Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the 

case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

ZACHARY A. WITTE GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Locke & Witte Attorney General of Indiana

Fort Wayne, Indiana 

J. T. WHITEHEAD

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

OLYMPIA SHELLMAN, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 02A04-1201-CR-34

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, Judge 

Cause No. 02D06-1107-FD-921

September 4, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DARDEN, Senior Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Olympia Shellman appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her 

guilty plea.

We affirm.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Shellman’s motion 

to withdraw her guilty plea.

FACTS

On June 30, 2011, Shellman was arrested for taking merchandise from a Meijer 

store without paying for it. On July 7, 2011, she was charged with theft, a class D felony. 

Shellman initially entered a not guilty plea, but on the day set for trial, November 17, 

2011, Shellman by counsel offered to change her plea to guilty. The change in plea was 

precipitated by defense counsel’s review of a tape from Meijer’s security camera and by 

counsel’s subsequent discussion with Shellman about the evidentiary weight of the tape.

The trial court asked Shellman whether she wished to change her plea, and she 

responded, “Yeah, that’s correct.” (Guilty Plea Tr. 3). Shellman then complained about 

treatment by Meijer employees and described a conversation with a friend who was with 

her at the time the theft occurred. In this conversation, Shellman told the friend that “I’m 

not stealing nothing so I don’t care [about Meijer’s security], you know, so basically what 

you causing a scene for? And I’m not doing nothing.” (Guilty Plea Tr. 5). The trial 

court informed Shellman that she had the right to a jury trial and that she had the right to 
3

counsel and the right to “stay silent.” (Guilty Plea Tr. 7). The trial court also informed 

Shellman that “[y]ou make your decision on whether or not you’re guilty or not guilty of 

this crime” and that “[n]obody should talk you into [entering a guilty plea]. Nobody 

should force you into this.” (Guilty Plea Tr. 8-9). Further, the trial court advised 

Shellman that she could select a jury from a waiting jury panel, tell her story to the jury, 

and let the jury decide her fate. 

The trial court then asked Shellman whether she was guilty of the acts described in 

the charging information. When Shellman did not immediately answer, the trial court 

stated that the jury pool should be called in. Shellman then expressed her desire to plead 

guilty and the trial court swore her in. Shellman told the court that she was medicated but 

that none of her medications affected her understanding of the proceedings or her ability 

to answer the questions asked by the trial court. The trial court informed Shellman of her 

rights and received affirmative answers to questions about whether Shellman understood 

those rights. 

Shellman assured the trial court that she was satisfied with defense counsel’s 

representation. Defense counsel then established a factual basis, obtaining Shellman’s 

affirmation that she took property from the Meijer store. The trial court then took the 

plea under advisement and scheduled a sentencing date.

On January 6, 2012, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, 

Shellman stated that she wanted to withdraw her guilty plea “on account of the fact that I 
4

was not caught on tape stealing nothing.” (Sentencing Tr. 6). The trial court asked 

Shellman if she had watched the tape, and she answered “No, I did not.” Id. The trial 

court then denied Shellman’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea and sentenced Shellman 

to a one-year sentence that was suspended to probation.

DECISION

Shellman contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion 

to withdraw her guilty plea. Shellman argues that the trial court should have granted her 

motion because she proclaimed her innocence at both the guilty plea and sentencing 

hearings. Shellman also argues that she was “not in the right state of mind” when she 

pled guilty. 

Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b) governs motions to withdraw guilty pleas. In 

general, “after a defendant pleads guilty but before a sentence is imposed, a defendant 

may move to withdraw a plea of guilty.” Jeffries v. State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012), (citing Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b)), trans. denied. The trial court must permit 

a defendant to withdraw a plea “if it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Id. On 

the other hand, “the motion to withdraw the plea should be denied if the plea’s 

withdrawal would substantially prejudice the State.” Id. In all other cases, the court may 

grant the defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea “for any fair and just reason.” Id.

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea arrives in this court 

with a presumption in favor of the ruling. Id. We will reverse only for an abuse of 
5

discretion. Id. In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea, “we examine the statements made by the defendant at 

the guilty plea hearing to decide whether the plea was offered ‘freely and knowingly.’” 

Id. (quoting Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001)).

Here, Shellman initially indicated at the plea hearing that she had a conversation 

with a friend where she said, “I’m not stealing nothing . . . .” (Guilty Plea Tr. 5). After 

being advised that she had the right to a jury trial and to certain other rights, however, 

Shellman insisted that she committed theft. Shellman’s conversation with her friend was 

not a claim of innocence; it was part of a rambling account about alleged mistreatment by 

Meijer loss control employees. Her admission of guilt, on the other hand, was 

unequivocal and followed the trial court’s recitation of the full panoply of rights she 

would forfeit if she pled guilty. 

With reference to Shellman’s sentencing-hearing statement about the security tape, 

we observe that she claims that she had not been “‘caught’ on tape stealing nothing.” 

(Sentencing Tr. 6). We interpret her statement as a lament about pleading guilty when 

the evidence against her was allegedly weaker than she previously understood, not a 

claim of innocence. Our interpretation is bolstered by Shellman’s admission that she had 

not viewed the tape. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Shellman’s claim that she was claiming innocence while pleading 

guilty. 
6

Shellman informed the trial court at the guilty plea hearing that she was on 

prescribed medication. Upon specific questioning from the trial court, Shellman stated 

that the medication did not affect her understanding of the guilty plea proceedings or of 

the questions asked and the advisements given by the trial court. Under these 

circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that 

Shellman’s use of prescribed medicine warranted the withdrawal of her guilty plea.

Affirmed. 

FRIEDLANDER, J., and BROWN, J., concur.