Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General *

Michael B. Mukasey has been substituted for former Attorney General

Alberto R. Gonzales.

Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. **

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 07-1850

JHON FREDY VALLEJO PIEDRAHITA,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, *

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER

OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

 Lynch, Circuit Judge,

Tashima, Senior Circuit Judge, **

and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Desmond P. FitzGerald, on brief for petitioner.

Yamileth G. HandUber, Attorney, M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright,

Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Peter D.

Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S.

Department of Justice, on brief for respondent. 

April 28, 2008
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TASHIMA, Senior Circuit Judge. Petitioner Jhon Fredy

Vallejo Piedrahita, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for

review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying

his application for asylum and withholding of removal. Because

Piedrahita fails to raise relevant issues in his opening brief and

because the BIA’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we

deny the petition.

I.

Piedrahita entered the United States on October 8, 2002

and timely applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) on April 29, 2003. On

December 16, 2004, Piedrahita was served with a Notice to Appear,

charging him with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present without admission or parole.

Piedrahita appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) on November

3, 2005 and conceded removability. 

During an evidentiary hearing on the same day, Piedrahita

testified that he fled Colombia because he feared persecution at

the hands of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”).

He detailed the murders of his uncle, father, step-father, and

mother, and alleged that FARC was behind the murders. He described

going into hiding after his mother’s death and being shot at while

in a FARC-controlled area of the city in which he lived.

Piedrahita further alleged that he and his brothers received
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numerous threatening phone calls and letters from FARC. Piedrahita

produced death certificates and Colombian country reports to

corroborate his testimony. 

In an oral decision and order rendered the same day, the

IJ found Piedrahita’s testimony not credible. First, she noted two

significant omissions from his application. Piedrahita did not

mention FARC in his asylum application or the supporting affidavit.

Also missing was any account of Piedrahita being shot at by FARC

members.

Second, the IJ detailed two inconsistencies between

Piedrahita’s testimony and previous statements in his application

and before an asylum officer. Piedrahita told the asylum officer

that his father was murdered during a robbery but testified before

the IJ that his father was not robbed, but instead murdered by

FARC. Piedrahita’s testimony regarding his mother’s murder was

similarly inconsistent. In his asylum application, Piedrahita

wrote that his mother was killed because she was going to identify

his step-father’s murderers. Before the IJ, however, Piedrahita

testified that his mother was killed by FARC because of her

community involvement. 

Third, the IJ found that Piedrahita’s testimony regarding

the threatening phone calls and letters was too vague. Piedrahita

never described the content of the calls or letters. Moreover, he

could not explain why he did not either produce one of the letters
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or an affidavit from one of his brothers describing the letters.

Finally, the IJ questioned Piedrahita’s account of being shot. She

did not believe that Piedrahita would willingly enter a FARCcontrolled area after FARC had murdered his family.

After making the adverse credibility finding, the IJ

found that Piedrahita failed to establish the requisite fear of

persecution and denied Piedrahita’s application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT. Specifically,

the IJ found that (1) the tragic deaths in Piedrahita’s family were

the “result of criminal lawlessness” and not on account of a

protected ground, and (2) Piedrahita’s allegations of threats and

harm were not sufficiently supported by credible testimony or

corroborative proof.

Piedrahita appealed the denial of asylum and withholding

of removal to the BIA. He did not appeal the denial of relief

under the CAT. The BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s adverse

credibility determination, finding that it was “supported by

several material inconsistencies, vague and implausible testimony,

and omissions which reached to the heart of the respondent’s

claim.” In a per curiam order, the BIA recounted the problematic

portions of Piedrahita’s testimony and held that Piedrahita’s

incredible testimony could not support his claim for asylum and

withholding of removal. The BIA dismissed Piedrahita’s appeal, and

Piedrahita timely petitions this court for review.
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II.

When, as here, “the BIA adopts the IJ’s opinion and

discusses some of the bases for the IJ’s decision, we have

authority to review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions.” Ouk v.

Gonzales, 464 F.3d 108, 110 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Romilus v.

Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004)). We review a BIA denial

of relief from removal in the form of asylum or withholding of

removal under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard. We

uphold the BIA’s decision as long as it is “‘supported by

reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record

considered as a whole.’” Tum v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 159, 161 (1st

Cir. 2007) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481

(1992)). Where the BIA affirms an IJ’s adverse credibility

determination, we will uphold the determination unless the evidence

compels a different result. Id. (citing Chen v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d

110, 113-14 (1st Cir. 2005)).

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the

Attorney General may grant asylum to refugees at his or her

discretion. INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A

refugee is one who flees his or her country and is “unwilling or

unable to avail himself or herself of the protection of[] that

country because of persecution . . . on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion.” INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also
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Ouk, 464 F.3d at 110-11. The applicant bears the burden of proof

to establish that he or she is a refugee. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i),

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).

The BIA denied Piedrahita’s asylum application primarily

on the basis of the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.

Piedrahita’s brief, however, addresses this dispositive issue in an

incoherent and perfunctory manner. It is well settled that “issues

‘adverted to on appeal in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by

some developed argumentation, are deemed to have been abandoned.’”

Tum, 503 F.3d at 160 (quoting Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916

F.2d 731, 734 (1st Cir. 1990)). Because “[j]udges are not expected

to be mindreaders,” United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st

Cir. 1990) (quoting Rivera-Gomez v. Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st

Cir. 1988)), “[i]t is not enough merely to mention a possible

argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do

counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh

on its bones,” id. 

Piedrahita contends that “[t]he Immigration Court

incorrectly arrived at an adverse credibility finding and the Board

should have reversed that determination.” Beyond this general

assertion, Piedrahita completely fails to address the substance of

the BIA’s adverse credibility determination. Piedrahita mentions

only one of the many omissions and inconsistencies cited by the BIA

and the IJ as the basis for the finding. He avers that in his
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application for asylum and supporting affidavit the term

“guerillas” was used as a proxy for FARC. However, even this

single, spare allegation is completely unsupported by the record

because the word “guerilla” appears nowhere in the application or

affidavit.

The IJ and BIA listed many specific problems with

Piedrahita’s testimony in support of their adverse credibility

determinations. Piedrahita challenged these well-reasoned orders

with one patently false factual allegation. Such a challenge does

not rise to the level of developed argumentation. Because “it is

the obligation of one who appeals . . . to address the evidence,”

Mayes v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 37 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1994), we

hold that Piedrahita has abandoned his opposition to the adverse

credibility determination.

An adverse credibility determination, however, does not

always doom an application for asylum. Such a finding is only

fatal if an applicant cannot meet his or her burden of proof

without the incredible testimony. See Melhem v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d

78, 81 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Pan v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 80, 86

(1st Cir. 2007)). The BIA held that the adverse credibility

determination was dispositive in Piedrahita’s case. The evidence

does not compel a different result. Without Piedrahita’s

testimony, the evidence amply supports the IJ’s finding that the

murders and threats to Piedrahita’s family were the result of
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general lawlessness in Colombia and not on account of a protected

ground.

Piedrahita’s claim for withholding of removal fares no

better. Because Piedrahita cannot establish eligibility for

asylum, he necessarily cannot establish eligibility for withholding

of removal, which requires a higher showing of proof. Wang v.

Mukasey, 508 F.3d 80, 85 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Barrio-Barrera v.

Gonzales, 460 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2006)); Makhoul v. Ashcroft,

387 F.3d 75, 82 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[I]f an alien cannot establish

asylum eligibility, his claim for withholding of [removal] fails a

fortiori.”). 

We deny the petition for review.