[Cite as Flint v. Flint, 2016-Ohio-5279.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

CONSTANCE M. FLINT 

 Appellant 

 v. 

JOSEPH D. FLINT 

 Appellee 

C.A. No. 15CA010895 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 14DR078121 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: August 8, 2016 

 

HENSAL, Judge. 

{¶1} Constance Flint appeals a journal entry of the Lorain County Court of Common 

Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, that ordered her to pay $1,781.25 in attorney fees. For the 

following reasons, this Court reverses. 

I. 

{¶2} In March 2014, Ms. Flint filed a petition for divorce against her husband Joseph 

Flint. In her complaint, Wife included a claim against Husband’s girlfriend, alleging that the 

girlfriend had harassed and tormented her in person and over the telephone. 

{¶3} Husband’s girlfriend moved to dismiss any claims against her, alleging that she 

could not be joined as a defendant in a divorce action. She also moved for attorney fees under 

Revised Code Section 2323.51 and Civil Rule 11, arguing that the allegations against her were 

frivolous. Wife opposed the motions, arguing that the girlfriend could be joined as a party under 

Civil Rule 20. She also argued that, because joinder was proper, her action was not frivolous. 
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{¶4} Wife subsequently amended her complaint to include a request that Husband’s 

girlfriend be temporarily and permanently enjoined from harassing or demeaning her. The 

girlfriend subsequently filed a reply to her motion to dismiss, arguing that Wife’s argument that 

she can be joined under Rule 20 was “spurious” and “ridiculous.” The trial court granted the 

motion to dismiss. After the divorce was resolved, the court granted the girlfriend’s motion for 

attorney’s fees. Examining the girlfriend’s argument that Wife’s “seeking joinder * * * 

constituted a frivolous filing pursuant to R.C. 2323.51[,]” it concluded that Wife’s claim against 

the girlfriend was a “frivolous filing for which no legal authority existed to attempt to join 

[Husband’s girlfriend] * * *.” Wife has appealed, assigning two errors. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT JOINING 

[HUSBAND’S GIRLFRIEND] IN A DIVORCE ACTION TO OBTAIN A 

RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST HER WAS FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT. 

{¶5} Wife argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that Civil Rule 75 prohibited 

her from joining Husband’s girlfriend as a party in a divorce proceeding. She argues that Rule 

75 allows parties to be joined under Civil Rule 20. She also argues that, because her argument is 

at least “ostensibly valid[,]” it cannot be said that her allegations against the girlfriend were 

frivolous under Section 2323.51. 

{¶6} Section 2323.51(B)(1) provides that “any party adversely affected by frivolous 

conduct may file a motion for an award of court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other 

reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the civil action or appeal.” In her motion, 

Husband’s girlfriend argued that Wife’s complaint qualified as frivolous conduct under Sections 

2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) and (ii). Those subsections provide that conduct is frivolous if it “obviously 
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serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action * * * or is for 

another improper purpose” or “is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a 

good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or cannot be 

supported by a good faith argument for the establishment of new law.” R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i), 

(ii). 

{¶7} “[A]nalysis of a claim under [R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)] boils down to a determination 

of (1) whether an action taken by the party to be sanctioned constitutes ‘frivolous conduct,’ and 

(2) what amount, if any, of reasonable attorney fees necessitated by the frivolous conduct is to be 

awarded to the aggrieved party.” P.N. Gilcrest Ltd. Partnership v. Doylestown Family Practice, 

Inc., 9th Dist. Wayne No. 10CA0035, 2011-Ohio-2990, ¶ 32, quoting Ceol v. Zion Industries, 

Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 291 (9th Dist.1992). This Court’s standard of review on an appeal of 

an award of sanctions depends on the part of the analysis at issue. The trial court’s factual 

findings will not be overturned if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. S & S 

Computer Sys., Inc. v. Peng, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20889, 2002-Ohio-2905, ¶ 9. We review 

questions of law, such as whether a claim is warranted under existing law, de novo. Jefferson v. 

Creveling, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24206, 2009-Ohio-1214, ¶ 16. Finally, we review the trial 

court’s decision whether to impose sanctions for improper conduct under an abuse of discretion 

standard. Gilcrest at ¶ 29. 

{¶8} Regarding Wife’s argument that a third-party can be joined in a divorce 

proceeding under Civil Rule 20, Civil Rule 75(A) provides that, in general, the rules of civil 

procedure “shall apply in actions for divorce * * *.” Rule 75(B) specifies, however, that Rules 

“14, 19, 19.1, and 24 shall not apply in a divorce[.]” Wife is correct that there is no language in 

Civil Rule 75 that explicitly provides that Rule 20 does not apply to divorce actions. 
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{¶9} Civil Rule 20 provides in pertinent part that “[a]ll persons may be joined in one 

action as defendants if there is asserted against them * * * any right to relief in respect of or 

arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or succession or series of transactions or 

occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” 

In her amended complaint, Wife alleged that Husband and his girlfriend “harass and torment 

[Wife] telephonically and in person * * *.” She then listed several examples of the harassment 

she had allegedly endured by one or both of them. 

{¶10} It is not necessary for us to resolve whether a third-party can, in fact, be joined to 

a divorce action under Civil Rule 20. Upon review of the record, we conclude that, because 

Wife alleged that some of the harassment she endured was done jointly by Husband and his 

girlfriend, Wife presented, at the very least, a good faith argument that she should be permitted 

to join Husband’s girlfriend pursuant to Rule 20. Accordingly, the trial court incorrectly ordered 

Wife to pay the girlfriend’s attorney fees. Wife’s first assignment of error is sustained. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED SANCTIONS FOR 

FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT PURSUANT TO OHIO REV. CODE § 2323.51 

WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING. 

{¶11} Wife’s second assignment of error is that the trial court should have held a 

hearing before ruling on the motion for attorney fees. In light of our resolution of Wife’s first 

assignment of error, we conclude that Wife’s argument is moot, and it is overruled on that basis. 

App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 
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III. 

{¶12} The trial court incorrectly granted the motion for attorney fees. The judgment of 

the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division is reversed, and this 

matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision. 

Judgment reversed, 

and cause remanded. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellee. 

 

 JENNIFER HENSAL 

 FOR THE COURT 

CARR, P. J. 

SCHAFER, J. 

CONCUR. 
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APPEARANCES: 

JONATHAN E. ROSENBAUM, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

LESLIE GENTILE, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.