UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) KIMBERLY MOORE STARKS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 13-1378 (ESH) ) FANNIE MAE, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion to Compel Arbitration [ECF No. 5]. The Court advised th e plaintiff of her obligations

under the Federal Rules of Civil Pr ocedure and the local rules of this Court to respond to the motion, and specifically warned her that, if sh e did not respond to the motion by November 15, 2013, the Court would treat the motion as conced ed. At the plainti ff’s request, the Court extended the deadline to December 2, 2013. To date , the plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion, nor has she requested a second extensi on of time. Therefore, the motion could be granted as conceded. See Local Civil Rule 7(b). But, the C ourt concludes that this action must

be dismissed for two inde pendent reasons. First, defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’ s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII”), see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , because she failed to timely

file this lawsuit. Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. in S upport of its Mot. to Dismi ss or, in the Alternative, Mot. to Compel Arbitration [ECF No. 5-1] (“De f.’s Mem.”) at 2-3. Generally, a plaintiff who has filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission2 (“EEOC”) must file her lawsuit within 90 days of receipt of a right-to-sue notice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Plaintiff alleges that she received the notice on April 30, 2013, see Compl. ¶ 4, and the Clerk of Court received plaintiff’ s complaint 91 days later, on July 30, 2013. 1 The complaint was therefore not filed on tim e and will be dismissed on that ground. Defendant also moves for referral of the pl aintiff’s claims to ar bitration pursuant to Fannie Mae’s Dispute Resolution Policy. See Def.’s Mem. at 3-4. In support of its motion, defendant submits a copy of plaintiff’s applicat ion for employment, pursuant to which plaintiff “agreed to be bound by Fannie Mae’s Dispute Resolution Policy.” Id. , Ex. 1 (Application for Employment dated February 11, 2000) at 4. Th e Dispute Resolution Poli cy purportedly “applies to all claims that an employee might make agai nst Fannie Mae . . . involving a legally-protected right, that directly or indirectly relate to . . . her employment or the termination of that employment,” such as “claims asserting rights pr otected by . . . Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [and the] Age Discrimi nation in Employment Act.” Id. , Ex. 2 (Dispute Resolution Policy effective March 16, 1998) at 1. It appears that all of plaintiff’s claims pertain to her employment and termination of her employment at Fannie Mae and thus are subject to Fannie Mae’s Dispute Resolution Policy. Accordingly, even if the complaint had been timely filed, defendant’s motion to compel arbi tration would be granted and th e claims stayed or dismissed pending the conclusion of arbitration. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge Date: December 11, 2013

1 The filing date that appears on th e electronic docket, September 11, 2013, is immaterial because a case is not formally docketed until after a rulin g on an application to proceed in forma pauperis

.