NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

F2019-02

Captain Died After Crew was 

Trapped During a Search for a 

Civilian in a 3rd Floor Apartment 

Fire – Maine 
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 2

Summary

• On March 1, 2019, a 32-year-old 

male captain was killed by 

rapid-fire progression while fighting a fire in a three-story apartment building. 

• Also, four firefighters were 

injured. 

• At 1105 hours, the town fire 

department was dispatched 

with automatic aid resources 

for a report of smoke in a 6-unit 

apartment building with one 

civilian occupant trapped. 

• A civilian occupant was the 9-1-1 

caller and trapped on the 3rd 

floor in an apartment 

bathroom. 

Initial arrival conditions. Showing Side Alpha and Side Delta. The 

victim was at window on 3rd floor on Side Bravo. The time was 

approximately 1108 hours.

(Photo courtesy of the town police department)
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 3

Summary

• Engine 2, which consisted of a captain, 2 firefighters, and driver/operator, 

arrived on-scene at 1108 hours and reported heavy smoke showing from the 

rear of the structure. 

• The captain advised the regional communication center (RCC) that Engine 2 

(the captain and FF1) were going to make entry into Side Alpha with a 13⁄4- inch hoseline to perform a primary search for a reported trapped civilian 

occupant. 

• The captain of Engine 2 told the other firefighter (FF2) from Engine 2 to get a 

ground ladder to the 3rd floor to rescue the trapped civilian occupant. 

• The captain and FF1 entered the interior stairwell through the front door on 

Side Alpha at 1109 hours and proceeded to the 2nd floor. 

• A police officer identified as PD113 and FF2 placed the ground ladder to the 

3rd floor bathroom window on Side Bravo where the trapped civilian was 

located. 
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 4

Summary • The trapped civilian occupant 

climbed out the window and 

onto the ground ladder. 

• The police officer (PD113) notified 

RCC that the civilian occupant 

was out of the building at 1109 

hours. 

• This message was delayed 

getting to the captain of Engine 2 because the information was 

transmitted on a police channel 

by PD113. 

• Engine 2 was operating on the 

3rd floor when the message was transmitted on the fire channel. 

• A decision was made to leave the 

hoseline on the 2nd floor and 

search the 3rd floor. 

The orange arrow identifies the window where the civilian was 

located upon arrival of the fire department. The civilian was 

removed from the 3rd floor window via the ground ladder. 

(Photo provided by the Maine Office of the State Fire Marshal)
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Summary

• The captain and FF1 from Engine 2 were unable to make entry into a 3rd

floor apartment due to the fire. 

• The captain made the decision to back out of the structure. 

• The crew’s exit was blocked by heavy fire traveling up the central 

stairway. 

• They were forced to search for another exit. 

• The crew made their way towards the back of the structure in the center 

hallway and into an apartment on side Charlie. 
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 6

Summary

• The captain reportedly threw himself on top of FF1 as conditions 

deteriorated. 

• Between 1112 - 1113 hours, the captain called a Mayday, which was not 

acknowledged by any resources on the fireground or by RCC. 

• At 1114 hours, Engine 4 from a mutual aid company arrived on-scene.

• The lieutenant recognized that the captain and FF1 from Engine 2 were 

missing and called Command and initiated a Mayday. 
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 7

Summary

• As additional companies arrived 

on-scene, a rapid intervention group was assigned to locate the 

Engine 2 crew. 

• Also, crews began attacking the 

fire on Side Charlie while the rapid 

intervention group was trying to 

access the 3rd floor. 

• FF1 was able to make his way out 

onto the porch on Side Charlie 

and called for help to the crews on 

the ground at 1116 hours. 

• A ground ladder was placed to the 

3rd floor on Side Charlie. 

• FF1 climbed down the ladder and 

was out of the building at 1122 

hours. The Side Charlie 3rd floor porch where the captain and 

firefighter 1 were removed. (NIOSH Photo)
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 8

Ground ladders extended to a 3rd floor porch where the captain and firefighter 1 were 

removed from the structure. (Photo provided by the Maine Office of the State Fire Marshal)
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 9

Summary

• The rapid intervention group located the captain in a room adjoining 

the Side Charlie porch. 

• They moved him to the Side Charlie porch. The captain was lowered 

down a ground ladder and moved to a stretcher. 

• He was out of the building at 1132 hours. 

• EMS crews began resuscitation efforts and transported the captain to a 

trauma hospital in New Hampshire at 1152 hours. 

• The captain was pronounced deceased at a trauma hospital in New 

Hampshire at 1201 hours. 
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 10

Contributing Factors

• Incomplete size-up and risk assessment

• Lack of incident management

• Lack of personnel accountability

• Inadequate fireground communications 

• Rapid fire spread in the interior center stairwell

• Lack of situational awareness

• Lack of fire sprinkler system in a multi-family residential occupancy.
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 11

Recommendations

• Fire departments should ensure a detailed scene size-up 

and risk assessment is conducted during initial fireground 

operations and throughout the incident. 

• Fire departments should ensure that once command is 

assumed, command is maintained until command is 

transferred, the incident is stabilized, or the incident is 

terminated.

• Fire departments should ensure firefighters communicate 

critical incident benchmarks to incident commanders 

throughout the incident. 
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 12

Recommendations

• Fire departments should ensure firefighters are trained in 

procedures for conducing search and rescue, especially 

above a fire.

• Fire departments should ensure hoselines are deployed, 

staffed, and appropriately utilized to protect crews 

operating in the hazard zone.

• Fire departments should ensure that firefighters are 

trained in situational awareness.

• Fire departments should use a functional personnel 

accountability system, requiring a designated 

accountability officer or resource status officer. 
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Recommendations

• Fire departments should use resources from the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 

Underwriters Laboratories (UL) Fire Safety Research 

Institute (FSRI), and the International Society of Fire 

Service Instructors (ISFSI) to develop and revise 

operational procedures on fireground tactics and provide 

training in fire dynamics in structures for all members.

• Governing agencies (state, regional, and local) should 

consider adopting and enforcing regulations for 

interventions to reduce or eliminate the spread of fire in 

multi-family structures, including automatic sprinkler 

systems and self-closing doors.
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program 14

CONTACT US

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch

Division of Safety Research

NIOSH 1000 Frederick Lane, MS 1808

Morgantown, West Virginia 26505-2888

FFFIPP Webpage

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