This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A13-1340

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Reinaldo Quesada,

Appellant.

Filed September 2, 2014

Affirmed

Johnson, Judge

Freeborn County District Court

File No. 24-CR-12-1933

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Craig S. Nelson, Freeborn County Attorney, David J. Walker, Assistant County Attorney, 

Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and 

Hooten, Judge. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JOHNSON, Judge

A Freeborn County jury found Reinaldo Quesada guilty of being an ineligible 

person in possession of a firearm. During the trial, the district court permitted the 

prosecutor to refer to the charged offense as “felon in possession of a firearm,” and the 

district court instructed the jury that Quesada was charged with the offense of “felon in 

possession of a firearm.” Quesada argues that these references to him as a “felon” 

deprived him of his right to a fair trial. We affirm.

FACTS

On the evening of October 29, 2012, Officer Adam Hamberg of the Albert Lea 

Police Department responded to a report of a fight at a residence. The dispatcher

informed the officer that the fight might have involved a gun. After Officer Hamberg 

arrived at the scene, witnesses said that Quesada had been at the home earlier in the 

evening and, after an altercation, pointed a black handgun at several people in the home 

and threatened to kill them. One witness also said that Quesada and another man fled the 

home on foot. Officer Hamberg drove to the area of Quesada’s home and found him 

hiding in a neighbor’s backyard storage shed. Officers searched the shed and found a 

“black handgun style” BB gun. 

The state charged Quesada with one count of second-degree assault, in violation of 

Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2012); one count of being an ineligible person in 

possession of a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2012); and one 

count of making terroristic threats, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2012). 
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The case was tried over three days in January and February 2013. Immediately 

before trial, Quesada and the state tentatively agreed to stipulate that Quesada is

ineligible to possess a firearm, which would have made it unnecessary for the state to 

introduce evidence of Quesada’s prior felony convictions. But Quesada withdrew from 

the agreement before the stipulation was finalized. Quesada’s attorney expressed concern 

that a stipulation might be inconsistent with an affirmative defense that might be pursued.

Before the jury was brought into the courtroom, the prosecutor indicated his 

intention use the term “felon in possession of a firearm” in his opening statement. 

Quesada objected on the ground that the proper term for the second charged offense is 

“prohibited person in possession of a firearm.” The district court overruled Quesada’s 

objection on the ground that the statute defines an “ineligible person” to include a person 

who has a previous “felony conviction.” During his opening statement, the prosecutor 

referred to Quesada as a “convicted felon . . . prohibited by Minnesota law from 

possessing any firearm,” described the second charged offense as “prohibited person, in 

this case meaning a convicted felon, in possession of a firearm,” and described the second 

charged offense a second time as “felon in possession of a firearm.”

The state called nine witnesses; Quesada called one witness and testified in his 

own defense. The state’s witnesses testified that Quesada and another man were at a

party and attempted to take another guest’s wallet. The state’s witnesses testified that, 

after a physical altercation, Quesada pointed a handgun at various people in the home and 

threatened to kill them. In his own testimony, Quesada agreed that he was at the home 

that evening but denied trying to take another guest’s wallet and denied possessing a gun, 
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other than to pick it up momentarily to move it as a safety precaution when others began 

fighting.

After the close of the evidence, the district court instructed the jury that the second 

charged offense was entitled “felon in possession of a firearm.” On five occasions during 

his closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the second charged offense as “felon in 

possession of a firearm.” The jury found Quesada guilty on all three counts. In April 

2013, the district court imposed concurrent prison sentences of 60 months for being an 

ineligible person in possession of a firearm and 45 months for second-degree assault. 

Quesada appeals.

D E C I S I O N

Quesada argues that the district court erred by allowing the prosecutor to refer to 

him as a felon and by describing the second charged offense as “felon in possession of a 

firearm.” Quesada contends that the district court’s rulings and instructions denied him 

his right to a fair trial. The state did not file a responsive brief. The appeal is submitted 

for a decision on the merits despite the absence of a responsive brief. See Minn. R. Civ. 

App. P. 142.03.

Quesada makes a relatively narrow argument on appeal by relying on only three 

opinions, only one of which is precedential. In short, Quesada argues that the district 

court’s rulings and instructions are contrary to State v. Davidson, 351 N.W.2d 8 (Minn. 

1984). In that case, the defendant was charged with being an ineligible person in 

possession of a firearm and sought a stipulation concerning his ineligibility so that the 

jury would not learn that he was a “convicted felon.” Id. at 9. The district court denied 
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his request for a stipulation and instructed the jury that Davidson previously had been 

convicted of arson. Id. On appeal, the supreme court determined that the district court 

had erred because, “in a prosecution for being a felon in possession of a weapon, the 

defendant should be permitted to remove the issue of whether he is a convicted felon by 

stipulating to that fact” to avoid encouraging the “jury to find defendant guilty for the 

wrong reason.” Id. at 11. But the supreme court also concluded that the error “was not 

so prejudicial as to require reversal.” Id. at 12.

The Davidson opinion is distinguishable from this case. The holding in Davidson

is based on the fact that the district court denied the defendant’s request for a stipulation. 

Id. at 10-12. In this case, however, Quesada and his trial counsel chose not to enter into a 

stipulation. Quesada does not argue that either the state or the district court prevented 

him from entering into a stipulation that he was ineligible to possess a firearm. In the 

absence of such a stipulation, the state was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

that Quesada was ineligible to possess a firearm. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). 

To satisfy its burden of proof, the state introduced evidence that Quesada previously was 

convicted of two crimes of violence, specifically, a “third-degree felony drug” conviction 

and an “aiding and abetting third-degree drug” conviction. The Davidson opinion 

provides no assistance to a person such as Quesada, who did not enter into a stipulation 

concerning his ineligibility. The Davidson opinion may even undermine Quesada’s 

argument because it refers to the charged offense in that case as “felon in possession of a 

handgun” on four separate occasions. Id. at 9, 10, 11. Thus, Quesada is incorrect in 

arguing that Davidson requires the reversal of his convictions.
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Quesada also relies on two unpublished opinions of this court. Unpublished 

opinions of this court are not precedential. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2012); 

Vlahos v. R & I Constr., Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672, 676 n.3 (Minn. 2004); State v. Porte, 832 

N.W.2d 303, 312 n.1 (Minn. App. 2013). Thus, Quesada may not obtain the reversal of 

his convictions based on unpublished opinions. Nonetheless, the unpublished opinions 

he cites are distinguishable. 

Although we are confident that no error occurred, we nonetheless note that, even if 

there were an error, it would be a harmless error. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01; State v. 

Bouwman, 354 N.W.2d 1, 8 n.7 (Minn. 1984); Porte, 832 N.W.2d at 312. The state 

introduced evidence of Quesada’s prior felony convictions for the purpose of impeaching 

his credibility. See Minn. R. Evid. 609. Quesada does not argue that the state did so 

improperly. In Davidson, the supreme court expressly qualified its opinion by stating, 

“Prior convictions would still be useable under Minn. R. Evid. 609 to impeach the 

defendant if he testified.” 351 N.W.2d at 11. Thus, the jury in this case would have 

learned that Quesada is a convicted felon even if the prosecutor and the district court had 

not used the word “felon” when referring to the second offense charged.

Affirmed.