Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules 56287 

6Wall thickness is the beltline wall thickness 

including the clad thickness. 

7RTPTS limits contributes 1 × 10¥8 per reactor 

year to the reactor vessel TWCF. 

8Excluding underclad cracks in forgings. 

TABLE 4.—CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES FOR CHEMICAL ELEMENT WEIGHT PERCENTAGES—Continued 

Materials P Mn 

Welds ........................................................................................................................................................... 0.019 1.63 

TABLE 5.—MAXIMUM HEAT-AVERAGE RESIDUAL [°F] FOR RELEVANT MATERIAL GROUPS BY NUMBER OF AVAILABLE DATA

POINTS

Material group s [°F] 

Number of available data points 

3 4 5 6 7 8 

Welds, for Cu > 0.072 ...................................................................................... 26.4 45.7 39.6 35.4 32.3 29.9 28.0 

Plates, for Cu > 0.072 ...................................................................................... 21.2 36.7 31.8 28.4 26.0 24.0 22.5 

Forgings, for Cu > 0.072 .................................................................................. 19.6 33.9 29.4 26.3 24.0 22.2 20.8 

Weld, Plate or Forging, for Cu ≤ 0.072 ........................................................... 18.6 32.2 27.9 25.0 22.8 21.1 19.7 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day 

of September 2007. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 07–4887 Filed 10–2–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 52 

RIN 3150–AI19 

Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for 

New Nuclear Power Reactor Designs 

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC or the Commission) 

is proposing to amend its regulations to 

require applicants for new standard 

design certifications that do not 

reference a standard design approval; 

new standard design approvals; 

combined licenses that do not reference 

a standard design certification, standard 

design approval, or manufactured 

reactor; and new manufacturing licenses 

that do not reference a standard design 

certification or standard design approval 

to assess the effects of the impact of a 

large, commercial aircraft on the nuclear 

power plant. Based on the insights 

gained from this assessment, the 

applicant shall include in its 

application a description and evaluation 

of design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies to avoid or 

mitigate, to the extent practicable, the 

effects of the aircraft impact with 

reduced reliance on operator actions. 

The impact of a large, commercial 

aircraft is a beyond-design-basis event, 

and the NRC’s requirements applicable 

to the design, construction, testing, 

operation, and maintenance of design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies for design basis events would 

not be applicable to design features, 

functional capabilities, or strategies 

selected by the applicant solely to meet 

the requirements of this rule. The 

objective of this rule is to require 

nuclear power plant designers to 

perform a rigorous assessment of design 

features that could provide additional 

inherent protection to avoid or mitigate, 

to the extent practicable, the effects of 

an aircraft impact, with reduced 

reliance on operator actions. 

DATES: Submit comments on this 

proposed rule by December 17, 2007. 

Submit comments on the information 

collection aspects on this proposed rule 

by November 2, 2007. Comments 

received after the above dates will be 

considered if it is practical to do so, but 

assurance of consideration cannot be 

given to comments received after these 

dates. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any one of the following methods. 

Please include the following number 

RIN 3150–AI19 in the subject line of 

your comments. Comments on 

rulemakings submitted in writing or in 

electronic form will be made available 

to the public in their entirety on the 

NRC rulemaking Web site. Personal 

information, such as your name, 

address, telephone number, e-mail 

address, etc., will not be removed from 

your submission. 

Submit comments via the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If 

you do not receive a reply e-mail 

confirming that we have received your 

comments, contact us directly at 301–

415–1966. 

Hand deliver comments to: 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. 

Federal workdays. (Telephone 301–415–

1966). 

Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301–

415–1101. 

You may submit comments on the 

information collections by the methods 

indicated in the Paperwork Reduction 

Act Statement. 

Publicly available documents related 

to this rulemaking may be viewed 

electronically on the public computers 

located at the NRC’s Public Document 

Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint 

North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland. The PDR reproduction 

contractor will copy documents for a 

fee. 

Publicly available documents created 

or received at the NRC after November 

1, 1999, are available electronically at 

the NRC’s Electronic Reading Room at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. From this site, the public 

can gain entry into ADAMS, which 

provides text and image files of NRC’s 

public documents. If you do not have 

access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the PDR 

Reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–

415–4737 or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Stewart Schneider, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001; telephone 301–415–

1462; e-mail: sxs4@nrc.gov or Ms. 

Nanette Gilles, Office of New Reactors, 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 


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Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone 

301–415–1180; e-mail: nvg@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

II. Currently Operating Power Reactors 

III. Currently Approved Standard Design 

Certifications 

IV. Renewal of a Standard Design 

Certification, Combined License, or 

Manufacturing License 

V. Newly Designed Power Reactors 

A. Introduction 

B. Description of Beyond-Design-Basis 

Aircraft Impact 

C. Aircraft Impact Assessment 

D. Evaluation of Design Features, 

Functional Capabilities, and Strategies 

VI. Section-by-Section Analysis 

VII. Guidance 

VIII. Specific Request for Comments 

IX. Availability of Documents 

X. Plain Language 

XI. Agreement State Compatibility 

XII. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

XIII. Finding of No Significant 

Environmental Impact: Availability 

XIV. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement 

XV. Regulatory Analysis 

XVI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification 

XVII. Backfit Analysis 

I. Introduction 

The Commission believes that it is 

prudent for nuclear power plant 

designers to take into account the 

potential effects of the impact of a large, 

commercial aircraft. The Commission 

has determined that the impact of a 

large, commercial aircraft is a beyonddesign-basis event and has chosen an 

approach consistent with NRC’s 

previous approach to such events. The 

overriding objective of this rule is to 

require nuclear power plant designers to 

perform a rigorous assessment of design 

and other features that could provide 

additional inherent protection to avoid 

or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the 

effects of an aircraft impact, with 

reduced reliance on operator actions. In 

this manner, this rule would result in 

newly designed power reactor facilities 

being more inherently robust with 

regard to a potential aircraft impact than 

if they were designed in the absence of 

this rule. This rule thus provides an 

enhanced level of protection beyond 

that which is provided by the existing 

adequate protection requirements, 

which all operating power reactors are 

required to meet, and which would be 

provided by the proposed adequate 

protection requirements that the 

facilities will be required to meet when 

finalized (see the proposed 10 CFR part 

73, ‘‘Physical Protection of Plants and 

Materials,’’ power reactor security 

requirements (71 FR 62663; October 26, 

2006)). 

The proposed rule would require 

applicants for new standard design 

certifications that do not reference a 

standard design approval; new standard 

design approvals; combined licenses 

that do not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor; and new 

manufacturing licenses that do not 

reference a standard design certification 

or standard design approval, and those 

applicants with applications pending on 

the effective date of this rule (relevant 

applicants), to perform an aircraft 

impact assessment of the effects on the 

designed facility of the impact of a large, 

commercial aircraft. Based on the 

insights derived from that assessment, 

the application would have to include a 

description and evaluation of the design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies to avoid or mitigate the effects 

of an aircraft impact, addressing core 

cooling capability, containment 

integrity and spent fuel pool integrity. 

The applicant would be required to 

describe how such design and other 

features avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the aircraft impact effects 

with reduced reliance on operator 

actions. 

The Commission has determined that 

the impact of a large, commercial 

aircraft is a beyond-design-basis event. 

For this reason, the Commissionapproved final design basis threat (DBT) 

does not include an aircraft attack. The 

NRC published its final DBT rule, Title 

10, Section 73.1, ‘‘Purpose and Scope,’’

of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR 73.1), in the Federal Register on 

March 19, 2007 (72 FR 12705). Two 

well-established bases support the 

exclusion of aircraft attacks from the 

DBT. First, it is not reasonable to expect 

a licensee with a private security force 

using weapons legally available to it to 

be able to defend against such an attack. 

Second, such an act is in the nature of 

an attack by an enemy of the United 

States. Power reactor licensees are not 

required to design their facilities or 

otherwise provide measures to defend 

against such an attack, as provided by 

10 CFR 50.13, ‘‘Attacks and Destructive 

Acts by Enemies of the United States; 

and Defense Activities.’’

The Commission has addressed 

aircraft attacks by regulatory means 

other than the DBT rule in 10 CFR 73.1. 

By Order dated February 25, 2002 

(Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) 

Order), the Commission required all 

operating power reactor licensees to 

develop and adopt mitigative strategies 

to cope with large fires and explosions 

from any cause, including beyonddesign-basis aircraft impacts (67 FR 

9792; March 4, 2002). The Commission 

has proposed incorporating the 

continuing requirement to provide for 

such mitigative measures in the NRC’s 

regulations in the proposed 10 CFR part 

73 power reactor security requirements, 

specifically the proposed revisions to 10 

CFR 73.55, ‘‘Requirements for Physical 

Protection of Licensed Activities in 

Nuclear Power Reactors Against 

Radiological Sabotage,’’ and Appendix 

C, ‘‘Licensee Safeguards Contingency 

Plans,’’ to 10 CFR part 73. If these 

requirements, which are promulgated 

on the basis of adequate protection of 

public health and safety and common 

defense and security, are finalized, all 

current and future power reactors must 

satisfy them. 

The current requirements, in 

conjunction with the currently proposed 

revisions to the security regulations in 

10 CFR 73.55 and Appendix C to 10 

CFR part 73, will continue to provide 

adequate protection of the public health 

and safety and the common defense and 

security. Nevertheless, the Commission 

has decided to require relevant 

applicants to evaluate possible 

additional features to avoid or mitigate 

the effects of an aircraft impact beyond 

satisfying the current regulations and 

the proposed 10 CFR part 73 regulations 

(assuming they become final). 

The Commission’s DBT requirements 

(both orders and existing rules) are 

based on adequate protection of the 

public health and safety and common 

defense and security. As such, they are 

excepted from the cost-benefit analysis 

that otherwise would be required under 

10 CFR 50.109, ‘‘Backfitting.’’ This new 

proposed rule to address the capability 

of newly designed power reactors 

relative to a potential aircraft impact is 

based both on enhanced public health 

and enhanced safety and common 

defense and security but is not 

necessary for adequate protection. 

Rather, it would be to enhance the 

facility’s inherent robustness. 

Requiring applicants for new reactor 

designs to perform a rigorous aircraft 

impact assessment and describe design 

features to address the effects of a 

beyond-design-basis aircraft impact is 

consistent with the NRC’s historic 

approach to beyond-design-basis events 

and is consistent with the NRC’s 

position in its ‘‘Policy Statement on 

Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding 

Future Designs and Existing Plants’’ (50 

FR 32138; August 8, 1985) (Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS) Accession No. 

ML003711521). The policy statement 

notes, ‘‘The Commission expects that 

vendors engaged in designing new 

standard [or custom] plants will achieve 

a higher standard of severe accident 

safety performance than their prior 

designs.’’ The NRC reiterated that 


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1By Order dated February 25, 2002 (ICM Order), 

the Commission required all operating power 

reactors to develop and adopt mitigative strategies 

to cope with large fires and explosions from any 

cause, including beyond-design-basis aircraft 

impacts (67 FR 9792; March 4, 2002). 

regulatory approach in its ‘‘Policy 

Statement on the Regulation of 

Advanced Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated 

July 8, 1986 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML051660651), ‘‘The Commission 

expects that advanced reactors would 

provide more margin prior to exceeding 

safety limits and/or utilize simplified, 

inherent, passive, or other innovative 

means to reliably accomplish their 

safety functions.’’ This regulatory 

approach has demonstrated its success, 

as all designs subsequently submitted to 

and certified by the Commission 

represent substantial improvement in 

safety for operational events and 

accidents. Therefore, the NRC is 

proposing to require applicants for 

newly designed facilities to assess the 

effects of an aircraft impact on the 

designed facility. 

The Commission considered the 

appropriate location for requirements on 

an aircraft impact assessment during its 

deliberations on the security assessment 

rulemaking (10 CFR 73.62) proposed by 

the NRC staff in SECY–06–0204, 

‘‘Proposed Rulemaking—Security 

Assessment Requirements for New 

Nuclear Power Reactor Designs (RIN 

3150–AH92),’’ dated September 26, 

2006 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML062300068). In its Staff 

Requirements Memorandum on SECY–

06–0204, dated April 24, 2007 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML071140119), the 

Commission disapproved the staff’s 

recommended rulemaking as described 

in SECY–06–0204. The Commission 

directed the NRC staff to include the 

aircraft impact assessment requirements 

in 10 CFR part 52, ‘‘Licenses, 

Approvals, and Certifications for 

Nuclear Power Plants,’’ (72 FR 49352, 

August 28, 2007) to encourage reactor 

designers to incorporate practicable 

measures at an early stage in the design 

process. This proposed rule is the result 

of that effort. 

This proposed rule would revise 10 

CFR part 52 to require applicants for 

new standard design certifications that 

do not reference a standard design 

approval; new standard design 

approvals; combined licenses that do 

not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor; and new 

manufacturing licenses that do not 

reference a standard design certification 

or standard design approval to assess 

aircraft impact assessments and describe 

the design features and other means to 

avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of an aircraft 

impact with reduced reliance on 

operator actions. This proposed rule 

renders as duplicative and therefore 

unnecessary the staff’s proposed 10 CFR 

73.62 rule to require security 

assessments. That rule would have 

required a security assessment which 

would include mitigation of large fires 

and explosions, a target set analysis, and 

design features to protect target sets 

against DBTs. The large fires and 

explosions provisions of that rule would 

be subsumed by this proposed 10 CFR 

part 52 aircraft impact rule. Sufficient 

target set provisions are included in the 

NRC’s proposed changes to 10 CFR 

73.55, which applicants for new 

facilities would have to satisfy if that 

rule is made final. Designers of new 

facilities are encouraged to account for 

the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55 in the 

facility design so as to minimize more 

costly, post-design features to meet 

those requirements. Accordingly, the 

proposed 10 CFR 73.62 is not necessary 

because the Commission is proposing a 

new 10 CFR part 52 aircraft impact 

assessment rule. 

In contrast to its relation to a possible 

security assessment rule, however, the 

new 10 CFR part 52 aircraft impact 

assessment rule would complement the 

proposed revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 and 

Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73, to 

mitigate the effects of large fires and 

explosions. The proposed 10 CFR 73.55 

and Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 

provisions on mitigating large fires and 

explosions codify the adequate 

protection requirement imposed on 

existing operating reactors by ICM 

Order, Item B.5.b. These provisions of 

the proposed 10 CFR part 73 rule, 

therefore, are necessary for adequate 

protection and must remain in 

regulations 1 that are applicable to all 

currently operating reactors and must be 

satisfied by all newly licensed reactors. 

Regarding large fires and explosions, 

which are two likely effects of an 

aircraft impact, the proposed Appendix 

C to 10 CFR part 73 is limited to 

mitigative strategies ‘‘using existing or 

readily-available resources,’’ which 

effectively can be adapted to existing 

facilities. For example, certain facility 

features might be virtually cost-free if 

designed into the facility (e.g., spatially 

diverse containment penetrations) but 

effectively impossible to retrofit. Thus, 

strategies that were not required by ICM 

Order, Item B.5.b, and are not required 

by proposed 10 CFR 73.55 and 

Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 because 

they do not use existing or readily 

available resources, might be 

implemented in new reactor designs 

because of the aircraft impact 

assessment rule. The proposed aircraft 

impact assessment rule does not deal 

with a design basis event but would 

result in facilities with additional 

features to avoid or mitigate the effects 

of an aircraft impact because they would 

be designed into the facility. Such 

features would reduce reliance on 

operator actions to cope with an aircraft 

impact event. Thus, this proposed rule 

is not necessary for adequate protection, 

but rather is an enhancement that will 

result in newly designed facilities being 

more inherently robust against aircraft 

impacts than the facilities not subject to 

this proposed rule. 

In contrast to the adequate protection 

requirements of proposed 10 CFR 73.55 

and Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73, a 

proposed rule that would enhance 

safety and security by requiring an 

evaluation of newly designed facilities 

to avoid or mitigate the effects of aircraft 

impacts is appropriate for inclusion in 

10 CFR part 52. The NRC is therefore 

proposing to require applicants for 

newly designed reactors, which will 

have to satisfy the revised 10 CFR part 

73 provisions if the rule is made final, 

to also perform an aircraft impact 

assessment under this proposed rule. 

However, the NRC expects that, 

compared to a licensee for a facility that 

was not designed to meet the 

requirements of the proposed rule, 

licensees for facilities that are designed 

to comply with the proposed rule would 

have much less of a need to develop 

specific procedures, guidance, or other 

strategies to cope with the loss of large 

areas of the plant due to explosions or 

fires in order to comply with the 

requirements in the proposed 10 CFR 

73.55 and Appendix C to 10 CFR part 

73. The Commission sees this as a 

significant benefit of this proposed rule; 

namely, that features to avoid or 

mitigate the effects of an aircraft impact 

are designed into the facility and will 

result in much less reliance on operator 

actions for such protection. 

Consideration of a rule to require 

applicants for newly designed reactors 

to perform an aircraft impact assessment 

and describe design and other features 

addressing such impacts, which are 

beyond-design-basis scenarios, is 

similar to the Commission’s 

consideration in the mid-1980’s of new 

rules addressing accidents more severe 

than design basis accidents. The 1985 

‘‘Policy Statement on Severe Reactor 

Accidents’’ explained the Commission’s 

conclusion that, although it was 

proposing criteria to show new reactor 

designs to be acceptable for severe 

accident concerns, then-existing plants 

posed no undue risk to public health 


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2The four standard design certifications currently 

in effect are the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water 

Reactor (ABWR) design (Appendix A), the System 

80+ design (Appendix B), the AP600 design 

(Appendix C), and the AP1000 design (Appendix 

D). 

and safety, and thus, there was no need 

for action on operating reactors based on 

severe accident risks. The Commission’s 

reasoning in the severe accident context 

supports its conclusion that although 

new reactor designs should be assessed 

for aircraft impacts and designed to 

avoid or mitigate the effects of an 

aircraft impact, existing reactors and 

designs provide adequate protection of 

the public health and safety and 

common defense and security. 

II. Currently Operating Power Reactors 

The Commission has determined that 

the existing designs of currently 

operating nuclear power plants, together 

with the security program actions 

mandated by the NRC’s orders (some of 

which are codified in the NRC’s final 

DBT rulemaking and others of which are 

being incorporated into other NRC 

regulations), as well as the protection 

provided by other Federal, State, and 

local entities, provide an adequate level 

of protection to public health and safety 

and common defense and security 

against aircraft impacts. As a result of 

the events of September 11, 2001, the 

NRC has undertaken a series of actions 

to provide continued reasonable 

assurance of adequate protection to 

public health and safety and common 

defense and security at the United 

States commercial nuclear power 

facilities. The NRC has assessed the 

potential vulnerabilities of operating 

nuclear power reactors to aircraft 

impact, and it has issued orders and 

provided associated guidance to 

licensees for implementing a range of 

mitigative strategies. The results of these 

aircraft impact assessments were 

derived from detailed calculations of 

plant damage mechanisms (e.g., 

structural failures, shock and vibration 

effects, and fire effects). The NRC 

ensured that implementation of the 

February 25, 2002, ICM Order included 

measures to mitigate such scenarios. 

The Commission’s ICM Order, Item 

B.5.b, first established the requirement 

for licensees to implement certain 

mitigation measures at existing power 

reactors for these beyond-design-basis 

events. This requirement was 

specifically intended to address ‘‘losses 

of large areas of a (reactor) plant due to 

fires and explosions.’’ The Commission 

has since incorporated this requirement 

into the proposed rulemaking for 10 

CFR 73.55 and Appendix C to 10 CFR 

part 73. Under the proposed 10 CFR part 

73 rulemaking, future license applicants 

must identify and implement mitigative 

measures similar to those required for 

currently operating plants. 

Most recently, the Commission 

published a final rule on March 19, 

2007 (72 FR 12705), amending the DBT 

in 10 CFR 73.1. The DBT rule describes 

general attributes that nuclear power 

plant licensees must defend against 

with high assurance. This rulemaking 

enhanced the DBT by codifying 

generically applicable security 

requirements similar to those previously 

imposed by the Commission’s April 29, 

2003, DBT Orders. 

On the basis of the previous 

information, the NRC concludes that 

existing power reactors pose no undue 

risk to public health and safety or 

common defense and security from the 

effects of an aircraft impact based on the 

Commission’s specified aircraft 

characteristics. Therefore, the NRC is 

not applying the aircraft impact 

assessment requirement in this 

rulemaking to existing operating nuclear 

power plants. 

III. Currently Approved Standard 

Design Certifications 

The Commission has concluded that 

the proposed rule need not be applied 

to the four currently approved standard 

design certifications in Appendices A 

through D to 10 CFR part 52.2 Therefore, 

applicants would not need to recertify 

these standard designs to meet this 

proposed rule. This follows from the 

Commission’s determination that the 

aircraft impact rule is an enhancement 

above and beyond what is necessary for 

adequate protection and that the aircraft 

impact scenario, as previously 

explained, is a beyond-design-basis 

event. Just as the currently operating 

power reactor facilities continue to meet 

adequate protection requirements and 

do not need to meet this new aircraft 

impact rule, so too are the already 

certified standard designs sufficient to 

meet adequate protection design 

requirements. Any reactor facility built 

to one of these already-certified designs 

will, of course, have to satisfy all 

adequate protection requirements 

applicable to operating power reactors. 

The original applicant (or successor in 

interest of any of the four current 

standard design certifications) may 

voluntarily seek to amend the standard 

design certification to add design 

features, functional capabilities, or 

strategies in accordance with the 

requirements of proposed 10 CFR 

52.500, ‘‘Aircraft Impact Assessment.’’

The NRC encourages voluntary 

enhancement by the applicants for the 

four current standard design 

certifications because it will increase 

the already high levels of safety and 

security provided by these reactor 

designs. Applicants may implement 

these design modifications in different 

ways, including: 

• Applications to amend the existing 

design certifications. 

• Application for a new design 

certification based on the existing 

certification, but containing the design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies identified as a result of this 

rule. 

• Requests submitted by combined 

license applicants for plant-specific 

departures from the standard design, 

where the departure implements the 

modifications developed by the original 

design certification applicant’s 

voluntary implementation of the 

provisions of the proposed 10 CFR 

52.500 (these requests may be submitted 

by each individual combined license 

applicant, or they may be submitted by 

a group of combined license applicants 

under the provisions of Appendix N, 

‘‘Standardization of Nuclear Power 

Plant Designs: Combined Licenses to 

Construct and Operate Nuclear Power 

Reactors of Identical Design at Multiple 

Sites,’’ to 10 CFR part 52 and subpart D, 

‘‘Additional Procedures Applicable to 

Proceedings for the Issuance of Licenses 

to Construct and/or Operate Nuclear 

Power Plants of Identical Design at 

Multiple Sites,’’ to 10 CFR part 2, 

‘‘Rules of Practice for Domestic 

Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of 

Orders.’’

IV. Renewal of a Standard Design 

Certification, Combined License, or 

Manufacturing License 

The NRC’s proposed rulemaking does 

not require updating of the assessment 

of aircraft impacts required by proposed 

10 CFR 52.500 as part of an application 

for either a renewed design certification 

under 10 CFR 52.57, ‘‘Application for 

Renewal,’’ a renewed combined license 

under 10 CFR 52.107, ‘‘Application for 

Renewal,’’ and 10 CFR part 54, 

‘‘Requirements for Renewal of Operating 

Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ or 

a renewed manufacturing license under 

10 CFR 52.177, ‘‘Application for 

Renewal.’’ The NRC’s requirement for 

assessment of large, commercial aircraft 

impacts is not an aging-related matter, 

nor is it based on time-limited 

considerations. Hence, aircraft impacts 

under the proposed rule are outside the 

scope of any combined license renewal 

proceeding under 10 CFR part 54 and 

combined license holders do not need to 

update the assessment required by 10 

CFR 52.500(b) at the license renewal 

stage. Similarly, aircraft impacts under 


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the proposed rule are outside the scope 

of any manufacturing license renewal 

proceeding under 10 CFR 52.177. 

V. Newly Designed Power Reactors 

A. Introduction 

Under this proposed rule, relevant 

applicants for newly designed power 

reactors would be required to undertake 

the following: 

• Perform an assessment of the effects 

on the designed facility of a beyonddesign-basis aircraft impact 

• Evaluate potential design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies for 

avoiding or mitigating the effects of a 

beyond-design-basis aircraft impact on 

the key safety functions of the facility 

• Describe how such design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies 

avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of the applicable 

aircraft impact with reduced reliance on 

operator actions 

The proposed rule is based on the 

premise that it is desirable for future 

power reactors to avoid or mitigate the 

effects of the applicable aircraft impact 

through design features that reduce or 

eliminate the need for operator actions. 

Because this type of consideration needs 

to occur during the development of the 

design itself, the NRC directs the 

requirements at plant designers. 

The NRC does not expect plant 

designers to demonstrate that design 

features alone, without any operator 

action or mitigative response activity, 

will practicably avoid or mitigate the 

effects of the beyond-design-basis 

aircraft impact. The NRC recognizes that 

the decision to rely on design features 

(as opposed to operator action or 

mitigative strategies) is complex, and 

often involves a set of trade-offs 

between competing considerations. The 

NRC’s goal is that the designer 

implement a rigorous assessment 

process to ensure that the design 

process constitutes a reasoned approach 

for assessing the plant design to identify 

practicable design or other features that 

either minimize the effects of, or 

mitigate, a beyond-design-basis aircraft 

impact. 

B. Description of Beyond-Design-Basis 

Aircraft Impact 

Since September 11, 2001, the 

Commission has used state-of-the art 

technology to assess the effects of 

aircraft impacts on nuclear power 

plants. As part of a comprehensive 

review of security for NRC-licensed 

facilities, the NRC conducted detailed, 

site-specific engineering studies of a 

limited number of nuclear power plants 

to assess potential vulnerabilities of 

deliberate attacks involving large, 

commercial aircraft. In conducting these 

studies, the NRC consulted national 

experts from several Department of 

Energy laboratories using state-of-the-art 

structural and fire analyses. The agency 

also used realistic predictions of 

accident progression and radiological 

consequences. 

The proposed rule sets forth a general 

description of the aircraft characteristics 

that are required to be used to perform 

the beyond-design-basis aircraft impact 

assessment. The assessment must be 

based on the Commission’s specified 

aircraft characteristics used to define the 

beyond-design-basis impact of a large, 

commercial aircraft used for long 

distance flights in the United States, 

with aviation fuel loading typically used 

in such flights, and an impact speed and 

angle of impact considering the ability 

of both experienced and inexperienced 

pilots to control large, commercial 

aircraft at the low altitude 

representative of a nuclear power 

plant’s low profile. 

Beyond these general characteristics, 

the Commission will specify for plant 

designers in a Safeguards Information 

(SGI) guidance document more detailed 

characteristics of the large, commercial 

aircraft that should be used in the 

required assessment. Although the 

detailed aircraft characteristics will be 

described in an SGI guidance document 

and will not be publicly available 

because of their potential value to 

terrorists, the description of some of the 

factors used in selecting the parameters 

is offered to foster a better 

understanding of this rulemaking: 

1. The aircraft used by the terrorists 

on September 11, 2001. The staff has 

reviewed the results of the September 

11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade 

Center and the Pentagon. The NRC has 

used these reviews in previous studies 

for operating reactors. The NRC also 

used these reviews to make its decisions 

with respect to this rulemaking. 

2. Communications with other U.S. 

Government agencies. Since September 

11, 2001, the NRC has worked closely 

with the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Department of Defense, 

and other agencies both to understand 

their information on terrorist threats and 

to communicate the NRC’s study results. 

3. Communications with foreign 

governments. A number of foreign 

governments are considering the 

construction of new nuclear power 

plants. The NRC is communicating with 

the regulatory authorities in these 

countries to understand their 

requirements and to convey its own 

results and plans. 

4. Evaluations of commercial aircraft. 

The NRC has studied the types, 

numbers, and characteristics of 

commercial aircraft flown in U.S. 

airspace. 

Because this proposed rule is 

intended to provide added features to 

avoid or mitigate the effects of a beyonddesign-basis event, the choice of aircraft 

characteristics and the scenario used for 

this analysis will not be linked to threat 

assessments or to any evolution of 

aircraft design. The proposed rule 

would require that the design-specific 

impact assessment use the Commissionspecified aircraft characteristics as 

described in proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b). 

As stated previously, more specific 

details about the aircraft characteristics 

specified by the Commission will be 

contained in a separate guidance 

document under SGI controls. Because 

the guidance containing the more 

detailed aircraft characteristics will be 

SGI, the document will only be made 

available to those individuals with a 

need-to-know and who are otherwise 

qualified to have access to SGI. Plant 

designers (including their employees 

and agents) who meet the Commission’s 

requirements for access to SGI would 

have access to the guidance document 

containing these more detailed 

characteristics in order to perform the 

assessments required by the proposed 

rule. 

The Commission has carefully 

balanced the public interest in knowing 

the characteristics of the specific aircraft 

to be used in the aircraft impact 

assessment and the need for meaningful 

comment on specific details of the 

aircraft impact assessment. The result is 

an aircraft impact assessment proposed 

rule that describes the general aircraft 

characteristics which applicants are 

required to use in their aircraft impact 

assessments. The text of this proposed 

rule and the associated supplementary 

information, provide ample information 

to enable meaningful comment on what 

the aircraft impact assessment should 

entail. No additional information is 

necessary to understand or to comment 

on the proposed aircraft impact 

assessment rule. Members of the public 

can provide the Commission their views 

on this rulemaking regarding the design 

areas to be addressed in the assessment, 

functions to be evaluated for possible 

enhancement, and criteria for assessing 

practicability without having access to 

the more detailed SGI aircraft 

characteristics. Therefore, access to the 

proposed SGI aircraft characteristics 

contained in the regulatory guidance is 

not necessary to enable meaningful 

public comment on the proposed 

aircraft impact assessment rule. 


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This regulatory approach is similar to 

that used by the NRC in describing the 

DBT against which security programs 

under 10 CFR part 73 must defend. The 

general characteristics of the DBT 

appear in 10 CFR 73.1. More detailed 

information of a sensitive nature is 

contained in adversary characteristics 

documents. As is the case with the 

Commission’s aircraft characteristics, 

the technical bases for these documents 

derive largely from intelligence 

information and contain SGI that must 

be withheld from public disclosure. 

They are available only on a need-toknow basis to those who are approved 

for access. In the final DBT rule, the 

NRC was careful to set forth rule text 

that does not compromise licensee 

security, but it also acknowledges the 

need to keep the public informed of the 

types of attacks against which nuclear 

power plants and Category I fuel cycle 

facilities are required to defend. The 

NRC is taking a similar approach in this 

proposed aircraft impact rule. This 

approach strikes the appropriate balance 

between public disclosure of the 

regulatory requirements governing 

nuclear power plants, and protection of 

public health and safety and common 

defense and security. 

C. Aircraft Impact Assessment 

Technical Issues 

Because the aircraft impact is a 

beyond-design-basis event, the methods 

and acceptance criteria used should be 

based on realistic assumptions. The 

aircraft impact assessment would 

include the items detailed in the 

following paragraphs: 

1. Consideration of aircraft 

characteristics. The assessment must 

consider a large, commercial aircraft of 

the type currently in use for long 

distance flights in the United States as 

described previously in this document 

and in 10 CFR 52.500(b). More detailed 

characteristics of the large, commercial 

aircraft to be used in this assessment 

will be contained in a separate guidance 

document under SGI controls. 

2. Plant functions, structures, systems, 

components, and locations to be 

assessed. The critical functions required 

to be evaluated in the aircraft impact 

assessment include core cooling, 

containment integrity, and spent fuel 

pool integrity. Evaluation of the 

survivability of these functions, should 

consider not only the key components, 

but also power supplies, cable runs, and 

other components that support these 

functions. The evaluation may take 

credit for the availability of both safety 

and non-safety equipment. The 

assessment should evaluate whether the 

structures containing equipment that 

provides needed functions are likely to 

be affected by the specified large, 

commercial aircraft impact. Factors to 

be considered in the evaluation include 

the size and location of the structures 

and the presence of external 

impediments to impact. 

3. Damage mechanisms. The 

assessment should model the structural 

response, shock and vibration effects, 

and fire effects of the postulated aircraft 

impact. 

a. Structural assessment. The 

structural assessment should be based 

on a detailed structural model of the 

plant taking into account the nonlinear 

materials and geometric behavior. The 

assessment should consider both local 

and global (plant-wide) behavior, as 

well as thermal effects resulting from 

fire. 

b. Shock assessment. The assessment 

should evaluate the local and global 

(plant-wide) shock and vibration effects 

resulting from the postulated impact. 

c. Fire assessment. The fire 

assessment should consider the extent 

of structural damage and aviation fuel 

deposition, if any, and spread within 

the impacted buildings. The assessment 

should consider both short- and longterm fire effects. 

Regulatory Treatment of the Assessment 

The impact assessment is subject to 

audit and review by the NRC and, 

therefore, must be maintained by the 

applicant along with the rest of the 

information that forms the basis for the 

relevant application, consistent with 

paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 52.0, ‘‘Scope; 

Applicability of 10 CFR Chapter I 

Provisions,’’ 10 CFR 50.70, 

‘‘Inspections,’’ and 10 CFR 50.71, 

‘‘Maintenance of Records, Making of 

Reports.’’ The applicant does not need 

to submit the impact assessment—as 

opposed to the ‘‘description and 

evaluation of the design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies’’

required by proposed 10 CFR 

52.500(c)—to the NRC in its application. 

Under the proposed rule, the NRC 

will confirm that the impact assessment 

was performed consistent with the 

regulatory requirements and related 

guidance documents. The NRC may take 

appropriate enforcement action for any 

violations of applicable NRC 

requirements, including, but not limited 

to, proposed 10 CFR 52.500, 10 CFR 

52.4, ‘‘Deliberate Misconduct,’’ and 10 

CFR 52.6, ‘‘Completeness and Accuracy 

of Information.’’ A failure to perform the 

assessment would be a violation of the 

rule. The NRC expects the assessment to 

be rigorous. Any assessment that is 

inadequate to reasonably assess the 

aircraft impact; to identify practicable 

design features, functional capabilities, 

or strategies; or to justify non-adoption 

of potentially advantageous design 

features, functional capabilities, or 

strategies, could be considered a 

violation of the rule. 

The NRC’s decision on an application 

subject to proposed 10 CFR 52.500 

would be separate from any NRC 

determination that may be made with 

respect to the adequacy of the impact 

assessment which the rule does not 

require be submitted to the NRC. 

Applicants would only be required to 

submit a description and evaluation of 

the design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies to avoid or 

mitigate the effects of the applicable, 

beyond-design-basis aircraft impact in 

their final safety analysis report (FSAR) 

with the understanding that the 

complete aircraft impact assessment 

would be available for NRC audit and 

review at the applicant’s offices, if 

needed. The NRC expects that, 

generally, the information that it needs 

to perform its review of the application 

to assess the applicant’s compliance 

with 10 CFR 52.500 would be that 

information contained in the applicant’s 

FSAR. Therefore, the adequacy of the 

impact assessment would not be a 

matter which may be the subject of a 

contention submitted as part of a 

petition to intervene under 10 CFR 

2.309, ‘‘Hearing Requests, Petitions to 

Intervene, Requirements for Standing, 

and Contentions.’’ A person who seeks 

NRC rulemaking action with respect to 

a proposed standard design certification 

on the basis that the impact assessment 

is inadequate could submit comments in 

the notice and comment phase of that 

rulemaking. A person who seeks 

rulemaking action after the NRC has 

adopted a final design certification rule 

on the basis that the impact assessment 

performed for that design certification is 

inadequate could submit a petition for 

rulemaking under 10 CFR 2.802, 

‘‘Petition for Rulemaking,’’ and 10 CFR 

2.803, ‘‘Determination of Petition,’’

seeking to amend the standard design 

certification. A person who seeks 

agency enforcement-related action on a 

combined license or manufacturing 

license on the basis of an inadequate 

impact assessment could file a petition 

under 10 CFR 2.206, ‘‘Requests for 

Action Under This Subpart.’’

Once the applicant completes the 

impact assessment, accomplishes the 

evaluation required by proposed 10 CFR 

52.500(c) based on insights gained from 

the proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b) 

assessment, and includes the 

description and evaluation required by 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) in the FSAR, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules 56293 

the purpose of the impact assessment 

would be achieved. Accordingly, the 

proposed rule would not require the 

impact assessment to be updated, by 

either: (1) The design certification 

applicant whose application references 

a design approval, (2) the design 

certification applicant following the 

NRC’s adoption of a final standard 

design certification rule, (3) a design 

approval holder, (4) a manufacturing 

license applicant or holder whose 

application references a design 

certification or design approval, (5) a 

combined license applicant or holder 

whose application references a design 

certification, design approval, or 

manufactured reactor, or (6) a combined 

license holder whose application does 

not reference a design certification, 

design approval, or manufactured 

reactor and is required to prepare its 

own assessment. 

The provisions of 10 CFR 50.71(c) 

require that records that are required by 

the regulations in 10 CFR part 50, 

‘‘Domestic Licensing of Production and 

Utilization Facilities,’’ or 10 CFR part 52 

must be retained for the period specified 

by the appropriate regulation. If a 

retention period is not otherwise 

specified, the licensee must retain these 

records until the Commission 

terminates the facility license. Because 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b) would 

require the performance of the aircraft 

impact assessment, it falls under the 

category of ‘‘records that are required by 

the regulations’’ and therefore, the 

licensee would be required to retain the 

assessment until the Commission 

terminates the facility license. The NRC 

also expects to add specific provisions 

to each standard design certification 

rule for a design covered by proposed 10 

CFR 52.500 governing retention of the 

aircraft impact assessment by both the 

applicant for the design certification 

(including an applicant after the 

Commission has adopted a final 

standard design certification rule) and a 

licensee who references that design 

certification. The NRC expects to 

require applicants and licensees to 

retain the assessment required by 10 

CFR 52.500(b) throughout the pendency 

of the application and for the term of the 

certification or license (including any 

period of renewal). An example of such 

requirements can be found in any of the 

current design certification rules, 

Section X, ‘‘Records and Reporting,’’ of 

Appendices A through D of 10 CFR part 

52. 

As discussed in Section VIII, 

‘‘Specific Request for Comments,’’ of 

this document, the NRC is requesting 

comments on whether, in lieu of the 

specific design certification rule 

provisions or reliance on 10 CFR 

50.71(c), it should adopt as part of the 

final 10 CFR 52.500 rulemaking a 

specific provision that would explicitly 

mandate the retention of the assessment. 

Such a provision, to be included in an 

additional paragraph of proposed 10 

CFR 52.500, would also set forth the 

proposed period of retention for the 

assessment as the term of the design 

certification, combined license, or 

manufacturing license. 

D. Evaluation of Design Features, 

Functional Capabilities, and Strategies 

Technical Issues 

The proposed rule would require 

designers of new facilities to describe 

how the design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies adopted 

based on the insights of the aircraft 

impact assessment avoid or mitigate the 

effects of the aircraft impact. Plant 

structures critical to maintaining facility 

safety functions should be designed, if 

practicable, such that an impact does 

not result in structural failure, and 

aircraft parts and jet fuel do not enter 

the structures. In circumstances in 

which an impact results in aircraft parts 

and jet fuel entering structures or 

affecting equipment, plant structures 

and layouts should be evaluated with 

respect to maintaining key safety 

functions by addressing equipment 

survivability following the entry of 

aircraft parts and jet fuel and key safety 

functions are accomplished 

notwithstanding the resulting internal 

damage resulting from structural loads, 

shock and vibration, and fire. 

As discussed previously, the 

Commission has issued orders to 

operating plants requiring mitigation of 

the effects of losing large areas of the 

plant from fires and explosions. These 

requirements include some reliance on 

operator actions, such as realigning 

systems to ensure continued core 

cooling following the loss of a large 

area. Because this proposed rule would 

apply to newly designed facilities before 

construction of the facility, the 

Commission expects that improvements 

can be made in the plant’s design that 

have the same result as operator actions 

credited in operating plants. Thus, these 

designs should have reduced reliance, 

relative to current operating plants, on 

operator actions. 

The proposed rule would require 

applicants to describe how the design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies avoid or mitigate, ‘‘to the 

extent practicable,’’ the effects of the 

applicable aircraft impact with reduced 

reliance on operator actions. The NRC 

intends this standard to include those 

design features, functional capabilities, 

and strategies that are realistically and 

reasonably feasible from a technical 

engineering perspective. For example, 

the NRC believes it may be practicable 

to employ new technologies currently in 

use in the commercial nuclear power 

industry or in another industry. 

Alternatively, it would not be 

practicable to introduce a design feature 

that could have adverse safety or 

security consequences under a different 

operational or accident scenario. This 

consideration of practicability allows 

the designers to evaluate potential 

competing technical factors, such as the 

response to earthquakes, while at the 

same time addressing aircraft impacts. 

Nuclear power plants are inherently 

very robust, secure structures designed 

to withstand tornadoes, hurricanes, 

earthquakes, floods, and other severe 

events. They have redundant and 

diverse safety equipment so that if an 

active component becomes unavailable, 

another component or system will 

satisfy its function. The results of the 

Commission’s evaluation of postulated 

aircraft impacts on operating reactors 

reinforced the value of design features 

such as the following: 

• Reinforced concrete walls 

• Redundancy and spatial separation 

of key systems, structures and 

components 

• Diversity of power supplies 

• Compartmentalization of interior 

structures with pressure resisting 

concrete walls and doors 

The NRC expects the required 

evaluation to consider the value of such 

design features and of possible 

improvements in these and other 

features. The applicant must base the 

evaluation on insights gained from the 

impact assessment performed under 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b). 

Regulatory Treatment of the Evaluation 

The NRC will confirm that the 

evaluation required by 10 CFR 52.500(c) 

was performed and that the FSAR 

includes the necessary description and 

evaluation of the design and other 

features adopted to avoid or mitigate, to 

the extent practicable, the potential 

effects of the applicable, beyond-designbasis aircraft impact. The NRC will 

review the evaluation contained in the 

application and reach a conclusion as to 

whether the applicant has conducted an 

evaluation reasonably formulated to 

identify practicable design and other 

features to avoid or mitigate the 

potential effects of the applicable, 

beyond-design-basis aircraft impact. 

However, NRC’s review of the adequacy 

of the evaluation, and the effectiveness 

and practicability of the applicantVerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM 03OCP1

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56294 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules 

selected features, capabilities, and 

strategies, are separate and distinct from 

the NRC’s determination whether to 

issue a final standard design 

certification rule, a final design 

approval, a combined license, or a 

manufacturing license. Therefore, as is 

the case with the impact assessment, the 

NRC will use its established audit and 

review process to ensure the evaluation 

and determination of practicability was 

performed consistent with the 

regulatory requirements and related 

guidance documents. The NRC may take 

appropriate enforcement action for any 

violation of applicable NRC 

requirements. Inasmuch as the adequacy 

of the evaluation and the practicability 

of the applicant-selected features, 

capabilities, and strategies, are separate 

and distinct from the approval of the 

final design in the design certification, 

design approval, combined license, or 

manufacturing license, there would be 

no issue resolution associated with the 

assessment regarding the lack of 

effectiveness or practicability of 

potential design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies not selected 

by the applicant for inclusion in the 

certified design. 

The NRC is proposing that the design 

features, functional capabilities, or 

strategies credited for avoiding or 

mitigating the effects of an aircraft 

impact be described in Chapter 19 of the 

FSAR, which addresses severe 

accidents. The design features may 

include structures or features 

unchanged from the plant design as it 

existed before the aircraft impact 

assessment (e.g., an existing wall is 

found to be effective), structures or 

features included in the plant design but 

enhanced to improve the response to an 

aircraft impact (e.g., an existing wall is 

made stronger), or new structures or 

features added solely to address aircraft 

impacts (e.g., a new wall). The 

regulatory treatment of the design 

features (e.g., how changes to the 

features are controlled) depends on 

which of the above categories apply. For 

example, a design feature added 

specifically to avoid or mitigate the 

effects of an aircraft impact would be 

controlled only by requirements 

specifically for control of those design 

features added in this proposed rule or 

requirements that the NRC expects to 

add to future design certifications that 

would be subject to proposed 10 CFR 

52.500. A safety-related structure 

credited in the aircraft impact 

assessment as a design feature would 

continue to be controlled by Appendix 

B to 10 CFR part 50, ‘‘Quality Assurance 

Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and 

Fuel Reprocessing Plants;’’ 10 CFR part 

21, ‘‘Reporting of Defects and 

Noncompliance;’’ and other regulations 

establishing technical and 

administrative requirements on the nonaircraft impact functions, in addition to 

the proposed requirements for control of 

features to address aircraft impacts. 

For combined licenses not referencing 

a certified design, the NRC is proposing 

to have change control governed by the 

requirements in a new 10 CFR 52.502, 

‘‘Control of Changes to FSAR 

Information,’’ to address changes to any 

design features, functional capabilities, 

or strategies credited for avoiding or 

mitigating the effects of an aircraft 

impact for a combined license that does 

not reference a certified design. 

Specifically, the proposed 10 CFR 

52.502(c) would require that, if the 

licensee changes the information 

required by 10 CFR 52.79(a)(47) to be 

included in the FSAR, the licensee reperform that portion of the evaluation 

required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) 

that addresses the changed feature, 

capability, or strategy. The licensee 

would also be required to describe, in 

the re-evaluation, how the modified 

design features, functional capabilities, 

and strategies avoid or mitigate, to the 

extent practicable, the effects of the 

applicable aircraft impact with reduced 

reliance on operator actions. Because 

this rule is being proposed to address a 

beyond-design-basis event, the NRC has 

determined that it is appropriate to 

apply the same standard to any licenseeproposed changes to features, 

capabilities, and strategies that would 

be applied during the original 

evaluation of those design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies. 

A combined license holder subject to 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500 (i.e., a licensee 

whose application does not reference a 

standard design certification, standard 

design approval, or manufactured 

reactor) may change the design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies 

incorporated into the design, in 

accordance with proposed 10 CFR 

52.502, without prior NRC review and 

approval, as long as the licensee reperforms that portion of the evaluation 

required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) 

addressing the changed feature, 

capability, or strategy. The licensee 

must also describe, in the re-evaluation 

documented in a change to the FSAR, 

how the modified design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies 

avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of the applicable 

aircraft impact with reduced reliance on 

operator actions. Licensees’ submittal of 

this updated information to the NRC 

will be governed by the existing FSAR 

update requirements in 10 CFR 50.71(e). 

A design feature, functional 

capability, or strategy described in a 

standard design certification may not be 

changed generically except by notice 

and comment rulemaking, see 10 CFR 

52.63, ‘‘Finality of Standard Design 

Certifications,’’ paragraphs (a)(1) and 

(2), and such a change must meet one 

of the criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). All 

referencing combined licenses must 

implement any generic change to a 

design certification rule, as required by 

10 CFR 52.63(a)(3). 

The NRC expects to add a new change 

control provision to future design 

certification rules subject to proposed 

10 CFR 52.500 to govern combined 

license holders referencing the design 

certification that request a departure 

from the design features, functional 

capabilities, or strategies in the 

referenced design certification. The new 

change control provision would require 

that, if the licensee changes the 

information required by 10 CFR 

52.47(a)(28) to be included in the FSAR 

for the standard design certification, 

then the licensee must re-perform that 

portion of the evaluation required by 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) addressing 

the changed feature, capability, or 

strategy. The licensee must also 

describe, in the re-evaluation 

documented in a change to the FSAR 

(i.e., a plant-specific departure from the 

generic design control document), how 

the modified design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies avoid or 

mitigate, to the extent practicable, the 

effects of the applicable aircraft impact 

with reduced reliance on operator 

actions. Licensees’ submittal of this 

updated information to the NRC will be 

governed by the reporting requirements 

in the applicable design certification 

rule. The NRC expects to continue, in 

future standard design certification 

rulemakings, its practice of adopting 

reporting requirements analogous to 

Section X.B of the four existing standard 

design certification rules. Licensees 

making changes to design features, 

capabilities, or strategies included in the 

certified design or in the plant-specific 

FSAR may also need to develop 

alternate means to cope with the loss of 

large areas of the plant from explosions 

or fires to comply with the requirements 

in the proposed 10 CFR 73.55 and 

Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73. 

A design feature, functional 

capability, or strategy described in a 

standard design approval may not be 

changed generically except under an 

application for a new design approval. 

There are no provisions in 10 CFR part 

52 for making generic changes to a 


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standard design approval. Paragraph (a) 

of Section 52.145, ‘‘Finality of Standard 

Design Approvals; Information 

Requests,’’ states that an approved 

design must be used by and relied upon 

by the NRC staff and the Advisory 

Committee on Reactor Safeguards in 

their review of any individual facility 

license application that incorporates by 

reference a standard design approval 

unless there exists significant new 

information that substantially affects the 

earlier determination or other good 

cause. Therefore, any changes to a 

design feature, functional capability, or 

strategy described in a standard design 

approval would be subject to review by 

the NRC in any application that 

references the design approval. Note 

that 10 CFR 52.131, ‘‘Scope of Subpart,’’

states that the an applicant may submit 

standard designs for a nuclear power 

reactor or major portions thereof. To the 

extent that a standard design approval is 

issued for only portion of a nuclear 

power reactor, any applicant referencing 

that design approval will have to 

separately comply with the 

requirements of 10 CFR 52.500 for any 

portion of the design not addressed in 

the design approval issued by the NRC. 

Under the provisions of 10 CFR 

52.171, ‘‘Finality of Manufacturing 

Licenses; Information Requests,’’ the 

holder of a manufacturing license may 

not make changes to the design features, 

functional capabilities, or strategies 

described in the FSAR without prior 

Commission approval. The request for a 

change to the design must be in the form 

of an application for a license 

amendment, and must meet the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.90, 

‘‘Application for Amendment of 

License, Construction Permit, or Early 

Site Permit,’’ and 10 CFR 50.92, 

‘‘Issuance of Amendment.’’

Under the provisions of 10 CFR 

52.171(b)(2), a combined license 

applicant or licensee who references or 

uses a nuclear power reactor 

manufactured under a manufacturing 

license under this subpart may request 

a departure from the design features, 

functional capabilities, or strategies 

described in the FSAR for the 

manufactured reactor. The Commission 

will grant such a request only if it 

determines that the departure will 

comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 

52.7, ‘‘Specific Exemptions,’’ and that 

the special circumstances outweigh any 

decrease in safety that may result from 

the reduction in standardization caused 

by the departure. 

Once the evaluation required by 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) is completed 

and the application includes 

descriptions of the design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies, 

the purpose of the evaluation would be 

largely achieved. Thus, as with the 

assessment required by proposed 10 

CFR 52.500(b), the applicant or licensee 

would not be required to update the 

paragraph (c) evaluation after the design 

certification, design approval, combined 

license, or manufacturing license is 

issued, or in an application for renewal 

under either 10 CFR 52.57, 10 CFR 

52.107 and 10 CFR part 54, or 52.177. 

However, licensees would be required 

to maintain the paragraph (c) 

evaluation, inasmuch as proposed 10 

CFR 52.79(a)(47) and 10 CFR 

52.157(f)(32) require the proposed 10 

CFR 52.500(c) evaluation and 

description to be included in the FSAR 

portion of the application. 

Following issuance of a final design 

certification rule, the design 

certification applicant would not be 

required to update the evaluation so 

long as it does not request a significant 

change to any of the design features, 

functional capabilities, or strategies in 

the design certification. Similarly, the 

holder of a combined license or 

manufacturing license would not be 

required to update the evaluation so 

long as the licensee makes no significant 

change to the design features, functional 

capabilities, or strategies described in 

the FSAR. 

As with the aircraft impact 

assessment required by proposed 10 

CFR 52.500(b), in accordance with 10 

CFR 50.71(c), each combined license 

holder and manufacturing license 

holder whose application was subject to 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500 would be 

required to retain the documentation 

supporting the proposed 10 CFR 

52.500(c) evaluation for NRC review. 

With respect to a standard design 

certification, proposed 10 CFR 

52.47(a)(28) would require the proposed 

10 CFR 52.500(c) evaluation to be 

included in the FSAR submitted as part 

of the design certification application. 

The NRC acknowledges that the 

applicant for a standard design 

certification is not, per se, responsible 

for maintaining the FSAR information 

once a final design certification rule is 

adopted by the NRC. Nonetheless, the 

NRC continues to believe, for the 

reasons set forth in the statement of 

considerations for the first design 

certification rulemaking, see 62 FR 

25800, May 19,1997, at 25813–25814, 

25826, that the original standard design 

certification applicant should be 

required to maintain the accuracy of the 

design certification information. 

Therefore, in future standard design 

certification rulemakings, the NRC 

expects to continue its practice of 

adopting a records management 

requirement analogous to Section X.A of 

the four existing standard design 

certification rules. In addition to the 

information included in the FSAR for 

the design certification or combined 

license, the supporting documentation 

retained onsite should describe the 

methodology used in identifying and 

evaluating the practicability of potential 

features, capabilities, and strategies for 

inclusion in the design; and list the 

features, capabilities, and strategies that 

were considered but rejected, along with 

the basis for their rejection. 

VI. Section-by-Section Analysis 

Section 52.11 Information Collection 

Requirements: OMB Approval 

Section 52.11 identifies the 

information collection requirements 

contained in 10 CFR part 52 approved 

by the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) as required by the 

Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 

3501 et seq.). The NRC is proposing to 

modify paragraph (b) to include 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500 in the list of 

requirements with approved 

information collections. 

Section 52.47 Contents of 

Applications; Technical Information 

Section 52.47 identifies the required 

technical information to be included in 

an application for a standard design 

certification. The proposed rule would 

revise this section by adding a new 

paragraph (a)(28) requiring that the 

FSAR contain the information required 

by proposed 10 CFR 52.500, ‘‘Aircraft 

Impact Assessment.’’ This information, 

as currently set forth in paragraph (c) of 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500, is limited to 

the following: 

1. A description of the design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies credited by the applicant to 

avoid or mitigate the effects of the 

applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft 

impact; and 

2. An evaluation of how such design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of the applicable 

aircraft impact with reduced reliance on 

operator actions. 

The 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) requirement 

applies only to those standard design 

certification applications which are 

subject to proposed 10 CFR 52.500, that 

is, those design certifications issued 

after the effective date of the final rule 

(see 10 CFR 52.500(a)) that do not 

reference a design approval. Thus, any 

standard design certification application 

not referencing a standard design 

approval that is docketed and under 


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review by the NRC but has not yet been 

issued in final form as of the effective 

date of the final 10 CFR 52.500 must 

amend its application to include the 

information required by final 10 CFR 

52.500. 

Section 52.79 Contents of 

Applications; Technical Information in 

Final Safety Analysis Report 

Section 52.79 identifies the required 

technical information to be included in 

an FSAR submitted in a combined 

license application under 10 CFR part 

52, subpart C, ‘‘Combined Licenses.’’

The proposed rule would revise this 

section by adding a new paragraph 

(a)(47) requiring that the FSAR contain 

the information required by proposed 10 

CFR 52.500. This is the same type of 

information that an applicant for a 

standard design certification would 

need to submit, namely, the following: 

1. A description of the design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies credited by the applicant to 

avoid or mitigate the effects of the 

applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft 

impact; and 

2. An evaluation of how such design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of the applicable 

aircraft impact with reduced reliance on 

operator actions. 

Only those combined licenses issued 

after the effective date of the final rule 

that do not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor would be 

subject to 10 CFR 52.79(a)(47). Thus, a 

combined license application filed after 

the effective date of the final 10 CFR 

52.500 and referencing a standard 

design certification, standard design 

approval, or manufactured reactor 

would not have to include the 

information required by 10 CFR 52.500. 

The NRC notes that this would be true 

even for a combined license application 

which references one of the four current 

standard design certifications (ABWR, 

10 CFR part 52, Appendix A; System 

80+, 10 CFR part 52, Appendix B; 

AP600, 10 CFR part 52, Appendix C; 

and AP1000, 10 CFR part 52, Appendix 

D). This is consistent with the 

requirements of 10 CFR 52.79(c), (d), 

and (e) which state that, if the combined 

license application references a 

standard design certification, standard 

design approval, or manufactured 

reactor, then the FSAR need not contain 

information or analyses submitted to the 

Commission in connection with the 

design certification, design approval, or 

manufacturing license, as applicable. By 

contrast, a combined license applicant 

not referencing a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor whose 

application is docketed and under 

review by the NRC but for which a 

license has not yet been issued as of the 

effective date of the final 10 CFR 52.500, 

must amend its application to include 

the information required by 10 CFR 

52.500. 

Section 52.137 Contents of 

Applications; Technical Information 

Section 52.137 identifies the required 

technical information to be included in 

an application for a standard design 

approval. The proposed rule would 

revise this section by adding a new 

paragraph (a)(26) requiring that the 

FSAR contain the information required 

by proposed 10 CFR 52.500. This 

information, as currently set forth in 

paragraph (c) of proposed 10 CFR 

52.500, is limited to the following: 

1. A description of the design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies credited by the applicant to 

avoid or mitigate the effects of the 

applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft 

impact; and 

2. An evaluation of how such design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of the applicable 

aircraft impact with reduced reliance on 

operator actions. 

The 10 CFR 52.137(a)(26) requirement 

applies only to those standard design 

approval applications which are subject 

to proposed 10 CFR 52.500, that is, 

those design approvals issued after the 

effective date of the final rule (see 10 

CFR 52.500(a)). Thus, any standard 

design approval application that is 

docketed and under review by the NRC 

but has not yet been issued in final form 

as of the effective date of the final 10 

CFR 52.500 must amend its application 

to include the information required by 

final 10 CFR 52.500. 

Section 52.157 Contents of 

Applications; Technical Information in 

Final Safety Analysis Report 

Section 52.157 identifies the required 

technical information to be included in 

an application for a manufacturing 

license. The proposed rule would revise 

this section by adding a new paragraph 

(f)(32) requiring that the FSAR contain 

the information required by proposed 10 

CFR 52.500. This information, as 

currently set forth in paragraph (c) of 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500, is limited to 

the following: 

1. A description of the design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies credited by the applicant to 

avoid or mitigate the effects of the 

applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft 

impact; and 

2. An evaluation of how such design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of the applicable 

aircraft impact with reduced reliance on 

operator actions. 

The 10 CFR 52.157(f)(32) requirement 

applies only to those manufacturing 

license applications which are subject to 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500, that is, those 

manufacturing licenses issued after the 

effective date of the final rule that do 

not reference a design certification or 

design approval (see 10 CFR 52.500(a)). 

Thus, any manufacturing license 

application that is docketed and under 

review by the NRC but has not yet been 

issued in final form as of the effective 

date of the final 10 CFR 52.500 must 

amend its application to include the 

information required by final 10 CFR 

52.500. 

Section 52.303 Criminal Penalties 

Section 52.303 identifies the 

regulations in 10 CFR part 52 that are 

not issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 

161o for the purposes of Section 223 of 

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, which provides for criminal 

sanctions for willful violation of, 

attempted violation of, or conspiracy to 

violate, any regulation issued under 

Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the Act. 

The NRC is proposing to modify 

paragraph (b) to include proposed 10 

CFR 52.500 and proposed 10 CFR 

52.502 in the list of regulations not 

issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 

161o for the purposes of Section 223 of 

the Act. 

Subpart K—Additional Requirements 

The NRC proposes to add a new 

subpart K, ‘‘Additional Requirements,’’

to 10 CFR part 52. This subpart would 

be reserved for requirements applicable 

only to the licenses, certifications, and 

approvals under 10 CFR part 52 that 

have unique characteristics which 

mitigate against placing them in other 

parts of 10 CFR Chapter I, ‘‘Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’’ of Title 10. 

Section 52.500 Aircraft Impact 

Assessment 

Proposed 10 CFR 52.500 would be a 

new requirement for assessing a large, 

commercial aircraft impact at nuclear 

power plants and incorporating design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies to avoid or mitigate, to the 

extent practicable, the effects of such 

aircraft impacts. 

Paragraph (a) would state that the 

requirements of this section would be 

applicable to all standard design 


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3See 10 CFR 50.69(b)(1)(I) through (xi) for a list 

of NRC’s ‘‘special treatment’’ requirements for light 

water power reactors, which would not be 

applicable to the design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies selected by the applicant 

in accordance with proposed 10 CFR 52.500. 

certifications issued after the effective 

date of the final rule that do not 

reference a standard design approval; 

standard design approvals issued after 

the effective date of the final rule; 

combined licenses issued after the 

effective date of the final rule that do 

not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor; and 

manufacturing licenses issued after the 

effective date of the final rule that do 

not reference a standard design 

certification or standard design 

approval. A design certification rule 

issued after the effective date of the final 

10 CFR 52.500 rule that does not 

reference a design approval is subject to 

the requirements of the rule even if its 

application was filed before the effective 

date of the final 10 CFR 52.500 rule. 

Similarly, a design approval issued after 

the effective date of the final rule is 

subject to the requirements of the rule 

even if its application was filed before 

the effective date of the final rule. A 

combined license issued after the 

effective date of the final 10 CFR 52.500 

rule that does not reference a design 

certification, design approval, or 

manufactured reactor would be subject 

to the requirements of the rule, even if 

its application was filed before the 

effective date of the final 10 CFR 52.500 

rule. As noted earlier in the section-bysection discussion of proposed 10 CFR 

52.79(a)(47) of this document, a 

combined license issued after the 

effective date of the final 10 CFR 52.500 

rule referencing one of the four current 

standard design certifications, would 

not be subject to the requirements of 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500. 

Paragraph (b) would require those 

applicants subject to proposed 10 CFR 

52.500 to perform a design-specific 

assessment of the effects on the 

designed facility of the impact of a large, 

commercial aircraft (impact 

assessment). By ‘‘design-specific,’’ the 

NRC means that the impact assessment 

must address the specific design which 

is either the subject of the standard 

design certification, standard design 

approval, combined license, or 

manufacturing license application. The 

proposed rule would require that the 

design-specific impact assessment be 

based on Commission-specified general 

aircraft characteristics used to define the 

beyond-design-basis impact of a large, 

commercial aircraft used for long 

distance flights in the United States, 

with aviation fuel loading typically used 

in such flights, and an impact speed and 

angle of impact considering the ability 

of both experienced and inexperienced 

pilots to control large, commercial 

aircraft at the low altitude 

representative of a nuclear power 

plant’s low profile. Beyond these 

general characteristics, the Commission 

will specify for plant designers in an 

SGI guidance document more detailed 

characteristics of the large, commercial 

aircraft to be used in the required 

assessment. This approach is discussed 

in more detail in Section V.B of the 

Supplementary Information of this 

document. Because the assessment of an 

aircraft impact is a beyond-design-basis 

event, the methods and acceptance 

criteria used in the assessment should 

be based on realistic assumptions. 

Paragraph (c) would require the 

relevant applications to include a 

description and evaluation of the design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies (features, capabilities, and 

strategies) to avoid or mitigate the 

effects of the aircraft impact that 

applicants must assess under paragraph 

(b). Design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies could 

include such things as reinforced 

concrete walls (in the original design, 

modified, or added); redundancy and 

spatial separation of key systems, 

structures and components; diversity of 

power supplies; and 

compartmentalization of interior 

structures. The NRC expects the 

required assessment to include an 

evaluation of such features, capabilities, 

and strategies and of possible 

improvements in them. The evaluation 

of such design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies must include 

core cooling capability, containment 

integrity, and spent fuel pool integrity. 

The description of the features, 

capabilities, and strategies should be 

equivalent in detail to descriptions of 

other design features and functional 

capabilities addressing beyond-designbasis events or severe accidents which 

are required to be described in the 

design certification, design approval, 

combined license, or manufacturing 

license FSAR. However, the NRC 

reiterates that the aircraft impact at 

which these features, capabilities, and 

strategies are directed is not a design 

basis event. Therefore, these features, 

capabilities, and strategies need not 

meet the ‘‘special treatment’’

requirements 3 applicable to safetyrelated or important to safety structures, 

systems, and components. 

The paragraph (c) evaluation should 

be a structured process which would 

require consideration of the insights 

gained by the impact assessment 

performed under proposed 10 CFR 

52.500(b) and identify features, 

capabilities, and strategies which are 

practicable to include in the facility 

design. The evaluation should 

summarize the bases for the applicant’s 

determination that the selected features, 

capabilities, and strategies incorporated 

into the facility design avoid or mitigate, 

to the extent practicable, the effects of 

the applicable, beyond-design-basis 

aircraft impact, with reduced reliance 

on operator actions. As with the impact 

assessment, the evaluation would 

address a beyond-design-basis event, 

and therefore, need not be performed in 

accordance with the NRC’s ‘‘special 

treatment’’ requirements, such as the 

quality assurance/quality control 

requirements in Appendix B of 10 CFR 

part 50. The proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) 

evaluation must be included in the 

FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 

52.47(a)(28), 10 CFR 52.79(a)(47), 10 

CFR 52.137(a)(26), or 10 CFR 

52.157(f)(32) and should address only 

those features, capabilities, and 

strategies selected by the applicant for 

inclusion in the plant design. In 

addition to describing and evaluating 

the incorporated design and other 

features, the application must describe 

how such design and other features, 

avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of the impact 

with reduced reliance on operator 

actions. The NRC intends this standard 

to include those design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies 

which are realistically and reasonably 

feasible from a technical engineering 

perspective. For example, the NRC 

believes that it may be practicable to 

employ existing technologies currently 

in use in the commercial nuclear power 

industry or in another industry. 

However, it would not be practicable to 

introduce a design feature that could 

have adverse safety or security 

consequences under a different 

operational or accident scenario. 

Inclusion of any SGI in the evaluation 

submitted in the FSAR as part of a 

relevant application must be in 

accordance with applicable 

requirements in 10 CFR part 73. The 

NRC will process and address requests 

for access to this information from the 

general public in accordance with the 

NRC’s existing procedures. 

Section 52.502 Control of Changes to 

FSAR Information 

Paragraph (a) would state that, for 

standard design certifications which are 

subject to proposed 10 CFR 52.500, 

generic changes to the information 


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required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be 

included in the FSAR are governed by 

the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 

52.63. A design feature, functional 

capability, or strategy described in a 

standard design certification may not be 

changed in the design certification 

except by notice and comment 

rulemaking, see 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1) and 

(2), and such a change must meet one 

of the criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). Any 

generic change to a design certification 

rule must be implemented by all 

referencing combined licenses, as 

required by 10 CFR 52.63(a)(3). 

Paragraph (b) would state that, for 

combined license applicants or holders 

which are not subject to proposed 10 

CFR 52.500 but reference a standard 

design certification which is subject to 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500, proposed 

departures from the information 

required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be 

included in the FSAR for the standard 

design certification are governed by the 

change control requirements in the 

applicable design certification rule. A 

combined license holder referencing a 

standard design certification subject to 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500 (i.e., a design 

certification issued after the effective 

date of the final 10 CFR 52.500), who 

seeks to depart from the design features, 

functional capabilities, or strategies in 

the referenced design certification, 

would be governed by a new change 

control provision that the NRC expects 

to add to future design certification 

rules to which proposed 10 CFR 52.500 

would apply. The new change control 

provision would require that, if the 

licensee changes the information 

required by proposed 10 CFR 

52.47(a)(28) to be included in the FSAR 

for the standard design certification, 

then the licensee shall re-perform that 

portion of the evaluation required by 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) addressing 

the changed feature, capability, or 

strategy, and describe, in the reevaluation, how the remaining design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of the applicable 

aircraft impact with reduced reliance on 

operator actions. 

Paragraph (c) would state that, for 

combined licenses which are subject to 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500, if the licensee 

changes the information required by 10 

CFR 52.79(a)(47) to be included in the 

FSAR, then the licensee shall re-perform 

that portion of the evaluation required 

by 10 CFR 52.500(c) addressing the 

changed feature, capability, or strategy, 

and describe, in the re-evaluation, how 

the modified design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies avoid or 

mitigate, to the extent practicable, the 

effects of the applicable aircraft impact 

with reduced reliance on operator 

actions. The NRC believes that, because 

this rule is being proposed to address a 

beyond-design-basis event, it is 

appropriate to apply the same standard 

that was applied during the original 

evaluation of design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies to any 

licensee-proposed changes to such 

features, capabilities, and strategies. 

Paragraph (d) would state that, for 

manufacturing licenses which are 

subject to 10 CFR 52.500, generic 

changes to the information required by 

10 CFR 52.157(f)(32) to be included in 

the final safety analysis report are 

governed by the applicable 

requirements of 10 CFR 52.171. 

Paragraph (b)(1) of 10 CFR 52.171 does 

not allow the holder of a manufacturing 

license to make changes to the design of 

the nuclear power reactor authorized to 

be manufactured without prior 

Commission approval. Any request for a 

change to the design must be in the form 

of an application for a license 

amendment, and must meet the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 

CFR 50.92. 

Paragraph (e) would state that, for 

combined license applicants or holders 

which are not subject to 10 CFR 52.500 

but reference a manufactured reactor 

which is subject to 10 CFR 52.500, 

proposed departures from the 

information required by 10 CFR 

52.157(f)(32) to be included in the FSAR 

for the manufacturing license are 

governed by the applicable 

requirements in 10 CFR 52.171(b)(2). 

Paragraph (b)(2) of 10 CFR 52.171 

allows an applicant or licensee who 

references or uses a nuclear power 

reactor manufactured under a 

manufacturing license under this 

subpart to request a departure from the 

design characteristics, site parameters, 

terms and conditions, or approved 

design of the manufactured reactor. The 

Commission may grant a request only if 

it determines that the departure will 

comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 

52.7, and that the special circumstances 

outweigh any decrease in safety that 

may result from the reduction in 

standardization caused by the 

departure. 

VII. Guidance 

The NRC staff is preparing new 

regulatory guidance on the requirements 

in proposed 10 CFR 52.500. This 

guidance is intended to provide an 

acceptable method by which relevant 

applicants can perform the assessment 

of aircraft impacts to meet the 

requirements of proposed 10 CFR 

52.500. The proposed rule would 

require that the design-specific impact 

assessment use the Commissionspecified general aircraft characteristics. 

A more detailed description of the 

aircraft characteristics that should be 

used in the assessment will be set forth 

in the regulatory guidance, which will 

be issued in draft form following 

publication of this proposed rule. 

Because the portion of this regulatory 

guidance describing the detailed aircraft 

characteristics is likely to contain SGI, 

that portion of the document will only 

be made available to those individuals 

with a need-to-know, and who are 

otherwise qualified to have access to 

SGI. A version of the document without 

the SGI would be made publicly 

available. Final publication of the 

regulatory guidance is planned to 

coincide with publication of the final 

rule. The Commission reiterates, 

however, that the commenters on this 

proposed rule need not await the 

publication of the draft guidance in 

order to be able to comment on the 

proposed rule, in as much as the rule 

and the supplementary information in 

this document are sufficient to comment 

on the substance of the proposed rule. 

VIII. Specific Request for Comments 

In addition to the general invitation to 

submit comments on the proposed rule, 

the NRC also requests comments on the 

following questions: 

1. Inclusion of impact assessment in 

application. The proposed rule does not 

require that the assessment of aircraft 

impacts that would be mandated by 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b) be included 

in the FSAR or otherwise submitted as 

part of the application for a standard 

design certification, standard design 

approval, combined license, or 

manufacturing license. However, the 

NRC is proposing that a description of 

the design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies credited by 

the applicant to avoid or mitigate the 

effects of the applicable, beyond-designbasis aircraft impact be included in the 

FSAR submitted with the relevant 

application. In addition, the FSAR must 

contain an evaluation of how such 

design features, functional capabilities, 

and strategies avoid or mitigate, to the 

extent practicable, the effects of the 

applicable aircraft impact with reduced 

reliance on operator actions. The NRC is 

seeking specific comments on the 

desirability, or lack thereof, of requiring, 

in the final rule, that applicants include 

the aircraft impact assessment required 

by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b) in the 

FSAR or another part of the application. 

2. Acceptance criteria. The 

acceptance criterion contained in 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500 by which the 


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NRC may judge the required assessment 

and evaluation is the practicability 

criterion addressed in paragraph (c), 

that is, that the applicant must describe 

how the ‘‘design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies avoid or 

mitigate, to the extent practicable, the 

effects of the applicable aircraft impact 

with reduced reliance on operator 

actions.’’ The NRC is considering 

adding an additional acceptance 

criterion to proposed 10 CFR 52.500 for 

judging the acceptability of the 

applicant’s aircraft impact assessment 

and evaluation. The NRC is seeking 

specific comments on the desirability, 

or lack thereof, of adding an additional 

acceptance criterion in the final rule 

beyond the proposed rule’s 

practicability criterion. Such an 

additional acceptance criterion could 

read, for example: 

The application must also describe how 

such design features, functional capabilities, 

and strategies will provide reasonable 

assurance that any release of radioactive 

materials to the environment will not 

produce public exposures exceeding 10 CFR 

part 100 guidelines. 

3. Records retention. The proposed 

rule relies on the general record 

retention requirements in 10 CFR 

50.71(c) for retention of the assessment 

required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500 for 

combined license and manufacturing 

license applicants subject to proposed 

10 CFR 52.500. The NRC intends to 

similarly rely on a general design 

certification rule provisions for 

retention of the assessment required by 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500 for design 

certification applicants and combined 

license and manufacturing license 

holders that reference a design 

certification. The NRC is requesting 

specific comments on whether, in lieu 

of the specific design certification rule 

provisions or reliance on 10 CFR 

50.71(c), the NRC should adopt as part 

of the final 10 CFR 52.500 rulemaking 

a specific provision that would 

explicitly mandate the retention of the 

assessment. Such a provision, would be 

included in an additional paragraph of 

final 10 CFR 52.500, and would set forth 

the proposed period of retention. 

Inclusion of a generic records retention 

requirement in final 10 CFR 52.500 

would preclude the need for the NRC to 

include a specific records retention 

provision in each standard design 

certification subject to final 10 CFR 

52.500. The NRC requests comments on 

whether such a provision should be 

included in final 10 CFR 52.500, 

together with specific reasons in 

support of the commenter’s position. 

The NRC also requests comments on 

the appropriate period for retention of 

the assessment, evaluation, and 

supporting documentation. The NRC is 

considering the following alternatives: 

• For a standard design certification, 

combined license, and manufacturing 

license the period of NRC review prior 

to NRC final action on the application. 

• For a standard design certification 

and manufacturing license, the duration 

of the design certification or 

manufacturing license (i.e., the period 

during which the design certification or 

manufactured reactor may be 

referenced, including any renewal). 

• For a standard design certification 

or manufacturing license, until the 

licensee of the final referencing license 

has submitted a certification under 10 

CFR 50.82(a), or the final referencing 

license has been terminated. 

• For a combined license, when the 

licensee has submitted a certification 

under 10 CFR 50.82(a), or the combined 

license has been terminated. 

4. Requests to amend existing 

standard design certifications to address 

aircraft impacts. The NRC has 

concluded that it does not need to apply 

the proposed rule to the four currently 

approved standard design certifications, 

as discussed in detail in Section III of 

the Supplementary Information of this 

document. Nonetheless, the original 

applicant (or successor in interest of any 

of the four current standard design 

certifications) may request an 

amendment to the standard design 

certification to add design features, 

functional capabilities, or strategies in 

accordance with the requirements of 10 

CFR 52.500. The NRC encourages such 

requests for amendment by the 

applicants for the four current standard 

design certifications because it will 

further enhance the already high levels 

of safety and security provided by these 

reactor designs. These design 

modifications may be implemented in 

different ways as described in Section 

III of the Supplementary Information of 

this document. However, under the 

proposed rule, there are no standards, 

other than those contained in 10 CFR 

52.63(a), for judging changes to the 

design to address the effects of an 

aircraft impact. The NRC requests 

specific comments on whether it should 

use the same criterion to judge 

amendments to an existing design 

certification as it would use on a new 

design certification applicant under the 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500. 

5. Applicability to future 10 CFR part 

50 license applicants. The NRC is 

proposing to apply the requirements in 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500 to 10 CFR part 

52 applicants only, specifically, to 

applicants for standard design 

certifications issued after the effective 

date of the final rule that do not 

reference a standard design approval; 

standard design approvals issued after 

the effective date of the final rule; 

combined licenses issued after the 

effective date of the final rule that do 

not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor; and 

manufacturing licenses issued after the 

effective date of the final rule that do 

not reference a standard design 

certification or standard design 

approval. However, the NRC is 

considering extending the applicability 

of the proposed 10 CFR 52.500 

requirements to future applicants for 

construction permits under 10 CFR part 

50. The NRC requests specific 

comments on the desirability, or lack 

thereof, of extending, to future 10 CFR 

part 50 construction permit applicants, 

the applicability of the proposed 

requirements to perform an aircraft 

impact assessment and to evaluate the 

design features, functional capabilities, 

and strategies to avoid or mitigate, to the 

extent practicable, the effects of the 

applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft 

impact. 

6. Addition of technical requirements 

to 10 CFR part 52. In the recent revision 

to 10 CFR part 52, the NRC took a 

comprehensive approach to 

reorganizing 10 CFR part 52 and making 

conforming changes throughout 10 CFR 

Chapter I, ‘‘Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission,’’ to reflect the licensing 

and approval processes in 10 CFR part 

52. In that rulemaking, the NRC 

reviewed the existing regulations in 10 

CFR Chapter I to determine if the 

existing regulations needed to be 

modified to reflect the licensing and 

approval processes in 10 CFR part 52. In 

making conforming changes involving 

10 CFR part 50 provisions, the NRC 

adopted the general principle of keeping 

the technical requirements in 10 CFR 

part 50 and maintaining all applicable 

procedural requirements in 10 CFR part 

52. This proposed aircraft impact rule 

represents a departure from that general 

principle in that it proposes to include 

specific technical requirements in 10 

CFR part 52 and would create a separate 

subpart for inclusion of future, similar, 

technical requirements. The NRC is 

considering relocating the proposed 

aircraft impact requirements from 10 

CFR 52.500 to a new section in 10 CFR 

part 50 in order to maintain the general 

principle it established in the 

comprehensive 10 CFR part 52 

rulemaking. The NRC requests specific 

comments on the desirability, or lack 


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thereof, of relocating the proposed 

aircraft impact requirements from 10 

CFR 52.500 to a new section in 10 CFR 

part 50. 

7. Applicability to design approvals 

and manufacturing licenses. The 

proposed rule would apply to future 

design approvals or manufacturing 

licenses. In the recent comprehensive 

rulemaking on 10 CFR part 52, the NRC 

strived for a high level of consistency in 

the requirements for design 

certifications, design approvals, and 

manufacturing licenses, given the 

similarity in the regulatory functions of 

these three processes. However, it is not 

clear that there will be future design 

approval applications, in light of the 

NRC’s recent determination to remove 

the design approval as a prerequisite for 

obtaining a design certification. 

Similarly, there does not appear to be 

any near-term interest in obtaining a 

manufacturing license for the 

manufacture of a nuclear power plant. 

Therefore, the NRC is considering 

eliminating the applicability of the 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500 requirements 

to future applicants for design approvals 

and manufacturing licenses. The NRC 

requests specific comments on the 

desirability, or lack thereof, of 

eliminating the applicability of the 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500 requirements 

to future applicants for design approvals 

and manufacturing licenses. 

8. Scope of design evaluated. The 

proposed 10 CFR 52.500 would be 

applicable to all standard design 

certifications, standard design 

approvals, and manufacturing licenses 

issued after the effective date of the final 

rule and to all combined licenses issued 

after the effective date of the final rule 

that do not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufacturing license. However, the 

proposed rule does not address the 

difference in the scope of the facility 

design that would be considered by an 

applicant for a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufacturing license and the scope 

of the design that would be considered 

by a combined license applicant. For a 

standard design certification, standard 

design approval, or manufacturing 

license, the applicant is required to 

address only a subset of the facility 

design that a combined license 

applicant is required to address. In 

general, a design certification, design 

approval, or manufacturing license 

applicant is required to address such 

items as the reactor core, reactor coolant 

system, instrumentation and control 

systems, electrical systems, containment 

system, other engineered safety features, 

auxiliary and emergency systems, power 

conversion systems, radioactive waste 

handling systems, and fuel handling 

systems. In contrast, a combined license 

applicant also must address site-specific 

design features, such as the ultimate 

heat sink. Combined license applicants 

that do not reference a design 

certification, design approval, or 

manufactured reactor could address 

such site-specific design features in 

their evaluation of design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies to 

avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of the applicable 

aircraft impact with reduced reliance on 

operator actions. However, the proposed 

rule does not impose any requirements 

on a combined license applicant that 

references a design certification, design 

approval, or manufactured reactor with 

regard to addressing the potential effects 

of an aircraft impact on such sitespecific portions of the design. The 

proposed rule could, therefore, 

introduce an inconsistency in the 

treatment of combined license 

applicants that reference a design 

certification, design approval, or 

manufactured reactor and combined 

license applicants that submit a custom 

design. Therefore, to ensure consistent 

treatment of all combined license 

applicants, the NRC is considering an 

alternative approach in the final rule. 

One approach that the NRC is 

considering is to adopt additional 

requirements for combined license 

applicants that reference a design 

certification, design approval, or 

manufactured reactor that would require 

such applicants to evaluate that portion 

of the design excluded from the design 

certification, design approval, or 

manufactured reactor for additional 

design features, functional capabilities, 

or strategies to avoid or mitigate, to the 

extent practicable, the effects of the 

applicable aircraft impact with reduced 

reliance on operator actions. 

Alternatively, the NRC is considering 

limiting the scope of the evaluation for 

combined license applicants not 

referencing a design certification, design 

approval, or manufactured reactor to 

that portion of the design that would 

otherwise be covered in a design 

certification, design approval, or 

manufacturing license application, 

which would include the majority of the 

facility considered most vulnerable to 

an aircraft impact. The NRC requests 

specific comments on the desirability, 

or lack thereof, of adopting one of these 

alternative approaches in the final rule. 

IX. Availability of Documents 

The NRC is making the documents 

identified below available to interested 

persons through one or more of the 

following methods as indicated. 

Public Document Room (PDR). The 

NRC Public Document Room is located 

at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland 20852. 

NRC’s Electronic Reading Room 

(ERR). The NRC’s public electronic 

reading room is located at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. 

Document PDR Web ERR (ADAMS) 

Environmental Assessment ...................................................................................................................... X X ML072200262 

SRM–SECY–06–0204 (April 24, 2007) .................................................................................................... X X ML071140119 

SECY–06–0204, ‘‘Proposed Rulemaking—Security Assessment Requirements for New Nuclear 

Power Reactor Designs’’ (September 26, 2006).

X X ML062300068 

NUREG/BR–0184, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook’’ (January 1997) .................. X ................ ML050190193 

NUREG/BR–0058, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,’’

Revision 4 (September 2004).

X X ML042820192 

X. Plain Language 

The Presidential memorandum ‘‘Plain 

Language in Government Writing’’

published June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883) 

directed that the Government’s 

documents be in clear and accessible 

language. The NRC requests comments 

on the proposed rule specifically with 

respect to the clarity and effectiveness 

of the language used. Comments should 

be sent to the NRC as explained in the 

ADDRESSES caption of this notice. 

XI. Agreement State Compatibility 

Under the ‘‘Policy Statement on 

Adequacy and Compatibility of 

Agreement States Programs,’’ approved 

by the Commission on June 20, 1997, 

and published in the Federal Register 

(62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997), this 


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rule is classified as compatibility 

‘‘NRC.’’ Compatibility is not required for 

Category ‘‘NRC’’ regulations. The NRC 

program elements in this category are 

those that relate directly to areas of 

regulation reserved to the NRC by the 

Atomic Energy Act or the provisions of 

10 CFR. Although an Agreement State 

may not adopt program elements 

reserved to the NRC, it may wish to 

inform its licensees of certain 

requirements via a mechanism that is 

consistent with the particular State’s 

administrative procedure laws. Category 

‘‘NRC’’ regulations do not confer 

regulatory authority on the State. 

XII. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

The National Technology Transfer 

and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. 

104–113, requires that Federal agencies 

use technical standards that are 

developed or adopted by voluntary 

consensus standards bodies unless 

using such a standard is inconsistent 

with applicable law or is otherwise 

impractical. The NRC is not aware of 

any voluntary consensus standard that 

could be used instead of the proposed 

Government-unique standards. The NRC 

will consider using a voluntary 

consensus standard if an appropriate 

standard is identified. 

XIII. Finding of No Significant 

Environmental Impact: Availability 

The NRC has determined under the 

National Environmental Policy Act of 

1969, as amended, and the 

Commission’s regulations in subpart A 

to 10 CFR part 51, that this rule, if 

adopted, would not be a major Federal 

action significantly affecting the quality 

of the human environment and, 

therefore, an environmental impact 

statement is not required. 

The determination of this 

environmental assessment is that there 

will be no significant offsite impact to 

the public from this action. However, 

the general public should note that the 

NRC is seeking public participation; 

availability of the environmental 

assessment is provided in Section IX of 

this document. Comments on any aspect 

of the environmental assessment may be 

submitted to the NRC as indicated 

under the ADDRESSES heading. 

The NRC has sent a copy of the 

environmental assessment and this 

proposed rule to every State Liaison 

Officer and requested their comments 

on the environmental assessment. 

XIV. Paperwork Reduction Act 

Statement 

This proposed rule contains new or 

amended information collection 

requirements that are subject to the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 

U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). This rule has been 

submitted to the Office of Management 

and Budget for review and approval of 

the information collection requirements. 

Type of submission, new or revision: 

Revision. 

The title of the information collection: 

10 CFR part 52; ‘‘Consideration of 

Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power 

Reactor Designs,’’ proposed rule. 

The form number if applicable: N/A. 

How often the collection is required: 

One time; to be submitted with each 

application for a design certification not 

referencing a design approval, a design 

approval, a combined license not 

referencing a design certification, design 

approval, or manufactured reactor; or a 

manufacturing license not referencing a 

design certification or design approval. 

Who will be required or asked to 

report: Designers and any person 

eligible under the Atomic Energy Act to 

apply for a design certification, design 

approval, combined license, or 

manufacturing license for a nuclear 

power plant. 

An estimate of the number of annual 

responses: 1. 

The estimated number of annual 

respondents: 1. 

An estimate of the total number of 

hours needed annually to complete the 

requirement or request: 3,960 hours. 

Abstract: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is proposing to 

amend its regulations to require 

applicants for new standard design 

certifications that do not reference a 

standard design approval; new standard 

design approvals; combined licenses 

that do not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor; and new 

manufacturing licenses that do not 

reference a standard design certification 

or standard design approval to assess 

the effects of the impact of a large, 

commercial aircraft on the nuclear 

power plant. Based on the insights 

gained from this assessment, the 

applicant shall include in its 

application a description and evaluation 

of design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies to avoid or 

mitigate the effects of the aircraft 

impact. The evaluation of such design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies must include core cooling 

capability, containment integrity, and 

spent fuel pool integrity. The impact of 

a large, commercial aircraft is a beyonddesign-basis event, and the NRC’s 

requirements applicable to the design, 

construction, testing, operation, and 

maintenance of design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies for 

design basis events would not be 

applicable to design features, functional 

capabilities, or strategies selected by the 

applicant solely to meet the 

requirements of this rule. The objective 

of this rule is to require nuclear power 

plant designers to perform a rigorous 

assessment of design features that could 

provide additional inherent protection 

to avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of an aircraft 

impact, with reduced reliance on 

operator actions. 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission is seeking public comment 

on the potential impact of the 

information collections contained in the 

proposed rule and on the following 

issues: 

1. Is the proposed information 

collection necessary for the proper 

performance of the functions of the 

NRC, including whether the information 

will have practical utility? 

2. Is the estimate of burden accurate? 

3. Is there a way to enhance the 

quality, utility, and clarity of the 

information to be collected? 

4. How can the burden of the 

information collection be minimized, 

including the use of automated 

collection techniques? 

A copy of the OMB clearance package 

may be viewed free of charge at the NRC 

Public Document Room, One White 

Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Room 

O–1 F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The 

OMB clearance package and rule are 

available at the NRC worldwide Web 

site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/ 

doc-comment/omb/index.html for 60 

days after the signature date of this 

document. 

Send comments on any aspect of 

these proposed information collections, 

including suggestions for reducing the 

burden and on the above issues, by 

November 2, 2007 to the Records and 

FOIA/Privacy Services Branch (T–5 

F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, or by Internet electronic mail to 

INFOCOLLECTS@NRC.GOV and to the 

Desk Officer, Nathan Frey, Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

NEOB–10202 (3150–0151), Office of 

Management and Budget, Washington, 

DC 20503. Comments received after this 

date will be considered if it is practical 

to do so, but assurance of consideration 

cannot be given to comments received 

after this date. You may also e-mail 

comments to 

Nathan_J._Frey@omb.eop.gov or 

comment by telephone at 202–395–

4650. 

Public Protection Notification 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 


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to, a request for information or an 

information collection requirement 

unless the requesting document 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number. 

XV. Regulatory Analysis 

The NRC has prepared a regulatory 

analysis on this proposed rule and has 

included it in this Federal Register 

document. The analysis examines the 

costs and benefits of the alternatives 

considered by the NRC. 

1. Statement of the Problem and 

Objective 

This proposed rule would amend 10 

CFR part 52 to require applicants for 

new standard design certifications that 

do not reference a standard design 

approval; new standard design 

approvals; combined licenses that do 

not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor; and new 

manufacturing licenses that do not 

reference a standard design certification 

or standard design approval to assess 

the effects of the impact of a large, 

commercial aircraft on the nuclear 

power plant. Based on the insights 

gained from this assessment, the 

applicant would need to include in its 

application a description and evaluation 

of design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies to avoid or 

mitigate the effects of the aircraft 

impact. The objective of this rule is to 

require nuclear power plant designers to 

perform a rigorous assessment of design 

features that could provide additional 

inherent protection to avoid or mitigate, 

to the extent practicable, the effects of 

an aircraft impact, with reduced 

reliance on operator actions. 

2. Identification of Regulatory 

Alternatives 

The only alternative considered was 

to conduct a rulemaking to require 

applicants to perform an aircraft impact 

assessment on newly designed facilities 

because the Commission directed the 

NRC staff in a staff requirements 

memorandum dated April 24, 2007, to 

so revise the regulations. However, the 

NRC staff considers the no-action 

alternative as the baseline from which to 

measure the costs and benefits of the 

proposed rule. 

The regulations in 10 CFR part 52 

would be amended to require applicants 

for new standard design certifications 

that do not reference a standard design 

approval; new standard design 

approvals; combined licenses that do 

not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor; and new 

manufacturing licenses that do not 

reference a standard design certification 

or standard design approval, and those 

applicants with applications pending on 

the effective date of this rule, (relevant 

applicants) to perform an aircraft impact 

assessment of the effects on the 

designed facility of the impact of a large, 

commercial aircraft. Based on the 

insights derived from this assessment, 

the application would need to include 

a description and evaluation of the 

design features, functional capabilities, 

and strategies to avoid or mitigate the 

effects of an aircraft impact, addressing 

core cooling capability, containment 

integrity, and spent fuel pool integrity. 

The applicant would need to describe 

how such design and other features 

avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the aircraft impact effects 

with reduced reliance on operator 

actions. The proposed rule would result 

in newly designed power reactor 

facilities being more inherently robust 

with regard to a potential aircraft impact 

than if they were designed in the 

absence of this rule. 

3. Analysis of Values and Impacts of 

Proposed Rulemaking 

3.1 Identification of Affected 

Attributes 

The NRC identified the attributes that 

the proposed regulatory action could 

affect by using the list of potential 

attributes provided in Chapter 5 of 

NUREG/BR–0184, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis 

Technical Evaluation Handbook,’’

issued January 1997. Affected attributes 

include the following: 

Public Health (Accident). The 

proposed regulatory action would 

reduce the risk that public health will 

be affected by the release of radioactive 

materials to the environment from the 

impact of a large, commercial aircraft on 

a nuclear power plant. 

Occupational Health (Accident). The 

proposed regulatory action would 

reduce the risk that occupational health 

will be affected by the release of 

radioactive materials to the environment 

from the impact of a large, commercial 

aircraft on a nuclear power plant. 

Offsite Property. The proposed 

regulatory action would reduce the risk 

that offsite property will be affected by 

the release of radioactive materials to 

the environment from the impact of a 

large, commercial aircraft on a nuclear 

power plant. 

Onsite Property. The proposed 

regulatory action would reduce the risk 

that onsite property will be affected by 

the release of radioactive materials to 

the environment from the impact of a 

large, commercial aircraft on a nuclear 

power plant. 

Industry Implementation. The 

proposed regulatory action would 

require applicants for new standard 

design certifications that do not 

reference a standard design approval; 

new standard design approvals; 

combined licenses that do not reference 

a standard design certification, standard 

design approval, or manufactured 

reactor; and new manufacturing licenses 

that do not reference a standard design 

certification or standard design approval 

to assess the effects of the impact of a 

large, commercial aircraft on the nuclear 

power plant. Based on the insights 

gained from this assessment, the 

applicant would need to include in its 

application a description and evaluation 

of design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies to avoid or 

mitigate, to the extent practicable, the 

effects of an aircraft impact, with 

reduced reliance on operator actions. 

NRC Implementation. Under the 

proposed regulatory action, the NRC 

would incur costs to develop guidance 

on performing an aircraft impact 

assessment, to review the actions taken 

by the applicant based on the insights 

gained from the assessment, and to 

review the assessment if the NRC needs 

additional information to verify 

compliance with this rule. The NRC 

would also incur the costs of completing 

this rulemaking. 

Improvements in Knowledge. The 

proposed regulatory action would 

improve knowledge by ensuring that 

applicants for newly designed nuclear 

power facilities perform a rigorous 

assessment of the effects of the impact 

of a large, commercial aircraft on the 

designed facility. Based on the insights 

gained from this assessment, the 

applicant would need to include in its 

application a description and evaluation 

of the design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies to avoid or 

mitigate the effects of the aircraft 

impact, addressing core cooling 

capability, containment integrity, and 

spent fuel pool integrity. The applicant 

would need to describe how such 

design and other features avoid or 

mitigate, to the extent practicable, the 

aircraft impact effects with reduced 

reliance on operator actions. 

Safeguards and Security 

Considerations. The proposed 

regulatory action to address the 

capability of newly designed power 

reactors relative to a potential aircraft 

impact is based both on enhanced 

public health and enhanced safety and 

common defense and security but is not 

necessary for adequate protection. 


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Rather, it would be to enhance the 

facility’s inherent robustness. 

3.2 Methodology 

This section describes the process 

used to evaluate benefits and costs 

associated with the proposed regulatory 

action. The benefits (values) come from 

any desirable changes in the affected 

attributes which are solely qualitative 

for the proposed regulatory action; the 

costs (impacts or burdens) come from 

any undesirable changes in the affected 

attributes (e.g., monetary costs, 

increased exposures). As described in 

Section 3.1 of this regulatory analysis, 

the attributes expected to be affected 

include public health (accident), 

occupational health (accident), offsite 

property, onsite property, industry 

implementation, NRC implementation, 

improvements in knowledge, and 

safeguards and security considerations. 

Ideally, a cost-benefit analysis 

quantifies the overall costs and benefits 

of the regulatory options relative to each 

of these attributes. This analysis relies 

on a qualitative evaluation of several of 

the affected attributes (public health, 

occupational health, offsite property, 

onsite property, improvements in 

knowledge, and safeguards and security 

considerations) because of the difficulty 

in quantifying the impact of the current 

rulemaking. The proposed regulatory 

action would affect these attributes 

through the associated reduction in the 

risks of aircraft impact damage to core 

cooling, containment integrity, spent 

fuel pool integrity, and other structures, 

systems, and components. 

The remaining attributes (industry 

implementation and NRC 

implementation) are evaluated 

quantitatively. Quantitative analysis 

requires a characterization of the 

universe, including factors such as the 

number of applicants and the scope of 

the aircraft impact assessment being 

performed. The NRC analyzed 

incremental costs and benefits of the 

proposed regulatory action relative to 

the baseline (i.e., the no-action 

alternative described in Section 2 of this 

regulatory analysis). 

Under OMB guidance and NUREG/ 

BR–0058, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis 

Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission,’’ Revision 4, 

issued September 2004, the results of 

the cost analysis are presented as 

discounted flows of funds using 3- and 

7-percent real discount rates. 

3.3 Data 

The NRC derived information on the 

estimated number of applications 

submitted for a new standard design 

certification that does not reference a 

standard design approval from industry 

announcements. Given the uncertainty 

in the number of (1) new standard 

design approvals; (2) combined licenses 

that do not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor; and (3) new 

manufacturing licenses that do not 

reference a standard design certification 

or standard design approval, the NRC 

staff applied its professional judgment 

in this analysis. 

3.4 Assumptions 

The proposed regulatory action would 

apply only to applications for new 

standard design certifications that do 

not reference a standard design 

approval; new standard design 

approvals; combined licenses that do 

not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor; and new 

manufacturing licenses that do not 

reference a standard design certification 

or standard design approval, and those 

applicants with applications pending on 

the effective date of this rule. It would 

not apply to (1) a standard design 

certification or combined license issued 

before the effective date of the final rule, 

(2) the design certification rule, (3) 

Appendices A through D to 10 CFR part 

52, or (4) a nuclear power reactor with 

a current operating license. 

3.5 Analysis 

For Sections 3.5.1 through 3.5.4, the 

cost-benefit analysis of the proposed 

regulatory action is based on the 

assumed number of applicants in each 

category. In each case, industry would 

incur both implementation and 

operation costs. Furthermore, because 

all of the benefits are measured 

qualitatively in this analysis, only costs 

are included in these subsections. 

This analysis uses $105 per hour for 

both NRC and industry staff rates. The 

annual results are derived as present 

values using the 3- and 7-percent 

discount rates as described in Appendix 

B to NUREG/BR–0184. 

3.5.1 Standard Design Certification 

Applications Not Referencing a 

Standard Design Approval 

In implementing the proposed 

regulatory action, standard design 

certification applicants would incur 

one-time costs to develop an SGI 

program, purchase an appropriate SGI 

storage container, perform the aircraft 

impact assessment, and incorporate the 

design features, functional capabilities, 

or strategies into the design based on the 

insights gained from the assessment. 

The NRC estimates that each applicant 

would spend 120 hours to develop the 

SGI program. Using the assumed staff 

rate of $105 per hour, the one-time cost 

of developing the SGI program would be 

$13,000 per applicant (120 hours × 

$105/hour). The NRC also estimates it 

would cost $2,500 to purchase an 

appropriate SGI storage container. 

Finally, the NRC estimates it would take 

an applicant 24 staff-months for a onetime cost of $400,000 (24 staff-months × 

4 weeks/month × 40 hours × $105/hour) 

per application to complete the 

assessment and incorporate the results 

into the design. Thus, the one-time cost 

for an applicant to implement the 

proposed regulatory action is estimated 

to be $420,000. 

For the standard design certification 

process, this analysis assumes that three 

applications would be affected by the 

proposed rule in the first year following 

promulgation of this rule, and 

thereafter, one application would be 

submitted every 4 years at years 4, 8, 12, 

16, and 20. Table 1 shows the 

discounted flow of funds (using 3- and 

7-percent discount rates) of the total 

industry implementation costs for 

standard design certification 

applications over a 20-year period. 

With respect to industry operational 

costs, there would be recordkeeping 

costs for retention of the assessment, 

evaluation, and supporting 

documentation. In addition, it is 

assumed that an applicant spends 3 

hours per year to maintain the records. 

The estimated annual cost for 

recordkeeping is $315 per applicant (3 

hours × $105/hour). However, for this 

analysis, it is assumed that it takes 4 

years for the Commission to adopt the 

application as a final standard design 

certification rule, after which the 

records are retained by the applicant for 

15 years as required by the standard 

design certification rule. Table 2 shows 

the discounted flow of funds of the 

recordkeeping costs (using 3- and 7- 

percent discount rates) for applications 

submitted over a 20-year period, using 

the schedule discussed previously. 


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TABLE 1.—SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY IMPLEMENTATION COSTS FOR STANDARD DESIGN CERTIFICATION APPLICANTS

Year 

Number of standard design certification 

applications 

Operating costs 

Using 7-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

Using 3-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

1 ................................................................................................................................. 3 1,200 1,200 

4 ................................................................................................................................. 1 320 370 

8 ................................................................................................................................. 1 240 330 

12 ............................................................................................................................... 1 190 290 

16 ............................................................................................................................... 1 140 260 

20 ............................................................................................................................... 1 110 230 

Total .................................................................................................................... 8 2,200 2,680 

TABLE 2.—SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY OPERATING COSTS FOR STANDARD DESIGN

Year*

Number of standard design certification 

applications 

Implementation costs 

Using 7-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

Using 3-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

1 ............................................................................................................................. 3 6 .6 10 

4 ............................................................................................................................. 1 1 .7 3 

8 ............................................................................................................................. 1 1 .3 2 .6 

12 ........................................................................................................................... 1 1 .0 2 .3 

16 ........................................................................................................................... 1 0 .74 2 .1 

20 ........................................................................................................................... 1 0 .53 1 .8 

Total ................................................................................................................ 8 11 .87 21 .8 

* Analysis assumes that it takes 4 years for the Commission to adopt the application as a final standard design certification rule, after which 

the records are retained by the applicant for 15 years. 

3.5.2 Standard Design Approval 

Applications 

Under the proposed regulatory action, 

an applicant for a standard design 

approval would need to comply with 

the requirements for an aircraft impact 

assessment in 10 CFR 52.500. However, 

the NRC staff concludes that it is 

unlikely that a request for a standard 

design would be submitted to the NRC 

for approval during the next 20 years. 

Therefore, no cost-benefit analysis was 

done for a standard design approval. 

3.5.3 Combined License Applications 

Not Referencing a Standard Design 

Certification, Standard Design 

Approval, or Manufactured Reactor 

Although the NRC concludes that 

there is a low probability of a combined 

license applicant not referencing a 

standard design certification, standard 

design approval, or manufactured 

reactor, this analysis assumes that one 

application would be submitted to the 

NRC in year 10 following promulgation 

of the rule. 

In implementing the proposed 

regulatory action, combined license 

applicants would incur one-time costs 

to develop an SGI program, purchase an 

appropriate SGI storage container, 

perform the aircraft impact assessment, 

and incorporate the design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies 

into the design based on the insights 

gained from the assessment. The NRC 

estimates that each applicant would 

spend 120 hours to develop the SGI 

program. Assuming a staff rate of $105 

per hour, the one-time cost of 

developing the SGI program would be 

$13,000 per applicant (120 hours × 

$105/hour). The NRC also estimates it 

would cost $2,500 to purchase an 

appropriate SGI storage container. 

Finally, the NRC estimates it would take 

an applicant 24 staff-months for a onetime cost of $400,000 (24 staff-months × 

4 weeks/month × 40 hours × $105/hour) 

per application to complete the 

assessment and incorporate the results 

into the design. Thus, the one-time cost 

for an applicant to implement the 

proposed regulatory action is estimated 

to be $420,000. For one application 

submitted in year 10, following 

promulgation of the rule, the discounted 

flow of funds of the implementation 

costs are $310,000 and $210,000 using 

3- and 7-percent discount rates, 

respectively. 

With respect to industry operational 

costs, there would be recordkeeping 

costs for retention of the assessment, 

evaluation, and supporting 

documentation. In addition, it is 

assumed that an applicant spends 3 

hours per year to maintain the records. 

The estimated annual cost for 

recordkeeping is $315 per applicant (3 

hours × $105/hour). For this analysis, it 

is assumed that it takes 4 years for the 

Commission to approve the application, 

after which the records are retained by 

the licensee for 60 years, at which time 

the Commission terminates the facility 

license. The discounted flow of funds of 

the recordkeeping costs for one 

application are $5,400 and $1,700 using 

3- and 7-percent discount rates, 

respectively. 

The total industry cost is the sum of 

the implementation and operation costs. 

The implementation cost is the present 

value of the assumed one application 

($420,000) which when discounted is 

$310,000 (using a 3-percent discount 

rate) and $210,000 (using a 7-percent 

discount rate). The operating costs are 

$5,400 and $1,700 using the 3- and 7- 

percent discount rates as shown above. 

Therefore, the total discounted industry 

costs are $315,400 and $211,700 using 

3- and 7-percent discount rates, 

respectively. 


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3.5.4 Manufacturing License 

Applications Not Referencing a 

Standard Design Certification or 

Standard Design Approval 

Although the NRC concludes that 

there is a low probability of a 

manufacturing license application not 

referencing a standard design 

certification or standard design 

approval, this analysis assumes that one 

application would be submitted to the 

NRC in year 10 following promulgation 

of the rule. 

In implementing the proposed 

regulatory action, manufacturing license 

applicants would incur one-time costs 

to develop an SGI program, purchase an 

appropriate SGI storage container, 

perform the aircraft impact assessment, 

and incorporate the design features, 

functional capabilities, and strategies 

into the design based on the insights 

gained from the assessment. The NRC 

estimates that each applicant would 

spend 120 hours to develop the SGI 

program. Assuming a staff rate of $105 

per hour, the one-time cost of 

developing the SGI program would be 

$13,000 per applicant (120 hours × 

$105/hour). The NRC also estimates it 

would cost $2,500 to purchase an 

appropriate SGI storage container. 

Finally, the NRC estimates it would take 

an applicant 24 staff-months for a onetime cost of $400,000 (24 staff-months × 

4 weeks/month × 40 hours × $105/hour) 

per application to complete the 

assessment and incorporate the results 

into the design. Thus, the one-time cost 

for an applicant to implement the 

proposed regulatory action is estimated 

to be $420,000. For one application 

submitted in year 10, following 

promulgation of the rule, the discounted 

flow of funds of the implementation 

costs are $310,000 and $210,000 using 

3- and 7-percent discount rates, 

respectively. 

With respect to industry operational 

costs, there would be recordkeeping 

costs for retention of the assessment, 

evaluation, and supporting 

documentation. In addition, it is 

assumed that an applicant spends 3 

hours per year to maintain the records. 

The estimated annual cost for 

recordkeeping is $315 per applicant (3 

hours × $105/hour). For this analysis, it 

is assumed that it takes 4 years for the 

Commission to approve the application, 

after which the records are retained by 

the licensee for 15 years, at which time 

the Commission terminates the license. 

The discounted flow of funds of the 

recordkeeping costs for one application 

are $3,300 and $2,200 using 3- and 7- 

percent discount rates, respectively. 

The total industry cost is the sum of 

the implementation and operation costs. 

The implementation cost is the present 

value of the assumed one application 

($420,000) which when discounted is 

$310,000 (using a 3-percent discount 

rate) and $210,000 (using a 7-percent 

discount rate). The operating costs are 

$3,300 and $2,200 using the 3- and 7- 

percent discount rates as shown above. 

Therefore, the total discounted industry 

costs are $313,300 and $212,200 using 

3- and 7-percent discount rates, 

respectively. 

3.5.5 NRC Implementation 

Cost to Review the Applicant’s 

Results. The NRC would incur costs to 

review the applicant’s actions in 

response to the requirements of the 

proposed rule. The one-time cost to (1) 

review the actions taken by each 

applicant for a new standard design 

certification that does not reference a 

standard design approval; a combined 

license that does not reference a 

standard design certification, standard 

design approval, or manufactured 

reactor; and a new manufacturing 

license that does not reference a 

standard design certification or standard 

design approval, and (2) review the 

assessment if the NRC requires 

additional information to verify 

compliance with this rule is estimated 

to be $17,000 (1 staff-month × 4 weeks/ 

month × 40 hours × $105/hour). 

As an example, the total NRC cost for 

the first year of implementing the 

proposed rule is the present value of the 

costs of reviewing three applications for 

standard design certifications and 

reviewing the assessments at $51,000 for 

all three applications. This corresponds 

to a net present value of $50,000 (using 

a 3-percent discount rate) and $48,000 

(using a 7-percent discount rate). 

Cost to Develop Guidance. The NRC 

would incur 0.5 full-time equivalent 

(FTE) of staff time to develop guidance 

to support implementation of the 

proposed regulatory action. The cost for 

this action is estimated to be $76,000 

(0.5 FTE at $152,000/FTE). 

Cost to Provide Training. The NRC 

would incur costs to develop a training 

course to instruct NRC staff on the 

proposed changes to 10 CFR part 52. 

Assuming that it would take 20 staffhours to develop the training course, the 

cost is estimated to be $2,100 (20 staffhours x $105/hour). The cost to train 20 

people for 2 hours, plus the instructor’s 

time of 2 hours is estimated to be $4,400 

(21 people × 2 hours × $105/hour). The 

total cost to the NRC to provide training 

for the proposed regulatory action is 

estimated to be $7,000. 

Cost of the Regulatory Action. The 

NRC would incur 2.2 FTE of staff time 

and $150,000 in contractor support to 

complete this rulemaking after 

publishing the proposed rule. The cost 

of this action is estimated to be 

$484,000 (2.2 FTE at $152,000/FTE + 

$150,000). 

Table 3 shows the discounted flow of 

funds of the total NRC implementation 

costs for the proposed regulatory action 

over 20 years. 

TABLE 3.—SUMMARY OF NRC IMPLEMENTATION COSTS

Year 

Application Implementation costs 

Number reviewed Category* 

Using 7-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

Using 3-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

1 ............................................................................................................. 3 DC .......... 48 50 

4 ............................................................................................................. 1 DC .......... 13 15 

8 ............................................................................................................. 1 DC .......... 10 13 

10 ........................................................................................................... 1 COL ....... 9 13 

10 ........................................................................................................... 1 ML .......... 9 13

12 ........................................................................................................... 1 DC .......... 8 12

16 ........................................................................................................... 1 DC .......... 6 11

20 ........................................................................................................... 1 DC .......... 4 9 

Cost to Review All Applications ................................................................................................................... 107 136 

Cost to Develop Guidance .......................................................................................................................... 76 76 

Cost to Provide Training .............................................................................................................................. 7 7 


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TABLE 3.—SUMMARY OF NRC IMPLEMENTATION COSTS—Continued 

Year 

Application Implementation costs 

Number reviewed Category* 

Using 7-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

Using 3-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

Cost of the Regulatory ................................................................................................................................. 484 484 

Total (rounded) ..................................................................................................................................... 670 700 

* DC = design certification. COL = combined license application. ML = manufacturing license application. 

3.5.6 Impacts to Other Stakeholders 

The NRC staff has not identified any 

impacts to other stakeholders or the 

Agreement States. However, the 

proposed action would lead to an 

increase in public confidence because 

nuclear power plant designers would 

perform a rigorous assessment of design 

and other features that could provide 

additional inherent protection to avoid 

or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the 

effects of an aircraft impact, with 

reduced reliance on operator actions. 

3.5.7 Qualitative Benefits of the 

Proposed Action 

The benefits of the proposed rule can 

be evaluated only on a qualitative basis. 

The analysis estimates that the proposed 

action would result in qualitative 

benefits in public health (accidental), 

occupational health (accidental), offsite 

property, onsite property, improvements 

in knowledge, and safeguards and 

security considerations. 

Specifically, the benefits would 

include improvements in knowledge 

because applicants for new power 

reactor designs would need to evaluate 

the design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies to avoid or 

mitigate the effects of the aircraft 

impact, addressing core cooling 

capability, containment integrity, and 

spent fuel pool integrity. If the effects 

are not assessed by facility designers, it 

would be more difficult to enhance the 

inherent robustness of the facility to 

avoid or mitigate the effects of the 

aircraft impact. Furthermore, designers 

of new facilities would need to describe 

how the design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies adopted 

based on the insights of the assessment 

avoid or mitigate, to the extent 

practicable, the effects of an aircraft 

impact, with reduced reliance on 

operator actions. In this manner, this 

proposed rule would result in newly 

designed nuclear power reactor facilities 

being more inherently robust with 

regard to a potential aircraft impact than 

if they were designed in the absence of 

this rule. 

In addition, because the impact of a 

large, commercial aircraft is a beyonddesign-basis event, this rule would 

provide an enhanced level of protection 

beyond that which is provided by the 

existing adequate protection 

requirements, which all operating 

facilities are required to meet, and the 

proposed adequate protection 

requirements that facilities will be 

required to meet if they are made final 

(see Section I of this document). 

4. Presentation of Results 

Table 4 summarizes the results of the 

NRC’s cost-benefit analysis for industry. 

TABLE 4.—SUMMARY OF TOTAL INDUSTRY COSTS FOR PROPOSED ACTION

Category of application* 

Using 7-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

Using 3-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

Implementation Costs 

DC ............................................................................................................................................................ 2,200 2,680 

COL .......................................................................................................................................................... 210 310 

ML ............................................................................................................................................................ 210 310 

Operating Costs 

DC ............................................................................................................................................................ 11 .87 21 .8 

COL .......................................................................................................................................................... 1 .7 5 .4 

ML ............................................................................................................................................................ 2 .2 3 .3 

Total (rounded) ................................................................................................................................. 2,600 3,300 

* DC = design certification. COL = combined license application. ML = manufacturing license application. 

Table 5 shows the total costs of the 

proposed regulatory action. 

TABLE 5.—SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY AND NRC COSTS

Using 7-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

Using 3-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

Industry ........................................................................................................................................................ 2,600 3,300 

NRC ............................................................................................................................................................. 670 700 


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TABLE 5.—SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY AND NRC COSTS—Continued 

Using 7-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

Using 3-percent 

discount rate 

($1,000) 

Total (rounded) ..................................................................................................................................... 3,300 4,000 

5. Decision Rationale 

The total present-valued costs of this 

proposed action are $4.0 million and 

$3.3 million for 3- and 7-percent 

discount rates, respectively. The 

benefits are expressed only qualitatively 

and are discussed in Section 3.5.7 of 

this regulatory analysis. As noted 

previously, the key benefit is 

improvements in knowledge because 

applicants for new standard design 

certifications that do not reference a 

standard design approval; new standard 

design approvals; combined licenses 

that do not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor; and new 

manufacturing licenses that do not 

reference a standard design certification 

or standard design approval would need 

to assess the effects of the impact of a 

large, commercial aircraft on the nuclear 

power plant. Based on the insights 

gained from this assessment, nuclear 

power plant designers could provide 

additional inherent protection to avoid 

or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the 

effects of an aircraft impact, with 

reduced reliance on operator actions. 

6. Implementation Schedule 

After publication of the proposed rule 

in the Federal Register and 

consideration and resolution of the 

public comments, the NRC would 

publish a final rule which would 

become effective 30 days after 

publication. 

The Commission requests public 

comments on the draft regulatory 

analysis. Interested persons may submit 

comments on the draft analysis to the 

NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES

heading. 

XVI. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

Certification 

In accordance with the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the 

Commission certifies that this rule will 

not, if promulgated, have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. This proposed 

rule affects only the licensing and 

operation of nuclear power plants. The 

companies that own these plants do not 

fall within the scope of the definition of 

‘‘small entities’’ set forth in the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size 

standards established by the NRC (10 

CFR 2.810). 

XVII. Backfit Analysis 

The NRC has determined that neither 

the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, nor any 

of the finality provisions in 10 CFR part 

52, apply to this proposed rule and, 

therefore, a backfit analysis is not 

required, because the proposed rule 

does not contain any provisions that 

would impose backfitting as defined in 

the backfit rule, nor does it contain 

provisions that would require a finding 

of compliance or adequate protection 

under the finality provisions in 10 CFR 

part 52. 

The proposed rule applies only to 

applicants for a standard design 

certification not referencing a standard 

design approval; a standard design 

approval; a combined license not 

referencing a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

manufacture reactor; or a manufacturing 

license not referencing a standard 

design certification or standard design 

approval that are pending at the time of 

or submitted after the effective date of 

the final rule. There are no existing 

combined licenses or manufacturing 

licenses protected by the backfitting 

restrictions in 10 CFR 50.109 or the 

finality provisions in 10 CFR part 52. To 

the extent that the proposed rule would 

revise the requirements for future design 

certifications, combined licenses, or 

manufacturing licenses the 

requirements would not constitute 

backfitting or otherwise be inconsistent 

with the finality provisions in 10 CFR 

part 52, because the requirements are 

prospective in nature and effect. Neither 

the backfit rule nor the finality 

provisions in 10 CFR part 52 were 

intended to apply to every NRC action 

which substantially changes the 

expectations of future applicants under 

10 CFR part 52. 

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 52 

Administrative practice and 

procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting, 

Combined license, Early site permit, 

Emergency planning, Fees, Inspection, 

Limited work authorization, Nuclear 

power plants and reactors, Probabilistic 

risk assessment, Prototype, Reactor 

siting criteria, Redress of site, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements, 

Standard design, Standard design 

certification. 

For the reasons set out in the 

preamble and under the authority of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; 

the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 

as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC 

is proposing to adopt the following 

amendments to 10 CFR part 52. 

PART 52—LICENSES, 

CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS 

FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 

1. The authority citation for part 52 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 

185, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 948, 953, 954, 

955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, 

as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2201, 2232, 

2233, 2235, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 

206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended 

(42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112 

Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note). 

2. In § 52.11, paragraph (b) is revised 

to read as follows: 

§ 52.11 Information collection 

requirements: OMB approval. 

* * * * * 

(b) The approved information 

collection requirements contained in 

this part appear in §§ 52.7, 52.15, 52.16, 

52.17, 52.29, 52.35, 52.39, 52.45, 52.46, 

52.47, 52.57, 52.63, 52.75, 52.77, 52.79, 

52.80, 52.93, 52.99, 52.110, 52.135, 

52.136, 52.137, 52.155, 52.156, 52.157, 

52.158, 52.171, 52.177, 52.500, and 

appendices A, B, C, D, and N of part 52. 

3. In § 52.47, paragraph (a)(28) is 

added to read as follows: 

§ 52.47 Contents of applications; technical 

information. 

* * * * * 

(a) * * * 

(28) For applications for standard 

design certifications which are subject 

to 10 CFR 52.500, the information 

required by 10 CFR 52.500. 

* * * * * 

4. In § 52.79, paragraph (a)(47) is 

added to read as follows: 

§ 52.79 Contents of applications; technical 

information in final safety analysis report. 

(a) * * * 

(47) For applications for combined 

licenses which are subject to 10 CFR 

52.500, the information required by 10 

CFR 52.500. 

* * * * * 


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5. In § 52.137, paragraph (a)(26) is 

added to read as follows: 

§ 52.137 Contents of applications; 

technical information. 

* * * * * 

(a) * * * 

(26) For applications for standard 

design approvals which are subject to 10 

CFR 52.500, the information required by 

10 CFR 52.500. 

* * * * * 

6. In § 52.157, paragraph (f)(32) is 

added to read as follows: 

§ 52.157 Contents of applications; 

technical information in final safety analysis 

report. 

* * * * * 

(f) * * * 

(32) For applications for 

manufacturing licenses which are 

subject to 10 CFR 52.500, the 

information required by 10 CFR 52.500. 

7. In § 52.303, paragraph (b) is revised 

to read as follows: 

§ 52.303 Criminal penalties. 

* * * * * 

(b) The regulations in part 52 that are 

not issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 

161o for the purposes of Section 223 are 

as follows: §§ 52.0, 52.1, 52.2, 52.3, 52.7, 

52.8, 52.9, 52.10, 52.11, 52.12, 52.13, 

52.15, 52.16, 52.17, 52.18, 52.21, 52.23, 

52.24, 52.27, 52.28, 52.29, 52.31, 52.33, 

52.39, 52.41, 52.43, 52.45, 52.46, 52.47, 

52.48, 52.51, 52.53, 52.54, 52.55, 52.57, 

52.59, 52.61, 52.63, 52.71, 52.73, 52.75, 

52.77, 52.79, 52.80, 52.81, 52.83, 52.85, 

52.87, 52.93, 52.97, 52.98, 52.103, 

52.104, 52.105, 52.107, 52.109, 52.131, 

52.133, 52.135, 52.136, 52.137, 52.139, 

52.141, 52.143, 52.145, 52.147, 52.151, 

52.153, 52.155, 52.156, 52.157, 52.158, 

52.159, 52.161, 52.163, 52.165, 52.167, 

52.171, 52.173, 52.175, 52.177, 52.179, 

52.181, 52.301, 52.303, 52.500, and 

52.502. 

8. A new subpart K—Additional 

Requirements and § 52.500 are added to 

read as follows: 

Subpart K—Additional Requirements 

Sec. 

52.500 Aircraft impact assessment. 

52.502 Control of changes to FSAR 

information. 

Subpart K—Additional Requirements 

§ 52.500 Aircraft impact assessment. 

(a) The requirements of this section 

apply to all standard design 

certifications issued after [EFFECTIVE 

DATE OF FINAL RULE] that do not 

reference a standard design approval; 

standard design approvals issued after 

[EFFECTIVE DATE OF FINAL RULE]; 

combined licenses issued after 

[EFFECTIVE DATE OF FINAL RULE] 

that do not reference a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

or manufactured reactor; and 

manufacturing licenses issued after 

[EFFECTIVE DATE OF FINAL RULE] 

that do not reference a standard design 

certification or standard design 

approval. 

(b) Each applicant for a standard 

design certification not referencing a 

standard design approval; a standard 

design approval; a combined license not 

referencing a standard design 

certification, standard design approval, 

manufacture reactor; or a manufacturing 

license not referencing a standard 

design certification or standard design 

approval shall perform a design-specific 

assessment of the effects on the 

designed facility of the impact of a large, 

commercial aircraft. Such assessment 

must be based on the Commission’s 

specified aircraft characteristics used to 

define the beyond-design-basis impact 

of a large, commercial aircraft used for 

long distance flights in the United 

States, with aviation fuel loading 

typically used in such flights, and an 

impact speed and angle of impact 

considering the ability of both 

experienced and inexperienced pilots to 

control large, commercial aircraft at the 

low altitude representative of a nuclear 

power plant’s low profile. 

(c) Based upon the insights gained 

from the aircraft impact assessment as 

stated in paragraph (b) of this section, 

the application must include a 

description and evaluation of the design 

features, functional capabilities, and 

strategies to avoid or mitigate the effects 

of the applicable, beyond-design-basis 

aircraft impact. The evaluation of such 

design features, functional capabilities, 

and strategies must include core cooling 

capability, containment integrity, and 

spent fuel pool integrity. The 

application must describe how such 

design features, functional capabilities, 

and strategies avoid or mitigate, to the 

extent practicable, the effects of the 

applicable aircraft impact with reduced 

reliance on operator actions. 

§ 52.502 Control of changes to FSAR 

information. 

(a) For standard design certifications 

which are subject to 10 CFR 52.500, 

generic changes to the information 

required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be 

included in the final safety analysis 

report are governed by the applicable 

requirements of 10 CFR 52.63. 

(b) For combined license applicants or 

holders which are not subject to 10 CFR 

52.500 but reference a standard design 

certification which is subject to 10 CFR 

52.500, proposed departures from the 

information required by 10 CFR 

52.47(a)(28) to be included in the final 

safety analysis report for the standard 

design certification are governed by the 

change control requirements in the 

applicable design certification rule. 

(c) For combined licenses which are 

subject to 10 CFR 52.500, if the licensee 

changes the information required by 10 

CFR 52.79(a)(47) to be included in the 

final safety analysis report, then the 

licensee shall re-perform that portion of 

the evaluation required by 10 CFR 

52.500(c) addressing the changed 

feature, capability, or strategy, and 

describe, in the re-evaluation, how the 

modified design features, functional 

capabilities, and strategies avoid or 

mitigate, to the extent practicable, the 

effects of the applicable aircraft impact 

with reduced reliance on operator 

actions. 

(d) For manufacturing licenses which 

are subject to 10 CFR 52.500, generic 

changes to the information required by 

10 CFR 52.157(f)(32) to be included in 

the final safety analysis report are 

governed by the applicable 

requirements of 10 CFR 52.171. 

(e) For combined license applicants or 

holders which are not subject to 10 CFR 

52.500 but reference a manufactured 

reactor which is subject to 10 CFR 

52.500, proposed departures from the 

information required by 10 CFR 

52.157(f)(32) to be included in the final 

safety analysis report for the 

manufacturing license are governed by 

the applicable requirements in 10 CFR 

52.171(b)(2). 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day 

of September 2007. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 07–4886 Filed 10–2–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Coast Guard 

33 CFR Part 165 

[Docket No. USCG–2007–29354] 

RIN 1625–AA87 

Security Zone; Nawiliwili Harbor, 

Kauai, HI 

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes to 

create a security zone in the waters of 

Nawiliwili Harbor, Kaui, and on the 

land of the jetty south of Nawiliwili 


ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS