IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on September 11, 2013

MICHELLE JAYNE ADAMS v. JAMES EARL ADAMS, III

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Maury County

No. 11190 Stella L. Hargrove, Judge

No. M2013-00577-COA-R3-CV - Filed September 17, 2013

This is an appeal from a “Final Decree of Divorce.” Because the decree does not resolve all

the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court;

Appeal Dismissed

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR. and ANDY D. BENNETT, JJ., joined.

Martin A. Kooperman, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, James Earl Adams, III.

S. Jason Whatley, Sr., Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellee, Michelle Jayne Adams.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

This appeal arises out of a divorce action filed by Michelle Jayne Adams (“Wife”)

against James Earl Adams, III (“Husband”) in the Chancery Court for Maury County. On

January 24, 2013, the trial court entered a “Final Decree of Divorce.” However, the decree

reserved for a further hearing the distribution of certain personal property in storage, the

distribution of the parties’ eight burial plots, and Husband’s ongoing child support obligation.

Tenn. R. Ct. App. 10 states: 1

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse

or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion

would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall

be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited

or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
Moreover, the decree provided that “[t]o the extent that any monies are remaining still owed

to Wife, either from her equitable distribution or for the alimony in solido owed to the same,

the same shall be brought before the court for final disposition unless otherwise agreed upon

by the parties.” Finally, the trial court reaffirmed a restraining order prohibiting Husband

from having any contact with the minor children, but reserved the right to review, upon

motion, Husband’s visitation and communication with the children. On February 14, 2013,

Husband filed a motion seeking parenting time and communication with the children. The

record does not contain an order resolving Husband’s motion. Husband filed his notice of

appeal on February 25, 2013.

A party is entitled to an appeal as of right only after the trial court has entered a final

judgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a); King v. Spain, No. M2006-02178-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL

3202757 at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. October 31, 2007). A final judgment is a judgment that

resolves all the claims between all the parties, “leaving nothing else for the trial court to do.”

State ex rel. McAllister v. Goode, 968 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). An order that

adjudicates fewer than all the claims between all the parties is subject to revision at any time

before the entry of a final judgment and is not appealable as of right. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a).

The record on appeal was filed with the clerk of this court on May 21, 2013. Upon

review of the record, this court determined that the decree appealed was not final because of

the numerous issues reserved by the trial court as well as Husband’s pending motion seeking

parenting time and communication with the children. Accordingly, the court ordered the

parties either to obtain a final order from the trial court within ninety days or else to show

cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. Although more than ninety days have now

passed, the parties have neither obtained a final judgment nor otherwise responded to the

show cause order.

The appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of a final judgment without prejudice to the

filing of a new appeal once a final judgment has been entered. The case is remanded to the

trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The costs of the appeal are

taxed to James Earl Adams, III and his surety for which execution may issue.

PER CURIAM

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