16-64 

Seepersad v. Sessions 

BIA 

Videla, IJ 

A029 380 732 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

8th day of June, two thousand eighteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT D. SACK, 

 PETER W. HALL, 

 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY 

 Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

ASHRAM SEEPERSAD, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 16-64 

 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: RION LATIMORE, Minneapolis, MN. 

 

FOR RESPONDENT: BENJAMIN C. MIZER, Assistant Attorney 

General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant 

Director; Tim Ramnitz, Attorney, 

Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC. 
2 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DISMISSED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

 Petitioner Ashram Seepersad, a native and citizen of 

Trinidad and Tobago, seeks review of a December 9, 2015, 

decision of the BIA, affirming a September 4, 2015, decision 

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Seepersad withholding 

of removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”), and a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(h). In re Ashram Seepersad, No. A029 380 732 (B.I.A. 

Dec. 9, 2015), aff’g No. A029 380 732 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 

4, 2015). In a separate per curiam opinion issued today, we 

deny Seepersad’s petition as it relates to the waiver of 

inadmissibility. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the 

BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). 

Seepersad’s criminal conviction limits our jurisdiction to 

constitutional claims and colorable questions of law, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(C), (D), for which our review is de novo, Pierre 

v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 2009). Seepersad raises 
3 

no such claims with respect to the agency’s conclusion that he 

failed to show “that it is [was] more likely than not that 

he . . . would be tortured.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). 

Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review to the extent 

that it challenges the denial of CAT relief. See Xiao Ji Chen 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 Seepersad seeks withholding of removal based on his fear 

of future persecution, citing a proposed social group: 

returning immigrants perceived as wealthy. Whether a group is 

legally cognizable presents a question of law. Paloka v. 

Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014). 

 An applicant seeking withholding of removal must establish 

that his fear of future persecution is “on account of race, 

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 

or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also 8 

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). To be cognizable, a social group must be 

“(1) composed of members who share a common immutable 

characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) 

socially distinct within the society in question.” Matter of 

M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014). The agency 

applied the correct criteria in its analysis and did not err 

in concluding that Seepersad did not establish that returning 
4 

immigrants perceived as wealthy have the particularity and 

definable boundaries necessary to form a particular social 

group. Seepersad testified to general violence and government 

corruption in Trinidad, but could not name one individual or 

group that would target him, testifying instead that his “fear 

is more general.” Record at 65. As we have previously noted 

with approval, “wealth” cannot form the basis of a social group 

because it “is simply too subjective, inchoate, and variable 

to provide the sole basis for membership in a particular social 

group.” Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Seepersad presented no 

evidence to distinguish his situation from that addressed in 

Ucelo-Gomez. That some returning immigrants have been 

attacked does not make the group cognizable. See Matter of 

M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242-43; see also Ucelo–Gomez, 509 

F.3d at 73 (“When the harm visited upon members of a group is 

attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary criminals 

rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped away from 

considering those people a ‘particular social group’. . . .”). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DISMISSED IN PART insofar as it challenges the denial of CAT 

relief and DENIED IN PART insofar as it challenges the denial 
5 

of withholding of removal. Seepersad’s motion for a stay of 

removal is DISMISSED as moot. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk