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Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) program 

California Department of Public Health

Occupational Health Branch

FATALITY ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL EVALUATION

PROGRAM (CA/FACE)

A Tree Feller Dies When Struck By a Tree Limb

While Felling a Fire-Damaged Tree

Case Report: 17CA004

SUMMARY

A 21-year-old male tree feller, working from a bucket truck as part of a small tree-felling crew, 

died when struck by a large tree limb he had just cut. The 80 to 90-foot, fire-damaged oak tree 

was located below a county road that ran along the steep bank of a creek ravine. The crew had 

been directed not to fell the tree into the ravine because of environmental and cultural 

concerns. The crew had been directed to take the tree down in small sections. However, after

the supervisor left, the victim decided that they should attempt to bring most of the tree down 

in two large sections. The crew used a rigging line, pulled by a mini-excavator, to attempt to 

direct the cut sections to fall uphill towards the road. Neither section fell in the direction 

intended; the second section fell uphill against the bucket truck, fatally crushing the victim. 

The California Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Program (CA/FACE) concluded that 

organizations involved in tree-felling operations should take the following steps to prevent 

similar incidents: 

• Tree-felling contractors should ensure that each crew includes, and is led by, a person

with substantial experience in tree felling.

• Tree-felling contractors should ensure that all supervisors are certified in tree-felling

safety by an organization such as the Tree Care Industry Association (TCIA) or the

International Society of Arboriculture (ISA). In addition, government agencies, utilities,

and other project customers should include bid language requiring that all supervisors

be certified in tree-felling safety by one of these organizations.

• Tree-felling crews should always be able to readily communicate with their supervisor

and medical emergency services. If cell phone reception is not reliable, the employer

should issue the crew a satellite phone.
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Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) program 

INTRODUCTION

On April 6, 2017, at approximately 11 am, a 21-year-old male tree feller, working from a bucket

truck as part of a crew, died when struck by a large tree limb. The CA/FACE program learned of 

the fatality from the California Department of Industrial Relations on April 12, 2017. The 

CA/FACE investigator visited the worksite and interviewed Cal/OSHA enforcement staff on 

January 18, and interviewed the site environmental monitor on February 23, 2018. Numerous

unsuccessful attempts were made to interview co-workers or the contractor. In addition, a 

trade association representative and a tree felling contractor were consulted for assistance 

with technical interpretation and assessment. 

PROJECT AND EMPLOYERS 

After a fire burned 70,000 acres in the California Sierra foothills in the late summer of 2015, the 

county received Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funding to remove

approximately 8,000 roadside ‘hazard trees’— which were burned and in danger of falling onto 

roads. The work began in late 2016. 

Initially the general contractor (general) selected three local contractors to do the on-theground work. However, rains slowed the release of the work, and only one local subcontractor 

(subcontractor) was eventually hired, as this company reportedly appeared able to keep up 

with the work. This subcontractor was a local, husband-and-wife-owned transportation and 

logging company, in business since 2005. The victim started working for this company in 

November 2016. In January 2017, this same couple formed a second company focused on treefelling operations. The victim then moved over to work for this second company. At the time of 

the incident, the company had 25 employees working in six crews on this county tree removal 

project. 

The county also hired an independent consulting company to oversee the expenditure of 

federal funds and to ensure that all regulations were followed. This company subcontracted to 

specialists to provide biological, archeological, and cultural monitors as on-site monitors to

ensure the safeguarding of environmental and cultural resources. 

WRITTEN SAFETY PROGRAMS, WORKER TRAINING, EXPERIENCE, AND 

KNOWLEDGE 

At the time of his death, the victim had approximately 31⁄2 years’ experience in the tree industry 

with three companies: for a local tree felling company as a sawyer/groundsman, for a 

communications company working as a communications lineman, and for a heavy civil 

construction firm conducting roadside hazard tree removal. The victim’s father estimated that, 
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Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) program 

prior to being hired by the subcontractor, his son had four months of part-time experience 

operating a bucket truck. 

Prior to this job, the victim received training on basic safety topics, grinding and chipping 

operations, chain saw safety, and logging. He did not, however, receive training on the 

following topics: technical tree felling and cutting techniques (safe rigging application and setup), rigging (chokers, cables, shackles, mechanical advantage systems, etc.), and knot and 

hitches (groundsman, saw man, technical tree fellers, and climbers). Between initial hiring in 

November and assignment to the county hazard tree removal project at the end of January, the 

victim worked primarily as a groundsman setting ropes, rigging, and dragging branches. He was 

observed by the general’s supervisor and reportedly demonstrated good, precise use of the 

chain saw. His crew reportedly completed multiple technical tree fellings. 

After moving to the county hazard tree removal project, the victim was again observed while 

climbing and was deemed to have the skills needed for taking down trees that do not present 

particular difficulties; he reportedly demonstrated good judgment and cautious decisionmaking. At the end of February, the victim began felling trees while operating a rental bucket 

truck (Altec 55-ft. forestry truck), and was assessed by management as being safe and 

competent. By the end of March, the crews were reconfigured and the victim was reassigned to

a specific bucket truck crew. Since he was ‘in the tree,’ he was given the power to make crew 

decisions. He was reportedly observed by management a number of times and each time 

demonstrated “extreme caution and good judgment.” This reconfigured crew was young, the 

oldest being 25 years old. 

During the project there were weekly mandatory tailgate safety meetings put on by the 

general. In addition, the subcontractor held daily safety and planning meetings for all 

employees. The general had an extensive written safety program. 

INCIDENT SCENE

There were a number of ‘hazard trees’ along the road, which ran along the steep bank of the

creek ravine. These hazard trees had been designated as such by the county arborist, because 

they were thought to be damaged and in danger of falling onto the road. Felling these trees was 

made more difficult because the subcontractor had been instructed not to fell trees into the 

ravine because of environmental and cultural concerns. Crews working in the ravine were 

observed by biological and cultural monitors, whose job it was to ensure that the crews 

adhered to this rule. 

A number of these ravine hazard trees (including the oak tree) were considered to be 

particularly problematic. At one point the subcontractor considered bringing in a crane to 

remove these trees, but realized that there was not sufficient room for this equipment on the 

narrow road. Two additional issues complicated the proposed task of felling this particular oak 
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tree. In addition to having sustained some fire damage, it had a large, pre-existing cavity at the 

base of the main trunk. This meant that the oak was possibly structurally unsound, and sending 

a climber up the tree to piece it down was ruled out as unsafe. For most of its 80 to 90-foot

length, the tree leaned away from the road and down towards the bottom of the ravine. This 

limited the ability of the 55-ft. bucket truck to reach the upper portions of the tree from the 

road. 

For two days prior to the fatal incident, the victim’s crew was climbing and felling trees down 

the road from the incident site. Meanwhile, the subcontractor had brought in a highly skilled 

crew from another project to use the bucket truck to piece down the ‘technical’ trees (those 

that required a high level of skill) along the ravine road. Whether the oak should have been 

included in this crew’s work is not clear. The general reported that, when the highly skilled crew 

left the ravine, the remaining trees, including the oak, were considered straightforward work. 

A week prior to the incident, the crew’s immediate supervisor was removed from the job 

because of an altercation with one of the monitors. The owner of the subcontractor and the 

regional manager of the general took over crew supervision in the interim. On the day of the 

fatal incident, the owner of the subcontractor was collecting supplies in a nearby city, and the 

contractor’s regional manager was supervising the crews. 

INVESTIGATION 

On the morning of the incident, after the daily safety and planning meeting, the victim and his 

crew assembled at the site of the oak at approximately 7:30 am. The victim met with the

general’s regional manager and the crew supervisor – no other crewmembers attended the job 

briefing. The general’s regional manager estimated the oak to be 80 feet tall with a maximum 

trunk diameter of 41 inches. The base of the tree was ten feet below the road. About 30 feet 

up, the trunk split into two large vertical spars which were each 16 to 18 inches in diameter. 

These two spars rose an additional 20 to 30 feet before spreading out into the canopy of the 

tree. The regional manager reported afterwards that they discussed piecing the tree down. He

reported pointing out a dominant crotch in the tree approximately 50 feet above the road. He

judged that this crotch was accessible using the bucket truck. From this crotch, the entire 

canopy of the tree was to be ‘pieced down’ using rigging and a tag line to pull the pieces down 

towards the road. After that, the spars and the trunk would also be pieced down by 

sequentially cutting off short sections from the top. The general regional manager later 

reported that the victim agreed to this plan, and pointed out the crotch which would be used 

for the initial work on the crown. The regional manager and the crew supervisor left 

immediately after the briefing, at about 7:45 am, to tour the rest of the project. 

The evidence documented afterwards at the site indicates that the crew was able to follow the 

work plan as they had been instructed. While the 55-ft. reach of the man basket limited how far 

the victim could reach into the canopy of the tree, he was able to piece down the canopy by 

cutting through branches, which were an estimated 6 to 9 inches in diameter. However, at 
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about 11 am, the victim decided to change course. The crew would not continue to 

methodically piece the tree down, it would attempt to bring down the upper two-thirds of the 

tree in two large pieces. The crewmembers did not check in with the general’s regional 

manager or the new subcontractor foreman before changing the plan. While cell phone 

reception was spotty in the ravine, contact was possible, either by driving approximately 7 

minutes up the road, or by climbing up the ravine above the road. 

The victim decided that he would fell each of the large spars by making cuts just above the split 

in the main trunk. This involved felling large sections of the remaining tree: the base of each 

spar was 16 to 18 inches in diameter, and extended upwards approximately thirty feet, before 

branching into what remained of the canopy (each linear foot of this spar weighed an estimated 

134 lbs.1). In total, the sections were probably 50 to 60 feet in length. In an attempt to ensure 

that each spar would fall uphill onto the road, the crew tied a rigging line around the spar and 

attached it, via a redirecting pulley, to a mini-excavator located on the road. The excavator was 

to put initial tension on the spar, and then after the face-cut and back-cut had been made from 

the bucket truck, pull the spar over and up towards the road. It is not known how high up the 

spar the rigging line was attached. 

The crew carried out this plan and the first spar fell, not onto the road (as was intended), but 

into the ravine. After some modifications, based on an assessment of what they thought had 

gone wrong, the crew was ready to fell the second spar using essentially the same strategy. The 

victim made the cuts from the bucket truck and then pulled the bucket back next to the near 

side of the bucket truck, parked approximately 10 to 15 feet from the base of the tree. The 

bucket was lowered to approximately 8 feet off the ground; the boom lift arm was folded back 

on itself, with its articulated joint in an elevated position. 

This time, as the excavator pulled, the spar initially moved as intended, but then abruptly

changed direction and fell (at a right angle to the rigging line) towards the bucket truck. The 

upper part of the tree section struck the elevated boom arm and slid down the sloped arm 

towards the bucket, striking the victim and bouncing him out of the bucket (Exhibits 1 & 2). As 

he hung suspended from his body harness, his co-workers were able to reach and unclip him, 

and lay him on the road. The time was approximately 11:10 am. 

The monitors and crew members began CPR immediately and took turns until the emergency 

medical services arrived. Witnesses were able to find spots on the hillside above the road that 

had cell phone reception, and five calls were placed to the 911 dispatcher. When emergency 

medical services arrived, they took over CPR. At approximately 12:11 pm, the paramedics 

conferred by phone with a physician, and the victim was pronounced dead at the scene.

1 ANSI Z133-2017, American National Standard for Arboricultural Operations—Safety Requirements, Annex E. 
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CAUSE OF DEATH

The cause of death, according to the death certificate, was blunt impact Injuries of head and 

torso.

RECOMMENDATIONS

CA/FACE concluded that organizations involved in tree-felling operations should take the 

following steps to prevent similar incidents: 

Recommendation #1: Tree-felling contractors should ensure that each crew includes, and is 

led by, a person with substantial experience in tree felling. 

Discussion: In this incident, the victim had only 31⁄2 years of miscellaneous experience in the tree 

industry, and the oldest person on the crew was 25 years old. The victim may not have had the 

knowledge and experience needed to assess the best method to fell the tree and discern the 

risks involved in changing the original plan. Contractors, when constituting a crew, should 

ensure that it includes, and is led by, a person with substantial experience. This will help ensure 

not only a consistent adherence to safe practices, but continuing opportunities for on-the-job 

training. Had there been an experienced person leading this crew, he/she likely would not have 

chosen to fell the tree in an unsafe manner, and the fatality would have been prevented.

Recommendation #2: Tree-felling contractors should ensure that all supervisors are certified 

in tree-felling safety by an organization such as the Tree Care Industry Association (TCIA) or 

the International Society of Arboriculture (ISA). In addition, government agencies, utilities, 

and other project customers should include bid language requiring that all supervisors be 

certified in tree-felling safety by one of these organizations. 

Discussion: In this incident, the supervisor was not certified in tree-felling safety. The crew was 

instructed to piece down the tree in sections, a method that was altered by the victim while the 

work was in progress. After altering the original work plan, the victim did not cradle the bucket 

truck boom and move the truck back a safe distance. Evidence suggests that the crew had not 

been clearly instructed to check in with their supervisor before changing the tree-felling plan, 

and had deviated from the original tree-felling plan on previous occasions. This suggests the 

lack of a robust safety culture with established practices of training, clear communication, 

adherence to safe work practices, adequate direct supervision, and consistent, impartial 

disciplinary action. Trade-specific safety training for all supervisors would help ensure a 

stronger safety culture in tree-felling projects. This is best attained by certification in tree-felling 

safety from the Tree Care Industry Association (TCIA) or the International Society of 

Arboriculture (ISA). This can be assured by bid language requiring that all supervisors possess 

this certification. Had there been adequate, well-trained safety supervision of the victim and his 
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crew, it is more likely that safe practices would have been implemented and this fatality

prevented.

Recommendation #3: Tree-felling crews should always be able to readily communicate with 

their supervisor and medical emergency services. If cell phone reception is not reliable, the

employer should issue the crew a satellite phone. 

Discussion: In this instance, the crew was working along a road in a steep creek ravine and had 

spotty cell phone reception. It is possible that the lack of reliable reception deterred the crew

from attempting to contact their supervisor prior to abandoning the original tree-felling plan.

Adequate supervision means, in part, that crews should be able to readily communicate with

their supervisor at all times. In addition, it is very important for crews to be able to readily and

reliably contact emergency medical services in the event of an injury, snake bite, allergic 

reaction, or heat illness. This is required by Cal/OSHA regulations Title 8, §3400, Medical

Services and First Aid, and Title 8 §3395, Heat Illness Prevention. In this incident, co-workers

were able to find spots on the hillside above the road that had cell phone reception, and five

calls were placed to the 911 dispatcher. However, it is quite possible that contact with the 911 

dispatcher could have been significantly delayed by relying solely on the spotty reception of 

personal cell phones.

REFERENCES

ANSI Z133.-2017, American National Standard for Arboricultural Operations—Safety

Requirements. 

California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section §3400, Medical Services and First Aid.

(see: https://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/3400.html) 

California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section §3395, Heat Illness Prevention. 

(see: https://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/3395.html)
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EXHIBITS

Exhibit 1. The bucket truck after the victim was struck and knocked out of the bucket. 

Photo used with permission. 

Exhibit 2. The trunk of the tree to the right of the road, and the bucket truck and mini-excavator 

used by the crew. Photo used with permission. 
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______________________________ ______________________________

Peter Scholz, CIH Robert Harrison, MD, MPH

FACE Investigator FACE Project Officer

______________________________ September 5, 2018 

Laura Styles, MPH

Research Scientist

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FATALITY ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL EVALUATION PROGRAM

The California Department of Public Health, in cooperation with the Public Health Institute 

and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), conducts 

investigations of work-related fatalities. The goal of the CA/FACE program is to prevent fatal 

work injuries. CA/FACE aims to achieve this goal by studying the work environment, the 

worker, the task the worker was performing, the tools the worker was using, the energy 

exchange resulting in fatal injury, and the role of management in controlling how these 

factors interact. NIOSH-funded, state-based FACE programs include: California, Kentucky, 

Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oregon, and Washington.

*******************************************************************************

Additional information regarding the CA/FACE program is available from:

California FACE Program

California Department of Public Health

Occupational Health Branch

850 Marina Bay Parkway, Building P, Third Floor

Richmond, CA 94804

www.cdph.ca.gov/face