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April 1, 2014

2013

06

Forest Fire Service Fire Fighter Monitoring Prescribed Burn from

Roadway is Struck and Killed When Smoke Obscures Visibility 

Following a Wind Shift —New Jersey 

Executive Summary

During a prescribed burn on March 28, 

2013, a 35-year-old male state forest fire 

service hourly fire fighter (the victim) lost 

his life after being struck by a motorist. The 

victim, working alone but in close proximity 

to his other crew members, was monitoring 

a prescribed burn from an adjacent roadway

while in his state forest fire service vehicle.

For an unknown reason, the victim, exited 

this vehicle and walked onto the roadway. 

Even though signs had been placed to warn 

motorists approaching from different 

directions of an ongoing prescribed burn, 

the victim was struck by a passing motorist

because smoke from the prescribed burn 

had obscured visibility. Lifesaving measures 

were immediately started and the victim 

was transported to a local hospital where he 

was pronounced dead.

Contributing Factors

• Victim working in unprotected travel 

lane

• Inconspicuousness of the victim

• Smoke-obscured roadway

• Shifting winds in the burn area

Key Recommendations

• Forest fire services should ensure that personnel receive proper training and have sufficient 

equipment and that appropriate procedures are in place for operating on or near roadways

Aerial view of section of roadway where incident 

occurred.

(Adapted from Google Earth® satellite image.)
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• Forest fire services should ensure that safety circulars or standard operating procedures 

providing guidance on identifying and the importance of remaining in a safe location while 

working in or near moving traffic are implemented and enforced

• Forest fire services should establish pre-incident plans and agreements regarding traffic 

control incident management with local fire departments, EMS, law enforcement, local or state 

departments of highways, and other public and private sector responders

• Local, state, and federal department of highways should evaluate different types of media to

ensure that motorists have ample warning of roadway hazards while operating a motor vehicle, 

especially when approaching and driving through a traffic incident management area, so that 

they avoid striking emergency responders, other vehicles, and/or traffic control devices.

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an institute within the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC), is the federal agency responsible for conducting research and making recommendations for the prevention of 

work-related injury and illness. In 1998, Congress appropriated funds to NIOSH to conduct a fire fighter initiative that resulted in the 

NIOSH “Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program” which examines line-of-duty-deaths or on duty deaths of fire 

fighters to assist fire departments, fire fighters, the fire service and others to prevent similar fire fighter deaths in the future. The 

agency does not enforce compliance with State or Federal occupational safety and health standards and does not determine fault or 

assign blame. Participation of fire departments and individuals in NIOSH investigations is voluntary. Under its program, NIOSH 

investigators interview persons with knowledge of the incident who agree to be interviewed and review available records to develop 

a description of the conditions and circumstances leading to the death(s). Interviewees are not asked to sign sworn statements and 

interviews are not recorded. The agency's reports do not name the victim, the fire department or those interviewed. The NIOSH 

report's summary of the conditions and circumstances surrounding the fatality is intended to provide context to the agency's 

recommendations and is not intended to be definitive for purposes of determining any claim or benefit. 

For further information, visit the program Web site at www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire or call toll free 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636).
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Introduction

During a prescribed burn on March 28, 2013, a 35-year-old male state forest fire service hourly fire 

fighter lost his life after being struck by a passing motorist on a public roadway. On April 1, 2013, the

U.S. Fire Administration notified the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 

of this incident. On April 21–26, 2013, a safety and occupational health specialist from the NIOSH 

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program traveled to New Jersey to investigate this 

incident. The NIOSH investigator met with and interviewed state forest fire service management

personnel, the prescribed burn incident commander (IC), state forest fire service members involved 

with the prescribed burn, a state deputy attorney general assigned to the incident, a detective with the

county prosecutor’s office tasked with investigating the incident, the occupational health and safety 

program manager for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), and his parttime assistant safety manager. The NIOSH investigator also met with the compliance officer and 

representatives of the New Jersey Public Employees Occupational Safety and Health Program

(PEOSH) and reviewed their photographs, investigative findings, and safety and health standards for 

fire department personnel. PEOSH will be issuing a report at a later date. 

The NIOSH investigator visited, documented, and photographed the incident scene, personal protective 

equipment similar to what was worn by the victim, the engine operated by the victim, and traffic 

control devices that were in place at the time of the incident. The NIOSH investigator reviewed 

training records for the victim and incident commander, the prescribed burn plan and program 

procedures, and circulars for the state forest fire service. The NIOSH investigator also reviewed the

death certificate. 

Fire Department

At the time of this incident, the state forest fire service had approximately 65 paid full-time field 

personnel. In addition, the DEP had approximately 1,500 part-time, paid hourly on-call, fire fighters 

employed on a regular basis to perform operations such as responding to wildland emergencies or 

prescribed burn projects, within three regions throughout the state. These regions were broken down 

into 29 sections with 7–12 districts per section and serving the entire state, covering 7,100 square miles 

with a population of over 8,000,000.

The state forest fire service is responsible for protecting life and property, as well as the state’s natural 

resources, from wildfires and has authority to:

• Determine forest fire hazards.

• Remove or cause to be removed brush, undergrowth, or other materials that contribute to forest 

fire hazards.

• Maintain or cause to be maintained fire breaks.

• Plow lands, set prescribed fires and back fires, order a highway or road closed to traffic by the 

authority responsible for it during wildland fire emergencies, and adopt regulations for burning 
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forests or any forest material. For planned events, such as a prescribed burn operation, 

permission to close a highway or road must be acquired in advance from the authority 

responsible for that highway or road.

• Summon any person between the ages of 18–50, who may be within the jurisdiction of the 

state, to assist in extinguishing fires.

• Require the use of materials, equipment, or property needed for extinguishing wildfires when 

required to abate an emergency. 

Prior to the NIOSH investigation, the state forest fire service had established circulars covering 

numerous administrative and operational functions. Circulars related to this incident include:

• Incident traffic safety

• Risk management

• SAFENET incident reporting system

• Radio communications plan

• Incident command system

• Vehicle emergency lighting

• Vehicle identification standard

• Training procedures and requirements

The incident traffic safety circular provided to the NIOSH investigator discussed information related to 

traffic incident management at roadway emergencies that included:

• Law enforcement and highway agency notification procedures for lane and road closures

• State of New Jersey Highway Incident Traffic Safety Guidelines for Emergency Responders1

• Chapter 6I, “Control of Traffic Through Incident Management Areas,” from the Manual on 

Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD)2

• Chapter 6G, “Type of Temporary Traffic Control Zone Activities,” from the MUTCD2

• United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service program Incident Sign Installation 

Guide.

3

The incident traffic safety circular is very detailed, outlining step-by-step procedures and requirements 

and according to the state DEP is intended to protect state forest fire service personnel any time they 

would be working along a highway, regardless of the reason. 

This state forest fire service had no centralized dispatch center and was not responsible for interior 

structural firefighting. 

Prescribed Burn Plan

In November 2009, the section forest fire warden, who was also the IC, had prepared a prescribed burn 

plan for a local recreational reservoir. The plan was approved by the state forest service in November 
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2011 and was valid until November 2014. This meant the same area could be burned as often as 

necessary without updating the original burn plan. On the day of the incident, 50 acres were scheduled 

to be burned. The 2011 prescribed burn plan included:

• Types of fuels to be burned

• Location of the burn

• Management goals and objectives

• Burn objectives

• Weather and wind conditions

• Burn methods

• Smoke management

• Potential impacts (e.g., wildlife, residents, and roadways)

• Medical plan 

• Logistics and resources

• Execution

o Personnel

o Resources

o Ignition plan

o Holding plan

o Contingency plan

o Prescription monitoring

o Mop up and patrol

o Rehabilitation plan

• Prescribed burn briefing outline

o Burn organization

o Burn objectives

o Description of burn area

o Expected weather

o Communications 

o Firing sequence

o Contingency plan

o Safety

Prior to any burning, the division fire warden or designee must ensure that conditions for that day fall 

within the scope of the prescribed burn plan and the available state forest fire service requirements. If 

not, the burn cannot proceed. Additionally, the IC for the day of the burn holds a briefing, detailing 

burn plan specifics, as listed above, to all personnel. This briefing is an ideal time to discuss potential 

safety concerns, especially those of working on or alongside roadways. 

Training and Experience

The victim had been with the state forest fire service for the past 6 years, holding the rank of district 

forest fire warden for the past 41⁄2 years. The victim was also an active member of a local volunteer fire 
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department spanning the last 10–15 years. As a district fire warden, he was required to be qualified as 

a firing boss—National Wildfire Coordinating Group Single Resource Boss and Incident Commander 

Type IV—and attend in-service training.4,5 The victim’s training record from the state forest fire 

service did not contain any courses related to traffic incident management; however, this does not 

mean that the victim had not received this type of training on his own or through his volunteer fire 

department. No additional training records were available.

Even though the state forest fire service incident traffic safety circular provided detailed information 

from many resources, the state forest fire service does not have a specific training program for safely 

implementing a traffic incident management area (TIMA). The state forest fire service has been in 

contact with the New Jersey Department of Transportation to develop a training program that is 

applicable to its operations and authorities. 

Equipment and Personnel

The state forest fire service vehicle operated by the victim was a 2006 diesel-powered heavy-duty 

pick-up truck chassis with an automatic transmission and dual rear wheels. It was classified as a Type 

6 engine carrying 300 gallons of water and a 250-gallon-per-minute pump. When purchasing new 

apparatus, the state forest fire service research and development shop would take possession of the 

chassis and then fabricate and install the rear body, including pump, cabinets, plumbing, ROPS,

emergency lighting and markings, and brush guards. According to the state forest fire service circulars

provided to NIOSH, the vehicle was appropriately identified with emergency lighting (above minimum 

requirements), decals and logos, reflective striping, and lettering (see Photo 1 and Photo 2). According 

to circulars provided to NIOSH during the investigation, amber warning lights or bar lights were not 

required for this type of state forest service vehicle. At the time of this incident, the vehicle the victim 

was using was scheduled for replacement with a new one, but it was still under construction and 

unavailable as the replacement at the time of the incident. The NIOSH investigator photographed the 

new vehicle, which was being made ready for service during the NIOSH investigation, and determined 

additional high-visibility retro-reflective striping and chevrons had been added to make the vehicle 

more conspicuous (see Photo 3 and Photo 4). The new vehicle went into service after the NIOSH 

investigation.
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Photo 1. Engine operated by the victim prior to being struck.

(NIOSH photo.)
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Photo 2. Rear of engine operated by the victim prior to being struck.

(NIOSH photo.)
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Photo 3. Vehicle purchased to replace engine used during the incident. The replacement unit was 

being made ready for service during the NIOSH investigation. 

(NIOSH photo.)
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Photo 4. Another view of the new engine. Note the high-visibility chevrons added on the rear of 

the engine for increased conspicuity. 

(NIOSH photo.)

Timeline

The times within the timeline are provided to set out, to the extent possible, the sequence of events 

according to witness interviews and other available information. No recorded radio transmissions were 

available during this incident. This timeline is not intended, nor should it be used, as a formal record of 

events.

• 0700 Hours

The forest fire warden (incident commander), state forest fire service fire fighters and the 

victim arrive at the prescribed burn location.
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• 0830 hours

Incident commander briefs personnel on the prescribed burn.

• 0900 Hours (approximately)

A “crew boss,” victim and three other state forest fire service fire fighters are assigned to burn 

out the area between the adjacent roadway and the main park drive way. The crew boss briefs 

them on tactics and safety, including traffic.

• 1000 Hours

Ignition of grass and leaf litter is initiated.

• 1100 Hours

Crew boss reports ignition is started inside the fence line along the adjacent roadway. He 

initiates another quick briefing before this part of the operations is started.

• 1125 Hours (approximately)

Crew reports a wind shift (not a radio transmission) that is now blowing smoke onto the 

adjacent roadway.

• 1130 Hours

Victim is struck by a passing motorist. 

Personal Protective Equipment

State forest fire service personnel reported to the NIOSH investigator that, at the time of the incident, 

the victim was wearing his state forest fire service approved protective gear. The state forest fire 

service provides a yellow NOMEX® long-sleeve shirt (see Photo 5), wildland helmet, gloves, and fire 

shelter. Cotton blue jeans and boots are approved gear, however, these items are not provided by the 

state forest fire service. The victim was not wearing a high-visibility retro-reflective vest (see Photo 

6). High-visibility retro-reflective vests are stored on forest fire service vehicles. The MUTCD

Chapter 6I allows for fire fighters who are involved in suppression to not wear a vest due to the 

melting, burning of the garment. Most traffic vests are now flame resistant but not all. Agencies 

should evaluate the potential of working in or near moving traffic and the conspicuity of workers as 

they write specifications for traffic vests and the SOPs for wearing them.
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Photo 5. Example of wildland long-sleeve shirt worn by the victim.

(NIOSH photo.)

Photo 6. Example of high-visibility retro-reflective vest available to the victim.

(NIOSH photo.)

Weather and Road Conditions

On the day of the incident, the temperature was approximately 50°F and overcast with no rain. The 

fatal incident occurred on a two-lane, paved, rural roadway that ran adjacent to the state park where the 

prescribed burn was taking place. The lanes ran north and south and were separated by painted,

broken and solid, yellow lines with periodic recessed roadway reflectors just off the centerline. A 

solid, white fog line on the outer edges of the paved roadway separated the roadway from the shoulder.

The state forest fire service had deployed a portable, fluorescent pink sign reading “Prescribed Burning

Ahead” approximately 2/10 of a mile south of the incident site on the northbound shoulder (see Photo 
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7). An additional sign reading “Smoke Limited Visibility Ahead” was posted approximately 7/10 of a 

mile north of the incident site on the southbound shoulder (see Photo 8). The posted speed limit was 50 

miles per hour. The motorist was traveling slower than the posted speed limit because of the smokelimited visibility conditions. 

Photo 7. Scene photo from the incident, as seen approaching from the south. 

(Photo courtesy of law enforcement.)
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Photo 8. Scene photo from the incident, as seen approaching from the north. 

(Photo courtesy of law enforcement.)
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Investigation

During a prescribed burn on March 28, 2013, a 35-year-old male state forest fire service hourly fire 

fighter lost his life after being struck by a passing motorist. On the day of the incident, the incident IC 

had performed his pre-burn preparations to ensure that the conditions to burn this day were 

appropriate, and he conducted a briefing with all personnel working the prescribed burn. This burn 

was scheduled to last for 1 day, starting at sunrise and ending by sunset. The burn location was next to 

a reservoir within a state park, and the IC advised the NIOSH investigator that the humidity was 

normally higher in this area. The area around the reservoir was known for rapid wind changes and 

swirling winds. All personnel commented to the NIOSH investigator that the smoke had good 

dispersion but would move and set in at different times and places. 

According to the victim’s crew boss, the victim was assigned to an engine on the day of the incident.

Prior to being struck, his duties were to maintain a presence on the adjacent roadway that ran parallel 

on the west side of the burn area, with the engine and to protect the fence from fire, if necessary. On 

this day, he was operating the engine by himself. Although not a procedural requirement, an engine

would normally be staffed with two personnel to allow the passenger to walk along a burn line with a 

hoseline while the operator drove. Additional personnel in close proximity could have been assigned 

to assist him if requested. During this incident, his two additional crew members were tasked with 

igniting a fire line within the fence line, approximately 30-50 feet from the victim’s position on the 

adjacent roadway. The fire crew boss stated to the NIOSH investigator that the victim had exited his 

vehicle three times to briefly spray down the plastic-coated, chain-link fence that separated the 

roadway from the park, using the engine’s booster reel. At some point, the victim parked the engine in 

the northbound lane and exited; all emergency lights were on. The engine was parked straddling the 

fog line and extended approximately 46 inches into the northbound lane (see Photo 9). Those working 

the burn line closest to the roadway remember the victim operating the engine and then stopping on the 

roadway. Since no hoseline was pulled prior to him being struck, some believe he was trying to get a 

better view of the burn area. It is unknown whether the smoke was obscuring the roadway prior to him 

exiting his engine. 

The victim was struck while in the southbound lane just off the passing yellow centerline of the 

roadway; approximately 6 feet from the engine (see Photo 9 and Diagram). Three vehicles were 

traveling north in the direction of the parked engine (within close proximity of each other). The first 

vehicle swerved urgently into the southbound lane to miss striking the victim’s vehicle. The second 

vehicle, which had slowed, also swerved into the southbound travel lane, inadvertently striking the 

victim who was standing in the roadway. The third vehicle side-swiped the engine before coming to a 

rest. The motorists stated that smoke was visually obstructing the roadway when the victim was 

struck.

The IC was immediately notified of the incident by personnel near the incident, and personnel from the 

park service and state forest fire service involved with the burn quickly responded to the roadway.

Resuscitative efforts were started before the victim was transported by ambulance to a local hospital.

The victim was later pronounced dead at the hospital. Individuals interviewed by NIOSH stated that 
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once they got to the victim the smoke had dissipated and was intermittent while waiting for the 

ambulance.

Photo 9. Position of engine when the victim was struck (see also Diagram). Note: The hoselines 

were deployed after the incident to control the prescribed burn.

(Photo courtesy of law enforcement.)
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Diagram. Incident scene at the time the victim was struck. 
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Contributing Factors

Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key 

events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH 

investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that led to the 

fatality:

• Victim working in unprotected travel lane

• Inconspicuousness of the victim

• Smoke obscured roadway

• Shifting winds in the burn area

Cause of Death

On the death certificate the coroner listed the victim’s cause of death as blunt force trauma.

Recommendations

Recommendation #1: Forest fire services should ensure that personnel receive proper training and

have sufficient equipment and that appropriate procedures are in place for operating on or near 

roadways.

Discussion: All personnel who have the potential of being assigned to traffic control duties or exposed 

to vehicular traffic should be trained in: the use of advanced warning devices, safe-positioning of an

apparatus, the use of high-visibility personal protective equipment and its limitations during fire 

suppression and hazardous material type incidents, available/necessary resources including personnel, 

vehicles and equipment, general safety practices, and establishment of the traffic incident management 

area (TIMA). Training should be provided to all personnel before responding to a roadway incident or 

working alongside a roadway. The state forest service incident traffic safety circular provided several 

resources for this state forest fire service.

1–3

The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) is a resource for establishing temporary 

traffic control. MUTCD Chapter 6I, “Control of Traffic Through Incident Management Areas,”

defines a traffic incident management area as “an area of highway where temporary traffic controls are 

installed, as authorized by a public authority or the official having jurisdiction of the roadway, in 

response to a road user incident, natural disaster, hazardous material spill, or other unplanned incident.2

A traffic incident management area is a type of temporary traffic control (TTC) zone and extends from 

the first warning device (such as a sign, light, or cone) to the last TTC device or to a point where 

vehicles return to the original lane alignment and are clear of the incident.”2 Also, according to the 

MUTCD, traffic incidents can be divided into three general classes of duration, each of which has 

unique traffic control characteristics and needs. These classes are:

A. Major—expected duration of more than 2 hours

B. Intermediate—expected duration of 30 minutes to 2 hours
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C. Minor—expected duration under 30 minutes

MUTCD guidance states that all TTC devices needed to establish the area should be available for ready 

deployment. The TIMA should include the proper traffic diversions, tapered lane closures, and 

upstream warning devices to alert traffic approaching the queue to use an appropriate alternative route.

Attention should be paid to the upstream end of the traffic queue such that warning is given to road 

users approaching the back of the queue. If manual traffic control is needed, it should be provided by 

qualified flaggers or uniformed law enforcement officers.2

Warning devices and transition areas are a means by which individuals can convey information to 

motorists approaching an incident scene, referred to as the “advance warning area.” Warning devices 

in the advance warning area may vary from a single sign or high-intensity rotating, flashing, 

oscillating, or strobe lights on a vehicle to a series of signs in advance of the incident scene. Warning 

devices or even apparatus should be placed to take advantage of topography and weather conditions so 

that protection is provided to personnel working on or near a roadway. The National Fire Protection 

Association (NFPA) 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Programs

section 8.7.5 states that one or more of the following warning devices should be used to warn 

oncoming traffic of the incident operations and the hazards to members operating at the incident: (1) 

fluorescent and retro-reflective warning devices such as traffic cones, (2) Federal Highway 

Administration approved 48-inch by 48-inch retro-reflective signs stating “Emergency Scene Ahead” 

(with directional arrow overlay), (3) illuminated warning devices such as highway flares, and (4) other

devices appropriate to warn oncoming traffic of the emergency operations.6 Additionally, cones should 

be predominantly orange and should be made of a material that can be struck without causing damage 

to the impacting vehicle. Cones should be a minimum of 18 inches in height for daytime and lowspeed roadways. Cones should be a minimum of 28 inches in height with retro-reflective markings 

when used on freeways and other high-speed highways or at night on all highways or when more 

conspicuous guidance is needed.6 NFPA 1500 section 8.7.6 states that warning devices should be 

placed and used with proper considerations given to visual obstruction, such as hills, curves, or blind 

spots, or unusual localized weather conditions, such as fog or rain.6 Weather conditions, curves, and 

hills that limit visibility of the incident scene require that the advance warning devices be placed at an 

even greater distance. For this incident, additional measures could have been taken since the

prescribed burn was previously planned to last all day with the potential of decreased visibility due to 

smoke.

The MUTCD states: “Where special emphasis is needed, signs may be placed on both the left and right 

sides of the roadway. Signs mounted on portable supports may be placed within the roadway itself.

Signs may also be mounted on or above barricades.”2 The primary purpose of portable changeable 

message signs is to advise the road user of unexpected situations such as changes in speed, visibility, 

or traffic pattern.

The roadway on which the incident occurred had a 50-mph posted speed limit. The state forest fire 

service had placed two portable signs: one for motorists approaching from the north and one for 

motorists approaching from the south. No additional TTC devices were available to establish a TIMA 
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and warn approaching motorists of potential vehicles or individuals working in or alongside the 

roadway. Only one of these signs warned motorists of potential visibility problems from smoke.

These signs did not indicate, or warn motorists, that there may be emergency personnel and/or vehicles 

on the roadway. Additionally, side streets feeding between the posted signs had no warnings. Finally, 

the MUTCD TTC guidelines include the need for a warning to traffic for a temporary incident, but not 

as in the case of a mobile traffic control zone. Since a prescribed burn situation near a roadway 

produces unique safety hazards for passing motorists, including the potential for changing smoke and 

visibility conditions as well as the presence of emergency personnel or moving emergency vehicles, a 

combination of MUTCD TTC zone signage and state forest fire service signage might be considered to 

provide additional warning to motorists of potential hazards ahead.

At the time of the incident, the engine driven by the victim did not have chevrons on the back and the 

use of chevrons had never been required. The State Forest Service Incident Traffic Safety circular 

provided information that wasn’t utilized for this incident, and the NIOSH investigator could not 

determine whether the scope of the circular included prescribed burns. All state forest services should 

review their circulars, procedures, and/or guidelines to ensure that all potential instances where an 

individual is working in a roadway or alongside a roadway are properly protected. A model SOP for 

establishing advance warning and transition areas at roadway-related incidents can be found on the 

Emergency Responder Safety Institute Website 

(http://www.respondersafety.com/Articles/Model_SOG_Available_for_Download_on_Deploying_Co

nes_and_flares_at_Roadway_Incidents.aspx).7

The NFPA is currently drafting standard NFPA 1091 Standard on Professional Qualifications for 

Traffic Control Incident Management. This document will provide emergency responders with 

information related to safe operations at a roadway incident. A draft copy of NFPA 1091 can be found 

at http://www.nfpa.org/AboutTheCodes/AboutTheCodes.asp?docnum=1091&tab=nextedition. Note: 

For more information related to training, personal protective equipment, and policies/procedures for 

traffic management, see the “Additional Information” section at the end of this report. 

Recommendation #2: Forest fire services should ensure that safety circulars or standard operating 

procedures providing guidance on identifying and the importance of remaining in a safe location 

while working in or near moving traffic are implemented and enforced.

Discussion: Forest fire service personnel should operate defensively with an awareness of the high risk 

associated with working in or near moving traffic, because individuals cannot rely on approaching 

motorists to see them, slow down, and/or move over. Motorists may not follow traffic signs and 

regulations for various reasons, including poor visibility, not understanding what the sign means, 

distraction, being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and/or because of a medical condition that 

affects their judgment or abilities. This line-of-duty death provides a reminder that one can never 

depend solely on signs to protect them when they are working near moving traffic. The forest fire 

service should ensure that multiple prevention strategies are in place and situational awareness is 

maintained at all times by personnel. NFPA 1500 states that every effort should be taken to protect 

members from conflict with motor vehicle traffic.2 Personnel should be trained on how to identify
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hazardous situations and preplan an escape strategy should they encounter a dangerous traffic situation,

such as a vehicle entering the temporary traffic control zone.

8 The placing of advanced warning 

devices to aid oncoming traffic to recognize a TIMA may not provide personnel with complete 

protection from traffic hazards. Personnel should remain in an area of safety created by the proper 

positioning of apparatus and warning devices. A vehicle with emergency lights flashing provides 

additional warning and additional protection to the incident scene but may not be sufficient warning 

for the approaching motorists, especially when roadway conditions are obscured by fog or smoke.

During this incident, the victim was struck while standing in the southbound travel lane. At the time 

he was struck, roadway conditions were obscured by smoke from the adjacent prescribed burn he was 

monitoring. Establishment of a more complete TIMA in this incident might have included temporarily 

suspending personnel operations on the roadway due to smoke conditions. Also, extreme caution 

should be taken if a vehicle must be parked within a travel lane where occupants exiting the vehicle 

could be exposed to oncoming traffic. Departmental safety circulars or standard operating procedures 

that detail safety measures along roadways should be routinely evaluated, implemented, and enforced. 

Recommendation #3: Forest fire services should establish pre-incident plans and agreements 

regarding traffic control incident management with local fire departments, EMS, law enforcement, 

local or state departments of highways, and other public and private sector responders.

Discussion: Pre-incident planning is fundamental to effective traffic control incident management.

The white paper Protecting Emergency Responders on the Highways9 states that a preplan should (1) 

account for possible use of detours, (2) anticipate the likelihood of vehicles transporting hazardous 

materials or of extraordinary weight or size, (3) accommodate the need to keep commerce flowing, (4) 

minimize the possibility of secondary incidents, and (5) account for possible impact on neighboring 

jurisdictions. All agencies that are responsible to keep roadways safe and open should be fully 

involved in the process, formatting, and development of pre-incident plans and ensure that the final 

plan is easily understood and implemented within their agency.

According to the U.S. Fire Administration document, Traffic Incident Management Systems,

10 specific 

concepts that should be addressed in pre-incident planning for roadway operations include the 

following:

• All agencies that may respond to roadway incidents should be fully involved in the 

development of the plan and ensure that the final plan is easily understood and implemented 

within their agency.

• Each agency involved must provide initial and refresher training and ensure that individual and 

organizational roles are understood.

• Each agency should make sure that personnel are at least minimally briefed on the roles and 

procedures of other plan participants to avoid on-scene confusion and conflict.

Local authorities, including law enforcement, departments of transportation, fire departments, 

municipal leadership, businesses, forestry services, and other interested parties, should work together 
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to develop local traffic control incident management plans that address the needs of the local 

community in the event of traffic disruptions. These traffic control incident management plans should 

address a wide range of events that could affect normal roadway traffic, such as traffic incidents, 

hazardous material spills, fires, natural disasters, inclement weather, parades, and other planned events.

States and municipalities, including the transportation department, in conjunction with state forest

services, fire departments, emergency medical responders, law enforcement, and parks and recreation,

should develop these plans to include automatic response protocols detailing the responsibilities of 

each at planned and unplanned incidents. Governing entities should ensure that adequate funding is 

available to staff and equip response protocols once jointly established and agreed upon by all parties 

involved. Preplanning such incidents allow forest fire services and other interested parties to identify 

needs, locate necessary resources and materials, and develop mutual-aid-response agreements. 

Additionally, these pre-plans should be readily available to all parties involved. 

Prior to this incident, no pre-incident plans or agreements had been established.

Recommendation #4: Local, state, and federal department of highways should evaluate different 

types of media to ensure that motorists have ample warning of roadway hazards while operating a 

motor vehicle, especially when approaching and driving through a traffic incident management 

area, so that they avoid striking emergency responders, other vehicles, and/or traffic control devices.

Discussion: Motorists need to maintain a constant awareness of their surroundings while operating a 

motor vehicle. They need to pay attention to such things as signs, emergency scenes, traffic patterns, 

work zones, and various roadway hazards (e.g., slowed/stopped vehicles, weather, and smoke).

Motorists could benefit from additional highway-related information disseminated by other sources.

Various means of disseminating incident-related information to affected motorists are listed below:

• Commercial radio broadcasts

• Highway advisory radio 

• Variable message signs 

• In-vehicle or personal data assistant information or route guidance systems

• Commercial and public television traffic reports

• Changeable message boards

Traffic reports on radio and television stations have been a traditional means by which motorists 

receive traffic information, including incident-related warnings. Radio and television stations receive 

the traffic information they use in their reports from a variety of sources, which may include public 

transportation agencies, or by monitoring emergency (police and fire) radio frequencies.

Public agencies, radio, and television stations can communicate important incident-related information 

to motorists. This information may help motorists be more prepared for what’s ahead and perhaps 

avoid an area all together. Motorist information should be disseminated as soon as possible or ahead 

of time, especially when advanced planning is required for prescribed burns. Motorist information 

should be disseminated until traffic flow is returned to normal conditions.
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References

1. State of New Jersey [2010]. Highway incident traffic safety guidelines for emergency 

responders 

[http://cait.rutgers.edu/system/files/u10/way_Incident_Traffic_Safety_Guidelines_Final.pdf].

Date accessed: July 2013. 

2. FWHA [2009]. Part 6, Temporary traffic control elements. In: Manual on uniform traffic 

control devices (MUTCD). 2009 ed. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Federal Highway Administration [http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/pdfs/2009/part6.pdf]. Date 

accessed: July 2013.

3. USDA [2005]. Incident sign installation guide. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Agriculture, Forest Service, Technology and Development Program [http://www.fs.fed.us/td/pubs/pdfpubs/pdf05512814/pdf05512814dpi72pt01.pdf]. Date accessed July 2013.

4. National Wildfire Coordinating Group [2011]. National interagency incident management 

system wildfire fire qualification system guide. Boise, ID: National Wildfire Coordinating 

Group [http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/docs/pms310-1-2008.pdf]. Date accessed: July 2013. 

5. State Forest Fire Service [2011]. Forest fire service circulars. 

6. NFPA [2007]. NFPA 1500 standard on fire department occupational safety and health program. 

2007 ed. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

7. ERSI [2009]. Model standard operating guideline (SOG) for cone, flare, or sign deployment at 

traffic related incidents. By Moore R. Berkeley Springs, WV: Cumberland Valley Volunteer 

Firemen’s Association, Emergency Responder Safety Institute 

[http://www.respondersafety.com/Articles/Model_SOG_Available_for_Download_on_Deployi

ng_Cones_and_Flares_at_Roadway_Incidents.aspx]. Date accessed: July 2013.

8. NIOSH [2007]. Volunteer fire fighter dies when struck by a bus while working along an

interstate highway–Illinois. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human

Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health, FACE Report No. F2007-26

[http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200726.html]. Date accessed: July 2013.

9. CVVFA [1999]. Protecting emergency responders on the highways. By Chen HS, Austin S.

Berkeley Springs, WV: Cumberland Valley Volunteer Firemen’s Association 

[http://www.respondersafety.com/DownloadCategories/White_Papers.aspx]. Date accessed: 

July 2013.

10. USFA [2008]. Traffic incident management systems. Emmitsburg, MD: Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, U.S. Fire Administration.
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a Wind Shift – New Jersey 

 

Investigator Information

This incident was investigated by Stacy C. Wertman, Safety and Occupational Health Specialist with 

the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, Surveillance and Field Investigations 

Branch, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH located in Morgantown, WV. An expert technical 

review was provided by Steve Austin with the Cumberland Valley Volunteer Firemen’s Association 

and Emergency Responder Safety Institute. A technical review was also provided by the National Fire 

Protection Association, Public Fire Protection Division.

Additional Information

Federal Highway Administration Traffic Incident Management Handbook

http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/eto_tim_pse/publications/timhandbook/

Emergency Responder Safety Institute http://www.respondersafety.com/

Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/

National Traffic Incident Management Coalition 

http://ntimc.transportation.org/Pages/default.aspx

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, “Traffic Incident 

Management” http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/eto_tim_pse/about/tim.htm

International Association of Fire Fighters Best Practices for Emergency Vehicle and Roadway 

Operations Safety in the Emergency Services http://www.iaff.org/hs/EVSP/guides.html

Disclaimer

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Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). In addition, citations to Web sites external to NIOSH do not 

constitute NIOSH endorsement of the sponsoring organizations or their programs or products. 

Furthermore, NIOSH is not responsible for the content of these Web sites.