CLD-192 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 18-1139

___________

EDWIN KOTATEE MERRITT,

Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-17-cv-03293)

District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter

____________________________________

Submitted on a Motion for Summary Action 

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

April 26, 2018

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 11, 2018)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

Edwin Merritt appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed his mandamus petition for lack of 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

jurisdiction. Because no substantial question is presented by this appeal, we will grant 

the Government’s motion to summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See Third 

Circuit LAR 27.4.

Merritt, a citizen of Liberia, was placed in removal proceedings in 2015 based on a 

criminal conviction. Rather than pursue any relief, Merritt, through counsel, executed a 

motion for a Stipulated Removal Order (“SRO”), which included a waiver of a hearing 

and appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b). The Immigration Judge granted that motion on 

September 16, 2015. Over a year and a half later, Merritt appealed to the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed his appeal as untimely on July 21, 

2017. 

In August 2017, Merritt filed the petition for a writ of mandamus at issue here, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Merritt claimed that United States Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) had a clear duty to return him to the United States because 

it had failed to respect an automatic stay of removal that was supposed to be in place 

while his appeal was pending with the BIA, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a).

1

 The 

Government argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the mandamus 

petition, and the District Court agreed. Merritt timely appealed.

 

1 Notably, that regulation states that “the decision in any proceeding under this chapter 

from which an appeal to the Board may be taken shall not be executed during the time 

allowed for the filing of an appeal unless a waiver of the right to appeal is filed, nor shall 

such decision be executed while an appeal is pending or while a case is before the Board 

by way of certification.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a) (emphasis added).
3

We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final order, and we may affirm 

for any reason supported by the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Brightwell v. Lehman, 

637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). We agree with the District Court that the sole means 

of challenging a removal order is through a petition for review, filed with the appropriate 

Court of Appeals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Thus, to the extent Merritt was seeking to 

challenge his removal order, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider his petition. 

Moreover, to the extent Merritt argued that ICE violated the automatic stay, that 

claim “aris[es] from the decision or action by the Attorney General to . . . execute 

removal orders.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Section 1252(g) explicitly provides that 

“notwithstanding . . . [28 U.S.C.] section[] 1361,” “no court shall have jurisdiction to 

hear” a claim “arising from” a decision to execute a removal order. So the District Court 

lacked jurisdiction for that reason, too. Cf. Silva v. United States, 866 F.3d 938, 940 (8th 

Cir. 2017) (pursuant to § 1252(g), district court lacked jurisdiction to consider alien’s 

Federal Tort Claims Act claim that Government violated 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a)’s 

automatic stay by removing him while appeal to BIA was pending). 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.2

 

2 To the extent that Merritt’s response requests time to file a brief, that request is denied.