# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted Mar ch 26 , 20 20 *

Decided March 30 , 20 20

Before

DAVID F

. HAMILTON , Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN , Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER , Circuit Judge

No . 19

- 3278

CARLOS LINDSEY , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v

.
STACEY HOEM, et al. , Defendant s

- Appellee s

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin

.
No. 19

- cv
- 904

- jdp

James D. Peterson , Chief Judge

.
No. 19

- 3311

CARLOS LINDSEY , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin

.
No. 19

- cv
- 885

- jdp

* The district court dismissed the complaints in these cases at screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)( B ), before any defendant appeared , and t he appellees are not participating in this appeal. W e have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record s adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1Nos. 19

- 3278 & 19

- 3311 Page 2

GARY A. BOUGHTON, et al., Defendants

- Appellees

. James D. Peterson , Chief Judge

.

O R D E R Carlos Lindsey, a Wisconsin prisoner , br ought two suits (which we have consolidated for decision ) alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment , but a filing bar blocked him at the courthouse door

. In the first suit , he maintains that while he wa s in solitary confinement, prison psychologists denied him medical c are that he need s to prevent self

- harm ; in the second , he alleges that prison officials have forc ed him to mix with prisoners who have plan ned to attack him

. Lindsey ’s filing bar (a sanction f rom a prior case) allows him to sue only if he allege s that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. The district court rul ed that he failed to meet that standard in either
case , but we conclude that he has , s o we vacate the dismissal s . B ut we also warn him that if he has lied, he may face even mo re onerous sanction s

. Lindsey is an untreated , mentally ill inmate who has been in administrative confinement (a form of segregation) for over eight years

. ( At this stage, w e read his complaints and his briefs together on appea l, see Geinosky v. City of Chicago , 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012), and take his allegations a s true, s ee Wallace v. Baldwin , 895 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 2018). ) After three years in segregation , a prison psychologist diagnosed him with post

- traumatic s tress disorder , obse rved “significant elevations” of suicidal thoughts , and recommended treating “ Mr. Lindsey per his request. ” Four years later, Lindsey (still in segregation) filed a health

- care request, complain ing that he had

“ not been receiving any treatment for [his] PTSD , ” despite his need and th e availab ility of helpful t reatments

. P riso n officials refused his request

. Lindsey fears that w ithout treatment for his PTSD , he is in danger of physically harm ing , or even kill ing , himself.
Lindsey is also in a four

- phase p rogram that allow s p risoners in administrative segregation to re
- enter the general population

. After the first phase , prisone rs must attend group recreation sessions

. Violent clashes and stabbings have occurred during these sessions , so Lindsey (who is in the second phase) a sked prison officials to keep hi m out of sessions with inmates who have pledged to harm him

. Th e y denied his request . I nstead , they schedule d him for sessions with those prisoners, including one who they kn e w ha d alrea dy a ttacked him . That prisoner again attacked Lindsey during
a group session in 2019

— so badly that he was sent to an outside hospital

. Afterward,Nos. 19

- 3278 & 19

- 3311 Page 3

officers allegedly promised Lindsey that they would make sure he “get[s] [his] ass beat again.”

In Lindsey ’s two suits, he allege s that , by refusing to treat his known risk of suicide in segregation and by fail ing to protect him f rom the known risk of attacks in group sessions , the defendants have violat e d the Eighth Amendment

. One year before he filed these suits, the district court had sanctioned Lindsey

— he had l ied in an affidavit in on e case, and in another case he had signed a fellow inmate’s name to documents without authoriz ation

. See Lindsey v. Johnston , No. 18

- cv
- 398

- jdp , 2018 WL 6606241 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 17, 2018). M irror ing th e three

strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court barred Lindsey from filing new cases except for habeas

- corpus petitions and “ complaints in which he alleges that he is in imminent danger of serious physical harm

. ” Compare i d . at *4, with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

The court dismissed both of these new cases , ruling that Lindsey was not in imminent danger

. For the self

- harm suit, it thought that Lindsey did not allege an absence of all mental

- health treatment and that his allegations were too vague

. F or the failure

- to

- protect suit , the court ruled t hat the danger was self

- i nflicted ( because Lindsey could fo rgo group session s ) , and that the threat was not ongoing , so no danger
was imminent

. On appeal, Lindsey contends that he has satisfied the imminent

- danger standard for both his s elf

- harm and failure

- to

- protect suits

. (He also contest s the district court’s power i n Lindsey v. Johnston to impose the sanction , but Lindsey did not appeal that decision , so we may not entertain a collateral challenge to it

. See, e.g. , Travelers Indem

. Co. v. Bailey , 557 U.S. 137, 152

– 53 (2009).) We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to enforce its own rules against a litigant. See Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F3d 880, 886

– 87 (7th Cir. 2011). And w e find an abuse here, recognizing that the PLRA defines imminent danger as a serious physical injury that is “ imminent or occurring at the time the complaint is filed. ” Ciarpaglini v. Saini , 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003)

. Lindsey ’s first complaint alleg es that prison staff have placed Lindsey in danger of imminent phys ic al harm by failing to treat his PTSD

. S uicidal ideation and a risk of self

- harm , particularly for a mentally ill prisoner like Lindsey in prolonged segregation , satisf y the statutory imminent

- danger exception that the court adopted in it s sanction order

. See Wallace , 895 F.3d at 484

– 85 ; Sanders v. Melvin , 873 F.3d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2017).Nos. 19

- 3278 & 19

- 3311 Page 4

T he core of Lindsey’s complaint is that his untreated PTSD , after eight years in segregation, elevates significantly his risk of suicid e a nd self

- har m

. We recognize that the district court thought that Lindsey failed to allege that he is not receiving any mental

- health treatment . But Lindsey allege s that the defendants have denied him “any” treatment for his PTSD , which according to a prison psychologist is the condition that creates “significant elevations” o f suicidal ideation and self

- injurious behavior

. So the first suit may go forward.
Lindsey’s second complaint contains an allegation t hat he faces imminent danger of physical harm

— from inmates planning to attack him. “Being placed near inmates on one’s enemies list, despite pleas for transfer to a different location after being beaten by those enemies , ” meets the imminent

- danger standard. Ciarpaglin i , 352 F.3d at 331 (citing Ashley v. Dilworth , 147 F.3d 715 ( 8 th Cir. 1998) )

. Lindsey’s complaint allege s that defendants have den ied his requests to be separated from prisoners who they know have threatened and attacked him

. And i t also states that t hey p ut him in a group session with one of those very prisoner s, and, after that inmate beat him savagely , they threatened to make sure that he “get[s] [his] ass beat again.” W e are mindful that the district court thought that Lindsey could choose to refuse to attend the group session and avoid th at danger . But Lindsey alleges that he ha d no such choice . A nd because he has alleged that the gu ards have threatened a nother attack , Lindsey’s second suit alleges an ongoing, imminent danger and may therefore proceed

. We end with a warning. Lindsey was not required to prove his allegations at this stage

. See Sanders , 873 F.3d at 960

. But the defendants may challenge the allegations of imminent danger after they are served with the complaint s , and if the district court decides that the allegations are unfounded, it may dismiss the suits

. See i d. at 961

– 62

. Furthermore, i f Lindsey lied to manipulate th e court into bypass ing the imminent

danger exception , it may also fine him , sanction him with a filing bar that does not include an imminent

- danger exception for civil suits , s ee Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995) , and refer him for p rosecution for perjury

.
We VACATE the judgments and REMAND for further proceedings.