IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2014-CA-01177-COA EMMA R. DOSS, CLARENCE E. SCUTTER, HENRY LEE CLAIBORNE, GLORIA EDWARDS, ROBERT EDWARDS, MARGIE H. JANUARY, MARY WALLS, BEATRICE B. MATHIS, ARTHUR LEE CAMPHOR, EDDIE DUFFIN, HELEN DUFFIN, SADIE APPLETON, J. GILBERT BUCK, DR. MILDRED L. HOLLAND, AND ELMO MCBRIDE JR. APPELLANTS

v. CLAIBORNE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS: ALLEN BURKS, CHARLIE NORRELLS, EDWIN SMITH, RONALD SHOULDERS, AND DANIEL PORTER; THE MISSISSIPPI STATE TAX COMMISSION; AND JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEES

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/21/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAMAR PICKARD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: CLAIBORNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: DEBORAH MCDONALD JEFFERY KENDRICK HARNESS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W ILSON DOUGLAS MINOR BARBARA BLACKMON EDW ARD BLACKMON JANESSA EMONTAN BLACKMON BRADFORD JEROME BLACKMON JAMES L. POW ELL NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: GRANTED APPELLEES’ MOTION TO DISMISS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED – 03/28/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:EN BANC.

IRVING, P.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In 2 009, Em m a R. D oss and f ourteen other Claiborne County property owners 1 sued the Claiborne C ounty Board of Supervisors ( the Board), t he Mississip p i S t a t e Tax Com m i ssion (MSTC), 2 and the Mississippi Attorney G eneral (AG). Doss claim ed that the Board, MSTC, a nd A G conspired to enact or com ply with racially d iscrim inatory legislation that prevents the county f rom c o l l e c t i n g traditional ad valorem taxes f rom Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Doss s ought a d e c laratory j udgm ent that t he statute is unconstitutional, inju n c t i v e r e lief

, and dam a ges. But the Claiborne C ounty Circuit Court d ism issed Doss’s

com plaint. Doss appeals. W e af f irm the circuit court’s judgm ent. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. This appeal stem s f r om the statutory taxation m ethodology of Grand G ulf – the only nuclear plant in Mississippi. Authorized in 1974, Grand G ulf cost $3.5 billion to build, and it began o p eration in 1985. 3 In 1986, the Mississippi Legislature enacted M ississippi Code Annotated section 27-35-309(3)(b) (Rev. 2010), which “exem pted f rom county , m

unicipal and district ad valorem taxes any [ qualif y ing] in-state nuclear g en e r a t ing plant owned or

1 F o r sim p licity ’s sak e, w e ref

er to th e p lain tif

f s co llectiv ely

as “D o ss.”

2 D u rin g th e p en d en cy o f th i s case, M S T C w a s re o rg an ized an d ren am ed th e M ississip p i D e p artm e n t o f R ev en u e. S

ee M i ss. C o d e A n n . § 2 7 -3 -1 (R ev . 2 0 1 3 ).

3 S ta te ex rel. P i t t m a n v
. M iss. P u b

. S

erv. C o m m ’n , 5 0 6 S o . 2 d 9 7 8 , 9 8 0

- 8 3 (M iss. 1 9 8 7 ) ( r ev ersed b y M

iss. P o w e r & L ig h t C o
. v. M iss. ex rel. M

o o r e , 4 8 7 U .S

. 3 5 4 , 3 7 7 (1 9 8 8 )). 2operated by a public utility rendering electrical service within the state.” Bur rell v. Miss.

State Tax Comm’n. , 536 So. 2d 848, 850-51 (Miss. 1988) (overruled in part on other grounds by Commonwealth Brands Inc. v. Morgan , 110 So. 3d 752, 763 (¶27) (Miss. 2013)). [ The statute] f

ur t h e r p r o v i d ed that any such utility , in lieu o f the t axes f rom which i t was thus e xem

pted, would be required to pay annually to t he [ MSTC] a sum equal to two percent (2%) of the valu e o f the plant as assessed by the [ MSTC], but i n no e v e n t l e s s than $16,000,000.00 f or any taxable y ear. In addition, [ t he statute] p rovided f or distribution of those revenues to the situs county , the m ost populous incorporated m unicipality within the situs county , the state’s general f

u nd, and the in-state counties and m unicipalities served by the utility

. The distribut i o n p l a n f avored the situs county , particularly in the early y ears f

o llowin g passage of the act. U nder n orm al a d valorem taxation principles, however, the situs county would r e c e i ve all o f the r evenues so generated. Id

. at 851. Traditional ad valorem taxation would have authorized the situs county to im pose

a n n u a l taxes e qual t o f

if teen p ercent of a nuclear plant’s assessed value. See Miss. Const

. art. 4, § 112 (providing that real p roperty other than residential a n d g overnm ent property m ay be taxed at “f

if t een percent

. . . of true value”). A r t i c l e 4 , Section 1 12 of the Mississippi Constitution was also am ended to include the f ollowing language: [ T]he Legislature, by general law, m ay deny or lim it a county or other t axing authority the right to l evy county and/or special taxes on nu c l e a r - powered electrical generating p lants. In addition to or in lieu of any such county and/or special taxes on nuclear

. . . plants, the Legislature . . . m ay provide a special m ode of valuation, assessm ent[ ,] and levy upon nuclear

. . . plants and provide f or the distribution of

the revenue derived theref r om . Burrell , 536 So. 2d at 852 n.2. ¶3. In August 1986, the Board and f our taxpay ers sued MSTC in Hinds C o unty Chancery Court. Id . at 852. The B urrell plaintif f s argued that Claiborne County was “entitled to all
3of the ad valorem tax r evenues generated by [ Grand Gulf ], the sam e as would be the case f or any other assessable and taxable properties within the c ounty .” Id

. They sought a j udgm ent declaring the statute and t he c onstitutional a m endm ent “null and void” u nder the Mississippi Constitution, a n injunction prohibiting their enf orcem ent, and an injunction r equiring MSTC
to “issue a n assessm e nt rol l p e r mitting Claiborne County to tax

. . . G r and G ulf

. . . as it would any

other property

within the county

. . . .” Id

. ¶4. The Mississippi Suprem e Court upheld the statute and t he constitutional am endm ent. Id

. at 859, 860-62. However, the Burrell Court a lso held that the chancery court erred when it denied the plainti f

f s ’ r e q uest to am end their com plaint “ to i nvoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
assert a c l aim that [ Grand Gulf ’s taxati o n m ethodology ] violate[ s] the Equal P rotection Clause of the Fourteenth A m endm ent.” Id

. at 862-64. Consequently , the suprem e court

rem anded the case to the chancery court “with instructions that the am endm ent be allowed

. . . . ” Id

. at 864. The Burrell plaintif f s later d ism issed their com plaint with prejudice in exchange f

or a one-tim e pay

m ent of $2 m illion to C laiborne County

. See Miss. Code Ann. § 27-35-309(3)(c) (Rev. 2010). ¶5. The present litigation began m ore than twenty y ears later. Its cataly st was the Board’s 2008 equalization of the county ’s tax roll. Doss o bjected and com plained that G rand Gulf

was not included on the t a x r o l l , a n d her p roperty was taxed at a higher rate than Grand Gulf ’s. The B oard m et and reje c t e d D o s s’s objections. Doss appealed to MSTC, which responded that it h ad no a u t hority to hear her appeal, because per Mississippi Code

4Annotated sec t i o n 27-35-119(2) (Rev. 2010), she should have appealed to circuit court.

However, MSTC noted that because section 27-35-309(3)(b) “controls the assessm ent procedure f

or nuclear g enerating p lants and the d istribution of revenues,” it was “ bound by the plain m eaning of

th[ e ] statute in the perf

o rm ance of

its tax assessm ent duties.” ¶6. In July 2 0 0 9 , D oss f i led a pro se com

plaint. S he nam e d the B oard, MSTC, and the AG a s def endants. Doss n oted that the county has an approxim ately 80% Af rican-Am erican population, and in ef

f ect the statute does not apply to any other county or power plant in the
state. Doss added that other t y pes of power plants in “m ajority white counties” are taxed dif f erently than Grand Gulf , so “the taxes p aid by the m ajority white t a x pay ers is substantially lower than the m ajority black taxpay ers in C laiborne C ounty .” Doss reasoned that racial anim

u s prom pted the Legislature’s enactm ent of the statute. ¶7. Doss alleged t hat the statute inf ringes on her equal-protection rights. Her r a t i o n a l e

was prem ised o n the concept that the statute is r acially discrim i natory , and her property taxes would decrease if t he county could collect t raditional a d v a l o r e m t axes f rom Grand Gulf

. Doss also claim ed the Board denied her due process r egarding its treatm ent of her o bjections
to the 2008 tax roll. Additionally , she claim ed MSTC denied her due p rocess when it did not hear her appeal. Finally , Doss claim ed that the Board conspired with MSTC to v iolate her constitutional rights b y com p ly ing with section 27-35-309(3)(b). Doss sought a declaratory judgm ent that t he statute is unconstitutional, injuncti v e relief preventing i ts enf orcem ent, and

5m ore than $400 m illion in dam ages. 4

¶8. MSTC and the AG f il e d a motion to dism iss Doss’s com plaint. They argued that dism issal was a

ppropriate u nder Rules 12(b)(1) a n d 1 2 (b)(6) o f the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The Board subsequently joined the m otion to d i s mi s s . Af ter conducting a hearing, the circuit court granted the m otion to dism iss on the basis that Doss had f ailed to state a claim

upon which relief

could be granted. Doss appeals. DISCUSSION
I. Due Process and Conspiracy ¶9. In the “ statem ent of relevant f

acts” section of her brief

, Doss s t ates that “the public

was never notif

i ed o f the Board[ ’s]

. . . f

inal equalization decision w hich ref lected the order of [ MSTC] to continue to im plem ent section 27-35-309(3)(b). The n otif ication procedure is required pursuant t o [ section] 27-35-119

. . . .” A nd in the “sum m ary of argum ents” portion of her initial brief , D oss s ay s that she “s t a t e d a cause of action against Mississippi [ s]tate [ o]f

f icials f or t heir continued im

plem entation of a tax schem e [ that] violated” her dueprocess rights. Bey ond that, her initial brief contains no m ention of h e r d u e - process claim —m uch less authority to support it. A nd her initial brief conta i n s a b s olutely no ref erence to her conspiracy

claim

. ¶10. Doss’s initial brief was required to i nclude her “contentions

. . . w ith respect to the i s s u es presented, and the reasons f or those contentions, w ith citations to the authorit i e s ,

4 D o ss su b seq u e n tly

clarif ied th at sh e o n ly

so u g h t d am ag es f

ro m th e B o a r d

. 6statutes, a nd parts of the r e c o r d relied on.” M .R.A.P. 2 8(a)(7). “In the absence of

m eaningf ul a r g u me nt and c itation of authority , [ an appellate court] generally will not consider [ an] assignm ent of error.” Randolph v. State , 852 So. 2d 547, 558 (¶29) (Miss. 2002). A “cursory argum ent without

. . . f urth e r r eason or e xplanation” is inadequate. Id

. at (¶30). For lack of m eaningf u l argum ents t o support h er conspiracy and due-process claim s, we f

ind that Doss has waived those issues on appeal.
II . Equal Protection ¶11. As a prelim inary m atter, we m ust determ ine whether Doss has standing to assert her claim t hat the statute is racially discrim inatory b ecause i t a llegedly increases h er property tax burden. “Standing i s a j u r i s dictional issue” that an appellate c ourt m ay raise at any tim e. Hall v. City of Ridgeland , 37 So. 3d 25, 33 (¶23) (Miss. 2010). Furtherm ore, the m otion to dism iss alleged that dism issal w a s a p p r o p r iate under Rule 12(b)(1), which is b ased o n a “[ l]ack of jurisdiction over the subject m atter[ .]” “Standing is an aspect of subject[ -]m atter jurisdiction.” Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi , 1 8 So. 3d 814, 826 (¶32) (Miss. 2009).
An a ppellate court reviews standing de novo. S ASS Muni-V LLC v. D eSoto Cty. , 170 So. 3d 441, 445 (¶12) (Miss. 2015). ¶12. In DaimlerChrysler C orp. v. Cuno , 5 47 U

. S. 332, 338 (2006), a g roup of taxpay ers sued the Ohio State T ax C o mmi s sioner and alleged “that t heir local and state tax burdens

were increased by the tax breaks f or D aim lerChry sler[ .]” As in the c a se p resently bef ore us, “the a l leged injury [ was] based o n the asserted ef f ect of the allegedl y i l l e g a l activity on

7public r evenues, to which the t axpay er contributes.” Id

. at 344. The United States Suprem e

Court stated that “[ a ]s an initial m atter, it is unclear that tax b reaks of the sort at issue here do in f act deplete the treasury : The very point of the tax benef i ts is to spur econom ic activity , which in turn increases governm ent revenues.” Id

. (em p hasis in o riginal). The Cuno Court
went on to describe the taxpay ers’ claim as “conjectural or hy pothetical in that it depends on how legislators respond to a reduction in revenue, if that is t h e c o n s e q u e nce o f the [ tax] credit.” Id

. Establishing i n

j u r y requires speculating that elected of f icials will increase a taxpay er-plaintif

f ’s tax bill to m ake up a def i cit; establishing redressability requires speculating that abolishing the challenged credit will redound to the benef it of t he t axpay er because leg i s lators will pass along the supposed increased revenue in the f orm of tax reductions. Id

. T he Suprem e Court concluded that “[ n]either sort of speculation suf f ices t o support standing.” Id

. ¶13. As the Cuno Court explained, “[ a] taxpay er . . . has no r i g h t t o i n s i s t t h a t the
governm ent dispose of any increased reven u e i t mi g h t experience as a result of his suit by decreasing his tax liability or bolstering program s that benef it him .” Id

. at 344-45. “To the contrary , the d e c i s i o n of how to a llocate any such savings is the very epitom e of a policy judgm ent com m itted to the broad and legitim ate discretion of lawm akers, which the courts
cannot presum e either to control or predict.” I d

. at 345. That “rationale

. . . applies with undim inished f

orce to state taxpay ers.” Id

. “The taxpay er m u st be a ble to show that he has sustained s om e d irect injury and not m erely that he suf f ers in s om e indef

inite way in com m on

8with people generally .” Id

. Because the taxpay ers lacked standing to c h a l l e n g e t he tax

c r e d it, the Suprem e Court h eld t hat “the l ower courts erred b y considering their c l a i ms against it on the m erits.” Id . at 354. ¶14. H o w e ver, Mississippi’s state standing r equirem ents h ave been d escribed a s “ q u i t e liberal com

pa r e d t o t h e standing requirem ents set out in Article III of t he United States Constitution.” SASS Muni-V , 170 So. 3d at 4 45-46 (¶13). “To have standing to sue, a party

m ust assert a colorable interest in the s ubject m atter of the litigation or experience an adverse ef f ect f rom the conduct of the d e f endant, or as otherwise authorized b y l a w . ” I d

. at 446 (¶13). Notwithstanding the prof essed d istinction b etween f ederal and state standing requirem ents, t here is a distinct sim ilarity

. As the Suprem e Court stated, a taxpay er cannot rely on a claim

“that he suf

f ers in som e indef

inite way in com m on with people generally .” Cuno , 547 U.S. at 345. That s t atem ent is strikingly sim ilar to the Mississippi Suprem e Court’s pronouncem ent t hat a plaintif f lacks standing unless he can show that “the [ alleged] adverse ef

f ect experienced [ is] d if

f erent f rom the adverse e f

f e ct e xperienced by the general public.” SASS Muni-V

, 170 S o. 3d at 446 (¶13). So the Cuno Court’s re a s o n ing applies equally to Doss’s claim s. ¶15. Because Doss’s claim s rest solely on the g eneral and s peculative conclusion that the
statute is racially discrim inatory because it causes her property

- tax liability to increase, she f ailed t o establish standing. It f ollows that the circuit court lacked subject-m atter jurisdiction

over D oss’s claim

. Although the circuit c ourt dism issed Doss’s com plaint on the basis that

9i t f

ailed to state a claim upon w hich relief can be g ranted, “[ i]t is well established in our jurisprudence that the right result reached f o r t h e w r o n g reason w ill not be disturbed on appeal.” Cucos Inc. v
. McDani e l , 9 3 8 S o . 2d 238, 247 (¶26) (Miss. 2006). No f urther analy sis i s necessary . Accordingly , we f i nd no me r i t t o Doss’s claim that the circuit court erred when it dism issed her com plaint. ¶16. T H E JUDGMENT OF T HE CLAIBORNE COUNTY CIRC U I T C O U R T I S AFFIRMED. A LL COSTS O F THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS. LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P .J., ISHEE, CARLTON, F AIR, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES AN D W E STBROOKS, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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