Filed 10/27/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THOMAS S. TEDESCO et al.,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

LAURA K. WHITE, as Co-trustee, etc., 

et al.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

 G061197

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-01078628)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, David L. 

Belz, Judge. Affirmed. 

Herzog, Yuhas, Ehrlich & Ardell, Ian Herzog and Evan D. Marshall for 

Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Adam F. Streisand, Nicholas J. Van 

Brunt and Valerie E. Alter for Defendants and Respondents Laura K. White, Julie M. Bas

and Sandra L. Kay.
2

Freeman, Freeman & Smiley, Saul Ewing, Geraldine A. Wyle, Jeryll S. 

Cohen and Thomas C. Aikin for Defendant and Respondent David M. Wilson.

* * *

A bulldozer can move piles of dirt from one place to another. But when the 

goal is to move minds rather than dirt, employing a bulldozer may be counterproductive. 

The bulldozer in this case is appellant Debra Wear’s counsel. In our prior nonpublished 

opinion, Tedesco v. White (June 15, 2022, G059883) (Tedesco 1), we made clear to these 

lawyers that “[w]e do not confuse aggressive argument with persuasive advocacy.” 

Although the aggression has not abated, our view of it remains unchanged. 

This appeal challenges an order of discovery sanctions in the amount of 

$6,000. But that sanctions order does not appear to be counsel’s real concern; if it were, 

counsel would have noticed an appeal from that order on their own behalf as well, since

counsel were held jointly and severally liable for the same sanction.

1

 They did not. 

Instead, counsel attempt to use that sanctions order as a basis for 

challenging the merits of the trial court’s nonappealable order quashing Wear’s document 

subpoena, and then to further use the trial court’s analysis underlying that discovery 

ruling into a basis for reviewing a separate order we have already ruled cannot be 

appealed. All of this seems to be in furtherance of counsel’s broader quest: to again 

collaterally attack the validity of a conservatorship over the estate of Thomas S. Tedesco,

which was established in the probate court in Riverside county in 2015. In keeping with 

that sweeping goal, Wear’s counsel has presented us with an appellant’s appendix in 

excess of 9,000 pages. 

1 Attorney Russell L. Davis, who also represented Wear in connection with 

the deposition subpoena and the opposition to Wilson’s motion to quash, is similarly 

liable for payment of the monetary sanction. But he is not involved in this appeal as 

either counsel or client. 
3

That same attack has already been repeatedly rejected by both the probate 

court and the appellate court in Riverside County, and also by a trial in Orange County

Superior Court and this court in Tedesco 1. Counsel’s dogged refusal to acknowledge 

those losses (other than by disparaging some of the courts involved)2 changes nothing.

In any event, as we explain below, our jurisdiction here is limited to the 

issue of sanctions. The court justified its order on the basis that “one of more of the 

requirements of the subpoena was oppressive” and “the subpoena was a misuse of 

discovery,” which followed its determination that the subpoena should be quashed on the 

basis it was overly broad and constituted an unreasonable intrusion on the privacy rights 

of Wilson’s conservatee, Tedesco. Our review is limited to those issues. 

Wear fails to directly challenge the court’s pertinent determinations, let 

alone demonstrate why the court abused its discretion in making them. We find no error 

in the court’s ruling. We therefore affirm. 3

FACTS

This case arises out of disputes over the propriety and enforceability of 

amendments to Tedesco’s living trust, which was conceived of as part of a family estate 

plan Tedesco created with his late wife, Wanda Tedesco. The trust came into being 

2 In appellant’s opening brief, counsel once again explicitly disparages the

integrity of our colleagues in the Fourth District, Division 2. We caution counsel about 

such tactics.

3 Respondents Laura K. White, Julie M. Bas, and Sandra L. Kay (Tedesco’s 

adult daughters and the cotrustees of the Thomas S. Tedesco Living Trust) use their 

respondents’ brief solely to argue for dismissal of the appeal on the ground Wear lacks 

standing to participate in the trial court proceeding. The assertion is misplaced. This 

appeal is from an order imposing a monetary sanction against Wear. As the subject of 

that order, Wear has standing to appeal from it, without regard to whether she has 

standing to participate in this case on the merits. 
4

following Wanda Tedesco’s death in 2002, and it was later restated. The primary 

beneficiaries of the restated trust are the cotrustees. 

Specifically, Wear questions the propriety of a June 2013 amendment to the 

restated trust that limited Tedesco’s ability to further amend the restated trust without the 

concurrence of the cotrustees. Wear also challenges other actions by the cotrustees and 

seeks a court order to suspend their powers as cotrustees. 

For their part, the cotrustees have petitioned the court to validate the 2013 

amendment, and thus to establish the invalidity of a purported 2020 amendment to the

restated trust.

4 The 2020 amendment indicates it is Tedesco’s intent to revoke the 

restated trust entirely, but due to Tedesco’s concerns that he may be unable to accomplish 

that amendment, he modifies its provisions to (1) remove cotrustees as trustees and as 

beneficiaries, and (2) leave 75% of the assets to his current wife, Gloria Tedesco, and in 

the event she does not survive him, to her two daughters (including Wear). 

Wear also contends that Wilson has abdicated his responsibilities as 

Tedesco’s conservator by refusing to challenge the validity of the 2013 amendment or by 

otherwise addressing the allegedly fraudulent actions of Tedesco’s daughters. She 

alleges Wilson refused to do so “despite findings of fiduciary breach by his own 

attorneys, Parker Mills, as set forth in a letter of July 16, 2016,”5 and further that his 

inaction was “in exchange for payment of exorbitant fees of himself and his lawyers by 

the daughters from the trust. [Wilson] and his attorneys thus became the daughters’

tool.”

4 We say “purported” not because we have developed any opinion about the 

propriety of this 2020 amendment, but rather to acknowledge that it fails to comply with 

the explicit requirements of the 2013 amendment. 

5 The Parker Mills letter Wear is concerned about is actually dated July 5, 

2016.
5

In June of 2021, Wear served a notice of deposition on the custodian of

records at Parker Mills, LLP (Parker Mills), the law firm that previously represented 

Wilson and allegedly found the “fiduciary breach” Wear is concerned about. The 

subpoena requested that the custodian of records for Parker Mills produce eight separate 

categories of documents: 

“1. Each record, writing and/or electronically stored data that in any way 

relate or refer to any communication concerning Thomas S. Tedesco, or any account, 

asset or trust in which Thomas S. Tedesco has or at any time had an interest, or TW 

Tedesco Properties. 

“2. Each record, writing and/or electronically stored data that in any way 

relate or refer to any investigation concerning Thomas S. Tedesco, or any account, asset 

or trust in which Thomas S. Tedesco has or at any time had an interest, or TW Tedesco 

Properties. 

“3. Each record, writing and/or electronically stored data that in any way 

relate or refer to any communication with MICHAEL BAS, ROBERT LATIMER, 

LATIMER & MASSONI, MICHAEL BAS, LAURA WHITE, SANDRA KAY, JULIE 

BAS or their attorneys including SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, or 

with DAVID WILSON or his attorneys, including HOLLAND & KNIGHT, concerning 

Thomas S. Tedesco, or any account or trust in which Thomas S. Tedesco has or at any 

time had an interest, or TW Tedesco Properties. 

“4. Each record, writing and/or electronically stored data that in any way 

relate or refer to any communication with JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL 

or any of its attorneys, including BURTON MITCHELL, concerning either Thomas S. 

Tedesco, or any account, asset or trust in which Thomas S. Tedesco has or at any time 

had an interest, or TW Tedesco Properties. 

“5. Each record, writing and/or electronically stored data referring or 

pertaining to David Wilson or any attorneys for David Wilson concerning or relating to 
6

Thomas S. Tedesco and/or any trust, property, assets and/or conservatorship proceeding 

related to Thomas S. Tedesco, or TW Tedesco Properties. 

“6. Any and all Partnership Agreements for TW Tedesco Properties 

Limited Partnership. 

“7. Each record, writing and/or electronically stored data referring or 

pertaining to Kenneth Jenkins or any attorneys for Kenneth Jenkins concerning or 

relating to Thomas S. Tedesco and/or any trust, property, assets and/or conservatorship 

proceeding related to Thomas S. Tedesco, or TW Tedesco Properties. 

“8. Each record, writing and/or electronically stored data referring or 

pertaining to any communication with Terence Nunan and/or David Humphrey 

concerning or relating to Thomas S. Tedesco and/or any trust, property, assets and/or 

conservatorship proceeding related to Thomas S. Tedesco, or TW Tedesco Properties.”

In December 2021, Wilson moved to quash the Parker Mills deposition 

subpoena and requested an award of $12,105 in monetary sanctions against Wear. He 

argued the subpoena should be quashed because (1) Wear’s efforts were in violation of an 

elder abuse restraining order issued against her; (2) Wear lacked standing to seek any 

relief with respect to the restated trust; (3) Wear failed to serve Tedesco with a notice to 

consumer as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1; and (4) the subpoena

was overly broad, unduly burdensome and reflected an improper effort to seek Tedesco’s 

private confidential financial records and information. 

Wear opposed the motion; she disputed Wilson’s procedural claims and 

relied on the July 2016 Parker Mills letter to support her claim that all the documents in 

Parker Mills’ possession were discoverable because “Wilson used Parker Mills as 

investigator [and thus] Parker Mills’ knowledge is directly relevant to Wilson’s 

knowledge of fraud, and the practice of fraud, perjury, elder abuse and fiduciary abuse by 

the daughters and their lawyers, and to the necessity of their removal. That pervasive 
7

dishonesty of the daughters and the lawyers who are presently looting the trust implicates 

the crime-fraud exception.”

Wear accused Wilson and his attorneys of significant wrongdoing: “their 

dishonesty about the results of the Parker Mills [2016] investigation, their retention of 

funds unlawfully disbursed by the daughters from Tedesco’s personal assets, their 

agreement to assist the daughters[’] fraud by perjury in exchange for payment with 

misappropriated funds, all contribute to a prima facie case that Wilson and Holland & 

Knight6 are engaged in an effort to deny Tedesco the right to petition, the right to hearing 

on the merits of his claims, the right to recover stolen assets, and the right to defend his 

interest in trust proceedings—that they are engaged in a criminal enterprise, which 

Holland & Knight has been retained to execute.”

In January 2022, the court granted the motion to quash. The court 

explained that, although it was not persuaded by Wilson’s arguments regarding the elder 

abuse restraining order, Wear’s lack of standing to propound discovery, or her failure to 

serve Tedesco with a notice to consumer, it agreed with his contentions that the subpoena 

was overly broad and it represented an unreasonable intrusion into Tedesco’s right to 

maintain the privacy of his financial information. The court also concluded Wear failed 

to explain how the 2016 Parker Mills letter was relevant to her claimed interest as an 

objector, which comes by way of the 2020 trust amendment that favors Wear and her 

mother. 

The court awarded $6,000 in sanctions against Wear and her counsel, 

jointly and severally, on the grounds that “one or more of the requirements of the 

subpoena was oppressive and, further, that the subpoena was a misuse of discovery.”

6 Holland & Knight is the law firm that represented Wilson in filing the 

motion to quash. 
8

DISCUSSION

1. Scope of the Appeal and Standard of Review

The notice of appeal, which was filed on behalf of both Wear and Stephen 

Carpenter (claiming to be acting as the guardian ad litem of conservatee Thomas 

Tedesco), sought to challenge two rulings: the January 7, 2022 order quashing the

document subpoena Wear had served on attorneys representing Wilson, and (2) a 

subsequent order denying an application—purportedly filed on behalf of Tedesco—to 

distribute funds from the trust to pay for claims favored by Wear and her counsel. 

Wilson moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the order quashing the 

subpoena was not appealable, and that neither Carpenter nor Wear had standing to 

challenge the latter order on Tedesco’s behalf. We granted that motion in part, 

dismissing the appeal from the second order entirely on standing grounds and explaining

the first ruling was appealable only as to the order awarding monetary sanctions against 

Wear.7

 We stated explicitly that Carpenter lacked standing to challenge the sanctions, 

which were imposed against him. (Tedesco v. White (Aug. 15, 2022, G061197) 

[nonpub.opn.].) 

The opening brief on appeal, which counsel purported to file on behalf of 

both Wear and Carpenter, largely ignored our ruling. The word “sanctions” appears for 

the first time at page 30, and it is not mentioned in argument until page 59. The opening 

brief instead challenges the merits of the order quashing the subpoena, asserting without 

7 Wear’s notice of appeal reflected she was appealing from the court’s 

January 7, 2022 order quashing the document subpoena Wear issued to Parker Mills “and 

from ever[y] other subsidiary thereto.” While Wilson was correct about the 

nonappealability of discovery orders, we found the notice of appeal broad enough to 

encompass the court’s additional order of the same date, imposing a $6,000 monetary 

sanction against Wear and her counsel. Because that monetary sanction was directly 

appealable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 901.4, subdivision (a)(12), we 

denied the motion to dismiss the appeal from the January 7, 2022 order.
9

analysis that it remains appealable “by reason of the $6,000 sanctions order,” and then 

arguing the subsequent order denying the application to distribute funds was also 

appealable for essentially the same reasons we already rejected in dismissing that portion 

of the appeal. 

We disagree. In relying on our dismissal ruling, Wilson moved to strike the 

portions of the opening brief which purport to challenge the order denying the requested 

distribution of funds, and we granted that motion. That ruling stands.

The appealability of the monetary sanction order does not change the fact 

the discovery order made on that same date is not appealable. (Doe v. United States 

Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1433 [when sanctions are imposed in 

connection with a discovery ruling, the “appeal is limited to review of that portion of 

the . . . order imposing a monetary sanction of over $5,000”].) When reviewing an 

appealable sanctions order, we review the merits of related orders only to the extent 

necessary to resolve the challenge to the appealable monetary sanctions.

An order awarding monetary sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion, 

and “we will reverse the trial court only if it was arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical in the 

exercise of that discretion.” (Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell (2017) 

18 Cal.App.5th 154, 191, disapproved on another point in Presbyterian Camp & 

Conference Center, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493, 516, fn. 17.) “[I]n 

reviewing the trial court’s determination, ‘[w]e defer to the court’s credibility decisions 

and draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s ruling.’ [Citation.] To the 

extent the trial court’s decision to issue sanctions depends on factual determinations, we 

review the record for substantial evidence to support those determinations. [Citation.] 

Thus, our review ‘“begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire 

record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support 

the determination [of the trial court].”’” (Id. at p. 192.)
10

2. Justification for Subpoena

Wear’s sole challenge to the sanctions order is to attack the merits of the 

court’s ruling quashing her subpoena. Because our concern here is the sanctions order, 

our review is limited to those aspects of the court’s merits ruling that supported the award 

of sanctions. Since the court sided with Wear in rejecting Wilson’s arguments about 

(1) the elder abuse restraining order, (2) the notice to consumer, and (3) Wear’s standing 

to participate in the case, we know those issues did not contribute to its decision to 

sanction Wear and her counsel. We consequently do not address them here.

We also disregard Wear’s argument that Wilson is not Tedesco’s legitimate 

conservator, that the conservatorship is “defective” or “invalid,” or that Wilson is 

somehow disqualified from protecting or representing Tedesco’s interests in this 

litigation. We have already ruled in Tedesco 1 on those issues: “the conservatorship 

judgment and the orders issued therein are valid and binding for purposes of this case.” 

(Tedesco 1, supra, G059883.) Wilson’s capacity to represent Tedesco’s interests is not 

subject to further dispute, and as a result every argument which relies on that assertion 

fails as a matter of law. 

3. Overbreadth and Privacy Issues

Instead, we focus on the court’s findings that (1) the subpoena was 

overbroad and an unreasonable intrusion into Tedesco’s right to financial privacy; and

(2) one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive and the subpoena 

was a misuse of the discovery process. 

According to Wear’s own argument, the July 2016 Parker Mills letter, and 

the investigation it reflects, “forms the core of the subpoena.” But contrary to Wear’s 

assertion that the cotrustees are “the subject of the Parker Mills investigation,” the letter 

is actually directed to Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell, LLP (Jeffer Mangels)—which 

is the law firm that had previously acted as Tedesco’s long-time estate counsel. The 
11

letter seeks disgorgement of fees previously paid to Jeffer Mangels based on allegations 

that it had acted improperly. 

Disgorgement is requested for two reasons: first, because Jeffer Mangels 

allegedly continued to charge for services rendered long after it had been formally

discharged as counsel; and, second, because Jeffer Mangels had allegedly been operating 

under a potential conflict of interest when it drafted the 2013 amendment—which 

prevented further amendments of the restated trust without the concurrence of both 

Tedesco and his daughters (the cotrustees)—allegedly because the amendment “offered 

Mr. Tedesco . . . no estate planning benefit and which [Tedesco] does not recall 

executing.” 8

The letter draws no conclusions about wrongdoing by Tedesco’s daughters, 

nor does it offer any opinions about the validity of the 2013 amendment to the restated 

trust. Moreover, the claim that the 2013 amendment offered no estate planning benefit to 

Tedesco is debatable because he may have shared his daughters’ legitimate concern that 

he could become increasingly vulnerable to the undue influence of persons seeking to 

obtain a share of the restated trust, and thus wished to ensure the trust was protected from 

that danger going forward. Indeed, that would be the same instinct that later caused 

Tedesco to stipulate to the conservatorship established under Wilson’s authority. 

The allegation that Tedesco did not recall signing the 2013 amendment, if 

true, is not inherently suspicious because by the time Wilson’s counsel made that claim, 

Tedesco had been the subject of conservatorship proceedings for two years, and under a 

conservatorship for one. His memory problems at that point of his life were well 

documented. 

8 The letter suggests the potential conflict created by drafting the 2013

amendment had “ripened” into an actual conflict a month later when Jeffer Mangels 

“began improperly sharing information received from [Tedesco’s doctor] with the 

Daughters.”
12

Despite the fact the letter accuses only Jeffer Mangels of impropriety, Wear

claims “the record shows” that Wilson had “knowledge of the daughter[s’] fraud [but] 

undertook their defense when they agreed to pay his fees.” Wear then points to the fact 

that in October 2015 (i.e., nine months before the Parker Mills letter), Wilson petitioned 

the court for instructions allowing him to remain neutral and not undertake an 

investigation relating to the validity of either the 2013 amendment or of a series of 

documents executed by Tedesco in 2015, purporting to revoke the restated trust.

In that filing, Wilson acknowledged the existence of evidence questioning

the validity of both the 2013 amendment and the 2015 trust documents, and that he was

uncertain whether either was valid. He then explained that “[i]t is in Gloria Tedesco’s 

interests to have the [2013 a]mendment invalidated and the Revocation of Trust to be 

upheld. It is in the Daughters’ interest to have all of the documents executed June 4, 

2015 invalidated,” and he noted that all of those parties were represented by counsel.

Based on those facts, Wilson asked the court to require that “the interested parties litigate 

the validity of these documents rather than the Conservator . . . [which] will allow the 

Conservator to remain neutral and focus on assisting Mr. Tedesco with managing his 

personal financial affairs.”

Despite Wilson’s expressed neutrality and dispassionate description of the 

family’s trust disputes, Wear asserts the filing reflects Wilson “not only admitted the 

factual basis for the [removal of] the daughters [as cotrustees], but admitted that Tedesco 

was likely owed millions, which should have gone into the conservatorship estate.” The 

record before us does not support this argument.

All eight categories of documents Wear demanded in her subpoena are 

broadly drawn. Taken together, they seek all documents, writings or communications, in 

whatever form, relating or referring to Tedesco or any of his accounts or assets—

including, but not limited to, those that are held by the restated trust. Nothing ties or 

limits any of the categories to the July 2016 Parker Mills letter, or to the investigation 
13

alluded to in that letter. We believe the trial court’s concerns that regard were well

founded.

In its ruling, the court stated the categories of documents are overbroad “on 

their face . . . as they are without limitation as to time.” Wear ignores that specific 

conclusion, and by doing so, she effectively concedes the point. (In re Marriage of

Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 [“A judgment or order of a lower court is 

presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in 

favor of its correctness”]; (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655 [Issues not 

properly raised or that lack adequate legal discussion will be deemed forfeited].)

The court also concluded that, because Wear seeks discovery of Tedesco’s 

private financial information, it was required to balance Wear’s interest in disclosure 

against Tedesco’s protected privacy interest and reasonable expectation of privacy. (See 

Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557.) After doing so, the court 

concluded the subpoena threatened a serious intrusion into Tedesco’s protected privacy

interest, and that Wear had failed to raise a legitimate and countervailing interest in 

disclosure. 

Wear contends the court erred in reaching that conclusion because “[i]t was 

ludicrous to allow a patently conflicted pseudo ‘conservator’ to assert Tedesco’s privilege 

or privacy rights in a manner that was plainly adverse to Tedesco’s interests [when there 

is evidence] that demonstrated fiduciary breach by Wilson and the daughters, and that 

justified removal from office of both Wilson and the daughters.” We disagree. Because 

Wilson is Tedesco’s duly appointed conservator, it would have been inappropriate not to 

allow him to assert the claim of financial privacy on Tedesco’s behalf.

9

 

9 Even if evidence of fiduciary breach sufficient to justify Wilson’s removal 

as Tedesco’s conservator existed (we have not seen any), that evidence should be 

presented to the court that appointed him.
14

Stated plainly, as long as Wilson remains as Tedesco’s conservator, it is 

he—not Wear or her counsel—who is empowered to decide what claims are in Tedesco’s 

interest to make. After disputing Wilson’s standing to assert Tedesco’s privacy interests, 

Wear fails to demonstrate the court erred in its required balancing of the interests in this 

case. 

4. Award of Sanctions

Finally, the court’s award of sanctions was based on findings that the 

subpoena was oppressive and a misuse of discovery. Wear’s opening brief fails to rebut 

either charge; indeed, it confirms the latter one. 

Wear attempts to justify her requested intrusion into Tedesco’s financial 

affairs by arguing that the “invalidity of the conservatorship means that [Tedesco’s] 

incompetence renders the trust irrevocable and [she] and Gloria have standing to 

complain of the daughter[s’] breach of fiduciary duty and Wilson’s fraud and collusion.”

She then asserts Wilson’s “failure to account renders it necessary to determine what 

assets [Tedesco] had, whether they were accounted for by the conservator or trustees; 

whether they had been misappropriated; whether they should have been held in or 

recovered by the trust. The requests are directed to these issues.”

In other words, Wear effectively admits that her goal in propounding the 

subpoena—however flawed her justification—was to obtain and examine all of 

Tedesco’s financial records, for the specific purpose of conducting an expeditionary 

search for unidentified financial misconduct. That is a misuse of the discovery process;

by itself it justifies the award of monetary sanctions.
15

DISPOSITION

The order of sanctions is affirmed. Respondents are to recover their costs 

on appeal.

GOETHALS, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.