II 

Calendar No. 99 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 178 

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in 

Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and 

harassment of these communities inside and outside China. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 17, 2019 

Mr. RUBIO (for himself, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. GARDNER, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. 

CORNYN, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Mr. DAINES, Mr. COONS, Mr. MORAN, Mr. 

KAINE, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. COTTON, Mr. MERKLEY, 

Ms. WARREN, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. KING, Mr. TOOMEY, 

Mr. BROWN, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. BRAUN, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. PETERS, Mr. 

SASSE, Mr. CARDIN, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. SANDERS, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. 

REED, Mr. WARNER, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. ISAKSON, Mr. CASEY, and Mrs. 

CAPITO) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

JUNE 3, 2019 

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment 

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 

A BILL 

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic 

Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary 

detention, torture, and harassment of these communities 

inside and outside China. 


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1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Uyghur Human Rights 

5 Policy Act of 2019’’. 

6 SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. 

7 The purpose of this Act is to direct United States 

8 resources to address gross violations of universally recog9 nized human rights, including the mass internment of over 

10 1,000,000 Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim eth11 nic minorities in China and the intimidation and threats 

12 faced by United States citizens and legal permanent resi13 dents. 

14 SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. 

15 In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional 

16 committees’’ means— 

17 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

18 Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee 

19 on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Hous20 ing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judi21 ciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 

22 Senate; and 

23 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

24 Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select 

25 Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on FinanVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:00 Jun 04, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6401 E:\BILLS\S178.RS S178

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1 cial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and 

2 the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 

3 Representatives. 

4 SEC. 4. FINDINGS. 

5 Congress makes the following findings: 

6 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

7 China (PRC) has a long history of repressing ap8 proximately 13,000,000 Turkic, moderate Sunni 

9 Muslims, particularly Uyghurs, in the nominally au10 tonomous Xinjiang region. These actions are in con11 travention of international human rights standards, 

12 including the Universal Declaration of Human 

13 Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 

14 Political Rights. 

15 (2) In recent decades, central and regional Chi16 nese government policies have systematically dis17 criminated against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and 

18 other Muslims in Xinjiang by denying them a range 

19 of civil and political rights, including the freedoms of 

20 expression, religion, movement, and a fair trial, 

21 among others. 

22 (3) Increased unrest in the Xinjiang region as 

23 a result of the central government’s severe repres24 sion is used in Orwellian fashion by the Government 

25 of the People’s Republic of China as evidence of 


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1 ‘‘terrorism’’ and ‘‘separatism’’ and as an excuse for 

2 further disproportionate response. 

3 (4) In 2014, Chinese authorities launched their 

4 latest ‘‘Strike Hard against Violent Extremism’’ 

5 campaign, in which the pretext of wide-scale, inter6 nationally linked threats of terrorism were used to 

7 justify pervasive restrictions on, and gross human 

8 rights violations of, the ethnic minority communities 

9 of Xinjiang. 

10 (5) Those policies included— 

11 (A) pervasive, high-tech surveillance across 

12 the region, including the arbitrary collection of 

13 biodata, including DNA samples from children, 

14 without their knowledge or consent; 

15 (B) the use of QR codes outside homes to 

16 gather information on how frequently individ17 uals pray; 

18 (C) facial and voice recognition software 

19 and ‘‘predictive policing’’ databases; and 

20 (D) severe restrictions on the freedom of 

21 movement across the region. 

22 (6) Chinese security forces have never been held 

23 accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in 

24 Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya 


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1 (2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of 

2 Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014). 

3 (7)(A) The August 2016 transfer of former 

4 Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen 

5 Quanguo to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary 

6 prompted an acceleration in the crackdown across 

7 the region. 

8 (B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used 

9 chilling political rhetoric to describe the purpose of 

10 government policy including ‘‘eradicating tumors’’ 

11 and ‘‘spray[ing] chemicals’’ on crops to kill the 

12 ‘‘weeds’’. 

13 (C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese 

14 cultural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and 

15 unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to 

16 state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as 

17 muqam (a musical tradition) and meshrep (tradi18 tional cultural gatherings), and due to elimination of 

19 the Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in 

20 Xinjiang schools and universities. 

21 (8) In 2017, credible reports found that family 

22 members of Uyghurs living outside of China had 

23 gone missing inside China, that Chinese authorities 

24 were pressuring those outside the country to return, 


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1 and that individuals were being arbitrarily detained 

2 in large numbers. 

3 (9) There is ample credible evidence provided 

4 by scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, 

5 and think tanks substantiating the establishment by 

6 Chinese authorities of ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps. 

7 (10) Independent organizations conducted 

8 interviews, including testimonies from Kayrat 

9 Samarkan, Omir Bekali, and Mihrigul Tursun, along 

10 with others who had been detained in such facilities, 

11 who described forced political indoctrination, torture, 

12 beatings, food deprivation, and solitary confinement, 

13 as well as uncertainty as to the length of detention, 

14 humiliation, and denial of religious, cultural, and lin15 guistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told 

16 by guards that the only way to secure release was 

17 to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty. Poor con18 ditions and lack of medical treatment at such facili19 ties appear to have contributed to the deaths of 

20 some detainees, including the elderly and infirm. 

21 Uyghurs Muhammed Salih Hajim (2018), Yaqupjan 

22 Naman (2018), Abdughappar Abdujappar (2018), 

23 Ayhan Memet (2018), Abdulreshit Seley Hajim 

24 (2018), Nurimangul Memet (2018), Adalet Teyip 

25 (2018), Abdulehed Mehsum (2017), Hesen Imin 


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1 (2017), and Sawut Raxman (2017) reportedly died 

2 while in the custody of the Chinese authorities in 

3 ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps, without proper inves4 tigation of the circumstances. 

5 (11) Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now ob6 tained permanent residence or citizenship in other 

7 countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment 

8 from Chinese officials. 

9 (12) Under pressure from the Government of 

10 the People’s Republic of China, countries have forc11 ibly returned Uyghurs to China in violation of the 

12 non-refoulement principle and their well-founded 

13 fear of persecution. States returning Uyghurs in14 clude Egypt (2017), the United Arab Emirates 

15 (2017), Malaysia (2011, 2013), Thailand (2011, 

16 2015), Laos (2010), Burma (2010), Cambodia 

17 (2009), Vietnam (2014), Kazakhstan (1999, 2001, 

18 2003, 2006), Uzbekistan (2007), Tajikistan (2011), 

19 Pakistan (2003, 2009, 2011), Nepal (2002), and 

20 India (2016). 

21 (13) Six journalists for Radio Free Asia’s 

22 Uyghur service have publicly detailed abuses their 

23 family members in Xinjiang have endured in re24 sponse to their work exposing abusive policies across 

25 the region. 


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1 (14) Several United States-based companies are 

2 conducting business with Xinjiang authorities with3 out sufficient due diligence or safeguards to ensure 

4 their business operations do not create or contribute 

5 to human rights violations. 

6 (15) The Government of the People’s Republic 

7 of China is increasingly investing in the ‘‘Belt and 

8 Road Initiative’’ across Xinjiang and throughout 

9 Central Asia, extending its influence through organi10 zations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza11 tion without regard to the political, cultural, or lin12 guistic rights of ethnic minorities. 

13 (16) The Secretary of State, Congressional-Ex14 ecutive Commission on China, Tom Lantos Human 

15 Rights Commission, and individual members of the 

16 executive branch and Congress have all expressed 

17 growing concern regarding the pervasive human 

18 rights abuses across Xinjiang and the ‘‘political re19 education’’ camps. 

20 (17) In August 2018, the United Nations Com21 mittee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination challenged 

22 the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

23 over abuses in Xinjiang, including the establishment 

24 of mass arbitrary detention camps. 


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1 (18) Between August and September 2018, 

2 Chinese authorities responded to these allegations by 

3 either flatly denying them or insisting that the facili4 ties are ‘‘vocational training centers’’. 

5 (19) In September 2018, newly appointed 

6 United Nations High Commissioner for Human 

7 Rights Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as 

8 High Commissioner the ‘‘deeply disturbing allega9 tions of large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs 

10 and other Muslim communities, in so-called re-edu11 cation camps across Xinjiang’’. 

12 (20) On September 18, 2018, the Washington 

13 Post editorial board wrote, ‘‘At stake is not just the 

14 welfare of the Uighurs, but also whether the tech15 nologies of the 21st century will be employed to 

16 smother human freedom.’’ 

17 (21) In December 2018 testimony before the 

18 Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and Inter19 national Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on 

20 Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Assistant 

21 Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 

22 Scott Busby testified that the number of those de23 tained in camps since April 2017 was ‘‘at least 

24 800,000 and possibly more than 2 million’’. 


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1 (22) In December 2018, independent media re2 ports pointed to growing evidence of forced labor in 

3 the camps, as well as reports of individuals who have 

4 been released from camps being forced to labor in 

5 nearby factories for low wages under threat of being 

6 sent back to ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps. 

7 (23) In December 2018 and January 2019, 

8 Chinese officials organized visits to ‘‘political reedu9 cation’’ camps in Xinjiang for a small group of for10 eign journalists and diplomats from 12 non-Western 

11 countries. In the months preceding the visits, inter12 national media reported that officials worked to re13 move security features from some ‘‘political reeduca14 tion’’ facilities, and coached detainees and area resi15 dents not to make negative comments about the 

16 camps. Reports also indicated that officials had 

17 transferred large numbers of detainees to detention 

18 facilities in other parts of China. 

19 (24) Experts have described the Xinjiang region 

20 as ‘‘a police state to rival North Korea, with a for21 malized racism on the order of South African apart22 heid’’ and the repression in the Xinjiang region as 

23 a ‘‘slow motion Tiananmen’’. 

24 SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

25 It is the sense of Congress that— 


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1 (1) the President should condemn abuses 

2 against Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities in 

3 Xinjiang and call on Chinese President Xi Jinping 

4 to recognize the profound abuse and likely lasting 

5 damage of China’s current policies, and immediately 

6 close the ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps, lift all re7 strictions on and ensure respect for internationally 

8 guaranteed human rights across the region, and 

9 allow for reestablishment of contact between those 

10 inside and outside China; 

11 (2) the United States Government should de12 velop a strategy to support the United Nations High 

13 Commissioner for Human Rights and numerous 

14 United Nations Special Rapporteurs’ urgent calls for 

15 immediate and unfettered access to Xinjiang, includ16 ing the ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps and instruct 

17 representatives of the United States at the United 

18 Nations to use the voice and vote of the United 

19 States to condemn the mass arbitrary detainment, 

20 torture, and forced labor of Turkic Muslims in the 

21 People’s Republic of China; 

22 (3) the Secretary of State should consider the 

23 applicability of existing authorities, including the 

24 Global Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of Public Law 

25 114–328), to impose targeted sanctions on members 


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1 of the Government of the People’s Republic of 

2 China, the Chinese Communist Party, and state se3 curity apparatus, including Xinjiang Party Secretary 

4 Chen Quanguo and other officials credibly alleged to 

5 be responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang 

6 and elsewhere; 

7 (4) the Secretary of State should fully imple8 ment the provisions of the Frank Wolf International 

9 Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114–281) and 

10 consider strategically employing sanctions and other 

11 tools under the International Religious Freedom Act 

12 (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.) and to employ measures re13 quired as part of the ‘‘Country of Particular Con14 cern’’ (CPC) designation for the Government of the 

15 People’s Republic of China that directly address par16 ticularly severe violations of religious freedom; 

17 (5) the Secretary of Commerce should review 

18 and consider the prohibition on the sale or provision 

19 of any United States-made goods or services to any 

20 state agent in Xinjiang, and add the Xinjiang 

21 branch of the Chinese Communist Party, the 

22 Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, and the Xinjiang 

23 Office of the United Front Work Department, or 

24 any entity acting on their behalf to facilitate the 

25 mass internment or forced labor of Turkic Muslims, 


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1 to the ‘‘Entity List’’ administered by the Depart2 ment of Commerce; 

3 (6) the Secretary of State should explore appro4 priate mechanisms to establish a voluntary database 

5 to which United States citizens or permanent resi6 dent family members of the Uyghur diaspora can 

7 provide details about missing family members, with 

8 a view towards pressing for information and ac9 countability from the Government of the People’s 

10 Republic of China, and take appropriate measures to 

11 expedite the asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 

12 and other Turkic Muslim minorities; 

13 (7) United States companies and individuals 

14 selling goods or services or otherwise operating in 

15 Xinjiang should take steps, including in any public 

16 or financial filings, to publicly assert that their com17 mercial activities are not contributing to human 

18 rights violations in Xinjiang or elsewhere in China 

19 and that their supply chains are not compromised by 

20 forced labor; 

21 (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation and ap22 propriate United States law enforcement entities 

23 should track and take steps to hold accountable offi24 cials from China who harass, threaten, or intimidate 

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1 dents, including Turkic Muslims, Uyghur-Americans, 

2 Chinese-Americans, and Chinese nationals legally 

3 studying or working in the United States; 

4 (9) the Secretary of State should work with tra5 ditional United States allies and partners to take 

6 similar steps and coordinate closely on targeted 

7 sanctions and visa restrictions; and 

8 (10) the work of Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur lan9 guage service should be commended for providing a 

10 detailed and accurate account of current events fac11 ing Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China 

12 despite efforts by the Government of the People’s 

13 Republic of China to intimidate their reporting 

14 through threats and detention of family members 

15 living in China. 

16 SEC. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT. 

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

18 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 

19 Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, 

20 shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees 

21 a classified and unclassified report to assess national and 

22 regional security threats posed by the crackdown across 

23 Xinjiang, the frequency with which Central and Southeast 

24 Asian governments are forcibly returning Turkic Muslim 

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1 ment of technology used by the Government of the Peo2 ple’s Republic of China that facilitates the mass intern3 ment and surveillance of Turkic Muslims, including tech4 nology relating to predictive policing and large-scale data 

5 collection and analysis. 

6 (b) ANNEX.—The report required under subsection 

7 (a) shall include an annex with a list of all Chinese compa8 nies involved in the construction or operation of the ‘‘polit9 ical education’’ camps, and the provision or operation of 

10 surveillance technology or operations, across Xinjiang. 

11 SEC. 7. PROTECTING CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS OF THE 

12 UNITED STATES FROM INTIMIDATION AND 

13 COERCION. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

15 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Fed16 eral Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Sec17 retary of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate 

18 congressional committees that outlines any and all efforts 

19 to provide information to and protect United States citi20 zens and residents, including ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese 

21 nationals legally studying or working temporarily in the 

22 United States who have experienced harassment or intimi23 dation by officials or agents of the Government of the Peo24 ple’s Republic of China and the Communist Party within 

25 the United States and those whose families in China have 


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1 experienced threats or detention because of their work or 

2 advocacy. 

3 (b) DATABASE OF DETAINED FAMILY MEMBERS OF

4 UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS.—The Sec5 retary of State should explore appropriate mechanisms to 

6 establish a voluntary database to which United States citi7 zens or permanent resident family members of the Uyghur 

8 diaspora can provide details about missing family mem9 bers, with a view towards pressing for information and ac10 countability from the Government of the People’s Republic 

11 of China and to take appropriate measures to expedite the 

12 asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic 

13 Muslim minorities. 

14 SEC. 8. REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. 

15 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date 

16 of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United 

17 States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appro18 priate congressional committees a report that— 

19 (1) describes the current status and reach of 

20 United States broadcasting to the Xinjiang region 

21 and Uyghur speaking communities globally, barriers 

22 to the free flow of news and information to these 

23 communities, and, if appropriate, detailed technical 

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1 casting and other media to these communities glob2 ally; 

3 (2) describes efforts to intimidate Radio Free 

4 Asia and Voice of America reporters reporting on 

5 human rights issues in the People’s Republic of 

6 China; and 

7 (3) in consultation with the Global Engagement 

8 Center at the Department of State, describes and 

9 assesses disinformation and propaganda by the Gov10 ernment of the People’s Republic of China or other 

11 members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

12 targeting Uyghur communities globally and efforts 

13 to downplay gross violations of universally recog14 nized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region 

15 and any activities or programs that address these ef16 forts. 

17 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con18 gress that the journalists of the Uyghur language service 

19 of Radio Free Asia should be highly commended for their 

20 reporting on the human rights and political situation in 

21 Xinjiang despite efforts to silence or intimidate their re22 porting through the detention of family members and rel23 atives by the Government of the People’s Republic of 

24 China. 


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1 SEC. 9. ANNUAL REPORT. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

3 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 

4 the Secretary of State, after consulting relevant Federal 

5 agencies and civil society organizations, shall submit to the 

6 appropriate congressional committees and make available 

7 on the website of Department of State an interagency re8 port that includes— 

9 (1) an assessment of the number of individuals 

10 detained in political ‘‘reeducation camps’’ and condi11 tions in the camps for detainees in the Xinjiang re12 gion, including whether detainees endure torture, 

13 forced renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment; 

14 (2) a description, as possible, of the geographic 

15 location of the camps and estimates of the number 

16 of people detained in such facilities; 

17 (3) a description, as possible, of the methods 

18 used by People’s Republic of China authorities to 

19 ‘‘reeducate’’ Uyghur detainees as well as the Peo20 ple’s Republic of China agencies in charge of reedu21 cation; 

22 (4) an assessment of the number of individuals 

23 being arbitrarily detained, including in pretrial de24 tention centers and prisons; 


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1 (5) an assessment of forced labor in the camps 

2 and in regional factories for low wages under threat 

3 of being sent back to ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps; 

4 (6) a list of Chinese companies and industries 

5 benefiting from such labor, and a description of ac6 tions taken to address forced labor in Xinjiang con7 current with the People’s Republic of China’s Tier 

8 3 designation under the 2018 Trafficking in Persons 

9 Report; 

10 (7) an assessment of the level of access People’s 

11 Republic of China authorities grant to diplomats, 

12 journalists, and others to the Xinjiang region and a 

13 description of measures used to impede efforts to 

14 monitor human rights conditions in the Xinjiang re15 gion; 

16 (8) an assessment of the repressive surveillance, 

17 detection, and control methods used by People’s Re18 public of China authorities in the Xinjiang region, 

19 and a list of individuals who hold senior leadership 

20 positions and are responsible for ‘‘high-tech’’ polic21 ing, mass incarceration, and reeducation efforts tar22 geting Uyghur and other predominately Muslim eth23 nic minorities in the Xinjiang region; and 

24 (9) a description of United States diplomatic ef25 forts to address the gross violations of universally 


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1 recognized rights in the Xinjiang region and to pro2 tect asylum seekers from the region, including in 

3 multilateral institutions and through bilateral rela4 tions with the People’s Republic of China, the na5 tions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 

6 (OIC), and other countries. 

7 (b) TERMINATION.—The Secretary of State may ter8 minate the report required under subsection (a) if the Sec9 retary certifies to the appropriate congressional commit10 tees that the gross violations of universally recognized 

11 human rights and mass detention of Uyghurs and other 

12 predominately Muslim ethnic minorities have ended in the 

13 Xinjiang region. 

14 SEC. 10. SPECIAL COORDINATOR AT THE DEPARTMENT OF 

15 STATE. 

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State should 

17 consider the establishment of a new position within the 

18 Department of State, the United States Special Coordi19 nator for Xinjiang, who will coordinate diplomatic, polit20 ical, public diplomacy, financial assistance, sanctions, 

21 counterterrorism, security resources, and congressional re22 porting requirements within the United States Govern23 ment to respond to the gross violations of universally rec24 ognized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region, 

25 including by addressing the mass detentions of Uyghurs 


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1 and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, the de2 ployment of technologically advanced surveillance and po3 lice detection methods, and the counterterrorism and 

4 counter-radicalism claims used to justify the policies of the 

5 Government of the People’s Republic of China in Xinjiang. 

6 (b) APPOINTMENT.—If the Secretary determines that 

7 establishment of the position described in subsection (a) 

8 is appropriate, the Secretary may appoint the Special Co9 ordinator from among officers and employees of the De10 partment of State. The Secretary may allow such officer 

11 or employee to retain the position (and the responsibilities 

12 associated with such position) held by such officer or em13 ployee prior to the appointment of such officer or employee 

14 to the position of Special Coordinator. 

15 (c) TERMINATION.—The Secretary of State may ter16 minate the Special Coordinator position 45 days after cer17 tifying to the appropriate congressional committees that 

18 the gross violations of universally recognized human rights 

19 and mass detention of Uyghurs and other predominately 

20 Muslim ethnic minorities have ended in the Xinjiang re21 gion. 

22 (d) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary shall consult 

23 with the chairman and ranking minority members of the 

24 appropriate congressional committees prior to the designa25 tion of the Special Coordinator under this section. 


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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Uyghur Human Rights 

3 Policy Act of 2019’’. 

4 SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. 

5 The purpose of this Act is to direct United States re6 sources to address gross violations of universally recognized 

7 human rights, including the mass internment of over 

8 1,000,000 Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim ethnic 

9 minorities in China and the intimidation and threats faced 

10 by United States citizens and legal permanent residents. 

11 SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. 

12 In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional 

13 committees’’ means— 

14 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

15 Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee 

16 on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

17 and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, 

18 and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 

19 and 

20 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com21 mittee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Com22 mittee on Intelligence, the Committee on Financial 

23 Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the 

24 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep25 resentatives. 


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1 SEC. 4. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

4 China has a long history of repressing approximately 

5 13,000,000 Turkic, moderate Sunni Muslims, particu6 larly Uyghurs, in the nominally autonomous 

7 Xinjiang region. These actions are in contravention of 

8 international human rights standards, including the 

9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 

10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

11 (2) In recent decades, central and regional Chi12 nese government policies have systematically dis13 criminated against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and 

14 other Muslims in Xinjiang by denying them a range 

15 of civil and political rights, including the freedoms of 

16 expression, religion, movement, and a fair trial, 

17 among others. 

18 (3) Increased unrest in the Xinjiang region as a 

19 result of the central government’s severe repression is 

20 used in Orwellian fashion by the Government of the 

21 People’s Republic of China as evidence of ‘‘terrorism’’ 

22 and ‘‘separatism’’ and as an excuse for further dis23 proportionate response. 

24 (4) In 2014, Chinese authorities launched their 

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1 ally linked threats of terrorism were used to justify 

2 pervasive restrictions on, and gross human rights vio3 lations against, the ethnic minority communities of 

4 Xinjiang. 

5 (5) Those policies included— 

6 (A) pervasive, high-tech surveillance across 

7 the region, including the arbitrary collection of 

8 biodata, such as DNA samples from children, 

9 without their knowledge or consent; 

10 (B) the use of QR codes outside homes to 

11 gather information on how frequently individ12 uals pray; 

13 (C) facial and voice recognition software 

14 and ‘‘predictive policing’’ databases; and 

15 (D) severe restrictions on the freedom of 

16 movement across the region. 

17 (6) Chinese security forces have never been held 

18 accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in 

19 Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya 

20 (2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of 

21 Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014). 

22 (7)(A) The August 2016 transfer of former Tibet 

23 Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen Quanguo 

24 to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary prompted an 

25 acceleration in the crackdown across the region. 


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1 (B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used chilling 

2 political rhetoric to describe the purpose of govern3 ment policy, including ‘‘eradicating tumors’’ and 

4 ‘‘spray[ing] chemicals’’ on crops to kill the ‘‘weeds’’. 

5 (C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese cul6 tural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and 

7 unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to 

8 state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as 

9 muqam (a musical tradition) and meshrep (tradi10 tional cultural gatherings), and due to elimination of 

11 the Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in 

12 Xinjiang schools and universities. 

13 (8) In 2017, credible reports found that family 

14 members of Uyghurs living outside of China had gone 

15 missing inside China, that Chinese authorities were 

16 pressuring those outside the country to return, and 

17 that individuals were being arbitrarily detained in 

18 large numbers. 

19 (9) There is ample credible evidence provided by 

20 scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, and 

21 think tanks substantiating the establishment by Chi22 nese authorities of ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps. 

23 (10) Independent organizations conducted inter24 views, including testimonies from Kayrat Samarkan, 

25 Omir Bekali, and Mihrigul Tursun, along with others 


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1 who had been detained in such facilities, who de2 scribed forced political indoctrination, torture, beat3 ings, food deprivation, and solitary confinement, as 

4 well as uncertainty as to the length of detention, hu5 miliation, and denial of religious, cultural, and lin6 guistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told 

7 by guards that the only way to secure release was to 

8 demonstrate sufficient political loyalty. Poor condi9 tions and lack of medical treatment at such facilities 

10 appear to have contributed to the deaths of some de11 tainees, including the elderly and infirm. Uyghurs 

12 Muhammed Salih Hajim (2018), Yaqupjan Naman 

13 (2018), Abdughappar Abdujappar (2018), Ayhan 

14 Memet (2018), Abdulreshit Seley Hajim (2018), 

15 Nurimangul Memet (2018), Adalet Teyip (2018), 

16 Abdulehed Mehsum (2017), Hesen Imin (2017), and 

17 Sawut Raxman (2017) reportedly died while in the 

18 custody of the Chinese authorities in ‘‘political reedu19 cation’’ camps, without proper investigation of the 

20 circumstances. 

21 (11) Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now ob22 tained permanent residence or citizenship in other 

23 countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment 

24 from Chinese officials. 


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1 (12) Under pressure from the Government of the 

2 People’s Republic of China, countries have forcibly re3 turned Uyghurs to China in violation of the non4 refoulement principle and their well-founded fear of 

5 persecution. States returning Uyghurs include Egypt, 

6 Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Burma, Cambodia, Viet7 nam, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, 

8 Nepal, and India. 

9 (13) Six journalists for Radio Free Asia’s 

10 Uyghur service have publicly detailed abuses their 

11 family members in Xinjiang have endured in response 

12 to their work exposing abusive policies across the re13 gion. 

14 (14) Several United States-based companies are 

15 conducting business with Xinjiang authorities without 

16 sufficient due diligence or safeguards to ensure their 

17 business operations do not create or contribute to 

18 human rights violations. 

19 (15) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

20 China is increasingly investing in the ‘‘Belt and 

21 Road Initiative’’ across Xinjiang and throughout 

22 Central Asia, extending its influence through organi23 zations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza24 tion without regard to the political, religious, cul25 tural, or linguistic rights of ethnic minorities. 


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1 (16) The Secretary of State, Congressional-Exec2 utive Commission on China, Tom Lantos Human 

3 Rights Commission, and individual members of the 

4 executive branch and Congress have all expressed 

5 growing concern regarding the pervasive human 

6 rights abuses across Xinjiang and the ‘‘political re7 education’’ camps. 

8 (17) In August 2018, the United Nations Com9 mittee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination challenged 

10 the Government of the People’s Republic of China over 

11 abuses in Xinjiang, including the establishment of 

12 mass arbitrary detention camps. 

13 (18) Between August and September 2018, Chi14 nese authorities responded to these allegations by ei15 ther flatly denying them or insisting that the facili16 ties are ‘‘vocational training centers’’. 

17 (19) In September 2018, newly appointed United 

18 Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 

19 Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as High 

20 Commissioner the ‘‘deeply disturbing allegations of 

21 large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs and other 

22 Muslim communities, in so-called re-education camps 

23 across Xinjiang’’. 

24 (20) On September 18, 2018, the Washington 

25 Post editorial board wrote, ‘‘At stake is not just the 


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1 welfare of the Uighurs, but also whether the tech2 nologies of the 21st century will be employed to 

3 smother human freedom.’’ 

4 (21) In December 2018 testimony before the Sub5 committee on East Asia, the Pacific, and Inter6 national Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on 

7 Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Assistant 

8 Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 

9 Scott Busby testified that the number of those de10 tained in camps since April 2017 was ‘‘at least 

11 800,000 and possibly more than 2 million’’. 

12 (22) In December 2018, independent media re13 ports pointed to growing evidence of forced labor in 

14 the camps, as well as reports of individuals who have 

15 been released from camps being forced to labor in 

16 nearby factories for low wages under threat of being 

17 sent back to ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps. 

18 (23) In December 2018 and January 2019, Chi19 nese officials organized visits to ‘‘political reeduca20 tion’’ camps in Xinjiang for a small group of foreign 

21 journalists and diplomats from 12 non-Western coun22 tries. In the months preceding the visits, international 

23 media reported that officials worked to remove secu24 rity features from some ‘‘political reeducation’’ facili25 ties, and coached detainees and area residents not to 


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1 make negative comments about the camps. Reports 

2 also indicated that officials had transferred large 

3 numbers of detainees to detention facilities in other 

4 parts of China. 

5 (24) Experts have described the Xinjiang region 

6 as ‘‘a police state to rival North Korea, with a for7 malized racism on the order of South African apart8 heid’’ and the repression in the Xinjiang region as a 

9 ‘‘slow motion Tiananmen’’. 

10 (25) On December 31, 2018, President Donald J. 

11 Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initia12 tive Act of 2018 (Public Law 105–409), which con13 demned China’s ‘‘forced disappearances, extralegal de14 tentions, invasive and omnipresent surveillance, and 

15 lack of due process in judicial proceedings,’’ author16 ized funding to promote democracy, human rights, 

17 and the rule of law in China, and supported sanc18 tions designations against any entity or individual 

19 that— 

20 (A) violates human rights or religious free21 doms; or 

22 (B) engages in censorship activities. 

23 SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

24 It is the sense of Congress that— 


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1 (1) the President should condemn abuses against 

2 Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities in Xinjiang 

3 and call on Chinese President Xi Jinping to recognize 

4 the profound abuse and likely lasting damage of Chi5 na’s current policies, and immediately close the ‘‘po6 litical reeducation’’ camps, lift all restrictions on and 

7 ensure respect for internationally guaranteed human 

8 rights across the region, and allow for reestablishment 

9 of contact between those inside and outside China; 

10 (2) the United States Government should develop 

11 a strategy to support the United Nations High Com12 missioner for Human Rights and numerous United 

13 Nations Special Rapporteurs’ urgent calls for imme14 diate and unfettered access to Xinjiang, including the 

15 ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps, and instruct represent16 atives of the United States at the United Nations to 

17 use the voice and vote of the United States to con18 demn the mass arbitrary detainment, torture, and 

19 forced labor of Turkic Muslims in the People’s Repub20 lic of China; 

21 (3) the Secretary of State should consider the ap22 plicability of existing authorities, including the Glob23 al Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of Public Law 114–328), 

24 to impose targeted sanctions on members of the Gov25 ernment of the People’s Republic of China, the ChiVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:00 Jun 04, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\S178.RS S178

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1 nese Communist Party, and state security apparatus, 

2 including Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo 

3 and other officials credibly alleged to be responsible 

4 for human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere; 

5 (4) the Secretary of State should fully implement 

6 the provisions of the Frank Wolf International Reli7 gious Freedom Act (Public Law 114–281) and con8 sider strategically employing sanctions and other 

9 tools under the International Religious Freedom Act 

10 (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.) and to employ measures re11 quired as part of the ‘‘Country of Particular Con12 cern’’ (CPC) designation for the Government of the 

13 People’s Republic of China that directly address par14 ticularly severe violations of religious freedom; 

15 (5) the Secretary of Commerce should review and 

16 consider prohibiting the sale or provision of any 

17 United States-made goods or services to any state 

18 agent in Xinjiang, and adding the Xinjiang branch 

19 of the Chinese Communist Party, the Xinjiang Public 

20 Security Bureau, and the Xinjiang Office of the 

21 United Front Work Department, or any entity acting 

22 on their behalf to facilitate the mass internment or 

23 forced labor of Turkic Muslims, to the ‘‘Entity List’’ 

24 administered by the Department of Commerce; 


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1 (6) United States companies and individuals 

2 selling goods or services or otherwise operating in 

3 Xinjiang should take steps, including in any public 

4 or financial filings, to publicly assert that their com5 mercial activities are not contributing to human 

6 rights violations in Xinjiang or elsewhere in China 

7 and that their supply chains are not compromised by 

8 forced labor; 

9 (7) the Federal Bureau of Investigation and ap10 propriate United States law enforcement entities 

11 should track and take steps to hold accountable offi12 cials from China who harass, threaten, or intimidate 

13 not only United States citizens and legal permanent 

14 residents, including Turkic Muslims, Uyghur-Ameri15 cans, and Chinese-Americans, but also Chinese na16 tionals legally studying or working in the United 

17 States; 

18 (8) the Secretary of State should work with tra19 ditional United States allies and partners to take 

20 similar steps and coordinate closely on targeted sanc21 tions and visa restrictions; 

22 (9) the Secretary of State should appoint a 

23 United States Special Coordinator for Xinjiang, from 

24 officers and employees of the Department of State, 

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1 plomacy, financial assistance, sanctions, counterter2 rorism, security resources, and congressional report3 ing requirements within the United States Govern4 ment to respond to the gross violations of universally 

5 recognized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang 

6 region, including by addressing— 

7 (A) the mass detentions of Uyghurs and 

8 other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities; 

9 (B) the deployment of technologically ad10 vanced surveillance and police detection methods; 

11 and 

12 (C) the counterterrorism and counter-radi13 calism claims used to justify the policies of the 

14 Government of the People’s Republic of China in 

15 Xinjiang; 

16 (10) the United States Special Coordinator for 

17 Xinjiang position should continue until the mass sur18 veillance and internment of Uyghurs and other pre19 dominantly Muslim ethnic minorities has ended and 

20 all detainees released; and 

21 (11) the full and timely implementation of sec22 tions 408, 409, and 410 of the Asia Reassurance Ini23 tiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) is critical 

24 to demonstrating unwavering support by the United 

25 States for the universally recognized human rights of 


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1 all ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities in 

2 China, including Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. 

3 SEC. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 

6 Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, 

7 shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees 

8 a report to assess national and regional security threats 

9 posed by the crackdown across Xinjiang, the frequency with 

10 which Central and Southeast Asian governments are forc11 ibly returning Turkic Muslim refugees and asylum seekers, 

12 and the transfer or development of technology used by the 

13 Government of the People’s Republic of China that facili14 tates the mass internment and surveillance of Turkic Mus15 lims, including technology relating to predictive policing 

16 and large-scale data collection and analysis. 

17 (b) ANNEX.—The report required under subsection (a) 

18 shall include an unclassified annex with a list of all Chinese 

19 companies involved in the construction or operation of the 

20 ‘‘political education’’ camps, and the provision or operation 

21 of surveillance technology or operations, across Xinjiang. 

22 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 

23 subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form 

24 but may contain a classified annex. 


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1 SEC. 7. PROTECTING CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS OF THE 

2 UNITED STATES FROM INTIMIDATION AND 

3 COERCION. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal 

6 Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Secretary 

7 of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congres8 sional committees that outlines any and all efforts to pro9 vide information to and protect United States citizens and 

10 residents, including ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese nationals 

11 legally studying or working temporarily in the United 

12 States, who have experienced harassment or intimidation 

13 by officials or agents of the Government of the People’s Re14 public of China and the Communist Party within the 

15 United States and those whose families in China have expe16 rienced threats or detention because of their work or advo17 cacy. 

18 (b) DATABASE OF DETAINED FAMILY MEMBERS OF

19 UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS.—The Sec20 retary of State should explore appropriate mechanisms to 

21 establish a voluntary database to which United States citi22 zens or permanent resident family members of the Uyghur 

23 diaspora can provide details about missing family mem24 bers, with a view towards pressing for information and ac25 countability from the Government of the People’s Republic 

26 of China and to take appropriate measures to expedite the 


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1 asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic Mus2 lim minorities. 

3 SEC. 8. REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. 

4 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date 

5 of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United States 

6 Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate 

7 congressional committees a report that— 

8 (1) describes the current status and reach of 

9 United States broadcasting to the Xinjiang region 

10 and Uyghur speaking communities globally, barriers 

11 to the free flow of news and information to these com12 munities, and, if appropriate, detailed technical and 

13 fiscal requirements necessary to increase broadcasting 

14 and other media to these communities globally; 

15 (2) describes efforts to intimidate Radio Free 

16 Asia and Voice of America reporters reporting on 

17 human rights issues in the People’s Republic of 

18 China; and 

19 (3) in consultation with the Global Engagement 

20 Center at the Department of State, describes and as21 sesses disinformation and propaganda by the Govern22 ment of the People’s Republic of China or other mem23 bers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization tar24 geting Uyghur communities globally and efforts to 

25 downplay gross violations of universally recognized 


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1 human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region and 

2 any activities or programs that address these efforts. 

3 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

4 United States to commend and support the journalists of 

5 the Uyghur language service of Radio Free Asia for their 

6 reporting on the human rights and political situation in 

7 Xinjiang despite efforts to silence or intimidate their report8 ing through the detention of family members and relatives 

9 by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. 

10 SEC. 9. REPORT AND SEMI-ANNUAL BRIEFING. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

12 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

13 after consulting relevant Federal agencies and civil society 

14 organizations, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

15 committees and make available on the website of the De16 partment of State an interagency report that includes— 

17 (1) an assessment of the number of individuals 

18 detained in political ‘‘reeducation camps’’ and condi19 tions in the camps for detainees in the Xinjiang re20 gion, including whether detainees endure torture, 

21 forced renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment; 

22 (2) a description, as possible, of the geographic 

23 location of the camps and estimates of the number of 

24 people detained in such facilities; 


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1 (3) a description, as possible, of the methods used 

2 by People’s Republic of China authorities to ‘‘reedu3 cate’’ Uyghur detainees, as well as the People’s Re4 public of China agencies in charge of reeducation; 

5 (4) an assessment of the number of individuals 

6 being arbitrarily detained, including in pretrial de7 tention centers and prisons; 

8 (5) an assessment of forced labor in the camps 

9 and in regional factories for low wages under threat 

10 of being sent back to ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps; 

11 (6) a list of Chinese companies and industries 

12 benefitting from such labor, and a description of ac13 tions taken to address forced labor in Xinjiang con14 current with the People’s Republic of China’s Tier 3 

15 designation under the 2018 Trafficking in Persons 

16 Report; 

17 (7) an assessment of the level of access People’s 

18 Republic of China authorities grant to diplomats, 

19 journalists, and others to the Xinjiang region and a 

20 description of measures used to impede efforts to mon21 itor human rights conditions in the Xinjiang region; 

22 (8) an assessment of the repressive surveillance, 

23 detection, and control methods used by People’s Re24 public of China authorities in the Xinjiang region, 

25 and a list of individuals who hold senior leadership 


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1 positions and are responsible for ‘‘high-tech’’ policing, 

2 mass incarceration, and reeducation efforts targeting 

3 Uyghur and other predominately Muslim ethnic mi4 norities in the Xinjiang region; 

5 (9) a description of United States diplomatic ef6 forts to address the gross violations of universally rec7 ognized human rights in the Xinjiang region and to 

8 protect asylum seekers from the region, including in 

9 multilateral institutions and through bilateral rela10 tions with the People’s Republic of China, the nations 

11 of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 

12 and other countries; and 

13 (10) a description, as appropriate, of diplomatic 

14 efforts by United States allies and other nations to 

15 address the gross violations of universally recognized 

16 human rights in the Xinjiang region and to protect 

17 asylum seekers from the region. 

18 (b) BRIEFING AND SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS.— 

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after 

20 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 

21 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or the Sec22 retary’s designee, shall provide a briefing to the ap23 propriate congressional committees covering the sub24 jects listed in subsection (a). At the time of each brief25 ing, the Department of State shall provide unclassiVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:00 Jun 04, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\S178.RS S178

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1 fied written materials detailing the subject matters 

2 covered in paragraphs (1), (2), (4), (6), and (9) of 

3 such subsection. 

4 (2) TERMINATION.—The briefing requirement 

5 under paragraph (1) terminates 5 years after the date 

6 of the enactment of this Act. 

7 SEC. 10. REPORT ON SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN 

8 RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE XINJIANG RE9 GION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

11 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

12 shall, except as provided in subsection (c), submit to Con13 gress a report that includes a statement of whether the per14 sons described in subsection (b) meet the criteria to be des15 ignated for the imposition of sanctions under section 1263 

16 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 

17 (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–238; 22 U.S.C. 

18 2656 note) because the persons— 

19 (1) are responsible for extrajudicial killings, tor20 ture, or other gross violations of internationally recog21 nized human rights in the Xinjiang region of the Peo22 ple’s Republic of China; or 

23 (2) materially assisted, sponsored, or provided fi24 nancial, material, or technological support for, or 

25 goods or services in support of, such violations. 


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1 (b) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—The persons described in 

2 this subsection are the following: 

3 (1) The Party Secretary for Xinjiang region of 

4 the People’s Republic of China, Chen Quanguo. 

5 (2) Senior full or alternate members of the Cen6 tral Committee of the Communist Party of China 

7 whose professional responsibilities relate to the gov8 ernmental administration of the Xinjiang region, or 

9 who have conducted business with government entities 

10 in the Xinjiang region. 

11 (c) EXCEPTION.—The Secretary shall not be required 

12 to submit a report under subsection (a) if the Secretary de13 termines, not later than 90 days after the date of the enact14 ment of this Act, that the Government of the People’s Repub15 lic of China allows independent, unrestricted, and unsuper16 vised access to the Xinjiang region for international human 

17 rights organizations. 


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Calendar No. 99 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 178 

A BILL 

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic 

China. ment of these communities inside and outside end to arbitrary detention, torture, and harassTurkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an 

JUNE 3, 2019 

Reported with an amendment 


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