IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

July 17, 2024 Session

IN RE LILAH G.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Bradley County

No. 2022-CV-294 Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor

No. E2023-01425-COA-R3-PT

In this termination of parental rights case, the trial court determined that (1) the father had 

abandoned his child by willfully failing to pay child support and (2) termination of the 

father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed, contending

that his failure to pay child support was not willful because the mother intentionally 

blocked his access to the child and because he was actively seeking visitation rights with 

the child in two separate juvenile court actions when the petition for termination was filed. 

The father also argues that the trial court did not properly evaluate and weigh the evidence 

in its analysis of the best interest factors. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., joined.

D. Mitchell Bryant, Athens, Tennessee, for the appellant, Quincy W.

Wencke West, Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellees, Mallory P. and Michael P.

1. Factual and Procedural Background

Lilah G. (“the Child”) was born on May 3, 2013, to Quincy W. (“Father”) and 

Mallory P. (“Mother”). At the time the Child was born, Mother and Father were no longer 

in a relationship, and Father learned of the Child’s birth from a coworker. On October 16, 

2013, Father filed a petition in the Madison County Juvenile Court (“Madison juvenile 

court”) seeking visitation with the Child, after which the parties entered an agreed order 

establishing Father’s paternity on December 17, 2013. Spanning the next several years, 

the parties exchanged discovery and filed cross-motions to compel discovery in the 

08/15/2024
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Madison juvenile court action. The matter was finally set for hearing on March 22, 2016, 

but the hearing was continued upon motion of Mother, who disclosed to the court that 

Father had been arrested on criminal charges including aggravated and domestic assault 

against Father’s then-girlfriend. The record contains no further action by the Madison 

juvenile court regarding Father’s visitation petition.

During the period between 2016 and 2020, while Father’s petition remained pending 

in the Madison juvenile court, Mother married, changed her surname, moved to Georgia,

and later returned to reside in Cleveland, Tennessee with the Child, her husband, and their 

other children. In his appellate brief, Father avers that he “remained unaware of his child’s 

whereabouts for years,” and testimony at trial was that Father “fervently tried” to be part 

of the Child’s life until he learned in 2020 that Mother and the Child were living in 

Cleveland. Father asserts that the COVID-19 pandemic and his inability to retain an 

attorney slowed his pursuit of visitation with the Child. At trial, Mother presented a 

different version of events, testifying that Father knew where Mother and the Child were

living and had sent gifts to the Child for her birthday every year beginning in 2018. 

On September 20, 2022, Father filed a pro se petition in the Bradley County Juvenile 

Court (“Bradley juvenile court”) seeking visitation with the Child. A week later, on 

September 27, 2022, Mother and her husband, the Child’s stepfather (“Stepfather”) 

(collectively, “Petitioners”) filed a “Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and 

Adoption by a Stepparent” (“the Termination Petition”) in the Bradley County Chancery 

Court (“trial court”).1

 Petitioners alleged that Father had (1) abandoned the Child by failing 

to visit the Child for four months preceding the filing of the petition and (2) abandoned the 

Child by failing to financially support or make reasonable payments toward the support of 

the Child for four months preceding the filing of the petition. Petitioners further alleged 

that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child.

The trial court conducted a bench trial concerning the Termination Petition on 

February 8 and 9, 2023, after which the court entered a final order terminating Father’s 

parental rights to the Child. The trial court found that Mother had failed to prove, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Child by failing to visit, noting

that Mother had kept her whereabouts and that of the Child from Father and that Father 

had attempted to forge a relationship with the Child over the years. However, the trial 

court determined that Mother had successfully established, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that Father had abandoned the Child by failing to financially support the Child. 

In so deciding, the trial court considered Father’s knowledge of the court system, his 

payment of child support for another of his children through that system, his delay in 

advancing his two previous visitation petitions, and Father’s statements “linking child 

support to visitation.” 

 

1 Petitioners subsequently amended the Termination Petition on January 4, 2023, raising the same 

allegations.
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Upon concluding that the ground of abandonment for failure to pay child support 

had been established, the trial court considered each of the best interest factors set forth in 

Tennessee Code Annotated 36-1-113(i) and found that the factors weighed in favor of 

termination. The court therefore terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child. Father 

timely appealed.

II. Issues Presented

Father presents two issues for our review on appeal, which we have restated slightly:

1. Whether the trial court erred by finding that Father willfully failed to 

provide financial support for the Child. 

2. Whether the trial court erred by finding that termination of Father’s 

parental rights was in the best interest of the Child.

III. Standard of Review

In a termination of parental rights case, this Court has a duty to determine “whether 

the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006). The 

trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record, accompanied by a 

presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. See

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 523-24 (Tenn. 

2016); In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d at 530. Questions of law, however, are reviewed de 

novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524 

(citing In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009)). The trial court’s determinations 

regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be 

disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Jones v. Garrett, 92 

S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).

“Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their 

children under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions.” Keisling v. Keisling, 

92 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tenn. 2002). It is well established, however, that “this right is not 

absolute and parental rights may be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence 

justifying such termination under the applicable statute.” In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96, 

97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). As our 

Supreme Court has explained:

The parental rights at stake are “far more precious than any property right.” 

Santosky [v. Kramer], 455 U.S. [745,] 758-59 [(1982)]. Termination of 

parental rights has the legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of a 
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complete stranger and of [“]severing forever all legal rights and obligations 

of the parent or guardian of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1); 

see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that a decision terminating 

parental rights is “final and irrevocable”). In light of the interests and 

consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to “fundamentally 

fair procedures” in termination proceedings. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754; see 

also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 

(1981) (discussing the due process right of parents to fundamentally fair 

procedures).

Among the constitutionally mandated “fundamentally fair 

procedures” is a heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing 

evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. This standard minimizes the risk of 

unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental 

parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).

“Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief 

or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or 

substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re 

Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). The clear-andconvincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as highly 

probable, rather than as simply more probable than not. In re Audrey S., 182 

S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

* * *

In light of the heightened burden of proof in termination proceedings, 

however, the reviewing court must make its own determination as to whether 

the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by a preponderance 

of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing evidence of the elements 

necessary to terminate parental rights. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-

97.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522-24. “[P]ersons seeking to terminate [parental] 

rights must prove all the elements of their case by clear and convincing evidence,” 

including statutory grounds and the best interest of the child. See In re Bernard T., 319 

S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).

Petitioners have not raised any issues regarding the trial court’s determination that 

they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the statutory ground of abandonment 

by failure to visit the Child. Although our Supreme Court has instructed that this Court 

“must review the trial court’s findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether 

termination is in the child’s best interests, regardless of whether the parent challenges these 
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findings on appeal,” see In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 525-26, this Court has not 

interpreted this instruction “to mean that this Court must also review grounds that the trial 

court found were not sufficiently proven when the party who sought termination does not 

challenge that ruling on appeal.” In Re Disnie P., No. E2022-00662-COA-R3-PT, 2023 

WL 2396557, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2023) (quoting In re C.S., No. E2019-01657-

COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 2066247, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020)). Accordingly, we 

will not review the trial court’s findings as to the statutory ground of abandonment by

failure to visit the Child because the trial court determined that that ground had not been 

proven by clear and convincing evidence.

IV. Statutory Grounds for Termination of Father’s Parental Rights

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113 (West July 1, 2022, to current)

2

lists the 

statutory requirements for termination of parental rights, providing in relevant part:

(a) The chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with 

the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to a 

child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption proceeding 

by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or guardianship 

rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1, part 1 and title 37, 

chapter 2, part 4 . . . .

* * *

(c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:

(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that 

the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights 

have been established; and

(2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the 

best interests of the child.

In its final judgment, the trial court determined that clear and convincing evidence

supported the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to support pursuant to Tennessee 

Code Annotated §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and -102(1)(A). 

 

2 Unless otherwise noted, throughout this Opinion all citations to any sub-section within Tennessee Code 

Annotated §§ 36-1-113 and 36-1-102 shall be made in reference to the version that was effective on 

September 27, 2022, the date the Termination Petition was filed, and not to any other version of the statute. 

See, e.g., In re Zakary O., No. E2022-01062-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 5215385, at *4, n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Aug. 5, 2023). In some instances, such as this one, the sub-section that was in effect at that time has not

changed and therefore remains current.
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V. Statutory Abandonment by Failure to Support

Concerning statutory abandonment, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(1)

(West July 1, 2022, to current), provides as relevant to this action:

(g) Initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be 

based upon any of the grounds listed in this subsection (g). The 

following grounds are cumulative and nonexclusive, so that listing 

conditions, acts or omissions in one ground does not prevent them 

from coming within another ground:

(1) Abandonment by the parent or guardian, as defined in § 36-1-

102, has occurred[.]

The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A) in effect when the 

Termination Petition was filed provided the following definition of abandonment as 

pertinent here: 

For purposes of terminating the . . . rights of a parent . . . of a child to that 

child in order to make that child available for adoption, “abandonment” 

means that:

(i) For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately 

preceding the filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any 

amended petition to terminate the parental rights of the parent 

or parents or the guardian or guardians of the child who is the 

subject of the petition for termination of parental rights or 

adoption, that the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians 

either have failed to visit or have failed to support or have 

failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the 

child[.]

The trial court determined that Father had abandoned the Child by failing to support 

the Child or make reasonable payments toward the Child’s financial support during the

relevant four-month statutory period, which it found began on May 26, 2022, and ended 

on September 26, 2022 (“Determinative Period”). Although the court incorrectly included 

one extra day in the Determinative Period, we determine such error to be harmless because 

the court “made sufficient findings of fact that encompassed the correct determinative 

period[.]” See In re Elijah F., No. M2022-00191-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 16859543, at *5 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2022); see, e.g., In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 702 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2016) (explaining that the applicable four-month statutory period preceding filing of 
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the termination petition “began on March 8, 2011, and concluded on July 7, 2011, the day 

prior to the filing of the termination petition”) (citation omitted). 

In the final order, the trial court included the following specific findings of fact 

regarding this ground:

The Court now addresses the failure to support. It is admitted [Father] 

paid no support. There is not a lot of proof about his ability to pay. [Father] 

testified that [he] got a good job at Vanderbilt shortly after birth of this child. 

It is [Father’s] burden to prove that his failure to pay support was not willful.

[Father] said after he left the hospital where [Mother] worked, he 

worked at Vanderbilt. There was no proof of his monthly income or 

expenses. However, he admits he sent gifts to the child. He sent flowers as 

late as February of 2022. He even purchased a BMW 2014 toy car for the 

child to be able to ride around and had it shipped to her. He put in no other 

proof about his inability to pay, and [Mother] admits that the flowers and 

balloons were sent.

[Father] knew of his duty to support. He pays support of an unknown 

amount for another child which comes out of his paycheck. He testified, “He 

could set up to pay child support but if we were to knock on the door what’s 

going to happen[.”] He appears to be in that testimony linking child support 

to visitation. He admits he did not pay because [Mother] withheld the child 

from him, and she said she did not want child support.

When on cross examination asked how much the BMW car cost, 

[Father] testified he didn’t know. And when further asked couldn’t he have 

just sent that money to buy diapers or take care of the child, he said, who 

knows where that money would have went. With those words who knows 

and in quotes went. When asked about the delay in the various court cases 

to now, he stated that now is the time if [Mother] will meet in the middle, 

maybe it wouldn’t have to be this way, end quotes.

The Court finds [Father] could have paid child support and did not 

and that his failure to pay was willful. He had an open case in Madison 

County Juvenile Court which he did not pursue.

* * * 

The fact that [Father] said [Mother] did not tell him she moved is of 

lesser weight because there was an already open case that granted the 

Juvenile Court jurisdiction over [Mother] that [Father] could have pursued.
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Therefore, this Court finds clear and convincing evidence that 

[Father] willfully failed [to] support his child and he failed to prove that [the]

failure was not willful. 

(Paragraph numbering omitted.)

In his answer to the Termination Petition, Father raised lack of willfulness as an 

affirmative defense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(I) (“The absence of willfulness 

is an affirmative defense pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure.”). The parent or guardian “shall bear the burden of proof that the failure to visit 

or support was not willful. Such defense must be established by a preponderance of 

evidence.” Id. This Court has previously explained “willfulness” in the context of parental 

termination actions as follows:

Conduct is “willful” if it is the product of free will rather than coercion. 

Thus, a person acts “willfully” if he or she is a free agent, knows what he or 

she is doing, and intends to do what he or she is doing.

Failure to visit or support a child is “willful” when a person is aware 

of his or her duty to visit or support, has the capacity to do so, makes no 

attempt to do so, and has no justifiable excuse for not doing so. Failure to 

visit or to support is not excused by another person’s conduct unless the 

conduct actually prevents the person with the obligation from performing his 

or her duty, or amounts to a significant restraint of or interference with the 

parent’s efforts to support or develop a relationship with the child . . . .

The willfulness of particular conduct depends upon the actor’s intent. 

Intent is seldom capable of direct proof, and triers-of-fact lack the ability to 

peer into a person’s mind to assess intentions or motivations. Accordingly, 

triers-of-fact must infer intent from the circumstantial evidence, including a 

person’s actions or conduct.

In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 863-64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (internal citations and 

footnotes omitted); see In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tenn. 2013) 

(“A parent cannot be said to have abandoned a child when his failure to visit or support is 

due to circumstances outside his control.”).

In the case at bar, Father admits that he never provided financial support for the 

Child. He does not contest the trial court’s determinations that he was aware of his duty to 

provide such support and that he possessed the ability to pay. However, Father asserts that 

his failure to provide support was not willful because Mother had blocked his access to the 

Child, moved out of state and kept the Child’s whereabouts unknown from him for several 
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years, and expressed that she did not want Father “involved with the Child in any way—

including support.” Father argues that the Termination Petition “was filed as a retaliation” 

against his own petition to gain visitation rights to the Child that he had filed one week

before. Moreover, Father urges that Mother’s actions in denying him access to the Child 

combined with his “active pursuit of litigation” seeking visitation rights to the Child “are 

inconsistent with the Trial Court’s finding of willful failure to support.” 

However, when questioned at trial whether he was aware that his “obligation to pay 

child support starts at birth,” Father answered in the affirmative. Father was also aware of 

the process by which a person would pay child support, as evinced by his testimony 

regarding automatic withdrawals from his bank account to pay support for another child

and from his stated knowledge that he was “accustomed to having [child support] garnished 

or taken out of the [pay]check.” As indicated above, Father proffered no evidence or

testimony indicating that he was unable to financially support the Child. Instead, Father 

testified that he had worked at West Tennessee Healthcare and later at Vanderbilt 

University Medical Center, and that he had sent gifts—“so many things” as Father 

described the gifts—for the Child over the years, including flowers and a toy BMW car. 

When asked why he did not begin paying child support once he learned that he was the 

Child’s Father, he stated merely that Mother “withheld the kid” from him and that Mother 

“said she didn’t even want child support” from him. 

Upon thorough review, we find that the trial court did not err in determining that 

Father’s failure to pay child support was willful. It is well settled in Tennessee that a parent 

maintains an obligation to provide child support and is taxed with knowledge of that 

obligation even in the absence of a court order or request from the other parent. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(H) (“Every parent who is eighteen (18) years of age or older is 

presumed to have knowledge of a parent’s legal obligation to support such parent’s child 

or children[.]”); State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Culbertson, 152 S.W.3d 513, 523-24 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (“In Tennessee . . . the obligation to pay [child] support exists even 

in the absence of a court order to do so.”) (citation omitted). Mother’s admitted refusal to 

facilitate any visitation time between Father and the Child did not prevent Father from 

performing his duty to financially support the Child and therefore did not amount to a 

significant restraint on Father’s ability to provide financial support for the Child. See In re 

Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 863-64. Moreover, Father had successfully filed two petitions 

for visitation with the Child: one in the Madison juvenile court and the second in the 

Bradley juvenile court. Father could have initiated steps to begin paying child support 

through the courts during either of those proceedings. Taking all of these facts into 

consideration, we determine that Father has failed to meet his burden to show that his lack 

of financial support for the Child was not willful. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s 

determination that clear and convincing evidence established that Father had abandoned 

the Child by failure to provide financial support for the Child during the Determinative 

Period pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-1-113(g) and 36-1-102.
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V. Best Interest of the Child

When, as here, a parent has been deemed unfit by establishment of at least one 

statutory ground for termination of parental rights, the interests of parent and child diverge, 

and the focus shifts to what is in the child’s best interest. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 

877; see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523 (“The best interests analysis is 

separate from and subsequent to the determination that there is clear and convincing 

evidence of grounds for termination.” (quoting In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 254 

(Tenn. 2010))). Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i)(1) (West July 1, 2022, to 

current) provides a list of twenty factors the trial court is to consider when determining if 

termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest:

(A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s 

critical need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the 

child’s minority;

(B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely 

to have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical 

condition;

(C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in 

meeting the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety 

needs;

(D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental 

attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that 

the parent can create such attachment;

(E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact 

with the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a 

positive relationship with the child;

(F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;

(G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household 

trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or posttraumatic symptoms;

(H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with 

another person or persons in the absence of the parent;
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(I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with 

persons other than parents and caregivers, including biological or 

foster siblings, and the likely impact of various available outcomes on 

these relationships and the child’s access to information about the 

child’s heritage;

(J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of 

circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial 

for the child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration 

of whether there is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or 

the use of alcohol, controlled substances, or controlled substance 

analogues which may render the parent unable to consistently care for 

the child in a safe and stable manner;

(K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, 

services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting 

adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions;

(L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the 

parent in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in 

the custody of the department;

(M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in 

establishing paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or 

addressing the circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an 

award of custody unsafe and not in the child’s best interest;

(N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the 

home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual, 

emotional, or psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any 

other child or adult;

(O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child 

or any other child;

(P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic 

and specific needs required for the child to thrive;

(Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to 

creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and 

specific needs and in which the child can thrive;
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(R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and 

safe for the child;

(S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token 

financial support for the child; and

(T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be 

detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and 

effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.

This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require the court to find the existence 

of every factor before concluding that termination is in a child’s best interest. See In re 

Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523; In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (“The relevancy 

and weight to be given each factor depends on the unique facts of each case.”). The best 

interest of a child must be determined from the child’s perspective and not the parent’s. 

White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). The statute further provides: 

“When considering the factors set forth in subdivision (i)(1), the prompt and permanent 

placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.” 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(2).

Under the previous statutory scheme utilizing nine similar best interest factors, our 

Supreme Court instructed:

These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party to the 

termination proceeding is free to offer proof of any other factor relevant to 

the best interests analysis. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523 (citing In 

re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). Facts considered 

in the best interests analysis must be proven by “a preponderance of the 

evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 

S.W.3d [533,] 555 [(Tenn. 2015)] (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 

861). “After making the underlying factual findings, the trial court should 

then consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether they 

amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s 

best interest[s].” Id. When considering these statutory factors, courts must 

remember that “[t]he child’s best interests [are] viewed from the child’s, 

rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. 

Indeed, “[a] focus on the perspective of the child is the common theme” 

evident in all of the statutory factors. Id. “[W]hen the best interests of the 

child and those of the adults are in conflict, such conflict shall always be 

resolved to favor the rights and the best interests of the child. . . . ” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017).
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Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote 

examination” of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. 

And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of 

statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v.

Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts 

and circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant each 

statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 

at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a factually 

intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives 

individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are 

terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. “[D]epending upon the 

circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the consideration

of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the analysis.” In re 

Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d at 194).

But this does not mean that a court is relieved of the obligation of considering 

all the factors and all the proof. Even if the circumstances of a particular 

case ultimately result in the court ascribing more weight—even outcome 

determinative weight—to a particular statutory factor, the court must 

consider all of the statutory factors, as well as any other relevant proof any 

party offers.

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017).

In its final judgment, the trial court considered all of the twenty best interest factors 

and, after applying them to the facts, determined that termination of Father’s parental rights 

was in the best interest of the Child. The trial court placed particular emphasis on the fact 

that the Child had never met Father and that Petitioners had provided the Child with a 

continuous, stable, and healthy home for her entire life. This emphasis notwithstanding,

the trial court appeared to weigh factor (I) against termination, concluding that Father’s 

family was “an impressive family” and that knowing Father’s family “would add value to 

[the Child] as this is a biracial child whose ethnicity is relevant to this case.” After 

considering each factor, the trial court concluded:

[T]his child’s need for stability and finality is important in this case. And 

weighing all of these factors, the Court does find it’s in the child’s best 

interest to terminate the father’s parental rights. And the Court does further 

find clear and convincing evidence that it’s in the child’s best interest for the 

adoption to occur with [Stepfather].

In his appellate brief, Father contends that the trial court “overemphasize[d] some 

facts while underemphasizing others” when conducting its analysis of the best interest 

factors. Father argues that regarding factor (B)—the effect a change of caretakers and 

physical environment is likely to have on the child’s emotional health—the trial court 
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afforded more weight to Mother’s testimony than to “the bevy of testimony” that “a large 

and loving family would be ready to meet and care for the Child” if Father remained in the 

Child’s life. Father also asserts that the trial court understated its analysis of factor (E)—

whether the parent has maintained regular visitation—when the court determined that 

Father’s visitation was “made more difficult” by Mother. According to Father, his 

visitation was made “impossible” by Mother’s moving out of state and her expressed 

intention to keep Father from being involved in the Child’s life. Father also disagrees with 

the trial court’s determination—relative to factor (M)—that Father did not show urgency 

in seeking custody of the Child. Father argues that he did demonstrate urgency by filing 

two petitions for visitation with the Child and “vigorously” fighting the petition for 

termination of his parental rights. Finally, Father urges that the trial court was incorrect 

when it determined that factor (I)—related to the likely impact of family on the Child’s 

access to information about the Child’s heritage—was the only factor that weighed in favor 

of Father’s parental interests. 

Upon thorough review of the relevant factors, we conclude that the evidence 

preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence 

established that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. At

the time the Termination Petition was filed, the Child was nine years old and did not know 

of Father’s existence. Mother and Stepfather had cared for the Child her entire life and had

exclusively provided for her basic, medical, and educational needs. Thus, we agree with 

the trial court that factors (A), (B), and (C) weigh in favor of termination. Although 

Father’s family testified that he was a good parent to his other child, Father had had no 

contact with the Child and it is unknown whether Father could create a secure parental 

attachment with her. Therefore, we agree that factor (D) also weighs in favor of 

termination of Father’s parental rights. 

Regarding factor (E), evidence at trial revealed that Father never exercised visitation 

with the Child; however, Mother testified that she intentionally did not facilitate any 

visitation between Father and the Child. Although Father did allow his petition for 

visitation in the Madison juvenile court to stall, Father testified that he did not know where 

Mother had moved with the Child and that he filed another visitation petition in the Bradley 

juvenile court as soon as he discovered where the Child was residing. Father’s failure to 

pursue visitation notwithstanding, we determine factor (E) to be neutral due to Mother’s 

intentional and admitted efforts to block Father from knowing the Child.

We agree with the trial court’s determination that factors (F), (G), (K), and (L) do 

not apply to the instant case because there was no proof relative to any of those factors 

presented at trial. Regarding factor (H), the proof at trial established that the Child had 

created healthy attachments with others in her current home, including with Stepfather, 

whom Mother had married when the Child was just under two years old, and the Child’s 

two younger stepsiblings. Thus, factor (H) weighs in favor of termination. Regarding 

factor (J)—whether it would be safe and beneficial for the Child to be in Father’s home, 
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including consideration of whether there is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, 

—there was very little proof regarding Father’s circumstances at home, and there was no 

account of any home study occurring at Father’s residence although Mother had requested 

one after Father filed his first petition for visitation in Madison County. Testimony 

revealed that Father had been arrested in 2015 for domestic assault. At the time of trial, 

Father was living with his parents and occasionally Father’s other child resided with them 

as well. Considering this evidence as a whole, we determine this factor to be neutral. 

Regarding factor (M), the trial court found that although Father had demonstrated a 

sense of urgency in establishing paternity of the Child, he had not manifested a sense of 

urgency in seeking custody of or visitation with the Child because Father had allowed his 

paternity case in the Madison juvenile court to “stall” in 2014 “and again in 2016.” Father 

testified that Mother had “blocked” him from seeing the Child and avers on appeal that he

“fervently” searched for the Child’s whereabouts when Mother moved away with her. He 

further contends that he “vigorously fought” the Termination Petition. However, the proof 

at trial demonstrated that Father was responsible in large part for the delay in the Madison 

juvenile court proceeding, including the withdrawal of Father’s attorney after a 

disagreement between Father and the attorney, Father’s unwillingness to comply with 

discovery requests, and Father’s refusal to initiate child support payments. Accordingly, 

this factor weighs in favor of termination.

Factor (N), which involves whether the parent or another person residing in the 

parent’s home has “shown brutality or physical, sexual, emotional, or psychological abuse 

or neglect toward the child or any other child or adult,” weighs neutrally. To be sure, there 

was extensive and conflicting testimony regarding whether the sexual encounter between 

Mother and Father that led to the conception of the Child was consensual. In the final 

order, the trial court determined that Father’s testimony that Father had avoided Mother at 

work following their sexual encounter so that he would “not be accused of something” lent 

some credibility to Mother’s accusations. However, the trial court noted uncertainty in the 

final analysis, stating that the “incident occurring between [Mother and Father] may or may 

not have been consensual.” Upon careful review, we find factor (N) to be neutral because 

the proof was inconclusive regarding Father’s alleged “oppressive and controlling” 

behavior toward Mother and whether their sexual encounter was consensual.

Meanwhile, substantial proof concerning Father’s fitness to parent came from 

Father’s family, whose testimony was positive regarding Father’s relationship with his son. 

Mother also testified that she did not think Father was a “bad father” “to his son.” Thus, 

factor (O)—whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child or any 

other child—weighs against termination. By contrast, factor (P)—whether the parent has 

demonstrated an understanding of the basic and specific needs required for the child to 

survive—weighs in favor of termination because the Child had never known Father and 

Father had not taken the steps necessary to ensure he would acquire visitation with the 

Child through the juvenile court system. Furthermore, due to Father’s expressed 
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unwillingness to provide financial support for the Child prior to the filing of the 

Termination Petition, we also find that factors (Q) and (S) weigh in favor of termination of 

parental rights. At the time of trial, testimony revealed that Father was living with his 

parents, but there was little testimony regarding the physical environment of the home. 

Therefore, factor (R)—whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy 

and safe for the child—weighs neutrally.

Regarding factor (T), the trial court determined that some of Father’s statements 

impacted the court’s opinion of “his emotional fitness in a small way” and gave the court 

“pause.” From this statement it appears that the trial court rendered a negative credibility 

determination as to certain of Father’s statements. This conclusion is supported by the trial 

court’s observation that Father “testified in a rather fantastical way” at trial on certain facts 

and that his “credibility was impacted negatively” by some of his testimony. We are 

reluctant to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court’s as to Father’s credibility and 

demeanor during trial. See Jones, 92 S.W.3d at 838. However, there was no evidence 

presented at trial that Father had ever exhibited any mental or emotional problems that 

would be detrimental to the Child or that would prevent Father from providing safe and 

stable care and supervision for the Child. Therefore, we determine this factor to be neutral. 

Finally, the trial court considered factor (I) as follows: 

[Father] relied heavily on Section I. Section I states: Whether the 

child has emotionally significant relationships with persons other than 

parents, which the child does with [Mother’s] family but does not with 

[Father’s] family, the likely impact of various outcomes on those 

relationships, the Court finds that the termination of parental rights would 

likely impact the potential relationships with Father and Father’s family and, 

most importantly, as argued by Mr. Guster, the child’s access to information 

about the child’s heritage.

[Father’s] family is an impressive family. Apparently, his brother was 

recognized by his hometown and a road of some sort was named after him. 

The family members that testified for [Father] were impressive. The Court 

finds that to know that family would add value to this child as this is a biracial 

child whose ethnicity is relevant to this case. However, this case can’t turn 

on one factor.

As impressive as [Father’s] family is, and the terminology used by his 

family was touching, [Mother] feels that the child should not be involved 

with his family until the child is old enough to make her own decisions which 

she says is 18.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.)
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We echo the trial court’s concern that access to the Child’s ethnic and racial heritage 

through her paternal extended family is an important and relevant factor and that this factor 

weighs against termination of Father’s parental rights. However, we must also afford 

significant weight to the evidence that the Child has developed strong, positive bonds with 

Mother, Stepfather, and her stepsiblings and that this is the only family she has ever known. 

Testimony at trial revealed that the Child’s current home is a loving, stable, and safe

environment, and we cannot ignore this present reality, especially considering that “the 

prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in 

the child’s best interest.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(2). 

Having considered all of the applicable best interest factors, we conclude that the 

evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. 

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. This 

case is remanded to the trial court, pursuant to applicable law, for enforcement of the trial 

court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child and for collection of 

costs assessed below. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant, Quincy W. 

s/Thomas R. Frierson, II

_________________________________

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE