IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-30514

RAINBOW GUN CLUB, INCORPORATED; LAKESIDE DEVELOPMENT 

COMPANY, INCORPORATED; DELLA MILLER BROUSSARD; REED 

JOSEPH MILLER; URSIN MILLER; ET AL,

Plaintiffs – Appellees

v.

DENBURY ONSHORE, L.L.C.; SPECTER EXPLORATION, 

INCORPORATED; SKH ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P.,

Defendants – Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

A group of 167 individuals, trusts, and associations (collectively, “the 

Plaintiffs”) entered into oil, gas, and mineral leases with Denbury Onshore, 

Specter Exploration, and SKH Energy (collectively, “Denbury”). The Plaintiffs 

later became unhappy with the outcome of their arrangement causing them to 

bring this suit in Louisiana state court, which alleged that Denbury breached 

its duty to act as a reasonable and prudent operator of the well that was drilled 

under these leases. Denbury removed the case to federal court asserting 

federal jurisdiction as a mass action under the Class Action Fairness Act 

(“CAFA”). CAFA, however, excludes federal jurisdiction over a state case that 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 23, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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is primarily local and arises from “an event or occurrence.” Holding that this 

was such a case, the district court remanded the case upon motion of the 

Plaintiffs. Denbury petitioned this court for permission to appeal that 

determination, which we granted. The sole issue presented is whether the 

Plaintiffs’ claims arise from a single event or occurrence. We hold that they

do, and we AFFIRM.

I.

In the early 2000s, the Plaintiffs entered into leases with Denbury 

allowing Denbury to explore for oil, gas, and hydrocarbons. In February 2003, 

Denbury began drilling Rainbow Gun Club Well No. 1 (“the Well”). The Well 

began producing hydrocarbons in July 2004 and was plugged and abandoned 

in July 2008.

In February 2013, the Plaintiffs brought this suit in Louisiana state 

court alleging that Denbury had breached its duty as a lessee under Louisiana 

law to act as a reasonable and prudent operator of the Well. Specifically, the 

Plaintiffs allege that Denbury acted imprudently in allowing extraneous water 

to enter the gas reservoir, greatly reducing the productivity of the Well. The 

Plaintiffs allege that this occurred because Denbury was negligent in several 

respects: (1) failing to heed methods of operation intended to avoid getting the 

drill pipe stuck; (2) failing to isolate the reservoir by properly cementing the 

well; (3) failing to properly cement the casing in a sidetrack well; (4) failing to 

heed increased differential pressures in the drilling of the original well; and (5) 

failing to correct the defective cement job. 

Denbury filed a notice of removal, asserting that the case was a “mass 

action” under CAFA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A)–(B), and that the district 

court thus had jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, arguing 

that two exclusions to the definition of “mass action” applied to this case: (1) 

the local single event exclusion, and (2) the $75,000 jurisdictional amount 

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exclusion. See id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i),(ii)(I). Based on these exclusions, the 

Plaintiffs argued that the case should either be remanded completely, or that 

at least those claims that do not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy 

requirement should be remanded.

The case was assigned to a magistrate judge, who held that the claims 

arose from a single event or occurrence, and therefore the Plaintiffs’ motion to 

remand must be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (allowing district courts 

to “designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine” certain pretrial 

motions). Specifically, the magistrate judge found it instructive that the 

Plaintiffs’ claims for recovery arose from a single statute that imposed a duty 

on Denbury to act as a reasonably prudent operator of the well. The magistrate 

judge concluded: “If this is so, then it suggests that the underlying matter is 

but one event or occurrence—the manner in which defendants drilled the well.” 

The magistrate judge also emphasized that the exploration of the property 

“persisted uninterrupted over a defined period of time, and the allegations of 

negligence reflect a logical series of happenings.”

Denbury challenged the magistrate judge’s order before the district 

court. See id. (allowing the district court to reconsider the magistrate judge’s 

decision “where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law”). The district court held that the magistrate’s 

decision was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Although recognizing 

that there must be a limit to what constitutes a single event or occurrence, the 

district court judge reasoned that “that limit may as often as not be supplied 

by the liberal application of common sense” because the ordinary meaning of 

the words of the statute do not require that the single event or occurrence occur 

at a single moment in time. The district court thus denied Denbury’s appeal 

of the magistrate judge’s order and remanded the case to the state court.

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Denbury then filed a motion before this court for permission to appeal 

the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c), which we granted.

II.

The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the district court erred in

remanding the case on the basis that the local single event exclusion applies

to the facts and circumstances of this particular case.1 We review a district 

court’s remand order de novo. Louisiana v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 746 

F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014). 

CAFA provides for federal jurisdiction over “mass actions.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(d)(11)(A). “[T]he term ‘mass action’ means any civil action . . . in which 

monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly 

on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or 

fact . . . .” Id. at § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). The parties agree that this provision is 

satisfied. Relevant to this case, however, the statute proceeds to circumscribe

this definition. “[T]he term ‘mass action’ shall not include any civil action in 

which . . . all of the claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence in 

the State in which the action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries 

in that State or in States contiguous to that State.” Id. at 

§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii),(ii)(I). We refer to this provision as the “local single event 

exclusion.” The dispute is whether the claims in this case “arise from an event 

or occurrence” for the purposes of the exclusion.2 We begin our analysis of the 

1 As discussed, the Plaintiffs also argued to the district court that at least some of the 

claims must be remanded to state court because they do not satisfy the $75,000 amount in 

controversy requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). The parties have not, however, 

presented any briefing on this issue, and because we hold that the local single event exclusion 

applies, requiring remand of the entire case, neither we nor the district court has any need 

to consider this alternative argument.

2 Denbury has presented no argument referencing the second portion of the 

exclusion—i.e. that the event or occurrence “allegedly resulted in injuries in [Louisiana] or 

in States contiguous to [Louisiana].” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I). Accordingly, Denbury 

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exclusion by looking to its text, its legislative history, and prior judicial 

decisions interpreting it. We then move to applying this analysis to the facts 

of this case.3

A.

In understanding the meaning of the exclusion, we begin with its text. 

Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013). Because the statute does not 

define “an event or occurrence,” we look to the ordinary meaning of those 

words. Id. (“As in any statutory construction case, we start, of course, with the 

statutory text, and proceed from the understanding that unless otherwise 

defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their 

ordinary meaning.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 

At the starting point, both parties agree that the exclusion contemplates 

a single event or occurrence. This agreement is based upon substantial judicial 

authority. See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270, 

276–77 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Adams v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 

829 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1136 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (“[T]he court cannot ignore the 

singular usage of ‘event’ and the singular usage of ‘occurrence.’”). These 

authorities also recognize, however, that the meaning of “event” or 

“occurrence” is not necessarily constrained “to a specific incident with a fixed 

duration of time.” Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277. 

has waived this issue. Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 668 (5th Cir. 1997) (“All issues not 

briefed are waived.”).

3 The parties briefly dispute who has the burden of demonstrating the applicability or 

inapplicability of the exclusion. Generally, the party seeking removal has the burden of 

proving that the provisions of CAFA are satisfied. See Hood ex rel. Miss. v. JP Morgan Chase 

& Co., 737 F.3d 78, 84–85 (5th Cir. 2013). The party seeking remand, however, has the 

burden of proving the applicability of any exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction. See Opelousas 

Gen. Hosp. Auth. v. FairPay Solutions, Inc., 655 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2011). Because it 

does not affect the outcome, and because the parties have presented no argument on this 

issue other than summary assertions, we decline to address this dispute.

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This reasoning is supported by the dictionary definitions—both popular 

and legal—of the terms. An “occurrence” is “[s]omething that happens, or 

takes place; specif., an accident, event, or continuing condition that results in 

personal injury or property damage.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1248 (10th ed. 

2014). And the words “event” and “occurrence” can be understood as 

synonymous. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 615 

(5th ed. 2011) (defining “event” as “something that takes place, especially a 

significant occurrence”); id. at 1219 (defining “occurrence” as “the action, fact, 

or instance of occurring . . . something that takes place; an event or incident”); 

see also Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 n.6. From these definitions, it is apparent 

that a singular event or occurrence, as contemplated by the local single event 

exclusion, need not be precisely confined to a moment in time. Nothing in 

either definition imposes a simultaneous time limitation, and Black’s Law 

Dictionary explicitly defines “occurrence” as including a “continuing condition.” 

Thus, the plain text of the exclusion supports the Plaintiffs’ view that

the terms “event” and “occurrence” are not generally understood to apply only 

to incidents that occur at a discrete moment in time.

B.

This understanding is supported by the legislative history of CAFA. We 

are permitted to look to this legislative history only when the text of the statute 

is ambiguous. See In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34 (5th Cir. 1993) (“We may 

not look beyond [the words of the statute] when, taken as a whole, they are 

rational and unambiguous.”). Here, at least some ambiguity exists in the scope 

of the terms “event” and “occurrence,” as evidenced by the district court

decisions cited by the parties. Accordingly, we consider the relevant legislative 

history to shed light on the intent of Congress in passing the local single event 

exclusion. Id. (“The sole purpose of statutory construction including, when 

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appropriate, a review of all available legislative history, is to ascertain the 

intent of the legislative authority.”).

In one of its prior proposed forms, the local single event exclusion would 

have applied only to cases in which the plaintiffs’ claims arose from a “single 

sudden accident.” The version of CAFA that was enacted “expand[ed] the 

‘single sudden accident’ exception so that federal jurisdiction shall not exist 

over mass actions in which all claims arise from any ‘event or occurrence.’” 151 

Cong. Rec. S1076-01 (statement of Senator Dodd summarizing compromise). 

This legislative history demonstrates that Congress considered explicitly 

adopting a view similar to what Denbury suggests here, constraining the 

exception to events that occur at a discrete moment in time. This proposal was 

rejected, however, and the exclusion expanded in the operative version of 

CAFA. This history thus supports the ordinary meaning of the terms in the 

exclusion and indicates that the exclusion applies to a single event or 

occurrence, but the event or occurrence need not be constrained to a discrete 

moment in time.

Denbury points to another piece of legislative history to supports its 

narrower reading of the exclusion. Specifically, Denbury cites the Senate 

Report discussing CAFA.4 In discussing the local single event exclusion, the 

Senate Report states:

4 The Plaintiffs argue that the Senate Report should not be considered as legislative

history because it was released after CAFA was enacted—a position that has been accepted 

by some courts. See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 279 n.8 (doubting that the legislative history 

would aid in the interpretation of CAFA because it “was issued after CAFA was enacted”). 

Some courts, however, have held that the Senate Report may be considered because it was 

still before the Senate at the same time that CAFA was being considered. See Lowery v. Ala. 

Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1206 & n.50 (11th Cir. 2007) (looking to the legislative history of 

CAFA for aid in interpreting the statute after noting “[w]hile the report was issued ten days 

following CAFA’s enactment, it was submitted to the Senate” while the Senate was 

considering the bill). We have previously looked to the Senate Report for insight into CAFA’s 

meaning. Louisiana v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 746 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2014). In 

short, we consider the Senate Report here, but remain cognizant of its shortcomings. 

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The [local single event] exception would apply only to a truly 

local single event with no substantial interstate effects. The 

purpose of this exception was to allow cases involving 

environmental torts such as a chemical spill to remain in state 

court if both the event and the injuries were truly local, even 

though there are some out-of-state defendants. By contrast, 

this exception would not apply to a product liability or 

insurance case. The sale of a product to different people does 

not qualify as an event. And the alleged injuries in such a case 

would be spread out over more than one state (or contiguous 

states)—even if all the plaintiffs in the particular case come 

from one state.

S. Rep. 109-14, 47, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 44–45. Denbury points 

to the report’s discussion of environmental torts as evidence that the exclusion 

was not intended to apply to the claims here, which arise out of the contracts 

between the Plaintiffs and Denbury.

We are not convinced that the Senate Report provides relevant insight 

into the reach of the exclusion as applied to this case. First, even accepting 

that the purpose of the exclusion was specifically to keep local environmental 

torts out of federal court, there is no reason that the exclusion cannot also apply 

to other cases if those cases fit within its language. Importantly, the text of 

the exclusion speaks to “any civil action” involving claims arising from an event 

or occurrence. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(11)(B)(ii)(I). In the light of this text, we 

cannot read the exclusion to apply only to a specific genre of claims. Second, 

even looking at the examples that the Senate Report cites, the Plaintiffs’ claims 

are more akin to an environmental tort than a product liability or insurance 

action. Like an environmental tort, these claims arise from Denbury’s 

allegedly negligent operation of the Well. The only distinction between this 

case and an environmental tort is the source of the damages—the Plaintiffs’ 

claims of financial harm due to lost productivity from the Well as opposed to a 

claim for property damage from an explosion or spill from the Well. Thus, to 

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the extent that we consider the Senate Report, it does not support Denbury’s 

interpretation of the statute.

C.

Lastly, we discuss two cases from other circuits that have addressed the 

scope of the local single event exclusion and have been cited to us by the 

respective parties. First, the Third Circuit has adopted an interpretation of 

“arise from an event or occurrence” that supports the Plaintiffs’ argument. In 

Abraham, the plaintiffs brought a suit against the operator of a refinery, 

alleging that the refinery had been continuously releasing hazardous 

substances for about a decade. Abraham, 719 F.3d at 273. Despite the long 

time frame, the court held that the claims did “arise from an event or 

occurrence” because “the words ‘event’ and ‘occurrence’ do not commonly or 

necessarily refer in every instance to what transpired at an isolated moment 

in time, [so] there is no reason for us to conclude that Congress intended to 

limit the phrase ‘event or occurrence’ . . . in this fashion.” Id. at 277. In its 

clearest explication of a rule, the court held: 

[W]here the record demonstrates circumstances that share 

some commonality and persist over a period of time, these can 

constitute ‘an event or occurrence’ for purposes of the exclusion 

in § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I). In short, treating a continuing set of 

circumstances collectively as an “event or occurrence” for 

purposes of the [local single event] exclusion is consistent with 

the ordinary usage of these words, which do not necessarily 

have a temporal limitation. Giving the words “event” or 

“occurrence” their ordinary meaning is not at odds with the 

purpose of the statutory scheme of CAFA. Congress clearly 

contemplated that some mass actions are better suited to 

adjudication by the state courts in which they originated.

Id. 

Against this broader interpretation, the Ninth Circuit has arguably 

adopted a position closer to Denbury’s advocacy. In Nevada v. Bank of Am. 

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Corp., the Ninth Circuit rejected an argument that the local single event 

exclusion applied to a parens patriae action against Bank of America for 

misleading consumers in various ways. 672 F.3d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 2012). The 

court held that the exclusion only applies “where all claims arise from a single

event or occurrence.” Id. at 668 (emphasis in original). The court went on to 

state that “[c]ourts have consistently construed the ‘event or occurrence’ 

language to apply only in cases involving a single event or occurrence, such as 

an environmental accident, that gives rise to the claims of all plaintiffs.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Applying the language in this way, the 

court held that the exclusion could not apply to a case involving “widespread 

fraud in thousands of borrower interactions.” Id. 

Abraham provides obvious support for the Plaintiffs’ position that the 

local single event exclusion can apply in situations beyond events or 

occurrences that happen at a discrete moment in time. The Ninth Circuit’s 

decision is more ambiguous in its agreement that continuous conduct may be 

perceived as a single event, but it does not upset our analysis for two reasons. 

First, it is unclear to what extent the Ninth Circuit applied a narrower reading 

of the exception that would support the argument Denbury makes. The 

decision only (1) recognizes that the exclusion applies to a single event or 

occurrence; (2) cites an environmental tort an as example that satisfies this 

language; and (3) holds that the exclusion cannot apply to the case before it, 

involving thousands of separate transactions. Id. So the decision’s support of 

Denbury’s position is equivocal. And second, to the extent that the Ninth 

Circuit did adopt that narrower view, its limited analysis does not overcome 

the text of the statute, the legislative history, and the unambiguous and 

compelling analysis of the Third Circuit in Abraham. 

In sum, the text of the statute, its legislative history, and other case law 

interpreting the local single event exclusion guide us to a single conclusion: 

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Although the exclusion certainly applies in cases in which the single event or 

occurrence happens at a discrete moment in time, the single event or 

occurrence may also be constituted by a pattern of conduct in which the pattern 

is consistent in leading to a single focused event that culminates in the basis 

of the asserted liability.

III.

Although Denbury disagrees with this interpretation, it argues that even 

if this is a proper interpretation of the exclusion, this case still does not fall 

within that reasoning. The Plaintiffs point to the failure of the Well as the 

single event or occurrence that their claims arise from. Denbury argues that 

the claims do not arise from a single event or occurrence, even under the 

broader interpretation of the exclusion that we have provided above, for two 

reasons, which we now discuss.

A.

First, Denbury argues that the claims actually arise from a number of 

different “events,” namely, the five separate incidents of negligence that the 

Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint. In Denbury’s view, these are the actual 

independent events that give rise to the Plaintiffs’ claims. The Plaintiffs argue

that Denbury conflates two different concepts: (1) the event or occurrence from 

which the claims arise; and (2) the underlying actions that lead to that event 

or occurrence. The multiple acts of negligence that the Plaintiffs allege fall 

into category (2); they are the actions that give causal substance to the event—

the failure of the Well from which the Plaintiffs’ claims arise.

The Plaintiffs provide an analogy to the Deepwater Horizon spill that is 

helpful in illuminating this distinction. Both parties agree that the Deepwater 

Horizon spill is “an event or occurrence” within the meaning of the exclusion. 

Just as in our case, the Deepwater Horizon spill was the event that resulted

from a number of individual negligent acts related to each other, all of which 

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came together to culminate in the single event. This is precisely what we have 

here. The Plaintiffs allege that Denbury performed several negligent acts, and 

the result of those acts was a single occurrence—the failure of the Well. And 

just as in the Deepwater Horizon example, the Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise 

from any one of the several alleged acts of negligence, but from the single 

occurrence that resulted from the collective related acts. Thus, we cannot 

embrace Denbury’s argument that the Plaintiffs’ claims arise from multiple 

events or occurrences because the Plaintiffs alleged several negligent acts.

B.

Denbury also borrows the Deepwater Horizon analogy to illustrate its 

second argument against the application of the exclusion. Denbury argues that 

in the Deepwater Horizon example, there is no dispute that the event or 

occurrence on which the claims are based actually occurred—i.e. nobody could 

dispute that there was an explosion and spill. Conversely, Denbury argues 

that the event or occurrence in this case—the failure of the Well—is disputed 

because Denbury contests whether the Well failed at all. Basically, Denbury 

asserts that the exclusion cannot be satisfied by an alleged event or occurrence.

Again, we are unpersuaded by this argument because it is only a matter 

of semantics. Rather than identifying the failure of the Well as the event or 

occurrence, the depletion of the Well or the untimely (in the Plaintiffs’ view)

cessation of production of the Well could also be treated as the event or 

occurrence. In both cases, the event or occurrence would be undisputed—that 

is, both parties agree that the Well has been depleted and is no longer 

producing. The parties disagree over the cause of this occurrence, but this

argument will be addressed in the merits of the Plaintiffs’ suit in the proper 

court. In short, we accept that the Well failed from the Plaintiffs’ perspective 

and thus hold that the failure of the Well can be treated as an event or 

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occurrence, but we of course express no opinion on whether the Well “failed” in 

the sense that the merits of the Plaintiffs’ suit alleges.

C.

Irrespective of whether we denominate the event or occurrence as the 

depletion or failure of the Well, the semantics of the exclusion are satisfied

based on the analysis above, specifically the ordinary meaning of the statute 

and the analysis from the Third Circuit. The failure of the Well certainly fits 

with the definition of “occurrence.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 1248 (10th ed. 

2014) (defining “occurrence” in part as a “continuing condition that results in 

personal injury or property damage”). Similarly, the alleged negligent acts in 

the operation of the Well that led to its failure are the sort of “circumstances 

that share some commonality and persist over a period of time” that the Third 

Circuit held satisfied the exclusion. Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277. And even 

though it may be impossible to define an exact moment at which the failure

occurred—e.g. before, upon, or after the capping of the Well—this does not 

change our conclusion because we find nothing in the definitions of the terms 

that requires that an event or occurrence must happen at an identifiable 

moment in time. 

In sum, we hold that here there was an ongoing pattern of conduct that

was contextually connected, which when completed created one event

consistent with the ordinary understanding and the legislative history of the 

exclusion. Accordingly, we hold that the failure of the Well constitutes the

“event or occurrence” from which the claims of the Plaintiffs arise.

IV.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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