[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-12275

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D.C. 5:12-cr-00082-MP-EMT

BLAKE COLLIER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS SECRETARY,

Respondent-Appellee.

 

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

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(November 12, 2015)

Before HULL, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM: 

Collier filed suit in federal district court seeking the writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2554, after the state courts had rejected on the merits his 

post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure of his trial 

counsel to seek another formal evaluation and hearing to determine his competence 

to stand trial. Collier’s claim was also rejected in the district court. Collier 

appeals.

After oral argument and careful review of the record, we conclude that the 

judgment of the district court should be affirmed. We seriously doubt that 

Collier’s trial counsel provided deficient performance pursuant to Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 102 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). We therefore doubt that there 

was an unreasonable application of Strickland when the state court held that his 

performance was not deficient. In any event, we conclude that Collier cannot 

satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, and thus that Collier’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim must fail.

Even if defense counsel were deficient (e.g., if there were a bona fide doubt 

as to Collier’s competence on April 17, 2007 and there should have been another 

formal hearing before the trial), Collier must still show that counsel’s deficient 

performance prejudiced him. Collier acknowledges that, to prove the prejudice 

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prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must demonstrate that there 

is a reasonable probability that he was actually tried, convicted and sentenced 

while he was not in fact competent to stand trial. The test for determining 

competence to stand trial is “whether a criminal defendant [1] ‘has sufficient 

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding—and [2] whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding 

of the proceedings against him.’” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. Ct. 

896, 903 (1975) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 

788 (1960)). 

We have carefully reviewed the relevant transcripts. We agree with the 

State that the transcripts, especially those of the April 27, 2007, pretrial hearing 

and of the trial and sentencing itself, affirmatively demonstrate that Collier had the 

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding, and had a rational as well as factual understanding of the 

proceedings against him. In particular, immediately before trial, Collier’s colloquy 

with the state trial judge – with respect to his decision to proceed with his then 

attorney and his decision to waive trial by jury and submit his case to the trial 

judge in a bench trial – revealed a clear and intelligent understanding of the 

proceedings against him, and a clear ability to consult rationally and effectively 

with his lawyer to further his defense. Indeed, his reasoning, as explained to the 

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trial judge in deciding to waive jury trial, was not only rational, it was nuanced and 

sophisticated. Furthermore, at the trial itself, Collier’s discussions with the trial 

judge reflected that he was well aware of the medications he was taking, and his 

colloquy with the trial judge and his lawyer about whether or not to testify showed 

that he was thinking rationally about his defense and consulting effectively with 

his lawyer.

For the foregoing reasons,1 we conclude that Collier has not demonstrated 

that there is a reasonable probability that Collier was not competent to stand trial 

when he was tried and sentenced. In other words, Collier has failed to satisfy the 

prejudice prong of Strickland. It necessarily follows that Collier has not 

established that the challenged state court proceedings resulted in a decision that 

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of Strickland.

Thus, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

 1 The single comment by Collier at sentencing, referring again to “that evil pact with the 

devil” does not persuade us that Collier has carried his burden to demonstrate a reasonable 

probability that he was incompetent to stand trial. That single comment occurred at the end of 

trial proceedings at which Collier had demonstrated a clear ability to understand the proceedings 

against him and to rationally and effectively consult with his lawyer to further his defense. 

Moreover, the comment is cast in the past tense, referring to the “evil pact” as having occurred in 

the past when he was he was “sick in my mind.”

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