NIOSH HEALTH HAZARD EVALUATION REPORT 

HETA #2005-0369-3034 

Hurricane Katrina Response 

June 2007 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
ii 

PREFACE

The Hazard Evaluation and Technical Assistance Branch (HETAB) of the National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) conducts field investigations of possible health hazards in the 

workplace. These investigations are conducted under the authority of Section 20(a)(6) of the Occupational 

Safety and Health (OSHA) Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 669(a)(6) which authorizes the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services, following a written request from any employers or authorized representative of 

employees, to determine whether any substance normally found in the place of employment has 

potentially toxic effects in such concentrations as used or found. 

HETAB also provides, upon request, technical and consultative assistance to federal, state, and local 

agencies; labor; industry; and other groups or individuals to control occupational health hazards and to 

prevent related trauma and disease. Mention of company names or products does not constitute 

endorsement by NIOSH. 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND AVAILABILITY OF REPORT

Principal Authors:

Chandran Achutan, PhD 

Brad King, MPH 

Contributing Authors

(in alphabetical order):

Ayodele Adebayo, MD, MPH Lynda Ewers, PhD, CIH Mark Methner, PhD, CIH 

Carlos Aristeguieta, MD, MPH Thomas Hales, MD, MPH Manny Rodriguez, MS, CIH, CSP 

Bruce Bernard, MD, MPH Ronald M. Hall, MS, CIH Aaron Sussell, PhD, MPH, CIH 

Yvonne Boudreau, MD, MSPH Kevin Hanley, MSPH, CIH, REHS/RS Dave Sylvain, MS, CIH 

Greg Burr, CIH Steven A. Lee, MS, CIH Sangwoo Tak, ScD, MPH 

Nancy Burton, MPH, CIH Kenneth D. Linch, MS, CIH Loren Tapp, MD, MS 

Gregory A. Day, PhD Stephen B. Martin Jr., MS, PE Angela Warren, MPH 

Chad Dowell, MS Lauralynn Taylor McKernan, ScD, CIH Christine West, RN, MSN/MPH 

Kenneth R. Mead, MS, PE 

Logistical Assistance: 

Donnie Booher 

Kevin L. Dunn 

Robert McCleery, MS, CIH 

Kenneth M. Wallingford, MS, CIH 

Editorial Review:

Ellen Galloway, MA 

 

This report is not copyrighted and may be freely reproduced. The report may be viewed and printed from 

the following internet address: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe. Copies may be purchased from the 

National Technical Information Service (NTIS) at 5825 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161. 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2005-0369-3034 

Hurricane Katrina Response 

May 2007 

SUMMARY

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck coastal areas in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and 

Mississippi, causing numerous deaths, massive infrastructure damage, and flooding. The two hardest hit 

areas were along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Mississippi. The State of Louisiana and the City of New 

Orleans invited the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to assist with the rebuilding of the

city’s public health system. Between September 11, 2005, and October 29, 2005, investigators from 

CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) were deployed to New Orleans 

and Baton Rouge. Their main objectives were to assist Federal, state, and local agencies in addressing 

occupational safety and health issues, to perform health and injury surveillance and exposure assessments 

among workers, to perform outreach to vulnerable workers, and to develop and disseminate occupational 

health information. Three teams of personnel responded to numerous requests for assistance in evaluating 

exposures to mold, chemicals, biological agents, floodwaters, dust and dried flood sediment, flood debris, 

and noise. 

Except for a limited number of noise exposure samples above the NIOSH recommended

exposure limit and carbon monoxide levels above the NIOSH ceiling limit, 

environmental sampling for a variety of substances including asbestos, metals and dust 

did not reveal levels above recognized occupational exposure limits. A summary of the

findings was shared with workers and employers. Safety hazards such as broken glass

posed a risk to workers. Worksites in the flood-ravaged areas had varying degrees of

capacity for hazard recognition, evaluation, and control. In general, the need for readily

accessible, pertinent, understandable information regarding workplace hazards and 

exposures was apparent throughout the response, and distribution of information proved 

challenging. 

Keywords: emergency response, hurricane, flooding, floodwater, contamination, remediation, mold,

sediment, dust, debris, carbon monoxide, noise, safety, OSHA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, fire 

fighters, police, New Orleans, Louisiana, Gulf Coast. 

iii 
Table of Contents 

Preface .................................................................................................................................................ii

Acknowledgments and Availability of Report .................................................................................ii

Summary ........................................................................................................................................... iii

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................1

Activities ..............................................................................................................................................1

Occupational Health Team 1 .............................................................................................................1

Carbon Monoxide and Other Gases..............................................................................................2

Floodwaters and Dried Flood Sediment........................................................................................2

Noise .................................................................................................................................................3

Mold .................................................................................................................................................4

Safety................................................................................................................................................4

Occupational Injury and Disease Surveillance.............................................................................4

Occupational Health Team 2 .............................................................................................................5

Entering Flooded Buildings ...........................................................................................................5

Flood Debris Collection, Transfer, and Removal.........................................................................6

Clean-up and Salvaging Operations..............................................................................................8

Disposal of Spoiled Food ................................................................................................................9

Building Remediation and Repair.................................................................................................9

Animal Shelter.................................................................................................................................9

Union Outreach...............................................................................................................................9

Occupational Injury and Disease Surveillance...........................................................................10

Occupational Health Team 3 ...........................................................................................................11

Outreach in the Hispanic Community ........................................................................................11

Outreach in the Vietnamese Community....................................................................................11

Outreach to Health Care and Emergency Services Personnel..................................................11

Outreach at Job Fairs...................................................................................................................11

Mold Remediation.........................................................................................................................12

Asbestos..........................................................................................................................................12

Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals Team ..................................................................12

Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................13

References .........................................................................................................................................14

Table ..................................................................................................................................................15

Appendix ...........................................................................................................................................16
Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 Page 1 

INTRODUCTION

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck 

coastal areas in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, 

and Mississippi, causing flooding, massive 

infrastructure damage, power outages, and 

numerous deaths and injuries. The two hardest 

hit areas were along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana 

and Mississippi. 

The State of Louisiana and the City of New 

Orleans invited the Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention (CDC) to assist with the 

rebuilding of the city’s public health system. 

The CDC assembled a multidisciplinary 

collection of scientists from its various centers, 

including the National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health (NIOSH), to respond to the 

complex public health needs of New Orleans 

and surrounding parishes. The NIOSH personnel 

staffed the Occupational Health Team, one of 

several teams (others included Communications, 

Injury, Mental Health, and Environmental 

Teams) comprising the CDC Hurricane Katrina 

response. 

Three Occupational Health Teams from 

CDC/NIOSH (Teams 1, 2, and 3) were deployed 

consecutively to New Orleans by the CDC 

Director’s Emergency Operations Center 

(DEOC) in Atlanta, Georgia, to support CDC’s 

mission in New Orleans. These teams consisted 

of industrial hygienists, medical officers, and 

engineers. The overall mission of these teams 

was to provide guidance on occupational health 

and safety needs and perform exposure 

assessment for workers involved in the cleanup 

and rebuilding of New Orleans and the 

surrounding parishes in the aftermath of the 

hurricane. The mission of Team 1 was to 

conduct a “needs assessment” of the situation on 

the ground by identifying hazards and 

establishing communication with various worker 

groups. Based on input from Team 1, the 

mission of Team 2 was to conduct 

environmental sampling of occupational 

exposures. The mission of Team 3 was to 

conduct outreach and provide occupational 

safety and health information to various worker 

groups. Team missions were modified as 

appropriate in response to local conditions, as 

activities occurred, and to build upon previous 

efforts. Additionally, CDC/NIOSH sent 

occupational health specialists to the Louisiana 

Department of Health and Hospitals at their 

request to assist in providing guidance on 

worker safety, health, and exposure issues. 

The Worker Safety and Health Annex of the 

Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF-8), which 

is in the National Response Plan, was also put 

into effect for the first time during Hurricane 

Katrina.1

 This annex describes the 

responsibilities that the Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration (OSHA) has to assist 

Federal employees and their contractors during 

disaster recovery operations, as well as the 

support role NIOSH plays to OSHA during such 

a response. 

This report summarizes the occupational health 

activities of the CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina 

response personnel and highlights the findings 

and recommendations that were made to 

workers, employers, and agencies in Louisiana. 

During the wide variety of activities performed 

by CDC/NIOSH personnel, recommendations 

were made to those groups that were directly 

involved with each of the specific activities 

performed by the Occupational Health Teams. 

Where recommendations were made by 

CDC/NIOSH personnel to wear respirators, 

recommendations were also made for their 

proper use following applicable OSHA 

respiratory protection program regulations.2 

ACTIVITIES

Occupational Health Team 1 

Mission: Address occupational exposure issues 

for management and union officials, workers, 

and government agencies.

Between September 11 and September 29, 2005, 

Occupational Health Team 1 members 

conducted visual assessments of work activities 

throughout the New Orleans metropolitan area. 

Some of the challenges Team 1 members faced 
Page 2 Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 

included difficulties in communication, housing, 

and transportation. A major challenge for Team 

1 members was the vastness of the disaster area, 

and systematically locating sites where work 

was being carried out. To identify such sites, 

Team 1 members conducted tours throughout 

various parts of the city including suburban, 

downtown, French Quarter, and convention 

center areas to observe response and cleanup 

operations and talk to workers about their work 

activities and use of personal protective 

equipment (PPE). Many of the hazards assessed 

during this period occurred during the following 

general activities: 

 Entering flooded facilities to identify 

general safety hazards 

 Cleaning and sanitation activities in 

buildings and hotels 

 Tree cutting and removal of debris 

A variety of potential chemical exposure and 

safety hazards were found throughout many of 

the activities observed. These included 

exposures to gases such as carbon monoxide 

(CO) and hydrogen sulfide (H2S), dust and dried 

flood sediment, floodwaters, noise, mold, and 

safety hazards such as broken glass. Specific 

activities carried out by Team 1 follow. 

Carbon Monoxide and Other 

Gases 

Team 1 members responded to a request from 

the Army to assess working conditions at 

Charity Hospital. At the time, members of the 

Army and Navy were using diesel-powered 

pumps and generators to pump water out of the 

hospital’s basement morgue in order to remove 

approximately 30 bodies. A member of the Navy 

staff was monitoring the area with a four-gas 

meter (CO, H2S, oxygen [O2], and lower 

explosive limit [LEL]). Results reported to Team 

1 members were well below occupational 

exposure limits (OELs). NIOSH investigators 

made recommendations to wear hearing 

protection in the area, follow confined space 

procedures, and extend the flex-duct that carried 

diesel exhaust away from the building and 

occupied areas. 

Team 1 members made a return visit 2 days 

later. It was reported that a Navy team fully 

equipped with self-contained breathing 

apparatuses (SCBAs) had entered the basement 

the previous day and reported that the CO and 

H2S readings had peaked on their instrument 

(neither these readings nor the scale on the 

instrument were provided). Therefore, the 

removal of the bodies had not begun as they 

were looking for equipment to ventilate the 

space. It was described that the only personnel 

entering the space were trained Navy personnel. 

Recommendations were reiterated to follow 

confined space procedures while entering the 

area after they completed pumping out the 

basement. 

Team 1 members observed approximately 85 

workers cleaning up one of the city’s major 

hotels in the French Quarter. Gasoline-powered 

pumps were running in a low-level parking 

garage. Measurements collected by Team 1 

members using a direct-reading instrument 

showed CO levels as high as 220 parts per 

million (ppm). Team 1 members immediately 

recommended opening a garage door, which 

resulted in a decrease of CO levels to 25 ppm. 

Additionally, hearing protection, eye protection, 

and respirators were recommended for grinding 

operations also occurring on-site. It was found 

that workers at the site were not immunized 

according to CDC recommendations for 

recovery workers, so arrangements were made 

with a nearby disaster medical assistance team 

(DMAT) to give the workers appropriate 

immunizations shots such as hepatitis B and 

tetanus. 

Floodwaters and Dried Flood 

Sediment 

A major concern brought to the attention of 

Team 1 members was worker exposure to 

floodwater and the dust and dried flood sediment 

left after floodwater receded. Team 1 members 

recommended appropriate respirators to several 

New Orleans area agencies, including Jefferson 

Parish Emergency Medical Service (EMS), U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), National 

Park Service (NPS), and the City of New 

Orleans. 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 Page 3 

Team 1 members and USACE officials visually 

assessed the work areas at the 17th Street Canal, 

where one of the major levee breaks occurred. 

Worker concerns included potential exposures to 

the dust from disturbing dried flood sludge or 

river mud. Concerns were also expressed about 

exposures to biological matter in the floodwater 

aerosol generated by aerators returning 

floodwater to Lake Pontchartrain. Team 1 

members recommended that workers avoid close 

proximity to the aerators that shoot spray 15–25 

feet above the water surface and that those who 

work near or downwind from aerators be 

provided with NIOSH-certified N-95 respirators. 

Recommendations were also provided regarding 

excavator and earth-moving activities at the 

broken levee site. Team 1 members observed an 

excavator operator moving dirt and gravel 

(crushed rock) in the area, prompting concerns 

of exposure to airborne silica. The operator was 

working in an open cab, transferring material 

with a bucket. Until an exposure assessment was 

completed, Team 1 members recommended that 

the worker wear a half-mask, NIOSH-certified

N-95 respirator and follow all applicable OSHA 

respirator requirements, including medical 

evaluation and fit testing.2

 

Workers were observed at a pump station on a 

canal near the Murphy oil spill in St. Bernard 

Parish. Because of concerns about potential 

exposure to volatile organic compounds 

(VOCs), Team 1 members recommended an 

exposure assessment in areas near oil spill 

cleanups. Team 1 members also recommended 

that, until exposure results were available, 

workers who must spend time in this area should 

be offered half-mask respirators with organic 

vapor cartridges (combined with N-100 or P-100 

filters if they were exposed to rock dust). If the 

workers reported eye irritation, Team 1 

members recommended providing them with 

full-face respirators with the same type of 

cartridges.

Authorities with the NPS reported concerns for 

their workers who were performing clean-up 

work and tree trimming and removal in several 

historic sites in and around New Orleans. One of 

the primary NPS historic sites in the area was 

the Chalmette National Battlefield in St. Bernard 

Parish. Primary concerns included exposure to 

contaminants in dried floodwater sediment 

including heavy metals, silica, and hydrocarbons 

on the dust particles as a result of the Murphy oil 

spill in Chalmette and St. Bernard Parish. Tasks 

with dust exposures included mowing historic 

battlefields covered with dried sediment, 

demolition of NPS buildings and clean-up of 

historic buildings/sites, tree removal, and street 

sweeping. Interim recommendations were 

provided including providing NIOSH-certified 

N-95 respirators for workers exposed to dust. 

NPS officers requested an exposure assessment 

for particulates; Team 1 members relayed this 

request to Occupational Health Team 2. 

Team 1 members attended a meeting sponsored 

by the City of New Orleans about their NoNotice Flood/Levee Breach Emergency 

Evacuation Plan, which included a safety plan 

for responders in flood-prone areas. While the 

plan addressed decontamination of personnel 

who come into contact with floodwaters, it was 

recommended that the plan also address the 

issue of PPE for response workers who came 

into contact with floodwater. Upon request, 

recommendations on PPE for workers exposed 

to floodwater were also sent to an Army 

representative present at the meeting. 

Noise 

Concerns of overexposure to noise were 

common. During the site visit to the 17th Street 

Canal worksite, large pumps were observed 

pumping water back into the canal from the 

neighborhood, and an excavator operator was 

moving large amounts of crushed gravel, 

resulting in potentially excessive noise levels. 

No hearing protection devices (HPDs) were 

provided to the workers on-site. Similar 

observations were made at other temporary 

pump station locations. Until an exposure 

assessment could be completed to quantify 

exposures, Team 1 members recommended that 

workers near the pump be provided adequate 

HPDs (foam earplugs or earmuffs with noise 

reduction rating [NRR] >27 dBA). 
Page 4 Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 



niversity (LSU) 

 nd 

establishment of temporary morgues 

spitals and medical care 

cilities, and shelters. 

Mold 

One of the major issues that confronted Team 1 

members was concerns about mold exposure 

during cleanup operations. Team 1 members 

provided information and recommendations to 

various groups, including the City of New 

Orleans, private businesses, and several search 

and rescue groups. Team 1 members also 

participated in discussions with other CDC 

teams on how to safely clean flood-damaged 

buildings and homes; provided technical 

assistance and information on mold cleanup to 

building managers, custodians, and others who 

were responsible for commercial building and 

school maintenance; and provided 

recommendations for the cleaning and 

remediation of flood-contaminated heating, 

ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) 

systems.3

 Additionally, Team 1 members 

assisted with a press release on mold for the 

Mayor of New Orleans and provided 

information on molds, especially on PPE 

concerns, to the City of New Orleans Health 

Department. 

Safety 

A variety of safety hazards were observed 

during cleanup operations. Team 1 members 

observed a construction worker pushing glass 

windows from the 15th floor of a hotel resulting 

in shards of glass more than 1 foot in diameter 

falling to the street and sidewalk below. No 

warning signs were observed, and the area had 

not been cordoned off by the contractor, 

representing an imminent hazard of death or 

serious injury to passersby and any workers at 

street level. Recommendations were made for 

the contractor to establish a safe perimeter 

around the hazardous zone with construction 

tape, cones, and flares. A return site visit later 

that day revealed that these recommendations 

had not been implemented, illustrating the 

challenge of government oversight over the 

thousands of contractors moving into New 

Orleans for cleanup and rebuilding. 

Occupational Injury and Disease 

Surveillance 

Medical officers on Team 1 advised local and 

state officials of the potential occupational 

health risks associated with the flooding when 

working around the City of New Orleans. They 

met with New Orleans leadership, state 

leadership and federal representatives from 

OSHA, the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA), and the National Institute for 

Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) 

concerning potential health hazards when 

returning to businesses. Sites visited by Team 1 

members included the Superdome, City Hall, 

and Tulane University Library. Team 1 members 

provided verbal recommendations and written 

materials from CDC to local and state officials, 

working groups and managers, rescue, recovery, 

and cleanup workers about the following issues: 

 Contaminated floodwater 

 Unclean or unstable work environments 

 Bites and scratches, rabies during 

animal rescue, dermatologic conditions, 

sharps injuries, infectious disease risks, 

insect and vector risk (including West 

Nile virus) 

 Immunization recommendations 

Work stress, post-traumatic stress 

disorder, including Substance Abuse and 

Mental Health Services Administration 

(SAMHSA) referrals, and referrals to 

Louisiana State U

psychiatric services 

Handling human remains a

Additionally, Team 1 members provided 

assessment tools for others to use to assess the 

potential occupational safety and health impacts 

of the Hurricane Katrina response including 

evacuation centers, ho

fa

Offers of assistance were extended to the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) 

New Orleans Emergency Operations Center 

(EOC) in analyzing data they were collecting on 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 Page 5 

ta affecting 

ost-Katrina New Orleans workers. 

r diagnoses that occurred 

on five or more visits. 

Occupational Health Team 2 

deployed USAR team members; to the George 

Washington University Medical College in 

analyzing data they were collecting on New 

Orleans Police Department (NOPD) personnel 

who were going on leave; to the NOPD mental 

health provider; and to approximately 10 

medical units in the New Orleans area to obtain 

occupational injuries and illness da

p

Team 1 medical officers, through contacts made 

in the field, identified medical units at a private 

security company and the police department jail 

at the Greyhound Bus Depot. They then 

distributed worker illness and injury surveillance 

forms at these two sites. Because of required 

evacuation for Hurricane Rita, follow-up by 

Team 1 members was not possible for the 

Greyhound Bus Depot. Staff at the private 

security company medical clinic did not use the 

forms provided because they found them to be 

more complicated and time-consuming than just 

using a notebook to record information 

regarding medical visits. Their staff compiled 

the medical visit information into a Microsoft 

Excel file and provided that to Team 1 members. 

During the 25 days that this company was 

working in New Orleans (September 3–27, 

2005), there were 270 reported clinic visits 

among the 150 employees. Table 1 shows the 

presenting complaints o

Mission: Perform quantitative exposure 

assessments at worksites throughout the New 

Orleans metropolitan area and follow-up on 

contacts made by Team 1 members.

mine the scope of illness, 

injury, and stress. 

s conditions were determined to be 

resent. 

Team 1 members were evacuated from New 

Orleans on September 21, 2005, in anticipation 

of Hurricane Rita. Once Hurricane Rita 

subsided, Occupational Health Team 2 was 

deployed; their work began on September 29, 

2005. Priority was placed on re-establishing 

communication with contacts made by Team 1, 

developing further contacts and cooperation with 

OSHA and USACE and its contractors working 

in the city, as well as responding to requests for 

assistance on occupational safety and health 

issues. Many of the concerns that were brought 

to the attention of Team 2 members were a 

reflection of the activities that were developing 

over time in the city’s cleanup efforts. 

Therefore, assistance with information on 

contact with floodwaters diminished, for 

example, as assistance in evaluating potential 

exposures during debris removal increased. 

Concerns about entering flooded buildings and 

potential exposure to dust and dried flood 

sediment were still prevalent. In particular, 

medical officers on Team 2 made efforts to 

locate specific populations of workers, 

particularly those who had worked through the 

days during and immediately after the 

Hurricane, to assist them in evaluating 

symptoms and to deter

Entering Flooded Buildings 

Assistance was requested from the U.S. Office 

of the Inspector General (OIG) to provide 

guidance for workers to enter the Tulane School 

of Medicine in New Orleans to remove boxes of 

patient records. Team 2 members accompanied 

OIG officers into the building. The hallway and 

the records office were intact. Because the 

ventilation and air conditioning systems had not 

been operational for over a month, the air in this 

location was noticeably stale and musty; 

however, there were no visible signs of water 

damage or mold growth. Team 2 members used 

direct reading instruments to monitor for 

airborne particulates, CO, carbon dioxide (CO2), 

total VOCs, and lower explosive limit while the 

record recovery operation took place. No 

hazardou

p

A site visit was performed in response to a 

request from the NOPD to provide health and 

safety guidance for workers entering the NOPD 

Headquarters (HQ). The first floor of the NOPD 

HQ had been flooded with approximately 5 feet 

of water, leaving a significant amount of mold in 

the offices on that floor, which included archival 

rooms of personnel records. Team 2 members 

were briefed about concerns related to entering 

the building to retrieve and remove large 
Page 6 Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 

tivities in these areas was 

lso recommended. 

ots 

were adequate for the tasks being conducted. 

ollection, Transfer, 

r trucks and transferred to sanitary 

ndfills. 

brought onto the site was scheduled 

r burning. 

quantities of paper personnel records. Team 2 

members provided information on health issues 

related to mold exposures and guidance on 

proper PPE for working in areas contaminated 

with floodwater and mold. They accompanied 

the requesting officer into his personnel offices 

on the first floor to observe the mold 

contamination. These offices had seen 

significant floodwater damage, and large 

quantities of mold growth were observed on 

walls, chairs, and other furniture. Team 2 

members observed restoration work 

commencing in other areas of the first floor, 

including large fans intended to dry out affected 

areas. They recommended that the contractor 

install fans in offices as soon as possible to 

minimize further mold growth due to the high 

humidity levels and significant dampness still in 

this area. The use of N-95 respirators and gloves 

when performing ac

a

Team 2 members were requested to brief federal 

and state police (Louisiana Attorney General’s 

Office; Louisiana State Police; OIG; 

Immigration, Customs, and Environmental 

[ICE] Federal Officers; Louisiana Department of 

Justice) concerning potential exposure and 

health hazards when entering Memorial Hospital 

in New Orleans to collect evidence. Team 2 

members briefed the officers concerning the 

health and exposure risks of floodwaters and 

sediment, debris, mold, odors, heat stress, work 

stress, infectious risks, and risks of handling 

human and animal remains. Additionally, the 

team provided observational site assessment of 

the second, fourth and seventh floors where 

evidence was being collected. No electricity was 

available in the building, requiring the use of 

flashlights for visibility. No water damage was 

observed on the seventh floor; on the second and 

fourth floors, signs of water damage to a number 

of ceiling tiles were observed due to overflow 

from sinks on the above floor. In addition, fallen 

wet debris around existing pipes was evident. 

Floodwaters had not reached any of these floors. 

No visible mold growth was observed during the 

assessment. Trash, debris, litter, oxygen tanks, 

and broken glass were distributed throughout the 

hallways, common rooms, and patient rooms. 

There were multiple trip hazards and sharps 

from broken glass in various areas, but no 

obvious airborne exposure hazards. A directreading particulate counter was used to evaluate 

total airborne particulate levels on these three 

floors. Results were consistent with particulate 

levels observed in poorly ventilated indoor 

environments. Team 2 members concluded that 

the officers collecting evidence in the building 

needed no respiratory protection. The standard 

precautions of nitrile gloves and steel-toed bo

Flood Debris C

and Removal 

As the cleanup from Hurricane Katrina 

continued, vegetative debris and construction 

and demolition (C&D) debris from throughout 

the New Orleans metropolitan area was being 

collected and transported to transfer locations. 

From these locations, the debris was reloaded 

onto large

la

One of the sites where construction/demolition 

debris from Jefferson Parish was being collected 

was in a 200-acre field adjacent to the Louis 

Armstrong New Orleans International Airport. 

The site was operated by Ceres Environmental, 

one of three main contractors with the USACE 

for debris removal. The USACE contracted the 

operation of the site to Ceres Environmental 

who subcontracted the site’s management to 

Beverly Construction. An average of 23,000 

cubic yards (yd3

) of debris from throughout 

Jefferson Parish was brought onto the site each 

day by trucks under contract to Ceres. Once 

onsite, the debris was sorted to remove 

refrigerators, air conditioners, microwave ovens, 

compressed gas cylinders, and other potentially 

hazardous items. Once these items had been 

removed, 5,000 to 6,000 yd3

 of the remaining 

debris (about 20%–25% of the incoming) was 

loaded onto trucks for transport to sanitary 

landfills outside of the New Orleans area. None 

of the debris 

fo

Work was conducted at the site for 12 hours 

(06:30 to 18:30) a day, 7 days a week. Beverly 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 Page 7 

re 

commended but their use was not enforced. 

investigators recommended that these employees 

Construction had an onsite staff of eight heavy 

equipment operators (trackhoes and bulldozers), 

one light equipment operator (front end loader), 

three laborers (traffic control staff), and two 

work supervisors. Eight to 10 USACE staff were 

onsite during daily operations. During a visit to 

the site, Team 2 members discussed safety 

issues with the Beverly Construction safety 

officer who raised concerns about the following 

health issues: contact dermatitis, noise 

exposures, upper respiratory irritation from dust, 

and infectious disease risks from bacteria in 

flood-contaminated debris. There were 

additional concerns about work-related stress 

because of long work shifts with minimal breaks 

and post-traumatic stress, particularly among 

those who lost homes and possessions because 

of Hurricane Katrina. At the time, the safety 

officer required the use of hard hats, safety 

glasses, and steel-toed shoes. N-95 respirators, 

hearing protection, and gloves we

re

Team 2 members conducted air sampling for 

total and respirable dust in the personal 

breathing zone (PBZ) of five workers. All 

samples were collected for at least 7 hours. The 

samples were sent to an American Industrial 

Hygiene Association (AIHA)-accredited 

laboratory for gravimetric and elemental (metals 

and minerals) analysis. A return site visit was 

conducted to perform asbestos and respirable 

dust/silica air sampling and noise dosimetry to 

assess potential exposures among USACE and 

Beverly Construction workers. During a portion 

of the day, the environmental conditions were 

very dusty, prompting the USACE to 

temporarily suspend operations. Following 

adequate dust suppression efforts by water tank 

spraying over a period of 2 hours, debris 

collection activities were resumed. Samples 

were collected over a 7–8 hour period of the 

work shift. Results of total and particulate dust 

sampling showed levels below occupational 

exposure limits. Personal noise dosimetry 

sampling conducted on three employees showed 

noise doses near or above the NIOSH 

recommended exposure limit (REL), but below 

the OSHA action level (AL). NIOSH 

wear hearing protection (Summary A of the 

Appendix). 

A site visit was conducted at a debris site at 

North Galvez and St. Louis Streets operated by 

ECC, one of the three main USACE prime 

contractors for debris removal. Team 2 members 

collected air samples and performed noise 

monitoring on personnel actively involved in the 

collection and reduction of debris. One PBZ air 

sample and three area air samples were collected 

and analyzed for total particulates with an 

additional analysis for elements (metals and 

minerals). Two area air samples were collected 

and analyzed for respirable dust with additional 

analysis for silica. The air samples were 

collected over approximately 6 hours. All air 

sample results showed levels below occupational 

exposure limits. Two bulk samples of debris pile 

dust were collected and analyzed for elements, 

asbestos, and crystalline silica (quartz and 

cristobalite). Low concentrations of minerals 

and metals were found in the bulk samples; they 

did not contain any detectable asbestos. Personal 

noise dosimetry was performed on a quality 

control (QC) inspector and a trackhoe operator 

for approximately 6 hours. All exposures were 

below the NIOSH and OSHA criteria for the 

actual time worked. Recommendations made by 

Team 2 members are in Summary B of the 

Appendix. 

Team 2 members performed a site visit in 

response to a request from Axis Remedial 

Services (a subcontractor to ECC) to provide 

health and safety guidance and exposure 

assessment for workers at a debris collection site 

located at Religious and Orange Streets in New 

Orleans. The site was used as a point of 

collection and separation of debris. It was the 

designated point for small dump trucks to unload 

their material for separation where it could be 

picked up by larger trucks for distribution to 

landfills. Because of the smaller quantities of 

materials the smaller trucks brought (compared 

to other sites where large trucks were directed), 

workers were able to get a better sense of what 

types of materials were coming into the site and 

separated by type of material, making the site 

unique. A worker discovered that a load dumped 
Page 8 Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 

by a truck had contained a significant quantity of 

TransiteTM siding shingles, a composite material 

that could potentially contain asbestos. Team 2 

members were specifically asked to perform 

exposure monitoring for asbestos during the 

disposal activities of this material at the site 

(Summary C of the Appendix). 

The site manager detailed the plan he developed 

to dispose of the approximately 2 yd3

 of 

TransiteTM shingles that had been found. He 

planned to line a dumpster with plastic lining 

where the material was going to be placed. 

Initially, he planned to do the work by hand 

using a shovel. However, he instead directed a 

trackhoe operator to do the work mechanically. 

During the work, he wore a Tyvek® suit and an 

elastomeric half-mask respirator with P-100 

cartridges, as did the trackhoe operator. Prior to 

moving the material into the lined dumpster, it 

was wetted down with water from a nearby 

water truck to minimize aerosolization of dust 

and/or fibers. Before the activity, Team 2 

members placed sampling pumps on the 

trackhoe operator, the site manager, and another 

worker on-site, and placed a pump downwind to 

collect an area air sample. Sample results for 

fiber concentrations were non-detectable or very 

low. Although asbestos exposure was not 

identified during this assessment, conditions and 

materials may vary at other times and worksites. 

It was recommended that the employees be 

trained on hazards associated with handling 

siding and roofing materials, such as old 

TransiteTM shingles, which may contain 

asbestos. It was recommended that they continue 

to assess the need for respirators as the debris 

composition and tasks vary. Respirator use 

should follow OSHA regulations even if 

voluntary use is allowed by management. A 

further recommendation was to continually use 

water sprays to minimize aerosolized dust. 

Team 2 members accompanied auditors from 

FEMA to 22 locations (mainly debris collection 

sites) within Jefferson Parish to identify sites for 

possible follow-up personal/area air sampling 

and to disseminate worker safety and health 

information. 

Clean-up and Salvaging 

Operations 

Team 2 members provided technical assistance 

to the NPS regarding cleanup and salvaging 

operations at the Chalmette Battlefield and 

National Cemetery, both located in St. Bernard 

Parish. The Chalmette Battlefield and National 

Cemetery are located within a 200-acre property 

bordered by the Mississippi River to the south 

and an industrial park, including an oil refinery, 

to the east. Several buildings were damaged 

during Hurricane Katrina, including the 

superintendent’s two-story house and the 

carriage house. Both structures had been 

inundated with approximately 5 feet of water 

and were under renovation. Many trees had 

fallen and had been consolidated and were being 

made into mulch for use on site. There was no 

oil damage at this site unlike that seen in 

adjacent residential and industrial Chalmette 

properties. 

The NPS requestor informed Team 2 members 

that during the first couple of weeks following 

the hurricane, recovery workers had entered the 

superintendent’s house to recover artifacts and 

were protected by knee-high rubber boots, 

coveralls, gloves, and half-mask air-purifying 

respirators. At the time of the visit, efforts were 

being made to ventilate the building and dry the 

contents through use of fans powered by a 

gasoline-powered outdoor generator. 

Additionally, natural ventilation was 

accomplished by opening all operable windows. 

The water-soaked carpet had not yet been 

removed from the house. Forest Service and 

NPS workers wore leather gloves while 

removing contents of the house; N-95 respirators 

were made available. Minimal to moderate 

levels of mold and mildew were visible only on 

the first floor, most notably on the carpet. A 

large tree had fallen on the carriage house, 

damaging the roof. The roofing shingles 

contained asbestos, and the majority of damaged 

shingles were in a pile near the corner of the 

building. Warning tape circled the perimeter of 

this area, thereby restricting access. Removal of 

the shingles was scheduled as soon as possible 

pending arrival of appropriate PPE. Team 2 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 Page 9 

members concurred with the approach and 

recommended high efficiency-filtered half-mask 

respirators, disposable coveralls, boot coverings, 

and gloves during clean up of the asbestoscontaining material. 

Disposal of Spoiled Food 

Team 2 members observed workers emptying 

and cleaning freezers and refrigerators of spoiled 

food at a restaurant. The spoiled food included 

maggot-infested meat. Employees were wearing 

protective gear (TyvekTM suits, gloves, half-face 

powered air purifying respirators) on a hot day. 

Therefore, heat stress was a potential health 

hazard for these employees. This was addressed 

by the site contractor’s health and safety officer 

who provided employees with water, a tent with 

chairs for shade, and cooling fans. 

Building Remediation and Repair 

Team 2 members visited numerous sites, 

particularly hotels, throughout the Central 

Business District where workers were 

performing remediation/reconstruction activities 

to provide information and determine the need 

for further hazard assessment. The levels of 

remediation/reconstruction were site-dependent. 

It was observed that water damage and mold 

growth were issues in the locations visited. 

There was a large number of Hispanic workers 

(many of whom spoke little to no English) 

employed by the remediation and cleanup 

companies. Worker safety and health 

recommendations were provided where 

applicable. 

Team 2 members were made aware of 

respiratory and dermal symptoms among 

contract workers at the U.S. Naval Air Station in 

Belle Chasse, Louisiana. Team 2 members 

collected air samples and performed noise 

monitoring on these workers actively involved 

in the repair of rooftops of four airplane hangars 

and a fire station damaged during Hurricane 

Katrina at the naval air station. Concerns were 

specifically expressed about potential fiberglass 

exposures during the removal of old rooftops. 

Sampling results and recommendations are 

provided in Summary D of the Appendix. 

Animal Shelter 

Team 2 members conducted noise monitoring at 

an outdoor animal shelter in St. Bernard Parish. 

The shelter was staffed by volunteers, some of 

whom stayed in trailers onsite. Team 2 members 

observed work practices and procedures and 

measured noise exposures on a veterinarian, a 

veterinarian assistant, and two veterinarian 

technicians for approximately 5 hours. The 

findings and recommendations from this site 

visit are summarized in Summary E of the 

Appendix. 

Union Outreach 

In an effort to reach out to unions whose 

members were likely to be conducting work in 

the hurricane-affected areas, union leaders were 

contacted to discuss ways in which the 

occupational health team members could 

provide assistance. 

Team 2 members discussed their availability in 

New Orleans and offered their services in 

worker safety and health guidance and exposure 

assessment to the Local 406 (Baton Rouge) 

representative of the Operating Engineers Union 

whose members were mainly performing 

infrastructure repairs such as bridge and levee 

repairs. The representative said that the union 

was sending a national hazardous materials 

(HAZMAT) Team to New Orleans and said that 

he would pass Team 2 contact information onto 

this HAZMAT Team. 

Team 2 members contacted a Paper, AlliedIndustrial, Chemical and Energy (PACE)/Steel 

Workers/Chemical Workers Union leader and 

discussed their availability in New Orleans. The 

representative said none of his workers were 

involved in cleaning up the contaminated areas. 

His major concerns were about process safety 

issues in the chemical plants that were going to 

be restarting over the coming weeks and months. 

 

Contact was made with Federal, state, and local 

leaders of the Communication Workers of 
Page 10 Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 

America (CWA). A conference call was held 

with two national representatives. They said that 

they had reviewed the protocol that BellSouth 

and Lucent sent them for sending people on a 

contract basis to the area to work. They agreed 

the protocols were comprehensive and properly 

included PPE and immunizations. The only 

issue the protocols did not address was training. 

The union leaders discussed this concern with 

the telephone companies who agreed to provide 

a training program for workers through the 

University of Alabama, Birmingham. The union 

leaders reported they had not heard of health 

problems and did not believe the companies 

were doing exposure monitoring. The union 

leaders were concerned that sludge/sediment 

was still inside and outside some locations 

where union members were working. The union 

leaders were concerned about subcontractors 

using immigrant labor and young workers. They 

asked us to keep them informed if Team 2 

members found mold exposures in buildings 

where their installers may have been hooking up 

communication lines. Team 2 members also 

discussed their availability in New Orleans and 

offered their services in worker safety and health 

guidance and exposure assessment to the state 

representative of the CWA. He said that 

BellSouth was taking care of their safety issues. 

They provided HAZMAT Teams to inspect 

facilities before the union workers went into 

potentially contaminated areas. He reported few 

to no complaints from the local unions in regard 

to safety issues. The local representative said he 

felt that his members were getting enough 

support for occupational safety and health from 

the contractors for whom they were working, in 

particular BellSouth. BellSouth had brought in a 

safety supervisor and was helping ensure safety 

for the CWA members. 

During a discussion with the regional 

representative of the Laborers Union, he 

reported that his members working with asbestos 

removal were trained on OSHA’s Hazardous 

Waste Operations and Emergency Response 

Standard (HAZWOPER).4

 He relayed concerns 

about having to clean up fecal matter in the 

Superdome, but he had not heard of other 

concerns. He stated that the majority of the 

contractors were keeping a “close eye” on his 

members. A local representative said he had not 

heard of many health and safety issues for 

projects on which their members were working. 

However he knew of several problems that nonmembers were involved in. One was the “hitand-miss attitude some worksites had in regards 

to PPE.” That is, some workers were being 

provided certain PPE and others working sideby-side with them were not. There were sites 

where people were required to wear a half-mask 

respirator, but also required to eat and drink and 

take breaks in the same locations where they 

worked. He said he was not aware of any 

ongoing air monitoring. 

Occupational Injury and Disease 

Surveillance 

The medical officers on Team 2 advised local, 

state, and Federal officials of the potential health 

and occupational risks associated with working 

around the City of New Orleans. A site visit was 

conducted to the temporary NOPD HQ to meet 

with 35 District leaders to discuss occupational 

health risks from exposure to floodwaters, 

debris, and clean up. 

To determine the prevalence of occupationallyrelated illness, injury, and stress, health hazard 

evaluations (HHEs) for both the NOPD and the 

New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) were 

initiated. Final reports on these evaluations are 

available separately.5,6

Team 2 members collected the surveillance 

sheets for illness and injury previously 

distributed by Team 1 medical officers at the 

Greyhound Bus Depot. The forms were 

incomplete and not useful in assessing illness 

and injury rates. 

Team 2 members developed and disseminated a 

single page information sheet for workers about 

NIOSH and the HHE program. The information 

sheet described the program and how to request 

assistance. 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 Page 11 

Occupational Health Team 3 

Mission: Conduct follow-up of activities begun 

by the previous Teams, focusing on outreach to 

vulnerable occupational populations and 

information dissemination.

Occupational Health Team 3 was deployed to 

New Orleans between October 11 and October 

29, 2005. It increased efforts at outreach and 

information dissemination among various 

communities and workforces. Team 3 members 

assisted in completing the NOPD and NOFD 

surveys mentioned previously. 

Outreach in the Hispanic 

Community 

Hispanic immigrant workers were a large source 

of labor for many of the sub-contractors working 

in the area. Team 3 members contacted various 

leaders in the area to investigate possible means 

of outreach to this Hispanic worker population. 

Contacts were made with a local Disaster 

Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), restaurant 

and supermarket owners, radio station owners, 

and Hispanic community leaders in Kenner and 

Gonzalez, Louisiana. Occupational safety and 

health information packages were then provided 

to these contacts for distribution to the Hispanic 

worker population. One Hispanic restaurant with 

a contract to provide Hispanic workers with 

noon and evening meals agreed with a request 

from Team 3 members to add a 1-page insert to 

each meal covering occupational safety and 

health issues such as respiratory protection, 

general hygiene, ladder safety, and prophylactic 

immunizations for cuts. Approximately 20,000 

pieces of occupational safety and health 

literature was distributed to Hispanic workers. 

Outreach in the Vietnamese 

Community 

Team 3 members were joined by public health 

service officers from the Joint Field Office 

(JFO) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana to conduct 

public health/occupational safety and health 

outreach to a Vietnamese community in 

Northeast Orleans Parish. With the assistance of 

Vietnamese language skills provided by the JFO 

officers, contact was made with the pastor of 

Queen Mary Catholic Church, a Vietnamese 

congregation serving almost 3000 parishioners. 

Approximately 1200 pieces of Vietnameselanguage public health/occupational safety and 

health literature from the CDC were left with the 

pastor for distribution among his parishioners. In 

addition, a need for immunization and medical 

support for the Vietnamese community was 

identified by the pastor and was pursued by the 

JFO members of the team. The combined team 

also identified a Buddhist temple badly damaged 

by the hurricane. Although devotees had 

reportedly not returned to the area, successful 

telephone contacts with temple leaders were 

established to distribute Vietnamese-language 

occupational safety and health literature to 

devotees. 

Outreach to Health Care and 

Emergency Services Personnel 

A Team 3 member was the keynote speaker at 

an Ochsner Clinic Health Fair in New Orleans. 

The presentation included general information 

about respirator use and other types of personal 

protection. The second speaker was a 

representative of the 3M Company, which 

provided cleaning kits (including three N-95 

respirators, hand disinfectant, sponge, and 

wound protector) to the attendees. The 

presentations were available by videoconference 

to two other Ochsner facilities. 

Team 3 members also provided educational 

materials to the staff at the Red Cross/FEMA 

tent. Remaining educational materials were 

given to the Billy Graham Disaster Team who 

promised to distribute the information to people 

working in their houses. 

Outreach at Job Fairs 

Over the course of two days, Team 3 members 

reached out to 24 employers and about 100 

prospective employees at a local job fair in St. 

Bernard Parish. Team 3 members provided 

information on worker health and safety for 

residents returning home and demonstrated the 

correct way of donning respirators and how to 

choose the right type of respirator. Team 3 
Page 12 Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 

members also met the director of homeland 

security and emergency preparedness for St. 

Bernard Parish who noted that they did not have 

respirators for returning residents and that all 

resources they requested were being diverted to 

New Orleans. Returning residents also 

complained of lack of access to respirators and 

lack of information on potential hazards and the 

types of PPE needed. 

Mold Remediation 

A site visit was conducted by Team 3 members 

at the St. Bernard’s Parish Courthouse in 

Chalmette, Louisiana in response to concerns 

about mold remediation efforts. The members 

discussed the status of these efforts and future 

plans with the Project Manager for Advanced 

Cleanup Technology, Inc. and conducted a 

walk-through tour of the courthouse and an 

adjacent building. They discussed 

recommendations for employee training and 

their use of personal protective equipment and 

why environmental sampling was not 

recommended (Summary F in the Appendix). 

Asbestos 

Team 3 members were contacted regarding 

concerns about dust (possibly containing 

asbestos) and dried flood sediment levels in a 

Red Cross warehouse. Reportedly, one of the 

workers recently had seen a physician because 

of respiratory irritation possibly associated with 

working at the warehouse; reportedly, the 

physician told him that he had asbestosis. Team 

3 members were asked if there was evidence of 

asbestos in the warehouse, if it was possible that 

this worker developed asbestosis if he only 

worked in this warehouse for several days, and if 

air samples for asbestos should be collected in 

the warehouse. 

A visual inspection was conducted at the 

warehouse for potential asbestos-containing 

materials. Team 3 members found no source 

materials that would suggest workers were 

potentially exposed to asbestos at the worksite. 

No fire retardant materials were observed that 

could be a source of asbestos (the ceiling was 

exposed plywood). Pipes hanging from the 

ceiling and along the warehouse walls were not 

insulated. Furthermore, the walls throughout the 

warehouse were cement. Debris piles from roof 

demolition appeared to contain wood debris, 

asphalt/fiberglass roofing material, and dirt. 

Additionally, the building owner/operator 

reported the building did not contain asbestos. 

Because there were no observable sources of 

asbestos during our walk-through inspection of 

the building, it was determined there was no 

justification to sample the air for asbestos. 

Information was provided on the chronic, slowly 

progressive nature of asbestosis, seen most often 

in workers who manufacture or use asbestos 

products and who have been exposed to high 

levels of asbestos. Team 3 members described 

how asbestosis is not a condition that develops 

over the course of several days, but rather that 

the first signs of disease can be 15–30 years after 

the exposure. 

Ongoing repair of the warehouse roof was 

observed. The work area in the warehouse was 

dusty during the site visit and could potentially 

cause respiratory irritation. It was reported that 

dust masks were offered to the workers but they 

chose not to wear them. Team 3 members were 

uncertain of the exact type of respirators offered. 

However, because the remaining supplies still 

needed to be removed from the building 

requiring workers to return to the warehouse, 

recommendations to minimize dust exposure 

were provided. These included wet mopping, 

rather than dry sweeping the floor prior to 

removal of supplies, accessing the supplies from 

the back dock rather than entering the larger area 

of the warehouse where the roof repair work was 

being performed; using a battery-powered pallet 

jack or hand pallet jack to move the supplies 

because the exhaust from a motorized fork lift 

may disturb any dust present on the floor; and 

using a damp cloth to wipe the dust from the 

supplies rather than using compressed air. 

Louisiana Department of Health 

and Hospitals Team 

CDC/NIOSH occupational health specialists 

assisted the Louisiana Department of Health and 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 Page 13 

Hospitals (LDHH) regarding worker health, 

safety, and exposure issues. The initial 

CDC/NIOSH team for the LDHH, Louisiana 

Office of Public Health, Environmental 

Epidemiology & Toxicology (EE&T) consisted 

of an administrative assistant, public health 

advisor, health educator, occupational health 

physician, and industrial hygienist. Subsequent 

CDC teams included occupational and 

environmental health support from the Agency 

for Toxic Substances and Diseases Registry 

(ATSDR) and NIOSH. The purpose of the teams 

were to provide technical support to the LDHH 

employees in the EE&T office, which was 

responsible for the toll-free number relating to 

environmental health issues, health issues 

dealing with hazardous exposures (including the 

Superfund sites in New Orleans), and indoor 

environmental quality. The team attended daily 

JFO and State EPA meetings to gather 

information for the state health representative; 

set-up communication on a daily basis with the 

environmental team in New Orleans; and review 

environmental health data on sludge, air, and 

water contamination in New Orleans and for 

Lake Pontchartrain. The team developed 

information handouts on safe entry and mold 

and helped get the pamphlets printed and taken 

to New Orleans for distribution with help from 

the CDC Foundation. Other tasks included 

answering public inquires, supporting state 

officials with policy statements dealing with 

mold exposures and PPE. 

CONCLUSIONS

During the time spent in the New Orleans area in 

the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, several 

themes emerged regarding occupational health 

and safety of response, rescue, and recovery 

workers. One was the recognition that, while the 

devastation in New Orleans may have been on a 

much larger scale than previous hurricanes and 

floods, many of the issues faced were, in fact, 

similar to past incidences of flooding elsewhere. 

In particular, concerns regarding health effects 

due to mold exposures in flooded homes and 

businesses were commonly brought to the 

attention of Occupational Health Team 

members. In addition to mold, concerns of 

exposures to harmful chemical and biological 

agents were abundant. The importance of 

information readily accessible and 

understandable by the workers and the public 

regarding these issues was apparent throughout 

the response. 

While environmental sampling by Occupational 

Health Team members typically did not reveal 

contaminant levels above recognized 

occupational exposure limits (see Appendix for 

summaries of results from individual sites), the 

ability and capacity of employers and employees 

to recognize and evaluate these hazards was 

quite variable. The USACE major contractors 

and subcontractors with whom the Occupational 

Health Team members met had varying degrees 

of capacity for hazard recognition, evaluation, 

and control. It is imperative to develop the 

capacity of contractors to safeguard the safety 

and health of their workers prior to such work so 

that they can successfully implement effective 

programs during often chaotic disaster 

conditions. 

Occupational safety hazards were evident during 

hurricane cleanup and recovery activities. The 

unions, in particular, expressed concerns over 

unaddressed safety issues to Occupational 

Health Team members. Oftentimes, it appeared 

that safety violations were committed in the rush 

of contractors to do as much work as possible in 

the shortest amount of time. This included 

common violations such as overloading trucks 

and hauling debris without tarps so that large 

chunks of debris (entire mattresses, dressers, 

large pieces of metal) fell from the trucks; 

traveling too fast at or near debris dump sites; 

and lack of professional safety staff and other 

resources on site. For example, a day after a visit 

to a debris transfer/dump site by Occupational 

Health Team members where safety hazards 

were evident, a flagman was killed after being 

trapped under the left track of a bulldozer. 

OSHA and USACE conducted investigations of 

the fatality. This example shows the need for 

qualified safety professionals as a key 

component of companies’ occupational health 

program for work in disaster areas. 
Cooperation between occupational safety and

health staff of the various governmental 

agencies involved (i.e., OSHA, NIOSH,

USACE) and the main contractor/subcontractors 

is essential for future emergencies. The Worker 

Safety and Health Annex of the Emergency

Support Function 8 (ESF-8), which is in the 

National Response Plan, was put into effect for 

the first time during Hurricane Katrina. This 

annex describes the responsibilities OSHA has 

to provide assistance to Federal employees and 

their contractors during disaster recovery

operations, as well as the support role NIOSH 

plays to OSHA during such a response.

Occupational Health Team members developed 

relationships with OSHA counterparts in New 

Orleans, as well as with safety and health staff 

among the main contractors to the USACE. 

Building on these relationships and making

changes in response to lessons learned will be 

important for enhancing Federal response efforts 

in the future. 

REFERENCES

1. Homeland Security [2004]. National 

Response Plan. [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

awcgate/nrp/nrp.pdf]. Date accessed: November 

22, 2006. 

2. CFR [1998]. 29 CFR 1910.134. Code of

Federal Regulations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Office of the

Federal Register. 

3. EPA [2006]. A brief guide to mold, 

moisture and your home. [http://www.epa.gov/ 

iaq/molds/moldguide.html]. Date accessed:

November 17, 2006. 

4. CFR [1990]. 29 CFR 1910.120. Code of

Federal Regulations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Office of the

Federal Register. 

5. NIOSH [2006]. Hazard evaluation and

technical assistance report: New Orleans Police

Department, New Orleans, Louisiana. U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services,

Public Health Service, Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention, National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health, HETA 2006-

0023-3003. 

 

6 NIOSH [2006]. Hazard evaluation and

technical assistance report: New Orleans Fire 

Department, New Orleans, Louisiana. U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services,

Public Health Service, Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention, National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health, HETA 2006-

0027-3001. 

Page 14 Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034
TABLE

Table 1 

 Health complaints or diagnoses occurring five or more times in the 150 employees of a private security

company working in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina (September 3–27, 2005) 

Diagnosis or Presenting 

Complaint 

Number Seen for This Reason 

(% out of 267 total clinic visits) 

Laceration (Fingers/Hand) 37 (14.0) 

Sinus Congestion 27 (10.0) 

Emotional Distress 25 (9.3) 

Insect Bites/Sting 21 (7.8) 

Laceration (All Other) 17 (6.3) 

Headache 15 (5.6)

Nausea 10 (3.7)

Heat Exhaustion 9 (3.3) 

Eye Irritation 8 (3.0) 

Abrasion 8 (3.0) 

Diarrhea 7 (2.6) 

Skin Rash 7 (2.6) 

Dehydration 7 (2.6) 

Blisters (Feet) 7 (2.6) 

Sore Throat 6 (2.2) 

Excessive Noise Exposure 6 (2.2) 

Fatigue 5 (1.9) 

Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 Page 15 
Appendix 

Page 16 Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034

Summaries of Individual Sites Evaluated 
CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - A 

CERES Environmental/Beverly Construction Airport Debris Site, 

New Orleans, Louisiana

Investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) evaluated job hazards on

October 3 and 5, 2005, at the Ceres Environmental/Beverly Construction Airport Debris Site. 

Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 Page 17 

What NIOSH Did

 We watched work processes and practices. 

 We took three personal breathing zone (PBZ) air 

samples for total dust and metals, eight PBZ air 

samples for respirable dust and silica, seven PBZ 

air samples for asbestos and other fibers and one

bulk sample of the debris pile for metals, silica, 

and asbestos. 

 We measured noise exposures on a bulldozer

operator, a team leader who was passing out

tickets to trucks, and a backhoe operator. 

What NIOSH Found

 PBZ samples for total dust were below the 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA) permissible exposure limit (PEL). 

 Lead, arsenic, and manganese concentrations

were very low or nondetectable. 

 PBZ samples for respirable dust were below the

OSHA PEL. Two of the samples contained

levels of quartz below the OSHA PEL. None of 

the samples contained cristobalite. 

PBZ samples for fibers were below the OSHA

PEL for asbestos. The types of fibers identified



 lead,

and arsenic, were found in the bulk sample. 

were mainly cellulose/plant fibers and fiberglass. 

Low levels of metals such as manganese,

 The bulk sample contained 12% quartz; asbestos 

was not detected. 

 Noise exposures for the team leader exceeded

the NIOSH Recommended Exposure Limit 

(REL) dose of 100%. The REL dose for the 

backhoe operator was 98.5%. Exposures for both

were below the OSHA criteria. Results are not

available for the bulldozer operator due to 

equipment malfunction. 

Recommendations 

 Enforce traffic rules on the site. 

 Restrict flagmen from the dumping area. 

 Provide sanitary facilities for hand washing.

Provide an area (for example, a tent) for 

employees to change into and out of protective 





 el posts set in concrete) to 

 trucks. 

 asks vary. Respirator

use should follow OSHA regulations even if 

ntary

clothing. Ideally, a shower facility should be 

available. 

Make hearing protection devices such as ear 

plugs available to the workers and enforce their 

use. 

Use barriers (e.g., ste

help protect the USACE personnel who work 

near moving

 Use water sprays regularly to reduce airborne 

dust levels. 

Continue to assess the need for respirators as the

debris composition and t

volu use is allowed. 

What To Do For More Information:

For more information about the sampling done

on this site visit, contact NIOSH at 

(513)-841-4382 and ask for 

Hurricane Katrina Response Support
CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - B 

North Galvez and St. Louis Streets Debris Site, 

New Orleans, Louisiana

On October 4, 2005, investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

(NIOSH) evaluated job hazards at a debris site located on North Galvez Street in New Orleans, Louisiana.

At this site, green debris (branches, trees shrubs, etc.) were compiled and mulched for transport to

landfills or burning sites. Workers at this site were employees of ECC, a contractor to the US Army Corps 

of Engineers. 

What NIOSH Did





 d recommendations for employee

training and their use of personal protective

equipment

 We watched work processes and practices. 

We took one personal breathing zone (PBZ) 

and three area air samples for total dust and 

metals. 

 We took two area air samples for respirable 

dust and silica. 

 We took two bulk samples of the soil to screen

for metals, crystalline silica, and asbestos. 

We measured noise exposures on a quality

control (QC) inspector and a trackhoe

operator/foreman. 

We discusse

.

What NIOSH Found

 Workers were required to wear hard hats,



Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure 

Limit (PEL). 

 f the bulk samples contained

 samples contained crystalline silica

 ow all 

exposure mpled. 

breathable coveralls, and N-95 filtering

facepiece respirators. 

Total dust concentration was below the

Occupational Safety and Health 

 Airborne lead, arsenic, and manganese

concentrations were very low or 

nondetectable.

 Respirable dust concentrations were below the

OSHA PEL. 

 Neither of the respirable dust samples

contained silica (quartz or cristobalite). 

 Low levels of metals such as manganese, lead

and arsenic were found in the bulk samples. 

Neither o

asbestos. 

Both bulk

(quartz). 

Noise exposures on the QC inspector and the 

trackhoe operator/foreman were bel

criteria for the time sa

Recommendations 

 Continue to use hard hats, breathable

coveralls, and safety glasses. 

Continue to assess the need for respirators as 

the debris composition and tasks vary. 

Respirator us



e should follow OSHA 

regulations even if management allows

voluntary use.

What To Do For More Information:

For more information about the sampling done

on this site visit, contact NIOSH at 

(513)-841-4382 and ask for 

Hurricane Katrina Response Support

Page 18 Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034
CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - C

Religious and Broad Streets Debris Site, 

New Orleans, Louisiana 

On October 10, 2005, investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

(NIOSH) assessed potential job hazards at a debris site located at Religious and Broad Streets in New

Orleans, Louisiana. The site was run through a subcontract of ECC. Investigators conducted air sampling

on personnel actively involved in the disposal of a pile of suspected TransiteTM material found among 

debris from Hurricane Katrina. Concerns were specifically expressed about potential asbestos fiber

exposures during this activity. TransiteTM is a fire-proofing material used in roofing and siding that used 

to be made with asbestos; modern-day TransiteTM is not made with asbestos. 

What NIOSH Did



ted TransiteTM material

to a lined dumpster. 

 We watched work practices and procedures. 

We took three personal breathing zone

(PBZ) air samples and one area air sample

for asbestos and other fibers during the

transfer of the suspec

What NIOSH Found

 air



perator,

 tified were cellulose, not

asbestos fibers. 

The fiber concentration on the area

sample was below the limit of detection. 

The fiber concentrations on two of the three 

PBZ samples were non-detectable. The third 

PBZ sample, taken on a trackhoe o

had a very low fiber concentration. 

The fibers iden

Recommendations



TransiteTM, which 



prevent fibers from 



en if management allows 

voluntary use. 

Although asbestos exposure was not

identified during this assessment, conditions 

and materials may vary at other times and 

worksites. Train employees on the hazards

associated with handling siding and roofing 

materials, such as old

may contain asbestos. 

 Use water sprays to suppress dust. 

Avoid crushing, grinding, or breaking old

TransiteTM or other materials that may 

contain asbestos to

becoming airborne. 

Continue to assess the need for respirators as

the debris composition and tasks vary. 

Respirator use should follow OSHA

regulations ev

What To Do For More Information:

For more information about the sampling done 

on this site visit, contact NIOSH at 

(513)-841-4382 and ask for 

Hurricane Katrina Response Support

Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 Page 19 

What To Do For More Information:

For more information about the sampling done at this 

site visit, contact NIOSH at (513) 841-4382 and ask

for Hurricane Katrina response support.
CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - D 

Assessment of Occupational Hazards at a U.S. Naval Air Station,

 Belle Chasse, Louisiana

Investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) evaluated job 

hazards on October 9 and 10, 2005, at a U.S. Naval Air Station in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. The workers 

were employed by the Young Group. 

What NIOSH Did

 We watched work processes and practices. 

Took three personal breathing zone (PBZ)

air samples for fiberglass, nine PBZ air

samples for total dust, and two bulk samples 



ures on a forklift 

operator and four roofers. 

of old roofing material and roof debris for 

asbestos. 

 We measured noise expos

What NIOSH Found

 and Health

Limit (PEL). 



REL doses for th

oise

OSHA criteria. 

 Fiberglass concentrations were very low or 

nondetectable. 

Total dust concentrations were below the 

Occupational Safety

Administration (OSHA) Permissible

Exposure

 Asbestos was not detected in the bulk 

samples. 

Noise exposures for the forklift operator 

exceeded the NIOSH Recommended

Exposure Limit (REL) dose of 100%. The 

e roofers were below 

100%. All n measurements were below 

Recommendations 

 Continue to wear hard hats when working 

on the roof. 

 Continue to drink fluids regularly to stay

hydrated. 

 Wear long sleeve shirts and safety glasses 

when tearing up old roofs. 

 Take a shower at the end of the day.

 Do not smoke in the workplace. 

Enforce use of hearing protectors for the 

forklift operator; reevaluate noise exposures 

on roofers when the work rate increases or

when roof



surfaces are different from those 



s even if 

management allows voluntary use. 

evaluated. 

Continue to assess the need for respirators as

the intensity of tasks increases. Respirator 

use should follow OSHA regulation

What To Do For More Information:

For more information about the sampling done

on this site visit, contact NIOSH at 

(513)-841-4382 and ask for 

Hurricane Katrina Response Support.

Page 20 Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034
CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - E 

Evaluation of Noise Exposures at an Animal Shelter, 

 St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana

Investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) conducted noise 

monitoring at an outdoor animal shelter in St. Bernard Parish. The shelter was staffed by volunteers, some

of whom stayed in trailers onsite. Monitoring was carried out on October 3 and 4, 2005.

What NIOSH Did

 We observed work practices and procedures. 





hange

rate, and the OSHA criteria are based on a 5-

dB excha L is more

conservative than the OSHA criteria. 

 We took nine instantaneous readings of 

noise levels at the dog tent. 

We measured noise exposures on a

veterinarian, a veterinarian assistant, and

two veterinary technicians for approximately

5 hours. 

 Personal exposures are expressed as a dose 

percent, where the maximum allowable dose 

is 100%. 

The doses are expressed as NIOSH

Recommended Exposure Limit (REL) and

the OSHA Action Level (AL). The NIOSH

REL is based on a 3-decibel (dB) exc

nge rate. The NIOSH RE

What NIOSH Found

The noise levels at the dog tent ranged from 

90–96 dB on an









quire 

workers a hearing

conservati

 A-weighted scale.

The veterinarian had a dose of 128% as

calculated by the REL and a dose of 36% as

calculated by the AL for the time sampled. 

The veterinary assistant had a dose of 136%

as calculated by the REL and 36% as

calculated by the AL for the time sampled. 

The two technicians had doses of 199% and 

337% respectively, as calculated by the 

REL, and a corresponding dose of 42% and

63%, as calculated by the AL. 

The noise exposure on one of the 

technicians exceeded the OSHA Action 

Level of 50% dose, which would re

to be placed in

on program (HCP). 

Recommendations



 regularly conduct 

similar activities, in an HCP as specified by

OSHA (29 CFR [Code of Federal 

Provide volunteers with hearing protectors 

when working with dogs. 

Enroll volunteers who

Regulations] 1910.95). 

Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 Page 21 

What To Do For More Information:

For more information about the sampling done 

on this site visit, contact NIOSH at 

(513) 841-4382 and ask for 

Hurricane Katrina Response Support.
CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - F 

Evaluation of the St. Bernard Parish Courthouse

On October 13, 2005, a site visit was conducted by investigato nal Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health (N St. Bernard’s Parish Co

discussed the ediation efforts and fu re

l a walk-through tour adjacent building. No 

n

rs from the Natio

IOSH) at the 

status of current rem

urthouse in Chalmette, Louisiana. Investigators

tu plans with the Project Manager for Advanced

C eanup Technology, Inc. and conducted of the courthouse and an

e vironmental sampling was conducted. 

 We conducted a walk-through tour of the facility. 

 We discussed r aining and

their use of p



s.

 ation efforts for porous surfaces were in the

 were not disassembled during initial remediation efforts. 

Cleaning within pipe cha

autions regar

and confined space

 Rooms with significant pa

and similar furnishings showed s

 Some “cleaned” rooms

growth along fibrous ceiling tiles,

items. 

 Some content removal activities attributed to work by Army

National Guard personnel was consistent with that of mold 

remediation activities. 

bution.

 ment 



peting/carpet 

been wet for more than 48 hours.

Porous items should not be returned to building unless they

can be thoroughly cleaned and dried.

 Courtrooms with raised sub-floor areas should be partially 

disassembled and evaluated for remediation options.

emediate nd air 

ning systems prior to re-occupancy.

Provide an area (for example, a tent) for employees to change 

into and out of protective clothing. Ideally, a shower facility 

e.

ecommendations for employee tr

ersonal protective equipment.

 We discussed why environmental sampling was not

recommended.

We checked portions of the false ceiling, pipe chase, and 

ventilation systems for mold contamination and flood 

residue.

 We provided recommendations regarding cleanup activitie

 Remediation and cleaning procedures for courthouse rooms

with non-porous surfaces appeared to be progressing

appropriately and effectively. 

Remedi

beginning stages.

Courtrooms utilizing raised sub-floors for elevated seating 

 se and electrical closets may require

special prec ding de-energizing electrical panels  R

entry requirements for pipe chase areas. 

per, carpet, pressboard furniture, 

conditio

 ignificant mold growth. 

showed persistent or new mold

 or on furniture and storage 

should be availabl

 Portions of some heating, refrigerating, and air conditioning

systems showed signs of internal contamination and 

subsequent spore redistri

 Ensure all workers involved in mold remediation activities 

have received sufficient training to understand the hazards

presented by the mold, the cleaning agents, and the

remediation processes. 

Ensure that all workers involved in mold remediation are 

equipped with appropriate personal protective equip

(skin, eye, respiratory protection). 

Follow OSHA requirements for use of respirators, including

fit-testing, medical clearance and establishing a written

respiratory protection program.

 Remove all porous items (paper, drywall, car

padding, upholstery, wallpaper, ceiling tiles, insulation

material, some clothing, leather, paper, wood ) that are 

contaminated or have



What NIOSH Did

and clean the heating, ventilation, a

What NIOSH Found

Recommendations

Page 22 Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034

What To Do For More Information:

For more information about the sampling done 

on this site visit, contact NIOSH at 

(513) 841-4382 and ask for 

Hurricane Katrina Response Support.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 4676 Columbia Parkway Cincinnati, OH 45226-1998 OFFICIAL BUSINESS Penalty for private use $300 

Delivering on the Nation's promise: 

Safety and Health at work for all people 

through research and prevention

To receive NIOSH documents or information 

about occupational safety and health topics 

contact NIOSH at: 

1-800-35-NIOSH (356-4674) 

Fax: 1-513-533-8573 

E-mail: pubstaft@cdc.gov 

or visit the NIOSH web site at: 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh

S A F E R • H E A L T H I E R • P E O P L ETM