# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

BIOGEN MA, INC.,

Plaintiff

- Appellant

v.

JAPANESE FOUNDATION FOR CANCER RESEARCH, BAYER PHAR MA AG, Defendants

- Appellees

______________________

2014

- 1525

______________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in No. 1:13

- cv

- 13061

- FDS, Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV.

______________________

Decided: May 7 , 2015

______________________

E DWARD A NTHONY F IGG , Rothwell, Figg, Ernst & Manbeck, P.C., Washington, DC

, argued for plaintiff

appellant. Also represented by D ANIEL M C C ALLUM , R OBERT D ANNY H UNTINGTON , S ETH E DWARD C OCKRUM ; C LAIRE L APORTE , D ONALD R OSS W ARE , Foley Hoag LLP, Boston, MA.

S. C ALVIN W ALDEN , Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY

, argued for defendant

- appelleeBIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

. v. JAPANESE FOUNDATION FOR CANCER 2

Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research. Also repr esented by B RITTANY B LUEITT A MADI , Washington, DC; N ELS L IPPERT , Tarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP, New York, NY; P AULA J OANNE E STRADA DE M ARTIN , Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, New Orleans, LA

.

D AVID I. B ERL , Williams & Connolly LLP , Washin gton, DC

, argued for defendant

- appellee Bayer Pharma AG. Also represente d by T HOMAS S. F LETCHER , D AVID M. K RINSKY , B RUCE G ENDERSON

.

______________________

Before D YK , S CHALL , and C HEN , Circuit Judges.

D YK , Circuit Judge

. Biogen MA, Inc. (“Biogen”) brought suit in d istrict

c ourt
, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 146

, to challenge an inte rference decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB” or the “Board”). The Board concluded that patent applicant Walter Fiers was estopped from establishing priority in I nterference No. 105,939 (the “’939 interfe rence ” or the “third interference” ) because he had lost two prior interferences covering the same subject matter

. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdi ction because the Leahy

- Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112 –2 9, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“A IA”)

, eliminated district court jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 146 with respect to interferences commenced after September 15, 2012

. The district court transferred this case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
We conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the district court’s jurisdiction; that the district court correc tly decided that it lacked jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 146 ; and that the Board ’s priority decision was not

erroneous. We affirm the Board’s decision

.BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

. v. JAPANESE FOUNDATION FOR CANCER 3

B ACKGROUND Beginning in 1983 , a series of interferences were declared between Fiers and Haruo Sugano, Masami Muramatsu, and Tadatsugu Taniguchi (collectively, “Sugano”) generally relating to claims to DNA sequences that encode the precursor and/or mature forms of human fibroblast interferon (“hFIF”) proteins, which promote viral resistance in human tissue, see Fiers v. Revel , 984 F.2d 1164, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and in the case of the most recent interference, to claims for the proteins the mselves. All of Fiers’ applications clai med priority to United Kingdom Patent Application No. GB 8011306, filed on April 3, 1980, while Sugano’s applications and patents claimed priority to Japanese Patent Application No. 33931/80, filed on March 19, 1980 (the “Japanese Applic ation”).

T he first , Interference No. 101,096 (the “’096 interfe rence” or the “first interfer ence”), declared August 30, 198 3 , was between Sugano’s U.S. Patent Ap plication No. 06/201,359 and Fiers’ U.S. Patent A pplication No. 06/250,609. T he count was directed to the DNA sequences coding for hFIF proteins. Fiers moved to add counts directed to hFIF proteins, but this motion was denied

. On June 5, 1991, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfe rences (“BPAI” or the “Board”) awarded priority to Sugano. We affirmed. See Fiers , 984 F.2d at 1172

. Th e second, Interference No. 105,661 (the “’661 inte rference” or the “second interfer ence”), declared March 4, 2009, was between Sugano ’s U.S. Patent Nos. 5,236,859 and 5,514,567 and Fiers’ Application No

. 08/471,646. The
count was directed to the DNA sequence encoding the mature hFIF proteins, and the Board ordered Fiers to show cause why the interference should continue given that its subject matter was the same as in the first inte rference. On August 4, 2009, the Board found that FiersBIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

. v. JAPANESE FOUNDATION FOR CANCER 4

failed to discharge his burden, entering judgment in favor of Sugano. Fiers did not appeal that decision.
Finally, o n July 16, 2013, the Board declared the ’939 interference between Fiers’ U.S. Patent Application No. 08/2 53,843 (the “Fiers ’843 application”), filed on June 3, 1994, and Sugano’s U.S. Pate nt Application No. 08/463,757 ( the “ Sugano ’757 application ” ), filed on June 5, 1995. The counts were directed to precursor and m ature hFIF proteins. Biogen owns the Fiers ’843 applic ation. The Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research (“JFC”) owns the Sugano ’757 application. 1 The specific ations of the patent applications in the ’939 interference are largely the same as the specifications of the applic ations or patents in the prior two interferences.
On July 16, 2013, the Board again ordered Fiers to show cause as to why Fiers should not be estopped from proceeding, given that Fiers lost the prior interferences and the subject matter was again the same as in the prior interf erences. In its response to the order, Fiers argued against applying to the interference two forms of interference estoppel: estoppel by judgment and estoppel for failure to file a motion. Fiers argued that estoppel by judgment did not apply because his c laims to hFIF proteins are paten tably distinct from the DNA sequences enc od ing those proteins ( the subject matter of the earlier interferences )

. Fiers submitted several pieces of purported evidence to support his argument. Fiers also argued that estoppel for failure to file a motion did not apply because Fiers had moved in prior interferences to add counts reciting hFIF

1 Bayer Pharma AG is a party to this case because it is a successor to an exclusive license agreement with the JFC

.BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

. v. JAPANESE FOUNDATION FOR CANCER 5

proteins , and had been barred from doing so by the Board.
Sugano responded that Fiers was properly estopped from pursuing the hFIF protei n claims because he had failed to submit sufficient evidence to show that the protein claims were patentably distinct from the lost counts, and that Fiers’ failure in its prior motions to follow the Board ’s procedural rules , as well as its failure to petition for review, also resulted in estoppel.

The Board agreed with Sugano and held that estoppel applied. The Board concluded that Fiers failed to di scharge his burden to show patentable distinctness and that Fiers was estopped from continuing the interference by reason of the two earlier interference proceedings. The Board entered judgment in favor of Sugano on October 3, 2013.
On December 2, 2013, Biogen filed a civil action in district court under pre

- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 146 to set aside the Board’s determination

. JFC moved to dismi ss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On May 22, 2014, the di strict court granted the motion to dismiss

, holding that the AIA had eliminated § 146 jurisdiction to review interferences, such as the one here, that were filed after September 15, 2012. The district court transferred the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 so that we could review the Board’s decision under pre

- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 141

. D ISCUSSION

I

A threshold issue is whether we have jurisdiction to d etermine the correctness of the district court’s determ ination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under

pre

- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 146

. JFC contends that the district court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction under § 146 is not reviewable.BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

. v. JAPANESE FOUNDATION FOR CANCER 6

In In re Teles AG Informationstechnologien , 747 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2014), we concluded that we had jurisdi ction in a case virtually indistinguishable in principle from this case. In Teles , the district court dismissed a paten tee’s action brought under 35 U.S.C. § 14 5 to review a Board ex parte reexamination decision for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court then transfer red the case to this court pursuant to § 1631. We held that the dismissal was improper and that the district court should have only transferred the case. Teles , 747 F.3d at 1359

– 61. Treating the case as though it had been properly transferred, w e then proceeded to address the question of the district court’s jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 145 an d the question of statutory interpretation underlying that issue under a de novo standard. See id. at 1361. We held that amendments to the patent statute had eliminated district court review of actions under 35 U.S.C. § 145 for patent owners (as opposed to applicants) and “affirm[ed] that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the § 145 action.” Id. at 1366. Since we did not explicitly discuss the basis for adj udicating the district court’s jurisdiction in Teles

, we find it appropriate to do so here. It is well

- established that transfer orders are generally not appealable. See Subsalve USA Corp. v. Watson Mfg., Inc. , 462 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2006) (“ [E] very court of appeals to have confronted [the issue] has concluded that section 1631 transfer orders are not immediately appealable.”)

. 2 We have not been asked, however, to sit in appellate review of the district court’s transfer order. We are instead the transferee court, and Biogen, despite its having styled its request as a “r emand,” is effectively asking us to retransfer this case to

2 There is a limited exception for transfers to the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 12 92(d)(4).BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

. v. JAPANESE FOUNDATION FOR CANCER 7

the district court because the district court had jurisdi ction under pre

- AIA § 146 and we do not have jurisdiction under pre

- AIA § 141

. S ee 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

I t is undisputed that we have “inherent jurisdiction to determine [our] own jurisdiction.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz , 716 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. United Mine Workers of Am. , 330 U.S. 258 (1947)). In this context, Congress has provided two mutual ly exclusive avenues of review under § 146 and § 141, so the question of our jurisdiction and the district court’s jurisdiction are different sides of the same coin . I f the district court lacked jurisdiction under § 146, we have jurisdiction under § 141 (a s a result of the transfer) , and if the district court court had jurisdiction under § 146, we lack jurisdiction under § 141. This latter proposi tion requires some explanation.

C ourts have repeatedly held in the con text of § 141 3

3 Section 141 provided in relevant part:
A party to an interference dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences on the interference may appeal the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federa l Circuit, but such appeal shall be di smissed if any adverse party to such interference, within twenty days after the appellant has filed notice of appeal in accordance with section 142 of this title, files notice with the Director that the party elects to have all further proceedings co nducted as provided in section 146 of this title. If the appellant does not, within thirty days after fi ling of such notice by the adverse party, file a civil action under section 146 , the decision appealedBIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

. v. JAPANESE FOUNDATION FOR CANCER 8

and § 146

, 4 and their predeces sor statutes
, that Congress provided “ alternative paths for judicial review of an interference decision of the Board.” Abb Vie Deutschland Gmb H v. Janssen Biotech

, Inc. , 759 F.3d 1285, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

. As the Supreme Court explained in Hoover Co. v. Coe

, 325 U.S. 79 (1945), “[i]t is evident that alternative rights of review are accorded an applicant

— one by appeal to the United States Court of Customs and Patent A ppeals, the other by bill in equity filed in one of the federal district courts.” 3 25 U.S. at 83. The Court thoroughly reviewed the legislative history of the patent acts since 1836, which reveal ed continued maintenance of altern ative paths of review. See id. at 84

– 87. The Court held that in 1927, “Congress decided

. . . to allow an appl icant ‘ to have the decision of the Patent Office reviewed either by the court of appeals or by filing a bill in equity, but not both .’ ” Id. at 87 (emphasis added) ( quoting S. Rep. No. 1313, at 4 (1927) ); s ee also P.J. Federico, Commentary on

from shall govern the further proceedings in the

case. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006). Unless otherwise specified, we refer to the pre

- AIA versions of both § 141 and § 146.

4 Section 146 provide d in relevant part:
Any party to an interference dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences on the interference, may have rem edy by civil action, if commenced within such time after such decision, not less than sixty days, as the Director appoints or as provided in section 141 of this title , unless he has appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and such appeal is pending or has been decided.
35 U.S.C. § 146 (2006).BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

. v. JAPANESE FOUNDATION FOR CANCER 9

the New Patent Act

, reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 161, 199 (1993) (explaining that “[d]ecisions of the Patent Office in refusing to grant patents, and in interferences, are reviewable by the courts in either of two

ways ” and that “since 1927 they have been mutually exclusive”).
Our predecessor c ourt and other circuits have been uniform in treating § 141 and § 146 or their predecessors

as mutually exclusive alternative paths of review that parties irrevocably elect. In general, if a party elects one path of review (§ 141 or § 146), the other is waived. 5 See Hofstein v. Silver , 201 U.S.P.Q. 77 , 79 (CCPA 1979) (explaining that the “clear import of the statute is to allow a dissatisfied party the option of either seeking review in this court or filing a civi l action, but not both” and that choosing one path would be an “irrevocable election”); In re Isler , 152 F.2d 1002, 1004 (CCPA 1946) (noting that the predecessor statutes to §§ 141 and 146 are “alternative

5 The statute was explicit about the waiver in se veral respects. Section 146 state d that a party has a rem edy in district court “unless” he has appealed in the Federal Circuit, 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2006), and § 141 stated that an applicant may appeal a BPAI decision under § 134

, but “[b]y filing such an appeal the applicant waives his or her right to proceed under section 145 of this title,” 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006). However, § 141 provide d for one limited exception to the rule that the patentee’s informed election governs : an “appeal shall be dismissed if any adverse party to such interference, within twenty days af ter the appellant has filed notice of appeal .

. . , files notice with the Director that the party elects to have all further proceedings conducted as provided in section 146 of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006).BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

. v. JAPANESE FOUNDATION FOR CANCER 10

and mutually exclusive” (quoting Hemphill Co. v. Coe , 121 F.2d 897, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1941)) ) ; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Berry , 99 F.2d 517, 521 (6th Cir. 1938) (noting that an appellant “could not be deprived of its right to file a bill in equity except by its own election to appeal to the [appe llate court]”) ; Jensen v. Lorenz , 92 F.2d 992, 994

– 95 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (“It is evident that Congress intended to r equire an election by the party as between the two rem edies offered to him .

. . and that when such election is made by the litigant it is to be final.”); B akelite Corp. v. Nat’l Aniline & Chem. Co. , 83 F.2d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 1936) ( noting it “cannot be doubted” the stat utes provide alte rnative remedies ); Walther v. Vanderveer , 64 F.2d 540 , 541 (CCPA 1933) (holding that because parties “elected” to bring the case to the appellate court in the first instance

, the appeal could not then be dismissed just to confer jurisdiction upon the district court to determine the issues)

. Thus, an election of § 146 review would foreclose § 141 review in this court and deprive us of jurisdiction

. 6 But of course, this is true only if § 146 review were available, since, in general, “an election will be found only if a party has chosen to pursue one position that is inconsistent with another possible position

. . . . ” 18B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4476 (2d ed. 2002)

. In short, w e have jurisdiction under § 141 as a result

6 Section 145, the section we interprete d in Teles , is similar. See Hyatt v. Kappos , 625 F.3d 1320, 1321 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (noting that sections 145 and 146 are “parallel provisions”). The predecessor statute to § 146, Revised Statute 4915, is the same one as the pred ecessor to § 145. See Kappos v. Hyatt , 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1698

– 99 (2012).BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

. v. JAPANESE FOUNDATION FOR CANCER 11

of the transfer if § 146 review was unavailable, but we lack jurisdiction if this case was properly brought to the district court under § 146 . W e thus must determine if the district court indeed lacked jurisdiction under § 146 in order to determine whether we lack jurisdiction and should retransfer the case.
Contrary to what JFC argues, the Supreme Court’s decision in Christian son v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. , 486 U.S. 800 (1988) , is not to the contrary

. In Christianson , the Court held that

, in order to avoid a “perpetual game of jurisdictional ping pong ” of transfers and retransfer s, a court of appeals should defer to another court of appeal’s transfer order under § 1631 unless the transferee court considers the transfer “clearly erron eous .” Id. at 818

– 19. “[I] f the transferee court can find the transfer decision plausible, its jurisdictional inquiry is at an end.” I d. at 81 9. Christianson thus recognized that the transferee court has the authority to determine its own jurisdiction, and only stands for the propo sition that courts ought to “apply law -of- the

- case principles to tran sfer decisions of coordinate courts .” Id. at 816 (emphasis added). Christianson does not suggest that a court of appeals should defer to a non

- coordinate district court on

a jurisdictiona l issue. Such deference would be particula rly odd here since we would have appellate jurisdiction i f the district court had determined that it did have jurisdi ction. See Trayco, Inc. v. United States , 994 F.2d 832, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1993)

. If we can determine that a district court erred in accepting jurisdiction, i t follows that we can equally review the district court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction.

II
We turn now to the question of whether pre

- AIA § 146 conferred jurisdiction on the district co urt in this case. That depends on whether the AIA , enacted on SeptemberBIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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16, 2011, eliminated the district court’s § 146 jurisdiction to review decisions from interference proceedings declared after September 15, 2012

. Ultimately

, we conclude that specific statutory provisions in the AIA as amended 7 govern the availability of § 146 review for interferences declared after September 15, 201 2 , and that for interfe rences declare d after that date , § 146 review is not avail able.
The AIA changed the patent system, among other things, from a first

- to

- invent to a first

- inventor

- to

- file regime for determining patent priority. See AIA § 3; Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office

, 756 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In doing so, it amended the patent sta tute’s central provisions on p atentability, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 102

– 103 , AIA § 3 (a)

– (c ); established derivation proceedings and eliminated interference proceedings, AIA § 3(i)

– (j) ; and changed the BPAI to the PTAB, AIA §§ 3(j), 7(a). T his case concerns the effective date of these provisions as to interferences

. In interpreting a statute, we start with the statute’s language. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson , 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999). Unfortunately, the effective date provisions in the AIA are far from a model of clarity. In general, t he
statute contains a hodgepodge of express reservations of

pre

- AIA provisions

, see AIA § 6(c)(2)(C) (pre

- AIA prov isions regarding inter partes reexamination “shall conti nue to apply to requests for [certain] inter partes reexamination [s] ”); implicit reservations, see AIA § 18(a)(1)(C) (mentioning a petitioner who challenges a patent in a covered business method proceeding on a ground raised under pre

- AIA §§ 102, 103); TCA § 1(k)(3)

7 The AIA was amended by the Leahy

- Smith Ame rica Invents Technical Corrections Act, Pub. L. No. 112

– 274, 126 Stat. 2456 (2013) (“TCA”).BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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(mentioning interferences d eclared under pre

- AIA § 135); and sometimes simply silence, see AIA § 3 ( amending but saying nothing about preserving pre

- AIA §§ 102 , 103).
Here, Biogen argues that AIA § 3(n)(1) makes the new AIA provisions applicable only to new applications and implicitly preserves interference proceedings and judicial review provisions concerning interference proceedings for patent applications filed before March 16, 2013, including § 146 review for Board decisions in interferences. JFC, on the other hand, apparently argues that § 3(n)(1) provides that the new AIA provisions shall apply not only to new applications but also to old applications pending on March 16, 2013. We think JFC’s interpretation in this respect is untenable since it is clear from the structure of the sta tute that new provisions cannot be applied in their entir ety to old applications. See Tobinick v. Olmarker , 753 F.3d 1220, 1223 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ( explaining that pre

- AIA law applies generally to old interferenc es )

. Indeed, JFC agrees that pre

- AIA law generally applies to interferences before the PTO. While we thus construe § 3(n)(1) as applying the new AIA provisions only to new applications, it does not follow that § 3(n)(1) requires application of pre

AIA judi cial review provisions to old applica tions.
Section § 3(n)(1) provides : (1) I N G ENERAL .— Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amendments made by this section shall take effect upon the expiration of the 18

- month period beginning on the date of the enac tment of this Act [i.e., March 16, 2013], and shall apply to any application for patent, and to any p atent issuing thereon, that contains or con tained at any time — (A) a claim to a claimed invention that has an effective filing date as defined i n sec tion 100(i) of title 35, United States Code, that is on or afterBIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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the effective date described in this paragraph; or
(B) a specific reference under section 120, 121, or 365(c) of title 35, United States Code, to

any pa tent or application that contain s or co nt ained at any time such a claim.

Th is provision on its face is silent as to whether interference proceedings and judicial review of these proceedings continue s with respect to patent applications filed prior to March 16, 2013. That silence, says Biogen, means that the old interference provisions , including § 146 review, co ntinue to apply to previously

- filed patent applications

. It is certainly true, as we have noted above and as the parties agree, that under AIA § 3(n)(1) inte rference pr oceedings are to continue with respect to previously

- filed patent applications , that is, applications filed before March 16, 2013. 8 But we think Congress specifically addressed the manner of judicial review of Board dec i8 One exception is § 6(f)(3)(A) , which provides that the Director may dismiss a pending interference in favor of a post

- grant review. See AIA § 6(f)(3)(A). Continuance of interference proceedings is also a pparent from § 3(n)(2), which provides that pre

- AIA inte rference provisions § 102(g), § 135, and § 291 continue to apply to patent applications with claims with “mixed” filing dates, i.e., applications with claims with filing dates before March 16, 2013, and claims with filing dates after March 15, 2013. See AIA § 3(n)(2). Section 3(n)(2) does not, how ever, provide for judicia l review of such interfe rences. Nor, as Biogen points out, was the district court correct in concluding that § 3(n)(2), which in fact only deals with patent applications with mixed filing dates, “provides the basis for the PTAB to continue to declare interferences.” Appellant’s B r . at 22 n.9

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sions in continuing inter ference proceedings and that the specific provisions with respect to judicial review trump any general rule of survivorship that c ould be inferred from § 3(n)(1).
In the AIA, Congress included § 6(f)(3)(C) , which provides : (C) A PPEALS .— The authorization to appeal or have remedy from derivation proceedings in se ctions 141(d) and 146 of title 35, United States Code, as amended by this Act, and the jurisdiction to entertain appeals from derivation proceedings in section 1295(a)(4)(A) of title 28, United Stat es Code, as amended by this Act, shall be deemed to extend to any final decision in an interference that is commenced before the effective date set forth in paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection [i.e., September 16, 2012] and that is not dismissed pursuant t o this paragraph.
This section provides tha t amended § 146 ( which now authorize s review only of derivation proceedings ) shall be “deemed” to provide review of interferences declared before September 16, 2012. 9 The section does not , howe ver, explicitly provide for judicial review for interferences declared after Sep tember 15 , 2012.
Congress corrected this omission in TCA § 1(k)(3) . It provides : (3) R EVIEW OF INTERFERENCE DECISIONS .— The provisions of sections 6 and 141 of title 35, United

9 Section 6(f)(3)(B) also provides that the PTAB shall be “deem[ed]” the BPAI for purposes of conducting “any further proceedings in [such] interference[s].” AIA § 6(f)(3)(B).BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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States Code, and section 1295(a)(4)(A) of title 28, United States Code, as in effect on September 15, 2012, shall apply to interference proceedings that are declared after September 15, 2012, under se ction 135 of title 35, United States Code, as in e ffect before the effective date under section 3(n) of the Leahy

- Smith America Invents Act. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board may be deemed to be the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for

purposes of such interference proceedings.
For interferences declared after September 15, 2012, t his provision explicitly authorizes pre

- AIA § 141 review , but unlike AIA § 6(f)(c)(3)

, does not authorize pre

- AIA § 146 review. Therefore, AIA § 6(f)(3)(C ) and TCA § 1 (k)(3) together make clear that pre

- AIA § 146 review was elim inated for interference proceedings declared after Septe mber 15, 2012.
The specific provisions in § 6(f)(3)(C) and § 1(k)(3) require us to apply the basic tenet of statutory interpret ation that the specific governs the general

. As the Supreme Court said in RadL AX Gateway Hotel , LLC v. Amalg amated Bank , 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012), it is “a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general,” especially where Congress “has enacted a co mprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions

. ” Id. at 2071 (internal quotation marks and citations omit ted)

. This principle equally applies when it comes to interpreting effective date provisions. For instance, in Gozlon

- Peretz v. United States

, 498 U.S. 395 (1991)

, the Supreme Court interpre ted a specific provision in the Anti

- Drug Abuse Act of 1986 governing supervised release. The petitioner had argued that the effective date of that specific pro vision should be delayed pursuant to a more general effective date prov ision in a different section of the statute. Id. at 406. Rejec ting that argument, the Court noted that a “specificBIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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prov i sion controls over one of more general application.” Id. at 407 ( citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc. , 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987))

. Here, even if the general effective date provision in § 3(n)(1) suggests that in general Congress preserved pre

AIA provisions for pre

- March 16, 2013

, patent applic ations, it do es not follow that we should myopically apply § 3(n)(1) independently of the specific provisions in AIA § 6(f)(3)(C) and § 1(k)(3). Here, Congress “deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions, ” RadLAX , 132 S. Ct. at 2071, so we cannot ignore them. Nor does the legislative history of the AIA suggest othe rwise. While Senator Kyl recognized “the continuing need to allow appeals of pending interferences,” 157 Cong. Rec. 1377 (2011) (emphasis added), the legislative history is silent about t he specific question of what pre

- AIA review was available for interference proceedings declared after September 15, 2012. The regulations and commentary of the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) that Biogen cites are equally unhelpful. They do not say tha t § 146 review is available for interference s commenced after September 15, 2012. See 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,625 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“ [C]ertain interferences may be deemed to be eligible for judicial review as though they were derivation proceedings.” (emphasis added)) ; 10 37 C.F.R. § 90.1 (“ [W]here available , judicial review of decisions arising out

10 The commentary also states that AIA § 3 “makes review of interference decisions by a District Court under 35 U.S.C. [§] 146 available only if the provisions of § 3(n)(1) .

. . are not satisfied.” 77 Fed. Reg. 6,879, 6,891 (Feb. 9, 2012). It is difficult to parse this pa rticular co mment, but it certainly does not clearly state § 146 review remains available for interferences commenced after September 15, 2012.BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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of interferences declared pursuant to 35 U.S.C. [§] 135 contin ue to be governed by the pertin ent regulations

. . . .” (emphasis added)). In any case, the PTO’s reg ulations interpreting the scope of the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction would not be entitled to Chevron deference. See Love v. Thomas , 858 F.2d 1347, 1352 n.9 (9th Cir. 1988) ( Chevron “deference does not extend to the question of judicial review, a matter within the particular expertise of the courts”)

. We must accordingly follow the express provisions in the statute. Biogen’s other convoluted efforts to argue that Congress’ specific approach should not govern require no further discussion.
In short, b ecause the AIA and its technical corrections provided that only pre

- AIA § 141 review in this court would be available fo r interferences declared after Se ptember 15, 2012, and the ’939 interference here was declared July 16, 2013, the district court properly found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction

. It follows that

we have jurisdiction to hear Biogen’s appeal pursuant to § 141

. III

We now turn to the merits of Biogen’s appeal of the Board’s judgment against Fiers in the ’939 interfe r ence

. The Board’s judgment was based on Fiers’ failure to meet his burden in responding to the July 16, 2013, order to show cause why Fiers should not be estopped from co ntinuing with the interference, given that he had lost two prior interferences

. Interference estoppel “by judgment” applies where “a losing party in a previous interference between the same parties” tries to patent a claim “not patentably distinct from the counts in issue in that [prior] interfe rence.” Woods v. Tsuchiya , 754 F.2d 1571, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ;BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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s ee also In re Deckler , 977 F.2d 1449 , 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that a losing priority judgment in an interference proceeding bars the loser from obtaining a patent containing claims that are patentably indisti nguishable from the claims corresponding to the lost count); MPEP § 2308.03 (9th ed. March 2014) (interfe rence estoppel applies where a “losing party is barred on the merits from seeking a claim that would have been anticipated or rendered obvious by the subject matter of the lost count”).

T he parties do not dispute that estoppel by judgment, if applicable, is itself sufficient to estop Fiers from conti nuing the interference even if Fiers’ motion to add protein counts to the earlier interferences failed

. 11 Estoppel by

11 That unsucce ssful efforts to add a count do not prevent estoppel by judgment is clear from Stoudt v. Guggenheim , 651 F.2d 760 (CCPA 1981), a case on which Biogen relies. As the court in Stoudt explained: “Where the prior judgment between the same parties is not stric tly res judicata because it resolves a different and distinct issue [e.g., a patentably distinct cou nt], that judgment may nonetheless create an estoppel as to matters actually in issue or points controverted.” Id. at 764 (bracketed

con tent in original). The court treated estoppel by jud gment and estoppel for failure to file a motion separately, holding th at neither applied in that case:
We agree with the board’s adoption of the e xaminer’s ex parte determination that the present count is patentably distinct from [the count in] the previous interference. No identity of issues is therefore present in the two interferences and the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable.BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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judgment rests on the principle that a “judgment in an action precludes relitigation of claims or issues that were

. . . raised in [the earlier] proceeding.” In re Deckler

, 97 7 F.2d at 1452. This is “an application of settled principles of res judicata,” id.

, under which “a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes .

. . relitigating issues.” San Re mo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. o f S.F., Cal. , 545 U.S. 323, 336 n.16 ( 2005). Claims that are not patentably distinct from lost counts were already adjudicated in the prior interference and are thus conclusive

. Even if Fiers’ filing of the motion to add the protein count would suffice to avoid other forms of estoppel, it is irrelevant to estoppel by judgment. S ee Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 26 cmt. b (1980) (noting that the “mere refusal of the
court .

. . to allow an amendment .

. . , even where the refusal of the amendment was urged by the defendant, is
not a reser vation by the court [of the right to maintain a second action]”).

W e agree with the Board that Fiers failed to meet his burden to show patentable distinctness to avoid interfe rence estoppel by judgment.

This issue of patentable distinctness arose in the mo st recent interference proceeding when the Board issued a show cause order requiring Fiers to “show why it will be able to prove an earlier date of conception in the current

Stoudt moved to add the proposed count. The interference examiner’s denial of that motion was not appealable to the board, and Stoudt could do nothing further to bring the matter before th e board in the earlier interference. The estoppel doctrine [based on failure to file a motion] ther efore finds no application to the facts of this case.

I

d. at 765.BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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interference when it could not do so in the prior interfe rence [the ’096 interfere nce].” J.A. 2807. Noting that a losing party to an interference is barred from obtaining a patent on claims that are patentably indistinguishable from the subject matter of the earlier count, the Board stated that “[i]n light of [the fact] that DNA and the known genetic code indicating which DNA sequences encode each amino acid, those of skill in the art would have considered the polypeptide Fiers now claims to have been obvious.” J.A. 2808.
Biogen argues on appeal that the hFIF proteins are patentably dist inct because they are “functional,” co mplaining that Fiers “should be entitled to introduce ev idence in the ’939 interference to demonstrate that in 1980 mere possession of the DNA sequence fell far short of possession of the functional protein required by the claims.” Appellant’s Br. at 43. But in fact, Biogen did have that opportunity in its response to the show cause order. It failed to properly submit evidence showing patentable di stinctness , and cannot now argue that the proteins are patentably distinct from the DNA

. Biogen does not contend that the show cause order was issued erroneously, and does not dispute that Fiers had the burden to provide evidence to show patentable distinctness

. Instead , Biogen argues that there is no estoppel by judgmen t here because Fiers showed in his response to the show cause order that the hFIF proteins claimed in the ’ 939 interference are not obvious over the DNA sequences encoding those proteins that were at issue in the prior interferences. In his re sponse, Fiers pointed to four pieces of alleged evidence.

First , Fiers p ointed to the fact that , on April 15, 1982, the PTO imposed a restriction requirement during pros ecution of Fiers’ U.S. Application No. 06/250,609 (the “’609 application,” of which the ’843 application is a divisional )

,BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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filed April 3, 1981, between claims directed to the DNA sequences and claims directed to the proteins. However, a restriction requirement is not substantive evidence that Fiers’ claims are patentably distinct over the DNA s equences . A t most , it is evidence that the examiner thought that there were “two or more indepen d ent and distinct inventions” claimed in a single applic ation. 35 U.S.C. § 121 ; 3 7 C.F.R. § 1.142 ; MPEP § 802.01 ( 9th ed. March 2014 )

. Restriction requirements are discr e tionary deci sions, primarily for administrative conve n ience, and do not represent a final determination that the relevant claims are patentably distinct. See Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am

. , Inc. , 98 F.3d 1563, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting r e striction requir ement is for “administrative convenience”); Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 558

– 59 (Fed. Cir. 19 94) ( same ); In re Watkinson , 900 F.2d 230, 233 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (restriction is “a matter within the discretion of the examiner and not tantamount to a reje ction of claims”); In re Hengehold , 440 F.2d 1395, 1403 (CCPA 1971) (restriction is a “discretionary , proc e dural or nonsubstantive” matter)

. 12

12 Biogen argues that the equitable principles unde rlying the safe harbor provision in 35 U .S.C. § 121 should apply here to protect Fiers from estoppel. See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (“A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as a result of such a

re quirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or against the original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the divisional application is filed befor e the issuance of the patent on the other application.”). Section 121 provides a safe ha r-BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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Second, Fiers argued that separate interferences , I nterferences No. 105,334 and No. 105,337, were declared between Sugano and a different party
, Goeddel. Those interferences separately involved counts corresponding to hFIF proteins and the DNA encoding them. See Goeddel v. Sugano , 617 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010). B ut once again, this fact is not substantive evide nce of patentable distinctness. The discretionary decision to declare sep arate interfer ence s in another proceeding is not necessarily a determination, let alone a final one, of patentable di stinctness.
Third, Fiers pointed to a Board decision in the in i tial ex parte proceeding concerning Fiers’ ’843 application reversing an examiner’s determination that protein claims in the Fiers application were unpatentable as anticipated over Sugano’s ’859 and ’567 patents. But in that decision, the Board reversed because the examiner had not established an evidentiary basis, and expressly said that it was making “no ruling as to whether the subject matter of the rejected claims is patentably distinct from ” the DNA count in the first interference. J.A

. 5212.
Finally

, in a section of his response dedicated to arg uing , not that the protein claims were patentably distinct, but that Fiers can prevail on priority, Fiers cited a decl abor from double patenting rejections against a patentee on claims that were a result of an earlier restriction requirement because it would be inequitable to reject divided claims on the ground of double patenting when the division was required on the theory that the original application contained claims for more than one invention

. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. , 518 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) . Secti on 121 is on its face inapplic able here

, and in any case, the restriction requirement did not result in Fiers’ losing in the prior interferences.BIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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ration by Dr. David A. Jackson. However, in that declar ation, Dr. Jackson addressed only whether the Japanese application contains a written description of an embod iment withi n the scope of the counts in the ’939 interfe rence, and whether the Japanese application provide s sufficient information for one skilled in the art to practice such an embodiment without undue experime n tation. J.A. 5198. There was nothing in the declaration about how Fiers’ hFIF protein claims were not obvious over the lost
counts directed to the DNA sequences

. We thus see no error in the Board’s conclusion that Fiers submitted no relevant evidence on patentable distinct ness and was thus estopped from continuing with the interference.

C ONCLUSION

We conclude that as a result of the transfer we have jurisdiction under pre

- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 141 to hear Bi ogen’s appeal . This is so because the AIA eliminated di strict courts ’ subject matter jurisdiction under p re

- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 146 to review decisions in interference procee dings declared after September 15, 2012. We therefore decline to transfer this case back to the district court.
On the merits, we conclude that the Board did not err in entering judgment against Fiers on the basis of inte rference estoppel because Fiers did not discharge its bu rden in response to the Board’s show cause order to provide evidence of the patentable distinctness of its hFIF protein claims over the DNA sequences encoding for such proteins

. Biogen’s request for retransfer is:

DENIED

T he Board’s decision is :
AFFIRMEDBIOGEN IDEC MA , INC

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C OSTS Costs to appellees.