Opinion issued October 15, 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

————————————

NO. 01
- 14
- 00942
- CR

——————————— ALBERT JUNIOR FEBUS , Appella nt V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appell e e
On Appeal from the 176th District Court Harris County, Te xas Trial Court Ca se No. 1406874

MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted appellant Albert Junior Febus of the third

- degree felony of failing to register as a sex offender. See T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. art s . 62.055(a) , 62.102 (a)

– (b)

. Febus pleaded true to two pr ior unrelated felony convictions, and he

was thus subject to an en hanced sentence. The jury assessed punishment at 352 years in prison, and Febus appealed. In his sole issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. We find s ufficient evidence to support the conviction, and we affirm. Background Febus is required to register as a sex offender due to a past conviction for
i ndecency with a child

. He was required to sign and initial forms indicating his understanding of the regis trati on rules both on his release from prison and on every occasion when he reregister ed

. Febu s complied with the registration program for six years without any issues

. In March 2013, Febus moved from the apartment where he was residing at 6110 Glenmont D rive, Apt. 57, to another apartment within the same complex, 6100 Glenmont Drive , Apt. 45

. He was not listed on the leases for either
apar tment, and the property manager testified that she did not know him and had not seen him on the apartment grounds

. The tenant who was listed on the new apartment’s lease testified that Febus lived with him for eight months and shared a portion of the rent

. Because Febus changed addresses, he was required to update his address for the sex

- offender registration. Febus obtai ned a new driver’s license from the Tex as Department of Public Safety in order to register for a new CR

- 14 identification, also known as a “blue card

. ” He also filled out a CR

- 39 registration (“Sex Offender Update Form”). All3 three of the registration docu ments in question (the temporary l icense, the blue card, and the Sex O ffe nder Update F orm) listed his new address as 6110 Glenmont Drive, Apt. 45, instead of the correct address, 6100 Glenmont Drive

. The registration officer who assisted Febus testified t hat reregistration for sex offenders i nvolve s a face

- to

- face meeting in which officers sit with the registrants and assist them with the process

. The officer stated that Febus provided her with the incorrect address when she typed out the registration form s . Febus, in contrast, testified that he gave the correct address when registering but that there was some form of clerical error that led to the incorrect version appear ing on the documents. Febus signed all three documents without correcting the address

. Seven months later, a compliance officer visited 6110 Glenmont Drive to attempt to locate Febus a nd ensure that he was living where he was registered

. The officer spoke with the property manager and the resident of the apartment identified on Febus’s r egistration

. After determining that Febus was not living a t the address, the officer obtained a warrant for his arrest

. The officer did not visit 6100 Glenmont Drive

. Febus was charged with intentionally and knowingly failing to provide his new address to the local law enforcement authority

. The jury found Febus guilty of failure to register. At the punishment stage, Febus pleaded true to past convictions for robbery and for being a felon in possession of a firearm , leading to4 enhancements that set the m inimum punishment at 25 years

. The State also
p resented evidence that Febus previously had been c onvicted of a state

- jail felony and that he had changed his name repeatedly over the past 20 years. The jury assessed p unishment at 35 years. Febus appealed.
A nalysis In his sole issue on appeal, Febus argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a criminal conviction by a legal sufficiency standard. Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 8 93, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of t he offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Merritt v. State , 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The State may rely on circumstantial evidence to establish guilt. See Carrizales v. Sta te , 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The legal standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Id. “The jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the tes timony.” Harris v. State , 3645 S.W.3d 328, 334 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet. ). We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams
v. State , 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume th at the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793; Merritt , 368 S.W.3d at 526. A person commits the offense of failure to comply with sex

- offender registration requirements “if the person is required to register and fails to comply with any requirement of ” Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. art. 62. 102(a) ; Robinson v. State , No. PD

- 0421

- 14, 2015 WL 4068109 , at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 2015); Harris , 364 S.W.3d at 334

. Chapter 62 requires sex offenders who change addresses to provide registration authorities with the “anticipated move date and new address” no later than seven days prior to moving, and to provide “proof of identity and proof of residence” to the new enforcement agency no later than seven days after moving, or the first day the agency allows them to report if later

. T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. art. 62.055(a). “If the definition of an off ense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental element.” T EX
. P ENAL C ODE § 6.02(b). Article 62.102(a) does not contain a culpable mental state , nor d oes it plainly dispense with one. As a6 result, “§ 6.02(c) requires that Article 62.102(a) be read to require intent, knowledge, or recklessness to establish criminal responsibility.” Robinson , 2015 WL 4068109 at *2. A person acts knowingly, or with knowled ge, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware that the circumstances exist. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE § 6.03(b). A person acts recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregard s a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist. Id

. § 6.03(c). Violation s of A rticle 62.102 contain two elements: awareness of a duty to register, and failure to comply with one of the statute’s requirements. Robinson , 2015 WL 4068109 at *2. This court has previously state d that “[w]hen the indictment alleges that a defendant ‘intentionally or knowingly’ failed to register as a sex offender,” we would require “sufficient evidence of the defendant’s intentional or knowing failure.” Harr is , 364 S.W.3d at 335. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recently held in Robinson v. State , No. PD

- 0421

- 14, 2015 WL 4068109 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 2015), that “the culpable mental states of knowledge and recklessness apply only to the duty

- to

- r egister element ” of the failure

- to

- comply offense. Robinson , 2015 WL 4068109 at *4. Thus, the requirement of a culpable mental state applies only to the circumstances of the conduct

— the duty to register , not the conduct of failing to do so

. Id. The statute7 requires only that the offender “(1) knew or was reckless about whether he had a duty to register as a sex offender, and (2) failed to report” his new address. Id. at *5. Febus argues that the S tate presented insufficient evidence to prove that his mental state was intentional or knowing when failing to give the correct address

. H e contends that he provided affirmative evidence that conclusively establish ed a reasonable doubt about his mental state . B ased on the alleged lack of mens rea evidence for his fa ilure, he says no reasonable juror could fin d him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

. This argument is effectively rendered moot by the holding of the Cou rt of Criminal Appeals in Robinson

. The evidence permitted a jury to conclude that Febus was fully awa re of the registration requi rements, based on the forms he had to sign upon r elease and reregistration, six years of maintaining his registration , as well as his own testimony

. This constitutes sufficient evidence to show knowledge for the duty

- to

- register element. See id. at *6 (testimony that offender was aware of the need to register was sufficient evidence to satisfy the first element of the offense). Based on Robinson ’s interpretation of A rticle 62.102, the State did not have to prove that Febus had a culpable mental state when failing to provide the correct address. The evidence shows that the required documen ts listed the incorrect8 address and that F ebus signed them. That is sufficient evidence to satisfy the second element, failure to comply with th e requirements of the statute . The evidence therefore was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find Febus guilty of failure to comply with the registration requirement.
T he holding in Robinson is dispositive of this case. Viewing the evidence in the lig ht most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational factfinder could have found Febus guilty of failing to comply with the requirements of Art icle 62

. T EX
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. P ROC
. art. 62 ; s ee Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789;
Merritt , 368 S. W.3d at 525. Accordingly, we overrule Febus’s sole issue. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Massengale Justice Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Massengale, and Lloyd. Do not publish. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b).