NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHNNY M. LAWRENCE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

J. CASTRO; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-15870 

D.C. No. 3:18-cv-00091-RCJ-VPC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 15, 2019**

Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. 

Johnny M. Lawrence appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force during an arrest. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for 

failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Sprewell v. Golden State 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 24 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-15870 

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm. 

The district court properly dismissed Lawrence’s excessive force claim 

because the video recording of the incident Lawrence attached to the complaint 

contradicts Lawrence’s allegations made in the complaint that defendants used an

unreasonable amount of force during his arrest. See Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San 

Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth factors for determining 

whether excessive force was used in arrest); Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (court need 

not accept as true allegations that contradict documents or exhibits attached to the 

complaint, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 

fact, or unreasonable inferences).

The district court properly dismissed Lawrence’s conspiracy, failure-toprotect, and failure-to-train claims because Lawrence failed to allege facts 

sufficient to show a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Flores v. County 

of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (to state a failure-to-train 

claim, plaintiff must show that the official “was deliberately indifferent to the need 

to train subordinates, and the lack of training actually caused the constitutional 

harm or deprivation of rights”); Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (“[P]olice officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers 

violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)); Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354, 359 (9th Cir. 1990) 
3 18-15870 

(deprivation of federal constitutional rights is a necessary element of the alleged 

conspiracy); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid 

dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lawrence’s Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) motion because Lawrence failed to establish any 

basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 

1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for 

reconsideration under Rule 60(b)).

We reject as unsupported by the record Lawrence’s contention that the 

district court judge was biased. 

AFFIRMED.