SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4771-16T1

JAMES N. QUERRY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MARY K. QUERRY, n/k/a

MARY K. OLSEN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted September 25, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hunterdon County, 

Docket No. FM-10-0097-03.

Carter, Van Rensselaer & Caldwell, attorneys for 

appellant (William J. Caldwell, on the briefs).

Patrick J. Mullaney, attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 19, 2018
2

A-4771-16T1

In this post-judgment dissolution matter, defendant Mary K. Olsen, 

formerly Mary K. Querry, appeals from the Family Part's May 11, 2017 order 

denying her motion to emancipate her and plaintiff James N. Querry's eldest son 

upon his graduation from high school and his alleged "enlistment" in the 

Marines and to terminate her child support obligation for him. She also appeals 

from its order granting plaintiff's motion to compel defendant to contribute 

toward their younger son's post-secondary vocational school expenses and 

rejecting defendant's support calculations. 

On appeal, defendant argues that the motion judge erred by designating 

February 14, 2016, as the date of emancipation for the oldest child, ignoring 

clear proof that plaintiff's earlier change of circumstances applications were 

fraudulent, determining that laches applied to defendant's entitlement to relief 

from an earlier support order, and improperly assessing the Newburgh1factors 

in determining that defendant must contribute towards the parties' younger 

child's post-secondary vocational school expenses. She also contends that she 

was entitled to credit against child support effective upon their older child's 

graduation and her support obligation should have been limited to one child 

 

1

 Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982).
3

A-4771-16T1

without the teen supplement. Finally, defendant claims the judge erred in 

awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I.

The facts found by the motion judge after a plenary hearing are 

summarized as follows. The parties were married on October 21, 1995 and 

divorced in 2003. They have two sons, one born in 1995 and the other in 1998. 

Their dual final judgment of divorce (JOD) incorporated the parties' February 

26, 2003 Custody and Parenting Plan (CPP) that addressed custody and support 

of their sons, who at the time of divorce were ages 7 and 4. Under the CPP, the 

parties shared joint legal custody of the children and defendant was designated 

as parent of primary residence for both children. The JOD required plaintiff to 

pay $50 per week for child support both children. Neither the JOD nor the CPP 

addressed the children's post-high school education expenses or emancipation. 

After the divorce, the two boys lived with defendant until 2010 when the 

older son moved in with plaintiff and 2013 when the younger son followed. 

Apparently, the change in living arrangements was due to a conflict between the 

boys and defendant's new husband. At the time the older son moved out from 

defendant's home, the parties entered into a consent order terminating plaintiff's 

obligation to pay support as it was their intention that each party support the 
4

A-4771-16T1

child residing with them. When the younger son moved out, there was no change 

in the support obligations. Although both children lived with plaintiff since 

2013, defendant never paid any child support. 

The older son graduated from high school in June 2014. Prior to his 

graduation, he investigated the possibility of joining the Marines and anticipated 

enlisting upon graduation, but that did not occur at that time. After graduation, 

while still living with plaintiff, he worked at a part-time job while he continued 

to pursue enlistment. He eventually understood that he would be "shipped out" 

in February 2016. However, prior to that time, the older son sustained an injury 

that prevented him from joining the service. Instead, for a while, he 

contemplated attending college but ended up securing a new job at a higher rate 

of pay and in July 2016, with his father's and grandparents' assistance, he moved 

out of plaintiff's home and began living with his fiancé and their young children, 

while still receiving help from plaintiff. 

The younger son graduated high school in June 2016 and continued to live 

with and receive support from plaintiff. He immediately enrolled in a vocational 

school pursuing a career as a certified master mechanic. At the time of the 

present dispute, he was also contemplating enlisting in the Navy. In addition to 

attending school, he volunteered as a firefighter. In order to help fund his post-
5

A-4771-16T1

high school education, he obtained grants and loans, with plaintiff paying the 

balance through loans. Defendant provided no support for him nor did she 

contribute towards his education. 

The parties' present dispute arose in April 2014 when plaintiff filed a 

motion for child support. Defendant did not respond to the motion. A Family 

Part judge granted the motion on July 7, 2014, without establishing a support 

amount because the parties had not submitted necessary financial information. 

The judge ordered the parties to submit that information so he could revaluate 

child support. However, neither party submitted the information and no 

recalculation of support occurred.

In 2015 plaintiff filed another motion for an order compelling defendant 

to pay child support and contribute towards the children's college expenses.

Defendant filed a cross-motion seeking that any child support or college expense 

payment be limited to the benefit of the younger child as, according to 

defendant, the older son was emancipated. She also sought to limit any award 

to be retroactive only to the filing date of the current motion.

On October 21, 2015, Judge Bradford M. Bury granted plaintiff's motion, 

ordering defendant to pay $248 per week in child support for both children, 

retroactive to July 14, 2014, on an interim basis pending defendant's submission 
6

A-4771-16T1

of the "long overdue financial documents previously ordered on . . . July 7, 

2014," which plaintiff had provided but defendant had still failed to submit. He 

denied without prejudice plaintiff's motion to compel defendant to contribute to 

the older son's college expenses because there were "insufficient proofs as to" 

the boy's college expenses. He denied the application for the younger child's 

college expenses because the claim was "unripe," and he denied without 

prejudice defendant's motion to emancipate the older son as of December 15, 

2013, because the boy was intending to attend college and there was no evidence 

that he "moved beyond the sphere of influence of the parties and obtained an 

independent status of his own."

On July 19, 2016, plaintiff filed another motion to compel defendant to 

contribute to the younger son's "continuing educational and training 

expenses[,]" and to provide the outstanding financial information. In response, 

defendant filed a cross motion to: 1) set aside the October 21, 2015 order; 2) 

declare the older son emancipated; 3) terminate child support; 4) apply 

retroactive credits for child support; 5) deny plaintiff's request for contribution 

to the younger son's educational costs; and 6) award attorney fees.

On September 20, 2016, Judge Julie M. Marino denied defendant's motion 

and ordered a plenary hearing "to determine the share of contribution" for [the 
7

A-4771-16T1

younger son]'s continued education, "and whether [the older son] should be 

deemed emancipated." The order also required defendant to "provide her 

updated financial information[,]" and "reserved" her request for counsel fees.

Judge Marino conducted a plenary hearing over four nonconsecutive days 

in early 2017.2 After considering the testimony and evidence adduced at the 

hearing and the parties' written submissions and oral arguments, on May 11, 

2017, Judge Marino issued an order denying defendant's motion supported by a 

comprehensive twenty-two page written decision. In the order, Judge Marino 

fixed February 14, 2016, as the older son's date of emancipation. She also 

ordered defendant to contribute $14,740 toward the younger son's postsecondary education costs. In addition, Judge Marino ordered defendant to pay 

child support for the younger son in the amount of $221 per week and arrears 

that accrued between July 7, 2014 and February 14, 2016 in the amount of $50 

per week. Finally the judge required defendant to pay plaintiff's counsel fees in 

the amount of $10,000.

In her written decision, Judge Marino set forth her detailed findings about 

the children's custody, support, and post-high school graduation activities, as 

 

2 At the hearing, in addition to the parties and their children, the parties' former 

attorneys, who represented them in 2014, testified about service of the 2014 

motion on defendant.
8

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summarized above. In her analysis of the legal issues, Judge Marino first 

addressed whether to terminate defendant's child support obligation 

retroactively to July 7, 2014. The judge noted that following the 2010 consent 

order, the parties agreed "that each would pay the costs for the child residing 

with him/her." Moreover, she observed that between 2010 and November 2015,

both children moved out of defendant's home, and during this time, "[d]efendant 

[] paid virtually no child support . . . ." The judge emphasized that defendant 

had an opportunity to contest the July 2014 order that established her child 

support obligation, but she failed to "take reasonable steps to address and oppose 

it." According to the judge, "[i]t would be fundamentally unfair to [p]laintiff to 

re-open these resolved issues[,]" and as such, Judge Marino denied defendant's 

"request to retroactively terminate child support to July 7, 2014."

Next, Judge Marino addressed the issue of the older son's emancipation. 

The judge found that he "became emancipated in or around February 14, 2016[]" 

as it was "the date that [he] was set to ship out in the Marine Corps." The judge 

noted that had his injury impacted his ability to be independent, then there would 

be a different finding. However, she stated that after he recovered, he obtained 

employment "earning $20 per hour and moved out of [plaintiff's] home." Judge 

Marino determined that the "year and one half" that the older son took to figure 
9

A-4771-16T1

out what he wanted to do post-high school was not "an unreasonable amount of 

time," and importantly, during this time, he "was not able to support himself," 

although "he was taking appropriate steps to become emancipated."

With respect to the younger son's educational expenses, the judge noted 

that defendant had the financial means3to "contribute to [her son]'s school 

costs[,]" and that the parties' final JOD "is silent as to contribution of college 

costs." Judge Marino applied the Newburgh factors to determine whether 

defendant had an obligation to contribute towards her son's college expenses.

In applying the relevant factors the judge found the following: 

(1) [T]hat if the [younger son was] still living with both 

parties, they would have contributed to his postsecondary education costs.

. . . .

(2) [I]t was inherently reasonable for [the son] to 

anticipate that he would obtain post-secondary 

education.

. . . .

(3) The cost of [the son]'s education at Lincoln Tech is 

$38,000. 

 

3

 The amount of the contribution as determined by the Judge is not an issue in 

this appeal. Defendant concedes she has the ability to pay that amount. As 

discussed below, the issue raised is whether defendant should be contributing at 

all. 
10 A-4771-16T1

. . . .

(4) [T]hat [d]efendant does have the financial ability to 

pay for these costs. Not only is [d]efendant able to 

contribute $300 per month to her 403(b) and pay $390 

per month for the RV, as well as $376 per month . . .

for a campsite, but . . . she recently discharged over 

$60,000 worth of credit card debt in bankruptcy[.]

. . . .

(5) [The younger son] desires to obtain his master 

mechanic certification. Lincoln Tech offers this course 

of study. 

. . . .

(6) Defendant has the financial ability to contribute to 

[the son]'s education. . . . [and] by availing himself of 

the parent plus loan option, [plaintiff] has been able to 

contribute his share.

. . . .

(7) [The younger son] appears firmly committed to his 

studies. 

. . . .

(8) [The younger son] has no independent financial 

resources. 

. . . .

(9) Currently[,][the son] is not employed. . . . Given 

[his] limited time and significant demands of his 

courses, the court sees no good reason to compel him 

to take a minimum wage job, which pay will be 
11 A-4771-16T1

insignificant as compared to the $22,000 balance owed 

for his education.

. . . .

(10) [The younger son] applied for and was awarded a 

$5,000 Pell Grant and a student loan of $11,000. 

. . . .

(11) Defendant is the adult and parent in this 

relationship and she bears the primary responsibility in 

making whatever arrangements or efforts were/are 

necessary to continue to parent her child and continue 

to maintain a healthy relationship with him. Her 

attempt to shift this burden to him, speaks volumes. 

. . . .

(12) [The younger son]'s goals of being a master 

mechanic are fully supported by his current course of 

study at Lincoln Tech.

Judge Marino concluded that defendant was obligated to contribute to the 

younger son's "post-secondary education costs[.]"

Finally, the judge addressed counsel fees. She found that "an award of 

[fees] to [p]laintiff [was] appropriate[,]" and that defendant's income, 

"substantial assets[,]" and her unreasonable position during the litigation 

warranted the award. Moreover, the judge noted that: 1) "[p]laintiff's parents 

significantly supplement[ed] the parties' housing costs[;]" 2) defendant received 

"employer sponsored tuition" benefits; 3) defendant failed to "disclose that she 
12 A-4771-16T1

had filed and been discharged in bankruptcy;" and 4) defendant has not paid any 

child support for her children "between the years 2010 and [November] 2015." 

Accordingly, the judge determined that defendant should pay plaintiff's counsel 

fees "in the amount of $10,000[.]" This appeal followed. 

II.

We begin by acknowledging the limited nature of our review of Family 

Part determinations. We "accord particular deference to the Family Part because 

of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 

N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 

412 (1998)). "We do 'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of 

the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by 

or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence 

as to offend the interests of justice.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) 

(alterations in original) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). Therefore, "'[o]nly 

when the trial [judge]'s conclusions are so "clearly mistaken" or "wide of the 

mark"' should we interfere . . . .'" Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). However, "all legal issues are reviewed 

de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017).
13 A-4771-16T1

III.

We turn first to defendant's challenge to Judge Marino's determination 

about the older son's emancipation. Defendant initially argues that the judge 

mistakenly relied upon the wrong date for the older son's enlistment in the 

Marines. She contends that while Judge Marino relied upon February 14, 2016 

as the boy's "ship out" date, it was actually supposed to be the same date in 2015. 

Moreover, she contends his enlistment occurred immediately after his 

graduation in June 2014, and pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67,4the older son 

"was emancipated at the time of enlistment." Defendant also relies upon the 

older son's employment in December 2014 and argues that "the latest 

emancipation should have occurred would have been December 2014 when [her 

son] became employed full-time at $12/hour."

Relying on Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997), 

defendant argues that Judge Marino "did not explain . . . how [p]laintiff . . . 

overcame the 'prima facie case for emancipation.'" To support this contention, 

defendant asserts that after graduating high school, her son "was an employed 

 

4

 The statute which became effective in February 2017 addresses emancipation 

and states in relevant part "[u]nless otherwise provided in a court order or 

judgment, the obligation to pay child support shall terminate by operation of law 

without order by the court on the date that a child . . . enters the military service 

[or] reaches 19 years[,]" absent certain exceptions. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67.
14 A-4771-16T1

single person, earning almost 65% of the $248 weekly child support award[,]" 

and "[b]y December 2014, . . . [he] was earning almost 200% of the child 

support award[, which was] roughly 50% [of] [p]laintiff’s annual income" For 

that reason, even though the older son was living with plaintiff after graduation, 

he "was clearly beyond the guidance and control of the [p]laintiff." We disagree. 

Although there is a statutory presumption that a child reaches adulthood 

at eighteen, see N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3, and absent a court order to the contrary, a 

parent's obligation to support a child automatically ends at age nineteen, see

N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67, it remains beyond cavil in this State that "[i]n certain 

situations, parents still have an economic duty to support children" beyond those 

ages. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 572 (quoting Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. 

Super. 207, 215 (App. Div. 2015)). The determination of whether an adult child 

is emancipated is highly fact-sensitive. See Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 543. 

In Ricci, we summarized a court's considerations when determining 

whether a child is emancipated. We stated:

A determination of emancipation is a legal issue, 

imposed when the fundamental dependent relationship 

between parent and child ends. See Dolce v. Dolce, 383 

N.J. Super. 11, 17 (App. Div. 2006) (stating 

emancipation is "the conclusion of the fundamental 

dependent relationship between parent and child"). It 

is not automatic and "need not occur at any particular 

age . . . ." Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 543. When 
15 A-4771-16T1

circumstances surrounding the parent-child 

relationship support a finding that the child is 

emancipated, "the parent relinquishes the right to 

custody and is relieved of the burden of support, and 

the child is no longer entitled to support." Filippone, 

304 N.J. Super. at 308.

. . . .

"[T]he essential inquiry is whether the child has moved 

'beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility 

exercised by a parent and obtains an independent status 

of his or her own.'" Filippone, 304 N.J. Super. at 308 

(quoting Bishop v. Bishop, 287 N.J. Super. 593, 598 

(Ch. Div. 1995)). A court's emancipation 

"determination involves a critical evaluation of the 

prevailing circumstances including the child's need, 

interests, and independent resources, the family's 

reasonable expectations, and the parties' financial 

ability, among other things." Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. at 

18 (citing Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 545).

[Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 571-73.]

Emancipation is also not triggered by the fact that a child is or is not living 

with a parent. "'[P]arents are expected to support their children until they are 

emancipated, regardless of whether the children live with one, both, or neither 

parent.'" Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 414 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting 

Burns v. Edwards, 367 N.J. Super. 29, 39 (App. Div. 2004)). "Not even the 

absence of a meaningful relationship relieves the legally obliged parent from 

providing support for a child's basic needs" until they are emancipated. L.V. v. 
16 A-4771-16T1

R.S., 347 N.J. Super. 33, 41 (App. Div. 2002). Nor does a child's pursuit of a 

career in the military, absent actual entry into active duty with the military or 

enrollment in one of the service academies. See Bishop, 287 N.J. Super. at 604. 

Likewise, "[an adult] child's decision to seriously pursue a college education 

alone does not create the required dependency allowing him or her to be 

unemancipated." Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 577-78. As we emphasized in Ricci, 

"facts matter, and the judge must fully analyze all circumstances[.]" Id. at 578.

Applying these guiding principles here, we affirm Judge Marino's 

determination regarding the older son's emancipation substantially for the 

reason expressed in her thorough written decision. We are satisfied that Judge 

Marino conducted the required fact-sensitive review of the parties' and their 

older son's circumstances. We agree with her conclusion that the older son 

remained unemancipated through February 2016, which was supported by 

substantial, credible evidence in the record that established the older son 

remained within the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by his 

parents and had not yet obtained an independent status of his own. Filippone, 

304 N.J. Super. at 308. 
17 A-4771-16T1

IV.

We turn next to defendant's contentions about the judge requiring

defendant to contribute towards her younger son's post-high school vocational 

training. According to defendant, Judge Marino erred in her application of the 

Newburgh factors. She contends that if the judge properly applied those factors 

her younger son would have been obligated to pay for his own post-secondary 

education expenses even though defendant has the ability to contribute to those 

costs. Defendant states that her "lifetime efforts at self-financed educational 

advancement" represents "the true family expectation about post high school 

education[,]" and that her son should fund his education as "[n]o 

parent . . . contributed a dime to her educational attainment." Defendant then 

argues that, even if this court finds that she must contribute towards her son’s 

education, we should "take judicial notice (N.J.R.E. 201(b)) of the New Jersey 

Department of Labor Statistic" and "impute 50% of six month's income as being 

available in addition to the $100/week . . . to pay toward the $20,298" balance. 

Defendant contends that "[t]he remaining credit [from the recalculation of the 

child support] should be applied against the $221 child support calculated by the 

[c]ourt[,]" which will end when her younger son completes "his training program 

in December 2017."
18 A-4771-16T1

We accord the Family Part "substantial discretion" in awarding college 

contribution. Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 308 (App. Div. 2008). We 

must accept the Family Part's determination concerning a parent's obligation to 

contribute toward college tuition, provided the factual findings are supported by 

substantial credible evidence in the record and the judge has not abused his or 

her discretion. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12; Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 

N.J. Super. 574, 587 (App. Div. 2016).

Applying this deferential standard, we conclude that defendant's 

arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written 

opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and affirm, again, substantially for the reasons 

expressed by Judge Marino in her written decision. Suffice it to say that, as 

found by the judge, defendant's contention that she paid her own way and 

therefore her son should do the same, was belied by the record of plaintiff's 

parents' support for both parties while defendant pursued her education and 

career. We are satisfied that Judge Marino properly "balance[d] the statutory 

criteria of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)[5]and the Newburgh factors, [see Newburgh, 88 

 

5 N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) requires the court to consider:

(1) Needs of the child;
19 A-4771-16T1

N.J. at 545,] as well as any other relevant circumstances, to reach a fair and just 

decision" as to defendant's obligation to contribute towards the younger son's 

post-secondary school expenses and correctly determined the "amount, 

[defendant] must contribute to [her] child's educational expenses." Gac v. Gac, 

186 N.J. 535, 543 (2006); see also Avelino-Catabran, 445 N.J. at 591 n.8.

V.

We similarly find no merit to defendant's contentions about Judge 

Marino's calculation of defendant's child support obligation. Those contentions 

 

(2) Standard of living and economic circumstances of 

each parent;

(3) All sources of income and assets of each parent;

(4) Earning ability of each parent . . . ;

(5) Need and capacity of the child for education, 

including higher education;

(6) Age and health of the child and each parent;

(7) Income, assets and earning ability of the child;

(8) Responsibility of the parents for the court-ordered 

support of others;

(9) Reasonable debts and liabilities of each child and 

parent; and

(10) Any other factors the court may deem relevant.
20 A-4771-16T1

are based primarily on defendant's arguments about her older son's emancipation 

that we have rejected, an allegation that the judge improperly considered 

defendant not having paid support since 2010, and challenges to the judge's basis 

for the determination of child support that were not raised before Judge Marino 

that we will not consider for the first time on appeal. See Zaman v. Felton, 219 

N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014) (citing State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (quoting 

Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973))).

VI.

Last, we consider defendant's arguments about Judge Marino's award of 

counsel fees. Defendant contends that the judge "erred in awarding attorney’s 

fees to plaintiff" as "[t]here was no proof that [p]laintiff was in financial need[,]" 

and "[p]laintiff’s bad faith litigation position was manifest." To support this 

contention, defendant asserts that "[t]he record demonstrates that his parents 

always . . . subsize[d] [p]laintiff’s lifestyle." Moreover, defendant states that 

plaintiff "omitted material facts" from his certification for his "applications to 

the [c]ourt in 2014 and 2015[,]" and "[h]e promoted a date of emancipation in 

clear violation of statutory imperative."

We accord great deference to a trial judge's award of counsel fees in a 

family matter. The award "is discretionary, and will not be reversed except upon 
21 A-4771-16T1

a showing of an abuse of discretion." Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. 

Div. 2011). The decision to award counsel fees "rests in the discretion of the 

trial court," Addesa v. Addesa, 392 N.J. Super. 58, 78 (App. Div. 2007), and 

will be disturbed "only on the 'rarest occasion,' and then only because of clear 

abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 

2008) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)). In determining 

whether s court exercised reasonable discretion, we consider whether the 

"decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from 

established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cty. 

Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. 

Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides: "The court may order one party to pay a 

retainer on behalf of the other for expert and legal services when the respective 

financial circumstances of the parties make the award reasonable and just." Rule

5:3-5(c) sets forth nine factors the court must consider in making an award of 

counsel fees in a family action. Essentially,

in awarding counsel fees, the court must consider 

whether the party requesting the fees is in financial 

need; whether the party against whom the fees are 

sought has the ability to pay; the good or bad faith of 

either party in pursuing or defending the action; the 
22 A-4771-16T1

nature and extent of the services rendered; and the 

reasonableness of the fees.

[Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 94-95 (2005) (emphasis 

omitted).]

For purposes of awarding counsel fees, bad faith relates only to the party's 

conduct during the litigation. Id. at 95. The purpose of an award of fees against 

a "bad faith" litigant "is to protect the innocent party from unnecessary costs 

. . . ." Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 461 (App. Div. 2000).

Here, Judge Marino considered the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors and concluded 

that defendant had considerable income and assets, and determined that 

defendant's opposition to contributing to her children's support, including post 

secondary school expenses for their younger son, was without any basis. She 

found that contrary to defendant's allegations about being self-made that 

justified her not paying for those expenses, defendant did not achieve her 

education and career without assistance. The judge found that defendant 

received "employer sponsored tuition" benefits, financial assistance for housing 

costs from plaintiff's parents, and the benefit of not paying child support since 

2013. Under these circumstances, defendant did not establish any abuse of the 

judge's discretion in her award of counsel fees to plaintiff.
23 A-4771-16T1

To the extent that we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's 

remaining arguments, we conclude that they are without sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.