MA FACE 

Occupational Fatality Report 

Foreman of a Highway Line Painting Crew Killed 

When a Car Enters the Work Zone – Massachusetts 

Release Date: May 14, 2018 Massachusetts Department of Public Health 

Investigation: # 16-MA-023-01 Occupational Health Surveillance Program 

SUMMARY 

On June 28, 2016, a 52-year-old male foreman (victim), employed by a roadway painting and 

safety company, was fatally injured when he was struck by a car. The victim was part of a work 

crew painting roadway lines within a highway work zone at night. While standing in front of his 

work truck, a passing motor vehicle intruded into the work zone. The motor vehicle struck the 

victim and continued forward, striking a cone truck that was backing. A call was immediately 

placed for emergency medical services (EMS). EMS and state police arrived within minutes. 

The victim was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. 

Contributing factors identified in this investigation included the victim being on foot and in 

proximity to the edge of the work zone and the operator of the motor vehicle that struck the 

victim was allegedly under the influence of alcohol. 

The Massachusetts FACE Program concluded that to prevent similar occurrences in the future, 

employers should: 

 Ensure shadow vehicle operators remain inside the shadow vehicle’s cab at all times 

while in an active work zone; and 

 Provide routine start of shift reminders of potential hazards. 

Transportation departments should: 

 Consider using blue LED light trailers at work zones where a police detail is not 

required and the roadway speed limit is greater than 45 mph. 

In addition, motorists should: 

 Never drink and drive and always plan ahead to ensure they have a ride with a sober 

driver, so remember: Ask, Designate, Hail. 

Massachusetts Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Project (FACE) 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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INTRODUCTION 

On June 28, 2016, the Massachusetts FACE Program was alerted by the local media that earlier 

that day a male employee had died from injuries sustained when he was struck by a car. The car 

had crashed into the highway work zone where the victim was working. On October 13, 2016, a 

representative from the Massachusetts FACE Program traveled to the company office location 

and met with multiple company representatives to discuss the incident. The state police report, 

death certificate, company information, and the OSHA fatality and catastrophe report were 

reviewed during the course of the investigation. 

EMPLOYER 

The employer was a roadway safety company that had been in business for about 36 years. The 

company provided multiple services that included roadway and pavement markings / painting. 

Other services the company provided were manufacturing of roadway signs, providing traffic 

control operations, and roadway sweeping services. The company employed approximately 150 

workers in the summer months, making up about 30 roadway work crews that are sent out to 

complete jobs. The number of employees would drop to about 20 employees during the winter 

months. The job being performed on the night of the incident was part of the roadway painting 

contract the company had with the Massachusetts Department of Transportation. 

WRITTEN SAFETY PROGRAMS AND TRAINING 

At the time of the incident, the company routinely had held safety meetings with employees. 

The company had a safety and health program that included, but was not limited to, information 

on work zones and the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), personal 

protective equipment, high visibility vests and clothing for work along roadways, and hazard 

communication. Although new employees were typically hired with previous experience, all 

employees were provided with on-the-job training and partnered with more experienced 

employees. The on-the-job training usually started in the shop area of the company, where 

traffic control signs are manufactured, before the new employee was assigned to a roadway crew. 

Employees were also provided with the OSHA 10-hour training and a training refresher every six 

years. 

All employees who were assigned to be out on a roadway crew were provided with American 

National Standards Institute’s (ANSI) compliant high-visibility safety apparel. These items were 

yellow-green ANSI Class 3 vests with sleeves and pants. In addition, hardhats and steel toe 

shoes were also provided to employees. 

VICTIM 

The victim was a 52-year-old male foreman. He had worked for the company for a couple of 

years at the time of the incident. Although the victim was a foreman for the company, on this 

job his role was not as a foreman, but as a shadow vehicle operator. Shadow vehicles are trucks 

that are equipped with crash attenuators at the rear of the truck and provide a physical barrier to 

protect workers performing the task from traffic approaching from the rear. 

The shift for this job was 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. and the victim arrived at the company location 

first and drove the shadow truck he was assigned to the job site. The victim was one of six 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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company employees that made up the work crew on site the day of the incident. The incident 

occurred around 2:30 a.m., about six and a half hours into his shift. 

The task to be performed was roadway line painting, which is classified as a mobile operation 

because the work moves intermittently or continuously along down the roadway. During mobile 

operations, such as the one that was being performed, the shadow vehicle are spaced a short 

distance behind the operation and will follow the crew and equipment as work progresses.1 The 

victim’s task was to operate and position the shadow truck at the beginning of the work zone to 

help warn motorists of the work being performed ahead. 

INCIDENT LOCATION 

The incident location was an interstate highway that was comprised of asphalt and primarily ran 

north and south (Figure 1a and 1b). The highway was an eight lane divided roadway, with four 

travel lanes and two shoulders in each direction. The speed limit for the highway was posted at 

55 miles per hour (mph). This location of the highway was in an urban area and was a relatively 

straight section of roadway. 

The incident occurred on the northbound side of the divided highway immediately after an exit 

off-ramp. The four northbound travel lanes were each approximately 12 feet wide and the travel 

lanes were separated by white-painted dashed (skip) lines. The west side of left-hand travel lane 

was bordered by a 7 1⁄2 foot paved shoulder. A solid yellow painted line separated the shoulder 

from the left travel lane. The western edge of this shoulder was a concrete median barrier. 

The east side of the right-hand travel lane was bordered by a paved shoulder that was 

approximately 13 1⁄2 feet wide. A solid white fog line separated this first travel lane from the 

shoulder. The location beyond the shoulder was primarily bordered by a grassy area that gently 

sloped upwards toward the off-ramp. In the area immediately adjacent to the off-ramp, the 

location between the shoulder and off-ramp was asphalt painted with white channelizing lines 

and white chevron markings (Figure 1). 

EQUIPMENT 

The company had three trucks on site for this job. As motorists approached the work zone, the 

first truck was the shadow truck (truck 1) the victim was operating (Figure 2). This six wheeled 

flatbed truck was equipped with a conventional cab, mounted attenuator, arrow board, and two 

yellow flashing beacons. At the time of the incident, this shadow truck was positioned at the 

beginning of the work zone and not moving. The attenuator was in use and in the down position, 

the arrow board was illuminated with a flashing arrow pointing to the left, and the two yellow 

beacons were also illuminated. 

The second truck that was struck by the car that intruded into the work zone was the cone truck 

(truck 2). This six wheeled truck had a conventional cab, mounted attenuator, arrow board, and 

two yellow flashing beacons (Figure 3). The cargo area of the truck was open with side rails to 

store cones, signs, and other equipment. The truck also had rear cone wells on either side of the 

truck where a worker would stand to position and collect cones. The attenuator was in use and in 

the down position, the arrow board was illuminated with a flashing arrow pointing to the left, and 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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the two yellow beacon lights were also illuminated. This truck also would follow the paint truck 

(truck 3) as it moved along performing the painting task. 

The third truck was a paint truck (truck 3), which paints the roadway lines (Figure 4). At the 

time of the incident, this truck was further ahead of where the incident occurred and pulled off 

the roadway onto the grassy area east of the right travel and breakdown lanes. This truck was 

equipped with an arrow board. 

INVESTIGATION 

The incident occurred during the early hours of a Tuesday morning. At the time of the incident, 

it was dark outside and the roadway was dry. The temperature was 70 degrees Fahrenheit with 

mostly cloudy skies and a wind speed of 12 miles per hour. 

Originally the job for this shift was to paint lines on the southbound side of the highway. This 

particular job would have required a six mile lane closure of the southbound right travel lane and 

would have included exit ramp detours. The Thursday before the incident, the company 

contacted the state police and requested a police detail for the shift. The company was notified 

by the state police that they would not be able to fill the request. The state police then contacted 

a local municipal police department to ask them to fill the police detail. 

While at the work location the day of the incident, the work crew checked in with the municipal 

police department because the detail was not on site. At this point the work crew was notified 

that the municipal police department was not going to be able to provide the police detail for the 

shift. Not having a police detail available prompted a change in the job for the work shift. 

The job was changed to painting the white fog lines located at the east side of the northbound 

right travel lane between the exit off and on ramps (Figure 5). The decision to change the job 

was made by a state Department of Transportation inspector and a representative of the 

company. This job was considered a lower risk task because it was a mobile operation and the 

work crew would not be located in any one work area for more than 20 minutes. Also, it was 

considered lower risk because motorists would be traveling past only one side of the work zone. 

Once the job change was communicated to the work crew, the work zone for a mobile operation 

on a multi-lane road work zone (Figure 6) was set up. Part of the work zone involved closing the 

right travel lane to oncoming traffic between the off and on ramps when the painting was 

occurring. The lane closure included advance warning signs, multiple 36 inch reflective traffic 

cones that started after the shadow truck (truck 1), and two trucks (truck 1 and 2) mounted with 

arrow boards. Both of these trucks were also equipped with crash attenuators. In addition, 

MassDOT activated overhead message boards on the highway leading up to the work zone to 

alert oncoming motorists of the roadway work being performed ahead. The cones were used to 

delineate the closed lane for motorists. There was no posted reduction in speed in the work zone 

area. 

The shadow truck (truck 1), the truck the victim was assigned to, was positioned at the beginning 

of the work zone and was positioned partly in the right-hand travel lane and partly in the paved 

shoulder. This truck had the attached attenuator in the down position, the arrow board 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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illuminated with a flashing arrow pointing to the left, and the two yellow beacon lights were also 

illuminated. The traffic cones started in front of the shadow truck. The traffic cones were used 

to keep motorists out of the right-hand travel lane and were positioned in immediately to the 

right of the white-painted dashed skip lines that separate the right-hand travel lane from the next 

travel lane over. Then the cone truck (truck 2) was positioned in the right-hand travel lane in 

front of the shadow truck. This truck also had an attenuator in the down position and an arrow 

board with a flashing arrow pointing to the left, along with two illuminated yellow beacon lights. 

Once a section of the fog line between the off and on ramps was painted, the work zone would be 

moved to the next exit location and the painting process would start again. The incident 

occurred at around 2:35 a.m. and at this point in the work shift all of the painting was completed. 

The work crew was picking up the cones as part of removing the work zone. The paint truck 

(truck 3) was positioned completely off the highway on the grassy shoulder further north, away 

from the incident. The cone truck (truck 2) had two workers in it when the crash occurred. One 

worker was operating the backing truck and another worker was riding in the cone well in the 

rear of the truck, picking up cones. The shadow truck (truck 1) was positioned at the beginning 

of the work zone, located just north of an exit on ramp. The victim was the operator of this 

truck. Immediately prior to the incident, for an unknown reason, the victim had exited truck’s 

cab and was standing inside the work zone in the first travel lane, which was closed to oncoming 

traffic. Although it is unclear why the victim exited the shadow truck, his position at the time of 

the incident suggests that he might have gone to pick up some of the traffic cones. 

According to the police report, a motorist observed a car traveling north in the second travel lane 

and then switched to the first travel lane. The car then started to bear to the right as if it was 

going to take the off-ramp located before the beginning on the work zone. The car then moved 

back into the second travel lane, passed the victim’s truck and then moved right and entered the 

closed travel lane that was part of the work zone. As the car entered the work zone it struck the 

victim who was on foot in front of his truck (truck 1). The car continued in a northerly direction 

for about 75 feet and then struck the crash attenuator attached to the rear of the cone truck (truck 

2) (Figure 7). The car then spun clockwise, exited the work zone and came to a stop facing 

southeast in the second northbound travel lane. When the car struck the victim, it threw him in a 

northerly direction and the victim landed in the second northbound travel lane beyond where the 

car ended up. The worker standing in the cone truck’s well collecting cones was injured in the 

crash. 

A call was immediately placed for emergency medical services (EMS). EMS arrived within 

minutes and the victim was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. Prior 

to the crash, the car was traveling at around 58 mile per hour (MPH) in the 55 MPH zone, and at 

the time of the crash the car was traveling at about 43 MPH. The driver of the car was placed 

under arrest and charged with Operating Under the Influence of Intoxication Liquor, among 

other charges. 

In March of 2017, Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT) implemented some 

safety initiatives aimed to help reduce motor vehicle crashes and enhance safety in and around 

the state’s work zones. Some of these initiatives included: 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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 Positioning portable trailers with flashing blue LED (light-emitting diode) lights, which 

can simulate the presence of a law enforcement vehicle, at the beginning of select work 

zones. 

 Placing temporary portable rumble strips at the entrances of select work zones to help 

alert distracted drivers to the work zone ahead. 

 Including work zone safety instructions in the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles 

Driver’s Manual. 

 Incorporating a "take-five" huddle or toolbox talk at the beginning of a shift, prior to 

setting up a work zone, to discuss potential hazards and facilitate improved 

communication. 

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key 

events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. The 

Massachusetts FACE team identified the following contributing factors in this incident. The 

victim being on foot in proximity to the work zone edge, and that the operator of the motor 

vehicle that struck the victim was allegedly under the influence of alcohol. 

CAUSE OF DEATH 

The medical examiner listed the cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries. 

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION 

Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure shadow vehicle operators remain inside the 

shadow vehicle’s cab at all times while in an active work zone. 

Discussion: In this case, the victim was assigned to operate the shadow vehicle; the first vehicle 

at the start of the work zone.2 Operating the shadow vehicle was his only assigned task. Prior to 

the incident occurring, the victim exited his truck and then walked in front of the truck, standing 

between his truck and the cone truck further ahead. The victim could have been going to pick up 

some of the cones positioned on the white skip lines that separated the first and second travel 

lanes. This would have brought the victim to the edge of the work zone and in proximity to 

passing traffic. This location would have increased his risk of being struck by a passing vehicle. 

Employers should ensure that workers assigned to operate shadow vehicles in highway work 

zones remain inside these vehicles at all times, especially when the operators’ task does not does 

require the operator to exit the vehicle. The line painting task that was being performed at the 

time of the incident can be accomplished without workers being on foot while along the 

roadway. If an employee has to exit a vehicle while on a highway work zone, when possible, 

they should keep as far away as possible from passing motor vehicles, and always face, be 

attentive to, and never turn their backs to approaching motor vehicles. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Recommendation #3: Transportation departments should consider using blue LED light 

trailers at work zones where a police detail is not required and the 

roadway speed limit is greater than 45 mph. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Recommendation # 2: Employers should provide routine start of shift safety reminders of 

potential hazards. 

Discussion: The employer had a safety and health program and provided employees with safety 

training that included training on work zones. As in this case, the company’s process of

deploying and picking up cones for highway work zones was typically performed from a cone 

truck. The cone truck makes the process faster, minimizes the amount of time the worker is on 

foot, and provides the employee with some protection from struck-by hazards. 

As mentioned above, MassDOT is encouraging contractors to incorporate a pre-work zone setup 

meeting to discuss safety.3 Providing employees with a reminder at the beginning of each shift 

about the hazards associated with the work to be performed and what to do if a situation arises 

could help employees to not become complacent with the hazards they could be exposed to. In 

this case, one of the routine reminders could have been about being aware of the surroundings, 

keeping an eye to approaching vehicles, such as the passing motorists in the adjacent travel lane 

with only traffic cones separating the work area from traffic. In addition, routine hazard 

reminders at the beginning of each shift will help ensure these workers are mentally prepared to 

identify hazards and to help respond appropriately if a situation arises. 

Discussion: If feasible, transportation departments should consider using blue LED light trailers 

at highway work zones where police details are not required, and at non–highway work zones 

where police details are not required but the roadway speed limit is greater than 45 mph. 

The work zone where the incident occurred was considered a lower risk work zone set up 

because there was traffic passing only on one side of the work zone, the left side. Having traffic 

passing only on one side reduces the chance of traffic conflicts occurring. In this case, the right 

side of the work zone was the paved highway shoulder and then a grassy area. Because this 

particular work zone set up was considered lower risk a police detail was not required. 

MassDOT has started using blue LED light trailers at some work zones.3 MassDOT and/or 

researchers should consider evaluating the effectiveness of these trailers in reducing the speed of 

traffic in work zones and reducing the occurrence of vehicles intruding into work zones. If these 

trailers are having a positive impact, then consideration should be given to expand the use of 

these trailers at MassDOT controlled work zones where police details are not required. These 

trailers could especially be used at work zones set up when it is dark outside and on roadways 

with a speed limit greater than 45 MPH. 
Recommendation #4: Motorists should never drink and drive and always plan ahead to 

ensure they have a ride with a sober driver, so remember: Ask, 

Designate, Hail. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Discussion: In 2015, there were 272 motor vehicle traffic fatalities in Massachusetts where the 

driver of the vehicle had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.01 gram per deciliter (g/dL) or 

higher.4 Of these fatalities, 154 involved a driver of a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration 

of 0.08 g/dL or higher.5 To make roads safe for all users, no one should ever drive under the 

influence of alcohol or other substances. Motorists should plan ahead to ensure they have a 

sober ride if consuming alcohol or other impairing substances. 

There are many events and situations where a motorist has advanced notice that they will be 

consuming alcohol. In these types of situations, before consuming alcohol, ask a friend or family 

member to provide a ride to where you need to go after consuming alcohol. If there is a group of 

people, designate a sober driver. This person will not drink and will be responsible of getting the 

people who have been drinking to their desired location. If planning ahead didn’t work out as

expected and there is no sober driver when it is time to leave, hail a ride-sharing car, taxi service, 

or use public transportation. So remember: Ask, Designate, Hail to ensure you don’t drive

impaired or get into a car with an impaired driver. 

REFERENCES 

1. MUTCD 2009 Edition Part 6 Figure 6H-35. Mobile Operation on a Multi-Lane Road (TA-35) 

https://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/htm/2009/part6/fig6h_35_longdesc.htm 

2. Field Guide for the Use and Placement of Shadow Vehicles in Work Zones 

https://www.workzonesafety.org/trainingresources/fhwa_wz_grant/atssa_field_guide_shadow_vehicles/ 

3. MassDOT Blog: MassDOT to Add Additional Work Zone Safety Features. March 2017. 

https://blog.mass.gov/transportation/uncategorized/massdot-to-add-additional-work-zone-safetyfeatures/ 

4. NHTSA. Traffic Safety Facts, 2015 Data, December 2016 

https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812350 

5. Massachusetts General Laws, Part I, Title XIV, Chapter 90, Section 24 

Driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor, etc.; second and subsequent offenses; 

punishment; treatment programs; reckless and unauthorized driving; failure to stop after collision 
 

 

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Figure 1a – Incident location and surrounding area 

Approximate incident location 

X 

Approximate location 

of victim’s truck

Figure 1b – Incident location aerial view 

At the time of the incident the paint truck (truck 3) was further up the highway and completely 

off the roadway parked on the grassy area. 

Victim’s 

truck (1) 

Cone 

truck (2) 

Travel 

route of 

car 

Paint 

truck (3) 
 

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Figure 2 – Victim’s truck (truck 1) 

Figure 3 – Cone truck (truck 2) 
 

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Figure 4 – Paint truck (truck 3) 

Figure 5 – Incident location and surrounding area 

X 
Truck 3 – at the 

time of the 

incident this 

truck was 

completely off 

the roadway 

and on the 

grassy area. 

Truck 2 

Truck 1 

 

 

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Figure 6 – MUTCD work zone set up 

Figure 7 – The attenuator attached to the cone truck that was struck (truck 2)