PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-2265

JOHN E. HARRELL; DAWN D. HARRELL,

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

DOUGLAS DELUCA,

 Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, Senior District Judge. (1:20-cv-00087-LO-IDD)

Argued: January 24, 2024 Decided: March 27, 2024 

Before KING, WYNN, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wynn 

wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Rushing joined.

ARGUED: Thomas Ryan Lynch, ASMAR, SCHOR & MCKENNA, PLLC, 

Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Michael John Coughlin, WALSH COLUCCI 

LUBELEY & WALSH, PC, Woodbridge, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: E. 

Andrew Burcher, WALSH COLUCCI LUBELEY & WALSH PC, Woodbridge, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

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WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Appellants John and Dawn Harrell brought this action after their relationship 

soured with Douglas DeLuca, the general contractor from whom they purchased a home 

in Arlington, Virginia. The Harrells sued DeLuca, alleging fraudulent inducement, 

constructive fraud, breach of contract, and violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection 

Act. The district court granted summary judgment in DeLuca’s favor as to the Harrells’

fraud claims based on one category of misrepresentations that they allege DeLuca made 

prior to their entry into the contract for purchase of the home. The case otherwise 

proceeded to a bench trial, after which the court found for the Harrells on the breach-ofcontract claim and for DeLuca on all other claims. 

We agree with the Harrells that summary judgment was inappropriate. As to the 

bench trial, we also agree with the Harrells that the district court must make explicit 

findings related to one of each of their constructive-fraud and breach-of-contract claims. 

Accordingly, we vacate summary judgment and the judgment after the bench trial as to 

the claims in question and remand for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Regarding the remaining claims, the resolutions of which the Harrells do not challenge on 

appeal, we affirm.

I.

This case arises from the Harrells’ purchase of a property in Arlington, Virginia 

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(“the Property”).1 Harrell v. Deluca, No. 1:20-CV-87, 2022 WL 16745115, at *1 (E.D. 

Va. Nov. 7, 2022). The Property consists of a six-bedroom house and separate two-level 

garage, or “carriage house.” Id. Douglas DeLuca, a general contractor who specializes in 

renovating residential properties, purchased the Property in 2018. Id. In 2019, the 

Harrells decided to relocate to the Washington, D.C., area and began to look for a 

residence. Id. A real estate agent introduced the Harrells to DeLuca, and DeLuca showed 

the Harrells the Property. Id.

On April 3, 2019, the Harrells and DeLuca entered into a contract for the sale of 

the Property (“the Sales Contract”) for a price of $4,425,139.00. The Sales Contract 

included an addendum containing a list of improvements that DeLuca was to make to the 

Property as part of the sale. Over the next few months, the parties executed various 

addenda to the Sales Contract. These addenda modified the improvements DeLuca was to 

make to the Property.

The parties closed on the sale on July 3, 2019, and, on that date, entered into 

another contract (the “Construction Agreement”). The Construction Agreement identified 

which of the planned improvements, as set forth in the Sales Contract, were still 

outstanding and provided that all outstanding work would be completed by August 1, 

2019. The Construction Agreement also identified several new improvements that were 

1 These facts are drawn in large part from the district court’s findings of fact 

following the bench trial in this case, which neither party challenges on appeal. Where 

relevant to the Harrells’ appeal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment, these 

facts are drawn from the record before the court on summary judgment and provided in 

the light most favorable to the Harrells as the nonmovants.

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to be made to the Property and provided that new work was to be completed by August 

15, 2019.

DeLuca continued to work on the property over the next month, but the 

relationship between the parties deteriorated. The Harrells “began to have doubts about 

[DeLuca’s] performance of the contract” and DeLuca felt that the Harrells were 

continuously making changes and interfering with his successful completion of the 

improvements to the Property. Harrell, 2022 WL 16745115, at *1. John Harrell ordered 

DeLuca to cease work on August 6, 2019, and, although he thereafter asked DeLuca to 

return to work, the relationship between the parties ultimately “had become irreconcilable 

and construction on the house was never completed.” Id. at *2.

On January 27, 2020, the Harrells filed the present diversity action in federal 

district court, asserting claims of fraud in the inducement, violations of the Virginia 

Consumer Protection Act, and breach of contract. DeLuca moved to dismiss the 

complaint, but the district court denied his motion on March 26, 2020. On December 14, 

2020, the Harrells filed an Amended Complaint asserting claims of fraud in the 

inducement, constructive fraud, violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, and 

breach of contract.

The Harrells’ claims for fraud in the inducement and constructive fraud arise from 

various representations they allege DeLuca made to them prior to their entry into the 

Sales Contract that they discovered were false after the relationship between the parties 

deteriorated. Specifically, the Harrells identified five categories of statements DeLuca 

made that they allege they have since learned were false: (1) that the square footage of 

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the Property was 6,500 square feet; (2) that work on the Property was being performed by

licensed subcontractors (“the licensing representation”); (3) that the roof on the Property 

was original slate; (4) that the custom marble tiling for the bathroom floor had already 

been ordered; and (5) that DeLuca had obtained the required permits to perform 

construction on the Property (“the permitting representation”).

DeLuca moved for partial summary judgment on the breach-of-contract claim and 

for summary judgment and dismissal of all other claims in the Amended Complaint. The 

Harrells cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the breach-of-contract claims and 

on one of DeLuca’s affirmative defenses. The district court granted summary judgment in 

DeLuca’s favor on the Harrells’ fraud claims that were based on the licensing 

representation. It otherwise denied the motions for summary judgment.

The parties proceeded to a bench trial, which took place off and on from July 11 

through 28, 2022. After the trial and posttrial briefing, the district court issued a 

memorandum opinion containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Harrell, 

2022 WL 16745115. The court found in DeLuca’s favor on the Harrells’ remaining 

claims for fraud in the inducement, finding that they had not shown that DeLuca had the 

requisite intent to defraud prior to forming the Sales Contract. Id. at *3. The court also 

found in DeLuca’s favor on the Harrells’ claims for constructive fraud and violations of 

the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. Id. at *3–7. On the former point, the court found

that the source-of-duty rule barred the claims. Id. at *4.

However, the district court found in the Harrells’ favor on their claim for breach of 

contract based on DeLuca’s failure to complete various work outlined in the Construction 

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Agreement by August 1, 2019. Id. at *8. The Harrells requested rescission of the contract 

as remedy for the breach, but the court declined to rescind the contract and instead 

awarded the Harrells $181,762.87 in damages. Id. at *12. The Harrells timely appealed.

II.

On appeal, the Harrells make three assignments of error. First, they argue that the 

district court erred in granting summary judgment in DeLuca’s favor on their fraud 

claims based on the licensing representation. Next, they contend that the district court 

erred in finding that the source-of-duty rule barred their claims for constructive fraud 

based on the permitting representation. Finally, they assert that the district court violated 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 by failing to make legal conclusions regarding 

whether DeLuca breached the Sales Contract, instead focusing only on the Construction 

Agreement. We address each assignment of error in turn.

A.

The Harrells first challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment on their 

fraud claims based on the licensing representation—their allegation that DeLuca 

erroneously represented to them, prior to their entry into the Sales Contract, that he 

employed only licensed subcontractors. “We review a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo, construing all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Millenium Inorganic Chems. Ltd. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 744 F.3d 

279, 285 (4th Cir. 2014).

The Harrells argue that the district court erred in concluding that the licensing 

representation was insufficient to sustain a claim for either fraud in the inducement or 

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constructive fraud. Under Virginia law,2 to prevail on an “actual fraud” claim, a plaintiff 

must prove: “(1) a false representation, (2) of a material fact, (3) made intentionally and 

knowingly, (4) with intent to mislead, (5) reliance by the party mislead, and (6) resulting 

damage to the party misled.” Hitachi Credit Am. Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 F.3d 614, 628 

(4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Evaluation Rsch. Corp. v. Alequin, 439 S.E.2d 387, 390 (Va. 

1994)). Virginia also recognizes a claim for constructive fraud, which “differs only in 

that the misrepresentation of material fact is not made with the intent to mislead, but is 

made innocently or negligently.” Id.

In granting summary judgment in DeLuca’s favor, the district court focused 

primarily on the second element, materiality. Harrell v. Deluca, 590 F. Supp. 3d 941, 949 

(E.D. Va. 2022). Specifically, the district court concluded that the “Harrells assert that 

this misrepresentation was material to entering the contract but do not point to any 

evidence to support this claim.” Id. The district court then went on to conclude that 

Virginia law does not require that subcontractors working under a licensed contractor 

hold their own licenses and thus concluded that, contrary to the Harrells’ assertion,

DeLuca’s use of unlicensed subcontractors was not unlawful. Id. at 949–50.

However, there was evidence before the district court on summary judgment that 

the licensing representation was material to the Harrells’ entry into the contracts to 

2 The parties agree that Virginia substantive law governs. See Opening Br. at 13; 

Response Br. at 10 n.2; Minnieland Priv. Day Sch., Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive 

Risk Assurance Co., 913 F.3d 409, 415 n.4 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that when parties agree 

that a certain state’s law applies, “we need not inquire further into the choice-of-law 

question[]”).

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purchase and improve the Property. Under Virginia law, “a fact is material when it 

influences a person to enter into a contract, when it deceives him and induces him to act, 

or when without it the transaction would not have occurred.” Packard Norfolk, Inc. v. 

Miller, 95 S.E.2d 207, 211–12 (Va. 1956).

In support of their opposition to DeLuca’s motion for summary judgment, the 

Harrells submitted declarations in which they each stated they would not have entered 

into the Sales Contract or Construction Agreement, nor closed on the sale, had they 

known that “DeLuca performed construction with unlicensed subcontractors.” J.A. 193 

¶ 3, 224 ¶ 3.3 And while this evidence was submitted to the district court in the form of 

self-serving declarations from the Harrells, DeLuca points to no evidence that contradicts 

these declarations.

Moreover, as the Harrells are the nonmovants, their self-serving declarations can 

defeat summary judgment. See Pfaller v. Amonette, 55 F.4th 436, 450 (4th Cir. 2022)

(discussing self-serving affidavits); Mann v. Failey, 578 F. App’x 267, 273 n.2 (4th Cir. 

2014) (per curiam) (unpublished but orally argued) (“[T]he record could defeat summary 

judgment even if the evidence consisted exclusively of so-called ‘self-serving’

declarations from [the nonmovant] himself.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (4) (permitting 

parties to show genuine dispute of material fact using a variety of materials, such as 

“affidavits or declarations,” so long as the affidavit or declaration meets certain 

requirements).

3 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this 

appeal.

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Thus, the evidence at summary judgment, taken in the light most favorable to the 

Harrells as the nonmoving party, is sufficient to raise a dispute of material fact as to the 

materiality of the licensing representation. The record at summary judgment shows that 

without DeLuca’s representation that he used licensed subcontractors, the Harrells would 

not have entered into the Sales Contract or Construction Agreement, and, therefore, the 

representation was material. Accordingly, we need not determine whether Virginia law 

also requires subcontractors working under a licensed contractor to hold their own 

licenses—it is enough for our purposes that, regardless of the minimum standards for 

subcontractors set by state law, it mattered to the Harrells that DeLuca’s subcontractors 

were licensed. 

Although the district court’s grant of summary judgment was primarily focused on 

its view that the Harrells could not satisfy the materiality requirement of a fraud claim, it 

also expressed its thoughts about whether the licensing representation was sufficiently 

definite and whether the Harrells could satisfy the requirement that their reliance on the 

representation resulted in some damage to them. Harrell, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 950. DeLuca 

cites these statements by the district court as providing us with alternative bases to affirm.

So, we will briefly address these points.

First, in arguing that the licensing representation is too vague to support a claim 

for fraud, DeLuca points to the district court’s statement that “[e]ven looking at the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Harrells, the statement that the subcontractors 

were ‘licensed’ is vague and indefinite.” Harrell, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 950. DeLuca further 

argues that any statement regarding whether he used licensed subcontractors is “general” 

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and that he could have been referring to his subcontractors holding “a business license, or 

a driver’s license.” Response Br. at 11–12. 

Under Virginia law, “[s]tatements which are vague and indefinite in their nature 

and terms, or are merely loose, conjectural or exaggerated” cannot support a claim of 

fraud because an individual “is not justified in placing reliance upon them.” Tate v. 

Colony House Builders, Inc., 508 S.E.2d 597, 599 (Va. 1999) (quoting Saxby v. S. Land 

Co., 63 S.E. 423, 424 (Va. 1909)). For example, in Tate, statements that a new dwelling 

was “free from structural defects; . . . constructed in a workmanlike manner[; and] . . . fit 

for habitation” were actionable for fraud because such statements were “representations 

of the present quality or character of the property” and their truth or falsity was subject to 

a factual determination. Id. at 600. In contrast, other statements at issue in Tate, such as

the home being of the “highest quality,” were not actionable as they were merely 

opinions. Id. (holding that statements “in the nature of puffing or opinion” cannot form 

the basis of an action for fraud). Similarly, in Lambert v. Downtown Garage, Inc., the 

Supreme Court of Virginia held that a statement that a vehicle was in “excellent” 

condition was not actionable for fraud because that statement “cannot be viewed as 

anything more than an opinion.” Lambert v. Downtown Garage, Inc., 553 S.E.2d 714, 

717 (Va. 2001). 

In support of their opposition to summary judgment, the Harrells submitted a 

declaration from John Harrell stating that DeLuca “stated to [him] that he was a Class A 

contractor and that all his subcontractors were also licensed.” J.A. 225 ¶ 10. We are not

persuaded by DeLuca’s argument that this statement was “general” because a statement 

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that a person is “licensed” could technically mean they hold any sort of license, including 

a driver’s license. While, stripped of all context, a statement that a person is “licensed”

may be general, Virginia law requires that we determine whether a statement is too vague 

and indefinite to support a claim for fraud by “taking into consideration the nature of the 

representation and the meaning of the language used as applied to the subject matter and 

as interpreted by the surrounding circumstances.” Packard Norfolk, Inc., 95 S.E.2d at 

211.

In the context of a conversation with a contractor to arrange for improvements to a 

property, a person would reasonably understand the word “licensed” to mean that 

someone holds a license to complete construction work. And, notably, DeLuca made the 

statement that his subcontractors were “also licensed” immediately following his 

representation that he was a Class A contractor. J.A. 225. DeLuca’s use of the word 

“also” strongly implies that his subcontractors were also licensed as contractors, or, at 

the very least, held a comparable license. Considering the context in which it was made, 

the licensing representation is sufficiently definite. It is similar to the statement in Tate

that the home was free from structural defects, constructed in a workmanlike manner, and 

fit for habitation—it is a representation of the present character of the construction

license status of DeLuca’s subcontractors and its truth or falsity can be determined 

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objectively.

4 Thus, DeLuca’s statement that he uses only licensed subcontractors is 

sufficiently definite to support a claim for fraud under Virginia law.

DeLuca next argues that we can affirm on the alternative ground that the Harrells 

are unable to satisfy the damage element of a claim for fraud. But the record before the 

district court did contain some evidence that at least raises an issue of disputed fact as to 

whether the Harrells suffered any damage from their reliance on the licensing 

representation. The Harrells submitted evidence that Eagles Contractors LLC performed 

construction work on the Property and that Eagles Contractors LLC did not have a 

Virginia contractor’s license. And in the expert report the Harrells submitted in support of 

their cross-motion for partial summary judgment, their expert noted flaws in several 

projects that appear on the Eagles Contractors LLC invoice—for example, the roof on the 

Carriage House, the wood flooring, and framing. The expert also concluded, based on the 

flaws, that “the subcontractors that performed the work had little, if any, experience in 

the work they were performing” and did not conform to industry standards. Thus, the 

expert concluded, corrective work at an additional cost would be needed to fix these 

4 We acknowledge that the Harrells’ Amended Complaint alleged only that 

“DeLuca represented that, as owner/developer, he would only use qualified contractors 

with years of experience in their trades and ‘the best’ reputations.” J.A. 74 ¶ 89. But the 

record before the district court on summary judgment, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the Harrells, evidences the more specific statement we analyze above. Satisfied that 

this statement is sufficiently definite to create a genuine dispute of material fact for 

purposes of summary judgment, we express no opinion regarding whether any of the 

other statements alleged at various points by the Harrells would be sufficient to support a 

claim of fraud in the inducement or constructive fraud. 

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flaws.

5 Accordingly, we cannot conclude from the record that the Harrells would not be 

able to show damage resulting from their reliance on the licensing representation.

Finally, DeLuca urges us to affirm because, after the bench trial, the district court 

concluded that DeLuca did not intend to fraudulently induce the Harrells to enter into the 

contracts. Response Br. at 17–18. But, in determining whether the district court properly 

entered summary judgment on this claim, we cannot properly consider posttrial 

conclusions it made in the context of other claims. E.g., Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, 

Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Our review is limited to the evidence before the 

district court at the time of its partial-summary-judgment ruling, and we do not consider 

the evidence introduced subsequently at trial.”); R.J. Clarkson Co. v. Jenn-Air Co., 85 

F.3d 616, at *1 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished, per curiam table decision) (“[W]e consider 

the record as it existed at the time the district court granted summary judgment [on the 

claim in question], ignoring evidence later presented at trial on other claims.”). And, in 

any event, for the reasons outlined below, even if the district court ultimately concludes 

that DeLuca misrepresented the license status of his subcontractors without ill intent, that 

representation could still support a claim for constructive fraud.

Thus, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for 

further proceedings.

5 After the bench trial, the district court ultimately awarded damages based on 

DeLuca’s expert’s calculation, not the Harrells’ expert. Harrell, 2022 WL 16745115, at 

*11. While that expert’s report does not appear to have been submitted at summary 

judgment, it also contains evidence of flaws in projects on which Eagles Contractors LLC 

worked. 

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B.

Turning to the bench trial, the Harrells next challenge the district court’s finding 

that their claim for constructive fraud based on the permitting representation—their 

allegation that DeLuca represented to them prior to their entry into the Sales Contract that

he had obtained all necessary permits for construction on the Property—was barred by 

the source-of-duty rule. We review a district court’s judgment following a bench trial 

under a “mixed standard of review,” reviewing factual findings for clear error and 

conclusions of law de novo. Roanoke Cement Co. v. Falk Corp., 413 F.3d 431, 433 (4th 

Cir. 2005).

Virginia’s source-of-duty rule delineates the boundary between tort and contract 

claims to protect against “turning every breach of contract into a tort.” Tingler v. 

Graystone Homes, Inc., 834 S.E.2d 244, 255 (Va. 2019) (quoting MCR Fed., LLC v. 

JB&A, Inc., 808 S.E.2d 186, 193 (Va. 2017)). Accordingly, whether an action sounds in 

tort, contract, or both depends on the “source of the duty violated.” Id. at 254. When a 

plaintiff brings a claim based on an alleged breach of a duty that arose “by mere 

agreement of the parties,” as opposed to “by operation of law,” then it sounds in contract 

and the source-of-duty rule prevents recovery in tort for that breach. Id. (quoting Glisson 

v. Loxley, 366 S.E.2d 68, 71 (Va. 1988)).

Here, the district court determined that the source-of-duty rule barred recovery in 

tort for the Harrells’ claims for constructive fraud based on the permitting representation

because it concluded that, to the extent DeLuca breached a duty by making the permitting 

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representation, it was a breach only of a contractual obligation to the Harrells.

6 Harrell, 

2022 WL 16745115, at *3–4. We conclude that further proceedings are necessary to 

resolve this matter.

“Virginia law ‘distinguishes between a statement that is false when made and a 

promise that becomes false only when the promisor later fails to keep his word. The 

former is fraud, the latter is breach of contract.’” City of Richmond v. Madison Mgmt. 

Grp., Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 447 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Lissmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 

848 F.2d 50, 53 (4th Cir. 1988)). Thus, whether the Harrells can recover in tort for the 

permitting representation depends upon the nature of the statement. A statement by 

DeLuca to the effect of “I have already obtained the necessary permit(s)” is either true or 

false when made—it does not hinge on any future action—so, if false, it can support a 

claim for fraud. Compare that to a statement by DeLuca to the effect of “I will obtain all 

necessary permits.” That is merely a promise to do something in the future. And while it 

might constitute breach of contract if he fails to follow through, it cannot sustain a claim 

for fraud.

7

6 The district court cited both the source-of-duty rule and the related economicloss rule in its conclusion. The economic-loss rule is a “remedy-specific application of 

the source-of-duty rule” and prevents recovery in tort for “damages which were within 

the contemplation of the parties when framing their agreement.” Tingler, 834 S.E.2d at

264 (quoting Abi-Najm v. Concord Condo., LLC, 699 S.E.2d 483, 488 (Va. 2010)). For 

simplicity, we refer in the main text only to the source-of-duty rule, but our conclusions 

should be understood to encompass the district court’s evaluation of both rules.

7 There is an exception to this categorical statement in cases where promises “are 

made with a present intention not to perform them.” Abi-Najm, 699 S.E.2d at 490 

(quoting Boykin v. Hermitage Realty, 360 S.E.2d 177, 178 (Va. 1987)). That is, a

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The district court did not make a factual finding regarding whether DeLuca’s 

statements regarding permits for construction on the property were of present fact or 

future promise, but the record seems to support the former characterization. Dawn Harrell 

testified that during a tour of the Property on March 22, 2019, DeLuca “told us that the—

he had already filed—or had a permit for the main house and that the carriage house was 

under the same permit.” J.A. 484. She then stated that she understood from DeLuca that 

he “hadn’t filed [the owner suite permit] yet” and would be filing that permit soon, but

that “the permits had been filed other than the owner suite addition.” J.A. 484. And John 

Harrell testified that “Mr. DeLuca had always told us that the carriage house was always 

part of the main house permit; in other words, there was one permit that covered all the 

work in the carriage house and all the work in the main house.” J.A. 323–24.

The district court recognized that “[i]n the post-trial briefing, the [Harrells] 

argue[d] that [DeLuca] made a representation that he ‘had a permit for the main house 

and that the carriage house was under the same permit’ and that ‘the permits had been 

filed other than the owner suite addition’ on March 22, 2019.” Harrell, 2022 WL 

16745115, at *5. But its findings of fact do not contain a clear indication of whether, 

based on the evidence at trial, it found the Harrells’ characterization of DeLuca’s 

statement to the effect of “I will obtain all necessary permits” could sustain a claim for 

actual fraud if DeLuca made the statement knowing he would not, in fact, obtain all the 

necessary permits. But the district court found—and the Harrells do not challenge on 

appeal—that DeLuca had no ill intent in making the permitting representation. Harrell, 

2022 WL 16745115, at *3. Thus, the exception for future promises that are made with the 

present intent not to fulfill them does not apply.

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statements credible. Because the source-of-duty rule would not bar a constructive-fraud 

claim based on a misrepresentation of present fact, the district court erred in relying on 

the source-of-duty rule without making a finding of fact regarding whether DeLuca 

misrepresented a present fact or merely failed to deliver on a promise. We thus vacate the 

district court’s judgment in favor of DeLuca on this point and remand for further 

proceedings.

DeLuca argues that, even if the source-of-duty rule arguably does not bar the 

Harrells’ constructive-fraud claim based on the permitting representation, we should 

nevertheless affirm because the Harrells cannot satisfy the damage or materiality 

elements of a constructive-fraud claim. We are not persuaded.

We start with the damage element. In analyzing the Virginia Consumer Protection 

Act claim, the district court stated: “[T]he only damages resulting from the general 

misrepresentations about the permitting process would be damages that result from not 

being able to move into the house as quickly as the Plaintiffs wished.” Harrell, 2022 WL 

16745115, at *5. And, as DeLuca notes, the district court later went on to determine that 

no damages were recoverable on the Virginia Consumer Protection Act claim because of 

the Harrells’ failure to mitigate. Id. at *9. So, DeLuca contends, because the only injury 

the permitting representation caused was a delay in moving into the Property, and 

because the Harrells could not collect damages arising from that injury, they must not be 

able to satisfy the element of a claim for constructive fraud requiring that they show that 

some damage resulted from their reliance on the representation.

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But whether the Harrells were able to recover monetary damages for a Virginia 

Consumer Protection Act claim based on the permitting representation is a question 

distinct from whether they were damaged by their reliance on the representation. The 

district court never reached the damage element of a constructive-fraud claim because it 

applied the source-of-duty rule to bar recovery, but its statements regarding the Virginia 

Consumer Protection Act claim indicate that it believed the permitting representation 

caused some harm to the Harrells, albeit harm for which they could not recover monetary 

damages for other reasons. Thus, the Harrells’ inability to recover monetary damages 

under a similar Virginia Consumer Protection Act theory does not preclude the district 

court finding that, if the other elements of constructive fraud are met, the Harrells are 

entitled to the remedy they seek on their constructive-fraud claim—rescission of the Sales 

Contract and Construction Agreement. See Devine v. Buki, 767 S.E.2d 459, 466–68 (Va. 

2015) (upholding trial court’s decision to rescind contract due to fraud but concluding 

consequential damages were not warranted).

Nor are we persuaded by DeLuca’s argument that because the Sales Contract did 

not include any term regarding permits, and because the real estate agent who represented 

the Harrells in purchasing the Property testified at trial that the Sales Contract included 

“all the material terms,” the permit status of the Property was not material. J.A. 469–70, 

472. The Virginia Supreme Court has explicitly stated that “[o]ne seeking to void an 

agreement for fraud is not limited, in proving such fraud, to the provisions of the 

agreement itself.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Butler, 125 S.E.2d 823, 826 (Va. 

1962) (quoting Bendford v. Nat’l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 96 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Mich. 

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1959)). At the very least, the district court should have the first opportunity to weigh the 

real estate agent’s testimony and, if it determines that testimony was credible, decide 

whether a term that was ultimately not material to the execution of the Sales Contract was

nonetheless material to the Harrells’ decision to enter into the contract. 

In short, because we conclude that the district court improperly applied the sourceof-duty rule without making an explicit finding regarding whether DeLuca made a 

misrepresentation of present fact or of future promise, we vacate the district court’s 

judgment for DeLuca on the Harrells’ claim for constructive fraud based on the 

permitting representation. We leave it to the district court to determine on remand 

whether the Harrells can satisfy the elements of this claim.

C.

Finally, the Harrells argue that the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 52(a) when, in finding in their favor on the breach-of-contract claim, it failed 

to conclude whether DeLuca had breached the Sales Contract and instead concluded only 

that he breached the Construction Agreement. This failure is important, the Harrells 

argue, because the Sales Contract expressly provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees in 

case of breach but the Construction Agreement does not. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires that, “[i]n an action tried on the 

facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and 

state its conclusions of law separately.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). And we have noted that 

“[t]o satisfy the demands of Rule 52(a), a trial court must do more than announce 

statements of ultimate fact. The court must support its rulings by spelling out the 

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subordinate facts on which it relies.” U.S. ex rel. Belcon, Inc. v. Sherman Constr. Co., 

800 F.2d 1321, 1324 (4th Cir. 1986). But we have also noted that, even if a district court 

should have made more explicit legal findings on certain issues, “once the district court 

ha[s] made adequate findings of fact, this court [i]s competent to apply proper legal 

principles to the facts found in order to resolve the controversy.” Glassman Constr. Co. v. 

U.S. ex rel. Clark-Fontana Paint Co., 421 F.2d 212, 214 (4th Cir. 1970).

We agree with the Harrells that the district court’s findings regarding the breachof-contract claim could have been more clearly stated. In its opinion, the district court 

stated that “[i]t is undisputed that a written agreement existed between the Parties. One of 

the operable documents demonstrating the written agreement is the [Construction 

Agreement].” Harrell, 2022 WL 16745115, at *7. It then explained that the Construction 

Agreement incorporated an attached exhibit listing items of work that were to be 

completed by August 1, 2019, and noted that multiple items on that list were not 

completed by that date. Id. at *7–8. And it concluded that “[t]he Plaintiffs have shown by 

a preponderance of the evidence that completing these items by August 1st, 2019—as 

expressly agreed to by the Parties—was material to the contractual agreement as 

unambiguously defined in the [Construction Agreement]. As these items were not 

complete by the deadline, the Defendant breached the contract.” Id. at *8.

It seems from the district court’s language that it was using the terms “the 

contract” and “the Construction Agreement” interchangeably. But the district court’s 

statement that the Construction Agreement was “one of” the documents demonstrating 

“the written agreement” between the parties implies that another document exists, such 

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that “the Construction Agreement” and “the contract” are not interchangeable. And, in its 

prior rulings in this case, the district court emphasized that the Sales Contract and the 

Construction Agreement were distinct. Order at 2, Harrell v. Deluca, No. 1:20-cv-00087, 

(E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2020), ECF No. 11 (denying DeLuca’s motion to dismiss and stating 

that the breach-of-contract claim “states a claim as to both the Sales Contract and the 

Construction Agreement,” and “[f]urther,” that “the Construction Agreement did not 

extinguish, discharge, or contradict the preexisting Sales Contract terms, but instead 

evidences a renewed intent to maintain them by requiring future completion”); Harrell, 

590 F. Supp. 3d at 947 (stating, when denying in part DeLuca’s motion for summary 

judgment, that “[t]he Court has already found as a matter of law that the Sales [Contract] 

was collateral to the [Construction Agreement] and the two contracts did not merge”).

Thus, despite apparently understanding the Sales Contract and Construction Agreement 

as distinct contracts, in its posttrial order, the district court failed to make an explicit 

finding regarding whether the Sales Contract had been breached.

Because they argue that the district court’s posttrial factual findings are sufficient 

for us to apply legal principles to the facts found and reach independent conclusions of 

law, as we did in Glassman Construction Co., the Harrells urge us to conclude as a matter 

of law that the Sales Contract was breached. Glassman Constr. Co., 421 F.2d at 214. But,

even if the Harrells are correct that the district court’s factual findings are sufficient for 

us to reach a conclusion regarding breach of the Sales Contract, they cite no authority, 

and we have found none, requiring us to make conclusions of law beyond those of the 

district court. Because “we are a court of review, not first view,” Biggs v. N.C. Dep’t of 

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Pub. Safety, 953 F.3d 236, 243 (4th Cir. 2020), we leave it to the district court on remand 

to resolve this issue. 

III.

In sum, because the district court erred in determining that the Harrells failed to

raise a dispute of material fact as to whether the licensing representation was material to 

their decision to enter into the Sales Contract, and because we are not otherwise 

convinced that this claim cannot survive summary judgment, we vacate the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment as to the Harrells’ fraud claims regarding the 

licensing representation. Because we conclude that the source-of-duty rule would not bar 

the Harrells’ constructive-fraud claim based on the permitting representation if the 

representation was of present fact, and because the district court did not make a clear 

determination of the character of that statement, we vacate the district court’s judgment in 

DeLuca’s favor as to that claim. And because we agree that the district court’s opinion is 

unclear as to whether DeLuca breached the Sales Contract, we direct the district court on 

remand to make conclusions of law on that point. We otherwise affirm. 

Accordingly, we remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED

IN PART, AND REMANDED

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