J-A32023-15 

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

EQT PRODUCTION COMPANY AND 

EQUITRANS, L.P. 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

RONALD K. TESKA AND GIULIA 

MANNARINO 

 Appellants No. 16 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order December 3, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County 

Civil Division at No(s): 217 of 2013 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 17, 2016 

 Ronald K. Teska and Giulia Mannarino (“Landowners”) appeal, pro se, 

from the order entered on December 3, 2014, which granted a motion for 

summary judgment filed by Appellees, EQT Corporation, EQT Production 

Company, Equitable Gas Company, and Equitrans (collectively, “EQT”), and 

issued a permanent injunction, enjoining and restraining Landowners from 

interfering with EQT’s right of entry upon their property and plugging 

operation. On appeal, Landowners argue the court erred in granting the 

motion for summary judgment and the permanent injunction. Based on the 

following, we affirm. 

 A previous panel of this Court summarized most of the relevant facts 

and procedural history of this case in the following manner: 
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This case arises out of a dispute over a gas well located on 

property currently owned by [Landowners]. On April 28, 1913, 

Florence and G.E. Houston (the Houstons) and Carnegie Natural 

Gas Company (Carnegie) entered into a lease. The lease, in 

relevant part, provided that Carnegie had the right to mine for 

gas, lay pipelines, and build tanks on the Houstons’ land. In 

exchange, Carnegie agreed to provide the Houstons free gas 

from any well drilled on the property as well as royalties. 

Subsequently, Carnegie drilled a shallow well and provided free 

gas to the Houstons. In 1992, the property, including the 

mineral and gas rights, was purchased by [Landowners]; and, in 

1999, Carnegie assigned its rights under the lease to EQT 

Production Company. A gathering line owned by Equitrans 

actually provided the free gas to [Landowners’] home.1

1

 The relationship between [the EQT entities] was 

explained during testimony from EQT Production Company 

employee Mary Drummond in the hearing on the 

preliminary injunction on August 20, 2012. EQT 

Production Company is a gas production company and 

produces gas from wells. Equitable Gas Company is a 

separately operated entity that acts as a billing agent for 

free gas customers. Equitrans is a separate company that 

owns a “gathering line.” N.T., 8/20/2012, at 54-57. The 

complaint asserted no separate claims against Equitrans. 

In February 2011, [Landowners] noticed that a valve on the well 

that fed the gathering line was in a closed position. Records 

they obtained from the Pennsylvania Department of 

Conservation and Natural Resources indicated that the well had 

last produced gas for use in 2007. On February 28, 2011, 

[Landowners] sent a certified letter to EQT Production Company 

to inform them that the gas well had been abandoned, and they 

returned a semi-annual royalty check. They also inquired about 

the status of the lease. On October 13, 2011, EQT Production 

Company filed a Release and Surrender of Oil and Gas Lease in 

the Greene County Recorder of Deeds. On October 27, 2011, 

EQT Production Company sent [Landowners] a certified letter 

notifying [Landowners] that their free gas would be terminated 

on November 7, 2011. That termination date was extended until 

March 31, 2012. Equitable Gas Company sought for 

[Landowners] to sign a Temporary Limited Service Agreement 

(TLSA) and fill out an application in order to arrange gas service 

for [Landowners]. Because [Landowners] disagreed with the 
J-A32023-15 

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manner in which Equitable Gas Company was treating them, 

they filed a complaint with the Public Utility Commission (PUC).2

2

 In October 2012, [Landowners] and Equitable Gas 

Company “agreed to a negotiated Settlement Stipulation 

prior to the scheduled PUC hearing resulting in 

[Landowners] officially [becoming] paying Equitable Gas 

Company customers and gas service was restored.” 

[Landowners’] Brief at 16. Thus, there are no issues to 

address regarding the [Landowners’] gas service. 

Meanwhile, in March 2012, representatives of EQT Production 

Company and [Landowners] met to discuss the transfer of the 

gas well, as tests had indicated that the well was not depleted. 

EQT Corporation notified [Landowners] that EQT Production 

Company required them to complete certain steps to facilitate 

transfer of ownership of the well; otherwise, EQT Production 

Company would be legally required to plug the well. 

[Landowners] disagreed with the need to complete those steps. 

Because the discussions about the free gas and the transfer of 

the well were not progressing, on July 26, 2012, EQT Production 

Company sent a letter to [Landowners] advising them they 

would be terminating their free gas service on August 13, 2012, 

as well as moving forward with plugging the well. 

On August 6, 2012, [Landowners] filed pro se a complaint for 

declaratory judgment against [EQT]. In that complaint, 

[Landowners] sought a declaration that they were the “owners of 

all rights of every kind” with respect to the gas well, as well as 

an order for EQT Production Company to transfer the “Operator’s 

Permit” to them. Complaint, 8/6/2012, at 15-16. [Landowners] 

also sought an injunction to prohibit [EQT] from discontinuing 

their gas service. Id. at 16. 

On August 10, 2012, [Landowners] filed a “Motion for 

Emergency Injunctive Relief and Petition for Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction Hearing.” On the same day, [EQT] filed 

preliminary objections to [Landowners’] motion for injunctive 

relief, as well as a motion for continuance of the preliminary 

injunction hearing. On August 10, 2012, the trial court granted 

[EQT’s] request for a continuance of the preliminary injunction 

hearing and scheduled it for August 20, 2012. The order also 

provided that EQT Production Company “shall not begin plugging 

operation before that date.” Order, 8/10/2012. 
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On August 17, 2012, [EQT] filed preliminary objections in the 

nature of a demurrer to [Landowners’] complaint for declaratory 

judgment. Specifically, [EQT] asserted, inter alia, that even if 

the well had been abandoned, [Landowners] still had no right to 

the fixtures associated with the well because Appellants do not 

meet the definition of “owner” as prescribed by Pennsylvania 

Department of Environmental Protection regulations. 

Preliminary Objections to Complaint, 8/17/2012, at ¶¶ 16-27. 

Moreover, [EQT] argued that as the owners of the well, they 

were legally obligated to plug it. Id. at ¶¶ 32-39. 

On August 20, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on the 

preliminary injunction. On August 21, 2012, the trial court 

entered an order overruling [EQT’s] preliminary objections to the 

motion for injunctive relief, and dissolving the no-plug order of 

August 10, 2012. 

On November 1, 2012, the trial court sustained [EQT’s] 

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissed 

[Landowners’] complaint for declaratory judgment. Specifically, 

the trial court concluded that [EQT] had the right to remove their 

fixtures from [Landowners’] property and that [EQT] had no duty 

to transfer ownership of the well to [Landowners]. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 11/1/2012, at 2-3. 

Teska v. EQT Corp., 82 A.3d 463 [1983 WDA 2012] (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(unpublished memorandum at 1-5), appeal denied, 85 A.3d 484 (Pa. 2014) 

(“Teska I”).1 

On June 18, 2013, a panel of this Court affirmed the trial court’s order, 

which sustained preliminary objections and dismissed Landowners’ complaint 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The remainder of facts and procedural history of this case have been 

gleaned from the certified record and the parties’ briefs, since no updated 

trial court opinion was filed. Rather, on January 8, 2014, the court entered 

an order, resting on previously filed record and decision. See Order, 

1/8/2014. 
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for declaratory judgment. Pertinent to this appeal, the panel made the 

following conclusions: (1) EQT, via its predecessor Carnegie Gas Company, 

was the owner of the well; (2) it had the right to remove its own fixtures 

from the land; and (3) it could have assigned or sold its ownership of the 

well to Landowners but was under no obligation to do so. Id. at 6-9. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Landowners’ petition for allowance of 

appeal on February 19, 2014.2 

 While Landowners’ appeal was pending, EQT attempted to commence 

plugging operations but Landowners prohibited EQT personnel from 

accessing the property. As a result, EQT filed a complaint in equity and 

motion for preliminary injunction against Landowners on March 27, 2013, 

seeking equitable relief in the form of an injunction that would allow them to 

access the property for purposes of plugging the well. A hearing was held 

on April 26, 2013 and May 17, 2013. On May 20, 2013, the court entered 

____________________________________________ 

2

 Landowners also filed a separate appeal from a separate order, which was 

entered on October 22, 2013, raising the following issues: (1) the trial court 

erred or abused its discretion in making the determination that “continued 

payment of flat rate royalty by lessees on a nonproductive well, whose lease 

was held by production and where lessors were not informed that production 

had ceased, was not a representation but merely a ‘contractual obligation’”; 

and (2) the trial court erred or abused its discretion in making the 

determination that “continued payment of flat rate royalty by lessees on a 

nonproductive well, whose lease was held by production and where lessors 

were not informed that production had ceased, established a tenancy at will 

without the knowledge and mutual consent of lessors.” Teska v. EQT 

Corp., 106 A.3d 177 [1983 WDA 2012] (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished 

memorandum at 4-5) (“Teska II”). A panel of this Court affirmed the trial 

court’s decision. 
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an order denying the preliminary injunction, due, in part, to the fact that 

Landowners’ appeal in the related matter was pending.3 

 On October 14, 2014, after Landowners’ appeal was decided, EQT filed 

a motion for summary judgment, arguing: (1) EQT’s clear right to relief is 

demonstrated by the fact that it is the statutory owner of the well and is 

legally obligated to plug the well; (2) equitable relief is necessary because 

monetary damages alone would not prevent Landowners from interfering 

with its statutory requirement to plug the well and its harm cannot be 

monetarily assessed; and (3) EQT would face a significantly greater injury 

from the denial of a permanent injunction because, without it, EQT would 

face regulatory fines, significant financial liability, and responsibility for 

environmental, health, and safety issues related to the well’s current 

condition. See EQT’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 10/14/2014, at 6-12. 

 On November 20, 2014, Landowners filed an opposition to EQT’s 

motion for summary judgment, alleging: (1) EQT, as statutory “owner,” did 

not come to court with clean hands because they intentionally overlooked 

their legal obligation to plug the well for many years and their present 

interest in plugging it was retaliatory; (2) EQT is not entitled to equitable 

relief because there was an adequate administrative remedy available, there 

was no actual harm to EQT, and because plugging the well is no longer 

____________________________________________ 

3

 During this time, the presiding judge retired, and President Judge 

Toothman was appointed to handle the matter. 
J-A32023-15 

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statutorily required; and (3) Landowners face far greater injury if the 

injunction is granted than if it is not granted because plugging the well will 

be environmentally hazardous and all of EQT’s future liability could be easily 

transferred. See Landowners’ Opposition to EQT’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, 11/20/2014, at 8-16. 

On December 3, 2014, the trial court granted the motion for summary 

judgment and issued a permanent injunction, enjoining and restraining 

Landowners from denying or interfering with EQT’s right of entry upon the 

property and its plugging operations. This pro se appeal followed.4

In Landowners’ first issue, they contend the court erred in granting 

EQT’s motion for summary judgment and in making the determination that 

no genuine issue of material fact regarding the plugging of the gas well still 

exists. See Landowners’ Brief at 13. They state that ownership of the well 

is not the only material fact at issue in this case, and assert there are two 

other equally important issues: (1) the environmental issues arising out of 

the plugging of the well; and (2) the irreparable harm Landowners could 

suffer. Id. Landowners allege the plugging of well would result in negative 

environmental consequences, including the contamination or diminution of 

their domestic household water supply. Id. at 14. As proof, they point to 

____________________________________________ 

4

 The court did not order Landowners to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Nevertheless, 

Landowners filed a concise statement on January 29, 2015. 
J-A32023-15 

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the fact that a spring on their property was lost due to the plugging of a gas 

well on an adjacent property. Id. Additionally, Landowners assert that 

“[a]lthough this case involves the same gas well and parties as the prior 

cases, the issue still under dispute is not identical to the issues resolved 

previously as it does not revolve around ‘ownership’ of or rights to the gas 

well but rather the consequences/necessity of its plugging.” Id. 

Landowners claim they deserve “the opportunity to conduct discovery to get 

more information about EQT’s decision and their motives behind it.” Id.5

____________________________________________ 

5

 Landowners also imply that because the current presiding judge took over 

the case after the declaratory judgment proceedings were decided, he was 

“unfamiliar with the case” since he “did not sit throughout the past 

proceedings and was not involved in the earlier rulings or a close 

examination of all of the issues.” Landowners’ Brief at 15. This allegation is 

self-defeating because as stated above, Landowners claim the issue that is 

still in dispute “is not identical to the issues resolved previously as it does 

not revolved around ‘ownership’ of or rights to the gas well[.]” Id. 

Therefore, it would be of no consequence if the presiding judge was not the 

same individual as ownership is not at issue. Moreover, other than bald 

allegations, Landowners do not present any evidence that the presiding 

judge was not well-prepared or acquainted with the pertinent facts and law. 

 Moreover, Landowners contend (1) they were barraged with court 

filings by EQT, which they claim bordered on frivolous, (2) they “have 

erroneously been waiting for some direction from the court regarding the 

start of [d]iscovery,” and (3) “they certainly cannot be expected to be as 

familiar with the court process.” Id. at 16-17. We point to the following: 

Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed 

by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon 

the appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent 

himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, 

assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his 

undoing. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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 We observe our well-settled standard of review as follows: 

Our scope of review of an order granting summary judgment is 

plenary. [W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, 

reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether there 

exists a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts 

as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be 

resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will 

summary judgment be entered. 

Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly implicate 

the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of his cause of action. ... 

Thus, a record that supports summary judgment will either (1) 

show the material facts are undisputed or (2) contain insufficient 

evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or 

defense and, therefore, there is no issue to be submitted to the 

[fact-finder]. Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the 

trial court’s conclusions of law, but may reach our own 

conclusions. The appellate Court may disturb the trial court’s 

order only upon an error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

Pa. Servs. Corp. v. Tex. E. Transmission, LP, 98 A.3d 624, 629 (Pa. 

Super. 2014), quoting DeArmitt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 3 A.3d 578, 

585-86 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Furthermore, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides the 

standard for granting a motion for summary judgment, as follows: 

After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as 

not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for 

summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-1212 (Pa. Super. 2010). 
J-A32023-15 

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(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to 

a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which 

could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or 

(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, 

including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who 

will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce 

evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense 

which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a 

jury. 

Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. 

 Additionally, Rule 1035.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 

states in pertinent part: 

Rule 1035.3. Response. Judgment for Failure to Respond 

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e), the adverse party may 

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings 

but must file a response within thirty days after service of the 

motion identifying 

(1) one or more issues of fact arising from evidence in the record 

controverting the evidence cited in support of the motion or from 

a challenge to the credibility of one or more witnesses testifying 

in support of the motion, or 

(2) evidence in the record establishing the facts essential to the 

cause of action or defense which the motion cites as not having 

been produced. 

Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(a)(1)-(2). 

Turning to the present matter, with respect to EQT’s motion for 

summary judgment, the issue was whether EQT was entitled to a permanent 

injunction based on its property interest in the well. As will be discussed in 

more detail with our analysis of the second issue, we briefly note the 

following: 
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To be entitled to a permanent injunction, a party must 

establish a clear right to relief, and must have no adequate 

remedy at law, i.e., damages will not compensate for the 

injury. Unlike a preliminary injunction, a permanent 

injunction does not require proof of immediate irreparable 

harm. 

Liberty Place Retail Assocs., L.P. v. Israelite Sch. of 

Universal Practical Knowledge, 2014 PA Super 233, 102 A.3d 

501, 505-06 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal citations omitted). 

PA Energy Vision, LLC v. South Avis Realty, Inc., 120 A.3d 1008, 1013 

(Pa. Super. 2015). 

Landowners acknowledge that EQT is the owner of the well, which also 

was affirmed by the courts in prior decisions. See Landowners’ Brief at 13, 

17; Teska I, supra. Nevertheless, they state there are two outstanding 

genuine issues of material fact: (1) the environmental issues arising out of 

the plugging of the well; and (2) the irreparable harm they could suffer. Id. 

However, in their brief, Landowners only discuss the alleged negative 

environmental consequences. Id. at 14.6 As stated above, in support of 

their claim regarding environmental harm, they merely point to the fact that 

a spring on their property was lost due to the plugging of a gas well on an 

adjacent property. 

____________________________________________ 

6

 The fact that Landowners did not make any arguments regarding 

irreparable harm is of no consequence since “a permanent injunction does 

not require proof of immediate irreparable harm.” PA Energy Vision, LLC, 

120 A.3d at 1013. 
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A review of the record reveals that other than meager allegations 

made in the pleadings, the only evidence regarding the environmental harm 

is Landowners’ Exhibit C, which was introduced at the hearing on the motion 

for summary judgment. Exhibit C is a May 23, 2012, letter from Brian J. 

Lohr, a geologic specialist of the District Mining Office, to Christopher 

Rabbitt, of Consol Pennsylvania Coal Company, LLC, concerning the approval 

of a water supply replacement plan. At the hearing, the following exchange 

took place regarding the exhibit and the spring: 

[LANDOWNERS]: The relevance, if I may explain, is the 

fact that this is a claim for the spring that disappeared due to 

the well that was plugged so close to it on our property. The 

spring was on our property. The well that was plugged on the 

neighbor’s property, DeSimone, caused the spring to practically 

disappear. We talked to Consol [Energy] about it, and they filed 

paperwork with [the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 

Protection (“DEP”)] to try to find a resolution to this 

consequence. 

THE COURT: Well, okay. But listen. Remember what

we’re here for. And I think what you’re telling me is that on the 

neighboring property there was a well plugging operation. And 

that that well plugging operation interfered with the spring that 

you relied on for your water supply? 

[LANDOWNERS]: The spring was not to our house; the

spring was actually watering our Blueberry plants. 

THE COURT: Okay. You had an interest in it? 

[LANDOWNERS]: Yes. 

THE COURT: And the spring was on your property? 

[LANDOWNERS]: Yes. 
J-A32023-15 

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THE COURT: Okay. And if somebody interfered with 

something you had by its activities, then you might have some 

cause of action against that entity. That isn’t this entity, and 

that’s not this well. And the purpose of this is to show what? 

That it might interfere with something else? 

[LANDOWNERS]: Yes. The fact that our domestic 

household water supply well is much closer to the well that they 

want to plug than our spring was to this well that was plugged. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

[LANDOWNERS]: That there is the potential for some kind 

of damage to our household water supply. And that is also 

verified by the fact that the state requires that water samples be 

taken before wells are altered. 

THE COURT: They told me they asked you for a water

sample, and you refused. 

[LANDOWNERS]: We refused because of the case that is 

still pending. 

... 

[LANDOWNERS]: But, Your Honor, if you allow the 

plugging to go on, it’s like putting a man in the electric chair 

before his DNA hearing occurs to prove he’s innocent. 

THE COURT: [Landowners], nobody is going to get hurt. 

[LANDOWNERS]: Oh, Your Honor, I disagree. 

THE COURT: You might be inconvenienced and you might 

suffer monetary loss. Nobody is going to get hurt.

[EQT’S COUNSEL]: If I may, Your Honor. I think the 

Court hit the nail on the head with this line of questioning, that I 

think it’s not relevant or germane to the issue before the Court, 

and I think I’m going to object to this line of questioning so that 

we can move on with the testimony that’s relevant to the case 

before the Court. 
J-A32023-15 

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THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this: Are you prepared 

to offer expert testimony that plugging this well will interfere 

with your domestic water supply? 

[LANDOWNERS]: No. But there is no one that can offer 

testimony that it won’t, I don’t believe. 

... 

[LANDOWNERS]: I think our point is that we don’t believe 

their right to relief is clear, because we still have a legal 

controversy about who actually has the rights to this well. And 

they want to plug it, and we want to use it. It’s the same issue 

as the case that’s pending. 

And there’s the possibility of contamination or diminishing 

of water supplies. That’s why our neighbors’ water supplies 

have to be tested and why our water supply does. 

... 

THE COURT: Well, if what you are attempting to show, is 

that because an interruption of water supply occurred when a 

well was plugged on a neighbor’s property, that makes it more 

likely than not that this plugging operation will interfere with 

your water supply, then I’m going to agree with [EQT’S counsel] 

that’s irrelevant to this proceeding. 

N.T., 4/26/2013-5/17/2013, at 72-79. 

Based on Landowners’ paucity of evidence presented at the hearing, 

we find their allegation amounts to a bald, speculative assertion that there 

would be negative environmental consequences to the plugging of the well. 

As pointed out by the trial court, Landowners have not presented any expert 

opinions or reports that plugging would have any relevant, negative results. 

They merely have presented evidence that the plugging of a well on 

another person’s property affected the spring that supplies water to 
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Landowners’ blueberry plants. Contrary to Rule 1035.3, Landowners did not 

meet their burden of presenting evidence that established facts essential to 

their defense to EQT’s right to access the well on their property. 

Moreover, to the extent that Landowners request more time to conduct 

discovery to determine EQT’s motives, we are guided by the following: 

We ... recognize that “the party seeking discovery is under an 

obligation to seek discovery in a timely fashion.” Reeves v. 

Middletown Athletic Ass'n, 866 A.2d 1115, 1124 

(Pa.Super.2004); see Fort Cherry School Dist. v. Gedman,

894 A.2d 135, 140 (Pa.Super.2006) (reasoning “[t]he

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure do not give [parties] an 

unlimited amount of time to conduct discovery”). However, this 

Court has unequivocally stated that the purpose of Rule 1035.2

“is to eliminate cases prior to trial where a party cannot make 

out a claim or defense after relevant discovery has been 

completed; the intent is not to eliminate meritorious claims 

prematurely before relevant discovery has been completed.”

Burger v. Owens Illinois, Inc., 966 A.2d 611, 618 

(Pa.Super.2009), quoting Gerrow, supra at 781–782. 

Moreover, “[t]he adverse party must be given adequate time to 

develop the case and the motion [for summary judgment] will be 

premature if filed before the adverse party has completed 

discovery relevant to the motion.” Id. 

Anthony Biddle Contractors, Inc. v. Preet Allied Am. St., LP, 28 A.3d 

916, 928-929 (Pa. Super. 2011) (footnote omitted). 

Here, Landowners have had ample opportunity to request discovery 

since the matter initially began in August of 2012. Moreover, we find that 

evidence of EQT’s alleged “motives” is irrelevant to the question of whether 

the plugging of the well will have a negative environmental impact, and does 

not, therefore, raise a genuine issue of material fact. Additionally, from our 

review of the record and the briefs, it appears that this is the first time that 
J-A32023-15 

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Landowners are making a discovery request. See Pa. R.A.P. 302 (“Issues 

not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first 

time on appeal.”). While Landowners claim they are not familiar with the 

judicial process, we reiterate they have 

chosen to proceed pro se and [they] cannot expect our court [or 

the trial court] to act as [their] attorney. See Commonwealth 

v. Sanford, 299 Pa.Super. 64, 445 A.2d 149, 150 (1982) (“We 

decline to become appellant’s counsel. When issues are not 

properly raised and developed in briefs, when the briefs are 

wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court 

will not consider the merits thereof.”) 

First Union Mortgage Corp. v. Frempong, 744 A.2d 327, 337-38 (Pa. 

Super. 1999). Accordingly, we conclude Landowner’s first argument 

warrants no relief. 

In Landowners’ second issue, they contend the court erred in issuing 

the permanent injunction for various reasons: (1) the evidence submitted 

by EQT does not satisfy all three of the elements required for a permanent 

injunction, (2) administrative remedies have not been exhausted; and (3) 

EQT has not come before the court with “clean hands.” Landowners’ Brief at 

17. 

With respect to the elements of a permanent injunction, Landowners 

state that while EQT’s right to the well may be clear, it “has not submitted 

adequate evidence that [it] would suffer any injury or harm that could not 

be monetarily compensated if the gas well is not plugged” and it “also failed 

to provide evidence that greater injury would result if the Permanent 
J-A32023-15 

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Injunction [was not] granted.” Id. at 18. Landowners’ argument focuses on 

EQT’s claim that it would face the harm of fines from the regulatory agency, 

the DEP, for being in violation of the plugging requirement. Landowners 

allege EQT abandoned the well in 2007, and state they have been in contact 

with DEP employees regarding the “abandonment” and plugging of the well 

and “EQT has not been fined to date and it is very unlikely [it] ever will be.” 

Id. at 19. Additionally, Landowners obscurely claim, 

[A] more than reasonable amount of time has passed since the 

plugging was statutorily required. EQT did not have any 

concerns about [its] liability or possible environmental hazards 

due to the well not being plugged, as required, for the many 

years [it was] in violation of this statute. Now [it is] playing the 

role of a prudent, concerned operator and alleging an urgent 

necessity to avoid injury and harm because the well is required 

to be plugged. In fact, circumstances have changed. A 

[Department of Transportation (“DOT”)] certified plumber has 

run a gas line from the gas well and it is now producing gas for 

domestic household use. Because the well is no longer 

statutorily abandoned (i.e. not producing in the prior 12 

months), the plugging is now no longer statutorily required. 

Id. (reproduced record citations omitted). 

Lastly, with respect to their “unclean hands” argument, Landowners 

point to the following: (1) EQT “intentionally ignored the plugging 

requirement as this operation would have alerted [them] to the fact that 

their lease, which was held by production with no provisions to extend it 

without production, was no longer valid” and is evidenced by the fact that 
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EQT continued the lease by payment of the semi-annual royalty;7 (2) EQT 

refused “to negotiate terms of the well transfer;”8 and (3) EQT does not 

qualify for injunction because “there is an administrative remedy provided by 

the Oil and Gas Act” contained in 58 Pa.C.S. § 3251.

9, 10

 As noted supra, 

[t]o be entitled to a permanent injunction, a party must 

establish a clear right to relief, and must have no adequate 

remedy at law, i.e., damages will not compensate for the injury. 

J.C. Ehrlich Co. v. Martin, 2009 PA Super 127, 979 A.2d 862, 

864 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Pestco, Inc. v. Associated 

Prods., 2005 PA Super 276, 880 A.2d 700, 710 (Pa. Super. 

2005)). 

... 

The grant or denial of a permanent injunction is a question of 

law. Buffalo Township v. Jones, 571 Pa. 637, 813 A.2d 659, 

664 & n.4 (Pa. 2002). Regarding the trial court’s legal 

determination, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope 

of review is plenary. Id.; J.C. Ehrlich, 979 A.2d at 864. As in 

all equity matters, however, we must accept the trial court’s 

factual findings and give them the weight of a jury verdict where 

they are supported by competent evidence. RESPA of Pa., Inc. 

v. Skillman, 2001 PA Super 30, 768 A.2d 335, 339 (Pa. Super. 

____________________________________________ 

7

 Landowners’ Brief at 20. 

8

 Id. at 21. 

9

 Id. Landowners cite “52 Section 601.501” in their brief, which does not 

produce any statutory provision. Id. They also reference page nine in their 

answer to EQT’s complaint, which does cite Section 3251. Therefore, we will 

use that citation in our analysis. 

10 Landowners also complain for the first time that the terms of the 

permanent injunction “are unreasonable and are physically impossible for 

anyone to comply.” Id. at 22. Because they did not raise this claim with

the trial court, it is waived on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302. 
J-A32023-15 

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2001), abrogated on other grounds by Buffalo Township, 813 

A.2d at 664 n.4. 

Liberty Place Retail Assocs., L.P. v. Israelite Sch. of Universal 

Practical Knowledge, 102 A.3d 501, 505-506 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

 Initially, we note that contrary to Landowners’ unrelenting insinuation 

that EQT had abandoned its interest in the well prior to filing its October 12, 

2011, release and surrender of oil and gas lease documentation, the trial 

court found EQT was still the owner of the well and its fixtures, which was 

affirmed by this Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Teska I,

supra. As such, EQT’s ownership established a clear right to relief. See 

Buffalo Twp., supra (upheld finding that railroad did not abandon right-ofway property, the property did not revert to landowners merely because of 

nonuse, and therefore, the trial court properly enjoined the landowners from 

interfering with property interest).11 Moreover, EQT established that as the 

____________________________________________ 

11 We also note in Buffalo Twp., the Supreme Court opined on 

abandonment in terms of an easement interest as follows: 

In evaluating whether the user abandoned the property, the 

court must consider whether there was an intention to abandon 

the property interest, together with external acts by which such 

intention is carried into effect. In order to establish the 

abandonment of a right-of-way, the evidence must show that 

the easement holder intended to give up its right to use the 

easement permanently. Such conduct must consist of some 

affirmative act on his part which renders use of the easement 

impossible, or of some physical obstruction of it by him in a 

manner that is inconsistent with its further enjoyment. Mere 

nonuse by the railroad does not amount to abandonment. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
J-A32023-15 

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owner and operator of the well, it was legally required to plug the well in 

conformity with DEP regulations. See 58 Pa.C.S. § 3203 (defining “owner” 

and “operator”); see also 25 Pa. Code § 78.91 (“Upon abandoning a well, 

the owner or operator shall plug the well under §§ 78.92 -- 78.98 or an 

approved alternate method under section 211 of the act (58 P.S. § 601.211) 

to stop the vertical flow of fluids or gas within the well bore[.]”); 58 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3220 (“Upon abandoning a well, the owner or operator shall plug it in the 

manner prescribed by regulation of the department to stop vertical flow of 

fluids or gas within the well bore, unless the department has granted 

inactive status for the well or it has been approved by the department as an 

orphan well.”). 

Likewise, EQT also demonstrated that an injunction was necessary 

because the harm that was occurring, Landowners’ interference with its 

property interest, could not be monetarily assessed. As EQT notes, it faces 

fines because it “would be noncompliant with state and local environmental 

laws, and unable to exercise [its] legal rights in accessing and controlling 

[its] property.” EQT’s Brief at 24. See 58 Pa.C.S. § 3255(a) (“A person 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

Buffalo Twp., 813 A.2d at 664-665 (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Turning to the present matter, other than allegations of nonuse, 

Landowners have not put forth any other argument to establish that EQT 

effectively abandoned its property interest in the well. 
J-A32023-15 

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violating a provision of this chapter commits a summary offense and, upon 

conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than $ 1,000 or to 

imprisonment of not more than 90 days, or both. Each day during which the 

violation continues is a separate and distinct offense.”); 58 Pa.C.S. § 3256 

(“In addition to other remedies available at law or in equity for a violation of 

this chapter, a regulation of the department, a departmental order or a 

permit condition, the department, after a hearing, may assess a civil penalty 

regardless of whether the violation was willful. The penalty shall not exceed 

$ 25,000 plus $ 1,000 for each day during which the violation continues or, 

in the case of a violation arising from the construction, alteration or 

operation of an unconventional well, $ 75,000 plus $ 5,000 for each day 

during which the violation continues.”). 

To the extent Landowners claim EQT has not been fined and will not be 

fined in the future, their argument amounts to nothing more than 

speculation as they rely on bald assertions alleged in their pleadings12 and 

did not present any other evidence to support their contention. Moreover, 

with regard to Landowners’ challenge that plugging is now no longer 

statutorily required because Landowners procured a plumber to run a gas 

line from the gas well and it is now producing gas for domestic household 

____________________________________________ 

12

 See Landowners’ Answer to EQT’s Complaint in Civil Action and Claims 

for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief and New Matter, 6/18/2013, at 7; 

Landowners’ Opposition to EQT’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 

11/20/2014, at 13. 
J-A32023-15 

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use, we find this issue without merit for several reasons. First, it appears 

that in addition to prohibiting EQT access to the well, Landowners are further 

harming EQT’s legally-recognized property interest in the well by adapting it 

without EQT’s consent. Second, as EQT points out,13 Landowners do not 

point to any statutory provision, which permits their unauthorized 

modification. 

Lastly, with respect to Landowner’s “unclean hands” argument, we are 

guided by the following: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the 

doctrine of unclean hands as “a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors 

of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative 

to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the 

behavior of the defendant.” Jacobs v. Halloran, 710 A.2d 1098, 1103 (Pa. 

1999), citing Shapiro v. Shapiro, 204 A.2d 266, 268 (1964). 

In Lucey v. W.C.A.B. (Vy-Cal Plastics PMA Group), 732 A.2d 1201 

(Pa. 1999), the Supreme Court further discussed what constitutes unclean 

hands as follows: 

The doctrine of unclean hands is derived from the 

unwillingness of a court to give relief to a suitor who has 

conducted himself so as to offend the moral sensibilities of the 

judge, and the doctrine has nothing to do with the rights and 

liabilities of the parties. In re Estate of Pedrick, 505 Pa. 530, 

544, 482 A.2d 215, 222 (1984). This maxim is far more than a 

mere banality. It is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the 

doors of a court of equity to one tainted with iniquity or bad faith 

____________________________________________ 

13 EQT’s Brief at 24. 
J-A32023-15 

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relative to the matter in which he seeks relief. This doctrine is 

rooted in the historical concept of a court of equity as a vehicle 

for affirmatively enforcing the requirement of conscience and 

good faith. Thus, while equity does not demand that its suitors 

shall have led blameless lives as to other matters, it does require 

that they shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to 

the controversy in issue. See Id. (citing Shapiro v. Shapiro, 

415 Pa. 503, 506-507, 204 A.2d 266, 268 (1964) (quoting 

Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance 

Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-815, 65 S.Ct. 993, 997-998, 89 

L.Ed. 1381 (1945))). 

Lucey, 732 A.2d at 1204-1205. 

The application of the doctrine to deny relief is within the 

discretion of the [trial court], and in exercising [its] discretion 

the [trial court] is free not to apply the doctrine if a 

consideration of the entire record convinces [it] that an 

inequitable result will be reached by applying it. 

In re Bosley, 26 A.3d 1104, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2011), quoting Stauffer v. 

Stauffer, 351 A.2d 236, 245 (Pa. 1976). “The bar of unclean hands is 

applicable in Pennsylvania only where the wrongdoing of the plaintiff directly 

affects the equitable relationship subsisting between the parties and is 

directly connected with the matter in controversy.” Id., 351 A.2d at 244. 

See also Equibank v. Adle, Inc., 595 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 1991) 

(“The doctrine does not bar relief to a party merely because his conduct in 

general has been shown not to be blameless.”). 

 Here, Landowners’ claim that EQT was allegedly deceitful by ignoring 

the plugging requirement and continuing to pay them royalties is disproved 

by the fact that in the earlier declaratory judgment action, the trial court 

concluded, and a panel of this Court agreed, that the continued payments by 
J-A32023-15 

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EQT of the flat rate royalty on the nonproductive gas well were not evidence 

of a fraudulent misrepresentation because the lease was still in effect at the 

time EQT proferred the lease payments. See Teska II, supra. 

Furthermore, their argument that EQT acted with unclean hands by 

purportedly refusing to negotiate terms of the well transfer is contradicted 

by the fact that in Teska I, the panel determined EQT could have assigned 

or sold its ownership of the well to Landowners, but was under no 

obligation to do so. See Teska I, supra. Other than a bald assertion that 

EQT included additional provisions designed to maintain involvement in the 

future operation of the well, Landowners also do not present any factual 

evidence that EQT acted fraudulently or deceitfully with respect to the 

negotiations. See Lucey, supra. 

Lastly, Landowners argue EQT does not qualify for injunctive relief 

because there is an administrative remedy provided by Section 3251 of the 

Oil and Gas Act.14 This contention, however, is similarly unavailing. As EQT 

____________________________________________ 

14 Section 3251 provides, in pertinent part: 

The department or any person having a direct interest in a 

matter subject to this chapter may, at any time, request that a 

conference be held to discuss and attempt to resolve by mutual 

agreement a matter arising under this chapter. Unless otherwise 

provided, conferences shall be held within 90 days after a 

request is received by the department, and notice shall be given 

by the department to all interested parties. A representative of 

the department shall attend the conference and the department 

may make recommendations. An agreement reached at a

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
J-A32023-15 

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points out,15 Chapter 32 of Oil and Gas Act deals with oil and gas resource 

development and does not concern disputes involving well ownership. See

58 Pa.C.S. § 3202 (declaration of purpose of chapter). Moreover, as stated 

supra, EQT was under no legal obligation to assign its property interest to 

Landowners and therefore, a conference remedy under Section 3251 was not 

applicable to the present matter. While EQT may have not been amenable 

in negotiations, Landowners have not demonstrated any wrongdoing on 

EQT’s part directly affected the equitable relationship between the parties 

and was directly connected with the matter at hand. Stauffer, 351 A.2d at 

244. Therefore, Landowners’ second argument also fails. 

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting EQT’s 

motion for summary judgment and issuing a permanent injunction against 

Landowners. 

 Order affirmed. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

conference shall be consistent with this chapter and, if approved 

by the department, it shall be reduced to writing and shall be 

effective, unless reviewed and rejected by the department within 

ten days after the conference. The record of an agreement 

approved by the department shall be kept on file by the 

department and copies shall be furnished to the parties. The 

scheduling of a conference shall have no effect on the 

department's authority to issue orders to compel compliance 

with this chapter. 

58 Pa.C.S. § 3251(a). 

15

 See EQT’s Brief at 30-31. 
J-A32023-15 

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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 3/17/2016