No. 12981 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

CEDRIC WOODTICK, 

a /k/a CEDRIC PLBINFEATHER, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

RODNEY TJ. CROSBY , 

Defendant and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant : 

Towe, Neely and Ball, Billings, Montana 

Thomas E. Towe argued, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Hibbs, Sweeney and Colberg, Billings, Montana 

William T. Wagner argued, Billings, Montana 

Submitted: September 29, 1975 

Decided: "I;%F!~ a;, ; JL A/ - 
Mr., Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from the district court, Big Horn 

County, from a final judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff, a competent Crow Indian, was issued a 

patent in fee simple on October 13, 1971 to land situate within 

the exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. Subse-- 

quently, by warranty deed dated October 29, 1971, plaintiff conveyed this land to Rodney L. Crosby, a non-Indian. 

By his complaint, filed July 23, 1974, plaintiff seeks 

cancellation of the deed given Crosby alleging that bythis deed 

Crosby became the non-Indian owner of more acreage of land within 

the Crow Indian Reservation than permitted under the provisions 

of Section 2, Act of June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 751), and, therefore, 

pursuant to the explicit language of that Act, the deed was void. 

By motion on August 30, 1974, defendant Crosby moved to 

dismiss the complaint on grounds that the courts of this state are 

without jurisdiction over the subject matter of this controversy. 

By order dated December 6, 1974, the district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. 

The land which is the subject matter of this case lies 

entirely within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. As such, Montana state courts have jurisdiction over it 

only to the extent granted by Congress. 

Section 4(2) of Montana's Enabling Act (25 Stat. 676), 

under which P4ontana was admitted to the Union and its Constitution 

adopted, provides: 

 h hat the people * * * [of ~ontana] * * * do agree 

and declare that they forever disclaim all right 

and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands 

lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian 

or Indian tribes; and that until title thereto shall 
l~ave been extinguished by the United States * * * 

said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute 

jurisdiction and control of the Congress oi- the 

United States J; 9: 9c." (Emphasis supplied.) 

Identical language is contained in Ordinance No. 1, 52, 

Montana Constitution of 1889. Article I, 1972 Montana Constitution provides that both the Enabling Act and Ordinance No. 1 are 

to "continue in full force and effect until revoked by the consent of the United States and the people of Montana. I I 

By the Crow Indian Allotment Act of June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 

751), as amended by the Act of May 26, 1926 (44 Stat. 6581, Congress undertook allotment of Crow Reservation lands among members 

of the Crow Tribe. Section 1 of the Act provides for allotments 

in severalty to be evidenced by "patents in fee to competent 

Indians +: * * but by trust patent to minors and incompetent 

Indians, the force and legal effect of the trust patents to be as 

is prescribed by the General Allotment Act of February 8, 1887, 

as amended. (Twenty-fourth Statutes at Large, page 388)", now 

25 United States Code, 55 348,349. 

Section 348 essentially provides that the United States 

is to hold legal title to the allotted lands "in trust" and continue to exercise its exclusive guardianship duties over the 

allottee and his lands for a period of 25 years. Section 349 further provides that at the expiration of the 25 year period, or 

sooner if the Secretary of the Interior determines that a given 

11 allottee is competent and capable of managing his or her affairsf1, 

a fee patent is to issue whereupon "* * * each and every allottee 

shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil 

and criminal, of the State JC * in which they may reside * * ;kl'. 

The United States Supreme Court has held that upon 

issuance of a fee patent to the Indian, questions arising thereafter pertaining to title fall within the jurisdiction of the state 

courts. Dickson v. Luck Land Co., 242 U.S. 371, 37 S.Ct. 167, 61 

L ed 371; Larkin v.laugh, 276 U.S. 431, 48 S.Ct. 366, 72 L ed 640, 
644, 645. As observed in Larkin: 

"F7ith the issue of the patent, the title not only 

passed from the United States but the prior trust 

and incidental restriction against alienation were 

terminated. This put an end to the authority 

theretofore possessed by the Secretary of the Interior by reason of the trust and restriction -- 

so that thereafter all questions pertaining to the 

title were subject to examination and determination by the courts, appropriately those in Nebraska, 

the land being there. * >k * 

"t7e are of the opinion therefore that there was 

nothing in the congressional statutes to prevent 

the local court from taking and exercising jurisdiction of the administrator's suit Jc * brought after the issue of the fee simple patent. * a" 

Plaintiff has received a patent in fee simple. At this 

point it appears that the parties agree that jurisdiction generally 

as it applies to Indians resides in the state courts. However, 

the point of difference and the legal issue presented to this 

Court concerns the effect, if any, the Crow Indian Allotment Act 

of June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 751) has on state jurisdiction. the 

pertinent part of Section 2 of the Act prohibits and declares void 

any conveyance of fee patent land by a Crow Indian to any person, 

company or corporation who owns more than 1,280 acres of grazing 

land, or who by such conveyance would become the owner of more 

than 1,920 acres of grazing land, within the boundaries of the Crow 

Indian Reservation. Act of June 4, 1920, Sec. 2 (41 Stat. 751). 

By the Act of June 8, 1940, only those conveyances to non-Indians 

owning in excess of the prohibited acreages are now prohibited. 

(54 Stat. 252). 

Defendant argues that because of the Crow Indian Allotment 

Act the federal restrictions have simply not been terminated. Thus, 

the cases above cited are recognized by defendant but distinguished 

on the grounds that the additional restrictions of the Crow 

Allotment Act were not involved in those cases. Defendant goes on 

to argue that in this event plaintiff must meet the conditions of 
State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 

1292 and related cases, or fail in his attempt to establish jurisdiction in the state court. 

A case cited by plaintiff as principal authority but not 

discussed by defendant is Dillon v. Antler Land Company, 341 F. 

Supp. 734, 740, 741, (D.C. Mont. 1972), affirmed 507 F.2d 940 

(9th Cir. 1974). In Dillon the Crow Indian attempts to set aside 

a conveyance of Indian lands conveyed in 1955 after receiving a 

patent and the elements of the fraud complained of were known 

as early as 1956. Judge Russell E. Smith, after mentioning other 

grounds and recognizing an alleged violation of the Crow Indian 

Allotment Act, held the claim for relief barred by the Montana 

statute of limitations. Judge Smith held directly that there is 

no conflict with 25 U.S.C., 5 349, which declares all restrictions, 

etc. shall be removed with issue of patent. He stated "* * fc the 

effect of Section 2 of the Crow Act was to limit the power of a 

buyer to buy. The Indian was not forbidden to sell; the penalty 

was directed solely at the buyer." In his discussion Judge Smith 

comments that the market was limited but this is true in other 

comparable instances as well. Further, the Court held: 

"The General A.llotment Act throughout its his tory has 

and the Crow Act does distinguish the competent from 

the incom~etent Indian and the trust lands from the 

fee lands. State law controls here because Congress has 

explicitly said that it does. The language of 25 U.S.C. 

5 349 is ;? * when the lands have been conveyed to the 

Indians by patent in fee * * * then each and every allottee 

shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both 

civil and criminal, of the State * * *'. 

"The patent exists. It has not been cancelled." 

(Emphasis supplied. ) 

Judge Smith further commented in Dillon: 

"The issuance of the fee patent had a broader effect 

than merely to free plaintiff to sell her land--it 

freed the United States from its trustee duties and 

altered the relationship of the land and plaintiff to 

the State of Montana. 11 

He cited the Montana Enabling Act (25 Stat. 676), and 

Montana Power Co. v. Rochester, 127 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1942). 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Smith in all particulars 

and also cited Montana Power Co. v. Rochester, 127 F.2d 189, 192, 

which states in relation to the statute on the issue of fee patents: 

I1 The obvious purpose of the provision is to define 

the status of the individual Indians in their relation 

to the state. Having been released from tutelage, the 

Indians are thereafter to be regarded as members of the 

community with the privileges and duties incident to 

citizenship. r 1 

The issue before this Court has been directly ruled upon 

and decided by the federal courts, therefore further discussion 

is unnecessary particularly since both firms of attorneys in this 

matter appeared in the federal district court in the proceeding 

in Dillon. 

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the 

cause remanded for further proceedings on the merits not inconeistent 

with this opinion, 

We Concur: 

Y 

4 @( I" 

i:*!,+#f>' d /$ *f .2d f , tt, ,". La i.***,. : 

Chief Justice