[Cite as Reed v. Jagnow, 2013-Ohio-2546.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

DONNIE REED, ) CASE NO. 12 MA 201 

) 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, ) 

) 

VS. ) O P I N I O N 

) 

BETTY JAGNOW, et al., ) 

) 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court, 

Case No. 10CV4539. 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant: Donnie Reed, Pro se

#A554-036 

Belmont Correctional Institution 

P.O. Box 540 

St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950 

For Defendants-Appellees: Attorney David Marburger 

 Attorney Nicholas White 

 3200 PNC Center 

1900 East Ninth Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114-3485 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Dated: June 17, 2013 
[Cite as Reed v. Jagnow, 2013-Ohio-2546.]

VUKOVICH, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Donnie Reed appeals the decision of the Mahoning 

County Common Pleas Court which adopted the magistrate’s decision dismissing his 

lawsuit against defendant-appellee The Youngstown Vindicator, et alia because it 

was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations for defamation actions. 

Appellant argues that his case should not have been dismissed under the statute of 

limitations because the statute was tolled due to a letter he sent, a federal lawsuit he 

filed, and his imprisonment. For a multitude of reasons, appellant’s arguments are 

without merit, and the trial court’s decision is affirmed. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

{¶2} On December 3, 2010, appellant filed a pro se complaint against The 

Youngstown Vindicator, Betty Jagnow, Mark Brown, and Peter Milliken in their 

individual and representative capacities for the Vindicator. Appellant claimed that 

during the summer of 2008, while he was on trial for a fatal shooting, the defendants 

published articles that defamed him and prevented him from having a fair criminal 

trial. Specifically, he alleged that the Vindicator delved into the facts of the case 

instead of reporting on events occurring in court, reported facts not proven by a jury, 

made him appear guilty before trial, attempted to disparage his character by making 

him out to be Anti-American and “some sort of mafia hit-man,” and made the victim 

appear to be “some sort of war hero.” He also stated that they failed to rectify their 

misstatements once he notified them of their mistakes. 

{¶3} The defendants filed a timely answer which denied the allegations and 

raised the statute of limitations as their first affirmative defense. Appellant filed a 

response to the answer, which filing does not exist under the civil law of this state. 

See Civ.R. 7(A). On February 2, 2011, the defendants filed a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, asking the court to dismiss the case because the one 

year statute of limitations for defamation actions had long since run. 

{¶4} On May 16, 2011, the magistrate issued a decision granting the 

defendant’s motion and dismissing the case. Appellant was provided the standard 

notice about filing objections within 14 days and the waiver that results from any 
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failure to timely object. Appellant filed a request for additional time to file objections. 

He was granted until July 7, 2011. 

{¶5} Instead of objecting, however, appellant filed various other documents. 

For instance, on June 7, he filed a Civ.R. 55(A) motion for default judgment. On 

August 17, he filed a motion to amend his complaint without stating what amendment 

he would make relevant to the statute of limitations issue. Then, on September 8, 

2011, appellant filed a motion to vacate judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). He alleged 

that he was not served with the dismissal motion and stated that there was 

insufficient process under Civ.R. 12(B)(4), which deals with the failure of service of 

the complaint upon the defendant. 

{¶6} On October 12, 2011, the magistrate issued a decision pointing out that 

no judgment exists of record from which a motion to vacate judgment could be filed. 

The magistrate also stated that appellant’s motion for default judgment was untimely 

and the reasons for its filing were unclear as the defendants had filed an answer. 

The magistrate noted how appellant was granted an extension of time to file 

objections to the magistrate’s dismissal order and that he failed to take advantage of 

said extension by filing objections. Finally, the magistrate explained that the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss was certified as being mailed to appellant and that this 

was sufficient to deem a party served with a motion, noting that certified mailing is not 

required once the complaint has been served. The magistrate concluded that the 

motion to vacate was denied. 

{¶7} On December 15, 2011, appellant filed another motion for relief from 

judgment under Civ.R. 60(B), reiterating his arguments regarding the alleged failure 

to serve him with the motion to dismiss and asserting excusable neglect in failing to 

respond to the dismissal motion. He also stated that he was objecting to the last 

magistrate’s decision and claimed that his time for objecting was indefinitely tolled 

because the decision was not mailed out by the clerk until October 21 instead of 

within three days as instructed. 

{¶8} The defendants responded by pointing out that appellant set forth no 

arguments regarding the statute of limitations and thus no basis for reconsideration of 

the magistrate’s prior decisions. Appellant filed a reply which again failed to 
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reference the statute of limitations issue besides a vague suggestion that his original 

complaint was filed in the wrong venue (which he did not explain) and removed to the 

lower court (which it was not, it was filed directly there by appellant). 

{¶9} On June 28, 2012, the magistrate denied appellant’s motion for relief, 

stating that appellant’s claims were time-barred. The magistrate also noted that 

appellant failed to object to the magistrate’s original dismissal order. 

{¶10} On July 12, 2012, appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. 

Regarding the statute of limitations, he again made reference to the original incorrect 

venue of the action, suggesting that some prior filing preserved the statute of 

limitations. He admitted that the discovery rule does not apply to defamation actions. 

He urged that any irregularities in his various filings be overlooked because he is pro 

se and incarcerated. 

{¶11} On October 12, 2012, the trial court overruled appellant’s objections, 

adopted the magistrate’s decision, and entered judgment. The court stated that 

appellant failed to timely object to the original magistrate’s decision dismissing the 

action. In any event, the court concluded that appellant’s claims were time-barred. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from that judgment entry. 

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

{¶12} Appellees initially ask that we dismiss the appeal, claiming that 

appellant’s brief was late. Appellees note that on November 29, 2012, we denied 

appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file the record on appeal with transcripts 

as there had been no hearing. Our order stated that his brief was due 20 days after 

the clerk’s transmission of the record to this court. The record was then filed on 

December 6. Appellant’s brief was certified by him as being mailed on December 12 

and was time-stamped December 28, 2012. Appellees claim that appellant’s brief 

was due on Wednesday, December 26. However, we cite appellees to the following 

appellate rules. 

{¶13} “Documents required or permitted to be filed in a court of appeals shall 

be filed with the clerk. Filing may be accomplished by mail addressed to the clerk, 

but filing shall not be timely unless the documents are received by the clerk within the 
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time fixed for filing, except that briefs shall be deemed filed on the day of mailing.” 

(Emphasis added.) App.R. 13(A). 

{¶14} “Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take 

some proceedings within a prescribed period after service of a notice or other 

document upon that party and the notice or paper is served upon the party by mail or 

commercial carrier service under App.R. 13(C)(4), three days shall be added to the 

prescribed period.” (Emphasis added.) App.R. 14(C). 

{¶15} Under these rules, appellant’s brief was not untimely. Thus, appellees 

motion to dismiss is not well-taken. 

APPELLANT’S STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED

{¶16} Appellant’s brief at page iii contains a statement of three issues 

presented for review. See App.R. 16(A)(3). The brief does not contain a statement 

of the assignments of error as required by App.R. 16(A)(2). The three listed issues 

are as follows: 

{¶17} “1. Defendant’s refusal to acknowledge or to adhere to “Written Notice 

Provision” to “Ceases and Desist” [sic] concerning publication of false information 

regarding Plaintiff.” 

{¶18} “2. Defendant’s belief that burden of proof shifts concerning Statute of 

Limitation lies with Plaintiff to bear validation.” 

{¶19} “3. The intentional infliction of emotional distress by continuously 

publishing the slanderous insinuation of criminal behavior of the Plaintiff, where none 

existed outside of traffic violation.” 

{¶20} Appellant’s brief also contains a one-page statement of the case and 

the facts which mainly just complains about the Vindicator’s reporting. Only one 

sentence of his statement of the case and facts relates to his statute of limitations 

contentions presented in the argument section of his brief. Notably, the statement of 

the case is attached to the brief after the argument and conclusion in violation of 

App.R. 16(A). 

{¶21} The substance of his brief is contained in two pages entitled, 

“Assignment of error and Argument.” The argument section is not separated into 
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issues presented or assignments of error and does not match the statement of the 

issues presented. In fact, no assignment of error is listed anywhere in the brief. 

{¶22} Pursuant to App.R. 16(A)(7), the brief shall include “[a]n argument 

containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error 

presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to 

the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” The 

appellate court may disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the party 

raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is 

based or fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief, as required under 

App.R. 16(A). App.R. 12(A)(2). 

{¶23} Thus, bare introductory statements that are not then argued in the brief 

need not be addressed. For instance, the third issue appellant sets forth in the 

preface to the brief, mentioning intentional infliction of emotional distress, need not 

be addressed by this court because it is never argued thereafter and no citations are 

provided relevant thereto. See id. Regardless, we note that there was not even a 

claim in the complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See also Ibenez 

v. Hutchins, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-319, 2012-Ohio-5040, ¶ 9 (where defamation is 

basis for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, one-year statute of 

limitations applies). And, appellant concedes that the one-year statute of limitations 

for libel and slander actions applies. (Appellant’s Brief at 2). 

{¶24} Essentially, the argument section of appellant’s brief presents two 

arguments in support of a contention that his case should not have been dismissed 

because the statute of limitations was tolled: (1) the savings statute of R.C. 2305.19 

applies because he sent a “cease and desist” letter to the defendants prior to the 

statute’s running out and he then filed a federal suit which was dismissed without 

prejudice allowing refilling in state court; and (2) the savings provision of R.C. 

2305.16 tolled the statute of limitations during appellant’s imprisonment. These 

arguments are overruled for the following reasons. 

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

{¶25} It is not disputed that the applicable statute of limitations for this 

defamation action is one year from the date the cause of action accrued. See R.C. 
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2305.11(A). The date a defamation cause of action accrues is the date of 

publication. Foster v. Wells Fargo Fin. Ohio, Inc., 195 Ohio App.3d 497, 960 N.E.2d 

1022, 2011-Ohio-4632, ¶ 15; T.S. v. Plain Dealer, 194 Ohio App.3d 30, 954 N.E.2d 

213, 2011-Ohio-2935, ¶ 7-8 (8th Dist.) (also stating that under the single publication 

rule, the statute does not restart when the original article became available on the 

Internet if no modifications were made). As appellant acknowledges, there is no 

discovery rule for defamation. Cramer v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 182 Ohio App.3d 653, 

914 N.E.2d 447, 2009-Ohio-3338, ¶ 69-70; Lyons v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 67 

Ohio App.3d 448, 450, 587 N.E.2d 362 (1990). 

{¶26} As appellant points out, the defendant has the ultimate burden of proof 

regarding the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. Lyons, 67 Ohio App.3d 

at 450. Still, a complaint can be dismissed upon motion of the defendant based upon 

the statute of limitations if the complaint conclusively shows on its face that the action 

is barred by the statute of limitations. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. v. McKinley, 103 

Ohio St.3d 156, 2011-Ohio-4432, ¶ 13. 

{¶27} “For there to be a conclusive showing in that regard, the complaint must 

show both: (1) the relevant statute of limitations; and (2) the absence of factors 

which would toll the statute or make it inapplicable.” Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 

139 Ohio App.3d 231, 241 743 N.E.2d 484 (7th Dist.2000). See also Feagin v. 

Mansfield Correctional Institution, 10th Dist. No. 07AP–182, 2007–Ohio–4862 (face 

of complaint shows statute has run and neither complaint nor response to dismissal 

motion raises the savings statute). Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 5th Dist. No. 95CA99 

(Mar. 8, 1996) (trial court erred in denying motion for judgment on pleadings where 

complaint is barred by statute of limitations on its face and fails to allege the 

applicability of the savings statute). 

{¶28} Here, the complaint established on its face that the one year statute of 

limitations for defamation actions was applicable. The complaint was filed on 

December 3, 2010, and it declared that the defamation occurred during the summer 

of 2008. Consequently, the complaint showed on its face that it was filed more than 

two years after the cause of action accrued in a case involving a one year statute of 

limitations. The complaint contained no factors showing that the statute could have 
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been tolled, which tolling arguments raised by appellant are shown below to lack 

merit in any event. 

{¶29} Notable here is the fact that appellant did not respond to the dismissal 

motion, and he then failed to object to the magistrate’s dismissal of the complaint. 

Even after being granted a lengthy extension of time for filing objections, he chose 

not to object. Instead, long after the extension expired, he filed reconsideration 

motions. He called the filings motions for relief from judgment or motions to vacate 

judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). 

{¶30} However, a magistrate’s decision is an interlocutory order. Ensell v. 

Ensell, 7th Dist. No. 09JE14, 2010-Ohio-5942, ¶ 26; In re N.R., 7th Dist. No. 

09MA85, 2010-Ohio-753, ¶ 13. Thus, it could be subject to reconsideration if the 

magistrate is so inclined. See Pitts v. Department of Transportation, 67 Ohio St.2d 

378, 423 N.E.2d 1105, fn. 1. But, a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment does 

not exist from a magistrate’s decision as such decision is not final. Civ.R. 60(B) 

(relief from “a final judgment, order, or proceeding”); Coleman v. Coleman, 2d Dist. 

No. 2003CA39, 2004-Ohio-1018, ¶ 12; Schuster v. Schuster, 11th Dist.No. 2007-L037, 2007-L-158, 2008-Ohio-3604, ¶ 37. And, it is not a substitute for timely 

objections. 

{¶31} In fact, the failure to object required the trial court only to view the face 

of the decision for an evident legal error or other defect. See Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c). 

And, this failure to object also means that this court need only review the dismissal 

for plain error. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). See also Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) (objections shall 

be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection); Lipp v. Lipp, 7th Dist. 

No 10CO38, 2011-Ohio-5759, ¶ 25. Plain error is recognized in a civil case only in 

an extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where the unobjected to 

error seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 

process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself. 

Gable v. Gates Mills, 103 Ohio St.3d 449, 816 N.E.2d 1049, 2004-Ohio-5719, ¶ 43, 

quoting Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099, syllabus. 

Such exceptional circumstances do not exist in this case, and no error seriously 

affected the basic fairness of the judicial process. 
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{¶32} Appellant’s irregular actions and omissions throughout this case have 

made for a convoluted procedural history and a procession of waivers. That he is a 

pro se plaintiff who is incarcerated cannot be an excuse for the various procedural 

and substantive flaws existing throughout this civil case. “Ignorance of the law is no 

excuse, and Ohio courts are under no duty to inform civil pro se litigants of the law.” 

Yoakum v. McIntyre, 7th Dist. No. 03CO63, 2005-Ohio-7083, ¶ 36. Pro se litigants 

are held to the same standard as all other litigants. Id.; Empire Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. 

Hoover, 8th Dist. No. 51311 (Dec. 4 1986). This comment is especially apt in a civil 

lawsuit where the pro se litigant is the plaintiff. Regardless, appellant’s items briefly 

posited in the argument section of appellant’s brief lack merit. 

SAVINGS STATUTE DUE TO LETTER AND FEDERAL SUIT

{¶33} The Savings Statute provides in pertinent part that if an action is 

commenced or attempted to be commenced and if the plaintiff fails otherwise than 

upon the merits, the plaintiff may commence a new action within one year of that 

failure or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever 

occurs later. R.C. 2305.19(A). 

{¶34} Appellant initially contends that a letter that he sent to the Vindicator 

tolled the statute of limitations by acting as the timely “attempt to commence” an 

action within the one year limitations period. Attached to his brief is a letter he 

purportedly sent to the defendants on November 2, 2008 asking them to “cease and 

desist” their publication of slanderous statements and advising that he may institute a 

civil action against them for “exaggeration of the first magnitude.” 

{¶35} However, this letter was not presented to the magistrate or to the trial 

court. Thus, we cannot rely upon it on appeal. State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 

377 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 1 (1978) (“A reviewing court cannot add matter to the record 

before it, which was not a part of the trial court's proceedings, and then decide the 

appeal on the basis of the new matter.”). 

{¶36} In fact, the argument itself (that a letter tolled the statute of limitations) 

was not presented below. Thus, this claim of tolling has been waived for purposes of 

appeal in the absence of plain error. See State ex rel. Gibson v. Indus. Comm., 39 

Ohio St.3d 319, 320, 530 N.E.2d 916 (1988) (cannot raise argument for first time on 
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appeal). See also Moore v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-732, 

2011-Ohio-1607, ¶ 22 (failure to raise claim that statute of limitations was tolled on 

equitable grounds waives the argument on appeal), citing Maynard v. Norfolk S. Ry., 

4th Dist. No. 08CA3267, 2009-Ohio-3143 and citing Davis v. Allen, 1st Dist. No. C–

010165 (Jan. 18, 2002); Dibert v. Watson, 3d Dist. No. 8-09-02, 2009-Ohio-2098, ¶ 

15 (failure to raise discovery tolling exception to statute of limitations in trial court 

waives issue). 

{¶37} And, as aforementioned, appellant did not object to the magistrate’s 

decision dismissing the case. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii)-(iv) (must object with specific or 

waive all but plain error on appeal). Without objection, the trial court was permitted to 

adopt the decision unless there was an error of law or other defect evident on the 

face of the decision. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c).

{¶38} Regardless, appellant cites nothing in support of his contention that a 

letter of complaint somehow tolls the statute of limitations for defamation or is the 

equivalent to an attempt to commence an action. There is no rational reason to 

create such a doctrine. “A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the 

court, if service is obtained within one year from such filing * * *.” Civ.R. 3(A). This 

does not permit attempted commencement of an action by sending a letter 

complaining about how a newspaper portrays a criminal defendant. Consumers write 

complaint letters on a regular basis, but causes of actions are not tolled thereby. 

{¶39} Appellant may have read case law regarding the prior version of the 

defamation statute of limitations which previously also contained the statute of 

limitations for medical malpractice actions. See former R.C. 2305.11. That former 

statute provided that an action upon a medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic 

claim shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued, but if 

prior to the expiration of that one year, a claimant gives to the defendant written 

notice that he is considering bringing an action, that action may be commenced at 

any time within one hundred eighty days after the notice is so given. Former R.C. 

2305.11(B)(1) (moved in 2003 to R.C. 2305.113). This notice provision was never 

relevant to defamation claims. Consequently, this argument is without merit. 
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{¶40} It is only with reliance on this argument that appellant delves into the 

second part of the savings statute claim. That is, he states that the letter, written 

within one year of the articles, stopped the statute from running. Thus, he concludes 

that a federal lawsuit was timely filed on January 4, 2010 (also more than one year 

from the summer of 2008 articles) because the clock was stopped by the letter. He 

notes that his federal suit was dismissed without prejudice. As he filed the within 

state lawsuit within one year of that dismissal, he believes his claim is saved from the 

statute of limitations by the savings statute. 

{¶41} Since the argument surrounding the letter fails, the remainder of the 

argument becomes moot since the federal suit was also filed outside of the one-year 

statute of limitations as applied to the date of publication set forth in appellant’s 

complaint. Now, for the first time in his reply brief, appellant contends that a 

defamatory article was published in May of 2009. He then posits that the federal suit 

was filed within one year of that publication and the savings statute would permit him 

to file in state court within one year of the federal dismissal. 

{¶42} Firstly, a reply brief is not the place for raising such an argument for the 

first time. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jarvis, 7th Dist. No. 08CO30, 2009-

Ohio-3055, ¶ 34-36. Secondly, an appeal is not the place for changing the date of 

publication set forth in the complaint. The complaint states that the dates of 

publication were all during the summer of 2008. (Even the articles he submitted in 

his response to the defendants’ answer {a filing that does not exist under the Civil 

Rules} were all 2008 articles). The date range specified in the complaint is the 

proper date for use by the magistrate and then by the trial court, especially where no 

timely objections were submitted to the original dismissal. As such, it is the date 

range to be used by the appellate court as well. 

{¶43} We also note that appellant has cited to no cases holding that Ohio’s 

savings statute applies after the dismissal of a federal suit. In Howard v. Allen, the 

Ohio Supreme Court announced that Ohio’s savings statute only applies where the 

action was originally commenced or attempted to be commenced in a court of this 

state. Howard v. Allen, 30 Ohio St.3d 130, 135, 293 N.E.2d 167. 
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{¶44} Thereafter, the Ohio Supreme Court considered an exception for class 

action lawsuits. Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 380, 

763 N.E.2d 160 (2002). The Court stated that it had not revisited the Howard case in 

the 30 years since the ruling. Id. at 381. The Court then modified Howard but only

“to the extent that it conflicts” with the new holding that class actions filed in Ohio or 

federal court will toll the statute of limitations as to all asserted members who would 

have been parties if the suit had been permitted to continue. Id. at 382-383. 

{¶45} Thus, Howard is still the law on cross-jurisdictional tolling in those 

cases not involving class actions. See id. (Notably, four justices agreed to the class 

action exception to Howard’s ban on cross-jurisdictional tolling and three justices 

voted that there should be no exception to Howard at all). For all of these reasons, 

appellant’s savings statute argument fails, and this assignment of error is overruled. 

INCARCERATION AS A TOLLING EVENT

{¶46} The next discernible argument that appellant presents is that the statute 

of limitations was tolled under R.C. 2305.16 while he was imprisoned for the 

shooting. Said statute provides in whole: 

Unless otherwise provided in sections 1302.98, 1304.35, and 

2305.04 to 2305.14 of the Revised Code, if a person entitled to bring 

any action mentioned in those sections, unless for penalty or forfeiture, 

is, at the time the cause of action accrues, within the age of minority or 

of unsound mind, the person may bring it within the respective times 

limited by those sections, after the disability is removed. When the 

interests of two or more parties are joint and inseparable, the disability 

of one shall inure to the benefit of all. 

After the cause of action accrues, if the person entitled to bring 

the action becomes of unsound mind and is adjudicated as such by a 

court of competent jurisdiction or is confined in an institution or hospital 

under a diagnosed condition or disease which renders the person of 

unsound mind, the time during which the person is of unsound mind 

and so adjudicated or so confined shall not be computed as any part of 

the period within which the action must be brought. 
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R.C. 2305.16. 

{¶47} Appellant cites a 1984 case in support of his position. See Paugh v. 

Fair, 16 Ohio App.3d 128, 474 N.E.2d 653 (10th Dist.1984) (holding that the savings 

provision of R.C. 2305.16 does not apply where imprisonment begins after the cause 

of action has accrued). However, the statute was changed in 1990 with the express 

purpose “to eliminate the tolling of certain statutes of limitation during imprisonment.” 

1990 S 125 (specifically citing R.C. 2305.11 and R.C. 2305.16). 

{¶48} Under the plain language of the current statute, imprisonment does not 

toll the running of the statute of limitations. Appellant’s claim that the statute of 

limitations was tolled under R.C. 2305.16 due to his imprisonment is without merit. 

Harman v. Wise, 7th Dist. No. 00CA50 (Dec. 10, 2011). See also Pankey v. Ohio 

Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-36, 2011-Ohio-4209, ¶ 10; Kucharski v. 

Kucharski, 8th Dist. No. 75049 (Nov. 4, 1999) (imprisonment is not a legal disability 

for purposes of statute of limitations). 

{¶49} For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, P.J., concurs.