## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-3284

___________ Matthew Curry; Jessie Roos; Amber * Harpel; Aaron Fagerness; Grant Buse; * * Plaintiffs - Appellees, * *
v. * * Regents of the University of * Minnesota; William E. Hogan, II; * Patricia B. Spence; Robert S. * Bergland; Julie A. Bleyhl; Warren C. * Larson; David R. Metzen; H. Bryan * Neel, III; Michael O'Keefe; William R. * Appeal from the United States Peterson; Jessica J. Phillips; Thomas R. * District Court for the Reagan; Maureen K. Reed, all in their * District of Minnesota official capacities as members of the * University of Minnesota Board of * Regents; * * Defendants, * * Queer Student Cultural Center; La Raza * Student Cultural Center; University * Young Women; * * Movants - Appellants. *

___________ Submitted: November 20, 1998 Filed: February 1, 1999

___________The H onorable William Brevard Hand, United States District Judge for th e 1 Southern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
The Honorable Jonathan Lebedoff, United States Magistrate Judge for th e 2 District of Minnesota, sitting to hear this pretrial matter by designation of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1994).
-2- Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, LOKEN, Circuit Judge, and HAND, District Judge. 1

___________ BOWMAN, Chief Judge.
The Queer Student Cultural Center (QSCC), La Raza Student Cultural Center (L aRaza), and University Young Women (U-YW) appeal the denial of their motio n for intervention of right or permissive intervention. We affirm.
On February 3 , 1998, five students filed a complaint against the Regents of the University of Minnesota alleging violations of their constitutional rights to the extent that their Student Services Fees are used to fund campus organizations engaging i n ideological or political advocacy with which the plaintiffs disagree. The complain t listedthree organizations that the plaintiffs specifically objected to funding throug h this mandatory fee system: QSCC, La Raza, and U-YW. The defendants filed a n
answer o n April 6, 1998. On April 21, 1998, QSCC, La Raza, and U-YW (th e Movants) jointly moved to int ervene in the action either of right or permissively under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. The Movants assert that this action directl y threatens their "First Ame ndment rights of free speech and association as well as their related right to undiminished funding." Appellants' Br. at 8.
Only the plaintiffs have opposed the motion to intervene. After a hearing on the inte rvention motion, the Magistrate Judge to whom the motion had been referred for 2 ruling denied intervention of right concluding that the Movants had not shown the y possess a legally protectable interest in the action's subject matter and that, in anyThe Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, Chief Judge, United States District Court 3 for the District of Minnesota. The nondiscrim

inatory distribution by the University of funds available for the 4 sup port of student organizations as required by Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors o f University of Virginia , 515 U.S. 819 (1995), is not at issue in this action because the University's system for distributing the fees collected has not been challenged by the plain tiffs. Rather, the plaintiffs challenge only the right of the University to compe l
-3- ev ent, they had not shown that the University would not adequately represent thei r interests. Finding that the Movants had not raised a question of law or fact common bot h to their interests and to the issues raised by the existing action and that th e Movants would inter

ject collateral issues into the litigation, the Magistrate Judge also denied p ermissive intervention but ruled that the Movants could participate as amic i curiae. The District Court affirmed the denial of th e Movants' motion for intervention. 3 The Movants appeal.

We review de novo the denial o f intervention of right, and we review the denial of perm issive intervention for abuse of discretion. See Standard Heating & Ai r Conditi oning Co. v. City of Minneapolis , 137 F.3d 567, 570, 573 (8th Cir. 1998)

. Although not discussed by the plaintiffs or the District Court, "Article III standing is a prerequisite for intervention in a federal lawsui t." Id. at 570. Constitutional standing requires a showing of: (1) an injury in fact, which is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete, particularized, and either actual or imminent; (2) causation ; and (3) redr essability. See Mausolf v. Babbitt , 85 F.3d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1996 ) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 561 (1992)).

The Movants allege injury to their interests in free expression; non

discriminatory, viewpoint-neutr al funding; and undiminished funding. See Appellants' Br. at 8, 18 n.4. This action, however, focuses only on the collection of the mandatory fees used to support the activities of campus organizations, not on the distribution of such funds to campus organizations. The Movants' interests in receiving viewpoint- 4them to payfees for the support of advocacy groups they do not wish to support. Cf.

id. at 840 ("[W]e do not have before us the question whether an objecting student has the First Amendment right to demand a pro rata return tothe extent the fee is expended for speech to which he or she does not subscribe."). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), intervention of right i s 5 permitted "when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction whi chis the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the dispositio n of th e action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability t o -4- neutral funding from the mandatory fee system a nd participating in expressive activities

are not thre atened by the plaintiffs' complaint. If the plaintiffs are successful in thei r action, the potential

harm to the Movants is only the possibility that their funding from the mandatory fee system

will be less than it would be otherwise, which might thereby lessen their financial ability to support their expressive activ ities. But the Movants have no constitutional or legal right to compel unwillingstudents to provide financial support for their activities, so the potential harm to the Movants is not a legally cognizabl e in jury in fact. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group o f Boston , 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995) (stating that the free speech guarantee guards only against government intrusion and not merely private conduct); Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn , 850 F.2d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that student organization s have no ri ght to require a university to provide a funding mechanism for thei r activi ties). For these reasons, we find the Movants do not have standing to intervene.

Even if standing were found, the Movants have not shown that intervention i s warranted. Upon timely application, a party seeking inter vention of right must establish that it: "(1 ) ha[s] a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation that (2 ) might be imp aired by the disposition of the case and that (3) will not be adequatel y protecte d by the existing parties." See Standard Heating , 137 F.3d at 571 (quotin g Mausolf , 85 F. 3d at 1299); Chiglo v. City of Preston , 104 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir

. 1997). Although the Movants' motion was timely, they have not established that they

5protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ad equately represented by existing

parties."
-5- possess a recognized interest i n this action's subject matter. The Movants merely have asserted an economic interest, maintaining the qu antum of their funding, in the outcome

o f this litigation. The Movants' economic interest in upholding the current fee system simp ly does not rise to the level of a legally protectable interest necessary fo r mandatory intervention. See Standard Heating , 137 F.3d at 571 (stating that the wouldbe intervenors' economic interests in the existing action were too speculative to b e deemed "direct, substantial, a nd legally protectable" interests); Green v. United States , 996 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that an economic stake in the outcome of an action is not sufficient to demonstrate a "significantly protectable interest").

The Movants also have not met their "minimal burden" of showing that th e University will inadequately represent their interests. Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1303. The Movants cha racterize their interest as a concern that they will lose funding, which i n turn may lessen their expressive activities, while characterizing the University a s merely interested in upholding the current fee system. The Movants potentially ma y lose fundi ng, however, only if the fee system is not upheld. Thus, although th e Mo vants' motives may be distinguishable from the University's, the Movants' and th e University's interests are the same: both want the current fee system upheld.
Our conclusion is further bolstered by the doctrine of parens pa triae , which posits that, when a government entity is a party and the case concerns a matter of sovereign interest, the government is presumed adequa tely to represent the interests of the public. See id. ; Chiglo , 104 F.3d at 187. This presumption may be rebutted by a stron g showi ng of inadequate representation, as, for example, by showing that the interest of the wou ld-be intervenor cannot be subsumed within the public interest represented by the governmen t entity. See Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1303. Although the Movants asser t that the University does not share their speech and economic interests,Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(2), permissive intervention i s 6 permitted"when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or f act in common. . . . In exercising its discretion the court shall conside r whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the right s of the original parties."
-6- the Univers ity's interest in defending the mandatory student fee system that has bee n created to support student organizations encompasses the Movants' asserted interests. Therefore, the Movants have not made the stron g showing of inadequate representation necessary to rebut the parens patriae presumption.

Permi ssive intervention similarly would be denied even if the Movants wer e found to have standing. The Magistrate Judge found that the Movants had not raised 6 a question of law or fact common to the questions presented by the existing action, and that t he Movants' presence in the case would interject collateral issues. We do no t discern any ab use of discretion in the denial of the motion for permissive intervention.
"While Rule 24 promotes judicial economy by facilit ating, where constitutionally permissible, the participation of interested parties in others' lawsuits, the fact remains that a fede ral case is a limited affair, and not everyone with an opinion is invited t o attend." Mausolf

, 85 F.3d at 1301. The Movants have failed to establish that they have Article III standing to be parties to this case. Even if standing were found, they have failed to make a case for intervention either as of right or as a matter of discretion. The District Court's order denying the Movants' motion for intervention is affirmed.
A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.