1

Filed 7/20/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

WESLEY WILSON,

Defendant and Respondent; 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

AND REHABILITATION,

Real Party in Interest and 

Appellant.

 A160394

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. 19-CR-018576)

Defendant and respondent Wesley Wilson (Defendant) invited the trial 

court to exercise its authority under Penal Code section 1203.21 to modify

a residency restriction imposed as a condition of his parole. The trial court 

accepted that invitation. Real party in interest Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (CDCR) appeals, arguing the trial court exceeded its 

authority under the statute because, at the time of the modification, there 

was no pending parole revocation proceeding or alleged parole violation. We 

agree and reverse the challenged order.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

BACKGROUND

In 2009, Defendant was convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious 

acts with a child under age 14 using force or violence (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) and 

one count of sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a)). After serving a state prison 

term, Defendant was released to parole in 2018. CDCR determined that 

Defendant was a “high risk” sex offender and imposed the following residency 

restriction as a condition of his parole: “You shall not reside within one-half

mile of any public or private school (kindergarten and grades 1 through 12, 

inclusive) pursuant to [s]ection 3003(g).”2

In 2019, Defendant filed a motion for relief under section 1203.2, 

subdivision (b)(1) (section 1203.2(b)(1)), inviting the trial court to “act on its 

[own] motion and modify the conditions of his parole to exclude the residence 

restrictions.”3 Defendant argued he was currently homeless because he was 

unable to reside in any home available to him, this result was harmful and 

contrary to the purposes of parole, and the residency restriction was therefore 

invalid as applied to him. CDCR opposed the motion, arguing the trial court 

was not authorized to modify Defendant’s parole conditions under section 

1203.2(b)(1) absent a pending parole violation and, in the alternative,

Defendant’s challenge to the residency restriction was meritless. On March 

2 Section 3003, subdivision (g) provides: “Notwithstanding any other 

law, an inmate who is released on parole for a violation of Section 288 or 

288.5 whom the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation determines 

poses a high risk to the public shall not be placed or reside, for the duration 

of the inmate’s parole, within one-half mile of a public or private school 

including any or all of kindergarten and grades 1 to 12, inclusive.”

3 Defendant’s motion erroneously stated he was subject to a residency 

restriction under section 3003.5, subdivision (b). CDCR clarified for the trial 

court the residency restriction in Defendant’s parole conditions.
3

6, 2020, the trial court issued an order modifying the residency restriction. 

CDCR appealed.

DISCUSSION

The first question before us is whether section 1203.2(b)(1) authorized 

the trial court to modify Defendant’s parole conditions in the absence of 

a pending parole revocation hearing or alleged parole violation. We review 

this statutory interpretation question de novo. (Manriquez v. Gourley (2003) 

105 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1233.) “Our fundamental task in interpreting 

a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s 

purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and 

commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in 

the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its 

scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If 

the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless 

a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature 

did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable 

interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, 

legislative history, and public policy.” (Coalition of Concerned Communities, 

Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.)

Section 1203.2(b)(1) provides, in its entirety: “Upon its own motion or 

upon the petition of the supervised person, the probation or parole officer, or 

the district attorney, the court may modify, revoke, or terminate supervision 

of the person pursuant to this subdivision, except that the court shall not 

terminate parole pursuant to this section. The court in the county in which 

the person is supervised has jurisdiction to hear the motion or petition, or for 

those on parole, either the court in the county of supervision or the court in 

the county in which the alleged violation of supervision occurred. A person 
4

supervised on parole or postrelease community supervision pursuant to 

Section 3455 may not petition the court pursuant to this section for early 

release from supervision, and a petition under this section shall not be filed 

solely for the purpose of modifying parole. This section does not prohibit the 

court in the county in which the person is supervised or in which the alleged 

violation of supervision occurred from modifying a person’s parole when 

acting on the court’s own motion or a petition to revoke parole. The court 

shall give notice of its motion, and the probation or parole officer or the 

district attorney shall give notice of their petition to the supervised person, 

the supervised person’s attorney of record, and the district attorney or the 

probation or parole officer, as the case may be. The supervised person shall 

give notice of their petition to the probation or parole officer and notice of any 

motion or petition shall be given to the district attorney in all cases. The 

court shall refer its motion or the petition to the probation or parole officer. 

After the receipt of a written report from the probation or parole officer, the 

court shall read and consider the report and either its motion or the petition 

and may modify, revoke, or terminate the supervision of the supervised 

person upon the grounds set forth in subdivision (a) if the interests of justice 

so require.”

We begin with the statutory language. The statute provides: “[u]pon its 

own motion . . . , the court may modify . . . supervision,” with the only stated 

exception being a prohibition on terminating parole. (§ 1203.2(b)(1).) This 

appears to supply the requisite authority. Indeed, although the statute 

prohibits filing a petition “solely for the purpose of modifying parole,” it 

expressly clarifies that it “does not prohibit the court . . . from modifying 
5

a person’s parole when acting on the court’s own motion . . . .” (§ 1203.2(b)(1), 

italics added.) As Defendant argues, the statute thus appears to authorize 

the court’s order.

However, as CDCR points out, indications to the contrary also appear 

in the statutory language. The statute provides the court “may modify, 

revoke, or terminate the supervision of the supervised person upon the 

grounds set forth in subdivision (a) if the interests of justice so require.” 

(Italics added.) Subdivision (a) governs procedures upon the rearrest of or 

issuance of a warrant for a supervised person, and provides the court “may 

revoke and terminate the supervision of the person if the interests of justice 

so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the 

report of the probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has 

violated any of the conditions of their supervision, has become abandoned to 

improper associates or a vicious life, or has subsequently committed other 

offenses, regardless of whether the person has been prosecuted for those 

offenses.” (Italics added.)4 As CDCR argues, section 1203.2(b)(1), by 

4 Section 1203.2, subdivision (a) provides, in its entirety: “At any time 

during the period of supervision of a person (1) released on probation under 

the care of a probation officer pursuant to this chapter, (2) released on 

conditional sentence or summary probation not under the care of a probation 

officer, (3) placed on mandatory supervision pursuant to subparagraph (B) of 

paragraph (5) of subdivision (h) of Section 1170, (4) subject to revocation of 

postrelease community supervision pursuant to Section 3455, or (5) subject to 

revocation of parole supervision pursuant to Section 3000.08, if any probation 

officer, parole officer, or peace officer has probable cause to believe that the 

supervised person is violating any term or condition of the person’s 

supervision, the officer may, without warrant or other process and at any 

time until the final disposition of the case, rearrest the supervised person and 

bring them before the court or the court may, in its discretion, issue 

a warrant for their rearrest. Notwithstanding Section 3056, and unless the 

supervised person is otherwise serving a period of flash incarceration, 
6

incorporating the reasons set forth in subdivision (a), appears to limit the 

court’s authority to modify supervision to instances where the supervised 

person has violated a parole condition or committed other wrongdoing. 

CDCR also points to other statutory language. Jurisdiction over 

parolees is vested in “either the court in the county of supervision or the court 

in the county in which the alleged violation of supervision occurred.” 

(§ 1203.2(b)(1), italics added.) “ ‘Court’ ” is defined as “a judge, magistrate, or 

revocation hearing officer described in Section 71622.5 of the Government 

Code.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (f)(1), italics added.)5 Although this language 

indicates the Legislature contemplated that many or most proceedings 

pursuant to this statute would be revocation proceedings, the language does 

whenever a supervised person who is subject to this section is arrested, with 

or without a warrant or the filing of a petition for revocation as described in

subdivision (b), the court may order the release of a supervised person from 

custody under any terms and conditions the court deems appropriate. Upon 

rearrest, or upon the issuance of a warrant for rearrest, the court may revoke 

and terminate the supervision of the person if the interests of justice so 

require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report 

of the probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has violated 

any of the conditions of their supervision, has become abandoned to improper 

associates or a vicious life, or has subsequently committed other offenses, 

regardless of whether the person has been prosecuted for those offenses. 

However, the court shall not terminate parole pursuant to this section. 

Supervision shall not be revoked solely for failure of a person to make 

restitution, or to pay fines, fees, or assessments, imposed as a condition of 

supervision unless the court determines that the defendant has willfully 

failed to pay and has the ability to pay. Restitution shall be consistent with 

a person’s ability to pay. The revocation, summary or otherwise, shall serve 

to toll the running of the period of supervision.”

5 Government Code section 71622.5 authorizes superior courts to 

appoint hearing officers “to conduct parole revocation hearings . . . and to 

perform related duties as authorized by the court.” (Gov. Code, § 71622.5, 

subd. (b).)
7

not conclusively limit the statute’s application to such proceedings. 

Similarly, CDCR notes the definition of “ ‘Supervised person’ ” includes 

a person “subject to revocation of parole pursuant to Section 3000.08,”

a statute setting forth parole revocation procedures (and which we discuss in 

greater detail below). (§ 1203.2, subd. (f)(3)(E).) This definition seems to 

mean a person currently subject to revocation of parole in a pending 

proceeding, as CDCR suggests, but it could reasonably be construed to mean 

a person who is on parole and therefore, unlike a person not on parole, is

subject to revocation if a violation is committed.6

We conclude the statutory language is ambiguous, and turn to the 

legislative history to help us discern the Legislature’s intent. Section 1203.2 

was originally adopted in 1935 and governed procedures regarding rearrest of 

probationers and revocation proceedings. (Stats. 1935, ch. 604, § 3, p. 1709.) 

Subdivision (b), including much of the language present today, was added in 

1970. (Stats. 1970, ch. 333, § 1, pp. 729–730.) The bill as originally 

introduced authorized only the district attorney to petition for modification or 

revocation. (Assem. Bill No. 998 (1970 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 4, 

1970.) A committee report stated the bill was proposed by a district 

attorney’s office “to increase the adequacy of probation supervision by 

keeping law enforcement informed (e.g., who is on probation; what the 

conditions of probation are) and by allowing the D.A. to go directly to the 

court on the basis of new information developed.” (Assem. Com. on Crim. 

Proc., Dig. of Assem. Bill No. 998 (1970 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 4, 

6 We note another ambiguous phrase: the court is granted the authority 

to modify parole “when acting on the court’s own motion or a petition to 

revoke parole.” While this could mean the court may modify parole on its 

own motion and without limitation, it may also be construed to mean the 

court is authorized to modify parole when acting on the court’s own motion to 

revoke parole.
8

1970, pp. 1–2.) The final version of the bill extended the right to petition to 

the district attorney and the probationer, and also authorized the trial court 

to act on its own motion.7 (Stats. 1970, ch. 333, § 1, pp. 729–730.) The 

legislative history does not indicate the reason for the amendment.

Parole was added to section 1203.2 following realignment.8 “Prior 

to the advent of Realignment, virtually all authority over parole and 

parolees—including whether a period of parole was to be required; if so, its 

duration and conditions; and the power to revoke parole—resided in the 

paroling authority, either the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(CDCR) or the Board of Parole Hearings (formerly known as the Board of 

Prison Terms). [Citations.] With Realignment came an enhanced role for 

superior courts.” (People v. VonWahlde (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1187, 1196; see 

also Couzens et al., Sentencing Cal. Crimes (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 11:77

[“Prior to the enactment of the realignment legislation, once a defendant was 

sentenced to state prison, with only limited exceptions, the trial court 

7 As enacted in 1970, subdivision (b) provided: “Upon its own motion or 

upon the petition of the probationer or the district attorney of the county in 

which the probationer is supervised, the court may modify, revoke, or 

terminate the probation of the probationer pursuant to this subdivision. The 

court shall give notice of its motion, and the district attorney shall give notice 

of his petition to the probationer and the probation officer; and the 

probationer shall give notice of his petition to the probation officer. The court 

shall refer its motion or the petition to the probation officer. After the receipt 

of a written report from the probation officer, the court shall read and 

consider the report and either its motion or the petition and may modify, 

revoke, or terminate the probation of the probationer upon the grounds set 

forth in subdivision (a) if the interests of justice so require.”

8 “ ‘[T]he 2011 Criminal Justice Realignment Act (Stats. 2011, 

1st Ex. Sess. 2011–2012, ch. 12, § 1) [the Realignment Act or 

“realignment”] . . . “changed the paradigm for the incarceration and 

postconviction supervision of persons convicted of certain felony offenses.” ’ ” 

(People v. Johnson (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 379, 392 (Johnson).)
9

generally lost jurisdiction over the defendant. [Citation.] When the 

defendant was released on parole after service of the sentence, he was under 

the exclusive jurisdiction of CDCR and its administrative parole 

procedures.”].) We explore this legislative shift in depth.

The first relevant enactment added section 3000.08, governing the 

supervision of parolees. (Stats. 2011, ch. 39, §§ 37–38.)9 Two versions of the 

statute were enacted, the first providing that, through July 1, 2013, parolees 

are “subject to the jurisdiction of and parole supervision by” CDCR. (Stats. 

2011, ch. 39, § 37.) The second version, operative on July 1, 2013, provided 

parolees are subject to “parole supervision by” CDCR and “the jurisdiction of 

the court in the county where the parolee is released or resides for the 

purpose of hearing petitions to revoke parole and impose a term of 

custody . . . .” (Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 38, italics added.) The legislative 

counsel’s digest states: “The bill would provide, as of July 1, 2013, the court 

in the county in which the parolee resides or commits a violation of the terms 

and conditions of parole shall have the limited jurisdiction to hear petitions to 

revoke parole and impose a term of custody.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. 

Bill No. 117 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.), italics added.) 

In 2012, section 1203.2 was amended to add mandatory supervision, 

postrelease community supervision, and parole. (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 30.) 

The bill includes the following uncodified statement of intent: “It is the intent 

of the Legislature in enacting this act to provide for a uniform supervision 

revocation process for petitions to revoke probation, mandatory supervision, 

postrelease community supervision, and parole.” (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2, 

italics added.) As explained in a legislative analysis: “Per 2011 Public Safety 

9 This statute superseded an enactment earlier that year adding 

a different version of section 3000.08, which never took effect. (Stats. 2011, 

ch. 15, § 469.) 
10

Realignment, effective July 1, 2013, the trial courts will be responsible for 

conducting revocation proceedings for four distinct categories of supervision: 

probation, mandatory supervision, post release community supervision, 

and parole. Under the current statutory scheme, distinct procedural 

requirements are prescribed for each of the four types of supervision. To 

reduce confusion and promote consistency across the four types of 

significantly similar procedures, this bill amends various statutes to apply 

current probation revocation procedures to all four categories of supervision.” 

(Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1023 

(2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 25, 2012, p. 3.)

Following realignment, in 2013, section 1203.2(b)(1) was amended to 

add the following sentence (which remains in the current version of the 

statute): “The court in the county in which the person is supervised has 

jurisdiction to hear the motion or petition, or for those on parole, either the 

court in the county of supervision or the court in the county in which the

alleged violation of supervision occurred.” (Stats. 2013, ch. 32, § 7.) The 

legislative counsel’s digest stated, “Existing law requires [certain] persons to 

be subject to parole supervision by the [CDCR] following release from state

prison and the jurisdiction of the court in the county in which the parolee is 

released or resides for the purpose of hearing petitions to revoke parole and 

impose a term of custody. [¶] This bill would require persons subject to parole 

supervision to additionally be subject to the jurisdiction of the court in the 

county in which the alleged violation of supervision occurred for the purpose 

of hearing petitions to revoke parole and impose a term of custody.” (Legis. 

Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 76 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.), italics added.) 

A legislative analysis similarly characterized the bill as providing “in regards 

to parolees, either the court in the county of supervision or the court in the 
11

county in which the alleged violation of supervision occurred has jurisdiction 

to hear a revocation motion or petition.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 

Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 76 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 

13, 2013, p. 2, italics added.) 

The legislative history thus clearly shows that (1) in enacting 

realignment, the Legislature intended to grant the courts only limited 

jurisdiction over parolees, extending to parole violations and revocation 

proceedings; and (2) by adding parole to section 1203.2, the Legislature 

intended to further implement realignment by providing uniform revocation

proceedings for the various types of supervision. Nothing in the legislative 

history indicates that, by adding parole to section 1203.2, the Legislature 

intended to give courts jurisdiction over parolees that extended beyond the 

context of an alleged parole violation.

A comparison with section 1203.3 provides further support for 

a construction of section 1203.2 limiting its application to alleged parole 

violations. Section 1203.3 authorizes courts “at any time during the term of 

probation to revoke, modify, or change its order of suspension of imposition or 

execution of sentence,” and sets forth procedures for the modification of 

probation terms or conditions. (§ 1203.3, subds. (a) & (b)(1).) By its terms, 

the statute “does not apply to cases covered by Section 1203.2.” (§ 1203.3, 

subd. (e).) Courts considering sections 1203.2 and 1203.3 before realignment 

concluded the two statutes applied to probationers in different contexts: 

“Section 1203.3 does not apply after a probationer is rearrested on a 

probation violation. (§§ 1203.2, 1203.3, subd. (e); [citation].) Instead, when 

a probationer is rearrested, the governing statute is section 1203.2 . . . .” 

(People v. Ramirez (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425; see also People v. 

Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1094 [“[S]ection 1203.3 . . . . by its terms does 
12

not apply to probation revocations following rearrests, which section 1203.2, 

subdivision (c), covers.”].) Under these cases, section 1203.2 governs

proceedings involving alleged probation violations and when the probationer 

has already been arrested, while section 1203.3 governs changes to probation 

in other contexts. This distinction was long-established, as an early case held 

the statutes were “adopted for separate and distinct purposes. Section 1203.2 

provides for and covers one situation, namely, where a probationer is 

rearrested because of a claimed violation of the terms of his probation. . . . [¶] 

On the other hand, section 1203.3 seems to cover another situation entirely, 

and to provide for revocation, modification or termination of the original 

order in cases where the probationer has not been rearrested.” (Ex parte 

Walden (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 861, 864.)10 In light of this distinction between 

sections 1203.2 and 1203.3, it is notable that the 2012 bill adding parole to 

section 1203.2 also amended section 1203.3, but the amendments to section 

1203.3 added mandatory supervision only. (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, §§ 30 & 31.) 

This further indicates a legislative intent that court jurisdiction over 

parolees, as provided for in section 1203.2, extends only to instances where 

the parolee has been arrested for alleged parole violations.

CDCR also relies on cases indicating that section 1203.2 governs 

alleged violations and revocation hearings. For example, our Supreme Court 

concluded, based on “[a] review of the amendments to section 1203.2 from the 

time it was added to the Penal Code in 1935 until [a] 1977 amendment,” that 

the “amendments consistently reflect the Legislature’s concern with 

continuing and broadening the court’s jurisdiction to resolve issues regarding 

a defendant’s noncompliance, during the term of probation, with the terms 

10 Although Ex parte Walden predated the addition of subdivision (b) to 

section 1203.2, the legislative history of that amendment, discussed above, 

indicates no intent to change this understanding.
13

and conditions of probation, as well as providing statutory procedures for the 

exercise of such jurisdiction.” (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 514.) In 

a subsequent case, the Supreme Court stated, “Under the Realignment Act, 

jurisdiction over most petitions to revoke parole shifted to the superior 

courts,” and characterized sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 as “establish[ing]

a statutory framework for parole revocation.” (People v. DeLeon (2017) 

3 Cal.5th 640, 647.) One Court of Appeal found, “In enacting realignment, 

the Legislature gave the trial court the authority to modify the conditions of 

parole in a parole revocation proceeding even though the defendant also has 

the option of filing an administrative appeal with CDCR to challenge the 

conditions of parole.” (Johnson, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 401, italics 

added; see also id. at p. 394 [“Prior to realignment, ‘[t]he executive branch 

ha[d] “inherent and primary authority” over parole matters.’ [Citation.] But 

after realignment that is no longer the case for matters arising in parole 

revocation proceedings.” (italics added)]; Department of Corrections & 

Rehabilitation v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1480 [“[T]he 

superior court is vested with the authority to modify the conditions of parole 

if it finds the parolee has violated the terms of his or her parole.”].) Although 

these cases did not consider the issue before us and are thus not direct 

authority, they do underscore the general understanding of section 1203.2’s 

limited applicability. 

We recognize that our Supreme Court, in a pre-realignment case, 

concluded section 1203.2(b)(1) “did not intend to alter the power of courts to 

modify probation absent a violation of the conditions of probation.” (People v. 

Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1100 (Cookson).) Specifically, the court held 

the provision’s specification of modification on the grounds listed in 

subdivision (a) did not so limit courts’ power to modify probation. However, 
14

in so holding, the court relied on section 1203.3 and earlier cases to find this 

authority over probationers: “In 1970, the Legislature amended section 

1203.2 by adding subdivision (b), which provides that a court may modify 

probation on the grounds listed in section 1203.2[, subdivision a]. (Stats. 

1970, ch. 333, § 1, p. 729.) Although it could be argued that the Legislature, 

by amending the statute, intended to overturn [earlier cases] and to limit the 

court’s power to modify to the grounds listed in section 1203.2[, subdivision 

a], we find no direct evidence of such an intent in the available legislative 

history. Instead it appears the Legislature added section 1203.2[, subdivision 

b] in an effort to improve supervision of probationers by enabling law 

enforcement officials to petition for revocation or modification. Moreover, the 

language used in section 1203.2[, subdivision b] does not indicate an intent to 

limit the court’s power to modify. We also note that the Legislature did not 

alter section 1203.3, which broadly states the court’s power to modify.” 

(Cookson, at p. 1100.) We thus take Cookson to hold that section 1203.2(b)(1) 

does not restrict authority conferred on the courts by other statutes and 

judicial interpretations.

In sum, we conclude, based on the statutory language, legislative 

history, and statutory framework, that section 1203.2(b)(1) does not authorize 

courts to modify parole conditions in the absence of an alleged parole 

violation or revocation hearing. The trial court thus lacked statutory 

authority to modify Defendant’s parole condition.11

This result does not leave a nonviolating parolee without a judicial 

remedy. “A petition for a writ of habeas corpus can be used to challenge 

11 Because of this conclusion, we need not and do not decide CDCR’s 

contention that the modification misapplied the law and violated separation 

of powers.
15

a parole restriction.” (In re David (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 675, 680; see also 

Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 685 [“A parolee may 

bring a habeas proceeding challenging his or her parole conditions . . . .”].)12

We note, however, the incongruity of a system whereby a parolee accused of 

violating parole may receive a favorable modification from the court, while 

one who has complied with all terms and conditions must seek relief through 

the more onerous procedures of a habeas petition. Moreover, there are

advantages to allowing courts to modify conditions outside of an alleged 

violation. As the Supreme Court noted in Cookson, “permitting modification 

even absent a violation of the conditions of probation is often consistent with 

the flexibility necessary to achieve the rehabilitative goals of probation:

‘[R]equiring a court or parole board to await a violation of a condition may be 

disadvantageous to the probationer or parolee. After a violation has occurred 

the respective authorities may be disinclined to do anything other than 

revoke, although they might have been receptive to modification prior to the 

actual commission of the violation. Allowing modification even absent 

a violation of a release condition may therefore be in the long-term interest of 

the parolee or probationer.’ ” (Cookson, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1098–1099.) 

These considerations cannot, and do not, impact our analysis. 

“ ‘Crafting statutes to conform with policy considerations is a job for the 

Legislature, not the courts; our role is to interpret statutes, not to write 

them.’ ” (Fort Bragg Unified School Dist. v. Colonial American Casualty & 

Surety Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 891, 909–910.) The Legislature has 

12 In addition, parolees can seek relief administratively with CDCR. 

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3481, subd. (a) [parolee can “submit a written 

grievance . . . to dispute a policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by 

the [CDCR] or departmental staff that causes some measurable harm to their 

health, safety, or welfare”].)
16

granted courts only limited jurisdiction over parolees, restricted to alleged 

parole violations and revocation hearings. Because this system deprives 

courts of the flexibility lauded in Cookson and creates the anomalous result 

whereby a violating parolee can receive a favorable modification under 

section 1203.2(b)(1) while a nonviolating parolee cannot, we urge the 

Legislature to act and grant courts the authority to modify parole conditions 

outside of an alleged violation or revocation proceeding.

DISPOSITION

The March 6, 2020 order modifying Defendant’s parole condition is 

reversed.
17

_________________________

Simons, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Needham, J.

_________________________

Rodriguez, J.*

A160394

* Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
18

Superior Court of Alameda County, Hon. Scott Patton

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney 

General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, Maria G. Chan, Sara 

J. Romano, and Jennifer G. Ross, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party 

in Interest and Appellant.

Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Respondent.