Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1611-CR-2698 | August 14, 2017 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John T. Wilson

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine Modesitt Cooper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Derrick R. Burt,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 14, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A04-1611-CR-2698

Appeal from the Madison Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Thomas Newman, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C03-1503-F3-412

Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Derrick Burt appeals the trial court’s interlocutory order denying his motion to 

suppress evidence. We reverse and remand.

Issue

[2] The sole issue Burt raises for review is whether a warrant issued for a body 

cavity search of Burt was supported by probable cause. 

Facts

[3] In March of 2015, Burt was incarcerated in the Indiana Department of 

Correction, where he was serving a sentence in another case. He was 

transported to the Madison County Jail for a modification hearing that was to 

be held on March 9, 2015. 

[4] Detective Jake Brooks of the Anderson Police Department was assigned to the 

Madison County Drug Task Force and was contacted by Sheriff Scott 

Mellinger concerning suspicion of heroin trafficking in the Madison County 

Jail. The sheriff told Detective Brooks about an interview the sheriff had with 

Daniel Massengale,

1

Burt’s cellmate while incarcerated in the Madison County 

Jail. Based upon this information, Detective Brooks met with Massengale, and 

 

1

In the transcript for the case, Daniel Massengale’s last name also is spelled “Massingale.”
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Massengale disclosed that Burt was hiding heroin in his rectum and trafficking 

the drug to other inmates. 

[5] On March 10, 2015, a Madison County deputy prosecutor appeared before the 

trial court on an oral application for a limited warrant for the purpose of 

obtaining a body cavity search of Burt to locate “any items that possibly could 

be concealed in his rectum.” Defendant’s Ex. D, p. 4. A probable cause 

affidavit was not filed. Instead, that same day, Detective Brooks appeared 

before the trial court and testified that Massengale, after being Mirandized, told 

him that Burt possessed heroin, had “stuffed” the heroin in his rectum, had 

been in the Madison County Jail for approximately five or six days, had been 

transferred to the jail for a hearing, and that Massengale had observed Burt 

“trafficking with other inmates [the] substances from [Burt’s] rectum . . . [, 

p]assing it to inmates . . . .” Id. at 3-4. Detective Brooks testified that the last 

time Massengale saw Burt in possession of heroin was around 11:30 a.m. that 

day, when Burt had to remove the “package” from his rectum to use the 

bathroom. Id. at 4. Detective Brooks also testified that “[Massengale] actually 

described the substance as being wrapped in a glove. Like a latex glove and 

that the substances were wrapped in plastic bags a couple of times so it 

wouldn’t break in [Burt’s] rectum.” Id. 

[6] Later, the same day, the trial court found probable cause to issue the limited 

warrant. The trial court then issued an order that granted the State’s 

application for the warrant and directed the Madison County clerk to issue a 

warrant so that a cavity search of Burt could be conducted “for the purpose of 
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collection of concealed illicit drugs.” Defendant’s Ex. B. However, the clerk 

did not issue the warrant until March 16, 2015. 

[7] On March 10, 2015, based upon the order issued by the trial court, the police 

took Burt into custody, and Burt was transported to a hospital where a body 

cavity search was conducted. Following an examination by a doctor at the 

hospital, a powdery substance contained in baggies was found in Burt’s rectum. 

The substance was seized and, later, tested and found to be heroin. 

[8] On March 16, 2015, the State filed a written application for a limited warrant to 

obtain a cavity search of Burt, and the State also charged Burt with dealing in a 

narcotic drug, as a Level 3 felony, and with possession of at least five grams of a 

narcotic drug, as a Level 5 felony. On that same day, the clerk issued the bench

warrant.

[9] Burt filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, 

which the trial court denied on November 1, 2016. On November 3, 2016, Burt 

filed a motion to certify the trial court’s November 1 order for interlocutory 

appeal, which the trial court granted. Burt filed with this court a motion to 

accept jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal on November 28, 2016. This 

court accepted jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal on January 6, 2017. 
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Analysis

[10] Burt contends that the evidence seized during the cavity search should be 

suppressed under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 

He specifically argues that the search warrant was invalid because Detective 

Brooks’ testimony lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to establish probable 

cause for the issuance of the warrant. According to Burt, Detective Brooks’ 

testimony was based on uncorroborated hearsay from a source, that is, Burt’s 

cellmate, whose credibility was unknown. The State argues that Detective 

Brooks’ testimony contained reliable information establishing the credibility of 

Burt’s cellmate, and contained information establishing that the totality of the 

circumstances corroborated the hearsay.

[11] We deferentially review a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to 

suppress, construing conflicting evidence in the manner most favorable to the

ruling. Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013). Although we do not 

reweigh the evidence, we will “consider any substantial and uncontested 

 

2

In his brief, Burt also “points out that [Detective] Brooks did the search of Burt without having the warrant 

in his hand. The warrant was not even issued until six (6) days after Burt was searched . . . .” Appellant’s Br. 

p. 13. However, we decline to address this issue because this case is resolved on other grounds. Also, Burt 

does not present a cogent argument as to how this procedural occurrence might have invalidated the search 

warrant. It is well-settled that we will not consider an appellant's assertion on appeal when he has failed to 

present a cogent argument supported by citation to authority and references to the record as required by the 

rules. Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

Although Burt also contends that the evidence seized during the cavity search should be suppressed under 

Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, he presents no separate argument and analysis with respect 

to the state constitution. Thus, any separate state constitutional claim is waived because of his failure to 

make a cogent argument under that provision. See Davis v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1043, 1048 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2009). 
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evidence favorable to the defendant.” Id. However, to the extent the motion 

raises constitutional issues, our review is de novo. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 

590, 596 (Ind. 2008).

[12] In deciding whether to issue a search warrant, “‘[t]he task of the issuing 

magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given 

all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” State v. 

Spillers, 847 N.E.2d 949, 952-53 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 

213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983)). The duty of a reviewing court is to determine 

whether the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable 

cause existed. Id. at 953 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S. Ct. at 2332).

“A substantial basis requires the reviewing court, with significant deference to 

the magistrate’s determination, to focus on whether reasonable inferences 

drawn from the totality of the evidence support the determination of probable 

cause.” Id. A “reviewing court” for these purposes includes both the trial court 

ruling on a motion to suppress and an appellate court reviewing that decision.

Id. Although we review de novo the trial court’s substantial basis 

determination, we nonetheless afford “significant deference to the magistrate’s 

determination” as we focus on whether reasonable inferences drawn from the 

totality of the evidence support that determination. Id.

[13] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons 

from unreasonable search and seizure by prohibiting, as a general rule, searches 

and seizures conducted with a warrant that is not supported by probable cause. 
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U.S. Const. amend. IV. These constitutional principles are codified in Indiana 

Code Section 35-33-5-2, which details the information to be contained in an 

affidavit for a search warrant. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 953. Where a warrant is 

sought based on hearsay information, the affidavit must either:

(1) contain reliable information establishing the credibility of the 

source and of each of the declarants of the hearsay and 

establishing that there is a factual basis for the information 

furnished; or

(2) contain information that establishes that the totality of the 

circumstances corroborates the hearsay.

Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2(b). Indiana Code Section 35-33-5-8 authorizes a judge to 

issue a search or arrest warrant without the affidavit required under Indiana 

Code Section 35-33-5-2 if the judge receives testimony subject to the penalties 

for perjury of the same facts required for an affidavit. 

[14] Uncorroborated hearsay from a source whose credibility is itself unknown, 

standing alone, cannot support a finding of probable cause to issue a search 

warrant. Gates, 462 U.S. at 227, 103 S. Ct. at 2326. The hearsay must exhibit 

some hallmarks of reliability. Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ind. 1997). 

The trustworthiness of hearsay for the purpose of proving probable cause can be 

established in a number of ways, including where: (1) the informant has given 

correct information in the past, (2) independent police investigation 

corroborates the informant’s statements, (3) some basis for the informant’s 

knowledge is demonstrated, or (4) the informant predicts conduct or activity by 
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the suspect that is not ordinarily easily predicted. Id. These examples are not 

exclusive. “Depending on the facts, other considerations may come into play in 

establishing the reliability of the informant or the hearsay.” Id.

[15] Burt argues that the probable cause testimony provided by Detective Brooks 

failed to establish Massengale’s credibility and did not contain information 

establishing that the totality of the circumstances corroborated the hearsay. We 

agree. 

[16] Regarding the first two examples for establishing the trustworthiness of the 

hearsay, Detective Brooks’ testimony did not indicate that Massengale gave 

correct information in the past, and the detective did not testify to an

independent police investigation that corroborated Massengale’s statements. 

There was no evidence for instance that, after Burt’s arrival at the jail, the 

incidents of heroin activity increased. Regarding the third example, while there 

was a basis for Massengale’s knowledge, that is, sharing a cell with Burt, no 

testimony was presented to establish Massengale’s knowledge of Burt’s 

activities other than Massengale’s own statements. See, e.g., Cartwright v. State, 

26 N.E.3d 663, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding hearsay statements 

insufficient to support probable cause where informant was generally familiar 

with manufacturing process for methamphetamine, but there was “nothing in

the [probable cause] affidavit to establish the informant’s knowledge of 

Cartwright’s activities other than the informant’s own statements”), trans. 

denied. As for the fourth example, the statements Massengale provided to 

Detective Brooks did not predict any conduct or activity by Burt. 
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[17] Gates indicated that “a statement that the event was observed first-hand” entitles

the tip to “greater weight than might otherwise be the case.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 

234, 103 S. Ct. at 2330. However, we find that Massengale’s assertion of 

firsthand knowledge carries little weight in light of the total lack of 

corroboration of the claim and no basis for concluding that he was a credible 

source. Id.; see Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 183 (holding that only factor supporting

crediting of anonymous tip was claim that caller had personally witnessed 

criminal activity, but caller gave no information to enable neutral and detached 

magistrate to assess credibility of claim of firsthand knowledge). Although 

Massengale knew several details about Burt, including the fact that Burt had 

been in the jail between five and six days and that Burt had been brought to the 

jail for a hearing, the verified facts were unremarkable and did not establish any 

corroboration of Massengale’s claim that Burt was hiding heroin in his rectum.

[18] Particularly since we are dealing here with a jailhouse informant, the level of 

substantiation and credibility must meet the minimum legal requirements. In 

absence of proof of Massengale’s credibility or corroboration under the totality 

of the circumstances, we find that Massengale’s hearsay statements were 

insufficient to establish probable cause. The lack of probable cause renders the 

subsequent body cavity search of Burt invalid. We understand the search did, 
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in fact, recover heroin from Burt’s rectum.3 However, the law requires more 

than uncorroborated “snitching” from a cellmate. The trial court did not have 

sufficient legal authority to issue the search warrant. 

[19] Nevertheless, lack of probable cause does not automatically require the 

suppression of evidence obtained during a search. Cartwright, 26 N.E.3d at 670.

Indiana law provides:

(a) In a prosecution for a crime or a proceeding to enforce an 

ordinance or a statute defining an infraction, the court may not 

grant a motion to exclude evidence on the grounds that the 

search or seizure by which the evidence was obtained was 

unlawful if the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement 

officer in good faith.

(b) For purposes of this section, evidence is obtained by a law 

enforcement officer in good faith if:

(1) it is obtained pursuant to:

(A) a search warrant that was properly issued upon a 

determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached 

magistrate, that is free from obvious defects other than 

nondeliberate errors made in its preparation, and that was 

reasonably believed by the law enforcement officer to be 

valid; or

 

3 We note that corroboration of an informant’s hearsay and establishing his credibility must occur prior to the 

search, not after. The fruits of the search cannot be used to support or justify an illegal search. Manson v. 

State, 249 Ind. 53, 56, 229 N.E.2d 801, 803 (1967), cert. denied.
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(B) a state statute, judicial precedent, or court rule that is 

later declared unconstitutional or otherwise invalidated; 

and

(2) the law enforcement officer, at the time he obtains the 

evidence, has satisfied applicable minimum basic training 

requirements established by rules adopted by the law 

enforcement training board under IC 5-2-1-9.

I.C. § 35-37-4-5.

[20] In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), the Supreme 

Court of the United States cautioned that certain police conduct would not 

qualify for this good-faith exception, including where the warrant was based on 

an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in 

the validity of the warrant entirely unreasonable. Id. at 923, 104 S. Ct. at 3421. 

Officers are reasonably charged with knowing the basic requirements of Indiana 

Code Section 35-33-5-2. Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 186. Detective Brooks should 

have known that establishing Massengale’s credibility or corroborating his 

hearsay statements was necessary. See Brown v. State, 905 N.E.2d 439, 447 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009). Therefore, we conclude that Detective Brooks’s reliance on the 

validity of the warrant was not objectively reasonable. The good-faith 

exception is not applicable. 

Conclusion

[21] The testimony presented by Detective Brooks to support the issuance of the 

search warrant lacked sufficient indicia of probable cause, and, therefore, the 
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warrant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment. The good-faith exception is 

inapplicable because Detective Brooks’s reliance on the validity of the warrant 

was not objectively reasonable. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[22] Reversed and remanded. 

Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.