COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Frank 

BOBBY MORTON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2326-98-2 PER CURIAM 

 MAY 4, 1999 

SERVICEMASTER CONSUMER SERVICE 

 AND ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

(Lindsay G. Dorrier, Jr., on brief), for 

appellant. 

(Charles F. Midkiff; Midkiff & Hiner, P.C., 

on brief), for appellees. 

 Bobby Morton ("claimant") contends that the Workers' 

Compensation Commission ("commission") erred in finding that he 

failed to prove that he sustained an injury by accident arising 

out of and in the course of his employment on August 2, 1997.1 

Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we 

conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the commission's decision. See Rule 5A:27. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 

1

Claimant presented five questions in his brief. All of 

those questions relate to the pivotal issue of whether he proved 

that a specific identifiable incident occurred on August 2, 

1997. 
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 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 

 "In order to carry [the] burden of proving an 'injury by 

accident,' a claimant must prove that the cause of [the] injury 

was an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event and 

that it resulted in an obvious sudden mechanical or structural 

change in the body." Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 589, 385 

S.E.2d 858, 865 (1989) (citations omitted). Unless we can say as 

a matter of law that claimant's evidence sustained his burden of 

proof, the commission's findings are binding and conclusive upon 

us. See Tomko v. Michael's Plastering. Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 

S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970). 

 In denying claimant's application, the commission found as 

follows: 

 Although the claimant at some point in 

his testimony indicated that he had hurt his 

back while lifting a bag of laundry, the 

Deputy Commissioner concluded that Morton 

had failed to prove that his injury resulted 

from any specific incident or identifiable 

event. We have carefully reviewed the 

record, and find no reason to reverse the 

implied credibility determination made by 

the Deputy Commissioner. The claimant has 

given different versions of his alleged 

accident. Although he presently contends 

that he hurt his back while lifting laundry 

early in the work shift, he had previously 

indicated that his injury occurred later in 

the work shift as he was shampooing carpets 

or cleaning the rooms. Also, he denied any 

prior back pain or problems with his back, 
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but that denial is contradicted by the 

medical records. The August 4, 1997, 

accident report, signed by the claimant, 

indicates that he was injured while working 

with discharge beds, an activity which he 

would perform after lifting the laundry 

bags. The medical records also indicate 

that the claimant remembered no specific 

injury. 

 As fact finder, the commission was entitled to reject 

claimant's testimony that a specific incident occurred. It is 

well settled that credibility determinations are within the fact 

finder's exclusive purview. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 

Pierce, 5 Va. App. 374, 381, 363 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1987). In 

light of the inconsistencies between claimant's testimony and 

his prior statements, his medical records, and the accident 

report, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that claimant's 

evidence sustained his burden of proof. 

 Claimant also argues that the commission erred in using the 

medical records to determine how the accident occurred. This 

contention is without merit. In McMurphy Coal Co. v. Miller, 20 

Va. App. 57, 59, 455 S.E.2d 265, 266 (1995), we held that under 

common law rules of evidence, medical histories are admissible 

substantively as party admissions. Thereafter, we recognized in 

Pence Nissan Oldsmobile v. Oliver, 20 Va. App. 314, 456 S.E.2d 

541 (1995), that, under Rule 2.2 of the Rules of the Workers' 

Compensation Commission, the commission may consider medical 

histories in determining how an accident occurred. Rule 2.2 
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gives the commission "'[t]he discretion to give probative weight 

to hearsay statements in arriving at its findings of fact.'" 

Oliver, 20 Va. App. at 319, 456 S.E.2d at 544 (quoting Williams 

v. Fuqua, 199 Va. 709, 714, 101 S.E.2d 562, 566 (1958)). 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

Affirmed.