J-S08033-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

:

:

:

:

RICHARD WOODWARD, :

 :

Appellant : No. 1090 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 25, 2015 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-02-CR-0012298-2010 

BEFORE: STABILE, DUBOW and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 29, 2016 

Richard Woodward (“Woodward”) appeals from the Order dismissing 

his first Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

In its Opinion, the PCRA court concisely set forth the relevant factual 

and procedural history underlying this appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 

9/22/15, at 1-4. We adopt the court’s recitation as though fully set forth 

 
J-S08033-16 

- 2 - 

herein. See id.1, 2

 On appeal, Woodward presents the following issue for our review: 

Did the [PCRA] court err in denying [Woodward’s] PCRA Petition 

since trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a suppression 

motion challenging the voluntariness of [Woodward’s

inculpatory] hospital bed statement to police detectives[,] since 

the only evidence connecting [Woodward] to the instant crimes 

came from that statement, and [Woodward] was drugged and 

incoherent when he gave the statement[,] since he had been 

administered pain killers because of his gunshot wound? 

Brief for Appellant at 3 (capitalization omitted). 

This Court examines PCRA appeals in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review 

is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of 

record. Additionally, we grant great deference to the factual 

findings of the PCRA court[,] and will not disturb those findings 

unless they have no support in the record. In this respect, we 

will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by 

evidence of record and is free of legal error. However, we afford 

no deference to its legal conclusions. 

Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) 

(internal citations, quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

 

1

 We additionally observe that while Woodward was being treated at the 

hospital for his gunshot wound, of his own accord he asked to speak with the 

lead detective investigating the shootings, Margaret Sherwood (“Detective 

Sherwood”). N.T., 8/29/11-9/2/11 (trial), at 479. On July 15, 2010, five 

days after the shootings, Detective Sherwood interviewed Woodward, in his 

hospital room, in the presence of a fellow detective. Id. Prior to 

interviewing Woodward, Detective Sherwood read Woodward his Miranda

rights, and gave him an opportunity to read and sign a Miranda rights 

waiver form. Id. at 480-81. 

 

2

 At trial, Woodward was represented by Christy Foreman, Esquire (“trial 

counsel”). 
J-S08033-16 

- 3 - 

To prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, the PCRA petitioner 

must demonstrate “(1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) 

that counsel’s course of conduct was without a reasonable basis designed to 

effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

ineffectiveness[.]” Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 

2012) (citations omitted). The PCRA court may deny an ineffectiveness 

claim if the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet any of these prongs. 

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 

380 (Pa. 2011) (stating that “[w]hen evaluating ineffectiveness claims, 

judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

 Regarding the first prong of the ineffectiveness test, if the petitioner’s 

underlying claim lacks arguable merit, his or her derivative claim of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness necessarily fails. Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 92 

A.3d 708, 722 n.7 (Pa. 2014). Concerning the second prong, our 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that 

[g]enerally, counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally 

effective if he chose a particular course of conduct that had 

some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s 

interests. Where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, 

a finding that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not 

warranted unless it can be concluded that an alternative not 

chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than 

the course actually pursued. 
J-S08033-16 

- 4 - 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citations, 

quotation marks and brackets omitted). Regarding the third, “prejudice 

prong,” it must be demonstrated that, absent counsel’s conduct, there is a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 

different. Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. 

2014). 

 In considering Woodward’s claim that his inculpatory statements were 

subject to suppression for being involuntarily given, we are mindful of the 

following. “When a court is called upon to determine whether a confession is 

voluntary and, hence, admissible at trial, it examines the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the confession to ascertain whether it is the 

product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A.3d 530, 537 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). “By the same token, the law does not require the coddling of 

those accused of crime. One [] need not be protected against his own 

innate desire to unburden himself.” Commonwealth v. Templin, 795 A.2d 

959, 966 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted). 

When assessing voluntariness pursuant to the totality of the 

circumstances, a court should look at the following factors: the 

duration and means of the interrogation; the physical and 

psychological state of the accused; the conditions attendant to 

the detention; the attitude of the interrogator; and any and all 

other factors that could drain a person’s ability to withstand 

suggestion and coercion. The determination of whether a 

confession is voluntary is a conclusion of law and, as such, is 

subject to plenary review. 
J-S08033-16 

- 5 - 

Commonwealth v. Harrell, 65 A.3d 420, 434 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted). 

Woodward argues that the PCRA court erred by failing to find that trial 

counsel was ineffective for not seeking to suppress Woodward’s inculpatory 

statements, as they were “involuntary due to [Woodward’s] drugged state 

during the interview[.]” Brief for Appellant at 24. According to Woodward, 

he was so medicated [at the time of making his statements] that 

he was not thinking clearly[,] and [he] has no recollection of 

anything that the police put in their report regarding the 

interview[.] [Woodward’s] contention is not disputed by the 

Commonwealth since there is no indication that the detectives 

checked to see what medication, or the quantity, [that 

Woodward] had been prescribed by doctors, or checked with 

hospital personnel to determine if [he] was lucid enough to 

interview. 

Id. at 23-24. Woodward avers that “[t]he evidence regarding [his] alleged 

statements to police was exceedingly damaging since it detailed his 

involvement in the instant crimes, and[,] without that evidence[,] there is a 

great likelihood that he would have never been convicted of any of the 

instant crimes, but especially [second-degree m]urder[.]” Id. at 23. 

Moreover, Woodward contends that, contrary to trial counsel’s position 

regarding her defense strategy, she had no reasonable basis for failing to 

suppress Woodward’s involuntary statements. Id. at 24. 

In its Opinion, the PCRA court adeptly addressed Woodward’s claims 

and determined that trial counsel was not ineffective. See PCRA Court 

Opinion, 9/22/15, at 6-8. In sum, the PCRA court determined that 
J-S08033-16 

- 6 - 

Woodward had failed to establish any of the three prongs of the 

ineffectiveness test, since (1) the mere fact that Woodward may have been 

on pain medication at the time of his statements,3 absent more, is not 

sufficient to warrant suppression; (2) trial counsel articulated a reasonable 

basis for making the conscious and strategic decision not to seek 

suppression; and (3) the outcome of Woodward’s trial would not have been 

different had trial counsel sought suppression. Id. at 6-7. The PCRA court’s 

analysis is supported by the record and the law, and we agree with its 

determination that Woodward failed to meet his burden to prove that trial 

counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, we affirm on this basis in rejecting 

Woodward’s sole issue on appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/22/15, at 6- 

 

 

3

 Woodward failed to advance any evidence that he was, in fact, on pain 

medication at the time of his statements to Detective Sherwood. 
J-S08033-16 

- 7 - 

8.4

 As we conclude that the PCRA court neither abused its discretion nor 

committed an error of law, we affirm the Order dismissing Woodward’s PCRA 

Petition. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 2/29/2016 

 

4

 As an addendum, we observe that Woodward failed to establish that his 

inculpatory statements were involuntary and subject to suppression. 

Contrary to Woodward’s above assertion, Detective Sherwood’s testimony 

shows that not only was Woodward alert and responsive to questioning, but 

he was also able to communicate normally, including in his attempt to 

initially disclaim his association with the robbers, before changing his story 

upon being presented with evidence establishing his involvement. See N.T., 

8/29/11-9/2/11, at 480-87; see also Commonwealth v. McQuaid, 417 

A.2d 1210, 1213 (Pa. Super. 1980) (wherein this Court held that the 

inculpatory statement given by the defendant to police was voluntary 

notwithstanding that it was made in a hospital setting where the defendant 

was being treated for a gunshot wound to the head, as the defendant had 

spoken after being read his Miranda rights and appeared to be alert and 

responsive to the detectives’ questions); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 398 

A.2d 690, 693 (Pa. Super. 1979) (en banc) (where the appellant was 

interviewed in his hospital bed while being treated for a stab wound, holding 

that his inculpatory statements were voluntary, since appellant was alert and 

responsive. The Court also rejected the appellant’s argument that “the 

interrogating officer should have made inquiry as to appellant’s medical 

condition and what medication had been administered to him[.]”). 
8 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2705 - 4 counts 

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3701(a)(l)(l) 

6 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3502(c)(l) 

7 18 Pa.C.S.A. §6106(a)(l) 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §250l(a) 

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §901 (a) - 5 counts 

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2702.lA- 3 counts 

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2702(a)(2)- 5 counts 

Carrying a Firearm Without a License," Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 8 

Law Enforcement Officer,3 Aggravated Assault of a Police Officer,4 Robbery,5 

The Defendant was charged with Criminal Homicide, 

1 Criminal Attempt,2 Assault 

appeal and, therefore, the judgment of sentence must be affirmed. 

review of the record reveals that the Defendant has failed to present any meritorious 

dismissed his Amended Post Conviction Relief Act Petition without a hearing. 

The Defendant has appealed from the Order of Court dated June 25, 2015, 

OPINION 

Defendant 

RICHARD WOODWARD, III, 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

V. CC: 201012298 

Circulated 01/29/2016 03:06 PM
9 18 Pa.C.S.A. §903(a)(l) 

10 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2702(a)(2) 

Conspiracy? and Aggravated Assault.!? Prior to trial, the Aggravated Assault, 

Assault of a Police Officer, Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer and Criminal Attempt - ...... ,_,_,,, 

were withdrawn. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was found guilty of second-degree 

murder and the remaining charges. 

On December 15, 2011, the Defendant appeared before this Court and was sentenced; to 

mandatory term of life imprisonment. Post-Sentence Motions were timely filed and were uc.JLUl,;,,U 

by operation of law on April 20, 2012. The judgment of sentence was affirmed by the 

Court on June 3, 2012. A timely Petition for Allowance of Appeal was filed and was 

our Supreme Court on December 19, 2013. 

No further action was taken until July 24, 2014, when the Defendant filed a prose 

Conviction Relief Act Petition. Counsel was appointed to represent the Defendant 

Amended Petition followed. After reviewing the Petition and record, and giving the 

notice of its intent to do so, this Court dismissed the Amended Petition without a hearing. 

appeal followed. 

By way of a brief review, the evidence presented at trial established that 

Hainesworth and her four (4) year old son, Kyere, lived at 2340 East Hills Drive in the 

Pittsburgh. Ms. Hainesworth's boyfriend, Anthony Lemon, stayed at the house v, ... ,a.,J,vuu.u, 

was known to keep drugs and money in the house. 

In the early morning hours of July 11, 2010, the Defendant, Richard Woodward, 

with two other men, co-Defendants Tyree Gaines and Amir Ferguson, broke into 

2 
residence for the purpose of stealing the drugs and money they knew to be in the house. 

three (3) men initially approached the front door and knocked, then left. Hainesworth, 

at home watching movies with her friends and son, looked out of the peep-hole in the 

saw the men wearing black clothing and scarves over their faces. She called another 

Terry Johnson, who had just left, and asked him to look around the area. 

anyone and returned to Hainesworth's residence. 

Approximately fifteen minutes later, the three men knocked again. This time 

looked out the peep-hole and after seeing the three (3) men, he instructed everyone to go 

and hide and to call the police. The group hid in Kyere's room, some inside the closet and 

behind the bed. Hainesworth was on the phone with 911 when the men broke the front 

down and entered the house. The men searched the downstairs level of the home, but 

unable to find the drugs and money. Two (2) of the men went upstairs and broke down the u.u.._,., .. _;;·s.-,,: 

of the bedroom where everyone was hiding. They demanded that Hainesworth tell them vvu'"'""":·, 

the drugs and money were, and when she did not, they grabbed Kyere, put the gun to his 

and asked him where the items were. Kyere directed them to an air vent, where they found """"'P"· 

money. They then let Kyere go, but put the gun to Hainesworth's head and forced her to 

them to the drugs. Hainesworth and the men went downstairs, when the Defendant, who 

been standing by the patio door with an assault rifle, yelled that the police had arrived. 

ran upstairs. 

The Defendant ran into the bedroom, kicked out the window screen and jumped 

the window. Shots were fired at the police from inside the house and the officers returned 

. The Defendant was shot in the back as he was fleeing the scene. 

3 
4 

must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) the underlying claim 

In order to establish a claim for the ineffective assistance of counsel, "a PCRA 

this claim is meritless. 

Motion to Suppress the Defendant's statement to the police. A review of the record reveals 

On appeal, the Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

$17,450.00. 

of the scene revealed a bag with 4 7 bricks of heroin, having a street value of 

saw the police approach, then ran upstairs, jumped out the window and ran. A subsequent 

search, he stayed downstairs with the assault rifle and acted as a lookout. He shouted 

would not name, and went to the house to conduct a robbery. The men were driven to the 

that the police had already learned, the Defendant said that he met up with two men whom 

buy drugs and ended up in the middle of a shootout. When confronted with other 

interviewed by Detective Margaret Sherwood, and initially told her that he went to the 

wound. Several days later, he asked to speak to the lead Detective on the case. 

The Defendant was transported to Presbyterian Hospital for treatment for his .... ~ •. u .. ,J. 

able to escape the police, but were apprehended several days later. 

to find and aid Hainesworth and was shot in the hand. Eventually, Gaines and Ferguson 

fled, she was hit with a bullet fired from the house. Johnson came out of the room in an <>1"1·,,m,r'\-r 

pursuit of the men. He encountered Hainesworth and told her to get out of the house. 

Downstairs, City of Pittsburgh Police Officer Steven Sywyj had entered the 

by a woman in a dark-colored vehicle. They broke into the house by kicking the door 
5 

1989). 

met."' Commonwealth v. Khalil, 806 A.2d 415, 421-2 (Pa.Super. 2002). "With regard to thtfH"\ 

(- '.}: ·:: (~'- !' 

; t:JtJ 

reasonable basis prong, (the appellate court] will conclude that counsel's chosen strategy lacked/ \H .... 

, !lJf::;u 

a reasonable basis only if the petitioner proves that the alternative strategy not elected offered a}}rl! · 1/tlSf:"<··;·. 

::::~:: ::,:::::, ::b:::::)~earer than the course acutely pursued." Commonwealfu vlll 

' (<c.f .•• Additionally, "[w]here the challenge is to a failure to move for suppression of evideμce,fjt / 

i . ll':J1lrl1 

the defendant must establish that there was no reasonable basis for not pursuing the suppression])\f<t ···• 

I t1l~\L1 

claim and that if the evidence had been suppressed, there is a reasonable probability the verpict\CJL .: i faijll,,;j 

would have been more favorable." Commonwealth v. Melson, 556 A.2d 836, 839 (Pa.Su'per.lf:rnf H 

. ~!I~~ 

. i .. ·liijift-:),-~- . It is well-established that '"When deciding a motion to suppress a confession, 1the1L'}t · , . 

1 ;r11~4 

touchstone inquiry is whether the confession was voluntary. Voluntariness is determined f~omtncx 

. . t. ~Jf''' 

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. The question of voluntariness is ;noti; lfH 

i f:Jt+n 

whether the defendant would have confessed without interrogation, but whether the interrogation lPul~ \"\ 

,:._:;::-r 

1(~\!!\t , 

arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel's action or inaction; and (3) ther~ is ~}f< 

·: :;.· ::rJ 

' i;),A' < 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different absent $Uc~i1~~ ?) 

- i· ·· tt·.,r 

:;.';:-r.f 

,. ··r.;: 

error." Commonwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512, 525-26 (Pa. 2011). "The law presumesithat\ll 

~ lj)lli:t/-:-~. counsel was not ineffective, and the appellant bears the burden of proving otherwise ... [I]f th{;®f: 

. 1~;·:: E:V 

issue underlying the charge of ineffectiveness is not of arguable merit, counsel will not b~JJ .••. ~ ·WtltJ: :·: ~-: - _ deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue... Also, if the prejudice prong of thti\fIJ : 

' ti···''I<',.-;: 

i,- .f.\:'.'. 

,' ~-· 

ineffectiveness standard is not met, 'the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone and [the~e i~!:~:~ j 

t t:Jl? 

no] need [to] determine whether the [ arguable merit] and [ client's interests] prongs have been/ tt( 

., ·.,:·.:·:.-·.; 

<f::;f"\; 

(. ·;\'i: 

., : :;:: ~ 
6 

suppression. She stated: 

Moreover, the record reflects that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to 

medication is not sufficient to warrant suppression of his confession. 

assertions regarding the nature of the interrogation, does not claim that he was 

provide a sufficient basis for suppression of the confession. The Defendant makes no 

The fact that the Defendant was receiving pain medication for his injury does not 

his bullet wound. 

now asserts that his "confession" was involuntary because he was receiving pain 

lookout but ran through the house, jumped out a window and fled when the police arrived. 

but when confronted with evidence from the surveillance video, he then stated that he acted as 

her. He initially stated that he had gone to the house to buy drugs and ended up in a 

As noted above, the Defendant contacted Detective Sherwood and asked to speak 

Commonwealth v. Harrell, 65 A.3d 420, 433-34 (Pa. 2014), internal citations omitted 

other factors that could drain a person's ability to withstand suggestion and coercion. 

factors: the duration and means of the interrogation; the physical and psychological state of 

{ . 

accused; the conditions attendant to the detention; the attitude of the interrogator; and any and 

voluntariness pursuant to the totality of the circumstances, a court should look at the 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant confessed voluntarily' ... 'When """'"'"'"'"'L»F, 

unconstrained decision to confess. The Commonwealth has the burden of proving 

was so manipulative or coercive that it deprived the defendant of his ability to make a free 

manipulated, beaten or otherwise coerced. Under these circumstances, the use 
had suppression been sought. Insofar as the Defendant utterly failed in establishing 

motion would have been granted or that the outcome of the trial would have been any UU.J..V.L"VUS 

strategic basis for her decision and the Defendant has not established either that a 

way with regard to a possible suppression motion. Counsel has demonstrated a 

Ultimately, the Defendant has not established that trial counsel was ineffective in 

suppressed. 

for a renunciation defense, which would not have been available to her if the statement had oeenv; 

result. Moreover, Ms. Foreman is also correct that the Defendant's statement provided a 

granted a Motion to Suppress based on these facts, and so there would not have been a 

decision not to. Ms. Foreman was correct in that, as discussed above, this Court would not 

have a reasonable basis for not seeking suppression and so made a conscious and 

Ms. Foreman's statement, read in conjunction with the record, demonstrates that 

(Amended PCRA Petition, p. 20). 

I did in fact tell him that I did not want to suppress the statement. First, while he 

may have had some medication, from the details he could relate about giving the 

statement to the police, that led me to believe he gave the statement (statements I 

should say) knowingly. Plus, I know Judge McDaniel would never suppress the 

statement as there was just not enough to say it was involuntary. More 

importantly, the ONLY defense I had to his Felony Murder case was renunciation. 

I told him that I did not want the statement suppressed as that was the best 

evidence I had to try to argue that while he may have participated in the Robbery, 

that he had renounced that participation in that crime before the homicide took 

place by kicking out the 2nd story window and jumping out to run away and 

subsequently [was] shot in the back. The placement of the gunshot wound would 

substantiate he was shot while running away PRIOR to Ms. Hainesworth being 

shot by the other co-defendant from the upstairs window. It is the defense I used 

at trial, and while it unfortunately did not work, it was the ONLY thing I had as 

far as felony murder. 

7 
Dated: September 22, 2015 

( ---~ 

BY THE COURT: 

must be affirmed. 

Accordingly, for the above reasons of fact and law, this Court's Order of June 25, 201 

Petition without a hearing. This claim must fail. 

ineffective claim, this Court was well within its discretion in dismissing the Amended 

8 

! 

f 

i