IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 13, 2022

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TERRY JAMES LEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County

No. I-CR-180523 Joseph Woodruff, Judge

No. M2021-01084-CCA-R3-CD

Aggrieved of his Williamson County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated 

kidnapping, simple possession, violating the financial responsibility law, speeding, and the

improper use of a vehicle registration, the defendant, Terry James Lee, appeals. In this 

appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the admission 

of evidence of certain uncharged conduct, and the admission of certain of his pretrial 

statements to the police. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L.

HOLLOWAY, JR., and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Jonathan E. Richardson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Terry James Lee.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Katharine E. Decker, Assistant 

Attorney General; Kim R. Helper, District Attorney General; and Jessica N. Borne,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Williamson County Grand Jury charged the defendant, Terry James Lee, 

with aggravated kidnapping, domestic assault, simple possession, driving after having been 

declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, violating the financial responsibility law, 

speeding, and improper use of vehicle registration related to events that occurred on April 

30 and May 1, 2018.

11/10/2022
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At the defendant’s October 2020 trial, the victim1testified that she began a 

romantic relationship with the defendant after the two met on a “chat line” in 2017. The 

two met in person in November 2017 when the defendant visited her at her home in 

Quitman, Georgia. The victim ended the relationship in late March or early April 2018.

On the morning of April 30, 2018, Leroy Waters came to pick the victim up 

at the residence she shared with her daughter in Quitman. The victim, who did not drive, 

cleaned houses for a living, and one of her clients was Mr. Waters’ mother, Joann. Mr. 

Waters stopped for gas and cigarettes, and the victim went inside the convenience store to 

purchase lottery tickets. Inside, the defendant approached the victim and asked if the two 

could talk. The victim “told him I didn’t have nothing to talk about,” but the defendant 

“kept talking about he wanted to talk to me, could he talk to me when I get down to Joann’s. 

So I told him I don’t know. I said, I’ll see.” The victim then left the store, and the defendant 

followed behind. Before the victim could reach Mr. Waters’ car, the defendant “grabbed 

me from behind and was holding my face to keep me from screaming and hollering.” The 

defendant forced the victim into the back seat of his waiting car, and she was unable to 

escape because “he had the safety lock on.” Surveillance video exhibited to her testimony 

and played for the jury showed the defendant forcing her into the car and her fighting 

against him.

The defendant drove away from the store and immediately demanded that 

the victim surrender her cellular telephone. Initially, he told her that he would drive her 

“to Ms. Joann’s, but he didn’t.” The defendant continued onto Interstate 75 in Valdosta 

and told the victim that he had “paid Leroy $250 to bring you up, so I could get you to ride 

with me to Tennessee” so the defendant could “pay on the car and put it in my name” 

despite that the victim did not drive and had never held a driver’s license. The defendant 

stopped for gas after approximately two hours but warned the victim that he would kill her

if she attempted to escape. He did not allow her to go inside to use the restroom and instead 

made her urinate “on the side of the road.”

Eventually, the defendant drove them to a hotel, but they did not stay long 

because “some people came out with him and stuff, and he said, we gotta go because 

they’re going to call the law.” The victim said that she did not attempt to report the 

kidnapping to “the people” because she “was scared what he might do to me.” When the 

pair shopped at a nearby Walmart, the defendant stayed near the victim the entire time. He 

did allow her to answer a telephone call from her daughter, whom she told she was “out of 

town,” that she was with the defendant, and that the trip “was not my choice.” She was 

afraid to say more.

 

1 To protect the anonymity of the victim, who was also sexually assaulted during the ordeal, we will 

not use her name in this opinion.
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Later, they checked into another hotel, and the defendant “started questioning 

me about who I been with and all that. Then he punched me in my face.” The defendant 

forced the victim to disrobe and then raped her. Afterwards, he drove the victim to various 

stores to purchase shoes, clothing, food, and medical supplies to treat the injury to her face. 

When they returned to the hotel, the defendant raped the victim a second time and placed 

her cellular telephone on the nightstand near his head to keep it from her.

On the following morning, the defendant drove to a roadside car dealership 

in Jackson, Tennessee, where “he paid the man some money for” a Pontiac and “told him 

he wanted to put it in my name.” The defendant demanded that the victim sign paperwork 

prepared by the man at the car dealership. The defendant then drove “to some of his 

people’s house” and then to the defendant’s uncle’s house to “get some dope and some . . 

. weed.”2 At each stop, the victim remained in the car, and the defendant stayed close by. 

The victim acknowledged smoking some of the marijuana while the defendant smoked 

some of the cocaine. She placed the remainder of the marijuana in the car’s console. 

Thereafter, they drove to the defendant’s mother’s house, and the victim reported to the 

defendant’s mother “that Terry Lee was being mean to me.” The defendant’s mother 

chastised him, and they left. The defendant returned the victim’s cellular telephone and 

promised to drive her home.

As they drove, the victim began to doze and was nearly asleep when the 

defendant alerted her to the presence of a police car behind them. The victim told the 

defendant that she was “going to tell the police what you done did.” At her first 

opportunity, “I said that he had kidnapped me.” After police officers found marijuana in 

her purse, she was placed under arrest. At the jail, the victim told detectives all that had 

happened from the time that the defendant forced her into his car in Quitman. At the 

conclusion of the interview, officers transported the victim to the hospital where “[t]hey 

did a rape kit on me” and took photographs of the bruises and scratches on her face, arms, 

and legs.

During cross-examination, the victim acknowledged that she interacted with 

other people when she and the defendant shopped for clothing, shoes, food, and other 

necessities. She admitted that the defendant paid for all the items. She also acknowledged 

that she was with the defendant when he procured a new license plate for the Pontiac. 

During redirect examination, the victim said that she did not travel to any location with the 

defendant of her own volition.

 

2 The victim explained that “dope” was crack cocaine and that “weed” was marijuana.
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Williamson County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”) Deputy Brian Welch was 

driving on eastbound Interstate 840 in Williamson County in his unmarked patrol car at 

approximately 5:00 p.m. on May 1, 2018, when he observed a black Pontiac G6

approaching from the rear “at a very high rate of speed.” Deputy Welch, whose vehicle 

was not equipped with radar, began “pacing” the vehicle to determine its rate of speed. He 

paced the car for a total of six miles, during which time the vehicle reached a speed of 105 

miles per hour and continued at that pace “for a length of distance.” During that time, 

Deputy Welch learned that the license plate affixed to the black Pontiac actually belonged 

to a green Mercury Grand Marquis. Deputy Welch stopped the vehicle and approached the 

driver, who identified himself as Terry Lee. The defendant gave the officer “a Tennessee 

ID” but not a driver’s license and told him “that he was trying to attempt to get to the 

hospital for his passenger because she was having stomach pains.” Deputy Welch offered 

to call for an ambulance, but the victim, who was seated in the passenger seat, demurred.

Deputy Welch ran the identification provided by the defendant and learned 

that the defendant’s driver’s license had been revoked and that he had been declared a 

motor vehicle habitual offender. Deputy Welch placed the defendant under arrest and 

placed him in the rear of the patrol car. Around the same time, other officers arrived on 

the scene and interviewed the victim, who reported that the defendant had kidnapped her 

in Quitman, Georgia. Deputy Welch telephoned the Quitman Police Department, and, 

while he was on the telephone, the defendant knocked on the window of the deputy’s 

vehicle. Deputy Welch “went back there to check on him,” and the defendant told him that 

the victim “had marijuana on her” and that “if she told you I kidnapped her . . . , she was 

an F’ing liar.” At that point, deputies searched the vehicle and discovered “three small 

bags of marijuana” inside “a little coin purse” in the victim’s purse. Deputy Welch elected 

to transport both the defendant and the victim to the police station. While placing the 

victim into custody, Deputy Welch observed “two to three scratches that were about three 

to four inches long” under the victim’s left eye.

On the following morning, a detective with the Quitman Police Department 

telephoned Deputy Welch to report that “they had watched videos and saw what 

happened.” Deputy Welch then referred the case to the criminal investigation division.

WCSO Detective Darren Barnes interviewed the victim following her arrest 

and observed injuries to her person. After speaking with the victim, he and his partner 

interviewed the defendant, who told them that the victim had voluntarily traveled with him 

to Tennessee “to put a car in her name or register a car in her name that he had purchased.” 

Detective Barnes watched the surveillance video from the store in Quitman and listened to 

a telephone call the defendant had placed from the Williamson County Jail. In the call, the 

defendant told “Mr. Waters to stick with their story, that the victim . . . couldn’t afford to 

come back to Tennessee. So I think it was his opinion that the charges would, ultimately, 
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just be dismissed.” The defendant also told Mr. Waters that he had “dope” in the Pontiac 

that the police had failed to discover during their initial search.

Detective Barnes interviewed the defendant a second time after listening to 

and viewing the recordings. Following that interview, the detective assisted in a search of 

the defendant’s car, during which search officers discovered a bag of what officers believed 

to be crack cocaine “in a cup that was in a cup holder in the center of the vehicle.” The 

substance was sent to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) for testing. Officers 

also discovered first aid supplies, including alcohol, peroxide, and Neosporin; a temporary 

tag for the Pontiac that had expired on December 3, 2017; and a number of shopping bags 

and receipts reflecting the various purchases described by the victim.

Detective Barnes also listened to a second telephone call placed by the 

defendant to Mr. Waters following the second interview. The audio recording of that call 

was exhibited to his testimony and played for the jury. Additionally, Detective Barnes 

obtained the medical records from the victim’s visit to the emergency room on May 1, 

2018. The records, which were exhibited to his testimony, established that the victim’s 

blood tested positive for the presence of marijuana and negative for the presence of cocaine. 

The records also indicated that a rape kit had been performed on the victim.

WCSO Investigator John Pierce participated in the search of the defendant’s 

vehicle and provided the defendant with a copy of the search warrant return, which 

included an inventory of all the items collected. After receiving the document, the 

defendant asked to speak to Sergeant Amy Cole. Investigator Pierce joined Sergeant Cole 

in interviewing the defendant, and a recording of the interview was exhibited to his 

testimony and played for the jury.

TBI Special Agent and Forensic Scientist Rebecca Hernandez testified as an 

expert in forensic chemistry that the substance she received from the WCSO and marked 

with the defendant’s case number was “[c]ocaine base in the amount of 8.02 grams.”

TBI Special Agent and Forensic Scientist Heather Lenzy testified as an 

expert in forensic biology that she subjected the cervical swabs taken from the victim to 

forensic testing. Her testing “confirmed the presence of sperm” on the victim’s cervical 

swab, and DNA testing established that the defendant was the “major contributor.” She 

said that the amount of sperm on the cervical swab suggested that the defendant had had 

sex with the victim sometime between 72 hours and one week before the swab was taken.

The defendant testified that in April 2018, he and the victim “was supposed 

to been going together” although the victim “was telling other people that we wasn’t.” 

According to the defendant, the couple had to be discreet because the victim was still 
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married when they began dating. The defendant claimed that he supported the victim. He 

said that at the time, he and the victim lived with the victim’s uncle and that he paid the 

victim’s uncle “$200 for the rent. . . . $100 for her and $100 for me. So even if she wasn’t 

there, I was still paying the $200.” He claimed that he and the victim had previously 

discussed traveling to Tennessee to “put the car up into her name and her meet my mother.”

The defendant claimed that he intended to give the car to the victim “to help her” because 

“she didn’t have nothing” and “[w]as on drugs bad and prostituting, and all that there.”

The defendant testified that on April 30, 2018, he enlisted Mr. Waters to 

arrange his meeting with the victim “[a]t the store” so that they could begin their trip to 

Tennessee. He claimed that he could not meet the victim at her home because the victim’s 

daughter believed that the defendant “had called in to the DHS office” and “told them about 

that supposedly that [the victim] was supposed to been playing with her son’s middle 

section in the bathtub.” The defendant said that when he first encountered the victim at the 

store, she confronted him about “this girl that you supposed to gave $200 to let her show 

you her middle section.” The two continued “conversing” as they walked into the parking 

lot and he “pushed her towards my car. You know, went around to my back door opened 

it.” He insisted that the victim wanted “to get in front” but that he told her to get into the 

back seat because “we had all this stuff in the front seat.” The defendant claimed that “the 

commotion started” when “I snatched her money from her” because he wanted to know 

what she had done “with the $500, the rest of the money, the $500 I gave her?”

The defendant testified that after leaving the store, he and the victim traveled 

to the victim’s uncle’s house to “get some clothes,” adding that the clothing “should still 

be in the back of the trunk of the car right now. They ain’t moved them, like that there. 

She got a lot of them, more belongings in the car.” From there, they traveled to Valdosta 

and then onto the interstate towards Tennessee. They stopped for gas, food, and other 

things along the way, with the victim returning each time to the car voluntarily. The 

defendant said that they stopped at a hotel in Atlanta but had to leave after he got into an 

argument with “the albino” working at the front desk over the cost of the room. From 

there, they went to Hardee’s and then to a convenience store in Chattanooga where the 

victim purchased “another beer and some lottery tickets” and a hat that said “Happy 

Mother’s Day.” Later, they checked into a motel where the defendant read and then went 

to sleep while the victim stayed up “messing with the TV,” “drinking[,] and smoking 

weed.” During the evening, the victim spoke with her daughter on the telephone and told 

her that she would not be returning that evening because “it’s time for me to have my fun 

and do what I need to do for myself sometimes.”

On the following morning, the victim “dyed my hair for me” “because, she 

said, I don’t like the way it looked with all that gray hair.” After they got showered and 

dressed for the day, the defendant and the victim drove to the car lot in Trenton, Tennessee. 
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The defendant and the victim went inside the dealership to sign the papers transferring the 

title of the Pontiac to the victim. They then traveled to the defendant’s mother’s house, 

where the victim jumped out of the still moving car, so excited was she to meet the 

defendant’s mother. She hugged the defendant’s mother and wanted to stay for dinner, but 

the defendant told her that they had to leave to make it to the courthouse in time to register 

the car. At the courthouse, the victim signed the necessary paperwork, the defendant paid 

the clerk, and the clerk gave the license plate to the victim.

After leaving the courthouse, the defendant and the victim traveled to visit 

first the defendant’s friend, then the defendant’s nephew who “got shot 12 times, you know, 

with a nine-millimeter, he’s paralyzed,” and then to the defendant’s uncle’s house. There, 

the victim purchased four bags of marijuana for $40 with money given to her by the 

defendant. The defendant testified that he then told the victim that they “need[ed] to be 

heading out” so that she could “be back tomorrow” and “I ain’t going to be doing no 

speeding.” The defendant said that he had to return to Quitman “because I had to be in 

court in Quitman on that Thursday.”

The defendant said that he first observed Deputy Welch “right there at 840” 

and that “we trailed behind him until we got all the way into Dickson,” where the defendant 

began to pass the deputy, who “was driving slow,” “running . . . about 55 or 60, just like 

that” in “a 70-mile-an-hour zone.” At that point, Deputy Welch sped up, so the defendant 

“got back in behind him, and then he slowed down again. So when I pulled out the second 

time, you know, he speeded up again. You know, so, I got down hard on mine, so he got 

down hard on his.” The defendant “passed him and got in front of him,” and “that’s when 

I noticed it was a police.” The defendant insisted that Deputy Welch “lied on this paper 

saying I was running 105 miles an hour,” insisting that the car “is governed down” and 

explaining that “[y]ou get up to 75, it ain’t going to go no more. It would be like it was 

trying to flood out.” The defendant said that a mechanic had previously explained that the 

car was equipped with a governor.

The defendant testified that he admitted to Deputy Welch that his driver’s 

license had been suspended and that he “gave him my social security card,” which was also 

“my Tennessee ID.” He said that while the deputy was checking his identification, the 

victim busied herself by hiding the marijuana inside her “coin purse.” The defendant stated 

that the deputy ordered him out of the car and placed him in handcuffs but specifically told 

him that he was not under arrest. He insisted that the victim “made up this story after they 

found the weed, that she was kidnapped.” The defendant denied knocking on the window 

to get the deputy’s attention, saying that he could not reach the window because his hands 

were handcuffed behind his back.
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During cross-examination, the defendant denied telling Detective Barnes that 

he knew that the victim did not want to be with him, despite that the recording of his 

interview with Detective Barnes included that proclamation. He also denied that the victim 

was in the process of seeking a restraining order against him in Quitman, Georgia, and that 

he had been charged with domestic assault in Quitman. He admitted that he had been 

charged with simple assault involving the victim and her son. The defendant said that at 

the time of the assault, during which he had been armed with a knife, he was living with 

the victim’s uncle but that she had moved out “to get to go do them drugs.” He added, 

“And she know I ain’t going to let it happen.” He then admitted that he had purchased 

marijuana for the victim when they were in Trenton because “she wanted to enjoy herself” 

so “I went on and done that for her. Yeah, of course I did.” The defendant testified that 

the victim also smoked crack cocaine and admitted that he “smoked some, too.”

When asked whether the victim “got in that vehicle on her own[,]” the 

defendant replied, “You know, in some ways it was on her own. But when the discussion 

came of me pushing her back, is when she was trying to get that money when she bit my 

hand . . . . that’s how them scratches got there on her face.” He denied forcing the victim 

into his car but admitted that “the video showed that I was back there scuffling with her in 

the car.” The defendant acknowledged that he told Mr. Waters “to stick to the story, 

because I know he’s slow, and you know people get convincing him, he -- he’ll say 

something else. But that was the truth.” He conceded that he “paid Leroy the money, yeah, 

to pick her up.”

The defendant denied telling the detective that he knew that the victim was 

scared of him but admitted that he overheard the victim tell his mother that he had been 

mean to her, explaining that “what she meant by that” was the defendant’s refusal to allow 

the victim to “smoke dope” and his insistence that she “get up and go outside.” The 

defendant acknowledged that he told the detective that he had not had sex with the victim 

for “a month or two” and insisted Special Agent Lenzy was not “truthful” when she 

testified that her testing established that the defendant and the victim had had sex much 

more recently than “a month or two.” The defendant denied ever striking the victim. He 

maintained that “Deputy Welch, he lied too many times to these questions” to be believed.

Mary Ann Blakely, the defendant’s mother, testified that the defendant and 

the victim visited her Trenton, Tennessee home on May 1, 2018, “pretty close to the noon 

day.” Ms. Blakely said that the victim “didn’t act like nobody that had been kidnapped. 

She was laughing and going on just like a woman would.” Ms. Blakely insisted that she 

“wouldn’t take up for” the defendant and “wouldn’t sit up here and lie for him . . . if he 

was in the wrong.”
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During cross-examination, Ms. Blakely insisted that the victim “ain’t told me 

nothing about he’d been no mean. She’s told me nothing about he had been mean to her.” 

Ms. Blakely also testified that the victim had no visible injuries the day that she visited Ms. 

Blakely.

Raymond Spinks, Jr., the defendant’s cousin, testified that he spoke with the 

defendant by telephone on either April 30 or May 1, 2018, and that the defendant “told me, 

that him and [the victim] was headed to my auntie’s house” and that he was going to repay 

Mr. Spinks the money that Mr. Spinks had lent the defendant for repairs to his car. Mr. 

Spinks said that the defendant referred to the car as “him and [the victim’s] car.” Mr. 

Spinks understood the defendant and the victim to be involved in a romantic relationship 

at that time.

Based upon this evidence, the jury convicted the defendant as charged of 

aggravated kidnapping, simple possession, speeding, violating the financial responsibility 

law, and the improper use of a vehicle registration.3 Following a sentencing hearing, the 

trial court imposed a Range II total effective sentence of 20 years’ incarceration. The 

defendant filed a timely but unsuccessful motion for new trial and a timely notice of appeal.

In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court lacked territorial 

jurisdiction over the kidnapping of the victim because all the elements of the offense 

occurred outside Williamson County, that the trial court committed plain error by 

permitting the introduction “of non-charged rape evidence” that occurred “outside of the 

county” in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412, and that the trial court should 

have suppressed his pretrial statement to the police.

I. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Sufficiency

The defendant’s claim is, to put it mildly, convoluted, drifting into issues of 

probable cause for the traffic stop,4the voluntariness of the defendant’s statement to 

Deputy Welch during the traffic stop,5and the application of “the rules of frolic and 

detour.”

6

 He asserts that “the main criminal activity” involved both began and ended in 

 

3 The State dismissed the charge of driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual 

offender.

4 The defendant’s traveling more than 30 miles per hour in excess of the speed limit provided Deputy 

Welch with probable cause to stop the vehicle and the defendant’s lack of a valid driver’s license provided 

probable cause for his arrest. See T.C.A. § 55-8-152(c).

5 The defendant does not mount a true challenge here to the admissibility of his statement, which, as 

the trial court astutely concluded, was a spontaneous utterance and not the product of custodial 

interrogation.

6 Obviously, “the rules of frolic and detour” have no application in this case. The concepts of “frolic” 
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Quitman, Georgia and that, although it is well-settled that kidnapping is a continuing 

offense, “none of the elements of [a]ggravated [k]idnapping were present at the time of the 

alleged traffic stop in Williamson County.” The defendant also challenges the sufficiency 

of the convicting evidence by suggesting that at the time of the stop, the victim “had her 

full liberty,” noting specifically “the consensual and free ride the couple took during the 

shopping spree, drinking, drug use, sex, and trip back to Georgia.” Thus, he asserts, the 

offense had ended before they entered the court’s jurisdiction.

“It is elementary that before a court may exercise judicial power to hear and 

determine a criminal prosecution, that court must possess three types of jurisdiction: 

jurisdiction over the defendant, jurisdiction over the alleged crime, and territorial 

jurisdiction.” State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tenn. 1999). “[T]erritorial jurisdiction, 

which recognizes the power of a state to punish criminal conduct occurring within its 

borders, is embodied in the constitutional right to a trial ‘by an impartial jury of the county 

in which the crime shall have been committed[]’” and “reflects that ‘[a] state’s criminal 

law is of no force and effect beyond its territorial limits.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

Territorial jurisdiction will lie in this state “when an offense is continuing in nature and has 

continued into Tennessee from another state . . . so long as any essential element to the 

offense continues to be present in Tennessee.” Id. at 116. Whether the State has 

established territorial jurisdiction is a question of fact to be determined by the jury beyond 

a reasonable doubt. See State v. Beall, 729 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).

Venue—not to be confused with territorial jurisdiction—refers to the fact 

that offenses generally must be tried in the county where the offenses were committed. See

Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 9 (stating that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right 

to . . . a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the County in which the crime shall 

have been committed”); see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 18(a) (“Except as otherwise provided 

by statute or by these rules, offenses shall be prosecuted in the county where the offense 

was committed.”). “Proof of venue is necessary to establish the jurisdiction of the court, 

but it is not an element of any offense and need only be proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” State v. Hutcherson, 790 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn. 1990); see also T.C.A. § 39-

11-201(e) (“No person may be convicted of an offense unless venue is proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence.”). Venue is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, 

which may “draw reasonable inferences from the evidence” and may make its 

determination based solely upon circumstantial evidence. State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 

101, 102 (Tenn. 2006).

 

and “detour” are antiquated labels affixed to the distinction between acts falling within the scope of 

employment and those falling without for the purpose of determining vicarious liability and compensability 

in workers’ compensation cases.
-11-

Sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction if, after considering the 

evidence—both direct and circumstantial—in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); 

State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011). This court will neither re-weigh the 

evidence nor substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact. Dorantes, 331 

S.W.3d at 379. The verdict of the trier-of-fact resolves any questions concerning the 

credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and the factual issues 

raised by the evidence. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). 

Significantly, this court must afford the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence 

contained in the record as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be 

drawn from the evidence. Id.

As charged in this case, “[a]ggravated kidnapping is false imprisonment, as 

defined in § 39-13-302, . . . [w]here the victim suffers bodily injury.” T.C.A. § 39-13-

304(a)(4). “A person commits the offense of false imprisonment who knowingly removes 

or confines another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with the other’s liberty.” Id.

§ 39-13-302(a). “‘Bodily injury’ includes a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement, 

and physical pain or temporary illness or impairment of the function of a bodily member, 

organ, or mental faculty.” Id. § 39-11-106(a)(3). Because “[t]he offense of false 

imprisonment was clearly intended to punish a continuing course of conduct,” our supreme 

court has determined that “an act of removal or confinement does not end merely upon the 

initial restraint, and a defendant continues to commit the crime at every moment the 

victim’s liberty is taken.” Legg, 9 S.W.3d at 117. “Because aggravated kidnapping is a 

continuing offense, the State needed only to show that at least one element of the crime 

continued into Tennessee for territorial jurisdiction to properly attach.” Id. at 118.

The State easily met its burden in this case. Minutes into Deputy Welch’s 

stop of the defendant’s car, the victim reported that she had been kidnapped and was being 

held against her will. The defendant’s spontaneous declaration, made without the benefit 

of the victim’s revelation to the officers, “that if she told you I kidnapped . . . her, she was 

an F’ing liar” suggests the defendant’s guilty knowledge. To be sure, the defendant and 

the victim made any number of stops during their foray into the State, but the victim’s 

testimony established that the defendant remained close to her during each stop. She 

testified that she feared the defendant because he had physically assaulted, raped, and 

threatened to kill her. Additionally, the victim did not drive, had no driver’s license, had 

no money, and, indeed, had no real idea of her own location throughout the ordeal. 

Photographs of the victim depicted scratches and bruises to her face and body. This 

evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions and to establish that, despite 

that the original removal occurred in Georgia, both territorial jurisdiction and venue lay in 

Williamson County.
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II. Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412

The defendant next asserts that the trial court committed plain error by 

permitting “the introduction of non-charged rape evidence at trial” in violation of 

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 and Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412, arguing 

that the State failed to provide him with notice as required. He also challenges Special 

Agent Lenzy’s qualifications to testify as an expert. Finally, the defendant circles back to 

his earlier arguments regarding territorial jurisdiction and venue, arguing that the trial court 

erred by admitting evidence of the rape because the victim was raped outside of Williamson 

County. The State contends that the defendant has waived plenary review of the admission 

of this evidence and that he cannot satisfy the requirements for plain error review because 

the trial court did not err by admitting the evidence.

We agree with the State that the defendant has waived plenary review of the 

admission of evidence that he raped the victim during the time that he held her against her 

will. Despite that the record clearly establishes that the defendant was aware well in 

advance of trial that the State intended to offer evidence of the rape and specifically 

intended to offer forensic evidence to establish the rape, the defendant did not move to 

exclude the evidence. The defendant did not object to the victim’s testimony about the 

rape at trial. He also failed to challenge Special Agent Lenzy’s qualifications or her 

testimony about the results of her forensic testing; he did object to the admission of Special 

Agent Lenzy’s final report on hearsay grounds. The defendant’s failure to make

contemporaneous challenges results in waiver on appeal. See State v. Bristol, No. M2019-

00531-SC-R11-CD, 2022 WL 5295777, at *4, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. 2022) (reiterating 

that “[i]t has long been the general rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not 

be entertained on appeal” (alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 

S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983) (other citations omitted)).

Whether properly assigned or not, this court may, “[w]hen necessary to do 

substantial justice, . . . consider an error that has affected the substantial rights of a party at 

any time, even though the error was not raised in the motion for a new trial.” Tenn. R. 

App. P. 36(b). This court will grant relief for plain error only when:

the record clearly establishes what occurred in the trial court; 

(2) the error breached a clear and unequivocal rule of law; (3) 

the error adversely affected a substantial right of the 

complaining party; (4) the error was not waived for tactical

purposes; and (5) substantial justice is at stake; that is, the error 

was so significant that it “probably changed the outcome of the 

trial.”
-13-

State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 808 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 

274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000)). The party claiming plain error bears the burden of satisfying 

all five criteria as a prerequisite to plain error review. See id. Because each factor must be 

established, we need not consider all five factors when a single factor indicates that relief 

is not warranted. State v. Fayne, 451 S.W.3d 362, 372 (Tenn. 2014) (citing State v. 

Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tenn. 2007)). “[A]n error would have to [be] especially 

egregious in nature, striking at the very heart of the fairness of the judicial proceeding, to 

rise to the level of plain error.” Fayne, 451 S.W.3d at 372 (citation omitted) (alterations in 

Fayne).

The defendant cannot avail himself of plain error review because he has 

failed to establish that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached.

As to the alleged violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d), 

that rule permits but does not require the State to “notify the defendant of its intent to use 

specified evidence at trial in order to afford the defendant an opportunity to object before 

trial under Rule 12(b)(2)(C).” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(d)(1). As indicated above, the 

defendant was fully aware that the State intended to use evidence of the rape, including the 

results of forensic testing on the rape kit, well in advance of trial.

As to Special Agent Lenzy’s qualifications, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 

provides for the admissibility of “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” that 

“will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 

in issue” by “a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 

education.” Tenn. R. Evid. 702. Generally, the admissibility of expert testimony is a 

matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and there can be no reversal on 

appeal absent clear abuse of that discretion. See State v. Scott, 275 S.W.3d 395, 404 (Tenn. 

2009); State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 301 (Tenn. 2007). “A trial court abuses its 

discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases 

its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that 

causes an injustice to the complaining party.” Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Konvalinka 

v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008)). Special 

Agent Lenzy testified as an expert in forensic biology based upon her education, training, 

and experience in that field. Given the opportunity to voir dire the agent about her

qualifications, the defendant specifically agreed that her education and experience were 

sufficient to qualify her as an expert in the field. Moreover, Special Agent Lenzy’s 

testimony about her education and experience as well as her curriculum vitae, which was 

exhibited to her testimony, established that she was eminently qualified to offer her expert 

opinion.
-14-

As to the alleged violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412, that rule is 

limited to “a criminal trial, preliminary hearing, deposition, or other proceeding in which 

a person is accused of” certain sexual offenses and places limitations on the type of 

evidence that may be offered by the defendant about the victim’s sexual history. Tenn. R. 

Evid. 412. Consequently, that rule has no application at all to this case and certainly does 

not impact the evidence offered by either the victim or Special Agent Lenzy.

As to the allegation that the trial court erred by admitting the evidence 

because the rape occurred outside of Williamson County, no rule of law or evidence 

prohibits the admission of evidence of uncharged conduct solely on the basis that the 

conduct occurred outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. Moreover, as indicated above, 

kidnapping is a continuing offense, and the evidence established that the rapes occurred 

while the defendant held the victim against her will and that the victim sustained bodily 

injury during the rape, bodily injury being an element of the aggravated kidnapping alleged 

in this case.

III. Traffic Stop

In his final claim for relief, the defendant contends that the trial court should 

have granted his motion to dismiss the speeding charge and suppress the evidence obtained 

during the traffic stop, specifically his statement to Deputy Welch, because Deputy Welch 

lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle. He also argues that the trial court should have 

suppressed his statement on grounds that his arrest was illegal7and that the deputy failed 

to provide the defendant with Miranda warnings. The State asserts that the defendant has 

failed to preserve these issues for review by failing to raise them in his motion for new 

trial.

As the State correctly points out, the defendant did not raise the denial of any 

pretrial motion as a ground for relief in his motion for new trial, and, accordingly, has 

waived plenary review of any issue related to the denial of his motion to suppress. See 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 (“[I]n all cases tried by a jury, no issue presented for review shall be 

predicated upon error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, jury instructions granted 

or refused, misconduct of jurors, parties or counsel, or other action committed or occurring 

during the trial of the case, or other ground upon which a new trial is sought, unless the 

same was specifically stated in a motion for a new trial; otherwise such issues will be 

treated as waived.”). Although it is technically correct that the defendant cannot waive 

plenary review of any issue for which the remedy is dismissal of the charge, it is clear that 

 

7

“[T]he law is settled in this State that there is no constitutional immunity from an unlawful arrest,” 

Nelson v. State, 470 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971), and the only “remedy in the criminal justice 

arena for an illegal arrest is suppression of any evidence obtained as a direct or indirect result of the arrest,” 

State v. Baker, 966 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
-15-

the defendant’s challenge to his speeding conviction is not a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence but a challenge to the probable cause for the traffic stop. Consequently, 

our review is limited to plain error. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).

The defendant, again, cannot avail himself of plain error review because the 

record does not establish that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached. 

Additionally, the record does not establish that any alleged error adversely affected any 

substantial right of the defendant.

Deputy Welch testified that he paced the defendant’s car and placed his speed 

at 105 miles per hour in a 70-miles-per-hour speed zone. As he paced the car, he learned 

that the license plate affixed to the defendant’s car was not registered to that car. The trial 

court and the jury accredited the deputy’s testimony. The defendant’s excessive speed and 

improper registration provided the deputy with probable cause to stop the vehicle. See 

State v. Davis, 484 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Tenn. 2016) (“Probable cause exists when ‘at the 

time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officers, and of 

which they had reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a prudent 

person in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense.’”) 

(citations omitted); T.C.A. §§ 55-8-152; -5-115. Upon examining the identification 

provided by the defendant, Deputy Welch discovered that the defendant did not possess a 

valid driver’s license and that he had been deemed a motor vehicle habitual offender. 

Consequently, the deputy had probable cause to arrest the defendant. See Maryland v. 

Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 

(1996) (“To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we 

examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide ‘whether these historical facts, 

viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’ probable 

cause.”). To be sure, Deputy Welch did not provide Miranda warnings to the defendant, 

but he did not subject the defendant to an interrogation at the roadside. See Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. at 436, 444 (defining “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated 

by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”). Instead, he placed the defendant 

in the back of his unmarked police vehicle and continued to investigate. While in the back 

of the vehicle, the defendant knocked on the window to get the deputy’s attention and 

voluntarily offered that the victim “had marijuana on her” and “that if she told you I 

kidnapped . . . her, she was an F’ing liar.” “Volunteered statements of any kind are not 

barred by the Fifth Amendment . . . .” Id. at 478.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
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_________________________________

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE