RECORD IMPOUNDED 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1008-22 

IN THE MATTER OF 

REGISTRANT M.L.1

____________________

Argued February 13, 20242 – Decided August 16, 2024 

Before Judges Gooden Brown,3 Natali and Puglisi. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Docket No. ML-22-03-

0038.

Fletcher C. Duddy, Assistant Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant M.L. (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, 

Public Defender, attorney; Fletcher C. Duddy, of 

counsel and on the briefs; Christina John, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs).

Tara Carlin, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for 

respondent State of New Jersey (LaChia L. Bradshaw,

Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney; Tara Carlin, of 

counsel and on the briefs).

1

 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings in accordance 

with Rule 1:38-3(c)(11). 

 

2

 On February 22, 2024, we granted M.L.'s motion for a stay pending the Law 

Division's resolution of his subsequent motion to reclassify. On April 18, 2024, 

we received supplemental briefings in which the parties advised us the outcome 

of that motion did not resolve the issues raised in this appeal. 

3

 Judge Gooden Brown did not participate in oral argument but joins the 

decision with counsel's consent. R. 2:13-2(b). 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION 

August 16, 2024 

APPELLATE DIVISION 
2 A-1008-22

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

PUGLISI, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned). 

 In this appeal, as a matter of first impression, we consider whether the 

State may move to expand the scope of notification under Megan's Law, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, based on an increased risk of harm to the community not 

otherwise accounted for in the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (Scale). 

I.

Megan's Law is intended "to protect the community from the dangers of 

recidivism by sexual offenders." In re Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 80 (1996) 

(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1(a)). To that end, it requires certain sex offenders to 

register with law enforcement agencies, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 to -4, which are then 

authorized "to release relevant and necessary information regarding sex 

offenders to the public when the release of the information is necessary for 

public protection," in accordance with the AG Guidelines.4 In re Registrant 

N.B., 222 N.J. 87, 95 (2015) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:7-5(a)), citing N.J.S.A. 2C:7-

8(a). 

4

 Attorney General Guidelines for Law Enforcement for the Implementation of 

Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Laws (rev. Feb. 2007). 
3 A-1008-22

 The scope of community notification is primarily determined by a 

registrant's designation as a Tier I, II or III offender. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(a), (c)(1) 

to (3). A registrant's tier designation indicates the risk of re-offense, as 

determined by the consideration of thirteen factors or criteria in the Scale, which 

are weighted and totaled. In re Registrant J.G., 463 N.J. Super. 263, 273-74

(App. Div. 2020). 

Offenders who score between zero and thirty-six points are deemed Tier I 

(low risk), and only "law enforcement agencies likely to encounter" the 

registrant are notified. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(1). Offenders who score between 

thirty-seven and seventy-three points are deemed Tier II (moderate risk) and, in 

addition to Tier I notification, schools and organizations in the community are 

also notified. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(2). Offenders who score seventy-four points 

or higher are deemed Tier III (high risk) and, in addition to Tier I and II 

notification, "members of the public who are likely to encounter" the registrant 

are also notified. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(3). Depending on tier designation and 

other statutory requirements, offenders are also subject to inclusion on the 

internet registry. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13.

A registrant's due process is satisfied by way of a tiering hearing, during 

which the State must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence both the 
4 A-1008-22

registrant's level of risk to the community and the scope of notification necessary 

to protect the community. In re Registrant R.F., 317 N.J. Super. 379, 383-84 

(App. Div. 1998). Although it is not scientific evidence, the Scale is a "reliable 

and useful tool that the State can use to establish its prima facie case concerning 

a registrant's tier classification and manner of notification." In re Registrant 

C.A., 146 N.J. at 110. While a tier classification made on the basis of the Scale 

score should be afforded deference, it is not absolute; a Megan's Law judge must 

conduct an independent review of the merits of the case and not rely solely on 

the Scale score. Id. at 108-09. 

Our Supreme Court has permitted limited challenges to a registrant's Scale 

score: 

In most cases, we expect that the tier classification 

suggested by the Scale will be the same classification 

recommended by the prosecutor and approved by the 

court. However, there may be cases in which the 

registrant presents subjective criteria that would 

support a court not relying on the tier classification 

recommended by the Scale. In those cases, we do not 

expect the court to blindly follow the numerical 

calculation provided by the Scale, but rather to enter the 

appropriate tier classification. We recognize that

subjective accomplishments, such as an individual 

registrant's positive response to treatment, may warrant 

a lower classification than the Scale recommends. 

However, we believe that those determinations are best 

made on a case-by-case basis within the discretion of 

the court. 
5 A-1008-22

[Id. at 109]. 

 In In re Registrant G.B., 147 N.J. 62, 69 (1996), our Supreme Court again 

acknowledged the Scale is not immune from challenge. "The Scale is only a 

tool, albeit a useful one. It does not graduate to an irrebuttable presumption 

simply because it is properly and accurately computed." Id. at 80-81. There, 

the Court identified three types of challenges a registrant may lodge: 

First, a registrant may introduce evidence that the

calculation that led to the Scale score was incorrectly 

performed either because of a factual error, because the 

registrant disputes a prior offense, because the variable 

factors were improperly determined, or for similar 

reasons. Second, a registrant may introduce evidence 

at the hearing that the Scale calculations do not 

properly encapsulate his specific case; or phrased 

differently, a registrant may maintain that his case falls 

outside the "heartland" of cases and, therefore, that he 

deserves to be placed in a tier other than that called for 

by the prosecutor's Scale score. Finally, a registrant 

may introduce evidence that the extent of notification 

called for by his tier categorization is excessive because 

of unique aspects of his case. 

[Id. at 85]. 

The Court opined "few cases" would present facts that would undermine 

the Scale score as calculated for a registrant. Id. at 82. It is "[o]nly in the 

unusual case where relevant, material, and reliable facts exist for which the 

Scale does not account, or does not adequately account, should the Scale score 
6 A-1008-22

be questioned. Those facts must be sufficiently unusual to establish that a 

particular registrant's case falls outside the 'heartland' of cases." Ibid. The Court 

provided two examples where a heartland motion may lie: when the registrant's 

sexual offenses were limited to within the family home, and a "more common" 

scenario concerning a registrant's psychological state. Id. at 82-83. "In some 

instances, an expert evaluating a registrant may believe that the registrant's 

psychological profile makes him substantially less likely to reoffend than the 

general sex offender." Id. at 83. Because the Scale does not "consider positive 

psychiatric profiles and positive post-sentence behavior as true mitigating 

factors that can reduce the projected risk of reoffense, expert testimony may be 

essential for an accurate tier designation, even to the point of overriding the 

Scale score." Ibid.

In addition to a heartland motion challenging the Scale score itself, the 

Court recognized "[a] separate challenge that potentially could be raised to the 

Scale score concern[ing] the scope of community notification," referring to "a 

registrant whose Scale score was properly computed and whose case does not 

fall outside the 'heartland' of cases in terms of his risk of reoffense" but 

nevertheless "seek[s] to narrow the scope of community notification." Id. at 84. 

The Court foresaw "few cases in which such a challenge will be successful" 
7 A-1008-22

because "the scope of notification for each tier categorization has been strictly 

defined by the Attorney General" in the AG Guidelines. Ibid. The Court 

concluded that "in the unusual case, facts may exist that warrant a narrowing of 

the notification (or, perhaps, even the expansion of the notification)." Ibid. 

M.L. argues the Court's holding in G.B. leads to the ineluctable conclusion 

that a Megan's Law judge must be bound by the tier designation determined by 

the Scale unless the registrant, and not the State, presents support to depart from 

the Scale score; and that only the court, and not the State, may use psychological 

evidence to justify a departure from the Scale score. We are unpersuaded by 

this cramped interpretation of Megan's Law and hold that the State may, in 

certain limited circumstances, request an upward adjustment of notification. 

Because we are also satisfied that M.L.'s case presented one of those limited 

circumstances, we affirm. 

II.

On the night of June 26, 1987, then nineteen-year-old M.L., fifteen-yearold R.C. and three other individuals attended a party, where M.L. drank alcohol 

heavily. They left the party shortly after midnight to go swimming in a wooded 

area. Upon arrival, M.L. led R.C. into the woods where he sexually assaulted 

her and then strangled her to death with her bra. He left her body and rejoined 
8 A-1008-22

the rest of the group, telling them R.C. had gone to the bathroom and he could 

not find her. 

After feigning a search for ten minutes, M.L. drove the other individuals 

home except for A.M., who had passed out in the car. M.L. drove back to the 

woods, retrieved R.C.'s body and clothing, placed them in the trunk of the car, 

and continued driving around. When A.M. awoke around 7:00 a.m., M.L. pulled 

the car into a motel parking lot and showed him R.C.'s body in the trunk. The 

car did not restart, so the two left it and took public transportation back to their 

respective homes. That evening, A.M. reported the murder to law enforcement. 

M.L. hid in the woods for two days until another friend convinced him to turn 

himself in to the State Police. 

M.L. was indicted for two counts of murder (capital offense), N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2) (counts one and two); first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-3(a)(3) (count three); two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual 

assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3) and (6) (counts four and five); third-degree 

hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) (count six); and fourth-degree 

endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (count seven). On 

March 22, 1989, a jury found M.L. guilty of all counts. 
9 A-1008-22

At sentencing, counts two and three merged with count one, and count 

seven merged with count five. M.L. was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 

thirty-year parole ineligibility period on count one; a consecutive fifteen-year 

term on count five; and a four-year consecutive term on count six. 

M.L. was paroled on April 9, 2021, and moved to Camden County. The 

State served him with notice of proposed tiering as a Tier II with inclusion on 

the internet registry, and Tier III community notification. After conducting the 

tiering hearing on February 10, 2022, the Camden County Megan's Law judge 

entered an order the next day confirming M.L.'s Scale score of sixty-four, which 

placed him in Tier II, with inclusion on the internet registry. The judge also 

granted the State's application for Tier III door-to-door community notification 

within a 1,000-foot radius of M.L.'s residence. M.L. appealed the order but 

subsequently withdrew it because he moved from Camden County. 

On August 8, 2022, M.L. relocated to and registered in Burlington County. 

On September 12, 2022, he was again served with notice of proposed tiering as 

a Tier II with inclusion on the internet registry, and Tier III door-to-door 

notification within a half-mile radius of his residence.5 

5

 The Tier III notification radius increased based on M.L.'s move to a less 

densely populated area. See In re Registrant E.A., 285 N.J. Super. 554 (1995). 
10 A-1008-22

The Burlington County Megan's Law judge conducted the tiering hearing 

on November 30, 2022. In considering the State's motion for Tier III 

notification, the judge expressed doubt that the Scale's consideration of 

"significant victim harm" encompassed the facts of this case, which had resulted 

in the "ultimate harm" of R.C.'s death. 

The judge then considered three psychological evaluations administered 

to M.L. The first, dated January 6, 2021, by Richard Mucowski, Ph.D., was an 

in-depth psychological evaluation prepared for purposes of determining M.L.'s 

suitability for parole release. Dr. Mucowski noted M.L. admitted he forced 

himself on R.C. and strangled her because she refused to perform oral sex on 

him.

6

 He expressed concerns about M.L.'s sexual and emotional abuse as a 

child, substance abuse and prior self-injurious behavior. Dr. Mucowski noted 

M.L. had not had any treatment for his sex offense or his own sexual abuse. He 

concluded M.L. presented a medium risk for reoffending if released on parole 

and recommended "close supervision" if that occurred. 

6

 Dr. Mucowski noted this statement contradicted M.L.'s prior statement to Dr. 

Greenberg that he had consensual sex with R.C., during which R.C. said 

something about his "manhood . . . not being big enough." He told Dr. 

Greenberg this made him think of his mother, who had made a similar comment 

to him a few years prior, and "he went into a blind rage and strangled [R.C.]." 
11 A-1008-22

The second evaluation, dated September 5, 2022, by Leland D. Mosby, 

Ed.D., was conducted at the request of the State Parole Board after M.L. had 

been released on parole, to determine his suitability for future treatment. Dr. 

Mosby concluded M.L. presented a "higher moderate category for violence and 

sexual recidivism" and recommended he continue with therapy. 

The third evaluation, dated November 1, 2022, by Kenneth L. McNiel, 

Ph.D., was conducted at M.L.'s request to assess his psychosexual health and 

risk to the community in connection with the State's application for Tier III 

notification. Dr. McNiel noted there were "minor discrepancies" in M.L.'s prior 

accounts of the murder and the "[c]omprehensive risk assessment provide[d] a 

mixed picture." He found M.L.'s "significant historical risks" were improved or 

stable and his dynamic risks were minimal based on his positive adjustment in 

the community, and therefore M.L. presented a low moderate risk of sexual or 

other violence. He concluded the risk could be "reasonably managed under 

[parole] supervision, and that a Tier [III] notification including door-to-door 

notifications would more likely increase the risk of residential and/or 

employment instability than decrease his overall risk to the community." 

In weighing this case, the judge noted the positive aspects of M.L.'s 

progress, including his adherence to parole conditions, community support, 
12 A-1008-22

gainful employment and participation in counseling. He also discussed risk 

factors, including the short time M.L. had been on parole release in the 

community and the potential for his provocation to anger, particularly with 

alcohol or drug use.7 

The judge found that, given the type of harm inflicted, which was "the 

death of another human being," the risk of harm to the community outweighed 

M.L.'s privacy interest. On December 2, 2022, the judge entered an order 

confirming M.L.'s Scale score of fifty-eight,8 which placed him in Tier II with 

inclusion on the internet registry, and granted the State's application for Tier III

door-to-door notification. On consent of the State, the Tier III notification has 

been stayed pending the resolution of this appeal. 

III. 

We review a trial court's conclusions regarding a Megan's 

Law registrant's tier designation and scope of community notification for 

7

 The judge also expressed his concerns regarding M.L.'s reconnecting with his 

mother, given the fact that he identified her as a trigger for his strangling R.C., 

but noted they "don't talk about the past" and were "living for today, trying to 

enjoy today and going forward together." Contrary to M.L.'s contention, this 

concern does not appear to be a primary factor in the judge's decision. 

8

 The State consented to a reduction in criteria nine (response to treatment), 

eleven (therapeutic support) and twelve (residential support). 
13 A-1008-22

an abuse of discretion. See In re Registrant A.I., 303 N.J. Super. 105, 114 (App. 

Div. 1997). "[A]n abuse of discretion arises when a decision is made without 

a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested 

on an impermissible basis." State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 

561, 571 (2002)). The trial court's findings will be upheld so long as they are 

supported by sufficient evidence in the record and we find "no basis for 

disturbing those factual findings." In re Registrant J.G., 463 N.J. Super. at

277. "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that 

flow from established facts are not entitled to any special 

deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 

366, 378 (1995). 

We first address whether the State may bring a heartland motion seeking 

to expand the scope of notification, and note that the record before us is unclear 

whether M.L. raised this issue before the Megan's Law judge. Ordinarily, we 

will decline consideration of an issue not properly raised before the trial court, 

unless the jurisdiction of the court is implicated or the matter concerns an issue 

of great public importance. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 
14 A-1008-22

(1973). Because we recognize the important public safety implications 

presented by this appeal, we will consider the issue. 

Having reviewed precedent concerning heartland applications, we are 

satisfied the State may, in limited circumstances, request notification more 

expansive than indicated by a registrant's confirmed Scale score. As with a 

registrant's heartland application, the State may only request an expansion of 

notification in the "unusual case where relevant, material, and reliable facts exist 

for which the Scale does not account, or does not adequately account . . . . Those 

facts must be sufficiently unusual to establish that a particular registrant's case 

falls outside the 'heartland' of cases." In re Registrant G.B., 147 N.J. at 82. 

 We agree this case, which resulted in the "ultimate harm" of death to the 

victim, presented the facts not taken into account by the Scale. The AG

Guidelines define criteria one, degree of force, as "related to the seriousness of 

the potential harm to the community if reoffense occurs." AG Guidelines, 

Exhibit E. The example provided for high risk is where the "offender causes 

lasting or substantial physical damage to [the] victim, or offender uses or is 

armed with a weapon." Ibid. Although "[t]hese examples are in no way intended 

to be exclusive," they nevertheless reflect the Scale does not account for a sexual 

assault that resulted in the victim's murder. 
15 A-1008-22

 While M.L.'s Scale score was properly computed, the judge nevertheless 

had the obligation to determine whether, given the individual facts of the case, 

the notification attendant to that tier was appropriate: 

The final determination of dangerousness lies with the 

courts, not the expertise of psychiatrists and 

psychologists. Courts must balance society's interest in 

protection from harmful conduct against the 

individual's interest in personal liberty and autonomy. 

The ultimate decision on dangerousness is, therefore, a 

legal one, not a medical one, even though it is guided 

by medical expert testimony. 

[In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 59 (1996).] 

 Because Megan’s Law was enacted to enable the public to protect itself 

against the dangers posed by sex offenders, the "level of notification required 

for the public to protect itself varies according to what crime the public must 

guard against." In re Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. at 102 (citing Doe v. Poritz, 142 

N.J. 1, 73 (1994)). "The need for greater or lesser notification is directly related 

to the gravity of the offense to be re-committed along with the risk that the 

registrant will re-commit whatever crime the registrant committed before." Ibid. 

For this reason, we reject M.L.'s contention the State's application in this case 

was required to be supported by expert testimony. Here, the upward adjustment 

was not grounded in a reassessment of the level of risk based on a psychological 

evaluation, but on the type of harm at risk of being inflicted. 
16 A-1008-22

We recognize that Megan's Law is intended to protect the public from 

recidivism of those convicted of sex offenses, and our Legislature has not 

enacted similar registration and notification requirements for other types of 

violent crimes. We note that here, in either of M.L.'s explanations for his 

motivation, his murder of R.C. was inextricably intertwined with his sexual 

assault of her. Our decision should not be construed to require Tier III 

notification in every case where a sexual assault resulted in the death of the 

victim. This determination must still be made on a case by case, fact-specific 

basis. Given our deferential standard of review and the particular facts of this 

case, we are satisfied the judge's decision here did not constitute an abuse of 

discretion. 

Affirmed.