Investigation: # 12WA015

Release Date: January 22, 2018

SHARP Report: # 52-42-2018

Forklift Operator Dies When

Crushed between Forklift

Overhead Guard and Mast
2

Table of Contents

SUMMARY...................................................................................................................... 3

RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................................... 3

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 4

Employer ..................................................................................................................... 4

Employer Safety Program and Training....................................................................... 4

Victim........................................................................................................................... 5

Equipment ................................................................................................................... 5

Incident Site................................................................................................................. 6

Weather....................................................................................................................... 6

INVESTIGATION............................................................................................................. 6

CAUSE OF DEATH......................................................................................................... 8

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS......................................................................................... 10

POST-INCIDENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN BY EMPLOYER.......................... 10

RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION ................................................................. 11

REFERENCES.............................................................................................................. 13

INVESTIGATOR INFORMATION.................................................................................. 14

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................................ 14
3

SUMMARY

In May of 2012, a 61-year-old longshore worker operating a forklift died when he was 

crushed between a forklift’s mast and the operator’s cab overhead guard. The incident 

occurred when he left the forklift operator’s seat and climbed over the operator’s 

console and stood on the dash between the mast and the overhead guard so that he 

could presumably look into a bin elevated on the forklift’s forks. He did not turn off the 

forklift engine. As he was standing on the dash, his right foot moved backward and 

contacted the mast tilt control lever on the console. This caused the mast to tilt back, 

crushing his torso between the mast cross member and the overhead guard. Workers 

arrived and helped him down from the forklift and administered first aid. Fire department 

paramedics arrived in less than seven minutes. He was taken to a hospital where he 

died in the emergency room.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To prevent similar occurrences in the future, Washington State Fatality Assessment and 

Control Evaluation (FACE) investigators concluded that to protect employees from the 

hazard of being crushed between a forklift’s mast and operator’s cab overhead guard 

employers should follow these guidelines:

 Ensure that forklift operators never position themselves between the 

forklift operator’s cab overhead guard and mast while the forklift is 

running.

 Ensure that standard operating procedures (SOP) are followed during 

forklift operation and review these procedures to ensure that they are 

effective in practice and revise if necessary.

 Ensure that operators do not use alcohol prior to or while operating 

equipment. 

 Consider purchasing or equipping forklifts with an operator safety interlock 

device such as an Operator Presence Sensing System (OPSS) that 

prevents movement of the forklift, and its mast and forks when the operator 

is not seated properly at the controls.
4

INTRODUCTION

In May 2012, the Washington FACE Program was notified by the Washington State 

Department of Labor and Industries Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) 

of the death of a 61-year-old forklift operator and longshore worker who died when he 

was crushed between a forklift mast and the operator’s cab overhead guard. 

Washington State FACE investigators reviewed documents which included the victim’s 

death certificate, police report, medical examiner’s report, and the DOSH investigation 

file. WA FACE conducted an incident site investigation and interview with the 

employer’s safety director.

Employer

The employer operates marine cargo terminals with more than 250 locations worldwide.

They have about 500 fulltime employees with a payroll of thousands of casual workers 

every day, depending on need. Founded in 1949 in Washington State, the employer 

provides services including:

 Terminal management

 Stevedoring

 Rail yard operations

 Project development management

 Technology system design, installation and training

 Equipment procurement

 Marketing support

 Trucking

 Warehousing

 Off-dock yard operations

Employer Safety Program and Training

The employer maintains an Injury and Illness Prevention Plan that outlines those work 

rules covering longshore labor. The plan references the Pacific Coast Marine Safety 

Code (PCMSC), as well as applicable state and federal requirements for Longshore and 

Marine Terminal operations. The longshore workers receive General Safety Training 

(GST) every three years. This training informs the longshore workers of their 

responsibilities under the PCMSC. Additionally, employees who operate Powered 

Industrial Trucks (PIT), or forklifts, are required to have training in the operation of that 

equipment, and they are re-evaluated through a review of their records every three 

years. The PIT training is through classroom and practical skills demonstration.
5

Employees are reminded every shift, through safety talks conducted by longshore 

foremen of the safety requirements specific to the operation for that shift. As the 

employer’s workforce is considered “casual” labor (from a union hiring hall), they may 

receive reminders from a foreman and a terminal site safety superintendent of safety 

requirements when they are found to be in non-compliance. The employer has two fulltime site safety superintendents, one on day shift and one on night shift. There is an 

employer safety director who reports directly to the company’s CEO. Both terminal 

management and longshore foremen routinely observe terminal operations to ensure 

that employees are complying with safety rules.

There is a labor/management safety committee. The employer safety director is a 

member of the committee. There are monthly safety meetings at which the union and 

management discuss safety issues.

Victim

The 61-year-old victim was a longshore worker who belonged to the International 

Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) local affiliate. He was hired as casual labor 

for the day out of the local union hall. On the day of the fatal incident he was hired to 

work as a “heavy lift operator.” This longshore job title indicated that he was trained and

qualified by the union to operate forklifts with load capacities of up to and over 15 tons.

He began longshoring in 1982. He been trained through the union and had qualified for 

and operated numerous types of heavy equipment. He was up-to-date with union and 

employer required training and had no record of accidents or damage to equipment. He 

had worked at this port facility many times.

Equipment

The piece of equipment involved in the incident

was a gas powered forklift manufactured in 2003

by Mitsubishi, model FD 40K (photo 1). The 

employer purchased the forklift new. It had a 

load capacity of 8,000 pounds. It was properly 

maintained and fully functional with all of the 

required warning stickers, information plates, 

and operator restraints. The forklift had three 

hydraulic lift control levers used to adjust the 

forklift mast and forks. These levers were located

behind the dash and to the right of the forklift’s

steering wheel. The lever closest to the steering 

wheel moved the forks up or down. The middle 

lever, when pulled down, tilted the mast 

Photo 1: Employer forklift similar to the 

incident forklift with a cone bin on the 

incident dock.
6

backwards, angling the forks up. The lever 

farthest from the steering wheel moved the 

forks side-to-side.

Incident Site

The incident took place at a marine port 

terminal dock (photo 2).

Weather

At the time of the incident, the weather was 

overcast with a temperature of 61 degrees 

and a wind speed of 8.1 miles per hour.

1

INVESTIGATION

The victim began his 8-hour night work shift at 6 p.m. at the marine port terminal. The 

previous evening he had been hired as a casual worker through the International 

Longshore Workers Union hall (ILWU). His job assignment for that shift was to operate 

a forklift. This was his usual work at the terminal and he was familiar with the various 

types of forklift equipment and work procedures. The victim was guaranteed an 8-hour 

shift. If there was not enough work or he finished his work before the end of the shift, he 

could go home early and still receive pay for the full eight hours. 

That evening, a ship docked at the terminal was to be unloaded of its cargo of shipping 

containers by container gantry cranes. As cranes discharged the containers from the 

ship to the dock, workers removed metal devices which secured one container to 

another to prevent movement at sea. The devices were called “twist locks” or “cones.”

When removed on the dock, the cones were to be placed in 2’X4’X4’ foot bins provided 

by the vessel. Individual bins were stowed on the vessel in “flat racks” specifically 

designed to hold them. These flat racks were discharged to intermodal trailers called 

chassis and parked on the dock nearby the vessel 

for the operation (photos 3 and 4).

A forklift operator would then check the contents of 

the bins on the carts to determine whether they 

were full or empty and what type of cones they 

contained, so they could move them to the 

appropriate locations for further use. In order to see 

into a bin to check its contents, the established 

procedure for workers was to drive the forklift 

beside a trailer and have the operator stand up on 

Photo 2: Port terminal dock with ship loaded 

with shipping containers.

Photo 3: Cone bin.
7

the forklift floor and look inside the bins.

Alternatively, the operator could lower the 

bin to ground level. 

At the start of his shift the victim checked in

with his foreman. The foreman assigned him

to move cone bins with a forklift. The forklift 

he would be operating was an 8,000 lb.

capacity forklift. He was the only person 

assigned to that task for that shift. There 

were about 50 other employees performing 

various jobs at the terminal. He was working 

alone on the dock behind a crane, but he 

was in an area where there was a lot of 

mobile equipment traffic, and he was not 

isolated. 

At 6:24 p.m., while operating the forklift, the victim approached a trailer loaded with four 

cone bins. He then used the forklift to elevate a cone bin approximately 2 feet above the

flat rack mounted on the trailer. The forks were elevated to be about parallel with the top 

of the forklift’s overhead guard. Leaving the forklift’s engine running, he then left the 

operator’s seat, climbed over the control console, and stood on the dash of the forklift

between the mast and the overhead guard, presumably to look into the elevated bin and 

perhaps other bins on the trailer. His right foot moved backward and contacted the mast 

tilt control lever on the console. (The mast tilt lever controls the angle of the forks 

relative to the ground.) This caused the mast to tilt back, pinning his torso between the

mast cross member and the overhead guard (photos 5–9).

Shortly after, the dock foreman saw the victim from a distance and, not realizing what 

had happened, went over to reprimand him for committing the unsafe act of standing in 

the bight between the forklift mast and the operator cab overhead guard. He considered 

this an unusual act, as he had not seen workers do this before. When he arrived at the 

scene and realized what had happened, the foreman called for help and another forklift 

operator heard him and came quickly. The foreman pushed the mast tilt lever forward, 

releasing the victim. Before moving the victim, they noticed that his right foot was in 

contact with the mast tilt lever located on the operator’s console. He and the other 

operator lifted the conscious victim down from his position on the forklift and placed him 

on the dock. The responding forklift operator called emergency services. The rescuers

spoke with the victim to assess his condition and keep him conscious. The victim 

complained of pain in his stomach. Another longshoreman arrived and began to 

administer first aid to the victim. Fire Department paramedics arrived in less than seven 

Photo 4: Cone bins set on flat racks loaded on 

to an intermodal chassis trailer. The arrow 

indicates the location of the bin that the victim 

had lifted and elevated on the forks of the 

forklift.
8

minutes and began administering aid. He was taken to a hospital, where he died in the 

emergency room.

Incident investigators made a number of determinations:

 All of the forklift controls functioned properly and required an action by the 

operator to activate.

 No equipment defect, malfunction, or failure could have contributed to the 

incident.

 Safety warning labels, including the pinch warning label on top of the mast, were 

affixed to the forklift and were readable.

 The forklift must be in the “on” position and running for the tilt lever to cause the 

mast to move.

 The mast tilt control lever is about 1 1⁄4 to 1 1⁄2 inches behind the top of the dash.

 Only a half-inch of movement of the mast tilt control lever was necessary to 

initiate and continue the rearward tilting of the forklift mast. 

 A partial reconstruction of the incident showed that the mast was probably tilted 

backwards approximately 5 degrees from the vertical before the victim’s foot 

contacted the tilt level.

 It took 2 to 3 seconds for the mast to tilt to the full rearward position from a 

starting backward tilt position of 5 degrees.

 In the full rearward position the mast was approximately 1 inch from the plastic

overhead guard cover and 4 inches from metal frame of the overhead guard.

 The mast cross member when in the full rearward position was 42 inches above 

the forklift dash. The overhead guard was also 42 inches above the dash.

 Fractures on the plastic cover of the overhead guard indicated that the victim was 

located near or just to the right of the forklift’s center line when his torso was 

crushed between the mast cross member and the overhead guard.

CAUSE OF DEATH

According to the death certificate, the medical examiner reported the cause of death as 

“Hemoperitoneum and mechanical asphyxia due to crush injury of torso.”

A toxicology report indicated that the victim had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.026 

percent.
9

Photo 7: Recreation of the position of the 

forklift just before the incident. The forklift is 

next to the intermodal chassis trailer with a 

bin elevated on its forks. The victim climbed 

on to the forklift’s dashboard between the 

mast and overhead guard to look into the 

bins on the trailer.

Photo 5: Forklift mast in the full tilted back 

position. The red circle indicates the area 

where the victim’s torso was crushed 

between the cross member of the overhead 

guard and the mast. 

Photo 6: A longshore worker demonstrates 

how the victim might have accessed the 

forklift’s dash to look into the bin elevated on 

the forklift’s forks. The victim was standing 

with both feet on the dash when his right foot 

inadvertently activated the forklift control on 

the dash that caused the mast to tilt 

backwards, crushing him against the 

operator’s cab overhead guard. 
10

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing 

factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or 

fatality. Washington FACE investigators identified the following factors that may have 

contributed to the death of the forklift operator:

 Forklift was not operated safely in accordance with the manufacturer’s operating 

manual. 

 Forklift was not turned off or otherwise secured when the operator left the operator’s 

seat.

 Forks were not lowered so that the 

operator could see the contents of the 

container bin.

 Consumption of alcohol by employee.

POST-INCIDENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 

TAKEN BY EMPLOYER

Following this incident, through an 

agreement between the longshore workers 

union and the employer, all bins are now

routinely removed from the trailer mounted 

flat racks and placed on the dock. This 

Photo 8: Forklift dash (red arrow) upon which 

the victim was standing when his foot 

inadvertently pushed against the mast tilt lever 

(yellow arrow). View is from inside the operator’s 

cab.

Photo 9: Forklift control levers used to adjust 

the forks and mast. The middle lever is the mast 

tilt lever.

Photo 10: Cone bins on dock after corrective 

action by the employer was taken.
11

allows forklift operators to see into the bins while remaining seated in the forklift (photo 

10).

RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION

Recommendation 1: Ensure that forklift operators never position themselves 

between the forklift operator’s cab overhead guard and mast while the forklift is 

running.

Discussion: In this incident, the victim was standing on the dash and looking into a bin 

elevated on the forks of the forklift he was operating. His right foot contacted and 

engaged the forklift’s tilt control lever, causing the lever to move backward, which then 

tilted the mast backward, crushing him between the cross member of the mast and the 

overhead guard. To prevent an incident such as this, employers should train forklift 

operators that before dismounting the forklift the forks should be lowered to the ground, 

the engine turned off, the parking brake set, and the controls neutralized. In this case, 

the victim had received forklift training through his union, the ILWU. He had been 

operating forklifts for over 30 years.

Employers should instruct forklift operators to never put themselves in the area between 

the forklift’s mast and overhead guard of the operator’s cab while the forklift is running.

Washington State’s Division of Occupational Health and Safety (DOSH), Safety 

Standards for Forklifts and Other Powered Industrial Trucks2require that employers 

must protect employees who work around powered industrial trucks or forklifts from 

putting any part of their body between the uprights of the mast and that they must 

operate them according to the manufacturer’s instructions.

The incident forklift’s operation and maintenance manual stated:

“Keep all parts of your body away from moving parts such as the mast, carriage, 

and attachments. Do not put any part of your body between the head guard and 

he mast. If the mast moves unexpectedly, you could get caught between the 

mast and the overhead guard and a serious accident could occur.”

Recommendation 2: Ensure that standard operating procedures (SOP) are 

followed during forklift operation and review these procedures to ensure that they 

are effective in practice and revise if necessary.

Discussion: At the marine terminal, the SOP for forklift operators was to drive the 

forklift up beside a trailer and have the operator stand up on the floor of the forklift and 

look inside the bins. Alternatively, the operator could lower the bin to ground level.

After the fatal incident, a review was undertaken by the employer and the longshore 

workers union of the current terminal SOP for managing movement and placement of 
12

cone bins on the dock. Based on this review an agreement was negotiated between the

union and the employer requiring that all bins should be routinely removed from the 

trailer mounted flat racks and placed on the dock. This procedure allows forklift 

operators to see into the bins while remaining seated in the forklift. This abated the

hazards associated with leaving the seat and climbing on the forklift and/or trailer.

Recommendation 3: Ensure that operators do not use alcohol prior to or while 

operating equipment.

Discussion: In this incident the victim had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 

0.026 %. This is a relatively low BAC, and the employer reports the employee did not 

show signs of “reasonable suspicion” for impairment. However, numerous studies, 

including a study cited by the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, have 

shown that there is no absolute BAC threshold below which there is no impairment of 

any kind. Even at BACs as low as 0.01 to 0.02 information processing skills important 

for operating equipment are impaired.

3

It is unknown what effect, if any, the victim’s 

consumption of alcohol had on his decision making process that resulted in him placing 

himself in the hazardous position that resulted in his death.

Employers can address employee alcohol use in the workplace by creating policies, 

training employees on alcohol abuse awareness, assessing the culture of employee 

acceptance of alcohol consumption, and referring employees to an employee 

assistance program or other assistance resources. 

Recommendation 4: Consider purchasing or equipping forklifts with an operator 

safety interlock device such as an Operator Presence Sensing System (OPSS) 

that prevents powered movement of the forklift, and its mast and forks when the 

operator is not seated properly at the controls.

Discussion: Various types of safety devices are available that, if installed on the 

forklift, may have prevented this fatality. Forklift manufacturers have introduced 

technologies that stop certain hydraulic and transmission functions when the operator 

leaves the seat or does not fasten the seatbelt. For example, an OPSS detects whether 

an operator is in the proper operating position. If the operator is not in the proper 

operating position the forklift will not drive, and the mast will not lift or tilt. 
13

REFERENCES

1. Weather Underground. 

https://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KBFI/2012/5/17/DailyHistory.html?re

q_city=Seattle&req_state=WA&req_statename=Washington&reqdb.zip=98101&req

db.magic=1&reqdb.wmo=99999

2. Chapter 296-863 WAC. Safety Standards for Forklifts and Other Powered Industrial 

Trucks. 

http://www.lni.wa.gov/Safety/Rules/Chapter/863/WAC296-

863.pdf#WAC_296_863_400

3. National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. Alcohol Alert. 

https://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/aa25.htm

4. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. Alcohol and Drugs in the 

Workplace. http://www.lni.wa.gov/Safety/Topics/AtoZ/AlcoholDrugsWorkplace/

5. NIOSH, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program. Forklift 

Operator Crushed Between Forklift Cage and Mast while Loading Waste Paper into 

a Trailer. https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/stateface/ma/08ma019.html

6. NIOSH, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program. A Forklift 

Operator Died When He Was Crushed in the Mast of a Forklift 

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/stateface/ca/04ca012.html

7. NIOSH, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program. Operator 

Dies When Caught Between Mast and Cage of Forklift in a Massachusetts 

Warehouse. https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/stateface/ma/98ma049.html

8. NIOSH, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program. Forklift 

Operator Dies When Head Caught in Lowering Mast.

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/stateface/mi/05mi078.html

9. NIOSH, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program. Hispanic 

Forklift Operator Dies after Being Caught Between Mast and Cage of Forklift - North 

Carolina. https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/In-house/full200209.html

10. NIOSH, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program. A Yard Hand 

Was Killed When He Was Crushed Between the Mast and the Rollover Protective 

Structure of a Forklift. https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/stateface/ok/04ok028.html
14

INVESTIGATOR INFORMATION

Todd Schoonover has a PhD in Industrial Hygiene from the University of Illinois at 

Chicago. He is a Certified Industrial Hygienist (CIH) and Certified Safety Professional 

(CSP). Todd is currently the Principle Investigator for the WA FACE Program.

Christina Rappin has a BAS from The Evergreen State College. She is a Research 

Investigator with the WA FACE program.

Randy Clark has a BA from the Evergreen State College. He is a Safety and Health 

Specialist with the WA FACE Program.

Washington State FACE Program Information

The Washington State Fatality Assessment and Control (WA FACE) program is one of 

many workplace health and safety programs administered by the Washington State 

Department of Labor & Industries’ Safety & Health & Research for Prevention (SHARP) 

program. It is a research program designed to identify and study fatal occupational 

injuries. Under a cooperative agreement with the National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health (NIOSH grant# 5 U60 OH008487), WA FACE collects information on 

occupational fatalities in WA State and targets specific types of fatalities for evaluation. 

WA FACE investigators evaluate information from multiple sources. Findings are 

summarized in narrative reports that include recommendations for preventing similar 

events in the future. These recommendations are distributed to employers, workers, and 

other organizations interested in promoting workplace safety. NIOSH-funded, statebased FACE programs include: California, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 

York, Oregon, and Washington. WA FACE does not determine fault or legal liability 

associated with a fatal incident. Names of employers, victims and/or witnesses are not 

included in written investigative reports or other databases to protect the confidentiality 

of those who voluntarily participate in the program.

Additional information regarding the WA FACE program can be obtained from:

www.lni.wa.gov/Safety/Research/FACE/default.asp

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report was reviewed by stakeholders from labor and business communities and 

various Washington State and Federal worker safety agencies. Though we are unable 

to acknowledge specific individuals for their contributions to this report, we would like to 

recognize the following for their help and support of the FACE mission and objectives:

 The employer involved in the incident

 Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) 

 Federal FACE Program management (NIOSH)

 Safety & Health Assessment & Research for Prevention (SHARP)