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Filed 4/22/22 P. v. Alexander CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Tehama)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THOMAS WAYNE ALEXANDER,

Defendant and Appellant.

C095163

(Super. Ct. No. 20CR002460)

Defendant Thomas Wayne Alexander pled guilty to oral copulation or sexual 

penetration of a child 10 years old or younger in exchange for a sentence of 15 years to 

life and dismissal of several other sexual abuse charges and special allegations. The trial 

court accepted the plea and sentenced defendant accordingly. The trial court, however, 

reserved jurisdiction over restitution, fines, and fees. 

Following a hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay $150,000 in direct 

victim restitution. Defendant appeals the victim restitution order. He asserts the trial 

court violated his constitutional right under the United States Constitution to a jury 
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determination of the facts and his right to a jury trial under article I, section 16 of the 

California Constitution. Defendant further asserts the order should be vacated because 

the trial court erred in failing to specify the losses to which the order pertained as 

required under Penal Code1section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) and it did not have an 

adequate factual foundation for the award. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I

The Offense And Surrounding Circumstances

Although the plea agreement states the police report would constitute the factual 

basis for the plea, the police report was not included in the record on appeal. We take the 

following from the probation report, which incorporates the police report.2

“According to the Tehama County Sheriff’s Office (Report #20-00515), on March 

24, 2020, the sheriff’s office received a report from Children’s Protective Services that a 

nine-year-old girl said she had spent the night at the defendant’s house with her ten-yearold friend, the victim in the current matter. The defendant had both girls sleep in his bed 

with him. While in bed, the defendant rubbed the nine-year-old girl’s ‘back and butt’ and 

‘tickled’ her chest, the next morning the defendant said, ‘here comes the hungry bear’ and 

bit the girl on her arms, back and legs and ‘slobbered’ on her.

1 All further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

2 The trial court may (and here did, as explained post) consider the information in 

the probation report in making discretionary sentencing decisions where the defendant 

had an opportunity to review the report and challenge its contents, including the 

statement of facts and circumstances of the offense described therein. (See People v. 

Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 887, 893.) The information pertaining to the history 

of defendant’s abuse of the victim is further pertinent because, as defendant concedes in 

his opening brief, he “checked the box on the plea form which allowed the trial court to 

consider dismissed counts in determining the sentence and restitution.” The dismissed 

sexual abuse counts in this case pertained to the same victim. 
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“On the same day, the defendant was questioned about the allegations. He 

admitted having the two girls sleep in his bed with him and that it was a ‘bad mistake.’ 

He said the nine-year-old girl ‘butted up against him’ in her sleep but he pushed her 

away. He thinks she may have misinterpreted that as inappropriate touching.

“On October 8, 2020, a second interview with the nine-year-old girl was 

conducted. She repeated her earlier allegations but soon became emotional and fearful 

and said she could not remember all that had happened. The ten-year-old victim was then 

interviewed. She said she had stayed at the defendant’s home with him many times in the 

three years since she was in the third grade. She liked to stay at his house to get a break 

from her siblings. He sexually abused her almost every time she stayed with him. The 

abuse would occur in his bed, in the shower, on his couch and in his car.

“He would ‘persuade’ her to sleep in his bed even if she did not want to and make 

her shower with him. He had her take off her clothes in front of him and he would give 

her one of his shirts to wear. He put his penis in her vagina and in her mouth. He would 

also put his fingers in her vagina and orally copulate her. She said after he would orally 

copulate her it made her mouth feel ‘disgusted.’ In the shower, he would make her wash 

him and he would wash her. In the bath, he would have her sit on his lap. On the couch 

and in his car, he would have her sit on his lap and put her hands down his pants and 

touch his penis. If she refused to participate in the abuse, he told her it made him sad or 

he would threaten to take her home. She was made to promise that she would never tell 

anyone about what they were doing or she could never see him again . . . . The victim 

said she is having nightmares about the defendant and is afraid he will escape from jail. 

She never wants him to be released from jail.

“The defendant said he has known the victim since she was a baby. He calls her 

and her brothers his grandchildren. He takes them swimming and does other things with 

them ‘like a grandfather would do.’ At first, the defendant denied being a part of any 

abuse. He eventually admitted ‘hugging and kissing’ her, fondling her vagina, 
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performing oral sex on her and having her perform oral sex on him and taking numerous 

showers together.” 

II

The Victim Restitution Hearing

The prosecution requested $150,000 in direct victim restitution. The prosecution 

relied on People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 415 as the legal basis for the request. 

The trial court stated it was “aware of the case law regarding availability of noneconomic 

damages with respect to therapy, medical costs, pain and suffering, all of that.” The trial 

court asked the prosecutor, “what is the evidentiary basis for what it is that you’re 

presenting?” The prosecutor responded the victim’s therapist would testify about “her 

experience and, in her opinion, sort of projecting future therapy needs.”

The victim’s therapist testified she had treated the victim approximately 33 times. 

The victim had expressed to her the following impacts from the sexual abuse: “She has 

reported that it changed her life because she’s not the same person as she was before. 

She stated that she’s not as social with others. That she’s afraid. That she has to take 

medication, and she has panic attacks.” The victim further explained “she didn’t want to 

talk about the secret, because it was painful for her; and she said that it was very difficult 

for her to focus at school.” Because of her panic attacks, the victim is “afraid to go out.” 

In the therapist’s opinion, the victim exhibited signs of depression, as evidenced 

by “an indication from mother that [the victim] had a knife in her hands and she tried to 

cut, because she had a flashback.” The therapist further saw signs of posttraumatic stress 

disorder in the victim based on the flashbacks, nightmares, and “triggers” when the 

victim saw people who look like defendant or cars like the one defendant had, and the 

victim’s avoidance in thinking about the abuse because “it’s too stressful for her.” In the 

therapist’s opinion, the “triggers” discussed would lead to declines in the victim’s mental 

health. 
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When asked how long the victim will likely need therapy, the therapist responded: 

“I will say for [a] long time. She is just 12 years old, and she will need at least treatment 

for her teenage years, and she will need . . . to continue with medication. [¶] She is 

afraid what will happen . . . when he gets out. She doesn’t know if she wants to live in 

the same town or she [if] wants to move. She’s afraid of what will happen, and I’m 

afraid that . . . may, you know, trigger some more [post-traumatic stress disorder] 

symptoms when she’s grown up. [¶] Also, when a child is abused, they have stages in 

their lives, you know, they get married, they have kids. It may impair her relationships in 

the future as a grown up and interfere with her work. It may impair relationships, and 

they’re also not -- not all the time, but they’re likely to get into drugs and other negative 

life situations without the proper assistance of help, with professional help.” 

The therapist testified the average cost for mental health therapy in the area is 

“around $120, at least, an hour or it can be more.” 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the prosecution explained it was requesting 

$150,000, “[t]hat is [$]50,000 for each of the three years of reported abuse.” The trial 

judge responded: “I guess, I’m . . . trying to narrow down . . . what the request is 

specifically tailored to aside from the years of abuse. Are you talking about future 

psychological expenses? Are you talking about the noneconomic damages such as pain 

and suffering . . . that are potentially allowable in a situation such as this? I mean . . . 

what is the breakdown, because . . . the [$]50,000 for each year for the three years of 

what you said was the abuse sounds like noneconomic pain and suffering-type damages; 

and that type of award would be the type of award that I think you were referring to with 

regard to the case that was cited versus psychological expenses that would be permissible 

pursuant to statute and cases such as the O’Neal case . . . or is it a mix of both and, if so, 

what’s the breakdown, and then I will hear from [defense counsel].” 

The prosecutor responded: “Your honor, it is a mix of both. Given the nature of 

this offense, we do believe she’s entitled to her damages for pain and suffering. We also 
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believe she would need funds for future therapy; however, at this time, it’s difficult to 

project what exactly that amount will look like. We have a base number at minimum of 

$120 per session, but how many for how long is difficult to determine at this stage in her 

treatment, except for to say likely many years and possibly different periods of intense 

therapy, other periods of lighter therapy and medication. [¶] In light of that, the 

[$150,000] reflects a mix for both together.” 

Defense counsel responded: “Your Honor, [the prosecution] just admitted that 

future counseling needs and costs is [sic] difficult to determine. I would take that farther 

and say that it’s not difficult, but impossible to determine. [¶] Prior to this hearing, the 

[prosecution] provided a little breakdown of what the [$]150,000 was based on and [it] 

had 30 years of counseling, 26 sessions per year at $175, totaling [$]136,500; and then 

also thrown in was the mother’s estimated future medical costs of $13,500. There was no 

claim for any past counseling or medical expenses. The [$]13,500 appears to be based on 

nothing at all and just to go out on a limb, it appears that number just so happens to bring 

the total to a nice round number [$]150,000. All completely baseless.” The trial court 

interjected and confirmed defense counsel had received “a breakdown of what that 

estimate was comprised of.” 

The trial court then responded to defense counsel: “If you were given nothing and 

it was [$]150,000, I think I would agree with the statement that it was baseless, but you 

were given information based on an estimate of what it may be in the future. But you 

believe that despite that estimate and the reason given to you -- which isn’t before the 

Court, this is something you received outside of court -- that . . . is still baseless and 

future medical and/or psychological treatment is so vague as to not be ascertainable and 

therefore can’t be awarded. [¶] Is that [the] argument you’re making?” 

Defense counsel replied: “Yes, your Honor. At the very minimum, it has not been 

established what the future needs would be in this case. But I believe that coming up 

with the numbers of -- I mean, it’s a mathematical equation 30 times 26 times 175 equals 
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[$]136,500; but the 30 years and 26 are baseless. It’s not based on any evidence or facts 

in this case. That’s my point. [¶] The [$]13,500 appears to be thrown in to bring it to a 

round number of [$]150,000.” 

The trial court posited: “But . . . [the prosecution] also -- aside from noneconomic 

future damages -- also stated that it was $50,000 per year, which also could be based on 

pain and suffering, which is specifically what the Court, to some extent, found in People 

v. Smith and did exactly that type of calculation.” Defense counsel said his “point is that 

that’s -- that’s a completely different and unrelated way of coming up [with] the 

$150,000 figure.” 

Following additional colloquy between the trial court and counsel, the trial court 

ruled as follows: “Well, the Court in Smith, based on the information that was presented 

regarding the victim, who was an adult at the time that the sentencing took place, made 

the [following] determination with respect to all of the factors in that case, which was a 

[section 288] case. That the victim has been abused over a 15-year period from age 8 to 

23, and the Court multiplied the 15 years times [$]50,000 a year in just noneconomic 

damages for psychological harm but didn’t include the specifics with regard[] to what 

future therapy might be, et cetera.

“The defendant had objected on several grounds including the right that he 

believed he had to a jury trial, equal protection, et cetera.

“Both of those arguments had no weight with the Court, and the defendant had 

argued specifically that the award of [$]750,000 did not meet the requirements applied to 

an award of economic damages; and the award was based on the victim’s suffering 

during years after the crimes were committed. The Court found that neither argument 

was convincing.

“The standard for awarding economic damages, which, by their nature are more 

definite, cannot be used to challenge an award for noneconomic damages.
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“The Court found that the victim’s pain and suffering lasted well beyond her 

childhood, and the Court, in going through the standard for fixing the noneconomic 

damages, looked to the civil jury instruction because that’s where you see noneconomic 

damages for the most part being addressed. And [it] specifically quoted CACI 3905A 

stating that ‘no fix[ed] standard exists for deciding the amount of damages. You must 

use your judgment to decide a reasonable amount on the evidence and your common 

sense.’

“And the Court found that the jury, of course, doesn’t make the determination in a 

criminal case, but [it] did adopt that standard of review. And [it] will -- [it] did affirm the 

noneconomic damages award that didn’t shock the conscience or suggest passion, 

prejudice or corruption in its issuance and went on and on and on.

“The bottom line is the statutory authority along with the cases that have been 

cited certainly do support an award in this type of situation for a [section 288.7 case]. 

The therapist had testified that you were talking about a scenario of $120 per hour right 

now, which obviously, that, at some point, can go up; and it’s impossible for the Court on 

that end. That noneconomic end as far as future therapy to make a definite award.

“When [the prosecutor] talks about 26 times a year being every other week and 

perhaps for however many years, it’s undetermined. It also could be once a week, once a 

month, but the Court is left with little guidance with regard to what something like that 

could be; and there has to be, based on the information presented, some sort of reasonable 

determination but, as was seen in the Smith case, the victimization of the defendant from 

the time she was a child and then after it stopped when she was an adult, went on and on; 

and I think the Court -- the trial Court, as upheld by the Court of Appeals [sic], came to 

the right determination.

“In light of the circumstances that the therapist testified to, in light of the 

information provided in the probation report regarding the nature of the abuse, the victim 

easily could be in therapy once a week at $120 an hour.
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“The Court does, in fact, note that for psychological services in this area, including 

but not limited to an hourly rate for those [who] provide services to the court for [some] 

issues, usually [is] and can be more than that anyway. It certainly could be less 

depending on the circumstances, but I don’t think it’s in any way, shape or form 

unreasonable to think that the victim in this case wouldn’t be in therapy for, you know, 

literally the rest of her life. 

“And based on this information that’s presented, if she were -- and, you know, I 

don’t have actuarial tables on how long people will live. But if you were in a scenario 

where things remain static just on a mathematical basis, and it was $120 an hour every 

other week for a certain number of years and, let’s say, just off the top, the victim lived to 

be -- to go on 50 years, that’s [$]156,000 right there. There is more than enough 

mathematically to support the $150,000 on an ongoing therapy basis alone, because 

without a doubt the $120 will go up. Without a doubt, to some extent, depending on the 

circumstances, the need for therapy may go down on a weekly or monthly basis, it may 

go up but that is the conundrum the Court faces.

“On top of that, in light of the horrific circumstances of the case and, in many 

ways similar to those facts in Smith regarding how the defendant came into the victim’s 

mother’s life, et cetera, the [$]50,000 times three that [the prosecutor], for the three years 

of abuse, had presented also supports an award of [$]150,000. To be able to put a 

monetary figure on what the victim went through is very difficult but, certainly, if you 

look at -- as the Smith Court did, you look to the civil instruction and you look at the civil 

awards that people have been given as the Smith Court did for circumstances such as this. 

Those go into the millions.

“So $150,000 is not at all unreasonable. It will be ordered, and it will be on both 

of those bases with respect to ongoing therapy and pain, suffering, et cetera as -- and 

emotional distress as is allowed for under Civil Code [section] 1431.2[, subdivision] 

(b)(2), the Smith case and Penal Code Section 1202.4[, subdivision] (f)(3)(F).”
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DISCUSSION

I

Defendant Did Not Have The Right To A Jury Trial

Defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury trial to 

determine the amount of victim restitution. He believes Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 

530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435] and its progeny, including Southern Union Co. v. United 

States (2012) 567 U.S. 343 [183 L.Ed.2d 318], establish a federal constitutional right to a 

jury trial to make findings of fact for determining victim restitution. Alternatively, 

“accepting characterization of victim restitution as a civil remedy rather than a form of 

punishment,” defendant asserts the trial court violated his right to a jury trial under article 

I, section 16 of the California Constitution. We find no merit in defendant’s arguments.

First, defendant did not request a jury trial, as he argues on appeal. It is clear from 

the context and discussion in the portion of the record upon which defendant relies that 

the trial court explained the defendant in Smith had requested a jury trial as to the victim 

restitution in that matter, and that defendant’s request was denied.

Second, accepting but not deciding defendant may raise the issue for the first time 

on appeal, we find no merit in his argument that he has a jury trial right under the United 

States Constitution. As defendant notes, a slew of California and federal cases have 

considered and rejected the argument. Those decisions have made clear the primary 

purpose of victim restitution is not punishment but instead compensation to victims of 

crime. (See, e.g., People v. Pangan (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574, 584-586; People v. 

Wasbotten (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 306, 308-309; United States v. Wolfe (7th Cir. 2012) 

701 F.3d 1206, 1215-1218.) Defendant’s argument, as presented, does not convince us 

otherwise.

Third, again accepting but not deciding defendant may raise the issue for the first 

time on appeal, we find no merit in defendant’s assertion he has a jury trial right under 

the California Constitution. This court rejected this very argument in Smith. (People v. 
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Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 433-434.) This court explained “[t]he restitution 

hearing, whether for economic or noneconomic damages, is a criminal sentencing 

hearing, not a civil trial.” (Id. at p. 434.) Defendant not only fails to identify and 

recognize the ruling in Smith in his opening brief, but also fails to present any credible 

argument warranting reconsideration of that opinion.

In sum, we conclude defendant did not have the right to a jury trial as to victim 

restitution.

II

The Trial Court Did Not Err In Awarding $150,000 In Victim Restitution

Defendant argues the victim restitution award must be vacated because: (1) the 

trial court failed to specify the losses to which the order pertained, as required under 

section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3); and (2) the order lacked an adequate factual basis. The 

People argue the restitution award specified the amount was for the victim’s 

noneconomic losses and the record provides a rational basis for the award. 

Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) provides, “[t]o the extent possible, the 

restitution order shall be prepared by the sentencing court, shall identify each victim and 

each loss to which it pertains, and shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully 

reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as a result 

of the defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, [several specified 

losses].” Such specified losses include mental health counseling expenses and 

noneconomic losses, including psychological harm, in cases such as this. (Id., 

subd. (f)(3)(C) & (F).)

We disagree with the People that the trial court’s victim restitution order was 

based on noneconomic damages alone. The trial court expressly stated the order was 

based on both bases presented by the prosecution, i.e., ongoing therapy and psychological 

harm. Given the trial court’s express statement in that regard, we further disagree with 
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defendant’s argument the trial court “failed to specify to which losses the restitution 

award pertained.” (Bolding and capitalization omitted.) 

Defendant also argues the restitution award failed to provide “a breakdown” for 

“the cost of future therapy and awards for ongoing pain and suffering past [sic] emotional 

distress.” To the extent defendant attempts to argue the trial court had to attribute a 

specific monetary value to each loss and failed to do so, we decline to address the cursory 

argument. Defendant made no such argument in the trial court and thus forfeited the 

argument on appeal. (See People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594, 597-599.) 

Indeed, any such argument is not a legal error that can be resolved without reference to 

the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court. (Id. at p. 594.)

We further find no merit in defendant’s foundational challenge to the restitution 

award. “A victim’s restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.” (People v. 

Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 500.) “We review a restitution order for abuse of 

discretion.” (Id. at p. 498.) “ ‘When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount 

of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the 

reviewing court.’ ” (Id. at p. 499.) 

Defendant argues the award lacked an adequate factual basis because: (1) beyond 

the ascertainable costs for past counseling expenses, the award was “based on neither 

facts nor a rational method of calculation”; (2) “the trial court needed more evidence than 

a second hand account from [the victim’s] therapist to evaluate how [defendant’s] 

conduct had impacted her life”; and (3) the trial court erroneously “believed People v. 

Smith had promulgated an amount that was a presumptively correct award for 

noneconomic damages in child sexual abuse cases.” 

We simply find no basis for concluding the trial court abused its discretion. The 

trial court was deliberate, specific, and very well apprised of the legal and factual 

foundations for making the award. Indeed, the trial court’s analysis was exceptional.
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Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the trial court did not rely solely upon the 

victim’s therapist’s testimony in determining the amount of victim restitution. The trial 

court explained it considered the therapist’s testimony and “the information provided in 

the probation report regarding the nature of the abuse.” Defendant does not challenge the 

trial court’s reliance on the probation report and, as explained ante, the trial court was 

entitled to do so. Nor did the defendant object on any such grounds in the trial court. 

The trial court further stated, “the horrific circumstances of the case [which] in 

many ways [resemble] those facts in Smith regarding how the defendant came into the 

victim’s mother’s life . . . support[] an award of [$]150,000.” In Smith, this court 

considered whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the victim in that case 

$3,265 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages. (People v. Smith, 

supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 430-433.) In discussing the noneconomic damages, this 

court explained we will affirm a noneconomic damages award “that does not, at first 

blush, shock the conscience or suggest passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the 

trial court.” (Id. at p. 436.) 

This court found $750,000 in noneconomic damages for sexual abuse extending 

over a period of 15 years did not shock the conscience (i.e., $50,000 per year). (People v. 

Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 436.) Defendant does not argue the trial court abused 

its discretion in analogizing the facts in this case to the facts in Smith. Nor do we find 

any reason to believe the trial court erroneously believed Smith promulgated a 

presumptive noneconomic award in child sexual abuse cases, as defendant asserts. The 

trial court was familiar with the facts in Smith and believed those facts to be like the facts 

here. The trial court’s decision was detailed and well-reasoned.

Defendant further cites no legal authority, nor are we aware of any, requiring a 

trial court to receive the victim’s testimony in determining victim restitution. Indeed, the 

law is to the contrary. (People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, 754 [“A sentencing 

judge ‘may, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
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consider responsible unsworn or “out-of-court” information relative to the circumstances 

of the crime and to the convicted person’s life and characteristics’ ”].)

In sum, defendant has failed to present any meritorious argument the trial court 

erred or abused its discretion in awarding the victim $150,000 in restitution.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/s/ 

Robie, J.

We concur:

/s/ 

Blease, Acting P. J.

/s/ 

Renner, J.