16-3221 

Chen v. Sessions 

BIA 

Vomacka, IJ 

A205 201 150

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 23rd day of February, two thousand 

eighteen. 

PRESENT: 

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

PETER W. HALL, 

DENNY CHIN,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

XUE ZHI CHEN, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 16-3221 

 NAC 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Lee Ratner, Law Office of Michael 

 Brown, New York, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General; Nancy Friedman, 

Senior Litigation Counsel; Gregory 

A. Pennington, Jr., Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States 
2 

Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC. 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Xue Zhi Chen, a native and citizen of the 

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 24, 

2016, decision of the BIA affirming a June 23, 2015, decision 

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Chen’s application for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Xue Zhi Chen, No. 

A205 201 150 (B.I.A. Aug. 24, 2016), aff’g No. A205 201 150 

(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 23, 2015). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 

in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of 

completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 

F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of 

review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu 

Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008)

(reviewing adverse credibility determinations under the 
3 

substantial evidence standard); Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 

767, 772 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing constitutional claims de 

novo). 

Adverse Credibility Determination 

 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of 

the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the 

applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between 

the applicant’s and witness’s written and oral 

statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such 

statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with 

other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an 

inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart 

of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); 

Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. 

 Although Chen argues that the agency erred in finding 

him not credible as to his claim of religious persecution 

in China, he does not challenge any of the specific 

findings the agency ultimately relied on in making its 

adverse credibility determination. See Yueqing Zhang v. 

Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) 

(finding that petitioner abandons issues and claims not 
4 

raised in his brief). The unchallenged findings are 

supported by the record and thus stand as a valid basis for 

the adverse credibility determination. For example, at 

times Chen gave the impression that he was testifying from 

a script. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also 

Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) 

(recognizing that particular deference is given to the 

trier of fact’s assessment of demeanor). Chen’s evidence 

was inconsistent regarding whether he came to the United 

States to find work or escape persecution, whether he 

sought care at a medical clinic after his release from 

detention, and whether he had previously applied for a visa 

to enter the United States. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 

165-67 & n.3. Chen testified that confirmation is 

important in his religion but he was unable to recall when 

he was confirmed. See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 

63, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that an adverse 

credibility determination may be based on inherent 

implausibility in the applicant’s story so long as the 

implausibility “finding is tethered to record evidence”). 

The agency’s adverse credibility determination was 

dispositive of Chen’s claims for asylum, withholding of 
5 

removal, and CAT relief because all three were based on the 

same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 

148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

Due Process Claim 

Chen argues that the IJ violated his due process rights 

by prejudging his case and refusing to let his mother 

testify. “To establish a violation of due process, an 

alien must show that []he was denied a full and fair 

opportunity to present h[is] claims or that [he was] 

otherwise deprived . . . of fundamental fairness.” Burger 

v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The IJ provided Chen a full and 

fair opportunity to present his claim without prejudging 

credibility. 

 Because Chen admitted in his asylum application that he 

had lied to U.S. immigration officials, the IJ proceeded 

reasonably in warning counsel that Chen had a credibility 

problem and should provide any available corroborating 

evidence. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d 

Cir. 2007) (“An IJ may, either expressly or impliedly, rely 

on falsus in uno to discredit evidence that does not 

benefit from corroboration or authentication independent of 

the petitioner’s own credibility.”); cf. Zhi Wei Pang v. 
6 

BCIS, 448 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting the IJ’s 

“obligation to help develop the record in immigration 

proceedings”). The IJ also did not deprive Chen of an 

opportunity to present his mother’s testimony because 

neither Chen nor his attorney asked that she be permitted 

to testify. On the record before us, Chen has not 

demonstrated that the IJ deprived him a full and fair a 

full and fair opportunity to present his case. His due 

process claim fails. See Burger, 498 F.3d at 134. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion 

for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk