IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

GAINESVILLE DIVISION 

SHERRIE RUSSELL-BROWN, 

 Plaintiff, 

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-00257-MP-AK 

v. 

 

THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 

THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, 

LEVIN COLLEGE OF LAW, and 

ROBERT H. JERRY, II, in his 

individual and official capacities as 

Dean of the University of Florida, 

Levin College of Law, 

Defendants. 

___________________________________/ 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A REPLY MEMORANDUM TO 

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE (DOC. 113) TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (DOC. 98)

 

Pursuant to N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1(C), Plaintiff Sherrie Russell-Brown (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. 

Russell-Brown”) respectfully moves this Court for Leave to File a Reply Memorandum in further 

support of her Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 98), and advises the 

Court as follows:

1. On March 23, 2010, Ms. Russell-Brown filed a Verified Complaint (Doc. 45) and on 

March 26, 2010, the Court entered an Order (Doc. 47) directing the Defendants to respond to Ms. 

Russell-Brown’s Verified Complaint, no later than Monday, April 26, 2010. Also on March 26, 2010, 

the Court entered an Initial Scheduling Order (Doc. 48) and referred the case to mediation (Doc. 49). 

2. On April 13, 2010, pursuant to the Initial Scheduling Order (Doc. 48, ¶¶ 1-2), Ms. 

Russell-Brown served on the Defendants, her First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for the 

Production of Documents, and Requests for Admissions. On April 26, 2010, the Defendants filed 

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their Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim (“Answer”) (Doc. 51). The Defendants also 

filed a Motion for Renewed Consideration and Supplementation of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (Doc. 52) (“Motion to Dismiss”). 

3. The Report of the Parties’ Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting (Doc. 65) was filed on May 11, 

2010, in which the parties jointly agreed to July 15, 2010, as the deadline to seek leave to add parties or 

to amend the pleadings and December 3, 2010, as the discovery deadline. The Defendants served 

their Responses and Objections to Ms. Russell-Brown’s First Requests for the Production of 

Documents and First Requests for Admissions, on May 17, 2010. In an Order dated May 20, 2010 

(Doc. 71), the Court extended the date by which the Defendants are to respond to Ms. RussellBrown’s First Set of Interrogatories, to 30-days after the Court’s Order on the Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss. 

4. On July 15, 2010, in accordance with N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 15.1, Ms. Russell-Brown filed a 

First Amended Complaint (Doc. 97). Also on July 15, 2010, in accordance with the Report of the 

Parties’ Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting (Doc. 65), Ms. Russell-Brown filed a Motion for Leave to File a 

First Amended Complaint (Doc. 98), explaining that she wished to amend her Verified Complaint to 

conform it to material obtained in discovery and to add the University of Oxford (“Oxford”) as a 

named Defendant (Doc. 98, ¶ 1). 

5. On July 28, 2010, in their Response in Opposition (Doc. 113) to Ms. Russell-Brown’s 

Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 98), the Defendants argue, in main part, 

that: 1) the instant action has been pending for fourteen (14) months (Doc. 113, p. 1); 2) discovery 

closed in the instant action on Monday, July 26, 2010 (Doc. 113, p. 1); 3) the “new” factual allegations 

in paragraphs 17, 49, 117-145 and 146 of Ms. Russell-Brown’s First Amended Complaint occurred 

“years ago” (Doc. 113, p. 3); 4) Ms. Russell-Brown unduly delayed seeking leave to file her First 

Amended Complaint and has offered no legitimate reason, such as newly-discovered evidence, for her 

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delay in asserting new allegations (Doc. 113, pp. 3-4); 5) service of process on Oxford under the 

Hague Service Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 

Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Service Convention”) will take two to four 

months to effect, which delay will prejudice the Defendants (Doc. 113, pp. 4-5), and; 6) Ms. RussellBrown’s amendments are “futile,” as a matter of law (Doc. 113, pp. 5-8). 

6. The Defendants misstate facts, including the factual and procedural posture of the 

instant action, but more importantly, the factual allegations in Ms. Russell-Brown’s First Amended 

Complaint. 

7. The Defendants also, generally, mischaracterize the authority cited to in their 

Response and, specifically, mischaracterize the authority regarding service of process on Oxford 

under the Hague Service Convention. 

8. In terms of the Defendants’ misstatements of facts, by way of illustration, for 

purposes of this Motion, Ms. Russell-Brown did not delay in seeking leave to file her First Amended 

Complaint. She sought leave by the deadline jointly agreed upon by the parties, four months after 

filing her Verified Complaint. And, she did explain, in paragraph 1 of her Motion, that she was 

seeking leave to amend in order to conform her Verified Complaint to material obtained in discovery 

and to add Oxford as a party defendant. 

9. Further, with respect to the “new” factual allegations in Ms. Russell-Brown’s First 

Amended Complaint, they did not occur “years ago.” The allegations in paragraph 146 occurred 

August 7 and 10, 2009 – not yet one year ago. With respect to the factual allegations in paragraphs 

117-145, Ms. Russell-Brown’s Verified Complaint (Doc. 45, ¶¶ 111-118), specifically includes the 

allegations of retaliation after December 31, 2007, under the heading “Defendants’ Unlawful 

Retaliation After the Execution of the General Release.” Under the same heading in Ms. RussellBrown’s First Amended Complaint, paragraphs 117-145 amend Ms. Russell-Brown’s post-Release 

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allegations of retaliation. However, there are no changes in the time period covered. Finally, the 

allegations in paragraph 17 occurred last January and, with respect to the allegations in paragraph 49, 

which did occur in 2006, in response to the allegations in Ms. Russell-Brown’s Verified Complaint 

(Doc. 45, ¶ 44), that, in June 2005, she complained to a UF Associate Provost that former Associate 

Dean Patrick Shannon had made, what she believed to be, discriminatory comments in an open, 

public faculty meeting, the Defendants, in their Answer (Doc. 51, ¶ 44), denied Mr. Shannon could 

have made any such discriminatory comments and averred that instead, he specifically opined during 

the meeting that consideration of race would be improper. Consequently, in response, Ms. RussellBrown amended the allegations concerning her complaints of discrimination during 2005 and 2006, 

to include the factual allegations regarding Mr. Shannon in 2006, in order to place any credibility 

issues during that time period in context. 

10. In terms of the Defendants’ mischaracterizations of the law, again, by way of 

illustration, for purposes of this Motion, service of process on Oxford, under the Hague Service 

Convention, will take days, not two to four months. Adding Oxford will not cause a significant delay 

prejudicing the Defendants. Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention specifically permits 

service by mail unless the State of destination has objected to this method. See, e.g., Curcuruto v. 

Cheshire, 864 F.Supp. 1410, 1411 (S.D.Ga.1994) (service by registered mail directly to the defendant, 

satisfied requirements of the Hague Service Convention). The U.K. has no objection to Article 10(a) 

of the Hague Service Convention. 

See http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=278 (“Article 10(a): No 

opposition”). 

 11. Further, many federal circuit courts and district courts, including several district 

courts within the Eleventh Circuit, have held that Article “10(a) permits service by mail unless the 

country has objected to this method.” See, e.g., Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Bequator Corp., Ltd., No. 

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10-cv-21462 (WMH), 2010 WL 2425959, at *1-2 (S.D.Fla. June 11, 2010) (serving Hong Kong 

corporate defendant with a copy of the summons and complaint sent via international express mail 

and via Federal Express directed to its President, General Manager, or other executive officer at its 

headquarters satisfies Hague Service Convention); Curcuruto, 864 F.Supp. at 1411; Lestrade v. U.S., 

945 F.Supp.2d 1557 (S.D.Fla.1996) (service of IRS petition by mail satisfied Hague Service 

Convention); Conax Florida Corp. v. Astrium Ltd., 499 F.Supp.2d 1287, 1293 (M.D.Fla.2007) 

(service of process in the United Kingdom) (authorizing service by mail upon finding that “Article 

10(a) is applicable to service of process”); Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir.2004) 

(service of process in the United Kingdom) (Article 10(a) does include service of process by mail, 

reasoning that “send judicial documents” encompasses “service of process,” and that such method is 

“consistent with the purpose of the Convention to facilitate international service of judicial 

documents”); Patty v. Toyota Motor Corp., 777 F.Supp. 956, 959 (N.D.Ga.1991) (service of 

summons and complaint by registered mail, return receipt requested, on Japanese corporation, was 

effective under Hague Service Convention); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F.Supp. 

1182 (D.D.C.1984); Borschow Hosp. and Medical Supplies, Inc. v. Burdick-Siemens Corp., 143 

F.R.D. 472 (D.P.R.1992); Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc., 923 F.Supp. 460, 469 (S.D.N.Y.1996); 

Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838-40 (2nd Cir.1986); Research Systems Corp. v. IPSOS 

Publicite, 276 F.3d 914, 926 (7th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 878, 123 S.Ct. 78, 154 L.Ed.2d 133 

(2002). 

12. In addition to international express mail, service on Oxford may also be effectuated 

via Federal Express. See, e.g., Tracfone Wireless, Inc., 2010 WL 2425959, at *2-3; Ehrenfeld v. Salim 

a Bin Mahfouz, No. 04-civ-9641 (RCC), 2005 WL 696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 23, 2005) 

(approving service by certified mail or FedEx); Mainstream Media, EC v. Riven, No. C-08-3623-PJH, 

2009 WL 2157641, at *3 (N.D.Cal. July 17, 2009) (noting that previously the “court granted 

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[Plaintiff’s] motion for alternative service on [Defendant] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(f)(3), directing that the prior delivery of service documents by [Plaintiff] to [Defendant] 

via e-mail, international mail, and international courier (Federal Express) was effective service of 

process”); Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int’l Telemedia Assoc), 245 B.R. 713, 719-20 

(Bankr.N.D.Ga.2000) (authorizing service via facsimile, ordinary mail, and email); Jenkins v. Pooke, 

No. C-07-03112-JSW, 2009 WL 412987, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. Feb, 17, 2009) (directing that service be 

effectuated via electronic mail, international mail, and international courier). 

13. Oxford may also have specifically appointed a registered agent for service of process 

in the United States, making service of process, under the Hague Convention, unnecessary. The 

appointed registered agent for service of process in the United States for Oxford’s North American 

Office located in New York City (see http://www.oxfordna.org/) is the Corporation Trust 

Company, Corporation Trust Center, 1209 Orange Street, Wilmington, Delaware, 19801. 

14. Finally, relevant to the Defendants’ allegations of the legal “futility” of Ms. RussellBrown’s proposed amendments, a review of the legal authority cited to by the Defendants in their 

Response, reveals that they mischaracterized most, if not all, of the legal authority. The case law will 

be addressed in greater detail in a Reply Memorandum. However, below is a brief bullet point survey 

of the Defendants’ authority, in order of their appearance in the Defendants’ Response: 

■ In Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 2010), the proposed 

amended complaint sought to add a claim for a violation of substantive due process under 

the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects those rights that are “fundamental.” The 

Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the proposed amendment was 

“futile” and failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff’s right to do business in Florida as a 

“viatical settlement provider” was established under the Florida Viatical Settlement Act, not 

the Constitution, and was therefore not a fundamental right. 

■ In Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. v. Florida Mowing And Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 

1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2009), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court dismissing 

plaintiff’s third amended complaint for having failed to comply with the court’s explicit order 

concerning how to frame the complaint. 

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■ In Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1255 (11th Cir. 2008), the Eleventh Circuit 

agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the additional facts, even when viewed in 

concert with those alleged in the amended complaint, did not create a strong inference of 

scienter as required to satisfy the heightened pleading standards imposed by the Private 

Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). 

■ In Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310-12 (11th Cir. 2007), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 

the district court’s denial, as “futile,” of the plaintiff’s motion to amend, because the district 

court had found that the use of force by the prospective defendant prison guard did not 

“shock the conscience,” as required under the Fourteenth Amendment, and, therefore, the 

prospective defendant prison guard would have been entitled to summary judgment on the 

claim against him if the amendment were allowed. 

■ In Laurie v. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, 256 F.3d 1266, 1275 (11th Cir. 2001), 

plaintiff’s motion to amend was filed more than 11 months after the Court’s Order setting 

the deadline for amending pleadings. 

■ In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Court of 

Appeals erred in affirming the District Court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to vacate the 

judgment in order to allow amendment of the complaint. 

■ In Best Canvas Products & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618, 623 (11th

Cir. 1983), plaintiff-in-counterclaim had waited until after close of a two-year discovery 

period to submit a motion for leave to amend. 

■ In Hoover v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 855 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1988), 

the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision not to consider claims asserted in 

the plaintiff’s second amended complaint, because the plaintiff did not move for leave of 

court to file a second amended complaint. 

■ In National Service Industries, Inc. v. Vafla Corp., 694 F.2d 246, 249 (11th Cir. 1982), the 

Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the defendants’ motion for leave to amend their 

answer in order to assert a defense of partial failure of consideration, where the facts 

supporting the proposed defense were known at the time of the original answer and the 

subsequently abandoned counterclaim and where amendment would cause delay at a late 

stage in the proceedings. 

■ In A. Cherney Disposal Co. v. Chicago & Suburban Refuse Disposal Corp., 68 F.R.D. 383, 

384-86 (N.D.Ill. 1975), the Northern District of Illinois denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend 

complaint to state a single claim under the Sherman Act by adding six new defendants and 

three new counts, after extensive discovery, where the case was 5-years old, the addition of 

new parties and new counts would result in undue delay, the amendment made substantial 

changes in the complaint, the defendants asserted that faded memories and unavailability of 

witnesses would impair their ability to defend proposed counts and that new claims would 

inevitably lead to time consuming new discovery. 

■ In Pilkington v. United Airlines, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 508, 509-10 (M.D.Fla. 1994), the Court 

denied the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, in order to add 

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eight (8) new plaintiffs and allegations of additional acts of harassment and unlawful acts, 

because, rather than disclose the identity of these prospective plaintiffs to the Court, 

plaintiffs’ counsel argued that a transfer should be denied because the majority of plaintiffs 

lived in Florida and would be inconvenienced by a transfer. However, if the motion for leave 

were granted, the clear majority of the plaintiffs (12 of 17) would be non-residents and to 

permit a large group of non-resident plaintiffs to join the lawsuit would only reward 

plaintiffs’ counsel for holding back the motion for leave until after the Court had ruled upon 

the plaintiff’s motion to transfer. In addition, the eight prospective new plaintiffs would add 

over 130 separate incidents of alleged harassment, some of which dated back to 1985, 

thereby raising new legal issues regarding the statute of limitations. 

■ Again, only decisions issued by the Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981, are binding as 

precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 

1207 (11th Cir.1981). Notwithstanding, the Eleventh Circuit in Ross v. Houston 

Independent School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1983), affirmed the district court’s 

finding that the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend would prejudice the defendant, because, 

inter alia, the motion was first presented 24-years after the complaint was filed, added 26 new 

parties and would add 7 additional years to an already protracted and complicated case. 

■ In Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1318-20 (11th Cir. 1999), the first motion for 

leave to amend sought to add claims and was made 40 months after the original 

counterclaim. The second motion for leave to amend was made 7 months after that and the 

third motion was made on the eve of trial! 

 

■ According to the Eleventh Circuit in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 85 

F.3d 1514, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1999), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) mandates that the 

district court freely grant plaintiff’s motion for leave when justice so requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 

Rule 15(a). “[U]nless a substantial reason exists to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the 

district court is not broad enough to permit denial.” Id. In Florida Power & Light Co., the 

Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend its complaint to 

add an additional claim for contribution against manufacturer defendants because the plain 

language of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 

of 1980 (CERCLA) did not subject the manufacturer defendants to liability. Id. 

■ In Halliburton & Associates, Inc. v. Henderson, Few & Co., 774 F.2d 441, 443-44 (11th Cir. 

1985), the Eleventh Circuit stated that “an amendment adding new claims and parties usually 

will speak for itself. During the course of pretrial proceedings new information may come to 

light, and in the exchange of pleadings new strategy may develop . . . Although we believe it 

appropriate and advisable for a party to explain the reasons for its amendments, we do not 

believe that the failure to do so is by itself a substantial reason to refuse an amendment that 

seeks to add closely related claims and parties.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial 

of the plaintiff’s motion for leave because the proposed amendments were subject to the 

parties’ agreement to arbitrate disputes before the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. 

Accordingly, the amendment was futile, arbitration was compelled and the proceedings 

stayed. 

■ The Defendants mischaracterize Diaz-Martinez v. Miami-Dade County, No. 07-20914-CIV, 

2009 WL 2970468, at * 9 (S.D.Fla. Sept. 10, 2009). The paragraph begins, “To satisfy the 

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heightened pleading standard for conspiracy claims, ‘[t]he plaintiff does not have to produce 

a smoking gun to establish the understanding or wilful participation required to show a 

conspiracy, but must show some evidence of agreement between the defendants.’” The 

Court found insufficient to satisfy plaintiff’s burden, his allegation in one paragraph of his 

complaint, that the police defendants had “agreed among themselves and with other 

individuals to act in concert in order to deprive [Plaintiff] of his clearly established Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Id. 

■ American Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2010), involves 

allegations of conspiracy under the specific pleading standards of the RICO statutes, which 

require a plaintiff to either show that 1) the defendant agreed to the overall objective of the 

conspiracy or 2) the defendant agreed to commit two predicate acts. 

 

■ Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009) involves allegations of a 

conspiracy between Colombian paramilitary , Colombian local police and Colombian bottling 

facilities connected to Coca-Cola, to kidnap, detain, torture and murder plaintiff Colombian 

trade union leaders. In response to a Motion to Dismiss, the Court held that certain 

allegations failed to state a claim for relief under the “law of nations,” as required by the 

Alien Tort Statute and, therefore, the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1269. 

■ Finally, the Defendants mischaracterize United Technologies Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 

1270-73 (11th Cir. 2009). United Technologies involves the theft and sale by the individual 

defendant of certain blueprints relating to an aircraft engine manufactured by the plaintiff 

and includes allegations of civil theft under Florida law, which requires an injury from a 

violation of Florida’s criminal theft statute, a civil claim for dealing in stolen property, which 

also requires an injury from a violation of Florida’s criminal statute prohibiting dealing in 

stolen property, unjust enrichment and conversion. The district court was concerned that the 

plaintiff allege that the individual defendant (1) acted in the scope of his employment, in 

pursuit of the corporate defendant’s interest, when he purchased and re-sold the stolen 

blueprints; and (2) acted for the benefit of the corporation, as opposed to himself. In finding 

that the complaint’s allegations withstood a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Eleventh 

Circuit held that the plaintiff did not have to expressly allege the above elements. Further, 

the Court held that the plaintiff was not required to go so far as to allege that the corporate 

defendant was established as an explicitly criminal enterprise, or that the individual 

defendant’s job description included criminal functions, in order to state a claim for 

corporate liability for an employee’s discharge of his duties in an illegal manner. If aviation 

blueprints could reasonably fall within the corporate defendant’s stock in trade, and if part of 

the individual defendant’s employment duties was to buy and sell the goods in which the 

corporate defendant traded, then the corporate defendant could reasonably be answerable for 

its employee’s illegal or tortuous conduct in carrying out those tasks. And, discovery to be 

taken by the plaintiff may well reveal additional evidence to be used in carrying the plaintiff’s 

burden, on summary judgment or at trial, of establishing that the individual defendant acted 

within the scope of his employment. 

15. The Defendants’ misstatements and mischaracterizations create good cause for 

granting leave to file a reply. See, e.g., Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Thai Henry “Hank” Chang, No. 1:07-

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CV-023-SPM, 2008 WL 419530, at * 1-2 (N.D.Fla. Sept. 9, 2008) (Mickle, C.J.) (granting leave to file 

a reply memorandum where the defendant’s response misstated the facts and mischaracterized the 

applicable law). 

WHEREFORE, Ms. Russell-Brown respectfully requests this Honorable Court for an order 

granting her leave to file a reply to the Defendants’ Response (Doc. 113) to her Motion for Leave to 

File a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 98). 

DATED this 29th day of July, 2010. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Lennox S. Hinds__________

Lennox S. Hinds 

New York Bar No. 8196 

Stevens, Hinds & White, PC 

116 West 111th Street 

New York, NY 10026-4206 

(212) 864-4445 

(212) 222-2680 (fax) 

lawfirmshw@yahoo.com 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 

I certify that I complied with my obligations under Local Rule 7.1(B)(1), to confer with 

Defendants’ counsel prior to filing this Motion. As of this filing, I have not received a response 

from Defendants’ counsel, Mr. Richard C. McCrea, Jr., Esq., regarding the Defendants’ position on 

the herein motion. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 29, 2010, the foregoing has been filed with the Clerk of 

the Court and served electronically by using the CM/ECF system, upon the following: 

Ian S. Marx, Esq. 

Greenberg Taurig, LLP 

200 Park Avenue 

Florham Park, NJ 07932 

Richard C. McCrea, Jr., Esq. 

Greenberg Taurig, LLP 

Courthouse Plaza, Suite 100 

625 East Twiggs Street 

Tampa, FL 33602 

Attorneys for Defendants 

/s/ Lennox S. Hinds__

Lennox S. Hinds 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

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