alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19

- 60110 Summary Calendar

JULIO ARMANDO BRUNET , Plaintiff

- Appellant

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Defendant

- Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 3:18

- CV

- 456

Before STEWART, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Julio Armando Brunet, federal prisoner # 05079

- 104, appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order releasing
him from incarceration and directing the United States to pay him monetary damages

. A district court’s determination that it will not exercise its discretion to grant a petition for mandamus is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. N ewsome

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set f orth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED December 30, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 19-60110 Document: 00515251854 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/30/2019No. 19

- 60110

2 v. E.E.O.C. , 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). “ Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only in t he clearest and most compelling cases.” In re Willy, 831 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1987). A party seeking mandamus relief must show both that he has no other adequate means to obtain the requested relief and that he has a “clear and indisputable” right to the writ. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Brunet failed to pursue properly his opportunity to appeal his conviction
and sentence that he challenges , and he continues to have an option of seeking postconviction relief. H e is not enti tled to mandamus relief because he failed to pursue remedies that were and may be available to him. Id. Further, Brunet has not shown a clear and indisputable right to relief. Id

. He has failed
to demonstrate that the district court abused its discreti on in denying his petition for a writ of mandamus. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Case: 19-60110 Document: 00515251854 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/30/2019
#### STATE v. LINDSEY

No. 113 PC.

Case below: 25 N.C. App. 343.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 6 June 1975. Motion of Attorney General to dismiss appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question allowed 6 June 1975.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 AND THE STATEMENTS OF INCOME AND CASH FLOWS FOR THE
PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FORM 10-Q QUARTERLY REPORT.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                    1,468,888
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                     11,805
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                         136,420
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                        36,564
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,653,677
<COMMON>                                       308,140
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                         (594)
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                            284,930
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                 592,476
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     40,000
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                           546,373
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                              29,900
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                       0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                       21
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                 444,907
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                1,653,677
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                      536,787
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                            39,136
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     408,343
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     447,479
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                         89,308
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                               6,899
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  96,207
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        29,790
<NET-INCOME>                                    66,417
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                          0
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                   66,417
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        48,785
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                       28,247
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                         145,066
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F1>
<FN>
<F1>ALL OUTSTANDING COMMON STOCK OF KENTUCKY UTILITIES COMPANY IS HELD BY ITS
PARENT COMPANY, KU ENERGY CORPORATION.  THEREFORE, EARNINGS PER SHARE IS NOT
APPLICABLE.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Michael Didyk, Respondent, *v.*Astoria Light, Heat and Power Company, Appellant.

*Didyk*v. *Astoria Light, Heat & Power Co., 172 App.*Div. 891, affirmed.

(Submitted October 28, 1918;

decided November 12, 1918.)

Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered December 31, 1915, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict in an action to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff through the negligence of defendant, his employer, in supplying the plaintiff, while at work in a generator house, with an improper electric drop light,, through which plaintiff claims to have sustained an electric shock, causing him to fall and strike his head on the ground, resulting in partial paralysis of the right side of his head and body. Defendant contended that there was no sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that the plaintiff’s fall was caused by an electric shock, and that there was no evidence of any negligence on the part of the defendant.

*John A. Garver*for appellant.

*Henry M. Dater, Jay S. Jones*and *David Oggins*for respondent.

•Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: His cock, Ch. J., Chase, Collin, Cuddeback, Cardozo and Pound, JJ. Absent: Andrews, J.
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1774 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for an energy 

equivalent of a gallon of diesel in the case of liquefied natural gas 

for purposes of the Inland Waterways Trust Fund financing rate. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 11, 2019 

Mr. CASSIDY (for himself, Mr. BENNET, and Mr. YOUNG) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide 

for an energy equivalent of a gallon of diesel in the 

case of liquefied natural gas for purposes of the Inland 

Waterways Trust Fund financing rate. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Waterway LNG Parity 

5 Act of 2019’’. 


pbinns on DSK79D2C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1774 IS

1 SEC. 2. LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS EQUIVALENT FOR PUR2 POSES OF INLAND WATERWAYS TRUST FUND 

3 FINANCING RATE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 4042(b)(2)(A) of the In5 ternal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended to read as fol6 lows: 

7 ‘‘(A) The Inland Waterways Trust Fund 

8 financing rate is 29 cents per gallon (per en9 ergy equivalent of a gallon of diesel, in the case 

10 of liquefied natural gas).’’. 

11 (b) ENERGY EQUIVALENT OF A GALLON OF DIE12 SEL.—Section 4042(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 

13 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following: 

14 ‘‘(5) ENERGY EQUIVALENT OF A GALLON OF

15 DIESEL WITH RESPECT TO LIQUEFIED NATURAL

16 GAS.—For purposes of paragraph (2)(A), the term 

17 ‘energy equivalent of a gallon of diesel’ means 6.06 

18 pounds of liquefied natural gas.’’. 

19 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

20 this section shall apply to any sale or use of fuel during 

21 any calendar quarter beginning after the date of the enact22 ment of this Act. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSK79D2C42PROD with BILLS
#### HUBERT MONTAGUE and HARVEY MONTAGUE, d/b/a MONTAGUE BUILDING COMPANY, Plaintiffs, *v.*C. T. WOMBLE, Defendant.

(Filed 19 April, 1967.)

Pleadings § 2A—

The effect of sustaining a plea in bar is to destroy the cause of action alleged, and motion to be allowed to. amend thereafter made by plaintiff is properly denied.

Appeal by plaintiffs from *Bone, E.J.,*December 1966 Assigned Civil Session, Wake Superior Court.

*Bailey, Dixon & Wooten by Wright T. Dixon. Jr., -¡or plaintiff appellants.*

*Crisp, Twiggs & Wells by Hugh A. Wells, for defendant appellee.*

Per Curiam.

The plaintiffs’ complaint is quoted in full, the defendant’s answer is summarized, and the pertinent facts involved in this controversy are discussed in the former opinion of this Court reported in 267 N.C. 360.

The plaintiffs’ cause of action was based entirely on the allegation the defendant issued to the plaintiffs a check for $5,000 which did not clear the bank. They demanded judgment for the amount of the check and interest. The defendant admitted signing and delivering the check. As a plea in bar, he alleged the check was intended as a down payment or credit on the purchase price of a *153house and lot which the parties were then negotiating; that the negotiations were entirely in parol, were never consumated and, in fact, the plaintiffs sold and conveyed the house and lot to another; and that the defendant received nothing for the check. These facts appeared from the plaintiffs’ testimony at the trial. They admitted the house and lot were sold to another purchaser. This Court reversed the judgment in plaintiffs’ favor entered in the court below upon the ground the plaintiffs’ evidence established the defendant’s plea in bar.

After our decision was certified to the Superior Court, the plaintiffs appeared and moved to amend their complaint, attempting to set up another and different cause of action. Judge Bone denied the motion and the plaintiffs appealed. When the plea in bar was established, the effect was to destroy the cause of action alleged. Judge Bone was correct in refusing to permit the plaintiffs to amend. The judgment is

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1415 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1415

   To require the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to 
    immediately release certain grant funds awarded for mitigation 
activities under the Community Development Block Grant program, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 9, 2019

  Mr. Manchin (for himself, Mr. Cornyn, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Cruz, Mr. 
 Tillis, and Ms. Harris) introduced the following bill; which was read 
  twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                                Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To require the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to 
    immediately release certain grant funds awarded for mitigation 
activities under the Community Development Block Grant program, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Bipartisan Disaster Recovery Funding 
Act of 2019''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Funding for mitigation activities was appropriated to 
        the Department of Housing and Urban Development by Congress in 
        February 2018 under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (Public 
        Law 115-123; 132 Stat. 64).
            (2) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development told 
        Congress that the funding described in paragraph (1) would be 
        released by May 1, 2019.
            (3) May 1, 2019, has come and gone with no official 
        explanation as to the reason for the continued delay in 
        releasing the funds.

SEC. 3. REQUIREMENT.

    For all amounts made available for mitigation activities under the 
heading ``Department of Housing and Urban Development--Community 
Planning and Development--Community Development Fund'' in Public Law 
115-123, and awarded as grants by the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall, 
not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, release 
such amounts awarded to all eligible grantees, regardless of any 
further studies as may be otherwise required by law.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-7547

PAUL F. LEE,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; RON

ANGELONE; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH

OF VIRGINIA,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, Chief District

Judge. (CA-02-58-7)

Submitted: December 19, 2002 Decided: January 7, 2003

Before WILKINS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Paul F. Lee, Appellant Pro Se. Eugene Paul Murphy, OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Paul F. Lee, a Virginia prisoner, seeks to appeal the district

court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in

a habeas corpus proceeding unless a circuit justice of judge issues

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000).

When, as here, a district court dismisses a § 2254 petition solely

on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not

issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1)’that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a

valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v. Lee, 252

F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000)), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 318 (2001). We have reviewed

the record and conclude for the reasons stated by the district

court that Lee has not made the requisite showing. See Lee v.

Department of Corr., No. CA-02-58-7 (W.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2002).

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Case 1:07-cv-03434-GBD Document 7 Filed 06/29/2007 Page 1 of 1
, . 

- L 

-, 

. . 

UNITEX) STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK *_ .............................. X 

HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO., I 

Plaintiff, 

ARIES FREIGHT SYSTEMS, L.P., 

Defendant. 

FRANK MAAS, United States Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to a conference held earlier today, it is here ORDERED that 

a settlement conference shall be held on October 26,2007, at 5:00 .m, in Courtroom 4 

2OA. A representative with full settlement authority from both part es shall attend the I 

conference. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: New York, New York 

October 11,2007 

Case 1:07-cv-03398-BSJ Document 10 Filed 10/11/2007 Page 1 of 2
Copies To: 

Honorable Barbara S, Jones 

United States District Judge 

Lisa A. Scognamillo, Esq. 

Badiak & Will, LLP 

Fax: (2 12) 376-6777 

Peter J. Zarnbito, Esq. 

Dougherty, Ryan, Giuffia, Zatnbito & Hession 

Fax: (212) 889-1288 

Case 1:07-cv-03398-BSJ Document 10 Filed 10/11/2007 Page 2 of 2
Case 1:07-cv-03429-DCF Document 12 Filed 10/25/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:07-cv-03429-DCF Document 12 Filed 10/25/2007 Page 2 of 2
Case 1:06-cv-15132-AKH Document 4 Filed 12/08/2006 Page 1 of 1
Case 1:06-cv-15118-AKH Document 18 Filed 10/11/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:06-cv-15118-AKH Document 18 Filed 10/11/2007 Page 2 of 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this j st day of May, 2007,1 caused a copy of the foregoing

ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND OF DEFENDANT MERCK & CO., INC. and NOTICE OF

REMOVAL OF DEFENDANT MERCK & CO., INC. to be served via first-class mail, postage

prepaid, on the following:

DINKES & SCHWITZER, ESQS.

William Hamel, Esq.

112 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10016

The above addresses have appeared on the prior papers in this action as the office address

of the attorneys for Plaintiff.

Deponent is over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action.

I further certify under penalty of perjury that under the laws of the United States of

America the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on May I , 2007

Sarah A. Binder

Case 1:07-cv-03453-GBD Document 3-2 Filed 05/03/2007 Page 1 of 1
Case 1:07-cv-03259-HB Document 10-10 Filed 07/09/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:07-cv-03259-HB Document 10-10 Filed 07/09/2007 Page 2 of 2
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1696 

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to eliminate origination fees 

on Federal Direct loans. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 3, 2019 

Mr. BRAUN (for himself, Ms. SINEMA, Mr. COONS, and Mr. SCOTT of Florida) 

introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 

Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to eliminate 

origination fees on Federal Direct loans. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Student Loan Tax 

5 Elimination Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. ELIMINATION OF ORIGINATION FEES ON FEDERAL 

7 DIRECT LOANS. 

8 (a) REPEAL OF ORIGINATION FEES.—Subsection (c) 

9 of section 455 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 

10 U.S.C. 1087e(c)) is repealed. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•S 1696 IS

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) shall apply with respect to loans made 

3 under part D of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 

4 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq.) for which the first dis5 bursement of principal is made, or, in the case of a Fed6 eral Direct Consolidation Loan, the application is received, 

7 on or after July 1, 2019. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

The Board of Directors
ARTISTdirect, Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No.
333-53208, No. 333-38104, No. 333-63572 and No. 68396) on Form S-8 of
ARTISTdirect, Inc. of our report dated February 11, 2002, with respect to the
consolidated balance sheets of ARTISTdirect, Inc. (and its predecessor company
ARTISTdirect, LLC) and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2000 and 2001, and the
related consolidated statements of operations, changes in members' and
stockholders' equity (deficit) and cash flows for each of the years in the three
year period ended December 31, 2001, which report appears in the December 31,
2001, Annual Report on Form 10-K of ARTISTdirect, Inc.


Los Angeles, California                                             KPMG LLP
March 29, 2002
Submitted on record and briefs February 16,

appeal dismissed March 24, 1999

#### CANYON WEST EASTON, *Appellant, v.*S. Frank THOMPSON, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, *Respondent.*

(96C-12479; CA A100118)

976 P2d 1176

Allen R. Peters filed the brief for appellant.

Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General, and Judy C. Lucas, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Landau, Presiding Judge, and Wollheim and Brewer, Judges.

PER CURIAM

*368PER CURIAM

Plaintiff appeals a judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We dismiss the appeal on the ground that it is moot.

In 1987, plaintiff was convicted of first-degree assault and sentenced as a dangerous offender to 30 years, with a minimum sentence of 15 years. On March 20, 1996, the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (Board) conducted a hearing to review plaintiffs status as a dangerous offender. After receiving psychological reports, the Board found that plaintiff continued to be a dangerous offender and declined to set a parole release date. Plaintiff initiated this action, challenging the validity of the March 1996 order declining to set a release date. The trial court dismissed the petition, and plaintiff appealed. Meanwhile, the Board conducted another hearing to review plaintiffs status as a dangerous offender. On March 17, 1998, the Board again concluded that plaintiff continues to be a dangerous offender and again declined to set a parole release date.

The state moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the March 1996 order that plaintiff challenges has been superseded by the March 17,1998, order. Thus, the state reasons, plaintiffs claims with respect to the March 1996 order have become moot. We agree. *Jones v. Thompson,*156 Or App 226, 968 P2d 380 (1998).

Appeal dismissed.
Case 1:07-cr-00371-PKC Document 6 Filed 08/13/2007 Page 1 of 1
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Case 1:06-cv-15115-AKH Document 1 Filed 12/08/2006 Page 9 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-15115-AKH Document 1 Filed 12/08/2006 Page 10 of 13
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Case 1:06-cv-15115-AKH Document 1 Filed 12/08/2006 Page 13 of 13
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 15.1


            Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm


The Board of Directors and Shareholders
Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No.
333-56878) on Form F-3 and the registration statements (No. 333-63814, No.
333-63816, No. 333-89849 and No. 333-116844) on Form S-8 of Chartered
Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd of our report dated March 1, 2006, with
respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Chartered Semiconductor
Manufacturing Ltd and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2004 and 2005, and the
related consolidated statements of operations, comprehensive income (loss),
shareholders' equity and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year
period ended December 31, 2005, which report appears in the December 31, 2005,
annual report on Form 20-F of Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd.


KPMG
SINGAPORE


March 1, 2006