IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-60342

Summary Calendar

KHALID UMER,

Petitioner

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A038 802 967

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Khalid Umer, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitions this court for

review of an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA

dismissed Umer’s appeal of the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ) which

granted the respondent’s motion to pretermit Umer’s request for a waiver of

removal pursuant to former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) and ordered Umer removed from

the United States.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 11, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 10-60342

Umer argues that the BIA erred in concluding that there is no ground of

inadmissibility under § 1182(a) comparable to his prior theft offense, defined as

an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and for which he was

found removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Umer contends that

his prior theft conviction is a crime of moral turpitude and that he is therefore

eligible for a discretionary waiver.

“While questions of law are reviewed de novo, this court accords deference

to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration statutes unless the record reveals

compelling evidence that the BIA’s interpretation is incorrect.” Gomez-Palacios

v. Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2009).

The BIA promulgated regulations to conform with INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.

289, 326 (2001), including 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5), which provides that an

application for relief under former § 1182(c) “shall be denied if: . . . [t]he alien is

deportable under former section 241 of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act

or removable under section 237 of the Act on a ground which does not have a

statutory counterpart in section 212 of the Act.” Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363,

367 (5th Cir. 2007). We have previously rejected the argument that a conviction

of aggravated sexual abuse of a child has as a statutory counterpart a crime

involving moral turpitude, ruling that “it is not enough that a crime could be

reclassified. There is no textual link between sexual abuse of a child and crimes

of moral turpitude to indicate that Congress had the same class of offenses in

mind when it enacted the two provisions that must be compared.” AvilezGranados v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 2007). Similarly, because

there is no textual link between “a theft offense (including receipt of stolen

property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment is at least one

year,” § 1101(a)(43)(G), and “a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a

purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime,”

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), Umer’s argument fails.

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No. 10-60342

Umer argues that his Fifth Amendment right to due process was denied

when the IJ did not permit him to withdraw his concession that he was

removable as charged, after his hearing had been reopened on his unopposed

motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Umer’s argument lacks merit

because the IJ’s ruling occurred at a hearing regarding discretionary relief and

because Umer has not demonstrated substantial prejudice. Ogunfuye v. Holder,

610 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2010); De Hoyos v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 339, 343 (5th

Cir. 2008).

Umer also argues that his Fifth Amendment right to due process was

violated because he was charged as removable on the bases of the aggravated

felony theft conviction and of having two prior crimes involving moral turpitude,

one of which was the theft conviction. Umer cites no authority to support his

contention that his right to due process was violated by the charges in the notice

to appear. His conclusory assertion that his right to due process was violated is

deemed abandoned. See Garrido-Morato v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 319, 322 n.1 (5th

Cir. 2007).

Umer raises as new issues before this court that (1) our approach to

determining eligibility for a waiver violates the Equal Protection Clause; and (2)

his Fifth Amendment right to due process was denied when he was ordered

deported without being allowed to apply for further relief. The second alleged

error was argued to and addressed by the BIA, but not on due process grounds.

We lack jurisdiction to address these newly-raised arguments. See Roy v.

Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 137 (5th Cir. 2004); Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d

383, 390 (5th Cir. 2001).

The petition for review is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part for

lack of jurisdiction.

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