United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-1498

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Armon Nahal

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Allina Health System; Kristi Gullickson; Kelly Mortitz; Matt Kresl, former 

Pharmacy manager; Matt Wolff; Michael Haight, Hospital Pharmacist; Lehlia 

Paschke, Former HR Rep. for the Pharmacy Department at Abbott Hospital, 

currently retired.; Susan Shorter, Registered oncology nurse at Abbott Hospital; 

Jen Hanson, Hospital Pharmacist; Anne Stern, Hospital Pharmacist; Christy 

Gullickson, Pharmacy manager and now Pharmacy director; Kelly Morris, clinical 

pharmacist; Matt Wolf, city manager; Paul Glynn, former Pharmacy manager

 Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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Submitted: December 16, 2020

Filed: April 1, 2021

[Unpublished]

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Before GRUENDER, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM. 
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Armon Nahal claims Allina Health System refused to grant him a reasonable

accommodation and fired him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 

1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. We affirm the district court’s1 grant of summary 

judgment to Allina.

After Nahal sued Allina Health System and several employees in district 

court, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of all individual defendants, 

Nahal’s HIPAA claim, and allegations of general harassment. The district court 

adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations. Allina then moved for 

summary judgment on Nahal’s ADA claims, and his claims of nationality, religious, 

and sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII, the Minnesota Human Rights 

Act, and the Minnesota Civil Rights Ordinance. The magistrate judge recommended 

granting Allina’s motion and the district court agreed. Nahal appeals the grant of 

summary judgment for his ADA failure-to-accommodate, discriminatory 

termination, and retaliatory termination claims. We review de novo. Higgins v.

Union Pac. R.R. Co., 931 F.3d 664, 669 (8th Cir. 2019). 

Nahal, a pharmacist, is diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and 

Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. He says that Allina knew of his disability 

when he started working in 2005 and that tardiness and irritability are symptoms of 

his diagnoses. Nahal claims he was fired because of his disability and in retaliation 

for his disability claims. Allina says that Nahal was fired for insubordination after 

he refused to attend a meeting with his supervisor, a union representative, and a 

human resources manager.

We review a failure to accommodate claim under a modified burden-shifting 

analysis. Nahal must first demonstrate that reasonable accommodation is possible 

because (1) Allina knew that he was disabled; (2) Nahal requested an 

1

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, Senior United States District Court Judge 

for the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the 

Honorable Katherine Menendez, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of 

Minnesota. 
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accommodation; (3) Allina failed to engage in a flexible and informal interactive 

process with him about possible accommodations; and (4) Nahal’s disability could 

have been reasonably accommodated had the interactive process taken place. 

Garrison v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 939 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted)

(cleaned up). The burden then shifts to Allina “to show that it is unable to 

accommodate” the request. Brunckhorst v. City of Oak Park Heights, 914 F.3d 

1177, 1182 (8th Cir. 2019). 

Nahal has no evidence that Allina did not engage in a flexible and informal 

interactive process about his request to randomly arrive late to work. Nahal first 

gave Allina a generally addressed letter that said “[b]ecause of [Nahal’s] attention 

and concentration problems he is often late for appointments,” but ignored Allina’s 

three written requests to complete an accommodation form and his physician’s 

recommendation that he undergo neuro-psych testing. Nahal knew the process 

because Allina had earlier granted two of his disability-related requestsadjusting 

his schedule and modifying his work station. 

The breakdown in the interactive accommodation process was not because of 

Allina. Nahal did not provide any medical documentation to clarify his disability, 

explain the resulting limitations on his work, or suggest a reasonable

accommodation. See Kratzer v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 398 F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th

Cir. 2005) (finding that an employee failed to request an accommodation when she 

did not obtain an updated physical exam); see also Lipp v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp., 

911 F.3d 537, 546 n.9 (8th Cir. 2018) (commenting that a company policy requiring 

medical verification is not unreasonable).

Nahal also says that Allina fired him “because he resisted meeting to yet again 

discuss the nature and severity of his disability and its tardiness symptom, at least 

until after an upcoming doctor’s appointment in just 3 days’ time.” Reply Br. 7. 

When a plaintiff supplies no direct discrimination evidence, we address disabilitydiscrimination claims with the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748, 755 
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(8th Cir. 2016). Nahal must show that (1) he was disabled; (2) he was qualified; and 

(3) “a causal connection between an adverse employment action and the disability.” 

Id. The burden then shifts to Allina to demonstrate “a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for the adverse action.” Id. Last, Nahal must show that Allina’s proffered 

reason was pretext for discrimination. Id. 

Nahal fails to show any “causal connection between an adverse employment 

action and the disability.” Id. Allina disciplined Nahal because, among other things, 

he had been tardy 89 times and absent 4 times in a six-month time period. See Greer

v. Emerson Elec. Co., 185 F.3d 917, 921 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that most jobs 

require “regular and reliable” attendance). He was also placed on a performance 

improvement plan because he refused to process prescription changes, called a floor 

nurse “useless,” referred to a coworker as a “money whore,” called other coworkers 

“IV room bitches,” asked a coworker if he was “off [his] meds,” and repeated to 

another coworker that “I just hate white people.” Allina Br. 8−9. Nahal was fired 

for misconduct and no reasonable jury could find that the evidence in this case shows 

a causal connection between Nahal’s termination for insubordination and his 

disability or ADA claims. See Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 

(8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the “ADA confers no right to be rude” and that insulting 

coworkers and angry outbursts “erode[] any causal connection” with the plaintiff’s 

firing). 

Finally, retaliation claims require a but-for connection between Nahal’s 

assertion of ADA rights and the adverse action. Oehmke, 844 F.3d at 755. We do 

not view multiple meetings about tardiness, disrespectful communications, and 

pharmacy procedure as retaliationat least not without further evidence. Nothing 

suggests that Nahal would not have been fired for insubordination but for his request 

for accommodations and resistance to following through on medical testing.

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

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