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ADRIANA RUIZ ET AL. v. VICTORY PROPERTIES, LLC

(SC 18997)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, McDonald and Espinosa, Js.
Argued December 4, 2013—officially released January 20, 2015

Louis B. Blumenfeld, with whom was Lorinda S.

Coon, for the appellant (defendant Victory Properties, LLC).

Michael T. Petela, with whom, on the brief, was

Angelo Cicchiello, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

PALMER, J. The plaintiff Olga Rivera (Olga) commenced this negligence action, both in her individual

capacity and as next friend and parent of the named

plaintiff, Adriana Ruiz (Adriana),1 against theirlandlord,

the defendant, Victory Properties, LLC,2 alleging that

the defendant was liable for injuries that then seven

year old Adriana sustained when her ten year old neighbor, with whom Adriana had been playing in their

shared backyard, removed a piece of concrete from

that backyard, carried it up to his family’s third floor

apartment and dropped it onto Adriana’s head from a

window orthe balcony of that apartment. The trial court

granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

concluding that the defendant did not owe Adriana a

duty of care because no reasonable juror could find

that her injuries were a foreseeable consequence of the

defendant’s alleged negligence and because imposing

liability on the defendant would be contrary to overriding public policy considerations. The plaintiffs appealed

to the Appellate Court from the trial court’s judgment

in favor of the defendant. In a divided opinion, the

Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and

remanded the case with direction to deny the defendant’s summary judgment motion. Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 135 Conn. App. 119, 133, 43 A.3d 186 (2012).

We then granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the issue of whetherthe Appellate Court properly reversed the trial court’s decision

to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 305 Conn. 922, 47 A.3d

882 (2012). Because we agree with the Appellate Court

that the trial court improperly granted the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment, we affirm the Appellate

Court’s judgment.

The record reveals the following facts, most of which

are undisputed.3 At all times relevant to this appeal, the

defendant owned and managed a six-family apartment

building located at 138 North Street in the city of New

Britain. Each of the apartments has an open deck overlooking the backyard, which includes a fenced in area

that is accessible by a gate. Children who lived in the

apartment, along with other visiting children, regularly

used that area as a playground, even though it was in

very poor condition. In particular, it contained discarded home furnishings and appliances, and an abandoned motor vehicle in a state of complete disrepair.

In addition, as a result of the deteriorating concrete

sidewalks and retaining walls, chunks of concrete were

lying about, along with piles of construction material,

trash and rocks. Parents of the children playing in this

area were concerned because the children would play

with the debris, including the broken concrete. The

defendant’s owner, who also served as the apartment

manager, was aware of the condition of this area
because a tenant had complained to him about it, and

he personally observed the area when he visited the

property each month to collect rent money. Nevertheless, the defendant made no effort to remove or cordon

off the debris so that children playing in the area would

not have access to it.

On May 14, 2008, Saribel Cruz resided in a third floor

apartment in the building with her ten year old son,

Luis Cruz (Luis). Olga and Adriana, who is Saribel Cruz’

niece, resided in another apartment in the building. On

that day, Luis and Adriana, along with as many as a

dozen other children, all of whom were being watched

by several adults, were playing in the backyard. Luis

decided that he wanted to see if he could break a piece

of concrete. To that end, at about 4 p.m., Luis picked

up a piece of concrete from the backyard that weighed

approximately eighteen pounds, carried it up to his

family’s third floor apartment, and dropped it from the

window or balcony of that apartment to the ground

below. Luis saw his cousin Adriana below and yelled,

urging her to get out of the way, but the rock struck

her on the head, causing very serious injuries, including

a crushed skull, traumatic brain injury and paralysis on

her right side. As a result of these injuries, Adriana

had two surgeries and had been hospitalized for nearly

two months.

The plaintiffs subsequently commenced this action

against the defendant, alleging that the defendant was

negligent in failing to remove the loose concrete and

other debris from the backyard of the apartment building, and that this negligence was a cause of Adriana’s

injuries because it was a substantial factor in producing

those injuries.4 The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that, under the circumstances,

it did not owe Adriana a duty of care and cannot as a

matter of law be held responsible for her injuries. The

trial court granted the defendant’s motion, concluding

that the defendant did not owe Adriana a duty of care

because a reasonable landlord in the defendant’s position, knowing that there were pieces of broken concrete

and other debris in the backyard of the apartment building, would not have foreseen that a child would injure

another child by ‘‘lugging a [piece of concrete] up to

the balcony of the building and pitching [it] off, onto

the head of [the other] child . . . .’’ The trial court

further concluded that permitting a jury to find liability

under the facts of this case ‘‘would likely discourage

landlords from renting apartments to families with

young children. It would surely drive up the economic

costs associated with maintaining and insuring rental

properties, without a concomitant benefit of safeguarding against conditions and hazards that are much

more prevalent than the one here. . . . [Although]

imposing liability on the defendant would surely be a

benefit to [Adriana] and her family, the overall economic and societal costs militate against such an impo-
sition in like situations.’’

The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court from

the judgment of the trial court. The Appellate Court

reversed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the

trial court, in evaluating whether Adriana’s injuries

were foreseeable, failed to consider whether the harm

that she suffered was within the general scope of the

risk created by the defendant’s failure to remove potentially dangerous debris from the backyard and, instead,

improperly focused on the specific manner in which

the injuries occurred. See Ruiz v. Victory Properties,

LLC, supra, 135 Conn. App. 126–27. In other words, the

Appellate Court determined that the trial court had

framed the nature of the risk in too narrow of terms.

See id. In its view, the risk of harm created by the

defendant’s conduct was not, as the trial court had

concluded, a child carrying a piece of concrete to a

third floor apartment and dropping it to the backyard

below but, rather, that of a child ‘‘getting hurt by a large

[piece of concrete] thrown by another child,’’ conduct

that, according to the Appellate Court, a fact finder

reasonably could find to be foreseeable. Id., 127. The

Appellate Court further concluded that imposing a duty

of care on the defendant was in accord with this state’s

long-standing public policy requiring a landlord to maintain the common areas of a rental property in a reasonably safe condition, particularly when, as in the present

case, the landlord is aware that children regularly play

in those areas. See id., 129–30.

Judge Alvord dissented from the majority opinion of

the Appellate Court. She agreed with the trial court that

the foreseeability inquiry should be characterized more

narrowly, that is, ‘‘as whether the defendant would reasonably foresee that a ten year old child would pick up

an eighteen pound cinder block, carry it up several

flights of stairs to the third floor of the apartment building and drop it on the head of [a] seven year old . . . .’’

(Emphasis omitted.) Id., 137–38 (Alvord, J., dissenting).

Believing that such a series of events was not reasonably foreseeable, and that imposing a duty of care on

the defendant would lead to increased litigation and

drive up the costs of property ownership, Judge Alvord

concluded that the defendant owed Adriana no duty of

care. Id., 138 and n.7 (Alvord, J., dissenting).

On appeal to this court following our granting of

certification, the defendant contends that the Appellate

Court incorrectly concluded that the defendant owed

Adriana a duty of care and improperly rejected its claim

that, even if the defendant did owe her such a duty,

the defendant’s conduct was not a proximate cause of

her injuries. We disagree with both contentions and,

accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Our analysis of the defendant’s claim is governed by

the following principles. A cause of action in negligence

is comprised of four elements: duty; breach of that
duty; causation; and actual injury. E.g., Mirjavadi v.

Vakilzadeh, 310 Conn. 176, 191, 74 A.3d 1278 (2013).

Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court,

and only if the court finds that such a duty exists does

the trier of fact consider whether that duty was

breached. See, e.g., id.

‘‘Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships

between individuals, made afterthe fact, and imperative

to a negligence cause of action. The nature of the duty,

and the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined by the circumstances surrounding the conduct

of the individual. . . . Although it has been said that

no universal test for [duty] ever has been formulated

. . . our threshold inquiry has always been whether the

specific harm alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable

to the defendant. The ultimate test of the existence of

the duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that

harm may result if it is not exercised. . . . By that is

not meant that one charged with negligence must be

found actually to have foreseen the probability of harm

or that the particular injury [that] resulted was foreseeable . . . . [T]he test for the existence of a legal duty

entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the

defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered

was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis

of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant’s

responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend

to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in

the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

191–92.

Foreseeability is determined in the context of causation, which has two components. With respect to the

first component, causation in fact, we ask whether the

injury would have occurred but for the actor’s conduct.

E.g., Winn v. Posades, 281 Conn. 50, 56, 913 A.2d 407

(2007). The second component of causation is proximate cause. Id. ‘‘Because actual causation, in theory,

is virtually limitless, the legal construct of proximate

cause serves to establish how far down the causal continuum tortfeasors will be held liable for the consequences of their actions.’’ First Federal Savings & Loan

Assn. of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., 247 Conn.

597, 604, 724 A.2d 497 (1999). ‘‘The test for proximate

cause is whether the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s injury. . . .

This substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, namely,

whether the harm [that] occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.’’(Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 321, 852 A.2d 703 (2004).

Additionally, it is well established that a landlord
owes a duty to maintain the common areas of an apartment building in a reasonably safe condition for the

benefit of the tenants who reside in the building. See,

e.g., Giacalone v. Housing Authority, 306 Conn. 399,

407–408, 51 A.3d 352 (2012); see also LaFlamme v.

Dallesio, 261 Conn. 247, 256, 802 A.2d 63 (2002) (‘‘[t]he

general rule regarding premises liability in the landlordtenant context is that landlords owe a duty of reasonable care as to those parts of the property over which

they have retained control’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]). ‘‘What defines the landlord’s duty is the obligation to take reasonable measures to ensure that the

space over which it exercises dominion is safe from

dangers, and a landlord may incur liability by failing

to do so.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Giacalone v. Housing

Authority, supra, 408. ‘‘The ultimate test of the duty is

to be found in the reasonable foreseeability of harm

resulting from a failure to exercise reasonable care to

keep the premises reasonably safe.’’ Noebel v. Housing

Authority, 146 Conn. 197, 200, 148 A.2d 766 (1959). This

duty is also codified at General Statutes § 47a-7 (a),

which provides in relevant part: ‘‘A landlord shall . . .

(3) keep all common areas of the premises in a clean

and safe condition . . . .’’

Finally, whether the injury is reasonably foreseeable

ordinarily gives rise to a question of fact for the finder

of fact, and this issue may be decided by the court only

if no reasonable fact finder could conclude that the

injury was within the foreseeable scope of the risk such

that the defendant should have recognized the risk and

taken precautions to prevent it. See, e.g., Vendrella v.

Astriab Family Ltd. Partnership, 311 Conn. 301,

331–32 and n.25, 87 A.3d 546 (2014). In other words,

foreseeability ‘‘becomes a conclusion of law only when

the mind of a fair and reasonable [person] could reach

only one conclusion; if there is room for reasonable

disagreement the question is one to be determined by

the trier as a matter of fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Gutierrez v. Thorne, 13 Conn. App. 493, 501,

537 A.2d 527 (1988). Guided by these principles, we

now turn to the merits of the defendant’s claims.

The defendant first contends that a landlord’s duty

to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the common

areas of leased premises is inapplicable to the present

case because the harm that Adriana suffered was not

foreseeable.In support of this contention,the defendant

argues that ‘‘Connecticut law does not require one to

anticipate that a child will misuse an inherently harmless object in a dangerous way,’’ and that the ‘‘buckets,

trash, rocks and broken concrete pieces’’ at issue in

this case are ‘‘no more dangerous than many common

objects occurring in nature or appearing routinely in

homes [or] yards where children live and play.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant further

contends that, even if such objects could be considered

dangerous, Adriana’s injuries are not of the kind that
one reasonably would expect to result from the misuse

of those objects, and, in any event, public policy militates against imposing a duty under the facts and circumstances presented.

We disagree with the defendant’s first argument

because we reject its underlying premise, namely, that

broken concrete pieces, discarded buckets, rocks and

other similar debris are inherently harmless when left

in the backyard of an apartment building where children

are known to play. Indeed, even the trial court, which

ultimately agreed with the defendant that Adriana’s

injuries were not foreseeable, recognized that, ‘‘[i]n a

backyard where children routinely play outside, a landlord may have a duty to attempt to prevent foreseeable

hazards,’’ which would include a duty ‘‘to clean up and

remove loose or sharp concrete [on] which a child might

twist an ankle or fall and cut herself.’’ In her dissenting

opinion in the Appellate Court, Judge Alvord also

acknowledged that ‘‘[i]t certainly was foreseeable that

a child might trip and fall over the debris or even throw

a piece of concrete at another child.’’(Emphasis added.)

Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra, 135 Conn. App.

138 (Alvord, J., dissenting). For our part, we are hard

pressed to conceive of any set of circumstances in

which it would be reasonable for a landlord, on the

basis of his or her belief that pieces of broken concrete

pose no inherent danger to children, to allow such

debris to accumulate in an area frequented by children

at play. Even if we agreed, however, that pieces of

broken concrete are inherently harmless, we are aware

of no authority that stands for the proposition that a

person cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from

such objects.5 For example, magazines and books are

the most innocuous of items, but few would argue that

they cannot become a fire hazard if allowed to accumulate, over time, in a hallway or attic. Although light

bulbs and paper weights are also inherently innocuous,

it hardly would be prudent to discard a wheelbarrow

full of them in the middle of a playground. On the

contrary, as the trial court observed, it is common

knowledge that children do not always appreciate the

dangers inherent in their surroundings and often will

play with objects found lying around. See, e.g., Wax v.

Honolulu, 34 Haw. 256, 259 (1937) (‘‘Not the least of

childish instincts is the proclivity [of children] to intermeddle with objects or devices [that] excite their curiosity or suggest means of amusement. And if it may be

reasonably anticipated that children might resort for

amusement to, or intermeddle with, an object or device,

left unguarded in a public park, to the injury of themselves or others and ordinary prudence would counsel

precautionary measures to prevent such injury, nonaction in that respect would constitute negligence

. . . .’’); Geary v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 Mass. 369,

370, 145 N.E.2d 716 (1957) (‘‘children at play sometimes

throw available objects for various reasons’’).
Consequently, ‘‘[o]ur cases have attempted to safeguard children of tender years from their propensity to

disregard dangerous conditions. It definitely has been

established by frequent repetition of the statement that

the degree of care required of children is such care as

may reasonably be expected of children of similar age,

judgment and experience. . . . As to the care required

of others in relation to children, the same propensity of

children has been taken into consideration in evaluating

the negligence of these others.’’6

(Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Neal v. Shiels, Inc.,

166 Conn. 3, 11, 347 A.2d 102 (1974). This is not to say

that an object’s intrinsic qualities and character play

no role in a duty analysis. Indeed, such considerations

may bear significantly on that analysis, but only insofar

as they inform the question of whether the harm that

occurred was sufficiently foreseeable that the defendant reasonably should have taken steps to prevent it.7

As we previously indicated, both the trial court and

Judge Alvord, in her dissenting opinion in the Appellate

Court, concluded that the harm that befell Adriana in

this case was not foreseeable. See Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra, 135 Conn. App. 134, 138 (Alvord, J.,

dissenting). Judge Alvord, in particular, reasoned that,

although it was foreseeable that a child might throw a

piece of concrete at another child, the catastrophic

injuries that Adriana sustained were not within the

scope of that risk and, therefore, could not reasonably

have been anticipated. See id., 138 (Alvord, J., dissenting). On appeal, the defendant urges us to adopt

Judge Alvord’s reasoning and reject the reasoning of the

Appellate Court majority, which, as we have explained,

concluded that the trial court and Judge Alvord improperly had framed the foreseeability question too narrowly

to encompass only the specific facts of this case,

namely, whether it was foreseeable that a ten year old

child would carry a heavy piece of concrete from the

backyard to a third floor balcony and drop it on Adriana’s head. We disagree that the Appellate Court majority’s analysis of foreseeability was improper. To the

contrary, as this court previously has explained, ‘‘[as]

long as harm of the general nature as that which

occurred is foreseeable there is a basis for liability even

though the manner in which the accident happens is

unusual, bizarre or unforeseeable.’’ Pisel v. Stamford

Hospital, 180 Conn. 314, 333, 430 A.2d 1 (1980); see

also Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 246 Conn. 563, 587,

717 A.2d 215 (1998) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (focus of

foreseeability inquiry should be ‘‘on the general nature

of the harm and not the specific manner in which the

injury occurred or the conduct of a third party’’); Figlar

v. Gordon, 133 Conn. 577, 581–82, 53 A.2d 645 (1947)

(foreseeability ‘‘does not mean that one charged with

negligence must be found actually to have foreseen the

probability of harm or that the particular injury which

resulted was foreseeable, but the test is, would the
ordinary man in the defendant’s position, knowing what

he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm

of the general nature of that suffered was likely to

result’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, as

the Appellate Court further explained, ‘‘[a]lthough a

jury might find it not foreseeable that a ten year old

child would carry a large [piece of concrete] up to a

third floor balcony, throw it off, and hit someone below,

defining the harm of the general nature in that way as

a matter oflaw would be too specific; it would transform

the general nature of the harm into the specific way in

which the harm occurred.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Ruiz

v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra, 127.

Comment (i) to § 29 of the Restatement (Third) of

Torts underscores this point: ‘‘Courts often respond

to efforts by advocates to employ excessive detail in

characterizing the type of harm in order to make it

appear more unforeseeable with the dictum that the

manner of harm is irrelevant. Factfinders, no doubt,

respond to these efforts with their own judgment and

common sense to decide the appropriate specificity

with which to assess the scope of liability.’’ 1 Restatement (Third), Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 29, comment (i), p. 504 (2010). Although,

in some cases, the injury is so remotely or tenuously

connected to the conduct of the defendant that it must

be deemed unforeseeable as a matter of law, this is not

such a case. Because reasonable people can disagree

as to whether the defendant should have anticipated

that a child playing in the common backyard reasonably

might by injured by another child’s mishandling of the

broken concrete or other debris that had accumulated

there, the plaintiff is entitled to have a jury decide

that question.

In the present case, the defendant does not dispute

that the risk of harm created by its failure to remove

the buckets, trash, broken concrete pieces and other

debris from the backyard was that children playing in

the area might trip on them or throw them at other

children. The types of injuries one would expect to

result from this type of behavior run the gamut from

cuts and bruises to broken bones, concussions and even

fractured skulls. Adriana’s injuries, although severe, fall

squarely along this continuum of harm. That they

occurred in an unusual manner, namely, by a child

dropping a piece of concrete into the backyard playground from a third floor balcony instead of throwing

it while in the backyard, does not alter this fundamental

fact. We therefore agree with the Appellate Court that

Adriana’s injuries were sufficiently foreseeable that it

was inappropriate for the trial court to foreclose the

foreseeability question as a matter of law.

Of course, ‘‘[a] simple conclusion that the harm to

the plaintiff was foreseeable . . . cannot by itself mandate a determination that a legal duty exists. Many
harms are quite literally foreseeable, yet for pragmatic

reasons, no recovery is allowed. . . . A further inquiry

must be made, for we recognize that duty is not sacrosanct in itself . . . but is only an expression of the sum

total of those considerations of policy [that] lead the

law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.

. . . The final step in the duty inquiry, then, is to make

a determination of the fundamental policy of the law,

as to whether the defendant’s responsibility should

extend to such results.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co.,

286 Conn. 563, 594, 945 A.2d 388 (2008). ‘‘[I]n considering whether public policy suggests the imposition of a

duty, we . . . consider the following four factors: (1)

the normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review; (2) the public policy of encouraging

participation in the activity, while weighing the safety

of the participants;(3) the avoidance of increased litigation; and (4)the decisions of otherjurisdictions.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Monk v. Temple George

Associates, LLC, 273 Conn. 108, 118, 869 A.2d 179

(2005). ‘‘[This] totality of the circumstances rule . . .

is most consistent with the public policy goals of our

legal system, as well as the general tenor of our [tort]

jurisprudence.’’ Id., 121.

Relying primarily on the trial court’s analysis of the

policy issue, the defendant contends that, even if a jury

reasonably could conclude that Adriana’s injuries were

foreseeable, public policy militates against imposing a

duty under the circumstances of this case. We disagree

with this assertion for several reasons. First, the defendant’s analysis fails to give due consideration to the

preexisting common-law and statutory duty requiring

landlords in this state to maintain the common areas

of leased premises in a reasonably safe condition. In

light of that duty, the only real issue in this case is

whether a compelling reason exists to conclude that

this duty is not controlling of the policy question raised

by the defendant. Clearly, the first two considerations

that bear on that question—the expectations of the

participants and the public policy of encouraging participation in the activity under review—do not support

the defendant’s position. The Appellate Court explained

that the activity at issue is a tenant’s use of the common

area of an apartment building—in this case a backyard—as a place for children to play. SeeRuiz v. Victory

Properties, LLC, supra, 135 Conn. App. 129. The law

imposes a duty on landlords to maintain the common

areas of rental property in a reasonably safe condition

precisely because it is expected that tenants will use

those areas for a variety of purposes, including as a

place for their children to recreate. Cf., e.g., Indianapolis Housing Authority v. Pippin, 726 N.E.2d 341, 346

(Ind. App. 2000) (public policy supports imposing duty

on owner of multifamily housing complex to consider

safety of common areas where children are known to
play). With respect to the public policy of encouraging

participation in the activity under review, we agree with

the Appellate Court that it is hardly controversial that

public policy supports ‘‘the maintenance of common

areas in properties such as the apartment building in

this case, so that children can socialize and play in safe

environments. A finding against the imposition of a duty

would discourage parents from allowing their children

to play and utilize [these] areas . . . . It would also

require tenants in such dwellings to exercise a much

higher degree of vigilance in monitoring their children’s

activities in order to prevent exposure to potentially

dangerous materials [in areas over which they have no

control]. There is certainly a strong public policy in

favor of facilitating and encouraging children to play

and socialize without forcing an overly heightened

degree of vigilance [on] parents.’’8 Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra, 130.

With respect to the third policy consideration, avoidance of increased litigation, the defendant argues that,

if this court permits a jury to decide whether the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff by failing to remove

the broken pieces of concrete from the backyard, then

almost any item found in the common area of an apartment building could be deemed dangerous, including

sticks and stones, flower pots, umbrellas or even lawn

chairs. The defendant asserts that this will result in

landlords being held strictly liable for injuries caused

by a wide array of harmless objects, expose all property

owners, not just landlords, to increased litigation and

property costs, and ‘‘encourage an unhealthy ‘sanitizing’

of areas where children play’’ in order to avoid such

litigation and costs. First, we reject the defendant’s

contention that imposing a duty under the circumstances of this case is tantamount to imposing strict

liability. To the contrary, concluding that a duty exists

simply affords the plaintiffs in the present case the

opportunity to prove to a jury that Adriana’s injuries

were foreseeable, that the defendant failed to take reasonable steps to avoid them, and that this failure was

a substantial factor in bringing about those injuries. It

is by no means clear, however, that the plaintiffs will

prevail on any of these components of their claim. As

in every negligence action, the jurors will be free to

reject the claim if they find, in light of their common

knowledge and experience, that Adriana’s injuries were

not reasonably foreseeable, or that the defendant exercised reasonable care under the circumstances, or that

the defendant’s conduct was not a substantial factor in

causing Adriana’s injuries.

Nor do we agree that our resolution of this appeal

will lead to a significant increase in litigation or drive

up the costs of property ownership, which might occur

if we were recognizing a new cause of action or otherwise breaking new ground in the area of premises liability. In the present case, we merely conclude that there
is a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant

breached its duty to maintain the common areas of

the plaintiffs’ apartment building in a reasonably safe

condition, such that the question of liability should be

decided by a jury and not by the court as a matter of

law. Indeed, we agree with the Appellate Court that,

rather than unnecessarily and unwisely increasing litigation, imposing a duty in this case will likely prompt

landlords to act more responsibly toward their tenants

in the interest of preventing foreseeable harm caused

by unsafe conditions in areas where tenants are known

to recreate or otherwise congregate. Moreover, the cost

of maintaining the common areas of an apartment building in a reasonably safe condition is likely one of the

least costly aspects of rental property ownership, and

one that the defendant in the present case assumed

by virtue of such ownership. We cannot imagine that

picking up pieces of loose concrete and other debris

that had accumulated in the common backyard, and

periodically inspecting the yard for new hazards, would

require more than a few hours of manual labor and

perhaps the occasional use of a pickup truck.

Finally, we are not persuaded that our conclusion is

likely to cause landlords to ‘‘sanitize’’ the common areas

where children play, thereby depriving those children

of the opportunity to recreate in a fun and enjoyable

environment. Our holding requires only that landlords

take reasonable steps to protect against foreseeable

injuries to children playing in those common areas, and

when a landlord is sued for allegedly breaching that

duty, summary judgmentremains available unless a jury

reasonably could determine that the landlord failed to

act reasonably under the circumstances.

With respect to the fourth consideration, namely, the

decisions of other jurisdictions, the defendant relies

primarily on a line of Illinois cases,9 which, according

to the defendant, explains why property owners are

not liable for injuries caused by inherently harmless

objects. Only one such case, however, involves a claim

that a landlord breached its duty to maintain a common

area in a reasonably safe condition. See Cole v. Housing

Authority, 68 Ill. App. 3d 66, 67, 385 N.E.2d 382 (1979).

All of the cases, moreover, are distinguishable on their

facts.10 Furthermore, as the plaintiffs note, the issue of

whether a landowner may be held liable for injuries

resulting from inherently harmless objects is far from

settled, even in Illinois, for there are a number of appellate cases from that state indicating that the duty

inquiry, particularly when the injured plaintiff is a child,

must ultimately turn on the foreseeability of the harm

rather than the inherently harmless nature of the instrumentality that caused the harm. See, e.g., Qureshi v.

Ahmed, 394 Ill. App. 3d 883, 887, 916 N.E.2d 1153 (2009)

(‘‘[i]t is the reasonable foreseeability of harm that determines liability in negligence actions involving children’’); Grant v. South Roxana Dad’s Club, 381 Ill. App.
3d 665, 672, 886 N.E.2d 543 (2008) (concluding that

issue of duty was not appropriately decided as matter

of law because jury reasonably could conclude that

harm to trespassing child, who was injured on four foot

high pile of dirt, was reasonably foreseeable); Nelson

ex rel. Tatum v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 124 Ill.

App. 3d 655, 663, 465 N.E.2d 513 (1984) (‘‘While foreseeability is . . . a proper matter for a court to consider

in making its duty determination . . . foreseeability is

a determinative consideration only [when] a particular

occurrence is so extreme that, as a policy decision, it

would be unwise to require [the] defendant to guard

against it. In the majority of cases, [in which] varying

inferences are possible from the facts, a court should

permit the jury to decide the foreseeability issue, including the foreseeability of the particular cause and effect

of [the] plaintiff’s injury, as a factual matter in its proximate cause determination.’’ [Citations omitted.]). In any

event, we agree with the Appellate Court that, as this

court previously has explained, ‘‘the decisions of other

jurisdictions . . . [are] not particularly helpful

because there are multiple ways in which our sister

states handle the question of duty with respect to premises liability.’’ Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra,

135 Conn. App. 130; accord Monk v. Temple George

Associates, LLC, supra, 273 Conn. 120. Accordingly, the

decisions of other jurisdictions, like the other relevant

considerations, do not support the defendant’s contention that it did not owe Adriana a duty of reasonable care.11

We turn, therefore, to the defendant’s final claim that,

even if it owed Adriana such a duty, its conduct was

not a proximate cause of her injuries as a matter of

law. In support of this contention, the defendant argues

that ‘‘[i]t is clear that the conduct of the defendant in

permitting debris to accumulate in the backyard was

not a direct cause of [Adriana’s] injury. The direct and

proximate cause was the conduct of Luis . . . .’’ As the

Appellate Court explained, however, ‘‘[b]ecause actual

causation, in theory, is virtually limitless, the legal construct of proximate cause serves to establish how far

down the causal continuum tortfeasors will be held

liable for the consequences of their actions. . . . The

fundamental inquiry of proximate cause is whether the

harm that occurred was within the scope of foreseeable

risk created by the defendant’s negligent conduct. . . .

In negligence cases . . . in which a tortfeasor’s conduct is not the direct cause of the harm, the question

of legal causation is practically indistinguishable from

an analysis of the extent of the tortfeasor’s duty to the

plaintiff. . . . Therefore, since [the court has] already

determined the question of whether a duty was owed

by the defendant, it would be repetitive . . . to engage

in an analysis concerning proximate cause.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra, 135 Conn. App. 133; see
also Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., supra, 246 Conn. 574

(‘‘[i]t is impractical, if not impossible, to separate the

question of duty from an analysis of the cause of the

harm when the duty is asserted against one who is not

the direct cause of the harm’’). Furthermore, as we

previously have stated, ‘‘[t]he issue of proximate causation is ordinarily a question of fact for the trier. . . .

Conclusions of proximate cause are to be drawn by the

jury and not by the court. . . . It becomes a conclusion

of law only when the mind of a fair and reasonable

[person] could reach only one conclusion; if there is

room for a reasonable disagreement, the question is

one to be determined by the trier as a matter of fact.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 558, 51

A.3d 367 (2012).

Although we acknowledge that Luis’ actions were a

direct and substantial cause of Adriana’s injuries, and

that a jury reasonably could conclude that he bore the

brunt of the responsibility for her injuries,12 it is well

established that ‘‘[t]he injury resulting from the breach

of duty need not be the direct or immediate result of

the wrongful act; if it is probable and a natural result,

that is according to the operations of natural laws, it

is enough. . . . The mere fact that the act of another

person concurs, co-operates or contributes, in any

degree whatever in producing the injury, is of no consequence . . . . [I]n no case is the connection between

an original act of negligence and an injury actually broken if a [person] of ordinary sagacity and experience,

acquainted with all the circumstances, could have reasonably anticipated that the [direct cause of the harm]

might, not improbably but in the natural and ordinary

course of things, follow his act of negligence.’’ Lombardi v. Wallad, 98 Conn. 510, 517–18, 120 A. 291 (1923);

see id., 513–14, 517 (defendant who left trash can fire

burning in common area of apartment building could

be deemed liable for child’s injuries when child playing

with fire accidentally set another child on fire). Our

determination that a jury reasonably could find that the

defendant’s alleged negligence also was a substantial

factor in causing Adriana’s injuries finds support in

sister state case law rejecting claims, like that of the

defendant in the present case, that the actions of a third

party were not a proximate cause of a child’s injuries

merely because another child directly caused those

injuries. See, e.g., Smith v. Eagle Cornice & Skylight

Works, 341 Mass. 139, 141, 167 N.E.2d 637 (1960) (jury

reasonably could conclude that leaving axe and other

construction materials in courtyard of apartment complex was proximate cause of injuries sustained when

child accidentally dropped axe on another child’s hand);

Speaks v. Housing Authority, 193 N.J. Super. 405, 408–

10, 474 A.2d 1081 (App. Div.)(jury reasonably could find

that landlord’s failure to repair eighth floor stairwell

window was proximate cause of child’s injuries after
child was struck by bicycle frame thrown by another

child from window), cert. denied, 97 N.J. 655, 483 A.2d

177 (1984); Mayer v. Housing Authority, 84 N.J. Super.

411, 424–25, 202 A.2d 439 (App. Div. 1964) (jury reasonably could have found that evidence of prior stone

throwing in area of housing project designated forrecreation of children would render future injury to children

foreseeable), aff’d, 44 N.J. 567, 210 A.2d 617 (1965).

We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs are entitled

to a jury determination of their claim that the defendant

bears at least some responsibility for Adriana’s injuries.

Consequently, we agree with the Appellate Court that

the trial court improperly granted the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment.

The judgment of the Appellate court is affirmed.

In this opinion ROGERS,C. J., and ESPINOSA, J., concurred.

1 We hereinafter refer to Olga and Adriana collectively as the plaintiffs.

2 After the plaintiffs commenced the present action, they successfully

joined two other defendants, namely, John R. Kovalcik and Interpros, Inc.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of those other defendants, however, after granting their independent motion for summary judgment, and

the plaintiffs have not challenged that aspect of the trial court’s judgment

on appeal. Accordingly, we refer to Victory Properties, LLC, as the defendant

throughout this opinion.

3 To the extent that any facts are disputed, we view those facts, as well

as any other relevant facts, in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See,

e.g., DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 306 Conn. 107, 116, 49

A.3d 951 (2012) (for purposes of deciding motion for summary judgment,

court views facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party).

4 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that the

defendant was negligent in that, inter alia, it (1) ‘‘caused, allowed, and/or

permitted the debris and loose concrete and cinderblocks to be and remain

in a dangerous and unsafe condition,’’(2)‘‘caused, allowed, and/or permitted

the debris and loose concrete and cinderblocks to become and remain loose

and defective, causing a hazardous condition,’’ (3) ‘‘failed to remedy [this]

condition when [such a remedy] was reasonable and necessary under the

circumstances,’’ (4) ‘‘failed to maintain [the] backyard and property in a

reasonabl[y] safe condition for [the] plaintiff[s] and other tenants to walk,

play and socialize,’’ and (5) ‘‘knew or should have known that the presence

of . . . loose debris and concrete caused an unsafe and hazardous condition

and that it was foreseeable that the harm caused to [Adriana] was a likely

result[of] the defendant’s failure to take corrective measures and [to]remedy

the hazardous condition . . . .’’

5

In support of its contention to the contrary, the defendant relies on

Goldberger v. David Roberts Corp., 139 Conn. 629, 96 A.2d 309 (1953), in

which the twelve year old plaintiff sought damages from the defendants,

which operated a summer camp for children, for injuries that the plaintiff

sustained when a fellow camper accidentally struck him while swinging a

paddle that broke into two pieces while the two boys were supposed to be

resting in a tent. Id., 629–30. We concluded that the failure of camp counselors to monitor the child who swung the paddle, after he was instructed to

get rid of the paddle, was not a breach of any duty that the defendants

owed the plaintiff. See id., 632–33. Contrary to the assertion of the defendant

in the present case, however, we did not state or imply in Goldberger that

it always is unforeseeable that a child will use an inherently harmless object

in a dangerous way. We simply concluded, rather, that, under the facts of

Goldberger, the defendants owed the plaintiff no duty to prevent the harm

that he suffered. See id.

6 This court also has ‘‘adopted the view of § 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that [a] possessor of land is subject to liability for physical

harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition [on]

the land if (a) the place where the condition exists is one [on] which the

possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass,

and (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason
to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable

risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and (c) the children

because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk

involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and (d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition

and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the

risk to children involved, and (e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable

care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 Conn. 290, 304, 512

A.2d 130 (1986); accord Duggan v. Esposito, 178 Conn. 156, 158–59, 422

A.2d 287 (1979), quoting 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 339, p. 197 (1965).

‘‘It is a question for the jury to decide if a defendant is maintaining a latently

dangerous instrumentality on his premises [that] is so exposed that he may

reasonably anticipate that a child is likely to be hurt by it. It is also for the

jury to decide if a defendant knows or has reason to know that children

are likely to trespass on that portion of his land where the instrumentality

is located. . . . Even if there is no evidence that any child had previously

trespassed on the site, it remains a jury question whether, based on all of

the evidence, the defendants knew or had reason to know that children

were likely to trespass on the place where the condition existed.’’ (Citation

omitted.) Yeske v. Avon Old Farms School, Inc., 1 Conn. App. 195, 201, 470

A.2d 705 (1984). Of course, a property owner’s responsibility to a tenant

exceeds the owner’s duty to a mere trespasser.

7 We agree with the plaintiffs, however, that the trial court, in its memorandum of decision,tended to minimize the defendant’s culpability by repeatedly

referring to the concrete that struck Adriana as a ‘‘rock,’’ which, as the

plaintiffs argue, suggests a natural rather than artificial condition, and by

analogizing the risk of harm in this case to that of a child removing a flower

pot from the back porch and dropping it. The plaintiffs argue that this

analogy is inapt because ‘‘[t]he inappropriateness of stealing and destroying

a . . . potted plant would be obvious, even to a ten year old child,’’ whereas

the conditions at issue in this case, which included an abandoned motor

vehicle, scattered cinder blocks and construction debris, were discarded

items that clearly belonged to no one, a difference that also would not have

been lost on children playing in the backyard. The plaintiffs contend, and

we agree, that the appropriate analogy would be to a child removing the

battery from the abandoned vehicle and dropping it on a playmate.

8 We reject the defendant’s suggestion that a ‘‘reasonably safe’’ environment in an urban setting has a different meaning than in other settings,

such that the expectation of urban tenants is that landlords will keep the

common areas ‘‘devoid of . . . objects like needles, broken glass, and explosives’’ but not harmless objects that can cause injury only if mishandled.

First, as we previously discussed, we do not agree with the defendant’s

characterization of the debris at issue in this case as inherently harmless

when left in an area where children routinely play. Even if we did, however,

the defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that urban landlords

are held to a lesser standard of care than their suburban orrural counterparts,

one requiring them to maintain the common areas under their control free

of only the most noxious and inherently dangerous of items, such as explosives or used needles. Suffice it to say that we do not believe an object that

poses a danger to children in a suburban backyard becomes less dangerous

to them merely because it is discarded in an urban backyard.

9 See Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 8, 13, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974) (trial

court properly dismissed complaint alleging, inter alia, that manufacturer

of conveyor belt located on farm was strictly liable for injuries suffered by

farm owner’s four year old granddaughter when she placed her hand in or

on conveyor belt because manufacturer reasonably could not have foreseen

that child would have access to belt); Cole v. Housing Authority, 68 Ill.

App. 3d 66, 67, 69, 71–72, 385 N.E.2d 382 (1979) (defendant housing authority

was not liable for injuries sustained by child who resided in housing project

owned and operated by defendant when child was playing in construction

area within housing project that children were prohibited from accessing

and was struck by metal stake, used in connection with ongoing construction, that another child had found at site and swung or threw, and defendant

had no duty to ensure that children did not gain access to such stakes

when company performing construction work placed barricades with yellow

flashers around construction site and picked up stakes at end of each work

day); Reeves v. Springfield, 5 Ill. App. 3d 880, 880–83, 284 N.E.2d 373 (1972)

(defendant city was not liable for five year old child’s injuries that he

sustained when another young child picked up discarded license plate from
public alley and threw it at five year old, striking him in eye, because city

had no duty to ‘‘constantly inspect and clean up its 108 miles of alleys, and

to remove all items with which a child could be injured’’); Kos v. Catholic

Bishop, 317 Ill. App. 248, 249, 252–53, 45 N.E.2d 1006 (1942) (parochial

school not liable for injuries sustained by student when she was struck by

brush used to clean floors that another student had thrown, as record

contained nothing to indicate that brush was dangerous or stored in inappropriate place).

10 The defendant also cites to Geary v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., supra,

336 Mass. 369–71 (defendant milk company, whose employee delivered milk

to grade school and left several pounds of ice on top of milk containers

delivered to school, was not liable when nine year old student took piece

of ice and threw it to ground, causing ice fragment to break off and cause

injury to another student, because injury was not foreseeable), Foss v.

Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 319, 322–23 (Minn. 2009) (defendant homeowners

were not liable for injuries sustained when freestanding bookshelf fell on

and injured three year old child who was visiting defendants’ home because

defendants did not know of child’s proclivity to climb on bookshelves, and,

therefore, child’s injuries were not reasonably foreseeable), and Chavez v.

Desert Eagle Distributing Co. of New Mexico, LLC, 141 N.M. 116, 119,

123–26, 151 P.3d 77 (App. 2006) (distributors who sold alcohol to casino

knowing that casino intended to serve alcohol continuously for twenty-four

hour period were not liable to passengers of vehicle struck by intoxicated

driver who had been served alcohol at casino during that twenty-four hour

period and while he was intoxicated because passengers’ injuries were not

foreseeable consequence of distributors’ sale of alcohol to casino), cert.

denied, 141 N.M. 164, 152 P.3d 151 (2007). These cases, two of which do

not involve premises liability, are also readily distinguishable and provide

even less support for the defendant’s policy arguments than the Illinois

cases on which the defendant primarily relies. See footnote 9 of this opinion.

Indeed, more than anything else, these cases illustrate that foreseeability

is a highly fact-sensitive issue that most often is not susceptible to resolution

through summary judgment.

11 Because the sister state cases on which the dissent relies are readily

distinguishable on their facts, they, too, provide no support for rejecting

the plaintiff’s claim on public policy grounds. Nor do they ‘‘[weigh] heavily

. . . against imposing a duty on the defendant,’’ as the dissent asserts. For

example, in Indian Acres of Thornburg, Inc. v. Denion, 215 Va. 847, 213

S.E.2d 797 (1975) (Indian Acres), the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded

that the owner and developer of certain property on which a silo was being

converted into an observation tower could not be held liable for injuries

sustained by the victim when she was struck by a piece of concrete rock

that a young boy, who had climbed to the top of the tower while it was

still under construction, dropped to the ground below. Id., 848–51. In

reversing the judgment that the trial court had rendered in accordance with

the jury verdictin favor ofthe victim,the SupremeCourt of Virginia explained

that, even though the property owner and developer had permitted rocks

and other debris, including the rock that struck the victim, to accumulate

at the base of the structure, the owner and developer ‘‘was not required to

eliminate all excess construction materials from the site, while construction

was still in progress.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 850. Because the injury in

the present case was sustained on a backyard playground, and not on an

active construction site, as in Indian Acres, the two cases are materially different.

The other case on which the dissent primarily relies, namely, Englund v.

Vital, 838 N.W.2d 621 (S.D. 2013), is similarly inapposite. In Englund, the

injured victim, a young girl, was struck by a rock thrown by her neighbor,

a young boy, who resided with his parents in a rental property owned by

the defendant Robert Smith. Id., 624–26. The victim’s parents filed an action

against Smith, among others, on the victim’s behalf, alleging that the rock

that the neighbor threw at the victim constituted debris from landscaping

work that Smith was performing on the rental property, that Smith knew

that the neighbor had a propensity to throw rocks, and that Smith had

indicated that he would remove the rocks from the rental property but did

not do so. Id., 625–26. The victim’s parents alleged that Smith’s failure to

remove the rocks was a breach of the duty he owed the victim to protect

her from the neighbor’s propensity to throw rocks. Id., 628–29. The South

Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment rendered in favor

of Smith, concluding that Smith could not be held liable for the victim’s

injuries, first, because he had ceded control of the rental property to the
neighbor’s parents; id.; and, second, because, even though he knew that the

neighbor sometimes threw rocks, he could not have foreseen the neighbor’s

intentional or criminal misconduct in throwing a rock at a person. Id.,

629–30. It is clear that there is nothing in the court’s decision in Englund

that bears even remotely on the proper resolution of the present case.

12 We note that ‘‘General Statutes § 52-572h supplanted [the] rule of joint

and several liability with a system of apportioned liability in which each

defendant is liable for only his proportionate share of damages according

to his percentage of negligence that proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.

. . . The stated purpose behind the apportionment statute is to prevent any

one defendant from having to pay more than his proportional share of the

damages.’’ (Citation omitted.) Alfano v. Randy’s Wooster Street Pizza Shop

II,Inc., 90 Conn. App. 766, 777, 881 A.2d 379 (2005). Even when the defendant

in a negligence action has failed to file an apportionment complaint, a jury

still may consider the negligence of unnamed parties in determining the

share of damages attributable to the defendant. See, e.g., Archambault v.

Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., 287 Conn. 20, 37, 946 A.2d 839 (2008) (‘‘A defendant is entitled to try to convince the jury that not only did it not cause

[the] plaintiff’s injuries, but someone else did. A void of evidence concerning

the [nonparty’s] conduct would leave a logical hiatus in the story presented

to the jury. With no one allowed to show what part the [nonparty’s] conduct

played, the jury would be left to wonder whether anyone other than the

defendant could have caused [the] plaintiff’s injuries. . . . Thus, the defendant . . . [is] entitled to show that the [nonparty’s] negligence was the

sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.’’ [Citation omitted; emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).