O n J u n e 2 2 , 2 0 0 5 , Ju d g e H a g e l re p la c e d C h ie f Ju d g e S te inb e rg o n the p a n e l tha t w a s a ssig n e d to d e c id e this * appeal

. O n Jul y 19 , 20 05 , oral ar gu ment s wer e hea r d bef ore a panel of Judge s K as ol d, H age l , and Lanc e. I t was subseq uent l y de t erm i ned t hat t hi s m at t er was ap p rop ri at e f o r en b anc co nsi d erat i o n. C hi ef Jud ge Stei nb erg t o o k no p art in th e d isp o sitio n o f t h is a p p e a l.

A ltho u g h 3 8 U .S .C

. § 7 2 6 1 ins tru c ts the C o u rt in ap p ro p ria te c a se s to " se t a sid e " d e c isio n s o f t h e B o a rd , i n 1 t a k i n g s u c h a c t i on , t h e Cou r t h a s t r a di t i on a l l y u s e d t h e t e r m "v a c a t e " t o d e s c r i be t h a t a c t i on
. The Cou r t u s e s t h e t e r ms
" v a c a te " a n d " se t as id e " inte rc h a n g e a b ly. T h e v e rb " to v a c a te " is d e fine d a s " to nu lli fy, c a n c e l; m a k e vo id ; i n v a lid a te ,"

UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O . 03-0752
D ENI S E J A RR ELL , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. R. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(Argued Jul y

19, 2005 Dec ided August 24, 2006 )
Kenneth M. Carpenter , o f T op e ka , K ans a s, fo r t he a pp e lla nt.
L a v i n i a A

. D e rr , wi th whom Tim S. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll, Assistant Gene ral Couns el; and Carolyn F. W ashington , Deputy Assistant Gener al Counsel, all of Washington, D.C., wer e on the br iefs, for the appe llee.
Be fo re GR E ENE, Chief Judge , a n d K A SO LD , H A G E L , M O O RMA N , LANCE, DAVI S, and SCHOEL EN, Judges

. *
KASOL D, Judge , filed the opinion of the Court. HAGEL , Judge , filed a dissentingopinion.
KASOL D, Judge : Veter an Denise J arr ell appea ls through counsel a J anuar y 3, 2003, Boa

rd of V e te r an s ' Ap p e a ls ( B o ar d ) d e c is io n th at, inte r a li a , c o n c lu d e d th at th e r e w a s n o clear and

unmis ta ka ble e rr or (C UE ) i n a

Janu ary 19 56 VAre g ion a l of

fi c e (R O) de c isi on

tha t de nie d d isa

bil ity compensation for a psychiatric disorder. F or the re asons s et forth below, the J anuar y 2003 decision of the B oard w ill be set aside in par t and the appe al dismissed. 1wh i l e t h e v er b ph r as e "t o s et a s i de" i s de f i n ed as "t o a n n u l or v ac at e ( a j u dg men t , or der , e t c. )

. " B L ACK ' S L AW D I CT I ON ARY 1376, 1546 ( 7t h e d. 1999). W e con cl u de t h at n o di s t i n ct i on e x i s t s be t we en "s et a s i de" a n d "v ac at e. " Virg in I s l an ds T e l

. Cor p. , v
. FCC , 4 4 4 F .3 d 6 6 6 , 6 7 1 ( D .C . C ir. 2 0 0 6 ) (" ' S e t as id e ' us u a lly m e a n s ' v a c a te .' " ); Ch e c k o s k y v
. S EC , 23 F

. 3d 452, 491 ( D

. C. Ci r
. 1994 ) ( "S e t t i n g as i de me a n s va c a t i n g ; no ot h e r me a n i n g i s a pp a r e n t

. ")

. Al t h ou g h bo t h t e r ms can b e used i nt erchangeab l y , t o be co nsi st ent w i t h the l anguage em p l o y ed b y C o ngres s, and f o r t he p urpo se of

de ci d i ng this c a se , t h e C o u rt w ill us e the ter m " se t as id e ."

A ltho u g h a re q u e st fo r re v isio n o n the b a sis o f C U E is f re q u e n tly re fer re d to a s a " C U E c la im " o r a " c la im 2
o f C U E ," the C o u rt w ill u se th e s ta tuto ry a n d r e g u la to ry la n g u a g e , as a p p ro p ria te

. See Li ve s ay v. Pr i nci pi , 15 V et

. App. 165, 179 ( 2001) ( en ba n c) ( "a r equ es t f or r ev i s i on of a pr ev i ou s dec i s i on on t h e bas i s of CU E i s n ot a n a ppl i ca t i on or cl ai m f o r any be nef

i t unde r t he l aws adm i ni st ered by t he Se cret ary " (i nt ernal quo t at i o ns o m i t t ed ))

. 2 I. BACKGROUND Ms. J arr ell serve d in the U.S. Navy from August 1952 to March 1954. Her service medic al

rec ords disclose no evide nce of a psy chiatric disorder upon her entry into or separation fr om service

. She wa s, ho we ve r, tr e ate d f or anxie ty duri ngse rv ic e on

thr e e oc c a sio ns . In Aug

us t 19 55 , M s. Jar

re ll filed a c laim for disability compensation benefits for a " nervous c ondition." Recor d (R.) at 72-75. I n J anu ary 19 56 , the R O de ni ed d is abi li ty compen sat io n fo r "ps ycho si s, un di fferentia te d, in c omp le te remission" be cause Ms. J arr ell' s "ne rvous condition w as not incurre d in or ag gravated by service ." R. at 112-14. Ms. J arr ell did not appeal that de cision. In Jun e 19 97 , M s. Jar

re ll f ile d thro ugh c ouns e l a

re qu e st f or re vis ion of the Janu ary

19 56 RO decision on the ba sis of C UE. In November 1997, she subm itted further argument in support of her 2 requ e s t, wh e r e in

s h e s p e c if

ic a ll y ar gu e d th at t h e RO h a d

n o t f o ll o w e d c o ntr o ll in gr e gu lations reg ardingservice connec tion for disease s noted in service or within the presump ti v ep e rio d there afte r and cited to Savage v . Gober , 1 0 V e t

. Ap p
. 4 8 8 ( 1 9 9 7 ) , an d 3 8 C

. F

. R

. § § 3

. 3 0 3 , 3

. 3 0 7 ( c ) ( 1 9 5 5 )

. In Fe bru ar y 1 9 9 9 , th e RO d e n ie d th e r e qu e s t. O n Jun e 1 4 , 1 9 9 9 , M s
. Jar r e ll f il e d a N o ti ce of Di s agr ee m en t(N OD ) w i thth e F eb ru ary 1 9 9 9 R O d ec i s i o n
. InJ u l y 2 0 0 0 , M s
. J arre l l fi l edthro u gh the same c ounsel her Substantive Appe al to the B oard; th er ei n , in addition to the theory of CUE prese nted to the RO, Ms. J arr ell raised f or the fir st tim e that the 1956 RO c ommitt ed CUE by failing to consider the pr esumptio n o f s o u n dcondition upon entry into service unde r 38 C.F.R. § 3.63 (1955). The Boa

rd acknow ledg ed that Ms. Jarre ll r aised this new theory of CUE in her Substantive Ap pe a l; i n 2 00 3 th e B oa

rd a dju dic ate d a

nd re je c te d b oth

the or ie s. On appe al to the Court, Ms. J arr ell argues solely that the B oard e rre d in its adjudication of her r equest for

revis i o n u nder the theory that the 1956 RO failed to c onsider the pr esumption of3

sound condition under § 3.63 – the theor y of CUE fi rst prese nted in her Substantive Appe al. She initially soug ht reve rsal and argued, inter a lia, that the 2003 B oard misinterpre ted the pre sumptionof-soundne ss r equire ments under § 3.63. Appellant' s Brief (B r.) at 1-11. In her r eply brief, how ever , Ms. J arr ell modifies her r equest so as to see k rema nd instead of r ever sal and p re sents a new argument that the B oard is re quired to " rea djudicate the a ppellant' s cl ai m o f C UE" under the

s ta n d ar d s s e t f

o rth in Mo o dy v. Principi , 360 F.3d 1306 ( Fe d. Cir. 2004), Szemraj v. Principi , 357 F.3d 1370 ( Fe d. Cir. 2004), and Roberson v. Princ ipi , 251 F.3d 1378 ( Fe d. Cir. 2001). On Ap ri l 15 , 2 00 5, the Court or de re d s up plem ent al bri e fi ngto a dd re ss j ur isd ic tio n. B oth parties a rgue that the B oard may adjudicate a request for revision of a n RO decision base d on a CUE the or y no t pr e vio us ly

pr e se nte d to an RO if the c la ima nt wa ive s initi a l adj ud ic atio n by the RO . T his position was echoe d by

the parties at oral a

rgument, duringwhich Ms. J arr ell expressly asser ted her knowingand voluntary

waiver of RO consider ation.

II. AN AL YSI S A. Revision of Dec isions Based on CUE Prior to N ovember 21, 1997, there was no statutory authority allowinga fina l RO decision to be collater ally

attacke d on the basis of CUE. Since at least 1928, howeve r, VA r egu lations pro vi ded for th e revi si on of deci si on s tha t were the pro du ct of "clear and unm is tak abl e erro r." See Veter ans Benef

its Regulation 187, § 7155 (1928); Ex ec. Order No. 6230 (Ve tera

ns Regulation No. 2a ) (July 28 , 1 93 3) ; se eals o Russell v. Principi , 3 Vet.App. 310, 312-13 (1991) (en ba nc) ( holding that 38 C.F .R. § 3 .1 05 (a), wh ic h a llo ws fo r r e vis ion of RO de c isi on s o n th e ba sis of CU E, is a va lid exercise of S ec re t ary ' s authority to prescribe re gulations, even in the a bsence of express statutory authority ). Until 1994, requests for

revision on the basis that either an RO dec ision or a B oard de cision contained c lear

and unmistakable e rror wer e made pursuant to this re gulatory authority . Howeve r, in Sm ith (W

ill iam ) v . B ro wn , the U.S. Court of Appea ls for the F eder al Circuit (F eder al Circuit) ruled that this regulatory

authority , specific ally

§ 3.105(a) , applies only

to reg ional o ffice decisions and that Boa rd dec isions are fina l unless rec onsideration is order ed by the Board Chairma n, the dec isionW i t h i n t h e v et er an - f r i en dl y admi n i s t r at i v e s et t i n g , t h er e a r e n u mer ou s m ea n s t o ha v i n g a f i n al B oar d de ci s i on 3 read d res sed. In ad d i t i o n t o t he m et ho d s st at ed i n S mi t h ( Wi l l i a m) , 3 5 F. 3d at 152 0- 21 , a pr i or deci s i on ca n be r eve r s ed o r re v ise d b a se d o n C U E , 3 8 U .S .C . § 7 1 1 1 ; Cook v

. Pr i nci pi , 31 8 F

. 3d 13 34 , 13 37 ( Fe d. Ci r
. 20 02 ) ( e n ba n c ) ; 38 C. F. R. § 2 0 .1 4 0 0 (2 0 0 5 ), re o p e n e d b a se d o n ne w a n d m a te ria l ev id e n c e , s ee 3 8 U .S .C . § 5 1 0 8 ; Cook , su p ra ; 38 C. F. R. § 3 .15 6 (a) (2 0 0 5 ), o r t he B o ard m ay sua sp o nte, reg ard l ess o f an y m o t i o n for re co nsid era t i o n, co rrec t o b vio us erro rs, s ee 3 8 U .S .C . § 7 1 0 3 (c ); Hazan v. G ob er , 1 0 V e t.A p p . 5 1 1 , 5 2 2 (1 9 9 7 ); s ee al s o D i Car l o v
. Ni chol

s on , 20 V et

. App. 5 2 , 56 (20 0 6 ) ( set t i ng f o rt h recognized exc ep t i o ns t o t he rul e o f f i nal i t y ). 4 is v a c ate d s ua sp onte by the B oa rd , or the B oa

rd de c isi on is re ve rs e d or re mand e d by the Court

. See 3 35 F.3d 1516, 1520- 21 (F ed. Cir. 1994). The F eder al Circuit noted that a body akin to a trial c ourt (an RO) cannot properly revie w dec isions rendere d by an appe llate body

(the B oard) that has jurisdiction over it. Se eid

. On November 21, 1997, Congr ess enac ted sections 5109A and 7111, title 38 , U. S

. C ode, which expressly

allow for the revision of a prior decision of the Sec reta ry made unde r cha

pter 51, title 38, U.S. C ode, and a dec i s ion of the B oard, r espec tively , on the basis of CUE. SeeP u b

. L. 105-111, § 1( b ), 111 Stat. 2271 (Nov. 21, 1997). Although both sections provide, in esse nce, the

same a uthority to attack c ollatera lly the final de cisions of an RO or the Boa rd, re spectively , they differ , as re levant to this appea l, in the la nguag e instructing how eac h reque st f or re vision shall be prese nted and a djudicated. Sec tion 5109A(e) states that a reque st f or revision of an RO de cision on the basis of CUE " shall be submitted to the Secre tary and shall be decide d in the same manne r as a ny other c laim." This contr asts with section 7111(e) , which states that a reque st for re vision of a B oard decision on the basis of C UE "shall be subm itted direc tly to the Board and shall be dec ided by the Boa rd on the merits, withoutref err al to any adjudicative or hearing official actingon behalf of the S ecret ary ." Section 5109A requires that a reque st for revision of a final R O decision on the basis of CUE "sha ll" be submitted to the Secr etar y ; section 7 1 1 1 re qu i res that a reque st for re vision of a final Boa rd decision on the basis of CUE "sha ll" be submitt ed direc tly to the Boa rd and, specific ally , not to t h e S ec reta

ry . Although se ction 7111 does not expli citly exclude the direc t submiss ion to the B oa rd , f or its c on sid e ratio n in the fi rs t insta nc e , a r e qu e st f

or re vis ion on the ba sis of

CU E i n a n RO de c isi on un de r s e c tio n 5 10 9A , p e rm itt ingsu c h a c tio n w ou ld c ontr ave ne the e xpre ss re qu ir e me nt i n section 5109A(e ) that a r equest under that section "sha ll" be submitt ed to the Secre tary

. See Splane

v . W est , 216 F.3d 1058, 1068- 69 (F ed. Cir. 2000) (" canons of construction .

. . require us to give5

eff ect to the c lear

languag e of a

statute and avo id rende ringany portions meaning less or

su pe rf luo us " ). Ad dit ion a lly , sec tio n 711 1 by its te rm s only sp e aks to p ri or B oa rd de c isi on s and

it

e vin c e s no a

uth or izatio n fo r t

he B oa rd to c on sid e r i n th e fi rs t in sta nc e any thi ngoth e r t

ha n a re qu e st for r evision of a pr evious Boa rd dec ision based on CUE. See Shoshone Indian T r i b e v
. Un ited States , 364 F.3d 1339, 1347 ( Fe d. Cir. 2004) (Court pre sumes "th at ' Congr ess expresses its intent through the languag e it chooses' and that the c hoice of words in a statute is ther efor e deliber ate a nd

re fl ec t i v e" ( qu o t i n g INS v. Cardoza-Fonsec a , 480 U.S. 421, 433 n.12, 436 (1987)))

. This rea ding of

sections 5109A and 7111 is also consistent with the s tatutory scheme

. See Ki ng v
. S t. V in c e n t' s Hosp. , 50 2 U.S . 2 15 , 2 21 (1 99 1) (whe n inte rp re tin ga statut e , th e Court

is

re qu ir e d to loo k at th e c onte xt an d th e pr ov isi on s of law a s a wh ole ); Im az io N

ur se ry , I nc . v . D an ia Gree nhouses , 69 F.3d 1560, 1564 ( Fe d. Cir. 1995) (all parts of a statute must be c onstrued tog ether wi tho ut ac c or din g un du e imp or tanc e to a sin g le or

iso late d p or

tio n) ; se eals o Gardner v. D erwinski , 1 V e t.A pp . 5 84 , 5 86 (1 99 1) (" De te rm ini nga statut e ' s p la in m e anin g re qu ir e s exam ini ng the sp e c if ic languag e at issue a

nd the over all structure of the statute." ), aff 'd su b n om . Gar

dn e r v . B ro wn , 5 F.3d 1456, 1456 (F ed. Cir. 1993), a ff 'd, 513 U.S. 115 (1994); 2A N. S I NGER , S UTHE R L AND O N S TATUTOR Y C ONS TR UC TI ON § 46:05 (6th ed. 2000) ( "e ach pa rt or sec tion of a statute should be construed in c onnection with eve ry other pa rt or section so as t o produce a harmonious whole" a nd "the court will not only

consider the particula

r statute in questi on, but also the entire le g islative scheme of which it is a par t") . Wherea s section 7111 desc ribes a s p ecific proce dure f or the adjudication of a

reque st for re vision of a Boa rd decision based on CUE, se ction 5109A(e ) re quires that a re quest for r evision based on CUE "sha ll be decided in the same manner as any other c laim." Section 5109A is part of c hapter 51, title 38, U.S. C ode, as is s ec t i o n 5 104(a) , which contr ols the adjudication of c laims by

the Secr etar

y . Section 5104(a) require s that the S ecr etar y notify a cla imant of the Sec reta

ry' s decisions aff

ectingthe provision of bene fits made under section 511(a ), title 38, U.S. Code. Section 511(a) require s the Secr etar y to decide a ll questions of law and fa ct nec essar y f o r a d e c i s i o nb y th e S e c r e t ar

y un d e r th e l awth ata f

f e c t s th e p r o v i s i o no f

b e n e f i t s b y th e S e c r e t ar

y. 1. Bo ar d J ur isd ic tio n O v e r a Cla im Although the term " claim" is not defined i n title 38, U.S. C ode, sec tion 5100 defines "c laimant" a s "a

ny individual applying f

or, or submi tting a c laim for, any benef it under the law sT he B oard has been gr ant ed ori gi nal j ur i s di ct i on t o adju di cat e a r eques t f or r evi s i on of

a B oard deci s i on bas ed 4
o n C U E , s ee 3 8 U .S .C . § 7 1 1 1 , t o c o rr e c t o b v io u s e rr o r, s ee 3 8 U .S.C

. § 7 1 0 3 (c), an d t o rev i ew att o rne y f ee ag ree m en t s, s ee 3 8 U .S .C

. § 5 9 0 4 (c )( 2 ); Scat es v
. Pr i nci pi , 282 F. 3d 1362, 1367 ( Fe d. C i r
. 2002) ( r ec og n i zi n g s ec t i on 5904( c) ( 2) a s g ivi n g B o a rd " n o n -ap p e llate a u tho rity" to re v ie w a tto rn e y fee a g re e m e n ts). S ee a lso M at t hews v
. Ni chol s on , 19 V et

. A pp
. 202 , 205 ( ci t i ng s ect i ons 590 4(c) ( 2) a nd 7 1 1 1 as exa mp l es of s t at ut ory provi s i ons gr ant i ng ori gi nal juri sdi ct i o n t o t he B o ard). 6 a dmi nis te re d b y

the Se c re tary ," wh ic h n e c e ssa ri ly su g g e sts that a

c la im i s o ne fo r a

ben e fi t. 38 U.S.C. § 5100. This sugg estion was adopte d b y t he Secr etar y in his implementingregulations which def

ine a " claim" as a written reque st for " deter mination of entitlement . . . to a bene fit." 38 C.F .R. § 3 .1 (p ) ( 20 05 ); see also 38 C.F.R

. § 2 0.3(f) (2005) ( defining"c laim" a s, inter alia, a n "a pplication made unde r title 38, United States Code, and implementing direc tives for e ntitlement to [ VA] benefits" ) . Claims for benefits, necessarily , are submitt ed to and adjudicated by the RO, which ac ts on behalf of

the Secr etar

y . Cf . 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) (Secr etar y shall take c erta in action "[u]pon rece ipt of a complete or substantially complete application" for benef its). This is so that the RO c an ma

ke the " ini tial revi ew or de te rm inatio n" re fe rr e d to in 3 8 U .S. C. § 71 05 (b )( 1) , a g a ins t which a N otice of D isagree ment (NOD ) m ay be filed to initiate appe llate re view. See G odfrey v

. Brown , 7 Vet.App. 398, 410 ( 1995). Once a cla im is adjudicated by the RO, that dec ision becomes fi n al unless the claimant appea ls the decision. See 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 5( c ). Th e re qu e st f or a pp e llate re vie w b y

the B oa rd is i nitiated by

filing a n NOD a nd is completed by

filing a Substantive Appeal. See3 8 U .S. C. § 7105(a) . When a claim is properly appea led to the B oard, the Boa rd is vested with the jurisdiction to revie w "[a]ll questions in a matter which under section 511(a ) of [titl e 38] is subj ect to a de cision of the Se c re tary ." 38 U. S.C. §§ 7104 (a), 71 05 (a); se eals o B e rn ar d v . B ro wn , 4 Vet.App. 384, 390-91 (1993)

. Although a claimant may file an NOD as to a claim adjudicated below, nothingin an NOD could conf

er jurisdiction upon the B oard ove r a claim that was never prese nted to and adjudicated by the RO bec ause the re is no dec is i o n o n s u ch a n ewly raised c laim to appeal to the B oard. See Godfrey , 7 Vet.App. at 408-10 (B oard la cks jurisdiction over c laim not first present ed to and adjudicate d by

the RO). Indeed, a s an appe llate tri b unal re viewingthe Secr etar y ' s decision on a claim for be nefits under

section 511, and absent the grant of origina l jurisdiction, the Boar d has no authority to adjudicate suc h a cla im in the first instance. See 38 U.S. C. § 7 10 4(a) ; Scates v

. 47

Principi , 2 82 F .3 d 1 36 2, 13 67 (F e d. Cir

. 20 02 ) (" Th e B oa rd is p ri mari ly

an a pp e llate tr ibu

na l [th at]

serve s as the dec iding e ntity ' on appea l to the Secre tary' of a que stion 's ubject to dec ision by the Secre tary' under [section] 511(a)." ). More over, it is axiom atic that in t he abse nce of leg islation authorizing other

wise, jurisdiction cannot be confe rre d – nor ca n the lack of

jurisdiction be waived – by the par ties. Se eJ

oh ns on v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 25, 27 ( 1994) (c itingBasso v. Utah Power &Light Co. , 495 F.2d 906, 909 ( 10th Cir. 1974) (" L ack of jurisdiction ' cannot be waived a nd jurisdiction

cann o t b e co n fe rr ed u

p o n a fe d er al co urt b y co n s en t , i n ac t i o n o r st i p u l at i o n
. '" ( qu o t i n g Cal ifo rn ia v. LaRue , 4 09 U. S. 1 09 , 11 2 n. 3 ( 19 72 )) )) ; Sm ith ( Ir ma ) v . B ro wn , 10 Vet.App. 330, 334 ( 1997) (v a c atin ga s u ltr a

vir e s a B oa rd de c isi on iss ue d w ith out jurisd ic tio n a nd dis mis sin ga

pp e a l) ; se eals o NLRB v. Fed. Sec ., Inc. , 154 F.3d 751, 754 ( 7th Cir. 1998) (noting in National L abor Relations B oa rd c a se that st atut or

y jurisd ic tio n o f t

he B oa rd " c a n n e ve r b e wa ive d" and

that qu e sti on s o f i ts
e xiste nc e may be rai sed at any tim e ); Dunklebarge r v. Me rit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 130 F.3d 1476, 1480 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 7) (s tating t hat "an a g e nc y c ann ot b y

a c qu ie sc e nc e c on fe r j ur isd ic tio n o n th e Me ri t Sy ste ms Pr ote c tio n B oa

rd to h e ar a

n a pp e a l th at Co ngre ss h a s n ot a uth or ize d t he Boar d to enter tain") ; P la q u e m in es P o r t, H a rb o r & Te rm in a l D is t. v
. F e d

. M a r
. Co m m 'n , 838 F.2d 536, 542 n.3 (D.C. C ir. 1988) (stating t hat abandonment of j urisdictional issues does not confe r jurisdiction wher e none e x ists and that "[ a] gen cy jurisdiction, like subject matter in the fe dera l courts, ca nnot be ac hieved by

consent of the parties" ). On c e the B oa

rd ha s juri sd ic tio n o ve r a

c la im, ho we ve r, it h a s th e a uth ori ty to a dd re ss a ll issues related to that c laim, e ven those not pr eviously decide d by the RO. Se eBe rn ar

d, 4 Vet.App. at 392 (distinguishingbetwee n questions or issues in a matter or claim and the matter or cla im its elf,

and ho ldi ngtha

t th e B oa rd ha s a uth or ity " to d e c ide a ll q

ue stion s pr e se nte d o n th e re c or d b e fo re it that wer e nec essar

y to its decision on the matter" on appeal (citing38 U.S.C. § 7104(a))) . To exercise this authority

with reg ard to questions or issues not pr eviously addre ssed by an RO in the first instance, how ever , the B oard must secur e a waiver from a c laimant or otherw ise deter mine that there would be no pre

judice to the cla imant by proce edingto adjudicate the quest i on or issue; otherwise r emand is appropriate. Se eBe rn ar d, 4 Vet.App. a

t 394 (Boa

rd must either obtain wa iver or dete rmine whe ther a

claimant will be prejudiced by the B oard' s adjudication of a question or issueT he U

. S. Sup rem e C o u rt c a se s o f Scar bor ough v

. Pr i nci pi , 541 U

. S. 401 ( 2004) , a n d A rb a u g h v. Y & H 5 Cor p. , 126 S. C t

. 123 5 (2006 ) , s uppo r t t hi s conc l us i on. T ho se ca ses, r ead t oget her , s t and f or t he propo s i t i on t hat juri sdi ct i o n ref

ers t o t he " ad

judicat o ry aut ho ri t y " ove r " c la ss es of cases (s ub ject m at t er j uri sdi ct i o n) and p ers o ns ( per s on al j u r i s di ct i on )

. " Scar bor ough , 5 4 1 U .S . at 4 1 3 -1 4 . A b se n t a sp e c ifi c gr a n t o f o rig ina l ju risd ic tio n , s ee su p ra n. 4 , t he B o ard' s ad

judicat i ve aut ho ri t y i s l i m i t ed to t ho se cl ass es o f cases i n whi ch t he Se cret ary had rendered a de ci si o n. See 3 8 U .S .C . § 7 1 0 4 (a ); s ee als o Sca t es , 2 8 2 F

. 3 d a t 1 3 6 7 ( e x c e p t w h e r e g r a n t e d " n o n - a p p e l l a t e a u t h o r i t y , " B o a r d 's aut ho ri t y i s t o "revi ew" de ci si o ns o f t he Se cret ary ). 8 in an appe al not otherwise de cided by the RO, otherwise it m u s t re m an d fo r the RO to decide the question in the first instance)

.

2. Board Jurisdiction Over a Re quest for Revision Under § 5109A( e) A r e qu e st fo r re vis ion ba se d on CU E is no t a c la im fo r be ne fi ts in its own ri ght; rathe r, it i s a collate ral attack on an othe rwise f inal benef its decision on the basis of a specific a lleg ation of CUE. See Live say , 15 Vet.App. at 178-79. As observe d by the Fe dera l Circuit in Andre v. Principi , "[ b ] ec au s e a C UE cl ai mi nv o l v es anal l egat i o no f anerro r w i th's o m e d egr ee o f s p ec i fi ci ty , ' a veter an' s ass ertion of a particula r cle ar a nd unmistakable er

ror by the RO constitutes a disti nct

c lai m . " 3 0 1 F. 3 d 1 3 5 4 , 1 3 6 1 (F ed

. C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( emp h as i s ad d ed ) ( qu o t i n g Fu go v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 40, 44 (1993)) . All questions within a single cla im are enco mp ass ed wi th in th e term "m att er." See Be rn ar d, 4 Ve t.A

pp . at 38 9- 92 . H ow e ve r, tw o s e pa rate c la ims are c on sid e red two s e pa rate "mat ter s. " See G odfrey , 7 Vet.App. at 410. Acc ording ly , eac h new theory of CUE is a separ ate a nd d i s t i n ct m atter. Se eAn dre , su pra . W h e na

n e wth e o r

y o f C U E un d e r

s e c t i o n5 1 0 9 Ai s f

i r st prese nt ed t o t h e Bo ard, that matter was not " subject to dec ision by the Secr etar

y ," a nd the B oard

w o u l d l a c k a p p e l l at e j ur i s d i c t i o no v e r th e n e w l y

r a i s e d th e o r y o f C U E

. 3 8 U

. S

. C

. § 7 1 0 4 ( a )

. In

5

su c h a c ir c ums tanc e , th e B oa

rd is obl ig ate d to re fe r tha t the or y of CU E to the RO to " be de c ide d in the same mann e r a s any

oth e r c la im. " 38 U. S.C. § 5 10 9A (e ); see G odfrey , 7 Vet.App. at 410. In contra st, when a r equ estfor r evision based on CUE is submitted to the RO and the claimant disagree s with the RO's a djudication of that specific request and appe als to the Boa rd, the Board i s vested with jurisdiction over the me rits of that matter be cause it had orig inally been submitt ed to the RO and subject to a decision by the Secr etar y . In Huston v. Principi , th e c la ima nt, in October

1998, soug ht r evision of "the previous final decision," and in a J une 1999 decision, the RO de te rm ine d th at a

Se pte mbe r 1 99 8 RO dec isi on , whi c h ha d, int e r al ia , ass igne d ane ff e c tiv e date of June 7, 1991, for an a

war d of service connec tion, wa s not the product of CUE. 18 V et.App. 395,9

399-400 (2004)

. Mr. Huston appea led, and the Boa rd deter mined that there was no CUE in a May 1 9 8 1 R O d e c i s i o n , wh i c hi td e t e r m i n e d w a s th e la st final d ec ision render ed, and thus de nied the

r e qu e s t f o r r e v ision. S

ee Hu s t on , 18 Vet.App. at 398. Under the se circ umstances, the B oard ha d jurisdiction over the matter beca use the Boa

rd adjudicated the spec ific theory of CUE that wa s prese nted to and adjudica ted by the RO, i.e., CUE in the " previo u s fi n al decision." Although the Boa rd' s denial of Mr. Huston' s reque st for re vision was based on r easons diff ere nt from those of the RO , th e B oa

rd did no t adj ud ic ate a dif

fe re nt re qu e st. Ind e e d, the B oa rd wa s nev e r p re se nte d w ith two separ ate a

nd distinct requests for r evision. Be cause the Board had jurisdiction over the matter, it could proce ed to addr ess any issue related there to. Se eBe rn ar d, su pra . The Court dete rmi n ed, howe ver, that beca use the B oard' s adjudication of the r equest for

re vis ion a dd re sse d a re late d i ss ue th at had

no t be e n a dd

re sse d b y the RO , th e B oa

rd e rr e d in adjudicatingthat issue in the first instance w ithout first "off ering to r emand the question to the RO." Huston , 18 Vet.App. at 403. Thus, in its revie w of the RO' s decision on a claim, CUE or otherw ise, if the B oard is re quired to addr ess an issue related to that matter that was not pr eviously considere d by the RO, the B oard must either rema nd the matter to the RO or secur e the a ppellant' s waiver

. See Huston , su

pra ; Su tto n v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 553, 564-70 (1996) (bef ore Boa rd considers issue not considere d by

RO, Boa rd shoul d "a dvise the cla imant of its intent to consider such . . . issue . . .

and

. . . un le ss the c la ima

nt s ub mit s to the B oa

rd the wa ive r,
. . . th e c a se wi ll b e re tur ne d to the RO for in iti a l a dju dic atio n a s to the

. . . is su e no t ye t c on sid e re d" ); s e e a ls o D is a b le d A m
. V e te rans v. Se c 'y o f V e te ra ns Af

fai rs [hereinaf

ter D A V v
. S e c 'y ], 327 F.3d 1339, 1 3 4 7 (F ed. Cir. 2003) (invalidating38 C.F.R. § 19.9(a) (2) be cause , in conjunction with 38 C.F.R. § 20.1 3 0 4 , i t allowed B oa rd to c on sid e r n e w e vid e nc e wi tho ut h avin gto r e mand to R O an d witho ut h avin gto o bta in appellant' s waiver). Moreove r, on e s eekingrevision base d on CUE may also " rephr ase a

nd provide a dditional argument and support for the s ame basic CUE argument prese nted" on appea l to the Boa rd. Jordan v. Principi , 17 Vet.App. 261, 270- 71 (2003) ( holding that an appellant is not bound to the exact words us ed i n a re qu es tfor r evision on the basis of a CUE in a Boa rd dec ision), aff'

d sub nom. Jordan v. Nicholson , 401 F.3d 1296 ( Fe d. Cir. 2005), rehearing en bancdenied, No. 04-7034 (F ed. Cir . M ay 23 , 2 00 5) . H ow e ve r, e a c h who lly dis tin c t and

dif fe re nt CU E the or

y un de rl yinga

re qu e stD A V v . S e c 'y , su

p ra , upo n whi ch o ur di ss ent i ng co l l eague rel i es, i s i nap p o si t e t o t he case at ba r. I n D A V v. 6 S e c 'y , t he Fe d eral C i rcui t he l d that w hen ad d i t i o nal e vi d ence i s subm i t t ed t o t he B o ard i n s up p o rt of a cl ai m t o reop en, the B o a rd m u st se c u re a c la im a n t' s w a ive r b e fo re p ro c e e d ing to e v a lua te su c h e v id e n c e a n d d e c id e the c la im a d v e rs e to the c la im a n t, o r re m a n d fo r t h e R O to u n d e rta k e su c h a c tio n in th e fi rs t i n sta n c e
. I d. at 1 34 2. T he cas e at bar i nv ol ves a who l l y dis t i nct and s ep arat e C U E t heo ry i n supp o rt o f a reque st f o r r evi si o n – a sep arat e and dis t i nct "c l ai m " (r eq uest ),
s ee A n d re , su

p ra – w h i c h , a s t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e , h a s n e v e r b e e n p r e s e n t e d t o a n R O. 10 fo r r e vis ion

is a se pa rate matte r a

nd , whe n atta c kin ga

pr ior RO de c isi on , e a c h mu st b e pr e se nte d to and ad j u d i ca t ed by

the RO in the first instance and, if not, the B oard la cks jurisdiction over the merits of the matter

. B . App lic atio n o f L aw t o F a c ts Both pa rties agree that the t heory of C UE pre sented to the B oard in Ms. Jarrell' s Substantive Appea l, which was a djudicated by the B oard in the de cision now on appe al, was a theory of CUE separ ate a nd distinct from that prese nted to and adjudicated by the 1997 RO. S p ec i fi ca l l y , the reque st presente d to the 1997 RO was based on the argument that the 1956 R O had not followe d the provisions of 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303 and 3.307(c ), the then- controllingregulations reg ardingservice connect i o n fo r diseases note d in service or within the presumptive pe riod there afte r. In her Sub sta nti ve Ap pe a l, h ow e ve r, Ms. Jar re ll r a ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me the fa ilure of the 19 56 RO to consider the presumption of sound condition under 38 C.F .R. § 3.63. Although Ms. Jarre ll f

iled an NOD and a Substantive Appe al, these a ctions could only confe r on the B oard jurisdiction to revie w the merits of a reque st for revision based on the theory of CUE prese nted to and adjudicated by the 1997 RO, and they did not serve to establish such jurisdiction in t he B oa rd ov e r a re qu e st f or re vis ion ba se d o n a

wh oll y dis tin c t th e or

y of CU E f ir st p re se nte d in her Substantive Appe al. Se eAn dreand Godfrey , both su pra . Moreove r, Ms. J arr ell' s wa iver of consideration by

the RO of the CUE theor

y prese nted to the B oard c annot serve to confe r jurisdiction wh e re it oth e rw ise do e s n ot e xist. See Sm ith ( Irma) and Johnson , both su pra ; see also Fe d. Sec. , 6 Dun kl eb a r

g er , Plaquemines , a ll su

pra . In this inst ance , beca use the B oard la cked jurisdiction on the merits of Ms. Jarrell' s reque st for revision that had not be en prese nted to and adjudicated by the RO, the appropriate cour se of action for the B oard w as to ref er the matter to the RO for adjudication in the first instance. See38 U. S.C. § 5 10 9( e ); Godfrey , 7 Ve t.A pp . at 41 0 ( ho ldi ngB oa

rd pr op e rl y ref err ed unadjudicated claim first ra ised to the Boa rd to the RO for a djudication).M y dis agreem ent wi t h m y co l l eagues s t em s f rom a ba si c d i f

f erence o f

op i ni o n regardi ng t he nat ure and 1
c h a ra c te r o f t h e B o a rd . M y c o llea g u e s a p p e a r to tr e a t th e B o a rd a s the fun c tio n a l eq u iva le n t o f a c o u rt o f l a w , se p a ra te and i nd ep end ent of any agency and be f o re whi ch t he p roce ed i ngs are f ul l y ad vers ari al

. T hi s p rem i se i s m i st aken. T he B o a r d i s a n a g e n t o f

t h e S e c r e t a r y c r e a t e d b y C o n g r e s s f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f

a f f o r d i n g c l a i m a n t s w h o d i s a g r e e w i t h V A 's i n i t i a l d e c i s i o n o n a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r b e n e f i t s t h e i r s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o a n o t h e r r e v i e w w i t h i n t h e a g e n c y p r i o r t o t h e a g e n c y 's fina l d e te rm ina tio n o n the a p p lica tio n
. S e e D isa b le d A m . V e te ra n s v . S e c 'y o

f V e te ra n s A ffa irs, 327 F. 3d 1339, 1346- 47 ( Fe d. Ci r
. 2003) ("B y s t at u t e, t h e B oar d i s a n a g en t of t h e Se cr et ar y , a s a r e t h e [ ag en ci es of or i g i n al j u r i s di ct i on ]

. ") (cit i ng 3 8 U .S.C

. § 7 1 0 1 (a) (2 0 0 0 )) T he B o ard an d i t s m em b ers ha ve a ri ch hist o ry i n the a d jud i ca t i o n o f

ve t era ns claim s, ho wever, e q uat i ng the B o ard wi t h a n indep end ent c o urt o f a p p eal s i s i nco nsi st ent w i t h t he m anner i n whi ch t he B o ard f un ct i ons an d i n w hi ch i t ha s been des cr i bed i n j udi ci al deci s i ons
. T he B oard, un l i ke nea r l y al l appel l at e c our t s , r evi ews al l f act s de novo. T he B oard' s deci s i on i s bas ed on t he ent i r e r ecor d bef ore t he r egi onal of

f i ce and i t mus t as s ume t hat t h e c l ai man t di s ag r ee s wi t h al l s t at eme n t s of f ac t pre v i ou s l y f

ou n d by t h e a g en cy
. 38 C. F. R. §§ 19. 7( a) ( 2005) , 20. 202 ( 20 05 )

. I ndeed, t he B oard conduc t s ev i dent i ar y he ar i ng s an d has i ndependen t aut hor i t y t o obt ai n i nf ormat i on f

or i ni t i al 11 Th e Court

mus t " take du e a c c ount of the ru le of pr e jud ic ia l e rr or " in e ve ry

c a se in whic h it fi nd s er ro r in the B oa

rd ' s dec isi on
. 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 1(b) (2 ); see Conway v. Principi , 353 F.3d 1369, 1 374-75 (F ed. Cir. 2004) (Court sha ll take due a ccount of the rule of

prejudicia l error). In the circ umstances of

this case, to hold that a l ac kof jurisdiction can be harmless e rror would be inconsistent with the well-established doc trine that par ties cannot c onsent to ag ency jurisdiction and that the absenc e of jurisdiction cannot be waived. See Sm ith ( Irma) and Johnson , both su pra ; see also Fed. Sec

. , Dunklebarge r , and Plaquemines , a ll supra.

IV . C ON CL USI ON Upon consider ation of the fore g oing, that portion of the J anuar y 3, 2003, Boa

rd dec ision that adjudicate d the re quest for re vision on the basis of CUE first raise d in Ms. J arr ell' s Substantive Appea l to the Boa

rd is SET ASI DE for

want of origina l jurisdiction over that matter. This appe al is DI SMI SSED. SET ASI DE and A PPEALDI SMI SSED.

HAGEL , Judge , d iss e nti ng : I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt f ro m th e ma

jority' s opin ion . T he ma

jority holds that the reg ional office ' s failure to consider a specific asser

tion of clea

r and unmistakable err or deprive s the Boa

rd of jurisdiction to do so, despite the claimant's waiver of reg ional office revie w. Ibe lie ve tha

t th e ma jority c on fu se s th e iss ue of

jurisd ic tio n w ith that of

the pr oc e dura l r e qu ir e me nts for intra -age ncy

claims proce ssing a

nd there by

forc es a bur densome, unne cessa ry , and unwa

nted

re mand on bo th p art ie s. Ms. Jar

re ll a nd the Se c re tary

bo th a gre e that Ms. Jar

re ll s ho uld

be a ble to 1c o n sid e ra tio n fro m b o th w ithin a n d o u tsid e V A , if it o b ta ins the c la im a n t' s w a ive r. 3 8 C .F .R . § 2 0 .1 3 0 4 (2 0 0 5 ); D i s ab l ed

A m . V e te ra n s, 32 7 F. 3d at 134 7- 48

. T he B oard i s al s o "bound" by t he "i ns t r uct i ons of t he Secr et ar y " as ex pl i ci t l y s et f or t h u n de r 38 U. S. C. § 71 04

. T hu s , be c a u s e t h e S e c r e t a r y i s bo t h a pa r t y i n t h i s c a s e a n d t h e h e a d o f t h e e n t i r e VA, inc lud ing the B o a rd , his a g re e m e n t w ith M s. J a rr e ll tha t sh e c a n w a ive h e r rig h t to a se c o n d a d ju d ic a tio n o f he r c la im p re se n ts a d iff

e re n t co n te x t t h a n w a ive r o f ju risd ic tio n in a fed e ra l d istric t o r a p p e llate c o u rt. 12 waive he r right to"one r eview on a ppeal" in ord er t o p er m i t the Boa rd to consider

her c lear -andunmistakable-e rror argument. 38 U.S.C. § 7104. I f both parties a gree to waive a n administrative proce dure, how can this Court, sua sponte, for ce that proce dural for mality on them? The re sult of this deci s i o n i s unnece ssary delay in the resolution of Ms. J arr ell' s case . Fur ther, c onsideringthe clea r term s o f sections 7261(a )(3) (C) and 7261(b), which r equire the Court to apply the rule of p re j u d i cial error e v en when t he Co urt s e tsa s id

ea Bo a rd

d e c is io n f o r la ck o f ju ris d ic tio n, any juris d i ct i o n al error c ommitt ed by the B oard w as nonpre

judicial in the instant case, g iven that the B oa rd ha d s ub je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n a

nd Ms. Jar

re ll is wa ivi ng he r ri ght to on e re vie w o n a pp e a l. A. The B oard' s Subject Matter Jurisdiction The majority

finds that this Court l acks jurisdiction over the matter on a

ppeal be cause the Boa rd lac ked subjec t matter jurisdiction. I disagree
. There is only one sec tion in ti tle 38 that define s the B oard' s jurisdiction, 38 U.S.C. § 7104, a nd it is appropriately

entitled "Jurisdiction of the Boa rd." The majority , howeve r, fails to consider the brea dth of authority g iven to both the Secre tary and the B oa rd un de r t hat statut e
. Se c tio n 710 4( a ) de fi ne s the B oa rd ' s jur isd ic tio n expans ive ly , b y c iti ngto 38 U.S.C. § 511(a), as extending to all questions "ne cessa ry to a decision by the S ecr etar y under a law that af

fec ts the provision of [veterans] be nefits." The B oard the ref ore ha s jurisdiction to review all claims that arise under a law that af

fec ts the provision of veterans be nefits. Bates v. Nicholson, 398 F.3d 1355, 1359 ( Fe d. Cir. 2005). Section 7104(d) also provides the Boa rd with jurisdiction to review a wide scope of matters by req u i ringthat the B oard c onsider " all materia l issues of fac t and law pr esente d on the re cord." There are no qualifying te rms requiringthe B oard to a ddress only materia l issues or claims that have been previously considere d by the reg ional office

. The only signific ant s tatutory limit ation on the Boa rd' s broad jurisdiction is the claimant' s right to " one re view on appe al" under se ction 7104(a)

. B ut t he F e de ra l Cir c uit

ha s in dic ate d th at th is l imi tatio n is e lim inate d whe n th e c la ima nt e ff e c tiv e ly waives a dditional review. Spec if i cally , in Disabled Americ an Veterans v . Secre tary of VeteransT he Fe d eral C i rcui t s uggest ed i n D i s abl ed Am er i can Vet er ans v. S ec reta ry o f V etera n s A

f f a i rs t h at i f

t he 2 cl ai m ant had be en af

f o rded t he o p p o rt uni t y t o wai ve ap p el l at e revi ew and had de ci d ed t o wai ve t hat ri ght , t he B o ard wou l d h av e bee n a l l owe d t o c on s i der n ew e v i den ce w i t h ou t h av i n g t o r ema n d t h e mat t er t o t h e r eg i on al of f i ce
. 327 F. 3d a t 1 3 4 1

. A l t ho ugh t he m ajo ri t y ci t es t o t he Fe d eral C i rcui t ' s d eci si o n i n S c a te s v . P rin c ip i f o r t he p rop o si t i o n t hat t he 3 B o ard i s p ri m ari l y an ap p e llate t ri b unal , t he Fe d eral C i rcui t al so est ab l i shed i n S ca t es t hat "[t ]he B o ard' s subst ant i ve juri sdi ct i o n i s b road

. " 28 2 F.3d 13 6 2 , 1 3 6 6

- 1 3 6 7 (2 0 0 2 ). M o reove r, i n Scat es t he Fe d eral C i rcui t de cl i ned t o reach t he hol di ng r eac hed b y t hi s C our t i n i t s under l y i ng d eci s i on, whi ch he l d t hat t he B oard l ack ed ori gi nal jur i s di ct i on t o re vi ew the q u e stio n o f en tit le m e n t t o a tto rn e y fee s. I d. ; se e S c a te s v . G o b e r, 1 4 V et. A p p . 6 2 , 65 (20 0 0 ). Si gni f i cant l y , t he Fe d eral C i rcui t ci t ed t o i t s p ri o r decis i o n i n C o x v
. W est , 14 9 F. 3d 13 60 , 13 64

- 65 ( Fed. Ci r
. 199 8), i n w hi ch i t r ul ed t hat t he B oard "mi gh t have [ha d] j ur i s di ct i on over Co x' s cl ai m [s eek i ng pay ment by t he Secr et ar y of an un di s put ed f

ee] un der § 71 0 4 , be cause t hat cl ai m requi red t he Se cret ary unde r § 5 1 1 (a) ' t o m ake a de ci si o n "und er a l aw t hat af f ect s t he pr ov i s i on of

be n ef i t s by t h e Se cr et ar y t o v et er an s
. "' " S ca t es, 28 2 F.3d at 13 6 8 (quo t i ng C ox, 1 4 9 F

. 3 d a t 1 3 6 5 (quo t i ng 3 8 U .S .C . § 5 1 1 (a )) ).

T he Se cret ary ' s i nt erest i n i nt ra- agency cl ai m s p roce ss i ng i s ser ved when t he B o ard d eci d es ei t her t o remand 4 a mat t er t o t he r egi onal o f f i ce or t o al l ow t he cl ai mant t o wai ve r egi onal o f f i ce re vi ew s o t hat i t may cons i der a mat t er in th e fi rs t i n sta n c e
. 13 Af fai rs the Fe dera l C ircuit held that sec tion 7104(a) c reates a proc edura l rig ht that entitles the claimant " to appea l an adve rse [ag ency-of- orig in a l- ju ris d ic ti o n ] d ecision to the Secr etar y of Ve tera ns Af fa ir s. " 32 7 F .3 d at 13 42

. Th e F e de ra l Cir c uit the n a c kn ow le dg e d th at th e c la ima nt m ay waive

thi s ri ght. Id. at 1341-42. 2 The majority cites to c ases from other jurisdictions that have held that an ag ency' s statutory or subj ect matter

jurisdiction cannot be wa ived. Se ean teat __ _; see also NLRB v. Fe d. Sec., I nc. , 154 F.3d 751, 754 ( 7th Cir. 1998); Dunklebarge r v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 130 F.3d 1476, 1480 (F ed. Cir . 1 99 7) ; P la q u e m in es P o r t, H a rb o r &Te rm in a l D is t. v
. F

e d

. M a r
. Co m m 'n , 838 F.2d 536, 542

n. 3 ( D. C. C ir . 1 98 8) . B ut t ho se c a se s are dis tin guis ha ble fr om the ins tant c a se be c a us e purs ua

nt t o section 7104 the B oard c lear ly has stat u t o ry o r subj ect matter jurisdiction to review the issue prese nted in this case–whe ther the reg ional office committed clea r and unmistakable error in a 1956 decision. T h at issue unquestionably arises unde r a la

w that af fec ts the provision of veter ans 3 benef its, ther efor e, as set forth above, it lies within the scope of the Boa rd' s statutory

j urisdiction. Bates, 398 F.3d at 1359. I am not implying, by any means, that the pa

rties could by

their own agree ment expand the Boa rd' s jurisdiction to an a rea of law unr elated to the pr ovision of vetera ns benef its. Rather, Iwould hold that the claimant may waive he r proc edu ra l ri gh t to one revie w on appea l if the Boa

rd agree s to review a

matter in the fir st instance. 4T h e m ajo ri t y al so rel i es on G odf r ey v
. Br own, a n d Be r na r d v

. Br own , wh i ch bot h ac k n owl edg ed t h at t he 5
se c tio n 7 1 0 5 re q u ire m e n ts w e re p ro c e d u ra l an d d e sc rib e d the m a s a " a se rie s o f ve ry sp e c ifi c , se q u e n tial, pr oce dur al s t eps tha t m u st b e c a rr ie d o u t" fo r a p p e llate re v ie w . G od f r e y v
. Br own 7 V et

. App. 398, 409 ( 1995) ( emph as i s a dded) (quo t i ng Be r na r d v

. Br own , 4 V e t.A p p . 3 8 2 , 3 9 0 (1 9 9 3 ))

. G od f r ey an d B ern a rd are al so d i st i ngui shable f rom t he i nst ant ca s e bec au s e t h e cl ai man t s i n t h os e ca s es di d n ot w an t t o w ai v e t h ei r r i g h t s t o "on e r ev i ew on a ppea l

. " 14 B. VA Proce ssing of

Requests for Revision B ased on Clea r and Unmistakable Er

ror I s Not a Jurisdi ctional I ssue. Th e majo ri ty

re lie s p ri nc ipa lly

on the argume nt t

hat th e dif

fe re nc e s b e tw e e n th e c la ims

pr oc e ssi ngre qu ir e me nts se t f or th i n 3 8 U .S. C. § 71 11 and 38 U. S.C. § 5 10 9Ade mon str ate that, purs ua nt t o s e c tio n 5 10 9A , th e B oa rd la c ks ju ri sd ictio n to re vie w r e qu e sts fo r r e vis ion in t he fi rs t instance. The majority

argues that 38 U.S.C. § 7111 expli citly provides that the B oard sha ll review in the first instance requests for revision of Boa rd decisions, wherea s, section 5109A does not. The

ma jority' s ana ly sis , h ow e ve r, fa ils to a dd re ss why se c tio n 7 11 1 w a s e na c te d. As the F e de ra l Cir c uit has stated, "[t]hat provision was a rea ction to our dec ision in Smith [ v . B ro wn , 35 F.3d 1516, 1526 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 4) ], whic h h e ld t hat th e ' c le ar and un mis taka ble e rr or ' re gulatio n a

pp lie d o nly

to regio nal off

ice deci si on s an d n otto th os e of t he Bo ard. " Don o va n v. W es t, 158 F.3d 1377, 1383 (F ed. C ir. 1998). The Fede ral Circuit dete rmined in Sm ith that to allow the re g ional office to review reque sts for re vision of Boa rd dec isions "would, oddl y , permit an inferior t o collater ally revie w the actions of a

superior, at least as an initial matter." 35 F.3d at 1526. T h e s t at u t e wa s there fore

enac ted, not to limi t the Boa rd' s jurisdiction, but rathe r to preve nt a lower tribunal from re viewing the dec isions of a hig her tribuna l. In the i nstant case , the reverse scena rio exis ts beca

use the B oard, th e s u p er i o r tri b un al , i s re v i ew i n g a c o l l at er al at t ac k o na r egi o n al o ff

i ce d ec i s i o n
. T h e m aj o ri ty 's centr al ar gument thus rests on a flimsy foundation. Rece nt U.S. Supreme Court decisions also ca st doubts on the majority ' s eff ort to label the

c la ims -p ro c e ssi ng re qu ir e me nts of se c tio n 5 10 9Aa s juri sd ic tio na l. Scarborough v. Principi , 541 5 U.S. 401, 414 (2004). In Day v. Mc Donough , the S upreme Court held t hat "a st atute of limitations defe nse is not '

jurisdictional,' hence courts are under no obl iga tion to raise the time bar su a s po nte ." __ U.S.__, __, No. 04-1324, slip op. at 5 (Apr. 25, 2006). The S upreme Court further deter mined that st atut e of

lim itatio ns " re se mbl e [] oth e r t hr e sh old ba rrie rs – e xha

us tio n o f s tate re me die s, proce dural de fault, nonre tro a c ti v it y – c o u r ts h ave ty ped ' nonjurisdictional,' a lthough r ecognizi ngthatT he Supre me C our t he l d t hat t hi s Co ur t ' s j ur i s di ct i onal r equi r ement s ha d al r eady b een s at i s f i ed whe n 6 S ca rb o ro ug h a p p ea l ed t he B o ard d ec i si o n d en yi ng his claim f o r d i sab i l i t y be ne f

i t s. 15 th os e def ens es 'i mp li cat e val ues bey on d the co ncerns of the p art ies .'" Id. (qu o t i n g Ac os ta v . A rtu z, 221 F.3d 117, 122 ( 2000)). In Scarborough, the Sup re me Court a lso re a so ne d a s f

oll ow s: Clarity would be fa cilitated if cour ts and litigants used the label " jurisdictional" not for c laim-proce ssing r

ules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of ca ses (subject- matter jurisdiction) and the persons (pe rsonal jurisdiction) fa lling within a c o urt ' s a d j u d i c at o r y a uth o r i ty. 5 4 1 U. S

. at4 1 4 (qu o t i n g Kontrick v. Ry an, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)). 6 Section 5109A provides g ener ally th at a re quest for r evision on the basis of cle ar a nd unmistakable er

ror " shall be submitted to the Secre tary and shall be decide d in the same manne r as any other c laim." B eca

use such a

reque st for revision must be "de cided in the same manner as any other c laim," se ction 5109A does not delineate any particula r jurisdictional requir ements beyond those alre ady

dictated unde r sec tion 7104.

C. Wa ive r o f a

Right It is well established that, absent a n aff irmative indication of Congr ess' s intent to pr eclude

wa ive r, "[ a] part y may

wa ive any

pr ov isi on

e ith e r o f a

c ontr a c t or

of a statut e , inte nd e d f

or his ben efi t. " Shutte v. Thompson, 8 2 U

. S

. 1 5 1 , 1 5 9 ( 1 8 7 3) ; Jan ss en v. Prin c ipi , 15 Vet.App. 370, 373-7 4 (2 00 1) ; se eals o U nite d S tates v . M e zza na tto , 513 U.S. 196, 200-01 (1995) ( "Rather than deemingwaiver

presumptively

unavailable absent some sort of express enabling clause , we instea d have a dhere d to the opposite presumption.") In Disabled Americ an Veterans , th e F e de ra l Cir c uit

rec ognized that "o n e re v i ew on appea l" wa s a proc edura l rig ht intended for the benef it of the claimant. 327 F.3d at 1342. It there fore follows that, in order to waive that right to one re view on

a pp e a l, a c la ima nt m us t ha ve kn ow le dg e of

that r ight, and

mus t inte nd , v olu

nta ri ly and fr e e ly , to relinquish or surre nder that rig ht. Janssen , 15 Vet.App. at 374. In th e ins tant c a se , th e re is no qu e sti on wi th re sp e c t to the c lari ty of the wa ive r. Ms. Jar

re ll, repr esente d by counsel, "e x pressly asser ted her knowingand voluntary

waiver of [reg ional office ]T he m ajo ri t y ' s f o rced remand i n t hi s case i s t ant am o unt t o f o rci ng a rem and t o requir e co m p l i ance wi t h t he 7
n o tice p ro v isio n s o f sec tio n 5 1 0 3 (a ) a g a ins t t h e w ish e s o f t h e a p p e llan t an d the S e c re ta ry.

T he major i t y conc edes t hat t he B oard ca n pr oceed t o adju di cat e a r gu ment s i n t he f i r st instance wh en 8
c la im a n t' s w a ive re g io n a l o ff ic e re v ie w s o lo n g a s the r e g io n a l o ff ic e ha s re v ie w e d the un d e rlying c la im . H o w e v e r, in t he cont ext of as s er t i ons of cl ear and un mi s t aka bl e e r r or, t he l i ne bet ween r ephr as i ng t he ar gu ment an d as s er t i ng a n ew cl ai m b ecomes un as cer t ai nabl e beca us e e ach "as s er t i on of a par t i cul ar cl ear a nd u nm i st ak abl e e r r or by t he [ r egi onal of f i ce ] con s t i t u t es a di s t i n ct c l ai m. " Andr e v. Pr i nci pi , 3 0 1 F .3d 1 3 5 4 , 1 3 6 1 (F ed

. C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) (cit ati o n o m i t t ed ). T hu s, i mp l ement i ng t he major i t y ' s r ul e wi l l res ul t i n a r bi t r ar y an d i ncons i s t ent out com es
. Suc h i ncons i s t enc y i s demo ns t r at ed b y a co m p ari son o f t he m ajo ri t y ' s p o si t i o n i n t he i nst ant case and i t s analysis o f H u st o n v
. Pr i nci pi , 18 V et

. App. 395( 2004)

. I n H u sto n , t he C o urt co nsi d ered t he same q uest io n po sed b y t he m ajo ri t y i n t hi s case– whether t he B o ard coul d cons i der a cl ear - and- un mi s t aka bl e- er r or ar gu ment t hat was not p r es ent ed t o t he r egi onal of f i ce. 18 V et

. A pp
. at 402- 3. T h e f

ac t s i n H u st on a re strik ing ly sim ilar to the fac ts in this c a se in tha t b o th M s. J a rr e ll a n d the c la im a n t i n H us t on pre s ent ed va gu e c l ear - an d- u n mi s t a k a bl e - e r r or a r g u me n t s bef ore t he r egi onal of

f i ce and t he B oard t hen cons i dere d mo r e s peci f

i c v ar i at i ons of

t hos e a s s er t i ons
. T he major i t y ' s hol di ng r ega r di ng t he adju di cat i on of t hi s ca s e, wh i ch has sim ilar fac ts, i s c o n tra d ic to ry a n d inc o n siste n t an d fo re sh a d o w s futu re p ro b le m s o f ad m inistra b ili ty. 16 consideration," as conce ded by the majority

. An te at ___. Th e Se c re tary ha s als o agre e d that Ms

. Jar re ll s ho uld

be a ble to w a ive that pr oc e dura l r ight. 7 I f not for the sake of

the claimant' s right to additional review or the Secr etar

y ' s interest in the

o rd er l y p ro ce s s i n g o f c l ai m s , wh atp urp o s e c anfo rc i n g "o n e re v i ew o nap p ea l " s erv e? T h e m aj o ri ty 's deci s i o n d i ct at es a further a dministrative pr ocedur e that is not sought by either Ms. Jarrell or the Secre tary , and not re quired by law for the sole purpose of confor ming the adjudication of this matter to the majority ' s sense of what a we ll-order ed proc ess should be. 8

D. Def ere nce to Ag ency

and Informal Claimant-F riendly Sy stem When a claimant wa i v es the right to one revie w on appe al, the Court should defe r to the Secre tary' s discretion reg arding whether the Boa rd should a djudicate the claim in the first instance. The Su p r e me Co urt h a s e s ta

b li s h e d th at " [c ]o g e nt ' a dmi n is tr ati v e inte r p r e tati o n s
. . . n ot [ the] pro du cts of f

orm al rul emaki ng . . . warran t r esp ect .'" Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 5 4 0 U. S

. 4 6 1 , 4 8 7 (2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g W as h. Sta teDe

p't o f Soc . &He alt

h S e rv s. v . G ua rd

ian sh ip E sta te of Keffeler , 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003)). Courts should " respe ct the congressional d el ega t i o nof authority to ag encie s in the m at t er s en t rust ed to them and should also re spect their spe cialized

ex pert is e in deci di ng th e mat ter s b efor e th em. " Kirkpatrick v. Nicholson , 417 F.3d 1361, 1365 (F ed. Cir. 2005). Be cause the Board is an age nt of the S ecr etar y , this Court would unnece ssarily interfe re in t he a g e nc y ' s inte rn a l pr oc e ssi ng of cla ims by dis a llo wi ngthe B oa

rd fr om a dju dic atin ga

c la im, despite the c laimant' s waiver . The Court should respe ct the Secr etar y ' s position i n this case.17

Moreove r, def

ere nce to the a g ency in the instant case r esults in an outcome both favorable to the claimant and in line with the c ong ressional inten t t h at t he VA sy stem be " as informa l and

no nadvers ari al as po ss ib le. " Ba ile yv . W est , 1 6 0 F. 3 d 1 3 6 0 , 1 3 6 9 (F ed

. C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g W alte rs
v . Na t'l A ss'n of R ad

iat ion Su rv iv or

s , 473 U.S. 305, 323-24 (1985))

. E. The Rule of Pre

judicial Error Assuming, f

or the sake of argument, that the B oard c ommitt ed a jurisdictional error , the Court must consider whethe r that er ror wa s prejudicial. Although it might at fi rs t gl ance seem
unnece ssary to c onsider the rule of prejudicia l e rror when there is a findingthat the B oard doe s not have jur isdiction in a matter, a c lear rea ding of

the statute dictate s otherwise. Congress' s decision to require this Court t o consider pr ejudice, e ven in the context of assessingthe B oard' s jurisdictional

err ors, is further

evidenc e of the leg islative intent to c reate a less f ormal conc ept of jurisdiction at the administrative leve l. Section 7261(a) provides, in pe rtinent part, that "to the extent nec essar y to its decision and when pr esente d [the Court] shall

. . . hold unlawful and set aside decisions

. . . by the Secr etar

y [or the Board] found t o be .

. . in excess of st atutory jurisdiction, authority , or l imitations ." Subsec tion (b)( 2) re quires that " [i ]n m akingthe deter minations under subsection (a), the Court shall . . . take due

acc ount of t h e ru l e of prejudicial er ror." The F eder al Circuit has stresse d these re quirements by remindingthe Court of its responsibility in this reg ard. Conway v. Principi , 353 F.3d 1369, 1375 (F ed. Cir. 2004)

. Read toge ther, subsections (a) and (b) expli citly provide that the Court must take due ac count of the r

ule of pre judicial err or when holding unlawful or setting aside Boa rd dec isions

on jurisd ic tio na l g ro un ds

. Th e ma jority a sse rt s that the B oa rd ' s e rr or mus t be pr eju di cia l bec a us e the B oa rd c omm itt e d a ju ri sdic tio na l e rr or and jurisd ic tio n c ann ot b e wa ive d. B ut t hat ana ly sis ignor es the fa ct that the issue befor e the Court c lear ly falls within the scope of statutory jurisdiction grante d by

Congr ess to the B oard. Bates, 39 8 F .3 d at 13 59

. An d it c ontr a dic ts the c le ar a nd pla in meaningof 38 U.S .C. § 7261(a) and (b), which distinctly sug g ests that a B oard jurisdictional e rror
may be no np re

jud ic ia l. T he ma

jority c ann ot p oint to any sp eci fi c preju dic e in t his c a se be c a

us e
n ei th er p arty

wa s p re j u d i ce d , d em o n s tra t edb y th e f ac tth atb o thp art i es agr ee th atth e B o ar d 's adjudication in the first instance was nonpre judicial. Application of the ru l e of prejudicial er ror
wo u l d thu s , wi th o utqu es t i o n , re s u l ti na f i n d i n g th atth er e w as n o p re j u d i ce , g i v e n M s
. J arre l l 's18

w a i v e r o f r e g i o n a l o f

f i c e r e v i e w an d th e S e c r e t ar y' s a gr e e m e ntth ats h e i s e nt i t l e d t o th atw a i v e r
. In
s h o rt , i nr e s p o n s e t o th e m a j o r i ty ' s f i n d i n go f p r e j u d i c e , Ic ano n l y

a s k , p r e j u d i c e t o wh o m ? F. Conclusion L et me be c lear

that it is notmy

view that, by wa i v i n g t h e right to appeal a nd there by consentingto adjudication of a n issue in the first instance by the B oard, a

claimant can f

orce the Boa rd to dec ide an issue without the bene fit of the fa ctfinding and decisional expertise of the a g ency of orig inal jurisdi ct i o n. Nor c an the B oard, by unilatera lly

decidingan issue not pre sented to the ag ency of orig inal jurisdiction, force the claimant to aba ndon the statutory

right to one revie w on
a pp e a l. Th e se lim itatio ns ill us tr ate tw o pr inc ipl e s: (1 ) Th e a g e nc y ha s a uth or ity to e nf or c e its c la ims proce ssing r

ules and (2) the claimant has a right to one review on appea l from the Secre tary

. But the proce dural re quirements for claims proce ssing set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7105 and 38 U.S.C. § 5109A do not define the jurisdictional require ments of either the Boa rd or the Court. As the Supreme Court clea rly set forth in Day and Scarborough , claims proce ss i n g rules ar e not jurisdictional. And, althoug h section 7104 provides that the claimant has a right to one re view on appe al, the cla imant can waive that right, provided that such a waiver is knowingand intellige nt. Cf. Disabled Am. Veterans , 327 F.3d at 1342. In the unique cir cumstance s of this case in whic h the i ntere sts of the c laimant and the institutional inter est of the ag ency coincide, there are no competing interests, and the disallowanc e of a w aiver

leads to absur d results–an unwa n t ed re mand, conse quential delay for Ms. Jarrell, and

wa ste of a dmi nis tr ativ e re so ur c e s f or VA . Co ns e qu e ntl y , I

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.