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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re CURNS, Minors. August 20, 2015

No. 326081 Clare Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 14-000079-NA

Before: O WENS , P.J., and S AAD and G ADOLA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent appeals the trial court’s order that terminated her parental rights to her children, EC and AC, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and MCL 712 A.19b(3)(l). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS” or “the De partment”) filed a petition for temporary custody over the minor children in Octob er 2014, because respondent— who has a long history of substan ce abuse and has had her paren tal rights to other children terminated in the past 1 —was pulled over in a vehicle tha t contained materials for prod ucing methamphetamine. This traffic stop led to the search of her ho me, which she shares with her husband Kenneth Husted. 2 During the search, the police found methamphetamine, and equipment and supplies used to produce the drug. Respondent cl aimed that she did not know whether Kenneth manufactured methamphetamine in the house, and that she did not think Kenneth used drugs in the home.

Accordingly, the Department’s petition noted that respondent: (1) made her residence an unsafe environment for children by allowing it to be a meth hou se; (2) continued to use drugs

1 Specifically, respondent’s paren tal rights to two other childr en, JD and LD, were terminated in 2006 because of respondent’s extensive substance abuse. The fa cts of that case closely parallel the facts of the instant action: the Department sought to prote ct JD and LD because of respondent’s drug use, and, despite the provision of extensive services from the state to help respondent overcome these problem s, she was not able to overcom e her addiction.

2 Kenneth is not the minor chi ldren’s biological father.-2- along with her husband; and (3) had a “toxic” relationship with her husband that had a negative impact on the children. 3 The trial court granted the petition and placed the children with Kenneth’s sister (who is not related to them by blood), but eve ntually moved them to their maternal grandmother’s home.

Over the next few months, the Department attempted to help res pondent combat her substance abuse by providing treatment services, and respondent appeared to have a job that she maintained. However, she continued to use drugs and failed to improve the condition of her home, which still remained a meth den in poor condition, with s ecurity issues and other safety problems. She also became uncooperative with Department worker s and frequently missed parenting time.

The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the children in Janu ary 2015 based on respondent’s: (1) previously terminated parental rights to anot her child; (2) extensive history of and continued problems with substance abuse; (3) lack of partic ipation in the prior proceedings; and (4) methamphetamine-related traffic stop and the fact that her home was used for methamphetamine production. The court noted that it assumed ju risdiction over the children with the knowledge that one of them had expressed her wish not to be separated from her mother. 4

Later in January 2015, DHHS sought to terminate respondent’s p arental rights based on the above. At the termination hearing, the trial court heard t estimony from a Child Protective Services employee and a foster-care worker, both of whom recomm ended termination, and the children’s maternal grandmother, who asked the court to preserv e respondent’s parental rights. Respondent did not testify because she arrived to the hearing a pproximately two hours after the hearing began, at which time the trial court was ready to issue its decision.

Based on the above facts and testimony, the trial court termin ated respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (l). 5 The court then held that termination was in the

3 Respondent acknowledged as much, and stated that in 2014, she and Kenneth had a “rough two years” that involved “a lot of arguing.” She also noted that s he relapsed into methamphetamine use in July 2014, and used the drug “maybe twice” per month. A drug test administered in early October 2014 confirmed respondent’s drug use, as she tested pos itive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and ephedrine.

4 EC and AC are older than the children our Court usually sees i n a termination of parental rights appeal—they are 17 and 16, resp ectively. Notwithstanding EC’s desire to remain in contact with her mother, the foster-care worker testified at the termination hearing that both EC and AC did not understand “why [respondent] would continue to use substanc es and choose not to visit them.”

5 MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (l) authori ze a court to terminate a re spondent’s parental rights when: (i) Parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have bee n terminated due to serious and chronic neglect or ph ysical or sexual abuse, and pr ior attempts to rehabilitate the parents have been unsuccessful.-3- best interests of the children because of respondent’s ongoing problems and refusal to demonstrate that her children, a s opposed to her drug habit, ar e her first priority.

On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred when i t found that termination was in the best interests of the ch ildren. The Department asks us to affirm the trial court’s decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review for clear error . . . the court’s decision regardin g the child’s best interest under MCL 712A.19b(5).” In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 40-41; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidenc e to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with a definite and firm con viction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Campbell , 170 Mich App 243, 253-254; 428 NW2d 347 (1988).

III. ANALYSIS

When a trial court determines whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, it looks to, among othe r things: “the child’s bond t o the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finali ty, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best intere sts of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).

Here, in its consideration of t he children’s best interests, t he trial court properly considered the children’s need for “permanency, stability, and finality,” and respondent’s lack of parenting ability. Resp ondent, despite the fact that she has l ost her parental ri ghts before—again, her rights to two of her other children were terminated in 2006 —has failed to change her destructive behavior in the inte rvening years. According to th e testimony provided by the social workers who have been involved in this case, and even responden t’s own mother, respondent continues to abuse drugs, freque ntly skipped parenting time, an d failed to take advantage of the services provided by the state to help her overcome her substan ce abuse and improve her parenting skills. Moreover, respondent’s home, which responden t allowed her husband to use as a methamphetamine production facil ity, is hardly a safe environ ment for children.

Respondent’s arguments that the trial court failed to consider EC and AC’s placement with a relative in its determination of their best interests ar e flatly contradicted by the record. In fact, the trial court explicitly noted that its decision took “ a great deal of consideration of the fact that [the children] are in rela tive placement,” thus complying with the procedural requirements of In re Mason , 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010).

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(l) The parent’s rights to another child were terminated as a r esult of proceedings under [MCL 712A.2] or a similar law of another state.-4- Affirmed.

/s/ Donald S. Owens /s/ Henry William Saad /s/ Michael F. Gadola