Filed 1/6/21 Morrow-Meadows Wage and Hour Cases CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

MORROW-MEADOWS WAGE 

AND HOUR CASES.

2d Civ. No. B298816

JCCP No. 4858

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 

No. BC590427, San Diego 

County Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-

00033224-CU-OE-CTL)

This appeal involves a pair of complex civil actions 

that were coordinated for trial. The first was a class action 

brought against the Morrow-Meadows Corporation by Marie 

Pacheco and Rafael Robinson (collectively, Appellants) that 

alleged violations of various Labor Code and Business and 

Professions Code provisions. It did not seek relief pursuant to 

the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA). The second was 

brought by Araceli Noriega. In contrast to the Pacheco action, 

the Noriega action did not seek classwide relief, but did seek 

PAGA relief.

After the actions were coordinated for trial, Noriega 

amended her complaint to encompass the claims set forth in the 
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Pacheco complaint. She then entered into a settlement 

agreement with Morrow-Meadows that released all claims 

against the company. The trial court certified the class action, 

approved the settlement, and entered judgment accordingly. 

Appellants contend the court erred when it: (1) deemed Noriega 

an adequate class representative, and (2) approved the 

settlement. Because we agree with Appellants’ first contention, 

we do not reach the second. We reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The complaints

Morrow-Meadows is an electrical contractor. About 

95 percent of its hourly employees are unionized field workers. 

The other five percent are nonunionized office workers. 

Pacheco is a former Morrow-Meadows employee. In 

August 2015, she filed a class action complaint on behalf of all 

current and former hourly employees who had worked for 

Morrow-Meadows in California since August 2011. In it, she 

alleged that Morrow-Meadows did not: (1) pay minimum wages, 

(2) pay overtime wages, (3) timely pay wages, (4) reimburse 

business expenses, (5) provide meal and rest periods, (6) provide 

compliant wage statements, or (7) keep the requisite payroll 

records. She also alleged that Morrow-Meadows engaged in

unlawful business practices. She sought classwide damages for 

unpaid wages, premium wages, actual damages, restitution of 

unpaid wages, statutory penalties, interest, and attorney fees, 

but did not seek PAGA relief. Robinson was added as a named 

plaintiff the following year. 

Noriega filed her complaint in October 2015. She 

alleged causes of action for minimum wage violations, overtime 

violations, failure to reimburse business expenses, meal and rest 
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period violations, wage statement violations, and failure to pay 

wages upon separation. Noriega brought her complaint as a 

representative of the State of California pursuant to PAGA, not 

as a class action. She sought unpaid wages, statutory civil 

penalties, interest, and attorney fees on behalf of MorrowMeadows’s employees who had worked for the company during 

the previous year.

Morrow-Meadows petitioned for coordination of the 

two actions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 404 et seq.; Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 3.501 et seq.) Noriega opposed coordination, claiming that 

her case was “a purely PAGA action” requiring only limited 

discovery. Her attorney also stated that he did not intend to 

represent unionized employees. The actions were coordinated 

over Noriega’s objections. 

Noriega settles with Morrow-Meadows

In mid-2017, Noriega and Morrow-Meadows entered 

into a $1.1 million settlement that released all claims against the 

company, including the classwide claims asserted in the Pacheco 

action. The settlement provided that 75 percent of the net 

proceeds would go to the employees delineated in Noriega’s 

original complaint, with the remaining 25 percent going to the 

additional employees delineated only in the original Pacheco 

complaint.

Before seeking approval of the settlement, Noriega 

requested leave to file an amended complaint. The proposed 

amended complaint asserted class action allegations on behalf of 

the same putative class delineated in the Pacheco complaint, 

including most of the same Labor Code violations. It did not 

include allegations related to Morrow-Meadows’s alleged failure 
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to maintain requisite payroll records, however, nor did it include 

all of the theories on which Appellants sought recovery. 

After a series of amendments, Noriega and MorrowMeadows executed the operative fourth amended settlement

agreement. Appellants objected on a number of grounds, 

including that Noriega was an inadequate class representative. 

Preliminary approval proceedings

Noriega moved for preliminary approval of the 

settlement and certification of a settlement class. In support of 

the motion, Noriega’s counsel submitted a declaration stating 

that the $1.1 million settlement was fair and reasonable because 

the best-case recovery was $1.8 million while the worst case was 

a defense verdict. Appellants objected that the claims included in 

counsel’s declaration totaled $2.5 million, not $1.8 million. They 

also complained that counsel’s valuation ignored several claims 

in their original complaint, including those made on behalf of 

unionized employees. They continued to object that Noriega was 

an inadequate class representative. 

The trial court preliminarily approved the 

settlement, and preliminarily certified the matter as a class 

action with two subclasses: a PAGA subclass and a non-PAGA 

subclass. It found that Noriega’s claims were “typical of the 

claims of the members of the [s]ettlement [c]lass” and appointed 

her as class representative, finding that she was “qualified and 

suitable” to serve in that role because she would “fairly and 

adequately protect the interests of the . . . [c]lass.”

Final approval proceedings

After mailing out class notices, the claims 

administrator reported that only Appellants had objected to the 

settlement. Noriega moved for final approval. Attached to her 
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motion was another declaration from counsel valuing the claims 

in settlement, this one with a best-case recovery of slightly more 

than $1.8 million. The valuation excluded claims made by 

unionized employees for everything but the wage statement 

claim. Appellants’ counsel countered with a valuation of more 

than $312 million for the settled claims plus penalties. 

At the final approval hearing, Appellants complained 

that the settlement grossly undervalued the class claims and was 

reached without adequate discovery, without pursuing claims on 

behalf of 95 percent of the class members, and without providing 

the court with accurate information about the nature and 

magnitude of the claims. They also claimed that Noriega was not 

an adequate class representative. 

The trial court granted final approval of the 

settlement. The court deemed the settlement fair and 

reasonable, the product of good-faith negotiations after adequate 

discovery. It found the difference in the amounts paid to PAGA 

class members and non-PAGA class members to be fair. Its order 

stated that it resolved all claims asserted in the coordinated 

proceeding.1

DISCUSSION

Appellants contend the trial court erred when it 

certified the class action and approved the settlement because it 

1 After Appellants timely filed their notice of appeal, 

Morrow-Meadows moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of 

standing. We denied the motion. Morrow-Meadows and Noriega 

ask that we now reconsider our denial. We decline to do so: 

Appellants were parties of record in the coordinated action, and 

thus have standing to appeal. (Hernandez v. Restoration

Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 269.)
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did so without setting forth its reasons for concluding that 

Noriega was an adequate class representative. We agree.

“Code of Civil Procedure section 382 authorizes class 

actions ‘when the question is one of a common or general interest, 

of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is 

impracticable to bring them all before the court.’” (Sav-On Drug

Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326 (Sav-On 

Drug Stores).) “The party seeking certification has the burden to 

establish the existence of both an ascertainable class and a welldefined community of interest among class members.” (Ibid.) A 

“community of interest” requires proof of “predominant common 

questions of law or fact,” “class representatives with claims or 

defenses typical of the class,” and “class representatives who can 

adequately represent the class.” (Ibid.)

We review the trial court’s finding that Noriega was 

an adequate class representative for abuse of discretion. (Sav-On 

Drug Stores, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) We will not disturb 

that finding “‘“unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial 

evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on 

erroneous legal assumptions.”’ [Citation.]” (Ayala v. Antelope

Valley Newspapers, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 530 (Ayala).) In 

contrast to ordinary appellate review, “[w]e review the trial 

court’s actual reasons for granting or denying certification.” 

(Ibid., emphasis added.) “[I]f they are erroneous, we must 

reverse, whether or not other reasons not relied upon might have 

supported the ruling.” (Ibid.)

Here, we cannot determine whether the trial court’s 

reasons for certifying the coordinated cases as a class action were 

erroneous because the court did not articulate any basis for its 

finding that Noriega could adequately represent the settlement 
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class. Though the court “parroted the ultimate finding needed to 

[grant class] certification,” it “did not provide any insight into its 

analytic route in reaching that finding.” (Myers v. Raley’s (2019) 

32 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1247 (Myers).) When it preliminarily 

granted certification, the court stated that Noriega was “qualified 

and suitable” to serve as class representative because she would 

“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the . . . [c]lass.” 

But it did not explain why it reached that conclusion. Nor did the 

court provide an explanation at the final approval hearing. The 

court’s “failure to explain itself is fatal.” (Ibid.)

Neither Morrow-Meadows nor Noriega point to 

anything in the record to support a contrary conclusion. MorrowMeadows notes that Noriega submitted a declaration detailing 

the work she had done in the case, while her attorney’s 

declaration noted his experience in class action litigation. Were 

this case subject to normal appellate review standards, these 

declarations might provide support for the trial court’s finding 

that Noriega would be an adequate class representative. But this 

is an appeal of a class action. “To turn to the record to concoct 

some basis for the trial court’s [grant] of certification is to abolish 

the relevant standard of review . . . and apply ordinary appellate 

review contrary to the legion of cases that prohibit appellate 

revisionism.” (Myers, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1251.)

Noriega similarly urges us to rely on her declaration,

noting that the trial court cited it when it concluded that she was 

entitled to an incentive award. This again ignores the standard 

of review in class action appeals, and instead would require us to 

infer a basis for the court’s determination that Noriega would 

have fairly and adequately represented the class where no 

explanation was given. “This we cannot do.” (Myers, supra, 32 
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Cal.App.5th at p. 1251.) The trial court abused its discretion 

when it failed to explain why Noriega was an adequate class 

representative. Reversal is therefore required. (Id. at p. 1252; 

see also Ayala, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 530.)

DISPOSITION

The orders certifying the coordinated cases as a class 

action and granting final approval of the settlement, entered 

March 6 and 27, 2019, are vacated, and the judgment is reversed. 

The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to 

articulate a statement of reasons for approving or denying class 

certification. Appellants shall recover their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
Yvette M. Palazuelos, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Lawyers for Justice, Edwin Aiwazian, Arby Aiwazian 

and Joanna Ghosh for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

Stuart Kane, Bruce D. May, Shane P. Criqui and 

Patricia H. Jun for Defendant and Respondent.

Sullivan Law Group, William Bransfield Sullivan and 

Eric Keith Yaeckel for Respondent.