FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

MATTHEW D. ANGLEMEYER GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

GEORGE P. SHERMAN 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ASHLEY BELL, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1312-CR-1026

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Steven J. Rubick, Magistrate

Cause No. 49F10-1307-CM-45257

July 28, 2014

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

CRONE, Judge
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Case Summary

Ashley Bell was the passenger of a vehicle that was stopped by a police officer

because of an illegally displayed temporary license plate. The officer learned that the driver 

did not have a valid driver’s license and ordered the vehicle’s occupants to exit. As Bell 

exited the vehicle, the officer smelled raw marijuana coming from both the vehicle and Bell’s 

person. The officer handcuffed Bell and conducted a patdown search which revealed ten 

baggies of marijuana. Bell was convicted of class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. 

On appeal, she claims that the search of her person during the traffic stop violated the 

Fourth Amendment and that the marijuana found during the search should not have been 

admitted at trial. Concluding that the search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment, 

we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

In July 2013, Bell was the front seat passenger of a vehicle that was stopped by

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Lorrie Phillips because of an illegally 

displayed temporary license plate. The driver did not have a valid driver’s license. Officer 

Phillips ordered the occupants of the vehicle to exit so the car could be towed. As Bell exited 

the vehicle, Officer Phillips smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana coming from both the 

vehicle and Bell’s person. Officer Phillips handcuffed and conducted a patdown search of 

Bell which revealed ten individual baggies of marijuana in her possession. Bell was charged 

with class A misdemeanor dealing marijuana and class A misdemeanor possession of 
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marijuana. Following a bench trial, Bell was found not guilty of dealing but guilty of 

possession.

Discussion and Decision

Bell claims that the trial court erred by admitting the evidence seized by Officer

Phillips because the search violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. 

A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of 

evidence. Accordingly, we will reverse a trial court’s ruling on the 

admissibility of evidence only when the trial court abused its discretion. An 

abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. 

Smith v. State, 980 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted), trans. denied

(2013). “We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most 

favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ind. Ct. App.

2000), trans. denied. However, we must also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to 

the defendant. Id. 

Here, Bell does not challenge the constitutionality of the investigatory traffic stop, nor 

does she challenge Officer Phillips’s order to exit the vehicle. However, Bell does claim that 

the warrantless patdown search violated the Fourth Amendment, which states,

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 

no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 

persons or things to be seized.
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Bell contends that Officer Phillips did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the 

patdown search. A patdown search is justified during an investigatory stop when the officer 

is concerned for her safety; it is not to discover evidence of crime, but rather to allow the 

officer to pursue her investigation without fear of violence. Shinault v. State, 668 N.E.2d 

274, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). A patdown search for weapons may be conducted if the 

officer is “justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is 

investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.” 

Jackson v. State, 669 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 

1, 24 (1968)). In a patdown search for weapons, an officer may seize nonthreatening 

contraband if while patting down a suspect’s outer clothing she feels an object whose identity 

is immediately apparent. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). Bell asserts,

and we agree, that Officer Phillips had no reason to believe that Bell was armed and 

dangerous.

We note however, that a patdown search would have been permissible if Officer 

Phillips had probable cause to arrest Bell. “Probable cause to search exists where the facts 

and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer making the search, based on 

reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution 

in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Meek v. State, 950 N.E.2d 816, 

819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. One of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s

warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 

338 (2009). When probable cause exists to make an arrest, the fact that a suspect was not 
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formally placed under arrest at the time of the search incident will not invalidate the search. 

Moffitt v. State, 817 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. A police officer’s 

subjective belief concerning whether she had probable cause to arrest a defendant has no 

legal effect. Fentress v. State, 863 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The ultimate 

determination of probable cause is reviewed de novo. Burkett v. State, 691 N.E.2d 1241, 

1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.

Here, Officer Phillips conducted a patdown search of Bell after she smelled a strong 

odor of raw marijuana coming from both the vehicle and Bell’s person. In a case involving 

the Indiana Constitution, we concluded that a warrantless search of the defendant driver was 

reasonable under the totality of the circumstances when the officer smelled raw marijuana 

coming from the vehicle after a lawful traffic stop. Meek, 950 N.E.2d at 820. In Shinault, 

we noted the possibility that the detection of a strong marijuana odor coming from the 

defendant driver could have given the officer probable cause to arrest and further search the 

defendant. 668 N.E.2d at 278 n.5. And we have previously held that the odor of burnt 

marijuana from a person’s vehicle and breath yields probable cause to believe that she

possesses marijuana. Edmond v. State, 951 N.E.2d 585, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 

We agree with the State’s argument that, like the smell of burnt marijuana, the smell 

of raw marijuana on a person is sufficient to provide probable cause that the person possesses 

marijuana. We note that the odor of raw marijuana indicates that it has not been smoked and 
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therefore still may be in the defendant’s possession.1 As such, we conclude that Officer 

Phillips had probable cause to arrest Bell and conduct a search incident to arrest. Therefore 

we also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence

seized during the search. Consequently, we affirm. 

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.

 

1 We note that a defendant may challenge the qualifications of the officer in determining the nature of 

the odor. State v. Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Here, Bell does not 

challenge Officer Phillips’s training and experience in detecting the odor of raw marijuana.