DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

ALEXANDRE TALUY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D23-1213

March 20, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for DeSoto County; Hunter W. Carroll, 

Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Susan M. Shanahan, 

Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alicia M. Winterkorn, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

SILBERMAN, Judge. 

Alexandre Taluy appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for 

postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. We affirm because 

Taluy has not demonstrated any reversible error.

Following a jury trial, Taluy was convicted of four counts of sexual 

battery upon a person twelve or older but less than eighteen by a person 

in familial/custodial authority. We affirmed his judgment and sentences. 

See Taluy v. State, 272 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (table decision). 
2

Taluy then moved for postconviction relief, alleging multiple grounds. In 

this appeal, he only challenges the denial of ground Two-B.

In that ground, Taluy argued that his trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to impeach the victim, B.M., during her trial testimony. He 

contended that B.M.'s testimony was inconsistent with her earlier 

statements as to the time Taluy drove her to school the morning a sexual 

battery allegedly occurred. He claimed that B.M. gave different times in 

her initial statement to law enforcement, at her deposition, and at trial. 

The postconviction court granted Taluy a limited evidentiary hearing on 

this ground. 

During the hearing, several transcripts were admitted into evidence 

including B.M.'s initial statement to law enforcement, her deposition, her 

trial testimony, and Taluy's post-Miranda1 statement to law enforcement. 

Taluy testified as to what he thought were inconsistencies in B.M.'s trial 

testimony and her prior statements. But he conceded that during a 

controlled call, he admitted performing oral sex on B.M. and engaging in 

sexual intercourse with her. He also acknowledged that there was a cell 

phone recording of he and B.M. engaging in sexual activity on the 

morning in question. 

Taluy's trial counsel also testified at the hearing. He did not believe 

that the time B.M. left for school on the morning of the sexual battery 

was a material, pertinent issue but was instead a minor detail. He added 

that B.M. had not testified at trial as to the time she left for school or 

arrived at school, and, therefore, he could not impeach her as to the time 

frame. 

In the thorough order denying relief, the postconviction court 

summarized the transcripts and testimony. The court found that there 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3

were no inconsistencies in B.M.'s trial testimony and her prior 

statements. The court noted Taluy's admissions to at least one instance 

of sexual intercourse with B.M., numerous instances in which he and 

B.M. kissed and touched each other in a sexual manner, and one 

occasion in which he and B.M. had engaged "in a '69' sexual act." The 

court concluded that any inconsistency as to the time frame would be 

immaterial. The court added that even if the times that B.M. left for 

school and arrived at school were material, there were no inconsistencies 

in B.M.'s initial statement to law enforcement, her deposition testimony, 

and her trial testimony. 

"Postconviction courts hold a superior vantage point with respect to 

questions of fact, evidentiary weight, and observations of the demeanor 

and credibility of witnesses." Lebron v. State, 135 So. 3d 1040, 1052 

(Fla. 2014). Thus, when reviewing a postconviction court's denial of relief 

after an evidentiary hearing, "we defer to the postconviction court's 

factual findings that are supported by competent substantial evidence 

but we review de novo the court's legal conclusions." Campbell v. State, 

247 So. 3d 102, 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (citing Light v. State, 796 So. 2d 

610, 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)). 

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant 

must satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Jackson v. State, 353 So. 3d 666, 667 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2022). First, the defendant must demonstrate counsel's deficient 

performance. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). This requires the 

defendant to show that counsel's "errors [were] so serious that counsel 

was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment." Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 345 (Fla. 2004) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Second, the defendant must 
4

establish prejudice by showing "that 'there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.' " Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

Competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction 

court's findings that Taluy failed to prove that the victim's testimony was 

inconsistent or that his trial counsel was ineffective. Because Taluy 

failed to establish any error in the postconviction court's findings or 

conclusions, we affirm the denial of relief. 

Affirmed.

BLACK and SMITH, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.