IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30397

NATHAN ROLLINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY; JOHN B.

JOSEPH, CCM1; JIMMY SMITH, Lieutenant Colonel; RICHARD STALDER,

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:07-CV-463

Before JONES, Chief Judge, BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge, and AYCOCK,

District Judge.

*

SHARION AYCOCK, District Judge.

Nathan Rollins, Louisiana prisoner # 131530, filed a pro se, in forma

pauperis (IFP), civil rights suit against officials at the Louisiana State

Penitentiary at Angola (Angola) alleging that his housing assignment violated

his due process and other constitutional rights.

The defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on

qualified immunity. They also filed a motion to dismiss the suit pursuant to

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 20, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 District Judge of the Northern District of Mississippi, sitting by designation. *

Case: 09-30397 Document: 00511452888 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/20/2011
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The magistrate judge recommended

that the defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted, and that the motion for

summary judgment be denied as moot. The district court adopted the

magistrate judge’s recommendation over Rollins’ objection and granted the

defendants’ motion to dismiss. Rollins timely appealed. The district court

denied Rollins’ motion to proceed IFP on the basis that the appeal was not taken

in good faith. Rollins then sought authorization from this Court for leave to

proceed IFP on appeal. This Court denied Rollins’ motion in part, but granted

him IFP status on the sole issue of whether his housing assignment violated his

due process rights. We affirm the district court.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On June 30, 2006, Rollins, an inmate at Rayburn Correctional Center

(formerly the Washington Correctional Institute), was found guilty by a prison

disciplinary board of “aggravated work offenses” and sentenced to four weeks of

cell confinement. On July 5, 2006, Rollins was transferred from Rayburn

Correctional Center to Angola. While at the Angola reception center, Rollins

1

was notified that he had been assigned to the maximum security unit at Camp-J.

Rollins was then placed in Camp-J administrative segregation. A review board

consisting of defendants Jimmy Smith and John Joseph was held outside Rollins’ 

presence. Rollins received a “board sheet” through prison mail stating the

reason for his assignment to Camp-J was “nature of the original reason for lockdown [and] serious rule infraction.” Rollins asserts that there was no “original

reason” for the lock-down, and he had committed no rule infractions at Angola.

Rollins filed an administrative grievance. In response, he was told that

Rollins asserts his geographic transfer had nothing to do with his most recent 1

disciplinary infraction.

2

Case: 09-30397 Document: 00511452888 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/20/2011
his assignment to Camp-J was due to battery on a correctional officer and

introduction of contraband into a correctional facility. The introduction of

contraband offense occurred on February 29, 2004, and the battery on a

correctional officer occurred on January 18, 2005. Rollins had previously served

disciplinary sentences for these infractions while housed at Rayburn

Correctional Center.

The defendants state that Camp-J is for “[i]nmates who require a higher

degree of physical control because they have been found guilty of committing

serious rule violations.” Rollins describes Camp-J as “a special (super max)

punitive management program.” Camp-J is a three level program – Level I

inmates receive the least amount of privileges, while Level III inmates receive

the most. Although the exact date is not clear from the record before the court,

at some point shortly after his arrival at Camp-J, Rollins was transferred out of

administrative segregation and placed in Camp-J Level II.

As of the time of Rollins’ amended complaint, filed on January 15, 2008,

2

he claims to have spent three months in Camp-J Level II and fifteen months on

Level III. Rollins asserts that Angola officials have reviewed his classification

twenty times, and after each review he is informed that his classification is

3

based on a serious rule infraction. Rollins claims that he received only “mock

The district court denied Rollins’ motion to amend. However, under the rules in 2

effect at the time, Rollins was permitted to amend once as a matter of course before a

responsive pleading had been filed. FED.R.CIV.P.15(a); Ayanbadejo v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 273,

278 (5th Cir. 2008). Because the defendants had not responded to Rollins’ complaint when he

filed his motion to amend, the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion. 

See Cambridge Toxicology Group, Inc. v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169, 177 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Therefore, in determining whether Rollins has stated a claim for a due process violation, we

will also consider the allegations in his amended complaint. 

In his brief, Rollins asserts that his status has now been reviewed “twenty-five (25) 3

times, and a [sic] additional twenty (20) times.” 

3

Case: 09-30397 Document: 00511452888 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/20/2011
reviews” before the board, that he was not given an opportunity to discuss the

merits of his case, and that the warden told him he will remain in Camp-J

indefinitely. We note that as of the date of his last filing in this case (October 27,

2010), Rollins is no longer housed in Camp-J.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Rollin’s complaint

is de novo. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th

Cir. 2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id., 173 L. Ed. 2d 868. “We do not accept as

true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal

conclusions.” Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005); see also

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (“While legal conclusions can provide

the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”).

“The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states

a valid claim when all well-pleaded facts are assumed true and are viewed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays

Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).

DISCUSSION

A. Record on Appeal

As an initial matter, this Court previously granted defendants’ motion to

supplement the record on appeal. Defendants have produced additional

documentation to support their motion to dismiss which was never presented to

4

Case: 09-30397 Document: 00511452888 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/20/2011
the district court. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

4

under Rule 12(b)(6), “the court’s review is limited to the complaint, any

documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion

to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone

Star Fund, 594 F.3d at 387. Furthermore, this Court will not consider evidence

produced for the first time on appeal. See Leonard v. Dixie Well & Supply, Inc.,

828 F.2d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 1987). Because the supplemental evidence presented

by the defendants was not before the district court and may not be considered

under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court finds the clerk’s order granting the defendant’s

motion to supplement the record on appeal was improvidently granted. The

additional evidence submitted is stricken and will not be considered by this

Court.

B. Due Process Claim

Rollins argues that his placement in Camp-J violated his Fourteenth

Amendment rights because he was placed there without a fair hearing. To

maintain this due process challenge, Rollins must show that his placement and

confinement in Camp-J deprive him of a cognizable liberty interest protected by

the Fourteenth Amendment. Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 562 (5th

Cir. 2008) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed.

2d 451 (1976)). In general, a prisoner has no liberty interest in his custodial

classification. Id. (citations omitted). This court has repeatedly affirmed that

“[p]rison officials should be accorded the widest possible deference” in classifying

Among other things, the supplemental evidence shows that Rollins received state 4

court convictions for introducing contraband into a correctional facility and battery on a

correctional officer; information on living conditions and the privileges available to inmates

in the different levels of Camp-J; and records showing Rollins was released to Camp-C on

September 24, 2008. Rollins subsequently committed disciplinary infractions which resulted

in him being placed inadministrative segregation for nearly three months and then reassigned

to Camp-J on December 21, 2009.

5

Case: 09-30397 Document: 00511452888 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/20/2011
prisoners' custodial status as necessary “to maintain security and preserve

internal order.” Id. (citing McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248, 1251 (5th Cir.

1990); Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 2003)). “Only when a

prisoner demonstrates ‘extraordinary circumstances’ may he maintain a due

process challenge to a change in his custodial classification.” Id. The Supreme

Court has stated that only those conditions which impose “atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life” will implicate the protection of the Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed.

2d 418 (1995).

However, before the Sandin test is triggered, it is crucial to determine

whether Rollins placement in Camp-J was an “initial classification” or a punitive

measure in response to his violation of prison rules. In Wilkerson, this Court

explained:

In resolving the nature of the liberty interest and the process that

is due for confinement of prisoners in extended lockdown under

these circumstances, it is crucial to know whether, based on their

crimes of conviction, the inmates’ confinement is the result of an

initial classification by prison officials as opposed to confinement for

violations of less serious prison disciplinary rules. Generally, courts

are not concerned with a prisoner’s initial classification level based

on his criminal history before his incarceration. . . . Thus, if the

inmates’ confinement in extended lockdown is not the result of their

initial classification, the Sandin test would be triggered.

Wilkerson, 329 F.3d at 435-36.

The district court, relying on Wilkerson, concluded that Rollins’

assignment to Camp-J was an initial classification, stating “prison officials

determined that placement of the plaintiff in a restrictive environment at

[Angola] was appropriate, and the Court will not second guess this

6

Case: 09-30397 Document: 00511452888 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/20/2011
determination.” The defendants argue on appeal that Rollins’ placement in

Camp-J upon his arrival at Angola was an initial classification, rather than a

disciplinary measure for his previous misbehavior, and therefore, the Sandin

test is not implicated. This Court has not yet addressed a situation such as this,

5

where a prisoner is transferred to a new facility, and his housing assignment is

based upon infractions committed at a prior facility. While we do not hold that

consideration of a transferee’s prior disciplinary history always transforms an

initial classification into a punitive act, Rollins’ pleadings indicate that he was

placed in Camp-J solely because of disciplinary violations that occurred at the

Rayburn Correctional Center. Further, Angola’s own documentation states that

Rollins’ “reason for original lockdown” is a “rule violation.” Therefore, taking

as true Rollins’ factual allegations, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868,

for 12(b)(6) purposes, we find that Rollins’ placement in Camp-J was

“confinement for violations of less serious prison disciplinary rules.” Wilkerson,

329 F.3d at 435. Accordingly, the Court’s inquiry now shifts to whether Rollins

has pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate that his placement in Camp-J

imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293.

In Wilkinson v. Austin, the Supreme Court found conditions at an Ohio

“supermax” prison, when taken together, imposed an “atypical and significant

hardship” so as to implicate a liberty interest under the due process clause. 545

U.S. 209, 223-24, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 162 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2005). The Court reached

that finding when presented with the following conditions: (1) almost all human

In particular, they argue the classification was based upon the state court convictions 5

Rollins received for battery on a correctional officer and introduction of contraband into a

correctional facility; however this was not presented to the district court and will not be

considered here. See Part A, supra. 

7

Case: 09-30397 Document: 00511452888 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/20/2011
contact was prohibited, even to the point that the cells were constructed to

prevent cell to cell communication; (2) opportunities for visitation were rare and

in all events conducted only through glass walls; (3) cell lights remained on at

all times; (4) placement in the facility was indefinite, and after an initial 30 day

review, only reviewed annually; and (5) placement in the facility disqualified an

otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration. Id. at 214, 224, 125 S. Ct.

2384. The Court concluded “[w]hile any one of these conditions standing alone

might not be sufficient to create a liberty interest, taken together they impose

an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context.” Id. at 224,

125 S. Ct. 2384.

In Wilkerson v. Stalder, this Court found that plaintiffs held in extended

lockdown in Angola for approximately thirty years might have a due process

claim. Wilkerson, 329 F.3d at 433, 436. The conditions of the inmates’

confinement was described as

the effective equivalent of solitary confinement. Prisoners in

extended lockdown remain alone in a cell approximately 55 to 60

square feet in size of [sic] 23 hours each day. One hour each day, the

prisoner may shower and walk along the tier on which his cell is

located. Three times a week, weather permitting, the prisoner may

use this hour to exercise alone in a fenced yard. Additional

restrictions are placed on generally available inmate privileges

including those pertaining to personal property, reading materials,

access to legal resources, work and contact visitation.

Id. at 433. This court remanded the matter, in part, “to determine the

appropriate baseline against which to measure the inmates’ confinement in

reviewing whether the inmates’ confinement is ‘atypical.’” Id. at 436.

Here, the district court initially concluded that Rollins’ assignment to

Camp-J was an initial classification and no due process right was implicated.

However, it also determined, in the alternative, that Rollins had failed to state

8

Case: 09-30397 Document: 00511452888 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/20/2011
a claim for a due process violation under the Sandin test. We agree.

Rollins expresses great dissatisfaction with his confinement at Camp-J,

but fails to allege what conditions there subject him to atypical and significant

hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Although Rollins

describes Camp-J as a “maximum security lockdown,” his pleadings contain

virtually no description of the conditions there other than a general assertion

that “Plaintiff has been forced to live under harsh conditions such as verbal

abuse, stress, and mental anguish. Pain and suffering has become a part of the

plaintiff's everyday struggle.” Unfortunately, this is hardly an atypical condition

of prison life. While Rollins’ amended complaint avers “his confinement in

6

extended lockdown for said duration, presents an atypical and significant

hardship, and extraordinary circumstances,” he fails to allege facts to support

this conclusion.

We agree with the district court that Rollins has failed to show his

placement in Camp-J imposed an atypical or significant hardship beyond the

ordinary incidents of prison life such that he was deprived of a cognizable liberty

interest . See Fisher v. Wilson, 74 F. App’x 301, 2003 WL 21654031, at *1 (5th

Cir. July 14, 2003) (“Fisher’s complaint failed to state a claim because Fisher has

not shown how placement in extended lockdown presented an atypical or

significant hardship”); Bannister v. Deville, 211 F.3d 593, 2000 WL 329244, at

*1 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2000) (“[Bannister] merely complains that he was

transferred to an extended lockdown facility where he was not entitled to the

See Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1999) (no due process violation 6

where inmate claimed he was placed in lockdown “next to psychiatric patients who scream,

beat on metal toilets, short out the power, flood the cells, throw feces, and light fires, resulting

in his loss of sleep for days at a time;” was often “moved into filthy, sometimes feces-smeared,

cells that formerly housed psychiatric patients;” and was deprived of “cleanliness, sleep, and

peace of mind”).

9

Case: 09-30397 Document: 00511452888 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/20/2011
privileges enjoyed by the general population. Bannister’s placement in [Camp-J]

did not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest

that entitled him to procedural due process during the disciplinary

proceedings”). The district court’s dismissal of this case is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

10

Case: 09-30397 Document: 00511452888 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/20/2011