Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

ZACHARY J. EICHEL JOSHUA W. CASSELMAN

MICHAEL L. EINTERZ, JR. Rubin & Levin, P.C.

Einterz & Einterz Indianapolis, Indiana

Zionsville, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JESS G. REVERCOMB, SR., )

)

Appellant/Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1305-CC-447

)

YELLOW BOOK SALES AND )

DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, INC., )

)

Appellee/Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT 

The Honorable John F. Hanley, Judge

Cause No. 49D11-1003-CC-12977

January 24, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

VAIDIK, Chief Judge
2

Case Summary

Jess G. Revercomb, Sr., appeals the trial court’s judgment that he assumed liability 

as both a corporate representative and as a personal guarantor when he signed five 

advertising contracts with Yellow Book Sales & Distribution Company, Inc. (“Yellow 

Book”) on behalf of R&G Construction. Finding that, based upon the unambiguous text 

of the contract, Revercomb did assume liability as both a corporate representative and a 

personal guarantor, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

From February 2007 to September 2008, Revercomb signed five Yellow Book 

contracts for advertisements of R&G Construction in the Boone, Hamilton, and greater 

Indianapolis telephone directories. Each contract had one signature line. On the February 

2007 contract, Revercomb wrote both “president” and “owner” after his signature. Ex. 1. 

On three other advertising contracts, Revercomb wrote “owner” after his signature. Ex. 2-

4. On the September 2008 contract, he wrote “president” after his name. Ex. 5.

Each contract was a standard Yellow Book form contract containing almost 

identical language. See Ex. 1-5. Directly underneath Revercomb’s signatures on the five 

contracts1it is written “Authorized Signature Individually and for the Customer (Read 

paragraph 15F[2] on the reverse hereof).” Ex. 1-5.

 

1 The language below the signature line of the February 2007, August 2007, and January 2008 

contracts is identically reproduced. Under the signature line of the February 2008 and September 2008 

contracts, the language directs the signer to read “Paragraph 15” rather than “Paragraph 15F.” Ex. 4-5. 

 

2 Although text under the signature line in the August 2007 contract directs the reader to Paragraph 

15F, the relevant contractual language can actually be found in Paragraph 15G. Paragraph 15F is correct 

in both the February 2007 and January 2008 contracts. 
3

Paragraph 15 provides, in relevant part:

The signer agrees that he/she has the authority and is signing this agreement, 

(1) in his/her individual capacity, (2) as a representative of the Customer, (3) 

as a representative of the entity identified in the advertisement or for whose 

benefit the advertisement is being purchased (if the entity identified in the 

advertisement is not the same as the Customer or signer). By his/her 

execution of this agreement, the signer personally and individually 

undertakes and assumes, jointly and severally, with the Customer, the full 

performance of this agreement, including payment of the amounts due 

hereunder. 

Id. 

The front page of each contract also refers the signer to the terms and conditions on 

the reverse side, with the following language in capitalized print:

THIS CONSTITUTES A CONTRACT FOR ADVERTISING WITH 

YELLOW BOOK SALES AND DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, INC . . . . 

IN THE NEXT EDITION OF THE ABOVE TELEPHONE 

DIRECTORY(IES). THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS SET FORTH 

HEREIN AND ON THE REVERSE HEREOF ARE AGREED TO BY 

CUSTOMER AND SIGNER.

Id.

Also within paragraph 15, the contract stated:

This agreement supercedes [sic] any other verbal or written agreement 

between Customer and Publisher. This agreement may not be changed 

except by a writing signed by an authorized signatory of Customer and 

Publisher. 

 

Yellow Book published all advertisements under the contracts except for the 2008 

Boone County contract, which was canceled. Tr. p. 14-15. R&G Construction failed to 

pay Yellow Book a total owed amount of $11,003.74 for the published advertisements. Ex. 

6. The terms and conditions of the advertising contracts further provide for the recovery 
4

of costs and expenses incurred by Yellow Book in the event of nonpayment, including 

reasonable attorney fees. 

Yellow Book filed its Amended Complaint on Contract and Guaranty against R&G 

Construction and Revercomb. Appellee’s App. p. 1-3. The Complaint sought judgment 

against both R&G Construction and Revercomb for the unpaid balance of Yellow Book’s 

advertising contracts. In its Answer, R&G Construction admitted that it had entered into 

the contracts and that the signature on the contracts was Revercomb’s. It, however, denied 

that Revercomb had entered into a personal guaranty for R&G Construction’s unpaid 

balance. Id. at 16-20. 

Yellow Book moved for summary judgment on its amended complaint against R&G 

Construction and Revercomb. Appellant’s App. p. 4. Revercomb filed a cross-motion for 

summary judgment. Id. at 5. 

After a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted 

Yellow Book’s motion for summary judgment against R&G Construction, denied Yellow 

Book’s motion for summary judgment against Revercomb, and denied Revercomb’s crossmotion for summary judgment against Yellow Book. Appellee’s App. p. 21-22. The court 

entered judgment against R&G Construction in the amount of $11,003.74 principal, 

$2,170.59 interest, and $4000.00 attorney’s fees. Id. at 24. 

A bench trial was held on the only remaining issue—Revercomb’s personal liability. 

At trial, Natalia Anderson, a paralegal and corporate representative of Yellow Book, 

testified. According to Anderson, when securing a contract, Yellow Book sales 

representatives generally point out the important aspects in a contract, which include the 
5

individual liability of the signer. Tr. p. 21-22. It is also Yellow Book’s general practice to 

leave a copy of the contract with the customer.

Revercomb also testified at trial. According to Revercomb, the Yellow Book sales 

representative only discussed each advertisement and told him to sign on the signature line. 

Id. at 32. On cross-examination, Revercomb admitted to signing the contracts, but stated 

that he did so as president of R&G Construction. Id. at 33-34. According to Revercomb,

he signed some contracts as “president” and others as “owner” because he signed them at 

different times and was “probably doing some other work trying to survive our business . 

. . .” Id. at 36.

The trial court entered an order finding that Revercomb “assumed liability as both 

corporate representative and as a personal guarantor” and entered judgment against 

Revercomb for $11,003.74, plus attorney’s fees of $3,575.55 and statutory interest. 

Appellant’s App. p. 12-13.

Revercomb now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

Revercomb argues that the trial court erred when it awarded judgment against him

because no valid guaranty contract existed between Revercomb and Yellow Book. 

Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred in finding that one signature could bind him 

both as a corporate representative and as an individual. Our standard of review is well 

settled. When a trial court has made findings of fact, we must first determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. 

Barkwill v. Cornelia H. Barkwill Revocable Trust, 902 N.E.2d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 
6

2009), trans. denied. We will set aside findings only if they are clearly erroneous, that is, 

“when the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them.” Id. To determine that 

a finding or a conclusion is clearly erroneous, an appellate court’s review must leave it 

with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Dinsmore v. Lake Elec. Co., Inc., 

719 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess 

the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. 

Id. 

Because Revercomb is appealing from a negative judgment, he may only prevail if 

he can establish that “the judgment is contrary to law, that is, the evidence is without 

conflict and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence lead only to one 

conclusion but the trial court reached a different conclusion.” Ponziano Constr. Servs., 

Inc. v. Quadri Enters., LLC, 980 N.E.2d 867, 874-75 (citing Clark v. Hunter, 861 N.E.2d 

1201, 1206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). 

A guaranty is “‘a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another 

person.’” Grabill Cabinet Co., Inc. v. Sullivan, 919 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010) (quoting S-Mart, Inc. v. Sweetwater Coffee Co., Ltd., 744 N.E.2d 580, 585 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2001), trans. denied). The interpretation of a guaranty agreement is governed by the

same rules as the interpretation of other contracts. TW Gen. Contracting Servs., Inc. v. 

First Framers Bank & Trust, 904 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Kruse v. 

Nat’l Bank of Indianapolis, 815 N.E.2d 137, 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). If the terms of a 

contract are “‘clear and unambiguous, courts must give those terms their clear and ordinary 

meaning.’” Everhart v. Founders Ins. Co., 993 N.E.2d 1170, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) 
7

(quoting Dunn v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d 249, 252 (Ind. 2005)). In doing so, 

we “interpret a contract so as to harmonize its provisions, rather than place them in 

conflict.” Everhart, 993 N.E.2d at 1174. “‘We will make all attempts to construe the 

language of a contract so as not to render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or 

meaningless.’” Id. (quoting Rogers v. Lockard, 767 N.E.2d 989, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). 

Moreover, “[t]he terms of the guaranty should neither be so narrowly interpreted so as to 

frustrate the obvious intent of the parties, nor so loosely interpreted as to relieve the 

guarantor of a liability fairly within their terms.” Kordick v. Merchs. Nat’l Bank & Trust 

Co. of Indianapolis, 496 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).

We must first look to the plain language of the contracts. Directly underneath where 

Revercomb signed each contract, the text stated “Authorized Signature Individually and 

for the Customer (Read paragraph 15F on the reverse hereof).” Ex. 1-5. Moreover, 

paragraph 15 on the opposite side of each contract stated:

The signer agrees that he/she has the authority and is signing this agreement, 

(1) in his/her individual capacity, (2) as a representative of the Customer, (3) 

as a representative of the entity identified in the advertisement or for whose 

benefit the advertisement is being purchased (if the entity identified in the 

advertisement is not the same as the Customer or signer). By his/her 

execution of this agreement, the signer personally and individually 

undertakes and assumes, jointly and severally, with the Customer, the full 

performance of this agreement, including payment of the amounts due 

hereunder. 

Id. 

Revercomb argues that he only intended to sign the contracts as a corporate 

representative of R&G Construction and not personally. However, his contention ignores 

the plain language of the contracts. It is well established that “[t]he intent relevant in 
8

contract matters is not the parties’ subjective intents but their outward manifestation of it.” 

Zimmerman v. McColley, 826 N.E.2d 71, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “A court does not 

examine the hidden intentions secreted in the heart of a person; rather it should examine 

the final expression found in conduct.” Id.

The trial court relied upon Revercomb’s outward manifestation to be bound under 

each of these contracts. Both under the signature line and in paragraph 15 of each contract, 

the text stated that the signer was signing as both a representative of the Customer and in 

his or her individual capacity. At trial, the only evidence Revercomb presented that he was 

not personally bound under the contracts was that he signed two of the contracts as the 

president of the company and the others as owner of the company. Tr. p. 32. Therefore, 

the argument goes, he did not want to sign in an individual capacity. However, the plain 

language of the contract directly conflicts with this statement. Revercomb’s argument is 

an attempt to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. The trial court’s determination 

that Revercomb signed both personally and as a corporate representative was not clearly 

erroneous based upon the unambiguous language of the contracts. Finally, Revercomb 

wants us to adopt a rule requiring two signatures to create a guaranty contract. We decline 

to do so when the language of the contract is unambiguous. 

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.