IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Paul Weaver, Jr. :

: No. 1115 C.D. 2017

v. :

: Submitted: January 12, 2018

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: February 15, 2018

The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) 

appeals from the May 25, 2017 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington 

County (trial court) which sustained the appeal of Robert Paul Weaver, Jr. (Licensee) 

from the three-month suspension of his operating privileges imposed by DOT under 

section 1786(d)(1) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(1) (relating to operating 

a motor vehicle without the required financial responsibility).

The facts of this case are not disputed. Around 5:22 p.m. on November 

26, 2016, the Pennsylvania State Police stopped Licensee while he was operating his 

vehicle on Interstate 79. As a result of this stop, Licensee received two citations. The 

first citation was for a violation of section 1543(a) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. 

§1543(a), relating to operating a motor vehicle while his operating privilege was 
2

suspended.1 The second citation was for a violation of section 1786(f) of the Vehicle 

Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §1786(f), relating to operating a motor vehicle without the required 

financial responsibility.2 During the course of this traffic stop, Licensee telephoned an 

insurance company and he was able to obtain insurance on his motor vehicle effective 

as of 5:39 p.m. that day. A Magisterial District Court subsequently convicted Licensee 

of both citations and he did not appeal these convictions. (Trial court op. at 1.)

The Magisterial District Court thereafter notified DOT of Licensee’s 

convictions. By notice dated February 13, 2017, DOT informed Licensee that his 

operating privileges would be suspended for a period of three months, effective 

February 13, 2018,3 under section 1786(d)(1) of the Vehicle Code as a result of his 

 

1 Section 1543(a) states,

Except as provided in subsection (b), any person who drives a motor 

vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth after the 

commencement of a suspension, revocation or cancellation of the 

operating privilege and before the operating privilege has been restored 

is guilty of a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced 

to pay a fine of $200.

75 Pa.C.S. §1543(a).

2 Section 1786(f) of the Vehicle Code states,

Any owner of a motor vehicle for which the existence of financial 

responsibility is a requirement for its legal operation shall not operate 

the motor vehicle or permit it to be operated upon a highway of this 

Commonwealth without the financial responsibility required by this 

chapter. In addition to the penalties provided by subsection (d), any 

person who fails to comply with this subsection commits a summary 

offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of $300.

75 Pa.C.S. §1786(f).
3

operation of a motor vehicle without the required financial responsibility.

4

 Weaver 

appealed both suspensions to the trial court, which consolidated the appeals and held a 

de novo hearing on May 24, 2017. (Trial court op. at 2.) 

At this hearing, DOT introduced and the trial court admitted, without 

objection, a certified packet of documents indicating that Licensee pled guilty to 

violating sections 1543(a) and 1786(f) of the Vehicle Code before the Magisterial 

District Court on February 3, 2017. Counsel for DOT noted that these guilty pleas 

establish that Licensee was operating a vehicle on November 26, 2016, at a time when 

his license was suspended and his vehicle was not covered by the required financial 

responsibility, thereby justifying the twelve-month and three-month suspensions of his 

operating privileges. Counsel for DOT acknowledged receipt of a faxed declarations 

page from Safe Auto Insurance Company reflecting insurance on Licensee’s motor 

vehicle, but noted that said insurance did not become effective until 5:39 p.m. on 

 

3 Around this same time, Licensee received another suspension notice from DOT indicating 

that his operating privileges would be suspended for a period of twelve months as a result of his 

conviction under section 1543 for driving a motor vehicle while his operating privileges were 

suspended. The three-month suspension was scheduled to take effect after service of Licensee’s 

twelve-month suspension.

4 Section 1786(d)(1) states,

The Department of Transportation shall suspend the registration of a 

vehicle for a period of three months if it determines the required 

financial responsibility was not secured as required by this chapter and 

shall suspend the operating privilege of the owner or registrant for 

a period of three months if the department determines that the

owner or registrant has operated or permitted the operation of the 

vehicle without the required financial responsibility. The operating 

privilege shall not be restored until the restoration fee for operating 

privilege provided by section 1960 (relating to reinstatement of 

operating privilege or vehicle registration) is paid.

75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(1) (emphasis added).
4

November 26, 2016, 17 minutes after Licensee’s traffic stop. Because Licensee did 

not have the required coverage as of the time of the stop, counsel for DOT argued that 

the imposition of the three-month suspension was proper. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) 

at 13a-32a.)

During questioning by the trial court, Licensee confirmed his entry of the 

guilty pleas before the Magisterial District Court. (R.R. at 23a.) With respect to the 

policy from Safe Auto Insurance Company, Licensee stated that he “pulled the policy 

up on [his] phone and signed up for it right then and there,” i.e., during the course of 

the traffic stop. (R.R. at 28a-29a.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court 

stated that it was dismissing Licensee’s appeal of the twelve-month suspension but 

sustaining his appeal of the three-month suspension. (R.R. at 30a.) That same day, the 

trial court entered separate orders reflecting its decision. (R.R. at 48a.) 

DOT thereafter filed a notice of appeal with the trial court. Upon the 

direction of the trial court, DOT later filed a statement of errors complained of on 

appeal, wherein DOT alleged that the trial court erred as a matter of law in sustaining 

Licensee’s appeal of the three-month suspension. DOT argued that the evidence of 

record established that Licensee operated his motor vehicle without the required 

financial responsibility on November 26, 2016, which resulted in his unappealed 

conviction for violating section 1786(f) of the Vehicle Code and compelled the 

aforementioned suspension. DOT noted that Licensee offered no evidence that his 

motor vehicle was properly insured at the time of his traffic stop; instead, the only 

evidence he offered revealed that he obtained such insurance 17 minutes after the stop. 

(R.R. at 49a-59a.)

In a subsequent opinion dated July 17, 2017, the trial court acknowledged 

that it should not have sustained Licensee’s appeal of the three-month suspension of 
5

his operating privileges. The trial court explained that, under section 1786(d)(4) of the 

Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(4), its scope of review in a case such as this was 

limited to determining whether the vehicle was registered or required to be registered 

and whether the owner operated or permitted the operation of the vehicle when it was 

not covered by financial responsibility. The trial court quoted this section, which 

further states:

The fact that an owner, registrant or operator of the motor 

vehicle failed to provide competent evidence of insurance or 

the fact that the department received notice of a lapse, 

termination or cancellation of insurance for the vehicle shall 

create a presumption that the vehicle lacked the requisite 

financial responsibility. This presumption may be overcome 

by producing clear and convincing evidence that the vehicle 

was insured at the time that it was driven.

75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(4)(ii). 

Here, the trial court noted that it was undisputed that Licensee was 

operating a vehicle that was required to have financial responsibility, that he did not 

have the same when he was stopped, and that he did not obtain insurance until 17 

minutes after the traffic stop. Additionally, the trial court stated that Licensee failed to 

offer any proof at the de novo hearing that he possessed the required financial 

responsibility at 5:22 p.m. on November 26, 2016, when the Pennsylvania State Police 

initiated the traffic stop. Further, the trial court noted, citing Parthasarathy v. 

Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 148 A.3d 492 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2016), that this Court has repeatedly found that common pleas courts “do not have 

discretion to sustain a registrant’s appeal of a vehicle registration suspension based on 

hardship or other equitable factors.” Id. at 495 (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).
6

On appeal,5 DOT reiterates its argument that the trial court erred as a 

matter of law in sustaining Licensee’s appeal of the three-month suspension of his 

operating privileges under section 1786(d)(1) of the Vehicle Code.6 We agree.

As noted above, section 1786(d)(1) states,

The Department of Transportation shall suspend the 

registration of a vehicle for a period of three months if it 

determines the required financial responsibility was not 

secured as required by this chapter and shall suspend the 

operating privilege of the owner or registrant for a period 

of three months if the department determines that the 

owner or registrant has operated or permitted the 

operation of the vehicle without the required financial 

responsibility. The operating privilege shall not be restored 

until the restoration fee for operating privilege provided by 

section 1960 (relating to reinstatement of operating privilege 

or vehicle registration) is paid.

75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(1) (emphasis added). 

Section 1786(d)(4) of the Vehicle Code addresses the right of appeal and 

the scope of the same:

Where an owner or registrant’s operating privilege has been 

suspended under this subsection, the owner or registrant shall 

have the same right of appeal under section 1550 (relating to 

judicial review) as provided for in cases of suspension for 

other reason. The court’s scope of review in an appeal from 

an operating privilege suspension shall be limited to 

determining whether:

 

5 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings were 

supported by competent evidence, whether errors of law were committed, or whether the trial court’s 

determinations demonstrated a manifest abuse of discretion. Department of Transportation, Bureau 

of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 555 A.2d 873, 875 (Pa. 1989).

6 By order of this Court dated January 9, 2018, Licensee was precluded from filing a brief in 

this matter.
7

(i) the vehicle was registered or of a type 

required to be registered under this title; and

(ii) the owner or registrant operated or 

permitted the operation of the same vehicle 

when it was not covered by financial 

responsibility. The fact that an owner, registrant 

or operator of the motor vehicle failed to 

provide competent evidence of insurance or the 

fact that the department received notice of a 

lapse, termination or cancellation of insurance 

for the vehicle shall create a presumption that 

the vehicle lacked the requisite financial 

responsibility. This presumption may be 

overcome by producing clear and convincing 

evidence that the vehicle was insured at the time 

that it was driven.

75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(4).

Thus, in order to satisfy its prima facie burden of proof for the suspension 

of Licensee’s operating privilege under section 1786(d)(1), DOT must establish that 

(1) the licensee’s vehicle was of a type that required registration; (2) the financial 

responsibility coverage for licensee’s vehicle was not secured or maintained; and (3) 

the licensee operated or permitted the operation of the vehicle while it was not covered 

by financial responsibility. Pangallo v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of 

Driver Licensing, 65 A.3d 1091, 1093 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). DOT can satisfy this 

burden through the introduction into evidence of properly certified documents showing 

a licensee’s conviction for violating section 1786(f) of the Vehicle Code. See Parnell 

v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 90 A.3d 840, 844 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014) (holding that DOT’s submission of its certified packet, which included 

the licensee’s conviction on the summary offense of operating a vehicle without 
8

insurance, satisfied its prima facie burden)7; Fine v. Department of Transportation, 

Bureau of Driver Licensing, 694 A.2d 364, 367 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (noting that 

while a suspension under section 1786(d) is not premised on a conviction, the elements 

of the offense set forth in section 1786(f) are the same facts DOT must establish for 

such a suspension).

In the present case, at the May 24, 2017 de novo hearing before the trial 

court, DOT introduced, without objection, a certified packet of documents that 

included Licensee’s conviction for violating section 1786(f) of the Vehicle Code before 

the Magisterial District Court on February 3, 2017. These documents revealed that 

Licensee’s conviction stemmed from his traffic stop on November 26, 2016. DOT’s 

introduction of this certified packet of documents satisfies its prima facie burden of 

proof for the suspension of Licensee’s operating privileges under section 1786(d)(1) 

and, hence, the burden shifted to Licensee to produce clear and convincing evidence 

that the vehicle was insured at the time that it was driven. However, Licensee admitted, 

and the trial court found, that he did not obtain the required liability insurance until 17 

minutes after the traffic stop was initiated. Consequently, the three-month suspension 

of Licensee’s operating privileges imposed by DOT under section 1786(d)(1) of the 

Vehicle Code was proper, and the trial court erred as a matter of law in sustaining 

Licensee’s appeal.

Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

 

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In Parnell, we also noted that DOT bore no burden to demonstrate that the licensee acted 

negligently in failing to maintain insurance or that the licensee had a culpable mental state in driving 

without insurance. 90 A.3d at 844 (citing Stone v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 647 A.2d 287, 288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Paul Weaver, Jr. :

: No. 1115 C.D. 2017

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, :

Appellant :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 15th day of February, 2018, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Washington County, dated May 25, 2017, is hereby reversed. The 

three-month suspension of the operating privileges of Robert Paul Weaver, Jr., 

imposed by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, is 

reinstated.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge