[J-73-2016] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Appellee 

 v. 

TERRANCE WASHINGTON, 

 Appellant 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 37 EAP 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of the 

Superior Court entered on May 12, 2015 

at No. 532 EDA 2011, reversing the 

Order entered on August 6, 2008 in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 

County, Criminal Division, at Nos. CP51-0711021-1996, CP-51-CR-0711091-

1996, CP-51-CR-0711141-1996, CP-51-

CR-1009712-1996, CP-51-CR1107481-1997, CP-51-CR-1107621-

1997, CP-51-CR-1107651-1997 and 

CP-51-CR-1107671-1997 

SUBMITTED: April 7, 2016 

CONCURRING OPINION 

JUSTICE TODD DECIDED: July 19, 2016

I join the Majority Opinion, with the exception of footnote 10, which in my view 

may unnecessarily serve to relax courts’ obligation to consider jurisprudential bases for 

resolution of appeals. Therein, the majority determines that, because this issue is 

“important” and will affect “a large range of cases,” and was “allowed discretely to 

address the Alleyne retroactivity issue,” the Court need not address the collateral 

jurisprudential matters raised by the Commonwealth, “such as [the] abstractness of the 

Alleyne rule relative to the substantial punishment which will be imposed on Appellant in 

all events.” Majority Opinion at 13, n.10. 

Specifically, the Commonwealth offers that Appellant’s claim is “potentially moot,” 

and that any determination regarding sentencing will have “no practical impact on his 
[J-73-2016] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] - 2 

aggregate sentence.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 8. I cannot join the majority’s 

determination that these potential impediments need not be addressed. While there 

may be exceptional circumstances in which such jurisprudential concerns might give 

way to addressing a legal issue of vital and immediate importance, I am concerned that 

the bench and bar might interpret the majority’s approach to arguments regarding such 

jurisprudential matters collateral to the primary legal question as a dilution of this Court’s 

otherwise fairly strict adherence to the need to resolve threshold jurisprudential matters. 

See, e.g., Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 916-17 (Pa. 2013); 

Markham v. Wolfe, 136 A.3d 134, 147 n.2 (Pa. 2016) (Dougherty, J., concurring) 

(“justiciability questions (including political question limitations, standing, ripeness, and 

mootness) are threshold matters generally to be resolved before proceeding to the 

merits.”). Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, while in my view our Court is not 

necessarily “obliged” to address these matters in all instances, it should do so on most 

occasions, especially when there is a risk we will be issuing a purely advisory opinion. 

Rather than endorse a relaxation of a court’s general obligation to consider these 

jurisprudential concerns, I would simply reject the Commonwealth’s jurisprudential 

assertions on their merits. Specifically, the Commonwealth, after conceding that 

jurisdiction properly lies for this appeal in our Court, maintains that, because the 

Superior Court reversed the PCRA court’s order denying relief, and remanded for an 

evidentiary hearing on two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, if further 

proceedings result in a new trial, the sentencing issue Appellant seeks to raise in our 

Court would be moot. According to the Commonwealth, if Appellant was granted a new 

trial, on retrial, he would be either acquitted or resentenced under current law. Under 

the Commonwealth’s scenario, the sentencing issue before us would be moot; however, 

if Appellant is not granted relief on his ineffectiveness claims, and no new trial is 
[J-73-2016] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] - 3 

granted, the sentencing question would remain viable. Accordingly, as the issue before 

our Court is not necessarily moot, that is a sufficient basis, in my view, to reject the 

Commonwealth’s entreaty to dismiss this case as improvidently granted. 

Further, the Commonwealth argues that we should dismiss this appeal because 

the five-year mandatory minimum sentencing provision at issue before our Court had no 

practical effect on the aggregate penalty. The Commonwealth explains, inter alia, that 

Appellant’s 35 to 70 year sentence resulted from the imposition of consecutive terms for 

7 of his 21 robbery counts, and that the sentencing court imposed a discretionary 

aggregate minimum sentence of 35 years. Thus, according to the Commonwealth, the 

impact of the mandatory minimum statute at issue herein on the final sentence was 

“effectively nonexistent,” and there is little likelihood the aggregate sentence will change 

if we were to grant Appellant relief and remand for resentencing. Commonwealth’s Brief 

at 9. 

Yet, the Commonwealth’s proffer — that the sentencing court “could, and plainly 

would, have imposed the same sentence if the mandatory provision had never existed” 

— is not necessarily true. Ultimately, sentencing is an integrated scheme. See 

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 67 A.3d 736, 745 n.11 (Pa. 2013) (rejecting request to strike 

invalid probation condition from sentence, as striking of condition was part of “landscape 

of options available to the court, and may affect the court’s sentencing scheme”); 

Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 517 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. 1986) (“When a defendant 

challenges one of several interdependent sentences, he, in effect, challenges the entire 

sentencing plan.”). While the Commonwealth’s assertion that a decision in favor of 

Appellant would not affect Appellant’s ultimate sentence is likely true, it is not a 

certainty, and, accordingly, does not mandate our dismissing this appeal on that basis. 
[J-73-2016] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] - 4 

Accordingly, for the above-offered reasons, I join the Majority Opinion with the 

exception of footnote 10. 

Justice Donohue joins this concurring opinion.