No. 83-390 IN THE SUPREME COURTOF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1984

CHARLES E. LINDBERG,et al., PlaintiffsandAppellants,

LEATHAb1BROTHERS, INC.

### , a Utah Corporation and THE STATEOF MONTANA, Defendantsand Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Inand for theCounty of Yellowstone, TheHonorable William J. Speare,Judgepresiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

ForAppellants: Whalen & Whalen;Timothy J. Whalen argued, Billings, Montana

For Respondents: McNamer,Thompson & Cashmore;William 8. PlcNamer argued, Billings, Montana Allen B. Chronister,Asst. Attorney General argued, Belena,Montana

Filed: Submitted: October 31, 1984 Decided: January 4, 1985

ClerkMr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is a wrongful death and survivorship case brought by plaintiffs against the above-named defendants in the District Court, Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone C~unty. A jury returned 

### a verdict for the defendants and judgment was entered thereon; plajntiffs appeal and we affirm. This action arises from a car-truck accident on June 30, 1980, at approximately 10:50 p.m., in which a head-on collision occurred between the car driven by Patricia A. Lindherg and a trailer truck driven by David Toland of Leatham Brothers, Inc. (Leatham)

# . The Lindberg vehicle was traveling north on U.S. Highway 87 and the Leatham truck was traveling south at the time the vehicles met on the Pass Creek Bridge south of Wyola, Montana. Mrs. Lindberg was killed in the collision. The existing roal! conditions were described by Janet Elwell who was driving behind the Lindberg vehicle prior to the collision. Rainhad diminished to a light sprinkle. The road was shiny and reflective, reducing visibility. Centerlines and side stripes were poorly marked on the road making it diffjcult to see the two-lane highway. The road surface was rough. The zebra-striped reflective bridge marker was missing on the corner where the Lindberg car approached the PassCreek Bridge. The driver of the truck, Toland, testified to the circumstances immediately preceding the fatal accident. The headlights of the Lindberg car were raised from low beam to high beam at approximately 150yards fromhis truck. Tolandturned the truck lights on bright.and back to dim to indicate the truck's lights were set on low beam. Toland testified that the Lindberg vehicle swerved intohis lane, immediately before impact. There is conflicting testimony regarding the point of impact and the position of eithervehicle. Testimony of the investigating patrolman, Officer Lee Graves, indicated the Lindberg car crossed the centerline and drove into the Leatham truck. Appellants' expertwitness, F. DenmanLee, a physicist, reconstructed the accidentand presented testimony that the collision occurred in thenorthbound lane. Dr. Tranel, a clinical psychologist from Billings, Montana, testified as to the visual and perceptual field available to the decedent just before the colli.sion. Dr. Tranelopined that perceptual distortion immediately prior to the accident triggered an irrational or panic response by Mrs. Lindberg causing her to swerve her car to correct the visual aberration, thus proximately causing her death. The court refused to hear Dr. Tranel's testimony as to what causedperceptualdistortion. Appellants contend that defense counsel's lack of cooperation during discovery stage caused undue delay which denied appellants a fair trial. Guaranty National Insurance Co. insured both Leatham and PatriciaA. Lindberg. Separate counsel was hired by Guaranty Natj-onal to represent each insured when T,eatham filed a counterclaim seeking damages against Lindberg. When Patricia Lindberg's present counsel attempted to discover facts from Guaranty National, her insurer,counsel for Lindberg hired by Guaranty National djd not release information from its investigation file until respondent Leatham had determined its position. DriverToland's 7oq hook was never provided, even though highway patrolman Lee Graves said he either gave it to the truck driver or put it back in the truck after he finished reviewing it. Photographs taken on behalf of the decedent, and in thepossession of insurance adjuster Sid Griffin,were mad-eavailable to the appellants only after extended delay. Appell-antsraise these issues on appeal:

(1) Did the District Court commit error in excluding the expert testimony of Dr. Tranel regarding the causes of perceptual distortion encountered by Patricia A. Lindberg immediatelybefore her death? (2) Did an abuse of thediscoveryprocessby respondent Leatham and Guaranty National Insurance Company prejudice appellants'discovery of relevant factsand evidenceprior to trial and deny appellantsa fair trial? (3) Did the District Court err in excluding from evidence appellants' offered exhibit nos. 133, 134, 137 and 138? 

### (4) Did the District Court commit error in excluding exhibit nos. 117, 118, 119, 120, 121 and 122 from the jury room during deliherations, even though the exhjbits were received into evidence at the time of trial? (5 Did the District Court err in excluding from evidence appellants' offered exhibit nos. 160 and 161, when the defendant,State ofMontana,had admitted the genuineness 

### of the exhibits and a foundationhad been laid to introduce the exhibits into evidence? (6) Did theDistrict Courterr in excluding appellants' offered exhibit no. 123, though the exhibit had been used by their accident reconstruction expert witness and truck driver Toland admitted his signaturewas on the document?(7 DjC! the District Court commit error when it disallowed testimony from defendant and witness Toland as to whether U.S. Department of Transportion Regulation No. 391-21(10) had been complied with in hiring truck driver Toland, and in refusing to allow the jury to hear evidence with regard to the integrity of driver Toland both as a Personand aprofessional truck driver? (8) Did theDistrictCourt commiterrorwhen it refused to allow testimony from Charles E. Lindberq, a truck driver with 23 years experience, as to appropriate use of lights under the circumstances that prevailed when the Leatham vehicle collided with the Lindberg vehicle? (9) Did the District Court err in excluding from evidence appellants' exhibit nos. 149 through 152, photographs of the roadwaywhere the accident occurred, taken by Charles E. JJindberg1s son a few months after the accident? (10) Did the District Court err in excluding exhibjt

nos. 154and 155,photoaraphs depictingPatriciaA. Lindberg, deceased, and the appellant Paul Gerard Teaford, neither of whomwere able tobepresent at the time of trial.? 611) Did the District Court commit error by allowing Jack Leatham, part owner of Leatham Brothers to submit testimony regarding an inspection of the condition of the headlights on the Leatham truck inJanuary 1980? (12) Did the District Court unfairly prejudice appellants' caseby revealingbias against appel-lantsr expert witnesses and by commenting upon the evidence offered by appellants, implying the judge's opinion as to the weight such evidence merited? (13) Did the DistrictCourt commit reversible error by refusing to give appellants' offered instruction no. 11?(14) Did the District Court commit error in si~ring instruction no. 19, the State of Montana's offered instructionno. 16? (15) Did the District Court commit error in granting the respondents' joint motion for a directed verdict aqainst appellants on the claim for damages underwhat hasheretofore been known as a survival cause of action? (16) Did the District Court commit error by not allowing the jury to take an evening recess before deliberating and consjdering their verdict and. thus deny appellantsa fair trial? We note that appellants presented two separate theories of liability in this case. The first theory imposes liability on the State ofMontana for failing to keepHighway 37 in proper repair and for negligently allowing unsafe conditions to exist at the time of the accident. These unsafe conditions included abumpy and narrow roadway,poorly marked centerline and sideline,and no zebra-striped warning marker attached to the Pass Creek bridge. Appellants argue that these conditions alone or coupled with the improper light-dimming sequence of the driver, Toland, caused a perceptual distortion which in turn caused an irrational panic response. The manifestation of this irrational panic response experienced by Mrs. Lindberg was her swerving into thewrong lane and into thepath of the Leatham truck. The second theory advanced by appellants is that the accident occurred in the northbound lane where the Lindberg vehicle was properly proceeding. The Leatham truck negligently crossed the centerline of the highway and collidedwith the Lindbergvehicle.Respondents' theory is that the Lin$.bergvehicle swerved across the centerline into the southbound lane and collided with the truck. I. DID THEDISTRICTCOURT COMMIT ERROR IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF DR. TRANEI; REGARDING THE CAUSES OF PERCEPTUAL DTSTORTION ENCOUNTERED BY PATRICIA A. LINDRERG IMMEDIATELY BEFOREHER DEATH? This issue presents the question of the scope of expert testimony and the trial court's role in regul-atingit. Art. VII, M.R.Evid., deals with opinion and expert testimony. Rule 702,provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledae will. assist the trier of fact to

2 

## - --- understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." (Emphasisadded.) The facts of each case and the substance of the expert testimony offered must be considered on 

### a case-by-case basis by the trial court todetermine if the testimony fallswithin the rule. Theproposed opinionsoffered by Dr. Tranel sought to establish that the perception of Mrs. Lindberg was so distorted because of the conditions created by defendants that a col.l.isonwas very likely. The conditions caused the distortion and. the distortion caused the accident. Dr. Tranel was going to supply the element of causation to appellants' case. Appellants rely heavily on State 

### v. Chapple (Ariz. 1983), 660P.2d 1208,for the proposition that it is an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to exclude expert testimony that could possibly aid the jury in understanding a fact in issue.Appellants seek tobroaden the law set forth in Chapple. The Arizona Supreme Court generally adhered to the criteria set forth in United States v. Amaral (9th cir. 1.9731,488 F.2d 1148. Amaral and Chapple set forth factorswe believe

are useful in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. The Amaral factors are: (1)qualified expert; (2) proper subject; (3) conformity to generally accepted explanatory theory; and (4) probative value compared to prejudicial effect. The testimony offered in Chapple regarded the factors involved in assessing the reliability 

### of the eyewitness testimony. No opinion was rendered regarding the ultimate credibility of specific witnesses. Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1222. Dr. Tranelwas allowed to testify to fa.ctorsinvolving perceptional distortion. He was not allowed to testify to how these factors affected Mrs. Lindberg's mental processes

even a.s the expert in Chapple could not testify that the existence of an identification factor made a particular witnesses perception or memory faulty. Chapple was also limited to its facts on this issue. Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1224. We hold the trial court.acted within its discretion in limiting the testimony of Dr. Tranel. 1. DID AN ABUSE OF DISCOVERY PROCESS EY RESPONDENT LEATHAM AND GUARANTY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY PREJUDICE APPELLANTS' DISCOVERYOF RELEVANT FACTSAND EVIDENCE PRIOR TO TRIALAND DENYAPPELLANTSA FAIR TRIAL? Appellants argue that discovery abuses prevented them from obtaininq a fair trial. In Massaro v. nunham (1979), 184 Mont. 400, 603 P.2d 249, we discussed discovery abuse. That case involved a divorce actionwhere various attempts todiscover information concerningchild supportpayments and to require production of documents related theretowere ignored by opposi.ngcounsel.. We set forth some general propositions that govern: "The District Court has the inherent discretionary power to controldiscovery. Thatpower isbased on the District Court's authority to control trial administration. See,Statev. Mecca TwinTheater & FilmExchange, Inc. (1973),82Wash.2d 87, 507 P.2d 1165, 1167. In controllinqdiscovery,theDistrict Court must regulate traffic to insure a fair trial to all concerned, neither according one party an unfair advantage nor placing the other party at a disadvantage. State v. Boehme (196?)

## , 71 Wash.2d 621, 430 P.2d 527, 534. "We will reverse the District Court only when its judgment may materially affect the substantial rights of the appellant and allow the possibility of a miscarriage of justice. Wolfe 

### v. Northern Pacific Railway Co. (1966), 147 Mont. 29, 41, 409 P.2d 528, 534. We find such a situation here. "The purpose of discovery is to promote the ascertainment of truth and the ultimate disposition of the lawsuit in accordance therewith. Discovery fulfills this purpose by assuring the mutual knowledge of al.1 relevant facts gathered by both parties which are essential to proper litigation. gickman v. Taylor (1947), 323 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 392, 91 L.Ed. 451, 460." 180 Mont. at 404, 405, 603 P.2d at 251, 252. Appellants compl-ain that certain accident reports prepared by Guaranty on behalf of Leathamwere not produced. The reports were prepared in anticipation of litigation. The District Court ruled that appellants did not demonstrate a substantial need for the investigative reports to require production pursuant toRule 26(b), M.R.Civ.P. The appellants offer no substantive reasons why the reports in question should havebeen turned over to them; they only complain that respondents never applied for a protective order. The District Courtproperly denied relief to Lindberg.This ruling wasmade on September 1, 1982, 8 1./2 months before trial commenced. Appellants' presentation at trial was notprejudiced by this delay. Appellants claim they were prejudiced by the fact that they were denied certain photos taken by insurance adjuster, Sid Griffin before the April 6, 1984 deposition of expert, Dr. F. Denham Lee. Appellants do not move at trial to limit inquiry or exclude the use of Dr. Lee's first deposition for impeachment. Appellants does not identify these crucial. photos by exhibit number here on appeal nor point out how they were crucial to Dr. Lee's change in position. Dr. Lee testified he did a lot more work after his initial deposition. He viewed 80 additional photos before changing his position. He had an opportunity to explain his change from the swerve theory to the theory that the Leatham truck crossed the centerline. Even if the seven so-called Sid Griffin photos were wrongfullywithheld from appellants their omissiondoes not amount to reversibleerror. 111. WHETHER THEDISTRICTCOURT ERRED INEXCLUDING FROM FVIOENCEAPPELLANTS' OFFERED EXHIEIT KOS. 133, 134, 137, 138. The exhibits are photographs measuring approximatel-y? 1/2 inches square taken by the county coroner. Each one depicts a separate piece ofdecedent'sbody lying on the road after the collision. Respondents contend the trial court properly excluded the photographs because due to their gruesome nature they were inflammatory and hence their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Appellants contend the photographs showed a path of debris thatallowed Dr. Lee to reconstruct the accident. The photographs supported and lent credibility to Dr. Lee's analysis and tended to disparage Patrolman Grave's version.The law regarding photographs is easy to state but sometimes difficult to apply. If the trial court determines the probative value outweighs the prejudical effect, the photographs should be admitted. State v. Hoffman (Mont. 1982), 639 P.2d 507, 309 St.Rep. 29; State v. 0'Donnell (1972),159Mont. 138, 496 P.2d 299. Given the gruesome nature of the photographs, their quality and size, the lack of background detail, and wealth of other photographs and information available to Dr. Lee the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence. IV. DID THE DISTRICT COURT COb3"IIT ERROR IN EXCJAITDING EXHIBIT NOS. 117, 118, 119, 120, 121,AND 122 FROM THE JURY ROOM DURINGDELIBERATION? The above-mentioned exhibits, a map and models which aided Dr. Lee in explaining his theory, were admitted into evidence. Jt was stipulated that the evidence is demonstrative in nature. Appellants argue that this evidence

was intended to go to the jury room during deliberation from the time itwas admitted. Respondents urge that no objection to the admission 

### of this evidencewasmade on the condition that itwould not go to the jury room. The trial court did not affirmativelyrule

on whether these exhibits could be used by the jury during deliberations. The jury had the opportunity to view the evidence. The exclusion from the jury room of these exhibits did not material]-yprejudice the appellants' case. 

## v. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN EXCLUDING FROM EVIDENCE LINDBERG'S OFFERED EXHIBIT NOS. 160 AND 161,WHERE THE DEFENDANT, HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, HAD ADMITTED THEGENUINENESS OF THE EXHIBITS AND FOUNDATION HAD EEEN LAID TO INTRODUCETHEEXHIBITS JNTO EVIDENCE? Fxhibitnos. 160and 161 are internalHighway Department memoranda that contain evaluations of specific stretches of road within the state. The memoranda include an eva-luation of the segment of roadwhere this collision occurred. These documents were drafted to assist the Monta.na Highway Department inplanning a.ndbudgeting road.repair,improvement and replacement. Exhibit no. 161 shows a computer print-out that summarizes road conditions over a 5.3 mile stretch of roadwhich includes the col-lisionsite. Don Opitz, a state employee, testifying at trial explained the documents and laid a foundation for their admission. The District Court excluded exhibit nos. 160 and 161. after lengthydiscussion in chamherswith counsel. The State contends the excluded exhibits were irrelevant,confusing,prejudicialand erroneous. Appellants contend the exhihits tend to prove the condition of the roadwaywhich contributed to the zccident. Rules 401, 402 and 403,M.R.Evid., provide the general framework in which this issuemust be resolved. These rules state: "Rule



### -- 401. Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency tomake the existenceof any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the actionmore probable or lessprobable than itwould he without the evidence. Relevant evidence ma.y include evidence bearing upon the credibility of a witness orhearsay declarant."

"Rule



### -- 402. All releva.ntevidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by constitution, statute, these rules, or other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant isnotadmissible." "Rule



## -- 403. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,confusionof the issues, or misleading the jury, or 

### by consi.derationsof unduedelay, waste of time,or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." These exhibi-tsare relevant. They tend to show the general condition of the highway which was a material issue in the appel-lants'case against the State of Montana. The argument of the Highway Department th3.t the printouts were too prejudicial or confusing is without merit. The Hi9hwa.y Department was afforded ample opportunity to present the factual evidence expl-aining the reports to the jury in cross-examination of sta.te employee Opitz and. in final argument. The view that the jury would be misled and would. not take into account the photographs of the road and other evidenceorbe able to sortout thed.ifferenttheoriesof the

case is very paternalistic and shows a lack of confidence in the intelligenceand common sense of the average juror. The trial court erred by not admitting this evidence. However, given all of the evidence admitted concerning the road conditions, the error did not material]-y prejudice appellants' case and i.sharmless. VI. DID THEDISTRICT COURT ERR IN EXCLUDJNG LINDBERG'S OFFERED EXHIBIT NO. 123, EVEN THOUGH THE EXHIBTT HAD BEEN USED BY THEIR ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS AND TRUCK DRIVER TOLAND ADMITTED HIS SIGNATURE APPEARED ON THE DOCUMENT? Exhibit no. 123 is a receipt or bill of ladingwhichwas signed.by driver Toland when he picked up his load before he left Seeley Lake. Appellants argue the document should have been admitted because it wa-sused to impeach driver Toland. Appellants also assert that the credibility of Dr. Lee was damaged by respondent's counsel's assertion that exhibit no. 123 contained unreliablehearsay.Driver Toland was confronted with exhibit no. 123. He admitted signing it. Appellants' counsel offered the document into evidence. The trial court did not admit it. At the time exhibit no. 1-23was rejected,Toland had notyet made the prior inconsistent statement referred to in appellants' brief. Jn fact, the inconsistencywas elicited by respondent's counsel. Appell-antsmade no further effort 

### to use exhibit no. 123 to impeach Toland or attempt to have it admitted as evidence. We findno error. T7II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE: ERROR WHEN IT DISALLOWED THE TESTIMONY FROM WITNESSES LEATHAM AND TOLAND AS TO WHETHER US. DEPARTMENT OF TRAP~SPORTATION REGULATTON NO. 391-21(10)

## , HAD BEEN COMPLIED WTTF IN HIF.ING TOLAND AND IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE JURY TO HEAR EVIDENCE WITF REGARD TO THE INTEGRITY OF DRIVER TOLAND BOTH A PERSONAND A PROFESSIONALTRUCK DRIVER? The U.S. Department of Transportation Regulation No. 391-21, requires that the employer submit information concerning employees who drive tractor-trailer rigs on the highways. The information isbasically the same as required

on most job applications. The information contained in this form shows that Toland had been fired from a bus-driving job for being late forwork. This evidence is relevant only to prove a character trait of driver Toland, to-wit: He is an irresponsible employee. Character evidence of this nature is specifically proscribed. SeeRule 404,M.R.Evid. This evidence has no bearing on truth or veracity. It does not tend to prove Toland is untruthful. See Rule 608, M.R.Evid.Appellants misconstrue what is meant by putting ones character into issue. Rule 404(a)(11, M.R.Evid., incorporates the time-honored practice of allowing the accused in a criminal case to introduce evidence of his good character. The prosecution may then rebut the same. The rule has no application in civil cases unless the character trait is an essential element of the charge, claim, or defense. A character trait of tardiness is not an essential element of an action allegingnegligentdriving. VIII. DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMBIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REFTJSED TOALLOW TESTIMONY FROM CHARLES E. LINDBERG, A TRUCK DRIVER OF 23 YEARS EXPERIENCE, ON THEAPPROPRIATE IJSE OF LIGHTS IJNDER THE CIRCUMSTP.NCES THAT PREVAILED WHEN THE TRUCKING COMPANY VEHICLE COLLIDED WITH THE LSINDBERGTTEHICLE? Appellants argue that the testimony of the decedent's husband, and appellant, should have been allowed because it would assist the trier of fact in understanding the customs and accepted driving practices of over-the-road tractor/trailerdrivers. Respondents argue thatLindbergwas not qualifiei!, facts not in evidence were assumed, and that the subject matter was within common knowledge of the jury. The trial court must exclude expert testimony if the subject is one of such common knowledge thatmen of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness, but if the matter is suffici-entlybeyond common experience that the opiri.on of the expert would assist the trier of fact the court must admit the evidence. State v. Howard (1981),195Mont. 400, 404, 405, 637P.2d 15, 17. We defer to the discretion of the trial. court in finding no

errorhere.IX. DID THEDISTRICT COURT ERR IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF LINDBERGS' EXHIBIT NOS. 149 THROUGH 153, WHICH ARE PHOTOGPAPHSOF THEROADWAY WHERE THEACCIDENT OCCURRED, TAKEN BY CHARLES E. LINDBERG'S SONA FEW MONTHS AFTER THEACCIDENT? Thephotos depict the roadway and the scraggy remains of

abush off the side of the road. Thebush photographed hears

no resemblance to theway it looked in fullbloom on June 30, 1980. The photograph does not tend to prove, disprove, or support any material fact in the case. It only tends to prove the location of a bush. The bush is depicted in other admissiblephotos. The evidence is irrelevantand repetitive and its exclusion was properly within the discretion of the trial court. X. DID THE DISTRICTCOURT ERR IN EXC1,UDINGEXHIBITNOS. 154 and 155, PHOTOGRAPHS DEPICTING PATRICIA A. LINDBERG, DECEASED, AND AN APPELLANT, PAUL GERARD TEAFORD, NEITHFR OF WHOM WERE ABLE TO BE PRESENT AT THETIME OF TRIAL? One exhibit shows a happy and healthy Patricia Lindberg with her son and, the other shows her with her class of Wyoming school children. The photos were offered to prove Mrs. Lindberg was in good health. The photo of decedent and her son 

### was taken in 1976 and the class picture in 1973. The discretion of theDistrict Court again is the reason

we find nobasis to this claim of error. The DistrictCourt,

as we have said many times, has broad discretion in the matter of admitting relevant evidence. XI. DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR BY AL1,OWING JACK LEATHAM, PART OWNER OF LEATHAM TO SUBYIT TESTIMONY REGARDING AN INSPECTION OF THE CONDITION OF THE HEADLIGHTS OF THE LEATHAM TRUCK IN JANUARY 1980?Appellants claim the testimony of Jack Leatharn should have been stricken because the matters testified to were not within his personal knowledge and the testimonywas hearsay. Leatham testified that the truck involved 

### in the collisonwas inspected and this inspection included thehead lights. Leathamhad nopersonal knowledge that the headlights on this particular truck were inspected. His testimony was based on hearsay. By definition, "hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 

### - of the matter asserted.If Rule 801(c)

## ,M.R.Evid. 

## - Hearsay is inadmissible except as otherwiseprovided by statute, the Montana Rules of Evidence, or other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Rule 802,M.R.Evid. Leathamdid not acquirehis knowledge that the truckwas inspected from personal observation but from a document in the company records. An out-of-court statement, the document,was made and repeated in court by Leatham to prove the truth of thematter asserted, to-wit: thatan inspection of the lightsweremade in January 1980. Leatham attempted to introduce this document to prove his testimony but the matter was dropped when the evidence

was admitted. This document was itself hearsay but could. have been admitted under the "recordsof regularly conducted activity1' exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(6), M.R.Evid., if aproper foundationwere laid. Since appellant did not pursue their objection and acquiesced to the admission of Leatham's testimony, we find no reversible

error. XII. DID THE DISTRICT COURT UNFAIRLY PREJUDICE LINDBERG'S CASE BY REVEALING TO THE JURY ITS ETAS AGAINSTLINDBERG'S EXPERT WITNESSES AND BY COMMENTING UPON THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY LINDRERG IMPLYING TTS OPINION AS TO THE WEIGHT SUCH EVIDENCE MERITED? Appellants contend that the trial court prejudiced the jury by its comments to appellants' expert witnesses and comments on the evidence. After reviewing the instances cited by appellants in their brief and looking at the record

as awhole, we find no showing of bias that could be imputed to the DistrictCourt. XIIL. DID THEDISTRICTCOURTCOMMITREVERSIBLE ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE LINDRERG'SOFFERED INSTRUCTIONNO. 11? Appellants' offered instruction nos. 10 and 11 quoted federal and state laws which concern the dimming of headlights at night on.the highway. The court gave instruction no. 10 but refused to give instruction no. 11. Both instructions are related and are set forth: "[Instruction no. 10.1 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations as prescribed by U. S. Department of Transportation,FederalHighway Administration; Section 392.23, provides: "'Sec. 329.32 Upper and lower head-lamp beams. During the time when lighted l-am.ps are required, every driver shallobey the following: 

### "(a) Upper beam. He shall use the upper distribution of light when there is no oncoming vehicle within 500 feet: Provided, however, that a lower distribution of light may be used when fog, dust, or other atmospheric conditions make it desirable for reasonsof safety,andwhen within the confines of municipalities where there is sufficient light to render clearly discernible persons and vehicles on the highway at a distance of 500 feet ahead; "(b) Lower beam. When within 500 feet of an on-coming vehicle, he shall use a distribution of light or composite beam so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the on-coming driver and such distribution of light shall also be used when following another vehicle within 500 feet.'

"If you find David Toland, 

### the driver of the Leatham Brothers', Inc. truck violated the abovesection at or about the time of the happening of the accident in this case,then suchviolationmay be considered by you in determiningwhether or not there was negligence upon the part of the defendant, Leatham Brothers, Inc., a Utah corporation." "[Instruction no. 11.1 Section 61-9-221(1), MCA, provides: "'61-9-221. Use of multiple beam road lighting equipment. Whenever a motor vehicle is being operated 

### on a roadway or shoulder adjacent thereto during the times specified in 61-9-201,the driver shall use a distribution of light, or composite beam,directed high enough and of sufficient intensity to reveal persons and vehicles at a safe d.istancein advanceof thevehicles, subjectto the fol.lowingrequirementsand limitations: 

### "(1) Whenever the driver of a vehicle 2pproaches an oncoming vehicle within 1,000 feet, such driver shall.use a distributionof lightor composite beam so aimed that the gl-aringrays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. The lowermost distributionof light specified in 61-9-220(2) shall be deemed to avoid glare at all times, regardless of road contour and loading.' "The times specified in Sec. 61-9-201,as applicable to this case,is at any time fromone-halfhour after sunsetto one-halfhour before sunrise. "Secti.on 61-9-220(2)

## , Montana Code ~nnotated, provides: 

### "'(2) There shall be a lowermost distribution of light, or composite beam, so aimed and of sufficient intensity to reveal persons and vehicles ata distance of at least 100 feet ahead; and on a straight level. of road under any condition of loading none of the high-intensity portion of the beam shal.1 be directed to strike the eyes of any approachingdriver.' "If you find from the evidence in this case that David Toland, the driver of the Leatham Brothers, Inc. truck, operated the truck in violation of the sections above quoted of the Montana Code, you are instructed 

### -- that such conduct was negligence as a 

## -- matter of law. 

### -- "However, in this action,a viol-ationof law is of no consequence unless it was a proximate cause of the death of Patricia A. Lind-berg. I' (Empha.sis added.) The trial court refused to give instruction no. 11 because itreferred only todriver Toland.Appellants point out that the proposed instruction mentions that violation of the statute must be a proximate cause of Mrs. Lindberg's death. They argue that it was not prejudicial to Leatha.m because Leatham never raised the contention that the 1igh.t~ on Mrs. Lindberg's car blinded Toland and. that this in some way contributed to the collision. These points are well taken but considering the fact that the court gave appell-ants'instruction no. 10,we find no reversible error. Instructionno. 10 is a fair statement of the law. It sets forth the duty of driver TolanC!with regard to dimming his lights. This instructi-ondiffers from instruction no. 11 

### in that it states a violation of the regulationmay be considered in determining negligencewhere violation of the Montana statute is declared neal-igenceas a matter of law by the language of instruction no. 11. It would havebeen preferable for theDistrictCourt to instruct

on the Montana statutes as they pertain to the use of high and low beams of headlights at night. However, the instruction given is sufficiently consonant with the statutes that the jury could nothave been misled. Thereforewe find

no error here. XIV. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 19, STATE OF MONTANA'S OFFERED INSTRUCTIONNO. 16? Instructionno. 19 given by the court is quoted in part from the language of section 61-8-321, MCA, and reads as follows: "You are instructed that Montana law requires as follows: 'Uponall roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway.

## '"Ifyou find from the evidence that aparty to this action conducted his or herself inviolation of the law just read to you, you are instructed that such conductwas negligence as amatter of law. "However,in this action, a violation of law is of no consequence unless it was a proximate cause of an injury." Appellants object to the instruction because section 61-8-321,MCA, was not set forth in its entirety and hence appellant was prejudiced. The remaining portions of the statute not quoted in the instruction are irrelevant. Section 61-8-321, MCA, inunabridged form states: 

### "(1) Upon all roa.d.waysof sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the road.wzy,except as follows: "(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing suchmovement; "(b) when the righthalf of a roadway is closed to trafficwhile under constructionor repair; "(c) upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the rulesapplicable thereon; or "(dl upon a roadway designated and signposted for one-way traffic. 

### "(2) Upon all roadways any vehicle proceeding at 1-essthan the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then existing shall be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close aspracticable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway except when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding j.n the same direction or when preparing for a left turn.at an intersection or into a private road or driveway.I' Appellants complain that giving instruction no. 19 had the effect of exonerating the State of Montana by making Lindberg or Leatham negligent per se. An instruction on comparative faultwas given. The jurywas not instructed to disregard any negligence on thepart of the StateofMontana, only that both parties involved in the collisionmust driveon the right side of the road. The court did not err in giving this instruction. XV. DID THE COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR TN GRANTING THE RESPONDENTS' JOINT MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AGAINST APPELLANTS ON THECLAIM FOR DAMAGESUNDERWHAT HAS HERETOFORE BEEN KNOWN AS A SURVIVAL CAUSE OF ACTION? This issue involves the damages allowable in a survival action. The appellants apparently ask this Court to reexamine the doctrine that a decedent must live "an appreciable amount of time" in order for a survival action to

accrue. See Stephens v. Brown (1972), 160 Mont. 453, 457, 503 P.2d 667, 670; Dillon v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1909), 38 Mont. 485, 496, 100 P. 960, 963; Smith, Thoughts on - Survival Action in Montana and Related Matters, 41 

## - - Mont.L.Rev. 165 (1980). Since the jury found that respondents were not liable and we affirm theirverdict, the above issue ismoot a.ndleft for anotherda.y

# . XVI

# . DID THE DISTRICT COURT COf?IMIT ERROR BY MOT ALLOWING THE JURY TO TAKE A RECESS BEFORE DELIBERATING AND CONSIDERTNG THEIR VERDICT AND THUS DENY APPEJJL,ANTSA FAfR TRIAI, ? Appellants cannot be heard here on appeal to complain about a tired juryheing sent to deliberatewhen they did not object at trial. The trial cou.rtshould consid-erthe hour and condition. of the jurors before sending them to deliberate. It is the duty of the trial court acting within its sound discretion not to allow the jury tobegin deliberationsunder conditions that would prejudice either party. No objection was raisedattrial, and we have no grounds to find inherent prejudice to theappel.lants. A£firmed.

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# i Justice 

# f

,jf './ WeConcur:

Justices