By time of trial, Sherwood w as employ ed by a diffe rent law -enf

orce ment ag ency . 1 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 332 -CR

Ro be r t P aul M ill s , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF CALDWELL COUNTY , 421S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 2007 -36 4 , HO NORAB LE JACK H. RO B ISO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N During the late e vening h o u rs of J uly 2, 2007, Offic er A lex S herw ood, then of the L oc kh art

Pol ic e De pa

rtme nt, init i at ed a tra ffic stop on Rober t Paul Mil ls after , Sherwood 1 testified, he witnesse d Mills m aking a rig ht turn after Mills had failed to signa l within one-hundred fee t of the interse ction. See Tex. Transp. C o d e Ann. § 545.104(b) ( West 1999) (“An ope rator intending to turn a

vehicle ri gh t o r l eft shall si g nal continuously for not less than the la st 100 feet of movement of t h e vehicle be fore the turn.”) . The investig atory detention led to a suc cession of incriminating discoverie s by Offic er Sher

wood and his colleag ues—we apons, outstanding out-ofstate wa rra nts, and a b ag g ie containing.78 ounces of coca ine—and Mills’s arr est. Mills was indicted and, base d on the evidenc e obtained during the traff ic stop, c onvicted for the offe nse of possession of a controlled substanc e, coc aine, in an a mount less than one g ram. See Tex. Health & Safety Code2

Ann. § 481.002(38) ( West S upp. 2008), § 481.115(b) (West 2003). Punishment was assessed at two y ear s’ conf

inement in state jail, probate d for a period of f

ive y ear s, and a $500 f

ine. On ap p ea l , M i l l s s ee k s re v er s al o f hi s co n v i ct i o n an d a ne w t ri al

. H e b r i n gs thr e e is s u e s . I n h is f

ir s t is s u e , M il ls c o mp la in s o f th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s r e f u s a l o f h is r e quest for a jury instruction under a

rticle 38.23(a ) of the code of cr iminal procedur e. SeeTex. Code Crim. P roc. Ann. art . 3 8. 23 (a ) ( Wes t 20 05 ); Ma dd e n v . S tat e , 242 S.W .3d 504, 509-11 (Tex

. Crim. App. 2007). Re la te dly , M ill s c omp la ins of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e xclu sio n o f e xpe rt te sti mony

g oin g to w he the r i t was phy sically

possible for Of

fice r Sherwood, f

rom his va

ntag e point, to have seen whether or not Mills had signale d within one -hundre d fee t of the intersec tion. I n his se cond issue, Mills challeng es wh e the r t he State c ou ld h a ve re lie d on the ou t- of -s ta te wa rr ants a s a ba sis fo r a

rr e sti ngMil ls. I n h is third issue, Mills complains that the district court e rre d “by d em o n s t ra ting ope n and continuous hostili ty towards defe nse counsel both in front of and outside the prese nce of th e j u ry , ref lecting a bias in f avor of the State.” Be cause we c onclude that the e vidence raised a materia l fac t issue that require d an ar

ticle 38.23(a ) jury instruction, w e will r ever se the judgme nt of conviction and r emand this cause f

or a ne w trial. Eviden ce obta ined in violation of the fede ral or state constitutions or laws is not admissible in evidenc e ag ainst the acc used in a criminal ca se. Se e Ma pp v . O hio , 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1 96 1) ; Mi le

s v . S tat e , 2 41 S.W. 3d

28 , 3 3-34 (Tex . Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Pi e rc e v . S tat e , 32 S.W .3d 247, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Tex. C ode Crim. Proc. Ann. a rt. 38.23(a)

. Mills was convicted based on the evidentiar

y “fr uit” of Officer Sherwood’s traffic stop. See W ong Sun v. United States , 37 1 U .S. 47 1 ( 19 63 ); Sta te v. Id ua rte , 268 S.W .3d 544, 550-51 (Te x . Crim. App. 2008). For an3

investigative detention like Off icer Sherwood’s tra ffic stop to be justifi ed u n d er the fede ral a nd state constitutions, an office r must have specific , articula ble fac ts that, w hen combined with rational inf e re nc e s f ro m th os e fact s, wo uld

le a d h im t o r e a so na

bly c on c lud e that a

pa rt ic ula r p e rs on is, has bee n, or soon will be eng ag ed in cr iminal activity

. Te rry v . O hio , 3 92 U. S. 1 , 2 1 ( 19 68 ); Cas tro

v . S tat e , 2 27 S.W. 3d

73 7, 74 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ). Whe the r such “reason a ble su sp ic ion ” is pr e se nt i s d e te rm ine d und e r a n o bje c tiv e sta

nd ard : wh e the r t

he fa c ts a va ila ble to t he of fi c e r “ wo uld

w ar r an t a r e a s o n a

b ly c a u ti o u s p e r s o n to b e li e v e th a t th e a c ti o n ta k e n w a s a

p propriate .” Gr iff

in

v . S tat e , 2 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d

4 0 3 , 4 0 9 ( T e x . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Te rry , 3 92 U. S. at 21 -2 2; O’ Ha ra

v . S tat e , 27 S.W .3d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). The fa ct s m u s t am ount to more than a

mere hunch or suspicion. Te rry , 3 92 U. S. at 22 ; Br oth e r v . S tat e , 1 66 S.W. 3d

25 5, 25 7 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2005). Whether re asonable suspicion is prese nt is a question of law f or the trial c ourt when th er e i s n o dispute conce rning the exist ence of the unde rlying historica l fac ts from which that deter mination is m ade. See M

adden , 2 42 S.W. 3d a t 51 0- 12

. Ho we ve r, if the re is a g e nu ine dis pu te

a bo ut t he e xiste nc e of

on e or mor e of the se his tor ic a l fa c ts an d suc h a fa c t’ s e xiste nc e is m a te ri a l to the stop’s leg ality , article 38.23(a) entitles the defe ndant to have the fac t’s exis tence deter mined by the jur y thr ou g h the su

bmi ssi on of an ins tr

uc tio n to dis re g ard any

e vid e nc e “ if

it b e lie ve s, or

ha s a

rea sonable doubt” a s to whether it wa s obtained in violation of fede ral or state constitutions and laws . Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . Ann. art . 3 8. 23 (a ); cf

. Madden , 242 S.W .3d at 510-13 (e mphasizi ng that de fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to ins tr uc tio n if e ith e r “ the re is n o d is pute d f a c tua l is su e ” or

fa c t,Marke t Street co n t i n u es we stward a cross Colorado/183 into downtown L ockhar t. One 2 blo c k w e st o f C olo ra do /18 3, Mark e t Str e e t r un s a lon g the so uth

bo un da ry of the Ca ldw e ll Co un ty courthouse la

wn. 4 though disputed, is immateria l beca use “othe r fa cts, not in dispute, are s ufficie nt to support the lawfulne ss of the cha lleng ed conduc t”).

At trial, Off

icer Sherwood testified that, as he w as driving north on Colorado Street (U .S. 18 3) in L oc kh art , he saw Mill s dri vin g we stw ard on Ea st M ark e t Str e e t—m ov ingri g ht- to- le ft , f r o m S h e r w o o d ’ s p e r s p e c ti v e

— a

n d approa ching that street’ s intersec tion with C olorado/183. Mil ls, 2

a c c or din g to S he rw oo d, sto pp e d at a sto p s ig n at th e int e rs e c tio n, the n tu rn ed rig ht o r n or

th o nto Colorado/183. Sherwood a cknowledg ed that Mills did si g nal bef ore turning , but testified he saw this occur only “[o] nce [Mi lls] g ot to the intersec tion,” “[w]hen he came to a stop,” and not be fore Mills had come within one -hundre d fee t of the intersec tion. After Mills turned r ight or northwar d onto Colorado/183, Sherwood pulled him over. Although not di spositive, we note that Sherw ood candidly acknow ledg ed that, once h e s aw M i l l s , he “w as looking for pr obable c ause f or a stop beca use [Mil ls] was c oming f rom a drug

—high dr ug activity

are a.” I t is undisput ed that, bec ause Sherwood was approa ching from the south or Mills’s left, Mi lls’s rig ht-turn s igna l was posit ioned on the north side of hi s vehicle—the opposite or “f ar” side of th e v e h ic le f

r o m Sh e r w o o d ’ s v ie w . T h e r e is a ls o n o d is p u te th a t it w a s late a t n ig h t and that M i lls was driving a low-to-the -g round Camar o. The re lative positions of the two vehicles and Mi ll s ’ s tu

r nin d ic a to r

ar e f u rth e r c o n f ir me d b y th e v id e o r e c o r d in g f

r o m O f f ic e r Sh e r w ood’s p a t r o l c ar c a m e r a , w h i c h w a s i ne v i d e n c e an d p l aye d f o r t h e j u r y.5 Th e vid e o fu

rt he r r e ve a ls t

hat th e blo c k im me diate ly so uth of Ma rk e t Str e e t and

e a st of Colorado/183—which from Sherwood’s path, he would have had to look throug h or over to see Mills approachingon Marke t Street—con t ained va rious potential obstacles to Sherw ood’s line of sight. The block contains a Walgr eens, which is dark. Surrounding the outer pe rimeter on the block is a cha in-link fence

. I n the northwe st corner of the block, ne ar the Marke t Street—Colorado/183 intersec tion, is a larg e r ec t an gu l ar form that appe ars to be a portable building or trailer . On the videotape, this building or trail er b l o ck s one’s viewof Mar ket Street be hind it unti l the patrol ca r passes to the lef

t of the building a

nd almost imm ediately

turns rig ht onto Market Stree t. On the videotape, Mills’s ca

r appea rs to come into view whe n Sherwood pa sses the portable building and immediately

turns rig ht. At that juncture, one can see the blinking il lumination from Mills’s rig ht tur n in dic a tor . T he vid e o th e n r e fl e c ts Sh e rw oo d ma kin g a u-tu rn to head we st o n M ark e t Str e e t, then a r ight turn onto Colorado/183, whe re he pursues Mills and pulls him over.

Con te nd ingtha

t th e e vid e nc e ra ise d a fa ct is su e a s to wh e the r i t w a s p hy sic a lly possible for Of

fice r Sherwood to have witnessed wh ether or not Mills had signale d within onehu nd re d f

e e to f t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , M i l l s r e qu e s t e d anart i c l e 3 8

. 2 3 ( a ) j u r

y i n s t r u c t i o n . M i l l s a lso soug ht to introdu ce ex p er t testimony from Joe Martinez, a retire d peac e off icer and license d pr ivate inv e sti g a tor . M artin ez was pr e pa re d to te sti fy

that he ha d ma de c a lc ulatio ns ba se d o n h is revie w of the vide o and mea s u re m en ts he made at the scene and dete rmined that it had bee n phy sically

impossibl e for Offic er Sherwood t o have seen whether or not Mill s signa led within onehundred fee t of

the intersec tion. The district court excluded Mar tinez’s testim ony , howeve r, base d6

on Mills’s failure to disclose Martinez as a n expert as re quired by

a discove ry

order

. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14( b) (West Supp. 2008).

On appe al, Mills devotes much o f h i s b ri ef ing to de bating the leg al standar ds that g overn e x clusion of d ef

ense ex perts (a s opposed to State experts) for f ailure to disclose the m as

re q u i re d by

a discove ry

order

. Se e J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , 2 3 3 S. W. 3 d

1 0 9 , 1 1 4 ( T e x. A p p . — H o u ston [14t h D ist .] 20 07 , n o p e t.) ; Strawn v . S tat e , No. 0 2 -0 2 -00170-CR , 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 4571, at *7-12 (T ex. App.—Fort Worth May 29, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op., not design at ed for publicat io n ) ( p e r c u r ia

m)

. We n e e d n o t r e a c h th a t qu e s ti o n b e c a u s e w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e above evidenc e, eve n without Martinez’s testimony , prese nts a fa ct issue reg ardingwhether it was phy sically

possible for Of

fice r Sherwood to have asc erta ined whethe r Mills had or had not si g naled within one-hundre d fee t of the i ntersec tion and whether, as Sherwood claimed, he ha d witnessed or had any rea son to suspect that Mills commi tted the alleg ed violation. The State ha s sugg ested that ther e is no fac tual dispute warr anting an article 38.23(a ) instruction beca

use Off icer Sherwood insisted that h e wa s able to see Mills despite any obstacles and that his patrol-c ar vide o did not fully captur e the rang e of his per iphera l vision as he approa ched the intersec tion. See M

adden , 242 S.W .3d at 513-14 (expl aining that “[t] o raise a disputed fac t issue

war ranting an Article 38.23( a) jury instruction, there must be some a ffirmative evidenc e that pu ts t he e xi st ence of

that f a c t in to q ue sti on ” and

that “ a c ro ss- e xami ne r’ s q

ue sti on s d o n ot c re a te a conf lict in the evidence , althoug h the witnesses’s a nswers to those questions might”) . Howeve r, Of fi c e r S he rw oo d ackn owle dg e d th e e xiste nc e of fa c ts that c ou ld g ive ri se to t he re a so na

ble infere nce that he could not possibly have se en whether or not Mills had committed the7

traff ic violation. O n cross, de fense counsel e licited the following testimony from Sherw ood about his ve hicle’s location relative to the location of Mills ’s vehicle and obstac les that could have blocked She rw oo d’ s li ne of

sig ht: Q: And in that [W alg ree ns] parking lot t here was a lot of construction g oing on, c or re c t? A: Cor

re c t. Q: All rig ht. And it had a cha in-link fence all the way around— A: Cor

re c t. Q: —th e pa

rk inglot , c or

re c t? A: Uh-huh. Q: You have to answer y es or no. A: Cor

re c t. Q: All r ight. And then ther e wa s the building, the Walg ree ns building, that wa s in t he pa rk inglot , c or

re c t? A: Cor

re c t. Q: And then ther e wa s another me tal building or some kind of building that wa s on the c or ne r o f t he int e rs e c tio n th a t Mr . M ill s wa s stop pe d at, is that c or re c t? A: Cor

re c t.

. . . . Q : All r ig h t. A n d f r o m th a t c o r

n e r o f th e Wa lgr e e n s p ar k in g lot, to the intersec tion where Mr. Mills is , what is the distance ? A: Iwo uld

pr ob a bly say 20 0 f e e t. Q: Wou ld i t surp ri se y ou if the dis tanc e wa s, in f

a c t, 3 25 fe e t?8

A: No , it

wo n’ t. Q: Al l r ig ht. An d s o in or de r f or y ou to h a ve wi tne sse d M r. Mi lls , y ou wo uld have be en looking at hi m at t hat time diag onal. I t wouldn’t have be en a straig ht, down the stree t, but it would have been diago n al t o the stree t that ru ns pe rp e nd ic ula

r t hat Mr . M ill s w a s o n, c or re c t? A: Th a t’ s c or

re c t.

. . . . Q: Al l r ig ht. No w, thi s is a t 10 :00 o’ c loc k at ni g ht, c or re c t? A: Ibelieve so. Q: An d M r. Mil ls i s d ri vin g a Camaro , c or

re c t? A: Th a t’ s c or

re c t. Q: And appr ox imately how fa r fr om the g round we re his blinkers, if you know? A: Idon’t know. Q: Ok ay . I t w ou ldn ’t have be e n mo re tha

n a c ou ple of fe e t, r ig ht? A: No. Q: So they

wer e low to the g round an d he wa s turning to the r ight. So the bli nk e r w ou ld h a ve be e n o n th e ri g ht s ide of the ve hic le , c or

re c t? A: Th a t’ s c or

re c t. Q: An d y ou

we re a pp ro a c hin g fr om t

he le ft sid e , c or re c t? A: Cor

re c t.

. . . . Q: Ok ay . An d he ha d jus t tur ne d fr om the ro a d b e hin d th e Wal g re e ns , c or re c t? A: Cor

re c t.The State doe s argue that the issue of an art i cle 38.23( a) instruc tion was rende red 3 “moot” by

Mills’s admissi on, afte r he w as stopped, that he ha d failed to signal withi n the re quired distance of

the inter s ec t i on. Sherwood testified that, when he inf ormed Mills about the rea son for the stop, Mills told hi m, “You g ot me. I did not signal.” Also, an admission of the violation by Mills can be hea

rd on the videotape, althoug h not in those exact words. In the State’s view, the re is no disputed fact issue wa rra nting an article 38.23 instruction beca use t here was no disput e about 9 Q: Ok ay . A nd

c ou ld you

se e tha t? A: Hi m tu rn i n g? Q: Uh-huh. A: Ic an’ t r e c oll e c t. As noted, i t i s undisputed that Mills had his rig ht turn signa l on when he w as at the interse ction, befor e he tur ned rig ht. Sherwood’s testimony and the video a

re a ffirmative evidenc e c apable of supporting the infer ence that Sherwood c ould not have see n—and did not

see—w hether

or not Mills had activated his turn sig nal within one -hundre d fee t of the intersec tion. Se e id . at 511. This disputed fac t issue, in turn, is materia l to the lawfulne ss of the traff ic stop and,

c on se qu e ntl y , w he the r t

he e vid e nti ary fr

uit s o f t hat st op we re pr op e rl y

a dmi tte d. Th e so le art ic ula ble fac t that Office r Sherwo o d identified as the ba sis for his stop was the traf fic violation he c laimed to have witnesse d. I f, co n t ra ry to Office r Sherwood’ s testimony , he phy sically could not have

seen w hether

Mills had or had not signa led wit hin the one-hundred feet before the i ntersec tion, he would, without more, have had no more than a hunc h or su s p icion that Mills commi tted the traff ic vi olation—not rea sonable suspicion. Te rry , 3 92 U. S. at 22 ; Brother , 166 S.W .3d at 257. The State points to no ot her f

acts that c ould give rise to re asonable suspicion for the stop. See M adden , 242 S.W .3d at 511. 3whether

Mills commi tted the traf fic off ense. H oweve r, the disputed fa ct issue that re quires an article 38.23(a) instruction is not whether it turned out that Mills had actually committed the offe nse, but w hether

or not Off

icer Sherwood a ctually

witnessed the tra ffic violation and the antec edent f act on which a rea sonable inferenc e of that fac t’s exis tence depends—that Sherwood c ould have se en whether or not Mills had si gn al ed wi t h in one-hundre d fee t of the interse ction. Cf. Ci ty of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 812 (Tex. 2004) (“[I ]f an ey ewitness’s location render s a cle ar vie w of an acc ident ‘phy sically impossibl e,’ it is no evidence of what occ urre d, even if

the ey ewitness thinks o t h erwi s e. ”) (q u o t i n g Te

x . &P. Ry . Co . v . B all , 75 S.W . 4, 6 (Tex. 1903)).

10 On this recor d, the d i strict court e rre d in refusingMills’s request for a n

ar t i cl e 3 8

. 2 3(a) instruction. Se e id

. a t 5 1 0 ( “ T h e te r ms o f th e s tatute ar e ma

n d a to r y , an d w h e nan issue of fa ct is raised, a

defe ndant has a

statutory rig ht to have the jury

char g ed ac cording ly .”) (q u o t i n g Mu rp hy

v . S tat e , 640 S.W .2d 297, 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)). We now consider whether Mills was harmed by

that err or. Se e Al

ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (o p. on re h’ g ); Swe arin gen v. Stat e , 270 S.W .3d 804, 808 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref ’d). Whe n, a s h e re , e rr or is p re se rv e d in the tr ia l c ourt

by tim e ly ob je c tio n, the re c or d mu st s ho w o nly

“ s ome harm.” Al ma nz a , 6 86 S.W. 2d a t 17 1; Swearingen , 270 S.W .3d at 808. Her e, if the jury had bee n proper ly instructed under article 38.23(a) , it would have had the opportunity to f ind, based on Sherwood’s te stimony and the videota

pe, that Sherw ood could not have se en, and did not see , Mil ls c omm it the tr a ff

ic vio la tio n. As the se we re the so le fa c ts he re tha t c ou ld s up po rt

re a so na ble suspicion for the tra ffi c s t o p , the jury would then have been instruc ted to disreg ard a ll evidence ob ta ine d f

ro m th e sto p, inc lud ingthe c oc a ine that f or me d th e bas is for Mil ls’ s c on vic tio n. Thus , M il ls s u f f e r e d “ s o me h ar

m” f r o m th e c h ar g e e r

r o r . See Rey no lds v . S

tat e , 848 S.W .2d 148, 149 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ) (e xpla ini ng ho w de fe nd ant wa s ha rm e d f ro m tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure to p ro pe rl y ins tr uc t jury on art ic le 38 .2 3) ; Vr ba v . S

tat e , 69 S.W .3d 713, 719 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.)11

(conc luding that defenda

nt suffe red some harm whe n rec ord conta ined no evidenc e of de fenda nt’s g uilt “independent of

that obtained as a

result of the stop”)

. Acc ording ly , we sustain Mills’s first issue. This holdingentitles Mills to the relief he se e ks on

a pp e a l—b e c a

us e his c on vic tio n is ba se d o n th e ve rd ic t of a jur y that wa s n ot p ro pe rl y instructed under

article 38.23, he is entitled to a new trial. See V

rba , 69 S.W .3d at 719, 725; se e als o Sto ne v . S tat e , 703 S.W .2d 652, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (re versingconviction and r emanding for ne w trial whe n trial court f ailed to instruct jury

on article 38.23). We thus need not re ach Mills’s alternative g rounds for a

new tria l asserte d in his other issues. See Tex. R. App. P . 47.1. We reve rse the judgment of conviction and r emand this ca use to the district court fo r a ne w tri a l.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and Pember

ton Reverse d and Remande d Filed: August 31, 2009 Pub lis h