1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PARASTOO RASHIDIAN, et al. , Plaintiffs ,

v. MERRICK GARLAND, et al. , Defendants

. Civil Action No. 1:23-1187 (ACR)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs Negin Khosravaninezhad and So roodeh Khalili are Iranian citizens who, in 2022, applied for nonimmigrant visas to travel to the United States. 1 To date, officials at the U.S. Consulate in Dubai have not issued final decisions on their applications. Like many other visa applicants in recent years, Plaintiffs have sued an array of federal officials, including Secretary of State Anthony Bli nken and various consular office rs, seeking an order requiring prompt adjudication of their ap plications. Although the Court sympathizes with Plaintiffs’ situation, their Complaint does not state any plausible claims. The Court therefore dismisses this case without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND A. Legal Background Foreign students “seek[ing] to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of pursuing” “full course[s ] of study” at U.S. educational institutions may apply for F-1

1 This case originally involved six plaintiffs. See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 6-11. Since the Complaint’s filing, the other four plaintiffs have voluntarily di smissed their claims. Dkts. 9, 12. The Court therefore addresses only Khosravaninezhad’s and Khalili’s claims.2 nonimmigrant visas. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)( i). Their spouses and minor children may apply for F-2 visas to join them in the United States. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(ii). Subject to exceptions not applicable here, each F-visa applicant must undergo an in-person interview with a consular officer. Id. § 1202(h). Upon receiving a completed application, a consul ar officer “must” either “issue the visa” or “refuse the visa.” 2 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(a). If the consul ar officer determines that he needs additional information to deter mine the applicant’s eligibility , he may, “in accordance with [State] Department procedures,” refuse the vi sa pending “further administrative processing.” Administrative Processing Information , U.S. Dep’t of State, http s://travel.state.gov/content/ travel/en/us-visas/visa-inform ation-resources /administrative-proces sing-information.html [https://perma.cc/5KN2-6X7U]. Plaintiffs face an additional hurdle because of their Iranian citizenship. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1735, “[n]o nonimmigrant visa,” in cluding an F visa, “shall be issued to any alien from a country that is a state sponsor of international terrorism”—a desi gnation that Iran has held since 1984—“unless the Secretary of State determines, in consultation w ith the Attorney General and the heads of other appropriate . . . agencies, that su ch alien does not pose a th reat to the safety or national security of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1735(a); see State Sponsors of Terrorism , U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/stat e-sponsors-of-terrorism [https://perma.cc/94QQE6RB].

2 The consular officer must instead “discontinue granting the visa” if the applicant’s country is subject to visa sanctions under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d) . 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(a). No party argues that such sanctions apply here. See Dkt. 5 at 18-19 (discussi ng 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(a)).3 B. Factual and Procedural Background The Court takes the facts from Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC , 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs are both Iranian citizens who app lied for F visas through th e U.S. Consulate in Dubai. Dkt. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 31, 33-34, 70. Plainti ff Khosravaninezhad applie d for an F-1 visa in June 2022 to enroll in an astrophysics Ph.D. program at the University of Ca lifornia, Riverside. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. She appeared for an intervie w with a consular officer on June 6, 2022. Id. ¶ 34. “[A]t the conclusion of her interview[,] she was given a []refusal notice for further administrative processing.” Id. “On the same day, the [C]onsulate em ailed [her] . . . a supplemental visa questionnaire,” which she retu rned nine days later. Id. ¶ 35. Khosravaninezhad has not yet received a final decision on her a pplication and has “repeatedly” been told “that her case is still pending . . . administrative processing.” Id. ¶¶ 36-37. She has “had to defer her [Ph.D. program] start date” at least twi ce as a result, and she “risks losing her hard-earned admission,” as well as the accompanying tuition waiver and living stipend, if she cannot secure a visa. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. Plaintiff Khalili app lied for an F-2 visa in Septembe r 2022 to join her husband, who has an F-1 visa, in the United States. Id. ¶ 72. She appeared for a c onsular interview on September 26, 2022. Id. ¶ 73. Like Khosravaninezhad, she r eceived “a []refusal notice for further administrative processing” at “the conclusion of the interview,” id. ¶ 73, followed “[l]ater that day” by “a supplemental visa questionnair e,” which she returned the next day, id. ¶ 74. Consular officials have not yet issued a final decision on Khalili’s app lication and have responded to multiple inquiries by her husband with “pro form a responses stating that her case is pending further administrative processing.” Id. ¶¶ 75-76. In the meantime, “K halili has been indefinitely4 separated from her husband,” causing her “extreme emotional distress,” id. ¶ 77, and requiring her to spend money “suppor t[ing] two households,” id. ¶ 78. Plaintiffs, together with f our other Iranian F-visa applic ants, sued Defendants Secretary Blinken, Attorney General Merrick Garland, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, Assistant Secretary of State for Consul ar Affairs Rena Bitter, the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate in Dubai, and ten unnamed consul ar officers at the U.S. Consulate in Dubai. Id. ¶¶ 6-17. The Complaint asserts that Defendant s have unreasonably delayed adjudication of Plaintiffs’ visa applications. Id. ¶¶ 92-113. Citing both the Adminis trative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706, and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendants to render fina l decisions within fourteen days. Compl. at 28. They also hint at a claim that Defendants “have engaged in a pattern and practice of unreasonable delay for Iranian visa applicants,” purporte dly in violation of the APA, id. ¶¶ 83, 105-07—though, as discussed below, Plaintiffs appear to have abandoned this theory, see infra Section III.C.2. The other four plaintiffs have since recei ved decisions on their visa applications and voluntarily dismissed their claims . Dkts. 9, 12. Defendants move d to dismiss the Complaint on June 27, 2023. Dkt. 5 (Mot.).
II. LEGAL STANDARD Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal both under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and unde r Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintif f bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. E.g. , Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Where, as here, “the defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations,” Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola , 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000),5 the Court “assume[s] the truth of all material fact ual allegations in the complaint and construe[s] the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. , 642 F.3d at 1139 (cleaned up). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contai n sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). To meet that standard, a pl aintiff’s allegations must support a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but itasks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (cleaned up). “Where a co mplaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitl ement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up).
III. ANALYSIS Defendants raise a host of arguments for di smissal, many of whic h have already been addressed repeatedly by cour ts in this District. See, e.g. , Fakhimi v. Dep’t of State , No. 23-cv1127, 2023 WL 6976073 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2023) (dismissi ng suit by Iranian nationals seeking to compel adjudication of F-visa applications); Rashidi v. U.S. Dep’t of State , No. 23-cv-1569, 2023 WL 6460030 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2023) (same); Khazaei v. Blinken , No. 23-cv-1419, 2023 WL 6065095 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023) (same). Readers fa miliar with those decisions will not be surprised that the C ourt largely rejects or bypasses De fendants’ non-merits arguments on jurisdiction and reviewability but agrees that Plaintiffs ’ claims fail on the merits.
A. Plaintiffs Have Standi ng to Sue Most Defendants Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Mot. at 8-14, 23-25. To establish standing at this stage, “Plaintiffs must state a plausible claim that they have suffered an6 injury in fact fairly traceable to [Defendants’] actions . . . that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits.” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack , 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Defendants make three arguments: First, that Plaintiffs have suffered no injury in fact because visa-processing de lay is a procedural injury that cannot confer standing unless tied to some concrete interest, see Summers v. Earth Island Inst. , 555 U.S. 488, 496-97 (2009), which Plaintiffs purportedly lack because they have no constitutional right to enter the United States, Mot. at 8-13; see Trump v. Hawaii , 585 U.S. 667, 703 (2018). Second, that Secretary Blinken, Attorney General Ga rland, and Secretary Ma yorkas cannot redress Plaintiffs’ injuries because they play no role in processing thei r applications. Mot. at 23-25. And third, that Plaintiffs’ injuries are not redres sable because no consular officer can grant them visas until Secretary Blinken determines under § 1735 that they do not thr eaten the safety or national security of the United States. Id. at 13-14. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish standing to sue Attorn ey General Garland or Secretary Mayorkas, but otherwise finds Defendants’ st anding objections unpersuasive. Defendants’ first argument misses the mark beca use it unduly restricts the range of concrete injuries that can conf er standing. While Defendants are correct that Plai ntiffs have no constitutional right to enter this country, e.g. , Trump , 585 U.S. at 703, concrete interests sufficient to support standing are not limited to those “specified by the Constitution itself,”
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez , 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021). Rather, “monetary injury” and “intangible harms . . . with a cl ose relationship to harms tradit ionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in Ameri can courts” also suffice. Id. Plaintiffs amply alle ge such harms. Both have identified monetary inju ries: Khosravaninezhad has be en unable to access her tuition waiver and living stipend, Compl. ¶ 40, and Khalil i has “suffered financially from . . . having to7 support two households” while separated from her husband, id. ¶ 78. Each has also plausibly alleged intangible, but still concrete, harms. Kh osravaninezhad has “a concrete professional . . . interest in earning an advanced degree.” Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *4 (cleaned up); see Compl. ¶¶ 39-41. And Khalili “has suffered a c oncrete harm due to [h er] separation from [her] family in the United States.” Pourabdollah v. Blinken , No. 23-cv-1603, 2024 WL 474523, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2024); see Trump , 585 U.S. at 698 (recognizing standing based on separation from family); Compl. ¶ 77. Pl aintiffs thus satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. Defendants’ second argument is somewhat more successful, though it does not resolve most of Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants contend th at Plaintiffs lack standing to sue Attorney General Garland, Secretary Blinken, and Secret ary Mayorkas because, they assert, none can redress their injuries. Mot. at 23-25. The Court disagrees as to Secretary Blinken. As numerous courts in this District have explained, “[w]hile the Secret ary of State has no legal aut hority to control which visa applications consular officers gr ant or deny, nothing precludes him fr om directing them to decide pending applications within a reasonable time.” Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *4; accord, e.g. , Fakhimi , 2023 WL 6976073, at *4. And the Complaint specifically alleges that Secretary Blinken “has supervisory control over” the relevant consular offi cers. Compl. ¶ 13. That is enough to show redressabili ty with respect to him. 3

3 Defendants concede that the consular officers are proper defendants, Mo t. at 25, and the Court agrees. An order directing them, as the offi cials responsible for adjudicating Plaintiffs’ applications, to do so more quickly would redre ss Plaintiffs’ injuries. Defendants’ Motion does not reference the other two defendants, Assistant Secretary Bitter and the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate in Dubai. See Mot. at 23-25. Plaintiffs allege that both are responsible for overseeing “consular activities,” Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16, and so the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have standing to sue each for the sa me reasons as with Secretary Blinken, see Lee v. Blinken , No. 23-cv-1783, 2024 WL 639635, at *3 (Feb. 15, 2024) (concl uding that Assistant Secretary Bitter was appropriate defendant in visa-delay suit).8 But the Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not established standing to sue Attorney General Garland or Secretary Mayorkas. Pl aintiffs must plausibly allege th at it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative,” that a favorable decision agai nst each defendant will redress their injuries. Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561 (cleaned up). Their Complain t falls short of that standard. Plaintiffs argue that § 1735 requires Secret ary Blinken to consult Attorn ey General Garland before determining whether Plaintiffs threaten the safetyor national security of the United States, and that a 2003 agreement between the Departments of Homeland Security and State requires him to consult Secretary Mayorkas as well. Dkt. 10 (O pp.) at 8-10. But they allege no facts showing that either Attorney General Garland or Secret ary Mayorkas has caused th e delays in processing their specific applications or th at there is anything either offici al could do to move the process forward. That Secretary Bli nken may consult both at some point, and that they “ might be responsible” for the delay, “is simply too speculative a basis” to conc lude that an order to either would do anything to redre ss Plaintiffs’ injuries. Rashidi , 2023 WL 6460030, at *3 (dismissing visa-delay claims against Secretary Mayorkas). The Court must therefore dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Attorney General Garland and Secretary Mayorkas for lack of jurisdiction. Finally, the Court rejects Defe ndants’ other argument agains t redressability. Defendants assert that “commands to State Department offi cials to re-adjudicate [P laintiffs’] . . . visa applications . . . cannot remedy [Plaintiffs’] . . . injuries” because § 1735 “precludes any State Department official from i ssuing . . . visa[s] to [Plaintiffs] unl ess . . . specific determination[s] [are] made that [they] ‘do[] not pose a threat to the safety or national security of the United States,’” and Plaintiffs “do not plead that these de terminations have been made yet.” Mot. at 13 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1735(a)). Courts in this Distri ct have routinely reject ed this argument, which misunderstands—at this point, one might conclude, willfully—the relief Plaint iffs seek. See,9 e.g. , Pourabdollah , 2024 WL 474523, at *4. Plaintiffs allege, and courts have agreed in similar cases, that the “refusals” of their applications pending “further administra tive processing” are not final decisions. 4 Compl. ¶¶ 34-38, 44, 73-76, 80; see, e.g. , Pourabdollah , 2024 WL 474523, at *4. Their injuries result not from the interim refusa ls of their applications but from the delay in reaching true final decisions, including as to the determinations required by § 1735. An order requiring Defendants “to complete [their] review more expeditious ly” would redress that harm. Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *4. As a result, Plaintiffs have standing, except with respect to Attorney General Garland and Secretary Mayorkas. B. Because Plaintiffs’ Claims Fail on the Merits, the Court Bypasses Defendants’ Other Non-Merits Arguments Defendants advance several other threshol d arguments for dismissal. The Court concludes that it need not re solve any of them before cons idering—and rejecting—Plaintiffs’ claims on the merits. First, Defendants assert that the Court ca nnot hear Plaintiffs’ claims because of the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which ge nerally “prevents a federal court from secondguessing a . . . consular o fficer’s decision to issue or withhold a visa.” Baan Rao Thai Rest. v. Pompeo , 985 F.3d 1020, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see Mot. at 25-29. Because consular nonreviewability is not a jurisdictional issue, Baan Rao , 985 F.3d at 1027-29, the Court may, and will, “proceed to the merits” without considering it, Almaqrami v. Pompeo , 933 F.3d 774, 784 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see Siddiqui v. Blinken , 646 F. Supp. 3d 69, 77 (D.D.C. 2022) (declining to address consular nonreviewability because visa-delay claim failed on merits).

4 The other four individuals who or iginally appeared as plaintiffs , whose applications were also initially refused for ad ministrative processing, Compl. ¶¶ 24, 49, 62, have since obtained final decisions on their applications, Dkts. 9, 12, illustrating that a refusal for administrative processing is not the end of th e road for a visa applicant.10 Second, Defendants advance what they style as a separate argument that the Court cannot review “any statutory claim ch allenging the conditions of entry, visa issuance[,] and admission . . . of non-citizens.” Mot. at 22; see id. at 20-23. This argument, which another court in this District aptly desc ribed as “somewhat puzzling,” Ahmadi v. Scharpf , No. 23-cv-953, 2024 WL 551542, at *4 n.6 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2024), app ears largely to restate the consular nonreviewability defense. Even if Defendants in tend the argument to sweep more broadly, they do not claim that it goes to the Court’s Article I II jurisdiction to hear th is case, and the Court does not see how it could. Indeed, Defendants ac knowledge that the Suprem e Court declined to reach a similar argument in Trump , instead electing to decide that case on the merits. Mot. at 22 n.5; see 585 U.S. at 682-83. The Court follows the same path here. Cf. Ahmadi , 2024 WL 551542, at *4 n.6 (concluding that identical argument was not jurisdictional). Third, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not “identif[ied] a cl ear, non-discretionary duty for a consular o fficer to adjudicate . . . a ny specific visa application,” as they must to bring an unreasonable-delay claim unde r either the APA or the Mandamus Act. Mot. at 14; see Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All. , 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (APA); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell , 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Mandamus Act). This argument has generally met with a frosty reception from courts in this District, several of which have conclude d that both the APA and State Department regulations cr eate a clear duty to adjudicate visa applications within a reasonable time. See, e.g. , Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *5-6; Fakhimi , 2023 WL 6976073, at *6. But some courts have come out the other way, see Mukkavilli v. Jaddou , No. 22-cv-2289, 2023 WL 4029344, at *7-12 (D.D.C. June 15, 2023), appeal docketed , No. 23-5138 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2023), and so, rather than wade into the dispute, the “Court will assume without deciding” that Plaintiffs have identified “a discrete, required duty because, in any event,” their11 claims fail on the merits, 5 Ahmadi , 2024 WL 551542, at *5; accord, e.g. , Barazandeh v. U.S. Dep’t of State , No. 23-cv-1581, 2024 WL 341166, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2024).
C. Plaintiffs’ Claims Fail on the Merits 1. Plaintiffs have not stated pl ausible unreasonable-delay claims The Court begins its merits an alysis with Plaintiffs’ primary theory: that Defendants have unreasonably delayed their processi ng of Plaintiffs’ vi sa applications. Under both the APA and the Mandamus Act, “‘the central que stion’ is ‘whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.’” Barazandeh , 2024 WL 341166, at *6 (cleaned up) (quoting In re Core Commc’ns, Inc. , 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). To make that determination, courts in this Circuit consider the six “ TRAC ” factors, drawn from the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Telecommunications Research & Action Center (TRAC) v.
FCC , 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984): (1) “[T]he time ag encies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason”; (2) “where Congre ss has provided a timeta ble or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason”; (3) “delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human hea lth and welfare are at stake”; (4) “the court should consider the effect of e xpediting delayed action on agency activities of a

5 Defendants argue that, at least under the Ma ndamus Act, and possibly under the APA, the requirement that Plaintiffs identi fy a “clear, non-discretionary duty” is jurisdictional. Mot. at 14- 15. Even so, it is at most a matte r of statutory jurisdiction, rather than an Article III concern. See In re Medicare Reimbursement Litig. , 414 F.3d 7, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rooting requirement of “clear duty to act” in text of Mandamus Act). And the D.C. Circuit has held that courts may “address[] the merits where doing so ma[kes] it possible to avoid a doubtful issue of statutory jurisdiction.” Kramer v. Gates , 481 F.3d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). The Court does so here. See da Fonseca v. Emmel , No. 23-cv-3300, 2024 WL 519603, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2024) (taking this approach); cf. Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off. , 80 F.4th 330, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (accepting as undisputed that agency had duty to act).12 higher or competing priority ”; (5) “the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by de lay”; and (6) “the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold th at agency action is unreasonably delayed.” Id. at 80 (cleaned up). “These considerations are of ten grouped into four basic inquiries”: First, is there any rhyme or reas on—congressionally prescribed or otherwise—for an agency’s delay (factors one and two)? Second, what are the consequences of delay if the Court does not compel the agency to act (factors three and fi ve)? Third, how might forcing the agency to act thwart its ability to address other priorities (factor four)? Finally, is the delay intent ional or due to a ny impropriety on the part of the agency (factor six)?
Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (cleaned up); accord, e.g. , Ahmadi , 2024 WL 551542, at *5-7. After conducting these four i nquiries (in a slightly different order), the Court concludes that the balance of the TRAC factors favors Defendants, ma king dismissal appropriate. See Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off. , 80 F.4th 330, 340-46 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (dismissing visadelay case based on TRAC factors).

a. TRAC factors one and two The first two factors, which consider whether “there [is] any rhyme or reason— congressionally prescribed or othe rwise—for [the] agency’s delay,” Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6, point toward dismissal. Visa processing inevitably “takes a base line amount of time,” and “courts have generally found that immigration delays in excess of five, six, seven years are unreasonable, while those between three to five years are often not unreasonable.” Id. Plaintiffs had waited only about seven and eleven months , respectively, at the ti me they filed their Complaint, and have waited only about seventeen and twenty- one months, respectively, now. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 73. Even setting aside the rule th at “[t]he proper method fo r calculating delay . . . is the length of time between the last action the government t ook on a visa application and the13 filing of [the] plai ntiff’s complaint,” Barazandeh , 2024 WL 341166, at *7 n.7, Plaintiffs’ current wait times fall well within th e bounds of what courts have ordinarily found reasonable, see, e.g. , Ahmadi , 2024 WL 551542, at *5 (finding twenty-one-m onth delay in processing F-visa application reasonable). Looking to the second TRAC factor, Plaintiffs respond that Congress has “provided a[n] . . . indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed,” TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80, in 8 U.S.C. § 1571. Opp. at 28. That provision states: It is the sense of Congress that the processing of an immigration benefit application should be comp leted not later than 180 days after the initial filing of the applicat ion, except that a petition for a nonimmigrant visa under section 1 184(c) of this title should be processed not later than 30 days after the filing of the petition. 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b). The trouble for Plaintiffs is that this provision—which, they acknowledge, is nonbinding, Opp. at 28-29—says nothing about pro cessing of F-visa applications by consular officials. First, the language appears in a section directed not to consular officials bu t to the Immigration and Nationality Service (INS), a since-dissolved agen cy distinct from the St ate Department whose functions have largely transfer red to entities within the Department of Homeland Security. See 8
U.S.C. § 1571(a) (stating congressional purposes related to INS); El Centro Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Blinken , No. 3:21-cv-361, 2021 WL 3141205, at *4 & n.2 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2021). Second, while the “except” clause does refer to nonimmig rant visas, the statut e it cross-references addresses certain employment-bas ed visas, not the F (student) visas that Plaintiffs seek. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c). In any event, even assuming that, “though the [1 80-day] language is in sufficient to set a deadline, [the Court] can look to Congress’s aspi rational statement as a ruler against which the14 agency’s progress must be measured[,] . . . the delay has not reached the level of disproportionality . . . sufficient [for th e Court] to grant relief.” Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344 (cleaned up) (discussing § 1571 in context of claim against subagenc y of Department of Homeland Security). Da Costa , for example, concluded that, even considering the 180-day period given in § 1571, a delay of four-and-a-half years in processing an immigration petition was reasonable. Id. at 342, 344, 346. Citing agency records and statements, Plaintif fs also argue that De fendants can and often do finish processing visa applica tions more quickly than the lengt h of Plaintiffs’ wait. Opp. at 26-30; Dkt. 15. These sources do not, how ever, show that officials can process all applications so quickly. For example, Plaintiffs cite a po st on the State Departme nt’s website describing purported improvements in visa-processing efforts. 6 Dkt. 15-1. Yet the post itself cautions that “demand remains at historically hi gh levels in some countries” and observes that some applicants “still face lengthy wait times” ev en to sit for interviews. Id. at 4. Similarly, while Plaintiffs assert that roughly “85% of ad ministrative processing is comple ted within 60 days,” Opp. at 27, that figure leaves a sign ificant share of applican ts facing longer delays. The upshot is that Plaintiffs have not plau sibly alleged that Defe ndants are not following a rule of reason in processing visa applications, a nd the first two TRAC factors support dismissal.
b. TRAC factor four The fourth factor, “the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority,” TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80, “carries significant weight,” Barazandeh , 2024

6 After filing their Opposition, Plaint iffs moved for the Court to take judicial notice of this post. Dkt. 15. Defendants have not opposed the Motion, a nd the Court agrees that it can take judicial notice of “information posted on official public websites of gove rnment agencies,” Markowicz v. Johnson , 206 F. Supp. 3d 158, 161 n.2 (D.D.C. 2016), so it grants Plaintiffs’ Motion.15 WL 341166, at *9, and also cuts strongly in Defendants’ favor. The D.C. Circuit has “refused to grant relief, even though all th e other factors considered in TRAC favored it, where a judicial order putting [a party] at the head of the queue would simply move all others back one space and produce no net gain.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton , 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). As the D.C. Circuit and courts in this District have repeatedly explained in recent visa-delay case s, such “judicial reordering of [Defendants’] priorities” is exactly what Plaintiffs seek. Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *7 (cleaned up); see,
e.g. , Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 343; Ahmadi , 2024 WL 551542, at *6. “Consular processing capacity is . . . a zero-sum game, so granting [Plaintiffs] relief would necessarily mean additional delays for other applicants—many of whom undoubted ly face hardships of their own.” Ahmadi , 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (cleaned up). “Any such reorde ring of the queue of applicants seeking adjudication would be inappropria te here because there would be no demonstrable net gain in visa processing at large.” Id. (cleaned up). Plaintiffs’ arguments to the c ontrary do not persuade. They a ssert first that the fact that other individuals who submitted th eir visa applications after Khosravaninezhad have since had their applications adjudicat ed “demonstrates [that] there is no orderly queu e of applicants.” Opp. at 35. But the fact that Defenda nts do not make final decisions in the exact order in which they receive applications does not plausibly show that they are not working in an orderly fashion. “[D]ifferent applications may [simply] re quire different time and attention.” Fakhimi , 2023 WL 6976073, at *9. Plaintiffs’ further ar guments (1) that, if there is a line, they have waited long enough to be at the front of it and (2) that the delay thus far shows that Defendants have “lost [Plaintiffs’ applica tions] in a bureaucratic s huffle,” Opp. at 34 (cleaned up), beg the question, assuming that the wait time to date is unreas onable and could not re sult from competing16 priorities and legitimate agency needs. Contrary to that assumption, the Court has already explained that the length of the dela y, standing alone, favors Defendants. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have claimed in public statements to be prioritizing F-visa applications, su ch that “even if [Plaintiffs’] a pplications were processed ahead of others, it would be justified by . . . Defendants[’] own priority buckets.” 7 Opp. at 34 (cleaned up). If Defendants intended to pr ioritize Plaintiffs’ specific app lications, they would presumably do so, and, otherwise, moving Plainti ffs to the front of th e queue of F-visa a pplicants would still result in judicial line -reordering. The fourth TRAC factor strongly favors Defendants. See, e.g. , Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 343; Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *7.

c. TRAC factors three and five
TRAC factors three and five, which examin e “the consequences of delay,” Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6, including the effect on “human health and welfare,” TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80, at least arguably tilt in Plaintiffs’ favor. Plai ntiffs have alleged concrete injuries to their educational, familial, financia l, and professional interests ca used by Defendants’ delay. See

supra Section III.A; see, e.g. , Ahmadi , 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (concluding based on similar allegations that third and fifth fa ctors favored plaintiff). Still, these injuries—which are likely shared by “many others faci ng similar circumstances,” Siddiqui , 646 F. Supp. 3d at 77 (cleaned up)—are not so extreme or unusual as to pl ausibly outweigh the other factors favoring Defendants. See Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344-45.

7 Plaintiffs also cite these stat ements in support of their argume nt that Defendants do not process applications on a “first-in, first- out basis.” Opp. at 33. But, ev en accepting this reading (which Defendants dispute, Dkt. 13 at 21- 22), Plaintiffs can hardly comp lain; Defendants’ prioritizing Fvisa applications would only help Plaintiffs. And the statements in no way suggest that, within the class of F-visa applicants, Defendants are not processing applicatio ns in an orderly way.17 d. TRAC factor six Plaintiffs acknowledge that they “have notalleged impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude” and that the sixth TRAC factor is therefore “neutral at best.” Opp. at 35. The Court agrees that this fact or favors neither side. See Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 345-46.
* * * Taken together, the TRAC factors cut Defendants’ way, a nd so the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ unreasonable-delay claims. 2. Any arbitrary-and-capricious claim also fails Plaintiffs’ Complaint gestures in passing to ward a claim that “Def endants have engaged in a pattern and practice of unreason able delay for Iranian visa applicants such as . . . Plaintiffs,” which conduct, Plaintiffs assert, is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Compl. ¶¶ 83, 105-07; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (authorizing courts to set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, . . . or othe rwise not in accordance with law”). Plaintiffs appear to have abandoned this claim (if they ever intended to bring it) in their O pposition to Defendants’ Motion, which focuses exclusively on their unreasonable-delay claims. See Dkt. 10. For completeness’s sake, the Court notes that, even if Plaintiffs ha d not forfeited this theory, and even if such disparat e treatment could be the basis of an APA claim, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege the existence of a discriminatory pattern or practice. See Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *7 (rejecting similar ar bitrary-and-capricious claim because of lack of nonconclusory supporting allegations). Setting asid e Plaintiffs’ conclusory say-so, nothing in the Complaint supports a reas onable inference that Defendants have singled out Iranian citizens for18 particularly unfavorable treatment. See Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 681 (“[C]onclusory [allegations are] . . . not entitled to be a ssumed true.”). The Court therefore dismisses this claim as well. 8
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER As Defendants acknowledge, Mot. at 38, Plaintif fs’ desire for final d ecisions on their visa applications is understandable. But their Compla int does not plausibly show that the delays in processing their applications are unreasonable, and so the Court must dismiss this case. For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice, Dkt. 15, is GRANTED . It is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 5, is GRANTED . And it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Dkt. 1, and this case are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE

. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED. This is a final appealable Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

Date: March 8, 2024

_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge

8 Plaintiffs’ Opposition also incl udes a two-sentence request that the Court compel production of the administrative record. Opp. at 12 & n.6. Plai ntiffs make this request in support of their argument that the refusals of their applications for further administra tive processing were not final decisions. See id. The Court has already agreed withPlaintiffs on this point, so their request is moot. In any event, since this case challenges agen cy inaction, rather than a final decision, “there is no adminis trative record for a fede ral court to review.” Palakuru v. Renaud , 521 F. Supp. 3d 46, 50 n.6 (D.D.C. 2021) (cleaned up).