UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4136

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM BILL F. ADAMS, JR., a/k/a Bill F. Adams, a/k/a 

William F. Adams,

Defendant – Appellant,

and

TOMMY SKEENS; JERRY SKEENS,

Petitioners.

No. 15-4137

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHN B. WARD,

Defendant – Appellant,

and

TOMMY SKEENS; JERRY SKEENS,

Petitioners.
2

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District 

Judge. (1:12-cr-00044-JPJ-PMS-1; 1:12-cr-00044-JPJ-PMS-5)

Submitted: December 22, 2015 Decided: January 5, 2016

Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Timothy J. LaFon, CICCARELLO, DEL GIUDICE & LaFON, Charleston, 

West Virginia; Michael A. Bragg, BRAGG LAW, PLC, Abingdon, 

Virginia, for Appellants. Anthony P. Giorno, United States 

Attorney, Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, William “Bill” F. Adams and 

John B. Ward appeal their convictions for conspiracy to defraud 

the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012), and 

structuring of currency transactions to evade reporting 

requirements, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (a)(3) (2012), 

contending the evidence was insufficient to sustain their 

convictions. Additionally, Adams and Ward claim that the 

Government did not prove a single conspiracy, but actually 

presented evidence of multiple conspiracies. Adams also 

challenges the district court’s rulings on evidentiary matters 

and the Government’s use of leading questions. Ward also 

challenges his conviction on the basis that the financial 

structuring committed by his coconspirators was not reasonably 

foreseeable to hold him criminally liable under the Pinkerton*

doctrine. 

We affirm. 

I.

A jury convicted Adams and Ward of conspiring to defraud 

the United States and of multiple counts of structuring currency 

transactions to evade reporting requirements. The district 

 * Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
4

court sentenced Adams and Ward to a 36-month prison term for 

each offense, running concurrently. 

These crimes arose out of a check-cashing scheme that 

involved coal mining companies and mine supply businesses 

located in Virginia and West Virginia. Under this scheme, mine 

suppliers provided false invoices to certain mining companies, 

and the companies paid the suppliers with a check. In return, 

the mine suppliers paid ninety percent of the check amount in 

cash to the mining company, keeping ten percent as its fee. 

This scheme allowed the mining companies and their owners to 

avoid payment of income tax on the cash received and benefit 

from fictitious business tax deductions. 

At the end of the Government’s case in chief and at the end 

of the trial, Adams and Ward moved the district court for a 

judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 29. Adams and Ward also moved the district court for 

a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, 

arguing the evidence presented at trial supported multiple 

conspiracies (rather than the charged single conspiracy) and was 

highly prejudicial, the Government improperly presented its case 

with leading questions, the district court erred when it limited 

the testimony of Adams’ expert witness, and the case lacked 

sufficient evidence to support the verdicts. Finding sufficient 
5

evidence for the convictions and no error, the court denied the 

motions. 

II.

A. Sufficient evidence supports the conspiracy and 

structuring convictions

We review de novo the denial of Adams’ motion for judgment 

of acquittal. United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th 

Cir. 2010). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Government, we must determine whether the conviction is 

supported by “substantial evidence,” where “substantial evidence 

is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as 

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Young, 609 

F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2010).

Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Adams 

and Ward participated in the conspiracy alleged in Count I of 

the superseding indictment. To establish a conspiracy under § 

371, the Government must prove (1) an agreement between two or 

more people to commit a crime, and (2) an overt act in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Cone, 714 F.3d 

197, 213 (4th Cir. 2013). A single conspiracy exists where 

there is one overall agreement, or one general business venture. 

United States v. Leavis, 853 F.2d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1988). The 

government can prove a single conspiracy by direct or 
6

circumstantial evidence that a defendant knew its “essential 

object” by demonstrating a “tacit or mutual understanding” 

between the defendants and other conspirators, even where the 

connection is slight. United States v. Hackley, 662 F.3d 671, 

679 (4th Cir. 2011).

In this case, the evidence supports a single conspiracy —

to defraud the United States – through the agreement made among 

Ward, Adams, and others, and their numerous overt acts involving 

various cash transactions. The Government presented evidence to 

establish a single conspiracy among bookkeepers, coal mine 

operators, and sellers of cash located on and around the border 

of West Virginia and Virginia. The conspirators, including 

Adams and Ward, worked together to ensure that the coal mine 

operators maintained a large supply of cash to conduct business 

in such a way as to avoid taxes, to create paperwork to hide the 

movement of untaxed cash through their businesses, and to make 

sure their scheme went undetected. 

To prove this conspiracy charge, the Government presented 

substantial written evidence in the form of handwritten notes on 

timesheets, the general ledgers of three mining companies 

affiliated with Adams and Ward, invoices, and records of the 

checks to pay those invoices. The Government also presented its 

case through the testimony of numerous witnesses who spoke about 
7

Ward’s and Adams’ working relationship, and their connection to

the cash suppliers involved in the conspiracy. 

The district court also instructed the jury on a multipleconspiracy theory of defense to support Adams’ and Ward’s 

argument that they were, at most, members of separate and 

uncharged conspiracies. The jury thus could have found the 

existence of multiple, separate conspiracies instead of one 

overarching conspiracy. Nevertheless, the jury found Adams and 

Ward guilty of the conspiracy charge. Accordingly, the evidence 

presented at trial supports a single conspiracy, and the 

district court did not err in denying the motions for judgment 

of acquittal or new trial. 

Substantial evidence also supports the jury’s finding that 

Adams and Ward structured currency transactions to evade 

reporting requirements. Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a), a 

person is not permitted to structure currency transactions in 

such a way to avoid federal reporting requirements. The 

government must prove three elements to support a conviction for 

this type of structuring: (1) the defendant knowingly engaged in 

structuring; (2) the defendant knew of the reporting 

requirements under federal law; and (3) the purpose of the 

transaction was to evade the requirements. United States v. 

$79,650.00 Seized from Bank of Am. Account Ending in 8247 at 

Bank of Am., 7400 Little River Tpk., Annandale, Va., 650 F.3d 
8

381, 384 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing without criticism the 

instructions of the trial judge); see also United States v. 

MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2005).

The aiding and abetting statute, which is also referenced 

in the structuring counts, provides “[w]hoever commits an 

offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, 

commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a 

principal,” and “[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done 

which if directly performed by him or another would be an 

offense against the United States, is punishable as a 

principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). Thus, even if Adams and Ward 

did not make the structured withdrawals of cash themselves, 

getting the cash providers to do so for them makes them equally 

as culpable. 

The record makes clear that the Government offered 

sufficient evidence at trial from which a reasonable juror could 

have found Adams and Ward guilty of structuring. First, Adams 

and Ward routinely obtained cash in an amount of $10,000 or 

less. Second, after the bank submitted one CTR each for Adams 

and Ward, they kept their transactions under $10,000. Two 

cooperating witnesses involved in the scheme testified that they 

purchased cash in order to avoid paying taxes and triggering 

bank reporting requirements. From this evidence, the jury could 

infer Adams and Ward knew about the reporting requirements and 
9

sought to avoid them. Moreover, the attempt to hide illegal 

activity is itself evidence that they knew their conduct was 

illegal. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1069 (4th 

Cir. 1997). Finally, the third element—that the purpose of the 

transactions was to avoid the reporting requirement—is 

established by the same evidence that satisfied the second 

element. Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1068-69. Adams and Ward could 

have withdrawn cash in amounts greater than $10,000, but they 

instead chose to go through the cash providers. The record 

therefore contains sufficient evidence to uphold the structuring 

convictions.

B. The district court did not abuse its discretion when

ruling on evidentiary matters or leading questions

“This Court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of 

discretion.” United States v. Hill, 322 F.3d 301, 304 (4th Cir. 

2003). 

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits using evidence of 

a crime, wrong, or other act “to prove a person’s character in 

order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 

accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 

Adams’ argument concerning alleged Rule 404(b) evidence relates 

to his argument that the Government improperly presented 

evidence of multiple conspiracies. Specifically, Adams argues 

that the Government’s Rule 404(b) Notice “shows that the 
10

presentation of evidence . . . as to his personally structured 

transactions . . . was a separate crime.” 

Because Rule 404(b) applies to other crimes, wrongs, or 

acts, it does not apply if the proponent offers evidence of the 

charged act itself. United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 352 

(4th Cir. 2010). Here, the Government offered evidence of 

Adams’ structured transactions and cash wages, not evidence of 

“other crimes.” These acts were intrinsic to the conspiracy 

charge and the structuring counts. Indeed, the district court 

and counsel briefly discussed this issue when preparing jury 

instructions, and no one objected to removing the Rule 404(b) 

instruction. Rule 404(b) thus does not extend to these 

intrinsic acts, which are not “other acts” and were not offered 

to prove Adams’ propensity to commit the charged offenses. As a 

result, the district court did not abuse its discretion or err 

when it admitted this evidence. 

Adams also contends the district court erred when it 

limited testimony by Dr. Robert Rufus, a certified public 

accountant, because Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows for 

testimony by a person who is an “expert by knowledge, skill, 

experience, training or education” as long as “the testimony is 

based on sufficient facts or data.” Adams further contends the 

only prohibition on expert testimony in criminal cases is that 

“an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the 
11

defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that 

constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). Because Rufus did not plan to testify as 

to the mental state or condition of the defendant, Adams argues 

his testimony should not have been limited. Adams also argues 

that Rufus’ testimony would have impeached Kermit Wiley, a 

mining company supplier who testified to his provision of false 

invoices for companies and other involvement in the conspiracy,

and the denial of that testimony prejudiced Adams and 

constituted clear error. 

A review of the record shows the district court properly 

excluded the chart and potential corresponding testimony in 

accordance with Rule 1006. The Rule states, in relevant part, 

“The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove 

the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs 

that cannot be conveniently examined in court.” Fed. R. Evid. 

1006. Thus, Rule 1006 permits the admission of charts into 

evidence as a surrogate for underlying voluminous records that 

would otherwise be admissible into evidence. United States v. 

Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 272 (4th Cir. 2004). 

Here, the district court found that the chart did not 

summarize voluminous records. Additionally, the chart focused 

on a Memorandum of Interview documenting certain out-of-court

statements made by Kermit Wiley. At no point during his 
12

testimony, however, did Wiley discuss the details set forth in 

that Memorandum. Thus, the chart relied on inadmissible 

evidence. 

The district court also concluded that the chart and 

proposed testimony did not amount to “expert” opinion evidence. 

The district court surmised that Rufus intended to recount 

inadmissible testimony of another witness for the purpose of 

impeaching that witness’ testimony. This is not an “expert” 

opinion based on otherwise inadmissible facts or data for 

purposes of Rule 703. See United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 

625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009) (“It is nonetheless appropriate for 

district courts to recognize the risk that a particular expert 

might become nothing more than a transmitter of testimonial 

hearsay and exercise their discretion in a manner to avoid such 

abuses.”). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it excluded Rufus’ chart summarizing the Kermit 

Wiley Transactions.

This court reviews rulings on the use of leading questions 

for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Durham, 319 F.2d 

590, 592 (4th Cir. 1963). “Generally, abuse of discretion is 

not found in the absence of prejudice or clear injustice to the 

defendant.” Id.

Adams argues the “large number of leading questions . . . 

substantially affected [his rights] and the same constitutes 
13

clear and prejudicial error.” Adams does not identify any 

individual questions or objections that he disputes. Rather, 

his argument seems to be that taken altogether, the Government 

presented its case through leading questions “without actually 

getting any substantive testimony from the witnesses.” 

Nevertheless, a review of the record shows that during the 

Government’s case in chief, Adams’ counsel made numerous 

objections to leading questions, some of which the district 

court sustained, and some of which the court overruled. Adams 

has not explained, nor does the record show, how prejudice 

occurred or how the district court abused its discretion in

ruling on these objections. Accordingly, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in ruling on the objections, nor did 

its rulings result in prejudice to Adams. 

C. The coconspirators’ financial structuring was 

reasonably foreseeable to hold Ward accountable under 

the Pinkerton doctrine.

The Pinkerton doctrine imposes vicarious liability on a 

coconspirator for the substantive offenses committed by other 

members of the conspiracy when the offenses are during and in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 

U.S. 640, 646–47 (1946); see also Nye & Nissen v. United States, 

336 U.S. 613, 618 (1949) (stating Pinkerton “held that a 

conspirator could be held guilty of the substantive offense even 

though he did no more than join the conspiracy, provided that 
14

the substantive offense was committed in furtherance of the 

conspiracy and as a part of it”); accord United States v. 

Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 110 (4th Cir. 1990).

Ward argues there “is no evidence that Ward himself engaged 

in any structured withdrawal transaction,” and “there is not 

evidence that Ward was aware that cash withdrawals over $10,000 

had to be reported.” 

Ward’s argument is without merit. In this case, a 

significant portion of the conspiracy involved purchasing large 

amounts of cash and falsified invoices to hide the movement of 

cash. Therefore, it was reasonably foreseeable that the cash 

sellers would undertake methods to avoid detection when 

acquiring the cash. 

Furthermore, in accordance with Pinkerton, the jury could 

have convicted Ward and Adams based solely on the substantive 

structuring offenses committed by their coconspirators in the 

course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The district 

court properly instructed the jury on this issue. Cooperating 

witnesses who pleaded guilty to participation in the conspiracy 

testified that they had structured cash out of financial 

institutions to avoid reporting requirements, and that they sold 

this structured cash to Adams and Ward. Whether Adams or Ward 

personally made the withdrawals is irrelevant. The evidence is 

sufficient that Ward used the structured cash to further a 
15

conspiracy and defraud the United States, and the possibility 

that cash providers might have structured the cash that they 

were selling to Ward and Adams was reasonably foreseeable. 

III.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Government, we conclude that a rational jury certainly could 

have found substantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to 

convict Adams and Ward of conspiracy to defraud the United 

States, and for the substantive counts of structuring currency 

transactions to evade reporting requirements. We further 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion or 

violate Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) when it admitted 

evidence intrinsic to these crimes. Similarly, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded a chart and 

limited the testimony of Dr. Robert Rufus regarding certain 

transactions and inadmissible evidence, nor did it abuse its 

discretion when it ruled on objections to leading questions. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED