“ P rio r to the set t i ng of o ral argument, t he C o urt s hal l revi ew t he reco rd and bri ef s and co nsi d er a ll err o rs 1

a s s i g n e d. The Cou r t ma y e n t e r a n or de r de s i g n a t i n g t h os e i s s u e s i t wi s h e s ad dr e s s e d a t or a l ar g u me n t

. . . . ” Ten n
. R. Su p. Ct

. 12. 2. 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Ja nuary 4, 200 6 S es sio n STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JONA THA N WE SLEY STEP HEN SON

Aut om at icApp e al fr omth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Circuit Court

for Cocke County Nos. 5012 and 5040 B en W. Hooper II, Judge

No. E2003-01091-SC-DD T-DD - F iled on Ju ne 2, 2006

Th e a p p ea l i nth i s ca

p i t al case arises f rom the re sentenc ing of

J onathan Wesley

Stephenson, who wa s c on victed i n 1 99 0 o f fi rst degree m urd er an d co ns pi racy to com mi t f

ir stdegree mur der f

or his ro le in the contra ct killing of his wife . Following the re sent en ci n g h ea ri n g, t h e j u ryi m p o s ed a s en t ence of dea th, and the Court of Criminal Appea ls a f f irme d

. Upon automatic appeal unde r Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-206( a)( 1), wedesi gn at ed t h e f o l l o wi n g i s s u es fo r oral arg ument: 1) 1 Do du a l se nte nc e s o f i nc a rc e ra tio n f orc onsp ir acy and deat h for fi rs t de g re e mur de r i n th is c a se vio la te do ub le je op ard y ; 2) D i d th et ri al c o u r t e r r i na d m i tti n g th ep ri o r

t e s ti m o n y

o f t w o w i tn e s s e s, GlenB r e w e r

an d M ic h a e l L

itz ; 3) Did the trial court err in not conside ring the def endant’ s motion to suppress his statement to th e p o li c e ; 4 ) D id th e tr ia l c o u r t la c k ju r is d ic ti o n to resente nce the d e f e n d an t; an d

5 ) I s th ed e f

e n d an t’ s d e ath

s e n te n c ec o mp a

r ati v e ly p r o p o r ti o n ate and is the sentence valid u n d e r th ema n datory revie w of Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-206( c)( 1). Ha ving car efully revie wed the r

ecor d and re leva n t

l ega l au th o ri ty , we conclude that none of the err ors alleg ed by the def endant war rants relief. With respect to issues not herein spec ifically addre ssed, we a

ffirm th e d e c is io n o f th e Co u r t o f Cr im in a l A p p e a ls

. Re le v a n t p o r ti o n s o f th a t opinion are published here afte r a s an ap p en d i x
. Ac co rd i n gl y , t h e j udg ment of the Court of Criminal Appea ls is affirmed.
Te nn. C ode Ann . § 39 -1 3- 20 6( a) (1 ); Judg m e nt of t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Affir m e d.
J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J. , d e li v e r e d th eo p in io no f

th ec o u r t, in w hich W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , and C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J J ., joined. A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., c on c ur re d in part, dissented in pa

rt, and filed a

separ ate opinion.
J ohn E. He

r b is o n , N a s h v il le , T e n n e s s e e ; C a r l R

. O g le , Je f

f er s o n Ci ty , T ennesse e; and Tim S. Moore, Newport, Tennesse e, for

the Appellant- Def

endant, Jonathan Stephenson.T hi s Co ur t r emanded for r es ent enc i ng due t o f und am en t al e rro rs i n t he s ent enc i ng phas e of t r i al , wh i ch 2 rende red t he verdict f aci al l y void. See S t ep henson, 8 7 8 S.W

. 2 d at 5 5 2

- 5 7

. T he jury was i nst ruct ed t hat t o i m p o se t he
s en t en ce of

de at h , i t mu s t f

i n d t h at ev i den ce of ag g r av at i n g c i r cu ms t an ce s ou t we i g h s mi t i g at i n g e v i den ce
. I d. a t 553. T he ap p lica b le s t at ut e requir ed , how ever, t hat t he evi d ence o f aggravat i ng ci rcum st ances outwei gh any m i t i gat i ng evi dence “ b e y o n d a re a so n a b le d o u b t. ” Id

. (q uo t i ng T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 (g) (2)(B ) ( 1 9 9 1 ) ( em p hasi s ad d ed ))

. T o c ompou n d ma t t er s , t h e j u r y wa s g i v en a n ou t dat ed v er di ct for m t h at a l s o omi t t ed t h e pr oper s t an dar d of pr oof

. I d. -2- Paul G . Su mme rs , A ttorney Gen eral and Re po rt er; Mi chael E. Mo ore, S ol ici to r Ge ne ra l; A ng e le Mic h e le Gr e g o r y an d M ic h e ll eCh a

p ma nM c In ti r e , A s s is ta

n t A tt o rn e y s G e n e ral; Al Schmutzer, J r., District Attorney

General; and Ja

me s B

. D u n n , A s s is ta

n t D is tr ic t A tto r n e y G e n er a l, f o r th e Appellee

Plaintiff, State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION
I. BACKG ROUND
I n March1 9 9 0 , J o n ath an W es l ey S t ep h en s o n(“the

defendant”) was c harg ed with first deg ree murder a nd conspira cyt o co m m i tfi rs td egr ee m u rd er for his role in the c ontrac t killi ng of his wife, L isa Stephenson (“ Mrs. Stephenson”) . Ralph T h o m p s o n , J r. (“ T h o m p s o n”) w as cha rg ed as acodefe ndant in both indictments. Thompson receive d a li fe se ntence for Mrs. Stephe nson’s murder , plu s ase nte nc e of

tw e nty -f ive y e a rs for con sp ir acy to com mi t mu rd e r. Th e de fe nd a nt w a s a lso c on vic te d o f b othc ou nts of the ind ic tme nt. Th ej u r

y s e nte nc e d th e de fe nd a nt t o d e a th f or the fi rs t deg ree murder, a nd the trial c o u r t im p o s e d a c o n s e c u ti v e sentenc e of twe nty -five y ear s for the conspirac y . On direc t appeal, this C ourt aff irmed both of the de fenda nt’s convictions but remande d for rese ntencing

. State v. Stephenson, 878 S. W

. 2 d 5 3 0 (T en n
. 1 9 9 4 ). On re m an d , t h e p arties 2 ag ree d that the def

endant would rece ive a se ntenceof life without par ole fo r t h e f i rst deg ree murder and a se ntence of six ty

y ear s for the c onspiracy . I n 1998, the def end an t filed a pe tition for writ of habea s co rp u s ch al l en gi n g t h e l ega l i t y o f h i s s en t en ce o f l i fe without parole. I n Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W .3d 910, 912 (Tenn. 2000) , this Court held that the d ef en d an t ’s s en t en ce of

life without paro le w a s il le g a l b e c au s e s u c h s e n te n c e w a s n o t s tatu to r il y authorized at the time of the offe nse. We d e c la

r e d th e s e n te nce of

life without parole void a nd rema nded the c ase to the tria l court for further proce edings

. Fo l l o wi n g a r es en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, the jury ag ain imposed a sente nce of death, and the Court of Criminal Appea ls affirme d.
At the re sentenc ing he aring , the St ate p r e s e n te d proof showing that in Dece mber 1989, the defe ndant was ma

rried to Mrs. Stephe nson and had a four- y ear -old son and an e ight- month- old son. The de fenda nt work ed as a t rac tor-tra iler driver in Morristown, Tenne ssee. I n Marc h 1989, the de fe nd a nt m e t JuliaAn n We bb (“ Web b” ) a t aba r i n K no xvil l e , T e n ne sse e , a nd the tw o b e c a me rom an ti c all y

in v o lv e d

. T h e def

endant told Webb that his wife had be en killed in a tra ffic a ccide nt fi ve y e ars e arl ie r andthat a ft e rw ard s h e ha d a n a ff a ir wi th h is w if

e ’s si st er, “ Kathy .” He a lso tol d Webb that he had a

child with eac h woman.
I n 1989, on numerous occasions, t he defenda nt asked Gle n Fr anklin Br ewe r (“ Br ewe r”) , a co-w orker , to kill the wife of a f r ie n d

. H o w e v e r , th e d e s c rip ti o n o f th e r e s id e n c e o f

th e p r o p o s edT he t wo y o ung b o y s were act ual l y l ef t al o ne at t he d efend ant ’ s ho use unt i l M rs
. Stephenso n’ s f at her f o und 3 the m the ne x t d a y. -3- vic tim match ed t he d efen dan t’ s o wn h om e. O n o ne o ccas io n t he d efen dan t off e re d B re wer a

bo at, a motor, and a

pickup truck

in r e turn for the reque sted killing. On another oc casion the de fendant o f f ere d B re w er $ 3 , 0 0 0

. 0 0in

re tu r n f o r th e k il li n g , a n d on y et another

occa sion, the defe ndant offered Br ewe r $5,000.00 f

r o m l if ein s u r an c ep r o c e e d s
. T h ed e f e n d an t c o mp la

in e d to B r e w e r

th at his wife wa s r e c e ivi ng e xpe ns ive ps y c hia tr ic tr e a tme nt an d m e d i c a t i o n a n d t h a t h e f e a re d h e wo uld “ los e ever y thing hehad wor

ked for ” if hedivorce d her. In t h e f al l o f 1989, the def

endant of fered another man, Steven Micha el L

itz (“L itz ”), w ho was a

f r ien d o f Th o mp s o n , $ 5 , 0 0 0

. 0 0tok il l the defe ndant’s wife be cause , the def

endan t s a id , s h e w a s g o in g to d iv o r c e h im a n d “ tak e e very thing he ’d eve r worke d for.”
On the eve ning of

Dec ember

3, 1989, th e def

endant a nd Thompson took Thompson’s 30/30 rifle a nd went to the home o f D av e Robertson (“ Robertson”), the defe ndant’s employ er, at around 7:30 p.m. After instru c ti n g Ro b e r ts o nto te llan y o n ew h o a s k e d th at he and Thompson had be en at Robertson’s h o u s e u n ti l 9 :4 5 p
. m. , th e defe ndant left with Thompson. The two men dr ove to an isolated are a in Cocke County , Tenne ssee, ne ar the h o me o f T h o mp s o n’s uncle. T hompson had previously

sug g ested that loca

tion as an out-of- the-wa

y placewhe

re th e d e f e n d a nt could “g et rid of” Mrs. Stephenson. Mrs. Stephenson was lured to the remote location t o picku p mo n e yf o rthe defe ndant that was suppose dlyowed to him for “ running ” drug s
. T h o m p s o n an d t h e def endant waited t h er e u n t i l M rs
. S t ep h en s o n arri v ed

. As s h e sat in her vehicle, Mr s. Stephenson was shot at close ra ng e throug h the car’s w in d s h ie ld

. T h e b u ll e t s tr u c k M r s
. St e p h e n s o n in the fore head a nd cause d massive hea d injuries. The de fenda nt told law enfo rc em en toffice rs that Thompson shot the victim, and the State’s evide nce show ed that the de fendant had offe red to g ive Thompson a truc k, a bo at, a nd a m o t o r f o r k i l l i n gt h e v i c t i m
. Th o m

p s o n , h o w e v er , te s t

i f i e d th at th ede fe nd ant s ho t Mr s. Stephenson. Thompson adde d th a t, a t th e d e f e n d a n t’ s in s is te n c e , h e a ls o f ir e d th e r if

le . The two the n d r o v e to th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s p la c e o f

w o rk , a n d th e d e f

e n d a n t s u b s e q u e n tl y

h e a d e d to O h io inan e ig hte e n- wh e e le r t ruck . W hen Th om ps on ask ed ab ou t t he d efen dan t’s c hil dre n, the de fe nd ant t old him that they

would be all rig ht because his fathe r-in-la w would che ck on them. On his way

out of the state, the de fenda nt met Webb in Harr og ate, Te nnessee . He infor med Webb that “Kathy ” had just bee n killed by some people to whom she ow ed money

. He e x plained that he and T hompson had g one to the sce ne o f th e killing wher e “K athy ” wa s found dea d. The defe ndant and Thompson foug ht there w ith two men wh o h ad k i l l ed “Ka thy ,” and the y

thought that the men were de ad. Th e

d e f e n d a n t s a id th at he ha d not contacte d the police be cause the police were in l ea gu e wi t h t h e k i l l er s
. He t o l d Webb that his children wer e with “Ka thy ’s” f ather and 3
c omm e nte d, “ I

did n’ t lo ve her bu t I ’m g oin g to m iss the B itc h. ” Web b r e c a lle d th a t sh e wa s w ith the def enda n t t h e we ek en d p ri o r t o M rs
. S t ep h en s o n ’s m u rder and that at that time the de fenda nt purcha sed ammunition for a rifle at a K-Mart store.
Af te r m e e tin g wi th Web b, the de fe nd ant d

ro vehis tr uc k to Oh io. Up onthe

dis c ov e ry

of his wi fe ’s b o d y , t h e d e f

e n d a n t w a s c a l l e d b a c k t o T e n n e s s e e f o r q u e s t i o n i n g
. T h e de fe nd a nt i nit ia lly-4-

de nied i nv ol vem entin hi s w if e’s mu rder . Af

terTh om ps on and Ro bert so n i mp li cat ed h im in M rs
. Ste ph e ns on ’s de a th, th e defe nd ant confe sse d to ha vin g Th omp so n k ill he r. Atthe tim e of Mr s. Stephenson’s dea

th, the defe ndan twa s t h e b en efic iary of a $5,000.00 lifeinsurance policy cover ing h is w ife. The defe ndant’s sons, who we re te enag ers by the time of the re sentenc ing he aring , wer e a do pte d b y

Mr s. Ste ph e ns on ’s pa

re nts a nd had no con tac t wi th th eir fathe r, wh o, a c c or din g to h is former fathe r-in-la w, had ne ver shown any re m o rs e fo r the killing. At a se parate trial, Thompson was c onvicted of f

irst deg ree murder and was sente nced to life in prison.
In mitigation, the def

endant pr e s e n ted evidenc e conc erninghis family history , psy cholog ical conditi o n , an d l i fe i n p ri s o n
. T es t i m o n y fr o m t h e d ef en d an t ’s p are nts and his y oung er br other painted a pic ture of a

rela tively normal childhood, althoug h the def endant’ s mother testified that the defen d an t h ads u ff er eds o m e e m o ti o n al p ro b l ems and wa s once hospitalized afte r attempting

suicide. The de fendan t , th e s ec o n d o f th re e s o n s , wa s d es cri b edas “a re gu l ar ki d ” a n d as “a ty pical teenag er” wi t h a g oo d s e ns e of

hu mor , w ho wa s q uic k- wi tte d a nd mor e int e re ste d in sp or ts t ha n s c ho ol. Be cause of his fathe r’s c are er a s an off icer in t h eU n it e d St ate s A ir

F o rce , the fa milymoved often. The de fenda

nt’s mother worke d outside the home. The de fenda n t ’s b ro t h ert es t i fi ed ab o u thow the defe ndant had “ rai s ed ” h i mwh i l e t h ei r m o t h eran d fa t h erwo rk ed

. Af t ert we n t y y ear s of marr

iag e, th e d e f e n d a n t’ s p a re n ts divorce d. Upset over the divorce , the def

endant lef t his home in Anchorag e, Al a sk a , a s s o o n a s h e g r a d u a t e d f r o m h i g h s c h o o l a n d w e n t t o l i v e w i t h h i s g r a n d p a r e n t s in Morristown and Ne wport, T en n es s ee
. P ri o r t o h i s co n v i ct i o n s i n t h i s ca s e, t h e d ef endant ha d no criminal re cord.
Dr. Eric S. Eng um, a clinical psy cholog ist specializing in clinical neur opsy cholog y and fore nsic psy cholog y , testified th a t h e p e r f o r me d a two-da y compre hensive e valuation of the defe ndant. Dr. Eng um describe d the d ef en d an t as al er t , re s p o n s i v e, ar t i cu l at e, and much more intelligent than the a v e r a g e c o n v ic t. D e s p it e a p a s t h is to r y o f A tt e n ti o n Def icit Disorder a nd a potential lear

ning disa bility , the de f

e n d a n t h ad a c o mpreh e n s iv e

I

. Q

. o f 1 1 8 , a v er b a l I

. Q

. o f 1 2 1 , and a pe rf orma nc e I .Q . o f 1 11 . A c c or din g to D r. En g um, the de fe nd a nt f a lls i n t o th e“ b ri g h t

no rm a l if not superior rang e of intellec tual functionin g , ” an d ana c h ie v e me n t t e s t s h o w e d th at h ep e rf

o rms at a bo vethe hig h s c h o o lgr ad

u a te l e v e li n b a s i c ac ad e mi c s k

i l l s
. D r
. E n g u m

f o u n d n o e v i d e n c e

o f b ra in d am age
. T h e d ef

en d an t ’s at t en t i o n an d concentration were g ood, and he perfor m ed ab o v e a v er age on neuropsy cholog ical tes t s ad m i nistered dur ing the evalua tion. Dr. Eng um testified that the defendant suffe

rs from a signific ant level of

depr es s i o nb u t

th at h e “ m asks” his conditi on. Acc ording to Dr. Eng um, the defe ndant, who has a passive-a g g ressive personality , is resig n ed , wi t h d ra wn, and fe e ls h e lpl e ss. Ne ve rt he le ss, the de fe nd a nt’ s p sy c ho log i c a l di ff ic ult ie s d o n ot i nte rf

e re wi th h is ability to perform his assigne d tas k s in p ris o n , w h e re he functions well. Dr . Eng um diag nosed the de fe nd a nt a s su ff

e ri ng fr om a

d e p r e s s i v e d i s o r d e r n o t o t h e r w i s e s p e c i f ie d a nd fr om ape rs on a lit y disorder not o th er wi s e s p ec i fi edwi ths ch i z o i d , d ep re s s i v e, and avoida nt fea tures. Dr . Eng um opined tha t pr iso ne rs wi th t he de fe nd a nt’ s p sy c ho log ic a l tr a its d o n o t h a v e m a j o r p r o b l e m s w hil e inc arc e rate d a ndg e ne ra lly are no t r e c idi vis ts. Dr. Eng um and other w itnesses, including members of the def en d an t’ s f ami ly , c o r r e c ti onal employ ees, a

nd churc h workers, testified aboutt h e defenda nt’s life at the N orthea stern Corre ctionalT h e ju d g m e n t f o rm sta te s tha t t h e d e a th se n te n c e ru n s c o n s e c u ti v e ly to the c o n sp ira c y se n te n c e . L iter a lly 4 i nt erpret ed , t hi s wo ul d m ean t hat t he d efend ant co ul d be execut ed only a f t er t he co nspi racy sent ence i s ser ved

. A t t he
m o t i o n fo r new t ri al , t he co urt and co unsel fo r t he Stat e agreed t hat t he co nspi racy s ent ence runs co nsecut i vel y t o t he deat h s ent enc e.

T h e d o u b le je o p a r d y c la u se o f t h e F ift h A m e n d m e n t t o the U n ited S ta te s C o n stitutio n , w h ic h is ap p lica b le 5
t o the st at es t h r ou g h t h e Fou r t ee n t h Amen dmen t , pr ov i des t h at n o pe r s on s h al l “ be s u bj ec t for t h e s ame of fen s e t o be (c o n tinu e d ...) -5- Center in Mountain City . The de fe n d an t s e rv e d a s a c lerk in the law library , completed a prog ram in pa rale g al studies and training in c ons t ru ct i o n wo rk , wa s an i n m at e a d v i s o r f o r t h e d i s ci p linary board, spokewith

troubled juveniles, par

ticipated in re ligious prog rams, wa s ordained a s a minister, and play ed bass g uitar in a multi-rac ial g ospel band. He was de scribed a s a g ood i n m at e, an asset to the prison, “the c ream of the cr op,” and “ a g ood individual.” Questioning by the St ate r e v e aled that the def

endant ha d sever al discipli n ar y re p o rt s p ri o r t o co m i n g t o t h e N o rt h ea s t ern Correctional Center but that he ha d only o n e m i n o r d i s ci p l i n ar y p ro b l em s i n ce t h en
. Hi s famil y members a nd churc h worke rs testified abou t t h e h i gh es t ee m i n wh i ch t h e d ef en d an t wa s held by the other priso ne rs a ndthe ir

famil ie s. Th e de fe nd a nt’ s f a mil y te sti fied th at he ha d c ha ng e d a ft e r c omi ng to Northea stern Corre ctional Center. H is mother describe d h im a s “ v e r y b it ter an d v e r y an g ry ” whe n h e w en t t o p ri s o nb u t

s ai d that he wa s now a diff

er en t p er s o n : ki n d , th o u gh t fu l , h o p ef u l , an d ca ri n g. Th ede fe nd ant’ s f

ather t e sti fi e d th at Mr s. Steph e ns on ’s fa ther wil l not allo w t

hede fe nd ant’ s p a

re nts to see thei r

tw o g r an d s o n s an d

th at, although the defe ndant has a sked his fathe r to contac t his sons f o r h i m , t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s f

o r m e r fa t h e r
- i n
- l a w o b s t r u c t s a n y c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h t h e b o y s
. In re sp on seto t

heSta te ’s qu e sti on s, wi tne sse s a dmi t te d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h ad n e v er e xp re s s e d

re mor se for killing his wife

. Ba sed on this proo f, th e jury found that the State ha d proven be y ond a re asonabledoubt one a g g ra va tin g c irc ums tanc e , t

h a t t h e d e f e nd ant c ommitt e d th emurder f or re mun e ra tio n o r t hepr omi se of re mune r a ti o n o r e mp lo y e d a n o th e r to c o mm it th e mu r d e r f o r r e mu n e r a ti o n o r the promise of re mun e ra tio n. Te nn . Co deAn n. § 3 9- 13 -2 04 (i )( 4) (1 989). I n a dd iti on , th ejur

y fo un d th at th eSta

te had prove n that this agg ravating c ircumstance outweig hed any mitigating circ umstances be y ond a rea sonable doub t. A s a

r e s u lt , th eju r

y s e n te n c e d

th ed e f e n d an t t o d e ath

f o r th ef ir s t d e g r e e murde r. Th e tr ia l c o u r

t o r d e r e d th at th ed e aths e n t e n c ean d

th es i xty
- y e a

r s e n t e n c ef

o r c o n sp ir a c y

to c omm it t h e f i r s td e g r e e m u r d e r

ru n c o n s e c u t i v e l y. 4

II. AN AL YSI S
A. DOUBLE JEO P ARDY
Th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t du a l se nte nc e s o f i nc arc e ratio n f or c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it f

ir st deg ree murder a nd death f or first deg ree murder ba sed on the a g g ravating c ircumstance that the kil lin g wa s com mi tt ed for rem un erat io n c on sti tut e mul tip le pu nis hme nts fo r t he sa me c on du c t, the re by vio la tin g the pr ov isi on s a g a ins t do ub le je op ard y in th e Fif th andF ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nts to the U n it e d St a te s Co n s titution and ar ticle I , section 10 of the T ennesse e Constituti on. He 5 6(

. . . con t i n u ed) 5
t wi ce put i n j eopardy of l i fe or l i mb

. ”

T he do ubl e j eopardy cl aus e of t he T enn es s ee C ons t i t ut i on provi des t hat “ no per s on s hal l , for t he s ame offens e, 6 be t wi ce pu t i n j eopa r dy of l i fe or l i mb. ” T en n
. Cons t

. a r t

. 1, § 10. -6- acknow ledg es that on direc t appeal o f h i s fi rs t trial this C ourt reje cted his cla im that convictions for bot h co n s p i ra cy t o co m m i t fi rs t d egr ee m u rd er an d fi rs t d egr ee m u rd er v i o l at ed double jeopa rdy under the Un i t ed S t at es C o n s t i t u t i o n . We held that conspirac yto commit a crime is a diff ere nt offe nse fr om the crime tha t is the o b je ct of the c onspiracy . State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W .2d at 538. I n the habe as cor

pus ca s e i n wh i ch t h i s C o u rt i n v al i d at ed t h e d ef en d an t ’s agr ee d s en t ence of life without parole, the Court s t at ed that its ruling did not af fec t the defe ndant’s sepa

rateconviction and sentenc e for

conspirac y

toc o mm it f ir s t de gre e mu rd er
. Se e Step h e n s o n

v
. Ca r lto n , 2 8 S. W. 3d at 912 n.3. Gene rally , the “law of the c ase” fore closes ar g ument on anissue that was pre viouslydecide d in an appe al of the sa me ca se. Se e St a te v
. Je f f e r s o n , 31 S.W .3d 558, 560-61 (Te nn. 2000). Howeve r, an issue may

be re considere d despite being decide d in a prior a ppeal if (1 ) the e vid e nc e of

fe re d at th e he ari ng on re mand w a s su bs ta nti a lly different from the e videnc e a t t h e f ir s t pro c e e din g ; (2) the pr

ior ruling wa s c le a r l y e r r o n e o u s a n d w o u l d r e s u l t i n a m a n i fe st i nju sti c e if a llo we d to stand ; or

(3 ) the prior

de c isi on is co nt rary to a chang e in the c on tr oll ing la w o c c ur

ri ng be tw e e n th e fi rs t a ndse c on d a pp e a l.
State v. Carter , 114 S.W .3d 895, 902 (T en n
. 2003). The de fendant arg ues that chang es in the law sin c e his fi rs t app e a l r e qu ir e that th is C ou rt re vis it h is d ou ble je op ard y c la im.
1. United States Constit ution
The de fendant’s theor

y is that the dec isions of the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 5 3 6 U. S

. 5 8 4 (2 0 0 2 ), an d S at t az ah n v
. P en n s y l v an i a, 5 3 7 U.S. 101 (2003), amount to a chang e in the contr olling law, w hich allows the issue o f d o u b l e j eo p ar d y t o b e re co n s i dere d. See Carter , 114 S.W .3d at 9 0 2

. T h e d efe ndant asserts that under Ring , the ag g ravating c ircumstance s fo un d in Tenn e sse e

Code Anno ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 04 (i ) m us t be c on sideredele men ts of the o ffense of c apit a l mu rd e r. He sa y s th at S att a z a h ne xt e n de d th e Rin g a na ly sis to d ou ble je op ard y so that in his ca s e p u n i s h m en t s fo r b o t h co n s p i ra cy and ca pital murder violate doublejeopardy . We disag ree tha t o u r p r i o r h o l d i n g h a s b e e n a ffe c te d b y e ith e r R ing or Sa tta zah n a nd re a ff ir m th a t it is constitutionally

permissible for thedefe ndant to be convic t ed o f a n d s en t en ce d fo r b o t h first deg ree murder and conspirac y

to commit first deg ree murder.T he Si xt h Amendm ent t o t he U ni t ed St at es Co ns t i t ut i on provi des , i n per t i nen t par t : “ I n a l l cr i mi nal 7 pros ecu t i ons , t he acc us ed s hal l en j oy t he r i gh t t o a .
. . t r i al , by an i mp ar t i al j ur y
. ”

-7- I n Ring, the U nited States Supreme Court held tha t Ariz o n a ’ s c a

p it al s e n te ncing proce dure violated the Six th A mendment rig ht of a defe ndant to ha ve a jury determine any fact u p o n wh ich 7 the leg islatu re co n d i t i o n s an i n cr ea s e i n h i s o r h erm ax i m u mp u n i s h m en t

. 5 36 U.S. at 609. Under Arizona’s ca

pital s en t en ci n g p ro ce d u re , t h e t ri al j u d ge wa s al l o we d t o d et er m ine the pre sence or absenc e of e numera

ted ag g rava

ting a nd mi ti g a ti n gc ir c u ms ta n c e s
. Th e U n it e d St a te s SupremeCourt explained that beca use Arizona’ s e n u me r a te d ag g rava ting f actor s opera ted as “ ‘the func tional equivalent of

an ele ment of a g rea

ter off ense,’ ” t h es e f

ac t o rs m u s tb e f

o u n d b y a j ury rather than by the trial judg e. I d. ( q u o ti n g A p p r e n d i v

. N e w Je r s e y , 5 3 0 U

. S. 4 6 6 , 4 9 4 n
. 1 9 ( 2 0 0 0 ) )

. Ri n g d id not hold, h o we v er , t h at t h e en u m er at ed aggr av at i n g fa ct o rs we re ac t u al el ements of an offe nse for pu rp os e s o f ado ub l e j e o p ar d y a n a l y s i s u n d e r t h e F i f th A me nd me nt, no r d id i t im ply tha t th e te st established by the United Stat e s Su p r e me Co u r t in B lo c k b u r g e r v
. U n it e d St a te s , 2 8 4 U.S. 299 (1932), would ha ve to be r evised to incorpor at e aggr av ating fac tors as ac tual elements of a crime. The “ Bloc kburg er te st” for de termining when multiple convictions violate double j eo p ar d y re quires that courts examine the off enses to asc erta in “whethe r eac h[statutory ] provisi on require s proof of a fa ct which the othe r does not.” B lockburg er, 284 U .S. at 304.
In Sattazahn, the United States Supreme Court he ld tha twh en a d ef endant who is convicted of murder

an d s en t en ce d t o l i fe i m p risonment beca use the jury is unable to ag ree on a sente nce succe eds in having his o r her conviction re verse d on appea l, double jeopar dy does not preve nt the state fr om s e e kin g the de a th p e na lty o nr e t ri al

. 5 3 7 U

. S

. at

1 1 2

- 1 3

. T h u s , S a

tt a z a h ni n v o l ve d o nly the prior a cqui tt al p r o n g o f d o u b le je o p a rdy . I n part I I I

of the opinion, J ustice Scalia, w riting f or a three-j u d ge p l u ra l i t y , ex p l ai n ed t h atR i n g h el d t h ataggr av at i n g ci rc u m s t an ce s m ak i n g a def endant elig ible for the de ath pena lty o p e r a te a s “ ‘ th e f u nctional equivale nt of an e lement of a greater off e ns e ’” and that for the pur po s es o f t h e S i x t h Am en d m en t ’s j u ry -t ri al gu ar an t ee , t h e o ffense of “murde r” is a distinct, lesser in c lu d ed off ense of “murde r plus one or more ag g rava ting circ umstances.” 5 3 7 U. S

. at 1 1 1 (q u o t i n g R i n g, 536 U.S. at 609). Jus tice Scalia c oncluded by stating, “ We can think of no princ ipled rea son to disti ng uish, in thi s context, between wha t constitutes an offe nse for purposes of the Six th Amendment ’ s ju r y
- tr ia l gua rante e and w hat constitutes an ‘off

ence ’ for purposes of the Fifth Ame ndment’s Double Jeopardy Clause.” I d. Contrary to the defe ndant’s conte ntion, Sattaz ahn does not a lter t h e h o l d i n g of Ring. T he defe ndant contends that because the four dissenting j u s ti c e s w o u ld h av eh e ld

th at d e ath

w a s n ot an a va ila ble se nte nc e on re tr ia l, the y a g re e wi th Jus tic e Sc a lia ’s app lic a ti o no f th eana ly sis in R ing to doubl e j eo p ar d y
. Ho we v er , a m ajorit y of the justices of the United States Supreme Court did not joi n inthe la ng ua g e in S a tta zah n r e lie d u po n b y the de fe nd ant . Mor e ov e r, the dis se nt d id n ot r e ly upon Ring. Under these circumstance s, the m ore reasona ble con c lu s io n is th a t o n ly tw o o ther justices, Re h n q u is t a n d T h o ma s , a g r e e d w it h Ju s ti c e Sc a lia’s re asoning . We conclude tha t the ma jo r it yo p in io n in Sa tt a za h n c a n n o t b e r e a d to h o ld d ir e c tl yo rb yim p li c a ti o n th a t a g g r a v a ting circ umstances must be include d as ac tual ele m en t s o f t h e o ff en s e o f c ap i t al m u rd erfo r p u rp o s es of the statutory

elements test under

Bloc kburg er. See

also Pe o p le

v
. H o g a n , 114 P.3d 42, 57-58 (Colo.-8-

Ct. Ap p. 20 04 ) (n on -cap it al c ase a do pt in g a si mi lar in ter pret ati on of R in g and S att az ahn in respo ns e to a double jeopa

rdy challeng e).
The B lockburg er te st is satisfied in thi s case beca use first deg ree murder r equire s p ro of of a k il li n gb u t d o e s n o t r

e qu ire proof

of an a g ree ment to commit a killi ng . Compare Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a)( 1) (pr emedi t at ed fi rs t d egr ee m u rd er ) wi t h i d

. § 3 9 -1 2 -1 0 3 (a ) (1989) (cr iminal c on sp ir a c y ). Th e re fo re , th ed e f e n d an t ’ s c o n v i c ti o n s f

o r b o thf ir st d e g re e mur de r andc on sp ir a c y to commit first deg ree

murder a re c onstitut ional l y

p er m i s s i b l e. Ring a

nd Sattazahn do not compel the conclusion that the fe deral constituti on’s prohibition a g a in s t d o ub le

je opardy is violated in this case.
In a dd iti on , even i f aggravat in g circu ms tan ce (i )(4 ) i s co ns id ered an el eme ntof t heof fe ns e of “ca pital pr emeditated first deg ree murder,” double jeopar dy is not v i o l at ed u n d er Bl o ck burg er.

“ Ca pit al mu rd e r” ba se d o n th e(i )( 4) a g g ra va tin g c irc ums tanc ere qu i re s p ro o f o f p a y m e n t o r p ro mis e of pay me nt a s a

m o ti v ef o r th emu r d e r
. C o n s p i r a c y

d o e s n o t r e q u i r ep r o o f

o f p aym e n t o r a p r o m ise of payment, or commission of the u n d er l y i n g cr i m e, b u t o n l y an agr ee m en t t o eng ag e in criminal conduct. F urthermore, u n d er fe d er al l aw , even when two cha rg es ar e identica l under the Bloc kburg er te st, cumulative punishment is not prohibit ed if s u ch wa s th e i n t en ti o no f th e l eg islature. Miss o u ri v

. H u n ter , 4 5 9 U

. S. 3 5 9 , 3 6 8

- 6 9 ( 1 9 8 3 )

. A lt h o u g h there is no provision in t he Te nnessee Code expressly

providing for se parat e p u n i s h m en t fo r t h e co n s p i ra cy an d t h e co m p l et ed offense, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-1 2

- 1 0 6 ( c ) ( 1 9 8 9 ) , w h ic h p r o v ide s that a per son may be c on vict ed o f con sp ir acy

and th e off

ens e th at w as t he o bje c t of the c on sp ir a c y , im

pli e s th at mu lti ple punishment is contempl a te d

. Se e a ls o T e n n
. Co d e A n n
. § 3 9

- 1 2

- 1 0 6 ( 1 9 8 9 ) , Se ntencing Commi ssion Com ments (“[T]he conspirac y is not merg ed with the complete d offe nse.”)

. 2. Tennessee Constit ution Arg uing tha

t the applicabletest for double je opardy under thestate constitution has chang ed since the time o f h is c o n v ic ti o n a n d s e n te n c e f o r c o n s p ir a c y a s a re sult of State v. Denton, 938 S

. W

. 2 d 3 7 3 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 6 ) , t h e d e f e n d a n t a l s o r a i s e s a d o u b l e j e o p a r d yc h a l l e n g e u n d e ra r t i c l e I, section 10 of

the Tenne ssee Constitution. Even under De nton, the defe ndant’s convic tions do not violate his rig ht ag ainst double j e o p ardy . Under Denton, re solution of a double jeopar dy question under t h eT e n n e s s e eCo n s ti tu ti o nd e p e nds upon 1) a B lockburg er analy sis of the statutory offe nse; 2) an a naly sis, guided by the principles o f D u c h a c v
. St a te , 5 0 5 S. W. 2 d 2 3 7 ( T enn. 1973), of the evidenc e used to prove the offe nses; 3) a c onsid er at i o n o f wh et h er t h er e we re multiple victims or discrete acts; a n d 4 ) a co m p ar i s o n o f t h e p u rp o s es o f t h e re s p ec t i v e statutes. 938 S.W.2d at 381. First, in the def

endant’ s direct a

p p ea l we d et er m i n ed t h at t h e o ff en s es ar e n o t the same unde r the B loc kb ur g e r t e st. Sta te v. Ste ph e ns on , 8 78 S.W. 2d a t 538. S econ d, we c on c lud e tha t th e sa me evidenc e is not require d to prove both off en s es
. T h e d ef

en d ant’s convic tion for first deg ree murder require d proof of

his c rimin al re s p o n sibili ty for the vic tim’s death and pr oof of the vic tim’s death. Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -2 02 (a )( 1) (1 98 9) ( p r e m e dit a te d f ir st d e g re e mur de r) . H ow e ve r, his c on vic tio n for co ns pi racy to com mi t f

ir stdegree m urd er req ui red pr oo f o f a

n a g re e me nt t o c ommit the murder , not nece ssarilyproof of a k il li n g
. T e n n
. Co d e A n n
. § 3 9

- 1 2

- 1 0 3 ( a ) ( 1 9 8 9) (c riminal conspirac y ). Third, al t h o u gh t h er e wa s o n l y o n e v i cti m, the defe ndant committed separ ate a ndIn the M o tio n fo r N e w T ria l, d e fen se c o u n se l ind ic a te d tha t the ir inv e stiga to r ha d lo c a te d L itz a n d tha t L itz 8 was i n pri son.

R ule 8 0 4 o f

t he T en ne ssee R ules o f E vid en ce p ro vid es, i n p erti ne nt p art, as fo l l o w s: 9
(a) D ef

i ni t i o n o f U navai l ab i l i t y
. “U navai l ab i l i t y o f a wi t ness ” i ncl ud es s i t uat i o ns in w h ic h the d e c la ra n t: (1) i s exem p t ed b y rul i ng o f the court on t he ground s o f pri vi l ege f

rom t est i f

y i ng con ce r n i n g t h e s u bj ec t ma t t er of t h e dec l ar an t ' s s t at eme n t ; or ( 2 ) p e r s i s t s i n r e f

u s i n g t o t e s t i f

y c o n c e r n i n g t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e d e c l a r a n t 's
s t at eme n t de s pi t e an or der of t h e cou r t t o do s o; or ( 3 ) d e m o n s t r a t e s a l a c k o f m e m o r y o f

t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e d e c l a r a n t 's
s t at eme n t ; or ( 4 ) i s u n a b l e t o b e p r e s e n t o r t o t e s t i f y a t t h e h e a r i n g b e c a u s e o f t h e d e c l a r a n t 's dea t h or t h en e x i s t i n g ph y s i ca l or me n t al i l l n es s or i n f i r mi t y ; or ( 5 ) is a b se n t fro m the he a rin g a n d the p ro p o n e n t o f a sta te m e n t ha s b e e n un a b le to pr ocu r e t h e dec l ar an t ' s a t t en dan ce by pr oce s s ; or (c o n tinu e d ...) -9- dis tin c t a c ts. T he d efen dan t’ s act of m urd er, whic h h ec ommitt e d b y e mpl oy ingano ther t o c ommit the murder f

o r r e munera tion or the promise of r emuner ation, is separa te and distinct from the defe ndant’s entering into an ag ree ment with Thompson to have M r s
. Step h e n s o n k il le d

. I n ad dit ion, the def endant’ s ag ree ment with Tho mp s o n to have Mrs. Stephe nson killed is separate and distinct from the act satisfy

ing the(i)(4) ag g rava

ting c irc u ms ta

n c e , th e d e f e n d a n t’ s ac t o f o f f er in gTh ompson a boat, motor, a nd pickup truck in e x ch a n g e f o r th e c o mp le te d killing. Fina lly , the leg islative purpose o f

th e s ta tute s is dif f ere n t. Th e

f ir st deg ree

murder sta

tute is intended to deter premeditated, intention al k i l l i n gs , wh i l e t h e co n spiracy statute is intended to deter ag ree ments to commit any criminal off

ense. A ccor dingly , t h e d o u b l e j eo pardy clause of the Te nnessee Constit ution was not violated by

sentenc ing thedefe ndant for both c onspiracy an d fi rs td egr ee m u rd er or by apply ing the (i)(4) ag g ravating c ircumstance to impose the death pe nalty for Mrs. Stephe nson’s murder

. B. ADMISSION OF P RIOR TES TIMONY
Over the def endant’ s objection, the trial court a llowed the State to re ad into the re cord the fo rm e r t e sti mon y

of bo th B rewer and L it z , each of who m tes ti fi ed at th e defe nd ant ’s fir st t ri a l in 19 90 that th e de fe nd a nt h a d o ff e re d to pay

him fo r k i l l i n g h i s w i f

e , or a “ frie nd ’s wi fe ” in the c a se of B re we r. At the tim e of the re se nte nc ing h e a r i n g , B r e w e r w a s i n p o o r h e a l t h a nd liv ing in Oklahoma, although hewas not so ill thath e c o u l d n ot have a ppeared. L

itz could not be loca

ted by the State despite seve ral a ttempts to fin d h i m
. At t h e re s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, the def endant 8 complained t h att h e S t at e h ad n o tes t ab l i s h ed t h atei t h erwi t n es s wa s “u n av ai l ab l e” as re q uired for admission of this evidence und er R u l e 8 0 4 o f t h e T en n es s ee R u les of Evidenc e. I n addition, the 9(

. . . con t i n u ed) 9 ( 6) for depos i t i on s i n c i v i l a ct i on s on l y , i s a t a g r ea t er di s t an ce t h an 100 mi l es f r om t he p l ace o f

t ri al or heari ng.
A dec l ar an t i s n ot u n av ai l abl e as a wi t n es s i f ex empt i on , r ef u s al , cl ai m of l ac k of
m em or y , i n abi l i t y , or abs en ce i s du e t o t h e pr ocu r eme n t or wr on g doi n g of t he p rop o nent of a st at em ent fo r t he p urpo se of preventi ng t he wi t ness f rom at t end i ng o r t est i f y i ng. (b) H earsay E xcep t i o ns. T he fo l l o wi ng are not excl ud ed by t he hearsay rul e i f t he d ec l ara nt i s una va i l ab l e a s a w i t ne ss: (1) Fo r me r T e s t i mony
. T est i m o ny gi ven as a wi t ness at ano t her heari ng of t he
sa m e o r a d iff

e re n t p ro c e e d ing o r in a d e p o sitio n tak e n in c o m p lian c e w ith la w in t he co urs e o f

t he same o r anot her pro ceed i ng, i f the p art y agai nst who m t he t es t i mon y i s n ow of

fer ed h ad bot h an oppor t u n i t y an d a s i mi l ar mot i v e t o de v el op t he t est i m o ny by di rect , cross , or redir ect exam i nat i o n.
Art i cl e I , s ect i on 9 of

t he T enn es s ee C ons t i t ut i on provi des “ [ t ] hat i n a l l cr i mi nal pros ecu t i ons , t he acc us ed 10 hat h t he r i gh t

. . . t o m eet t he wi t nes s es f ace t o f ace
. ” T he Si xt h Amendm ent of t he U ni t ed St at es Co ns t i t ut i on gu ar ant ees an acc us ed i n a cri mi nal p r oceedi ng t he r i gh t t o conf r ont t he wi t nes s es ag ai ns t hi m, an d t hi s r i gh t i s bi ndi ng on t he s t at es t hrough t he Fo urt eent h A m end m ent

. P o i nt er v. T exas, 38 0 U

. S. 40 0 , 40 3 (19 6 5 ). -10- de fe nd ant c on te nd e d in

the Mo tio n f or Ne w Tri al th at a dmi ssi onof thi s p ri or te sti mon y

vio la te d h is rig hts of confrontat i o n fo u n di n b o t h t h e s t at e a n d fe d er al co n s t i t u t i o n s
. I n t h e C ourt of Criminal 10 Ap pe als , t he d efen dan t al so rel ied on Cr awfo rd v . W ash in gton , 5 41 U.S . 3 6 (2 00 4), to su pp ort h is confr ontation c laim

. T h e Co u r t o f Crim in a l A p p e a ls he ld that the Confrontation Clause wa s not applicable to senten c in g h e a r in g s a n d th a t Cr a w f o r d d id not expand its application to a c apital se nte nc ing he ari ng . T he Cou rt of Cr imi na l A p p e al s d i d

n o t a d dr e s s th ed e f

e n d an t ’ s s e p arate c la im under a rticle I , section 9 of the T ennesse e Constituti on. 1. Rules of Evidenc e
The de fendant’s arg ument that the witnes s es ’ p rior testimony should have be en pre cluded under the Tenne ssee Rules of Evide nce is misp lac e d

. T h is Co u r t h a s r e p e a

te d ly h e ld that the rules of evide nce do not limit the admissibil ity of evide nc e , in c lu d in g hear say , at a c apital sentenc ing he ari ng . Se e Cart e r, 11 4 S. W.3 d at 90 3; S ta te v. Aus ti n, 87 S.W. 3d44 7, 45 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; State v. Si ms , 4 5 S. W. 3 d

1 , 1 4 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 1 )

. M o re o v er, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-204(c ) provides: “Any . . . evidenc e which the court de ems to have probative value on the issue of punishme n t may b e r e c e iv e d r e g ar d le s s o f it s a d mi s s ib il ity u n d e r th e ru le s o f evidenc e; provided, tha t th ede fe nd ant i s a c c orde d a fa ir o p p o r t u n i t y t o re b u t a n y h e a r s a y s t a te me nts so a dmi tte d. ” Thus , the pre requisites for admission of the tw o w it n e s s e s’ testimony under Rule 804( b)(1) of the T en n es s ee R u l es o f E v i d en ce d o n o tap p l y t o t h i s re s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g.Se e, e
. g
. , Sz abo v
. W al l s , 313 F. 3d 392, 398 ( 7t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ); U n i t ed St at es v
. G ar ci a- Sa n ch ez , 189 F. 3d 11 1143, 1149 ( 9t h Ci r
. 1999) ; U n i t ed St at es v
. B i n g h am, 81 F. 3d 617, 630 ( 6t h Ci r
. 1996) ; U n i t ed St at es v
. Pet t y , 982 F. 2d 13 65 , 136 7 (9t h Ci r
. 199 3); U ni t ed St at es v. Si l ver man, 97 6 F. 2d 15 02 , 15 10 ( 6t h C i r
. 19 92 ) ( en banc) ; U ni t ed St at es v. W i se, 97 6 F.2d 39 3 , 40 2 (8t h C i r. 1 9 9 2 ) (e n b a n c ); U ni t ed Stat es v. T ardif f , 96 9 F.2d 12 8 3 , 12 8 7 (1st C i r. 19 9 2 ); U ni t ed Stat es v. Jo hnson, 93 5 F.2d 47 , 50 (4t h C i r. 19 9 1 ); U ni t ed Stat es v. K i kum ura, 91 8 F.2d 10 8 4 , 11 0 2 (3d C i r. 1990) ; Un i t e d S t a t e s v
. M a r s h a l l , 9 1 0 F

. 2 d 1 2 4 1 , 1 2 4 4 ( 5 t h Ci r
. 1 9 9 0 ) ; Un i t e d S t a t e s v
. Be a u l i e u , 8 9 3 F

. 2d 1177, 1 1 8 0

- 8 1 (10 t h C i r. 19 9 0 ). -11-

2. United States Constit ution and Tennessee Constitution
We also conclude th at t h e defe ndant’s Six th Amendment rig ht of confr ontation was not v io la te d b y th ea d mi s s io no f

th ef o rmer te s ti mo n y

o f B r e w e r an d L it z. InCr a w ford v. Washing ton, the Unit ed S t at es S u p re m e C o u rt h el d t h at t h e C o n frontation C lause ba rs the admission of

“ te s ti m o n i al ” s t at e m e n t s b y anu n av ai l a

b l ew i tn e s s u n l e s s th ed e f e n d an t h a s h a d a p ri o r o p p ortun ity to cro ss- e xam in e th e wi tn ess . 5 41 U.S . at 68 . W ith res pect

to te sti monia

l st a teme nts , th e

Cou rt he ld that “the Six th Amendment demands w hat the common la w re q u i red: una vailability and a pr ior opportunity

for cross-examination.” Id. Thus, Crawf ord plac ed re st

ri ct i o n s s i m i l ar

t o R u l e 8 0 4 (b)( 1) on the a dmi ssi on of tes ti mo ni al st ate men ts

. Th e defe nd ant con cedes th at Cr awfo rd’ s c ro ssexamination prong is met; howeve r, he c ontinues to a r g u eth at t h ew it n e s s e s w e r enot unavailable. C ra wf o rd d o es n o t

ad d re s s t h e u s e o f h ea rs ayats en t en ci n g.
The Unite d S t at es S u p re m e C o u rt h as n ev erex pressly held that the Six th Amendment rig ht to co n f r o n tati o n d o e s n o t ap p ly a t s entenc ing; howe ver, the various cir cuit courts of appeal ha ve re pe a te dly

so he ld. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t d e c i s i o n u s u a l l y c i t e d f o r t h i s p r i n c i p le is 11 Wil liams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 ( 1 9 4 9 ) , a c ap it a l c ase de cided on due proce ss gr ounds and involving fully

discretionary

sentenc ing by

a judg e. The continuing

v ali d ity of Will iams has bee n questioned. See, e .g ., Susan N. Her m an , T h e T ai l t h at Wagg ed the Dog : Bifur cate d Fa ct-F inding under the Fe dera l Sentencing Guidelines and the L im it s o f Due Proc ess, 66 S. Cal. L . Rev. 289, 317-21 (1992) ; Alan C. Michae ls , Tr ia l R ights a t S e n ten c in g , 8 1 N

. C. L

. Re v
. 1 7 7 1 , 1 8 3 7

- 39 (2003). Howeve r, the fe dera l appellate c ourts continue to hold that the Si xth A me n d me nt rig ht of confr ontati o n d o es n o t ap p l y at s entencing, e ven af ter Cra wford. See United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 6 5 1 , 6 5 4 ( 6 thCi r
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( s tati n g th a t C r a w f o r d d o e s n o t c h a n g e p r io r ru le th a t c o n frontation clause does not applyto sente n c in g ) ; U n ited States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1322- 23 (11th Cir. 2 0 05) (refusingto consider Crawford’ s application at sente ncing as plain er ror a nd noting that other circ uit courts have una nimously h e ld tha t Crawfor d does not alter the previous rule that the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentenc ing he aring s); Unit ed States v. Monteiro, 417 F.3d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 2 0 0 5 ); Un i t ed S t at es v
. R o ch e, 4 1 5 F. 3 d 6 1 4 , 6 1 8 (7 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ); Un i t ed S tates v. Luciano, 41 4 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Ci r. 2005); United States v. F leck, 413 F .3d 883, 894 (8th Cir. 2005).
Ev e n if

the Con fr on ta tio n Cl aus e we re de e me d to app ly to c apit a l se nte nc ing pr oc e e din g s, the defe nd ant ’s ri ghts un der th at cla us e were no t vi ol ate d. Th e Uni ted St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt , in Cr a wf ord, st ate d th at “[ w] here te sti mon ia l st ate me nts are a t is su e , th e on ly ind ic ium of re lia bil ity su ff ic ie nt t o s a tis fy c on sti tutio nal dem and s is th e on e th e Co ns ti tu ti on a c tua lly pr e sc ri be s:T he Fourt h Amendm ent provi des t hat 12
[t]he right of t he p eo p l e to b e sec ure in t he i r p erso ns, ho use s, p ap ers, a nd eff ec t s, a g a ins t un re a so n a b le se a rc h e s a n d s e iz u re s, s h a ll n o t b e vio la te d , an d no W a rr a n ts shal l i ss ue, but up o n p ro b a b l e cause, s up p o rt ed by O at h or af f i rma t i o n, and par t i cu l ar l y d escri b i n g t h e pl ac e t o be s ea r ch ed, a n d t h e per s on s or t h i n g s t o be
s ei ze d.

T h e Fou r t h Am e n d m e n t i s a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e s t a t e s t h r o u g h t h e F o u r t e e n t h Am e n d m e n t

. M a p p v
. Oh i o , 3 6 7 U. S. 643 (19 6 1 ). -12- confrontation.” 541 U.S. at 68-69. Here, although the w itnesses were not pre sent a t s e n tencing , the defe ndant had the opportunit y to c o n f ront both witnesses at trial, a nd the entire cross-e x amination of each witness wa s rea d to theju r y d ur in gth e re s e n ten c in gh e a

r in g
. M o re o v er , th e

d e f e n dant’s own statement to police wa s sufficient to support th e j u ry ’s fi n d i n g o f th e ( i )( 4 ) a ggra v at i ngcirc umstance.
The T e n n e s s e e

Co n s ti tuti o n

re qu ir e s “ f ac e
- to

- f ac e ” c o n f ro ntation; thus, i t affords a def endant g rea ter c onstitut ional protec tion than d o es t h e U n i t ed S t at es C o n s t i t u t i o n
. S ee S t ate v. Deuter, 839 S.W .2d 391, 395 (Tenn. 1992) . Nonethele ss, we also c on cl u d e t hat the rig ht to confrontation under the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut iondidno t ba r the a dmi ssi on of th e for mer tes ti mo ny of Brewer a ndL itz during the pena lty phrase . This conclusion is consis t en t wi t h o u r p re v i o u s o b serva tion that the admission of hear say evidenc e during sentenc ing under Tenne ssee Cod e A n n o t at ed section 39-13-204( c) a

nd it s p re d e c e s s o r s d o e s n o t v io la te th e r ight to c o n f

ro n ta ti o n
. Se e State v. Smit h, 857 S.W .2d 1, 23 (Tenn. 1993) . Fur thermor e , w e n o te th a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h ad th e o p p o r tunity to confront Br ewe r and Litz fac e-to-f ace during the g uilt phase of this capital c ase. C. M OTI ON TO SU P P RE SS
Be fore his first trial, the defe ndant filed a motion to s uppress his st at em en t t o law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ice rs. On app eal , h e arguedth at h is c on fe ssi on sh ou ld h a ve be e n s up pr

e sse d b e c a

us e 1) his int o xic ati o nan d

e mo ti o n al c o n d it

io np r e v e nted a knowing , intelligent, a nd voluntary waiver of his r ight to re main s ile nt; 2) the of fi c e rs c oerc e d h is s ta

te me nt; 3) the

of fi c e rs did no t in fo rm

him that a n atto rn e y

hir e d b y his f ath e r w a s p r e s e n t

at th es h e ri f f ’ s o f f i c e ; an d 4 ) h ei n v o ke d h is rig ht t o cou n s el

. W e h el d th att h e t ri al co u rt d i d n o terr i n re fu s i n g t o s u p p re s s t h e st atement. SeeState v. Stephenson, 878 S.W

. 2 d a t 5 4 2

. Pr io r to th e r e s e n te n c in g h e aring , the def endant f iled another motion to s uppress his state men t o n th e gro u n d that he had be en deta ined at the sheriff’ s depar

tment without probable c ause in violation of the FourthAm en d m en t t o th e U n i t edS t at es C o n s titution and 12A rti cle I, s ec t i o n 7 o f t he T en ne ssee C o nsti t uti o n p ro vid es: 13

[t]hat t he p eo p l e sh all b e se cu re in t he i r p erso ns, ho use s, p ap ers a nd p o ssessi o ns, f r om un r eas onabl e s ear che s an d s ei zures; a nd t hat ge ner al war r ant s , wh er eby an off i cer may be com manded t o s ear ch s us pect ed pl ace s , wi t hout ev i dence of t he f act comm i t t e d , o r t o s e i z e a n y p e r s o n o r p e r s o n s n o t n a m e d , w h o s e o f fe n c e s a r e n ot p art i cul arl y de scr ib e d a n d s up p o rt ed by evi d ence, are da ngerous t o l i b ert y and
ou g h t n ot t o be g r an t ed.

T h i s c on s t i t u t i on al pr ov i s i on i s i den t i ca l i n i n t en t a n d pu r pos e wi t h t h e Fou r t h Amen dmen t

. St at e v
. Y ea r g an, 958 S.W

. 2 d 62 6 , 62 9 (T enn. 19 9 7 ). -13- art ic le I , sect io n 7 of th e Ten ne sse e Con sti tut ion

. We h oldthat th e de fe nd a nt w a ive d th is c la im 13 by no t r a isi ng it a s a

g ro un d inthe fi rs t mo tio n to su pp re ss.
The de fend ant arg ues that he is not pre cluded f rom challeng ing his stateme nt on this ground beca use T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o ta te d s e c ti o n 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 ( c ) ( 2 003), which a ddresse s the ty pes of evidenc e admissible at a c apital sentenc ing he aring , provides that subsec ti o n ( c) “ shall not be construed to authorize t h e i n t ro d u ct i o n o f an yevidenc e sec ured in violation of the c onstitut ion of the Un ite d St a te s o r t he c on sti tut ion of Te nn e sse e .” He c on te nd s th a t if e vid e nc e ob ta ine d in violation of a def

endant’ s Fourth Amendment ri gh t s i s ac ce p t ed by

the sentenc er a

nd used to enha

nce the def endant’ s sentence , the go v er n m en t wi l l p ro fi t fr o m i t s l aw l es s b eh avior, a nd the sentenc er become s a par

tner in o ff i ci al l aw l es s n es s
. I n ad d ition, the defenda nt points t o lang uag e in pre vious case s indicating th at t

h is Co u r t w il l c o n s id e r

s ig n if ic an t er r o r s r e g a r d le s s o f w h e th e r th e y are called to the trial court’ s attention be c a u s eth is Co u r

t i s r equire d by

statute to review a sente nce of death. See State v. Mar tin, 702 S.W .2d 560, 56 4 (T en n. 1985) (ove rruled on othe r g rounds byState v. Br own , 8 3 6 S

. W

. 2 d

5 3 0 (T en n
. 1 9 9 2 ))

. Howeve r, the de fenda

nt has waive d this challeng e. The fac t that the def

endant’ s senten c e w a s o v e r turned on a ppeal doe s not provide him with a second op po rtun ity

to l iti g a te pr e -t

ri a l is su e s th a t c ou ld h a ve be e n r a ise d b e fo re his orig ina l tria l.
Rul e 12 (b )( 3) of

the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e du re re qu ir e s th a t a ll m oti on s to su pp re ss evi den ce be pres ent ed pri or to tr ial. F a ilu re to m a ke the mot ion be fo re tr ia l r e su lts in waiver , althoug h a cour

t may g rant re lief fr om the waiv er f o r c a u s e s h o wn. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(f). Wai ve r i s sup po rt ed by the t ra dit ion a l r e a din g of

bo th R ule 12 a ndthe wo rd“ tr ia l” a s r e fe rring to the proc eeding

at which guilt is deter

mined, with senten ci n g b ei n g o n l y a p art of that unified criminal proce ss. I n addition, the lang uag e in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 ( c ) prohibiting the us e of un c on sti tut ion a lly se c ur e d e vid e nc e do e s no t ind ic a te tha t the Ge nera l Asse mbl y contemplated that the doctrine o f wa i v er should not apply at ca pital sentencing . Furthermore , the rema nd f o r r e s e n te n c in g s h o u ld

n o t b ec o n s tr

u e d a s r e
- o p e n in g th is issue . Cf. State v. O’Ha ra, 439 N.E.2d 431, 4 3 2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (g ranting of new trial did not permit defe ndant to raise a motion to s uppress whe re n o s u ch m o t i o n t o s u p p re s s wa s m ad e p ri o r t o fi rs ttri al , wh er e n ew trial was gran t edfo r p u rp o s es wh o l l y as i d e f ro m th e gr o u n d s fo r th e motion, and wher e a r ule of c riminal proce dure r equire d a motion to suppress to be made se ven day s befor e trial).-14- D. JURISDICTION OF THE T RIAL COURT Upon dec laring

th e d ef en d an t ’s s en t en ce o f l ife without parole void in St ephenson v. Car lton, this Court remanded the c ase to “ the t r ia l c o u r t” f o r f u r th e r p r o c e eding s. 28 S.W .3d at 912. Mandatethere upon issu e d toth e Cr im in a l C o ur t f o r Jo h n s o n Co u n ty , th e

h a b eas c orpus cour

t, which enter ed a f

inal judgme nt on Dece mber 5, 2000, de claring the d ef en d an t ’s s en t en ce o f life without pa ro le nu ll a nd vo id a nd or derin g t hat a cop y of th e ju dgmen t be forward e d to se ve ra l pe rs on s, inclu d i n g t h e C i rc u i t C o u rt C l er k o f Cocke Countyand the District Attorne yGene ral of Coc ke County wher e the de fenda

nt was orig inally

t ri ed

. T h e d ef

en d an t fi l edan o b

j ec ti o nt o th e j u ri s d iction of the Coc ke Cou nty Cir c uit Court; ho wev er, t he tri al c ou rt con clu dedth at t he Coc ke Cou nty Cir c uit Court retaine d ju r is d ic ti o n b a s e d o n th e o r ig in a l r e ma n d and manda te for r esente ncing enter ed following the direc t appea l in 1994.
The de fen d an t a s s e r

ts th at t h etr ia l c o u r t h a d n o ju ris d ic ti o nto r e s e n te n c eh im b e c a u s eth ere was ne ither manda te or re mand by t h e ap p el l at e cour t nor transfe r of the c ase f rom the Johns on County Criminal Court to th e

Co c ke Co u n ty Circ u it Co ur t. Re ly in g on McL aney

v. Be ll, 59 S.W .3d 90, 95 (Ten n
. 2 0 0 1 ) , th e d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s th a t th is Co u r t s h o u ld h a v e r e ma n d e d the case to the or ig ina l tr ial co urt aft er vo id in g the j ud gment . In M cL aney , we hel d th a t th e se ntenc e wo uld be vo id under c erta

in circumstan ces a

nd rema nded the c ase to the ha

beas c orpus cour

t to determine whe ther the se c ir c ums ta nc e s e xiste d a nd , if so , to tr a ns fe r t he c a se to t he t r i a l c o u r t “ fo r a pp ro pr ia te dispositi on.” I d. at 95-96. I n t h e p re s en t ca s e, wh i l e t h e J o h n s on CountyCriminal Court did not state that it

wa s “ tr a ns fe rring ” the c a se to C oc ke Cou nty , it se nt the Coc ke Cou nty

Cir c uit Cou rt a copy of the orde r dec laring the d e f e n d an t’ s s e n te n c en ull and void. Upon rec eipt of such a n order , the Cocke County

Circuit Court, as the orig inal conviction cour t, was o b l i gat edt o ex er ci s e i t s subject matter jurisdiction to impose a sentenc e on the de fend an t ’s fi rs t d egr ee murder c onviction, which rema ined v a li d a n d in e f

f e c t. M o r e o v e r , a s th e c o u r t w ith e xc lu s iv e s u b je c t matt e r ju risdiction of the def endant’ s conv i ct i o n fo r f

i rs td egr ee m u rd er , t h e C o ck e C o u n t y C i rc u i tC o u rt al s o p o s s es sed the inh e re nt a

uth ority to i mp o s ea

s e n t e n c ef

o r th at c o n v i c ti o n
. T h ea c tio ns of the John so n Co un ty Cr imi na l Cour t in de c la ri ng the de fe nd a nt’ s sen te nc e nu ll an d v o i d c r e a t e d s u f f i c i e n tre a so nable nece ssityto p ro m p t t h e C o ck e CountyCircuit Court to ex erc ise its inherent authority . There fore , the de fe nd a nt’ s a

rg ume nt r e g ard ing jurisd ic tio n is wi tho ut m e ri t.
E. MANDA TORY REVIEW FA CTORS
T en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t at ed s ection 39-13- 206(c) (1) ( 2003) re quires that cou rt s re v i ew i n g a sentenc e of de ath for f

irst deg ree murder de termine whe ther: (A) T he sente nce of

death wa s imposed in an arbitra ry fashion; (B ) The e viden ce s u p p o rt s t h e j ury ’s finding of statutory ag g rava ting c ir c ums ta nc e or

c ir c ums ta nc e s;-15- (c) The e vidence supports the jury ’s finding that the ag g rava ting circ umstanc e o r c ir c u ms ta n c e s o u tw e ig h a n y mi ti g a ti ng circ umstances; and (D) T he sente n ce o f death is ex cessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in simi lar c ases, c on s i d er i n g both the nature of the c ri me a ndthe de fe nd a nt.
Our review of the

rec ord conf

irms that the death sentence in this case wa s n o t

i mp o s edi nan ar

b itrary fashi o n
. Weals o c o n c lu d eth at t h ee v id e n c eth at t

h ed e f e ndant offe red to g ive Thompson a boat, a moto r , an d

a tr u c k is s u f f ic ie n t t o s u p p o r

t t h eju r y ’ s f in d in g o f a g g r avating circ umstance ( i)(4), that the def endan tco m m i t t ed t h e m u rd erfo r r em u n er at i o n o r the promise of remuneration or e mploy ed another to com m i t t h e m u rd er fo r re m u n er at i o n or the promise of remune ration. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(4).
We further

conclude that the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support t he jury ’s finding that the a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e o u t w e i g h e d t h e m i t i g a t i n g ci rc u m s t an ce s b ey o n d a r ea s o n ab l e d o u b t

. In determining whe ther the e vidence s u p p o r ts th eju r y ’ s f in d in g , the prope r standar d is whether, a fter revie wing the eviden ce i n t h e l i gh t m o s t fa v o ra b l e t o t h e S t at e, a ra t i o n al t ri er o f fa ct could have foun d t h at t h e aggr av at i n g ci rc u m s t an ce (s ) o u t we i gh ed t h e m i t i gat i n g ci rc u m s t an ce (s ) bey ond a rea sonable doubt. See State v. H ender son, 24 S

. W

. 3 d 307, 313 (Tenn. 2000) ; State v. Bland, 958 S

. W

. 2 d 6 5 1 , 6 6 1 (T en n
. 1 9 9 7 ). A rational juror could have found that the (i) (4) a g g rava ting circ umstance outwei gh edth e v ari o u s m i ti gat i n g ci rc u m s t an ce s p re s en t ed by the def endant, including his famil y his tory , p sy c ho log ic a l c on dit ion , a ndhis lif e in p ri so n, be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.
I n con d u ct i n g a co m p ar at i v e p ro p o rt i o nality revie w as re quired by

Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-206( c)( 1)(D) , we ha ve pre viouslystated that

we be g in w ith the pr e s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h is proportional with the cr ime of first d egr ee m u rd er
. A s entenc e of de a th m a ybe fo un d d isp ro po rt ion a te if th e case bei ng re vie we d is “plainly l ac k i n g i n ci rc u m s t an ce s co n s i s t en t with those in sim ilar case s in which t h e d ea t h p en al t y h as p re v i o u s l y b ee n i m p o s ed.” A sentenc e of de ath is not disp roportionate merely beca use the c ir c ums ta nc e s o f t h e o f

f e n s e ar e s i m i l ar t o th o s e o f a n o t h e r o ff e ns e f o r w h i c h a d e f

e n d a n t h a s r e c e i v e d a l i f e s e n t e n c e
. O u r i n q u i r y, the re fo re , d oe s n ot r e qu ir e a fi nd ing that a

se nte nc e“ l e ss tha n d e a th wa s n e v e r i mp os e d ina

c a se wi th s imi lar c ha

ra c te ri sti c s. ” Ou r d uty “is to assure that no aber

rant de ath sentenc e is aff

irmed.” State v. Powers, 10 1 S. W. 3 d 3 8 3 , 4 0 3 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( q u o ti n g St a te v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 135 (Tenn. 1998) ) (c ita ti o n s o mi tt e d )

. I n c o n s id e r in g p r o p o r ti o nality , we look at the f acts a nd circ umstances of

the cr imes, the cha

rac teristics of the de fenda nt, and the ag g rava

ting a nd mitig ating-16-

circ umstances in v o lv e d , a n d c o mp a r e th e p r e s e n t case with others in which a de fenda nt was convicted of

the same o r s im il ar c r im e s
. Se e St a te v
. G o d s e y , 6 0 S. W. 3 d 7 5 9 , 7 8 2 (Tenn. 2001)

. The pool fr om which we se lect similar ca ses in c lu d e s “ o n ly th o s e f ir s t de gre e murder c ases in which the State se e k s the dea th penalty , a ca pital sentencing hear ing is he ld, and the sente ncing jury deter mines whether the sentenc e should be life imprisonme n t , l i fe i m p ri s o n m en t wi t h o u t the possibili ty

of par ole, or de ath, re g ardle ss of the sentenc e ac tuall y i m p o s ed

. ” I d

. at 7 8 3 (footnotes omit te d )

. T h ef

o ll o w in g f

a c to r s a r eu s e f u l i nid e n ti f

yin g an d c o mp a rin g s imil a

r c a s e s : 1 ) th e mea ns and manne r of de ath; 2) the motivation for k i l ling; 3) the place of dea th; 4) the similarity of the victims and treatment of t h e v i ct i m s ; 5 ) t h e ab s en ce o r p re s ence of pre meditation, provoca tion, and justi fi ca t i o n ; an d 6 ) t h e i n j u ry t o an d eff

ects on non-de cede nt victims. S ee B land, 958 S.W.2d at 667. I n comparing de fendants, we consider the foll owing non-exclusive fac tors: 1) prior c riminal history ; 2) ag e, r a

c e , a n d g e n d er ; 3 ) men ta

l, e mo ti o n a

l, a nd phy sical condition; 4) role in the murder; 5) c oo peration

wi th a uth or iti e s; 6 ) re mor se ; 7) kn ow le dg eof he lpl e ssn e ss o f v ic tim ; and 8) c a pa c ity for r ehabilitation. See id.
In th i s ca s e, we b egi n b y

re v i ew i n g t h e n at u re o f t h e o ff en s e. The defe ndant appr oache d at least two per sons offering pay ment to kill hi s w i fe b ef o re he conspire d with Thompson to murder Mr s. Ste ph e n so n, the mothe r o f t wo y ou ng c hil dr e n. Mr s. Ste ph e ns on , w ho wa s lu re d u nd e r f a lse pretenses to the remote location wher e she w as killed, was shot inth e h ea d wi tha ri fl e at close ra

ng e. The de fenda nt’s role in t h e m u rd er wa s s i gn i fi ca n t

. He i n s t i gat ed t h e p l an t o m urder his wife, offered Thompson re munera tion for the killing, a

nd was pre sent at t

h e s c ene w hen her

preme ditated murder took plac e. The re w a s n o e v id e n c e o f p r o v o c a ti o n o r ju s ti f ic ation for Mrs. Stephe nson’s murder.
We also consider e vidence reg arding th e defenda nt and his backg round. The de fenda nt, a white male, ha d no prior cr iminal hist ory
. H e in it ia ll y d e n ie d in v o lv e me nt in his wife’s murder

. Whil e the de fend a nt w a s diag no se d with a d epre ss iv e di so rder and a pe rs on a lit y dis or de r, the de fens e e xpe rt , D r. En g um, op ine d t hat the de fe nd a nt’ s p sy c ho log ic a l di ff ic ult ie s d o n ot i nte rf

e re wi th h is ability to perfor m his assigne d tasks in p ri s o n
. T h er e w as n o ev i d en ce o f b ra i n d am age
. T here was also no evidenc e pre sented to show that the de fendant exhi bited remorse for killing his wife

. I n mitigation, seve ral w i t nesses testified that the defe ndant was an asset to the prison and that he func tions well there. Witnesses mentioned the de fenda nt’s positive con t ri b u t i ons to the prison community , particula rlyhis work ministering to a n d assisting other prisoners. How ever , considering the nature of the c rime a n d th e d e fe n d a n t, we c onclude that the mur der of the de fend a nt’ s w if e pla c e s him i ntothe

c la ss of defe nd ant s fo r wh omth e dea th p e na lty is a n a pp ropr ia te pu nis hme nt.
Th e de fe nd a nt’ s p ri mary

arg ume nt i s th a t th e de a th pe na lty is dis pr op ortio nate in this c a se beca use Thompson r e c e iv e d

a li f es e n te n c ef

o r h is r o le in th emu r d e r , w h il eth e def endant r ece ived a se nte nc e of

de a th. We h a ve re pe a te dly re je c te d th e a r g u m e n t t h a t a s e n t e nc e of de a th i s disproportionate simply b ec au s e a co -d ef en d an t wh o wa s i n v o l v ed i n t h e same killing re ceive d a lesser se ntence . See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W .3d 4 6 9 , 5 03-04 (Te nn. 2004); State v.Al t houg h t he defendan t i n G r ose cl ose i ni t i al l y rece i ved t he deat h pen al t y for h i r i ng ot her s t o ki l l hi s wi fe, 14
t h e def en dan t w as g r an t ed fede r al h abe as c or pu s r el i ef a n d u n der we n t a n ew s en t en ci n g h ea r i n g a t w h i ch h e r ec ei v ed a l i fe s ent enc e.

H ut chi s on’ s co- defendan t , M i l l ar d C ur nu t t , wh o al s o was i nv ol ved i n t he murder for h i r e s che me, r ece i ved 15
t he deat h pen al t y but di ed i n pr i s on before t hi s Co ur t coul d re vi ew h i s s ent enc e. -17- Middlebrooks, 995 S.W .2d 550, 565 (Tenn. 19 9 9 ); S t at e v
. C au t h er n , 9 6 7 S

. W

. 2 d 7 2 6 , 7 4 1 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Henle y , 774 S.W .2d 908, 918 (Tenn. 1989 )

. D is p a r ate s e n te n c e s ma

y e xist if there is a rational ba sis for the dec ision of the jury to impose the death pe nalty o n o n e p erp etra

tor and not the other. See State v
. Ca r te r , 7 1 4 S. W. 2 d 2 4 1 , 2 5 1 ( T e n n
. 1 9 8 6 )

. I n th e p r e s e n t c ase, the defe ndant’s re lationship to t he victim and his role a s leade r in in s ti g a ti n g an d planning the murder distinguishes him from Thompson. Moreover, this Court has up h e ld d e a th sentenc es in murder -for

hire c ases where theactual k i l l erre ce i v ed a s en t en ce o f l i fe i m p ri s o n m en t

. S ee S tate v. Austin, 87 S.W .3d 447 (Tenn. 2002) ; State v. Stevens, 78 S.W .3d 8 1 7 (Tenn. 2002) ; State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W .2d 161 (Tenn. 1994) ; State v. Grosec lose, 615 S.W .2d 142 (Tenn. 1981)

. 14

I n undertaking a proportionality revie w, we rec og nize that “no two ca ses involve identical circ umstances.” St ev en s , 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d at 842. Our obje ctive, ther efor e, is not to “‘sea rch f or proof that a def endant’ s death sente nce is pe rfe ctly s y mm e tr ic a l, b u t to id e n ti f y a n d to in v a li d a te the aberrant de ath sentenc e.’” I d. (quotin g Bl an d , 9 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d at 6 6 5 ). Ba s ed u p o n an ex haustive revie w of the rec ord and Supreme Court Rule 12 reports f rom trial judge s in t ri al s fo r f i rs t deg ree mur d er , we co n cl u d e t h att h e s en t en ce i n t h e p re s en tca s e is proportionate w hen compa red to other sim ila r mur de rs in w hic h th e de a th p e na lty wa s im po sed

. Th e fo llo wi ng c a se s in wh ic h th e de a th pena l t y wa s i m p o s ed s u p p o rt t h e p ro p o rt i onality of the de fendant’s sentenc e: State v. Austin, 87 S.W .3d 447 (Tenn. 2002) (def endant hire d man to kill underc over police office r; sole ag g ravating circ umstance ( i)(4)) ; St a te v
. St e v e n s , 7 8 S. W. 3 d 8 1 7 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 2 ) ( d e f e n d a n t paid teena g er $5,000.00 to kill hi s wife a nd mother-in-la w to avoid f in an c ial difficulties of divorc e; ag g ravating circ umstances ( i)(2) (prior violent fe lony conviction) a

n d (i )( 4 )) ; S t at e v
. Hu t ch i s o n , 8 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d 1 61 (Tenn. 1994) (man hire d others to drown vic tim to g e t in s u r a n c e money ; sole ag g rava ting c ircum st ance ( i) (4) ); and S tate v . Po rt e rf ie ld, 74 6 S. W.2 d 4 41 (T e nn . 1 98 8) (w oma n h ire d ma

n to 15 kil l he r h us ban d; wi fe’s agg rava ti ng circ ums ta nc e s ( i) (4 ) a nd (5 ); hir e d k ill e r [Po rt e rf ie ld] a lso rec eived de ath sentenc e). A fter re v i ew i n g t h es e ca ses, and many others not spec ifically

cited, we c on c lud e tha t the pe na lty imp o s e d b yt h e j u r yi n t h i s c a s e i s n o t d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e p e n a lty imposed for similar cr i m es
. The sente nce thus satisfies the criteria of Te nnessee Code Annotated section 39-13- 206(c) (1)( A)-( D).
III . C ON CL USI ON
I n ac c o r d a n c e w ith T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d s e c ti o n 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 6 ( c ) ( 1 ) a n d th e p r in c iple s a d o p te d in p r io r d e c i s i o n s , w e h a v e c o n s i d e r e d t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d a n d r e l e v a n t l e g a l au t h o r i t y
. We conclud eth at t

h es e n te n c eo f

d e ath h a s n o t b e e nim

p o s e d a r b itr arily , that the evidenc e supports the j u ry ’s fi n d i n g o f th e s t atu t o ry aggr av at i n g ci rc u m s t an ce , th at th e e vidence

supports the jury ’s finding tha t th e a g g ra va tin g c ir cum st ance ou tw eighs th e miti g a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s b e y on d are a so nableT h e def en dan t a l s o as s er t s t h at he i s e n t i t l ed t o r es en t en ci n g on bot h h i s c on v i ct i on s , n ot j u s t h i s c on v i ct i on 16 fo r f i rs t de gree murd er, be cause nul l i f i cat i o n of t he sent ence o f li fe wi t ho ut pa role necessar i l y negat ed t he agreem ent
r ega r di ng t he cons pi r acy s ent enc e. W hat eve r mer i t t hi s ar gu ment ha s was wai ved b y hi s f ai l ur e t o f i l e a pet i t i on t o re hea r i n Stephenso n v. C arl t o n chal l engi ng t hi s C o urt ’ s st at em ent i n fo o t no t e th re e o f t hat op i ni o n t hat i nval i d at i o n of t he sent ence o f

l i fe wi t ho ut pa ro le d id n o t af fect t he si xt y
- y ear s ent ence i m p o sed f o r t he co nspi racy co nvi ct i o n. T he d e fen d a n t fu rth e r a sse rts tha t b e c a u se th e tr ia l c o u rt o n r e m a n d in 1 9 9 4 “ fo rc e d h im to c h a n g e his p le a a n d e n te r a G u ilt y P le a , . . . it n e g a te d a n d to o k the p la c e o f an y p rio r find ing o f G u il t b y a C o c k e C o u n ty Ju ry, the re fo re lea v ing him wi t h ou t a c on v i ct i on of a n y k i n d. ” B ec au s e t h i s a r g u men t w as n ot r ai s ed i n t h e Cour t of C r i mi n al A ppea l s , i t i s w ai v ed. -18- doubt, and that the sente nce is not ex cessive or disproportionate. F urthermor e, we have r eviewe d all of the issues ra

ised by the def endant a nd concludethat they

d o n o twarrant re lief. Wit h respe ct 16 to issues not specifica lly addre ssed within this opi nion, we af f ir m th e d e c is io n o f th e Co urt of C ri m i n al Appeals. Relevant portions of that opinion are published here afte r as a n appendix. The defe ndant’s sente nce of

death is af

firmed a nd shal l b e c arri ed o u ton the 11th day of Oc tober, 2006,
u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e o r d e r e d b y t h i s C o u r to r p r o p e r au t h o r i t y.
I t appea ring that the def

endant, Jonathan Wesley

Steph e n s o n , is in dig e n t, c o s ts o f this a p peal are taxed to the St ate of

Tenne ssee.

___________________________________ JANI CE M . H OLDE R, JUS TI CE