IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2021 ND 134

Jennifer Michelle Williams, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.

Aron Lyle Williams, Defendant and Appellee

and

State of North Dakota, Statutory Real Party in Interest

No. 20210014

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, 

the Honorable Frank L. Racek, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice.

Jessica L. Moen, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.

Leslie J. Aldrich, Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellee.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

JULY 22, 2021 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Williams v. Williams

No. 20210014

McEvers, Justice.

[¶1] Jennifer Williams appeals from a second amended divorce judgment. 

She argues the district court failed to make findings supporting its 

modification of parenting time. She also argues the court erred when it 

terminated a parenting coordinator, and the court violated her right to due 

process when it removed a specific provision of the judgment without a request 

from either party. We affirm.

I

[¶2] After being married for roughly a year, the parties separated and later 

divorced. They share two minor children. The initial divorce judgment was 

entered in February 2018 and an amended judgment was entered in January 

2020. In June and July of 2020, the parties filed cross-motions for contempt 

and to amend the judgment. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on 

November 2, 2020. At the hearing, the court made rulings from the bench. It 

denied the motions for contempt and ordered the judgment amended in various 

respects. As relevant to this appeal, the court ordered parenting time 

provisions to be modified, it terminated a parenting coordinator, and it 

removed a provision giving the parties the first option to exercise overnight 

parenting time when the other cannot. The court instructed Jennifer William’s

attorney to prepare a proposed order for judgment. On November 18, 2020, 

the court held a status conference to clarify its rulings. The court entered a 

second amended judgment on November 24, 2020.

II

[¶3] Jennifer Williams argues the district court erred when it modified 

parenting time. She claims the court did not make the requisite findings that 

there is a material change in circumstances or that the modifications are in 

the children’s best interests. She requests we remand the case for the court to 

make additional findings.
2

Under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-22(2), the district court has continuing 

jurisdiction to modify parenting time. The standard for modifying 

parenting time has been established through our caselaw. To 

modify parenting time, the movant must establish a material 

change of circumstances has occurred since the prior parenting 

time order and that it is in the best interests of the child to modify 

the order.

. . . .

For the purpose of modifying parenting time, a material change in 

circumstances is defined as “important new facts that were 

unknown at the time of the initial custody decree or initial 

parenting time order.”

Green v. Swiers, 2018 ND 258, ¶¶ 12-13, 920 N.W.2d 471 (citations omitted)

(quoting Wolt v. Wolt, 2011 ND 170, ¶ 19, 803 N.W.2d 534). Decisions 

concerning parenting time and modification of parenting time are findings of 

fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Curtiss v. Curtiss, 

2016 ND 197, ¶ 10, 886 N.W.2d 565. The district court must state its findings 

“with sufficient specificity to enable this Court to understand the basis for its 

decision.” Id. (quoting Keita v. Keita, 2012 ND 234, ¶ 5, 823 N.W.2d 726). See 

also N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(1) (“the court must find the facts specially and state its 

conclusions of law separately”).

[¶4] The district court heard testimony indicating the parties were having 

difficulty exchanging the children. The court specifically heard testimony from 

one child’s occupational therapist. The therapist testified the child had 

difficulty coping with transitions and exhibited separation anxiety. The court

also received a letter of medical necessity signed by the therapist and the 

child’s pediatrician. The letter recommended the child receive counseling from 

a professional with training in separation anxiety to help the child cope with 

life changes and daily transitions.

[¶5] The district court explained its rationale for amending the judgment at 

the hearing. The court explained the current arrangement was not working, 

and its intent was to reduce exchanges of the children “to a minimum.” The 

court also explained its modifications were “to get a system that’s a little more 
3

structured, that’s a little less involved that works better.” Although the court 

did not explicitly identify a material change in circumstances or find the

modifications are in the children’s best interests, we understand the rationale 

for the court’s decision based on our review of the record. It is apparent from 

the court’s comments at the hearing that it considered the problems with the 

exchanges between the parties to be a material change in circumstances 

supporting a modification of parenting time. It is also clear the court concluded 

that reducing the number of exchanges between the parties would be in the 

best interests of the children given the difficulty of the transitions.

[¶6] We caution district courts to clearly articulate their findings when 

modifying parenting time. See Curtiss, 2016 ND 197, ¶¶ 13-14 (remanding 

when the district court “made no findings as to whether a material change in 

circumstances occurred”). However, despite the court’s findings being sparse

in this case, we clearly understand its rationale. “We will not remand for 

clarification of findings of fact when, through inference or deduction, we may 

discern the district court’s rationale.” Schmitz v. Schmitz, 1998 ND 203, ¶ 6, 

586 N.W.2d 490; see also Reinecke v. Griffeth, 533 N.W.2d 695, 698 (N.D. 1995) 

(collecting cases where this Court has relied on implied findings of fact). We 

are not convinced the court abused its discretion when it modified the 

parenting time provisions under the circumstances present in this case.

III

[¶7] Jennifer Williams argues the district court “misapplied the law by 

terminating the parenting coordinator without good cause to do so.” She reads 

N.D.C.C. § 14-09.2-08, which provides for modification and termination of a 

parenting coordinator, to require “good cause” any time the court terminates a 

parenting coordinator. Aron Williams asserts the “good cause” standard only 

applies when the court terminates a parenting coordinator on its own motion.

[¶8] The interpretation of a statute is a question of law fully reviewable on 

appeal. Bride v. Trinity Hosp., 2019 ND 131, ¶ 7, 927 N.W.2d 416. Our 

primary goal when interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s 

intent based on the language of the statute. Overboe v. Farm Credit Servs. of 

Fargo, 2001 ND 58, ¶ 9, 623 N.W.2d 372. “[W]e give words in a statute their 
4

plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning.” Bride, at ¶ 7. “Words 

and phrases must be construed according to the context and the rules of 

grammar and the approved usage of the language.” Robot Aided Mfg., Inc. v. 

Moore, 1999 ND 14, ¶ 12, 589 N.W.2d 187 (quoting N.D.C.C. § 1-02-03).

[¶9] Section 14-09.2-08, N.D.C.C., provides in full:

The court may terminate or modify the parenting coordinator 

appointment upon agreement of the parties, upon motion of either 

party, at the request of the parenting coordinator, or by the court 

on its own motion for good cause shown. Good cause includes:

1. Lack of reasonable progress over a significant period 

of time despite the best efforts of the parties and the 

parenting coordinator; 

2. A determination that the parties no longer need the 

assistance of a parenting coordinator; 

3. Impairment on the part of a party that significantly 

interferes with the party’s participation in the process; 

or

4. The parenting coordinator is unwilling or unable to 

serve.

[¶10] The statute sets out various instances, separated by commas, when a 

parenting coordinator may be terminated. The words “good cause” only appear 

in the clause concerning termination of a parenting coordinator by the court on 

its own motion. That clause is separated from the others by the word “or.” 

“Terms or phrases separated by ‘or’ have separate and independent 

significance.” State ex rel. Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 2006 ND 84, ¶ 14, 

712 N.W.2d 828 (internal citations omitted); see also Grand Forks Prof’l 

Baseball, Inc. v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 204, ¶ 11, 654 N.W.2d 

426 (the word “or” is a coordinating conjunction used for “introducing an 

alternative”). The other clauses do not contain a good-cause requirement; they

set out different circumstances when a parenting coordinator may be 

terminated for reasons not necessarily constituting “good cause” as it is defined 

by the statute. We therefore read N.D.C.C. § 14-09.2-08 only to require a

specific good-cause finding when the court terminates a parenting coordinator 

on its own motion.
5

[¶11] Aron Williams requested termination of the parenting coordinator in his 

motion for an amended judgment. We review a district court’s decision to 

terminate a parenting coordinator for an abuse of discretion. See Prchal v. 

Prchal, 2011 ND 62, ¶¶ 27-29, 795 N.W.2d 693. Aron Williams claimed the 

retainer for the parenting coordinator was nearly exhausted and no progress 

had been made. The court heard testimony indicating there was still 

significant conflict between the parties despite the appointment of the 

parenting coordinator. Under these circumstances, we conclude the court did 

not abuse its discretion when it ordered the parenting coordinator’s

appointment terminated.

IV

[¶12] Jennifer Williams claims the district court violated her right to due 

process when it removed a right of first refusal provision from the judgment. 

She argues “neither party had adequate notice or a fair opportunity to be heard 

on that issue at the evidentiary hearing.” The right of first refusal provision 

stated:

If either party is unable to care for the children overnight, the 

other party shall be given the option to have this parenting time 

before any third-party is used.

[¶13] The government may not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 

without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; N.D. Const. art. I, § 

12. Due process requires parties receive “adequate notice” and “a fair 

opportunity to be heard.” Schmalle v. Schmalle, 1998 ND 201, ¶ 9, 586 N.W.2d 

677. “[T]he requirements imposed by due process are flexible and variable and 

dependent upon the particular situation being examined.” Isaacson v. 

Isaacson, 2010 ND 18, ¶ 10, 777 N.W.2d 886. “Due process requires that 

parties be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present objections.” State v. 

Ehli, 2003 ND 133, ¶ 10, 667 N.W.2d 635.

[¶14] The district court informed the parties it intended to delete the provision 

at the evidentiary hearing. The court explained: “Obviously, first right of 

refusal isn’t working and nor is make-up time, because it just doesn’t occur.” 
6

Neither party objected or voiced a concern. Nor were any objections made at 

the follow-up status conference. At both hearings, the court gave the parties 

the opportunity to make objections and neither did. Because Jennifer Williams

received notice and an opportunity to object, we conclude the court did not 

violate her right to due process.

V

[¶15] We affirm the second amended judgment.

[¶16] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Gerald W. VandeWalle

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte