Filed 11/15/13 In re Kylee H. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication 

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published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re KYLEE H., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KATHRYN H.,

Defendant and Appellant;

MARGARET H. et al.,

Movants and Respondents.

 D063831

 (Super. Ct. No. NJ14484)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael J. 

Imhoff, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Michele Anne Cella, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County 

Counsel, and Dana C. Shoffner, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Patricia K. Saucier for Movants and Respondents.

Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.

Kathryn H. appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating jurisdiction of her minor 

daughter, Kylee H., and issuing custody and visitation orders. Kathryn contends the court 

violated her substantive due process right to custody and control of Kylee by issuing a 

grandparent visitation order. She further contends the family court, not the juvenile court, is 

the proper forum for issuing a visitation order. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Kylee was born in October 2003 to Kathryn and Duke A. Kylee began living with her 

maternal grandparents when she was seven months old, and returned to Kathryn's care when 

she was five and one-half years old. Kathryn married Roger S. in 2010, and they had a 

turbulent relationship. 

In May 2011, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) 

received a referral of three recent domestic violence incidents between Kathryn and Roger. 

During one of these incidents, Kylee was in the car and saw Kathryn punch and slap Roger 

while he was driving. When the car stopped, Kathryn screamed at Kylee, "Get out, I hate you, 

run away." Kathryn and Roger continued to fight, and Kathryn threatened to kill herself and 

Kylee. Kylee heard the threat, causing her to be sad and scared. Following this incident, she 

returned to live with the maternal grandparents. 

Kathryn and Roger had a history of domestic violence and arrests. Kylee told the social 

worker she did not like being in Kathryn's home and preferred to live with the maternal 

grandparents because there was "no screaming and yelling" in their home. She also said she 
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was afraid of Roger. School personnel noticed Kylee seemed calmer and happier after she 

began living with the maternal grandparents. 

Agency filed a petition in the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code1

section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Kylee was at substantial risk of harm as a result of the 

domestic violence and Kathryn's threats to kill Kylee.2 The court detained Kylee with the 

maternal grandparents and granted their request for de facto parent status. 

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court sustained the allegations of the 

petition, declared Kylee a dependent, removed her from parental custody, and placed her with 

the maternal grandparents. The court ordered reunification services for Kathryn, including 

supervised visits with Kylee. 

During the next six months, Kathryn participated in individual therapy, domestic 

violence treatment and in-home parenting classes. She progressed to unsupervised visits with 

Kylee. At the six-month review hearing, the court continued Kylee as a dependent, continued 

her placement with the maternal grandparents, and ordered six more months of services for 

Kathryn. 

By the 12-month hearing, Kathryn had completed individual therapy and was still

participating in other services. Kylee had begun an extended 60-day visit with Kathryn and 

Roger. The maternal grandparents requested overnight visits twice a month with Kylee. 

Kathryn opposed this schedule, arguing the family needed time to bond and Kylee needed time 

to "settle in." The court set the visitation issue for a special hearing and made an interim order 

 

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

2 An allegation under section 300, subdivision (a), was later dismissed. 
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for the maternal grandparents to have overnight visits with Kylee on the first and third 

weekends of the month from noon on Saturday until 4:00 p.m. on Sunday. The court placed 

Kylee with Kathryn but retained jurisdiction. 

The social worker met with Kylee twice to discuss her visits with the maternal 

grandparents. Kylee reported she enjoyed visits with them and liked seeing her friends who 

lived nearby. She liked overnight visits and wanted them to continue. 

Kathryn preferred to have Kylee visit the maternal grandparents from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00

p.m. on Saturdays so Kylee could go to church with the family on Sundays, have time to 

complete her homework, and prepare for the week. The maternal grandparents believed their 

proposed visitation schedule—twice a month, from noon on Saturday to 4:00 p.m. on 

Sunday—would give Kylee time to spend with them, as well as with her family and friends. 

At the special hearing on visitation, the court continued the twice-a-month visitation schedule 

between Kylee and the maternal grandparents. 

In its report for the family maintenance review hearing, the social worker noted Kathryn 

had completed most of her services and had learned techniques to help eliminate the protective 

issues. Kathryn did, however, have a lapse in medication compliance that caused some 

concerns about her anger management. Further, Kathryn acknowledged she and Roger 

continued to argue, but said they avoided exposing Kylee to their arguments. Following one 

argument, Kylee said to Roger, "mom is sad because she thinks you are leaving her."

Nevertheless, Agency recommended the court terminate jurisdiction of Kylee. 

At the family maintenance review hearing, Kathryn reiterated her opposition to 

continuing the visitation order for the maternal grandparents after the court terminated 
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jurisdiction. Kathryn argued she did not oppose visits for the maternal grandparents, but only 

the existence of a court order for visitation. The court set a contested hearing on the visitation 

issue. 

At the contested hearing, the court terminated jurisdiction, ordered joint legal custody of 

Kylee to Kathryn and Duke, with physical custody to Kathryn, and continued visitation for the 

maternal grandparents as previously ordered.3

DISCUSSION

I

Kathryn contends the court violated her substantive due process rights to custody and 

control of Kylee by issuing a grandparent visitation order. Citing Troxel v. Granville (2000) 

530 U.S. 57 (Troxel), she asserts the court should have deferred to her wishes when 

considering the visitation rights of a nonparent.

A

When the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, it may issue

custody and visitation orders to be used as the basis for opening a superior court file. (§ 362.4; 

In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 712.) Custody and visitation orders under section 

362.4 are not limited to ensuring the protection of the child, or to mitigating any risk. Instead, 

they focus on the best interests of the child under all the circumstances, and remain in effect 

until terminated or modified by the family court. (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 

1122-1123; In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268; In re John W. (1996) 41 

Cal.App.4th 961, 973; In re Jennifer R., at p. 712.) Because the juvenile court " 'has been 

 

3 The court also ordered visitation for Duke. Duke supported the maternal grandparents' 

request for visitation. He is not a party to this appeal.
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intimately involved in the protection of the child,' " it is best situated to make custody and 

visitation orders based on the child's best interests. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 

206 (Chantal S.).) The court's broad discretion in determining a minor's best interests will not 

be reversed on appeal unless the party challenging it has clearly shown the court abused its 

discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination. (In re 

Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318; In re Tamneisha S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 798, 806.)4

A nonparent, including a grandparent or de facto parent, can be awarded visitation 

under section 362.4 upon termination of juvenile court jurisdiction. (In re Robin N. (1992) 7 

Cal.App.4th 1140, 1146 [juvenile court had authority to order visitation with de facto parent 

when terminating dependency where de facto parent had substantial parental relationship with 

child who needed consistent and regular contact with him]; In re Hirenia C. (1993) 18 

Cal.App.4th 504, 518 [§ 362.4 authorizes visitation order in favor of de facto parent on 

termination of dependency proceedings, even over objections of minor's biological parents].)

Even when a parent retains his or her parental rights, there may be instances in which a child 

would be significantly harmed by not ensuring he or she continues a relationship with a person 

who has lived with the child for a substantial portion of the child's life and has been "regularly 

involved in providing day-to-day care, nurturance and guidance for the child appropriate to the 

child's stage of development . . . . The needs of the child, which are the most important 

consideration, may sometimes require that a visitation award be made to such a 'de facto 

 

4 Kathryn argues we should review the issue de novo because it raises pure questions of 

law. However, she has identified no legal error requiring application of a de novo standard of 

review. Where, as here, the court issues a visitation order based on a minor's best interests, we 

review its decision for abuse of discretion. (Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 

Cal.App.4th 285, 300-301; In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48.)
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parent.' " (In re Marriage of Gayden (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1510, 1522, 1521; In re Hirenia 

C., at p. 519.)

B

Here, the court properly considered Kylee's best interests when issuing its visitation 

order. The maternal grandparents were Kylee's de facto parents and she was very attached to 

them. She enjoyed visiting them and seeing extended family and friends, and she wanted 

overnight visits to continue. The evidence showed that maintaining the current visitation 

schedule would ensure a predictable and stable schedule for Kylee. The court was entitled to 

find that, absent an order for visitation, Kathryn would not facilitate visits as she stated she 

would. The court's findings that Kathryn had eliminated the reasons that led to dependency

jurisdiction and that it was safe for Kylee to return to Kathryn's custody did not preclude the 

juvenile court from issuing a visitation order.

C

Kathryn relies on Troxel to support her argument that the juvenile court should have 

deferred to her wishes regarding the maternal grandparents' visitation. In that case, the mother 

limited the grandparents' visitation after the children's father committed suicide. (Troxel, 

supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 60-61.) The grandparents then sought visitation under a Washington 

statute permitting any person to petition for visitation rights at any time. The nonparental 

visitation statute also authorized the trial court to grant visitation whenever, in its view, the 

visitation would serve the best interests of the child. (Id. at p. 61.)

The Supreme Court held that, as applied to the mother and her children, the nonparental 

visitation statute infringed on "the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning 
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the care, custody, and control of their children," a right guaranteed by the due process clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at 

p. 66.) Moreover, the application of that statute violated due process because it allowed any 

person to seek visitation at any time and it did not require the trial court to consider or defer to 

a parent's belief that visitation was not in the child's best interests. (Id. at p. 67.)5 The court's 

decision was based, in part, on the presumption that "fit parents act in the best interests of their 

children," and no one had ever alleged or found the mother was an unfit parent. (Troxel, supra, 

530 U.S. at p. 68.)

Unlike the mother in Troxel, Kathryn was not entitled to the presumption of parental 

fitness that underlies custody law in family court. (See Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206; 

In re Nicholas H., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 268.) This case was decided in juvenile court 

because Kathryn neglected Kylee, exposed her to serious domestic violence, and consequently 

lost custody of her for a substantial amount of time. Even after the juvenile court terminated

jurisdiction because no protective issues remained, it was entitled to impose, in its role as 

parens patriae, other conditions it deemed were in Kylee's best interests, including continued 

visitation with the maternal grandparents. (§ 362.4; In re Roger S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 25, 

30-31.) In issuing its visitation order, the court was not required to defer to Kathryn's wishes. 

 

5 The court in Troxel did not consider the primary constitutional question of whether the 

due process clause "requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or 

potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation." (Troxel, supra, 530 

U.S. at p. 73.) Further, the court did not hold that a parent's constitutional liberty interest in the 

care, custody and control of his or her children is absolute or that grandparents can never 

obtain an order permitting them to visit with their grandchildren. (See In re Marriage of Ross 

& Kelley (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 130, 139-140.)
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There was no unconstitutional infringement of Kathryn's fundamental right to make decisions 

concerning the care, custody and control of Kylee.

D

Kathryn asserts the court erred by issuing a grandparent visitation order without first 

finding the order was necessary to avert harm to Kylee. She argues the court could not 

reasonably find detriment to Kylee where there was no evidence Kathryn intended to 

discontinue visits between Kylee and the maternal grandparents.

A visitation order issued by the juvenile court when jurisdiction is terminated is not " 'an 

award of custody to a [nonparent],' " which requires a finding of detriment. (In re B.G. (1974) 

11 Cal.3d 679, 698, 699 [court reversed an order where foster parents were awarded full 

custody of children under former Civ. Code, § 4600 without a finding it would be detrimental 

to the child to award custody to the parent].) Here, the court did not order custody of Kylee to 

a nonparent. Its visitation order, made under section 362.4, was not limited to ensuring Kylee's 

protection or mitigating any risk to her, but instead properly addressed her best interests under 

all the circumstances. (In re Hirenia C., supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 520.) No detriment 

finding was required.

Kathryn argues there was no evidence she intends to discontinue visits between Kylee 

and the maternal grandparents. However, the record shows Kathryn had a difficult and 

sometimes hostile relationship with the maternal grandparents. Although the maternal 

grandparents raised Kylee and played a significant role in her life, Kathryn opposed any 

visitation order for them, claiming she should be the one to decide if and when those visits 

occurred. At the contested hearing on the issue of visitation, the court expressed its concern 
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that Kathryn wanted "to be in control and call the shots," and would not always make visitation 

decisions that were in Kylee's best interests. In this regard, the court was entitled to establish 

ongoing protections for Kylee by issuing an order for visitation with her maternal 

grandparents. (See Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 212.)

II

Kathryn contends the issue of grandparent visitation was a private scheduling dispute 

between Kathryn and the maternal grandparents, which should be decided in the family court, 

not the juvenile court.6

As we have discussed, section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court to issue visitation 

orders, even as to nonparents. Although both the family court and the juvenile court focus on 

the best interests of the child, the juvenile court has a special responsibility to the child as 

parens patriae and must look at the totality of the child's circumstances. (In re Roger S., 

supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 30-31.) By empowering the juvenile court to issue custody and 

visitation orders when it terminates jurisdiction, the Legislature has expressed its belief that 

" 'the juvenile court is the appropriate place for these matters to be determined . . . .' " (Id. at 

p. 31.) The juvenile court was the proper forum for determining visitation, including an order 

for visitation between Kylee and the maternal grandparents.

 

6 Kathryn also contends Family Code section 3104, subdivision (a), which allows a 

grandparent to petition for visitation of a minor child, does not apply in juvenile court. We 

agree, but note the juvenile court did not rely on this statute in issuing its visitation order.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

MCDONALD, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

NARES, J.