alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1758 

To extend a repayment contract relating to the Purgatoire River Water 

Conservancy District and to authorize the District to develop an excess 

capacity contract to offset repayment costs, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 10, 2019 

Mr. GARDNER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To extend a repayment contract relating to the Purgatoire 

River Water Conservancy District and to authorize the 

District to develop an excess capacity contract to offset 

repayment costs, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. TRINIDAD DAM, PURGATOIRE RIVER, COLO4 RADO. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the maximum 

6 term of the repayment of the irrigation first cost described 

7 in House Document 325, 84th Congress, 2d Session, the 

8 Commissioner of Reclamation may extend the contract 


khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1758 IS

1 with the Purgatoire River Water Conservancy District re2 lating to the Purgatoire project for the Trinidad Dam on 

3 Purgatoire River, Colorado, authorized by section 203 of 

4 the Flood Control Act of 1958 (72 Stat. 309) to allow 

5 for a maximum term of the repayment of the irrigation 

6 first cost of not more than 100 years. 

7 (b) EXCESS CAPACITY.— 

8 (1) AUTHORIZATION.—Notwithstanding any 

9 other provision of law, the Commissioner of Rec10 lamation may enter into excess capacity contracts at 

11 the project described in subsection (a). 

12 (2) USE OF REVENUE.—Notwithstanding the 

13 reclamation laws, any revenue derived from a con14 tract for the use of the excess capacity at the project 

15 described in subsection (a) shall be— 

16 (A) first credited toward the outstanding 

17 repayment obligation of the Purgatoire River 

18 Water Conservancy District under the contract 

19 referred to in subsection (a); and 

20 (B) after the outstanding repayment obli21 gation referred to in subparagraph (A) is repaid 

22 in full, credited toward the annual operations, 

23 maintenance, and replacement obligation of the 

24 Purgatoire River Water Conservancy District. 


khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 1758 IS

1 (c) OPERATIONS, MAINTENANCE, AND REPLACE2 MENT COSTS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of 

3 law, the operations, maintenance, and replacement costs 

4 of the Corps of Engineers described in the contract re5 ferred to in subsection (a) and annually invoiced to the 

6 Purgatoire River Water Conservancy District shall not ex7 ceed the lesser of— 

8 (1) the actual costs of the Corps of Engineers, 

9 determined in accordance with the terms of the con10 tract; and 

11 (2) the calculation of the Bureau of Reclama12 tion of the actual costs of the Corps of Engineers for 

13 a single-purpose irrigation reservoir facility. 

Æ 


khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS
#### STATE v. OXENDINE

No. 2 PC.

Case below: 40 N.C. App. 280.

Application by defendant for further review denied 25 September 1979.
NOTICE TO CLERK OF COURT: Please accept this Initiating Complaint as an initial pleading 

pursuant to CMO __, dated ____________, of Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein in In Re World Trade 

Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litigation, 21 MC 102 (AKH). 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

--------------------------------------------------------------X 

 

IN RE WORLD TRADE CENTER LOWER 

MANHATTAN DISASTER SITE LITIGATION 

 

--------------------------------------------------------------X 

21 MC 102 (AKH) 

--------------------------------------------------------------X 

XXXXX, 

 Plaintiff(s), 

 -againstXXXXX, 

 Defendants. 

--------------------------------------------------------------X 

 XX Civ. XXXX (AKH) 

INITIATING COMPLAINT

Pursuant to Case Management Order No. __ (“CMO __”) dated June __, 2007 by Hon. 

Alvin K. Hellerstein, U.S.D.J., in In Re World Trade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site 

Litigation, 21 MC 102 (AKH), Plaintiff(s) hereby submit this Initiating Complaint against the 

above named Defendants and state: 

1. Plaintiff ____________ (XXXX) [Å last 4 digits of social security number] 

currently resides at ______________. 

2. Plaintiff(s) have a claim for injury against the Defendants named above that 

would be encompassed within the scope of the In Re World Trade Center Lower Manhattan 

Disaster Site Litigation, 21 MC 102 (AKH). 

3. Plaintiffs will file a fully complete Check-Off Complaint under this docket 

number within 30 days of the filing of this Initiating Complaint. 

Case 1:07-cv-03479-AKH Document 3-4 Filed 06/29/2007 Page 1 of 2
NOTICE TO CLERK OF COURT: Please accept this Initiating Complaint as an initial pleading 

pursuant to CMO __, dated ____________, of Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein in In Re World Trade 

Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litigation, 21 MC 102 (AKH). 

Dated: _____ __, 200X 

{law firm name} 

Attorney(s) for 

Plaintiff(s)_______________________ 

By: ________ 

 {name} 

{law firm address} 

Telephone: _______________ 

Case 1:07-cv-03479-AKH Document 3-4 Filed 06/29/2007 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 13.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the annual report on Form 20-F of Bontan Corporation Inc.. for the year ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, I hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.  The annual report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2.  The information contained in the annual report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Bontan Corporation Inc.








Date:  July 23, 2010








/s/ Kam Shah





Kam Shah


Chief Executive Officer  and Chief Financial Officer











A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Case 1:07-cv-03553-VM     Document 4      Filed 06/04/2007     Page 1 of 2

Case 1:07-cv-03553-VM     Document 4      Filed 06/04/2007     Page 2 of 2
# Presidential Determination on Energy Assistance for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

# Memorandum for the Secretary of State

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 610(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the “Act”), I hereby determine that it is necessary for the purposes of the Act that $25 million in FY07 funds available for assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States under the Act and the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act be transferred to and consolidated with funds made available for chapter 4 of part II of the Act, and such funds are hereby transferred and consolidated. 

In addition, pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 614(a)(1) of the Act, I hereby determine that it is important to the security interests of the United States to furnish up to $25 million in funds made available pursuant to chapter 4 of part II of the Act, comprised of funds transferred pursuant to this determination, for energy assistance for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea without regard to any provision of law within the purview of section 614(a)(1) of the Act. I hereby authorize the furnishing of this assistance. 

                    You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this determination to the Congress and to arrange for its publication in the                     **Federal Register**                    .                 

[FR Doc. 07-4953

Billing code 4710-10-P
#### INSURANCE GROUP v. PARKER

No. 20 PC.

Case below: 24 N.C. App. 452.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals allowed 2 April 1975.
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 5 Filed 04/27/2007 Page 1 of 1
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 1 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 2 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 3 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 4 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 5 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 6 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 7 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 8 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 9 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 10 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 11 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 12 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 13 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 14 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 15 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 16 of 17
Case 1:07-cv-03258-VM Document 3-2 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 17 of 17
#### STATE v. GUNN

No. 27 PC.

Case below: 24 N.C. App. 561.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 2 April 1975.
!y F{y Y1'Y ': l ELKC;':*'.:: ~:c;,L., 1 *-& !; C'NITEU STATES DIS'I'RICT COIJRT ? i ! ! DOC 2: ;r S(lU'l'1 IERN DISTRICT Ol NEW YORK i _.__._l.r_ _ E, i \\;~gr~;~-{i,i:,-;:): --- 5:3&-cR ..," 7; I. - t 

:,__ .--" .--.- ---. .u.-,rrF---"-' .,'+--., .-. .I <.- ' 

IK RE: 

j MAS-I'EK FlLE 

FOSAhl,AX PRODTJCTS LI;\131LI'l'Y I I I'IG.4TION 

I 1 106-MD- 1789 (Jl'K) 

l'hir. Ur)c./,nrr.n~ Kt~/tr!c.s Tu All Acriotw 

OKI)EK FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC \'1C E 

Considcring thc Ccrtiticate oS Good Sta~ldi~~g and all nthcr documents required by Case 

Managenlent Order No. 3 submitted by counsel. IT IS HFREI31' 0RT)ERE':T) that: 

Applicant's Name: S. Lccnan C';irter 

Firm Name: iVnllcr. Lansden. Dortch & Davis, I .I .P 

Address: 51 1 1 Inion Streil.l. Suite 2700 

is adulirtcd to practice pro hac \.ice as cou~lsel for hlcrck & Co., lnc, in the above captionrd case 

\ in the United States District Court for the Suulhel.n Ilistrict of Ncw Ynrk. 

A 

'" Jlaled: ~a~'.. 7008 

New Yorli. Kt.\v I'rlrh 

. . . . . . .- . LfA, - . 

llnitcd Status Ilist rid Judge 

Case 1:07-cv-03462-JFK Document 32 Filed 05/30/2008 Page 1 of 2
CEItTIFICATE OF GOOD STANDING 

; ss, 

.\.lIUULE DISTRICT OF TENNKSSI'II 

1. KEI'I'H 'I'HIIOClihlOII'I'I~.U. Clerk ui' the L'nilcd Slates Ilistrict C:ourt for the Middle 

1)istr.icl of'l'cnncsscc. 

110 I Il-,KIX3Y C'ER'I I1 Y I hat S. KEENAN CARTER lvas duly ndmittcd li! jlrdct~cc in said 

('our1 on ,lutlc 2Sih, 2004, :ind IS in good standing as a rneu~bcr 01' ~hu b;~r 01-said Courr. 

Case 1:07-cv-03462-JFK Document 32 Filed 05/30/2008 Page 2 of 2
#### AYERS v. ROWLAND

No. 78 PC.

Case below: 32 N.C. App. 599.

Petition by plaintiff for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 3 May 1977.
#### SUSIE JANE WALLS v. CITY OF WINSTON-SALEM.

(Filed 7 April, 1965.)

Municipal Corporations § 12—

Plaintiff’s evidence tending to show that she knew of the existence of a hole in the asphalt in the street adjoining the concrete curb in front of her house and that she stepped into the hole and fell on returning at night from a neighboring house, *is held,*to disclose contributory negligence as a matter of law, since if the hole constituted a hazard plaintiff’s failure to remember it was inexcusable.

Appeal by plaintiff from *Olive, E. J.,*August 31, 1964 Nonjury Session, Foesyth Superior Court.

The plaintiff who lived at 720 Alexander Street in the City of Winston-Salem, instituted this civil action to recover damages for the injury she sustained on the night of October 12, 1963, when she stepped in a hole in the street pavement in front of her home. The sidewalk was unimproved. The street was of asphalt construction with a concrete curb extending 18 inches into the street. The asphalt abutted this curb.

A concrete walk extended 16 feet from the plaintiff’s doorstep to the curb. Opposite the end of the walk the asphalt had raveled, leaving a depression about 18 inches long, about the same width, and a maximum depth of six to eight inches at the low point. The depression had existed for approximately two months. The plaintiff testified she gave agents of the city notice of the depression. It was not repaired.

At about 7:30 or 8:00 o’clock the plaintiff, on a visit to her daughter nearby, stepped in the hole and was injured. The light, half a block away, showed dimly on the hole which was filled by falling leaves. The plaintiff bases her claim for damages on the city’s alleged negligent failure to keep its streets in proper repair.

From a judgment of compulsory nonsuit entered on defendant’s motion, the plaintiff excepted and appealed.

*233
      *Clyde C. Randolph, Jr., George E. Clayton, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.*

*Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice by I. E. Carlyle, and H. Grady Barnhill, Jr., for defendant appellee.*

PER Cueiam.

The court, sitting in this nonjury case, did not render judgment on the merits; but at the close of plaintiff's evidence entered judgment of nonsuit. The judgment may be sustained only if the evidence is insufficient to make out a case of negligence against the city, or if it discloses that plaintiff’s negligence, as a matter of law, caused or contributed to her injury. According to the plaintiff’s own evidence, the hole in which she fell had been there, to her knowledge, for two months. Both she and her husband were accustomed to park the family automobile over it. If the hole constituted a hazard, her failure to remember it was certainly inexcusable. The plaintiff’s failure to exercise reasonable care for her own safety constitutes negligence as a matter of law. The nonsuit is

Affirmed.
Case 1:06-cv-15128-AKH Document 4 Filed 12/08/2006 Page 1 of 1
EXHIBIT 15.1

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-151194 on Form F-3
of our reports dated June 30, 2010 relating to the consolidated financial statements of National Bank of Greece S.A. and subsidiaries (the "Group") (which report expresses an unqualified
opinion on those consolidated financial statements and includes explanatory paragraphs regarding (a) the translation of Euro amounts into U.S. dollar amounts for the convenience of the readers
in the United States in accordance with Note 2 of such consolidated financial statements, (b) the retrospective adjustment of the consolidated financial statements for the adoption of
guidance issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board that addresses the accounting for noncontrolling interests and (c) the restatement of the certain disclosures in Note 37), and
the effectiveness of the Group's internal control over financial reporting, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 20-F of the Group for the year ended December 31, 2009.

/s/
Deloitte.
Hadjipavlou, Sofianos & Cambanis S.A.
Athens, Greece
June 30, 2010

---



QuickLinks
#### Susan Lipton, Plaintiff, v Charles Lipton, Defendant.

Supreme Court, New York County,

August 22, 1986

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Reich & Reich (Louis Reich*of counsel), for plaintiff. *Bernard Dworkin*for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Walter Schackman, J.

Plaintiff Susan Lipton and defendant Charles Lipton were engaged to be married in December 1983. As a symbol of the parties’ intentions and implied promises to marry, the defendant gave an engagement ring to the plaintiff at that time, and the parties were married in August 1984. In this action for divorce, the court must determine whether the engagement ring is marital or separate property and thus whether it should be included in the property to be distributed pursuant to the Equitable Distribution Law.*

An engagement ring is a gift to which a condition subse*1077quent, the fulfillment of the marriage agreement, is attached. *(Wilson v Riggs,*243 App Div 33, *affd*267 NY 570.) Both parties agree that the condition occurred, but they disagree as to the time of the vesting of the gift. The defendant argues that since the condition was fulfilled upon their marriage, vesting occurred on the wedding day and therefore the property is marital property. However, it is well settled that although a gift made in contemplation of marriage is conditional, it is absolute in form when given. *(Wilson v Riggs, supra; Beck v Cohen,*237 App Div 729.) The mere fact that a gift absolute in form may be defeated on the happening of a certain event does not invalidate the gift. (38 CJS, Gifts, § 37; *Lowe v Quinn,*27 NY2d 397; *Cohen v Bayside Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn.,*62 Misc 2d 738.) Thus, it was absolute in form on the day it was given.

All the elements of an inter vivos gift were satisfied. *(See, Matter of Szabo,*10 NY2d 94, 98.) The ring was delivered and accepted. Whether in a given instance the gift is conditional or absolute is an ordinary question of intention to be determined by an express declaration in the making of the gift or from the circumstances. (38 CJS, Gifts, § 61.) The facts and circumstances herein demonstrate that defendant had the requisite donative intent. The question of the conditional nature of the gift became moot upon the marriage when the ring unconditionally became the property of the plaintiff.

Therefore, the ring given prior to the marriage retains its character as separate property not subject to equitable distribution.

*

 The court is aware of a recent decision by Justice Zitler *(Addeo v Addeo,*NYLJ, July 15, 1986, at 12, col 6 [Sup Ct, Kings County]). While the court agrees with the result, it is of the opinion that the issue of whether an engagement ring should be marital property upon dissolution of the marriage is particularly amenable to analysis on traditional principles of property law.
#### West Chicago Street R. R. Co. v. Theodore Becker, for the use of, etc.

1. *Presumptions—In the Absence of a Bill of*Exceptions.—Where a bill of exceptions does not show the reason for dismissing a writ of certiorari, the Appellate Court will presume that the court below had a good reason for doing so.

Memorandum.—Certiorari. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1894, and affirmed.

Opinion filed February 12, 1895.

Edmund Furthmann, attorney for appellant.

Will F. Wanless and Chas. O. Knudson, attorneys for appellee.

*534Mb. Justioe Gaby

delivebbd the opinion of thf, Coubt.

April 21, 1894, the appellant filed a petition for a certiorari, to remove a cause in which judgment had been rendered against it from before a justice into the Superior Court, which was granted the same day. The affidavit verifying the petition was sworn to March 19, 1894. May 19, 1894, the record shows : “ On motion of plaintiff’s attorney, it is ordered that the writ of certiorari issued in said cause, be, and is hereby dismissed, at defendant’s costs, and that a *procedendo*do issue herein to the court below.”

The ground of the petition is that the appellant was summoned as a garnishee in an attachment suit commenced by the firm of Wanless *&*Knudson against Theodore Becker, to appear January 26, 1894; that January 25, 1894, it filed an answer denying all indebtedness; that the justice continued the case, first, to February 3d, then to February 6th, then to February 19,1894, and then entered judgment against the appellant for $200; that such last continuance was not for the purpose of taking any deposition.

Whether by this last continuance the justice lost jurisdiction, is a question which may be profitably studied with the aid of Harrison v. Chipp, 25 Ill. 575, Crichton v. Beebe, 7 Ill. App. 272, and People v. Jarrett, 7 Ill. App. 566, but which we need not decide. Whether trespass will lie for enforcing the judgment is not yet a subject of inquiry.

Why the court dismissed the' writ of certiorari does not appear on this record, for though there is a bill of exceptions, it is so useless that it is not abstracted, being merely that the appellant excepted to the action of the court, without "showing what was the ground of .such action. Such a bill merely shows that the appellant was dissatisfied. It is, therefore, to be presumed that the court had a good reason. Blair v. Ray, 103 Ill. 615; Chicago v. Porter, 124 Ill. 589; Chi. R. I. & P. Ry. v. Town of Calumet, 151 Ill. 512; Matson v. Lally, 37 Ill. App. 484; Chicago World Book Co. v. Brewer, 57 Ill. App. 526.

The judgment is affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 24.1


                                POWER OF ATTORNEY


KNOW ALL BY THESE PRESENTS, that each person whose signature appears below
constitutes and appoints each of John J. Davis and Randall J. Schmidt, with full
power to each to act without the other, his or her true and lawful
attorney-in-fact and agent with full power of substitution, for him or her and
in his or her name, place and stead, in any and all capacities, to sign the
Annual Report on Form 10-K of eBenX, Inc. (the "Company") for the Company's
fiscal year ended December 31, 2001, and any or all amendments to said Annual
Report, and to file the same, with all exhibits thereto, and other documents in
connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and to file
the same with such other authorities as necessary, granting unto each such
attorney-in-fact and agent full power and authority to do and perform each and
every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and about the
premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as he or she might or could do in
person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that each such attorney-in-fact and
agent, or his substitute, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the following persons have signed this Power of
Attorney on this 27th day of March 2002.


       /s/ Mark W. Tierney                       /s/ James P. Bradley
     -------------------------                 -------------------------
           Mark W. Tierney                           James P. Bradley

       /s/ John J. Davis                         /s/ Daniel M. Cain
     -------------------------                 -------------------------
           John J. Davis                             Daniel M. Cain

       /s/ Randall J. Schmidt                    /s/ Alain C. Enthoven
     -------------------------                 -------------------------
           Randall J. Schmidt                        Alain C. Enthoven

       /s/ Paul V. Barber                        /s/ Frank C. Witthun
     -------------------------                 -------------------------
           Paul V. Barber                            Frank C. Witthun
#### IN RE FORECLOSURE OF DEED OF TRUST

No. 56PA82.

Case below: 55 N.C. App. 373.

Petition by Robinsons for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 allowed 30 March 1982. Motion of respondents to dismiss appeal for lack of significant public interest denied 30 March 1982.