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2017 IL App (2d) 160631 

No. 2-16-0631
 

Opinion filed March 29, 2017 

IN THE
 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
 

SECOND DISTRICT
 

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

MASUD M. ARJMAND, ) of Du Page County. 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

and ) No. 09-D-1168 

) 

MUNEEZA R. ARJMAND, ) Honorable 

) Timothy J. McJoynt, 

Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. 

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Jorgensen and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 The petitioner, Masud Arjmand, appeals from orders entered by the circuit court of Du 

Page County on October 9, 2014, April 22, 2016, and August 4, 2016. The first two orders 

awarded the respondent, Muneeza Arjmand, interim attorney fees pursuant to section 501(c-1) of 

the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/501(c-1) (West 2012)). 

In the final order being appealed, the trial court denied Masud’s motion to quash garnishment 

proceedings instituted by Muneeza in order to collect the interim attorney fees and ordered the 

turnover of funds to pay those fees. Because we lack jurisdiction to review any of these orders, 

we dismiss the appeal. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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¶ 3 We begin with the relevant procedural history. In 2009, Masud filed a petition for 

dissolution of his marriage to Muneeza. A short time later, the parties entered into a marital 

settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the judgment for dissolution entered in July 

2009. However, in 2011, Muneeza filed a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)), seeking to vacate the judgment for 

dissolution on the basis that it was unconscionable. The trial court granted the petition, 

vacating everything except the legal dissolution of the parties’ marriage. Masud appealed this 

order. In 2013, we affirmed the trial court’s vacation of most of the prior judgment of 

dissolution. In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2013 IL App (2d) 120639. The case returned to the 

trial court for further proceedings. Although those proceedings have been going on for some 

years, a trial of the issues remaining in the dissolution has yet to occur. 

¶ 4 On August 14, 2014, Muneeza petitioned for interim attorney fees pursuant to sections 

501(c-1) and 508(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/501(c-1), 508(a) (West 2012)). In her petition, 

Muneeza detailed the numerous matters litigated by the parties, which had resulted in significant 

attorney fees. She asserted that she was in need of assistance to pay her attorney fees, that 

Masud had income of over $1 million per year, and that the marital estate had substantial liquid 

assets from which attorney fees could be paid. She sought $303,590 in past fees due and 

owing; $100,000 in anticipation of future fees reasonably necessary to prepare for trial, and 

$87,000 for anticipated expenses for expert witnesses, for a total of about $490,000. Masud 

filed a response disputing her assertions and objecting to any interim award of attorney fees. 

¶ 5 On October 9, 2014, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the petition for 

interim attorney fees. Masud sought to present several witnesses, including accountants and 

real estate appraisers. He argued that, in order to decide Muneeza’s petition, the trial court was 

required to determine the value of the marital estate (which included almost a dozen residential 

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and commercial properties) as well as the marital or nonmarital nature of all of the parties’ 

assets. The trial court rejected this argument, stating that the resolution of the interim fee 

petition did not require it to make a determination on those issues, which would more properly 

be addressed at the eventual trial: 

“[T]he purpose of today’s hearing is to level the playing field. The legislative intent is 

clear. It’s supposed to be an expeditious, quick way to resolve the issue and to level the 

playing field with minimal evidence to be presented to the Court. If you allow either 

party to get in too deeply into the economic aspects of the case, it defeats the whole 

purpose. The purpose of the statute is to make sure that each party has sufficient funds 

to retain attorneys and retain expert witnesses to litigate this case.” 

The trial court therefore limited the parties to presenting evidence of their current economic 

circumstances, including their assets, incomes, and expenditures. The evidence presented 

included a September 2014 financial disclosure statement by Masud, which reflected appraisals 

that had valued his real estate holdings as of July 2009 (the date of dissolution). The statement 

listed the properties’ total net value as about $5.5 million; Masud also had various investments 

and accounts worth about $6.5 million, although $6.2 million of these assets were “founder’s 

shares” of Accenture, which were subject to restrictions on liquidation. Masud testified that his 

access to funds was extremely limited, due in part to a restraining order entered earlier in the 

dissolution case, and he argued that most of the shares in his accounts were nonmarital anyway. 

As to income, the statement showed that Masud was self-employed and had a gross annual 

income of over $224,000 (primarily from investments and businesses), although it also stated 

that his gross income was reduced by: (1) about $102,000 in taxes and court-ordered support for 

Muneeza, and (2) over $173,000 in unspecified business expenses. Muneeza testified that she 

had no access to any marital assets. She had a net income of about $50,000 per year. 

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¶ 6 At the close of the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting Muneeza’s petition in 

an amount significantly lower than her request: $130,000 ($110,000 in attorney fees and $20,000 

for expenses for expert witnesses). The order required Masud to sell some of the founder’s 

shares of Accenture in order to pay the award. 

¶ 7 Both parties filed motions to reconsider the October 2014 award of interim attorney fees. 

Muneeza argued that Masud’s filings and testimony at the evidentiary hearing understated two of 

the relevant factors in determining interim attorney fees: his current assets and liabilities, and the 

amount he had paid his own attorneys and expert witnesses. Muneeza asked that Masud be 

required to file corrected affidavits and that the trial court increase its award. Further, Muneeza 

asserted that Masud had made no effort to sell his founder’s shares as ordered and had not 

responded to her attorney’s requests for information. Finally, Muneeza asked the trial court to 

clarify that its award of interim attorney fees was an enforceable judgment pursuant to section 

508(a) of the Act. See 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2014) (“The court may order that the award of 

attorney’s fees and costs (including an interim or contribution award) shall be paid directly to the 

attorney, who may enforce the order in his or her name, or that it shall be paid to the appropriate 

party,” and [“j]udgment may be entered and enforcement had accordingly”). It does not appear 

that Masud filed any written response to this motion. However, Masud later agreed that he had 

understated his attorney fees during the October 2014 hearing. 

¶ 8 Masud’s motion to reconsider, filed on November 13, 2014, argued that the trial court 

had improperly refused to consider expert witness testimony regarding the nonmarital nature of 

the founder’s shares and the overall value of the marital estate, which Masud contended was 

essentially zero. Masud sought, as alternatives: (1) a reconsideration and denial of any interim 

attorney fees; (2) a vacation of the October 2014 fee award and a new hearing on interim 

attorney fees, at which the value of the marital estate as a whole could be litigated; (3) the entry 

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of a finding of immediate appealability pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 

26, 2010); or (4) a finding of “friendly contempt” against Masud, imposing a nominal sanction 

that would permit him to appeal the fee award. 

¶ 9 Muneeza’s response noted that Masud’s motion for reconsideration was untimely. She 

also asserted that, despite the barring of Masud’s proffered experts, there was ample evidence in 

the record supporting the trial court’s determination that the marital estate was sufficiently large 

to support the advance of interim attorney fees. Finally, she argued that Illinois law clearly 

established that interim-attorney-fee awards are not final or appealable orders and that Masud’s 

efforts to circumvent this law should be denied as improper, both on policy grounds and because 

she had not sought to have him held in contempt. 

¶ 10 Over the next year and a half, Masud filed four appeals from various interlocutory orders 

entered by the trial court, all of which were dismissed by this court because we lacked 

jurisdiction to hear them. See In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2015 IL App (2d) 150115-U; In re 

Marriage of Arjmand, 2015 IL App (2d) 150274-U; In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2015 IL App 

(2d) 150483-U; In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2016 IL App (2d) 160332-U. 

¶ 11 On April 22, 2016, the trial court heard oral argument on the parties’ motions to 

reconsider its October 2014 award of interim attorney fees. The trial court granted Muneeza’s 

motion and modified its earlier award, entering a judgment against Masud in favor of Muneeza’s 

attorneys in the amount of $230,000 ($210,000 in attorney fees and $20,000 for expert witness 

expenses). The written order stated that the judgment constituted “temporary relief.” The 

order also incorporated the provisions of the October 2014 order regarding the method by which 

the fees were to be paid. 

¶ 12 The trial court denied Masud’s motion to reconsider or, in the alternative, for a finding of 

“friendly” contempt or of immediate appealability pursuant to Rule 304(a). The trial court 

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noted that, as no final judgment disposing of all the issues in the dissolution was in effect, Masud 

could not use Rule 304(a) to prosecute piecemeal appeals from interim orders. See In re 

Marriage of Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d 114, 119 (1983); In re Marriage of King, 336 Ill. App. 3d 83, 

88 (2002) (“The request for attorney fees in a dissolution action that has not yet been resolved is 

not an independent action and must be considered to be part of the overall divorce proceeding.”). 

Further, no finding of “friendly” contempt was appropriate, as Masud’s purpose in seeking an 

immediate appeal of the interim fee award was not “a good-faith effort to secure an interpretation 

of an issue without direct precedent” (In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 321 

(2001)); rather, Masud simply disagreed with the result reached by the trial court. See In re 

Marriage of Levinson, 2013 IL App (1st) 121696, ¶ 56 (“The Act does not allow for parties to 

generally test the validity of interim fee awards under the guise of a ‘friendly contempt’ merely 

because the party does not agree with the award.”). 

¶ 13 On April 25, 2016, Muneeza filed an affidavit for nonwage garnishment of various 

accounts held by Masud, in the amount of $230,000. The circuit court clerk issued nonwage 

garnishment summonses directed toward Morgan Stanley and Computershare, the entities that 

held some of Masud’s assets, including the founder’s shares. Muneeza’s attorneys sent notice 

of the garnishment summonses to Masud pursuant to section 12-705 of the Code (735 ILCS 

5/12-705 (West 2014)), advising him of his right to contest the garnishment. 

¶ 14 Masud filed a motion to quash the garnishment proceedings, arguing that, as the interim 

fee award was not a final judgment, garnishment was not available to enforce it. Masud also 

argued that, if the $230,000 judgment was sufficiently final to provide a legal basis for 

garnishment, it must also be sufficiently final to be appealable, or else Masud would be unfairly 

prejudiced by being effectively unable to challenge the interim fee award. 

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¶ 15 On August 4, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the garnishment. At the close of the 

hearing, the trial court ruled that Muneeza was legally permitted to pursue garnishment in order 

to obtain payment of the $230,000 judgment against Masud for interim attorney fees. The trial 

court entered a turnover order requiring Morgan Stanley to liquidate certain shares (not the 

founder’s shares) in one of Masud’s accounts to pay the judgment. Morgan Stanley executed 

the turnover on the following day. On August 9, 2016, Masud filed this appeal. 

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 17 On appeal, Masud raises many of the same arguments raised in his motion to reconsider 

the trial court’s October 2014 order awarding interim attorney fees, as well as his arguments 

directed toward the April 2016 judgment modifying that earlier order and the August 2016 

turnover order. Before we may address these arguments, however, we must first determine 

whether we have jurisdiction to hear Masud’s appeal. See In re Marriage of Link, 362 Ill. App. 

3d 191, 192 (2005) (a reviewing court has a duty to consider whether it has jurisdiction and to 

dismiss an appeal if it lacks jurisdiction). We note that Muneeza previously moved to dismiss 

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We denied that motion. However, “we may reconsider our 

ruling on a motion to dismiss an appeal at any time before the disposition of the appeal.” 

Stoneridge Development Co. v. Essex Insurance Co., 382 Ill. App. 3d 731, 739 (2008). We 

therefore examine the issue of our jurisdiction further. 

¶ 18 As explained by our supreme court, although the Illinois Constitution provides for 

appellate review of a final judgment disposing of all of the claims raised in a case, the 

jurisdiction of a reviewing court to hear any other appeal is governed by the Illinois Supreme 

Court Rules: 

“Article VI, section 6, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides that final 

judgments may be appealed as a matter of right from the circuit court to the appellate 

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court. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6.) There is no corresponding constitutional right to 

appeal from interlocutory orders of the circuit court. Rather, article VI, section 6, vests 

this court with the authority to provide for such appeals, by rule, as it sees fit. (Ill. 

Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6.) Except as specifically provided by those rules, the appellate 

court is without jurisdiction to review judgments, orders or decrees which are not final.” 

Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 162 Ill. 2d 205, 210 (1994). 

In this case, many of the issues related to the dissolution—including the determination of 

whether various assets are marital or nonmarital, the extent of the marital estate, and the 

appropriate distribution of that estate—are still pending before the trial court. Accordingly, we 

have jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal only if such an appeal is specifically permitted 

by a supreme court rule. Id. 

¶ 19 Masud acknowledges that, under Illinois law, orders awarding interim attorney fees are 

not immediately appealable in and of themselves. See In re Marriage of Tetzlaff, 304 Ill. App. 

3d 1030, 1039 (1999). Section 501(c-1)(3) of the Act permits a court to “assess an interim 

award against an opposing party in an amount necessary to enable the petitioning party to 

participate adequately in the litigation, upon findings that the party from whom attorney’s fees 

and costs are sought has the financial ability to pay reasonable amounts and that the party 

seeking attorney’s fees and costs lacks sufficient access to assets or income to pay reasonable 

amounts.” 750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(3) (West 2014). “In enacting section 501(c-1), the 

legislature’s goal was to level the playing field by equalizing the parties’ litigation resources 

where it is shown that one party can pay and the other party cannot.” In re Marriage of Beyer, 

324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 315 (2001). 

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¶ 20 An interim award of attorney fees is strictly temporary in nature, subject to adjustment 

(including, if necessary, the disgorgement of overpayments to an attorney) at the close of the 

dissolution proceeding: 

“Any assessment of an interim award (including one pursuant to an agreed order) shall be 

without prejudice to any final allocation and without prejudice as to any claim or right of 

either party or any counsel of record at the time of the award. Any such claim or right 

may be presented by the appropriate party or counsel at a hearing on contribution under 

subsection (j) of Section 503 or a hearing on counsel’s fees under subsection (c) of 

Section 508. Unless otherwise ordered by the court at the final hearing between the 

parties or in a hearing under subsection (j) of Section 503 or subsection (c) of Section 

508, interim awards, as well as the aggregate of all other payments by each party to 

counsel and related payments to third parties, shall be deemed to have been advances 

from the parties’ marital estate. Any portion of any interim award constituting an 

overpayment shall be remitted back to the appropriate party or parties, or, alternatively, to 

successor counsel, as the court determines and directs, after notice in a form designated 

by the Supreme Court.” 750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(2) (West Supp. 2015). 

Further, section 501(d) of the Act explicitly states that a temporary order entered pursuant to 

section 501: “(1) does not prejudice the rights of the parties *** which are to be adjudicated at 

subsequent hearings in the proceeding; (2) may be revoked or modified before final judgment, on 

a showing by affidavit and upon hearing; and (3) terminates when the final judgment is entered.” 

750 ILCS 501(d) (West 2014). 

¶ 21 The plain language of section 501 thus clearly indicates that the legislature intended the 

remedy for any error in the granting of interim attorney fees to be addressed through a 

comprehensive reconsideration and reallocation at a final hearing on attorney fees held near the 

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entry of the final judgment of dissolution. In accordance with this intent, the interlocutory 

appeal of interim-attorney-fee awards is not permitted by any supreme court rule. See Tetzlaff, 

304 Ill. App. 3d at 1039; see also In re Marriage of Johnson, 351 Ill. App. 3d 88, 96 (2004) 

(order requiring attorney to disgorge previously paid fees was not immediately appealable where 

final hearing on attorney fees had not yet been held). 

¶ 22 Masud contends, however, that Rule 304(b)(4) permits him to appeal the August 2016 

turnover order that arose from the garnishment proceedings. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(4) (eff. Feb. 

26, 2010). He further argues that, just as the review of a contempt order requires the reviewing 

court to consider the validity of the order(s) disobeyed by the appellant (see Kaull v. Kaull, 2014 

IL App (2d) 130175, ¶ 22), any review of the August 2016 turnover order also requires us to 

consider the validity of the underlying orders awarding interim attorney fees. There are several 

flaws in these arguments. 

¶ 23 A. Rule 304(b)(4) Pertains to Citation Proceedings 

¶ 24 First, Rule 304(b)(4) does not authorize interlocutory appeals from orders entered in 

nonwage garnishment proceedings, which are governed by sections 12-701 through 12-719 of 

the Code. See 735 ILCS 5/12-701 et seq. (West 2014). Rather, Rule 304(b)(4) permits an 

interlocutory appeal only from “[a] final judgment or order entered in a proceeding under section 

2-1402 of the Code [(735 ILCS 5/2-1402 (West 2014))].” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(4) (eff. Feb. 26, 

2010). Section 2-1402 relates to a different type of proceeding: a citation to discover assets. 

Nothing in Rule 304(b)(4) permits an appeal from an interlocutory garnishment order. 

¶ 25 This conclusion arises from the unambiguous language of the rule itself. Supreme court 

rules “are to be construed in the same manner as statutes.” In re Denzel W., 237 Ill. 2d 285, 294 

(2010); see also In re Marriage of Nettleton, 348 Ill. App. 3d 961, 967 (2004) (“In interpreting a 

supreme court rule, we apply the same principles that are used to construe a statute, and our goal 

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is to determine the intent of the drafters of the rule.”). The language of a rule or statute is the 

most reliable indicator of its intended purpose. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 

(2001). That language must be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the 

language is clear and unambiguous we must apply the law without resort to further interpretory 

aids. In re Michael D., 2015 IL 119178, ¶ 9. Here, the plain language of Rule 304(b)(4) is 

unambiguous: it permits interlocutory appeals only from final judgments entered in citation 

proceedings under section 2-1402 of the Code. 

¶ 26 Masud argues that, although the language of Rule 304(b)(4) refers only to citation 

proceedings, it should be interpreted as extending to garnishment proceedings as well. In 

support of this argument, he cites three cases: Busey Bank v. Salyards, 304 Ill. App. 3d 214 

(1999), In re Marriage of McElwee, 230 Ill. App. 3d 714 (1992), and Peter Fischer Import 

Motors, Inc. v. Buckley, 121 Ill. App. 3d 906 (1984). However, none of these cases warrants a 

departure from the plain language of the rule. 

¶ 27 In McElwee, the reviewing court stated—without offering any legal support—that 

“[g]arnishment proceedings under section 12-701 of the Code *** are regarded as 

‘supplementary proceedings’ within the meaning of section 2-1402 of the Code.” McElwee, 

230 Ill. App. 3d at 719. However, insofar as we have been able to discover, neither the text and 

commentary of sections 12-701 and 2-1402, nor the case law interpreting those provisions, 

supports this statement. To the contrary, garnishment and citation proceedings had different 

origins at common law and have always been codified as distinct procedures. See Robert G. 

Markoff, Survey of Illinois Law: Enforcement of Judgments, 33 S. Ill. U. L.J. 631, 633-35 (2009) 

(tracing the different historical roots and scope of garnishment and citation proceedings); see 

also National Home, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 16 Ill. App. 2d 

111, 115-16 (1958) (garnishment actions have different statutory requirements than 

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“supplementary” citation proceedings arising under the precursor to section 2-1402 (Ill. Rev. 

Stat. 1957, ch. 110, ¶ 73), and one type of action could not be converted into the other without 

complying with the statutory requirements); Michael G. Cortina, Citations Versus Non-Wage 

Garnishments: Which Is Right for Your Collection Case?, 93 Ill. B.J. 362, 363 (2005) (“Unlike a 

third-party citation to discover assets, *** garnishments are not considered ‘supplementary 

proceedings.’ ”). The McElwee court went on to state that appeals in garnishment proceedings 

“are governed by Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(4).” McElwee, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 719. 

However, this statement was supported only by a single citation, to Buckley. (Similarly, Busey 

Bank cited only McElwee and Buckley to support its statement that “orders that terminate all or 

part of [a] garnishment proceeding are appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(4).” 

Busey Bank, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 218.) Thus, we must turn to Buckley to see if it advances any 

principled or logical reason to depart from the plain language of Rule 304(b)(4). 

¶ 28 In Buckley, the plaintiff filed a breach-of-contract suit against the defendant. Buckley, 

121 Ill. App. 3d at 907. Before the conclusion of the suit (indeed, even before the defendant 

had been served), the plaintiff moved to attach a bank account belonging to the defendant. Id. 

at 908. The trial court entered an attachment order. Upon receiving the attachment order, the 

bank moved to dismiss the order on the ground that the account was exempt from “garnishment” 

proceedings. The trial court granted the bank’s motion and dismissed the attachment order. 

The plaintiff appealed the dismissal. Subsequently, the defendant was served, and the 

underlying contract suit was still pending when the reviewing court took up the appeal. Id. 

¶ 29 In examining whether it had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal, the 

reviewing court noted that, although the third party in attachment proceedings can be referred to 

as a “garnishee,” attachment is a prejudgment procedure that differs from garnishment under 

section 12-701 of the Code, which occurs after a judgment has been entered. Id. at 910. The 

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reviewing court then commented, without citation to any legal authority, that Rule 304(b)(4) 

“permits an appeal from an order in a supplementary proceeding such as garnishment.” Id. 

However, the court explained, no supreme court rule permitted an interlocutory appeal from an 

attachment proceeding. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. 

¶ 30 When read in context, the Buckley court’s statement that Rule 304(b)(4) permits the 

interlocutory appeal of an order entered in a garnishment proceeding under section 12-701 must 

be seen as dicta. As the court itself acknowledged, the proceeding at issue in Buckley was not a 

garnishment proceeding, and thus the issue of jurisdiction to review a garnishment order was not 

before the court. Moreover, as we have noted, the court offered no support for its casual 

statement that Rule 304(b)(4) provides for jurisdiction over appeals from garnishment orders. 

Accordingly, we find the Buckley statement unpersuasive, offering no justification to ignore the 

plain language of Rule 304(b)(4) that limits the scope of that rule to citation proceedings 

pursuant to section 2-1402. As the August 2016 turnover order did not arise from a citation 

proceeding, we have no jurisdiction under Rule 304(b)(4) to review it. 

¶ 31 B. Limits on Interlocutory Appeals in Dissolutions 

¶ 32 Even if the language of Rule 304(b)(4) were not so clear, we would be hesitant to hold 

that a party to a dissolution proceeding could obtain appellate review of an interim order by 

appealing that order’s enforcement. As our supreme court has explained, the intertwined nature 

of the issues encompassed in a dissolution proceeding requires them to be addressed 

comprehensively in a single final order: 

“A petition for dissolution advances a single claim; that is, a request for an order 

dissolving the parties’ marriage. The numerous other issues involved, such as custody, 

property disposition, and support are merely questions which are ancillary to the cause of 

action. [Citation.] They do not represent separate, unrelated claims; rather, they are 

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separate issues relating to the same claim. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a 

situation in which the issues are more interrelated than those involved in a dissolution 

proceeding. Should the trial court decline to grant the petition for dissolution, no final 

relief may be obtained relevant to the other issues involved. *** Practically speaking, 

then, until all of the ancillary issues are resolved, the petition for dissolution is not fully 

adjudicated.” (Emphasis in original.) Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 119.1 

¶ 33 Masud argues that, if a judgment requiring the payment of interim attorney fees is 

sufficiently final to be enforceable through garnishment, it must also be immediately appealable. 

To support his argument that enforceability and appealability necessarily go hand in hand, he 

cites the supreme court’s statement in In re Application of Du Page County Collector, 152 Ill. 2d 

545, 549 (1992), that “[i]t is precisely the prevailing party’s ability to enforce a judgment which 

gives rise to the nonprevailing party’s ability to immediately challenge the judgment on appeal.” 

Du Page County Collector is distinguishable from this case, however, in that it was not a 

dissolution case. As the supreme court taught in Leopando, dissolution cases are different from 

other cases; even when the trial court has entered a valid finding under Rule 304(a) (the question 

addressed in Du Page County Collector), most of the issues raised in a dissolution case are not 

immediately appealable. Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 119. But see Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(6) (eff. Feb. 

1 This view of a dissolution case as presenting a single unified claim explains why this 

appeal is considered an interlocutory “prejudgment” appeal: although the marriage between 

Masud and Muneeza has been dissolved, the petition for dissolution has not been fully adjudicated, 

because not all of the issues related to that dissolution have been resolved. Thus, statutory 

provisions relating to the conduct of postjudgment hearings regarding attorney fees do not have 

any current application. 

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26, 2010) (subsequent to the entry of the decision in Leopando, Rule 304(b) was amended to add 

subsection (6), which permits the immediate appeal of any judgment relating to child custody). 

¶ 34 Moreover, the structure of the Act itself provides for a variety of interim or temporary 

orders that may give rise to enforceable judgments despite the fact that the final judgment of 

dissolution has not yet been entered. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 5/504(b-7) (West 2014) (“Any new or 

existing maintenance order *** entered by the court *** shall be deemed to be a series of 

judgments against the person obligated to pay support thereunder,” and “[e]ach such judgment 

shall have the full force, effect and attributes of any other judgment of this State, including the 

ability to be enforced”); 750 ILCS 5/505(d) (West 2014) (“Any new or existing support order 

entered by the court under this Section shall be deemed to be a series of judgments against the 

person obligated to pay support thereunder, each such judgment to be in the amount of each 

payment or installment of support and each such judgment to be deemed entered as of the date 

the corresponding payment or installment becomes due,” and [e]ach such judgment shall have 

the full force, effect and attributes of any other judgment of this State, including the ability to be 

enforced”); 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2014) (when a trial court enters an award of interim 

attorney fees, “[j]udgment may be entered and enforcement had accordingly”). Illinois courts 

have consistently held that, despite their enforceability, such interim judgments arising from the 

court-ordered payment of temporary support or attorney fees in dissolution cases are not 

immediately appealable. See, e.g., Tetzlaff, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 1039; In re Marriage of Ryan, 

188 Ill. App. 3d 679, 681 (1989) (finding no appellate jurisdiction to review trial court’s entry of 

a judgment of arrearage in child support and maintenance payments, commenting that “[t]he fact 

that an order is enforceable *** does not necessarily make it appealable”). Accordingly, when 

the judgment at issue awards interim relief under the Act, enforceability and appealability are not 

necessarily synonymous. 

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¶ 35 As the supreme court has stated, one purpose of the Act was to “ ‘encourage[ ] the court 

to decide all matters incident to the dissolution in a single judgment, to the fullest extent of its 

authority, in order to achieve finality, promote judicial economy, and avoid multiple litigations 

and complications which can result from the entry of partial judgments.’ ” In re Marriage of 

Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d 190, 197 (1982) (quoting Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, ¶ 401(3), Historical & Practice 

Notes, at 105 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (codified at 750 ILCS 5/401(3))). In this case, Muneeza 

cannot retain the benefit of Masud’s payment of interim attorney fees unless she files a motion 

for contribution at the close of the dissolution proceedings, and the trial court’s ultimate 

determination of that issue will depend in part on matters that are not yet resolved, such as the 

appropriate distribution of the marital estate. 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2014). This policy 

against piecemeal appeals from interim orders entered in dissolution cases provides additional 

support for our determination that Masud may not use an appeal from a garnishment order as a 

vehicle to challenge the award of interim attorney fees. 

¶ 36 Finally, the policy behind section 501(c-1) of the Act also supports our determination 

that Illinois law does not countenance appeals from garnishment orders arising from 

interim-attorney-fee awards. “[I]f orders addressing interim attorney fee awards were subject to 

interlocutory appeal, the party in a dissolution proceeding with less financial ability to pay fees 

incident to the litigation would be at a severe disadvantage in retaining counsel,” which would 

undermine “one of the key purposes of the ‘leveling the playing field’ amendments to the Act[:] 

*** to provide ‘for timely awards of interim fees to achieve substantial parity in parties’ access 

for funds for litigation costs.’ ” Tetzlaff, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 1039-40 (quoting 750 ILCS 

5/102(5) (West 1996)). Indeed, the procedural history of this dissolution proceeding—which 

includes no fewer than five fruitless (but costly) interlocutory appeals by Masud—is an example 

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2017 IL App (2d) 160631 

of the very evil that the legislature sought to avoid. We urge Masud, Muneeza, and the trial
 

court to focus their energies on bringing the remaining issues to trial without further delay. 

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
 

¶ 38 For all of these reasons, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal and must dismiss it.
 

¶ 39 Appeal dismissed. 

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