NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

F2016-09

Career Captain Drowns After 

Running Out of Air During 

Technical Rescue SCUBA Dive—

North Carolina
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 2

Summary

• A 28-year-old male, part-time, 

career fire captain died after 

running out of air and suffering a 

pulmonary embolism during a 

technical rescue deep dive. 

• The victim was a member of a 

local fire department dive team 

that was trying to recover the 

body of a civilian who drowned 

the day before. 

• The captain (Diver 4 and victim) 

ran low on air at a depth of 80 feet. 

Dive boat from fire department 4, from which Diver 4 was diving. It 

was not his department’s boat. (Photo courtesy of mutual aid fire 

department.)
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Summary

• After communicating with surface 

crews, Diver4 and his dive partner 

(Diver 3) ascended to a depth of 

12-14 feet. 

• Diver 4 then experienced an 

uncontrolled out-of-air 

emergency and was unable to 

switch over to his or his partner’s 

redundant air system.

• Diver 3 tried unsuccessfully to 

assist Diver 4, but Diver 4 pulled 

Diver 3’s mask off forcing Diver 3 

to kick away and swim to the 

surface while Diver 4 descended. A career captain drowned after running out of air while searching 

for a civilian drowning victim during a technical rescue deep dive.

Photo taken from Dive Boat 38 showing the bow of FD 4’s dive boat 

and divers having to surface swim to the descent buoy. Photo taken 

before the drowning.

(Photo Courtesy of mutual aid dive team.)
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Summary

• According to the medical 

examiner, Diver 4 experienced 

an arterial gas embolism, most 

likely from holding his breath 

on ascent and subsequent 

rupture of alveoli and drowned. 

• Mutual aid technical rescue 

divers located Diver 4 on the 

lake bottom and removed him 

approximately 2 hours later, and 

he was pronounced dead at the 

scene. 

• Mutual aid technical rescue 

divers then recovered the 

civilian victim. Sonar image showing the location of the cage (metal cage that the 

descent line is attached to), the civilian drowning victim’s location, and the 

downed firefighter/diver. 

(Courtesy of mutual aid dive team.)
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Contributing Factors

• Pre-dive safety check

• Air management 

• Uncontrolled out-of-air emergency (not being able to use redundant air 

supply, redundant air regulator was routed under the air fill for the dry 

suit and also under the high chest strap for the BCD)

• Panic/rapid uncontrolled ascent while holding breath

• Training and experience 

• SCUBA equipment issues affecting buoyancy control (dump valve was 

pinned open and unintentionally allowed air to escape)

• Lack of a safety officer trained in technical rescue SCUBA diving during 

the event.
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The photo shows the orientation of Diver 4’s redundant air regulator is routed under the air fill for the dry suit and also under the high chest 

strap for the BCD. Although the final location of the mouthpiece would have been close to the diver’s head, it would have been difficult to 

deploy. Diver 3 reported during interviews that Diver 4 was struggling with his redundant air regulator. Divers should always have easy access 

to the redundant and alternate air regulator. (Photo courtesy of the mutual aid dive team. The photograph was altered by NIOSH to obscure 

manufacturer’s name.)
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 7

Close up photo taken when the victim was recovered showed his shoulder dump valve was possibly pinned “open” by the body bag 

carabiner inside the D ring. This could have made maintaining positive buoyancy difficult as any air pushed into the BCD may have 

escaped here.

(Photo by mutual aid dive team. Analysis by Dive & Marine Consultants International, Inc.)
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. Key Recommendations

• Fire departments should ensure that public safety divers complete a predive safety check (including adequate beginning air) with a qualified dive 

partner, witnessed by the dive safety officer.

• Fire departments should ensure that incident commanders and group 

leaders maintain frequent and accurate air status and accountability on all 

divers. Additionally, no diver should be allowed to start a deep dive with 

inadequate air and inadequate air reserves and resources at the dive site. 
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Key Recommendations

• SCUBA manufacturers and standard-setting organizations for public 

safety divers should consider including HUD in all full-face SCUBA 

apparatus due to the frequent zero-visibility conditions and silt-out in 

low-light conditions. 

• Fire departments should ensure that public safety divers are properly 

trained to recognize and have the repetitive skills training to control outof-air emergencies and be able to use their redundant air before anxiety 

leads to panic. Additionally, when dive teams mix full-facepiece 

regulators with stand-alone regulators from a pony system, the divers 

must be well-trained to accomplish the difficult removal and switch task.
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Key Recommendations

• Fire departments should ensure technical rescue SCUBA dive teams 

have a Dive Safety Officer on site who is trained in technical rescue 

SCUBA diving before commencing a dive. 

• Fire departments should provide annual training on dive hazards such as 

lung overexpansion injuries, out of air emergencies, emergency ascent 

procedures, including the dangers of breath holding, and emergency 

release of dive weights.
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Key Recommendations

• Fire departments should recognize public safety SCUBA diving as high 

risk/low frequency events and ensure public safety divers are properly 

trained, equipped, and supported to perform public safety diving 

responsibilities and integrate the training and SOPs with regional dive 

and water rescue team(s) with whom they regularly respond.

• Fire departments and other public safety dive teams should consider 

advanced level training courses/agencies that closely match the public 

safety dive team needs.
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Key Recommendations

• Fire department dive teams should ensure vessels are properly equipped 

when used for supporting dive operations or consider other options.

• Standards-setting organizations should consider adopting a national 

consensus standard for public safety SCUBA divers that includes 

minimum initial and refresher training and a SCUBA equipment 

standard that includes minimum respirator performance. 

• Fire departments should consider implementing a body recovery 

procedure to reduce the time dive teams spend at depth recovering a 

victim.
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CONACT US

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch

Division of Safety Research

NIOSH 1000 Frederick Lane, MS 1808

Morgantown, West Virginia 26505-2888

FFFIPP Webpage

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