www.cdc.gov/niosh/face

___________________________

INCIDENT HIGHLIGHTS

DATE: 

February 1, 2014

TIME:

11:37 a.m.

VICTIM:

27-year old tower climber

32-year old tower climber

INDUSTRY/NAICS CODE:

Communication Tower/23

EMPLOYER: Communication tower 

servicing. 15 employees, 6 

working at the incident 

location

SAFETY & TRAINING:

Employer conducted 

training on tower climbing 

and rescue. Weekly safety 

meetings on various topics

SCENE: 

Site covered more than 2.5 

acres on top of a hill

LOCATION:

West Virginia

EVENT TYPE:

Tower collapse

REPORT#: 2015-02 REPORT DATE: May 28, 2019

Two Tower Climbers Fatally Injured When a 

Cellular Tower Collapsed While Performing 

Tower Upgrades – West Virginia.

________________________________________________________ 

SUMMARY 

On February 1, 2014, at approximately 11:37 am, two tower climbers were 

fatally injured when a 340-foot, Rohn 80 series cellular tower collapsed 

during upgrading/construction activities. Four employees were working on 

the tower removing diagonal tower supports and no temporary supports 

were installed. As a result, the tower collapsed and two employees were 

killed and two others were injured.... READ THE FULL REPORT> (p.3)

________________________________________________________ 

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include:

• Removal of multiple support structure braces of the tower before

reinforcing the tower’s structural integrity

• Lack of engineering analysis

• Lack of rigging plan LEARN MORE> (p.9)

_______________________________________________________ _ 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to help prevent similar 

occurrences, employers should: 

• Consult with an engineer to conduct a structural analysis

• Develop a written rigging plan

• Provide employees with training on hazard recognition

• Conduct a job hazard analysis (JHA)

• Train communication tower employees on the proper use of tower

climbing anchor points and fall protection equipment LEARN

MORE> (p.9)
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 2

NIOSH • 304-285-5916

1095 Willowdale Road

Morgantown, West Virginia 26505

Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an institute within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

(CDC), is the federal agency responsible for conducting research and making recommendations for the prevention of work-related 

injury and illness. In 1982, NIOSH initiated the Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program. FACE examines the

circumstances of targeted causes of traumatic occupational so that safety professionals, researchers, employers, trainers, and workers 

can learn from these incidents. The primary goal of these investigations is for NIOSH to make recommendations to prevent similar 

occurrences. These NIOSH investigations are intended to reduce or prevent occupational deaths and are completely separate from the 

rule making, enforcement and inspection activities of any other federal or state agency. Under the FACE program, NIOSH investigators 

interview persons with knowledge of the incident and review available records to develop a description of the conditions and 

circumstances leading to the deaths in order to provide a context for the agency’s recommendations. The NIOSH summary of these 

conditions and circumstances in its reports is not intended as a legal statement of facts. This summary, as well as the conclusions and 

recommendations made by NIOSH, should not be used for the purpose of litigation or the adjudication of any claim. For further

information, visit the program website at www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/ or call toll free at 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636).
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 3

SUMMARY 

On February 1, 2014, at approximately 11:37 am, two tower climbers were fatally injured when a 340-foot, Rohn 80 

series cellular tower collapsed during upgrading/construction activities. Four employees were working on the tower 

removing diagonal tower supports and no temporary supports were installed. As a result, the tower collapsed and two 

employees were killed and two others were injured. The tower fell onto the guy wires of an adjacent smaller cell tower 

and caused it to collapse, also killing a firefighter while he was attempting to rescue the injured employees on the 

ground. The collapse of the smaller tower is not covered in this report, but further information can be found in the 

NIOSH report F2014-03 [NIOSH 2014].

INTRODUCTION

On February 1, 2014, a Rohn, series 80, cellular tower collapsed while four tower climbers were completing renovations 

on the tower. On January 15, 2015, a safety and occupational health specialist from the NIOSH Division of Safety 

Research, and a guest researcher from the West Virginia University Occupational Medicine Residency Program met with 

the area director of the West Virginia Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and reviewed the 

circumstances of the incident. Photos from the incident site, witness statements, and the medical examiner’s report 

were provided to NIOSH. 

EMPLOYER

The employer has been in business since 2000 and provides services across the nation to the telecommunication 

industry, such as, cell tower upgrades and tower erection. The company employs approximately 15 employees, 6 

working at the location of this incident. The towers were inspected in May 2013, and the company was hired to conduct 

maintenance and perform upgrades.

WRITTEN SAFETY PROGRAMS and TRAINING

Prior to the fatal incident, the employer conducted training for employees related to tower climbing and rescue. The 

foreman conducted weekly safety meetings on various topics; a test was given to the employees in the form of a 

multiple choice and/or true and false format. Examples of topics covered are: Fall Prevention, Site Security, Hearing 

Protection, and Crane Safety. Some employees received certification in first aid/CPR, OSHA 10 hour, and Radio 

Frequency (RF) Site Safety Awareness. The employer did not have a written rigging plan as required by the

communication tower industry standard [OSHA 2017]. 

As a corrective action after this fatal incident, a third-party organization conducted a much more in-depth training on

Tower Climbing Safety and Rescue. The training included sessions to review both proper anchor points and proper 

connection to those points, along with methods of creating an acceptable anchor point if none existed. 

WORKER INFORMATION

Tower Climber #1 was 27 years old. He had been with the company for 11 months as a tower climber. He was removing 

diagonal tower supports on a 60–80-foot section of the tower when the tower collapsed. 

Tower Climber #2 was 32 years old. He had been with the company for 9 years as a tower climber. He was fitting a new 

leg stiffener to the leg of the tower on the 20–40-foot section of the tower when it collapsed. 

On January 27, 2014, both employees completed a daily inspection sheet on fall protection climb belts, harnesses, and 

hardware. 
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 4

This was the first day of working on this tower for both employees. The employees had been removing diagonal bracing 

from the tower for approximately 2–3 hours before the tower collapsed at 11:37 am.

INCIDENT SCENE AND TOWER DESCRIPTION

The site covered more than 2.5 acres on top of a hill. The site contained two cell phone towers and three structures that 

housed electrical components and a generator to support the operation of the cell phone towers. The towers were 

located at the end of a dirt and partially graveled road. 

Tower 1 was 340 feet tall and triangular in shape. Each tower leg consisted of 2-inch-diameter steel pipes that were 41 

inches apart, connected with diagonal support braces (approximately 3 foot 10 inches) forming the shape of a triangle. 

The tower was secured with guy wires connecting it to the ground by concrete anchor blocks. The guy wires were 

attached to Tower 1 at elevations of 80 feet, 160 feet, 240 feet, and 320 feet. Tower 1 was the first tower to collapse. 

The second tower was much smaller and located beside the larger tower. Tower 2 consisted of three sides 

approximately 16 inches wide and three round legs fastened together with a continuous 3/8-inch solid bar welded to the 

legs in a diagonal pattern along its entire 312-foot height. Tower 2 was also secured with guy wires attached to it and to 

the ground by concrete anchor blocks. During the collapse of Tower 1, the top portion of Tower 2 also collapsed, most 

likely from some of the guy wires on Tower 1 contacting the top of Tower 2 and pulling it to the ground. Note: the 

collapse of the smaller tower is not covered in this FACE investigation report. The 2nd tower collapse is covered in 

NIOSH F2014-03 [NIOSH 2014]. 

Six employees were at the site the day of the incident. Four employees were on Tower 1 when it collapsed, and a 

foreman was on the ground with a worker who was cutting sections to replace the diagonal support bracing that was 

removed. Three employees were removing diagonal supports on the tower at 60–80 feet, one on each face of the tower, 

and one employee was replacing a tower leg at 20–40 feet up on the tower. The foreman was on the ground giving 

instructions to his employees. 

A tower inspection was last completed on May 6, 2013. The results of the inspection found 34 improvement 

recommendations for Tower 1. The employer was hired to modify the cellular tower and components for the 

improvements such as the replacement of tubular bracing with stronger steel angles. 

WEATHER

The weather was clear with an approximate temperature of 35 degrees Fahrenheit (F) when the incident occurred 

[Weather Underground 2014]. Winds were recorded at less than 2 mph at the time of the tower collapse. It was 26 

degrees the night before, and snow was on the ground from a previous snow storm. Weather does not appear to be a 

contributing factor in this incident.
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 5

INVESTIGATION

On February 1, 2014, a Rohn, series 80, cellular tower collapsed while four tower climbers were working on the tower. 

Three tower climbers were removing diagonal support bracing (3 foot 10 inches) (Photo 1) from the 60–80-foot section 

while a fourth worker was at the 20–40-foot section examining the legs and test-fitting a section of the leg stiffener to 

the tower leg to make sure the materials they had were appropriately sized. Another worker was on the ground, cutting 

sections of the bracing to length to replace the diagonal bracing that was removed. In addition, the foreman was located 

on the ground, communicating by radio and shouts to the employees on the tower.

The three employees on the 60–80-foot section of the tower removed eight bolts (Photo 2) and five diagonal angle 

support braces: two angles from the A-B face, two angles from the C-B face, and one angle from the A-C face. The 

removal of the eight bolts also disconnected one end of the other diagonal bracing section on the tower. At each welded 

lug of the tower leg, one bolt connected two diagonal support braces. One diagonal had two holes for connection, one 

at each end. Removing one bolt would disable two diagonal support braces, although they would still be connected to 

the tower at the other ends (Figure 1). Because of this, 6 diagonal angle braces were weakened in addition to the 5 that 

were completely removed from the structure. The diagonals were removed without installing any temporary supports to 

offset the structural weakening of the tower.

Photo 1. One of five diagonal support braces (3 foot 10 inches) that were removed from Tower 1. 

(Photo courtesy of WV OSHA)
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 6

Photo 2. One of the eight bolts removed from Tower 1.

(Photo courtesy of WV OSHA)
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 7

Figure 1. Section of Tower 1 shown with removed bolts and diagonal support braces.
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 8

At approximately 11:37 am, the Tower 1 collapsed. As Tower 1 fell, it contacted guy wires to Tower 2, causing it to 

become unstable. Tower 1 fell to the ground, with a section of the tower landing on the top of the small building on the 

site (Photo 3). The 4 workers on the tower were thrown to the ground, resulting in crushing and impalement traumatic 

injuries to each of the workers. Two employees died either instantly or within a few seconds from injuries sustained 

from the tower collapse. The other two employees were sent to the hospital and subsequently recovered. In addition, a 

fire fighter was fatally injured while trying to rescue one of the injured tower climbers when the weakened Tower 2 

collapsed [NIOSH 2014].

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger 

sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following 

unrecognized hazards as key contributing factors in this incident: 

• Removal of multiple structural support braces of the tower without reinforcing the tower’s structural integrity 

• Lack of engineering analysis

• Lack of rigging plan

CAUSE OF DEATH 

The medical examiner listed the cause of death as major body trauma for both tower climbers.

Photo 3. Incident scene of the two towers

(Photo courtesy of WV OSHA)
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 9

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION

Recommendation #1: Employers should consult with a qualified engineer to conduct a structural analysis before 

workers are assigned any tasks related to tower maintenance or upgrading. 

Discussion: Employers should consult with a qualified engineer to conduct a structural analysis before workers are 

assigned any tasks related to tower maintenance and upgrading. A structural analysis will give an employer very detailed 

data to determine when an object such as a beam, connection, or in this case, a tower may collapse. According to ANSI 

A10.48 – 2016, a qualified engineer is responsible for designing permanent or temporary fall protection systems on a 

communication structure and will be knowledgeable and experienced with this standard [ANSI, ASSP 2016]. In this case, 

the employees were removing multiple diagonal structural members, and were not using any temporary braces or 

supports. They stated they had never heard of anyone using temporary bracing when doing this type of work on 

communication towers. Employers should not do any work on towers until a thorough structural analysis is completed

by a qualified engineer. The structural analysis should be used when completing a daily Job Hazard Analysis (JHA). Once 

the structural analysis is completed, employees will be able to create a more accurate JHA since they will then have a 

better understanding of how they will complete tasks that day. 

Recommendation #2: Employers should develop a written rigging plan based on the guidelines established in 

American National Standards Institute/Telecommunication Industry Association (ANSI/TIA -1019-A-2012). 

Discussion: Employers should develop a written rigging plan following the guidelines established in ANSI/TIA-1019-A 

2012 Standard for Installation, Alteration and Maintenance of Antenna Supporting Structures and Antennas. ANSI/TIA1019-A-2012 details the construction sequence and procedures for the removal or reinforcing of structural members. 

ANSI/TIA-1019-A, 2.7 Temporary Supports states: “The potential for partial or complete collapse of a structure may exist 

when constructing, dismantling or altering structural components of a structure. A procedure defining critical steps in 

the process shall be provided and followed by the rigging crew during all phases of the work. Such a procedure shall take 

into consideration temporary reinforcing of members to support the structure while structural components are 

disconnected or altered” [ANSI, TIA 2012].

The National Association of Tower Erectors (NATE) outlines the minimum level of responsibility needed to evaluate a job 

based on the complexity of construction, using various construction classes defined in ANSI/TIA-1019-A (Table 1) [NATE 

2013]. The least complex classes are defined as Class I and the most complex as Class IV. Once the rigging class has been 

determined, the qualified person creates a rigging plan that is based on the statement of work, structure, and safety 

requirements [ANSI, TIA 2012]. A rigging plan is a set of procedures and techniques that may include a requirement for 

temporary supports to complete the transformation of the existing structure into the modified structure [ANSI, TIA 

2012]. ANSI/TIA-1019-A-2012 identifies diagonals as structural members [ANSI, TIA 2012], with the removal of a 

structural member falling under the Class IV Construction Classification, which establishes a minimum level of 

responsibility to a “qualified person with qualified engineer” [NATE 2013].
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 10

Table 1. National Association of Tower Erectors (NATE) Construction Classifications and Minimum Level of 

Responsibility recommendations.

A competent rigger is defined as a person knowledgeable and experienced with the procedures and equipment common 

to the communication structures industry and trained to identify hazards with authorization to take prompt corrective 

measures. A qualified person is a person knowledgeable and experienced in the communication structures industry 

capable of developing rigging plans and who has successfully demonstrated the ability to coordinate construction 

related to the communication structures industry. A qualified engineer is a professional engineer who is knowledgeable 

and experienced in the communication structures industry [ANSI, TIA 2012]. 

After the incident, ANSI A10.48 – 2016 was released. This version of the standard states that all construction, including 

maintenance and hoist activities, shall have a rigging plan classification outlining the project and responsibilities within 

that project [ANSI, ASSP 2016]. Depending on the classification of the construction type, a qualified person will assign a 

competent rigger to ensure the proper procedures, equipment, and rigging are used for the operation [ANSI, ASSP 

2016]. At a minimum, the rigging plan will consider operational and non-operational loads, construction equipment, 

supporting structures, construction sequence and duration, and required load testing and field monitoring [ANSI, ASSP 

2016]. 

In this incident, ANSI/TIA-1019-A-2012 was not followed: No written rigging plan was established showing the manner, 

sequence, and number of diagonals to be removed at a time; no temporary supports were provided when removing 

structural members; and no qualified engineer, qualified person, or competent rigger were identified. 

Recommendation #3: Employers should provide employees with training on hazard recognition and prevention.

Discussion: Employers should provide employees with training on hazard recognition and prevention before they begin 

work on a communication tower construction or maintenance job site [OSHA 2017]. Employees should be well educated 

Class Description Minimum Level of Responsibility

I The scope of work does not affect the integrity of the structure and 

the proposed rigging loads are minor in comparison to the strength of 

the structure, but not exceeding rigging forces greater than 650 lbs.

Competent Rigger

II The scope of work involves the removal or the addition of 

appurtenances, mounts, platforms, etc. that involve minor rigging 

loads in comparison to the strength of the structure, but not 

exceeding rigging forces greater than 1,000 lbs.

Competent Rigger

III Rigging plans that involve work outside the scope of Class I, II, or IV 

construction.

Qualified Person

IV The scope of work involves custom or infrequent construction 

methods, removal of structural members or unique appurtenance, 

special engineered lifts, and unique situations.

Qualified Person with Qualified 

Engineer
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 11

on the potential dangers that come with their industry. Moreover, in an industry such as communication tower 

maintenance/construction, employees should be trained to be on the lookout for hazards since their worksite and 

environment can change dramatically throughout a year. Employers should also give refresher training to employees on 

new industry standards and update company policy and procedures periodically [OSHA 2017]. 

In this incident, the employer did not have any formal rigging plan in place on the day of the incident. 

Recommendation #4: Employers should conduct a job hazard analysis (JHA) and develop standard operating procedures 

to be followed for each tower climb where workers are assigned tasks. 

Discussion: OSHA recommends that a thorough JHA be completed before employees begin work at a location [OSHA 

2010]. It is recommended a JHA be performed every day on-site and when jobsite conditions change, such as weather. 

Multiple JHAs might need to be performed in 1 day in order to make employees aware of new hazards. A JHA can 

include environment, exposure, and consequence. The JHAs should include management, supervisors, and employees in 

order to allow everyone who is on the worksite to be involved with the JHA and be aware of the hazards associated with 

tasks and the preventative measures necessary to avoid those hazards [OSHA 2017]. 

A comprehensive JHA can identify specific risk factors. Standard operating procedures should be developed based on the 

results of the JHA to control and reduce the risk and ensure worker safety [OSHA 2010].

In this incident, no JHA was completed for the jobsite. The fatal incident occurred the first day the employees were 

working on the tower. A JHA could have made the employees more aware of the hazards they faced for their work day. 

Recommendation #5: Employers should train communication tower employees on the proper use of tower climbing 

anchor points and fall protection equipment.

Discussion: Employers should train employees on the proper use of tower climbing anchor points and fall protection 

equipment [NIOSH 2001]. Although not directly related to the cause of the tower collapse, the employer had not done

any type of engineering test to determine what the appropriate anchor points would be for employees while climbing on 

the tower. Employers need to first understand what acceptable anchor points are while on the tower and then train 

employees on those acceptable anchor points. According to ANSI A10.48 – 2016 (written after the incident), anchorages 

need to be identified at all transition points prior to ascending the structure [ANSI, ASSP 2016]. Ultimately, the fall 

protection was not a major contributor to the fatalities in this incident, but the fall protection requirements by the 

employer did not meet OSHA regulations on anchor points defined under 29 CFR 1926.502(d)(15). At a minimum, fall 

protection training needs to cover regulations and standards, employer responsibilities, fall protection hierarchy, 

primary and secondary connections, anchorages, anchorage connectors, full body harnesses, and energy absorbing 

lanyards [Code of Federal Regulations 2016].

After this fatal incident, the employer conducted an in-depth training with a third-party organization and employees 

earned Tower Climbing Safety and Rescue Certifications. Training included sessions to review proper anchor points and 

connection, along with methods of creating acceptable anchor points if none existed. 

REFERENCES

ANSI, ASSP [2016]. ANSI/ASSP A10.48-2016 Criteria for Safety Practices with the Construction, Demolition, Modification 

and Maintenance of Communication Structures. Washington, DC: American National Standards Institute. Alexandria, VA: 

https://webstore.ansi.org/Standards/ASSE/ANSIASSEA10482016. 
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 12

ANSI, TIA [2012]. ANSI/TIA-1019-A Standard for Installation, Alteration and Maintenance of Antenna Supporting 

Structures and Antennas. Washington, DC: American National Standards Institute, Arlington, VA: Telecommunication 

Industry Association. https://global.ihs.com/doc_detail.cfm?item_s_key=00441642&csf=TIA. 

Code of Federal Regulations [2016]. 29 CFR 1926.502. Fall protection systems criteria and practices. Washington DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Office of the Federal Register.

NATE [2013]. Tower Times. Planning Advisory Notice. National Association of Tower Erectors, Telecommunications 

Industry Registered Apprenticeship Program (TIRAP). Watertown, SD: March/April 2013, pg. 70-72. https://tirap.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/ANSI-TIA_1019-A-2012.pdf. 

NIOSH [2001]. Alert: preventing injuring and deaths from falls during construction and maintenance of 

telecommunication towers. Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Publication No. 2001-156, 

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2001-156/pdfs/2001-156.pdf. 

NIOSH [2014]. Volunteer Fire Fighter Killed Rescuing Injured Construction Worker When Struck by Collapsing Cell Phone 

Tower – West Virginia. Clarksburg, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) 

Report F2014-03 https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face201403.pdf. Date accessed: October 14, 2017. 

OSHA [2010]. OSHA 3071: Job hazard analysis. Rev. Washington, DC: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 

https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3071.html

OSHA [2017]. OSHA 3877: Communication Tower Best Practices. Rev. Washington, DC: Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration, Federal Communication Commission. https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3877.pdf 

Communication Tower Best Practices OSHA 3877 [2017].

Weather Underground [2014]. Weather history for Benedum, WV, February 1, 2014. Atlanta, GA: The Weather Channel 

Interactive, Inc., 

https://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KCKB/2014/2/1/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_s

tatename=NA

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

The National Association of Tower Erectors (NATE) is a non-profit trade association in the wireless and broadcast 

infrastructure industries providing a unified voice for tower erection, maintenance and service companies. NATE offers a 

vast array of educational videos and resources. The NATE website is available at: https://natehome.com/ 

The US Department of Labor Safety and Health Topics Page for Communication Towers is available at: 

https://www.osha.gov/doc/topics/communicationtower/. The website provides highlights with links to many 

communication tower resources such as Communication Tower Best Practices. 

OSHA News Release: 14-198-NAT. No more falling workers. OSHA focuses on protecting cell tower employees after 

increase in worksite fatalities. 

https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=25593
REPORT#: 2015-02 Page 13

OSHA [2014]. Investigation of the February 1, 2014 Collapse of a Telecommunication Tower at the Summit Park 

Community in Clarksburg, WV. Rev. Washington, DC: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 

https://www.osha.gov/doc/engineering/pdf/2014_r_06.pdf. Directorate of Construction [July 2014].

INVESTIGATOR INFORMATION

This investigation was conducted by Nancy Romano, Safety and Occupational Health Specialist. The report was authored 

by Melanie Moore, Safety and Occupational Health Specialist, Fatality Investigations Team, Surveillance and Field 

Investigations Branch, Division of Safety Research.

ACKNOWLEDGEMEMENT

The NIOSH FACE Program and the safety and occupational health specialists would like to acknowledge the compliance 

officer and staff of the West Virginia Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Division for their assistance 

with this investigation.