* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fe d. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defe ndant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 10/9/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

RAYMOND L. SOLANO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-1523 (D.C. No. 94-Z-1924) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before PORFILIO, LOGAN, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Raymond L. Solano appeals from the distric t court’s order affirming the denial of his application for social security disability benefits by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). Following a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits at s tep five of the five-step sequential evaluation process. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988)(discussing five steps). The ALJ c oncluded that although claimant could not perform his past work, classifie d as medium, he could perform a full range of light work. The Appeals Council de nied review, and the district court upheld the Secretary’s decision. Claimant no w appeals to this court. The ALJ determined that claimant’s eligibility for disability benefits was limited to a closed period of disability from Septe mber 12, 1990 through August 1, 1993. Claimant does not challenge that determin ation, but he claims he is entitled to benefits for that period. On appeal, h e asserts that (1) because he had a nonexertional impairment, the ALJ’s use of the me dical-vocational guidelines (grids) was inappropriate; (2) the ALJ improperly l imited the testimony of the-3-

vocational expert (VE); and (3) the ALJ incorrectlyequated claimant’s general equivalency degree (GED) to a high school diploma. We review the Secretary’s decision to determine whe ther the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence based on the entire record, and to ascertain whether she applied the correct legal sta ndards. Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonabl e mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Soliz v. Chate r , 82 F.3d 373, 375 (10th Cir. 1996)(quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(further quotation omitted)). We do not reweigh the evidence. Hamilt on v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs. , 961 F.2d 1495, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). Claimant alleges that the ALJ was precluded from us ing the grids because he suffered from psychological problems. The ALJ d etermined that claimant’s psychological problems did not limit his ability to work. Because that determination is supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ’s reliance on the grids was proper. See Castellano , 26 F.3d at 1030 (reliance on grids held proper where ALJ found claimant’s pain testimony not fullycredible). Claimant next complains that the ALJ did not permithim to elicit testimony from the VE regarding cardiac rehabilitation from t he psychological point of view, even though the VE was qualified to testify o n those matters. The ALJ has-4-

a duty to develop facts relevant to the decision. Thompson v. Sullivan , 987 F.2d 1482, 1492 (10th Cir. 1993). The “‘inquiry is whether [sufficient questions were asked] to ascertain (1) the nature of a claimant’s alleged impairments, (2) what on-going treatment and medication the claimant is r eceiving, and (3) the impact of the alleged impairment on a claimant’s daily rou tine and activities.’” Id. (quoting Musgrave v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 1992)). Based on our review of the record, we find no error in the A LJ’s decision to restrict the VE’s testimony to vocational issues. We do not address claimant’s argument that a GED ca nnot be equated to a high school diploma because the grids direct a find ing of not disabled even if he had neither a GED nor a high school diploma. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rule 202.10. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

John C. Porfilio Circuit Judge