II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1690 

To improve United States missile defense, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 23 (legislative day, MAY 22), 2019 

Mr. SULLIVAN (for himself and Mr. MANCHIN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To improve United States missile defense, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Modernizing America’s 

5 Missile Defense Act of 2019’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EXPANSION OF NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POL7 ICY AND PROGRAM REDESIGNATION. 

8 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that the 2019 Missile 

9 Defense Review— 

10 (1) is fully aligned with the 2017 National Se11 curity Strategy (NSS), the 2018 National Defense 


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1 Strategy (NDS), and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Re2 view (NPR); 

3 (2) establishes a policy framework for United 

4 States missile defense that is responsive to new 

5 threats and exploits new approaches to the defensive 

6 mission; 

7 (3) adopts a balanced and integrated approach 

8 to countering missile threats through a combination 

9 of deterrence, active and passive missile defenses, 

10 and attack operations; 

11 (4) is entitled the ‘‘Missile Defense Review’’ 

12 (MDR) because of the expanding offensive missile 

13 threat includes nonballistic systems, such as ad14 vanced cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons; 

15 (5) states that the United States, allies, and 

16 partners will pursue a comprehensive missile defense 

17 strategy that will deliver integrated and effective ca18 pabilities to counter ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic 

19 missile threats; and 

20 (6) hedges against future unanticipated offen21 sive missile threats and pledges to develop and field 

22 innovative and advanced missile defense capabilities 

23 to counter future threats. 

24 (b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the Sense of the 

25 Senate that— 


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1 (1) the United States must continue to pursue 

2 a comprehensive missile defense strategy that will 

3 deliver integrated and effective capabilities to 

4 counter ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile 

5 threats; 

6 (2) adversaries are quickly expanding the capa7 bilities of their existing missile systems, adding new 

8 and unprecedented types of missile capabilities to 

9 their arsenals, and further integrating offensive mis10 siles into their coercive threats, military exercises, 

11 and war planning; 

12 (3) both Russia and China are rapidly enhanc13 ing their existing offensive missile systems and de14 veloping advanced sea-, ground-, and air-launched 

15 cruise missiles as well as hypersonic capabilities; 

16 (4) due to the proliferation of offensive ballistic 

17 and cruise missiles and the emergence of game18 changing hypersonic weapons technologies, all of 

19 which threaten regional balances, our allies and 

20 partners, United States deployed armed forces, and 

21 the United States homeland, missile defenses become 

22 an even more critical element of United States strat23 egy; and 

24 (5) the United States must outpace adversary 

25 offensive missile capabilities. 


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1 (c) EXPANSION OF POLICY.—Section 1681(a) of the 

2 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 

3 (Public Law 114–328; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) is amended 

4 by striking ‘‘ballistic missile threat’’ and inserting ‘‘bal5 listic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats’’. 

6 (d) REDESIGNATION REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 

7 the date on which the President submits to Congress pur8 suant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the 

9 annual budget request of the President for fiscal year 

10 2021, the Secretary of Defense shall, as the Secretary con11 siders appropriate, redesignate all strategies, policies, pro12 grams, and systems under the jurisdiction of the Secretary 

13 to reflect that missile defense programs of the United 

14 States defend against ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic mis15 siles in all phases of flight. 

16 SEC. 3. ACCELERATION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF PER17 SISTENT SPACE-BASED SENSOR ARCHITEC18 TURE. 

19 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find20 ings: 

21 (1) The Missile Defense Agency currently oper22 ates the Space Tracking and Surveillance System23 Demonstration (STSS–D), a two-satellite constella24 tion for testing purposes, which uses sensors capable 

25 of detecting visible and infrared light and serves as 


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1 an experimental space tracker for the ballistic mis2 sile defense system. 

3 (2) Conceptually developed in 2009, the Preci4 sion Tracking Space System (PTSS) would have 

5 provided the persistent space-based tracking of bal6 listic missiles, including object characterization and 

7 discrimination, and would have also supported home8 land, regional, and theater missile defense. 

9 (3) Projected to enter orbit in 2018, the Missile 

10 Defense Agency and the Applied Physics Laboratory 

11 of Johns Hopkins University is currently conducting 

12 a Space-Based Kill Assessment (SKA) experiment, a 

13 network of small sensors hosted on commercial sat14 ellites, used to collect the energy signature of the im15 pact between a ballistic missile threat and an inter16 ceptor from the ballistic missile defense system. 

17 (4) Section 236 of the National Defense Au18 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (127 Stat. 715; 

19 Public Law 113–66) required the Secretary of De20 fense to conduct an evaluation of options and alter21 natives for future sensor architectures for ballistic 

22 missile defense in order to enhance the ballistic mis23 sile defense capabilities of the United States. 

24 (5) General John Hyten, Commander of the 

25 United States Strategic Command, has argued for 


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1 the ‘‘deployment of a global space-based sensor sys2 tem with discrimination capability’’ as a ‘‘critical 

3 component to improving the effectiveness of our de4 ployed interceptors’’ to ‘‘conduct both the character5 ization of these new threats . . . as well as discrimi6 nate better and earlier the mid-course element of the 

7 threat that exists today’’, and finally to ‘‘target 

8 against . . . hypersonic capabilities [and] other ca9 pabilities in the boost phase.’’. 

10 (6) General O’Shaughnessy, Commander of the 

11 United States Northern Command, stated that— 

12 (A) ‘‘A space-based sensor network will 

13 provide far greater coverage, survivability, and 

14 persistence—all of which are necessary to main15 taining confidence in our ability to deter, de16 tect, and defeat missile threats to the home17 land.’’; 

18 (B) ‘‘We must take prudent steps now to 

19 ensure our next generation defensive capabili20 ties to include a space-based sensing layer [are] 

21 not late to need.’’; and 

22 (C) ‘‘The space-based sensing layer . . . is 

23 of the highest urgency [and] that we gain that 

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1 versaries are actively developing these weapons 

2 as we speak.’’. 

3 (7) General Samuel Greaves, a former Director 

4 of the Missile Defense Agency, has stated that— 

5 (A) space provides the critical vantage 

6 point necessary to address rapidly advancing 

7 threats across multiple regions of interest and 

8 the only vantage point for global persistence to 

9 address warfighter requirements; 

10 (B) a space-based sensor layer consisting 

11 of two separate constellations, one for tracking 

12 and discriminating ballistic missiles and one for 

13 tracking dim ballistic targets and hypersonic 

14 missiles, would enable the United States to use 

15 interceptor inventory more efficiently and effec16 tively to counter a broad array of threats; and 

17 (C) space-based sensors are ‘‘absolutely 

18 critical for the real threat that we see in front 

19 of us, the hypersonic threat’’. 

20 (8) Admiral James Syring, a former Director of 

21 the Missile Defense Agency, has stated, ‘‘From a 

22 missile defense perspective, we have to develop a fu23 ture operational space layer. Given where the threat 

24 is going with hypersonics and more ICBMs and so 


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1 forth this persistent tracking and discrimination ca2 pability from space is a must.’’. 

3 (9) The Department of Defense’s 2019 Missile 

4 Defense Review states that— 

5 (A) the exploitation of space provides a 

6 missile defense posture that is more effective, 

7 resilient, and adaptable to known and unantici8 pated threats; 

9 (B) space-based sensors, for example, can 

10 monitor, detect, and track missile launches 

11 from locations almost anywhere on the globe— 

12 they enjoy a measure of flexibility of movement 

13 that is unimpeded by the constraints that geo14 graphic limitations impose on terrestrial sen15 sors; and 

16 (C) unlike land-based sensors, space sen17 sors do not require basing rights or agreements 

18 with foreign states enabling them to be placed 

19 where necessary to achieve the ideal viewing ge20 ometry for launch detection, missile tracking, 

21 threat discrimination, and intercept detection/ 

22 kill assessment of missile threats to the United 

23 States homeland, our forces abroad, and to our 

24 allies and partners. 


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1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con2 gress that— 

3 (1) the two most recently enacted National De4 fense Authorization Acts have expressed support for 

5 a space-based missile defense sensor program; 

6 (2) the Secretary of Defense should rapidly de7 velop and deploy a persistent, space-based sensor ar8 chitecture to ensure missile defenses of the United 

9 States are more effective against ballistic missile 

10 threats and more responsive to emergent threats 

11 from hypersonic and cruise missiles; 

12 (3) the responsibility for developing and deploy13 ing a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor 

14 should remain within the Director of the Missile De15 fense Agency; and 

16 (4) the Director of the Missile Defense Agency 

17 should deploy a hypersonic and ballistic tracking 

18 space sensor constellation as soon as technically fea19 sible. 

20 (c) ASSIGNMENT OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR

21 DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE HYPERSONIC

22 AND BALLISTIC TRACKING SPACE SENSOR.—Not later 

23 than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

24 the Secretary shall— 


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1 (1) assign the Director of the Missile Defense 

2 Agency with the principal responsibility for the de3 velopment and deployment of a hypersonic and bal4 listic tracking space sensor; and 

5 (2) submit to the congressional defense commit6 tees certification of such assignment. 

7 (d) CERTIFICATION REGARDING FUNDING OF

8 HYPERSONIC AND BALLISTIC TRACKING SPACE SENSOR

9 PROGRAM.—At the same time that the President submits 

10 to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United 

11 States Code, the annual budget request of the President 

12 for fiscal year 2021, the Under Secretary of Defense 

13 Comptroller and the Director for Cost Assessment and 

14 Program Evaluation shall jointly certify to the congres15 sional defense committees whether the hypersonic and bal16 listic tracking space sensor program is sufficiently funded 

17 in the Future-Years Defense Program for the Missile De18 fense Agency. 

19 (e) DEPLOYMENT DEADLINE.—Section 1683(a) of 

20 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

21 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) is 

22 amended— 

23 (1) by striking ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—’’ and in24 serting the following: 


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1 ‘‘(a) DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND DEPLOY2 MENT.— 

3 ‘‘(1) DEVELOPMENT.—’’; and 

4 (2) by adding at the end the following new 

5 paragraphs: 

6 ‘‘(2) TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT.—The Direc7 tor shall begin on-orbit testing of a hypersonic and 

8 ballistic tracking space sensor no later than Decem9 ber 31, 2021, with full operational deployment as 

10 soon as technically feasible thereafter. 

11 ‘‘(3) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Defense may 

12 waive the deadline for testing specified in paragraph 

13 (2) if the Secretary submits to the congressional de14 fense committees a report containing— 

15 ‘‘(A) the explanation why the Secretary 

16 cannot meet such deadline; 

17 ‘‘(B) the technical risks and estimated cost 

18 of accelerating the program to attempt to meet 

19 such deadline; 

20 ‘‘(C) an assessment of threat systems that 

21 could not be detected or tracked persistently 

22 due to waiving such deadline; and 

23 ‘‘(D) a plan, including a timeline, for be24 ginning the required testing.’’. 

25 (f) REPORT ON PROGRESS.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

3 of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 

4 committees a report on the progress of all efforts 

5 being made by the Missile Defense Agency, the De6 fense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Air 

7 Force, and the Space Development Agency relating 

8 to space-based sensing and tracking capabilities for 

9 missile defense and how each of such organizations 

10 will work together to avoid duplication of efforts. 

11 (2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 

12 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 

13 include a classified annex. 

14 SEC. 4. NONSTANDARD ACQUISITION PROCESSES OF MIS15 SILE DEFENSE AGENCY. 

16 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find17 ings: 

18 (1) In 2002, four years prior to North Korea’s 

19 Taepodong-2 ICBM/SLV test in 2006, the Depart20 ment of Defense directed the Missile Defense Agency 

21 to utilize flexible acquisition approaches to quickly 

22 develop missile defense capabilities, which led to the 

23 fielding of an initial operational homeland missile 

24 defense system by the fall of 2004. 


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1 (2) The Department of Defense’s 2018 Na2 tional Defense Strategy states that the Department 

3 of Defense must ‘‘[d]eliver performance at the speed 

4 of relevance [and to] prioritize speed of delivery, 

5 continuous adaptation, and frequent modular up6 grades.’’. 

7 (3) The Department of Defense’s 2019 Missile 

8 Defense Review states that— 

9 (A) the Department must adopt processes 

10 and cultures that enable the Missile Defense 

11 Agency and the military departments to deliver 

12 missile defense capabilities faster, learn from 

13 failure and rapidly adjust, and swiftly adapt 

14 systems once fielded; 

15 (B) the Department cannot meet this goal 

16 by returning the Missile Defense Agency to the 

17 standard acquisition and requirements genera18 tion processes; and 

19 (C) the Department must instead continue 

20 to streamline and refine acquisition processes 

21 and ensure flexibility in the development, test22 ing, and fielding of missile defenses. 

23 (4) General Greaves, the former Director of the 

24 Missile Defense Agency, stated that— 


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1 (A) the Missile Defense Agency under2 stands the importance of innovating, devel3 oping, and delivering new missile defense capa4 bilities quickly, accelerating where possible mis5 sile defense acquisition timelines while adhering 

6 to sound acquisition principles; and 

7 (B) United States missile defenses must be 

8 responsive to existing and new threats and le9 verage new approaches to the homeland and re10 gional defensive missions by delivering capabili11 ties faster, learning from failures to make rapid 

12 adjustments, and swiftly adapting our systems 

13 once they are fielded. 

14 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense Congress 

15 that— 

16 (1) in order for the Department of Defense to 

17 provide more lethal capabilities at the speed of rel18 evance, the Department needs to ensure its acquisi19 tion processes continue to fulfill the needs of mem20 bers of the Armed Forces now and in the future; 

21 (2) significant defense acquisition reforms en22 acted over the past three National Defense Author23 ization Acts have improved access to nontraditional 

24 and commercial innovation and to expanded flexible 

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1 native acquisition pathways to acquire critical na2 tional security capabilities; 

3 (3) the Department appropriately recognized 

4 the Missile Defense Agency for its acquisition suc5 cess by presenting it with the 2018 David Packard 

6 Excellence in Acquisition Award for the development 

7 of the Space-Based Kill Assessment (SKA) program 

8 and the Missile Defense Agency should be com9 mended for its numerous and rapid acquisition suc10 cesses; 

11 (4) the recently completed Missile Defense Re12 view explicitly highlights, in stark terms, the threat 

13 posed to the United States by ballistic and 

14 hypersonic missile threats; and 

15 (5) the Missile Defense Agency should maintain 

16 its nonstandard acquisition authorities in order to 

17 continue to rapidly design, test, and deliver critically 

18 needed defensive capabilities to the warfighter. 

19 (c) CHANGES TO NONSTANDARD ACQUISITION PROC20 ESSES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.— 

21 (1) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized 

22 to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or 

23 expended to change the nonstandard acquisition 

24 processes and responsibilities described in paragraph 

25 (2) until the Secretary— 


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1 (A) has consulted with the Under Sec2 retary of Defense for Engineering and Policy, 

3 the secretaries of the military departments, the 

4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

5 Commander of United States Strategic Com6 mand (USSTRATCOM), the Commander of 

7 United States Northern Command (US8 NORTHCOM), and the Director of the Missile 

9 Defense Agency; 

10 (B) certifies to the congressional defense 

11 committees that the Secretary has coordinated 

12 the changes with and received the views of the 

13 individuals referred to in subparagraph (A); 

14 (C) submits to the congressional defense 

15 committees a report describing the changes, the 

16 rationale for the changes, and the views of the 

17 individuals referred to in subparagraph (A) 

18 with respect to such changes; and 

19 (D) a period of 270 days has elapsed since 

20 submittal of the report under subparagraph 

21 (C). 

22 (2) NONSTANDARD ACQUISITION PROCESSES

23 AND RESPONSIBILITIES DESCRIBED.—The non24 standard acquisition processes and responsibilities 


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1 described in this paragraph are such processes and 

2 responsibilities described in— 

3 (A) the memorandum of the Secretary of 

4 Defense titled ‘‘Missile Defense Program Direc5 tion’’ signed on January 2, 2002; and 

6 (B) Department of Defense Directive 

7 5134.09, as in effect on the date of the enact8 ment of this Act. 

9 SEC. 5. PLAN FOR THE REDESIGNED KILL VEHICLE. 

10 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con11 gress that— 

12 (1) the ground-based midcourse defense system 

13 is the only system capable of defending the United 

14 States from long-range ballistic missile threats and 

15 is critical to our national security; 

16 (2) the redesigned kill vehicle for the ground17 based interceptor is a top priority for the Missile 

18 Defense Agency and a critical element to increasing 

19 system reliability to build warfighter confidence; 

20 (3) the Missile Defense Agency must continue 

21 to leverage mature technologies from proven fielded 

22 components in a modular design to reduce the num23 ber of production processes and improve reliability, 

24 producibility, and maintainability of the redesigned 

25 kill vehicle; 


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1 (4) the consensus among senior Department of 

2 Defense experts on missile defense, including Gen3 eral Terrance O’Shaughnessy, Commander of the 

4 United States Northern Command, and Lieutenant 

5 General Greaves, the Director the Missile Defense 

6 Agency, is that the redesigned kill vehicle will make 

7 homeland defenses much more robust and will im8 prove our ability to defend the homeland of the 

9 United States; 

10 (5) the Redesigned Kill Vehicle Program is vital 

11 to providing the warfighter with a more reliable and 

12 effective capability to defend the homeland from 

13 long-rage ballistic missile threats; and 

14 (6) the Missile Defense Agency should be com15 mended for its rigorous and disciplined acquisition 

16 and engineering processes it has applied to the Re17 designed Kill Vehicle Program. 

18 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—The Director of the Missile 

19 Defense Agency shall submit to the congressional defense 

20 committees a report on the delay in the Redesigned Kill 

21 Vehicle Program. 

22 (c) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection 

23 (b) shall include the following: 

24 (1) A description of the reason for the delay. 


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1 (2) An overview of the revised program sched2 ule including a revised test plan and revised acquisi3 tion strategy. 

4 (3) A detailed description of any recommenda5 tions that could be utilized to accelerate the sched6 uled fielding including modifications to the acquisi7 tion strategy or the procurement and assembly of 

8 long-lead materials unaffected by the reason for the 

9 delay. 

10 (4) A timeline associated with such rec11 ommendations. 

12 (5) Additional funding required to carry out 

13 such recommendations. 

14 (6) An assessment of risk associated with such 

15 recommendations. 

16 (7) A description of any recommendations that 

17 were submitted to the Director by contractors that 

18 the Director considers reasonable but were not 

19 adopted. 

20 (8) An explanation as to why the recommenda21 tions described in paragraph (7) were not adopted. 

22 (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 

23 subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 

24 may contain a classified annex. 


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1 SEC. 6. REPORT ON IMPROVING GROUND-BASED MID2 COURSE DEFENSE ELEMENT OF BALLISTIC 

3 MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM. 

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find5 ings: 

6 (1) A report from Johns Hopkins University, 

7 published in 2015, and entitled ‘‘North Korea’s Nu8 clear Futures: Technology and Strategy’’, concluded 

9 that, by 2020, North Korea could have as many as 

10 100 nuclear weapons. 

11 (2) Currently, the United States will have 44 

12 operational ground-based interceptors distributed be13 tween Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air 

14 Force Base, California. 

15 (3) Section 1686 of the National Defense Au16 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 

17 115–91; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) authorizes up 28 ad18 ditional ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and be19 gins the deployment of 20 additional ground-based 

20 interceptors to Fort Greely. 

21 (4) In September 2017, Congress approved a 

22 Department of Defense reprogramming of fiscal year 

23 2017 funding of more than $400,000,000 to counter 

24 the North Korean missile threat. 

25 (5) In November 2017, the President submitted 

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1 quest, which Congress subsequently approved, for 

2 $4,000,000,000 for missile defeat and defense, in3 cluding funding to begin the construction of a new 

4 missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska, and additional 

5 procurement funding necessary for 20 new ground6 based interceptors. 

7 (6) The 2000 Final Environmental Impact 

8 Statement for Fort Greely included the authoriza9 tion for up to 100 ground-based interceptors to en10 sure that growth would not incur any unexpected en11 vironmental delays. 

12 (7) The current maximum potential capacity for 

13 ground-based interceptors is 104, with up to 100 at 

14 Fort Greely, and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base. 

15 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days 

16 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 

17 of the Missile Defense Agency shall submit to the congres18 sional defense committees a report on— 

19 (1) the options to increase the capability, capac20 ity, and reliability of the ground-based midcourse de21 fense element of the United States ballistic missile 

22 defense system; and 

23 (2) the infrastructure requirements for increas24 ing the number of ground-based interceptors as part 

25 of such element. 


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1 (c) CONTENTS.—The report required by subsection 

2 (b) shall include the following: 

3 (1) An assessment of the requirements of the 

4 ground-based midcourse defense element of the 

5 United States ballistic missile defense system to 

6 meet threats outlined in the 2018 National Defense 

7 Strategy and the 2019 Missile Defense Review. 

8 (2) An assessment of the feasibility of fielding 

9 up to 104 ground-based interceptors as part of such 

10 element, including a description of the additional in11 frastructure and components needed to further out12 fit missile fields at Fort Greely, Alaska. 

13 (3) A cost estimate of such infrastructure and 

14 components. 

15 (4) An estimated schedule for completing such 

16 construction as may be required for such infrastruc17 ture and components. 

18 (5) An identification of any environmental as19 sessments or impact studies that would need to be 

20 conducted to expand missile fields at Fort Greely be21 yond current capacity. 

22 (6) A determination of the appropriate fleet mix 

23 of ground-based interceptor kill vehicles and boosters 

24 to maximize overall system effectiveness and in25 crease its capacity and capability, including the costs 


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1 and benefits of continued inclusion of capability en2 hancement II block 1 interceptors after the fielding 

3 of the redesigned kill vehicle. 

4 (7) The modernization requirements for the 

5 ground-based midcourse system, including all com6 mand and control, ground systems, sensors and sen7 sor interfaces, boosters and kill vehicles, and inte8 gration of known future systems and components. 

9 (8) A discussion of the obsolescence of such sys10 tems and components. 

11 (9) The industrial base requirements relating to 

12 the ground-based midcourse system, as determined 

13 by the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. 

14 (10) Such other matters as the Director con15 siders appropriate. 

16 (d) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection 

17 (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in18 clude a classified annex. 

19 SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RECENT MISSILE DE20 FENSE AGENCY TESTS. 

21 It is the sense of Congress that the Office of the 

22 Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineer23 ing, the Missile Defense Agency, the Office of the Director 

24 for Operational Test and Evaluation, the operational test 


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1 agencies, the military departments, and warfighters 

2 should— 

3 (1) be strongly commended for a highly success4 ful 2018 flight test campaign, which consisted of 13 

5 total flight test events including— 

6 (A) FTX–35, which successfully proved 

7 interoperability between Terminal High Altitude 

8 Area Defense (THAAD) and the Phased Array 

9 Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PA10 TRIOT) to detect and track a simulated en11 gagement with a short-range ballistic missile; 

12 (B) Pacific Dragon 2018, which success13 fully demonstrated joint ballistic missile defense 

14 interoperability with Japan and Korea to en15 gage a short-range ballistic missile with a 

16 Standard Missile 3 (SM–3) Block IB by a Jap17 anese ship and an Aegis Ashore site; 

18 (C) JFTM–5, which successfully dem19 onstrated the intercept of a short-range ballistic 

20 missile with a Standard Missile 3 Block IB 

21 threat upgrade from a Japanese ship; 

22 (D) FTM–45, which successfully dem23 onstrated the intercept of a medium-range bal24 listic missile with a Standard Missile 3 Block 

25 IIA from a United States ship; and 


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1 (E) FTI–03, which as a part of the oper2 ational test of the European Phased Adaptive 

3 Approach (EPAA) Phase 3 architecture, suc4 cessfully demonstrated the intercept of an inter5 mediate-range ballistic missile using the Aegis 

6 Weapon System’s Engage-on-Remote capability; 

7 (2) be especially recognized for the success of 

8 FTG–11, the first salvo test of the United States 

9 Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, during 

10 which two ground-based interceptors were launched 

11 nearly simultaneously from the same location and 

12 successfully intercepted a threat-representative inter13 continental ballistic missile target, and then the next 

14 most lethal object; 

15 (3) continue to pursue an increasingly rigorous 

16 testing regime for all elements of the Ballistic Mis17 sile Defense System, in coordination with the Office 

18 of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, to 

19 more rapidly deliver capabilities to the warfighter as 

20 the threat evolves; 

21 (4) not consider tests which do not achieve an 

22 intercept or the main objective as failures; and 

23 (5) recognize, in an effort to deliver capabilities 

24 at the speed of relevance, the learning value of indi25 vidual advancements made by all test events, rather 


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1 than viewing any total outcome as an indication of 

2 the reliability of entire missile defense systems. 

3 SEC. 8. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MISSILE DEFENSE TECH4 NOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES. 

5 It is the sense of Congress that— 

6 (1) the 2019 Missile Defense Review articulates 

7 a comprehensive approach to preventing and defeat8 ing the rapidly expanding offensive missile threat 

9 through a combination of deterrence, active and pas10 sive missile defense, and attack operations; 

11 (2) to counter the expanding offense missile ca12 pabilities of potential adversaries and hedge against 

13 unanticipated missile threats, the Secretary of De14 fense should aggressively pursue new missile defense 

15 capabilities and examine concepts and technologies 

16 for advanced missile defense systems; 

17 (3) the Secretary should fully implement the 

18 2019 Missile Defense Review’s focus on increasing 

19 investments in and deploying new technologies and 

20 concepts, including— 

21 (A) the redesigned kill vehicle; 

22 (B) a hypersonic and ballistic tracking 

23 space sensor; 

24 (C) hypersonic glide vehicle defense; 


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27 

•S 1690 IS

1 (D) directed energy for missile defense to 

2 include laser scaling; 

3 (E) the multi-object kill vehicle; 

4 (F) a space-based missile intercept layer; 

5 (G) improved Standard Missile 3 (SM–3) 

6 ballistic missile interceptors; 

7 (H) F–35 sensor suite missile defense inte8 gration; 

9 (I) neutral particle beam; and 

10 (J) missile defense capabilities from Mis11 sile Defense Agency-configured airborne plat12 forms, including the discrimination sensor dem13 onstrator; and 

14 (4) the Secretary should work to ensure that all 

15 missile defense systems are more survivable, includ16 ing through— 

17 (A) more distributed air and missile de18 fense operations; and 

19 (B) improved camouflage, concealment, 

20 and deception, including emission control. 

Æ 


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