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305 Nebraska Reports

GREAT NORTHERN INS. CO. v. TRANSIT AUTH. OF OMAHA

Cite as 305 Neb. 609

Great Northern Insurance Company, an Indiana 

corporation, appellee, v. Transit Authority of 

the City of Omaha, a governmental subdivision 

of the State of Nebraska individually and 

doing business as Metro Area Transit, 

appellant, and Jessica Johnson, 

an individual, appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed April 17, 2020. No. S-19-913.

1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question 

that does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate 

court as a matter of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a 

conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision.

2. Statutes: Time. Statutes covering substantive matters in effect at the 

time of the transaction or event govern, not later enacted statutes. But 

where there has been an amendment to a statute which was a procedural 

change and not a substantive change, upon the effective date of the 

amendment, it is binding upon a tribunal.

3. ____: ____. Procedural amendments to statutes are ordinarily applicable 

to pending cases, while substantive amendments are not.

4. Statutes: Words and Phrases. A substantive amendment is one that 

creates a right or remedy that did not previously exist and which, but for 

the creation of the substantive right, would not entitle one to recover. A 

procedural amendment, on the other hand, simply changes the method 

by which an already existing right is exercised.

Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals, on 

appeal thereto from the District Court for Douglas County, 

Thomas A. Otepka, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals 

reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

06/19/2020 08:07 AM CDT
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GREAT NORTHERN INS. CO. v. TRANSIT AUTH. OF OMAHA

Cite as 305 Neb. 609

Robert M. Schartz and Timothy Mulliner, of Abrahams, 

Kaslow & Cassman, L.L.P., for appellant.

Matthew D. Hammes, of Locher, Pavelka, Dostal, Braddy & 

Hammes, and Cheri MacArthur, of Cozen O’Connor, for appellee Great Northern Insurance Company.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Freudenberg, J.

NATURE OF CASE

The Transit Authority of the City of Omaha, doing business 

as Metro Area Transit (Metro), moved for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity in a suit brought by Great 

Northern Insurance Company (Great Northern). The district 

court denied this motion, and Metro appealed. The Nebraska 

Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 

explaining that the denial of a motion for summary judgment 

is interlocutory and not a final order. However, after the order 

denying summary judgment was entered but before the 30-day 

period to file a timely appeal expired and before Metro filed 

its notice of appeal, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016) 

was amended to add denials of summary judgment based on 

a claim of sovereign immunity to the definition of a final 

order. 1 Metro petitioned for further review, and we granted 

the petition.

BACKGROUND

The underlying claim, not at issue here, is a subrogation 

action in which Great Northern is seeking compensation from 

Metro under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. 2 In the 

proceedings below, Metro challenged Great Northern’s compliance with the notice requirements of the Political Subdivisions 

Tort Claims Act.

1 See 2019 Neb. Laws, L.B. 179, § 1.

2 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-901 et seq. (Reissue 2012).
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GREAT NORTHERN INS. CO. v. TRANSIT AUTH. OF OMAHA

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Metro moved for summary judgment based on sovereign 

immunity. Metro claimed that Great Northern did not properly 

comply with the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act and 

that the failure to comply with the notice requirements meant 

that Metro never waived sovereign immunity. On August 23, 

2019, the district court denied Metro’s motion on the ground 

that Metro was estopped from asserting immunity after Metro’s 

outside counsel responded to Great Northern’s notice. On 

September 3, Metro moved to reconsider. The motion was 

denied, and Metro filed an appeal on September 19. Metro’s 

notice of appeal stated that it was appealing the original order 

denying summary judgment. On October 11, the Court of 

Appeals summarily dismissed the appeal, explaining that a 

denial of a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and 

not a final order pursuant to § 25-1902.

However, § 25-1902 was amended effective September 1, 

2019. 3 This change added language specifying that an order 

denying summary judgment when the motion is based on sovereign immunity is a final order. The relevant sections were 

amended to read:

(1) The following are final orders which may be 

vacated, modified, or reversed:

. . . .

(d) An order denying a motion for summary judgment 

when such motion is based on the assertion of sovereign 

immunity or the immunity of a government official.

(2) An order under subdivision (1)(d) of this section 

may be appealed pursuant to section 25-1912 within thirty 

days after the entry of such order or within thirty days 

after the entry of judgment. 4

Because the change to § 25-1902 took effect before the appeal 

was filed, but after the order itself was issued, the question presented is which version of the final order statute should apply.

3 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Supp. 2019).

4 See id.
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GREAT NORTHERN INS. CO. v. TRANSIT AUTH. OF OMAHA

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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Metro argues that the Court of Appeals erred by failing to 

recognize that the denial of Metro’s motion for summary judgment asserting sovereign immunity was a final order under 

§ 25-1902 as of September 1, 2019.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual 

dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law, 

which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision. 5

ANALYSIS

The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals 

had jurisdiction when the notice of appeal was filed on 

September 19, 2019. We find that the Court of Appeals did 

have jurisdiction when the notice of appeal was filed because 

the amended version of § 25-1902 had taken effect.

In order to vest the court with appellate jurisdiction, the 

party seeking the appeal must comply with several statutory requirements. Section 25-1902 provides the definition 

of what is a final order, and Neb. Rev. Stat § 25-1912 (Cum. 

Supp. 2018) provides the methodology for how an appeal is 

perfected. In interpreting the requirements of § 25-1912, we 

have said that “[s]ection 25-1912 sets forth the only method 

by which a party may invoke the jurisdiction of an appellate 

court . . . .” 6 There are three steps required to invest the court 

with jurisdiction: (1) there must be a judgment or final order 

entered by the court from which the appeal is taken, 7 (2) a 

party must timely file a notice of appeal, 8 and (3) the appealing 

5 Green v. Seiffert, 304 Neb. 212, 933 N.W.2d 590 (2019).

6 State v. Schmailzl, 248 Neb. 314, 316, 534 N.W.2d 743, 745 (1995).

7 See, § 25-1902 (Supp. 2019); Fritsch v. Hilton Land & Cattle Co., 245 

Neb. 469, 513 N.W.2d 534 (1994).

8 See, § 25-1912; Green v. Seiffert, supra note 5.
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party must pay the docket fee to the clerk of the court or file 

in forma pauperis. 9

[2,3] The order entered on August 23, 2019, did not meet the 

definition of a final order when entered. However, the amendment to § 25-1902 took effect before Metro’s 30-day window 

to appeal had expired. It is a well-established principle that 

statutes covering substantive matters in effect at the time of 

the transaction or event govern, not later enacted statutes. 10

But where there has been an amendment to a statute which 

was a procedural change and not a substantive change, upon 

the effective date of the amendment, it is binding upon a tribunal. 11 Thus, procedural amendments to statutes are ordinarily 

applicable to pending cases, while substantive amendments 

are not. 12

[4] We have explained that a substantive amendment is one 

that creates a right or remedy that did not previously exist and 

which, but for the creation of the substantive right, would not 

entitle one to recover. 13 A procedural amendment, on the other 

hand, simply changes the method by which an already existing 

right is exercised. 14

At issue in the larger case is the substantive question of 

whether Metro waived sovereign immunity under the Political 

Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. The change to § 25-1902 does 

not affect the substance of that claim. Rather, it changes the 

procedure governing when Metro can request review. By making the denial of a claim of sovereign immunity a final order, 

the amendment allows a sovereign to file an interlocutory 

appeal within 30 days of the order instead of waiting until the 

9 See § 25-1912.

10 Dragon v. Cheesecake Factory, 300 Neb. 548, 915 N.W.2d 418 (2018).

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id.
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final judgment to seek review of the lower court’s decision on 

sovereign immunity. We hold that the amendment to § 25-1902 

which took effect September 1, 2019, was a procedural change 

that was binding upon its effective date.

Because Metro filed its notice of appeal after the effective 

date of the amendment to § 25-1902, the amendment governed 

whether that notice of appeal succeeded in divesting the lower 

court of jurisdiction and in bringing the matter of the lower 

court’s ruling on sovereign immunity to the Court of Appeals. 

Subsection (2) of the amended version of § 25-1902 provides 

that any order that meets the definition under subsection (1)

(d) may be appealed pursuant to § 25-1912. The order subject 

to Metro’s notice of appeal meets that definition. Thus, the 

amended language of § 25-1902 allowed for Metro to file a 

notice of appeal based on the August 23, 2019, order. 15

The amended change to § 25-1902 allows for the appeal 

from an order denying summary judgment based on a claim 

of sovereign immunity as long as the appealing party complied with the requirements of § 25-1912. Metro has otherwise 

complied with the requirements for perfecting an appeal under 

§ 25-1912. As such, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the 

appeal for a lack of jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

We find that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction pursuant 

to § 25-1902 (Supp. 2019), which was effective September 1, 

2019. We reverse the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of 

Appeals and remand the cause for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded for 

further proceedings.

15 See § 25-1902(2) (Supp. 2019).