Preventing Deaths and Injuries to 

Firefighters Working at Strip Mall Fires 

Summary

Firefighters are at significant risk of 

injury or death when fighting fires in 

strip malls. Strip mall fires are lowfrequency, high-risk incidents due 

to a variety of construction features, 

including limited entry and egress, 

high heat release rate (the rate at which 

fire releases energy) fuel loading, mazelike conditions, and high entanglement 

potential. Fire departments should 

ensure first-arriving resources conduct 

a complete 360-degree size-up, locate 

the fire, identify probable avenues for 

fire extension, knock down any visible 

fire from the exterior, and reassess fire 

conditions before initiating firefighting 

operations in the hazard zone.

Strip malls present challenges that may 

cause firefighters to become disoriented 

while conducting interior search and 

firefighting operations. The first 

arriving resource’s ability to conduct 

a 360-degree might not occur due 

to the size (length and width) of the 

building. This information needs to 

be communicated to the dispatcher 

and other responding units by the first 

arriving resource. If the initial size-up 

doesn’t include Side Charlie, resources 

should be assigned to the rear of the 

building (Side Charlie) [NVERS 2013].

might have illegal housing or contain a 

living space. While the individual occupancies may be separated by a wall, 

they may have a common attic space 

[NVERS 2013; NFPA 2021b].

Fire departments should understand 

that these structures may not have fire 

protection systems in place and construction features may contribute to 

rapid horizontal spread of fire. In buildings with fire protection systems, system integrity, operability and functionality based on current occupancy 

use must be considered when fighting 

fires in strip malls [Weinschenk and 

Zevotek 2020]. 

Firefighting and occupancy hazards include the following:

 Firefighting hazard

— High entanglement potential, including drop ceiling assemblies

— High heat release rate fuel loading

— Maze-like conditions 

— Void spaces such as the plenum 

space (the space between a

dropped ceiling and the structural ceiling) accumulate fire gas 

which allows rapid fire growth 

and smoke explosions

Description of Risk

Strip malls have various physical features, dimensions and construction 

features based on the era of construction, renovations, or alternations. Many 

of these structures are Type II (noncombustible construction), Type III (ordinary construction), Type V (wood 

frame), and can contain both conventional wood framing and engineered 

structural systems [Weinschenk and 

Zevotek 2020]. In the United States, 

strip malls are typically one-story and 

contain a wide range of occupancy 

types under one roof with a sidewalk 

in front. Restaurants, discount stores, 

automotive parts retailers, dry cleaners, clothing stores, medical and dental 

offices, and banks are just a few of the 

businesses that can be found in a strip 

mall. In urban settings, an occupancy 
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— Possible basement or other below-grade areas, even if 

the fire appears to be on the ground or higher level

— Hazardous materials storage such as propane/compressed natural gas on Side Charlie

— Challenging roof top ventilation, including construction, solar panels, dead loads, and compartmentalized 

rooms below the roof 

— Collapsing roofs and walls

— Falling facades

 Occupancy hazards

— Limited access and egress

— Complicated security measures, such as window bars, 

reinforced locks, and roll down gate(s) [NVERS 2013; 

NFPA 2021b]

Firefighting Strategy and Tactics for 

Strip Mall Fires

Critical factors that can’t be changed when fighting structure 

fires include building design and construction, type of occupancy, age, size, entrances/exits, and roof type. However, 

incident commanders (IC) should consider the initial arrival factors, such as the life safety profile (survivability of occupants); location and travel of the fire, fire and smoke conditions of exposures, wind direction, and smoke conditions; 

available staffing and resources; and water supply to develop the correct strategy and incident action plan (IAP) [FIRESCOPE 2015].

The next step is to identify the appropriate strategy. The development of the IAP for a strip mall incident should be designed around the tactical priorities of:

 Completing search and rescue operations

 Managing fire control by knocking down the main body 

of fire and preventing it from extending into exposures by 

using the reach of the stream from a protected position

 Basing the salvage profile on the building’s contents and 

firefighters’ exposure to the products of combustion and 

suppression activities to preserve property efficiently and 

safely [FIRESCOPE 2015] 

Many of today’s command posts are equipped with an internet connected computer, tablet, cell phone or the use of a 

drone that can provide the incident commander with overhead pictures of the building. This aerial footprint/map can 

provide the IC with the following:

 Access to and around the building

 Hydrant locations

 Apparatus placement for responding companies

 Firewalls 

 Heavy objects (e.g., heating, ventilation, air conditioning 

(HVAC) units on the roof), solar panels, skylights, smoke 

and vent hatches, potential translucent panels on the roof 

 Location and extent of overhangs, facades, perimeter wall 

parapets and large drop-offs, including setbacks and additions

 Exposures (when the fire extends beyond the main fire occupancy or unit, e.g., Bravo 1, Delta 1) (See Diagram 1)

 Utility shut off locations [NVERS 2013; FIRESCOPE 2015]

Heavily packed occupancies present safety challenges for 

firefighters. When advancing hoselines, friction points such 

as shelving, merchandise, display and checkout counters can 

hamper the stretch, causing delays in reaching the seat of the 

fire. Stock can fall from shelves, causing firefighters to become entangled in racks of clothing and merchandise. Operating in occupancies with a high volume of merchandise 

and furnishings in zero visibility creates additional hazards 

for firefighters. Firefighters can become disoriented and lose 

directional awareness. 

Most roof construction in strip malls consists of lightweight 

construction elements (such as wooden trusses or steel bar 

joists), which can result in early roof failure when exposed to 

fire conditions. Steel bar joists are common on the east coast, 

and wooden beams or trusses are more common in the western 

part of the country. [Weinschenk and Zevotek 2020].

Illustration by NVERS

Diagram 1. Exposures can be indicated by the identifier for the side of the Extension (e.g., Bravo 1) followed by a number that starts 

adjacent to the unit on fire.
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Side Charlie of most strip malls units do not have windows, 

only doors. The IC should assign an engine company and 

truck company to Side Charlie for hoseline deployment and 

forcible entry. The rear door should be opened early in the 

incident to provide egress for occupants and enable an assessment of fire and building conditions by firefighters. Then 

the door should be controlled so that ventilation can be coordinated with suppression operations [NVERS 2013; NFPA 

2021b]. Fire attack should be coordinated with ventilation 

and forcible entry, which should be communicated to the IC. 

The doors on Side Charlie of strip mall occupancies are typically well secured, requiring a higher level of forcible entry. 

Crews spotting apparatus and operating on Side Charlie also 

need to be aware of overhead power lines. Side Charlie often has tight access for apparatus. Officers should ensure that 

engineers or chauffeurs avoid parking or spotting apparatus 

in potential collapse zones [NVERS 2013]. 

Case Study 

On April 30, 2016, a 20-year-old volunteer firefighter (identified as FF2) died while fighting a fire in a strip mall. The fire 

occurred in a 7,037-square-foot retail golf store that was approximately 50 feet wide and 140 feet in depth. The front of 

the building (Side Alpha) was constructed entirely of plateglass windows with a center entrance doorway protected by 

a metal security gate. Side Bravo (left side) and Side Delta (right side) were constructed of concrete block fire walls 

which were approximately 12 feet high and reached to the 

roof deck. A storage room, offices, and restrooms were located at the rear of the structure. A closed fire door was located 

on Side Charlie near the Side Charlie/Side Delta corner. The 

front door on Side Alpha provided the only means of normal 

entry and exit to the store. The flat roof consisted of a metal 

roof deck covered by three layers of asphalt, foam, and waterproof membrane covered by asphalt and gravel. The onestory building was built on a concrete pad. The building did 

not contain a sprinkler system. 

Engine 3 crew observed a light haze of smoke when they arrived in the strip mall parking lot. The Engine 3 senior captain, lieutenant, and firefighter 2 (FF2) approached the golf 

store door. Another fire department member arrived and 

joined the Engine 3 crew. They quickly forced open the outer 

sliding plate-glass door and were confronted with an inner 

security gate door. The lieutenant and senior captain from 

Department 7 were able to force open the security gate. The 

captain directed the Engine 3 firefighters to pull a 200-foot 

13⁄4-inch hoseline to the front door. The lieutenant entered 

the structure a short distance and used a thermal imager to 

scan the interior.

Engine 3 (a lieutenant and two firefighters) advanced toward 

the Side Charlie/Side Delta corner and began to flow 

water toward the fire. The Engine 3 lieutenant used the 

thermal imager to direct the firefighter (FF1) working the 

nozzle where to flow water. FF1 on the nozzle ran low on air, 

became fatigued, and passed the nozzle to FF2. FF1 began to 

follow the hoseline to the outside after telling the lieutenant 

that he had to leave. FF2 continued to work the nozzle with 

the lieutenant directing him. 

The ladder company had difficulty cutting through the flat 

metal roof due to the composition of the roof. They unsuccessfully tried to ventilate the roof using a chainsaw and had 

to switch to a circular saw with a metal cutting blade. (See 

Photo 1).

Photo 1. Construction of flat metal roof covered with 

asphalt foam insulation, and gravel. Chain saws were initially 

used to open the roof for vertical ventilation but would not cut 

through the metal deck. A circular saw with metal cutting blade 

had to be used.

Photo by NIOSH

Conditions continued to deteriorate inside the structure 

with increasing smoke and heat, plus no visibility (See Photo 

2). Due to the deteriorating conditions and trying to get FF2 

out of the building, the Engine 3 lieutenant followed the hoseline until he came to a coupling. He looked back for FF2 and 

saw that he was standing. The lieutenant turned around and 

grabbed FF2. They fell over a display of golf bags and became 

separated from the hoseline.

The lieutenant turned in the direction that he thought was 

Side Alpha and began pulling FF2 with him. They were both 

walking in near-zero visibility and ran into another display 

of golf clubs. FF2 stated that he was completely out of air 

and had to get out of the building. FF2 disappeared into the 

thick smoke, moving away from the lieutenant toward the 

Side Charlie of the store. The lieutenant also ran out of air. 

His facepiece fogged up, so he removed his helmet and facepiece. The lieutenant activated his personal alert safety system (PASS) device as he continued to crawl through a series 
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Photo 2. The photo shows the interior conditions. 

Photo by County Fire Marshal's Office.

of golf club displays. The lieutenant did not have a portable radio so he could not call for assistance. He heard a voice 

in front of him, which was Engine 16 and began to yell for 

help. A Mayday was transmitted by the captain of Engine 20 

at the front door for a missing firefighter as the lieutenant 

exited the building. FF2 was located about two minutes later and transported to the hospital where he was pronounced 

deceased. The lieutenant was transported to the hospital for 

treatment of smoke inhalation and was released later that 

day [NIOSH 2016].

Additional challenges with fighting fires in strip malls are 

highlighted in the following NIOSH investigation reports:

 F1996-17: Sudden Roof Collapse of a Burning Auto Parts Store 

Claims the Lives of Two Fire Fighters—Virginia

 F2013-14: Career Probationary Fire Fighter Runs Out of Air and 

Dies in Commercial Structure Fire—Michigan

 F2017-14: Career Fire Fighter Dies and Another is Seriously 

Burned Fighting Arson Fire at a Commercial Strip Mall—Texas 

Controls

To minimize the risks of fighting fires in strip mall occupancies, NIOSH recommends that fire departments take the following precautions:

Pre-Incident: 

 Develop, implement, and enforce standard operating procedures/standard operating guidelines (SOPs/SOGs) for 

firefighting operations in strip malls.

 Ensure that an incident management system is used at all 

incidents, including a personnel accountability system 

[FIRESCOPE 2019; NFPA 2020b; NFPA 2021a].

 Integrate risk management into the regular functions of 

incident command [NFPA 2020b; NFPA 2021a].

 Understand how horizontal and vertical ventilation affects 

fire behavior and coordinate ventilation with firefighting 

operations so that the flow path is appropriately identified 

and controlled [Weinschenk and Zevotek 2020].

 Conduct pre-incident planning, building familiarization, 

and develop defined tactical objectives to ensure effective fireground decision-making at strip mall fires [NFPA 

2024]. Identify hanging facades that create a collapse hazard.

 Conduct practical training on strip mall fires, focusing on 

the IAP, crew integrity, hoseline placement, ventilation, 

air management, and safe exterior and interior firefighting operations [NFPA 2021a].

Incident:

 Size-up:

— Ensure the first arriving officer provides a complete 

and accurate initial radio report including a 360-degree 

report, plus an initial rescue profile and risk assessment [FIRESCOPE 2015; NFPA 2020b].

— Use a thermal imager as part of the size-up to assist in 

determining the fire location [NFPA 2021b].

— Assign a company to Side Charlie and a company to 

the roof to complete size-up. Send the initial truck 

company to the roof to report on roof stability, heavy 

dead loads, fire extension in the attic, fire wall locations, and unusual configuration of the structure 

[NVERS 2013].

 Incident Management:

— Ensure the strategy and IAP are communicated to all 

on-scene and responding members before entry is 

made into the fire building [FIRESCOPE 2015; NFPA 

2020b].

— Ensure incident commanders forecast the direction of 

the incident based upon the initial strategy and IAP. 

Forecasting is done early in the incident in order to 

build an effective incident organization [FIRESCOPE 

2015; NFPA 2020b].

— Establish divisions and groups to ensure manageable 

span of control and to maintain personnel accountability [FIRESCOPE 2014; NFPA 2020b].

— Initiate a defensive strategy when risk outweighs gain, 

especially for property only [NFPA 2020b; NFPA 

2021a].

 Fireground Operations:

— Ensure crew integrity and personnel accountability. 

Firefighters should stay in physical contact with the 

attack hoseline and/or search rope, use a thermal imager, and use proper air management to ensure they 

can exit the structure safely [NFPA 2021a]. 
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— Remember that air management is critical to firefighter 

safety, and it will take just as long, if not longer, to get out 

of the structure as it did to get inside [NIOSH 2016].

— Assign and stage rapid intervention crews at strategic 

locations [NFPA 2021a].

— Establish collapse zones if external fire damage is evident [NFPA 2021a; NFPA 2021b].

— Secure an uninterrupted water supply that will provide an adequate water before initiating interior firefighting operations [NVERS 2013].

— Apply water from a safe distance to achieve knockdown when fire has extended out of the building.

— Use a 21⁄2-inch hoseline with a solid bore nozzle to 

provide necessary extinguishment and penetration 

capability [NVERS 2013].

— Consider mobile portable masters and blitz attack devices in combination with attack lines [NVERS 2013].

— Deploy attack lines as back-up to the first handline 

into Bravo 1 Exposure and Delta 1 Exposure to check 

for fire extension [FIRESCOPE 2015].

 Critical Benchmarks:

— Check the facade for smoke or fire before entering structure [NVERS 2013; NFPA 2021b].

— Inspect the plenum space to check for fire extension at 

the entrance doorway before moving into the building and continue as the crew advances [NVERS 2013; 

NFPA 2021b].

— Deploy an interior crew to check the cockloft or concealed attic space for fire extension into exposures. 

Horizontal fire spread is a critical factor and must be 

addressed early [Weinschenk and Zevotek 2020].

— Secure all electrical service panels and natural gas 

or propane meters. If this is not feasible, contact the 

appropriate utility company for assistance [NVERS 

2013].

Post-Incident:

 Conduct a post-incident analysis [FIRESCOPE 2015; NFPA 

2021a].

 Provide an action plan and lessons learned to identify the 

need for revisions to SOPs/SOGs, additional mandatory 

training, or other necessary changes. 

 Update your community risk assessment program and 

pre-incident planning process based on recommendations from post-incident analysis reports [NFPA 2021a; 

FIRESCOPE 2019].

Suggested Citation

NIOSH [2023]. Preventing deaths and injuries to firefighters working at strip mall fires. By Loflin ME. Cincinnati OH: 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication 

No. 2023-126, https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHPUB2023126.

References

NVERS [2013]. Fires in strip shopping centers. In: Firefighting and Operations Manual, 3rd Edition. Fire and Rescue 

Departments of Northern Virginia. https://www.nvers.org/

fireems/fireems-documents/nova-procedural-and-trainingpackages 

FIRESCOPE [2015]. Structure fire operations. ICS 500, October 14. Riverside, CA: FIRESCOPE. https://firescope.caloes.ca.gov/ICS%20Documents/ICS%20500.pdf

FIRESCOPE [2019]. Incident command system position, 

manual firefighter incident safety and accountability guidelines, ICS 910, April 10. Riverside, CA: FIRESCOPE. https://

firescope.caloes.ca.gov/ICS%20Documents/ICS%20910.pdf 

NFPA [2020a]. NFPA 1300: Standard on community risk 

assessment and community risk reduction plan development. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2020b]. NFPA 1561: Standard on emergency services 

incident management system and command safety. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association. 

NFPA [2021a]. NFPA 1500: Standard on fire department occupational safety, health, and wellness program. Quincy, 

MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2021b]. NFPA 1700: Guide for structural fire fighting. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2024]. NFPA 1660: Standard for emergency, continuity, and crisis management: preparedness, response, and recovery. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NIOSH [1998]. Sudden roof collapse of burning auto parts 

store claims the lives of two fire fighters—Virginia. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fire Fighter 

Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP). 

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9617.html

NIOSH [2016]. Volunteer fire fighter dies after running out 

of air and becoming disoriented in retail store in Strip Mall 

Fire—North Carolina. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation 

and Prevention Program (FFFIPP). https://www.cdc.gov/

niosh/fire/reports/face201607.html
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Weinschenk C, Zevotek R [2020]. Underwriters Laboratories Firefighter Safety Research Institute, Exploratory analysis of the impact of ventilation on strip mall fires. 

UL Firefighter Safety Research Institute, Columbia, MD 

21045 https://fsri.org/research-update/technical-report-released-strip-mall-experiments

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHPUB2023126

DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2023-126

September 2023