FATALITY INVESTIGATION REPORT 

INCIDENT FACTS 

DATE: 

May 17, 2012 

TIME: 

5:34 p.m. 

VICTIM: 

25-year-old boat maintenance 

crew supervisor 

INDUSTRY/NAICS CODE: 

Ship building and repairing 

NAICS 336611 

EMPLOYER: 

Repair, restoration, cleaning, 

and painting services to 

commercial ships and boats 

SAFETY & TRAINING: 

Company had a safety program 

SCENE: 

Fishing boat moored at a dock 

LOCATION: 

Washington State 

EVENT TYPE: 

Poisoning 

REPORT #: 52-44-2018 

REPORT DATE: 08/02/2018 

A Boat Maintenance Crew Supervisor Dies of Carbon Monoxide 

Poisoning While Using a Gasoline-Powered Pressure Washer 

SUMMARY 

On May 17, 2012, a 25-year-old boat maintenance crew supervisor died from 

carbon monoxide poisoning while using a gasoline-powered pressure washer to 

strip paint from a boat. 

On the day of the incident, he was supervising a crew using a pressure washer and 

disc grinders to remove old paint from the exterior of a 162-foot steel hulled fishing 

boat moored at a dock. The six crew members were working on the boat in different 

areas that were covered with plastic tarps in order to prevent paint chips and dust 

from entering the water. 

At the start of the day, the gasoline-powered pressure washer was positioned on 

the dock. Later, employees of another contractor moved the pressure washer onto 

the boat to clear the way for supply deliveries. Shortly before the end of the work 

day, the victim moved the pressure washer onto a side deck passageway that was 

fully enclosed by plastic tarps. Working alone, he used the pressure washer for 

about 20 minutes. A co-worker went to look for the victim and found him 

unconscious on top of the pressure washer. Emergency responders arrived and 

determined that the victim was deceased. The medical examiner reported the cause 

of death as “carbon monoxide intoxication due to inhalation of engine exhaust.”

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Washington State Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) investigators 

concluded that to protect employees from the hazard of carbon monoxide (CO) 

poisoning from small gasoline-powered engines and tools, employers should: 

 Ensure that gasoline-powered pressure washers or other fuel-powered tools are 

not used in enclosed or partially enclosed areas where CO can build up. 

 Train employees on the hazards, sources, symptoms, and control of CO 

exposure from fuel-powered equipment and tools. 

 Ensure that personal CO detectors equipped with audible alarms are used by 

employees when working with small gasoline-powered engines in locations 

where CO may build up. 

 Coordinate work activities at job sites where there are multiple contractors and 

their employees to ensure safe work. 

 Ensure that CO safety warning labels are attached to pressure washers and that 

they are replaced when no longer readable. 

 Consider using alternatives to fuel powered equipment and tools. 
DEFINITIONS 

APP Accident Prevention Program 

CO Carbon Monoxide 

COHb Carboxyhemoglobin 

DOSH Division of Occupational Safety and Health 

HP Horsepower 

IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health 

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

PSI Pounds per Square Inch 

STEL Short-Term Exposure Limit 

TWA Time-Weighted Average 

WA FACE Washington State Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation program 

WASHINGTON STATE FACE PROGRAM INFORMATION 

The Washington State Fatality Assessment and Control (WA FACE) program is one of many workplace health and safety programs 

administered by the Washington State Department of Labor & Industries’ Safety & Health & Research for Prevention (SHARP) program. 

It is a research program designed to identify and study fatal occupational injuries. Under a cooperative agreement with the National 

Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH grant# 5 U60OH008487), WA FACE collects information on occupational fatalities in 

WA State and targets specific types of fatalities for evaluation. WA FACE investigators evaluate information from multiple sources. 

Findings are summarized in narrative reports that include recommendations for preventing similar events in the future. These 

recommendations are distributed to employers, workers, and other organizations interested in promoting workplace safety. NIOSHfunded, state-based FACE programs include: California, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oregon, and Washington. WA 

FACE does not determine fault or legal liability associated with a fatal incident. Names of employers, victims and/or witnesses are not 

included in written investigative reports or other databases to protect the confidentiality of those who voluntarily participate in the 

program. 

Additional information regarding the WA FACE program can be obtained from: 

www.lni.wa.gov/Safety/Research/FACE 

PO Box 44330 

Olympia, WA 98504-4330 

1-888-667-4277 

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CONTENTS 

BACKGROUND......................................................................................................................................................................... 4 

INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................................................................... 4 

EMPLOYER............................................................................................................................................................................... 4 

WRITTEN SAFETY PROGRAMS and TRAINING......................................................................................................................... 4 

WORKER INFORMATION......................................................................................................................................................... 5 

EQUIPMENT ............................................................................................................................................................................ 5 

EXPOSURE ............................................................................................................................................................................... 5 

INCIDENT SCENE...................................................................................................................................................................... 6 

WEATHER ................................................................................................................................................................................ 6 

INVESTIGATION....................................................................................................................................................................... 6 

CAUSE OF DEATH .................................................................................................................................................................... 7 

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS........................................................................................................................................................ 7 

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................................................ 9 

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................................................... 10 

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES ...................................................................................................................................................... 11 

INVESTIGATOR INFORMATION ............................................................................................................................................. 12 

ACKNOWLEDGEMEMENTS.................................................................................................................................................... 12 

DISCLAIMER........................................................................................................................................................................... 12 

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BACKGROUND 

Carbon monoxide (CO) is a colorless, odorless, tasteless, nonirritating toxic gas that is produced by burning fuel, such as 

gasoline, wood, coal, propane, oil, or kerosene. It is found in engine exhaust. When fuel burning equipment, tools, and 

appliances are used in enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces, CO levels can quickly build to dangerous or fatal 

concentrations. Hazardous CO levels can build up even in spaces that appear to be well ventilated. 

CO combines with hemoglobin to form carboxyhemoglobin which interferes with the oxygen-carrying capacity of blood, 

resulting in a deficiency in the amount of oxygen reaching body tissue.

1 The common mild-to-moderate viral-like 

symptoms of CO exposure such as fatigue, headache, nausea, confusion, and dizziness may be easy to overlook. Severe 

health effects of CO exposure include disorientation, unconsciousness, long-term neurologic disabilities, coma, 

cardiorespiratory failure, and death. 

CO is a leading cause of death due to poisoning in the United States.2 From 1999 through 2010, the National Center for 

Vital Statistics reported a total of 5,149 unintentional, non-fire related deaths from CO poisoning, an average of 430 

deaths per year.3 A separate study found 374 occupational CO exposure fatalities during the period 1992 through 2008.4 

A study of occupational carbon monoxide poisoning in Washington State found that for a 6-year period there were 221 

different exposure incidents resulting in 345 individual worker injury claims comprising. The distribution of exposure 

incidents occurred in numerous industry sectors, with the highest numbers in construction 43 (20%), wholesale trade 32 

(15%), and agriculture 27 (12%).5 

INTRODUCTION 

In May of 2012, the Washington State Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (WA FACE) Program noted a news 

article about the death of a 25-year-old boat maintenance crew supervisor who died from CO poisoning while using a 

gasoline-powered pressure washer to strip paint from a boat exterior. 

Washington State FACE investigators interviewed the incident company owner. Documents reviewed during the course 

of this investigation included the OSHA inspection file, the victim’s death certificate, police report, and medical

examiner’s report. 

EMPLOYER 

The employer provided repair, restoration, cleaning, and painting services to commercial ships and boats. The business, 

a sole proprietorship, had been operating for 17 years. The employer directly oversaw his employees and provided daily 

task-based support. The employer had 20 fulltime employees at the time of the incident. There were four employees 

who, like the victim, worked as supervisors. 

WRITTEN SAFETY PROGRAMS and TRAINING 

The employer/owner had a written accident prevention program (APP), a respiratory protection program, and a 

confined space program. These programs were in both English and Spanish. The APP did not include information about 

CO exposure from the use of gasoline-powered pressure washers; the employer stated that he provided this information 

verbally. 

The employer was in charge of safety for the company. He provided employees with hands-on training in how to 

perform job tasks and how to work safely. He or an experienced employee would watch a new worker performing a task 

to see that they did it correctly and safely. The employer used a contractor to do training for employees in fall 

protection, CPR, and other safety matters. He was a shipyard competent person, meaning he was responsible for 

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determining whether a space was safe for workers and prescribing and implementing the appropriate safety 

measures 6,7 . 

Safety and health meetings were held every two weeks. Before each job the employer held a meeting at the job site 

where he explained to employees what they were going to be doing and what safety measures they needed to take. 

WORKER INFORMATION 

The 25-year-old victim supervised a crew of boat painters. In addition to supervising a crew, he also performed all the 

tasks that his crew performed in the process of painting steel hulled vessels, such as removing old paint by using a 

grinder, pressure washing, priming, and applying a finish coat of paint. He had been hired as a laborer three years prior 

and had worked his way up to the position of supervisor. He was trained on-the-job by his employer in how to perform 

the various required tasks and supervisory responsibilities. Previously, he had worked as a landscaper. His native 

language was Spanish, which he used to communicate with his Spanish speaking crew and employer. He spoke some 

English, it is unknown how well he read English. 

EQUIPMENT 

The piece of equipment was a 24 HP, 5,000 PSI maximum pressure gasolinepowered pressure washer. The engine was mounted on a roll cage frame 

with tires. Its engine was an air-cooled, 4-stroke overhead valve, 2 cylinder, 

V-Twin. The manufacturer states that this small engine has common 

applications in powering pressure washers, commercial lawn and garden 

equipment, tillers, generators, small vehicles, water pumps, and forestry, 

construction, industrial and agricultural equipment.8 

The employer stated that there was a manufacturer’s user manual available 

to employees, and that some workers had reviewed the manual. User 

manuals are available in English and Spanish from the manufacturer. 

The user manual for the pressure washer contained warnings about CO 

exposure, symptoms in those exposed, and to only operate out of doors 

away from openings where the exhaust gas could enter enclosed areas. 

Photo 1: Incident gasoline-powered pressure 

washer. 

It is not known whether there was a label attached to the pressure washer engine warning of the danger of carbon 

monoxide from engine exhaust. The engine manufacturer owner’s manual indicates that a CO warning label should have 

been attached by the manufacturer. This label would have this warning: “the engine emits toxic carbon monoxide – do 

not run in an enclosed area.” The engine appears dirty in photos; if there was a warning label, it may have been difficult 

or impossible to read. The owner’s manual indicates that if a label comes off or is hard to read, to contact the 

manufacturer’s servicing dealer for a replacement. Warning labels are available in English and Spanish.

The company owned eleven gasoline-powered pressure washers: four were 5,000 PSI and seven were 4,000 PSI. 

EXPOSURE 

The employer estimated that the victim was exposed to carbon monoxide from the pressure washer’s exhaust gas inside 

the boat’s plastic tarped companion way deck for about 20 minutes before his death. The medical examiner reported 

the toxicological analysis of the victim’s blood showed a peak blood carboxyhemoglobin (COHb) level of 63.2%. The 

typical blood COHb level for a non-smoker is between 0.5% and 1.5%.

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Based on the victim’s COHb level, OSHA’s Salt Lake Technical Center calculated the victim’s CO exposure averaged 

approximately 1100 parts per million (ppm). For perspective, the OSHA Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) 

exposure concentration is 1200 ppm.10 The victim’s 8-hour time-weighted average exposure was 556 ppm, which is 11 

times the OSHA PEL of 50 ppm for CO. 

INCIDENT SCENE 

The incident took place aboard a longline fishing boat. The 162-foot-long boat was moored at a city owned short-term 

moorage and maritime industrial facility for fishing and commercial vessels. The facility had 1,518 linear feet of concrete 

dock space for vessel loading and repair/maintenance work. The moorage was located on a freshwater bay near locks 

leading to a larger saltwater bay. 

WEATHER 

During work hours on the day of the incident, there was a mixture of clouds and sun with temperatures ranging from 48 

to 61 degrees; wind speeds ranged from calm to 8 mph.

11 

INVESTIGATION 

For several weeks, the employer’s work crew had been performing painting preparation work on the exterior of a 162-

foot steel-hulled fishing boat. The painting process involved several procedures. First, the workers would use gasolinepowered pressure washers to wash the boat’s metal exterior to remove old paint. Next, they would use hand-held disc 

grinders to further remove old paint and smooth the steel surface. Then they would rewash, followed by a primer coat 

of paint, and, lastly, a finish coat. 

On the day of the incident, the crew of six employees started work at 7 a.m. The victim was supervising two 

crewmembers working from a scaffold using grinders to remove paint from the front exterior of the boat’s wheelhouse. 

He was also overseeing three workers who were cleaning the inside the boat’s engine room. The victim’s task, in

addition to supervising, was to sweep up paint chips so that they would not leave the boat and go into the water. The 

victim was working on the starboard (right side of boat) companion way deck alongside the wheelhouse. The companion 

way deck was approximately 80 feet long. In addition to the employer’s workers, there were other contractors and their 

employees on the boat doing repair and maintenance work. The boat’s chief engineer was in charge of the boat. He was

employed by the boat’s owner. 

In order to prevent paint chips and dust created by grinding and pressure washing from entering the lake water, the 

workers had put up plastic tarping covering the front and right side of the boat’s wheelhouse. 

According to the employer, when his workers were pressure washing a boat, the pressure washer would be left on the 

dock and a hose run from it to where the worker needed to use it. 

During the day of the incident, workers from other companies were delivering supplies to the boat. The pressure washer 

was in their way on the dock, so they used the boat’s crane to lift the pressure washer onto the boat, placing it on the 

deck towards the bow. 

The employer’s crew worked through the day, performing their assigned tasks of grinding, cleaning, and sweeping up. 

Shortly after 4 p.m., the employer stopped by to check with the crew to see if they needed anything. His workers 

assured him that they did not need anything and that work was going fine. The employer then left to check on another 

job, saying that he would see them in the morning. 

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When the employer left, the victim was sweeping up paint chips and dust created by the grinders. This is what the 

employer expected him to continue to do until the end of the work day at 5:30 p.m. Instead, he decided to use the 

pressure washer to clean the wall of the wheelhouse companion way deck, located near the boat’s stern. The victim

moved the pressure washer into the companion way deck under the enclosure of the plastic tarping where he was 

working alone. The companion way deck was fully enclosed along the side and both ends by the plastic tarping. The 

workers would duck under the plastic to get in and out of the area. This enclosed space was not ventilated. The pressure 

washer had a 50-feet long hose. The victim was working near the stern and the pressure washer was positioned 

alongside the wheelhouse near its front, not far from where the other two workers were working from a scaffold 

grinding on the front of the wheelhouse. 

After approximately 20 minutes, the victim stopped pressure washing and walked along the companion way deck in the 

direction of the bow where the pressure washer was located, about 50 feet away. As it was now 5 p.m., their work day 

was nearly finished and they needed to start putting equipment away, a co-worker went to look for the victim. He found 

him inside the tarped area, about 10 feet to the stern from the wheelhouse front. He was unconscious and collapsed 

face-down on top of the pressure washer which had been turned off. Another co-worker called the employer, who then 

summoned emergency first responders. A carpenter who worked for another contractor performed CPR. None of these 

workers knew what had happened to the victim. City police and firefighters responded to the site. He was pronounced 

dead at the scene by the medical examiner. 

CAUSE OF DEATH 

According to the death certificate, the medical examiner reported the cause of death as “carbon monoxide intoxication

due to inhalation of engine exhaust.”

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger 

sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. Washington FACE investigators identified the following 

factors that may have contributed to the death of the boat maintenance crew supervisor: 

 Using a gasoline-powered pressure washer in an enclosed, unventilated area. 

 Victim’s apparent lack of awareness of the consequences of CO exposure.

 Air monitoring was not used to ensure that carbon monoxide levels were kept below the permissible exposure level. 

 Lack of coordination among multiple contractors at the job site may have caused the pressure washer to be placed 

in an unsafe location. 

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Photo 4: The boat’s wheelhouse companion way where the

victim was found slumped on top of the pressure washer (red 

“X”). Temporary plastic sheeting enclosed the area (it was cut 

open by EMS responders). The hose on the deck leads to the 

stern where the victim had been pressure washing. 

Photo 2: The yellow arrow indicates where the victim had 

been pressure washing the exterior of the wheelhouse. The 

red arrow indicates where the victim was found unconscious 

on top of the pressure washer. Plastic sheeting covered the 

entire area. [Photo not at incident scene.] 

Photo 3: Exterior of the boat covered with a plastic tarp 

located near the stern where the victim was pressure 

washing. 

Photo 5: Exterior of fishing boat showing plastic sheeting 

covering the front of the boat’s wheelhouse. 

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RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION 

Recommendation 1: Employers should ensure that gasoline-powered pressure washers or other fuel-powered 

equipment and tools are not used in enclosed or partially enclosed areas where CO can build up. 

Discussion: When planning work projects, employers should ensure that workers are not exposed to dangerous levels of 

CO during performance of tasks requiring the use of fuel-powered equipment and tools. Periodic spot checks should be 

made by the employer or a designated competent person to ensure that safe work procedures are being followed so 

that workers are not being overexposed to CO. 

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health has issued an alert “Preventing Carbon Monoxide Poisoning 

from Small Gasoline-Powered Engines and Tools” with this warning: “Do not use equipment and tools powered by

gasoline engines inside buildings or other partially enclosed spaces unless the gasoline engine can be placed outdoors 

and away from air intakes”.

12 

Recommendation 2: Employers should train employees on the hazards, sources, symptoms, and control of CO 

exposure from fuel-powered equipment and tools. 

Discussion: Employers should train employees who use fuel-powered equipment and tools about CO exposure. This 

should include recognition of: 

 Hazards of CO exposure. CO is a poisonous gas that is colorless, odorless, tasteless, and nonirritating. It can 

cause illness, permanent neurological damage, and death. Exposed persons can be overcome without warning. 

Depending on the amount being emitted from equipment or tools, it can build up quickly or accumulate over a 

longer period of time in enclosed or partially enclosed areas. 

 Sources of exposure. CO is produced by gas-powered engines and anything that uses combustion to operate, 

including fuel-powered engines, pressure washers, generators, pumps, compressors, welding equipment, and 

space heaters. 

 Symptoms of exposure. Early symptoms of CO intoxication are confusion, headache, dizziness, fatigue, and 

weakness. Employers should train workers to recognize the early symptoms of CO intoxication and direct 

workers to seek fresh air upon first noticing symptoms and to warn other workers in the area at risk of exposure. 

 Control of exposure. Do not use gas powered equipment or tools inside buildings or areas that are enclosed or 

semi-enclosed. Place pressure washer outdoors and keep away from building air intakes, so as to not expose 

workers inside the building. Provide continuous ventilation at volumes and flow rates sufficient to ensure that 

workers are not overexposed to CO. Use personal CO monitors with alarms to provide warning of high levels of 

CO air concentrations. When feasible, substitute nonfuel burning technologies, such as electricity. 

Recommendation 3: Employers should ensure that personal CO detectors equipped with audible alarms are used by 

employees when working with small gasoline-powered engines in locations where CO may build up. 

Discussion: Workers using gasoline-powered equipment should wear personal exposure real-time monitors with 

response times in seconds, not minutes, and audible alarms that correspond to OSHA’s Immediately Dangerous to Life 

and Health (IDLH), Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL), and Time-Weighted Average (TWA) for CO. Similar monitors should 

also be used in the general work area around gasoline-powered equipment to warn workers in the area of CO exposure 

hazards. 

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Recommendation 4: Employers should coordinate work activities at job sites where there are multiple contractors and 

their employees to ensure safe work. 

Discussion: On the day of the incident, there were workers other than the employer’s engaged in various tasks on the 

boat. At some point during the day, the boat’s crane was used to move the pressure washer from the dock onto the 

boat by some of these other workers. This was done because supplies needed to be moved onto the boat, the pressure 

washer was considered to be in the way. The crane and the decision to use it was under the control of the boat’s chief 

engineer who is in charge of the boat and is responsible to the owner. It is unknown who made the decision to move the 

pressure washer or whether there was communication about this with the employer’s supervisor, the victim. It is also

unknown why the pressure washer was moved into the plastic tarp enclosed space of the boat’s companion way deck. 

The employer believes that the victim moved it there. 

A Certified Marine Chemist inspected and tested the atmosphere of areas of the boat where work was planned and 

issued a certificate which was posted on the boat. Worker CO exposure relating to pressure washing work on the 

starboard companion way deck was not noted on the Marine Chemist’s certificate. 

If the pressure washer had remained on the dock, this fatality would not have occurred. It is essential that coordination 

of work activities at job sites be planned and communicated to all affected contractors and their employees to ensure 

work is conducted in a safe manner. 

Recommendation 5: Employers should ensure that CO safety warning labels are attached to pressure washers and 

that they are replaced when no longer readable. 

Discussion: Incident scene photos of the pressure washer do not show any safety labels affixed to the machine warning 

of CO exposure. It is unknown whether the pressure washer previously had these labels, and if so whether they were 

worn off or obscured by grime and dust. The manufacturer of the incident pressure washer’s engine provides a safety

warning label that reads, in part, “engine emits toxic carbon monoxide – do not run in enclosed area.”

Recommendation 6: Consider using alternatives to fuel-powered equipment and tools. 

Discussion: Employers should consider the use of technologies that do not rely on equipment or tools powered by fuel, 

thereby removing the hazard of CO exposure to workers. For example, electric-powered pressure washers or laser 

technology can be used to clean and remove paint from many types of steel structures, including ships. 

REFERENCES 

1. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Job Fatalities Due to Unintentional Carbon Monoxide Poisoning, 1992-96. 

Compensation and Working Conditions, Fall 1998. 

www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwil0ISoxY3bAhUh4IMK 

HbOwB5gQFggnMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bls.gov%2Fopub%2Fmlr%2Fcwc%2Fjob-fatalities-due-tounintentional-carbon-dioxide-poisoning-1992-96.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1E0S1Rk2rquQl170DqKcxe 

2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Carbon Monoxide Exposures – United States, 2000—2009. 

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 2011; 60(30); 1014-1017. 

www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6030a2.htm 

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3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Quick Stats: Average Annual Number of Deaths and Death Rates 

from Unintentional, Non-Fire-Related Carbon Monoxide Poisoning, by Sex and Age Group, United States, 1999-2010. 

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 2014; 63:65.www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6303a6.htm 

4. Henn SA, Bell JL, Sussell AL, Konda S. Occupational carbon monoxide fatalities in the US from unintentional non-fire 

related exposures, 1992-2008. American Journal of Industrial Medicine 2013 November; 56 (11): 1280-1289. 

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/ajim.22226 

5. Carolyn K. Reeb-Whitaker, David K. Bonauto, Stephen G. Whittaker & Darrin Adams. Occupational Carbon Monoxide 

Poisoning in Washington State, 2000–2005. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Hygiene 2010, 7:10, 547-556. 

www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15459624.2010.488210 

6. Washington Administrative Code. WAC 296-304-01021. Competent Person, Safety standards for ship repairing, 

shipbuilding and shipbreaking. http://apps.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=296-304-01021 

7. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 29 CFR, Part 1915, Occupational Safety and Health Standards 

for Shipyard Employment, Subpart A, General Provision 1915.7, Competent Person. 

www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=10215#1915.7(d) 

8. Honda. https://engines.honda.com/models/model-detail/gx690 

9. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). 

ToxGuide for Carbon Monoxide. 

www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjjn9TFjM_cAhVsIjQIHfyKDGYQFjAAegQI 

CRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.atsdr.cdc.gov%2Ftoxguides%2Ftoxguide201.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1Jr_ZJMPwh3PyBpdoNm7O10. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Carbon 

Monoxide – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health Concentrations. www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/630080.html 

11. Weather Underground. www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KBFI/2012/5/17/DailyHistory.html 

12. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Preventing carbon monoxide poisoning from small 

gasoline-powered engines and tools. www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/96-118/ 

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Average annual number of deaths and deaths from unintentional, 

non-fire-related carbon monoxide poisoning, by sex and age group. 

www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6303a6.htm 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Carbon monoxide-related deaths, United States, 1999-2004. 

www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5650a1.htm 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Nonfatal, unintentional, non-fire-related carbon monoxide exposures, 

United States, 2004-2006. www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5733a2.htm 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). Carbon 

Monoxide – Fact Sheet. www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/TF.asp?id=1163&tid=253 

Center to Protect Workers’ Rights (CPWR). Carbon monoxide, toolbox talk (English and Spanish). 

www.cpwr.com/publications/carbon-monoxide-poisoning 

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Center to Protect Workers’ Rights (CPWR). Carbon monoxide poisoning – gas-powered generators tools and other 

equipment, hazard alert (English and Spanish). www.cpwr.com/publications/carbon-monoxide-poisoning-0 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Carbon monoxide, publications and resources. 

www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/co-comp/ 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 29 CFR 1915, Occupational Safety and Health Standards for 

Shipyard Employment, Subpart Z, Air contaminants, Toxic and Substances. 

www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=10286&p_text_version=FALSE 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Ship repair. 

www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/shipyard/shiprepair/sr_index.html 

Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. Carbon Monoxide. 

www.lni.wa.gov/Safety/Topics/AtoZ/CarbonMonoxide/ 

Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, Washington Administrative Code (WAC). WAC 296-304-02005, 

Cleaning and other cold work, Safety standards for ship repairing, shipbuilding and shipbreaking. 

http://app.leg.wa.gov/WAC/default.aspx?cite=296-304&full=true#296-304-02005 

INVESTIGATOR INFORMATION 

Todd Schoonover has a PhD in Industrial Hygiene from the University of Illinois at Chicago. He is a Certified Industrial 

Hygienist (CIH) and Certified Safety Professional (CSP). Todd is currently the Principle Investigator for the WA FACE 

Program. 

Christina Rappin has a BA/BS from The Evergreen State College. She is a Research Investigator with the WA FACE 

program. 

Randy Clark has a BA from the Evergreen State College. He is a Safety and Health Specialist with the WA FACE Program. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMEMENTS 

This report was reviewed by stakeholders from labor and business communities and various Washington State and 

Federal worker safety agencies. Though we are unable to acknowledge specific individuals for their contributions to this 

report, we would like to recognize the following for their help and support of the FACE mission and objectives: 

 The employer involved in the incident 

 Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 

 Federal FACE Program management (NIOSH) 

 Safety & Health Assessment & Research for Prevention (SHARP) 

DISCLAIMER 

Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by the National Institute for Occupational Safety 

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sponsoring organizations or their programs or products. Furthermore, NIOSH is not responsible for the content of these 

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