116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 178 

AN ACT 

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic 

Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary 

detention, torture, and harassment of these communities 

inside and outside China. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Uyghur Human Rights 

3 Policy Act of 2019’’. 

4 SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. 

5 The purpose of this Act is to direct United States 

6 resources to address gross violations of universally recog7 nized human rights, including the mass internment of over 

8 1,000,000 Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim eth9 nic minorities in China and the intimidation and threats 

10 faced by United States citizens and legal permanent resi11 dents. 

12 SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. 

13 In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional 

14 committees’’ means— 

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

16 Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee 

17 on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Hous18 ing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judi19 ciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 

20 Senate; and 

21 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

22 Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select 

23 Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Finan24 cial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and 

25 the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 

26 Representatives. 
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1 SEC. 4. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

4 China has a long history of repressing approximately 

5 13,000,000 Turkic, moderate Sunni Muslims, par6 ticularly Uyghurs, in the nominally autonomous 

7 Xinjiang region. These actions are in contravention 

8 of international human rights standards, including 

9 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 

10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

11 (2) In recent decades, central and regional Chi12 nese government policies have systematically dis13 criminated against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and 

14 other Muslims in Xinjiang by denying them a range 

15 of civil and political rights, including the freedoms of 

16 expression, religion, movement, and a fair trial, 

17 among others. 

18 (3) Increased unrest in the Xinjiang region as 

19 a result of the central government’s severe repres20 sion is used in Orwellian fashion by the Government 

21 of the People’s Republic of China as evidence of 

22 ‘‘terrorism’’ and ‘‘separatism’’ and as an excuse for 

23 further disproportionate response. 

24 (4) In 2014, Chinese authorities launched their 

25 latest ‘‘Strike Hard against Violent Extremism’’ 

26 campaign, in which the pretext of wide-scale, inter-
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1 nationally linked threats of terrorism were used to 

2 justify pervasive restrictions on, and gross human 

3 rights violations against, the ethnic minority commu4 nities of Xinjiang. 

5 (5) Those policies included— 

6 (A) pervasive, high-tech surveillance across 

7 the region, including the arbitrary collection of 

8 biodata, such as DNA samples from children, 

9 without their knowledge or consent; 

10 (B) the use of QR codes outside homes to 

11 gather information on how frequently individ12 uals pray; 

13 (C) facial and voice recognition software 

14 and ‘‘predictive policing’’ databases; and 

15 (D) severe restrictions on the freedom of 

16 movement across the region. 

17 (6) Chinese security forces have never been held 

18 accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in 

19 Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya 

20 (2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of 

21 Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014). 

22 (7)(A) The August 2016 transfer of former 

23 Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen 

24 Quanguo to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary 
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1 prompted an acceleration in the crackdown across 

2 the region. 

3 (B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used 

4 chilling political rhetoric to describe the purpose of 

5 government policy, including ‘‘eradicating tumors’’ 

6 and ‘‘spray[ing] chemicals’’ on crops to kill the 

7 ‘‘weeds’’. 

8 (C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese 

9 cultural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and 

10 unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to 

11 state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as 

12 muqam (a musical tradition) and meshrep (tradi13 tional cultural gatherings), and due to elimination of 

14 the Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in 

15 Xinjiang schools and universities. 

16 (8) In 2017, credible reports found that family 

17 members of Uyghurs living outside of China had 

18 gone missing inside China, that Chinese authorities 

19 were pressuring those outside the country to return, 

20 and that individuals were being arbitrarily detained 

21 in large numbers. 

22 (9) There is ample credible evidence provided 

23 by scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, 

24 and think tanks substantiating the establishment by 

25 Chinese authorities of ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps. 
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1 (10) Independent organizations conducted 

2 interviews, including testimonies from Kayrat 

3 Samarkan, Omir Bekali, and Mihrigul Tursun, along 

4 with others who had been detained in such facilities, 

5 who described forced political indoctrination, torture, 

6 beatings, food deprivation, and solitary confinement, 

7 as well as uncertainty as to the length of detention, 

8 humiliation, and denial of religious, cultural, and lin9 guistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told 

10 by guards that the only way to secure release was 

11 to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty. Poor con12 ditions and lack of medical treatment at such facili13 ties appear to have contributed to the deaths of 

14 some detainees, including the elderly and infirm. 

15 Uyghurs Muhammed Salih Hajim (2018), Yaqupjan 

16 Naman (2018), Abdughappar Abdujappar (2018), 

17 Ayhan Memet (2018), Abdulreshit Seley Hajim 

18 (2018), Nurimangul Memet (2018), Adalet Teyip 

19 (2018), Abdulehed Mehsum (2017), Hesen Imin 

20 (2017), and Sawut Raxman (2017) reportedly died 

21 while in the custody of the Chinese authorities in 

22 ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps, without proper inves23 tigation of the circumstances. 

24 (11) Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now ob25 tained permanent residence or citizenship in other 
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1 countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment 

2 from Chinese officials. 

3 (12) Under pressure from the Government of 

4 the People’s Republic of China, countries have forc5 ibly returned Uyghurs to China in violation of the 

6 non-refoulement principle and their well-founded 

7 fear of persecution. States returning Uyghurs in8 clude Egypt, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Burma, 

9 Cambodia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 

10 Tajikistan, Pakistan, Nepal, and India. 

11 (13) Six journalists for Radio Free Asia’s 

12 Uyghur service have publicly detailed abuses their 

13 family members in Xinjiang have endured in re14 sponse to their work exposing abusive policies across 

15 the region. 

16 (14) Several United States-based companies are 

17 conducting business with Xinjiang authorities with18 out sufficient due diligence or safeguards to ensure 

19 their business operations do not create or contribute 

20 to human rights violations. 

21 (15) The Government of the People’s Republic 

22 of China is increasingly investing in the ‘‘Belt and 

23 Road Initiative’’ across Xinjiang and throughout 

24 Central Asia, extending its influence through organi25 zations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
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1 tion without regard to the political, religious, cul2 tural, or linguistic rights of ethnic minorities. 

3 (16) The Secretary of State, Congressional-Ex4 ecutive Commission on China, Tom Lantos Human 

5 Rights Commission, and individual members of the 

6 executive branch and Congress have all expressed 

7 growing concern regarding the pervasive human 

8 rights abuses across Xinjiang and the ‘‘political re9 education’’ camps. 

10 (17) In August 2018, the United Nations Com11 mittee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination challenged 

12 the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

13 over abuses in Xinjiang, including the establishment 

14 of mass arbitrary detention camps. 

15 (18) Between August and September 2018, 

16 Chinese authorities responded to these allegations by 

17 either flatly denying them or insisting that the facili18 ties are ‘‘vocational training centers’’. 

19 (19) In September 2018, newly appointed 

20 United Nations High Commissioner for Human 

21 Rights Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as 

22 High Commissioner the ‘‘deeply disturbing allega23 tions of large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs 

24 and other Muslim communities, in so-called re-edu25 cation camps across Xinjiang’’. 
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1 (20) On September 18, 2018, the Washington 

2 Post editorial board wrote, ‘‘At stake is not just the 

3 welfare of the Uighurs, but also whether the tech4 nologies of the 21st century will be employed to 

5 smother human freedom.’’ 

6 (21) In December 2018 testimony before the 

7 Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and Inter8 national Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on 

9 Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Assistant 

10 Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 

11 Scott Busby testified that the number of those de12 tained in camps since April 2017 was ‘‘at least 

13 800,000 and possibly more than 2 million’’. 

14 (22) In December 2018, independent media re15 ports pointed to growing evidence of forced labor in 

16 the camps, as well as reports of individuals who have 

17 been released from camps being forced to labor in 

18 nearby factories for low wages under threat of being 

19 sent back to ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps. 

20 (23) In December 2018 and January 2019, 

21 Chinese officials organized visits to ‘‘political reedu22 cation’’ camps in Xinjiang for a small group of for23 eign journalists and diplomats from 12 non-Western 

24 countries. In the months preceding the visits, inter25 national media reported that officials worked to re-
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1 move security features from some ‘‘political reeduca2 tion’’ facilities, and coached detainees and area resi3 dents not to make negative comments about the 

4 camps. Reports also indicated that officials had 

5 transferred large numbers of detainees to detention 

6 facilities in other parts of China. 

7 (24) Experts have described the Xinjiang region 

8 as ‘‘a police state to rival North Korea, with a for9 malized racism on the order of South African apart10 heid’’ and the repression in the Xinjiang region as 

11 a ‘‘slow motion Tiananmen’’. 

12 (25) On December 31, 2018, President Donald 

13 J. Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Ini14 tiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 105–409), which 

15 condemned China’s ‘‘forced disappearances, extra16 legal detentions, invasive and omnipresent surveil17 lance, and lack of due process in judicial pro18 ceedings,’’ authorized funding to promote democ19 racy, human rights, and the rule of law in China, 

20 and supported sanctions designations against any 

21 entity or individual that— 

22 (A) violates human rights or religious free23 doms; or 

24 (B) engages in censorship activities. 
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1 SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

2 It is the sense of Congress that— 

3 (1) the President should condemn abuses 

4 against Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities in 

5 Xinjiang and call on Chinese President Xi Jinping 

6 to recognize the profound abuse and likely lasting 

7 damage of China’s current policies, and immediately 

8 close the ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps, lift all re9 strictions on and ensure respect for internationally 

10 guaranteed human rights across the region, and 

11 allow for reestablishment of contact between those 

12 inside and outside China; 

13 (2) the United States Government should de14 velop a strategy to support the United Nations High 

15 Commissioner for Human Rights and numerous 

16 United Nations Special Rapporteurs’ urgent calls for 

17 immediate and unfettered access to Xinjiang, includ18 ing the ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps, and instruct 

19 representatives of the United States at the United 

20 Nations to use the voice and vote of the United 

21 States to condemn the mass arbitrary detainment, 

22 torture, and forced labor of Turkic Muslims in the 

23 People’s Republic of China; 

24 (3) the Secretary of State should consider the 

25 applicability of existing authorities, including the 

26 Global Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of Public Law 
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1 114–328), to impose targeted sanctions on members 

2 of the Government of the People’s Republic of 

3 China, the Chinese Communist Party, and state se4 curity apparatus, including Xinjiang Party Secretary 

5 Chen Quanguo and other officials credibly alleged to 

6 be responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang 

7 and elsewhere; 

8 (4) the Secretary of State should fully imple9 ment the provisions of the Frank Wolf International 

10 Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114–281) and 

11 consider strategically employing sanctions and other 

12 tools under the International Religious Freedom Act 

13 (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.) and to employ measures re14 quired as part of the ‘‘Country of Particular Con15 cern’’ (CPC) designation for the Government of the 

16 People’s Republic of China that directly address par17 ticularly severe violations of religious freedom; 

18 (5) the Secretary of Commerce should review 

19 and consider prohibiting the sale or provision of any 

20 United States-made goods or services to any state 

21 agent in Xinjiang, and adding the Xinjiang branch 

22 of the Chinese Communist Party, the Xinjiang Pub23 lic Security Bureau, and the Xinjiang Office of the 

24 United Front Work Department, or any entity act25 ing on their behalf to facilitate the mass internment 
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1 or forced labor of Turkic Muslims, to the ‘‘Entity 

2 List’’ administered by the Department of Commerce; 

3 (6) United States companies and individuals 

4 selling goods or services or otherwise operating in 

5 Xinjiang should take steps, including in any public 

6 or financial filings, to publicly assert that their com7 mercial activities are not contributing to human 

8 rights violations in Xinjiang or elsewhere in China 

9 and that their supply chains are not compromised by 

10 forced labor; 

11 (7) the Federal Bureau of Investigation and ap12 propriate United States law enforcement entities 

13 should track and take steps to hold accountable offi14 cials from China who harass, threaten, or intimidate 

15 not only United States citizens and legal permanent 

16 residents, including Turkic Muslims, Uyghur-Ameri17 cans, and Chinese-Americans, but also Chinese na18 tionals legally studying or working in the United 

19 States; 

20 (8) the Secretary of State should work with tra21 ditional United States allies and partners to take 

22 similar steps and coordinate closely on targeted 

23 sanctions and visa restrictions; 

24 (9) the Secretary of State should appoint a 

25 United States Special Coordinator for Xinjiang, 
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1 from officers and employees of the Department of 

2 State, who will coordinate diplomatic, political, pub3 lic diplomacy, financial assistance, sanctions, 

4 counterterrorism, security resources, and congres5 sional reporting requirements within the United 

6 States Government to respond to the gross violations 

7 of universally recognized human rights occurring in 

8 the Xinjiang region, including by addressing— 

9 (A) the mass detentions of Uyghurs and 

10 other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities; 

11 (B) the deployment of technologically ad12 vanced surveillance and police detection meth13 ods; and 

14 (C) the counterterrorism and counter-radi15 calism claims used to justify the policies of the 

16 Government of the People’s Republic of China 

17 in Xinjiang; 

18 (10) the United States Special Coordinator for 

19 Xinjiang position should continue until the mass 

20 surveillance and internment of Uyghurs and other 

21 predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities has ended 

22 and all detainees released; and 

23 (11) the full and timely implementation of sec24 tions 408, 409, and 410 of the Asia Reassurance 

25 Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) is crit-
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1 ical to demonstrating unwavering support by the 

2 United States for the universally recognized human 

3 rights of all ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities 

4 in China, including Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. 

5 SEC. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

7 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 

8 Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, 

9 shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees 

10 a report to assess national and regional security threats 

11 posed by the crackdown across Xinjiang, the frequency 

12 with which Central and Southeast Asian governments are 

13 forcibly returning Turkic Muslim refugees and asylum 

14 seekers, and the transfer or development of technology 

15 used by the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

16 that facilitates the mass internment and surveillance of 

17 Turkic Muslims, including technology relating to pre18 dictive policing and large-scale data collection and anal19 ysis. 

20 (b) ANNEX.—The report required under subsection 

21 (a) shall include an unclassified annex with a list of all 

22 Chinese companies involved in the construction or oper23 ation of the ‘‘political education’’ camps, and the provision 

24 or operation of surveillance technology or operations, 

25 across Xinjiang. 
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1 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 

2 subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form 

3 but may contain a classified annex. 

4 SEC. 7. PROTECTING CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS OF THE 

5 UNITED STATES FROM INTIMIDATION AND 

6 COERCION. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

8 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Fed9 eral Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Sec10 retary of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate 

11 congressional committees that outlines any and all efforts 

12 to provide information to and protect United States citi13 zens and residents, including ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese 

14 nationals legally studying or working temporarily in the 

15 United States, who have experienced harassment or in16 timidation by officials or agents of the Government of the 

17 People’s Republic of China and the Communist Party 

18 within the United States and those whose families in 

19 China have experienced threats or detention because of 

20 their work or advocacy. 

21 (b) DATABASE OF DETAINED FAMILY MEMBERS OF

22 UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS.—The Sec23 retary of State should explore appropriate mechanisms to 

24 establish a voluntary database to which United States citi25 zens or permanent resident family members of the Uyghur 
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1 diaspora can provide details about missing family mem2 bers, with a view towards pressing for information and ac3 countability from the Government of the People’s Republic 

4 of China and to take appropriate measures to expedite the 

5 asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic 

6 Muslim minorities. 

7 SEC. 8. REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. 

8 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date 

9 of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United 

10 States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appro11 priate congressional committees a report that— 

12 (1) describes the current status and reach of 

13 United States broadcasting to the Xinjiang region 

14 and Uyghur speaking communities globally, barriers 

15 to the free flow of news and information to these 

16 communities, and, if appropriate, detailed technical 

17 and fiscal requirements necessary to increase broad18 casting and other media to these communities glob19 ally; 

20 (2) describes efforts to intimidate Radio Free 

21 Asia and Voice of America reporters reporting on 

22 human rights issues in the People’s Republic of 

23 China; and 

24 (3) in consultation with the Global Engagement 

25 Center at the Department of State, describes and 
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1 assesses disinformation and propaganda by the Gov2 ernment of the People’s Republic of China or other 

3 members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

4 targeting Uyghur communities globally and efforts 

5 to downplay gross violations of universally recog6 nized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region 

7 and any activities or programs that address these ef8 forts. 

9 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

10 United States to commend and support the journalists of 

11 the Uyghur language service of Radio Free Asia for their 

12 reporting on the human rights and political situation in 

13 Xinjiang despite efforts to silence or intimidate their re14 porting through the detention of family members and rel15 atives by the Government of the People’s Republic of 

16 China. 

17 SEC. 9. REPORT AND SEMI-ANNUAL BRIEFING. 

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

19 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

20 after consulting relevant Federal agencies and civil society 

21 organizations, shall submit to the appropriate congres22 sional committees and make available on the website of 

23 the Department of State an interagency report that in24 cludes— 
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1 (1) an assessment of the number of individuals 

2 detained in political ‘‘reeducation camps’’ and condi3 tions in the camps for detainees in the Xinjiang re4 gion, including whether detainees endure torture, 

5 forced renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment; 

6 (2) a description, as possible, of the geographic 

7 location of the camps and estimates of the number 

8 of people detained in such facilities; 

9 (3) a description, as possible, of the methods 

10 used by People’s Republic of China authorities to 

11 ‘‘reeducate’’ Uyghur detainees, as well as the Peo12 ple’s Republic of China agencies in charge of reedu13 cation; 

14 (4) an assessment of the number of individuals 

15 being arbitrarily detained, including in pretrial de16 tention centers and prisons; 

17 (5) an assessment of forced labor in the camps 

18 and in regional factories for low wages under threat 

19 of being sent back to ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps; 

20 (6) a list of Chinese companies and industries 

21 benefitting from such labor, and a description of ac22 tions taken to address forced labor in Xinjiang con23 current with the People’s Republic of China’s Tier 

24 3 designation under the 2018 Trafficking in Persons 

25 Report; 
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1 (7) an assessment of the level of access People’s 

2 Republic of China authorities grant to diplomats, 

3 journalists, and others to the Xinjiang region and a 

4 description of measures used to impede efforts to 

5 monitor human rights conditions in the Xinjiang re6 gion; 

7 (8) an assessment of the repressive surveillance, 

8 detection, and control methods used by People’s Re9 public of China authorities in the Xinjiang region, 

10 and a list of individuals who hold senior leadership 

11 positions and are responsible for ‘‘high-tech’’ polic12 ing, mass incarceration, and reeducation efforts tar13 geting Uyghur and other predominately Muslim eth14 nic minorities in the Xinjiang region; 

15 (9) a description of United States diplomatic ef16 forts to address the gross violations of universally 

17 recognized human rights in the Xinjiang region and 

18 to protect asylum seekers from the region, including 

19 in multilateral institutions and through bilateral re20 lations with the People’s Republic of China, the na21 tions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 

22 (OIC), and other countries; and 

23 (10) a description, as appropriate, of diplomatic 

24 efforts by United States allies and other nations to 

25 address the gross violations of universally recognized 
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1 human rights in the Xinjiang region and to protect 

2 asylum seekers from the region. 

3 (b) BRIEFING AND SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after 

5 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 

6 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or the Sec7 retary’s designee, shall provide a briefing to the ap8 propriate congressional committees covering the sub9 jects listed in subsection (a). At the time of each 

10 briefing, the Department of State shall provide un11 classified written materials detailing the subject 

12 matters covered in paragraphs (1), (2), (4), (6), and 

13 (9) of such subsection. 

14 (2) TERMINATION.—The briefing requirement 

15 under paragraph (1) terminates 5 years after the 

16 date of the enactment of this Act. 

17 SEC. 10. REPORT ON SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN 

18 RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE XINJIANG RE19 GION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

21 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

22 shall, except as provided in subsection (c), submit to Con23 gress a report that includes a statement of whether the 

24 persons described in subsection (b) meet the criteria to 

25 be designated for the imposition of sanctions under section 
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1 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Account2 ability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114– 

3 238; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) because the persons— 

4 (1) are responsible for extrajudicial killings, tor5 ture, or other gross violations of internationally rec6 ognized human rights in the Xinjiang region of the 

7 People’s Republic of China; or 

8 (2) materially assisted, sponsored, or provided 

9 financial, material, or technological support for, or 

10 goods or services in support of, such violations. 

11 (b) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—The persons described in 

12 this subsection are the following: 

13 (1) The Party Secretary for Xinjiang region of 

14 the People’s Republic of China, Chen Quanguo. 

15 (2) Senior full or alternate members of the Cen16 tral Committee of the Communist Party of China 

17 whose professional responsibilities relate to the gov18 ernmental administration of the Xinjiang region, or 

19 who have conducted business with government enti20 ties in the Xinjiang region. 

21 (c) EXCEPTION.—The Secretary shall not be required 

22 to submit a report under subsection (a) if the Secretary 

23 determines, not later than 90 days after the date of the 

24 enactment of this Act, that the Government of the Peo25 ple’s Republic of China allows independent, unrestricted, 
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1 and unsupervised access to the Xinjiang region for inter2 national human rights organizations. 

Passed the Senate September 11, 2019. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 
116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 178 

AN ACT 

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic 

China. ment of these communities inside and outside end to arbitrary detention, torture, and harassTurkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an