FILED

June 8, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

MAY SESSION, 1998

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9709-CC-00373

)

Appellee, )

 ) HARDEMAN COUNTY

V. ) 

)

) HON. JON KERRY BLACKWOOD,

ANTHONY P. GEANES, ) JUDGE 

)

Appellant. ) (DELIVERY OF SCHEDULE II DRUG)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

JOHN C. MASK, JR. JOHN KNOX WALKUP 

P.O. Box 611 Attorney General & Reporter

Bolivar, TN 38008

CLINTON J. MORGAN 

Assistant Attorney General

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

ELIZABETH T. RICE

District Attorney General 

JERRY W. NORWOOD 

Assistant District Attorney General

302 Market Street 

Somerville, TN 38068

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

The Defendant, Anthony P. Geanes, appeals as of right from his conviction

in the Circuit Court of Hardeman County. Following a jury trial, Defendant was

convicted of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance. He was sentenced to

serve fifteen (15) years as a Range II Offender. In this appeal, Defendant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the length of his sentence. We affirm

the judgm ent of the trial court.

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the

standard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond any reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and

all inferences therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).

Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with

a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of illustrating why the

evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by the trier of fact. State v.

Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476

(Tenn. 1973).

Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to

be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence, are

resolved by the trier of fact, not this court. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623

(Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 1987). Nor may this court

reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835. A jury verdict
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approved by the trial judge accredits the State’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts

in favor of the State. Grace, 493 S.W .2d at 476. 

Sylvester Island worked with the Drug Task Force in 1996 and was paid

$100.00 each day he served as a confidential informant. He knew the Defendant as

“Money G.” On August 15, 1996, he saw the Defendant at Defendant’s brother’s

home and told Defendant that he needed a “sixteenth.” A “sixteenth” refers to a big

rock of crack cocaine. They discussed meeting the next day at Defendant’s

brother’s home. On August 16, 1996, Investigator Barrett Stevens put a video

camera in Island’s car and provided him with $100.00 to purchase the cocaine.

Jarhonda Parker, the Defendant’s girlfriend, accompanied him to purchase the

cocaine from the Defendant.

Island and Parker drove to Defendant’s brother’s home and Defendant

approached their car. Island asked him, “You got that sixteenth for me?” Defendant

stated that he had it, reached in his pocket and gave Island an object wrapped in

paper while Island gave Defendant $100.00. Island drove to meet Stevens and gave

the object wrapped in paper to him. No one else handled the object. 

Investigator Barrett Stevens with the Bolivar Police Department worked with

Sylvester Island several times per week. On August 16, 1996, before Island left to

meet with the Defendant, Stevens searched him and his car and then put a video

camera in his car to videotape the transaction. After Island completed the

transaction, he met Stevens at the National Guard Arm ory. Island gave Stevens a

white piece of paper, and when Stevens unfolded it, there appeared to be a large
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rock of crack cocaine. Stevens put the substance in a sealed envelope and then

delivered it to the crime lab.

Kay Sheriff is a forensic scientist for the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation

and works in the crime lab. She received and tested this object and determined that

the substance was six-tenths (0.6) of a gram of a Schedule II cocaine base

substance. 

Jarhonda Parker testified that she accompanied Island to meet with

Defendant. Parker knew the Defendant and recognized him when he handed the

object to Island. A videotape of the transaction was shown to the jury.

The Defendant testified that Island approached him on August 16, 1996 at his

brother’s home. Defendant gave him some “speed” pills for which Island paid

Defendant $50.00. Defendant stated that these pills were not cocaine and that he

has never sold cocaine. 

Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient as there was reasonable

doubt regarding the drug transaction and whether the Defendant actually handed the

cocaine to Island. It is an offense to knowingly deliver a controlled substance. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(2). In the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier

of fact could have determined that Defendant delivered the controlled Schedule II

substance of cocaine to Island. This delivery was testified to by Island and Parker,

in addition to a videotape of the drug transaction. Any questions concerning the

credibility of witnesses and the factual issues have previously been determined by

the trier of fact, and we will not reevaluate the evidence. This issue is without merit.
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Defendant also challenges the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial

court failed to apply appropriate mitigating factors. When an accused challenges the

length, range or the manner of service of a sentence, this court has a duty to

conduct a de novo review of the sentence with a presumption that the determinations

made by the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d). This

presumption is “conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial

court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.”

State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The Defendant failed to include

the transcript from the sentencing hearing for our review, and it is his duty to prepare

an adequate record in order to allow for a meaningful review on appeal. Tenn. R.

App. P. § 24(b); State v. Bunch, 646 S.W .2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983); State v.

Roberts, 755 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). In absence of that record

which is essential for our review, we m ust presume that the trial court’s ruling is

correct and we are precluded from considering the issue. State v. Richardson, 875

S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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____________________________________

THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________

JOHN H. PEAY, Judge

___________________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge