-1- 

### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED October 27, 2015

In re ROBINSON/LOWELL, Minors.

No. 326183

Kent Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 13-051900-NA; 13-051901-NA;

13-051902-NA

Before: T ALBOT , C.J., and B ECKERING and G ADOLA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Respondent mother appeals as of right the order terminating he r parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ) (child deserted for 91 or more days), (c)( ii ) (conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist), (g ) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (children will be harmed if returned to paren t). We affirm.

On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court deprived her of parenting time, which denied her a fair opportunity to be reunified with her children . For that reason, respondent argues that the trial court cle arly erred in finding statutory grounds for the termination of her parental rights. We disagree. A ny argument that petitioner fa iled to provide respondent with adequate services or that she did not receive adequate parentin g time can be traced to respondent’s own actions and inactions. The children were init ially left in respondent’s care, but following a positive drug test, they were removed from her home in September 2013. Thereafter, respondent failed to comply with the court-ordered services plan, as she failed to participate—or provide proof of her participation—in various se rvices for substance abuse counseling and domestic relati onships counseling. Respondent l ast visited the children on approximately March 11, 2014. For over two months, respondent ceased attending parentingtime visits, stopped communicating with foster care workers, an d provided no evidence of her whereabouts or activities. During this time, she admitted to r elapsing and using “a little bit of everything.” Respondent later explained her absence by telling a foster care worker that she did not want the children to see her while she was using drugs. Be cause of respondent’s history of disappearing at times and not visiting the children, the foster care worker recommended suspending parenting time visits, opining that respondent’s dis appearance was difficult for the children to process. As a result, the trial court entered an o rder requiring that respondent only receive supervised parenting time with the children after she i nvested in the parent/agency treatment plan and after a peri od of negative dr ug screens.-2- In June 2014, the foster care worker discussed parenting-time visits with respondent and decided that respondent had to have two negative drug screens b efore parenting time would be re-established. Respondent was to have two random drug screens each month. Her June 3, 2014 drug screen revealed that she had used cocaine and opiates. As ide from this positive test, respondent failed to submit to subsequent drug screens in June 2014. She also failed to participate in the two random sc reens that were scheduled for J uly 2014.

On or about July 17, 2014, respondent entered a treatment faci lity. The facility tested respondent for drugs, but would not release the test results to the foster care worker. The facility also would not allow respondent to leave. In an effort to test respondent for drug use, the foster care worker visited respondent at the treatment facility and ob tained a negative drug screen from her on or about August 14, 2014. Later in August, respondent l eft the treatment facility without completing the program. Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 1

Although petitioner has “a respons ibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there ex ists a commensurate responsibi lity on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are offered.” In re Frey , 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Here, the record demonstr ates that respondent’s parent ing time was stopped only after she relapsed on drugs, stopped visiting the children for severa l months, thereby creating

confusion with the children a bout why she stopped visiting, and that she failed to participate in services, despite having numerous opportunities to do so. The trial court was required to make determinations about the appropriateness of parenting time duri ng the pendency of this case, see MCL 712A.19a(12), and on the record before us, we see no error in the trial court’s determinations. Respondent’s own actions were what led to the suspension of parenting time. And, given her actions, we rejec t any assertion by respondent t hat the trial court erred with regard to parenting time. See MCL 712A.19a(12); In re Frey , 297 Mich App at 248.

Additionally, although respondent d oes not expressly contest t he trial court’s finding that there were statutory grounds for terminati on of her parental ri ghts, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err in so concluding. T o terminate parental rights , a trial court must find the existence of a statutory ground for termin ation in MCL 712A.19b has been met by clear and convincing

evidence. In re McIntyre , 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). We review for clea r error a trial court’s factual findings in terminating parental rights. MCR 3.977(K); In re Trejo

Minors , 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

A trial court need only find that one statutory ground exists in order to terminate parental rights. In re Trejo Minors , 462 Mich at 360. Here, we find no clear error in the conclus ion that grounds for termination existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). In t his regard, there was evidence respondent had a history of domestic relationship issues and su bstance abuse, and that she struggled with emotional stabil ity. Respondent did not complet e counseling that was designed to address her domestic relationship issues. Also, after years of struggling with drug abuse,

1 Upon filing the petiti on to terminate parental rights, the tri al court could suspe nd parenting time visits. See MCL 712A.19b(4); MCR 3.977(D).-3- respondent continued to test positive for drugs in the months b efore the termination hearing, did not stay in contact with her caseworker, nor did she make any a ttempt to appear for several random drug screens. She also disappeared for months at a time during the proceedings. “A parent’s failure to participate in and benefit from a service p lan is evidence that the parent will not be able to provide a child proper care and custody.” In re White , 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Additionally, a trial court may rely on a respondent’s history of failing to provide care and custody in finding that there was no reasonabl e expectation that the respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reaso nable time. In re Archer , 277 Mich App 71, 75-76; 744 NW2d 1 (2007). C onsidering the ages of the children and the length of time they were in care, along w ith respondent’s failure to demo nstrate the ability to provide proper care and custody within a r easonable time, the trial cou rt did not clearly err in finding a statutory ground for terminati on under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). MCR 3.977(K); In re Trejo

Minors , 462 Mich at 356-357. Because only one statutory ground for t ermination must be established, we do not address the remaining statutory grounds. In re Trejo Minors , 462 Mich at

360.

Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s best interests determination. Nevertheless, we have reviewed the issue and find that, for man y of the reasons noted above, the trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. “In deciding whether termina tion is in the child’s best interests, the court may consider the child’s bond to the parent, the pare nt’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantage s of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors , 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted). As the tr ial court recognized, petitioner had been involved in the children’s lives for years because of respondent’s conduct. Respondent ha d a history of struggling with substance abuse, being involved in violent relationships, and s truggling to maintain emotional stability. She was offered services, but often failed to parti cipate in or complete those services. While she began to make some progress at one point, she thereaf ter experienced a significant relapse in March 2014 and disappeared for several months. Her disappearance, which was not her first such disappearance, was understandably difficult for the children. She cut off communication with foster care workers for a significant period of time and failed to follow through with random drug screening, including screening offered as recently as October 2014. In sum, the record was clear t hat, although respondent loved th e children, she was not in a position to provide for their needs. The trial court did not c learly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights w as in the minor children’s bes t interests. MCR 3.977(K); In re Trejo Minors , 462 Mich at 356-357.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Talbot /s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Michael F. Gadola