J-A07014-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN RE: A.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: SOMERSET COUNTY CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES No. 1420 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered July 24, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County, Or phans’

Court, at No(s): 14 Adoption 2013 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, and MUNDY, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 11, 2015 Somerset County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) appeals from the order entered July 24, 2014, in the Court of Co mmon Pleas of Somerset County, which denied its petitions to terminate inv oluntarily the parental rights of D.P. (“Mother”) and A.C. (“Father”) to th eir minor son, A.C. (“Child”). After careful review, we reverse the su bject order, and remand for the orphans’ court to enter decrees terminating the parental rights of Mother

and Father. Child was born in February of 2012. At the time of his birth, Child tested positive for oxycodone and methadone. Both Mother and Father admitted to CYS that they took prescription drugs t hat had not been prescribed for them, and a safety plan was implemen ted. On May 25, 2012, Mother and Father submitted to drug screens. On Ma y 31, 2012, CYS received the results of these screens, indicating t hat both parents tested positive. That same day, CYS sought and received a n order of protectiveJ-A07014-15

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custody for Child. A dependency petition was filed on or about June 1, 2012, and Child was adjudicated dependent by order dated June 5, 2012. On October 7, 2013, CYS filed petitions to termina te involuntarily the parental rights of Mother and Father. A hearing wa s held on July 14, 2014, during which the orphans’ court heard the testimony of Psychologist Dennis Kashurba, CYS caseworker Andrea Palguta, CYS casewo rk supervisor Teya Lopaze, Father, and Father’s mother, P.C. (Grandmot her). Mother failed to appear at the hearing. 1 On July 24, 2014, the court entered its order denying the termination petitions. CYS timely file d a notice of appeal on August 22, 2014, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). CYS now raises the following issues for our review. I. Whether [CYS] proved by clear and convincing evi dence at least one statutory ground for the termination of [ ] Father’s parental rights[?] A. Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter o f law, or abused its discretion by requiring [CYS] to show it made reasonable efforts to reunify [Child] with [] Father while incarcerated in order to meet its burden[?] B. Whether [CYS] proved by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of [] Father’s parent al rights would best serve the needs and welfare of [Child?]

1 At the beginning of the hearing, Mother’s counsel stated that he attempted to contact Mother, but was unable to reach her. N. T., 7/14/14, at 9-10.J-A07014-15

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II. Whether [CYS] proved by clear and convincing ev idence at least one statutory ground [for] the termination of [] Mother’s parental rights[?] A. Whether [CYS] proved by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of [] Mother’s parent al rights would best serve the needs and welfare of [Child?] CYS’s brief at 4 (orphans’ court answers and unnece ssary capitalization omitted). We consider the claims presented by CYS mindful of our well-settled

standard of review. The standard of review in termination of parental r ights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if th ey are supported by the record. If the factual findings are support ed, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be revers ed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of mani fest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or i ll-will. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed m erely because the record would support a different result . We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spannin g multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M. , 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotat ion marks omitted). Termination of parental rights is governed by Secti on 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requir es a bifurcated analysis. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the paren t. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convinc ing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the st atutoryJ-A07014-15

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grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511( a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warr ants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently seve ring any such bond.

In re L.M. , 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations om itted). In this case, CYS petitioned to terminate the pare ntal rights of Mother and Father pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5 ), (8), and (b), which provide as follows: (a) General rule.-- The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period o f at least six months immediately preceding the filin g of the petition either has evidenced a settled purp ose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the chi ld to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or wil l not be remedied by the parent.

*** (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placemen t of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot o rJ-A07014-15

- 5 - will not remedy those conditions within a reasonabl e period of time, the services or assistance reasonab ly available to the parent are not likely to remedy th e conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

*** (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. (b) Other considerations.-- The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and wel fare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be termina ted solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequa te housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if f ound to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), th e court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the co nditions described therein which are first initiated subsequ ent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In its opinion accompanying the subject order, the orphans’ court concluded that CYS failed to present clear and conv incing evidence that the parental rights of Father should be terminated unde r any of these sections. The court reasoned as follows, in pertinent part:

The removal of the Child [] from the parents on May 25, 2012, at a point in time when the Child was three m onths of age, resulted from a positive test for drugs ... in v iolation of theJ-A07014-15

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existing safety plan. Accordingly, the reunificati on plan consisted of the parents demonstrating that they we re no longer dependent on drugs.... It is noteworthy that while Father’s primary goal w as to eradicate his involvement with drugs, he successful ly completed an inpatient treatment program with the Cove Forge Treatment Center, and his successful completion was reported to agents of [CYS]. Although there were treatment recommendatio ns assigned to Father upon his release, his incarcerat ions in early 2013 and subsequent sentence in the state correctio ns system made [] compliance with those treatment recommendat ions impossible. As Father was removed from the ability to visit wit h his son and show meaningful progress towards the stated goals in the permanency plan, [CYS] failed to adapt its prog ram goals consistent with an incarcerated parent. From that point forward the goals as to visitation with the child, attendan ce at medical appointments, maintaining stable employment, follow ing treatment recommendations, and the like were meanin gless because incarceration precluded pursuit of those go als. At that point in time [CYS] failed to adjust and monitor Fa ther’s progress based on the activities that he was capabl e of performing within the state corrections system. Th ere are many programs within the state corrections system which focus on an inmate’s post-release freedom from drug dependency as well as job skills, parenting skills, and other life skills , which would permit an inmate to become reunited with his minor children. [CYS] continued to measure Father’s compliance with the plan and progress towards achievement of goals based on his conduct as if he was not incarcerated. While it might be a rgued as to whose duty it was to report Father’s treatment prog ress within the state correction system, it simply wasn’t done.

*** If it is the role of [CYS] to promote the goal of reunification, it seems to the [c]ourt that when th e parental goals focus on matters which only a parent out in t he community can do, it is incumbent on [CYS] to modify the goal s upon the incarceration of a parent to fit the reunification plan. Here, Father has completed drug and alcohol inpatient tre atment and has furthered his drug abstinence through correctio nsJ-A07014-15

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opportunities for AA, NA, substance abuse education , parenting skills and the like for which an inmate should be g iven credit in pursuit of his goals. [CYS] had little knowledge o f Father’s achievements during his incarceration and further w as apparently unaware of his upcoming release from pri son in September, 2014. Considering the original “circums tances that made placement necessary” centered on Father’s posi tive drug screen and his duty to seek treatment and prove fol low-up results, Father’s success in inpatient drug treatme nt followed up by drug programs within the correction’s system sho uld have been reported to the Dependency Judge. These “succ esses” add up to demonstrate progress toward the goals that ma tter and for which Father has the capacity to complete. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/24/14, at 17-21 (unpagina ted). Notably, the court offered no discussion as to why it was denying the termination petition with respect to Mother. In it s opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the court explained its decision not to terminate Mother’s parental rights as follows: [I]t is our position that the termination of parent al rights, when posed against both birth parents, is ineffective to promote an adoption when the termination is not granted as to both parents. Under the circumstances where the court determines that the parental rights of one parent should be retained, a s in the instant case, that parent may well go forward as th e primary custodian of the child. As a result, where the par ental rights of the other parent are still intact, the primary cust odial parent should be in a position to pursue child support. A t that point, the primary custodial parent is performing parental duties, perhaps to the exclusion of the other parent, and t he family is no longer a burden to [CYS]. Assuming that the primar y custodial parent is properly parenting the child, it is of li ttle import to the court and to society that the noncustodial parent i s nonfunctioning. Further, over time, as in the inst ant case, the other parent may overcome a drug dependency and the reafter become an appropriate and caring parent. Under thi s scenario, the time required by this noncustodial parent is no t at the expense of [CYS] and may otherwise play out as need ed duringJ-A07014-15

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when the custodial natural parent is appropriately providing all parental services. The [c]ourt did not address the involuntary termin ation factors as to Mother because it determined that the rights should not be terminated as to Father.... The primary purpo se of termination of parental rights proceedings is to ac hieve a position where an adoption can proceed. The statut ory provision for termination are found under the general chapter heading of “Proceedings Prior To Adoption” which subdivision i s under Title 23. Domestic Relations, Part III. Adoption. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 2-3 (unpaginate d). On appeal, CYS argues that the court abused its dis cretion by denying the termination petitions. CYS contends that it pr esented clear and convincing evidence to establish that the parental rights of both Mother and Father should be terminated, and that the court imp roperly required CYS to show that it made reasonable efforts to reunify Fat her with Child. CYS’s brief at 12-25. We agree with CYS, and conclude th at the orphans’ court abused its discretion by refusing to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b). In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 2 3 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstra ted: (1) The child has been removed from parental care for 12 mo nths or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions w hich led to the removal or placement of the child continue to e xist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re Adoption of M.E.P. , 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). “Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8), doe s not require an evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability t o remedy the conditions thatJ-A07014-15

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led to placement of [the] children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S. , 901 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted). Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination o f parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical , and emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S. , 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court state d, “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and s tability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed that the trial court mus t also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, wit h utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to inf er that no bond exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the par ticular case. In re Adoption of J.M. , 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some citations omitted). [W]hile both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” w e are required to resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a) (8), prior to addressing ... Section 2511(b); as such, they are dis tinct in that we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching Sec tion 2511(b).

In re C.L.G. , 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) ( en banc ). Initially, we note that the court erred by declinin g to terminate Mother’s parental rights simply because the parenta l rights of Father were being preserved. Our Supreme Court expressly rejec ted this proposition nearly 40 years ago in In re Burns , 379 A.2d 535, 541 (Pa. 1977) (“Nothing in the Adoption Act requires that an agen cy, which has assumed custody of a child, must establish grounds for the involuntary termination of both parents, before it can obtain such a decree as to either.”). WhileJ-A07014-15

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Burns was decided under a prior version of the Adoption Act, nothing in the

current Act contradicts the Court’s decision. Inde ed, as acknowledged by the orphans’ court, this Court more recently reache d a similar result in In re C.W.U., Jr. , 33 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2011). In that case, a tri al court “conceded that it refused to terminate Father’s par ental rights because the court did not wish to leave Child without a father, in light of the fact that it was not terminating Mother’s parental rights at thi s time.” Id. at 9. This Court reversed, holding that there was no competent evidence to support

the trial court’s decision. Id. Additionally, as explained infra , the evidence presented by CYS in this matter overwhelmingly supported the termination of both parents’ parental rights. During the hearing, Ms. Andrea Palguta tes tified that she was the CYS caseworker assigned to this matter from January 30, 2012, prior to Child’s birth, until January 5, 2013. Id. at 34-35, 43. Ms. Palguta explained that, as a result of Child’s adjudication of depend ency, Mother and Father were ordered to, inter alia , “complete drug and alcohol evaluations; comply

with whatever treatment recommendations came from t hat evaluation; ... complete random drug screens and to give at least t hree consecutive negative drug screens ....” Id. at 42-43. Ms. Palguta stated that both Mother and Father completed drug and alcohol evalua tions. Id. at 43-44. However, they did not comply fully with the recomme nded treatment. Id. at 44. Ms. Palguta noted that, between the September 4, 2012 permanencyJ-A07014-15

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review hearing and the November 6, 2012 permanency review hearing, Father reported to CYS that that he was receiving d rug treatment from a “Dr. Cober,” and that he “was going to enter a 90-d ay drug and alcohol treatment program in Harrisburg, but ... we received no verification that he

ever did that.” Id. at 52-53. Additionally, during Ms. Palguta’s time on the case , neither parent had three consecutive negative drug screens. Id. at 44, 58-59. Ms. Palguta explained that at least seven drug screens would ha ve been requested from Mother during her time as the caseworker. Id. at 62-63. Of those seven tests, Mother provided four samples and tested posi tive three of those four

times. Id. at 63. Ms. Palguta stated that Father at one poin t refused a drug screen, and that there were “other times” when the parents admitted to using drugs. Id. at 50. Specifically, Mother admitted to using ano ther person’s Percocet on July 10, 2012. Id. Father refused a drug screen that same day “stating that he could not product [ sic ] any urine because of severe dehydration from diarrhea.” Id. Finally, Ms. Palguta testified that Child appeared very comfortable with his foster fam ily. Id. at 66. She noted that, when Child would not see Father for a l ong period of time, he developed “kind of a stranger anxiety around him.” Id. Child appeared “fairly comfortable” with Mother. Id. at 67. Ms. Teya Lopaze testified that she is a casework su pervisor for CYS, and that this case “was assigned to a caseworker in my unit in January of ...J-A07014-15

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2013.” Id. at 68. Ms. Lopaze explained that, from the time s he had the case until the time the termination petitions were filed, neither parent submitted three consecutive negative drug screens. Id. at 70, 87. Father did complete drug treatment in 2012. Id. at 71, 95. However, Ms. Lopaze noted that, when Father was discharged, “it was rec ommended that he do intensive outpatient counseling, attend 90 AA/NA me etings within 90 days of discharge, [and] retain a sponsor within three to f ive days of discharge ....”

Id. at 95. To her knowledge, Father did not complete these

recommendations. Id. at 97-98. Ms. Lopaze further explained that Mother completed a drug evaluation at Twin Lakes in March of 2013, but that CYS did no t receive any confirmation that Mother completed the recommended drug treatment. Id. at 71, 87. The last drug screen administered to Mother took pl ace on April 2, 2013. Id. at 79. Mother tested positive for opiates and coc aine. Id. Ms. Lopaze stated that CYS was not able to administer a dditional drug screens to Mother because, following her final visit with Chil d on June 11, 2013, “she

has not made herself available. We didn’t even kno w her whereabouts.” Id. at 79-80, 83. At the time of the termination heari ng, Ms. Lopaze still did not

know where Mother was. Id. at 87. Ms. Lopaze noted that Child is doing

well in foster care. Id. at 69. She opined that it would be in Child’s best interest for the parental rights of Mother and Fath er to be terminated. Id.

at 88-89.J-A07014-15

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Psychologist Dennis Kashurba testified as an expert in bonding studies between parents and their children. N.T., 7/14/14, at 12-14. Mr. Kashurba explained that he was unable to observe the Child w ith Father or Mother, as Father was incarcerated, and Mother failed to appea r for her scheduled visit.

Id. at 16. However, Mr. Kashurba noted that the bond b etween Child and his foster parents “seems to be quite appropriate,” and that the foster home was “more than adequate.” Id. at 18. Mr. Kashurba stated that Child had been in the foster home since he was approximately three months old, and that he would view his foster parents as his “mom a nd dad.” Id. at 19. Mr. Kashurba opined that it would be a detriment to Chi ld’s development to remove him from his current placement. Id. at 21. Mr. Kashura further opined that the parental rights of Mother and Fathe r should be terminated, and that this would not have a negative impact on C hild. Id. at 21. Mr. Kashurba noted that he has “no information to sugge st” that Child has a bond with either Father or Mother, and that it is u nlikely that the parents will be able to develop a parent/child relationship with Child within a reasonable

amount of time. 2 Id. at 20-25. Father, who still was incarcerated at the time of t he hearing and testified by phone, indicated that he has criminal records in seven Pennsylvania counties: Allegheny, Blair, Cambria, F ayette, Indiana,

2 In his psychological bonding study, admitted durin g the hearing as Exhibit F, Mr. Kashurba reported that Child’s foster father “reiterated that he and his wife wish to be considered as adoptive parents for [Child] ....” Exhibit F at 4.J-A07014-15

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Somerset, and Westmoreland. Id. at 114. 3 Father has been convicted of a variety of criminal offenses, including retail thef t, fleeing and eluding police, simple assault, tampering with evidence, criminal t respass, public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, possession of drug paraphernalia, and drug possession. Id. at 114-18. Father also conceded that he has a dru g problem. Id. at 119. According to Father, he previously comple ted a drug rehabilitation program, which he attended from “Nov ember -- I believe 13th to early December” of 2012. Id. at 105, 113. Father claimed that

“somehow CYS contacted the Welfare Office and had m y insurance terminated,” and that these “insurance issues” prev ented him from getting

into treatment sooner. Id. at 110, 112. Father admitted that he failed to complete the recommended follow-up treatment, but i nsisted that “[w]e don’t have 90 and 90 in Johnstown,” and that he did the best he could by attending four Narcotics Anonymous and/or Alcoholic s Anonymous meetings per week. Id. at 119. Father was incarcerated shortly after he completed treatment, “in the beginning of January.” Id. at 113. Father’s last visit with Child took place in October of 2012, and lasted fiv e minutes. Id. Father further testified that he participated in “t he therapeutic community while incarcerated here, which is another alcohol and drug treatment,” and that he also attends Narcotics Anon ymous, Alcoholics Anonymous, and “Smart Recovery” meetings on a weekl y basis, as well as

3 Father neglected to mention his prior conviction i n Cumberland County, which would bring the total to eight. N.T., 7/14/1 4, at 117.J-A07014-15

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parenting classes. Id. at 105-06. Father indicated that he would be released from incarceration on approximately Septem ber 10, 2014, and that he would immediately report to a “Community Correct ion’s Residency Center for alcohol and drug treatment, which can range any where from 14 to 90 days.” Id. at 105, 123-25. Grandmother testified that Father loves Child, and that she would assist Father in caring for Child upon his release. Id. at 134-35. Grandmother conceded that Father has a drug problem , that he has been in rehabilitation programs “[m]ultiple times,” and tha t he continues to relapse.

Id. at 138. 4 Accordingly, the record confirms that CYS presented clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of b oth parents’ parental rights. With respect to Section 2511(a)(8), Child was removed from the care of Mother and Father on May 31, 2012. At the time of the July 14, 2014 termination hearing, Child had been in the cus tody of CYS for over two years. As acknowledged by the orphans’ court, Chil d was removed due to drug use, and it was incumbent on both parents to r emedy this problem, or at least get it under control, in order to regain c ustody of Child. Neither parent did so. Mother’s final drug test with CYS, which took place on April 2,

4 Grandmother also testified that she considered act ing as a kinship placement for Child. N.T., 7/14/14, at 133. Follo wing Grandmother’s testimony, Ms. Palguta and Ms. Lopaze were recalled as witnesses, and testified concerning CYS’s consideration of Grandmo ther as a possible kinship placement. Id. at 145-49.J-A07014-15

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2013, was positive for opiates and cocaine. While Mother underwent a drug evaluation at Twin Lakes, CYS did not receive any c onfirmation that she completed drug treatment. The record is simply dev oid of evidence that

Mother remedied the conditions which resulted in Ch ild’s placement. Similarly, Father admitted during the hearing that he has a drug problem. While Father completed an inpatient drug treatment program in late 2012, Father did not complete the recommended follow-up treatment, including intensive outpatient counseling, prior to his incarceration. Moreover, the record does not suggest that Father w as able to complete adequate, or equivalent, drug treatment during his time as an inmate. To the contrary, Father testified that he was going to be released from incarceration directly into a facility where he wou ld receive an additional 14 to 90 days of treatment. Thus, at the time Father received notice of the termination petition in this matter, he too had fai led to remedy the conditions which resulted in Child’s placement. Additionally, it would best serve the needs and wel fare of Child to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Child is doing well with his foster family, which has cared for and bonded w ith Child for years. In contrast, Mother and Father have spent a significan t portion of this time incarcerated, or otherwise absent from Child’s life . Father in particular appears to be incorrigible, as he has an 18-year cr iminal history spanning numerous Pennsylvania counties. As this Court has stated, “a child's lifeJ-A07014-15

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cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. Th e court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for per manence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future .” In re Adoption of

R.J.S. , 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). With respect to Section 2511(b), it is apparent tha t Child has little, if any, bond with his parents. Child was removed from his parents’ care when

he was about three months old. At the time of the termination hearing,

Child had not visited with Mother since June of 201 3, and Child had not

visited with Father since October of 2012. Mr. Kas hurba testified that it would not be detrimental to Child if the parental r ights of Mother and Father were terminated. Mr. Kashurba opined, however, tha t Child would suffer harm if removed from his current foster placement. 5 Again, it is abundantly

clear that termination would best serve the needs a nd welfare of the Child. While the orphans’ court observes that CYS did not adjust Father’s reunification goals to accommodate his incarceratio n, nothing in the Adoption Act supports the court’s position. Notabl y, in its opinion

5 The orphans’ court did not address Section 2511(b) , except to state in its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) that it place d “little weight” on Mr. Kashurba’s testimony because, inter alia , Mr. Kashurba “did not have any basis with which to evaluate the natural parent bon ding inasmuch as [F]ather was incarcerated and [M]other’s whereabout s were unknown.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 3. To the exte nt the orphans’ court concluded that termination would not be in Child’s best interest, we conclude that the court abused its discretion by reaching a decision that was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence of record.J-A07014-15

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accompanying the subject order, the orphans’ court discussed and relied

upon In re D.C.D. , 91 A.3d 173, 179 (Pa. Super. 2014), reversed , 105 A.3d 662 (Pa. 2014), in which a panel of this Court stat ed that an agency must first make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent w ith his or her child before filing a petition to terminate parental rights. D.C.D. recently was reversed by our Supreme Court. We have discussed the Suprem e Court’s decision as

follows:

In In re D.C.D. , 105 A.3d 662 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme Court analyzed the language of Section 2511(a)(2) of the Adoption Act, as well as Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 4 2 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. The Court reasoned that, while “reasonable e fforts may be relevant to a court’s consideration of both the grounds for termination and the best interests of the child,” n either of these provisions, when read together or individually, req uires reasonable efforts. The Court also concluded that reasonable efforts were not required to protect a parent’s con stitutional right to the care, custody, and control of his or h er child. While the Supreme Court in D.C.D. focused its analysis on Section 2511(a)(2), we find the Supreme Court’s reasoning e qually applicable to Section 2511(a)(8). Like Section 251 1(a)(2), nothing in the language of Section 2511(a)(8) sugge sts that reasonable reunification services are necessary to support the termination of parental rights. In re Adoption of C.J.P. , 2015 WL 1668310 at *7, 2015 Pa. Super. LEXIS 181 at *21 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some citations omitte d). Critically, our Supreme Court in D.C.D. observed that “the remedy for an agency’s failure to provide services is not to punish an innocent child, by delaying her permanency through denying terminat ion , but instead to conclude on the record that the agency has faile d to make reasonable efforts ....” 105 A.3d at 675 (citations omitted, em phasis added). Here, theJ-A07014-15

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orphans’ court’s opinion reveals that it did precis ely what our Supreme Court has instructed that courts should not do, i.e. , not giving due regard to Child for the perceived failings of CYS. Accordingly, because we conclude that the orphans’ court abused its discretion by denying CYS’s petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father, we reverse. We remand this matt er for the orphans’ court to enter decrees terminating the parental rig hts of both Mother and Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b ). Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceed ings consistent with this Memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judge Mundy joins this memorandum. Judge Lazarus files a concurring statement.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 5/11/2015