No. 05-165 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2006 MT 225N 

_______________________________________ 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

MATTHEW OLSON, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

______________________________________ 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

 In and for the County of Cascade, Cause No. BDC 04-221-2 

 The Honorable Julie Macek, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

 For Appellant: 

 Carl B. Jensen, Jr., Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana 

 For Respondent: 

 Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; John Paulson, Assistant Attorney 

General, Helena, Montana 

 Brant Light, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana 

____________________________________ 

Submitted on Briefs: November 22, 2005 

Decided: September 8, 2006 

Filed: 

______________________________________ 

Clerk 
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Justice John Warner delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal 

Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed 

as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and its case title, Supreme 

Court cause number and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of 

noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. 

¶2 Matthew Curtis Olson (Olson) appeals from the imposition of a sentencing 

requirement that he register as a violent offender. We affirm. 

¶3 Law enforcement officers arrested Olson on May 15, 2004. This arrest followed a 

tip that he and two other people made suspicious cold medicine purchases the previous 

three days. The State charged Olson by Information with multiple counts, including 

operation of an unlawful clandestine laboratory in violation of § 45-9-132, MCA. 

¶4 Olson entered a plea agreement with the State wherein he agreed to plead guilty to 

the charge of operation of an unlawful clandestine laboratory. The State agreed to 

recommend a ten-year commitment to the Department of Corrections with five years 

suspended, and to dismiss the remaining two counts. 

¶5 The District Court imposed the sentence recommended by the State pursuant to the 

plea agreement. The District Court’s judgment required that Olson, in part, “register as a 

Violent Offender in compliance with Title 44, Chapter 23, Part 5 M.C.A. and give 

appropriate notice of any address change.” Olson appeals the requirement that he register 

as a violent offender. 

¶6 This Court reviews a District Court’s sentence for legality only. State v. Johnson, 

2005 MT 48, ¶ 5, 326 Mont. 161, ¶ 5, 108 P.3d 485, ¶ 5; State v. Eaton, 2004 MT 283, ¶ 
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11, 323 Mont. 287, ¶ 11, 99 P.3d 661, ¶ 11. 

¶7 Olson urges this Court to excuse his failure to object to the registration 

requirement during sentencing pursuant to either State v. Lenihan (1979), 184 Mont. 338, 

602 P.2d 997 or State v. Finley (1996), 276 Mont. 126, 915 P.2d 208, abrogated in part 

on other grounds by State v. Gallagher, 2001 MT 39, & 21, 304 Mont. 215, & 21, 19 

P.3d 817, & 21. He then presents three arguments against imposition of the registration 

requirement. First he argues that this requirement has no correlation or connection to the 

underlying offense as required by State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16, 293 Mont. 133, 974 

P.2d 620. Next he argues that the registration requirement violates his right to due 

process, violates fundamental fairness, and is an unjust punishment. He concludes by 

arguing that the registration requirement violates his right to equal protection under both 

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 4 of 

the Montana Constitution. 

¶8 We need not determine whether Olson’s failure to object to the registration 

requirement is excused by either Lenihan or Finley. 

¶9 Regarding his first argument, the provision of a sentence that was found illegal in 

Ommundson was a discretionary condition placed on a probationary sentence. 

Ommundson, ¶ 3. On the other hand, the registration requirement in this case is a part of 

the sentence required by law pursuant to § 46-23-504, MCA. The sentencing judge 

lacked the discretion to omit the registration requirement pursuant to § 46-18-201(7), 

MCA. Ommundson is inapposite. 
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¶10 Olson provides neither sufficient argument nor supporting authority for his 

constitutional arguments that the registration requirement violates his right to due 

process, violates fundamental fairness, and is an unjust punishment. We therefore 

decline to consider these arguments. Johnson, ¶ 11; M. R. App. P. 23(a)(4); State v. 

Hicks, 2006 MT 71, ¶ 22, 331 Mont. 471, ¶ 22, 133 P.3d 206, ¶ 22. 

¶11 Olson’s equal protection argument is without merit. He suggests that those 

persons convicted of non-predatory felonies are a class. He then argues that those 

convicted of operating a clandestine laboratory are members of this class that are treated 

differently because they are required to register as violent offenders. He provides no 

supporting authority for this position. This Court has previously held that “individuals 

convicted of different offenses are not similarly situated for purposes of equal 

protection.” State v. Davison, 2003 MT 64, ¶ 15, 314 Mont. 427, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d 203, ¶ 15. 

Olson has not been denied equal protection of the law. 

¶12 Affirmed. 

 /S/ JOHN WARNER 

We Concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ JIM RICE 

/S/ BRIAN MORRIS 

Justice James C. Nelson specially concurs. 

¶13 I agree with the result the Court reaches in this case, but not with its reasoning. 
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¶14 Generally, this Court will not consider an issue to which a timely objection was 

not made in the lower court. See §§ 46-20-104(2) and -701(2), MCA. However, we have 

recognized exceptions to this rule in State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 

1000 (1979) (permitting challenges to sentences that are alleged to be illegal or beyond 

statutory mandates, even if no objection was made at the time of sentencing), and State v. 

Finley, 276 Mont. 126, 137, 915 P.2d 208, 215 (1996) (stating that we may 

discretionarily review claimed errors that implicate a criminal defendant’s fundamental 

constitutional rights, even if no objection was made in the lower court, where failing to 

do so may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of 

the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of 

the judicial process), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Gallagher, 2001 MT 

39, ¶ 21, 304 Mont. 215, ¶ 21, 19 P.3d 817, ¶ 21. Where the prerequisites for invoking 

the Lenihan exception or plain error review under Finley are satisfied, we will proceed to 

the merits of the defendant’s claim. 

¶15 In the case at hand, the Court states that we need not determine whether Olson’s 

failure to object to the registration requirement is excused by either Lenihan or Finley

because his sentencing challenges, apparently, are without merit. I disagree with this 

approach. In my view, we should not be reaching the merits of Olson’s sentencing 

challenges. 

¶16 It is not logical to state on the one hand that we will not reach the merits of a 

sentencing claim to which no objection was raised in the lower court unless Lenihan or 

Finley apply, but then to state on the other hand that we need not determine whether 

Lenihan or Finley apply because we went ahead and considered the merits of the 
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unpreserved claim anyway and determined that it is without merit. Such reasoning puts 

the proverbial cart before the horse. Contrary to the Court’s approach, we must 

determine whether Olson’s failure to object is excused by Lenihan or Finley before

considering the merits of his claim. 

¶17 In this regard, I note that in order to obtain review of an otherwise procedurally 

barred sentencing claim by way of Lenihan or Finley, a defendant must conform to our 

rules and precedents requiring proper argument and citation. See M. R. App. P. 23(a)(4); 

In re Marriage of McMahon, 2002 MT 198, ¶ 6, 311 Mont. 175, ¶ 6, 53 P.3d 1266, ¶ 6 

(“[W]e will not consider unsupported issues or arguments. Similarly, this Court is under 

no obligation to locate authorities or formulate arguments for a party in support of 

positions taken on appeal.” (internal citation omitted)). This requirement is independent 

of the respective prerequisites for invoking Lenihan and Finley. For instance, an 

otherwise valid allegation that the lower court lacked authority to impose the challenged 

sentence is insufficient to invoke the Lenihan exception if it rests on an incoherent 

analysis or lacks supporting authority. Such is the case here with Olson’s sentencing 

challenges. 

¶18 In his first argument, Olson contests the requirement that he register as a violent 

offender on the ground that this registration requirement does not have a correlation or 

connection to the offense of operation of an unlawful clandestine laboratory. However, 

he cites no relevant authority for the underlying proposition that the registration 

requirement has to have such a correlation or connection. Granted, he directs our 

attention to State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16, 293 Mont. 133, 974 P.2d 620; yet, as the 

Court observes, Ommundson is entirely inapposite, given that we were interpreting a 
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statutory provision that authorized sentencing restrictions or conditions “reasonably 

related to the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society,” 

Ommundson, ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks omitted), whereas here the sentencing 

restriction is both specific and mandatory. In particular, § 46-18-201(7), MCA, mandates 

that in imposing a sentence on an offender convicted of a violent offense—as was Olson, 

see § 46-23-502(9)(a), MCA (listing § 45-9-132 as a “[v]iolent offense”)—“the 

sentencing judge may not waive the registration requirement provided in Title 46, chapter 

23, part 5” (emphasis added). On its face, this statutory language contains no limitation 

on its application to only those offenses which have a correlation or connection to the 

registration requirement, and Olson cites no pertinent authority for such a limitation. 

¶19 Likewise, Olson has provided insufficient argument and supporting authority for 

his constitutional arguments that the registration requirement violates due process, 

fundamental fairness, and equal protection and is an unjust punishment. Cf. State v. 

Johnson, 2005 MT 48, ¶ 11, 326 Mont. 161, ¶ 11, 108 P.3d 485, ¶ 11 (“It is unclear to us 

whether Johnson intends his argument to be construed as a constitutional challenge to 

§ 44-6-103, MCA. Assuming that he does, we cannot make such a determination on the 

basis of the abbreviated arguments before us.”). 

¶20 Accordingly, I conclude that Olson did not articulate persuasive and properly 

supported arguments on appeal which would demonstrate that his challenges to the 

registration requirement may be reviewed under the Lenihan exception or the plain error 

doctrine as explained in Finley. 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 
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