COLONIAL INVESTORS, LLC v. LOIS FURBUSH ET AL.

(AC 38303)

DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Schaller, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff owner of a mobile home park sought, by way of summary

process, to regain possession of certain premises leased to the defendant

in connection with the defendant’s alleged nonpayment of rent. The

defendant alleged several special defenses, including that the notice to

quit was legally insufficient, that certain charges assessed by the plaintiff

were improperly treated as part of her rent and thereby improperly

increased the amount of her arrearage, and that the plaintiff had misapplied a payment to the defendant’s arrearage rather than to her current

monthly rental obligation. The trial court rendered a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this

court. She claimed, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction due to the legal insufficiency of the notice to quit. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the notice to quit was

legally insufficient because it failed to inform her clearly of her statutory

(§ 21-80) right to avoid eviction by paying the total arrearage due within

thirty days of receipt; the notice to quit clearly specified the total arrearage due and adequately informed the defendant of her right to avoid

eviction by paying the total arrearage due within thirty days of receipt,

and the disclaimer in the notice to quit that any partial payments would

be accepted for use and occupancy only and not for rent was substantially similar to the use and occupancy disclaimer set forth in the general

summary process statute (§ 47a-23 [e]), which applied to mobile home

parks pursuant to § 21-80 (a), and, therefore, was not misleading or

ambiguous.

2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly

determined that it did not need to decide her second special defense,

in which she alleged that the plaintiff improperly imposed customer

service charges for utilities as rent and that the plaintiff’s charges for

utilities in excess of the defendant’s usage were illegal and could not

serve as a basis for an eviction for nonpayment of rent: that court, which

concluded that it did not need to find that the surcharges for the utilities

were excessive or against public policy because, even if they were not

enforced, there would still be an arrearage at the time that the notice

to quit was served, in effect rejected the defendant’s second special

defense as a basis for attacking the legal sufficiency of the notice to

quit; moreover, on the basis of the plain and unambiguous language of

the parties’ renewal rental agreement and the accompanying documents

related to the defendant’s billing, the customer service charges were

properly included as a component of the rent billed to the defendant,

and, therefore, the past arrearage due in the notice to quit was correct.

3. The trial court properly rejected the defendant’s claim in her second

special defense that the notice to quit included improper water charges

and, thus, was legally insufficient, which was based on her claim that

the plaintiff had engaged in illegal submetering in violation of the state

regulation (§ 16-11-55) that requires that submetering of water be

approved by the state Public Utilities Commission; that court properly

determined that the plaintiff submetered water from the Metropolitan

District Commission, which, by the plain language of the relevant statute

(§ 16-1 [a] [6]), was not subject to that regulation, and, therefore, the

notice to quit was not legally insufficient on that basis.

4. The trial court properly determined that the defendant’s April, 2014 payment was correctly applied to a past arrearage that was due rather

than to her current monthly rental obligation; because each monthly

statement given to the defendant included any balance remaining from

the previous month, and because the defendant often tendered payments

exceeding her monthly rental obligation, which lowered her past arrearage due, it was clear from the parties’ course of performance that the

defendant was aware that her payments were applied first to her total

arrearage due and then to her current rental obligation.
Argued February 1—officially released August 1, 2017

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, where the court, Woods, J., denied the named

defendant’s motion to dismiss; thereafter, the matter

was tried to the court; judgment for the plaintiff, from

which the named defendant appealed to this court; subsequently, the court, Woods, J., denied the named defendant’s motion for an articulation. Affirmed.

David A. Pels, with whom, on the brief, was Giovanna Shay, for the appellant (named defendant).

Colin P. Mahon, with whom was Thomas T. Lombardo, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SCHALLER, J. The defendant Lois Furbush1 appeals

from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the

plaintiff, Colonial Investors, LLC, in this summary process action. On appeal, the defendant claims that the

trial court(1)lacked subject matterjurisdiction overthe

summary process action due to the legal insufficiency

of the notice to quit and (2) improperly held that the

defendant’s April, 2014 payment to the plaintiff correctly was applied to her past arrearages that were due

rather than to her April, 2014 rent obligation. We affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s appeal. The plaintiff owns a

mobile home site in East Hartford known as Colonial

Mobile Home Park (park). The plaintiff leases the 460

lots in the park to tenants who own mobile homes. In

August 2012, the defendant, who owned and occupied

a mobile home, signed a one year rental agreement

for a lot, and, in August, 2013, the defendant signed a

renewal of rental agreement (renewal) for an additional

year. Pursuant to the rental agreement and renewal,

the defendant was to pay a base rent of $420, as well

as additional rent, which included utility charges for

kerosene, propane, and water.

By January, 2013, the defendant was in arrears on

her monthly rent payments. As of April 1, 2014, the

defendant had an outstanding arrearage of $1615.13.

This included base rent and additional rent. On April

11, 2014, the defendant made a $600 payment to the

plaintiff, which was applied to the outstanding arrearage. After said payment, the defendant had a remaining

balance of $1015.13.

On April 30, 2014, the plaintiff served the defendant

with a notice to quit possession of the premises on or

before June 2, 2014. The ground stated in the notice

was for nonpayment of rent totaling $1015.13. Pursuant

to the notice to quit, the defendant could avoid eviction

should she pay the total arrearage due within thirty

days of receipt of the notice. The defendant, however,

did not tender any payment to the plaintiff within the

thirty days.

Thereafter, on June 13, 2014, the plaintiff commenced

this summary process action. In its one count amended

complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed

to pay rent for the month of April, 2014, failed to tender

the total arrearage due to the plaintiff following the

receipt of the notice to quit, and subsequently failed to

quit possession of the premises by the time designated

in the notice to quit. On June 30, 2014, the defendant

filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction on the ground that the notice to quit was

legally insufficient. The trial court denied the motion

on July 23, 2014.
On October 14, 2014, the defendant filed an answer

and special defenses. The first special defense alleged

that the defendant tendered, and the plaintiff accepted,

rent for the month of April, 2014, prior to the delivery

of the notice to quit. The second special defense alleged

that the plaintiff submetered water at the park without

the necessary approval required by § 16-11-55 of the

Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. The third

special defense alleged thatthe notice to quit was legally

insufficient in that it did not state correctly the rent

due for April, 2014. After a trial before the court, the

trial court issued a written decision on August 21, 2015,

in which it rendered judgment of possession of the

premises for the plaintiff. The defendant then filed this

appeal. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

Before addressing the specifics of the defendant’s

claims, it is helpful to identify the legal principles

regarding summary process actions. ‘‘Summary process

is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an

expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to

obtain possession of leased premises without suffering

the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants

wrongfully holding their terms. . . . Summary process

statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination. . . . Therefore, the statutes relating to summary

process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan

v. Lazzari, 135 Conn. App. 831, 835, 43 A.3d 750, cert.

denied, 305 Conn. 925, 47 A.3d 884 (2012).

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over the summary process

action because the notice to quit was legally insufficient. Specifically, she argues that the notice to quit

failed to inform her clearly of her right to avoid eviction

by paying the total arrearage due within thirty days

of receipt. Moreover, she argues that the trial court

improperly failed to consider her special defenses that

the customer service charges were imposed improperly

as rent and that the water was submetered illegally,

which led to the significant inflation of the past arrearage due as stated in the notice to quit.

Our Supreme Court previously has articulated the

standard for ‘‘reviewing challenges to the trial court’s

subject matter jurisdiction in a summary process action

on the basis of a defect in the notice to quit. Before

the [trial] court can entertain a summary process action

and evict a tenant,the owner ofthe land must previously

have served the tenant with a notice to quit. . . . As

a condition precedent to a summary process action,

proper notice to quit . . . is a jurisdictional necessity.

. . . This court’s review of the trial court’s determination as to whether a notice to quit served by the plaintiff
effectively conferred subject matter jurisdiction is plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381,

388, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009).

The requirements for a notice to quit in a summary

process action involving a mobile home is governed by

General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (3). ‘‘Notwithstanding the

provisions of [General Statutes] § 47a-23,2

the general

summary process statute, when a tenant, as in this case,

breaches her lease by failing to pay rent, and the landlord seeks to terminate the tenancy, the landlord must

follow the procedures enunciated in § 21-80 (b) (3) (B).3

. . . [U]nder the plain language of § 21-80 (b) (3) (B),

the prerequisites to the maintenance of a summary process action for nonpayment of rent are a written thirty

day notification to the tenant and a statement of the

total arrearage due.’’ (Footnotes added.) Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 568–69, 563 A.2d 741 (1989).

A

We begin with the defendant’s claim that the use and

occupancy disclaimer included in the notice to quit was

not a clear notification of the defendant’s right pursuant

to § 21-80 to avoid eviction by making full payment of

past arrearage due within thirty days of receipt. The

defendant argues that, because the plaintiff did not comply with the requirements of § 21-80, the trial court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. The notice to quit included the following disclaimer: ‘‘ANY PARTIAL PAYMENTS

TENDERED WILL BE ACCEPTED FOR USE AND

OCCUPANCY ONLY AND NOT FOR RENT, WITH FULL

RESERVATION OF RIGHTS TO CONTINUE WITH THE

EVICTION ACTION IF THE TOTAL OF ALL PARTIAL

PAYMENTS MADE WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF

THIS NOTICE DOES NOT EQUAL THE TOTAL

ARREARAGE STATED ABOVE. ALL PAYMENTS

SHOULD BE MADE TO THE ATTORNEY’S

OFFICE AND NOT TO THE LANDLORD.’’ (Emphasis in original.) In its motion to dismiss, the defendant

argued that the notice to quit failed to meet the requirements of § 21-80 because it did not indicate that the

defendant could avoid eviction by paying the past

arrearage due. The trial court denied the defendant’s

motion to dismiss, finding that the notice to quit satisfied the requirements of § 21-80.

‘‘Under[§ 21-80 (b)(3)(B)], to effectuate the termination [of a tenancy for nonpayment of rent] the landlord

must give the resident thirty days written notice and

that notice must state the total arrearage due. If the

tenant tenders the total arrearage due within the thirty

day notice period provided in this section, the landlord

‘shall not maintain or proceed with the summary process action.’ General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (3) (B). The
purpose forreciting the total arrearage due in the notice

is to afford the tenant a final opportunity to save the

tenancy by tendering the total arrearage within the

thirty day grace period. If tender is made within the

grace period, the statute bars further action by the landlord.’’ Ossen v. Kreutzer, supra, 19 Conn. App. 568.

In the present action, the notice to quit clearly specified the total arrearage due; it stated that the defendant

owed rent of $834.09 for April, 2014, the balance of

$160.04 for March 2014 rent, and a late fee of $21, for

a total of $1015.13. The use and occupancy disclaimer

then provided the required notice period; it made clear

that the defendant had a thirty day grace period in

which she could make payments totaling the past

arrearage due in order to avoid eviction. Specifically,

the disclaimer stated that the plaintiff reserved the

‘‘rights to continue with the eviction action if the total

of all partial payments made within 30 days of receipt

of this notice does not equal the total arrearage

stated above.’’

The defendant, however, claims that the use and

occupancy disclaimer was not a clear statement of this

grace period, but rather a misleading statement that

discouraged her from tendering payment. With regard

to the appropriate language for a use and occupancy

disclaimer, § 21-80 does not provide any guidance. Pursuant to § 21-80 (a), however, the provisions for summary process in mobile home parks are in addition to

the provisions for summary process under chapter 832,

unless otherwise specified.4 Section 47a-23, which falls

under chapter 832, provides an example of a use and

occupancy disclaimer, and, therefore we may examine

it in relation to the disclaimer in the present case.

Accordingly, § 47a-23 (e) provides that: ‘‘[A use and

occupancy] disclaimer shall be in substantially the following form: ‘Any payments tendered after the date

specified to quit possession or occupancy, or the date

of the completion of the pretermination process if that

is later, will be accepted for use and occupancy only

and not for rent, with full reservation of rights to continue with the eviction action.’ ’’ The use and occupancy

disclaimer in the present case is substantially similar

to that in § 47a-23 (e), clearly indicating that future

payments by the defendant will be accepted for use

and occupancy, not as rent, but that such payments

may help the defendant avoid eviction should the total

of her payments equal her past arrearage due of

$1015.13.

In addition, the defendant claims that the disclaimer

lacks clarity because it is a sentence of over fifty words

with a double negative. Specifically, the defendant suggests that the phrases ‘‘and not for rent’’ and ‘‘does not

equal’’ create a double negative. With regard to the

phrase ‘‘and not for rent,’’ the inclusion of the word

‘‘not’’ is to indicate to the defendant that all payments
tendered will be accepted not for rent, but rather for

use and occupancy only. The same language can be

seen in the suggested disclaimer found in § 47a-23 (e).

With regard to the phrase ‘‘does not equal,’’ the inclusion

of the word ‘‘not’’ is to indicate that, if the defendant

makes payments within thirty days of receipt of the

notice, but these payments do not equal the past arrearage due, the defendant cannot avoid eviction. In neither

context does the inclusion of the word ‘‘not’’ create a

double negative. We therefore determine that there is

no ambiguity regarding the language used in the use

and occupancy disclaimer. Accordingly, we conclude

that the notice to quit was legally sufficient in this

regard.

B

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly determined that it need not decide the defendant’s

claims alleged in the second and third special defenses

that the past arrearage due in the notice to quit was

incorrect, thereby causing the notice to be legally insufficient pursuant to § 21-80 and consequently depriving

the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly held that it need not decide whether the plaintiff

imposed customer service charges for the utilities as

rent in violation of the parties’ rental agreement.5 Furthermore, the defendant claims that the trial court

improperly held that it need not decide whether the

plaintiff engaged in submetering in violation § 16-11-55

of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which

led to the inclusion of improper water charges in the

past arrearage due.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s claim. Pursuant to the renewal,

kerosene, propane, and water ‘‘will be billed . . .

based on the usage at the rate posted in the park office

. . . . Except for the . . . delineated rental payments

and the utility charges [provided in § 3 of the renewal],

the [plaintiff] shall not collect any service charges . . .

unless itemized in billing to Resident and authorized

elsewhere in this [r]ental [a]greement. Any charges or

expenses assessed under the provisions of this [r]ental

[a]greement orthe [r]ules and [r]egulations of the [p]ark

shall be paid to the [plaintiff] as additional rent . . . .’’

As part of additional rent, the defendant was billed for

all kerosene usage, plus an additional $.70 per gallon

of kerosene used; all propane usage, plus an additional

$.45 per gallon of propane used; and all water usage,

plus a $40.40 quarterly customer service charge. The

monthly statements sent to the defendant included individual charges for kerosene and propane, and two distinct water charges, one for usage and one for the

customer service charge.

With respect to water usage, the Metropolitan District

Commission (MDC) supplies the water to the park. Spe-
cifically, MDC delivers the water to the master meter

at the park. From the master meter, the plaintiff distributes the water to individual meters located on each of

the occupied lots. The trial court heard evidence that

the individual meters measure the water usage at each

individual lot. These readings are recorded and sent to

the park’s corporate offices where bills are generated.

The tenants are billed quarterly for water, and the total

owed is comprised of actual water usage as measured

by the individual meter and a quarterly customer service

charge of $40.40. The plaintiff collects payment from

the tenants and pays the usage portion of the bill to

the MDC. The plaintiff retains the quarterly customer

service charge to cover the cost of maintaining the

water system that connects the MDC master meter to

the individual meters.

Generally, in determining whether a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the inquiry does not extend to

the merits of the case. See Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209

Conn. 724, 728, 553 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919,

109 S. Ct. 3244, 106 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1989). In Lampasona,

however, our Supreme Court, in considering whether

the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

a summary process action, determined that an examination of the facts was necessary. Id. Specifically, the

court determined that, because proper notice to quit is

a jurisdictional necessity for a summary process action,

and the defendant in that case claimed that the notice

to quit complied with the inapplicable general summary

process provision rather than the applicable mobile

home summary process provision, the court was

required to determine which provision applied. Id., 726,

730. To resolve which provision applied, the court had

to examine the facts of the case to determine whether

the defendant was a resident of the plaintiff’s mobile

home park. Id., 730. In the present case, the defendant

claims that the trial court lacked subject matterjurisdiction because the notice to quit was defective for failure

to state properly the total arrearage due. The dispositive

question in determining if the arrearage was stated

properly is whether the customer service charges and

water charges constituted rent, and, therefore, an examination of the facts is necessary.

1

We first address the defendant’s claim that the trial

court improperly held that it did not need to decide

whether, as alleged in the defendant’s second special

defense, the plaintiff improperly imposed customer service charges for utilities as rent, in violation of the

parties’ rental agreement. Specifically, the court held:

‘‘The defendant’s second special defense is that the

plaintiff’s charges for utilities in excess of the tenant’s

usage [are] illegal and therefore cannot serve as the

basis for an eviction for nonpayment of rent. The court

does not need to find that the surcharges for the utilities
are excessive and against public policy . . . because

even if the surcharges are not enforced, there would

still be an arrearage at the time that the notice to quit

was served.’’ Therefore, although the defendant argues

that the trial court did not decide her second special

defense, the record shows that the court essentially

rejected the second special defense as a basis for

attacking the legal sufficiency ofthe notice to quit due to

the existence of an arrearage apart from the challenged

surcharges. Nevertheless, we conclude that the customer service charges were a proper component of the

rent billed to the defendant.

‘‘In construing a written lease . . . three elementary

principles must be [considered]: (1) The intention of

the parties is controlling and must be gathered from the

language of the lease in the light of the circumstances

surrounding the parties at the execution of the instrument; (2) the language must be given its ordinary meaning unless a technical or special meaning is clearly

intended; [and] (3) the lease must be construed as a

whole and in such a manner as to give effect to every

provision, if reasonably possible.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Elliott Enterprises, LLC v. Goodale,

166 Conn. App. 461, 469, 142 A.3d 335 (2016).

The defendant claims that the rental agreement and

renewal6 did not contain an agreement that the defendant would pay utility charges beyond actual usage.

The facts and the evidence before the trial court, however, do not support the defendant’s position. The plaintiff treated as rent the ‘‘base rent in equal monthly

installments’’ pursuant to § 3 (B) and ‘‘additional rent’’

pursuant to § 3 (C) of the renewal. Under the clear

language of § 3 (C) of the renewal, all utilities are billed

based on usage, and the rates at which they are billed

are posted in the park office. The renewal and rental

agreement do not mention the customer service charges

related to each utility. Section 3 (D)7 of the renewal,

however, states that service charges may be collected if

they are itemized in billing to the tenant and authorized

elsewhere in the rental agreement. Section 5 (A) (6)

of the rental agreement states that the plaintiff is to

maintain all utilities provided by it, and § 5 (A) (7)

specifically states that the plaintiff is to maintain all

water lines and connections.

Recognizing that, when construing the renewal and

rental agreement as a whole rent consists of multiple

components, we conclude that the customer service

charges billed to the defendant were not in violation

of the rental agreement. Although the customer service

charges were not listed specifically as additional rent

in § 3 (C) of the renewal, they were authorized as additional rent through § 3 (D) of the renewal and § 5 of

the rental agreement, for they were customer service

charges that were a necessary part of maintaining the

utilities and the water system. The details of how the
customer service charges were calculated into the billing of utilities were provided to the defendant in utility

rate notices sent to all residents of the park. The utility

rate notices confirmed that the billing rates also would

be posted in the park office, as stipulated in the

renewal.

Moreover, the defendant’s monthly statements itemized these customer service charges. Each monthly

statement given to the defendant provided individual

utility details for kerosene, propane, and water. For

kerosene and propane, the rate at which usage was

billed included the customer service charges. The inclusion of the charge in the rate was stipulated in the utility

rate notices sent to the tenants. The total billed each

month for propane and kerosene match the monthly

entries in the plaintiff’s ledgers. With regard to the water

charges, a quarterly customer service charge was listed

consistently under the water detail in the defendant’s

monthly statements. The customer service charge, however, was only included in the monthly balance due

every three statements. These charges coincide with

the plaintiff’s ledgers, which included water charges

every three entries. On the basis of the plain and unambiguous language in the renewal, rental agreement, and

the accompanying documents related to the defendant’s

billing, the customer service charges were a proper

component of the rent billed to the defendant, and,

therefore, the past arrearage due in the notice to quit

was correct. Consequently, this challenge to the legal

sufficiency of the notice to quit fails.

2

We next address the defendant’s claim that the trial

court improperly held that it need not decide whether

the plaintiff engaged in illegal submetering as alleged in

her second special defense. Specifically, the defendant

argues that the plaintiff engaged in submetering in violation of § 16-11-55 of the Regulations of Connecticut

State Agencies because that regulation requires that

submetering be approved by the state Public Utilities

Commission (commission), and the MDC does not have

such approval.8 As a result, the defendant claims that

the notice to quit was legally insufficient, for the total

arrearage stated was inflated significantly by the inclusion of improper water charges.

We first note thatthe trial court did make a determination with regard to this aspect of the defendant’s special

defense. Specifically, the trial court held that the MDC

was a water company that was not regulated by the

Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA), the

authority under which § 16-11-55 was promulgated, and,

therefore, it rejected the special defense.9 We further

conclude that the trial court properly rejected the defendant’s special defense.

This issue of whether § 16-11-55 of the Regulations
of Connecticut State Agencies applies to the MDC presents a question of statutory interpretation. ‘‘Administrative rules and regulations are given the force and

effect of law. . . . We therefore construe agency regulations in accordance with accepted rules of statutory

construction.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734,

751, 865 A.2d 428 (2005). ‘‘When construing a statute,

[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give

effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In

other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied

to the facts of [the] case, including the question of

whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z10

directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself

and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining

such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does

not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual

evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be

considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the

legislative history and circumstances surrounding its

enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to

implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation

and common law principles governing the same general

subject matter . . . .’’ (Footnote in original; internal

quotation marks omitted.) In re William D., 97 Conn.

App. 600, 606, 905 A.2d 696 (2006), aff’d, 284 Conn. 305,

933 A.2d 1147 (2007).

We begin our analysis with the governing statute and

its accompanying regulation. Pursuant to General Statutes § 16-1 et seq., public service companies, including

water companies, are regulated by PURA. A water company includes ‘‘every person owning, leasing, maintaining, operating, managing or controlling any pond,

lake, reservoir, stream, well or distributing plant or

system employed for the purpose of supplying water

to fifty or more consumers,’’ but it does not include ‘‘a

municipal waterworks system established under chapter 102, a district, metropolitan district, municipal district or special services district established under

chapter 105, chapter 105a or any other general statute

of any public or special act which is authorized to supply

water . . . .’’ General Statutes § 16-1 (a) (6). Pursuant

to this statutory authority, PURA promulgated § 16-11-

55 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies,

subdivision (4) of which requires a public service company to receive the approval of the commission to

submeter.

The MDC was created in 1929 by a special act of the

Connecticut General Assembly, which declares that the

MDC is a metropolitan district within the county of

Hartford formed to provide water and sewage services.

20 Spec. Acts 1204, No. 511, § 1 (1929);11 see Rocky Hill
Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan District,

160 Conn. 446, 450, 280 A.2d 344 (1971). As a metropolitan district established through a special act, the MDC

falls within the exception set forth in § 16-1 (a) (6).

Thus, the MDC was not required to receive approval

from the commission to submeter at the park. Accordingly, the trial court properly rejected the defendant’s

special defense thatthe MDC’s submetering of the water

was in violation of § 16-11-55 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.

We conclude that the notice to quit was legally sufficient. Accordingly, the trial court properly assumed

jurisdiction over the summary process action.

II

The defendant further claims that the trial court

improperly determined that her April, 2014 payment

was applied correctly to the past arrearage instead of

her April, 2014 rent obligation. Specifically, the defendant argues that no evidence was presented that standard practice between the parties was to have payments

applied to the past arrearage due before the current

monthly obligation. Rather, the defendant argues that

this was an uncommunicated, unilateral practice of

the plaintiff.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s claim. The trial court heard

evidence that, if a tenant is in arrears, the custom of

the plaintiff is to apply any payment by the tenant to

the arrearage first. The tenants are not specifically notified as to how their payments are being applied, but

the practice is memorialized through the monthly statements that tenants are given. The plaintiff’s ledgers

also reflect this practice. As recorded in the plaintiff’s

ledgers, as of April, 2014, the defendant owed a balance

of $1615.13. On April 11, 2014, the plaintiff recorded in

its ledger a $600 payment made by the plaintiff, which

left a balance of $1015.13. Said payment also was

reflected in a statement provided to the defendant.

Whether the defendant’s April, 2014 payment properly was applied to the past arrearage due is a mixed

question of law and fact. ‘‘Questions of law mixed with

questions of fact receive plenary review.’’ Duperry v.

Solnit, 261 Conn. 309, 318, 803 A.2d 287 (2002). ‘‘When

a debtor has two or more obligations to the same creditor, the debtor possesses the powerto direct the manner

in which his payment is to be applied. . . . The obligor

must manifest his direction to the obligee, but he need

not manifest it in words. A direction may be inferred

from other circumstances, including the performance

itself. It is often clear from the nature of the performance that it is to be applied to a particular duty.’’

(Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) South Sea Co. v. Global Turbine Component Technologies, LLC, 95 Conn. App. 742, 750–51,
899 A.2d 642 (2002).

Applying the reasoning of South Sea Co. to the present case, we may consider the defendant’s conduct,

the parties’ course of performance, and the defendant’s

failure to give a contrary direction in determining the

proper application of the April, 2014 payment. Each

monthly statement given to the defendant included any

balance remaining from her previous month, thus providing her with the past arrearage due. By the time

that the defendant’s April, 2014 payment was made, the

defendant had received numerous monthly statements

and tendered payments based on the amount identified

in each statement as due. On many of these occasions,

the payments tendered exceeded the monthly rent and

thus further lowered her past arrearage due. Consequently, it may be inferred that the defendant was aware

that her payments were applied first to her total arrearage due and then to her current monthly obligation.

Despite the defendant’s having knowledge of the manner in which the payments were applied, nothing in the

record suggests that she gave the plaintiff direction to

apply the April, 2014 payment first to the April rent

obligation instead of the past arrearage due. Because

nothing suggests that the defendant gave direction to

the plaintiff, either actually orinferentially, we conclude

that the trial court properly determined that the defendant’s April, 2014 payment was correctly applied to

the past arrearage due rather than to her April, 2014

rent obligation.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although the plaintiff’s amended complaint originally named Lois Furbush and Piper Goehring as defendants, the plaintiff subsequently moved

for default against Goehring for failure to appear, which the court granted

on June 1, 2016, and she has not participated in this appeal. We therefore

refer to Furbush as the defendant.

2 General Statutes § 47a-23 is the general summary process statute that

governs the form and delivery of notices to quit possession, whereas § 21-

80 is the provision specific to mobile home summary process actions. See

Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 726, 553 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 492

U.S. 919, 109 S. Ct. 3244, 106 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1989).

3 General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (3) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Notwithstanding the provisions of section 47a-23, termination of any tenancy in a mobile

manufactured home park shall be effective only if made . . . (B) By the

owner giving the resident at least sixty days’ written notice, which shall

state the reason or reasons for such termination, except that, when the

termination is based upon subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of this subsection, the owner need give the resident only thirty days’ notice, which notice

shall state the total arrearage due provided, the owner shall not maintain

or proceed with a summary process against a resident who tenders the total

arrearage due to the owner within such thirty days . . . .’’

General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A]n owner

may terminate a rental agreement or maintain a summary process action

against a resident who owns a mobile manufactured home . . . for . . .

(A) Nonpayment of rent, utility charges or reasonable incidental service

charges . . . .’’

4 General Statutes § 21-80 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘An action for

summary process may be maintained by the owner of a mobile manufactured

home park against a mobile manufactured home resident who rents a mobile

manufactured home from such owner for the following reasons, which shall

be in addition to other reasons allowed under chapter 832, and, except as
otherwise specified, proceedings underthis subsection shall be as prescribed

in chapter 832 . . . .’’

5 On appeal, the defendant initially argued that the customer service

charges were imposed as rent in violation of the parties’ lease agreement

and General Statutes § 47a-4 (a) (9). The defendant, pursuant to Practice

Book § 67-10, subsequently withdrew § 47a-4 (a) (9) from her argument on

the premise that General Statutes § 47a-2 (b) excludes from § 47a-4 (a) (9)

mobile home owners who own their mobile homes but rent the lots on

which the homes are situated.

6 The renewal substituted § 3 of the rental agreement, but otherwise incorporated all of the terms of the rental agreement.

7

In the renewal, the subsection of § 3 discussing service charges is labeled

‘‘A.’’ The subsection is mislabeled, however, and should be labeled ‘‘D,’’ as

provided in § 3 of the rental agreement. Therefore, we refer to the subsection

of the lease addressing customer service charges as § 3 (D).

8 The defendant also argues that the water customer service charge was

an unfair or deceptive trade practice within the meaning of the Connecticut

Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.,

and, therefore, its inclusion in the rent was improper. ‘‘[A] violation of

CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice

. . . or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gebbie v. Cadle Co., 49 Conn. App. 265, 279, 714 A.2d

678 (1998). In her brief, the defendant merely states that the discrepancy

between what the plaintiff collects from its tenants and what it owes to the

MDC is enormous, and that the plaintiff deceives its residents by billing a

customer service charge on the claim that it is related to MDC charges.

No further analysis is given. Accordingly, we only address the illegality

of submetering as to the applicability of § 16-11-55 of the Regulations of

Connecticut State Agencies, which the defendant adequately briefed and

argued before this court. See Strobel v. Strobel, 73 Conn. App. 488, 490, 808

A.2d 1138 (‘‘[w]e consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere

abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by

failure to brief the issue properly’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert.

denied, 262 Conn. 928, 814 A.2d 383 (2002).

9 The trial court also held that ‘‘[a] per se violation of this regulation,

without more, would not rise to the level of a special defense in this action

because the court finds that the charges for water usage (not the quarterly

customer service charge) were reasonable.’’

10 General Statutes § 1-2z provides: ‘‘The meaning of a statute shall, in the

first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its

relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and

does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the

meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’

11 The act provides in relevant part: ‘‘There shall be within the county of

Hartford a metropolitan district with territorial limits as hereinafter more

particularly defined. All the inhabitants and electors of the towns composing

said metropolitan district are constituted and declared, upon the taking

effect of this act as hereinafter provided, body politic and corporate by the

name of The Metropolitan District . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) 20 Spec. Act

1204, No. 511, § 1 (1929).