*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 15, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 03-30664

Summary Calendar

_______________________

ARTHUR COPES, ORTHOTIST, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

AMERICAN CENTRAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

Civil Docket No. 01-CV-128-A

_________________________________________________________________

Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Arthur Copes, Orthotist, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) appeals the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant

American Central Insurance Company. The instant appeal revolves

around a dispute over insurance coverage for the named plaintiff.
2

Because we agree that the insurance policy did not cover all

operations conducted at the insured premises, we affirm.

Arthur Copes, Ph.D., currently operates various corporate

entities for the treatment of scoliosis patients. In 1998, Copes

took out an insurance policy with American Central which named

“Dr. Arthur Copes Office,” a corporation, as the named insured.

Eventually, the policy insured the premises at 8108 Picardy Avenue,

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, which the policy’s declarations page

described as a doctor’s office. In February 2000, a fire at the

insured premises caused property damage and a temporary suspension

of business operations. Pursuant to its policy, American Central

paid the insured, Dr. Arthur Copes Office, sums relating to

property damage, business losses and increased expenses related to

the interruption of patient treatments through the office.

However, American Central refused to make additional payments and

the instant suit followed.

American Central moved for summary judgment on two

grounds: (1) the plaintiff, Arthur Copes, Orthotist, Inc., was not

the named insured on the policy, and (2) the plaintiff sought

payment for business operations beyond the terms of the policy.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of American

Central, finding that Arthur Copes, Orthotist, Inc. had no

insurable interest in the policy and that the policy’s terms did

not extend to business activities beyond those regularly occurring

in a doctor’s office.
3

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. Principal Health Care of La., Inc. v. Lewer Agency, Inc.,

38 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is only proper

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file together with the affidavits indicate that no

genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Because the interpretation of an

insurance policy is a question of law, we review the district

court’s determination de novo. Principal Health Care, 38 F.3d at

242. 

It is undisputed that when applying for the American

Central policy, the plaintiff provided the agent with a former

policy listing “Dr. Arthur Copes Office” as the named insured. The

plaintiff argues that no legal entity called “Dr. Arthur Copes

Office, Inc.” ever existed. However, the plaintiff does not

dispute that the checking account for the office was drawn in the

name of “Dr. Arthur Copes, Inc.” In addition, Copes controlled

various corporate entities other than “Arthur Copes, Orthotist,

Inc.,” including Copes Clinics, Inc., Copes Enterprises, Inc.,

Copes Foundation, Copes Laboratories, Inc., and STRS (Scoliosis

Treatment Recovery System) and STRC (Scoliosis Treatment Recovery

Centers). Each corporate entity listed 8108 Picardy Avenue as its

mailing address.
4

The plaintiff admits that three distinct business

activities take place on the Picardy Avenue premises: (1) treatment

of scoliosis patients, (2) manufacturing and production of custom

scoliosis braces for in-state and out-of-state patients, and

(3) physician training, or a residency program, to prepare doctors

to open satellite clinics outside of Louisiana. Indeed, at the

time the fire occurred, Dr. Copes’ entities included a Tampa

office, a San Diego office, and a Houston office. However, the

Baton Rouge office was the “hub” of the operation and all income

was directed to that office. At the time the American Central

policy was executed, neither the company nor its agent was aware of

the multiple corporate entities or business activities taking place

at the insured location.

An insurance policy is a contract and is subject to the

general rules of contract interpretation. Clements v. Folse ex

rel. Succession of Clements, 830 So.2d 307, 312 (La. Ct. App.

2002). Courts must endeavor to discern the common intent of the

insurer and insured. Id. To this end, courts must look to the

words of the insurance contract and infuse them with their

generally prevailing meaning. Id. The insurance contract must be

enforced as written when the words are clear and explicit and lead

to no absurd results. Id.

The insurance policy at issue here covers the actual loss

of business income due to the necessary suspension of the insured’s

“operations.” In addition, “operations” is defined by the policy
1The only relevant physical location covered by the policy is

8108 Picardy Avenue in Baton Rouge.

2The district court also held that, because Arthur Copes,

Orthotist, Inc. was not the named insured on the policy, the

plaintiff could not recover under the policy. We do not reach this

issue because we resolve the case on the policy interpretation

ground. It is likely, however, that, to expand the policy’s

coverage to include the myriad business interests of Arthur Copes,

doing business as Arthur Copes, Orthotist, Inc., would be to assign

to the defendant risks it did not initially foresee when issuing

the policy to a doctor’s office. This result is untenable. See,

e.g., Bonadona v. Guccione, 362 So.2d 740 (La. 1978) (noting that

an insurance policy may not be reformed when the risks assumed

would be substantially greater or different in nature).

5

as “business activities occurring at the described premises.” The

policy’s declarations page describes the insured premises as a

doctor’s office. The generally prevailing meaning of “doctor’s

office” includes neither prosthetic manufacturing facilities for

patients not treated at the office nor residency training programs.

In addition, to the extent that the covered premises served as a

hub for out-of-state operations, that lost income would not be

covered by the policy’s plain terms.1 Thus, the only business

losses to which the plaintiff is entitled flow from the necessary

suspension of the treatment of scoliosis patients at the Baton

Rouge location. The plaintiff has already received compensation

for such loss.2

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.