alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 23-2580

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Stanford C. Griswold

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

 ____________

 Submitted: January 24, 2024

Filed: February 7, 2024

[Unpublished]

____________

Before GRUENDER, SHEPHERD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Stanford Griswold appeals the within-Guidelines-range sentence the district

court1

 imposed after he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm

1The Honorable David Gregory Kays, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.
pursuant to a written plea agreement containing an appeal waiver. His counsel has

moved to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), challenging, inter alia, the voluntariness of Griswold’s plea and his sentence. 

Griswold has filed a pro se brief challenging his plea, his sentence, and his counsels’

effectiveness; as well as a motion to proceed pro se.

We conclude that Griswold’s involuntary-plea claim is not cognizable on direct

appeal because he did not move below to withdraw his guilty plea. See United States

v. Washington, 515 F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that a claim that a plea was

involuntary or unknowingly entered is not cognizable on direct appeal where the

defendant failed to move in the district court to withdraw the guilty plea). In

addition, we decline to consider Griswold’s ineffective-assistance claim on direct

appeal. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826-27 (8th Cir.

2006) (establishing that ineffective-assistance claims are usually best raised in

collateral proceedings where the record can be properly developed).

We further conclude that the appeal waiver is valid, enforceable, and applicable

to Griswold’s challenges to his sentence. See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702,

704 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing de novo the validity and applicability of an appeal

waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)

(enforcing appeal waiver if the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, the

defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement and the waiver,

and enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice).

We have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the

appeal waiver. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, deny

Griswold’s motion to proceed pro se as moot, and dismiss this appeal.

______________________________

-2-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

IN RE: ESTATE OF KATHLEEN 

TALERICO 

PETITION OF: DONALD P. TALERICO 

:

:

:

:

:

No. 268 MAL 2016 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 27th day of September, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is DENIED.
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This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from SEC
Form 10Q and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
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<RECEIVABLES>                                  4417000
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<INVENTORY>                                    4196000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              15585000
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          7216000
<BONDS>                                              0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               58000
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</TABLE>
#### EUGENE BENNETT SMITH v. FRED CLARENCE STONE and COLORCRAFT OF CHARLOTTE, INC.

(Filed 22 November, 1967.)

Appeal by defendants from *Fountain, J.,*February 26, 1967 Term, ANSON Superior Court.

Plaintiff instituted this civil action to recover for the personal injuries he received on December 24, 1964 as he was attempting to walk across Wade Street at its intersection with Greene Street in Wadesboro. Plis allegations and evidence disclose that at about 10:00 in the morning, as he was crossing within the boundaries of a marked crosswalk, in obedience to a green light for pedestrians, the defendant, Fred Clarence Stone, agent of Colorcraft of Charlotte, Inc., backed the corporation's Valiant automobile from its parked position at an angle to the curb, near the crosswalk, without seeing that the reverse movement could be made in safety. The rear bumper of the Valiant crashed into the plaintiff, inflicting serious and permanent injuries.

The defendants, by answer, denied negligence on the part of Stone and conditionally pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff as a bar to his recovery.

Both parties introduced evidence. The Court submitted these issues, which the jury answered as here indicated:

“1. Was the plaintiff injured by the negligence of the defendants, as alleged in the Complaint?

ANSWER: Yes.

2. If so, did the plaintiff, by his own negligence, contribute to his own injury, as alleged in the Answer?

Answer: No.

3. What amount, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover of the defendants?

Answer: $48,000.00.”

From judgment on the verdict, defendants appealed.

*A. Paul Kitchin; Smith, Leach, Anderson & Dorsett by John H. Anderson for defendants appellants.*

*E. A. Hightower for plaintiff appellee.*

Per Curiam.

All assignments of error discussed in the brief or in the oral argument here involve exceptions to the Court’s charge. When the charge is considered contextually, as it must be, *114it is cleai’, concise, and in accord with the decisions of this Court. It covers all essential elements of negligence, contributory negligence and damages.

The Court placed on the plaintiff the burden of proof on Issues 1 and 3 and on the defendants on Issue 2. The Court instructed that a negative answer to Issue 1 would end the case, or an affirmative answer to Issue 2 would likewise end the case. But, an affirmative answer to Issue 1 and a negative answer to Issue 2 would require the jury to answer Issue 3. The Court gave the jury the proper rules with respect to the quantum of proof necessary to require affirmative answers and further charged that a failure to carry the burden required a negative answer. The Court gave correct rules for the assessment of damages.

No error.

BbaNCh, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
#### COAKLEY v. MOTOR CO.

No. 13 PC.

Case below: 11 N.C. App. 636.

Petition for writ of *certiorari*to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 7 September 1971.
#### DUKE POWER v. WINEBARGER

No. 99 PC.

Case below: 54 N.C. App. 365.

Petition by defendants for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 12 January 1982.
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 192 (Thursday, October 4, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 56789]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-4880]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

[CO-03-840-1610-241A]


Southwest Resource Advisory Council; Canyons of the Ancients 
National Monument Subgroup Meeting

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION:  Notice of public meetings.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA) and the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA), the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Southwest 
Resource Advisory Committee (RAC) Canyons of the Ancients National 
Monument (Monument) Subgroup, will meet as directed below.

DATES: The Southwest RAC Canyons of the Ancients National Monument 
(Monument) Subgroup meeting will be held October 19, 2007, at the 
Anasazi Heritage Center in Dolores, Colorado. The meeting will begin at 
1 p.m. One public comment period is planned and will begin at 
approximately 2:30 p.m. The meeting will adjourn at approximately 3:30 
p.m.

ADDRESSES: The Southwest RAC Canyons of the Ancients National Monument 
(Monument) Subgroup meeting will be held at the Anasazi Heritage 
Center, located at 27501 Highway 184, in Dolores, Colorado.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: LouAnn Jacobson, Monument Manager, or 
Heather Musclow, Monument Planner, Anasazi Heritage Center, 27501 
Highway 184, Dolores, Colorado 81323; Telephone (970) 882-5600.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 11-member Subgroup provides counsel and 
advice to the full Council for its consideration and deliberation 
concerning development and implementation of a management plan 
developed in accordance with FLMPA, for public lands within the 
Monument. We plan to discuss the planning schedule and content of the 
Monument's Draft Resource Management Plan/Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement and other issues as appropriate.
    The meeting is open to the public and includes a time set aside for 
public comment. Interested persons may make oral statements at the 
meeting or submit written statements at any meeting. Per-person time 
limits for oral statements may be set to allow all interested persons 
an opportunity to speak.
    Summary minutes of all Subgroup meetings will be maintained at the 
Anasazi Heritage Center in Dolores, Colorado. They are available for 
public inspection and reproduction during regular business hours within 
thirty (30) days of the meeting. In addition, minutes and other 
information concerning the Subgroup can be obtained from the Monument 
planning Web site at: http://www.blm.gov/rmp/canm which will be updated 
following each Subgroup meeting.

    Dated: September 25, 2007.
LouAnn Jacobson,
Monument Manager Canyons of the Ancients National Monument.
[FR Doc. 07-4880 Filed 10-3-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-JB-M
Denied and Opinion Filed July 13, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-21-00337-CV

IN RE JAMES MEEHAN, BODMD MEDICAL GROUP (OK), P.C. AND 

CATALYST UTICA, P.C., Relators

Original proceeding from the 380th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 380-06699-2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Myers, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle

Opinion by Justice Myers

James Meehan, BODMD Medical Group (OK), P.C., and Catalyst UTICA, 

P.C. bring this original proceeding asking that we order the trial court to rule on five 

discovery motions that have been pending from six months to over a year.

The evidence presented to the appellate court must be in an appendix 

containing “a certified or sworn copy of any order complained of, or any other 

document showing the matter complained of” or in a record consisting of “a certified 

or sworn copy of every document that is material to the relator’s claim for relief and 

that was filed in any underlying proceeding.” TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A), 

52.7(a)(1). 
–2–

The documents in relators’ appendix and record are mostly neither certified 

nor sworn and therefore do not comply with the rules. The issues relators raise in 

their petition for writ of mandamus are a cause of concern for this Court, but we 

cannot grant the petition unless the evidence properly before the Court demonstrates 

that the trial court abused its discretion. See In re Hughes, 607 S.W.3d 136, 137–38 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, orig. proceeding) (court of appeals cannot 

“cut through the ‘red tape’” and reach the merits when the record is defective); In re 

Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding) (denying 

petition for writ of mandamus because the record was not authenticated). “Because 

the record in a mandamus proceeding is assembled by the parties, this Court strictly 

enforces the authentication requirements of rule 52 to ensure the integrity of the 

mandamus record.” In re McKinney, 05-14-01513-CV, 2014 WL 7399301, at *1 

(Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 15, 2014, no pet., orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus without prejudice to 

relators filing a petition that complies with the rules of appellate procedure. 

210337f.p05

/Lana Myers//

LANA MYERS

JUSTICE
#### STATE v. BURNETT and SANDERS

No. 68 PC.

Case below: 39 N.C. App. 605.

Application by defendants for further review denied 1 May 1979.
#### TURNER v. INSURANCE CO.

No. 8 PC.

Case below: 11 N.C. App. 699.

Petition for writ of *certiorari*to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 7 September 1971.
<PAGE>




                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
             PURSUANT TO TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Lancaster Colony Corporation
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2003, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
John B. Gerlach, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of
my knowledge:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

Date:  May 13, 2003              By:  /s/JOHN B. GERLACH, JR.
                                      -----------------------
                                         John B. Gerlach, Jr.
                                         Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Case 7:07-cv-03502-CLB     Document 18      Filed 01/17/2008     Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), Brian M. NeSmith, President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) of Blue Coat Systems, Inc. (the Company), and Michael J.
Gennaro, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:



| | 1. | The Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended April 30, 2009, to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the Report),
fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: June 22, 2009



|                                                                                     |  |  |  |                                               
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |  |  |  | ----------------------------------------------
|                                                                                     |  | 
|/s/ BRIAN M. NESMITH                                                                 |  |  |  | /s/ MICHAEL J. GENNARO                        
|Brian M. NeSmith President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) |  |  |  | Michael J. Gennaro Principal Financial
Officer

This certification is not deemed to be filed for purposes of section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section. This certification is not deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or Securities Exchange Act of 1934, except to
the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.
#### STATE v. RUTH BERNICE EVANS.

(Filed 23 September, 1964.)

Criminal law § 19—

Where a prosecution in an inferior court is transferred to the Superior Court upon defendant’s demand for a jury trial, defendant must be tried in the Superior Court upon an indictment, and trial on the original warrant is a nullity.

Appeal by defendant from *McLean, J.,*June 1964 Mixed Session of McDowell.

The defendant was arrested on a warrant issued March 31, 1964 by a justice of the peace and made returnable to the McDowell County Criminal Court. She was charged with the wilful abandonment of her two minor children. On May 12, 1964, the State moved for a jury trial. Whereupon, the matter was transferred to the Superior Court as required by N. C. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 530. When the case was called for trial at the June Term, the solicitor made the following statement to the court: “Your Honor, the defendant should be tried on the warrant. I do not have a proper bill of indictment.” The defendant objected to being tried on the warrant and specifically declined to waive the bill of indictment. The court overruled the objection; defendant excepted and entered a plea of not guilty. The jury’s verdict was “guilty as charged in the warrant.” From the judgment imposed defendant appeals, assigning error.

*Attorney General Bruton and Deputy Attorney General McGalliard for the State.*

*Thomas E. White for defendant appellant.*

Pee Cueiam.

A defendant may be tried in the Superior Court upon a warrant only when there has been a trial and appeal from a conviction by an inferior court having jurisdiction. G.S. 15-137, G.S. 15-140; *493
      *State v. Norman,*237 N.C. 205, 74 S.E. 2d 602. As this Court has repeatedly held, where there has been no such conviction, trial in the Superior Court upon the original warrant is a nullity. *State v. Peede,*256 N.C. 460, 124 S.E. 2d 134; *State v. Johnson,*251 N.C. 339, 111 S.E. 2d 297; *State v. Thomas,*236 N.C. 454, 73 S.E. 2d 283. The judgment of the Superior Court is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings as allowed by law.

Judgment arrested.
---

EXHIBIT 12.2

SARBANES-OXLEY CFO CERTIFICATION

I, Jeffrey R. Mason, Chief Financial Officer of Rockwell
Ventures Inc., certify that:

1.           
I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 20-F of Rockwell Ventures Inc.

2.           
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.           
Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for,
the periods presented in this report;

4.           
The Companys other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and have:

(a)           
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)           
Evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls and procedures
and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and

(c)           
Disclosed in this report any change in the Company's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
Company's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.           
The Companys other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of the internal control over financial reporting, to the
Companys auditors and the audit committee of Companys board of directors (or
persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)           
All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and

(b)           
Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the Companys internal control over financial
reporting.

|Date:  | 14 December 2006        | 
|------ | ----------------------- | 
|       |                         | 
|       | /s/ Jeffrey R. Mason    | 
|       |                         | 
|By:    | Jeffrey R. Mason        | 
|Title: | Chief Financial Officer | 



---



---
#### STATE v. LOUCHHEIM

No. 131 PC.

No. 50 (Fall Term).

Case below: 36 N.C. App. 271.

On reconsideration, petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 and defendant’s appeal allowed 14 July 1978.