J-A24004-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

EUGENE P. LEONI, JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

GREGORY T. LEONI (AS THE EXECUTOR 

OF THE ESTATE OF EUGENE LEONI, SR.) 

AND MARIAN LEONI

Appellants No. 198 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 1989-01293

EUGENE P. LEONI, JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

GREGORY T. LEONI (AS THE EXECUTOR 

OF THE ESTATE OF EUGENE LEONI, SR.) 

AND MARIAN LEONI

Appellants No. 199 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 1989-01293
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EUGENE P. LEONI, JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

GREGORY T. LEONI (AS THE EXECUTOR 

OF THE ESTATE OF EUGENE LEONI, SR.) 

AND MARIAN LEONI

Appellants No. 200 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 1989-01294

EUGENE P. LEONI, JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

GREGORY T. LEONI (AS THE EXECUTOR 

OF THE ESTATE OF EUGENE LEONI, SR.) 

AND MARIAN LEONI

Appellants No. 201 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 1989-01294

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2015

Appellants, Gregory T. Leoni (as the Executor of the Estate of Eugene 

Leoni, Sr.) and Marian Leoni, appeal from the orders entered in the 

___________________________

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, denying their motion to compel 

distribution of escrow and termination of letters of credit and their separate 

motion to vacate the court’s September 10, 2013 order that granted the 

petition of Appellee, Eugene P. Leoni, Jr., and assessed interest on 

previously awarded judgments. We affirm these orders and quash the 

appeal in part. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

In 1989, Dr. Eugene Leoni, Sr. and his wife, Marian Leoni, 

issued five confessed judgments in favor of three of their 

four children, Nanette, [Appellee] Eugene Jr. and 

[Appellant] Gregory, and against themselves as a plan to 

protect their assets from creditors. On January 25, 1989, 

the Judgments were entered in Montgomery County. 

These judgments included two in favor of [Appellee] in the 

amounts of $375,000.00 and $215,000.00, docketed as 

89-01293 and 89-01294.... The Judgments were revived 

once on [April 19, 1995]. Dr. Leoni died on August 18, 

2006 and Gregory Leoni was named executor of his estate. 

On November 1, 2006, [Appellee] filed praecipes for writs 

of revival of the Judgments. These writs included a 

request to record the Judgments in the judgment index, 

which created liens against [Appellants’] real property 

located in Montgomery County.1 [Appellants] opposed the 

revival of the judgments. 

1

Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 4303(a) which states: 

Real property.―Any judgment or other order of 

a court of common pleas for the payment of 

money shall be a lien upon real property on 

the conditions, to the extent and with the 

priority provided by statute or prescribed by 

General Rule adopted pursuant to section 

1722(b) (relating to enforcement and effect of 

orders and process) when it is entered of 

record in the office of the clerk of the court of 
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common pleas of the county where the real 

property is situated, or in the office of the clerk 

of the branch of the court of common pleas 

embracing such county. 

and Pa.R.C.P. 3023(a) which states: 

Except as provided by subdivision (b), a 

judgment when entered in the judgment index 

shall create a lien on real property located in 

the county, title to which at the time of entry is 

recorded in the name of the person against 

whom the judgment is entered. 

A bench trial was held before the [trial court] on April 27, 

2010 regarding the revival of the Judgments. On May 4, 

2010, [the trial court] entered a Decision that revived the 

Judgments in favor of [Appellee] and against [Appellants] 

in the amounts of $375,000.00 and $215,000.00. 

[Appellants] appealed that Decision to the Superior Court 

on September 30, 2010. [Appellants] posted two 

Irrevocable Standby Letters of Credit on November 17, 

2010 as security in the amounts of $450,000.00 in the 

case under docket number 1989-01293 and $258,000.00 

in the case under docket number 1989-01294 during the 

pendency of the appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1731 and 

1734.2 On January 18, 2012, the Superior Court...affirmed 

[the trial court’s] Decision and the resulting Judgments.... 

The Superior Court denied [Appellants’] request for 

reargument. [Appellants’] Petitions for Allowance of 

Appeal...were denied.... The case was remanded...back to 

[the trial] court on December 4, 2012. 

2 These numbers represent 120% of the Judgment 

amounts pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1731(a) which states: 

Except as provided by subdivision (b), an 

appeal from an order involving solely the 

payment of money shall, unless otherwise 

ordered pursuant to this chapter, operate as a 

supersedeas upon the filing with the clerk of 

the [trial] court of appropriate security in the 

amount of 120% of the amount found due by 

the [trial] court and remaining unpaid. Where 
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the amount is payable over a period of time, 

the amount found due for the purposes of this 

rule shall be the aggregate amount payable 

within 18 months after entry of the order. 

On January 3, 2013, [Appellee] filed a Motion to have 

Prothonotary Direct Bank to Draw Down Irrevocable 

Standby Letters of Credit in favor of [Appellee] pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1734. On March 20, 2013, [the trial] court 

granted [Appellee’s] Motion and directed the Prothonotary 

to collect the Irrevocable Standby Letters of Credit in the 

aggregate amount of $708,000.00 and distribute same to 

[Appellee]. On May 20, 2013, [Appellants] filed an 

Emergency Motion to Stay Draw Down on Irrevocable 

Standby Letters of Credit, claiming [Appellee was] not 

entitled to the entire amount of the Standby Letters of 

Credit, but solely the principal aggregate amount of the 

Judgments equaling $590,000.00, without interest. On 

May 23, 2013, the [trial court] ordered [Appellants] to file 

a legal memorandum on the issue of whether [Appellee] 

was entitled to interest on the Judgments. On May 30, 

2013, [the trial] court ordered the immediate 

disbursement of $590,000.00, said sum representing the 

undisputed principal of the two Judgments. The principal 

of the Judgments was paid to [Appellee] on June 18, 2013. 

On August 5, 2013, [Appellee] filed a Petition to Assess 

Interest from January 25, 1989 on the two Judgments 

totaling $849,600.00. On September 10, 2013, ... [the 

trial] court granted said petition and assessed interest on 

the Judgments in the amount of $849,600.00. 

On September 16, 2013, [Appellants] filed a Motion to 

Vacate Order of September 10, 2013....[1] On September 

____________________________________________

1

In their motion, Appellants asserted Appellee “filed the instant Petition to 

Assess Interest, notwithstanding the fact that the issue of interest was the 

subject of [Appellants’] previously filed Emergency Motion to Stay Draw 

Down on Irrevocable Standby Letters of Credit, and on which the parties had 

already submitted legal memoranda pursuant to the [trial court’s] Order of 

May 23, 2013.” (Motion to Vacate, filed 9/16/13, at 3; R.R. at 190a). 

Appellants argued the trial court “has since never ruled on the issue of 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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18, 2013, the court stayed its order of September 10, 

2013 and scheduled argument on the Motion to Vacate. 

On October 15, 2013, [Appellants] filed a Motion to 

Compel the Distribution of Escrow and Termination of 

Letters of Credit...seeking the court to order (1) [Appellee] 

and his assignee3to enter satisfactions of the Judgments; 

(2) [Appellee] and his assignee to pay the Estate of Marian 

E. Leoni the sum of $5,900.00 (1% of $590,000.00) for 

each day that the satisfactions have not been entered 

since July 18, 2013; (3) the proceeds held in escrow by 

City Line Abstract Company be distributed immediately to 

Gregory T. Leoni and Nanette G. Leoni;[2]and (4) the 

letters of credit issued by Ambler Savings Bank 

immediately be terminated and cancelled. 

3 On September 25, 2013, [Appellee] assigned his 

rights, title and interest in the Judgments to SJL, 3 

LLC, a Delaware limited liability company. 

On December 1[3], 2013, the court entered an order which 

denied [Appellants’] Motion to Vacate and [Appellants’] 

Motion to Compel. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed April 8, 2014, at 1-4). 

On January 9, 2014, Appellants timely filed two (2) notices of appeal 

from the orders entered at docket No. 1293 of 1989. One notice of appeal 

pertained to the order denying Appellants’ motion to vacate, and the second 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

interest since this component of [Appellants’] Emergency Motion has never 

been listed for argument or hearing.” (Id. at 2; R.R. at 189a). 

2 The funds held in escrow by City Line Abstract Company represented the 

proceeds of a transaction where the Marian E. Leoni Trust and the Eugene P. 

Leoni, Sr. Family Trust sold certain real property to Appellee. The parties 

disputed whether the court’s September 10, 2013 order created a lien on the 

property. Consequently, the parties “agreed to cause the liens, if any, of the 

Judgments and the September 10 Order to be released from the Property 

and any such liens shall attach to the Escrow Fund....” (Motion to Compel, 

filed 10/15/13, at 2; R.R. at 319a). 
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notice of appeal pertained to the order denying Appellants’ motion to 

compel. That same day, Appellants filed two (2) notices of appeal from the 

orders entered at docket No. 1294 of 1989, pertaining to the denial of the 

same motions. On January 13, 2014, the court ordered Appellants to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). Appellants timely filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on January 31, 

2014. This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte on March 12, 2014. 

Appellants raise the following issues for our review: 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING 

[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2013[?] 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING 

[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO COMPEL THE DISTRIBUTION 

OF [ESCROW AND] TERMINATION OF LETTERS OF 

CREDIT[?] 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING 

[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING[?] 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING 

[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO COMPEL THE DISTRIBUTION 

OF ESCROW AND TERMINATION OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 

WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING[?] 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING 

[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 AND MOTION TO COMPEL THE 

DISTRIBUTION OF ESCROW AND TERMINATION OF 
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LETTERS OF CREDIT SINCE THE LIENS OF THE 

JUDGMENTS OF [APPELLEE] WERE EXTINGUISHED WHEN 

THEY WERE PAID IN FULL AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 

MARKED SATISFIED[?] 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING 

[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 AND MOTION TO COMPEL THE 

DISTRIBUTION OF ESCROW AND TERMINATION OF 

LETTERS OF CREDIT SINCE [APPELLEE’S] JUDGMENTS 

CANNOT BE AMENDED AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN PAID IN 

FULL[?] 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING 

[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 AND MOTION TO COMPEL THE 

DISTRIBUTION OF ESCROW AND TERMINATION OF 

LETTERS OF CREDIT SINCE THE LIENS OF THE 

JUDGMENTS IN FAVOR OF GREGORY AND NANETTE WERE 

SUPERIOR TO ANY PURPORTED LIENS CLAIMED BY 

[APPELLEE?] 

(Appellants’ Brief at 4). Appellants’ statement of questions involved, 

however, does not correspond to the argument section of their brief. The 

argument section is divided into six parts, addressing four distinct concerns: 

1) whether the court erroneously refused to conduct oral argument on 

certain filings; 2) whether the parties entered into a settlement agreement 

in May 2013, whereby Appellants satisfied the judgments in favor of 

Appellee by making a single payment of $590,000.00; 3) whether there is a 

basis for the court to assess interest on the judgments; and 4) regarding the 

funds held in escrow by City Line Abstract, whether the liens in favor of 

Gregory and Nanette Leoni are superior to the liens in favor of Appellee. 
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Consequently, we will consider these four distinct arguments in the same 

order and as they appear in the body of Appellants’ brief. 

In their first issue, Appellants complain the court denied them the 

opportunity to present oral argument on their motion to compel distribution 

and motion to vacate the order assessing interest on the judgments, even 

though they timely requested argument. Citing Pa.R.C.P. 211, Appellants 

insist they have the right to argue their motions. Appellants maintain, “The 

presentation of issues and the resulting development of the record would 

have assisted” the trial and appellate courts. (Appellants’ Brief at 17). 

Appellants conclude the court committed reversible error by denying their 

motions without oral argument. We disagree. 

“[T]he interpretation and application of a Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure presents a question of law.” Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hosp. of the 

Sisters of Christian Charity, 32 A.3d 800, 808 (Pa.Super. 2011), affirmed, 

___ Pa. ___, 91 A.3d 680 (2014) (quoting Boatin v. Miller, 955 A.2d 424, 

427 (Pa.Super. 2008)). “Accordingly, to the extent that we are required to 

interpret a rule of civil procedure, ‘our standard of review is de novo, and 

our scope of review is plenary.’” Barrick, supra (quoting Boatin, supra at 

427). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 211 governs requests for oral 

argument as follows: 

Rule 211. Oral Arguments
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Any party or the party’s attorney shall have the right to 

argue any motion and the court shall have the right to 

require oral argument. With the approval of the court, oral 

argument may be dispensed with by agreement of the 

attorneys and the matter submitted to the court either on 

the papers filed of record, or on such briefs as may be filed 

by the parties. The person seeking the order applied for 

shall argue first and may also argue in reply, but such 

reply shall be limited to answering arguments advanced by 

the respondent. In matters where there may be more 

than one respondent, the order of argument by the 

respondents shall be as directed by the court. 

Pa.R.C.P. 211. 

Rule 211 gives every party or his attorney a qualified

right to make an oral argument on any motion. The court 

by local rule may regulate the length of time of such 

arguments. In a given case the local court may also 

dispense with oral argument if it so desires and 

dispose of the case on the record or upon briefs. 

* * *

Since motions may be of numerous varieties, with many 

degrees of supporting data (or lack of it), discretion must 

lie with the trial judge to determine whether issues are 

raised which can best be resolved by briefs and/or oral 

arguments. 

Gerace v. Holmes Protection of Phila., 516 A.2d 354, 359 (Pa.Super. 

1986), appeal denied, 515 Pa. 580, 527 A.2d 541 (1987) (internal citations 

omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Instantly, Appellants concede the court allowed and received argument 

on their motion to vacate the order of September 10, 2013. (See

Appellants’ Brief at 12.) Regarding Appellants’ motion to compel 

distribution, Appellants filed the motion on October 15, 2013. The motion 
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included a cover sheet with a specific request for oral argument as well as 

numerous exhibits in support of Appellants’ claims. Further, Appellants’ 

claims in the motion to compel distribution overlapped with the issues raised 

in their motion to vacate the order of September 10, 2013. On December 2,

2013, Appellee filed a response in opposition to the motion to compel 

distribution, including a memorandum of law addressing Appellants’ claims. 

Here, the court had an extensive record of filings, memoranda, and 

exhibits to dispose of the claims in Appellants’ motion to compel distribution. 

Therefore, the court found it could resolve Appellants’ motion to compel 

without conducting oral argument. See Gerace, supra (holding plaintiffs 

did not suffer prejudice due to court’s denial of oral argument prior to grant 

of defendant’s summary judgment motion; parties had submitted extensive 

depositions and affidavits, providing court with ample record of facts, 

allegations, and legal positions at issue). Consequently, Appellants are not 

entitled to relief on their first argument. 

In their second dispute, Appellants assert the parties entered into a 

settlement agreement on May 15, 2013. Pursuant to the terms of the 

agreement, Appellants agreed to pay, and Appellee purportedly agreed to 

accept, $590,000.00 on or before May 20, 2013. Appellants further contend 

Appellee was supposed to file orders to satisfy the judgments upon receipt of 

the payment. Appellants insist the payment of $590,000.00 to Appellee 

satisfied the judgments in full, and Appellee should have marked the 
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judgments as satisfied. Because Appellee failed to file the requisite 

satisfactions, Appellants claim they are now entitled to liquidated damages. 

On this basis, Appellants conclude the trial court should have ordered 

Appellee to mark the judgments as satisfied and awarded Appellants 

damages. We disagree. 

“[T]he enforceability of settlement agreement is a matter to be 

determined according to the principles of contract law.” Cawthorne v. Erie 

Ins. Group, 782 A.2d 1037, 1038 (Pa.Super. 2001). “Basic contract law 

directs that in order to constitute a contract there must be an offer on one 

side and an acceptance on the other.” Id. “Until accepted in the mode and 

manner expressly provided by the terms of the offer, there remains an 

unaccepted offer which cannot, in itself, be considered a binding contract.” 

Id. at 1038-39. 

Instantly, Appellants attempted to prove the existence of a settlement 

agreement by submitting a series of emails between counsel. In the first 

email, sent at 1:01 p.m. on May 15, 2013, Appellants’ counsel stated: 

As discussed, here are the Orders to Satisfy the judgments 

captioned at Docket Nos. 1989-01293 ($375,000) and 

1989-01294 ($215,000). This will confirm that you will be 

signing these and filing them of record upon receipt of the 

Estate’s check in the amount of $590,000, which you 

asked to be in one check. We are making arrangements 

accordingly, with the hope of forwarding the check on or 

before May 20, 2013. 

* * *
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(See Emergency Motion to Stay Draw Down, filed 5/20/13, at Exhibit E; R.R. 

at 99a.) 

At 1:12 p.m., Appellee’s counsel responded: 

I will file Orders once the funds have cleared. The filing 

will take place within one day of the funds clearing. Our 

paralegals do this routinely. If there is any delay with the 

check, let me know. Once the check has cleared, I will 

advise you and [the accountant] in writing. 

(Id.) At 3:39 p.m., Appellee’s counsel added: 

I do want to be clear and clarify my prior email[.] 

[Appellee] will always reserve all his rights to the interest 

component that he is entitled to under the judgments. I 

checked [the trial court’s] opinions, as we briefly 

discussed, and, at first read, they appear to be silent on 

the issue. That is the primary reason we would be drafting 

and filing the appropriate Orders to reflect the payments. 

Our filed Orders will reflect the payments received and 

reserve our rights with respect to interest. 

(Id.) Appellants’ counsel concluded the email exchange at 7:48 p.m., 

stating: “Left you a voicemail. To be clear―if the judgments are not 

satisfied upon payment we will seek to recover statutory liquidated 

damages.” (Id.) 

Here, Appellee’s counsel did not expressly accept Appellants’ “offer” to 

resolve the matter with one payment of $590,000.00. Appellee’s counsel 

specifically sought to reserve his client’s right to pursue interest on the 

judgments. On this record, Appellants failed to demonstrate an enforceable 

settlement agreement, and they are not entitled to relief on their second 

topic. See Cawthorne, supra. 
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In their third argument, Appellants rely on Appellee’s counsel’s 

statements from the 2010 bench trial to support their assertion that 

Appellee waived any claim to interest on the judgments. Appellants contend 

Appellee sought only to revive the existing judgments from 1995, and 

counsel’s cursory mention of interest amounted to an “afterthought” that 

could not have preserved Appellee’s rights. Further, Appellants complain the 

court erroneously determined that post-judgment interest is a matter of 

procedure, and that it automatically accrues. Appellants insist Appellee 

needed to include a separate claim for post-judgment interest in his writs of 

revival. Appellants maintain that interest was not a component of the 

judgments or the writs of revival; thus, Appellee was entitled to the face 

amount of the judgments without an award of interest. Moreover, 

Appellants argue that Appellee has already received a payment of 

$590,000.00, representing the entire amount of the judgments, and the 

court could not amend the judgments after Appellants provided full 

payment. Appellants conclude the court should not have awarded postjudgment interest to Appellee. We disagree. 

Whether a trial court erred in awarding post-judgment interest 

presents a question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary. Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 946 A.2d 

744 (Pa.Super. 2008). The Judicial Code governs the imposition of interest 

on judgments as follows: 
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§ 8101. Interest on judgments

Except as otherwise provided by another statute, a 

judgment for a specific sum of money shall bear interest at 

the lawful rate from the date of the verdict or award, or 

from the date of the judgment, if the judgment is not 

entered upon a verdict or award. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8101. “Judgments bear interest from the time obtained 

until...satisfaction [is] made.” Koolvent Aluminum Awning Co. of 

Pittsburgh v. City of Pittsburgh, 162 A.2d 256, 257 (Pa.Super. 1960). 

“It is as distinctly a substantive part of the debt as if the obligation to pay it 

was founded on a contract for interest.” Id. 

“Post-judgment interest does not serve to compensate the plaintiff for 

any damages....” Lockley v. CSX Transp. Inc., 66 A.3d 322, 327 

(Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 667, 74 A.3d 127 (2013).

Rather, [p]ost[-]judgment interest serves two important 

functions—it compensates the judgment creditor for the 

loss of use of the money until the judgment is paid and it 

acts as an incentive for the judgment debtor to pay the 

judgment promptly. 

Additionally, we note that three federal circuits have 

viewed post-judgment interest as procedural. The United 

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit best explained 

the characterization as follows. 

Post[-]judgment interest has a substantive 

characteristic because the applicable rate of interest 

and rules of accrual can increase or decrease the 

amount of a monetary award. But post[-]judgment 

interest is better characterized as procedural 

because it confers no right in and of itself. Rather, it 

merely follows and operates on the substance of 

determined rights. Post[-]judgment interest is 

designed to compensate a successful plaintiff for the 
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time between his entitlement to damages and the 

actual payment of those damages by the defendant. 

* * *

Based on the above considerations, we conclude that postjudgment interest is a method by which rights...are 

enforced.” We therefore agree...that post-judgment 

interest is properly characterized as a matter of procedure, 

rather than one of substantive law. 

Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted). 

Instantly, Dr. Leoni issued the two judgments in favor of Appellee, 

totaling $590,000.00, on January 25, 1989. Dr. Leoni filed writs of revival in 

1995. Appellee filed the current writ-of-revival actions on November 1, 

2006. Significantly, Appellee’s praecipes for writ of revival for both 

judgments requested the principal amounts “with interest from January 25, 

1989.” (See Appellee’s Petition to Assess Interest and Authorize 

Distribution, filed 8/5/13, at Exhibit C; R.R. at 167a, 170a.)

The matter proceeded to a bench trial where Appellee’s counsel 

reiterated the demand for interest: “[W]hatever entitlement that [Appellee] 

would have to interest[,] he would continue to have those rights, whatever 

those rights may be.” (See Emergency Motion to Stay Draw Down at Exhibit 

A; R.R. at 90a.) When viewed in context, we cannot agree with Appellants’ 

characterization of counsel’s statement as an “afterthought.” We conclude 

Appellee’s actions throughout the proceedings made clear his right to postjudgment interest. 

Subsequently, the court found Appellee was entitled “to the immediate 
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payment of the undisputed $590,000.00....” (See Order, dated 5/30/13, at 

1; R.R. at 116a). The court added, “Nothing in this Order adjudicates any of 

the parties’ claims with regard to post-judgment interest or any right to 

have the judgments marked as satisfied.” (Id.) In a separate order, dated 

May 23, 2013, the court directed Appellants to file a memorandum on the 

issue of post-judgment interest. On August 5, 2013, Appellee filed his 

petition to assess interest and authorize distribution. Pursuant to Section 

8101, Appellee argued that interest on the judgments had accrued since 

January 25, 1989, at six percent (6%) per year, until the court’s May 23, 

2013 order. Appellee concluded Appellants owed $849,600.00 in interest on 

the judgments. Ultimately, the court granted Appellee’s petition to assess 

interest and awarded him $849,600.00 in interest. 

Contrary to Appellants’ argument, the payment of the undisputed 

$590,000.00 did not satisfy their obligation to Appellee. Appellee properly 

pursued post-judgment interest to compensate him “for the time between 

his entitlement to damages and the actual payment of those damages” by 

Appellants. See Lockley, supra. On this record, the court committed no 

error of law in awarding post-judgment interest to Appellee, and Appellants 

are not entitled to relief on this claim. See Hutchison, supra. 

In their fourth and last argument on appeal, regarding the priority of 

the parties’ liens against certain funds held in escrow by City Line Abstract, 

Appellants contend the liens in favor of Gregory and Nanette Leoni are 
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superior to any liens claimed by Appellee. Appellants insist their act of 

posting security, in the form of the irrevocable standby letters of credit, 

discharged the liens in favor of Appellee. Additionally, Appellants maintain 

Gregory and Nanette Leoni revived their own liens in 2012, thereby 

elevating the priority of their liens over the liens of Appellee. On this basis, 

Appellants conclude the court should have granted their motion to compel 

distribution of escrow and termination of letters of credit. We decline to 

address the merits of Appellants’ argument at this time. 

As a prefatory matter, we note: 

Rule 341. Final Orders; Generally

(a) General rule. Except as prescribed in 

subdivisions (d), and (e) of this rule, an appeal may be 

taken as of right from any final order of an administrative 

agency or lower court. 

(b) Definition of final order. A final order is any 

order that: 

(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or 

(2) is expressly defined as a final order by statute; or 

(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision 

(c) of this rule. 

Pa.R.A.P. 341(a), (b). 

Instantly, the trial court evaluated this issue as follows:

The parties’ respective claims regarding proceeds held in 

escrow by City Line Abstract [have] not been adjudicated 

by [the trial] court.... Both parties agree this issue is not 

ripe and has not been adjudicated as reflected by 

paragraph 14 of [Appellee’s] Motion to Authorize the 
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Distribution of an Escrow Fund filed on February 26, 2014 

and paragraph 14 of [Appellants’] answer to said motion 

filed on March 11, 2014. There has been no evidence 

proffered as to any judgments in favor of Nanette or 

Gregory, or the liens that they created. Likewise, there 

has been no evidence of record regarding the sale of any 

of [Appellants’] property. This matter was first raised in 

the Motion to Compel, which was combined with requested 

relief regarding the Judgments and the interest thereon. 

(See Trial Court Opinion at 8) (internal footnotes omitted). Our review of 

the record confirms the court’s assertions.3 Moreover, the escrowed funds 

relate to a real estate transaction involving Appellee and various family 

trusts which are not parties to the current appeal. Issues concerning the 

escrowed funds are, at best, tangential to Appellants’ claims regarding the 

award of post-judgment interest to Appellee. For these reasons, we quash 

the portion of the appeal relating to the escrowed funds. See Pa.R.A.P. 341. 

Accordingly, we affirm the orders denying Appellants’ motion to 

compel and separate motion to vacate. We quash that portion of the appeal 

as it relates to the priorities of liens on the City Line Abstract escrow funds. 

Orders affirmed; appeal quashed in part. 

____________________________________________

3

In Appellee’s Motion to Authorize the Distribution of an Escrow Fund, he 

stated: “The December 1[3], 2013 Orders did not facially adjudicate the 

parties’ entitlement to the Escrow with City Line Abstract.” (See Motion, 

filed 2/26/14, at 4; R.R. at 428a.) In Appellants’ answer, they also 

conceded: “The Order denying the Motion to Compel the Distribution of 

Escrow and Termination of Letters of Credit did not adjudicate the issue with

respect to the balance of the escrow with City Line Abstract.” (See Answer, 

filed 3/11/14, at 5; R.R. at 460a.) 
J-A24004-14

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/19/2015