### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

JONATHAN CHISCUL
, Appellant,

v.

MICHELLE GOMEZ HERNANDEZ
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 20

- 287

[February 10, 2021]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County ; Susan L. Alspector , Judge; L.T. Case No.

DVCE 19

- 00 8957 (63)

.

Joseph A. Costello of Costello Law, LLC, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee

.

D AMOORGIAN
, J

.

Jonathan Chiscul (“ the husband”) appeals the permanent injunction for protection against domestic violence entered against him on behalf of

his estranged wife, Michelle Gomez Hernandez (“the wife”)

. We reverse

because the evidence was insufficient to support entry of the injunction.

I t is uncontested that the parties had only know n each other for a period of six months. During that time, they married and separated. The

w ife filed a petition for injunction against domestic violence almost two

months after the ir separation. In the petition, s he alleged the following:

if the w ife refuse d to have sex, the hus b and would throw her against the wall, shake her and yell at her , and t hreaten to call police and immigration officials on her; when the w ife would leave the house to go to work or to the store, the h usband would get upset

, call her vulgar names, and follow her; and when the wife left him for good, the husband called and texted her “nonstop” and follow ed her to a chiropractor ’s appointment and

threatened her.

At the hearing on the petition, the wife generally testified that, during the course of the marriage, she was fearful of the husband because he2 threatened to call immigration, “would stand in the doorway” to prevent her from leaving, accused her of cheating, and was jealous and controlling. Regarding the allegation of forced sex, the wife testified “he forced me to have sexual relations with him, I did not have sexual relations . . . but he manipu late[d] me by saying that I have three partners, that he was going to send me to immigration. ” When asked by the court if the h usband threw her against the wall as alleged in the petition

, the w ife testified that the

h usband did not throw her but that “he would grab me” and “shake me.”

The w ife did not testify when this incident occurred.

Regarding recent threats or violence by the husband since the filing of the petition

, the wife testified that the husband called her on two occasions, but she did not answer the phone and the h usband did not leave a message . When asked by the court for proof that the h usband called her, the w ife admitted the h usband did not call her and that “it was

a relative of his.” She then st ated the husband wrote her “ a few days before” on Instagram or Facebook

. The w ife failed to provide any detail s as to the content s of the message ; the husband however, testified that he

wrote the wife to tell her that he was still going forward with the divorce.

The w ife also testified that on one occasion

, the husband followed her to a chiropractor ’s appointment

. Notably, the wife did not allege the husband

was violent or threatened violence during either of those instances.

T he husband , i n turn, testified the wife threatened him, that she had mood issues, was allegedly bi

- polar, and that her petition was filed in retaliation for the husband “starting the papers to get the divorce.” The

husband further testified the wife was the aggressor and that he never touched her. The husband also alleged that he had no contact with the

wife in the two months since she left the marital home. After hearing both parties’ evidence, t he trial court granted a permanent domestic violence injunction against the husband.

On appeal, the h usband argues the trial court erred in entering the
permanent injunction because the wife’s allegations were either

insufficient as a matter of law or too remote in time for purposes of showing

that she was in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic

violence. We agree.

An order granting an injunction in the domestic violence context is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Selph v. Selph , 144 So. 3d 676, 677 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)

. “ A trial court abus es its discretion by entering a domestic violence injunction when the ruling is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. ” Id. at 677

– 78. “ When evaluating

whether a trial court ’ s order granting an injunction is supported by3 competent, substantial evidence, ‘ legal sufficiency

. . . as opposed to evidentiary weight, is the appropriate concern of an appellate tribunal .’”

Id. at 678 (quoting Stone v. Stone , 128 So. 3d 239, 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) )

.

A trial court may issue a domestic violence injunction to protect a petitioner who demonstrate s that he or she has an objectively reasonable apprehension that he or she is in “imminent danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence.” Randolph v. Rich , 58 So. 3d 29 0, 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011 ) (quoting § 741.30(1)(a) , Fla. Stat. (2010) ). “Domestic violence” is defined as “any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false impr isonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death of one family or household member by another family or household member.” § 741.28(2), Fla. Stat. ( 2019).

In determining whether a petitioner has reasonable cause to believe

that he or she is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of any act of domestic violence, the trial court “must consider the current allegations, the parties’ behavior within the relationship, and the history of the relationship as a whole.” Zarudny v. Zarudn y , 241 So. 3d 258, 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) ( citation omitted)

. “[T]he law requires more than general relationship problems and uncivil behavior to support the issuance of an injunction.” Randolph , 58 So. 3d at 292 (emphasizing that the law requires the p arty seeking the inju n ction to “ present sufficient evidence to establish the objective reasonableness of his or her fear that the danger of violence is ‘imminent’”).

In the present case, t he w ife’s testimony largely described incidents that

occurred befo re the parties ’ separation

. Since their separation, the only contact between the parties was the wife’s allegation that the husband

followed her to a chiropractor ’s appointment once and left her a message informing her he was going forward with the divorce. These later acts were simply insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish a fear of imminent danger

.

Turning to the one possible act of violence, as previously pointed out,

o f particular importance is when or how frequently this occurred. The parties were separated several months before the permanent injunction

was issued

. Thus, the shaking incident could have occurred between two

to six months prior to the fil ing of the petition

. The w ife’s testimo ny of an isolated incident, absent additional evidence

, was insufficient to warrant a permanent domestic violence injunction

. See Selph , 144 So. 3d at 6 7 8

– 7 9 ( the wife’s allegation that the husband ordered his dog to attack her4 was insufficient to support entry of a domestic violence injunction because

the incident occurred five months prior, there was no medical or police
report s , and the parties had not been in contact with each other during

the t hree months before the filing of the petition) ; Phillips v. Phillips , 151 So. 3d 58, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (finding evidence legally insufficient to support a domestic violence injunction where

, despite the allegations in her petition, the wife acknowledge d in her testimony that there had been

no violence or threats of violence from the husband since their separation

four months before filing the injunction ).

Based on the record before us

, the post

- separation incidents do not

constitute acts or threats of violence by the husband . As for the

pre

- separat ion shaking incident, the wife’s testimony failed to establish

when it occurred. Therefore, the court lacked competent

, substantial

evidence from which to conclude the wife was “ in imminent dange r of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence

. ” § 741.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019). Accordingly, the permanent domestic violence injunction

is reversed.

Reversed and remanded

.

C IKLIN and K LINGENSMITH

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.