Filed 8/10/15 In re Amaya B. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re AMAYA B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B259770 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TJ21473)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

AMAYA B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a n order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

Catherine J. Pratt, Ju venile Court Referee. Affirmed as corrected with directions

.

Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURA L BACKGROUND

After Amaya B. (then 13 years old) punched, kicked

, and hit a middle school

classmate with a belt, t he People filed a petition alleging that she had committed assau lt
by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)).
Amaya denied the allegation and filed a motion pursuant to Welfare and Institutions

Code section 700.1 to suppress her statements to David L l amas, a Los Angeles School
Police Officer, in which she admitted beating up J.J. (then 12 years ol d) a fter school.
Amaya argued that Officer Llama s obtained her statements in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.

The court heard the suppression motion in conjunction with the jurisdiction
hearing. Officer L l amas testified that he interviewed J.J. the d ay after the incident . J.J.

said he saw his attacker during the assault but did not know her name. Nor was he able to
find her photograph in the school yearbook. J.J. explained to the officer , however, that he

had since learned from others that his atta cker ’ s name was Amaya.

Officer L l amas testified that he spoke to Amaya on the campus of the middle

school. Before commencing the interview, Officer L l amas advised Amaya of her right to
remain silent, to the presence of an attorney and, if indigent, to appointed counsel.

( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602].) Amaya
waived her rights and made incriminating statements.
Following argument by counsel, the juvenile court denied the motion to suppress

and Officer L l amas ’ t estimony resumed

. H e testified Amaya admitted to him that she
had beat up J.J. because he had called her names, and she described the assault in detail.

J.J. also testified about the attack. Amaya presented no evidence in her defense.

At the conclusio n of the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the
allegation true, declared the offense a felony

, and sustained the petition. The court

ordered Amaya home on probation and awarded her one day of predisposition credit

. A maya filed a timely notic e of appeal, challenging the denial of her suppression motion.3 DISCUSSION

We appointed counsel to represent Amaya on appeal. After examination of the
record counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues. On April 29, 2015 we advised
Amaya that s he had 30 days within which to submit any contentions or issues s he w anted

u s to consider. We have received no response.

We have examined the record and are satisfied Amaya ’ s attorney on appeal has
fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and the re are no arguable issues. 1 ( See

Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277

- 284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People
v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112

- 113; People v

. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)

W hen the juvenile court sustained the delinquency petition and placed Amaya on
probation, however, the court did not adjudicate her a ward of the court. Although the

clerk ’ s minute order indicates Amaya was declared a ward of the court, “[w] hen there is a
discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of ju dgment and the minute order, the oral
pronouncement controls .” ( People v. Morales (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1587, 1594.)

“‘ The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a

pr ovision to the minute order.

. . . [Citation.]

. . . [T]he clerk ’ s minutes must accurately
reflect what occurred at the hearing. ’” ( Ibid. , quoting People v. Zackery (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 380, 387.) In addition, t he minute order does not reflect that the juvenile
court orally awarded Amaya one day of predisposition credit

. (See In re A.M. (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 1075, 1085 [“[i] n a juvenile delinquency proceeding, ‘ a minor is entitled to
credit against his or her maximum term of confinement for the time spent in custody

1 Amaya did not argue in her suppression motion that the waiver of her Miranda rights was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. (See People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 482 [ Miranda claim forfeited where “ Miranda was not one of the several grounds upon which defendant challenged the admissibility of this stateme nt below,” and “[a]s a result, the trial court had no opportunity to resolve material factual disputes and make necessary factual findings”]; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 667 [“[h] aving failed to make [ Miranda as a] basis for exclusion clear eithe r in his written motion or at the hearing on that motion, defendant has waived the right to assert error on those grounds now ”].)4

before the disposition hearing

, ’ ” and “ ‘ [i]t is the juvenile court’ s duty to calculate the
number of days earned, and the court may not delegate that duty ’ ” ].)

DISPOSITION

The cause is remanded for the juvenile court to declare Amaya B. a ward of the

court and to prepare a corrected disposition order reflect ing an award of one day of
predisposition credit. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

ZELON, J.