REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No s
. 5 99 September Term, 201 5

______________________________________ BOARD OF LIQUOR LICENSE COMMISSIIONER FOR BAL TIMORE CIT Y, ET AL.

v. BRETT AUSTIN ET AL.

______________________________________ Krauser, C.J., Arthur , Kenney, James. A. , III (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

______________________________________ Opinion by Kenney , J.

______________________________________ Filed: April 26, 2017The transfer of a liquo r license i n Baltimore City often involves issues of life and death, and in some instances, zombies and phantoms

. 1 In this case , the Circuit Court for Baltimore City reversed the September 25, 2014 , two

- to

- one decision of the Board of Liquor Commissioners f or Baltimore City (the “Board”) that the license to sell liquor at
an establishment previously known as Turner’s in Federal Hill , (the “License”), had “expired.” Appellants are the Federal H ill Neighborhood Association in addition to a
number of individu als 2 (collectively referred to in this opinion as the “Association”) and
the Board . The appellees , Brett Austin and Jo shua F o ti , are the con tract purchaser s of the
License (the “Contract Purchasers”)

. The q uestion presented , slightly rephrased, is:
Did t he circuit court err in its determina tion that the License had not expired by operation of law when the transfer of the License to the Contract

1 A zombie is defined as “the supernatural power according to voodoo belief may enter into and reanimate a dead body.” Merriam Webster, Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1372 (10th ed. 2000). A phantom is defined as “something (as a specter) apparent to sense but with no substantial existence. Merriam Webster, Merriam Webster ’s Collegiate Dictionary 868 (10th ed. 20 00). Both are used as slang terms to refer to a liquor license that has been permitted by the Board to survive, for transfer purposes, beyond the statutory expiration period.

2 The docket entries indicate that, in addition to “the Association,” the fol lowing individuals were interested parties to the suit: Arthur Adasse, Douglas Berkowitz, Michael Brassert, George Della, Sall y Dworak

- Fisher, Keenan Dworak

- Fisher, Michael Eckhardt, John Ginovsky, Nancy Gordon, Tom Gregory , Joseph Halperin, Lynn Halperin, Alma Hays, David Hicks, Elizabeth Homer, Ivo Jamrosz, David Nicholas Kaw, Edward Kelly, Sarah Lambdin, Jeff Lewis, Rosalie McCabe, Helen Brooke Mcdonald, Vincent Mettle, Debra Nelson, Nick Patron, Joseph Reed, Paul Robinson, Lana Robinson, Linwood Simpler , Diana Sugg, Shirley Summers, Mark Tonti, David Wallace, Judi Wallace, and Kyle Warner.Purchasers was not completed within 180 days after the Board approved the transfer?
We hold that it did and rev erse the decision of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Notwithstanding the extended procedural history of this case, the dispositive facts are not in dispute. Turner’s closed for bus iness on or about July 11, 2009, 3 during the license y ear ending April 30, 2010. The first applicati on to the Board to transfer the
License to the Contract Purchasers was filed on June 19, 2009. That application was approved by the Board on July 23, 2009. On January 19, 2010, Sam uel Daniels ( the
then

- Executi ve Secretary of the Board) signed a memorandum r ecommending that the deadline to complete the transfer be extended 180 days (to July 5, 2010 ) “[b]ased on discussion w/ Mr. Austin and receipt of projected completion schedule

. ” 4 T he Board grant ed three addit ional sixty

- day extensions to complete the transfer, all of which were granted after the prior extension period had ende d. T he last extension was granted on November 15, 2012. In the meantime, t he License was renewed in the name of the
Contract Purchasers for the license years ending on April 30 in 2011, 2012, and 2013.

3 The fire permit for the premises expired on July 11, 2009.

4 The statutory basis for the recommended extension, or w hether the Board was even involved , is unclear. It appears that the Contract Purchasers filed their first and only request for a hardship extension in a letter dated August 13, 2014, which was more than 180 days after the transfer of the License had been approved

.

- 2

-On February 25, 2013, a second Application for Transfer and Exp ansion was filed. 5 The validity of the License itself was raised when, “despite having prevailed in
their case in chief,” the Asso ciation sought judicial review on that issue . On December 13, 2013, a hearing was held , and on December 23, the circuit court remanded the case to the Board to create a record on the validity issue. On Feb ruary 20, 2014, the Board held
the remand hear ing “to determine the status of the license under the provisions of [ M aryland Code (1957, 2011 Repl

. Vol.) Article 2B, § 10

– 504(d) (“Article 2B § 10

- 504(d)”)] ” related to liquor license transfers and the expiration of a license 180 days after
a license hol der has closed the business or ceased actual alcoholic beverages business operations in Baltimore City. At that hearing, t he Association argued that the L icense had “sat dormant since July 2009,” and even though the “Board approved the application for

a tr ansfer of ownership to a new location and repeatedly extended [the] approval, no transfer was ever completed.”
T he Contract Purchasers argued that the annual renewal of the L icense without protest “can certainly be construed as a tolling of the period und er Article 2B.” Moreover,
the “ va lidity” of the ir L icense for May 1, 201 3

– April 30, 201 4, “was ruled upon , ” and
because they had rel ied o n the renewals and the direction they received from the Board , “principles of collateral estoppel” and res judicata pre cluded revisiting the validity issue

.

5 The original intent was to transfer the license to 1100

- 06 South Charles Street. Later, it was determined to expand and utilize the original East Cross Street premises.

- 3

-The Board, in the “decision phase” of the February 20, 2014 hearing , concluded
that “even with an extension , legal or otherwise, the [ L ] icense would have been
considered dorm ant ” as of October 17, 2011, notwithstandin g extensi on s or “ a transfer of

owners hip hearing after that time.” C haracterizing the Contract Purchaser s’ arguments as “generally center[ing] around estoppel,” the Board concluded “that the only way to avoid
the inj ustice . . . is to declare the [L] icense viable as of today.” 6
The Association again sought judicial review of the Board ’s decision . On August
1 3 , 2014, a Stipulation of Dismissal and Agreement for Remand to the Board was entered at the request of the Board and the Association and , on Septembe r 17, 2014, the circuit
court issued an order remanding to the Board and dismiss ing the case

. The stated purpose of the remand was “so the [Board] can conduct further proceedings on this matter within sixty (60) days after the date of the dismissal of this appeal. ”
The second rema nd hearing was held on September 25, 2014. 7 The Contract
Purchasers moved to dismiss the proceeding on the grounds that the Boar d had failed to
inform them of the judicial review proceeding s challenging the Board’s Fe bruary 20,
2 014 decision that the L icense was “viable.” In response, th e Chair noted that the
Contract Purchasers had actual notice of the judicial review proceedings because their

6 At that time, the members of the Board were Stephen Foglema n, Chair man , Elizabeth C. Smith, and Harvey E. Jones.

7 The composition of t he Board had now changed. The new C hair man was Thomas Ward, and Dana Petersen Moore had replaced Elizabeth C. Smith. Harvey E. Jones remained on the Board.

- 4

-counsel , by “letter dated April 9, 2014,” wrote the then

- Chairman of the Board
acknowle dging that the Association “had filed an appeal in the Circuit Court.” Observing
that the Contract Purchasers had not appealed the circuit court decision, the Board denied
the motion to dismiss and the hearing proceeded. As to the Board’s right to reconsi der the viability of the License, t he Association argued that the issue was not one of fact, but one of law that the Board was entitled to review. It pointed out that t he Board ’s prior decisi on had been based on a theory of estoppel resulting from the Boar d’s accept ance of renewal fees after the L icense had expired

. But, it argued, “the government cannot be estopped under the same terms as
oth er litigants,” and the Contract Purchasers could not rely on the “unauthorized acts” o f the Board’s agents.
T he Ass ociation called as a witness former Senator George Della , who had sponsored the 2000 legislation creating Article 2B § 10

- 504(d) , which is commonly
referred to as the “180 day rule.” According to Senator Della: It basically says [a] license can remain dor mant fo r 180 days. And then if there’ s a hardship, then that licensee can come back to the [B] oard and make their case , if they ’ re in a hardship situation . An d then the Board could then grant them another extension of 180 days. * * * * Beyond that, if th ey don’t activate that license, that license is dead. That’s what the legislative intent is behind the 180 day rule. And the Board knew it. The Board knew it.
Counsel for the Contract Purchasers sta ted th at they were not arguing estoppel or a mis take by the Board or its agents. Nor were they relying on the har dship extension provisions of the statute

. Rather, they were contending, citing Yim, LLC v. Tuzeer , 211

- 5

-Md. App. 1 (2013 ), that , notwithstanding cessation of the business itself, the successive

ren ewals of the L icense “tolls the 180 period. ” In addition, the Contract Purchasers
advanced a pol icy argument that the Board’s adoption of the Association’s position
would thwart r edevelopment efforts in the c ity because these projects can “take years” to

c omplete. The better policy, in their view, was to permit a developer to “preserve” an existing license by renewals rather than issuing a new license. That , they argued, would satisfy the legislative “goal [of ] reduc[ing] the number of licens es.” In resp onse, c ounsel for the Associati on asserted that the Contract Purchaser s ’ policy argument “is essentially something to be taken up with the legislature,” but it did

not reflect the intent of the current legislation , and thus, its adoption by the Board would
be a “rewrite [ of ] the law.”
The Board expressly ruled on the validity of the L icense an d , by implication , on the Contract Purchaser s ’ recently filed hardship extension request, which would fail in
the absence o f a viable L icense to transfer

. T he Chairma n concluded t hat “th e license has expired.” He based his decision on the “ clear command of the law , ” and which had been “ignored” by the Board in granting the earlier purported extensions and lic ense renewals “outside the scope of its authority.” Commissi o ner Petersen Moore “agree[d]” with the
Chairman “for all the reasons stated.” Although Commis sioner Jones also agreed that “the license is dead,” he v oted “no” because, under the circumstances, he thought that a “second chance is needed.” On October 7, 20 14, the Contract Purchasers filed a Petition for Judici al Review.
A hearing was held on May 1, 2015 , and on May 5, 2015, the circuit court reversed the

- 6

-Board , stating that it s decision “was not supported by substantial evidence and was clearly erroneous a s a matter of law.” The court explained that : failure to complete a transfer of a license within 180 days pursuant to Art. 2B § 10

- 503(d)(4) does not carry a sanction of expiration of the license. To hold that such a sanction applies is illogical in the face of Art. 2B § 10

- 504(d)(2)(i), which provides an exception to the 10

- 504(d)(2) 180 day expiration provision when a transfer “has been approved or is pending.” Furthermore, in the instant case the Board approved the transfer on July 23, 2009, and the r ecord contains several references to the approval and the fact that the transfer “remains pending.” Thus, the 2B § 10

- 504(d)(2)(i) exception for approved or pending transfers would apply. The Board filed its timely appeal on May 29, 2015.
STANDARD OF R EVIEW “On appellate review of the decision of an administrative agenc y, this Court reviews the agency’ s decision, not th e circuit court’ s decision.” Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Prigel Family Creamery , 206 Md. A pp. 264, 273 (2012) (quoting Halici v. City of Gaithersburg , 180 Md. App. 238, 248 (2008) ). W e “determine whether the agency’ s decision is in accordance with the law or whether it is arbitrary, illegal, and capricious.” Prigel Family Creamery , 206 Md. A pp. at 274 (quoting Md. Dep’t of the Env’ t v. Ives , 136 Md. App. 581, 585 (2001) ). In doing so, w e will uphold factual decisions and discretionary judgment s that are “ supported reasonably by substantial evidence.” HNS Dev., LLC v. People’ s Counsel , 425 Md. 436, 449 (2012) ( citations omitted). Our r eview

o f the agency’s legal conclusion s is less deferential , but, we respect the agency’s expertise in its field and g ive considerable weigh t to it s inter pretation and application of

a ny statu te s or regulations it is charged with administering

. Thanner Enters., L LC v. Balt. Cty. , 414 Md. 265, 275 (2010)

.

- 7

-When , as here, the issue centers on statutory construction , and thus, legislative intent, we look first at “the statute’s plain la nguage as ordinarily understood ” because that
is “ [t] he most reliab le indicator of the [legislative] intent .” Id. at 277. And, when the language is “clear and unambiguous, we ordinarily ‘need not look beyond [its] provisions and our analysis ends.’” Opert v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. , 403 Md. 587, 593 (2008) (alteration added) (quoting Barbre v. Pope , 402 Md. 157, 173 (2007)). “[W]here a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the s etting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment.” Tucker v. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co. , 308 Md. 69, 75 (1986) . In other words, a provision within an i ntegrated statutory scheme must be understood in its broader context and, to the extent possible , harmoni zed with the other provi sions

. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’ n of
M d

. , 305 Md. 145, 157 (1986)

. Contention s of the Parties The Association contends that under Article 2B, § 10

- 504(d), a liquor license in Baltimore City expires 180 days after th e licensee “ has closed the business or ceased active alcoholic beverage business operation s .” I f an application to transfer the l icense is
filed and approved by the Board, the Association asserts tha t the approved transfer “ must be completed

— by operating a n alcoholic beverage business

— within 180 day s ,” unless ,

- 8

-u nder Article 2B § 10

- 504(d)(4), the Board finds that undue hardship exists. 8 (Emphasis in original). The refore, it argues, the grant of any extensions in this case was contrary to the “plain language ” of the statute , and any Board practice or course of conduct
“inconsist ent with the statutory scheme” i s entitled to “no weight.” As to the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estop pel, the Association
contends that the Board, “as a government ag ency,” cannot be “estopped from applying the express direction it has been given by the Legislature merely because an employee of the agency accepted [ a renewal] payment for an expired license.” I n support, i t cites Marzullo v. K a hl , 366 Md. 158, 195 ( 200 1 ) ( Baltimore County Board of A ppeals not estopped from enforcing zoning regulation that prevented appellant , who h ad substantially constructed a reptile barn and obtained a permit approval to do so from the Baltimore County Dep artment of Permits and Licen ses , from using his property to breed reptiles ) ; ARA Health Serv s ., Inc. v. Dep’ t of Pub

. Safety and Co rr . Serv s. , 344 Md. 85,
95 ( 1996) (Department of Corrections not estopped from seeking reimbursement for
overpa yment of a contract provider to which the Department had remitted the excessive payments without objection) ; and Heckler v. C m ty. Health Serv s . of Crawford C ty. Inc. , 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984) ( Department of Health and Human Services not estopped from recouping overpayment s made to a non

- profit organ ization)

.

8 Article 2B 10

- 504(d) (3) states that a licensee “may make a written request to t he Board for an extension of the life of the license due to undue hardship for a time period of no more than a cumulative period of 360 days after the date of closing or cessation of alcoholic beverages business operations of the business [for which the li cense is held] .”

- 9

-The Board contends that “under the appropriate interpretation of the applicable

statut ory provisions, the License had expired as a matter of law.” The transfer application was approved by the Board on July 23, 2009, and under Article 2B § 10

- 503 (d), the transfer had to be completed by January 19, 2010

. Once the 180 day expiration period provided for in the statute was “no longer suspended ,” the License “ which had already been inactive for well over 180 days

– expired as a matter of law.” Therefore, according to the Board, any “purported” extensions were invalid because they are not authorized by
the statute. And, “[t]he same analysis applies” to the Board’s acceptance of renewal fees “for the inactive License,” because t he renewal of the License doe s not “reset” or
“ex tend” the “180 day rule.” The Board recognizes , however, that there may be a situation where the transfer deadline “overlap[s] two licensing per iods.” When that happens , the license would have to be renewed “before the transfer has been completed.”
The Contract Purchasers mount a two prong ed attack on the denial of their motion to dismiss the remand proce edings . The first is the failure of the Board to notify them of the judicial review proceeding initiated by the Association and the subsequent remand to
the Bo ard by stipulation. The second is the contention that the Board wa s barred from holding a second hearing on the same issue when a substantial record has already been created before it , it rendered a decision based on that record . . . and no hearing of any kind, nor ruling made on any substantive issue , has been heard nor rendered by the C ircuit C ourt for Baltimore City

.

- 10

-As to the Board’s interpretation of the statute at t he September 17, 2014, remand hearing, the Contract Purch asers appear to object to the fact that Senator D e lla had been
called as a witness and had testified to the intent of the “180 day r ule” legislation. 9 They
further contend that the Board “accepted legal conclusions drawn by [ Senator ] Della as
the basis fo r its decisio n.” M ore particularly, however, they point to “ the lack of recognition by both [Senator D e lla] and [the Board ] of the pertinent section of Article 2B , namely § 10

- 504(d)(2)(i).” 10 They argue that the subsection’s “then pending” language “expa nd [s] upon the 180 day rule ,” and , citing Yim , 211 Md. App. at 36, that a purchaser
of such a license can keep a license from expiring by annual renewals of the li cense as long as the intended transfer remains “p ending.”
T he Board , in its reply brief, con tends t hat the Contract Purchaser s’ reliance on
Yim is “misplaced” because the Yim C ourt “merely held that a liquor license did not

9 At the remand hearing the Contract Purchasers’ counsel only objected to Senator Della’s testimony “for the record as to the legal conclusion from the witness.” He stated that Senator Della was “certainly entitled to testify as to the le gislative intent,” but it was the Board’s responsibility “to interpret the laws . . . in terms of what happens to the license after it’s dormant.” The Chairman commented that counsel was “absolutely correct” as to any legal conclusion on the part of Senato r Della and nothing in the record suggests that the Board relied on his testimony in reaching its conclusion in this case. Senator Della’s testimony included background on why he introduced the legislation and was referred to by one of the Board members as a “living legislative history.”

10 Article 2B Section 10

- 504(d)(2)(i) provides that an alcoholic beverage license shall expire 180 days after the holder’s business has closed or ceased alcohol sales, unless: “An application for approval of a transfer to another location or an application for assignment to another person pursuant to § 10

- 503(d) of this subtitle has been approved or is then pending .” (Emphasis added). Section 10

- 503(d) provides the procedures for transferring a license.

- 11

-expire when the licensee had filed a timely request for a hardship extension under § 10

- 504(d)(2)(ii i ) of Article 2B, even t hough the licensee did not file his annual renewal application on time while the hardship request was pending.” As to “impermissibly” relying on the testimony of Senator Della “as the basis” for its interpretation of the statutory la nguage, the Board “ made clear that it was not seeking a legal conclusion” but

“ only background information on the legislative history” from Senator Della and it made only a mention of legislative history in its “methodically summarized” opinion. In regard to the Contract Purcha ser s’ argument that the Board was not authorized to hold the September 25, 2014 hearing and reconsider its February 20, 2014 decision,
the Board sta tes that it denied the Contract Purchaser s’ motion to dismiss and the c ircuit

court had agreed. Therefore, i n the absence of an appeal of the circuit court decision by
th e Contract Purchasers, the d enial of the motion to dismiss wa s not “properly” before the
Board in the September 25, 2014 hearing but had it been , it would fail

. Regarding the Board’s failure t o provide notice to the Contract Purchasers of the Association’s petition for judicial review, the Board argue s that the record demonst rates
actual notice to the Contract Purchasers within three weeks of the petition being fil ed.
Nevertheless , they took n o action to participate in the proceeding in the month s leading up to the circuit court’s remand to the Board . Moreover , any “technical deficits” resulting from the Board’s failur e to provide notice “were cured” because there was no judicial re view as a r esult of the remand and the Contract Purchasers had a full opportun ity to participate in the subsequent proceeding s
.

- 12

-As to Contract Purchaser s’ res judicata argument, the Board , citing Board of County Comm’rs of Cecil C ty

. v. Racine , 24 Md. App. 435, 450 (1975), acknowledges that principles of res judicata may apply to a final administrative agency decision “ passed in the exercise of its discretion upon issues of fact or up on mixed issues of law and fact. ”
B ut , “when there has been substantial change of c onditions or it is shown that the
decision was the product of

. . . mistake ,” the Board’s decision may be reconsidered and, in the proper case, reverse d

. Id. Here, on remand , the Board “was singularly focused ” on

“ reconsidering its prior interpretation an d appl ication of the law,” and not the facts of t he
case. N ot only did the Board have the right to reconsider, it had a duty to do so. The Association, in its reply brief , also responds to the Contract Purchasers ’ argument that the remand proceedings shou ld have been dismissed based on “ lack of
notice ” by the Board and “ principles of res judicata .” In regard to the for mer, it too
references the Contract Purchasers ’ actual notice and their failure to intervene. Regarding
the latter , the Association contends that the remand meant that there wa s no final judgment . The February 20, 2014, decision of the Board went to the circuit court o n the
Association’s petition for judicial review and was then remanded to the Board for further proceedings with out a ruling o n the merits. But , even if there had been a final judgment, the Association agrees that “an agency is not bound by inflexible principles of res judicata with re g ard to decision s that are legally, as oppo sed to factually, erroneous.” Quoti ng Radio Communic ations , Inc. v. Public Serv ice Comm ission of M arylan d. , 50 Md. App. 422, 430

– 31 ( 1982) , the Association asserts “ an affirmative duty upon an administrative agency to correct a prior decision when, because of an error of law, a

- 13

-continued adherence to its er roneous decision would place a litigant at an unfair disadvantage. ’ ”
The Association rejects the circuit court’s reading of Article 2B, § 10

- 503(d)(4) that a “pending” transfer would extend the life of the License. It contends that argument
is “based on a misreading ” of the re levant provisions of the statute

. As to the Contract Purchasers ’ reliance on Y im , the Association asserts that the “primary issue” in that case was “ whether alleged defects in application s to transfer the
license rendered the transfe r s ineffective.” But, because “ any defects in the application s to transfer had been corrected . . . the statut ory period was tolled,” and the L icense did not expire. In its view, the Contract Purchasers “have attempted to seize on language in
dictum in a footnote in Yim ” that is unrelated to the Court’s decision in that case.
ANALYSIS We begin by addressing the Contract Purchaser s’ arguments regarding the denial
of thei r motion to dismiss the remand proceeding. The first argument relates to the failure

o f the Board to notify them that the Association had sought judicial review of the Board’s February 20, 2014, decision re garding the L icense. 11 They raised this argument in passing

11 Maryland Rule 7

- 2 02(d)(3) provides: (3) Notice From Agency to Parties

. (A) Duty. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the agency, upon receiving the copy of the petition from the clerk, shall give written notice promptly to all parties to the agency proceeding that: (i) a petition for judicial review has been filed, the date of the filing, the name of the court, and the civil action number; and

- 14

- (Continued...)a t the September 25, 2014 remand hearing and in the circuit court hearing on their
Petition for Judicial Review of the Board’s Decision . They also argued that the Board
viol ated its Administrative R ule N umber O ne, which was adopted to avoid the Board “reviewing the decisions of past liquor boards ” and required motions for reconside ratio n to be filed within sixty days.
T he circuit court expressly rejected the argument related to A dmin istrative Rule
Number One because there was no motion for reconsideration in this case . T he circuit

court otherwise found the “denial of the motion to dismi ss was appropriate” and moved directly to the issue of whether the L icense had “expired.”

(ii) a party who wishes to oppose the petition must file a response within 30 days after the date the agency's notice was sent u nless the court shortens or extends the time. (B) Method. The agency may give the notice by first class mail or, if the party has consented to receive notices from the agency electronically, by electronic means. And, in regard to a “response,” Maryland Ru le 7

- 204 provide s, in relevant part : (a) Who May File; Contents. Any person, including the agency, who is entitled by law to be a party and who wishes to participate as a party shall file a response to the petition. The response shall state the intent to participate in the action for judicial review. No other allegations are necessary. * * * * (c) Time for Filing Response; Service. A response shall be filed within 30 days after the date the agency mails notice of the filing of the petition unless the court shortens or extends the time. The response need be served only on the petitioner, and shall be served in the manner prescribed by Rule 1

- 321.

- 15

- (...contin ued)The Contract Purchasers did not press the notification argument or question the

c ourt’s failure to expressly address it, and they did not appeal the c ourt’s dec ision.
Therefore , the iss ue is not before us on appeal, b ut, if it were, the y would fare no better. Not only did the Contract Purchasers have actual notice of the petition for judicial
review “as early as April 9, 2014, ” they took no action in that procee ding in the 161 days
between that date and September 17, 2014, when the court signed the order for remand

. A nd, because of the remand, there was no judicial review on the merits . In short, the purpose of the rule was effectively satisfied , and the Contract Purchasers were not deprived of an opportunity to assert their legal rights before the court

. As to any concern regarding Senator Della’s testimony, the circuit court did not
“find any error,” and i t is clear from the record that the Board’s decision tha t t he L icense had expired was based on the plain language of the applicable statutory provisions and not on Senator Della’s testimony. 12

12 In Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc. , 310 Md. 437, 471 n.18 (1987), the Court of Appeals commented t hat statements of legislative intent by individual legislators “run[s] afoul of well

- recognized principles,” citing Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction , § 48.16

– 17 (4th ed. 1986). The current version of section 48.16 indicates “[a] corollar y to the general rule against the use of statements by individual legislators made during debate on a bill directs courts not to consider testimony about legislative intent by members of the legislature which enacted a statute.” 2A Norman J. Singer, Suther land Statutory Construction , § 48:16 (7th ed.). And that “[p]ostenactment statements made by a legislator about legislative intent, including affidavits, are not part of the original enactment’s legislative history.” Id. The current version of section 48. 17 provides, in part, that “[c]ourts are cautious . . . and usually disregard any reference to an individual’s legislative motivation except as expressed in a statute itself.” Id. § 48:17. Here the legislation itself clearly expresses the motivation and in tent of the legislature (of which Senator Della was a small but important part). Although his testimony was

- 16

- (Continued...)The C ontract P urchaser s argue that the Board was “barred from holding a second
heari ng [because] a substantial record ha[d] already been created before it, it [had] rendered a decision based on that record, and no hearing of any kind, nor ruling ma de on any substantive issue, ha[d] been heard nor rendered by the Circuit Court of Balt imore City.” In support, they cite Gayw ood Comty. Ass’ n v . Metro. Transit Auth. , 246 Md. 93 (1967); Woodlawn Area Citizens Ass’n v. Board of C ty

. Co m m’ rs for Prince George’s
C ty

. , 241 Md. 187 (1966); Whittl e v. B d . of Zoning Appeals of Balt. C ty

. , 211 Md. 36 (1956); Bensel v. May or and City Co uncil of Balt. , 203 Md. 506 (1954); and May or and City Council of Balt. v. Linthicum , 170 Md. 245 (1936)

. They ass e rt that such cases, especially Whittle , 211 Md. 36, stand for the proposition that the Board, as an administrative body exercising quasi

- ju dic ia l authority,
could not reach a different conc lusion on the v iability of the License because “the facts and the law . . . have remained unchanged since February 20, 2014.” Quoting Gaywood Community Ass’ n 246 Md. at 99

- 100 , they state that their argumen t “rest[s] not strictly on the doctrine of res judicata, but upon the proposition that it would be arbitrary for the Board to arrive at opposite conclusio ns on substantially the same s t ate of facts and the

same law.” They draw further support from Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould , 273 Md. 486 (1975) , in which the agency first determined that t he claimant was an independent contractor , and later, “upon its own initiative,” and on the same facts,

inadmissible for purposes of discerning legislative intent, its admission was, in our view, harmless in this case

.

- 17

- (...contin ued)determined he w as an employee. Id. at 519

. T he re, the Cour t of Appeals held that the
agency ’s “attempt to redetermine [Gould’s] status was clearly erroneous as a matter of
law.” I d.
T he redetermination in this case came about when the Association filed for judicial review of the B oard’s initial decision . R ather t han a reapplication of the same
facts to the same law , the issue before the Board in the “second hearing” was essentially
the interpretation of the law itself , and whether it had made a mistake in its pr ior interpretation o f the controlling law. Because it determined that it had , the Board could reverse its prior decision . A s t he Racine Court concluded: “Perpetuation of illegality by an administrative body by inflexible application of the principle of res judicata is impermissible.” Racine , 24 Md. App. at 4 52. Notably, t he Racine Court found support for
that conclusion in Gould , in which the Court of Appeals stated “ [m] istaken interpretations of law, however honestly arrived at, are held not to be within the exercise
of sound administrative discretion and th e legislative prerogative, but to be arbitrary and illegal. ” 273 Md. at 521

. Tu rning now to the expiration of the License in this case , o ur analysis begins and
ends with the provisions of Article 2B, § 10

- 504(d) , read in the context of the statutory
scheme : (d) Baltimore City.

-- (1)(i) This subsection applies only in Baltimore City. (ii) In this subsection, “Board” means the Board of License Commissioners or the Office of the Comptroller, whichever is the issuing party.

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-(2) 180 days after the holde r of any license issued under the provisions of this article has closed the business or ceased active alcoholic beverages business operation of the business for which the license is held, the license shall expire unless: (i) An application for approva l of a transfer to another location or an application for assignment to another person pursuant to § 10

- 503(d) [ 13 ] of this subtitle has been approved or is then pending ; (ii) An application pursuant to § 10

– 506 [ 14 ] of this subtitle has been approved or is then pending ; or (iii) A written request for a hardship extension , as provided in this subsection, is filed within the 180

– day period

. (3) The license e or other appropriate interested parties may make a written request to the Board for an extensio n of the life of the license due to undue hardship, for a time period of no more than a cumulative period of 360 days after the date of closing or cessation of alcoholic beverages business operations of the business for which the license is held. (4) Afte r a hearing conducted on the extension request, on a finding that undue hardship currently exists causing the closing or cessation of business operations, the board may grant an extension of the life of the license for a time period not to exceed 360 days as defined in paragraphs (3) and (5) of this subsection.

13 Article 2B § 10

- 503(d) , in rel evant part, states: (1) This subsection applies only in Baltimore City. (2) A transfer of any license may only be made as authorized in subsection (a) of this section if the Board has presented to it a receipt or certificate from the Director of Finance showing there are no unpaid taxes on the merchandise, fixtures, and stock of the transferor due to the City of Baltimore or the State of Maryland. * * * * (4) A transfer of any license shall be completed not more than 180 days after the Board approves th e transfer.

14 Article 2B § 10

- 506 concerns r ules and regulation s related to the e xpiration or continuation of a l icense of a deceased li cense holder

.

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-(5) It is the intent of this subsection that the total time period for which a license may be deemed unexpired under paragraph (2) of this subsection is 180 days if no undue hardship extension is gr anted, and no more than 360 days if an undue hardship extension has been granted . The time period begins at the earlier of the closing of the business or cessation of alcoholic beverages business, and shall be tolled only upon the filing of an application or request described in paragraph (2) of this subsection , the expiration period to begin running again, cumulatively to the time period before the filing of the application or request, upon the occurrence of the later to occur of the following events: (i) Final action of the Board granting or denying a request authorized by paragraph (3) of this subsection; (ii) Final action of the Board denying an application described under paragraph (2)(i) or (ii) of this subsection; or ( iii) Final judgme nt of the appellate court when judicial review of the Board’s action on an application or request authorized by paragraph (2) or (3) of this subsection has been sought, or on dismissal of a petition for judicial review. (6) If an application or request to the Board described in paragraph (2) or (3) of this subsection is withdrawn, there shall be no tolling of the period for automatic expiration of the license and it shall be deemed as if no such application or request was filed. (Emphasis added). The pl ain langua ge of the statute supports the Board’s conclusion at the remand hearing that the L icense had “ expired

. ” The closing of Turner’s in July of 20 09 triggered the 180 day rule (“180 days after the holder of any license . . . has closed the business o r ceased active alcoholic beverages business operations . . . the license shall expire [

. ] ” Article 2B, §10

- 504(d)(2 ) ) . T he 180 days can be tolled by “ [a]n application for approval of a transfer to another location or an application for assignment to anothe r person ”
which “ has been approved or is then pending .” In context, “p ending” clearly refers to a
transfer application that is awaiting Board action and not the intended completed transfer

. In the absence of a “hardship extension ” by the Board , the transf er of the License had to

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-be completed not more than 180 days after the Board approved the transfer on July 23,
2009. Not only is the plain language of the statute clear , p aragra ph (5) of the subsection
states the legislative intent , that is, “ the total ti me period for which a license may be deemed unexpired . . . is 180 days if no undue hardship extension is granted , and no more than 360 days if an undue hardship extension has been granted. ” Id. § 10

- 503(d)(5). And,

t his same intent is reflected in other r elated statutory provisions. For example, t he initial transfer request was filed under § 10

- 503(d), which also provides that the transfer “shall be completed not more than 180 days after the Board approves the transfer.” And, u nder
section 10

- 50 4 (d) , a ha rdship extension “filed within the 180 day period, ” may extend the
life of the lic e nse to “no more than 360 days” from “the date of closing or cessation of alcoholic beverages business operations [

. ] ” When the application was approved on July 23, 2009, the applicant had 180 day s to complete the transfer, i.e. , until January 19, 2010 , subject to filing a request for a hardship extension during the 180 day period. 15 As noted, no hardship extension request

was filed until August 13, 2013. But , even if t he first 180 day extension could be

15 Article 2B Subsection 10

- 504(4) indicates that the Board may, after a hearing, “on a finding that undue hardship currently exists, grant an extension.”

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-considered a hardship extension, the transfer had to be completed within 360 days of the closing of the business or the cessation of liquor sales in July of 2009

. 16
A t the Septem ber 25, 2014 hearing , counsel for the Contract Pur chasers indicated that they had “never filed for 180 day hardship, but what [they] did do was renew the license every year , ” and that “ the renewal toll s the 180 day period” to complete the transfer. On appeal, and “[a]ssuming arguendo, the five (5) year s of license renewals
cannot be construed as evidence of a ‘ pending transfer, ’ ” the Contract Purchasers argue, citing Yim , “the renewals are still permitted by law to preserve the validity of the
license [

. ] ” We do not agree.
In Yim , the C ourt considered wh ether a liquor license issued to Two Sisters, LLC for its restaurant operation had expired for its failure to renew the license in a timely

manner. 211 Md. 21

- 24. In its analysis, the Court noted the difference between the Board’s authority to accept a lat e filed renewal application and it s authority under Article 2B § 10

- 504(d), where “[s]epa rate statutory provisions apply.” Id. at 26. The Court
concluded that a late filed renewal application , which could be accepted by the Board, did not preclude the fili ng of a hardship extension within 180 days of the “last day of active alcoholic beverages business.” Id. at 34.
The Contract Purchasers seek support in a footnote in Yim that states: “ A s we discuss below, this time period [ the 360 days from cessation of a lcoholic beverages

16 Whether the Board’s failure to act on a pending application could extend the life of a license beyond the 360 days from the close of business or cessation of liquor sales is not before us.

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-business ] is held in abeyance upon the receipt of a transfer or renewal application, making the effective length of the hard ship extension longer .” Id. at 36 n.30. The footnote is unrelated to the issue being considered by the Yim C ourt and has no application to the facts of this case. In it s later discussion , the Court states that if the Board “grants the transfer application, the transfer must occur within 180 days of the Board’s approval .” Id. at 38 (emphasis added). But, “once the B oard granted the hardship extension request, Two Sisters’ license was considered unexpired for 360 days after Two Sisters stopped s erving alcohol.” Id. The Court stated that the 360 days is
tolled when “a transfer application is pending” and commented that “there is no statutory requirement that Board render a decision on a transfer application within a certain period
of time.” Id.
T he l angua ge of the footnote in no way suggest s that the renewal of a license overcomes the requirements of Article 2 B § 10

- 50 4(d) to complete an approved transfer within 180 days of the approval in the absence of a granted hardship extension request. At most, it recognizes a possible delay between the filing of a transfer request and it being acted upon by the Board

. See footnot e 17 , supra at 21 . T hat the Two Sisters license “survived beyond Two Sisters’ business itself and lived on to be renewed or transferred,”
Id. at 36, simply means that t he Two Sisters license was kept alive on the statutory life support of a timely hardship extension request that was filed within 180 days of the
cessation of the alcohol sales business.

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-In sum , the Board correctly determined that the License had expired . And, neither the approved but uncompleted transfer nor the Board’s subsequent renewal s of the
License could imbue it with new life.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED . COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE S
.

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