PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7442

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SPENCER PETERS, a/k/a Smoke,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior

District Judge. (3:08-cr-00186-REP-RCY-2)

Argued: September 23, 2016 Decided: December 12, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the

majority opinion, in which Judge Diaz joined. Chief Judge 

Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Caroline Swift Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Peter Sinclair 

Duffey, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal 

Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, Robert J. Wagner, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
2

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Spencer Peters appeals the district court’s denial of his 

motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A 

jury convicted Peters of both conspiracy to distribute 50 grams 

or more of cocaine base, or “crack,” and a related firearms 

conspiracy. Given the quantity of cocaine base attributable to 

Peters, the district court applied the maximum base offense 

level for drug-trafficking crimes under the Sentencing 

Guidelines. Peters ultimately received 480 months of 

imprisonment.

After Guidelines Amendment 782 increased the minimum

quantity of cocaine base associated with the maximum base 

offense level to 25.2 kilograms, Peters moved for a sentence 

reduction under § 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the 

motion, concluding that “the quantity of controlled substance in 

the offense of conviction renders the defendant ineligible for a 

reduction of sentence.” J.A. 748. On appeal, Peters argues that 

the district court erred by failing to explain its eligibility 

determination in sufficient detail and by finding him 

responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

A.
3

We first set forth the general statutory framework for 

deciding sentence reductions. Ordinarily, of course, a sentence 

is final. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2012). Recognizing a discrete 

exception to the general rule of sentencing finality, section 

3582(c)(2) allows reductions to a defendant’s term of 

imprisonment to give the defendant “the benefit of later enacted 

adjustments to the judgments reflected in the Guidelines.” 

Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010); see

§ 3582(c)(2). Section 3582(c)(2), the Supreme Court has 

explained, permits “only a limited adjustment to an otherwise 

final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.” 

Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826. This court has noted that § 3582(c)(2) 

does not allow “a do-over of an original sentencing proceeding,” 

in which the defendant is “cloaked in rights mandated by 

statutory law and the Constitution.” United States v. Legree, 

205 F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 

Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1999)).

To decide whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under

§ 3582(c)(2), courts conduct a “two-step inquiry.” Dillon, 560 

U.S. at 826; United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 253, 257 (4th 

Cir. 2015). First, a court must determine the defendant’s 

eligibility. Section 3582(c)(2) permits a reduction only if (1) 

the defendant’s “term of imprisonment [was] based on a 

sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the 
4

Sentencing Commission,” and (2) the reduction “is consistent 

with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 

Commission.” § 3582(c)(2). Second, the court may grant the 

authorized reduction “after considering the factors set forth in 

section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” Id.; 

see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). The ultimate decision of 

“[w]hether to reduce a sentence and to what extent” is committed 

to the district court’s discretion. United States v. Smalls, 720 

F.3d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 2013); see Legree, 205 F.3d at 727.

The Guidelines policy statement implementing the statute, 

Guidelines § 1B1.10, spells out the process for determining 

whether an amendment lowers a defendant’s sentencing range. See

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.10 (2014). 

Courts “shall substitute . . . the amendments . . . for the 

corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the 

defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline 

application decisions unaffected.” Id. § 1B1.10(b)(1). Section 

1B1.10 also functions as a gatekeeper, specifying which 

Guidelines amendments apply retroactively and thus may give rise 

to a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Id.

§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(A), (d).

B.

Motions under § 3582(c)(2) must be based on an amendment to 

the Guidelines. See id. § 1B1.10(a)(1). Following the Fair 
5

Sentencing Act of 2010, the Sentencing Commission amended the 

Guidelines with respect to cocaine base offenses.

For drug-trafficking crimes in general, a defendant’s base 

offense level depends on the type of drug and the amount 

attributable to the defendant. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)

(2015). The Drug Quantity Table specifies particular base 

offense levels for quantity ranges of various drugs, with a 

maximum of 38 levels. Id. § 2D1.1(c).

The Sentencing Commission revised the Drug Quantity Table 

after Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act. To alleviate the 

severe sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine, 

the Act reduced the statutory penalties for cocaine base 

offenses. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 § 2, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 

124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012)). 

Accordingly, Guidelines Amendments 750 and 782 lowered the base 

offense levels assigned to different amounts of cocaine base. 

The Commission made both amendments retroactive. See U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.10(d).

Amendment 750 increased the minimum quantity of cocaine 

base necessary to trigger the maximum base offense level from 

4.5 to 8.4 kilograms. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 750 (effective 

Nov. 1, 2011). Amendment 782 again raised the requisite amount 

of cocaine base from 8.4 to 25.2 kilograms. U.S.S.G. supp. app. 

C, amend. 782 (effective Nov. 1, 2014).
6

For defendants responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of 

cocaine base, Amendment 782 has no effect; the maximum base 

offense level (38 levels) still applies. Defendants accountable 

for more than 8.4 but less than 25.2 kilograms of the drug, 

however, will receive a base offense level of 36 levels. 

II.

The appellant Spencer Peters was indicted in 2008 along 

with his brother Terrence Peters and their associate Clifford 

Noel.1 The two-count superseding indictment charged them with 

conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base (Count 

One) as well as conspiring to possess firearms in furtherance of 

a drug-trafficking offense (Count Two). The indictment alleged 

that these conspiracies lasted nearly a decade, beginning around 

January 2000 and ending around February 2008.

At trial, the government presented numerous witnesses, 

including former confederates, law enforcement officials, and 

individuals who purchased cocaine base from Peters and members 

of his organization. The evidence indicated that Peters was 

second only to his brother, Terrence, in the conspiracy’s multilayer hierarchy and led the group when Terrence was absent. 

Although Peters was incarcerated for a period in 2003 and again 

from May 2005 onward, witnesses explained that Peters stayed in 

 1 We refer to the appellant Spencer Peters as “Peters.” When 

discussing his brother, we use “Terrence” or “Terrence Peters.”
7

contact with members of the conspiracy while in prison and 

attempted to recruit a fellow inmate.

According to the government’s witnesses, members of the 

crack-distribution ring, including Peters, regularly traveled 

from Richmond, Virginia to New York to purchase cocaine 

hydrochloride, or “powder cocaine.” They usually bought one to 

two kilograms per trip. The group used two vehicles for these 

missions. Peters transported the drugs back to Richmond in his 

car, which was specially outfitted with hidden compartments. 

Terrence drove ahead in a separate vehicle to look out for 

police and warn his brother. Upon returning to Richmond, 

Terrence converted the powder cocaine into crack.

The group distributed crack through multiple channels, 

using a dedicated house as home base. Witnesses testified that 

the traffickers, including Peters, sold cocaine base to 

individual users and drug dealers, mostly for money but 

sometimes for firearms. One witness estimated that he had 

purchased a total of 1 to 1.5 kilograms of crack from the group. 

Peters also supplied his subordinates with cocaine base to sell 

on consignment. At one point, the conspirators began working in 

shifts, retailing crack 24/7 from their house and serving 40 to 

50 customers on an average day. The group later shifted to a 

wholesale model in which it primarily sold cocaine base to midlevel dealers.
8

The jury convicted Peters, his brother, and Noel in 2009. 

At sentencing, the government argued that “a highly conservative 

estimate of the attributable drug weight in this case exceeds 

150 kilograms.” J.A. 596. At Terrence’s sentencing hearing, 

which directly preceded Spencer’s, the district court observed: 

“The Government’s estimate of 150 kilograms is not off the mark 

. . . based on the evidence in the case of which there was ample 

amount and corroborated in every respect.” J.A. 630.

Under the Drug Quantity Table in effect when Peters was

sentenced, defendants responsible for 4.5 or more kilograms of 

cocaine base received the maximum, 38-level base offense level. 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2008). Peters’s presentence investigation 

report (PSR) attributed at least 4.5 kilograms of crack to him. 

The PSR summarized the key facts supporting this finding:

Testimony showed that the members were bringing 1 to 2 

kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride from New York to 

Richmond on a weekly basis. While there were time 

periods that no drugs were brought from New York due 

to members being jailed or out of town, the extended 

period of the conspiracy makes it clear that the total 

amount of cocaine base trafficked by the conspiracy 

members would be well in excess of 4.5 kilograms.

J.A. 756. The district court adopted the PSR. 

The PSR also recommended that Peters receive a 2-level 

enhancement for possessing a firearm and a 3-level enhancement 

as a manager or supervisor of a drug conspiracy involving at 

least five participants. At Peters’s sentencing hearing, the 
9

district court characterized Peters as the “acting CEO when the 

CEO was gone.” J.A. 644. The court noted that Peters “supervised 

the business [and] the subordinates” and “helped recruit new 

members to the organization.” Id.

Peters’s adjusted offense level of 43 and his criminal 

history category of I yielded an advisory Guidelines sentencing 

range of life in prison. Because of a prior drug offense, his 

statutory mandatory minimum sentence was 20 years.

Attuned to Peters’s individual role in the offense, the 

district court concluded that “[a] sentence of life imprisonment 

is greater than necessary to effectuate the goals set forth in 

Sec. 3553(a).” J.A. 787. The court varied downward and 

ultimately sentenced Peters to 480 months of imprisonment for 

Count One and 240 months of imprisonment for Count Two, to run 

concurrently. This court upheld the conviction and sentence. 

United States v. Peters, 392 F. App’x 161 (4th Cir. 2010).

In 2013, Peters filed his first motion for a sentence 

reduction under § 3582(c)(2). He argued that Amendment 750 

lowered his sentencing range by raising the crack quantity 

threshold for the maximum base offense level to 8.4 kilograms. 

The district court denied Peters’s motion, stating: “The 

quantity of controlled substance in the offense of conviction 

renders the defendant ineligible for a sentence reduction, but, 

even if he were eligible, the Court would decline to [reduce his 
10

sentence] because . . . the originally imposed sentence is 

appropriate.” J.A. 717-18. This court affirmed. United States v. 

Peters, 576 F. App’x 209 (4th Cir. 2014).

In 2015, Peters again sought a sentence reduction under

§ 3582(c)(2), this time relying on Amendment 782. The Probation 

Office recommended that the district court find Peters 

ineligible because Peters was responsible for more than 25.2 

kilograms of cocaine base. As before, the district court denied 

the motion:

Having considered the defendant’s [motion], the 

Government’s response thereto and the reply, the 

record, the presentence report, the [recommendation 

of] the Probation Office and all other applicable 

requirements of law, it is hereby ORDERED that the 

defendant’s [motion] is denied because the quantity of 

controlled substance in the offense of conviction 

renders the defendant ineligible for a reduction of 

sentence under the retroactive crack amendment, 

Amendment 782.

J.A. 748. Because the district court found Peters ineligible at 

the first step of the § 3582(c)(2) inquiry, the court did not 

reach the discretionary second step.

This appeal followed.

III.

Peters’s eligibility for a sentence reduction turns solely 

on whether he is responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of 

cocaine base. If so, he still receives the maximum base offense 

level, and Amendment 782 does not alter his Guidelines 
11

sentencing range--thus precluding him from a sentence reduction 

under § 3582(c)(2).

Peters challenges the district court’s denial of his motion 

on two grounds. First, Peters asserts that the district court 

did not adequately explain why it found him ineligible. Second, 

he argues that any finding attributing 25.2 or more kilograms of 

cocaine base to him is clearly erroneous.

We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a 

sentence-reduction motion under § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of 

discretion. Smalls, 720 F.3d at 195. We review the district 

court’s ruling as to the scope of its legal authority under

§ 3582(c)(2) de novo. United States v. Mann, 709 F.3d 301, 304 

(4th Cir. 2013). Finally, we review factual determinations, 

including the attributable drug quantity, for clear error. Id.

A.

At the outset, we note that district courts may make 

additional findings on the drug quantities attributable to 

defendants in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. Such findings must be 

supported by the record and consistent with earlier findings. 

The eligibility inquiry contemplated by § 3582(c)(2) may 

even require the court to supplement its findings in some 

circumstances. Section 3582(c)(2) instructs courts to determine

whether a retroactive Guidelines amendment lowers a defendant’s 

sentencing range. For an amendment to the Drug Quantity Table, 
12

this analysis hinges on whether the drug quantity attributable 

to the defendant exceeds or falls below the revised quantity 

threshold. This inquiry is straightforward where the sentencing 

court found the defendant responsible for a precise amount (such 

as “X kilograms”). But sentencing courts sometimes attribute a 

range of quantities (such as “at least X kilograms”) to 

defendants. In these circumstances, a court deciding a

§ 3582(c)(2) motion may need to identify the attributable drug 

quantity with more precision to compare it against the new 

quantity threshold.

In United States v. Mann, we declined to address the 

question of whether district courts may supplement their 

findings on attributable drug quantities. Id. at 306. We noted, 

however, that “our sister circuits agree that additional 

findings lie within a sentencing court’s discretion.” Id. The 

Seventh Circuit, for example, held that

nothing prevents the court from making new findings 

that are supported by the record and not inconsistent 

with the findings made in the original sentencing 

determination. Indeed, new findings may be necessary 

where, as here, the retroactive amendment to the 

guidelines altered the relevant drug-quantity 

thresholds for determining the defendant's base 

offense level.

United States v. Hall, 600 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2010). The 

Eleventh Circuit also elaborated on the power of courts to make 

additional findings consistent with earlier ones: “[I]f a 
13

district court found during the original sentence proceeding 

that ‘at least X kilograms’ were attributable to the defendant, 

it may not find . . . that ‘less than X kilograms’ were 

attributable; it may, however, find attributable X kilograms, or 

2X kilograms, or 10X kilograms.” United States v. Hamilton, 715 

F.3d 328, 340 (11th Cir. 2013).

Other courts of appeals have reached the same conclusion. 

See United States v. Wyche, 741 F.3d 1284, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(“If the original sentencing court failed to make a specific 

drug-quantity calculation, the resentencing court may have to 

make its own quantity finding in order to determine the 

defendant’s guideline range.”); United States v. Battle, 706 

F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[A] district court may look 

to its previous findings . . . to make supplemental calculations 

of drug quantity at resentencing if such calculations are 

necessary . . . .”); United States v. Moore, 706 F.3d 926, 929 

(8th Cir. 2013) (“[Section] 1B1.10(b)(1) not only permits, but 

may often require, district courts to make findings necessary to 

resolve § 3582(c)(2) motions.”); United States v. Moore, 582 

F.3d 641, 646 (6th Cir. 2009) (“We do not agree . . . that the 

district court’s previous determination of ‘more than 1.5 

kilograms’ means that it cannot also find more than 4.5 

kilograms.”).
14

We now join our sister circuits in holding that a district 

court may make additional findings on the drug quantity 

attributable to a defendant. Such findings cannot contradict 

earlier ones and must be supported by the record.

Here, the district court properly supplemented its earlier 

findings on the quantity of cocaine base attributable to Peters. 

The court initially attributed at least 4.5 kilograms of cocaine 

base to Peters. The court later found Peters ineligible for a 

sentence reduction based on Amendment 750, which benefited only 

defendants responsible for less than 8.4 kilograms of crack. 

Amendment 782 would lower Peters’s base offense level (and thus 

his sentencing range) only if he were accountable for less than 

25.2 kilograms of cocaine base. It would have been impossible 

for the district court to determine Peters’s eligibility for a 

reduction without supplementing its previous attribution of at 

least 8.4 kilograms of cocaine base. In denying Peters’s motion 

on eligibility grounds, the court implicitly found him 

responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base. This 

finding was consistent with the earlier ones and, for the 

reasons that follow, was not clearly erroneous.

B.

The question of “whether a court ruling on a § 3582(c)(2) 

motion must provide an individualized explanation is one of law 

that we consider de novo.” Smalls, 720 F.3d at 195. Peters 
15

argues that the district court did not adequately explain why he 

was ineligible. Specifically, Peters contends that the court 

erred by failing to make “specific findings of fact showing how 

it concluded that [he] [wa]s ineligible due to drug quantity,” 

Br. of Appellant at 8, and by failing to specify “the scope of 

the relevant conduct for which he can be held accountable,” id.

at 21.

As a threshold matter, there can be no dispute that the 

district court found Peters ineligible because he was 

responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base. The 

court explained that “the quantity of controlled substance in 

the offense of conviction renders the defendant ineligible.” 

J.A. 748. Although the court did not expressly attribute 25.2 

kilograms of cocaine base to Peters, his eligibility turned 

solely on whether he was responsible for at least that amount. 

See Br. of Appellant at 8. Contrary to Peters’s assertion, logic 

and common sense indicate the “basis [on which] the district 

court concluded that Mr. Peters was ineligible.” Reply Br. of 

Appellant at 6-7.

Moreover the “limited nature of § 3582(c)(2) proceedings,” 

Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827, contrasted with plenary sentencing or 

resentencing proceedings, gives district courts more leeway in 

articulating reasons for granting or denying motions under

§ 3582(c)(2). In an ordinary sentencing proceeding, the district 
16

court “must place on the record an ‘individualized assessment’ 

based on the particular facts of the case before it.” United 

States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). The court must 

“adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful 

appellate review and to promote the perception of fair 

sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.

For motions under § 3582(c)(2), however, “we presume a 

district court . . . has considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors [under the discretionary step] and other pertinent 

matters before it.” Smalls, 720 F.3d at 195-96. As we explained 

in Legree, “[a] court need not engage in ritualistic incantation 

in order to establish its consideration of a legal issue. It is 

sufficient if . . . the district court rules on issues that have 

been fully presented for determination. Consideration is 

implicit in the court’s ultimate ruling.” Legree, 205 F.3d at 

728 (quoting United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 

1995)). “[I]n the absence of evidence a court neglected to 

consider relevant factors,” we confirmed in Smalls, “the court 

does not err in failing to provide a full explanation for its

§ 3582(c)(2) decision.” Smalls, 720 F.3d at 196.

Like our precedents, the text of § 3582(c)(2) reflects the 

“fundamental differences between sentencing and sentencemodification proceedings.” Dillon, 560 U.S. at 830. Section 
17

3582(c)(2) directs courts to § 3553(a) but not § 3553(c), which 

requires courts to give reasons for imposing particular 

sentences “at the time of sentencing.” § 3553(c).

In short, Legree and Smalls control here. The defendants in 

those cases argued that the district courts erred by failing to 

“articulate on the record the precise reasons” for their 

conclusions. Legree, 205 F.3d at 727. So did the defendant in 

United States v. Stewart. 595 F.3d 197, 199 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010). 

But “[w]e held directly to the contrary” in Legree and Smalls, 

id., and we must do so here.

The district court’s order denying Peters’s motion 

contained more detail than the ones we upheld in Legree and 

Smalls. The district court in Legree “provided no individualized 

explanation in support of its decision.” Smalls, 720 F.3d at 

196. Its order stated: “[The] Amendment . . . does not create a 

mandatory right to reduction of sentence for defendant. On 

consideration of the matter, this court concludes that 

defendant’s sentence was correct and that no reduction is 

appropriate.” Order, United States v. Legree, No. 5:93-cr-92-PMD 

(D.S.C. Sept. 30, 1997). The defendant in Smalls unsuccessfully 

appealed the district court’s decision to grant a limited 

reduction. Smalls, 720 F.3d at 194-95. That court’s order 

declared, “In granting this motion, the court has considered the 
18

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 195 (quoting 

the district court).

Here the district court clarified that it denied Peters’s 

motion because he was ineligible. The court also noted the 

factual and legal sources on which it relied: “the defendant’s 

[motion], the Government’s response thereto and the reply, the 

record, the presentence report, the [recommendation of] the 

Probation Office and all other applicable requirements of law.” 

J.A. 748.

Peters argues that the presumption we endorsed in Legree

and reiterated in Smalls applies only to the second, 

discretionary step of the § 3582(c)(2) inquiry. We can discern 

in Legree and Smalls no such limitation. These decisions were 

grounded in the nature of a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, not in some 

supposed distinction between the first and second steps of the 

inquiry. See Smalls, 720 F.3d at 198.

Peters offers no evidence to rebut the presumption that the 

district court considered the relevant facts and legal 

principles. Where a full sentencing has been held and the 

defendants’ objections raised and entertained, there is simply 

no reason to replay the ground. Though it is not required, it 

will often be the case that the judge hearing the § 3582(c)(2) 

motion will have prior familiarity with the defendant and may 

even have conducted the original sentencing. See Smalls, 720 
19

F.3d at 196; Legree, 205 F.3d at 729. Here, for example, the 

district court was “intimate[ly] familiar[] with [Peters’s] 

case.” Legree, 205 F.3d at 729. The court oversaw the trial, the 

sentencing, and Peter’s prior motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 

§ 3582(c)(2). It cannot be claimed that Peters was procedurally 

shortchanged or his motion decided by a court unfamiliar with 

the depth of his involvement in the conspiracy. 

Of course, it is always permissible for district courts, in 

resolving motions under § 3582(c)(2), to offer whatever 

explanation they find fitting. A fuller explanation is generally 

preferable to an abbreviated one. But, under this court’s clear

precedents, “[n]o greater specificity was required.” Id. at 729 

n.3.

C.

Finally, the district court’s finding that Peters was 

responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base was not 

clearly erroneous. See Mann, 709 F.3d at 304. Under Guidelines

§ 1B1.3, a defendant’s relevant conduct determines which base 

offense level applies when the Guidelines specify more than one. 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (2015). Courts must assess relevant conduct 

on an individual basis. Id. For drug conspiracies, a defendant 

is accountable for

all quantities of contraband with which he was 

directly involved and . . . all quantities of 

contraband that were involved in transactions carried 
20

out by other participants, if those transactions were 

within the scope of, and in furtherance of, the 

jointly undertaken criminal activity and were 

reasonably foreseeable in connection with that 

criminal activity.

§ 1B1.3 cmt. n.3(D) (describing how Guidelines § 1B1.3(a)(1) 

applies to “offenses involving contraband (including controlled 

substances)”).

The district court did not commit clear error in finding 

Peters responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base 

under Guidelines § 1B1.3. Peters helped lead a criminal 

enterprise that manufactured and sold high volumes of crack for 

the better part of a decade. The district court’s finding was 

not a close call.

Peters received a 3-level enhancement for serving in the 

organization as his brother’s second-in-command. The record 

indicates that Peters was intimately familiar with the group’s 

business model and deeply involved in its day-to-day operations. 

He was responsible for transporting the cocaine hydrochloride 

from New York back to Richmond. Peters dispensed crack to his 

fellow coconspirators, or “what he called his soldiers,” J.A. 

393, for them to sell on consignment. He sold crack himself. He 

also helped ensure the business’s security by procuring 

firearms. And while Terrence was incarcerated, Peters took up

the mantle of leadership, making major decisions and managing 

the group’s affairs.
21

The PSR captured the full sweep of the conspiracy’s 

trafficking, which lasted from January 2000 to February 2008: 

“Testimony showed that the members were bringing 1 to 2 

kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride from New York to Richmond on 

a weekly basis.” J.A. 756. At Terrence’s sentencing hearing, the 

district court noted that evidence of “the vastness of this 

operation” was “overwhelming.” J.A. 630. The court also observed 

that the government’s 150-kilogram estimate was “not off the 

mark” given the “ample” evidence that was “corroborated in every 

respect.” Id.

Peters argues that he is not accountable for “any drug 

transactions” that occurred while he was incarcerated. Br. of 

Appellant at 24. But witnesses testified that while in prison, 

Peters kept in touch with members of the conspiracy and even 

arranged to bring a fellow inmate into the business.

In light of Peters’s leadership role in this high-volume 

crack-distribution conspiracy, it was hardly inappropriate for 

the district court to find Peters responsible for at least 25.2 

kilograms of cocaine base. Even excluding the periods during 

which Peters was incarcerated, we still cannot say that the 

district court committed clear error. Under Guidelines § 1B1.3, 

Peters may be held accountable for the quantity of cocaine base 

“with which he was directly involved” plus the quantity involved 

in transactions carried out by his coconspirators that were 
22

“within the scope of, and in furtherance of” his drugtrafficking scheme and were “reasonably foreseeable in 

connection with that criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 

n.3(D); see id. § 1B1.3(a)(1). Applying this standard, the 

district court’s finding that the total quantity of cocaine base 

attributable to Peters exceeded 25.2 kilograms did not approach 

clear error. The court’s conclusion that Peters was not eligible 

for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction is accordingly affirmed.2

AFFIRMED

 2 Our distinguished colleague in dissent does not discuss or 

dispute any of the above facts or explain what purpose a remand 

here could possibly serve.
23

GREGORY, Chief Judge, dissenting:

I agree with the majority holding that a district court 

considering a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) may make 

additional findings on the drug quantity attributable to a 

defendant so long as the findings do not contradict earlier ones 

and are supported by the record. I disagree with the conclusion 

that the district court’s ruling that Peters is ineligible for a 

sentence reduction, without any individualized consideration of 

his relevant conduct, suffices as an additional drug quantity 

finding in this case.

Courts have a general duty to explain their reasoning. In 

the sentencing context, the court “should set forth enough to 

satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ 

arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal 

decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 

325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Citing Dillon v. 

United States, the majority highlights the “limited nature of 

§ 3582(c)(2) proceedings” in comparison to ordinary sentencing 

proceedings. 560 U.S. 817, 825, 827 (2010) (explaining that 

§ 3582(c)(2) “does not authorize a sentencing or resentencing 

proceeding”). But nothing in Dillon suggests that we should 

abrogate district courts’ general responsibility to provide some 

individualized legal reasoning.
24

Indeed, the rationale for requiring courts to explain their 

sentencing decisions applies equally to § 3582(c) proceedings. 

Explaining sentencing decisions “not only ‘allow[s] for 

meaningful appellate review’ but it also ‘promote[s] the 

perception of fair sentencing.’” Carter, 564 F.3d at 328 

(citing Gall v. United States, 52 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). This is 

especially true for sentence reductions made pursuant to a 

revised crack-cocaine ratio, which was enacted to correct 

structural flaws in the law, rather than to inure to the benefit 

of any single defendant. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States,

552 U.S. 85, 98 (2007) (“[T]he severe sentences required by the 

[prior] 100–to–1 ratio [we]re imposed ‘primarily upon black 

offenders.’”). Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) generally reduces by two levels the base 

offense levels assigned to the drug quantities described in 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Manual 2008). In 

cases where defendants seek redress from a flawed sentencing 

scheme, it would be even more valuable for the court to explain 

why that defendant was not eligible.

Nevertheless, the majority holds that district courts need 

not explain their reasoning with any particularity in sentencing 

modifications. Relying on this Court’s holdings in United 

States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724 (4th Cir. 2000), and United 

States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2013), the majority 
25

presumes that the district court’s ruling that Peters is 

ineligible for a sentence reduction implicitly found that he was 

individually responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine 

base.* Unlike the case before us, Legree and Smalls involved 

challenges to the district courts’ consideration of the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors—the second, discretionary step of the 

§ 3582(c)(2) inquiry.

The majority should be reluctant to apply such a broad 

presumption in cases where the defendant challenges the district 

court’s consideration of his eligibility for a sentence 

reduction—the first step of the inquiry. See Dillon, 560 U.S. 

at 826 (“A court must first determine that a reduction is 

consistent with [U.S.S.G. §] 1B1.10 before it may consider 

whether the authorized reduction is warranted . . . according to 

the factors set forth in § 3553(a).”). A judge is required to 

“explain his conclusion that an unusually lenient or an 

unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case 

with sufficient justifications.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. Even in 

cases challenging the district court’s consideration of the 

§ 3553(a) factors, like in Legree and Smalls, we cautioned that 

 * At the time Peters was sentenced, he received a base 

offense level of 38, which applied where the offense involved at 

least 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1). 

Under Amendment 782, a base offense level of 38 applies where 

the offense involved at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base. 

Id.
26

“a talismanic recitation of the § 3553(a) factors without 

application to the defendant being sentenced does not 

demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking or provide an adequate basis 

for appellate review.” Carter, 564 F.3d at 329 (citing United 

States v. Stephens, 549 F.3d 459, 466–67 (6th Cir. 2008)). The 

same must undoubtedly be true in cases where the district court 

must evaluate the defendant’s eligibility for a reduction.

Determining a defendant’s eligibility requires the court to 

calculate the drug quantity attributable to the defendant, see

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1; U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 782 (effective Nov. 1, 

2014), which includes the quantities associated with the 

defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct, 

United States v. Flores-Alvarado, 779 F.3d 250, 255–56 (4th Cir. 

2015), as amended (Mar. 11, 2015). The drug amount is “the 

factual predicate necessary for sentencing.” United States v. 

Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 2005). In Collins, we held 

that a defendant found guilty of a drug conspiracy should 

receive an individualized sentence, where the district court 

considers the distribution of the amount of drugs “attributable 

to him” as opposed to the amount distributed by the entire 

conspiracy. Id. at 312. It seems axiomatic that a court 

considering a § 3582(c)(2) motion—particularly in a case where 

there is an obvious need for additional drug-quantity fact 

finding—must provide some individualized explanation 
27

demonstrating its consideration of the defendant’s relevant 

conduct. To hold that the district court made such an important 

factual determination by simply finding Peters ineligible for 

the reduction cuts against courts’ embedded responsibility to 

explain their decisions. I would therefore vacate and remand 

with instructions to the district court to provide a fuller 

explanation of its drug-quantity calculation.