United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued July 8, 2010

Decided July 20, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 10-1074

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ALONSO PALMERO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:08 CR 00173

David F. Hamilton,

Circuit Judge, Sitting by Designation.

O R D E R

Alonso Palmero pleaded guilty to one count of distributing and one count of

possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing

methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He received concurrent terms of 180 months’

imprisonment on each charge. Palmero appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court

erred by refusing to apply the “safety valve” guideline, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a), which would

have decreased his offense level, see id. § 2D1.1(b)(11), and yielded a lower guidelines

range. We affirm the sentence.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 10-1074 Page 2

From May to October 2008, Palmero sold at least 3.13 kilograms of

methamphetamine to a confidential informant. Police then found in his home and on his

person an additional 3.49 kilograms. After he pleaded guilty but before he was sentenced,

Palmero met with the government in an attempt to benefit from the safety-valve guideline,

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a). The chief function of § 5C1.2(a) is to permit district courts to impose

sentences below an otherwise-mandatory statutory minimum. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). That

function would not have aided Palmero because his drug quantity placed him in a range

above the statutory minimum, but he sought a 2-level reduction in offense level that

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(11) provides to drug offenders who qualify for the safety valve.

A defendant seeking a safety-valve reduction must meet five requirements, but the

only one at issue here is the fifth: “not later than at the time of the sentencing hearing, the

defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the

defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of

conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a) (emphasis added). 

Unfortunately, Palmero began the proffer session by lying about the identity of his

methamphetamine supplier. Not until the government confronted him with evidence

contradicting his statements did Palmero recant and provide a new version. The

government did not have any evidence to contradict Palmero’s second story.

At sentencing the government contended that Palmero did not qualify for a safetyvalve reduction because his disclosures were not truthful and complete. The district court

agreed, but went on to explain that it would in any event have used its discretion to

sentence Palmero to 180 months, even if he had qualified for the safety valve. (Without the

safety valve, Palmero’s adjusted offense level of 34 and criminal history category of I

yielded a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months.) On appeal Palmero argues that he should

have gotten a 2-level reduction in his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(11).

A defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he

qualifies for the safety valve. United States v. Ponce, 358 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2004). If the

government challenges the truthfulness or completeness of his disclosure, he must produce

evidence to persuade the district court that the disclosure was truthful and complete. 

United States v. Martinez, 301 F.3d 860, 866 (7th Cir. 2002). On appeal, we review for clear

error the district court’s factual finding that a defendant was not fully truthful in a safetyvalve proffer. United States v. Alvarado, 326 F.3d 857, 860 (7th Cir. 2003).

Palmero argues that his lying at the proffer session should not disqualify him for the

safety valve because he immediately recanted the lie and, at the same session, ultimately

provided a complete statement of his crime that the government did not contradict. The
No. 10-1074 Page 3

government counters that Palmero only recanted because he was confronted with contrary

evidence; otherwise, he might have persisted in his falsehood.

We have explained that the safety valve applies only to those who make “a good

faith effort” and “do their best” to cooperate fully. United States v. Corson, 579 F.3d 804, 814

(7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1751 (2010); United States v. Marin, 144 F.3d 1085, 1095

(7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1996). Lying to

investigators demonstrates bad faith and will disqualify a defendant for the safety valve. 

United States v. Ramunno, 133 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1998). Palmero confined his lying to

just one session, but by lying about his supplier he demonstrated bad faith and cast doubt

on the truth of his other, uncontradicted statements. See Marin, 144 F.3d at 1095; Arrington,

73 F.3d at 148. Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Palmero failed to meet his

burden of showing complete and truthful disclosure under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a).

We presume Palmero’s within-guidelines sentence reasonable, see Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 46-47 (2007); United States v. Panaigua-Verdugo, 537 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir.

2008), and Palmero offers nothing to rebut that presumption. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the

sentence.