NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDWIN ANTONIO RIVASYANES; BIRDI DE LOS ANGELES 

RIVAS-QUEZADA; DARLIN ARACELY 

RIVAS-QUEZADA; VERONICA 

ARACELI QUEZADA-CHACON,

Petitioners,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 22-1149

Agency Nos.

A209-906-074

A209-906-075

A209-986-154

A209-986-153

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 29, 2024 **

Before: NGUYEN, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 3 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 22-1149

Edwin Antonio Rivas-Yanes (“Rivas”), a native and citizen of El Salvador, 

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision 

dismissing his appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his 

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). His wife and two daughters are derivative beneficiaries 

on Rivas’s asylum application. “Where, as here, the BIA cites [Matter of Burbano, 

20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994),] and also provides its own review of the evidence 

and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” Ruiz-Colmenares v. 

Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “We review 

questions of law de novo and the agency’s factual findings for substantial 

evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Under the 

substantial evidence standard, administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless 

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id.

(citation omitted). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount 

them here. We deny the petition.

1. Asylum applicants must demonstrate “persecution or a well-founded fear 

of persecution on account of [a protected ground],” also known as the nexus 

requirement. Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2021) 

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)); see also Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1132 

n.3 (9th Cir. 2016). Applicants “must prove causal connection” by direct or 
3 22-1149

circumstantial evidence that the persecution was on account of a protected ground.

Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1486-87 (9th Cir. 1997). Membership in a 

particular social group and political opinion are two examples of protected 

grounds. Id. at 1486 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum based on its 

determination that Rivas failed to establish a nexus between past or future 

persecution and a protected ground. After Rivas brought his cousin, a member of 

the 18th Street (“18th St.”) gang, into the rival territory of the Mara Salvatrucha 

(“MS-13”) gang, Rivas’s cousin was shot and killed, and Rivas was grazed by a 

bullet during the exchange. Regarding subsequent threats made by MS-13, Rivas 

testified that MS-13 sought revenge because he brought a rival gang member 

(Rivas’s cousin) into their territory. Regarding subsequent threats made by 18th 

St., Rivas testified that 18th St. sought revenge because he was responsible for 

bringing his cousin into MS-13 territory, resulting in his cousin’s death. However, 

actions based on revenge or personal retribution alone do not satisfy the nexus 

requirement. See Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(holding that purely personal retribution is not persecution on account of a 

protected ground). 

Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s nexus determination, we 

do not reach any other ground for denying Rivas’s asylum claim, including the 
4 22-1149

BIA’s determination that Rivas waived his proffered particular social group before 

the IJ.

2. Withholding of removal applicants must demonstrate that “a cognizable 

protected ground is ‘a reason’ for future persecution.” Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1146 

(citation omitted). 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of withholding of removal 

because Rivas failed to establish any nexus between the alleged persecution and a 

protected ground. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 

2023) (noting that the nexus standard required for withholding of removal is lower 

than for asylum, but when the petitioner has not shown “any nexus whatsoever,” 

both claims fail).

3. CAT applicants must demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that he 

or she would be tortured if removed” by or with the acquiescence of government 

officials. Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations 

omitted). 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because 

Rivas did not allege harm or threats by a government official in El Salvador, nor 

did he establish that any government official would consent or acquiesce in his 

torture. See id. at 770 (“[A] general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to 
5 22-1149

investigate and prevent crime will not” suffice to show acquiescence. (citation 

omitted)).

4. The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. 

The motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied.

PETITION DENIED.