* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 12/16/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JOHN G. WESTINE, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. GONZALES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Third-Party-PlaintiffAppellee,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Third-Party-DefendantAppellee. 95-1510 (D.C. No. 94-B-1143) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *** Honorable John W. Lungstrum, District Judge, UnitedStates District Court

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

1 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau o f Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). -2- Before BALDOCK and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges, and LUN GSTRUM, ** District Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff John G. Westine, Jr. appeals from an orde r of the district court dismissing his action for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm. Westine commenced this Bivens 1 action alleging his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because he was exposed to asbestos and lead-containing material during ins tallation of a fire suppression system at the Federal Correctional Institution wher e he was confined. Westine also alleged violations of CERCLA, OSHA, RICO, and state law negligence. The district court dismissed the action holding that Westine had failed to state any viable claim for any federal action and d eclining to exercise jurisdiction over Westine’s remaining state law claims. We revi ew the district court’s-3-

dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction de novo. Brumark Corp. v. Samson Resources Corp. , 57 F.3d 941, 944 (10th Cir. 1995). Neither CERCLA nor OSHA contain statutory provision s permitting a private cause of action for personal injury. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co. , 972 F.2d 1527, 1537 (10th Cir. 1992)(CERCLA); Ellis v. Chase Communications, Inc. , 63 F.3d 473, 477 (6th Cir.1995)(OSHA); cf. Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n , 521 F.2d 628, 631 (10th Cir. 1975). No recovery for personal injury is providedfor under the statutes governing RICO actions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(recovery permitted only for injury to individual’s business or property); cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. , 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)(phrase "business or property" excludes personal injuries). Westine alleged several constitutional violations u nder his Bivens claim. However, defendant is a private contractor, not a g overnment actor, a prerequisite to bringing such a claim. See Bivens , 403 U.S. at 397 (to state a Bivens -type claim, plaintiff must show injury as a result of vi olation of constitutional rights by federalagents). Westine has alleged no viable federal claim. When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may properly decline to e xercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We see no abuse of-4-

discretion by the district court in its dismissal o f Westine’s remaining state claims. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge