* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-50776

Summary Calendar

MARGIE MITCHELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

(A-94-CV-827)

May 25, 1998

Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, AND BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Margie Mitchell applied for Supplemental Security I ncome on

November 11, 1992, alleging that she had been disabled since 1991

because of arthritis, internal b leeding, “female problems,” and

assorted psychological impairme nts. An Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) found that Mitchell was not disabled within the meaning of2 Anthony v. Sullivan , 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992).

3 Id

.

4 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

2 the Socia l Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Mitchell’s

request for review, and the ALJ’s decision became the final

decision of the Commissioner. Mitchell then filed suit in the

district court seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. Both

the magistrate judg e and the district court found that the

Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Mitchell timely filed notice of appeal. We affirm.

We will affirm an ALJ’s findings if they are supported by

substantial evidence. 2 We will not reweigh the evidence or review

the iss ues de novo , as “conflicts in the evidence are for the

[Commissioner] to resolve.” 3

The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability

to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 4 In

the case at bar, the ALJ determined that Mitchell was not disabled

because she remained capable of performing a full range of light

work. The ALJ specifically determined that even though Mitchell

suffered from arthritic pain, the record showed that the medication

controlled the pain to the extent that she could perform the5 Harrell v. Bowen , 862 F.2d 471, 480 (5th Cir. 1988).

6 In its opinion , the district court noted that Mitchell,

having rea ched the age of 50 as of February 22, 1997, might be

eligible for disability benefits, assuming her work-related

limitations had not changed. This issue was not raised during the

administrative process, however. As such, we do not have

jurisdiction o ver Mitchell’s claim that the district court’s

statement entitles her to relief. S ee Paul v. Shalala , 29 F.3d

209, 210 (5th Cir. 1994).

3 walking, sitting, lifting and carrying associated with light work.

Finally, the ALJ determined that Mitchell’s alleged psychological

problems were not so severe as to qualify as a listed impairment.

The ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. The

medical evidence in the record supports a finding that Mitchell did

not suffer from limitations on her ability to perform light work.

We further note that “the evaluation of a claimant’s subjective

symptoms is a task particularly within the province of the ALJ, who

has had an oppo rtunity to observe whether the person seems to be

disabled.” 5 The ALJ ably handled this task, and we shall not

disturb the decision. 6

AFFIRMED.