THE ATI‘ORNEY GENERAL 

OF TexAs 

AUIITIN. - 78711 

aOBN L. BItaL 

August 13, 1973 

The Honorable Bevington Reed 

The Honorable Joe Resweber 

The Honorable George L. Thompson 

The Honorable David Wade, M. D. 

The Honorable Henry Wade 

Opinion No. H-82 

Re: Senate Bill 123 

Gentlemen: 

The 63rd Legislature adopted Senate Bill 123, sometimes known as 

“The l# Year Old Bill”. It will become effective August 27, 1973 and each 

of you has asked our opinion as to matters connected with it. 

Senate Bill 123; in its entirety, is as follows: 

“AN ACT 

providing that a person who is at least 18 years of age 

has all the rights, privileges, and obligations of a person 

who is 21 years of age; containing a provision that a custodian of certain property of a minor may elect not to 

have the provisions of this Act apply to such property; 

and declaring an emergency. 

“BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE 

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: 

“Section 1. The purpose of this Act is to extend all 

the rights, privileges, and obligations of majority to all 

persons who are at least 18 years of age. It shall be 

construed liberally to accomplish that purpose. 

“Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any statutory or decisional 

law, or any rule, regulation, or ordinance of this state or 

of any political subdivision or incorporated city or town of 

this state, a person who is at least 18 yearsof age has all 

p. 370 
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Page 2 (H-82) 

the rights, privileges, and obligations of a person who is 

21 years of age. A law, rule,regulation, or ordinance 

which extends a right, privilege, or obligation to a person 

on the basis of a minimum age of 21, 20, or 19 years 

shall be interpreted as prescribing a minimum age of 

18 years. 

“It is specifically provided, however, that with 

respect to property held by a custodian under the Texas 

Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, as amended (Article 5923- 

101, Vermn’s Texas Civil Statutes), on effective date 

hereof and the proceeds and reinvestments thereof, the 

, , -:’ custodian may elect not .to.have the provisions of this ACt 

apply by so notifying the minor in writing, but such election 

may be revoked at the election of the custodian. 

“Sec. 3. The importance of this legislation and 

the crowded condition of the calendars in both houses 

create an emergency and an imperative public necessity 

that the constitutional role requiring bills to be read on 

three several days in each house be suspended, and this 

rule is hereby suspended, and that this Act take effect 

and be in force from and after its passage, and it is 

so enacted. ” 

We have been asked, first, whether or not the Bill is constitutional under 

Article 3, 5 36 of the Texas Constitution. If we answer in the negative, the 

other questions become moot. 

Article 3, 5 36 of the Constitution is: 

“No law shall be revived or amended by reference 

to its title; but in such case the act revived, or the section or sections amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length. ” 

Also to be considered is the effect of Article 3. 5 35 which provides: 

p. 371 
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Page 3 (H-82) 

“No bill, (except general appropriations bills, which 

may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and 

on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in 

its title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, 

which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall 

be void only as to so much thereof, as shall not be so 

expressed. “ 

The initial inquiry must be whether Senate Bill 123 is an original 

act, complete in itself, or an amendatory act. No section or sections 

of any other Act are re-enacted or published at length by it, as Article 3, 

5 36 commands be done if an act amends other enactments. 

In lA, Sutherland Statutory Construction, (4th Ed. 1972) 0 22.01, p. 106 

it is said: 

“In determining whether an act is original or 

amendatory in form the controlling test is whether 

itpurports to be independent of existing statutory 

provisions. It may, in fact, add new regulations 

to fields already extensively regulated by legislation and to that extent amend or supplement them or 

it may establish new and inconsistent procedures 

which by the doctrine of implied repeal may supersede and repeal the existing law, but so long as it is 

not specifically identified as an amending or repealing act it will be treated as an original act and. 

courts will not apply constitutional standards for 

amendment and repeal to it even though that is the 

consequence and effect of the act. ” 

We think the foregoing passage well states the law in Texas. See Clark v. 

Finley, 54 S. W. 343 (Tex. 1899); Consolidated Underwriters v. Kirby Lumber 

co., 267s. W. 703 (Trx. Comm., 1924); Realty Trust Co. v. Lindsey, 105 S. W. 

2d 210 (Tex. 1937); Baker v. State, 158 S. W. 998 (Tex. Crim. 1913); Ex parte 

Wilson, 213 S. W. 984 (Tex. Crim. 1919); Terre11 v. State, 228 S. W. 240 (Tex. 

Crim. 1921); Davis v. State, 246 S. W. 395 (Tex.Crim;. 1922); Southwestern Gas & 

Electric Co. v. State, 190 S. W. 2d 132 (Tex. Civ.App., Austin, 1945, aff’d. 

193 S. W. 2d 675); Thompson v. United Gas Corp., 190 S. W. 2d 504 (Tex. 

Civ. App., Austin, 1945). 

p. 372 
Page 4 (H-82) 

In our opinion, as an original act and not an amendatory act, it is 

unnecessary that Senate Bill 123 meet the requirements of Article 3, 5 36. 

The purpose of the requirements of $ 35 of Article 3 of the Constitution 

is to give notice through the title of the Bill, both to the Legislature and the 

people of the State, of the subject of the proposed law and thereby to prevent 

the passage of a law on one subject under the guise of a title which expresses 

another. Lee v. State, 352 S. W. 2d 724 (Tex. 1962); Fletcher v. State, 

439 S. W. 2d 656 (Tex. 1969); Harris County Fresh Water Supply District .No. 55 v. 

Carr, 372 S. W. 2d 523 (Tex. 1963); C. Hayman Construction Co. v. American 

Indemnity Co., 471 S. W. 2d 564 (Tex. 1971); Stun v. State, 208 S. W. 2d 633 

(Tex. Crim. 1948). 

In our opinion the title to Senate Bill 123 is sufficient to give notice of its 

purpose and it does meet the requirements of Article 3, $ 35. 

Prior to the effective date of the Probate Code in 1956, Article 4104, V. T. C. S., 

provided that: “Females under twenty-one years of age who have never been 

married and males under said age are minors. ” This statute was repealed by 

adoption of the Probate Code which contained, among its definitions in $ 3, a 

definition of minors in 5 3(t) as: ” . . . all persons under twenty-one years of 

age who have never been married, except persons under that age whose disabilities of minority have been removed generally, except as to the right to vote, 

in accordance with the laws of this State.” 

The title to the Probate Code (Acts 1955, 54th Leg., ch. 55) does state 

that one of the purposes of the Act is to define the meaning of certain words, 

etc. It does not, however, state that it intends to amend all statutes of the 

State having to do with minors and minority. Nevertheless, when the question 

was raised in Pittman v. Time Securitiqs301 S. W. 2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App., San 

Antonio, 1957, no writ hist. ) as to whether $ 3(t) of the Probate Code was an 

act of general application or limited to the Code itself, the court said that it 

was one of general application and that married males under 21 years of age, 

were adults for all purposes, not just for the purpose of the Probate Code. The 

decision was reaffirmed and followed in Ward v. Lavy, 314 S. W. 2d 381 (Tex. Civ. 

APP. 3 Eastland, 1958, no writ) and in Travelers Indemnity Company V. Mattox, 

345 S. W. 2d 290 (Tex. Civ.App., Texarkana, 1961, err. ref’d., n. r. e. ). 

Just as the definition of “minor” contained in 0 3(t) of the Probate Code 

was held to provide a definition for all purposes, even though it did not specifically amend any other statute, so too we are of the opinion that Senate Bill 

p. 373 
Page 5 (H-82) 

123 does not operate to amend but rather is a general law creating an 

additional class of people (18, 19, and 20 year olds) who, without regard 

to marriage or judicial removal of disabilities, are entitled to the same 

rights, privileges, and obligations previously reserved to those of another 

class (persons 21 years of age and over), except as specifically provided 

otherwise in Senate Bill 123. Henceforth, 5 3(t) of the Probate Code as 

applied by Pittman. supra, and Senate Bill 123 murt be read together 

and applied generally in all instances which condition limitations or privileges on the minority or majority status of an individual. 

The intent of the 63rd Legislature in making the age of majority 18 

is further evidenced in the enactment of Titles 2 and 3 of the Family Code 

(Senate Bills 168 and 111 respectively) and the amendments to Title 1 of 

the Family Code ( House Bill 103). The Family Code now considers all 

persons as children or minors insofar as biological age is concerned if 

they are under 18 years old. 

Section 404 of the Probate Code pertains to the closing of estates of 

decedents and the guardianship of the persons and estates of wards. It 

specifically provides in Subsection (b)l that the guardianship of a minor 

shall be settled and clored when he dies or becomes an adult by becoming 

21 years of age or by removal of disabilities of minority or by marriage. 

Senate Bill 123 effects the removal of disabilities of minority of those 

18 years of age or older. After its effective date, when a person becomes 

18 years of age, by the specific terms of $404 of the Probate Code, his 

estate shall be settled and closed. There is no conflict. 

Senate Bill 123 does not require that “21 years of age” in these tvo 

sections of the Probate Code be replaced by “18 years of age”. It is to be 

read with but &es not amend these,two sections. 

Mr. Alton Griffin has posed questions concerning the effect of the 

Bill upon the Jury Wheel Law, Article 2094, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes. 

Article 2133 as amended in 1969 (Acts 1969, 61st Leg., p. 1364, ch. 412) 

provides that “all persons both male and female over twenty-one (21) years 

of age are competent jurors. unless disqualified under some provisions 

of this chapter . . . . ‘I This, in our opinion, extends a right, privilege 

or obligation to a person 21 years of age, and uder the specific provisions 

of Senate Bill 123, persons 18 years of age or older will be, therefore, 

p. 374 
Page 6 (U-82) 

qualified jurors. Article 2094 ae amended in 1971 provides that between 

the firrt and fifteenth days of August of each year the jury wheel shall 

be reconstituted “using ahe ale ad mandatory source, all names on 

the voter registration lists from all precincts in the county.” 

In our opinion the names of all r:egistered voters, including 18 year 

olds and those older, should be included in re,constituting the jury wheel 

this year. If called to serve before Senate Bill 123 becomes effective, 

those under 21 years should be excused from jury duty. Attorney General 

Opinion M-911 (1971) is overruled; the law has changed. 

Dr. Wade has asked: 

“In what respect, if any, will the provisions of 

Senate Bill 123. 63rd Legislature, affect the liability 

of parents under the provisions of Section 21, Article 

3871b? ” 

The section cited (amended in 1967 ) provides, in part: 

“(a) The parents of a mentally retarded person 

under twenty-one years of age who is a student in a 

state school operated by the Texas Department of 

Mental Health and Mental Retardation shall pay, if 

able to do so, such portions of the cost and support 

and maintenance of the mentally retarded person ar 

may be applicable under the following formula: 

[dependent upon net taxable income] . . . . 

‘l(b) Parents of a mentally retarded person 

who is twenty-one years of age or older shall not 

be required to pay for his support and maintenance 

in a state school as a student, but the mentally retarded person and his estate shall be liable for his 

support and maintenance regardless of his age . . . .” 

. . . 

“Unpaid charges for support and maintenance 

accruing after the effective date of this amendment 

due by parents for the support and maintenance of 

p. 375 
Page 7 (H-82) 

mentally retarded persons who are minors and students in state schools shall be a claim in favor of the 

state for such support and maintenance, but only to 

the following extent: . . . 

“After a mentally retarded person who is a 

student in a state school reaches 21 years of age the 

cost of his support and maintenance may be determined under rules and regulations adopted by the 

Texas Board of Mental Health and Mental Retardation 

provided that charges for support and maintenance 

shall not exceed the actual cost of such support and 

maintenance and the costs determined under such 

rules and regulations shall constitute a claim by the 

state against the entire estate or any property of the 

mentally retarded person including but not limited 

to any share he may have by gift, descent or devise 

in his parents’ estates or any other person’s estate. ” 

It is obvious from a reading of the statute that the amount by which the 

retarded person’s estate can be made liable for his care while at the school 

literally depends upon his age. The dividing line is 21 years. When he 

reaches that age the obligations of his estate change. Senate Bill 123 

operates to charge a person in like circumstances, but who is 18 years old 

rather than 21, with the same obligations as the 21 year old. 

The liability of persons for the cost of care for incompetents at 

State institutions is purely a matter of statute; the common law imposes 

no duty upon parents (or upon the estates of incompetents) to reimburse 

the State for the cost of caring for incompetent children, under age or 

not, at State institutions. See Wiseman v. State, 94 S. W. 2d 265 (Tex. 

Civ. App. , San Antonio, 1936, writ ref’d. ); State v. Stone, 271 S. W. 2d 741 

(Tex. Civ. App. , Beaumont, 1954, no writ); State v. Morris, 303 S. W. 2d 802 

(Tex. Civ. App., Eastland, 1957,wrt r&d). Also see State of California v. 

Copus, 309 S. W. 2d 227 (Tex. 1958). 

In other words, unless Article 3871b, § 21 specifically makes it so, 

the liability of parents for the cost of care for their incompetent children 

in State institutions does not depend upon the legal infancy of the child. 

p. 376 
Page 8 (H-82) 

Before the statute was amended [Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p.1935, ch. 725 

§ 11, it was clear that parents were liable regardless of the age or status 

of the child. Section 21 then read (in part): 

“The parents, spouse and the estate of a 

mentally retarded person . . . shall pay, if able 

to do so, for the support, maintenance and treatment of the person . . . . ” 

When 5 21 was amended in 1967, a new clause specified that as to 

charges accruing after the effective date of the amendment,‘unpaio c~harges 

due by parents for the support and mainienance “‘of mentally, retarded.persons 

who are minors” would be a claim in favor, of the State only to the. extent they 

could be collected from the property or estate of the retarded person. 

Unless it were intended that “under 21 years of age”, as used in the 

amended statute have the same meaning as “legal infant”, then charges 

would be due by a parent for the support and maintenance of a retarded 

son or daughter aged 17 years of age who was married (and thus, not a 

minor), which charges be a claim in favor of the State 

against persons or property other than the property or estate of the incompetent (the parents). Whereas, if the 17 year old son or daughter had 

never been married (a minor), any unpaid charges for his or her care 

could be a claim only against the child’s property or estate. 

We do not think the Legislature intended to place a more onerous 

burden upon the parents of children who have lost their disabilities 

because of marriage, or by judicial removal. than on parents of minor 

children. We are compelled to think the words “minors” and “persons 

under 21 years of age” are used interchangeably in Article 387lb. 5 21 

to signify that different treatments are to be accorded parents and their 

children, depending upon the legal capacity of the child. 

Even before Senate Bill 123 was enacted, therefore, ambiguous 

language in Article 3871b, $ 21 required construction. Senate Bill 123 did 

not make the construction necessary and does not change it. Without reference to Senate Bill 123, in our opinion, the words “21 years of age” in 

that context have reference to “legal infancy”. Inasmuch as “legal infancy” 

will be differently defined after Senate Bill 123 becomes effective, the 

effect of Article 3871b, $ 21 will be changed to that extent. In our opinion, 

p. 377 
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Page 9 (H-82) 

parents of incompetent children 18 years of age or more will have no 

obligation to the State for their support while in State schools, and the 

cost of their support and maintenance may be determined under rules 

and regulations by the Texas Board of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, as provided. 

Dr. Reed, Commissioner of the Coordinating Board, Texas College 

and University System, has asked for an interpretation of the non-resident 

tuition provisions of Subchapter B of Chapter 54. 

The tuition for institutions of higher education described by 5 54.&N 

of the Education Code is made to depend, in most instances, upon the 

residence of the student. Residence, in turn, is governed by the provisions of 5 54.052. The presidential status of individuale under 21 years 

of age is made to depend upon the residence of their families, but that of 

individuals 21 years of age or older depends upon their own circumstances. 

Assuming the constitutionality of a distinction between a person who 

has been a resident twelve months and one who has been a resident for 

a lesser period d time, it is our opinion that these statutes extend rights 

and privileges depending upon a minimum age and that the provisions 

of Senate Bill 123 operate to apply the same standards, rights and obligations to persons at least 18 years of age as are by those sections of the 

Education Code applied to persons 21 year8 of age. 

Finally, the county attorney of Harris County has asked whether 

a county clerk may issue a marriage license to a male eighteen years of 

age without parental consent after Senate Bill 123 becomes effective. Section 1. 51 of the Family Code, as it presently exists, provides that except 

with parental consent, a county clerk will not issue a.marriage license to 

a male applicant under 19 years of age or a female applicant under 18. 

House Bill 103 of the 63rd Legislature has amended this, effective January 1, 

1974, to the effect that the county clerk shall not issue a marriage license 

if either applicant is under 18 years of age. 

In addition, Article 1. 52 of the Family Code presently provides that if the 

male applicant is under 19 years of age the county clerk will issue the license 

if parental consent is given. It,too, was anended by House Bill 103 to authorize issuance of a license with parental consent to minors over 16 but under 

18 years of age. 

p. 378 
Page 10 (H-82) 

Marriage without parental consent is a right or privilege, and since 

here it is presently made contingent upon a minimum age of nineteen, it 

is our opinion that Senate Bill 123 would affect the age at which persons 

may marry without parental consent. 

It is our answer then to Mr. Resweber’s question that the county 

clerk may issue a marriage license to :nales 18 years of age without 

parental consent after Senate Bill 123 becomes effective. 

SUMMARY 

Senate Bill 123 is not an amendatory act but is 

an original and complete enactment which complies 

with all constitutional requirements. It has the 

effect of emancipating all persons aged 18 years or 

more from disabilities of infancy to the same extent 

that other law emancipates older persons; it co-exists 

with other emancipatory statutes but is independent 

of them. After its effective date, August 27, 1973, 

persons who are 18 years old will be adults for all 

purposes, save for eligibility to remain beneficiaries 

under the Texas Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. All 

other inconsistent laws or parts of laws which make 

distinctions of legal infancy on a different basis 

are repealed by necessary implication. 

Very truly yours, 

Attorney General of Texas 

DAVID M. KENDALL. Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

p. 379