Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 4 / Thursday, January 6, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 1163

applies: Critical Functions: Functions 

whose failure would contribute to or 

cause a failure condition that would 

prevent the continued safe flight and 

landing of the airplane.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

December 23, 2004. 

Kevin Mullin, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 05–236 Filed 1–5–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. NM287; Special Conditions No. 

25–281–SC] 

Special Conditions: Airbus Model 

A330, A340–200 and A340–300 Series 

Airplanes; Lower Deck Mobile Crew 

Rest (LD–MCR) Compartment

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Airbus Model A330, 

A340–200, and A340–300 series 

airplanes. These airplanes will have 

novel or unusual design features 

associated with a lower deck mobile 

crew rest (LD–MCR) compartment. The 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for this design feature. 

These special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 23, 2004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim 

Backman, FAA, International Branch, 

ANM–116, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification 

Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, Washington, 98055–4056; 

telephone (425) 227–2797; facsimile 

(425) 227–1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On March 20, 2003, Airbus applied 

for a change to Type Certificate 

Numbers A46NM and A43NM to permit 

installation of an LD–MCR compartment 

in Airbus Model A330, A340–200, and 

A340–300 series airplanes. 

The LD–MCR compartment will be 

located under the passenger cabin floor 

in the aft cargo compartment of Airbus 

Model A330, A340–200, and A340–300 

series airplanes. It will be the size of a 

standard airfreight container and will be 

removable from the cargo compartment. 

The LD–MCR compartment will be 

occupied in flight but not during taxi, 

takeoff, or landing. No more than seven 

crewmembers at a time will be 

permitted to occupy it. The LD–MCR 

compartment will have a smoke 

detection system, a fire suppression 

system, and an oxygen system. 

The LD–MCR compartment will be 

accessed from the main deck via a 

‘‘stairhouse.’’ The floor within the 

stairhouse has a hatch that leads to 

stairs which occupants use to descend 

into the LD–MCR compartment. An 

interface will keep this hatch open 

when the stairhouse door is open. In 

addition, there will be an emergency 

hatch which opens directly into the 

main passenger cabin. The LD–MCR 

compartment has a maintenance door. 

This door is intended to be used to 

allow maintenance personnel and cargo 

handlers to enter the LD–MCR from the 

cargo compartment when the airplane is 

not in flight. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of § 21.101, 

Airbus must show that Airbus Model 

A330, A340–200, and A340–300 series 

airplanes, as changed, continue to meet 

(1) the applicable provisions of the 

regulations incorporated by reference in 

A46NM (for Airbus Model A330) and in 

A43NM (for Airbus Model A340–200 

and A340–300 series airplanes) or (2) 

the applicable regulations in effect on 

the date of application for the change. 

The regulations incorporated by 

reference in the type certificate are 

commonly referred to as the ‘‘original 

type certification basis.’’ The regulations 

incorporated by reference in A46NM 

and A43NM are as follows: 

The certification basis for Airbus 

Models A330–300, A340–200, and 

A340–300 series airplanes is 14 CFR 

part 25, as amended by Amendments 

25–1 through 25–63; certain regulations 

at later Amendments 25–65, 25–66, and 

25–77; and Amendment 25–64 with 

exceptions. Refer to Type Certificate 

Data Sheet (TCDS) A46NM or A43NM, 

as applicable, for a complete description 

of the certification basis for these 

models, including certain special 

conditions that are not relevant to these 

proposed special conditions. 

The certification basis for Airbus 

Model A330–200 series airplanes is 14 

CFR part 25, as amended by 

Amendments 25–1 through 25–63, 25–

65, 25–66, 25–68, 25–69, 25–73, 25–75, 

25–77, 25–78, 25–81, 25–82, 25–84 and 

25–85; certain regulations at 

Amendments 25–72 and 25–74; and 

Amendment 25–64 with exceptions. 

Refer to TCDS A46NM for a complete 

description of the certification basis for 

that model, including certain special 

conditions that are not relevant to these 

proposed special conditions. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for Airbus Model A330, A340–200, and 

A340–300 series airplanes because of a 

novel or unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, Airbus Model A330, A340–

200, and A340–300 series airplanes 

must comply with the fuel vent and 

exhaust emission requirements of 14 

CFR part 34 and the noise certification 

requirements of 14 CFR part 36. 

Special conditions, as defined in 

§ 11.19, are issued in accordance with 

§ 11.38 and become part of the type 

certification basis in accordance with 

§ 21.101. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, or should any 

other model already included on the 

same type certificate be modified to 

incorporate the same or similar novel or 

unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under the provisions of § 21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

While the installation of a crew rest 

compartment is not a new concept for 

large transport category airplanes, each 

crew rest compartment has unique 

features based on design, location, and 

use on the airplane. The LD–MCR 

compartment is novel in terms of part 

25 in that it will be located below the 

passenger cabin floor in the aft cargo 

compartment of Airbus Model A330, 

A340–200, and A340–300 series 

airplanes. Due to the novel or unusual 

features associated with the installation 

of a LD–MCR compartment, special 

conditions are considered necessary to 

provide a level of safety equal to that 

established by the airworthiness 

regulations incorporated by reference in 

the type certificates of these airplanes. 

These special conditions do not negate 

the need to address other applicable 

part 25 regulations. 

1164 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 4 / Thursday, January 6, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

Operational Evaluations and Approval 

These special conditions specify 

requirements for design approvals (i.e., 

type design changes and supplemental 

type certificates) of LD–MCR 

compartments administered by the 

FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service. 

Prior to operational use of a LD–MCR 

compartment, the FAA’s Flight 

Standards Service, Aircraft Evaluation 

Group (AEG), must evaluate and 

approve the ‘‘basic suitability’’ of the 

LD–MCR compartment for occupation 

by crewmembers. If an operator wishes 

to utilize a LD–MCR compartment as 

‘‘sleeping quarters,’’ the LD–MCR 

compartment must undergo an 

additional operational evaluation and 

approval. The LD–MCR compartments 

will be evaluated for compliance to 

§§ 121.485(a) and 121.523(b), with 

Advisory Circular 121–31 providing one 

method of compliance to these 

operating regulations. 

To obtain an operational evaluation, 

the type design holder must contact the 

AEG within the Flight Standards 

Service which has operational approval 

authority for the project. In this 

instance, it is the Seattle AEG. The type 

design holder must request a ‘‘basic 

suitability’’ evaluation or a ‘‘sleeping 

quarters’’ evaluation of the crew rest. 

The type design holder may make these 

requests concurrently with the 

demonstration of compliance to these 

special conditions. 

The results of these evaluations will 

be documented in the A330, A340–200 

and A340–300 Flight Standardization 

Board (FSB) Report Appendix. In 

discussions with their FAA Principal 

Operating Inspector (POI), individual 

operators may reference these 

standardized evaluations as the basis for 

an operational approval, in lieu of an 

on-site operational evaluation. 

An operational re-evaluation and 

approval will be required for any 

changes to the approved LD–MCR 

compartment configuration, if the 

changes affect procedures for emergency 

egress of crewmembers, other safety 

procedures for crewmembers occupying 

the LD–MCR compartment, or training 

related to these procedures. The 

applicant for any such change is 

responsible for notifying the Seattle 

AEG that a new crew rest evaluation is 

required. 

All instructions for continued 

airworthiness (ICAW), including service 

bulletins, must be submitted to the 

Seattle AEG for approval acceptance 

before the FAA issues its approval of the 

modification. 

Discussion of Special Conditions No. 9 

and 12

The following clarifies how Special 

Condition No. 9 should be understood 

relative to the requirements of 

§ 25.1439(a). Amendment 25–38 

modified the requirements of 

§ 25.1439(a) by adding the following 

language,

In addition, protective breathing 

equipment must be installed in each isolated 

separate compartment in the airplane, 

including upper and lower lobe galleys, in 

which crewmember occupancy is permitted 

during flight for the maximum number of 

crewmembers expected to be in the area 

during any operation.

Section 25.1439(a) requires protective 

breathing equipment (PBE) in isolated 

separate compartments in which 

crewmember occupancy is permitted. 

But the PBE requirements of 

§ 25.1439(a) are not appropriate in this 

case, because the LD–MCR compartment 

is novel and unusual in terms of the 

number of occupants. 

In 1976, when Amendment 25–38 was 

adopted, underfloor galleys were the 

only isolated compartments that had 

been certificated, with a maximum of 

two crewmembers expected to occupy 

those galleys. Special Condition No. 9 

addresses PBE requirements for LD–

MCR compartments, which can 

accommodate up to 7 crewmembers. 

This number of occupants in an isolated 

compartment was not envisioned at the 

time Amendment 25–38 was adopted. 

In the event of a fire, an occupant’s 

first action should be to leave the 

confined space, unless the occupant(s) 

is fighting the fire. It is not appropriate 

for all LD–MCR compartment occupants 

to don PBE. Taking the time to don the 

PBE would prolong the time for the 

occupant’s emergency evacuation and 

possibly interfere with efforts to 

extinguish the fire. 

In regard to Special Condition No. 12, 

the FAA considers that, during the one 

minute smoke detection time, 

penetration of a small quantity of smoke 

from the LD–MCR compartment into an 

occupied area on this airplane 

configuration would be acceptable 

based upon the limitations placed in 

these special conditions. The FAA 

determination considers that the special 

conditions place sufficient restrictions 

in the quantity and type of material 

allowed in crew carry-on bags that the 

threat from a fire in this remote area 

would be equivalent to that experienced 

in the main cabin. 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

No. 25–04–02–SC for the Airbus Model 

A330, A340–200 and A340–300 series 

airplanes was published in the Federal 

Register on September 3, 2004 (69 FR 

53841). Several commenters submitted 

comments on the proposed special 

conditions. 

Proposed Special Condition 1(a)

requires that there be appropriate 

placards displayed in a conspicuous 

place at each entrance to the LD–MCR 

compartment.

One commenter suggested that since 

cargo may be loaded through the 

maintenance door, the placard should 

be required to be outside the 

maintenance door. 

The FAA considers that the special 

condition is sufficient as written, 

because the maintenance door is strictly 

for accessing and servicing the LD–

MCR. No cargo or baggage will be 

loaded through the maintenance door, 

and, therefore, a placard is not needed 

on the outside of the door. 

Proposed Special Condition 1(d)

requires a means for any door installed 

between the LD–MCR and the passenger 

cabin to be quickly opened from 

‘‘inside’’ the LD–MCR, even when 

crowding occurs at each side of the 

door. 

One commenter indicates that the 

requirement for quick opening during 

crowding should also apply if there is 

an attempt to open the door from the 

passenger cabin. 

This requirement addresses crew 

members who are exiting the mobile 

crew rest area and, therefore, do not 

have control of the area outside the 

door. When crew members are entering 

the LD–MCR, they would have 

sufficient control of the area outside the 

door to be able to enter the LD–MCR. 

Therefore, the FAA considers the 

special conditions sufficient to address 

this installation. 

Proposed Special Condition 2 requires 

two emergency evacuation routes which 

could be used by each occupant of the 

LD–MCR compartment to rapidly 

evacuate to the main cabin. 

One commenter states that the phrase 

‘‘each occupant’’ in 14 CFR part 25 has 

been interpreted to mean a 5th percent 

female to a 95th percentile male. Yet the 

proposed Special Condition mentions 

only the 95th percentile male when 

addressing means to evacuate an 

incapacitated crewmember. The 

commenter suggests that the FAA define 

‘‘each occupant’’ as used in this Special 

Condition. 

In terms of evacuating an 

incapacitated crewmember, an 

incapacitated 95th percentile male is 

considered the ‘‘worst case’’ and is 

specifically addressed in the special 

conditions. The FAA concludes that 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 4 / Thursday, January 6, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 1165

these special conditions are sufficient to 

address this installation. 

Proposed Special Condition 12, in the 

third paragraph, addresses built-in fire 

extinguisher systems in the LD–MCR. It 

proposes that the system ‘‘must have 

adequate capacity to suppress any fire 

occurring in the LD–MCR compartment, 

considering the fire threat, the volume 

of the compartment, and the ventilation 

rate.’’

One commenter suggests that the 

Special Condition be revised to include 

the maximum approved ExtendedRange Twin-Engine operations (ETOPS) 

diversion time for the airplane in the list 

of things to be considered when 

determining adequate capacity of the 

fire extinguisher system. 

The FAA does not concur. Since the 

certification regulations are design 

requirements and do not address the 

types of operation, the special 

conditions are intended to address only 

the design parameters of the LD–MCR. 

Therefore, these special conditions are 

considered sufficient to address this 

installation. 

Proposed Special Condition 16

requires that materials and mattresses 

comply with the flammability standards 

of 14 CFR § 25.853 (Compartment 

Interiors) at Amendment 25–66. 

One commenter states that—in 

Special Conditions No. 25–230–SC 

which were applied to Boeing’s 

overhead crew rests—the FAA required 

that the materials comply with § 25.853 

at Amendment 25–83. The commenter 

asks for clarification of the reason that 

the lower lobe area allows for 

compliance with a lower amendment 

level of the design requirements. 

In response, the FAA notes that, 

before initiating these special 

conditions, we determined the 

applicable airworthiness standards for 

this design change in accordance with 

14 CFR 21.101 and Advisory Circular 

21.101–1. Because the LD–MCR is not a 

‘‘product level’’ change, we do not 

consider this change ‘‘significant’’ for 

purposes of that regulation. Therefore, 

the applicable regulations are those 

specified in the type certificate for the 

airplane, and it is not necessary for the 

applicant to show compliance with later 

amendments. For the A330 and A340, 

the certification amendment level is 

Amendment 25–66, whereas for the 

Boeing airplane, the certification 

amendment level is Amendment 25–83. 

In adopting special conditions in 

accordance with 14 CFR 21.16, we 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

the applicable regulations. Therefore, 

the referenced amendment level is 

different for the two types of airplanes. 

Proposed Special Condition 19

requires that ‘‘means must be provided 

to prevent access into the Class C cargo 

compartment during all airplane 

operations and to ensure that the 

maintenance door is closed during all 

airplane flight operations. 

One commenter suggests that the 

proposed special condition is confusing, 

because the FAA uses two very different 

phrases: ‘‘airplane operations’’ and 

‘‘airplane flight operations.’’ The 

commenter asks that the FAA define the 

terms, since ‘‘airplane operations’’

seems to be broader than ‘‘airplane 

flight operations.’’ In addition, the 

commenter asks that the wording be 

revised to require that the door be 

‘‘secured’’ during flight operations, not 

just closed. The securing of this 

maintenance door during airplane 

operations is an important security 

measure to prevent passengers from 

accessing the cargo compartment or 

stowaways in the cargo compartment 

from accessing the airplane. 

The FAA concurs and will revise the 

special condition as follows:

Means must be provided to prevent access 

into the Class C cargo compartment during 

all airplane flight operations and to ensure 

that the maintenance door is closed and 

secured during all airplane flight operations.

Proposed Additional Special 

Conditions:

One commenter suggests that there 

are some unique features of the LD–

MCR that do not appear to be 

adequately covered by the proposed 

Special Condition. 

1. One of these features is that two 

means of access from the LD–MCR to 

the main passenger compartment are 

required as part of the modification to 

the Airbus airplanes. Since the LD–MCR 

is removable, there must be provisions 

to secure the access means to eliminate 

any possibility of access between the 

cargo compartment and the passenger 

cabin when the LD–MCR is not

installed.

The FAA concurs, and the FAA 

considers these special conditions, 

specifically No. 19, sufficient to address 

the certification requirements for this 

installation. 

2. The commenter states that another 

unique feature of the LD–MCR is that it 

must connect to the airplane for 

electrical power and may have potable 

water and waste water attachments if it 

contains a lavatory. Since the LD–MCR 

is removable, those systems must be 

readily disconnected. As such, there 

should be requirements that ensure the 

integrity of those disconnects during a 

survivable crash landing, so that there 

are no sources of electrical arcing or the 

waste water system is not breached, 

possibly contaminating evacuating 

passengers. 

The FAA concurs, and the FAA 

considers the basic requirements of 14 

CFR part 25 and these special 

conditions sufficient to address the 

certification requirements for this 

installation. 

3. Finally, one commenter suggests 

that the facility should be physically 

isolated from the active areas and 

located close to the Flight Deck, so as to 

allow access to the flight deck without 

transiting public areas. 

In response, the FAA indicates that 

there are no current regulations which 

require a crew rest to be located such 

that the flight deck personnel have 

private access to the crew rest or do not 

have to pass through public areas to get 

to it. These requirements are not 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to the regulations. The FAA 

concludes that these special conditions 

are sufficient to address the certification 

requirements for this crew rest 

installation. 

Applicability 

As mentioned above, these special 

conditions are applicable to Airbus 

Model A330, A340–200 and A340–300 

series airplanes. Should Airbus apply at 

a later date for a change to the type 

certificate to include another model 

incorporating the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, these special 

conditions would apply to that model as 

well. 

Under standard practice, the effective 

date of final special conditions would 

be 30 days after the date of publication 

in the Federal Register; however, as the 

certification date for the Airbus Model 

A330, A340–200, and A340–300 is 

imminent, the FAA finds that good 

cause exists to make these special 

conditions effective upon issuance. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on the A330, 

A340–200, and A340–300 series 

airplanes. It is not a rule of general 

applicability, and it affects only the 

applicant which applied to the FAA for 

approval of these features on the 

airplane.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements.

■ The authority citation for these special 

conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

1166 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 4 / Thursday, January 6, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

The Special Conditions

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the following special conditions are 

issued as part of the type certification 

basis for certain Airbus Model A330, 

A340–200, and A340–300 series 

airplanes. 

1. Occupancy of the LD–MCR 

compartment is limited to the total 

number of installed bunks and seats in 

each compartment. For each occupant 

permitted in the LD–MCR compartment, 

there must be an approved seat or berth 

able to withstand the maximum flight 

loads when occupied. The maximum 

occupancy in the LD–MCR 

compartment is seven. 

(a) There must be appropriate 

placards displayed in a conspicuous 

place at each entrance to the LD–MCR 

compartment indicating the following 

information: 

(1) The maximum number of 

occupants allowed;

(2) That occupancy is restricted to 

crewmembers trained in the evacuation 

procedures for the LD–MCR 

compartment; 

(3) That occupancy is prohibited 

during taxi, take-off and landing; 

(4) That smoking is prohibited in the 

LD–MCR compartment; and 

(5) That the LD–MCR compartment is 

limited to the stowage of personal 

luggage of crewmembers and must not 

be used for the stowage of cargo or 

passenger baggage. 

(b) There must be at least one ashtray 

located conspicuously on or near the 

entry side of any entrance to the LD–

MCR compartment. 

(c) There must be a means to prevent 

passengers from entering the LD–MCR 

compartment in an emergency or when 

no flight attendant is present. 

(d) There must be a means for any 

door installed between the LD–MCR 

compartment and the passenger cabin to 

be capable of being quickly opened from 

inside the LD–MCR compartment, even 

when crowding occurs at each side of 

the door. 

(e) For all doors installed in the 

evacuation routes, there must be a 

means to preclude anyone from being 

trapped inside a compartment. If a 

locking mechanism is installed, it must 

be capable of being unlocked from the 

outside without the aid of special tools. 

The lock must not prevent opening from 

the inside of a compartment at any time. 

2. There must be at least two 

emergency evacuation routes, which 

could be used by each occupant of the 

LD–MCR compartment to rapidly 

evacuate to the main cabin and could be 

closed from the main passenger cabin 

after evacuation. 

(a) The routes must be located with 

one at each end of the LD–MCR 

compartment or with two having 

sufficient separation within the LD–

MCR compartment and between the 

routes to minimize the possibility of an 

event (either inside or outside of the 

LD–MCR compartment) rendering both 

routes inoperative. 

(b) The routes must be designed to 

minimize the possibility of blockage, 

which might result from fire, 

mechanical or structural failure or from 

persons standing on top of or against the 

escape route. If an evacuation route 

utilizes an area where normal 

movement of passengers occurs, it must 

be demonstrated that passengers would 

not impede egress to the main deck. If 

a hatch is installed in an evacuation 

route, the point at which the evacuation 

route terminates in the passenger cabin 

should not be located where normal 

movement by passengers or crew occur, 

such as in a main aisle, cross aisle, 

passageway or galley complex. 

If such a location cannot be avoided, 

special consideration must be taken to 

ensure that the hatch or door can be 

opened when a person who is the 

weight of a ninety-fifth percentile male 

is standing on the hatch or door. 

The use of evacuation routes must not 

be dependent on any powered device. If 

there is low headroom at or near an 

evacuation route, provision must be 

made to prevent or to protect occupants 

of the LD–MCR compartment from head 

injury. 

(c) Emergency evacuation procedures, 

including the emergency evacuation of 

an incapacitated crewmember from the 

LD–MCR compartment, must be 

established. All of these procedures 

must be transmitted to the operator for 

incorporation into its training programs 

and appropriate operational manuals. 

(d) There must be a limitation in the 

Airplane Flight Manual or other suitable 

means requiring that crewmembers be 

trained in the use of evacuation routes. 

3. There must be a means for the 

evacuation of an incapacitated 

crewmember who is representative of a 

95th percentile male from the LD–MCR 

compartment to the passenger cabin 

floor. The evacuation must be 

demonstrated for all evacuation routes. 

A flight attendant or other crewmember 

(a total of one assistant within the LD–

MCR compartment) may provide 

assistance in the evacuation. Additional 

assistance may be provided by up to 

three persons in the main passenger 

compartment. For evacuation routes 

having stairways, the additional 

assistants may descend down to one 

half the elevation change from the main 

deck to the LD–MCR compartment or to 

the first landing, whichever is higher.

4. The following signs and placards 

must be provided in the LD–MCR 

compartment: 

(a) At least one exit sign which meets 

the requirements of § 25.812(b)(1)(i) at 

Amendment 25–58 must be located near 

each exit. However, a sign with reduced 

background area of no less than 5.3 

square inches (excluding the letters) 

may be utilized, provided that it is 

installed such that the material 

surrounding the exit sign is light in 

color (e.g., white, cream, light beige). If 

the material surrounding the exit sign is 

not light in color, a sign with a 

minimum of a one-inch wide 

background border around the letters 

would also be acceptable; 

(b) An appropriate placard which 

defines the location and the operating 

instructions for each evacuation route 

must be located near each exit; 

(c) Placards must be readable from a 

distance of 30 inches under emergency 

lighting conditions; and 

(d) The exit handles and the placards 

with the evacuation path operating 

instructions must be illuminated to at 

least 160 microlamberts under 

emergency lighting conditions. 

5. There must be a means for 

emergency illumination to be 

automatically provided for the LD–MCR 

compartment in the event of failure of 

the main power system of the airplane 

or of the normal lighting system of the 

LD–MCR compartment. 

(a) This emergency illumination must 

be independent of the main lighting 

system. 

(b) The sources of general cabin 

illumination may be common to both 

the emergency and the main lighting 

systems, if the power supply to the 

emergency lighting system is 

independent of the power supply to the 

main lighting system. 

(c) The illumination level must be 

sufficient for the occupants of the LD–

MCR compartment to locate and transfer 

to the main passenger cabin floor by 

means of each evacuation route. 

(d) The illumination level must be 

sufficient to locate a deployed oxygen 

mask with the privacy curtains in the 

closed position for each occupant of the 

LD–MCR compartment. 

6. There must be means for two-way 

voice communications between 

crewmembers on the flight deck and 

crewmembers in the LD–MCR 

compartment. Section 25.785(h) at 

Amendment 25–51 requires flight 

attendant seats near required floor level 

emergency exits. Each such exit seat on 

the aircraft must have a public address 

system microphone that allows two-way 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 4 / Thursday, January 6, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 1167

voice communications between flight 

attendants and crewmembers in the LD–

MCR compartment. One microphone 

may serve more than one such exit seat, 

provided the proximity of the exits 

allows unassisted verbal 

communications between seated flight 

attendants. 

7. There must be a means for manual 

activation of an aural emergency alarm 

system, audible during normal and 

emergency conditions, to enable 

crewmembers on the flight deck and at 

each pair of required floor-level 

emergency exits to alert crewmembers 

in the LD–MCR compartment of an 

emergency. Use of a public address or 

crew interphone system will be 

acceptable, provided an adequate means 

of differentiating between normal and 

emergency communications is 

incorporated. The system must be 

powered in flight for at least ten 

minutes after the shutdown or failure of 

all engines and auxiliary power units 

(APU) or the disconnection or failure of 

all power sources which are dependent 

on the continued operation of the 

engines and APUs. 

8. There must be a means—readily 

detectable by seated or standing 

occupants of the LD–MCR 

compartment—which indicates when 

seat belts should be fastened. If there are 

no seats, at least one means, such as 

sufficient handholds, must be provided 

to cover anticipated turbulence. Seat 

belt-type restraints must be provided for 

berths and must be compatible with the 

sleeping attitude during cruise 

conditions. There must be a placard on 

each berth indicating that seat belts 

must be fastened when the berth is 

occupied. If compliance with any of the 

other requirements of these special 

conditions is predicated on specific 

head location, there must be a placard 

specifying the head position. 

9. To provide a level of safety 

equivalent to that provided to occupants 

of a small isolated galley—in lieu of the 

requirements of § 25.1439(a) at 

Amendment 25–38 that pertain to 

isolated compartments—the following 

equipment must be provided in the LD–

MCR compartment: 

(a) At least one approved hand-held 

fire extinguisher appropriate for the 

kinds of fires likely to occur; 

(b) Two Personal Breathing 

Equipment (PBE) units approved to 

Technical Standard Order (TSO)–C116 

or equivalent, which are suitable for fire 

fighting, or one PBE for each hand-held 

fire extinguisher, whichever is greater; 

and 

(c) One flashlight.

Note: Additional PBEs and fire 

extinguishers in specific locations, beyond 

the minimum numbers prescribed in Special 

Condition No. 9, may be required as a result 

of any egress analysis accomplished to satisfy 

Special Condition No. 2(a).

10. A smoke or fire detection system 

or systems must be provided to monitor 

each occupiable area within the LD–

MCR compartment, including those 

areas partitioned by curtains. Flight 

tests must be conducted to show 

compliance with this requirement. Each 

smoke or fire detection system must 

provide the following: 

(a) A visual indication to the flight 

deck within one minute after the start of 

a fire; 

(b) An aural warning in the LD–MCR 

compartment; and 

(c) A warning in the main passenger 

cabin. This warning must be readily 

detectable by a flight attendant, taking 

into consideration the positioning of 

flight attendants throughout the main 

passenger compartment during various 

phases of flight.

11. The LD–MCR compartment must 

be designed such that fires within it can 

be controlled without a crewmember 

having to enter the compartment or be 

designed such that crewmembers 

equipped for fire fighting have 

unrestricted access to the compartment. 

The time for a crewmember on the main 

deck to react to the fire alarm, don the 

fire fighting equipment, and gain access 

must not exceed the time for the 

compartment to become smoke-filled, 

making it difficult to locate the source 

of the fire. 

12. There must be a means provided 

to exclude hazardous quantities of 

smoke or extinguishing agent 

originating in the LD–MCR 

compartment from entering any other 

compartment occupied by crewmembers 

or passengers. This means must include 

the time periods during the evacuation 

of the LD–MCR compartment and, if 

applicable, when accessing the LD–MCR 

compartment to manually fight a fire. 

Smoke entering any other compartment 

occupied by crewmembers or 

passengers when the LD–MCR 

compartment is opened during an 

emergency evacuation must dissipate 

within five minutes after the LD–MCR 

compartment is closed. 

Hazardous quantities of smoke may 

not enter any other compartment 

occupied by crewmembers or 

passengers during subsequent access to 

manually fight a fire in the LD–MCR 

compartment. (The amount of smoke 

entrained by a firefighter exiting the 

LD–MCR compartment through the 

access is not considered hazardous.) 

During the one-minute smoke detection 

time, penetration of a small quantity of 

smoke from the LD–MCR compartment 

into an occupied area is acceptable. 

Flight tests must be conducted to show 

compliance with this requirement. 

If a built-in fire suppression system is 

used in lieu of manual fire fighting, the 

fire suppression system must be 

designed so that no hazardous 

quantities of extinguishing agent will 

enter other compartments occupied by 

passengers or crewmembers. The system 

must have adequate capacity to 

suppress any fire occurring in the LD–

MCR compartment, considering the fire 

threat, the volume of the compartment 

and the ventilation rate. 

13. For each seat and berth in the LD–

MCR compartment, there must be a 

supplemental oxygen system equivalent 

to that provided for main deck 

passengers. The system must provide an 

aural and visual warning to alert the 

occupants of the LD–MCR compartment 

of the need to don oxygen masks in the 

event of decompression. The warning 

must activate before the cabin pressure 

altitude exceeds 15,000 feet. The aural 

warning must sound continuously for a 

minimum of five minutes or until a reset 

push button in the LD–MCR 

compartment is depressed. Procedures 

for crewmembers in the LD–MCR 

compartment to follow in the event of 

decompression must be established. 

These procedures must be transmitted 

to the operator for incorporation into 

their training programs and appropriate 

operational manuals. 

14. The following requirements apply 

to LD–MCR compartments that are 

divided into several sections by the 

installation of curtains or doors: 

(a) To warn crewmembers who may 

be sleeping, there must be an aural alert 

that accompanies automatic 

presentation of supplemental oxygen 

masks. The alert must be able to be 

heard in each section of the LD–MCR 

compartment. A visual indicator that 

occupants must don an oxygen mask is 

required in each section where seats or 

berths are not installed. A minimum of 

two supplemental oxygen masks is 

required for each seat or berth. There 

must also be a means to manually 

deploy the oxygen masks from the flight 

deck. 

(b) A placard is required adjacent to 

each curtain that visually divides or 

separates the LD–MCR compartment 

into small sections for privacy purposes. 

The placard must indicate that the 

curtain is to remain open when the 

private section it creates is unoccupied.

(c) For each section created by the 

installation of a curtain, the following 

requirements of these special conditions 

1168 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 4 / Thursday, January 6, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

must be met both with the curtain open 

and with the curtain closed: 

(1) Emergency illumination (Special 

Condition No. 5); 

(2) Aural emergency alarm (Special 

Condition No. 7); 

(3) Fasten seat belt signal or return to 

seat signal as applicable (Special 

Condition No. 8); and 

(4) Smoke or fire detection (Special 

Condition No. 10). 

(d) Crew rest compartments visually 

divided to the extent that evacuation 

could be affected must have exit signs 

that direct occupants to the primary 

stairway exit. The exit signs must be 

provided in each separate section of the 

LD–MCR compartment and must meet 

the requirements of § 25.812(b)(1)(i) at 

Amendment 25–58. An exit sign with 

reduced background area, as described 

in Special Condition No. 4. (a), may be 

used to meet this requirement. 

(e) For sections within a LD–MCR 

compartment that are created by the 

installation of a partition with a door 

separating the sections, the following 

requirements of these special conditions 

must be met with the door open and 

with the door closed: 

(1) There must be a secondary 

evacuation route from each section to 

the main deck, or it must be shown that 

any door between the sections has been 

designed to preclude anyone from being 

trapped inside the compartment. 

Removal of an incapacitated 

crewmember from this area must be 

considered. A secondary evacuation 

route from a small room designed for 

only one occupant for a short period of 

time, such as a changing area or 

lavatory, is not required. However, 

removal of an incapacitated occupant 

from this area must be considered. 

(2) Any door between the sections 

must be shown to be openable when 

crowded against, even when crowding 

occurs at each side of the door. 

(3) There may be no more than one 

door between any seat or berth and the 

primary stairway exit. 

(4) There must be exit signs in each 

section which meet the requirements of 

§ 25.812(b)(1)(i) at Amendment 25–58 

that direct occupants to the primary 

stairway exit. An exit sign with reduced 

background area, as described in Special 

Condition No. 4.(a), may be used to 

meet this requirement. 

(5) Special Conditions No. 5 

(emergency illumination), No. 7 (aural 

emergency alarm), No. 8 (fasten seat belt 

signal or return to seat signal as 

applicable) and No. 10 (smoke and fire 

detection) must be met both with the 

door open and the door closed. 

(6) Special Conditions No. 6 (two-way 

voice communication) and No. 9 (PBE 

and other equipment) must be met 

independently for each separate section, 

except in lavatories or other small areas 

that are not intended to be occupied for 

extended periods of time. 

15. Where a waste disposal receptacle 

is fitted, it must be equipped with a 

built-in fire extinguisher designed to 

discharge automatically upon 

occurrence of a fire in the receptacle. 

16. Materials, including finishes or 

decorative surfaces applied to the 

materials, must comply with the 

flammability standards of § 25.853 at 

Amendment 25–66. Mattresses must 

comply with the flammability standards 

of § 25.853(b) and (c) at Amendment 25–

66. 

17. A lavatory within the LD–MCR 

compartment must meet the same 

requirements as a lavatory installed on 

the main deck, except with regard to 

Special Condition No. 10 for smoke 

detection. 

18. When a LD–MCR compartment is 

installed or enclosed as a removable 

module in part of a cargo compartment 

or is located directly adjacent to a cargo 

compartment without an intervening 

cargo compartment wall, the following 

conditions apply:

(a) Any wall of the LD–MCR 

compartment—which forms part of the 

boundary of the reduced cargo 

compartment and is subject to direct 

flame impingement from a fire in the 

cargo compartment—and any interface 

item between the LD–MCR 

compartment and the airplane structure 

or systems must meet the applicable 

requirements of § 25.855 at Amendment 

25–60. 

(b) Means must be provided to ensure 

that the fire protection level of the cargo 

compartment meets the applicable 

requirements of §§ 25.855 at 

Amendment 25–60; 25.857 at 

Amendment 25–60; and 25.858 at 

Amendment 25–54 when the LD–MCR 

compartment is not installed. 

(c) Use of each emergency evacuation 

route must not require occupants of the 

LD–MCR compartment to enter the 

cargo compartment in order to return to 

the passenger compartment. 

(d) The aural emergency alarm 

specified in Special Condition No. 7 

must sound in the LD–MCR 

compartment in the event of a fire in the 

cargo compartment. 

19. Means must be provided to 

prevent access into the Class C cargo 

compartment—whether or not the LD–

MCR is installed—during all airplane 

flight operations and to ensure that the 

maintenance door is closed and secured 

during all airplane flight operations. 

20. All enclosed stowage 

compartments within the LD–MCR 

compartment—that are not limited to 

stowage of emergency equipment or 

airplane supplied equipment (i.e., 

bedding)—must meet the design criteria 

given in the table below. As indicated 

in the table, enclosed stowage 

compartments larger than 200 ft 3 in 

interior volume are not addressed by 

this Special Condition. The in-flight 

accessibility of very large enclosed 

stowage compartments and the 

subsequent impact on the 

crewmembers’ ability to effectively 

reach any part of the compartment with 

the contents of a hand fire extinguisher 

will require additional fire protection 

considerations similar to those required 

for inaccessible compartments such as 

Class C cargo compartments.

Fire protection features 

Interior volume of stowage compartment 

Less than 25 ft3 25 ft3 to 57 ft3 57 ft3 to 200 ft3

Materials of Construction 1 ..................................... Yes .............................................. Yes .............................................. Yes. 

Smoke or Fire Detectors 2 ...................................... No ............................................... Yes .............................................. Yes. 

Liner 3 ...................................................................... No ............................................... Conditional .................................. Yes. 

Location Detector 4 ................................................. No ............................................... Yes .............................................. Yes. 

1 Material

The material used to construct each enclosed stowage compartment must at least be fire resistant and must meet the flammability standards 

for interior components specified in § 25.853. For compartments less than 25 ft3 in interior volume, the design must ensure the ability to contain a 

fire likely to occur within the compartment under normal use. 2 Detectors

Enclosed stowage compartments with an interior volume which equals or exceeds 25 ft3 must be provided with a smoke or fire detection system to ensure that a fire can be detected within a one-minute detection time. Flight tests must be conducted to show compliance with this requirement. Each system (or systems) must provide: 

(a) A visual indication in the flight deck within one minute after the start of a fire; 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 4 / Thursday, January 6, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 1169

(b) An aural warning in the LD–MCR compartment; and 

(c) A warning in the main passenger cabin. This warning must be readily detectable by a flight attendant, taking into consideration the positioning of flight attendants throughout the main passenger compartment during various phases of flight. 3 Liner

If it can be shown that the material used to construct the stowage compartment meets the flammability requirements of a liner for a Class B 

cargo compartment, no liner would be required for enclosed stowage compartments equal to or greater than 25 ft3 but less than 57 ft3 in interior 

volume. For all enclosed stowage compartments equal to or greater than 57 ft3 but less than or equal to 200 ft3 in interior volume, a liner must 

be provided that meets the requirements of § 25.855 at Amendment 25–60 for a class B cargo compartment. 4 Location Detector

LD–MCR compartments which contain enclosed stowage compartments with an interior volume which exceeds 25 ft3 and which are located 

away from one central location, such as the entry to the LD–MCR compartment or a common area within the LD–MCR compartment, would require additional fire protection features or devices to assist the firefighter in determining the location of a fire. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

December 29, 2004. 

Kevin Mullin, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 05–235 Filed 1–5–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2004–19089; Directorate 

Identifier 2000–CE–38–AD; Amendment 39–

13928; AD 2005–01–04] 

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Raytheon 

Aircraft Company 90, 99, 100, 200, and 

300 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) to 

supersede (AD) 98–15–13, which 

applies to certain Raytheon Aircraft 

Company 90, 100, 200, and 300 series 

airplanes. This AD adds the Raytheon 

Beech 99 series to the applicability 

listed in AD 98–15–13. The compliance 

actions remain the same for those 

aircraft originally affected by AD 98–15–

13. AD 98–15–13 currently requires you 

to check the airplane maintenance 

records from January 1, 1994, up to and 

including the effective date of that AD, 

for any MIL–H–6000B fuel hose 

replacements on the affected airplanes; 

inspecting any replaced rubber fuel hose 

for a spiral or diagonal external wrap 

with a red or orange-red stripe along the 

length of the hose with 94519 printed 

along the stripe; and replacing any MIL–

H–6000B rubber fuel hose matching this 

description with an FAA-approved hose 

having a criss-cross or braided external 

wrap. We are issuing this AD to prevent 

fuel flow interruption, which could lead 

to uncommanded loss of engine power 

and loss of control of the airplane.

DATES: This AD becomes effective on 

February 22, 2005. 

As of February 22, 2005, the Director 

of the Federal Register approved the 

incorporation by reference of certain 

publications listed in the regulation.

ADDRESSES: To get the service 

information identified in this AD, 

contact Raytheon Aircraft Company, 

P.O. Box 85, Wichita, Kansas 67201–

0085; telephone: (800) 625–7043. To 

review this service information, go to 

the National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal_register/

code_of_federal_regulations/

ibr_locations.html or call (202) 741–

6030. 

To view the AD docket, go to the 

Docket Management Facility; U.S. 

Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–

001 or on the Internet at http://

dms.dot.gov. The docket number is 

FAA–2004–19089.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jeffrey A. Pretz, Aerospace Engineer, 

ACE–116W, 1801 Airport Road, Room 

100, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone: 

(316) 946–4153; facsimile: (316) 946–

4407.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

What events have caused this AD?

Blockage of fuel hoses due to hose 

delamination on certain Raytheon 

Aircraft Company 90, 100, 200, and 300 

series airplanes caused us to issue AD 

98–15–13, Amendment 39–10664 (63 

FR 38295–98, July 16, 1998). AD 98–15–

13 currently requires the following on 

the affected airplanes:

—Checking the airplane maintenance 

records from January 1, 1994, up to 

and including the effective date of the 

AD, for any MIL–H–6000B fuel hose 

replacements on the affected 

airplanes; 

—Inspecting any replaced rubber fuel 

hose for a spiral or diagonal external 

wrap with a red or orange-red stripe 

along the length of the hose with 

94519 printed along the stripe; and 

—Replacing any MIL–H–6000B rubber 

fuel hose matching this description 

with an FAA-approved hose having a 

criss-cross or braided external wrap.

What has happened since AD 98–15–

13 to initiate this action? The FAA has 

evaluated the design of the Raytheon 

Beech 99 series airplanes and 

determined that they could incorporate 

the same fuel hoses. Therefore, we have 

determined that the 99 series airplanes 

should be added to the applicability of 

these actions. 

What is the potential impact if FAA 

took no action? Fuel flow interruption 

could lead to uncommanded loss of 

engine power and loss of control of the 

airplane. 

Has FAA taken any action to this 

point? We issued a proposal to amend 

part 39 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include 

an AD that would apply to certain 

Raytheon Aircraft Company 90, 99, 100, 

200, and 300 series airplanes. This 

proposal was published in the Federal 

Register as a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) on October 14, 2004 

(69 FR 60971). 

The NPRM proposed to supersede AD 

98–15–13, which applies to certain 

Raytheon Aircraft Company 90, 100, 

200, and 300 series airplanes. AD 98–

15–13 currently requires you to check 

the airplane maintenance records from 

January 1, 1994, up to and including the 

effective date of that AD, for any MIL–

H–6000B fuel hose replacements on the 

affected airplanes; inspecting any 

replaced rubber fuel hose for a spiral or 

diagonal external wrap with a red or 

orange-red stripe along the length of the 

hose with 94519 printed along the 

stripe; and replacing any MIL–H–6000B 

rubber fuel hose matching this 

description with an FAA-approved hose 

having a criss-cross or braided external 

wrap; and the NPRM proposed to add 

the Raytheon Beech 99 series to the 

applicability listed in AD 98–15–13.

Comments 

Was the public invited to comment?

We provided the public the opportunity 

to participate in developing this AD. We 

received no comments on the proposal 

or on the determination of the cost to 

the public.