II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 178 

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in 

Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and 

harassment of these communities inside and outside China. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 17, 2019 

Mr. RUBIO (for himself, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. GARDNER, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. 

CORNYN, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Mr. DAINES, Mr. COONS, Mr. MORAN, Mr. 

KAINE, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. COTTON, Mr. MERKLEY, 

Ms. WARREN, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mr. MARKEY, and Mr. KING) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic 

Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary 

detention, torture, and harassment of these communities 

inside and outside China. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Uyghur Human Rights 

5 Policy Act of 2019’’. 


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1 SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. 

2 The purpose of this Act is to direct United States 

3 resources to address gross violations of universally recog4 nized human rights, including the mass internment of over 

5 1,000,000 Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim eth6 nic minorities in China and the intimidation and threats 

7 faced by United States citizens and legal permanent resi8 dents. 

9 SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. 

10 In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional 

11 committees’’ means— 

12 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

13 Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee 

14 on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Hous15 ing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judi16 ciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 

17 Senate; and 

18 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

19 Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select 

20 Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Finan21 cial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and 

22 the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 

23 Representatives. 

24 SEC. 4. FINDINGS. 

25 Congress makes the following findings: 


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1 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

2 China (PRC) has a long history of repressing ap3 proximately 13,000,000 Turkic, moderate Sunni 

4 Muslims, particularly Uyghurs, in the nominally au5 tonomous Xinjiang region. These actions are in con6 travention of international human rights standards, 

7 including the Universal Declaration of Human 

8 Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 

9 Political Rights. 

10 (2) In recent decades, central and regional Chi11 nese government policies have systematically dis12 criminated against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and 

13 other Muslims in Xinjiang by denying them a range 

14 of civil and political rights, including the freedoms of 

15 expression, religion, movement, and a fair trial, 

16 among others. 

17 (3) Increased unrest in the Xinjiang region as 

18 a result of the central government’s severe repres19 sion is used in Orwellian fashion by the Government 

20 of the People’s Republic of China as evidence of 

21 ‘‘terrorism’’ and ‘‘separatism’’ and as an excuse for 

22 further disproportionate response. 

23 (4) In 2014, Chinese authorities launched their 

24 latest ‘‘Strike Hard against Violent Extremism’’ 

25 campaign, in which the pretext of wide-scale, interVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:42 Jan 26, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S178.IS S178

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1 nationally linked threats of terrorism were used to 

2 justify pervasive restrictions on, and gross human 

3 rights violations of, the ethnic minority communities 

4 of Xinjiang. 

5 (5) Those policies included— 

6 (A) pervasive, high-tech surveillance across 

7 the region, including the arbitrary collection of 

8 biodata, including DNA samples from children, 

9 without their knowledge or consent; 

10 (B) the use of QR codes outside homes to 

11 gather information on how frequently individ12 uals pray; 

13 (C) facial and voice recognition software 

14 and ‘‘predictive policing’’ databases; and 

15 (D) severe restrictions on the freedom of 

16 movement across the region. 

17 (6) Chinese security forces have never been held 

18 accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in 

19 Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya 

20 (2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of 

21 Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014). 

22 (7)(A) The August 2016 transfer of former 

23 Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen 

24 Quanguo to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary 


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1 prompted an acceleration in the crackdown across 

2 the region. 

3 (B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used 

4 chilling political rhetoric to describe the purpose of 

5 government policy including ‘‘eradicating tumors’’ 

6 and ‘‘spray[ing] chemicals’’ on crops to kill the 

7 ‘‘weeds’’. 

8 (C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese 

9 cultural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and 

10 unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to 

11 state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as 

12 muqam (a musical tradition) and meshrep (tradi13 tional cultural gatherings), and due to elimination of 

14 the Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in 

15 Xinjiang schools and universities. 

16 (8) In 2017, credible reports found that family 

17 members of Uyghurs living outside of China had 

18 gone missing inside China, that Chinese authorities 

19 were pressuring those outside the country to return, 

20 and that individuals were being arbitrarily detained 

21 in large numbers. 

22 (9) There is ample credible evidence provided 

23 by scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, 

24 and think tanks substantiating the establishment by 

25 Chinese authorities of ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps. 


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1 (10) Independent organizations conducted 

2 interviews, including testimonies from Kayrat 

3 Samarkan, Omir Bekali, and Mihrigul Tursun, along 

4 with others who had been detained in such facilities, 

5 who described forced political indoctrination, torture, 

6 beatings, food deprivation, and solitary confinement, 

7 as well as uncertainty as to the length of detention, 

8 humiliation, and denial of religious, cultural, and lin9 guistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told 

10 by guards that the only way to secure release was 

11 to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty. Poor con12 ditions and lack of medical treatment at such facili13 ties appear to have contributed to the deaths of 

14 some detainees, including the elderly and infirm. 

15 Uyghurs Muhammed Salih Hajim (2018), Yaqupjan 

16 Naman (2018), Abdughappar Abdujappar (2018), 

17 Ayhan Memet (2018), Abdulreshit Seley Hajim 

18 (2018), Nurimangul Memet (2018), Adalet Teyip 

19 (2018), Abdulehed Mehsum (2017), Hesen Imin 

20 (2017), and Sawut Raxman (2017) reportedly died 

21 while in the custody of the Chinese authorities in 

22 ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps, without proper inves23 tigation of the circumstances. 

24 (11) Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now ob25 tained permanent residence or citizenship in other 


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1 countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment 

2 from Chinese officials. 

3 (12) Under pressure from the Government of 

4 the People’s Republic of China, countries have forc5 ibly returned Uyghurs to China in violation of the 

6 non-refoulement principle and their well-founded 

7 fear of persecution. States returning Uyghurs in8 clude Egypt (2017), the United Arab Emirates 

9 (2017), Malaysia (2011, 2013), Thailand (2011, 

10 2015), Laos (2010), Burma (2010), Cambodia 

11 (2009), Vietnam (2014), Kazakhstan (1999, 2001, 

12 2003, 2006), Uzbekistan (2007), Tajikistan (2011), 

13 Pakistan (2003, 2009, 2011), Nepal (2002), and 

14 India (2016). 

15 (13) Six journalists for Radio Free Asia’s 

16 Uyghur service have publicly detailed abuses their 

17 family members in Xinjiang have endured in re18 sponse to their work exposing abusive policies across 

19 the region. 

20 (14) Several United States-based companies are 

21 conducting business with Xinjiang authorities with22 out sufficient due diligence or safeguards to ensure 

23 their business operations do not create or contribute 

24 to human rights violations. 


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1 (15) The Government of the People’s Republic 

2 of China is increasingly investing in the ‘‘Belt and 

3 Road Initiative’’ across Xinjiang and throughout 

4 Central Asia, extending its influence through organi5 zations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza6 tion without regard to the political, cultural, or lin7 guistic rights of ethnic minorities. 

8 (16) The Secretary of State, Congressional-Ex9 ecutive Commission on China, Tom Lantos Human 

10 Rights Commission, and individual members of the 

11 executive branch and Congress have all expressed 

12 growing concern regarding the pervasive human 

13 rights abuses across Xinjiang and the ‘‘political re14 education’’ camps. 

15 (17) In August 2018, the United Nations Com16 mittee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination challenged 

17 the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

18 over abuses in Xinjiang, including the establishment 

19 of mass arbitrary detention camps. 

20 (18) Between August and September 2018, 

21 Chinese authorities responded to these allegations by 

22 either flatly denying them or insisting that the facili23 ties are ‘‘vocational training centers’’. 

24 (19) In September 2018, newly appointed 

25 United Nations High Commissioner for Human 


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1 Rights Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as 

2 High Commissioner the ‘‘deeply disturbing allega3 tions of large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs 

4 and other Muslim communities, in so-called re-edu5 cation camps across Xinjiang’’. 

6 (20) On September 18, 2018, the Washington 

7 Post editorial board wrote, ‘‘At stake is not just the 

8 welfare of the Uighurs, but also whether the tech9 nologies of the 21st century will be employed to 

10 smother human freedom.’’ 

11 (21) In December 2018 testimony before the 

12 Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and Inter13 national Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on 

14 Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Assistant 

15 Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 

16 Scott Busby testified that the number of those de17 tained in camps since April 2017 was ‘‘at least 

18 800,000 and possibly more than 2 million’’. 

19 (22) In December 2018, independent media re20 ports pointed to growing evidence of forced labor in 

21 the camps, as well as reports of individuals who have 

22 been released from camps being forced to labor in 

23 nearby factories for low wages under threat of being 

24 sent back to ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps. 


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1 (23) In December 2018 and January 2019, 

2 Chinese officials organized visits to ‘‘political reedu3 cation’’ camps in Xinjiang for a small group of for4 eign journalists and diplomats from 12 non-Western 

5 countries. In the months preceding the visits, inter6 national media reported that officials worked to re7 move security features from some ‘‘political reeduca8 tion’’ facilities, and coached detainees and area resi9 dents not to make negative comments about the 

10 camps. Reports also indicated that officials had 

11 transferred large numbers of detainees to detention 

12 facilities in other parts of China. 

13 (24) Experts have described the Xinjiang region 

14 as ‘‘a police state to rival North Korea, with a for15 malized racism on the order of South African apart16 heid’’ and the repression in the Xinjiang region as 

17 a ‘‘slow motion Tiananmen’’. 

18 SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

19 It is the sense of Congress that— 

20 (1) the President should condemn abuses 

21 against Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities in 

22 Xinjiang and call on Chinese President Xi Jinping 

23 to recognize the profound abuse and likely lasting 

24 damage of China’s current policies, and immediately 

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1 strictions on and ensure respect for internationally 

2 guaranteed human rights across the region, and 

3 allow for reestablishment of contact between those 

4 inside and outside China; 

5 (2) the United States Government should de6 velop a strategy to support the United Nations High 

7 Commissioner for Human Rights and numerous 

8 United Nations Special Rapporteurs’ urgent calls for 

9 immediate and unfettered access to Xinjiang, includ10 ing the ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps and instruct 

11 representatives of the United States at the United 

12 Nations to use the voice and vote of the United 

13 States to condemn the mass arbitrary detainment, 

14 torture, and forced labor of Turkic Muslims in the 

15 People’s Republic of China; 

16 (3) the Secretary of State should consider the 

17 applicability of existing authorities, including the 

18 Global Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of Public Law 

19 114–328), to impose targeted sanctions on members 

20 of the Government of the People’s Republic of 

21 China, the Chinese Communist Party, and state se22 curity apparatus, including Xinjiang Party Secretary 

23 Chen Quanguo and other officials credibly alleged to 

24 be responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang 

25 and elsewhere; 


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1 (4) the Secretary of State should fully imple2 ment the provisions of the Frank Wolf International 

3 Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114–281) and 

4 consider strategically employing sanctions and other 

5 tools under the International Religious Freedom Act 

6 (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.) and to employ measures re7 quired as part of the ‘‘Country of Particular Con8 cern’’ (CPC) designation for the Government of the 

9 People’s Republic of China that directly address par10 ticularly severe violations of religious freedom; 

11 (5) the Secretary of Commerce should review 

12 and consider the prohibition on the sale or provision 

13 of any United States-made goods or services to any 

14 state agent in Xinjiang, and add the Xinjiang 

15 branch of the Chinese Communist Party, the 

16 Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, and the Xinjiang 

17 Office of the United Front Work Department, or 

18 any entity acting on their behalf to facilitate the 

19 mass internment or forced labor of Turkic Muslims, 

20 to the ‘‘Entity List’’ administered by the Depart21 ment of Commerce; 

22 (6) the Secretary of State should explore appro23 priate mechanisms to establish a voluntary database 

24 to which United States citizens or permanent resi25 dent family members of the Uyghur diaspora can 


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1 provide details about missing family members, with 

2 a view towards pressing for information and ac3 countability from the Government of the People’s 

4 Republic of China, and take appropriate measures to 

5 expedite the asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 

6 and other Turkic Muslim minorities; 

7 (7) United States companies and individuals 

8 selling goods or services or otherwise operating in 

9 Xinjiang should take steps, including in any public 

10 or financial filings, to publicly assert that their com11 mercial activities are not contributing to human 

12 rights violations in Xinjiang or elsewhere in China 

13 and that their supply chains are not compromised by 

14 forced labor; 

15 (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation and ap16 propriate United States law enforcement entities 

17 should track and take steps to hold accountable offi18 cials from China who harass, threaten, or intimidate 

19 United States citizens and legal permanent resi20 dents, including Turkic Muslims, Uyghur-Americans, 

21 Chinese-Americans, and Chinese nationals legally 

22 studying or working in the United States; 

23 (9) the Secretary of State should work with tra24 ditional United States allies and partners to take 


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1 similar steps and coordinate closely on targeted 

2 sanctions and visa restrictions; and 

3 (10) the work of Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur lan4 guage service should be commended for providing a 

5 detailed and accurate account of current events fac6 ing Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China 

7 despite efforts by the Government of the People’s 

8 Republic of China to intimidate their reporting 

9 through threats and detention of family members 

10 living in China. 

11 SEC. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

13 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 

14 Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, 

15 shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees 

16 a classified and unclassified report to assess national and 

17 regional security threats posed by the crackdown across 

18 Xinjiang, the frequency with which Central and Southeast 

19 Asian governments are forcibly returning Turkic Muslim 

20 refugees and asylum seekers, and the transfer or develop21 ment of technology used by the Government of the Peo22 ple’s Republic of China that facilitates the mass intern23 ment and surveillance of Turkic Muslims, including tech24 nology relating to predictive policing and large-scale data 

25 collection and analysis. 


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1 (b) ANNEX.—The report required under subsection 

2 (a) shall include an annex with a list of all Chinese compa3 nies involved in the construction or operation of the ‘‘polit4 ical education’’ camps, and the provision or operation of 

5 surveillance technology or operations, across Xinjiang. 

6 SEC. 7. PROTECTING CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS OF THE 

7 UNITED STATES FROM INTIMIDATION AND 

8 COERCION. 

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

10 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Fed11 eral Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Sec12 retary of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate 

13 congressional committees that outlines any and all efforts 

14 to provide information to and protect United States citi15 zens and residents, including ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese 

16 nationals legally studying or working temporarily in the 

17 United States who have experienced harassment or intimi18 dation by officials or agents of the Government of the Peo19 ple’s Republic of China and the Communist Party within 

20 the United States and those whose families in China have 

21 experienced threats or detention because of their work or 

22 advocacy. 

23 (b) DATABASE OF DETAINED FAMILY MEMBERS OF

24 UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS.—The Sec25 retary of State should explore appropriate mechanisms to 


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1 establish a voluntary database to which United States citi2 zens or permanent resident family members of the Uyghur 

3 diaspora can provide details about missing family mem4 bers, with a view towards pressing for information and ac5 countability from the Government of the People’s Republic 

6 of China and to take appropriate measures to expedite the 

7 asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic 

8 Muslim minorities. 

9 SEC. 8. REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. 

10 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date 

11 of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United 

12 States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appro13 priate congressional committees a report that— 

14 (1) describes the current status and reach of 

15 United States broadcasting to the Xinjiang region 

16 and Uyghur speaking communities globally, barriers 

17 to the free flow of news and information to these 

18 communities, and, if appropriate, detailed technical 

19 and fiscal requirements necessary to increase broad20 casting and other media to these communities glob21 ally; 

22 (2) describes efforts to intimidate Radio Free 

23 Asia and Voice of America reporters reporting on 

24 human rights issues in the People’s Republic of 

25 China; and 


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1 (3) in consultation with the Global Engagement 

2 Center at the Department of State, describes and 

3 assesses disinformation and propaganda by the Gov4 ernment of the People’s Republic of China or other 

5 members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

6 targeting Uyghur communities globally and efforts 

7 to downplay gross violations of universally recog8 nized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region 

9 and any activities or programs that address these ef10 forts. 

11 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con12 gress that the journalists of the Uyghur language service 

13 of Radio Free Asia should be highly commended for their 

14 reporting on the human rights and political situation in 

15 Xinjiang despite efforts to silence or intimidate their re16 porting through the detention of family members and rel17 atives by the Government of the People’s Republic of 

18 China. 

19 SEC. 9. ANNUAL REPORT. 

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

21 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 

22 the Secretary of State, after consulting relevant Federal 

23 agencies and civil society organizations, shall submit to the 

24 appropriate congressional committees and make available 


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1 on the website of Department of State an interagency re2 port that includes— 

3 (1) an assessment of the number of individuals 

4 detained in political ‘‘reeducation camps’’ and condi5 tions in the camps for detainees in the Xinjiang re6 gion, including whether detainees endure torture, 

7 forced renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment; 

8 (2) a description, as possible, of the geographic 

9 location of the camps and estimates of the number 

10 of people detained in such facilities; 

11 (3) a description, as possible, of the methods 

12 used by People’s Republic of China authorities to 

13 ‘‘reeducate’’ Uyghur detainees as well as the Peo14 ple’s Republic of China agencies in charge of reedu15 cation; 

16 (4) an assessment of the number of individuals 

17 being arbitrarily detained, including in pretrial de18 tention centers and prisons; 

19 (5) an assessment of forced labor in the camps 

20 and in regional factories for low wages under threat 

21 of being sent back to ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps; 

22 (6) a list of Chinese companies and industries 

23 benefiting from such labor, and a description of ac24 tions taken to address forced labor in Xinjiang con25 current with the People’s Republic of China’s Tier 


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1 3 designation under the 2018 Trafficking in Persons 

2 Report; 

3 (7) an assessment of the level of access People’s 

4 Republic of China authorities grant to diplomats, 

5 journalists, and others to the Xinjiang region and a 

6 description of measures used to impede efforts to 

7 monitor human rights conditions in the Xinjiang re8 gion; 

9 (8) an assessment of the repressive surveillance, 

10 detection, and control methods used by People’s Re11 public of China authorities in the Xinjiang region, 

12 and a list of individuals who hold senior leadership 

13 positions and are responsible for ‘‘high-tech’’ polic14 ing, mass incarceration, and reeducation efforts tar15 geting Uyghur and other predominately Muslim eth16 nic minorities in the Xinjiang region; and 

17 (9) a description of United States diplomatic ef18 forts to address the gross violations of universally 

19 recognized rights in the Xinjiang region and to pro20 tect asylum seekers from the region, including in 

21 multilateral institutions and through bilateral rela22 tions with the People’s Republic of China, the na23 tions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 

24 (OIC), and other countries. 


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1 (b) TERMINATION.—The Secretary of State may ter2 minate the report required under subsection (a) if the Sec3 retary certifies to the appropriate congressional commit4 tees that the gross violations of universally recognized 

5 human rights and mass detention of Uyghurs and other 

6 predominately Muslim ethnic minorities have ended in the 

7 Xinjiang region. 

8 SEC. 10. SPECIAL COORDINATOR AT THE DEPARTMENT OF 

9 STATE. 

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State should 

11 consider the establishment of a new position within the 

12 Department of State, the United States Special Coordi13 nator for Xinjiang, who will coordinate diplomatic, polit14 ical, public diplomacy, financial assistance, sanctions, 

15 counterterrorism, security resources, and congressional re16 porting requirements within the United States Govern17 ment to respond to the gross violations of universally rec18 ognized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region, 

19 including by addressing the mass detentions of Uyghurs 

20 and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, the de21 ployment of technologically advanced surveillance and po22 lice detection methods, and the counterterrorism and 

23 counter-radicalism claims used to justify the policies of the 

24 Government of the People’s Republic of China in Xinjiang. 


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1 (b) APPOINTMENT.—If the Secretary determines that 

2 establishment of the position described in subsection (a) 

3 is appropriate, the Secretary may appoint the Special Co4 ordinator from among officers and employees of the De5 partment of State. The Secretary may allow such officer 

6 or employee to retain the position (and the responsibilities 

7 associated with such position) held by such officer or em8 ployee prior to the appointment of such officer or employee 

9 to the position of Special Coordinator. 

10 (c) TERMINATION.—The Secretary of State may ter11 minate the Special Coordinator position 45 days after cer12 tifying to the appropriate congressional committees that 

13 the gross violations of universally recognized human rights 

14 and mass detention of Uyghurs and other predominately 

15 Muslim ethnic minorities have ended in the Xinjiang re16 gion. 

17 (d) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary shall consult 

18 with the chairman and ranking minority members of the 

19 appropriate congressional committees prior to the designa20 tion of the Special Coordinator under this section. 

Æ 


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