DATE: 

May 29, 2015

TIME: 

12:04 p.m. 

VICTIM:

50-year old female 

employee of a construction 

company 

INDUSTRY/NAICS CODE:

Bridge and road 

construction/237310

EMPLOYER: 

Construction company

SAFETY & TRAINING:

Not trained on how to 

safely operate the 

vibratory pile driver

SCENE: 

Bridge construction site

LOCATION:

New York

EVENT TYPE: 

Struck and killed by a steel 

sheet pile 

INCIDENT HIGHLIGHTS

 

REPORT#: 15NY032 REPORT DATE: 04/19/22

Construction Worker Fatally Struck by Steel 

Sheet Pile Falling from a Vibratory Pile Driver

SUMMARY

On May 29, 2015, at 12:04 p.m., a 50-year-old female employee of a 

construction company was struck and killed by a steel sheet pile that 

broke off from a vibratory pile driver at a bridge construction site. At 

the time of the incident, the decedent was directing traffic while a crew 

consisting of a foreman, a crane operator, an excavator operator, and 

an assistant iron worker were conducting a pile driving operation. A 

vibratory pile driver was used to install sheet piles at the existing bridge 

abutments... READ THE FULL REPORT> (p.3)

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include:

• There was only one main hoist line holding the pile driver 

because the crane’s auxiliary hoist was not assembled and rigged

• The sheet pile was not rigged to the crane through a safety line

• Workers were not trained on how to safely operate the vibratory 

pile driver LEARN MORE> (p.16)

RECOMMENDATIONS

New York FACE investigators concluded that, to help prevent 

similar occurrences, employers should: 

• Ensure that piles are always secured to the crane via a safety line 

for as long as the piles are being held by the crane. 

• Ensure that all workers are protected from being struck by the 

load of a crane during pile driving. 

• Ensure that the hydraulic clamp bolts are inspected and evenly 

tightened to the appropriate torque as specified by the 

manufacturer. LEARN MORE> (p.17)

New York FACE Program
Page 2

The New York State Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (NY FACE) is a research program funded by the National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health and administered by the New York State Department of Health. NY FACE collects information on workrelated fatalities, investigates the incidents to identify the causes and contributing factors, proposes prevention measures, and shares 

the injury prevention information with employers, workers, and other organizations interested in promoting workplace safety. NY FACE

does not determine fault or legal liability associated with a fatal incident. Names of employers, victims and/or witnesses are kept

confidential. Additional information regarding the NY FACE program can be obtained from:

New York State Department of Health FACE Program

Bureau of Occupational Health and Injury Prevention

Corning Tower, Room 1325

Empire State Plaza

Albany, NY 12237 

866-807-2130

518-402-7900

Email | Twitter | Facebook| Website
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 3

SUMMARY

On May 29, 2015, at 12:04 p.m., a 50-year-old female employee of a construction company was struck and killed by a 

steel sheet pile that broke off from a vibratory pile driver at a bridge construction site. At the time of the incident, the 

decedent was directing traffic while a crew consisting of a foreman, a crane operator, an excavator operator, and an 

assistant iron worker were conducting a pile driving operation. A vibratory pile driver was used to install sheet piles at 

the existing bridge abutments. Each sheet pile consisted of two 32-inch wide, 40-foot-long Z-shaped steel sheet piles 

interlocked to form a “paired” or “double sheet” pile that weighed approximately 4,000 pounds. The sheet pile was not 

secured to the crane; it was only held by the hydraulic clamp on the pile driver. When the sheet pile was being driven 

between 18 and 24 inches below grade, the foreman observed a hydraulic clamp bolt falling off the pile driver. The 

foreman immediately hit the emergency stop. At the same time the sheet pile broke from the hydraulic clamp and 

started to topple over. The sheet pile landed on a concrete jersey barrier and started to slide on top of it. The jersey 

barrier was parallel to the roadway. The sheet pile was sliding horizontally on top of the jersey barrier with its length 

spanning the width of the bridge. Meanwhile, the decedent was running south from the center of the bridge where she 

was directing traffic, trying to avoid being struck by the sliding sheet pile. The sheet pile struck the decedent from 

behind near the south end of the bridge before it slid and fell off the jersey barrier and landed on the west side of the 

bridge. The victim suffered injuries on the head, neck, and back. The foreman immediately reached the victim and 

started CPR, and 911 was called at the same time. Emergency medical technicians and New York State troopers 

responded to the site within minutes. The county coroner was on scene and pronounced the death of the worker at 1:00 

p.m. The post incident analysis determined that the sheet pile fractured and broke at the point where it was being

gripped by the hydraulic clamp. The hydraulic clamp did not fail: It was holding the broken sheet pile piece. The root

cause of this fatal incident was that the sheet pile was not rigged to the crane, allowing it to fall and strike the decedent.

INTRODUCTION

On May 29, 2015, at 12:04 p.m., a 50-year-old female employee of a construction company was struck and killed by a 

steel sheet pile that broke off from a vibratory pile driver at a bridge construction site. New York State Fatality 

Assessment and Control Evaluation (NY FACE) staff learned of the incident from news media reports and contacted the 

employer to initiate an investigation. The employer, however, decided not to allow an on-site NY FACE investigation. The 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigated the incident. The NY FACE investigator obtained the 

case information from OSHA, visited the incident site (after the bridge construction was completed), consulted 

engineers of a third-party construction firm that specialized in pile driving, and discussed the case with a field 

representative of the pile driver manufacturer. During the investigation, the NY FACE investigator reviewed the OSHA 

report, pile driver manual, police report, and death certificate. This report summarizes the findings of the NY FACE 

investigation. 

EMPLOYER

The construction company involved in the incident has been in business for over 75 years. It started as a paving 

contractor and later expanded its business into bridge, road, and highway construction, repair, and replacement 

including steel structure fabrication and rehabilitation. It conducts business in both New York and Pennsylvania. At the 

time of the incident, the company employed approximately 175 workers who were represented by two labor unions.
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 4

WRITTEN SAFETY PROGRAMS and TRAINING

The company had developed written safety and health programs including an accident prevention and investigation 

program and provided employees with construction safety training and other OSHA required training. Unionrepresented workers also received safety trainings provided by the unions. Workers were required to wear high visibility 

orange vests or T-shirts, hard hats, safety glasses, gloves, and steel-toed boots at job sites. 

This was the company’s second fatal incident. In May 2005, three employees of the company were killed after being 

struck by a passenger bus inside a highway work zone. NY FACE investigated the case, and the case report is available at 

https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/investigations/face/docs/05ny039.pdf. 

WORKER INFORMATION

The deceased worker was represented by a labor union. She started as an apprentice in 2001 and became a 

journeyperson. She worked for different contractors at job sites ranging from road and bridge construction to pipeline 

installation. She was an experienced worker and was the foreman on a couple of job sites. 

EQUIPMENT

The vibratory pile driver was an ICE 14-23 model with a power pack manufactured in 2010. It was designed to drive or 

extract sheet, pipe, piles, caissons, and beams to provide structural foundation support. The pile driver was powered by 

a 220-horsepower diesel engine (Caterpillar 3116DITA). The unit, which weighed approximately 5525 pounds, operated 

in a frequency range of 900 to 1900 vibrations per minute and generated an eccentric moment of 1100 inch-pound with 

a centrifugal force of 80 tons and a maximum amplitude (vertical travel distance of pile per vibration) of 0.94 inch. 

The pile driver consisted of three major components: The vibrator, the vibration suppressor, and the hydraulic clamp 

(Figure 1 and Photo 1). Vibration was created in the vibrator gear case by a pair of rotating eccentric weights powered 

by hydraulic motors. Only vertical vibration was created as horizontal vibration being canceled by the paired eccentrics. 

The vertical vibration was transmitted into the pile being driven by the hydraulic clamp which was attached to the 

bottom of the gear case. The pile driver was held by a crane during pile driving. To prevent the vibration created in the 

gear case from affecting the crane, a vibration suppressor absorbed and dampened the vibrations reaching the crane. 

The hydraulic clamp consisted of two gripping jaws with teeth: one was fixed, and the other was movable. The movable 

jaw was connected to a hydraulic cylinder. The hydraulic circuit could maintain a clamping pressure at 4500 psi when the 

jaws were in “CLOSE” position. A clamp relief valve ensured a clamping pressure not exceeding 4800 psi. 

The hydraulic clamp was attached to the gear case by 14 socket-head cap bolts (1.5”- 6), with eight bolts securing the 

fixed jaw and six bolts securing the movable jaw. The clamp bolts are critical in pile driving: If they are loose or not 

evenly torqued, the hydraulic clamp would not be able to transmit the correct vibration energy into the piles being 

driven. Damage to the equipment, as well as serious worker injury could occur. The manufacturer required that each 

clamp bolt be torqued 2800 ft-lbs (3.79 kN-m) with a torque wrench. 

The manufacturer emphasized in the Operating and Maintenance Manual that the only reason clamp bolts break is 

because they are not tightened to the correct specified torque. An operator is required to check the bolts at least daily 

since vibration could loosen them. If one is broken, then they all need to be replaced. The operator should never drive 

piles if one or more bolts are loose or broken. 
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 5

To prevent serious worker injuries, the manufacturer required that a safety line must be attached to a pile when the pile 

was being extracted or hoisted into position, and the safety line is rigged to the crane. In other words, the pile should be 

secured to the crane through the safety line, and it should not be held solely by the jaws of the hydraulic clamp when 

extracting or hoisting into position.
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 6

 

Photo 3. The crane had only one load line that was holding the pile driver. The auxiliary hoist was never rigged 

(photo courtesy of OSHA).

Photo 1. The International Construction Equipment, 

Inc (ICE) Model 14-23 vibratory driver/extractor that 

was involved in the incident (photo courtesy of 

OSHA).

Photo 2. The Link-Belt crane had two winding 

drums, one for the main hoist rope and the 

other for the auxiliary hoist rope (photo 

courtesy of OSHA).
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 7

INVESTIGATION

The construction company was contracted by the New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) to demolish 

and reconstruct a two-lane bridge on a state route in central NY. The bridge, oriented in a north/south direction, was 

approximately 47 feet wide and 52 feet long spanning a creek in an east/west orientation. The construction plan was to 

first demolish one lane of the bridge while keeping the other lane open to traffic. The company was to install steel sheet 

piles at the existing bridge abutments to reinforce and maintain their structural integrity before excavating and installing 

new abutments. The project started on May 11, 2015, and the incident occurred on Friday, May 29, 2015, when the pile 

driving started.

The project was overseen by a superintendent, who was in charge of another job site at the same time. When the 

superintendent visited the other site, a foreman was put in charge. The foreman had been with the company for seven 

years and had been a foreman for six years at the time of the incident. 

The company had its own pile driving equipment and a designated crew that was trained and experienced in pile driving. 

However, the pile driving crew was not available for this project since they were working at another job site. The 

company had to rent the ICE pile driver and use a crew that was neither familiar with the equipment nor trained for the 

pile driving operation. None of the crew members including the foreman had received specific training on safety hazards 

associated with the pile driving and how to properly operate the pile driver. 

On Monday, four days prior to starting the pile driving operation, a crew lead by the foreman set up supporting cables 

and a debris net over the creek. The crew then demolished one (west) lane of the bridge. A lattice boom crawler crane 

Photo 4. Two piles were interlocked to form a “pair” or “double sheet”. The double-sheet pile were 

approximately 40 feet long and 4000 pounds in weight (photo courtesy of OSHA).
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 8

(Link-Belt 218 Hylab HSL) with a maximum lift capacity of 110 tons and maximum boom length of 230 feet was delivered 

to the site on Tuesday afternoon. The crane was assembled and erected on Thursday. The vibratory pile driver along 

with the power pack were delivered to the site on Thursday. The Operating and Maintenance Manual did not come with 

the pile driver. 

For a typical pile driving operation, at least two crane hoist lines are needed: The main hoist line to hold the pile driver 

and the auxiliary line to hold the pile. In addition, the pile must be rigged to the auxiliary hoist through a safety line. The 

Link-Belt crane had two winding drums, one for the main hoist rope and the other for the auxiliary hoist rope (Photo 2). 

However, the crew only rigged the main hoist on Thursday. The auxiliary hoist was never rigged (Photo 3). 

On the day of the incident, Friday, the workers started working at around 7:00 a.m. The crew consisted of the 

superintendent, the foreman, a crane operator, an excavator operator, an assistant iron worker, and the decedent, who 

all wore hard hats and high visibility vests. A NYSDOT transportation construction inspector was at the site. The 

decedent was assigned to direct traffic. The traffic control plan, that was designed by NYSDOT, consisted of a stop light 

system on each end of the bridge with appropriate signage. 

The foreman first set up the vibratory pile driver. He reportedly checked the fuel and the engine oil in the power pack, 

rigged the vibratory pile driver to the crane’s main hoist line, and connected the hydraulic lines to the pile driver and the

power pack. He conducted a visual inspection of the pile driver looking for “things that were out of the ordinary”. 

According to the OSHA investigation, the foreman did not know what torque the clamp bolts had to be set at, and he 

was not sure if he even had a torque wrench on site. However, he indicated that he did check the clamp bolts with a 

regular wrench.

The crane operator was hired approximately two months prior to the incident. He had worked for a pile driving company 

prior to his employment with this company. He did a visual inspection of the crane, and he relied on the foreman to rig 

and inspect the pile driving equipment. 

The piles were stacked at a staging area. Each consisted of two 32-inch wide, 40-foot-long Z-shaped steel sheet piles 

interlocked together to form a “pair” or “double sheet” (Photo 4). The double-sheet pile weighed approximately 4000 

pounds. The piles were reportedly used previously on another project. The grade of steel was unknown.

At the staging area, the crew attached a pair of sheet pile shackles to a double-sheet pile (Photo 5). The shackles had a 

ground release mechanism with a release line, which could be used to remove the shackles from the sheet pile from the 

ground. The crane picked up the sheet pile by the pile shackle wire with the pile driver’s hydraulic clamp and placed it in 

driving position. Once in position, the shackles were removed from the pile. With the help of an excavator, the foreman 

used a level to make sure that the sheet pile was plumb and aligned. The pile driver then was aligned, and the hydraulic 

clamp was set in the “close” position, grabbing the pile. The sheet pile from then on was only 11 held by the hydraulic 

clamp, and there was no safety line to secure the sheet pile to the crane. At approximately 10:30 a.m., the foreman 

turned the power on at the power pack and started pile driving. The superintendent left to visit the other job site before 

pile driving started. 
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 9

Photo 5. Pile shackles with ground release attached to a pair of sheet pile (photo courtesy of OSHA). 

At approximately 11:00 a.m. the traffic lights at both ends malfunctioned. Instead of alternating in red or green cycles, 

both lights went to flashing yellow simultaneously. The decedent was first directing the traffic at the north end of the 

bridge. Once the traffic lights malfunctioned, the traffic kept encroaching into the work zone. The foreman sent the 

decedent to the center of the bridge so that she could better control the traffic (Figure 2. Incident site sketch).
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 10
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 11

At the power pack, the foreman put the pump to maximum pressure. The hydraulic clamp was clamped to the center of 

the double-sheet pile (first grip), with one set of teeth gripping each sheet pile (Photo 9). The vibratory driver started 

driving the sheet pile into the ground. The soil was rocky, and the pile reportedly went down seven feet and stopped. 

The crew continued to drive for another minute but was unable to drive any deeper. When the crew pulled the pile out, 

they noticed that the pile was ripped around the clamped area. They repositioned the clamp (second grip on Photo 9) 

and drove the sheet pile again in the original location but made no progress. 

The crew started extracting the sheet pile when the foreman noticed that the sheet pile ripped around the second grip 

area. He had the excavator steady the pile with its bucket while he switched to a third grip location on the intact sheet 

pile (Photo 9). With this grip the crew extracted the pile, placed it in a second location, and drove it. This time the pile 

only went down four feet before it stopped. During this attempt the interlocked sheet piles started to shift. The foreman 

tack welded the two sheet piles together. The crew took a short break at approximately 11:45 a.m. 

The crew resumed the operation after the break and began driving the sheet pile in a new location (the third location) at 

approximately 12 p.m. While the assistant iron worker worked with the excavator operator to position the pile in the 

third location, the foreman started the pile driver. The crane operator was operating the crane, and the decedent was in 

the middle of the bridge directing traffic. 

The incident occurred at 12:04 p.m. when the sheet pile was being driven down between 18 and 24 inches below grade. 

According to the foreman, he observed a large bolt falling off the pile driver and immediately hit the emergency stop. At 

the same time the sheet pile, which was not secured to the crane, broke from the pile driver and started to topple over. 

The sheet pile landed on a concrete jersey barrier and started to slide on top of it. The jersey barrier was parallel to the 

roadway. The sheet pile was sliding horizontally on top of the jersey barrier with its length spanning the width of the 

bridge. Meanwhile, the decedent was running south from the center of the bridge where she was directing traffic, trying 

to avoid being struck by the sliding sheet pile. The sheet pile struck the decedent from behind near the south end of the 

bridge before it slid and fell off the jersey barrier and landed on the west side of the bridge (Photo 10). The victim 

suffered injuries on the head, neck, and back. 

The foreman immediately reached the victim and started CPR while the NYSDOT inspector called 911. Emergency 

medical technicians and NYS Troopers responded to the site within minutes. The county coroner was on scene and 

pronounced the death of the worker at 1:00 p.m. 

Two broken bolts were found at the site after the incident. Each bolt had metal failures, leaving a portion of the 

threaded end in the pile driver (Photo 6). One bolt piece was found on the north side of the bridge, this was the one 

observed by the crew. The other piece was found on the south side of the bridge, on the debris netting. Both pieces 

were 1 1/2 inches in diameter, and one was 115/8 inches long, and the other was 12 1/8 inches long. They were the clamp 

bolts that secured the fixed jaw to the gear case.
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 12

Photo 6. The clamp bolt broken from the vibratory pile driver had metal failure (photo courtesy of OSHA).

Both fixed and movable jaws had two clamp areas with teeth: Each clamp area was approximately 1 inch wide and 7 3/4

inches long with 10 teeth (Photos 7 and 8). All four clamping surfaces had worn or broken teeth: The peaks were either 

broken off or worn flat. The sections that had worn or broken peaks were approximately 4 inches long from the end of 

the jaws where they gripped the piles. The jaws were mis-aligned in all three dimensions resulting in unparallel gripping 

surfaces and mis-aligned and partially engaged teeth.
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 13

Photo 7. The bolt holes of the broken bolts and clamp areas of fixed and movable jaws of the hydraulic clamp. Both 

the fixed and movable jaws have two clamp areas with teeth. The jaws were mis-aligned (photo courtesy of OSHA).
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 14

Photo 8: The jaws had worn or broken teeth: the peaks were broken off or worn flat especially in the lower end of the 

jaws. Part of the sheet pile was still being held by the jaws (photo courtesy of OSHA).

The failures on three clamped areas on the interlocked sheet piles were examined (Photo 9). Each clamped area had two 

grip marks (left and right). All clamped areas had tooth imprints indicating unevenly worn and partially engaged teeth. 

For example, the left gripping mark of the first grip showed that the top part of the sheet pile was being crushed and the 

lower part was ripped or torn off, indicating uneven pressure distribution among gripping teeth. 

The post incident analysis determined that the sheet pile fractured and broke at the point where it was being gripped by 

the hydraulic clamp. The hydraulic clamp did not fail: It was holding the broken sheet pile piece. The root cause of this 

fatal incident was that the sheet pile was not rigged to the crane, allowing it to fall and strike the decedent. The 

untightened or unevenly torqued bolts, mis-aligned clamp jaws, and broken or unengaged teeth in the clamp area 

exposed the pile driver to excessive forces and vibrations and contributed to the failure of the sheet piles and the clamp 

bolts.
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 15

Photo 9. All three gripping areas on the sheet pile had tooth imprints indicating unevenly worn and partially engaged 

teeth and uneven distribution of pressure (photo courtesy of OSHA).
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 16

Photo 10. The sheet pile broke from the pile driver, fell and landed on the west side of the bridge (photo courtesy of 

OSHA).

CAUSE OF DEATH 

According to the death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries. 

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger 

sequence of events. The NY FACE investigation identified the following key contributing factors in this incident: 

• There was only one main hoist line holding the pile driver because the crane’s auxiliary hoist was not assembled and 

rigged.

• The sheet pile was not rigged to the crane through a safety line.

• Workers were not trained on how to safely operate the vibratory pile driver.

• The pile driver operation/maintenance manual was not available to the crew. 

• Clamp bolt torques were not checked. 

• The jaws of the hydraulic clamp were mis-aligned, and the teeth were unevenly worn or broken. 
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 17

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION

Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that piles are always secured to the crane via a safety line for as long 

as the piles are being held by the crane. 

Discussion: A pile driver exerts tremendous forces on piles being driven. Piles may fracture or break, and equipment may 

malfunction or fail causing the piles to topple over or fall. To prevent serious worker injuries, employers should ensure 

that piles are always secured to the crane via safety lines for as long as the piles are being held by the crane. If a safety 

line becomes detached, the operation should be halted immediately until the safety line is reattached, and the pile 

secured. 

The crew in this case never rigged the crane’s auxiliary hoist which should have been used to hoist and secure the sheet 

pile through a safety line. Employers should ensure that the pile driving crew and the crane operators strictly follow the 

manufacturer’s safety requirement.

Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that all workers are protected from being struck by the load of the 

crane during pile driving. 

Discussion: During pile driving, overhead cranes suspend heavy equipment including pile drivers and piles, presenting 

potentials for fatal crushing injuries. Parts may fall from pile driving equipment, and piles may break or shatter creating 

additional hazards. A fall zone or danger zone should be established to protect workers from suffering serious injuries 

caused by falling objects. All workers except the essential crew must stay outside of the fall zone when piles are being 

positioned, driven, or extracted. 19 

When replacing infrastructure, one major challenge is the tight work zones. The crane swing radius in this case extended 

beyond the actual width of the bridge. The decedent who was directing traffic in the middle of the bridge was exposed 

to the fatal struck-by hazard. Employers should consider using two flaggers, one at each end of the construction zone, to 

ensure that flaggers can work safely outside the fall zone.

Recommendation #3: Employers should ensure that the hydraulic clamp bolts are inspected and evenly tightened to 

appropriate torque as specified by the manufacturer. 

Discussion: The hydraulic clamp transmits vibrations generated in the vibrator gear case into the piles being driven, and 

the clamp bolts secure the hydraulic clamps to the gear case. The clamp bolts are critical in pile driving: If they were 

loose or not evenly tightened, the hydraulic clamp would not be able to transmit the vibration energy efficiently to the 

piles. Loose jaws can expose both the pile driver and the piles to excessive non-centric forces and vibrations which can 

cause equipment and pile damage as well as serious worker injuries or deaths. 

The manufacturer in this case required that the clamp bolts be torqued to 2800 ft-lbs (3.79 kN-m) with a torque wrench. 

The crew did not have a torque wrench on site, and the foreman did not know the correct torque. Employers should 

ensure that all clamp bolts are evenly tightened to the specified torque, and all clamp bolts are inspected at the 

beginning of each shift. Since vibration loosens bolts, workers should check the bolts periodically during their shifts 

depending on driving conditions. If one bolt breaks, all bolts must be immediately replaced since others may be 

damaged. Never drive piles if one or more bolts are broken. 
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 18

Recommendation #4: Employers should ensure that the hydraulic clamp teeth are in good working condition and the 

fixed and movable jaws are aligned properly. 

Discussion: Both the fixed and movable jaws had broken, unevenly worn, or partially engaged teeth, and the jaws were 

mis-aligned in this case. To ensure that the clamp transmits the vibrations efficiently to the piles, manufacturers require 

that all teeth must engage the work evenly and the fixed and movable jaws must be aligned properly. 

Employers should ensure that operators inspect the hydraulic clamp teeth and the gripping jaws to ensure that they are 

properly aligned and in good working condition before starting the pile driver. A jaw with cracked, broken, unevenly 

worn, or non-engaging teeth should be replaced immediately. 

Recommendation #5: Employers should conduct a hazard assessment and a job hazard analysis when there is a 

change in the construction plan to ensure worker safety.

Discussion: The company used workers who were not trained to conduct pile driving operations because the trained 

crew was at another job site. Pile driving is a high-risk operation. Using an untrained crew can lead to serious worker 

injury including death. 

Whenever there is a change in the construction plan, employers should conduct a hazard assessment to identify the 

hazards and risks associated with the new plan. A job hazard analysis (JHA) should be conducted since the new plan may 

require changes in operation procedures as well as job assignments. A JHA focuses on the relationship between the 

worker, the task, the tools, and the work environment so that the hazards associated with each component and each 

step of the task can be identified before they occur. It is critical that one conducts a JHA on new or complex jobs, jobs 

with high injury or illness rates, jobs with the potential to cause severe or disabling injuries or illness, or jobs in which

one simple human error could lead to a severe accident or injury. Based on the hazards identified through a JHA, 

employers can then develop and implement appropriate control and prevention measures and standard safe work 

procedures for workers to follow. 

Recommendation #6: Employers should provide specific training to workers on pile driving equipment, hazards, and 

safety measures before assigning them to pile driving operations. 

Discussion: The employer in this case did not provide specific training to the workers before assigning them to pile 

driving. Pile driving is a high-risk operation: One single human error could lead to severe injuries or deaths, or costly 

equipment or property damage. It is critical for employers to provide workers with training so that they fully understand 

the hazards, the risk factors, the protection measures, and the consequences for not following safe operating 

procedures. 

Recommendation #7: Employers should ensure that the pile driving equipment operating and maintenance manual is 

available, and the crew read and understand the manual.

Discussion: The manufacturer in this case required that users of the vibratory pile driver read and understand the 

information in the Operating and Maintenance Manual before operating, lubricating, repairing, or performing 

maintenance on the equipment. 

The manufacturer warned that improper operation of the pile driver can be dangerous and could result in injury or 

death. The Operating & Maintenance Manual was not delivered to the site with the vibratory pile driver. Employers 
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 19

should ensure that the operating and maintenance manual is available for the pile driving crew, and the crew read and 

understand the manual.

Recommendation #8: Manufacturers, pile driving companies, and trade associations should require that the piles be 

secured to the crane via a safety line for as long as the piles are being held by the crane.

Discussion: The current requirement for rigging a pile to a crane through a safety line is not consistent among major 

manufacturers, pile driving companies, and trade groups. Some required only rigging the pile to the crane when 

extracting or hoisting into position, while others only required it if there is a danger of injury or property damage. 

Piles can shatter and break free from the pile driver when they are being driven into the ground as it happened in this 

case. Therefore, it is critical that a safety line be attached to the pile during pile driving. Manufacturers should clearly 

emphasize in their operating manuals that the pile should be secured to the crane via a safety line for as long as it is 

suspended by the crane including when hoisting a pile into position, or positioning, driving, or extracting a pile. All 

driving operations shall be suspended immediately if the safety line becomes detached. The operations should not be 

resumed until the safety line is reattached and pile secured. All construction companies and trade groups should include 

this requirement in their standard operating procedure and adopt that as the best industry practice.

DISCLAIMER

Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by the NY FACE and National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). In addition, citations to websites external to NY FACE and NIOSH do not 

constitute NY FACE and NIOSH endorsement of the sponsoring organizations or their programs or products. 

Furthermore, NY FACE and NIOSH are not responsible for the content of these websites. All web addresses referenced in 

this document were accessible as of the publication date. 

REFERENCES

American National Standards Institute/American Society of Safety Professionals. Safety Requirements for Pile 

Installation and Extraction Operations. ANSI/ASSP A10.19-2017. 

International Construction Equipment, Inc. Operating and Maintenance Manual. ICE Model 14-23 Vibratory Pile 

Driver/Extractor with Model 230 Power Pack. 301 Warehouse Drive, Matthews NC 28104. 

New Jersey Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Program. “43-Year-old Construction Foreman Dies after Struck 

by Steel Pile”. Retrieved May 26, 2021 from https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/stateface/nj/06nj078.html

New Jersey Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Program. “Construction Worker Struck and Killed by a Pile Falling 

from a Crane”. Retrieved May 26, 2021 from https://www.nj.gov/health/workplacehealthandsafety/documents/fatalinjuries/03nj010.pdf 22

Oregon Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Program. “Crane operator killed by falling steel beam”. Retrieved 

May 26, 2021 from https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/pdfs/15OR002.pdf
REPORT#: 15NY032 Page 20

Pile Driving Contractors Association. “Pile Driving Safety and Environmental Best Management Practices” Retrieved May 

26, 2021 from http://www.piledrivers.org/files/2e14d6ba-3e07-4974-b3f6-cd561949f991--91da5999-28af-4672-b8d4-

d8692e84b4b5/piledriver-safety-and-environ-bmp-final-updated.pdf

American Pile Driving equipment, Inc. “APE Vibratory Hammer Safety Precautions”. Retrieved May 26, 2021 from 

https://www.americanpiledriving.com/pdfs/vibros/Vibro%20Safety%20Sticker%20Information.pdf

Bechtel Environmental Safety and Health. “Piling Operations”. Retrieved May 26, 2021 from 

https://www.y12.doe.gov/sites/default/files/assets/document/CP-235_Piling_Operations.pdf

New York State Department of Transportation. “Pile Driving Inspection Manual”. Retrieved May 26, 2021 from 

https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/engineering/technical-services/technical-services-repository/GEM-26b.pdf

Pile Buck. “Pile Driving Safety & Accident Prevention – Gear, Site Conditions, Material Storage/Handling, and More”. 

Retrieved April 26, 2021 from http://www.pilebuck.com/foundation/pile-driving-safety-accident-prevention-gear-siteconditions-material-storagehandling/

Link-Belt Cranes. Technical Data Specifications and Capacities, 218 Hylab HSL Crawler Crane 110 Ton. Retrieved May 26, 

2021 from https://www.linkbelt.com/sites/default/files/pdf/LCC/218hsl/218hslt.pdf

INVESTIGATOR INFORMATION

This investigation was conducted by NY FACE, Bureau of Occupational Health and Injury Prevention, Center for 

Environmental Health, New York State Department of Health.

ACKNOWLEDGEMEMENT

The NY FACE staff would like to acknowledge the OSHA Syracuse Office for assisting this investigation.