This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 2 ). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A13
- 1340 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Reinaldo Quesada, Appellant. Filed September 2, 2014 Affirmed Johnson , Judge Freeborn County District Court File No. 24

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Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Craig S. Nelson, Freeborn County Attorney, David J. Walker, Assistant County Attorney, Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly , Presiding Judge; Johnson , Judge; and
Hooten , Judge

.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N JOHNSON , Judge
A Freeborn County jury found Reinaldo Quesada guilty o f being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm

. During the trial , the district court permitted the prosecutor to refer to the charged offense as “felon in possession of a firearm , ” and the district court instructed the jury that Quesada was charged with the offense of “felon in possession of a firearm.” Quesada argues that these references to him as a “felon” deprived him of his right to a fair trial. We affirm. FACTS On the evening of October 29, 2012, Officer Adam Hamberg of the Albert Lea Police Department responded to a report of a fight at a residence. The d ispatch er informed the officer that the fight might have involved a gun. After Officer Hamberg arrived at the scene , witnesses said that Quesa da had been at the home earlier in the evening and, after an altercation, pointed a black handgun at several people in the home and threat en ed to kill them. One witness also said that Quesada and another man fled the home on foot. Officer Hamberg drove t o the area of Quesada’s home and found him hiding in a neighbor’s backyard storage shed

. O fficers search ed the s hed and found a “black handgun style” BB gun.
T he state charged Quesada with one count of second

- degree assault, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2012) ; one count of being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2012) ; a nd one count of making terroristic threats, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.71 3, subd. 1 (2012).3

The case was tried over three days in January and February 2013. Immediately before trial, Quesada and the state tentatively agreed to stipulate that Quesada is ineligible to possess a firearm , which would have made it unnecessary for the state to introduce evidence of Quesada’s prior felony convictions . But Quesada withdrew from the agreement before the stipulation was finalized. Quesada’s attorney expressed concern that a stipulation might be inconsistent with an affirmative defense that migh t be p ursued

. Before the jury was brought into the courtroom, t he prosecutor indicated his intention use the term “ felon in possession of a firearm” in his opening statement. Quesada objected on the ground that the proper term for the second charged offen se is “prohibited person in possession of a firearm.” The district court overruled Quesada’s objection on the ground that the statute defines an “ineligible person” to include a person who has a previous “felony conviction.” During his opening statement, the prosecutor referred to Quesada as a “convicted felon . . . prohibited by Minnesota law from possessing any firearm,” de scribed the second charged offense as “prohibited person, in this case meaning a convicted felon, in possession of a firearm,” and d escribed the second charged offense a second time as “felon in possession of a firearm.” The state called nine witnesses; Quesada called one witness and testified i n his

own defense

. The state’s witnesses testified that Quesada and another man were at a party and attempted to take another guest ’s wallet

. The state’s witnesses testified that,

a fter a physical altercation , Quesada pointed a hand gun at various people in the home and threatened to kill them. In his own testimony, Quesada agreed that he was at the home that evening but denied trying to take an other guest’s wallet and denied possessing a gun ,4

other than to pick it up momentarily to move it as a safety precaution when others began fighting

. After the close of the evidence, t he district court instruct ed the jury that the second charge d offense was entitled “felon in possession of a firearm .” On five occasions during his closing argument, t he prosecutor referred to the second charged offense as “felon in possession of a firear m . ” The jury found Quesada guilty on all three counts . In April 2013, the district court imposed concurrent prison sentence s of 60 months for being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm and 45 months for second

- degree assaul t. Quesada appeals. D E C I S I O N Quesada argues that the district court erred by allowing the prosecutor to refer to him as a felon and by describing the second charged offense as “felon in possession of a
firearm

. ” Quesada contends that the district court’s rulings and instructions denied him his right to a fair trial. The state did not file a responsive brief. The appeal is submitted for a decision on the merits despite the absence of a responsive brief. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03. Quesada makes a relatively narrow argument on appeal by relying on only three opinions , only one of which is precedential

. In short, Quesada argues that the district court’s rulings and instructions are contrary to State v. Davidson , 351 N.W.2d 8 (Minn. 1984). I n that case, the defendant was charged with being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm and sought a stipulat ion concerning his ineligib ility so that the jury would not learn that he was a “convicted felon.” Id. at 9 . The district court denied5

his request for a stipulation and instructed the jury that Davidson previously had been convicted of arson

. Id. On appeal, t he supreme court determined that the district court had erred because, “in a prosecution for being a felon in possession of a weap on, the defendant should be permitted to remove the issue of whether he is a convicted felon by stipulating to that fact” to avoid encouraging the “jury to find defendant guilty for the
wrong reason . ” Id. at 11. But t he supreme court also concluded that the error “was not so prejudicial as to require reversal.” Id. at 12. The Davidson opinion is distinguishable from this case

. The holding in Davidson is based on the fact that the district court denied the defendant’s request for a stipulation. Id. at 10

- 12. In this case, however, Quesada and his trial counsel chose not to enter into a stipulation. Quesada does not argue that either the state or the district court prevented him from entering into a stipulation that he was ineligible to possess a firea rm. In the absence of such a stipulation, t he state was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Quesada was ineligible to possess a firearm

. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). To satisfy its burden of proof, the state introduced evidence that Quesa da previously was convicted of two crime s of violence, specifically, a “third

- degree felony drug ” conv iction and an “aiding and abetting third

- degree drug” conviction. The Davidson opinion provides no assistance to a person such as Quesada, who did not enter into a stipulation concerning his ineligibility. The Davidson opinion may even undermine Quesada’s argument because it refer s to the charged offense in that case as “felon in possession of a handgun” on four separate occasions

. I d. at 9, 10 , 11

. Thus, Quesada is incorrect in arguing that Davidson requires the reversal of his convictions.6

Quesada also relies on two unpu blished opinions of this court. U npublished opinions of this court are not precedential. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2012); Vlahos v. R & I Constr., Inc. , 676 N.W.2d 672, 676 n.3 (Minn. 2004) ; State v. Porte , 832 N.W.2d 303, 312 n.1 (Minn. App. 2013)

. Thus, Quesada may not obtain the reversal of his convictions based on unpublished opinions. Noneth eless , the unpublished opinions he cites are distinguishable

. Although we are confident that no error occurred, we nonetheless note that, e ven if there were an error , it would be a harmless error . See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01; State v.
Bouwman , 354 N.W. 2d 1, 8 n.7 (Minn. 1984) ; Porte , 832 N.W.2d at 312

. T he state introduced evidence of Quesada ’s prior felony convictions for the purpose of impeaching his credibility

. See Minn. R. Evid. 609 . Quesada does not argue that the state did so improperly. In Davidson , the supreme court expressly qualified its opinion by stating, “Prior convictions would still be useable under Minn. R. Evid. 609 to impeach the defendant if he testified.” 351 N.W.2d at 11. Thus, the jury in this case would have learned that Qu esada is a convicted felon even if the prosecutor and the district court had not used the wor d “felon” when referr ing to the second offense charged

. Affirmed.