Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1509-CR-1483 | July 13, 2016 Page 1 of 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Nicole A. Zelin

Pritzke & Davis, LLP

Greenfield, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Amanda N. Gonzales,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

July 13, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

30A05-1509-CR-1483

Appeal from the Hancock Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Terry K. Snow

Trial Court Cause No. 

30D01-1407-MR-1274

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Following a jury trial, Amanda Gonzales (“Gonzales”) was convicted of 

murder and conspiracy to commit murder and sentenced to an aggregate term 
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of sixty years. Gonzales appeals and presents five issues, which we consolidate 

and restate as the following four: 

I. Whether the State presented evidence sufficient to support 

Gonzales’s convictions; 

II. Whether Gonzales’s convictions for both murder and conspiracy 

to commit murder constitute impermissible double jeopardy 

under the Indiana Constitution; 

III. Whether the trial court erred by excluding hearsay testimony that 

implicated another individual; and 

IV. Whether Gonzales’s aggregate sentence of sixty years is 

inappropriate. 

[2] We conclude that the State presented evidence sufficient to support Gonzales’s

conviction for murder, that the trial court did not err in excluding the hearsay 

testimony, and that Gonzales’s sentence is not inappropriate. However, the 

State concedes, and we agree, that Gonzales’s convictions for both murder and 

conspiracy to commit murder constitute impermissible double jeopardy. 

Accordingly, we affirm Gonzales’s conviction and sentence for murder but 

vacate Gonzales’s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit murder.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At the time relevant to this appeal, Gonzales lived with her boyfriend, Ronnie 

Westbrook (“Westbrook”), at a hotel on the east side of Indianapolis. 

Westbrook rented several rooms in the hotel. The victim in this case, twentyeight-year-old Katrina Miller (“Miller”), stayed in one of the other rooms rented 

by Westbrook. On July 19, 2014, Westbrook spent the night in one of these 

rooms with Miller. The next morning, Westbrook awoke to the sound of 
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someone banging on the door to his room. When he opened the door, he saw 

Gonzales walking across the parking lot to another room occupied by Joe 

Meyers (“Meyers”). Westbrook returned to bed, but approximately fifteen to 

twenty minutes later, Gonzales returned and again began to bang on the door. 

This time, Miller answered the door, and Gonzales entered the room, asking 

Westbrook what he had been doing in the room with Miller. Gonzales believed 

that Westbrook and Miller had been having sex. Gonzales insisted that 

Westbrook return to their room with her and became angry when he said that 

he would not leave with her. 

[4] In the early hours of the next morning, Gonzales, Meyers, Westbrook, and 

Miller all got into Meyers’s SUV. Gonzales placed something in her waistband, 

in the small of her back, before she got in the vehicle. Meyers drove to a 

location on Carroll Road, which runs along the county line between Marion 

and Hancock Counties. A cornfield is on the Hancock County side. There, 

Meyers and Miller exited the vehicle. Westbrook, who was wearing a GPSenabled ankle monitor, drove with Gonzales to the intersection of 42nd Street 

and German Church Road, where Westbrook got out of the vehicle. Gonzales 

then drove back to the cornfield where Meyers and Miller had been let out. 

Gonzales then gave Meyers a .380 caliber Sig Sauer brand semi-automatic 

pistol and told him to shoot Miller. Meyers then shot Miller in the back of the 

head at the base of her skull, execution style. Meyers and Gonzales then left to 

pick up Westbrook and returned to the hotel at approximately 6:30 a.m. 
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[5] Back at the hotel, Gonzales went to the room rented by Isadore Webster

(“Webster”) and his wife, Michelle Muse (“Muse”). Gonzales asked Muse if 

she had ever seen someone be killed or seen a dead body. Gonzales told Muse

that she had earlier taken drugs from Westbrook’s room and that Westbrook 

then accused both Gonzales and Miller of taking the drugs and threatened to 

kill them. Gonzales further told Muse that she was afraid when she, Miller, 

Meyers, and Westbrook went to the cornfield but that Meyers assured her that 

he would not harm her and proceeded to kill Miller without aid or assistance 

from Gonzales. 

[6] Four days after Miller’s murder, two Mormon missionaries found Miller’s body 

in the cornfield and telephoned the authorities. Subsequent investigation 

revealed that Miller had been shot in the back of the head, just above her spine, 

with a .380 caliber bullet. The bullet fragments were found in her brain and a 

.380 shell casing was found in the field near her body. In addition to the fatal 

gunshot, Miller also showed signs of having been beaten before being shot: she 

had blunt-force trauma to the right side of her face and some of her teeth had 

been knocked out. She also had a contusion on her thigh. 

[7] When the discovery of Miller’s body was announced on the local news, 

Webster and Muse decided to tell the police about what Gonzales had said the 

day of Miller’s murder. Based on the information gathered from Muse and 

Webster, the police collected security video from the hotel on the morning in 

question. This corroborated Muse’s story, and the police began to look for 

Gonzales, Westbrook, and Meyers. 
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[8] In the meantime, Westbrook cut off his ankle monitor, and he and Gonzales 

fled to a hotel on the west side of Indianapolis. The police eventually located 

and arrested the pair on July 27, 2014. While she was in jail awaiting trial, 

Gonzales spoke to a fellow inmate and told her that the police would never find 

the gun used to kill Miller and that, even if they did, it could not be forensically 

matched to Miller’s death because “they had taken the . . . firing pin and barrel 

apart from the gun,” and hidden it at a storage unit rented by Meyers’s wife. Tr. 

p. 633. This jail inmate informed the police about Gonzales’s statements. When 

the police obtained a warrant and searched the storage unit, they found a 

partially disassembled Sig Saur .380 caliber pistol from which the barrel had 

been removed. Subsequent testing revealed this to be the weapon that had fired 

a shell casing found near Miller’s body. 

[9] On July 30, 2014, the State charged Gonzales with Level 3 felony kidnapping 

and murder. On April 13, 2015, the State added an additional charge of Level 1 

conspiracy to commit murder. That same day, Gonzales pleaded guilty to the 

kidnapping and conspiracy charge in exchange for the State dismissing the 

murder charge. However, Gonzales later successfully petitioned to trial court to 

withdraw her plea of guilty, and the State reinstated the charge of murder. 

[10] A three-day jury trial commenced on August 3, 2015. Among the State’s 

witnesses was Detective Trent Smoll (“Detective Smoll”) of the Hancock 

County Sheriff’s Department. On cross-examination, Gonzales’s trial counsel 

asked Detective Smoll if he had spoken with a man named Josh Brown 

(“Brown”) during his investigation of Miller’s death. Detective Smoll answered 
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in the affirmative, and Gonzales’s counsel asked if Brown had told him that he 

heard another individual state something. At this point, the State objected on 

hearsay grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection. Gonzales then 

made an offer to prove by stating that Brown told Detective Smoll that he heard 

Miller “was robbing people and that was what got her killed.” Tr. p. 889. At the 

conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted Gonzales’s motion 

for judgment on the evidence with regard to the charge of kidnapping. 

[11] During Gonzales’s case-in-chief, she called Detective Smoll as a witness and 

asked him if he had spoken with Brown and two other men named Chris Taylor 

(“Taylor”) and Jordan Storch (“Storch”). Gonzales’s counsel attempted to elicit 

from Detective Smoll that Taylor had told him that Storch had told Taylor that 

he had killed someone. Although the State objected again on hearsay grounds, 

the trial court granted defense counsel some leeway and allowed Detective 

Smoll to testify that “Taylor . . . did come to the Sheriff’s Department and he 

did say that he overheard Jordan Storch say that he killed a bitch, or something 

like that, he wasn’t specific. Any of that information was not backed up by any 

evidentiary value[.]” Tr. pp. 942-43. Notably, however, Gonzales did not call 

Brown, Taylor, or Storch as witnesses. 

[12] The jury was instructed regarding accomplice liability and found Gonzales 

guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. A sentencing hearing was 

held on September 2, 2015, at which the court found no mitigating 

circumstances and found as aggravating the following circumstances: the harm 

caused was greater than that necessary to commit the crime; Gonzales had 
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threatened witnesses while she was in jail; Gonzales was on bond at the time 

the offenses were committed; new charges were filed against Gonzales while 

she was incarcerated, one of which resulted in a conviction for battery on a 

witness against her; charges were pending against Gonzales in another county; 

and the “cold and calculate[ed]” nature of Miller’s murder. Tr. pp. 1066-67. 

The court then imposed a sentence of sixty years on the murder conviction and 

a concurrent thirty-year sentence on the conspiracy conviction. Gonzales now 

appeals. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[13] Gonzales first argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 

support her conviction for murder. Of course, when reviewing a challenge to 

the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we neither reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Neukam v. State, 934 N.E.2d 

198, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 

(Ind. 2005)). Instead, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable 

inferences supporting the verdict, and we will affirm if the probative evidence 

and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a 

reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. 

[14] To convict Gonzales of murder, the State was required to prove that she 

knowingly or intentionally killed Miller. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). Here, the 

State argued that Gonzales was guilty as an accomplice and that Meyers shot 

Miller, and the jury was instructed regarding accomplice liability. To convict 
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Gonzales as an accomplice, the State was required to prove that she knowingly 

or intentionally aided, induced, or caused Meyers to kill Miller. See Ind. Code § 

35-41-2-4. Our supreme court has explained the law of accomplice liability as 

follows:

A defendant may be charged as the principal but convicted as an 

accomplice. Generally there is no distinction between the 

criminal liability of an accomplice and a principal, although 

evidence that the defendant participated in every element of the 

underlying offense is not necessary to convict a defendant as an 

accomplice. There is no bright line rule in determining 

accomplice liability; the particular facts and circumstances of 

each case determine whether a person was an accomplice. We 

consider four factors to determine whether a defendant acted as 

an accomplice: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) 

companionship with another at scene of crime; (3) failure to 

oppose commission of crime; and (4) course of conduct before, 

during, and after occurrence of crime. That a defendant was 

present during the commission of a crime and failed to oppose 

the crime is not sufficient to convict her. But, presence at and 

acquiescence to a crime, along with other facts and 

circumstances may be considered. 

Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012) (citations and internal 

quotations omitted). 

[15] Gonzales admits that evidence shows that she was at the scene of the crime. 

However, Gonzales claims that the jury must have credited Muse and 

Webster’s version of events, i.e., that Westbrook was angry with Gonzales and 

Miller because he thought they had stolen drugs from him and that Meyers shot 

Miller with no assistance from her. However, the jury may choose not only 
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whom to believe but also what portions of conflicting testimony to believe, and 

is not required to believe any witness’ testimony, even when it is 

uncontradicted. Wood v. State, 999 N.E.2d 1054, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

[16] More importantly, however, Gonzales’s argument overlooks the testimony of 

Westbrook, who testified that Gonzales gave Meyers a gun and told him to 

shoot Miller. Tr. p. 685. Thus, the evidence indicates that Gonzales was in 

companionship with another at the scene of the crime. Instead of merely failing 

to oppose the crime, she actively encouraged it by telling Meyers to shoot 

Miller and providing him with the gun. Moreover, Gonzales’s course of 

conduct before, during, and after the crime supports a conclusion that she was 

an accomplice. She was angry with Westbrook, and apparently Miller, for 

sleeping together in the same room, actively encouraged Meyers to kill Miller, 

fled to another hotel after the killing, and knew that Meyers had partially 

disassembled and disposed of the gun. 

[17] From this evidence, the jury could readily conclude that Gonzales knowingly 

aided, induced, or caused Meyers to kill Miller. Gonzales’s arguments to the 

contrary are little more than a request that we consider the evidence in her 

favor, reweigh the evidence, and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which 

we may not do on appeal. See Neukam, 934 N.E.2d at 202 (citing McHenry v. 

State, 820 N.E.2d at 126). 
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II. Double Jeopardy

[18] Gonzales also claims that her convictions for both murder and conspiracy to 

commit murder constitute impermissible double jeopardy. As we have 

explained previously: 

Under the Richardson actual evidence test, conviction for two 

offenses may constitute double jeopardy if the defendant 

demonstrates a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts 

used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one 

offense may also have been used to establish the essential 

elements of the second offense. Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 

1234 (Ind. 2008) (citing Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 53 

(Ind. 1999)). Our supreme court has explained that the actual 

evidence test is not simply whether the evidentiary facts used to 

establish one of the essential elements of the first offense may also 

have been used to establish one of the essential elements of the 

second offense. Id. (citing Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 833 

(Ind. 2002)). Under the actual evidence test, if the evidentiary 

facts establishing any one or more elements of one of the 

challenged offenses establishes the all essential elements of the 

second challenged offense, double jeopardy considerations 

prohibit multiple convictions. Alexander v. State, 768 N.E.2d 971, 

973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), aff’d on reh’g, 772 N.E.2d 476, trans. 

denied. It is not required that the evidentiary facts establishing all 

of the elements of the one challenged offense also establish all of 

the essential elements of a second challenged offense, and both of 

the offenses being analyzed for double jeopardy purposes must be 

viewed in the context of the other offense. Id.
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Chappell v. State, 966 N.E.2d 124, 131-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (footnote 

omitted).1 

[19] Here, in the information charging Gonzales with conspiracy, the State alleged 

that she agreed with Meyers to kill Miller and that the overt act in furtherance 

of the conspiracy was that Meyers “forced Katrina Miller at gun point to enter a 

corn field and then shot Katrina Miller in the head.” Appellant’s App. p. 73. 

Thus, one of the overt acts alleged was the actual murder itself. 

[20] Under these facts and circumstances, we agree with Gonzales and the State that 

Gonzales’s convictions for both murder and conspiracy to commit murder 

constitute impermissible double jeopardy. That is, it is a reasonable possibility

that the jury relied upon the same evidentiary facts — the murder of Miller —

to establish all of the elements of murder and one of the elements of conspiracy 

to commit murder. This is improper. See Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 

1037-38 (Ind. 2006) (concluding that convictions for both robbery and 

conspiracy to commit robbery constituted double jeopardy where the overt act 

alleged was the act of robbing the victim, but that convictions for murder and 

conspiracy to commit murder did not constitute double jeopardy where overt 

 

1 In addition to the Richardson actual evidence test, our courts have long adhered to a series of rules of 

statutory construction and common law that were often described as double jeopardy, but were not governed 

by the constitutional test set forth in Richardson. Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1037 (Ind. 2006) (citing 

Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. 2002)). Among those sorts of claims that are considered to constitute 

“double jeopardy” are a claim based on “[c]onviction and punishment for the crime of conspiracy where the 

overt act that constitutes an element of the conspiracy charge is the very same act as another crime for which 

the defendant has been convicted and punished.” Id. (citing Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 56-57 (Sullivan, J., 

concurring); Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind. 2002)). 
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acts alleged did not include the act of killing the victim); Fosha v. State, 747 

N.E.2d 549, 553 (Ind. 2001) (concluding that convictions for both murder and 

conspiracy to commit murder constituted double jeopardy where the 

evidentiary facts used by the jury to establish the essential elements of the 

conspiracy charge were also used to prove the essential elements of murder),

overruled in part on other grounds by Gutermuth v. State, 868 N.E.2d 427 (Ind. 

2007). 

[21] Gonzales argues that we should vacate her conviction for murder to cure this 

double jeopardy violation, repeating her contention that the evidence was 

insufficient to support her conviction for murder. However, we have already 

concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Gonzales’s murder 

conviction. It has long been held that the proper remedy for a double jeopardy 

violation is to vacate the lesser of the two convictions. See Clark v. State, 752 

N.E.2d 209, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 54). We 

therefore reverse Gonzales’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder and

vacate her conviction and sentence entered thereon.2 

III. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Other Suspect

[22] Gonzales next contends that the trial court erred in limiting her crossexamination of Detective Smoll regarding the fact that Josh Brown had told the 

 

2 Because we reverse Gonzales’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder, we need not address her claim 

that the evidence was insufficient to support her conspiracy conviction. 
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detective that he had heard that Miller was killed because she had “robbed”

someone and that Chris Taylor had told the detective that Jordan Storch had 

admitted to killing “a bitch.” Tr. pp. 942-43. 

[23] Questions regarding the admission of evidence are within the sound discretion 

of the trial court, and we review the court’s decision only for an abuse of that 

discretion. Wells v. State, 904 N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

A trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision is clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the court has 

misinterpreted the law. Id. 

[24] Gonzales claims that the trial court improperly prevented her from presenting 

evidence implicating another suspect in the murder of Miller. The State 

responds that the trial court simply exercised its discretion in excluding hearsay 

testimony. Hearsay is defined by rule as a statement that is not made while the 

declarant is testifying at trial that is offered into evidence to prove the truth of 

the matter asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay evidence is generally 

inadmissible. Ind. Evidence Rule 802. 

[25] Here, the statements Gonzales wished to elicit through Detective Smoll were 

unquestionably hearsay: they were statements made by Brown and Taylor that 

were not made while they were testifying and that were proffered to prove the 

truth of the matter asserted in the statements, i.e. that Miller was killed for 

stealing drugs and Storch admitted to killing “a bitch.” In fact, the statement 
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made by Storch was hearsay within hearsay: it was what Detective Smoll said 

Taylor said that Storch said. 

[26] Gonzales makes no claim that these statements were subject to any of the welldefined exceptions to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial 

court abused its discretion in excluding these hearsay statements. Gonzales 

does cite to Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997) for the proposition 

that it is error to “categorically exclude the defendant’s evidence supporting [a] 

defense that the murder was committed by another person.” However, at issue 

in Joyner was the relevance of the evidence supporting the defense that the crime 

was committed by another person. See id. at 390.3 The Joyner court did not 

address the admissibility of hearsay evidence at all, as the evidence implicating 

another individual in that case was not hearsay. 

[27] Instead, we agree with the State that this case is more akin to Lashbrook v. State, 

762 N.E.2d 756 (Ind. 2002). In that case, the trial court had excluded, under the 

hearsay rule, evidence that “one Nicholas Perez had said that the victim, 

Duane Morton, was going to die or that something adverse was going to 

 

3 The excluded evidence in Joyner included:

Oral Bowens, a married man, was having an affair with the victim, Hernandez; Bowens 

worked at the same place as Hernandez and the defendant; Bowens had sexual relations with 

Hernandez the night of March 1; he had lied to his wife about where he was that evening 

and later told his wife that he had had an argument with Hernandez on March 2, the last day 

Hernandez was seen alive; and Bowens came in late to work the morning of March 3 and 

lied about his tardiness on his time card, which showed that he had come in on time. 

Id. at 389. 
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happen to him.” Id. at 758. On appeal, the defendant cited Joyner in support of 

his argument that the trial court’s exclusion of Perez’s statements was reversible 

error. Our supreme court disagreed, first noting that Lashbrook had presented 

“no material evidence that Perez was connected to the crime.” Id. The court 

further noted that other witnesses had testified regarding the fact that Perez had 

stated that the victim was going to die, and the defendant used this evidence in 

his closing statement to argue to the jury that there was reasonable doubt 

regarding Lashbrook’s guilt. Id. Accordingly, the court held that “the admission 

of further testimony establishing the Perez utterance would have been 

cumulative, and its exclusion did not prevent the defendant from making the 

same argument to the jury.” Id. at 758-59. 

[28] The present case is substantially similar to Lashbrook. Other than the hearsay 

statement, Gonzales presented no material evidence that Storch was involved in 

Miller’s death. More importantly, Gonzales called Detective Smoll as a witness 

and elicited from him testimony that Taylor told him that Storch claimed to 

have killed “a bitch.” Smoll then explained that Taylor’s information was not 

backed up by any other evidence. Brown’s statement that he heard that Miller 

was killed for stealing drugs was substantially the same as Webster and Muse’s 

testimony regarding Gonzales’s story that Miller was killed because Westbrook 

thought she had stolen drugs. 

[29] Thus, just as in Lashbrook, the jury heard evidence that another person may 

have killed Miller. Gonzales used this evidence to question the thoroughness of 

Detective Smoll’s investigation. See Tr. pp. 944-46. Gonzales also referenced 
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this evidence in her closing statement to the jury to argue that there was 

reasonable doubt regarding her guilt. See Tr. p. 1002. We therefore are unable 

to conclude that the exclusion of Taylor and Brown’s statements constituted 

reversible error. 

IV. Appropriateness of Sentence

[30] Lastly, Gonzales claims that her sixty-year sentence is inappropriate. As we 

recently explained in Rose v. State:

Even if a trial court acted within its statutory discretion in 

imposing a sentence, Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana 

Constitution authorize independent appellate review and revision 

of a sentence imposed by the trial court. This authority is 

implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which 

provides that the court on appeal “may revise a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s 

decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” 

Still, we must and should exercise deference to a trial court’s 

sentencing decision, because Rule 7(B) requires us to give “due 

consideration” to that decision and because we understand and 

recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its 

sentencing decisions. Although we have the power to review and 

revise sentences, the principal role of appellate review should be 

to attempt to level the outliers, and identify some guiding 

principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of 

the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve what we perceive to be 

a “correct” result in each case. 

Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) should focus on the 

forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—

consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the 
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sentence on any individual count. The appropriate question is 

not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the 

question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. It is 

the defendant’s burden on appeal to persuade us that the sentence 

imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. 

36 N.E.3d 1055, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (footnote omitted) (some citations 

and internal quotations omitted). 

[31] The sentencing range for a murder conviction is forty-five to sixty-five years, 

with fifty-five years being the advisory sentence. Gonzales was sentenced to a 

term of sixty years, above the advisory, but below the maximum sentence. With 

this in mind, we turn to the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender. 

[32] The nature of the Miller’s death was cold and brutal. Because Gonzales was 

jealous of Miller and the attention that Westbrook had shown her, Gonzales 

gave Meyers a handgun and told him to kill Miller, the mother of a young 

child. The evidence indicates that Miller was brutally beaten before being shot, 

execution style, in the back of the head. She was then left unceremoniously to 

lie in a cornfield until innocent passers-by noticed her body. Although all 

murders are horrible, the manner of Miller’s murder was particularly callous. 

This alone would justify the imposition of a sentence above the advisory. 

However, Gonzales’s character provides further support for the trial court’s 

sentence. 
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[33] When Gonzales committed the instant crime, she was out on bond on pending 

charges of possession of cocaine, driving while intoxicated, and driving while 

suspended. Moreover, new charges were filed against Gonzales while she was

incarcerated, one of which resulted in a conviction for battery on a witness 

against her, and other charges were pending against her in another county. 

Also, nothing in the record indicates that Gonzales ever demonstrated any 

remorse for her actions. None of this speaks well for her character. In short, 

Gonzales’s sixty-year sentence is not inappropriate. 

Conclusion

[34] The State presented evidence sufficient to support Gonzales’s conviction for 

murder. Ample evidence supports a conclusion that Gonzales aided, induced, 

or caused Meyers to kill Miller. However, we agree with Gonzales and the 

State that Gonzales’s convictions for both murder and conspiracy to commit 

murder constitute impermissible double jeopardy. We therefore vacate her 

conviction for conspiracy and the sentence imposed thereon. The trial court did 

not err in excluding evidence that the investigating detective heard evidence 

that another individual may have committed the murder. Lastly, Gonzales’s

sixty-year sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and 

Gonzales’s character. 

[35] Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, J., concur.