THI RD DI VI SI ON DOYLE, P. J. , HODGES and W

A TKI NS, JJ.

Jul y

16, 2024



# In t he C ourt o f A ppe a ls o f G e o r g ia

A 24A 0 343. SN EED v . PLA CE A T M I D W A Y, LLC et al.
D O Y L E , Presid ing J ud ge. M elo d a Sneed f

iled a p e rso nal inj u ry s u it against Plac e at M id way, LLC (“ Mid w a y” ), and Pinnac le Pro p erty M anagement Serv ic es, LLC (“ Pinnac le” ), and

o thers. 1 The trial c o u rt d ismissed Sneed ’ s c laims against the D e f end a nts based o n a time- limitatio n pro v isi o n i n t he lease agreement betw een M id w ay a nd Sneed , 2 and
Sneed a p p e a ls, argu ing that the trial c o u rt’ s o rd er sho u ld be rev ersed u nd er the

1 Sneed a lleged c l a i m s against o ther entities that she c laimed w ere the p red e c e s so rs in i n t er est to M id w ay and to the p ro p erty manager f o r that p rec ed ing o w ner. T ho se c laims, ho w ev er, are no t at issu e in this ap p eal

. I n t h i s o p inio n, “ Def end ants” ref

ers c o llec tiv e ly to M id w ay and Pinnac le.

2 There are mu ltip le leases at issu e, bu t there is no c o ntentio n that the leases are su bstantiv ely d if

f erent in regard to the ap p lic able lease p ro v isio n, so fo r p u rp o ses o f c larity, w e hav e streamlined the d isc u ssio n to a single lease betw een the p a rties.Geo rgia Su p r eme Co u r t’ s ho ld ing in La n gley v . MP S

pri ng La ke

. 3 Fo r the r easo ns that
f o llo w , w e af

f irm.
A c o mp laint f

ails to state a claim u p o n w hic h relief c an be granted and w arrants d ismissal o r j u d gment on the plead ings o nly if its allegatio ns d isc lo se w ith c ertainty that no set o f f ac ts c o nsistent w ith the allegatio ns co u ld be p ro v ed that w o u ld entitle the p laintif f to the r elief he seek s. Pu t ano ther w ay, if , w ithin the f

r a m e w o r k o f the c o mp laint,
ev id enc e may b e intro d u c ed whic h w i l l s u stain a grant o f relief to the p laintif f , t he c o m p laint is su f

f ic ient. L ik e t he c o u rt b e l o w , w hen w e
assess t he su f

fic ienc y o f the c o m p l aint o n ap p eal, w e mu st ac c ep t the allegatio ns of f

ac t that ap p ear in the c o m p laint and v iew tho se allegatio ns in the light mo st f

av o rable to the p laintif

f. 4

On Sep tember 1 2, 2022, Sneed su ed t he D ef end ants. I n her c o mp laint, Sneed alleged that she w as a t e nant a t a p r o p erty o wned by M id w ay and managed by
Pinnac le. Sneed c ontend ed that o n Oc to ber 1 , 2020, she s u stained serio u s inj u ries o n

an o utd o o r g r a v el w alk w ay lead ing t o her unit, w hic h w alk w ay was maintained imp ro p erly by t he D ef

end ants. A ltho u gh the c o mp laint d o e s no t state that t he

w alk way was limited to ac cess f ro m o thers a t the co mp lex, the D ef end ants co ntend ed

3 307 Ga. 321 (834 SE2d 800) (201 9 ).

4 (Citatio ns and p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) Bu s h v . Ba n k o f N ew Yo rk Mello n , 31 3 Ga. A p p . 84, 89 (7 20 SE2d 37 0) (201 1 ). 2that it was exc lu siv ely f o r Sneed ’ s use; s he d oes no t argu e o n ap p eal that t he w alk w ay

w as in the c o mmo n area o f the c o mp lex.
A f ter Sneed ’s f

all, the D ef

end ants m o ved Sneed t o a new ap artment. This
ap artment c o ntained a ceiling f an, a nd S n e e d c o ntend e d that she was inj u red o n J anu ary 29 , 2021 , w hen the d ef ec ti v el y installed and rep aired c e iling f a n d etac hed
f ro m the c eiling o f her ap artment and hit her in t he head , k no c k ing her u nc o nsc io u s. Sneed alleged that she had m a d e a rep air requ est to the D ef end ant s p r i o r t o the
inc id ent, that a rep air had been sc hed u led to o c cu r prio r to her inj u ry, and that it w as
rep aired negligently o r no t at all p rio r to her inj u r y. Sneed ’ s Sep tember 1 2, 2022 c o mp laint alleged v ario u s instanc es o f negligenc e against the D ef

end ants related to these tw o inc id ents, inc lu d ing f ailu re to insp ec t f

o r d ef ec ts o r exerc ise reaso nable care in maintaining or rep airing t he p ro p erty, f ailu re to k e e p a lo o k o u t o r warn o f d anger, and other negligenc e that d isc o v ery may r e v e a l

. Sneed d id no t c ite to any sp ec if ic c o d e sec tio n in her c o mp laint. It is u nd isp u ted that
Sneed f iled the c omp laint w ithin tw o yea r s o f e a c h inc id ent u nd er the statu te o f
limitatio n f

o r to rt c laims. 5

5 See OCGA § 9 -3- 33 (p ro v id ing th a t “ a c t io ns f o r inj u ries t o the p erso n shall be bro u ght w ithin tw o years af ter the right o f

ac tio n ac c ru es” )

. 3M id w ay and Pinnac le answ ered and mo v ed to d ismiss the c o mp laint, argu ing

that Sneed ’ s c laims were t ime b a r r e d b e c au se the lease co ntained a o ne- year timelimitatio n p ro v isio n f

o r c laims against the mana g e ment c o mp any o r o w ner. The
p ro v isio n at issu e stated : Limitatio ns o n Ac tio ns. To t he extent allo w ed b y law , Resid e n t also agrees and u nd erstand s that any legal a c tio n against M a n a g e m e nt o r Ow ner mu st b e institu t ed w ithin o ne year o f the d ate a ny claim o r c au se
o f ac tio n arises and that any ac tio n f iled af ter one y ear f

ro m s u c h d a t e shall be time barred as a matter o f law

.
Sneed resp ond ed to the mo tio n, argu ing t h a t the p ro visio n w as id entic al to a
p ro v isio n c o nsid ered by t he Geo rgia Su p reme Co u rt in La n gley , 6 in w hic h the Co urt ad d ressed w hether the c o ntrac t barred the plaintif f ’ s p erso nal inj u ry c laims af ter she
f ell in the c o m mo n area o f h e r ap artment c o mp lex. 7 The Co u rt exp lained that the langu age o f the p ro v isio n w as ambigu o u s, meaning either that it ap p lied to any ac tio n th e p laintif

f c onc eiv ably c o u ld f

ile against the def

end a nts o r that it ap plied o nly to

c laims that a r o s e fr o m t h e co n t rac tu a l relatio nship itself , and bec au se o f the a m bigu ity,

6 307 Ga. at 321

- 322.

7 See id

. 4it c o nstru ed the langu age in f av o r o f the no n- d raf

ting p laintif

f

. 8 The Co u rt c o nc lu d ed
that the langu age was limited t o c laims arisin g f r o m the c o ntrac tu al land lo rd

- tenant

r elatio nship , and theref

o re, it d id no t ap ply to the p laintif f’ s c laims aris i n g f

r o m
p remises liability to rt law

. 9 I n exp laining its ho ld ing f u rther, the Co u rt stated that [t]he law establishe s a c o ntrac t c laim arising f ro m a breac h o f [the d ef end ant’ s] d u ties u nd e r the lease and OCGA § 44- 7- 1 3, sep arate a nd ap art f ro m a p r emises liability to rt c laim arising f ro m [the d ef

end ant’ s] d u ties a s a p ro p erty o w ner to k eep the p remises s af e u nd er OCGA § 51

- 3- 1

. To rt a nd c o ntrac t simp ly p ro v id e alternate v ehic les (and remed ies) thro u gh w hic h [the d ef

end ant] c o u ld be liable to [the p laintif f ] fo r f ailing to k eep the p ro p e rty in rep air. 1 0

8 See id

. at 322.

9 See id

. at 327 (ho ld ing that “ the general langu a ge ‘ any legal a c t i o n,’ in the absenc e o f langu age sp ec if ic ally enc o mp a ssing to rt c laims, is limited t o claims arising o u t o f the lease agreement” ).

1 0 I d

. a t 32 9

. T h e C o u rt also no t e d that the Geo rgia “ General A ssembly has c o n s i st e n t l y exp ressed the p u blic p o lic y o f t his [S]tate as one in fav o r o f imp o sing u p o n the land lo rd l i ab i l i t y f o r d amages to o thers f

ro m d ef e c tiv e c o nstru c tio n and f ailu re to k eep his p remises in rep air. The exp r e ssed pu blic p o lic y in f av o r o f land lo rd liability is matc hed b y an equ ally stro ng and imp o rtant pu b l i c p o lic y in f av o r o f p rev enting u nsaf

e resid ential ho u sing

. ” I d. at 329 , n. 4, qu o ting Tho mps o n v . C ro wn o v er , 259 Ga. 1 26 , 1 28 (381 SE2d 283) (1 9 89 ).
5D esp ite the ho ld ing in L a n gley , in the p r esent c ase, the trial c o u rt granted the

mo tio ns to d ismiss, f

ind ing that the same time- limitatio n p ro v isio n in Sneed ’ s lease
agreement barred her c laims. Sneed ap p ealed this d ec isio n, bu t t his Co u rt d ismissed
the a p p eal, exp laining that the trial c o u rt’ s o r d er w as no t f inal. Bac k in the trial c o u rt, Sneed f iled a mo tio n to v ac ate the trial c ou rt’ s o rd er granting the mo tio n to d ismiss,
argu ing t hat her c laims w ere to rt c laims arising und er OCGA § 44- 7

- 1 4 and theref o re

no t time barred by the c ontrac t
. The trial c o urt d enied the mo tio n, bu t it entered an

o rd er stating that its d e c isio n d ismissing the claims against the D ef end ants w as f

inal,
and there is no j u st reaso n t o d elay the a p p eal. S n eed no w timely a p p eals f ro m that

o rd er. B a sed o n t h e h o l ding o f La n gley , Sneed argu es that t he trial co u rt erred by
d ismissing her c laims against the D ef end ants based o n the time- limitatio n p ro v isio n in the lease. I n resp o nse, the D e f end ants c o ntend t hat Sneed ’ s c laims w e re p ro p erly
d ismissed bec au s e they o c c u rred no t in the c o m mo n areas o f the p ro p erty lik e t he inj uries in La n

gley , bu t in her p ri v a t e r es id enc e o r the c u rtilage o v er w hic h she w as giv en p o ssessio n; t heref o re, her c laims aro se s o lely f ro m t he land l o r d

- tenant

6relatio nship and no t f ro m a sep a r a t e b o dy o f to rt law

. 1 1 Thu s , ac co rd ing to the
D ef e nd ants, the trial co u rt co rrec tly dismissed the claims by ap p lying the c o ntrac tu al
time- limitatio n p r o v isio n to Sneed ’ s to rt c laims.

1

. A s an initial matter, t h e D e f e n d a n t s d o no t argu e , and u p o n rev iew o f the
lease w e d o no t f

ind , t hat there is ad ditio nal langu age in this lease that w ou ld remo v e it f ro m the interp retatio n mad e by the La n gley Co u rt. 1 2 The o nly issu e here is w hether
S n e e d ’s c laims are ind ep end ent f ro m the c o ntrac tu al relatio nship lik e tho s e a d d r e s s e d
in La n gley , su c h that the c o ntrac t p ro v isio n sho uld no t ap p ly to bar the c laims.

2. OCGA § 51

- 1

- 1 d e f

ines “ [a] to rt [as] t he u nlaw f u l v io latio n o f a p riv ate legal right o ther than a m ere b reac h of co ntrac t, exp r ess o r imp lied

. A to rt may also be the

v io latio n o f a p ublic d u ty if , as a resu lt o f the v io latio n, so me sp ec ial d amage ac c ru es

t o t h e ind iv id u al. ” I n La n

gley , the p laintif

f and the d ef

end ant w ere in a land lo rd

- ten a n t

1 1 The D ef

end ants c ite at length BGP In s pecti o n , LLC v . Oms tea d , 36 7 G a. A p p . 1 28, 134- 135 (1 ) (883 SE2d 59 3) (2023), a ff irmed by Oms tea d v . BGP In s p e c ti o n , LLC , Case N o . S23G07 71 (d e c id ed J u n. 1 1 , 2024), and its langu age d istingu ishing La n gley

. I n that c ase, ho w e v er, the c o ntrac t at issu e exp lic itly inc lu d ed to rt c laims (as w ell as o thers) in its time- limitatio n p r o v isio n. See id

. at 1 29

- 1 30.

1 2 See generally Ou tfro n t Medi a v . Ci t y o f S an dy S pri n gs , 356 Ga. A p p . 405, 41 8 (2) (847 SE2d 59 7 ) (2020), f o r a d isc u ssio n o f the ap p ro p riate ru les f o r co nstru c tio n o f the langu age o f

a lease.
7relatio nship v ia the resid ential lease betw een the p arties, and the lease o nly go v erned

tho se p o r t i o n s o f their relatio nship , d u ties, and c laims, bu t there simu ltaneo u sly
existed the relatio nship of an o w ner o r o cc u p ier o f

land to an inv itee, w hic h w as the

so u rc e o f the d u t y f ro m w hic h the p laintif

f ’ s c laims aro se. 1 3 I n o ther w o rd s, bec au se there w as a d uty that e xisted fo r the d ef end ants u nrelated to the d u ties c reated by o r ref erred t o in the c o ntrac t, the c laims arising f ro m the no n- c ontrac t u al d u ties w ere no t
p rec lu ded by that c o ntrac tu al time- limitatio n p r o v isio n. 1 4
I n this c ase, altho u gh her c o mp laint alleged v a rio u s bro ad ly stated negligenc e

c laims, in her brief

, Sneed c o ntend s that they are to rt c laims arising f ro m OCGA § 44-
7

- 1 4. That Co d e sec tio n states that [h]av ing f u lly p a rted w i th p o ssessio n and the right of p o s sessio n, the land lo rd is no t r e sp o nsible t o third p erso ns f o r d amages resu lting f

ro m the negligenc e o r illegal u se of the p remises by the tenan t ; p ro v id e d , ho w ev e r, the land lo rd is resp onsible f o r d amages arising f

ro m d ef ec tiv e
c o nstru c tio n o r f

o r d amages arising f

ro m the f ailu re to keep the p remises in rep air.

1 3 See La n gley , 307 Ga. at 321

.

1 4 See id

. at 329

. 8A s op p o sed to OCGA § 51

- 3- 1, w hic h imp o ses a d u ty o f c a re t o o wners a nd o c c u p iers

o f land (inc lu d ing land lo rd s with resp ec t to c o mmo n areas o f an ap a r tment c o mp lex

o r inj u ries arising f

ro m f o reseeable c riminal ac tiv ity), 1 5 if the lo catio n o f the inj u ry is

an area o ver w hic h the land lo rd has c ed ed c ontro l to the tenant, then the so u rc e o f the
land lo rd ’ s liability arises f r o m OCGA § 44- 7

- 1 4. 1 6
H ere, the c laims related to Sneed ’ s tw o inj u ries arise u nd er OCGA § 44- 7

- 1 4

as c o nc ed ed by Sneed in her mo tio n to s et asid e and in her brief o n ap p eal. The d u ty

o f c are t hat ap p lies to the inj uries arise f ro m Sneed ’ s land lo rd

- tenant relatio nship w ith
the D ef end ants, w hic h r elatio nship enc omp asses c o nc o mitant c ontrac t u al and

statu to ry d u t ies o w ed to Sneed

. A ltho ugh as Sneed c o rrec tly argu es she has
artic u lated to rt c laims rather than co ntrac t c laims, tho se c laims arise f ro m the same land lo rd

- tenant relatio nship d esp ite w hether they w e r e c reated by s t at u te o r by the

1 5 See, e . g. , La n

gley , 307 Ga. at 321 ; Stu rb ri dge Pa rtn ers v . W

a lker , 26 7 Ga. 7 85, 7 85- 7 86 (482 SE2d 339 ) (1 9 9 7 ) (ex p l a ining that a land lo rd had a d u ty u nd er OCGA § 5 1- 3

- 1 to exerc ise o rd inary c are to p ro tec t t e nants against third

- p arty c rim i n a l a t t a ck s ev en in the tenant’ s o w n ap artment).

1 6 See, e. g. , C

ha m v . E CI Mgmt. C

o rp. , 31 1 Ga. 1 7 0 , 1 7 3 (2) (a) (856 SE2d 26 7 ) (2021 ) (d isc ussing the c atego ries in relatio n t o a v isito r o f t he tenant t o p ro p erty); Ma rti n v . Jo hn so n - Lemo n , 27 1 Ga. 1 20, 1 22- 1 23 (1 ) (51 6 SE2d 6 6 ) (1 9 99 ) (ad d ressing an inj u ry su stained by a visito r to a p o o l e rec t ed by a tenan t a t th e c o nsent o f the land lo rd ). 9langu age o f the lease. T hu s, the situ atio n here is d if f erent f ro m that in La n

gley , in

w hic h the alleged c laims aro se f ro m a sep a rate relatio nship c r e ating a sep a rate d u ty f o r the d ef

end ant t han the relatio nship arising fro m the p arties’ land l o r d

- t enant relatio nship and s u bj ec t matter o f the lease. 1 7 I n this c ase, t he lease ap p lies t o t he same relatio nship and thereby the same d uties f ro m whic h arise Sneed ’ s c laims. T heref o re, read ing the p lain langu age o f the p ro v isio n in the c ontext o f the c o ntrac t as a w ho le,

w e d e termine that the t ime- limitatio n p ro v isio n ap plies to bar her c laims. 1 8 Thu s, the
trial c o u rt d id no t err by d ismissing her c o mp laint o n that basis. 1 9

1 7 See 307 Ga. a t 327 ( “ N o thing in t he lease agreement su ggests t hat it c reates any relatio nship o ther than that o f land lo r d and tenant, o r that it co v ers su bj ec t matter b e y o n d that relatio nship o r the p arties’ r ights a nd o bligatio ns sp ec if ied in the lease agreement. This o missio n su ggests that no thing in the lease sho u ld b e read to ap p ly to , o r to c u r tail, t o rt c laims, o r t o o therw ise sp eak to legal rights beyo nd tho se arising f ro m t he lease agreement and the bo d y o f law c reating c o ntrac tu al du ties betw een land lo rd s and tenants. ” ).

1 8 See id

. at 323- 325 (“ I n o rd er to asc e rtain what c l a i m s t h e p arties so u ght to ad d ress in the L imitatio n Pro v isio n, w e mu st r ead that p ro visio n in light o f the c o ntrac t as a w ho le and in the legal c o ntext in w hic h it w as c r eated

. ” ).

1 9 Sneed argu es in her r ep ly brief that the limitatio n p ro v isio n v io lated OCGA § 44- 7

- 2 (b), w hic h states that [i]n a ny c o ntrac t, lease, lic ense agreement, o r similar a greement, o ral o r w ritten, f o r the u se o r rental o f real p ro p erty as a d w e l l i n g plac e, a land lo rd o r a tenant may no t w aiv e, assign, transf er, o r o therw ise av o id any o f th e r ights, d u ties, o r r emed ies co ntained in the f o llo w ing 10Ju dgmen t a ffi rmed. Ho dges a n d W

a tki n s , JJ. , co n c u r .

p ro v isio ns o f law : (1 ) Co d e Sec tio n 44- 7

- 1 3, relating to the d u ties o f a land lo rd as to rep airs and imp ro v ements; (2) C o d e Sec tio n 44- 7

- 1 4, relating to the liability o f

a land lo rd f

or f ailu re to rep air .

. . . W e d o no t ad d r ess this argu m ent bec au se it w as no t enu merated as erro r in her initial brief . See, e. g. , C

u rri d v . D eKa lb S ta te C

o u rt Pro b a ti

o n D ept. , 27 4 Ga. A p p . 7 04, 7 07 (1 ), n. 8 (6 1 8 SE2d 6 21 ) (2005) (exp laining that an ap pellant may no t raise an argu ment f

o r the f irst time in their rep ly brief ). 11