UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5115

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff – Appellee, 

v. 

JOEL RAMIREZ-MONTANEZ, a/k/a Gilberto Ramirez, a/k/a 

Herbert Ramirez, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief 

District Judge. (3:11-cr-00118-JRS-1) 

Submitted: May 30, 2012 Decided: June 4, 2012 

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Elizabeth W. 

Hanes, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, 

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Richard D. 

Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Joel Ramirez-Montanez (“Ramirez”) pled guilty, 

pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of illegally 

reentering the United States after having been removed following 

conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(a), (b)(2) (2006). In the plea agreement, Ramirez 

reserved the right to challenge the district court’s denial of 

his motion to suppress evidence of his identity obtained 

following a stop of the pickup truck in which he was a 

passenger. Ramirez argues on appeal that he was unreasonably 

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by officers with 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and that the 

evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal 

seizure. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

We review for clear error the factual findings 

underlying a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress and 

the court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Foster, 

634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). When evaluating the denial 

of a suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Government, the party prevailing below. 

Id. 

Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a law 

enforcement officer “may conduct a brief investigatory stop 

where the officer has reasonable suspicion [but not probable 
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cause to believe] that criminal activity may be afoot.” 

United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). 

To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a temporary stop must be 

“justified at its inception” and “reasonably related in scope to 

the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 

place.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Officers may 

stop a suspect when they can “point to specific and articulable 

facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 

facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. at 21. Courts 

are to judge those facts “against an objective standard: would 

the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 

seizure . . . warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the 

belief that the action taken was appropriate?” Id. at 21-22 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

A Terry or investigative stop may become a full-scale 

arrest requiring probable cause under certain circumstances. 

“The test for determining whether an individual is in custody or 

under arrest is whether, under the totality of the 

circumstances, the suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a 

degree associated with formal arrest.” Park v. Shiflett, 

250 F.3d 843, 850 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) 

(explaining that, instead of being distinguished by the absence 

of any restriction of liberty, Terry stops differ from custodial 
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interrogation in that they must last no longer than necessary to 

verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion). 

After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we 

conclude that the district court correctly determined that the 

initial stop of the pickup truck was a Terry stop supported by 

reasonable suspicion. We find no merit to Ramirez’ assertion

that the stop of the truck was transformed into a full-scale 

arrest requiring probable cause by the ICE officers’ attire, 

alleged armaments, and positioning of their vehicles relative to 

the truck. United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109 

(4th Cir. 1995). We further conclude that the officers’ 

confirmation of Ramirez’ identity during the stop provided the 

probable cause necessary to support his subsequent arrest. 

United States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 2012). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED