If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re MYERS, Minors. September 22, 2022

No. 359930

Kent Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 18-052510-NA; 

 18-052511-NA

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and O’BRIEN and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-father appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to 

his two sons: SDM and SKM. The trial court ordered termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), 

(g), and (j). Because we conclude that respondent has not identified any errors that warrant relief, 

we affirm.

I. DRUG ABUSE FINDINGS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent argues that the trial court erred in several respects when it made findings 

involving his drug use. This Court reviews de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted 

and applied the relevant statutes. See In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 431; 871 

NW2d 868 (2015). This Court, however, reviews the trial court’s factual findings underlying its 

application of the law for clear error. Id. at 430; see also MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly 

erroneous when this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made. In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 430-431.

B. ANALYSIS

A trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if it finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the petitioner established one or more grounds for termination. See MCL

712A.19b(3). Once a trial court finds that the Department of Health and Human Services (the 

Department) has established one or more grounds for termination, it must terminate the parent’s 
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parental rights if it also finds that termination is in the child’s best interests. See MCL

712A.19b(5).

Respondent first argues that his positive test for cocaine and related evidence when making 

its findings were insufficient to warrant terminating his parental rights. He also argues that the 

trial court should have waited for the results of his hair follicle test and should have concluded that 

respondent’s involvement with drugs was—at most—recreational and did not implicate his ability 

to parent.

As respondent recognizes, the trial court did not terminate respondent’s parental rights 

solely on the basis of his purported drug use. The trial court identified numerous barriers to 

respondent’s reunification with the children: substance abuse, domestic relations, emotional 

stability, resource management, parenting skills, and child characteristics. The continued 

existence of these barriers implicated grounds for terminating his parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Even concerning the barrier of substance abuse, the trial court did 

not find that respondent had been using substances. Rather, the trial court found that he did not 

“have the supports for preventing a relapse” because he refused to admit that he had ever had a 

drug problem and did not participate in any drug abuse prevention services after his release from 

prison.

The trial court identified this barrier as only one of many barriers to respondent’s ability to 

parent his children safely, and respondent has not stated how any error involving the trial court’s 

findings about his drug use prejudiced the outcome of his termination hearing. Even if the trial 

court erred about respondent’s drug use, the existence of the other barriers would still establish 

grounds for terminating his parental rights, at the least, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). 

Accordingly, respondent has not met his burden to demonstrate that any error in this finding 

warranted relief. See MCR 3.902(A); MCR 2.613(A). In any event, a careful review of the record 

shows that the trial court did not clearly err when it found that respondent’s substance abuse 

problem continued to be a barrier.1

Respondent also argues that the trial court should have postponed the termination hearing 

to await his late hair follicle test, but, given the record, respondent had had ample opportunity to 

act before the termination hearing and failed to do so. Moreover, there was no evidence in the 

record about how his hair removal and delays might have affected the test results. Given the 

 

1 Respondent had a lengthy criminal record that included significant offenses associated with 

substance abuse. He had been arrested for possession of marijuana and possession of cocaine, and 

for maintaining a drug house. By July 2019, he had completed serving a sentence for driving under 

the influence, third offense. As a result of his last incarceration, respondent was unable to care for 

his children and could not prevent them from being neglected while in his wife’s care. From 

September 2019 through February 2020, which was a few months after his release from prison for 

an offense arising from substance abuse, respondent tested positive for cocaine. Although 

respondent tested negative for substances for 31 of his tests in 2021, he tested positive for cocaine 

in May 2021. He suggests on appeal that the positive results were unreliable and could not be 

considered in terminating his parental rights. The record, however, supported a finding that the 

test results were accurate. 
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record, the trial court cannot be faulted for making its findings on the basis of the evidence before 

it.

Respondent further argues that—even if the evidence established that he was using drugs—

there was no evidence that his drug use was anything other than recreational, and there was no 

evidence that his recreational use posed a danger to his children. His argument is unpersuasive. 

The evidence showed that respondent had repeatedly been arrested for behaviors associated with 

his drug use and that, as a result, he was unable to parent his children, and they suffered from 

trauma associated with his arrest and incarceration. Consequently, there was a direct connection 

between his failure to rectify the barrier presented by his abuse of substances and the harm that the 

children entrusted to his care had suffered and might suffer again if he had a relapse. And this 

finding alone established grounds for terminating respondent’s parental rights under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).

II. ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER

A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent next argues that the trial court erred when it considered evidence about his 

diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder without admitting the psychological evaluation and 

erred when it terminated his parental rights on the basis of that diagnosis without requiring the 

Department to provide him with services to rectify it. 

To preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue must have been raised in the trial court. 

See In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). Similarly, to preserve an argument

that the Department should have provided additional services to preserve and reunify the family, 

the parent must raise the issue at some time after the trial court adopted the case service plan and 

before the ultimate disposition. See In re Atchley, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) 

(Docket Nos. 358502 and 358503); slip op at 2. This Court reviews de novo whether the trial court 

properly interpreted and applied the relevant statutes, In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 

at 431, and reviews the trial court’s factual findings for clear error. Id. at 430. However, to the 

extent that respondent failed to properly preserve an issue for appellate review, this Court reviews 

that claim of error for plain error affecting his substantial rights. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8. 

To establish a plan error that warrants relief, respondent must show that the trial court made a plain 

error that affected the outcome of the proceedings, or that the error seriously affected the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the outcome. See id. at 8-9.

Respondent never objected to the testimony about his psychological evaluation or 

otherwise asserted that it was improper for the trial court to consider the evaluation. He also did 

not argue that the evaluator had to be called at the termination hearing and never asserted that the 

Department had an obligation to provide him with services to help him overcome the problems 

associated with his diagnosis. Consequently, his arguments concerning the admission of the 

evidence concerning his psychological evaluation and whether the Department should have 

provided him with more services are unpreserved. See id.; Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8.

B. ANALYSIS
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The trial court formally admitted respondent’s psychological evaluation, authored by Dr. 

Jeffrey T. Kieliszewski, at the hearing held in December 2019. On the basis of the testing and 

history, Dr. Kieliszewski diagnosed respondent as having a personality disorder—specifically, 

antisocial personality disorder. 

The trial court had the authority to consider the record from all the previous dispositional 

hearings when determining whether the Department established its burden. See In re Hudson, 294 

Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011) (recognizing that child protective proceedings are 

viewed as one continuous proceeding); In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 129; 777 NW2d 728 (2009)

(stating that the trial court may take judicial notice of its records). Moreover, respondent’s

psychological evaluation was admissible at the termination hearing, and the trial court could have 

considered it for all its probative value. See MCR 3.977(H)(2) (“At the hearing all relevant and 

material evidence, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and may be 

relied upon to the extent of its probative value.”). Accordingly, had respondent objected to the 

testimony at the termination hearing on the ground that the evaluation had not been formally 

admitted at that hearing, the trial court could have admitted the report. Similarly, had respondent

wanted to cross-examine Dr. Kieliszewski, or controvert the report at the termination hearing, he 

had the right to do so. See MCR 3.977(H)(2). He chose not to call Dr. Kieliszewski and chose 

not to present any evidence to contradict his evaluation. On this record, respondent has not shown 

that the trial court plainly erred to the extent that it considered the evaluation and related testimony 

when making its findings of fact. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8-9. 

Likewise, respondent has not identified any services to treat antisocial personality disorder,

and Dr. Kieliszewski specifically wrote that counseling was contraindicated because the prognosis 

was so poor. Instead, Dr. Kieliszewski identified services and efforts that the Department could 

use to safeguard the children if returned to respondent’s care. The record shows that the 

Department followed Dr. Kieliszewski’s recommendations. Therefore, respondent has also not 

demonstrated a plain error premised on the Department’s failure to provide him with services 

tailored to his diagnosis. See id.

Nor has respondent shown that the trial court’s findings involving his diagnosis were 

clearly erroneous. The trial court stated that antisocial personality disorder was not treatable 

through counseling, and found that respondent had engaged in conduct that was consistent with 

his diagnosis, and that emotional stability remained a barrier and a danger to the children. The 

finding was entirely supported by the record. Dr. Kieliszewski wrote that persons such as 

respondent were prone to instability, criminality, and drug use, which was consistent with 

respondent’s history and constituted evidence that, on the basis of his personality disorder, 

respondent was likely to again involve himself in unstable living situations, engage in criminal 

activity, and abuse drugs. The trial court did not clearly err. See In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 

Mich App at 430-431.

Finally, although respondent argues that a diagnosis by itself does not constitute grounds 

for termination, as noted the trial court identified respondent’s history of engaging in behaviors 

that exposed his children to neglect, noting that those acts and omissions had led to the children’s 

removal. It then found that those barriers continued to exist and stated that respondent’s antisocial 

personality disorder was just one of those barriers. 
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Respondent has not identified any error involving the trial court’s use of the psychological 

evaluation or the testimony about the evaluation, and has not shown that the trial court’s findings 

about his diagnosis were clearly erroneous. 

III. PARENTING TIME AND PREFERENCES

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent next argues that the trial court erred in several respects when it made its 

findings about SDM’s behaviors before and after parenting time and concerning SDM’s 

preferences. This Court reviews de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied 

the relevant statutes. See id. at 431. This Court reviews the trial court’s factual findings underlying 

its application of the law for clear error. Id. at 430.

B. ANALYSIS

Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it considered the evidence that SDM had 

behavior problems before and after parenting-time visits with respondent and erred to the extent 

that it considered SDM’s preferences in terminating respondent’s parental rights. In discussing 

the children’s best interests, the trial court recognized that there was some evidence that respondent

developed a bond with SDM during parenting therapy. The court, however, stated that there was 

also evidence that SDM acted out before and after parenting sessions, which it characterized as 

trauma behaviors. From that, it found that the bond between respondent and SDM was not a 

healthy bond. It determined that that factor weighed in favor of finding that termination was in 

SDM’s best interests. The trial court also cited SDM’s behaviors as evidence that the parentingtime visits did not go well and that SDM preferred not to be placed with respondent.

Respondent does not contest the evidence that SDM acted out before and after visits with 

him. Rather, he states that there was no direct evidence that SDM acted out because he did not 

want to attend parenting time. He suggests that SDM might have been engaging in the disruptive 

behavior for ulterior reasons or as a result of acts by the foster family. Respondent’s conjecture 

does not establish that the trial court clearly erred in its findings.

There was evidence that SDM had begun to act out before and after visits with respondent. 

Although there was evidence that SDM had uneventful visits with respondent and that respondent 

was appropriate during parenting visits, there was also evidence that SDM had a strong reaction 

because he feared respondent and did not want to visit with him. For example, SDM’s therapist, 

Carmel McKentry, testified at the termination hearing that SDM was initially “ambivalent” about 

having parenting time with respondent. However, she stated, over the past year or more, SDM

had consistently indicated to her “that he does not want to even have visits with dad. He does not 

want to talk to dad. He does not want to have any sort of relationship from what he tells me.” 

SDM also told her that he feared respondent as a result of actual aggressive behaviors that he 

experienced or witnessed. And there was evidence that respondent twice used improper restraints 

against SDM during parenting time, which affected SDM dramatically. Likewise, a foster-care 

clinician, Brianna Bost, testified that SDM’s behaviors always worsened at about the time of visits 

with respondent, and that SDM began to pull his own hair out to the point at which he had bald 

spots. SDM told her as well that he did not want to even talk about respondent.
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This evidence—when considered in the context of other evidence—fully supported the trial 

court’s finding that SDM had been acting out because he did not want to have visits with 

respondent, and not because of something done by the foster family. The same evidence supported 

the trial court’s finding that SDM did not have a healthy bond with respondent and preferred not 

to be placed with him. Moreover, to the extent that there was a conflict in the evidence, this Court 

defers to the trial court’s superior ability to resolve that conflict. See In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 

344; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); MCR 2.613(C); MCR 3.902(A). Accordingly, the trial court did not 

clearly err when it made those findings and weighed them in favor of finding that termination of 

respondent’s parental rights was in SDM’s best interests. See In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich 

App at 430-431.

Respondent also argues that, even if the trial court did not clearly err by factoring SDM’s

preference into its best interests finding for SDM, it erred by considering SDM’s preference when 

finding that termination was in the best interests of SKM. It is certainly true that the trial court 

had the obligation to make individual findings concerning the best interests of SDM and SKM to 

the extent that their best interests significantly differed. See In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 715-

716; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). However, the trial court repeatedly made separate findings about the 

best-interest factors for each child throughout its oral opinion. There is no indication in the record 

that the trial court improperly weighed SDM’s preference as a ground for finding that termination 

was in SKM’s best interests. Respondent’s argument to the contrary is unsupported.

IV. REVOCATION OF PARENTAGE

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

For his final argument, respondent maintains that the trial court improperly considered 

respondent’s decision to revoke his paternity to his wife’s two youngest children when determining 

whether to terminate his rights to his two biological children. This Court reviews de novo whether 

the trial court properly interpreted and applied the relevant statutes. See In re Gonzales/Martinez, 

310 Mich App at 431. This Court reviews the trial court’s factual findings underlying its 

application of the law for clear error. Id. at 430.

B. ANALYSIS

With respect to respondent’s assertion that his decision to revoke his paternity to his former 

wife’s two youngest children had no relevance to any issue of fact before the trial court, the record 

shows that the trial court did not make improper inferences from respondent’s decision to revoke 

his paternity. Instead, the trial court noted the evidence and drew reasonable inferences on matters 

that were pertinent to the matter before it.

As background, the evidence showed that respondent’s former wife had her fifth child 

while respondent was imprisoned. She also had her last child under circumstances that strongly 

suggested that respondent was not the father. Because respondent was still married to her at the 

time, he was the children’s legal father. After his release from prison, respondent and his wife 

lived together and pursued a joint case service plan. Respondent served as the father figure for the 

two youngest children during that time and participated in services related to them. Indeed, as the 

trial court aptly noted, there was evidence that the two youngest children thought of respondent as 
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their father and that some service providers were unaware that there was a paternity issue. But 

respondent made it clear to the Department from the very inception of services that he only 

intended to participate in the services on the assumption that he would remain with his wife, and 

would discontinue them if he and his wife ceased to be together. And when he and his wife ceased 

to be a couple, respondent revoked his paternity to the two youngest children.

The trial court noted respondent’s treatment of the two youngest children as his own 

throughout the proceedings, but found that the evidence showed that respondent “slammed the 

door” on his relationship with the two youngest children after he and his wife separated. The trial 

court used this evidence to find that respondent lacked “insight” and showed that he had no 

“empathy to how this child might be affected by his decision.” Notably, the trial court did not 

punish respondent for revoking his paternity, and did not use that fact as grounds for termination. 

Rather, the trial court simply drew inferences from his course of conduct involving the younger 

children and made findings on the basis of those inferences.

The evidence that respondent revoked his paternity within a short time after the relationship 

with his wife ended allowed at least the inference that respondent acted with disregard to the effect 

that revocation would have on his relationship with the children and the trauma that would arise 

from it. The trial court did not err.2

V. CONCLUSION

Affirmed.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien 

/s/ James Robert Redford 

 

2 Respondent maintains that the trial court in effect punished him for separating from his wife. It 

is true that respondent had been warned that his relationship with his wife was unstable and might 

jeopardize his ability to reunify with the children. However, respondent’s relationship with his 

wife was a separate matter from his treatment of the children. Whether he continued to have a 

relationship with his wife did not prevent respondent from acting with insight and empathy when 

interacting with the two youngest children. And his separation from his wife did not require him 

to revoke his paternity. He could have continued to work for reunification with them or could 

have pursued a more empathetic path for introducing the change in their lives. The evidence 

concerning respondent’s treatment of his legal children before he revoked his paternity was 

evidence that implicated whether he had empathy for his biological children and could develop 

insight into their needs. See In re Kellogg, 331 Mich App 249, 259; 952 NW2d 544 (2020).