alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

Calendar No. 659 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5651 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2010 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and 

Public Works 

NOVEMBER 30, 2010 

Reported by Mrs. BOXER, without amendment 

AN ACT 

To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located at 515 9th Street in Rapid City, South 

Dakota, as the ‘‘Andrew W. Bogue Federal Building 

and United States Courthouse’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ANDREW W. BOGUE FEDERAL BUILDING AND 

4 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The Federal building and United 

6 States courthouse located at 515 9th Street in Rapid City, 

7 South Dakota, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘AnVerDate Mar 15 2010 01:36 Dec 01, 2010 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H5651.RS H5651

smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5651 RS

1 drew W. Bogue Federal Building and United States 

2 Courthouse’’. 

3 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg4 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

5 States to the Federal building and United States court6 house referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be 

7 a reference to the ‘‘Andrew W. Bogue Federal Building 

8 and United States Courthouse’’. 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS

smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 659 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5651 

AN ACT 

To designate the Federal building and United 

Courthouse’’. Bogue Federal Building and United States Rapid City, South Dakota, as the ‘‘Andrew W. States courthouse located at 515 9th Street in 

NOVEMBER 30, 2010 

Reported without amendment 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1268

___________________________

Rhonda Harris

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________

 Submitted: September 19, 2014

Filed: October 6, 2014

[Unpublished]

____________

Before COLLOTON, BOWMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Rhonda Harris appeals from the order of the District Court1

 granting summary

judgment to the defendant in Harris’s Title VII action against her former employer,

1

The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.
the Social Security Administration (SSA). After careful review, we conclude that

Harris’s placement on a Performance Assistance Plan in August 2009 was not an

adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII so as to support her claim

of racial discrimination. See Clegg v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir.

2007) (“An adverse employment action is a tangible change in working conditions

that produces a material employment disadvantage.” (citations to quoted cases

omitted)). In any case, SSA presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

action, and Harris did not present sufficient evidence of pretext. See Gibson v. Am.

Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 854 (8th Cir.) (explaining that pretext must be

demonstrated with evidence that raises a genuine doubt about the legitimacy of an

employer’s motive), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 313 (2012). Regarding Harris’s retaliation

claim, we conclude that she failed to present sufficient evidence that she engaged in

protected conduct. See Guimaraes v. SuperValu, Inc., 674 F.3d 962, 978 (8th Cir.

2012) (stating that a plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia, that “she engaged in

protected conduct” in order to prove a prima facie case of retaliation). Finally, to the

extent Harris asserted a hostile-work-environment claim, we conclude that she failed

to present any evidence that the alleged harassment was racially motivated. See

Malone v. Ameren UE, 646 F.3d 512, 517 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that an employee

must demonstrate, inter alia, “unwelcome race-based harassment” in order to prove

a hostile-work-environment claim).

We affirm, and we deny SSA’s pending motion.

______________________________

-2-
#### STATE v. GOODMAN

No. 1PC

Case below: 50 N.C. App.212

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 4 March 1981.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM BALANCE
SHEET/INCOME STATEMENT AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997             DEC-31-1997
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<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997             SEP-30-1997
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               180,354                 492,895
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  159,120                 434,504
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    82                     732
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  51                     151
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 22,307                  60,599
<INCOME-TAX>                                     9,545                  25,962
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                    12,762                  34,637
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .18                     .50
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .18                     .49
        
 

</TABLE>
Case 1:07-cv-03475-LAP     Document 2      Filed 05/23/2007     Page 1 of 2

Case 1:07-cv-03475-LAP     Document 2      Filed 05/23/2007     Page 2 of 2
Case 7:07-cv-03302-KMK-LMS Document 30 Filed 06/14/2007 Page 1 of 2Case 7:07-cv-03302-KMK-LMS Document 30 Filed 06/14/2007 Page 2 of 2
Case 1:07-cv-03475-LAP Document 6 Filed 07/20/2007 Page 1 of 1
Filed 11/2/22 P. v. Coleman CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DARRICK ANTHONY COLEMAN,

Defendant and Appellant. D079958

(Super. Ct. No. S CD280153 )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,

Laura W. Halgren, Judge. Affirmed.

Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for

Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Darrick Anthony Coleman pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by

a felon (Pen. Code, 1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted a prior strike (§ 667,

subds. (b)

- (i)). The remaining charge and allegations were dismissed.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.2

The court denied Coleman’s motion to dismiss the strike prior.

( People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 497.) The court

sentenced Coleman to the mid

- term of two years, doubled because of the prior

strike.

Coleman filed a timely notice of appeal challenging matters occurring

after the plea.

Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (19 79)

25 Cal.3d 436 ( Wende ), indicating counsel has not been able to identify any

arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks the court to review the

record for error as mandated by Wende

. We offered Coleman the opportunity

to file his own brief o n appeal but, he has not responded.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This appeal is from a guilty plea. Coleman admitted he possessed a

firearm as a convicted felon.

DISCUSSION

As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a Wende brief and asks

the court to review the record. To assist the court in its review, and in

compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 ( Anders ), counsel

has identified the following possible issues which were considered in

evaluating the potential merits of this appeal :

1. Di d the court err in denying Coleman’s motion to strike the prior

conviction ( Romero motion )?

2. Did the court err in accepting Coleman’s guilty plea when he was

not physically present in court?

We have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende and Anders.

We have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal.

Competent counsel has represented Coleman on this appeal.3 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

BUCHANAN, J.
Case 1:07-cv-03251-JSR Document 11 Filed 08/17/2007 Page 1 of 1
#### STANBACK v. STANBACK

No. 340 PC.

Case below: 53 N.C. App. 243.

Petition by plaintiff for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 6 October 1981.
#### STATE v. TOWNSEND

No. 66 PC.

Case below: 34 N.C. App. 326.

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 1 November 1977. Appeal dismissed ex mero motu for lack of substantial constitutional question 1 November 1977.
Case 1:07-cv-03413-LAP Document 27 Filed 01/21/2008 Page 1 of 1
## State of N ew York Su p reme Cou rt, A p p ellate Division Third J u dicial Dep artment Decided and Entered: July 2, 2015 105978

________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER BOBBY T. JENKINS, Appellant.

________________________________ Calendar Date: May 27, 2015 Before: Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Garry and Devine, JJ.

__________ Linda B. Johnson, West Sand Lake, for appellant. Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (John R. Thweatt of counsel), for respondent.

__________ Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Hayden, J.), rendered April 12, 2013, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. In satisfaction of a six-count indictment related to the sale and possession of cocaine on three occasions, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. He was sentenced, as an admitted second felony offender, to the agreed-upon prison term of four years with three years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.-2- 105978

We affirm. Defendant's contention that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel is not preserved for our review as the record does not reflect that he made an appropriate postallocution motion (see People v Moses, 110 AD3d 1118, 1118 [2013]). In any event, "[i]t is well settled that in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant has been afforded meaningful representation when he or she receives an advantageous plea and nothing in the record casts doubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel" (People v Wares, 124 AD3d 1079, 1080 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 25 NY3d 993 [2015]). Counsel pursued appropriate pretrial motions and discovery, and ensured that the controlled substance lab reports, which reflected that the substances tested positive for the presence of cocaine, were received before proceeding with the plea agreement. Were this issue properly before us, we would find that the record reflects that defendant received meaningful representation (see id.). Any challenge to counsel's preplea motion practice or discovery efforts was forfeited by defendant's guilty plea (see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 230-231 [2000]; People v Trombley, 91 AD3d 1197, 1201 [2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 914 [2013]). Finally, to the extent that defendant makes arguments addressed to matters outside the record, such as what counsel investigated, they are more properly raised in a motion to vacate pursuant to CPL article 440 (see People v Brown, 125 AD3d 1049, 1050 [2015]). Peters, P.J., Lahtinen and Garry, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger Clerk of the Court
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, United States District Judge for the ***

Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALICIA UNGER,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES; CHIEF

RONALD J. BOYD; SGT. KEVIN

MCCLOSKEY,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 09-55375

D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02139-SVW-CT

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 9, 2010** 

Pasadena, California

Before: D.W. NELSON and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges, and WHALEY, Senior

District Judge.*** 

FILED

APR 13 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Plaintiff Alicia Unger brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging violations of her First and Fourth Amendment rights during an incident

that occurred after a press conference on August 3, 2007. She appeals the district

court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Sergeant

Kevin McCloskey, Port Police Chief Ronald Boyd, and the City of Los Angeles on

her First Amendment claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we affirm.

Because Unger has not presented any evidence from which a reasonable

fact-finder could infer that McCloskey acted with the intent to chill her speech, she

has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his conduct violated

her rights under the First Amendment. See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino

County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 1999). Because Unger has not created a

genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a constitutional violation, her

supervisory and municipal liability claims also fail. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.

1989). Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the

defendants.

AFFIRMED.
#### STATE v. TRAPPER

No. 143

No. 48 N.C. App. 481

Motion of Attorney General to dismiss appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question allowed 4 November 1980.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          193,697
<BONDS>                                      4,222,320
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,905,871
<SALES>                                      2,257,960
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,392,284
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               646,624
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                379,819
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    16.55<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    16.55<F1>
<FN>
<F1>EPS is per limited partnership unit.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### LONG v. EDDLEMAN

No. 147 PC.

Case below: 22 N.C. App. 43.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 30 August 1974.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                       UT
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<NAME> KENTUCKY UTILITIES COMPANY
<MULTIPLIER>                    1,000
       
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<FN>
<F1>Includes common stock expense of $595.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
Don’t let germs make you sick! 

Kill germs with disinfectants.

Did you know that workers and people 

in jails and prisons can get sick from 

germs on things they touch?

Wash your hands for 20 seconds with 

soap and water after touching things to 

avoid getting sick! 

A disinfectant kills germs. Some 

disinfectants don’t work for every germ!

Viruses are a type of germ that 

can give you

• A common cold

• Hepatitis

• HIV

• Flu

• A stomach bug

• COVID-19

Things that people touch

in jail or prison that may not be 

clean include

• Table

• Chair

• Writing desk

• Door handle

• Stair rail

• Light switch

• Sink and shower faucet

• Toilet

• Phone

• Computer keyboard

If you touch anything that may not be clean, wash 

your hands with soap and water for 20 seconds!

DO NOT mix disinfectants

with anything else!

• Some disinfectants can make you sick if you mix

them with other disinfectants or chemicals.

• The disinfectant may not work when it’s mixed with

anything else.

Steps you should take

• Use disinfectants that

jail or prison staff give

to you.

• Listen to and follow the

cleaning instructions

that the jail or prison

staff give to you about

how often to disinfect

things.

• Follow all instructions

and training that tell

you how to apply the

product (such as using

a mop, sponge, brush,

cloth, or something

else).

• Read and follow all the

label instructions on

the disinfectant.

• The instructions may

tell you

- what you should use

it on,

- how long to leave

the product on

before wiping it off or

removing it, and

- how long the product

should last before it

goes bad.

• Wear gloves to protect

your hands when you

use disinfectants.

Know how 

disinfectants work

• If something looks dirty, clean it with soap and

water or cleaning products before you use the

disinfectant.

• Some disinfectants may need time to work. Put

the product on and let it soak for the time that the

label instructions tell you. This might mean you

wipe the product off after 1 minute, 10 minutes, or 

for some other time.

• Always wash your hands with soap and water for at

least 20 seconds after you use a disinfectant, or after 

you touch something that may have germs on it.

Get More Information

1-800-CDC-NIOSH (1-800-232-4636) | cdc.gov/cdc-info | cdc.gov/niosh

DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2023-127

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHPUB2023127

March 2023
Case 1:07-cv-03439-WHP Document 13 Filed 07/10/2007 Page 1 of 1