The Honor able Richard M ills, Unit ed States District Judge f or the Centra l District of * I llinois , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0930n.06 F iled: Dec em ber 22, 2006 No. 05-6256 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. RO NN I E L EB RO N SLAT ER, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On Appea l from the United States District Court for the Ea stern District of Tenne ssee

Before: BOGG S, Chief Judge; DAUG HTREY, Circuit Judge; MILLS, District Judge. * P ER CURIAM
. Ronnie L ebron Sl ater was arre sted on Dec ember 13, 2002. He wa s ind ic te d o n thre e c ounts of vio la tin g 21 U. S.C. § 841 (a )( 1) . The c ha rg e s w e re : ( 1) po sse ssi on

wi th intent to dist ribute in excess of five g rams of coca ine base , 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)( B) ; (2) possession with intent to dis tribute in ex cess of 500 g rams of c ocaine powder , 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)( B) ; (3) possession w ith intent to distribute marijuana , 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)( 1)(D)

. On Marc h 22, 2005, Slater
wa s c on vic te d b y

a jur y on a ll thr e e c ounts and se nte nc e d to 13 0 mo nth s. Slate r a pp e a ls h is conviction on two g rounds. First, he contends that the district c ourt improperly admitted evidenc e ob ta ine d f ro m a se arc h o f h is r e sid e nc e be c a us e the se arc h w arr ant w a s o bta ine d in vio la tio n o f R

uleNo. 05-6256

United States v. Slater

- 2 - 41 of the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e dure . Se c on d, Slate r c la ims the dis tr ic t c ourt imp ro pe rl y
a dmi tte d e vid e nc e ob ta ine d f ro m a sto p a nd se arc h o f h is c ar beca

us e the po lic e la c ke d p ro ba ble
cause for the stop a

nd sear ch and pe rfor

med them without a war

rant. Slater also appea ls his sentence on the g round that the district c ourt wrong ly found that his r eckle ss dr iving during his stop created

a substantial r isk of sever e harm and there fore wrong ly applied a two-le vel sentenc ing e nhance ment under U SSG § 3C1.2. Be cause we find that the district court did not commit plain error in upholding the se arc h of Slate r’ s re sid e nc e , c or re c tly up he ld the sto p and se arc h of Slate r’ s a uto mob ile , a

nd did not clear ly

err in the fac t-finding supporting the two-leve l sentencingenhanc ement, we aff irm Slater’s c onviction and sentenc e. I The re levant fa cts of this case ar e gene rally not in disput e. De tective Todd F loy d of the C h a t t an o o g a

P o l i c e D e p art m e n tb e g ant o i n v e s t i g a t e S l a t e r a f t e r r e c e i v i n g i n f

o r m a t i o nfr om a confide ntial informant that Slater ha d been se lling coc aine. Floy d had known the inf ormant for

one
we e k p ri or

to r e c e ivi ngthe tip . T he inf orman t ag re e d to c oo pe ra te wi th t he po lic e and

pe rf or m a
c on tr oll e d b uy

of dr ug s f ro m Slate r. Pr ior

to t he buy , th e po lic e se arc he d th e inf orman t and

his vehicle to e nsure th at n ei t h er cash nor controlled substanc es we re pr esent. The police then continuously

watche d the i nformant and Slater as they met at a pr ear

rang ed location, then as Slater drove to 2134 Ea s t 2 7 t h S t
. , en tere d, emer g ed, and r eturne d to the prea rra ng ed location. At that point, Sl ater

g ave the informant coc aine. I n a dd iti on

to t his c on tr oll e d buy , oth e r d e te c tiv e s c on du c te d s ur ve ill anc e on

the Ea st 2 7th S t
. ad dre s s an d

o b s er v edt h at t h e v eh i cl e S l at e r d r o v e d u r i n g t h e c o n t ro l l edb u y , an ea rl y 1 9 9 0 'sNo. 05-6256

United States v. Slater

- 3 - Ca dil la c wi th Te nn e sse e ta g numbe r B F N0 07 , ha d b e e n p re se nt at th e a dd re ss o n s e ve ra l oc c a sio ns . Slater had also been stopped for a traff ic violation while driving the Cadillac on a nother oc casion. Another infor

mant stated that Slater dr ove the ve hicle while se lling and de livering coca ine, and that Slater sold coca ine from the East 27th St. addre ss. The sec ond informant had pr ovided the police with information on at least six occasions in the past that had led to the a rr es t of individuals for violating na

rcotic laws. Another of

fice r also re ceive d information from a nother infor

mant that drug
sa le s h a d ta

ke n p la c e a t th e a dd

re ss. At so me po int

in t he inv e sti g a tio n, the loc a l po lic e con ta c te d th e B ur e a u o f A lc oh ol, Tobac co, and F irea

rms (“A TF” ) reg arding the investigation. ATF Ag ent Cordell Malone testified that he bec ame involved in the investig ation of Slater a wee k befor e S later’ s arr est. He a lso testified that he wa s not the case ag ent, did not take notes, ha ndle t he contr olled buy , or otherw ise direc t the operation. B a se d o n th e a

bo ve inv e sti g a tio n, the po lic e a pp lie d f or a wa rr ant t o s e arc h th e Ea st 27 th S t. addre ss. The af

fidavit in support of the sear ch war rant application included all of the details of the investigation, as rec ited above. T he applica tion was made to a

Hamilton County , Ten

n e s s e e , G e nera l S e s s i o n s C o u rtj u d g e . T h e j u d g e i s s u e d t h e s e ar c h w ar r an t o nD e c e mb e r

1 1 , 2 0 0 2 , a

u t h o r i z i n g F l o yd
or ano the r o ff

ic e r t o s e arc h th e Ea st 2 7th St. a dd re ss. T h e s a m e c o n f

i d e n t i a l i n f

o r m an tw h o h a d

o r i g i n a l l y c o n t a c t e d

F l o yd a l s o i n f o r m e d F l o yd that Slater had me nt i o n ed in a telephone conver sation with the informant that Slater would be dr ivingto A tla

nta , G e or g ia

on De c e mbe r 1 1, 20 02 and

re tur nin g on the same da

y wi th n arc oti c s. Ba sed on this information, the pol ice (including A TF A g ent Cordell Malone a nd Detec tive Floy d)No. 05-6256

United States v. Slater

- 4 - cre ated a plan to stop Slater upon his return from Georg ia, and then e x ecute the sea rch w arr ant at the East 27th St. address. The police did not obtain a war rant to stop or sea

rch Slater ’s ca

r. On De c e mbe r 1 1, of

fi c e rs tr acked Slate r a s h e dr ov e no rt h o n I -7 5 f

ro m G e or g ia

int o Tenne ssee. Onc e he w as in Tenne ssee, se vera l office rs executed a slowdown of traffic be hind Slater to ke e p c ivi lia

n tr a ff ic ou t of the vic ini ty

of the sto p, and

an o ff ic e r t he n p ull e d a

n unma rk e d d ump truck into the fast lane in f ront of Slater while another detec tive driving an unmar ked SUV pulled up next t o Slater i n the right lane. The dump truck wa s travelingapproximately 45 to 50 mph. At that point, two marke d police car s drove up behind Slater a nd activate d their lig hts. Blocke d to the
rea r, fr ont, and rig ht, Slater did not respond to the pol ice lights, but rathe r veered into the emer g ency lane a nd acc eler ated. The dump truck pulled into the emer gen cy l an e in front of Slater. Simul taneously , the SUV moved into the left lane . At some point, the Cadillac a nd the SUV collided

and the bumpe rs of

the tw o v e hic le s lo c ke d. Th e of fi c e r d ri vin g the SUVpu sh e d th e Ca dil la c int o the c on c re te div ide r a

nd Slate r s top pe d. Th e e nti re e pis od e oc c ur re d w ith in l e ss t

ha n 2 mil e s. Acc ording to one offic er’ s testimony , afte r Slater was stopped, he tried to bac k up, but hit a marked police ca r that had pulled in be hind the Cadillac. Slater c ontends that this never ha ppened a nd notes that even if it did, the impac t was not sufficie nt to cause the police ca r’s a irbagto deploy . Acc ording to one offic er, no sig nificant damag e wa s done to the Cadillac a s a re sult of the stop. Slate r w a s th e n ta

ke n in to c us tod

y . Th e de te c tiv e s ha d br ou g ht a c anin e un it w iththe m to the stop and the dogaler

ted on the trunk of t he C adillac. A s ear ch of the t runk reveale d a dog food bagwith approxim ately

three pounds of marijuana inside. Upon beingnotified of Slater’ s arr est, Dete ctive Fl o y d executed the se arc h war rant on theNo. 05-6256

United States v. Slater

- 5 - Ea st 2 7th St. a dd re ss. Whe n o ff

ic e rs e nte re d th e ho us e , Sl a te r’ s mo the r a nd da ug hte r w e re pr e se nt, both of whom reside d at the addr ess. The of fice rs wer e dire cte d t o S l at er’s bedroom whe re the y found a small saf

e conta ining c ocaine powder and cr ack c ocaine

. Af te r his ini tia l a

pp e ara nc e , Slate r fi le d se ve ra l mot ion s to su pp re ss, a dd

re ssi ng any a nd

a ll evidenc e ob t ained as a re sult of the sear ches of the East 27th St. address a nd the Cadillac. A mag istrate judg e conduc ted a suppression hear ing, rec ommended that the motions be denie d, and the district court ac cepte d the re commendation. The case went to trial on Marc h 21, 2005, and Slater
wa s c on vic te d o n a ll thr e e c ounts
. Following Slater’s conviction, the district court conduc ted a se ntencinghear ing on July 20, 2005. The o n e relevant issue upon appe al is whether the district court should have followed the probat i o no ff

i ce r’ s re co m m en d at i o nt o i n cr ea s e t h e s en t en ci n g gu i d el i n e l ev el b y t wo l ev el s pursuant to U SSG § 3C1. 2: “ I f the de fe nd ant re c kle ssl y c re a te d a su bs tanti a l r isk

of de a th o r s e ri ou s b od ily i n j u r y t o a n o t h e r p e r s o n i n t h e c o u r s e o f f l e e i n g f r o m a l aw e n f

o r c e m e n t o f

f i c e r , i n c r e a s e b y 2 le ve ls. ” I nr

u l i n g t h a tt h e e n h an c e m e n ts h o u l d a p p l y , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtd e n i e d S l a t e r ’ s r e qu e s tto have a tr a ff ic a c c ide nt e xpe rt te sti fy a t his se nte nc ing he ari ng . Th e c ourt did a llo w Sl a te r t o s ub mit
a re port from the e x pert a

nd allowed Slater ’s attorne y to argue, using that repor

t, that Slater’s ac tions did not create a substantial risk of se rious bodily injury . Ba sed on th at en hance ment, the cour t imposed a sentenc e of 130 months, which wa s within the guide line rang e of 121- 151 months. Had the cour t not applied the enhanc ement, the g uideline rang e would have been 97-121 months. The statut or y min imum pe na lty

wa s 1 20 mon ths

. IINo. 05-6256

United States v. Slater

- 6 - I n revie wing a dis trict court’s denial of a motion to suppress evide nce, w e re view the district
c ourt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t f or c le ar e rr or , a

nd its le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo. United States v. Foster , 376 F.3d 577, 583 ( 6th Cir. 2004). The ev i d ence must be viewe d in the light most favor able to the district court’s de cision. Ib id . Fa ctu al fi n d i n gs by the district court a

re only clea rly err oneous “whe n, althoug h there may be evide nce to support [them], t he reviewing court on the entirety of the
ev i d en ce i s left with the def inite and firm convic tion that a mistake has bee n committed.” I b id. (q u o t i n g United States v. Navarro-Camac ho , 186 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 1999)). A lowe r cour t’s observations reg ardingwitness cre dibilit y are “ac corde d g reat defe renc e.” Y ates v. Av co Corp. , 819 F.2d 630, 636 ( 6th Cir. 1987). We r e vie w a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a pp lic a tio n o f t

he fe de ra l se nte nc ingg uid e lin e s de novo , and the trial court’s f

indings of f

act unde r the guidelines for c lear err or. See U

nited States v. Jarman , 144 F.3d 912, 9 1 4 ( 6 th Ci r . 1 9 9 8 )

. A d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s d e c is io n s o n th e a d mi s s io n o f e v id e nce a t sentenc ing a

re r eviewe d for a

buse of discr etion. United St ates v. Bingham , 81 F .3 d 61 7, 63 0 ( 6th Cir. 1996). III A. Sup pr e ssi on

of the F ru its of

the Se arc h o f t

he Ea st 2 7th

St. Ad dr e ss On appe al, Slater a

rg ues for the first time that the investigation into his activities beca me “a fede ral investig ation” a w eek be fore the police obtaine d a s ear ch wa rra nt for his addre ss. Slater notes that ATF Ag ent Malone te stified that he beca me involved a wee k prior to the application for
a sea rch w arr ant, that he pa

rticipated in planningboth the sear ch of the ho u s e an d t h e s t op of the vehicle, a nd that Malone testified that the case beca me a fede ral case a wee k prior to the applicationNo. 05-6256

United States v. Slater

- 7 - for a s e ar c h w ar

r an t. T h e r e f

o r e , Sl a te r

ar g u e s th a t t

h e w ar r an t m u s t b e e v a lu a te d

u n d e r f e d e r al standards, inc luding the r equire ments of Rule 41 of the Fe dera l Rules of Criminal Procedure

. See Un ite d S tat es v . S e ar p , 586 F.2d 1117, 1119- 21 (6th Cir. 1978). Rule 41 authorizes fede ral law
e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs to o bta in s e arc h w arr ants fr om m a g istra te j ud g e s, or

in t he a lte rn a tiv e , s ta te courts of r ecor d. Fe d. R. Crim. P. 41(b)( 1). Accordingto Slater, the evide nce f ound as a r esult of the sea rch of his r esidenc e should be suppressed a s it was a state of fice r, not a fe dera l office r, who obtained the se arc h war

rant, a nd beca use the war

rant wa s not obtained from a state cour

t of rec ord. The g overnme nt argues that S later w aived this argument by failing to raise it bef

ore the district court and that it n eed not be considere d by this court. The Supreme Court has held that “[w]hereas f

orfe iture is the fa ilure to make the timely asser tion of a r ight, wa iver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (q uo ta tio ns omi tte d)

. Ha d Slat e r fa ile d to obje c t to a sp e c if ic fi nd ingof

the ma g istra

te jud g e on

thi s issue, he mig ht have wa ived that objection upon appe al. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . Ca mp be ll , 261 F.3d 6 2 8 , 6 3 1

- 3 2 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 1 )

. Wi th o u t e v id e n c e th a t Sl a te r w a s aw ar e o f th is Ru le 4 1 ar g u me nt at the time of his suppr ession hear ing, howeve r, it is difficult to se e how we c ould decide if his waiver
o f i tw a s “ kn o w i n g , i n t e l l i g e n t , a n d v o l u n t ar y” a s r e qu i r e d

b y United States v. Osborne , 402 F.3d 626, 630 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). I nstead, we find that Slater for feited his Rule 41 ar g ument and ther efor e subjec t it to review for plain e rror : “B efor e an appellate court c an cor rec t an er ror not ra ised at trial, ther e must be (1)
err or, (2) that is plain, and (3) that af fects substantial rights. I f all three conditions are me t, an appellate court may

then exercise its discre tion to noti ce a forf eit ed er ro r, b u t only

if (4) the err orNo. 05-6256

United States v. Slater

- 8 - seriously aff ect s t h e fa irness, integ rity , or public re putation of judicial proce eding s.” Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) ( quotations omit ted). I n th is c a se , it

do e s n ot a

pp e ar t hat r e qu ir e d e le me nts of pl ain error a re me t. F ir st, it i s unclea r that there was any err or, let alone plain err or. We ha ve held that “[w]hil e it is important not to s tif le c oo pe ratio n b e tw een

fe de ra l and

state of fi c e rs , w e thi nk

it c le ar t hat f e de ra l of fi c e rs , investigating a

fede ral c rime, must comply with the fede ral rule s g overningtheir conduc t.” Se ar p , 586 F.2d at 1121. Howeve r, “[m] ere fede ral involvement is not enoug h; there must be sig nificant i n volvement prior to the se arc h.” United States v. Hunte r , 4 F
. A p p ’ x 2 9 5 , 3 0 1 ( 6th Cir. Feb. 9, 20 01 ); se e als o Se ar

p , 586 F.2d at 1119-21. I n Searp, for e x ample, the investig ation was a “joint undertaking be tween the Kentucky police and the FB Ifrom the be g inning,” they initiated the inv e sti g a tio n to g e the r, an F B Ia g e nt s wo re ou t th e a ff ida vit su pp or tin g the se arc h w arra

nt i n question, there w ere five FB I ag ents prese nt at the sear ch, and a fede ral office r direc ted the sea rch. Se ar p , 586 F.2d at 1121. On the other ha nd, in case s wher e only a si ng le federa l ag ent consulted on

an inve sti g a tio n, did

no t pa rt ic ipate in t

he pr oc e ss o f o bta ini nga se arc h warr ant, and a de c isi on to purs ue fe de ra l c ha

rg e s wa s not m a de pr ior

to t he se arc h, we have he ld t

hat th e re qu ir e me nts of

Rul e 41 do not gove rn the sea

rch. See, e .g. , Un ite d Stat es v . A lc or n , 9 F. App’ x 426, 431 (6th Cir. May 16 , 2 00 1) ; Hunter , 4 F. App’ x at 301. The only evidenc e Slater pr esents that fe dera l office rs wer e sub s t an t i ally involved in the investigation is t he testimony of ATF Ag ent Malone at the detention hea ring held purs u an t to 18 U. S.C. § 3 14 2( f) (2 ). Slate r’ s ma in e vid e nc e is t hat w he n a sk e d on

c ro ss- e xami natio n: “ Whe n d id the ca se officially come from [si c] a st ate case into a feder al ca se? ”, Malone replied: “ When IwasNo. 05-6256

United States v. Slater

E v e nif w e h a d f o u n d p la in e r r o r , v io lati o n s o f

Ru le 4 1 ar e n o t a

b a s is f o r s u p p r e s s ion 1 without an additional showing that (1) there was prejudice in the sense that the se arc h may not have occur red or been so intrusive had the Rule been f ollowed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disreg ard of a provision of Rul e 41. Se e Se ar p , 586 F.2d at 1125. There is no evidence of int e n ti o n a l d is r e g ar d o f Ru le 4 1 in th e r e c o r d

. T h e r e is a ls o n o r e a s o n to b e li e v e tha t had the investigators complied with Rule 41, a sea rch war rant would not have been issued. While the a ff ida vit fi le d by the po lic e in su pp or t of the ir a

pp lic a tio n fo r a se arc h wa rr ant wa s conf

us ing ly written in parts, it c lear ly descr ibed a c ontrolled buy from Slater that involved him traveling to the E as t 2 7 t h S t
. ad dre s s an d

i n fo rm at i o nfr o m m u l t i p l e i n fo rm an t s t h at i n d i ca t edt h at S l at er s o l d dru gs a t th e Ea st 2 7th

St. a dd re ss. B oth

the ma g ist

rate jud g e and

the dis tr ic t ju dg e e xami ne d th e a ff ida vit and dete rmined that it prese nted probable cause sufficie nt f or the issuanc e of a

sear ch wa

rra nt. See United States v. Finch , 998 F.2d 349, 352 ( 6th Cir. 1993). - 9 - contac ted by

the spec ial investigations unit that they had lea rned throug h informants that Mr. Slater was di s t ri b u t i n g signific ant quantities of nar cotics.” JA 125. Neither the question nor Malone’ s reply demonstrates that all parties involved, both state office rs and fe dera l ag ents, consider ed that the inv e sti g a tio n ha d be c ome a fe de ra l inv e sti g a tio n and sto pp e d b e inga state inv e sti g a tio n, no r i s Malone’s answer on cross-e x amination binding on this court. I n fac t, Malone’s fur ther testimony t h a th e d i d

n o tb e c o m e t h e c a s e a g e n t , t h a tD e t e c t i v e F l o y d r e m a i n e d t h e c a s e a g e n t , t h a tF l o yd obtained the wa

rra nt, and that Malone’ s involvement in the investig ation was limited all indicate that the state off

icer s s t i l l considere d it to be a state investig ation at the time. Malone’ s answer to an ambig uous question may

mere ly have indica

ted that it was at that time that the fede ral g overnme nt be g an c on sid e ri nga

c on c ur re nt f e de ra l in ve sti g a tio n a

nd /or fe de ra l pr os e c uti on . B a s e d so le ly on thi s
e vid e nc e , w e c ann ot f

ind that f e de ra l of fi c e rs we re so inv olv e d in the state inv e sti g a tio n a s to mandate that any war

rant be obtained pursuant to f eder al standards. Se e Alc or n , 9 F. App’ x at 431; Hunter , 4 F. App’ x at 301. Had Slater made his R u l e 4 1 o b

jection to the mag istrate judg e or the dis tr ic t c ourt , mo re e vid e nc e mig ht b e a va ila ble in t he re c or d to e va luate his c la im. 1No. 05-6256

United States v. Slater

- 10 - B . Su pp re ssi on of the F ru its of

the Sto p a

nd Se arc h o f S la te r’ s A uto mob ile Slater’s nex t argument is that the stop and sear ch of his ca r violated the F ourth Amendment beca use there was no proba

ble ca use for the stop and sea

rch, nor was ther e an e x ige ncy

justify ing
a wa rra ntless stop and sear ch. This ar g ument is to no avail. F ir st, t h e s t o p o f

ana u t o m o b i l e an d

t h e s u b s e qu e n t“ w ar

r an t l e s s s e ar c h o f

ana u t o mob ile based upon pr obable c ause to be lieve that the vehicle c ontain[s] evidenc e of c rime in the lig ht of an exigenc y arising out of the likely

disappea ranc e of the vehicle [does] not contravene the Warra nt Clause of the F ourth Amendment.” Calif ornia v. Ace vedo , 5 00 U. S. 5 65 , 5 69 (1 99 1) . Furt he r, thi s “automobile exception” doe s not “re quire[] a separate finding of exige ncy in addition to a finding of proba ble ca use.” Maryland v. Dy

son , 5 27 U. S. 4 65 , 4 67 (1 99 9) ; accord U nited States v. Graham , 27 5 F .3 d 4 90 , 50 9-1 1 (6t h Ci r. 20 02 ). Th e re fo re , th e e xiste nc e or la c k th e re of

of any e xig e nc y is ir re le va nt. S ec o n d , the police did not re quire proba ble ca use to stop Slater’s ca

r. The police are permitted “to stop a pe rson when the office r has r easona ble, ar ticulable suspicion that the per son has been , is, or is about to be eng ag ed in cr iminal activity .” United States v. He nsley , 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985) (quotations omitted). I n this case, the police had bee n informed of Slater’s plans by

a known informant, who ha d worke d with the police in ca rry ing out a cont ro l l ed b u y , who desc ribed the
source of his knowledg e of Slater ’s plans (a phone conve rsation with Slater), a nd had gi v en the police fa cts that they

corr oborate d throug h their own obser vation (the de scription of the c ar Slater would be driving , the time of Slater’ s trip, and the destination from which Slater would be returning ).No. 05-6256

United States v. Slater

Slater also ar g ues that the district cour t should have a llowed his putative expert to testify 2 at the sentencing hear ing. Be y ond citing c ases in which e x pert witnesse s were allowed to testified a t se nte nc inghe ari ng s, Slate r p ro vid e s n o s up po rt fo r t he pr op os iti on

that hi s p art ic ul ar witne ss should have be en allowed to testify . Fur ther, Slater doe s not address whe ther the f act that the district court allowed Slater to e nter a repor t f rom the putative expert into the sentenc ing rec ord ei t her rende rs the claimed err or harmless or obviates it e ntirely

. We a re not c onvinced that t h e d i s trict court a bused its discretion in ref using to hear live testimony from Slater’ s witness. See B ingham , 81 F.3d at 630. - 11 - This is cer tainly enoug h to establish rea sonable suspicion. Un ite d S tat es v . P ad

ro , 52 F.3d 120, 123- 24 (6th Cir. 1995) (findingnot only rea sonable suspicion, but probable cause , under similar circ umstances)

. Once the pol ice had stopped Slater, a drug -sniffing dog aler ted on the trunk of the car . See Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that a usi ng a drug- sniffing dog during a lawf ul tr a ff ic sto p d oe s n ot v iol a te the 4th Am e ndme nt)

. At that po int , th e re wa s c le arl y pr ob a ble c a us e to
sear ch the trunk.
C. Application of the Sentenc ing E nhance ment Slater’s fina l argument i s t h at t h e district court er red in the c alculation of his advisory Gu ide lin e ra

ng e by a pp lying the se nte nc ing e nh anc e me nt of USS G § 3C1 .2 , ba sed on reckle ss
e nd ang e rm e nt d

ur ingfl ig ht. 2 We have he ld that while “the que stion of what consti tutes endang erme nt is a mix ed question of la w an d f

a c t , i ti s h i g h l y

f a c t
- b a s e d

. T h e r e f

o r e , s i g n i f

i c an td e f e r e n c e t o t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtis require d.” United St ates v. Haze lwood , 398 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005). See also United States v. W right , 1 9 F
. Ap p’ x 2 30 , 23 3 (6 th Cir

. Au g . 28 , 20 01 ) ( “ Whe the r a de fe nd ant e ng a g e d in

re c kle ssNo. 05-6256

United States v. Slater

- 12 - endang erme nt in the proce ss of flig ht is a fac t-specif ic inquir y re viewed f

or cle ar e rror .”). The Section 3C1.2 enhanc ement may be applied e ven if no one was a ctually injured; the re levant issue is whether Slater ’s conduc t cre ated a substantial r isk of serious injury

. Hazelwood , 398 F.3d at 796. The district cour

t found that Slater ac ted re cklessly when he moved into the left eme rg ency lane a nd
acc eler ated to tr

y to g et around the dump tr uck. The district cour

t further found that eve n though the speeds may

not have be en at the 65 mph spe ed limit , whene ver ve hicles come into contact with one

ano the r w hil e mov inga t a sig nif ic ant sp e e d, su c h a s the 45 -5 0 mp h h e re , th e ri sk of inj ur y is g re a t. Th e re fo re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt fo un d th a t Slate r’ s a c tio ns ha d me t th e Se c tio n 3 C1. 2 r e qu ir e me nts
. The district cour

t’s finding s must be give n g reat defe renc e. While it is true that c ivilians had been r emoved f

rom dang er by

the well-e x ecute d traff

ic slowdown, Slater’ s at t em p t to maneuver around the dump truck did incre ase the risk of serious injury to the police off

icer s directly

involved in t he sto p. I n plann ing thi s stop inv olv ing a dump tr uc k, an SUV , an d s e ve ra l ma rk e d p oli c e c a rs , the police may

have hope d that their over whelming show of for ce w ould intim idate Slater sufficie ntly

to preve nt any

attempt by

him to escape appre hension. I nstead, S later did try to make a run f or it, howe ver brief, and his ma neuver s resulted in a collision be tween his c ar and one drive n by a police of

fice r. We c annot say that the district court wa s clea rly wrongin determining that the ri sk s o f s e ri ou s in

jur y c re a te d b y

Slate r’ s a c tio ns we re su

bs tanti a l. IV For the re asons stated a

bove, we AFF I RM Sl ater ’s conviction and se ntence
.