Page i 

2016 

06

October 10, 2018

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Executive Summary

On April 15, 2016, a 37-year-old male 

career fire fighter/paramedic was killed 

and a 19-year-old male volunteer fire 

fighter was seriously wounded when 

they were shot after a combination fire 

department was dispatched for a check 

on the welfare of a citizen. The fire 

fighters were on the front porch 

attempting to gain entry into the single 

family dwelling when they were shot by 

the resident. At approximately 1930 

hours, the county 911 center received a 

call from a civilian who reported that he 

was outside of his brother’s house and 

his brother was not answering his phone 

calls or knocks on the front door. The 

caller reported that he had spoken with 

his brother earlier in the day and that his 

brother’s vehicle was parked in the 

driveway in front of his house. He 

further stated that his brother had known medical issues. He requested assistance in gaining entry into 

his brother’s house. Rescue Engine 827 with six volunteer fire fighters and Paramedic Ambulance 823 

with two career fire fighter/paramedics were dispatched at 19:35 hours. After arriving on scene, the fire 

fighters met the homeowner’s brother in the driveway and observed that all visible windows were 

covered. The fire fighters knocked on the front door, announced their presence several times and 

checked for an open door, however they did not perform a 360-degree walk around. After again 

announcing their presence, the fire fighters began to force open the front doors. Forcing both doors 

took 5-8 minutes with multiple strikes from three fire fighters using a halogen tool, axe and a sledge. 

The fire fighters forced the metal outer door but had trouble forcing the inner wooden door and ended 

up knocking a lower panel out of the wooden door and reaching through the hole to open the door from 

the inside. Four fire fighters, two medics and the homeowner’s brother were standing on the small 

front porch and the steps in front of the door. As the door was opened the homeowner’s brother 

entered. The homeowner fired a pistol multiple times through the open doorway striking his brother, 

the fire fighter/paramedic and a volunteer fire fighter. 

Two Fire Fighters and a civilian were shot and two 

other fire fighters injured when trying to perform a 

welfare check at this single-family residence.

(Photo source Local Police Department Homicide Unit)
Page ii

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

The fire fighters and the civilian all tried to escape from the front porch area (see cover photo) and ran 

to take cover behind the apparatus in the street. The career fire fighter/paramedic who was shot, ran to 

Paramedic Ambulance 823 and collapsed at the unit. He was transported in Paramedic Ambulance 823 

to a local hospital where he was later pronounced dead. The volunteer fire fighter who was shot ran to 

Rescue Engine 827 where he was driven to a safe area, transferred to a medic unit, and then 

transported by air ambulance to a local trauma center. The homeowner’s brother was taken by police to 

the off-site command post and later transported by ambulance to a local hospital. Two other volunteer 

fire fighters suffered minor injuries (not gunshot-related) during their escape from the porch and were 

treated and released.

Contributing Factors • Police were not on scene at time door was forced open 

• Fire Fighter Identification (lack of standardized station uniform) and time of evening 

• Lack of communication of important information to responders (presence of firearms in 

residence)

• Resident did not acknowledge multiple attempts by fire department to contact him verbally and 

by knocking on front door 

• Fire fighters/paramedics not wearing ballistic vests or personal protective equipment. 

Key Recommendations 

• Fire, EMS, police departments, and dispatch agencies should ensure that police are the 

primary agency initially assigned to “check on the welfare” of occupants and that information 

regarding weapons in a residence are communicated to all of the responding agencies

• Fire and EMS departments should implement standard operating procedures requiring fire 

fighters and EMS providers to present themselves in uniforms that readily identify them to be 

emergency responders

• Fire, EMS, police departments and dispatch agencies should ensure important responder safety 

information is requested during the call taking process and that information is transferred into 

the dispatch system and provided to first responders. 

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an institute within the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC), is the federal agency responsible for conducting research and making recommendations for the prevention of 

work-related injury and illness. In 1998, Congress appropriated funds to NIOSH to conduct a fire fighter initiative that resulted in the 

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, which examines line-of-duty deaths or on-duty deaths of fire 

fighters to assist fire departments, fire fighters, the fire service, and others to prevent similar fire fighter deaths in the future. The 

agency does not enforce compliance with state or federal occupational safety and health standards and does not determine fault or 

assign blame. Participation of fire departments and individuals in NIOSH investigations is voluntary. Under its program, NIOSH 

investigators interview persons with knowledge of the incident who agree to be interviewed and review available records to develop 

a description of the conditions and circumstances leading to the death(s). Interviewees are not asked to sign sworn statements and 

interviews are not recorded. The agency's reports do not name the victim, the fire department, or those interviewed. The NIOSH 

report's summary of the conditions and circumstances surrounding the fatality is intended to provide context to the agency's 

recommendations and is not intended to be definitive for purposes of determining any claim or benefit.

For further information, visit the program website at www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire or call toll free 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636).
Page 1 

2016 

06

October 10, 2018

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Introduction 

On April 15, 2016, a 37-year-old male career fire fighter/paramedic was killed and a 19-year-old male 

volunteer fire fighter was seriously wounded when they were shot after a combination fire department 

was dispatched for a check on the welfare of a citizen. A civilian (the homeowner’s brother) was also 

shot and seriously injured. Two other volunteer fire fighters suffered minor injuries (not gunshotrelated) while trying to escape off the front porch. On April 18, 2016, the U.S. Fire Administration 

notified the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) of this incident. On April 

25, 2016, the Fire Department contacted the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention 

Program and requested assistance with an independent investigation of the incident. Over the next few 

weeks, a number of phone conversations were held to exchange information and arrange the on-site 

investigation. In early June, 2016, the Fire Chief requested that NIOSH place its investigation on hold 

due to the complexity of the incident and the on-going criminal investigation. In December 2016, the 

Fire Department again contacted the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention 

Program and requested that NIOSH re-open its investigation. Additional phone calls were held over 

the next few weeks. On February 21, 2017, a Safety and Occupational Health Specialist, a Safety 

Engineer with the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program and a Research 

Epidemiologist from the NIOSH Division of Safety Research traveled to Maryland to investigate this 

incident. The NIOSH investigators met with senior staff officers and representatives of the fire 

department, the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) local 1619 and the volunteer fire 

fighters association. The NIOSH investigators met with and interviewed the career fire fighters and 

officers involved in the incident. The NIOSH investigators obtained and reviewed fire department 

training records, standard-operating procedures, incident scene photographs and drawings, and training 

records and medical records. On May 4, 2017, the NIOSH Occupational Safety and Health Specialist

and the Safety Engineer returned to Maryland to conduct additional interviews with current and 

subsequently retired members of the career department. The volunteer fire fighters who responded on 

Rescue Engine 827 along with chief officers from the volunteer fire department were not available to 

be interviewed by NIOSH.

Fire Department

The fire department involved in this incident is a combination career and volunteer department 

consisting of 860 career and 1072 volunteer uniformed members that provide fire suppression and 

emergency medical service (EMS) protection. The fire department employes a total of 908 paid staff. 

There are 45 fire stations located strategically throughout the county that serve a population of 

approximately 909,535 in a geographic area of approximately 482 square miles. The department 

responded to approximately 148,506 incidents in 2016. Some station houses are staffed by career fire 
Page 2

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland

Report # F2016-06

fighters, some station houses are staffed entirely by volunteer fire fighters and some station houses are 

staffed by both career and volunteer fire fighters. These 45 stations house 163 apparatus, including 49

engines (including 5 paramedic units), 23 ladder trucks, 9 rescue trucks, five rescue engines, 43 basic 

life support (BLS) and 18 advanced life support (ALS) ambulances, and 16 specialty units. Five 

battalion chiefs are on duty per shift. The battalion chiefs and career fire fighters are assigned to one of 

four shifts that work 24 hours on and 72 hours off duty. The fire department does not utilize chief’s 

aides or incident command technicians. The station that the fatally injured fire fighter/paramedic’s 

ambulance responded from is a career station that responded to 7697 emergency calls in 2016. The 

station that the injured fire fighters responded from is a volunteer station that responded to 7172

emergency calls in 2016.

During calendar year 2016, the department responded to a total of 5959 "check on the welfare" 

incidents resulting in 7654 individual unit responses. This equates to approximately 16 per 24-hour 

shift. The department dispatched an engine with the EMS unit to assist in these incidents (force entry) 

28 percent of the time.

The fire department estimated that less than 20 percent of all “check on the welfare” calls result in the 

fire department providing patient care. It was also reported that 28 percent of these calls required

forceable entry. 

The fire department was dispatched on tactical channel 8 per department standard operating 

procedures. The response area is divided by a major east-west highway. Once dispatched, responding 

units would switch to channel 8 alpha, bravo, or charlie dependng on the incident location. Channel 8 

alpha is used for incidents on the north side of the highway, Channel 8 bravo is used for high 

volume/high speed roadways and vehicle entrapment incidents and Channel 8 charlie is used for 

incidents south of the highway.

The communication center operates 24 hours per day with call takers working 12-hour shifts from 

06:30 to 18:30 hours and 18:30 hours to 06:30 hours. The communication center is staffed according to 

the expected call volumne and time of day. The communciation center may have anywhere from 7 or 8 

call takers and up to 24 persons at dedicated work stations at any time. The hours of 14:30 to 22:30 

hours generally experience the most call volume and require the highest number of dispatchers.

Note: The fire department administrative office requested that NIOSH conduct an independent 

investigation of this incident. The volunteer department number 27 did not participate in this 

investigation. The volunteer department did not provide standard operating procedures, training 

records or related information. The volunteer fire fighters involved in this incident were not made 

available for the NIOSH interview process.
Page 3 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

Training and Experience

The state of Maryland requires training for volunteer fire fighters that meets or exceeds the 

requirements of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1001, Standard for Fire Fighter 

Professional Qualifications, [NFPA 2013] for the topic areas of Fire Fighter I, Hazardous Materials 

Awareness, Hazardous Materials Operations, and First Responder. The process requires annual 

recertification.

The career fire department involved in this incident has a recruit school which is 18 weeks in length 

and consists of NFPA 1001, Standard on Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications, Fire Fighter I, Fire 

Fighter II, Hazardous Materials Awareness, Hazardous Materials Operations, and Emergency Medical 

Technician (EMT). 

In the state of Maryland, training requirements are as follows:

• Firefighter I is 108 hours 

• Firefighter II is 60 hours 

• EMT is 380 hours 

• Hazardous Materials Operations is 24 hours 

• Hazardous Materials Awareness is 12 hours. 

The career fire fighter/paramedic fatally shot in this incident had 13 years of fire service experience. 

Fire department training records indicated he had received training and certification in Fire Fighter I 

Equivalency, Fire Fighter II Equivalency, Hazardous Materials Operations Equivalency, Emergency 

Vehicle Operator, Pump Operator, Aerial Apparatus Operator, Truck Company Operations, National 

Fire Academy Responding to Terrorism Basic Concepts, Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) 

training and certification, and Paramedic training and certification. The career fire fighter/paramedic 

was working an overtime shift at the time of the incident and was not working at his normal duty 

station.

Training records for the volunteer fire fighter wounded in this incident were requested by NIOSH but

not provided by the volunteer fire department. 

Equipment and Personnel

Units that initially responded to the check on the welfare incident: 

• Rescue Engine 827 with six volunteer personnel including an officer (lieutenant).

• Paramedic Ambulance 823 with two career fire fighters (fire fighter/EMT driving and fire 

fighter/paramedic (the shooting victim).
Page 4 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

Timeline 

The following timeline is a summary of events that occurred as the incident evolved. This timeline is 

not a formal record of events and not all incident events are included in this timeline. The times are 

approximate and were obtained by studying the dispatch records, audio recordings, witness statements, 

and information courtesy of the local police department and other available information. All times are 

approximate and rounded to the closest minute. 

Incident Conditions Time Response 

Civilian repeatedly called his 

brother’s cell phone and landline, 

feared a medical event may have 

occurred

1430-

1915 

hours 

No answer on either line 

Civilian then went over to check on 

his brother at incident location 

1915 

hours 

Couldn’t get his brother to answer his 

door and then knocked on windows 

with no success 

Civilian called 911 for assistance 1930 Dispatcher took information from the 

civilian (brother of the occupant) 

1933 Call was entered for “Check on the 

Welfare”

Call was dispatched to Fire/Rescue 

Department

1935 Rescue Engine 827and Paramedic 

Ambulance 823 assigned and 

responded

Rescue Engine 827 arrived on scene 1946 Volunteers from Rescue Engine 827 

met with the civilian (brother) and 

walked up and started to force door 

Paramedic Ambulance 823 arrived on 

scene

1948 The 2 career fire department EMT’s 

from Paramedic Ambulance walked

up the yard to the front door while

the rescue engine was attempting to 

force the front door 
Page 5

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland

Report # F2016-06

Incident Conditions Time Response 

PD unit 3K9 and 3K6 dispatched to 

assist FD

1949 Rescue Engine 827 and Paramedic 

Ambulance 823 personnel were at the 

front door (on the porch and steps) 

with tools attempting to force the 

door 

PD unit 3K10 replaced 3K9 on the 

incident and responded

1950 No PD units were on scene, just 

Rescue Engine 827 and Paramedic 

Ambulance 823 and the civilian 

The fire fighters broke out a panel of 

the lower portion of the wooden front 

door and a fire fighter reached in and 

unlocked and opened the door and 

yelled fire department

A responder on the radio advised 

“shots fired” (an additional shot 

could be heard in the background of 

the dispatch tape during this 

transmission)

1950-

1951

Fire crews and civilian had just 

entered the front door, then the home 

owner fired a total of 5 shots at the 

responders and his brother

Radio transmission “police step up” 1951 Fire fighters ran off the porch 

(civilian ran too but did yell to his 

brother to identify himself)

Radio transmission “One fire fighter 

down by the house, cannot get to 

him”

1953 Shooting suspect was still in the 

house

PD timeline noted 1954 hours 

“Paramedic Ambulance 823, one shot 

to chest, not conscious”

1951-

1954

Fatally injured career fire fighter

from Paramedic Ambulance 823 ran 

to Paramedic Ambulance 823 in 

street and told members he was shot, 

then collapsed
Page 6 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

Incident Conditions Time Response 

1951-

1954 

Volunteer fire fighter from Rescue 

Engine 827 was shot 3 times and 

tried to get down the sidewalk by 

crawling, then rolled down driveway 

to Rescue Engine 827

PD arrived on scene 1957 

2009 Shooting suspect walked out of the 

house and surrendered to PD 

2038 Career fire fighter medic off of 

Paramedic Ambulance 823 was 

pronounced dead at local hospital 

from gunshot wound to the chest 

Rescue Engine 827 transported 

injured volunteer fire fighter to meet 

ambulance 825. Staff from 

ambulance 825 provided care on the 

tailboard of Rescue Engine 827 until 

ambulance 829 arrived and took over 

care. Transport to medic helicopter 

was initiated in ambulance 825. 

Ambulance 829 took the 

homeowner’s injured brother 

(gunshot wound) to trauma hospital. 

Unit ambulance 825 gave care to 

Rescue Engine 827 fire fighter on the 

tailboard of Rescue Engine 827 then 

transferred care to ambulance 829. 

829 then transported 2 volunteer fire 

fighters with minor injuries (nongunshot related) to hospital. 

Weather 

At approximately 1951 hours, the weather in the immediate area was reported to be approximately 54

degrees Fahrenheit, a dew point of 31.6 degrees F., and the relative humidity was 43%. Wind 

conditions were 6.9 miles per hour from the southeast and clear with visibility of 10 miles [Weather 

Underground 2017]. 
Page 7 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

Incident Location

This incident occurred at a one-story, 1,600-square foot, residential single-family dwelling located 

within city limits. The structure included an in-basement garage and contained 4 bedrooms and 2 

baths. The structure faced a two-lane city street (See Photo 1 and Diagram 1). 

Photo 1. Incident Scene.

(Photo source Local Police Department Homicide Unit) 

Diagram 1, first floor layout. 

(Diagram derived from floorplan provided by the fire department.) 

Investigation 

At approximately 1930 hours on April 15, 2016, the county 911 center received a call from a civilian 

who reported that he was outside of his brother’s house and his brother was not answering his phone 
Page 8

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland

Report # F2016-06

calls or knocks on the front door. The caller reported that he had spoken with his brother earlier in the 

day and that his brother’s vehicle was parked in the driveway in front of his house. He also stated that 

his brother had known medical issues and had “blacked-out” at work the previous day. The caller also 

reported the possibility of firearms inside the house, and requested assistance in gaining entry into his 

brother’s house. Dispatch recorded the information and entered the call as a “Check on the welfare” 

call.

At 1935 hours, Rescue Engine 827 and Paramedic Ambulance 823 were dispatched for the assignment. 

Rescue Engine 827 responded from Station 27 with six volunteer fire fighters onboard, including one 

officer. Paramedic Ambulance 823 responded at 1935 hours with two career fire fighters (fire 

fighter/EMT driving and fire fighter/paramedic) onboard. Rescue Engine 827 arrived on scene at 1946 

hours and met with the resident’s brother in the driveway in front of the house, and proceeded to the 

front door. Paramedic Ambulance 823 arrived on scene at 1948 hours and joined the Rescue Engine 

827 fire fighters at the front porch (see Photo 2). The resident’s brother joined the fire department 

members on the front porch and urged them to force open the door so that they could gain entrance and 

check on the status of the resident.

Fire fighters knocked on the front door and loudly announced that they were with the fire department

and checked the front door, however they did not perform a 360-degree walk around. It was reported 

that they did not hear any response from inside the house. All the visible windows were covered over 

from the inside so the fire fighters could not see inside the house. It was also reported that the 

resident’s brother made several more calls from his cell phone in an attempt to reach the resident who 

was assumed to be inside. After again announcing their presence, the fire fighters began to force open 

the front doors.

At 1949 hours, two police department patrol units were added to the dispatch assignment and went 

enroute. The Rescue Engine 827 crew members began to force open the front door using hand tools. 

The fire fighters encountered some difficulties in forcing open the outer metal door and the main 

wooden door. At approximately 1950 hours, one of the fire fighters used a sledge hammer and broke 

out the bottom left panel of the four-panel wooden door (see Photo 3). The fire fighters again loudly 

announced they were with the fire department. One of the fire fighters reached through the opening in 

the door and unlocked the door from the inside.

The fire fighters opened the door and prepared to step inside. Six of the eight fire fighters on-scene 

were standing on the front porch (approximately 6 feet by 6 feet) with one fire fighter standing on the 

sidewalk and the driver of Rescue Engine 827 remained in the driver’s seat of the engine. One 

volunteer fire fighter (wounded) and the resident’s brother (also wounded) were standing side-by-side 

just outside the threshold when the door was swung open. Another volunteer fire fighter and the 

fatally-wounded career fire fighter/paramedic (carrying a medical bag) were located right behind them.
Page 9

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland

Report # F2016-06

Photo 2. Incident Scene. Photo shows the 6 foot by 6 foot front porch area where fire fighters and 

the resident’s brother were located just prior to the shooting. Medical bag and tools were 

dropped as the fire fighters exited the area.

(Photo source Local Police Department Homicide Unit)
Page 10

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland

Report # F2016-06

Photo 3. Incident Scene. Photo taken from inside the residence facing the front entrance shows 

the front door which was forced open by the responding fire fighters. Numbered markers were 

placed by the local police department.

(Photo source Local Police Department Homicide Unit)

Unknown to the fire fighters, the resident was located approximately 10 feet from the front door at the 

hallway leading to the bedroom area (see Diagram 1). As the door was swung open, the resident began 

firing a handgun, striking the fire fighter/paramedic, one of the volunteer fire fighters, and his brother. 

None of the fire fighters were believed to have entered the house when the shooting occurred.

The fire fighter/paramedic from Paramedic Ambulance 823 was struck in the upper chest by a single 

bullet. The volunteer fire fighter from Rescue Engine 827 was struck three times in the arm, abdomen 

and upper leg. The resident’s brother was struck by a single bullet in the chin. The resident’s brother 

reportedly called out to his brother and identified himself by name after the shooting. Note: It was 

reported during NIOSH interviews and police photographs confirmed that some of the Station 27 
Page 11

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland

Report # F2016-06

volunteer fire fighters (on Rescue Engine 827) were not wearing fire department uniforms. The Station 

27 volunteers did not participate in the NIOSH interviews or information requests. Police photographs 

showed athletic-type shorts, tee-shirts and athletic shoes being worn at the time of the incident. It was 

also reported that the volunteer fire department did not have a uniform requirement.

All of the fire fighters immediately ran for cover. Two of the volunteer fire fighters suffered minor 

injuries diving off the porch. The fire fighters ran toward the street to take cover behind the engine and 

ambulance. The career fire fighter/EMT and the volunteer officer both dove behind Paramedic 

Ambulance 823 at the same time. The volunteer officer got into the right front seat and radioed 

dispatch that fire fighters had been shot. The career fire fighter/EMT got into the driver’s seat as 

another Rescue Engine 827 volunteer fire fighter dove behind Ambulance 823 for cover. The wounded 

fire fighter/paramedic (victim) reached the ambulance and walked around to the right side of the 

ambulance. He reportedly said “I think I’m shot” and then collapsed as he was opening the side door.

The career fire fighter/EMT jumped out of the driver’s seat to assist his partner. The volunteer fire 

fighter helped to pull the wounded fire fighter/paramedic into the ambulance through the side door. 

The wounded fire fighter/paramedic was placed on the cot facing rearward. The career fire 

fighter/EMT and the volunteer fire fighter began checking the fire fighter/paramedic for wounds as the 

volunteer officer began driving away from the scene while radioing dispatch that Paramedic 

Ambulance 823 was transporting the wounded fire fighter/paramedic to the hospital. The career fire 

fighter/EMT hooked up a heart monitor and began to monitor the wounded fire fighter/paramedic’s 

vital signs.

As Paramedic Ambulance 823 drove away from the scene, dispatch advised that a medic unit was 

being dispatched to meet them. Paramedic Ambulance 823 briefly stopped, the three fire fighters 

discussed the situation and then they decided to proceed immediately to the closest county hospital. 

After arriving at the hospital, the wounded fire fighter/paramedic was immediately taken into the 

emergency room for treatment. Unfortunately, the fire fighter/paramedic did not survive his wounds 

and was pronounced dead at the hospital.

Rescue Engine 827 drove away from the residence with the wounded volunteer fire fighter and the 

remaining three crew members onboard. Ambulance 825 was dispatched to meet Rescue Engine 827 

at a local middle school. Ambulance 825 was staffed with two fire fighter/paramedics but was 

operating as a basic-life-support (BLS) ambulance at the time of the incident. The fire 

fighter/paramedics on Ambulance 825 treated the Rescue Engine 827 volunteer fire fighter’s gunshot 

wounds and prepared him for transport. Medic 829 arrived and assisted with medical treatment. The 

wounded fire fighter was placed in the police helicopter (Trooper 2) and transported to the shock

trauma hospital in Baltimore MD. One of the Rescue Engine 827 volunteer fire fighters rode in the 

helicopter with the wounded fire fighter. The Ambulance 825 crew then treated the remaining injured 

Rescue Engine 827 fire fighters and transported them to the local county hospital. One of the volunteer 

fire fighters suffered a broken jaw and the other volunteer fire fighter suffered an ankle injury diving 

off the porch during the shooting. The driver of Rescue Engine 827 suffered a knee injury when he 

exited the driver’s seat of the engine. Ambulance 829 transported the resident’s brother from the off-
Page 12 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

site command post (where police had transported him) to the local trauma hospital to be treated for the 

gunshot wound he sustained during the incident. 

Occupation Related Violence 

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that 2,600 EMS workers received hospital 

treatment in 2014 for injuries resulting from work-related violence out of a total of 21,300 EMS 

medical treatment incidents for all types of work-related injuries [CDC 2014]. 

A survey conducted by the National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians (NAEMT) found 

that 80 percent of emergency medical services (EMS) workers have experienced some form of injury 

on the job [NAEMT 2005]. Further, the majority (52 percent) reported that they were injured from an 

assault [NAEMT 2005]. In 2012, the overall private industry rate of injury requiring days away from 

work for violence and other injuries by persons or animals was 4.0 per 10,000 full time employees

[BLS 2014]. The rate for EMTs and paramedics was over eight times greater (32.5) [BLS 2014]. 

Compared to 2012 numbers, the number of EMS workers seeking treatment for all work-related 

injuries in 2014 decreased by 2,900, while the number seeking treatment for work-related assault 

injures increased by 200 [CDC, 2012]. Although, not all assault-related injuries can be prevented, the 

risk can be reduced by implementing recommendations included in this report. 

Contributing Factors

Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key 

events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH 

investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately 

led to the fatality: 

• Police were not on scene at time door was forced open

• Fire Fighter identification (lack of standardized station uniform) and time of evening 

• Lack of communication of important information to responders (presence of firearms in 

residence)

• Resident did not acknowledge multiple attempts by fire department to contact him verbally and 

by knocking on front door. 

• Fire fighters not wearing ballistic vests or personal protective equipment. 

Cause of Death

According to the medical examiner report, the victim died from a gunshot wound to the chest.
Page 13 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

Recommendations 

Recommendation #1: Fire, EMS, police department’s and dispatch agencies should ensure that 

police are the primary agency initially assigned to “check on the welfare” of occupants and that 

information regarding weapons in a residence are communicated to the responding agencies.

Discussion: In 2004, NIOSH released EMS specific recommendations on methods to best mitigate 

violence following the investigation into the death of a female firefighter who responded to the scene

of a civilian shooting [NIOSH 2005]. Table 3 summarizes the recommendations from the 2005 NIOSH 

report.

Table 3. NIOSH recommendations from Report F2004-11 [NIOSH 2005].

Fire departments should:

• Develop standard operating procedures for responding to potentially violent situations. 

These should include, at a minimum, simultaneous dispatch of police and EMS. 

• Develop integrated emergency communication systems that include the ability to

directly relay real-time information between the caller, dispatch, and all responding 

emergency personnel.

• Make it standard operating procedure that any time weapons are mentioned during the 

dispatch, EMS personnel stage a safe distance from the scene until police declare the 

scene safe.

• Provide body armor or bullet-resistant personal protective equipment; train on, 

and consistently enforce its use when responding to potentially violent situations 

(including all check on the welfare calls).

• Ensure all emergency response personnel have the capability for continuous radio

contact, and consider providing portable communication equipment that has integrated 

hands-free capabilities.

• Consider requiring emergency dispatch centers to incorporate the ability to archive 

location, or individual, historical data, and provide pertinent information to responding 

fire and emergency medical services personnel.

• Develop coordinated response guidelines for violent situations, and hold joint training

sessions with law enforcement, mutual-aid and emergency response departments.
Page 14 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

NIOSH recommends that employers train workers on recognizing and preventing workplace violence, 

investigate all reports of violence, work with police to identify dangerous neighborhoods where special 

precautions need to be taken, and provide that information to employees. 

From the employee’s standpoint, NIOSH recommends the following in response to violent workplace 

incidents: employees should participate in violence prevention training and report all incidents of 

violence, no matter how minor [NIOSH Fast Facts, 2012]. Other recommendations include concurrent 

dispatching of police in all high-risk situations associated with violence or the potential for violence 

(e.g., suicide, homicide, domestic violence, intoxication, and psychiatric illness) [Corbett et al., 1998; 

Mechem et al., 2002, USFA 2017b]. 

During this incident, the fire department members arrived on Rescue Engine 827 and Paramedic 

Ambulance 823 before the police department arrived. Due to the urgency expressed by the resident’s 

brother, the fire department members did not wait for the police department to arrive before beginning 

to force open the front door. 

Recommendation #2: Fire and EMS departments should implement standard operating procedures 

requiring fire fighters and EMS providers to present themselves in uniforms that readily identify 

them to be emergency responders

Discussion: The ability of the public to identify a fire fighter or EMS provider as someone who does 

not pose a physical threat to them is vital for the safety of emergency responders and the public. Fire 

fighters and all emergency responders should be easily identifiable and highly visible for both practical 

and safety purposes. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1975 Standard on Emergency 

Services Work Clothing Elements establishes requirements for fire fighter and emergency responder 

work apparel and clothing be worn while performing their official duties. [NFPA 2014a]. This standard 

does not apply to clothing that is intended to protect the wearer with primary protection from given 

hazard exposures. 

The uniform should make the fire fighter easily and readily identifiable as a member of the fire 

department. The U.S. Fire Administration final report Mitigation of Occupational Violence to 

Firefighters and EMS Responders provides emergency medical services best practices to avoid 

violence to EMS and emergency responders based upon first-hand experience. One important 

recommendation from this report states “Make sure ‘EMS’ is clearly stated in your appearance, so that 

there is no confusion of your intentions” [USFA 2017b]. The uniform should make the fire fighter 

easily and readily identifiable as members of the fire department. NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire 

Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, Paragraph 7.1.4 states “Where station/work 

uniforms are worn by members, such station/work uniforms shall meet the requirements of NFPA 

1975, Standard on Station/Work Uniforms for Emergency Services [NFPA 2013b]. Annex A, Chapter 

7.1.4 of NFPA 1500 states “Because it is impossible to ensure that every member, whether a volunteer, 

call, or off-duty career member, will respond to an incident in a station/work uniform or will change 

into station/work uniform clothing before donning protective garments, it is very important that 
Page 15 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

members understand the hazards of some fabrics that more easily melt, drip, burn, shrink, or transmit 

heat rapidly and cause burns to the wearer. Clothing made from 100 percent natural fibers or blends 

that are principally natural fibers should be selected over other fabrics that have poor thermal stability 

or that ignite easily. The very fact that members are fire fighters indicates that all clothing they wear 

should be flame resistant to give a degree of safety if unanticipated happenings occur that expose the 

clothing to flame, flash, sparks, or hot substances [NFPA 2013b].” 

In this incident, it was reported that some members of the volunteer engine company who responded 

on the initial dispatch were wearing athletic apparel (shorts) and tennis shoes. This could have 

contributed to the resident failing to identify them as members of the responding fire department and 

perceiving them as a threat. The resident did not call or request the fire department to respond so it is 

possible the resident heard the sound of the fire department forcing open the front door and thought his 

home was being burglarized. Easily identifiable fire service uniforms may have made the individuals 

more easily recognizable as fire department members. 

Fire departments should consider developing and implementing standard operating procedures or 

guidelines requiring fire department members to be properly dressed in a professional manner while on 

duty. Note: During the NIOSH interview process information was reported and police photographs 

confirmed that some of the Station 27 volunteer fire fighters (on Rescue Engine 827) were not wearing 

fire department uniforms. Police photographs showed athletic-type shorts, tee-shirts and athletic shoes 

being worn at the time of the incident. It was also reported that the volunteer fire department did not 

have a uniform requirement. The Station 27 volunteers did not participate in the NIOSH interviews or 

respond to information requests. 

Recommendation #3: Fire, EMS, police departments and dispatch agencies should ensure important 

responder safety information is requested during the call taking process and that information is 

transferred into the dispatch system and provided to first responders.

Discussion: Critical information, such as the suspected presence of weapons, that can assist first 

responders with their safety needs to be obtained and transmitted to all of the responding units to an 

emergency. This information can help establish the proper response urgency and put the responders in 

the proper mind-set regarding their own safety. This incident was initiated when a civilian called 911 

and expressed concern that his brother was not responding to repeated phone calls and attempts to 

make contact. The caller reported that he was at his brother’s house and his brother’s vehicle was 

parked in the drive way. The caller stated that he had knocked on the door but his brother did not 

respond. The call taker asked the caller if any weapons were in the house and the caller stated that 

there could be firearms inside the house. 

The communications center did not have a process for entering this type of critical information into the 

computer-aided-dispatch system. The information about the possibility of weapons in the house was 

not forwarded to the responding units. 
Page 16 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

Recommendation #4: Fire and EMS departments should ensure that important information 

regarding an incident (such as weapons in the house) are communicated to individual responding 

units and provide mobile data terminals (MDT) for reserve units.

Discussion: Fire departments and authorities having jurisdiction should ensure that critical information 

that could impact responder safety is communicated to all responding units as part of the initial 

dispatch and all subsequent dispatches to the incident. It is also important to relay this information by 

radio as well as putting notes in the warning or information section of the MDT. Fire fighters and EMS 

providers may not be sitting in front of a MDT or be able to scroll through notes and read important 

cases notes such as this during an emergency response. These important messages should have a 

priority screen presence with some sort of visual stimuli to ensure it is noticed. This is not only 

important for the primary units assigned, but also fire department and EMS supervisors for those units. 

When sensitive information cannot or should not be transmitted over the radio, the dispatcher should 

verbally prompt responding units to check case notes and acknowledge to complete the 

communications loop. 

In this incident, the communications center did not have a process for entering this type of critical 

information (possibility of weapons in the house) into the computer-aided-dispatch system. The 

information about the possibility of weapons in the house was not forwarded to the responding units. 

The resident’s brother had a conversation with the dispatcher and when the dispatcher asked if there 

were any weapons in the residence, the brother said yes, but he (resident) wouldn’t hurt himself. This 

information may have led to the information on weapons not being considered a priority and 

transmitted over the radio. 

Fire and EMS departments should train fire fighters to ask if weapons are in the structure before 

forcing entry. This should be directed to the dispatch and also any civilians on the scene who may 

know the location. Additionally fire and EMS departments should consider providing MDT’s for 

reserve fire and EMS vehicles.

Recommendation # 5: Fire departments and authorities having jurisdiction should consider issuing 

ballistic vests to fire fighters and emergency responders that meet, at a minimum, the requirements 

of the National Institute of Justice, Standard-0101.06, Ballistic Resistance of Body Armor. 

Discussion: Protective equipment (which includes ballistic vests, helmets, and eyewear) for both 

civilian first responders and the military is designed and tested according to anticipated threats, injury 

patterns, and existing technology. Historically, first responders have been primarily concerned with 

protective equipment to counter firearm and, to a certain extent, chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear threats). 
Page 17 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

First Responders 

The development of standards and the manufacturing of this protective equipment for first responders 

have only been available since the 1970s [Montanarelli et. al 1973, NIJ 2001]. The 126 percent 

increase in police officer fatalities from 1966 to 1971 prompted the Department of Justice (DOJ) to 

develop and evaluate concealable soft body armor for daily use that would protect against ballistic 

threats while minimizing blunt trauma. [Hanlon & Gillich 2012, Montanarelli et al.] Handguns have 

historically been the most common threat to police officers, but National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 

ballistic vest testing parameters follow trends in threats, and updated testing parameters are added 

based on new knowledge of vest performance and necessary test conditions [DOJ 2008, OTA 1992]. 

Currently there are five types of ballistic vests based on NIJ body armor standards. However, statistics 

from the Bulletproof Vest Partnership/Body Armor Safety Initiative suggest that the majority of vests 

used by first responders are Type II and IIIA. Descriptions of the body armor standards are listed 

below, ordered by the level of protection. For instance, Type IIA provides protection against Type II 

and IIA threats, whereas Type III vests provide protection for Type IIA, Type II, and Type IIIA 

threats. All of the vests listed, with the exception of Types III and IV, are considered concealable body 

armor and designed to fit under a normal uniform shirt [NIJ 2001]. 

NIJ Standard-0101.06 establishes five formal armor classification types [NIJ 2008, DOJ 2010]: 

• Type IIA protects against 9 mm; .40 S&W 

• Type II protects against 9 mm; .357 Magnum 

• Type IIIA protects against.357 SIG; .44 Magnum 

• Type III protects against Rifles; 7.62mm FMJ

• Type IV protects against Armor Piercing Rifles; .30 caliber AP

Some manufacturers also produce soft armor vests that accommodate “trauma packs”, which are 

ballistic inserts added to a vest to provide added protection. These inserts are referred to as “in 

conjunction” designs and are similar to military ballistic inserts. These “in conjunction” designs must 

be threat level tested and labeled appropriately [NIJ 2001]. In other words, if a Type III vest provides 

Type III protection only in conjunction with a trauma pack, then the system’s label must be marked 

accordingly. 

Recommendation #6: Fire and EMS departments should ensure that accountability is maintained 

on all incidents. 

Discussion: Although there is no evidence that the following recommendation would have prevented 

this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of best safety practice for the fire service. Fire and EMS 

departments need to ensure accountability for all responding personnel. Accountability should be 

maintained at the task, tactical and strategic level.
Page 18

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland

Report # F2016-06

An accountability system can be as simple as a team using the buddy system (task level) on a single 

unit response to a formal command (tactical and strategic level) accountability function established. It 

not only keeps track of where personnel are but can even be used as a protection element for 

responders. An example would be sending two members to search a residence when no one answers 

the door. Two responders can account for each other and perform a quick scan to make sure the 

mission is complete. Not only are the two members maintaining accountability, they are also ensuring 

mission integrity and security. Once an incident escalates and multiple units are dispatched, 

supervisors need to be aware. This may mean supervisors are made aware of or sent to incidents when 

multiple units are assigned. 

A personnel accountability system can help to reduce exposure to hazardous areas and also potentially 

hazardous areas such as this front porch. A personnel accountability system is a system that readily 

identifies both the location and function of all members operating at an incident scene [NFPA 2014b]. 

The accountability system should be inclusive of all sizes and types of emergency incidents. 

The philosophy of the personnel accountability system starts with the same principles of an incident 

management system – company unity and unity of command. Unity can be fulfilled initially and 

maintained throughout the incident by documenting the situation status and resource status on a tactical 

worksheet. An integral part of the accountability system is to make sure the fire fighters who are 

assigned and operating in the hazard zone are accounted for, starting with the initial operations and 

throughout the entire incident. Also, a system should be in place to periodically check to make sure 

that all members operating in the hazard zone are accounted for.

One of the most important functions of command safety is for the incident commander to initiate a 

personnel accountability system that includes the functional and geographical assignments at the 

beginning of operations until the termination of the incident. NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency 

Services Incident Management System and Command Safety states in Paragraph 8.12.4, “The incident 

commander and members who are assigned a supervisory responsibility that involves three or more 

companies or crews under their command shall have an additional member(s) (e.g., staff aide) assigned 

to facilitate the tracking and accountability of the assigned companies or crews” [NFPA 2014b]. 

A functional personnel accountability system requires the following:

• Development and implementation of a departmental accountability SOP

• Necessary components and hardware, such as an accountability board, individual name tags, 

and company name tags

• Training for all members on the operation of the system

• Strict enforcement during emergency incidents.

Resource accountability should be assigned to personnel who are responsible for maintaining the 

location and status of all assigned resources at an incident. As the incident escalates, resource status 

would be placed under the Planning Section. This function is separate from the role of the incident 

commander. The incident commander is responsible for the overall command and control of the 
Page 19 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

incident. Due to the importance of responder safety, resource status should be assigned to a dedicated 

member as the size and complexity of the incident dictates. 

An important aspect of a personnel accountability system is the personnel accountability report or 

PAR. A PAR is an organized on-scene roll call in which each supervisor reports the status of their 

crew when requested by the incident commander or accountability officer [NFPA 2014b]. The PAR 

should be conducted every 15-20 minutes or when benchmark activities are met.

In situations where individual fire department units and EMS units may respond without a fire 

battalion chief or EMS supervisor; the agencies need to insure appropriate levels of accountability are 

in place and effective. Individual units should not be left alone or unaccounted for. This can easily 

happen when single piece responses are dispatched without the battalion chief or ems supervisor being 

aware of the initial response. In a recent incident in MD, a fire department safety officer was left in an 

exposure after a fire and died from smoke inhalation. The safety officer was a single person emergency 

response vehicle. It was not realized that he was unaccounted for until the following morning when his 

vehicle was spotted outside of the original fire building [NIOSH 2014]. 

In situations where there are single piece fire and EMS units on scene and no supervisor responding, 

departments should ensure that they are checked on even if it is by the dispatcher. This could be 

considered task or tactical level accountability by the members on the ambulance or engine, and may 

be the extent of the accountability needed. However, if a single unit is dispatched to a seemingly nonhazardous or insignificant incident and doesn’t report in with dispatch or their supervisor a break down 

in accountability at the strategic level can occur. To prevent this, supervisors such as Battalion Chiefs 

and EMS supervisors as well as dispatchers should have a system to recognize when a unit never clears 

the scene. 

In this incident, task and tactical level command and control quickly deteriorated after the shooting 

occurred and the two initial companies left the scene to seek safety. Once it was determined that the 

shooting had occurred, responding chief officers struggled to determine what had happened, how many 

fire fighters were wounded and who they were. This confusion continued for some time as conflicting 

information was reported over the radio. When the volunteer fire fighter who was wounded was 

airlifted, another member of the volunteer fire department rode in the helicopter, adding additional 

confusion as chief officers attempted to get a personnel accountability report.

Recommendation #7: Fire and EMS departments should consider using field incident technicians 

for command officers to help ensure an effective unified command post is established. 

Discussion: Although there is no evidence that the following recommendation would have prevented 

this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of best safety practice for the fire service. A field 

incident technician, staff assistant, or a chief’s aide is a position designed to assist an incident 

commander with various operational duties during emergency incidents. The chief’s aide can be an 

essential element for effective incident management. During an emergency incident, the staff assistant 
Page 20 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

can assist with key functions such as: managing the tactical worksheet; maintaining personnel 

accountability of all members operating at the incident (resource status and deployment location); 

monitoring radio communications on the dispatch, command, and fireground channels; control 

information flow by computer, fax, or telephone; and, access reference material and pre-incident plans. 

The personnel accountability system is a vital component of the fire fighter safety process. The system 

is designed to account and track personnel as they perform their fireground tasks. In the event of an 

emergency or “Mayday,” the personnel accountability system must be able to provide the rapid 

accounting of all responders at the incident. This is one of the chief’s aide’s essential responsibilities. 

Another important function is the role of a driver in addition to their role as part of the command team. 

Chief Officers are required to respond quickly to emergency incidents. In their response, they have to 

be fully aware of heavy traffic conditions, construction detours, traffic signals, and other conditions. 

The chief officer should also monitor and comprehend radio traffic to assess which companies are 

responding, develop a strategy for the incident based upon input from first arriving officers, develop 

and communicate an incident action plan which defines the strategy of the incident. A chief’s aide can 

assist the battalion chief or chief officer in processing information without distraction and complete the 

necessary tasks enroute to the scene [Ciarrocca & Harms, 2011]. 

The fire department involved in this incident does not employ field incident technicians, assistants or 

aides for chief officers. Thus, Battalion Chiefs and above-ranking officers are responsible for the 

operation of their vehicles during emergency responses, in addition to collecting and analyzing 

information about the incident from a number of sources. Departments should consider the aide to be 

an individual that has the experience and authority to conduct the required tasks. Other potential roles 

for the chief’s aide include assisting with the initial size-up, completing a 360-degree size-up, 

coordinating progress reports from sector/division officers and many others. The aide position can be 

used as a training position to help facilitate officer development. There are non-emergency functions 

for the chief’s aide that are vital to the daily operations of the department. Some jurisdictions assign an 

incident command technician or chief’s aide to command officers to perform daily administration 

functions (such as position staffing and leave management). In this incident, a chief’s aide or staff 

assistant could have helped the Incident Commander manage a rapidly escalating emergency situation 

following the shootings. 

Recommendation # 8: Fire Departments should consider developing and implementing a workplace 

violence prevention program with standard operating procedures and guidelines that support the 

workplace violence prevention program. 

Discussion: There have recently been numerous incidents involving violence against emergency 

responders. Fire and EMS organizations need to ensure training in avoidance and protection for all 

members. 

The U.S. Fire Administration joined with the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) and 

Drexel University to research best practices for preventing and mitigating violence against firefighters 

and other first responders. Their study supports the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation's Fire 
Page 21 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

Fighter Life Safety Initiative 12 – Violent Incident Response [NFFF 2018]. Violence is a major 

occupational challenge confronting the field of Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Firefighters and 

EMS responders are increasingly called upon to meet community demands for this service. As a result, 

firefighters and EMS responders are often expected to respond to incidents where they can be exposed 

to violence. Violence against EMS responders has been recognized as an occupational hazard since the 

early 1970s, and recent incidents are evidence that the problem continues. 

Violence is a major occupational challenge confronting the EMS field. A review of the literature from 

academic and industry trade journals shows an increase in attention to the issue over the years. 

However, there is limited understanding of risk factors and preventive measures. The literature 

provides insight into the characteristics of violence perpetrators, EMS responder risk factors, and best 

practices. However, much of the available information on these factors is contradictory, or not rooted 

in evidence-based assessment. The U.S. Fire Administration, in cooperation with the International 

Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) recently published a report titled Mitigation of Occupational 

Violence to Firefighters and EMS Responders. The purpose of this report, released in June 2017, is to 

document the causes and risk factors of violence and mitigation opportunities to reduce and prevent 

violence to EMS responders [USFA 2017b]. 

In fire and EMS, there is an obvious need for training and interventions to prevent and mitigate 

violence. There is limited evidence regarding the availability and effectiveness of such interventions 

(Gates et al., 2011). Much of the current violence prevention training that exists consists of generic 

programs that are not tailored to the unique setting of the patient care provider, and primarily focus on 

self-defense techniques rather than prevention [Gates et al., 2011]. Researchers note the guidelines 

developed for violence reduction in emergency department (ED) settings do not work well in the EMS 

industry [Corbett et al., 1998]. It is incumbent on the U.S. fire service to work toward developing 

standard operating procedures and guidelines that address workplace violence prevention measures. 

While NIOSH has not developed an EMS specific intervention, several recommendations for fire 

departments to prevent and mitigate violence at both the organizational and employee levels can be 

found in the NIOSH Publication Workplace Violence Prevention Strategies and Research Needs which 

is available at https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2006-144/.pdf) [NIOSH 2006]. 

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is currently developing a new standard NFPA 1300 

Standard on Community Risk Assessment and Community Risk Reduction Plan Development that is 

intended to service as a source of information that communities can use to assess and plan for risks 

within their own jurisdiction [NFPA 2018]. 

References 

BLS [2014]. Occupational Injuries/Illnesses and Fatal Injuries Profile. 

http://data.bls.gov/gqt/InitialPage. Accessed December 1, 2017. 

Ciarrocca M & Harms T [2011]. Help on the scene. FireRescue Magazine. February 2011, 

vol 29, issue 2. Pp 40-48. 
Page 22

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland

Report # F2016-06

CDC [2014]. Emergency Medical Services Workers; Injury and Illness Data; 2014. Atlanta GA; 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/ems/data.html Date accessed: October 17, 2017. 

CDC [2012]. Emergency Medical Service Workers: Injury and Illness Data: 2012. Atlanta GA; 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/ems/data2012.html Date accessed: November 29, 2017.

Corbett, S., Grange, J., & Thomas, T. [1998]. Exposure of Prehospital care providers. Prehospital 

Emergency Care, 2(2), 127-131.

DHS [2015]. First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device 

and/or Active Shooter Incidents. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs. 

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/First%20Responder%20Guidance%20June%2020

15%20FINAL%202.pdf. Date accessed: October 2017. 

DOJ [2008]. NIJ Standards: Ballistic Resistance of Body Armor, Department of Justice, Washington 

DC. NIH Standard-0101.06. 

DOJ [2010]. Bulletproof Vest Partnership/ Body Armor Safety Initiative. U.S. Department of Justice; 

Washington DC. https://ojp.gov/bvpbasi/award_reports/2007vests.html. Date accessed: October 2017. 

Gates, D., Gillespie, G., Kowalenko, T., Succop, P., Sanker, M., & Farra, S. [2011]. Occupational and 

demographic factors associated with violence in the emergency department. Advanced Emergency 

Nursing Journal, 33(4), 303-31p

Lexipol [2017]. Webinar: Firefighters Under Fire. Learning from Active Shooter Incidents. July 18, 

2017. http://info.lexipol.com/fire-active-shooter

Mechem, C., Dickinson, E., Shofer, F., & Jaslow, D. [2002]. Injuries from assaults on paramedics and 

firefighters in an urban emergency medical services system. Prehospital Emergency Care, 6(4), 396-

401.

Montanarelli N., Hawkins C., Goldfarb M., & Ciurej T. [1973]. Protective Garments for Public 

Officials. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Land Warfare Laboratory; 1973.

NAEMT [2006]. Experiences with Emergency Medical Services Survey, 2005. 

https://www.jems.com/articles/2006/07/naemt-survey-federal-ems-agenc.html?c=1. Date accessed: 

December 01, 2017.
Page 23

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland

Report # F2016-06

NIJ [2001]. Selection and Application Guide to Personal Body Armor. Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Justice; 2001.

NIJ [2008]. National Institute of Justice. Standard-0101.06, Ballistic Resistance of Body Armor. 

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/223054.pdf. Date accessed: October 2017.

NFFF [2018]. 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives. National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, 

Everyone Goes Home webpage. https://www.everyonegoeshome.com/16-initiatives/. Date accessed: 

August 2018.

NFPA [2013a]. NFPA 1001 Standard for Firefighter Professional Qualifications, 2013 edition. 

National Fire Protection Association, Quincy MA.

NFPA [2013b]. NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, 

2013 edition. National Fire Protection Association, Quincy MA.

NFPA [2014a]. NFPA 1975 Standard on Emergency Services Work Clothing Elements, 2014 edition. 

National Fire Protection Association, Quincy MA.

NFPA [2014b]. NFPA 1561: Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and 

Command Safety, 2014 edition. National Fire Protection Association, Quincy MA.

NFPA [2018]. Draft standard NFPA 1300 Standard on Community Risk Assessment and Community 

Risk Reduction Plan Development. (under development). National Fire Protection Association, Quincy 

MA.

NIOSH [2005]. Career Lieutenant Killed and Fire Fighter Injured By Gunfire While Responding To 

Medical Assistance Call – Kentucky. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health, FACE Report F2004-11. https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200411.html

NIOSH [2006]. Workplace Violence Prevention Strategies and Research Needs. Department of Health 

and Human Services (DHHS) / (NIOSH) Publication Number 2006-144. 

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2006-144/

NIOSH [2012]. NIOSH Fast Facts, Home Healthcare Workers: How to Prevent Violence on the Job. 

Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Dhhs/NIOSH Publication No. 2012-

118. https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2012-118/pdfs/2012-118.pdf. 

NIOSH [2014]. Shift Safety Officer Falls through Hole in Floor into Basement of
Page 24

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland

Report # F2016-06

Vacant Row House and Dies from Smoke Inhalation – Maryland. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department 

of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health, FACE Report F2014-24. 

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face201424.pdf 

OTA [1992]. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Police Body Armor Standards and 

Testing, Volume II: Appendices, OTA-ISC-535. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 

Taylor J, et. al [2016]. Expecting the Unexpected: A Mixed Methods Study of Violence to EMS 

Responders in an Urban Fire Department. American Journal of Industrial Medicine 59:150-163 

(2016). Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

USFA [2017a]. Violence Against EMS Responders. US Fire Administration website: Current Events 

and Emergent Issues. https://www.usfa.fema.gov/current_events/083117.html. Date accessed: 

October 17, 2017. 

USFA [2017b] Mitigation of Occupational Violence to Firefighters and EMS Responders. U.S. Fire 

Administration Contract Number HSFE20-15-Q-0053. Department of Homeland Security, 

Washington DC. June 2017.

https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/mitigation_of_occupational_violence.pdf. 

Date accessed: September 12, 2018. 

Weather Underground [2017]. Weather history for Largo, MD, April 15, 2016,

https://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KADW/2016/4/15/DailyHistory.html?req_city=Upper

+Marlboro&req_state=MD&req_statename=Maryland&reqdb.zip=20774&reqdb.magic=1&reqdb.wm

o=99999
Page 25 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

Investigator Information

This incident was investigated by Stephen T. Miles Investigator/Safety and Occupational Health 

Specialist; and Tim Merinar, Investigator/Safety Engineer; with the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation 

and Prevention Program, Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch; and Dan Hartley, Research 

Epidemiologist, Analysis and Field Evaluation Branch; Division of Safety Research, NIOSH located in 

Morgantown, West Virginia. This report was authored by Stephen T. Miles. An expert technical 

review was provided Fire Chief Gary Ludwig. A technical review was also provided by the National 

Fire Protection Association, Public Fire Protection Division. A technical review was also provided by 

Lori Moore-Merrell, Dr.PH, MPH, EMT-P and Assistant to the General President of the International 

Association of Fire Fighters. 

Additional Information

International Association of Fire Fighters 

Active Shooter Toolkit includes information on key criteria for local protocols, national organization 

policies and examples of established and practiced active shooter protocols. Additionally, the site 

includes a compendium of active shooter incidents. 

http://client.prod.iaff.org/#page=activeshooter 

International Association of Fire Chiefs 

The IAFC Active Shooter Toolkit provides direct access to resources to prepare, respond and recover 

from active shooter and associated incidents. IAFC members must remember the active shooter threat 

spans a broad base of events from organized terrorist cells to the lone wolf actor. Developing local 

response plans, procedures and policies collaboratively with all other local stakeholders is imperative 

then—exercise, exercise, exercise—with total stakeholder participation.

The Active Shooter Toolkit was developed and the resources vetted by the IAFC Terrorism and 

Homeland Security Committee. All resources and references provided are for member consideration 

without qualification or recommendation. 

https://www.iafc.org/topics-and-tools/large-scale-response/active-shooter-toolkit 

Lexipol 

This online webinar learning series focuses on fire service responses to active shooter events. In this 

webinar, chief officers from three departments recount their experiences in responding to an activeshooter situation. 
Page 26

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland

Report # F2016-06

http://info.lexipol.com/fire-active-shooter

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation

This FBI report, covering active shooter incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 

examines specific behaviors that may precede an attack and that might be useful in identifying, 

assessing, and managing those who may be on a pathway to violence.

https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view

Department of Homeland Security

DHS Report: First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device 

and/or Active Shooter Incidents:

Recent improvised explosive device (IED) and active shooter incidents reveal that some traditional 

practices of first responders need to be realigned and enhanced to improve survivability of victims and 

the safety of first responders caring for them. This Federal, multi-disciplinary first responder guidance 

translates evidence-based response strategies from the U.S. military’s vast experience in responding to 

and managing casualties from IED and/or active shooter incidents and from its significant investment 

in combat casualty care research into the civilian first responder environment. Additionally, civilian 

best practices and lessons learned from similar incidents, both in the United States and abroad, are 

incorporated into this guidance. Recommendations developed in this paper fall into three general 

categories: hemorrhage control, protective equipment (which includes, but is not limited to, ballistic 

vests, helmets, and eyewear), and response and incident management.

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/First%20Responder%20Guidance%20June%2020

15%20FINAL%202.pdf

U.S. Fire Administration

US Fire Administration Final report: (Contract: HSFE20-15-Q-0053) Mitigation of Occupational 

Violence to Firefighters and EMS Responders.

In January 2016, Drexel University was subcontracted by the International Association of Fire Fighters 

under their contract with the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management 

Agency contract number: HSFE20-15-Q-0053 for the final report: Mitigation of Occupational 

Violence to Firefighters and EMS Responders. Violence is a major occupational challenge confronting 

the field of Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Firefighters and EMS responders are increasingly 

called upon to meet community demands for service. As a result, firefighters and EMS responders are 

often expected to respond to incidents where they can be exposed to violence. Violence against EMS 
Page 27 

Career Fire Fighter Killed and Volunteer Fire Fighter Seriously 

Wounded When Shot during a Civilian Welfare Check—Maryland 

Report # F2016-06

responders has been recognized as an occupational hazard since the early 1970s, and recent incidents 

are evidence that the problem continues. 

https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/mitigation_of_occupational_violence.pdf 

NIOSH On-line Training: “Workplace Violence Prevention for Nurses”. 

This free, interactive course is designed to help healthcare workers better understand the scope and 

nature of violence in the workplace. Upon successful completion of the course, healthcare 

professionals can earn continuing education units (CEUs). Course modules include: Definition, types, 

and prevalence; WPV consequences; Risk factors for type II and type III violence; Prevention 

strategies for organizations; Prevention strategies for nurses; and Post–event response. 

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/violence/training_nurses.html

Army Testing of Personal Protective Equipment

Over the last several years, the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) has conducted 

thousands of ballistic tests of protective equipment, including individual pieces of equipment 

traditionally thought of as “body armor” (softer material vests containing hard armor plates), helmets, 

bomb suits, eye and face protection, extremity and pelvic protection, and concealable body armor. In a 

majority of these tests, the threats evaluated include 7.62mm to 9mm bullets, metallic fragments of 

various sizes and shapes, stab tests using both blade and pick threats, blast tests, and blunt trauma tests. 

Other types of testing are also conducted, such as durability, reliability, wear ability, and suitability. 

Permission to review reports must be obtained from the test sponsor, since ATEC was contracted to 

conduct the assessment and is thus not the owner of the subsequent test data. All reports can be 

requested through the ATEC website www.atec.army.mil/foia.html [DHS 2015].

Disclaimer 

Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by the National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). In addition, citations to websites external to NIOSH do not 

constitute NIOSH endorsement of the sponsoring organizations or their programs or products. 

Furthermore, NIOSH is not responsible for the content of these websites. All web addresses referenced 

in this document were accessible as of the publication date.