[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. McKenney v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-583.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-583

THE STATE EX REL. MCKENNEY, ADM. JUDGE, ET AL. v. JONES, ADM. JUDGE,

ET AL.

THE STATE EX REL. WILLIAMS, JUDGE, ET AL. v. JONES, ADM. JUDGE, ET AL.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. McKenney v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 

2022-Ohio-583.]

Prohibition—Mandamus—Appointment of counsel for indigent criminal 

defendants—To the extent that municipal-court judges sought to invalidate 

an agreement for the appointment of counsel, the wrong parties were 

named, because the parties to the agreement were not the common-pleascourt judges—Municipal-court judges lacked standing to challenge the 

appointment of counsel in the common pleas court, because the aggrieved 

parties were the indigent defendants or the unpaid attorneys—When a local

rule is ambiguous, a common pleas court cannot have a clear legal duty to 

repeal it—Writs denied.
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(Nos. 2020-1405 and 2021-0043—Submitted December 7, 2021—Decided 

February 28, 2022.)

IN MANDAMUS and PROHIBITION.

________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} In these consolidated cases, the relators, four Summit County 

Municipal Court judges,1seek writs of prohibition and mandamus against the 

respondents, the Summit County Court of Common Pleas and its administrative 

judge, Amy Corrigall Jones. For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the requests 

for writs.

I. BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} By statute, a municipal court has jurisdiction over certain portions of 

a felony case. R.C. 1901.20(B). Specifically, a municipal court has jurisdiction to 

conduct preliminary hearings and other necessary hearings prior to a criminal 

defendant’s indictment or prior to a probable-cause determination (after each of 

these, jurisdiction is transferred exclusively to the court of common pleas). Id. A 

municipal-court judge has the power “to exercise any other powers that are 

necessary to give effect to the jurisdiction of the court.” R.C. 1901.13(A)(1). These

cases concern a dispute over the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants 

who appear in municipal court before they are bound over to the common pleas 

court on a felony charge.

{¶ 3} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution confers on 

any indigent defendant charged with a felony a constitutional right to appointed 

counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). 

In addition, Crim.R. 44(A) provides that when a defendant charged with “a serious 

1. The relators in case No. 2020-1405 are Barberton Municipal Court Administrative Judge Todd 

McKenney and Judge Jill Flagg Lanzinger and the relators in case No. 2021-0043 are Akron 

Municipal Court Judges Annalisa S. Williams and David Hamilton.
January Term, 2022

3

offense” is unable to obtain counsel, “counsel shall be assigned to represent the 

defendant at every stage of the proceedings from their initial appearance before a 

court through appeal as of right,” unless the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waives the right to counsel.

{¶ 4} The evidence establishes that at least one of the relators appoints 

counsel to represent indigent felony defendants in cases originating in arraignment 

“when the right to counsel attache[s].” The municipal court maintains a list of 

qualified attorneys from which appointments for indigent defendants are made.

{¶ 5} The process by which common-pleas-court judges appoint counsel in 

cases pending in their own court is more complicated. In Ohio, a county may 

choose from different methods for appointing counsel for indigent defendants in its 

jurisdiction, one of which is to create a “county public defender commission.” R.C. 

120.13(A). A county public-defender commission may then contract with a 

qualified nonprofit organization for that entity to provide legal representation to 

indigent defendants. R.C. 120.14(F).

{¶ 6} In 1977, Summit County created a county public-defender 

commission. Effective January 1, 2021, the commission entered into a 

professional-services agreement with the Legal Defender’s Office of Summit 

County (“the office”), a private corporation providing legal representation. See 

Summit County Ordinance No. 2021-007 (authorizing the commission to enter into 

an agreement with the office).

{¶ 7} Under section 1(A)(2) of the agreement, the office must provide legal 

services to any indigent defendant2in the municipal courts in Summit County. 

Section 1(A)(3) of the agreement specifically provides that the office will provide 

representation at the “initial appearance of [indigent defendants] for whom a 

2. The agreement uses the term “Eligible Person,” which it defines as a person unable to pay for 

counsel as determined under various statutes. See section 1(A)(4).
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criminal complaint alleging a felony violation has been filed prior to being bound 

over to Common Pleas Court.”

{¶ 8} The common pleas court’s local rules provide that the court’s 

designated assignment judge will appoint counsel for all defendants charged with a 

felony in Summit County and eligible for appointed counsel. Loc.R. 21.09(A)(1) 

and (4) of the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, General Division. “Upon 

appointment, the attorney shall perform basic duties as warranted by the facts of 

the case * * *.” Loc.R. 21.09(B)(4). The rules require that “any lawyer appointed 

in municipal court” be notified of the identity of counsel appointed by the 

assignment judge. Loc.R. 21.09(A)(3). In an email to the county’s municipal-court 

judges about the process, the common pleas court’s administrative judge explained 

that a public defender represents the indigent defendant at the initial arraignment, 

pursuant to the public defender’s contract with the county; thereafter, the common 

pleas court would appoint private counsel to handle the representation through 

indictment and the remainder of the criminal proceedings. The administrative 

judge also explained that the common-pleas-court judges would not approve fee 

applications for counsel appointed by the municipal courts.

{¶ 9} Citing these local rules, the office of the county executive asked the 

municipal-court judges to stop appointing counsel for indigent unindicted felony 

defendants. According to the county, the agreement supersedes the municipal

court’s local rules: under those rules, municipal courts may appoint counsel to 

indigent defendants “in need of an attorney,” but because the administrative judge 

of the common pleas court declared that representation by a public defender is now 

available after an arraignment, indigent defendants would no longer be “in need” 

of counsel. Therefore, the county deems municipal-court appointments of private 

counsel to be a “misuse of public funds” and will no longer “waste taxpayer money 

to compensate an attorney when the representation is already provided for in the 

contract with the Legal Defender Office.”
January Term, 2022

5

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 10} Barberton Municipal Court Administrative Judge Todd McKenney 

and Judge Jill Flagg Lanzinger filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and 

prohibition on November 16, 2020, to prevent the appointment of counsel by the 

common-pleas-court judges while a case is pending in municipal court. We

referred the case to mediation. 160 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2020-Ohio-5393, 157 N.E.3d 

786. The mediation stay was lifted, and the case returned to the docket, on 

December 29, 2020. 160 Ohio St.3d 1512, 2020-Ohio-6923, 159 N.E.3d 1153.

{¶ 11} Akron Municipal Court Judges Annalisa S. Williams and David 

Hamilton filed a similar complaint on January 11, 2021. We consolidated the two 

cases, 161 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2021-Ohio-182, 161 N.E.3d 708, and the relators filed 

amended complaints seeking two forms of relief. They demanded a writ of 

prohibition to prevent the common-pleas-court judges from attempting to regulate 

or interfere with the appointment of counsel in felony cases pending in the 

municipal court, on the theory that these appointments interfered with the 

jurisdiction of the municipal-court judges. And they sought a writ of mandamus 

compelling the common-pleas-court judges to repeal their local rules purporting to 

allow them to appoint counsel in municipal-court cases.3

{¶ 12} Judge Jones and the common pleas court filed an answer in each 

case, along with a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On June 30, 2021, we

denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted an alternative writ. 

163 Ohio St.3d 1487, 2021-Ohio-2097, 169 N.E.3d 1262. In addition to the 

evidence and brief submitted by the parties, we have received amicus curiae briefs 

3. The amended complaint in case No. 2020-1405 appears to also seek to compel the common-pleascourt judges to withdraw any appointments they may have made in municipal-court cases. 

However, as discussed below, this request receives no attention in the relators’ briefs.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

from the Legal Defender’s Office and the Office of the Ohio Public Defender 

opposing relief.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The relators make three requests in seeking a writ of prohibition

{¶ 13} To state a claim for a writ of prohibition, a relator must allege the 

exercise of judicial power, the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and 

the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Elder 

v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. However, 

if the absence of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, a relator need not establish 

the third prong, the lack of an adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin 

Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15.

{¶ 14} In their consolidated merit brief, the municipal-court judges discuss 

at length the concept of “vertical representation,” which they define as “the same 

attorney represent[ing] a client from when jeopardy attaches until it ceases.” They 

contrast this with “horizontal representation,” which occurs “when different 

lawyers represent poor people at different stages of the proceedings.” The 

municipal-court judges argue that Ohio law requires vertical representation. They 

further argue that the right of indigent criminal defendants to vertical representation 

is being threatened in three ways.

{¶ 15} First, the municipal-court judges argue that the agreement between 

the commission and the office ensures horizontal representation: a lawyer from the 

office will appear only at the defendant’s initial court appearance, after which new 

counsel will be appointed. According to the municipal-court judges, the provision 

in the agreement limiting attorneys from the office to a single court appearance is 

invalid and “[t]he remedy is to invalidate the portion of the contract respecting 

limited felony representation.”

{¶ 16} Second, the municipal-court judges complain that after felony 

defendants are bound over to the common pleas court, the common-pleas-court 
January Term, 2022

7

judges appoint new counsel of their own choosing to replace counsel initially 

appointed by the municipal-court judges. The municipal-court judges ask us “[to] 

hold that if a felony case is initiated in a municipal court and that court appoints a 

licensed attorney who meets or exceeds the standards for reimbursement for 

representing a particular indigent defendant, then that lawyer will continually 

represent the client in all related successive proceedings, including defense of a 

subsequent indictment in common pleas court, absent specific cause otherwise, 

such as an ethical conflict or irreconcilable attorney-client dispute.” (Emphasis 

sic.)

{¶ 17} Finally, the municipal-court judges argue that the common-pleascourt judges should not appoint counsel for defendants while the defendants’ cases 

are still pending in municipal court; they premise this argument on principles of 

vertical representation more than on alleged interference with the jurisdiction of the 

municipal court. In the section of their merit brief specifically addressing 

prohibition, the municipal-court judges request a writ “prohibiting respondents 

from (a) appointing counsel in any cases pending in municipal court and (b) 

subsequently appointing different counsel than may have been appointed by a 

municipal court absent specific cause otherwise.”

1. The relators’ request for a writ of prohibition declaring a clause of the 

agreement unenforceable

{¶ 18} Pursuant to R.C. 120.16(A)(1), a county public defender must 

provide representation to indigent defendants who are charged with the commission 

of an offense, in violation of a state statute, when the penalty includes a possible 

loss of liberty. R.C. 120.16(B) provides that the county public defender “shall 

provide the legal representation authorized by division (A) of this section at every 

stage of the proceedings following arrest, detention, service of summons, or 

indictment.” The municipal-court judges contend that R.C. 120.16(B) imposes a 

duty of vertical representation on all county public defenders. And the municipal-
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8

court judges contend that because a private entity that contracts with the county 

public defender must “[c]omply with all statutory duties and other laws applicable 

to county defenders,” R.C. 120.14(F)(3), the private entity—in these cases, the

office—is equally subject to a duty of vertical representation. And as noted above, 

they contend that section 1(A)(3) of the agreement between the commission and 

the office, which allows only a single limited appearance by an attorney, violates 

this statutory duty.

{¶ 19} R.C. 120.14(F) authorizes a county public-defender commission to 

contract with a nonprofit organization “to provide all or any part of the services that 

a county public defender is required or permitted to provide.” Far from requiring 

vertical representation, the statute plainly contemplates that the county may 

contract with the office to provide representation for only a portion of a case. 

Regardless, to the extent that the municipal-court judges seek to invalidate the 

agreement or control how obligations under the contract will be performed, they 

have named the wrong parties in this litigation. The parties to the agreement are 

the county public-defender commission and the office, not the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas and Judge Jones.

{¶ 20} Moreover, in challenging a specific term of the agreement, the 

municipal-court judges have strayed from their prohibition case and are instead 

seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the meaning of the agreement and a 

prohibitory injunction to prevent its enforcement. We have no original jurisdiction 

to provide such relief. See State ex rel. Esarco v. Youngstown City Council, 116 

Ohio St.3d 131, 2007-Ohio-5699, 876 N.E.2d 953, ¶ 8.

{¶ 21} We also note that the municipal-court judges did not raise the issue 

of the enforceability of section 1(A)(3) of the agreement in their amended 

complaint. In State ex rel. Massie v. Gahanna-Jefferson Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 

76 Ohio St.3d 584, 589, 669 N.E.2d 839 (1996), we recognized the unfairness of 
January Term, 2022

9

considering a new claim when the respondent had no notice of the claim at the time 

it submitted its evidence.

{¶ 22} For all these reasons, we deny the request for a writ of prohibition 

declaring section 1(A)(3) of the agreement unenforceable.

2. The relators’ request for a writ of prohibition preventing the removal of the 

municipal-court-appointed counsel

{¶ 23} Second, the municipal-court judges claim that once indigent criminal 

defendants facing felony charges are bound over to the common pleas court, the 

common-pleas-court judges are (1) removing counsel the municipal-court judges 

have appointed, (2) appointing new counsel to represent the defendants, and (3) 

refusing to approve fee requests submitted by the former counsel.

{¶ 24} Under R.C. 120.33(A)(2), a common pleas court has authority to 

appoint counsel for indigent persons in proceedings over which the court has 

jurisdiction. This statute does not prohibit a common pleas court from appointing 

different counsel from the one assigned at a preindictment arraignment. Continuity 

of counsel may be the better practice, but it is not required by the statute. Moreover, 

the relators before us lack standing to challenge the appointment of counsel in the 

common pleas court or that court’s alleged refusal to pay fees incurred by prior 

counsel: the aggrieved parties would be the indigent defendants or the unpaid 

attorneys, not the municipal-court judges.

3. The relators’ request for a writ of prohibition preventing the common-pleascourt judges from appointing counsel to represent indigent defendants while 

their cases are pending in municipal court

{¶ 25} The municipal-court judges brought this litigation to stop the 

practice of common-pleas-court judges appointing counsel to appear on behalf of 

indigent criminal defendants in municipal court. However, the municipal-court 

judges have not proved that this practice is actually taking place.
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{¶ 26} In her affidavit, Judge Jones attests that the common-pleas-court 

judges “do not issue orders appointing counsel until a case is bound over, a common 

pleas case number is assigned, and the matter is pending in the Summit County 

Common Pleas General Division.” Judge Jones does not deny that attorneys from 

the office are appearing in municipal court but contends that those attorneys are not 

doing so based on appointments by common-pleas-court judges. Rather, the

attorneys are appearing pursuant to the terms of the county’s agreement with the 

office, an agreement to which the common-pleas-court judges are not parties.

{¶ 27} In response, the relators have submitted nine volumes of exhibits. 

The first exhibit is an affidavit of Montrella S. Jackson, court administrator for the 

Akron Municipal Court. Jackson attests that from November 4, 2020, to July 20, 

2021, she received more than 1,700 emails, which were attached to her affidavit,

from the common pleas court identifying an attorney appointed to represent a 

defendant in cases in which the municipal court had conducted arraignments and 

appointed counsel. According to Jackson, “[e]ach email notice either listed the 

attorney retained or a new attorney appointed by Summit County Common Pleas.”

{¶ 28} However, the relators provide no context for these emails. The first 

email, for example, announces the appointment of counsel for a defendant in 

municipal case No. 20CRA09043. But there is no evidence in the record to indicate 

whether, as of the date of the email (November 25, 2020), that case was still pending 

in municipal court or whether the defendant had been bound over to the common 

pleas court. And the same is true of the other emails. It is not the role of this court 

to “search the record or formulate legal arguments on behalf of the parties,” State 

v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19, much 

less to conduct research to develop evidence the parties did not submit.

{¶ 29} A court “speaks only through its journal and not by oral 

pronouncement,” Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio St. 109, 113 N.E.2d 625 (1953), 

paragraph one of the syllabus, or in this case, not by emails or press releases. 
January Term, 2022

11

Because no orders have been submitted as evidence that show that the common 

pleas court appointed attorneys in cases other than in the common-pleas-court 

cases, the precise conduct that this court is being asked to prohibit is not clearly 

identified.

{¶ 30} No statute grants either municipal courts or courts of common pleas 

exclusive jurisdiction over felony matters prior to an indictment, see R.C. 

1901.20(B) and 2931.03. The municipal court has jurisdiction to conduct 

preliminary hearings in felony cases preindictment, R.C. 1901.20(B), but the 

common pleas court also has original jurisdiction over criminal charges, R.C. 

2931.03. Thus, the relators have not established that the common-pleas-court 

judges lack authority to proceed under their local rules. And if, as the amended 

complaint filed by Judges McKenney and Lanzinger alleges, the assignment judge 

in the common pleas court is appointing private counsel within 24 hours of the 

initial municipal-court felony arraignment, such practice would seem to further the 

goals of the vertical representation espoused by the relators: if a new attorney is to 

be appointed for the duration of the case in the common pleas court, it makes sense 

for the defendant to know who that attorney is as soon as possible so that the client 

can communicate with counsel and counsel can begin to investigate and work on 

the client’s behalf.

{¶ 31} While we deny the requested writ of prohibition, we emphasize the 

importance of providing competent and effective counsel to indigent criminal 

defendants at all stages of their cases. Courts—in this instance, a municipal court 

and a court of common pleas—that have jurisdiction at various steps in the same 

case should work together cooperatively to provide a system for the representation 

of indigent criminal defendants that will result in competent representation and fair 

proceedings throughout the adjudication of defendants’ cases. And while courts 

must ensure that a defendant’s right to counsel is satisfied, the responsibility in the 

first instance to provide competent counsel belongs to a county public-defender 
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commission. No court should interfere with that process absent indications or 

evidence in a particular case that counsel may not be serving the indigent criminal 

defendant’s need for representation.

{¶ 32} We deny the relators’ request for a writ of prohibition.

B. The relators are not entitled to a writ of mandamus

{¶ 33} Finally, the relators seek a writ of mandamus compelling the 

respondents to “lift or rescind any ‘local rule’ or ‘orders’ (or interpretations of those 

orders) purporting to (1) govern felony proceedings pending in the Akron or 

Barberton municipal courts or (2) enable the common pleas court judges to annul 

preexisting attorney-client relationships forged by the judicial branch through a 

municipal court appointing counsel when the fundamental right to counsel first 

attached.” To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a party must establish by clear 

and convincing evidence a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty 

on the part of a respondent to provide the requested relief, and the lack of an 

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell,

150 Ohio St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3.

{¶ 34} We deny the request for a writ of mandamus. The relators object to 

Loc.R. 21.09(A) of the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, General 

Division, which provides that the common pleas court’s designated assignment 

judge will appoint counsel for all defendants charged with a felony in Summit 

County and eligible for appointed counsel. Contrary to the relators’ allegation, the 

rule does not expressly state that the common pleas court will appoint counsel in 

cases pending in municipal court. The rule is susceptible to the interpretation 

offered by the respondents that appointments occur only after the case is transferred 

to the common pleas court. And if the rule is ambiguous, then the common pleas 

court cannot have a clear legal duty to repeal it.
January Term, 2022

13

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶ 35} Based on the evidence and the arguments of the parties, we deny the 

requests for writs of prohibition and mandamus.

Writs denied.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and 

STEWART, JJ., concur.

BRUNNER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.

_________________

BRUNNER, J., concurring in judgment only.

{¶ 36} Relators, Barberton Municipal Court Administrative Judge Todd 

McKenney, and Judge Jill Flagg Lanzinger in case No. 2020-1405 and Akron 

Municipal Court Judges Annalisa S. Williams and David Hamilton in case No. 

2021-0043, brought this action to stop respondents, the Summit County Court of 

Common Pleas and its administrative judge, Amy Corrigall Jones, from appointing 

counsel for indigent criminal defendants in cases in municipal courts. This court 

finds that the municipal-court judges have not established that common-pleas-court 

judges are in fact making such appointments and that nothing in the local rules 

clearly states that the common-pleas-court judges may do so.

{¶ 37} I concur in judgment only, because I do not find the facts to be as 

unequivocal as expressed in the majority opinion. The municipal-court judges 

submitted more than 2,000 pages of emails sent from the common pleas court to a 

municipal-court administrator identifying attorneys appointed for defendants in 

cases that arose in the municipal court. The administrator submitted an affidavit 

stating that each of the emails “either listed the attorney retained or a new attorney 

appointed by Summit County Common Pleas.” Having determined that relators 

have not provided enough context to understand the timing or purpose of the emails, 

the majority states that it will not “ ‘search the record or formulate legal arguments 

on behalf of the parties.’ ” Majority opinion, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Quartermain, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14

140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19. The majority’s 

statement could be understood as suggesting that there is no evidentiary value to 

the emails supporting relators’ claims.

{¶ 38} While the emails (on a cursory review of their contents) may not be 

direct evidence that the common-pleas-court judges appointed attorneys to 

represent defendants in municipal court, certain inferences may be drawn from 

them. A number of the emails were sent to the municipal court and inform that 

court of the name of the attorney who has been appointed in the case, with that 

attorney’s name also listed as the municipal-court attorney. Specifically, the 

subject line in each of the emails submitted by the municipal-court administrator is 

“ATTORNEY APPOINTMENT,” and each email begins, “Notice of SCCP 

APPOINTMENT.” The first email was sent on November 25, 2020, and states, 

“JORDAN E. KNABB HAS BEEN APPOINTED TO REPRESENT THE ABOVE 

DEFENDANT BY SCCP ASSIGNMENT JUDGE: AMY CORRIGALL JONES.” 

It then states, “MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY: JORDAN E. KNABB.” (All 

capitalizations sic.)

{¶ 39} Thus, while the evidence offered by relators may not involve an 

entry or order from the common pleas court appointing the attorneys in the 

municipal-court case, it supports—to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the 

view of the trier of fact—the municipal court judges’ allegations that the commonpleas-court judges were attempting to exercise authority in the municipal courts.

{¶ 40} Conversely, I agree with the majority in that a court “speaks only 

through its journal and not by oral pronouncement,” Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio 

St. 109, 111, 113 N.E.2d 625 (1953), or in this case, by emails or press releases. I 

also agree that the common-pleas-court judges established a process by which the 

contract between the county public-defender commission and the Legal Defender’s 

Office of Summit County would be carried out not only in their court but also in 

the municipal courts, refusing to authorize any other attorneys than those stated in 
January Term, 2022

15

the emails to be paid, leaving the municipal court with no other feasible way to 

appoint counsel. Finally, I agree that because there do not appear to be any orders 

from the common pleas court appointing attorneys in cases other than in the 

common-pleas-court cases, the precise conduct that this court is being asked to 

prohibit is not clearly identified. I would further note that given that neither 

municipal courts nor courts of common pleas have exclusive jurisdiction over 

felony matters prior to an indictment, see R.C. 1901.20(B) and 2931.03, I cannot 

say the common-pleas-court judges lack authority to proceed under their 

promulgated local rules.

{¶ 41} In the end, it is every court’s duty to individuals accused of a crime, 

and to the state, that federal and state constitutional requirements for fair trials must 

be observed and guaranteed. Courts must constitutionally provide competent 

counsel in criminal proceedings to those who are indigent, and this must be central 

to the process, with territorial differences and interests subordinated to this singular 

purpose.

_________________

Mayle, L.L.C., Andrew R. Mayle, Ronald J. Mayle, and Benjamin G. 

Padanilam, for relators in case No. 2021-0043.

The Pattakos Law Firm, L.L.C., Peter Pattakos, and Rachel Hazelet, for 

relators in case No. 2020-1405.

Isaac, Wiles & Burkholder, L.L.C., Mark Landes, Donald C. Brey, C. 

Awele Nwajei, and Madeline Shanahan, for respondents.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, for amicus curiae Office of the 

Ohio Public Defender, in support of respondents in case No. 2020-1405.

Kushner & Hamed Co., L.P.A., Phillip S. Kushner, Michael R. Hamed, and 

Brandon Mordue, for amicus curiae Summit County Legal Defender’s Office, in 

support of respondents.

_________________