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FATALITY INVESTIGATION REPORT

INCIDENT HIGHLIGHTS 

DATE: 

January 26, 2016 

TIME: 

4:07 p.m. 

VICTIMS: 

46-year-old male Crewman 

INDUSTRY/NAICS CODE: 

Commercial Fishing/114 

EMPLOYER: 

Commercial Crab Fishing 

SAFETY & TRAINING: 

Safety meetings & training 

were limited at this 

employer 

SCENE: 

Employees were returning 

from retrieving crab gear 

from another vessel that 

sank previously. They lost 

power while crossing the 

bar and waves capsized the 

vessel. The Captain and 1 

crewmember survived. 

EVENT TYPE: 

Saltwater immersion 

drowning 

Crab fishing vessel capsizes and 

one crew member drowns 

REPORT#: 2016-07-1 REPORT DATE: June 2020 

SUMMARY 

On January 26, 2016, a commercial fishing vessel left a harbor on 

Oregon’s coast with three crewmembers to retrieve crab pots left by 

another vessel and crew that had capsized and sank a week prior. 

The vessel’s Captain proceeded out to sea, they collected the 

crabbing gear and returned to port that afternoon. While returning 

across the bar, in rough seas, there was a loud noise and the vessel 

lost power and maneuverability. A series of waves washed over the 

vessel. Upon losing power and steering, the Captain ordered the 

crewmembers to don immersion suits and abandon ship and notified 

the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) by radio. The Captain donned a 

personal flotation device (PFD). The vessel was rolled by a wave onto 

its side throwing the crewmembers overboard. Shortly after, the 

Captain exited through a broken window, then off the bow. The 

USCG arrived approximately 20 minutes after the radio call. The 

Captain and one crewmember were recovered together; the second 

crewmember was found 10 minutes later. The second crewmember 

was face down in the water and unresponsive at that time. 

Resuscitation was attempted during transport, and continued at the 

hospital until he was declared deceased. 

(Full report begins on p.5) 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FATALITY INVESTIGATION REPORT

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: 

• Mechanical failure while crossing the bar resulting in inability to steer and control the vessel.

• Failure to examine internal components after possible damage from prop entanglement with a net.

External components were examined and found to be intact.

• Crossing the bar to retrieve lost crab fishing gear during adverse weather conditions.

• Failure to establish and follow maintenance and inspection intervals on critical components. The vessel

had experienced 4 separate mechanical failures since its purchase, less than 2 years prior.

• Failure to secure the aft cabin door in heavy seas.

• Failure to request USCG escort for crossing the rough bar.

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Oregon Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (OR-FACE) investigators concluded that to help prevent 

similar occurrences, employers should: 

• Confirm major vessel damage is thoroughly inspected and repaired prior to sailing, especially prior to

sailing in rough seas and inclement weather.

• Establish and follow maintenance and inspection intervals for critical components.

• Before deciding to fish and venture to sea, Captains must consider weather conditions and vessel

suitability.

• If the decision is made to cross the bar in rough seas the Captain should request and obtain a USCG escort.

• Secure all potential water infiltration points in rough seas, including doors, windows, and hatch covers.

• Captains should work together to request regional safety training and encourage crewmembers to

participate in available safety training.

(Recommendations section starts on p. 9)
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Oregon Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program 

The Oregon Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (OR-FACE) Program is a project of the Oregon 

Institute of Occupational Health Sciences at Oregon Health & Science University (OHSU). OR-FACE is 

supported by a cooperative agreement with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH) (grant #U60OH008472) through the Occupational Public Health Program (OPHP) of the Public 

Health Division of the Oregon Health Authority. OR–FACE reports are for information, research, or 

occupational injury control only. Safety and health practices may have changed since the investigation 

was conducted and the report was completed. Persons needing regulatory compliance information 

should consult the appropriate regulatory agency. 

OR-FACE supports the prioritization of safety interventions using a hierarchy of safety controls, 

where top priorities are hazard elimination or substitution, followed by engineering controls, 

administrative controls (including training and work practices), and personal protective equipment. 

REPORT#: 2016-07-1 Page 3
 

Google	map	of	the	port	involved in	the	incident.

Photograph	of	a 	similarly-sized	crab

fishing	vessel

REPORT#: 2016-07-1 Page 4
INTRODUCTION 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On January 26, 2016, three crab fishermen (Captain and two crewmembers) were returning from retrieving 

crab pots left the week prior by a vessel that sank after setting them, while crossing the same bar off the coast 

of southern Oregon (see OR-FACE report 2016-06). This 42.3-foot steel hulled vessel experienced mechanical 

problems approximately 1 mile away from the harbor. It was raining and the seas were rough, with reported 6 

to 8-foot swells on the north jetty and 10 to 12-foot swells on the south jetty and winds about 5 mph. As the 

Captain attempted to maneuver back to the bay, he heard a loud noise, and lost propulsion which meant 

maneuverability was also lost. He ordered the crewmembers to don immersion suits and called the US Coast 

Guard (USCG) to request immediate help. The Captain donned a PFD while in the cabin. While waiting for the 

USCG at the entrance to the bay, also known as the bar, several large waves hit the vessel. An estimated 16-

foot-high wave/breaker struck the vessel, rolling it onto its side. The two crewmembers were thrown 

overboard as it rolled. The Captain exited through a broken window, entering the sea from the bow. The 

vessel flooded in part from the open aft cabin door, turned into the waves and quickly sank. The USCG arrived 

20 minutes after the mayday call was received and found and retrieved the Captain and one crewmember. 

The second crewmember was found unresponsive and face down in the water approximately 10 minutes 

later. Resuscitation efforts were started and he was transported to the hospital by boat, then helicopter. At 10 

p.m. he was pronounced dead due to trauma and drowning. 

OR-FACE received the initial notification of the incident from its ongoing surveillance of programmed Google 

alerts. This investigation report is based on review of the US Coast Guard Marine Information for Safety and 

Law Enforcement (MISLE) Incident Investigation Report (2016) and NIOSH commercial fishing safety research 

and recommendations. A phone discussion was also completed 10/30/19 with Mr. Greg Merten, USCG Civilian 

Search And Rescue (SAR) Planner, Columbia River Division. 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) reports of commercial fishing fatalities from 

2000 to 2009 and 2010 to 2014 both concluded that the Oregon Dungeness crab fishing occupation is one of 

the most hazardous nationally (NIOSH, 2010; 2017). This comparison includes deaths that occur in the Alaskan 

commercial fishing industry. Despite efforts to reduce these fatalities, a number of common hazards persist. 

According to the 2010 report, from 2000-2009, “...86 commercial fishing deaths occurred off the West Coast” 

(p. 2). It continued with, “The Dungeness crab fishery experienced the highest number of occupational deaths 

with 27 fatalities...Vessel disasters caused the most deaths among the Dungeness crab fisherman (78%)” (ibid, 

p. 2). Vessel disasters are particularly hazardous, as multiple crews are often at risk of injury or fatality per 

event. According to the 2017 NIOSH report covering 2010 to 2014, “the Dungeness crab fishery experienced 

the highest number of fatalities in the region, with eight crewmember deaths” (p. 3). The report stated, “Poor 

weather was reported to have contributed to five (38%) of the 12 fatal vessel disasters and six (11%) of the 57 

non-fatal disasters” (ibid, p. 4). Drowning due to falls overboard was also listed as a cause of fatalities in both 

NIOSH reports. 

REPORT#: 2016-07-1 Page 5
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INCIDENT BACKGROUND 

Despite the inclement weather and rough seas, the Captain decided to proceed. There was a small craft 

advisory posted from the previous day through 4 pm the following day (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, National Weather Service, 2016). When the Captain decided to return to port, the Captain did 

not request a USCG escort over the rough bar. A USCG escort can improve recovery chances for crewmembers 

if conditions put their vessel at-risk for a capsizing or man overboard event. There is no information about the 

bar conditions for January 27 nor if the Captain had looked at alternative dates for retrieving the crabbing 

gear. 

In the USCG investigative report, the vessel “had a history of four separate marine casualties relating to 

equipment failure dating back to April 2014” when it had been purchased (MISLE Incident Investigation 

Report, 2016). A marine casualty refers to anything that might affect or impair the seaworthiness of the vessel. 

The report also found “the vessel’s owner had not implemented an inspection schedule for tail-shafts, 

rudders, propellers and their components.” Had this been done the failure may have been avoided. 

The vessel had fouled the propeller (tangled on netting) several days earlier. A diver was able to remove the 

debris and assess the external damage. However, the interior coupling bolts were not inspected. Despite 

having gone to sea and returning after the fouling without incident, the USCG attributed the fouling and lack 

of internal inspection as a contributing factor as the parts failed in the heavy seas. 

EMPLOYER 

The Captain was in charge of the two crewmembers; he did not own the vessel. The Captain had operated the 

same vessel at least since 2014 based on public records and been engaged in crab fishing during those years, 

among other related fishing work. The vessel owner gave testimony after the incident that the boat was 

seaworthy and they were not aware of any issues with the vessel that could have contributed to it sinking. 

WRITTEN SAFETY PROGRAMS and TRAINING 

The USCG report did not mention the employers’ policy of practicing monthly safety drills prior to the incident. 

In the employee interview there was no mention of practicing safety drills either. 

WORKER INFORMATION 

The decedent was a 46-year old male and had approximately 1 year of experience in the fishing industry; 

however, employment duration with the Captain was not reported. Similarly, there was no information 

regarding the second crewmember’s experience. He did state in an interview this was not the first close call 

he’d had while crabbing. There was no mention regarding crew agreements in the Coast Guard’s investigation 

report. Such crew agreements are considered a good safety practice, and a sample crew agreement posted by 

researchers at Oregon State University is available (Commercial Fishing Crew Member Agreement, n.d.). 

REPORT#: 2016-07-1 Page 6
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

VESSEL MAINTENANCE 

According to the USCG MISLE report, “The vessel’s owner had not implemented an inspection schedule for 

tail-shafts, rudders, propellers, and their components. Had these maintenance intervals or inspection 

timeframes been in place, potential problems with the component within the vessel’s propulsion system may 

have been found and corrected prior to this casualty” (MISLE Incident Investigation Report, 2016). The report 

also stated that “The drive shaft and transmission on the vessel were misaligned. This put added stress on the 

coupling bolts. This together with the fouling of the propeller several days earlier led to the failure of the bolts 

in heavy weather conditions at the time of the incident” (ibid). They noted the coupling bolts were not 

inspected after the fouling and the fouling likely deformed the bolts. 

INCIDENT SCENE 

The port involved is an active commercial deep-water coastal harbor. The incident occurred as the vessel was 

coming back to the port after collecting crab pots in inclement weather. The United States Coast Guard 

Auxiliary considers vessels less than 65 feet to be “small” (United States Coast Guard Auxiliary, 2009), and a 

Small Craft Advisory that included this area had been issued by the National Weather Service on the day of the 

incident (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 2016). 

The vessel was crossing the “bar” which is where the deeper ocean waters and the shallower river waters 

meet. The change can result in additional significant wave and current effects, especially when the weather is 

severe as it was in this incident. 

The USCG has published specific information for the various bar crossings along the Pacific Northwest (United 

States Coast Guard, 2020). Based on a Jan. 27, 2016 KVAL Eugene news report, “Coast Guard Officer Bryan 

Paplinski says this is one of the roughest winters he's ever seen on the Oregon coast.” 

WEATHER 

Weather was considered to be a critical factor in the incident. The US Coast Guard report stated it was raining 

and the seas were rough, with reported 6 to 8-foot swells on the north jetty, 10 to 12-foot swells on the south 

jetty, and winds about 5 mph. Breakers were 16 feet high when they hit the vessel, rolling it and sinking it 

shortly afterward. 

According to historical weather data (Weather Underground, 2019), the average outdoor temperature on 

January 26 at the port city was 54 degrees Fahrenheit (F) and 0.1 inches of rain fell. Average wind speed was 

reported as 5 mph that day. 

INVESTIGATION 

The USCG investigation reported that the vessel sank in part because the Captain decided to go to sea in 

inclement weather. National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) researchers have identified 

REPORT#: 2016-07-1 Page 7
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

sailing in adverse weather conditions as a significant factor in a number of fatalities. The National Weather 

Service Small Craft Advisory “... means that winds and seas will create a potential hazard to smaller vessels and 

inexperienced mariners” (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 2019). 

The National Weather Service notes “there is no precise definition of a small craft,” but cautions that “Any 

vessel that may be adversely affected by Small Craft Advisory criteria should be considered a small craft. Other 

considerations include the experience of the vessel operator, and the type, overall size, and seaworthiness of 

the vessel” (ibid). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration does separate vessels into different 

classes by length. (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2015). This particular vessel was a class 

III (40 – 65 ft.). 

As stated in the Historical Background section, reviews of Dungeness crab fishing fatalities identify vessel 

disasters as causing the majority of fatalities, often with more than one person killed in a single disastrous 

event. Weather is a recognized contributing factor to vessel disasters, either causing sinkings or knocking 

crewmembers overboard. Having watertight openings such as an aft door open while transiting across the bar 

was another potential contributing factor. With such openings closed, the vessels may stay afloat for a longer 

period of time and create more opportunity for actions leading to survival and/or rescue. 

As stated in the Vessel Maintenance section, the vessel had been damaged when the propeller became 

entangled with a net. That was removed and the exterior inspected however the shaft and bolts holding it 

were not inspected for damage. The complete loss of propulsion left the vessel at the mercy of the winds and 

waves. 

CAUSE OF DEATH 

According to Oregon Vital Records data, the cause of death was determined to be saltwater immersion 

drowning for the recovered crewmember. It was unknown if he became unresponsive prior to or after 

drowning. News reports stated he sustained other injuries as well. 

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a 

larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. OR-FACE investigators identified the 

following factors that may have contributed to this incident: 

• Mechanical failure while crossing the bar resulting in inability to steer and control the vessel. 

• Failure to examine internal components after possible damage from prop entanglement with a net. 

External components were examined and found to be intact. 

• Crossing the bar to retrieve lost crab fishing gear during adverse weather conditions. 

• Failure to establish and follow maintenance and inspection intervals on critical components. The vessel 

had experienced 4 separate mechanical failures since its purchase, less than 2 years prior. 

• Failure to secure the aft cabin door in heavy seas. 

REPORT#: 2016-07-1 Page 8
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Failure to request U.S. Coast Guard escort for crossing the bar. 

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION 

• Recommendation #1: Confirm major vessel damage is thoroughly inspected and repaired prior to sailing, 

especially prior to sailing in rough seas and inclement weather. 

Discussion: If the Captain had inspected the internal components of the propeller after the fouling 

occurred, the weakened bolts might have been discovered and replaced. Alternatively, knowing the seas 

were rough, he may have postponed the trip to avoid crossing the bar in rough conditions. There is no 

information whether any testing efforts were made to confirm, after removing the fouled gear, that 

nothing else had been damaged and everything was operational and fully functional. 

• Recommendation #2: Establish and follow maintenance and inspection intervals for critical components. 

Discussion: If the owner had established and followed maintenance and inspection intervals for critical 

components, the Captain may have been inclined to correct the misaligned drive shaft and transmission 

and ensured a complete inspection after fouling the propeller (Recommendation #1). There had been four 

casualties from equipment failures prior to this, occurring in less than a two-year period. 

• Recommendation #3: Before deciding to fish and venture to sea, Captains must consider weather 

conditions and vessel suitability. 

Discussion: It is not known whether the Captain examined the weather forecast before making his decision 

to retrieve the gear on the particular day in question, or whether he deliberated with his crewmembers 

about his decision. On the day of the incident, the USCG reported the weather as “severe” and there was a 

small craft advisory that applied to the size of the Captain’s vessel and that extended through 4 pm the 

following day (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 2016). 

According to Weather Underground’s history for this port, on the day after the incident there was no rain 

and winds were comparable though gusting with less intensity (Weather Underground, 2020). It may have 

been advisable to wait until better weather returned to the area. 

• Recommendation #4: If the decision is made to cross the bar in rough seas, the Captain should request 

and obtain a Coast Guard escort for both departing and returning crossings. 

Discussion: Having the Coast Guard on scene would improve the chances of recovery in the face of a 

capsizing or other disaster. Even with the radio mayday call, it took 20 minutes before Coast Guard search 

and rescue vessels arrived. With rough seas and harsh weather conditions, finding people floating in the 

sea is very difficult. It may also be so rough that a response is not possible, despite the Coast Guard’s best 

efforts. The presence or absence of an escort could factor into the decision to postpone the crossing until 

better conditions exist. 

• Recommendation #5: Secure all potential water infiltration points in rough seas: doors, windows, hatch 

covers. 

REPORT#: 2016-07-1 Page 9
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Discussion: The aft cabin door was open while crossing the bar while returning. This allowed flooding of 

the vessel when the larger swells washed over the stern. This set the beam to the incoming swells and it 

rolled, contributing to the speed at which the vessel filled with water and sank. While at sea in heavy 

weather, doors, windows, and hatch covers should be closed. 

• Recommendation #6: Captains should work together to request regional safety training and encourage 

crewmembers to participate in available safety training. 

Discussion: Prior to the start of the crabbing season Captains should work together to request regional 

safety training be provided in the local area. In addition to regular drilling, Captains can encourage 

crewmembers to take available safety training. For example, Clatsop Community College in Astoria, 

Oregon offers a range of Marine Safety and drill conductor classes. The College reports willingness to offer 

classes in off campus locations as needed, but it should be acknowledged, there would be a higher level of 

effort for fishermen in other parts of the state to arrange and access such training. Some additional 

commercial fishing safety classes are available through the Alaska Marine Safety Education Association 

(2016), and the Oregon Sea Grant (2020). The US Coast Guard coordinates with both entities to schedule 

and promote the trainings. Expanded training for crewmembers could further strengthen preparedness 

and safety climate on a Captain's vessel (see Oregon State University, 2020 for examples). By working with 

other Captains and vessel owners they can enhance the overall safety awareness and culture of area 

crewmembers. Everyone would benefit by having more qualified crewmembers able to work safely; two 

examples are reduced injuries, and hazards recognized and addressed before significant exposures occur. 

GENERAL DISCUSSION 

The characteristics of the incident described in this report are relatively common in vessel disasters based on 

reviews of prior incident reports (NIOSH 2010; NIOSH 2017). Although there have been some minor reductions 

in fatality rates in recent years, vessels in the Dungeness crab fishing industry continue to go to sea in 

hazardous weather, cross the bars without Coast Guard escorts, and allow employees to work on deck without 

PFDs. 

The mechanical failure that contributed to the sinking was not the only factor, however the USCG voluntary 

inspection program may have helped ensure all components were sea worthy. Had the vessel shaft and rudder 

been inspected inside, after fouling with a net, any weakened or damaged bolts may have been found and 

replaced. The other vessel that sank prior to this one, also had experienced mechanical failure and that played 

a role in the decision to return to port in rough seas, without a USCG escort (see OR-FACE report 2016-06). 

Newer low-profile PFDs are available that will only activate if submerged. To encourage PFD use, Captains 

could supply crewmembers with multiple PFD options and allow crewmembers to choose and wear a 

preferred type. But in all cases, Captains must be the driving force in requiring their use. 

REPORT#: 2016-07-1 Page 10
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Monthly safety drills are required, but are often considered optional for many of the small commercial fishing 

vessels (less than 65 feet), yet they would benefit the most. Per the US Coast Guard requirements, drills must 

be conducted and instruction must be given to each individual on board the vessel at least once each month. 

Contingencies that must be covered in drills include: 

• Abandoning the vessel 

• Fighting a fire in different locations on the vessel 

• Recovering an individual from the water (i.e., man overboard) 

• Minimizing the effects of unintentional flooding 

• Launching survival craft and recovering lifeboats 

• Donning immersion suits and other wearable PFDs 

• Making distress calls and using visual distress signals 

• Activating the general alarm 

• Reporting inoperative alarms, fire detection systems. 

Northwest Dungeness crab fishing has been identified as a high-risk occupation. In 2015 a requirement went 

into effect for commercial fishing vessels that operate beyond 3 nautical miles of the baseline of U.S. 

territorial sea, and/or have more than 16 individuals on board (or are a fish tender vessel in the Aleutian 

trade; United States Coast Guard, 2014). Specifically, a current (unexpired) safety decal or a dockside safety 

examination was required by October 15, 2015. At each examination, vessels will be issued a safety decal that 

is valid for 2 years, and another dockside safety examination is required at least once every 5 years. Given the 

hazardous nature of the industry, it would be recommended best practice for commercial fishing vessels to 

obtain and keep current a valid safety decal every two years, even if not mandated to do so. It would also be 

best practice to stay in compliance with the mandatory dockside safety examination every 5 years. 

There have been some voluntary pre-season safety examinations conducted by the Coast Guard in the 

industry. These could continue on an annual basis to promote safety and create ongoing educational 

opportunities. Captains and vessel owners should work together to request regional safety training in the local 

area. Education on safety and vessel stability could be part of these examinations. Other areas of emphasis in 

examinations, or educational outreach, that should be completed by everyone prior to going to sea include: 

• Preventive vessel maintenance 

• Weather forecasts and decision making 

• Specific bar crossing hazards and procedures 

• Water tight integrity training 

• Regular training in the deployment and use of life boats 

Education and outreach efforts could address the above factors, as well as the importance of ensuring 

monthly training in the use of immersion suits and PFDs. In the Northeastern region of the US, outreach 

efforts to lobstermen have included the deployment of “lifejacket vans” to make it easier for fishermen to 

access, try on, and afford PFDs (Northeast Center for Occupational Health and Safety 2019). Similar efforts, 

REPORT#: 2016-07-1 Page 11
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

tailored to regional needs of particular fishing fleets, would be a promising avenue to pursue. The option for 

requesting Coast Guard escorts both in and out of the bar should be widely publicized. 

DISCLAIMER 

Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by the National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) or OR-FACE. In addition, citations to websites external to NIOSH or 

OR-FACE do not constitute endorsement of the sponsoring organizations or their programs or products. 

Furthermore, neither NIOSH nor OR-FACE is responsible for the content of these websites. All web addresses 

referenced in this document were accessible as of the publication date. 

REFERENCES 

1. Weather Underground. (2019). The Weather Underground Family of Sites. Retrieved Oct. 1, 2019, 

from https://www.wunderground.com/history/ 

2. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (July, 2019). Commercial Fishing Safety – 

West Coast. CDC.gov. Retrieved 

from https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/fishing/westcoastregion.html#anchor_1561411663 

3. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (July, 2017). Commercial Fishing Fatality 

Summary West Coast Region. CDC.gov. Retrieved from: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2017-

172/pdf/2017-172.pdf?id=10.26616/NIOSHPUB2017172 

4. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (July, 2010). Commercial Fishing Deaths – United States, 

2000-2009. CDC.gov. Retrieved 

from https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5927a2.htm?s_cid=mm5927a2_w 

5. The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA). (October, 2008). Commercial Fishing 

Fatalities – California, Oregon, and Washington, 2000-2006. Jamanetwork.com 

Retrieved https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/182662?resultClick=1 

6. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (November, 2010). Fatal Occupational 

Injuries in the U.S. Commercial Fishing Industry: Risk Factors and Recommendations West Coast 

Region. CDC.gov. Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2011-104/ 

7. Coast Guard Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE Incident Investigation Report) 

(November, 2016) Commercial Fishing Vessel (O.N. 550572) Investigating Officer’s Report. U.S. Coast 

Guard Marine Safety Unit Portland. 

8. United States Coast Guard Auxiliary (February, 2009). SC – Small Craft Facility Training Guide. 

USCGAAN.com. Retrieved from: http://www.uscgaan.com/cd/SCF/NS-SC02-

Small%20Craft%20Facility%20Program%20Training%20Guide%20(02-08-09).pdf 

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9. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service (October, 2019). Marine 

Forecasts: Coastal Warning Display Signals. NWS.NOAA.gov. Retrieved from: 

https://www.weather.gov/marine/cwd 

10. Oregon State University (n.d.). Commercial Fishing Crew Member Agreement. OregonState.Edu. 

Retrieved from: 

https://health.oregonstate.edu/sites/health.oregonstate.edu/files/labs/kincl/pdf/sample_crew_agreement_fina 

l.pdf 

11. Alaska Marine Safety Education Association (2016). Marine Safety Training for Commercial Fishermen. 

AMSEA.org. Retrieved from: https://www.amsea.org/commercial-fishermen 

12. Oregon State University, Oregon Sea Grant (2020). FFAST: Fishermen First Aid & Safety Training. 

Seagrant.Oregonstate.edu. Retrieved from: https://seagrant.oregonstate.edu/ffast-fishermen-first-aidsafety-training 

13. United States Coast Guard (January, 2020). Marine Safety Information Bulletin, number 01-20: Crossing 

Hazardous Bars in the Pacific Northwest. FishSafeWest.info. Retrieved from: 

http://www.fishsafewest.info/PDFs/MSIB_Hazardous_Bars_Final.pdf 

14. United States Coast Guard (December, 2014). Marine Safety Information Bulletin, number 18-14: 

Implementation of New Requirements for Commercial Fishing Vessels. FishSafeWest.info. Retrieved 

from: http://www.fishsafewest.info/PDFs/MSIB_CFVSReq.pdf 

15. Oregon State University (2020). FLIPP Resources for Commercial Fishermen. Health.OregonState.Edu. 

Retrieved from: https://health.oregonstate.edu/labs/osh/resources/flipp 

16. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2015). Length of Vessel by Class. Omao.noaa.gov. 

Retrieved from: https://www.omao.noaa.gov/learn/small-boat-program/resources/length-vessel-class 

17. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service (2020). Weather 

Prediction Center Surface Analysis Archive. Wpc.ncep.noaa.gov. Retrieved from: 

https://www.wpc.ncep.noaa.gov/archives/web_pages/sfc/sfc_archive_maps.php?arcdate=01/19/2016 

&selmap=2016011912&maptype=namussfc 

18. Northeast Center for Occupational Health and Safety (2019). Researchers Launch New Van to Make 

Lifejackets Affordable for Lobstermen. Necenter.org. Retrieved from: 

https://www.necenter.org/pressroom/fishing-research/ 

19. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service (2016). Watches, 

Warnings & Advisories, Small Craft Advisory. Forecast.weather.gov. Retrieved from: 

https://web.archive.org/web/20160126030217/http:/forecast.weather.gov/wwamap/wwatxtget.php? 

cwa=usa&wwa=Small%20Craft%20Advisory 

INVESTIGATOR INFORMATION 

Steve Eversmeyer, CIH, CSP, Contract Fatality Investigator/Outreach Specialist, OR-FACE Program conducted 

this investigation. The report was reviewed and received input from Ryan Olson, PhD, Director, OR-FACE 

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Program, the OR-FACE Publications Review Panel, and personnel from the National NIOSH FACE program and 

NIOSH Western States Division. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 

The Oregon FACE Program would like to acknowledge the CDC/NIOSH Western States Division for assisting 

with communications with the U.S. Coast Guard, providing suggestions and comments, and background 

information. We also acknowledge the U.S. Coast Guard for their investigative efforts and reports, and 

providing assistance and information during this investigation (investigation reports) and a phone interview. 

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