NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ACARTA, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

DANE R. PARTRIDGE, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0467

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County

No. S0300CV201300641

The Honorable Jacqueline Hatch, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Offices of James R. Vaughan, Scottsdale

By Brian K. Partridge

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Dane R. Partridge, Page

Defendant/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Donn Kessler and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined.
ACARTA v. PARTRIDGE

Decision of the Court

2

G O U L D, Judge:

¶1 Dane Partridge appeals from the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Acarta, LLC. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Partridge opened a credit card account with Chase Bank in 

August 1995 (account 9677). In July 2002, Partridge opened a second 

account with Chase Bank (account 0140). Partridge defaulted on both 

accounts in 2009. Chase Bank subsequently charged off the principal 

balances for both accounts; $13,926.45 for account 0140, and $23,436.23 for 

account 9677. 

¶3 In early 2011, Chase Bank sold the debts for both accounts to 

Sherman Originator III, LLC. On December 20, 2011, Sherman Originator 

III, LLC assigned its interest in the debts to Sherman Originator LLC, who 

then assigned its interests to LVNV Funding LLC. On the same day, LVNV 

Funding LLC assigned the debts back to Sherman Originator III, LLC who 

assigned the debts to Jackson Capital. Finally, Jackson Capital assigned the 

debts to Acarta. 

¶4 On October 15, 2013, Acarta filed a complaint against 

Partridge seeking judgment in the amount of the principal balances for the

subject accounts. Acarta did not seek any contractual interest, but did 

request attorneys’ fees based on Partridge’s original contracts with Chase

Bank and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-341.01. Partridge 

made a general denial as to all of Acarta’s allegations. 

¶5 Acarta filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of 

the motion, Acarta submitted the affidavit of Victor Gilgan, its manager and 

custodian of records. In his affidavit, Gilgan avowed that Partridge’s

accounts had been sold and assigned to Acarta; he also attached copies of 

the assignments and bills of sale showing the transfer of ownership to 

Acarta. Gilgan also attached the monthly statements for Partridge’s 

accounts, as well as a statement listing the current unpaid principal balance 

for each account.

1 

¶6 Partridge opposed the motion arguing that Acarta’s claims 

were barred by the statute of limitations. Partridge also challenged the 

 

1 These records did not include the original credit card agreements 

between Chase Bank and Partridge. 
ACARTA v. PARTRIDGE

Decision of the Court

3

authenticity and sufficiency of the documents Acarta produced in support 

of its claims. Partridge did not submit a controverting affidavit. 

¶7 The trial court granted Acarta’s motion for summary 

judgment.2 The court concluded that Acarta’s claims were not time-barred, 

and that Gilgan’s affidavit and its attached documents proved that 

Partridge owed Acarta the principal amounts for the subject credit card 

debts. Partridge timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review 

¶8 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to 

determine “whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and 

whether the trial court erred in applying the law.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 

Allen, 231 Ariz. 209, 213, ¶ 14 (App. 2012). In our review, “we view the facts 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. 

II. Statute of Limitations

¶9 Partridge argues the court improperly granted summary 

judgment because Acarta’s claims were time-barred. The parties agree that 

Acarta’s claims accrued on May 5, 2009 for account 9677, and June 9, 2009

for account 0140. Partridge contends the debts were either oral debts or 

open accounts subject to the three-year statute of limitations set forth in 

A.R.S. § 12-543. Thus, according to Partridge, when Acarta filed its lawsuit 

on October 13, 2013, the statute of limitations had expired. We disagree.

¶10 Acarta’s claims are governed by the six-year statute of 

limitations set forth in A.R.S. § 12-548, not the three-year statute of 

limitations listed in A.R.S. § 12-543. Indeed, on July 21, 2011, A.R.S. § 12-

548 was expressly amended to include actions based on credit card debt. 

¶11 Partridge argues, however, that when § 12-548 was amended, 

Acarta’s claims were already barred by the three-year statute of limitations 

in A.R.S. § 12-543. As a result, Partridge asserts the amendment of A.R.S. 

§ 12-548 did not revive Acarta’s claim, because it was barred by “preexisting law.” See A.R.S. § 12-505 (stating that an “action barred by pre-

 

2 In addition to the unpaid principal balances for the accounts, the 

court awarded Acarta attorneys’ fees based on A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A); the 

award was not based on the credit card agreements. 
ACARTA v. PARTRIDGE

Decision of the Court

4

existing law is not revived by amendment of such law enlarging the time in 

which such action may be commenced”). 

¶12 Partridge’s reasoning is incorrect. “Under Arizona law, 

amended statutes must be given prospective effect to extend periods of time 

within which claims may be brought on causes of action existing at the time 

the amendment takes effect.” Rutherford v. Babcock, 168 Ariz. 404, 406 (App. 

1991). Thus, the phrase “action barred by pre-existing law” in A.R.S. § 12-

505 has been interpreted to mean an action that is time-barred “at the time 

of the statutory amendment.” Id. Here, at the time § 12-548 was amended, 

Acarta’s claims were not barred by either the six-year or the three-year 

statute of limitations. As a result, the six-year time limit in § 12-548 governs

the claims. 

¶13 Accordingly, Acarta’s claims were not time barred, because 

Acarta filed its complaint on October 8, 2013, which was within the 

applicable six-year statute of limitations period. 

III. Evidentiary Basis for Summary Judgment

¶14 Partridge argues the trial court erred by considering the 

exhibits attached to Gilgan’s affidavit because they were inadmissible 

hearsay and not properly authenticated. He also argues Gilgan’s affidavit 

contains inaccuracies and was based on inadmissible hearsay. 3 

¶15 The trial court has broad discretion in determining the 

admissibility of evidence in summary judgment proceedings; we 

“deferentially review[] the evidentiary rulings of the trial court and affirm[] 

unless [we] find[] clear abuse of discretion or legal error, and prejudice.” 

Mohave Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Byers, 189 Ariz. 292, 301 (App. 1997). “An 

affidavit used to support or oppose a motion [for summary judgment] shall 

be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in 

evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters 

stated.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

¶16 Hearsay is inadmissible unless some exception to the hearsay 

rule applies. Ariz. R. Evid. 802. One exception to the hearsay rule is the 

 

3 Partridge also points out that Acarta did not produce a signed credit 

card agreement between Partridge and Chase Bank as evidence of the debts. 

Acarta was not required to do so; the evidence Chase Bank extended credit 

on Partridge’s behalf and Partridge’s use of and partial payments on those 

cards provides “convincing proof that the contract[ual relationship] exists.” 

Owens v. M.E. Schepp Ltd., 218 Ariz. 222, 226, ¶ 16 (2008).
ACARTA v. PARTRIDGE

Decision of the Court

5

business records exception. Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6). The business records 

exception requires that “either the custodian of records or ‘other qualified 

witness’ testify that the record was made 1) contemporaneously, or nearly 

so, with the underlying event; 2) ‘by, or from information transmitted by, a 

person with first-hand knowledge acquired in the course of a regularly 

conducted business activity;’ 3) completely in the course of that activity; 

and 4) as a regular practice for that activity.” State v. McCurdy, 216 Ariz. 

567, 571-72, ¶ 9 (App. 2007); Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6). Documents that satisfy 

the business records exception are also considered self-authenticating. 

Ariz. R. Evid. 902(11).

¶17 The “adoptive business records doctrine” provides that 

documents may be admitted as business records “where an organization 

incorporated the records of another entity into its own, relied upon those 

records in its day-to-day operations, and where there are other strong 

indicia of reliability.” Air Land Forwarders, Inc. v. U.S., 172 F.3d 1338, 1344 

(Fed. Cir. 1999); State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, 401-02, ¶ 33 (2013) (stating that 

documents are admissible as adoptive business records when a business 

“regularly relies on the information that third parties submit as part of their 

ordinary course of business”.) 

¶18 The Gilgan affidavit satisfies the elements of the adoptive 

business record exception. The affidavit properly sets forth the basis for 

Gilgan’s personal knowledge and his competence to testify. Gilgan avows 

that he serves as Acarta’s manager and custodian of its records, and he is 

familiar with Acarta’s “practices and procedures” for keeping and 

maintaining records “in the ordinary course of business.” 

¶19 Based on his personal knowledge, Gilgan also avows that 

Chase Bank, as a federally regulated bank, kept digital records of 

Partridge’s accounts based on information transmitted (1) “by or from a 

person with firsthand knowledge of the events and transactions,” and (2) 

the information was recorded “at or about the time of the events and 

transactions” listed in the records. Gilgan states that it is the customary 

practice of Acarta to buy debts that have accrued on credit cards issued by 

federally regulated banks such as Chase Bank, and that Acarta incorporated 

Partridge’s records into the business records it maintains. Further, Gilgan 

avows that Acarta relies on the records it purchased from Chase Bank “in

the regular course of its business.” 

¶20 Based on the statements contained in Gilgan’s affidavit, we 

conclude that Partridge’s monthly credit card statements, electronic 

detailed statement of accounts, and bills of sale qualify as business records.
ACARTA v. PARTRIDGE

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6

¶21 Moreover, when considered in conjunction with Gilgan’s 

avowals in his affidavit, the monthly statements and account records prove 

that Acarta is entitled to judgment on Partridge’s credit card debts. 

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 44-7804, the amount of Partridge’s debt can be 

established through these billing statements. The monthly account 

statements show that Partridge owed Chase Bank $13,926.45 and $23,436.23 

for charges made pursuant to his credit card agreement with the bank. 

¶22 The evidence also shows that Acarta was validly assigned 

Partridge’s debts. The trail of assignments shows that Acarta was assigned 

all rights to collect Partridge’s debts for accounts ending in 0140 and 9677. 

Each bill of sale evidencing a transfer of ownership references the electronic 

records identifying the specific debts being assigned. In addition, Gilgan 

avows that the electronic statements concerning Partridge’s accounts were 

transferred with each of the assignments and bills of sale attached to the 

affidavit. 

¶23 Finally, we note that Partridge did not oppose or address 

Gilgan’s affidavit with his own controverting affidavit. Specifically, 

Partridge did not file an affidavit stating that he does not owe the subject 

debts, or contesting the amounts of the debts. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e)

(party opposing summary judgment must do so with affidavits and specific 

facts setting forth a genuine fact dispute); GM Dev. Corp. v. Cmty. Am. Mortg. 

Corp., 165 Ariz. 1, 5 (App. 1990) (opposing party’s failure to present facts

controverting the moving party’s affidavits permits the trial court to accept 

facts alleged by moving party as true).
ACARTA v. PARTRIDGE

Decision of the Court

7

CONCLUSION

¶24 For the reasons above, we affirm the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Acarta.4 As the successful party, Acarta is 

entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees upon 

compliance with ARCAP 21. A.R.S. §§ 12-341, 12-341.01. 

 

4 Acarta asks this court to direct the trial court to amend the judgment 

to include the community property of Partridge and his wife. We need not 

reach this issue because Acarta did not file a cross-appeal and the record 

fails to reflect service on Partridge’s wife. See A M Leasing Ltd. v. Baker, 163 

Ariz. 194, 195-96 (App. 1989) (stating that a party who does not cross-appeal 

cannot seek to enlarge its rights under the judgment).