Filed 3/27/13 P. v. Vasquez CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
S. VASQUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant. B242760
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YA081297)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Los Angeles County. James R. Brandlin, Judge. Affirmed. Andy Miri for Defendant and Appellant Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorn ey General, Susan Sulli van Pithey and Louis W. Karlin, Deputy Atto rneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________ _______________2 A jury found defendant gu ilty of six offenses involving the sexual abuse of his daughter and two step-daughters. The court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 81 years to life. On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in admitting expert testimony regarding “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome ,” the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and his sentence is “excessive.” We affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROC EEDINGS BELOW The principal prosecution witnesses we re the three victims and a clinical psychologist. We summarize their testimony below. A. Alexis’s Testimony Alexis was 12 years old at the time of tr ial. Defendant bega n molesting her when she was in the first grade. The first incide nt occurred in the bathroom of their home. Defendant pulled down his pants and exposed his penis then pulled down Alexis’s pants and put his penis in her anus. It hurt and she started to blee d. On subsequent occasions over the next six years defendant placed his penis and his finge rs in her anus, and touched her vagina over and unde rneath her clothes. At least five times defendant forced Alexis to sleep with him in the nude and on five oc casions defendant tried but failed to penetrate Alexis’ vagina with his penis. This molest ation conti nued for six years until Alexis was in the sixth grade. B. Vanessa’s Testimony At the time of trial Vanessa was 11 years old. She was eight years old when the abuse began. She and defendant were in hi s bedroom when he told her to take her
clothes off and lie on his bed. When she did so he penetrated her vagina with his penis. He repeated this abuse “lots of times.” He penetrated her anus with his penis on two
occasions. Defendant would also force Vanessa’s hand ont o his penis. Vanessa saw
defendant do the same things to Alexis.3 C. Abigail’s Testimony Abigail was 7 years old at the time of trial. She testified that when she was in the first grade defendant touched and fondled he r vagina and chest 10 times. She knew the number, she said, because she co unted the instances and made a list on a paper she kept in her backpack. She saw defendant get into bed naked with Alexis and saw the bed start shaking. D. Dr. Jayme Bernfeld’s Testimony Over defendant’s objection, the trial c ourt allowed the prosecution to present expert testimony concerning Child Sexua l Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS)
which describes the manner in which some ch ildren respond to sexual abuse, including delayed disclosure of the crime. Dr. Bernfe ld, a clinical psychol ogist, testified as an expert on CSAAS. She explained that a child’s delay in reporting sexual abuse is primarily caused by a combin ation of belief in the need for secrecy, feelings of helplessness and a desire to accommodate the s ituation. The doctor also explained to the jury that CSAAS is not a predictive model. “It doesn’t tell us whether or not someone has been abused,” she said.
The court instructed the jury under CALCRIM No. 1 193 that “Dr. Bernfeld’s testimony about child sexual abuse accommoda tion syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any of th e crimes charged against hi m” and that the jury may
consider the evidence about CSAAS “only in deciding whether or not the children’s
conduct was not inconsistent w ith the conduct of someone wh o has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of the children’s testimony.” The jury convicted defendant of co mmitting lewd and lascivious acts and continuous sexual abuse with respect to Alexis, sexual intercourse or sodomy and
continuous sexual abuse of Vane ssa and of two separate lewd and lascivious acts upon Abigail. (Pen. Code, §§ 288, su bd. (a), 288.5 and 288.7, subd. (a).) 1 As to all six counts,

1 All statutory references are to the Pena l Code except where otherwise specified.4 the jury found that defendant committed the cr imes against more than one victim within the meaning of the “one strike” law (Pen. Code, § 667.61). As noted, the court imposed a prison sentence totaling 81 years to life.
DISCUSSION
I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ACC OMMODATION SYNDROME. Defendant argues that th e court should not have ad mitted evidence of CSAAS because its probative value was outweighed by the risk that despite the court’s limiting instruction the jury would use Dr. Bernfeld’s testimony as evidence that defendant
molested the children. Altern atively, he maintains the c ourt should only have admitted evidence pertaining to the portion of CSAAS that deals with delay in reporting abuse and only as to Alexis because hers was the only si gnificant delay in reporting. We disagree with both arguments. Previous appellate decisions have held that evidence of all the factors that comprise CSAAS is relevant in cases invol ving the sexual abuse of minors (see, e.g., People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 1289, 1300-1302; People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 958-959) but that the ev idence must be accompanied by a limiting
instruction such as the one the court gave here. (See ante , at p. 3. ) ( People v. Bergschneider (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 144, 159.) On review, we presume that the jury understood and followe d that instruction. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 83.)
The CSAAS evidence was relevant to all th ree children. Alexis delayed six years in reporting defendant’s molestation, Vanessa delayed three years and Abigail delayed a year. Furthermore, the children’s testimony raised questions about their behavior in addition to their delay in reporting defendant’s abuse. These ques tions included why the children didn’t fight defendant of f when he tried to molest them and why they continued to place themselves in situa tions where defendant had the opportunity to abuse them. Dr. Bernfeld explained that young children abused by an adult have a feeling of helplessness which arises from their physical inability to fight back as well as their5 having been raised to obey adu lts which results in their feeling uncomfortable saying no to an abusive adult. As to why children co ntinue their relationship with their abuser, Dr. Bernfeld explained that children who feel helpless will try to adap t to the situation in
order to make the abuse more tolerable. Fo r example, many victims continue displaying affection toward their abuser, especially if he or she is a family member.
II. DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION S ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Defendant contends his c onvictions should be revers ed because the children’s testimony accusing him of sexua l abuse was uncorroborated and so general as to deny him due process. Again, we disagree.
A. Corroboration
Evidence Code section 411 states: “Exc ept where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact.” Defendant maintains that section 803, subdivision (f), required
additional evidence of sexual ab use. He is mistaken. Section 803, subdivision (f) revive s the expired limitations periods for prosecuting sex offenses under sections 288 and 28 8.5 under certain circumstances. Subdivision (f)(2) of the statut e states: “This subdivisio n applies only if . . . the following occur[s]: . . . (C) Th ere is independent evidence that corroborates the victim’s allegation.” Section 803 does not apply to this case for two reasons. The time in which to prosecute offenses against Alexis, Vanessa and Abigail under sec tions 288 and 288.5 could be “any time prior to the victim’s 28th bi rthday.” (§ 801.1, subd. (a).) Thus, the prosecutions under those sections were comm enced with about 20 years to spare. Corroboration is not required in a prosecution under section 288.7 because section 803, subdivision (f), by its terms does not apply to that section. (A violation of section 288.7, subdivision (a) is punishable by imprisonmen t in the state prison for 25 years to life; therefore under section 799 the prosecution fo r that offense may commence at any time.)6 B. Specificity Defendant argues on the one hand that the children’s testimony was too general and “generic” to permit the pr eparation of a defense and cr oss-examination of witnesses in violation of his right to due process and to confront his accusers. He argues on the other hand that some of the testimony is too detailed to be credible as a matter of law. We reject both arguments.
In People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 294, 316 ( Jones ), the court held that in cases alleging child molestation the victim must de scribe at trial “the kind of act or acts committed,” “the number of acts committed,” a nd “the general time period” in which the acts occurred. (Italics omitted .) These descriptions plus “the availability of the preliminary hearing, demurrer and pretrial di scovery procedures” satisfy the “defendant’s due process right to fair notice of the charges against him.” ( Id . at p. 318.) Having reviewed the testimony of the three victims in the light most favorable to the judgment ( Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 693-694) we conclude that their testimony met the standard s articulated by our high court in Jones . Defendant’s arguments for the most part invite us to rede termine issues of credibility and conflicts in the evidence. That is not our role. ( People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 488.) Defendant calls Alexis’s testimony that defendant molested her between 30 and 50 times “outrageous” and argues that it is proof that she and the other children were coached in their testimony, probably by her mother, and th erefore their testimony could not support defendant’s conviction. As we no ted above, credibility de terminations are for the jury not this court. “Testimony may be re jected only when it is inherently improbable or incredible, . . . unbelievable per se, physica lly impossible or wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds.” ( People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 729 [internal quotation marks omitted].) There is nothing remarkable about Alexis’s testimony that defendant sexually abused her 30 to 50 times over a six-year period. (Cf. People v. Moore (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1400, 1409 [10-year-old vic tim testified father had sexual intercourse with her “almost every ni ght” for three months].)7 III. DEFENDANT HAS NO T DEMONSTRATED TH AT HIS SENTENCE WAS ILLEGAL OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Defendant argues that his sentence is “exc essive” but not that it is illegal or an
abuse of discretion. His clai m of abuse of discretion is aimed at the prosecutor for overcharging the case in order to pr oduce an extremely long sentence. There being no legally-based argument be fore us, we have no basis for altering
defendant’s sentence.
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

.

ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J. We concur:

CHANEY, J.

JOHNSON, J.