IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30043

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

MAURICE ANTUAN SPEIGHTS, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:15-CR-46

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

A jury found Maurice Speights guilty of committing sexual abuse under

18 U.S.C. § 2242(2). The district court sentenced Speights to 121 months’ 

imprisonment, followed by five years’ supervised release, and ordered him to 

pay $3,570 in restitution. On appeal, Speights challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his conviction, the legal and evidentiary bases for the

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 9, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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restitution order, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We 

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On the evening of October 19, 2013, Tiffany Scott, then a first lieutenant 

in the army, attended a gathering of friends near Fort Polk military base in 

western Louisiana. Speights, who was on close terms with Scott, was also 

present. Scott had one or two shots of liquor over the course of as many hours.

She and Speights then traveled to the home of Scott’s friend, Kiasha Hamilton, 

who lived on-base at Fort Polk. There, Scott had at least two more shots of 

liquor—one with Speights’ encouragement—and began to show signs of 

intoxication. Later that night, Scott, Speights, and Hamilton went to a bar. By 

the time the three left at around 2:00 a.m., Scott was noticeably drunk and had 

to be helped into Hamilton’s truck. On the drive back, Scott was slumped over 

in the backseat and, according to Hamilton, “had basically passed out.” When 

they arrived at Hamilton’s house, Speights and Hamilton carried Scott, who 

was largely unresponsive, to an upstairs bedroom. They put Scott into the bed 

fully-clothed, and she went directly to sleep. Hamilton initially told Speights 

to spend the night in another room, but when he complained that the room was 

too hot, Hamilton told him he could sleep on the floor in Scott’s room, which 

had the only fan in the house. Hamilton then went to her own room to sleep.

Scott testified that she was unconscious throughout the night, except for 

one point when she briefly awoke to find Speights on top of her. Speights said 

something like “I got this,” and Scott passed out again. The next morning, Scott

found Speights lying next to her in the twin-sized bed. Scott’s pants were 

unbuttoned and unzipped. She immediately felt that something was wrong but 

could not recall what had happened. Hamilton entered the room, told Scott how 

drunk she (Scott) had been the previous night, and asked whether Scott

remembered various events that had happened. Scott said she did not. Scott 

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then went to the bathroom and noticed blood on a tissue when she wiped 

herself. Scott, who is openly lesbian, had never had sex with a man. Feeling 

embarrassed, Scott told Hamilton that she and Speights were leaving. Scott 

and Speights got into Scott’s car, where Scott repeatedly asked Speights what 

he had done to her. Speights said he did not remember. Scott asked whether 

he used protection; Speights again said he did not remember. Speights asked 

Scott whether she would forgive him and whether she would tell anyone. Scott 

told Speights to get out of the car and called him a coward. When she arrived 

home, she took a shower.

Scott contacted a sexual harassment representative and went to the 

hospital for an examination. There, Scott reported that she was sure there had 

been penetration. A physical examination did not reveal any visible injuries.

Initially, Scott made her report restricted out of embarrassment that her chain 

of command could find out about the incident. But on December 10, 2013, after 

several sessions of counseling, she granted access to the Army’s Criminal 

Investigation Command (known as “CID”). CID interviewed various witnesses 

and examined the scene at Hamilton’s residence. CID also requested the 

assistance of the FBI, which located Speights in Florida. In an interview with

the FBI, Speights stated that he encountered Scott at the bar and did not know 

she had been drinking. He and Scott then went to the apartment of one of 

Scott’s friends, where, according to Speights, the two briefly had consensual 

sex. 

On March 12, 2015, Speights was indicted on one count of sexual abuse 

under 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2). A two-day trial was held. After the Government 

presented its case, Speights moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the 

district court denied. Speights did not take the stand, but the FBI agent who 

interviewed him testified about the account Speights had given. The jury 

unanimously found Speights guilty.

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The presentence report (PSR) calculated Speights’ offense level to be 30, 

which corresponded to a range of 97–121 months in prison under the 

Sentencing Guidelines. The PSR included a “Victim Impact” section stating, in 

pertinent part:

A Declaration of Victim Losses was received from the victim, 

Tiffany Scott. The Declaration of Victim Losses states the 

following:

I, Captain Tiffany Scott, am a victim in the above referenced case. 

I believe that I am entitled to restitution in the total amount of 

$3,570.00.

My specific losses, harms, or costs as a result of this offense are 

summarized as follows:

– From November 2013 to April 2015 I drove to Behavioral 

Health appointments twice a week. Gas - $1500

– Clothing taken for evidence - $70

* * *

– After the incident I isolated myself from the world and felt lost. 

I went into deep depression. I was not eating and had no energy 

to do anything. That was not like me because I am a very social 

being. I had to fly my grandmother out for a few months, to help 

me get back to myself.

– Flight/cost of living for 3 months - $2,000

* * *

At the sentencing hearing, Speights, citing his limited criminal history

and other mitigating factors, argued for a sentence at the low end of the 

Guidelines range. The district court, stating that it had “not heard one word of 

sympathy for the victim,” adopted the PSR’s findings and sentenced Speights 

to 121 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. The court 

also ordered Speights to pay the full $3,570 in restitution requested by Scott. 

Speights objected, arguing that Scott did not qualify for restitution under 18 

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U.S.C. § 3663A and that there had been “no proof of any expenses incurred.”

The district court overruled the objection. 

This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

To obtain a conviction for sexual abuse under § 2242(2), the Government 

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant knowingly 

engaged in a “sexual act” with the victim; (2) the act took place within the 

special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or certain other 

locations specified in the statute; and (3) the defendant knew the victim was 

either (a) “incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct” or (b) “physically 

incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to 

engage in, that sexual act.” 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2); see United States v. Bruguier, 

735 F.3d 754, 757–63 (8th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding that § 2242(2) requires 

the defendant to have knowledge of the victim’s incapacity or inability to 

consent).1 Speights disputes only the third element, asserting there is 

insufficient evidence that he knew Scott was physically incapable of declining 

participation in the sexual act.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

conviction, we ask “whether, after viewing the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). 

Applying that standard to the case at hand, we conclude that a rational jury 

 

1 This circuit has not previously confronted the question decided by the Eighth Circuit 

in Bruguier. Since the parties do not dispute that a mens rea of knowledge is required under

the third element, we will assume as much for purposes of this case only. We express no 

opinion on whether § 2242(2) actually requires that a defendant have knowledge of the 

victim’s incapacity or inability to consent.

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could have found that Speights knew Scott was physically incapable of 

declining participation in the sexual act Speights committed. Ample testimony 

indicated that Speights knew that Scott was intoxicated to the point of 

unconsciousness. In addition, Scott testified that she had passed out, briefly 

awoke to find Speights on top of her, and then passed out again. See United 

States v. Fasthorse, 639 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘[A] reasonable jury 

may conclude that a person who is asleep when a sexual act begins is physically 

unable to decline participation in that act.’” (quoting United States v. 

Wilcox, 487 F.3d 1163, 1169 (8th Cir. 2007))). Speights gave a conflicting 

account to the FBI, but the jury was not required to credit his version of events, 

and when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we 

must assume that it did not. See United States v. Winkler, 639 F.3d 692, 700 

(5th Cir. 2011).

B. The Restitution Order

Speights challenges the district court’s restitution order on two grounds. 

We review “the legality of a restitution order de novo and the amount of the 

restitution order for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Adams, 363 F.3d 

363, 365 (5th Cir. 2004).

First, Speights asserts that the restitution order is not supported by 

adequate evidence because it is based entirely on Scott’s “unaudited victim 

impact statement,” as incorporated into the PSR. Generally speaking, “a PSR 

bears sufficient indicia of reliability” for a court to rely on its contents for 

sentencing purposes. United States v. Huerta, 182 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 

1999); accord United States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2012). It is 

true that “mere inclusion in the PSR does not convert facts lacking an adequate 

evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability into facts a district court 

may rely upon.” Harris, 702 F.3d at 230 n.2. We do not view Scott’s declaration

as falling into this latter category, however. Scott’s statement provides 

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sufficient factual details to support each portion of the total amount of 

restitution she sought and is thus unlike the sort of “[b]ald, conclusionary 

statements [that] do not acquire the patina of reliability by mere inclusion in 

the PSR.” United States v. Elwood, 999 F.2d 814, 817–18 (5th Cir. 1993); see 

also United States v. Sharma, 703 F.3d 318, 323–24 (5th Cir. 2012) (district 

court abused its discretion by awarding restitution based on PSR that 

contained “obvious mistakes” suggesting that the Probation Office failed to 

give “any meaningful scrutiny to the actual losses” suffered).

Second, Speights argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3663A does not authorize 

restitution for the $2,000 in costs Scott incurred when she arranged for her

grandmother to travel and live with her for several months as social support 

following the incident, or for the $1,500 Scott spent on gas while travelling to 

mental health appointments for a year and a half.2 We need not decide whether 

these losses fit into the categories delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b) because 

they are plainly compensable under 18 U.S.C. § 2248.3 Section 2248 requires a

court to order restitution in “the full amount of the victim’s losses,” which it 

defines to include: “medical service relating to physical, psychiatric, or 

psychological care”; “necessary transportation [and] temporary housing . . . 

expenses”; and “any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result 

of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 2248(b)(1), (3). The factual information in the PSR 

 

2 Speights concedes that the $70 in restitution for clothing seized as evidence is

authorized by statute.

3 Speights asserts that the Government waived its argument that § 2248 authorized

the restitution order by failing to raise that argument before the district court. Speights has 

not adequately briefed this argument; in particular, his conclusory assertion fails to grapple 

with the mandatory nature of restitution under § 2248. See 18 U.S.C. § 2248(a), (b)(4). 

Although neither the district court nor the PSR cited § 2248, this court may affirm a 

restitution order “in the absence of express findings if the record provides an adequate basis 

to support the restitution.” Sharma, 703 F.3d at 322 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

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reasonably suggests that Speights’ offense proximately caused Scott to incur 

these losses and belies any suggestion that the causal link here is so attenuated 

that Scott’s losses were a “mere fortuity.” Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 

1710, 1719 (2014).

We perceive no basis for overturning the district court’s restitution order.

C. Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentence

Speights challenges his 121-month sentence as substantively 

unreasonable. Since it falls within the properly calculated range set forth by 

the Guidelines, the sentence is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 

reasonableness. United States v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 2011).

Speights briefly argues that the district court did not adequately consider a 

variety of mitigating factors, including his lack of criminal history and the 

requirement that he register as a sex offender upon release. However, he raised 

these same arguments during his sentencing hearing, and the district court 

considered them before it handed down the sentence. A defendant’s mere 

disagreement with his sentence, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the 

presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Ruiz, 621 F.3d 390, 398 (5th 

Cir. 2010).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 

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