SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1442-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROBERT O. GOODSON, a/k/a

BOBBY EARLY, and BOBBY

GOODSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Argued October 30, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Koblitz, Whipple and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Indictment No. 16-11-0780.

Zachary G. Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. 

Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Zachary G. 

Markarian, of counsel and on the brief).

Milton S. Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney General/

Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for 

respondent (Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 3, 2019
2

A-1442-17T4

Prosecutor, attorney; Milton S. Leibowitz, of counsel 

and on the brief).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Robert O. Goodson appeals from his October 27, 2017

conviction after his motion to suppress the evidence was denied. Because the 

facts track very closely with those in State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263 (2017), we 

reverse, suppressing the evidence found in defendant's car and home, vacating

his guilty plea, and remanding for further proceedings. 

I. Facts Developed at the Suppression Hearing.

On August 6, 2016, Plainfield Detective Pierre McCall and three other 

officers were traveling in a police SUV, which, although unmarked, was a "well 

known police vehicle," equipped with lights and sirens. At approximately 9:00 

pm, on the "hot night," the officers turned onto Sumner Avenue, a narrow 

residential street known to law enforcement as a "high crime narcotic area." 

Immediately after turning, they "observed a brown Honda parked on the 

west side of the street, facing southbound." The Honda was lawfully parked 

outside of defendant's residence and was "occupied by a black male," later 

identified as defendant, who was "sweating heavily." McCall testified that as 
3

A-1442-17T4

the officers passed defendant's car, "it appeared that he leaned back to shield 

himself out of our view." The officers then "backed up alongside [defendant's 

car]." 

McCall and another officer shined their "really bright" LED flashlights 

inside, and McCall asked defendant "his reason for being in the area." 

Defendant told the officers that he came out to the car to retrieve a tablet. 

McCall "believed there was more to it" because he could not see the tablet from 

where he was seated in the police SUV, so he stepped out of the SUV and 

approached defendant's driver's side door, shining his flashlight into the car. 

McCall asked defendant his address and defendant responded that he lived 

where he was parked. 

McCall could see a clear plastic baggie containing a green pill on the 

driver's side door armrest. He reached inside the car to retrieve the pill and 

ordered defendant out. As defendant exited, another officer smelled marijuana 

and asked defendant if he had any marijuana. Defendant replied he had 

marijuana in his pocket. Meanwhile, a third officer searched the car, finding a 

container of pills and heroin. 
4

A-1442-17T4

McCall placed defendant under arrest, handcuffed him, read him the

Miranda1 warnings, and asked if defendant would consent to a search of his 

home. Defendant refused to provide consent. McCall then informed defendant 

he would obtain a warrant. 

Another police SUV arrived containing four additional officers. 

Defendant's child's grandmother left the home, and an officer began to question 

her. Defendant then said he did not want anyone else involved and would 

consent to a search of the home. 

Because defendant had a foot injury and thus did not want to accompany 

officers to his third-floor apartment, he provided them with his keys and 

instruction. The officers recovered additional narcotics, paraphernalia, and a 

handgun. Defendant was subsequently indicted for various drug charges as well 

as illegal possession of the handgun.

Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to seconddegree possession of a firearm in the course of committing a drug offense, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a), and was sentenced on October 27, 2017, to eight years in 

prison with a forty-eight month parole disqualifier. 

Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5

A-1442-17T4

POINT I: THE COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED 

THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN STATE V. 

ROSARIO AND GRANTED THE MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS BECAUSE MR. GOODSON WAS 

DETAINED WITHOUT REASONABLE SUSPICION 

AFTER OFFICERS SAW HIM SITTING IN A 

LAWFULLY PARKED VEHICLE OUTSIDE OF HIS 

HOME SWEATING ON A HOT SUMMER 

EVENING.

A. MR. GOODSON WAS DETAINED WHEN 

OFFICERS STOPPED THEIR SUV IN THE ROAD 

ALONGSIDE HIS PARKED VEHICLE AND 

QUESTIONED HIM WHILE SHINING 

FLASHLIGHTS AT HIM.

B. OFFICERS LACKED REASONABLE 

ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL 

ACTIVITY TO JUSTIFY THE INVESTIGATIVE 

DETENTION OF MR. GOODSON.

C. BECAUSE THE INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 

WAS UNLAWFUL AND NO EXCEPTION TO THE 

EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES, THE 

CONTRABAND SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED 

BY THE OFFICERS MUST BE SUPPRESSED.

POINT II: BECAUSE MR. GOODSON WAS 

ARRESTED, HANDCUFFED, INITIALLY 

REFUSED CONSENT, AND DENIED GUILT, AND 

THERE WAS AN OVERWHELMING POLICE 

PRESENCE OUTSIDE HIS HOME WHEN POLICE 

REPEATEDLY REQUESTED CONSENT, MR. 

GOODSON'S CONSENT WAS NOT VOLUNTARY.

POINT III: A REMAND FOR RESENTENCING IS 

REQUIRED BECAUSE THE JUDGE FAILED TO 

INDIVIDUALLY CONSIDER MR. GOODSON AT 
6

A-1442-17T4

SENTENCING, AND INSTEAD APPLIED A 

BLANKET POLICY OF FINDING AGGRAVATING 

FACTOR NINE IN EVERY CASE.

II. Legal Standards.

"An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal 

case must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision, 

provided that those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the 

record.'" State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425–26 (2017) (quoting State v. Scriven, 

226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016)). It does so "because those findings 'are substantially 

influenced by [an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 

"feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Gamble, 218 

N.J. 412, 424–25 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 

N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We owe no deference to conclusions of law, which we

review de novo. State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015).

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, 

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey State Constitution, provide that "[t]he right of 

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. 

IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. "Warrantless searches and seizures presumptively 

violate those protections, but '[n]ot all police-citizen encounters constitute 
7

A-1442-17T4

searches or seizures for purposes of the warrant requirement.'" Rosario, 229 

N.J. at 271 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 

172 N.J. 117, 125 (2002)). 

One such encounter is a field inquiry, "a voluntary encounter between the 

police and a member of the public in which the police ask questions and do not 

compel an individual to answer." Ibid. "The test of a field inquiry is 'whether 

[a] defendant, under all of the attendant circumstances, reasonably believed he 

could walk away without answering any of [the officer's] questions.'" Id. at 

271–72 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 483 

(2001)). 

"In contrast to a field inquiry, an investigative detention . . . occurs during 

a police encounter when 'an objectively reasonable person' would feel 'that his 

or her right to move has been restricted.'" Id. at 272 (quoting Rodriguez, 172 

N.J. at 126); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) 

(plurality opinion) (holding that a person is seized for Fourth Amendment 

purposes when, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 

reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave"). The 

crucial distinction is that while a field inquiry does not constitute a seizure for 

the purposes of the federal and state constitutions, and thus requires no 
8

A-1442-17T4

particularized suspicion of criminal activity, an investigative detention must be 

supported by an officer's "reasonable and particularized suspicion . . . that an 

individual has just engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity." 

State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21

(1968)). An officer's "reasonable and particularized suspicion" should be "based 

on the totality of the circumstances." Ibid. An officer's subjective, good-faith 

hunch does not justify an investigatory stop, even if that hunch proves correct. 

See State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 (1997). 

"The United States Supreme Court has defined reasonable suspicion as 'a 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal 

activity.'" Stovall, 170 N.J. at 356 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 

690, 696 (1996)). "In justifying an investigatory detention based on reasonable 

suspicion, a police officer must 'be able to articulate something more than an 

"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch."'" Id. at 357 (quoting United 

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). 

III. The Car Search.

As was the case in Rosario, "[t]he key issue in this case lies in the 

distinction between a field inquiry and an investigative detention." 229 N.J. at 

272. Here, defendant was sitting in his lawfully parked car on a narrow, 
9

A-1442-17T4

residential street directly outside of his home when a police SUV containing 

four officers drove by him before backing up to stop alongside his car. The 

officers shined bright LED flashlights at defendant and into his car, before 

asking him what he was doing. After defendant said he lived there, and was 

fetching a reading tablet, one of the officers left the SUV to approach defendant, 

flashlight in hand, while another's flashlight also remained on defendant and his 

car. 

In Rosario, an officer pulled up to and parked his car behind the 

defendant's car at a perpendicular angle, effectively blocking the defendant's car 

from leaving. Id. at 268. The patrol car's "alley light" was aimed at the parked 

car. Ibid. The officer then approached the car, asking for the defendant's 

"identification and driver's license." Ibid. Our Court found those circumstances 

constituted an investigative detention requiring reasonable and articulable 

suspicion. Id. at 273.

The Court rejected the argument that "because [the] defendant was right 

outside her residence, she could have left her vehicle, walked away from [the 

officer], and entered her home." Ibid.; see also Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 129 ("[A]s 

a practical matter, citizens almost never feel free to end an encounter initiated 

by the police."). "[S]uch police activity reasonably would, and should, prompt 
10 A-1442-17T4

a person to think that she must stay put and submit to whatever interaction with 

the police officer was about to come." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 273. 

The State did not negate that defendant here was blocked in by the police 

SUV, with other cars parked ahead and behind it. A reasonable person would

not have felt free to leave under these circumstances when a police SUV backed 

up to stop alongside his car on a narrow residential street. "Our case law 

instructs members of the public to submit to a police officer's show of authority, 

not to look for an exit." Id. at 274–75. "Case law tells people to obey words 

and deeds of law enforcement that communicate demands for directed behavior 

and to raise constitutional objections thereafter." Id. at 275.

The moment Detective McCall stepped out of his SUV, flashlight in hand, 

supported by the three other officers, no reasonable person would have felt free 

to leave, and such an intrusion on an individual's liberty requires more than an 

officer's subjective belief or hunch. See State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 343 

(2014). 

As our Supreme Court stated, 

[a] person sitting in a lawfully parked car outside [his 

or] her home who suddenly finds [himself or] herself 

blocked in by a patrol car that shines a flood light into 

the vehicle, only to have the officer exit his [or her] 

marked car and approach the driver's side of the 

vehicle, would not reasonably feel free to leave.
11 A-1442-17T4

[Rosario, 229 N.J. at 273.]

That is almost precisely what occurred here. Thus, "defendant was faced with 

an investigative detention" and we must consider "whether, based on a totality 

of the circumstances, the encounter was 'justified at its inception' by a reasonable 

and articulable suspicion of criminal activity." Id. at 276 (quoting Terry, 392 

U.S. at 20).

Being in a high-crime area, as here, is relevant in the totality of the 

circumstances analysis. See State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 22–27 (2004)

(reviewing precedent). We have, however, "rejected the notion that mere 

presence in an area known for its drug activity" in and of itself justifies 

reasonable suspicion. State v. Dangerfield, 339 N.J. Super. 229, 238 (App. Div. 

2001), aff'd as modified, 171 N.J. 446 (2002).

No compounding indicia of criminal activity existed and defendant was 

not known to the officers. Defendant's presence in a high-crime area alone did 

not amount to reasonable suspicion. As we stated in similar circumstances, if 

that were so, "a significant portion of our urban population would be susceptible 

to constant police investigation. In our view that is an entirely unacceptable 

proposition." State v. Stampone, 341 N.J. Super. 247, 252 (App. Div. 2001). 
12 A-1442-17T4

The fact that defendant was sweating on an August evening is also not 

significant. See Arthur, 149 N.J. at 10–11. Detective McCall's perception that 

defendant leaned back as the officers passed him in an effort to hide himself is 

also not significant; again, Rosario is instructive. There, our Court recognized 

the long-standing distinction between furtive movements made during the 

course of a legitimate detention, which might give rise to "a reasonable suspicion 

that the person may be armed and dangerous or probable cause . . . that the 

person possesses criminal contraband," Rosario, 229 N.J. at 277 (quoting State 

v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 48 (1990), and the use of furtive movements to support a 

detention "in the first instance," ibid. The Court stated: "Nervousness and 

excited movements are common responses to unanticipated encounters with 

police officers on the road, and '[m]ere furtive gestures of an occupant of an 

automobile do not give rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal 

activity.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Lund, 119 N.J. at 47). 

Even if Detective McCall's perception that defendant leaned back into his seat 

to avoid notice were true, absent other circumstances indicating criminal activity, 

defendant's actions were merely a "common response[] to [an] unanticipated 

encounter[] with police officers on the road." Ibid. Like the defendant’s movements 
13 A-1442-17T4

in Rosario, that is, "'scuffling around' and leaning toward the passenger seat," ibid., 

defendant's observed action is insufficient to generate articulable suspicion. 

Last, McCall's inability to see the tablet was not a basis for reasonable suspicion. 

On the stand, McCall admitted the tablet might well have not been visible from his 

position in the police SUV, whether it was out of view in the passenger compartment, 

or out of sight in a backpack or the glove compartment. Again, this is a purely innocent 

fact absent the "objectively reasonable belief that the collective circumstances are 

consistent with criminal conduct" sufficient to support reasonable suspicion. State v. 

Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003). The law enforcement officers had no reasonable 

and articulable suspicion of criminal activity at the time they initiated the investigative 

detention of defendant, and thus the encounter was an unlawful infringement of 

defendant's constitutional rights. 

Because McCall was not lawfully in the viewing area when he saw the 

green pill in the vehicle, the plain view exception to the warrant requirement 

does not apply. The "plain view doctrine requires the police officer to lawfully 

be in the viewing area." State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 206 (2002). McCall

should not have blocked in defendant's car and approached it on foot. See State 

v. Keaton, 222 N.J. 438, 450 (2015) (finding that "items discovered in 

defendant's car do not fall within the plain view doctrine, and were illegally 
14 A-1442-17T4

seized, because the trooper was not lawfully within the viewing area at the time 

of the contraband's discovery"). Thus, the evidence obtained from defendant's 

person and car must be suppressed.

IV. The Search of Defendant's Home.

In Rodriguez, our Court firmly held that where a defendant was 

unlawfully detained, "the stop's illegality void[ed] [the] defendant's subsequent 

consent to search and, as a result, the fruits of the warrantless search must be 

suppressed." 172 N.J. at 133. "In view of our conclusion that the officers lacked 

a sufficient basis to detain defendant, we need not evaluate whether his consent 

to the search was voluntary. The illegal detention voids the consent." Id. at 

132.

The State argues that the attenuation doctrine applies. Where the 

connection between the unlawful police conduct and the seizure is "so attenuated 

as to dissipate the taint" from the unlawful conduct, the evidence need not be 

excluded. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975); see also State v. Badessa, 

185 N.J. 303, 311 (2005). The factors for determining attenuation are: "(1) 'the 

temporal proximity' between the illegal conduct and the challenged evidence; 

(2) 'the presence of intervening circumstances'; and (3) 'particularly, the purpose 

and flagrancy of the official misconduct.'" State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 415 
15 A-1442-17T4

(2012) (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 602–04). The burden of demonstrating 

attenuation rests on the State. Brown, 422 U.S. at 604. 

With regard to the first factor, the time period here was mere minutes, and 

the link explicitly clear. See Shaw, 213 N.J. at 416. As the Court recognized, 

"[i]n cases where a confession or consent to search follows shortly after an 

unlawful stop, the brevity of the interval ordinarily will work against the State." 

Ibid. "[T]he closeness in time between the two may lend credence to the 

argument that an unlawful detention was exploited to extract a confession or 

consent from a suspect." Ibid. 

With regard to the second factor, the presence of intervening 

circumstances, it is axiomatic that "[a] consent to search that is attributable to 

police misconduct involving the violations of constitutional rights may be 

regarded as the product of that unconstitutional conduct and an invalid basis on 

which to justify a search." State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 101 (1998).

The third factor looks to the purpose and flagrancy of the official 

misconduct. Shaw, 213 N.J. at 420. While no evidence suggests the police 

purposefully violated defendant's constitutional rights, violations of "[t]he right 

of freedom of movement without unreasonable interference by government 

officials . . . weigh[] most heavily against the State." Id. at 421. 
16 A-1442-17T4

As the State has failed to demonstrate "the connection between the 

unconstitutional police action and the [secured] evidence[s] [was] 'so attenuated 

as to dissipate the taint' from the unlawful conduct," the evidence seized from 

defendant's home must also be suppressed. Badessa, 185 N.J. at 311 (quoting

Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536 (1988)). Because we reverse the 

order denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his car 

and home, we vacate defendant's guilty plea.

Reversed. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

We do not retain jurisdiction.