Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed May 30, 2024. 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00383-CR

PATRICIA LYNN SWARTZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 405th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 20-CR-2075

M A J O R I T Y O P I N I O N 

A jury convicted appellant Patricia Lynn Swartz of the third-degree felony 

of possession of a controlled substance, penalty group one, in an amount of one

gram or more but less than four grams. Texas Controlled Substances Act, Tex. 

Health & Safety Code § 481.115(c). Appellant pleaded true to two previous felony 

convictions for possession of a controlled substance, which enhanced her sentence. 

The jury assessed punishment at imprisonment for twelve years. Tex. Penal Code 
2

§§ 12.33(a), .34(a), .42(a). The trial court signed a judgment of conviction 

consistent with the jury’s verdict. 

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) submitting an erroneous 

instruction to the jury; (2) overruling her best-evidence objection; (3) overruling 

her hearsay objection; and (4) even if such errors are harmless individually, their

cumulative impact mandates reversal. We affirm.

Background

In 2020, Deputy Breann Boone was dispatched to a recreational-vehicle park 

with an all-night laundromat in San Leon because there were reports of a

suspicious vehicle. On arrival, Deputy Boone found appellant and her companion

sitting in their vehicle outside the laundromat. After approaching the vehicle, 

Deputy Boone requested dispatch to search for any warrants relating to appellant 

and her companion. Deputy Boone was told there was an active warrant for 

appellant’s arrest for a previous burglary of the coin-operated machine at the 

laundromat where the vehicle was parked, as well as an out-of-state warrant from 

North Carolina.

During her search of appellant incident to arrest, Deputy Boone found

methamphetamine hidden in appellant’s bra. Appellant also had a bag of pills in 

her mouth, which she was attempting to hide and swallow. Various drug 

paraphernalia were found in the vehicle.

Appellant was indicted for intentionally possessing methamphetamine—a

controlled substance—of more than one gram but less than four grams. At trial, 

appellant’s counsel focused on the lack of justification for appellant’s arrest.

Counsel argued that the State never produced a valid warrant or affidavit 

demonstrating probable cause to arrest her. And without a valid warrant, none of 
3

the drugs found on appellant’s person were admissible. Appellant elected to make 

her exclusionary argument to the jury instead of filing a motion to suppress. See 

Roberts v. State, 545 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (“The defendant’s 

counsel may either file a pretrial motion to suppress evidence or he may wait until 

the trial on the merits and object when the alleged unlawfully obtained evidence is 

offered.”); Johnson v. State, 743 S.W.2d 307, 309-10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

1987, pet. ref’d) (“Failure to file a pretrial motion does not waive a complaint of

improperly obtained evidence.”). Although the judge provided instruction

regarding improperly obtained evidence, the jury found appellant guilty.

Appellant timely appealed.

Analysis

A. Jurisdiction

We first address our dissenting colleague’s contention that we lack 

jurisdiction over this appeal. According to the dissenting justice, there exists no 

final judgment because the trial court failed to pronounce sentence. See Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. art. 42.03, § 1(a) (“sentence shall be pronounced in the defendant’s 

presence”).

After the jury deliberated on punishment, the following transpired:

THE COURT: Madam foreman, I understand the jury has 

reached a verdict in punishment.

THE FOREPERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Please stand, Ms. Swartz. This is Cause No. 

20-CR-2075, The State of Texas v. Patricia Swartz.

The verdict in the enhancement paragraphs:

We, the jury, find the allegations in Enhancement Paragraph 1 

to be true.
4

We, the jury, find the allegation in Enhancement Paragraph 2 to 

be true.

We, the jury, having found allegations in Enhancement 

Paragraph 1 and Enhancement Paragraph 2 are true, assess the 

defendant’s punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of 

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a period of 12 years and 

assess a fine in the amount of zero. That’s signed by the foreman.

Is this the verdict of each and every member of the jury?

(The jury as a whole responded “yes.”)

THE COURT: Patricia Swartz, the jury, having found you 

guilty and found the allegations in Enhancement Paragraph 1 and 

Enhancement Paragraph 2 to be true, assess your punishment at 12 

years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice.

Do you have anything to say, ma’am, as to why sentence should 

not now be pronounced against you?

[Appellant’s counsel]: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Having nothing further to say, it is the order of 

this Court that you be remanded to the custody of the Galveston 

County sheriff to be transported to the authorities of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice to obey and carry out the orders of

this sentence.

The trial judge signed a judgment of conviction by jury the same day, which 

was consistent with the jury’s verdict. The judgment states that appellant was 

convicted by a jury, that the punishment imposed is twelve years confinement, and 

that the sentence commences on April 27, 2022 (the date on which the events 

quoted above occurred). The judgment orders appellant “punished in accordance 

with the jury’s verdict” and orders appellant’s sentence executed. 

We disagree with our colleague that the trial judge failed to pronounce

appellant’s sentence. No set formula is required. Williams v. State, No. 05-05-
5

00648-CR, 2005 WL 3163784, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 29, 2005, no pet.) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding trial court complied with 

article 42.03 when assessing punishment). At most, the present record can be 

construed as ambiguous. Even assuming that the judge’s oral pronouncement is 

unclear, we are to construe the verdict, the oral pronouncement, and the judgment 

together to resolve the ambiguity. E.g., Cuellar v. State, Nos. 07-20-00057-CR, 

07-20-00058-CR; 2020 WL 5931048, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 6, 2020, no 

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Morris v. State, Nos. 07-12-

00409-CR, 07-12-00410-CR, 2013 WL 1668222, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 

Apr. 16, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Aguilar v. 

State, 202 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d); see also Mendez 

v. State, Nos. 07-19-00028-CR, 07-19-00029-CR, 07-19-00030-CR, 2019 WL 

6885026, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 17, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). We also consider the context of the court’s utterances. 

Cuellar, 2020 WL 5931048, at *3; Mendez, 2019 WL 6885026, at *2. In addition 

to correctly stating in appellant’s presence the punishment found by the jury, the 

court also asked appellant, as is required, whether she knew of any reason the 

sentence should not “now” be pronounced. She answered that she did not. There 

was no confusion on appellant’s part, as she filed a notice of appeal the same day

and does not complain on appeal that the court failed to pronounce sentence.

Moreover, recitations in the judgment create a binding presumption of 

regularity in the absence of direct proof of their falsity. Johnson v. State, 72 

S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Breazeale v. State, 683 S.W.2d 446, 450 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g). This presumption will not be set aside 

unless the record affirmatively shows the contrary. Breazeale, 683 S.W.2d at 450.

The judgment reflects that appellant was convicted and sentenced to twelve years 
6

confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections—Institutional Division.

Although the trial court stated that it would “assess your punishment” rather than 

that it was “sentencing” appellant, viewing the court’s complete statements in 

context we conclude that the record is not sufficient to overcome the presumption 

of regularity and truthfulness carried by the formal judgment’s recitation that 

appellant was convicted and sentenced consistent with the jury’s verdict.

Accordingly, considering the verdict, the court’s statements, and the 

judgment, we conclude that the present record sufficiently reflects the trial court’s 

intent to sentence appellant to a term of twelve years confinement and that the 

judge pronounced that sentence in appellant’s presence consistent with article 

42.03. Because the written judgment clearly expresses that intent, we resolve any 

lack of clarity in the pronouncement of sentence in favor of appellate jurisdiction. 

B. Jury instruction

In issue one, appellant argues the trial court erred by including a

good-faith-exception instruction in the jury charge. Before trial, appellant 

requested the court instruct the jury to disregard any evidence obtained in violation 

of the law. Appellant sought the instruction to support her argument that the 

evidence of drug possession was obtained without a valid arrest warrant. Although 

the trial court denied appellant’s requested instruction, the court included an

instruction in the charge based on Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23.1

1 The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that: “No evidence obtained by an officer or 

other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of 

the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against

the accused on the trial of any criminal case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23(a). In any case 

“where the evidence raises an issue hereunder,” the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or 

has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of article 38.23, “it shall 

disregard any such evidence obtained.” Id.
7

1. Article 38.23 instruction

The jury charge contained the following instruction:

You have heard evidence obtained as a result of an arrest of 

PATRICIA SWARTZ by Deputy Boone. Specifically, you have 

heard Deputy Boone arrested the Defendant for an open warrant and 

that during that arrest, Deputy Boone discovered methamphetamine 

on the person of PATRICIA SWARTZ.

You may consider this evidence only if you resolve a preliminary 

question in favor of the state. No evidence obtained by an officer or 

other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws 

of the state of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States of America, shall be used against the accused on the trial of any

criminal case. The state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

the evidence was not obtained in violation of the law.

The charge also contained an additional instruction, commonly referred to as 

the “good-faith exception,” which provides that an exception to the 

mandatory-exclusion provision is made if the law enforcement officer was “acting 

in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based

on probable cause.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23(b). The court instructed the 

jury as follows:

A police officer may, under the law, arrest a person if she has a good 

faith belief that there is a valid warrant for arrest of that individual. 

Before you may consider the evidence obtained as a result of Deputy 

Boone’s arrest of PATRICIA SWARTZ, you must all agree that the 

state has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the officer had a

reasonable belief that there was a valid warrant for her arrest. If you 

find that fact beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may consider all of 

the evidence obtained as a result of Deputy Boone’s arrest of the 

Defendant.

If you do not find that fact beyond a reasonable doubt, then you will 

disregard all evidence obtained as a result.
8

Appellant objected to the inclusion of an instruction on the good-faith 

exception arguing it was not raised by the evidence. Because the State never 

produced the arrest warrant and supporting affidavit demonstrating probable cause,

appellant maintained there was no warrant that supported her arrest or the inclusion 

of a “good faith exception” instruction.

2. Applicable law

The Court of Criminal Appeals and this court have repeatedly concluded that 

if the State seeks to justify an arrest based on an arrest warrant, the warrant and 

supporting probable-cause affidavit must be produced to the court for inspection to 

ensure that the arrestee’s rights have been protected. Weems v. State, 167 S.W.3d 

350, 356-57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (citing Miller v. 

State, 736 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)); see Etheridge v. State, 903 

S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 920, 116 S. Ct. 314, 

133 L.Ed.2d 217 (1995); Dorsey v. State, 964 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d); Myles v. State, 946 S.W.2d 630, 636 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.); Torres v. State, 933 S.W.2d 339, 339 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.).

The State may be excused from producing the warrant and probable-cause 

affidavit, however, “if the State introduces sufficient evidence or testimony to 

permit the trial court to determine the existence of probable cause to effect the 

arrest.” Weems, 167 S.W.3d at 356; see Dorsey, 964 S.W.2d at 703. This court 

explained in Dorsey, “[t]he rule requiring the State to produce the arrest warrant 

was originally imposed to protect arrestee’s rights by forcing the trial court to 

inspect documents and determine whether probable cause existed. However, 

where probable cause is otherwise established through evidence and testimony, the 

arrestee’s rights are still protected.” Dorsey, 964 S.W.2d at 704 (citations 
9

omitted). This showing may be accomplished in a variety of ways. Weems, 167 

S.W.3d at 357. Reconstituted documents, for example, can be sufficient to 

establish probable cause for arrest if the information on which the magistrate relied 

to determine there was probable cause was available for review by the trial court. 

See Myles, 946 S.W.2d at 636 (although original warrant was no longer available,

officer who completed paperwork for warrant testified at trial as to probable cause 

alleged in affidavit). The validity of an arrest may also be shown by testimony of

the complainant or officer who furnished the basis for the probable-cause affidavit

supporting the arrest warrant. See Dorsey, 964 S.W.2d at 704 (testimony of officer 

who provided probable-cause affidavit); Torres, 933 S.W.2d at 340-41 (testimony 

from complaining witness and arresting officer sufficient to show probable cause 

for arrest); see also Garrett v. State, 791 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) 

(holding arrest valid based on existence of outstanding warrant together with 

testimony of parole worker).

3. Application

The State called David Payne, the manager of the property where the 

laundromat and coin-operated machine are located. Payne testified that the 

laundromat is monitored by security cameras, which he can access remotely from 

his phone. He said that people have “messed with” the equipment on the property. 

He recalled a specific incident occurring on July 8, when people broke into the 

coin-operated machine in the laundromat. He had a security video recording of 

that event and reported the incident to the police. He also reported the license plate 

of a vehicle he saw on the property that was associated with the break-in. An 

arrest warrant was issued for appellant for burglary of a coin-operated machine

occurring on July 8. 
10

Eleven days later, on July 19, Payne identified the same vehicle he 

recognized from the July 8 break-in parked at the laundromat. Payne recognized 

appellant from the July 8 break-in. He called 9-1-1. A recording of Payne’s 9-1-1 

call was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. In the recording, Payne 

stated that he received reports from residents that the occupants of that car were 

dealing drugs. He gave the dispatcher a description of the car and its license plate 

number and stated that he reported the car on July 8 in connection with the breakin. He recognized the car’s occupants as the people who broke into the coinoperated machine. He said he had a video recording of the July 8 incident. 

In response to Payne’s July 19 9-1-1 call, Deputy Boone was sent to the 

property. Deputy Boone spoke to a resident, who said he was involved in the prior 

police report of July 8. The resident told Deputy Boone that there was a video of 

appellant breaking into the coin-operated machine on the property. Deputy Boone 

confirmed that the license plate number on the car matched the license number 

associated with the July 8 report. Deputy Boone spoke to appellant, who was 

sitting in the car’s passenger seat. Deputy Boone told appellant that she was 

suspected of previously attempting to rob the coin machine. Appellant denied it. 

Deputy Boone conducted a records check on appellant with the National Crime 

Information Center (NCIC) and the Texas Crime Information Center (TCIC), 

which revealed two active arrest warrants for appellant—one in Texas and the 

other in North Carolina. The Texas warrant was for the alleged burglary of the 

coin-operated machine at the same laundry facility. Deputy Boone arrested 

appellant. During a search incident to the arrest, Deputy Boone found the drugs 

that led to the charge at issue. When Deputy Boone arrived at the police station, 

she printed the warrant worksheet as part of her arrest documentation but never 

actually reviewed the original warrant or supporting affidavits. 
11

Because the State did not produce the actual arrest warrant or a supporting 

probable-cause affidavit, we examine whether sufficient evidence or testimony 

permitted the trial court to determine if probable cause existed to arrest appellant.

See Weems, 167 S.W.3d at 356; Dorsey, 964 S.W.2d at 703. Probable cause exists 

when the facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable 

caution in the belief that, more likely than not, a particular suspect has committed 

the crime. See Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 

We conclude that the testimony summarized above supplied the court with 

facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that appellant committed the

offense of burglary of a coin-operated machine on July 8. Payne was the 

complainant whose July 8 report led to issuance of the arrest warrant for appellant. 

Payne recognized appellant (and the car she occupied) as a person (and vehicle) he 

had previously reported as associated with the machine break-in, captured on 

video. Comparable testimony has been held sufficient to support a conclusion that 

an arrest warrant was supported by probable cause when the State had not 

produced the warrant or affidavit. See, e.g., Dorsey, 964 S.W.2d at 704; Torres, 

933 S.W.2d at 340-41; see also Etheridge, 903 S.W.2d at 18-19 (testimony of 

magistrate and officer). We hold, therefore, that although the State did not produce 

the arrest warrant, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that probable 

cause existed to support appellant’s arrest. The court had sufficient facts from 

which it could reasonably conclude that appellant’s rights were protected. The

challenged jury instruction was not harmful error. We overrule appellant’s first 

issue.

B. Best-Evidence Objection

In her second issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting testimony from Deputy Boone about the information she received from 
12

dispatch regarding the return of active warrants for appellant based on a 

NCIC/TCIC records check. Appellant argues the best-evidence rule applied and 

the State should have produced the warrants.

The best-evidence rule requires that if the contents of a writing are to be 

proved, it must be by the production, if possible, of the very writing itself. Tex. R. 

Evid. 1002; see Ortiz v. State, 651 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). 

However, the best-evidence rule is inapplicable here.

Deputy Boone’s testimony that dispatch advised there were open warrants 

for appellant’s arrest from Texas and North Carolina was not offered to prove the 

contents of the warrants. Rather, Deputy Boone’s testimony was offered to explain

her justification for appellant’s arrest and the sequence of events. Because Deputy 

Boone was not testifying as to the contents of the warrants or any public records, 

we conclude the best-evidence rule is inapplicable here. See Tex. R. Evid. 1002; 

cf. Dansby v. State, 530 S.W.3d 213, 229 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, pet. ref’d) 

(best-evidence rule did not allow peace officer to testify to contents of vehicle 

registration databases).

In any event, any error in admitting the challenged evidence is harmless 

because, as we have held, the trial court had adequate opportunity to assess 

probable cause supporting the arrest warrant based on other testimony and 

evidence described above. See Garrett, 791 S.W.2d at 140.

We overrule issue two.

C. Hearsay objection

In issue three, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by

overruling her hearsay objection to Deputy Boone’s testimony about the 

information she received from dispatch regarding the active warrants for appellant. 
13

Appellant argues the truth of the report was relevant to the determination of the 

good-faith exception. In response, the State argues that it did not solicit any 

testimony from Deputy Boone regarding the contents of the warrant.

The record reflects the following exchange:

Q. (Counsel for the State) Okay. So did you approach the vehicle and 

ask what happened?

A. Yes. I wanted their side, as well.

Q. Could you tell me what happened next?

A. Whenever I approached, they had said that they weren’t on the 

property; but the male I talked to earlier said there had been video.

Q. Okay.

A. So at that point, I ran both of them through TCIC, NCIC.

Q. What came back?

A. It showed that he was clear, as in he had no warrants; and she had 

two warrants out of Texas and out of North Carolina.

Q. Were they both currently active warrants?

A. Yes.

. . . .

Counsel for Appellant: It’s hearsay as to whatever the contents may 

be.

The Court: Overruled.

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 

at trial, that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid.

801(d). Hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception created by statute or the 

Texas Rules of Evidence applies. Tex. R. Evid. 802. Appellant objected that 

Deputy Boone’s testimony was hearsay as to the contents of the warrant.

However, Deputy Boone did not testify as to the contents of the warrants, only to

the information provided to her regarding their existence. In fact, one of the major 

themes of appellant’s cross-examination of Deputy Boone was that she did not find 
14 

or review the Texas arrest warrant. Because Deputy Boone’s testimony was not 

offered to establish the truth of the contents of the warrants, we overrule issue 

three.

2

D. Cumulative error

In issue four, appellant argues that even if this court concludes that each of 

the alleged errors asserted in issues one through three were harmless; taken 

together, they created cumulative, reversible error. See Estrada v. State, 313 

S.W.3d 274, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 

452, 471 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The cumulative error doctrine provides relief only when 

constitutional errors so ‘fatally infect the trial’ that they violated the trial’s 

‘fundamental fairness.’”)). 

We need not address this issue because we have not concluded that the trial 

court committed any error as asserted in appellant’s first three issues. See 

Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“we are 

aware of no authority holding that non-errors may in their cumulative effect cause 

error”). We overrule issue four.

2 To the extent that appellant argues on appeal that her hearsay objection was as to the 

existence of active warrants, that argument was not the basis of her objections at trial. 

Regardless, the information received by Deputy Boone also constitutes “information acted on,” a 

hearsay exception. See Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 408 n.21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), 

abrogated on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) 

(testimony from police officer generally explaining her behavior and actions is not hearsay); 

Schaffer v. State, 777 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (police officer should be allowed

some explanation of her presence and conduct). Although Deputy Boone could not testify as the

information in the warrant database, she was allowed to testify in explanation of her arrest of 

appellant. 
15

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

______/s/ Kevin Jewell___________

Kevin Jewell

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson. (Spain, J., dissenting).

Publish —Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).