[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 97-8076 ________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:96-CV-1414-MHS

CYNTHIA A. EVERETT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, KENNESAW STATE COLLEGE, 

a unit of the University System of Georgia; and

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA,

 Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

__________________________

(April 16. 1998)

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, and GODBOLD and RONEY, Senior

Circuit Judges.

GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Cynthia Everett appeals from the dismissal of her

claims against the Board of Regents of the University System of

Georgia, Kennesaw State College, and Cobb County School District

alleging that she was discriminated against because of her
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disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Because we find her claims

to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations we affirm

the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants. 

I. Factual and Procedural History

Cynthia Everett is a person with disabilities as defined by

the ADA. She has multiple sclerosis and bilateral SI joint

dysfunction, and although she can walk for periods of time using

a cane, she relies on an electrically-powered scooter for

mobility.

Everett attended Kennesaw State College from 1991 to 1994 to

obtain a degree in Early Childhood Education. During the spring

quarter of 1994, she began her student teaching assignment at

Kennesaw Elementary School in the classroom of Nancy Hardy.

Everett alleges that Hardy would not allow her to use her scooter

in the classroom. Everett also alleges that Hardy made frequent

comments concerning Everett’s disability and expressed her doubts

on whether the disability would allow her to be a good teacher. 

Some time in May Hardy assigned Everett a grade of Unsatisfactory

(U) for the student teaching assignment, stating that to pass

Everett would be to admit that she that she was capable of

teaching in any situation. 

On May 31, 1994 Kennesaw State faculty decided to change
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Everett’s grade from a U to an Incomplete (I) and allow her to

repeat the student teaching program the next year. On June 6,

1994 Everett received a letter from the same Board confirming

that the May 31 decision would stand and that she would be

assigned an I.

On June 6, 1996 Everett filed a complaint against the

defendants alleging discrimination because of her disability in

violation of Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of

1973. She also included state law claims alleging breach of

contract. The defendants moved to dismiss all of Everett’s

federal claims as time barred. The district court granted the ,

motion, finding that Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations

applied to all of Everett’s claim and that she had failed to file

suit within two years of the discriminatory acts complained of.

Everett filed this appeal, asserting that Georgia’s twoyear, personal injury statute of limitations is inapplicable to

claims brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and that

regardless of which limitations period this court chooses to

apply her action was timely filed.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of review

We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint de

novo. In doing so we view the facts in the light most favorable
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to the nonmovant. Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir.

1995).

B. The appropriate statute of limitations

The issue of the applicable statute of limitations under

Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is an

issue of first impression for this circuit. Because causes of

action brought under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation

Act are essentially identical, we will consider the two statutes

simultaneously and apply the same statute of limitations to both.

See Pottgen v. Missouri St. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d

926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that interpretations of the ADA

must be consistent with interpretations of the Rehabilitation

Act). 

Where a federal statute does not contain a limitations

period courts should look to the most analogous state statute of

limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). Most

civil rights actions are essentially claims to vindicate injuries

to personal rights. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S.

656, 661 (1987)(action for discrimination is one for "fundamental

injury to the individual rights of a person"); Wilson, 471 U.S.

at 276 (claims which allege discrimination are best characterized

as personal injury actions).

Based on this guidance from the Supreme Court most circuits
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that have adopted a statute of limitations for ADA or

Rehabilitation Act claims have looked to the state’s limitations

period for personal injury actions. See, e.g., Soignier v.

American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d 547, 551 (7th Cir.

1996)(district court correctly applied Illinois' two-year statute

of limitations for personal injuries as the most analogous

limitations period for an ADA claim, cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 771

(1997); Baker v. Board of Regents of State of Kan., 991 F.2d 628,

632 (10th Cir. 1993) (analogizing Rehabilitation Act claims to

personal injury claims); Morse v. University of Vermont, 973 F.2d

122, 127 (2d Cir. 1992)(“we now hold that actions under § 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the state statute of

limitations applicable to personal injury actions”); Hickey v.

Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F.2d 980, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1992).

Only the Fourth Circuit has declined to apply the state

personal injury statute of limitations. In Wolsky v. Medical

College of Hampton Roads, that court held that because the state

of Virginia had passed a state anti-discrimination statute that

was identical to the federal Rehabilitation Act, the statute of

limitations contained in that statute should be applied as the

most analogous. Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 1

F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 1993)(“Given that the Virginia Act is

modeled after the Rehabilitation Act, we break with the

conclusions of the other circuits to apply a personal injury
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statute of limitations”). Because Georgia has not passed a state

law identical to the Rehabilitation Act from which to borrow a

limitations period, we follow the lead of the other circuits that

have decided this issue and apply Georgia’s two-year statute of

limitations period for personal injury actions. See O.C.G.A. § 9-

3-33 (1982). 

Everett assertions that this court should apply the twentyyear statute of limitations found at O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 are

without merit. This twenty-year limitations period applies to

“actions for the enforcement of rights accruing to individuals

under statutes or acts of incorporation or by operation of law.”

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. The only authority Everett points to for

support of her position consists of cases decided prior to the

Supreme Court’s decisions in Wilson and Goodman that § 1983 and § 

1981 claims are to be governed by state personal injury

limitation periods. The cases cited by Everett apply other

statutes of limitations to federal civil rights actions and are

no longer good law. See Hill v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid

Transit Authority, 841 F.2d 1533, 1545-46, modified on other

grounds, 848 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that “[r]ecent

Supreme Court decisions have directed that the appropriate

statute of limitations for [1981 and 1983 actions] is the

personal injury statute of the state in which the federal court

is sitting”). 
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Because other circuits that have decided this issue have

applied the personal injury statute of limitations period, and

because Everett has failed to cite any relevant authority that

convinces this court otherwise, we hold that Georgia’s two-year

statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be

applied to discrimination claims brought under Title II of the

ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 

C. Is Everett’s complaint time barred?

Everett contends that even if this court finds that the twoyear limitation period applies to her claims, her suit should not

have been dismissed because it was timely filed within two years. 

Specifically, she says that her claims of discrimination accrued

on June 6, 1994 when she received a letter from the school

confirming that she would receive an I in her student teaching

course and that she would have to repeat her student teaching

exercise. Her original complaint was filed on June 6, 1996. 

Kennesaw State College and the Cobb County School District

assert that Everett’s claims accrued prior to June 6th. They

maintain that her claims accrued some time in May of 1994 when

she was assigned a grade of U by Hardy. Alternatively, they

argue that the latest date her claims could have accrued was May

31, 1994, because on that date Everett met with her professors

and they informed her that she would be given the grade of “I,”
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rather than “U” in her student teaching course and would not be

allowed to graduate. In dismissing Everett’s complaint, the

district court found that the letter Everett received on June 6

only confirmed what she had learned on May 31, and that her claim

had accrued no later than May 31 1994, thus barring her current

suit under the applicable two-year limitations period. 

We agree with the district court. Claims of discrimination

accrue when the plaintiff is informed of the discriminatory act. 

Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980)(period

commenced at time the tenure decision was made and communicated

to plaintiff, even though one of the effects of denial of tenure,

the eventual loss of a teaching position, did not occur until

later); Calhoun v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 705

F.2d 422, 425 (11th Cir. 1983)(“the statute [of limitations] does

not begin to run until the facts which would support a cause of

action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a

reasonably prudent regard for his rights”); Soigner, 92 F.3d at

551 (7th Cir. 1996)(“[t]he statute of limitations begins with the

discovery of injury, not the date on which full consequences of

the actions became clear"); Lever v. Northwestern Univ., 979 F.2d

552, 556 (7th Cir. 1992)("An employer's refusal to undo a

discriminatory decision is not a fresh act of discrimination”).

Because Everett first learned that Hardy would give her a U

because of her disabilities in May, and because she learned of
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the I on May 31st at the meeting with professors, the district

court was correct in dismissing her claims as time barred. 

The June 6 letter merely confirmed what happened at the May

31 meeting. At the most it only failed to undo the prior

discriminatory acts of both Hardy and Kennesaw State. Failure to

remedy a prior act of discrimination does not constitute a new

act of discrimination for the purpose of determining whether a

claim is time barred. See Lever,979 F.2d at 556. We hold that

Everett’s complaint was time barred by Georgia’s two-year statute

of limitations period. The district court did not err in

dismissing her claims. 

III. Conclusion

We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Everett’s claims

under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.