Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A05-1707-CR-1591 | January 23, 2018 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Christopher L. Clerc

Columbus, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lee M. Stoy, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Steven R. Burton,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 23, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

03A05-1707-CR-1591

Appeal from the Bartholomew 

Superior Court

The Honorable James D. Worton, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

03D01-1612-F6-6829 & 03D01-

1311-FD-5985

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Steven R. Burton (Burton), appeals the sentence imposed 

by the trial court in two separate causes. 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Burton presents us with two issues on appeal, which we restate as: 

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to identify Burton’s 

guilty plea and admission to a probation violation as significant mitigating 

factors in its sentencing decision; and 

(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Burton’s probation 

and ordering him to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence 

in the Department of Correction. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On November 7, 2013, the State filed an Information, charging Burton with 

resisting law enforcement, as a Class D felony; invasion of privacy, as a Class D 

felony; and criminal recklessness, as a Class A misdemeanor, in Cause number 

03D01-1311-FD-5985 (FD-5985). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Burton pled 

guilty to resisting law enforcement, as a Class D felony; and invasion of 

privacy, as a Class D felony, in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the other 

charge. After accepting the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Burton to 

consecutive terms of 2.5 years on each Count to be served in community 
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corrections, with two years of each sentence suspended. On December 14, 

2015, the State filed a petition to revoke Burton’s probation, and after Burton 

admitted to the allegations in the State’s petition, the trial court ordered him to 

return to supervised probation. On June 2, 2016, the State filed a second 

petition to revoke Burton’s probation for failing to attend two appointments 

with his probation officer and for failing to comply with counseling 

recommended by probation.

[5] On December 19, 2016, Officer Frank Dickman of the Columbus Police 

Department (Officer Dickman) observed a black Chevrolet Cavalier, driven by 

Burton, drive aggressively on Saddle Drive, in Columbus, Indiana. After 

noticing Burton make a right turn without using his turn signal, Officer 

Dickman attempted to initiate a traffic stop and activated his emergency lights. 

However, Burton refused to stop and instead tried to avoid capture by driving 

through a church parking lot. Officer Dickman pursued Burton, who weaved in 

and out of traffic. At a certain point during the pursuit, Burton started driving

on the wrong side of the road. In an attempt to cross back to the correct side of 

the road, Burton drove over a raised median, causing his car to lose its right 

front tire. The vehicle eventually came to a stop and Burton fled on foot. 

Police officers detained Burton. 

[6] On December 20, 2016, the State filed an Information, charging Burton with 

resisting law enforcement, as a Level 6 felony; resisting law enforcement, as a 

Class A misdemeanor; driving while suspended, as a Class A misdemeanor;

and criminal recklessness, as a Class B misdemeanor, under Cause number 
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03D01-1612-F6-6829 (F6-6829). As a result of these charges, the State 

amended its second petition for revocation of Burton’s probation in FD-5985 to 

include these new charges as a possible ground for revocation.

[7] On May 22, 2017, Burton entered into a plea agreement with the State in F6-

6829, in which he agreed to plead guilty to resisting law enforcement, as a Level 

6 felony, as well as to admit to the allegations of the State’s second amended 

petition to revoke probation in FD-5985. In exchange, the State would dismiss 

the remaining Counts in F6-6829 and agreed that the total sentence in F6-6829 

should not exceed one year. 

[8] On June 14, 2017, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing in both Cause 

numbers. During the hearing, Burton testified that he does not do well on 

“general probation” and prefers to be in a program with “some kind of 

structure.” (Transcript p. 13). Burton’s probation officer confirmed that Burton 

does “well for a while,” but “then he just kind of disappears.” (Tr. p. 17). 

Therefore, the probation officer recommended terminating Burton’s probation 

in FD-5985. In sentencing Burton in F6-6829, the trial court found his “history 

of criminal delinquent behavior, including five convictions for resisting in a 

vehicle,” as a “significant, significant aggravator in this case.” (Tr. p. 21). As a 

second aggravator, the trial court noted that Burton “has been placed on 

[p]robation multiple times in the past and has had multiple [p]etitions to 

[r]evoke [p]robation.” (Tr. p. 21). “He’s had an opportunity for treatment 

outside the penal facility, nothing has been successful.” (Tr. p. 21). Turning to 

mitigating factors, the trial court noted that Burton “has made efforts to 
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improve himself by participating in programs while he has been incarcerated.” 

(Tr. p. 21). Burton was subsequently sentenced to 352 days in the Bartholomew 

County Jail for F6-6829. With regard to Burton’s probation revocation in FD5985, the trial court observed:

I am looking through all of these in your criminal history, all of 

these probation, I just can’t see, I don’t even see one here that 

you have been on [p]robation where you haven’t had a [p]etition 

to [r]evoke, at least one filed. So the State argues, the State’s 

statement that this is your second chance on this case, [] but all of 

these other cases, you’ve had chance after chance and you just 

keep violating. So the [c]ourt is going to accept the Probation 

Department’s recommendation and order that [Burton] execute 

the balance of his sentence in the Indiana Department of 

Correction.

(Tr. p. 21). 

[9] Burton now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Finding of Mitigators in F6-6829

[10] Burton contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find 

certain mitigators in F6-6829. Specifically, Burton posits that his guilty plea 

and his admission to the probation violation in FD-5985 should have been 

considered when calculating his sentence. Sentencing decisions are a matter of 

trial court discretion and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of that 

discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490, clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 
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218 (Ind. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision “is ‘clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or 

the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’” Id.

(quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)). A trial court “may 

impose any sentence within the statutory range without regard to the existence 

of aggravating or mitigating factors.” Id. at 489. If the trial court “‘finds’ the 

existence of ‘aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances’ then the 

trial court is required to give ‘a statement of the court’s reasons for selecting the 

sentence that it imposes.’” Id. at 490 (quoting I.C. § 35-38-1-3(3)).

[11] On appeal, a trial court may be found to have abused its discretion by failing to 

enter a sentencing statement at all; entering a sentencing statement that explains 

its reasons for imposing a sentence where such reasons are not supported by the 

record or are improper as a matter of law; or entering a sentencing statement 

that omits reasons which are clearly supported by the record and advanced for 

consideration. Id. at 490-91. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by 

failing to properly weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 491. If we 

find that the trial court has abused its sentencing discretion, our court will 

remand for resentencing only “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial 

court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered 

reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id.

[12] In Anglemyer, our supreme court clarified on rehearing that “a defendant who 

pleads guilty deserves ‘some’ mitigating weight to be given to the plea in 

return.” Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 220 (citing McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 
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591 (Ind. 2007)). Nevertheless, the court qualified its statement by noting that 

its significance as a mitigating factor varies from case to case. Id. at 221. As 

such, when the evidence of guilt is “overwhelming,” the plea may be merely 

pragmatic, thereby diminishing its effect as a mitigating circumstance during 

sentencing. Id. 

[13] Here, Burton’s guilty plea in F6-6829 and his admission to the probation 

revocation appear to be nothing but pragmatic as there was overwhelming 

evidence of his guilt. In F6-6829, Officer Dickman pursued Burton when he 

refused to stop after the officer initiated a traffic stop. During the pursuit, 

Burton’s vehicle became disabled and Burton continued to flee on foot in an 

effort to resist apprehension by law enforcement. After entering into a plea 

agreement in F6-6829, Burton was no longer in any position to dispute the 

allegations in the second amended petition to revoke probation, which included 

the charges of F6-6829. Accordingly, his admission became purely pragmatic. 

Therefore, based on the directives in Anglemyer, the trial court could properly 

decide not to award the guilty plea and admission any mitigating weight. 

II. Revocation of Probation in FD-5985

[14] Next, Burton contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him 

to serve his entire previously suspended sentence following his probation 

revocation in FD-5985. 

[15] Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) sets forth a trial court’s sentencing options if 

the court finds a probation violation and provides:
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If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any 

time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke 

is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one 

(1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying 

or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than 

one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was 

suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[16] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s sentencing decisions for 

probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard. 

Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). “Once a trial court has 

exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge 

should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Id. “If this 

discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too 

severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to 

future defendants.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. 

[17] The record reveals that Burton has had nineteen petitions to revoke his

probation filed against him, which have resulted in his probation being 

extended seven times and his probation being unsuccessfully terminated three 

times. This trend continued in FD-5985 as this was also the second petition for 
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probation revocation in that cause. Moreover, Burton admitted to not doing 

well on general probation, preferring a more structured environment and 

Burton’s probation officer advised against continuing him on probation. Based 

on these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion in reinstating Burton’s previously suspended sentence.

CONCLUSION

[18] Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s sentencing decisions in F6-

6829 and FD-5985.

[19] Affirmed.

[20] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur