The Honor able Curtis L . Colli er, Chief United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District * of Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0445n.06 No. 09-3180 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
CL AU DIA U

NG ER, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. CI TY OF MENTOR; CHRI STOPHER COOPERRI DER, Supervisor, Parks a nd Pub lic L and s Di vis ion , City of Me nto r; KU RT KRAUS, Parks and Public L ands Division, City of Mentor, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE N O R T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

Be fore : BOG GS, COOK, Circuit J udg es, and COL L I ER, District J udg e. *
CO OK , Ci rc uit

Judg e . Cl a

ud ia Un g e r s ue d th e City

of Me nto r a nd tw o emp lo y ees of

its Park s and

Pub lic L and s D ivi sio n, Chr ist op he r C oo pe rr ide r a nd Kurt Kr a us (c olle c tiv e ly “De fenda nts”), alleg ing that they

intentionally

misclassified her as a sea sonal employ ee to pr eclude her memb e r s h ip in

L a b o r e r s ’ U n io nL o c a l 1 0 9 9 ( th e u n io n )
. Sp e c if ic a ll y , U n g e r

c la im s that Def endants c lassified her as a seasona l e mploy ee, despite her work history

(44 we eks per

y ear for 6 y e ars ) a nd re pe a te d r e c la ssi fi c a tio n r e qu e sts , a nd ult imate ly dis mis se d he r in re ta liatio n f or tho se reque sts and for f

iling a state administrative action. She alleg es De fenda nts thereby : (1) depr ivedNo. 09-3180

Unger v . City of Mentor

- 2 - her of her F irst Amendment rig hts and right t o unioniz e under Ohio’s publ ic employ ees c ollective ba rg a ini nglaw, g ivi ngri se to a c la im und e r 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 ; ( 2) wr on g fu lly te rm inated he r i n
c on tr a ve nti on of clear p ub lic po lic y a s e xpre sse d in

the Natio na l L a

bo r R e la tio ns Ac t, t

he F ir st Amendment, and O hio collective ba rg aining law; (3) br eac hed her em p l o y m ent contract; and (4) dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t he r b e c a us e of he r se x, vio la tin g Oh io law a nd the Eq ua l Pa y Ac t, 2 9 U .S. C. § 206(d). Defe ndants moved for dismiss al under

Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b) (6), a rg uing that Ung er’ s complaint failed to state a ny cog nizable claim for r elief. The di strict court dismissed all of Ung er’ s claim s ex ce p t it declined supplementa l jurisdiction over her state-lawsex discrimination claim and dismissed it without prejudice . Ung er nowappea ls.
Be cause Ung er f

ailed to state a

n actionable claim, we a ffirm.
I. Stand ard of Review
Th is c ourt

re vie ws de no vo a

dis tr ic t c ourt ' s d e c isi on

to d ism iss a

c omp la int

fo r f a ilure to state a claim under Rule 12( b)(6)
. J & R Mktg., SEP v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 5 49 F .3 d 3 84 , 3 89 (6 th Cir. 2008). I n our re view, “‘ we c onstrue the c omplaint in the light most favora ble to the plaintiff,
acc ept its alleg ations as true, a nd drawall rea sonable infe renc es in favor of t he plainti ff.’ ” Ba sse tt v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n , 5 2 8 F
. 3 d 4 2 6 , 4 3 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g DirecTV, Inc . v. Tre esh , 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). The complaint’s fa ctual alleg ations must “raise a rig ht to r el i ef ab ove the spe culative leve l,” Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), andNo. 09-3180

Unger v . City of Mentor

- 3 - “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face,” id . at 570.
Th is c ourt re vie ws a dis tr ic t court ’s de c isi on to de c lin e su pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n o ve r a state law claim for abuse of discretion. Ca r l s b a d Tech., Inc . v. HI

F Bio, Inc. , 129 S. Ct . 1862, 1867 (2009).
II. Ana lys is
A. § 1 98 3 Claim
Un g e r a lle g e s th at th e de fe nd ants vio la te d § 19 83 by de pr ivi nghe r o f h e r r ig hts to p e a c e a bly
a sse mbl e and

c oll e c tiv e ly

un ion ize un de r O hio ’s Pub lic Em plo y e e s’ Col le c tiv e B arg a ini ngAc t, O.R.C. § 4117.01 et seq ., and the F irst Amendment. As an initial matter, the por tion of Ung er’ s § 1983 that rests on De fenda nts’ alleg ed violation of her rig hts under Ohio’s public e mploy ees c o l l ec tive barg aining statute fails as a matter of la

w. Section 1983 protec ts ag ainst the “de privation of a rig ht se cure d by the Constitut ion or laws of the Un ite d S tat es . . . .” Sig le

yv . Ci ty of P ar ma He igh ts , 4 37 F .3 d 5 27 , 5 33 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) (e mph a sis ad d ed ) ( ci t i n g W

est v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)) . A state law , like Ohio’s collec tive barg aining statute, ca nnot cre ate a

fede ral rig ht, Ha rri ll v . B lou nt C ou nty , 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 ( 6th Cir. 1995), and ther efor e ca

nnot underlie Ung er’ s § 1983 claim.
The re mainder of

Ung er’ s § 1983 claim rests on De fenda nts’ alleg ed F irst AmendmentNo. 09-3180

Unger v . City of Mentor

- 4 - violation. Although she br oadly complai n s o f al l Def

endants’ misdee ds, she cites Cooper rider’ s
c on du c t a lon e . B e c a

us e sh e do e s n ot i de nti fy any misc on du c t by Kr a us , s he fa ils to s ta te a

c la im ag ainst him. Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 5 5 5
. He r cl aim ag ainst the City simil arly fails: responde at superior c annot form the basis for municipal liability under § 1983. Mo ne ll v . D e pt. of S oc . S e rv s. , 43 6 U.S. 65 8, 69 1 (19 78 ). B e c a us e Un g e r doe s not al le g e mis c on du c t by the City its e lf or tha t a c ity policy or custom authoriz ed Cooperr ider’s a lleg ed misconduct, she f ails to state a cla im ag ainst the City
. Caudill

v. Hollan , 431 F.3d 900, 914–15 ( 6th Cir. 2005).
As to C oo pe rr ide r, Un g e r a lle g e s t hat h e vio la te d h e r F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts in h is individual capa city when he, actingas her supervisor, r efuse d to rec lassify and ter minated her . But in or de r to state a pr ima fa c ie c a se of F ir st Am e ndme nt re ta liatio n, Un g e r’ s c omp la int mus t pl a us ibl y alleg e that: (1) she eng ag ed in spee ch or a ssociation addre ssing a matter of public c oncer n, Cockrel

v . S he lby Cou nty Sc h. Di st. , 2 70 F .3 d 1 03 6, 10 48 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1); (2) her in te re st “ a s a c iti zen , in commenting upon matters of public conce rn” outweig hed the “intere st of the State, as a n employ er, in promoting the eff

iciency of t he publi c ser

vices it perf

orms throug h its employ ees,” Picke ring v. Bd. of. Educ. , 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); and ( 3) her speec h or association substantially motivated the employ er’ s decision t o take adverse employ ment action, Mt. Healthy City Sch. D ist. Bd. of Educ.

v . D oy le , 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Be cause she does not sufficiently alleg e the f

irst element—that her spe ech touc hed on a matter of public c oncer n—Ung er f

ails to state a claim ag ainst Cooperrider
. Un g e r c on te nd s th a t the un ion -r e la te d na tur e of he r s pe e c h p ro pe ls i t in to t he re a lm o f p ub licNo. 09-3180

Unger v . City of Mentor

- 5 - c on c e rn . T ru e , w he re a g ov e rnme nt em plo y e r’ s a c tio ns re su lt i n s ub sta nti a l me a sure fr om h os til ity to union activities, the employ ee states a va lid First Amendment cla im. Boals v. Gray , 775 F.2d 686, 693 (6th Ci r . 1 9 8 5 )
. B u t U n g e r f a il s to c o mp la in o f an ti

- u n io n an im u s . T h u s , e v e n if

her spe ech ultimately

relates to potential union membership, it must s till t ouch on a matter of public concer n to overc ome the “w ide latitude” we aff ord g overnme nt officials in mana g ing the ir emp l o y ees “without intrus i v e o v er sight by the judiciary

in the name of

the Fir st Amendment.” Connick v. My e rs , 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
Whe n an e mp lo y e e s p e a k s “ a s an e mp lo y e e u p o n matt e r s o n ly o f p e r s o n a l in te r e s t, a bsent the most unusual circumstanc es, a f eder al cour

t is not t he appr opriate f

orum” for

revie wing the employ er’ s behavior, id . at 147, “e ven if the reasons for the dismiss al are alleg ed to be mistaken or
unrea sonable,” id
. at 146. To dete rmine whe ther the spe ech touc hes on a matter of public c oncer n,
we r eview the “conte nt, form, and c ontext of a g iven statement, as reve aled by the whole r ecor d.” Id. a t 14 7–48 . T he pu

bli c c on c e rn e le me nt may no t be me t by wh a t the sp e a ke r m ig ht i nc ide nta lly
c on ve y ; “‘ pa ssi ng ’ or ‘f

le e tin g ’ re fe re nc e s to an ar gua bly pu bli c ma tte r do not e le vate the sp e e c h to
a matt e r o f ‘ p u

b li c c o n c e r

n ’ ” w h e r e th e s p e e c h a d v an c e s o n ly a p r iv a te in te rest. Farhat v. Jopk e , 370 F.3d 580, 592–93 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (interna l citations omit ted). Ung er a rg ues that she spoke to g ain “ne eded or appropr iate” inf

ormation “to ena

ble the other members of

society (fe llow seasonal wor

kers) to make informe d decisions abou t the oper ation of their g overnme nt in poten t i al ly depriving them of their r ights a s well.” B ut even if w e re ad herNo. 09-3180

Unger v . City of Mentor

- 6 - complaint most ge nerously and assume that Ung er expli citly called for a g ener al re classification of all seasona l e mploy ees such that they could join the union, he r claim still falls short bec ause U ng er’ s persona l que st f

or re classification moti vated he r spee ch. In Connick , the Supreme Court he ld that when Connick, a

n assistant prosec utor, upset over her pe nding transfe r, circ ulated a que stionnaire to fellow employ ees a

bout “offic e transfe r policy , office morale, the need f or a g rieva

nce c ommitt ee, the level of

confide n ce i n supervisors, a nd whether

employ ees f

elt pressure d to work in political
c a mpa ig ns ,” 46 1 U .S. a t 13 8, on ly the po lit ic a l c a mpa ig n- re la te d s pe e c h ros e to the le ve l of p ub lic
conce rn, id . at 141. L ike in Connick , Ung er’ s ref ere nces to the inne r workin gs o f a g overnme nt of fi c e , unio n- re la te d o r not , with ou t impli c a tio ns fo r the po lit ic a l pro c e ss or the pu bli c int e re st, fa il to br ing her speec h within the ambit of public conce rn. Ung er’ s complaint, thus la cking a p ri mafa c ie e le me nt of

a F ir st- Am e ndme nt- re ta liatio n c la im, fa ils to s ta te a § 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t Cooperride r.
As the district court c orre ctly held, Ung er’ s failure to state a § 1983 cla im render s moot her related punitive damag es cla im.
B. W ro ng ful Te rm ina tio n in Vi ola tio n o f P ub lic Po lic

yCla im
Un g e r a lso c omp la ins that the De fe nd ants wr on g fu lly te rm inate d he r in v iol a tio n o f p ub lic policy . I n Gree ley v . Miami Valley M aint. Cont ractors., Inc. , 49 Ohio St. 3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990), the O hio S u p re m e C o u rt established that an e mploy ee holds a private c ause of

actionNo. 09-3180

Unger v . City of Mentor

- 7 - so un din g in t or

t f or wr on g fu l di sc ha

rg e wh e n he r d isc ha

rg e c on tr a ve ne s a

“ su ff ic ie ntl y c le ar p ub lic policy .” Id . at 23 3– 34
. To state su c h a c la im, a pla int if f mus t pla us ibl y a lle g e that: ( 1) a

c le ar p ub lic policy exis ted, manife s ted in a state or fede ral c onstitut ion, statute, or administrative re g ulation (c lari ty e le me nt) ; ( 2) dis mis sin g e mpl oy e e s un de r su c h c ir c ums tanc e s wo uld je op ard ize the pu bli c policy (jeopa rdy element) ; (3) conduc t re la ted to the public policy

motivated the dismissal (causation element) ; and (4) the employ er lacke d an over riding leg itimate business justi fication (justification element)
. Kulch v. Structural Fibe rs, Inc. , 78 Ohio St. 3d 134, 677 N.E.2d 308, 321 (1997) (inter nal citation omitted). Ung er c ontended that the defe ndants violated “a clea r publ ic pol icy

as evide nced by the Natio na l L a

bo r R e la tio ns Ac t, [ Ohi o’s c oll e c tiv e ba rg a ini ngstatut e ], and

the F ir st Amendment
. . . .” Reg arding the policy alleg edly manifested in the N ational L abor Relations Act (N L RA ), the dis tr ic t c ourt c or re c tly c on c lud e d th a t 29 U. S.C. § 1 52 (2 ) e xpre ss ly ex clu des p ub lic employ ees f

rom the NL RA’s protec tion, a nd thus U ng er cannot claim that NL RA policy protec ts her speec h or employ

ment. Wit h respe ct to both the First Amen dment and the Ohio c ollective barg aining statute, Ung er f ailed to suffic iently

claim the first and third elements of the w rong ful te rm inatio n to rt
. F ir st, Un g e r’ s com

pla int fa ils to sa tis fy the c lari ty e le me nt. B e c a

us e De fe nd ants ’ a lle g e dly adver se ac tions d i d n o t v i o late her fre e spee ch or a ssociation rig hts, the First Amendme nt cannot underlie U ng er’ s clea

r p u b li c p o li cy

violation claim. Ohio’s public employ ees’ collective ba rg aining law expressly

excludes seasona l employ ees. O .R.C. § 4117.01(C) (13). Even assuming Ung erNo. 09-3180

Unger v . City of Mentor

- 8 - su c c e ssf ull y c la ime d t hat the d e fe nd ants mis c la ssi fi e d h e r a nd that th e mis c la ssi fi c a tio n it se lf
un fa ir ly fo re c los e d th e statut e ’s pr ote c tio n, the law d oe s n ot m anif e st a c le ar p ub lic po lic y

a g a ins t classifying e mploy ees w ho work full-time hours a s seasona l employ ees. Second, re g ardingthe ca usation element, Ung er’ s claim fails becau s e she does not sufficie ntly

alleg e that her policy -re lated conduct motivated her dismiss al. She cites only temporal proxi mity —that “on or a

bout Aug ust 8, 2007 a ce rtified copy of the init i al [state administrative unfair la bor pra ctice c harg es] was sent to the City , and a c opy was fax ed to the City ’s counse l;” and that “[u] pon rec eipt of the c ertified c opy of the char g e, the City announce d that eff ective Septe mber 30, 2007, [she] would be laid off as a se asonal e mploy ee.” But “[ w] h i le the timing of the te rm inatio n c an c on tr ibute to a n in fe re nc e of

re ta liatio n, te mpo ra l pro ximity a lon e is ins uf fi c ie nt t o support a finding of a c ausal c onnection.” Bu e hle r v . Am Pa m C om me rc ial

Mi dwe st , No. C-060475, 20 07 WL26 83 52 0, a t *5 (O hio Ct. Ap p. 1s t D ist
. S ept
. 14 , 2 00 7) (f oo tno te omi tte d) ; se e als o Cunningham v. Steubenv ille Orthopedics & Sports Med., Inc

. , 888 N.E.2d 499, 511 (Ohio Ct. App. 20 08 ); ac c or

d Tut tle v . Me tro . Gov ’t of N as hv ill e , 4 74 F .3 d 3 07 , 3 21 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) (h old ingthat,
as a matter of f

eder al l aw, “temporal prox imity , standing alone, is i nsufficie nt to establish a causa l
connec tion for a r etaliation claim”)
. C. Employment Contract Claims Ung er a lternatively

claims that by

terminating her, the defe ndants brea ched a n oral c ontrac tNo. 09-3180

Unger v . City of Mentor

- 9 - governi ngthe te rm s o f h e r e mpl oy me nt. She ig no re s, ho we ve r, lon g sta nd ingOh io l aw: a

pa rt y
c an n o te n f

o r c e ano r a l c o n t r a c tw i t h a m u n i c i p a l i t y. See, e .g. , Cooney v. City of Indepe ndence , No. 6 6 5 0 9 , 1 9 9 4 W L6 6 3 4 5 3 , at * 2 (O h i o C t
. Ap p . 8 t h Di s t
. No v . 2 3 , 1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g City of W ellston v. Morgan , 65 Oh io St. 21 9, 62 N. E. 2d 12 7 ( 19 01 ); W

ole ry v . Ci ty of P or tsm ou th , 67 Ohio App. 3d 16, 58 5 N .E .2 d 9 55 , 9 57 –5 8 ( 19 90 ); City of Seven H ills v. Cit y of Cleve land , 47 Ohio App. 3d 159, 547 N. E. 2d 10 24 , 102 6– 29 (1 98 8) ; Cuy ah og a F all s v . A sh c ra

ft , No
. 15 12 9, 19 91 WL 28 41 88 (O hio Ct. App. 8th Dist. D ec. 26, 1991)). I ndeed, “ municipalities may not be bound to a contr act unless the ag ree ment is f

ormally ratified throug h proper channe ls.” Cooney , 1994 WL 663453, at *2. I n Ohio, a valid ratification requir es that the c ity direc tor of law pr epar e a w ritten contra ct. O.R.C. § 705.11. Ung er the ref

ore f ails to alleg e the e x istence of a contr act, let a lone its breac h.
D. Eq ua l P ay

Ac t Cla im Ung er’ s sex di scrimination claim under the E q u al Pay

Act also fa ils. Her complaint cites
no thi ngmor e tha

n th e c la im’ s le g a l e le me nts , n e g le c tin g to p ro vi de any fact ua l ba sis in s up po rt
. Thus, under Rule 12(b)( 6), she f ailed to state a

claim. Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A] plaintiff’s obligatio n t o provide the ‘ g rounds’ of his ‘e ntitlement to relief’ r equire s more than labe ls and conclusions, and a

formulaic r ecitation of the elements of a cause of ac tion will not do . . . .”).
E. Additional Stat e Law Clai ms
The district cour

t declined t o e xe r c is e s u

p p le me ntal jurisdiction over Ung er’ s state law- basedNo. 09-3180

Unger v . City of Mentor

- 10 - s ex discrimination claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) . To reve rse, we must find an abuse of discretion. Carlsbad T

ech., I nc. , 129 S. Ct . at 1867. B eca use Ung er a dvance s no develope d
a rgu m e n t f

o r s u c h a f

i n d i n g i n e i t h e r h e r o p e n i n g b r i e f o r i n h e r r e p l y , s h e f o r f e i t s thi s c la im. Humphrey

v. United States Attorney Gen.’ s Office , 279 F. App’ x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2008) (c iting United States v. J

ohnson , 44 0 F.3 d 83 2, 84 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 6) ; Cau dil l , 431 F.3d at 915 n.13). F ur the rm or e , e ve n if

we c ho se to e nte rt a in the a rgume nt, no e vid e nc e of

a bu se of dis c re tio n e xists
. III. Conclusi on
For these re asons, we a ffirm the district c ourt’s dismissal without prejudice of Ung er’ s statelaw b a se d s e x d isc ri min a tio n c la im a nd its dis mis sa l w ithpr e

jud ic e of the re ma ind e r o f h e r c la ims
.