NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JERAD COMAYAN WOODLEY, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 21-0131

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-159217-001

The Honorable Suzanne E. Cohen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jana Zinman

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Mikel Steinfeld

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 7-19-2022
STATE v. WOODLEY

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Jerad Comayan Woodley appeals his convictions and 

sentences for second-degree burglary and possession of burglary tools. He 

argues the superior court erred in granting the State’s motion to consolidate 

his two cases into a single jury trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In November 2017, law enforcement officers stopped 

Woodley, searched his car, and found stolen items from a burglary that 

occurred days prior. Woodley was released but the stolen items were 

seized. Police began investigating Woodley for a string of burglaries 

occurring in Maricopa County. At the same time, police conducted a

separate investigation into Trevin Island, who they also believed was

involved in the burglaries. Police placed a GPS tracking device on Island’s

BMW.

¶3 On December 23rd, detectives watched as Island met

Woodley at a gas station in Mesa. Woodley got into the passenger seat of 

Island’s BMW, and they drove off together. Detectives surveilled the two

as they drove around a gated residential neighborhood, making stops along 

the way. One of the stops at a residence lasted about forty-five minutes.

Detectives watched as Island got out of the BMW and walked towards the 

residence. Ten minutes later detectives heard a loud bang or crashing noise.

Roughly half-an-hour after that Island returned to the BMW and the two 

drove off. Detectives then went to the residence where they saw a broken

glass door leading into the garage, a damaged (and open) door leading into 

the home, and the appearance that things in the home were rummaged 

through, including open drawers in the primary bedroom. 

1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions 

with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” State v. 

Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996).
STATE v. WOODLEY

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 Police continued to surveille Woodley and Island. After 

Island cut himself at another residence, the two drove back to the gas 

station. Woodley exited the driver’s seat of the BMW. Island then got into 

the driver’s seat and drove away. When police announced their presence, 

Woodley attempted to run, but was immediately forced to the ground and 

arrested. Island was arrested a couple of hours later while leaving an urgent 

care facility where he was treated for injuries from his cut. At the time of 

arrest, Woodley had jewelry and a loaded handgun, which were stolen 

items from previous burglaries. Police also searched Woodley’s car and 

found other stolen items such as purses and a backpack that contained

fifteen to twenty pounds of jewelry.

¶5 Woodley was indicted for second-degree burglary, 

possession of burglary tools, and misconduct involving weapons related to 

the residential burglary on December 23rd.

2 Months later, he was 

separately indicted on one count of first-degree burglary, six counts of 

second-degree burglary, and three counts of possession of burglary tools,

all relating to several other burglaries that occurred between November

and December 2017.

¶6 In July 2019, the State moved to consolidate Woodley’s two 

cases for trial. At a final management conference on August 12th, Woodley, 

through counsel, acknowledged he was late in filing a written response to 

the State’s motion, indicated his objection orally, and asked the court for a

two-day extension to file a written response. The court instructed Woodley 

to respond in writing before the morning of August 19th. By August 26th, 

the court still had not received Woodley’s written objection and so prepared 

an order granting the State’s motion to consolidate. The order was not filed 

with the clerk’s office, however, until the following day. In the meantime, 

also on August 26th, Woodley filed his written response objecting to 

consolidation. Though the record suggests the superior court may have, at 

least in part, joined the indictments after considering Arizona Rule of 

Evidence 404, something which the court and parties briefly discussed on 

August 12th, the written order stated “[n]o response having been received,” 

as its basis for consolidation. The cases remained consolidated for trial.

¶7 The jury was presented with the following twelve counts at 

trial: seven counts of second-degree burglary (Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11), four

2 The misconduct involving weapons count was later dismissed upon the 

State’s motion.
STATE v. WOODLEY

Decision of the Court

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counts of possession of burglary tools (Counts 3, 5, 10, 12),3 and one count 

of first-degree burglary (Count 7).

¶8 The jury convicted Woodley of the charges relating to the 

residential burglary on December 23rd (Counts 11 and 12) but was unable 

to reach a verdict on all remaining counts arising on dates other than 

December 23rd and occurring at different locations. The superior court 

declared a mistrial on all remaining counts. 

¶9 As to Counts 11 and 12, the jury found the following 

aggravating circumstances: (1) the offenses involved the presence of an 

accomplice; (2) the offenses were committed as consideration for the 

receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; 

and (3) the offense caused physical, emotional, or financial harm to the 

victim. Based upon Woodley’s three prior felony convictions, the court 

sentenced Woodley to slightly aggravated concurrent prison terms of 

thirteen years for second-degree burglary and four years for possession of 

burglary tools, with 1,203 days of presentence-incarceration credit for each 

count.

¶10 Woodley timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 

6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 

13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Woodley argues the superior court erred in granting the 

State’s motion to consolidate his two cases for trial because he offered 

different defenses in the two cases (mere presence for the case arising

December 23rd and denial of his presence altogether in the other case) and 

the primary reasons for joinder applied to Island, not to Woodley.4 The 

State contends the court did not err because the cases were properly joined 

under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.3(a)(1)-(2), Woodley’s 

defenses were not antagonistic, and he suffered no harm from any alleged 

error as “the evidence of the crimes in either case would have been 

3 Count 5 was later dismissed on the State’s motion.

4 Woodley also argues the superior court erred when it “made no findings 

of fact or conclusions of law” in granting the motion to consolidate. But 

Woodley provides no legal authority suggesting the court was obligated to 

do so. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(7) (requiring appellant provide citations to 

legal authorities for each contention made on appeal).
STATE v. WOODLEY

Decision of the Court

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cross-admissible in separate trials under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) 

and the evidence overwhelmingly supported his conviction.”

¶12 We will not disturb a superior court’s ruling regarding 

joinder or severance absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Prince, 204 

Ariz. 156, 159, ¶ 13 (2003). In considering whether the superior court erred, 

“we are mindful that the [superior] court exercises considerable discretion 

in determining whether, in light of the evidence then before the court, the 

defendant has made the requisite showing of prejudice.” State v. Van 

Winkle, 186 Ariz. 336, 339 (1996).

¶13 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.3(a) provides offenses 

may be joined into one proceeding “if they: (1) are of the same or similar 

character; (2) are based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected 

together in their commission; or (3) are alleged to have been a part of a 

common scheme or plan.” “If the offenses fit into one or more of these

categories, Rule 13.3(c) authorizes consolidation of separately charged cases 

in whole or in part ‘provided that the ends of justice will not be defeated 

thereby.’” State v. Williams, 183 Ariz. 368, 375 (1995) (quoting State v. 

Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. 441, 445 (1985)). However, because the rules 

governing joinder and severance must be read together, State v. Curiel, 130 

Ariz. 176, 183 (App. 1981), a defendant is entitled to have the offenses 

severed as a matter of right when they are joined by virtue of Rule 13.3(a)(1) 

“unless evidence of the other offense or offenses would be admissible if the 

offenses were tried separately.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.4(b).

¶14 Here, the State argued in their motion to consolidate, and now 

again on appeal, that the offenses from the two cases (1) were of the same 

or similar character and that (2) the offenses were “otherwise connected” in 

their commission. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.3(a). Record evidence supports the

State’s position that the two cases were of the same or similar character. For 

example, they involved similar burglaries in affluent homes in Maricopa 

County, late in the evening while the owners were away, and the 

ransacking of the same parts of the home (primary bedroom area) for 

similar items.

¶15 The State further argued the offenses were “otherwise 

connected” in their commission. “Offenses are considered otherwise 

connected when ‘the offenses arose out of a series of connected acts, and the 

evidence as to each count, of necessity, overlaps;’ ‘where most of the

evidence admissible in proof of one offense [is] also admissible in proof of 

the other;’ or ‘where there [are] common elements of proof in the joined 
STATE v. WOODLEY

Decision of the Court

6

offenses.” State v. Garland, 191 Ariz. 213, 217, ¶ 14 (App. 1998) (quoting 

Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. at 446).

¶16 Here, evidence of the two cases would be cross-admissible 

under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b). For example, record evidence 

includes that at the time of his arrest following the burglary charged from 

December 23rd, Woodley had items reported stolen from some of the 

burglaries charged in the other case, including jewelry and a loaded 

handgun. Upon searching his car, police also found other stolen items 

charged in the other case, including purses and a backpack that contained 

fifteen to twenty pounds of jewelry. See Garland, 191 Ariz. at 217, ¶ 14.

¶17 Moreover, the jury instructions mitigated any risk of 

prejudice that might have resulted from consolidation. See Prince, 204 Ariz. 

at 160, ¶ 17 (providing a defendant is not prejudiced by the denial of a 

severance “where the jury is instructed to consider each offense separately 

and advised that each must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt”). Here, 

the jury was instructed that each count is a separate and distinct offense, 

that they must decide each count separately on the evidence with the law 

applicable to it, “uninfluenced by [their] decision on any other count.”

¶18 Woodley has failed to show where the superior court abused

its discretion in consolidating for trial the charges from his two cases. See 

State v. Johnson, 212 Ariz. 425, 430, ¶ 14 (2006).

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Woodley’s convictions 

and sentences.