2017 UT App 115

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LARRY HARMON,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Opinion

No. 20160192-CA

Filed July 13, 2017

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy

No. 150903620

Michael P. Studebaker, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Stanford E. Purser, Attorneys

for Appellee

Before JUDGES STEPHEN L. ROTH, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, and 

JILL M. POHLMAN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Larry Harmon appeals from the district court’s order 

dismissing his petition for extraordinary relief. We affirm.

¶2 When reviewing an appeal from an order dismissing a 

petition for extraordinary relief, we accord no deference to the 

lower court’s conclusions of law but instead review them for 

correctness. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022-23 (Utah 

1996). However, generally decisions of the Board of Pardons and 

Parole regarding paroles “are final and are not subject to judicial 

review.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016). 

Judicial review is limited only to “the fairness of the process by 

which the Board undertakes its sentencing function,” and does 
Harmon v. Board of Pardons and Parole

20160192-CA 2 2017 UT App 115

not include review of the result. Lancaster v. Board of Pardons, 869 

P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994) (emphasis omitted).

¶3 Harmon initially argues that the rationale sheet used by 

the Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) to memorialize its 

decision concerning when to schedule Harmon’s parole review 

date was insufficient. Specifically, he seems to argue that the 

preprinted rationale sheets, on which the Board checks off the 

“mitigating” and “aggravating” factors it deems relevant in 

making the parole determination, did not provide a sufficiently 

detailed explanation of the Board’s actions to satisfy due process. 

However, the Utah Supreme Court has previously determined 

that the rationale sheets used by the Board to explain its 

decisions are adequate and satisfy due process. See Monson, 928 

P.2d at 1031 (“While perhaps not a perfect explanation of the 

Board’s rationale, this document [i.e., a rationale sheet] 

nonetheless satisfies the Board’s own requirement that it provide 

a written explanation of the reasons for its decision.”). To the 

extent that Harmon complains that the Board failed to “checkoff” all of the mitigating factors he believed were applicable, 

such an argument is not reviewable because it pertains the 

substance of the Board’s decision as opposed to the “fairness of 

the process.” See Padilla v. Board of Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d 

664, 667 (Utah 1997). 

¶4 Harmon next makes several arguments that are 

inadequately briefed. “Since an appeal is a resort to a superior 

court to review the decision of a lower court, Utah appellate 

rules require the appellant to address reasons why the district 

court’s dismissal of his petition should be overturned.” Allen v. 

Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 14, 194 P.3d 903. “A brief is inadequate when 

it merely contains bald citation[s] to authority [without] 

development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on 

that authority. As we have repeatedly noted, we are not a 

depository in which [a party] may dump the burden of 

argument and research.” Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health 
Harmon v. Board of Pardons and Parole

20160192-CA 3 2017 UT App 115

Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶ 46, 70 P.3d 904 (alterations in original) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “An 

inadequately briefed claim is by definition insufficient to 

discharge an appellant’s burden to demonstrate trial court 

error.” Simmons Media Group, LLC v. Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 

145, ¶ 37, 335 P.3d 885

¶5 Harmon has raised several arguments for which he fails

to set forth any legal reasoning or analysis to support the issues 

raised. He argues that the district court applied the wrong legal 

standard in analyzing the Board’s motion to dismiss. However, 

Harmon makes no effort to explain why the standard set forth in 

the district court’s analysis was incorrect or how the district 

court incorrectly applied the standard to the facts of the case. In 

so doing, Harmon has failed to demonstrate any error on the 

part of the district court. Similarly, Harmon argues that he 

should have been advised that he had a right to seek private 

counsel to assist him at his hearing before the Board. However, 

after acknowledging that there is no right to appointed counsel 

at a parole hearing, see Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1103-04 

(Utah 1994), Harmon fails to set forth any analysis or legal 

citations to support his claim. Finally, Harmon claims that the 

“Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner as it relates 

to Mr. Harmon’s continued imprisonment.” However, once 

again Harmon presents no legal argument or analysis to support 

the contention. Instead, he offers only broad conclusions in a 

single four-sentence paragraph. By failing to adequately brief 

these issues, Harmon has attempted to “dump the burden of 

argument and research” on the court. See Smith, 2003 UT 23, ¶ 46 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, in so 

doing, he has failed to demonstrate any error on the part of the 

district court. Accordingly, because these issues were

inadequately briefed, we decline to address them.

¶6 Affirmed.