Filed 2/16/24 Contreras v. Superior Court CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ISRRAEL RODRIGUEZ 

CONTRERAS,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 

ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

CHAMPION DODGE, LLC, A 

CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY DBA CHAMPION 

CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM 

FIAT et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

 B331737

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 21STCV38701)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Rupert A. 

Byrdsong, Judge. Petition granted.
2

Knight Law Group, Roger Kirnos and Jeffrey Mukai, for 

Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Ongaro PC, Scott S. Shepardson, for Real Party in Interest

FCA US LLC.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Isrrael Rodriguez Contreras is the plaintiff in a 

lawsuit filed against real parties in interest Champion Dodge, 

LLC and FCA US, LLC (FCA). Petitioner contends the trial court 

erred when it denied his motion to reconsider the court’s earlier 

granting of a motion to compel arbitration. We grant the 

petition.

II. BACKGROUND

On March 23, 2019, petitioner purchased a 2019 Dodge 

Ram 1500 (the vehicle) from a dealership,1 pursuant to a form 

Retail Installment Sale Contract (the sale contract), which 

included an arbitration clause.

On October 20, 2021, petitioner filed a complaint alleging 

that when the suspension system on his vehicle began to exhibit 

“[d]efects and nonconformities,” FCA, the vehicle’s manufacturer, 

failed to make necessary repairs or to reimburse petitioner for 

the vehicle, in violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty 

Act (Song-Beverly Act). Petitioner’s complaint also alleged a 

cause of action for negligent repair against Champion Dodge.

1 The dealership is not a party to this dispute.
3

On January 6, 2022, FCA filed a motion to compel 

arbitration, which Champion Dodge joined. The motion to compel 

relied on the arbitration clause of the sale contract, which 

provided, in relevant part: “Any claim or dispute, whether in 

contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation 

and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of 

the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, 

agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to 

your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this 

contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including 

any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this 

contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, 

binding arbitration and not by a court action.” FCA cited in 

support of its motion the Court of Appeal opinion in Felisilda v. 

FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (Felisilda), in which the 

court held that plaintiffs who had entered into a sale contract 

that included an identically-worded arbitration clause were 

compelled to arbitrate their Song-Beverly claims against the 

vehicle’s manufacturer. (Id. at pp. 498–499.) The court in 

Felisilda reasoned that the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which 

allows a “‘“nonsignatory defendant [to] invoke an arbitration 

clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when 

the causes of action against the nonsignatory are ‘intimately 

founded in and intertwined’ with the underlying contract 

obligations,”’” prohibited plaintiffs from refusing to arbitrate 

their claims against the manufacturer. (Id. at p. 495.) The court 

reasoned that the plaintiffs’ Song-Beverly claims were 

“intimately founded in and intertwined” with the plaintiffs’

obligations under the sale contract, in which they agreed to 
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arbitrate “‘[a]ny claim or dispute . . . which arises out of or relates 

to . . . [the] condition of this vehicle . . . .” (Id. at p. 496.)

On March 7, 2022, the trial court granted the motion to 

compel arbitration.

On June 23, 2023, petitioner filed a motion for 

reconsideration of the order compelling arbitration. Petitioner 

argued that although at the time the court granted the motion to 

compel, Felisilda, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 486, was the only 

appellate opinion to address whether an arbitration clause 

contained in a sale contract could require a plaintiff to arbitrate 

his claims against a nonsignatory manufacturer, a later-filed 

opinion, Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, 

review granted July 19, 2023, S279969 (Ford Motor), expressly 

rejected Felisilda’s holding and supported a contrary result. In 

Ford Motor, the court concluded that the doctrine of equitable 

estoppel did not require plaintiffs to arbitrate their Song-Beverly 

claims against a third-party manufacturer because “no plaintiffs 

alleged violations of the sale contracts’ express terms. Rather, 

plaintiffs’ claims are based on [the manufacturer’s] statutory 

obligations to reimburse consumers or replace their vehicles 

when unable to repair in accordance with its warranty. . . . Not 

one of the plaintiffs sued on any express contractual language in 

the sale contracts.” (Ford Motor, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1335.) Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial 

of the manufacturer’s motion to compel arbitration. (Id. at 

pp. 1336, 1343.)

On July 19, 2023, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion 

to reconsider. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court 

“acknowledged” that if it had heard the motion to compel 

arbitration “following the publication of [Ford Motor],” it would 
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have denied it. Nonetheless, it declined to reconsider its earlier 

order because it “was the correct decision in March 2022.”

On September 15, 2023, petitioner filed this petition for 

writ of mandate challenging the order denying reconsideration. 

On October 31, 2023, we issued an alternative writ, tentatively 

concluding that “[c]ourts retain the power to reconsider their 

orders compelling matters into arbitration based on changes in 

the law at any time prior to the entry of judgment” and ordering 

the trial court to either “vacate [its] order denying the motion for 

reconsideration and analyze the motion in light of the above” or 

show cause why a peremptory writ ordering it to do so should not 

issue. The trial court did not respond to the order to show cause.

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying its 

motion for reconsideration. We agree. A motion for 

reconsideration, which must be filed within 10 days of service of 

written notice of entry of the order, requests that the court 

“reconsider the matter” based “upon new or different facts, 

circumstances, or law . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) 

If “a court at any time determines that there has been a change of 

law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may 

do so on its own motion and enter a different order.” (Id., subd. 

(c).)

“A change in the law is always an appropriate basis, up 

until a final judgment is entered, for changing an interim order; 

courts retain the inherent power, regardless of Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1008, to change their orders at any time prior 

to entry of judgment. [Citation.] And the fact that a party brings 
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the basis for such a change to the court’s attention, even if via a 

motion for reconsideration pursuant to section 1008, and even if 

such motion is made after the 10-day period, does not negate this 

inherent power.” (Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 728, 739, 

fn. 10, disapproved of on another ground by Le Francois v. Goel

(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107.) We review orders denying a 

motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. (Wilson v. The 

La Jolla Group (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 897, 921.)

Here, as the trial court acknowledged, changes in the law, 

namely, the opinion in Ford Motor, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, 

supported a reconsideration of the court’s earlier granting of the 

motion to compel arbitration. On the same day that the court 

denied petitioner’s motion to reconsider, our Supreme Court 

granted review of Ford Motor on the following issue: “Do 

manufacturers’ express or implied warranties that accompany a 

vehicle at the time of sale constitute obligations arising from the 

sale contract, permitting manufacturers to enforce an arbitration 

agreement in the contract pursuant to equitable estoppel?” (Ford 

Motor (S279969, July 19, 2023) [order granting review].)

Although we await further guidance from the Supreme Court, we 

note that every other Court of Appeal decision to consider the 

issue has rejected Felisilda’s reasoning and concluded that the 

doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply to permit a thirdparty manufacturer to enforce an arbitration clause included as 

part of a sale contract to compel arbitration from a consumer. 

(See e.g., Montemayor v. Ford Motor Co. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 

958, 971–972; Kielar v. Superior Court (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 614, 

620; Yeh v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 264, 272, 278.) 

Accordingly, the court erred in denying petitioner’s motion to 

reconsider.
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IV. DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial

court to vacate its July 19, 2023, order denying petitioner’s

motion for reconsideration and issue a new order granting the 

motion. Petitioner Isrrael Rodriguez Contreras shall recover his

costs in this proceeding.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM, J.

We concur:

MOOR, Acting P. J.

LEE, J.*

* Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.