*The Honorable Sandra S. Beckwith, United States District Judge forthe Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0011P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0011p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________UNITEDSTATES OFAMERICA,Plaintiff-Appellant,v.GARNETTL.TUTTLEandLARRYSETTLE,Defendants-Appellees.;>1No. 98-5575Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Eastern District of Kentucky at London.No. 97-00020—Jennifer B. Coffman, District Judge.Argued: December 13, 1999Decided and Filed: January 7, 2000Before: MERRITT and SILER, Circuit Judges;BECKWITH,*District Judge.2United States v. Tuttle, et al.No. 98-55751A second superseding indictment was ultimately returned whichadded several counts to the original indictment, including one conspiracycount in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, fourteen counts of possession withintent to dispose of motor vehicles and parts with altered VINs inviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 2321, fourteen counts of altering or removingVINs from motor vehicles or parts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 511(a), andtwo counts of possession of drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)._________________COUNSELARGUED:David Bunning, OFFICE OF THE U.S.ATTORNEY, Covington, Kentucky, for Appellant. David A.Tapp, Somerset, Kentucky, Thomas L. Jensen, London,Kentucky, for Appellees.ON BRIEF:David Bunning,OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, Covington, Kentucky,for Appellant. David A. Tapp, Somerset, Kentucky, ThomasL. Jensen, London, Kentucky, for Appellees._________________OPINION_________________MERRITT, Circuit Judge. In this criminal case in whichthe defendants were indicted for operating an auto “chopshop” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2322,1the governmentappeals the district court’s grant of the motion of the twodefendants to suppress evidence seized under three searchwarrants found by the district court to lack probable cause. Inadopting the report and recommendation of the magistratejudge, the district court held that the first warrant was basedupon a “bare bones” affidavit that relied on insufficientindependent police investigation and an anonymousconfidential informant whose reliability was not established.The second warrant was likewise held by the district court tobe factually deficient, and the second and third warrants wereheld to be tainted under the “fruit of the poisonous treedoctrine” because each warrant relied on information acquiredduring the first, but subsequently invalidated, search. We do6United States v. Tuttle, et al.No. 98-5575Supervised Release for Interstate Transportation of StolenMotor Vehicles.Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of thedistrict court invalidating the three search warrants andsuppressing the seized evidence is REVERSED and the caseremanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.No. 98-5575United States v. Tuttle, et al.3not agree with these rulings because the information providedby the confidential informant was corroborated by otherinformation which together was sufficient to establishprobable cause under the Fourth Amendment.* * *On March 7, 1999, Kentucky State Police detective BillRiley inspected a rebuilt pickup truck that had been purchasedfrom an auto sales store in London, Kentucky. Based on hislong experience in investigating stolen cars and parts, hisinspection revealed to him a truck made from stolen parts.Detective Riley then learned from the auto sales shop that thetruck had been rebuilt for it by co-defendant Garnett Tuttle.Detective Riley immediately conducted an independentinvestigation that included an interview of a London citypolice officer who had received information from anunidentified confidential informant indicating that the autosales shop was currently selling cars and trucks assembledwith stolen parts by Tuttle at a garage rented by Tuttle onproperty owned by co-defendant Larry Settle. The informantsaid that Tuttle’s work was ongoing and that he was currentlyusing the same place to rebuild other vehicles with stolenparts. The London city police officer specifically stated thathe had received information within the past week that theinformant’s information was still current.Detective Riley memorialized the foregoing information inan affidavit submitted to a Kentucky state court judge, whoissued a search warrant on March 8, 1996, authorizing theKentucky State Police to search a white garage located onproperty owned by Settle and leased to Tuttle. The state courtfound that probable cause existed to believe that the garagewas being used to house an illegal automobile “chop shop”operation. While executing the warrant on the white garage,the state police found and seized numerous items believed tobe stolen property or evidence of crimes, including threeautos, auto parts, VIN plates, boxes of records and receipts,and small amounts of marijuana and methamphetamine seizedas contraband in plain view of the searching officers.4United States v. Tuttle, et al.No. 98-5575Based in part upon information obtained during the earliersearch, the state court issued a second search warrant laterthat same day authorizing the search of a gray garage ownedand controlled solely by Settle located on the same propertynear the white garage. Although nothing was seized from thegray garage, the state police observed a pickup truck withsuspicious parts. Finally, several days later, a third and lastsearch warrant was issued authorizing a search of both thewhite and gray garages. The state police found and seizedadditional auto parts, as well as other items believed to bestolen property and evidence of crimes.The magistrate’s report relied on by the district court tosuppress the seized evidence characterized the affidavit insupport of the first search warrant as lacking probable causebecause there was nothing in the first paragraph of theaffidavit that linked the white garage with any criminalactivity or contraband. The paragraph only indicated that theseized truck was suspected of containing stolen parts and thatit had been rebuilt by Tuttle. Furthermore, the magistratefound the second paragraph of the affidavit to be “fatallyflawed” because it failed to establish the credibility of theconfidential informant relied upon by the state police, as wellas failed to provide any independent corroboration of theinformation relayed by the informant. The magistrateapparently believed that the affidavit for the warrant wasinsufficient under the rule ofIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213(1983), that an uncorroborated tip of an anonymous informantis insufficient to establish probable cause.* * *We have previously held that information received from aninformant whose reliability is not established may besufficient to create probable cause when there is someindependent corroboration by the police of the informant’sinformation.See United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372,1377 (6th Cir. 1996);United States v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359,1365 (6th Cir. 1993). The error made by the magistrate in thiscase was in concluding that probable cause for the search didNo. 98-5575United States v. Tuttle, et al.5not exist because the basis for the warrant was only theinformation provided by the anonymous informant whosereliability was questionable. The informant statements recitedin Detective Riley’s affidavit saying that Tuttle wasrebuilding cars with stolen parts in a garage leased from Settlewere in fact corroborated. Prior to the warrant’s issuance,Detective Riley had independently discovered from theLondon auto sales shop on March 7 that a pickup truck rebuiltwith what appeared to be stolen auto parts had beenassembled for the shop by Tuttle. This information alreadywithin Detective Riley’s knowledge clearly providedindependent corroboration of the informant and theinformation the informant relayed that Tuttle was currentlyrebuilding trucks with stolen parts in a garage leased fromSettle. The information from the informant linking the whitegarage to the seized truck was not stale because the affidavitclearly stated that, as of the previous week, the informationfrom the informant was that the work at the chop shop wasongoing.In light of the above discussion finding that the first warrantwas valid, the second and third search warrants withstandconstitutional scrutiny because any items seized under thesesubsequent warrants can no longer be suppressed as “fruit ofthe poisonous tree.” The court below was in error when itheld that the affidavit in support of the second search warrantlacked a sufficient factual basis to establish probable cause.First, the second affidavit indicated that a Kentucky Statepoliceman observed Settle leaving the white garage on hisproperty (where numerous auto parts believed to be stolenwere found and seized) immediately prior to execution of thefirst search warrant. Second, business records of Settlerelating to the purchase of auto parts were found throughoutTuttle’s business records seized by the police from the whitegarage. Third, the affidavit indicated that Settle not onlyowned the white garage and had a key to it, but that the graygarage was within several feet of the white garage and on thesame property. Fourth, the affidavit said that Settle had aprior federal conviction and was currently on Federal