alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1768 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1768

To clarify that noncommercial species found entirely within the borders 
    of a single State are not in interstate commerce or subject to 
   regulation under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 or any other 
  provision of law enacted as an exercise of the power of Congress to 
                     regulate interstate commerce.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 10, 2019

    Mr. Lee introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To clarify that noncommercial species found entirely within the borders 
    of a single State are not in interstate commerce or subject to 
   regulation under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 or any other 
  provision of law enacted as an exercise of the power of Congress to 
                     regulate interstate commerce.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Native Species Protection Act''.

SEC. 2. TREATMENT OF INTRASTATE SPECIES.

    (a) Definition of Intrastate Species.--In this Act, the term 
``intrastate species'' means any species of plant or fish or wildlife 
(as those terms are defined in section 3 of the Endangered Species Act 
of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1532)) that is--
            (1) found entirely within the borders of a single State; 
        and
            (2) not part of a national market for any commodity.
    (b) Treatment.--An intrastate species shall not be--
            (1) considered to be in interstate commerce; and
            (2) subject to regulation under--
                    (A) the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 
                1531 et seq.); or
                    (B) any other provision of law under which 
                regulatory authority is based on the power of Congress 
                to regulate interstate commerce as enumerated in 
                article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution of 
                the United States.
                                 <all>
```
#### THOMAS v. POOLE

No. 95 PC.

Case below: 54 N.C. App. 238.

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 12 January 1982.
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





I,
      Patricia S. Morris, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual
      Report of SourceForge, Inc. on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended July 31,
      2008
      fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on
      Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition
      and
      results of operations of SourceForge, Inc.





Date: 
                October 13, 2008
            By:
            /s/
                PATRICIA S. MORRISName:
            Patricia
                S. MorrisTitle:
            Chief
                Financial Officer and Senior Vice
                President
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

SHERRIE RUSSELL-BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:09cv257/MCR/GRJ

THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

BOARD OF TRUSTEES; THE 

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, LEVIN

COLLEGE OF LAW; and ROBERT

H. JERRY, II, in his individual and 

official capacities as Dean of the 

University of Florida Levin College

of Law,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

ORDER

This cause comes on for consideration upon the magistrate judge’s Report and

Recommendation dated March 21, 2012 (doc. 274). The parties have been furnished a

copy of the Report and Recommendation and have been afforded an opportunity to file

objections pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). I have made a de

novo determination of the plaintiff’s timely filed objections (see doc. 287).

Having considered the Report and Recommendation, the plaintiff’s objections, and

the defendants’ response to the plaintiff’s objections, I have determined that the Report

and Recommendation should be adopted.

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED as follows:

1. The magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation is adopted and

incorporated by reference in this order.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment on, the

Defendants’ Counterclaim (doc. 200) is DENIED.

3. The plaintiff shall submit an answer to the defendants’ counterclaim within

Case 1:09-cv-00257-MCR-GRJ Document 313 Filed 07/27/12 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

fourteen (14) days of the date of this order. 

4. The court will set this matter for a Rule 16 status conference by separate

order. 

DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of July, 2012.

s/ M. Casey Rodgers 

M. CASEY RODGERS

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case No: 1:09cv257/MCR/GRJ

Case 1:09-cv-00257-MCR-GRJ Document 313 Filed 07/27/12 Page 2 of 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-01-2000
<CASH>                                          12,979
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,593
<ALLOWANCES>                                        78
<INVENTORY>                                      7,608
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                23,792
<PP&E>                                          16,999
<DEPRECIATION>                                   9,522
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  32,648
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,378
<BONDS>                                          3,492
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            41
<OTHER-SE>                                      19,442
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    32,648
<SALES>                                         32,560
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                32,560
<CGS>                                           25,455
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   25,455
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,524
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    19
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 221
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,918
<INCOME-TAX>                                       595
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,323
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,323
<EPS-BASIC>                                      .32
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .32


</TABLE>
#### JUNIOR HALL, INC., t/a SEATON HALL v. CHARM FASHION CENTER, INC.

(Filed 17 March, 1965.)

Evidence § 58—

Where defendant’s witness testifies that the merchandise in question was defective and not marketable, it is competent for the seller’s attorney to elicit on cross-examination that the witness had appeared as a witness in another like suit and that the witness had known the purchaser over a number of years and was raised in the same town, and the court correctly instructs the jury that such testimony was admitted for the purpose of showing bias, if it did so show.

Appeal by defendant from *Huskins, J.,*November 9, 1964 “A” Civil Session, MeceleNburg Superior Court.

Civil action by plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation, to recover $1,614.25 from the defendant, a North Carolina corporation, allegedly due by account for articles of wearing apparel sold and delivered to the defendant.

The defendant answered, admitted the receipt of certain shipments of wearing apparel, but some of which on account of defective material and workmanship were unsalable and were returned to the plaintiff. The defendant denied there was any balance due on the account.

Both parties introduced evidence. The jury found the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $1,348.25. From a judgment on the verdict, the defendant appealed.

*Harkey, Faggart, Coira*& *Fletcher by Francis M. Fletcher, Jr., for plaintiff appellee. . ■-*

*Winfred R. Ervin for defendant appellant.*

PeR Curiam.

The plaintiff’s evidence, oral and record, was sufficient to go to the jury and to support the verdict. The defendant’s sole assignments of error discussed in the brief relate to the questions propounded by counsel to a defendant’s witness designed to show bias. The witness testified that she was in defendant’s store at the time a *82large shipment from Seaton Hall was delivered. “The workmanship was so poor I did not want any of it ... I told her (Mrs. Davis, President of the defendant) I would not hang it in my store even as seconds or thirds ... In my opinion the merchandise I saw was not marketable.”

On cross-examination, she testified she had known Mrs. Davis “quite a few years. Both of us were raised up near Boone.” On cross-examination, the witness testified, over objection, that she had appeared as a witness at the request of Mrs. Davis in another suit involving the return of merchandise from another shipper. The court instructed the jury: “This is admitted ... for the purpose of showing bias ... if in fact it does tend to do so ... a matter for the jury to determine.”

The testimony of the witness, in view of her relationship to the president of the defendant, was such as to be admissible on the question of bias. The court limited the testimony to that purpose. In the trial, we find

No error.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Goldrich Mining Company, (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ted R. Sharp, Chief Financial Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 81 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Goldrich Mining Company.







/s/ Ted R. Sharp                                                DATE:  August 20, 2012

Ted R. Sharp, Chief Financial Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Goldrich Mining Company and will be retained by Goldrich Mining Company to be furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.











---
Case 1:07-cv-03412-DC Document 3 Filed 02/11/2008 Page 1 of 5
Case 1:07-cv-03412-DC Document 3 Filed 02/11/2008 Page 2 of 5
Case 1:07-cv-03412-DC Document 3 Filed 02/11/2008 Page 3 of 5
Case 1:07-cv-03412-DC Document 3 Filed 02/11/2008 Page 4 of 5
Case 1:07-cv-03412-DC Document 3 Filed 02/11/2008 Page 5 of 5
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-5064

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

TERRY NATHANIAL KEITH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (CR03-568-RDB)

Submitted: April 8, 2005 Decided: April 26, 2005

Before TRAXLER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per

curiam opinion.

Ricardo Daniel Zwaig, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ellicott

City, Maryland, for Appellant. Thomas Michael DiBiagio, United

States Attorney, Harry Mason Gruber, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
*He also challenged the amount of credit given him for time

spent in state custody, but has now withdrawn that claim as

premature. 

- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Terry Nathanial Keith pled guilty on August 26, 2004, to

possession of a firearm after conviction of a felony, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). The district court sentenced

Keith on November 19, 2004, over his objection based on Blakely v.

Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), to fifty-seven months of

imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release.

The district court also specified an alternative sentence of fortyeight months of imprisonment pursuant to this court’s

recommendation in United States v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir.

2004) (order), opinion issued by 381 F.3d 316, 353-54 (4th Cir.

2004) (en banc), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 125 S. Ct.

1051 (2005).

Keith appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the

federal sentencing scheme in light of the Supreme Court’s decision

in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).* The case was

held in abeyance pending the decision in United States v. Booker,

125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). That opinion has now issued, and applies

the Court’s reasoning in Blakely to the federal sentencing

guidelines.

Keith now moves for an expedited remand of this case to

the district court to allow implementation of the alternative
- 3 -

sentence previously announced by the district court, a motion which

is unopposed by the Government. We grant the motion to allow the

district court to reconsider Keith’s sentence in light of the

Booker decision. Therefore, we affirm his conviction, vacate the

sentence imposed by the district court, and remand for

reconsideration of the sentence. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
#### BRYANT v. BALLANCE

No. 109 PC.

Case below: 13 N.C. App. 181.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 9 February 1972.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE COMPANY'S 10-Q FOR THE
QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                    1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                              MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                            754
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     573
<ALLOWANCES>                                       54
<INVENTORY>                                       109
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                1,725
<PP&E>                                          1,512
<DEPRECIATION>                                    860
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  5,322
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           5,009
<BONDS>                                           390
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                           10
<OTHER-SE>                                        303
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    5,322
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                2,826
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   2,227
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  357
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   37
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   244
<INCOME-TAX>                                      182
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                62
<DISCONTINUED>                                    225
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                      287
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .03
        


</TABLE>
#### KENNEDY v. WHALEY

No. 60P82.

Case below: 55 N.C. App. 321.

Petition by plaintiffs for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 30 March 1982.
or,lciroAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 18-0282

IN RE THE PARENTING OF D.I.B., a Minor Child,

NICHOLAS R. BRACCIALE,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

GAIL A. SULLIVAN, f/k/a GAIL ANN INGELS,

Respondent and Appellee.

FILED

JUN 1 6 2020

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of Supreme Court

State of Montana

ORDER

This matter is an appeal from the Thirteenth Judicial District Court's March 23, 2018

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order amending the parenting plan for the

parties' now fifteen-year-old daughter, D.I.B. By order dated July 3, 2018, this Court stayed

the District Court's order through the pendency of the appeal. Since that time, we have

entered two orders holding the appeal in abeyance while the parties attempted to work with

D.I.B.'s therapist in a reintegration process. Our last order for abeyance directed the filing of

status reports by September 18, 2020.

Appellee Gail Sullivan now seeks to modify the stay to permit her to

"seek enforcement in District Court of the parties' mediated agreement that was to serve as

the parties' parenting plan pending appeal." Appellant Nicholas Bracciale responds that

D.I.B.'s condition has not improved and that her treating psychiatrist has recommended that

D.I.B. be placed in a residential treatment facility, which may occur by July. Nicholas

represents that "Mlle argument here, from Nick's point of view, is entirely factual. As such,

maybe it would be more appropriate for the District Court to deal with it." The Court agrees.

This matter has been pending for more than two years, and it now appears that the

parties are at an impasse regarding the next step forward. As such, it is appropriate that the

District Court consider any factual disputes about D.I.B.'s arrangements with her parents.

06/16/2020

Case Number: DA 18-0282
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the stay previously entered by this Court is

MODIFIED to allow the District Court to consider D.I.B.'s current condition and the parties'

circumstances to determine whether enforcement or further amendments to the

amended parenting plan are appropriate. This Court's order requiring status reports by

September 18, 2020, remains in effect. The parties are directed to address in that report

whether this appeal should be dismissed without prejudice to their right to appeal further

parenting orders entered in this matter.

The Clerk is directed to provide immediate notice of this Order to all counsel of

record in Yellowstone County Cause No. DR 06-60 and to the Thirteenth Judicial District

Court, the Hon. Donald L. Harris, presiding.

Dated this I L day of June, 2020.

Chief Justice
<PAGE>

                                                            Exhibit 32.1
                                                            ------------





                        CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                         18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                         AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
              SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the quarterly report of K-V Pharmaceutical Company
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2006,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Marc S. Hermelin, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
          13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
          all material respects, the financial condition and results
          of operations of the Company.







Date:  March 25, 2008                    /s/ Marc S. Hermelin
                                  ------------------------------------
                                           Marc S. Hermelin
                                  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
                                      (Principal Executive Officer)
**Exhibit10.1**

 

**STRAIGHT NOTE**

 

| $300,000 |   |   | South El Monte,  California |   | March 17, 2004 |
|----------|--------|--------|-----------------------------|--------|----------------|

 

For value received, Lee Pharmaceuticals promises topay Roberts Proprietaries Inc. or order, at South El Monte, California the sumof THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS, with interest from March 17, 2004, on unpaidprincipal at the rate of twenty (20) per cent annum; principal is payablemonthly, commencing on April 1, 2004, with monthly principal payments of$5,000. Interest shall be calculated on the basis of the unpaid principalbalance daily, based on a 365-day year, actual day month and payable monthly.Principal and interest shall be payable in lawful money of the United States.If action were instituted on this note, I promise to pay such sum as the Courtmay fix as attorney’s fees. This note is secured by the trademark on theproduct brand Zip®.

 

This promissory note replaces the $200,000 promissorynote, dated July 1, 2002, which has been paid down to $100,000 as of March 1,2004. All other terms and conditions (including the Security Agreement,Amendment No. 1 to 1988 Security Agreement, Guarantee of Ronald G. Lee andExhibits) of the December 1, 1998, original $500,000 promissory note, remain inforce except as stated in the above paragraph of this new promissory note, datedMarch 17, 2004.

 

 
| MARCH 17, 2004 |                                          | /s/ RONALD G. LEE      |   |
|----------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------|
| Date           | Lee Pharmaceuticals - Ronald G. Lee           |
|           |                                          |
| MARCH 17, 2004 |                                          | /s/ MICHAEL L. AGRESTI |   |
| Date           | Lee Pharmaceuticals – Michael L. Agresti |

 

----
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

EDITH OWENS,

Plaintiff,

vs. CASE NO.: 1:10-CV-20-SPM/AK

FIRST FEDERAL BANK OF FLORIDA,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the Plaintiff's Notice of

Settlement (doc. 26). Pursuant to Northern District of Florida Local Rule 16.2(D),

it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. This case is hereby dismissed.

2. The Court shall retain jurisdiction for a period of 60 days, during

which time any party may move to reopen for good cause shown.

DONE AND ORDERED this tenth day of September, 2010.

s/ Stephan P. Mickle

Stephan P. Mickle

Chief United States District Judge