Docket No. 87076–Agenda 35–September 1999.

THE CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS, Appellant, v. THE EAST ST.

 LOUIS FINANCIAL ADVISORY AUTHORITY, Defendant-								 Appellee.

Opinion filed December 16, 1999.

	JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:

	This case presents two issues: first, whether the Financially

Distressed City Law (hereinafter, the Act) (65 ILCS 5/8–12–1 et seq. (West 1996)) empowers a “Financial Advisory Authority” to impose a budget upon a financially distressed city after that city

fails to adopt a satisfactory budget; and second, whether the East

St. Louis Financial Advisory Authority (the Authority) acted in an

arbitrary and capricious manner in rejecting the second of two

proposed city budgets submitted by the City of East St. Louis (the

City). For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Act does not

empower a Financial Advisory Authority to impose a budget upon

a city; however, we also hold that the Authority did not act in an

arbitrary and capricious manner when it rejected the City’s second

proposed budget.

BACKGROUND

	Following the enactment of the Financially Distressed City

Law in 1990, the City adopted an ordinance requesting that it be

designated a financially distressed city under the Act. Consistent

with that designation, the City thereafter has been required each

year to submit its annual budget, after adoption by the City, to the

Authority for approval. 65 ILCS 5/8–12–16 (West 1996).

	In accordance with the statutory procedure, on November 12,

1997, the City adopted a budget for 1998 and submitted it to the

Authority for its approval. On November 22, 1997, the Authority

rejected the City’s first proposed budget and returned it to the City

for correction. The Authority listed several reasons for its rejection

of the budget: (1) the City’s revenue estimates failed to comply

with the estimates approved by the Authority; (2) the budget failed

to separate grants and special revenues; (3) the salaries of certain

city employees were improperly charged to the Motor Fuel Tax Fund; (4) the budget failed to comply with certain requirements of

the federal “COPS FAST” grant program; (5) several budget items,

including “electricity,” “vehicle maintenance,” “unemployment

insurance,” “overtime,” and “sewer maintenance,” were

underfunded; and (6) the budget improperly failed to fund the

position of a fire department lieutenant who was then on active

military leave.

	On December 7, 1997, the City adopted a revised budget and

submitted that budget to the Authority for approval. On December

20, 1997, the Authority rejected the City’s revised budget.

According to the Authority, the revised budget still failed to fully

comply with the requirements of the federal COPS FAST grant

program. In particular, under the revised budget, the City proposed

to fund certain vacant police officer positions in the budget while

other officers would be paid with federal grant money. Thus, the

City was proposing to pay eight officers with grant money while at

the same time cutting back on the number of officers being paid by the City and using the salary savings for other purposes. This, according to the Authority, was a violation of the “maintenance of

effort” requirement of the grant program and rendered the City’s

budget inconsistent with the City’s three-year financial plan.

Moreover, the Authority noted that several budget line items,

including electricity, unemployment insurance, overtime, sewer

maintenance, and vehicle maintenance, remained underfunded in

the revised budget. The Authority stated that the underfunding of

these items rendered the budget not reasonably capable of being

achieved.

	In addition to the above defects, the Authority alleged new

problems with the City’s revised budget. First, the revised budget

proposed to fund $400,000 in maintenance work with sewer

revenues that had never generated more than $100,000. Second,

the Authority concluded that the City’s proposed $200,000

reduction in the amount budgeted for the public library was

unlawful because it improperly reduced the library’s proportionate

share of the City’s personal property tax replacement funds from

23% to 7%.

	At the Authority’s December 20 meeting, immediately after

the roll-call vote rejecting the City’s second budget, the members of the Authority discussed how to proceed with respect to the

City’s budget. First, the Authority could simply allow its rejection

of the budget to stand and take no further action. Second, the

Authority could act pursuant to its statutory authority to intercept

funds due to the City from the state. 65 ILCS 5/8–12–21(2) (West

1996). Third, the Authority could simply impose a budget of its

own making upon the city. A copy of the Authority’s proposed

budget, which had already been prepared by the Authority’s staff,

was distributed among the Authority’s members. After hearing

comments from several of the Authority’s directors who expressed

the opinion that intercepting state payments was too harsh a

remedy, the Authority unanimously voted to impose its budget on

the City.

	On December 24, 1997, the City filed a complaint against the

authority requesting that the circuit court of St. Clair County

enjoin the Authority from intercepting payments due the City from

the state Treasurer, and further requesting that the court declare

the Authority’s imposition of a budget on the City to be “void,

unconstitutional, improper and otherwise contrary to law ab initio.” On December 30, 1997, the City obtained new counsel and filed an amended complaint. On December 31, 1997, the court

entered an order whereby the parties agreed to operate under the

Authority’s proposed budget, except that the City was required to

operate under its own proposed budget regarding the layoff of

employees. The Authority also agreed not to intercept any funds

due to the City from the state Treasurer. The agreement also

required the parties to continue to negotiate in good faith to obtain

an approved budget.

	On April 15, 1998, the City filed a four-count second-amended

complaint. In count I, the City sought a declaration that the

Financially Distressed City Law did not permit the Authority to

impose a budget on the City. The City also requested that the

Authority be enjoined from imposing its budget on the City. Count

II requested that the court find that the Authority acted arbitrarily

and capriciously when it rejected the City’s second proposed

budget. Count III, entitled “Petition for Writ of Certiorari,”

requested that the court review the decision of the Authority to

reject the City’s proposed budget and impose its own budget on the City. Count IV requested injunctive relief prohibiting the

Authority and its agents from taking certain steps to implement the

budget.

	On April 17, 1998, the court entered an order denying the City

relief, stating that the Authority had not acted arbitrarily and

capriciously in rejecting the City’s budget, and that the Authority

had not acted beyond the scope of its powers in imposing a budget

on the City. The appellate court affirmed. No. 5–98–0288

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted the

City’s petition for leave to appeal and now affirm in part and

reverse in part.

ANALYSIS

	I. The Imposition of Budget by the Authority

	The City argues that the appellate court erred in holding that

the Act permitted the Authority to impose a budget of its own

making on the City. The City points out that no provision of the

statute expressly confers such a power on the Authority, and

further argues that it would be improper to infer such an important

power from the more general enabling language of the statute. The

Authority, in contrast, argues that this court should infer the power

to impose a budget from statutory language granting the Authority

“all powers necessary to meet its responsibilities and to carry out

its purposes and the purposes of this Division.” 65 ILCS

5/8–12–6(b) (West 1996). The Authority argues that such an

inference is proper in light of the broad remedial purposes of the

Act.

	This court has consistently held that the starting place in

interpreting the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect

to the legislative intent in enacting the statute. See, e.g., Balmoral Racing Club, Inc. v. Illinois Racing Board, 151 Ill. 2d 367, 390 (1992); Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96 (1990); People v. Madison, 121 Ill. 2d 195, 200 (1988). “ ‘ “This is to be done primarily from a consideration of the

legislative language itself, which affords the best means of [the statute’s] exposition ***.” ’ ” Maloney v. Bower, 113 Ill. 2d 473, 479 (1986), quoting Franzese v. Trinko, 66 Ill. 2d 136, 139 (1977), quoting Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (1960). We are also mindful that “[w]e should not

attempt to read the statute other than in the manner in which it was

written.” Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 215 (1983).

	Thus, in determining whether the Act permitted the Authority

to impose a budget on the City after the City allegedly failed to

adopt a satisfactory budget on its own, we must look first to the

language of the statute itself. Section 8–12–16 of the Act describes

the role which the legislature intended for the Authority to have in

the budgetmaking process:

			“The financially distressed city shall develop, adopt and

submit to the Authority *** an annual Budget for each

*** fiscal year. After adoption by the city, the city shall

submit each Budget to the Authority for its approval not

later than 60 days prior to the commencement of the fiscal

year to which the Budget relates. The Authority shall

approve or reject the Budget not later than 30 days prior

to the commencement of the fiscal year. No Budget shall

have force or effect without approval of the Authority.

Each Budget shall be developed, submitted, approved and

monitored in accordance with the following procedures:

			(1) Each Budget submitted by the financially distressed

city shall be based upon revenue estimates approved or

prepared by the Authority ***.

			(2) Each Budget shall contain such information and

detail as may be prescribed by the Authority. ***

			(3) The Authority shall approve each Budget if, in its

judgment, the Budget is complete with respect to

providing a detailed accounting of revenues and

expenditures, is reasonably capable of being achieved, will

meet the requirement [of being balanced] set forth in

Section 8–12–14, and will be consistent with the Financial

Plan in effect. Otherwise, the Authority shall reject the Budget. *** No Budget submitted by the financially distressed city shall be arbitrarily or capriciously rejected

by the Authority. Any rejection by the Authority of any

Budget submitted by the city shall be in writing and shall

state the reasons for the rejection. In the event of

rejection, the Authority may prescribe a procedure and

standards for revision of the Budget by the city.” 65 ILCS

5/8–12–16 (West 1996).

	It is clear from the text of this statute that the General

Assembly intended for the elected city government to retain its role

as the body charged with crafting and adopting a budget. The

statute commands the financially distressed city to “develop, adopt

and submit *** an annual budget” for the Authority’s review. The

Authority, for its part, is given a direct command to approve the

budget if it complies with the statutory requirements, and to reject the budget if it does not. Nowhere in the statute has the General

Assembly even hinted that the Authority may simply take over and

draft the budget itself once two proposed city budgets have been

rejected. On the contrary, the statute plainly states that even after

a city’s proposed budget is rejected, the budgetmaking power

remains with the city. The statute provides: “In the event of

rejection, the Authority may prescribe a procedure and standards

for revision of the Budget by the city.” (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/8–12–16(3) (West 1996).

	In addition to the procedure described in section 8–12–16, the

statute gives the Authority a powerful tool in dealing with a city

that fails to submit an acceptable budget proposal. Section

8–12–21(2) of the statute provides:

			“The Authority in its sole discretion may intercept any

payments that the city from time to time is entitled to

receive from any funds then or thereafter held by the State

Treasurer to the credit of the city or otherwise in the

custody of the State Treasurer to the credit of the city,

whether in or outside of the State Treasury, upon the

occurrence of any of the following:

				***

				(2) Any Financial Plan or Budget for any subsequent

fiscal year is not approved by the Authority by the commencement of the fiscal year to which such

Financial Plan or Budget relates, and the Authority has

theretofore given written warning notice to the

corporate authorities of the city, on the 15th day prior to the commencement of that fiscal year, that the

Financial Plan or Budget for such fiscal year has not

been approved by the Authority[.]” 65 ILCS

5/8–12–21(2) (West 1996).

In this case, the Authority declined to resort to this statutory

enforcement mechanism after several of the Authority’s directors

expressed the view that intercepting funds would cause undue

hardship for the citizens of East St. Louis. That decision was well

within the discretion of the Authority. However, having rejected

the enforcement mechanism provided by the General Assembly, the

Authority did not thereby free itself to craft an alternative remedy

not provided for by the statute.

	Attempting to overcome the clear absence of a statutory

provision expressly conferring a budgetmaking power upon the

Authority, the Authority relies heavily upon section 8–12–6 of the

statute, which sets forth the purposes and powers of the Authority.

That section provides, in its entirety:

			“(a) The purposes of the Authority shall be to provide

a secure financial basis for and to furnish assistance to a

financially distressed city to which this Division is

applicable as provided in Section 8–12–4, and to request

the Illinois Development Finance Authority to issue its

Obligations on behalf of and thereby provide financial aid

to the city in accordance with applicable provisions of the

Illinois Development Finance Authority Act, so that the

city can provide basic municipal services within its

jurisdictional limits, while permitting the distressed city to

meet its obligations to its creditors and the holders of its

notes and bonds.

			(b) Except as expressly limited by this Division, the

Authority shall have all powers necessary to meet its

responsibilities and to carry out its purposes and the

purposes of this Division, including, but not limited to, the

following powers:

				(1) To provide for its organization and internal

management, and to make rules and regulations

governing the use of its property and facilities.

				(2) To make and execute contracts, leases, subleases

and all other instruments or agreements necessary or

convenient for the exercise of the powers and functions

granted by this Division.

				(3) To approve all loans, grants, or other financial aid

from any State agency.

				(4) To appoint officers, agents, and employees of the

Authority, define their duties and qualifications and fix

their compensation and employee benefits.

				(5) To engage the services of consultants for

rendering professional and technical assistance and

advise on matters within the Authority’s power.

				(6) To pay the expenses of its operations.

				(7) To determine, in its discretion but consistent with

the requirements of this Division, the terms and

conditions of any loans it may make to the financially

distressed city.

			(c) Any loan repayments received by the Authority from

the distressed city may be deposited by the Authority into

a revolving fund under the control of the Authority.

Money in the revolving fund may be used by the Authority

to support activities leading to a restructuring of the

distressed city’s debt and may be pledged by the Authority

as security for any new debt incurred by the distressed city

with the approval of the Authority.

			(d) From any funds appropriated to the Authority for

the purpose of making a loan to a distressed city, the

Authority may expend not more than $250,000 for the

expenses of its operations in the fiscal year in which the

appropriation is made.” 65 ILCS 5/8–12–6 (West 1996).

The Authority argues that the statutory language “all powers

necessary to meet its responsibilities and to carry out its purposes

and the purposes of this Division” should be interpreted to confer

upon the Authority the power to impose a budget where a city has failed to draft a satisfactory budget on its own. The Authority

specifically emphasizes the statutory phrases “[e]xcept as expressly

limited by this Division” and “including, but not limited to.”

According to the Authority, this statutory language, when read in

conjunction with the absence of a clear prohibition of

budgetmaking by the Authority, is broad enough to evince an intent

by the legislature to authorize the Authority to impose its budget

on the City under the facts of this case.

	We decline to adopt the Authority’s extraordinary

construction of this statutory language. The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a statute lists several classes of persons or things but provides that the list is not exhaustive, the class of

unarticulated persons or things will be interpreted as those “others

such like” the named persons or things. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University v. Department of Human Rights, 159 Ill. 2d 206, 211 (1994); Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services of Illinois, Inc. v. Clayton, 105 Ill. 2d 389, 396 (1985); Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975). Here, the General Assembly expressly listed six specific types of

powers which it believed the Authority would require in order to

carry out its purposes and the purposes of the statute. These

enumerated powers deal with the Authority’s power to run its day-

to-day operations, to execute legal documents, to hire employees

and consultants, and to pay the Authority’s bills. The power of the

Authority to bypass the elected governance of a city, to draft a

budget for that city, and to require the city to live under the

Authority’s budget is simply not of like kind. Accordingly, the

general language of section 8–12–6 of the Act cannot fairly be read

to confer upon the Authority the power to impose a budget upon

a city.

	In reaching a contrary conclusion, the appellate court relied

upon this court’s decision in East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. Louis School District No. 189

Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399 (1997). The appellate court’s reliance on Local 1220 was misplaced. At issue in Local 1220 was the authority of a school district financial oversight panel to order a school district not to renew the contract of its

superintendent. In that case, this court held that the panel had acted within its authority under a statute which authorized the panel to

approve or reject contracts made by the school board. Local 1220, 178 Ill. 2d at 409-10. Thus, by refusing to approve a renewal of the

superintendent’s contract, the oversight panel was simply

exercising a power expressly granted to it by the legislature. The

facts of the instant case are inapposite. Here, the Authority did far

more than exercise an express power. Rather, it exercised its

express power to reject the City’s proposed budget, but then went

further and drafted, adopted, and imposed a budget of its own

making upon the City. For Local 1220 to be even arguably analogous to the instant case, the oversight panel would have had

to reject the superintendent’s contract, and then gone out and hired

a new superintendent on its own. As the facts of that case were

otherwise, however, Local 1220 provides no authority for the appellate court’s holding in the instant case.

	In reaching our conclusion today that the Authority exceeded

its statutory mandate by imposing a budget upon the City of East

St. Louis, this court is not unmindful of the serious financial

difficulties which the City of East St. Louis has experienced in

recent years. Nor do we question the good faith of the members of

the Authority who believed that the imposition of a budget drafted

by the Authority was the most expedient solution to a difficult

financial situation and would be in the best interests of the citizens

of East St. Louis. Nevertheless, whatever the wisdom of a law that

would permit the Authority to impose a realistic budget upon a city

that has failed or refused to do so, the power to enact such a law

lies not with the Authority, nor even with this court. Rather, as this

court has consistently and recently noted:

			“It is the province of the legislature to enact laws; it is

the province of the courts to construe them. Courts have

no legislative powers; courts may not enact or amend

statutes. A court cannot restrict or enlarge the meaning of

an unambiguous statute. The responsibility for the justice

or wisdom of legislation rests upon the legislature.

[Citations.] A court must interpret and apply statutes in

the manner in which they are written. A court must not

rewrite statutes to make them consistent with the court’s

idea of orderliness and public policy. [Citation.]” Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 394-95 (1998).

Thus, where the legislature has not chosen to invest the Authority

with the power to impose a budget upon a city, it would be wholly

improper for this court to substitute its judgment for that of the

only branch of government constitutionally authorized to make

such choices.

II. The Authority’s Rejection of the City’s Budget

	The City next contends that the lower courts erred in finding

that the Authority did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it

rejected the City’s second proposed 1998 budget. In Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 505-06 (1988), this court discussed the proper analysis for determining

whether the action of an agency is arbitrary and capricious. We

wrote:

			“While it is probably not possible to enumerate all the

kinds of acts or omissions which will constitute arbitrary

and capricious conduct, the following guidelines apply.

Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency: (1)

relies on factors which the legislature did not intend for

the agency to consider; (2) entirely fails to consider an

important aspect of the problem; or (3) offers an

explanation for its decision which runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or which is so implausible that

it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the

product of agency expertise. [Citation.] While an agency

is not required to adhere to a certain policy or practice

forever, sudden and unexplained changes have often been

considered arbitrary. [Citation.] The standard is one of

rationality. The scope of review is narrow and the court is

not, absent a ‘clear error of judgment’ [citation], to

substitute its own reasoning for that of the agency.”

Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 505-06.

In the instant case, the City argues that the Authority’s rejection of

the revised budget was arbitrary and capricious because the City

had corrected all of the defects of which the Authority had complained with respect to the first budget. The City makes the

related argument that it was arbitrary and capricious for the

Authority to raise new objections to items in the City’s revised

budget after the Authority had failed to object to those same items

in the original budget.

	In response, the Authority argues that while the City did fix

some of the problems that were present in the first budget, certain

other defects remained unsolved. In particular, both the City’s

original and revised budget failed to comply with the “maintenance

of effort” requirement of the federal COPS FAST grant program.

In addition, the Authority maintains that certain budget items,

including “electricity,” “vehicle maintenance,” “unemployment

insurance,” “overtime,” and “sewer maintenance,” were

underfunded in the City’s first budget, and remained underfunded

in the City’s revised budget.

	The Authority also states that when it reviewed the City’s

revised budget, it noticed that the City was planning to fund

$400,000 in maintenance work with sewer revenues that had never

generated more than $100,000. The Authority argues that it was

obligated to object to this defect in the budget, regardless of when

it was first discovered, because the Authority is statutorily required

to approve only those budgets which comply with the criteria set

forth in section 8–12–16 of the statute.

	After reviewing both sides’ arguments on the validity of the

reasons for the rejection of the City’s revised budget, we conclude,

as did the courts below, that: (1) the Authority did not rely on

factors the legislature did not intend, (2) the Authority did not fail

to consider an important aspect of the problem, and (3) the

Authority’s explanation for its decision does not run counter to the

evidence, nor is it so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a

difference in view. Moreover, we agree that the Authority did not

act improperly when it objected to a flaw in the revised budget

even after it failed to object to that same flaw in the original

budget. While it would, of course, have been preferable if the

Authority had discovered and pointed out every flaw contained in

the original budget when it first rejected that budget, the

Authority’s failure to do so did not render its subsequent objection

arbitrary or capricious, particularly when considered in the context of the other specific complaints made by the Authority regarding

the revised budget. Accordingly, we hold that the Authority did not

act in an arbitrary or capricious manner when it rejected the City’s

revised 1998 budget.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons expressed above, we reverse the holdings of

the appellate and circuit courts that the Financially Distressed City

Law conferred upon the Authority the power to impose a budget

upon the City. We affirm, however, the appellate court’s and the

circuit court’s holdings that the Authority did not act in an

arbitrary or capricious manner in rejecting the City’s revised 1998

budget.

Appellate court judgment affirmed

in part and reversed in part;

circuit court judgment affirmed

in part and reversed in part. 

	JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting:

	I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion

that holds that the Authority did not have the power to adopt a

1998 budget for the City under the facts of this case.

	The Financially Distressed City Law (the Act) (65 ILCS

5/8–12–1 et seq. (West 1996)) requires the City to submit its proposed budget no later than 60 days prior to the commencement of its fiscal year. See 65 ILCS 5/8–12–16 (West 1996). The City’s fiscal year is the calendar year. The City’s budget for the period

commencing January 1, 1998, and ending December 31, 1998, is

involved in this case. The City adopted its first proposed 1998

budget and submitted it to the Authority for approval on

November 12, 1997. Incredibly, the City adopted this budget 10

days later than required by the Act. After adopting an ordinance

requesting that it be designated a financially distressed city under

the Act, the City failed to comply with the provisions of the Act.

Here, the Authority did what the City should have done–it adopted a timely and balanced budget. The Authority did so only after two failed attempts by the City.

	The majority erroneously decides that the Act does not allow

the Authority to impose a budget on the City under the facts of this

case. The Act gives the Authority “all powers necessary to meet its

responsibilities and to carry out its purposes and the purposes of

[the Act].” See 65 ILCS 5/8–12–6(b) (West 1996). With less than

two weeks remaining in 1997, the Authority properly exercised

these powers to rescue the City from its inept financial

performance. Only harm could be visited on the citizens and

taxpayers of the City without a timely approved budget.

	The broad language of the Act shows an intent by the

legislature to give the Authority the power to impose a budget on

the City. The provisions of the Act reveal that the legislature

deemed it critical for a financially distressed city to have a balanced

budget. As the circuit court found, prohibiting the Authority from

imposing a budget “would be to limit their choice to either

throwing the City into the same financial chaos and distress which

the Law was enacted to prevent or compromising the City’s

financial integrity which is contrary to the legislative intent.” The

Authority was acting within the broad powers that the Act

provides to it. The Authority determined that imposing a budget on

the city was the best way “to provide a secure financial basis for

the continued operation” of the City. See 65 ILCS 5/8–12–2(b)

(West 1996).

	Moreover, the Act should be read as a whole, with all relevant

parts considered. See Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). Section 8–12–6(b) states that the Authority shall have all

powers necessary to meet its responsibilities and to carry out its

purposes and the purposes of the Act “including, but not limited

to” certain enumerated powers. The word “including” is a term of

enlargement, not limitation. People v. Valley Steel Products Co., 71 Ill. 2d 408, 419 (1978). The term should not be construed to

mean that those things not enumerated are excluded, where such

a construction would override the intent of the legislature. See

Valley Steel Products Co., 71 Ill. 2d at 419. The “including, but not limited to” language of the Act shows that the legislature

contemplated that the Authority has powers other than the powers specifically enumerated. Indeed, two of the provisions in section

8–12–6(b) describe certain enumerated powers by referencing the

broad power that the Act provides to the Authority. See 65 ILCS

5/8–12–6(b)(2), (b)(5) (West 1996). Thus, the fact that the Act

does not explicitly grant the Authority the power to impose a

budget is not determinative. The legislature granted the Authority

“all powers necessary” to carry out the Act’s purposes. The

legislature stated that a purpose of the Act is “to provide a secure

financial basis for the continued operation of a financially distressed

city.” 65 ILCS 5/8–12–2(b) (West 1996). A legitimate budget is

necessary to provide the City with a secure financial basis.

	The legislative history also reveals that the Act was intended

to correct the problems of financially distressed cities.

Representative Stephens made the following comments in support

of the Act:

		“If you are going to give money to people who have been

irresponsible with it in the past, for once and for all let’s

simply say ‘no more.’ Now if you enter into a financial

agreement, we will have an oversight committee that has

to give a stamp of approval. Two of the citizens of that

five man oversight committee will reside in the city, three

will not. They will be put there to watch the taxpayers’

dollars, because they deserve to be watched. If the mayor

continues his ways of the past, he will lose all authority,

because we are saying to him, ‘no more.’ These are

strings. These are ropes. These are iron clad guarantees to

the taxpayers throughout the State of Illinois that we are

fed up with irresponsibility.” 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., House

Proceedings, June 29, 1990, at 220 (statements of

Representative Stephens).

Representative McNamara added the following:

		“[T]he most important thing we are doing during this

Session is what we do here tonight. That is, to revitalize

an economy to effectively bring financial ability into a

community and to help for the future of East St. Louis and

all other communities that may need *** help. And not to

do it by the unspent or the reckless spending of dollars,

but to do it by the ability to have good common fiscal management under a good loan package.” 86th Ill. Gen.

Assem., House Proceedings, June 29, 1990, at 225

(statements of Representative McNamara).

These comments support that the legislature intended to give the

Authority broad powers to rectify the financial problems of the

City. Here, the Authority determined that the City appeared

unwilling to adopt a legitimate budget. Consequently, the

Authority voted to adopt its own budget for the City. The

legislature gave the Authority broad powers to effectuate the

purposes of the Act. Under these broad powers, the Authority was

able to impose its budget as a means to provide a secure financial

basis for the continued operation of the City.

	For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the Authority

properly imposed a budget on the City pursuant to the Financially

Distressed City Law. I therefore respectfully dissent.