J-S57039-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

DEONTE SATCHELL

Appellee No. 610 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered July 12, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No: CP-23-CR-0004850-2011

BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY, and STABILE, JJ.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2015

Deonte Satchell received a sentence of time served (167 days) to 23 

months in jail plus probation for brutally raping and assaulting his girlfriend. 

In my view, the Majority does not apply the applicable legal standards 

correctly in evaluating whether the trial court’s sentence is unreasonable. 

By applying applicable legal standards correctly, I would hold the sentence is 

unreasonably lenient. The law does not support the trial court’s reasons for 

deviating well below the applicable range of the Sentencing Guidelines.1 

Further, the trial court did not properly account for the serious nature of 

Appellee’s crimes and the protection of the public. I respectfully dissent.

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1 204 Pa. Code §§ 303.1-.18(c).
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The Sentencing Code2sets forth our procedure for reviewing the 

discretionary aspects of sentences when a substantial question exists3that 

the sentence is inappropriate:

(c) Determination on appeal.--The appellate court shall 

vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing 

court with instructions if it finds:

(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the 

sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines 

erroneously;

(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing 

guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the 

application of the guidelines would be clearly 

unreasonable; or

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing 

guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

In all other cases, the appellate court shall affirm the sentence 

imposed by the sentencing court.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c) (emphases added); see also Commonwealth v. 

Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 963-67 (Pa. 2007) (setting forth the legal standard 

under which this Court reviews the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

imposed outside of the Sentencing Guidelines’ range). The Majority 

accurately and thoroughly recounts our standard of review. However, it 

____________________________________________

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9701-81.

3

I agree with the Majority that the Commonwealth’s claim that “that the 

trial court imposed an unreasonable sentence outside of the guidelines and 

did not justify its sentence with sufficient reasons raises a substantial

question in this case.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 946 A.2d at 767, 770 

n.6 (Pa. Super. 2008), aff’d per curiam, 971 A.2d 1121 (Pa. 2009).
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does not mention the Sentencing Guidelines that apply to Appellee’s 

offenses. 

Reference to the Guidelines highlights the leniency of Appellee’s 

sentence. Under the applicable Guidelines, rape and involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse (IDSI) are Level 5 offenses: 

Level 5 provides sentence recommendations for the most violent 

offenders and those with major drug convictions . . . . The 

primary purposes of the sentencing options at this level are 

punishment commensurate with the seriousness of the criminal 

behavior and incapacitation to protect the public.

204 Pa. Code § 303.11(b)(5). Appellee’s rape and IDSI convictions have 

offense gravity scores (OGSs) of 12. Appellee, who had no prior convictions, 

has a prior record score (PRS) of 0. The Guidelines range for an OGS of 12 

and a PRS of 0 is 48 – 66 months, and the aggravated/mitigated ranges are 

+/- 12 months. See 204 Pa. Code §§ 303.15-.16. Thus, the minimum 

suggested mitigated-range sentence called for Appellee to serve three years 

in prison. Instead, the trial court imposed a sentence with a maximum

incarceration (two years less one day), i.e., one year less than the 

minimum suggested mitigated-range sentence.4

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4 The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing’s 2013 Annual Report further 

highlights the unusually lenient nature of Appellee’s sentence. See

Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, Annual Report, at 59, Table 7 

(2013), available at, http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-andresearch/annual-reports/2013/view (last accessed Feb. 18, 2015). In 2013, 

the year Appellee was sentenced, only 5 out of 133 convicted rapists 

received a county jail sentence (as Appellee did). One offender received 

probation. Similarly, in 2013, 6 out of 218 offenders convicted of IDSI 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The fact that the sentence here is outside of the Guidelines is central 

to the Commonwealth’s argument. In fact, at the sentencing hearing, the 

Commonwealth conceded that a mitigated-range sentence would be 

acceptable, but strenuously argued for the trial court to sentence within the 

Guidelines. I am aware that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory. See, 

e.g., Walls, 926 A.2d at 961-62 & n.3. The Sentencing Code nonetheless 

requires a trial court to consider the Guidelines and explain on the record the

reasons for imposing a sentence outside of the Guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9721(b). The Sentencing Code further requires this Court to examine 

outside-the-Guidelines sentences for unreasonableness instead of clear 

unreasonableness for inside-the-Guidelines sentences. Id. § 9781(c)(2) and 

(3). Here, like in Walls, the “the sentencing court considered the 

guidelines.” Walls, 926 A.2d at 967. However, unlike in Walls, the trial 

court failed to provide proper justification for departing from the Guidelines. 

Cf. id.

This Court determines whether a sentencing court abused its discretion 

as follows:

(d) Review of record.--In reviewing the record the appellate 

court shall have regard for:

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

received a county jail sentence. Two offenders (presumably one was 

Appellee) received probation. I am aware that trial courts sentence 

individual defendants, and cannot and should not tailor sentences to fit 

statewide data. I provide these statistics only to highlight the unusually 

lenient nature of Appellee’s sentence.
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(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation.

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d). In Walls, our Supreme Court described this 

standard as a “component of the jurisprudential standard of review 

for an abuse of discretion.” Walls, 926 A.2d at 962 (emphasis added). 

Thus, the § 9781(d) factors are how this Court determines whether a 

sentencing court abused its discretion.

The Majority mentions § 9781, but fails to apply it. While a trial court 

has wide latitude in imposing sentence, its discretion is not unfettered or 

absolute. Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 53-54 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(“In fashioning a sentence, we have acknowledged that trial courts are 

vested with great, but not unfettered discretion.”) (internal quotation 

omitted); Commonwealth v. Whitman, 880 A.2d 1250, 1252 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (“While sentencing courts do possess broad discretion, that discretion 

is not unfettered and remains subject to appellate review.”), rev’d in part on 

other grounds per curiam, 918 A.2d 115 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. 

Cornish, 589 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. Super. 1991); see also Walls, 926 A.2d 

at 968 (Baer, J., concurring) (“An appellate court should vacate a sentence 

where the trial court provides no basis, or an unreasonable basis, for the 

deviation [from the Guidelines].”). 
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Our standard of review is not some talismanic key that closes the door 

to appellate review. Walls counsels that we must evaluate the 

reasonableness of the sentence using the § 9781(d) factors:

[U]nder the Sentencing Code an appellate court is to exercise its 

judgment in reviewing a sentence outside the sentencing 

guidelines to assess whether the sentencing court imposed a 

sentence that is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c), (d).

Yet, what makes a sentence “unreasonable” is not defined in the 

statute. Generally speaking, “unreasonable” commonly connotes 

a decision that is “irrational” or “not guided by sound judgment.” 

THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 2084 (2d 

ed. 1987); see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903 (words to be construed 

according to their common and approved usage). While a 

general understanding of unreasonableness is helpful, in this 

context, it is apparent that the General Assembly has intended 

the concept of unreasonableness to be a fluid one, as 

exemplified by the four factors set forth in Section 9781(d) to be 

considered in making this determination. Indeed, based upon 

the very factors set out in Section 9781(d), it is clear that the 

General Assembly intended the concept of unreasonableness to 

be inherently a circumstance-dependent concept that is flexible 

in understanding and lacking precise definition. Cf. United 

States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining 

concept or reasonableness in context of sentencing matters).

Walls, 926 A.2d at 963.

The Walls court declined to fashion any “concrete rules,” except that 

we must look to §§ 9781(d) and 9721(b) to analyze the reasonableness of a 

sentence. Moreover, although our Supreme Court has stated that this Court 

should “infrequently” find a sentence unreasonable, Walls, 926 A.2d 964, it 

did not hold this Court may never reverse a sentence as unreasonably 

excessive or lenient. Even after Walls, we have found sentences 

unreasonable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Daniel, 30 A.3d 494, 499 
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(Pa. Super. 2011) (holding trial court’s reasons did not justify 111⁄2 – 23 

month sentence for aggravated assault); Wilson, 946 A.2d at 769 (holding 

trial court’s reasons did not justify 111⁄2 – 23 month sentence for robbery 

and burglary).

Because the Majority has mentioned the § 9781(d) factors only in 

passing, I will apply the factors myself. I look first to “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 

defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d)(1). Appellee raped and assaulted his 

girlfriend by using physical force to subdue her despite her repeated, explicit 

pleas to stop. At sentencing, the trial court first acknowledged the 

seriousness of Appellee’s crimes, stating that “[t]his type of rape is so 

destructive because it betrays the fundamental basis of a loving 

relationship.” N.T. Sentencing, 7/12/13, at 4. Yet, the trial court later 

minimized the depravity of Appellee’s conduct, stating that the rape “lacked 

the attendant circumstances associated with most rapes. This crime did not 

involve a fiend lurking in a park, nor a burglar attacking [a] homeowner, nor 

a lothario on a first date with his prey.” Trial Court Opinion 3/10/14, at 13.

The trial court provided no support for its bald assertion that “most 

rapes” involve sensational attacks on unsuspecting strangers or date rapes, 

and there is none in the record. In fact, the opposite is true: most sexual 
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assault victims know the perpetrators.5 It is true in this case, too. The 

victim and Appellee were in a relationship, lived together, and attended the 

same church. I agree with the Commonwealth that this case fits the 

unfortunate, common profile of domestic assault. Appellee and the victim 

once had a loving relationship, and there was a possibility for reconciliation, 

which led to the victim’s unwillingness to prosecute Appellee. 

The trial court also noted that it had never seen a rape victim testify 

on the rapist’s behalf at sentencing. Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/14, at 13-14. 

This misses the point. As the Commonwealth notes, domestic violence 

victims commonly do not want the Commonwealth to prosecute. If the 

victim does not testify, the Commonwealth cannot even bring charges. For 

example, here the victim’s testimony was the sine qua non of the proof of 

forcible compulsion. Thus, where a victim wants to testify on behalf of the 

defendant, the case cannot proceed to a preliminary hearing or trial. 

The trial court also offered the speculative conclusion that the victim 

does not suffer from Battered Woman Syndrome. I realize that a sentencing 

judge must evaluate a wide range of material at sentencing, but Appellee 

here presented no evidence that supports the trial court’s nonprofessional 

____________________________________________

5

Intimate partners account for almost 30% of rapes or sexual assaults of 

females, and over 70% of female rape victims know their assailants. 

Shannan M. Catalano, National Crime Victimization Survey: Criminal 

Victimization, 2005, at 9 Table 9 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sept. 2006), 

available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv05.pdf.
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diagnosis. Appellee could have presented evidence in this regard, but he did 

not. Medical, psychological, and psychiatric diagnoses are properly left to 

qualified experts. Moreover, the trial court did not acknowledge that the 

victim was threatened by one of Appellee’s friends after she reported the 

rape to police. See N.T. Trial, 2/20/13, at 286. Also unmentioned is the 

fight that occurred between the victim and Appellee—while he was on bail 

and subject to a protection from abuse order—necessitating police 

involvement. See N.T. Sentencing, 5/24/13, at 70-71.

The Commonwealth also argues that the trial court failed to consider 

Appellee’s prior contact with law enforcement. The trial court should have 

given some weight, rather than none, to Appellee’s violation of the 

protection from abuse order while on bail. It also understated his arrest 

record. The trial court had little information regarding the facts or 

disposition of Appellee’s prior charges, except that they were withdrawn in 

Philadelphia Municipal Court. See N.T. Sentencing, 7/12/13, at 8-10. 

However, it repeatedly understated what little information it had. Appellee 

did not have “one prior arrest for simple assault.” Id.; Trial Court Opinion, 

3/10/14, at 4, 11. Appellee had been arrested at least twice, for robbery (a 

first-degree felony), simple assault, terroristic threats, and harassment. 

See N.T. Sentencing, 5/23/14 at 48. Though the charges were withdrawn, 

the trial court failed to give proper weight to Appellee’s arrest history 

because it was mistaken regarding that history. 
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Next, I consider the trial court’s opportunity to observe Appellee, and 

the results of the presentence investigation. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d)(2). 

Though I am skeptical that the record supports Appellee’s sincere 

remorsefulness, I agree with the Majority that we cannot reassess the trial 

court’s factual finding in this regard. 

Turning to the third factor, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d)(3), the trial court’s 

findings are either unsupported by the record, or do not support imposition 

of a lenient sentence.

The trial court opined that the victim’s statements at sentencing 

constituted “90%” of its motivation for imposing a lenient sentence. See

N.T. Sentencing, 7/12/13, at 5. While the victim’s wishes are certainly a 

valid consideration, they cannot be used to the exclusion of almost every 

other consideration. A sentencing court must consider, inter alia, the 

protection of the public and the impact of the offense on the community. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Thus, in addition to the victim’s wishes, a 

sentencing court must take into account the general deterrent effect of the 

sentence. Here, by relying almost entirely on the victim’s wishes, the trial 

court failed to take into account protection of the public and the impact of 

the offense on the community. 

Furthermore, a trial court may not “double count” factors already 

taken into account by the Guidelines. Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 

A.2d 721, 732 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc). For that reason, I would find 

error in using Appellee’s PRS of 0 to deviate below the mitigated range. The 
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Guidelines already account for Appellee’s lack of prior convictions. See 

Commonwealth v. Celestin, 825 A.2d 670, 679 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“The 

court’s reliance upon [the defendant’s lack of a prior record] was clearly 

misplaced since the guideline sentence recommendations already 

contemplate a defendant’s [PRS].”). 

Likewise, the trial court erred in relying on the fact that Appellee did 

not make use of a weapon during the rape. Had Appellee used or possessed 

a deadly weapon, the deadly weapon enhancement (DWE) sentencing 

matrixes—and not the basic matrix would have applied. The DWE matrixes 

include higher recommended Guidelines ranges. See 204 Pa. Code

§ 303.17. 

The trial court further erred in relying on Appellee’s lifetime 

registration requirement under Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (SORNA).6 Although it recognized SORNA registration is not 

a punishment, the trial court opined that the burden of SORNA registration is 

“arguably more severe than incarceration.” Trial Court Opinion 3/10/14, at 

15-17. SORNA registration is a collateral consequence of a conviction. It is 

not punishment. Commonwealth v. McDonough, 96 A.3d 1067, 1071 

____________________________________________

6 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-.41.
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(Pa. Super. 2014). I also do not believe that SORNA registration is 

“arguably worse” than actual incarceration.7

The Majority characterizes the trial court’s comments on Appellee’s 

prior record, the lack of a weapon, and SORNA consequences as a mere 

description of the circumstances of the case. The Majority charges the 

Commonwealth with taking the trial court’s statements out of context. 

Rather, it is the Majority that takes the trial court’s statements out of 

context. The record clearly shows that the trial court relied on these factors 

to justify imposing a sentence outside of the Guidelines.

During its statutorily required on-the-record colloquy of the reasons 

for deviating from the Sentencing Guidelines, the trial court stated that 

Appellee had a zero prior record score, N.T. Sentencing, 7/12/13, at 8, did 

not use a weapon, id. at 9, and will be subject to lifetime SORNA 

registration, id. at 6. See also id. at 12 (“Now in light of everything I’ve 

said, I’m deviating from [the Sentencing Guidelines].”). If the trial court’s 

oral colloquy is ambiguous, its written opinion makes clear that it relied on 

____________________________________________

7 The Majority erroneously categorizes the trial court’s use of SORNA 

registration as a description of the “particular circumstances of the case.” 

Majority Memorandum at 17. Nothing about SORNA, however, is particular 

to this case. All offenders convicted of rape must register for life as sex 

offenders. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14(d)(2), 9799.15(a)(3) (designating 

rape as a Tier III offense requiring lifetime registration). Indeed, if, as the 

trial court posited, SORNA registration is “arguably worse than incarceration” 

and a reason to mitigate here, then it is a reason to mitigate in every rape 

case. 
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these factors (incorrectly so, see supra) to deviate below the Sentencing 

Guidelines. Part B of the trial court’s opinion is entitled “Criteria for 

Deviation from Sentencing Guidelines.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/14, at 10. 

In Part B(1), the trial court stated “The [Appellee] had no prior history of 

violent behavior. In fact, the [Appellee] has no prior criminal history (i.e., a 

zero [prior] record score).” Id. at 11 (citation of notes of testimony 

omitted); see also id. at 18 (suggesting that the sentence is not manifestly 

unreasonable because Appellee “had no prior criminal history”). Again, in 

Part D of its opinion, the trial court stated its believe that SORNA registration 

is “arguable more severe than incarceration.” Id. at 15-17.

By sentencing Appellee to less than two years in jail, the trial court 

ensured that it—and not the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole—

was the parole authority. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9775. At sentencing, the trial 

court noted that the Board of Probation and Parole often does not grant 

parole to sex offenders upon the expiration of their minimum sentences. 

N.T. Sentencing, 5/24/13, at 51-53. It accordingly expressed concern that, 

if it imposed a sentence at the bottom of the mitigated range (3 – 6 years), 

Appellee would remain in prison long after he served the minimum sentence. 

Id. at 56; see also Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/14, at 15 & n. 10. The trial 

court opined “that a prolonged incarceration of [Appellee] just might in the 

long run negatively impact the safety of [the] public and ‘make [Appellee] a 

bitter parolee, and a greater danger to the community.’” Trial Court 

Opinion, 3/10/14, at 11 (quoting N.T. Sentencing, 7/12/13, at 8-9)). I fail 
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to see how prolonged incarceration or parole would make Appellee a

greater danger to the community than would a short stint in jail followed by 

release into the community at large. I do not believe it is appropriate for a 

trial court to speculate regarding a defendant’s expected release date on 

state parole. Here, the trial court allowed its distaste for the Board of 

Probation and Parole’s parole decisions for sex offenders to color its 

sentencing decision. 

Finally, I review the applicable Sentencing Guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9781(d)(4). As in Daniel, this sentence is not a “slight departure from 

those recommendations.” Daniel, 30 A.3d at 499. Appellee used force to 

overpower, assault, and rape his paramour. Despite the violent nature of 

Appellee’s crimes, the trial court’s maximum aggregate sentence of 

incarceration (two years less one day) is one year less than the minimum

suggested mitigated Guidelines ranges (three years). The trial court’s 

findings do not support its departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. 

Although the trial court heavily emphasized the victim’s forgiveness of 

Appellee and the potential for rehabilitation, the sentence must still be 

consistent with the gravity of the offense. See Wilson, 946 A.2d at 775 

(“Here, the [trial] court did not but should have recognized the brutal nature 

of the acts Wilson committed.”); Celestin, 825 A.2d at 681-82 (“On 

remand, we remind the trial court that its sentence must reflect not just the 

rehabilitative needs of Mr. Celestin, but also the gravity of the offense and 

protection of the public.”). 
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The facts of this case are a depressingly common feature of American 

life. Appellee committed a depraved act of violence against his domestic 

partner. When charges were filed, the victim had second thoughts and did 

not want to testify or see her boyfriend go to prison. These facts are not 

unusual or unique and do not, therefore, justify a sentence well below the 

mitigated range of the Sentencing Guidelines. The unreasonably lenient 

sentence imposed fails to account for the serious, violent nature of 

Appellee’s crimes, and it fails to accord the citizens of this Commonwealth 

the protection they deserve.

Under the Majority’s analysis, it is hard to envision how we could 

vacate any sentence on appeal. A trial court has wide discretion in 

sentencing, but that does not mean we must act as a rubber stamp for trial 

courts on appeal.8

Certainly, the victim’s forgiveness of Appellee and his need for 

rehabilitation are relevant factors at sentencing. Indeed, these factors may 

suggest the appropriateness of a mitigated sentence, something the 

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8

In fact, Article V, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees the right 

of appeal. I realize that we have rejected a constitutional challenge to 

§ 9781, which limits the right to challenge the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Chilcote, 578 A.2d 429, 

435-37 (Pa. Super. 1990), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 625 

A.2d 614 (Pa. 1993). However, I am sympathetic to the argument that 

erecting higher and higher arcane procedural barriers runs afoul of Article V, 

§ 9 when those limitations become unreasonable.
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Commonwealth conceded here. These factors, however, do not obviate the 

social and legal imperative that an offender’s punishment must reflect the 

seriousness of his crimes and ensure the protection of the public. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9721(b), 9781(d). The sentence here belies adequate 

consideration of these two items. Rather, this case is like Daniel, where we 

concluded that the defendant’s drug addiction and acceptance of 

responsibility by pleading no contest were insufficient reasons to impose a 

111⁄2 – 23 month sentence for an aggravated assault resulting in serious 

bodily injury to the victim. Daniel, 30 A.3d at 498-99. This case is like 

Wilson, where we held the defendant’s drug dependence and stated 

penitence, did not justify a 111⁄2 – 23 month sentence for his guilty pleas to 

robbery and burglary. Wilson, 946 A.2d at 774-75. 

In imposing sentence, the trial court unreasonably placed too much 

weight on the wishes of the victim, and failed to account for the serious 

nature of Appellee’s offenses and the protection of the public. It also relied 

on factors that were either irrelevant or already accounted for by the 

Guidelines. The trial court appears to have used the victim’s wishes and its 

disagreement with the Board of Probation and Parole’s practices regarding 

parole of sex offenders to keep Appellee in county jail, which resulted in the 

trial court imposing an overly lenient sentence. I would vacate and remand 

for resentencing. Hence, I respectfully dissent.