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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRIAN W.

PRUCKER ET AL.

(AC 38509)

Sheldon, Keller and Prescott, Js.

Argued January 13—officially released April 25, 2017

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Elgo, J.)

Brian W. Prucker, forthe appellant(defendant American Legal Services, LLC).

Gary G. Williams, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. This is an action brought by the state

of Connecticut, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 17b-93

and 17b-94, to recover unreimbursed public assistance

payments that it had made to Tammy Wright, whom the

defendant American Legal Services, LLC,1successfully

represented in a personal injury action arising out of a

motor vehicle accident. The state alleges in its action

that it was entitled to enforcement of its statutory lien

on 50 percent of the net settlement proceeds retained

by the defendant after it had settled Wright’s personal

injury claim against a third party.

The defendant appeals from the summary judgment

of the trial courtrendered in favor of the state, awarding

it $250, plus interests and costs, from the net settlement

proceeds that are subject to a statutory lien held by the

state. The defendant claims that (1) summary judgment

was improperly granted because the pleadings were not

closed, (2) the court improperly determined that the

state’s action sounded in conversion, and (3) summary

judgment was improperly granted because, among

other things, there was a genuine issue of material fact

as to the appropriate calculation of the net settlement

proceeds. We affirm the judgment of the court.

Before turning to the specific claims of the defendant,

it is helpful to review briefly the statutory scheme under

which this case arises. Section 17b-93 (a) provides in

relevant part: ‘‘If a beneficiary of [public assistance]

. . . has or acquires property of any kind . . . the state

of Connecticut shall have a claim . . . which shall have

priority over all other unsecured claims and unrecorded

encumbrances, against such beneficiary for the full

amount paid . . . to the beneficiary or on the beneficiary’s behalf under said [public assistance] programs

. . . .’’ In order to effectuate this recovery, the legislature also adopted § 17b-94 (a), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘In the case of causes of action of

beneficiaries [of public assistance] . . . the claim of

the state shall be a lien against the proceeds therefrom

in the amount of the assistance paid or fifty per cent

of the proceeds received by such beneficiary . . . after

payment of all expenses connected with the cause of

action, whichever is less, for repayment under section

17b-93 . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

The record before the court, viewed in the light most

favorable to the defendant as the nonmoving party,

reveals the following facts and procedural history. On

November 25, 2013, the defendant entered into a contingent fee agreement with Tammy Wright to represent

her in an action for injuries she had sustained in a car

accident (personal injury action) for which the other

driver disputed liability. In April, 2014, Wright’s vehicle

was stolen. In order to purchase a replacement vehicle,

she applied for and received a $500 loan2

from Peachtree
Funding Northeast, LLC (Peachtree) against the value

of the anticipated settlement of her personal injury

action. As part of her agreement with Peachtree, Wright

agreed to repay Peachtree $1000—the original $500 plus

a purchase price of $500—upon the occurrence of the

anticipated settlement.

On or about August 8, 2014, Wright settled her personal injury action against the other driver for $12,900.

After deducting attorney’s fees, outstanding medical

bills, the $1000 repaid to Peachtree, and other costs,

the defendant calculated Wright’s total net proceeds

from the settlement to be $5294.43.

On August 13, 2014, the state sent the defendant

notice that it held a lien against 50 percent of any net

settlement proceeds, pursuant to §§ 17b-93 and 17b-94,

because Wright had received $10,318.60 of unreimbursed public assistance from the state. On August 15,

2014, in an effort to discharge the lien, the defendant

sent to the state a ‘‘Statement of Account’’ alleging that

Wright’s net settlement proceeds were $5294.43, and

remitted $2647.21 as 50 percent of the net settlement

proceeds.

The state, however, in a written letter to the defendant, objected to that part of the accounting statement

that treated the $1000 that was repaid to Peachtree as

an expense connected with the litigation and thus was

not included by the defendant as part of the net proceeds. In response to that objection, on September 17,

2014, the defendant sent the state a revised accounting

statement that instead attributed an expense deduction

of $500 payable to Peachtree, while reflecting Wright’s

net proceeds as $500 greater than in the previous statement. In accordance with the new accounting figures,

the defendantremitted to the state a sum of $250, which

constituted 50 percent of the $500 increase to the net

proceeds.

In response, the state maintained that the remaining

$500 expense deduction for the payment to Peachtree

was not an expense connected with the personal injury

action for which a deduction is permitted under § 17b94 (a), and sought the remaining balance of 50 percent

of $500, that is, $250. The state subsequently initiated

this litigation against the defendant.

OnApril 28, 2015,the state filed a motion for summary

judgment and memorandum in support in which it

asserted, inter alia, that the loan from Peachtree and

its corresponding cost is not an expense connected to

the personal injury action because a loan is fundamentally different than an ‘‘expense,’’ and the loan was to

be used by Wright to buy a car for personal use, not

to pay for litigation costs. The defendant opposed the

state’s motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter

alia, that such loans, and the costs to obtain them,

should be treated under the statute as an expense con-
nected to the action because they benefit the state as

the lienholderin that they assist the individualreceiving

public assistance ‘‘to stay the course in order to maximize [his or her] recovery by settlement.’’

The court,Elgo, J., heard oral argument on the motion

on June 29, 2015. By memorandum of decision dated

October 21, 2015, the court granted the state’s motion

for summary judgment because, as a matter of law,

Wright’s cost to obtain the loan was not for an expense

connected with the personal injury action within the

meaning of § 17b-94 (a) but,rather, was forthe purchase

of the upfront payment of $500 to be used to replace her

stolen car. It, therefore, held that this $500 deduction in

the defendant’s accounting statement was improperly

made. Subsequently, the defendant filed this appeal.

We begin by setting forth our applicable standard of

review. ‘‘The standards governing our review of a trial

court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof

submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion

for summary judgment, the trial court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party . . . . The party seeking summary judgment has

the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue

[of] material facts which, under applicable principles

of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter

of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must

provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact. . . . A

material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case. . . . Finally, the scope

of our review of the trial court’s decision to grant the

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is plenary.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 306 Conn. 107, 115–16, 49

A.3d 951 (2012).

The defendant first claims on appeal that summary

judgment was improperly granted because the pleadings were not closed. We disagree. There is no requirement in our rules of practice that the pleadings must

be closed prior to adjudication of a motion for summary

judgment unless the case has been scheduled for trial

or there is a scheduling order. See Practice Book § 17-

44; see also Gordon v. Gordon, 170 Conn. App. 713,

722-23, A.3d (2017); Girard v. Weiss, 43 Conn.

App. 397, 416, 682 A.2d 1078 (‘‘a motion for summary

judgment can be made ‘at any time,’ without the necessity of closing the pleadings’’), cert. denied, 239 Conn.

946, 686 A.2d 121 (1996). In the present case, at the

time the court rendered summary judgment, a trial had

not been scheduled, nor was there a scheduling order
in place. Accordingly, we reject this claim.

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

determined that the state’s action sounded in conversion.3 We summarily dispose of this claim on the ground

that it is irrelevant whether the court properly characterized the state’s complaint as sounding in conversion.

The state’s authority to seek reimbursement for public

assistance and enforce its lien is plainly authorized by

the statutory scheme. In other words, the state’s claim

is sui generis and its viability is not dependent upon

the elements of a common-law conversion claim. The

state was clearly entitled to enforce its statutory lien

on the settlement proceeds against the defendant who,

at the time of receiving notice of the lien, possessed

the funds. Accordingly, the defendant cannot prevail

on this claim.

With regard to its remaining claim, the defendant

argues that the parties dispute factually whether the

loan was for $1000 or whether it was for $500 and

whether the $500 cost to obtain the loan should be

considered as an ‘‘[expense] connected with the . . .

[personal injury] action’’ pursuant to § 17b-94 (a). We

disagree that the amount of the loan was factually in

dispute and conclude that the defendant has failed to

brief adequately its claim that the $500 cost to obtain

the loan should be considered as an expense connected

with Wright’s personal injury action.

Although the defendant bases its characterization of

the state’s position that the loan was for $1000 on a

single allegation contained in its complaint,4

the state

contests the notion that it ever disagreed with the defendant as to the amount of the loan, stating in its brief

that ‘‘[t]he [state] accepted, and accepts, as did the

Superior Court . . . the figures set forth by the Defendant in its two Settlement Statements . . . and the

Defendant’s responses to the [state’s] interrogatories

nos. 1 and 4 . . . : that $500 was borrowed by [Wright]

from Peachtree; that $1000 was ultimately paid to

Peachtree out of the settlement proceeds in repayment

of said [loan]; and that two remittances were made to

the [state’s] Department of Administrative Services on

its statutory lien, the second of which included a $250

reimbursement associated with the Peachtree loan.’’

Upon our review of the record, we agree with the state

that there is no dispute between the parties as to the

amount of the loan: both maintain Wright received $500

from Peachtree.

More importantly, however, the distinction between

labelling the funds a $1000 loan and labelling it a $500

loan that carries a $500 ‘‘deduction’’ cost, as the defendant does, does not equate to a dispute regarding a

material fact because it is not ‘‘a fact which will make

a difference in the result of the case.’’ DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, supra, 306 Conn. 116. It

ultimately does not matter what label is assigned to the
$1000 paid to Peachtree because the trial court decided,

as a matter of law, that the cost of obtaining the loan

is not an ‘‘[expense] connected with the . . . [personal

injury] action’’ within the meaning of the lien statute,

§ 17b-94 (a). Accordingly, the courtreasoned, the defendant improperly deducted the $500 cost of obtaining

the loan before calculating the net proceeds of the settlement.

Because the entire $1000 repayment to Peachtree

should have been included in the net settlement proceeds, not just the $500 loan itself, the court found

that the defendant’s net figure was short by $500, and

because the state was entitled to 50 percent of that

additional $500 under the lien provisions of § 17b-94

(a), the court awarded the state the $250 it sought from

the defendant. For these reasons, we conclude that the

financial calculations under the lien statute, and, thus,

the end result of the case here, would have been the

same, no matter if the funding from Peachtree was

referred to as ‘‘a $1000 loan’’ or ‘‘a $500 loan with a

$500 cost.’’ Therefore, there was no genuine issue of

material fact that precluded the court from entering

summary judgment.

Significantly, we note that the defendant dedicates

merely one sentence in its brief to challenging the

court’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, the cost to

obtain the loan was not an expense connected to the

personal injury action within the meaning of § 17b-94

(a).5 That single assertion appears midway through the

defendant’s conclusion, wherein it baldly states for the

first time that ‘‘[t]he underlying question is whether the

cost of [a loan] is a cost of litigation.’’ (Emphasis in

original.) The defendant provides no analysis of that

fundamental question in its brief. More specifically, it

fails to cite to any cases in support of this claim or to

engage in any statutory analysis of the phrase ‘‘expenses

connected with the cause of action’’ in order to divine

the legislative intent behind § 17b-94 (a). In fact, the

defendant does not even repeat the contention that it

made before the trial court with regard to this claim,

i.e., that the cost of the loan should be treated as a

cost connected to the personal injury action because

it allowed Wright to continue her litigation to its maximum potential, thereby increasing the chances that the

state, in turn, would be able to recover more money

from Wright.

In sum, the defendant’s brief contains only five pages

of analysis that it devotes to other issues, and this court

has long held that ‘‘[w]here the parties cite no law and

provide no analysis of their claims, we do not review

such claims.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jalbert v. Mulligan, 153 Conn. App. 124, 133, 101 A.3d 279,

cert. denied, 315 Conn. 901, 104 A.3d 107 (2014). Accordingly, we do not consider the merits of this question.

The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The action also was originally commenced against Brian W. Prucker

individually, but was later withdrawn as to him. Hereafter, references to

the defendant are to American Legal Services, LLC.

2 Although the parties use both the term ‘‘advance’’ and the term ‘‘loan’’

in describing the funds paid by Peachtree, we conclude that it is more

accurate to refer to the funds as a ‘‘loan.’’

3

In briefing this claim, the defendant also argues, without any supporting

analysis, that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the state

adequately complied with § 17b-94 (a) by presenting an executed assignment

from Wright to the defendant. Because it is inadequately briefed; see Jalbert

v. Mulligan, 153 Conn. App. 124, 133, 101 A.3d 279, cert. denied, 315 Conn.

901, 104 A.3d 107 (2014); we decline to address this argument.

4 As support for its assertion that the state claims that the loan was for

$1000, the defendant points to paragraph seven of the state’s complaint,

which alleges that the defendant’s accounting statement ‘‘contained an

improper deduction to [Peachtree] in the amount of $500, which deduction

was not for an expense connected with the . . . [personal injury] action

but was, upon information and belief, a repayment of [a loan] made by

[Peachtree] to [Wright].’’ (Emphasis added.) The defendant then states in

its brief ‘‘[a]t the 50% . . . reimbursement pursuant to . . . § 17b-94 (a)

rate, the [loan] [according to the state] would be $1000 . . . .’’

5 We note that, in its reply brief, the defendant raises, for the first time,

the claim that summary judgment was improperly granted because there

was a genuine issue of material fact as to how Wright actually utilized the

loan from Peachtree. Specifically, the defendant argues in its reply brief

that although the motivation for Wright obtaining the loan was to buy a

vehicle to replace her stolen one, there was no evidence presented as to

how it was actually used, and, thus, ‘‘testimony [was] required . . . to

[show] whether the expense [was not] ‘connected with the . . . [personal

injury] action’ pursuant to the statute. . . .’’ ‘‘It is well established . . . that

[c]laims . . . are unreviewable when raised for the first time in a reply

brief. . . . Our practice requires an appellant to raise claims of error in his

original brief, so that the issue as framed by him can be fully responded to

by the appellee in its brief, and so that we can have the full benefit of that

written argument. Although the function of the appellant’s reply brief is to

respond to the arguments and authority presented in the appellee’s brief, that

function does not include raising an entirely new claim of error.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) SS-II, LLC v. Bridge Street Associates, 293 Conn.

287, 302, 977 A.2d 189 (2009). Accordingly, we decline to review the merits

of this claim.