Filed 10/6/21 P. v. Jackson CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOHNNY EARL JACKSON, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B310163

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. NA104857)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.

Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________
2

Johnny Earl Jackson, Jr. asks us to remand for 

resentencing because he says the sentencing court misunderstood 

its discretion to strike his strike. We affirm because the record 

shows the court understood the sentencing options and exercised 

its discretion appropriately. Undesignated statutory citations are 

to the Penal Code. 

I

We have seen Jackson’s case before. We outline the 

procedural history. 

In 2016, Jackson grabbed a necklace from a skateboarder’s 

neck. An information charged Jackson with one count of second 

degree robbery. (§ 212.5, subd. (c).) It also alleged Jackson 

served four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), which included 

a burglary conviction (§ 459) that qualified as a prior serious 

felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and as a strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 

1170.12). A jury found Jackson guilty of second degree robbery. 

He admitted the prior conviction allegations. (People v. Jackson

(May 7, 2018, B280386) [nonpub. opn.].) 

The trial court sentenced Jackson to 10 years: the low term 

of two years, doubled because of the prior strike, plus five years 

for the prior serious felony, plus one year for one prior prison 

term. 

On direct appeal in 2018, we remanded Jackson’s case for 

resentencing because the trial court had not advised him of his 

right to a trial on the prior conviction allegations. (People v. 

Jackson, supra, B280386.) Then Jackson had a bench trial on 

these allegations and the court found the allegations true. 

(People v. Jackson (June 8, 2020, B293680) [nonpub. opn.].) In 

September 2018, the trial court sentenced Jackson to the same 

10-year sentence. 
3

Jackson appealed again. (People v. Jackson, supra, 

B293680.) By that time, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. 

Sess.) made Jackson ineligible for the section 667.5, subdivision 

(b) enhancement. We struck the enhancement and remanded for 

a second resentencing. 

The present appeal concerns the second resentencing. 

Jackson asked the trial court to exercise its discretion to lower 

his sentence by striking the prior strike, striking the five-year 

prior serious felony allegation, or both. 

The prosecution asked the court to keep Jackson’s earlier 

sentence, less the one-year section 667.5, subdivision (b) term we 

had struck. 

The court considered Jackson’s requests. It understood 

why the first judge who sentenced Jackson had denied his motion 

to strike his strike. The court explained, “I looked at a preplea 

report. In 2005, minor crime. 2005, identity theft. 2005, grand 

theft. 2006, possession of a gun. 2007, minor crime. 2009 is first 

degree residential burglary where he got 2 years prison. The 

second he gets out in 2011 we have receiving stolen property, 2 

years prison. Clearly already the strike must have [] been 

stricken for that 2011 sentence because that’s not doubled. 2013, 

they may or may not have got[ten] rid of the strike. I don’t know. 

So it looks like he already had the benefit. When you do the 

People v. Williams [(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 (Williams)] factors, I 

think this defendant is outside those factors. And I do 

understand why a [People v. Superior Court (]Romero[) (1996) 13 

Cal.4th 497] motion was denied. . . . His prior history shows that 

he has been escalating in the severity of crimes. 

“In this particular case it is a crime of violence. He is 

doing this while he is on parole. He didn’t seem at least at 
4

the time it didn’t seem as if you had much hope for him. 

Actually doing fire camp does bode well in his record now. 

But clearly 2, 2 and 4 year prison commitments didn’t seem 

to get the point across to him in the past. He has to earn 

himself the right at this point to get rid of the strike. The 

court will deny that request at this point in time. [If t]he 

court were to look at this case now, I don’t deny that 10 

years seem[s] a little high. This case sort of strikes me as 

being maybe a 7 or 8 years case. But there is no way the 

court can get to that. It’s not a 4 years case. It’s just not. 

The defendant deserves more. Because I am denying 

getting rid of the strike, I have to double, 2, 3, 5. 

“So that gives me 4, 6, or 10 as the base term. So 

what I will do is I’m going to deny your request to strike a 

5-year prior. And I will do 4 plus 5 for a total of 9 years.” 

 II

We uphold Jackson’s sentence. 

A

Sentencing courts may strike prior strike convictions and 

may strike five-year prior serious felony enhancements in 

furtherance of justice. (§ 1385.) We review these decisions for an 

abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 

374 (Carmony); People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 586–

587.)

A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it is unaware of 

its discretion to strike a prior strike or if it relies on 

impermissible reasons to decline to dismiss a strike. (Carmony, 

supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) 

Courts may strike a strike if the nature and circumstances 

of the defendant’s present felony and prior serious or violent 
5

felony convictions, and the particulars of the defendant’s 

background, character, and prospects, bring the defendant 

outside the spirit of the three strikes law. (Williams, supra, 17 

Cal.4th at p. 161.) 

B

The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion. 

Jackson incorrectly asserts the court’s statement about 

there being no way to get a seven- or eight-year sentence meant 

the court mistakenly believed these sentences were categorically 

impossible. Jackson explains a seven- or eight-year term would 

have been possible had the court struck Jackson’s strike, imposed 

a two- or three-year base term, and imposed the five-year 

enhancement. Jackson asks us to remand and direct the court to 

consider exercising its discretion to impose such a sentence. 

Jackson’s argument fails because the trial court 

demonstrated it knew it had discretion to strike the strike. The 

court offered a lengthy account of Jackson’s prior convictions and 

determined it should not strike the strike. It was proper for the 

court to consider Jackson’s criminal history. The court made a 

reasoned decision not to strike the strike. 

After the court made this decision, it said it was not 

possible to give Jackson a seven- or eight-year sentence. This 

was true because, as the court explained, with Jackson’s prior 

strike intact, the court could give a four-, six-, or 10-year base 

sentence. In context, the court’s statement meant a seven- or 

eight-year sentence was not possible, given that the court had 

determined it should not strike the strike. Jackson is incorrect 

that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing options.

The court also understood it had discretion to strike the 

five-year prior serious felony allegation under section 667, 
6

subdivision (a)(1). The court denied Jackson’s request to do so. 

This was not an abuse of discretion. 

The sentencing court understood, and did not abuse, its 

discretion. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

GRIMES, Acting P. J. 

STRATTON, J.