NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

DENNIS PERRY, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-10150

D.C. No. 3:18-cr-00345-SI-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 13, 2020

San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** District 

Judge.

Defendant Dennis Perry appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress a firearm and ammunition that police discovered in his vehicle. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo whether the facts and 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 21 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

circumstances identified by the district court give rise to reasonable suspicion. See 

United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Upon review, we conclude that, even without considering the Records 

Information Management System (RIMS) designation (discussed below), Deputy 

Constantino had reasonable suspicion to prolong the May 20, 2018 traffic stop to 

investigate the Public Storage Burglary. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 

348, 355-57 (2015). The relevant point in time for this analysis is the moment just 

before Deputy Constantino questioned Perry about the firecracker that had been set 

off at the Public Storage that morning, i.e., after Constantino had completed the 

“routine measures” associated with a traffic stop, id. at 356, but before he began 

investigating the burglary.

“[R]easonable suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific, 

articulable facts which, when considered with objective and reasonable inferences, 

form a basis for particularized suspicion.” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 

F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted). Constantino knew of

ample facts of this kind. The manager of the Public Storage facility had seen Perry 

on the premises earlier in the morning of May 20, which was seemingly around the 

time the burglary was committed.1 The manager also observed Perry “trying to 

1 The burglary must have been committed at some point after 9:00 a.m. on May 19, 

when the property had last been inspected. But Constantino knew both that (1) a 
3 

push down the trunk” of his vehicle, which “appeared jammed” with “black tool 

bags inside.” And Constantino learned from the manager that Perry had in the past 

told her an odd story about a storage locker theft that she could not corroborate.

2

Moreover, when Constantino pulled over Perry’s car, Constantino saw in plain 

view “plastic construction dollies, boxes, [and] tools . . . in the backseat,” as well 

as “several screwdrivers and hand tools on the driver’s floorboard,” which could 

have been the tools the victim had reported stolen. Constantino also learned from a

license and background check that Perry had previously been arrested for property 

crimes. These facts, in combination, gave Deputy Constantino a valid “basis for 

particularized suspicion” that Perry was the Public Storage burglar. Id. at 1129 

(emphasis omitted).

Deputy Constantino was also aware of two facts that suggested otherwise, 

but that were not sufficient to negate reasonable suspicion. First, the manager of 

the Public Storage facility told Constantino that Perry was a paying customer who 

firecracker had been set off at the Public Storage facility on the morning of May 

20, and (2) the victim reported that firecrackers were stolen from his locker. This, 

as the Government posited at oral argument, would have given Deputy Constantino 

some basis to believe that the robbery had occurred on the morning of May 20. 

2 According to Constantino, Perry had told the manager when renting his storage 

unit two weeks earlier that Perry’s locker at another Public Storage location “had 

been broken into and he needed to move.” The manager found this story “odd,” 

however, as she had searched Public Storage’s records and had not found a 

previous rental agreement between the company and Perry. 
4 

rented his own storage locker there, potentially giving Perry an innocent 

explanation for his presence on the morning of May 20. But this is not so 

exculpatory: Perry’s locker was located near the one that was burgled. Moreover, 

Perry had apparently lied to the manager of the facility about why he was renting a 

storage unit there. Second, the Public Storage manager had reported to Constantino 

that a portion of the fence on the north side of the property had been found cut on 

the morning of May 20, suggesting that the burglar might have entered through the 

fence. Perry, in contrast, indisputably drove onto the premises by opening its 

electronic gate. But this is also weak evidence in Perry’s favor, as he may have had 

accomplices who entered through the fence. The manager had seen two other 

people with Perry at the Public Storage that morning, and one other person was in 

the car with Perry when Constantino pulled him over. Considering the “totality of 

the circumstances,” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting 

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)), and examining both the 

incriminating and exculpatory evidence, Deputy Constantino had a reasonable 

suspicion to prolong his traffic stop of Perry in order to investigate the burglary.

Perry’s designation in RIMS as a suspect in a recent, similar burglary of 

another Public Storage facility would have served only to provide further basis for 

Constantino’s reasonable suspicion of Perry. We need not decide whether the 

district court properly considered this evidence as part of the analysis. We note, 
5 

however, that there is a strong argument that it may be so considered, despite the 

fact that Deputy Constantino did not know the basis for the designation, because it 

appears likely that the deputy who made the designation had a reasonable 

justification for doing so. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 233 (1985).

AFFIRMED.