J-A07034-19

2019 PA Super 108

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOHN M. BLOUNT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1278 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 26, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0124901-1990

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 08, 2019

Appellant, John M. Blount, appeals from the March 26, 2018, judgment 

of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

following the lower court’s grant of PCRA1relief and resentencing of Appellant 

on, inter alia, his conviction for two counts of first-degree murder pursuant to 

Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), which held 

that state courts are required to grant retroactive effect to new substantive 

rules of federal constitutional law, such as Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 

132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). Miller held unconstitutional mandatory sentences of 

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for offenders, like Appellant, 

who were under eighteen years of age at the time of their crimes. After a 

careful review, we affirm. 

____________________________________________

1 Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On September 

28 or 29, 1989, Appellant, who was seventeen years old, shot two men in the 

head at close range. One of the men was a tenant in Appellant’s mother’s 

residence where Appellant also lived. After the killings, Appellant removed 

money and jewelry from the deceased victims, and with the help of his 

stepfather, moved their corpses to a basement garage. Thereafter, Appellant 

paid two men to remove the victims’ decomposing corpses from the basement.

On October 24, 1989, Appellant was arrested for the murders, and he 

confessed to the police that he shot both victims.

On October 29, 1990, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial and was 

convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, possessing an instrument of 

crime, and abusing a corpse. At a separate penalty hearing, with regard to 

the two murder convictions, the jury determined the aggravating 

circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and fixed Appellant’s 

penalty at death. The trial court immediately sentenced Appellant to two 

consecutive sentences of death. 

The trial court then sentenced Appellant to one year to two years in 

prison for abuse of a corpse, and two and one-half years to five years in prison 

for possessing an instrument of crime, both to run concurrently to each other 

but consecutively to the sentences of death. 

Appellant filed a direct appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 

which affirmed Appellant’s convictions but vacated his death sentences due to 
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erroneous instructions from the trial court pertaining to how the jury should 

assess aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Commonwealth v. 

Blount, 538 Pa. 156, 647 A.2d 199 (1994). Upon remand, on July 24, 1996, 

the trial court resentenced Appellant to two consecutive terms of life in prison 

without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, a consecutive term of 

two and one-half years to five years in prison for possessing an instrument of 

crime, and a concurrent term of one year to two years in prison for abuse of 

a corpse. 

Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on January 9, 1997, and counsel 

was appointed to assist him. The PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition 

on December 31, 1997, and Appellant did not appeal. 

On March 24, 2006, Appellant filed a second pro se PCRA petition, and 

the PCRA court denied the petition on the basis it was untimely. Appellant 

filed an appeal, and this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Blount, 2145 

EDA 2008 (Pa.Super. filed 11/10/09) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant 

filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which our Supreme Court denied on 

July 30, 2010.

On August 10, 2012, Appellant filed a third pro se PCRA petition, and 

the PCRA court denied the petition on the basis it was untimely. Appellant did 

not appeal. 

On March 8, 2016, Appellant filed a fourth pro se PCRA petition in which 

he argued that he was entitled to relief under Montgomery, supra and 
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Miller, supra. Following the appointment of counsel and the granting of 

numerous continuances, the Honorable Barbara A. McDermott granted relief 

based on the “new constitutional right” exception to the PCRA’s time-bar and, 

thus, vacated Appellant’s July 24, 1996, judgment of sentence. 

On March 26, 2018, Judge McDermott held a resentencing hearing, at 

the conclusion of which she imposed thirty-five years to life imprisonment for 

each count of first-degree murder, the sentences to run concurrently. Judge 

McDermott imposed no further penalty for possessing an instrument of crime 

or abuse of a corpse. 

On April 4, 2018, Appellant filed a counseled post-sentence motion, 

which counsel supplemented on April 25, 2018. Following a hearing on April 

26, 2018, Judge McDermott denied the post-sentence motion, and this timely 

appeal followed on May 3, 2018. All Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have been 

met. 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues in his “Statement of 

Questions Involved”:

1. Must the sentencing judge recuse herself where the judge did 

not accept the sentence agreed upon by the parties?

2. Did not the sentencing court err when imposing sentence by 

considering matters without support in the record that were 

actually false, here that [Appellant] would live into his 90s and 

that he had desecrated the bodies of the decedents?

3. Did not the sentencing court unconstitutionally err and violate 

Miller, [supra], where, at the resentencing of a juvenile lifer, 

the court relied exclusively upon the facts of the homicide in 

imposing an additional six more years of incarceration beyond 
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the twenty-eight years already served and by doing so ignored 

the total rehabilitation demonstrated by [Appellant]?

4. Is not a sentence of an additional six years of incarceration 

beyond the twenty-eight years already served excessive where 

the sentencing judge agreed that the evidence established that 

[Appellant] was rehabilitated?

5. Is it unconstitutional to impose a mandatory lifetime parole tail 

on all juvenile lifers being resentenced?

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4 (suggested answers omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant contends the sentencing judge, Judge 

McDermott, erred in failing to recuse herself from resentencing Appellant since 

she refused to impose the parties’ negotiated sentence.2 He complains that 

“the refusal of the [sentencing] judge to [accept] the stipulated sentence 

requires that the judge recuse herself.” Id. In developing his argument, 

Appellant points to four unrelated cases involving the resentencing of juveniles 

who had originally been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 

Appellant notes that, in those cases, “Judge McDermott indicated that she 

would recuse herself if the negotiated sentence was not accepted.” Id. Thus, 

Appellant reasons that “Judge McDermott knew it was legally appropriate for 

____________________________________________

2 On March 16, 2018, in anticipation of Judge McDermott granting PCRA relief 

and resentencing Appellant, the parties appeared briefly before Judge 

McDermott. At this brief hearing, the parties indicated they were in 

negotiations with regard to resentencing, and Judge McDermott scheduled a 

formal sentencing hearing for March 26, 2018. As will be discussed infra, the 

Commonwealth agreed to not contest a sentence of twenty-nine years to life

imprisonment. N.T., 3/26/18, at 46. 
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her to recuse herself if she rejected the negotiated sentence” in the instant 

matter. Id.

The standards for recusal are well-established. Commonwealth v. 

Abu-Jamal, 553 Pa. 485, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (1998). The party requesting 

recusal is required “to produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or 

unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist’s ability to preside 

impartially.” Id. The judge to whom a motion for recusal is addressed must 

make two decisions:

[T]he jurist must first make a conscientious determination of his 

or her ability to assess the case in an impartial manner, free of 

personal bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist must then 

consider whether his or her continued involvement in the case 

creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would tend to 

undermine public confidence in the judiciary.

Id. Each judge in this Commonwealth is entitled to the presumption that, 

“when confronted with a recusal demand, [she has] the ability to determine 

whether [she] can rule impartially and without prejudice.” Commonwealth 

v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 60 (Pa.Super. 2014). Her ruling will not be 

overturned but for an abuse of discretion. Id.

Finally, recusal requests must be timely made. Lomas v. Kravitz, 642 

Pa. 181, 170 A.3d 380 (2017). 

The law is clear. In this Commonwealth, a party must seek recusal 

of a jurist at the earliest possible moment, i.e., when the party 

knows of the facts that form the basis for a motion to recuse. If 

the party fails to present a motion to recuse at that time, then the 

party’s recusal issue is time-barred and waived. 

Id. at 390 (citations omitted).
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Initially, we note that, at the commencement of the March 26, 2018, 

sentencing hearing, Judge McDermott specifically informed the parties she 

was not obligated to accept the parties’ negotiated sentence; but rather, it 

was her job “to conduct a hearing to decide what the appropriate sentence 

is.” N.T., 3/26/18, at 11-12. Judge McDermott further stated she would need 

to hear testimony, as well as arguments, and even if she believed Appellant 

attempted to change his life while he was in prison, “that does not mean that 

[she was] accepting the Commonwealth’s offer.” Id. at 14. Appellant did not 

object to any of these statements or ask for Judge McDermott’s recusal at this 

time. 

Additionally, after Judge McDermott heard impact statements from the 

victims’ families, the following exchange occurred in the midst of the 

sentencing hearing:

[ADA]: Your Honor, the offer that was extended in this case was 

29 years to life. Obviously the facts of this case are egregious and

I discussed that point-blank with the family about that aspect. But 

based on his scores, how he’s done in prison, that was the offer 

conveyed. That’s what the committee and the DA approved.

THE COURT: As everyone knows, I’m not the DA and I’m not the 

committee and I give my independent judgment. 

[ADA]: I agree 100 percent. 

***

[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: If I may, Your Honor, there was, as 

you know, a formal offer that was made and accepted.

THE COURT: Well, he accepted it, but I haven’t.

[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: I know that. But I have the formal 

acceptance form that should be made part of the record.
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THE COURT: No. Only if I accept it does it become part of the 

record. I haven’t agreed to accept it.

[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. Just for purposes of the 

record---

THE COURT: Well, you can mark it, but...

[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Mark it D-1.

Id. at 46-48. As is evident, Appellant did not object to Judge McDermott 

indicating that she could refuse to impose the negotiated sentence, and 

Appellant did not ask for Judge McDermott’s recusal at this time. 

At the end of all testimony, evidence, and arguments, the following 

relevant exchange occurred:

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, [Appellant]. [Appellant], you 

need to know that if I was sentencing you today for this crime, 

you would be getting a lot more time than I’m giving you, because 

you may not be happy with the sentence. 

***

Please stand.

(Appellant stood).

[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, if I may, you’re 

disinclined to accept the offer?

THE COURT: I’ve made that very clear.

[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: I’d ask you to recuse yourself.

THE COURT: No, I’m not recusing myself. I’m going to sentence 

[Appellant] now. The case was assigned. It was transferred to 

me for a hearing. It remains with me. And I am going to sentence 

him accordingly. 

Id. at 91-92.

Based on the aforementioned, we initially conclude Appellant did not 

seek Judge McDermott’s recusal in a timely fashion. That is, at the very 
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commencement of the sentencing hearing, as well as in the midst of the 

sentencing hearing, Judge McDermott expressly indicated she had discretion 

to accept or reject the parties’ negotiated sentence, and she would not make 

a decision until after she considered the appropriate sentencing factors. 

However, Appellant did not object or make a motion for recusal at this time.

Rather, Appellant waited until the close of all testimony, evidence, and 

arguments before seeking Judge McDermott’s recusal. Accordingly, the record 

reveals Appellant did not seek recusal of Judge McDermott at the earliest

possible moment (i.e., when Judge McDermott clearly stated she had no duty 

to accept the parties’ negotiated sentence). See Lomas, supra.

In any event, assuming, arguendo, Appellant’s objection at the 

conclusion of the sentencing hearing preserved his challenge, we find no merit 

to his claim. As Judge McDermott relevantly explained in addressing 

Appellant’s issue:

As per the First-Judicial District’s General Court Regulation 

No. 1 of 2016, all contested resentencing hearings are to be 

presided [over] by either [Judge McDermott] or the Honorable 

Jeffrey P. Minehart.5 

5 On March 1, 2018, the instant matter was transferred from Judge 

Minehart to [Judge McDermott] in anticipation of a contested 

resentencing hearing.

At the time of assignment, [Judge McDermott], the 

Commonwealth, and [Appellant] anticipated that a contested 

sentencing hearing would occur on the date of resentencing. The 

mere fact that [Appellant] negotiated with the Commonwealth for 

a stipulated sentence does not obligate the [lower court] to accept 

the negotiations. At no point prior to the instant hearing did 

[Judge McDermott] indicate that [she] would accept the 

negotiations, nor did [Judge McDermott] colloquy [Appellant] 
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about accepting the negotiated sentencing offer before 

commencing the instant resentencing hearing.

[Appellant] alleges that [Judge McDermott] was obligated to 

recuse [herself] after [she] rejected his and the Commonwealth’s 

negotiated sentence offer. [Appellant] cites the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania’s 1969 holding in Commonwealth v. Evans,

[434 Pa. 52,] 252 A.2d 689 (1969), which summarizes the then 

current ABA Minimum Standards for guilty pleas, suggesting that 

when a Common Pleas judge rejects a negotiated plea offer, the 

matter should be sent to another judge for trial, when practical. 

Evans, 252 A.2d at 691, n.1. 

The Evans holding is irrelevant, as the instant appellant was 

not negotiating his own guilty plea; he was rightfully convicted of 

his crimes in 1990. At no point during the instant proceedings 

was [Judge McDermott] required to make a decision that would 

affect the guilt or innocence of [Appellant].

Moreover, [Appellant] fails to establish that [Judge 

McDermott] was incapable of honorably, fairly, and competently 

presiding over the instant matter. He has presented no evidence 

of bias, prejudice, or unfairness necessary to show that [Judge 

McDermott’s] recusal was warranted. [Appellant] fails to meet his 

burden.

[Appellant’s] position reveals his naked attempt to shop for 

a favorable judge in this jurisdiction. In essence, he seeks a new 

sentence for time served, notwithstanding [Judge McDermott’s] 

duty to consider the gravity of his offense, the protection of the 

public, the impact his crime had on the victim and the community, 

and the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant]. As [Judge McDermott] 

clearly explained during both the resentencing hearing and during 

[Appellant’s] argument for reconsideration, the negotiated 

sentence as presented was appropriate, given [Appellant’s] role 

as the sole assailant in a double homicide....[T]he recommended 

sentence gave [Judge McDermott] extreme pause when 

considering the totality of the circumstances.

[Appellant’s] references to [Judge McDermott’s] statements 

in four other Juvenile Life Sentences Without parole...hearings is 

also irrelevant to this matter. The [instant] matter was originally 

scheduled for a contested hearing on December 1, 2017[,] before 

the Honorable Jeffrey Minehart. After assignment to [Judge 

McDermott], [she] treated and prepared for the instant matter as 

a contested hearing, and [she] gave no indication to either party 

that [she] would accept the negotiations. Unlike in the matters 
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cited by [Appellant], [Judge McDermott] did not colloquy 

[Appellant] about his rights with respect to a negotiated 

sentencing hearing. [Appellant] erroneously assumed that [Judge 

McDermott] would accept the negotiated offer without conducting 

[her] own independent analysis. [Judge McDermott] ultimately 

decided to reject the sentencing negotiations at the conclusion of 

the sentencing hearing, after hearing argument from both sides. 

Nothing on the record indicates that [Judge McDermott] acted 

with bias or prejudice necessitating recusal, nor has [Appellant] 

demonstrated that [Judge McDermott] abused [her] discretion.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/5/18, at 4-6 (footnote in original) (footnotes

omitted).

We agree with Judge McDermott’s well-reasoned opinion and find no 

abuse of discretion. Applying the appropriate standard, we specifically 

conclude Appellant has not produced any evidence of bias, prejudice, or 

unfairness that raises a substantial doubt as to Judge McDermott’s ability to 

preside over Appellant’s sentencing proceedings impartially. See Abu-Jamal, 

supra. Moreover, we note it is well-settled that the Sentencing Code places 

an independent obligation upon a judge to impose a sentence, which the judge 

finds appropriate upon consideration of the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9721(b).3 

____________________________________________

3 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) provides that the court shall impose a sentence of 

confinement that is “consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity 

of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the 

community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 
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We hold that merely because the district attorney and defense counsel 

negotiate a stipulated sentence, the sentencing judge is not bound thereby 

and has the ultimate independent responsibility to impose a sentence 

consistent with the Sentencing Code.4 The fact Judge McDermott ultimately 

rejected the parties’ negotiated sentence does not require the conclusion that 

she was biased, prejudiced, or unfair such that she should have recused 

herself from this matter. Therefore, we find no merit to Appellant’s first claim. 

In his second issue, Appellant contends that, in resentencing Appellant,

the lower court relied upon “false” factors; namely, Appellant would live into 

his 90s, he engaged in sophisticated, criminal behavior in disposing of the 

victims’ corpses, and he desecrated the bodies. This presents a challenge to 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence.5

____________________________________________

4 Appellant seeks a per se rule to the effect that, once the district attorney 

and defense counsel agree to a stipulated sentence, the trial court must accept 

such sentence upon resentencing. To adopt this rule would take the 

sentencing responsibility from the sentencing judge and, in effect, allow the 

district attorney and defense counsel to usurp the power of the sentencing 

court. 

5

It bears mentioning that, to correct Pennsylvania’s unconstitutional 

sentencing scheme in the wake of Miller, supra, and Montgomery, supra, 

our Legislature enacted 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1, which provides that offenders 

who were between the ages of fifteen and seventeen at the time of their 

crimes and convicted of first-degree murder after June 24, 2012, must be 

sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1102.1(a)(1). The minimum term for that class of offenders is 35 years in 

prison. Id. The new statute did not address the resentencing of juvenile 

offenders, such as Appellant, convicted of murder and sentenced to life 

without parole before June 24, 2012. However, in Commonwealth v. Batts, 
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We have long held that “[t]he right to appeal a discretionary aspect of 

sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 122 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc) (citation omitted). Instead, such challenges are 

considered petitions for allowance of appeal. Id. Generally, an appellant who 

wishes to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence must satisfy a 

four-part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction:

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) 

whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); 

and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Id. (citation omitted). Finally, “[w]hether a particular issue constitutes a 

substantial question about the appropriateness of sentence is a question to be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he presented his 

issue in his post-sentence motion. Also, Appellant included a separate 

statement in his brief pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), and a claim the 

sentencing court relied upon erroneous factors raises a substantial question. 

____________________________________________

640 Pa. 401, 163 A.3d 410 (2017) (“Batts II”), our Supreme Court held that 

juvenile offenders for whom the sentencing court deems life without parole 

sentences inappropriate “are subject to a mandatory maximum sentence of 

life imprisonment as required by Section 1102(a), accompanied by a minimum 

sentence determined by the common pleas court upon resentencing.” Id. at 

421. Our Supreme Court held that in fashioning a minimum sentence, courts

have discretion but “should be guided by the minimum sentences contained 

in Section 1102.1(a)[.]” Id. at 458. 
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See Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa.Super. 2009) (“[A]n 

allegation that the court considered an impermissible sentencing factor raises 

a substantial question.”) (citation omitted)). Hence, we will consider the 

substantive merits of Appellant’s sentencing claim.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quotation 

omitted).

With regard to Appellant’s claim there is no evidence his disposal of the 

victims’ bodies was “criminally sophisticated” or constituted “desecration,” 

and thus, the sentencing court was not permitted to rely on these factors in 

sentencing Appellant, we disagree. As the sentencing court explained in its 

opinion: 

At the commencement of the sentencing hearing, the 

Commonwealth described how, after the shooting, [Appellant] 

took the decedent Ramsey’s money, jewelry, and car, the latter 

of which he got rid of. [Appellant] hid the murder weapon in his 

mother’s room, and he recruited Stackhouse, an allegedly abusive 

stepfather, to move the bodies from upstairs bedrooms to a pit in 

the garage of the house. [Appellant] and his family members also 

cleaned up the blood in the house and disposed of the bedding 

and other evidence of the crime. After Bernard Russell, an 

individual to whom [Appellant] owed money, came to 

[Appellant’s] house to collect, [Appellant] enlisted two drug 

addicts known as Travis and Beetle, as well as his paramour, Ms. 

Underwood, to dispose of the bodies. The authorities did not 
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discover the bodies until October 3, 1989, some five days after 

the murders.

The above described facts demonstrated a sophistication not 

present in most other shootings, especially committed by minors. 

The [c]ourt’s interpretation of the facts of this case as an example 

of [Appellant’s] sophisticated thinking was a fair inference, well 

within the purview of the [c]ourt’s authority during 

sentencing....[H]is argument fails.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/5/18, at 10-11 (citations to record omitted). 

We agree with the sentencing court that there was ample evidence from 

which the court could infer Appellant was “criminally sophisticated” in his 

actions after he committed the killings. Further, we conclude the facts of the 

crime support the sentencing court’s conclusion that Appellant desecrated6the 

bodies after the killings. Accordingly, these did not constitute “false” factors 

as alleged by Appellant. 

With regard to Appellant’s claim there is no evidence that he will live 

into his 90s, assuming, arguendo, he is correct that no such evidence was 

presented during the sentencing hearing,7 Appellant has not shown that he is 

entitled to relief. As the trial court explained in its opinion:

____________________________________________

6 “Desecrate” means “to defile[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary 477 (8th ed. 2004). 

In further support of the sentencing court’s sound rationale, we note that 

Appellant was convicted of abuse of corpse, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5510, which 

provides “a person who treats a corpse in a way that he knows would outrage 

ordinary family sensibilities commits a misdemeanor of the second degree.”

7 We clarify that, during the sentencing hearing, the sentencing court did not 

affirmatively state Appellant would live into his 90s; but rather, the court 

merely noted that, generally, “a life expectancy is in the 90s these days.” 
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[Appellant] further claims the [c]ourt improperly considered 

[Appellant’s] life expectancy when furnishing his sentence. 

[Appellant] fails to demonstrate a modicum of prejudice, as he will 

be eligible for parole in October 2024, when [Appellant] will be 

fifty-two years old. In its recent holding in Commonwealth v. 

Bebout, [186 A.3d 462] (Pa.Super. 2018), the Superior Court 

explained the upper limit of what constitutes a constitutional 

sentence: there must be some meaningful opportunity to obtain 

release, such that it must be at least plausible that one could 

survive until the minimum release date, with some consequential 

likelihood that a non-trivial amount of time at liberty exists. In 

deeming the appellant’s sentence constitutional, the Superior 

Court noted that possible release at the age of sixty did not 

constitute a de facto life sentence. The appellant had a reasonable 

opportunity for meaningful release, the Superior Court held, 

despite his contention that the life expectancy for juvenile life 

prisoners was 50.6 years. Regardless of what [Appellant] argues 

his life expectancy would be [in the case sub judice], the [c]ourt’s 

sentence renders him eligible for parole long before he reaches 

that age.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/5/18, at 11 (footnote omitted). 

We agree with the trial court’s sound reasoning and conclude that 

Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Appellant’s third and fourth issues are intertwined. Specifically, 

Appellant claims that, upon resentencing Appellant, the sentencing court failed 

to consider his “rehabilitation, growth, and remorse,” as well as the protection 

of the public, and, instead, focused entirely upon the facts surrounding the 

homicides. Appellant’s Brief at 29. Appellant argues the sentencing court 

diminished his “accomplishments of the past 281⁄2 years, while focusing upon 

____________________________________________

N.T., 3/26/18, at 13. In any event, as discussed infra, Appellant has failed to 

demonstrate he is entitled to relief on his claim. 
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the static factors of the homicide itself.” Id. at 32. He notes that he has “fully 

demonstrated rehabilitation...[and the] record demonstrated that [Appellant] 

no longer posed a danger to the community.” Id. at 34-35. He contends the 

sentencing court’s abuse of discretion led to an excessive minimum sentence 

requiring him to “serve an additional 6 years of incarceration before even 

being eligible for parole.” Id. at 37. 

Initially, we note this issue presents a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of Appellant’s sentence. Appellant has preserved the challenge in his 

post-sentence motion, and we conclude it raises a substantial question 

permitting our review. See generally Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 960 

A.2d 473 (Pa.Super. 2008) (holding that averment court sentenced based 

solely on seriousness of offense and failed to consider relevant factors raises 

a substantial question). Thus, we shall review the merits of Appellant’s issue. 

In Batts II, with regard to fashioning a minimum sentence, our 

Supreme Court specifically held:

In determining the minimum sentence for a juvenile 

convicted of first-degree murder prior to Miller, a sentencing 

court is to exercise its discretion to find the appropriate, 

individualized sentence in each case, just as it would when 

fashioning the minimum sentence for any other defendant before 

it. 

***

In sentencing a juvenile offender to life with the possibility 

of parole, traditional sentencing considerations apply. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). The sentencing court should fashion the 
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minimum term of incarceration using, as guidance, section 

1102.1(a) of the Crimes Code.[8]

Batts II, supra, 163 A.3d at 456, 460 (footnote added). 

In the case sub judice, the sentencing court acknowledged that it 

reviewed Appellant’s Sentencing Memorandum. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 

6/5/18, at 8. The Sentencing Memorandum set forth information concerning 

the pre-crime physical and emotional abuse inflicted upon Appellant by his 

stepfather, as well as information concerning Appellant’s completion of various

programs and classes since he has been in prison. Further, during the 

sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge acknowledged the following:

[B]oth sides need to understand what I take into account 

when I sentence. I take into account the nature of the crime, the 

seriousness of the offense. I take into account the danger, the 

danger that the defendant poses to the community.

Now, the difference is back 20 years ago [when Appellant 

committed his crimes] we didn’t have as much information as we 

have available today. I consider his rehabilitative needs. And I 

don’t know, but I’m going to tell you that in terms of prison 

behavior after his initial reaction to prison...[Appellant] your 

behavior has changed.

His behavior in terms of the ones that I look at, significant 

improvement. And, in essence, he has done beyond what the 

prisons have asked of him. You need to know that, because that’s 

something that I factor in.

____________________________________________

8 With regard to juvenile first-degree murder convictions, Section 1102.1(a) 

of the Crimes Code relevantly provides “[a] person who at the time of the 

commission of the offense was 15 years of age or older shall be sentenced to 

a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment, the 

minimum of which shall be at least 35 years to life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1102.1(a)(1).
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But I also factor in my decision the impact, 

[Appellant], that your behavior had on the victims’ families 

and the community as a whole, and I can’t discount that 

either. 

So I’ll be blunt with all of you, the factor in this 

[c]ourt’s mind is the fact that there’s two deaths here. 

***

I need to hear from the victims’ families. I also need you to 

understand, and I’m telling you this ahead of time, that I’m not—

when sentencing, I’m not going to discount [Appellant’s] behavior 

in prison[.] And so you know in advance, he’s had many, many 

letters written in support for a variety of different factors.

I believe, and I can’t say this all the time, I believe that you 

are absolutely, unequivocally sincere and you’ve acted in your 

belief, in your attempts to change your life around[.] 

***

[Appellant], you need to know that if I was sentencing you 

today for this crime, you would be getting a lot more time than 

I’m giving you, because you may not be happy with the sentence. 

It’s not what the Commonwealth thinks the case is worth. I 

cannot discount two lives. I believe in proportionality in a 

sentence. 

Trust me when I tell you that you are getting a break from 

me because I believe every word you said. And I believe that 

when you are released, you will continue to do what you’ve been 

doing in prison. 

***

So, [Appellant], on—you have two different counts of firstdegree murder. The charge on each of them is 35 to life, and that 

is to run concurrent. You are getting no further penalty on either 

of the other charges. 

N.T., 3/26/18, at 12-13, 91-92 (bold added). 

As the aforementioned reveals, contrary to Appellant’s argument, the 

sentencing court did not focus entirely upon the facts surrounding the 

homicides without consideration of Appellant’s rehabilitation, growth, and 
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remorse, as well as the need to protect the public. Rather, as mandated by 

Section 9721(b), the court properly weighed and considered the protection of 

the public, the gravity of Appellant’s offense as it relates to the impact on the 

lives of the victims’ families and on the community, and the rehabilitative 

needs of Appellant. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Accordingly, we find no 

merit to Appellant’s claims. 

In his final issue, Appellant contends the sentencing court “incorrectly 

determined that [it] was required to impose a mandatory maximum sentence 

of life.” Appellant’s Brief at 37. He further contends that a mandatory 

maximum term of life imprisonment is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile 

offenders and violates the mandates of proportionality and individualized 

sentencing. Appellant maintains that a mandatory maximum term of life 

imprisonment effectively denies him a meaningful opportunity for release. 

Appellant’s claim presents a challenge to the legality of his sentence. 

See Commonwealth v. Seskey, 170 A.3d 1105 (Pa.Super. 2017). “When 

reviewing the legality of a sentence, our standard of review is de novo and 

our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Melvin, 172 A.3d 14, 

19 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted). 

Initially, we reject Appellant’s contention that the sentencing court 

incorrectly determined it was required to impose a mandatory maximum 

sentence of life imprisonment. As recognized by this Court, in Batts II, 
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following the Legislature’s passing of Section 1102.1, our Supreme Court 

relevantly held the following:

For those defendants [convicted of first or second-degree murder 

prior to June 25, 2012,] for whom the sentencing court determines 

a [life without parole] sentence is inappropriate,[9]it is our 

determination here that they are subject to a mandatory 

maximum sentence of life imprisonment as required by Section 

1102.1(a), accompanied by a minimum sentence determined by 

the common pleas court upon resentencing[.]

Seskey, 170 A.3d at 1108 (citing to Batts II, 163 A.3d at 421) (citation 

omitted) (footnoted added). In light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Batts 

II, there was valid authority for the sentencing court to impose upon Appellant 

in this case a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for his first-degree 

murder convictions. 

As for Appellant’s claim a mandatory maximum term of life 

imprisonment is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders convicted of 

murder prior to Miller and violates the mandates of individualized sentencing, 

this Court has repeatedly rejected these claims. See Commonwealth v. 

Olds, 192 A.3d 1188 (Pa.Super. 2018) (holding imposition of mandatory 

maximum sentence of life imprisonment for juvenile defendant convicted of 

____________________________________________

9 We note the High Court in Miller did not foreclose sentencing courts from 

ever imposing terms of life without parole upon juvenile offenders. Instead, 

it required sentencing courts to consider a juvenile’s immaturity and capacity 

for change, and to refrain from imposing a life without parole term except in 

extreme cases where the sentencing court determines that the juvenile is 

incapable of rehabilitation. Miller, supra. In any event, in the case sub 

judice, Appellant was resentenced to 35 years to life imprisonment, and thus, 

the trial court’s sentence permits parole. 
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second-degree murder prior to Miller was constitutional); Seskey, supra

(holding trial court was required to impose mandatory maximum sentence of 

life imprisonment when it resentenced juvenile defendant convicted of firstdegree murder prior to Miller). 

Further, as to Appellant’s claim a mandatory maximum term of life 

imprisonment is unconstitutional since it affords him no meaningful 

opportunity for release, we conclude Appellant misapprehends Pennsylvania’s 

sentencing scheme.

Pennsylvania utilizes an indeterminate sentencing scheme with a 

minimum period of confinement and a maximum period of confinement. “In 

imposing a sentence of total confinement the court shall at the time of 

sentencing specify any maximum period up to the limit authorized by law....” 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756(a). See also Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 544 Pa. 

158, 675 A.2d 268, 277 n.1 (1996). Here, that maximum period is life 

imprisonment. Therefore, the sentence imposed, with a maximum period of 

life, is lawful.

To the extent Appellant meant his minimum term is unconstitutional and 

affords him no meaningful opportunity for release, we note “[t]he maximum 

term represents the sentence imposed for a criminal offense, with the 

minimum term merely setting the date after which a prisoner may be paroled.” 

Martin v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 576 Pa. 588, 840 

A.2d 299, 302 (2003). In considering what constitutes a “meaningful 
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opportunity for release,” this Court has recognized that “[t]o be meaningful 

or, at least, potentially meaningful, it must at least be plausible that one could 

survive until the minimum release date with some consequential likelihood 

that a non-trivial amount of time at liberty awaits.” Commonwealth v. 

White, 193 A.3d 977, 986 (Pa.Super. 2018) (quotation and emphasis 

omitted).

Here, the lower court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate minimum 

term of thirty-five years’ imprisonment. Appellant has been incarcerated for 

his crime since the time of his arrest when he was seventeen years old. Upon 

resentencing, the trial court gave Appellant credit for all time served from the 

date of his arrest. Thus, Appellant will be eligible for parole when he is fiftytwo years old. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that his sentence offers him no 

meaningful opportunity for parole is without merit. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/8/19