[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 228 (Tuesday, November 29, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71491-71500]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-23457]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

National Nuclear Security Administration


Record of Decision: Final Site-wide Environmental Impact 
Statement for Continued Operation of Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory and Supplemental Stockpile Stewardship and Management 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA), is issuing this Record of Decision (ROD) 
regarding its plan for continued operation of the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory located approximately 40 miles east of San 
Francisco in Alameda and San Joaquin Counties; and for use of 
plutonium, other fissile materials, fissionable materials and lithium 
hydride in experiments to be conducted at the National Ignition 
Facility (NIF). In making its decisions NNSA considered the ``Final 
Site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (DOE/EIS-0348) and Supplemental 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement (DOE/EIS-0236-S3) (LLNL SW/SPEIS)'' and other information, 
including programmatic mission needs and cost. NNSA has decided to 
implement the Proposed Action Alternative as described in the LLNL SW/
SPEIS with the exception of the Energetic Materials Processing Center 
Replacement and High Explosives Development Center Project. This 
alternative includes the continued operation of LLNL; an increase in 
administrative and material-at-risk limits for plutonium and tritium; 
and the use of plutonium, other fissile materials, fissionable 
materials, and lithium hydride in experiments conducted at the NIF. 
NNSA's implementation of the individual components of the Proposed 
Action Alternative during the next decade is subject to its continuing 
assessment of its mission needs and of LLNL's role in meeting those 
needs.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the LLNL 
SW/SPEIS or the ROD, or to receive a copy of the LLNL SW/SPEIS or ROD, 
contact: Thomas Grim, Document Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, 
Livermore Site

[[Page 71492]]

Office NNSA, 7000 East Avenue, Livermore, CA 94550-9234, (925) 422-
0704.
    For information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy 
and Compliance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message 
at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    NNSA prepared this ROD pursuant to the regulations of the Council 
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) for implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 
1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021). 
In making its decisions NNSA considered the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS dated 
March 2005 and other information, including programmatic mission needs 
and cost.
    LLNL consists of two sites: an 821-acre site in Livermore, 
California (Livermore Site), and a 7,000-acre experimental test site 
near Tracy, California (Site 300). Most LLNL operations are located at 
the Livermore Site, which is situated about 40 miles east of San 
Francisco in southeastern Alameda County. Site 300 is primarily a test 
site for explosives and non-nuclear weapons components; it is located 
about 15 miles southeast of Livermore in the hills of the Diablo Range. 
Most of Site 300 is located in San Joaquin County; the western edge of 
the site is in Alameda County.
    The continued operation of LLNL is critical to NNSA's Stockpile 
Stewardship Program and to preventing the spread and use of nuclear 
weapons worldwide. LLNL maintains core competencies in activities 
associated with research, development, design, and surveillance of 
nuclear weapons, and with the assessment and certification of their 
safety and reliability. In response to the end of the Cold War and 
changes in the world's political regimes, the emphasis of the United 
States' nuclear weapons program has shifted from developing and 
producing new weapons designs to dismantling obsolete weapons and 
sustaining a smaller weapons stockpile. Programs at LLNL support a 
number of DOE and NNSA missions. These missions include nuclear weapons 
stewardship, nonproliferation, preventing the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction, energy security and meeting long-term energy needs, 
environmental assessment and management, bioscience, fundamental 
sciences, and developing applications for new technology. LLNL also 
supports other Federal agencies such as the Department of Defense, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), and the Department of Homeland Security.
    The LLNL SW/SPEIS evaluates the use of plutonium, other fissile 
materials, fissionable materials, and lithium hydride in experiments at 
the NIF and updates the analysis of the environmental impacts of 
operation of the NIF as described in the Final Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management 
(SSM PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0236).
    NNSA expects to continue its support of new projects and facilities 
at LLNL subject to its continuing assessment of its mission and LLNL's 
role in that mission. Any new projects or facilities would be 
considered in programmatic or project-specific NEPA reviews as 
appropriate. Subsequent NEPA reviews for projects or activities at LLNL 
would make reference to, and be based on, the LLNL SW/SPEIS.

Alternatives Considered

    The alternatives evaluated in the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS represent a 
range of operation from minimum levels that maintain core capabilities 
(Reduced Operation Alternative) to the highest reasonable activity 
levels that could be supported by current facilities, as well as the 
expansion and construction of new facilities for specifically 
identified future actions (Proposed Action). The No Action Alternative 
would continue operation of current LLNL programs in support of 
assigned missions, and includes approved interim actions and facility 
construction, expansion or modification, and decontamination and 
decommissioning for which NEPA analysis and documentation already 
exist. The Proposed Action includes operations evaluated in the No 
Action Alternative as well as construction of new facilities and 
expanded operations in support of future NNSA mission requirements. The 
Reduced Operation Alternative represents a 30 percent reduction of the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program as analyzed in the No Action Alternative. 
The Reduced Operation Alternative maintains full operational readiness 
for NNSA facilities and operations, but does not include the level of 
operation needed to perform tasks assigned to the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program at LLNL. NNSA identified the Proposed Action as the preferred 
alternative in the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS. A discussion of the 
alternatives is provided in the following sections.

No Action Alternative

    The No Action Alternative was analyzed as required by CEQ's NEPA 
implementing regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) to provide a baseline 
against which the impacts of the Proposed Action and Reduced Operation 
Alternatives could be compared. Under the No Action Alternative, LLNL 
would continue to support major DOE and NNSA programs such as defense 
programs, environmental management, nuclear nonproliferation, and 
energy research. The No Action Alternative represents the level of 
operations that would occur in the absence of new decisions regarding 
activities at LLNL. The changes in facilities and operations, including 
those that are currently under construction or planned in the near 
future, are completion of NIF; the BioSafety Level 3 Facility; the 
Terascale Simulation Facility; the Container Security Testing Facility; 
facility modifications, upgrades and decontamination and 
decommissioning; and full implementation of Stockpile Stewardship 
Programs in the LLNL Plutonium and Tritium facilities.
    As noted in the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS, NNSA decided to remove the 
Advanced Materials Program from this and other alternatives in response 
to public comments and a reassessment of program needs.

Proposed Action Alternative

    The Proposed Action would result in an increase in LLNL operations 
to support reasonably foreseeable mission requirements. This includes 
the expansion or modification of current facilities and construction of 
new facilities, as well as those projects, activities, and facilities 
described in the No Action Alternative. The proposed changes in 
facilities and operations are:
    (1) Conduct experiments at the NIF using plutonium, other fissile 
materials (such as uranium 235), fissionable materials (such as thorium 
232), and lithium hydride.
    (2) Construct and operate a neutron spectrometer as part of the NIF 
core facility diagnostics capability.
    (3) Increase the administrative limit for plutonium to 1,400 
kilograms from the existing 700 kilograms. The limit for enriched 
uranium would remain unchanged at 500 kilograms.
    (4) Increase the plutonium material-at-risk limit from 20 to 40 
kilograms of fuel-grade equivalent plutonium in each of two rooms of 
the Plutonium Facility.
    (5) Increase the Tritium Facility administrative limit for tritium 
from 30

[[Page 71493]]

to 35 grams and the material-at-risk at a single workstation from 3.5 
to 30 grams.
    (6) Upgrade existing materials fabrication, characterization, and 
testing facilities supporting NNSA's national security mission as part 
of the Materials Science Modernization Project.
    (7) Perform research and development activities on a variety of 
biodetector technologies in the Physics Facility and the 
Microfabrication Laboratory at the Livermore Site as part of the 
Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Expansion.
    (8) Install and operate a petawatt laser prototype in the Inertial 
Confinement Fusion Laser Facility.
    (9) Physically consolidate security services to improve 
functionality, efficiency, and effectiveness of security operations as 
part of the Consolidated Security Facility.
    (10) Change waste management activities to accommodate increased 
waste generation and improve overall operational methods.
    (11) Accept 5 drums of mixed transuranic waste from the Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory.
    (12) Upgrade LLNL facilities to meet current seismic and utilities 
standards, and decontaminate and decommission other facilities at LLNL.
    (13) Increase the highly enriched uranium administrative limit for 
the Radiography Facility from 25 to 50 kilograms to support Stockpile 
Stewardship Program activities.
    As noted in the Final SW/SPEIS, NNSA decided to remove the 
Integrated Technology Program from this alternative in response to 
public comments and a reassessment of program need.

Reduced Operation Alternative

    The Reduced Operation Alternative includes reductions in LLNL 
operations supporting the NNSA Stockpile Stewardship Program. This 
alternative represents a 30 percent reduction in operations for the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program as compared to the No Action Alternative. 
Under this alternative, NNSA would maintain full operational readiness 
of NNSA facilities and operations, but would not conduct operations at 
the level needed to fulfill all of the Stockpile Stewardship Program 
tasks assigned to LLNL. However, LLNL operations would not be reduced 
beyond those required to maintain safety and security activities, such 
as managing nuclear materials, explosives, and other hazardous 
materials safely.
    This alternative considers and analyzes reasonable proposals for 
the reduction or cessation of specific operations to reduce potential 
adverse impacts. For this LLNL SW/SPEIS, NNSA did not analyze in detail 
the complete closure, decontamination, and decommissioning of the 
Livermore Site or Site 300 because the continued operation of these 
sites is critical to NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program and to 
prevention of the spread and use of nuclear weapons. Reductions include 
a decrease in the annual yield from NIF ignition experiments, 
fabrication of 50 percent fewer engineering demonstration units during 
pit surveillance activities, and fabrication of nearly 50 percent fewer 
subcritical assemblies. Other reductions include operation of the 
Terascale Simulation Facility computer at 60 percent capacity and 
conducting fewer experiments using tritium at Site 300.

Preferred Alternative

    The preferred alternative is the alternative that NNSA believes 
would fulfill its statutory missions and responsibilities giving 
consideration to economic, budget, environmental, schedule, technical 
and other factors. In the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS, NNSA identified the 
Proposed Action as the preferred alternative for continued operations 
of LLNL.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    After considering impacts to each resource area by alternative, 
NNSA has identified the Reduced Operation Alternative as the 
environmentally preferable alternative, which is the alternative with 
the lowest level of operations. The Reduced Operations Alternative has 
lower socioeconomic impacts because of the reduced number of workers, 
reduced hazardous and radioactive waste, and reduced radiological 
exposure to workers and the public.

Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives

    The following section compares the potential impacts to 
environmental resources associated with the continued operation of LLNL 
under the No Action Alternative, the Proposed Action, and the Reduced 
Operation Alternative. The resource areas discussed below are listed in 
two sections: those with potentially major environmental impacts and 
those with minor impacts.

Resource Areas With Major Environmental Impacts

    The major impacts occur in three areas; materials and waste 
management, human health and safety, and radiological accidents.

Materials and Waste Management

    Waste generation for both routine and nonroutine wastes would be 
higher under the Proposed Action than under the No Action Alternative 
or Reduced Operation Alternative.
    Differences in the amount of waste generated include routine low-
level waste, which would increase from 170 cubic meters per year under 
current (2002) conditions to 200 cubic meters per year under the No 
Action Alternative. It would increase to 330 cubic meters per year 
under the Proposed Action Alternative, primarily due to differences in 
the operation of the NIF, and increase slightly to 180 cubic meters per 
year under the Reduced Operation Alternative. Routine transuranic waste 
would increase from 35 cubic meters per year to 50 cubic meters per 
year under the No Action Alternative and the Proposed Action, and 
increase to 45 cubic meters per year under the Reduced Operation 
Alternative.
    Differences in nonroutine waste generation cover all major waste 
categories across the alternatives, with the highest waste generation 
under the Proposed Action and lowest under the Reduced Operation 
Alternative. Levels of waste generation are within the capacities for 
treatment, transportation, or storage either onsite or at waste 
repositories such as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). In 
addition, LLNL is implementing cost effective pollution prevention 
techniques to reduce waste generation.

Human Health and Safety

    Under the No Action Alternative, the occupational (involved) worker 
ionizing radiation dose would increase from 28 person-rem per year to 
89 person-rem per year due to the increase in operations. These 
operations include increases in NIF and stockpile stewardship 
activities and the packaging of excess plutonium in the Plutonium 
Facility. The dose under the Proposed Action Alternative would increase 
to 93 person-rem per year, mostly from the use of proposed materials in 
experiments at the NIF. Under the Reduced Operation Alternative, worker 
dose would increase to 38 person-rem per year. Latent cancer fatalities 
(LCFs) calculated from these exposures would be 5.3 x 
10<SUP>-</SUP>\2\, 5.6 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\2\, and 2.3 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\2\ 
per year of exposure under the No Action Alternative, Proposed Action, 
and Reduced Operation Alternative, respectively. Worker exposure will 
be maintained as low as reasonably achievable.

[[Page 71494]]

    The ionizing radiation dose to the general public under all three 
alternatives would increase from 0.5 person-rem per year to 1.8 person-
rem per year at the Livermore Site, and would increase from 2.5 person-
rem per year to 9.8 person-rem per year at Site 300. The corresponding 
LCFs for all three alternatives would be 1.1 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\3\ at the 
Livermore site, and 5.9 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\3\ at Site 300. The projected 
dose at both sites is within the ranges of doses observed within the 
past 5 years.
    The maximally exposed individual (MEI) dose at the Livermore Site 
from ionizing radiation would increase from 0.023 millirem per year 
(which yields 1.4 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\8\ LCFs) to 0.30 millirem per year 
(which yields 1.8 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\7\ LCFs) under the No Action 
Alternative. The MEI dose for the Proposed Action and the Reduced 
Operations Alternatives would be 0.33 millirem per year (which yields 
2.0 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\7\ LCFs) and 0.22 millirem per year (which yields 
1.3 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\7\ LCFs) respectively. The MEI dose at the Site 
300 from ionizing radiation would increase from 0.021 millirem per year 
(which yields 1.3 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\8\ LCFs), to 0.055 millirem per year 
(which yields 3.3 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\8\ LCFs) for the No Action and the 
Proposed Action Alternatives. The dose under the Reduced Operations 
Alternative would be 0.054 millirem per year (which yields 3.3 x 
10<SUP>-</SUP>\8\ LCFs).

Accidents

    The LLNL SW/SPEIS analyzed potential accidents at all major 
facilities. Potential LCFs in the offsite population for median 
meteorological conditions were used to identify bounding radiological 
accidents for nuclear material handling and waste management 
operations.
    In making thee decisions announced in this ROD, NNSA considered the 
accidents analyzed in the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS and reviewed the data and 
methodology used to identify bounding site accidents. This review found 
that all bounding site accidents were accurately identified; however, 
minor discrepancies were found in a few analyses of non-bounding site 
scenarios. Information concerning these discrepancies is available from 
Thomas Grim, the NNSA Document Manager for the LLNL SW/SPEIS, at the 
address and phone number included at the beginning of this ROD. These 
discrepancies are negligible and the LLNL SW/SPEIS adequately evaluates 
the potential impacts of the alternatives.
    The bounding radiological accident for nuclear material handling 
under the Proposed Action is a fire involving radioactive material in 
the Plutonium Facility in which emissions are released without high-
efficiency particulate air filtration. Such an accident would result in 
0.112 LCFs in the offsite population. The exposure to noninvolved 
workers would result in 0.372 LCFs from this accident. The calculated 
annual frequency for this accident is 3.9 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\7\, which is 
less frequent than once in a million years. Under the No Action and the 
Reduced Operation Alternatives, the bounding accident for nuclear 
material handling in the Plutonium Facility is a small aircraft 
crashing into the building, which would result in 0.058 LCFs in the 
offsite population, and with a probability of 6.1 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\7\ 
per year, which is also less than once in a million years.
    The bounding radiological accident for waste management operations 
is a small aircraft crashing into the Radiological and Hazardous Waste 
Storage Facility, which would result in 1.21 LCFs in the offsite 
population under the Proposed Action. The exposure to noninvolved 
workers from such an accident would result in 0.055 LCFs. The estimate 
of LCFs for the same accident under the No Action and the Reduced 
Operation Alternatives is 0.397 LCF. The calculated annual frequency of 
an aircraft crashing into the building with subsequent gasoline pool 
fire is 6.1 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\7\, which is less frequent than once in a 
million years. The aircraft accident scenario evaluated at the 
Radiological and Hazardous Waste Storage Facility is very conservative 
in that it assumes the facility is loaded to its physical limit with 
containers of transuranic waste, each container holding its maximum 
allowable curie limit. Therefore, the consequences discussed above are 
calculated using what would be considered the maximum allowable 
inventory in the Radiological and Hazardous Waste Storage Facility 
under the facility's operational procedures. It is unlikely that the 
facility would ever contain this large of an inventory.
    Bounding accident scenarios for chemical, explosive, and biological 
accidents are the same among all three alternatives and are unlikely to 
result in fatalities to the general public or workers except for the 
bounding explosives accident, which could result in 20 worker 
fatalities.

Resource Areas With Minor Environmental Impacts

    The following resource areas have some small environmental impact 
differences among the alternatives or are of a particular concern to 
the public based on comments.

Socioeconomic Characteristics and Environmental Justice

    The socioeconomic impacts from continued operations at LLNL would 
vary under the three alternatives, and would primarily affect Alameda 
and San Joaquin counties. For the No Action Alternative, LLNL 
employment would increase by 300 workers to 10,650 at the Livermore 
Site and increase by 10 workers to 250 at Site 300 compared to the 2002 
employment levels. For the Proposed Action, the worker population would 
increase, over the No Action Alternative, by 500 workers to 11,150 at 
the Livermore Site and would remain at 250 workers at Site 300. For the 
Reduced Operation Alternative, worker population would decrease from 
the No Action Alternative by 880 workers to 9,770 at the Livermore Site 
and decrease by 20 workers to 230 at Site 300. The number of housing 
units affected would be proportional to the changes in worker 
population in both counties.

Community Services

    The only notable impact for community services would be the 
generation and disposal of nonhazardous solid waste. For the No Action 
Alternative, it is estimated that 4,600 metric tons per year of 
nonhazardous solid waste would be generated at the Livermore Site. 
Under the Proposed Action, the Livermore Site would generate 4,900 
metric tons per year of nonhazardous solid waste. Under the Reduced 
Operation Alternative, nonhazardous solid waste generation at the 
Livermore Site would be reduced to 4,200 metric tons per year. 
Nonhazardous waste generation at Site 300 would be 208 metric tons per 
year under both the No Action and Proposed Action alternatives and 
reduced to 191 metric tons per year for the Reduced Operation 
Alternative. The local Altamont Landfill is estimated to have 
sufficient capacity to receive waste until the year 2038. The current 
total daily permitted throughput is 11,150 tons per day.

Aesthetics and Scenic Resources

    Changes to the offsite views of the Livermore Site would be similar 
under all alternatives. At Site 300, the Proposed Action would have 
little or no impact on aesthetics and scenic resources. The existing 
character of LLNL would not change at either site under any of the 
alternatives.

Biological Resources

    NNSA completed a biological assessment (included as Appendix E of 
the LLNL SW/SPEIS) and has requested formal consultation with the U.S. 
Fish

[[Page 71495]]

and Wildlife Service pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species 
Act. NNSA will implement any new or additional mitigation measures, and 
will carefully consider implementation of conservation recommendations 
contained in the Fish and Wildlife Service's Biological Opinion when it 
is issued.
    The effects of the Proposed Action at the Livermore Site were 
considered on the California red-legged frog, a federally listed 
threatened species. The biological assessment concludes that 
construction related projects, facility maintenance, landscaping, 
grounds maintenance, herbicide application, and vehicular traffic may 
affect, but are not likely to adversely affect, this species. The frogs 
may be adversely affected during the Arroyo Las Positas Maintenance 
Project; however, the overall Proposed Action would have a near-term 
positive effect on the frog population and habitat. The demolition of 
facilities at the Livermore Site would result in a long-term indirect 
benefit to the California red-legged frog.
    Although six federally listed threatened or endangered species 
occur or potentially occur at Site 300, based on habitat assessments, 
field studies, and distribution data, the California red-legged frog, 
Alameda whipsnake, and California tiger salamander were identified in 
the biological assessment as either having the potential to occur or as 
occurring at the project areas at Site 300 that would be affected by 
the Proposed Action. These areas include formerly designated critical 
habitat for the Alameda whipsnake and proposed critical habitat for the 
California red-legged frog. Appendix E concludes that the Proposed 
Action may affect, but is not likely to adversely affect, the 
California red-legged frog, Alameda whipsnake, and California tiger 
salamander.

Radiological Air Quality

    There are differences among the alternatives regarding the 
potential radiological air quality impacts, all of which would be low 
both in relative and absolute terms. Once the NIF is operating, the MEI 
would be located due east of the NIF. The MEI doses for the Livermore 
Site would be 0.1, 0.13, and 0.09 millirem per year under the No 
Action, Proposed Action, and Reduced Operation Alternative, 
respectively. These doses are approximately two orders of magnitude 
below the EPA standard (40 CFR part 61.92), which requires that the 
maximally exposed member of the public not receive a dose exceeding 10 
millirem per year. The population dose for the Livermore Site would be 
1.8 person-rem per year under all three alternatives. At Site 300, the 
MEI would be west-southwest of Firing Table 851, the only outdoor 
firing facility that would use tritium. The MEI dose at Site 300 would 
be 0.055 millirem per year under the No Action Alternative and the 
Proposed Action, and 0.054 under the Reduced Operation Alternative, 
which are over two orders of magnitude under the EPA standard. The 
population dose for Site 300 would be 9.8 person-rem per year under all 
three alternatives. The potential impacts of these exposures are 
included in the results discussed in Human Health and Safety for each 
of the alternatives.

Traffic and Transportation

    Traffic at the Livermore Site would be directly affected by changes 
in worker population under each alternative. Under the No Action 
Alternative, traffic would increase slightly as a result of the 
increase in worker population by 300 workers (22,600 total vehicle 
trips per day) compared to current (2002) conditions. Traffic volume 
would increase further under the Proposed Action due to the addition of 
500 workers (23,700 total vehicle trips per day). Traffic volume would 
decrease under the Reduced Operation Alternative due to the loss of 880 
workers (as compared to the No Action Alternative) at the Livermore 
Site (21,000 total vehicle trips per day). At Site 300, the impact to 
traffic due to changes in the number of workers would be negligible 
under any of the alternatives. Construction projects would result in 
temporary increases in commuter traffic and deliveries.
    Transportation of radioactive materials offsite would increase 
under the No Action Alternative and Proposed Action. Under the No 
Action Alternative, offsite shipments would result in a collective dose 
of 7.4 person-rem per year. Under the Proposed Action, offsite 
shipments would result in a collective dose of 9.0 person-rem per year. 
This dose would decrease under the Reduced Operation Alternative to 1.7 
person-rem per year. The potential cancer risk from shipments of 
radioactive materials from the Livermore Site would be low under all 
alternatives. The calculated potential LCFs under the No Action and the 
Proposed Action Alternatives would be 4 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\3\ and 5 x 
10<SUP>-</SUP>\3\, respectively. Under the Reduced Operation 
Alternative, the LCF would fall to 1 x 10<SUP>-</SUP>\3\. Under the 
Proposed Action, the amount of explosive materials transported to Site 
300 would increase slightly from the No Action Alternative. Under the 
Reduced Operation Alternative, transportation of these materials would 
decrease.

Utilities and Energy

    Under the No Action Alternative, the projected peak electrical 
demand at LLNL would be 82 megawatts and the annual total use would be 
446 million kilowatt-hours. In 2004, the State of California projected 
the statewide peak demand to be 53,464 megawatts and projected a growth 
in peak demand of about 2.4 percent per year. LLNL's projected peak 
demand in 2004 was 0.1 percent of total demand in California. There 
would be virtually no change in the peak demand under the Proposed 
Action and the Reduced Operation Alternative. Annual electric use among 
the No Action, Proposed Action, and Reduced Operation Alternatives 
would be 446, 442, and 371 million kilowatt-hours, respectively. The 
decrease in electricity usage from the No Action Alternative to the 
Proposed Action is due to a cumulative reduction of LLNL floor space 
under the Proposed Action. For the same reason the Livermore Site would 
experience a decrease in water consumption and sewage discharges under 
the Proposed Action.

Site Contamination

    Areas of soil and groundwater contamination exist at the Livermore 
Site and Site 300. These are primarily the result of past waste 
management practices, some of which took place during the 1940s when 
the Livermore Site was a naval air station. Although there is no 
immediate or long-term threat to human health from this contamination, 
there is localized degradation of groundwater. Remediation systems are 
currently operating to reduce the concentrations and extent of 
contamination. Appropriate cleanup measures implemented with the 
concurrence of regulators would continue regardless of the alternative 
selected.
    Increased site activities under the No Action Alternative or 
Proposed Action could increase the likelihood of soil contamination 
with corresponding increases in the potential for accidental releases. 
However, minimal deposition of contaminants is expected because of 
spill prevention and control procedures. Under the Reduced Operation 
Alternative a lower likelihood of soil contamination would be expected.

Comments on the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS

    NNSA received three letters concerning the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS 
after distributing approximately 500 copies of it to Congressional 
members and committees, the state of California,

[[Page 71496]]

other Federal agencies, American Indian tribal governments, local 
governments, nongovernmental organizations, and interested individuals. 
Tri-Valley CAREs (Communities Against a Radioactive Environment) 
submitted two letters and the EPA submitted one. The EPA indicated that 
it was pleased that the issues identified in its review of the Draft 
LLNL SW/SPEIS had been addressed in the final version of the document.
    In an August 3, 2005 letter to NNSA, Tri-Valley CAREs asked why the 
Final LLNL SW/SPEIS does not contain any of the 36 attachments that 
Tri-Valley CAREs submitted with its 63-page letter of comments on May 
27, 2004. It asserted that its ``attachments provided supporting 
material for many of the substantive comments that were included in our 
May 27, 2004 Comment Letter'', and that the omission of these 
attachments might violate NEPA. Volume IV of the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS 
includes all of the 63 pages of substantive comments in Tri-Valley 
CAREs' Comment Letter, as well as comment summaries, responses, and a 
detailed cross-reference between comments and summaries. NNSA did not 
include copies of the 36 attachments because NNSA included the entirety 
of the 63-page Comment Letter itself, which includes Tri-Valley CAREs' 
substantive comments. Although not included in the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS, 
NNSA reviewed the attachments and considered the relevant material in 
them during its preparation of the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS. The attachments 
are included in the administrative record for the LLNL SW/SPEIS as part 
of the comment letter.
    A May 31, 2005, letter from Tri-Valley CAREs reiterated its 
comments on the Draft LLNL SW/SPEIS and provided additional 
information, including comments on the recent stand-down at the LLNL 
Plutonium Facility. The comments provided by Tri-Valley CAREs on the 
Final LLNL SW/SPEIS did not lead NNSA to conclude that it should change 
any of the analyses of the alternatives. NNSA responded to comments 
from Tri-Valley CAREs on the Draft LLNL SW/SPEIS in Volume IV, Chapter 
3 of the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS. The following is a brief summary of the 
Tri-Valley CAREs' comments from the May 31, 2005, letter including the 
stand-down of the Plutonium Facility.
    (1) The LLNL SW/SPEIS did not address comments from Tri-Valley 
CAREs and others that the purpose and need is critical to identifying 
the range of alternatives. Therefore, the range of alternatives 
analyzed in the LLNL SW/SPEIS is too narrow. NNSA should have analyzed 
a broader range of alternatives that included the reduction of nuclear 
weapons activities, many of which are duplications of programs at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory or limit nuclear weapons modernization 
programs.
    Response: The range of reasonable alternatives is provided in 
Volume I, Chapter 3 of the LLNL SW/SPEIS. As described in Section 3.4, 
the range of alternatives analyzed in the LLNL SW/SPEIS is reasonable 
and appropriately responds to the programmatic purpose and need. 
Additional information is provided in Comment Responses 7.01, 8.01, 
8.02 and 8.03. Comment Response 8.01 states that significant reductions 
or consolidations of the weapons laboratories beyond those analyzed in 
the Reduced Operations Alternative are unlikely and therefore not 
reasonable alternatives because they would not allow NNSA to maintain 
core competencies or to develop new technologies necessary to ensure 
continued high confidence in a safe and reliable nuclear weapons 
stockpile.
    Alternatives that would cease work involving the use of nuclear 
materials and the eventual removal of all nuclear materials were 
considered. However, none of these alternatives would meet Presidential 
Decision Directives or comply with Congressional guidance, or national 
security policy, all of which require the continued viability of all 
three NNSA nuclear weapons laboratories.
    (2) Adequate purpose and need were not provided for many program 
activities at LLNL such as producing tritium targets at the Tritium 
Facility and developing plutonium production technologies that will be 
used in a proposed modern pit facility.
    Response: The purpose and need are provided in Volume I, Chapter 1 
of the LLNL SW/SPEIS for the major programs and projects at LLNL. 
Chapter 3 provides additional information on specific projects at LLNL 
that support the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) including the 
Tritium Facility Modernization Project and support for pit 
manufacturing. Chapter 3 of Volume IV, Comment Response 37.01, 
addresses comments on plutonium production technologies for pit 
manufacturing and Comment Response 34.01 addresses comments on tritium 
operations. Increased limits on the use of tritium will make it 
possible to fill targets for high-energy density physics experiments 
and to provide diagnostic systems for test readiness, which are 
required to fulfill the requirements of the Enhanced Test Readiness 
Program.
    (3) DOE should not increase the plutonium limit in the Plutonium 
Facility because the facility is currently in a ``stand down'' mode due 
to safety problems.
    Response: LLNL initiated a programmatic stand down of operations in 
the Plutonium Facility in order to resolve issues and findings from a 
January 6, 2005, report issued by the DOE Office of Independent 
Oversight and Performance Assurance. NNSA will verify the adequacy of 
corrective actions taken to resolve the issues prior to any increase of 
Plutonium Facility operations. Once the Plutonium Facility is fully 
operational, NNSA and DOE will continue to oversee and inspect its 
operations to ensure they are performed according to requirements.
    To support SSP missions, NNSA has determined that it will need to 
increase the plutonium administrative limit from 700 kg to 1400 kg for 
the Plutonium Facility and increase the plutonium material-at-risk 
limit from 20 to 40 kilograms of fuel-grade equivalent plutonium in 
each of two rooms of the Plutonium Facility. Under the Proposed Action, 
NNSA will review and approve the appropriate documentation and 
procedures required to implement these new limits.
    (4) The increase in the plutonium administrative limits in the 
Plutonium Facility creates storage, transportation, management, 
accident, and security concerns that were not adequately analyzed. 
Rather than analyzing an increase in the administrative limits the LLNL 
SW/SPEIS should have analyzed the removal of all special nuclear 
material from LLNL.
    Response: Comment Response 33.01 provides information on the 
purpose and need for increasing the plutonium limits. NNSA continues to 
rely on LLNL to meet its SSP mission objectives, which require 
increasing the quantity of plutonium. NNSA continues to work on a 
solution for disposal of plutonium, but no pathway for LLNL to dispose 
of excess plutonium currently exists. The increase in plutonium 
administrative limits is analyzed in Volume I, Chapter 5. The impacts 
of transportation of radioactive materials, specifically plutonium, are 
analyzed in Section 5.3.11. Additional specific information on 
transportation of these materials is provided in Appendix J. Section 
5.3.13 analyzes waste generated from plutonium operations and Section 
5.3.14 analyzes exposure to workers and the public from these 
operations. Accidents involving the storage and use of plutonium are 
analyzed in Section 5.5. The impacts of security concerns are analyzed 
as part of the accident analysis in Section 5.5. Comment Response 25.01 
provides specific

[[Page 71497]]

responses to many of the question raised concerning accidents involving 
the use of plutonium at LLNL.
    (5) The former Secretary of Energy announced in 2004 that DOE would 
study removal of special nuclear material from LLNL. The omission of 
this and other information provided in attachments to the comments on 
the draft LLNL SW/SPEIS undermines the legal sufficiency of the EIS.
    Response: As indicated in Comment Response 08.02, the removal and 
relocation of nuclear materials to another DOE/NNSA laboratory is not 
considered a reasonable alternative as it would not respond to the 
programmatic purpose and need for stockpile stewardship missions at 
LLNL. Section 3.5 of the LLNL SW/SPEIS explains why this alternative is 
unreasonable and was eliminated from detailed analysis. NNSA considers 
the storage and use of this material at LLNL to be safe and secure.
    The Secretary of Energy did agree to conduct a comprehensive review 
of the nuclear weapons complex during testimony on March 11, 2004, to 
the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water. The Nuclear 
Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force was asked to conduct this 
review and submitted its draft report titled Recommendations for the 
Nuclear Weapons Complex of the Future on July 13, 2005, to the 
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB). The draft final report is 
currently undergoing public review. The full SEAB will meet in the fall 
of 2005 to review the comments and the draft final report; it will 
thereafter submit its recommendations, which may differ from those of 
the task force, to the Secretary of Energy.
    (6) Accident analysis for the increase in the use and storage of 
plutonium is not given an adequate level of study. The accident 
scenarios did not evaluate the impacts of a commercial airliner hitting 
the laboratory; the document only considered impacts of planes 
originating from the Livermore Municipal Airport. The accident analysis 
did not use the correct leak path factor or consider other concerns for 
releases during an accident in the Plutonium Facility. Additionally, 
the unfiltered fire scenario does not address concerns such as alarms, 
security doors, emergency equipment and supply pressure for water.
    Response: A discussion of Plutonium Facility accidents is provided 
in Chapter 5, Section 5.5 and in Appendix D, Section D.2.3. In 
addition, Comment Response 25.08 provides information on potential 
aircraft crash scenarios for LLNL facilities for all types of aircraft, 
including commercial aircraft. The methodology in DOE Standard 3014 
``Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities'' was 
used for this evaluation. The calculated frequency of a commercial 
aircraft crashing into the LLNL Plutonium Facility is 1 x 
10<SUP>-8</SUP> per year. NNSA does not consider this accident to be 
reasonably foreseeable and thus it is not evaluated in detail in the 
LLNL SW/SPEIS.
    As indicated in Comment Response 25.07, the values used in the 
accident analysis, such as the leak path factors, are based on careful 
consideration of the material present in the facility, potential 
initiating events and their probabilities, and potential pathways 
through which material could escape to the environment. The unfiltered 
fire scenario assumed that all of the radioactive material in the room 
was involved in the fire and the material was released using a leak 
path factor of 0.05 for this accident. Alarms, doors, emergency 
equipment and water pressure were not considered in the unfiltered fire 
scenario because the analysis assumes that the fire is of sufficient 
magnitude that all the radioactive material is engulfed in the fire, 
and that the fire burns long enough to release the material from 
storage containers to the glovebox, room, and the environment. 
Therefore, there are no reasonably foreseeable accidents with greater 
consequences.
    (7) It is improper for NNSA to not fully incorporate the City of 
Livermore's General Plan into the LLNL SW/SPEIS. The city's plan 
rezones the land around LLNL as high density residential and this 
information was not considered in all sections of the LLNL SW/SPEIS. As 
a result DOE is not in full compliance with the NEPA directive to 
include written and actively pursued plans in an EIS. Additionally, the 
LLNL SW/SPEIS states that LLNL and much of the surrounding area is 
designated for industrial uses which is in direct conflict with figures 
in the other sections of the LLNL SW/SPEIS.
    Response: Chapter 4, Section 4.2 of the LLNL SW/SPEIS, was changed 
to reflect the City of Livermore's General Plan. The city also 
submitted comments on the Draft LLNL SW/SPEIS. NNSA evaluated these 
comments and made appropriate changes in the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS as 
indicated in Comment Response 9.02. Based on comments from the City of 
Livermore, which reflect its current planning, Figures 4.2.1.1-1 and 
4.2.2.1-1 were revised to indicate residential use consistent with the 
city's General Plan. The City of Livermore comments are addressed in 
Comment Responses 8.03, 9.01, 9.02, 9.03, 12.01, 17.02, 17.03, 20.03, 
26.03, and 33.01.
    (8) The radiation dose to involved workers does not account for 
releases due to minor accidents, decaying facilities, and workers 
encountering unexpected radiation sources in areas that were not 
properly recorded.
    Response: Chapter 5, Section 5.3.14, analyzes the radiation dose to 
workers for the Proposed Action. Comment Response 23.05 provides 
information on the health impacts to workers and the public. Health 
impact analysis is performed using a broad range of available 
information and models developed by regulatory agencies and data drawn 
from experience. In the case of existing operations, worker doses are 
based on exposure records, which take into account all exposure 
pathways. In the case of new operations, worker doses are based on 
models that simulate exposure for the operations to be performed. 
Exposure from all accidents at LLNL is taken into consideration when 
developing worker exposure estimates. These exposures are bounded by 
the accident analysis provided in Chapter 5, Section 5.5 and Appendix 
D. Information on past accidents is also provided in Appendix C, 
Section 3.2.
    (9) Information was not provided in the LLNL SW/SPEIS about what 
activities or programs are contained in facilities that are identified 
to have unacceptable seismic risks. Information was not provided to 
indicate what facilities were undergoing renovation or what facilities 
would remain operational after an earthquake. Updated information on 
California seismic risk provided by Tri-Valley CAREs was not 
considered.
    Response: Chapter 4, Section 4.8, and Appendix H provide detailed 
analysis of the seismic faults in the Livermore Valley and their 
potential effect on LLNL facilities and operations. Comment Response 
14.03 explains that all facilities at LLNL have been evaluated against 
modern seismic criteria, current and planned use, and building 
population and inventory. These evaluations allowed for ranking of the 
facilities by the amount of retrofit that could be required. This 
evaluation is used as part of the overall planning for LLNL to 
determine if buildings should be replaced, their use changed, or their 
structural integrity improved. Based on comments received, updated 
information was added in Appendix H on the seismic upgrades of 
Buildings 141, 151, 298, 321, and 511. It is not possible to determine 
what specific facilities would remain operational after an earthquake. 
This would depend on a

[[Page 71498]]

wide range of variables at the time of the earthquake. A seismic event 
at LLNL was analyzed in Appendix D of the LLNL SW/SPEIS and the impacts 
for all potentially affected buildings are included. Information 
provided by individuals was considered. However, as indicated in 
Comment Response 14.01, information from the U.S. Geological Survey on 
seismic risk for the San Andreas, Calaveras, and Greenville faults was 
used because its analyses represent the best knowledge currently 
available for the seismic risk associated with these faults.
    (10) A declassified security analysis should be provided that 
includes a summation of the efforts that went into the security study 
and the account of how the conclusions drawn from the study were 
integrated into the LLNL SW/SPEIS analysis.
    Response: Chapter 5, Section 5.5, and Appendix D provide detailed 
analysis on potential accidents that could occur at LLNL. Comment 
Response 30.01 provides information on security concerns and indicates 
that it is not possible to predict whether intentional attacks would 
occur at LLNL or at other critical facilities, or the nature of the 
types of attacks that might be made. Nevertheless, NNSA reevaluated 
scenarios involving malevolent, terrorist, or intentionally destructive 
acts at LLNL in an effort to assess potential vulnerabilities and 
identify improvements to security procedures and response measures in 
the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Security at NNSA 
and DOE facilities is a critical priority for the Department, and it 
continues to identify and implement measures designed to defend against 
and deter attacks at its facilities. Substantive details of terrorist 
attack scenarios and security countermeasures cannot be released to the 
public, as disclosure of this information could be exploited by 
terrorists to plan attacks.
    (11) The use of fissile and fissionable materials in NIF 
experiments would take NIF in a new direction that would give it 
increased applicability for weapons design, and this work was not 
analyzed. The 1995 NIF Non-Proliferation Study does not address the use 
of these materials and therefore is not adequate for determining if the 
use of these materials is in compliance with the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.
    Response: A review of the treaty obligations and proliferation 
aspects of NIF was conducted and new information provided in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.3.1. of the Final LLNL SW/SPEIS. As Comment Response 01.01 
states, NIF is an integral part of the SSP and as such was considered 
during NNSA's review of compliance with treaty and proliferation 
aspects of the SSP. Appendix I of the SSM PEIS provided an evaluation 
of the construction and operation of the NIF. As indicated in Chapter 1 
of Appendix I, one of the objectives of the SSP is ``Ensurance that the 
activities needed to maintain the Nation's nuclear deterrent are 
consistent with the Nation's arms control and nonproliferation 
objectives.'' Nonproliferation issues regarding NIF were evaluated in a 
December 19, 1995, study, The National Ignition Facility and the Issue 
of Nonproliferation. The study, prepared by the DOE Office of 
Nonproliferation and National Security and coordinated with the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Departments of Defense and State, concluded that (1) the technical 
proliferation concerns regarding NIF are manageable and therefore are 
acceptable, and (2) NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control 
and nonproliferation policy goals. As stated in Comment Response 01.01, 
NNSA has determined that the use of fissile material, fissionable 
material, and lithium hydride in NIF experiments is consistent with 
treaty obligations and the proliferation aspects of conducting these 
experiments are manageable.
    (12) It is inappropriate to use a bounding accident scenario study 
for the BioSafety Level-3 (BSL-3) Facility that is out-of-date and 
based on a facility not at LLNL.
    Response: Chapter 5, Section 5.5.4, and Appendix D, discuss the 
analysis of a biological accident. As indicated in Comment Response 
25.04, for purposes of the LLNL SW/SPEIS, NNSA selected a 
representative facility accident that was previously analyzed by the 
U.S. Army in the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
Biological Defense Research Program (April 1989). NNSA believes that 
this accident scenario is comparable to and bounds potential accident 
scenarios associated with the BSL-3 Facility at LLNL. NNSA reviewed 
more recent environmental impact statements, including the U. S. Army's 
Chemical and Biological Defense Program Final Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement (May 2004) and the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security's Final Environmental Impact Statement for 
Construction and Operation of the National Biodefense Analysis and 
Countermeasures Center (NBACC) Facility (December 2004) and concluded 
that these EISs incorporate the same bounding accidents and identify 
the same environmental impacts as the U.S. Army's earlier EIS issued in 
1989 (i.e., the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
Biological Defense Research Program [April 1989]).
    (13) The impact analysis focused on LCFs in general rather than the 
population that is immune-suppressed as a result of LLNL operations. 
Additionally, radiological dispersal could result in measurable 
increases in cancer mortality for decades following an accident. 
Information was not provided on economic loss of farmland, loss of 
vineyards, and impacts on the local economy and property values.
    Response: The human health effects on the general population around 
LLNL from radiation exposure in the Proposed Action are analyzed in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.14. As indicated in Comment Response 25.05, 
health effects other than LCFs could result from environmental and 
occupational exposures to radiation. These include nonfatal cancers 
among the exposed population and genetic effects in subsequent 
generations. Previous studies have concluded that these effects are 
less probable than fatal cancers as consequences of radiation exposure. 
Dose-to-risk conversion factors for nonfatal cancers and hereditary 
genetic effects (0.0001 per person-rem and 0.00013 per person-rem, 
respectively) are substantially lower than those for fatal cancers. The 
LLNL SW/SPEIS presents estimated effects of radiation in terms of LCFs 
because that is the major potential health effect from exposure to 
radiation. Any additional increases in cancer mortality or morbidity 
from exposure to residual environmental contamination from an accident 
would be minor considering that the increase in LCFs for the population 
exposed to the accident (highest concentrations) would only be 1.21 LCF 
under the bounding analysis. In addition, there is no evidence that the 
population surrounding LLNL is ``immune suppressed'' as a result of 
LLNL operations.
    As indicated in Comment Response 25.06, NNSA focused the accident 
analysis on human health impacts among LLNL workers and the general 
public near LLNL. Secondary impacts could also result from the 
postulated facility accidents, such as loss of farm production, 
contamination, land usage, and ecological harm; however, they would not 
be significant within the 50-mile radius, which was analyzed in the 
LLNL SW/SPEIS. These secondary impacts were determined not to be a 
major discriminator among alternatives; therefore, they were not 
assessed in detail.

[[Page 71499]]

    (14) The LLNL SW/SPEIS analysis does not address whether programs 
to modernize U.S. nuclear weapons are in compliance with international 
law. The LLNL SW/SPEIS should analyze all of the current and proposed 
activities at LLNL and their relationship to the NPT. The LLNL SW/SPEIS 
should analyze foreseeable plans for new nuclear weapons development 
including the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, the Reliable Replacement 
Warhead program, the Modern Pit Facility, and Enhanced Test Readiness.
    Response: A review of the treaty and nonproliferation aspects of 
LLNL operations was added to Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1. As indicated in 
Comment Response 02.01, it is the United States policy for DOE to 
develop and produce the nation's nuclear weapons and to ensure their 
safety and reliability. With the end of the Cold War, DOE has been 
developing strategies for appropriate adjustments to its missions and 
activities consistent with current national security policies that 
reflect post-Cold War realities and threats. Some of these adjustments 
reflect a smaller weapons stockpile. However, even after the--Cold War, 
threats remain and nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone 
of U.S. national security policy for the foreseeable future. The 
Proposed Action is consistent with the NNSA mission assigned to LLNL 
and does not adversely affect the United States' compliance with any 
international law.
    (15) A nonproliferation study should be conducted to determine if 
biodefense work at LLNL could undermine the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC). Collocating bio-defense work at top-secret military 
labs could complicate negotiations of verification and enforcement 
protocols for the BWC. The LLNL SW/SPEIS does not respond to concerns 
that the BSL-3 Facility will be used to aerosolize and genetically 
modify biological agents and also have a large-capacity fermentor 
nearby.
    Response: As stated in Comment Response 35.01, the United States is 
a signatory to the BWC, which prohibits the development and production 
of bioweapons. The BWC does not prohibit activities using biological 
agents that are for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes. The operation of the BSL-3 facility would be consistent with 
the BWC as its activities will conform to treaty obligations. The 
facility is designed to accommodate work on detection and 
counterterrorism technologies, and will provide for environmentally 
safe and physically secure manipulation and storage of infectious 
microorganisms. Operations at this facility will not combine biological 
research and nuclear weapons activities. Verification requirements 
established by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention will be met 
with. The BSL-3 facility will be used for many operations with 
biological infectious agents; however, all biological agents would be 
managed in accordance with the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention BioSafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories 
Guidelines.
    (16) An environmental analysis should be done on the manufacturing 
of tritium targets and on the Tritium Facility Modernization Project.
    Response: The manufacture of tritium targets and the Tritium 
Facility Modernization Project were analyzed in preparation of the LLNL 
SW/SPEIS. Chapter 3, Section 3.3.5, provides information on the new 
activities that are considered under the Proposed Action such as the 
high-energy density physics target fill and the Test Readiness Program. 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3.8, provides an analysis of the increased use of 
tritium to support SSP activities in the Tritium Facility. Comment 
Response 34.01 provides information on the environmental analysis of 
proposed programs in the Tritium Facility including filling of tritium 
targets, the Test Readiness Program and the Tritium Facility 
Modernization Project. Comment Response 26.04 also provides information 
on high-energy density physics target fabrication at the Tritium 
Facility and includes the resulting environmental impacts. Comment 
Response 31.09 provides additional information on the Tritium Facility 
Modernization Project.
    (17) Additional information should be provided on the likelihood 
and consequences of shifting from TRUPACT II to TRUPACT III containers 
for shipping transuranic waste. Analysis should be conducted on the 
increased rate of public exposure to transuranic waste, the heightened 
risk of transportation accidents, and the TRUPACT III Containers 
greater susceptibility to terrorist attacks.
    Response: Chapter 3, Section 3.3.15 discusses the use of TRUPACT II 
containers for shipment of transuranic waste. As indicated in Comment 
Response 20.05, the proposed TRUPACT-III shipping package would be a 
Type B container as defined by Department of Transportation and the 
NRC. Accordingly, it will be required to meet the same stringent safety 
and performance standards as the TRUPACT-II. Should NRC certify this 
package and should DOE propose to use it for waste shipments from LLNL, 
the package would be used in compliance with its certification and 
safety analysis report. NNSA has not evaluated its use, and prior to 
the certification of the package, cannot state whether any LLNL 
transuranic waste would be shipped in a TRUPACT-III. The transuranic 
waste transportation accident analysis in the LLNL SW/SPEIS was 
performed under the assumption that a TRUPACT-II would be used. Given 
that the TRUPACT-III would also be required to meet all requirements 
for a Type B container, it is unlikely that results would change if 
NNSA were to use a TRUPACT-III container. Should DOE adopt the TRUPACT-
III, DOE will ensure that its use remains within the safety envelope of 
previous analyses for the TRUPACT-II.

Mitigation Measures

    CEQ's NEPA regulations require that an EIS include a discussion of 
means to mitigate adverse effects. As described in the LLNL SW/SPEIS, 
NNSA and LLNL operate under existing laws, programs, and controls, 
including regulations, policies, and contractual requirements; many of 
these requirements mandate actions that would mitigate potential 
adverse affects. Examples include the Environment, Safety and Health 
Manual, emergency plans, Integrated Safety Management System, pollution 
prevention/waste minimization program, several protected species 
programs, and energy and water conservation programs. To date, NNSA has 
not identified additional mitigation measures for resource areas 
evaluated in the LLNL SW/SPEIS. It will continue to implement existing 
procedures and controls, or appropriately updated ones, during 
implementation of the Proposed Action. For biological resources, NNSA 
will implement the reasonable and prudent measures necessary to avoid 
or minimize incidental taking of listed species and will carefully 
consider implementation of conservation recommendations determined as a 
result of consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. For 
cultural resources, NNSA will implement agreed-upon treatment 
strategies to preserve historic properties determined through 
consultation with the California State Historic Preservation Office.

Decisions

    The impacts identified in the LLNL SW/SPEIS were based on 
conservative estimates and assumptions. In this regard, the analyses 
bound the impacts of the alternatives evaluated in the LLNL SW/SPEIS. 
The Proposed Action would result in an increase in LLNL

[[Page 71500]]

operations to support reasonably foreseeable mission requirements. This 
includes the expansion or modification of current facilities and 
construction of new facilities, as well as those projects, activities, 
and facilities described in the No Action Alternative. The LLNL SW/
SPEIS and the analyses it contains may support additional programmatic 
or project decisions in the future. The implementation of these 
decisions and the schedules for implementation depend on funding levels 
and allocation of the DOE/NNSA budget.
    NNSA's review of the data and methodologies used in accident 
analyses verified that the LLNL SW/SPEIS correctly identifies bounding 
site accidents and estimates their potential consequences. This review 
found a small number of minor discrepancies on non-bounding site 
accident scenarios. Information concerning these discrepancies is 
available from Thomas Grim, the NNSA Document Manager for the LLNL SW/
SPEIS, at the address and phone number included at the beginning of 
this ROD. These discrepancies are negligible and the LLNL SW/SPEIS 
adequately evaluates the potential impacts of the alternatives.
    NNSA has decided to implement the preferred alternative, the 
Proposed Action with the exception of the Energetic Materials 
Processing Center Replacement and High Explosives Development Center 
Project. With the issuance of this ROD, NNSA will begin to expand 
operations at LLNL critical to NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program. 
The major decisions are increasing the administrative and material-at-
risk limits for plutonium in the Plutonium Facility and increasing the 
administrative and material-at-risk limits for tritium in the Tritium 
Facility. NNSA will review and approve the appropriate documentation 
and procedures required to implement the increase to a 1,400 kilogram 
administrative limit for plutonium and the 40 kilograms of fuel-grade 
equivalent plutonium material-at-risk limit for two rooms for the 
Plutonium Facility. NNSA will conduct experiments at the NIF using 
plutonium, other fissile materials, fissionable materials, and lithium 
hydride. These decisions are discussed in more detail in the following 
paragraphs.
    NNSA continues to rely on LLNL to meet its Stockpile Stewardship 
Program objectives. These objectives include campaigns relating to pit 
manufacturing and certification, advanced radiography, dynamic 
materials properties, materials shelf life experiments, and enhanced 
surveillance research, which contribute to the need for long-term 
storage of plutonium. These campaigns and programs require increasing 
use of plutonium. NNSA continues to work on a solution for disposal of 
plutonium, but no pathway for disposal of the excess plutonium at LLNL 
currently exists, requiring an increase in the plutonium administrative 
limits. A July 2005 report issued by the Government Accountability 
Office, Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials, discusses some of the problems 
that need to be solved in order to develop a disposal path for excess 
plutonium. These problems have not yet been resolved and the amount of 
plutonium stored at LLNL will increase as NNSA continues to operate the 
Plutonium Facility. Therefore, NNSA has decided to increase the 
administrative limit for plutonium to 1,400 kilograms. The inventory 
will continue to be stored in robust vaults in the facility.
    NNSA has decided to increase the plutonium material-at-risk limit 
from 20 to 40 kilograms of fuel-grade equivalent plutonium in each of 
two rooms of the Plutonium Facility. The material-at-risk limit for all 
other rooms would remain at 20 kilograms fuel grade equivalent 
plutonium. The increases are needed to meet future Stockpile 
Stewardship Program objectives such as the casting of plutonium parts. 
These activities support campaigns for advanced radiography, pit 
manufacturing, and certification.
    NNSA has decided to increase the tritium administrative limit for 
the Tritium Facility from 30 to 35 grams and the material-at-risk at a 
single workstation from 3.5 to 30 grams. These increases are needed to 
support future planned Stockpile Stewardship Program activities such as 
the high-energy density physics target fill and the Test Readiness 
Program.
    NNSA has decided to use plutonium, other fissile materials, 
fissionable materials, and lithium hydride in experiments at the NIF as 
evaluated in the LLNL SW/SPEIS. This decision is based on the need for 
a variety of experiments using fissionable and fissile material at the 
NIF. NIF will perform experiments with plutonium or highly enriched 
uranium without ignition to study the equation of state of these 
materials. Experiments will be conducted to measure fundamental nuclear 
physics properties using plutonium or highly enriched uranium that 
require ignition. Experiments will be conducted with lithium hydride, 
which is not a special nuclear material, with and without ignition. 
These are materials physics and equation of state experiments designed 
to address fundamental physical behavior of this material and to allow 
benchmarking of physical models of the material. Experiments will be 
performed with depleted uranium with ignition. These experiments 
require materials with high atomic numbers collocated on the ignition 
target to enhance the conversion of laser light to x-rays for inertial 
confinement fusion experiments.
    In accordance with the provisions of NEPA, its implementing 
procedures and regulations, and DOE's NEPA regulations, I have 
considered the information contained in the LLNL SW/SPEIS and public 
comments received in response to the both the Draft and Final LLNL SW/
SPEIS. Being fully apprised of the environmental consequences of the 
alternatives and other information relevant to these decisions, I have 
decided to continue operations at LLNL as described in the Proposed 
Action with the exception of the Energetic Materials Processing Center 
Replacement and High Explosives Development Center Project. This 
decision will help enable the Department to maintain the core 
intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear 
weapons, and maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. In 
making this decision, all practicable means to avoid or minimize 
environmental harm from implementation of the Proposed Action will be 
adopted. NNSA will consider changes in its programmatic needs prior to 
implementing Proposed Action projects. The implementation of these 
decisions and the schedules for their implementation depend on funding 
levels and allocation of the DOE/NNSA budget. Their implementation also 
depends on the results of NNSA's continuing assessment of its mission 
needs and of LLNL's role in meeting those needs.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on November 22, 2005.
Linton F. Brooks,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
[FR Doc. 05-23457 Filed 11-28-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P