J-S03010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EDMOND J. CALLOWAY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 957 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0509401-1995

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EDMOND J. CALLOWAY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 958 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0509411-1995

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2023

Edmond J. Calloway appeals from the order that dismissed his fifth 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Also before 

us is the application of Coley O. Reynolds, Esquire, to withdraw as counsel 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 
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Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). We 

grant counsel’s application and affirm. 

This Court provided the following summary of the underlying facts in 

adjudicating the appeal from the denial of Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition:

On April 8, 1995, [Appellant] went to a speakeasy in search of 

Tyrone [“Reds”] Hill, where, upon arrival, he repeatedly struck 

Hill’s cousin, Richard McCray, with a baseball bat, rendering him 

unconscious. [Appellant] then demanded to know [Reds]’s 

whereabouts. Shortly thereafter, when [Reds] approached the 

speakeasy in his car, [Appellant] fired three shots into the vehicle, 

causing [Reds] to crash. [Appellant] then ran up to the 

automobile and fired three shots inside, killing [Reds].

 

Commonwealth v. Calloway, 227 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2020) (nonprecedential decision at 1) (cleaned up). We affirmed Appellant’s judgment 

of sentence on March 23, 1998, and none of his first four PCRA petitions 

resulted in relief. See id. at 2-3 (summarizing history of first three petitions), 

10 (affirming dismissal of Appellant’s fourth petition). 

The PCRA court summarized the litigation of the fifth petition, at issue 

in this appeal, as follows:

On April 7, 2020, [Appellant] filed the instant pro se PCRA 

petition. In his petition, [Appellant] raised the following three 

claims:

(1) The prosecution never established the elements 

for a prima facie case for aggravated assault in 

accordance with 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a), or 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2302.

(2) [Appellant] intends on presenting to the court 

documented evidence supporting Richard McCray’s 

new declaration as being the truth.
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(3) [Appellant] also intends on presenting evidence to 

show the prosecution never presented a physician, 

medical records, or any evidence to support the 

charge for aggravated assault against [Appellant].

The PCRA court denied [Appellant]’s first and third claims, 

which challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

[Appellant]’s conviction for aggravated assault, on the ground that

they were previously litigated and therefore not cognizable under 

the PCRA. However, the court granted [Appellant] an evidentiary 

hearing on [Appellant]’s second claim, which was premised upon 

the recantation of trial witness Richard McCray. Pursuant to Rule

904(D) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court 

appointed [Attorney Reynolds], to represent [Appellant] at the 

hearing.2 On March 1, 2022, following an evidentiary hearing, the 

court dismissed the fifth petition.

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2 Rule 904(D) provides that on second or subsequent PCRA 

petitions, an indigent pro se defendant is entitled to 

appointed counsel if an evidentiary hearing is necessary.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/6/22, at 2-3 (cleaned up). Specifically, after 

concluding that Appellant’s petition was timely filed following his discovery of 

new facts previously unknown to him, the PCRA court held that Appellant’s 

substantive after-discovered evidence claim merited no relief. See id. at 5-7 

(citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)). 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the PCRA court directed 

him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal. Instead, Attorney Reynolds filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 19525(c)(4) a 

statement of intent to file a Turner/Finley brief. The PCRA court 

subsequently filed an opinion in support of its dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA 

petition. 
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In this Court, counsel filed a petition to withdraw along with his no-merit 

letter pursuant to Turner and Finley. Before we consider the merits of the 

issues raised on appeal, we must determine whether counsel has followed the 

required procedure, which we have summarized as follows:

When presented with a brief pursuant to Turner/Finley, we 

first determine whether the brief meets the procedural 

requirements of Turner/Finley. A Turner/Finley brief must: (1) 

detail the nature and extent of counsel’s review of the case; (2) 

list each issue the petitioner wishes to have reviewed; and (3) 

explain counsel’s reasoning for concluding that the petitioner’s 

issues are meritless. Counsel must also send a copy of the brief 

to the petitioner, along with a copy of the petition to withdraw, 

and inform the petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or to retain 

new counsel. If the brief meets these requirements, we then 

conduct an independent review of the petitioner’s issues

Commonwealth v. Knecht, 219 A.3d 689, 691 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal 

citations omitted).

We are satisfied from the review of counsel’s petition and no-merit letter 

that counsel has substantially complied with the technical requirements of 

Turner and Finley. Counsel has detailed his review of the case and the issues 

Appellant wishes to raise and has explained why the issues lack merit. 

Counsel also sent copies of his no-merit letter and application to withdraw to 

Appellant and advised him of his immediate right to proceed pro se or with 

privately-retained counsel.1 Accordingly, we proceed to consider the 

substance of the appeal. 

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1 Appellant has not filed a response or a pro se brief. 
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We begin our independent evaluation of the merits of Appellant’s issues

with a review of the applicable law. As our Supreme Court summarized:

When [an appellate court] reviews an order dismissing or 

denying a PCRA petition, its standard of review is whether the 

findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and are 

free from legal error. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, 

when supported by the record, are binding on [the appellate 

court]. Appellant has the burden to persuade [the appellate court] 

that the PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief. 

Lastly, it is well settled that [the appellate court] may affirm a 

valid judgment or order for any reason appearing as of record.

Commonwealth v. Reid, 259 A.3d 395, 405-06 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).

Counsel first addresses Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim 

premised upon the recantation testimony of Richard McCray. The following 

legal principles apply to that claim:

After-discovered evidence is a recognized ground for relief under 

the PCRA. Relief is due when the proponent can demonstrate that 

the evidence: (1) could not have been obtained prior to the 

conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) 

is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used 

solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely 

result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted. Failure to 

satisfy any one prong is fatal to the claim.

Commonwealth v. Crumbley, 270 A.3d 1171, 1178 (Pa.Super. 2022) 

(cleaned up). 

Specific to after-discovered evidence claims involving recanting 

witnesses, our Supreme Court has acknowledged the inherent limitations of 

recantation testimony, which it characterized as “extremely unreliable.” 

Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 977 (Pa. 2018). The Hight Court 

explained:
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[T]here is no less reliable form of proof, especially where it 

involves an admission of perjury. For that reason, we have 

emphasized that, when addressing an after-discovered evidence 

claim premised on recantation testimony, the PCRA court must, in 

the first instance, assess the credibility and significance of the 

recantation in light of the evidence as a whole. Unless the PCRA 

court is satisfied that the recantation is true, it should deny a new 

trial.

Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 977 (Pa. 2018) (cleaned up).

In the instant case, Mr. McCray testified at Appellant’s 1996 trial that he 

was standing outside of the speakeasy, when a car pulled up, Appellant 

jumped out, Appellant and two other men approached Mr. McCray, and 

Appellant beat Mr. McCray in the head with an aluminum baseball bat about 

three times. See N.T. Trial, 3/22/96 (Afternoon session), at 86-88. 

Afterwards, Appellant went upstairs into the speakeasy, and Mr. McCray saw 

that Appellant and one of the other men had guns. Id. at 89-90. 

In January 2020, Mr. McCray was speaking to his cousin 

Laquisha McCain, who is Appellant’s niece. Ms. McCain lamented not knowing 

Appellant since he went to prison when she was young, which prompted 

Mr. McCray to confess to her that Appellant was innocent and promise to do 

what he could to get Appellant out of prison. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/1/22, 

at 19-20. Thereafter, Mr. McCray was approached by an investigator hired by 

Appellant and offered a written statement. Therein, he indicated that 

Appellant did not hit him with the bat, but merely pushed him and someone 

else punched him and knocked him out. See Brief in Support of PCRA Petition, 
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4/7/20, at 13-14. Further, Mr. McCray asserted that Appellant did not have a 

gun on the night in question. Id. at 14.

At the outset of his testimony at the PCRA hearing, Mr. McCray 

disavowed some of the statements attributed to him in the interview with the 

investigator, offering corrections thereto concerning such matters as the 

amount Mr. McCray had to drink on the night in question and who informed 

him that Reds had been shot. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/1/22, at 12. Mr. 

McCray then proceeded to reaffirm to the PCRA court that, inter alia, Appellant 

did not assault him or possess a gun on that night in 1995. On crossexamination, Mr. McCray exhibited a selective memory and offered further 

testimony that was inconsistent with his statement to the investigator. See, 

e.g., id. at 41 (claiming that he was both struck with a bat and a fist). 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the PCRA court stated its findings of 

facts and conclusions of law. The court indicated that Appellant acted with 

due diligence in discovering Mr. McCray’s recantation, but that Appellant’s 

after-discovered evidence claim did not merit relief.2 The court found that 

hearing Mr. McCray’s testimony compelled it to find him incredible. The PCRA 

court explained that Mr. McCray’s inconsistent versions of events, even 

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2 The Commonwealth does not dispute on appeal the PCRA court’s finding 

that Appellant’s petition was timely filed in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii) (stating newly discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s oneyear time bar). Our review of the certified record did not give us cause to 

disturb the ruling that the PCRA court had jurisdiction to address the merits 

of Appellant’s substantive claim based upon the new facts. 
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between the statement he gave the investigator not long before the hearing, 

caused it to simply not believe his testimony. Id. at 80-81. The PCRA court 

alternatively concluded that Mr. McCray’s recantation was unlikely to lead to 

a different result, especially as to Appellant’s murder conviction. Id. at 81. 

See also PCRA Court Opinion, 6/6/22, at 8 (detailing the other evidence of 

Appellant’s guilt). 

The PCRA court’s credibility determinations are supported by the 

certified record, and we are therefore bound by those findings. See Reid, 

supra at 405-06. As discussed above, Mr. McCray displayed a convenient 

ability to testify to details of events favorable to Appellant, but the inability to 

recollect others when cross-examined about prior versions of his story. 

Moreover, Mr. McCray failed to maintain a consistent narrative of events at 

the PCRA hearing itself. Since the record support’s the PCRA’s finding that 

the recantation was not true, it properly denied Appellant relief. See Small, 

supra at 977 (“Unless the PCRA court is satisfied that the recantation is true, 

it should deny a new trial.” (cleaned up)). 

The two remaining claims Appellant raised in his PCRA petition 

concerned the adequacy of the Commonwealth’s evidence to establish the 

aggravated assault conviction. In particular, he asserted that the 

Commonwealth failed to establish that Mr. McCray suffered bodily injury, that 

Mr. McCray’s medical records document no head injury, and, therefore, “the 
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verdict is not supported by the weight and/or sufficiency of the evidence.” 

Brief in Support of PCRA Petition, 4/7/20, at 8.

The PCRA court dismissed these claims prior to the hearing, ruling that 

they were claims were waived for purposes of the PCRA claims because they

could have been raised on Appellant’s direct appeal.3 See also PCRA Court 

Opinion, 6/6/22, at 4. This ruling was correct. See 42 Pa.C.S.. § 9544(b) 

(“[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so 

before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state 

postconviction proceeding.”). See also Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 

988, 995 (Pa.Super. 2005) (“[A]n appellant may not raise allegations of error 

in an appeal from the denial of PCRA relief as if he were presenting the claims 

on direct appeal.”). 

For the above reasons, we agree with counsel that Appellant’s issues 

are meritless. Therefore, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm 

the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s fifth PCRA petition.

Application of Coley O. Reynolds, Esquire, to withdraw as counsel 

granted. Order affirmed. 

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3 We observe that Appellant did not assert that Mr. McCray’s 1995 medical 

records or their contents were newly discovered, previously unavailable facts. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/28/2023