2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-28-2009

Elizabeth Liggon-Redding v. Willingboro Twp

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-1802

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1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-1802

____________

ELIZABETH LIGGON-REDDING,

 Appellant

vs.

WILLINGBORO TOWNSHIP; WILLIAM R. TANTUM, ASSESSOR;

SALLY LANDRY; KUENY, BADGE # 156; WHITE, BADGE # 161

____________________________________

On Appeal From the United States District Court

For the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civ. Nos. 06-cv-03129)

District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler

_______________________________________

No. 08-1803

___________

ELIZABETH LIGGON-REDDING,

 Appellant

vs.

CONGRESS TITLE; KEY PROPERTIES GMAC REALTY

____________________________________

On Appeal From the United States District Court

For the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-01863)
2

District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler

_______________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 2, 2009

Before: Chief Judge SCIRICA, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges

Opinion Filed: September 28, 2009 

____________

 OPINION

____________

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Elizabeth Liggon-Redding appeals the District Court’s orders

dismissing her three complaints. We have consolidated her two appeals for disposition

and will affirm the District Court’s order of July 17, 2007 in (06-cv-3129). We will

vacate the Court’s orders of March 7, 2008 in (06-cv-3129) and (07-cv-1863) and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

An understanding of the complicated nature of the plaintiff’s appeals

requires a review of the background circumstances. Tyrone Redding is a disabled veteran

of the Vietnam War. He receives compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs

(“VA”) which is payable to his mother Marlene Redding, who the VA has entrusted as his

fiduciary. As a disabled veteran, Mr. Redding is also entitled to a property tax exemption

under New Jersey law. See N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.30(a).

In 1977, Mr. Redding married plaintiff. They lived in property located at
 At a May 23, 2006 hearing in front of the Tax Court of the State of New Jersey, 1

Appellate Division, the following exchange occurred,

“The Court: Mr. And Mrs. Redding, you have to

understand [Willingboro Township is] gonna keep on trying

[to challenge Mr. Redding’s eligibility for a disabled

3

82 Hamilton Lane in Willingboro Township, New Jersey. 

Title to the 82 Hamilton Lane property had been transferred from Edgar

Robinson to “Elizabeth House [the plaintiff’s former name] in trust for Stewart A.

Liggon, JR.” on October 31, 1977. 

On January 19, 1998, plaintiff conveyed the title to “T. N. Redding [her

husband], Etux.” Plaintiff stated in the District Court that she transferred the property to

Mr. Redding “so we could get the [veteran’s] property tax exemption.” 

Willingboro Township’s Tax Assessor, William R. Tantum, denied Mr.

Redding the tax exemption for several years on the basis that he had not established that

82 Hamilton Lane was his domicile. Tantum justified his decision with evidence that Mr.

Redding spent a considerable amount of time at his mother’s home in Pennsylvania.

The tax dispute was finally resolved when the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Appellate Division, held that Mr. Redding was entitled to the exemption. See

Twp. of Willingboro v. Redding, No. A-5356-05T1, 2007 WL 250379, at *2 (N.J. Super.

Ct. App. Div. Jan. 31, 2007). 

During the pendency of the tax case, the Reddings stated that they were

going to sell the 82 Hamilton Lane premises, and they indeed conveyed it on June 30, 1
veteran’s property tax exemption] and they’re entitled to do

that every year.

Mr. Redding: I’m selling that place [82

Hamilton Lane].

Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: Your – Your Honor,

we’re moving. We’re selling the house and we’re gone. 

We’re not – 

Mr. Redding: I’m not go[ing] through this.

The Court: Well – 

Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: – go[ing] through this

no more.

The Court: – that may make Mr. Tantum very

happy, I don’t know, but – 

Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: And us too.

The Court: – but they do have the right to do it

every year.

Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: Thank you, Your

Honor.

The Court: Okay.

Mr. Redding: I’ll be gone sometime this year.

Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: You got rid of us. 

We’re out.

Mr. Redding: Thank you.

Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: Thank you so much. 

Yes, Mr. Tantum, you can collect taxes from the next people. 

We’re out. You got what you wanted. You wanted us out.

The Court: It’s been a really fruitful morning.”

4

2006. 

On July 16, 2006, plaintiff filed suit in the District Court. Her complaint,

docketed at (06-cv-3127), named Fidelity National Title, Congress Title Division, the

closing agent for the sale of the property; its parent company, Fidelity National Title

Insurance Company; and Key Properties GMAC Real Estate, a real estate agency
 The following exchange occurred at a June 1, 2007 hearing before the District Court: 2

“[The Court:] Who got the money from the sale [of 82

Hamilton Lane]?

[Mrs. Liggon-Redding:] My husband.

 . . . 

[The Court:] What did he do with the money?

[Mrs. Liggon-Redding:] He gave it to my son.” 

5

involved in the transaction, as defendants. She asserted that the Hamilton Lane property

was sold without her consent and that she was defrauded into signing documents. She

also claimed the right to $10,000 in an escrow account established at the settlement of the

property. In a later proceeding before the District Court, plaintiff admitted that her

husband received the proceeds of the sale of 82 Hamilton Lane and that Mr. Redding

gave that money to the plaintiff’s son Stewart.2

The District Court dismissed the complaint in (06-cv-3127) for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Liggon-Redding v. Cong. Title, No. 06-3127, 2007 WL

432985, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2007). On appeal, we dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B). Liggon-Redding v. Cong. Title, 229 Fed. Appx. 105 (3d Cir. 2007). 

 The present appeals involve three suits that plaintiff subsequently filed in

the District Court. In the amended complaint filed at (06-cv-3129), Willingboro

Township and Tantum are named as defendants. Plaintiff alleges that she and her

husband were deprived of quiet enjoyment of their home because the Township and

Tantum’s alleged discriminatory acts in attempting to collect taxes caused Mr. Redding to

sell their house against her wishes. 
 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941. 

3

 On June 11, 2008, Mrs. Liggon-Redding also filed suit in the Superior Court of New 4

Jersey, Burlington County, Chancery Division, against all of the defendants named in (07-

cv-1863) except Klein. She asserted a claim to quiet title to 82 Hamilton Lane and a

claim pursuant to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. § 56:8-1 et seq. The

case was dismissed with prejudice on September 12, 2008. Redding v. Fid. Nat’l Title,

No. C-77-08, slip op. at 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. Burlington County Ch. Div. Sept. 12, 2008). 

The Court held that Mrs. Liggon-Redding’s claims were “barred by the doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel, as this matter is tantamount to re-litigation of the same

claims and issues that have been raised and brought to final judgment on the merits [in the

District Court].” Id. at 2. We are not aware of any appeal of that case. 

6

The plaintiff’s complaint at (07-cv-1863) asserted a RICO claim pursuant 3

to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 against Anthony Balboni, Linda Huller, Tahir Zaman, Kristine

LaPointe, Charles Wexton, Esq., and Oren Klein, Esq. According to the complaint,

Balboni, Huller, and Zaman are employed by Key Properties; LaPointe and Wexton are

employees of Congress Title; and Klein misrepresented himself as an attorney for Key

Properties. Plaintiff alleges that these defendants committed numerous acts of fraud in

connection with the sale of the family home, “enlisted Willingboro Police Officers to

Harass, Frighten, and Threaten [plaintiff] into not pursuing Justice,” and “have all gotten

together to try to cover up their ongoing fraudulent and illegal activities.” 

4

Her final complaint, which was originally entered in the District Court’s

docket at (07-cv-1890) and subsequently consolidated with her suit at (06-cv-3129),

asserted a RICO claim against Willingboro Township; Tantum; Willingboro police

officers Landry, Kueny, and White; as well as numerous John Doe defendants. 
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides, “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with 5

these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim

against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision

 . . . operates as an adjudication on the merits.” 

7

According to the complaint, the Township, Tantum, the named police officers, and the

Doe defendants committed a series of wrongful acts against plaintiff and her family. 

The District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint that was

filed at (06-cv-3129) for lack of standing. Her complaints that were originally entered in 

the docket at (07-cv-1863) and (07-cv-1890) were dismissed as a sanction pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) because the plaintiff’s failure to comply with numerous Rules of 5

Civil Procedure and court orders in prosecuting her complaints warranted “the extreme

sanction of dismissal.” 

II.

In deciding to impose the sanction of dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaints

that were filed at (07-cv-1863) and (07-cv-1890), the District Court considered the Poulis

factors. See Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). But

a Rule 41(b) “[d]ismissal is a harsh remedy and should be resorted to in only extreme

cases.” Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Marshall v.

Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917, 918 (3d Cir. 1974)). All doubts should be resolved in favor of

reaching a decision on the merits. See Briscoe v. Klaus, 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2008).

 The plaintiff’s abusive language and failures to heed helpful suggestions
8

have sorely taxed the patience of the District Court, whose restraint has been

commendable. Nevertheless we prefer to address the merits in this case rather than

impose sanctions. 

The plaintiff’s complaints at (07-cv-1863) and (07-cv-1890) contain two

types of claims. The first consists of RICO claims. A necessary element of a cognizable

RICO claim where the collection of an unlawful debt is not alleged is the presence of “a

pattern of racketeering activity.” H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 232

(1989).

A pattern of racketeering activity occurs when a defendant commits a set of

predicate racketeering acts, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), that “are related, and . . . amount to

or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1292 (3d

Cir. 1995) (quoting H. J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239) (emphasis omitted). Continuity can be

proved by showing “either . . . a closed period of repeated conduct, or . . . past conduct

that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.” H. J. Inc., 492 U.S.

at 241. 

We find no basis in the extensive pleadings in this case for any RICO

claims. Plaintiff has not alleged a set of predicate racketeering acts that satisfy RICO’s

continuity requirement. See id. at 242 (“[p]redicate acts extending over a few weeks or

months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy [RICO’s continuity]

requirement”). She therefore has not stated a RICO claim upon which relief can be
 We note that the plaintiff has not demonstrated any particularly objectionable 6

conduct with respect to her excessive force claim. 

9

granted. Upon remand, the District Court shall dismiss the plaintiff’s RICO claims

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

 The second type of claim that appears in the complaints filed at (07-cv1863) and (07-cv-1890) is one of the use of excessive force by the police against the

plaintiff personally. She asserts that she was physically assaulted during arrests that

occurred on August 29 and September 21, 2006. 

A pro se complaint “is to be liberally construed . . . and . . . must be held to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff’s pleadings are sufficient to state an excessive

force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court shall reinstate this claim on

remand.6

III.

The District Court’s dismissed the plaintiff’s discrimination claim in (06-

cv-3129) for lack of standing. We will affirm.

In her amended complaint at (06-cv-3129), plaintiff alleged that

Willingboro Township and Tantum “attempt[ed] to take away the Veterans Tax

Exemption which her husband is entitled to because of his service in Viet Nam” on the
10

basis of Mr. Redding’s race and disability. When pressed by the District Court as to why

she was the party bringing this claim, plaintiff stated that she had authority to bring the

claim on behalf of Mr. Redding pursuant to a power-of-attorney agreement. However she

was unable to prove that Mr. Redding was competent when he executed the alleged

power-of-attorney agreement, and the District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of

standing. 

The District Court properly dismissed this complaint. Pro se plaintiffs are

generally prohibited “from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative

capacity.” Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9 Cir. 2008). As this Court th

has observed, “[i]t goes without saying that it is not in the interest of . . . incompetents

that they be represented by non-attorneys.” Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d

876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906

F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)).

IV.

In sum, we will affirm the District Court’s July 17, 2007 order dismissing

the plaintiff’s amended complaint at (06-cv-3129). We will vacate the Court’s March 7,

2008 orders in (07-cv-1863) and (06-cv-3129) dismissing the plaintiff’s complaints that

were filed at dockets (07-cv-1863) and (07-cv-1890) pursuant to Rule 41(b) and remand

for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.