### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs D ec em be r 18, 200 7
WILLIAM MILLE R v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Warre n Coun ty Nos. F -9154 and F- 9654 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

No. M2007- 00487-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Fe bruary 25, 2008

Th e pe tit ion e r, William Mi lle r, ple a de d guil ty to s a le of mor e tha n . 5 g ra ms o f c oc a ine , a

Cla ss B felony , and two counts of sale of less than .5 g rams of coca ine, Class C felonies, in exchang e for an eff ective se ntence of 12 y ear s. On pos t-conviction appeal, t he petitioner a rgues that his g uilty

plea was unlaw fully

induced a

nd enter ed wi thout an understandingof the c onsequenc es, that the prosec ution failed to disclose favorable evidenc e, and that his trial counsel was inef fec tive by failing to investigate alibis and inform him of opportunities to appe al m o t i o n s
. Discer ning no e rror , we aff irm the denial of post-c onviction relief.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. G L EN N and D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J J ., joined.
Bud Shar p, McMinnville, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Wi lliam Mil ler. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; Camero n L . Hy der, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; and L isa Z avog iannis, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION
On Janu ary 26 , 2 00 5, the pe tit ion e r ple a de d guil ty to t he sa le of mor e tha n . 5 g ra ms of c oc a ine , a

Cla ss B fe lony , a

nd tw o c ounts of

sa le of le ss t ha n .5 grams of

c oc a ine , a

Cla ss C felony

. SeeT.C.A. § 39-17-417. He rec eived a sentenc e of twelve y ear s on the Class B fe lony and eig ht y ear s on eac h of the Class C felonies, to be se rved c oncurr ently as a Rang e I IOffe nder at 35 perc ent. The pe titioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on November

10, 2005. An
e v i d e n t i ar y h e ar i n g w a s h e l d

o nJ anu ar

y 1 0 , 2 0 0 7 i nt h e C r i m i n a l C o u rtf o r S h e l b y C o u n t y.-2- At the post-conviction hea ring , the petitioner testified that his main issues were a lac k of a spe edy

trial, that his alibi witnesses were never interviewe d, that he did not rec eive pr oper discovery , and that his attorney did not appeal motions. The petitioner te stified that he we nt to trial fo ur te e n mo nth s f

ro m the date of his ind ic tme nt. He te sti fi e d th a t hi s c ouns e l di d in fa c t sp e a k w ith his alibi witnesses but that the information was not pre sented to the c ourt.

The pe titioner testified that he did not know that the denial of his motion for a spe edy trial could have been appea led t o the C ourt of C riminal Appea ls. He said he took the plea ag ree ment beca use his pre- trial motions were unsuc cessf ul and his counsel advise d him that he “c ouldn’t win,” and “ne eded to g o on and plea d out.”

On cr oss examination, t he petitio n er t es t i fied that his counse l went throug h the char g es with him, as well as e vidence the State would pre sent if the case went to trial. He testified that he saw transcr ipts fr om a confide ntial inf ormant and wa s awa

re that he could be f

acingup to 80 y e ars in p ri so n if

he wa s c on vic te d. He kn e w the c ha rg e of se lli ngc oc a ine in a

sc ho ol zo ne wa s a Class B fe l o n y

subject to 100 perc ent servic e of ja il tim e. The petitioner testified that at the plea hear ing he told the judg e that he had no problems with his repr esentation a nd that he wa s satisfied with how his counsel had ha ndled the ca se.
Trial counse l t es t i fi ed that he f iled motions t o suppress evide nce, a motion for a speedy trial, and a

motion to obt ain the ar

rest history

of the c onfidential i nformant. He wanted the
arr est history

to support a theory

that the inform an t p ro v i d ed information in ex chang e for specia l treatment but there wa s no informatio n t o support this. He testified that he inve stigated the pe tit ion e r’ s a lib i, b ut “ the a lib is w e re no t of any va lue

. . . I

did in ves ti g a te the m and Itr ie d to develop them a

nd Idon’t think they

wer e any benef it.”
Trial counse l testified that he wa s conce rned w ith the petitioner’s cr iminal hist ory be c a us e he fe are d a jur

y wo uld loo k ne g a tiv e ly up on it. He sa id that he dis c us se d th e ple a of fe r w ith the petitioner for

“a g ood hour, two hours.” Trial counsel testified he explained to the pe titioner the conseque nces of

losing the motions and exactly what the plea

ag ree ment entailed.
On cr oss examination, t rial counse l testified that he ar gu ed the motions on the petitioner’s behalf befor e any plea a g ree ment was e ntere d, that he filed se vera l motions for the c ase, and pe rf or me d a n a pp ro pr iate inv e sti g a tio n. Th e ple a a g re e me nt w a s d isc us se d “ e xten siv e ly” wi th the petitioner. The pe tition for post-conviction relief was de nied by

written orde r on Janurary 19, 2 0 0 7

. T h e o rd er

ad dre s s edt h e s p ec i fi c c l ai m s b y t h e p et i t i o n er , h o l d i n g:
Petitioner first all eg es that the c onviction was base d on an unlawf

ull y induced guilty

plea involuntarily

enter ed without understandingthe nature and conse quence s of the plea . The trial court finds the Petitioner ha s no evidenc e of this. In fac t, the proof-3- showed the Petitioner had rea d, signe d, and answe red in c ourt that he had re ad and unde rstood the plea and t hat he wa s enteringinto the ag ree ment fre ely

and voluntarily . The c ourt furthe r co n s i d ere d the Pe tit ion e r’ s p re vi ou s convic tio ns on mul tip le a c c ounts and

his fa mil iari ty wi th t he le g a l sy ste m. Petitioner alleg es that his c onviction was base d on the unconstitutional failure of the prosec ution to dis close to Petitioner evidenc e fa

vorable to Petitioner. The trial court hea rd no proof

of any favor able e vidence not disclosed.

Petitioner alleg es the denial of eff ective a ssistance of
co u n s e l b y

n e v e r r e c e iv in g th e in f

o r ma n t’ s ar r e s t h is to r y
. T h e tr ia l
c ourt he ard no e vid e nc e that th e State ha d a n o bl igat io n to turn

thi s over to Petitioner and is a n invalid gr ound for post convic tion.
Petition e r a ll e g e s h is pr ior attorney

. . . never contac ted those named on the indictment. Attorne y . . . testified that he talke d to some of the witnesses listed on the [ i] ndictment, but could not say that he talked to e veryone listed. The trial court did not hear how, by contac ting those listed on the Indictment, would prove his innoce nce in Count I I

. Petitioner alleg es that his prior attorne y
. . . u s ed a
scar e tac tic by

telling him he did not believe they could win. The tria l court notes that a

g o o d attorney

would let the Petitioner know what he is f a c ingif c on vic te d at tr ia l and the lik e lih oo d to su c c e ss at tr ia l.
Petitio n e r a ll e g e s th a t h e f

il e d a M o ti o nf o r Sp e e dy Trial an d t hat this Motion was not heard. The trial court f inds that this Moti on was he ard a

nd that the Petit i o n er was incarce rate d on oth e r c ha rg e s at th e tim e and

the fact th at it wa s to be tr ie d w ith in fourtee n (14) months from the indictment a nd there fore , car

ries no weig ht.
Th e tr ia l c o u rt f in d s th a t t

h e Pe ti ti o n e r

w a s not prejudice d and did enter

a knowingand voluntary plea. The pe titioner filed a timely appea l on Febr

uary 12, 2007. I n this appeal he alleg es that his guilty

plea wa s unlawfully

induced a

nd enter ed without an understanding of the conseque nces, that the prosec ution failed to disclose ex culpatory evidenc e, and that his trial counsel was inef fec tive by failing to investigate alibis and inform the pe titione r of oppor tunities to appeal
un su c c e ssf

ul m oti on s.-4- The post-c onviction petitioner bea rs the burden of proving his or her alleg ations by clea r and c onvinci n g ev i d en ce . T.C.A. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2006). On a ppeal, the a

ppellate c ourt ac co rd s t o t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs o f fa ct t h e we i gh t o f aj u ry v er d i ct , an d

t h es e f i n d i n gs are conclusive on a

ppeal unless the e vidence prepond er at es aga inst them. He nle yv . S tate , 960 S.W. 2d 57 2, 57 8- 79 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ; Ba te s v . S tate , 973 S.W .2d 615, 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

. By contra st, the post-conviction court’ s conclusions of law r ece ive no def ere nce or presumption of
corr ectne ss on appea l. Fi e lds v . S tate , 40 S.W .3d 450, 453 (Tenn. 2001)

. W e w i l l n o w a d dr e s s t h e c l a i m s o f t h e p e t i t i o n e r

i n d i v i d u a l l y.
A. P e ti ti one r ’s c lai m th atth e gui lt y pl e a was unla wfully i nduc e d and en ter e d wit hout unde r st andi ng t he c ons e que nc e s.

The pe t i t i o ner f

irst argues that his g uilty

plea wa s unlawfully

induced a

nd enter ed without understandingthe conse quence s. Due proc ess demands that a gu ilty plea be enter ed voluntarily , knowing ly , and under standing ly

. See B oykin v . Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969). “[T] he core requireme nt of Bo y k in is ‘ that no g uilty

plea be acc epted without an a ffirmative showing th a t it w a s inte ll ig e n t an d v o lu n ta r y .’” B l a n ke n ship v. State, 858 S.W .2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (q u o t i n g Fo nta inev . U

nite d S tates, 52 6 F .2 d 51 4, 51 6 (6 th Cir

. 19 75 ))

. Th e ple a mus t r e pr e se nt a “voluntary

and intellige nt choice a

mong the al t er n ati ve cour ses of a ction open to the def endant.” North C arolina v. Alford, 40 0 U .S. 25 , 3 1 ( 19 70 ). A p le a is i nv olu

nta ry if the a c c us e d is incompetent or only

“if it is the product o f ‘i gn o ranc e, incompre hension, coe rcion, ter ror, inducements, [or] subtle or blatant thre ats.’” Blankenship, 8 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d at 9 0 4 (q u o t i n g Bo

y k in , 395 U.S. at 242-43).

I n this case, the pe titioner testified that he made the choice to plead guilty based upon his be lie f t

hat he c ou ld n ot b e su c c e ssf ul at tr ia l. A lth ou g h h e c la ime d th a t he did no t c omp le te ly
un de rs tand

his a pp e llate op tio ns , th e pe tit ion e r a c kn ow le dg e d that his tr ia l c ouns e l ha d f ull y explained the conseque nces of the guilty pleas to him. Trial counse l testified that he discussed the entirety of the State’s e vidence with the petitioner and that it was the petitioner’s c hoice to plea d g uilty . The pe titioner testified that he wa s advised of his rights be fore enter ing his plea s. Moreove r, nothing in the tra

nscript sug g ests that the pl eas were the product of “‘ignor ance , incomprehe nsion,
coer cion, terr or, induce ments, [or] subtle or blatant thre ats.’” Blankenship, 8 5 8 S

. W

. 2d at 904 (q u o t i n g Bo

y k in , 3 95 U. S. at 24 2- 43 ). Un de r t he se c ir c ums tanc e s, the pe tit ion e r h a s f a ile d to establish by clea

r and convincing evidenc e that his guilty pleas wer e not knowing ly , voluntarily , and intelligently

enter ed.

B. Pe titioner’ s claim that the prosec ution f ailed to disclose e v id e nc e fa v orable to the pet itioner.

Th e pe tit ion e r n e xt ar g ue s g e ne ra lly that th e State wi thh e ld “ fa vo ra ble ” state me nts , including “ the police state ments, or t he informant, the wit nesses’ statements.” The withholding of
cer tain exculpatory

information runs af

o u l of principles of

due proc ess. See, e .g. , Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). The state counte rs that no exculpatory or mater ial-5-

statements wer e withheld.

I n Brady , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u rt h e l d t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n h a s a constitutional dut

y to f urnish an ac cused w ith ex culpatory evidenc e per

taining to e ither the a ccuse d’s g uilt or innocenc e or the puni shment that may be im posed. Fa ilure to reve al exculpatory evidenc e violates due proc ess when the evidenc e is materia l either to g uilt or punishment, irrespec tive of the prosec ution’s good f

aith. Brady , 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97. I n Strickler v. G reene , 527 U.S. 263, 119 S. C t. 1936 (1999), the Court enumer ated three components of a Bradyviolation: “The
e vid e nc e a t is su e mus t be fa vo ra ble to t he a c c us e d, e ith e r b e c a

us e it is e xcu lpator

y , o r b e c a us e it i s i mp e a c h i n g ; t h a te v i d e n c e m u s t h av e b e e ns u p p r e s s e d b y t h e S t a t e , e i t h e r

w i l l f u l l y o r i n a dv e rt e n t l y; and pre judice must have e nsued.” Id. at 281-82, 119 S. Ct. at 1948.

We see n o evidenc e of a

such a violation in the pre sent ca se. The post-c onviction court foun d

th a t t h e r e w a s n o p r o o f

o f an y u n d is c lo s e d

f a v o r a b le e v id e n c e
. T h e p e ti ti o n e r has provided no proof of any such undisclosed evidenc e, its suppre ssion by the State, or ho w h e was prejudice d. Acc ording ly , the record supports the pos t-conviction cour t’s finding that no violation of the pe titioner’s due proc ess rig hts occurr ed.

C. P e ti ti one r ’s c lai m of ine ffec ti ve as sis ta nc e of c ouns e l.

Finally , the petitioner a

rgues that he rec eived ineffe ctive assitanc e of c ounsel. The Six th Amendment of t h e United St ates Constituti on and ar ticle I , section 9 of the T ennesse e Con sti tut ion

bo th r e qu ir e tha

t a de fe nd ant in a cr imi na l ca se re c e ive e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. See U. S. Co ns t. a

me nd . V I ; T e nn . Co ns t. a

rt . I , § 9; se e als o B ax te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930 (Tenn. 1975). “Claims of inef

fec tive assistance of counse l are considere d mix ed questions of lawand fa ct and ar e subjec t to de novo revie w.” Se rra no v . S tate , 133 S.W. 3d

59 9, 60 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) ; se e Sta te v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) When a def endant c lai m s i n ef

fective assistance of
c o u n s e l, th e c o u rt mu s t d e te r mi n e ( 1 ) w h e th e r c o u n s e l’ s p e r f o r ma n c e w a s w it

h in th e r an g e of competenc e dema

nded of attorney s in criminal ca ses, Baxter , 523 S.W .2d at 936, and ( 2) whe ther any defic ient perf

ormanc e pre

judiced the pe titioner, Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct . 2052, 2068 (1984). Se e als o P owe rs v . S tate , 942 S.W .2d 551, 557 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Courts need not a ddress these components in any particula r order or even addre ss both if the petitioner fa ils to m eet his burde n with respec t to one. Henley , 960 S.W .2d at 580.

A r e vie wi ngc ourt

mus t in du lg e a

str on g p res ump tio n th a t c ouns e l’ s c on du c t f a lls within the range o f re as o n ab l e prof essional assistance

. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct . at 20 70 . T his c ourt

sh ou ld n ot s e c on d- g ue ss i nf ormed ta c tic a l and

str a te g ic de c isi on s b y

de fe ns e counsel. Henley , 960 S.W .2d at 579. I t must evaluate counsel’s perf ormanc e fr o m co u n s el’s perspe ctive at the time of

the alleg ed error and in light of the totality of the e vidence

. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct . at 2070.-6- Howeve r, this co u rt’s def ere nce to c ounsel’s tac tical dec isions will depend upon counsel’s a dequate investigation of defense options. Burger v. Kem p , 4 83 U. S. 7 76 , 7 94 , 1 07 S. Ct

. 3114, 3126 (1987). Assuming adequate investig ation, the fa ct that a strateg y or tac tic failed or

hurt the defe nse does not alone support the claim of ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. Tho mp so n v . S tate , 9 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d 1 5 6 , 1 6 5 ( T e n n
. C r i m
. Ap p
. 19 97 ); Jerr y W hitesid e Di c k e rso n v . S tate , No. 03C01- 9710-CR-00472, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxvil le, Sept. 16, 1998).

I n s um, a de fe nd ant is not e nti tle d to pe rf e c t r e pr e se ntatio n, on ly

c on sti tut ion a lly adequate re prese ntation. De nto n v . S tate , 945 S.W .2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

. To show prejudice , the petitioner must demonstrate a rea sonable proba

bility that but for counse l’s defic ient perf ormanc e, the r esult of the proc eedingwould have be en diffe rent. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 10 4 S. Ct. a t 20 68

. A r e a so na ble pr ob a bil ity is “ a pr ob a bil ity su ff ic ie nt t o und e rm ine c on fi de nc e in the outcome.” Id

.

Our a naly sis of t he is sues on appea l need not be protracted. The recor d supports the post-conviction cour

t’s deter mination that the petitioner failed to e stablish his claims of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. The trial co u rt found that trial counse l perf ormed a n appropr iate investig ation into the case, an d that finding is supported in the rec ord. That ce rtain motions were not appea led does not per se entitle the pe titioner to relief. The Tenne ssee Supreme Court has c onsistently held that the entr

y of an infor

med and co u n s el ed guilty plea constitutes an admission of all of the f acts a nd elem en t s nece ssary

to sustain a conviction and a waiver of any non-jurisdictional defe cts or constitutional irregularities. See State v. Mc Kinney , 74 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 1 , 3 0 6 (T en n
. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Carter , 9 88 S.W. 2d 14 5, 14 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; State v. Pettus , 9 8 6 S.W .2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) ). More over, tria l counsel’s de cision not to pursue an appea l of unsucce ssful motions qualifies, in thi s case , as a sound tac tical dec ision.

F ina lly , th e pe tit ion e r’ s a lle g e d a lib i wi tne sse s we re no t c a lle d to te sti fy a t th e po stconviction hea

ring and no evide nce instruc ts us as to what their testi mony would provide. “ When a [post-conviction] petit ioner c ontends that trial counse l failed t o d i s co v er, inter view, or pr esent witnesses in support of his defe n s e, these witnesses should be pre sented by the petitioner at the evidentiar y hear ing.” Blac k

v . S tate , 7 9 4 S

. W

. 2 d

7 5 2 , 7 5 7 ( T e n n
. C r i m
. Ap p
. 1 9 9 0 )

. G e n e r a l l y, pr e se nti ngsu c h wi tne sse s in the po st- c on vic tio n he ari ng is the on ly wa y a pe tit ion e r c an e sta

bli sh that “ the fa ilure to d isc ov e r o r i nte rv ie w a wi tn ess in ured to h is p re jud ic e
. . . o r .
. . the fa ilure to have a known witness prese nt or call the witness to the stand resulted in th e d en i al o f c ri tical evidenc e which inur ed t o t h e pre judice of the petitioner.” Id . Acc ording ly , a petitioner w ho
e sta bli sh e s th a t tr ia l c ouns e l de fi c ie ntl y pe rf or me d b y fa ili ngto i nv e sti g a te or

c a ll w itn e sse s is
e n t i t l e d t o n o r e l i e f “ u n l e s s h e c an p r o d u c e a m a t e r i a l w i t n e s s w h o ( a ) c o u l d h a v e b e e nf

o u n d b y a rea sonable investig ation and (b) would have te stified favor ably in support of his defe nse if ca lled.” Id . at 757-58. Thus, the pe titioner failed to esta blish prejudice with re spect to trial counse l’s failure to u se any

or a ll o f t he pr os pe c tiv e a lib i w itn e sse s at tr ia l.-7- Havingrevie wed the petitioner’s claims for post-c onviction relief a nd holding that the re cord suppor

ts the post-conviction court’s denial of his c laims, w e aff irm the judg ment of the po st- c on vic tio n c ourt

.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT J R., J UDGE