### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No s

. 16

- 2121,

- 2165
T ONYA D AVIS , Plaintiff

- Appell ee and Cross

- Appellant ,

v.
E RNEST B. F ENTON , et al. , Defendants

- Appell ants and Cross

- Appellees

.

____________________ Appeal s from t he United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

. No. 13 C 3224

— Ruben Castillo , Chief Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 7, 2017

— D ECIDED M AY 26, 2017

____________________

Before P OSNER , R IP PLE , and S YKES , Circuit Judges

. P OSNER , Circuit Judge

. In 2013 Tonya Davis sued Ernest Fenton ( as well as Fenton’s law firms ) in federal district

cour t asserting state malpractice and breach of contract claims , as well as fe d eral Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Act claims , all arising out of Fenton ’ s repr e sentation of Davis in a mortgage foreclosure action in which Davis had lost her home

. Davis alleged that Fenton’s represent a tion of her had2 N os. 16

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been deficient, and that he had targeted her for deficient re presentation because of her race.
Fenton asked the district court to stay the law suit pen ding a r bitration, because his contract with Davis to represent her in the foreclosure action had required the parties to arb itrate any di s putes arising from the rep r esentation; and the Federal Arbitration Act , 9 U.S.C. § 3, provides that when the parties to a dispute lit i gable in federal court have a written agreement to arbitrate their dispute, either of the parties is entitled to stay the trial of the a c tion until the arbitration is complete , provided that the appl i cant for the stay is not in default of its obligations in the arbitr a tion. Agreeing that Fenton’s request for a stay was proper, the di s trict judge ordered the suit “ stayed pending arbitration ” ; the docket reflects that the lawsuit was “ administratively dismissed without prejudice subject to full reinstatement upon the compl e tion of the required arbitration , ” which awarded Davis $82,528.10 in damages for malpra c tice but denied her other claims. Fenton then sued Davis in a n Ill inois state court to have the arbitration award vacated or at least reduced. Davi s responded by moving the federal di strict court to reinstate her suit because the arbitr a tion had been concluded, to confirm the arbitration award purs u ant to 9 U.S.C. § 9, and to permit her to file a new Fair Hou s ing Act claim against Fenton , accusing him of retaliating against her for having filed her original Fair Housing Act claim

. When Fenton failed to appear at the hearing in the di strict court on Davis’s motion, th e judge entered a default judgment granting the motion , reinstating the case, and co nfirming the arb i tration award. He also permitted Davis to file her new Fair Hou s ing Act claim

. Fenton moved the courtNos. 16

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to vacate the default judgment and r e mand the case to state court , on the ground that the district court lacked jurisdi cti on because he (Fenton) had filed his state lawsuit challen ging the arbitr a tion award prior to Davis ’s having moved the district court to re

- open the case

. The district judge refused, remi nding the parties that “ I was the one that e n forced the defendants ’ request for arbitration and I sent the case for a rbitration. So it would seem to me, because I retained jurisdi ction, that any request to vacate the arb i tration award that the plaintiff wo n should have come to this Court and not to

some [state court] judge.” Fenton also moved the district court to di s mis s Davis’s retaliation claim; the court granted the motion. On appeal Fenton has renewed his challenge to the di strict judge ’s jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award

. But the challenge is meritless

— t he judge had jurisdiction over the case at the time it was filed, as it raised q uestions of federal law, and the judge’s order staying the case (or, equivalently, administratively dismissing it subject to rei nstatement at the conclusion of arbitration) retained jurisdi ction to confirm or vacate an arbitral award

. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad Co. v. Wisconsin Central Ltd. , 154 F.3d 404, 407 (7th Cir. 1998).
This is true notwithst anding Magruder v. Fidelity Broke rage Se r vices LLC , 818 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016) , a case in which

an a g grieved customer of Fidelity had arbitrated his dispute with the company , lost, filed a federal lawsuit asking the
court to ove r turn the arbitrator’s dec ision , and argued that the court had jurisdi c tion to vacate the award because the arbitrator had resolved a question of federal law . But we ruled that “ a federal issue r e solved by the arbitrator does not4 N os. 16

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supply subject

- matter jurisdiction for r e view or enf orcement of the award.” Id

. at 288 (emphasis in orig i nal)

. B ecause there

was no other basis for subject

- matter jurisdi c tion, the suit should have been dismissed. Davis’s federal suit, in contrast, preceded the arbitration and was stayed pending it ; upon
co mpl e tion of the arbitration she returned to the federal
court seeking confirmation of the award. B e cause h er suit had been stayed, not dismissed , the court , by virtue of ha ving jurisdiction over the original lawsuit , retained jurisdi ction not only over her r e quest to confirm the award but also over her federal

- law claims

. One other issue needs to be resolved

— Davis’s appeal of the dismissal of her retaliation claim

. In her original lawsuit against Fenton she’d been represented by two lawyers , whom a fter the lawsuit was filed Fenton sued in state court, accusing them of having improperly acquired confidential information , and spread false information, about his bus iness. See Fenton v. Dudley , 761 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2014) . Fe nton asked the state court for an in junction against the la wyers prohibiting them from speaking to Davis about her la wsuit against him , a nd the state court granted the i n junction (although it was eventually lifted). Davis now a r gues that Fenton’s lawsuit was in retaliation against her for ha v ing filed her original Fair Housing Act claim against him , and

was therefore a further violation of the Fair Housing Act. The Act does prohibit retaliation against a person for exerci sing his or her rights under the Act; see 42 U.S.C. § 3617 , also Bloch v . Frischholz , 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009) . B ut filing a lawsuit, or asking for an injunction, can’t be considered r etaliation, except perhaps in extraordinary circu m stances not present in this case. A FFIRMED

.