[Cite as State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574.] 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CODELUPPI, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574.] 

Criminal procedure—Motion to suppress—Particularity of grounds for 

suppression of field sobriety tests—Crim.R. 47. 

(No. 2013-0186—Submitted November 20, 2013—Decided April 17, 2014.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 11CA010133, 

2012-Ohio-5812. 

____________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

A highly detailed pleading of the facts and law is not required to satisfy the notice 

requirements of State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 636 N.E.2d 319 

(1994), and to trigger the right to a hearing on a motion to suppress.

____________________ 

LANZINGER, J. 

{¶ 1} In this case, we apply the holding of State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio 

St.3d 54, 636 N.E.2d 319 (1994), and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 

and remand this case. 

I. Case Background

{¶ 2} On August 3, 2011, Corrine Codeluppi was charged by citation 

with speeding, a minor misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4511.21, and with 

operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OVI”), a first-degree misdemeanor in 

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A). There was no video recording of the traffic stop 

and the field sobriety tests conducted. The only discovery evidence provided to 

Codeluppi was the police report of the arrest. The report indicated that the lawenforcement officer administered the three field sobriety tests that are 

standardized by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) 
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guidelines: (1) horizontal-gaze nystagmus, (2) walk and turn, and (3) one-leg 

stand. The report described Codeluppi’s actions and the law-enforcement 

officer’s findings, but did not describe the instructions and demonstrations given 

by the officer prior to each test. 

{¶ 3} Codeluppi filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during 

the traffic stop, for which the court set a hearing and pretrial conference. The day 

before the hearing, the state filed its response to the motion, requesting that the 

motion be denied pursuant to Crim.R. 47 as lacking sufficient particularity on the 

issue of alleged improper administration of field sobriety tests. The trial court 

denied the suppression motion that same day, stating that the motion lacked 

sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor and the court on notice of the issues 

to be decided. The court ordered the pretrial conference to proceed as scheduled. 

{¶ 4} The next day, Codeluppi filed a motion for leave to file a 

supplemental brief in support of her motion to suppress and a motion for 

reconsideration. But at the pretrial, she pled no contest. The trial court found her 

guilty of OVI, dismissed the speeding charge, and sentenced her to 30 days in jail 

and a $1,000 fine. Twenty-seven days of the sentence and $400 of the fine were 

suspended, and she was placed on probation for one year with a 180-day license 

suspension allowing occupational driving privileges. 

{¶ 5} Codeluppi appealed the denial of her motion to suppress to the 

Ninth District Court of Appeals. In a two-to-one decision, the court of appeals 

affirmed. The lead opinion agreed that the motion to suppress had “generally set 

forth numerous legal issues regarding probable cause, substantial compliance with 

NHTSA guidelines in field sobriety testing, and possible constitutional 

violations.” (Emphasis sic.) 2012-Ohio-5812 at ¶ 24. Nevertheless, it found the 

motion deficient in that it failed 
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to state with particularity any factual allegations as to (1) how 

Officer Young allegedly lacked probable cause to further detain 

Ms. Codeluppi after initiating the traffic stop, and (2) the respects 

in which Officer Young allegedly violated provisions of the 

NHTSA guidelines in administering the Field Sobriety Tests. 

(Emphasis sic.) Id. The dissenting judge did not agree that more factual detail 

was needed, because Codeluppi had specifically identified the code section and 

NHTSA standards that had not been met as well as the specific tests being 

challenged. The dissent concluded, “The State could have had no doubt what the 

basis for Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress was.” Id. at ¶ 44 (Belfance, J., 

dissenting). 

{¶ 6} Codeluppi appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction on 

the first proposition of law: “When a defendant files a Motion to Suppress, a 

highly detailed pleading of facts and law is not required to satisfy the Shindler

notice requirements and to trigger the right to a hearing[;] thus the trial court errs 

in dismissing the Motion without a hearing.” 135 Ohio St.3d 1431, 2013-Ohio1857, 986 N.E.2d 1021. 

II. Legal Analysis 

Standard of Review 

{¶ 7} The lead opinion of the court of appeals was mistaken in 

employing the abuse-of-discretion standard of review in this matter. Normally, 

appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and 

fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. 

When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the 

role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve 

factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. 
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Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972. 

Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s 

findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible 

evidence. State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 1 OBR 57, 

437 N.E.2d 583. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court 

must then independently determine, without deference to the 

conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the 

applicable legal standard. State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio 

App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539. 

Id. 

{¶ 8} Here, the trial court never acted as the trier of fact, because the 

motion to suppress was denied without a hearing. Whether the motion to suppress 

satisfied Crim.R. 47’s minimum standards is a legal question. Crim.R. 47 states: 

An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. 

A motion, other than one made during trial or hearing, shall be in 

writing unless the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state 

with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall set 

forth the relief or order sought. It shall be supported by a 

memorandum containing citations of authority, and may also be 

supported by an affidavit. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 9} A trial court must hold a suppression hearing if the motion meets 

Crim.R. 47’s minimum standards. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 636 N.E.2d 319, at 

syllabus. The lead opinion of the court of appeals reasoned that Traf.R. 11(E), 

like Crim.R. 12(F), does not mandate a hearing on every suppression motion. It 
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determined that the trial court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing would 

not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 2012-Ohio-5812, ¶ 23. But 

questions of law are to be reviewed de novo. State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 

295, 2007-Ohio-4163, 871 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 8. 

Particularity in a Motion to Suppress

{¶ 10} We have held that “[i]n order to require a hearing on a motion to 

suppress evidence, the accused must state the motion’s legal and factual bases 

with sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor and the court on notice of the 

issues to be decided.” Shindler, syllabus. Failure to include or particularly state 

the factual and legal basis for a motion to suppress waives that issue. See 

Defiance v. Kretz, 60 Ohio St.3d 1, 573 N.E.2d 32 (1991). 

{¶ 11} Codeluppi challenged the traffic stop, the officer’s probable cause 

to arrest, his failure to conduct field sobriety tests in substantial compliance with 

NHTSA guidelines, and statements obtained in violation of her Fifth and Sixth 

Amendment rights. The state’s response complained only about the specificity of 

the motion regarding the alleged improper administration of the field sobriety 

tests. The admissibility of results of field sobriety tests is governed by R.C. 

4511.19(D)(4)(b). That subdivision provides: 

In any criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division 

(A) or (B) of this section, * * * if a law enforcement officer has 

administered a field sobriety test to the operator of the vehicle 

involved in the violation and if it is shown by clear and convincing 

evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial 

compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible, 

and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the 

time the tests were administered, including, but not limited to, any 
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testing standards then in effect that were set by the national 

highway traffic safety administration, all of the following apply: 

(i) The officer may testify concerning the results of the 

field sobriety test so administered. 

(ii) The prosecution may introduce the results of the field 

sobriety test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the 

criminal prosecution * * *. 

(iii) * * * [I]f the testimony or evidence is admissible under 

the Rules of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or 

evidence and the trier of fact shall give it whatever weight the trier 

of fact considers to be appropriate. 

In other words, the results of the field sobriety tests are not admissible at trial 

unless the state shows by clear and convincing evidence that the officer 

administered the test in substantial compliance with NHTSA guidelines. A 

motion to suppress is an appropriate pretrial proceeding designed to determine the 

admissibility of this evidence. 

{¶ 12} Codeluppi’s motion to suppress requested the exclusion of 

1. Any and all evidence obtained by the State of Ohio 

subsequent to the unlawful and unconstitutional traffic stop and 

seizure of the Defendant herein; 

2. Any and all evidence obtained by the State of Ohio as 

the fruit of the unconstitutional arrest of the Defendant; 

3. Any and all standardized field sobriety test observations 

and/or results as said field tests were not performed in substantial 

compliance with NHTSA guidelines; and/or 
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4. Any and all oral or written custodial statements obtained 

from or made by the Defendant. 

The memorandum in support also asked the court to consider the following 

specific claims in determining whether there was probable cause to arrest: 

1) The tests were administered under duress resulting in 

the Defendant’s emotional and/or physical condition (independent 

of alcohol) affecting the Defendant’s ability to perform the field 

sobriety tests; 

2) The tests were administered under difficult 

environmental conditions; 

3) The officer’s analysis of the Defendant’s performance 

on these tests was biased resulting in inaccurate recording at the 

police station. 

The memorandum continued: “It is the Defendant’s contention, and the State is 

hereby put on notice, that the testing law enforcement officer failed to instruct, 

conduct, evaluate, administer, and/or record the standardized field sobriety tests 

used in the within matter in substantial compliance with [NHTSA] Guidelines.” 

{¶ 13} Shindler does not require that a defendant set forth the basis for 

suppression in excruciating detail. Instead, the question is whether the language 

used provides sufficient notice to the state. After all, “[t]he motion to suppress is 

merely a procedural vehicle to ‘put the ball into play’ and serve notice that the 

defendant intends to have the state meet its legislatively mandated burden of 

demonstrating compliance with any and all challenged regulations and 

requirements.” Weiler & Weiler, Baldwin’s Ohio Driving Under the Influence 

Law, 2012-2013, Section 9:13, at 265 (2012). Codeluppi’s motion meets this 
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standard. She alleged that the officer had not conducted the field sobriety tests in 

substantial compliance with NHTSA guidelines as required by R.C. 

4511.19(D)(4)(b). This statement was sufficient to identify the issues Codeluppi 

was raising. We agree with the dissenting judge below that the state could have no 

doubt about the basis for the motion to suppress. 

{¶ 14} The primary source of evidence normally available to an OVI 

defendant—a video recording of the field sobriety tests—was not available in this 

case. Defense counsel had no readily available reliable evidence from which 

counsel could formulate more particularized grounds regarding the police 

officer’s failure to substantially comply with NHTSA guidelines. Codeluppi 

therefore provided notice of legally significant facts to the extent that the facts 

were available, rendering her motion more than a mere fishing expedition. 

III. Conclusion

{¶ 15} We hold that a highly detailed pleading of the facts and law is not 

required to satisfy the notice requirements of Shindler and to trigger the right to a 

hearing on a motion to suppress. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court 

of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for a hearing on the motion to 

suppress. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 

concur. 

PFEIFER, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 

appeals. 

____________________ 

 Toni L. Morgan, North Ridgeville City Prosecutor, for appellee. 

 Polito, Paulozzi, Rodstrom & Burke, L.L.P., and Joseph T. Burke, for 

appellant. 
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Gregg Marx, Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jocelyn S. Kelly, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 

Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 

 John T. Forristal, urging reversal for amicus curiae Cuyahoga Criminal 

Defense Lawyers Association. 

 Paul A. Griffin Co., L.P.A., and Paul A. Griffin, urging reversal for 

amicus curiae Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 

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