Although the trial court first stated it f ound that Bor

jon’s suit had no arguable ba sis in law 1 or in fa c t, the c ourt or de re d the pe tit ion be dis mis se d be c a us e it fo un d tha t the su it h a d n o a rgua ble basis in law. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 217 -CV

Aur e lio Ca r r as c o Bo r

jo n , TD CJ

#8 87 13 2, App e lla nt
v. Ted Pot terand Associates, Joe P etr onis, an d Ed die Sh ell and Associates , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 169TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 221, 672- C , HO NORAB LE RICKMO RRIS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Aure lio Carrasc o Bor

jon, an inmat e in the Texas Depar tment of Criminal Justi c e –Co rr e c tio na l Ins tit uti on s Di vis ion , a

pp e a ls the or de r of the tr ia l c ourt dis mis sin g his pr o s e petition ag ainst Ted Pot t er an d Associates, Joe Petronis, and Eddie Shell and Assoc iates (“D efe ndants”). Bor

jon’s petition wa s filed on Fe bruar y 13, 2007. Be fore service of proc ess on the Def endants a nd without a fac t-finding hear ing, the trial court on Fe bruar y 15, 2007, dismiss ed the pet i t i o n af

t er f inding that it fa iled to comply with chapter

14 of the Te x as Civil P rac tice and Re me die s Co de and

that B or jon ’s su it w a s f

ri vo lou s a nd ma lic iou s b e c a

us e it ha d n o a

rgua ble ba sis in law. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.001-.014 (W est 2002). The dismissal order

12

do e s not s pe c if

y the ba sis fo r t

he c ourt ’s fi nd ingtha

t th e c la ims we re fr ivo lou s. F or re a so ns se t f

or th below, we aff

irm the court’ s dismis sal order
.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We reviewa trial c ourt’s cha pter 14 dismissal of an indig ent inmate’s claim under an abuse- of-discr etion standard. Sa mu e ls v . S tra in , 11 S.W .3d 404, 406 (Tex. App.—Hous ton [1st Di st. ] 200 0, no pe t.) ; T h o ma s v. W

ichita General Hosp. , 952 S.W .2d 936, 939 ( T e x . A p p . — F o rtW o rt h 1 9 9 7 , w r i t d e n i e d )
. A t r i a l c o urta b u s e s i t s d i s c r e t i o ni f

i ta c t s ar b i t r ar i l y,
unrea sonably , without reg ard to guiding leg al principles, or without supportingevidenc e. K- Ma rt Cor p. v . H on e y c utt , 2 4 S. W.3 d 3 57 , 3 60 (T e x. 20 00 ); Bocque t v. Herring , 972 S.W .2d 1 9 , 20 (Tex. 1998).
DI SCU SSIO N

Se c tio n 1 4. 00 3 o f t

he Te xas C ivi l Pr a c tic e and Re me die s Co de pr ov ide s multipl e g ro un ds fo r dis mis sin g an ind ig e nt inm a te ’s claim
. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a ). Section 14.003(a )(2) provides that a court may dismiss a claim, either befor e or afte r ser vice of proce ss, if the court f

inds that the claim is frivolous or malicious. Id. When a cour t dis mis se s a

c la im w ith ou t a fa c t- fi nd inghe ari ng , th e c ourt c ou ld n ot h a ve de te rm ine d th a t th e su it had no ar g uable ba sis in fact. Harrison v. Texas De p’t of Crim. Justice , 915 S.W .2d 882, 887 (T ex . Ap p . — Ho u s t o n[ 1 s tDi s t
. ] 1 9 9 5 , n o wr i t ) ( ci t i n g Hec tor v. Thaler , 8 6 2 S.W .2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1993, no writ)). We, the ref ore, interpre t the trial court’s action as a finding that Bor

jon’ s cl ai m s lack a

n arguable ba sis in law. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Code § 14.003(a) , (b); R etzlaff v. Texas Dep’ t of Cri m. Justice , 94 S.W .3d 650, 6533

(Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) ; Gill v

. Boyd Distribution Center , 64 S.W .3d 60 1, 60 3 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 01 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Mc

Do na ld v . H

ou sto n D air

y , 813 S.W .2d 238, 239 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1991, no writ).

We m us t de te rm ine wh e the r the tr ia l court pr op e rl y fo un d the re is no a rgua ble ba sis in law for B orjon’s cla ims. Johnson v. Lynaugh , 796 S.W .2d 705, 706 (T ex . 1990). While the dismiss al of inmate litig ation under c hapter 14 is ge nera lly

revie wed f

or an a buse of di s cr etion, whether there was a

n arguable ba sis in law for an inmate ’s claims is a question of law that we re view de novo. Minix v. G onzalez , 162 S.W .3d 635, 637 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Gi ll , 64 S.W .3d at 603. Fo r a claim t o have no a rg uable ba sis in law, it mus t be base d on “an indisputable meritless leg al theory” or w holly incre dible or irrational fac tual alleg ation s . Gi ll , 6 4 S
. W
. 3 d

at 6 0 3 (q u o t i n g Neitzke v. W illiams , 4 9 0 U. S
. 3 1 9 , 3 2 7 (1 9 8 9 ), an d ci t i n g Denton v. He rnandez , 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)). A ccor dingly , we e x am i ne B orjon’s petition to decide whether , as a matter of law , it state d cause s of ac tion that would authorize relief. Denson v . Texas Dep’ t of Cri m. Justice , 63 S.W .3d 454, 459 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, pe t. denied).
Fac tua l All

e ga tio ns B or jon ’s pe tit ion

c on ta ine d th e fo llo wi nga lle g a tio ns . In e arl y 19 98 , Bor jon pa id attorney J oe Petronis $25,000 to r epre sent him in a pending criminal ca se. In October 1998, Bor

jon
wa s a rr e ste d. On Oc tob e r 13, 19 98 , att or ne y Te d Potte r of Te d Potte r an d Ass oc ia te s ent e re d in to a contr act with B orjon’s fat h er, Aureliano B orjon (now de cea sed), to sig n Bor jon’s bail bond and become co-c ounsel with Petronis, in ex chang e for Aure liano Bor

jon’s pay ment of $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 and deposit of $65,000 into Pott er’ s trust acc ount as parti al secur ity for B orjon’s bail bond. On4

November

12, 1998, Bor

jon failed to appear

in district court when his cr iminal case w as ca lled. On November

20, 1998, Bor

jon’s bond was re voked, and the cash collater al for the bond w as cla imed by the tr ia l c ourt
.

On De ce mb er

1 1 , 1 9 9 8 , P et ro n i s co n t ac t ed Au re l i an o Bo rj o n(“ Au re l i an o ”) t h ro u gh a fa csimile transmission to sol icit, as an a dditional fee, 50 pe rce nt of the bond proce eds re maining afte r pay ment of the judg ment nisi for Bor jon’s failure to appea

r and for other related ex penses a nd fee s. On December 31, 1998, an agr eeme nt was made to transfe r all of the monies r emaining of the
c a shc oll a te ra l pr oc e e ds to a ne w atto rn e y , d e sig nate d b y Pe tr on is, wh o w ou ld s ub sti tut e fo r P e tr on is as Borjon’s co-counsel. On J anuar y 6, 1999, a motion to substi tute attorney Eddie Shell of Shell and Associate s f

o r Pe tr o n is a s c o u n s e l f

o r B o r jo nw a s g r an te d
. O n

Ja n u ar y 8 , 1 9 9 9 , Po tt e r

s ent Shell a chec k for $48,250 a s the rema ining c ash colla t er al proceeds f rom Bor jon’s bond. On J anuar y 12, 1999, Shell sent Pot ter a nd Petronis eac h a che ck for $19,125 from the pr ocee ds of the cash c ollatera l. On J anuar y 19, 1999, Potter paid Be ll Count y $10,213 for the judg ment nisi entered in Borjon’ s bond-forf

eiture c ase. On Marc h 4, 1999, Potter sent a letter to Aureliano statingthat he had pa id $10,213 to Be ll Count y , $48,25 0 t o S h el l , $ 3 50 to the psy cholog ist, and $5,000 to himself. He also noted that, of the re maining $1,187, he was “haveing[si c] another $300.00 f or [the psy cholog ist] ” and thus
was re funding Aure liano $887. I n November 2000, Shell wrote a le tter re aff irming his oblig ation to repre sent Bor

jon “in the continuing criminal ac tion for appe al and post-c onviction remedie s.” Al le g ingtha

t Sh e ll h a d f

a ile d to pe rf

or m, B or jon so me ti me in 20 01 a tte mpt e d to
rec over t h e $ 4 8 , 250 from Shell that Potter had transf err ed. In November

2002, Bor

jon filed a
c omp la int a g a ins t Sh e ll w iththe State B ar of Te xas. I n Ma rc h 20 03 , She ll fi le d a

state me nt o f f

a c ts5

with the State Ba

r’s g rieva nce c ommitt ee reve aling that, at Potter’s instruction, he had re distributed $3 8, 25 0 o f the $4 8, 25 0 to Potte r an d Petr on is fr om his tr us t a c c ount. On

Ma y 16 , 2 00 3, the State Ba r disciplinary

counsel infor

med Borjon that the m atter had been dismissed bec ause the committee ha d d e te rm ine d th e re wa s n o ju st c a us e to b e lie ve She ll c omm itt e d an y pro fe ssi on a l mi sc on du c t. Bor jon a lleg ed he then rea liz ed that his reliance on Potter’s repr esentations reg ardingthe disposition of the c ash collate ral proc eeds ha d cause d him to “suffer damag es i n the loss of the ca sh collatera l proce eds fr audulently

appropr iated by

[P otter].” Causes of Action

Bor jon pleaded a

cause of action for fra

ud ag ainst eac h of the Def endants. He a lleg ed that, in the Marc h 4, 1999, letter to Aure liano, Potter made a false r epre sent at i o n re g ardingthe dis tr ibutio n o f t

he re ma ini ngpr oc e e ds of the c a shc oll a te ra l tha t had be e n en tr us te d to hi m, t

hat is , She ll n owpo sse sse d th e re ma ini ng$4 8, 25 0. B or jon a lso c on te nd e d th a t Pe tr on is m ade f a lse repr esentations in his c ontrac t w ith Aur eliano with the intention of inducing Aure liano to acquiesc e in Petronis’ solicitation of 50 perce nt of the re mainin g p ro ce ed s o f the c ash collate ral of Bor jon’s bond. Finally , Bor jon alleg ed that Shell contribut ed t o t he fr audulent tra nsactions perpe trated by

Potter and Petronis by

rec eiving the $48,250 and plac ing it in his trust acc ount. Bor jon also pleade d a bre ach- of-f iduciary -duty

cause of a ct ion ag ainst eac h of the attorney Def endants. B orjon alleg ed that, by fra udulently a p p r o p r iating $19,125 that B orjon claimed
an in te re st i n, Pot te r b re a c he d h is f idu c iary du ty . A s to Pe tr on is, Bo rjon ple a de d th a t Pe tr on is br e a c he d h is fi du ciar

y du ty by us inghis re la tio ns hip a s B or jon ’s a tto rn e y

to i nd uc e Aure lia

no to enter into an illega l and void contra ct in order to de fra ud Bor jon a nd Aure liano of 50 perc ent of the
re ma ini ngc a shc oll a te ra l pr oc e e ds fr om B or jon ’s bo nd . A g a ins t Shel l, B or jon a lle g e d th a t Sh e ll6

brea ched his fiduciar

y duty by redistributing client funds that had been place d in his care , without noti fy i n g Bor

jon of the transa ction and re distribution and without ex press instructions from Bor jon or his father
.

“ A c ourt ha s n o ju ri sd ict ion ov e r a c la im m a de by

a pla int if f w ith ou t st and ingto
asser t it.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman , 252 S.W .3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008)

. T o h av e s t an d i n g, plaintiffs must be persona lly ag g rieve d; their allege d injuries must be concr ete a nd particula

rized, actua l or imminent, not hy pothetical. Id. at 304-05. See Tex as Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W .2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1992). The causes of action that Bor jon pleaded in his petition are based on f

actua l alleg ations that conce rn transa ctions betwee n the Def endants a nd Aure liano, not tr ans a c tio ns be tw e e n B or

jon and the De fe nd ants , a

nd the fu nd s tha t Bo rj on a lle g e d he los t as a r e su lt of the De fe nd ants ’ f

ra ud and br e a c h o f f

idu c iary du ty we re no t hi s o wn

bu t A ur e lia

no ’s
. CO NC LU SION Be cause Bor

jon himself w as neither dece ived, def raude d, nor injured, he is without sta nd ingto a sse rt

the c a us e s o f a c tio n of fr a

ud and br e a c h o f f

idu c iary du ty a g a ins t th e De fe nd ants
. Finding that a court has no jurisdiction over the claims made by Bor jon who lacks standingto assert the m, w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r o f d ism iss a l.

____________

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Oc tober 29, 2009