Filed 8/24/17 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re TRAVIS C. et al., Persons 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B276877

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. DK16101)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALLISON S.,

Defendant and Appellant;

J.C.,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

 [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
2

THE COURT:

IT IS ORDERED that the opinion filed herein on August 2, 

2017, be modified as follows:

On page 11, the paragraph after the heading “DCFS’s 

Cross-Appeal” is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted 

in its place: 

Our resolution of Mother’s appeal renders DCFS’s crossappeal moot. (In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492; see In 

re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 876; In re Ashley B.

(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979.) The cross-appeal is dismissed.

This modification does not change the judgment.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

____________________________________________________________

CHANEY, Acting P. J. JOHNSON, J. LUI, J.
Filed 8/2/17 (unmodified version)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re TRAVIS C. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B276877

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. DK16101)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALLISON S.,

Defendant and Appellant;

J.C.,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Terry T. Truong, Commissioner. Affirmed.
2

Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Respondent.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Senior Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________

Allison S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

declaring her children dependents of the court under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1).

1 Mother 

contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s 

jurisdictional findings. The Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) cross-appeals, arguing

substantial evidence does not support the court’s amendments to 

the allegations in the petition. DCFS also moves to dismiss 

Mother’s appeal as moot because Mother did not appeal from a

subsequent order sustaining a section 387 petition DCFS argues 

provides an alternative basis for jurisdiction. We deny DCFS’s 

motion to dismiss, affirm the court’s order sustaining the section 

300 petition as amended, and dismiss DCFS’s cross-appeal.

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

Mother and J.C. (Father) had two children together, Travis 

in 2007 and Samantha in 2008. Mother and Father permanently 

separated in 2010, and Mother had custody of Travis and 

Samantha after the separation. Mother and the children lived 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

with Mother’s parents, even though Mother had a strained

relationship with her parents.

In September 2015, Mother began having serious mental 

health problems, including psychotic episodes. Mother’s 

condition caused her to become delusional and paranoid and act 

in ways that scared the children. Mother’s condition made her 

hear voices, believe she was being stalked, believe law 

enforcement was following her, believe the children were being 

manipulated by the government, and believe she had implants in 

her brain, among other delusions, and she was open with the 

children about her mental illness. Mother’s psychotic episodes 

manifested themselves in various ways. At times, she became 

angry. At least once, Mother became suicidal and was later 

hospitalized. 

Mother sought treatment for her condition, but did not 

consistently follow any treatment regimen. She checked into a 

treatment center, but checked out, citing a disagreement with the 

facility over her treatment. Mother was also treated by a 

psychiatrist, who prescribed various medications. The 

medications gradually improved Mother’s condition. But she

repeatedly stopped taking her medications for various lengths of 

time and various reasons. 

Before she was medicated, before her condition became 

more stable, and when she went off her medication, Mother’s 

parents—particularly the maternal grandmother—stepped in as 

Travis and Samantha’s primary caregivers. The maternal 

grandmother prepared the children’s meals, helped them with 

school projects, and readied them for bed. When Mother 

threatened suicide, the maternal grandmother removed the 

children from the home for the night. And the maternal 
4

grandparents confiscated Mother’s keys when they believed she 

could not drive. 

The maternal grandparents’ interventions mitigated, but 

could not eliminate, the effects of Mother’s illness and treatment 

decisions on Travis and Samantha. The maternal grandparents 

sought but were never granted temporary legal guardianship of 

Travis and Samantha. And even after Mother’s medication 

stabilized her condition, she threatened to leave the maternal 

grandparents’ home and take Travis and Samantha. Mother 

continued to drive alone with the children in the car, including 

when she was experiencing symptoms of her illness. 

Mother’s psychiatrist reported that he was not concerned 

with the children’s safety as long as the maternal grandmother 

was caring for them and as long as Mother stayed on her 

medication. If Mother were to be off her medication or if the 

maternal grandmother were not involved, however, he said he 

would have concerns. 

Mother also had a history of substance abuse. Before she 

was pregnant with Travis, Mother used methamphetamine, 

cocaine, and marijuana. Mother continued to use marijuana 

daily. 

For his part, Father regularly visited Travis and Samantha 

at the maternal grandparents’ home and frequently kept them on 

weekends. Father alternately lived with his parents and his 

girlfriend’s parents. Father’s income fluctuated, but he 

voluntarily assisted with the children’s financial support. He was 

regularly in their lives, but Father was unaware of the extent of 

Mother’s condition or its effects on Travis and Samantha. 
5

Procedural Background

DCFS began investigating Travis and Samantha’s situation 

on February 10, 2016. On March 11, the juvenile court ordered

Travis and Samantha detained, and DCFS detained and released 

them to the maternal grandparents on March 15. 

A. Section 300 Petition and Detention Hearing

DCFS filed the section 300 petition on March 18, 2016,

alleging the juvenile court had jurisdiction over Travis and 

Samantha under subdivision (b)(1). The petition alleged a 

substantial risk Travis and Samantha would suffer serious 

physical harm or illness because of Mother’s inability to 

adequately supervise or protect them, Father’s failure to protect 

the children from Mother, and Mother’s inability to regularly care 

for them as a result of her mental illness and substance abuse. 

The petition also contained two paragraphs of facts supporting

the jurisdictional allegations; one detailed Mother’s mental 

illness and Father’s failure to protect the children from it (par. b1), and the other detailed Mother’s substance abuse (par. b-2). 

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court—over DCFS’s 

objection—released Travis and Samantha to Father on the 

condition they remain with the maternal grandmother. 

B. Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing

The court presided over the combined jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing on June 10, 2016. 

As filed, the petition’s paragraph b-1 stated: “The children 

Travis C[.] and Samantha C[.]’s mother, Allison S[.], has mental 

and emotional problems including a diagnosis of Schizoaffective 

Disorder, visual and auditory hallucination, delusions, suicidal 

ideation and paranoia, which render the mother incapable of 

providing regular care of the child. The mother failed to take the 
6

mother’s psychotropic medication as prescribed. The children’s 

father, J[.]C[.], knew of the mother’s mental and emotional 

problems and failed to protect the children. Such mental and 

emotional problems on the part of the mother and the father’s 

failure to protect the children endanger the children’s physical 

health and safety and place the children at risk of serious 

physical harm, damage, danger and failure to protect.” 

The court amended paragraph b-1 by striking all 

allegations about Father and changing the end of the paragraph

to state: “The mother failed to consistently take the mother’s 

psychotropic medication as prescribed. Such mental and 

emotional problems on the part of the mother endangers the 

children’s physical health and safety and places the children at 

risk of harm.” The court struck paragraph b-2 entirely. 

After sustaining the petition as amended, the court 

declared Travis and Samantha dependents of the court and 

placed them with Mother and Father on the condition that the 

children reside in the maternal grandparents’ home. 

Mother filed this appeal the same day.2 DCFS crossappealed on August 23, 2016. 

 

2 Jurisdictional findings under section 300 are not 

appealable, but are reviewable on appeal from a dispositional

order. (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393, fn. 

8.)
7

C. Subsequent Proceedings3

DCFS filed a section 387 supplemental petition (requesting 

the court to remove the children from Mother’s custody) in 

January 2017, alleging additional facts about Mother’s mental 

health. At the detention hearing on the section 387 petition on 

January 18, the court detained the children, removed them from 

Mother, and released them to Father. The court adjudicated the

section 387 petition on March 7, 2017, placing the children in 

Father’s custody. After the time expired for an appeal from the 

court’s order on the section 387 petition, DCFS moved to dismiss 

Mother’s appeal.

DISCUSSION

DCFS’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal

DCFS moved to dismiss Mother’s appeal as moot, arguing 

the juvenile court’s orders on the section 387 petition vested the 

juvenile court with jurisdiction independent of the section 300 

petition. DCFS correctly points out that we need only find 

substantial evidence to support any one statutory basis for 

jurisdiction to affirm the court’s jurisdictional finding. (See, e.g.,

In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492.)

 

3 The information in this section comes from exhibits

attached to two DCFS motions to take judicial notice of postjudgment proceedings. We consider the information in the 

context of DCFS’s motion to dismiss, but not in the context of our 

review of the trial court’s jurisdictional findings. An “appellate 

court reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the time it is 

rendered, based on the evidence that was before the trial court 

for consideration at that time.” (In re V.M. (2010) 191 

Cal.App.4th 245, 254, fn. 1.) “This is not one of those rare cases 

presenting unusual, compelling new circumstances that would 

justify this court taking additional evidence.” (Ibid.)
8

Because there was no appeal from the order adjudicating 

the section 387 petition, DCFS argues, the juvenile court had

jurisdiction regardless of the section 300 petition. DCFS cites In 

re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1363-1364, in which we 

concluded that jurisdictional findings on a section 342 petition 

mooted an appeal from jurisdictional findings based on an earlier 

section 300 petition.

In re A.B., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th 1358 does not apply 

here. Section 342 requires the trial court to determine whether 

newly-alleged facts or circumstances establish jurisdiction 

independent of facts alleged in the section 300 petition. By 

contrast, a “necessary prerequisite to file a section 387 

modification petition is jurisdiction over the children.” (In re 

Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 203.) A “section 387 

supplemental petition does not affect the jurisdiction of the 

court.” (Kimberly R. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 

1067, 1077.)

If the court was without jurisdiction to rule on the section 

300 petition, it was also without jurisdiction to consider the 

section 387 petition. We must decide, therefore, whether the 

court’s jurisdictional findings on the section 300 petition were in 

error. DCFS’s motion to dismiss is denied.

Mother’s Jurisdictional Challenge

Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support 

the juvenile court’s determination that Travis and Samantha are 

persons described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1). That 

subdivision brings a child within the court’s jurisdiction when the 

“child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child 

will suffer, serious physical harm or illness” under various 

circumstances not in question here. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) There 
9

are three elements to jurisdiction under section 300: “(1) 

neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) 

causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, 

or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” (In re Rocco M.

(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)

“We review the trial court’s findings for substantial 

evidence. [Citation.] We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate 

the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. 

[Citation.] The judgment will be upheld if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the 

contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a 

different result had it believed other evidence. [Citation.] [¶] 

Substantial evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. It 

is not synonymous with ‘any’ evidence. [Citation.] The evidence 

must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. 

[Citation.] The appellant has the burden of showing there is no 

evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the 

finding or order.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 

228.)

Mother first contends the court’s amendment of the 

supporting facts in the petition was a determination that 

Mother’s condition did not create a substantial risk that Travis 

and Samantha would suffer “serious physical harm or illness,” as 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1) requires. We disagree. The 

petition contained both jurisdictional allegations (the court did 

not amend) tracking the statutory language and the supporting 

facts the court amended. The court sustained the petition with 

the jurisdictional allegations intact. 

Mother also argues the risk of the children suffering 

serious physical harm or illness was speculative. “Harm to a 
10

child cannot be presumed from the mere fact the parent has a 

mental illness.” (Kimberly R. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 

Cal.App.4th 1067, 1079.) 

The court did not, however, presume harm to Travis and 

Samantha merely because Mother has a mental illness. The 

court was instead concerned with Mother’s choice to not 

consistently treat her illness. Mother’s psychiatrist reported that 

he would be concerned for Travis and Samantha’s safety because 

of Mother’s mental condition if Mother were not medicated. 

After she began taking medication, but before her condition 

had stabilized, Mother threatened suicide while the children were 

present. Mother’s parents removed the children from the home 

when Mother threatened suicide and took Mother’s keys away 

when they believed she was not able to drive. Mother’s parents 

mitigated the risks as best they were able, but Mother continued 

to go unmedicated at times, continued to experience severe 

episodes related to her illness, and continued to drive alone with 

Travis and Samantha in the car, even while she was experiencing 

the effects of her illness. 

Mother’s argument focuses on a lack of any specific 

identified harm Mother’s illness and choices risk causing Travis 

and Samantha. Mother analogizes this case to In re David M.

(2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, where the court found the risk of 

harm speculative. The Court of Appeal explained, “David was 

healthy, well cared for, and loved, and that mother and father 

were raising him in a clean, tidy home.” (Id. at p. 830.) There 

was no evidence in that case that the identified problems 

impacted the parents’ ability to care for their child or to provide a 

decent home for him. (Ibid.) There was no substantial risk of 

any future harm identified. (Ibid.)
11

DCFS’s inability to precisely predict how Mother’s illness 

will harm Travis and Samantha does not defeat jurisdiction. 

Mother’s illness and her failure to consistently treat it have 

already put Travis and Samantha into situations where they 

were at a substantial risk of serious physical harm. It is not 

necessary for DCFS or the juvenile court to precisely predict what 

harm will come to Travis and Samantha because Mother has 

failed to consistently treat her illness. Rather, it is sufficient that 

Mother’s illness and choices create a substantial risk of some

serious physical harm or illness.

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional findings.

DCFS’s Cross-Appeal

The juvenile court issued its dispositional order on the 

section 300 petition on June 10, 2016. The court served notice of 

Mother’s appeal on June 16. DCFS filed its notice of appeal from 

the same order on August 23. Because August 23 was more than 

60 days after June 10 and more than 20 days after June 16, 

DCFS’s cross-appeal was untimely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.406(a)(1), (b).)

DISPOSITION

We deny DCFS’s motion to dismiss the appeal and affirm 

the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. DCFS’s cross-appeal 

is dismissed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

CHANEY, Acting P. J.

We concur:

JOHNSON, J. LUI, J.