NO. 81-221 

IN THE SUPREBE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

VS. 

EARL CAMERON d/b/a CAMERON TRUCK REPAIR 

and SUHR TRANSPORT and GENE LENZ, d/b/a 

GENE LENZ CONSTRUCTION, 

~efendants and Respondents. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Flathead. 

Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Warden, Christiansen & Johnson, Kalispell, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Murray, Kaufman, Vidal and Gordon, Kalispell, Montana 

E. Eugene Atherton, Kalispell, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on briefs: July 9, 1981 

Decided: September 15, 1981 

Y U' Clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Plaintiff, Aetna Insurance Company (Aetna), appeals 

from an order and judgment of the District Court which 

denied its motion for summary judgment and granted summary 

judgment to the respondents. In its complaint Aetna asked 

for a declaratory judgment construing a cargo insurance 

policy issued to the respondent Earl Cameron, a self-employed 

hauler of heavy equipment. The policy insured goods hauled 

by Cameron against "direct physical loss or damage caused 

by: . . . 5. Accidental collision of carrying conveyance 

with any other vehicle or object" but excluded coverage for: 

". . . j. Loss or damage caused by the vehicle coming 

in contact with any portion of the roadbed, curbing, 

rails or ties of railways; 

"k. Loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by 

the load or any portion thereof or tarpaulin covering 

thereon coming into contact with any other object 

unless the carrying vehicle also collides with such 

object . . ." 

On November 2, 1979, Cameron was hauling a forklift 

owned by respondent Gene Lenz from Kalispell, Montana, to 

Columbia Falls, Montana. Before reaching its destination, 

the forklift mast struck a railroad overpass causing extensive 

damage to the forklift. The collision between the forklift 

and the overpass caused the trailer to swerve and strike the 

overpass supports. 

The issue raised by this appeal is whether the damage 

resulted from a peril insured against under the policy. 

There are no disputed genuine issues of material fact. 

Aetna contends the damage was not covered for three 

reasons. First, the primary coverage required at least two 

occurrences in the proper sequence before coverage existed: 

(1) the carrying conveyance or trailer must initially collide 
with an object, and (2) the collision between the trailer 

and object must directly cause the physical damage or loss 

to the cargo. A collision between the cargo and a foreign object which is the direct cause of the damage is not, argues 

appellant, within the insured peril. Second, the overpass 

formed part of the railway roadbed, therefore, exclusion (j) 

of the policy precludes coverage. Lastly, the accident was 

covered by exclusion (k). Appellant contends that the 

conveying vehicle did not collide with the same object as 

did the cargo thus making exclusion (k) operative. 

The respondents contend ambiguity exists requiring 

judicial construction of the policy. Respondents rely upon 

ambiguity being construed against the insurance carrier. 

We hold that the general risk provision and exclusion 

(k), are ambiguous when read together. The insured is 

entitled to a favorable construction. Under the facts of 

this case, a reasonable interpretation of the policy provisions 

supports the judgment of the District Court. 

Aetna has cited numerous cases arising from cargo 

collisions where the courts have found no ambiguity, and 

have held that the plain meaning of the terms and definitions 

denied coverage for cargo collisions. Hamilton Trucking 

Service, Inc. v. Automobile Ins. Co. (1951), 39 Wash.2d 688, 

237 P.2d 781; Mendelsohn v. Automobile Ins. Co. (1935), 290 

Mass. 228, 195 N.E. 104; Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. 

Robert P. Stapp Inc. (1963), 278 Ala. 209, 177 S.2d 102; 

Wolverine Insurance Company v. Jack Jordan Inc. (1957), 213 

Ga. 299, 99 S.E.2d 95. 

Contrary authority exists supporting liberal construction 

of similar cargo risk provisions. C & J Commercial rivew way, 

Inc. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp. (1932), 258 ~ich. 624, 

242 N.W. 789; Gould Morris Electric Co. v. ~tlantic Fire 
Ins. Co. (1948), 229 N.C. 518, 50 S.E.2d 295; Jorgenson 

v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1949), 229 Minn. 48, 38 

N.W.2d 209. The cases cited are not controlling under the 

facts of this case. None of the cases cited involved an 

exclusionary provision relating to cargo collisions as we 

have here. 

Contracts of insurance are interpreted in light of all 

relevant provisions. Alpha Real Estate Dev. v. Aetna Life & 

Cas. Co. (1977), 174 Mont. 301, 570 P.2d 585. Here the 

general risk provision provided coverage for cargo loss 

caused by collision of the carrying conveyance with an 

object but the exclusion only denies coverage in those instances where cargo is damaged but the conveying vehicle is 

not in collision. The construction urged by Aetna would 

require singular focus on the general risk provision and 

little or no consideration of the meaning and effect of 

exclusion (k), the only specific policy reference to cargo 

collision. The ambiguity here evident must be resolved 

against the contract's author. 

It appears that coverage was intended if the conveying 

vehicle struck "such object". Here the conveying vehicle 

struck a portion of the overpass structure thus satisfying 

policy provisions for coverage. 

Aetna argues that the overpass was a part of the 

railway roadbed and thereby excluded by subsection (j). 

Exclusions and words of limitation must be strictly construed 

against the insurer. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. Phalen 

(1979) Mont. I - - , 597 P.2d 720r 36 St.Rep. 1115. An overpass is not commonly understood to be roadbed; subsection 

(j) does not therefore exclude coverage. 

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 
We Concur: