SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3504-19

THOMAS GORMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BOROUGH OF AUDUBON,

Defendant-Respondent.

__________________________

Argued November 17, 2021 – Decided December 16, 2021

Before Judges Gilson, Gooden Brown, and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-1230-18.

Christopher A. Gray argued the cause for appellant 

(Sciarra & Catrambone, LLC, attorneys; Christopher A. 

Gray, of counsel and on the briefs; Frank C. Cioffi, on 

the briefs).

Joseph G. Antinori argued the cause for respondent 

(Brown & Connery, LLP, attorneys; Joseph G. 

Antinori, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Plaintiff Thomas Gorman was a police officer who was charged with a 

second-degree crime. He entered the Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI) and 

agreed to forfeit his position as a police officer with the Borough of Audubon

(Borough). Thereafter, plaintiff was granted ordinary disability retirement 

benefits by the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System 

(the Board). He sued the Borough when it refused to provide him and his family 

with medical benefits after he had left his employment. Plaintiff claimed that 

he was entitled to those benefits under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 

as an officer who had retired on disability and the denial of those benefits was 

discriminatory, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 

(LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50. 

Plaintiff appeals from a March 31, 2020 order granting summary judgment 

to the Borough and dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. We affirm. 

The indisputable material fact is that plaintiff forfeited his position as a police 

officer as a condition of PTI. Consequently, he was not entitled to medical 

benefits under the CBA, nor did he make any showing of discrimination under

the LAD. 
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I.

We discern the facts from the summary judgment record, viewing them in 

the light most favorable to plaintiff, the party opposing summary judgment. See

Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Ed., 246 N.J. 507, 515 (2021) (citing Brill v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). Plaintiff began working for the 

Borough as a police officer in 2003. In 2015, he was a member of the 

Policemen's Benevolent Association (PBA), Local No. 328, which had a CBA 

with the Borough.

The events that gave rise to plaintiff leaving his position as a police officer 

occurred on September 24, 2015. For several days before September 23, 2015, 

plaintiff had been in Las Vegas attending the annual PBA convention. 

According to plaintiff, he had been abusing alcohol for years and drank heavily 

while at the convention.

Plaintiff came home on September 23, 2015, earlier than originally 

planned. The following day, he argued with his wife and parents. Plaintiff's 

wife, who was also a Borough police officer, called another Borough police 

officer, Corporal David Bauer, for assistance. After Bauer arrived, plaintiff 

threw a punch at Bauer, starting an altercation. While plaintiff and Bauer were 

struggling, plaintiff grabbed Bauer's service weapon and the weapon discharged, 
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but no one was hurt by the discharge. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was charged 

criminally with second-degree disarming a law enforcement officer in violation 

of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11(a). 

Following the incident, plaintiff was taken to several hospitals, and he 

received treatment at two in-patient substance-abuse facilities for over thirty 

days. He was diagnosed with moderate alcohol use disorder, with recent past 

alcohol withdrawal delirium. On November 12, 2015, a treating doctor cleared 

plaintiff to return to work without restrictions.

Sometime after November 15, 2015, plaintiff was informed by the 

Borough's chief of police that he could not return to work because he was facing 

criminal charges and there was an ongoing internal affairs investigation related 

to the September 24 incident. Plaintiff was also advised that, effective 

November 28, 2015, his status would change from suspended with pay to 

suspended without pay.

On August 31, 2016, plaintiff applied for ordinary disability retirement 

benefits with the New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits. He requested 

a retirement date effective September 1, 2016, acknowledged he was currently 

charged with disarming a police officer, and stated he suffered from "a 
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psychological issue and was diagnosed with alcohol withdrawal with delirium 

and psychotic features."

On December 8, 2016, plaintiff resolved his criminal charges by entering

PTI. As a condition of PTI, plaintiff agreed he would "immediately" forfeit his 

"current employment" with the Borough's Police Department. He also agreed to 

"forever forfeit[]" his right to hold any public office or position in New Jersey. 

Those forfeitures were memorialized both in the PTI order and an "Order 

Disqualifying [Plaintiff] from Holding Public Office," which plaintiff and his 

counsel signed on December 8, 2016.

The disqualification order was filed on January 5, 2017. Thereafter, 

copies of that order and the PTI order were provided to the Borough. On January 

24, 2017, the Borough wrote to plaintiff informing him that it accepted his 

forfeiture, and his employment was terminated "effective the date of [the] 

[c]ourt filing on January 5, 2017."

On February 17, 2017, the Division of Pensions informed plaintiff that he 

was ineligible to file for ordinary disability and his application was denied. Two 

weeks later, on March 1, 2017, plaintiff appealed that decision to the Board.

On May 9, 2017, the Board wrote to plaintiff's counsel advising that it 

would approve plaintiff's request to file for ordinary disability retirement. The 
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Board explained that it had "based its determination on the fact that [plaintiff's] 

claim for disability is the direct reason for his termination and therefore the 

Board's approval is consistent with N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4." The Board also 

acknowledged that, on December 8, 2016, an order had been entered 

disqualifying plaintiff from holding public office. At a meeting on November 

13, 2017, the Board approved plaintiff's application for ordinary disability 

retirement benefits effective September 1, 2016, the date of his original 

application.

Thereafter, plaintiff requested the Borough to provide him and his family 

with medical insurance coverage. He relied on article 29 of the CBA between 

PBA Local 328 and the Borough. Article 29 stated that an employee who retires 

on a state-approved disability pension will receive medical insurance paid for 

by the Borough. The Borough denied plaintiff's request, reasoning that plaintiff 

had forfeited his employment with the Borough in resolving his criminal charge 

and entering PTI.

In April 2018, plaintiff sued the Borough, alleging that it had breached the 

CBA and had discriminated against him in violation of LAD. Following 

discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. After hearing oral 

argument, on March 31, 2020, the trial court denied summary judgment to 
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plaintiff, granted summary judgment to the Borough, and dismissed plaintiff's 

complaint with prejudice. The court explained its reasons for the rulings on the 

record and entered an order that same day. 

II.

On this appeal, plaintiff makes three main arguments, contending that the 

trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Borough because (1) the 

Borough breached the CBA; (2) there were disputed issues of material fact 

concerning whether the Borough terminated him for discriminatory reasons 

related to his alleged alcohol disability; and (3) there were disputed issues of 

material fact concerning whether the Borough failed to accommodate plaintiff's 

alcohol-related disability by not providing him with continued medical 

insurance. We reject these arguments because the indisputable material fact is 

plaintiff forfeited his position as a police officer.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using "the same 

standard that governs the motion judge's" decision. RSI Bank v. Providence

Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018). "That standard mandates that 

summary judgment be granted 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the 
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moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'" Templo 

Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 

199 (2016) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). "An issue of material fact is 'genuine only 

if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the 

parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring 

the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.'" 

Grande v. St. Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat v. 

Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)). In our review, we owe "no special deference" 

to the trial court's legal analysis. RSI Bank, 234 N.J. at 472.

It is indisputable that plaintiff forfeited his position as a Borough police 

officer on December 8, 2016. That fact is established in two court orders, one 

of which plaintiff and his counsel signed. We must determine the effects of that 

forfeiture under the CBA and the LAD.

1. The Claim Under the CBA

Plaintiff's position as a police officer with the Borough was covered by a 

CBA between PBA Local 328 and the Borough. The CBA states that police 

officers who retired after satisfying certain conditions will continue to receive 

medical insurance coverage paid for by the Borough. In that regard, article 29 

of the CBA stated, in relevant part:
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For employees retiring . . . on a State approved 

disability pension as per Chapter 88:PL 1974, the 

Borough shall provide a fully paid [B]lue [C]ross and 

[B]lue [S]hield medical benefit plan or a substantially 

equal or better medical plan carried by the Borough.

Plaintiff did not retire on a state-approved disability pension. Instead, he 

forfeited his position as a Borough police officer as a condition of entering PTI 

to resolve a second-degree criminal charge. 

Plaintiff argues that he applied for disability retirement benefits before he 

agreed to forfeit his position. That is true. The material fact, however, is that 

before the Board approved his application for ordinary disability retirement in 

May and November of 2017, on December 8, 2016, he forfeited his position as 

a Borough police officer. The plain language of the CBA states that medical 

benefits will be provided to "employees retiring . . . on a State approved 

disability pension." Under the plain and unambiguous language of the CBA, 

plaintiff does not get the benefit of article 29 because he did not retire. 

Plaintiff also argues that article 29 requires him only to be on a stateapproved disability pension and that he did not need to be "retiring" on the 

disability pension. That argument is also rebutted by the plain and unambiguous 

language of the CBA.
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The issue of the Board's approval of ordinary disability retirement benefits 

to plaintiff is not before us. Nevertheless, we note that police officers who are 

voluntarily or involuntarily terminated from service due to "total forfeiture of 

public service" are generally not eligible to apply for disability retirement 

benefits. See N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4. The regulation allowing those benefits requires 

that "the disability must be the reason the member left employment." Ibid. The 

issue that is before us is whether plaintiff qualifies for continued medical 

insurance coverage under the CBA. We hold that he does not because he 

forfeited his position, and a forfeiture is not a retirement.

2. Plaintiff's Discrimination Claim Under LAD

"The LAD prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of a 

disability." Potente v. Cnty. of Hudson, 187 N.J. 103, 110 (2006) (citing 

N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1, -29.1). In his complaint, plaintiff asserted two types of claims 

under the LAD: (1) discrimination based on a disability and (2) a violation of 

the LAD's public accommodation provision.

A. The Disability Discrimination Claim

Under the LAD, "there is no single prima facie case that applies to all 

discrimination claims. Instead, the prima facie elements of a claim vary 

depending upon the particular employment discrimination claim being made." 
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Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 409-10 (2010). To state a prima facie case for 

disability discrimination under the LAD, a plaintiff must allege: 

(1) a disability or the employer's perception that the 

employee was disabled; (2) the employee remains 

qualified to perform the essential functions of the job 

and was performing at a level that met the employer's 

expectations; (3) an adverse employment action 

because of the disability or perceived disability; and (4) 

the employer thereafter sought a similarly qualified 

individual. 

[Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc., 458 N.J. 

Super. 416, 429 (App. Div. 2019).] 

Plaintiff has not and cannot satisfy the third element of his alleged 

disability discrimination claim. Plaintiff's forfeiture established that the 

Borough's action was not based on a disability or perceived disability; rather, it 

was in response to plaintiff's forfeiture of his position.

Plaintiff's arguments concerning factual disputes regarding the Borough's 

motivation lack validity in light of his forfeiture. In that regard, plaintiff's 

contentions about what might have motivated the Borough's business manager 

or the chief of police do not create a fact that disputes plaintiff's forfeiture of his 

position.

Even if plaintiff could show a prima facie disability discrimination claim, 

he has failed to show that the Borough was motivated by discriminatory intent. 
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In evaluating LAD claims, New Jersey has adopted the three-part burdenshifting approach outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 

802 (1973). Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 13-14 (2002). Under that 

approach, a plaintiff first bears a burden of establishing a prima facie case under 

the LAD. Id. at 14. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of 

production shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by 

articulating "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's action." 

Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 449 (2005) (citing Clowes v. 

Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 596 (1988)). If the employer satisfies its 

burden, "the burden of production shifts back to the employee to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the reason articulated by the employer was 

merely a pretext for discrimination and not the true reason for the employment 

decision." Ibid.

The Borough asserted that it had denied plaintiff medical health benefits 

after he forfeited his employment with the Borough. Given that plaintiff's 

forfeiture of his position was embodied in two court orders, the Borough has 

established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the denial of the health 

benefits. Plaintiff's agreement to that forfeiture as a condition for PTI also 
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establishes that he cannot prove that that non-discriminatory reason was a 

pretext.

B. The Accommodation Claim 

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged a violation of the LAD's publicaccommodation provision, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f). Plaintiff has not stated a publicaccommodation claim. Indeed, his counsel conceded that point at oral argument. 

Moreover, plaintiff did not argue a public-accommodation claim on this appeal. 

Accordingly, we deem plaintiff to have waived his LAD accommodation claim. 

See N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 505-06 n.2 

(App. Div. 2015) (explaining an "issue that is not briefed is deemed waived upon 

appeal"). 

Instead of arguing his public-accommodation claim, plaintiff for the first 

time on this appeal attempts to argue a failure-to-accommodate claim. We 

decline to entertain this new claim. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) 

(explaining that "appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not 

properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation 

[was] available"). Even if we were to consider the failure-to-accommodate

claim, that claim has no merit. See Richter, 246 N.J. at 526; Caraballo v. City 
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of Jersey City Police Dep't, 237 N.J. 255, 268 (2019) (setting forth the elements 

of a failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD).

Affirmed.