UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RANDY J. SLAGER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 97-2301

DOUGLAS DUNCAN, County

Executive; MONTGOMERY COUNTY,

MARYLAND,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-97-1598-AW)

Submitted: May 29, 1998

Decided: August 28, 1998

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Alan B. Fischler, LAW OFFICES OF ALAN B. FISCHLER,

Bethesda, Maryland; Charles H. Fleischer, MARSH, FLEISCHER &

QUIGGLE, Chtd., Bethesda, Maryland, for Appellant. Charles W.

Thompson, Jr., County Attorney, Linda B. Thall, Chief Counsel,

Karen L. Federman Henry, Principal Counsel for Appeals, Sharon V.

Burrell, Associate County Attorney, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Randy J. Slager appeals the district court order granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss and denying Slager's motion for summary

judgment in his action brought under Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995 &

Supp. 1998) (ADA). Finding no error in the judgment, we affirm.

Slager is a Montgomery County, Maryland, resident. He suffers

from a permanent, disabling spinal condition. Slager alleges that

when he drives over speed humps his spine is jarred, causing him pain.1

Slager resides on Michaels Drive. He contends that by installing

speed humps on Michaels Drive and Greentree Road, the County

would restrict his access to the roads in violation of the ADA. Slager

also asserts that the ADA requires the County to consider the impact

of speed humps on disabled individuals in the form of pain and discomfort as a part of the analysis conducted prior to installing the

speed humps.

Title II is violated when a qualified individual with a disability is

prevented from participating in or benefitting from a public service,

program, or activity, by reason of a qualifying disability, regardless

of whether the entity intended to discriminate against the disabled

person. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994); Patton v. TIC United Corp.,

77 F.3d 1235, 1245-46 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 518 U.S. 1005

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1 Appellant explained the distinction between a speed "hump" and a

speed "bump." The Appellees do not dispute the definition. According to

the Institute of Transportation Engineers, a speed hump is a three to four

inch raised area in the roadway pavement surface extending traversely

across the travel way, with a travel length of approximately twelve feet.

A speed bump is a more abrupt obstruction typically found on private

roadways and parking lots.

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(1996). The County contends that Slager is not being discriminated

against or denied the benefits of the County's services, programs, or

activities.

The ADA addresses discrimination against individuals with disabilities in regard to transportation barriers. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)

(1994).2 Slager argues that the streets with speed humps and the

streets that are planned to have speed humps constructed on them are

no longer readily accessible to him. He alleges that he has to avoid

routes with speed humps and thus his freedom of movement is limited. However, Slager did not state or provide any evidence that

because he must avoid the speed humps he is denied access to transportation available to non-disabled persons. He did not put forth any

specific evidence regarding alteration of driving routes or driving

speed over the humps to decrease his pain. Slager's general statements of pain and discomfort when driving over speed humps, without more, are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

We therefore affirm the district court's order. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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2 To achieve the goals of the ADA, Congress charged the Department

of Justice with developing regulations to implement Title II. See 42

U.S.C. § 12134(a) (1994). The Department of Justice promulgated a

Technical Assistance Manual to set out the requirements under the ADA.

The Title II Technical Assistance Manual does not contain any provisions regarding the installation of speed humps or bumps. While the

Technical Assistance manual is not exhaustive of requirements for governments to meet under Title II, it is persuasive evidence that speed

humps are not deemed to be a primary transportation barrier.

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