COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Petty , Huff and Senior Judge Frank Argued by videoconference

NEWMAN KNIGHT FRANK AND ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0600

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- 2 JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF NOVEMBER 4, 2020 THE ESTATE OF BRUCE A. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS ’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION Kevin W. Cloe (Timothy D. Watson ; Midkiff, Muncie & Ross, P.C., on brief s ) , for appellant s . Craig A. Brown (The Law Office of Craig A. Brown, PLLC, on brief), for appellee s . Newman Knight Frank and its insurer, Zurich American Insurance Company (collectively, “ e mployer”), appeal the Worker s ’ Compensation Commission’s award of benefits
to the widow, dependent children , and estate of Bruce A. Williams (“ d ecedent”). Employer asserts that the Commission erred by: (1) finding that d ecedent’s death occurred by means of an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment; (2) applying the personal comfort doctrine; (3) applying the death presumption codified in Code § 65.2

- 105; and (4) awarding benefits, burial expenses, and transportation expenses. This Court find s no error in the Commission’s ruling. The Commission’s finding that
d e cedent was either resting before his shift or working is supported by credible evidence in the record and is therefore binding. Furthermore, the Commission did not err in determining that,

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1

- 413, this opinion is not designated for publication. UNPUBLISHED- 2

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regardless of which was true, d ecedent’s injury arose out of and i n the course of his employment. Accordingly, this Court affirm s the Commission’s award of benefits

. I. BACKGROUND “Under settled principles of appellate review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to [claimant] as the prevailing party be fore the commission.” Layne v. Crist Elec. Contractor, Inc. , 64 Va. App. 342, 345 (2015). So viewed, the evidence shows the following: Decedent worked as a master electrician for e mployer, covering several buildings that were located in the same office p ark in Falls Church. According to e mployer’s job description,
d ecedent was “[r]esponsible for working from blueprints and drawings in an effort to assemble, install, test, troubleshoot, repair, adjust, and maintain HVAC fixtures, apparatus, equipment, and wiring.” However, there was a separate chief engineer for the buildings that “gave out all the scope of work that needed to be done.” Therefore, d ecedent did not frequently work with blueprints. Instead, he typically worked as one of the lead technicia ns repairing and maintaining the buildings and equipment . In addition to regular shift work, d ecedent was on

- call outside of his normal shift hours. Decedent lived approximately forty

- five minutes away from the office park in good traffic, although the c ommute often took much longer in D.C. m etro a rea traffic. Due to the combination of his on

- call hours and the lengthy commute, d ecedent was known by

e mployer to occasionally spend the night at work. Toward the end of 2016, a number of other employees had ceased working for e mployer. This meant that d ecedent was “pretty much the only master electrician that was left.” As a result, d ecedent had assumed additional work duties and had to help with virtually any electrical work that was necessary at any of th e buildings. On December 20, 2016, d ecedent completed a normal work shift

. Shortly after returning home, d ecedent received a call from e mployer requiring him to return to work because people- 3

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had gotten stuck in an elevator. After fixing the elevator prob lem, d ecedent returned home at approximately 9:00 p.m. However, “right after he got into [his] house from taking care of that issue, [ e mployer] called him again” due to a false alarm from one of the fire alarms and d ecedent returned to work. Upon arriving at the office park, d ecedent met his supervisor, Evan Saunders. 1 The two worked on the faulty fire alarm and resolved the problem. Afterwards, Saunders returned to his home and d ecedent remained at work on “fire watch,” which involve d monitoring the fire alarm in case another false alarm occur red . Decedent’s fire wa tch concluded at 6:00 a.m. on December
21. Shortly after 6:00 a.m. Saunders began receiving text messages from d ecedent. At 6:01 a.m., d ecedent texted Saunders “I’m in High air pressure. Taking fire panal [sic] offline.” Saunders explained that “high p ressure is on the fire panel, which is the power to the building, basically saying that the panel . . . basically just saying it was off

- line at the panel.” At 7:15 a.m., d ecedent texted Saunders to say “[n]eed new furnas [sic] pressure control switch.” Saunders explained that this text “had nothing to do with the [fire] panel” and referred to the boiler system located in a different area of the building than the fire panel. Decedent was scheduled for a shift that began at 10:00 a.m. that morning , but he never showed up for work. When d ecedent failed to return home after that scheduled shift, his family began contacting his employer and the police, but to no avail. His wife and three children began searching for d ecedent on their own. On December 24, 2 016, his family saw his van parked in a vacant parking garage approximately 75 to 100 yards from his work. His family approached the

1 Although Saunders was d ecedent’s supervisor, he was not an electrician.- 4

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van to investigate and, upon opening the door, found him sitting in the second

- row seats, deceased. Decedent was still dr essed in his work clothes with a blanket over his legs. He was “slouched towards the front” with his “hand out” as if “he was reaching for something.” Decedent’s “work pad with all his schematics there and a pen” were on the seat next to him. Decedent’s phone was found on the floor , 2 and his work tools were found in the back of the van. His widow called the police to the scene. Decedent’s cause of death was later determined to be carbon monoxide poisoning. The apparent source was from d ecedent’s pers onal vehicle, as the record indicates no other potential source of carbon monoxide. After being notified of his death, e mployer reviewed security camera footage from cameras located outside their buildings. Security footage showed d ecedent leav ing work at approximately 8:00 a.m., get ting into his van, and then dri ving into the vacant parking garage

. Decedent’s estate filed a claim for death benefits and burial expenses, which came before Deputy Commissioner Cummins on August 6, 2019. Employer defended, ar guing that d ecedent’s estate failed to demonstrate that his injury arose out of or occurred during the course of his employment. 3 The d eputy c ommissioner applied the “death presumption” of Code § 65.2

- 105

— which satisfies the arising out of and in the co urse of requirements

— and awarded benefits.

2 The r ecord indicates that d ecedent had both a personal cell phone and a work cell phone that was issued by his employer. Although the record is unclear which phone wa s found on the floor of the van

— or where the other phone was

— the evidence showed that d ecedent received work

- related calls and texts on both phones.

3 Employer also argued that d ecedent’s carbon monoxide poisoning was not an injury by accident and posited that it may have been a suicide. However, that argument was rejected by the d eputy c ommissioner and e mployer did not seek review of that determination.- 5

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The full Commission affirmed, albeit in a splintered opinion. Commissioner Newman wrote the majority opinion. Commissioner Newman found it unnecessary to reach the “death presumption” of Code § 65.2

- 105. Instea d, Commissioner Newman found that the evidence established that d ecedent’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment without need to resort to the presumption. Commissioner Newman determined that there were only two possibilities to explain d ecedent’s actions at the time of his death. Either d ecedent was working

— in which case the in the course of employment element is satisfied

— or he was resting during the short two

- hour break he was afforded before starting another shift of work. Commissio ner Newman determined that even if d ecedent was resting, the personal comfort doctrine would apply and therefore would also satisfy the in the course of employment requirement. Commissioner Newman further held that regardless of whether d ecedent was worki ng or resting, the arising out of employment prong was satisfied because his employment required him to find a place to stay while awaiting his next shi f t. Commissioner Marshall wrote a concurring opinion, finding that d ecedent was working at the time he s uccumbed to carbon monoxide. Therefore, Commissioner Marshall did not reach either the personal comfort doctrine or statutory presumption questions. Commissioner Rapaport dissented. Commissioner Rapaport agreed with Commissioner Newman that d ecedent was either working or resting when he died from carbon monoxide poisoning. However, Commissioner Rapaport maintained that the personal comfort doctrine was inapplicable because d ecedent had left his work and traveled to a vacant parking garage. I n Commissioner Rapaport’s opinion, the evidence did not establish d ecedent was working and not resting. Therefore, Commissioner Rapaport determined that d ecedent’s estate had failed to- 6

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satisfy its burden to prove that the injury arose out of and in the co urse of d ecedent’s employment. 4 This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether an injury was sustained in the course of and arose out of employment present mixed questions of law and fact. Conner v. Bragg , 203 Va. 204, 207 (1962). The legal component of that question is reviewed de novo

. O’Donoghue v. United Cont ’ l Holdings, Inc. , 70 Va. App. 95, 103 (2019). The accomp anying “factual findings of the commission are binding if they are supported by credible evidence.” Wagner Enterprises, Inc. v. Brooks , 12 Va. App. 890, 894 (1991) (citations omitted). In determining whether credible evidence exists, this Court will not “retry the facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or make its own determination of the credibility of the witnesses.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS Employer argues that d ecedent’s estate failed to meet its burden to prove that d ecedent’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. This Court disagree s . The Commission’s finding th at d ecedent was either working or sleeping in preparation for his next shift are both supported by credible evidence in the record. Furthermore, the Commission did not err in finding that d ecedent’s injury would be compensable in either case. Therefore, this Court affirm s the Commission’s award of benefits

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4 Commissioner Rapaport’s opinion did not explain why he viewed the d eputy c ommissioner’s application o f the statutory presumption in Code § 65.2

- 105 to be incorrect.

5 Because this Court affirms on these grounds, we need not address whether a “death presumption” applies in this case.- 7

- A. The Commission’s Factual Findings The Commission found that d ecedent was either working or resting in preparation for his next shift at the time he succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning. This finding is supported by credible evidence in the record. The evidence indicates that, after working a shift the day before and working through the night, d ecedent’s van entered the parking garage shortly after 8:00 a.m.

— within two hours of his

next work shift. Decedent was found sitting upright in his van in the second

- row seating. Decedent was slouched slightly forward with his hand outstretched. He ha d a blanket over his legs and on the seat next to him were his work pad, schematics, and a pen. His work tools were in the vehicle with him. Furthermore, at 7:15 a.m., shortly before he went to the parking garage, d ecedent had notified e mployer that he i dentified a new problem with the boiler system that was unrelated to his other work that morning or the prior evening. It is, of course, impossible to know with absolute certainty what d ecedent was doing at the time of his death. 6 However, that is not th e standard this Court is to apply. This Court only asks whether credible evidence exists to support the Commission’s findings. Here, the entirety of the evidence supports a finding d ecedent was either working or resting. Indeed, nothing

6 On brief, e mployer speculated as to other activities that d ecedent could have been doing besides working or resting:

At the time of his death the claimant could have been napping, or he could have been passing time until his shift started. Or, since the record con tains no evidence of when he died, he could have skipped work on December 21 and stayed in [the] vacant garage playing games, and not have died until after his shift would have been over

. Employer, however, points to no evidence in the record to support it s speculations. Moreover, proffering alternative factual theories is little more than an invitation to re

- weigh the evidence

. A lternative factual theories are of no consequence when querying whether the r ecord contains credible evidence to support the Co mmission’s findings.- 8

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contradicts that finding. Employer makes much of the fact that d ecedent had not been assigned a work project during those two hours and only rarely worked with schematics. However, rarely does not mean never and the fact remains that working with schematics is part of e mployer’s description of d ecedent’s job. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine e mployer objecting to d ecedent working during his off

- hours had this story not ended so tragically; especially when d ecedent had just identified a new problem in the boiler system shortly before his next working hours. In sum, credible evidence supports the Commission’s finding that d ecedent was either resting or working at the time of his death. Therefore, that finding is binding on this Court.
B. The Commission’s Legal Conclusi ons The Commission determined that d ecedent’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment regardless of whether he was working or merely resting before his shift began. Therefore, to affirm the Commission’s award, both conclusions must be corr ect. See , e.g. , Kraf Const. Servs., Inc. v. Ingram , 17 Va. App. 295, 298 (1993) ; see also O’Don o ghue , 70 Va. App.

at 115 (Huff, J., dissenting) (“ If an employee seeks coverage for injuries that must have arisen from one of multiple mechanisms, and each of those mechanisms would satisfy the actual risk test, then the injury must satisfy the actual ris k test and is thus compensable. ”)

. This Court hold s that whether d ecedent was working or resting , either would satisfy the standard for compensability.
1. Decedent’s injury is compensable if he was working. Employer contends that even if the Commission is correct that d ecedent was working at the time of his death, his injury still did not arise out of and in the course of d ecedent’s employment. This Co urt disagree s . To prove a compensable injury under the Worker s ’ Compensation Act (the “Act”), a claimant must prove: “(1) that the injury was caused by an accident; (2) that the injury was- 9

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sustained in the course of the employment; and (3) that the injury arose out of the employment.” Van Buren v. Augusta County , 66 Va. App. 441, 449 (2016) (quoting Southland Corp. v. P arson , 1 Va. App. 281, 284 (1985)). When interpreting these requirements, courts must remain mindful that “the Act is remedial legislation and should be liberally construed in favor of the injured employee.” E.I. Du Pont De Nemours v. Eggleston , 264 Va. 13, 17 (2002) (citing Byrd v. Stonega Coke & Coal Co. , 182 Va. 212, 221 (1944)). On appeal , e mployer challenges only the second and third prongs

. “[T]he words ‘in the course of’ refer to the time, place and circumstances under which
the accident occurred.” Hess v. Virginia State Police , 68 Va. App. 190, 196 (2017) (quoting
Conner , 203 Va. at 208). An injury “ occurs in the ‘course of employment ’ when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may be reasonably e xpected to be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or is doing something which is reasonably incidental thereto. ” Clifton v. Clifton Cable Contracting, L.L.C. , 54 Va. App. 532, 539 (2009) (citing Conner , 203 Va. at 208).
He re, there is little doubt that , if d ecedent was working at the time of his death, then the injury leading to his death occurred in the course of his employment. That he was working plainly implies that he was reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employ ment. Furthermore, although it was not during one of his assigned shifts, the injury occurred during his period of employment. As the twenty

- four hours before his death demonstrate, d ecedent’s work was not limited to only his scheduled shift hours. Empl oyer expected him to be available to work whenever necessary. Decedent was engaged in the course of his employment from approximately 10:00 p.m. the night before to 8:00 a.m. that morning while working on the fire panel and boiler systems despite it being outside of his assigned shifts. To the extent that d ecedent continued working after leaving the building at 8:00 a.m., that continued to be within- 10

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the period of his employment. Moreover , d ecedent was injured in a place e mployer could have reasonably exp ected him to be. Employer was aware that d ecedent often spent the night at or near his work after being called in due to his long commute. In this case, d ecedent had been working for well over twelve hours straight. Moreover, d ecedent had only two hours until beginning his shift and faced a round

- trip commute that would take an hour and a half , at a minimum. Considering these circumstances, e mployer could have reasonably expected that d ecedent would retreat to his vehicle prior to beginning his next shi ft. Decedent’s injury must also have ar i se n out of his employment. “The words ‘arising out of’ . . . refer to the origin or cause of the injury .” Conner , 203 Va. at 208. It “ covers those accidents which cause injury to an employee while he is dischargin g some duty he is authorized to perform in furtherance of his employer ’ s business, either directly or indirectly. ” Lucas v. Lucas , 212 Va. 561, 563

- 64 (1972) (citing Cohen v. Cohen’s Dep’t Store , 171 Va. 106 , 110 (1938)). The “actual risk test” defines the scope of the “arising out of” prong. O’Donoghue , 70 Va. App. at 104. “ This test requires proof that ‘ the employment expose[d] the work[er] to the particular danger from which he was injured, notwithstanding the exposure of the public generally to like risks. ’ ” Id. (quoting Lucas v. Fed. Express Corp. , 41 Va. App. 130, 134 (2003)). The “actual risk test” is satisfied “when there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal conne ction between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury .” Hess , 68 Va. App. at 196 (quoting Bradshaw v. Aronovitch , 170 Va. 329, 335 (1938) ). The requisite causal connection, however, is not that some aspect of one’s employment directly caused an injury by accident. Rather, a claimant need only show that the “employment relationship ‘caused the employee to be at the place he was at the time of the accident, and thus exposed him . . . to the hazard or risk of- 11

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the happening of the accident[.]’” Lucas , 212 Va. at 563 (quoting Honaker & Feeney v. Hartley , 140 Va. 1, 13 (1924)). Thus, “[a] risk is incidental to the employment when it belongs to or is connected with what the employee has to do in fulfilling his c ontract of service.” Kane Plumbing, Inc. v. Small , 7 Va. App. 132, 137 (1988) (quoting Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hosey , 208 Va. 568, 572 (1968)). Employer contends that d ecedent dying from carbon monoxide poisoning in his personal vehicle is too attenuated from his job requirements to qualify as arising out of his employment.
T his argument misapprehends the governing legal principles. The core question is not the closeness of the relation between the injury and the employee’s work duties; the key is wheth er the employment relationship caused the employee to be exposed to the injury by accident. See,
e.g. , Lucas , 212 Va. 561 (holding that an employee’s injury arose from his employment despite being injured while running an errand for his boss that was unre lated to his job duties); Honaker & Feeney , 149 Va. 1 (holding that a woodsman’s injury arose out of his employment when he fell outside the bunkhouse door of his employer’s lumber camp while not on duty ). Here, the evidence demonstrates that d ecedent’s em ployment “caused [him] to be at the place he was at the time of the accident and thus exposed him . . . to the risk .” Lucas , 212 Va. at 563 (quoting Honaker & Feeney , 140 Va. at 13). Decedent’s work required him not only to work a full shift on December 20, but also to respond to two emergency maintenance problems. By the time d ecedent had finished his work with the malfunctioning fire alarm and left the office buil ding, it was already 8:00 a.m. Decedent’s next assigned shift started at 10:00 a.m., leaving him no time to return home. Assuming that he opted to continue working, it is not unreasonable nor unexpected that d ecedent chose to use his vehicle as a workspa ce . This is especially true given that the r ecord makes no mention of d ecedent having an office or dedicated workspace within the building.- 12

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Given these circumstances, this Court find s no error with the Commission’s
determination that d ecedent’s injury aro se from his employment. As the Commission succinctly noted: “an employer cannot work the decedent so extensively that he is unable to return home and then claim immunity from his death while the worker waits in this vehicle for his next shift to begin.”
2. Decedent’s injury is compensable if he was resting. Employer contends that , if d ecedent was resting prior to his shift , then his injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. Employer argues that the Commission erred by applying the personal comfort doctrine to the facts of this case. Furthermore, e mployer asserts that the personal comfort doctrine, even if it applies, satisfies only the “ in the course of employment ” prong. The personal comfort doctrine recognizes that certain acts “ are necessary to the life, comfort, and convenience of the servant while at work.” Bradshaw , 170 Va. at 337. Therefore, while such acts are “strictly personal to [the servant], and not acts of service, [they] are incidental to the service.” Id. “ Such a ctivities benefit the employer by enhancing feasibility and desirability of employment, good physical and mental conditioning of his employees, and the cultivation of good employment relationships. ” Ablola v. Holland Road Auto Center, Ltd. , 11 Va. App. 18 1, 183 (1990). Accordingly, injuries which occur during “breaks and excursions for food, drink, rest and restroom visitation” may be compensable under the Act. See, e.g. , Southern Motor Lines Co. v. Alvis , 200 Va. 168, 171 (1958) (injury compensable wher e employee fell out the window of a hotel room employer provided him); Kraf Const. Servs. , 17 Va. App. 295 (injury compensable where employee was hit by a car crossing the street to get a drink from a convenience store); Bradshaw , 170 Va. 329 (injury compe nsable where employee fell out of a moving work vehicle while reaching for a beverage).- 13

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“If the employer provides the employee a satisfactory place to satisfy his personal comfort, the employee must use that place or risk the loss of compensation. ” Kraf C onst. Servs. , 17 Va. App. at 299. However, where a place to satisfy the employee’s personal comfort is not provided by employer, the question becomes whether the activity satisfying the employee’s personal comfort “is incidental to the . . . employment or a ‘frolic’ of one’s own.” Id.
T his Court ha s no difficulty determining that the personal comfort doctrine applies if d ecedent was resting prior to his shift. There is little doubt that employees need sleep and rest to be alert and fit for the responsibilities of their employment. See Alvis , 200 Va. at 171. This is doubly true for a master electrician, for whom a small error may result in grave personal injury or significant disruption to the building or system upon which they are working. Decedent worked a normal shift on December 20 and then fielded two emergency calls. Decedent worked through the night and did not l eave his place of employ until 8:00 a.m. on December 21. His next assigned shi f

t began a mere two hours later, leaving him insufficient time to return home despite having worked continuously for the better part of twenty

- four hours. Employer provided d ec edent no accommodations for him to rest during this brief window. These circumstances make clear that if d ecedent retreated to his vehicle to rest for the two hours he was afforded, it was for his personal comfort and incidental to the requirements of his job. 7

7 Employer, on brief, attempts to frame this issue as being d ecedent’s fault for living so far away from his place of employment. Employer contends that taking such a factor into account would unduly expand potential liability. First and foremost, forty

- five minutes is not particularly far, especially considering that this case arose in the Washington D.C. m etro a rea. Regardless, e mployer’s concerns are overstated. The pertinent question is whether an employee’s work requirements ne cessitate him taking time to rest such that it is incidental to his employment. This is necessarily a fact

- specific inquiry. T he facts here indicate that d ecedent had been working for the better part of twenty

- four hours and was afforded only two hours b efore his next shift began. These working conditions plainly necessitated d ecedent taking time to rest such that it was incidental to his employment.- 14

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Employer argues that even if the personal comfort doctrine applies, it can satisfy only the

“ in the course of employment ” prong of the statutory test. This is a matter of some debate , and precedent offers conflicting answers

. 8 Nonetheless, this Court need not resolve that question today. Even if application of the personal comfort doctrine fails to satisfy the “ arising out of ” prong, this Court’s analysis above is equally applicable here. Decedent’s injury arose from his employment if he was re sting for the same reasons that d ecedent’s injury arose from his employment if he was working: his employment afforded hi m no time to return home and no temporary lodgings. T herefore , his employment required him to find an alternative place to rest.
Acc ordingly, this Court find s no error with the Commission’s determination that d ecedent’s injury was compensable if he were resting.

8 Compare Alvis , 200 Va. at 171 (“an injury sustained by an employee while engaged in the performance of an act essential to his personal comfort and convenience, but ultimately for the benefit of the employer, is compensable as arising out of and in the course of employment”); Bradshaw , 170 Va. at 337 (“Such acts are necessary to the life, comfort, and conve nience of the servant while at work . . . and injury sustained in the performance thereof is deemed to have arisen out of the employment.”) , and Campbell v. Food Lion, LLC, #835 , No. 3156

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- 2 , * 10 ( Va. Ct. App. July 27, 200 4) (“[a]n injury sustained by an employee ‘ out of ’ and ‘ in the course of ’ the employment while engaged in the performance of an act essential to his personal comfort and convenience . . . is compensable as ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of’ the employment” (quoting Cadmus Magazines v. Williams , 30 Va. App. 129, 132 (1999)) ), with Ablola , 11 Va. App. at 183 (“Virginia has long recognized the personal comfort doctrine . . . [t]hus occasional breaks [for personal comforts] are deemed to be in the course of employment.”); CJW Medical Center v. Wallace , No. 2542

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- 2 , * 6

- 7 ( Va. Ct. App. July 31, 2 012) (“The personal comfort doctrine operates only to keep the employee within the course of employment; it has no bearing on whether the injury arises out of the employment.” (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n , 909 N.E.2d 983, 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) ) ); Angelo v. Stihl, Inc. , No. 0564

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- 1 , * 3 n.1 ( Va. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2009) (“The personal comfort doctrine operates only to keep the employee within the course of employment; it has no bearing on whether the injury arises out of the employment.” (citing Cadmus , 30 Va. App. at 132)); see also Kraf Const. Servs. , 17 Va. App. at 299 (“Virginia has adopted the ‘personal comfort’ doctrine, under which an employee who seeks to satisfy his personal comfort, such as seeking to quench his thirst at a place provided by the employer, is within the employment.”); Flynn v. Professional Tile Co. , No. 1548

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- 4 , * 4 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1994) (“[S]ince claimant had not returned to the scope of his employment at the time of the injury, we need not address the personal comfort doctrine.”).- 15

- IV. CONCLUSION The Commission found that d ecedent was either resting or working at the time of his death. Because these fin dings are supported by credible evidence, they are binding on this Court. The Commission further determined that, regardless of whether d ecedent was working or resting before his shift, his injury was compensable. This Court agree s . Either way, d ecedent ’s injury both arose out of and in the course of his employment. Therefore, this Court affirm s the Commission’s award of benefits.
Affirm ed.