[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 

re Application of E. Ohio Gas Co., Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3073.] 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-3073 

IN RE APPLICATION OF EAST OHIO GAS COMPANY, D.B.A. DOMINION EAST 

OHIO, FOR APPROVAL OF TARIFFS TO ADJUST ITS AUTOMATED-METERREADING COST-RECOVERY CHARGE TO RECOVER COSTS INCURRED IN 2011;

EAST OHIO GAS COMPANY, D.B.A. DOMINION EAST OHIO, APPELLANT;

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, APPELLEE. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, 

it may be cited as In re Application of E. Ohio Gas Co., 

Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3073.] 

Public utilities—Recovery of costs associated with automated-meter-reading 

program—Commission’s decision to reduce recovery of costs was 

unreasonable—Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

(No. 2012-2117—Submitted May 14, 2014—Decided July 16, 2014.) 

APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, No. 11-5843-GA-RDR. 

____________________ 

PFEIFER, J. 

{¶ 1} The East Ohio Gas Company, d.b.a. Dominion East Ohio 

(“Dominion” or “DEO”), appeals an order of the Public Utilities Commission 
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2 

reducing Dominion’s proposed customer charge to recover costs associated with 

Dominion’s automated-meter-reading (“AMR”) program. The commission 

reduced Dominion’s proposed AMR charge—from $0.54 per customer per month 

to $0.42 per customer per month—ostensibly because Dominion had failed to 

timely implement the AMR program. The reduction, according to Dominion, 

prevents Dominion from recovering from customers approximately $1.6 million 

in costs associated with the program. 

{¶ 2} On appeal, Dominion argues that the commission’s order should be 

reversed because (1) the order is not supported by evidence in the record, (2) the 

order is unreasonable, (3) the commission lacks statutory and constitutional 

authority to issue retroactive orders that alter the significance of a utility’s 

previous conduct, and (4) the order is barred by collateral estoppel. Dominion 

also argues that the commission erred by denying Dominion’s motion for a stay of 

its order pending appeal.

{¶ 3} For the reasons explained more fully below, we agree that the 

commission’s order is substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, we reverse the 

commission’s order and remand this case for further proceedings, consistent with 

this opinion. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Dominion’s application to recover AMR program costs 

{¶ 4} On December 7, 2006, the commission’s minimum gas-service 

standards took effect, which required natural-gas companies to, among other 

things, make reasonable attempts to obtain actual readings of customers’ meters 

every other month. See Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-13-04(G)(1). Readings taken by 

AMR equipment qualified as “actual” readings, but readings taken by remotemeter-index equipment—the equipment then utilized by Dominion—did not 

qualify as “actual” readings. Id. Consequently, in December 2006, Dominion 
January Term, 2014 

3 

filed an application to recover costs associated with implementing an AMRinstallation program. 

{¶ 5} By installing AMR devices—small electronic modules—on 

customers’ existing gas meters, Dominion employees could then drive through 

neighborhoods collecting actual gas-meter readings through mobile data 

collectors installed in the employees’ vehicles. Before the installation of AMR 

devices, Dominion meter readers walked routes and had to access the inside of 

some of Dominion’s customers’ premises in order to obtain an actual gas-meter 

reading. Thus, AMR technology offered accurate gas-meter readings without the 

inconvenience of a meter reader accessing the inside of a customer’s property. 

{¶ 6} In its AMR application, Dominion estimated that installing AMR 

devices on all of its meters would cost between $100 million and $110 million 

and would take as long as 15 to 20 years to complete if it were paid for through its 

normal budgeting process. To speed up the installation, Dominion applied for an 

automatic adjustment mechanism under R.C. 4929.11, which would allow 

Dominion to install AMR equipment on all of its meters over a five-year period 

by funding an accelerated installation program through an AMR-cost-recovery 

charge, or “AMR charge,” to each customer per month. Dominion proposed a 

process whereby it would file an application in February of each year seeking the 

commission’s approval for its proposed yearly AMR charge, which was to be 

based on the costs accumulated in the prior year for implementing the AMR 

program. 

{¶ 7} The AMR charge was also meant to reflect the savings achieved as 

a result of using AMR devices. Because implementation of AMR equipment 

would reduce some of Dominion’s operations and maintenance expenses—

especially meter-reading and call-center costs—Dominion proposed to reduce the 

AMR charge by the amount of savings generated by the program. For example, 

after installation of AMR devices, Dominion could begin reducing its meter-
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4 

reader labor force because fewer meter readers would be necessary. The savings 

generated by the AMR program would be passed on to customers as a credit to 

the AMR charge.

B. Ambiguity regarding the initial commencement date 

of the AMR program 

{¶ 8} Dominion’s AMR application was consolidated with a then 

pending rate case, and the commission did not ultimately approve the application 

until October 2008. The commission’s order approving Dominion’s application 

failed to specify expected commencement or completion dates for the program. 

Dominion has maintained that the program did not have a firm start date, but that 

it began, at the earliest, in January 2008, the date specified in its application. In 

contrast, the commission’s staff has maintained that Dominion’s AMR program 

began in January 2007. As support, the staff points to the facts that Dominion 

actually began installing AMR devices in 2007 and that Dominion filed a related 

application in a separate proceeding suggesting that its AMR program began in 

2007. Thus, throughout this litigation, Dominion and the commission’s staff have 

disagreed over when Dominion’s five-year AMR program officially began and, 

therefore, when the five-year program should have been completed. 

C. The 2009 AMR order

{¶ 9} Once its plan was approved, Dominion was required to submit an 

application to the commission in February of each year justifying its yearly AMR 

charge based on the prior year’s accumulated AMR expenses. In the first three 

AMR cases—determining charges based on costs incurred in 2008, 2009, and 

2010, respectively—Dominion and the commission’s staff ultimately agreed on 

the appropriate AMR charges. This appeal has resulted from Dominion’s 

application to recover costs incurred in 2011, in which the commission’s staff and 

Dominion could not agree on the AMR-charge rate. The merits of this appeal, 

however, turn on the meaning of an order that the commission issued in the 
January Term, 2014 

5 

proceeding to recover the 2009 costs. For ease of reference, we refer to the order 

from the earlier proceeding as the “2009 AMR order,” despite the fact that the 

proceeding occurred in 2010, because it determined the AMR charge to recover 

2009 costs. 

{¶ 10} In the proceeding to recover the 2009 costs, the commission’s staff 

and Dominion agreed that the utility could charge $0.47 per customer per month 

to recover 2009 expenses. The Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (“OCC”), however, 

objected to the agreed rate. After a hearing, the commission issued an opinion 

and order rejecting the OCC’s arguments. But in its order, the commission also 

set forth the following instructions to Dominion regarding the timing of its AMR 

program: 

While the evidence in this case supports DEO’s calculation, the 

Commission finds that DEO should be installing the AMR devices 

such that savings will be maximized and rerouting will be made 

possible in all of the communities at the earliest possible time. 

Therefore, the Commission expects that DEO’s filing in 2011, for 

recovery of 2010 costs, will reflect a substantially greater number 

of communities rerouted. The Commission anticipates that, by the 

end of 2011, it will be possible to reroute nearly all of DEO’s 

communities. To that end, the Commission finds that, in its 2011 

filing, DEO should demonstrate how it will achieve the installation 

of the devices on the remainder of its meters by the end of 2011, 

while deploying the devices in a manner that will maximize 

savings by allowing rerouting at the earliest possible time. 

 

2009 AMR order at 7, Pub. Util. Comm. No. 09-1875-GA-RDR (May 5, 2010). 
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6 

{¶ 11} Consistent with the 2009 AMR order, Dominion, in its next 

application—to recover AMR costs incurred in 2010—submitted a plan indicating 

how it would install AMR devices on the remainder of its meters by the end of 

2011. Dominion’s plan also indicated that it would initiate rerouting in five 

service areas in 2011 and initiate rerouting in its final two service areas in 2012. 

Dominion and the commission’s staff agreed that the appropriate rate to recover 

the 2010 costs should be $0.57 per customer per month, and the commission set 

the charge at the agreed rate. 

D. Terms of art: “installing” and “rerouting” 

{¶ 12} “Installing” AMR devices and “rerouting” service areas are 

important concepts for this appeal, although neither party specifically defines the 

terms. “Installing” appears to mean accessing the customer’s home or business to 

install the AMR device on the gas meter. The commission refers to “rerouting” as 

converting walking meter-reader routes into drive-by routes. Dominion disputes 

that “rerouting” is simply converting walking routes to driving routes and instead 

asserts that rerouting is “essentially a final fine-tuning of the meter-reading 

routes,” which includes converting billing cycles and changing other internal 

processes. The parties agree, however, that “rerouting” a service area occurs after

installation is mostly complete and that the rerouting process takes from one to 

three months. 

E. The present case: the 2011 AMR-charge proceeding 

{¶ 13} In February 2012, Dominion filed its application to recover AMR 

costs incurred for 2011, requesting that its AMR charge be adjusted from $0.57 to 

$0.54. Dominion also reported that it had not completed installation of all AMR 

devices in 2011; it had 9,530 devices yet to install. As for rerouting, Dominion 

reported that it had rerouted eight of its eleven service areas by the end of 2011 

and that it planned to reroute the remaining three areas in the first and second 

quarters of 2012. Unlike the previous three AMR-charge proceedings, Dominion 
January Term, 2014 

7 

and the commission’s staff could not reach agreement on the appropriate yearly 

AMR charge, and the matter proceeded to a hearing. 

1. The staff’s argument: Dominion violated the 2009 AMR order 

{¶ 14} At the hearing, the staff argued that Dominion had missed its 

deadline to complete the AMR program by the end of 2011 and therefore violated 

the commission’s 2009 AMR order. As a result, the staff recommended reducing 

Dominion’s AMR charge to $0.42, the rate that the staff found Dominion could 

have charged if it had fully complied with the 2009 AMR order. 

{¶ 15} To support its theory, the staff pointed primarily to the fact that 

Dominion’s pace of AMR installations after 2009 had progressively slowed, 

which demonstrated that Dominion did not modify its installation practices in 

order to maximize savings at the earliest possible time, as directed by the 

commission in the 2009 AMR order. Specifically, the staff argued that if 

Dominion had continued its 2009 installation pace in years 2010 and 2011, it 

would have completed installation of all AMR devices in early August 2011. 

Assuming that Dominion would have needed two additional months to reroute its 

service areas, the commission’s staff estimated that Dominion could have 

completed the rerouting process by the beginning of October 2011. And if 

Dominion had completed the rerouting process by that time, the staff argued that 

Dominion would have been able to report much more savings in 2011. 

{¶ 16} To calculate the amount of those savings, the staff first concluded 

that if Dominion had completed its AMR program in October, it would have been 

able to immediately terminate 87 meter readers, which would have resulted in a 

monthly labor savings of $542,759. The commission’s staff then multiplied that 

figure by three—for the months of October, November, and December—and 

determined that Dominion should have had an additional savings of $1,628,277 

by the end of 2011. This additional $1,628,277 in savings would have reduced 

Dominion’s 2011 AMR charge from $0.54 to $0.42. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8 

{¶ 17} In sum, the staff argued that if Dominion had complied with the 

2009 AMR order, it would have completed the AMR program by October 2011, 

which would have resulted in more savings by the end of 2011 and therefore a 

lower AMR charge. 

2. Dominion’s argument: it did not violate the 2009 AMR order 

{¶ 18} Dominion argued that it had fully complied with the 2009 AMR 

order and that the staff had misconstrued the text and meaning of that order. 

According to Dominion, the 2009 AMR order did not expressly require it to 

complete installation and rerouting by the end of 2011—and certainly not by 

August or October of 2011, as determined by the staff. Dominion asserted that 

the staff’s attempt to move the target completion date at such a late stage would 

be unfairly retroactive.

{¶ 19} Dominion also heavily criticized the staff’s calculations for its 

proposed additional savings. Dominion claimed that it did not slow down its 

installation pace after 2009 but instead installed AMR devices as fast as it could. 

Dominion presented evidence attempting to show that the only remaining 

customers without AMR devices at the end of 2011 were either customers who 

had refused to allow Dominion access to their premises or large commercial 

customers who required special appointments to prevent business disruption. 

Further, Dominion argued that the staff’s calculation did not take into account the 

increased costs of completing AMR installations at a faster pace. 

3. The commission agreed with its staff 

{¶ 20} In its October 3, 2012 opinion and order, Pub. Util. Comm. No. 11-

5843-GA-RDR, 2012 Ohio PUC LEXIS 801 (Oct. 3, 2012) (the “underlying 

order”), the commission adopted the staff’s recommended reduction in 

Dominion’s AMR charge. Specifically, the commission found that Dominion’s 

program term ended on December 31, 2011, and that the 2009 AMR order 

“directed DEO to deploy the [AMR] devices in a manner that would maximize 
January Term, 2014 

9 

* * * savings by allowing rerouting at the earliest possible time.” Id. at 17-18. 

The commission further interpreted its 2009 AMR order as setting forth the 

“expectation that DEO would reroute nearly all of its communities by the end of 

2011.” Id. at 18. And because Dominion failed to reroute three service areas by 

the end of the year, Dominion did not comply with the mandates and directives in 

the 2009 AMR order. Finally, the commission determined that its staff’s 

calculation was reasonable and quantifiable because it was based on “the actual 

number of meter readers and the reduction in the number of meter readers once 

the program is fully deployed, which was to be by the end of 2011.” Id. 

{¶ 21} Dominion filed a motion to stay the commission’s order pending 

appeal and an application for rehearing. In a December 12, 2012 entry, the 

commission denied both requests. Dominion timely appealed to this court and 

filed a motion to stay the commission’s order. On March 13, 2013, this court 

granted the stay and ordered that the rate in effect prior to the commission’s 

underlying order—$0.57 per customer per month—remain the interim rate 

pending resolution of this appeal. 

II. Law and Analysis

A. Proposition of law Nos. 1 and 2 

{¶ 22} Dominion’s proposition of law Nos. 1 and 2 are similar. In both 

propositions, Dominion finds fault with the commission’s underlying order. 

Because the arguments overlap, we interpret proposition of law No. 1 as setting 

forth an evidentiary argument and proposition of law No. 2 as setting forth a 

reasonableness argument. 

{¶ 23} In proposition of law No. 1, Dominion asserts that the 

commission’s order lacks record support because the commission “took a path 

recommended by no one.” We disagree. Although the order is confusing—as 

explained more fully below—the commission clearly intended to adopt its staff’s 

recommendation. The commission’s order reviews in detail how its staff 
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10 

calculated its proposed reduction to Dominion’s AMR charge, and the 

commission then expressly “adopt[ed] Staff’s recommendation.” The underlying 

order, Pub. Util. Comm. No. 11-5843-GA-RDR, 2012 Ohio PUC LEXIS 801, at 

18. Thus, we cannot conclude that the commission took a path recommended by 

none of the parties in the case. 

{¶ 24} However, we agree with Dominion that the path the commission 

ultimately took was unreasonable. R.C. 4903.13 provides that “[a] final order 

made by the public utilities commission shall be reversed, vacated, or modified by 

the supreme court on appeal, if, upon consideration of the record, such court is of 

the opinion that such order was unlawful or unreasonable.” In proposition of law 

No. 2, Dominion argues that the commission held Dominion to one standard—

completion of its AMR program by the end of 2011—but then penalized 

Dominion on the basis of a different standard—installation of AMR devices by 

August 2011 and completion of rerouting by October 2011. Dominion is correct. 

Throughout the underlying order, the commission repeats its position that “DEO’s 

AMR program was approved for a five-year period ending December 31, 2011.” 

Id. at 13. But if Dominion’s deadline was the end of 2011, it was irrational and 

arbitrary for the commission to adopt its staff’s recommended AMR charge. The 

staff’s recommendation was based on an assumption that Dominion should have 

installed all AMR devices by August 2011 and completed rerouting by the 

beginning of October 2011—which was three months earlier than the December 

31, 2011 deadline. Thus, even if Dominion violated the commission’s December 

31, 2011 deadline—which it may have, as Dominion had 9,530 devices yet to 

install in 2012—the remedy for that violation was not the staff’s calculation, 

which was based on a different (earlier) deadline. Accordingly, the commission’s 

adoption of its staff’s recommendation was not rationally tied to Dominion’s 

alleged failure to meet the December 31, 2011 deadline. 
January Term, 2014 

11 

{¶ 25} The commission argues, however, that the 2009 AMR order 

directed Dominion to complete the program before the deadline. According to the 

commission, the 2009 AMR order “made it clear that the Commission expected 

Dominion to reroute communities and deliver savings to customers at the ‘earliest 

possible time,’ ” and because Dominion failed to comply with this directive, the 

commission was justified in reducing Dominion’s proposed AMR charge. But 

again, the 2009 AMR order provided only the following: 

[T]he Commission finds that DEO should be installing the AMR 

devices such that savings will be maximized and rerouting will be 

made possible in all of the communities at the earliest possible 

time. Therefore, the Commission expects that DEO’s filing in 

2011, for recovery of 2010 costs, will reflect a substantially greater 

number of communities rerouted. The Commission anticipates 

that, by the end of 2011, it will be possible to reroute nearly all of 

DEO communities. To that end, the Commission finds that, in its 

2011 filing, DEO should demonstrate how it will achieve the 

installation of the devices on the remainder of its meters by the end 

of 2011, while deploying the devices in a manner that will 

maximize savings by allowing rerouting at the earliest possible 

time. 

(Emphasis added.) 2009 AMR order at 7. 

{¶ 26} This dispute centers on the four sentences quoted above. The 

commission focuses on the first sentence, interpreting it as directing Dominion to 

install AMR devices in a manner to maximize savings and ensure rerouting at the 

earliest possible time. But the first sentence cannot be read in isolation and must 

be read in context with the other sentences in the paragraph. 
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12 

{¶ 27} The second sentence begins with “therefore,” which means that it 

was meant to further explain how Dominion was to comply with the first 

sentence. The second sentence, however, merely directed Dominion to ensure 

that its 2010 AMR-charge application “reflect a substantially greater number of 

communities rerouted.” Presumably, Dominion complied with this directive, 

since the commission’s staff and Dominion agreed to an appropriate AMR charge 

in the 2010 AMR proceeding. 

{¶ 28} The third sentence expressed the commission’s anticipation that by 

the end of 2011, it would be possible to reroute nearly all of Dominion’s 

communities. In its merit brief, the commission argues that this sentence “was 

concerned about Dominion actually rerouting communities, not the mere 

possibility of rerouting.” (Emphasis sic.) But that is not what the 2009 AMR 

order says, and the commission cannot substitute the word “actual” for “possible.” 

Compare Cleveland Elec. Illum. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441 

(1988), paragraph three of the syllabus (“In matters of construction, it is the duty 

of this court to give effect to the words used, not to delete words used or to insert 

words not used”). A plain reading of the third sentence indicates that the 

commission anticipated only that it would be possible to reroute nearly all service 

areas by the end of 2011. 

{¶ 29} Finally, the fourth sentence of the paragraph directed Dominion to 

include a plan in the 2010 AMR-charge proceeding explaining how it would 

achieve installation of all AMR devices by the end of 2011, while rerouting at the 

earliest possible time. Dominion has conceded, and we agree, that this sentence 

could reasonably be interpreted as setting forth a target date of December 31, 

2011, for completing installation of all AMR devices. But the sentence cannot be 

read as directing Dominion to complete rerouting by the end of 2011 because 

rerouting necessarily occurs after installation is mostly complete. 
January Term, 2014 

13 

{¶ 30} The 2009 AMR order is so vague that it is difficult to summarize 

what, exactly, it directed Dominion to do—other than to submit additional 

information in Dominion’s next AMR-charge application and aim to complete 

AMR installations by the end of 2011. Nothing in the 2009 AMR order clearly 

put Dominion on notice that it was required to complete its AMR program by the 

end of 2011. And certainly nothing in the 2009 AMR order instructed Dominion 

to maintain its 2009 AMR installation pace in order to complete installation of 

AMR devices by August 2011 and fully reroute all service areas by October 

2011—which is how the staff calculated its recommended AMR charge in this 

case. Ultimately, if the 2009 AMR order were intended to speed up the program’s 

deadline, the commission should have made its instructions clear and explicit. 

Instead, the commission relies on a strained interpretation of the 2009 AMR order 

to justify its staff’s calculation, which was based on a program deadline that 

neither the commission nor its staff had previously set or announced to Dominion. 

Thus, it was substantively unreasonable for the commission to adopt its staff’s 

recommended AMR charge. 

{¶ 31} Finally, the commission argues that we should defer to the 

agency’s interpretation of one of its own prior orders. But no deference is 

necessary when an agency has set forth an interpretation of a prior order that is 

contrary to the order’s express terms. Accordingly, we find Dominion’s second 

proposition of law well taken. 

B. Dominion’s remaining propositions of law 

{¶ 32} In proposition of law No. 3, Dominion asserts that the 

commission’s underlying order effectively revised the installation and rerouting 

requirements set in the 2009 AMR order and that the commission lacked statutory 

and constitutional authority to take this retroactive action. However, we find that 

it is more accurate to conclude that the commission unreasonably interpreted its 

prior order rather than to find that it effectively revised that order. Our holding 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

not only reflects what actually occurred in this case but also avoids the 

constitutional issues regarding retroactivity raised in Dominion’s brief. See, e.g.,

State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481, 2004-Ohio-5586, 817 N.E.2d 

5, ¶ 34, quoting State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool, 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 7, 716 N.E.2d 

1114 (1999) (“ ‘courts decide constitutional issues only when absolutely 

necessary’ ”). Accordingly, because we have already decided that the 

commission’s order was unreasonable, it is not necessary for us to decide this 

issue. 

{¶ 33} In proposition of law No. 4, Dominion claims that the 

commission’s order was barred by collateral estoppel. Specifically, Dominion 

argues that the issues of the target completion date for AMR installation and 

rerouting were decided in the 2009 AMR order, from which no party appealed. 

Therefore, the underlying order’s “revisions” of the 2009 AMR order amounted to 

relitigation of those two issues, which violated the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

Collateral estoppel, however, “applies when the fact or issue * * * was actually 

and directly litigated in the prior action.” Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 

183, 637 N.E.2d 917 (1994). Because we do not interpret the 2009 AMR order as 

setting forth clear program deadlines, we cannot conclude that those issues were 

“actually and directly litigated” in the 2009 AMR proceeding. When an issue is 

not actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding, collateral estoppel 

cannot apply. Id. Accordingly, we reject proposition of law No. 4. 

{¶ 34} Finally, in Dominion’s proposition of law No. 5, Dominion argues 

that the commission erred in denying Dominion’s motion to stay the 

commission’s order pending its appeal. Specifically, Dominion asserts that the 

commission applied the incorrect legal standard in denying its motion, and it 

requests that we “reverse the Commission’s denial of the stay, with instructions to 

apply the proper standard going forward.” Dominion, however, also filed a 

motion for stay in this court, and we granted Dominion’s motion in March 2013. 
January Term, 2014 

15 

Given that the commission’s order has since been stayed, Dominion has failed to 

identify an effective remedy for the commission’s alleged error, other than this 

court’s instructing the commission on the proper legal standard on a “going 

forward” basis. We decline Dominion’s invitation to issue an advisory ruling, and 

because there does not appear to be an effective remedy here, we reject this 

proposition of law. See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 

103 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-5466, 816 N.E.2d 238, ¶ 17 (dismissing appeal 

where “[i]n the absence of the possibility of an effective remedy, [the] appeal 

constitute[d] only a request for an advisory ruling from the court”). 

III. Conclusion

{¶ 35} The commission’s order was unreasonable. The commission’s 

adoption of its staff’s recommended reduction to Dominion’s AMR charge was 

not rationally tied to Dominion’s alleged failure to meet the December 31, 2011 

deadline, because the staff’s calculation was based on Dominion’s failure to meet 

earlier—and previously unknown—deadlines. And contrary to the commission’s 

position, the 2009 AMR order cannot be reasonably interpreted as instructing 

Dominion to complete its AMR program months before the program deadline. 

{¶ 36} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and 

remand this case to the commission for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

Order affirmed in part 

and reversed in part, 

and cause remanded. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and

O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

____________________ 

Whitt Sturtevant, L.L.P., Mark A. Whitt, and Andrew J. Campbell, for 

appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and William L. Wright, Devin D. 

Parram, and Thomas G. Lindgren, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 

Bruce J. Weston and Joseph P. Serio, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, 

Ohio Consumers’ Counsel. 

_________________________