Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1711-CR-2699 | October 24, 2018 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Matthew M. Kubacki

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Keijuan Ramey,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 24, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1711-CR-2699

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Bradley Keffer, 

Judge Pro Tempore

The Honorable Marshelle D. 

Broadwell, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G17-1708-CM-32073

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1711-CR-2699 | October 24, 2018 Page 2 of 6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Keijuan Ramey (Ramey), appeals his conviction for 

Counts I and II, domestic battery, Class A misdemeanors, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-

1.3(a). 

[2] We affirm. 

ISSUE

[3] Ramey presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State 

presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Ramey’s 

domestic battery convictions. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On August 25, 2017, Ramey and his eight-month pregnant girlfriend, Bricia 

Chaves (Chaves), were in an apartment leased by Ramey’s sister, Shalika 

Parcher (Parcher). At some point, Chaves and Ramey walked into Parcher’s 

bedroom, and Parcher sensed that Ramey was “mad about something.” 

(Transcript Vol. II, p. 49). Chaves then stated that she needed to go home, and 

she borrowed Parcher’s cellphone to contact her sister who would arrange for 

“an Uber home.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50). While talking on the phone, Ramey 

snatched the phone from Chaves. Ramey then paced back and forth in the 

living room, hurling insults and threats to Chaves’ sister. Because Parcher 

“didn’t want [Ramey] to break” her phone, she took it back. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50). 

At that point, Ramey was “yelling and screaming.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50). 

Parcher ordered Ramey to leave and she threatened to call the police. Ramey 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1711-CR-2699 | October 24, 2018 Page 3 of 6

refused, and he angrily threw his own phone against the wall. Annoyed by 

Ramey’s conduct, Parcher began pushing Ramey out of her apartment. Ramey 

refused and stated, “If I’m leaving, then [Chaves is] leaving with me.” (Tr. Vol. 

II, p. 52). Ramey then “yanked [Chaves] by the back of the neck and tried to 

push [Chaves] out of the door, but [Chaves] knelt down because she didn’t 

want” to leave. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 52). Upon seeing Ramey’s actions, Parcher 

“panicked and she tried to get [Ramey] off of [Chaves,]” but Ramey turned 

around, swung his arm, and hit Parcher on her shoulder. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 53). 

Although he left Parcher’s house, Ramey was later arrested. 

[5] On August 30, 2016, the State filed an Information, charging Ramey with 

Counts I and II, domestic battery, Class A misdemeanors. On November 2, 

2017, a bench trial was conducted. At the close of the evidence, the trial court 

found Ramey guilty as charged. The same day, the trial court sentenced Ramey 

to serve concurrent terms of 365 days on each Count in the Marion County Jail. 

However, the trial court suspended 351 days to probation on both Counts.

[6] Ramey now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[7] Ramey contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt to support his convictions for domestic battery. When 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate 

courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences 

supporting the judgment. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007). It 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1711-CR-2699 | October 24, 2018 Page 4 of 6

is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility 

and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a 

conviction. Id. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted 

with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial 

court’s ruling. Id. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable 

fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every 

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. The evidence is sufficient if an 

inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the judgment. See id.

Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess the 

credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 2002).

[8] Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1.3(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “a person 

who knowingly or intentionally: (1) touches a family or household member in 

a rude, insolent, or angry manner; or (2) in a rude, insolent, or angry manner 

places any bodily fluid or waste on a family or household member . . . commits 

domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor.” 

[9] In Count I, the State alleged that “Ramey did knowingly touch Bricia Chavez, 

a family or household member, in a rude, insolent or angry manner by grabbing 

her and/or pushing her and/or pulling her.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 16). 

Here, Ramey claims that while “there is a high probability” that he touched 

Chaves, “the touching does not rise to the level of rude, insolent or angry as 

necessary for the conviction.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 11). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1711-CR-2699 | October 24, 2018 Page 5 of 6

[10] On the day in question, Chaves and Ramey were arguing. When Chaves used 

Parcher’s cell phone to call her sister who would arrange for an Uber to take her 

home, Ramey became furious. Ramey, who was “already livid . . . snatched 

the phone” from Chaves, and he began hurling threats and insults at Chaves’ 

sister. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50). Because Parcher “didn’t want [Ramey] to break” her 

phone, she took it back. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50). At that point, Ramey was “yelling

and screaming,” and Parcher ordered Ramey to leave and threatened to call the 

police. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50). Ramey refused, and he angrily threw his own phone 

against the wall. Based on his appalling behavior, Parcher again ordered 

Ramey to leave her house. Ramey informed Parcher, “If I’m leaving, then 

[Chaves is] leaving with me.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 52). At that moment, Ramey 

“yanked [Chaves] by the back of her neck and [he] tried to push her out of the 

door, but [Chaves] knelt down because she didn’t want to go.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 

52). Ramey’s arguments that Chaves offered an alternate explanation—that 

Ramey did not hold her neck in rude, insolent or angry manner—amount to an 

invitation to reweigh conflicting evidence, which we cannot do. See Stewart, 

768 N.E.2d at 435.

[11] As for Count II, the State alleged that “Ramey did knowingly touch Shalika 

Parcher, a family or household member, in a rude, insolent or angry manner by 

striking her with his hand.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 16). Ramey’s only 

claim is that he did not knowingly hit Parcher. “A person engages in conduct 

‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high 

probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1711-CR-2699 | October 24, 2018 Page 6 of 6

[12] Parcher alleged that after Ramey “yanked” Chaves by “the back of her neck,” 

she “panicked” and she “tried to get [Ramey] off of [Chaves]” because she 

“didn’t know what [Ramey] was going to do next to [Chaves].” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 

53). At that moment, Ramey turned around, swung his arm severally and “hit” 

Parcher on her “shoulder.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 54). Here, the factfinder could have 

reasonably inferred that Ramey was aware of a high probability that he would 

hit Parcher at the time he swung his arm. 

[13] In sum, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt to convict Ramey of two Counts of domestic battery, Class A 

misdemeanors. 

CONCLUSION

[14] For the reasons stated, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain 

Ramey’s two Counts of Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.

[15] Affirmed. 

[16] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur