Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A19A2457. STEVEN SYDOR v. THE STATE

In January 2009, and while represented by counsel, Steven Sydor was

convicted upon a negotiated plea of guilty to 13 counts of child molestation. In

February 2019, and while still incarcerated, Sydor filed a pro se motion challenging

hissentences asfailing to comply with the split-sentence mandate of OCGA § 17-10-

6.2 (b). The trial court denied that motion, and Sydor appeals pro se.

Under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), a court may modify a sentence during the year

after its imposition or within 120 days after remittitur following a direct appeal,

whichever is later. Frazier v. State, 302 Ga. App. 346, 348 (691 SE2d 247) (2010).

Once, as here, this statutory period expires, a trial court may only modify a void

sentence. Id. And a direct appeal may lie from an order denying a motion to vacate

or correct a void sentence only if the defendant raises a colorable claim that the

sentence is, in fact, void. See Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 217 (1), n.1 (686 SE2d

786) (2009); Burg v. State, 297 Ga. App. 118, 119 (676 SE2d 465) (2009). When a

sentence is within the statutory range of punishment, it is not void. Jones v. State, 278

Ga. 669, 670 (604 SE2d 483) (2004).

A person over the age of eighteen who is convicted of a first offense of child

molestation is subject to a split sentence, which must include a mandatory-minimum

five-year prison term, followed by at least one year of probation. OCGA §§ 16-6-4

(b); 17-10-6.2 (a) (5), (b). But a trial court is permitted, in its discretion, to deviate

from the mandatory minimum sentence when it finds that certain factors are present.

See OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1); Hedden v. State, 288 Ga. 871, 874 (708 SE2d 287)

(2011). In this case, the sentencing order shows that the trial court expressly found

March 06, 2020
each of the factors designated in OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1).

In this appeal, Sydor posits that he “met all of the requirements of a sentence

under Code § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1),” and therefore, the trial court erred when it did not

sentence him below the mandatory minimum. However, a challenge to the trial

court’s failure to impose such a downward deviation does not state a void-sentence

claim. See Jackson v. State, 338 Ga. App. 509, 510 (790 SE2d 295) (2016). “The

failure to deviate—or consider deviating—below a minimum sentence does not

render the sentence one that the law does not allow, so long asthe sentences imposed

remain within the range of punishments permitted by law.” (Punctuation omitted.) 

Id. Here, the record shows the child molestation sentences fell within the statutory

range of punishment permitted by law. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (b).

Because Sydor has notraised a colorable void-sentence claim, he is not entitled

to a direct appeal, and this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

03/06/2020