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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MICHAEL AARON REED

Appellant No. 1044 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order May 21, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0002248-2010

BEFORE: OTT, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2015

Michael Aaron Reed appeals, pro se, from the order entered May 21, 

2014, in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his first 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9541 et seq. Reed seeks relief from the judgment of sentence of an 

aggregate nine to 18 years’ imprisonment imposed following his conviction 

of two counts of robbery and one count of criminal conspiracy.1 On appeal, 

he argues both trial and PCRA counsel provided ineffective assistance. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The facts underlying Reed’s convictions are as follows. On July 27, 

2010, at approximately 9:13 p.m., two armed men entered the Blue Ridge 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), (a)(1)(v), and 903, respectively.
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Food Mart in Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania, and demanded the clerk give 

them all of the money in the cash register.2 Both men were wearing masks, 

one had a gun and the other was armed with a knife. After robbing the 

store of an estimated $500 to $550 in cash, they fled in a car parked behind 

the store.3 See N.T., 6/23/2011, at 45-49, 71. The robbery was captured 

on the store’s video surveillance camera.

Two witnesses, who were outside of the food mart at the time of the 

robbery, saw the culprits flee in a two-door, two-tone maroon and grey car, 

which they believed had the same body type as a Dodge Shadow or Spirit. 

One witness, Joseph Trail, noticed the car had a Maryland license plate, 

although he could not identify the plate number. See N.T., 6/23/2011, at 

85, 109. 

At approximately 9:20 p.m., Jeffrey Croteau was traveling on Pen Mar 

Road near Camp Louise, just over the Maryland border, when he observed a 

car on the side of the road with its front end in a ditch. Id. at 136-137. 

Croteau stopped to see if the driver needed assistance and, as he 

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2 The Blue Ridge Food Mart is located close to the Pennsylvania/Maryland 

border. As will be discussed infra, Reed was arrested after his car slid down 

an embankment on a road in Maryland. Officers from several surrounding 

jurisdictions assisted in the investigation of the robbery.

3 The store clerk testified he believed the culprits took a “[c]ouple of 

hundred dollar[ bills], couple of fifty dollar[ bills] ... four or five [twenties] ... 

two or three [tens] ... for or five [fives]” and possibly “30 to 50” one dollar

bills. N.T., 6/23/2011, at 72-73. 
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approached, he noticed the driver and passenger putting on t-shirts as they 

exited the car. He explained the two men “seemed like they wanted to get 

the car back on the road and get moving as quickly as possible.” Id. at 137. 

The passenger, later identified as Reed, asked Croteau if he could use his 

cell phone to call his mother. Croteau attempted to place the call for Reed, 

but the call would not go through. Croteau then left as another vehicle 

stopped to help. See id. at 137-138.

Shayla Murray and her boyfriend were driving by the accident scene 

around the same time when they stopped to help. Murray allowed Reed to 

use her cell phone, and he placed two calls to his mother at 9:27 p.m. 

Murray and her boyfriend were still at the scene when the police arrived. 

See N.T., 6/24/2011, at 4-6, 11.

Officer Bryan Chappell, Jr., of the Waynesboro Police Department, 

responded to a radio call from the Washington Township Police to assist in 

investigating an armed robbery. Officer Chappell proceeded to the food 

mart and began driving around the nearby area to search for the suspects. 

At approximately 9:37 p.m., he came upon an older model Dodge or 

Plymouth that had slid off the embankment on Pen Mar Road, approximately 

two miles from the robbery scene. The car was two-tone, maroon on top 

and silver on the bottom, with a Maryland license plate, and matched the 
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description of the vehicle used in the robbery.4 Officer Chappell secured the 

four individuals at the scene - Reed, his co-defendant Russell Runk, as well 

as, Murray, and her boyfriend Cameron Himes - until backup arrived. See

N.T., 6/23/2011, at 155-160.

Corporal Lloyd Perkins, of the Washington Township Police 

Department, also responded to the armed robbery call, arriving at the food 

mart at approximately 9:20 p.m. Corporal Perkins was interviewing 

witnesses at the scene when he received a radio call from Officer Chappell, 

stating the officer believed he had located the suspect vehicle. Corporal 

Perkins proceeded immediately to the crash scene in Maryland, arriving at 

approximately 9:39 p.m. See id. at 176-180. Corporal Perkins stated he 

was “surprised because [the vehicle that had skidded off the road] was the 

exact description [he] got from the witnesses at the [robbery] scene of 

the vehicle.” Id. at 180-181 (emphasis supplied). 

The responding officers conducted a pat down search of Reed and 

Runk. Detective Timothy Atwell, of the Washington County Maryland 

Sheriff’s Office, who was assisting at the crash scene, asked Runk if he could 

search his clothing. Runk agreed, and Detective Atwell recovered $487.00, 

which was kept “in a loose unorganized haphazard fashion” in his back 

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4 We note, however, that unlike the description of the suspects’ car provided 

by the witnesses, Reed’s car had four doors.
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pocket.5 N.T., 6/24/2011, at 19. Thereafter, Runk and Reed were arrested. 

During a search incident to the arrest, the police recovered latex gloves from 

Reed. 

Detective Atwell secured the vehicle involved in the crash and later 

obtained a search warrant for the vehicle. From inside the vehicle, the 

police recovered, inter alia, a pair of black camouflage pants, a black 

sweatshirt, a brown t-shirt, two pairs of sports gloves, a small pellet clip to 

an air gun, and a registration card indicating the vehicle was registered to 

Reed.6 See id. at 32-34. One pair of the gloves recovered matched the 

gloves on one of the suspects as seen in the surveillance video. No weapons 

were ever recovered. 

Reed and his co-defendant Runk were tried before a jury in June of 

2011. On June 24, 2011, the jury found both co-defendants guilty of two 

counts of robbery and one count of conspiracy. On August 23, 2011, Reed 

was sentenced to 60 to 120 months’ imprisonment for one count of robbery, 

and a consecutive 48 to 96 months’ incarceration for the conspiracy 

conviction. The court imposed a concurrent sentence of 18 to 36 months’ 

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5 The bills recovered from Runk were “two one hundred dollar bills, four fifty 

dollar bills, one twenty dollar bill, twelve five dollar bills, [and] seven one 

dollar bills.” Id. at 20.

6

It appears, from the surveillance video, that one of the masked robbers 

wore jeans and a black and white long-sleeved shirt, while the other wore 

camouflage pants and a black hoodie sweatshirt.
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imprisonment for the second robbery conviction. Reed did not file a direct 

appeal.7

On September 10, 2012, Reed filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, in 

which he raised, inter alia, a challenge to the sufficiency and weight of the 

evidence, and trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to: (1) object to 

evidence and impeach witnesses at trial; (2) conduct a more thorough 

pretrial investigation, including an investigation of a similar robbery that 

occurred two weeks after the one in question; and (3) file a direct appeal.8 

Brian O. Williams, Esq. was appointed as counsel to assist Reed in litigating 

his PCRA petition. After being granted two extensions of time to file an 

amended petition, Williams filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and 

accompanying Turner/Finley9“no merit” letter on August 2, 2013. 

However, on August 20, 2013, the PCRA court entered an order directing 

Williams to address Reed’s claim that trial counsel failed to file a requested 

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7 Runk’s judgment of sentence was affirmed by a panel of this Court. See 

Commonwealth v. Runk, ___ A.3d ___, No. 1621 MDA 2014 (Pa. Super. 

May 28, 2015) (unpublished memorandum).

8 The other issues Reed raised in his pro se PCRA petition have been 

abandoned on appeal. Specifically, he argued (1) the initiation of his 

criminal case by the filing of an information, rather than by a grand jury 

indictment, was unconstitutional; (2) the Legislature had no authority to 

enact the Pennsylvania Crimes Code; and (3) the restitution order in his 

sentence was erroneous. See Motion for Post Conviction Relief, 9/10/2012.

9 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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direct appeal. Thereafter, on September 9, 2013, Williams filed an amended 

“no merit” letter, contending, once again, that Reed’s PCRA claims were 

meritless, and concluding, specifically, that Reed never asked trial counsel to 

file a direct appeal. See Amended No Merit Letter, 9/9/2013, at 

unnumbered p. 4. 

On October 15, 2013, the PCRA court entered an opinion and order 

granting counsel’s petition to withdraw, and dismissing Reed’s PCRA petition 

without a hearing. However, the court entered an amended order eight days 

later, to comply with the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and provide 

Reed with the opportunity to respond to the court’s proposed dismissal of his 

petition. Reed originally filed a pro se response to the court’s first order on 

October 30, 2013, in which he reiterated his prior claims of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, as well as asserted PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing 

to raise additional claims. Specifically, Reed claimed he asked PCRA counsel 

to challenge trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file a suppression 

motion, contesting the legality of the police’s arrest and subsequent search 

of his person. After the PCRA court entered its amended order, Reed filed a 

second pro se response, in which he incorporated by reference his prior 

filing. Thereafter, on December 20, 2013, the trial court entered an order, 

acknowledging that prior PCRA counsel’s “no merit” letter “improperly 

addressed the issue of trial counsel’s failure to file a direct appeal.” Order, 

12/20/2013. Accordingly, the court appointed Kristin Nicklas, Esq., to 

represent Reed at a February 13, 2014, hearing on the issue. See id.
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The hearing was continued until April 28, 2014, and, following the 

hearing, on May 22, 2014, the PCRA court entered an order and opinion 

dismissing Reed’s PCRA petition.10 Reed filed a pro se motion for 

reconsideration, which the PCRA court declined to consider since Reed was, 

at that time, represented by counsel. On June 13, 2014, PCRA counsel filed 

a motion to amend the PCRA petition and requested a hearing, stating that 

she had obtained new evidence to support Reed’s claim that he asked 

counsel to file a direct appeal. See Motion to Amend PCRA and Schedule 

Hearing, 6/12/2014. Nonetheless, the PCRA court denied counsel’s motion, 

and this timely appeal followed. 

On June 30, 2014, the PCRA court directed Reed to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

On July 14, 2014, however, PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw and 

requested a Grazier11 hearing because Reed had informed her he wanted to 

proceed pro se. At the conclusion of a Grazier hearing on August 15, 2014, 

the PCRA court determined Reed “made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

waiver of his right to counsel” and granted him permission to proceed pro 

se. Order, 8/15/2014. See also N.T., 8/15/2014. Accordingly, on August 

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10 The only issue addressed the April 28, 2014, hearing was whether trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal.

11 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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18, 2014, Reed filed a pro se concise statement in response to the PCRA 

court’s June 30, 2014, order. 

On appeal, Reed raises the following four layered ineffectiveness 

claims. He asserts PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise or 

properly argue the ineffectiveness of trial counsel for (1) failing to file a 

pretrial suppression motion; (2) failing to impeach witnesses, prepare for 

trial, and object to evidence; (3) failing to investigate and present evidence 

of third party culpability; and (4) failing to object to the admission of 

Commonwealth’s Exhibit #4. 

When reviewing an order dismissing a PCRA petition, we must 

determine whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the 

record, and whether its legal conclusions are free from error. 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). “Great deference 

is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be 

disturbed unless they have no support in the certified record.” 

Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation 

omitted).

Where, as here, the only claims raised on appeal challenge the 

effectiveness of counsel, our review is well-settled: 

We begin our analysis of ineffectiveness claims with the 

presumption that counsel is effective. To prevail on his 

ineffectiveness claims, Appellant must plead and prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, three elements: (1) the 

underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no 

reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) Appellant 

suffered prejudice because of counsel’s action or inaction. With 
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regard to the second, i.e., the “reasonable basis” prong, we will 

conclude that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a reasonable 

basis only if Appellant proves that “an alternative not chosen 

offered a potential for success substantially greater than the 

course actually pursued.” To establish the third, i.e., the 

prejudice prong, Appellant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 

different but for counsel’s action or inaction.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 259-260 (Pa. 2011) (internal 

citations omitted). “Failure to establish any prong of the test will defeat an 

ineffectiveness claim.” Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050, 1061 

(Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

Moreover, 

[w]here the defendant asserts a layered ineffectiveness claim he 

must properly argue each prong of the three-prong 

ineffectiveness test for each separate attorney. 

Layered claims of ineffectiveness “are not wholly distinct from 

the underlying claims[,]” because “proof of the underlying claim 

is an essential element of the derivative ineffectiveness claim[.]” 

“In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical 

inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts 

was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of 

counsel. If that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel 

cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the underlying 

issue.” 

Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1190 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(internal citations omitted), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 631 (Pa. 2013).

Reed first challenges PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to 

assert trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file a pretrial suppression 

motion. He also contends the PCRA court erred in failing to direct PCRA 

counsel to address this claim. Specifically, Reed contends trial counsel 
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should have challenged the legality of his vehicle stop and arrest, as well as 

the searches of his person, his co-defendant, and his vehicle. In support of 

these claims, Reed asserts (1) his vehicle did not match the description of 

the suspect vehicle; (2) once he was detained, the officers took no action to 

confirm or dispel their suspicion that he was involved in the robbery for 

more than 45 minutes; (3) he was not arrested for another two and onehalf hours; (4) the “pat down” of Runk exceeded a valid Terry12 stop; (5) 

Runk’s consent to search was not voluntarily given; and (7) the probable 

cause affidavit supporting the search warrant for his vehicle contained false 

information “contrived” by two of the investigating officers. See Reed’s Brief 

at 11-26. 

Preliminarily, we note “a petitioner can preserve [a challenge to PCRA 

counsel’s representation] by including that claim in his Rule 907 response or 

raising the issue while the PCRA court retains jurisdiction.” 

Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1085 (Pa. Super. 2014). Here, 

Reed properly preserved this issue by including it in his October 30, 2013, 

response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. See Reed’s Objections to 

Opinion and Order of Court, 10/30/2013, at 11-13. 

The PCRA court addressed this claim, summarily, as follows:

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12 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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[W]e conclude that it was reasonable for counsel to forgo a 

suppression motion on this issue, and even if the issue had been 

raised, the outcome of this case would not likely have been 

different. Despite allegations of an unlawful arrest and search of 

the Defendants, the evidence presented at trial by various 

officers was consistent with a valid stop, search, and eventual 

arrest.

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/19/2014, at 8. We agree. 

First, we emphasize that, contrary to Reed’s characterization, this case 

did not involve a traditional vehicle stop, since Reed’s car was stuck in an 

embankment when Officer Chappell drove by the scene. The officer stopped 

to investigate because the car matched the description of the one involved in 

the robbery, and had crashed not far from the robbery site. Under these 

circumstances, Officer Chappell had reasonable suspicion to detain Reed and 

Runk so that he could determine whether they were involved in the robbery. 

Moreover, because the officer was informed the suspects were armed, he 

had sufficient justification to perform a pat-down for weapons. See 

Commonwealth v. Guess, 53 A.3d 895, 901 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“In order 

to justify a pat-down search, or Terry stop, the officer must have 

reasonable suspicion, under the totality of the circumstances, that criminal 

activity is afoot and that ‘the individual whose suspicious behavior he is 

investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer 

or to others.’”) (footnote omitted), appeal denied, 67 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2013).

Thereafter, Runk gave Detective Atwell consent to search his person, 

and the detective recovered a large amount of cash similar to that taken 

during the robbery. Reed cannot challenge the voluntariness of Runk’s 
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consent because he had no “expectation of privacy in the situs from which 

the contraband was seized,” that is, Runk’s back pocket. Commonwealth 

v. Hawkins, 718 A.2d 265, 268 (Pa. 1998). Furthermore, with regard to 

Reed’s complaints regarding the time it took investigators to formally place 

him under arrest, we find he has failed to assert how he was prejudiced. 

We remind Reed that this case involved an armed robbery in a small town, 

and the suspects fleeing over the state line into another jurisdiction. 

Assuming, arguendo, Reed’s account is accurate, a two and one-half hour 

delay is not unreasonable under the circumstances presented herein. 

Lastly, Reed’s challenge to the search warrant executed on his vehicle 

is also unavailing. Although he claims the warrant contained incorrect 

information, namely that witnesses “described the robbery perpetrators as 

wearing camo pants” when none of the witnesses provided such a 

description,13 we note that a review of the surveillance videotape from the 

mini-market clearly shows one of the suspects wearing camouflage pants. 

Further, although it is unclear if the officers actually viewed the surveillance 

videotape before applying for the search warrant, we note that

“misstatements of fact will invalidate a search warrant and require 

suppression of the fruits of the search only if the misstatements of fact are 

deliberate and material.” Commonwealth v. Tucker, 384 A.2d 938, 

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13 Reed’s Brief at 24.
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941 (Pa. Super. 1978) (emphasis supplied). Moreover, “[t]he inclusion of 

false evidence will not invalidate a search warrant if the warrant is based 

upon other information which is valid and sufficient to constitute probable 

cause.” Id. Here, there was sufficient probable cause to justify the search 

of Reed’s vehicle even if the information regarding the camouflage pants was 

not included. See Application/Affidavit for a Search and Seizure Warrant, 

7/28/2010 at 2-3 (averring (1) vehicle matched the description of car in 

which robbery suspects fled; (2) witnesses had stated suspects were armed; 

(3) large amount of cash, consistent with what was taken during the 

robbery, was recovered from co-defendant’s back pants pocket; and (4) 

disabled vehicle was within two miles of robbery scene, and in an area

consistent with direct of travel of suspect vehicle as recounted by 

witnesses). Therefore, we agree with the conclusion of the PCRA court that 

trial counsel had a reasonable basis for not filing a meritless suppression 

motion. Accordingly, no relief is warranted on this claim. 

Reed’s next layered ineffectiveness claim challenges trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness in failing to adequately prepare for trial.14 He also asserts 

PCRA counsel neglected to examine the record, independently, and only 

reviewed those specific ineffectiveness claims Reed raised in his pro se

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14 Under this rubric, Reed claims that he “has discovered well over 100

examples of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness both pretrial and at trial[.]” 

Reed’s Brief at 31 (emphasis in original).
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petition. Additionally, Reed argues PCRA counsel misaddressed the claims 

he did review. 

Preliminarily, we note that many of these trial counsel ineffectiveness 

claims were not included in either Reed’s pro se petition, or his response to 

the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. Therefore, those issues, are waived for 

our review.15 See Rigg, supra. 

The remainder of Reed’s claims challenge trial counsel’s failure to 

“closely examine the material ‘evidence’ presented by the Commonwealth 

and thereafter carefully articulate the differences between such ‘evidence’ 

and items connected with the crime for the jury’s understanding[.]” Reed’s 

Brief at 36. Essentially, Reed asserts the Commonwealth attempted to 

“‘bamboozle’ and confuse the jury” with evidence that was irrelevant to the 

robbery. Id. In particular, Reed claims the amount of money recovered 

from Runk did not match the amount reported stolen, the color of Reed’s car 

was different from that described by the witnesses, and the clothing 

recovered from his car did not match the items worn by the perpetrators.

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15 The waived issues include Reed’s contentions that trial counsel failed to: 

(1) present evidence that Reed’s vehicle could not have been involved in the 

robbery based on the time frame of the events and distance from the crime 

scene; (2) object to the Commonwealth’s closing argument; (3) obtain a 

daily report of the lottery sales for that day to determine that exact amount 

of money stolen; and (4) object to Washington Township Police Sergeant 

Vernon Ashway’s testimony that he conducted internet research of air guns. 

See Reed’s Brief at 31-34, 35-36, 42-43, 51-52.
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These claims, however, were raised in Reed’s pro se petition, and 

addressed by the PCRA court in its October 15, 2013, opinion. See PCRA 

Court Opinion, 10/15/2013, at 6-8 (finding (1) trial counsel “thoroughly 

cross-examined the victim about the amount of money taken and the 

inconsistencies between his trial testimony and the preliminary hearing 

testimony[;]” (2) although counsel did not directly cross-examine the 

witness regarding their description of car color as maroon, when Reed’s car 

was, in fact, bright red, the PCRA court determined it was “entirely 

reasonable” for the car to “appear darker at night” and counsel did not need 

to impeach witnesses “to distinguish between two allegedly different shades 

of red[;]” and (3) both trial counsel and co-defendant’s counsel objected to 

several items of clothing recovered from Reed’s car). Because we find the 

PCRA court sufficiently addressed and properly disposed of these issues in its 

prior opinion, we rest on its well-reasoned basis. Accordingly, no relief is 

warranted.

Reed also presents a layered ineffectiveness claim focused on trial 

counsel’s purported failure to “investigate and present evidence of third 

party culpability.” Reed’s Brief at 52. Specifically, Reed claims:

he had discovered pretrial that another robbery in the same 

general vicinity and within a matter of a couple of weeks had 

occurred after the robbery at bar; that [the robbery] had been 

committed by two teenaged males, who were armed and 

wearing masks; and who fled the scene in a red car. 

Id. He asserts he advised trial counsel of “this other incident, but counsel 

did nothing to make further inquiry into it[.]” Id.
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Reed, however, has failed to provide any explanation in his petition or 

his appellate brief to support his claim that this “other incident” actually 

occurred, or how he learned about this other crime, nor has he provided 

sufficient details for this Court to determine whether the culprits could have 

committed the robbery in question. Accordingly, because Reed cannot 

demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present evidence of 

this “other incident” to the jury, assuming such evidence did, in fact, exist, 

we conclude he is entitled to no relief.

Reed’s final layered ineffectiveness claim asserts trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness for failing to object to the admission of Commonwealth’s 

exhibit #4, which “contains ALL of the police reports composed in this case 

during investigations[.]” Reed’s Brief at 54. Because this issue was not 

raised in either Reed’s pro se PCRA petition, or his response to the PCRA 

court’s Rule 907 notice, it is waived for our review. See Rigg, supra. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/23/2015