[Cite as Tarshis v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 2019-Ohio-3633.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Vadim Tarshis, : 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 19AP-172 

 (C.P.C. No. 18CV-9838)

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Ohio Civil Rights Commission, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on September 10, 2019 

 

On brief: Vadim Tarshis, pro se. Argued: Vadim Tarshis. 

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Sharon D. 

Tassie, for appellee. Argued: Sharon D. Tassie. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} Vadim Tarshis, plaintiff-appellant, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas, in which the court dismissed his appeal of a letter of 

determination on reconsideration issued by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission 

("commission"), defendant-appellee. 

{¶ 2} Emerald City Ballroom ("Emerald") is a dance studio owned by Jeff Stein. 

Appellant is a patron of Emerald. According to appellant's petition, on May 12, 2017, 

Stein told appellant to leave the premises and banned him from returning. Stein allegedly 

told appellant that people did not like him, but he could not disclose their names. 

Appellant claimed some females, including the former manager of Emerald, would 

inappropriately touch him in a sexual manner during dances and he would politely reject 
No. 19AP-172 2

their advances. Appellant opined that some of these females might have complained to 

Stein as revenge. 

{¶ 3} Appellant filed a charge of discrimination with the commission alleging 

Emerald engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice and claiming he was banned 

from a place of public accommodation in retaliation for engaging in activity protected 

under R.C. 4112.02(I). Appellant asserted Emerald retaliated against him based on his 

resisting the sexual advances of female patrons and advising Stein about R.C. 4112 

compliance at the time Stein forced him to leave the premises. 

{¶ 4} The commission conducted an investigation and found no probable cause to 

believe Emerald engaged in discriminatory conduct and declined to issue an 

administrative complaint. Appellant applied for reconsideration of the commission's 

decision. On October 25, 2018, the commission issued a letter of determination on 

reconsideration. The commission found the evidence failed to corroborate appellant's 

allegations that Emerald retaliated against him or that appellant engaged in protected 

activity as defined by R.C. 4112. The commission indicated Emerald barred appellant from 

the premises based on several complaints from patrons who reported feeling 

uncomfortable and threatened by appellant's behavior. Therefore, the commission again 

found there was no probable cause for the commission to issue an administrative 

complaint and ordered the matter dismissed. 

{¶ 5} On November 23, 2018, appellant filed a petition for judicial review of the 

commission's determination with the common pleas court. On February 26, 2019, the 

trial court issued a decision and entry dismissing appellant's petition. The trial court 

found appellant had no due process claim against Emerald, the commission did not 

violate his due process rights, and the commission did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, 

or irrational fashion. Appellant appeals the judgment of the trial court, asserting the 

following three assignments of error: 

[I.] THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS DID NOT SATISFY 

THE "RELIABLE, PROBATIVE OR SUBSTANTIAL 

EVIDENCE" REQUIREMENT PURSUANT TO R.C. 

§4112.06(E) AND WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE 

APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 

TO BE PUT ON NOTICE OF THE SPECIFIC PATRONS' 

DETAILED COMPLAINTS AND SPECIFIC ALLEGED 

ACTIONS THAT CONSTITUTE HARASSMENT IN EACH 
No. 19AP-172 3 

PATRONS' CASE SO THAT APPELLANT COULD PRESENT 

A DEFENSE. 

[II.] THE OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ERRED BY 

FAILING TO HOLD THAT THERE IS NO RELIABLE, 

PROBATIVE OR SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH 

SUPPORTS THE OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION'S 

FINDING OF HOSTILE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 

ENVIRONMENT OF MAKING "PATRONS" FEEL 

"UNCOMFORTABLE AND THREATENED[,"] CREATED BY 

APPELLANT. 

[III.] THE OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ERRED BY 

FAILING TO HOLD THAT THERE IS RELIABLE, 

PROBATIVE OR SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH 

SUPPORTS APPELLANT'S CHARGES OF UNLAWFUL 

RETALIATORY BAN FROM STUDIO AND REFUSAL OF 

SERVICE BASED ON PROTECTED ACTIVITY OF 

OPPOSING DISCRIMINATION AND PARTICIPATING IN 

DISCRMINATION INVESTIGATION. 

{¶ 6} We address appellant's assignments of error together. Appellant argues in 

his assignments of error the trial court erred when it dismissed his judicial review because 

there existed reliable, probative, and substantial evidence that Emerald engaged in 

unlawful discrimination. 

{¶ 7} R.C. 4112.02 provides: 

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: 

* * * 

(G) For any proprietor or any employee, keeper, or manager 

of a place of public accommodation to deny to any person, 

except for reasons applicable alike to all persons regardless of 

race, color, religion, sex, military status, national origin, 

disability, age, or ancestry, the full enjoyment of the 

accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of the 

place of public accommodation. 

{¶ 8} R.C. 4112.05(B)(1) provides "[a]ny person may file a charge with the 

commission alleging that another person has engaged or is engaging in an unlawful 

discriminatory practice." A charge under division (G) must be in writing, under oath, and 
No. 19AP-172 4 

filed with the commission within six months after the alleged unlawful discriminatory 

practice was committed. 

{¶ 9} The commission has the discretion to investigate a charge and determine 

whether there is probable cause that unlawful discrimination occurred. R.C. 

4112.05(B)(2). See also State ex. rel. Westbrook v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 17 Ohio St.3d 

215, 216 (1985) (the commission has the discretion to decide whether to investigate a 

charge and to issue a complaint based on that charge); McCrea v. Ohio Civ. Rights 

Comm., 20 Ohio App.3d 314, 317 (9th Dist.1984) (courts grant discretion to the 

commission in determining whether to find probable cause). When the commission 

makes a probable cause determination, no evidentiary hearing is held. R.C. 4112.o5(B)(5). 

See also id. at 316. "Prior to the filing of a complaint, the procedure set out in the statute is 

informal and in the nature of an ex parte proceeding." Id. "Although the commission 

investigates the charge, it does not seek to receive formal evidence." Id. "A determination 

of no probable cause is one which cannot, therefore, be reviewed on the basis of reliable, 

probative, and substantial evidence." Thus, the product of the commission's investigation 

does not constitute evidence that could be reevaluated by the trial court but, rather, only 

contains the factual findings contained in its letter. Hous. Advocates, Inc. v. Am. Fire & 

Cas. Co., 8th Dist. No. 86444, 2006-Ohio-4880, ¶ 9-11; McCrea at 316. 

{¶ 10} Pursuant to R.C. 4112.06(A), a party "claiming to be aggrieved by a final 

order of the [Ohio Civil Rights Commission], including a refusal to issue a complaint, may 

obtain judicial review thereof * * * in a proceeding * * * brought in the common pleas 

court." " 'Upon review of a determination that no probable cause exists [to issue a 

complaint], the common pleas court must determine whether [the Ohio Civil Rights 

Commission's] decision is unlawful, irrational, and/or arbitrary and capricious.' " Yeager 

v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 148 Ohio App.3d 459, 2002-Ohio-3383, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.), 

quoting Coleman v. Warner, 82 Ohio App.3d 263, 265 (6th Dist.1992). 

{¶ 11} In the present case, the commission found no probable cause that Emerald 

engaged in discriminatory behavior. The commission concluded the evidence did not 

demonstrate that Emerald retaliated against appellant or that appellant engaged in 

protected activity. Instead, the commission found, Emerald banned appellant from the 

premises because of several complaints from patrons who reported feeling uncomfortable 
No. 19AP-172 5

and threatened by appellant's behavior. On judicial review, the common pleas court 

found that, although appellant believed his actions were acceptable, the commission was 

free to believe or disbelieve appellant's version of the facts. As for his misdirected due 

process claim, the trial court found that because Emerald is not a state actor, due process 

would not normally apply to it. The court also found there was no evidence the 

commission committed any due process violation by violating its procedures or treating 

appellant differently than other charging parties but, instead, merely disagreed with 

appellant. 

{¶ 12} We agree with the trial court. There is nothing before this court to suggest 

the commission acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or irrational fashion. The commission's 

investigation showed several patrons complained that appellant made them feel 

uncomfortable and threatened. Although appellant asserts the patrons' "feelings" are not 

facts and his behavior was not improper, the appropriateness of his behavior is not 

relevant to our analysis on appeal, given our standard of review. Furthermore, although 

appellant argues the commission should have been required to investigate every alleged 

incident, appellant cites no authority for placing such a burden on the commission. The 

commission investigated Emerald's actions and adduced facts from its investigation 

pursuant to R.C. 4112.05. As explained in Hous. Advocates, we have no evidence to 

review to determine what specific witnesses the commission relied on and whether the 

evidence was substantial. We have only the letter of determination. From that letter, we 

see nothing that would indicate the commission acted in an arbitrary, capricious or 

irrational fashion. The letter does not indicate appellant complained to Emerald about 

any harassing behaviors by female patrons or that Emerald was discriminating or 

retaliating against him based on appellant's complaints about such alleged behavior. 

Thus, the record before us is devoid of anything to substantiate appellant's claim that he 

engaged in a protected activity or that Emerald engaged in discriminatory behavior based 

on any protected activity. 

{¶ 13} Furthermore, with regard to appellant's due process argument that the 

commission's findings were in violation of his constitutional due process rights to be put 

on notice of the specific patrons who complained about his behavior and their specific 

complaints, we disagree. In addressing a due process argument, there is a two-part 
No. 19AP-172 6

inquiry: the court must determine whether the party was deprived of a protected interest 

and, if so, what process was his due. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 

(1982). In Logan, the protected property interest that was deprived was Logan's right, 

created by Illinois law, to have a factfinding conference convene to consider his 

employment discrimination charge within 120 days after he filed said charge. The present 

case is unlike Logan, in that appellant was not deprived of the commission's adjudicatory 

procedures. See id. at 429-30. Appellant would suggest he has a protected property 

interest in being put on notice of the specific patrons who complained about his behavior 

and their specific complaints. However, the United States Supreme Court has noted "[t]he 

hallmark of property * * * is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which 

cannot be removed except for 'just cause.' " Id. at 430. Ohio law has not conferred on 

appellant an individual entitlement to access such specific evidence at the preliminary 

investigation stage of his discrimination charge. As we noted above, the Supreme Court of 

Ohio found in McCrea that, prior to the filing of a complaint, the procedure is informal 

and in the nature of an ex parte proceeding, and the commission does not seek to receive 

formal evidence during the investigative stage. Appellant has cited no authority 

demonstrating the commission is required to perform the specific type of investigation 

and inquiry that he suggests or to provide him such specific information if it did. 

Therefore, we find appellant did not possess any protected property interest susceptible of 

deprivation without due process of law. For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant's 

first, second, and third assignments of error. 

{¶ 14} Accordingly, appellant's three assignments of error are overruled, and the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT, P.J., and NELSON, J., concur. 

____________________