[Cite as State v. Carlisle, 131 Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio-6553.] 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CARLISLE, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State v. Carlisle, 131 Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio-6553.] 

Sentencing—Trial court’s authority to modify sentence before sentence’s 

execution—Repeal of authorizing statute withdrew court’s authority to 

modify sentence—Judgment affirmed. 

(No. 2010-2158—Submitted October 18, 2011—Decided December 22, 2011.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 93266, 2010-Ohio-3407. 

__________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} This appeal involves the question of whether the trial court had 

authority to modify Carlisle’s criminal sentence. Absent statutory authority, a 

trial court is generally not empowered to modify a criminal sentence by 

reconsidering its own final judgment. For the reasons explained below, the trial 

court lacked the requisite authority to modify Carlisle’s sentence. Accordingly, 

we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} On June 8, 2007, a jury found Jack Carlisle guilty of kidnapping 

and gross sexual imposition (“GSI”) in connection with the sexual assault of his 

6-year-old foster daughter. On July 11, 2007, the trial court sentenced Carlisle to 

three years’ imprisonment for kidnapping and one year of imprisonment for GSI, 

to be served concurrently, followed by five years of mandatory postrelease 

control. The trial court also classified Carlisle as a sexually oriented offender, 

granted him 278 days of jail-time credit, and suspended execution of his sentence 

and continued his bond pending appeal. On July 13, 2007, the clerk journalized 

the final, appealable order that reflected his sentence. 
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{¶ 3} On appeal, Carlisle challenged his convictions but did not raise any 

issues regarding his sentence. State v. Carlisle, Cuyahoga App. No. 90223, 2008-

Ohio-3818 (“Carlisle I”), ¶ 1. On July 31, 2008, the Eighth District Court of 

Appeals affirmed Carlisle’s convictions, issued a special mandate to the trial court 

to carry the judgment into execution, revoked his bail, and remanded the case to 

the trial court for execution of sentence. Id. at ¶ 63. Carlisle unsuccessfully 

moved the court of appeals to reconsider its merit opinion based on the appellate 

court’s alleged misapplication of the rape-shield law, and the court of appeals 

stayed execution of Carlisle’s sentence pending appeal to this court. On February 

4, 2009, we declined jurisdiction. State v. Carlisle, 120 Ohio St.3d 1508, 2009-

Ohio-361, 900 N.E.2d 624. 

{¶ 4} Having exhausted his appeals and facing revocation of his bond 

and imprisonment, on February 19, 2009, Carlisle moved the trial court to 

reconsider and modify his sentence. Asserting that he suffers from chronic, lifethreatening conditions, Carlisle argued that the trial court had authority to modify 

his sentence because the sentence had not been “executed,” i.e., Carlisle had not 

yet been delivered to the state penal institution. The motion posited, “[T]his 

Court must ask itself whether Mr. Carlisle’s punishment is worth the cost” in light 

of his “expensive” medical treatment, including kidney dialysis three times a 

week. 

{¶ 5} In opposing the motion, the state acknowledged the significant 

medical expenses associated with Carlisle’s incarceration but represented, 

essentially, that it was willing to bear those costs in light of the seriousness of the 

offenses. It further argued that Carlisle’s medical conditions did not prevent him 

from committing the offenses and, therefore, incarceration was necessary for the 

protection of the community. The court granted the defense motion and set a 

resentencing date. The state then filed an amended response asserting that the 

trial court lacked authority to modify its final judgment. 
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{¶ 6} On April 2, 2009, the trial court vacated Carlisle’s sentence “due to 

change of circumstances” and conducted a resentencing hearing, where Carlisle’s 

attorneys noted that his dialysis alone costs Medicare and his private insurer 

nearly $100,000 a year. At the hearing, the court mentioned that the state is 

“cutting budgets everywhere” and that “the costs in this situation are going to be 

astronomical.” It then found that Carlisle did not pose a threat to the community 

and imposed a sentence of five years of community control. 

{¶ 7} The court of appeals reversed. State v. Carlisle, Cuyahoga App. 

No. 93266, 2010-Ohio-3407 (“Carlisle II”), ¶ 49. In so doing, the court of 

appeals agreed with Carlisle that a trial court has authority to modify a criminal 

sentence until the defendant is delivered to the prison to begin serving the 

sentence, holding, “[I]n criminal cases, a judgment is not considered final until 

the sentence has been ordered into execution.” Id. at ¶ 10, citing State v. 

Garretson (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 554, 558-559, 748 N.E.2d 560. It concluded, 

however, that the trial court lacked authority to modify Carlisle’s sentence 

because his convictions had been affirmed on appeal. Id. at ¶ 13. It held that 

State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common Pleas (1978), 55 

Ohio St.2d 94, 97, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162, dictates that a judgment of a 

reviewing court is “controlling upon the lower court as to all matters within the 

compass of the judgment.” Id. Even though Carlisle’s appeal addressed only the 

determinations of his guilt, and not his sentence, the court of appeals reasoned 

that res judicata operated to bring Carlisle’s sentence within the compass of the 

judgment because Carlisle could have challenged his sentence on appeal. Id. at 

¶ 14. Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the trial court on remand was 

authorized to carry out only the appellate court’s special mandate to execute 

Carlisle’s sentence, not to modify it. Id. at ¶ 16. 

{¶ 8} We accepted Carlisle’s discretionary appeal from that judgment. 

State v. Carlisle, 128 Ohio St.3d 1411, 2011-Ohio-828, 942 N.E.2d 384. He set 
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forth one proposition of law: “This court’s holding in Special Prosecutors does 

not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to modify a sentence that has not yet 

been executed even if the sentence modification occurs following the direct 

appeal.” 

{¶ 9} At the threshold, we note that Carlisle’s proposition presupposes 

that absent a mandate from the court of appeals, a trial court necessarily has 

authority to modify a sentence that has not been executed. Not so. Consequently, 

Special Prosecutors, which discusses the mandate rule, does not control our 

analysis. Instead, application of State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 

353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, which explained the general rule that a 

trial court lacks authority to modify a final criminal judgment, is dispositive. 

ANALYSIS

{¶ 10} Carlisle concedes that a trial court lacks statutory authority to 

modify a final sentence. But Carlisle claims that the trial court had unfettered 

authority to resentence him because his sentence had not yet been executed and, 

therefore, was not yet final. We disagree. 

{¶ 11} A criminal sentence is final upon issuance of a final order. See, 

e.g., State ex rel. White v. Junkin (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 337, 686 N.E.2d 267 

(a trial court had authority to vacate a finding of guilt and imposition of sentence 

and order the defendant to face trial on a more serious charge because the 

judgment had never been journalized by the clerk pursuant to Crim.R. 32); see 

also State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, 

syllabus, as modified by State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 

N.E.2d 142, at syllabus (a judgment of conviction is final when the order sets 

forth (1) the fact of the conviction; “(2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the 

judge; and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of court”). 

{¶ 12} In this case, a valid judgment of conviction was journalized on July 

13, 2007, yet the trial court purported to modify Carlisle’s sentence nearly two 
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years later. The trial court’s attempt to do so was improper. See Johnson v. Sacks

(1962), 173 Ohio St. 452, 454, 20 O.O.2d 76, 184 N.E.2d 96; Walker v. Maxwell

(1965), 1 Ohio St.2d 136, 138, 30 O.O.2d 487, 205 N.E.2d 394; Majoros v. 

Collins (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 442, 443, 596 N.E.2d 1038; State ex rel. Massie v. 

Rogers (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 449, 450, 674 N.E.2d 1383 (all recognizing that 

sentencing errors are an improper exercise of jurisdiction). 

{¶ 13} Carlisle’s argument that a sentence is not final until it is executed 

evolved from trial courts’ now defunct authority to modify a criminal sentence at 

any time before it is executed. See State v. Addison (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 7, 

530 N.E.2d 1335, syllabus. As a consequence, the case law that appears to 

support Carlisle’s position suffers from a fundamental flaw: it relies on nowrepealed statutes. 

{¶ 14} In Addison, the defendant sought a sentence modification from the 

trial court under the now-repealed “shock probation” statute, former R.C. 

2947.061(B), 146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 100, 116-117, which authorized trial courts 

to impose probation on defendants who had served a specified portion of their 

prison sentences (thereby receiving the shock of incarceration). Id. at 7-8. The 

trial court had properly denied the motion under former R.C. 2947.061(B), but 

had modified the underlying sentence. The court of appeals held that the trial 

court had no authority to do so because the modification had not been authorized 

by statute. Id. at 8. Id. In so holding, the Tenth District Court of Appeals held 

that the only authority for trial courts to modify final criminal sentences was 

former R.C. 2929.51(A), 143 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4170, 4216, now repealed, 

which provided that after sentencing for a felony up to the time the defendant is 

delivered to the institution where he is to serve sentence, the court may suspend 

the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The Tenth District Court of 

Appeals concluded, “Once a sentence has been executed, the trial court no longer 

has the power to modify the sentence except as provided by the legislature.” Id. 
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at 8-9. Similarly, the Fifth District Court of Appeals analyzed former R.C. 

2929.51 and reached the same conclusion. State v. Lambert, Richland App. No. 

03-CA-65, 2003-Ohio-6791, at ¶ 17 (“Once the defendant has been delivered into 

the custody of the institution in which he is to serve his sentence, the trial court's 

authority to suspend sentence under R.C. 2929.51(A) terminates * * *”). 

{¶ 15} Some courts of appeals have continued to cite the conclusion 

reached in Addison and Lambert as a stand-alone proposition, even though 

Addison and Lambert were premised on a statute that has since been repealed. 

See, e.g., State v. Plunkett, 186 Ohio App.3d 408, 2009-Ohio-5307, 928 N.E.2d 

760, ¶ 10 (citing Addison for authority that “[a]s a general rule, once a defendant 

has commenced serving his sentence, the trial court no longer has the authority to 

modify or amend that sentence, except as specifically provided by the General 

Assembly”). In turn, that logic has been extended to conclude that a criminal 

sentence is not final until it is executed, thereby creating the illusion of 

compliance with our rule in Cruzado. Carlisle II, 2010-Ohio-3407, ¶ 10, citing 

Garretson, 140 Ohio App.3d at 558-559, 748 N.E.2d 560, citing Addison for 

authority that “[o]nce the trial court has carried into execution a valid sentence as 

authorized above [under R.C. 2949.05], it may no longer amend or modify that 

sentence.” These holdings are unsound. Neither Carlisle nor the courts of 

appeals can rely on them. 

{¶ 16} Notwithstanding the repeal of R.C. 2929.51(A), Carlisle argues 

that a trial court retains the authority to modify a final criminal sentence until it is 

executed because the General Assembly has not expressly prohibited such 

modifications. We disagree. The repeal of R.C. 2929.51(A) unequivocally 

constituted a withdrawal of the authority provided under that section. State ex rel. 

Carmean v. Hardin Cty. Bd. of Edn. (1960), 170 Ohio St. 415, 419, 11 O.O.2d 

162, 165 N.E.2d 918 (repeal of a statute is the abrogation or destruction of that 

law). 
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CONCLUSION

{¶ 17} For the reasons explained, the judgment of the court of appeals is 

affirmed, albeit on different grounds from those relied on by that court, and this 

cause is remanded to the common pleas court to execute the original sentence. 

Judgment affirmed 

and cause remanded. 

PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 

MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and T. Allan 

Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Erika B. 

Cunliffe, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 

Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, and David M. Lieberman, 

Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General 

Michael DeWine. 

______________________