Reversed and Rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed May 26, 2022.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-20-00275-CV

INTOWN HOMES LTD. & INTOWN BUILDER GP, LLC, Appellants

V.

SUSAN KNOCHE, Appellee

On Appeal from the 189th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2017-11949

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants InTown Homes, Ltd. and InTown Builder GP, LLC appeal the 

denial of confirmation of an arbitration award. In one issue appellants argue that 

“the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the 

Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award which 

sought dismissal of Appellee’s claims without prejudice.” Appellee Susan Knoche 

argues that because there is no final arbitration award on the merits of the case, we 

lack jurisdiction over this appeal. We reverse and render.
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I. BACKGROUND

Appellee filed suit in the trial court against appellants asserting claims related 

to the construction of her home. The parties agreed that the claims were subject to 

an arbitration agreement, and the trial court abated the cause for the parties to 

arbitrate their claims (initial arbitration). Due to appellee’s health issues, the 

arbitrator signed an order of abatement in the initial arbitration that allowed a certain 

number of days as an abatement period. At the end of the abatement period, the 

order provided that if appellee “is unable to proceed with discovery at the conclusion 

of the additional stay, this matter will be dismissed.” After the period of abatement 

had passed, appellee requested additional time. Citing the order of abatement, the 

arbitrator dismissed the initial arbitration proceeding “without prejudice to refiling.” 

Appellants then filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award in the trial court and 

asked the trial court to confirm the arbitrator’s award of dismissal without prejudice. 

Appellee responded arguing that the dismissal without prejudice was not an “award” 

for purposes of confirmation and attached evidence that appellee had filed a new 

arbitration case (second arbitration). The trial court denied appellants’ motion to 

confirm the arbitration award. This appeal followed. 

II. JURISDICTION

The parties agree that the Texas General Arbitration Act (TAA) applies to 

their agreement to arbitrate and on appeal. Appellant argues that the order rendered 

by the arbitrator dismissing appellee’s claims without prejudice is an “award” under 

the TAA subject to being confirmed by the trial court under that statute. See Tex. 

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 171.053, 171.087. Appellee contends that this court 

lacks jurisdiction because there was no “final arbitration award” subject to being 

confirmed by the trial court and, therefore, no appealable order under the TAA. 
3

A. General Legal Principles

We must address whether the trial court’s order denying confirmation of the 

arbitration award is appealable. Bison Bldg. Materials v. Aldridge, 422 S.W.3d 582, 

585 (Tex. 2012). Generally, unless authorized by statute, Texas appellate courts 

only have jurisdiction to review final judgments. Id. Under the TAA, the denial of 

confirmation of an arbitration award is appealable by statute. Tex. Civ. Prac. & 

Rem. Code § 171.098(a)(3) (permitting interlocutory appeal over a trial court order 

confirming or denying confirmation of an arbitration award). The question here is 

whether an arbitrator’s dismissal without prejudice is considered an “award” under 

the TAA. If the arbitrator’s dismissal without prejudice is considered an “award,” 

then we have jurisdiction. However, if the arbitrator’s dismissal without prejudice 

is not considered an “award,” then there is nothing for the trial court to either confirm 

or deny and, as a result, we lack jurisdiction because the trial court’s order would be 

interlocutory. See Aldridge, 422 S.W.3d at 589 (concluding that trial court’s order 

partially confirming and partially remanding an arbitration award was not a final 

award for purposes of appeal and dismissing for lack of jurisdiction); SM Architects, 

PLLC v. AMX Veteran Specialty Sevs., LLC, 564 S.W.3d 902, 907 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2018, pet. denied) (concluding that because there was no “award” being 

confirmed or denied, and because arbitrator’s the order was merely interlocutory,

the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal). 

The TAA provides that an award “must be in writing and signed by each 

arbitrator joining the award.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.053(a). The TAA 

further directs a trial court to confirm an award upon application of a party. See id. 

§ 171.087. However, the term “award” is not defined in the TAA. SM Architects, 

PLLC, 564 S.W.3d at 905. 
4

“We review issues of statutory construction de novo.” Silguero v. CSL 

Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019). “[O]ur primary objective is to give 

effect to the legislature’s intent.” Id. When a term within a statute is not defined, 

“[u]nless the context or the statue instructs otherwise, our analysis begins with the 

plain language of the statute read in context, not in isolation.” Ex parte R.P.G.P., 

623 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. 2021); Silguero, 579 S.W.3d at 59. “The statutory terms 

bear their common, ordinary meaning, unless the text provides a different meaning 

or the common meaning leads to an absurd result.” Silguero, 579 S.W.3d at 59; SM 

Architects, PLLC, 564 S.W.3d at 905. “[W]here a term has acquired a technical or 

particular meaning, it is construed accordingly.” SM Architects, PLLC, 564 S.W.3d 

at 905 (citing Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.011(b)). 

“We often look to dictionary definitions to shed light on the ordinary meaning 

of a statutory term.” Silguero, 579 S.W.3d at 60. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 

“award” as “a final judgment or decision, esp. one by an arbitrator or by a jury 

assessing damages.” Award, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also SM 

Architects, PLLC, 564 S.W.3d at 905 (referring to Black’s Law Dictionary to define 

“award”). 

B. Analysis 

Because award is defined as “a final judgment or decision,” the question 

becomes whether a dismissal without prejudice is considered a final judgment or 

decision. Under Texas law, the answer is yes. See Childers v. Advanced Foundation 

Repair, L.P., 193 S.W.3d 897, 898 (Tex. 2006) (holding where suit was dismissed 

without prejudice and disposed of all parties and claims before it, considered final 

judgment and appealable); Villafani v. Trejo, 251 S.W.3d 466, 468 (Tex. 2008) 

(denial of defendant’s claims for sanctions and dismissal without prejudice of 

plaintiff’s claims against defendant “disposed of all the claims between the two 
5

parties. Thus, the trial court’s severance and dismissal order on the nonsuit became 

a final judgment for purposes of appeal.” (citation omitted)); Winter Garden Land 

Co. v. Zavalla-Dimmit Ctys. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 5 S.W.2d 606, 609 

(Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1928, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“So far as the present action is 

concerned, all of the issues are disposed of, though as to the issues dismissed without 

prejudice under the fifth paragraph another action could be brought. The judgment 

should be regarded as final in the appealable sense.”); see also LeCompte v. Mr. 

Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Where the trial court allows the 

plaintiff to dismiss his action without prejudice, the judgment, of course, qualifies 

as a final judgment for purposes of appeal.”). 

Appellee argues that the dismissal without prejudice is not an award because 

it did not dispose of the substance of the arbitration claims. See Aldridge, 422 

S.W.3d at 586–87. In Aldridge, the defendants sought confirmation of an arbitration 

award in the trial court. Id. at 583. The trial court partially confirmed and partially 

vacated because “questions of fact” existed and needed resolution before the 

arbitrator. Id. at 584. The supreme court concluded that the order of the trial court 

was not final because it did not “contain finality language, state that it is a final order, 

or dispose of all claims and parties.” Id. at 585. Instead, the court held that the trial 

court’s order partially confirming and partially vacating the arbitration award “does 

not dispose of the substance of the claims, but instead explicitly identifies unresolved 

issues and, in essence, remands the case to the same arbitrator to compete its fact 

finding and legal determinations.” Id at 586–87. Policies disfavoring partial 

resolution by arbitration precludes appellate intrusion until the arbitration is 

complete. Id. at 587 (citing Forsythe Int’l., S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d 

1017, 1020 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
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Aldridge is distinguishable because there was a lack of finality in the trial 

court and the arbitration. Here, while appellee asserts that the arbitration is 

incomplete because she may continue to assert her claims in the second arbitration, 

her claims are not incomplete as far as the initial arbitration that resulted in the 

dismissal without prejudice. Appellee does not contend that the arbitrator’s 

dismissal without prejudice failed to dismiss any of the pending claims or issues 

pending in the initial arbitration. Appellee also does not contend that her claims 

should be remanded to the initial arbitration and arbitrator to reopen the proceedings, 

like in Aldridge, and instead filed the second arbitration with a new arbitrator, further 

confirming the finality of the initial arbitration. 

Appellee argues that “to be ‘final,’ an arbitration award must be intended by 

the arbitrators to be their complete determination of all claims submitted to them” 

and that there can be no “substantive task” remaining to be performed. See Denver 

City Energy Assocs., L.P. v. Golden Spread Elec. Co-op., Inc., 340 S.W.3d 538, 545–

46 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). However, as a result of dismissing the 

claims, there were no remaining substantive tasks for the arbitrator to perform in the 

initial arbitration. 

The text of the TAA does not provide a different meaning. The common 

meaning does not lead to an absurd result because the trial court is merely confirming 

what the arbitrator did, dismissing the cause without prejudice. See Silguero, 579 

S.W.3d at 59. If the dismissal without prejudice is not an award, then appellants 

would be stuck waiting for either the trial court or appellee to take some action. 

Appellants may not have recourse to the Rules of Civil Procedure to force such 

action for fear that they may waive their arbitration provision. See Perry Homes v. 

Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 591 (Tex. 2008) (discussing the meaning of “substantially 

invoking the judicial process” with regard to waiver of an arbitration provision). 
7

Appellants could file another motion to compel arbitration, however, they would 

have to continue to wait for appellee to file a new arbitration. 

Because the arbitrator’s dismissal without prejudice is a final judgment under 

Texas law, it is an “award” under the term’s technical and commonly used meaning.

See SM Architects, PLLC, 564 S.W.3d at 905. We conclude, therefore, that we have 

jurisdiction over this appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.098(a)(3) 

(permitting interlocutory appeal over a trial court order “confirming or denying 

confirmation of an award” under the TAA). 

III. Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award

In appellants’ first issue they argue that they filed a motion to confirm the 

arbitration award and because appellee did not file a motion to vacate, modify or 

correct the award, the trial court had no discretion but to confirm the award. 

Appellee argues that because there is no award, there is nothing for the trial court to 

confirm and, therefore, the trial court did not commit reversible error. Appellee 

argues that the order of dismissal without prejudice is “interlocutory” in nature and 

is not final. 

Review of an arbitration award is “extraordinarily narrow.” Amoco D.T. Co. 

v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 343 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Upon application of a party, a trial court “shall confirm” 

an arbitration award “[u]nless grounds are offered for vacating, modifying, or 

correcting [it] under Section 171.088 or 171.091.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 

171.087; see also Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. 2016) (“In sum, 

the TAA mandates that, unless a statutory vacatur ground is offered, the court shall

confirm the award.”). 
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Here, appellants filed a motion to confirm the arbitrator’s award arguing that 

the trial court should confirm the arbitrator’s dismissal of appellee’s initial 

arbitration without prejudice and enter an order confirming that disposition and 

dismiss appellee’s case before the trial court without prejudice. Appellee filed a 

response but, as appellee admits, did not offer any statutory ground for vacating, 

modifying, or correcting the award. Instead, appellee argued that there was no award 

to confirm. 

As we addressed above, we conclude that the dismissal without prejudice is 

an “award” under the TAA. Because the TAA mandates confirmation of the award 

unless a statutory ground is offered to vacate, modify, or correct, and appellee failed 

to offer such a statutory ground, we conclude the trial court erred in denying 

confirmation of the award. See Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d at 494; First Tex. Homes, Inc. 

v. Provost, 622 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020, no pet.) (“[B]ecause First 

Texas had no motion to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award on file with 

the trial court prior to the trial court’s ruling on the Provosts’s motion to confirm, 

the trial court had no discretion but to confirm the arbitration award . . . .”). 

We sustain appellants’ first issue.1

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude a dismissal without prejudice is an “award” as that term is used 

in the TAA. Because appellants sought confirmation of the award and appellee 

failed to offer any ground to vacate, modify, or correct the award, the trial court erred 

in denying confirmation of the award. We reverse the order of the trial court denying 

confirmation and render judgment confirming the arbitrator’s award. Tex. R. App. 

1 Because we sustain appellants’ first issue, we need not address the remaining issues 

asserted on appeal because they would not afford appellants greater relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 

47.1. 
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P. 43.3; see also E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co. v. Werline, 307 S.W.3d 267, 274 

(Tex. 2010) (affirming appellate court’s judgment reversing and rendering 

confirmation of award). 

/s/ Ken Wise

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Bourliot, and Zimmerer.