## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . One 2008 Chevrolet, V

IN No. 2GIWT58K889278949 , 2011 IL App (2d) 100772

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I LL I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ONE 2008 CHEVROL ET, VI N No. 2GIWT58K889278949, Def endant (Ve rnon Guy

nn, Interve nor-Appe llee).

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-10-0772

Filed Modified upon denial of r ehea

ring August 11, 2011

October 27, 2011

Held (Note : Th is syl lab us

c ons ti tut es no par t o

f the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the R epo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The innocent-lienholde r exception to the forf eiture statute did not a

pply
to bar the fa ther of a forf eited automobile’s titleholder from paying off the lienholder, t aking title in his name and then allowing his son to execute a p ro missory note to his fathe r to repa y the loan balanc e in monthly installments, reg ardle ss of the State’s contention that the fathe r knew the ve hicle had be en used to c ommit a crime.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Du Pag e County
, No. 08-MR-483; the Hon. B onnie M. Wheaton, Judg e, pre siding

Judgment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l J oseph E. Birke tt, State’s Attorney
, of Wheaton (L i s a Anne Hoffma n, Assistant State’s At t o rn ey , and L awr ence M. Ba uer and Kristin M. Schwind, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Pr o s ec utor’s Offic e, of counsel), f

or the People.

Paul M. DeL

uca, of Oakbrook Terrace , for a

ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE McLAREN delivere d the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice J org ensen and Justice Bow man concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 The State a

ppeals the trial court’s order grantingsummary judgment to Vernon Guy nn and rele asing to him a vehicle that had previously been the subject of a forf eiture proce eding

. The State contends that the trial court err ed by finding that the innocent-lienholde r exception in the forf eiture statute a

pplied to Guy

nn. We affir

m. ¶ 2 On Marc h 1 8
, 2 0 0 8
, W heaton police seized a 2008 Chevrolet that had been driven by L indsey Kee l while her driver’ s license was suspen d ed o r re v o ked. The State then filed a complaint for forf

eiture. At th at t ime, Brent Guy nn was the Chevrolet’s reg istered owner , with AmeriCredit F inancial Ser vices, Inc. (AmeriCredit), holdinga lien. ¶ 3 AmeriCre dit filed a cl ai m asser ting that it was an innocent lienholder. See 720 I L CS 5/36-1a (West 2008). On April 18, 2008, the trial court rele ased the vehicle to AmeriCre dit with the condition that it not release thevehicle to B rent Guy nn or L indsey

Kee l. ¶ 4 Br ent Guy

nn contac ted AmeriCre dit about purcha sing the vehicle, and he was infor med that AmeriCre dit would rele ase its interest if he paid off the balanc e of the loan. Thus, on April 22, 2008, Br ent Guy nn, having borrowe d the funds from his fathe r, Ver non Guy n n, paid off the $28,644.07 loan balanc e, executing a promissory note to his fathe r to repa y the amount in monthly

installments. S ubsequently , Ver non Guy nn took titl e to the vehic le. ¶ 5 After lear

ning that AmeriCredit no long er ha d an intere st in the vehicle, the State filed a petiti on under section 2-1401 of the C ode of Civil Procedur e to vac ate the rele ase order. See 735 I L CS 5/2-1401 (West 2008). The tria l court grante d the petition and set a date for a for feiturehearing. ¶ 6 Ve rn o n Gu y

n n fi l ed a p et i t i o n t o i nterve ne, alleg ing that he had succe eded t o AmeriCre dit’s interest in the vehicle. The trial court grante d the petition. Ver non Guy nn then filed a motion for summary judgme nt, alleg ing that he had “steppe d into the shoes” of AmeriCre dit and acc epted all i t s ri gh t s in the vehicle, including its status as an innocent

-2-lienholder. Thetrial court grante d the motion, and the State timely appea ls. ¶ 7 T h e S t at e co n t ends that summary judgme nt was improper beca use fac tual quest i o n s

rema in re g arding whether Ver non Guy nn was an innocent lienholder. The State’s

overa rching contention is that he did not qualify for that status beca use he actua lly knew that the vehiclehad bee n used to commit a crime. ¶ 8 Section 36-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides for the seizure of any vehicle “used with the knowledg e and consent of the owner in the commission of” various listed offe nses. 720 I L CS 5/36-1 (West 2008). The State may then initiate an action to forf eit the vehicle. 7 2 0 IL CS 5/36-2 (West 2008). However, section 36-1a provides a safe ty valve fo r a lienholder who can show that its intere s t i s b o n a fide and “wa s cre ated without actua l knowledg e that such *** vehicle *** was used or to be used in the commission of the offe nse cha

rg ed.” 720 IL CS 5/ 36-1a ( West 2008). ¶ 9 Summary judgme nt is appropriate wher e no g enuine issue of materia l fac t is prese nt a nd
th e m o ving party is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. Ralls v. Village of Glen d a l e Heights
, 233 I ll. App. 3d 147, 151 (1992). Summary judgme nt is proper when the pleading s, depositions, and aff

idavits demonstrate that no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exis ts and that the moving party is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. 735 I L CS 5/2 -1 0 0 5 (c) (West 2008). We revie w de novo an order granting summary judgme nt. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual InsuranceCo. , 154 I ll. 2d 90, 102 (1992). ¶ 10 The State essentially contends that, if Ver non Guy nn knew that the vehicle was used in the commission of a crime, he was not elig ible to purcha se the vehicle from an innocent lienholder who lacke d such knowledg e when its interest was cre ated. We cannot acc ept this construction of the statute, and we note that the Sta t e cites no authority in support of its proposed reading. Adopting the State’s construction would mean that an innocent lienholder who had a vehicle re l ea s ed t o it could never sell the vehicle to a buyer who knew the vehicle’ s h i s t o ry

. Such a construction is absurd and would rende r the innocent-lienholde r exception virtually worthless. See Solon v. Midwest Medic al Rec ords Ass’n
, 236 I ll. 2d 433, 441 (2010) (in construing a statute, we presume the leg isla ture did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust conseque nces)

. Thus, we reje ct the State’s contention and hold that,

even if he knew that the vehicle was used in committing a crime, Ver non Guy nn was entitled to purcha se the ve hicle from AmeriCredit af ter the vehicle wa s relea sed. ¶ 11 Her e, the trial court release d the vehicle to AmeriCre dit on April 18, 2008, eff ective l y terminating the forf

eiture proce eding s. Ver

non Guy nn paid off the loan and had the vehicle titled in his name after that date. Thus, the tra nsaction wa s not subject t o the “knowledg e”
excep t i o n to the innocent-lienholde r provision. Moreove r, the State could not avoid this result by havingthe re leaseorder

vacated pursuant to its section 2-1401 pe tition. ¶ 12 When the sale took place
, there was no fo rf ei ture p ro ceeding in place

. The State’s subsequent attempt, albe it a succe ssful one, to resur rec t the orig inal forf

eiture proce eding s could not retroa ctively invalidate the rele ase of the vehicle to AmeriCre dit or the subsequent sale to Ver

non Guy nn. As noted above, wer e the State able to essentially void any subsequent sale of the vehicle by

the s imple expedient of having the rele ase order vacated pursuant to section 2-1401, the innocent-lienholde r provision would cea se to provide the lienholder with

-3-any meaning ful relief

. ¶ 13 The judgment of the c ircuit court of Du Pag e County

is affirme d.

¶ 14 Affir

med.

-4-