[Cite as In re Z.C. , 2021-Ohio-763.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HURON COUNTY

In re Z.C., L.C. Court of Appeals Nos. H-20-020 H-20-021

Trial Court Nos. DNA 2018 00156 DNA 2018 00157

DECISION AND JUDGMENT Decided: March 12, 2021

* * * * * Christopher S. Clark, for appellant. James Joel Sitterly, Huron County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard H. Palau, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee

. * * * * * OSOWIK, J. {¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which terminated the parental rights of appellant-mother, R.N., to the subject minor children, Z.C. and L.C., and granted perma nent custody to appellee,2. Huron County Department of Job & Family Services. The father o f the minor children, E.C., Jr., whose parental rights were also terminated, did not appeal the judgment, and we will focus the facts relevant to appellant-mother. For the rea sons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the juvenile court. I. Background {¶ 2} On November 5, 2018, appellee filed two complaints in abuse and dependency regarding Z.C., who was then five years old, and L.C ., who was then seven years old, respectively. Appellee alleged the father contacted local police “due to mother * * * appearing to be under the influence of methamphetamines a nd demonstrating out of control behavior.” When the police arrived at the home father shared with appellantmother and the minor children, the police observed drug paraphe rnalia accessible to the minor children and the home was “very unkempt” and “no food loc ated in the home.” The police arrested father and appellant-mother for child endan gering. {¶ 3} Due to the parents’ incarcerations, the juvenile court immediat ely held an emergency shelter care hearing and granted appellee temporary c ustody of the minor children, who were placed with an approved foster family relate d to the father. {¶ 4} On January 15, 2019, the juvenile court dismissed the dependenc y claims regarding the minor children and, following appellant-mother’s admission to the remaining abuse claim, adjudicated both Z.C. and L.C. abused ch ildren by clear and convincing evidence and continued temporary custody with appell ee. The juvenile court ordered appellant-mother to submit to substance abuse and menta l health assessments and3. to successfully complete the recommended treatment plans. The juvenile court further ordered appellant-mother to submit to random substance abuse sc reens, obtain and maintain adequate housing, and obtain and maintain employment s ufficient for her needs

and the needs of the minor children. {¶ 5} After a series of pretrial hearings continuing the juvenile cou rt’s temporary custody order with appellee and adding a couples counseling req uirement, on February 5, 2020, appellee filed a motion for permanent custody of the mino r children pursuant to R.C. 2151.413(A) and 2151.414(B)(1)(2), (D) and (E). Appellee argued that terminating the parental rights and awarding permanent custody with appelle e was in the best interests of the children because the parents made little progr ess with their case plan services, which were developed “so reunification could occur.” Appellant-mother’s case plan included services for a history of domestic violence on ap pellant-mother and the children by the father, substance abuse with fentanyl and metha mphetamines, mental health, lack of safe and stable housing and food access, and pa renting decisions placing the children at risk of harm. Appellee alleged that the minor children could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. {¶ 6} Then on March 13, 2020, appellee filed an amended motion for pe rmanent custody of the minor children pursuant to R.C. 2151.413(A) and (D)(1) and 2151.414. Appellee alleged it had temporary custody of the minor children for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. Appellee argued that termina ting the parental rights and awarding permanent custody with appellee is in the best int erests of the children4. because the parents “made little progress on their case plan go als meaning reunification is no longer [an] option * * *.” The goal is for permanent placem ent with an adoptive family, and the current foster family is interested in adopting the children. {¶ 7} The dispositional hearing on permanent custody was held on Sept ember 8, 2020. The transcript of the hearing is in the record. {¶ 8} The juvenile court heard extensive testimony from witnesses and admitted evidence in the record, including Abby Keefer, the Intensive Su pervision Probation Officer for Norwalk Municipal Court, who supervised both parent s since the minor children were removed from the home in November 2018; Jessica P riest, the foster mother for the past 13 months; Carrie Kimmet, the court-appoint ed guardian ad litem for the children since November 2018; and Chelsea Fuller, appellee’ s case worker assigned to this family since September 2019. Appellant-mother declined to testify, present any evidence, or to request an in-camera interview. {¶ 9} By judgment entries journalized on September 15, 2020, the juve nile court granted permanent custody of Z.C. to appellee and of L.C. to ap pellee for adoptive placement and made a number of findings relevant to this appeal

. {¶ 10} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and (D), the juvenile court fou nd by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody with appellee is in the best interest of

Z.C. and L.C.5. {¶ 11} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (E)(1), the juvenile cou rt found by clear and convincing evidence that “the children cannot be plac ed with either of their parents within a reasonable period of time and should not be pl aced with them.” {¶ 12} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) and (D)(1)(c), the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that “the children have been p laced in the temporary custody of [appellee] since 5 November 2018, or 22 months of a consecutive 22 month period.” {¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) and (e), the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that: Although the case began with a focus on parents’ substance abus e and unhealthy conditions of the home, [appellee] soon became aw are of the

extensive emotional trauma that the children have had to endure during their lives. For example, [L.C.] was forced by her father to w atch her parents having sexual intercourse. She has described times whe n her family was on the run from “men from Mississippi.” The childre n witnessed domestic violence in their home between their parents . These experienced have led to aggressive behavior and emotional outbu rsts from [L.C.], and, to a lesser degree, [Z.C.]. Both children regular ly attend mental health counseling, and [L.C.] has been prescribed medica tion.

* * *6. [Father] and appellant-mother have unfortunately not exercised all of the parenting time to which they were entitled, largely due to their periods of incarceration and then conflicting work schedules. {¶ 14} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that: The children’s guardian ad litem acknowledges that [Z.C.] and [L.C.] appear to “genuinely enjoy” visits with the parents, but would never wish to live with them again. The guardian ad litem does not “ believe that

reunification is in the best interest of the children or that i t could ever safely occur,” and recommends that the permanent custody motions be gr anted. {¶ 15} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d), the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that: [Z.C. and L.C.] have bonded with their foster parents, the Prie sts, and are very bonded with each other. They appear to be beginni ng to realize they are safe in the home and will not be put in trauma tic situations such as those they experienced in their parents’ home. The str ucture and routine of the Priest foster home is beginning to lead to impro ved behavior and emotional stability for the children. The Priests have ind icated they would be willing to adopt the children of the agency’s Motions are granted. {¶ 16} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (9) and (14), the juvenile cou rt found by clear and convincing evidence that both appellant-mother and fa ther have “failed7. repeatedly and continuously to remedy the issues that led to th e removal of their children 22 months ago.” The juvenile court further found: The children were removed from their parents’ home after [fathe r] called the Willard Police Department because [appellant-mother] was under the influence of methamphetamines and acting out of control. T he officers who responded discovered fail and drug paraphernalia accessible to the children in a homes that was unkempt and without food. Both pa rents were arrested for child endangering. [Appellee] exercised reasonabl e efforts to assist both [father] and [appellant-mother] to remedy their sub stance abuse and their lack of appropriate housing. Referrals were made for substance abuse counseling, and the agency provided both parents with job listings, housing listings and applications for government subsidized ren t assistance. The agency even provide parents with bicycles to assist in tran sportation and looked into eligibility for an amnesty program that would l ift sanctions for failing to pay child support. Despite these efforts, [fath er] and [appellant-mother] have still not located suitable housing and have not successfully completed substance abuse counseling. Both have b een incarcerated during the course of these cases for violations of probation due to their use of illegal substances and failure to comply with t reatment recommendations. Neither has successfully participated in or c ompleted8. the couples counseling that was required by this Court as a fur ther dispositional order on 25 April 2019.

* * * [The children] have suffered profound emotional trauma as a dir ect result of the environment in which they lived and the experienc es they were forced to endure. [Father] and [appellant-mother] have demonst rated an inability to protect the children from this trauma, and, in fac t, contributed to it. It has taken the structure, routine and devotion of the cu rrent foster parents to begin [to] turn the tide for the children. While [f ather] and [appellant mother] have participated in some substance abuse co unseling, they have not completed a program. [Appellant-mother] was term inated unsuccessfully from counseling as recently as August 2020. The children’s parents have been incarcerated for violations of probation and have suffered from relapses. They are currently residing with another indivi dual who is on probation for a drug offense and has submitted positive drug screens for his probation officer. A person recently suffered from a drug overdose in the parents’ home. [Father] acknowledged to the assigned socia l worker that their present home was not appropriate. After 22 months o f [appellee] exercising reasonable efforts to reunify the family, the childr en now have a need for a legally secure placement so that the progress they h ave made in

the Priest home will continue.9. {¶ 17} Appellant-mother timely appealed the juvenile court’s decisions , which were assigned case nos. H-20-020 (for Z.C.) and H-20-021 (for L .C.). On November 24, 2020, this court consolidated case No. H-20-021 under case No. H-20-020. {¶ 18} Appellant-mother set forth one assignment of error in her appea l: The trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing eviden ce that it is in the best interest of the children to terminate appella nt-mother’s parental rights and to award permanent custody of the children to Huron County Department of Job & Family Services. II. Permanent Custody Determination {¶ 19} In support of her assignment of error, appellant-mother argues the juvenile court did not support the decision by clear and convincing evid ence to terminate appellant-mother’s parental rights as being in the best interes ts of Z.C. and L.C. Appellant-mother argues all relevant evidence should have been considered by the trial court, including her compliance “with both drug abuse and menta l health counseling until May 2020,” regularly attending visitations with the children fr om August 2019 to February 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic; her return to work in September 2020, the children’s aggressive outbursts “appeared to stem from the lack of contact between the children and the natural parents”; and the children’s excit ement to re-establish inperson visits with the parents and the strong emotional bond be tween the children and their parents. Appellant-mother argues “she should have furthe r opportunity to comply10. with the trial court’s orders to continue to participate in the necessary personal counseling and that (sic) in to continuing efforts to provide a safe envir onment for her children.” {¶ 20} In response, appellee argues the trial court did not err as the re was clear and convincing evidence in the record to support a finding that it is in the best interests of Z.C. and L.C. to terminate parental rights and award permanent custody to appellee. Appellee argued the evidence showed appellant-mother struggled to maintain drug sobriety and mental health counseling. The evidence further sh owed appellant-mother did not use the skills learned from her decision making and pee r association seminar because she continued to use drugs and to associate with others who use drugs and alcohol. The evidence showed appellant-mother and father did n ot start, let alone complete, couple’s counseling. {¶ 21} We review the juvenile court’s determination of permanent custo dy under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. In re D.R. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1240, 2018-Ohio-522, ¶ 37. We “must weigh the evidence and all reaso nable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whethe r the trier of fact clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the decision must be reversed.” Id . We are mindful the juvenile court was the trier of fact and was “in the best position to weigh eviden ce and evaluate testimony.”

Id. {¶ 22} Prior to terminating appellant-mother’s parental rights and gra nting permanent custody of Z.C. and L.C. to appellee pursuant to R.C. 2151.413(A) and11. 2151.353(A)(4), the juvenile court must find clear and convinci ng evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child * * * cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with ei ther parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of perm anent custody to appellee is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis unde r R.C. 2151.414(D). In re

B.K. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1082, 2017-Ohio-7773, ¶ 16; R.C. 215 1.414(B)(2). {¶ 23} “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of pro of which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to th e extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, a nd which will produce in

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as t o the facts sought to be

established”. Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469, 471, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. A judgment on permanent custody support ed in the record by some competent, credible evidence by which the court could have form ed a firm belief as to all the essential elements will not be reversed on appeal as being against the manifest weight

of the evidence. In re Denzel M. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1337, 2004-Ohio-3982, ¶ 8.

A. R.C. 2151.414(E) Factors {¶ 24} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E), in determining whether a child ca nnot or should not be placed with the parents, the juvenile court “shal l consider all relevant evidence” by clear and convincing evidence, including whether o ne or more of the factors described in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(16) exists. The record shows the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (9) and (14). Although12. the juvenile court found multiple R.C. 2151.414(E) factors to s upport its decision, it needed to only find one. In re C.F. , 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 50. {¶ 25} R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) states: In determining at a hearing held pursuant to [R.C. 2151.414(A)] * * * whether a child cannot be placed with either parent withi n a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the pare nts, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, * * * that one or more of the following ex ist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding th at the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent: (1) following the placement of th e child outside of the child’s home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to rem edy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside t he home, the parents failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially rem edy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s h ome. In determining whether the parents have substantially remedied tho se conditions, the court shall consider parental utilization of me dical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose13. of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and mainta in parental duties. {¶ 26} The record indicates the juvenile court’s orders approving appe llantmother’s individualized case plans consistently contained the g oal of reunification. R.C. 2151.412(E). Appellant-mother was bound by the terms of the ca se plans, and she admitted being offered her case plan services and, at times, be ing non-compliant with those services. R.C. 2151.412(F)(1). The record shows appella nt-mother’s noncompliance for drug abuse, domestic violence, mental health, an d couple’s counseling services. Although appellant-mother completed her decision mak ing and peer association class, she failed to use those skills because she continued to associate with people who used drugs and alcohol. {¶ 27} We reviewed the record and find the juvenile court’s findings p ursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) satisfied the requirements of the first pro ng for determining permanent custody. We do not find the juvenile court abused it s discretion with those findings. We find there was some competent, credible evidence by which the juvenile court could form a firm belief as to the first prong of a perma nent custody determination.

B. Best Interests of the Child {¶ 28} For the second prong, the juvenile court must consider “all rel evant factors, including, but not limited to” the five enumerated factors desc ribed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e). In re C.F. , 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, at ¶ 52. “The statute is written broadly to allow a free-rangi ng inquiry by the juvenile14. court judge. All relevant best-interests factors are to be con sidered to allow the judge to make a fully informed decision before terminating parental righ ts, privileges and responsibilities.” In re Tiffany Y. , 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-03-004, 2003-Ohio-6203, ¶ 13-14. The juvenile court’s discretion in determining the be st interests of Z.C. and L.C. with an order of permanent custody is accorded the utmost respe ct due to the nature of the proceeding and the impact on the lives of the parties conce rned. In re D.R. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1240, 2018-Ohio-522, at ¶ 37. {¶ 29} The juvenile court determined the best interests of Z.C. and L. C. after considering R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e), which state: In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held p ursuant to [R.C. 2151.414(A)] or for the purposes of [R.C. 2151.353(A)( 4) or (5)] or [R.C. 2151.415(C)], the court shall consider all relevant fa ctors, including, but not limited to, the following: (a) The interaction and interrelationship of a child with the c hild’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the c hild has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children se rvices15. agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more m onths of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in t he temporary custody of one or more public children services agenc ies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a c onsecutive twenty two-month period and, as described in [R.C. 2151.413(D)( 1)], the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state; (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement a nd whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; (e) Whether any of the factors in [R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11)] apply in relation to the parents and child. {¶ 30} Although the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) (a) satisfied the requirements of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the court ma de further findings in the record by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to R.C. 2151.4 14(D)(1)(b) through (e). We will not disturb those findings. We find there was some com petent, credible evidence by which the juvenile court could form a firm belief as to the second prong of a permanent custody determination. We do not find the juvenile c ourt clearly lost its way to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice as to require reversal of the judgment regarding the permanent custody of Z.C. and L.C. {¶ 31} Appellant-mother’s assignment of error is not well-taken.16. III. Conclusion {¶ 32} On consideration whereof, we find the judgment of the juvenile court terminating appellant-mother’s parental rights and granting per manent custody of Z.C. and L.C. to appellee was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶ 33} The judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenil e Division, is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs o f this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pur suant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ________________________

_______ JUDGE Thomas J. Osowik, J.

_______________________________ Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE CONCUR.

_______________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Cour t of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing th e final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.