United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-60366

Summary Calendar

Gisele Jocelyne Louis-Joseph, 

Petitioner,

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A079 012 201

Before Smith, Stewart, and Graves, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Gisele Jocelyne Louis-Joseph, a native and citizen of France, petitions 

for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying 

her motion to remand and dismissing her appeal of the immigration judge’s 

(IJ) denial of her petition to remove conditions on her permanent resident 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 3, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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status. Louis-Joseph contends that the BIA committed legal error by 

adopting and affirming the IJ’s determination that she was not eligible for a 

waiver of the joint filing requirement pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B)

because she had not met her burden of proof to show that she entered into a 

good-faith marriage with Derrick Garner, a U.S. citizen. She further argues 

that the BIA erred in refusing to remand the case for the IJ to consider 

whether she was eligible for a waiver of the joint filing requirement pursuant 

to § 1186a(c)(4)(A) based on extreme hardship to her son.

We review the BIA’s decision and the IJ’s ruling, to the extent it 

affects the BIA’s decision. Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2009). 

The BIA’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See Orellana-Monson v. 

Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 2012). The BIA’s factual findings are 

reviewed for substantial evidence. Id. at 517-18. The denial of a motion to 

remand is reviewed “under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard.” Milat v. Holder, 755 F.3d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

An alien may obtain permanent resident status on a conditional basis 

by marrying a U.S. citizen. § 1186a(a)(1). The conditional basis of that status 

may be removed, thereby making the alien a lawful permanent resident, if the 

alien and the citizen spouse jointly file a petition during the 90-day period 

preceding the two-year anniversary of the grant of conditional status. 

§ 1186a(c)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A). If the alien and citizen spouse separate within 

the first two years of marriage, preventing the couple from filing a timely joint 

petition and appearing for an interview, the alien may seek a waiver of these 

procedural requirements by demonstrating that extreme hardship would 

result from the alien’s removal or that “the qualifying marriage was entered 

into in good faith by the alien spouse, but the qualifying marriage has been 

terminated (other than through the death of the spouse) and the alien was not 

at fault in failing to meet the requirements of [§ 1186a(c)(1)].” 

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§ 1186a(c)(4)(A)-(B). While the ultimate decision whether to grant or deny 

a good-faith marriage waiver is discretionary and unreviewable, the predicate 

questions of whether the BIA and IJ applied the correct legal standard and 

whether the facts are legally sufficient to establish a good-faith marriage are 

questions of law properly raised in a petition for review. See Alvarado 

de Rodriguez v. Holder, 585 F.3d 227, 233-34 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Contrary to Louis-Joseph’s contention, “[t]he conduct of the parties 

after marriage is relevant to their intent at the time of marriage.” Matter of 

Laureano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 1983). When “considering whether an 

alien entered into a qualifying marriage in good faith,” one must “consider 

evidence relating to the amount of commitment by both parties to the marital 

relationship.” 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e)(2). Here, other than her testimony, 

Louis-Joseph submitted no evidence of a common residence, a comingling of 

assets or debts, or anything that established she and Garner shared a common 

life together. Cf. Alvarado de Rodriguez, 585 F.3d at 230-31. Further, LouisJoseph does not explain what, if any, other evidence should have been 

considered to show she entered into the marriage in good faith. Accordingly, 

the BIA did not err in concluding that Louis-Joseph was ineligible for a goodfaith marriage waiver because she failed to provide legally sufficient evidence 

to establish that her marriage to Garner was entered into in good faith. See

§ 1186a(c)(4)(B); see also Alvarado de Rodriguez, 585 F.3d at 233-34.

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Louis-Joseph’s 

motion to remand. See Milat, 755 F.3d at 365. Louis-Joseph acknowledged

that the evidence she offered had been previously submitted and considered 

by the IJ in connection with her application for cancellation of removal. 

Additionally, it was not until her appeal to the BIA that Louis-Joseph sought 

an extreme hardship waiver under § 1186a(c)(4)(A), and the BIA generally 

does not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal. See Eduard v. 

Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 195 n.14 (5th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the BIA’s 

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denial of her motion to remand was “not capricious, racially invidious, 

utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so irrational that it 

is arbitrary[.]” Milat, 755 F.3d at 365 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

The petition for review is DENIED.

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