alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Franklin L. Noel, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 03-2129

___________ Beck, formerly known as David * Wayne Beck, * * Appellant, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * District of Minnesota. * Erik Skon; David Crist; Dr. Christopher * [UNPUBLISHED] Ceman, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: March 4, 2004 Filed: March 18, 2004

___________ Before BYE, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Minnesota inmate “Reverend Beck” (formerly known as David Wayne Vanderbeck) appeals the district court’s 1 order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO). We affirm.-2- Beck filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against prison officials, claiming they violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants on all but one claim, i.e., that officials conditioned needed surgery on his execution of a release of liability. As to that claim, we remanded for further development of the record. SeeBeck v. Skon , 253 F.3d 330, 334 (8th Cir. 2001). On remand, Beck filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and TRO, and for “a three-judge court,” requesting the district court to stop defendants from harassing him, denying him proper placements, denying him proper medical treatment, denying him necessary legal documents, and placing him at further risk of assault. The district court denied the motion. We have jurisdiction to review the denial of injunctive relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and “we will reverse only for clearly erroneous factual determinations, an error of law, or abuse of discretion,” see Manion v. Nagin , 255 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2001). There is no basis for reversal here. See Davis v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist. , 104 F.3d 204, 205 (8th Cir. 1997) (factors to determine whether injunctive relief is warranted). To the extent Beck asserted in his motion that he is being denied the opportunity to litigate the claim at issue on remand, there are avenues by which he can seek specific documents and depositions necessary to litigate the relevant claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a), 56(f). Beck’s remaining bases for injunctive relief are not within the scope of the remand order. Cf. Children’s Broadcasting Corp. v. Walt Disney Co. , 2004 WL 111806, at *8 (8th Cir. Jan. 26, 2004) (liability question was beyond scope of limited remand for new trial on damages). Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________
EXHIBIT 13.1



                 Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 906 Certification

     The following Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 906 Certification is
furnished to (not file with) the Securities and Exchange Commission:

     In connection with this annual report on Form 20-F of CNOOC Limited, we,
Chengyu Fu, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and Hua Yang, Chief
Financial Officer and Senior Vice President, of CNOOC Limited certify,
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.   This annual report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
     or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information contained in this annual report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
     CNOOC Limited.



Date: June 22, 2005



                                     By:      /s/  Chengyu Fu
                                              ---------------------
                                     Name:   Chengyu Fu
                                     Title:  Chairman & Chief Executive Officer



                                     By:      /s/  Hua Yang
                                              ---------------------
                                     Name:   Hua Yang
                                     Title:  Chief Financial Officer
                                             and Senior Vice President
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-7417

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus RICHARD N. GARRIES, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CR-03-69; CA-04-576) Submitted: February 16, 2006 Decided: February 22, 2006 Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Richard N. Garries, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Joseph Seidel, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Richard N. Garries seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Garries has not made the requisite showing. SeeUnited States v. Morris , 429 F.3d 65, 72 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), is not retroa ctively applicable to cases on collateral review). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
II 

Calendar No. 122 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1759 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

456 North Meridian Street in Indianapolis, Indiana, as the ‘‘Richard 

G. Lugar Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 10, 2019 

Mr. BRAUN (for himself and Mr. YOUNG) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

JUNE 19, 2019 

Reported by Mr. JOHNSON, without amendment 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 456 North Meridian Street in Indianapolis, 

Indiana, as the ‘‘Richard G. Lugar Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. RICHARD G. LUGAR POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 456 North Meridian Street in 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1759 RS

1 Indianapolis, Indiana, shall be known and designated as 

2 the ‘‘Richard G. Lugar Post Office Building’’. 

3 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg4 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

5 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

6 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Richard G. Lugar 

7 Post Office Building’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS

pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 122 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1759 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States PostLugar Post Office Building’’. in Indianapolis, Indiana, as the ‘‘Richard G. al Service located at 456 North Meridian Street 

JUNE 19, 2019 

Reported without amendment 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-2687

___________

Lamarr Love, *

 *

Appellant, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * District of Minnesota.

J. W. Tippy, *

 * [PUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: November 7, 1997

 Filed: November 12, 1997

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In 1994, Lamarr Love was convicted of federal drug offenses in the

Northern District of Iowa and sentenced as a career offender to 270 months

in prison. Love filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

District of Minnesota, where he is presently incarcerated, alleging that

a 1988 Wisconsin state court conviction should not have been used to

enhance his federal sentence because it was infected by an
 The HONORABLE DAVID S. DOTY, United States District Judge for the District 1

of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendation of the HONORABLE

FRANKLIN L. NOEL, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.

-2-

involuntary guilty plea and ineffective assistance of counsel. The

district court dismissed the petition with prejudice, and Love appeals.

1

We affirm.

First, construing Love's pro se petition as directly challenging his

Wisconsin conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the district court dismissed

it for lack of jurisdiction because Love completed serving the state

sentence before his federal conviction, so he is no longer in custody under

the state conviction. We agree. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989);

Charlton v. Morris, 53 F.3d 929, 929 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.

328 (1995). 

Second, construing Love's petition as also seeking to challenge the

validity of his federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the district court

held that a collateral attack on a prior sentence used to enhance this

federal sentence is barred by Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994),

as construed in Partee v. Hopkins, 30 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 1135 (1995). On appeal, Love urges us to modify the

district court's judgment to a dismissal without prejudice, no doubt

because § 2255 jurisdiction lies in the district court that sentenced him,

the Northern District of Iowa, rather than the district where he is

incarcerated. However, the district court's decision to deny § 2255 relief

was correct on the merits. Custis was a direct federal appeal. Therefore,

the Supreme Court's decision establishes that the enhancement issue Love

seeks to raise should have been raised at his sentencing and is now

procedurally defaulted, and that he may not collaterally attack the

Wisconsin conviction in this manner because it did not involve a failure

to appoint counsel. Because Love was sentenced in another district within

the Eighth Circuit, we will short-circuit a potential multiplicity of

meritless post-conviction proceedings by affirming the dismissal of his

petition for § 2255 relief with prejudice.
-3-

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
J-S59034-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MELVIN METZ

 Appellant No. 3463 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 13, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-51-CR-0903491-1996

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD,*J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED AUGUST 31, 2016

Pro se Appellant, Melvin Metz, appeals from the order dismissing his 

fourth Post Conviction Relief Act1(“PCRA”) petition. Appellant claims that

Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), applies retroactively to 

his 1998 sentence. We affirm.

We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by the PCRA court. 

See PCRA Ct. Op., 12/11/15, at 1-2. Appellant timely appealed and the 

court did not order him to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant 

contends the court erred by not correcting his illegal sentence. As noted 

above, he asserts Alleyne applies retroactively to his case. 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S59034-16

- 2 -

Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claim, our Supreme Court 

has required this Court to examine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain 

the underlying PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 

223 (Pa. 1999). “Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a 

PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is supported by the evidence of record and free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). A PCRA petition “must normally be filed within one 

year of the date the judgment becomes final . . . unless one of the 

exceptions in § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies and the petition is filed within 60 

days of the date the claim could have been presented.” Commonwealth v. 

Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646, 648 (Pa. 2007) (citations and footnote 

omitted).

After careful review of the parties’ briefs, the certified record, and the 

PCRA court’s decision, we affirm on the basis of that decision. See PCRA Ct. 

Op. at 3-4 (holding that Alleyne has no retroactive effect to cases in which 

judgments of sentence had become final (citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 998, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014)). More recently and definitively, our 

Supreme Court held “Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases pending 

on collateral review . . . .” Commonwealth v. Washington, ___ A.3d ___, 

2016 WL 3909088 at *8 (Pa. July 19, 2016). Having discerned no abuse of 

discretion or law, we affirm the order below. See Wilson, 824 A.2d at 333.
J-S59034-16

- 3 -

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/31/2016
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED OC TOBER 28 , 2016

NO. 03

- 15

- 00530

- CR

Jack Bissett, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 6 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PE MB ERTON, AND FIELD

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction r en d ered by the trial court. Having reviewed

the record and t he parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the

trial court’s judgment . Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment of conviction

.

Because a ppellant is indigent and unable to pay costs , no adjudication of costs is made

.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Kewaunee Scientific Corporation (the Company) for the
period ending January 31, 2007, I, D. Michael Parker, Senior Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



| | (1) | such Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended January 31, 2007, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in such Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended January 31, 2007, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: March 15, 2007



/s/ D. Michael ParkerD. Michael ParkerSenior Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial
Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Consolidated Balance Sheet at June 30, 1998, and the Consolidated Statement of
Income for the period ending June 30, 1998, and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such Form 10-Q.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                           88600
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   346200
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     222800
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                725700
<PP&E>                                         4918100
<DEPRECIATION>                                 2374900
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 3686400
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           563600
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         54200
<OTHER-SE>                                     1450400
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   3686400
<SALES>                                         685500
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                685500
<CGS>                                           383700
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   664000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (25900)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               29700
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  47400
<INCOME-TAX>                                      5500
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              41900
<DISCONTINUED>                                   59500
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    101400
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.13
        


</TABLE>
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Holston Banks, III

, * From the 118th District Court

of Howard County,

Trial Court No. 14870

.

Vs. No. 11

- 1 8

- 00 337

- CR * December 31, 2020

The State of Texas

, * Memorand um Opinion by Bailey

, C.J.

(P anel consists of: Bailey , C.J.,

Trotter , J. , and Wright, S.C.J.,

sitting by assignment )

( Willson , J., not participating)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is no

error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s opi nion,

the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
Case 7:07-cv-03332-CLB-MDF Document 4 Filed 05/30/2007 Page 1 of 1
DISMISS and Opinion Filed August 14, 2014 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-00470-CV 

CHIRON POINT INVESTMENTS FUND I, LLC, Appellant 

V. 

SCOTT H. HOWARD, EDWIN B. HOWARD, AND KENNETH S. BRODY, Appellees 

On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-11-09150 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Francis, and Lang-Miers 

Opinion by Justice Bridges 

Before the Court is appellant’s unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal. Appellant has 

informed the Court that it no longer wishes to pursue the appeal. Accordingly, we grant 

appellant’s motion and dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). 

140470F.P05 

 

/David L. Bridges/ 

DAVID L. BRIDGES 

JUSTICE 
 –2– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

CHIRON POINT INVESTMENTS 

FUND I, LLC, Appellant 

No. 05-14-00470-CV V. 

SCOTT H. HOWARD, EDWIN B. 

HOWARD, AND KENNETH S. BRODY, 

Appellees 

 On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas. 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-11-09150. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. 

Justices Francis and Lang-Miers, 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED. 

 It is ORDERED that the parties bear their own costs of this appeal. 

Judgment entered August 14, 2014
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Woodstock Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), William J. Raike, III, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Melissa L. Whitley, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, respectively, do each certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his and her knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ William J. Raike, III            
|William J. Raike, III                
|President and Chief Executive Officer
|March 21, 2011                       
|                                     
|/s/ Melissa L. Whitley               
|Melissa L. Whitley                   
|Chief Financial Officer              
|March 21, 2011
<PAGE>


EXHIBIT 32.1


     CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the amended Annual Report of One Voice Technologies, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Dean Weber, Chief Executive Officer and Interim Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 9.06 has been
provided to One Voice and will be retained by One Voice and furnished to the
Securities Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

Dated: APRIL 4, 2008



/s/ Dean Weber
-----------------------------
Name: Dean Weber
President, Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer),
interim Chief Financial Officer
(Principal accounting and financial officer),
Chairman of the Board and Secretary
#### NEWTON v. INSURANCE CO.

No. 94 PC.

Case below: 27 N.C. App. 168.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals allowed 5 November 1975.