Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 1

Evaluation of Law Enforcement Agents’ 

Potential Exposures during a Raid of a 

Clandestine “Spice” Lab

HHE Report No. 2014-0039-3246

March 2016

Jessica G. Ramsey, MS, CPE

Loren Tapp, MD, MS

Gregory Burr, CIH

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Page 2 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

Contents

Highlights...............................................i

Abbreviations ..................................... iii

Introduction......................................... 1

Methods................................................ 2

Results .................................................. 4

Discussion .......................................... 11

Conclusions........................................ 12

Recommendations............................. 13

Appendix A..........................................16

Appendix B..........................................18

Appendix C..........................................19

Appendix D..........................................22

References...........................................26

Acknowledgements........................... 31

The employer is required to post a copy of this report for 30 days at or near the 

workplace(s) of affected employees. The employer must take steps to ensure 

that the posted report is not altered, defaced, or covered by other material.

The cover photo is a close-up image of sorbent tubes, which are used by the HHE 

Program to measure airborne exposures. This photo is an artistic representation that may 

not be related to this Health Hazard Evaluation. Photo by NIOSH.
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page i

Law enforcement agents 

were concerned about 

chemical exposures during 

raids of spice labs. We found 

no exposures to airborne ABPINACA or mitragynine, and 

very low exposures to volatile 

organic compounds. However, 

we detected AB-PINACA, 

its breakdown products, or 

mitragynine in the urine of six 

of nine agents after the raid. 

Agents had potential exposure 

to contaminants from skin 

contact and unintentional 

ingestion. The agency’s office 

layout and ventilation system 

were not designed for handling 

contaminated evidence.

Highlights of this Evaluation

The Health Hazard Evaluation Program received a request from a manager at a federal law 

enforcement agency. Law enforcement agents were concerned about their potential exposures 

to synthetic cannabinoids and other compounds during raids of clandestine spice labs. The 

agents were also concerned about exposures when they processed evidence at their office.

What We Did

● We watched agents raid a spice lab in December 2013.

● We collected urine from employees to check for AB-PINACA, a synthetic cannabinoid, 

and its breakdown products (also called 

metabolites). We also checked for mitragynine. 

This chemical is a plant material with opiumlike effects in humans.

● We took surface wipe samples in the spice 

lab and in the agency’s office. We tested the 

samples for AB-PINACA and mitragynine.

● We took air samples for volatile organic 

compounds, AB-PINACA, and mitragynine. 

We sampled during the raid and in the agency’s 

office during evidence processing. 

● We used questionnaires to ask employees about 

their work history and work-related symptoms.

● We looked at the use of personal protective 

equipment by the agents.

● We checked the ventilation system to see if it was 

designed for evidence handling and processing.

What We Found

● We found AB-PINACA, its breakdown products, 

and/or mitragynine in the urine of six of nine 

agents after the raid. These compounds were not 

present in any urine samples before the raid.

● One surface wipe sample from the spice lab had a detectable amount of AB-PINACA.

● We found no airborne AB-PINACA or mitragynine in the spice lab or in the agency’s office.

● We found very low levels of airborne volatile organic compounds in the spice lab and 

in the agency’s office.

● About half of the agents reported symptoms when handling synthetic cannabinoids.

● Most of the agents did not use gloves when handling evidence bags in the agency’s office.
Page ii Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

● The agency did not provide hand washing supplies for the agents’ use in the field.

● The agency’s office and its ventilation system were not designed to contain or control 

contaminants from the evidence.

● Agents inconsistently used gloves and protective clothing. Their practices could expose 

them to contaminants and spread contamination.

What the Employer Can Do

● Store and handle evidence in the northeast corner of the seventh floor. This area was on 

a separate ventilation system from the remainder of the seventh floor.

● Provide office ventilation separate from the ventilation system for evidence processing, 

evidence storage, and laboratories.

● Provide a locker room and shower for agents.

● Provide disposable protective clothing for all agents working in potentially 

contaminated areas or when handling potentially contaminated items.

● Provide hand-washing supplies for agents during field assignments.

● Train agents in work practices, hygiene, and use of personal protective equipment that 

will prevent exposure to potentially contaminated evidence.

What Agents Can Do

● Wear protective gloves and clothing when handling potentially contaminated items.

● Put on and take off protective equipment properly.

● Do not eat or drink around potentially contaminated items in the field or in the office.

● Wash your hands after handling potentially contaminated items, even if gloves are used. 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page iii

Abbreviations

μg/100 cm2 Microgram per 100 square centimeter

ACGIH® American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

ELISA Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

LC-MS/MS Liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry

LLOQ Lower limit of quantification

mg/m3 Milligram per cubic meter

MIK Methyl isopropyl ketone

mL Milliliter

MPK Methyl propyl ketone

ND Not detected

ng/mL Nanogram per milliliter

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

OEL Occupational exposure limit

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PEL Permissible exposure limit

ppm Parts per million

REL Recommended exposure limit

TLV® Threshold limit value

TWA Time-weighted average

VOC Volatile organic compound
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Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 1

Introduction

The Health Hazard Evaluation Program received a request from a manager at a federal law 

enforcement agency. Law enforcement field agents (agents) were concerned about their 

potential exposures to synthetic cannabinoids and other compounds during unannounced 

investigations (raids) of clandestine spice labs. They also were concerned about synthetic 

drug exposures when they processed the evidence in their office.

In this report “spice” refers to manufactured chemical mixtures that produce experiences 

similar to marijuana (cannabis) and that are marketed as a “legal” high. Synthetic cannabinoids 

are chemicals with psychoactive properties. The Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act, part of 

the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-

144), places 26 types of synthetic cannabinoids and cathinones (a plant stimulant with effects 

similar to those of amphetamine) into Schedule 1 of the Controlled Substances Act. Because 

these substances have been designated as Schedule 1, federal law enforcement agencies have 

exercised their authority in controlling manufacturing, stopping production, and collecting 

evidence. 

We accompanied the agents during a raid in December 2013. Before the raid, we met with 

agency managers and agents to discuss their concerns. We observed workplace conditions 

and work processes and practices during the raid and at the agency’s office where agents 

sorted and processed the evidence. We sent a letter summarizing our activities and initial 

observations to the manager and agent’s representatives in January 2014. In May and June 

2014, we sent a letter to each of the nine agents we tested notifying them of their air sample 

results for volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and psychoactive compounds. We sent letters 

summarizing these results to the manager and the agent’s representatives at the same time. In 

June 2015, we sent the manager and agent’s representatives an interim report that discussed 

the results of the air and surface samples and our evaluation of the office ventilation system. 

In that same month we also sent each of the nine agents we tested a letter notifying them 

of their urine sample results for psychoactive compounds. We sent a summary letter to the 

manager and the agent’s representatives at the same time.

Background

On the basis of their past law enforcement experience and background information on this 

particular spice lab, the agents suspected that the operators were likely dissolving synthetic 

cannabinoids in ethanol and spraying the solution onto dried raspberry or strawberry plant 

material. The treated plant material would be air dried on baking sheets and then packaged 

in heat-sealed foil packets. This background information proved to be accurate. Information 

provided to us by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), suggested that the 

psychoactive compounds likely present in this spice lab were a synthetic cannabinoid called 

AB-PINACA and mitragynine.

During the raid, the agents collected evidence, including suspected treated and untreated 

plant material, sealed spice packets, baking sheets, and paper records. The agents collected 

sealed packages of kratom, a designer drug of abuse that contains the active ingredient 
Page 2 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

mitragynine. Mitragynine, an indole alkaloid, produces psychoactive effects on the user. 

After hand-writing descriptions of the item in an evidence log, agents placed the evidence 

in plastic or paper bags before taking the bags back for storage in the evidence room at the 

agency’s office. On the days following the raid, the agents removed evidence bags from the 

evidence room and took them to an adjacent equipment room or to a nearby conference room 

for sorting and cataloging.

Methods

The objectives of this evaluation were the following:

1. Evaluate agents’ potential airborne and skin exposures to chemicals including 

psychoactive compounds. 

2. Analyze agents’ urine for synthetic cannabinoids and other psychoactive compounds.

3. Determine the prevalence of symptoms consistent with exposure to psychoactive compounds.

Air and Surface Wipe Sampling

We evaluated agents’ potential exposures to VOCs in two steps. We took six area air samples 

in the spice lab and at the agency’s office using thermal desorption tubes following National 

Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Method 2549 [NIOSH 2016]. We 

screened these samples to identify chemicals for further analysis. We also took 16 personal 

and 4 area air samples on charcoal tubes following NIOSH Method 1500 [NIOSH 2016]. We 

analyzed the charcoal tube samples for acetone, ethanol, toluene, methyl isopropyl ketone 

(MIK), methyl propyl ketone (MPK), xylene, benzene, cyclohexanone, diisobutyl ketone, 

ethylbenzene, and methyl butyl ketone. 

To evaluate exposures to AB-PINACA and mitragynine we took personal and area air 

samples on polytetrafluoroethylene filters. We analyzed the samples by gas chromatographymass spectrometry following method conditions and using an extraction solvent (methanol) 

recommended by the DEA (Appendix C). Because this is not a validated method, the results 

we obtained should be considered semi-quantitative and the reported minimum detectable 

and minimum quantifiable concentrations should be considered estimates. However, a limited 

study of extraction and recovery efficiency was conducted (Appendix C). On the basis of our 

limited study and other quality control parameters, it appears that methanol may not be the 

best media/extraction solvent combination.

We took 17 surface wipe samples in the spice lab and at the agency’s office. For each wipe 

sample we wore clean nitrile gloves to avoid cross contamination and sampled a 

100-square-centimeter surface area using a disposable cardboard template, when possible. 

For uneven or irregular surfaces, we estimated the sample area. We took wipe samples using 

Puritan® sterile foam-tipped applicators (macrofoam swabs), AlphaWipes®, and Puritan 

cotton swabs. The samples were wetted with either deionized water (macrofoam swabs and 

AlphaWipes) or a buffer solution (cotton swabs). We used different sampling techniques 

side-by-side for some samples because we were uncertain which method might be best. 

We analyzed the surface wipe samples for AB-PINACA and mitragynine using gas 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 3

chromatography-mass spectrometry following the method conditions and extraction solvent 

used by the DEA (Appendix C).

Workplace Observations

We looked at the work activities of agents, including their initial entry into the raided spice 

lab, the collection and bagging of evidence in plastic and paper bags, and the transfer of 

evidence to the office for additional processing and storage. In all locations, we observed the 

use of personal protective equipment. 

Ventilation

We looked for evidence of water damage, water incursion, visible mold, and other potential 

indoor environmental quality problems in the agency’s offices. We visually inspected the 

rooftop air handling unit that provided ventilation for the floor where the offices were 

located. We evaluated air distribution to the offices by measuring airflow with a TSI 

AccuBalance® Model 8371 ventilation flow hood. We also spoke with the building’s 

facilities managers about the design and maintenance of the ventilation system. 

Questionnaire

We asked agents participating in the raid to complete a short questionnaire the day after 

the raid. The questionnaire contained questions about demographics, work history, medical 

history, history of smoking and alcohol use, and health symptoms that could be related to 

workplace psychoactive drug exposures. 

Biological Monitoring

Each agent on whom we collected an air sample provided urine samples. We asked agents to 

provide five samples over 3 consecutive days. We collected urine samples at the following times: 

1. Day 1 (baseline): in the afternoon of the day before entry and search of the spice lab

2. Day 2 (post-shift): immediately after the work shift during which entry, search, 

handling, and processing evidence of synthetic cannabinoids and other psychoactive 

drugs occurred

3. Day 2 (bedtime): at bedtime the same day of the raid

4. Day 3 (morning): the next morning before sorting evidence

5. Day 3 (post-shift): at the end of the shift after sorting evidence

We used two methods to measure the amount of AB-PINACA and mitragynine in all urine 

samples. The first was a screening test that uses an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 

(ELISA) method (Appendix C). The second was a liquid chromatography-tandem 

mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) method (Appendix C), which is considered to be a more 

accurate test. We also used the LC-MS/MS test to measure two AB-PINACA metabolites, ABPINACA-(4-hydroxypentyl) and AB-PINACA N-pentanoic acid. Levels of these metabolites 

tell us how much of the original substance entered the body. The manufacturer of the AB-
Page 4 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

PINACA ELISA method determined a cut-off of 5 nanograms per milliliter (ng/mL) to indicate 

a positive AB-PINACA result. There are no other biological exposure limits or reference ranges 

for these substances, and we do not know the levels at which health effects may occur.

Results

Air and Surface Wipe Sampling

We compared the personal air results for VOCs to occupational exposure limits (OELs) set 

by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), NIOSH, and the American 

Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH®). Employers are required 

by law to keep exposures below the OSHA limits. An OEL is meant to be the amount of a 

substance that most employees can be exposed to without harm. There are no OELs for 

AB-PINACA and mitragynine.

Appendix D discusses health effects of acetone and ethanol, the main VOCs that were present 

in quantifiable concentrations in the personal and area air samples. The OELs and personal 

sample results for acetone, ethanol, and the other four VOCs found in measureable amounts 

are presented in Table 1. The concentrations of these six VOCs in the personal air samples 

ranged from not detected to 1.3 parts per million (ppm). All VOC concentrations were well 

below their lowest OELs (Table 1). We also analyzed for the following chemicals, but none 

were found. The minimum detectable concentrations are shown in parentheses:

● benzene (0.005 ppm)

● cyclohexanone (0.01 ppm) 

● diisobutyl ketone (0.004 ppm) 

● ethylbenzene (0.004 ppm) 

● methyl butyl ketone (0.004 ppm) 

We took two area air samples and analyzed them for the same VOCs as in the personal air 

samples. We took the area air samples in the conference room and in the equipment room 

when agents handled the bagged evidence. We found low concentrations of acetone 

(0.02–0.09 ppm), ethanol (0.02–0.2 ppm), toluene (0.002 ppm), and MIK (0.002 ppm). We 

did not find benzene, cyclohexanone, diisobutyl ketone, ethylbenzene, methyl butyl ketone, 

MPK, or xylene (< 0.01 ppm).
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 5

Appendix D discusses health effects of AB-PINACA and mitragynine, the psychoactive 

compounds that we sampled for in this evaluation. We did not find AB-PINACA or 

mitragynine in any of the 18 personal air samples we collected. Each agent that we collected 

a personal air sample for AB-PINACA and mitragynine from also provided a urine sample 

for these psychoactive compounds. For the personal air samples, the estimated minimum 

detectable concentration was 0.08 milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m3

) or less for 

AB-PINACA and 0.06 mg/m3

 or less for mitragynine. 

We also took two area air samples for AB-PINACA and mitragynine in the spice lab, and 

five area samples in office areas that included the conference room, evidence storage room, 

and equipment room. We did not find AB-PINACA or mitragynine in any of these area air 

samples; estimated minimum detectable concentrations ranged from 0.03–0.1 mg/m3

 for 

AB-PINACA and from 0.02–0.1 mg/m3

 for mitragynine. 

One wipe sample, taken from a baking sheet in the spice lab where treated plant material was 

dried, had a detectable level of AB-PINACA (Table 2). None of the other wipe samples had 

detectable levels of mitragynine.

Table 1. Results of personal air sample concentrations for VOCs, in ppm*

Day Location Samples Acetone Ethanol Toluene MIK MPK Xylene

1 Spice 

lab

6 0.012 to 

0.17

0.34 to 

1.3

ND† to 

0.020

ND ND to 

(0.0083)‡

ND

2 Agency 

office

5 0.026 to 

0.077

0.050 to 

0.18

ND (0.0032) 

to 

(0.0036)‡

ND ND

3 Agency 

office

4 0.043 to 

0.11

0.062 to 

0.17

ND to 

(0.0028)‡

ND ND (0.00067)‡

NIOSH REL 250 1,000 100 50 150 100

OSHA PEL 1,000 1,000 200 100 200 100

ACGIH TLV 500 1,000§ 20 20 None 100

REL = Recommended exposure limit

PEL = Permissible exposure limit

TLV = Threshold limit value

*Sampling periods ranged from 190 to 399 minutes. The work shift included the time that agents spent at the 

raided spice lab and at their office with the collected evidence.

†ND = not detected, below the minimum detectable concentration. For these personal samples the minimum 

detectable concentrations for MIK ranged from 0.002–0.01 ppm; for MPK 0.0007–0.005 ppm; for xylene 

0.0006–0.005 ppm; for toluene 0.001–0.008 ppm.

‡Concentration shown in parentheses is between the minimum detectable and minimum quantifiable 

concentration (not shown). This means there is more uncertainty associated with this value.

§A 15-minute time weighted average exposure that should not be exceeded any time during a workday 

(a short-term exposure limit).
Page 6 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

Table 2. Wipe sample results (semi-quantitative) for AB-PINACA and mitragynine 

Sampling date and location Sampling method AB-PINACA

(μg/100 cm2

)

Mitragynine

(μg/100 cm2)

12/11/2013 – Spice lab, during raid

Floor

Baking tray

Inside plastic tote

Inside round drum

Suspect liquid†

Equipment case‡ 

Cotton swab

Cotton swab

Cotton swab

Cotton swab

Cotton swab

Cotton swab

ND*

250

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

12/12/2013 – Agency office, before evidence processing

Conference room table

Top of bookcase

Computer desk

Computer desk

Suspect bag§

Suspect bag§

Suspect bag§

Cotton swab

Cotton swab

Cotton swab

Macrofoam swab

Cotton swab

Macrofoam swab

AlphaWipe

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

12/13/2013 – Agency office, after evidence processing

Conference room table

Conference room table

Conference room table

Computer desk

Cotton swab

Macrofoam swab

AlphaWipe

AlphaWipe

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

Estimated limit of detection

Estimated limit of detection

Estimated limit of detection

Cotton swab

AlphaWipe

Macrofoam swab

50

300

50

40

100

40

μg/100 cm2

 = micrograms per 100 square centimeter

*ND = not detected, below the limit of detection.

†Wipe sample from bucket suspected to contain spice. Agents later told us that it was not spice.

‡Agency equipment case on the floor in the spice lab.

§Wipe samples from bags suspected to contain spice. Agents later told us that it was not spice.

Workplace Observations

Agents inconsistently used gloves and protective clothing. Their practices could expose 

them to contaminants and spread contamination. For example, some agents voluntarily wore 

disposable protective clothing (Tyvek® suits) during the raid; other agents did not. The 

use of latex or nitrile gloves during the raid and evidence processing was inconsistent; and 

no agents wore disposable shoe coverings. Some agents did not change out of the clothing 

(either personal or disposable) worn during the raid before entering the office. The offices did 

not have a designated locker room where agents could change clothing and clean up before 

going home. 

We saw agents using the passenger elevators to bring evidence from the spice lab into the 

office. We watched agents sorting and processing this evidence in a carpeted conference 

room and individual offices, occasionally while eating and drinking. Agents could be exposed 

to spice or other illegal drugs through ingestion when they handle evidence with bare hands 

and do not wash their hands before eating, drinking, or smoking. Agents also sorted and 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 7

processed evidence in an equipment room adjacent to the evidence storage room. This 

room had a tile floor and a large table with a nonporous top that could easily be cleaned. 

The evidence processing and storage rooms were connected to the ventilation system that 

supplied the remaining seventh floor offices. The potential for cross contamination in the 

ventilation system is discussed below. 

According to agent’s representatives, the agency had purchased respirators for voluntary use 

by the agents. These respirators included 3M model 8511 N95 filtering facepiece particulate 

respirators and 3M model 6000 series elastomeric half-mask respirators equipped with 3M 

model 6092 combination organic vapor, acid gas, and particulate cartridges. The agency 

contracted with Federal Occupational Health to operate the respirator program. Agents 

completed a questionnaire to determine if they were medically cleared to wear a respirator. 

Cleared agents completed fit testing for the respirator they would use. We did not see agents 

wearing respirators during the raid or when processing evidence. We saw some agents with 

facial hair that would have interfered with achieving a proper seal when wearing either 

of these tight-fitting respirators. The agent’s repreentatives told us that the agents had not 

been medically cleared to wear the elastomeric half-mask respirators, only the N95 filtering 

facepiece respirators.

Ventilation

The agency occupied most of the seventh floor of a multitenant office building. One rooftop 

variable air volume air handling system provided heating and cooling for the seventh floor 

tenants, except for a law enforcement office in the northeast corner that was on a separate 

ventilation system. The ventilation system was not designed to contain or control forensic 

hazards from the handling and testing of evidence. Likewise, the layout of the agency’s office 

and the work practices of the agents were not designed to contain or control hazards from 

receiving, processing, and storing evidence. We did not see evidence of past or present water 

damage, water incursion, or mold.

The ventilation system had minimum efficiency reporting value 8 panel filters. The filters 

were properly installed and in good condition. According to the building facility managers, 

the building’s ventilation system normally operated from 5:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on weekdays. 

It did not operate on the basis of occupancy nor on weekends unless outdoor temperatures 

were unusually cold or hot. However, agents informed us that evidence processing and other 

law enforcement activities did occur in the evenings and on the weekends in their offices.

We measured airflow from ceiling diffusers on the seventh floor. Although we asked, 

the facilities managers did not provide a design plan or a test and balance report for the 

ventilation system. Therefore, we were not able to compare our measured airflows to 

the intended design of the ventilation system. Some of the air diffusers had zero airflow, 

including all four diffusers in the conference room (Appendix A and Appendix B). 
Page 8 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

Questionnaire

All nine agents participated in the questionnaire and urine monitoring. All nine were male, 

and the average age in years was 45, range: 35–60 years. The average number of years in 

their current job was 9, range: 4–19 years. All reported handling evidence from illegal drug 

raids including synthetic cannabinoids, cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, bath 

salts (slang term for synthetic cathinones), raw methylone, and prescription drugs in pill 

form. Cathinones and methylone are central nervous system stimulants. 

All nine agents reported handling or being in the same room with the spice substance during 

the time of our evaluation. Two agents reported always wearing gloves, five agents reported 

“sometimes” or “usually” wearing gloves, and two reported not wearing gloves when 

handling spice during our evaluation. When asked about respirator use, six of the nine agents 

reported that they sometimes wore respirators during the course of their job. The types of 

respirators reportedly worn included dust masks (not NIOSH approved), 3M model 8511 

N95 filtering facepiece respirators, and half-mask elastomeric respirators. Regarding the 

latter, we do not know if the agents were referring to the 3M model 6000 series elastomeric 

half-mask respirators equipped with 3M model 6092 combination organic vapor, acid gas, 

and particulate cartridges that had been provided for voluntary use.

We asked agents how frequently they contacted spice when working with it, even if covered 

by gloves or clothing. We combined responses of frequent, occasional, and rare as “yes” and 

reassigned responses of never to “no.” Table 3 shows that the hands and forearms were the 

most common body parts with contact with spice. 

Table 3. Number of agents reporting contact with spice, even 

if covered by gloves or clothing, by body part (n = 9)

Part of body with 

spice contact

Contact with spice

Yes

Contact with spice

No

Hand 9 0

Forearm 9 0

Upper arm 8 1

Neck 7 2

Face 7 2

Leg 5 4
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 9

Figure 1 shows the number of agents reporting symptoms while ever handling spice. This 

question did not specify a time period, so symptoms could be related to historical handling 

of spice. Over half of the agents reported having cough, eye irritation, throat irritation, and 

dizziness or lightheadedness while handling spice. Four of nine agents reported feeling 

“high” when handling spice; three of these four agents reported irritability, difficulty 

remembering things, and difficulty concentrating in addition to feeling high.

Figure 1. Number of agents reporting having symptoms while ever handling spice, by symptom type (n = 9).

It is possible that agents’ personal habits, medical conditions, and medication use could 

contribute to these symptoms. Some agents reported tobacco smoking, alcohol consumption, 

and exposure to solvents outside of work. Some agents reported history of heart disease, high 

blood pressure, elevated lipids, and diabetes; and took medication for these conditions. The 

combined effects of taking prescription medication and being exposed to psychoactive drugs 

at work are unknown. We did not ask the agents about other factors, such as caffeine intake 

and sleep hours, that could also contribute to symptoms.
Page 10 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

Biological Monitoring

There are no OELs for AB-PINACA, its metabolites, or for mitragynine in urine. Since the 

LC-MS/MS method is considered to be more accurate than the ELISA in detecting presence 

of these substances, we report only the results of the LC-MS/MS analysis. 

The LC-MS/MS results for AB-PINACA, its metabolites, and mitragynine in urine and the 

range of concentrations are shown in Table 4. On the day before the raid (day 1 baseline), no 

quantifiable levels of any of these compounds were found. After the raid on day 2 and day 

3, four agents had quantifiable levels of AB-PINACA and/or its metabolites in their urine 

samples. Two of these agents had quantifiable levels AB-PINACA N-pentanoic acid in all 

four urine samples on day 2 and day 3. After the raid on day 2 and 3, six employees had 

quantifiable levels of mitragynine in their urine. Four of these agents had quantifiable levels 

of mitragynine in all four urine samples on day 2 and day 3.

Table 4. Cannabinoid and mitragynine levels in agents’ urine samples, by LC-MS/MS (n = 9)

Compound Number of agents with quantifiable levels 

(range of concentrations, ng/mL)

Day 1:

Baseline

Day 2: 

Post-shift

Day 2:

Bedtime

Day 3:

Morning

Day 3:

Post-shift

AB-PINACA* 0 3 

(< LLOQ–0.29)

1 

(< LLOQ–0.12)

0 0

AB-PINACA 

N-(4-hydroxypentyl)*

0 1

(< LLOQ–0.11)

1 

(< LLOQ–0.12)

0 0

AB-PINACA 

N-pentanoic acid*

0 2 

(< LLOQ–1.98)

3 

(< LLOQ–3.45)

2 

(< LLOQ–0.43)

2 

(< LLOQ–0.62)

Mitragynine† 0 4 

(< LLOQ–3.70)

5 

(< LLOQ–12.62)

5 

(< LLOQ–0.94)

5

(< LLOQ–5.28)

LLOQ = lower limit of quantification

*The LLOQ for AB-PINACA, AB-PINACA N-(4-hydroxypentyl) metabolite and AB-PINACA N-pentanoic 

acid metabolite is 0.10 ng/mL.

†The LLOQ for mitragynine is 1.0 ng/mL.

The agent with the greatest number of positive urine samples and highest concentrations 

reported not wearing gloves during the evaluation. We observed that this agent also handled 

most of the evidence. In contrast, three agents had no quantifiable levels for any of the 

four analytes. Two of those agents did not handle evidence during the raid or participate in 

evidence processing; the third agent participated in both activities and reported some glove 

use. The remaining five agents handled evidence during the raid and reported varied glove 

use from none to always. One of these five agents was a smoker, reported usually wearing 

gloves, and thus may have had hand-to-mouth exposure.
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 11

Discussion

Synthetic Cannabinoids and Mitragynine

We found detectable levels of AB-PINACA, its metabolites, or mitragynine in six of nine 

agents after the raid. One of the surface wipe samples from the spice lab and none of the 

agents’ personal air samples contained detectable levels of AB-PINACA or mitragynine. The 

sampling and analytical methods we used to test for these psychoactive compounds have not 

been validated. Appendix C discusses method limitations, particularly low recoveries and 

extraction efficiencies. 

The urine results suggest that workplace exposures to AB-PINACA and mitragynine occurred 

during the raid or evidence processing and that agents absorbed these chemicals into their 

bodies. Agents handling evidence without gloves and while eating and drinking risk ingesting 

the chemicals or absorbing them through the skin.

Little information is available in the scientific literature about exposures to synthetic 

cannabinoids and mitragynine and human health effects. We do not know the concentrations 

of synthetic cannabinoids and mitragynine in urine that would be expected from airborne, 

dermal, or ingestion exposures nor the levels at which symptoms or health effects would be 

expected. We did not find reports in the scientific literature describing occupational exposure 

to synthetic cannabinoids such as AB-PINACA and to mitragynine. However, the levels 

found among agents in this evaluation are much lower than the levels found in patients 

presenting to the emergency department after intentional use [Gerona 2015].

Volatile Organic Compounds

The concentrations of the six measureable VOCs in the personal air samples were well below 

their lowest OELs. One of these six was ethanol, the suspected solvent used to dissolve 

the synthetic drugs. Volatile organic compounds are a large class of organic chemicals 

(containing carbon) that have a sufficiently high vapor pressure to allow some of the 

compound to exist in the gaseous state at room temperature. These compounds are emitted 

in varying concentrations from many common indoor sources, including carpeting, fabrics, 

adhesives, solvents, paints, cleaners, waxes, cigarettes, and combustion sources. 

Ventilation

A variable air volume air handling system like the one present in the agency’s office should 

provide minimum airflow at all times to avoid stagnant air conditions developing in occupied 

spaces. However, we measured no airflow from the supply diffusers in the conference room. 

The ventilation system at the agency’s office was not designed to contain or control forensic 

hazards from the handling and storage of evidence. Likewise, the layout of the agency’s 

office and the work practices of the agents did not contain or control potential hazards from 

the receiving, processing, and storing of evidence. At the time of our evaluation, a new 

office was planned, although the completion date was not known, and no design plans were 

available to review. 
Page 12 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

In addition to a properly designed forensic facility, good hygiene practices by the agents, 

such as washing hands before eating, drinking, smoking, and using personal protective 

equipment, will also reduce personal exposures to potential contaminants during raids and 

while handling evidence.

Personal Protective Equipment

Selecting the appropriate type of personal protective equipment can be challenging in this 

situation because of the expected variability between raids. For example, raided facilities can 

differ in the size of the lab, the types and quantities of drugs, and the presence or absence of 

exterior doors, windows, and mechanical ventilation systems. These differences will affect 

agents’ exposures. For these reasons, managers should consider information they receive before 

a raid in deciding about the need for and level of personal protective equipment, including 

respiratory protection. We do not have sufficient information based on this evaluation to 

make a general recommendation on an appropriate level of respiratory protection for all raids. 

However, regardless of the field situation, a minimum level of personal protective equipment, 

such as disposable clothing and protective gloves, should be required while working in 

clandestine drug labs. A properly designed forensic facility where potentially contaminated 

evidence can be safely transferred, processed, and stored will further help to minimize 

unnecessary exposures to illicit drugs, VOCs, and other contaminants. 

Limitations

Our evaluation had the following limitations: 

● We observed only one spice lab raid that involved a small number of agents. The 

findings may not represent other raids.

● Agents may have been exposed to psychoactive compounds during the raid that were 

unknown to us. 

● The air and surface wipe sampling and analytical methods we used for AB-PINACA 

and mitragynine have not been validated; therefore our results should be considered 

semi-quantitative. 

● The analytical tests run on the urine specimens are new and investigational. 

● We could not compare agents’ symptoms with urine levels of cannabinoids and 

mitragynine. We asked about symptoms in general when handling spice, not symptoms 

specifically during the evaluation. 

Conclusions

Our findings indicate that agents are at risk for dermal and ingestion exposures, and have 

the potential for unnecessary airborne exposures to synthetic cannabinoids and other 

contaminants. The risk arises from collecting and processing contaminated evidence and 

occurs in the field and office. A minimum level of personal protective equipment, such 

as disposable clothing and protective gloves, should be required. A hazard assessment 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 13

should be used to determine if agents also need additional personal protective equipment 

such as respirators. This assessment should use information about the lab to be raided and 

from previous raids. A properly designed forensic facility will further help to minimize 

unnecessary exposures to illicit drugs, VOCs, and other contaminants.

Recommendations

On the basis of our findings, we recommend the actions listed below. We encourage the law 

enforcement agency to use a labor-management health and safety committee or working 

group to discuss our recommendations and develop an action plan. Those involved in the 

work can best set priorities and assess the feasibility of our recommendations for the specific 

situation at the agency. 

Our recommendations are based on an approach known as the hierarchy of controls 

(Appendix D). This approach groups actions by their likely effectiveness in reducing or 

removing hazards. In most cases, the preferred approach is to eliminate hazardous materials 

or processes and install engineering controls to reduce exposure or shield employees. Until 

such controls are in place, or if they are not effective or feasible, administrative measures and 

personal protective equipment may be needed. 

Engineering Controls

Engineering controls reduce employees’ exposures by removing the hazard from the process or by 

placing a barrier between the hazard and the employee. Engineering controls protect employees 

effectively without placing primary responsibility of implementation on the employee. 

1. Design an office to accommodate a variety of purposes such as general offices; 

laboratories; evidence receiving, processing, and storage areas. To this end, review the 

new building plans to determine if the following goals are addressed.

a. Designing the ventilation system(s) to contain potential contaminants from 

processing and storing evidence.

b. Designating routes within the building for transporting evidence from the 

field to storage and processing locations to minimize the spread of 

contaminants to surrounding office areas.

c. Providing areas or rooms specifically designed to hold evidence and for 

handling and processing evidence.

d. Using easy-to-clean, nonporous surfaces.

e. Providing a locker and shower area for employees to use to reduce 

contamination within the facility as well as prevent take-home exposure.

The following links provide information on forensic facility design, including a modular planning 

concept that allows flexibility in accommodating the differing needs of office, lab, and storage areas.

a. Forensic Facility Design, Part 1 (http://www.forensicmag.com/ 

articles/2005/04/forensic-facility-design).

b. Forensic Facility Design, Part 2 (http://www.forensicmag.com/ 

articles/2005/01/design-forensic-facilities-part-2).
Page 14 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

2. Store and process evidence in the office space in the northeast corner of the seventh floor 

because this area has its own ventilation system. Doing so will reduce the chance of 

recirculating potentially contaminated air to other occupied spaces on the seventh floor. 

3. Evaluate the ventilation system serving the seventh floor. All of the variable air 

volume supply boxes should provide a minimum amount of air during occupancy to 

avoid stagnant air conditions. After making repairs, perform a test and balance of the 

ventilation system.

Administrative Controls

The term administrative controls refers to employer-dictated work practices and policies 

to reduce or prevent hazardous exposures. Their effectiveness depends on employer 

commitment and employee acceptance. Regular monitoring and reinforcement are necessary 

to ensure that policies and procedures are followed consistently.

1. Train employees on proper work practices and hygiene when working with potentially 

hazardous substances. Prohibit eating and drinking in areas where evidence is 

processed. Improve personal hygiene practices such as hand washing after handling 

potentially contaminated items, after glove removal, and before eating and drinking.

2. Provide hand-washing supplies, soap, and water, for agents to use in the field.

3. Train employees in proper donning and doffing techniques of personal protective 

equipment to avoid skin contamination. Training should also include the reasons for 

the protective equipment use and its limitations.

4. Do not sort or process evidence outside of the equipment storage room.

5. Avoid working in the office between 6:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. or other times when the 

building’s ventilation system is not operating. If work is necessary during these times 

consult with the building’s facilities managers to adjust the operating schedule of the 

ventilation system.

6. Encourage agents to report potential work-related health conditions to their supervisor. 

Agents with persistent symptoms should be evaluated by an occupational medicine 

physician or a medical provider specializing in workplace diseases and illnesses. The 

Association of Occupational and Environmental Clinics has an online directory of 

such providers at http://www.aoec.org/directory.htm.

7. Evaluate potential hazards in future raids to help inform decisions regarding a 

minimum level of personal protective equipment for agents entering clandestine 

spice labs. This information could then be included in a written standard operating 

procedure for selecting the appropriate level of personal protective equipment.

8. Conduct a hazard assessment prior to each raid to decide what personal protective 

equipment, including respiratory protection, may be needed. 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 15

Personal Protective Equipment

Personal protective equipment is the least effective means for controlling hazardous 

exposures. Proper use of personal protective equipment requires a comprehensive program 

and a high level of employee involvement and commitment. The right personal protective 

equipment must be chosen for each hazard. Supporting programs such as training, changeout schedules, and medical assessment may be needed. Personal protective equipment should 

not be the sole method for controlling hazardous exposures. Rather, personal protective 

equipment should be used until effective engineering and administrative controls are in place.

1. Wear disposable protective gloves when handling items that may be contaminated. Do 

not use latex gloves for activities that are not likely to involve contact with infectious 

materials because of potential allergic reactions. Many types of glove materials are 

available, such as nitrile, polyvinyl chloride, neoprene, and polyvinyl alcohol. Each 

glove material provides different levels of protection from chemicals and liquids, and 

varying levels of cut, tear, abrasion, puncture, and thermal resistance. We recommend 

using the information gained from hazard assessments to help select the most appropriate 

glove material for each event and type of work. Nitrile gloves like the ones worn by 

agents in this evaluation provide good protection from ethanol and isopropanol (also 

called isopropyl alcohol or “rubbing alcohol”) [Ansell 2015]. In this evaluation, ethanol 

was the most prevalent VOC present in the air samples we collected. 

2. Provide disposable protective clothing, including shoe covers, for all agents working 

in potentially contaminated areas and when collecting and processing evidence. Like 

protective gloves, protective clothing materials provide varying levels of protection 

to particulates and chemicals as well as to fabric cuts and tears. The breathable Tyvek 

disposable suits worn by the agents in this evaluation provide barrier protection 

against small size hazardous particles [DuPont 2016]. Although not as breathable 

as Tyvek, disposable TyChem® protective suits provide the wearer with chemical 

protection against many toxic liquids and vapors [DuPont 2016]. We recommend using 

the information from hazard assessments to help select the most appropriate clothing 

material for each event and type of work.

3. Make sure agents are medically cleared by Federal Occupational Health for 

each respirator that they may voluntarily use. For voluntary use, agents must be 

provided with Appendix D from the OSHA respiratory protection standard 1910.134 

(Information for Employees Using Respirators When not Required Under Standard). 

Additionally, agents must be medically evaluated for voluntary use of any respirator, 

except for voluntary use of disposable filtering facepiece respirators. Agents should 

also be informed that facial hair can interfere in the facepiece to face seal, and 

supervisors should monitor the proper use and wearing of respirators by agents to 

include the presence of facial hair. If respirators are required in the future, ensure 

that the respiratory protection program meets all required elements in the OSHA 

respiratory protection standard.
Page 16 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

Appendix A: Tables

Table A1. Air supply measurements, seventh floor

Diffuser 

(Figure B1)

Airflow, cubic feet per minute Comments

Measurement Average

1 2 3

A 33 34 32 33

B 22 26 29 26

C 33 32 32 32

D 51 51 51 51

E 30 29 31 30

F 20 20 20 20

G 25 24 28 26

H 62 61 61 61

I 35 36 38 37

J 0 0 0 0

K 84 88 86 86

L 79 79 79 79

M 117 121 122 120

N 64 64 65 64 Corner column area not shown on 

diagram shown

O 20 0 0 7 Corner column area not shown on 

diagram shown

P 161 160 161 161

Q 175 174 174 174

R 84 85 86 85

S 83 82 86 84

T 75 74 71 73 Corner column area not shown on 

diagram shown

U 40 37 38 38 Corner column area not shown on 

diagram shown

V 100 101 99 100 Average of two adjacent diffusers

W 174 180 179 178

X 194 189 190 191

Y 35 33 31 33

Z 35 37 35 36

All ceiling diffusers were 2 feet by 2 feet
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 17

Table A2. Airflow measurements, seventh floor

Diffuser 

(Figure B1)

Airflow, cubic feet per minute Comments

Measurement Average

1 2 3

AA 51 52 55 53

BB 67 67 69 68

CC No measurements, 

office locked

DD No measurements, 

office locked

EE 39 40 41 40

FF 38 37 39 38

GG 105 105 105 105

HH 97 96 96 96

II 0 0 0 0

JJ 0 0 0 0

KK 0 0 0 0

LL 0 0 0 0

MM 180 182 183 182

NN 250 251 244 248

OO 0 0 0 0

PP 0 0 0 0

QQ 35 34 34 34

RR 129 130 128 129

SS 75 75 76 75

TT 71 72 72 72

UU 94 93 93 93

VV 94 96 95 95

WW 31 34 33 33

All ceiling diffusers were 2 feet by 2 feet
Page 18 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

Appendix B: Figure

Figure B1. Office diffuser locations, seventh floor
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 19

Appendix C: Methods

Enzyme Linked Immuno-sorbent Assay

ELISA assays are often used as screening methods but may have a limitation of reacting 

to structurally similar compounds. In this evaluation we used the AB-PINACA assay from 

Randox Toxicology Limited, United Kingdom to screen for AB-PINACA in urine. This is 

a competitive ELISA, meaning that AB-PINACA in the sample competes with enzymelabelled AB-PINACA for a limited number of anti-AB-PINACA binding sites in test wells 

coated with AB-PINACA antibody. The more AB-PINACA present in the samples, the fewer 

enzyme labelled AB-PINACA – antibody complexes are present that are responsible for the 

color development in the assay. Therefore, more AB-PINACA in the sample means less color. 

The same laboratory also developed an ELISA assay to screen for mitragynine in urine.

Liquid Chromatography Tandem Mass Spectroscopy Test

Because ELISA is a screening test that can have interferences, we used an LC-MS/MS 

method developed by researchers at the University of California San Francisco to confirm 

the presence of AB-PINACA, AB-PINACA N-(4-hydroxypentyl) metabolite, AB-PINACA 

N-pentanoic acid metabolite, and mitragynine in the urine samples. Using Agilent LC 

1260- AB Sciex 5500, all four compounds were measured using electrospray ionization in 

the positive polarity. Each analyte was monitored by multiple reaction monitoring using two 

transitions. Labeled paroxetine, an antidepressant drug, was used as an internal standard.

Each urine sample (0.5 milliliter [mL]) was thawed and centrifuged at 3,000 rotations per 

minute for 10 minutes before it was prepared for LC-MS/MS analysis by deconjugation using 

H. pomatia beta-glucuronidase and H. pomatia sulfatase. Twenty-five microliters of a 

five-fold diluted deconjugated urine aliquot of the extract was used for each of the replicate 

injections of the sample. Chromatography was done in an Agilent Poroshell 120 column 

(2.1 × 100 millimeter, 2.7 μm) maintained at 50°C and at a flow rate of 0.6 milliliters per 

minute. Chromatographic separation of the analytes was achieved by gradient elution using 

water with 0.05% formic acid and 5 millimole ammonium formate as mobile phase A and 

acetonitrile with 0.05% formic acid as mobile phase B. A millimole is a standard scientific 

unit for measuring large quantities of very small entities such as atoms, molecules, or other 

specified particles. The elution gradient employed was 0–0.5 minutes = 5% B; 2.5 minutes = 

100% B; 2.5–4.5 minutes = 100% B; 4.6 minutes = 5% B and 4.6–6.5 minutes = 5% B. Two 

quality control materials were used at low (1 ng/mL) and high (20 ng/mL) concentrations. To 

accept the results of a batch run, quality control materials measurements were set to be within 

20% of their target values.

The LC-MS/MS LLOQ for AB-PINACA, AB-PINACA N-(4-hydroxypentyl) metabolite, and 

AB-PINACA N-pentanoic acid metabolite was 0.10 ng/mL, and the LLOQ for mitragynine 

was 1.0 ng/mL. Quantitation of each analyte was done by isotope dilution method using a 

10-point calibration curve. Data analysis was done using AB-Sciex MultiQuant software.
Page 20 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

Air and Surface Wipe Sampling for AB-PINACA and 

Mitragynine

We do not have validated sampling and analytical methods for either of these psychoactive 

compounds, so the results from these analyses should be considered semi-quantitative. The 

limits of detection and quantitation are estimates and provided for advisory purposes.

For the air samples we selected 37-millimeter diameter, 2-micrometer pore size 

polytetrafluoroethylene filters. Following sample collection, each filter was transferred to a 

4 mL vial, then extracted with 2 mL of methanol. We used a similar sample extraction approach 

for the three surface wipe sample media that we used in this evaluation. For the cotton 

AlphaWipes the sample media was transferred to a 50 mL Falcon tube and extracted with 20 mL 

of methanol. For the Puritan cotton swabs the media was extracted with 1.5 mL of methanol, and 

for the macrofoam swabs the media were transferred to a 4 mL vial, then extracted with 2 mL of 

methanol. Following extraction the samples were shaken for 30 minutes.

For all the samples an extract was obtained by transferring a 0.1 mL aliquot of the extraction 

solvent to an auto-sampler insert. Two 2.0 microliters of a 2,000 micrograms per milliliter 

internal standard that consisted of phenanthrene-d10 was added. The mixture was briefly 

mixed on a vortex and then analyzed using gas chromatography/mass spectroscopy using the 

following parameters.

Analytical Run Parameters:

Instrument: Hewlett Packard Model 6890 Gas Chromatograph/Hewlett Packard 

 Model 5972 Mass Selective Dectector

Column: Phenomenex® ZB-5MS, 30 meter, 0.25-millimeter interior diameter 

with a 0.25 micrometer film thickness

Column Flow: Pressure program, approximately 1.5 milliliter per minute

Injection Temperature:280°C

Injection Volume: 1 microliter

Oven Temperature Profile:

Initial Temperature: 50°C

Initial Hold Time: 10 minutes

Temp. Program Rate: 20°C/minute

Temperature: 90°C

Hold Time: 0.5 minutes

Temp. Program Rate: 12°C/minute

Temperature: 290°C

Hold Time: 0.5 minutes

Temp. Program Rate: 20°C/minute

Final Temperature: 320°C

Final Hold Time: 3.0 minutes

Mass Spectrometer Operating Parameters:

SCAN mode: 35–500 atomic mass units
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 21

Tables C1 and C2 summarize the estimated limits of detection and quantitation obtained by 

spiking media supplied by our analytical laboratory.

Table C1. Estimated limits of detection and quantitation for air filter samples and macrofoam and 

cotton swab wipe samples, in micrograms per sample

Compound Limit of detection Limit of quantitation Analytical range

AB-PINACA 50 240* 50–500

Mitragynine 40 150* 40–500

*Limit of quantitation raised to the 75% recovery of the laboratory control sample.

Table C2. Estimated limits of detection and quantitation for cotton AlphaWipe samples, in 

micrograms per sample

Compound Limit of detection Limit of quantitation Analytical range

AB-PINACA 300 Not achieved* 300–5000

Mitragynine 100 Not achieved* 100–5000

*75% recovery of the laboratory control sample was not achieved.

We also looked at the extraction efficiency of methanol for the different media types and 

performed other quality control tests. A recovery study was performed on the various media 

at two levels, spiked in triplicate. On the basis of our limited study and other quality control 

parameters, it appears that methanol may not be the best media/extraction solvent combination.
Page 22 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

Appendix D: Occupational Exposure Limits and 

Health Effects

NIOSH investigators refer to mandatory (legally enforceable) and recommended OELs for 

chemical, physical, and biological agents when evaluating workplace hazards. OELs have 

been developed by federal agencies and safety and health organizations to prevent adverse 

health effects from workplace exposures. Generally, OELs suggest levels of exposure that 

most employees may be exposed to for up to 10 hours per day, 40 hours per week, for a 

working lifetime, without experiencing adverse health effects. However, not all employees 

will be protected if their exposures are maintained below these levels. Some may have 

adverse health effects because of individual susceptibility, a pre-existing medical condition, 

or a hypersensitivity (allergy). In addition, some hazardous substances act in combination 

with other exposures, with the general environment, or with medications or personal habits of 

the employee to produce adverse health effects. Most OELs address airborne exposures, but 

some substances can be absorbed directly through the skin and mucous membranes.

Most OELs are expressed as a time-weighted average (TWA) exposure. A TWA refers to 

the average exposure during a normal 8- to 10-hour workday. Some chemical substances 

and physical agents have recommended short-term exposure limits or ceiling values. Unless 

otherwise noted, the short-term exposure limit is a 15-minute TWA exposure. It should not be 

exceeded at any time during a workday. The ceiling limit should not be exceeded at any time.

In the United States, OELs have been established by federal agencies, professional 

organizations, state and local governments, and other entities. Some OELs are legally 

enforceable limits; others are recommendations.

● The U.S. Department of Labor OSHA PELs (29 CFR 1910 [general industry]; 29 CFR 

1926 [construction industry]; and 29 CFR 1917 [maritime industry]) are legal limits. 

These limits are enforceable in workplaces covered under the Occupational Safety and 

Health Act of 1970. 

● NIOSH RELs are recommendations based on a critical review of the scientific and technical 

information and the adequacy of methods to identify and control the hazard. NIOSH 

RELs are published in the NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards [NIOSH 2010]. 

NIOSH also recommends risk management practices (e.g., engineering controls, safe work 

practices, employee education/training, personal protective equipment, and exposure and 

medical monitoring) to minimize the risk of exposure and adverse health effects.

● Other OELs used and cited in the United States include the TLVs, which are 

recommended by ACGIH, a professional organization, and the workplace 

environmental exposure levels, which are recommended by the American Industrial 

Hygiene Association, another professional organization. The TLVs and workplace 

environmental exposure level are developed by committee members of these 

associations from a review of the published, peer-reviewed literature. These OELs are 

not consensus standards. TLVs are considered voluntary exposure guidelines for use 

by industrial hygienists and others trained in this discipline “to assist in the control of 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 23

health hazards” [ACGIH 2015]. Workplace environmental exposure levels have been 

established for some chemicals “when no other legal or authoritative limits exist” 

[AIHA 2015].

Outside the United States, OELs have been established by various agencies and organizations 

and include legal and recommended limits. The Institut für Arbeitsschutz der Deutschen 

Gesetzlichen Unfallversicherung (Institute for Occupational Safety and Health of the German 

Social Accident Insurance) maintains a database of international OELs from European Union 

member states, Canada (Québec), Japan, Switzerland, and the United States. The database, 

available at http://www.dguv.de/ifa/GESTIS/GESTIS-Stoffdatenbank/index-2.jsp, contains 

international limits for more than 1,500 hazardous substances and is updated periodically. 

OSHA requires an employer to furnish employees a place of employment free from 

recognized hazards that cause or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm 

[Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Public Law 91–596, sec. 5(a)(1))]. This is 

true in the absence of a specific OEL. It also is important to keep in mind that OELs may not 

reflect current health-based information.

When multiple OELs exist for a substance or agent, NIOSH investigators generally 

encourage employers to use the lowest OEL when making risk assessment and risk 

management decisions. NIOSH investigators also encourage use of the hierarchy of controls 

approach to eliminate or minimize workplace hazards. This includes, in order of preference, 

the use of (1) substitution or elimination of the hazardous agent, (2) engineering controls 

(e.g., local exhaust ventilation, process enclosure, dilution ventilation), (3) administrative 

controls (e.g., limiting time of exposure, employee training, work practice changes, medical 

surveillance), and (4) personal protective equipment (e.g., respiratory protection, gloves, 

eye protection, hearing protection). Control banding, a qualitative risk assessment and risk 

management tool, is a complementary approach to protecting employee health. Control 

banding focuses on how broad categories of risk should be managed. Information on control 

banding is available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/ctrlbanding/. This approach can be 

applied in situations where OELs have not been established or can be used to supplement 

existing OELs.

Psychoactive Compounds

Synthetic Cannabinoids

In the 1960s, the pharmaceutical community developed synthetic cannabinoids like 

AB-PINACA while trying to find a product with the analgesic and anti-inflammatory 

properties of tetrahydrocannabinol in marijuana without psychotropic side effects 

[Rosenbaum et al. 2012]. Recently, synthetic cannabinoids, also known as spice, have 

become designer drugs of abuse because of their psychoactive properties. Synthetic 

cannabinoids first appeared in the United States in 2008, and by 2011, the DEA had given 

several synthetic cannabinoids schedule I status, making it illegal to manufacture, distribute, 

dispense, or possess the controlled substance [DEA 2011]. To avert the illegal status, spice 

packages are commonly marked as “incense” or “not for human consumption.” 
Page 24 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

Synthetic cannabinoids have similar effects as the psychoactive compound, 

Δ-9-tetrahydrocannabinol, found in marijuana. However, synthetic cannabinoids are 

high-potency full agonists at the cannabinoid brain receptor, unlike tetrahydrocannabinol, 

which is a low-potency partial agonist [Spaderna et al. 2013]. An agonist is a substance that 

acts like another substance and therefore stimulates an action. Symptoms of toxicity from 

synthetic cannabinoid use vary by route of exposure, type of synthetic cannabinoid, and dose. 

Reported symptoms of abuse include anxiety, agitation, paranoia, hallucinations, seizures, 

tachycardia, hypertension, excessive sweating, nausea, and vomiting [Hermanns-Clausen et 

al. 2012; Seely et al. 2012; Harris and Brown 2013; Spaderna et al. 2013]. Other negative 

health effects associated with the use of synthetic cannabinoids include respiratory depression 

needing intubation [Jinwala and Gupta 2012], psychiatric complications resulting in suicide 

[Patton et al. 2013], acute kidney injury [CDC 2013; Buser et al. 2014], hyperthermia and 

rhabdomyolysis [Hermanns-Clausen et al. 2012], acute myocardial infarction [Mir et al. 

2011; Streich et al. 2014], and acute cerebral ischemia [Takematsu et al. 2014]. Synthetic 

cannabinoids are not currently identified by routine screening tests. 

Mitragynine

Mitragynine, derived from the Mitragyna speciose plant in subtropical regions of Asia, is 

used by drug users when opium is unavailable [Hanapi et al. 2013]. Mitragyna speciose 

preparations have been used by Malay and Thai natives for their opium and coca-like 

effects to enhance tolerance for hard work under the hot sun [Grewal 1932a,b; Suwanlert 

1975; Tanguay 2011]. Studies have found this drug to have similar analgesic and antitussive 

properties as codeine [Matsumoto et al. 1996]. 

In Western societies, Mitragyna speciose preparations are accessible from local coffee shops 

and web-based “legal highs” pharmacies [Boyer et al. 2008; Hillebrand et al. 2010]. This 

has enticed many consumers to self-treat with mitragynine to modulate opiate withdrawal, 

alcohol withdrawal, and chronic pain [Boyer et al. 2008; Havemann-Reinecke 2011; Ward et 

al. 2011]. It is also a cheaper alternative to established opioid-replacement therapies and is 

obtainable without medical prescription. 

There is a general effect of “cocaine-like” stimulation in small doses, while at high doses 

“morphine-like” sedation and nausea are reported [Babu et al. 2008]. Several publications 

suggest that Mitragyna speciose preparations have analgesic, antipyretic, antidiarrheal, 

euphoric, anti-depressant, and anxiolytic effects [ASEAN 2010]. They may work as immune 

booster, lower blood pressure, and have antiviral, diabetes-suppressing, and appetitesuppressing effects [Burkill 1935; Macko et al. 1972]. Besides this, they can also cause 

anorexia, dry mouth, diuresis and constipation after long-term use at high doses [Suwanlert 

1975]. While there was no evidence of a dosage increment among long-term and repeated 

users, withdrawal symptoms were reported, which suggests an addiction potential. These 

symptoms range from hostility, aggression, aching of muscles and bones, jerky movements 

of the limbs, and anorexia to weight loss and insomnia [Suwanlert 1975].

In Indonesia, kratom is legally cultivated and exported on large scale to Asia, North 

America, and Europe [Tanguay 2011]. Mitragyna speciose and/or mitragynine and 7-HMG 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 25

are controlled drugs in many European Union countries including Denmark, Poland, and 

Sweden. In other countries they are under the control of the narcotic laws, including Australia 

and Myanmar. In the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany they are currently not 

controlled substances but under surveillance [EMCDDA 2015]. The DEA has placed kratom 

on its Drugs and Chemicals of Concern list, which suggests that the agency may eventually 

try to ban it in the United States once more reliable data on its addictive properties and/or 

health hazards become available [DEA 2011]. 

Acetone and Ethanol

Acetone is a widely used industrial solvent that can be irritating to the eyes and mucous 

membranes and at concentrations much higher than those we measured in this evaluation may 

depress the central nervous system [Hathaway and Proctor 2004]. Acetone can also be absorbed 

through the skin [Hathaway and Proctor 2004]. Ethanol, also called ethyl alcohol, can have health 

effects similar to acetone, but at concentrations higher than those measured here [Hathaway and 

Proctor 2004]. Unlike acetone, ethanol is not appreciably irritating to skin [Hathaway and Proctor 

2004]. Occupational exposure limits for acetone and ethanol are in Table 1.
Page 26 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

References

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Keywords: North American Industry Classification System 928110 (National Security), 

Nevada, spice lab, synthetic cannabinoids, AB-PINACA, mitragynine, kratom, PPE, illegal 

drugs, personal protective equipment, respirators, ventilation, law enforcement.
Page 30 Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246

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Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2014-0039-3246 Page 31

The Health Hazard Evaluation Program investigates possible health hazards in the workplace 

under the authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. § 669(a)

(6)). The Health Hazard Evaluation Program also provides, upon request, technical assistance 

to federal, state, and local agencies to investigate occupational health hazards and to prevent 

occupational disease or injury. Regulations guiding the Program can be found in Title 42, Code 

of Federal Regulations, Part 85; Requests for Health Hazard Evaluations (42 CFR Part 85).

Disclaimer

The recommendations in this report are made on the basis of the findings at the workplace 

evaluated and may not be applicable to other workplaces.

Mention of any company or product in this report does not constitute endorsement by NIOSH.

Citations to Web sites external to NIOSH do not constitute NIOSH endorsement of the 

sponsoring organizations or their programs or products. NIOSH is not responsible for the 

content of these Web sites. All Web addresses referenced in this document were accessible as of 

the publication date.

Acknowledgments

Analytical Support: Jennifer Roberts; Deborah Sammons; Roy Gerona, University of 

 California, San Francisco; Randox Toxicology Limited; Bureau Veritas North America

Data Management: Denise Giglio

Desktop Publisher: Shawna Watts 

Editor: Ellen Galloway 

Logistics: Donnie Booher, Kevin Moore

Medical Field Assistance: Deborah Sammons

Availability of Report

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local health department and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Regional Office 

have also received a copy. This report is not copyrighted and may be freely reproduced. 

This report is available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/reports/pdfs/2014-0039-3246.pdf.

Recommended citation for this report:

NIOSH [2016]. Health hazard evaluation report: evaluation of law enforcement agents’ 

potential exposures during a raid of a clandestine “spice” lab. By Ramsey JG, Tapp L, 

Burr G. Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 

NIOSH HHE Report No. 2014-0039-3246.
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