l like there’ s been some—I just don’t reca ll, but I reme mber that be ca u s e I s u pervised the
case . And since I

don’t supervise c ases a

ny more, I just don’t reca ll.” The c riteria f

or making rele vancy

deter minations at the punishment phase dif fer be c a us e the us e of

e vid e nc e dif

fe rs . A t the punis hme nt pha se , the re are fe we r d e fi ne d e le me nts to be fo un d; t

he c ourt of c ri min a l app eals w ro te , “ B e c a us e the ma te ri a l is su e a t pu nis hme nt i s so indisti nct, relevanc y of proffer ed evidence c annot be de termined by deductive pr ocesse s.” Su nb ur y
v . Sta te , 8 8 S.W .3d 229, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Acc ording ly , “dete rmining w hat evidenc e should be admitted at the punishment pha se of a non-ca pital f elony offe nse is a function of policy12

rathe r than a

question of log ical re levanc e.” Id
. Some of t he policy considerations include g iving complete infor

mation for the jury

to t ail or an a

ppropriate sentenc e for

a def endant; the policy

of optional completene ss; and admitt ing the truth in sentencing
. Id
. Although the criter ia the trial cour t
u s es diffe r, we revie w the dec ision for an a buse of discr etion. Mi tc he ll v . S tat e , 9 3 1 S. W. 2 d

950, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

The State contends that Pierce failed to pr eser ve this e rror , arguing that the objection
overr uled at trial wa s to a narr ow question conc erninga shot g un murdere r g etting pr obation, but the
c omp la int on a

pp e a l is to e vid e nc e on the br oa de r iss ue of mur de re rs g e tti ngpr ob a tio n. I n c on te xt, howeve r, Pierce ’s objection wa s t o an y i n quiry into other ca ses. She first objec ted to a broa d question about murder ers g etting pr obation; when the State r ephra sed—without the court r uling on the ob je c tio n— and

a sk e d s pe c if

ic a lly a bo ut p ro batio n b a se d o n a “ sh otgun kil lin g ,” Pie rc e a g a in objected that “[t] his is just a nother way around here
. This is a ref ere nce to a specific case . I t’s not rele vant to Dana

Pierce .” We find the a sserted e rror adequately

prese rved f

or our r eview. That Z insmey er could rec all only one other murdere r who used a shotgun r ece iving probation has little rele vance to what sentenc e Pierc e should rec eive. The testimony does not prove, as the State c ontends, that the probation department c ould not adequate l y s u pervise a convicted murdere r; rathe r, it shows that the depar tment is not of

ten called upon to do so. But ne ither did the testimony , as Pierce contends, invi te the jury to speculate about how other murdere rs wer e sente nced i nW i l l i am s o nC o u n t y w i t h o u t p ro v i d i n g anyinformation about the other case s; it showed that pr ob a tio n f

or mur de re rs wa s ra

re . Th is e vid e nc e is a t mos t ind ir e c t e vid e nc e of the a pp ro pr ia te ne ss of probation, which the court can admit if the evidence will not confuse the j ury . Se e Or tiz v . S tat e ,13

834 S.W .2d 343, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). But this evidenc e does not e x plai n whether other murdere rs who used shotguns did not g et probation, whether this wa s appropr iate, or whether or how those ca ses should inform the jury reg ardingtheir dec ision on P ierc e. Any err or in the admis sion of this testim ony did not harm Pierce . Be cause admission of this evidenc e is not constitutional err or, we cannot rever se unl ess we find that the er ror a ffe cted the substantial ri gh t s o f the appe llant. See Tex. R. App. P . 44.2(b)( 2). Substantial rig hts are not aff ecte d by the er roneous a dmission of evidence “if the appellate court, after ex amining the rec ord
as a w hole, has fa ir assura nce that the err or did not i nfluenc e the jury , or had but a slight ef fec t.” Re ese v . S

tat e , 3 3 S
. W
. 3 d 2 3 8 , 2 4 3 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 967 S.W .2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). Ther e wa s ample other evidenc e rele vant to punishment. There
wer e more than two wee ks of evidenc e at the guilt-innocence phase that cover ed the nature of the crime a s well as Pierc e’s c onduct and motivations. At the punishment phase, the State c alled Re nd on ’s mot

he r t o d isc us s the e ff

e c t of the los s o f h e r s on . Pi e rc e c a lle d tw o w itn e sse s to dis c us s probation and a

third to talk about her friendship with Pierce . The fa ct that the six ty -y ear sentenc e far exceeds the ma x imum ten-y ear leng th for a sentence that could be pr obated indicates strong ly that the jury based its sentenc e, and the implicit decision not to r ecommend community supervision, on
e vid e nc e oth e r t

ha n Z ins me y e r’ s com men ts. We c on c lud e that th e inf or ma tio n th a t c omm

un ity supervision for murde rer s was ra re in Willi amson County

had no ef fec t on the sentenc e.
Ineff ect ive assistance of counsel By her f ifth and six th issues on appea l, Pierce a rg ues that she wa s denied e ffe ctive assistance of counse l in violation of both t he state a nd fede ral c onstitut ions. Pierce complains that14

her c ounsel was unprepar ed to deal with the various way s in which her cre dibilit y would be attac ked. She argues that these c redibility challeng es cr ippled her a ssertion of self- defe nse. The fe dera l and state c onstitut ions gua rante e t h e right to the re asonably eff ective assistance of counse l in a criminal proc eeding . U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Tex. C onst. art. I , § 10. To
s h o w in e f

f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e o f c o u n s e l, a d e f

e n d an t mu s t s h o w th a t ( 1 ) h is tr ia l counsel’s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt, in that counsel mad e s u ch s er ious error s he wa s not functioning eff ectively as counse l; and (2) the defic ient perf ormanc e prejudiced the defe nse to such a de g ree that the def endant wa s deprived of

a fa ir trial. Stri ck l a n d v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984); He rn an de z v . S tat e , 726 S.W .2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (adopting S t r ickland standard f

or state constitutional violations).

A s tr on g pr e su

mpt ion e xists that c ouns e l re nd e re d ad e qu a te a ssi sta nc e and ma de a ll sign i fi ca nt decisions in the exercise of rea sonable prof

essional judg ment. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 69 4. Th e str on g pr e su mpt ion is th at couns e l’ s c on du c t f e ll w ith in t

he wi de ra

ng e of re a so na ble profe ssional assistance. Tho mp so n v . S tat e , 9 S.W .3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 199 9 ). The challeng ed conduc t will not constitute defic ient perf ormanc e unless the conduc t was so outrag eous that no competent attorney would have e ng ag ed in it. Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 57 S.W. 3 d

4 3 6 , 4 4 0 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2002).

Re vie w o f a

de fe nd ant’ s c la im o f i ne ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e mus t be hig hly

de fe re nti a l to trial counsel. Thompson , 9 S
. W
. 3 d a t8 1 3
. W e d o n o ts p e c u l at e a b o u tt r i a l c o u n s e l ’ s s t r a t e g y. Bl e v ins v . S

tat e , 18 S.W .3d 266, 271 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.). Rather, in the absenc e of dir e c t e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d of co un se l’ s re a so ns fo r the c ha lle ng e d co nd uc t, an a pp e llate c ourt

wi ll15

a s s u me a s tr a te g ic mo ti v a ti o n if an y c an b e imag ined. Gar cia , 57 S.W .3d at 440. The de fenda nt must show “a re asonable probability that but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the proce eding s would have be en diffe rent.” Thompson , 9 S.W. 3d a t 812. A r e a so na ble pr ob a bil ity is one that under

mines confidenc e in the outcome. Id
. The rec ord must a ffirmatively demonstrate the alleg ed ineffec tiveness and, in most cases, the trial r ecor d alone will be insuff icient. Thompson , 9 S.W. 3d a t 81 3. B ut c la ims of i neff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e c an b e su c c e ssf

ul i f t he a pp e llate re c or d is sufficie ntly

develope d. Se e Ro bin so n v . S tat e , 16 S.W .3d 808, 813 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Pierce complains about seve ral instance s in which her c ou n s el ’s performanc e wa s de fi c ie nt w hil e sh e wa s b e inge xam ined ; he r c omp la int s d e pe nd on the tr ia l r e c or d a lon e be c a us e the re wa s no he ari ng on the mot ion fo r ne w tr ia l. She c omp la ins a bo ut the fa ilu re t o o bj ect to improper que stions while the State was cr oss-examining her ; thes e q u e s tions concer

ned her financ ial status a nd reloc ation plans. She also complains that the State a dduced r esponses fr om her that set up “straw men” that the State could then impeac h with prior inconsistent statements; she g ives the example of the State adduc ing he r denia l that she eve r told any one that she had a trust fund or that her g randf

ather g ave he r $100,000, which the State then rebutted with testimony from witnesses w ho
sa id s he ha d ma de tho se state me nts
.

Pierce also complains about counsel’s perf ormanc e while other witnesse s were being
e xami ne d. She a ssa ils he r c ouns e l’ s fa ilure to obj e c t to he r land lor d’ s te sti mony a bo ut i ns tanc e s in wh ic h Pi e rc e lie d a

bo ut m a kin g arr ang e me nts to p ay he r l a te re nt, Willi s’ s te sti mony a bo ut d e ta ils of Pierce ’s scheme to c ollect disability pay ments and other lies, and other witnesses’ testimony about lie s Pie rc e tol d th e m. S he a lso c omp la ins that he r c ouns e l f a ile d to ob

je c t to the State ’s fa ilure to16

lay the prope r pre dicate f

or impeac hment of her

claims of prior se x ual abuse and the State’ s violation of a motion in limine reg arding Pierce ’s arrest for theft by chec k. She attacks her counse l’s failure to o bje c t to the e lic itatio n o f t e sti mony that sh e ha d te mpe r tantr ums , th a t sh e re qu e ste d d isa bil ity leave beca

use she did not like her job, a nd that Pierce ’s ex-husband was not surprise d to hear that sh e sh ot R e nd on . Pi e rc e a lso argue s tha t her c ouns e l wa s ine ff e c tiv e fo r e lic iti ngte sti mony fr om a S tate’s witness r eg ardingPierce ’s statement that she c ould not rece ive a f air trial in Willi amson C o u n t y. Finally , Pierce co ntends that her c ounsel was inef fec tive during argument at the punishment phase for failing to r emind the jury of the sudden pa ssion inst ruction and f or appe aling to the jury

to give her pr obation so as not to separ ate her from her children. Pierce found the latter particula rly ineffe ctive bec ause the State th en argue d that invoking the c hildren as a rea son for decision wa s essentially

shameful a

nd exploi tative; she points to the fa ct that jurors wa nted to meet with prosecutor s, but not the defe nse, afte r the trial a s proof that he r counse l’s techniques a lienated the jur y so muc h th a t sh e wa s d e pr ive d o f t he e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Pierce ’s c o m plaints about her c ounsel not objecting to various evidenc e about he r monetary difficult i es fail bec ause that evidence was a dmissibl e to show motive under the State’s alternative theory

of eve nts. See Te x. R. Ap p. P. 40 4( b)
. Th e e vid e nc e a bo ut her d ebt s co uld
su pp or t a vie w o f h e r mot ive —th a t Pier c e wa s des pe rate to p re ve nt R e nd on fr om l e a vin g be c a

us e she ow ed h i m an d others so much money ; indeed, evide nce show ed that she ow ed him betwee n $5,000 and $20,000 and w as ser ved two day s befor e the shooting with a ci v i l p et i tion seeking
re p ay m en to f a n o t h er

d eb t
. T h u s , t h e e v i d en ce re b u t s P i er ce ’s s el f- d ef en s e c l ai m b y s h o wi n g a17

differ ent motive. Pierce ’s counse l was not ineff ective f or fa iling to object to admissible evidenc e. Se e Or tiz v . S tat e , 93 S.W .3d 79, 93-95 (Te x . Crim. App. 2002). Simi larly , evidenc e rebutting her version of events surr ounding he r leave of a bsence from wor k was re levant to m otive. She testified t hat s he took the l eave of absence be cause of the combination of ef

fec ts from childhood sexual abuse and he r re lati o n s h i p wi th Rendon. Evidence that she conc octed the sy

mptoms t hat substantiated her obtaining the leave in order to g et paid for work a nd not ge t laid of

f undermine her c laim that she was a psy cholog ically

battere d woman who sh ot Re nd on in se lf

-d e fe ns e . He r c ouns e l wa s no t ine ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto o bje c t to thi s a dmi ssi ble evidenc e. Se e id
.

The testimony

that Pierce was a

rre sted for th ef

t b y check came in throug h a pea ce office r’s testimony

about the cir cumstance s surrounding Pierce ’s s ta tement to law enf

orce ment. The State a sk e d if

Pie rc e wa s arr e ste d a ft e r g ivi ng he r se c on d state me nt. Th e of fi c e r re sp on de d, “ Ye s, she wa s. She was arr ested for a theft-by -che ck war rant that she had outstanding .” The State then
a sk e d if the of

fi c e r ob ta ine d a wa

rr ant fo r mur de r, and the of fi c e r c on fi rm e d th at h e di d. S ho rt ly there afte r, Pierce ’s counse l asked to appr oach the bench a nd noted that the office r’s testimony about the theft-by -che ck cha

rg e violated a motion in limine; she stated her intention to elicit evidence that the cha rg e had be en dismissed. On cross- examination, the officer admitted that he did not know that t h e c h ar ge h adb ee nd i s m i s s ed
. T h i s m et h o d o f de al i n g wi th t h e me n t i o n o f th e e x t ra n eo u s ch ar ge may have de-e mphasized its importance to the jury
. Se e Cas tor e no v . S tat e , 932 S.W .2d 597, 603 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1996, pet. ref ’d). We do not find that Pierce ’s counse l was ineff ective f or failing to object in the pre sence of the jury to the initial mention of the charg e.18 N o r w a s Pi e r c e ’ s c o u n s e l i n e f f e c ti v e f o r f a il in g to o b

je c t t o te s ti mo n y

b y h e r e xhusband. B y

raising a def

ensive theor

y , the def

endant o p ens the door f or the State to off

er rebuttal testimony

reg ardingan extr an eo u s offe nse if the e x trane ous offe nse has c ommon char acte ristics with the offe nse for which the defe ndant was on trial. Se e Be ll v . S tat e , 620 S.W .2d 116, 126 (Tex
. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on re h’g ). Pierce ’s ex-husband testified about his lac k of surprise whe n hear ing that Pierce shot Rendon shortly befor e he w as to leave for wor k. He testified that she often sta

rted a rg uments sho rt l y b ef

ore he was to leave for

work a nd that she sometimes threw dishes at him when they argued. This tends to rebut the c hara cter ization o f P i er ce by other witnesses as a quiet, undemonstrative, and passive person, and shows a differ ent state of mind and intent for the argument than s he portray ed herself as having . Counsel was not ineff ective f or fa iling to object to this admissi ble evidenc e. Se e Or tiz , 93 S.W .3d at 93-95.

Th e re c or d d oe s n ot de mon str a te that Pier c e ’s c ouns e l wa s in e ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto
ar g u e f o r a s u d d e n - p a s s i o n f

i n d i n g a t t h e p u n i s h m e n t p h a s e . T h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s g i v e nt o t h e j u r y. The rec ord does not show whether the failure to a rg ue the issue was a lapse or an i ntentional omission. P ierc e’s c ounsel focuse d o n persua ding the jury to rec ommend probation, noting her compliance with pre-tr ial supervision. Given the jury ’s re jection of self

-def ense at guilt-innoce nce, counsel may

have chosen to a

ttempt to cre ate sy

mpathy for Pierce in spite of her action rather than ask the jury

to “excuse” he r ac tion. The failure of that s t ra t egy d o es not rende r counse l’s perf ormanc e consti t u t i o n ally defic ient. On this recor d, we c annot say that the strateg y

was
unrea sonable. Se e Ga rc ia , 57 S.W .3d at 440.

Pie rc e ’s c ouns e l re pr e se nte d he r a c tiv e ly be fo re and

duri ngthe tr ia l, f

ili ngmot ion s, questioning w itnesses, and makingo b jections. Ther e wa s no evidenc e deve loped at a motion for19

new tria l about possible trial strateg ies. The acts and omi ssions of which Pi erc e complains do not show defic ient perf

ormanc e by

her c ounsel on this recor d.
CO NC LU SION Havingresolved Pier ce’ s issues in favor of t he judg ment, we a ffirm the c onviction and sente nce.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: August 3, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh