$uprrtur 'Court of tifit 

2015-SC-000250-KB 

KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION 

V. IN SUPREME COURT 

JUSTIN ROSS MORGAN 

.e. 

MOVANT 

RESPONDENT 

OPINION AND ORDER 

The Respondent, Justin Ross Morgan, 1is alleged to have committed 

three violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct by becoming significantly 

in arrears on his child-support obligations. A trial commissioner heard the 

matter, concluded that Morgan was guilty of the charges, and recommended 

that Morgan be suspended from the practice of law for 90 days. This Court 

adopts the decision of the Trial Commissioner. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The facts are not in dispute. Morgan had a court-ordered child support 

obligation in the amount of $3,475 per month. In December 2012, he was 

found in contempt of court for failing to comply with the order. He was given a 

thirty-day sentence, which was suspended on the condition that he make all 

his child-support payments. The matter was set for review in the following 

month. Morgan had not made a payment by that review, and on January 10, 

2013, the trial court imposed the thirty-day contempt sentence. Morgan was on 

1Morgan admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky in 

October 1997. His Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) number is 86844 and his bar 

roster address is P.O. Box 23190, Lexington, Kentucky 40523. 
work release while in jail and was thus able to continue practicing law. 

Nevertheless, he had still not paid his child support when released from 

custody February 9, 2013. As of September 30, 2013, Morgan's child support 

arrearage was more than $23,000. 

Based on these events, the Inquiry Commission issued a three-count 

charge against Morgan alleging violations of SCR 3.130-3.4(c) 2by failing to pay 

his child support as ordered, SCR 3.130-8.4(b) 3by failing to comply with the 

support order to such an extent as to constitute the crime of flagrant nonsupport under KRS 530.050(2), and SCR 3.130-8.4(c) 4by failing to pay his 

child support as ordered. 

Morgan responded to the initial charge through counsel (his brother), 

admitting all the factual allegations but denying that they constituted 

violations of our ethical rules. When the Inquiry Commission amended its 

complaint to include exhibits, it served the amended complaint on Morgan's 

counsel. At that point, his counsel told the trial commissioner that he had been 

unable to communicate with Morgan. After renewed attempts to contact 

Morgan failed, his counsel was permitted to withdraw. Subsequent efforts to 

serve Morgan at his bar roster address also failed, and service was ultimately 

2 "A lawyer shall not ... knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a 

tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 

exists ...." SCR 3.130-3.4(c). 

3 "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... commit a criminal act that 

reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 

other respects ...." SCR 3.130-8.4(b). 

4 "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation ...." SCR 3.130-8.4(c). 

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made upon the Executive Director of the KBA under SCR 3.175(2). The record 

reflects no further contact made between the KBA and Morgan. 

The trial commissioner assigned to the case conducted a hearing on the 

charge in November 2014, and thereafter issued a recommendation that 

Morgan be suspended for 90 days. In making this recommendation, the trial 

commissioner noted that the three counts in the charge all stemmed from a 

single incident: Morgan's failure to meet his child-support obligation. The 

commissioner also noted there was no evidence of aggravating factors, such as 

a violation of duties owed to a client, and that Morgan's violations were 

primarily breaches of duties owed to his family and to the legal system. Finally, 

the commissioner noted that Morgan "has essentially disappeared" and that he 

"ha[d] to take into account that the lawyer's mental state is certainly a 

mitigating factor." 

II. ANALYSIS 

No appeal of the trial commissioner's recommendation, as allowed under 

SCR 3.360, .365, and .370, was sought, either by Morgan or Bar Counsel. As a 

result, this matter was submitted directly to this Court without going before 

the Board of Governors. See SCR 3.360(4). 

The question, then, is whether the trial commissioner's findings and 

conclusions are supported by the record and the law, and whether the 

recommended sanction is appropriate in light of the misconduct and Morgan's 

history of prior discipline, if any. Although he has not continued to defend 

against the charges, Morgan initially claimed that his admitted conduct did not 

violate the Rules of Professional Conduct as a matter of law. 

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The first count in the Inquiry Commission's charge alleged that Morgan 

violated SCR 3.130-3.4(c). That rule provides that "[a] lawyer shall not ... 

knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an 

open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists." We agree 

with the trial commissioner that Morgan did, in fact, violate this rule when he 

failed to pay his court-ordered child support. 

Although Rule 3.4(c) is part of a more general rule aimed at maintaining 

fair treatment for opposing parties and counsel, this Court has nevertheless 

held that its requirement that a lawyer not disobey an obligation under a 

tribunal's rules extends to "circumstances where an attorney violates a court 

order." Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Blum, 404 S.W.3d 841, 848 (Ky. 2013). And we 

have expressly stated that failure to pay ordered child support "encompases 

several breaches," including "failure to follow a court order." Kentucky Bar 

Ass'n v. James, 452 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Ky. 2015); see also id. at 607 

("Furthermore, as officers of the court, attorneys have a duty to follow court 

orders, and we have disbarred attorneys for, in part, failing to do so."). 

And this was a significant obligation: Morgan was held in contempt of 

court and sentenced to thirty days in jail for disobeying it. His refusal to 

comply with the family court's order violated this rule. 

The second count in the Inquiry Commission's charge alleged that 

Morgan violated SCR 3.130-8.4(b), which states that "[i]t is professional 

misconduct for a lawyer to ... commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on 

the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." 

Again, we agree with the trial commissioner that Morgan violated this rule by 

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committing flagrant nonsupport. That offense is laid out in KRS 530.050(2), 

which states in relevant part: 

A person is guilty of flagrant nonsupport when he persistently fails 

to provide support which he can reasonably provide and which he 

knows he has a duty to provide by virtue of a court or 

administrative order to a minor ... and the failure results in: 

(a) An arrearage of not less than one thousand dollars 

($1,000); or 

(b) Six (6) consecutive months without payment of 

support .... 

Flagrant nonsupport is a class D felony. While Morgan has been neither 

charged with nor convicted of this crime, he admits to being more than 

$23,000 behind on his child support obligations as of September 2013. 

Furthermore, "an attorney can be guilty of a violation of SCR 3.130-8.3(b) even 

in the absence of criminal charges or a conviction." Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. 

Greene, 386 S.W.3d 717, 730 (Ky. 2012) (citing KBA v. McDaniel, 205 S.W.3d 

201 (Ky. 2006)). 

We also agree with the trial commissioner that Morgan's failure to 

provide support for his two minor children "reflects adversely on [his] honesty, 

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." In fact, we recently 

held that commission of flagrant nonsupport also violated the Rules of 

Professional Conduct: 

"[I]t is the duty and the responsibility of an attorney as an officer of 

the court to conduct [his or her] personal and professional life in 

such manner as to be above reproach." Grigsby v. Kentucky Bar 

Ass'n, 181 S.W.3d 40, 42 (Ky. 2005). Failing to pay court ordered 

child support encompasses several breaches, including: failure to 

satisfy the statutory obligation of supporting one's child; failure to 

follow a court order; and violation of the attorney's duty recognized 

in Grigsby. 

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Part of keeping one's personal and professional life above 

reproach requires financial propriety. Parents have a statutory 

obligation to support their children, a breach of which may 

lead ... to criminal sanctions. ... We believe that the duty of a 

parent to support his or her children is no less important than the 

duty of an attorney to act responsibly when handling client 

funds, and we have not hesitated to disbar attorneys for 

mishandling client funds. 

James, 452 S.W.3d at 606-07. 

The last count of the Inquiry Commission's charge alleged that Morgan 

violated SCR 3.130-8.4(c), which states that "[i]t is professional misconduct for 

a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation ...." Morgan admits that he repeatedly failed to pay his child 

support obligations, even after serving a thirty-day sentence. This Court 

harbors serious doubt that failure to pay child support reflects dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. There is no allegation that Morgan told a lie 

or stole; he is only alleged to have not paid the support he is obligated to pay. 

While such conduct can no doubt become criminal, as discussed above, it is of 

a different kind from crimes involving deceit or dishonesty. 

Were this the only charge, this Court would have to take review of this 

matter under SCR 3.370(8). At the same time, this Court cannot deviate from 

the trial commissioner's decision without taking review. SCR 3.370(9) ("If no 

notice of review is filed by either of the parties, or the Court under paragraph 

eight (8) of this rule, the Court shall enter an order adopting the decision of the 

Board or the Trial Commissioner, whichever the case may be, relating to all 

matters."). And taking review would lead to the drafting and filing of briefs. See 

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SCR 3.370(8). 5As it stands, however, even if this count were dismissed, the 

other counts would remain, and as described above they are fully supported by 

the proof. It would be an exercise in futility to take review to dismiss one of 

several counts and then impose the same sanction. And Morgan himself has 

not sought review. Rather than waste the resources of the parties and this 

Court, this Court will decline to accept review based only on this count. 

Thus, this Court will accept the trial commissioner's decision as to 

Morgan's guilt of the charged ethical violations. 

For these violations, the trial commissioner recommended Morgan be 

suspended from the practice of law for ninety days, pointing out that Morgan 

violated not only duties to his family, but to the legal system and profession as 

a whole. The Trial Commissioner also noted that all three violations stem from 

a singular course of conduct—Morgan's repeated failure to pay his child 

support obligations—rather than from myriad circumstances. The trial 

commissioner suggested that its recommended ninety-day suspension would 

not interfere with Morgan's long-term ability to provide for his family. We agree, 

particularly since neither party has asked this Court for further review. 

While Morgan's violations are serious, Morgan does not have a long 

disciplinary history with the KBA. In fact, his only prior disciplinary matter 

concerned advertising and resulted in a private reprimand. He also appears to 

have been suspended recently for failure to pay his bar dues. We understand 

that all of the current violations are related to Morgan's child support 

5 Technically speaking, briefing would not be required, as the rule states the 

parties may file briefs. Practically speaking, however, it is likely that briefs will be filed. 

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obligations. We do not take this matter lightly, but agree with the trial 

commissioner that we should not (yet) deprive Morgan of his ability to earn 

funds with which to support his family through the practice of law for a lengthy 

time. However, we also point out to him that should he maintain his pattern of 

habitual nonpayment, the discipline will be much more severe in the event that 

another complaint on these grounds comes before this Court. We point Morgan 

to the similar conduct in Kentucky Bar Association v. James, 452 S.W.3d 604, 

607 (Ky. 2015), which led to permanent disbarment. Of course, we also note 

that the attorney in James had a lengthy history of bar complaints, a 

significantly greater arrearage, and was convicted of felony flagrant 

nonsupport. Nevertheless, we re-emphasize our statement that "[w]e believe 

that the duty of a parent to support his or her children is no less important 

than the duty of an attorney to act responsibly when handling client funds, 

and we have not hesitated to disbar attorneys for mishandling client funds." Id. 

at 606-07. 

III. ORDER 

Agreeing that the Trial Commissioner's recommendation is appropriate, it 

is ORDERED that: 

1. Justin R. Morgan is found guilty of the violations of the Supreme 

Court Rules detailed above and is suspended from the practice of law 

for 90 days for each charge, said suspensions to run concurrently. 

2. Pursuant to SCR 3.390, Morgan shall, within ten days from the entry 

of this Opinion and Order: (a) notify, in writing, all clients of his 

inability to represent them, and of the necessity and urgency of 

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promptly retaining new counsel; (b) notify, in writing, all courts in 

which he has matters pending of his suspension from the practice of 

law; (c) provide a copy of all such letters of notification to the Office of 

Bar Counsel; and (d) to the extent possible, immediately cancel and 

cease any advertising activities in which he is engaged. 

3. In accordance with SCR 3.450, Morgan is directed to pay all costs 

associated with these disciplinary proceedings against his, said sum 

being $341.88, for which execution may issue from this Court upon 

finality of this Opinion and Order. 

Minton, C.J.; Abramson, Cunningham, Keller, Noble, and Venters, JJ., 

sitting. All concur. Barber, J., not sitting. 

ENTERED: August 20, 2015. 

C HI STILE 

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