ASSESSING THE SAFETY CULTURE OF UNDERGROUND COAL MINING: RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

C. L. Kosmoski, Office of Mine Safety and Health Research, Pittsburgh, PA

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, coal mining safety has attained national attention 

due to several highly publicized disasters. Despite these threats to 

worker safety and health, the U.S. relies on the mining of coal to meet 

its need for electrical power, with 42% of electricity in the U.S.

generated through the burning of coal (U.S. Energy Information

Administration, 2012b; United Mine Workers of America, n.d.).

Furthermore, the production of coal continues to increase and reach 

record levels every year (National Mining Association, 2012; U.S. 

Energy Information Administration, 2012a). For this reason, the coal 

mining industry must continue to find ways to protect its workers while 

maintaining productivity.

One potential approach to protecting workers while maintaining 

productivity is through improving the safety culture at coal mines. In 

order to achieve this culture, operators, employees, the inspectorate, 

etc. must share a fundamental commitment to safety as a value. This 

type of culture is known in other industries as a “safety culture,” and 

can be defined as the characteristics of the work environment (such as 

the norms, rules, and common understandings) that influence facility 

personnel’s perceptions of the importance that the organization places 

on safety.

Fundamental to improving safety culture within an organization is 

understanding the existing safety culture; improvements cannot be 

made without first elucidating areas that require improvement. This 

manuscript details the process undertaken by researchers at the 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Office of 

Mine Safety and Health Research (OMSHR) to assess the safety 

culture at five underground coal mines across the United States. The 

purpose of this manuscript is to present the aggregated results from 

those five safety culture assessments conducted at underground coal 

mines. Additionally, some general recommendations for areas where 

coal mines might focus their attention as part of their attempts to 

improve safety culture are offered.

BACKGROUND ON SAFETY CULTURE ASSESSMENTS

Since its inception, the concept of safety culture has been a key 

topic in discussions of safety across many industries. There is “a 

recognition that, while having engineered safeguards and formal 

management systems to control risks is essential, it is equally 

important to win the commitment of the workforce to treat safety as a 

priority through a genuine corporate commitment to achieve high levels 

of safety” (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 2002, 

Foreword). However, evaluating the safety culture of a particular 

organization poses some challenges. Cultural assumptions, which 

influence behavior and, therefore, safety performance, are not always 

clearly observable.

Safety culture can be aptly described using Schein’s (1992)

model of organizational culture. According to Schein, organizational 

culture consists of three levels: artifacts, espoused values, and basic 

assumptions. Artifacts are “all the phenomena that one sees, hears, 

and feels when one encounters a new group with an unfamiliar culture” 

(Schein, 1992, p. 17). For example, artifacts of the safety culture in a 

coal mine might include personal protective equipment such as hard 

hats and hearing protection as well as the communication practices

between a continuous miner operator and a shuttle car operator. 

Espoused values are the strategies, goals, and philosophies of the 

organization (Schein, 1992) and may become known through 

examples such as the company’s mission statement, other 

organizational literature, training for new hires or longtime employees, 

or even through direct communication from organizational members. In 

a coal mine, espoused values might be reflected through mottos such 

as “Safety first.” The third level of organizational culture, basic 

assumptions, are, according to Schein, “unconscious, taken-forgranted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings” (p. 17) that guide 

the behavior of group members as well as their expectations for and 

judgments of others’ behavior. This level is the most difficult to detect 

because often these “core” assumptions are so ingrained that 

employees do not realize they have them. In a coal mine, these could 

include assumptions such as “Everyone follows safety regulations,” or 

“You never leave someone behind in the mine.” In an organization that 

holds these basic assumptions, it would be viewed as inconceivable 

that someone would violate a safety regulation or leave a coworker 

behind. Schein suggests that artifacts and espoused values develop 

and are sustained based on the underlying basic assumptions. Thus, 

safety culture can be assessed by examining elements of each of the 

three levels.

Artifacts, claimed values, and basic assumptions can be 

evaluated to identify the presence or absence of the characteristics 

that have been found to be important for the existence of a positive 

safety culture (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2006). These 

characteristics include:

 Safety is a clearly recognized value in the organization.

 Accountability for safety in the organization is clear.

 Safety is integrated into all activities in the organization.

 A safety leadership process exists in the organization.

 Safety culture is learning-driven in the organization.

A sixth characteristic can be added to this framework to

specifically evaluate the absence or presence of a Safety Conscious 

Work Environment (SCWE). A Safety Conscious Work Environment is 

one in which individuals feel free to raise concerns of any type without 

the fear of reprisal. A healthy SCWE is a critical subset of a healthy 

safety culture and ensures that problems can be identified before they 

become significant events. Adding this sixth element to the framework 

results in this characteristic: 

 A process for establishing a strong and effective SCWE is in

place.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology described below was originally developed with 

the support of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Haber & 

Barriere, 1998) to assess the influence of organization and 

management on safety performance within the nuclear power industry. 

Overall the methodology has been implemented in over 50 different 

organizations, across 5 different countries, representing industries as 

diverse as nuclear power, fossil energy, research, mining, 

transportation, health care, and chemical reprocessing.

The methodology entails collecting a variety of information that is 

largely based upon the attitudes and perceptions of the individuals in 

an organization, as well as conducting structured observations of

individuals performing work activities. Behavioral research has shown 

that attitudes and perceptions factor largely into determining behavior 

(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen, 1991). Therefore, the data collected 
regarding individuals’ perceptions and attitudes are critical to this type 

of evaluation.

A multiple-method approach was utilized to assess the safety

culture of underground coal mines for this project. The methods

included (1) functional analysis, (2) in-depth interviews, (3) behavioral

anchored rating scales (BARS), (4) organizational and safety culture

(paper and pencil) surveys, and (5) behavioral observations. Each

methodology offers a unique insight into a mine’s safety culture, and

the use of all methodologies combined offers the most comprehensive

and complete assessment of a mine’s safety culture. The five

methodologies will be explained in detail below.

Functional Analysis

The purposes of the functional analysis in this study were: (1) to 

clearly identify the organizational units of the mines, (2) to gain an 

understanding of each organizational unit’s functions and interfaces, 

(3) to examine the way in which information flows among and within 

units, and (4) to identify the key supervisory and managerial positions 

of each organizational unit. Information to support this activity was 

obtained primarily through the review of documentation as well as 

preliminary discussions with mine staff. The following are examples of 

documents that were reviewed at the mine sites studied as part of the 

functional analysis:

 Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) Mine Data

Retrieval System entries related to that particular mine.

 Any comprehensive safety program, which includes all safety

policies and practices.

 Employee handbooks.

 Organizational structure charts.

 Mine maps.

 Records of MSHA violations.

 Ventilation plans.

 Roof control plans.

 Foremen’s pre-shift reports.

 Incident investigation report templates.

 Completed incident investigation reports.

 Performance review templates.

Functional Analysis Sampling

The sample of documents analyzed for the functional analysis 

was determined based on what documents and information were 

publicly available and what documents and information were voluntarily 

provided by the mine. The MSHA Mine Data Retrieval System 

information is publicly available; therefore, information contained in the 

MSHA database relating to incidents, accidents, violations, and 

citations was gathered for each mine site. Once on site at a mine, 

researchers were given access to the mine maps, ventilation plans, 

and roof control plans. All mine sites also allowed researchers access 

to the previous year’s MSHA citation narratives. Organizational safety 

programs, employee handbooks, organizational structure charts, 

incident report templates and actual incident reports, and performance 

review templates were requested at each mine site, but they were not 

provided at all sites. The mines cited proprietary information or 

absence of information as reasons for not providing these requested 

documents.

In-Depth Interviews

The structured interview protocol for each in-depth interview was 

derived from a database of interview questions. A particular subset of 

questions can be selected to provide a predefined focus to an interview 

session. The assessment team members selected a set of questions 

(see Appendix A for an example) to gather information related to the 

safety culture characteristics. Each interview consisted of two 

introductory questions designed to make the interviewee comfortable 

and get him or her used to talking. Then the interview focused on 

gathering information about four organizational behaviors randomly 

selected from the following eight organizational behaviors that were 

investigated during each safety culture assessment (Haber & Barriere, 

1998): 

Attention to Safety. Attention to safety refers to the 

characteristics of the work environment, such as the norms, rules, and 

common understandings that influence personnel’s perceptions of the 

importance that the organization places on safety. It includes the 

degree to which a critical, questioning attitude exists that is directed 

toward organizational improvement.

Communication. Communication refers to the exchange of 

information, both formally and informally, primarily between different 

departments or units. It includes both the top-down (management to 

staff) and bottom-up (staff to management) communication networks.

Formalization. Formalization refers to the extent to which there 

are well-identified rules, procedures, and/or standardized methods for 

routine activities as well as unusual occurrences.

Goal Setting/Prioritization. Goal setting/prioritization refers to 

the extent to which facility personnel understand, accept, and agree 

with the purpose and relevance of goals. 

Organizational Learning. Organizational learning refers to the 

degree to which individual personnel and the organization as a whole 

use knowledge gained from past experiences to improve future 

performance.

Performance Quality. Performance quality refers to the degree 

to which facility personnel take personal responsibility for their actions 

and the consequences of the actions. It also includes commitment to 

and pride in the organization.

Problem Identification and Resolution. Problem identification 

and resolution refers to the extent to which the organization 

encourages facility personnel to draw upon knowledge, experience, 

and current information to identify and resolve problems.

Training. Training refers to the degree to which personnel are 

provided with the knowledge and skills required to perform tasks safely 

and effectively. It includes personnel’s perceptions regarding the 

general usefulness of the training program.

Three to five interview questions were asked about each of the 

four randomly selected organizational behaviors. The interviewer 

asked each of the pre-selected questions verbatim, but was given the 

latitude to probe and explore other lines of information when deemed 

necessary. Finally, each interview concluded with two summary 

questions. Interviews lasted no longer than 50 minutes and were 

typically conducted with one research team member interviewing one 

interviewee. Interviews were not recorded and the interviewer took 

handwritten notes during the interview. At times, a second research 

team member would sit in on interviews to assist with note taking. 

In-Depth Interview Sampling

A sample of 10-20% of the employee population was selected to 

participate in the in-depth interviews. A purposive, stratified sampling 

method was utilized in order to ensure that the sample included 

participants from all shifts, all portal locations, all job classifications, 

and all levels of the organizational hierarchy. In order to conduct this 

type of sampling, the lead researcher requested organizational 

hierarchical charts as well as job rosters from each mine site well in 

advance of the data collection. The job rosters provided information 

about how many of each job classification worked on each shift and 

from each portal. For example, a job roster might indicate that on the 

day shift (7:00 am to 3:00 pm) there would be four continuous miner 

operators and they all entered the mine through the North portal. The 

lead researcher would compile a list of job positions that were selected 

to be interviewed and that list would be provided to the mine prior to 

data collection. The mine would then provide an employee who filled 

that job and designate him or her as an interview participant. The 

number of interviews conducted at each mine depended on the total 

population of the mine and ranged from a low of 26 (13% of that mine’s 

employee population) to a high of 68 (15% of that mine’s employee 

population) in-depth interviews.

Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (BARS)

The Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (see Appendix B for an 

example) were administered to all of the individuals who participated in 

the in-depth interviews during each safety culture assessment. Each 

interviewee was administered BARS associated with the four 
organizational behaviors that were randomly selected as focus 

behaviors for the interview. The BARS provide the opportunity to 

quantitatively summarize qualitative data associated with the 

interviewee’s perceptions of the organization. At the culmination of 

each in-depth interview, the interviewee was presented with four 

sheets of paper, one sheet for each of four behavioral anchored rating 

scales. At the top of each sheet of paper was an organizational 

behavior and its definition. Below that on the page were five 

statements that described how that behavior could be manifested in an 

organization. Participants had the option of reading and filling out the 

BARS on their own or having the interviewer read the BARS to them. 

Each participant was instructed to read or listen to the name of the 

behavior and its definition and then read or listen to each of the five 

statements below the definition and choose the one statement that 

most accurately described how that behavior was manifested at the 

mine.

Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (BARS) Sampling

Behavioral anchored rating scales were administered in 

conjunction with the in-depth interviews. Therefore, the sampling was 

consistent with the sampling procedures outlined above for the indepth interview sampling.

Organizational and Safety Culture Survey

The primary purpose of administering an employee survey is to 

measure, in a quantitative and objective way, topics related to safety 

culture, coordination of work, job satisfaction, communications, work 

group cohesion, organizational commitment, perceived hazardous 

nature of work, and the safety consciousness of the work environment 

(see Appendix C for definitions of these survey scales). By conducting 

a survey, a broad sample of the individuals in the organization can be 

obtained, and it is possible to gather information from a larger number 

of personnel than can be reached through the interview process alone.

Organizational and Safety Culture Survey Sampling

The organizational and safety culture survey was administered to 

all personnel at each participating mine site. Typically, the survey was 

administered in the “ready room” where employees gathered before 

entering the mine for each shift. The survey was administered to 

employees on all shifts and all portals at each mine. Additionally, 

surveys were administered to salaried workers who might not gather in 

the “ready room” before a shift. This was done by distributing the 

surveys to individuals in their offices or the mine foremen’s office. 

Survey response rates ranged from a low of 54% to a high of 98% with 

an average response rate of 70% across all five mines.

Behavioral Observations

The use of behavioral observations provides an unobtrusive 

assessment of particular organizational behaviors and structured 

observations of critical processes including shift changes, training, 

management and work unit meetings, and responses to planned or 

unplanned events. Behavioral observations also allow researchers to 

objectively view “how things really work” at a mine site. During the 

course of each safety culture assessment, observations of various 

work activities were made. These activities included:

 Ongoing work being conducted in surface areas at the mine.

 Ongoing work being conducted underground in the mine.

 Ongoing work being conducted at the preparation plant.

 Training to prepare to go underground.

 General conditions on the surface at the mine.

 8-hour annual refresher training.

 Foremen’s meetings.

 Incident investigations.

 Daily safety talks prior to each shift.

 Daily management roundtable meetings.

 Weekly safety meetings.

 Safety kickoff meals.

Behavioral Observation Sampling

Behavioral observations were conducted on a convenience basis.

The only formal requirement that was made of the mine was that the 

research team was given access to the underground working 

environment at least one time during the data collection. Otherwise, 

assessment team members simply requested permission to observe 

any activity that took place while the team was at the mine site for data 

collection. Generally, permission was granted for observation of all 

activities taking place. 

RESULTS

The results presented below summarize the insights gained from 

the assessment team’s analysis of the functional analyses, structured 

interviews, behavioral anchored rating scales (BARS), survey data, 

and behavioral observations across the five participating mine sites. A 

concern at the commencement of this project was that NIOSH 

researchers would only be invited to assess the safety culture at mines 

with pre-existing strong, positive safety cultures – in other words, the 

“best of the best” mines. This situation would be less than ideal 

because the best data and information for this project would come from 

a sample of mines that have safety cultures significantly different from 

one another. This would allow researchers to observe examples of 

best practices, examples of less desirable practices, and also trends 

that appear across the mines even though the safety cultures differ. A 

one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if there were differences 

in the 11 safety culture survey dimensions across the five participating 

mines (for a detailed discussion of the one-way ANOVA statistical test, 

including information on how to interpret results, please see Sprinthall, 

2003). Results from the ANOVA1

1 Due to the large sample size, η2

, a measure of effect size, has been 

included in the presentation of the ANOVA results. Conventional rules 

of thumb for interpreting η2 are: .01 = small effect, .06 = medium effect, 

and .14 = large effect (Sprinthall, 2003).

indicated significant differences for:

 Communication accuracy (F(4, 1341) = 10.119, p < .001, η2 

= .029)

 Communication interaction (F(4, 1335) = 3.541, p < .01, η2 =

.010) 

 Communication satisfaction (F(4, 1332) = 25.063, p < .001,

η2 = .070)

 Job satisfaction (F(4, 1325) = 21.528, p < .001, η2 = .061)

 Commitment to the organization (F(4, 1349) = 83.229, p <

.001, η2 = .198)

 Coordination (F(4,1349) = 26.304, p < .001, η2 = .072)

 Workgroup cohesion (F(4, 1348) = 9.417, p < .001, η2 =

.027)

 Hazard (F(4,1348) = 15.842, p < .001, η2 = .045)

 Attention to safety (F(4, 1348) = 6.488. p < .001, η2 = .019)

 Safety conscious work environment (F(4, 1346) = 32.970, p

< .001, η2 = .089)

There were not significant differences across the mines for the 

safety culture dimension communication trust:

 (F(4,1346) = 1.538, p = .189, η2 = .005)

A second one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if there 

were differences in the eight behaviors investigated by using the 

behavioral anchored rating scales across the five participating mines. 

Results from this ANOVA indicated significant differences for all 

behaviors, including:

 Attention to safety (F(4, 127) = 9.845, p < .001, η2 = .237)

 Formalization (F(4,136) = 5.646, p < .001, η2 = .142)

 Goal setting and prioritization (F(4, 134) = 6.568, p < .001, η2 

= .164)

 Communication (F(4,150) = 7.586, p < .001, η2 = .168)

 Organizational learning (F(4, 124) = 10.960, p < .001, η2 =

.261)

 Performance quality (F(4, 126) = 9.255, p < .001, η2 = .227)

 Problem identification and resolution (F(4, 137) = 6.173, p <

.001, η2 = .153)

 Training (F(4,123) = 7.187, p < .001, η2 = .189).

The results for the six safety culture characteristics (defined in the 

Background on Safety Culture Assessments section ) are detailed next 
under the “Assets” and “Areas for Improvement” subheadings for each 

characteristic:

CHARACTERISTIC 1: SAFETY IS A CLEARLY RECOGNIZED 

VALUE IN THE ORGANIZATION

Assets

At the five mine sites assessed, documentation that describes the 

importance and role of safety in the operation of the organization 

exists. Some examples of this documentation include employee 

handbooks, comprehensive safety programs, and risk calculators. 

Additionally, assessment results indicated that at the mines, multiple 

mechanisms exist to communicate the value of safety throughout the 

organization. Some of these mechanisms include preshift safety talks, 

weekly safety meetings, monthly safety kickoff meals, quarterly 

communication meetings, message centers and bulletin boards, video 

screens, safety status “traffic lights,” email messages, and paycheck 

inserts. Assessment team members observed artifacts related to safety 

(including decals and posters) displayed and distributed throughout the 

mines that participated in this project. 

All of the mines that were assessed had a safety incentive 

program in place. These programs varied from mine to mine, but most 

are corporate-driven and focus on reducing lost-time accidents (LTAs). 

Some mines also have a safety recognition program in place. Through 

these programs, individuals can be recognized for performing safe 

behaviors, reporting unsafe conditions and behaviors, and for 

suggesting innovative ways to improve safety at the mine. Many of the 

employees that were interviewed described that safety and production 

are well-balanced at their mines. 

Conservative decisionmaking with respect to safety was evident

at the participating mine sites. Some examples of this include the use 

of rib bolts in excess of the approved plan, use of wire screening on 

the mine roof even when not required, use of “pizza pans” in 

conjunction with roof bolts, use of tilt bolters instead of jacks when 

bolting corners, installation of a proximity detection system on the 

continuous miner, installation of lifeline reflectors and indicators in 

excess of requirements, increased fan efficiency to move more air to 

the face, and noise reduction technology on the fans. The assessment 

team observed that physical resources, including personal protective 

equipment (PPE) and proper tools and equipment, were generally

readily available to employees. 

Quantitative data from the survey results (Figure 1) show that the 

Attention to Safety scale was the highest rated survey scale across all 

five mines. This indicates that, in general, mine employees understand 

the behaviors important to safety in their work activities. More 

specifically, behaviors identified as “being alert to the potential for 

serious accidents,” “paying attention to potential danger,” and “doing 

one’s job well” were perceived to be very highly valued, according to 

survey results.

Areas for Improvement

Although there were many positive examples demonstrating that 

safety is a clearly recognized value at the five mine sites, performance 

on behaviors indicative of the value of safety must still be improved, 

consistently demonstrated, and understood by all members of each

organization. Some examples observed across the five mines include:

 Basic safety issues that exist with respect to housekeeping

and condition of materials must be addressed. Observations

by the assessment team indicated areas in the mine where

debris and waste were scattered about.

 Although some personal protective equipment (PPE) is

required to be worn by all personnel, e.g., safety glasses, the

optional use of other equipment, e.g., hearing protection and

respirators, needs to be reinforced.

 Safety messages, while regularly communicated during

preshift safety talks, may not always be immediately relevant

to planned work activities and should be regularly reinforced

to ensure importance.

 Some observations by the assessment team indicated a lack

of attention to detail that needs to be improved. For example,

reflectors on lifelines were often covered in rock dust and 

additional reflectors could be used, signs in the escapeway 

were covered in rock dust, warning lights on proximity 

detection systems were covered in mud.

 Safety significance of having inexperienced personnel

operating underground equipment needs to be reinforced.

For example, some interviewees indicated that

inexperienced people have operated equipment during

longwall moves.

 Interviewees reported that shortcuts are taken while working

(e.g., lifting a buggy with a scoop to change a tire). These

shortcuts tended to be more common on production sections

and when mines were running behind in production.

Another finding that indicates an area for improvement is that 

personnel tend to have the perception that management places the 

value of safety over production or that there is a balance between 

safety and production, but certain policies and practices do not 

reinforce the perception. Some examples of this possible contradiction 

between safety and production include:

 Having both a longwall move bonus given for completion

date (reward for speed) and an injury-free move bonus

(reward for safety) presents a conflicting message to miners.

 Bonuses for production are much larger than bonuses for

safety.

 Production goal charts were displayed throughout the portal,

but there were no charts documenting safety goals.

 Many of the messages displayed on the break room

televisions were production based, including information

about lost production due to down time.

 Some interviewees indicated that young or new foremen

tend to stress production over safety in an effort to impress

upper management.

Many of the five mines had a tendency to be reactive instead of 

proactive, which indicates a focus area for improving safety culture. 

Some interviewees expressed that their mine tends to be reactive to 

incidents, but the root problem is not always solved, as shown in the 

following examples:

 Requiring everyone to wear shower shoes in the bath house

after a slip and fall instead of creating a floor surface that will

not get slippery.

 Putting sand on an icy buildup by the warehouse door

instead of doing something to prevent the ice buildup.

 Running equipment until it breaks and is out of service, then

fixing the equipment instead of using preventative

maintenance to keep equipment in good working order at all

times.

 Miners repeatedly reported to management that there were

not enough SCSRs available; however the problem was not

remedied until the mine was issued a citation.

 Miners repeatedly reported to management that there were

clogged sanders on the mantrip, but the problem was not

addressed until the mine received a citation.

A practice that was common at all five of the participating mines

was the utilization of incentive programs that reward employees for

working for periods of time with no injuries or lost-time accidents.

However, these incentive programs often have the effect of

discouraging employees from reporting incidents and injuries. Some

interviewees indicated the presence of negative peer pressure during

long runs of time without injuries as well as employees working or

attending work (without doing any work) when they should not have

been (due to injury) because they did not want to break the “streak” of

no injuries.

Quantitative results from the BARS for Goal Setting and

Prioritization indicated that only 40.3% (Figure 2) of employees who

were interviewed across the five mines feel that site personnel

understand, accept, and agree with the purpose and relevance of

goals to an extent consistent with a high-performance safety culture.
CHARACTERISTIC 2: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SAFETY IN THE 

ORGANIZATION IS CLEAR

Assets

There were many examples of accountability for safety being 

clear in the five organizations that participated in this study. A majority 

of employees who were interviewed indicated that mine management’s 

commitment to safety is either perceived positively across the 

organization or is perceived as improving. Front-line supervisors (e.g., 

section foremen) have the authority to address issues as they arise. 

They are only required to escalate the problem upward through the 

hierarchy when they cannot solve the problem at their level.

Employees at the mines typically know what the responsibilities of their 

jobs are. Employees are trained that safety is the personal 

responsibility of everyone, not just members of the Safety Department. 

Foremen hold individuals accountable for safety by talking to them 

when they observe unsafe behavior (e.g., not wearing personal 

protection equipment). Employees typically take responsibility for 

making sure work is performed correctly and safely. Many interviewees 

indicated that they would feel comfortable correcting another employee 

if a job task was being performed incorrectly or unsafely.

Areas for Improvement

Interviewees at some mines described seeing members of upper 

management rarely, if ever, underground. This lack of management 

presence underground in the working areas may give employees the 

perception that they are not being held accountable for performing their 

work correctly or safely.

Although most employees know what their responsibilities are for 

performing their job, many indicated that they do not have a formal job 

description or that their roles and responsibilities are not formally 

documented. It is difficult to hold an employee accountable for safely 

and correctly performing his/her job if formal documentation of the 

roles and responsibilities of each job does not exist.

Interviewees indicated that they believe there is often inequity 

when dealing with employees on self-reporting incidents. The idea that 

the consequence for an action “depends on who you are” is prominent 

within the workforce. Additionally, employees indicated that they are 

held responsible for safe work performance through a hierarchical

disciplinary system. However, there seemed to be some confusion 

about the exact process.

Standards and expectations for taking personal responsibility and 

accountability for safety need to be developed and communicated to all 

employees. Many interviewees indicated that it was someone else’s 

(e.g., the fireboss’s) job to identify and fix safety-related problems (e.g., 

derail devices, condition of the ribs). Several interviewees indicated a 

lack of clear understanding about who was responsible for performing 

certain tasks—e.g., whether equipment operators or maintenance 

personnel were responsible for cleaning equipment.

Quantitative results from the BARS (Figure 3) show that

Performance Quality was one of the lowest scoring organizational

behaviors investigated during the five safety culture assessments, 

indicating a low level of employee pride and ownership in performance.

Pride and ownership in one’s work can be linked to accountability 

(Haber & Barriere, 1998).

CHARACTERISTIC 3: SAFETY IS INTEGRATED INTO ALL 

ACTIVITIES IN THE ORGANIZATION

Assets

Safety standards and norms exist for several different aspects of 

mine operations, including, but not limited to:

 Use of personal protection equipment

 Meters and tracers for detection of electrical currents

 Meters for detection of gas and dust levels

 Checklists for equipment prior to startup

 Reporting of all injuries, including minor ones

 Lock-out/tag-out policy and procedures

 Seatbelt use policy

 Discussion of the Mine Plan before each shift and availability

of the plan for the section being worked

 At least one, but usually two, Emergency Medical

Technicians available in each working section

 An onsite mine rescue team

 An onsite fire brigade

Additionally, employees are given an employee handbook, safety 

policy, and other company information when first hired. Mines also 

encourage employees to use a procedure where they “step back” and 

“take a second look” at potential risks before doing a job. Many of the 

participating mines require the completion of risk assessments when 

employees have to perform a new task or a task under new conditions.

Quantitative data obtained from the Behavioral Anchored Rating 

Scales for Formalization (Figure 3) indicate that personnel have an 

overall favorable perception of their company’s documentation and 

standardization process. Results from the survey (Hazard, Figure 1) 

indicate that employees’ perceptions of how well informed they are of 

the risks in their work environment are generally good.

Areas for Improvement

Although there were many illustrations of safety being integrated 

into all mine activities at the five participating mine sites, the safety 

culture assessments also revealed numerous opportunities for 

improvement. Efforts to implement some valuable safety processes are 

undermined by a lack of formality (e.g., no standard forms for 

documenting near misses, no written plan to carry out existing 

emergency procedures, informal or arbitrary personnel selection for job 

postings). Interviewees reported numerous exceptions to mine policy 

being made, including:

 The speed limit inside the mine is rarely followed.

 Miners rarely follow the procedure for calling into and out of

sections when traveling through the mine.

 Numerous miners do not obey the mine’s seatbelt use

policy.

 When encountering a red light on the track, some miners call

to see if there are other vehicles nearby and, if not, go

through the red light instead of waiting for it to turn green.

 Continuous miner (CM) operators are supposed to have

miner helpers (according to that individual mine’s policy), but

one CM operator did not have one with him and had been

working without a helper for a number of days.

 Work orders have safety procedures and hazards sections,

but most of the time miners do not see the actual work order

until the job has been completed.

 Lock-out/tag-out are not always used or enforced.

Based on the interview results, there is a need for more strategic 

and big-picture thinking and understanding of integrating safety into all 

activities—e.g., considering the safety implications when deciding to 

order and install a heavier conveyor belt and how the installation 

should be carried out, or considering the safety implications when 

deciding not to install concussion doors in a new longwall panel.

Many interviewees indicated that they normally worked overtime 

each week. Although they describe the overtime as voluntary, they 

indicated that individuals are expected to work the overtime.

Additionally, some individuals indicated that the regulatory 

requirements for emergency response training were excessive—e.g., 

walking escapeways every quarter. The reasons and expectations for 

this additional training need to be better communicated and 

understood by all personnel.

Quantitative data from responses on the Coordination of Work 

Survey Scale (Coord, Figure 1) indicate that the overall perception of 

how work is coordinated at underground coal mines is that it could be 

greatly improved. Coordination of Work was the second lowest scoring 

survey scale across the five mines.
CHARACTERISTIC 4: A SAFETY LEADERSHIP PROCESS EXISTS 

IN THE ORGANIZATION

Assets

There were numerous examples and illustrations of safety 

leadership processes in place at the five participating mines. 

Interviewees describe seeing mine management and Safety 

Department members, primarily during the day shift, participating in 

safety meetings and conducting periodic underground observations. 

Most individuals who were interviewed expressed that they are well

informed about safety issues at their mine. Foreman’s meetings and/or 

daily management team meetings are excellent opportunities for 

interdepartmental communication to take place. Additionally, several 

mechanisms are used to convey information, including daily safety 

talks, video screens, message center, interaction with line 

management (foreman), interaction with the Safety Department.

Most interviewees indicated that they would feel comfortable 

going to their immediate supervisor, shift supervisor, or a member of 

the Safety Department to express concerns about safety issues. At 

many of the participating mines, mine management boasts an opendoor policy.

Quantitative data obtained from survey scores on the Work Group 

Cohesiveness Scale (Cohesion, Figure 1) were very positive, 

indicating that employees tend to have a strong identification and 

involvement with their respective workgroups. Survey results indicate 

that employees’ satisfaction (Job Sat, Figure 1) with their jobs is quite 

high. The survey results (Figure 1) indicate that workers’ commitment 

to the organization (Commit) is sufficiently high.

Areas for Improvement

With regard to safety leadership processes, some areas for 

improvement were elucidated. Interviewees indicated that they rarely 

see senior mine management participating in safety meetings or 

conducting underground observations. Also, interviewees indicated 

that shift-to-shift communication can be problematic. It was also 

discovered that mine management generally does not seem to be 

aware of the impact that change of any magnitude can have on the 

workforce and the importance of effectively managing all changes 

implemented. Therefore, the current processes to manage change 

being used by mine management to effect behavioral change is usually 

an informal one.

Quantitative data obtained from survey results (Figure 1) indicate 

that respondents are generally dissatisfied with communication. 

Communication trust (Com Trust), communication satisfaction (Com 

Sat), and communication accuracy (Com Acc) are three of the four 

lowest rated survey scales across all five mines. Scores on the BARS 

for Communication (Figure 3) were consistent with the survey results, 

indicating an overall dissatisfaction with communication. Consistent 

with scores from the survey and BARS, many interviewees felt that 

there is a general lack of information, a tendency for last-minute 

information, or a great deal of misinformation at their mine.

CHARACTERISTIC 5: SAFETY CULTURE IS LEARNING-DRIVEN IN 

THE ORGANIZATION

Assets

The five participating mines demonstrated that safety culture is 

learning-driven in their organization in numerous ways. Information, 

both internal and external to the mines, is collected and distributed by 

various mechanisms (e.g., safety talks, accident grams, reports, 

meetings, and training). Events and violations at other mine locations, 

as well as events at nonmining locations, are discussed at the preshift 

safety talks. Individuals are encouraged to report problems through 

their line management, and most indicated that they would do so. Most 

interviewees indicated that serious safety concerns get addressed 

quickly and that mine management is supportive when it is sometimes 

necessary to pull back and stop cutting coal. Immediately convening

accident investigation boards and dissemination of their subsequent 

reports help with understanding and identifying incident causes. 

Quantitative data obtained from the BARS for Problem 

Identification and Resolution (Figure 3) indicated that respondents 

perceive those processes very favorably.

Training activities are generally perceived to be effective and 

plentiful by most individuals. Examples include, but are not limited to: 

 New miner training

 Annual 8-hour retraining

 Diesel 8-hour refresher training

 Mentor training

 Quarterly emergency evacuation training including use of

SCSRs and escapeway drills

 Annual refuge chamber training

 Fire extinguisher training

 Smoke expectations training

 Lifeline training

 Annual electrical training

 First-aid training

The mines have formalized training in place for production-related 

activities including task training, new employee training programs, and 

new supervisor classes (e.g., fundamentals of supervision). 

Additionally, some mine trainers consistently strive to provide unique 

and relevant training. Examples of this include incorporating stories 

and lessons learned from the trainer’s mining experience and 

conducting “blind” SCSR switchover training. Some mine safety 

departments schedule new and different presentations and trainings in 

order to provide novel information to workers.

Quantitative data from ratings on the BARS for training indicated 

that 62.0% (Figure 2) of employees interviewed had a favorable 

perception of the training activities that take place at their mine.

Areas for Improvement

The effectiveness and role of operational experience information 

as part of a learning process at the mines needs to be enhanced.

Many individuals indicated that the examples of accidents or events 

presented in the preshift safety talks are not always relevant to their 

own activities and tasks. Additionally, the assessment team observed 

that often the presentation of information about accidents and events 

from other mines does not initiate discussion or include a questionand-answer period. Some interviewees indicated that their individual 

mine will learn from its mistakes, but then become complacent and the 

mistakes recur.

Quantitative data from ratings on the BARS for Organizational 

Learning (Figure 3) were not as high as the other organizational 

behaviors investigated during the five safety culture assessments, 

indicating that personnel overall have a less than favorable perception 

of the organizational learning processes in place at their mines.

Although most interviewees expressed the belief that individuals 

were not afraid to raise problems, organizational inhibitors exist that 

may limit the opportunities for the organization to learn from its 

employees. A few examples to illustrate this include:

 Few formal programs exist for the identification of problems.

Issues are usually addressed immediately by the individual

who identifies them or are brought to the attention of the

Foreman or the Maintenance Department. In the case of the

Foreman, the issue may or may not be entered in the

Foreman’s Log.

 Some mines employ a suggestion box, but some

interviewees indicated that no one in management ever

takes their suggestions seriously. Some questioned whether

or not the suggestions are even reviewed by management.

 Although employees are encouraged to share near-misses

at weekly safety meetings, there is no formal process for

documenting these near-misses. Therefore, there is no way

to track these incidents to determine if patterns are

occurring.

Although interviewees indicated that training is viewed favorably, 

some training issues are in need of attention. These include:
 Annual refresher training consists of the same material

presented in the same manner year after year. Interviewees

indicated that they found this boring and uninformative.

 There is often no formal process for providing task training

on specific equipment; anyone, regardless of their level of

experience, can provide task training to others.

 Some specialized training is not relevant to all employees

(e.g., fall protection training).

 Many interviewees indicated that training is conducted too

quickly and is done just to satisfy MSHA regulations.

Training should be more in-depth.

 There is little training for workers who assume new jobs at

the mine to orient them on how to perform the new job.

 Some mines do not offer management training for individuals

assuming mid-management positions to prepare them for

managing workers.

 There is no formal process for assessing training

effectiveness that is consistently used across the

organization.

CHARACTERISTIC 6: A PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING A STRONG 

AND EFFECTIVE SCWE IS IN PLACE (SEE FIGURE 4)

Assets

Information pertaining to the safety-conscious work environment 

present at the five participating mines was obtained from survey 

results. Most survey respondents (85.8%) expressed the belief that 

they are responsible for identifying problems at their respective mines. 

Of the survey respondents, 67.9% indicated that they are able to 

approach management at their mine to express safety concerns. More 

than half of all survey respondents (60.6%) indicated that they felt that 

the management at their mine wanted concerns to be reported and 

listened to employees when reports were made. Of the survey 

respondents, 55.7% reported that the management at their mine 

ensures that safety concerns are addressed after they have been 

reported.

Areas for Improvement

Fewer than half of survey respondents (49.7%) felt that they were 

able to openly challenge decisions made by management. Only 49.5% 

of survey respondents indicated that helpful criticism is encouraged at 

their mine.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the conclusions of NIOSH researchers with regard to 

the existing safety culture at the participating mines, the following 

recommendations are presented for consideration in further enhancing 

efforts for continuous improvement of safety performance.

 Improve communication.

Communication at a mine site can be difficult; 24-hour

operations, multiple shifts, numerous workgroups, reliance on oral 

and posted communications, and limited opportunities to address 

large groups of or the entire employee population at once all 

contribute to the challenges of effectively communicating. 

Communication is critical because, not only is it a means of 

passing on information, it also plays a crucial role in the 

coordination of work, management of change, and emphasis of 

core organizational values. The importance of communication and 

the barriers to effective communication in the work environment 

require that mines place heavy emphasis on striving to improve 

communication processes. Some suggestions for improving 

communication at mines include:

o Holding meetings (such as preshift meetings) with

employees as often as possible and on a regular basis.

o Documenting the information that is to be

communicated to employees during meetings to ensure

that the same information is presented in the same

manner to all groups of employees.

o Making information available in multiple formats (e.g.,

postings on bulletin boards, inserts in paychecks,

emails, company newsletters, etc.) to increase the

number of opportunities an employee has of receiving 

the information.

o Providing feedback to employees in a timely manner if

they report a problem or make a suggestion.

o Holding employee meetings as soon after an unusual

event as possible in order to reduce the potential for

rumors and misinformation.

 Make safety a clearly recognized value.

Although the message that safety is a clearly recognized

value is communicated through several different mechanisms—

primarily artifacts and claimed values (as categorized by Schein 

(1992)—the basic assumptions (beliefs and attitudes) behind this 

message are less definitive from the data collected through the 

research project described in this document. Many employees are 

not certain that an environment where reporting mistakes, 

challenging or questioning decisions, or providing constructive 

criticisms is really desired by their mine management. Responses 

to many of the safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) 

questions on the survey revealed employees’ reluctance to 

engage in low-level reporting. Additionally, during interviews, 

employees expressed concerns about the way some decisions 

are made. 

Behaviors that may help to improve the basic assumptions

that safety really is a clearly recognized value include:

o Encouraging greater employee involvement and

ownership in problem solving and decisionmaking as

appropriate

o Fostering greater perceived trust and accuracy in

communication

o Promoting and facilitating those behaviors by a

leadership team that models and exhibits actions

consistent with the goal of developing safety as a

clearly recognized value

 Implement and use a formal change management

system.

Informality in the implementation of new organizational 

processes may contribute to the continuation of unwanted 

behaviors. When new processes are informally 

implemented, it becomes difficult to hold employees 

accountable to the expectations and standards of 

management. This type of implementation causes confusion 

and may result in differential treatment for some employees. 

A more formal implementation process would be helpful for 

effecting behavior change and would help mine 

management to treat all employees consistently. This 

process should clearly define the standards and criteria 

around the change, identify the communication process to 

be used to roll out a new standard or expectation, and 

specify the consequences of not meeting the expectation for 

implementing the process.

 Ensure consistent policy enforcement and penalization

for infractions.

This research has revealed that there tends to be

inconsistency in enforcement of policies and procedures as well 

as penalization for infractions. Enforcing policies and procedures 

and doling out consequences for violations differently to different 

employees makes it difficult to hold all employees accountable to 

the expectations and standards of management. Consistent 

enforcement of all mine policies and procedures and a 

documented and consistently applied penalization structure would 

foster employee adherence to mine policies. It is also important to 

create a system for reprimand that recognizes not only the

immediate and short-term consequences of behavior, but also the 

long-term consequences of repeated undesirable actions.

 Be proactive.
Organizations that have to conduct business in a highly 

regulated industry tend to become reactive to those regulations in 

many of their behaviors. The mining industry has witnessed 

several new regulations that have required substantial changes 

and resources over the last few years. Mine companies need to 

find ways to share experiences so that they can implement 

initiatives that will keep them ahead of the next safety event, and 

not just address problems after they occur. Benchmarking and 

industry-wide initiatives can be helpful to integrate new ideas and 

different ways of thinking into the organization’s own processes 

and activities. A focus on finding ways to enhance the basic 

behaviors that will facilitate safety performance, and not just 

actions that are in response to new requirements, would be very 

valuable.

 Reconsider the structure of bonus systems.

Using injury-based incentive programs does not necessarily

prevent injuries. Instead, these programs often have the opposite 

result and reward employees who take chances, but are lucky 

enough not to get injured, or reward employees who do not report 

incidents. Production-based incentives reward employees for 

getting the job done no matter what, even if that means working in 

an unsafe manner. A high-performance safety culture is one that 

fosters safe work habits and the reporting of hazardous 

conditions, accidents, injuries, incidents, and near-misses. Injurybased and production-based incentive programs often work 

against this. Instead of rewarding people for avoiding injuries or 

meeting production goals, mines should consider rewarding safe 

behaviors that are directly linked to the desired result of improving 

safety.

 Conduct (regularly scheduled) safety culture

assessments.

Mines should conduct periodic safety culture assessments.

Mine management cannot fully understand a mine’s assets and 

areas in need of improvement without first conducting a baseline 

safety culture assessment. Periodic followup assessments are 

also recommended to allow mine management to track over time 

the improvement or deterioration of the mine’s safety culture.

CONCLUSIONS

The existing safety culture at five underground coal mines was 

assessed against the characteristics identified to be important for the 

promotion of a healthy safety culture. Overall, the assessment team 

believes that the participating mines and their respective companies 

have a strong commitment to and belief in the importance of safety to 

their operations. Initiatives and behaviors that are designed to facilitate 

and promote a positive safety culture and safety-conscious work 

environment at the mines were identified over the course of the five 

assessments, including:

 Documentation that describes the importance and role of

safety in the operation of the mine exists, and multiple

mechanisms exist for communicating the value of safety to

all employees.

 Management’s and the Safety Department’s commitment

and involvement in safety-related activities is perceived

positively across the organization.

 Safety standards and norms exist for several different

aspects of mine operations, including maintenance and

operation of equipment as well as the conduct of personnel.

 The majority of employees believe that they are responsible

for identifying safety problems.

The results of these assessments also indicate that some of the 

behaviors associated with the safety culture characteristics need more 

attention. These behavior recommendations, presented for 

consideration in the continued enhancement of safety performance, 

are listed below:

 Although there are multiple mechanisms to communicate the

value of safety to all employees at each of the participating

mines, performance on behaviors indicative of the value of 

safety needs to be improved and more consistently 

demonstrated. 

 There is a need for more proactive thinking about the

integration of safety into all activities and processes and

more knowledge on how behaviors important to safety can

enhance the quality of all work to be done.

 Communication issues exist at each of the participating

mines. These issues may include poor shift-to-shift

communication, questions about the accuracy of

communications, a lack of trust in communications, and a

lack of accountability for what is communicated.

 Informality and inconsistency in the change management

process being used by mine management may be inhibiting

the effect of the desired behavioral change.

 Efforts to learn from past performance have been addressed

for some major industry events, but the process of learning

from all aspects of basic day-to-day performance is not

consistently or systematically implemented in the

organization.

 The behaviors important to creating an environment where

concerns can be openly raised without fear of some type of

retribution are not perceived to be present by a large

percentage of the organization.

A NIOSH-numbered publication offering a Safety Culture 

Assessment Toolkit is planned for release in the near future. This 

toolkit will contain all of the data collection instruments used for the 

assessments conducted through the current research. This includes 

interview questions, behavioral anchored rating scales (BARS), the 

safety culture questionnaire, and behavioral observation checklists. 

The toolkit will also include detailed instructions for administering each 

of these data collection methodologies. Finally, the toolkit will offer 

guidance for analyzing and interpreting the data collected in order to 

draw conclusions about the safety culture at the mine where the 

assessment is conducted. This Safety Culture Assessment Toolkit will 

allow mines to conduct safety culture assessments on their own 

without relying on NIOSH or a consultant.

LIMITATIONS

The limitations of this research primarily revolve around the issue

of sampling. Specifically, there are three sampling-related limitations.

First, this methodology stems from the sample of underground coal

mines where the safety culture assessments were conducted. This

research did not employ a systematic sampling method, but rather

relied on a convenience sample of mines that volunteered to

participate in this research. To obtain these volunteers, NIOSH

researchers first published an article in a trade magazine detailing the

project and explaining that mine sites were being sought as

participants in the project. This resulted in one mine site volunteering.

NIOSH researchers then contacted company representatives from

mines that had participated in previous NIOSH research. This tactic

resulted in securing two mines as volunteers. Finally, NIOSH

representatives presented information about the project at miningrelated conferences and stressed that mine sites were being sought to 

participate in the research. These presentations and recruitment efforts 

resulted in securing the final two participating mines.

Although at the commencement of this project the goal was to 

obtain participating mines that represented the varying sizes, 

geographic locations, and union affiliations of the total population of 

underground coal mining, this was not accomplished due to the 

convenience sampling method employed. As a result, this research 

does not include, for instance, a participating mine from the coalproducing region located in the central United States. Also, small 

mines are underrepresented in the research sample. Finally, only one 

of the mines participating in this research was a unionized mine. 

Although the sample of participating mines for this research may not 

be truly representative of the population of all underground coal mines, 

the researchers are confident that the sample that was obtained is 

large and diverse enough to provide an important and very informative 

look into the safety culture of the U.S. underground coal mining 

industry. Future research into the safety culture of underground coal 
mining should seek to include mines from the geographic regions, size 

categories, and labor affiliation categories that were underrepresented 

in the present research.

A second limitation of this research is the sampling procedures

that were undertaken for the in-depth interviews. By providing a list of

selected job classifications on specific shifts to the mine and allowing

the mine to select the actual interview participants, the possibility exists

that the mine management may strategically choose certain

employees to participate. One could postulate that the mine may

supply interview participants who are likely to reveal only positive

insights about the safety culture at the mine. Nevertheless, this

research must assume and accommodate for this limitation because

the mine must be given some level of control over which employees

are taken away from their production jobs to participate in research

activities. For example, if a roof bolter is requested as an interview

participant, the mine needs to have the control to provide a roof bolter

who works on a section with a backup roof bolter who can step in and

fill the position while the other is participating in an interview. Also, by

giving mine management control over selecting interview participants,

they are able to provide participants who would be more willing to

participate in an activity such as an interview. If interview participants

were randomly selected, there might be a higher rate of individuals

who refuse to participate in the interviews. The impact of the above

limitation has been tempered by some aspects of the design of this

methodology, including (1) each of the interviews lasted about an hour,

(2) neither mine management nor the interviewees were given the

interview questions in advance, (3) many more employees responded

to the quantitative survey and BARS than participated in interviews,

and (4) a strongly skewed sample for the interviews would be indicated

by substantial disagreement between the interview results and the

results from the quantitative measures, which was not the case with

the current research. 

A third limitation of this research is the convenience sampling of

events for behavioral observation. Because the research team was

only able to observe events that took place during the time they were

onsite at the mine for data collection, the sample of behavioral

observations for each mine varied widely. Some mines have regularly

scheduled events, including preshift safety meetings, daily foremen’s

meetings, and weekly management meetings, that provide multiple

opportunities for behavioral observations. However, some mines do

not have regularly scheduled events. Some of the safety culture

assessments happened to take place during time periods when mines

were having events that happen on an infrequent basis, such as

annual refresher training or a monthly safety kickoff meal. Finally,

some mines experienced safety incidents during the time of the safety

culture assessment, and the research team was allowed to observe

incident investigation procedures.

Although the events that were observed at each mine varied, the

research team was consistent in observing the above-ground

conditions of each mine, the training that each mine provided to

research team members prior to going underground, and the

underground working conditions at each mine. Obviously, the more

events the research team was able to observe, the more data was

collected to contribute to the overall safety culture assessment.

Despite this limitation, a sufficient number of behavioral observations

were conducted at each mine to draw objective conclusions about the

actual goings-on at the mine.

A final potential limitation (non-sampling-related) of this research 

is that we may have experienced a Hawthorne Effect (Mayo 1945). 

Employees at the mines may have altered their behavior because they 

were aware that NIOSH personnel were onsite and evaluating the 

safety culture at their mines. However, the use of multiple methods (as 

was done in the current study) instead of the reliance on only one 

assessment method should have minimized, if not eliminated, the 

impact any change in participant behavior may have had on the end 

results of the research.

DISCLAIMER

The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the author 

and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health.

REFERENCES

Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational 

Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50, pp. 179-211.

Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding and predicting social 

change. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Haber, S. B., & Barriere, M. T. (1998). Development of a regulatory

organizational management review method. Ottawa, Canada:

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2006). Application of the

management system for facilities and activities: Safety guide No.

GS-G-3.1.

International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group. (2002). Key practical 

issues in strengthening safety culture. Vienna, Austria:

International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mayo, E. (1945). The social problems of an industrial civilization.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

National Mining Association. (2012). Most Requested Statistics - U.S.

Coal Industry Retrieved October 1, 2012, from

http://www.nma.org/pdf/c_most_requested.pdf

Schein, E. (1992). Organizational Culture and Leadership (2nd ed.).

San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Sprinthall, R. C. (2003). Basic statistical analysis. 7th ed. Boston, MA: 

Pearson Education Group, Inc., pp. 313–353.

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2012a). Annual Coal Report 

2010. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy.

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2012b). Electricity explained: 

Electricity in the United States. Retrieved October 1, 2012, from 

http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_in

_the_united_states

United Mine Workers of America. (n.d.). What coal miners do

Retrieved December 17, 2007, from

http://www.umwa.org/?q=content/underground-coal-mining
FIGURES

* p < .05, ** p < .01

Figure 1. Organizational and safety culture survey results.

Figure 2. Percentage of positive, neutral, and negative responses to behavioral anchored rating scales (BARS).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Mean Rating

Mine 1

Mine 2

Mine 3

Mine 4

Mine 5

Mean

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Training

Problem ID & Resolution

Performance Quality

Org Learning

Communication

Goal Setting & Prioritization

Formalization

Attention to Safety

Positive

Neutral

Negative
* p < .05, ** p < .01

Figure 3. Mean scores for behavioral anchored rating scales (BARS) for each mine and the average of all five mines.

Figure 4. Safety conscious work environment (SCWE) survey item results.

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

Mean Rating

Mine 1

Mine 2

Mine 3

Mine 4

Mine 5

Mean

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Retaliation Is Not Tolerated

Helpful Criticism Is Encouraged

Concerns are Addressed

Management Wants Concerns Reported

Free to Approach Management w/ Concerns

Can Openly Challenge Management Decisions

Responsible to ID Problems

Agree

Neutral

Disagree
Appendix A

Sample In-Depth Interview Questions

Introduction Questions

1. Please start by telling me a little about your history in mining, such as how long you have worked in mining, how long you have worked at this

mine, how you got your current job at the mine, etc.

2. Tell me about the roles and responsibilities in your current job.

Attention to Safety Questions

1. How does the mine handle the potential trade-offs and conflicts that exist between safety and productivity?

2. What would you do to improve the safety attitudes of workers at the mine?

3. What organizational barriers exist that keep people from reporting potential safety concerns?

4. What is done to encourage employees to strive for excellence when it comes to safety?

Concluding Questions

1. Is there anything else you would like to tell me about today before I ask just one last question?

2. If you were king or queen of this mine and had the power to change anything, what three things would you change to make this a better place

to work?
Appendix B

Sample Behavioral Anchored Rating Scale

Attention to Safety

Attention to Safety refers to the characteristics of the work environment, such as the norms, rules, and common understandings that influence site 

personnel’s perceptions of the importance that the organization places on safety. It includes the degree to which a critical, questioning attitude exists 

that is directed toward site improvement.

Individuals at the site believe safety is the number one priority and that perspective is reinforced by senior (high-level) management

and clearly spread to all individuals at the site.

Personnel make an effort to correct problems in a timely and effective manner to ensure that safety levels are not compromised at 

the site. Individuals have a clear understanding that safety is a top priority.

Site management reflects a delicate balance of emphasizing safety, while at the same time, making it clear that there is a need to 

keep the site operating.

At times, the interests of the stakeholders seem to take priority over concerns regarding the safe operation of the site and the lack of 

organization wide support for safe site operations is clearly evident.

Questions regarding safe operations are not welcome or addressed. Management's attitude is to keep running coal regardless of 

evident safety issues.
Appendix C

Organizational and Safety Culture Survey Scale Definitions

The Communication-Trust Scale assesses respondents’ impressions regarding the freedom they feel to discuss the problems and difficulties in their jobs

with an immediate supervisor without jeopardy. A higher value indicates greater trust in the communication process.

The Communication-Accuracy Scale assesses respondents’ perceptions of the accuracy of information they receive from other organizational levels 

(superiors, subordinates, and peers). A higher value indicates greater perceived accuracy of communications.

The Communication-Interaction Scale assesses respondents’ level of desire for frequent interactions and contact with others in the organization 

(superiors, subordinates, and peers). A higher value indicates greater desire for interaction.

The Communication-Satisfaction Scale assesses respondents’ overall satisfaction with the communication process. A higher value indicates greater 

satisfaction.

The Coordination Scale assesses the respondents’ perceptions of the degree to which the subunits of the organization operate according to the 

requirements of each other and of the total organization. A higher value indicates a perception of work being highly coordinated.

The Cohesion Scale assesses the relative strength of respondents’ identification with and involvement in a particular work group. A higher value 

indicates high work group cohesiveness.

The Hazard Scale assesses respondents’ perception of the emphasis the organization places on making employees aware of the hazards of their job 

and work environment. A higher value indicates higher perceived hazard emphasis or awareness.

The Attention to Safety Scale is used to assess perception of the importance of safety to success in an organization and is measured by the value 

placed on various safety promoting behaviors. A higher value indicates higher attention to the values and/or behaviors important to safety performance.

The Job Satisfaction Scale assesses respondents’ overall satisfaction with their job. A higher value indicates greater satisfaction.

The Commitment Scale assesses the relative strength of respondents’ identification with and involvement in a particular organization. Commitment 

extends to the goals of the organization and the desire to maintain membership in the organization to facilitate these goals. A higher value indicates 

greater commitment.

The Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) Scale assesses the degree to which individuals agree or disagree with a number of characteristics 

that impact the establishment of a Safety Conscious Work Environment. Those characteristics include:

• Individual responsibility for problem identification;

• Ability to openly challenge management decisions;

• Freedom to approach management with concerns;

• Management’s desire to have concerns reported and willingness to listen to problems;

• Management’s constructive address of concerns raised;

• Encouragement of constructive criticism;

• Management’s intolerance of retaliation for raising concerns.

A higher value indicates greater emphasis placed on behaviors important for an effective SCWE.