[Cite as Stevens v. Little Stars Early Learning Ctr., L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-380.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

ACE STEVENS, ET AL., : 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, : 

 No. 110602 

 v. : 

 

LITTLE STARS EARLY LEARNING 

CENTER, L.L.C., ET AL., : 

 

 Defendants-Appellees. : 

[Appeal by Sherwanda Black] : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 10, 2022 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-19-926208 

 

Appearances: 

Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., Frank H. Scialdone, 

and Amy K. Herman, for appellees. 

Sherwanda Black, pro se. 
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J.: 

Defendant-appellant Sherwanda Black1 brings this appeal challenging 

the trial court’s judgment granting defendant-appellee Little Stars Early Learning 

Center, L.L.C.’s (“Little Stars”) motion for judgment on the pleadings on Black’s 

cross-claims. Black appears to argue that the trial court erred by permitting Little 

Stars’ counsel to withdraw from Black’s representation and that Black’s cross-claim 

alleged “six (6) distinct causes of negligence actions” that were sufficient to 

withstand Little Stars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. After a thorough 

review of the record and law, this court affirms. 

I. Factual and Procedural History 

Little Stars is a childcare center located in Lyndhurst, Ohio. Little Stars 

is owned by Asma Mujib and managed by Valda Lennon. Black and defendantappellee Michelle Brown were employed by Little Stars. 

This appeal arose from incidents that occurred at Little Stars between 

October 4 and October 8, 2019, during which plaintiff, Ace Stevens (“Ace”), who was 

approximately 18 months old at the time, was injured. During this time period, 

Black and Brown were assigned to the same classroom. It is undisputed that Black 

was not directly involved in the incident between Brown and Ace. 

1 Also known as Sherwanda Moore. 
Ace was purportedly “physically assaulted and abused” by Brown on 

October 4, 2019, causing him to strike his head on a table. Complaint at ¶ 4. Ace 

sustained a knot on his forehead and chipped a tooth. 

The record reflects that another incident occurred on October 8, 2019, 

during which Ace’s guardian observed Brown tightly squeezing Ace’s arm. Ace’s 

guardian observed finger marks on the child’s arm after it was released by Brown. 

The incident was reported to the Cuyahoga County Department of 

Children and Family Services, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services 

(“ODJFS”), and the Lyndhurst Police Department. County and state officials 

initiated investigations into the allegations. At the conclusion of the investigations, 

it was recommended that both Brown and Black be terminated from Little Stars. 

Brown was terminated on October 15, 2019, and Black was terminated on 

October 29, 2019. 

On December 5, 2019, Ace, by and through his guardian and next friend 

Jazmyn Alexander, and Anthony Stevens (collectively “plaintiffs”), filed an eightcount complaint against defendants Little Stars, Brown, and Black. A settlement 

was ultimately reached with respect to plaintiffs’ claims. On June 14, 2021, counsel 

for plaintiffs, Little Stars, and Brown filed a “stipulation for dismissal and journal 

entry.” The stipulation provided, in relevant part, 

We, the attorneys for the respective parties, do hereby stipulate that 

Plaintiffs’ claims in the above captioned matter have been settled and 

dismissed, with prejudice, as against Defendants Little Stars Early 

Learning Center, LLC, Michelle Brown and Sherwanda (Black) Moore, 

at the cost of Defendant Little Stars Early Learning Center, LLC. 
On June 15, 2021, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice 

based on the parties’ stipulation for dismissal. 

This appeal does not pertain to the settlement of plaintiffs’ claims. 

Rather, this appeal involves cross-claims that Black asserted against Little Stars. On 

February 14, 2020, Black, acting pro se, asserted a six-count cross-claim against 

Little Stars. The substance of Black’s cross-claims will be addressed in further detail 

below. However, Black appeared to assert claims for negligence, breach of contract, 

hostile work environment, or wrongful termination against Little Stars. Black 

alleged that Little Stars failed to inform employees about the allegations that were 

filed against Brown or the county and state investigations into the allegations. Black 

amended her cross-claim on April 15, 2020. 

Little Stars filed an answer to Black’s amended cross-claim on May 18, 

2020. Therein, Little Stars raised several affirmative defenses, including that 

(1) Black’s cross-claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 

(2) any losses, injuries, or damages sustained by Black were not proximately caused 

by Little Stars, (3) Little Stars did not breach any duty it owed to Black, (4) Black’s 

cross-claim failed to comply with the pleading requirements set forth in Civ.R. 8, 

and (5) the claims asserted by Black failed based on Black’s inability to prove the 

requisite elements of the claims. 

On August 7, 2020, Little Stars filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings as to Black’s cross-claim. Therein, Little Stars argued that (1) to the extent 

that Black was asserting a negligence claim, Little Stars did not have a duty to 
disclose information about the allegations filed against Brown or corresponding 

investigations to Black; (2) Black lacked standing to assert her claims pertaining to 

Little Stars’ failure to conduct a background check before hiring Brown, failure to 

conduct an internal investigation into the Brown allegations, or failure to review and 

preserve video footage from the classrooms because Black could not demonstrate 

that she suffered an injury that was fairly traceable to Little Stars’ purportedly 

unlawful conduct; (3) Black failed to sufficiently allege that a binding contract or 

agreement existed between her and Little Stars; (4) Black failed to sufficiently allege 

a hostile-work-environment claim; and (5) because Black acknowledged in her 

cross-claim that investigators determined that Black was negligent, and Little Stars 

was instructed to terminate Black’s employment by ODJFS, Black’s wrongful 

termination claim failed. Regarding Little Stars’ second argument, Little Stars 

emphasized that Black was terminated based on the investigators’ conclusion that 

Black was negligent, not because Little Stars failed to conduct a background check, 

complete an internal investigation, review surveillance footage, or share information 

about the Brown allegations with other employees. 

On September 30, 2020, Black filed a brief in opposition to Little Stars’ 

motion for judgment on the pleadings. Black filed a corrected brief in opposition on 

October 1, 2020. Therein, Black argued that as a pro se litigant, she knows nothing 

about the law, the rules of civil procedure, or how to sufficiently state a claim against 

Little Stars. Black appeared to request a hearing so she would have an opportunity 

to orally oppose Little Stars’ motion. Black appeared to rely on the doctrine of 
respondeat superior in opposing Little Stars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, 

suggesting that Little Stars was responsible for the negligent acts or omissions of its 

employees. Black also appeared to assert that she was attempting to recover against 

Little Stars under a negligent hiring, retention, or supervision theory. Regarding 

Count IV of her cross-claim, Black argued that she and Little Stars’ owner “indeed 

had a contract.” Finally, Black requested an opportunity to orally assert additional 

claims against Little Stars for civil rights violations, harassment, infliction of 

emotional distress, and punitive damages. 

On October 6, 2020, the trial court granted Little Stars’ motion for 

judgment on the pleadings as to Black’s cross-claim. Black appealed the trial court’s 

October 6, 2020 judgment on October 23, 2020 (Stevens v. Little Stars Early 

Learning Ctr., L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110053) and March 29, 2021 (Stevens 

v. Little Stars Early Learning Ctr., L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110389). Both 

appeals were dismissed by this court sua sponte for lack of a final appealable order. 

This court concluded that plaintiffs’ claims remained pending and the trial court’s 

October 6, 2020 judgment entry did not contain Civ.R. 54(B) language stating that 

“there is no just reason for delay.”2 

After the parties reached a settlement on plaintiffs’ claims and the trial 

court dismissed the case with prejudice on June 15, 2021, Black filed a third appeal 

2 This court cited Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989), 

syllabus, in its judgment entries dismissing Black’s first and second appeals for lack of a 

final appealable order. 
on June 22, 2021, challenging the trial court’s judgment granting Little Stars’ motion 

for judgment on the pleadings as to Black’s cross-claim. 

II. Law and Analysis 

A. Preliminary Matters 

There are two preliminary matters we must address before reviewing 

the merits of Black’s appeal. 

1. Pro Se Litigants 

First, we acknowledge that Black acted pro se in the trial court in 

asserting her cross-claim against Little Stars and opposing Little Stars’ motion for 

judgment on the pleadings. Black is also acting pro se in this appeal. 

This court has previously recognized, 

a pro se litigant may face certain difficulties when choosing to represent 

oneself. Although a pro se litigant may be afforded reasonable latitude, 

there are limits to a court’s leniency. Henderson v. Henderson, 11th 

Dist. Geauga No. 2012-G-3118, 2013-Ohio-2820, ¶ 22. Pro se litigants 

are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures, and 

are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by 

counsel. In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 138 

Ohio St.3d 43, 2013-Ohio-5478, 3 N.E.3d 173, ¶ 22. 

Saeed v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104617, 

2017-Ohio-935, ¶ 7. 

Black was presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal 

procedures, including the procedures for asserting her cross-claim against Little 

Stars. In this appeal, Black is presumed to have knowledge of the law and appellate 
procedure, as set forth in App.R. 12 and 16, regarding her burden of demonstrating 

error on appeal and the requirements for her appellate brief. 

2. App.R. 12 and 16 

Second, we note that Black failed to comply with App.R. 12 and 16. 

Pursuant to App.R. 12(A), this court is instructed to “[d]etermine the 

appeal on its merits on the assignments of error set forth in the briefs under App.R. 

16[.]” (Emphasis added.) App.R. 12(A) further provides that “errors not specifically 

pointed out in the record and separately argued by brief may be disregarded” by the 

reviewing court. N. Coast Cookies v. Sweet Temptations, 16 Ohio App.3d 342, 343, 

476 N.E.2d 388 (8th Dist.1984); Martin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prosecutor, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 102628, 2015-Ohio-4589, ¶ 10. Accordingly, an appellant’s 

assignments of error should designate specific rulings that the appellant is 

challenging on appeal. If the appellant fails to comply with App.R. 12, the appeal 

may be dismissed. 

“The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal by 

reference to the record of the proceedings below.” Davis v. Wesolowski, 2020-Ohio677, 146 N.E.3d 633, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), citing Stancik v. Hersch, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 97501, 2012-Ohio-1955. App.R. 16(A)(3) provides that the appellant’s brief shall 

include “[a] statement of the assignments of error presented for review, with 

reference to the place in the record where each error is reflected.” App.R. 16(A)(4) 

provides that the appellant’s brief shall include “[a] statement of the issues 

presented for review, with references to the assignments of error to which each issue 
relates.” App.R. 16(A)(7) provides that the appellant’s brief shall include “[a]n 

argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each 

assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the 

contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on 

which appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a summary.” 

In the instant matter, Black’s appellate brief fails to include a 

statement of the assignments of error and a statement of the issues presented for 

review, as required by App.R. 16(A)(3) and (4). Although appellant raises several 

arguments throughout her appellate brief, she fails to support several arguments 

with citations to the record on which she relies, as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). 

Black fails to clearly and concisely designate specific rulings she is 

challenging, and she fails to present separate arguments with respect to the trial 

court’s purported errors. Based on Black’s failure to comply with App.R. 12 and 16, 

this court may disregard Black’s arguments. See Bradley v. Bradley, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 109792, 2021-Ohio-2514, ¶ 25; Cleveland v. Taylor, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 109371, 2021-Ohio-584, ¶ 87, citing State v. Wells, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 98388, 2013-Ohio-3722, ¶ 55; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Collins, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109555, 2021-Ohio-508, ¶ 29; State v. Thompson, 2021-Ohio376, 167 N.E.3d 1072, ¶ 91 (8th Dist.); Wiltz v. Cleveland Clinic, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

Nos. 109147 and 109483, 2021-Ohio-62, ¶ 18. 

Rather than dismissing Black’s appeal based on her failure to comply 

with App.R. 12 and 16, we will exercise our discretion to address the merits of Black’s 
arguments. Black appears to challenge the following two rulings: (1) the trial court’s 

May 12, 2020 judgment granting Little Stars’ counsel’s motion to withdraw from 

Black’s representation, and (2) the trial court’s October 6, 2020 judgment granting 

Little Stars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Black’s cross-claim. 

B. Withdrawal of Counsel 

In “Law & Argument 1,” Black appears to argue that Little Stars’ 

attorneys erred by withdrawing from Black’s representation and leaving Black to 

proceed in the litigation pro se. 

The record reflects that the attorneys that were initially representing 

Little Stars, Black, and Brown,3 filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel for 

Black on April 1, 2020. Counsel asserted that withdrawal was necessary because 

Black, acting pro se, filed a cross-claim against Little Stars, creating a conflict of 

interest for counsel. 

The trial court granted counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw on 

May 12, 2020, noting that it was unopposed. Because Black did not oppose or object 

to Little Stars’ counsel’s motion to withdraw, she waived all but plain error. See 

Alcorso v. Correll, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110218, 2021-Ohio-3351, ¶ 32, 44. 

Furthermore, the record reflects that on April 2, 2020, the day after 

Little Stars’ counsel moved to withdraw from Black’s representation, a notice of 

appearance was filed on Black’s behalf by attorneys Richard Williams and Arnold 

3 Jeffrey Kay, Mary Beth Klemencic, and Ryan Bockmuller. 
Finkbine. There is no indication in the record that Williams and Finkbine withdrew 

from Black’s representation. Therefore, we question Black’s assertion that she was 

forced to proceed in the lawsuit pro se. 

Nevertheless, the lawsuit initiated by plaintiffs and the cross-claims 

Black asserted against Little Stars are civil proceedings. It is well established that 

there is no right to counsel in civil proceedings or civil appeals absent statutory 

authority that specifically provides for the right to counsel. See State ex rel. Dixon 

v. Bowerman, 156 Ohio St.3d 317, 2019-Ohio-716, 126 N.E.3d 1086, ¶ 6, citing State 

ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div., 135 Ohio 

St.3d 291, 2013-Ohio-65, 986 N.E.2d 925, ¶ 9. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not commit plain error in granting 

Little Stars’ counsel’s motion to withdraw. Black’s argument pertaining to the trial 

court’s judgment permitting Little Stars’ counsel to withdraw from the 

representation of Black is overruled. 

C. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

Black’s “Law & Argument” 2 and 3 appear to challenge the trial court’s 

judgment granting Little Stars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on Black’s 

cross-claim. 

1. Standard of Review 

A Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings raises only 

questions of law that this court reviews de novo. Cohen v. Bedford Hts., 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 101739, 2015-Ohio-1308, ¶ 7. Courts apply the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 

standard in reviewing Civ.R. 12(C) motions: 

The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for 

judgment on the pleadings is to be considered as if it were a belated 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. State ex rel. Pirman v. Money, 69 Ohio St.3d 591, 592, 1994-

Ohio-208, 635 N.E.2d 26 (1994). Therefore, we will analyze the [Civ.R. 

12(C) motion] under the same principles which we would apply in 

reviewing a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal. 

Black v. Coats, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85067, 2005-Ohio-2460, ¶ 6. 

“In order to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, the court must find beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no 

set of facts warranting relief after it presumes all factual allegations in the complaint 

are true, and construes all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.” Black at ¶ 7, 

citing State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 490, 633 N.E.2d 1128 

(1994). A Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings presents only 

questions of law, and the trial court is restricted solely to the allegations in the 

pleadings in ruling on the motion. Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 166, 297 

N.E.2d 113 (1973). 

Civ.R. 8(A) governed Black’s cross-claim against Little Stars. 

Pursuant to Civ.R. 8(A), a [cross-claim] is only required to contain “(1) 

a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is 

entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which 

the party claims to be entitled.” There is no requirement for a party to 

plead the legal theory of recovery, and it is sufficient for the pleader to 

set forth facts which, if proven, establish their claim for relief. Illinois 

Controls v. Langham, 70 Ohio St.3d 512, 526, 639 N.E.2d 771 [(1994]). 

“‘The rules make clear that a pleader is not bound by any particular 

theory of a claim but the facts of the claim as developed by the proof 
establish the right to relief.’” Id., quoting McCormac, Ohio Civil Rules 

Practice 102, Section 5.01 (2d Ed.1992); see also NZR Retail of Toledo, 

Inc. v. Beck Suppliers, Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1179, 2016-Ohio3205, ¶ 17-18; Donovan v. Omega World Travel, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 68251, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4448, 6 (Oct. 5, 1995). 

Tennant v. Huntington Natl. Bank, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108993, 2020-Ohio4063, ¶ 15. 

In ruling on Little Stars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the 

trial court was restricted to the allegations in Black’s cross-claim and Black was 

entitled to have all the material allegations in her cross-claim, with all reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom, construed in her favor. Tennant at ¶ 16, citing Peterson

at 165-166. Black, as the cross-claim plaintiff, was not required to prove her case at 

the pleading stage. Tennant at id. Rather, “as long as there is a set of facts, 

consistent with [Black’s cross-claim], which would allow [Black] to recover, the 

court may not grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” York v. Ohio State Hwy. 

Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991). A well-pled complaint 

must include, however, factual allegations going to each element of the claim, and 

conclusory statements without any supporting factual allegations are insufficient. 

Hendrickson v. Haven Place, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100816, 2014-Ohio-3726, 

¶ 27. 

Black appeared to assert six cross-claims against Little Stars. 

2. Count I 

In Count I of her cross-claim, Black alleged that the duties of Little 

Stars’ director, Valda Lennon, included hiring new teachers, and that Lennon hired 
Brown, a former parent, to the “toddler one” classroom. Count I of Black’s crossclaim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Accepting the 

factual allegations in Count I as true, and making all reasonable inferences in favor 

of Black, Count I cannot be read to have pled any actionable claims against Little 

Stars, nor does Count I allege a set of facts that, if true, would establish Little Stars’ 

liability. See Chromik v. Kaiser Permanente, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89088, 2007-

Ohio-5856, ¶ 8, citing Walters v. First Natl. Bank of Newark, 69 Ohio St.2d 677, 

433 N.E.2d 608 (1982). 

Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Little Stars’ motion for 

judgment on the pleadings as to Count I. 

3. Count II 

In Count II of her cross-claim, Black alleged that Little Stars knew 

about the allegations filed against Brown and the ensuing county and state 

investigations, but failed to inform other employees about the allegations and 

investigations. Assuming, arguendo, that Black was attempting to assert a 

negligence claim against Little Stars, Count II cannot be read to have pled an 

actionable negligence claim against Little Stars. 

“[I]n order to establish actionable negligence, one seeking recovery 

must show the existence of a duty, the breach of the duty, and injury resulting 

proximately therefrom.” Strother v. Hutchinson, 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 285, 423 

N.E.2d 467 (1981); Salvati v. Anthony-Lee Screen Printing, Inc., 2018-Ohio-2935, 

117 N.E.3d 950, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.), citing Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 
544 N.E.2d 265 (1989). Assuming that (1) Little Stars had a duty to inform 

employees about the allegations levied against Brown and the county and state 

investigations, and (2) Little Stars breached that duty, Count II failed to include any 

factual allegations regarding the element of an injury that was proximately caused 

by Little Stars’ breach. 

Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Little Stars’ motion for 

judgment on the pleadings as to Count II. 

4. Count III 

In Count III of her cross-claim, Black again alleged that Little Stars 

failed to inform employees about the allegations filed against Brown. Black also 

alleged that Little Stars failed to (1) conduct a background check before hiring 

Brown, (2) conduct an internal investigation after learning about the abuse and 

neglect allegations, and (3) failed to review or preserve video footage from the 

classrooms. 

To the extent that Black was attempting to assert a negligence claim 

against Little Stars, Count III cannot be read to have pled an actionable negligence 

claim. Count III failed to include any factual allegations regarding the element of an 

injury that was proximately caused by Little Stars’ breach. 

To the extent that Black was attempting to assert a claim for negligent 

hiring against Little Stars, Count III cannot be read to have pled an actionable 

negligent hiring claim. 
“‘To prove a claim of negligent hiring and retention, a plaintiff must 

show (1) [t]he existence of an employment relationship; (2) the 

employee’s incompetence; (3) the employer’s actual or constructive 

knowledge of such incompetence; (4) the employee’s act or omission 

causing the plaintiff’s injuries; and (5) the employer’s negligence in 

hiring or retaining the employee as the proximate cause of plaintiff's 

injuries.’” 

Evans v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 9th Dist. Summit No. 28340, 2018-Ohio-3031, ¶ 26, 

quoting Jones v. MTD Consumer Group, Inc., 2015-Ohio-1878, 32 N.E.3d 1030, 

¶ 44 (9th Dist.), quoting Zanni v. Stelzer, 174 Ohio App.3d 84, 2007-Ohio-6215, 880 

N.E.2d 967, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). 

Accepting Black’s allegation that Little Stars hired Brown without 

conducting an investigation as true, Count III failed to include any factual 

allegations regarding the elements of Brown’s incompetence at the time she was 

hired, Little Stars’ knowledge of Brown’s incompetence, or injury that was 

proximately caused by Little Stars’ negligence in hiring or retaining Brown. Black 

alleged that Little Stars learned about the allegations levied against Brown after, not 

before, she was hired. 

Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Little Stars’ motion for 

judgment on the pleadings as to Count III. 

5. Count IV 

 In Count IV of her cross-claim, Black again asserted that Little Stars 

failed to provide adequate information to Black about the Brown allegations and 

investigations before Black spoke with investigators. Black also alleged that she had 

an agreement with Little Stars’ owner that was broken. 
As noted above, to the extent that Black was attempting to assert a 

negligence claim based on Little Stars’ failure to disclose information to Black, Count 

IV cannot be read to have pled an actionable negligence claim. Count IV failed to 

include any factual allegations regarding the element of an injury that was 

proximately caused by Little Stars’ purported breach. 

Black alleged in Count IV that “[Black] and [Little Stars’ owner] had 

an agreement. This agreement was not a legal one, but once broken [Black] was 

compelled to combine classes with [Brown].” To the extent that Black was 

attempting to assert a claim for breach of contract against Little Stars, Count IV 

cannot be read to have pled an actionable breach-of-contract claim. 

In order to recover on a claim for breach of contract, Black was 

required to demonstrate (1) the existence of a contract; (2) that Black, as the 

nonbreaching party, performed on the contract; (3) that Little Stars, the purportedly 

breaching party, failed to perform its contractual obligations without legal excuse; 

and (4) Black, the nonbreaching party, suffered damages flowing from the breach. 

Holliday v. Calanni Ents., 2021-Ohio-2266, 175 N.E.3d 663, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing 

Doner v. Snapp, 98 Ohio App.3d 597, 600, 649 N.E.2d 42 (2d Dist.1994). 

Black concedes in her cross-claim that her agreement with Little Stars’ 

owner was not a legal contract or agreement. Nevertheless, assuming, arguendo, 

that the “agreement” between Black and Little Stars’ owner was a contract, and 

accepting Black’s allegations in Count IV as true, Count IV cannot be read to have 

pled an actionable breach-of-contract claim. Aside from her conclusory statement 
that the agreement was broken, Count IV failed to include any factual allegations 

regarding the elements of performance by Black or damages that were proximately 

caused by the purported breach. Finally, Black failed to provide any additional 

details regarding the “agreement” between her and Little Stars’ owner. 

Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Little Stars’ motion for 

judgment on the pleadings as to Count IV. 

6. Count V 

In Count V of her cross-claim, Black alleged that she was mistreated, 

neglected, ridiculed on a daily basis, belittled, and taunted by Little Stars and other 

employees. She alleged that the actions of Little Stars and the other employees 

created “an emotional, hostile work environment.” 

To the extent that Black was attempting to assert a hostile-workenvironment claim under Ohio law (R.C. 4112.02) or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

against Little Stars, Count V cannot be read to have pled an actionable hostile-workenvironment claim. 

Claims asserted pursuant to Title VII and R.C. 4112.02 are subject to 

the same standards. Roberts v. Mike’s Trucking, Ltd., 2014-Ohio-766, 9 N.E.3d 

483, ¶ 58 (12th Dist.). ‘“Ohio courts apply federal case law interpreting Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to claims arising under R.C. Chapter 4112 to the extent 

that the terms of the statutes are consistent.’” Colston v. Cleveland Pub. Library, 

522 Fed.Appx. 332, 336 (6th Cir.2013), quoting Birch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Probate 

Court, 173 Ohio App.3d 696, 2007-Ohio-6189, 880 N.E.2d 132, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). 
A hostile work environment exists whenever “the workplace is 

permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that 

is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 

employment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 

367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 [(1993)]. Conduct that is “merely offensive” but 

“not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or 

abusive work environment” does not violate Title VII. Id. 

(Emphasis added.) Fry v. Wheatland Tube, L.L.C., 2019-Ohio-1453, 135 N.E.3d 

420, ¶ 53 (5th Dist.). 

To establish a claim under R.C. Chapter 4111 for hostile work 

environment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the employee was a member 

of a protected class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome 

harassment; (3) the harassment was based on the employee’s status as 

a member of a protected class; (4) the harassment had the purpose or 

effect of unreasonably interfering with the employee’s work 

performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work 

environment; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. 

Simmons-Means v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Justice Affairs, 8th Dist. 

No. 87303, 2006-Ohio-4123, ¶ 22. A hostile work environment exists 

“[w]hen the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, 

ridicule, and insult,’ * * * that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 

the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive 

working environment.’” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 

114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB 

v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). For 

there to be an actionable claim, a hostile work environment “must be 

both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable 

person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did 

perceive to be so.” Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 

2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), citing Harris at 21-22. Furthermore, “no 

matter how severe or pervasive the conduct, harassment does not 

constitute a discriminatory practice under R.C. 4112.02(A) unless 

based on a prohibited classification.” Hampel v. Food Ingredients 

Specialties, Inc., 89 Ohio St.3d 169, 184-185, 2000-Ohio-128, 729 

N.E.2d 726. 

(Emphasis added.) Nemcek v. N.E. Ohio Regional Sewer Dist., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 98431, 2012-Ohio-5516, ¶ 14. 
In the instant matter, Black failed to allege in Count V that she was a 

member of a protected class or that the harassment she faced from Little Stars and 

its employees was based on her status as a member of a protected class. See Francis 

v. N.E. Ohio Neighborhood Health Servs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110322, 2021-

Ohio-3928, ¶ 21. Accordingly, Count V cannot be read to have pled an actionable 

hostile-work-environment claim. 

The trial court properly granted Little Stars’ motion or judgment on 

the pleadings as to Count V. 

7. Count VI 

In Count VI of her cross-claim, Black alleged that she was terminated 

on October 22, 2019. Black asserted that county investigators found Black to be 

negligent, and Little Stars was instructed by state officials to terminate Black’s 

employment. Black alleged that Little Stars treated her like a “predator.” Finally, 

Black alleged that Little Stars’ director “demanded [Black] have a ‘love[d] one’ drop 

[her] children off,” the director stated that Black “could not be in the facility nor 

around children,” and that the director subsequently removed Black’s children from 

Little Stars’ roster. 

To the extent that Black was attempting to assert a wrongful 

termination claim against Little Stars, Count VI cannot be read to have pled an 

actionable wrongful termination claim. 

“Traditionally, an employer could terminate the employment of any atwill employee for any cause, at any time whatsoever, even if the 

termination was done in gross or reckless disregard of the employee’s 
rights.” Moore v. Impact Community Action, 10th Dist. [Franklin] No. 

12AP-1030, 2013-Ohio-3215, ¶ 7, citing Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio 

St.3d 65, 67, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995). However, Ohio law recognizes a 

public policy exception to the protections otherwise afforded to an 

employer under the employment-at-will doctrine. An at-will employee 

may state a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy by 

alleging facts demonstrating that the employer’s act of discharging him 

contravened a “clear public policy” based on statutes, or other sources 

such as the Ohio and United States Constitutions, administrative rules 

and regulations, and the common law. Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St.3d 

377, 639 N.E.2d 51 (1994), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. 

Hinkle v. L Brands, Inc. World Headquarters, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-80, 

2021-Ohio-4187, ¶ 24. 

In order to assert an actionable claim for wrongful discharge in 

violation of public policy, Black must establish the following elements: 

(1) that there exists a clear public policy that is manifested in a state or 

federal constitution, statute, or administrative regulation, or in the 

common law (the “clarity” element), (2) that dismissal of employees 

under circumstances like those involved in the plaintiff’s dismissal 

would jeopardize that public policy (the “jeopardy” element), (3) that 

the plaintiff’s dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public 

policy (the “causation” element), and (4) that the employer lacked 

overriding legitimate business justification for the dismissal (the 

“overriding justification” element). 

Blackburn v. Am. Dental Ctrs., 2014-Ohio-5329, 22 N.E.3d 1149, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.), 

citing Collins at 69-70. The first two elements are questions of law to be determined 

by the court, and the third and fourth elements are questions for the trier of fact. 

Blackburn at id., citing Collins at 70. 

Here, Black merely alleged in Count VI that she was terminated. She 

did not even allege that the termination was improper or wrongful. Nor did Black 

identify any public policy that applies in this case. We are unable to reasonably infer 
a public policy that applies based on the allegations in Count VI. Count VI did not 

contain any factual allegations that Black’s dismissal jeopardized any public policy. 

Black alleged in Count VI that she was terminated based on (1) the 

determination made by county investigators that Black was negligent, and (2) state 

officials’ recommendation to Little Stars that Black’s employment be terminated. 

Accepting these allegations as true, as we must, we find that Black failed to 

sufficiently allege a claim for wrongful termination in Count VI. 

We cannot find that the remaining allegations in Count VI can be read 

to have pled any actionable claims against Little Stars, or that Count VI alleges a set 

of facts that, if true, would establish Little Stars’ liability. See Chromik, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 89088, 2007-Ohio-5856, at ¶ 8, citing Walters, 69 Ohio St.2d 677, 

433 N.E.2d 608. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Little Stars’ motion 

for judgment on the pleadings as to Count VI. 

8. Additional Claims 

In her brief in opposition to Little Stars’ motion for judgment on the 

pleadings, Black appeared to request an opportunity to assert additional claims 

against Little Stars for “[v]iolation of civil rights, [d]efamation — harassment claim, 

[e]motional [d]istress and [p]unitive [d]amages.” 

Other than her hostile-work-environment claim in Count V, Black’s 

cross-claim cannot be read to have pled any additional claims that Little Stars 

violated her civil rights. Nor can Black’s cross-claim be read to have pled claims 

against Little Stars for defamation, infliction of emotional distress (either 
intentional or negligent), or punitive damages. As noted above, in ruling on Little 

Stars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court was restricted to the 

allegations in Black’s cross-claim. Accordingly, the additional claims that Black 

referenced in her brief in opposition were not sufficient to withstand Little Stars’ 

motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

In her appellate brief, Black appears to argue that the trial court erred 

in granting Little Stars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings because Black 

sufficiently alleged a claim for premises liability negligence. Black appears to argue 

that she was an invitee of Little Stars and that Little Stars breached its duty to inform 

Black about the hazardous situation involving the allegations filed against Brown 

and the county and state investigations into the allegations. Black did not assert a 

premises liability negligence claim against Little Stars in her cross-claim. 

It is well-settled that issues not raised in the trial court may not be 

raised for the first time on appeal. Crenshaw v. Cleveland Law Dept., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108519, 2020-Ohio-921, ¶ 42[,] fn.6, citing 

Shadd v. Cleveland Civ. Serv. Comm., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107603, 

2019-Ohio-1996, ¶ 27 (“Appellants cannot raise an issue for the first 

time on appeal that they did not raise to the trial court.”); Scott Fetzer 

Co. v. Miley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108090, 2019-Ohio-4578, ¶ 41 (“A 

party cannot raise new issues or arguments for the first time on appeal; 

failure to raise an issue before the trial court results in a waiver of that 

issue for appellate purposes.”); Lycan v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

Nos. 107700 and 107737, 2019-Ohio-3510, ¶ 32-33, 142 N.E.3d 210 (“It 

is well-established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal 

are generally barred and a reviewing court will not consider issues that 

the appellant failed to raise in the trial court.”), citing Cawley JV, L.L.C. 

v. Wall St. Recycling L.L.C., 2015-Ohio-1846, 35 N.E.3d 30, ¶ 17 (8th 

Dist.). 
Spy v. Arbor Park Phase One Assoc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108819, 2020-Ohio2944, ¶ 16 

Because Black’s cross-claim cannot be read to have pled an actionable 

premises liability negligence claim, Black cannot raise a premises liability theory for 

the first time on appeal in an attempt to defeat Little Stars’ motion for judgment on 

the pleadings. 

For the same reason, Black cannot raise her assertions, for the first 

time in her appellate brief, that (1) Little Stars’ owner Asma Mujib and manager 

Valda Lennon violated R.C. 2307.60 and committed the offense of failure to report 

a crime (in violation of R.C. 2921.22), and (2) Little Stars is liable for defamation in 

relation to Black’s employment file. Black did not assert a defamation claim against 

Little Stars in her cross-claim, nor allege that Mujib or Lennon violated R.C. 2307.60 

or 2921.22. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we cannot conclude that the trial 

court erred in granting Little Stars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings based on 

the additional claims referenced by Black in her appellate brief and brief in 

opposition to Little Stars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings 

III. Conclusion 

After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. The trial court did not commit plain error in granting Little Stars’ 

counsel’s motion to withdraw from Black’s representation, and Black did not have a 
right to counsel in the civil proceedings below. The trial court did not err in granting 

Little Stars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Black’s cross-claims. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR 
KEYWORDS 

#110602 – Stevens v. Little Stars Early Learning Ctr. 

Motion for judgment on the pleadings; Civ.R. 12; question of law; de novo; crossclaim; pro se litigant; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; motion to withdraw as counsel; plain 

error; right to counsel; negligence; injury; proximate cause; negligent hiring; 

breach of contract; hostile work environment; wrongful termination. 

The trial court did not commit plain error in granting the motion to withdraw from 

appellant’s representation filed by the attorneys for the childcare center. Appellant 

did not have a right to counsel in the civil proceedings in the trial court. The 

assertions and allegations in appellant’s cross-claims cannot be read to have pled 

any actionable claims against the childcare center, or the childcare center’s owner, 

manager, or employees. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the childcare 

center’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.