[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Gil-Llamas v. Hardin , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-1508.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2021-O HIO -1508
T HE S TATE EX REL
. G IL -L LAMAS ET AL
. v . H ARDIN , P RESIDENT , ET AL
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Gil-Llamas v. Hardin , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-1508.] Elections—Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel Columbus City Council to submit to city electors a proposed municipal ordinance on the May 4, 2021 primary-election ballot— Council abused its discretion in finding relators’ initiative petition insu fficient—Although relators are not entitled to writ ordering council to place proposed ordinance on the May 4 ballot, relators are entitled to limited writ ordering council to find initiative petition sufficient and to proceed with process for an initiated ordinance under Columbus City Char ter—Limited writ granted. (No. 2020-1466—Submitted Marc h 30, 2021—Decided April 29, 2021. )
I N M ANDAMUS

.

__________________ F ISCHER , J.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 {¶ 1} Relators, Irene Gil-Llamas, Christina L. Gonzaga, Tyrone Spence , Udell Hollins, and ProEnergy Ohio, L.L.C., seek a writ of manda mus to compel respondents, the members of the Columbus City Council—Columbus City Council President Shannon G. Hardin, President Pro Tempore Elizabeth Br own, and council members Rob Dorans, Mitchell J. B rown, Shayla Favor, Emmanuel V . Remy, and Priscilla R. Tyson (collectivel y, “the council”)—to submit to c ity of Columbus electors a proposed municipal-ordinance initiative on the May 4 , 2021 primaryelection ballot. The council declined to submit the initiative to the electors because
it found relators’ initiative petition deficient in form. {¶ 2} We hold that relators have demons trated by clear and convincing evidence that the council abused its discretion in finding rela tors’ initiative petition insufficient. Although relators are not entitled to the full r elief that they seek in mandamus—a writ ordering the counc il to place the proposed ordi nance on the May 4, 2021 primary-election ballot—we hol d that relators are entit led to a limited writ of mandamus ordering the council to find the petition sufficien t and to proceed with the process for an initiated or dinance under Columbus City Char ter Section 43-1 et

seq. I. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Initiative Pr ocess Under the Columbus City Charter {¶ 3} Under the home-rule powers granted to municipalities by the Ohi o Constitution, a municipality’s charter may contain provisions t hat govern the initiative and referendum process for local ordinances. State ex rel. Harris v.
Rubino , 155 Ohio St.3d 123, 2018-Ohio-3609, 119 N.E.3d 1238, ¶ 15-16; see generally Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Sections 3 and 7. The Colum bus City
Charter does so. See Charter Sections 42 through 42-15 and 43 through 43-4. {¶ 4} When an initiative petition proposing a Columbus ordinance is f iled with the city, the cit y attorney must advi se the city council o n the legal sufficiency of the petition. Id. at Section 42-9. Further, the city clerk must forward the peti tionJanuary Term, 2021

3 to the board of elections and th e board must determine the numb er of valid signatures on the petition. Id. Upon receipt of a report regarding the number of valid signatures on the petition, the council must determine th e sufficiency of the petition. Id. at Section 43-1. If the counc il finds the petition sufficient , it must vote within 30 days to either adopt the proposed ordinance or submit it to a vote of the city’s electors. Id. B. Relators’ Proposed Ordinance {¶ 5} Gil-Llamas, Gonzaga, Spence, and Hollins are members of a committee formed by ProEnergy Ohio, L.L.C., whose purpose is to gather signatures for an initiative petition proposing a Columbus ordi nance and to support the ordinance’s passage. The p roposed ordinance would require the city to establish four separate funds totaling $87 million, including (1) a $10 m illion “Energy Conservation and Energy Efficiency Fund,” (2) a $10 million “Cl ean Energy Education and Training Fund,” (3) a $10 million “Minority Busin ess Enterprise Clean Energy Development Fund,” and (4) a $57 million “Columbus Clean Energy Partnership Fund.” {¶ 6} On October 16, 2020, relators filed their initiative petition w ith the city clerk under Columbus City Charter Section 42-7. As requir ed by Charter Section 42-9, the city clerk forwarded a copy of the petition t o the city attorney and the Franklin County Board of El ections. The board certified th e petition as containing a sufficient number of valid signatures for placemen t on the ballot. The city attorney, however, advised the council that the petition w as deficient under Charter Section 42-2(e), because it did not include a title tha t sufficiently described the content of the proposed ordinance. Consistent with the cit y attorney’s advisement, the c ouncil found that relat ors’ initiative petitio n failed to meet the mandatory requirements establishe d in the Columbus City Charter and passed an ordinance stating that relators’ initiative would not be submit ted to the Columbus
electors.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 7} Relators commenced this action on December 4, 2020, seeking a w rit of mandamus to compel the counc il to submit the proposed ordina nce to the electors on the May 4, 2021 primary-election ballot. This court denied the council’s motion to dismiss, granted an alternative writ, and set a schedule for the submission of evidence and merit briefs. 161 Ohio St.3d 1424, 2021-Ohio-320, 162 N.E.3d 803. The parties filed evidence and merit briefs. Relators also fil ed “supplemental evidence” and “amended evidence” beyond the deadline for the su bmission of
evidence and without leave of c ourt. Relators filed objections to the council’s evidence, and the council filed a motion to strike relators’ su pplemental evidence.
Relators also file d a motion to expedite this matter.
II. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES {¶ 8} Before we address the merits of this case, we resolve several evidentiary issues that have arisen during the course of this l itigation. For the reasons stated below, we overrule relators’ objections to the c ouncil’s evidence, grant the council’s motion to str ike relators’ supplemental evi dence, and sua sponte
strike relators’ amended evidence. A. Relators’ Objections t o the Council’s Evidence {¶ 9} Relators object on relevance grounds to two pieces of evidence submitted by the council: (1) Exhibit A-5, which is a copy of a n envelope postmarked November 25, 2020, and addressed to Gonzaga at the C olumbus address listed on the precirculated copy of relators’ initiativ e petition, and which is marked “return to sender” and has a forwarding address in Houst on, Texas, and (2) Exhibit B, which is a certified copy of a Franklin County indic tment of “John A. Clark Jr. AKA John Alexander Clarke Jr.” for felony election fa lsification and felony tampering with records . We overrule relators’ objection s to that evidence. {¶ 10} Relators argue that Exhibit A- 5, the copy of the envelope submi tted by the council, is not relevant to whether Gonzaga was a Columb us elector when the initiative petition was circulated for signatures, because the mailing of theJanuary Term, 2021

5 envelope occurred after the initiative petition was filed. Rel ators also argue that Exhibit A-5 is “a transparent attempt to accuse the Relators of lying that Ms. Gonzaga was a resident and elector of the City of Columbus,” an d is inadmissible under Evid.R. 403(A) because its p robative value is substantial ly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice an d confusion of the issues. Th e council argues that Exhibit A-5 is directly relevant to whether Gonzaga was a quali fied elector of
Columbus. {¶ 11} Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determinati on of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence .” (Emphasis added.) Evid.R. 401. We agree w ith the council that the envel ope exhibit is
relevant in this matter and is thus admissible under Evid.R. 40 2 (relevant evidence is generally admissible) and that its probative value outweighs any alleged undue prejudice and does not confuse t he issues, Evid.R. 403(A). The refore, we overrule relators’ objections to the ad mission of the council’s Exhibit A-5. {¶ 12} Relators also argue that the c ouncil’s Exhibit B, the certified copy of the indictment, is inadmissible because it is irrelevant and is unduly prejudicial and
confuses the issues before this court. The council argues that this evidence is relevant to its argument that the proposed ordi nance’s title is misleading. It is true that Exhibit B has little relevance regarding whether the propo sed ordinance’s title is misleading or is otherwise invalid under Columbus City Chart er Section 42-2(e). But this court considers only relevant, material, and competent evidence. See State v. Bays , 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 28-29, 716 N.E.2d 1126 (1999) (the court is presumed to have considered only relevant, material, and competent evide nce; the court is presumed to have been unaffected by allegedly inflammatory evid ence). Therefore, we overrule relators’ objecti on to the council’s Exhibit B.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 B. The Council’s Moti on to Strike Relators ’ Supplemental Evide nce {¶ 13} On March 2, 2021, relators filed supplemental evidence—an affidavit of relator Gonzaga—t o rebut any assertion that Gonzag a was not a qualified elector of Columbus, Oh io. The council moved to stri ke that evidence as untimely because it was filed after this court’s deadline for s ubmitting evidence. Relators oppose the council’s motion to strike the evidence, ar guing that they are entitled to present rebuttal evidence under this court’s decisi on in Phung v. Waste Mgt. Inc ., 71 Ohio St.3d 408, 410-411, 644 N.E.2d 286 (1994), and that in any event, S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13 allows them to amend their evidence. Thus, relators argue that their supplemental eviden ce was timely filed. Relators ar e wrong. {¶ 14} This court’s decision in Phung is inapposite. In Phung , we held that
in the context of a trial , a party has “an unconditional right” to present rebuttal evidence in response to evidence submitted in the opposing part y’s case-in-chief.
Id. at 411. But this is an extraordi nary-writ proceeding in which this court ordered the parties to submit “any evidence they intend[ed] to present” by a deadline, 161 Ohio St.3d 1424, 2021-Ohio-320, 162 N.E.3d 803. And relators’ reliance on S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(A) is misplaced. Although that rule allows a party to “make corrections or additions to a pr eviously filed document,” divis ion (B) of the rule provides that the revised docum ent “shall be filed within the t ime permitted by the[] rules,” S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(B). Because we set a deadline for t he submission of evidence under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05, which relators failed to mee t, relators’ submission of its supplemental evidence was untimely. Finally, relators failed to seek leave of this court to file the supplemental evidence. Ac cordingly, we grant the council’s motion to strike relators’ supplemental evidence.
C. We Strike Relators’ U ntimely Amended Evidence {¶ 15} Relators filed their amended evidence to make corrections and a dd to their earlier filed evidence. Relators purported to file th eir amended evidence under S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(A), declar ing that the submission “rela t[es] back” to theirJanuary Term, 2021

7 original evidence filing. But relators are mistaken, as there is no provision in S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(A) allowing evidence to relate back to earlie r filed evidence.
Because relators’ submission of the amended evidence was untime ly, they had to first seek leave of this court before they submitted their amen ded evidence. Because they did not do so, we will not consider the amendments to relators’ evidence submitted on March 11, 2021. D. Relators’ Argument that Certa in Facts in Their Complaint Ar e Uncontroverted {¶ 16} Relators also argue that even in the absence of their supplemen tal and amended evidence, Gonzaga’s status as a qualified elector o f Columbus and the content of the signed version of their initiative petition filed with the city on October 16, 2020, are still uncontroverted. Specifically, rela tors argue that because
the council did not file an answer to relators’ complaint withi n 14 days after this court denied the council’s motion to dismiss the complaint, the facts alleged by relators in their complaint s hould be deemed admitted under Civ .R. 8(D). See also Civ.R. 12(A)(2)(a) (when a defe ndant files a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer to a complaint, the responsive pleading is due within 14 days a fter notice of the court’s denial of the motion). {¶ 17} In original actions filed in this court, the Rules of Civil Pro cedure supplement this court’s rules of p ractice “unless [they are] cl early inapplicable.” S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.01(A)(2)(b). In this case, Civ.R. 12(A)(2)(a) is clearly inapplicable. When we denied the council’s motion to dismiss, we granted an alternative writ and set a schedule for the presentation of evi dence and briefing under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05. The grant of an alternative writ sup ersedes the operation of Civ.R. 12(A)(2)(a). Simply put, our rules do not contemplat e an answer being filed after we grant an alternative writ. When denying a motio n to dismiss and ordering a respondent to file an answer to the complaint in an original action, this court has specified such a proce dure and not granted an alterna tive writ. See, e.g. ,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 State ex rel. Moir v. Kovack , 142 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2015-Ohio-2104, 31 N.E.3d 653; State ex rel. Schiffbauer v. Banaszak , 141 Ohio St.3d 1486, 2015-Ohio-842, 26 N.E.3d 822. Accordingly, the council’s failure to file an answer to the complaint is of no consequence here. {¶ 18} In sum, the factual allegations in relators’ complaint are not deemed admitted. The evidence properly before this court consists of relators’ evidence filed on February 16, 2021, and the council’s evidence filed on February 23. Relators’ supplemental and ame nded evidence is stricken.
III. ANALYSIS OF RELATORS’ MANDAMUS CLAIM {¶ 19} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators must establish ( 1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal du ty on the part of respondents to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate reme dy in the ordinary
course of the law. State ex rel. Oberlin Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Talarico , 106 Ohio St.3d 481, 2005-Ohio-5061, 836 N.E.2d 529, ¶ 11. Rela tors must prove those requirements by clear and convincing evidence. State ex rel. Scott v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections , 139 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-Ohio-1685, 10 N.E.3d 697, ¶ 14. {¶ 20} In order for relators to establish a clear legal right to relie f and a clear legal duty of the council to provi de it, relators must show tha t the council engaged in fraud or corruption or abused its discretion in refusing to submit the proposed ordinance for placement on the ballot. See State ex rel. Nauth v. Dirham , 161 Ohio St.3d 365, 2020-Ohio-4208, 163 N.E.3d 526, ¶ 11-13. Because re lators do not allege fraud or corruption, this court must determine whether r elators have shown
that the council abused its discretion. Id. at ¶ 13. We hold that relators have met
that burden.January Term, 2021

9 A. The Council Abused Its Discre tion in Finding Relators’ Peti tion
Insufficient 1. Absence of the Signed Petition Is Not Fatal to Relators’ Claim {¶ 21} The council argues that relato rs cannot show an entitlement to mandamus relief because the signed version of the initiative pe tition that relators filed with the city of Columbus on October 16, 2020, is not in evidence. Relators included with their complaint and evidence a copy of only the p recirculated petition. Although relators attemp ted to file with this court the signed version of the petition as Exhibit 10 to their amended evidence, as discus sed above, this court must disregard the amended evidence because it was untimely fil ed without leave of court, see 161 Ohio St.3d 1424, 2021-Ohio-320, 162 N.E.3d 803. Neverthel ess, the question of the sufficiency of the petition is still before this court. {¶ 22} Relators submitted as evidence the precirculated copy of the pe tition, which was filed with the city clerk in October 2019. The parti es do not dispute that relators also filed with the city clerk a copy of the initiativ e petition with the electors’ signatures on October 16, 2020, which was forwarded t o the city attorney for review. The city attorney reviewed the copy and reported t he alleged deficiencies in the petition to the council on November 6, 2020 . Notably, the city attorney stated: “The form and content of the part-petitions fi led on October 16, 2020 are the same as that of the pre-circulation filing * * *.” Thus, we may examine the content of the precirculated version of the petition submit ted as evidence in order to determine the sufficiency of the signed version of the petition.
2. The Council Abused Its Discretion in Determining that the Petition Is Insufficient for Failure to Comply with the Columbus City Charter’s Requirement for the Title of the Proposal {¶ 23} The council specifically rejected relators’ proposal for placem ent on the ballot for failure to comply with the title requirement for proposed ordinances under Section 42-2(e) of the Columbus City Charter. More speci fically, the councilS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 argues that the proposed ordinance’s title omits a reference to (1) the establishment of a “Minority Business Enterprise Clean Energy Development Fun d” and (2) the fact that the ordinance would delegate the city’s contracting a uthority to private parties. {¶ 24} The purpose of the title requirement is to immediately alert si gners to the nature of the proposed legislation. See State ex rel. Carrier v. Hilliard City
Council , 144 Ohio St.3d 592, 2016-Ohio-155, 45 N.E.3d 1006, ¶ 12. Whi le omitting a title altogether is a fatal defect “because it inter feres with a petition’s ability to fairly and substantially present the issue and might mislead electors,” Christy v. Summit Cty. Bd

. of Elections , 77 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 671 N.E.2d 1 (1996), the council does not argue that the proposed ordinance complete ly lacks a title. Rather, the council contends t hat the proposed ordinance’s titl e does not adequately summarize the totality of its s ubstance. The council further e mphasizes that the title requirement in Charter Section 42-2(e) is more demanding than those for municipal-ordinance-in itiative titles under R.C. 731.31. {¶ 25} Although Charter Section 42-2( e), which requires a title to “cl early and without argument describe the proposed ordinance,” controls over the general provisions regarding ordinance initiatives in the Revised Code, see R.C. 731.41, the council’s argument that re lators’ title omits required info rmation is problematic, if not unreasoned, on its face. The proposed ordinance’s title , which is more than
150 words long as it is, already sufficiently describes the substance of the proposed ordinance. The title states that the proposed ordinance would require the city auditor to transfer from the general fund (1) $10 million to an “Energy Conservation and Energy Efficiency Fund,” (2) $10 million to a “Clean Energy Education and Training Fund,” (3) $10 million for the purpose of funding a mi nority-businessdevelopment program, and (4) $57 million for the purpose of fun ding an electricitysubsidy program for Columbus residents. The title therefore de scribes the ordinance and what it would prin cipally do: provide for the exp enditure of $87January Term, 2021

11 million for specific purposes. The title more than adequately describes the substance of the proposed ordinance. {¶ 26} The omission in the title of the name of the minority-businessdevelopment fund sought to be cr eated (the “Minority Business E nterprise Clean Energy Development Fund”) does not make the title’s description of the ordinance inaccurate. Nor does the title’s lack of a specific reference to the fact that the ordinance would potentially cause funds to be transferred to pr ivate entities for expenditure render the title deficient. {¶ 27} At its core, the proposed ordinance calls for the city to alloc ate a significant amount of public funds for specific purposes relati ng to clean energy and minority-business enterprise s involving clean energy. The title states the amount of money that the ordinance would commit the city to spe nd and the purposes of the expenditures. Wh ile the mechanics of how the m oney would be spent is significant as a matter of city policy, the omission o f this detail from the title of the proposed ordinance does not make the title deficie nt under Section 42- 2(e) of the Columbus City Charter. {¶ 28} Perhaps recognizing this, the coun cil essentially argues that t he title is deficient because it does not fully capture every facet of t he proposed ordinance. But the Columbus City Charter requires a title, not a summary. See Charter Section 42-2(e) and (f). {¶ 29} Indeed, Charter Section 42-2(e) s pecifically requires a proposa l to
have a title and Charte r Section 42-2(f) expressly rejects the requirement of a summary. It is only in the event that the council finds that a n initiative petition satisfies the Charter’s require ments and submits the proposed o rdinance to the
electors that “ city council shall prescribe a brief summary of [the proposed ordinance], which shall be accu rate, shall not be misleading, a nd shall be without material omission or arguments.” (Emphasis added). Id. at Section 43-3. In contrast, a title need only “describe the proposed ordinance.” Id. at Section 42-S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 2(e). While the features of the proposed ordinance cited by th e council might be required for a summary of the ordinance, their o mission does not render its title deficient under the Columbus City Charter. {¶ 30} The council also argues that the title of the proposed ordinanc e rendered the petition misleading. But absent evidence that the title had the potential to mislead the initiative petition’s signers, the title’s failu re to capture every detail of the proposed ordinance is not a basis for invalidating the p etition. See Christy , 77 Ohio St.3d at 38, 671 N.E.2d 1; Stutzman v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Elections , 93 Ohio St.3d 511, 515, 757 N.E.2d 297 (2001). Crucially, the cou ncil presents no
such evidence here. {¶ 31} Instead, the council argues that the title “could have easily m isled signatories” because the title does not specify that the propos ed ordinance would result in a “marked departure from typical public expenditure a nd procurement practices.” That argument, t hough, overlooks the fact that the full text of the proposed ordinance was included with the part-petitions that we re circulated for signatures. {¶ 32} “Generally, inclusion of the full text of an amendment or ordin ance on a petition satisfies all constitutional and statutory requir ements * * * because the full text * * * usually fairly and substantially presents the i ssue to petition signers.” State ex rel. Hackworth v. Hughes , 97 Ohio St.3d 110, 2002-Ohio-5334, 776 N.E.2d 1050, ¶ 33. In this case, that means that relators prov ided signatories with the specific information the council complains is missing from the title. {¶ 33} Thus, while it is true that unde r the home-rule powers granted to municipalities by the Ohio Cons titution, municipalities have so me authority to enact their own procedures and requirements as to initiative pe titions, Rubino , 155 Ohio St.3d 123, 2018-Ohio-3609, 119 N.E.3d 1238, at ¶ 15-16, in this case, the council applied Secti on 42-2(e) of the Columbus City Charter un reasonably to require the title to be so detailed as to be a summary of the p roposed ordinance,January Term, 2021

13 even though the Charter does not r equire a summary. For these reasons, the council’s decision finding the petition insufficient as to its form was an abuse of
discretion. 3. The Composition of the Committee’s Me mbership Did Not Create a Deficiency
in Relators’ Initiative Petition {¶ 34} The council also argues that relators’ initiative petition is d eficient because, in their view, relator Gonzaga was not a qualified ele ctor of the city of Columbus, and Williams has passed away and “is no longer a peti tion committee member.” These argumen ts are without merit. {¶ 35} Charter Section 42-3 requires an initiative petition to “bear t he names of five qualified electors of the city of Columbus, who s hall represent the petitioners in all matters relating to such petitions and shall be known as the petition committee.” Gonzaga and Williams are two of the committee memb ers listed on the initiative petition. {¶ 36} Relying on a returned envelope submitted as evidence showing a Houston, Texas forwarding address for Gonzaga, the council cont ends that Gonzaga is no longer a qualified elector and that relators thus failed to abide by Columbus City Charter Section 42-3. However, relator Gil-Llama s has testified by affidavit that Gonzaga was a qua lified elector of Columbus when the initiative petition was circulated. The c ouncil’s evidence does not refut e this testimony. All that the returned envelope shows is that Gonzaga had a forwardi ng address in Houston, Texas on November 25, 2020, after the initiative petit ion had been filed with the city. The forwarding address does not necessarily mea n that Gonzaga was no longer a qualified elector of Columbus at that time, much le ss that she was no longer a qualified elector during the time that the initiative petition was circulated and filed. Therefore, this is not a valid reason to find relat ors’ petition insufficient. {¶ 37} The council also argues that b ecause Williams has passed away, the petition committee lacks a sufficien t number of members under t he Columbus CityS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 Charter. The filing of the petition, the cit y attorney’s issua nce of its memorandum regarding the petition, the Franklin County Board of Elections’ certification of the petition, and the city clerk’s read ing of the signature-validat ion report all predated Williams’s death. The council found the petition insufficient on the same day that Williams passed away. The evidence thus demonstrates that Will iams was a qualified elector at all times pertinent to the petition proces s. Had the council not
abused its discre tion, Williams’s death would not be an issue h ere. {¶ 38} But regardless, the council’s arguments regarding the compositi on of the committee are without mer it. The council makes a sweepi ng argument that Williams’s death caused the petition committee to have an insuf ficient number of members and that the petition was therefore invalid, but it pro vides no legal support for that argument. This court will not supply such support on its behalf. We therefore reject the council’s assertion that Williams’s death is a valid reason to find relators’ petition insufficient.
4. Relators Are Entitled to a Limited Writ of Mandamus {¶ 39} For the reasons set forth above, the council abused its discret ion in finding relators’ petition insufficient. But for a writ to iss ue, relators must demonstrate that they are entitled to the relief sought. Oberlin Citizens for Responsible Dev ., 106 Ohio St.3d 481, 2005-Ohio-5061, 836 N.E.2d 529, at ¶ 11. “[T]he relator has the burden to show the existence of a legal right and a leg al duty
that are clear.” State ex rel. Syx v. Stow City Council , 161 Ohio St.3d 201, 2020- Ohio-4393, 161 N.E.3d 639, ¶ 27. {¶ 40} Relators argue that the council was wrong to find their petitio n insufficient, and they seek a writ of mandamus “ordering [the c ouncil] to submit Relators’ proposed Columbus City Ordinance for a vote of the el ectors in the May 4, 2021 Primary Election.” But r elators cannot demonstrate a c lear legal right to have the proposed ordinance submitted to the Columbus electors at the May 4 primary election.January Term, 2021

15 {¶ 41} If the council had found relators’ initiative petition sufficie nt, Columbus City Charter Secti on 43-1 dictates what would have hap pened next:

Should the council find [an ordi nance-initiative] petition suff icient, it shall vote within thirty days to either adopt the proposed o rdinance without alteration, or by ordinanc e forthwith order and provide for the submission of such proposed ordinance in its original form to a vote of the elector s of the city.

{¶ 42} Thus, the city council’s finding that a petition is sufficient does not automatically mean that the proposed initiative goes on the bal lot. Rather, a sufficiency finding by the city c ouncil triggers a requirement that it take further action—adopting the ordinance or submitting it to the electors— within 30 days. {¶ 43} And even if the council had found relators’ petition sufficient and decided to submit it to the electors, the proposed initiative w ould not necessarily go on the May 4 primary-election ballot. If the council, by ordin ance, chooses to submit a proposed initiative to t he electors, the Charter provi des the following:

The aforesaid ordinance [submitting the proposed ordinance to the electors] shall require that such proposed ordinance be submitted at the next regular municipal election if one shall o ccur not less than sixty nor more than one-hundred-twenty days after its passage. If no such election will be held within the period he rein provided, the council shall, at its sole discretion , order and provide for the submission of such proposed ordinance to a vote of the electors of the city at either a special election within such p eriod, or at the next regular municipal election.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 (Emphasis added.) Columbus City Charter Section 43-2. Thus, e ven if the council had found relators’ petition su fficient on November 25, 2020 (i .e., the date of the ordinance finding relators’ petition insufficient), and voted within 30 days to submit the proposed ordinance to the electors, there was no “re gular municipal
election” that occurred within t he 60-to-120-day parameter mand ated in Charter
Section 43-2. See id. at Section 41(a) (defining “re gular municipal elections” as those occurring in November of odd-numbered years). Thus, unde r Charter Section 43-2, it was within the council’s “sole discretion” to either o rder a special election or submit the initiative for a vote at the next regular municip al election, which will occur on November 2, 2021. To the extent that relators seek a writ of mandamus ordering the council to submit the proposed ordinance at a spec ial election on the May 4 primary-election ballot, they are not entitled to such relief, because the calling of a special election is at the council’s sole discretion . A writ of mandamus will not issue to control the discretion of a municipality’s le gislative authority. State ex rel. Obojski v. Perciak , 113 Ohio St.3d 486, 2007-Ohio-2453, 866 N.E.2d 1070, ¶ 20. {¶ 44} But this court will not entirely foreclose relators’ request fo r relief. In addition to the specific relief sought by relators, they hav e also requested “such
other relief that this Court d eems just and proper.” Just and proper relief is a limited writ of mandamus ordering the council to proceed with relators’ initiative petition under the process set forth for initiated ordinances under Colu mbus City Charter Section 43-1 et seq. {¶ 45} This ruling is not unprecedented for this court. Indeed, this court has granted a limited writ of mandamus under similar circumstances. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Dunn v. Plain Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 159 Ohio St.3d 139, 2020- Ohio-339, 149 N.E.3d 460, ¶ 26 (g ranting a “limited writ of man damus” ordering performance of “duties required by law for the potential placem ent of the proposal” on the ballot). Because the counc il abused its discretion in f inding relators’January Term, 2021

17 initiative petition insufficient, a limited writ of mandamus re quiring the council to go forward with the process set forth in Charter Section 43-1 e t seq. is appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION {¶ 46} We hold that the council abused its discretion in finding relat ors’ initiative petition insufficient and grant relators a limited w rit of mandamus ordering the council to find th e petition sufficient and to pro ceed with the process
for an initiated ordinance under Columbus City Charter Section 43-1 et seq. And as noted above, we overrule rela tors’ objections to the council ’s evidence and grant the council’s motion to strike relators’ supplemental evidence. We sua sponte strike
relators’ amended evidence and d eny relators’ motion to expedit e as moot. Limited writ granted.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.
K ENNEDY , J., dissents, with an opinion.
B RUNNER , J., dissents.

_________________ K

ENNEDY , J., dissenting. {¶ 47} In this case, relators, Irene Gil-Llamas, Christina L. Gonzaga, Tyrone Spence, Udell Hollins, and ProEnergy Ohio, L.L.C., seek a writ of mandamus ordering respondents, C olumbus City Council President Shannon G. Hardin, President Pro Tempore E lizabeth Brown, and council memb ers Rob Dorans, Mitchell J. Brown, Shay la Favor, Emmanuel V. Remy, and Pricilla R. Tyson (collectively, “the counc il”), “to submit Relators’ propo sed Columbus City
Ordinance for a vote of the ele ctors in the May 4, 2021 Primary Election.” This is the only specific mandamus relief that relators seek. The majo rity determines that
relators cannot have that relie f. That determination should en d this case. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s judgment granting a limited writ. {¶ 48} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators must establish ( 1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal du ty on the part ofS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 respondents to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate reme dy in the ordinary
course of the law. State ex rel. Oberlin Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Talarico , 106 Ohio St.3d 481, 2005-Ohio-5061, 836 N.E.2d 529, ¶ 11. Rela tors must prove those requirements by clear and convincing evidence. State ex rel. Scott v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections , 139 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-Ohio-1685, 10 N.E.3d 697, ¶ 14. {¶ 49} Relators argue that the council was wrong to find their petitio n insufficient, and they seek a writ of mandamus “ordering [the c ouncil] to submit Relators’ proposed Columbus City Ordinance for a vote of the el ectors in the May 4, 2021 Primary Election.” But in this case, we need not reach the question whether the council erred in finding the initiative petition insufficie nt. The majority agrees that even if relators’ petition is sufficient under the Columbu s City Charter, they have not shown a clear legal right to have their petition submi tted to the Columbus electors at the May 4 primary election or a clear legal duty on the part of the council
to submit it at the election. {¶ 50} But despite that dete rmination, the majority grants relators something that they do not seek: an order instructing the counc il to find relators’ initiative petition sufficient and to follow the Columbus City Charter’s process for
the consideration of an initiated ordinan ce. Even if the counc il had found relators’ initiative petition sufficient of its own volition, Columbus Ci ty Charter Section 43- 1 does not require the council to place the proposal on the May 4, 2021 ballot. Nothing further can happen until the council either adopts the ordinance itself without alteration or “by ordinan ce forthwith order[s] and prov ide[s] for the submission of such proposed ordinance in its original form to a vote of the electors of the city.” Id. Charter Section 43- 2 then states:

The aforesaid ordinance [submitting the proposed ordinance to the electors] shall require that such proposed ordinance be submitted at the next regular municipal election if one shall o ccurJanuary Term, 2021

19 not less than sixty nor more than one-hundred-twenty days after its passage. If no such election will be held within the period he rein provided, the council shall, at its sole discretion , order and provide for the submission of such proposed ordinance to a vote of the electors of the city at either a special election within such p eriod, or at the next regular municipal election.

(Emphasis added.) {¶ 51} Therefore, in granting the limited writ, the majority forces th e council to decide either to adopt the proposed ordinance itself or to determine at which election it should be put before the people for a vote. If only relators had thought to ask for that relief, it might be appropriate. But t oday, the majority provides the mandamus request as well as the relief. That deci sion is counter to the core elements of a mandamus claim: “[I]n a mandamus case, the relator has the burden to show the existence of a legal right and a legal duty that are clear .” (Emphasis sic.) State ex rel. Syx v. Stow City Council , 161 Ohio St.3d 201, 2020- Ohio-4393, 161 N.E.3d 639, ¶ 27. It is not the province of thi s court to take on
relators’ burden in mandamus. {¶ 52} The majority explains that this court has issued a limited writ before, offering the example of State ex rel. Dunn v. Plain Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 159 Ohio St.3d 139, 2020-Ohio-339, 149 N.E.3d 460. In that cas e, citizens sought a writ of mandamus ordering a school board to certify to the bo ard of elections a proposal to transfer territory from one school district to anot her and an order compelling the elections board to place the proposal on the Mar ch 17, 2020 ballot,
id. at ¶ 1, 2, 6. In granting a limited writ, this court required the school board to forward the proposal to the board of elections, but we did not order the board of elections to put the proposal on the ballot, because the board of elections had remaining statutory duties to review and examine the petition u nder R.C.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 3501.11(K)(1) and to perform any other duties required by law f or the potential placement of the proposal on the March 17, 2020 ballot. Id . at ¶ 26. This court concluded, “If the board determines that the petition otherwise meets the requirements established by law, then it shall place the proposal on the March 17 ballot notwithstanding the 90-da y requirement set forth in R.C. 3311.242(B)(2).” (Emphasis added.) Id

. {¶ 53} Therefore, the ultimate aim of the mandamus complaint in Dunn

— the placement of the transfer proposal on the March 17, 2020 ba llot—was
enforceable in mandamus. And the relators in Dunn had specifically sought the relief this court ordered agai nst the school board. This court did not order the next step of relief that t he relators sought a gainst the board of el ections. {¶ 54} Here, relators do not seek separate relief from different governmental entities such that relief as to only one of those entities is appropriate. And, unlike in Dunn , the ultimate aim of relators’ mandamus complaint in this case
is not achievable. {¶ 55} Relators are required to seek a ppropriate relief in mandamus. In State ex rel. Maxcy v. Saferin , 155 Ohio St.3d 496, 2018-Ohio-4035, 122 N.E.3d 1165, the relators sought a writ of mandamus ordering the board of elections to place a proposed city-charter amendment on the ballot; the boar d of elections had rejected the proposed amendment because it contained provisions that it said were beyond the power of the city to enact by initiative. Id. at ¶ 1, 5. This court held that the board of elections did not have the authority to deter mine whether a proposed amendment to a municipal charter falls within the scop e of authority to
enact via initiative. Id. at ¶ 13, 22. We held that a board of elections plays only a ministerial role once a city council has passed an ordinance to place a proposed
charter amendment on the ballot. Id. at ¶ 19. Even though this court held that the
board of elections did not have the power to keep the proposed ordinance off the ballot, we did not grant a writ of mandamus ordering the propos ed charterJanuary Term, 2021

21 amendment to be placed on the ballot, because the city council had failed to pass an ordinance submitting the proposed ordinance to the electors. Id. at ¶ 19-24. We determined, “The city council fa iled to fulfill that duty in th e first instance, but relators have not named it as a party in this mandamus action o r sought a writ compelling it to comply with that duty.” Id. at ¶ 22. The relators in Maxcy had therefore failed to seek the correct relief, and despite the fa ct that they were correct that the board of elections had acted outside its authority, we did not order the proposed charter amendment to be placed on the ballot. {¶ 56} Like the relators in Maxcy , relators here did not seek the correct relief. So why would we engage in an act beyond the requested relief? Relators have no legal right and the coun cil has no legal duty to place the proposed ordinance on the ballot for the May 4, 2021 election. It is unnecessary for this court to decide more than that. Simply denying the writ is consistent with our duty not to issue advisory opinions and is faithful to “ ‘the cardinal principle of judicial restraint— if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to d ecide more,’ ” State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner , 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 51, quoting PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. Un ited States Drug Enforcement
Administration , 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in judgment). {¶ 57} Therefore, because I would deny relators’ request for a writ of
mandamus and would not issu e a limited writ, I dissent.

_________________ Fitrakis & Gadell-Newton, L.L.C., Robert J. Fitrakis, and Const ance A. Gadell-Newton, for relators. Zach Klein, Columbus City Attorney, and Richard N. Coglianese a nd Rebecca E. Wilson, Assistant City Attorneys, for respondents.

_________________