Filed 6/20/22 Gonzalez v. Aluminum Precision Products CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

MAIKEL GONZALEZ,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALUMINUM PRECISION 

PRODUCTS, INC.,

 Defendant and Respondent;

JOHN MALDONADO, JR.,

 Movant and Appellant. 

2d Civil No. B313833

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2020-

00546795-CU-OE-VTA)

(Ventura County)

Appellant John Maldonado, Jr., appeals from two orders

denying him leave to intervene in the Labor Code Private 

Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) action filed by respondent 

Maikel Gonzalez against respondent Aluminum Precision 

Products, Inc. (APP). (Lab. Code,1 § 2698 et seq.) He contends he 

1 Further unspecified references are to the Labor Code. 
2

had a right to intervene in the Gonzalez action and the court 

erred in approving Gonzalez’s settlement without his 

participation in that action. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

APP employed Maldonado and Gonzalez. In July 2020, 

Maldonado submitted a PAGA notice to the Labor and Workforce 

Development Agency (LWDA) pursuant to section 2699.3. He 

alleged three violations: (1) a WARN Act2 violation, (2) failure to 

reimburse expenses arising from the use of personal vehicles, in 

violation of section 2802, and (3) an Industrial Welfare 

Commission wage order No. 1-2001 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, 

§ 11010, subd. 15) violation for excessive heat and work 

conditions violations. In October 2020, Maldonado filed a 

complaint in Orange County Superior Court alleging the same 

three PAGA claims against APP.

In November 2020, Gonzalez submitted a PAGA notice to 

LWDA (§ 2699.3) alleging seven violations, including failure to 

(1) pay minimum, straight time, and overtime wages, (2) provide 

meal periods, (3) permit rest periods, (4) maintain accurate 

records of hours worked and meal periods taken or missed, (5) 

reimburse and indemnify expenses that were used “to purchase 

work-related items . . . which includes uniforms,” in violation of 

section 2802, (6) pay all wages upon termination, and (7) provide 

accurate itemized wage statements.

Also in November, Gonzalez filed a class action complaint

in Ventura County Superior Court, alleging the following 

individual and class claims: (1) failure to pay minimum and 

straight wages, (2) failure to pay overtime wages, (3) failure to 

2 The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. 

(§ 1400 et seq.) 
3

provide meal periods, (4) failure to permit rest breaks, (5) failure 

to indemnify business expenses, (6) failure to pay wages upon 

termination, (7) failure to provide accurate itemized wage 

statements, and (8) unfair business practices.

In March 2021, Gonzalez and APP stipulated to allow 

Gonzalez to amend his complaint to add a ninth cause of action 

for civil penalties pursuant to PAGA; and Gonzalez agreed to

dismiss his individual and class claims. The trial court approved

the stipulation and deemed the First Amended Complaint filed.

Maldonado’s Ex Parte Applications and Attempts to Intervene

In May, Maldonado filed an ex parte application to stay the 

Gonzalez action pending a petition for coordination that he filed 

in the Orange County Superior Court. The trial court denied the 

application because he was not a party to the action and there 

was no “irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other 

statutory basis for granting relief ex parte.” 

Maldonado filed another ex parte application, seeking leave 

to intervene in the Gonzalez action. The trial court denied the 

application.

Six days later, Maldonado filed a regularly noticed motion 

to intervene. In July, the trial court denied the motion, stating 

that it had “already denied this motion on the merits, and moving 

party is seeking the same relief based on the same documents.” 

The court found that the “motion is an improper motion for 

reconsideration which does not comply with Code of Civil 

Procedure, section 1008.”

Settlement of the Gonzalez Action

Meanwhile, in April and in May, Gonzalez filed two 

amended PAGA notices with LWDA and APP. In the amended 

notices, Gonzalez added new claims previously raised in 
4

Maldonado’s complaint, including the WARN Act violation and 

excessive heat and work conditions.

Gonzalez and APP reached a settlement of the PAGA 

action. The proposed settlement included the new claims raised 

in the two amended PAGA notices. Gonzalez moved for approval 

of the proposed settlement with the court and sent a copy to 

LWDA.

LWDA sent a notice to Gonzalez and APP, informing them 

that it was investigating the new claims in Gonzalez’s amended 

PAGA notices and that the court could not approve the 

settlement of any PAGA claims subject to investigation. LWDA 

instructed Gonzalez and APP to limit their settlement to the 

claims originally noticed in Gonzalez’s November 2020 PAGA 

notice to LWDA. The parties amended the proposed settlement 

to conform to these instructions. Gonzalez sent the amended 

settlement agreement to LWDA.3

The trial court granted Gonzalez’s motion to approve the 

PAGA settlement. The settlement identified “aggrieved 

employees” as “all persons currently or formerly employed by 

[APP] in California during the designated PAGA Period [July 28, 

2019 through July 14, 2021 (date of settlement approval)].” It 

was estimated that there were 700 aggrieved employees. Under 

the settlement, APP agreed to pay a maximum of $300,000 for 

the “PAGA Penalties” with at least $177,050.42 available for 

3 Maldonado admitted that settlement of the claims 

originally raised in the November 2020 PAGA notice would be 

appropriate. At the May 27 ex parte hearing, Maldonado’s 

counsel stated that: “[Maldonado is] happy for the $350,000 [that 

Gonzalez] want[s] to take to apply to their claims to go back to 

November, but only for the claims that they have authority to 

settle.”
5

distribution to the aggrieved employees and the LWDA. In 

exchange, APP “shall be entitled to a limited release from the 

LWDA and each and every Aggrieved Employee, including 

[Gonzalez].”

 The court found “that the terms of the proposed settlement 

are reasonable” and were “the product of informed, non-collusive 

negotiations conducted at arms’ length by the Parties.” The court 

considered APP’s “potential liability, the benefit to the State of 

California, allocation of settlement proceeds among Aggrieved 

Employees, and the fact that a settlement represents a 

compromise of the Parties’ respective positions rather than the 

result of a finding of liability at trial.” The court dismissed the 

underlying action with prejudice and entered “judgment following 

entry of order granting plaintiff’s motion for an order approving 

settlement of claims.”

4

DISCUSSION

Maldonado contends the trial court erred when it denied 

him leave to intervene because (1) he had an interest in the 

Gonzalez action sufficient for intervention, and (2) the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying him leave to intervene.

5

4 We grant APP’s request for judicial notice with respect to 

documents labeled Exhibit E-L. We deny the request regarding 

all other documents attached to APP’s request and deny 

Maldonado’s request for judicial notice in full because those 

documents are either already in the appellate record or are 

irrelevant to our resolution of the appeal. 

5 To the extent Maldonado raises contentions regarding the 

May 25, 2021, order denying his request for a stay of the 

Gonzalez action, an order denying a stay is not an appealable 

order. (Brunzell Construction Co. v. Harrah’s Club (1967) 253 
6

Right to Intervene

Code of Civil Procedure section 387 allows either 

mandatory or permissive intervention. For both mandatory and 

permissive intervention, the nonparty must show an interest that 

is the subject of the action in which the nonparty seeks to 

intervene. (Id., subd. (d)(1)(B) & (2).) 

The parties dispute whether Maldonado had an interest in 

the Gonzalez action sufficient for either mandatory or permissive 

intervention. Our Supreme Court has granted review of our 

colleagues’ opinion in Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 

955 (Turrieta), review granted Jan. 5, 2022, S271721, to 

determine whether a PAGA representative has the right to 

intervene, object to, or move to vacate, a judgment in a related 

action that purports to settle the claims that the PAGA 

representative has raised. 

In Turrieta, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at page 962, the 

appellants and Turrieta filed separate PAGA actions alleging 

overlapping claims relating to Lyft’s misclassification of its 

drivers as independent contractors. When Turrieta reached a 

settlement in her action, the appellants moved to intervene, 

moved to vacate the judgment approving Turrieta’s settlement, 

and later appealed the judgment. (Turrieta, at pp. 964-965, 967.) 

Turrieta and Lyft moved to dismiss the appeal, contending the 

appellants lacked standing. (Id. at p. 967.) 

The Court of Appeal held that the appellants lacked

standing to challenge the Turrieta settlement. (Turrieta, supra, 

69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 967-968.) The court reasoned that the 

Cal.App.2d 764, 772, fn. 3.) Moreover, that order was not 

specified in the notice of appeal. (Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 

Cal.App.4th 963, 967.)
7

appellants were not “aggrieved parties” pursuant to Code of Civil 

Procedure section 902. A party is aggrieved “‘only if its “rights or 

interests are injuriously affected by the judgment.”’ [Citation.]” 

(Turrieta, at p. 971.) The court rejected the appellants’

contention that they were aggrieved in their capacity as 

designated proxies for the state. (Ibid.) The court reasoned that 

in a PAGA action, the state is the real party in interest, and 

PAGA representatives who file a claim on behalf of the state do

“not convert the state’s interests into their own or render them 

real parties in interest.” (Turrieta, at p. 972.) Thus, because “it 

is the state’s rights, and not appellants’, that are affected by a 

parallel PAGA settlement, appellants are not aggrieved parties 

with standing to seek to vacate the judgment or appeal.” (Ibid.) 

Similarly, the court concluded the appellants did not have a right 

to intervene because they could not show they had a “direct and 

immediate interest in the settlement.” (Id. at p. 977.) 

Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 72-73 

(Moniz), disagreed with Turrieta and held that “where two PAGA 

actions involve overlapping PAGA claims and a settlement of one 

is purportedly unfair, it follows that the PAGA representative in 

the separate action may seek to become a party to the settling 

action and appeal the fairness of the settlement as part of his or 

her role as an effective advocate for the state.” In so ruling, 

Moniz recognized that an employee, deputized pursuant to PAGA 

to prosecute their employer’s Labor Code violations on behalf of 

the state, “represents interests that are sufficiently aggrieved to 

satisfy Code of Civil Procedure section 902, a remedial statute to 

be liberally construed in favor of the right to appeal.” (Moniz, at 

p. 73.) 
8

Similarly, in Uribe v. Crown Building Maintenance Co.

(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 986, 999-1000 (Uribe), an intervenor

(Garibay) who opted out of a class settlement but also asserted a 

PAGA claim had standing to appeal a settlement in another 

action that resolved both class and PAGA claims. The court 

concluded that Garibay had “standing to appeal because, having 

intervened and yet unable to opt out of the parties’ settlement of 

Uribe’s PAGA claim, Garibay’s PAGA cause of action in this same

lawsuit was resolved against her by the trial court’s entry of

judgment on its final approval of the settlement. She is therefore

a party ‘aggrieved’ by the judgment. As one court has explained,

the ‘prejudice’ giving rise to standing arises when ‘“the

settlement strips the party of a legal claim or cause of action.”’ 

[Citation.]” (Uribe, at p. 1001.)

We agree with our colleagues in Moniz and Uribe and 

conclude that where two separate PAGA actions have 

overlapping claims, the PAGA representative in one action has 

an interest in the other action sufficient to intervene in that other 

action. Allowing intervention under these circumstances

promotes fairness in the context of a PAGA settlement and

protects against collusive judgments and “reverse auctions.”

6

Denial of the Intervention

Having concluded that Maldonado possessed an interest 

sufficient for intervention, we must next determine if the court 

erred in denying him leave to intervene. 

6 A “‘reverse auction’” occurs when a “defendant settles 

with the low bidder among two or more class representatives, to 

the detriment of the class.” (Uribe, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 

990, italics added.) 
9

For mandatory intervention, the nonparty must have “an 

interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject 

of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of 

the action may impair or impede that person’s ability to protect 

that interest, unless that person’s interest is adequately 

represented by one or more of the existing parties.” (Code of Civ. 

Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(1)(B).) For permissive intervention, the 

nonparty must satisfy the following factors: “(1) the proper 

procedures have been followed; (2) the nonparty has a direct and 

immediate interest in the action; (3) the intervention will not 

enlarge the issues in the litigation; and (4) the reasons for the 

intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in 

the action.” (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 

Cal.App.4th 383, 386; Code of Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(2).)

Here, the trial court denied the ex parte application for 

intervention without specifying its legal reasoning. Thus, we do 

not know if the court determined that Maldonado, as a PAGA 

representative, lacked a personal interest to intervene. 

Nevertheless, error is harmless unless it resulted in a 

miscarriage of justice. (Kyne v. Eustice (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 

627, 635.) Error is prejudicial and results in a miscarriage of 

justice if the reviewing court concludes that it is reasonably 

probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have 

been reached absent the error. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 780, 800.)

Maldonado was not prejudiced by denial of leave to 

intervene (either mandatory or permissive) because his interests 

were “adequately represented by” Gonzalez. (Code of Civ. Proc., 

§ 387, subd. (d)(1)(B); see Coalition for Fair Rent v. Abdelnour

(1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 97, 116 [no prejudice resulting from a 
10

denial of permissive intervention where party’s position was fully 

litigated by another party]).) 

Here, at the time of the settlement, there was only one 

overlapping PAGA claim remaining between the Maldonado and 

Gonzalez actions—reimbursement of personal vehicle expenses. 

Specifically, Maldonado’s PAGA notice and complaint alleged 

that APP required aggrieved employees “to use their personal 

vehicles for work related activities,” in violation of section 2802. 

Gonzalez’s PAGA notice, complaint, and settlement covered a 

broader violation of section 2802 by alleging that aggrieved 

employees were required to “purchase work-related items without 

reimbursement.” The Gonzalez action thus encompassed 

Maldonado’s expense claim. And, in evaluating the Gonzalez 

settlement, the trial court concluded that the settlement was 

“reasonable” and was a “product of informed, non-collusive 

negotiations conducted at arms’ length by the Parties.”

Maldonado does not show otherwise; there is no analysis on how 

the settlement amount relating to personal vehicle expense is 

inadequate. The record thus reflects that Gonzalez adequately 

represented Maldonado’s interest in the one limited claim

asserted by both.

Maldonado argues that Gonzalez did not have the authority 

to represent his interests and did not meet the 65-day waiting 

period (§ 2699.3) to litigate those claims. But these arguments 

pertain only to the PAGA claims that Gonzalez added in his 

amended PAGA notice and initially attempted to settle. These

claims were ultimately omitted from the amended settlement 

terms after LWDA informed Gonzalez of its ongoing investigation

and instructed the parties to omit them. Therefore, to the extent 
11

there was any issue regarding a failure to comply with the 65-day 

waiting period, Gonzalez and APP remedied those issues.

Maldonado contends that even after the amendment of the 

settlement, “Gonzalez . . . lacked authority to expand the scope of 

the settlement to all expense reimbursement claims.” He is 

wrong. There was no improper expansion of the scope of the 

settlement. Pursuant to section 2699.3, Gonzalez properly 

noticed LWDA in his November 2020 letter of his claim for 

expenses that were used “to purchase work-related items without 

reimbursement, which includes uniforms,” but was not limited to

uniforms. (See Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72 

Cal.App.5th 334, 350-351 [plaintiffs are not required to set forth 

every potential fact or every future theory and are only required 

to state sufficient information that will put the employer and 

LWDA on notice]; see also Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2018) 28 

Cal.App.5th 824, 838 [a notice identifying one specific wage 

violation but stated that “[t]he violations include, without 

limitation” that specific violation was sufficient to exhaust 

remedies for a broader wage claim].)

Maldonado contends that Gonzalez lacked the authority to

“expand[] the period of release to July 28, 2019.” Maldonado 

argues that Gonzalez cannot release claims beyond the one-year 

limitations period prior to the date of his PAGA notice, which was 

filed in November 2020. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (a)

[statute of limitations for a PAGA claim is one year].) This 

argument lacks merit. The statute of limitations is an 

affirmative defense that can be waived by the defendant in a 

settlement agreement. (See Amaro v. Anaheim Arena 

Management, LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 543.) 
12

Maldonado therefore does not show how his interests were 

not adequately represented by Gonzalez or how he was 

prejudiced by the denial of leave to intervene. 

July 14 Order

With respect to the July 14 order denying Maldonado leave 

to intervene, Gonzalez contends that the underlying motion was 

actually a motion to reconsider the ruling on the earlier ex parte 

application. Gonzalez argues the trial court properly denied it 

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, and that the 

order denying the motion is not appealable. We agree. 

“A party who originally made an application for an order 

which was refused in whole or part, or granted conditionally or on 

terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order 

upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case 

it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, 

when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and 

what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to 

be shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (b).) Regardless of a 

motion’s title, if the motion raises the same issues as an earlier 

motion that was previously denied, it is properly deemed a 

renewal of the earlier motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1008, subdivision (b). (Powell v. County of Orange (2011) 

197 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1577.)

Here, Maldonado filed the motion to intervene six days 

after the trial court denied his ex parte application seeking the 

same relief. Maldonado raised the same arguments and 

requested the same relief. His motion was therefore an 

“application for the same order.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1008, 

subd. (b).) 
13

An order denying a renewed motion or motion for 

reconsideration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 

is not an appealable order. (Tate v. Wilburn (2010) 184 

Cal.App.4th 150, 159-160.) We therefore lack jurisdiction to 

consider an appeal of the July 14, 2021, order. (Woodman v.

Ackerman (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 644, 646.)

DISPOSITION

The May 27 and July 14, 2021, orders (denying leave to 

intervene) are affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on 

appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
Jeffrey G. Bennett, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Law Offices of Sima Farde and Sima Farde for Movant and 

Appellant. 

Moon & Yang, H. Scott Leviant, Kane Moon and Lilit 

Tunyan for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Ronda D. 

Jamgotchian, Paul Berkowitz and Michaela R. Goldstein for 

Defendant and Respondent.