by 

R. H. Thompson 

August 1973 

Prepared for 

U.S. Bureau of Mines 

Department of. Interi or 
The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the 

author and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the 

official policies or recommendations of the Interior Department's Bureau 

of Mines or of the U. S. Government. 
USBljl Contract No. 140210068 

EVALUATIOrJ AND DETERflINATION OF SEFJSITIVITY AND ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERACTIONS OF COTilMERCIAL BLASTING CAPS 

BY 

R. H. Thompson 

The Franklio Institute Research Laboratories 

USBH Contract Final Report (contract No. t{0210068) 

Department of the Interior 

Bureau of Mi nes 

Washington, D. C. 
The Hercules delay caps have iron leg wires which are shunted to provide protection against stray currents. This particular shunt foms an 

envelope around. the exposed leads which provides corrosion protection. 

Delay times are available from 25 ms to 500 ms and are color coded. A 

delay of 25 ms was also chosen for this cap in the testing program. 

E. Austin -. Delay Blasting -- Cap -. 113 -. - . - .. --. 

The Austin Powder Company delay blasting cap is a coal mining cap made 

in Great Britain. It has iron leg wires and is similar in constructicn to 

the other delay caps. Its delay, h3wever, is 30 ms. 

F. Austin Instantaneous Blasting Cap 

The Austin Powder Company instantaneous cap is a coal mining cap and 

is similar in construction to the DuPont instantaneous cap. It has iron 

leg wires and is shunted to protect ageinst stray currents, 
FOREWORD 

This report was prepared by the Pranklin Institute Research Laboratories under USBM Concract NO. H0210068. The contract was initiated under 

the Coal Mine Health and Safety Research Program. It was administered 

under the technical direction of the Pittsburgh Mining and Safety Research 

Center with Mr. Richard W. Watson acting as the technical project officer. 

Mr. Dean Priddy was the contract administrator for the Bureau of Mines. 

This report is a summary of the work recently completed as part of 

this contract during the period July 1971 to July 1973. This report was 

submitted by the author on October 9, 1973. 
ABSTRACT 

Six different types of blasting caps, mainly of the type used in 

coal mines, were evaluated to determine both their 1lF and L)C characteristics. Two of the caps were of foreign manufacture. All the American 

made caps had "no-fire" (0.1% firing probability with 95% confidence, as 

determined by the Uruceton test) levels above 0.04 watts. One of the 

caps of foreign manufacture had a "no-fire" level of 0.023 watts. 

A worst case analysis of blasting cap pick up of KF power in coal 

mines was performed and safe distance curves were generated. 

iii 
This report was prepared by the Applied Physics Laboratory of FIRL 

under the administrative supervision of lir. P . F. Mohrbach, Principal 

Physicist. The experimental effort was physically carried out by PIessrs. 

A. Id. Cipkins and li. T. Tucker. lir. W. J. Dunning, Research Engineer 

and Ilr. D. J. Mullen, Senior Itesearch Engineer, evaluated the experimental 

data and contributed to the writing of this report. Iir. Jeffrey Tecosky 

assisted in some of the computer programming and data plotting and lir. 

K. C. Tl~ompson compiled the data of Appendix G. 

We would like to thank Mr. R. W. Watson of the Bureau of Mines for his 

advice and assistance in the planning and execution of the work. 
SUBJECT INVENTIONS 

- 'I'lli.1-c. wcrc IIO illvc~lt i ens nladc or patents issued as a result of the 

wc, t-k pc. r fo r111c.d (111 t il i s rcpor t . 
CONTENTS 

Section Page 

FOREWORD. . 

ABSTRACT. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. 

SUBJECT INVENTIONS . 

1 INTRODUCTION . . 

2 THE BLASTING CAPS TESTED . 

3 THE TESTS PEWORMED . 

dc Constant Current Sensitivity . Dynamic Resistance . 

Bridgewire Break Time. . . Thermal Time Constant. 

dc Constant-Current Dudding . 

Static Sensitivity' . RF Comparison. . 

RF Cook-Off or Dudding . 

RF Bruceton . 

TEST RESULTS . . . . 

4.1 CapA. . 

4.2 CapB. . 

4.3 CapC. . 4.4 CapD. . 

4.5 CapE. . 4.6 CapF. . 

. iii 
CONTENTS (CONT' D. ) 

TitZe Page 

TEST CONCLUSIONS. . 5-1 

PREDICTING THE RF POWER PICKUP OF BLASTING CAPS . . 6-1 

6.1 Introduction . . 6-1 

6.2 Functioning Power . . 6-5 

6.3 Coupling to the Cap. . . 6-7 

6.4 The Field in the Vicinity of the Blasting Cap and its 

Associated Wiring . . 6-19 

6.4.1 Electromagnetic Parameters . . 6-19 

6.4.2 TEM Propagation . . 6-21 

6.4.3 A General Approach to the Propagation Problem 6-23 

6.4.4 Propagation with a Conductor in the Drift . 6-28 

6.4.5 The Worst Case Propagation Constants. . . 6-31 

6.4.6 Determination of the Propagation Constants . 6-38 

6.5 An Overall Coupling Expression . . 6-44 

6.6 Safe Distances . . 6-46 

7 CONCLUSIONS . . 7-1 

8 REFERENCES . . 8-1 

APPENDIX A - EXCERPT FROM FRANKLIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES REPORT M-C2210-1 

APPENDIX B - BRUCETON TEST RESULTS 

APPENDIX C - RF PROBING TEST RESULTS 

APPENDIX D - EXCERPT FROM FIRL REPORT F-B2256 

APPENDIX E - BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR UNDERGROUND PROPAGATION OF ELECTROElAGNETI C WAVES 

APPENDIX F - HILL DESCENDING PROGRAM AND SAMPLE OUTPUT 

APPENDIX G - ROOTS OBTAINED FROM THE COMPUTER PROGRAM 

vii 
FIGURES 

- Title Page 

Cap Mounting for RF Sensitivity Determination. . . . 3-3 

Schmeatic of a Typical Blasting Cap . . . . . . 6-2 

Underground Complications. . . . . . . . . 6-4 

Summary of Bruceton Results . . . . . . . . 6-6 

Layout for Face Boring . . . . . . . . . 6-8 

Cap Connect ion Layout. . . . . . . . . . 6-9 

Shot Line and Wired Face . . . . . . . . . 6-10 

Possible Blasting Configuration and Transmitting Antenna 

Which Illustrate the Horizontal Half-Wavelength Dipole Antenna Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 

Possible Blasting Configuration and Transmitting Antenna 

Orientation, Which Illustrates With Vertical Loop Antenna 

Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 

Pin-to-Case Sensitive lasti in^ configuration and Its Antenna 

Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14 

Pin-to-Pin Vertical Loop Underground Configuration . . 6-15 

Pin-to-Case Vertical Loop Underground Configuration . . 6-16 

Vertical Loop Aperature . . . . . . . . . 6-18 

TEM Attentuation Constant Versus Frequency . . . . 6-24 

TEM Phase Constant Versus Frequency . . . . . . 6-25 

Geometry for the General Rectangular Waveguide Problem . 6-27 

Section of a Drift with a Good Conductor on the Floor. . 6-29 

6-17 Section of A Wide Drift with a Conducting Floor . . . 6-30 

viii 
FIGURE (CONT'D.) 

Nwnber 

6-18 

Title Page 

Section of the Infinitely Wide Drift with a Conducting 

Flow. . . . . . . 6-32 

6-19 Image Geometry . . . 6-33 

6-20 Three Dimensional Rectangular Coordinates . . 6-36 

6-21 "q" Surface . . . . . . 6-37 

6-22 Attentuation Constant for E = 2. R . 

6-23 Attentuation Constant for E = 10 . R 

6-24 Phase Constant for E = 10 . R . 

6-25 Worst Case Attentuation Constant. . 

6-25 Safe Distance . 

T,ABL E S 

Nwnber Title Page 

4-1 Blasting Cap Test Plan . . . 4-2 

4-2 Summary of dc Results . . . . 4-3 

4-3 Summary of RF Results for Most Sensitive Conditions Tested 4-4 
1. INTRODUCTION 

The specific objec~ of this program was to provide a means of evaluating the potential hazards to blasting caps caused by equipment producing electromagnetic fields, particularly communication systems. 

In many underground coal mining operations the use of electromagnetic 

field producing equipment, particularly communication systems, not only 

increases the overall efficiency of the mining operation but can be 

directly linked with mine safety considerations. The use of electromagnetic field producing equipment in underground coal mining operations 

can only be expected to gro1~~. Several new communication systems have 

already been proposed. In addition, high-frequency producing equipments 

for many diverse uses in mining operations are under study. 

The use of this equipment in underground mining operations is 

hampered by the possibility of their electromagnetic fields interacting 

with the electric blasting cap operations commonly carried out in the 

mines. Such interactions can have at least two results bearing directly 

on mine safety: 

Premature initiation of the cap, either in its normal 

shot location or during hookup or transportation 

Dudding of the cap so that normal firing operations do 

not cause initiation, thereby leaving unexploded high 

explosives after normal firing 

The general problem of predicting possible RF hazards for any electroexplosive device (EED) is best treated by reference to Appendix A' of this 

report. Appendix A considers the general problem from a military/space 

agency viewpoint but blasting caps are the primitive models for most 

EEDs so the material is directly applicable to blasting cap problems. 

1 Superscripts refer to the numbered references of Section 8. Appendix A 

is an excerpt from reference 1. 
In brief, the specific problem of analytically predicting possible 

RF hazards to blasting caps can be reduced to finding answers to the 

following three questions: 

(1) How much power, at the frequency of concern, 

is necessary to function the caps? - 

(2) How much power is coupled to the cap by a given 

field existing in the vicinity of the cap and its 

associated wiring? 

(3) What fields will exist in the vicinity of the blasting 

cap and its wiring for a given source, physical environment, frequency and separation? 

A considerable body of work 29394 exists that deals with questions 

(2) and (3) for aboveground blasting operations and sources. Although 

some of the results of this work are directly applicable to underground 

mining operations, the factors of minimum distance between transmitting 

sources and caps, tunnel geometry, unknown electrical properties of the 

surrounding minerals, etc., that are inherent in underground operations 

limit complete application of t11ese methods and results. Some limited 

theoretical inves tigations5' 6, tailored to a specific underground communication system, have been performed. In the end, electromagnetic 

hazard evaluation of the system was forced to rely on experimental data 

taken in a tunnel of the mine in which the communication system was to be 

installed. 

The overall program described here can be broken down into the 

following tasks: 

(1) The experimental determination of the dc sensitivity, RF sensitivity, static sensitivity, and dc and RF dudding susceptibility for commercial blasting caps used in coal mines. 

(2) The determination, in sufficPent detail to allow conservative 

estimation, of the electromagnetic properties of the mine 

environments. 
(3) The development of prop,agation models for underground mine 

environments considering typical source antenna characteristics, 

the mineral electromagnetic parameters, and the tunnel geometry, 

mine equipment, etc. 

(4) The correlation of previous analyses on aboveground operations 

to underground blasting wiring configurations. 

(5) Determination of the possible power that can be delivered to 

caps used in various underground operations from various electromagnetic sources. 

Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this report describe the overall experimental 

effort and Sections 6, 7 and 8 present the analytical portion of the work. 
2. THE BLASTING CAPS TESTED 

Underground coal mining operations using electric blasting techniques 

generally use blasting caps that incorporate a time delay. The delays 

commonly available from commercial sources run from a minimum of approximately 25 milliseconds to about 500 milliseconds in steps of approximately 

75 milliseconds. The advantages gained by use of caps having various 

delays in coal mining operation are both economically and safety oriented 7 

and are not our concern here; however, the sheer number of different delay 

caps available seemed to require an enormous amount of testing to characterize the RF behavior of the caps. Visits to the manufacturing facilities 

of the various cap producers in the United States, examination of assembly 

drawings, and discussions with the manufacturers' production and design 

personnel showed that the ignition producing subsystem (the header, bridgewire and primer mix) of almost all of each manufacturers' delay caps was 

of the same construction. Since this is the only portion of the cap that 

can be expected to influence the RF behavior of the cap we can, with 

small risk, characterize all of a manufacturers coal mine delay caps by 

testing a single delay from each manufacturer. 

The caps selected for testing were: 

(1) Tkree 25 millisecond delay caps from different United 

States manufacturers. All of these caps had iron 

leg wires. 

(2) A 30 millisecond delay cap of foreign manufacture. 

(iron Leg wires) 

(3) An instantaneous cap of U.S. manufacture for control 

purposes. (copper leg wires) 

(4) An instantaneous cap of foreign manufacture for control purposes. (iron leg wires) 

Iron leg wires caps are the type most usually encountered in 
underground coal mining operations. Our methods of determining cap 

sensitivity require that the cap leads be reduced to less than onequarter inch in length, so we do not believe that copper leg wire caps 

will differ seriously in RF sensitivity from the results determined for 

the iron leg wire caps. - 

The six types of caps tested in this report are referred to by the 

capital letters A, B, C, D, E and F. Types .E and F are those of foreign 

manufacture. 
3. THE TESTS PERFORtlED 

Blasting caps can be initiated with RF energy in two different ways. 

Tlie blasting cap is designed to initiate by bridgeuire heating and this 

mode of initiation can be utilized by KF currents as well as the normal 

firing currents. Since a potential difference must exist between the 

blasting cap leads (or "pins") for this mode of initiation it is referred 

to as the pin-to-pin firing mode. Blasting caps can also be initiated by 

appiication of an RF potential between one of the pins and the metallic 

case. In this firing mode it makes little or no difference whether the 

pins are shorted together or not. This firing node is usually referred 

to as the pins-to-case mode. 

The most common statistical method of determining the sensitivity 

of any electroexplosive device is the "~ruceton" test. This rllethod of 

testing is described in a report submitted by the Statistical Research 

Group, Princeton University, to the Applied Ifathematics Panel of the 

National Uefense Research Committee in July, 1944. The report details 

the methods for statistical analysis of the test data obtained by the 

new procedure at the Explosives Research Laboratory at Bruceton, Pa. 

Hence, the designation "~ruceton" test. Much of our evaluation work here 

uses the Bruceton procedure. Keference 8 is the original "~ruceton" 

report. 

Tests corlducted on electroexplosive devices (EELIS) over the last 

ten years have indicated that, rather than conduct a full Bruceton-type 

statistical test at each frequency and firing mode (pin-to-pin or pinsto-case) combination, a set of probing tests can be conducted across the 

frequency band of interest using the dc sensitivity as a reference level. 

Bruceton type 1W sensitivity tests are generally conducted only at those 

conditions which indicate the greatest sensitivity. If the blasting cap 

has some unusual sensitivity to RF at a specific condition this approach 
should detect it and define it. This approach eliminates a large portion 

of the otherwise required testing and hence provides a means of economically 

determining EED RF characteristics. 

In brief, the general test plan is as follows: 

(1) The dc response of the cap to constant current pulses is determined as a control. Additional supporting data obtained 

includes therxiial time constant, rate of change of resistance 

of the bridgewire with application of electric stimulus 

(dK/dt), and time to rupture of the bridgewire. 

(2) The approximate RF response of the cap in all modes of initiation, as determined from the probing tests, is compared with 

the dc response. 

(3) The RF condition which indicates the greatest sensitivity is 

explored with a Bruceton or Probit-type test. 

(4) The static sensitivity of the cap is determined. 

The dudding characteristics the are determined. 

The equipment used in the testing is all special purpose instrurnentation and evaluation equipment. The measurement techniques are also 

special purpose and have been developed particularly for the evaluation 

of electroexplosives. A full description of the equipment and techniques 

is given in References 9, 10 and 11. Reference 9 deals with the dc 

instrumentation, 10 with the static tests and 11 with the 1V equipment 

and techniques. Reference 12 gives more information on the RF firing 

systems. The RF firing systems ;equire a precise mounting arrangement 

for the blasting caps. Figure 3-1 shows, from right to left, a blasting 

cap in the "as received" condition, a cap with the leg wires cut and 

stripped, a stripped cap mounted in a collet type mounting fixture and 

the actual firing mount in which the collet type mounting fixture is 

inserted to provide a precise mounting arrangement for the cap. The 

actual firing mount provides a precisely known location for the transition 

from the coaxial line that connects to the firing system and the input 

to the blasting cap. 

The following paragraphs give a brief description of the specific 

tests that were conducted on each different type of cap. 

3.1 DC CONSTANT CURRENT SENSITIVITY 

This test determines the mean current sensitivity of the cap to long 

dc pulses. The resulting information forms the basis for evaluating 

relative sensitivity with other stimuli such as short pulses or RF. The - 

testing procedure uses the Franklin Institue Laboratories Universal Pulser 

(FILUP) which determines the resistance and funtioning time for each 

item during the constant current test. Using this equipment and the 

Bruceton procedure each item is subjected to a constant current pulse 

for 10 seconds. If the item fires, the next item is tested at the next 

lower level. If it does not fire, the next item is fired at the next 

higher level. From this "fire; no-fire" information at the various fixed 

firing levels the mean and standard deviation of the firing current can 

be determined as well as the "no-fire" (0.1%) level and the "all-fire", 

(99.9X) level. In addition, various confidence intervals may be attached 

to these levels. 

3.2 DYIJAMIC RESISTANCE 

The dynamic resistance of a blasting cap is a necessary parameter 

for calculation of the input power for a given constant current stimuli. 

This calculation is required since the RF data is obtained in terms of 

power. Furthermore, a knowledge of the changing resistance characteristics 

of an EEU under electrical stimuli aids in anticipating problems resulting 

from impedance mismatching between RF generator and blasting caps. The 

bridgewire resistance varies due to the heating effect of the applied 

stimulus, immediate environment of the bridgewire and the bridgewire 

material. The dynamic resistance of the blasting cap is obtained by 

passing a known current through the bridgewire and recording the voltage 

across the bridge as a function of time. 

3.3 BRIDGEWIRE BREAK TI14 

It is often of interest to know at what time a bridgewire breaks 

after application of a particular firing stimulus; for example, if a number 

of devices are to be connected in series for firing, it may be of con- 
siderable importance to know when the circuit may be interrupted. Even 

for an instantaneous cap this break time can differ considerably from the 

functioning time, defined as the time of stimulus application to rupture 

of the case. 

The dynamic resistance measurements discussed in Section 3.2 are 

conducted at reasonably large stimulus levels and the bridgewire electrical 

parameters are monitored by- an oscilloscope. As a result, useful bridgewire break times can be obtained as an extra dividend from the dynamic 

resistance data. 

It is possible that the blasting cap may be subjected to repetitive, 

pulse-type stimulus such as that produced by the modulation of a 

common search radar signal. Each pulse alone has insufficient energy to 

fire the blasting cap or effect its performance, but the combined effect 

may produce thermal stacking and fire the cap. Thermal stacking occurs 

when the bridgewire has not had sufficient time to cool off before the 

next pulse arrives, thus the bridgewire temperature increases 

until it reaches the ignition temperature of the explosive mix. Thermal 

time constant is measured by passing a small, constant current through 

the blasting cap and measuring the voltage across it. A high amplitude, 

short duration pulse is separately applied and the bridgewire resistance 

is recorded as a function of the time. The thermal time constant is 

defined as the time required for the bridgewire temperature to decay to 

36.8% (l/e) of the maximum temperature excursion. Since temperature 

change is proportional to resistance change, the thermal time constant 

may be obtained directly from the monitoring voltage recording which is 

proportional to bridgewire resistance. 

DC CONSTANT-CURRENT DUDDIIIG 

The dudding tests measure the change in sensitivity of a blasting 

cap due to application of stimuli not sufficient to fire the blasting 
cap. A blasting cap that misfires in use could produce a hazardous situation, so any reduction in senstivity caused by previous exposure could 

be dangerous. In addition, an occasional device shows an increase in 

sensitivity when subjected to prior exposure. The dc dudding test is 

performed by passing the 0.1% firing current of interest through a number 

of caps for 5 minutes and then determining the sensitivity to the standard 

stimulus used in 3.1 using-the Bruceton technique. The results are then 

compared with the control Bruceton. The 0.1% level used in the dudding 

tests is computed without a confidence level. 

3.6 STATIC SENSITIVITY 

The test measures the effects of human generated static electricity 

on the blasting cap as well as the effects of electromagnetic fields 

induced by nearby lightning discharges. Very high voltages can be 

generated by persons handling caps, especially if they are wearing 

synthetic clotiling and/or rubber soled shoes. The test potential is 

applied across the bridgewire (pin-to-pin) as well as pins-to-case. A 

500 pF capacitor is charged to the test potential (25,000 volts) and 

discharged into the cap through a 5,000 ohm resistor. These values of 

resistance and capacitance are typical of those of a person handling the 

cap. See Reference 13 for a detailed description of personnel-borne static 

charge hazard. 

3.7 RF COMPARISON 

RF testing is conducted in a slightly different manner than the dc 

tests. Both the pin-to-pin (normal dc firing mode) and pins-to-case 

mode are investigated. This is necessary since some caps may be more 

sensitive to RF excitation in the pin-to-case mode than they are to RF 

pin-to-pin excitation. Using the results of the dc Bruceton test 

(Section 3.1) and the dynamic resistance test (Section 3. 2), the approximate mean firing power is calculated. This information is then used as 

the starting point in the RF sensitivity determination. At each test 

frequency, a series of items is fired to determine the approximate mean 
firing level at that frequency in both the pin-to-pin and pins-to-case 

modes. Many frequencies throughout the RF spectrum are employed in the 

probing tests. They are chosen to match the frequency bands which contain 

high radiated powers. Broadcast band, HF communications, business radio, 

telemetry, microwave heating, and various radar and microwave frequencies 

are used. In addition to -continuous wave (cw), pulse modulation is used 

in the microwave region where this type of modulation is frequently encountered. 

Before a test is begun, the item is placed in a mount compatible 

with the firing system and frequency involved as well as the type of 

test (pin-to-pin or pins-t~-~&e). The firing system is then matched to 

the item to be tested and the system efficiency is determined. Thus, 

the actual power delivered to the EED may be accurately determined. 

3.8 RF COOK-OFF OR DUDDII4G 

This test is conducted to determine the effects of applied RF power 

not sufficient to fire the EED. Such an exposure might alter tlle sensitivity of a device so that it will not fire when intended, or fire prematurely while being handled or tested. The device is subjected to RF 

energy at its most sensitive frequency at the approximate no fire (0.1% 

firing) level for 5 minutes. The items are then subjected to a dc Bruceton 

using the standard conditions stated in Section 3.1. Any changes in 

sensitivity will then be detected as deviations from the original (control) 

dc Bruceton. 

3.9 RF BRUCETON 

Bruceton tests are performed at the most sensitive frequency/modulation 

stimuli of the comparison tests for both the pin-to-pin and pins-to-case 

modes. The Bruceton procedure is the same as that used for the dc Bruceton control test. 
4. TEST RESULTS 

'l'lie planned tests for eacl~ cap type and the number of caps to be 

used in eacli test are given in Table 4-1. Appendix U contains the computer 

~~~itptit slieets for all of the Eruceton test data evaluations. Appendix C 

gives tlie di~ta obtained from the RF probing tests. 

Tlie dc test results, including the "means" for both the dc and KF 

d~lclJing Uruceton tests are summarized for all caps in Table 4-2. While 

functioning times are recorded during tests and we have included average 

functioning time in the data summary, it is of little practical value 

since it was determined at the firing levels which are used in the 

Bruceton tests. Currents used during the test would not compare with 

tlie large currents used to fire the items in the field and the current 

level materially effects the functioning time. Exact thermal time constants 

were not obtained on any of the caps tested because it was found that all 

caps liad comparatively rapid cooling rates (thermal time constants less 

than 7 microseconds) and that thermal stacking thus should not occur. 

Exact determination of thermal time constant less tlian 7 microseconds was 

impossible with our present equipment. It should also be noted that none 

of the caps tested indicated any significant sensitivity to personnelborne static charges. 

The results of the RF tests are summarized in Table 4-3 along with 

the data from the dc control Bruceton tests converted to power values. 

The conditions at which the RF Gruceton tests were conducted were chosen 

on the basis of the RF probing tests which in general were conducted on 

ten caps each in both the pin-to-pin and pins-to-case mode at the following 

frequencies: Continuous Wave 0.088, 1.5, 10, 150, 450, 2700, 5400 and 

9000 MHz; Pulsed: 2700, 5400, and 9000 MHz. 
Table 4-1. Blasting Cap Test Plan 

pp = stimuli pin to pin 

pc = stimuli pin to case 

- 

DC Tests Number of Caps and Fi r i ng Mode 

D. C. Control Bruceton 50 PP 

Dynami c Res. 10 PP 

Static 15 PP 

D. C. Dudding 50 pp at 0.1% of D.C. Control for 

5 minutes, then BI-uceton 

Thermal Tine Constant 10 PP 

RF Tests 

R. F. Probes 

Frequency (HHZ) 

0.088 

1.5 

10 

150 

450 

2700 cw 

pu 1 sed 

5400 cw 

pu 1 sed 

8900 cw 

pu 1 sed 

RF Bruceton 

RF Dudding 

Exposures Exposures 

ee PC 

10 10 

10 10 

10 10 

10 10 

10 10 

10 10 

10 10 

10 10 

10 10 

10 10 

10 10 

50 50 

50 at 0.1% then D.C. Bruceton 
Table 4-2. Summary of dc Results 

- -- - -p -- - -- - -- 

Fi ring Levels (Amps) 

Average 

Bridgerri re 

Break T irie 

(fils) 

I. 028 

-353 

.762 

.527 

. 148 

. 183 

dR/dt 

(U~)I~IS/~ J 

126 

596 

80 5 

309 

1400 

1200 

I 

S

Scn

None 

tione 

tione 

None 

None 

None 

RF 

Dudding 

504 

.302 

-398 

.429 

.286 

.230 

.234 

ti3 P 

Designation 

A 

b 

C 

D 

E 

F 

Cap 

Type 

Inst. 

Uel ay 

Oe I ay 

Delay 

Ue 1 ay 

Inst. 

Average 

Bridgewi re 

Resistance 

(ohms ) 

1.2 

1-3 

1.2 

1.6 

2.9 

2. I 

D C 

Dudding 

SO*: 

.315 

-473 

,550 

.305 

.30l 

,312 

1 

D C 

Control Test 

99.9% 

2 

I 1 

0.14 

.254 

504 

2286 

.303 

.466 

.228 

& 

.266 

.3391.381 

.526 

.275 

.299 

3 

,594 

3 

.517 

.369 
Table 4-3. Sumnary of RF Results for Most Sensitive Conditions Tested 

Firing Levels (watts) 

dc Control 

Cap 

A 

B 

C 

D 

E 

F 

RF Pin-to-Pin RF P i ns- to-Case 

0.1% 

.078 

.I19 

.260 

.083 

.O87 

.I48 

Frequency 

(HHZ) 

1.5 

1 .5 

1.5 

1.5 

10 

10 

50% 

.og8 

.I49 

.332 

.I21 

.259 

,207 

Frequency 

(tltlz) 

9000 

5400 

1.5 

2700 

5400 

Modulation 

Mode 

cw 

cw 

cw 

cw 

cw 

cw 

99.3% 

.I24 

.I89 

.423 

.I75 

.775 

.286 

99.9% 

,157 

.389 

.399 

.I76 

.219 

1.069 

Modulation 

Mode 

P 

cw 

Not 

cw 

P 

P 

0.1% 

,580 

.770 

Fired 

,059 

.388 

.043 

0.1% 

.077 

.I64 

.275 

.O89 

.098 

.023 

50% 

.I10 

.253 

.331 

.I25 

.I46 

.I56 

20% 

3.312 

2.611 

.O85 

1.764 

.251 
I>iscussions of tile results for the individual caps follow. It should 

1)~- noted that all 0.1% and 99.9% firing levels mentioned in this report 

Iliive been determined with 95% confidence. 

4.1 CAPA 

DC Test Results. Tile dc control produced a mean firing level of 

0.286 amperes and a 0.1% firing level of 0.254 amperes. While these 

values marked this cap as one of the more sentitive caps it also 

appeared to liave one of the tightest spreads between 0.1% and 99.9% 

firing levels. Its dR/dt of 126 ohms/second was the lowest recorded 

and its average bridgewire break time of 1.028 ms was the longest 

determined time. The results of both the dc and RF dudding tests 

indicated a slight shift toward decreased sensitivitv. The RF dudding stimulus was 0.086 watts at 1.5 MHz cw, p-p. The dc dudding 

stimulus was 0.269 amperes. 

RF Test Results. All probing tests were conducted as previously 

indicated except that no firings were obtained at 0.088 MHz, pinsto-case at the firing levels we were able to generate. The most 

sensitive condition for pin-to-pin firing occurred at 1.5 MHz, cw 

where a 0.1% firing level of 0.077 watts was obtained. Furthermore, 

as in the case of the dc control Bruceton, the spread between 0.1% 

and 99.9% firing values was small. Comparison with the dc Bruceton 

indicates that the RF and dc levels are really quite comparable to 

each other as one would expect at 1.5 MHz in the bridgewire mode. 

The most sensitive condition in the pins-to-case mode occurred at 

9000 IIHz and the Uruceton test produced a 0.1% firing level of 

0.580 watts. The spread between 0.1% and 99.9% levels was large. 

In summary this cap indicated no marked pins-to-case sensitivity 

and its pin-to-pin sensitivity was in line with what one would expect from its dc sensitivity. 

4.2 CAP B 

DC Test Results. The dc control Bruceton test produced a mean firing 

level of 0.339 amperes and a 0.1% firing level of 0.303 amperes. 

This made it one of the least sensitive caps tested. The spread 

between 0.1% and 99.9% was acceptably small. dR/dt was 596 ohms/ 

sec, an intermediate change rate, and average bridgewire break time 

was 0.353 ms which was on the short side. The results of the dudding 

tests indicated some decrease of sensitivity was caused by preexposure although the effect was much more marked in the case of the 

dc exposures than it was in the case of the RF exposures. The shift 

produced by the dc exposure of 318 mA for 5 minutes was the largest 

produced on any cap in the evaluation. The RF dudding stimulus was 

0.192 watts at 1.5MHz cw, p-p. 
RF Test Results. All probing tests were conducted as previously 

indicated except no tests were conducted at 0.088 IIIIz, pins-to-case. 

The most sensitive pin-to-pin condition was determined to be at 

1.5 MHz, cw where the mean was 0.253 watts and the 0.1% firing 

level was 0.164 watts. This was somewhat less sensitive than the 

dc sensitivity and probably indicates some KF loss in the base even 

at this low frequency. The most sensitive pins-to-case condition 

was determined to be at 5400 >fHz cw, where 0.1% firing level of 

0.770 watts was produced which was tlle highest (least sensitive) 

value obtained in these tests. In summary, this cap demonstrated 

no unexpected KF sensitivity. 

4.3 CAP C 

DC Test Kesults. The dc control test produced a mean firing level 

of 0.526 amperes and a 0.1% firing level of 0.466 amperes. This 

was the least 'sensitivity of any of the caps tested. Bridgewire 

break time was 0.762 ms, one of the longer ones recorded and the 

dR/dt recorded was 805 ollms/sec, an intermediate rate. The results 

of the dudding tests were somewhat confusing. The caps exposed to 

a dc preexposure showed practically no significant shift in sensitivity from the dc control Bruceton. In the case of the KF preexposure, however, the caps showed a marked increase in sensitivity. 

While this increase in sensitivity did not make the cap unusually 

sensitive in co~nparison to all of the caps tested, it is an unusual 

result and indicates a possible need for further study. The RF 

dudding stimulus was 0.0293 watts at 1.5 MHz cw, p-p. The dc dudding 

stimulus was 0.496 amperes. 

RF Test Results. There were no exceptions to the probing test 

schedule for this cap. The most sensitive frequency for the pin-topin firing mode occurred at 1.5 MHz, cw where the mean firing level 

was determined to be 0.331 watts and the 0.1% firing level was 0.275. 

This compares very favorably with the dc control Bruceton results. 

There was no determination of pins-to-case sensitivity by Bruceton 

testing for this item. The RF probing tests showed that this item 

is relatively insensitive in pins-to-case exposure and in consequence a Bruceton test would have been impossible to perform with 

available equipment. We feel that it is safe to assume, on the 

basis of the RF probing data, that this cap is less sensitive pinsto-case than pin-to-pin at its most sensitive point so that the pinto-pin RF Bruceton data can be used as an upper limit on the pinsto-case sensitivity. 

4.4 CAP D 

UC Test Results. The dc control Bruceton test produced a mean firing 

level of 0.275 amperes and a 0.1% firing level of 0.228 amperes. 

These levels indicate it is one of the more sensitive caps tested. 
A bridgewire break time of 0.527 ms was recorded along with a d~/dt 

of 309 ohrns/second, both intermediate. Both dudding tests, dc and 

RF yreexTosure, indicated no significant shift in sensitivity. The 

KF dudding stimulus was 0.105 watts at 1.5 Mlfz cw, p-p. The dc 

dudding stimulus was 0.252 amperes. 

l<F Test Results. There were no exceptions to the probing test 

schedule on these caps. The most sensitive condition in the pinto-yin mode was determined to be at 1.5 MIIz, cw where the mean firing 

level was found to be 0.125 watts and the 0.12 firing level was 

comp~lted at 0.089 watts. This coincided almost exactly with the 

dc control Bruceton test results. For this device tlle most sensitive 

pins-to-case sensitivity was at 1.5 PflIz, cw where the mean firing 

level was 0.085 watts and the 0.1% firing level was 0.059 watts. 

This was the nost sensitive pins-to-case mean value recorded on any 

of the caps tested. 

4.5 CAP E 

DC Test Results. The dc control Bruceton produced a mean firing 

level of 0.299 amperes and a 0.1% firing level of 0.173 amperes. 

This was the lowest 0.1% firing level computed from the dc control 

tests. In addition the bridgewire break time of 0.148 ms was the 

shortest time recorded for any of the caps tested and the dK/dt of 

1400 ohms/second was the largest rate of increase recorded. Neitller 

the dc or RF dudding response test indicated any significant effect 

due to the preexposure of tlre cap to the dudding stimulus. The RF 

dudding stimulus was 0.114 watts at 10 MHz cw, p-p. The dc dudding 

stimulus was 0.239 amperes. 

RF Test Results. There were no exceptions for this device in the 

RF probing test schedule. The most sensitive RF pin-to-pin condition 

was found to occur at 10 MHz, cw where the mean firing level was 

found to be 0.146 watts and the 0.1% firing level was calculated to 

be 0.098 watts. Comparing the mean firing levels of this test and 

the dc control test indicates that the RF sensitivity has shifted 

to somewhat more sensitive condition. However, the spread of data 

on the RF test was even tighter than on the dc control test this 

resulted in cornparable 0.1% firing levels for both tests. We, therefore, concluded that the dc levels and the most sensitive pin-topin RF levels are substantially the same. The most sensitive pinsto-case RF sensitivity occurred at 2.7 GHz, pulsed where the mean 

firing level was found to be 1.764 watts and the 0.12 firing level 

was computed as 0.388 watts. This is a relatively insensitive response. 
4.6 CAP F 

DC Test Results. The dc control Bruceton test produced a'mean firing 

level of 0.314 amps and a 0.1% firing level of 0.266 amps. This is 

a medium sensitivity for the set of caps considered in this study. 

The bridgewire breaktime was 0.183 ms, a relatively short time, 

and the d~/dt was 1200 ohms/second, a relatively large rate of 

change. The results of the dc and RF dudding preexposure tests 

indicated no significant effect from the dudding stimulus. The 

RF dudding stimulus was 0.053 watts at 10 MHz, cw, p-p. The dc 

dudding stimulus was 0.290 amperes. 

RF Test Results. No exceptions to the RF probing tests schedule 

were made with this cap. The most sensitive condition was judged 

to occur at 10 MHz, cw where the mean firing level was determined 

to be 0.156 watts and the 0.1X firing level was computed as 0.023 

watts. This cap, as in the case of Cap Ey indicated an increased 

sensitivity for the RF mean over the dc control mean. At this 

relatively low RF frequency and in the pin-to-pin or bridgewire 

mode this is an unusual occurrence. However, this cap also had a 

relatively wide spread of response and as a result produced the 

lowest 0.1 firing level of any cap in this study, 0.023 watts. 

The most sensitive pin-to-case response occurred at 5400 I-fHz, 

pulsed where tile mean firing level was determined to be 0.251 watts 

and the 0.1% firing level was computed as 0.043 watts. This is 

the lowest 0.1% pin-to-case level determined in this evaluation. 
It must be noted when considering the data in this report that the 

data was gathered to evaluate the performance of the overall group of 

caps, not any individual cap. With this understanding certain overall 

conclusions may be considered. 

The dc sensitivity firing characteristics of all the caps are similar. 

The 0.1% firing levels range from 173 ma to 466 ma and the 99.9% firing 

levels range from 321 ma to 594 ma. No particularly unusual sensitivity 

is indicated nor any particular difficulty in producing fires. Furthermore, for the most part, there seems to be little chance of producing 

duds or dangerously sensitive caps by preexposure to either low level RF 

or dc. Of course, every measure should be taken to eliminate the possibility of such preexposure, but the data indicates that while some changes 

occurred, these changes did not alter the sensitivity of the caps to 

unacceptable levels. 

The d~/dt data, while of interest for many special calculations 

probably has a minimal effect on 'performance since the changes occur in 

such a short time and just before firing. 

Bridgewire break time is meaningful only when used with other information as indicated earlier. All of the manufacturers of these caps 

seem to have taken adequate steps to minimize personnel borne static 

sensitivity since no indication of static sensitivity was observed in the 

tests. It must be remembered, however, that electrostatic sources other 

than that used in the personnel borne static tests can produce much worse 

conditions both in terms of capacitance and voltage so one must not construe the results to lower the need for proper handling. 

In the case of the RE' tests, the pin-to-pin tests indicated that the 

most sensitive condition for all caps occurred at the low frequency end 
of the frequency range listed and paralleled the dc sensitivity. This 

indicates that functioning for pin-to-pin RF exposure of these caps is 

by bridgewire heating as in the case of the dc exposure. Cap F is a 

possible exception to this statement and no explanation is offered for 

the pin-to-pin results on that cap at this time. It should be noted that 

even though the pin-to-pin response of the rest of the caps is strp-ightforward and exactly as one-would predict from normal cap behavior, the 

potential RF firing levels are low enough to be of concern. Even if we 

ignore the 23 mw, 0.1% firing level of Cap F, we still have levels as 

low as 77 mw with which to contend. With this low level a user should 

be aware of his RF environment in any firing set-up and be prepared to 

take steps to minimize resulting problems. 

The majority of these caps show no significant sensitivity to pinsto-case applied RF. Caps ]> and F are the exceptions. Cap D has a 0.059 

watt 0.1Z firing level at 1.5 1.111~ cw. The 0.043 watt 0.1% level of Cap 

F, at 5400 MHz p, is more in keeping with the type of behavior we have 

observed in other electroexplosives investigations. The same comments 

about user awareness of the RF environment made in the last paragraph 

are reinforced by these relatively low RF pinstto-case sensitivities. 
6. PREDICTING THE RF POWER PICKUP OF BLASTING CAPS 

INTRODUCTION 

The use of electrically initiated blasting caps in blasting operations 

creates the possibility of the initiation of explosives by electrical 

energy sources not directly under the user's control. The most commonly 

recognized of these sources are: lightning; static electricity; electromagnetic communication; navigation or search systems; galvanic potentials 

and ground currents. 

The electroexplosive devices used in blasting are designed to be 

initiated by the rapid heating of a low resistance (about 1 ohm) wire 

in contact with a fairly sensitive explosive. Premature initiation will 

occur whenever an uncontrolled source of energy can sufficiently heat the 

wire or when sufficient electrical energy can be delivered directly to the 

sensitive explosive. The latter may occur whenever the electrical potential between the initiating wire and the case of the electroexplosive 

device is high enough. Figure 6-1 is a crude schematic of a typical 

blasting cap. Normally, a voltage is applied between points A and B to 

cause initiation. We refer to this mode as the pin-to-pin firing mode. 

If the energy source voltage is applied between points A and C, or B and 

C, the mode is pin-to-case. 

We are concerned, in this report, specifically with the pickup from 

electromagnetic communication equipment and other unspecified radiating 

equipment that might be in use in underground mining operations. Our 

final object is to predict distances from these sources at which blasting 

caps can be used safely. 

A strict analytical solution to the general problem of determining 

aboveground safe distance from a source of radio frequency power requires 

complete knowledge of the power output of the source, the effect of 
rLEAD WIRES n PLUG /-WIRE BRIDGE 

LMETAL CASE SENSITIVE ---A LSECONDAR

MIX EXPLOSIVE 

Figure 6-1. Schematic of a Typical Blasting Cap 
distance, t5e ability of wiring in the blasting circuit to pick up energy, 

and the amount of power necessary for initiation of a blasting cap. This 

would be a formidable problem even in an ideal case; in practice the difficulties become unsurmountable. The presence of objects, terrain features, 

and soil moisture, which -may absorb or reflect power; the fact that the 

wiring of the blasting circuit is randomly laid out and is not usually 

divisible into neat geometric segments which can be analyzed and related 

to the plane of polarization of the offending field - all these are complications which make a strict analytical solution virtually impossible 

even for aboveground operations. The underground problem is further 

complicated. Figure 6-2 is a rough sketch of a section of underground 

tunnel that exemplifies some of these further complicating features. The 

sketch tries to illustrate the possibilities of tunnel geometry irregularity, and the presence of field perturbing objects such as vehicles 

and power lines. In sum, even for the simplest well defined geometry 

and source/blasting wiring configuration the hope of an exact analytical 

solution to the pickup problem is hopeless. We must make some simplifying 

assumptions and, since we are concerned with personnel/explosive safety 

situations, they must be selected so that any resulting error due to the 

assumptions will occur on the side of caution. 

An analysis using such assumptions is called "worst-case". The 

result of a worst case analysis indicating safety may be taken as quite 

safe indeed; the lack of such a result should be interpreted as indicating 

that safety cannot be proved, not necessarily that a hazard exists. 

As mentioned in the introduction to this report, the specific problem 

of analytically predicting possible RF hazards to blasting caps can be 

reduced to finding answers to the following three questions: 

(1) How much power, at the frequency of concern, 

is necessary to function the caps? 

(2) How much power, at the frequency of concern, 

is coupled to the cap by a unit amplitude field 

existing in the vicinity of the cap and its associated 

wiring? 
Figure 6-2. Underground Complications 
(3) What fields will exist, at the frequency of 

concern, in the vicinity of the blasting cap 

and its wiring for a given source, physical 

environment and separation? 

The following sections present worst case answers to the above 

questions. 

FUNCTIONING 

The amount of power necessary to function the caps can be determined, 

from a worstcase viewpoint, by consideration of Figure 6-3 which summarizes the RF Bruceton test results of Sections 3 and 4. The large 

arrows of Figure 6-3 indicate the frequencies at which the RF probing 

tests were performed. These frequencies were selected as those most 

likely to be used in any high RF power equipment with vhich underground 

blasting operations might interact. Note also that these frequencies 

provide a fairly even sampling of the overall frequency interval of concern. The circles connected by solid vertical lines indicate the mean 

and 0.1% firing level (95% confidence) for the pin-to-pin Bruceton tests. 

The squares connected by dashed lines indicate the same levels for the 

pin-to-case Brucetons. Since the frequencies at which the Bruceton tests 

were fired were selected as the .most sensitive of the frequencies probed, 

the Bruceton test results can be used as a good frequency independent 

approximation to the most sensitive firing levels for the caps. Roughly, 

the top of each vertical line in Figure 6-3 represents a power level at 

which one-half of the caps fired during a Bruceton test. The power level 

at the bottom of the line (0.1% level, 95% confidence) is the predicted 

level at which no more than one in a thousand of the caps would fire. 

The 0.1% level (with 95% confidence) has been used, for about the past 

fifteen years, as a general level at which exposures of electroexplosives 

could be tolerated without undue risk. This level has not been determined 

for blasting caps in general but a level of 0.04 watts (for any frequency 

and firing mode) has been used as an approximation for American made caps 

for many years. The data of Figure 6-3 would seem to contradict 

this assumption since a 0.1% level of 0.023 watts at 10 MHz is indicated. 

However, this level, as well as the 0.043 watt pin-to-case 0.1% level 

*at 5400 MHz, is associated with Cap F, a cap of foreign manufacture. So 

we see that the use of a 0.04 watt level as a tolerable exposure level 

for caps of American manufacture is in keeping with the data determined 

by the experiments. In particular the data shows that the use of a 0.04 

watt level as an approximation to the 0.1% firing level is conservative 

for the American made caps that would be encountered in underground 

blasting operations. 

6.3 COUPLING TO THE CAP 

The determination of the power coupled to the cap, at the frequency 

of concern, by a unit amplitude field in the vicinity of the cap and its 

wiring is essentially a determination of a pickup model for the cap and 

its wiring. In line with our worst case approach to the overall problem 

we must choose a pickup model which maximizes the total power picked up 

by the cap at all frequencies and yet is in accord with the physical 

aspects of the cap and its wiring. 

Figure 6-4 is a layout sketch for the boring of a 38 hole blast of 

a 28' wide heading in a copper mine. Figure 6-5 shows how the blasting 

cap leg wires (which will extend from each hole after hole loading) will 

be connected together for connections to the shot line. Figure 6-6 is a 

sketch of how the wired face and shot line might appear after connection. 

During the loading and connection of the face, the caps and their attached 

wires assume several distinct configurations. These configurations are 

identical from a vorst case viewpoint, to those formed in almost any 

underground blasting operation. The configurations of concern are: 

1) Caps in their original packing configuration. 

2) Caps with leg wires extended, but leg wires still 

shorted, both in the bore hole and before insertion 

in the hole. 
38 HOLE ROUND FOR 28' WIDE HEADING 

WITH 0-2.0' OF BASAL MASSIVE S.S 

28' HEADING -------- 

Figure 6-4. Layout for Face Boring 

DELAY NO. 

I (0) 

I 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

ALL 

CAPS REO~D j 

10 

2 

2 

2 

6 

6 

6 

4 

TOTA1.38CAPS 

Figure 6-6. Shot Line and Wired Face 

6-10 
3) Cap in bore hole with the short removed from leg 

wires. 

4) Caps connected leg to leg and final legs shorted. 

[Wired, shorted face]. 

5) Wired face connected to either a shorted or an 

open shot line. 

Figures 6-7, 6-8 and 6-9 are sketches of aboveground blasting wiring 

lavouts that have been considered as antennas. Reference 2 treats the 

models for these configurations in detail and concludes that the best 

overall antenna model for aboveground layouts is that of the vertical 

loop antenna of Figures 6-8 and 6-9. The sketches of Figures 6-10 and 

6-11 show that the vertical loop antenna configurations can ~lso be formed 

in underground blasting layouts. The half-wavelength dipole configuration 

of Figure 6-7 can also be formed in underground layouts for RF sources with 

wavelengths equal to twice the length of cap lead wire extending from a 

loaded bored hole. Many other antenna configurations can also be identified 

in underground layouts but they do not differ significantly from those of 

aboveground layouts. The arguments presented by Reference 2 for the use 

of the vertical loop antenna as a worst case antenna for aboveground 

blasting layouts are still valid for underground blasting wiring configurations. There are no configurations formed underground that are significantly different, in an RF pickup point of view, from those formed aboveground. We will, therefore, use the vertical loop for our underground 

pickup determination. 

Reference 2 derives the worst case aperture for the vertical loop 

antenna as 9 

square meters, 
TRANSMITTING ANTEPiN b 

Figure 6-7. Possible Blasting Configuration and Transrni tting Antenna b!hich I1 

the Horizontal Hal f-\#lavelength Dipole Antenna Model. 
VERTICALLY 

POLARIZED 

TRANSM ITTlNG 

ANTENNP 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

BLASTING 

MACHINE 

A 

a 

- 

* a 

- C F 

/-, 

- > 

TO 

Figure 6-8. Possible Blasting Configuration and Transmitting Antenna Orientation, 

I1 1 ustrates wi th Vertical Loop Antenna Model. 
I VERTICALLY POLARIZED TRANSMITTING 

BLASTING 

MACHINE 

Figure 6-9. Pin-to-Case Sensitive B
Figure 6-10. Pin-to-Pin Vertical Loop Underground Configuration. 

where 

A is the worst case aperture in square meters and f is the frequency e Mc 

in Megahertz. 

Figure 6-12 plots Ae-as a function of frequency. 

The power delivered to the electrical load connected to an antenna 

can be computed, with certain limitations, by multiplying the aperture 

of the antenna/load combination by the incident power density. If Pd 

2 (watts/meter ) is the power density incident on the antenna and A 

e 

(square meters) is the effective aperture of the antenna/blasting cap 

combination, than the power delivered to the blasting cap load is W R 

(watts) where 

=P A 'R d e 

Appendix D is an excerpt from Reference 2 that contains most of the 

detailed derivation of the worst case nature of the vertical loop antenna 

aperture. The interested reader is referred to Reference 2 in its entirety 

for a complete understanding of the method of derivation. Reference 1 is 

also helpful. We would like to note here, however, that the vertical loop 

aperture as given above is an upper limit on any linear antenna having the 

same ratio between area and perimeter and the same electrical loading 

conditions as those used to derive the vertical loop aperture. In effect 

the aperture of the vertical loop as given by Figure 6-12 is an upper 

bound (at any frequency) for any vertical loop in the blasting wiring of 

a smaller linear dimension than that used to generate Figure 6-12. 

In addition it can be shown that for frequencies higher than the peak 

of the aperture curve of Figure 6-12, the curve is an upper limit on any 

linear antenna of total length less than or equal to the perimeter of the 

loop on which Figure 6-12 is based [7.35 meters]. 

6.4 -:'HE FIELD IN THE VICINITY OF THE BLASTING CAP AND ITS ASSOCIATED 

WIRING 

The fields in the vicinity of the blasting wiring are primarily 

dependent on the source characteristics (output power, antenna configuration, frequency and modulation type), the geometry of the mine tunnels, 

the locations of tlle source and the blasting wiring, and the electromagnetic charcteristics of the geological strata in which the mine is located. 

Distances between possible sources and the blasting wiring can be 

controlled and source characteristics, at least those known, can also be 

controlled by limiting the types of equipment that can be used in underground mining. The parameters of interest are, therefore, the uncontrollable parameters: mine geometry and the electromagnetic parameters of the 

geological strata. Appendix E lists a number of papers and articles that 

deal with underground propagation of electromagnetic waves. Some of these, 

particularly those dealing with the electromagnetic properties of minersls, 

were quite useful and are referenced in the following discussion. 

6.4.1 Electromagnetic Parameters 

Many basic electromagnetic field texts 14' l5 point out that for media 

that are homogeneous, isotropic and linear the electromagnetic behavior 

of the medium is completely defined if the complex permittivity and complex permeability are known as functions of frequency. Although the 

minerals usually encountered in coal mining may be inhomogeneous, anisotropic and non-linear we expect these characteristics to be confined to 

localized small volumes so that the overall behavior of the mineral can 

be specified by some complex macroscopic permeability and permittivity. 

The real parts of these complex quantities are simply the familiar mzgnetic 

permeability and dielectric constant of the medium. The imaginary parts 

of the complex parameters determine the loss (power dissipating) characteristics of the medium. The losses associated with magnetic phenomena, and 

magnetic phenomena in general, are usually associated with relatively pure 
materials with magnetic permeability considerably greater than that of 

free space. In the geologic strata of coal mine workings such materials 

are not to be expected in large enough amounts to seriously change the 

results of an analysis based on a magnetically lossless media of the 

same magnetic permeability as that of free space. - 

The dielectric and conduction losses associated with the complex 

permittivity are another matter, however. We will assume, in this report, 

that all losses are associated with the resistivity of the media. Actually 

the division of the total loss between dielectric loss and conduction loss 

mechanisms depends on frequency but since the only data available on 

mineral electromagnetic parameters has been gathered in such a way as to 

lump all losses into resistivity losses, we have no other choice. Thiq 

procedure does us no harm since we are only interested in macroscopic 

behavior of the media. With the above considerations we need only the 

dielectric constant and resistivity of a medium to completely characterize 

it electromagneticly. 

Study of the papers and articles listed in Appendix E, plus searches 

of the open literature, indicate that good detailed data on the electromagnetic parameters of the minerals likely to be encountered in coal 

mining operations are not availab.le. References 16, 17 and 18 indicate, 

however, that relative dielectric constant values varying between 2 and 

10 seem to cover almost all coal mine encounterable minerals. This holds 

for all frequencies greater than 10 KHz. The resistivities of minerals 

vary rapidly with water content. The data of Reference 16 shows resistivities of about 180 ohm meters for the wet rocks investigated. Study 

of the Reference 17 data indicates that resistivities of 10 to 1000 ohm 

meters might to expected as normal for wet rock. In any event the bibliographic entries and the pertinent references above agree that the resistivity of the rocks likely to be encountered in coal mining operations 

will vary widely depending on the water content. The water content in 

turn varies with the rock porosity and local geographical features. About 

the only reasonably reliable deduction we can make for purposes of our 
analysis is that the resistivity of the wet rocks likely to be encountered 

in mining operations should be somewhere between 100 and 1000 ohm meters, 

Ln sum, the result of our reference search is that the relative 

dielectric constant of the minerals likely to be encountered will be - 

between 2 and 10 and the resistivity between 100 and 1000-ohm meters. The 

relative permeability of the minerals can be assumed to be that of free 

space. The above conclusions hold for wet rock. The resistivity of dry 

rock should be considerably greater than 1000 ohm meters ranging to 10 10 

ohm meters under ideal conditions. 

6.4.2 TEFI Propagation 

With the electromagnetic parameters of the minerals known, the propagation constant for transverse electromagnetic (TEM) waves may be 

calculated for the minerals. In truth, such waves can never exist exactly 

and probably the fields ..ropagating along a mine drift will not be even 

approximately TEM; nevertheless, the TEM propagation constant will provide 

a useful reference point for the rest of our calculations. 

Reference 14 derives expressions for the TEM propagation constant. 

We will, by the way, adhere strictly to the notation of Reference 14 in 

all of our electromagnetic calculations unless otherwise noted. The 

reader who is unfamiliar with electromagnetic propagation problems and 

wishes to follow our reasoning in detail should consult ~eferences 14 and 

15 or other similar texts. In general the propagation constant 

defines the variation of the total electromagnetic field solution with 

distance. Thus, for propagation in the z direction, 

jut, where A. = A e , A is a complex constant, 

j=fi, u is the angular frequency, is the real instantaneous 
value of one of the electric or magnetic field components and the Re 

operation extracts the real part of the complex quanity to which it 

is applied. The significance of a, the attenuation constant, is easily 

seen if we rewrite (6-2) as 

Since pof (6-3) represents all or any of the solutions field components, 

the power density of the solution varies as the square of the magnitude 

of,p. Thus the power density of the solution Pd varies as 

where 

P is the power density in convenient units, d 

C is a constant, 

a is the attenuation constant (nepers/meter), and 

z is the distance parameter in the direction of propagation (meters) . 

Since the power density is the parameter of major concern in the 

calculation of pickup by the blasting wiring our interest in a parameter 

of the type of the attenuation constant is obvious. Reference 14 gives, 

after simple manipulation of some of the units, 

6, the phase constant is given by the same expression as (6-5) but the 

minus sign under the radical must be charged to plus. In (6-5), 

is frequency in megahertz, 

E is the relative dielectric constant (unitless) and R 
p is the resistivity in ohm-meters. 

Figure 6-13 plots a for various values of p and E and Figure 6-14 plots R 

f3 for the same values. 

Study of Figure 6-13 shows that the very low frequency TEM attenuation is dependent primarily on resistivity whereas the high frequency 

attenuation depends on both the dielectric constant and the resistivity. 

The high frequency asympotic values for TEM a are 

Figure 6-14 shows that while the low frequency phase constant behavior 

is primarily dependent on resistivity, the high frequency behavior is wholly 

determined by tlle dielectric constant (for the resistivity range of 1 to 

1000) . Thus at high frequencies 

radians 

We are interested, however, not only in the high and low frequency limits. 

Our concern is also directed to the middle frequencies where, we have 

seen, the aperture of the blasting wiring can have a maximum. 

6.4.3 A General Approach to the Propagation Problem 

Our objective in the study of the possible propagation in coal mines 

is to determine a reasonably good estimate of the minimum attenuation that 

will occur between two points in the mine. Now even if the mine drift 

were a perfectly regular rectangular or cylindrical hole in an almost 

perfect conductor we would have great difficulty in determining the actual 

propagation exactly. The main problems in this case would be determining 

how much of the transmitted energy was in each of an infinite number of 

"modes" permitted by the geometry. We could calculate the atteguation 

for each mode to a very good approximation since this problem has been 

completely solved for certain regular geometries. If we desired a worst case 


estimate of propagation in this case we could use the value of the smallest 

attenuation constant for any of the modes and be sure that our estimate 

was good. 

One of our first approaches to the overall problem was to try to 

determine the equations-that define the propagation constants for a smooth 

walled rectangular hole in the medium described by the electromagnetic 

parameters (i.e. 2 < E < 10, 10 < P < 1000) that describe the minerals - R- - - 

in which the drift is located. Figure 6-15 is a sketch of the geometry 

for this case. The classical approach to the solution of a problem of 

this type is to assume a separable solution for the fields such that all 

the boundry conditions are satisfied. If this assumed solution satisfies 

Maxwell's equations then it is "the" solution since a gezeral theoreom 

of "uniqueness of solution" applies. What it amounts to is "cut and try" 

but the "cut" can, for simple problems, be a well-guided guess; not some 

random choice. The successful result of such a procedure in a complicated 

problem such as we face is not the final answer, however. What is usually 

obtained is a set of complex transcendental equations involving the propagation constant, y, the dimensions related to the geometry and the 

electromagnetic parameters of the media. If all the values of y that 

simultaneously satisfy the equations can be found, then the overall propagation problem would be solved and we would be in the same position for 

our problem of very lossy material as we are for the slightly lossy conductor problem of normal waveguide theory. 

We realized early in our attempt to obtain the a defining equation 

for the very lossy material that the equations would be extremely difficult to solve for the as, but we hoped to be able to take limits for 

resistivity and demonstrate that the equations were indeed compatible 

with the slightly lossy waveguide solutions which are well known. There 

was also the hope that perhaps the equations would not be "all that" 

difficult to solve. In any event we couldn't even determine the defining 

equations. The classical approach of assuring a separable solution of 

exponential functions leads to overspecification of the propagation 
Figure 6-15. Geometry for the General Rectangular Waveguide Problem 
constants and so we conclude that no simple separable solution exists. 

This is good reason to suspect that no separable :qolution exists in 

rectangular coordinates. The problem in cylindrical coordinates for a 

round mine tunnel does appear to be simpler but it was not investigated. 

While considering our next step we observed that even a complete 

solution for a rectangular drift in the minerals would not provide us 

with the sort of worst case information we desired. Many, if not most, 

mines have metal pipes, metal rails, electrical power cables or telephone 

wires that run along the drifts. Certainly the presence of the conductor 

in the drift would be expected to provide a "guiding" aspect to any electromagnetic propagation along the drift and thus allow propagation with 

a considerably lower attenuation than would be expected (or calculated) 

for the drift alone. 

We can thus see that a general solution that does not include the 

possible presence of conductors along the drift will not give a worst 

case estimate. 

6.4.4 Propagation With a Conductor in the Drift 

We would expect that, for single conductor the drift, the 

larger the surface area of the conductor the lower the atte~uation. Thus 

a mine drift having rails for ore cars would provide lower attenuation 

than the same drift with only a telephone line present. We also speculate 

that a drift with a layer of highly conducting water on the floor would 

represent a practical limit in this respect. A possible geometry for 

this case is shown in Figure 6-16. We estimate that the solution for the 

propagation constants for the geometry of Figure 6-16 would be considerably 

more difficult to determine than the general solution for a smooth rectangular hole. 

A simplification of the estimation problem can be expected, however, 

if the drift is very wide in relation to its height. Figure 6-17 suggests 

this condition. For this geometry the electromagnetic field configuration 

in the portion of the drift between the dotted lines AA' and BB' of 
PERFECT 

( (1 DRIFT MINERALS 5 

CONDUCTOR 

Figure 6-16. Section o'f a Drift with a Good Conductor on the Floor 

1:i~ure 6-17 could be ciilc:ulated, at least for a port ion of tlle frequency 

t)ilnds of interest, ils if tile dimension "a" of Figure 6-17 were infinite. 

t:~~-t ller , we would ilxpec. t sucll a determination to give attenuation values 

1owt.r tl~iln tllose dctermined by a ~rocedure that considers "a" as finite. 

'l'llis is due, in tile main, to tlle fact that less of tile field will be 

1-thquired to be in tllr lossy material and llence we will have lower attenuation. \Je thus reason tllat tlle attenuation constants for a infinitely 

widtb drift wit11 i1 perfectly conducting floor will provide us with a worst 

cS'ise cstimatt. of propagation in coal mines. 'rllis geometry is shown in 

Figurc 6-18. 

6.4.5 The Worst Case Propagation Constants 

The propagation constants for the geometry of Figure 6-18 are the 

same as those for the geometry of Figure 6-19. Figure 6-19 illustrates 

that our geometry of Figure 6-18 can be imaged in the perfect conductor 

to obtain a new geometry. The constraint imposed for solutions in Figure 

6-19 is that all electric fields are zero half way between the planes. 

This problem, with this odd symmetry constraint, is addressed by Reference 14. The problem yields to the classical- approach and since there 

is only one dimension of variation, other than the direction of propagation, 

we obtain only one complex transcendental equation. The equation is 

K 

tan (Kdb) = j c 

K E* d RC 

where 

b is the dimension shown in Figure 6-18, meters 

2 K~ =Jy2+w p E meters -1 

0 0' 

2 * -1 K = Jy2 + w p r cRC , meters , 

C 0 0 
DRIFT MINERAL 

I \ 

PERFECT CONDUCTOR 

Figure 6-18. Section of the Infinitely Wide Drift with a Conducting Flow 
DRIFT MINERAL 

DRIFT MINERAL 

Figure 6-19. Image Geometry 
. -- 

f = frequency, Hertz 

= permeability of air, henries/meter 

E = permittivity of air, farads/meter 

0 

€ =€ + RC RC ~WPE~, , unitless, the 

relative-complex dielectric constant of the drift mineral 

E = the relative real dielectric constant of the drift 

RC mineral 

p = resistivity of the drift mineral, ohm meters 

-1 y = a + jf.3, the propagation constant, meters 

a = the attenuation constant, nepers/meter 

f.3 = the phase constant, radians/meter 

Note that if we assume that we know p, E b and frequency the only RC' 

unknuzns in equation 6-6 are a and 8. Thus values of y= a + jf.3 that 

satisfy equation 6-6 are the propagation constants we desire to find. 

For our worst case estimate we further require, for each set of values 

of p, \c, b and frequency assumed, the y that has the smallest real 

part, a . 

Analytical solution of 606 for general values of the parameters is: 

,impossible; however, if p is very small, the equation approximates a nontranscendental equation that can be solved. This aspect is the one that 

promoted the derivation of this equation in Reference 14. We will use 

this limiting case later as a check for our general non-analytic solution. 

In order to formulate a non-analytic solution we can define a new 

real quantity q such that 

- C 

- tan -- ' I 

where the vertical bands denote magnitude. Now, values of y that satisfy 

equation 6-6 force q of equation 6-7 to be zero; thus our desired ys are 

the roots of equation 6-7. The overall situation can be visualized as a 

three dimensional function, For a certain set of frequency, p, E RC and b 
values, a, B and q can be related by equation 6-7 and plotted in the 

coordinates of Figure 6-20. For every set of parameter (D, f, eRC 

and b) values, q will be a surface over the a, B plane. The roots of 

the function will be those values of a and B for which q = 0. Equation 

6-7 shows that q is non-negative so we can imagine each q surface as a 

surface over the a, B plane. 

The roots of equation 6-7 can be determined in various ways. Our 

first approach was to obtain a set of tabular values of q versus a region 

in the a, plane for a given E p, f and b. The tabular data were RC' 

studied and locations of roots could be found for some cases. In general, 

however, the effects of the roots were relatively local and they were hard 

to find. Figure 6-21 is a photograph of a "q" surface plotted for a 

discrete set of a, B values. The surface is that for a frequency of 150 

EfHz, a mineral relative dielectric constant (E ) of 2, a resistivity RC 

(c) of 1000 ohm meters and a spacing (b) of 2 meters. The pencil locations 

in the photograph are close to the locations of two roots. These roots 

were not found by observation of the data that made up the three dimensional plot. Indeed, Figure 6-21 shows that the surface is quite irregular 

and that plotting is not, in general, an effective method of root location. 

The tabular data used for the plotting approach were, of course, 

computer generated. It required about fifty minutes of hand calculation 

with an HP-35 calculator to evaluate one value of equation 6-7. This 

hand calculated value was used to check the computer program that was 

written to calculate q. 

Since plotting was not effective in finding the roots we decided to 

use a "hill climbing", or in our case "hill descending", computer approach. 

In this scheme a value of q is calculated b? equation 6-7 for the parameter set of interest. The values of a arc7 B used for this first computation are specified, call them a and B . Next a set of values of q for 

0 0 

several points in the neighborhood of (a Bo) are calculated and examined. 

0' 

The a and B values associated with the lowest value of q of this set of 

qs is then used as a new (a f3 ).point and the iteration is repeated. 0' 0 
Figure 6-20. Three Dimentional Rectangular Coordinates 

Thus the computer program will always be dealing with a point that is 

"downhill" of the previous point. If this continues long enough the 

program will always arrive at a zero of the q function or a local minimum. 

A more exact approach can be taken in this scheme by evaluating the 

gradient of the q function in terms of a and B at (a B ) and stepping 0' 0 

in the directian of the gradient. This method theoretically converges 

faster since the direction of the gradient is the direction of steepest 

descent. Actual convergence time depends however on the scheme used to 

choose the size of the step. We used only the first described scheme 

that evaluates points close to (a Bo) 

6.4.6 Determi nation of the Propagation Constants 

A computer program using the hill descending technique and the 

previously checked out q calculation program was written in FORTRAN V. 

Appendix E-shows the program and some sample output. The program 

evaluated the q function at 8 points evenly spaced about (a Bo), the 

0' 

program starting point. One thousand iterations are performed. The 

first set of sample output is for the parameter set of a frequency of 

150 MHz, a dielectric constant of 2, a resistivity of 1000 and a spacing 

of 2. The (ao, B ) point chosen to start the program was (0.01, 14.627) . 0 

After 1000 iterations the value of q was found to be about 7.9 x 

at a (a, B) location of (0.0265, 14.47). The sample output also shows 

the intermediate values of q, a and B for each iteration evenly divisable 

by 10. The overall running time on a UNIVAC 1108 is about 10 seconds for 

the 1000 iterations. 

The second set of sample output is a check of the entire computation 

scheme. It shows a value of q of 2.32 x for an a of 6.693 x 

and a €3 of 3.1415996. The parameters are a frequency of 150 MHz, a 

-7 dielectric constant of 2, a resistivity of 1.73 x 10 ohm meters and a 

spacing of 2 meters. We mentioned earlier that Reference 14 derived 

equation 6-6 and then took limits to use the resulting equation for a 

slab waveguide loss evaluation. The parameter set above agrees with the 
limiting operations performed in Reference 14. Using their results, 

p.382 of Reference 14, and our parameter set we obtain an a of 6.6925 x 

and a f3 of 3.1415994. The close agreement between the results of 

our program and those of Reference 14 shows that our root evaluation 

program gives correct answers. 

- Appendix G gives all the roots found by the computer program. Figures 

6-22 and 6-23 plot roots for three different parameter sets. Note that 

the legends on the figures give values for L t is exactly equivalent R* R 

to c used previously. These symbols are used interchangeably from RC 

here on in the test and on the figure leg ends. Figure 6-22 is concerned 

only with sets containing E = 2. Roots associated with E = 2, p = 1000, R R 

and b = 2 meters are plotted as crosses (X), with E = 2, p = 100 and R 

b = 2 as circles with dots (0) and with E = 2, p = 1000 and b = 1 as R 

triangles with dots A. Figure 6-23 uses the same legend but is only 

concerned with E = 10. R 

study of Figures 6-22 and 6-23 shows that at the low frequencies the 

infinitely wide drift is behaving as a waveguide and that its attenuation 

would be predictable from the slab line equations. At intermediate frequencies (Q 50 MHz) the attenuation peaks and then the mineral behavior 

begins to be dominated by the dielectric properties and we obtain a sort 

of surface wave phenomena with more and more of the wave being bound 

tightly to the conductor and the lossless air space. Note the numerous 

higher order a values shown on Figures 6-22 and 6-23. Each of these 

corresponds to a higher order mode. It is of considerable interest to 

observe that some of these modes show very high attenuations at only 

moderate frequencies so that any energy in these modes is likely to be 

quickly dissipated. 

Figures 6-22 and 6-23 also plot the TEM u values for reference. 

Figure 6-24 plots some values of the phase constant (B) for E - 10. At 

R 

the higher frequencies lfmz > 501 the lowest a values were associated 

with B values very close to the free space propagation constant for the 

same frequency . 

Figure 6-25 shows an approximation of the a curves of Figures 6-22 

and 6-23 that is no larger than any of the determined attenutation 

6-39 


0.OOOl I I I I I 1 I I I I 

0.1 0.15 0.4 5 1 1.5 4.5 10 15 45 100 150 450 1000 

FREQUENCY (MHz 

Figure 6-24. Phase Constant for ER = 10 

F-C3102 

constants. We will use this approximation as the worst case attenuation 

constant (% ) for coal mines. The approximation was chosen so we could C 

easily obtain an analytic expression for %cm We obtain 

where a is given in nepers per meter and f is frequency in megahertz. WC MHz 

In dB we obtain 

3/4 dBWC = 0.057 x fmZ, < 15 fMHz - 

dBWC = 2 > 150 

MHz , fMHz - 

where dB is the minimum number of dB per meter of attenuation. WC 

In making the approximation of Figure 6-25 we note that the actual 

data of Figure 6-22 and 6-23 are extremely close to a l/f 2 variation MHz 

at high frequency but that the low frequency data are really a bit 

slower varying than the f 3'4 variation we have assumed. MHz 

6.5 AN OVERALL COUPLING EXPRESSION 

An overall coupling expression can now be written for the worst 

case coupling of a transmitter in a drift to a blasting cap wiring set-up 

some x meters away. Thus 

where 

W is the power delivered to the blasting cap, watts, R 
T, is a transforming parameter of the transmitting antenna, I -2 meters . 

a is the worst case propagation constant determined in WC -1 the last section (eq. 6-8), meters . - x is the separation between the transmitter and the blasting 

cap wiring, meters, and 

A is the worst case aperture of the blasting cap wiring as 

e 

given in Section 6-3, meters squared. 

If we are to relate safe distances to transmitted power we must still 

provide a vorst case estimate of the transmitting antenna T parameter. T 

All other parameters of equation 6-10 have been treated. 

The power gain of a transmitting antenna is essentially a measure of 

the efficiency of the antenna in converting input power to power density 

at the point at which the gain is to be measured. In our application 

where the antenna is to be used underground and we are interested primarily 

in the power density in the lowest order, minimum attenuation propagation 

mode, some analogous parameter can be considered a measure of the efficiency 

of conversion of input power to power density in the lowest order propagation mode. We call this parameter T At the lower frequencies we T* 

estimate that no more than one-quarter of the power input to the antenna 

could be converted to lowest order propagation mode power density. For 

a drift of minimum dimensions of 1.5 x 3 meters this would give a T 

-2 T 

value of 0.056 meters . At higher frequencies where highly directional 

antennas could be used we estimate that 1/2 of the transmitted power could 

-2 be converted so that above 1000 MHz we will assume T to be 0.11 meters . T 

With all the factors of equation 6-10 accounted for we can rearrange 

6-10 and solve for x, thus 
Equation 6-11 is the final coupling equation that we will use for 

the estimation of safe distances in coal mines. The worst case approximations to be used in its evaluation are, in review, 

and 

TT = 0.056- 

meters 

2 f~z - 

< loo0 7-2 ) meters 

TT = 0.11 

meters 2 , ' 1000 fmz - J 

WR = 0.040 watts, 

3/4 

a = 6.56 x loe3 fmz WC -1 

meters (6-15) 

a = 0.05 , 155fmzi150 WC 

6.6 SAFE DISTANCES 

Equation (6-ll), with the substitutions given in equations 6-12 

through 6-15, defines the safe distances for coal mine blasting cap/transmitter separations. Figure 6-26 plots 6-11 for several values of transmitted 

power (WT). The use of the curves in Figure 6-26 is straightfoward. 

Suppose we have a transmitter with an output of 100 watts of average 

power at 160 MHz driving a transmission line in a coal mine drift. Figure 

6-26 indicates that if blasting wiring is kept 60 meters from any portion 

of the transmission line and transmitter we have no interaction problem - even in the event the transmission line is attached to an antenna. The 

reader, having come this far and noted all our worst case approximations, 

will realize that we will probably have no problem if the wiring is much 

closer than the safe distance recommended by Figure 6-26. The important 

word in the last sentence is probably. The safe distances predicted by 

Figure 6-26 are the only reliable distances we can use without more 

information about a particular interaction and its environment. 

Figure 6-26 may seem odd in the fact that the curves predict safe 

distances of essentially zero for certain transmitted power/frequency 

combinations. This behavior is due to the way we have formulated the 

general coupling equation, (6-11). We repeat it here: 

As long as the expression in brackets is greater than one, x is greater 

than zero. At the point where the bracketed expression equals 1, x goes 

to zero. Remember that we assumed the parameter T to convert (or spread T 

out) the transmitted power to a power density in the lowest order propagating mode. In essence we allowed T to perform this function in no T 

distance at all, so that the transmitters location is really a location 

of some "equivalent1' power density. In the bracketed term of equation 

6-11, the T W product produced is power density, if this density is multi- T T 

plied by the aperture we obtain the amount of power extracted from the 

field at the transmitter location by the blasting wiring. This term is 

in the numerator of equation (6-11). If it is less than the 0.04 watts 

assumed to be W then the bracket is less than one and a separation dis- R 

tance is trivial. We can't extract enough power to equal 0.04 watts even 

at the transmitter location. The overall problem arises because we allow 
T to its work in essentially no distance at all. This points out that T 

the curves should not be applied for any distances of, say 5 meters or 

less. The sharp drop-off of the safe distances for the various transmitting powers shows that the bracketed term varies quickly with frequency 

about the drop-off point. We have calculated the frequencies at which 

the brackets equal one and plotted there points as if the safe distance 

equalled 0.1 meters instead of zero meters at these frequencies. The 

zero would be difficult to locate on the log-log plot. 

6.7 ON USE OF THE SAFE DISTANCE CURVES 

The safe distance curves of Figure 6-26 have been derived as worst 

case safe distances and, as such, they provide positive limits outside 

of which we can assume that no significant transmitter/blasting cap interactions occur. By their worst case nature they are conservative and 

hence operation inside the safe distances will probably not result in 

premature cap initiations; HOWEVER, there is no way we can evaluate the 

possibility so such operation must be considered unsafe unless a more 

detailed analysis can be made of the actual operation site or measurements can be performed using the equipment of concern. 
CONCLUS IONS 

Section 5 gives the detailed conclusions for the blasting cap tests 

and Section 6.2 comments irr detail about a general sensitvity level useful 

for hazard evaluation. In sum the blasting cap tests performed indicated 

that the use of a 0.040 watt level as a "no-fire" level for American 

made blasting caps for coal mine use is reasonable. It is applicable 

for both pin-to-pin and pin-to-case excitation of the caps for all the 

frequencies tested. 

The safe distance curves of Figure 6-26 have been derived as worst 

case safe distances and, as such, they provide positive limits outside 

of which we can assume that no significant transmitterlblasting cap interactions occur, By their worst case nature they are conservative and 

hence operation inside the safe distances will probably not result in 

premature cap initiations; HOWEVER, there is no way we can evaluate the 

possibility so such operation must be considered unsafe unless a more 

detailed analysis can be made of the actual operation site or measurements can be performed using the equipment of concern. 

I 
1 . Monograpll on Corn~)uI,a Lirm of Rl*' Ilanards - H-C2210 P. F. Mohrbach, 

It. 11. 'l'l~ompso~l, ct ;11 - prepared for NASA, Goddard Space Flig\lt 

(:c:ntcr, (;reenl~clt, Maryland, 1968. 

2. 1m)e:;tigationc of thr? IIP' llnzards to Elccf~ic 1:lactin:j Cup- - F-R2256, 

R. 11. Thompson, P. F. Efohrbach, et a1 - prepared for the Institute 

of Makers of Explosives, 1965. 

3. lilt' I'ickup of Antnnms Simulating Blasting Wiring L'onfig~m~tiorr::, 

M(?crs7~rcrncrnt- 11'e.sult;s - F-B2256-2, R. H. Thompson - prepared for the 

Tnstitute of Makers of Explosives, 1966. 

4. Measurernnnts of the IfP Coofling Betueen an Antenna Zimulating a 

I~lastin~g Wiring Configuration and l.'ear ly /4ol1i ZI? Y'rannrnit tirig An Lcnri~, 

E-C1951, R. It. Thompson, K. Fertner - prepared for the Institute of 

Makers of Explosives, 1967. 

5. 'The Possible RF Hazard to Blasting Caps Cawed by u T,r,zoy I.'~no;rnni~:~1,7~0~1 

Sgstern - F-C2399, R. H. Thompson, P. F. Mohrbach - prepared for Motorola, 

Inc., 1969. 

6. RF Pickup of Blasting Face Wiring - F-C2942, R. 11. Thompson - prepared 

for Motorola Incorporated, 1970. 

7. Blasters Handbook, 14th Ed., E. I. duPont, Wilmington, Delaware, 

p. 340. 

8. Bruceton Report, Statistical Analysis for a dew Procedure in 3ensitivity Experiments, National Defense Research Committee Report 110. 

101.1R, July 1944. 

9. Operation and Maintenance Manual for the FIRL Universal Pulser - 

FILUP 3, C. T. Davey, prepared by FIRL for NASA, Langely Research 

Center, 1965. 

10. Instruction ManwzZ for Initiator Static Tester /4odel III - FM-C1981, 

C. T. Davey, prepared by FIRL for NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center, 

1967. 

11. Systems ad Technicians Employed at The Franklin Tnstitute to Leterrlxe 

Responses of EEDs to R. F. Power, APL-69-1, P. F. Ffohrbach, R. F. Wood, 

prepared by FIRL, revised 1970. 
12. RF Susceptibility Evaluation of Minuteman Ordnance Systems, The 

Franklin Institute, Report No. P-B2198-6, August 1964. 

13. Electrostatic Hazard to Electroexplosive Devices From Personnel-Borne 

Charges, APL 65-1, R. Amicone, C. T. Davey and J. B. Campbell, prepared by FIRL, February 1965. 

14. Fields and Waves in Gomunication Electronics, Ramo, Whinnery and 

Van Duzer, John Wiley and Sons, N.Y., N.Y., 1965. 

15. Time Harmonic Electromagnetic Fields, R. F. Harrington, McGraw-Hill 

~ook Company, Inc., N.Y., N.Y., 1961. 

16. Dielectric Constants and Dissipation Factors for Six ~ock Types 

Between 20 and 200 Megahertz, Russel E. Griffin and Robert L. Marovelli, 

U.S. Dept. of the Interior - report of Invest. 6913 - July 1963. 

17. Dielectric Behavior of Rocks and Minerals, B. F. Howell, Jr. and 

P. H. Licastro, The American Mineralogist V46, Mar.-Apr. 1961, 

p. 269-88. 

18. Electrical Properties of Rocks and /4ineraZ, George V. Keller, Handbcok of Physical Constants (~ev. Ed.) - The Geological Soc. of her. 

Memoir 97, 1966, p. 553-77. 
Appendix 

EXCERPT FROM FRANKLIN INSTITUTE 

RESEARCH LABORATORIES REPORT 

M-C2210-1 

fiE FRANKLIN ISSTITIvTE RESEARCH LIBORITORlES 
COMPUTATION OF RF HAZARDS 

(Excerpt) 

Paul F. Mohrbach 

Rami e Thompson 

Robert F. Mood 

Daniel J. Mullen 

July, 1968 

Prepared for - 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 

Greenbel t, Mary1 and 

mHE FRANXLIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATORlES 
~~l~ll~~}~,l-~l~>ll )I-(:;!;! 1 0-1- 

"(:lji~ij~~ t at. I on oI ItF 11;17.:11-(1s" 

)'a111 I:. )lo11 1 11;1(-11 , JZ;11iij c 14. l'tlompson, 

l:t>l)e~-t I:. \dood , Danj ~$1 .I . )lullen 

'I'lic I'r;1111il j 11 111s t lt11 t c Rc:scnrcl~ Laboratories 

.lr~ly, 1968 

f 01- Nat l onnl Ac>i-ol-rn\~t lcs i~nd Space. 

Aclnli ~li sti-;it i cj11/Goc1~131-d Sp;icc Fl il;ht Center 

ABSTRACT 

This inol-rograph presents a mctllod for analyzing the potent:jal 

l<F susc*el)tjbil.ity to electrical componcnts and systcms used in typical 

spncc vcllicl cs. It prescnts the philosophy, npplicabili ty and ljrnj tat i cjns of tllis ;~pproach. \Jhi le not exhaustive, enough ilint llcl~i;~tics j :; ' 

pl-c?scntcd to pel-mit ;~nalysis of a very large. percentage of the types of 

p~-ol>l ciiis ~11ich norma lly occur. \Jhere the actual. dcvelopmcnt of equations is not r,ivcn in detail, suitable r~ferences are provided. 

Fmniliarizat ion with the text and the cited r~fer~nr~c shniil A nrn1r-i Jra 

the reader with the necessary information to analyze most systems and 

tl~c general procedures to llandle those situations wl~ich are beyond the 

scope of this nlonograph. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

This monograph is based on work performed and techniques and 

ideas developed by the Applied Physics Laboratory, Em E. Hannum, 

Manager. Inquiries concerning this work should be referred to him or 

to the sponsoring agency, \ 

$??HE FFlANKUN INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES 
'l'llt. dct rtr111i 11nt ion of t l1c3 pot r!nt l a1 r;ltllo f rc:clur*ncy (lo.') 

t1i1z;l~-d t o illly sy!; t c.111 ca>:l)osc*d to ill1 i nc.i clr!nt I(]: j'i c*ld i!; a very compl ex 

oil I. Co~.rs idclr , for c*xarnl)lc., a typicill clcc~rrplsve devj cc: 

(I.:l;l)) i~lld i LS ;ISSOC i;itc*(l f J ring circ-111 t ~nounted in ;I mi s:;-l 1 c. To I)c.f:i n 

wJ ti1 , t ilc! 1111 !;!; i 11: lrlny l)cb triln:;portc*d t o tile la111lc1.1 :;i te wi t11 some or a7 I 

of Its circui t s instctl Jc!(l and could conc(tiva\>ly be exposed to a trjdc: 

val-icbfy of 111: signal!; along the way. At thc launcll site It may hc 

nc!ccssary to insta1.l some of the EJZDs or electronic con~ponents w1li'l.t: in 

nn IlF cnvironolcl~t. T1li s would permit the possibility of the individu;tl 

colill~oncnts bc>.ing i rradiat-cd during Ilandling and, suI)sc.qucntJ y, after installation in its circuit. In addition check out procedures oftcn 

result in altering the circuits, connecting temporary new circuits to 

thc potentially vulnerable component and such actions as the opening 

and closing of vents and ports in the missile skin. Furtllern~ore, there 

wn111t-l nrnhrhl;r I.? ~2rtt~i.2 rlrvlLlll~lt~ ui vei~icles 2nd personnel in the 

area and this movement would cause continual fluctuation in local I<F 

field intensities. A11 of these factors would contribute to a constantly changing and very difficult to define set of conditions with 

respect to RF hazards. It should be noted- that localized field intensity conditions can exceed the overall field intensity that would 

be determined by measuring the field produced at a given point by a 

radiating transmitter. Unless one can,measure the field at the exact \ 

point of interest, under the actual conditions and with all equipment 

that will be in the area and without serious perturbation of the field 

by the measuring equipment one can be certain only of an approximation 

of the actual field conditions. 

Even if one could accomplish a testing program which would 

cover all of the conditions, the inherent variation from missile to 
missllc woi~ltl i~lt I-oclucc another large var i;ihle. Sl ight changes in the 

a1-ra11gcmcnt of tllc wiring or in the oric~ltatiorl of the missile wit11 

rcDspcct to the K1: field might well produce large variations in the a~nount 

of KF energy clcljvercd to tile device u~~dcr investigation, ident jcal 

clcc-trical imped;~ncc cc~ndi t ions cannot be maintained from missile to 

n~is:;ilc and on board transmitters may directly interact with tile - 

vult~~~r~hle ci rcuit s . 

Of course, if the circuit designer were frcc to design his 

circuits wit11 notlling else in mind but to make them insensitive to RF, 

thc 1W problcni col~ld be essentially eliininnted. Complete continuous 

shicbldjng of the entire systems would in general reduce RF levels at 

tlie components to safe values. llowever, this is of ten almost inlpossible, 

for in our mndi!rn complex electric circuits it is usually necessary to 

break branch circuits out of the shield, to terminate on circuit boards 

open to RF sjgnals or to follow other procedures which compromise RF 

safety. In addition, other design groups may arguc for and obtain 

different concepts for wiring to accomplish their ends, and in so doing 

may also seriously rnrnfrrnrnic~ tho Dc ------c--L'-- 

C - - --------• 

On the other hand it is often suggested that even with circuits poorly designed from the RF viewpoint, there have been relatively 

few accidents directly attributed to RF and therefore the problem must 

be negligible. This could be a very dangerous viewpoint. First of all, 

information on accidents of any nature is usually very poorly disseminated so that it is difficult to know what accidents have occurred and 

what situations surrounded such accidents. This is particularly true 1 

of accidents which do not result in severe injury to personnel or very 

large property damage. Second, the determination of the cause of an 

accident after it has happened is a very difficult business. This is 

particularly true when trying to evaluate the after-the-fact influence 

of anything as variable as the potential RF hazard. Furthermore if the 

investigators do not fully understand how RF energy can be transferred 

they will easily miss many possibilities. Third, at the present time 

*HE FFiANKUN 1NSTITlJE RESEARCH LABORATORES 
mo:;t; Kl' f!elds in proximity of vulnerable systems are of 

reasonably low intensity or are turned off during possibly critical 

periods. Every year, however, the RF environmental levels are increasing, and RF silence may not always be possible. Systems which are now 

marginal may eventually become quite vulnerable. 

With all of these complicating and generally uncontrollable 

factors, how can one even evaluate the potential FW hazard to any 

critical system? Unfortunately, the answer at the present state-of-theart is that it cannot be done with great precision for anything but a 

very specifically defined case; however, the hazard can sometimes be 

evaluated in such a manner that it can be coi~clusively stated that no 

hazard exists if this should be the case. 

Two methods are now tn general use. Both of these require 

that the RF sensitivity of the device in question be known. There are 

laboratory techniques for determining this with reasonable precision; 

unfortunately, the RF sensitivity is of the device is not always so 

determined and this in general will negate the effectiveness of either 

uul~;~~i unless sui~z~le precautions are taken. 

The first method, stated briefly, is to directly radiate the 

system in question with a variety of high powered transmitters and to 

observe the RF levels that arrive at the device under test. The method 

is appealing, if expensive, since it is a direct approach which superficially appears to simulate the actual conditions that will occur. 

But, while such tests are much used, and have a definite place in the 

scheme of things, there are many that generally make them unsatisfactory for a really valid hazard determination. The chief weaknesses of the method include inadequacy of present RF detectors, inability to determine field strengths accurately, the very large expense 

of suitably powerful transmitters, the risk of assuming that tests on 

one or two systems can be extended to all such systems and the lack of 

complete understanding by most field testers of the mechanisms of RF 

damage on the vulnerable devices. 
To mitlimizc tl~e effect of these various problems, irradiation 

tcsts arc often conduc~cd with an arbitrary safety factor added to the 

nccpetablc RF pick up at the detector. Many times this factor is not 

large cnoug11 for all conditions. In addition it should be recognized 

that tl~r only positivc result of a fjeld irradiation is Lo demonstratr - that a hazard exists for certain frequencies, irradiation angles, 

pol:~rizat ioils and oricntat ions of the irradiating antenna and tlbe 

system bring irradiated. Specifically a field irradiation test can 

never assure complete KF safety since only a finite number of fr~quencies, 

polarizations, etc., can be tested from the literally infinite number 

of situations that can develop in the actual use of tlle system. llowever, properly conducted, field tests can give considerable reassurance 

regarding RF safety. 

The second method is the application of analytical techniques 

to the systems to determine the extent of RF hazard. This approach in 

its present form has two distinct advantages: first, properly conducted 

the results are alr~ays on the safe side, and should it he dPrnnn~tr~*~J 

by this approach that a system is safe in a gi.ven field and at a 

specific frequency, its safety can practically be guaranteed; second, 

tlie actual analysis is reasonably inexpensive. The main expense comes 

from the fact that to perform the analysis properly the RF sensitivity 

of the device in question must be determined, but as was pointed out 

earlier, this should also be done in the case of the direct radiation 

method. The one exception to this occurs when the circuits are so well 

designed from an RF standpoint that it c$n be demonstrated analytically 

that protection levels are so large that the sensitivity of the device 

is not a factor after installation in these circuits. The main objection to the analytic method in its present form is that it can put 

unusually stringent restrictions on the circuits so that only the very 

well designed systems can be shown to be safe; in other words, the 

safety factor afforded thereby can be unreasonably large. In contrast 

to the irradiation method, it should be noted that the only positive 
result of the analytical approach is to show that a given system is 

safe. SpecificnlJy, the analysis can not sllow tllat a system is 

hazardous since the worst case assumptions implicit in the analysis 

can never be guaranteed to exist. 

-1 .1 General Approach 

The procedure for establishing the extent of the RF hazard 

to any system by means of the analytic method is as follows: 

a. The RF sensitivity of the particular device or devices in 

eactl of the circuits in the system is determined over the entire frequency range of interest, for both continuous wave (CIZ) and puJ sed RF 

signals and for all possible modes of damage such as through the regular 

leads or between the leads and the case or any other potential damage 

mode which exists. 

b. Using circuit diagrams, wiring diagrams, observation of 

the actual systems, observations and discussions of the handling, inc+-ll ?+:c\n 222 z>;;l.vu; pL"~~G~~e~ aria aiscusslons with the engineers 

directly concerned the details of the actual physical systems are 

established. These details include such things as length of cables, 

locations of wiring breakouts, and separation of distancc between firing 

leads and between the firing leads and the ground plane. 

c. Mathematical models are constructed which closely resemble 

the actual wiring systems, and which can be handled with analytic 

techniques. These models are constructed for all phases of the problem; 

i.e., handling, installation, check out and installed; and treat circuits, in the case of EED'S for example, for pin-to-pin, pins-to-case 

and bridgewire-to-bridgewire effects, as applicable. All known parameters of the circuits are used such as the length of unshielded portions, and the physical shape; but wherever a parameter cannot be 

properly defined a worst case assumption is made. For example it is 

normally assumed that a given circuit is oriented with respect to the 

1-5 

*THE FRANKLIN MSmZm RESEARCH LABORATORE 
H1: f l eld for m:ixliniuii pi ck-up of canergy, that the entire circuit is in 

a sln~;l(. plane and tl~at all impedances in the circuit arc matched for 

optimum pick-up and transfer of energy. 

d. The matliematical n~odcl is analyzed to establish the 

amount of RF cnergy tllat can he extracted from any incident 11F f icld - 

and subsequently transferred to the device under consideration, for 

cxnmple, tile EED terminating the circuit. The analysis gives, for a 

particular cir'cuit, a quantity known as ";ll~crt1~rc1' a measure of 

ability to pick up cnergy. The aperture as a function of frequency 

plot can be applied to any assumed field intcnsity. 

e. For any assumed field intensity and frequency the amount 

of RF energy that could be delivered to the test item is obtained by 

thc product of the incident power density and the aperture and this 

value compared with its RF sensitivity. The degree of potential 

hazard is thereby established. Ilnder the assumptions wllich are made, 

an indicated safe condition should be quite safe; an indicated 

hazardous condition may or may not be hazardous. 

These data are usually presented graphically and in such a 

manner that as long as the same circuits and test items are enployed, 

the analysis can be irnmediately.app1ied to any change, present or 

future, in the incident field desnities. Only those circuits which are 

completely different need be analyzed; for example, in the case of 

redundant circuits only one analysis need be conducted if the two circuits are very similar. In a few rare cases the evaluation of the RF 

sensitivity of the device under test can be eliminated. The usual case 

occurs when preliminary investigations of the circuits indicates that 

they are so well designed from an RF standpoint that only a small amount 

of energy can be extracted from even a very strong incident field; then 

the sensitivity of the test device may be of secondary importance. 

However, RF sensitive EEDs should always be avoided if possible. 

eiE FRANKLIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES 
Tl~is approocl~ is of ten designated a "worst case" analysis, 

howcver, it s11oul.d be noted that this is a mild misnomer. In actual 

fact, all of the known or reasonably obtajned data bearing upon any 

circuit is ~lscd. For example, such details as actual sizc!s of loops, 

lengtl~ of unshielded wire runs, separation distance of cab1.e from Zramc, 

pin configuration of rest device, HF sensjtivity of test device, impedancc of test devicc:, quality of shielding material used and attcnuation providc>d by switcl~cs and nrirling devices uscd in tl~c circuit are 

careflrlly dctcrmincd and actual values are uscd in the calculations 

whercver possible. On the other hand, those characteristics which 

could be variable from test vel~icle to test vehicle or very expensive 

to determine are assumed to be at their worst. For example; orientation of all circuits is assumed to be optimized in the incident field, 

impedances throughtout the circuit are generally assumed to be matched 

in such a manner as to give maximum transfer of KF energy to the test 

device, RF pickup from all loops is assumed to be in phase and missile 

skins, except under unusual circumstances, are assumed to offer no 

attenuation. Exn~rienrn h~c ,h---- - ....eLJ- -..-- ' - A U.J.I)UIIIpL;~~~ LU be qulce 

valid. 

As a result, the analysis produces values of RF power delivered 

to the test device which are always on the conservative side, occasionally by rather large amounts. This leads-to the statement made earlier 

that if under the worst case approach a system is found to be safe, 

it is most likely quite safe; if on the other hand a hazard is indicated, the system may still be safe. 

Three additional points should be noted, however. First, experience has shown that if the missile system is considered across a 

wide frequency band there is a good probability that at some point in 

the frequency spectrum the worst case assumptions will cone close to 

being satisfied and the analysis and the real conditions will come 

close to coinciding. Second, attempts to assign probability values to 

*HE mAN?CUN INSTITUTE RESUlACH lABORATORLES 
2. DETAILED ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 

It is the purpose of this section to describe in detail most 

of the mathematical procedures necessary to conduct an RF analysis on 

a component. From the start it should be careful-ly noted that when 

analyzing the potential hazard to a component such as an EED every 

pertinent aspect of its history must be carefully considered in its own 

specific situation. For example, the circuit attached to an EED when 

it is installed in a space vehicle may have very different RF picltup 

characteristics than the circuit which might be temporarily attached 

to check the resistance or some other parameter of the EED. If the EED 

is installed in a vehicle with the shorting cap attached and the shorting cap is removed to attach the functioning circuit while an RF field 

is present, possible RF hazard must be considered for the EED with 

shorting cap, without shorting cap and installed in circuit. Should a 

I~IVII~LULIII~ C~~CU~E be Included in the EED, the RF pickup associated 

with this circuit must be considered along with its possible coupling 

to the EED functioning circuit. In short, the engineer performing the 

analysis must become intimately farnilar with all aspects of the device, 

its associated circuits usually back to the-power source and its history 

insofar as handling, installation, checkout and final installed condition are concerned. 

\ In addition the engineer must consider all of the possible 

functioning modes of a device. For a wire bridge EED this would include 

the following: through the bridgewire, between the bridgewire and the 

case and between the bridgewires,if applicable. 

For each condition, the engineer must characterize the system 

as to its most likely manner of acting as a receiving antenna. In its 

simplest form one might consider a wire lead EED with its leads twisted 

together at the end. This system could probably be most directly 

fiE FRANKLIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATOFUES 
characterized as a small loop antenna terminated in the bridgewire impedance. The same EED installed in a complex missile circuit may be 

much more elusive to characterize, however. A typical configuration 

would result in shielding of the cables leading to the EED but no 

attachment of the shield-to the case of the EED. If single point 

grounding of the shield philosophy is also followed, the engineer may 

find that a large loop is formed and attached to the pins-to-case mode 

of the EED. 

In smlary, and it cannot be said too strongly, when applying 

the analytical techniques discussed here, it is most important to 

consider all possible configurations and hazard modes and to characterize the systems being considered into their proper patterns. This step 

is the single most important and time conswning element of the analysis. 

-E FHAMUN INSTlTllTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES 
. B 

BRUCETON TEST RESULTS 

*E FR.4SKLlN ISSTITITTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES 
The computer output sheets give the results of the Bruceton 

tests. The program computer conforms to the Bruceton procedure 

as given in reference 8. All Bruceton test results for the same 

item are grouped together,- first those for cap A, then cap B, etc. 
4aa 

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DATAtHF TEST IJUI~BER 2247 5.4 GC P-CASE CAP B PHO.~CT C3102 

FUNCT LEVELS LEVEL STIMULUS 

SEH* HES. TIMES. 

NO. (OHMS) ( SEC) 1 2 3 4 3 6 7 8 9 10 NO. (NATTS) I I+I 140 r4X 

1 X 

2 0 1 .2340+01 0 0 6 0 

3 0 

4 X 2 .2u50+01 1 1 h 7 

5 X 

6 X 3 .2566+01 2 4 3 7 

7 0 

8 0 4 .2687+01 3 9 2 4 

9 0 

10 X 5 .2813+01 4 lb 4 3 

11 0 

12 X 6 .2946+01 5 25 2 4 

13 0 

14 0 7 .3085+01 6 36 0 2 

15 X 

16 0 8 .OOOO 7 49 0 0 

17 X 

18 X 9 00000 8 64 0 0 

19 X 

2 0 X 10 .OOOO 9 81 0 0 

21 X 

2 2 3 NO=23 NX=27 

23 X 

24 0 LOG OF FIRST LEVEL= 036922 D= 0020 

2 5 X 

26 X AO= 44 AX= 77 

27 0 

2 8 C) BO= 150 BX= 291 

2 9 0 

3 0 X MO= 2.86200 MX= 2.64'+72 

3 1 X 

3 2 X MEAI4O= 041748 MEAIJX= .41b26 

33 U 

3 4 i) SXGMO= 009577 SIbidX= 008828 SIGMA= .09180 

3 5 X 

VALIDITY TESTS 

EQUALITY OF 

OCCURRENCE -OK 

NO. OF HUNS- 27 

LENGTH OF 

RUNS- 5 

S= 4.59012 G= -91~ G*G= o828550 

H= 2.521 H*H= 6.357038 

CONFIOEIICE INTERVAL= .24b48 

LOG OF 99.9%(35bcUluk)= 0'9Qo97 9909%(95%COt~F)= 8.851 WATTS 

LOG OF MEAN(~G$)LEPLL~ .41~82 YEAN(50XJ= 2.611 ~JATTS 

LOG OF 0 1%(95%COtJF 1 = -. 11333 0.1 (05%C jFlF 1 = .7?0 aaT~5 
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RF PROBING TEST RESULTS 

fi~ FRANKLIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES THT UCNJAMIN FRANKLIN PARKWLV . PHIIADTIPMIA PCNYSVLVANIA ~q~n
This appendix presents the results of the RF probing tests. Exposures 

were commonly made for 10 seconds unless otherwise noted. The tests 

were not performed in any particular order. The test numbers indicate 

the order in which the tests were performed. For example, PROP TEST 12204 

(which is real probing test 1,2204) occurred before any test of higher number. 

The RF Probing Test - Results are given for each cap tested in the 

following tables. The test results for each cap are grouped together. Each 

table is headed by our laboratory record book RF Probing Test Number. An X 

(or fire) result is to be interpreted as the result of the application of 

the associated RF power. An 0 indicates a no-fire response. In many cases a 

cap that fired had been exposed to lower powers of the same modulation and 

frequency type so that the tables really record the maximum power applied 

to each cap. Each probing test used virgin caps. 
PROB. TEST # 2372 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

2.5 

3.0 

3.0 

3.0 

3.5 

4 .o 

4 .o 

4.0 

5 .o 

5.0 

PROB. TEST # 2377 

CAP #'F 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

x 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

COMMENTS: Arcing 

PROB. TEST k' 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULATION - 

MHz 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 2375 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

8.0 

10-Q 

1.0 . 0 

13.0 

13.0 

15.0 

19-0 

19 -0 

PROB. TEST # 2378 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION' - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : Arcing 

AVE. POWER , 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULATION - 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

WATTS I X = FIRE 6-NO 
PROB. TEST # 2322 I 

d CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.600 

0.600 

0.700 

0.750 

0.800 

0.800 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

4.0 

PROB. TEST # 2325 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X = FIRE O=NO 

I 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2326 

CAP #' F 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

COMMENTS: Arcing 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 2314 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 1.5 Mtlz 

FIRING MODE - pin-pin 

MODULATION - LW 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2329 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

PROB. TEST # 2316 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 1.5 MH 

FIRING MODE -Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

AVE. POWER RESULT I AVE= 

RESULTS 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO WATTS I X = FIRE ?=NO 

COMMENTS : Arcing I COMMENTS: All misfires had 

a short 
PROB. TEST # 2323 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULAT I ON - cw 

COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.600 

0.700 

0.7~10 

0.750 

0.800 

0.800- 

0.800 

0.800 

0.850 

0.900 

PROB. TEST # 2324 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 2700 F4H z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

x 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

5.0 

6.0 

7.0 

8.5 

10 .o 

15.0 

15.0 

15 .O 

15.0 

15.0 

PROB. TEST # 2327 

CAP #' E 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

0 

0 

0 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST ft 2319 

CAP fi: E 

FREQUENCY - 10 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

-- 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER ' RESULT 

PROB. TEST # 2328 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 2700 f4tlz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION. - Pulsed 

WATTS 

AVE. POWER I RESULT 

x = FIRE o=rio 

WATTS ' ( X = FIRE O=NO 

PROB. TEST # 2320 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

f4ODULATION - CW 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

WATTS I X = FIRE G=!JO 

I COMMENTS: Arcing / COMilENTS : 
PROB. TEST # 2339 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 150 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.200 

0,200 

-- 0.250 

0.250 

0.275 

0.300 - 

0,300 

0.325 

0.400 

0.400 

---- -- 

-- 

PROB. TEST # 2340 

CAP #F 

FREQUENCY - 150 /*!HZ 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X - 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

5.0 

5,9 

5.0 

5 .o 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5tQ 

PROB. TEST # 2347 

CAP #'F 

FREQUENCY - 0.088 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Fin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

0 

0 .- 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

PROB. TEST # 2318 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - lo MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin--pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS: 1 COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

- 0.150 -- 

Q, 150 

0.175 

0.175 

0.175 

0.175 

0.200 

0.200 

0.200 

0.300 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 0-088 i4Hz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE 0-NO 

PROB. TEST # 2321 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 10 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

t~lODULATION - cw 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

3.5 

5.n 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5-0 

5.0 

5-0 

RESULTS 

X = FIRE 

0 * 

n 

I) 

0 

0 

I) 

0 

n 

COMMENTS: Could not fire but 

it was above other 

COMMENTS: * Shorted 

low fires I 
PROB. TEST # 2331 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

1.5 

1.5 

1.5 

1.5 

2.0 

2.0 

2.0 

2.0 

PROB. TEST # 2333 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 5400 I4H z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

PROB. TEST # 2335 

CAP #' E 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

15 .O 

17.5 

17.5 

20.0 

20.0 

25.0 

75.0 

25.0 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : Some Arcing - - 

PROB. TEST # 2336 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS 1 X = FIRE O=NO 

PROB. TEST #2342 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 450 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS 1 X = FIRE 0-NO 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2344 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 450 MH 

FIR1 NG MODE - Pin-case 

t4ODULATION - cw 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

VATTS I X = FIRE O=N( 

COMMENTS : I COMMENTS : 

I 
PROB. TEST # 2330 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

PROB. TEST # 2334 

CAP #' F 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.5 

1.5 

1.5 

- 

PROB. TEST # 2343 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 450 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : I COMMENTS: Arcing I COMMENTS: 

PROB. TEST #2332 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

X = FIRE O=NO 

I 

PROB. TEST # 2337 

CAP # F 

FREQUENCY - 5400 f4H z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION Pulsed 

PROB. TEST # 2345 

CAP 4 F 

FREQUENCY - 450 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

fllODULATION - CW 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 0

WATTS X = FIRE O=NO 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : 
PROB. TEST # 2338 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 150 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.250 

0.250 

0.300 

0.300 

0.300 

0.350 

0.550 

0.550 

1.0 

1.0 

-- - 

PROB. TEST # 2341 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 150 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

0 

COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

4.5 

4.5 

4.5 

4.5 

4.5 

- 4.5 

4.5 

4.5 

4.5 

4.5 

PROB. TEST # 2346 

CAP #' E 

FREQUENCY - 0.088 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULATION - 

MHz 

COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # I PROB. TEST # 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 0.088 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULATION - 

MHz 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

WATTS 1 X = FIRE O=NC 

COMMENTS: Could not firebut 

it was above other low 

fires 
PROB. TEST # 2204 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

WATTS 

AVEg I X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS: 

PROB. TEST # 2205B 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 5400 I4H z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

PROB. TEST # 2205~ 

CAP #' A 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - pin-pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

COMMENTS : Arcing 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 2206 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 5400 NH z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION .- Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE 0-NO 

PROB. TEST # 2209 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 450 MHz 

FIRING MODE - pin-pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 1 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.275 

0.275 

0.300 

0.300 

0.300 

0.300 

0.350 

0.350 

0.400 

0.400 

PROB. TEST # 2230 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 450 MHz 

FIRING MODE -Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : I COMMENTS: Some drdng / COMMENTS: 
PROB. TEST d 2242 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

20.0 

25.0 

25.0 

25.0 

25.0 

-.?_5*0-- 

- - 

-- 

- 

-- 

PROB. TEST # 2243 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - pin-case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

0 

X 

X 

X 

X 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS 1 X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2245 

CAP #'B 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS: Arcing 

PROB. TEST # 2228 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 450 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X- FIREO=NO 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2244 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 5400 Mtiz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS X = FIRE O=NO 

PROB. TEST # 2231 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 450 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

MHz 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

WATTS X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS: Arcing I 
PROB. TEST # 2212 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - pin-pin 

MODULATION - cw 

24.0 X 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 2213 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 2700 r.1 H z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

9.0 

9.0 

10.0 

10.0 

10.0 

10.0 

10.0 

10.0 

PROB. TEST # 2210 

CAP #' B 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS: Arcing - - 

PROB. TEST d 2211 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin--Case 

MODULATION -. Pulsed 

AVE. POWER 

X = FIRE O=NO 

I 

COMMENTS: Arcing 

PROB. TEST # 2223~ 

CAP k' B 

FREQUENCY - 10.0 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2225 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 10 MHz 

FIRING MODE -Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

WATTS X = FIRE 

- 

O=NO 

COMMENTS 

I 

: 
PROB. TEST # 2232 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 150 MHz 

FIRING MODE - pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2234 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 150 I4H z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2236 

CAP #' A 

FREQUENCY - 0.088 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-pin 

MODULATION - CW 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULATION - 

MHz 

COMMENTS : I COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 0.088 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION .- CW 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - MHz 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULATION - 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS: * Could not fire bu 

it was above other low fire 
PROB. TEST # 2214 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MO DULAT I ON - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

5.0 

6.5 

8.0 

8.0 

- 8.0 

10.0 

15 .O 

18.0 

20.0 

20.0 

30.0 

- 

PROB. TEST # 2215 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 8900 flHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

PROB. TEST # 2220 

CAP #' A 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

15.0 

15 .O 

15.0 

18.0 

20.0 

20.0 

25.0 

. 25.0 

25 .O 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS: Some arcing 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 2221 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MH z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

PROB. TEST # 2222 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 1.5 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2227 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 1-5 MHz 

FIRING MODE - pin-case 

t4O DULAT I ON - cw 

COMMENTS : I COMMENTS: Some arcing 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

4.0 

I5 

4- 5 

4.5 

5.6 

_L 

5-6 

5.6 

5.6 

5-6 

RESULTS 

X = FIRE 

x 

K 

X 

o* 

X* 

X 

X* 

0 

0 

n* - 

- 
PROB. TEST # 2207 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.975 

1.0 

1.0 - 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.2 

1.2 

1.2 

-. 

PROB. TEST # 2208 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 2700 f4H z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

8.0 

9 .o 

9.0 

9 .o 

11.0 

11.0 

20.0 

20.0 

20.0 

20 .o 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS: 

PROB. TEST # 2209 

CAP #' A 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.800 

0.800 

0.800 

COMMENTS: Arcing 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

PROB. TEST # 2210 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 2700 Mfl z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION -- Pulsed 

PROB. TEST # 2224A 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 10 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

4.0 

5.0 

6.0 

8.0 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.325 

0.350 

0.350 

0.350 

0.350 

0.375 

0,375 

0.375 

0.375 

0.375 

PROB. TEST # 2224B 

CAP # A 

FREQUENCY - 10 E1H ; 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

F4ODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

AVE. POWER 

COMMENTS : 
PROB. TEST # 2304 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 150 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.650 

0.700 

0.700 

- 0.700 

0.750 

0.750 

0.750 

0.800 

0.800 

PROB. TEST # 2301 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 150 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

0.800 X 

PROB. TEST # 2305 

CAP #' c 

FREQUENCY - 0.088 MHz 

' FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

2.0 

2.0 

6.0 

6.0 

6.0 

6.0 

6 .O 

6.0 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE 0-NO 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

0 

0 

0 

0* 

0* 

o* 

o* 

o* 

I 

COMMENTS: 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULATION - 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS . 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 0.088 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O-=NO 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

I WATTS ( X = FIRE O=NO 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - MHz 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULAT I ON - 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

RESULTS 

X = FIRE O=NO 

- 

- 

- 

COMMENTS: * Shorted COMMENTS: not fire but COMMENTS: 

it was above the other low 

fires 

I 

I 
PROB. TEST # 2287 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

15 .O 

15 .O 

15 .O 

15 .O 

20.0 

20.0 

20.0 

20.0 

PROB. TEST # 2268A 

CAP #' c 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

0 

AVE. POWER I RESULT 

I COMMENTS: Arcing 

WATTS 

3.0 

3.0 

4.0 

5.0 

PROB. TEST # 2297 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 450 MHz 

FIRING MODE -Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

1.25 

1-35 

1.25 

I .25 

1.25 

3 -5 

1-5 

7-0 

3.C) 

PROB. TEST # 2288 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

x 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

- 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2268B 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION. - Pulsed 

AVE. POWER 

X = FIRE O=NO 

. 

COMMENTS : Arcing 

PROB. TEST # 2300 

CAP # C 

FREQUENCY - 450 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

WATTS I X = FIRE 0=N0 

COMMENTS : 
PROB. TEST # 2256 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

4.0 

4.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

6.0 

10.0 

PROB. TEST # 2257 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

38.0 

38.0 

38.0 

38.0 

38.0 

38.0 

38.0 

38.0 

PROB. TEST # 2262 

CAP #' c 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

0 

0 

X 

0 

0 

X 

0 

0 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

PROB. TEST # 2294 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 10 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS: Arcing I COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

PROB. TEST # 2263 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

COMMENTS: Arcing 

- 

PROB. TEST # 2296 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 10 MHz 

FIRING MODE - pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

/ COMMENTS: 
PROB. TEST # 2233 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 150 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MO DULAT I ON - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.800 

0.900 

1.0 

1.0 

1.2 

1.5 

1.5 

1.5 

1.5 

1.9 

PROB. TEST # 2237 

CAP #' B 

FREQUENCY - 0.088 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULATION - 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

MHz 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

- - -- - - - - 

PROB. TEST # 2235 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.900 

0.900 

0.900 

0.900 

0.900 

0.900 

0.900 

0.900 

0.900 

0.900 

PROB. TEST # I 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 0.088 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULAT I ON . - cw 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

COMvENTS:* Could not fire but 

lt was above other low fire 

- - 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULAT I ON - 

AVE. POWER RESULTS I

WATTS X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : 
PROB. TEST # 2216 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULAT I ON - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

3.0 

3.0 

6.0 

6 .O 

8.0 

-- 

8.0 

10.0 

10.0 

10.0 

10.0 

PROB. TEST # 2218 

CAP #' B 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : Arcing 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 2223A 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 1.5 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.325 

0.325 

0.350 

0.350 

0.350 

0.400 

0.400 

0.400 

0.400 

0.400 

- - - 

PROB. TEST # 2217 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULAT I ON - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

6.5 

8.0 

8.0 

10.0 

10.0 

10.0 

10.0 

10.0 

10.0 

15.0 

15.0 

PROB. TEST # 2219 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 8900 f4Hz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION '- Pulsed 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS: Arcing 

PROB. TEST # 2226 

CAP # B 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

tllODULATION - cw 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

WATTS I X = FIRE 0-NO 
PROB. TEST # 2258 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.750 

0.850 -- 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 - 

1.5 

- 3.0 

5.0 

-- 

-- 

PROB. TEST # 2259 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MI1 z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

12.0 

12.0 

15.0 

15.0 

20.0 

20.0 

20.0 

20.0 

PROB. TEST # 2264 

CAP # ' D 

FREQUENCY - 2700 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE 0-NO 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

0 

X 

0 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS: Some arcing 

PROB. TEST # 2265 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 2700 lilliz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION L Pulsed 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER . WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 2295 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 10.0 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2293 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 10 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

f*lODULATION - CW 

AVE. POWER 

X = FIRE O=tJO 
PROB. TEST # 2285 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MO DULAT I ON - cw 

COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.450 

0.500 

0.500 

0.500 

0.550 

P 

0.550 

0.600 ---- 

0.600 

0.700 

5.0 

-- 

--- - -- 

PROB. TEST # 2286 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

Y 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

6.0 

-3 8 0 

8.0 

8.0 

8.0 

10.0 - 

10.0 

10.0 

15.0 

PROB. TEST # 2266 

CAP #' D 

FREQUENCY - 5400 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS 1 X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : Some arcing 

PROB. TEST # 2267 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 5400 LIH z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULAT ION - cw 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

: 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2298 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 450 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.450 

0.450 

0.450 

0.450 

0.450 

0.450 

0,500 

0.500 

0.500 

0.600 

PROB. TEST # 2299 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 450 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

t4ODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

I 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

RESULTS 

X = FIRE G=W0 

--- 
PROB. TEST # 2253 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

2 .o 

2.0 

2.5 

2.5 

2.5 

3.0 

3.0 

4.0 

PROB. TEST # 2251 

CAP #' D 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X= FIRE O=NO 

I 

I 

I 

COMMENTS : I 

I PROB. TEST # 2290 I CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 1.5 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : -- - 

PROB. TEST # 2254 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 8900 t4H z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

6.0 

7 -0 

8,O 

8.0 

8.0 

8-0 

PROB. TEST # 2252 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

-- - - - - - 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 2291 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 1.5 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

t4ODULAT I ON - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

MHz 

AVE. POWER 

X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : 
PROB. TEST # 2303 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 150 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

0.250 

0.275 

0.300 

0.300 

0.300 

0.300 

0.300 

0.500 

1.0 

- - 

PROB. TEST # 2302 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 150 EilH z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2306 

CAP #' D 

FREQUENCY - 0.088 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # D 

FREQUENCY - 0.088 I.4H z 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

Could not fire but 

COMMENTS: it was above other 

low fires 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULATION - 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - MHz 

FIRING MODE - 

t4ODULAT I ON - 

RESULT 

X = FIRE 0=t40 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

WATTS 

I 

COMMENTS : 
PROB. TEST # 2254 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

4.0 

5-0 

8.0 

8.0 

2% 0 

-IILL1 

PROB. TEST # 2255 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - CW 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

20.0 

31],1) 

30.0 

30 .O 

30.0 

3*0 

--- 

PROB. TEST # 2249 

CAP #' c 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

0 

X 

0 

0 

0 

0 

COMMENTS: 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 2250 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION .- Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : 

- 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

PROB. TEST # 2289 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 1.5 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - CW 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 2292 

CAP # c 

FREQUENCY - 1.5 Mtlz . FIRING MODE - pin-case 

f4ODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS: All shorted p-c 

after exposure 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

RESULTS 

X = FIRE 13-NO 
PROB. TEST # 2373 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Pin 

MODULATION - cw 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

15 

- 1.5 

2.0 

2.0 

2.0 

2.0 

2.5 

2.5 

10.0 

- 

PROB. TEST # 2374 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION - cw 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

COMMENTS : 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

6 .O 

7.0 

7 .o 

7.0 

10.0 

10.0 

15.0 

15.0 

PROB. TEST # 2376 

CAP #' E 

FREQUENCY - 8900 MHz 

FIRING MODE - pin-pin 

MODULATION - Pulsed 

RESULT 

X = FIRE O=NO 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS: 

PROB. TEST # 2379 

CAP # E 

FREQUENCY - 8500 TlIiz 

FIRING MODE - Pin-Case 

MODULATION -. Pulsed 

AVE. POWER 

WATTS 

RESULT I X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS: Arcing 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - 

FIRING MODE - 

MODULATION - 

MHz 

AVE. POWER RESULT 

WATTS 1 X = FIRE O=RO - 

COMMENTS : 

PROB. TEST # 

CAP # 

FREQUENCY - I:IH z 

FIRING MODE - 

140 DULAT I ON - 

AVE. POWER RESULTS 

WATTS I X = FIRE O=NO 

COMMENTS 

I 

: 
EXCERPT FROM FIRL REPORT 

F-B2256 

*Z FRASKLIS ISSTITITTE RESEARCH L.\RORATORIES ! I IN A, I FA A. . DHI si\ r+,ir ?~NYSVLI,L*I,I 71.n. 
(which is evaluated 1,-!.en '.k,e terminating resistant(-- equals the radiation 

resist an^^:, and when tilS ;, actances cancel), we cx1 obtain for the induced 

*: ;=age 

1,:;p'iacing R aYLd u by ti-*; -~alues given above, we get R 

Sutstituting this expression and XA = -5, in Equation 2-20 we 

oms t ain 

4 For large h the h term in the expression of the radiation 

resistance domirLates and the radiation resistance becomes very small 

2 (for reasonable arzas, say 40 TII ), in relation to the @:her resistance 

in the circuits; therefore we may assume % = 0. 

Using this approximation we obtain 

The same ewrsssion for the aperture as given by Equation 2-25 

can be derived by calculating the maximum open circuit voltage that would 

be induced in the loop. The expression therefore implies that the 

power reradiat2d by tl-:s loop is small. 
To obtain an expression for the voltage induced in the small loop, 

assurne that the magnetic flux density is uniform over the loop. The total 

voltage around the loop is then given by 

whzre A = area of the loop 

a = 8 6n x 10 /A =2nf - 

f = frequency, A = wave length in meters 

po= permeability of free space - 

B = magnetic flux density 

If we express /HI in terms of P and Z0 from Equation 2-2 and frequency in terms of wavelength and substitute these into the square of Equation 

2-26 we obtain 

where 

If we now make use of the physical relations 

6 '% =300x10 meters/sec andZo~/- =px Q 90 = 377 ohms 

where co is the permittivity of'free space, we can write Equation 2-27 in the 

form 

n2 42 P Z 

.lvI = Om - 1.48 x lo4 x n2 P 

h2 h2 

Substitution of Equation 2-28 in 2-20 with % = 0, 5 = -XT zgain 

results in Equation 2-25. 
I F-B2256 

Equation 2-25 represents the aperture of a small loop, assuming 

reactive match between antenna and load, no dissipation of power by means 

of reradiation (we have seen that the radiation resistance is very low for 

snall loops), and orieritation of the loop for maxhum pickup. 

The analysis holds for frequencies up to 1 = 2l where 1 is the 

peri-neter of the loop. At higher frequencies it breaks down due to the nonuniform current distribution of the leads; the .~irmrm effecitve aperture 

(A,,) at these higher frequencies can, however be calcualted from Equation 

(2-5) rapeated here : 

DX~ A =- 

em 417 

w!~ich holds for arly lossless antenna. 

In this formula Aem is the maximum possible aperture, assuming a complete impedance match, and D is the directivity of the antenna. 

The directivity of the configuration under consideration as a function 

of frequency is not known; but if we assume that it can be no more tha~ that 

of an antenna of known directivity we can calculate A em* 

Reference 5, page 16, gives curves of directivity for three types of 

antennas: the unterminated rhombic, thelong wire, and the circular loop.. It 

is reasonable to assume that our configuration will be no more directive than 

these, since these are among the most directional linear antennas known. 

Figure 2-9 is a composite plot of the greatest directivity of these 

antennas types as a function of overall lead length. The plot was made directly 

from the above reference. Using Figure 2-9 and Equation 3-29 the maximum effective 

aperture of our antenna configuration can be calculated. The maxinum effective 

aperture (A ) is calculated under the assumption that the lead configuration will 

em 

be no more directive than an unterminated rhombic, a long wire or a circular loop 

antenna of equal linear dimension. The effective aperture (A,) is calculated with 
OVERALL LEAD LENGTtl !wovelength i 

FIG. 2 -9. MA XIMUM D/RECT/V/TY Of THREE KNOWN ANTENNA CONFIGU4 nONS -- 
the f oliowing assumptions : the terminating bridgewire resistance is no less 

than the dc resistance, the antenna is reactively matched, loss resistance is 

zera, and the radiation resistance is zero. Note that the last three assumptions 

2 rff,:ctivcljr mvcimize the A expression (see Equation 2-20 wher~ V is considered 

e 

ccnstant). Tkese calculations contain a seeming anomaly, since the effective 

aperture curve rises above the maxirrlum effective aperture curve. This is the - 

result of considering the radiation resistance as equal to zero in our maximizing 

prccedure of the effective ~p7:rture. If the radiation resistances were taken into 

c~r~sideration, the curves would not intersect. 

The blasting wiring layouts that correspond to the loop model are 

shobn in Figures 2-10 and 2-11. Figure 2-10 shows a pickup having its effect 

chiefly pin-to-pin; Figure 2-11 is similar, except pin-to-case. 

The model for the situation shown in Figure 2-10 is.a loop of wire 

of the same planar area as the pickup area (A) shown in the figure. The loop 

will be loaded with two impedances: that seen between points A and B looking 

toward the blasting machine and that seen between points C and D looking towards 

the cap 01- caps. 

The configuration shown in Figure 2-11 is similar except now the 

loading impedances of the wire loop are those measured between one of the 

-2;asting wires and ground, and in addition the loop is loaded with the impedance 

a:,paaring between the measurement ground points (Z ) e 

In both of the antenna models the .loading impedances are almost completely unknom. We know only that the cap impedance (either pin-to-pin or 

pin-to-case) influences the value of the impedance seen looking toward the cap. 

The impedances looking away from tk cap can be expected to be nainly 

reactive but we will treat them as completely unspecified. For maximum power 

to the cap the sum of the reactive portions of the loading impedances is assumed 

to be zero thus providing a reactively matched antenna. The cap impedance is 

actually separated from the measurement point by a length of transmission line 

of farily high characteristic impedance. 

I VERTICALLY POLARIZED 

I TRANSMITTING ANTENNA 

BLASTING 

MACHINE 

ANTENNA MODEL 

NG. 2 -//. PIN - TO - CA SE SENS/T
2 Pd is the power density in (watts/meter ) 

GT is the transmitting antenna gain (unitless) 

W is the power into the antenna (watts) T 

r is the distance from the antenna (meters) 

Substituting Equation (2-32) in Equation 2-4 and solving for r 2 

we obtain 

where WR is watts dissipated in the antenna load (the cap), and Ae is given 

by Equation 2-31. 

Now GT WT is Effective Radiated Power (ERP); making this substitution 

along with WR = 10 mw as an estimate of the minimum sensitivity of the cap, 

and substituting Equation 2-31 into 2-33, we get 
7.56 fit ERP 

r2 = - r\ 

and 

in meters 

r = 1.71 x ~o-~XP KfV, in miles 

where 

- - 'Mc 

Kfv 1 + 0.616%~ 

Kfv is plotted in Figure 2-12 with a plot of K = fMc as a comparison. This comparison line illustrates the value of K if the losses fv 

in the wire loop are ignored. Plots'of Equation 2-35 as a function of 

frequency, with ERP as a parameter, yield the low frequency safe distances 

for the loop model we are considering. The higher frequency distance can be 

computed from Equation 2-29 and Figure 2- 9. Taking 7.35 meters as the total 

perimeter of loop and making a straight line approximation to Figure 2-9 

we obtain for the maximum possible aperture 

Using the same development that led to Equation (2-33) we obtain 

A .ERP.100 r2 = em meters 4n 

r=1.75~10-"/~~~ A miles 

em 
FREQUENCY (Mc) 

F/GZ-/Z. FREWENCY FACTOR /K& FOR THE VERTICAL LOOP MOEL VS. fREOUENCY 
BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR UNDERGROUND PROPAGATION 

OF ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVES 

ei FRASRLIS 1SSTITI:TE RESEARCH LABORATORIF , ,I..,~ICI\ ~RANIIIN PAR~HAV . PHI~API >'NI~SY~\&NI* 197 
Electrical Properties of Rocks and Mineral s, George V. Kel ler, 

Handbook of Physical Constants (Rev. ~d.) - The Geological Soc. 

of Amer. Memoir 97, 1966, p. 553-77. 

Magnetic Properties of Rocks and Minerals, Do H. Lindsay, 

G. E. Andreasen, and J. R. Balsley, Handbook of Physical 

Constants - The Geological Soc. of Amer. Memoir 97, 1966, 

p. 543-52. 

Dielectric Constants and Dissipation Factors for Six Rock 

Types Between 20 and 100 Megahertz, Russel E. Griffin and 

Robert L. Marovelli, U.S. Dept. of the Interior - report of 

Invest. 6913. 

Dielectric Behavior of Rocks and Minerals, B. F. Howell, Jr. and 

P. H. Licastro, The American Mineralogist V46, Mar.-Apr. 1961, 

p. 269-88. 

Electrical Properties in the Deep Crust, Go V. Keller, IEEE 

Transactions on Antennas and Propagation, May 1963, p. 344-57. 

Rock Electrical Characteristics Deduced from Depth Attenuation 

Rates (in Drill Holes), J. T. de Bettencourt and J. W. Frazier, 

lEEE Transactions on Antennas and Propagation, May 1963, 

p. 358-63. 

The Diffraction of a Plane Wave Through Two or More Slits in a 

Plane Screen, Erik B. Hansen, App. Sci. Res. (Sec. B) V8, 

1960, p. 73-83. 

Genesalized Scattering Matrix Equations for Wavegudde Structures 

of Varying Surface Impedance Boundaries, E. Bahar, Radio Sc6. 

V2 (New Series), n. 3, Mar. ,1967, p. 287-97. 

A Reciprocity Theorem for the El ectromagnetic Field Scattered 

by an Obstacle, A. To DeHoop, App. Sci. Res. (Sec. B) V8, 1960, 

p. 135-40. 

Electromagnetic Fields of a Small Loop Antenna on the Surface 

of a Polarizable Medium, B. KO Bhattacharyya, Geophysics V29, 

n. 5, Oct. 1964, p. 814-31. 

Electromagnetic Absorption by Rocks With Some Experimental 

Observations Taken at the Mammoth Cave of Kentucky, J. Wallace Joyce, 

U.S. Dep. of Commerce - Technical Paper 497, January 11, 1952. 

Radio Propagation in Coal Mines, L. Finklestein and U. Erdem, 

Mining and Minerals Engineering, Mar. 1969, p. 48-55. 
Propagation of El ectromagnetic Pul ses in a Homo eneous Conducting 

Earth, James Re Waif, App. Sci. Res. V8 (Sec. B 3 , 1960, p. 213-53. 

Waveguide Survey, He E. Me Barlow, Electronics and Power, 

Oct. 1964, p. 332-8. 

An Approximate Wave Equation for an Axially Symnetric Periodic 

Naveguide, C. Re James and G. B. Walker, IEEE Transactions on 

Microwave Theory and Tech. V MTT-14, n. 9, Sept. 1966, p. 428-30. 

Cutoff Frequencies of Eccentric Waveguides, H. Ye Yee and 

N. F. Audeh, IEEE Transactions on Microwave Theory and Tech. 

V MTT-14, n. 10, Oct. 1966, p. 487-93. 

Propagation i n Nonuniform Waveguides wi th Impedance Wall s, 

Robert L. Gallawa, Radio Sci. J. V68D, n. 11, Nov. 1964, 

p. 1201-213. 

Radio \laves in Rock Near Overburden-Rock Interface, J. Carol an, Jr. 

and J. T. de Bettencourt, IEEE Transactions on Antennas and 

Propagation, May 1963, p. 336-8. 

A General Power Loss Method for Attenuation of Cavities and 

Uaveguides, J. J. Gustincic, IEE Transactions on Microwave 

Theory and Tech., Jan. 1963, p. 83-7. 

The Propagation of an Electromagnetic Wave Along an Infinite 

Corrugated Surface, Re A. Hurd, Canadian Journal of Physics 

V32, n. 12, Dec. 1954, p. 727-34. 

Telecormunication Equipment for Hazardous Areas, J. R. H. Stevens, 

Communications and Electronics (Lond.) V2, n. 4, April 1955, 

p. 50-4. 

Electrical Properties of ~oal's and Carbonized Material s, 

E. Ouchi , Fuel V46, n. 2, March 1967, p. 71-85. 

How Radio Locates Drill Holes Underground, R. P. Corbett, Eng. 

and F1ining.J. V156, n. 9, Sept. 1955, p. 90-1. 

A Power Main's Firing Circuit, Australian Mining V58, n. 1, 

Jan. 15, 1966, p. 17. 

Continuation of Electromagnetic Fields - 11, 

Amalendu Roy, Geophysics V34, n. 4, Aug. 1969, p. 572-83. 
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ROOTS OBTAINED FROM THE COMPUTER PROGRAM 

l6i?% FRANKL19 ISSTITUTE RESEARCH LABOHATORIF IHI flf NJAKIN FRANKLIN PbR*WAv - Plitllnf iPnl4 ?CNYSl;\*4Y#b 101 
APPENDIX G 

ROOTS OBTAIlJED FROM THE COMPUTER PROGRAM 

The following tables contain the approximate roots obtained for 

equation 6-7. The tables-are given in order of increasing frequency. 

Each table lists the dielectric constant (E ), the resistivity (p) [in R 

hm meters], the dimension (b) [in meters] and the value of a and BR, the R 

real and imaginary parts of the root. The value of q at the root value 

is also given. 

All data is presented in the same notation as the computer printout. 

The number is followed by a signed exponent. Thus 1.23-02 is read as 

1.23 x lom2. 
0.15 MHz F-C3102 
0.45 MHz F-C3102 
1.5 MHz F-C3102 
4.5 MHz F-C3102 
15 MHz F-C3102 
15 MHz F-C3102 

100 MHz F-C3102 
125 MHz F-C3102 
140 MHz F-C3102 

-- - 
150 MHz F-C3102 
175 MHz F-C3102 

- --- - - - - 
200 MHz F-C3102 
250 MHz 
275 MHz F-C3102 
300 MHz F-C3102 
400 MHz F-C3102 
450 MHz F-C3102 
475 MHz F-C3102 
500 MHz F-C3102 
600 Mtlz F -C3102 
650 MHz F-C3102 

800 MHz F-C3102 
900 MHz F-C3102 
1000 MHz F-C3102 
1500 MHz F-C3102 
2000 MHz F-C3102 
2500 MHz F-C3102 
4500 MHz F-C3102