COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

DEBORAH PATTERSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 2528-99-2 PER CURIAM 

 MARCH 28, 2000 

NOTTOWAY COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NOTTOWAY COUNTY 

Thomas V. Warren, Judge 

 (Paul W. Cella, on briefs), for appellant. 

 (Carol B. Gravitt; Gravitt & Gravitt, P.C., 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Deborah Patterson appeals the decision terminating her 

parental rights to four of her children. On appeal, Patterson 

contends that the trial judge erred by (1) allowing an expert 

witness to present hearsay information on which she based her 

opinion; (2) allowing into evidence hearsay concerning the 

children's school attendance; and (3) finding that the Nottoway 

County Department of Social Services provided sufficient evidence 

that neglect or abuse suffered by the children presented a 

substantial threat to their lives, health, or development and that 

the conditions could not be substantially corrected or eliminated 

within a reasonable time. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. 

See Rule 5A:27. 

Hearsay

 Patterson contends that the trial judge erred by allowing 

Michele Killough Nelson, a licensed clinical psychologist, to 

testify that the children were alleged to have engaged in 

panhandling while with Patterson. Patterson argues that the 

reports of panhandling were inadmissible hearsay. We find no 

error. 

 In any civil action any expert witness 

may give testimony and render an opinion or 

draw inferences from facts, circumstances or 

data made known to or perceived by such 

witness at or before the hearing or trial 

during which he is called upon to testify. 

The facts, circumstances or data relied upon 

by such witness in forming an opinion or 

drawing inferences, if of a type normally 

relied upon by others in the particular 

field of expertise in forming opinions and 

drawing inferences, need not be admissible 

in evidence. 

Code § 8.01-401.1. 

 Nelson testified that she reviewed the records provided to 

her by the Department, spoke with Patterson and each of the 

children, and interviewed certain family members and other 

individuals. One area of concern which Nelson identified was 

"whether [Patterson] told blatant mistruths or whether her 

perception of things is so radically different" from that of 

others. As an example, Nelson noted that, although Patterson 

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denied any incidents of panhandling, each of the children 

confirmed at least one instance of panhandling. 

 Over Patterson's objection, the trial court ruled "it is 

something that she, as a licensed clinically [sic] psychologist 

considers and I consider the fact . . . that she did not see the 

pan handling first hand but do consider this a [legitimate] 

source of information as a basis for her opinion." Citing 

McMunn v. Tatum, 237 Va. 558, 379 S.E.2d 908 (1989), Patterson 

contends that ruling was error. We disagree. 

 In McMunn, the Supreme Court ruled that "Code § 8.01-401.1 

does not authorize the admission in evidence, upon the direct 

examination of an expert witness, of hearsay matters of opinion 

upon which the expert relied in reaching his own opinion." 237 

Va. at 566, 379 S.E.2d at 912. The focus of Nelson's testimony 

was her evaluation of Patterson's ability to accurately assess 

her own parenting abilities. Nelson's opinion was based on 

events amply documented by other sources, but which Patterson 

denied. Indeed, Nelson's opinion was based upon facts, not 

hearsay opinions, and falls within the scope of Code 

§ 8.01-401.1. See also Cox v. Oakwood Mining, Inc., 16 Va. App. 

965, 968-69, 434 S.E.2d 904, 906-07 (1993). The trial judge did 

not err in allowing its admission into evidence. 

 In addition, Patterson contends the trial judge erred by 

allowing into evidence hearsay concerning the number of school 

days missed by the children. Theresa Keller testified, without 

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objection, that when the children came into foster care, they 

"had missed so much school that they were behind." Patterson's 

mother-in-law testified, without objection, that in the past she 

told Patterson the children "should be in school." Nelson 

testified, without objection, as follows: 

I questioned [Patterson] about why her 

children did not attend school regularly. 

And she said that they did. That they did 

not miss excessive amounts of school. I 

showed documentation to her suggesting 

otherwise and she continued to deny that 

this was accurate. 

 Over objection, Keller testified that a teacher in the 

Lexington County school system told her that the two older 

children missed twenty-four days out of the thirty-nine days 

they were enrolled. This evidence, while more specific, was 

cumulative of previous evidence concerning the children's poor 

school attendance which was admitted without objection. Even 

assuming that the testimony by Keller was hearsay and not 

admissible under Code § 8.01-401.1, any error in its admission 

was harmless in light of the previous testimony. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

 "Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, 

its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it." Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social 

Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986). "In matters 

of a child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad 

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discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to 

foster a child's best interests." Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't 

of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) 

(citations omitted). 

When addressing matters concerning a child, 

including the termination of a parent's 

residual parental rights, the paramount 

consideration of a trial court is the 

child's best interests. On review, "[a] 

trial court is presumed to have thoroughly 

weighed all the evidence, considered the 

statutory requirements, and made its 

determination based on the child's best 

interests." 

Id. "Code § 16.1-283 embodies '[t]he statutory scheme for the 

. . . termination of residual parental rights in this 

Commonwealth . . . [, which] provides detailed procedures 

designed to protect the rights of the parents and their child, 

balancing their interests while seeking to preserve the 

family.'" Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 538, 

540 (1995) (citations omitted). 

 In pertinent part, Code § 16.1-283(B)(1) and (2), as 

amended, provides that if a child is placed in foster care after 

being found by a court to be neglected or abused, the trial 

judge may terminate residual parental rights upon a finding by 

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's 

best interests and that: 

1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such 

child presented a serious and substantial 

threat to his life, health or development; 

and 

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2. It is not reasonably likely that the 

conditions which resulted in such neglect or 

abuse can be substantially corrected or 

eliminated so as to allow the child's safe 

return to his parent . . . within a 

reasonable period of time. In making this 

determination, the court shall take into 

consideration the efforts made to 

rehabilitate the parent . . . by any public 

or private social, medical, mental health or 

other rehabilitative agencies prior to the 

child's initial placement in foster care. 

Code § 16.1-283(B). 

 On appeal, under familiar principles, we view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below. See

Martin, 3 Va. App. at 20, 348 S.E.2d at 16. So viewed, the 

evidence proved that the Department had contact with Patterson 

and her family for at least nine years. In June 1997, Patterson 

hitchhiked with the children to Crewe, Virginia. The driver, an 

unknown man, paid for one night's lodging in a hotel. The next 

day, the family was without food, money or a place to stay. The 

children were placed in foster care. 

 Under the foster care plan, Patterson was to receive 

individual counseling, attend a parenting class, and maintain 

adequate housing. Patterson attended individual counseling for 

a year. She made so little progress that her therapist did not 

encourage her to take the parenting class. Nelson testified 

that Patterson functioned at a borderline mild retardation 

intelligence level. Her poor parenting skills, however, were 

not attributable to her intelligence level. Patterson was 

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unwilling or unable to admit unfavorable facts or to identify 

any way in which her parenting methods could improve. She 

denied making repeated housing moves, denied that her children 

had poor school attendance, and refused to acknowledge that her 

repeated housing changes had a negative impact on her children. 

She lacked insight into why her past decisions were contrary to 

the children's best interests. Although Patterson testified 

that she received about $1,500 a month in social security 

payments for herself and her two older children, she was unable 

to maintain any financial stability. 

 The evidence supports the trial judge's finding that 

termination of Patterson's parental rights was in the best 

interests of the children. When the children entered foster 

care, they were underweight and under height for their ages. In 

their foster home, the four children each grew physically and 

socially. They progressed notably in their schoolwork. 

Although the two children who were fourteen years old or older 

were entitled to object to termination in their individual 

cases, see Code § 16.1-283(G), they indicated to the trial judge 

in camera that they wished to remain together, even if it 

required termination. 

 The Department presented clear and convincing evidence that 

the children suffered from neglect, that the neglect presented a 

serious and substantial threat to their health and development, 

and that, notwithstanding the services provided to Patterson, it 

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was not reasonably likely that the conditions could be 

substantially corrected to allow their safe return to 

Patterson's care within a reasonable time. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the decision. 

 Affirmed. 

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