We substitut e L t. Col. L amar Be ckwor th, in his officia l capa city , as successor to Stanley 1 E. Clark, for

mer dire ctor of the Texas Depar tment of Public Safety

. SeeTex. R. App. P . 7.2. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00 222 -CV
Texas Depart m ent of Public Saf ety; Lt. Col. Lam ar Bec kw orth, in hi s off icial capacity as Int e r im Di r e c to r of t he Te xa s D e par tm e ntof P ublic Safe ty ; a nd A lla n B. P olu nsky , in his off icial capacity as Chairm an of the P ubl ic Saf

ety C om m ission , Appellan ts

v. Miguel Salazar; Edgar Soria; F rancisco Avila Trej o; G ree n Meadows Land scaping, In c.;

Eustoli o Galvan; and Jose Gom ez , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-09- 0002 73 , HO NORAB LE ORLI NDA NARAN JO , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
The Te x as De p ar t m en to f P u b l i c S af et y , t h e Int er i mDi re ct o r o f t he Te x as Department

o f P u b l i c S a f e t y, and the Chairma

n of t h e P u b l i c S afe ty Commi ssion (collectively , the 1 “De partment” ), appe al from the tr ial court’s or der g rantinga temporary injunction sought by appellee s Migu el S al az ar, Edg ar Soria, F ranc isco Avila Tre jo, Eustolio Galvan, J ose Gomez, and Gr e e n M e a do ws L and sc a pin g (c oll e c tiv e ly , th e “ Ap pe lle e s” ). Th e tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r t e mpo ra ri ly enjoined the De partment fr om implementing and e nfor c in g Ru le1 5

. 2 4 , a s a

me n ded, and Rule 15.171 of cha pter 37 of the Texas Admi n i s t ra t i v e C o de. See 3 7 T e x. A dmi n . Co d e § 1 5

. 2 4 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ( T e x. De p’ t of Pub . Sa fe ty , I de nti fi c a tio n o f A pp lic ants ) ( he re ina ft e r, “ Rul e 15 .2 4” ); id. § 15.171 (2009)2

(T e x. De p’ t of

Pu b

. Sa fe ty , I ssu anc e of

Dr ive r L ic e ns e s & I de nti fi c a tio n Ce rt if ic a te s to No n- c iti zen s) (her einaf ter, “ Rule 15.171”). The trial c ourt furthe r enjoined the Depa rtment from issuing driver’ s lic e ns e s th a t are te mpo ra

ry or dif fe re nt i n a pp e ara nc e fr om s tand ard

dr ive r’ s li c e ns e s to ind ivi du a ls

on the ba sis that th e y

are no t c iti zen s or le g a l pe rm ane nt re sid e nts of the Un ite d State s or on the ba sis that they are leg al per

manent re sidents with an expiration date on their per manent re sident car d. We h old that th e Ap pe lle e s’ c la ims , w iththe e xce pti on of the c ha lle ng e s to Rules 15.24 an d 1 5

. 171 broug ht by Gre en Mea dows, Salazar, Soria, a nd Trejo, a

re ba rre d by

sovere ign immunity . Wit h respe ct to those claims that are n o t b ar re d by sovere ign immunity , we ho ld t hat th e tr ia l c ourt a

bu se d its dis c re tio n in g ra nti ng inj un c tiv e re lie f. Ac c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e the trial cour

t’s order issuing the tempor ary

injunction.

BACK GR OUND The De partment is authorized to adopt rules necessa ry to administer chapte r 521 of the transpor

tation code, g overningthe issuance of driver ’s license s. See T ex . Transp. Code Ann. §§ 521.005, .291 (West 2007) (dele g ating rulemaking authority to the Depa rtment). Transpor tation code se ction 521.142 provides that an a pplication for a

driver’ s license must include any “information the [ D]epartment requires to deter mine the applicant’s identity , competenc y , and elig ibilit y .” Id. § 521 .1 42 (e ) ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 9) ; see also id. § 521.142(a) (re quiring “pre sentation of pr oo f o f i de nti ty

satis fa c tor

y to t he [D]e pa rtme nt” ). Rul e 15 .2 4 d e sc ri be s th e ty pe s o f d oc ume nts considere d satis fa ctory

proof of identity . I n 2008, the Depa rtment amende d the ty

pe of pr imary identification docume nt describe d in subsection (1)( D) of Rule 15.24 f rom an “ unexpired United States Bur eau of

Citi zenship and I mmigration Service s document” to a n “unexpired United StatesSince 2006, subsection (1) (F ) of Rule 15.24 has provided that a fede rally issued For

m I -94 2 c ou ld o nly

be us e d to e sta

bli sh ide nti ty if it wa s o ri g ina lly iss ue d f or a t le a st o ne y e ar a

nd ha s at le a st six months of validi ty rema ining at the t ime of the lice nse applica tion. Subs ection (1) (F ) is not at iss ue in t his a pp e a l. 3 Bur eau of Citi zenship and I mmigration Service s document is sued for a period of at least one y ear
and mus t be va lid

fo r n ot l e ss tha

n six (6 ) months fr om t

he date pr e se nte d to the [D]e pa rtme nt w ith a complete d application.” 2

Also in 2008, the Depa

rtm en t adopted Rule 15.171, titled “I ssuance of Drive r L icense s and I dentification Certificates to Non- citizens.” Rule 15.171 provides that if a n applicant has less than six months remaining on his lawful admission period in the United States, no drive r’s license ma

y be issued. Rule 15.171(a )(2) . The rule further p rovi des that if the a pplicant’s lawf

ul admission period is more than six m onths but less than th e fu l l t er m o f a driver’s lice nse, the applicant will be issued a driver’ s l i ce n s e “with a status date display ed that coinc ides with the

e xp ir a ti o n o f th e a

p p li c an t’ s la

w f u l a dmi s s io n p e r io d in th e U n it e d States.” Id. at (a )(1) . I f the applicant’ s lawful admission period ha s an i n definite e x piration date, the driver’ s license will be issued with a status date of one y ear from the date of the application. Id. at (a )(3) . I f the a pplicant

c ann ot s ho w v a lid

do c ume ntatio n o f a c ha

ng e or e xten sio n w ith in 4 5 d ay s f ro m th e status date , h is driver’ s license will be c ance lled. Id. at (c ).

I n September 2008, the Depa rtment iss u ed an interna l memorandum stating that licenses issued to ce rtain non-c itiz en drive rs would diffe r in appe ara nce f rom standar d driver’ s licenses by

beingvertica lly

oriented a

nd bear ing a

stamp stating, “ T em p orar y Visitor.” TheThe fe dera l H-2B prog ram a llows emplo y er s i n non-ag ricultural businesse s to petition 3 the fe dera l gove rnm ent for pe rmission to hi re te mporary labor a nd service worke rs from oth e r c ountr ie s if

tho se po si ti on s c ann ot b e fi lle d b y pe rs on s in

the Un ite d St a te s. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)( 15)(H) (ii)(a ) (West Supp. 2009). 4 memorandum fur

ther provided that such l icense s would display the license holder’s status date as require d by

Rule 15.171. This memorandum was ne ver me morialized in a Depa rtment rule. I n response to the Depa

rtment’s ame ndment of Rule 15.24, adoption of Rul e 15.171, and September

2008 internal memora

ndum, t h e Ap p ellees f

iled suit seeking decla

ratory and injunctive relief under the Uniform Dec laratory J udg ments Act (UD J A), see Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.011 (W est 2008), and section 2001.038 of t he Admini strative Proce dure A ct (APA), see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.038 (West 2008).

The Appe llees alleg ed that the e nforc ement of Rules 15.24 a nd 15.171 and the D e p art m e n t ’ s p o l i c i e s a s o u t l i n e d i nt h e m e m o r an d

u mw o u l d

c a u s e t h e mp r o b a

b l e i n j u r y. Specifica lly , Appellee s Salazar, Soria, and Tr ejo asser t that they are authorized worke rs under the fe de ral H- 2B wo rk

vis a pr og ra m, b ut c ann ot o bta in d

ri ve r’ s li c e ns e s und e r t

he ne w r ule s b e c a us e t h ei r v i s as are only

valid for ten months at a time. Ap p e ll e e G r e e nM e a d o w s , a la n d s c a p ing 3 business that relies on temporary employ ees w orking in the U.S. on H-2B work visas, a lleg es that the De pa rtme nt’ s n e w r

ule s h ave pr e ve nte d it s H -2 B wo rk e rs fr om o bta ini ngTe xas d ri ve r’ s li c e ns e s, and ther efor e pre cluded Gr een Meadow s from employing them as fore men, as that position requires the ability

to drive work c rew s from o n e job site to another. B eca use of the r esulting shor

tag e of fo re me n, Gr e e n M e a do ws c on te nd s th a t it ha s b e e n f

or c e d to for e g o o bli g a tio ns ow e d to its landsca ping c u s to me r s . A p p e ll e e G o me z, w h o h o ld s a Cl a s s B c o mm e r c ia l dr iv e r ’ s li c e n s e andTempora ry protec ted status (TPS) is gr anted to elig ible nationals of desig nated c ountries 4 wh o a re te mpo ra

ri ly un a ble to s a fe ly

re tur n to the ir ho me c ountr

y be c a us e of on g oin g arm e d c on fl ic t, an envir onmental disaster, or other e x traordina

ry and temporar

y condition. See id. § 1254a (West 2005). 5 re sid e s in the Un ite d St a te s wi th t e mpo ra ry pr ote c te d s tatus , a lle g e s th a t he ha s b e e n d e nie d a Cla ss A driver ’s per

mit as a result of the D epar tment’s n ew ru l es, despite having taken and pa ssed the require d written examination. Finally , Appellee Galvan, a leg al perma nent resident of the United 4 States, alleg es t h at he wa s harmed by the Depa

rtment’s newrules and policie s when he was mistakenly

issued a non-standa

rd drive r’ s l i ce n se indicatingthat he is a tempora ry visitor to the Un ite d St a te s. After

a hea ring , the trial cour

t gr anted the A

ppellees’ reque st for a te mporary injunction, and this appeal followe d. On appeal, t he De partment a rgues that the trial c ourt did not have subje ct-matter

jurisdiction to gra

nt the temporar

y injunction beca

use the Appe llees’ c laims are barr ed by sovere ign immunity . The Department f urther a rgues eve n if the trial cour t did have subject-matter

jurisdiction, it abused its dis cre tion in gra nting the te mporary

injunction.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We reviewthe g rant or de nial of a temporar y injunction f

or an abuse of

discretion. Se e W all ing v . M e tc alf e , 863 S.W .2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993) (“T he dec ision to gra nt or deny a tempora

ry
wr it o f i nju

nc tio n li e s in

the so un d d isc re tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt , a

nd the c ourt ’s g ra

nt o r d e nia l is subject to reve rsal only

for a clea r abuse of that discre tion.”). A trial c ourt abuses its discre tion when it acts arbitra

rily , unrea sonably , and without ref ere nce to g uiding r

ules or princ iples, or misapplies6

the law to the e stablished fac ts of the ca se. See W alker v. Gutierrez , 111 S.W .3d 56, 63 (Tex. 2003); W alker v . Pack

er , 827 S.W .2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig . proce eding ). Sovereig n immunit y

from suit defe ats a trial c ourt’s subject- matter j u r is d ic ti o n. Sta te v. Gonzalez , 82 S.W .3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002). Whether a trial court ha s subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law w e re view de novo. W estbrook v. P enley , 231 S.W .3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007).

DI SCU SSIO N Jurisdi ction
1. Subject-M

atter Jurisdiction Under the APA I n its first issue on appeal, the D epa rt m ent contends that the Appellee s’ claims ar e barr ed by sovere ign immunity

. Specifica lly , the Depa rtment argues that the Appe llees have failed to as s er t a v ali d ultra vires c laim sufficient to wa ive sovere ign immunity

. Se e City of E l P as o v. Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009) (desc ribing “ultra vire s exception” to sover ei gn immun ity fo r s uit s a lle g ingtha

t sta te of fi c ia l ac te d with out le g a l a uth or ity or fa ile d to pe rf

or m pu re ly minist eria l act).

Howeve r, if the Appe l l ee s have r aised va lid challeng es to the De partment’s r ules under the APA, then we need not deter mine whether the Appellees have pr operly alleg ed ultra vire s claims bec ause the trial court’ s subject-matter jurisdiction is established by section 2001.038 of the APA. See T ex . Go v ’t C o d e A n n . § 2 0 0 1

. 0 3 8

. S ec t i o n2 0 0 1

. 0 3 8 al l o ws a p ar t y t o b ri n g a decla ratory -judg ment action cha lleng ing the validity or applica

bility of an a g ency

rule if it is alleg ed that the rule or

its threatene d application int erf ere s with or i mpairs a leg al right or privileg e of the7

plaintiff. See id. Section 2001.038 is considere d a leg islative g rant of subje ct-matter jurisdiction,

s o t h a tv a l i d

c l a i m s r a i s e d p u r s u a n tt o t h a tp r o v i s i o nar e n o tb ar r e d b y s o v e r e i g ni m m u n i t y. See Combs v . Entertainment Publ’ns, Inc

. , 292 S.W .3d 712, 720 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (collec ting c ases)

.

The De partment a

rgues that bec ause the APA only expressly authorizes decla

ratory

a c tio ns c ha lle ng inga g e nc y ru le s, it d oe s n ot e sta

bl ish su bje c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n w ithre sp e c t to reque sts f or injunctive relief

. Whil e sec tion 2001.038 does not ex pressly mention injunctive relief, t h i s C o u rt h as h el d

t h at i n j u n ct i v e r el i ef

aga i n s ta st at e agen cy i s av ai l ab l e u n d er t h e A P A, s t at i n g: The Commission’s final point on appeal is that the trial court ’s o rder is void for a tte mpt ingto e njo in a

sta te a g e nc y . Or din ari ly , a

pla int if f m us t su e an in div idu a l in a u t h o r i t y t o e n

j o i nt h e a c t i v i t i e s o f

a s t a t e a g e n c y. Howeve r, as discussed above, the trial court’ s jurisdiction ove r this matter was founded on the APA. I t was there fore empower ed to issue an injunctive or der.
Texas Alcoholic Bev erage Comm’n v. Amusement & Music Ope rators of T ex., I nc. , 997 S.W .2d 651, 65 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin

19 99 , p e t. d ism ’d

w. o. j.) (i nt erna l c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also W atson

v . No r th Te

x . H ig h e r E d u c . A u th ., Inc. , No. 03-00-00139- CV, 2000 Tex. App. L EXI S 7017, at *30-31 (Tex . App.—Austin Oct. 19, 2000, pet. dism’d by ag r.) ( mem. op.) (a ffirmingtrial court’ s denial of ple a to jurisdiction on sovereig n-immunity g rounds in suit challeng ing a g ency rule unde r section 2001.038 and f

urther af fi rm ing tr ial court’s or der te mporarily enjoining a g ency

from enfor cing rule). A llowing plaintiffs to challeng e the validity of an a g ency

rule but bar

ring injunctive relief preve nting application of t he challeng ed rule would defe at the purpose of sec tion 2001.038,

w h i c h “ i s t o o b t a i na

f i n a l d e c l ar a t i o no f a

r u l e ’ s v a l i d i t y before the rule is applied.” Ru the rfo rd Oi l8

Corp. v. Gene ral Land Off ice , 776 S.W .2d 232, 235 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no writ). Ther efor e, we hold t h at i f t h e Appellees raised va lid rule cha lleng es under the APA, the trial c ourt had

su bje c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n

t o c on sid e r t

he ir c la ims fo r b oth

de c larator

y and inj un c tiv e re lie f. To ho ld otherwise w ould nullify the relief afforde d by section 2001.038 of t he APA. See id. at 236 (stating t h at t o h o l d t h at s t at e a gen cy co u l d n o tb e e n j o i n edfr o map p l yi n g ru l e s u b j ec tt o v al i d i t y

ch al l en ge would “wholly

nullify ” pre dece ssor to section 2001.038 of APA). The De partment fur

ther c ontends that in o rd er to see k injunctive relief ag ainst the State, the Appellee s must bring a valid ultra vires c laim ag ainst a s t at e o fficia l, as opposed to the ag ency i t s elf. See H

einrich , 2 84 S.W. 3d

a t 37 3. We d isa g re e . Wh ile the su pr e me c ourt

he ld i n Heinrich that cer

tain ty pes of ultra

vires suits must be broug ht ag ainst a state official, rather than the State or its subdivisi ons, the court noted that this rule did not apply to “claims ch al l enging the validity of ordinanc es or statutes,” beca use t he UDJ A “requires that the re levant g overnme nt entities be made parties, and there by waives imm unity ” for such validi ty claims. Id. a t 3 7 3 n . 6 ( c it in g T e x. Ci v. Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 3 7. 00 6( b) ). Simi larl y , th e APAre qu ir e s th a t th e re le va nt s tate ag ency be made a party to any action cha lleng ing the validity of an a g ency

rule, a nd there by

waives the ag ency ’s i mmunity with respe ct to such rule c halleng es. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.038(c ) (“The state ag ency

must be made a

party to the action.”)

. 2. Does the AP

A Apply? Havingdeter

mined that subject-matter jurisdiction i s est ablished by the APA for

a g e nc y ru le c ha lle ng e s, we mus t no w d e te rm ine wh e the r t he Ap pe lle e s a c tua lly

ra ise d v a lid

ru le challeng es under

the APA in this case. As a preliminary matter, section 2001.038 require s that the9

challeng ed action be “a rule.” See Tex. Gov’t C ode Ann. § 2001.038(a)

. Whil e ther e is no doubt that Rules 15.24 and 15.171 are ag ency rules, a closer examination is require d to de termine whe ther the D ep ar t m en t ’s S ep t em b er 2 0 0 8 i n t ern al m em o ra n d

u m qu al i fi es as a “ ru l e” t h at m ay b e c h al l enged under the APA.

Section 2001.003 of the APA de fines a r u l e as a state ag ency

statement of g ener al applicability

that “implements, interpre ts, or presc ribes law or pol icy ” or “ descr ibes the proc edure or pra ctice require ments of a state ag ency .” Te x . Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.003( 6) (West 2008). The definition of a r

ule “doe s not include a stateme nt reg arding o n l y the interna l manag ement or org anization of a state ag ency and not af

fec ting pr ivate rig hts or proce dures.” Id. The De partment’s September 2008 me mo r a

n d u m d e scribes inter

nal proc edure s to be taken by Depa rtment staff in or der to comply with Rule 15.171 and outlines the m ethods by which non-citiz ens are to be issued dr iver’s licenses indicating “ status dates” a s require d by that rule. S

ee Ru l e 15.171. The c omplained-of portion of the memora

ndum is a statement that non-c itiz en drive r’s lice nses will be produc ed “in a vertica l car d format with a r ed box around the pho t o gra p h , a s t atement at the top of the ca rd ( ‘ T e mp o r ar

y V is it o r ’ ) , an d

a s e c o n d ar y s tate me n t near th e p h o to g r a p hw h ic hw il l i n c lu d e th e []

s tatu s e xp ir a ti o n d a te
. ” B e c a u s e th e in c lu s io n o f a s tatu s d a te is r e qu ir e d b y Ru le 1 5

. 171, the memorandum doe s not refle ct rulemaking in c onnection with that issue, but merely reiter ates what is alrea dy contained in Rule 15.171. The question then becomes whethe r the “ Tempora ry Visitor” desig nation and the ve rtical for mat of the lice nses desc ribed in the memorandum constitute improper ag ency rulemaking

.L ic e n s e s is s u e d to in d iv id u a ls u n d e r th e a g e o f 2 1 ar e v e rti c a ll y o r ie n te d a s require d by 5 statute. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.1 23 (West 2007) (re quiring Depa rtment to “orient the information on the license to clear ly distinguish the [under 21] li cense from a lice nse that is issued to a per son who is 21 y ear s of ag e or olde r”)

. 10

Not ever y administrativ e p ro n o u n ceme nt is a rule within the meaningof the APA. See Texas E d

u c. A g en cy v. Leepe r , 893 S.W .2d 432, 443 (Tex. 1994). In order to be consider ed state me nts of “ g e ne ra l a

pp lic a bil ity” a s de sc ri be d in

se c tio n 2 00 1. 00 3( 6) , a g e nc y pr on ounc e me nts must “aff ect the inter est of the public at larg e such that they cannot be g iven the eff ect of law w ithout public input.” Railroad Comm’n v. W BD Oil &Gas Co. , 104 S.W .3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2003). Ag ency statements that “have no leg al eff ect on private persons” are not considere d rules. Brinkley v . Texas Lottery Comm’n , 986 S.W .2d 764, 770 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.).

The Appe llees have not identified any public interest in ensuringthat all qualified applicant s re ceive a horizontally oriented dr iver’s lice nse or a driver’ s license f

ree from any “Te mp o ra ry Vi s i tor” de signation. The Appe llees have also failed to identify any leg al ef fec t on 5 private pe rsons as a r esult of the De partment’s policy

. I t is undisputed that the vertica lly oriented driver’ s licenses, includingthe “Te mporary Visitor” desig nation, rema in valid Texas driver’s licenses, de spite their non-standa rd appe ara

nce. T he De p ar tment’s internal policy reg ardingthe appea ranc e of dr iver’s lice nses as outlined in the memora ndum does not aff

ect the inter est of the pu bli c su c h th a t it

c ann ot b e a lte re d w ith out pu bli c inp ut, no r doe s it have any le g a l e ff e c t on pr ivate p er s o n s . On that basis, we hold that the D epar tment’s September 2008 me morandum does not qualify as a rule unde r the APA. See W BD Oil &Gas Co. , 1 04 S.W. 3d a t 79 ; Brinkley , 986 S.W .2d

a t 77 0; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.003(6).As the supre me cour t expl ained in Heinrich , u ltr a vir e s suit s may on ly be br ou g ht a g a ins t 6 the re l ev an t governme nt actors in their of ficial c apac ity , rathe r than the state ag ency itself. See 284 S.W .3d at 373. There fore , even if we de termine that the A

ppellees ha

ve ra ised a va lid ultra vires cl ai m wi t h re s p ec tt o t h e S ep t em b er 2 0 0 8 m em o ra n d

u m , t h a t c l ai m re m ai n s b arre d b y s o v er ei gn immunit y to the extent it is broug ht ag ainst any party other than the Direc tor of the De partment. 11 Be cause the Depa

rtment’s interna l memorandum does not qua lify as a rule unde r the APA, section 2001.038 does not c onfer subject-matter jurisdiction on the trial cour t to consider the Ap pe lle e s’ re qu e st fo r de c larator y and inj un c tiv e re lie f wi th re sp e c t t o t he mem or and um. See ge nerally Entertainment Publ’ns , 292 S.W .3d at 723 (fir st r es o l v ing issue of whether ag ency action constituted rule u n d er AP A i n the af firmative be fore concludingthat trial court ha d jurisdiction to consider validity challeng e).

3. Subject-M

atter Jurisdiction Under the UDJ A: The Septe mber 2008 Me morandum Whil e the Appe lle es al s o s ee krelief under the UDJA, the UDJ A is not a g ener al waiver of sover eig n immunit y

and does not e nlarg e a tr ial court’s ju ri s d i ct i o n . See H einrich , 28 4 S. W.3 d at 37 0; State of Texas v. BP Am . Prod. Co. , 2 90 S.W. 3d 34 5, 36 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 2009, pet. filed). T here fore , if the memora n d u m re p rese nts an ac t within the lega l authority and dis c re tio n of the Di re c tor , any c ha lle ng e to the me mor and um re pr e se nts an a tte mpt

to c on tr ol s tate action and is barr ed by sovere ign immunity

. See H einrich , 284 S.W .3d at 372. On the other hand, i f a p art y a l l e g e s , an d

c anu l t i m a t e l y p r o v e , t h a t a s t a t e o f f i c i a l h a s a c t e d o u t s i d e h i s l e g a l a u t h o r i t y, that party ’s ul tra vires claims are considere d attempts to reasse rt the control of the State and a

re not b ar r e d b y s o v e r e i g ni m m u n i t y. See id. 612 Howeve r, bec ause the Appellee s lack standing under the UDJA, we need not rea ch the i ssue of

w h e th e r th e y h av e r a is e d

a v a li d u lt r a v ir e s c la im

a ll e g in g a c ts b e y o n d

th e D ir e c to r’s authority . Whil e private par ties may seek declar atory relief in connec tion with an alleg ed ultra vire s act, “ [a] decla

ratory judgme nt require s a jus ticiable controversy as to the rig hts and status of par ties actua lly befor e the court for adjudication, and the decla ration soug ht must actua lly re s o l v e t he controve rsy .” Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n , 14 1 S.W. 3d 15 8, 16 3- 64 (T e x. 20 04 ). To es tab lish standing under the UDJA, the Appellees must show “a particula rized, leg ally

protec ted intere st that is actua lly or imminently

aff ecte d by the alleg ed har

m.” Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v . City of Dripping Springs ,

_

_ S. W. 3 d

_

_ _ ,

_ _ _ , N o . 0 3

- 0 4

- 0 0 6 8 3

- CV , T e x. Ap p . L E X I S 5 1 1 4 , a t * 2 3 ( T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin

20 09 , n o p e t. h .) . A s disc us se d ab ov e , the Ap pe lle e s hav e no t alle g e d a ny c og niza ble le g a l e ff e c t on pr ivate pe rs on s a s a

re su lt o f t

he De pa rtme nt’ s Se pte mbe r 20 08 me mor and um, a s it

mere ly alters the a

ppear ance of ce rtain driver’ s licenses. The Appellee s have not shown that r ece ipt of a Te x as d ri v er’s license that is standar d in appea ranc e, as oppose d to vertica lly oriented a

nd stamped with a “ Tempora

ry V is it or” de signation, is a recognizable leg ally protec ted intere st. On that basis, we h o ld that the Appellee s have not e stablished standing to challeng e the De partment’s Septem b er 2008 me morandum under the UDJA, and there fore that the trial cour t lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction to resolve the issue.To the e xten t th e Ap pe lle e s a lso se e k re lie f un de r the UD JA in c onne c tio n wi th the se ru le 7 challeng es, we dismiss those claims for wa nt of jurisdiction on the g round that a pa rty may not seek relief under the UDJA whe n such relief would be re dundant to relief under the APA. Se e Te

x as Sta te Bd. of Plumbing Exam’rs v . Associated Plumb i n g-He ating-Cooling Contractors of T ex., I nc. , 31 S .W .3 d 75 0, 75 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 00 , p e t. d ism ’d

by a g r. ) ( “ Whe n a

pla int if f f ile s a proce eding that only challeng es t he validit y of an a dminist rative r ule, the par

ties are bound by

the APA and may

not seek re lief under

the UDJA beca

use such r elief w ould be re dundant.”)

. 13 4. Standing Under the APA: Rules 15.24 and 15.171 W e n o w t u rn t o t h e q u e s t i o no f w h et h er t h e A p p el l ee s h av e s t an d i n g t o ch al l en ge Rules 15.24 and 15.171 under the APA. I n order to have standingunder se ction 2001.038, the 7 Ap pe ll ees m us t h ave al legedth at t he ch all enged r ul es o r t hei r threa ten ed ap pl ica ti on “in ter fe re [] wit h

o r im p a ir [], o r thr e a te n [] to inte r f e r e w it h o r im p a ir , a le g a l r igh t or

p r iv il e g e o f

th e p la in ti f

f

. ” T e x. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.038.

W h i l e a driver’ s license is not a leg al rig ht, it is c onsidered a privileg e. See Tex as Dep’ t of Pub. Safety v. Sc haejbe , 687 S.W .2d 727, 728 (Tex. 1985) . Appellee s Salazar, Soria, and T re j o h av e all alleg ed that due to their immigration status, they are not eligible to obtain Te x as driver’ s licenses unde r Rules 15.24 and 15.171. Unde r t hese r ules, a non-c itiz en’s immigr ation do c ume ntatio n fr om the fe de ra l go ve rnme nt mus t hav e be e n ori g ina lly iss ue d f or a pe ri od of a t le a st one y ear . Salazar, S oria, and Trejo work in the Unit ed S tates throug h the fe dera l H-2B prog ram on visas issued for a period of approximately ten months. W hile they

g ener ally rec eive e x tensions from the fe dera l gove rnment, the fa ct that their visas a re or igina lly

issued for a period of less than a y ear preve nts them from obtaining a Te x as driver ’s license under the new r ules. As a r esult, Sala z ar, Soria, and Tr ejo have demonstrated that the new r ules interfe re with the ir privileg e to obtain a Texas driver’ s license, g iving them standingto challeng e the r ules under se ction 2001.038 of the APA.14 Gre en Mea dows alleg es that it relies on H-2B worke rs in conductingits landscaping business, and t hat due to the s easona l nature of its business, the H-2B visa s it requests for its worke rs
are valid for a

period of te n months. Bec ause the visas h el d b y the H-2B worke rs employ ed by Gre en Mea dows are valid for less than one y ear , these wor kers a re pr eclude d from obtaining a Te x as driver’ s license unde r t h e n ew rules. Ac cordingto Gree n Meadow s, it cannot employ worke rs without driver’s lice nses as for emen, be cause the fore men must be able to drive work c rew s from one job site to another. G ree n Meadow s further contends that the resulting shortag e of f oreme n has pr e ve nte d it

fr om f ulf ill ingob lig a tio ns to i ts l and sc a pin g c us tom e rs . The abilit y of an employ er to participate i n fede ral guest-wor ker pr og rams, such a s the H-2B prog ram, is a pr ivilege cre ated by fede ral law

. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)( 15)(H) (ii)(a ) (We st Su pp . 2 00 9) . G re e n M e a do ws ha s a lle g e d th a t the De pa rtme nt’ s n e w r

ule s thre a te n to imp a ir th is privilege by

preve nting its H-2B employ ees f rom obtaining Texas driver’ s licenses, thus limiti ng Gre en Mea dows’s ability

to utili ze these employ ees in its business. There fore , we hold that Gr een Meadow s has suffic iently established standingto challeng e the ne w rules unde r the APA. Appellee Gomez, wh o h o ld s a T e xa s Cl a s s B c ommercia l driver’ s license, a lleg es that he wa s d e nie d a

Cla ss Adr ive r’ s p e rm it i n M arc h 20 09 a s a re su lt of the De pa rtme nt’ s n e w r

ule s, despite having taken and passed the required written examination. The recor d ref lects that Gomez’s immigration documentation is valid from Marc h 10, 2009, to September 9, 2010. Gomez testified at the tempora

ry -injunction hear ing that he applied f or the Class A permit sometime in Marc h 2009. When asked whe ther he applied for a C lass A per mit before or

afte r Mar ch 10, 2009, Gomez responde d, “I

think b ef o re . ” However , the trial cour t later a sked Gomez whethe r he pr ovided theFor the same rea son, even if we considere d Gomez’s rule c halleng e to be a valid ultra vires 8 claim under

the UDJA, he has fa iled t o establish a justiciable c ontroversy and ther efor e lac ks sta nd ingun de r t

he UD JA a s w e ll. 15 immigration document enter ed into evidenc e—the document ref lectingthat his valid imm igr ation status ext ends fr om March 10, 2009, to Septe mber 9, 2010—whe n applying f or the lice nse, and Go me z an sw e re d, “ Cor

re c t.” I t is un c le ar why

Gomez was denie d th e Cla ss Ape rm it, a s h is imm ig ratio n d oc ume nt w a s v a lid fo r m or e tha

n o ne y e ar at th e tim e it w a s is su e d a nd re ma ine d v a lid fo r m or e tha

n s ix mon ths a t th e tim e he a pp lie d f or the lic e ns e. I f the pr ob le m st e mme d f ro m hi s
a pp lying fo r the lic e ns e pr ior to the Marc h 1 0, 20 09 e ff e c tiv e date of

his imm ig ra

tio n d oc ume nt, it would have be en re medied on that date , and in fa ct , Gomez’s immigration document rema ins sufficie nt to obtain a license under the new rules until Mar ch 2010, at which time it will no longe r have six mont hs of validity rema ining. B ecau s e Gom ez has not established that Rules 15.24 and 15.171 have inter fer ed with or impaired his ability to obtain a Class A license, w e hold that he lac ks standing to challeng e Rule 15.24 and 15.171 unde r the APA. 8

Simi larly , appellee Galvan ha s not e stablished that the Depa rtment’s newrules have imp a ir e d o r i nte rf

e re d w itha

le g a l r ig ht o r p ri vil e g e . T he Depart men t con c e de s th a t G a lva n, a s a leg al per manent re sident of the United States, wa s entitled to a standar d license r efle cting an
e xp ir a ti o nd a te s ix ye ar s f r o m t h e d a te it w a s is s u e d , b u t t

h a t h e w a s is s u e d

a v e rti c a ll y

o r ie nted license stampe d “Te mporary Visitor” by mistake. Whil e thi s turn of eve nts is unfortunate, it is not an indication Rule 15.24 or Rule 15.171 impairs or interf ere s with or threatens to impair or interf ereL ike Go me z, G a lva n h a s a lso fa ile d to e sta

bli sha jus tic iab le con tr ov e rs y

that w ou ld 9 g ive him standing unde r the UD J A in the eve nt of a va lid ultra vires claim re g ardingthe De pa rtme nt’ s r ule s. I n light of our

holding on the jur isdictional q u es t ion, we nee d only deter mine whether 10 Gr ee n M ea d ows, Salazar, Soria, a nd Trejo e stablished the eleme nts nece ssary to entitle them to a temporar y injunction, as the rema ining a ppellees ha

ve bee n dismiss ed. 16 with Galvan’ s leg al privileg e to obtain a Te x as driver ’s license

. T h er ef o re, G alvan ha s not

e sta bli sh e d s tand ingto c ha lle ng e the se ru le s. 9

I n light of the fore g oing, w e hold that the trial court pr operly exercised subjec t-matter jurisdiction o v er the challeng es to Rules 15.24 and 15.171 broug ht by Gre en Mea dows, Salazar, Soria, and Tr ejo under section 2001.038 of the APA. The Appe llees’ c halleng e to the De partment’s September 2008 me morandum, Gomez and Ga lvan’s rule challeng es, and all claims raised pur suant to the UDJA, are dismissed for w ant of jurisdiction. Temporar y Injun ction We now turn to the Depa

rtment’s sec ond issue on appea l, in which it argues that the trial court a

bused its disc retion in determining that the Appellee s established the e lements nec essar y to entitle them to a temporar y injunction. Se e W

all ing v . M e tc alf e , 863 S.W .2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993) 10 ( s tati n g th a t tr ia l c o u rt’ s d e c is io n to g r an t o r d e n y te mp o r ar y in ju n c ti o n is r e v ie w e d f

o r a b u s e of dis c re tio n) . “ To ob ta in a te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n, the a

pp lic ant m

us t pl e a d a

nd pro ve thre e sp e c if

ic elements: (1) a cause of action aga inst the defendant; (2) a probable right t o the relief s oug ht; and (3) a probable , imminent, a n d irrepa rable injury

in the interim.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W .3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002).17 I n support of the a

rgum ent that they

would suffe r a pr obable, imminent, and irrepa r a b le in ju r y in th e a b s e n c e o f a te mp o r ar y in ju n c ti o n , Sa la za

r , So r ia , an d

T r e jo c o n te n d

tha t the Depa rtment’s newrules pre vent them from obtainingTex as driver’s license s, which in turn preve nts them from rec eiving promotions at work and forc es them to r ely on others for tra nsportation to work or to obtain medica l car e if ne eded. G ree n M ea d o ws argues that application of the Depa rtment’s rules w ould disrupt its business by restric ting the numbe r of e mploy ees that can a ct as for emen a

nd drive wor

k cre ws to various job sites. Th e De pa rtme nt as se rt s, ho we ve r, that e ve n v ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the tria l court’s orde r, as we must to do i n revie wing a tempora ry injunction,

se e CRC -E v an s Pi pe lin e In t’ l, In c . v . M

y e rs , 927 S.W .2d 259, 262 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ), the Appellee s have failed to e stablish a probable , imminent, and irrepa rable injury that they would suffe r in the abse nce of a tempora

ry injunction. Establishing proba

ble, imminent, and irrepa rable injury

require s proof of a

n actua l threat ened injury , as opposed to a spe culative or purely conjec tural one. Da lla s G e ne ra l D riv e rs, W arehouseme n & Helpers v . W amix, Inc

. , 295 S.W .2d 873, 879 (Tex. 1956) . Fe ar or appre hension of possible injury

is insufficient to support a finding of imminent injury

. Frey v . DeCordova Be nd Estates Owners Ass’n , 647 S.W .2d 2 4 6 , 2 4 8 (Tex. 1983). The que stion of whether a proba ble, imm ine nt, and

ir re pa ra ble inj ur y e xists to w arr ant i nju

nc tiv e re lie f is a leg a l qu e sti on fo r t he c ourt
. O p e r a ti o n R e s c u e - Na ti onal v. Planned Pare nthood , 9 7 5 S

. W

. 2 d 5 4 6 , 5 5 4 (T ex . 1 9 9 8 ). Fu rt hermore , a tempora ry injunction will not be g rant ed “w h er e there is a plain and a dequate reme dy at law.” Mc Gloth lin v . Kl ie be rt , 672 S.W .2d 231, 232 (Tex. 1984).Ba sed on the testimony provided at the temporar y -injunction hear ing, it appe ars that 11 Salazar holds a license from Mex ico, but that Soria and Trejo do not. Howeve r, t he question at iss ue here is whether a

n adequate re medy is available, not whe ther the pa rties have actua lly

availed themselves of that remedy . Fur thermore , “[t] he lac k of an a d eq u at e re m edy is not shown by

the m er e fa ct t h at the re medy provided would involve more expense or dela y .” Ke n d a ll A p p r a is al Dist. v. Cordill er a Ranch, Ltd. , No. 04-03-00150- CV, 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 6293, at *10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio J uly 23, 2003, no pet.) (c itin g Ca na dia n H e lic op te rs L td. v . W

itt ig , 876 S.W .2d 304, 306 (Tex. 1994)). 18

To the extent Salazar, Soria, and Tr ejo cite their inability to drive in Texas for purp os es of d

ri vin g to w or

k, ob ta ini ngfo od

and oth e r n e c e ssi tie s, or

se e kin g me dic a l c are if

nece ssary , there are alternatives to a standar d Texas driver’ s license that c reate an a dequate reme dy to this pot ential har

m. Section 521.030 of the transportation c ode provides that a non-re sident from an appr oved countr

y of re sidence who holds a license in his or her country of re sidence may

rely on that rec iproca l licens e t o leg ally drive in Texas without obtaining a Texas driver’ s license. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.030 (West 2007). Mexi co, the country of re sidence for Salazar , Soria, and Trejo, is on the list of approve d countries for the use of r ecipr ocal lice nses. See 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 15.91(b)( 6) (2009) (Tex. D ep’t of Pub. Saf ety , I nt’l Reciproc ity). Rule 15.91 also provides that “[r]eciproca l privileg es ar e limited to private vehicles. Carria g e of

. . . g oods other than pe rsonal bag g ag e of the occupa

nts of the vehicle s is not authoriz ed.” Id. § 15.91(d)( 2). This would appe ar to exclude any

transportingof landsca

ping w ork cr ews and their equipment. Howe ver, f or eve ryday driving purposes, the statute a nd regulation authorizing reciproc al l icense s fore close Salazar, Soria , and Tr e jo f ro m arguin g tha

t in the a bs e nc e of a te mpo ra

ry inj un c tio n, the y

wo uld su ff e r i mmi ne nt, i r r e p ar a b l e i n j u r y f o r w h i c h t h e r e i s n o a d e qu a t e r e m e dy. 1119 Salazar, Soria, and Trejo further argue that beca use they are unable to obtain Te x as dr ive r’ s lic e ns e s, the y are un a ble to se e k pr omo tio ns a t wo rk , a s the po sit ion of fo re man r e qu ir e s a dr ive r’ s li c e ns e . Sa la zar , So ri a , a nd Tr e jo h a ve pr e se nte d n o e vid e nc e tha t th e y are oth e rw ise qualified or e ligible f

or a pr omotion to t he position of fore man. As a re sult, their inability to seek

a po ssi ble pr omo tio n with out a Te xas d ri ve r’ s li c e ns e do e s n ot r e pr e se nt a n im min e nt i nju

ry , b ut a specula tive or mere ly

conjec tural one. Se e Bu tna ru , 84 S.W .3d at 204 (stating that applicant f or te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n h a s b ur de n o f p le a di ng and prov ingpr ob a ble , immin e nt, and

ir re pa ra ble injury). Ther efor e, we h o l d that Salazar, Soria, and T rejo do not mee t the require d elements of temporar y injunctive relief

. Simi larly , Gre en Mea d o ws ’s asser tion that it wil l eventually run out of emplo y ee s el i gi ble to work a s fore men is merely conjec tural, and doe s not repre sent the ty pe of imm ine nt, ir

re pa ra ble inj ur y re qu ir e d to qu a lif

y fo r te mpo ra

ry inj un c tiv e re lie f. F ur

the rm or e , w hil e Gre en Mea dows argues that it is ha rmed by its inability to pr omote from within the company , there is no indication that Gre en Meadows i s in any way prec luded from hiring additional employ ees w ho possess valid Texas driver’ s licenses to ser ve as foreme n. As a re sult, Green Me adows ha s not shown that its inability to pr omote from within cre ates a probable , imminent, and irrepa rable injury f o r w h i c h t h e r e i s n o o t h e r

a d e qu a t e r e m e dy. Ba sed on our c onclusion that t h e Ap p el l ees have fa iled to establish the exis tence of a pr o b a

b le , immi n e n t, ir

r e p ar a b le in ju r y f o r w h ic h th e r e is n o a d e qu a te r e me dy , w e h old that the trial cour

t abused its discretion in t em p o ra rily enjoining the Depa

rtment from e nforc ing Rules 15.171 and 15.24.20 CO NC LU SION We h old that th e c ha lle ng e s to Rul e s 15 .2 4 and 15 .1 71 br ou g ht by Gr e e n M e a do ws , Salazar, Soria, an d T re

j o are not barr ed by

sovere ign immunity . Howeve r, bec ause the nece ssary elements for

tempora ry i n

j u n ct ive re lief we re not met, we reve rse the tr ial court’s or der issuing injunctive relief

with respec t to those claims. All of Appellee s’ re maining c laims are dismissed for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction on the basis of sovere ign immunity

.

_________________

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Waldrop and He nson Reverse d and Rende red in Part, Dismissed in Part Filed: De cembe r 31, 2009