UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

LISA-ATHENA S. ABU HANTASH, in her 

individual capacity and as mother and natural 

guardian of JORDAN-ANNETTEE JAZZMIN 

RICHARDSON, a minor, and JORDAN 

RICHARDSON, INC., a Virginia Corporation, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 

-against- 

 

V MODEL MANAGEMENT NEW YORK, INC. 

and VNY MODEL MANAGEMENT, LLC, 

 

 Defendants. 

 Docket No.: 07 Civ. 3363 (GBD) 

(KNF) 

 

(Oral Argument Requested) 

 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 

AN ORDER DIRECTING A SPEEDY HEARING AND ADVANCING THE 

ACTION ON THE TRIAL CALENDAR PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 57 

 

 NISSENBAUM LAW GROUP, LLC 

 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

LISA ATHENA S. ABU HANTASH, JORDANANNETTEE JAZZMIN RICHARDSON and 

JORDAN RICHARDSON, INC. 

 140 Broadway, 46th Fl. 

 New York, New York 10005 

 (212) 871-5711 

Gary D. Nissenbaum 

 Of Counsel 

Gavin I. Handwerker, Esq. 

Neelam K. Singh, Esq. 

 On the Brief 

Case 1:07-cv-03363-GBD Document 33 Filed 07/10/2007 Page 1 of 15
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Preliminary Statement........................................................................................................................1 

POINT I 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS WARRANTED IRRESPECTIVE OF THE FACT 

THAT TH PARTIES HAVE NOT COMPLETED DISCOVERY .......................................3 

A. The Law ...........................................................................................................................3 

B. The Law Applied To The Facts At Hand.........................................................................4 

POINT II 

THE LAW IS CLEAR THAT, UNLESS PROVIDED OTHERWISE 

BY STATUTE, A MINOR HAS AN UNFETTERED RIGHT TO 

DISAFFIRM AN AGREEMENT EVEN WHERE HER PARENT 

CONSENTED TO THE AGREEMENT...............................................................................7 

 

POINT III 

AS FED. R. CIV. P. 57 APPLIES TO ACTIONS BROUGHT PURSUANT 

TO THE FEDERAL DECLARATORY ACT, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 ET SEQ., 

THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A SPEEDY HEARING AND ADVANCE 

THE WITHIN MATTER ON THE CALENDAR ................................................................10 

Conclusion .........................................................................................................................................11 

Case 1:07-cv-03363-GBD Document 33 Filed 07/10/2007 Page 2 of 15
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITES

Page

Federal Cases

C.R.A. Realty Corp. v. Enron Corp., 842 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ..........................................3 

Forras v. Andros, 470 F. Supp. 2d. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)..................................................................3 

Meloff v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1995) ................................................................3 

NYC Management Group, Inc. v. Brown-Miller, 2004 WL 1087784 

(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2004) ......................................................................................................9

Reznor v. J. Artist Management, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) .................................4 

Saffire Corp. v. Newkidco, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 2d 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) .........................................3, 4 

State Cases

Bombardier v. Goodrich, 110 A. 11 (Vt. 1920) ................................................................................9 

Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1988) ..........................................................4 

Hines v. Cheshire, 219 P.2d 100 (Wash. 1950) ................................................................................9 

Hogue v. Wilkinson, 291 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) ..........................................................9 

Schmidgall v. Engelke, 224 N.E. 2d 590 (Ill. App. 1967) ................................................................9 

Scott Eden Management v. Kavovit, 149 Misc.2d 262 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)...................................9 

Shields v. Gross, 58 N.Y.2d 338 (1983) ...........................................................................................7-8 

Tencza v. Hyland, 171 A.D.2d 1057 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) ...........................................................5 

Federal Statutes

28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 et seq..................................................................................................................10 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Fed. R. Civ. P 57................................................................................................................................10 

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Page

State Statutes

N.Y. Gen. Oblig. § 3-101...................................................................................................................8 

N.Y. Gen. Oblig. § 3-102...................................................................................................................8 

N.Y. Gen. Oblig. § 3-103...................................................................................................................8 

Case 1:07-cv-03363-GBD Document 33 Filed 07/10/2007 Page 4 of 15
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

 Plaintiffs Lisa-Athena S. Abu Hantash, in her individual capacity and as mother and 

natural guardian of Jordan-Annettee Jazzmin Richardson, a minor, and Jordan Richardson Inc. 

submit this brief in further support of their motion for summary judgment and, in the alternative, 

for an Order advancing the above-captioned matter on the trial calendar. In an attempt to 

convolute the issues, Defendants V Model Management New York, LLC (“V Management”) and 

VNY Model Management, LLC (“VNY”) contend that there are various legal and factual issues 

that must be resolved through discovery prior to a ruling on the within application. However, the 

“unresolved” factual and/or legal issues specified by Defendants in their opposition are either: 

(1) legal issues that are, in fact, ripe for adjudication; or (2) factual issues that have no bearing on 

Plaintiffs’ claims and, as such, discovery would be a useless endeavor. 

 Furthermore, the mere speculation by Defendants that discovery will somehow provide a 

valid defense against Plaintiffs’ claims (e.g., support Defendants’ challenge to Plaintiff Abu 

Hantash’s standing) is insufficient to defeat Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. This is 

especially true in the instant matter because the issues forming the basis of the within action are 

legal in nature. 

 The Court should note that Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that the agreement between 

Jordan Richardson and Defendant V Management dated April 22, 2005 (“2005 Management 

Agreement”) is no longer in effect and/or not enforceable. Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to 

summary judgment as to Counts One and Two. 

 Accordingly, the only issue in dispute that the Court must resolve pertains to the 

enforceability of the agreement dated June 19, 2006 between Defendant VNY and Plaintiff 

Jordan Richardson or Jordan Richardson, Inc. (“2006 Management Agreement”). Interestingly, 

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Defendants have made it clear that the 2006 Management Agreement is between Defendant 

VNY and Plaintiff Jordan Richardson and does not involve Jordan Richardson, Inc. Therefore, 

Plaintiff Jordan Richardson, Inc. is entitled to summary judgment as it pertains to Counts Three, 

Four and Five. 

 Throughout their opposition, Defendants repeat ad nauseum that a parent is vested with 

the authority to bind their child to a contract; and, that the child, try as they may, is obligated to 

perform pursuant to the contract once the parent has consented (a sort of forced labor scenario). 

Notwithstanding the fact that Jordan Richardson, in her individual capacity, never signed the 

2006 Management Agreement, the sole issue for the Court to resolve is purely legal in nature —

whether a minor can disaffirm a contract where the parent consented to her daughter entering 

into the agreement. 

As there is no statute or case law providing otherwise, the law is clear that Jordan 

Richardson has the unfettered right to disaffirm the 2006 Management Agreement regardless 

whether her mother consented to her entry into the agreement. As such, all Plaintiffs are entitled 

to summary judgment as to Counts Three, Four and Five. 

 Finally and in the alternative, the Court should grant Plaintiffs’ request for a speedy 

hearing and advance the matter on the trial calendar. Defendants’ assertion that Rule 57 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only applies to criminal trials lacks any merit whatsoever. 

Case 1:07-cv-03363-GBD Document 33 Filed 07/10/2007 Page 6 of 15
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POINT I 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS WARRANTED IRRESPECTIVE OF THE 

FACT THAT THE PARTIES HAVE NOT COMPLETED DISCOVERY 

 

A. The Law 

The Southern District of New York has recognized that where the movant has 

demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the burden shifts to the party 

opposing the motion to set forth specific facts evidencing that there are genuine issues of 

material fact for trial. Forras v. Andros, 470 F. Supp. 2d. 283, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In 

addition, “[t]he non-moving party may not rely simply on conclusory allegations, but instead 

must offer evidence to show that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.” Id. (internal 

citations omitted). 

Furthermore, although motions for summary judgment are generally brought subsequent 

to the completion of discovery, neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the case law in 

this jurisdiction preclude a ruling granting summary judgment where the parties have not 

engaged in discovery. This is especially true when there are no genuine issues of material fact 

and the issues in dispute are purely legal in nature. C.R.A. Realty Corp. v. Enron Corp., 842 F. 

Supp. 88, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“The issue in dispute is purely a matter of law, and summary 

judgment is appropriate”). 

Furthermore, the Second Circuit has stated the following on the subject: 

“[a] party opposing summary judgment on the ground that further discovery is 

necessary cannot, however, simply claim that they need more discovery. Rather, 

he or she ‘must show (1) what facts are sought to resist the motion and how they 

will be obtained; and (2) how those facts are reasonably expected to create 

genuine issue of material fact.’” 

 

Forras v. Andros, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 289 citing Saffire Corp. v. Newkidco, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 2d 

302, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) quoting Meloff v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1995). 

Case 1:07-cv-03363-GBD Document 33 Filed 07/10/2007 Page 7 of 15
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Moreover, “[t]he existence of disputed facts that are immaterial to the issues at hand is not 

impediment to summary judgment.” Saffire Corp. v. Newkidco, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 306 

(internal citations omitted). 

B. The Law Applied To The Facts At Hand

In this case, summary judgment is warranted because Plaintiffs have adequately 

demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. In an effort to convolute the issues, Defendants contend that there 

are disputed factual and legal issues which must be resolved through discovery. Grier Affirm. at 

¶ 4. To the contrary, all of the issues raised by Defendants are either: (1) legal issues that are, in 

fact, appropriate for adjudication by the Court; or (2) factual issues that have no bearing on 

Plaintiffs’ claims. 

Specifically, the following “unresolved” issues as set forth in Defendants’ opposition are 

clearly legal in nature and, thus, can be resolved by the Court at this time: 

• “Whether a natural parent can execute a model management agreement for an 

enfant [sic] model in the State of New York?” Grier Affirm. at ¶ 4. 

• “Whether the 2005 V Model Management Agreement is unconscionable?” Id.; 

Reznor v. J. Artist Management, Inc., 365 F.Supp.2d 565, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 

(“In New York, unsconscionability of a contract is a matter of law for a court to 

decide, not a jury question”); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 N.Y.2d 1, 12 

(1988) (Recognizing that in certain situations “the provision of a contract is so 

outrageous as to warrant holding it unenforceable on the ground of substantive 

unconscionability alone.”) 

 

• “Whether the 2005 V Model Management Agreement is null and void as plaintiffs 

contend?” Id.

In addition, information pertaining to Jordan Richardson Inc.’s state and date of 

incorporation and composition of its board of directors and/or officers are in no way relevant to 

the issues at hand. Grier Affirm. at ¶ 4. Notwithstanding that (a) Defendants could have easily 

Case 1:07-cv-03363-GBD Document 33 Filed 07/10/2007 Page 8 of 15
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obtained such corporate information from the State of Virginia and (b) that Plaintiffs have 

provided sworn statements with regard to this information, it is Plaintiffs’ contention that 

Defendants have made it clear that the 2006 Management Agreement is between Defendant 

VNY and Plaintiff Jordan Richardson. Handwerker Affirm. Ex. A at ¶¶ 37-40; Richardson Affid. 

dated May 24, 2007 at ¶ 10. 

In that regard, Defendants throughout their opposition claim that a parent is vested with 

the authority to bind their child to a contract and that once parental consent is given, the child is 

stripped of the ability to rescind. Nowhere do Defendants contend that Lisa Hantash was binding 

the Plaintiff corporation to an agreement with the Defendants. Defendants’ claim has always 

been the same — that Lisa Hantash, as Jordan Richardson’s parent (not as an officer or agent of 

Jordan Richardson, Inc.) consented to the 2006 Management Agreement and, therefore, Jordan 

Richardson, is obligated to perform. See, Winters Affid. at ¶ 10 (“Upon information and belief 

Jordan took the 2006-2008 VNY-Jordan Richardson Model Management Agreement to the 

Plaintiff,..., Lisa- Athena S. Abu Hantash... for her signature as guardian and natural parent of 

Jordan Richardson.”)(emphasis supplied).1 Accordingly, discovery pertaining to the corporate 

information regarding Jordan Richardson, Inc. is clearly not relevant for purposes of the within 

application. 

 Furthermore, the factual issue as to when Lana Winters executed the 2006 Management 

Agreement is clearly immaterial to the within matter because the law is well-established that for 

an acceptance to be effective, it must be communicated to the other party. Grier Affirm. at ¶ 4; 

Tencza v. Hyland, 171 A.D.2d 1057, 1057 (4th Dept. 1991) (finding that no valid contract 

 

1

 Plaintiffs would also request that the Court take judicial notice of the fact that all of the checks submitted by 

Defendants in their verified answer are all made payable to Jordan Richardson, not Jordan Richardson, Inc. and that 

income for the tax year 2006 was reported to the Internal Revenue Service for Jordan Richardson, not Jordan 

Richardson, Inc. See Verified Answer at Exhibits C and D. 

Case 1:07-cv-03363-GBD Document 33 Filed 07/10/2007 Page 9 of 15
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entered between purchasers and vendors where vendors’ counteroffer was signed by purchasers 

but was never delivered to vendors and vendors were never advised of purchasers’ acceptance of 

counteroffer prior to its revocation). 

Regardless, the Court need not resolve when Defendant VNY delivered the executed 

2006 Management Agreement in order for Plaintiffs to prevail on their claims. Even assuming 

that the 2006 Management Agreement is a valid contract (even though Jordan Richardson did not 

sign the agreement), the Court should still render the 2006 Management Agreement null and 

void as Jordan Richardson subsequently disaffirmed all agreements with Defendants. Richardson 

Affid. dated May 24, 2007 Ex. D and E. 

Finally, Plaintiffs’ application for summary judgment should not be defeated by 

Defendants’ baseless and meritless assertions with regard to Jordan Richardson’s, Jordan 

Richardson, Inc.’s and Lisa Athena Abu-Hantash’s standing to bring the within action. As 

absurd as the idea is, Defendants could have easily filed a cross-motion with regard to their 

claims that the Plaintiffs lack standing. Rather, Defendants seek to prolong the inevitable and 

waste the Court’s time and resources under the guise of needing to go on a discovery scavenger 

hunt to prove their speculative claims. 

As the factual issues raised by Defendants are not relevant to determining the 

enforceability of the 2005 Management Agreement and the 2006 Management Agreement, the 

fact that discovery in the above matter is not complete should not preclude the Court from 

granting summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor. 

 

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 POINT II

THE LAW IS CLEAR THAT, UNLESS PROVIDED OTHERWISE BY 

STATUTE, A MINOR HAS AN UNFETTERED RIGHT TO DISAFFIRM 

AN AGREEMENT EVEN WHERE HER PARENT CONSENTED TO THE 

AGREEMENT 

 In reality, the question before the Court is easier than the Defendants make it: whether 

the two agreements at issue are enforceable and, if so, whether a minor can thereafter disaffirm 

one, both or none of them. With regard to the 2005 Management Agreement, all parties agree 

that it is no longer enforceable. See, e.g. Verified Answer at ¶¶ 94-99. Therefore, Plaintiffs are 

entitled to summary judgment as to Counts One and Two of the Complaint. 

 That leaves the Court only with the task of determining whether the 2006 Management 

Agreement is enforceable. For purposes of summary judgment, and giving Defendants every 

reasonable inference, Plaintiffs will assume that the 2006 Management Agreement is enforceable 

under New York law. Therefore, the analysis becomes even simpler. If the agreement is 

enforceable, does Jordan Richardson, as a minor, have the unfettered right to disaffirm it? 

 Obviously, Defendants answer that question in the negative. Their argument, so it goes, 

centers on the case of Shields v. Gross and the claim that a parent can bind a minor to a contract 

that the minor cannot later disaffirm. Shields v. Gross, 58 N.Y.2d 338 (1983); Grier Affirm. at ¶ 

10; Verified Answer at ¶ 73. However, the facts of the Shields case and the law the Court of 

Appeals utilized to arrive at its holding are vastly different from the present one. 

 In Shields, the famous model/actress Brooke Shields sought, among other things, 

injunctive relief against a photographer who wanted to use photographs taken of her when she 

was only 10 years old and with the consent of her mother. Id. In essence, she wanted to rescind 

(as an adult mind you) the consent her mother gave to the use of the photographs. In denying 

Brooke Shields the relief she sought, the New York Court of Appeals held (a) that an adult could 

Case 1:07-cv-03363-GBD Document 33 Filed 07/10/2007 Page 11 of 15
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not maintain an action against a photographer and disaffirm a contract when her mother had 

consented (as required by law) to the use of her daughter’s photographs, and (2) that the section 

requiring prior court approval of infants’ contracts did not apply to models. Id.

 What the Court must keep in mind is that, unlike in this case, the Court of Appeals was 

left to determine the enforceability of a consent to use photographs in light of Sections 50 and 51 

of New York’s Civil Rights Law. Id. at 344-345. In fact, the Court of Appeals found that New 

York law actually required the photographer to obtain the consent of the parent before using the 

photographs, lest he be liable for the unauthorized use of the model’s photograph without her 

consent. Id. In this case, however, New York law requires no such consent. 

 Even so, Defendants argue that because Jordan Richardson’s mother consented to her 

daughter entering into an agreement with the Defendants, her consent acts to bar Jordan 

Richardson from disaffirming the contract at some later date. Defendants, however, cite no 

statute or case law which supports that proposition. Notwithstanding that serious flaw, the Court 

should take note of the analysis provided in Shields which actually runs contrary to Defendants’ 

contention: 

“Concededly, at common law an infant could disaffirm his written consent or, for 

that matter, a consent executed by another on his or her behalf Notwithstanding 

these rules, it is clear that the Legislature may abrogate an infant’s common-law 

right to disaffirm or, conversely, it may confer upon infants the right to make 

binding contracts. Where a statute expressly permits a certain class of agreements 

to be made by infants, that settles the question and makes the agreement valid and 

enforceable. That is precisely what happened here. The Legislature, by adopting 

section 51, created a new cause of action and it provided in the statute itself the 

method for obtaining an infant’s consent to avoid liability. Construing the statute 

strictly, as we must since it is in derogation of the common law, the parent’s 

consent is binding on the infant and no words prohibiting disaffirmance are 

necessary to effectuate the legislative intent. Inasmuch as the consents in this 

case complied with the statutory requirements, they were valid and may not be 

disaffirmed.” 

Id. at 344-345 (internal citations omitted); see also N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 3-101, 3-102, 3-103. 

Case 1:07-cv-03363-GBD Document 33 Filed 07/10/2007 Page 12 of 15
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 Here, no legislative exception exists to Jordan Richardson’s right to disaffirm her 

agreements with the Defendants. Likewise, Lisa Abu Hantash’s consent was not even required 

under New York Law in order for Jordan Richardson to perform as a child model, it was simply 

requested by the Defendants; but, that is an important fact because even if this Court were to 

determine that 2006 Management Agreement is enforceable and that Lisa Abu Hantash bound 

her daughter to the agreement, Jordan Richardson, as a minor, is still permitted to disaffirm it. 

See Scott Eden Management v. Kavovit, 149 Misc.2d 262, 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (“[a]n 

infant’s contract is voidable and the infant has an absolute right to disaffirm [a contract]”); NYC 

Management Group, Inc. v. Brown-Miller, 2004 WL 1087784, *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2004)2

(infant entering into a contract did not take the contract “outside the statutory rubric allowing a 

minor to disaffirm her contract” especially where the contract “spell[s] out the performance 

required of each party to the contract-namely, of [the model] and the modeling agencies” and no 

performance is required of the model’s parent who only signed the contract to signal her assent 

to her daughter entering into the contract); Bombardier v. Goodrich, 110 A. 11, 11 (Vt. 1920) 

(“The assent of the father adds nothing to the binding force of an infant’s promise”); Hines v. 

Cheshire, 219 P.2d 100, 104-05 (Wash. 1950) (“[T]he law seems to be settled that an infant is 

not precluded from disaffirming by reason of the fact that an adult joined with him in signing the 

contract.”); Schmidgall v. Engelke, 224 N.E.2d 590 (Ill. App. 1967) (“A minor’s right to 

disaffirm his contract is not affected by parental approval, and a parent by his relationship to 

minor is without authority to enter into contracts binding on the minor”); Hogue v. Wilkinson, 

291 S.W.2d 750, 755 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (“Even if the mother and grandfather had signed the 

written contracts as agents of the minor plaintiff, such contracts would not have bound the minor 

if he wished to disaffirm”). 

 

2

 A copy of this decision was previously provided to the Court. 

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POINT III 

AS FED. R. CIV. P. 57 APPLIES TO ACTIONS BROUGHT PURSUANT 

TO THE FEDERAL DECLARATORY ACT, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 ET SEQ., 

THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A SPEEDY HEARING AND ADVANCE 

THE WITHIN MATTER ON THE CALENDAR 

Defendants’ argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57 only applies to criminal 

cases lacks merit. A plain reading of Rule 57 provides that the court may order a speedy hearing 

of an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 

2201 et seq., and advance it on the calendar. Fed. R. Civ. P. 57. Furthermore, the Federal 

Declaratory Act clearly applies to civil actions. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 et seq. Although the statute 

explicitly excludes a limited number of civil claims (e.g. civil action involving an antidumping or 

countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of merchandise of a free trade area 

country), none of these exceptions are implicated here in any way. Id. 

For the reasons set forth previously and as Defendants have not raised any other objection 

to Plaintiffs’ request, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court order a speedy hearing and 

advance the within matter on the calendar. 

Case 1:07-cv-03363-GBD Document 33 Filed 07/10/2007 Page 14 of 15
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Court grant the relief 

requested herein and grant such other, further and different relief as to the Court seems just, 

equitable and proper under the circumstances. 

Dated: July 10, 2007 

 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 NISSENBAUM LAW GROUP, LLC 

 /S/ GAVIN I. HANDWERKER 

 By: Gavin I. Handwerker (GIH6191) 

 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

 140 Broadway, 46th Fl. 

 New York, New York 10005 

 (212) 871-5711 

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