Exhibit 10.1






Exhibit 10.1




Cardtronics, Inc.

2009 Annual Executive Cash Incentive Plan




Members of the Cardtronics, Inc. (Cardtronics or the Company) leadership team are eligible to
participate in the Annual Executive Cash Incentive Plan (AECIP). The 2009 AECIP has been designed
to include certain performance thresholds and metrics focused on Company performance, subject to a
Management by Objective (MBO) modifier, to ensure the Company is measuring and rewarding its
executive leadership team on critical business drivers that they influence.



     I. Plan Mechanics




Three components factor into the calculation of a participant’s earned AECIP award:




	 	A.	 	Performance Thresholds: Minimum levels of Company financial performance that must be
attained in order for AECIP payouts to occur.

	 
	 	B.	 	Performance Metrics: Particular levels of Company financial achievement that the
AECIP is designed to reward.

	 
	 	C.	 	Individual MBO Modifier: Adjustments to an individual’s bonus payout will be based
on attainment of that individual’s MBOs.






     II. Performance Thresholds




For any AECIP to be payable, all three of the following performance thresholds must be met:




	 	A.	 	Cardtronics must achieve the threshold level of its fiscal year corporate Adjusted
Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (Adjusted EBITDA).

	 
	 	B.	 	Cardtronics must be compliant with all material public company regulations and
reporting requirements for its fiscal year.

	 
	 	C.	 	The executive must achieve the minimum performance standards established by his
superior and/or the Board.






     III. Participants & Groupings




The Cardtronics 2009 AECIP participants have been placed into one of two groups, which reflect
their ability to control the results of the metrics assigned to each group. The two participant
groups are:




	 	A.	 	Worldwide. These metrics represent the consolidated fiscal year results as per the
Company’s public reporting.

	 
	 	B.	 	UK Only. These metrics represent the UK results denominated in UK pound sterling.






Schedules A & B list each of the 2009 AECIP participants, their respective group assignment, and
the related Target Bonus Payout.



 









 





Cardtronics 2009 AECIP

Plan Summary

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Version: August 11, 2009




     IV. Performance Metrics




The AECIP rewards the achievement of performance on key metrics that are critical to Cardtronics’
continued success. For the Worldwide participants, the 2009 AECIP metrics are:




	 	A.	 	Adjusted EBITDA.
	 
	 	B.	 	Return on Invested Capital.





For the UK participants, a single metric of Adjusted EBITDA will be used.



     V. Performance Metrics — Definitions





	 	A.	 	Adjusted Earnings Before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization
(Adjusted EBITDA)







	 	1.	 	Worldwide Adjusted EBITDA: Adjusted EBITDA as reported to the public in
Cardtronics’ press releases, modified by any adjustments that the Compensation
Committee believes are appropriate.

	 
	 	2.	 	UK Adjusted EBITDA: The contribution of UK entities to the Worldwide
Adjusted EBITDA figure, per Cardtronics’ internal financial statements, as modified by
any adjustments that the Compensation Committee believes are appropriate.







	 	B.	 	Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)






	 	1.	 	ROIC = Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) divided by Capital Invested
(CI).

	 
	 	2.	 	NOPAT = (Adjusted EBITDA less depreciation for the relevant plan year, less
adjustments for non-wholly-owned subsidiaries), less taxes at a 35% tax rate.

	 
	 	3.	 	CI = For the trailing five quarter-ends (12/08, 3/09, 6/09, 9/09, 12/09), the
average of (Total Assets minus Goodwill and Intangible Assets, minus accounts payable,
accrued liabilities, assets related to interest rate hedging, and asset retirement
obligations), as reported in the Company’s quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and annual
reports on Form 10-K (or in the case of subsidiaries, in the Company’s internal
records).






     VI. Performance Targets




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Group	 	Metric	 	Weighting	 	Threshold	 	Target	 	Maximum
	Worldwide
	 	Adjusted EBITDA	 	 	50	%	 	$	72,000	 	 	$	80,000	*	 	$	96,000	 
	 
	 	ROIC	 	 	50	%	 	 	19.2	%	 	 	23.5	%	 	 	32.0	%
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	UK Only
	 	Adjusted EBITDA	 	 	100	%	 	£	7,538	 	 	£	8,376	 	 	£	10,051	 








 




			
	* 	This target was set by the Company’s Board of Directors on January 23, 2009.	 




 









 








Cardtronics 2009 AECIP

Plan Summary

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Version: August 11, 2009




Worldwide Targets: Fifty percent (50%) of the bonus pool will be based on Adjusted EBITDA
performance. For the Adjusted EBITDA metric, the threshold level is set at 90% of the Target
(budgeted) Adjusted EBITDA level, and the Maximum level is set at 120% of the Target EBITDA level.



Fifty percent (50%) of the bonus pool will be based on ROIC performance. For the ROIC metric, the
Threshold ROIC level is set at 19.2% (which is the level achieved if Capital Invested is at
budgeted levels and Adjusted EBITDA is 90% of budget), and the Maximum level is set at 32.0% (which
is the level achieved if Capital Invested is at budgeted levels and Adjusted EBITDA is at 120% of
budget). The Target ROIC level of 23.5% would be achieved if both Capital Invested and Adjusted
EBITDA are at budgeted levels.



For both metrics, it is intended that the Threshold performance level triggers a potential bonus
pool at the Threshold level (50% of Target bonus pool), that the Target performance level triggers
a potential bonus pool at the Targeted level (100% of Target bonus pool), and performance at or
above the Maximum level triggers a potential bonus pool at the Maximum level (200% of Target bonus
pool), in each case for the relevant portion of the bonus pool.



UK Target: 100% of the bonus pool will be based on Adjusted EBITDA performance.



     VII. Performance Levels




AECIP is designed to pay bonuses relative to the Company’s actual performance using the schedule
shown below. The AECIP is structured to reward the attainment of performance targets and to
provide for substantially increased rewards when these performance targets are exceeded. Bonus
payouts will not be made unless the Company exceeds certain critical threshold levels.



	 	 	 
	 	 	Bonus Payout for Performance
	Performance Level	 	(% of Target)
	Maximum
	 	200%
	Target
	 	100%
	Threshold
	 	50%
	Below Threshold
	 	No Payout






     VIII. Individual MBO Modifier




Regardless of financial performance, each AECIP award will be adjusted to reflect the individual
performance of each executive based on the attainment of his MBOs. The AECIP incentivizes each
executive to outperform his MBOs and penalizes underperformance. Management’s intention is for the
Company’s total bonus payout (e.g., after the MBO modifier) to correlate to the consolidated bonus
accrual. For



 









 





Cardtronics 2009 AECIP

Plan Summary

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Version: August 11, 2009




example, if the Company achieves its Adjusted EBITDA Target and ROIC Target (aka “budget”),
the sum of the bonus payout would not exceed 100% of the budgeted accrual. If the Adjusted EBITDA
performance is +5% to budget, the sum of the bonus payouts would not exceed 125% of the bonus
budget, etc.



The MBO adjustment scale is as follows:



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	Modification / % of AECIP
	MBO Rating	 	Performance	 	Paid
	5
	 	All MBOs  exceeded	 	120%
	4
	 	All MBOs attained	 	100%
	3
	 	Substantially all MBOs attained	 	80%
	2
	 	Most but not all MBOs attained	 	50%
	1
	 	Most MBOs missed	 	0%






     IX. Graphical Representation




The following graphics and example explain the AECIP plan design (for the UK group, only the
Adjusted EBITDA metric is used, with a 100% weighting):









 











 





Cardtronics 2009 AECIP

Plan Summary

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Version: August 11, 2009




Cardtronics’ 2009 Annual Executive Cash Incentive Plan




Joe Example




Performance Targets (#s in 000’s)




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Performance Metric	 	Weighting	 	Threshold	 	Target	 	Maximum
	Adjusted EBITDA
	 	 	50	%	 	$	72,000	 	 	$	80,000	 	 	$	96,000	 
	ROIC
	 	 	50	%	 	 	19.2	%	 	 	23.5	%	 	 	32.0	%




               Payout Matrix




	 	 	 	 	 
	Current Base Salary
	 	$	150,000	 
	Target Incentive as % of Salary
	 	 	40	%






	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Below Threshold	 	Threshold	 	Target	 	Maximum
	Payout as % of Target
	 	 	0	%	 	 	50	%	 	 	100	%	 	 	200	%
	Incentive Payout
	 	$	0	 	 	$	30,000	 	 	$	60,000	 	 	$	120,000	 






               Example of AECIP Calculation





Assumptions: Adjusted EBITDA and ROIC thresholds are met, public company material
reporting met, and minimum performance standards met.



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Performance Metric	 	Actual Performance	 	AECIP Payout Level	 	Weighting	 	Actual AECIP
	EBITDA
	 	$	80,000	 	 	 	100	%	 	 	50	%	 	$	30,000	 
	ROIC
	 	 	23.5	%	 	 	100	%	 	 	50	%	 	$	30,000	 






	 	 	 	 	 
	AECIP Amount Before MBO Modifier
	 	$	60,000	 
	MBO Rating
	 	 	3	 
	MBO Modification
	 	 	20	%
	Final AECIP Payout
	 	$	48,000	 






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Cardtronics 2009 AECIP

Plan Summary

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Version: August 11, 2009




Miscellaneous




                   X. Recoupment Policy



It is Cardtronics’ policy that cash bonuses paid to executives are subject to recoupment if the
operating or financial results used to calculate the bonus are later restated. Under this policy,
an executive who engages in fraud or other misconduct leading to the restatement is required to
repay any cash bonus paid for the period in question.




                   XI. Discretion



While the intent is to determine bonuses in accordance with the calculations defined by this plan,
the CEO and Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors retain the discretion to adjust the
bonus determinations for the performance period relative to the performance targets. Final bonus
awards will be determined based on the funds available.




                   XII. AECIP Calculations



In the event actual results fall in between the Threshold, Target and Maximum levels, interpolation
will be used to determine the appropriate bonus payout.




                   XIII. Other Considerations



The Performance Levels described in the 2009 AECIP represent the Cardtronics business as of January
1, 2009. Should the Board of Directors formally approve actions, such as a material acquisition
that may affect the attainment of the Performance Metrics and Levels described herein, the impact
of such actions to the 2009 AECIP will be determined and presented to the Compensation Committee
for approval of revised Performance Levels for bonus calculation purposes.




     XIV. Effective Date



The 2009 AECIP is effective as of January 1, 2009. If bonuses are paid, audited financial results
for the year ended December 31, 2009 will be used to calculate the bonus payout. As a result, any
payment of bonuses will be delayed until the results of the Company’s 2009 audit are substantially
finalized. As a result, participants can expect to receive payment with the last paycheck of
March, 2009. To be eligible to receive a bonus for fiscal 2009, an employee must be an active
employee on the date the bonus is paid.




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Cardtronics 2009 AECIP

Plan Summary

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Version: August 11, 2009




Schedule A




Target Bonus Goals for “Worldwide” Executive Officers Bonus Group



Target bonus goals for each executive officer are as follow:




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	Target Bonus Payout
	Name	 	Title	 	(% of Salary)
	Mike Clinard

	 	President — Global Services
	 	 	50	%
	Chris Brewster

	 	Chief Financial Officer
	 	 	50	%
	Rick Updyke

	 	President — Global Development
	 	 	50	%
	Brian Archer

	 	Chief Marketing Officer
	 	 	50	%
	Thomas Upton

	 	EVP Acquisitions
	 	 	50	%
	Tres Thompson

	 	Chief Accounting Officer
	 	 	40	%
	Jerry Garcia

	 	Chief Information Officer
	 	 	40	%
	Bill Knoll

	 	EVP Product Management
	 	 	40	%
	Mike Keller

	 	General Counsel
	 	 	40	%
	Bill Sass

	 	EVP Advanced Services
	 	 	40	%
	Jim Bettinger

	 	EVP Operations
	 	 	40	%
	Randy Rice

	 	EVP Risk Management
	 	 	30	%
	Benjamin Psillas

	 	President — Allpoint
	 	 	30	%
	Brad Conrad

	 	SVP Corporate Controller
	 	 	30	%
	Todd Ruden

	 	SVP Planning & Treasurer
	 	 	30	%






Schedule B




Target Bonus Goals for “UK” Executive Officers Bonus Group



Target bonus goals for each executive officer are as follow:




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	Target Bonus Payout
	Name	 	Title	 	(% of Salary)
	Ron Delnevo

	 	Bank Machine Managing Director
	 	 	40	%
	Debbie Smyth

	 	Bank Machine Operations Director
	 	 	30	%
	Anthony Horne

	 	EVP International Business Dev
	 	 	41	%







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