Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 222 / Friday, November 18, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 69893 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for the Raytheon A36 

airplane modified by Garmin AT, Inc. to 

add the G1000 EFIS system. 

1. Protection of Electrical and 

Electronic Systems from High Intensity 

Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each system 

that performs critical functions must be 

designed and installed to ensure that the 

operations, and operational capabilities 

of these systems to perform critical 

functions, are not adversely affected 

when the airplane is exposed to high 

intensity radiated electromagnetic fields 

external to the airplane. 

2. For the purpose of these special 

conditions, the following definition 

applies: 

Critical Functions: Functions whose 

failure would contribute to, or cause, a 

failure condition that would prevent the 

continued safe flight and landing of the 

airplane. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on 

November 7, 2005. 

William J. Timberlake, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 05–22917 Filed 11–17–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 23 

[Docket No. CE233, Special Condition 23–

173–SC] 

Special Conditions; Garmin AT, Inc.; 

EFIS on the Raytheon Model B58; 

Protection of Systems for High 

Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued to Garmin AT, Inc., 2345 Turner 

Rd., SE., Salem, Oregon 97302, for a 

Supplemental Type Certificate for the 

Raytheon Model B58. The airplane will 

have novel and unusual design features 

when compared to the state of 

technology envisaged in the applicable 

airworthiness standards. These novel 

and unusual design features include the 

installation of an electronic flight 

instrument system (EFIS) display, 

Model G–1000, manufactured by 

Garmin International Inc., for which the 

applicable regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate airworthiness 

standards for the protection of these 

systems from the effects of high 

intensity radiated fields (HIRF). These 

special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

the airworthiness standards applicable 

to these airplanes. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is November 3, 2005. 

Comments must be received on or 

before December 19, 2005. 

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed 

in duplicate to: Federal Aviation 

Administration, Regional Counsel, 

ACE–7, Attention: Rules Docket Clerk, 

Docket No. CE233, Room 506, 901 

Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. All 

comments must be marked: Docket No. 

CE233. Comments may be inspected in 

the Rules Docket weekdays, except 

Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wes 

Ryan, Aerospace Engineer, Standards 

Office (ACE–110), Small Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification 

Service, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 901 Locust, Room 301, 

Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone 

(816) 329–4127. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA 

has determined that notice and 

opportunity for prior public comment 

hereon are impracticable because these 

procedures would significantly delay 

issuance of the approval design and 

thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In 

addition, the substance of these special 

conditions has been subject to the 

public comment process in several prior 

instances with no substantive comments 

received. The FAA, therefore, finds that 

good cause exists for making these 

special conditions effective upon 

issuance. 

Comments Invited 

Interested persons are invited to 

submit such written data, views, or 

arguments, as they may desire. 

Communications should identify the 

regulatory docket or notice number and 

be submitted in duplicate to the address 

specified above. All communications 

received on or before the closing date 

for comments will be considered by the 

Administrator. The special conditions 

may be changed in light of the 

comments received. All comments 

received will be available in the Rules 

Docket for examination by interested 

persons, both before and after the 

closing date for comments. A report 

summarizing each substantive public 

contact with FAA personnel concerning 

this rulemaking will be filed in the 

docket. Commenters wishing the FAA to 

acknowledge receipt of their comments 

submitted in response to this notice 

must include a self-addressed, stamped 

postcard on which the following 

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to 

Docket No. CE233.’’ The postcard will 

be date stamped and returned to the 

commenter. 

Background 

On March 8, 2004, Garmin AT, Inc., 

2345 Turner Rd., SE., Salem, Oregon 

97302, made an application to the FAA 

for a new Supplemental Type Certificate 

for the Raytheon Model 58. The 

Raytheon Model 58 is currently 

approved under TC No. 3A16. The 

proposed modification incorporates a 

novel or unusual design feature, such as 

digital avionics consisting of an EFIS 

that is vulnerable to HIRF external to 

the airplane. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of 14 CFR part 

21, § 21.101, Garmin AT, Inc. must 

show that the Raytheon Model 58 meets 

its original certification basis, as listed 

on Type Data Sheet 3A16, the additional 

certification requirements added for the 

G1000 system, exemptions, if any; and 

the special conditions adopted by this 

rulemaking action. The additional 

certification requirements for the G1000 

system include § 23.1301, § 23.1309, 

§ 23.1311, § 23.1322, § 23.1353 and 

other rules at the amendment 

appropriate for the date of application. 

Further details of the certification basis 

for the installation of the G1000 EFIS 

are available on request. 

Discussion 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness standards do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards because of novel or 

unusual design features of an airplane, 

special conditions are prescribed under 

the provisions of § 21.16. 

Special conditions, as appropriate, as 

defined in § 11.19, are issued in 

accordance with § 11.38 after public 

notice and become part of the type 

certification basis in accordance with 

§ 21.101. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the applicant apply 

for a supplemental type certificate to 

modify any other model already 

included on the same type certificate to 

incorporate the same novel or unusual 

design feature, the special conditions 

would also apply to the other model 

under the provisions of § 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

Garmin AT, Inc. plans to incorporate 

certain novel and unusual design 

features into the Raytheon Model 58 for 

69894 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 222 / Friday, November 18, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

which the airworthiness standards do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for protection from the 

effects of HIRF. These features include 

EFIS, which are susceptible to the HIRF 

environment, that were not envisaged 

by the existing regulations for this type 

of airplane. 

Protection of Systems from High 

Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF): Recent 

advances in technology have given rise 

to the application in aircraft designs of 

advanced electrical and electronic 

systems that perform functions required 

for continued safe flight and landing. 

Due to the use of sensitive solid-state 

advanced components in analog and 

digital electronics circuits, these 

advanced systems are readily responsive 

to the transient effects of induced 

electrical current and voltage caused by 

the HIRF. The HIRF can degrade 

electronic systems performance by 

damaging components or upsetting 

system functions. 

Furthermore, the HIRF environment 

has undergone a transformation that was 

not foreseen when the current 

requirements were developed. Higher 

energy levels are radiated from 

transmitters that are used for radar, 

radio, and television. Also, the number 

of transmitters has increased 

significantly. There is also uncertainty 

concerning the effectiveness of airframe 

shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, 

coupling to cockpit-installed equipment 

through the cockpit window apertures is 

undefined. 

The combined effect of the 

technological advances in airplane 

design and the changing environment 

has resulted in an increased level of 

vulnerability of electrical and electronic 

systems required for the continued safe 

flight and landing of the airplane. 

Effective measures against the effects of 

exposure to HIRF must be provided by 

the design and installation of these 

systems. The accepted maximum energy 

levels in which civilian airplane system 

installations must be capable of 

operating safely are based on surveys 

and analysis of existing radio frequency 

emitters. These special conditions 

require that the airplane be evaluated 

under these energy levels for the 

protection of the electronic system and 

its associated wiring harness. These 

external threat levels, which are lower 

than previous required values, are 

believed to represent the worst case to 

which an airplane would be exposed in 

the operating environment. 

These special conditions require 

qualification of systems that perform 

critical functions, as installed in aircraft, 

to the defined HIRF environment in 

paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed 

value using laboratory tests, in 

paragraph 2, as follows: 

(1) The applicant may demonstrate 

that the operation and operational 

capability of the installed electrical and 

electronic systems that perform critical 

functions are not adversely affected 

when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF 

environment defined below: 

Frequency 

Field strength 

(volts per meter) 

Peak Average 

10 kHz–100 kHz ........... 50 50 

100 kHz–500 kHz ......... 50 50 

500 kHz–2 MHz ............ 50 50 

2 MHz–30 MHz ............. 100 100 

30 MHz–70 MHz ........... 50 50 

70 MHz–100 MHz ......... 50 50 

100 MHz–200 MHz ....... 100 100 

200 MHz–400 MHz ....... 100 100 

400 MHz–700 MHz ....... 700 50 

700 MHz–1 GHz ........... 700 100 

1 GHz–2 GHz ............... 2000 200 

2 GHz–4 GHz ............... 3000 200 

4 GHz–6 GHz ............... 3000 200 

6 GHz–8 GHz ............... 1000 200 

8 GHz–12 GHz ............. 3000 300 

12 GHz–18 GHz ........... 2000 200 

18 GHz–40 GHz ........... 600 200 

The field strengths are expressed in terms 

of peak root-mean-square (rms) values. 

or, 

(2) The applicant may demonstrate by 

a system test and analysis that the 

electrical and electronic systems that 

perform critical functions can withstand 

a minimum threat of 100 volts per 

meter, electrical field strength, from 10 

kHz to 18 GHz. When using this test to 

show compliance with the HIRF 

requirements, no credit is given for 

signal attenuation due to installation. 

A preliminary hazard analysis must 

be performed by the applicant for 

approval by the FAA to identify either 

electrical or electronic systems that 

perform critical functions. The term 

‘‘critical’’ means those functions, whose 

failure would contribute to, or cause, a 

failure condition that would prevent the 

continued safe flight and landing of the 

airplane. The systems identified by the 

hazard analysis that perform critical 

functions are candidates for the 

application of HIRF requirements. A 

system may perform both critical and 

non-critical functions. Primary 

electronic flight display systems, and 

their associated components, perform 

critical functions such as attitude, 

altitude, and airspeed indication. The 

HIRF requirements apply only to critical 

functions. 

Compliance with HIRF requirements 

may be demonstrated by tests, analysis, 

models, similarity with existing 

systems, or any combination of these. 

Service experience alone is not 

acceptable since normal flight 

operations may not include an exposure 

to the HIRF environment. Reliance on a 

system with similar design features for 

redundancy as a means of protection 

against the effects of external HIRF is 

generally insufficient since all elements 

of a redundant system are likely to be 

exposed to the fields concurrently. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the 

Raytheon Model 58. Should Garmin AT, 

Inc. apply at a later date for a 

supplemental type certificate to modify 

any other model on the same type 

certificate to incorporate the same novel 

or unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would apply to that model as 

well under the provisions of § 21.101. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

of airplane. It is not a rule of general 

applicability and affects only the 

applicant who applied to the FAA for 

approval of these features on the 

airplane. 

The substance of these special 

conditions has been subjected to the 

notice and comment period in several 

prior instances and has been derived 

without substantive change from those 

previously issued. It is unlikely that 

prior public comment would result in a 

significant change from the substance 

contained herein. For this reason, and 

because a delay would significantly 

affect the certification of the airplane, 

which is imminent, the FAA has 

determined that prior public notice and 

comment are unnecessary and 

impracticable, and good cause exists for 

adopting these special conditions upon 

issuance. The FAA is requesting 

comments to allow interested persons to 

submit views that may not have been 

submitted in response to the prior 

opportunities for comment described 

above. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and 

symbols. 

Citation 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 

44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR 

11.38 and 11.19. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 222 / Friday, November 18, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 69895 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for the Raytheon 

Model 58 airplane modified by Garmin 

AT, Inc. to add the G1000 EFIS system. 

1. Protection of Electrical and 

Electronic Systems from High Intensity 

Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each system 

that performs critical functions must be 

designed and installed to ensure that the 

operations, and operational capabilities 

of these systems to perform critical 

functions, are not adversely affected 

when the airplane is exposed to high 

intensity radiated electromagnetic fields 

external to the airplane. 

2. For the purpose of these special 

conditions, the following definition 

applies: Critical Functions: Functions 

whose failure would contribute to, or 

cause, a failure condition that would 

prevent the continued safe flight and 

landing of the airplane. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on 

November 3, 2005. 

William J. Timberlake, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 05–22918 Filed 11–17–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2005–21951; Directorate 

Identifier 2005–CE–39–AD; Amendment 39–

14381; AD 2005–24–01] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; CENTRAIR 

101 Series Gliders 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA adopts a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

CENTRAIR 101 series gliders. This AD 

requires you to make pen and ink 

changes to the Limitations Section of 

the glider maintenance manual to 

eliminate contradictory information 

concerning the structural life limit. This 

AD results from a review by FAA of the 

Limitations Section of the CENTRAIR 

Model 101AP glider maintenance 

manual that revealed conflicting 

information concerning the structural 

life limit. We are issuing this AD to 

assure that the published life limit is 

adhered to and to prevent structural 

failure of the glider once this life limit 

is reached. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective on 

January 3, 2006. 

ADDRESSES: To get the service 

information identified in this AD, 

contact CENTRAIR, Aerodome B.P.N. 

44, 36300 Le Blanc, France; telephone: 

02.54.37.07.96; facsimile: 

02.54.37.48.64. 

To view the AD docket, go to the 

Docket Management Facility; U.S. 

Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–

001 or on the Internet at http:// 

dms.dot.gov. The docket number is 

FAA–2005–21951; Directorate Identifier 

2005–CE–39–AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Greg 

Davison, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, 

Small Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 

301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; 

telephone: (816) 329–4130; facsimile: 

(816) 329–4090. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

What events have caused this AD? A 

review by FAA of the Limitations 

Section of the CENTRAIR Model 101AP 

glider maintenance manual revealed 

conflicting information concerning the 

structural life limit. Page 5.1 of this 

manual specifies inspection criteria 

upon accumulating 3,000 hour time-inservice (TIS). However, page 5.01 of the 

manual identifies a structural life limit 

of 3,000-hour TIS. CENTRAIR has 

verified that all the 101 series gliders 

delivered to the United States have a 

3,000-hour life limit with no current 

extension. 

Cumulative fatigue damage and 

fatigue cracking damage would 

sufficiently reduce residual strength of 

the airframe and result in failure of the 

airframe. 

What is the potential impact if FAA 

took no action? If this situation is not 

corrected, the published life limit may 

not be adhered to and the structural 

integrity of the glider could be 

compromised. 

Has FAA taken any action to this 

point? We issued a proposal to amend 

part 39 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include 

an AD that would apply to all 

CENTRAIR 101 series gliders. This 

proposal was published in the Federal 

Register as a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) on August 22, 2005 

(70 FR 48918). The NPRM proposed to 

require you to make pen and ink 

changes to the Limitations Section of 

the glider maintenance manual to 

eliminate contradictory information 

concerning the structural life limit. 

Comments 

Was the public invited to comment? 

We provided the public the opportunity 

to participate in developing this AD. We 

received no comments on the proposal 

or on the determination of the cost to 

the public. 

Conclusion 

What is FAA’s final determination on 

this issue? We have carefully reviewed 

the available data and determined that 

air safety and the public interest require 

adopting the AD as proposed except for 

minor editorial corrections. We have 

determined that these minor 

corrections: 

—Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM for 

correcting the unsafe condition; and 

—Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM. 

Changes to 14 CFR Part 39—Effect on 

the AD 

How does the revision to 14 CFR part 

39 affect this AD? On July 10, 2002, the 

FAA published a new version of 14 CFR 

part 39 (67 FR 47997, July 22, 2002), 

which governs the FAA’s AD system. 

This regulation now includes material 

that relates to altered products, special 

flight permits, and alternative methods 

of compliance. This material previously 

was included in each individual AD. 

Since this material is included in 14 

CFR part 39, we will not include it in 

future AD actions. 

Costs of Compliance 

How many gliders does this AD 

impact? We estimate that this AD affects 

51 gliders in the U.S. registry. 

What is the cost impact of this AD on 

owners/operators of the affected gliders? 

We estimate the following costs to do 

this change of the maintenance manual: 

Labor cost Parts cost Total cost 

per glider 

Total cost on 

U.S. operators 

1 work hour × $65 = $65 .......................................................................................................... Not Applicable. $65 $3,315