UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LARRY RIDDICK,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v. No. 96-6298

RONALD ANGELONE,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CA-95-506-3)

Submitted: November 26, 1996

Decided: January 14, 1997

Before WILKINS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,

Senior Circuit Judge.

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Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Larry Riddick, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Cauthorne Daniel, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Larry Riddick appeals from the district court's order dismissing his

petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).* We dismiss the

appeal.

Riddick raised eight claims in his initial petition, and moved to

amend his complaint to add four more claims following the Government's motion to dismiss. Our review reveals that only the following

claims are properly exhausted and subject to federal review:

I. His conviction for seven counts of forgery violated the

Double Jeopardy Clause because, although separate

acts, they were all committed in furtherance of a common scheme.

II. He was denied due process of law when the state magistrate judge who issued his arrest warrant testified at

his trial in alleged violation of Va. Code Ann.§ 19.2-

271 (Michie 1995).

III. He received ineffective assistance of counsel because

his attorney failed to:

A. object to a statement which suggested that

Riddick was being held in jail pending the

outcome of his trial and may have threatened

a witness against him;

B. subpoena a detective who could have testified

that another person, using an ID card with

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*Effective April 26, 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was amended by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214. Because Riddick filed this appeal prior to the Act's

enactment, we need not consider what effect the Act would have on this

appeal.

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Riddick's picture attempted to commit a similar offense; and

C. vigorously pursue his appeal.

Addressing claim I, we find that although Riddick committed all

seven forgeries in furtherance of a single goal, he still committed

seven distinct violations of Virginia law. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-

172 (Michie 1996); United States v. Swaim, 757 F.2d 1530, 1536 (5th

Cir.) (stating that the test for whether a continuous transaction results

in the commission of one or multiple offenses is determined by

whether separate and distinct criminal acts have occurred), cert.

denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985). Furthermore, all of these violations were

tried in a single proceeding, and the Virginia Supreme Court did not

find the punishment to exceed that intended by the Virginia legislature. Accordingly, we hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause has not

been violated. See Thomas v. Warden, 683 F.2d 83, 85 (4th Cir.)

("Where the [double jeopardy] claim is made in relation to state

offenses, federal courts are essentially bound by state court interpretations of state legislative intent."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1042 (1982).

Turning to claim II, we find that the magistrate judge's testimony did

not violate Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-271 because it did not relate to factual matters which came before him in his official duties. See Carter

v. Commonwealth, 403 S.E.2d 360 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). Finally, we

find that Riddick has failed to demonstrate both deficient performance

and prejudice in any of his three ineffective assistance claims as

required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To the

extent that claim III.A might also allege a due process violation, we

find that any error was harmless. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637-38 (1993).

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of probable cause to appeal and

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

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