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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

QUEEN MILLER,

Appellant,

v. CASE NO. 4:10-cv-00039-MP-WCS

EDNY SAINT FELIX,

Appellee.

_____________________________/

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court on appeal from Bankruptcy court. The Bankruptcy Court,

Judge Killian, sanctioned Mr. Abrams, Appellant’s counsel, for filing frivolous claims. After the

issue was briefed, this Court held a hearing on April 23, 2010. On appeal, Mr. Abrams argued

that while his claims were not ultimately successful, upholding the sanctions against him would

chill attorney ability to pursue novel legal claims to defend zealously their clients’ interests. 

This Court disagrees. 

The debtor in this bankruptcy case, Queen Elizabeth Miller, sold a parcel of real property

to Edny St. Felix in trust, the defendant in this bankruptcy case. Edny St. Felix paid Queen

Miller $1,000.00 for the property, which was mortgaged. Edny St. Felix was to pay off the

mortgage when he subsequently sold the property. Mr. St. Felix spent $28,000 repairing the

property and made all mortgage, tax, and insurance payments on the property subsequent to

buying it from Queen Miller. Mr. Abrams, representing Queen Miller, sued Mr. St. Felix,

alleging that he was involved in deceptive trade practices and that he did not in fact buy the
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Case No: 4:10-cv-00039-MP-WCS

property from Ms. Miller. Mr. St. Felix properly served and subsequently filed a Motion for

Sanctions, outlining the lack of legal merit to Mr. Abrams’ claims. After granting Mr. St. Felix

summary judgment, Judge Killian had a hearing specifically to determine whether or not

sanctions would be appropriate. 

Judge Killian imposed sanctions on Mr. Abrams for two of his claims: 1) that the

warranty deed to the trust did not create a valid conveyance, and 2) the defendant was in

violation of § 501.2077 of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act for engaging in

“mortgage rescue” activities. Mr. Abrams then appealed, arguing that Judge Killian abused his

discretion in failing to give specific enough notice of what specific argument was sanctionable, 

imposing sanctions for legal arguments that have not previously been ruled sanctionable, 

denying Mr. Abrams’ claims of qualified immunity, and awarding sanctions in an amount that

Mr. Abrams alleges was greater than required to deter incorrect behavior by attorneys. 

Mr. Abrams had sufficient notice that sanctions could be imposed for improper

arguments submitted to the bankruptcy court. In addition to the extensive litigation over these

claims below, Judge Killian held a hearing specifically to allow Mr. Abrams to defend against

charges that he had violated Bankruptcy Rule 9011. No more is required. See In re

Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347 (11th Cir. 1996). 

Nor is Mr. Abrams entitled to qualified immunity for filing the claims in question against

Mr. St. Felix. However, that qualified immunity serves as a “business judgment rule” for

trustees, and by derivation their counsel. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 274 (1951) (trustee

may derive some qualified immunity from the “difficult business judgments” she is called upon

to make). That immunity will not protect the trustee from personal liability for negligent or

willful acts. Id. at 273-74. Filing a frivolous and sanctionable lawsuit is not a question of
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Case No: 4:10-cv-00039-MP-WCS

business judgment, as it is never good judgment to file a frivolous claim in court, and so the

trustee’s qualified immunity does not apply to protect Mr. Abrams from the consequences of his

actions here. 

The heart of Mr. Abrams argument before this Court is that just as unethical financial

agencies attempt new and evolving methods to defraud consumers, consumer advocates must be

allowed to pursue recovery on novel legal theories to protect those consumers. Whatever the

merit of this argument, an advocate’s ability to argue in good faith for an application, extension,

or modification under the law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 or Bankruptcy Rule 9011 must not be

mistaken to allow the kind of factually baseless accusations that Judge Killian sanctioned here. 

As Judge Killian explained at length in the order granting Defendant’s motion for sanctions, the

true facts of the case make clear that Mr. Abrams had no good faith basis to support his

allegations of fraud and deceptive practice. 

First, Judge Killian sanctioned Mr. Abrams for his argument that the sale of the property 

by Ms. Miller to Mr. St. Felix was invalid. Mr. Abrams failed to cite any applicable authority

that would support this claim. Instead, Mr. Abrams argued that he made a diligent inquiry into

the law of all 50 states. This inquiry, however, was into the consumer protection laws, not the

property law that governs transfers of real property such as the one at issue here. The

bankruptcy court itself found that Fla. Stat. § 689.07(1) (2006) specifically provides that the

conveyance would have been declared a fee simple transfer. An inquiry into the law must be

both “reasonable and competent.” Estate of Blue v. County of Los Angeles, 120 F.3d 982 (9th

Cir. 1997). A fifty state survey of consumer protection law, overlooking the property law of the

state in which a transfer of real property is being attacked, is neither. 

Second, Judge Killian sanctioned Mr. Abrams for his argument that Mr. St. Felix’s
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Case No: 4:10-cv-00039-MP-WCS

purchase of Ms. Miller’s property was a deceptive or unfair trade practice. Judge Killian did not

abuse his discretion in doing so. Mr. St. Felix did not deceive Ms. Miller or injure her

financially. Mr. St. Felix bought her house, paid her $1,000, paid to repair the house, paid the

mortgage and insurance on the house, and improved its value in preparation for sale, reducing

the possibility she would personally owe a deficiency if the mortgage was ever foreclosed. 

Mr. Abrams’ argument that Mr. St. Felix was engaged in “mortgage rescue” activities in

violation of the Florida Foreclosure Fraud Prevention Act, § 501.1377 (2008), is also meritless

for at least two reasons. First, the statute, adopted in 2008, was not in effect at the time of the

May 4, 2006 sale. Second, the debtor was not in default or in foreclosure, so that statute would

not apply even if it had been in force at the time of the transaction. Additionally, as Judge

Killian noted, Mr. Abrams spent much of the two hour deposition of Mr. St. Felix attempting to

badger or trick him into describing the transaction as something other than a sale, despite his

client’s clearly stated intention to sell the house to Mr. St. Felix. Judge Killian was well within

his discretion to sanction Mr. Abrams for this frivolous argument, and for his deposition

conduct. 

Judge Killian’s determination of the amount of sanctions to award was reasonable. 

Though counsel for Mr. St. Felix failed to submit detailed time records, Judge Killian’s

experience as a bankruptcy judge allows him to determine both a reasonable amount of time to

spend on the litigation before him, and a reasonable hourly rate. Twenty-one hours billed at

$250 per hour for the depositions, hearings, filings, and briefings required in this case, in

addition to the costs of ordering copies of the relevant transcripts, is not unreasonable. 

The amount awarded by the bankruptcy judge was the minimum sought by Defendant’s

counsel, including only attorney fees and costs. The bankruptcy court did not award
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reimbursement of any expenses to Mr. St. Felix himself, nor did he award punitive damages. 

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by awarding these fees to Mr. St. Felix, nor

were the fees greater than required to deter appellant and like counsel from repetition of the

sanctionable behavior at issue. 

Finally, Mr. St. Felix argues that when a party is forced to defend an award of attorney’s

fees on appeal, the resulting time is compensable to the defending party. He cites Danik v.

Hatmarx Corp., 875 F.2d 890 (C.A. D.C. 1989). The relevant ruling in that case, however, was

overruled in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405-08 (1990). In that case, the

Supreme Court discussed the impropriety of district courts sanctioning parties for frivolous

pleadings, and then increasing the sanctions when the sanctioned party appeals the district

court’s own order. The Supreme Court described that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38

governs litigants’ conduct on appeal from the district court to the Court of Appeals, not Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11. Since Mr. St. Felix did not vet his citations particularly thoroughly on this point, the

applicability of the precedent to appeals from a bankruptcy court to a district court is less than

clear. Therefore, this Court declines to award further sanctions based on Mr. Abrams’ conduct

before this Court on appeal of Judge Killian’s order. 

 Judge Killian did not abuse his discretion in awarding sanctions against Mr. Abrams, nor

did he abuse his discretion in the amount of the sanctions. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

 1. The Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to FRBP 9011 is

AFFIRMED. 

2. Mr. St. Felix’ request for additional attorney’s fees for the defense of the appeal,

included in the Appellee’s Response Brief, Doc. 12, is DENIED. 
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3. Mr. Abrams is ordered to pay Mr. St. Felix $5,500.00 by close of business May

26, 2010. 

DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of April, 2010

 s/Maurice M. Paul 

 Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge