Leadership Characteristics in Escape from Three Underground Mine Fires 

Kathleen M. Kowalski, Ph.D., Research Psychologist 

Launa G. Mallett, Research Sociologist 

Michael J. Brnich, Jr., Mining Engineer 

Mining Health and Safety Research Center 

Cochrans Mill Road 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15236 

USA 

ABSTRACT 

The characteristics of leaders under the duress of an emergency are important in the 

development of emergency planning, training, and in the management of an actual emergency. 

Knowledge of human behavior is an important component in the formation of emergency 

strategies. The U.S. Bureau of Mines analyzed the leadership behavior in three underground 

mine fire escapes. The subjects described their escapes during open-ended interviews. Data 

were coded according to: (1) evidence of leadership behavior, (2) evidence of lack of 

leadership behavior, and (3) characteristics of the individual in each group who led the 

subjects out of the mines. This paper discusses the profile of six individual leadership 

characteristics which emerged from the data. 

INTRODUCTION 

This research explores leadership behavior in a life-threatening emergency situation, a fire 

in an underground coal mine. Underground coal mines are extremely dangerous 

environments as there is constant threat of accidents due to massive machinery operating in 

close, dark areas, the numerous electrical and water hazards, unsafe "top" which can result in 

roof falls, and the threat of fire and explosions. Since 1949, there have been at least 18 major 

explosions and more than 1,000 fires in underground coal mines in the United States 

(McDonald & Baker, 1979; Richmond, et al. 1983). 
While mine fires and explosions are not uncommon in the industry, they are infrequent 

events from the perspective of individual miners. Little is known about behavior in these 

circumstances. The opportunity to learn more about this topic came in March 1988 when a 

major fire occurred in an underground coal mine in the eastem United States. The fire forced 

the evacuation of miners who were working in areas of the mine that were located beyond the 

site of the fire. Twenty-seven miners had to travel through smoke-filled passages in order to 

escape and reach fresh air. Fortunately, no lives were lost. Researchers interviewed 21 of the 

27 miners who escaped this fire to learn more about their experiences. 

Since this 1988 fire, researchers have had the opportunity to study two other fires in which 

miners were forced to escape through hostile environments. To date, 48 miners have been 

interviewed about their escape experiences. The information, contained in more than 2000 

pages of transcribed testimony, has been analyzed along several different subject lines. The 

focus of this paper is leadership behavior during the escapes. 

This investigation examines leadership behavior in crisis. It looks at the authority structure 

before the fires, leadership behaviors and lack of leadership behaviors during the escapes, and 

the behaviors associated with the emergence of leadership. According to Bardo, (1978, p.78) 

"emergent behaviors are those forms of action, and the norms, values and beliefs governing 

those actions, that rise out of the disaster situation." This paper examines the emergent 

behaviors of leaders under duress. 

PREVIOUS STUDIES 

Previous research on leadership in crisis is limited and focuses mainly on simulations and 

escapes from structure fires. Much of the recent research on leadership behavior in crisis is 

from Japan. Hayashi (1988) emphasized the importance of studying leadership behavior 

patterns as opposed to concentrating on circumstances. Studies have shown that leaders can 

have a calming influence and be instrumental in helping others avoid panic (Misumi & Sako, 

1982). The research also shows that information and knowledge can be significant to survival 

(Abe, 1976). 

Panic is not automatic in crisis and in fact individuals have the tendency to follow the 

prevailing social order (Hodgkinson, 1990; Johnston & Johnston, 1988). People tend to 
follow the route of others andor familiar paths (Hodgkinson). In addition, attachment and 

affiliation during escape may have survival value (Sime, 1983; Bowlby, 1973 in Sime) and 

cooperation contributes to successful escape (Kelley, et al., 1965 in Sugiman & Misumi, 

1988). 

Little data has been collected in the area of leadership in actual life-threatening situations. 

It is important to note that the only perspective on an emergency event and subsequent 

behavior is from the view of the survivors and from circumstantial data evaluated after the 

event. Rescuers may provide some "after the fact information" but in all cases survivors and 

rescuers have been under physical and emotional stress which may influence their reports of 

the incident. 

METHOD OF STUDY 

After learning of each of three mine fires, referred to as Mines A, B, and C in the study, 

researchers at the Bureau of Mines contacted officials from the affected companies and the 

United Mine Workers of America, the labor union which represented the employees. 

Cooperation with the Bureau in an on-going study of miners' responses to underground mine 

fires was requested. Across the three subject mines, eight separate groups of miners escaped 

through smoke. Forty-eight individual interviews were conducted with subject volunteers 

from each of these groups. Data tapes were transcribed verbatim and entered into computer 

files for ease of text-based analyses. 

Table 1 shows the number of miners in each escape group and the number interviewed. 

Data from forty-five interviews were included in the analysis. Average age and years 

experience for each group are shown in Table 2. The average age of the miners interviewed 

was 4 1.7 years. They had a mean of 16.8 years of mining experience with an average 15 

years at the mine where they were working at the time of the fire. 

All subjects escaped under extremely difficult environmental conditions. Mine entries 

were dark with the miners' cap lamps as the only light source. In most instances, the subjects 

were confronted with heavy smoke reducing visibility to less than four feet. They literally 

"ran into each other." The dense smoke made it difficult to see tripping hazards and overhead 

obstacles. 
Table 1 : Number of Miners in Each Escape 

Group and Number In Sample 

Table 2: Average Ages and Years Experience of Miners Who Were 

Part of Escape Groups (N46) 

* Only one person was interviewed from this group. 

Average Age 

(NA2) 

41.8 

39.3 

39.7 

41.7 

40.3 

56." 

38.8 

40.0 

41.8 

Average Years 

(Total =16.8) 

17.1 

14.3 

17.6 

17.2 

17.6 

25." 

13.9 

14.7 

16.8 

Group 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

Total 

Average Years 

This Mine 

(Totalz15.2) 

17.1 

14.0 

15.0 

16.7 

14.4 

15.* 

13.9 

13.9 

15.2 

Mine 

A 

A 

A 

B 

B 

B 

C 

C 
While emergency breathing apparatus, Self-contained Self-Rescuers (SCSRs), provided 

miners with a source of life-sustaining oxygen, breathing through the devices is unlike normal 

breathing and created problems during the escapes. See Figure 1 for an example of miners 

donning their rescuers. Several of the miners had difficulty with the SCSRs and this impacted 

group dynamics and the leaders' decisions. The apparatus, because of the design, produces 

restricted aimow. When miners "out breathe" the devices, they tend to feel as if they can't get 

enough air, creating added tension and even panic. Under the emotional and physical distress 

of escape, these problems compound in an already dangerous environment. 

THE STUDY 

The Escapes 

Across the three mines, eight escape groups were identified and studied. This paper 

presents an example from Mine C. The general layout of the mine workings of Mine C is 

shown in Figure 2. The distances traveled by each group during the escapes was substantial, 

ranging from as little as 1.0 krn to, in one case, nearly 4 km. This distance, substantial under 

norrnal walking conditions, was complicated under the mining conditions of limited visibility 

and irregular bottom, which made for poor footing and walking hazards. Each group was 

Figure 1 : Miner' s Donning S CSR' s 
8 FACE 

e 1.7 km 

Figure 2: Mine C 

unique in their escape. In several groups, a strong leader emerged and led the escape while in 

some groups, the decision making was conflicted. One group, Group 8 from Mine C, had an 

ineffective leader and subsequently escaped in chaos and panic. A discussion of this group's 

experience follows. 

Group 8 was not a regular working group as none of the members were involved in coal 

production. Instead, most typically performed maintenance and support tasks throughout the 

mine. On the day the fire occurred at Mine C, miners in this group were doing construction 

and moving supplies. In addition, there happened to be two locomotive operators driving 

through the section when notified of the fire. Miners in Group 8 gathered at the beginning of 

the primary escapeway and proceeded to travel the escapeway on foot about .5 km before 

being confronted with heavy smoke. Upon encountering the smoke, the crew turned around 

and followed the primary escapeway back to the working section. After returning to the 

section, the group then walked to the section's left return air course. The group followed the 

left return air course for about .4 km before realizing that they were not in a designated 
escapeway. The group mmed around and followed this air course back to the section. At this 

point, the group crossed the section and made their way into the right return airway (the 

designated altemate escapeway) and followed it for ;2 kih before turning left. After turning 

left, the group continued on foot through the alternate escapeway for about -4 krn before 

turning right. After turning right, the group continued on foot for another .5 krn before 

turning left into the main alternate escapeway. After turning into the main alternate 

escapeway, the crew continued for about 1.6 km before reaching clear air. One member of 

this group estimated they spent some 20 minutes traveling through the mine before reaching 

the alternate escapeway. 

Group 8 was effectively out of control most of the time during their escape. The foreman, 

who was the authority figure, was not in control and there was considerable notation of blame 

and emotion evidenced in the interviews of this group. The manner in which the group 

donned their SCSR's was indicative of the lack of leadership. When asked who decided it was 

time to put them on, one miner responded, "Well, I think everybody decided together but, you 

know, I already had mine on." Another miner said he kept asking, should we put these on and 

the foreman never answered. 

In short, the foreman was incompetent as a leader. As one miner described, "...the guys 

were more or less talking amongst themselves and I said, you know, this is real serious and 

this boss, if we're not carefbl, he's going to get us killed." A miner, who was not familiar with 

the section and became concerned, noted, "I can understand how people could be excited and 

you know, improper decisions could be made. But, you know, it kept snowballing. You 

know, his (the foreman's) improper decisions that he was making, you know. I was getting 

more 

and more negative about following this man as we went." But the fear level was starting to 

rise ... "There was a lot of confusion ... the (foreman) couldn't figure out how to get into the 

intake escapeway ... alot of the guys started getting kind of real, losing dot of confidence in 

him. " 

In the course of this group's escape, a leader did emerge. This miner, a General Inside 

Laborer (GIL) was knowledgeable and discerning, his leadership evolved, and he was 

responsive to others in the group. He began functioning as an advisor to the foreman and was 
one of the first miners to recognize the gravity of the situation. This miner recognized that the 

men were getting upset and as he explained, 

I am a personal friend of (The foreman) and .. the sittiation, I wanted to talk 

to (him) but I did not want other people to hear what I wanted to tell him 

because people were getting upset right off the get go ... I was thinkin' of - people I can count on .. I guess you would say that it was kind of a feeling 

of if you were in an airplane and you had to count on someone to hold that 

parachute for you could you count on that person. 

This leader was continually evaluating the situation and was conscious of the behavior of 

other members and careful in how he presented his advice to them. When some members of 

the group left their lunch buckets behind, the leader was concerned: "How can I say it, being a 

foreman for eight years its hard not to say things sometime ... I could see things going on that 

was wrong, especially the discarding (of the buckets). So I would say, "I sure wouldn't throw 

that away. I wouldn't say don't throw that away you don't know how long we're going to be 

here or what's going to happen." 

The statement above characterized this miner. He presented himself as the foreman's 

helper during his interview, whereas the other members of the group clearly indicated their 

foreman was inept and that the GIL led them out. He placed himself in a peer relationship 

with the group and a peer relationship with the foreman. The interview with the foreman 

quoted the GIL often and was resplendent with "I should have." At one point he stated, "I 

plain, freely admit, I screwed up. I should .... 

Observations 

A profile of leadership in crisis emerged from the analysis of the eight escapes. The data 

suggests several characteristics based on the behavior of the leaders. The leader of each 

escape may be described as an aware, knowledgeable person or as an individual who is alert 

to his environment, attentive, and discerning. This person notices things - more so than do 

other people. This astute quality is probably not limited to the mine environment or to crisis 

circumstances. This individual is naturally curious all the time and is the type of individual 

who excels at incidental learning. Each of the leaders retained information that was 
instrumental to the escapes. They "remembered" specific details and repeatedly referred to 

the fact that they "knew" through information or deduction. 

A second, generally shared characteristic of the leaders was the manner in which they took 

charge. In the groups where the authority led the subjects out of the mine, the leadership was 

a natural evolution of the group dynamics. It was a continuation of the social order before the 

disaster. Yet, the same dynamic occurred in the groups where there was a definite emerging 

leader. These leaders did not force themselves and their suggestions on the group - the 

leadership developed in a natural way. 

Third, the leaders were decisive, yet flexible. They made decisions; yet if circumstances 

changed they adapted. 

Fourth, the leaders were open to input from others. There is evidence that in most of the 

escape groups there was a "second lieutenant," an individual who offered worthwhile 

suggestions, support, and served as a "sounding board." In instances where there was 

emergent leadership, many times the leader began in a consulting function to the authority. 

Fifth, effective leaders seemed to have a calming effect on their group. They were aware 

of others' levels of fear and offered reassurance when it was needed. Miners in each group 

had confidence in the leader's ability to direct them to safety. 

Finally, there was a Logic to the leadership. Decisions were appropriate and congruent with 

the available information. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 

There are several areas for further inquiry. Are characteristics identified in the profile 

presented in this study required for an individual to fulfill the role of leader during a crisis 

situation? What if an individual has some, but not all of the noted characteristics? There 

were individuals identified during this study who evidenced some, but not all, of the profile 

characteristics. Further analyses are needed to determine the fit of these individuals in the 

group dynamics and their contributions to the successful escapes. 
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