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Supervisory Research Psychologist, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute

for Occupational Safety and Health, Pittsburgh, PA. Electronic mail may be sent to

rep8@cdc.gov

THE CHALLENGE OF ENFORCING SAFETY RULES

IN REMOTE HAZARDOUS WORK AREAS

Robert H. Peters1

 Are the safety rules in your work place effective? Do supervisors enforce them as they

should? Do supervisors abide by these rules? Safety rules are an important aspect of many

company safety programs, particularly if employees must work in an intrinsically hazardous

environment such as a coal mine. However, for various reasons, supervisors sometimes fail to

enforce safety rules (Arvey & Jones, 1985; Hartshorn, 1998). This paper presents some findings

obtained from interviews with coal miners about why supervisors sometimes fail to enforce an

important mine safety rule. It also contains a few suggestions addressing what could be done to

help supervisors perform this job function more effectively.

 The safety rule: Don't go underneath unsupported roof. The typical cycle of operations in a

continuous coal mining section consists of two basic phases: (1) extracting the coal, and (2)

supporting the roof. The roof is supported by inserting anchoring bolts that are usually 4 to 8 feet

in length, and are usually spaced four or five feet apart. There is an interval between these two

phases when it is possible for miners to go beyond the last row of roof bolts. If miners need to

work under unsupported roof before it has been bolted, they should set temporary supports (i.e.,

mechanically operated safety jacks or wooden posts).

 We know the following facts about unsupported roof: 
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 (1) One can easily determine where the area of unsupported roof is by examining the roof for

bolts.

 (2) Roof conditions are often quite varied within a mine. In some areas, it is unlikely that a

miner will be harmed if under unsupported roof for a short time. However, it is impossible for

miners to judge how soon an area of unsupported roof might fall.

 (3) Nearly all miners know going beneath unsupported roof is prohibited by mine safety

regulations and that many people have been killed while under unsupported roof.

 Unfortunately, miners sometimes perceive the benefits of this behavior to be worth the risks. 

During the period 1992-96, 50 coal miners were killed by roof falls, and more than 5,000 were

injured (McAteer and Reich, 1992-96). In most years, roof falls are the leading cause of fatalities

among coal miners. Miners dramatically increase the chances of being harmed by a roof fall

when they enter areas of the mine where the roof is not supported. Approximately one-half of all

miners killed by roof falls are in an area where the roof is unsupported.

 We performed a study to reveal reasons miners sometimes go under unsupported roof and to

obtain miners' opinions about preventing this unsafe behavior. Interviews were conducted with

268 coal miners and 29 first-line supervisors at 6 different mining companies. As part of these

interviews, employees were asked several questions concerning the enforcement of rules about

avoiding areas of unsupported roof.

Expectations concerning noncompliance with a safety rule.

 For company safety policies to have their intended effect, employees must have clear

expectations about what types of action will be taken if they violate a safety rule. Consequences

of violating a safety rule fall into two categories: formal and informal. Formal consequences
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might include sanctions such as days off without pay, or written warnings. These actions are

usually part of the company's written policies concerning employee conduct. However,

supervisors sometimes use informal methods to discourage unsafe acts, such as talking to

employees about the risks they are taking, or threatening the use of formal action if rule

violations continue. Supervisors may attempt to influence employees via informal methods prior

to utilizing the more formal disciplinary system specified by the organization. Thus a transition

between the two might be viewed as a means of escalating negative influence.

 Miners were asked a few questions to determine what their expectations were concerning the

consequences of being found under unsupported roof. They were first asked, "Does this

company have a policy about going under unsupported roof?" At each mine, miners almost

always responded "yes". Next, miners were asked to explain the policy. Their comments suggest

that virtually everyone realized going under unsupported roof was formally prohibited by the

company; however, almost no one had a confident expectation about what formal action the

company may take in response to employees who repeatedly disobeyed the rule.

 There are several potential explanations for why miners did not have a confident expectation

about what type of disciplinary action would be taken. When company safety officials were

asked about this issue, they usually said decisions concerning the severity of the action had to be

made on a case-by-case basis. Also, none of the companies in this study had a policy specifically

dealing with working under unsupported roof (as opposed to other types of unsafe employee

behavior).

 Other factors that may prevent employees from having clear expectations about the

consequences of violating a safety rule include:
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(1) The policy is too long and complicated for most employees to understand or remember.

(2) The policy has not been regularly reviewed with employees.

(3) The policy is rarely enforced.

(4) Situations pertaining to the policy rarely arise.

 The person with the greatest potential to promote safe work practices is the first-line

supervisor. The supervisor’s statements and actions have as much (if not more) impact on the

crew's behavior than formal company safety policy. Therefore, an attempt was made to assess

miners' expectations about how their supervisor would react if he/she found them working under

unsupported roof. Miners were given a card containing a list of five response options (see table

1) and asked to answer the following questions:

Question 1: Using one option on this response card, please tell me how likely it is that your

supervisor would say something to you if he/she saw you working under unsupported roof.

Question 2: How likely is it that your supervisor would report your actions to someone else in

management if he/she saw you working under unsupported roof twice within the same week?

Table 1 summarizes miners' responses to these two questions. The responses to Question 1 

Table 1. Miners’ ratings of how likely their supervisor would take an action in

response to seeing them beneath unsupported roof under two sets of circumstances.

Rating Question 1: How likely

supervisor would say

something to you

(%)

Question 2: How likely supervisor

would report you

(%)

Very Likely 68.9 33.8

Likely 21.3 19.2

Have no idea 3.1 22.1

Unlikely 4.0 16.9

Very Unlikely 2.7 8.0
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suggest that an overwhelming majority of miners interviewed believe their supervisor would say

something if he/she saw them working under unsupported roof. Conversely, a substantial

number doubt their supervisor would report their actions to someone else in management if

he/she saw them working under unsupported roof twice within the same week. Crew members

who had been working for the same supervisor for a considerable period of time often held

widely different views about how the supervisor would react to such a situation. Most crews

clearly lacked a consensus opinion about what their supervisor would do. Some thought that the

supervisor would initiate some type of formal action; others thought it was unlikely; several said

they simply had no idea.

"Looking the other way"

 At many large coal mines, higher-level mine managers seldom visit underground work sites. 

Consequently, the first-line supervisor is often the only person in a position to stop miners from

violating company safety rules. Unfortunately, there are a variety of reasons why supervisors

may wish to simply "look the other way," rather than stop someone from performing an unsafe

act. To help determine the reasons supervisors may ignore miners who go beyond the edge of

supported roof, crew supervisors were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or

disagreed with eight statements. Supervisors were asked to respond to each statement using a

six-point agree-disagree rating scale. Response options ranged from 1 for “strongly agree” to 6

for “strongly disagree.” Table 2 lists each reason and shows the percentage of supervisors who

agreed, as well as the mean value of their responses. Most supervisors disagreed with all but two

of the eight statements. 
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Table 2. Percentage of supervisors agreeing that various reasons explain why supervisors

sometimes ignore miners who go under unsupported roof.

Reason Agree

(%)

Mean

Value

They are too busy taking care of production-related matters 73.1 3.08

Because foremen occasionally go under unsupported roof themselves, they don't say

anything to others because they feel they would be viewed as having a double

standard

65.4 2.96

They believe that it is very unlikely that the person will be hurt by a roof fall 46.4 3.73

They believe that if they reprimand a miner for being under unsupported roof, the person

will become hostile and uncooperative

46.2 3.73

They think the union would object to the use of disciplinary action 41.2 4.00

They have tried talking people out of working under unsupported roof before, but

they just wouldn't listen

34.6 4.23

They think that they should not interfere because they believe that the miner is aware of

the risks he/she is taking

30.8 4.27

They doubt whether mine management would support the use of disciplinary action in

such a situation

25.9 4.46

 Seventy-three percent of the supervisors agreed with Reason # 5: "One of the main reasons

supervisors sometimes ignore people who go under unsupported roof is that they are too busy

taking care of production-related matters." This finding correlates with statements that

supervisors made in response to an earlier interview question. When asked to explain why

supervisors sometimes ignore miners who go under unsupported roof, the reason cited most

frequently was the desire or pressure to mine an acceptable amount of coal. This suggests that

upper management must stress the importance of avoiding unsupported roof in all situations. If

crew supervisors believe that higher level managers want them or their crews to risk going under

unsupported roof in some situations (e.g., to avoid falling behind in production), some will likely

do so. If mine managers fail to regularly communicate the importance of avoiding unsupported

roof, some supervisors may interpret this as an indication of apathy or even implicit approval.
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 Most supervisors also agreed with Reason # 8: "Because supervisors occasionally go under

unsupported roof themselves, they don't say anything to others because they feel they would be

viewed as having a double standard." It is rather surprising that so many supervisors agreed with

this statement. However, other sources of information seem to confirm the notion that crew

supervisors sometimes go under unsupported roof themselves. During the interviews, several

miners remarked that supervisors commit this unsafe act more often than anyone in the crew. 

Additionally, a study by Snyder (1986) suggests that the fatality rate for underground coal mine

supervisors is significantly higher than that for the average mine production worker (0.10 versus

0.06 per 200,000 hours exposure). The reasons for this may include:

 1. Supervisors feel that since they are accountable for the safety of their crew, they (instead of

a crew member) should take the risks. One supervisor commented, "If something needs to be

done under unsupported roof, I do it myself. I never send anyone else."

 2. Supervisors feel production pressures more directly than crew members; they are held

directly accountable for production.

 3. Supervisors know that no one is going to criticize them. Usually, no one is around to see

their actions (except perhaps a crew member), and crew members are unlikely to tell upper

management that the supervisor is doing something he/she should not.

 There are two reasons why it is very important that all supervisors genuinely believe that going

under unsupported roof should be avoided regardless of the situation. First, it is difficult for

management to control supervisor actions because other managers are rarely present to monitor

their behavior. Second, supervisors’ actions have a critical influence on their crew's willingness
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to comply with safety rules. Crew supervisors must be aware that they serve as models and,

consequently, they must follow all safety procedures.

How should supervisors respond?

 One reason supervisors sometimes do nothing to correct unsafe behavior may be their

uncertainty about appropriate actions given the circumstances surrounding the violation. To

obtain some information regarding what supervisors should do when they see miners under

unsupported roof, we asked miners and supervisors the following open-ended questions:

Question 1: What should a supervisor do the first time he/she sees someone working beyond

the last row of roof supports?

Question 2: What should a supervisor do the second time he/she sees the same individual

beyond the last row of roof supports?

Table 3 summarizes their replies to the first question. The vast majority thought the supervisor

should simply say something to let the person know he/she is not allowed to go under 

Table 3. Percentage of miners and supervisors who

recommended that supervisors take various actions the first

time they see someone beyond the last row of roof supports

Response Miners

(%)

Supervisors

(%)

Tell him/her not to do it 92.0 86.2

Inform management 3.6 3.4

Issue a formal written warning 3.2 3.4

Recommend suspension 1.2 6.9

 Total number of interviewees 251 29

unsupported roof, and leave it at that. Only 8 percent of the miners and 13.8 percent of the

supervisors thought that supervisors should report the incident. Replies to the second question
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are summarized in Table 4. These responses indicate that most miners thought the supervisor

should, in some way, report the incident the second time an individual is seen under unsupported

roof. Only 30.3 percent of the miners and 17.2 percent of the supervisors who responded thought

that supervisors should not report the incident.

Table 4. Percentage of miners and supervisors who recommended that

supervisors take various actions the second time they see the same individual

beyond the last row of roof supports.

Response Miners

(%)

Supervisors

(%)

Tell him/her not to do it 30.3 17.2

Inform management 28.3 20.7

Issue a formal written warning 19.3 31.0

Recommend suspension 16.9 13.8

Inform the mine safety committee or a union official 2.4 6.9

Recommend transferring the miner to a different job 1.6 3.4

Recommend discharge 1.2 6.9

 Total number of interviewees 254 29

 Interestingly, there appears to be some discrepancy between miners' responses to the questions

about what supervisors should do versus what their supervisor actually would do the second time

he/she saw them working under unsupported roof. Seventy percent of the miners thought that

supervisors should inform management the second time. In contrast, only 53 percent thought it

likely their supervisor would report their actions to management if he/she saw them under

unsupported roof twice within the same week. There are at least two potential explanations for

the discrepancy in these two percentages. This discrepancy could reflect a tendency for some

miners to see their supervisor as too lenient on this issue, i.e., miners believe that their supervisor

should take formal action, but think it is unlikely he/she would actually do so. However, miners
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did not say anything during the interviews to suggest they viewed their supervisor as too lenient

with those who violate safety rules. Rather, most said their supervisors were very concerned

about the crew’s safety, and would not allow miners to go under unsupported roof.

 Research on attribution theory suggests that this discrepancy may reflect a tendency for some

miners to think their supervisor would be more likely to excuse them for going under unsupported

roof rather than someone else. Social psychologists have documented the existence of a self-other

bias in the attributions people make about the reasons for undesirable or deviant behaviors (Jones

& Nisbett, 1972). According to attribution theory, people tend to attribute such behaviors to some

faulty internal characteristic of the person when someone else performed the behavior (e.g., the

person was too foolish or lazy to avoid the unsupported roof). However, people attempt to protect

self-esteem by accounting for their own actions in terms of external causes that absolve them of

any blame (e.g., I was unaware that I was under unsupported roof, or I was faced with an

"emergency" or unusual circumstance and had no other option). This might explain why some

miners are more inclined to think their supervisor would excuse an unsafe act if committed by

themselves rather than someone else. Because miners may tend to assume that their own actions

could be justified, they may believe their supervisor would excuse the transgression.

 In addition to having clear expectations about the consequences of violating company safety

rules, employees must believe that the policy is fair and consistently enforced. Arvey and Jones

(1985) note that punished individuals form judgments about the fairness of the punishment, and

this perception guides their responses to the punishment. Perceptions of inequity must be

minimized; inequity can lead to employee behavior that is detrimental to the organization and to

other employees, e.g., frustration, apathy, absenteeism, sabotage, or theft. Arvey and Jones
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propose that judgments about the fairness of disciplinary actions are likely to be based on (1) the

individual's knowledge about the actual rule infraction committed, (2) whether the punishment

somehow "fits the crime," and (3) whether other employees have committed similar offenses, yet

gone unpunished.

 The following methods might help improve compliance with safety rules and minimize the

negative side effects often associated with rule enforcement:

 (1) Solicit input from supervisors and representatives from the hourly work force in formulating

policies to deal with workers who violate safety rules. Employees are less likely to object to the

use of disciplinary actions when employee representatives have helped develop the policy and

have voiced support for it.

 (2) A clear policy concerning employee safety-related behavior is needed. This policy should

(a) clearly delineate the conditions under which various negative sanctions will be applied, (b)

explain why it is important--to both the company and the employee--that individuals comply with

safety rules; and (c) be communicated regularly to the work force.

 (3) Supervisors should be trained in proper procedures for correcting unsafe employee

behavior. They should be shown role models interacting with employees found violating a safety

rule and should participate in role-playing exercises on how to handle these situations. 

Supervisors should know how important it is to never ignore employees found violating safety

rules. When supervisors disregard this behavior, they send an implicit message to employees

saying they either do not care about compliance with the rule or may actually condone violating

the rule in some circumstances.
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 (4) The consequences of violating a safety rule should be applied soon after the infraction and

should be applied fairly and consistently--from situation to situation and person to person.

Conclusion

 It is often easier to prevent employees from performing unsafe acts through manipulations of

the work environment than through disciplinary action or motivational programs. Accident

prevention programs must seek to identify reasons for the unsafe behavior and to redesign the

work environment (e.g., tools, equipment, physical surroundings) to shield or remove employees

from sources of harm and to prevent situations that may prompt unsafe acts. Unfortunately, in

several industries (including underground coal mining), the work environment is innately

hazardous, rapidly changing, and unpredictable--making it difficult, perhaps impossible, to fully

protect employees by environmental manipulations. In these situations, companies must have

effective safety policies. These policies must specify what is expected of employees and the

consequences of violating rules. However, formulating good safety policies is only the first step. 

For policies to be effective, they must be clearly communicated to all employees and supervisors. 

They must understand the policies and believe the company genuinely expects compliance--even

if it means sacrificing production or other company goals. In addition, first-line supervisors must

never ignore unsafe behavior. If left unchecked, small or infrequent rule violations tend to grow

into more serious and more frequent violations. Supervisors must also know that their actions

speak louder than words. They cannot expect others to comply with a safety rule if they

sometimes break the rule themselves.

 In work areas that can be regularly monitored by company officials other than the first-line

supervisor, an ineffective supervisor can be identified and appropriate actions taken. However, in
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work areas not easily monitored, it is crucial that all first-line supervisors (1) understand

procedures for correcting employees found violating safety rules, and (2) understand the

importance of regularly encouraging employees to abide by safety policies. Unfortunately, if

supervisors in remote work areas do not possess these qualifications, management may not

become aware of their inadequacies until after a tragedy occurs.

References

 Arvey, R. D., & Jones, A. P. (1985). The use of discipline in organizational settings: A

framework for future research. Research in Organizational Behavior, 7, 367-408.

 Hartshorn, D. (1998) Punishing unsafe behavior. Occupational Hazards, 10, 112-120.

 Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1972). The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the

causes of behavior. In E. E. Jones, D. E. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, and B.

Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior (pp. 79-94). Morristown, NJ:

General Learning Press.

 McAteer, J. D., & Reich, R. B. (1992-1996). Injury Experience in Coal Mining, 1992, 1993,

1994, 1995, 1996. Mine Safety and Health Administration Information Reports 1215, 1225, 1236,

1242, and 1253, US Department of Labor.

 Snyder, K. (1986). Fatal mine accidents that strike supervisors: Does the boss know the risk? 

Professional Safety, 1, 13-17.