II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1433 

To limit funding for any extension of the New START Treaty or any successor agreement unless the agreement includes the People’s Republic 

of China and covers all strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces of 

the Russian Federation. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 13, 2019 

Mr. COTTON (for himself and Mr. CORNYN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To limit funding for any extension of the New START 

Treaty or any successor agreement unless the agreement 

includes the People’s Republic of China and covers all 

strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces of the Russian 

Federation. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘New START Treaty 

5 Improvement Act of 2019’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 


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•S 1433 IS

1 (1) The United States and the Russian Federa2 tion signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Trea3 ty (the ‘‘New START Treaty’’) on April 8, 2010. 

4 (2) The United States Senate advised and con5 sented to the treaty on December 22, 2010, by a 

6 vote of 71–26. 

7 (3) The Senate resolution advising and con8 senting to the ratification of the New START Trea9 ty states that ‘‘prior to the entry into force of the 

10 New START Treaty, the President shall certify to 

11 the Senate that . . . the United States will seek to 

12 initiate . . . not later than one year after the entry 

13 into force of the New START Treaty, negotiations 

14 with the Russian Federation on an agreement to ad15 dress the disparity between the non-strategic (tac16 tical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian 

17 Federation and of the United States’’. 

18 (4) The New START Treaty is due to expire in 

19 February 2021. 

20 (5) The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states— 

21 (A) ‘‘While the United States has contin22 ued to reduce the number and salience of nu23 clear weapons, others, including Russia and 

24 China, have moved in the opposite direction. 

25 Russia has expanded and improved its strategic 


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1 and non-strategic nuclear forces. China’s mili2 tary modernization has resulted in an expanded 

3 nuclear force, with little to no transparency into 

4 its intentions.’’; 

5 (B) ‘‘Russia is developing and deploying 

6 new nuclear warheads and launchers. These ef7 forts include multiple upgrades for every leg of 

8 the Russian nuclear triad of strategic bombers, 

9 sea-based missiles, and landbased missiles. Rus10 sia is also developing at least two new inter11 continental range systems, a hypersonic glide 

12 vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear13 armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous 

14 torpedo.’’; 

15 (C) ‘‘[Russia] is also building a large, di16 verse, and modern set of non-strategic systems 

17 that are dual-capable . . . . These theater- and 

18 tactical-range systems are not accountable 

19 under the New START Treaty’’; 

20 (D) ‘‘China continues to increase the num21 ber, capabilities, and protection of its nuclear 

22 forces.’’; and 

23 (E) ‘‘China has developed a new road-mo24 bile strategic intercontinental ballistic missile 

25 (ICBM), a new multi-warhead version of its 


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1 DF5 silo-based ICBM, and its most advanced 

2 ballistic missile submarine armed with new sub3 marine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It 

4 has also announced development of a new nu5 clear-capable strategic bomber, giving China a 

6 nuclear triad.’’. 

7 (6) On April 4, 2019, President Donald J. 

8 Trump stated, ‘‘Between Russia and China and us, 

9 we’re all making hundreds of billions of dollars 

10 worth of weapons, including nuclear, which is ridicu11 lous . . . and I would say that China will come 

12 along, and I would say Russia will come along. It 

13 doesn’t really make sense that we’re doing this.’’. 

14 (7) In testimony before the Committee on For15 eign Relations of the Senate on April 10, 2019, Sec16 retary of State Mike Pompeo stated, in response to 

17 a question about extending the New START treaty, 

18 that ‘‘we need to make sure that we’ve got all of the 

19 parties that are relevant as a component of this as 

20 well’’. 

21 (8) On March 16, 2019, National Security Ad22 visor John Bolton stated, ‘‘China is building up its 

23 nuclear capacity now. It’s . . . one reason why if 

24 we’re going to have another arms control negotiaVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:57 May 23, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1433.IS S1433

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1 tion, for example, with the Russians, it may make 

2 sense to include China in that discussion as well’’. 

3 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

4 It is the sense of Congress that— 

5 (1) arms control is beneficial for both United 

6 States national security and international stability, 

7 but the United States should not enter arms control 

8 agreements that impose unilateral restrictions on the 

9 United States Armed Forces and fail to properly ac10 count for the nuclear arsenals of all near-peer com11 petitors in the international system; and 

12 (2) any New START Treaty extension or suc13 cessor agreement must be a trilateral arrangement 

14 among the United States, the Russian Federation, 

15 and the People’s Republic of China. 

16 SEC. 4. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS. 

17 No funds shall be expended to implement a New 

18 START Treaty extension or any successor agreement un19 less the New START Treaty or such successor agree20 ment— 

21 (1) includes and is signed by the People’s Re22 public of China; and 

23 (2) covers all strategic and non-strategic nu24 clear forces held by the Russian Federation, includ25 ing— 


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1 (A) the RS–28 Sarmat (SS–X–30) inter2 continental ballistic missile system; 

3 (B) the 9M730 Burevestnik (SSC–X–9) 

4 nuclear-powered cruise missile system; 

5 (C) the KH–47M2 Kinzhal air-launched 

6 hypersonic missile system; 

7 (D) the Avangard hypersonic boost-glide 

8 vehicle system; and 

9 (E) the Status-6 (Kanyon) unmanned un10 dersea vehicle. 

Æ 


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