* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the

limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-50031

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MORRIS PROCTOR, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

EP-99-CR-302-ALL-P

_____________________________ December 8, 2000

Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Morris Proctor, Jr. (Proctor) appeals h i s conviction for

possession with intent to distribute marijuana, alleging that his

consent to search was involuntary and that the government committed

a discovery violation. Finding no reversible error, we AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Proctor, a sergeant in the United States Army stationed in

Georgia, stopped his vehicle at the Sierra Blanca checkpoint in the2

early morning hours of February 22, 1999. When the border patrol

agent began making inquiries with respect to his citizenship and

identification, Proctor “started gripping” the wheel and looked

forward. The agent asked Proctor whether he “could take a look

into his trunk.” When Proctor answered, “Sure, go ahead,” the

agent asked Proctor to drive his ve hicle to the right where the

secondary inspection area was located.

The agent in the secondary inspection area also asked Proctor

if he could look into his trunk, and Proctor again responded, “Go

ahead.” When the trunk was opened, the agent smelled a strong odor

of marijuana. The agent at the secondary checkpoint requested that

the first agent retrieve his drug-sniffing canine. The canine

alerted to the trunk of the car. Inside the trunk, the agent saw

two suitcases; one suitcase had an identifica tion tag with

Proctor’s name on it. The border patrol agent discovered

approximately 70 pounds of marijuana in the two suitcases.

Prior to trial, Proctor moved to suppress the marijuana. He

argued that he was unlawfully detained at the secondary inspection

point and that the agent searched the trunk without his voluntary

consent. Proctor argued that he merely acquiesced to the border

patrol agent’s claim of authority. Proctor argued that the opening

of the trunk, the canine inspection, and the search of the luggage

were products of an illegal detention. He argued that the evidence

discovered in the search should be suppressed.

Following an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress,3

the district court denied the motion. The district court

determined that the referral to the secondary inspection point was

authorized and was not without j ustification based on Proctor’s

nervous behavior. The district court also found that Proctor

consented to go to the secondary checkpoint. The district court

determined that Proctor cooperated with the agents and consented to

open his trunk for inspection. The district court rejected

P roctor’s argument that he acquiesced to the agents’ show of

authority.

A jury convicted Proctor on one count of possession with

intent to distribute marijuana. The district court sentenced

Proct or to 27 months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised

release and ordered him to pay a $1,000 fine and a $100 assessment.

Proctor now appeals to this Court.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Voluntary Consent

Proctor contends that he did not c onsent voluntarily to the

search of the trunk of his vehicle; he asserts that he acquiesced

in the border patrol agents’ show of authority. He contends that

he was detained involuntarily at the checkpoint and the agents used

an element of coercion, i.e.

, “a show of lawful authority,” to

secure consent to open the trunk. Proctor asserts that the traffic

signs leading to the checkpoint, the flashing lights, the traffic

cones, and the uniformed officers caused him to believe that the4

officers were “entitled to search.” He adds that the border patrol

agents did not inform him that he could r efuse their requests to

search. Proctor contends that his cooperation resulted from the

agents’ show of authority and that his military background

contribut ed to his characterization of the agents’ requests to

search as “affirmative assertions of lawful authority.” He asserts

that because he did not voluntarily consent to the search, the

marijuana found in the trunk should have been suppressed.

“Border patrol agents may briefly detain motorists at

permanent immigration checkpoints to questi on them about their

citizenship

. . . [and] may refer motorists to the secondary

inspection area with any ‘particularized reason.’” United States

v. Gonzalez-Basulto, 898 F.2d 1011, 1012 (5th Cir. 1990)(citations

omitted). The agents’ referral of Proctor to the secondary

inspection area did not violate his constitutional rights. S ee id.

The voluntariness of consent to a search is a question of fact

that is determined by an examination of the “totality of the

circumstances.” I d. at 1012-13. The government has the burden of

proving that consent was given freely and voluntarily. S ee

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2045

(1973). Consent is not given voluntarily if it was “coerced by

threat or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful

authority.” Id. at 233, 93 S.Ct. at 2051.

The district court considers six factors in e valuating the5

voluntariness of consent: (1) the defendant’s custodial status;

(2) the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and

level of cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant’s awareness

of his right to refuse to consent; (5) the defendant’s education

and intelligence; and (6) the defendant’s belief that no

incriminating eviden ce will be found. See Gonzalez-Basulto, 898

F.2d at 1013. This Court cannot overturn the district court’s

finding that consent was voluntarily obtained unless the finding is

clearly erroneous. S ee id. When a district judge’s finding of

consent is based on oral testimony at a suppression hearing, the

clear error standard of review of factual findings “is particularly

strong since the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor

of the witnesses.” U nited States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 421

(5th Cir. 1996)(citation and internal quotations omitted).

The district court evaluated the above-mentioned factors

before it denied Proctor’s motion to suppress. The district court

found that the agents did not brandish weapons or threaten Proctor.

Proctor testified that he cooperated with the agents by agreeing to

open the trunk. The district court found no evidence that the

agents “put any pressure” on Pr octor to open the trunk. The

district court found no e vidence that Proctor was of substandard

intelligence and noted that Proctor’s demeanor at the hearing

suggested otherwise.

We have rejected a very similar claim. In Gonzalez-Basulto,6

border patrol agents stopped a motorist at the Sierra Blanca

checkpoint and inquired regarding his citizenship; t he motorist

responded nervously, and the agents referred him to the secondary

inspection area. S ee 898 F.2d at 1012. The agent asked whether

the motorist would mind opening the trailer for an inspection and

the motorist said, “No pro blem.” I d. A dog alerted on a row of

boxes in the trailer. See id. When the agents opened the boxes,

they discovered cocaine. See id.

This Court rejected the appellan t’s argument in GonzalezBasulto that his consent was not given voluntarily. See id. at

1013. We found that the agents did not threaten or pressure the

appellant to submit; the appellant cooperated with the agents; and

the appellant, although not well-educated, sufficiently understood

the circumstances. See id. W e expressly noted that the agents did

not inform the appellant t hat he could refuse consent. S ee id.

Nevertheless, under the totality of the circumstances, this Court

affirmed the district court’s finding that the appellant had

consented to the search. See id.

In the instant case, as the district court recogn ized, the

facts of Proctor’s case are practically identical to those in

Gonzalez-Basulto

. Proctor testified that the agent said, “Can you

open the trunk,” and he complied. The agent testified that he did

not threaten, restrain, or touch Proctor and that he did not

display a weapon. The agent testified that Proctor twice consented1 S ee also United States v. Olivier-Becerril

, 861 F.2d 424,

425-26 (5th Cir. 1988)(affirming denial of motion to suppr ess on

similar facts).

7 to open the trunk when the agents asked for such consent. Proctor

has not shown that the district court’s finding that he voluntarily

consented to a search of the trunk was clearly erroneous. 1

B. Discovery Violation

T he day before Proctor’s trial began, a border patrol agent

who had questioned Proctor at the checkpoint informed the

prosecutor that Proctor had admitted ownership of the suitcases in

the trunk. It is undisputed that the government did not disclose

this statement prior to trial and that Proctor had not made a

request for such evidence. Neither is it disputed that, pursuant

to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court’s

general order of discovery directed the government to permit the

defendant to inspect and copy or photograph:

The substance of any oral statement which the

Government intends to offer in evidence at the

trial made by the Defendant whether before or

after arrest in response to interrogation by

any person then known to the Defendant to be a

Government agency.

Relying on the district cour t’s general order of discovery,

Proctor argues that, in light of t he prosecutor’s failure to

disclose the evid ence, the district court erred in allowing the

prosecut or to elicit the testimony. We will assume solely for purposes

of this appe al that, pursuant to the district court’s discovery order,

the prosecutor should have disclosed the statement prior to trial.8

Nonetheless, because any error was harmless, Proctor is not entitled to

any relief.

We may reverse Proctor’s conviction only upon “a showing that the

error was prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant.”

United States v. Arcentales, 532 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1976).

Proctor has failed to make such a showing.

Proctor contends that the admission of this statement, without

prior notice, deprived him of the opportuni ty to investigate the

circumstances under which the statement was made, preempted any attempt

to suppress the statement, prejudiced his defense, and prevented him

from designing an intelligent defense strategy. Further, Proctor

asserts that the surprise admission of his statement derailed his

defense strategy midway through trial in that his defense focused on the

theory that he did not know that marijuana was in the suitcases and that

he did not own th e luggage. He claims that his defense strategy

“undoubtedly would have been different if counsel had known of Proctor’s

purported statement claiming ownership of the bags[.]”

We are not persuaded that Proctor has shown his substantial rights

were prejudiced. His contentions with respect to a different strategy

are all speculative in that he has not shown how he would have changed

his strategy.

More importantly, in light of the other evidence at trial, Proctor

cannot show that this evidence violated his substantial rights.

Proctor’s friend, Gerald Bryant, purchased a on e-way plane ticket for9

Proctor from Georgia to El Paso, Texas. Bryant and Proctor flew

together to El Paso but Proctor claimed to have no idea where Bryant

went after they left the airport. Prior to leaving the airport, Bryant

rented one vehicle for Proctor and one vehicle for himself. After

spending only a few hours in El Paso, Proctor began to drive his one-way

rental car back to Georgia.

Upon questioning at the checkpoint, Proctor informed the border

patrol agents that the purpose for his trip to El Paso was shopping.

Proctor later changed his story and claimed he had flown to El Paso

because he was interested in finding a position as an instructor at Fort

Bliss. Proctor was the sole occupant of the car, and the brown suitcase

containing marijuana had an airline identification tag attached to it

bearing Proctor’s name. After the marijuana was discovered, Proctor

quickly volunteered to the agents that he may have been “set up.”

Accordingly, because there was other evidence indicating Proctor’s

ownership of the suitcases and the evidence of his guilt was

overwhelming, Proctor has not shown that his substantial rights were

prejudiced. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.