ALERT

Preventing Injuries

and Deaths of Fire

Fighters due to

Structural Collapse

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Public Health Service

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

ALERT

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN
DISCLAIMER

Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by the

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.

This document is in the public domain and may be freely copied or reprinted.

Copies of other NIOSH documents are available from

Publications Dissemination, EID

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

4676 Columbia Parkway

Cincinnati, OH 45226

Fax number: (513) 5338573

Telephone number: 180035NIOSH

(18003564674)

E-mail: pubstaft@cdc.gov

To receive other information about occupational safety and health

problems, call 180035NIOSH (18003564674), or visit the

NIOSH web site at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh

DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 99146

August 1999
WARNING!

ALERT

Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters

due to Structural Collapse

Fire fighters are frequently injured or killed when burning structures collapse without warning.

Implement and review occupational

safety programs and standard operating procedures.

Ensure that the incident commander

conducts an initial size-up and risk

assessment of the incident scene

before beginning interior fire fighting.

Ensure that the incident commander

always maintains accountability for all

personnel at a fire sceneboth by

location and function.

Establish rapid intervention crews

(RICs)often called rapid intervention

teamsand make sure they are positioned to respond immediately to

emergencies.

Ensure that at least four fire fighters

are on the scene before beginning

interior fire fighting at a structural fire

(two fire fighters inside the structure

and two outside).

Equip fire fighters who enter hazardous

areas (such as burning or suspected

unsafe structures) to maintain two-way

communications with the incident

commander.

Ensure that standard operating procedures and equipment are adequate and

sufficient to support radio traffic at

multiple-responder fire scenes.

Provide all fire fighters with personal

alert safety system (PASS) devices and

make sure that they wear and activate

them when they are involved in fire fighting, rescue, or other hazardous duties.

Conduct prefire planning and inspections

that cover all building materials and components of a structure.

Transmit an audible tone or alert immediately when conditions become unsafe for

fire fighters.

Establish a collapse zone around buildings with parapet walls.

TEAR OUT AND POST

Fire departments should take the following steps to minimize the risk of

injury and death to fire fighters during structural fire fighting:

Please tear out and post. Distribute copies to workers.

See back of sheet to order complete Alert.
For additional information, see NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths

of Fire Fighters due to Structural Collapse (DHHS [NIOSH] Publication No.

99146). Single copies of the Alert are available free from the following:

Publications Dissemination, EID

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

4676 Columbia Parkway

Cincinnati, OH 45226-1998

Fax number: 15135338573

Phone number: 180035NIOSH (18003564674)

E-mail: pubstaft@cdc.gov/niosh

NIOSH Web site: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Public Health Service

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

 NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
WARNING!

ALERT

 Fire fighters are frequently injured or killed when burning structures collapse without warning.

Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters

due to Structural Collapse

The National Institute for Occupational Safety

and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in

preventing injuries and deaths of U.S. fire

fighters due to structural collapse during firefighting operations. Structural collapse of a

building during fire fighting is a leading cause

of death among fire fighters. Such collapse is

very difficult to predict during fire fighting,

and it usually occurs without warning.

Fire departments should implement and review occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to prevent serious

injuries and deaths of fire fighters. NIOSH

recommends that fire departments take 10

essential steps to minimize the risk of injury

and death to fire fighters during structural fire

fighting:

1. Ensure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of

the incident scene before beginning interior

fire fighting.

2. Ensure that the incident commander always

maintains accountability for all personnel at

a fire sceneboth by location and function.

3. Establish rapid intervention crews (RICs)

often called rapid intervention teamsand

make sure they are positioned to respond

immediately to emergencies.

4. Ensure that at least four fire fighters are

on the scene before beginning interior fire

fighting at a structural fire (two fire fighters

inside the structure and two outside).

5. Equip fire fighters who enter hazardous

areas (such as burning or suspected unsafe

structures) to maintain two-way communications with the incident commander.

6. Ensure that standard operating procedures

and equipment are adequate and sufficient to

support radio traffic at multiple-responder fire

scenes.

7. Provide all fire fighters with personal alert

safety system (PASS) devices and make sure

that they wear and activate them when they

are involved in fire fighting, rescue, or other

hazardous duties.

8. Conduct prefire planning and inspections

that cover all building materials and components of a structure.

9. Transmit an audible tone or alert immediately when conditions become unsafe for fire

fighters.

10. Establish a collapse zone around buildings with parapet walls.

NIOSH requests that the information in this

Alert be brought to the attention of all U.S.

fire fightersincluding those in the largest

metropolitan and the smallest rural departments by the following: fire chiefs and fire

commissioners and administrators, editors of

trade journals and other publications, safety

and health officials, State fire marshals, unions

and labor organizations, fire-fighting agencies,

and insurance companies.

1
BACKGROUND

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

reports that 968 fire fighters died between 1989

and 1998 [NFPA 1999]. Nearly half of these deaths

(443) occurred on the fireground. Furthermore,

structural collapse caused 56 (18%) of the 316

fire fighter deaths at structure fires. A structural

collapse often results in multiple fire fighter

fatalities. For example, during this time period,

43 fire fighters were fatally injured by collapsing materials at 11 fires.

As these statistics show, structural collapse of any

part of a building (floors, walls, ceilings, roofs,

or structural members) during fire fighting is a

leading cause of death among fire fighters. The

potential for structural collapse is one of the most

difficult factors to predict during initial size-up

and ongoing fire fighting. Structural collapse

usually occurs without warning. For example,

the floor of a burning structure may suddenly collapse, spilling fire fighters into a burning inferno.

Or a sudden roof collapse may trap fire fighters

inside the structure. After arrival at a fire scene,

the incident commander must consider numerous

variables to determine the structural integrity of

a burning building [Dunn 1988]:

Fire size and location

Length of time the fire has been burning

Conditions on arrival

Size of the building (single or multistory, floor area,

and height)

Age of the building (deterioration of structural

members, evidence of weathering, use of lightweight materials in new construction)

Presence of combustible materials

Occupancy

Renovations or modifications to the building

Previous fires

Supported loads (such as roof-top heating and cooling systems) that might affect the integrity of the

structure

Exposures that might pose fire and smoke hazards

to nearby people or buildings

Resources at the scene for extinguishing the fire

(number of apparatus, fire-fighting personnel, water supply, and auxiliary appliances)

Other factors such as the time of day (day or night)

and weather conditions (extreme heat or cold)

OSHA

State and local government employees (such as fire

fighters) are exempt from Federal Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards. However, in the 25 States currently authorized by OSHA to run an occupational safety and

health program, all OSHA regulations apply to both

public and private employees.

Current OSHA regulations that apply to fire fighters

include 29 CFR* 1910.134 (Respiratory protection)

and 29 CFR 1910.156 (Fire brigades). In 29 CFR

1910.134, employers are required to provide respirators suitable for the purpose intended and to

establish and maintain a respirator protection program.

The standard also states that if fire fighters must enter

an area that is immediately dangerous to life and

health (IDLH), at least two must enter the area together and remain in visual or voice contact with

one another at all times. They must also conduct

interior fire fighting using self-contained breathing

apparatus (SCBA). In addition, at least two properly equipped and trained fire fighters must be

 positioned outside the IDLH atmosphere,

 account for the interior team(s), and

 remain capable of rapid rescue of the interior

 team(s).

In 29 CFR 1910.156, OSHA lists the requirements

for organizing, training, and equipping fire brigades

established by the employer.

*Code of Federal Regulations. See CFR in references.

CURRENT STANDARDS

2 Structural Collapse
NFPA

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

recommends in NFPA 1500 that all fire departments

establish a policy of providing and operating at "the

highest possible levels of safety and health for all

members" [NFPA 1997a]. Several NFPA standards apply to structural fire fighting operations:

NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building

Construction, specifies methods of classifying

types of construction and fire resistance ratings

[NFPA 1995a].

NFPA 1404, Standard for a Fire Department

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Program,

specifies the minimum requirements for a respiratory protection training program in a fire

department [NFPA 1996].

NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department

Occupational Safety and Health Program,

specifies (1) the minimum requirements for

a fire department's occupational safety and

health program; (2) the safety procedures for

members involved in rescue, fire suppression,

and related activities; and (3) the integration

of risk management into regular functions of

the incident commander [NFPA 1997a].

NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department Incident Management System, defines the essential elements of an incident management system [NFPA 1995b].

Other relevant NFPA Standards include the following:

NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective Ensemble

for Structural Fire Fighting, which includes

protective coat, pants, helmet, gloves, hood,

and footware [NFPA 1997b]

NFPA 1981, Standard on Open-Circuit SelfContained Breathing Apparatus for the Fire

Service [NFPA 1997c]

NFPA 1982, Standard on Personal Alert

Safety Systems (PASS) for Fire Fighters.

[NFPA 1998].

The following case reports describe incidents involving fire fighter injuries and deaths due to structural collapse. They were investigated by the

NIOSH Fire Fighter Investigation Team using the

Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation

(FACE) protocol.

CASE 1Commercial Structure Fire in

California

On March 8, 1998, one male fire fighter (a captain)

died at a fire scene while trying to exit from a commercial structure. The first unit on the scene reported light smoke showing from a one-story commercial building. A ventilation team proceeded to

the roof of the building and began ventilating. Another team began forcible entry into the front of the

building through two metal security doors (which

took 71⁄2 to 9 minutes to force open). While fire

companies waited for the front door to be opened,

fire conditions changed dramatically on the roof.

Fire was coming from the ventilation holes opened

by the ventilation crew.

About the same time, three engine crews advanced

hand lines through the front door to determine the

origin of the fire. Approximately 15 feet inside the

front door, the fire fighters encountered heavy

smoke and near-zero visibility. The engine crews

advanced their lines 30 to 40 feet inside the building, but could not locate the fire. Conditions continued to deteriorate rapidly, so the officers on the

engine crews ordered their fire fighters to exit from

the building. During this time, the victim became

separated from his crew and remained in the building. About 1 minute later, a partial roof collapse

blocked the front door. The rapid intervention team

subsequently located the victim. Cardiopulmonary

resuscitation was performed immediately and en

route to the hospital, where the victim was pronounced dead. The medical examiner listed smoke

inhalation and burns as the cause of death [NIOSH

1998a].

Applicable Recommendations: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 9

in the Recommendations section.

CASE REPORTS

Structural Collapse 3
CASE 2Floor Collapse in a Single-Family

Dwelling in Kentucky

On February 17, 1997, one male fire fighter died

and another was injured in a fire in a single-family

dwelling. When the fire company arrived at the

fire scene, the district major reported that heavy

smoke was coming from the roof area of the dwelling. Two male fire fighters pulled two 13⁄4-inch

charged lines from their assigned engine and proceeded toward the dwelling. After knocking down

a ceiling fire, they entered the dwelling, apparently

without the district majors knowledge. On entering the front door, both fell through the floor into

the basement. The fire fighters landed at the fires

origin in extremely hot water and heavy black

smoke. Neither was equipped with a radio, so an

emergency transmission to the incident commander

was impossible. The fire fighters manually triggered

their PASS devices, but the pumps and engines

operating on the street made it impossible to hear

the alarm. About 8 minutes into the operation, the

district major discovered that two fire fighters were

missing. A lieutenant noticed the hose lines leading into the front door. He crawled along the

ground, following them to the front door, where he

saw a light shining up from the basement. A ladder

was lowered. One fire fighter grabbed the ladder

and was pulled from the basement. He stated that

another fire fighter was still in the basement. After

numerous search efforts, the second fire fighter was

found (about 53 minutes into the operation). Eight

to ten minutes after the two fire fighters had entered

the structure, their SCBAs had run out of air and they

had tried to breathe entrained air from the water spray

in their lines. The first fire fighter was injured but survived. The second fire fighter died from asphyxiation

due to smoke inhalation [NIOSH 1997].

Applicable recommendations: 2, 3, and 5

in the Recommendations section.

CASE 3Sudden Roof Collapse of a Burning

Auto Parts Store in Virginia

On March 18, 1996, two male fire fighters died

while fighting a fire in an auto parts store. At

1129 hours, a 911 call to the fire dispatch reported

sparking in the fuse box at a local auto parts

store. At 1135 hours, fire fighters arrived, not

knowing that a power company service truck had

accidentally broken the neutral line to the auto parts

store. The store did not have adequate electrical

grounds; thus all electrical circuits in the store superheated and started a series of fires above the

dropped ceiling. A lieutenant and a fire fighter from

Engine 3 went into the auto parts store with a

charged 13⁄4-inch line to locate the origin of the fire

(only light smoke was showing inside). All employees had left the store and all lights were out. At 1149

hours, the lieutenant inside the store radioed that

they were in trouble and could not get out. However, because of heavy radio traffic, the battalion

chief did not understand the transmission. At 1150

hours, the fire rapidly accelerated without warning

and the entire roof (containing 50-foot wood trusses

supporting heavy heating and cooling units) collapsed into the store. Both fire fighters died from

burns and smoke inhalation [NIOSH 1996].

Applicable recommendations: 2, 3, 6, and 8 in

the Recommendations section.

CASE 4Parapet Wall Collapse during a

Warehouse Fire in Vermont

On September 5, 1998, one fire fighter died when

a parapet wall collapsed on him during a warehouse fire. Four fire departments were dispatched

to fight a fire in a warehouse that stored recycled

paper. The warehouse was built in the late 1800s

of brick masonry frame with heavy wood truss

construction. The first arriving chief of an engine company saw smoke issuing from below the

Photo courtesy of Bradley Whitcomb, St. Johnsbury Fire Department,

St. Johnsbury, Vermont

4 Structural Collapse
eaves at the rear of the structure. He decided not to

enter the building but to "surround and drown" it.

When the Engine 3 crew arrived, they were ordered

to place their engine at the north end of the structure and attack from the exterior. One of the fire

fighters from Engine 3 approached the structure to

open the large, barn-like doors and enable the fire

fighters to attack from the exterior. The fire fighter

then returned to the hose line and discovered that

the doors had closed behind him (they were self

closing). He was returning to prop them open when,

without warning, the parapet wall above the doors

suddenly collapsed on him. He died as a result of

multiple crushing injuries [NIOSH 1998b].

Applicable recommendations: 8 and 10 in the Recommendations section.

Many complex factors are present when fighting a

structural fire, and conditions can deteriorate rapidly at the fire scenesometimes with little or no

warning. Fire departments need to be constantly

aware of the potential for a structural collapse and

take appropriate steps to ensure the safety of fire

fighters.

To minimize the risk of injury and death to fire fighters during structural fire fighting, NIOSH recommends

that fire departments (1) implement and review occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures and (2) take the following steps:

1. Ensure that the incident commander conducts

an initial size-up and risk assessment at the incident scene before beginning interior fire fighting.

This size-up and risk assessment should continue

throughout the incident and should include evaluation of the situation, fire-fighting strategy, tactical planning, plan evaluation and revision, and operational

command and control. A primary concern is

whether the scene involves an imminent life-threatening situation that may require rescue.

An initial size-up and assessment of a fire should

include an evaluation of the following factors

[Dunn 1988]:

Fire size and location

Length of time the fire has been burning

Conditions on arrival

Size of the building (single or multistory,

floor area, and height)

Age of the building (deterioration of

structural members, evidence of weathering,

use of lightweight materials in new

construction)

Presence of combustible materials

Occupancy

Renovations or modifications to the

building

Previous fires

Supported loads (such as roof-top heating

and cooling systems) that might affect the

integrity of the structure

Exposures that might pose fire and smoke

hazards to nearby people or buildings

Resources at the scene for extinguishing the

fire (number of apparatus, fire-fighting

personnel, water supply, and auxiliary

appliances)

Other factors such as the time of day (day

or night) and weather conditions (extreme

heat or cold)

CONCLUSIONS

RECOMMENDAT IONS AND

DISCUSSION

Structural Collapse 5
2. Ensure that the incident commander always

maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire sceneboth by location and

function.

Accountability for all fire fighters at a fire scene

is essential and constitutes one of the incident

commander's most important duties. Personnel

accountability systems should be integrated into

the incident command policy and used to track

locations and assignments of companies operating at a fire scene. Personnel accountability systems include accountability checks that require

the incident commander to communicate with

officers at each level within the incident command system.

3. Ensure that at least four fire fighters are

on the scene before entering a structure and

beginning interior fire fighting at a structural

fire (two fire fighters inside the structure and

two outside).

The NFPA and the OSHA state that at a minimum

four persons (each with full protective clothing and

respiratory protection) are needed to assure the

safety of those working inside a burning structure.

Two fire fighters may be inside the structure, but

two must remain outside. The team members should

be in visual, audible, or electronic communication

with each other to coordinate all activities and determine whether emergency rescue is needed.

4. Establish rapid intervention crews (RICs) and

make sure they are positioned to respond immediately to emergencies.

The primary purpose for an RIC is to provide a dedicated and specialized team of fire fighters ready to

rescue fire fighters who become trapped in a burning structure. An RIC is vitally important at a structure fire, as it provides the incident commander with

a designated emergency team and thereby eliminates

the need for reassigning other fire fighters to this

duty during a critical period. The RIC's primary duty

is to respond to emergencies in which fire fighters

are trapped, lost, or disoriented in a burning structure. Under optimum conditions, an RIC should

respond with the first alarm to eliminate later response time. The RIC should be equipped with full

turnout gear, SCBAs, portable radios and lights,

axes, forcible entry tools, hooks, and other equipment needed for the rescue effort. The RIC should

report directly to the incident commander and be

nearby to await rescue commands. An RIC should

consist of at least two fire fighters, but the size and

complexity of the incident dictates the size of the

RIC.

5. Equip fire fighters who enter hazardous areas (such as burning or suspected unsafe structures) to maintain two-way communications with

the incident commander.

Lack of effective communications on the fireground

can result in tragic loss of life. Fire fighters who

enter burning structures must be able to communicate with the incident commander about interior

conditions, the need for additional support, and

emergencies that require rescue or response teams.

Effective communications are of primary importance to the incident commander in decision making, overall operations, and safety on the fireground.

6. Ensure that standard operating procedures and

equipment are adequate and sufficient to support

radio traffic at multiple-responder fire scenes.

Communications become ineffective at the fire

scene when radio traffic becomes so heavy that

messages cannot be understood. The ambient noise

on the fireground further hampers effective comPhoto courtesy of National Institute of Standards and Technology munication. Specified channels should be

6 Structural Collapse
used for the tactical channel and dispatch to prevent competition for air time. Radio traffic can be

reduced if users

 avoid unnecessary transmissions,

 are brief but accurate,

 speak clearly,

 wait for the air channel to clear, and

 allow priority for emergencies and

 rescues.

The standard operating procedures, personnel, and

communications equipment should be of sufficient

quality and quantity to support the volume of communications encountered at various types of fire

scenes. Fire department communication policies

should include a standard operating procedure for

the delivery and acknowledgment of "emergency

traffic" at the incident scene. Common terminology must be readily identifiable by all personnel at

the incident scene and by the dispatcher or

telecommunicator in all communications centers.

7. Provide all fire fighters with PASS devices

and make sure that they wear and activate them

when they are involved in fire fighting, rescue,

or other hazardous duties.

PASS devices are designed to set off an audible

alarm when a fire fighter becomes motionless for

30 seconds. However, a primary complaint about

PASS devices is that the alarm often sounds while

fire fighters are on standby or in a rest period. The

alarm is manufactured so that any movement by

the fire fighter should reset the alarm. Also, the

fire fighter can manually activate the PASS device

alarm whenever assistance is required.

The PASS device should be worn by fire fighters and activated whenever they operate in a hazardous area. The devices are not designed to be

heard outside a building, but they are intended

to alert nearby fire fighters or officers that someone is missing, lost, or trapped. An activated

PASS alarm will also help an RIC find lost or

trapped fire fighters.

8. Conduct prefire planning and inspections that

cover all building materials and components of

a structure.

Prefire inspections are an excellent opportunity for

fire departments to determine the following:

Age of the structure

Structural integrity

Exposed interior insulation materials

Type of roof structure and supports

(truss, bow, etc.)

Type of interior support structures

Type of materials used in the structure

(such as wood, steel, plastics, foam, or

materials that produce toxic gases when

subjected to heat)

Storage of flammable or toxic materials

Amount of load (for example, heavy

heating and cooling units) on roof

structures that could weaken the supports

Water supply

Automatic sprinkler systems

Truss roofs should be evaluated for a minimum fire

resistance rating of 1 hour. Each structure in a

multistructure (such as a strip mall) should receive

a prefire inspection to determine the interior design

and types of materials used in construction.

9. Transmit an audible tone or alert immediately when conditions become unsafe for fire

fighters.

An emergency evacuation is ordered when an extremely serious emergency has occurred or is about

to happen. Examples of such emergencies are missing fire fighters, explosion, and structural collapse.

Unlike a withdrawal, an emergency evacuation

requires that fire fighters leave behind tools and

hoses and that the incident commander

Structural Collapse 7
conduct a roll call or a head count. An emergency

evacuation is a rare event in fire fighting, and thus

confusion and delay usually occur when it is ordered. For this reason, a prearranged audible signal should be sounded to alert fire fighters of an

emergency evacuation. Fire departments should

train their members to evacuate the building at

the sound of the signal.

10. Establish a collapse zone around buildings with parapet walls.

A parapet wall is the continuation of an exterior

wall above the roof level. A parapet wall has

reduced stability because it has fewer connections

to the rest of the structure and is subject to collapse if it suffers any movement, shock, or vibration during fire-fighting operations. A collapse zone is the distance from the fire building

equal to the height of the wall. However, since

the falling wall may break apart and allow flying

debris to cover a greater distance than the height

of the wall, a safety margin should be considered when establishing a collapse zone. Fire fighters should not be allowed to operate inside a collapse zone. For example, they should not advance

attack lines or conduct staging or fire fighter rehabilitation within this zone. In addition, hose

streams, deck guns or pipes, portable deluge

nozzles, and aerial ladders with fire fighters operating at the tip or inside buckets should operate outside the collapse zone.

8 Structural Collapse
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS REFERENCES CITED

The principal contributors to this Alert were Ted

Pettit, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH;

Vincent Dunn, Deputy Chief (retired), New York

City Fire Department; and Greg Main, District

Chief, Evansville Indiana Fire Department. Rita

Fahy, NFPA, provided the NFPA data. Ted Pettit,

Richard Braddee, and Frank Washenitz, Fire Fighter

Investigation Team, Division of Safety Research,

NIOSH, investigated the cases used. Kim Clough,

Health Effects Laboratory Division, NIOSH, created the document design and layout. Jason Britton,

Health Effects Laboratory Division, NIOSH, created the Web document.

Please direct any comments, questions, or requests

for additional information to the following:

Dr. Nancy A. Stout, Director

Division of Safety Research

National Institute for Occupational Safety and

Health

1095 Willowdale Road

Morgantown, WV 265052888

Telephone: 3042855894; or call

180035NIOSH (18003564674)

We greatly appreciate your assistance in protecting

the health of U.S. workers.

Linda Rosenstock, M.D., M.P.H.

Director, National Institute for

 Occupational Safety and Health

Centers for Disease Control and

 Prevention

CFR. Code of Federal regulations. Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Office of the

Federal Register.

Dunn V [1988]. Collapse of burning buildings: a

guide to fireground safety. Saddle Brook, NJ: Penn

Well.

NFPA [1995a]. NFPA 220: standard on types of

building construction. Quincy, MA: National Fire

Protection Association.

NFPA [1995b]. NFPA 1561: standard on fire department incident management system. Quincy,

MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [1996]. NFPA 1404: standard for a fire department self-contained breathing apparatus program. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [1997a]. NFPA 1500: standard on fire department occupational safety and health program.

Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [1997b]. NFPA 1971: standard on protective ensemble for structural fire fighting. Quincy,

MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [1997c]. NFPA 1981: standard on open-circuit self-contained breathing apparatus for the fire

service. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [1998]. NFPA 1982: standard on personal

alert safety systems (PASS). Quincy, MA: National

Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [1999]. Personal communication from Rita

Fahy, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy,

MA, to Ted Pettit, Division of Safety Research,

National Institute for Occupational Safety and

Health, Centers for Disease Control, Public Health

Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human

Services, Morgantown, WV.

Structural Collapse 9
NIOSH [1996]. Sudden roof collapse of a burning

auto parts store claims the lives of two fire fightersVirginia. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health

Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and

Health, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Report 96-17.

NIOSH [1997]. Floor collapse in a single family

dwelling fire claims the life of one fire fighter and

injures anotherKentucky. Morgantown, WV:

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,

Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fatality Assessment and

Control Evaluation (FACE) Report 97-04.

NIOSH [1998a]. Commercial structure fire claims

the life of one fire fighterCalifornia.

Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and

Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE)

Report 98-F07.

NIOSH [1998b]. Fire fighter dies while fighting

warehouse fire when parapet wall collapsesVermont. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of

Health and Human Services, Public Health Service,

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,

Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation

(FACE) Report 98-F20.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brunacini A [1985]. Fire command. Quincy,

MA: National Fire Protection Association.

Dunn V [1992]. Safety and survival on the fire

ground. Saddle Brook, NJ: Penn Well.

Dunn V [1996]. Systems analysis/size-up: part

1. Firehouse Magazine (Oct).

Dunn V [1996]. Systems analysis/size-up: part

2. Firehouse Magazine (Dec).

International Fire Service Training Association

[1995]. Essentials of fire fighting. 3rd ed.

Stillwater, OK: Oklahoma State University, Fire

Protection Publications.

Kipp JD, Loflin ME [1996]. Emergency incident risk management. New York, NY: Van

Nostrand Reinhold.

NFPA [1997]. Fire protection handbook. 18th ed.

Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

10 Structural Collapse
Structural Collapse 11
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Public Health Service

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

4676 Columbia Parkway

Cincinnati, OH 45226-1998

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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Call NIOSH at 1-800-35-NIOSH (1-800-356-4674)

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DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 99-146