Determining the Root Causes of Flame Cutting and 

Welding Fires in Underground U.S. Coal Mines 

William D. Monaghan
 

Jürgen F. Brune 

Alex C. Smith 

Pittsburgh Research Laboratory 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

Post Office Box 18070 

Cochrans Mill Road 

Pittsburgh, PA 15236 

Abstract 

One of the predominant causes of fires in 

underground coal mines is flame cutting and welding. 

These fires can lead to major events such as the 

explosion that occurred on January 22, 2003 in an 

airshaft being constructed at the McElroy mine. Six 

contractors were inside the shaft at the time of the 

explosion and the explosion fatally injured three and 

seriously injured three [MSHA 2003]. Understanding 

the root causes of these fires and explosions will help 

prevent these types of events from occurring in the 

future. Fires and explosions require fuel, oxygen and an 

ignition source (heat). These three items are referred to 

as a fire triangle. The control of these three items in 

flame cutting and welding operations is required to 

prevent fires and or explosions. United States 

Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health 

Administration (MSHA) Reports of Investigation (ROI), 

MSHA Mine Accident, Injury, and Illness Reports, and 

the MSHA Mining Industry Accident, Injuries 

Employment, and Production Data Base were analyzed 

and interviews and observations with mine workers and 

welders were conducted to determine the root causes of 

coal mine fires and explosions caused by flame cutting 

and welding operations. This paper will discuss the root 

causes and potential means to reduce the number of fires 

and resulting fatalities and injuries caused by or due to 

flame cutting and welding. 

Introduction 

One of the goals of NIOSH is to enhance the safety 

of mine workers by preventing disasters caused by fires 

and explosions. To prevent and reduce the number of 

fires and explosions from occurring in underground coal 

mines, one must understand the nature of their initiation 

and identify the root causes. Small underground coal 

mine fires can lead to larger uncontrolled fires if not 

extinguished quickly. 

Of the four major sources of fires in underground 

coal mines (electrical, friction, flame cutting and 

welding, and spontaneous combustion), flame cutting 

and welding operations are probably the easiest to 

manage. There is always a person present who can 

ensure that the heat source is used only when the fuel can 

be controlled and accidental ignitions can be 

extinguished immediately. Fires related to flame cutting 

and welding are normally a result of human failure to 

prepare and protect the work site [Hartman et al. 1997]. 

Major fires and explosions have been reduced over 

the last few decades at coal mines in the United States. 

With respect to flame cutting and welding fires, Pomroy 

and Carigiet reported that 16% of the 164 underground 

coal mine fires from 1978 – 1992 were caused from 

flame cutting and welding operations [Pomroy et al 

1992]. Conti reported that 14% of the 76 underground 

coal mine fires from 1991-2000 were caused from flame 

cutting and welding operations [Conti et al. 2005]. Even 

though there has been a slight reduction in flame cutting 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and welding fires, over the last few decades, 14% is still 

too high and the goal is to have zero fires and explosions. 

Any fire or explosion in an underground coal mine is 

a potential disaster. Underground coal mines are 

confined in space and the ventilation system is required 

to provide a constant supply of breathable air and dilute 

and renders harmless any explosive or toxic gas and 

dusts. The ventilation system can play a major part in 

the occurrence of fires and explosions and in their 

prevention, since it can carry combustion products, hot 

smoke particles, or provide dilution of the explosive 

gasses in confined spaces. After an underground coal 

mine fire or explosion occurs, the mine air composition 

and ventilation flow quantities may change. It is difficult 

to predict the direction and quantity of airflow in areas 

with active fires or where ventilation controls have been 

destroyed. 

Methodologies for Determining 

Root Causes 

The root causes of mine fires and explosions caused 

by flame cutting and welding fires were determined by 

analyzing MSHA Reports of Investigation [MSHA 2003, 

MSHA 1992, MSHA 1999] from three recent major 

accidents, MSHA Mine Accident, Injury, and Illness 

Reports from 1995 to 2005, the MSHA Mining Industry 

Accident, Injuries Employment, and Production Data 

Base [MSHA 2006], and by conducting interviews with 

mine workers and welders and through observations of 

flame cutting. 

MSHA Reports of Investigation 

A formal Report of Investigation is required for all 

fatal accidents. MSHA District Managers determine if 

Reports of Investigation will be filed for other non-fatal 

or non-injury investigations based on factors such as the 

need to inform the industry of case-specific facts or 

public interest. 

MSHA Accident, Injury and Illness 

Reports 

Mine operators are required by 30 CFR §50.10 to 

immediately contact MSHA when an accident occurs. 

After notification of an accident by the mine operator, 

the MSHA District Manager will decide whether to 

conduct an accident investigation and will promptly 

inform the operator of his or her decision. If MSHA 

decides to investigate an accident, it will initiate the 

investigation within 24 hours of notification. Accidents 

pertaining to flame cutting and welding include: an 

unplanned ignition or explosion of gas or dust, an 

unplanned mine fire which is not extinguished within 15 

minutes of discovery, and an injury or death due to flame 

cutting or welding operation. 

In addition to immediately reporting accidents, 

30 CFR §50.20 requires mine operators to prepare and 

submit a Mine Accident, Injury, and Illness Report, 

MSHA Form 7000-1, for each accident, occupational 

injury, or occupational illness at the mine. An 

occupational injury is any injury to a miner which occurs 

at a mine and for which medical treatment is 

administered, or which results in death or loss of 

consciousness, inability to perform all job duties on any 

day after an injury, temporary assignment to other duties, 

or transfer to another job. Occupational illness means an 

illness or disease of a miner which may have resulted 

from work at a mine or for which an award of 

compensation is made [CFR]. 

When MSHA investigates an accident, Accident 

Investigation Data Forms, MSHA Form 7000-50 series, 

are completed by MSHA inspectors to document their 

findings. These forms are entirely independent from 

MSHA Form 7000-1; however both sets of forms can be 

on record with MSHA if MSHA had performed an 

investigation. 

MSHA Mining Industry Accident Injuries 

Employment and Production Data Base 

NIOSH’s Surveillance and Statistics team accessed 

MSHA Mining Industry Accident, Injuries Employment, 

and Production public data base from 1995-2005 to 

identify injuries that were caused by flame cutting and 

welding of underground mine fires and explosions. The 

information in this data base is entered from MSHA 

Form 7000-1 reports filed by mine operators. 

Analysis of Flame Cutting and 

Welding Fires and Explosions 

McElroy Mine Explosion 

An explosion occurred on January 22, 2003 at the 

McElroy Mine (WV) at a shaft sinking site where 

contractors were attempting to remove corrugated, 

galvanized steel sheeting which was blocking access to 

the unventilated water ring being constructed. Three of 

the workers were fatally injured and three were seriously 

injured. The workers first cut an opening in the sheeting 

with an axe. This opening was large enough to allow the 

foreman to place a hand-held methane detector in the 

opening to test for methane gas. The reading obtained 

was 0.2%. After the methane reading, a mechanic 

starting cutting the sheeting with an oxygen-acetylene 

torch and an explosion occurred inside the water ring 

that had contained an explosive methane-air mixture. 

MSHA determined that the root cause of the 

explosion at the McElroy mine was that the examination 

for methane was not adequate. An adequate examination 

would have required testing for methane in all areas that 

could have been affected by the used of cutting torch 

[MSHA 2003]. 

Blackville Mine Explosion 

An explosion due to a welding operation occurred on 

March 19, 1992 at the Blackville No. 1 Mine, (WV) 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

under the cap above the Production shaft, which resulted 

in the deaths of four persons (one mine employee and 

three contractors). The personnel underground were not 

injured by the effect of the explosion and safely exited 

the mine. Overcasts, cribs, stoppings, and the rotary 

dump in the underground area within 100 feet of the 

shaft were also severely damaged by the forces of the 

explosion. 

According to MSHA, the causes of the explosion at 

the Blacksville No.1 Mine were as follows [MSHA 

1992]: 

1)	 The volume and velocity of air was not 

maintained in sufficient amounts to render 

harmless and to carry away explosive gases. 

2)	 The approved ventilation system and methane 

and dust control plan for this mine was not 

followed in that a major change in ventilation 

was made without the approval of MSHA. A 

major ventilation change occurred when the 

production shaft was capped. 

3)	 A change in ventilation was made which 

affected the split of air ventilating the 

Production shaft. A few miners continued to 

work underground. Miners were allowed to 

work in this environment before a certified 

person checked the changes in ventilation. 

Methane was being liberated inside the shaft 

and failure to adequately ventilate the area 

allowed an explosive methane-air mixture to 

accumulate undetected in the production shaft 

that was being capped. 

4)	 Methane examinations were not being 

conducted at the capped Production shaft. 

Welding operations were conducted without 

examinations for methane having been made at 

any time. 

Loveridge Mine Fire 

An underground coal mine fire was discovered at 

12:50 a.m. on June 22, 1999 inside the Loveridge No. 22 

Mine, near and behind a permanent stopping separating 

the submains from a mined-out longwall pillared area. 

According to MSHA, a foreman found the fire while 

checking on a work site where flame cutting operations 

had been performed on the previous day shift. The 

foreman traveled to another section of the mine to obtain 

fire-fighting equipment and to report the fire. Four other 

foremen, including the shift foreman, joined him and 

attempted to put out the fire with three 20-pound fire 

extinguishers at the base of the permanent stopping but 

were not successful. Water was sprayed onto the 

stopping and an orange glow was still visible through 

holes in the bottom and both top corners of the stopping. 

The shift foreman then realized that there was a large fire 

on the inby side of the stopping, within the worked-out 

area, and sent one of the foreman to a nearby mine phone 

to inform all underground personnel to report to fight the 

fire. Seven additional mine workers who were 

underground at the time assisted in fighting the fire. 

Water was applied to the fire through the holes in the 

stopping; however, the conditions of the fire worsened 

and the mine was evacuated at 1:45 a.m. Management 

made the decision to seal the entire mine in order to 

minimize the spread of the fire. 

According to MSHA, the cause of the mine fire at 

the Loveridge No. 22 mine was the failure to comply 

with 30 CFR §75.1106 (A diligent search for fire was not 

made during and after flame cutting operations, which 

were performed during the day shift) [MSHA 1999]. 

MSHA Mine Accident Analysis 

MSHA investigation reports from 1995 – 2005 were 

examined in order to determine the root causes of fires 

and explosions caused by flame cutting and welding 

operations in underground U.S. coal mines during this 

time period. From the MSHA 7000-50 reports, thirtyone fires or explosions were the result from flame cutting 

and fifteen fires were the result from welding (Figure 1). 

From the MSHA accident reports, the three causes of 

these fires or explosions, shown in Figure 2, were: 

1) Hot slag or sparks ignited methane bleeders on 

the roof, ribs or floor (28 fires or explosions). 

2)	 Hot slag or sparks ignited a methane build up 

(for example, in an air shaft or under a 

longwall pan) (9 fires or explosions). 

3)	 Hot slag or sparks ignited coal dust on the 

floor of the mine (9 fires or explosions). 
 

According to MSHA, 12 citations were issued for 

violations of safety standards that contributed to these 

accidents. These enforcement actions were issued under 

six different subparts of 30 CFR Part 75-Mandatory 

Safety Standards-Underground Coal Mines and 30 CFR 

Part 77-Mandatory Safety Standards, Surface Coal 

Mines and Surface Work Areas of Underground Coal 

Mines. Figure 3 shows the failures that contributed to 

these accidents, including: 

1) Six citations for inadequate examination of 

methane. 

2)	 Two citations for ventilation plan not followed. 

3)	 One citation for inadequate search for fire. 

4)	 One citation for inadequate rock dusting. 

5)	 One citation for unusable fire extinguisher. 

6)	 One citation for noncombustible barrier not 

 installed. 

Mining Industry Accident, Injuries, 

Employment and Production Data Base 

Analysis 

Another problem with flame cutting and welding 

operations is personal injuries. The mining industry 

accident, injuries, employment, and production data base 

was examined from 1995-2005 to identify the number of 

personal injuries from flame cutting or welding activities 

[MSHA 2006]. From this data there were a total of 

thirty-three nonfatal injuries caused by flame cutting or 

welding (Figure 4). 

The numbers and causes of these injuries, shown in 

Figure 5 were: 

1) 19 injuries resulted from sparks or hot slag. 

•	 Eleven of these injuries occurred 

when the mine worker was cutting in 

a position where hot sparks were 

able to fall into the worker’s ear. For 

example, one of the mine workers 

was lying on their side next to a 

continuous miner, one under a cable 

tray, one was under a roller bearing 

on a conveyor system, and another 

was under a continuous miner 

cutting head cutting off bit lugs when 

hot sparks entered the mine worker’s 

ear. 

•	 Five of these injuries occurred when 

the mine worker was cutting or 

welding and hot slag or a spark got 

behind the welding shield or cutting 

glasses. 

•	 Three of these injuries occurred 

when the mine worker was cutting 

and sparks or hot slag entered 

through openings in the shirt, gloves 

or boots. In one of these injuries, the 

mine worker was stretching to cut a 

top rail and a spark went down his 

shirt and burned him. In another 

injury, the mine worker was burning 

lugs off of a continuous miner when 

hot slag entered his boot. In the last 

injury, the mine worker was cutting a 

swivel pin out of a continuous miner 

when a piece of hot slag burned the 

oxygen hose behind the torch. The 

hose then caught fire burning the 

mine worker’s hand. 

2)	 Four injuries resulted from faulty or damaged 

torch hoses. 

•	 One set of welding hoses broke and 

caught fire burning the mine 

worker’s left hand. 

•	 One set of hoses was cut when roof 

rock fell onto both the oxygen and 

acetylene hoses. The mine worker’s 

left glove filled with the gases which 

were ignited by a spark, burning the 

worker’s hand. 

•	 One set of hoses was damaged when 

a beltline headroller was being 

disassembled with a cutting torch. A 

piece of metal fell on the hoses, 

pulling the hoses away from the 

mine worker. The mine worker then 

examined the hoses without shutting 

off the torch. The hoses were 

damaged and leaking, causing them 

to catch fire and burn the mine 

worker’s left finger and thumb. 

 
 

 

•	 One set of hoses got caught in a 

feeder breaker when a mine worker 

was using a torch to change a 

bearing on the tail roller. The torch 

hoses got caught in the breaker 

which pulled the small acetylene 

tank through breaker, causing it to 

explode and burning the mine 

worker. 

3)	 Four injuries resulted from the improper 

handling of the torch. 

•	 One injury resulted when the mine 

worker was using a cutting torch to 

trim a piece of belt structure and 

caught his glove on fire. 

•	 One injury resulted when the mine 

worker completed cutting with a 

torch and then shut it off. The 

worker then used the torch to blow 

dust off of his safety glasses, which 

were hanging around his neck. The 

worker lost his balance and the hot 

torch touched his right eye burning 

his cornea. 

•	 One injury resulted when the mine 

worker used a cutting torch on a 

piece of metal lodged and under 

tension at the bottom of the feeder. 

When the hot metal suddenly 

released from under tension, it struck 

his arm and burned it. 

•	 One injury resulted when the mine 

worker’s cutting torch went out due 

to the accumulation of debris at the 

end of the cutting torch tip. The 

mine worker shut off the torch, and 

used his left, glove-covered hand to 

clean the torch tip. The glove caught 

on fire and burned his left hand. 

4)	 Three injuries resulted from methane gas 

ignitions. 

•	 Two injuries resulted when two mine 

workers were using cutting torches 

to a cut a longwall conveyor chain 

and a methane ignition occurred. An 

accumulation of methane gas under 

the conveyor ignited, burning both 

workers. 

•	 One injury resulted when the mine 

worker was flame cutting near the 

face inside a vertical shaft. The 

ventilation device, intended to 

ventilate the area in which the 

ignition occurred, was not within the 

20-foot maximum distance required 

by the shaft sinking plan, allowing 

methane gas to accumulate in a roof 

void approximately thirty-four feet 

from the end of the ventilation 

tubing. One miner was burned. 

5)	 One injury resulted from a leaky pressure 

gauge on an acetylene tank. The mine worker 

was flame cutting a conveyor chain on a 

continuous miner. Hot slag ignited the leak 

near the acetylene tank pressure gauge, 

burning the mine worker’s face. 

6)	 One injury resulted while the mine worker was 

flame cutting bolts from the center section of a 

scoop. Hot sparks caught lubricating grease on 

fire. The mine worker extinguished the grease 

fire with his left gloved-cover hand. The mine 

work burned his left hand. 

7)	 One injury occurred while the mine worker 

was welding a toolbox latch. Oil located 

inside the toolbox caught fire, burning the 

welder. 

The effects of these fires resulted in 11 burned ears, 11 

burned hands, five burned eyes, four burned faces, one 

burned leg, and one burned arm (Figure 6). 

Mine Worker Interviews 

Several miners who perform flame cutting and 

welding operations were interviewed by NIOSH’s 

researchers to gain insight into the root causes of fires 

caused by flame cutting and welding. One mine worker 

stated that taking adequate time to preparing and perform 

flame cutting and welding tasks was very important in 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

preventing accidents and injuries. Some examples he 

gave on how to perform the flame cutting or welding job 

safely were: check the oxygen and acetylene tanks, 

gauges and hoses for leaks or damage, rock dust the area, 

have portable fire extinguishers in close proximity, and 

perform an adequate methane check. Another mine 

worker commented that having a helper or observer 

could prevent accidents and injuries. Working alone 

makes it difficult to detect hot spots from sparks and 

slag. Another mine worker stated that methane pockets 

from bleeders on the floor of the mine often accumulate 

under equipment, especially under longwall panlines. 

These methane pockets are difficult to detect with handheld methane detectors and can result in fires or 

explosions when flame cutting or welding. The mine 

worker also stated that he had observed several small 

fires from flame cutting that were initiated while cutting 

off rusted bolts when relocating the conveyor systems. 

The mine workers all felt strongly that these small fires 

had the potential to lead to major fires or explosions. 

Flame Cutting Experiments 

Several flame cutting experiments were performed 

by an experienced miner at NIOSH’s Lake Lynn 

Laboratory to observe the effects of hot steel particles on 

coal fines and grease. Coal fines and grease were placed 

on a steel sheet (1/8 in. x 2 ft. x 2 ft.) and the miner 

performed a flame cutting operation directly above 

(Figure 7). 

This allowed sparks and slag to fall onto the coal fines 

and grease. Thermal images of the coal fines and grease 

were taken using an infrared (IR) camera. Figure 8 

shows an image from the IR camera of the sparks and 

slag from the flame cutting operation falling onto the 

coal and grease. In this image, hot spots of 1600 oF were 

observed. 

Hot particles and slag from the flame cutting that came 

in contact with the coal fines and grease immediately 

ignited the grease. After several minutes, the flames 

from the grease appeared to be burned out and, to the 

naked eye, the fire appeared to be out; however, hot 

spots not visible by the human eye were detected by the 

IR camera. The highest temperatures observed with the 

IR camera approximately 15 minutes, after the end of the 

cutting operations, were between 200-300 ̊F degrees 

(Figure 9). These hot spots were monitored with the IR 

camera for a time period of approximately two hours and 

the temperature of the hot sports remained between 200­

300 ̊F. 

A small fan with an average air velocity of 400 

ft/min was then placed one foot in front of steel sheet 

that contained the coal fines and grease. This ventilation 

flow caused the temperature of the hot spots to increase, 

resulting in a re-ignition of the coal fines and grease. 

Without the use of the IR camera, it appeared that the 

fire was completely extinguished. This demonstrates 

that hot spots, hot enough to re-ignite coal and grease, 

can be invisible to the human eye and difficult to detect. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Root Causes of Fires and 

Explosions 

From the MSHA Mine Accident reports that were 

analyzed, the major cause of fires and explosions due to 

flame cutting and welding was an inadequate 

examination for methane. While 30 CFR §75.323(a) 

specifies that tests for methane concentrations must be 

made at least 12 inches from the roof, face, ribs and 

floor, this distance requirement is not applicable to 

welding, cutting and soldering activities performed under 

§75.1106. MSHA’s policy on §75.1106 clearly states 

that methane tests conducted under this section must be 

made in locations where methane is likely to exist, and in 

no case is cutting, welding or soldering permitted in an 

atmosphere that contains 1.0 percent or more of methane. 

Since the face, roof, ribs, floors and any fully or partially 

enclosed areas of an underground coal mine are locations 

where methane is likely to exist, methane tests must also 

be made at or near the surface of these areas (not 12 

inches away), and within any enclosed areas that may be 

exposed to the above ignition sources MSHA [2004]. 

According to MSHA, additional ventilation may also be 

used to reduce the methane level in these areas where 

flame cutting and welding activities are occurring. 

The root causes of mine workers not conducting 

adequate methane examinations include: 

1)	 Methane checks are not being made close 

enough to surfaces where ignitable 

concentrations of methane may exist. Tests 

should be conducted in and around the 

immediate area where flame cutting and 

welding is conducted and where hot slag and 

sparks might fly. If necessary, a pump type 

methane monitor and probe should be used 

(Figure 10). 

2)	 The methane checks are not being performed 

throughout the entire area where hot sparks or 

slag may reach. 

3)	 Improper use of methane detection 

instrumentation. When continuously 

monitoring for methane, the instrument needs 

to be located where the highest concentration 

of methane is likely to first accumulate within 

the area affected by the flame cutting or 

welding task. 

From the MSHA Mine Injury reports that were 

analyzed, the other causes of accidents were as follows: 

1)	 Unsafe acts such as not using appropriate 

personal protection equipment or using flame 

cutting and welding equipment in an unsafe 

manner. 

2)	 The environment or physical workspace was 

not properly prepared, resulting in physical 

hazards remaining in the workspace. 

3)	 Inspection of tools and equipment was not 

done prior to starting the task. 

4)	 A diligent search for fire and hot spots in all 

potentially affected areas was not made during 

and after cutting operations. 

In the author’s opinion, the root causes of these 

accidents were as follows: 

1)	 The area was not properly prepared. For 

example: adequate ventilation needs to be 

provided, methane checks need to be 

performed around the entire area prior and 

during the task, grease needs to be cleaned off 

of surface area prior to starting flame cutting 

and welding and a portable fire extinguisher 

should be located in close proximity of the 

work area. 

2)	 Tools and equipment were not inspected prior 

to starting the task. A safety check of the tools 

and equipment must be performed prior to the 

start of each flame cutting or welding task. 

3)	 The personal protection equipment must be 

chosen so that it is effective and also 

comfortable to wear. 

4)	 If a search for fire was performed after the 

flame cutting or welding work ended and no 

hot spots were detected, it is possible that hot 

spots may have been invisible to the human 

eye and may have been missed. 

Recommendations 

Based on the data obtained, there are several 

recommendations for reducing the number of fire 

accidents and injuries caused by flame cutting or welding 

by addressing the root causes identified above. 

1)	 The inspection doors on longwall panlines 

should be removed when available to allow 

methane pockets to be vented. 

2)	 All persons (mine workers and contractors) 

who are required to conduct methane 

examinations during flame cutting and welding 
operations should have regular training. This 

training should include: 

•	 The proper calibration and use of 

methane detection instruments. 

•	 Proper methods for tests of methane 

and the use of methane probes in 

conjunction with a methane pump. 

3)	 All persons (mine workers and contractors) 

who are required to flame cut or weld should 

have regular training. This training should 

include: 

•	 A review of pertinent regulations 

pertaining to flame cutting and 

welding in underground coal mines. 

Some of these include: 

o	 Welding, cutting or 

soldering must be done 

under the supervision of a 

qualified person. 

o	 The qualified person must 

conduct a diligent search 

for fire during and after 

any welding, cutting, or 

soldering activity. 

o	 Any welding, cutting or 

soldering shall not be 

conducted in air that 

contains 1.0 percent or 

more methane. 

o	 Rock dust (240 pounds) or 

one portable fire 

extinguisher shall be 

immediately available 

during any welding, 

cutting or soldering 

activity. 

o	 A diligent search for hot 

sports shall be made after 

flame cutting or welding. 

Hot spots can remain 

invisible and smolder for 

many hours. 

•	 Proper preparation of the area and 

good house keeping. Its appears that 

better fire protection to the work area 

around conveyor structures is needed 

when performing flame cutting or 

welding on these structures, since 

several small fires have resulted 

while relocating these structures. 

•	 Proper use of a torch. All persons 

required to use a torch should have 

regular training on torch operation 

and safety. 

4)	 When the flame cutting or welding tasks are 

completed, additional rock dusting and water 

should be used in all areas where the task was 

performed in order to extinguish any remaining 

hot spots. 

5)	 The oncoming shift section foreman should 

make an immediate inspection of the area 

where flame cutting or welding operations 

were performed and record that a check for fire 

and hot spots was made. 

6)	 The proper use of personal protection 

equipment will help reduce the number of 

accidents and injuries. PPE that should be 

worn in areas of flame cutting or welding 

includes: 

•	 Flame-resistant gloves 

•	 Safety cutting goggles when flame 

cutting 

•	 Welder’s helmets with full face 

shield when welding 

•	 Flame-resistant hood 

•	 Welder’s apron 

•	 Metatarsal boots 

•	 Long-sleeved shirts and full length 

pants made from heavy, flameresistant material. 

Based on the number of injuries to the ears and 

eyes, it appears that an ergonomically 

designed, custom-fit ear guard made from a 

fire-resistant material, and an ergonomically 

designed custom-fit welding shield and cutting 

glasses could reduce the number of injuries to 

these body parts. 

7)	 Hoses must be routed such that they are 

protected from machinery, roof falls and sharp 

objects. 

8)	 The use of thermal imaging (IR) systems to 

detect hot spots. In addition, there are several 

other uses for IR systems in an underground 

coal mine that can reduce the risks of accidents 

fatalities and injuries. These include: 

inspection of hot rollers during belt exams, 

power center inspections, brake inspections, 

hot hangers inspections on trolley wires, and 

mine rescue efforts. 

9)	 New technologies are also being developed 

using IR for detecting methane gas emissions. 

NIOSH PRL has begun researching this 

technology at its ventilation gallery to evaluate 

its effectiveness for use in underground coal 

mines. In addition, this technology may be 

used on the surface in coal preparation plants 

and at gob vent holes. Manufacturers are 

considering developing intrinsically safe IR 

instruments for use in underground coal mines 

at this time. 

Summary 

Flame cutting and welding fires have accounted for 

approximately 15% of the reportable underground coal 

mine fires over the last 25 year period. These fires have 

led to major events such as the McElroy mine explosion 

on January 22, 2003, the Loveridge No. 22 mine fire on 

June 22, 1999, and the Blackville No. 1 mine explosion 

on March 19, 1992. One of the goals of NIOSH is to 

enhance the safety of mine workers by preventing 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

disasters caused by fires and explosions. This paper 

identifies some of the root causes of fires and explosions 

and causes of injuries resulting from flame cutting and 

welding. These include the failure to detect hot spots 

(sometimes invisible to the human eye), inadequate 

methane checks of the entire area where hot sparks or 

slag can reach, failure to adequately prepare the work 

site and the improper use of personal protective 

equipment. Suggestions to correct these root cause 

failures include training in the use of methane measuring 

instrumentation and personal protective equipment and 

the use of infrared camera technology to search for hot 

spots. 

References 

Conti RS, Chasko LL, Wiehagen WJ, Lazzara CP 

[2005]. Fire response preparedness for underground 

mines. Pittsburgh, PA: U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services, Public Health Service, Center for 

Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH) 

Publication No. 2006-105, IC 9481, pp. 2. 

CFR. Code of Federal Regulations. Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, Office of the Federal 

Register. 

Hartman HL, Mutmansky JM, Ramani, Wang Y.J. 

[1997]. Mine Ventilation and Air Conditioning Third 

Edition: The University of Alabama (Emeritus), The 

Pennsylvania State University, West Virginia University: 

A Wiley-Interscience Publication, pp 564. 

MSHA [1992]. Underground Coal Mine Explosion, 

March 19, 1992, Blacksville No.1 Mine – I.D. 46-01867, 

Consolidation Coal Company, Arlington, VA: U.S. 

Department Labor, Mine Safety and Health 

Administration, Report of Investigation. 

MSHA [1999]. Noninjury Mine Fire and explosion, 

June 22, 1999. Loveridge No. 22 Mine ID 46-01433, 

Consolidation Coal Company, Arlington, VA: U.S. 

Department Labor, Mine Safety and Health 

Administration, Report of Investigation. 

MSHA [2003]. Fatal Shaft Sinking Explosion January 

22, 2003. McElroy Mine ID 46-01437, McElroy Coal 

Company, Arlington, VA: U.S. Department Labor, Mine 

Safety and Health Administration, Report of 

Investigation, CAI-2003-1-3. 

MSHA [2004]. MSHA Program Policy Letter No. PO4­

V-6. November 3, 2004. 

MSHA [2006]. Mining industry accident, injuries, 

employment, and production data: Denver, CO: U.S. 

Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health 

Administration, Office of Injury and Employment 

Information. Date accessed: January 2006. 

Pomroy WH, Carigiet AH [1992]. Analysis of 

underground coal mine fire incidents in the United States 

from 1978 through 1992. Minneapolis, MN: U.S. 

Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, IC 9426, pp 

12.