IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joanne Hardik, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 385 C.D. 2022

: Submitted: March 24, 2023

Community Health Systems (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: May 17, 2023

Joanne Hardik (Claimant) has petitioned this Court to review an 

adjudication of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which affirmed 

the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ). The WCJ granted a 

petition to modify compensation benefits filed by Community Health Systems 

(Employer). In this appeal, Claimant challenges as unconstitutional the retroactive 

application of Act 111,1 which altered the criteria for modification of a claimant’s 

benefits based on the results of an impairment rating evaluation (IRE). Upon review, 

this case is controlled by Pierson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Consol 

Pennsylvania Coal Co.), 252 A.3d 1169 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 261 A.3d 378 

(Pa. 2021), in which this Court previously rejected similar claims. Thus, we affirm.

1 Act of October 24, 2018, P.L. 714, No. 111 (Act 111). Act 111 repealed Section 306(a.2) of 

the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, added by the Act 

of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, formerly 77 P.S. § 511.2, and added Section 306(a.3), 77 P.S. § 511.3. 
2

I. BACKGROUND

On July 11, 2013, Claimant suffered a work-related injury, which 

aggravated preexisting injuries to her back and resulted in total disability benefits. 

On March 12, 2021, Employer filed a modification petition alleging that Claimant’s 

benefit status must be modified from total to partial based upon a February 25, 2021 

IRE by Dr. Michael Wolk.

The WCJ held a hearing, following which Employer introduced the 

deposition testimony of Dr. Wolk and the IRE. Notes of Testimony (N.T.) Hr’g, 

7/13/21, at 8. Dr. Wolk stated that Claimant had a whole-body impairment rating of 

27% and that she had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). N.T. Wolk 

Dep., 7/6/21, at 11-12. Dr. Wolk performed the IRE under the Sixth Edition of the 

American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 

(AMA Guides). Id. at 12. Claimant did not present any testimony and stated that 

she would only be challenging the constitutionality of Act 111. N.T. Hr’g, 7/13/21, at 

6-7; N.T. Hr’g, 4/13/21, at 7.

The WCJ held that Employer established that Claimant had reached 

MMI and had a whole-body impairment of 27%. WCJ’s Op., 3/23/22, at 6. Thus, 

the WCJ granted Employer’s petition, modifying Claimant’s benefit to partial 

disability status effective February 25, 2021. Claimant appealed to the Board, which 

affirmed. See Bd. Op. & Order, 3/23/22. Claimant timely petitioned this Court for 

review. 
3

II. ISSUES

2

Claimant contends that retroactive application of Act 111 to her pre-Act 

111 injury is unconstitutional. Claimant’s Br. at 11. In support, Claimant reasons she 

has a vested right to WC benefits, which cannot be retroactively altered by law. Id.

at 11-12. In Claimant’s view, Act 111’s retroactive application deprived her of the right 

to vested benefits and limited her total payments. Id. at 12, 15. Claimant assails 

Pierson as flawed because it held that Act 111 did not alter any substantive rights. Id.

at 15-16. In support, Claimant alleges that Dana Holding Corporation v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Smuck), 232 A.3d 629, 647 (Pa. 2020) (Dana), 

undermined Pierson’s holding because the Dana Court “specifically held that Act 111 

altered a substantive right to benefits.” Id. at 16. Claimant also argues that Act 111

lacks “sufficiently specific language to make the law retroactive.” Id. at 20.3

III. DISCUSSION

In 2018, the General Assembly passed Act 111, which authorizes the use 

of an IRE to determine a claimant’s disability status.4 Among its provisions, Section 

306(a.3), the employer may require a claimant to submit to an IRE after receiving 

104 weeks of total disability compensation. Section 306(a.3) expressly adopted the 

Sixth Edition of the AMA Guides (second printing April 2009) as the basis for a 

2

In a workers’ compensation appeal, our review is limited to determining whether an error 

of law was committed, whether constitutional rights were violated, and whether necessary findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Bryn Mawr Landscaping Co. v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Cruz-Tenorio), 219 A.3d 1244, 1252 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citation omitted).

3 Employer rejects these claims, asserting that Act 111 is constitutional and applies 

retroactively. See Employer’s Br. at 11-15 (citing in support, inter alia, Pierson). Further, Employer 

reasons that the holding of Dana was limited to cases pending on appeal when our Supreme Court 

issued Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 161 A.3d 827

(Pa. 2017). Id. at 16. Employer argues that Pierson rejected Claimant’s argument that Act 111 could 

not apply retroactively. Id. at 17-18.

4 Prior law governing the IRE process was deemed an unconstitutional delegation of 

legislative authority. Protz, 161 A.3d at 841.
4

qualified physician’s IRE, and it set the threshold required for a total disability status 

at 35% whole-body impairment. Id.5 If a claimant’s impairment rating is less than 

35%, then the claimant shall be considered partially disabled.6

In Pierson, this Court determined that Act 111 did not deprive claimants 

of a vested right but “simply provided employers with the means to change a 

claimant’s disability status from total to partial by providing the requisite medical 

evidence that the claimant has a whole[-]body impairment of less than 35%, after 

receiving 104 weeks of [total temporary disability] benefits.” Pierson, 252 A.3d at 

1179. Further, the General Assembly granted employers/insurers credit for the weeks 

of disability compensation paid to an injured employer prior to the passage of Act 

111. Rose Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Espada), 238 A.3d 551, 561-62 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2020); see also Section 3(1) of Act 111 (“[A]n insurer shall be given credit 

for weeks of total disability compensation paid prior to the effective date of this 

paragraph.”), Section 3(2) of Act 111 (“[A]n insurer shall be given credit for weeks 

of partial disability compensation paid prior to the effective date of this paragraph.”). 

Therefore, the employer credit provision was “explicitly given retroactive effect . . . 

by the General Assembly.” Pierson, 252 A.3d at 1180.

Our analysis in Pierson is dispositive here. Claimant, like the claimant 

in Pierson, sustained her work-related injury before the passage of Act 111. See

Pierson, 252 A.3d at 1171. Employer, like the employer in Pierson, sought to modify 

Claimant’s benefits based on an IRE obtained after the Act’s effective date. See id.

5

In Pennsylvania AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 219 A.3d 306, 317 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019), aff’d,

(Pa., No. 88 MAP 2019, filed August 18, 2020) (per curiam), this Court determined that Section 

306(a.3) of the Act does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority 

because the General Assembly named and adopted a particular set of standards as its own. 

6 A change in disability status does not alter the amount of compensation received by a 

claimant but limits the receipt of benefits to 500 weeks. See Section 306(b) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 

512(1).
5

at 1172. Claimant, like the claimant in Pierson, challenges the retroactivity of the 

employer credit provision of Act 111 and asserts a vested right in her disability 

benefits. See id. at 1175. To the extent Claimant contends that Dana undermined 

Pierson, Claimant is mistaken. As Employer correctly observed, the issue before 

the Dana Court was whether Protz should apply only to cases then-pending on direct 

appeal. See Dana, 232 A.3d at 636; see also Scampone v. Highland Park Care Ctr., 

LLC, 57 A.3d 582, 604 (Pa. 2012) (cautioning against cherry-picking phrases out of 

context). Because Pierson post-dated Dana, the validity of Pierson’s analysis was 

simply not before the Dana Court. Therefore, based on our reasoning in Pierson, 

we reject Claimant’s arguments. Accord DiPaolo v. UPMC Magee Women’s Hosp.

(Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 278 A.3d 430, 438 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022), appeal denied, 

290 A.3d 237 (Pa. 2023); Force v. Cmwlth. of Pa. (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.) (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 63 C.D. 2022, filed Nov. 10, 2022); Wescoe v. Fedchem, LLC (Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1010 C.D. 2021, filed Aug. 16, 2022); Sochko 

v. Nat’l Express Transit Serv. (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 490 

C.D. 2021, filed Mar. 16, 2022); Hender-Moody v. Am. Heritage Fed. Credit Union 

(Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 166 C.D. 2021, filed Feb. 15, 2022); 

Dohn v. Beck n’ Call (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 103 C.D. 2021, 

filed Sept. 20, 2021).7

Thus, we affirm.

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

7 We cite unreported opinions for their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P 126(b)(1); 210 Pa. 

Code § 69.414(a).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joanne Hardik, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 385 C.D. 2022

:

Community Health Systems (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2023, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board, entered March 23, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge