J-S04013-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF: J.K.V. II, A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.K.V. I, FATHER,

No. 414 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order February 25, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Civil Division at No(s): 20037-2014 D.C.A. IN THE INTEREST OF: J.K.V. II, A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.K.V. I, FATHER,

No. 415 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered February 25, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Civil Division at No(s): CP-37-DP-0000030-2013

NO. 30 OF 2013 D.C.A. IN THE INTEREST OF: J.K.V. II, A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.K.V. I, FATHER

No. 416 WDA 2015J-S04013-16

- 2 - Appeal from the Order February 25, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Civil Division at No(s): CP-37-DP-0000035-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2016 J.K.V. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered o n February 25, 2015, wherein the orphans’ court terminated his par ental rights to his son,
J.K.V. II. 1 We affirm. At the outset, we observe that Father’s appeals fi led at Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County action numbers 30-2 013 and and 35- 2013 stem from dependency proceedings that are not at issue in this case regarding the termination of parental rights. The proceedings at action number 30-2013 related to a prior application for s helter care that the Lawrence County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed and subsequently withdrew on on April 12, 2013. Hence, that case is closed and there is no order from that proceeding that is curr ently before us. Accordingly, we quash the appeal filed at 415 WDA 2 015 regarding action number 30-2013.

____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Co urt.

1 The orphans’ court order also terminated the paren tal rights of D.B., J.K.V. II’s birth mother. We do not address that aspect o f the order.J-S04013-16

- 3 -

Similarly, the appeal filed at action number 35-20 13 relates solely to the underlying juvenile court proceedings and appar ently challenges the juvenile court’s adjudication of dependency pursuan t to 42 Pa.C.S § 6341(c). 2 Any appeal from the juvenile court’s order adjudi cating J.K.V. II dependent had to be filed within thirty days of the date the order was filed. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. Herein, the juvenile court adjudic ated J.K.V. II dependent on November 20, 2013, and Father failed t o appeal that order or any ensuing order from the juvenile court. Hence, that appeal is also

____________________________________________ 2 It is not entirely clear why Father purported to a ppeal from multiple action numbers when the only appealable order was entered at 20037-2014, relating to the termination of parental rights. We observe that CYS filed a motion in the dependency proceedings to change J.K. V. II’s permanency goal to adoption and the juvenile court scheduled a rgument concurrent with the evidentiary hearing on the agency’s petition fo r involuntary termination. CYS reasserted its motion at the outset of the invo luntary termination hearing, but the trial court, sitting as the orphan s’ court in that proceeding, did not dispose of the dependency-related motion on the record or in the resulting order terminating parental rights. Moreo ver, the copy of the docket for the juvenile court proceedings that is i ncluded in the certified record confirms that the juvenile court never enter ed an order granting the motion for a goal change. Hence, nothing exists to form the basis of the instant appeal filed at 35-2013. In addition, in l ight of the facts that (1) Father does not purport to challenge the goal chang e and (2) it is beyond peradventure that the orphans’ court may terminate parental rights regardless of whether the juvenile court has formal ly changed a dependent child’s goal to adoption, we decline to address tha t juvenile court matter sua sponte

. See In re Adoption of S.E.G. , 901 A.2d 1017, 1026 (Pa. 2006)(“an agency may file a termination petition ev en where reunification remains the permanency goal for the child.”); In re M.T. , 101 A.3d 1163, 1166 (Pa.Super. 2014) ( en banc ) (juvenile court’s goal change is not prerequisite to involuntary termination of parental rights in orphans’ court).J-S04013-16

- 4 -

improper. Therefore, we quash the appeal at 416 WD A 2015 concerning action number 35-2013. J.K.V. II was born during June 2013. CYS was fami liar with the family because it had an open case involving an older half -sibling. When CYS discovered that Mother had given birth to J.K.V. II , it inquired as to who would care for the newborn. Mother advised the age ncy that she had placed J.K.V. II in Father’s care. As CYS was not familia r with Father, it filed an application for shelter care pending its review. T hat application was withdrawn after CYS’s investigation confirmed that Father had provided appropriate accommodations for his son at a relativ e’s home in New Brighton, Pennsylvania. CYS revived its concern approximately two weeks la ter after a caseworker observed Father wandering around downtow n New Castle, Pennsylvania with J.K.V. II, the child’s belongings , and a formula canister that was filled with flour instead of baby formula. The flour mixture was also discovered in the newborn’s bottle. Father appeare d to be homeless, which he denied, but he failed to provide the agency with a home address. CYS took emergency custody of J.K.V. II. On November 1 9, 2014, the juvenile court adjudicated J.K.V. II dependent, and placed h im in kinship care with his paternal aunt and uncle, a pre-adoptive resourc e, where he has remained.J-S04013-16

- 5 -

The original permanency goal was reunification. I n order to achieve that goal, CYS crafted a child permanency plan (“th e plan”) that directed Father to, inter alia , secure and maintain housing, improve his parentin g skills, address emotional instability, complete dru g and alcohol counseling and treatment, participate in anger management, and refrain from criminal activity. Each of these components subsumed relate d goals and objectives that CYS used to measure Father’s progress toward r eunification. Father’s compliance with the plan was minimal. Fro m the outset, Father was adversarial. He refused to even sign th e plan, and he informed CYS that he would not participate in any of the pro grams absent a court order. He was so recalcitrant that he refused to e xecute a release to allow CYS to contact service providers in order to confir m the progress he made toward his goals and objectives. Father participat ed in thirteen of approximately thirty-eight bi-weekly supervised vis itations with J.K.V. II, acknowledged his substance abuse by completing an i npatient treatment program, and passed the only drug screen that he vo lunteered to take. On the other hand, he failed to obtain housing, addres s his parenting deficiencies, confront his emotional instability, p articipate in anger management counseling, or refrain from criminal act ivity. On September 17, 2015, CYS filed a petition to term inate Father’s parental rights to J.K.V. II pursuant to the statut ory grounds outlined in 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) and (8). Father was represent ed by the attorney whoJ-S04013-16

- 6 -

had been appointed in the course of the dependency proceedings. During the ensuing hearing, CYS presented the testimony of Stephanie Kelley, the caseworker currently assigned to the family and the custodian of the agency’s case file. Father testified on his own be half. On February 25, 2015, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parent al rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and (b). This timely appeal followed. 3
Father raises one issue. “The trial court abused i ts discretion [in] terminating [F]ather’s rights without full consider ation that the child had been detained for [an] unsubstantiated allegation a nd that [F]ather had substantially complied with what was required of hi m to reunify him with the child.” 4 Father’s brief at xxi. Our standard of review is well settled. The standard of review in termination of parental r ights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if th ey are supported

____________________________________________ 3 Although represented at that juncture, Father filed a pro se notice of appeal. The orphans’ court subsequently granted tr ial counsel’s petition to withdraw and eventually appointed current counsel, who filed Father’s appellate brief with this Court.

4 We interpret Father’s curious reference to J.K.V. II’s “detention for [an] unsubstantiated allegation” as a challenge to the j uvenile court’s finding that J.K.V. II was a dependent child as the term is defi ned in 42 Pa.C.S § 6302. While the propriety of the adjudication of dependen cy is not properly before this Court, we understand the gist of Father’s argu ment, i.e ., since the agency’s concern over Father’s homelessness was mis placed, the goals and objectives that CYS established for Father lacked a ny rational relationship to the facts of this case.J-S04013-16

- 7 -

by the record. If the factual findings are support ed, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be revers ed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of mani fest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or i ll-will. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed m erely because the record would support a different result . We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spannin g multiple hearings. In re T.S.M. , 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotat ion marks omitted). Involuntary termination of parental rights is gover ned by § 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. As the part y petitioning for termination of parental rights, CYS “must prove the statutory criteria for that termination by at least clear and convincing eviden ce.” In re T.R. , 465 A.2d 642, 644 (Pa. 1983). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as “testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and c onvincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, withou t hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Matter of Sylvester , 555 A.2d 1202, 1203–04 (Pa. 1989). As noted, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s pa rental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows. (a) General Rule .—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

. . . .J-S04013-16

- 8 - (8) The child had been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the dat e of removal or placement, the conditions which led to t he removal or placement continue to exist and terminat ion of parental rights would best serve the needs and welf are of the child.

. . . . (b) Other considerations. --The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and wel fare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be termina ted solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequa te housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if f ound to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), th e court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the co nditions described therein which are first initiated subsequ ent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). In order to satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(8 ) in the case at bar, CYS was required to produce clear and convincing ev idence that: (1) J.K.V. II has been removed from Father for at least twelve months; (2) the conditions which led to the child’s removal continu e to exist; and (3) involuntary termination of parental rights would be st serve J.K.V. II’s needs and welfare. See In Re Adoption of M.E.P. , 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276 (Pa.Super. 2003). “Notably, termination under Sect ion 2511(a)(8), does
not require an evaluation of [Father's] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S. , 901 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa.Super. 2006) (emphasis in ori ginal).J-S04013-16

- 9 -

First, we observe that J.K.V. II has been in CYS’s care since April of 2013, due to concerns that Father was homeless and lacked a minimal degree of parenting skills. As CYS did not file it s petition to terminate Father’s parental rights until September 17, 2014, approximately seventeen months later, CYS satisfied the threshold requireme nt of § 2511(a)(8), which mandates that the child be removed from Fathe r for at least twelve months. Next, the certified record reveals that th e condition that led to J.K.V. II’s removal in April 2013, i.e. , Father’s inability to provide his son a safe and secure environment continued to exist, and that terminating Father’s parental rights would best serve J.K.V. II ’s needs and welfare. During the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Kelley testifie d that she had been assigned to the family since May 2014. N.T., 12/11 /14, at 5. She was the current custodian of the family’s file. Ms. Kelley outlined Father’s lack of cooperation and refusal to sign the plan or comply with it absent a court order. Id . at 14-15. She highlighted Father’s goals, justif ied their inclusion into the plan, and gave a brief explanation of what was expected of him. For example, under the goal of maintaining secure housi ng, which addressed the agency’s primary concern of homelessness, Father wa s required to lease an appropriate residence for six months in order to de monstrate stability. Id

. at 25. He was not compliant with this component. Ms. Kelley testified that Father failed to provide CYS with any address between the date of his son’s placement during Apri l 2013 and July of 2014,J-S04013-16

- 10 -

when he provided an address to a home that was vaca nt. Id . at 25, 27. When the agency confronted him with the fact that h e provided an address to an unoccupied home, Father claimed that he lived on the second floor of the home and that his belongings could not have bee n viewed from the outside. Id . at 25-26. He continued that it would not be nece ssary for CYS to return to the home for an inspection of the uppe r level because he intended to move to a better neighborhood and would forward the agency his new address. Id . at 26. Father failed to provide that information

. Id

. Three months later, Ms. Kelley serendipitously disc overed that Father was living with Mother, after he used a house key to en ter Mother’s residence through a locked door and unknowingly interrupted a discussion that Mother was having with Ms. Kelley in the home. Id . at 27. Father denied that he lived with Mother, but Mother subsequently admitted that he resided in her home and a check of the public welfare records conf irmed that Father listed that address as his residence. Id

. In order to improve his parenting skills, Father wa s expected to attend supervised visitation, cooperate with the agency, c omplete a parenting class, and demonstrate the appropriate parenting skills. Father did not attend a parenting program and he only participated in thirt een of thirty-eight biweekly supervised visitations scheduled since April 2014. Id . at 29-30, N.T., 2/12/15, at 47. At least once, Father called after the missed visitation in order to proffer an excuse. N.T., 12/11/14, at 30. On other occasions,J-S04013-16

- 11 -

however, he simply failed to attend the visitations without notice or excuse. N.T., 2/12/15, at 34, 37. The tone of the visitati ons was neither positive nor negative. Id . at 47. Ms. Kelley also testified about Father’s failure to address his emotional instability and drug and alcohol treatment. She in dicated that the agency included these components in the plan due to his cr iminal history and potential substance abuse. N.T., 12/11/14, at 32, 34. She explained that “the number of past convictions often relates to a [parent’s] stability. Depending on [the nature of the charges and prior b ehaviors] . . . we’ve seen in the past[,] maybe we still see [them].” N. T., 2/12/15, at 51. The agency attempts to determine whether the criminal a ctivity is connected to drug or alcohol abuse or whether a pattern exists t hat will forecast future
issues. Id . at 51-52. Ms. Kelley surmised, “We would like to see stability before we release a child to [a parent], because . . . we don’t want to traumatize the child by bringing them back into the system.” Id . at 52. As it relates to mental health, Father was required to have a psychological evaluation, comply with treatment rec ommendations, and execute releases in order to permit CYS to confirm his compliance. N.T., 12/11/14, at 32. In relation to the substance abus e component, Father had to participate in a drug and alcohol assessment, comply with treatment recommendations, submit random drug screens, and at tend three NarcoticsJ-S04013-16

- 12 -

Anonymous (“NA”) or Alcoholics Anonymous (AA”) meet ings per month. Id

. at 34. His compliance with these goals was half-he arted. Father apparently scheduled a mental health assessm ent and attended that intake appointment. However, he failed to sha re the results of the assessment or confirm whether he completed the prog ram or followed the treatment protocol. Id . at 33-35; N.T., 2/12/15, at 41-42. Indeed, witho ut releases permitting CYS to substantiate Father’s se lf-reporting, there was no documentation that he completed any of the necessar y tasks. N.T., 12/11/14, at 33-34. CYS encountered similar impediments in determining whether Father addressed his substance abuse. Ms. Kelley testifie d that Father was uncooperative with prior caseworkers’ attempts to a dminister drug screens, but she indicated that Father passed the one drug s creen that he permitted her to administer. N.T., 2/12/15, at 41. Similarl y, he completed inpatient treatment administered by the Addiction Recovery Ce nter (“ARC”), however, it remained unclear whether he engaged in the requi red clean-and-sober aftercare program at another facility. Id . at 40; N.T., 12/11/14, at 35-37. Again, without the appropriate releases, the agency could not confirm that Father initiated after-care. N.T., 12/11/14, at 36 . Likewise, Father neglected to attend the required number of AA and N A meetings per week. Id

.J-S04013-16

- 13 -

Finally, as it relates to domestic violence and ang er management, Ms. Kelley testified that those features of the plan we re necessary to address reported concerns of domestic violence between Fath er and Mother. Id . 37. In addition, based upon the nature of Father’s prio r criminal activity, CYS believed that anger management would be beneficial. Id . at 38. Father neglected to address either component. Id . At the time of the February 2015 evidentiary hearing, Father was incarcerated f or a probation violation, and he was subject to a temporary protection from a buse (“PFA”) order that had been entered for Mother’s protection. N.T., 2/ 12/15, at 53-54. Ms. Kelley concluded that J.K.V. II was thriving in the pre-adoptive foster home with his paternal aunt and uncle and th at she did not have any concerns about his health and welfare. Id . at 52-53. She opined that it was in J.K.V. II’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. She concluded, “The child is comfortable with [paternal aunt and uncle.] They have expressed their willingness and eagerness to k eep him if the termination does go through. He interacts with [th em] as though they’re [his] parents.” N.T., 12/11/14, at 42. The foregoing evidence sustains the trial court’s d etermination that CYS proved by clear and convincing evidence the sta tutory grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights to J.K.V. II pur suant to § 2511(a)(8). J.K.V. II has been removed from Father’s care for a pproximately two years as of the date of the termination hearings; the con ditions that led to theJ-S04013-16

- 14 -

child’s removal continue to exist; and, as discusse d infra , involuntary termination of parental rights would best serve J.K .V. II’s needs and welfare. Stated plainly, Father’s failure to address his men tal health issues, rectify his parenting deficiencies, and secure stable housing, illustrates that he is unable to care for his son. Accordingly, we find t hat the record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that CYS satisfied the statutory requirements to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 P a.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). See In re Adoption of R.J.S. , supra . We reject Father’s assertion that CYS should not ha ve interfered with the family in the first place because the agency’s claim of his homelessness was unfounded. Equally unpersuasive is Father’s pr otestation that the services that CYS required him to complete were unc onnected to the reason for its involvement. First, to the extent Father i ntended to challenge the juvenile court’s decision to adjudicate J.K.V. II d ependent, Father failed to appeal that decision, which is entirely independent of the orphans’ court’s current decision to terminate parental rights. Hen ce, Father’s stale complaint regarding the sufficiency of the evidence that CYS adduced before the juvenile court during 2013 to demonstrate his h omelessness is not properly before this Court. What is highly relevan t, however, is the fact that two years after the initial determination of homele ssness, Father remains unable to secure safe and stable housing as require d by the plan, and he attempted to mislead the agency about living with M other. As it relates toJ-S04013-16

- 15 -

Father’ secondary complaint, we underscore that Ms. Kelley explained during the evidentiary hearings the various reasons that t he agency selected the precise objectives for Father in the child permanen cy plan. Stated simply, CYS perceived risks related to, inter alia , Father’s homelessness, parenting deficiencies, emotional instability, substance abus e, and criminal activity, and it crafted goals that would permit Father to re medy those inadequacies. In obdurate defiance of CYS, Father intentionally s quandered the agency’s efforts by either failing to comply with the plan o r neglecting to execute a release of information that would permit CYS to con firm his accomplishments. No relief is due. Next, we address whether the trial court abused it s discretion in finding that CYS presented sufficient evidence to d emonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that terminating Father’s paren tal rights and permanently severing the existing bond between him and J.K.V. II would best serve the child’s needs and welfare pursuant t o § 2511(b). While the Adoption Act does not mandate that the trial court consider the effect of permanently severing parental bonds, our case law r equires it where a bond
exists to some extent. See In re E.M. , 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). The extent of the trial court’s bond-effect analysi s depends upon the circumstances of a particular case. In re K.Z.S. , 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa.Super. 2008). We have emphasized that, while a parent’s emotional bond with his child is a major aspect of the § 2511 (b) best-interest analysis,J-S04013-16

- 16 -

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be co nsidered by the trial court when determining what is in the best interest of th e child. In re K.K.R.-S. , 958 A.2d 529, 535-536 (Pa.Super. 2008). Indeed, th e mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the termination of parental rights. See In
re T.D. , 949 A.2d 910 (Pa.Super. 2008) (trial court’s deci sion to terminate parental rights was affirmed where court balanced s trong emotional bond against parents’ inability to serve needs of child)

. As we explained in In re K.Z.S. , supra at 763 (emphasis omitted), In addition to a bond examination, the court may eq ually emphasize the safety needs of the child under subse ction (b), particularly in cases involving physical or sexual abuse, severe child neglect or abandonment, or children with spec ial needs. The trial court should also examine the intangibles such as the love, comfort, security and stability the child mig ht have with the foster parent. Another consideration is the import ance of continuity of relationships to the child and whethe r the parent child bond, if it exists, can be severed without de trimental effects on the child. All of these factors can con tribute to the inquiry about the needs and welfare of the child. See also In re A.S. , 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010) (orphans’ court can emphasize safety needs, consider intangibles, s uch as love, comfort, security, and stability child might have with the f oster parent, and importance of continuity of existing relationships)

. Herein, the orphans’ court concluded that severing the parental bond and freeing J.K.V. II for adoption was in the child ’s best interest. The court implied that the parental bond that nurtures safety , security, and permanency exists between J.K.V. II. and his foster parents rather thanJ-S04013-16

- 17 -

between him and Father. The court reasoned, Although . . . Father did care for J.V. in the mont hs immediately following his birth, the evidence is void of any fa cts to support a finding that [he] developed a strong and proverbial bond with J.V. or that J.V. has any bond with either parent. Furthermore, . . . Father offered [no] evidence that [he is] pre pared to care for J.V. in the immediate future if the underlying petition was denied. Accordingly, the Court determines that ter mination of parental rights would best serve the minor child’s best interests. Trial Court Opinion, 2/25/15, at 12. Our review of the certified record confirms the orp hans’ court’s conclusion. Ms. Kelley stated that the tone of Fat her’s visitations with J.K.V. II was neither positive nor negative. N.T., 2/12/15, at 47. There was little bonding during those sessions. N.T., 12/11/ 14, 29. She indicated, “[T]he child would be more preoccupied with playing with the toys than engaging with Father.” Id . Similarly, he did not cry or act out when he was separated from Father following the visitations. Id . at 39. Indeed, Ms. Kelley opined, “the child reacts . . . to . . . [F] ather [in] the same way [he] reacts to [her, as his caseworker].” Id

. In contrast to the disinterest that he demonstrated toward Father, J.K.V. II sought out his paternal aunt for comfort on the few occasions that he needed consolation during the visitations. Id . at 38. Furthermore, Ms. Kelley made the following observations regarding th e child’s interactions with paternal aunt and uncle at the pre-adoptive fo ster home. Id . at 40. There is a discernible bond between J.K.V. II and h is paternal aunt, whomJ-S04013-16

- 18 -

he refers to as “Mimi.” Id . at 41. He is comfortable in the foster home and displays affection for both foster parents. Id . 40-41. She described how J.K.V. II “climbs all over them. [H]e’s really cli ngy to [his uncle] and still really possessive with [his aunt].” Id . at 41. In addition, he enjoys the love of his paternal family members who live nearby. Id . at 42. He is particularly close with his grandmother, and two co usins with whom he spends a lot of his time. Id . In sum, Ms. Kelley opined that J.K.V. II shares a bond with his pre-adoptive parents, and, if he ha s any connection with Father, it is weak. Id . at 42. As noted, supra , she believes that it was in J.K.V. II’s best interest to terminate Father’s par ental rights so that the child can be adopted by his kinship foster parents. As highlighted by the foregoing evidence, the certi fied record supports the trial court’s needs and welfare analysis pursua nt to § 2511(b). No meaningful bond exists between J.K.V. II and Father that would be detrimental to sever. The evidence confirms that J .K.V. II’s primary attachment is to his pre-adoptive foster parents. That relationship reveals the hallmarks of a healthy parent-child relationshi p. In contrast, Father has not cultivated any bond with his son beyond visitat ion. The fact that J.K.V. II’s primary attachment is with his pre-adoptive fo ster parents rather than Father is a significant factor in evaluating his de velopmental and emotional needs and welfare. See In re K.Z.S., supra (“the bond between [the child]J-S04013-16

- 19 -

and [foster mother] is the primary bond to protect, given [the child’s] young age and his very limited contact with Mother”). Thus, mindful of the additional factors that should be emphasized during the needs-and-welfare analysis in In re K.Z.S. , supra at 763, such as “the love, comfort, security and stability the c hild might have with the foster parent” and the importance of continuing tha t beneficial relationship, we find that the record confirms that terminating F ather’s parental rights best satisfies J.K.V. II’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orp hans’ court order terminating Father’s parental rights to J.K.V. II p ursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and (b). Order affirmed. Appeals filed at 415 WDA 2015 and 416 WDA 2015 quashed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 3/4/2016