* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CHERRY DIETZMANN, individually; J.A., II, minor, by and through his mother and guardian Cherry Dietzmann; D.A., minor, by and through her mother and guardian, Cherry Dietzmann, Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v. WILLIAM HUTT, Sergeant; DAVID SHEALY, Sergeant; STACY LUCK, Officer, Defendants - Appellants, and THE HOMER POLICE DEPARTMENT; MARK ROBL, Homer Police Chief; LAWRENCE KUHNS, Sergeant, Defendants,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES MARSHAL’S No. 10-36098 D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00019-RJB
MEMORANDUM * 

# FILED
AUG 01 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 OFFICE; KEVIN GUINN; JOHN OLSON, Jr.,Defendants-third-partyplaintiffs, and CITY OF HOMER,Defendant-third-partyplaintiff - Appellant,

v. JASON ANDERSON, Sr., Third-party-defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Robert J. Bryan, Senior District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted June 25, 2012 Anchorage, Alaska Before: GOODWIN, W. FLETCHER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges. This interlocutory appeal arises from th e denial of qualified immunity to three City of Homer, Alaska, police officers (the “Homer Defendant s”) for claims brought against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Alaska state law. The cl aims emanate from events surrounding a shootout at the Homer airport during the attempted arrest of3 fugitive Jason Anderson. As the facts and procedural history are familiar to the parties, we do not recite them here excep t as necessary to explain our disposition. We have jurisdiction as to the denialof qualified immunity on the federal claims because after taking all inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor, the issue on appeal is whether the facts demonstrate a violation of Plaintiffs’ clearly established, constitutional rights. Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield , 439 F.3d 1055, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2006). We have jurisdiction as to the denial of qualified immunity on the Alaska state law claims because under Alaska law qualif ied immunity “functions as an immunity from suit” as opposed to a “defense to liability.” See Liberal v. Estrada , 632 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Olson v. City of Hooper Bay , 251 P.3d 1024, 1030–31 n.18 (Alaska 2011) (referenc ing the Alaska qualified immunity statute). The district court concluded that there were genui ne issues of material fact that precluded granting qualified immunity to the Home r Defendants. We agree and affirm. The record reflects factual disputes including whether the children were hostages in Anderson’s car at the time of the shootout, whether the Homer Defendants had time to deliberate the decision to join the attempted arrest at the airport, and whether their actions during the execution of that attempted arrest were a reasonable use of force. As the district court concl uded, these factual disputes require the denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity. See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v.4 Mendocino Cnty. , 192 F.3d 1283, 1296 (9th Cir. 1999); Crawford v. Kemp , 139 P.3d 1249, 1256, 1259 (Alaska 2006). AFFIRMED.