Filed 2/28/24 Rosales v. Janelle S. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ASTRID ROSALES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JANELLE S.,

Defendant and Respondent.

B322055

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. LF005708)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Firdaus F. Dordi, Judge. Affirmed.

Rodriguez Law Group, Patricia Rodriguez, and Cierra 

Wilson for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Taub & Taub and Richard F. Taub for Defendant and 

Respondent.

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Astrid Rosales appeals from a parentage judgment, urging 

that the trial court erred by refusing to recognize her as a third 

parent of minor Lila S. pursuant to Family Code1 section 7612, 

subdivision (c) (section 7612(c)). Section 7612(c) permits a court 

to find that a child has more than two parents if recognizing only 

two parents “would be detrimental to the child.” Astrid contends 

she had a long-term romantic relationship with Lila’s biological 

mother, Janelle S., and she acted as Lila’s coparent for the first 

six years of the child’s life. Astrid thus urges that failing to 

accord her legal status as Lila’s parent is detrimental to Lila 

within the meaning of section 7612(c). 

As we discuss, Astrid has forfeited her appellate 

contentions by failing to provide this court with an adequate 

appellate record and with appropriate legal and factual citations. 

In the alternative, the trial court’s findings are supported by 

substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

Lila was born in April 2010 and is the biological child of 

Janelle and Marlon M. Janelle and Marlon lived together briefly 

after Lila’s birth, but ended their relationship when Lila was 

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Family Code.

2 An appellant’s opening brief must contain “a summary of 

the significant facts” relevant to the issues raised in the appeal, 

supported by a citation to the page number of the record where 

each fact appears. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) As 

we discuss below, appellant’s opening brief does not contain an 

appropriate factual summary. Nonetheless, we have briefly 

summarized the relevant facts based on our independent review 

of the record. 
3

about two months old. In February 2012, the Los Angeles 

Superior Court entered a parentage judgment declaring Janelle 

and Marlon to be Lila’s parents, and awarded Janelle sole legal 

and physical custody of Lila.

Janelle and Astrid dated intermittently between 1999 and 

2007, and lived together in Hawaii from 2007 to 2008. According 

to Astrid, she and Janelle continued their relationship after 

returning to Los Angeles in 2008, and they were still dating when 

Janelle became pregnant with Lila. Astrid and Janelle broke up 

for about six months between December 2009 and May 2010, and 

then reconciled and resumed living together until 2016. Astrid 

contends that she acted as Lila’s coparent between 2010 and 

2016, including by cooking for Lila, caring for her when she was 

sick, taking Lila to and from school, scheduling playdates, paying 

for some of Lila’s expenses, and holding Lila out as her daughter. 

Astrid also contends that Janelle recognized her coparent status, 

including by identifying her as Lila’s other parent on school forms 

and registering Lila in preschool with a hyphenated version of 

Janelle’s and Astrid’s last names.

Janelle gives a very different account of her relationship 

with Astrid. According to Janelle, she and Astrid have not been 

involved romantically since 2007, although they remained good 

friends until 2016. After Janelle broke up with Marlon in

June 2010, she sought a restraining order against him and lived 

for a short time with Astrid’s mother. Subsequently, Janelle 

moved into an apartment with her sister. Astrid did not share 

the apartment with Janelle, but she offered to care for Lila while

Janelle was at work. Because Janelle worked nights, Astrid 

spent those nights at Janelle’s apartment. Janelle contends, 
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however, that Astrid never lived with her after 2008, and Astrid 

was never Lila’s coparent.

It is undisputed that Janelle did not allow Astrid to see Lila 

after about mid-2016. In December 2017, Astrid filed the present 

action to establish a parental relationship with Lila.

In June 2018, the court entered a stipulated order that 

Astrid have three3 professionally monitored two-hour visits with 

Lila. By all accounts, the visits went badly: Lila cried and shook 

during most of the first visit, and she refused to speak to Astrid 

during either visit.

In January 2019, the court entered a stipulated order that 

Lila would continue therapy with her current therapist, with a 

focus on reunification between Lila and Astrid if deemed 

appropriate by the therapist. According to the therapist, Astrid 

was the primary focus of Lila’s therapy for about six months. 

Lila repeatedly told the therapist that she did not want to see 

Astrid and was uncomfortable when Astrid sent her gifts and 

packages. The therapist opined that there was not a path for 

reunification between Lila and Astrid because Lila “does not view 

Astrid as a family member or even a friend, and does not 

understand why she would be forced to see one of her mother’s 

old friends.”

The trial court heard testimony over two days in March and 

April 2022, including from Janelle, Astrid, and Lila’s therapist.

At the conclusion of testimony, the court found that Astrid was 

Lila’s presumed parent pursuant to section 7611, subdivision (d). 

The court further concluded, however, that there was not a strong 

3 Although the court ordered three visits, the appellate 

record contains a record only of two.
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relationship between Lila and Astrid, and thus denying Astrid 

third-parent status pursuant to section 7612(c) would not be 

detrimental to Lila. The court therefore entered a parentage 

judgment naming Janelle and Marlon as Lila’s sole parents.

Astrid timely appealed from the parentage judgment.

DISCUSSION

Astrid contends that the trial court erred by refusing to 

grant her third-parent status under section 7612(c), and Janelle 

violated the parties’ joint stipulation regarding reunification 

therapy. These claims lack merit, as we discuss.

I. Astrid has forfeited her appellate contentions.

We begin by addressing the inadequacy of the appellate 

record and Astrid’s appellate briefs. It is a fundamental principle 

of appellate procedure that the trial court’s order is presumed to 

be correct. To overcome the presumption of correctness, 

appellants “must affirmatively establish prejudicial error by 

providing an adequate record, citing to the record, and presenting 

a persuasive argument with citations to supportive legal 

authorities. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C); 

Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609; Lee v. Kim (2019) 

41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 

1229, 1246.)” (LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection 

Community Assn. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1070 (LNSU).)

In the present case, Astrid has wholly failed to provide this 

court with an adequate appellate record or argument. Much of 

the direct testimony in the trial court was through declarations, 
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which Astrid has not provided to this court.4 Further, Astrid’s 

appellate briefs contain few legal citations and cite absolutely no

authority for many of her assertions, including that she need not 

demonstrate an existing relationship with Lila to establish 

detriment under section 7612(c). Finally, none of Astrid’s factual 

assertions is supported by a precise citation to the appellate 

record: Her factual assertions either are entirely unsupported or 

cite to hundreds of pages of testimony.

“It is not our role as an appellate court independently to 

review the record for error and to construct arguments for 

appellants that would require reversal of the judgment. (United 

Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 

142, 153; Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 

836, 852.)” (LNSU, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.) Instead, 

“ ‘ “[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails 

to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, 

we treat the point as waived.” ’ ” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & 

Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956; see also In re 

Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830

[“The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority 

allows this court to treat the contentions as waived”].) 

Accordingly, we conclude that Astrid has forfeited each of her 

appellate contentions. 

4 Some of these declarations appear in the respondent’s 

appendix.
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II. Alternatively, the trial court’s findings are supported 

by substantial evidence.

Notwithstanding our conclusion that Astrid has forfeited 

her appellate contentions, we review those contentions on the 

merits and conclude that the trial court’s findings are supported 

by substantial evidence.

The Uniform Parentage Act (§ 7600 et seq.) provides the 

framework by which California courts make parentage 

determinations. (M.M. v. D.V. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 733, 740–

742; Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 937.) A 

person qualifies as a natural parent either by giving birth or by 

meeting one of the applicable statutory methods for being 

adjudged a natural parent (§ 7610, subd. (a)), including by 

“receiv[ing] the child into their home and openly hold[ing] out the 

child as their natural child” (§ 7611, subd. (d)). A judgment or 

order of the court determining the existence or nonexistence of 

the parent and child relationship is, with exceptions not relevant 

here, “determinative for all purposes.” (§ 7636.)

It is undisputed in the present case that Janelle and 

Marlon are legally recognized as Lila’s parents under the 2012 

parentage judgment. Astrid did not attempt to set aside that 

judgment, but she sought to be adjudicated Lila’s third parent 

pursuant to section 7612(c). That section provides that in an 

appropriate action, a court “may find that more than two persons 

with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if the 

court finds that recognizing only two parents would be 

detrimental to the child.” (Italics added.) In determining 

detriment, the court “shall consider all relevant factors, 

including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the child from 

a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the child’s 
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physical needs and the child’s psychological needs for care and 

affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period 

of time.” (§ 7612(c).) On appeal, we review the trial court’s 

detriment finding under section 7612(c) for substantial evidence 

(In re Donovan L. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1088); thus, 

because Astrid had the burden of establishing detriment below, 

we may reverse the judgment only if “ ‘the evidence compels a 

finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law’ ” (Estate of 

Herzog (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 894, 904, citing In re I.W. (2009) 

180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527–1528, disapproved of on other 

grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, 

fn. 7).

To demonstrate detriment, a putative third parent must 

establish, at a minimum, an existing relationship between the 

child and the putative parent. Thus, for example, in In re L.L.

(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1302, 1315, the Court of Appeal held that 

the lower court erred by recognizing a biological father as a 

child’s third parent because the child did not “have a strong 

relationship with” the biological father. The court explained: 

“Absent an existing relationship with [the child], there is no 

ground on which [the biological father] could be recognized as a 

third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c). . . . [A]ll of the 

evidence submitted at the hearing, as well as arguments of 

counsel, showed [the child] did not have an existing relationship 

with [the biological father] at that time. . . . [A]t the time of the 

hearing, [biological father] had had no relationship with [the 

child] for at least six years. Accordingly, there is insufficient 

evidence to support a finding that [biological father] had an 

existing relationship of any sort, much less a parent-child 

relationship, with [the child] at the time of the hearing.
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Therefore, the court erred by finding [the biological father] is a 

third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c).” (Id. at pp.

1316–1317.)

Similarly, In re Donovan L., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1078, held that the juvenile court erred in applying section 

7612(c) given the court’s determination that a child and his 

biological father lacked an existing parent-child relationship. 

The appellate court noted that section 7612(c) was intended to 

“ ‘protect[ ] children from harm by preserving the bonds between 

children and their parents’ (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 

Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 274 (2013–2014 

Reg. Sess.) as amended May 14, 2013, p. 7, italics added) and 

avoid the ‘disastrous emotional, psychological, and financial 

consequences for a child, who may be separated from one or both 

of the parents he or she has always known.” ’ (Assem. Com. on 

Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 274 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended May 14, 2013, pp. 4–5, italics added).” (In re Donovan 

L., at p. 1089.) Thus, the court concluded, “ ‘an appropriate 

action’ ” for application of section 7612(c) “is one in which a court 

finds an existing, rather than potential, relationship between a 

child and a putative third parent, such that ‘recognizing only two 

parents would be detrimental to the child.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1089–

1090 (second italics added); compare C.A. v. C.P. (2018) 29 

Cal.App.5th 27, 38 [affirming third-parent finding where putative 

third parent had “ ‘an existing and significant bond’ ” with the 

child at time of judgment].)

In the present case, while there was evidence of a 

relationship between Astrid and Lila prior to 2016, there was no

evidence of a continuing relationship between them by the time of 

the hearing, nearly six years later. To the contrary, the 
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undisputed evidence was that Lila and Astrid had almost no 

contact between 2016 and 2022, and Lila repeatedly said she did 

not want to see Astrid. Further, Lila refused to speak to or 

engage with Astrid during their supervised visits in July 2018,

and Lila’s therapist believed that there was no path for any kind 

of reunification between Lila and Astrid. On this record, 

substantial evidence unquestionably supported the trial court’s 

finding that Lila would not suffer detriment if only Janelle and 

Marlon were recognized as her parents.

Astrid asserts that she could meet her burden under 

section 7612(c) by demonstrating a relationship between herself

and Lila was “available”—that is, that it had existed in the past 

and could be reestablished in the future. However, she cites no 

authority for this proposition, and we are not aware of any. To 

the contrary, all of the authority of which we are aware holds 

that a third-parent finding is permitted under the statute only 

where there is an existing strong relationship between a child 

and putative third parent. (See In re L.L., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 1316–1317; In re Donovan L., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1078.) By her own admission, Astrid has not made such a 

showing here.

Finally, Astrid asserts that Janelle violated the parties’ 

stipulation regarding counseling because reunification-focused 

therapy lasted just six months and the therapist was unqualified 

to provide reunification therapy. But the trial court found that 

Astrid had not presented any evidence as to the alleged 

inadequacy of the reunification therapy, and she points to none

on appeal. She therefore has failed to demonstrate error.
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DISPOSITION

 The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her 

appellate costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

ADAMS, J.