* This opinion is being released initially in typescript form. In the



## United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

__________

No. 09

‐ 2264

IN RE:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner.

__________

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

from the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:05

‐ cr

‐ 00145

‐ JPS

‐ 1

‐‐ J.P. Stadtmueller

, Judge

.

__________

JULY 10, 2009 *

__________

Before RIPPLE, ROVNER and WOOD, Circuit Judges

.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

. The United States (“the Government”) has

filed this petition for a writ of mandamus seeking the recusal of the

respondent district judge currently presiding over a criminal action

pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin. Because the Government has established that a reasonable,

well

‐ informed observer might question the impartiality of the districtNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 2

judge, we must grant the requested writ, disqualifying the judge from

presiding over the proceeding and requiring that he vacate all orders

entered since the filing of the recusal motion in the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

In January 2003, Rashid A. Salahuddin failed to return to a

corrections facility while he was on work

‐ release. Local authorities in

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, obtained an escape warrant and searched for

Mr. Salahuddin in the home of his estranged wife, where he may have

been living at the time. During the course of the search, the officers

discovered two guns in a bedroom closet, but they did not find Mr.

Salahuddin. The next day, they returned, found Mr. Salahuddin and

placed him under arrest. Before the officers were able to administer

Miranda warnings, Mr. Salahuddin stated that there were two guns in the

closet of the bedroom where the guns had been found the previous day.

Mr. Salahuddin was charged in state court with being a felon in

possession of a firearm. Later that month, a state court commissioner

dismissed the case for lack of probable cause on the ground that there

was insufficient evidence connecting the guns to Mr. Salahuddin. The

state appealed, arguing that Mr. Salahuddin’s statement indicated an

ability to possess the guns. The state court disagreed, however, and, in

April 2003, affirmed the commissioner’s dismissal of the case.

More than two years later, in June 2005, a federal grand jury

indicted Mr. Salahuddin on one count of being a felon in possession of a

firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The case was assigned toNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 3

1 Citations to the record are to the district court’s docket available on

CM/ECF. There is no record on appeal. Judge Clevert. Shortly thereafter, the parties began plea negotiations.

The assistant United States attorney prosecuting the case suggested in a

letter to Mr. Salahuddin’s attorney that Mr. Salahuddin would not

qualify as an armed career criminal and therefore would not be subject

to the fifteen

‐ year mandatory minimum sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §

924(e)(1). According to the prosecutor’s letter, Mr. Salahuddin’s criminal

history included juvenile convictions for resisting or obstructing an

officer, receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled substance

and three separate incidents of burglary. He also had adult convictions

for armed robbery (for which he had been imprisoned for almost eight

years), being a felon in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed

weapon, possession of marijuana and escape. The assistant United States

attorney calculated Mr. Salahuddin’s advisory guideline range as 46

‐ 57

months’ imprisonment, but also advised Mr. Salahuddin that “the judge

will ultimately decide the defendant’s criminal history score.” R.20, Att.

1. 1 Mr. Salahuddin elected to plead guilty. At the change of plea hearing,

Mr. Salahuddin hesitated when the court explained that, by pleading

guilty, he could no longer challenge the admissibility of the

Government’s evidence against him as the fruits of an unlawful search.

Mr. Salahuddin decided at that time to plead not guilty. Judge Clevert

set the matter for trial, but, only days later, Mr. Salahuddin again

changed his mind and entered a guilty plea.

After the change of plea hearing, but shortly before the sentencing

hearing, the Government altered its position and informed

Mr. Salahuddin that it now believed he did qualify as an armed career

criminal. Mr. Salahuddin then moved to withdraw his plea, which the

Government opposed. Judge Clevert granted Mr. Salahuddin’s motionNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 4

2 Around the same time, the Government petitioned for Mr. Salahuddin’s

pretrial bond to be revoked. This matter was heard before Magistrate Judge

Callahan, who agreed with the Government that Mr. Salahuddin’s failure to return

home, as required by the conditions of his release, necessitated the revocation of his

bond. Mr. Salahuddin did not challenge the petition for detention, and he was

remanded into custody. to withdraw his plea and, in the same order, recused himself from further

participation in the case.

The matter was reassigned to Chief Judge Randa. Although the

deadline for filing pretrial motions had expired, Mr. Salahuddin moved

in March 2006 for leave to file instanter two motions to suppress both the

guns and statements he allegedly had made. The motions were referred

to Magistrate Judge Goodstein who, reasoning that the delay in filing the

suppression motions resulted from the dispute over the applicability of

the armed career criminal statute, concluded that “in the interests of

justice” the motions should be entertained. R.39 at 3. The Government

sought review of that order in the district court. Chief Judge Randa

concluded in May 2006 that Mr. Salahuddin had not met the “good

cause” requirement of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e) and,

therefore, reversed the magistrate judge’s decision. 2

After a two

‐ day trial in August 2006, Mr. Salahuddin was

convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(1). Mr. Salahuddin’s post

‐ trial motions for a judgment of acquittal

and for a new trial were denied, and Chief Judge Randa sentenced him

to 180 months’ imprisonment; the sentence was the mandatory minimum

for career criminals sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and also was

below the advisory guidelines range.

Mr. Salahuddin appealed to this court. He argued that the district

court should have entertained his motions to suppress. We agreed andNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 5

3 Circuit Rule 36 provides in relevant part: “Whenever a case tried in a

district court is remanded by this court for a new trial, it shall be reassigned by the

district court for trial before a judge other than the judge who heard the prior trial

unless the remand order directs or all parties request that the same judge retry the

case.

. . .” Circuit Rule 36. It is not immediately clear whether this rule required

Chief Judge Randa to recuse himself before ruling on the suppression motions.

Although the rule requires cases remanded for new trials to be reassigned, this

court’s opinion only conditionally directed a new trial, which would be necessary

only if the district court first concluded that Mr. Salahuddin’s arguments were

meritorious. Orders directing the district court to undertake further proceedings are

routinely heard by the district judge who entered the order that was the subject of

the appeal. Chief Judge Randa probably could have, consistent with Circuit Rule

36, heard the suppression motions and, if necessary, ordered the case reassigned if

he concluded that a new trial was warranted. held that it was “incongruous to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty

plea and go to trial while not permitting him to litigate the admissibility

of significant evidence.” United States v. Salahuddin

, 509 F.3d 858, 862 (7th

Cir. 2007). We remanded the case with instructions to hear the

suppression motions and, if they were found to be meritorious, to order

a new trial.

B.

On remand, the motions were referred to Magistrate Judge

Goodstein, who recommended that the motions be denied in their

entirety. Mr. Salahuddin objected to the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation, and the Government filed a response. However, before

the district court issued a ruling on the report and recommendation,

Chief Judge Randa sua sponte recused himself under Circuit Rule 36. 3 The

case was reassigned to the respondent district judge (hereinafter “the

Judge”).No. 09

‐ 2264 Page 6

The Judge reviewed the report and recommendation, and he

called a meeting in chambers on October 9, 2008, with then

‐ United States

Attorney Steven M. Biskupic and Federal Defender Daniel W. Stiller.

Assistant United States Attorney Gordon P. Giampietro and Associate

Federal Defender Nancy Joseph, who were the attorneys actually

litigating the case, were not invited. No court reporter was present, and

no meeting minutes are reflected on the district court’s docket. The Judge

began by telling Mr. Biskupic and Mr. Stiller that he would not hear

discussion, comment or response from either of them. According to the

parties’ submissions, the Judge then recounted the procedural history of

the case and reminded the office heads that, before the confusion

surrounding application of the armed career criminal statute, both parties

had preferred to resolve the case with a plea bargain. The Judge also

suggested that his pending ruling on the motions to suppress would not

satisfy either party and recommended that they consult with the assigned

attorneys to explore the possibility of resolving the case without

additional litigation.

The Government adds that, in discussing the procedural history

of the case, the Judge suggested that there was “an awful lot of blame to

be spread around for what he considered to be a total breakdown of

justice.” Pet. 4. The Government states that the Judge mentioned the

length of time that had passed between Mr. Salahuddin’s arrest by state

authorities and the commencement of his federal prosecution and

questioned why the case was accepted for federal prosecution at all,

given that the qualifying conviction for armed career criminal status was

an armed robbery Mr. Salahuddin had committed while a juvenile (he

had been waived into adult court). The Government further recites that

the Judge said the case should be resolved without further litigation and

that he recommended that the parties agree to a guilty plea to a false

‐

statement count (which carries a ten

‐ year statutory maximum, as

opposed to the fifteen

‐ year statutory minimum under § 924(e)),

recognizing that Mr. Salahuddin would have to waive the statute ofNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 7

4 This account is corroborated by the Judge’s order of April 10, 2009, which

denied the Government’s motion for reconsideration of its request for recusal. See

R.117 at 5 n.1. (stating that “the court thought it prudent to suggest an alternative

disposition under an otherwise appropriate statute that would not trigger

application of the enhancement”).

5 This concern also is corroborated by comments in the Judge’s order of

January 8, 2009, denying the Government’s motion for recusal. R.107 at 1. limitations. 4 The Government submits that the Judge suggested in the

alternative that the case be sent back to state court. Finally, the

Government suggests that, although the Judge recognized that he should

not be involved in plea negotiations, he opined that this was an

“extremely rare” case that needed to be addressed “at the top”; that he

was disturbed that there were 100 docket entries in a one

‐ count gun case; 5

that if the case were to go forward there may be another appeal; that the

case was “an embarrassment to the justice system;” and that he would

recuse himself if requested. Pet. 5. Neither the Judge nor Mr. Salahuddin

challenges the accuracy of the Government’s recitation of these additional

facts.

Eleven days later, on October 20, 2008, the Government moved for

the Judge’s recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). On January 5, 2009,

the Government inquired as to the status of the case. Three days later,

the Judge issued an order adopting in part the report and

recommendation of the magistrate judge. He granted Mr. Salahuddin’s

motions to suppress statements, denied the motion to suppress the gun,

ordered a new trial and denied the Government’s motion for recusal.

The portion of the order denying the recusal motion reads in its entirety:

There remains but one additional matter

‐ a recusal motion filed

by the government. The motion followed a joint meeting between

the court and counsel for the parties as more fully detailed in anNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 8

earlier footnote. To be sure, on its face the motion represents

nothing more than an ill

‐ considered, poorly

‐ disguised,

preemptive collateral attack, albeit through the convenience of

forum shopping, on the wisdom of the court’s decision

announced today. The motion is denied.

R.107 at 30

‐ 31. The earlier footnote explains that:

The court was prepared to issue its decision on de novo review of

the magistrate’s recommendations on October 10, 2008. As part

of its review, the court took note of the troubling procedural

history of this case and the ever

‐ mounting commitment of limited

prosecution, defense, and judicial resources that, when taken

together, have become prohibitively expensive and certainly less

cost effective to taxpayer interests. Thus, the confluence of these

factors together with the interests of justice more than suggest that

the court and counsel for the parties make a good faith effort

toward resolution of the case without the necessity of further

litigation. Toward that end, on October 9, 2008, the court met in

chambers with the Federal Defender, Daniel Stiller, and the

United States Attorney, Steven Biskupic, to explain that the court

had completed its review of the magistrate’s recommendation

and, without further elaboration, indicated that neither side

would be happy with the court ruling since litigation in the case

would likely continue unabated. The court then provided counsel

with additional relevant background facts leading to the court’s

recommendation that the parties explore potential alternatives to

the current charge. The court concluded by stating that it would

withhold release of today’s ruling for a reasonable period of time

so as to provide the parties with a safe harbor within which to

consider an alternative disposition.

R.117 at 2 n.1.No. 09

‐ 2264 Page 9

Two weeks later, the Government filed a motion for

reconsideration; it contended that the October 9, 2008 meeting violated

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and that the Judge’s comments,

both during the meeting and in his order, called into question his

impartiality. At the final pretrial conference, the district court did not

rule on the motion for reconsideration, but did invite the United States

to respond to Mr. Salahuddin’s waiver of recusal, which Mr. Salahuddin

had filed in response to the Government’s motion for reconsideration.

The Government declined to do so on the ground that, under In re

National Union Fire Insurance Co.

, 839 F.2d 1226, 1231 (7th Cir. 1988), it

was inappropriate for the court to solicit the parties’ views on recusal.

The Judge denied the motion for reconsideration on April 10,

2009. He reasoned that he did not violate Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11 for three reasons: (1) Neither the Government nor Mr.

Salahuddin proposed or reached a plea agreement; (2) The discussion

was with the United States Attorney and Federal Defender, not the

attorneys litigating the case (although the Judge acknowledged that

otherwise it might be considered a “classic negotiation session”); and (3)

The rule protects the defendant, not the Government, from judicial

coercion. The Judge further held that recusal was not necessary because

Mr. Salahuddin had waived recusal, because neither the denial of the

Government’s motion nor comments made in judicial rulings were a

basis for recusal, and because the October 9 meeting did not amount to

interference with the Government’s prosecutorial function.

Trial was set for May 18, 2009. On May 12, the Government filed

in the district court a motion to stay proceedings pending a petition for

writ of mandamus in this court. The next day, the Government filed in

this court a petition for a writ of mandamus and a motion to stay district

court proceedings pending resolution of the petition. The Government

requests a writ of mandamus directing the Judge to recuse himself from

the case and vacate all orders entered after October 20, 2008, when theNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 10

6 See, e.g., In re United States

, 398 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 2005); United States

v. Boyd

, 208 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Hatcher

, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir.

1998); United States v. Horton

, 98 F.3d 313, 316

‐ 17 (7th Cir. 1996); Hook v. McDade

, 89



### (continued...) Government filed its motion for recusal. Both this court and the district

court granted motions to stay the proceedings. We ordered Mr.

Salahuddin to respond and invited a response from the Judge. Those

responses have now been filed.

II

DISCUSSION

In considering a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking the

disqualification of a district judge, we review that judge’s denial of a

recusal motion de novo. Hook v. McDade

, 89 F.3d 350, 353

‐ 54 (7th Cir.

1996).

A.

The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, permits courts created by Act

of Congress to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their

respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of

law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). See generally United States v. Denedo

, 120 S. Ct.

2213, 2220

‐ 22 (2009). Courts of appeals traditionally have employed the

writ of mandamus to confine a district court to the “lawful exercise of its

prescribed jurisdiction.” See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court

, 542 U.S.

367, 380 (2004) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n

, 319 U.S. 21, 26

(1943)). We have held that a petition for writ of mandamus under the All

Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), is the proper

‐‐ indeed the only

‐‐ means of

reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for recusal. 6 TheNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 11

6 

### (...continued)

F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Mason

, 916 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 1990); Taylor

v. O’Grady

, 888 F.2d 1189, 1201 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Balistrieri

, 779 F.2d

1191, 1204

‐ 05 (7th Cir. 1985); SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan

, 557 F.2d 110, 117

‐ 18 (7th Cir.

1977); but see Boyd

, 208 F.3d at 649

‐ 50 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (noting that this position

is in tension with two decisions by the Supreme Court and has not been followed

by other courts of appeals).

7 See also Cheney v. United States District Court

, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004)

(Scalia, J., in chambers); Microsoft Corp. v. United States

, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)

(statement of Rehnquist, C.J. 

### ). Government’s petition is therefore the appropriate means of seeking

review in this court of the district court’s denial of the Government’s

motion for recusal.

Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code provides: “Any justice, judge,

or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The Supreme Court has explained that “‘[t]he goal of

section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality.’” Liljeberg v.

Health Serv. Acquisition Corp.

, 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988) (quoting Hall v.

Small Bus. Admin.

, 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983)). Accordingly, we

have required recusal “whenever there is ‘a reasonable basis’ for a

finding of an ‘appearance of partiality under the facts and circumstances’

of the case.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. McMillen

, 764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1985)

(quoting SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan

, 557 F.2d 110, 116 (7th Cir. 1977)).

Recusal is required when a “reasonable person perceives a significant

risk that the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits.”

In re Mason

, 916 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 1990); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.

, 839

F.2d at 1229. 7

Of course, needless recusals exact a significant toll; judges

therefore should exercise care in determining whether recusal isNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 12

8 Neither the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), nor Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 21, provides a specific time frame within which all petitions for

writ of mandamus must be filed. necessary, especially when proceedings already are underway. “[A]

change of umpire mid

‐ contest may require a great deal of work to be re

‐

done

. . . and facilitate judge

‐ shopping.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.

, 839 F.2d

at 1229 (citation omitted).

B.

Mr. Salahuddin submits that the Government’s petition is

untimely. He suggests that this court requires litigants to petition for

mandamus “immediately after a judge grants or denies a motion for

recusal.” Salahuddin Br. at 8 (citing United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313

(7th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Balistrieri

, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.

1985)). Here, the district court denied the Government’s motion for

recusal on January 8, 2009, and the Government did not file this petition

until May 12, 2009, four months after the motion was denied and one

month after the motion for reconsideration was denied.

We cannot accept this submission. The time during which the

Government sought reconsideration of the district court’s order denying

its motion for recusal should not be considered in determining the

timeliness of the petition. 8 Mr. Salahuddin suggests no reason why the

rule should be otherwise, and, indeed, there are significant benefits in

excluding that period. Most importantly, there is significant judicial

economy in not requiring a party to file a petition for writ of mandamus

in the court of appeals while the district court reconsiders its earlier

denial. This approach gives the district court adequate time to reflect on

its order and, if necessary, correct its own error before another court

becomes involved. Both the parties and the court of appeals are sparedNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 13

9 Cf. United States v. Dieter

, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that

deferring appellate consideration until disposition of a petition for rehearing saves

time and reduces the burden on appellate courts by “giving district courts the

opportunity promptly to correct their own alleged errors”); Divane v. Krull Elec. Co.

,

194 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59(e) allows district courts to correct their own errors, thus avoiding “unnecessary

appellate procedures” (quoting Moro v. Shell Oil Co.

, 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir.

1996))).

10 See United States v. Ruzzano

, 247 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2001); United States

v. Troxell

, 887 F.2d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases); N.Y. City Hous. Dev.

Corp. v. Hart

, 796 F.2d 976, 978

‐ 79 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). the burden of an additional round of litigation. 9 Requiring the petition

to be filed any earlier would accomplish very little; indeed, in most

instances this court would withhold judgment until the district court had

ruled on the motion to reconsider.

Here, the Government’s petition was filed more than a month

after the district court denied its motion to reconsider. Mr. Salahuddin

suggests that this delay does not comport with this court’s requirement

that a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the recusal of a district

judge must be made “immediately” or not at all. Horton

, 98 F.3d at 316

‐

17; Balistrieri

, 779 F.2d at 1205. Read in context, however, these cases

simply stand for the proposition, well

‐ established in this circuit, that a

motion for recusal under section 455(a) must be made before trial; after

trial, the damage to the public perception of the judicial system already

has been done, and the party may not then seek relief because the simple

appearance of partiality is, at most, harmless error. 10

Rather than turning on the term “immediately,” our cases have

taken a fact

‐ specific, pragmatic approach in determining whether a

petition seeking recusal is timely. We have examined the prejudice to

any other party or to the district court caused by the delay and haveNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 14

11 This reason is mentioned in footnote 1 of the motion for stay, but not in

the petition for a writ of mandamus. examined the amount of work that the delay would cause the new judge

to redo. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.

, 839 F.2d at 1232. Here, neither the

Judge nor Mr. Salahuddin have suggested any prejudice caused by the

time it has taken the Government to file its petition. Since denying the

Government’s motion for recusal, the Judge has issued, in addition to the

denial of the Government’s motion for reconsideration and the order

staying proceedings pending this petition, only a handful of orders, most

of which concern scheduling. The Judge did rule on the major issue on

remand, the suppression motions, after the Government filed its motion

for recusal. However, the Judge’s decision to resolve all the suppression

motions in the same order as the denial of the recusal motion cannot be

attributed to the Government. Any delay attributable to the Government

would not require significant work to be redone by a new judge.

Moreover, the Government has given a significant reason for the

four

‐ week intermission between the denial of its motion for

reconsideration and the filing of this petition. The United States

Attorney’s office was required, under the policies of the Department of

Justice, to obtain the permission of the Solicitor General before filing the

petition for a writ of mandamus. 11 See United States Attorneys’ Manual,

§ 2

‐ 2.124. The petition was filed the day after permission was received.

While this requirement necessarily slows the progress of a case, it has

long been recognized as a salutary device to ensure that governmental

litigation is conducted in a manner consonant with national norms rather

than provincial priorities.No. 09

‐ 2264 Page 15

12 This is an objective standard. Hook

, 89 F.3d at 353

‐ 54. In denying the

motion for reconsideration, the Judge suggested that the fact that Mr. Salahuddin

did not desire his recusal demonstrates that such a standard has been met. We

respectfully disagree. Mr. Salahuddin is not an impartial observer. The Judge’s

view of the future course of this prosecution clearly was favorable to the defendant.

13 See United States v. Head

, 927 F.2d 1361, 1376 (6th Cir. 1991) (observing

that the parties’ divergent recollections of what occurred during an off

‐ the

‐ record

presentence conference demonstrated the the “serious dangers of such discussions

off the record” and, “[b]ecause of the uncertainties attendant to this procedure,”

remanding “with directions to afford a full opportunity to defendant to address

those parts of the sentencing” affected by the in

‐ chambers conference); cf. Maltby v.

Winston

, 36 F.3d 548, 561 n.18 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that “it is the responsibility of

the district court, if it conducts the instruction conference without a court reporter,



### (continued...) C.

We now turn to the merits of the Government’s submission. At

bottom, this matter requires that we decide one fundamental issue:

whether a reasonable, well

‐ informed observer could question the Judge’s

impartiality. See, e.g., Hatcher, 150 F.3d at 637. 12

In answering this question, we must examine carefully the nature

of the Judge’s meeting with the heads of the two governmental offices

involved. The Judge called an off

‐ the

‐ record meeting with the United

States Attorney and the Federal Defender. This manner of proceeding in

a federal criminal matter is indeed unusual and necessarily raises

substantial concerns in the mind of any well

‐ informed observer. We

must take special note of the fact that no record was taken of the meeting.

In other contexts, this and other courts have pointed out the need to make

a record whenever substantive discussions take place between court and

counsel, and we see no reason to exempt the present situation from that

admonition. 13 Indeed, the extraordinary nature of this meeting,No. 09

‐ 2264 Page 16

13 

### (...continued)

to provide the parties with an opportunity to specifically object to jury instructions

on the record”); United States v. Gallo

, 763 F.2d 1504, 1532 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding

that the defendant had waived violations of Court Reporters Act but noting that the

“safe course” was to “let the reporter record what takes place” during side bars).

14 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) states:

(c) Plea Agreement Procedure.

1) In General. An attorney for the government and the defendant’s

attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss

and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate in these

discussions. If the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to

either a charged offense or a lesser or related offense, the plea

agreement may specify that an attorney for the government will:

(A) not bring, or will move to dismiss, other charges;

(B) recommend, or agree not to oppose the defendant ʹ s

request, that a particular sentence or sentencing range is



### (continued...) evidenced by the Judge’s initial willingness to disqualify himself, should

it be requested, and his recognition that such a proceeding was

extraordinary, should have made the need to memorialize the event even

more obvious to the participants.

The substance of the discussion at the meeting convinces us that

the Judge misapprehended the limits of his authority. The parties agree

that, at the October 9 meeting, the Judge suggested a specific plea

bargain. This participation was clearly violative of the specific

prohibition in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that forbids the

court from becoming involved in plea negotiations. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(c)(1). 14 As the Fifth Circuit has noted, “such involvement ‘is likely toNo. 09

‐ 2264 Page 17

14 

### (...continued)

appropriate or that a particular provision of the Sentencing

Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does

or does not apply (such a recommendation or request does

not bind the court); or

(C) agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the

appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular

provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy

statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply

(such a recommendation or request binds the court once

the court accepts the plea agreement).

15 Because of the distinct possibility of such resentment, the Rule is violated

even when no plea negotiation actually takes place. See United States v. Baker

, 489

F.3d 366, 371 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007).

16 See United States v. Kraus

, 137 F.3d 447, 457 (7th Cir. 1998) (evaluating



### (continued...) impair the trial court’s impartiality. The judge who suggests or

encourages a particular plea bargain may feel a personal stake in the

agreement

. . . and may therefore resent the defendant who rejects his

advice.’” United States v. Miles

, 10 F.3d 1135, 1139 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting

United States v. Adams

, 634 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1981)) (omissions in

original). We have expressed the same view in United States v. Kraus

, 137

F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1998), when we wrote that “[e]xcluding the judge

from the plea discussions thus serves three purposes: it minimizes the

risk that the defendant will be judicially coerced into pleading guilty, it

preserves the impartiality of the court, and it avoids any appearance of

impropriety.” The judge who advocates a particular plea bargain may

resent the government for disagreeing. 15

Here we must conclude that the Judge did more than simply

participate in a plea bargain. 16 He questioned the Government’s decisionNo. 09

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16 

### (...continued)

whether “the error in this case, or the appearance of error, was harmless” and

quoting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(h) for the proposition that “[a]ny

variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial

rights shall be disregarded,” but also noting that “insofar as judicial intervention in

the negotiation of a plea agreement is concerned, the possibility of harmless error

may be more theoretical than real”). to prosecute the matter as a federal case in terms that a reasonable

observer might well interpret as critical of the Government’s position in

the case. The statement that neither party would be pleased with his

ruling on the suppression motions could have been interpreted as

indicating that he was ill

‐ disposed toward the Government’s position

and might rule based not on the merits, but on his distaste for its

prosecutorial decision. A reasonable, well

‐ informed observer well may

have concluded that the Judge was no longer acting as a neutral arbiter,

but was advocating for his desired result.

The Supreme Court has noted that:

[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or

events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of

prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality

motion unless they display a deep

‐ seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus,

judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or

disapproving of, or even hostile, to, counsel, the parties, or their

cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.

. .

. they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or

antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.

Liteky v. United States

, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (emphasis in original). The

parties therefore correctly acknowledge that “[e]xpressions of impatience,No. 09

‐ 2264 Page 19

17 We cannot accept the suggestion that the appearance of impropriety was

somewhat lessened by the participation at the meeting of policy

‐ level officers

‐‐ the

United States Attorney and the Federal Defender

‐‐ rather than the litigating

attorneys. The United States Attorney has the ultimate authority to prosecute cases.

See 28 U.S.C. § 547. A reasonable observer certainly could conclude that the purpose

of the meeting was to pressure the officers present at the meeting to direct their

subordinates to undertake the course of action preferred by the Judge. dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger,” do not establish bias or

partiality. Id

. at 555

‐ 56. We must conclude, however, that, taken in

context, some of the Judge’s comments go further and comment on

substantive matters, rather than the conduct of the proceedings. For

example, as we have just noted, the Judge questioned why this case was

accepted for federal prosecution, expressed concern about the time that

had passed between Mr. Salahuddin’s initial arrest and the

commencement of federal proceedings, and suggested that this case was

an embarrassment to the justice system and an inefficient allocation of

taxpayer resources. He also sought to avoid a conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c), so as to prevent imposition of the fifteen

‐ year mandatory

minimum sentence.

In expressing these views and insisting that action be taken to

conform the future course of litigation to those views, the Judge

misapprehended the limits of his authority as the presiding judicial

officer and undertook to participate in determinations that are in the

proper domain of the Department of Justice. 17 The power of the

Executive Branch to make these decisions is a safeguard of liberty. As

this court has noted, entrusting these prerogatives to the Executive

ensures that “‘no one can be convicted of a crime without the concurrence

of all three branches.’” United States v. O’Neill

, 437 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir.

2006) (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting In re United States

,

345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003)). Judges do not possess, and should not

attempt to exercise, prosecutorial discretion.No. 09

‐ 2264 Page 20

18 See N.Y. City Hous. Dev. Corp.

, 796 F.2d at 979.

19 Because we have granted the Government’s writ of mandamus, the

Government’s motion to compel disclosure is dismissed as moot. A motion under section 455(a) is “directed against the appearance

of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.” Balistrieri

, 779

F.2d at 1204 (emphasis supplied). We must conclude that the Judge’s

actions, assessed in their totality, are such that a reasonable, well

‐

informed observer would question his partiality. Hook

, 89 F.3d 350 at

353

‐ 54.

The question before us is not whether the Judge is biased. If the

Government had the burden to establish that fact, it would have indeed

a high mountain to climb in light of the Judge’s distinguished public

service of almost forty years. However, we must conclude that the

Government is entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandamus for

which it has petitioned because it has established that a reasonable well

‐

informed observer could question the Judge’s impartiality. Accordingly,

all orders entered by the Judge after the motion for recusal was filed must

be vacated. 18 The Judge is directed to remove himself from further

proceedings in this matter.

It is so ordered. 19