**************************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of this opinion is the date the opinion was

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the

beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion

motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially

released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

This opinion is subject to revisions and editorial

changes, not of a substantive nature, and corrections

of a technical nature prior to publication in the

Connecticut Law Journal. ****************************************************************
IN RE MARCQUAN C.*

(AC 43892)

Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the trial court’s order

requiring her to participate in a psychological evaluation, issued in the

same memorandum of decision with its judgment denying her motion

to revoke the commitment of her minor child to the custody and care

of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. The mother

claimed the order was a part of the judgment denying her motion to

revoke commitment, alleging that the order, inter alia, violated her right

to remain silent in neglect proceedings. Held that this court lacked

jurisdiction over the respondent mother’s appeal, as the order from

which the mother appealed was not a final judgment: the trial court’s

order for a psychological examination was not a part of the court’s

judgment denying the motion to revoke commitment, as the court’s

denial of the motion to revoke commitment was not based on its decision

to order the psychological examination; moreover, the trial court’s order

for a psychological examination was not immediately appealable as it

did not satisfy either of the prongs of the test set forth in State v. Curcio

(191 Conn. 27) that govern when an interlocutory order is appealable,

as the order was an integral part of the ongoing proceedings involving

the mother and her child following the uncared for petition brought by

the petitioner in that the results of the evaluation could affect the ultimate outcome of a later adjudication of the mother’s parental rights,

and, thus, the resolution of the issue did not constitute a separate

and distinct proceeding; furthermore, no presently existing right of the

mother had been concluded by the court’s order to undergo a psychological evaluation, as the order did not risk irreparable harm to the mother’s

custody or visitation rights or to the parent-child relationship, and the

order did not directly infringe on or threaten irreparable harm to the

mother’s right to remain silent or rule on the admissibility of any statement made by her, and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Argued October 8, 2020—officially released February 2, 2021**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child uncared

for, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of New Haven, Juvenile Matters, where the court, Conway, J., adjudicated the child uncared for and ordered

protective supervision with custody vested in the

respondent mother; thereafter, the court, Conway, J.,

extended the period of protective supervision and sustained an order of temporary custody vesting custody

of the minor child with the respondent father; subsequently, the court, Hon. Richard E. Burke, judge trial

referee, vacated the order of temporary custody and

ordered shared custody and guardianship of the child

between the respondent parents with primary physical

custody vesting in the respondent father; thereafter,

the court, Hon. Richard E. Burke, judge trial referee,

sustained an order of temporary custody vesting custody of the minor child in the petitioner; subsequently,

the court, Hon. Richard E. Burke, judge trial referee,

granted the motion filed by the petitioner to open and

modify the dispositive order of protective supervision,
and committed the child to the custody of the petitioner;

thereafter, the court, Conway, J., denied the respondent

mother’s motion to revoke commitment, and the

respondent mother appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.

Albert J. Oneto IV, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(respondent mother).

Seon Bagot, assistant attorney general, with whom,

on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and

Benjamin Zivyon and Evan O’Roark, assistant attorneys general, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The respondent mother, Monica C.,1

appeals from the trial court’s order requiring her to

participate in a psychological evaluation. The court

ordered the evaluation immediately after it denied the

respondent’s motion to revoke commitment with

respect to her minor child, Marcquan C.2 The respondent does not challenge on appeal the judgment denying

her motion to revoke commitment. Her appeal is limited

to her claim that the court abused its discretion by

compelling her to participate in the psychological evaluation. We do not reach the respondent’s claim because

we agree with the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, that the order for a psychological

evaluation was not part of the court’s judgment denying

the respondent’s motion to revoke commitment and is

not otherwise an appealable final judgment.3 Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The following facts, which are either undisputed or

were found by the court, and procedural history are

relevant to this appeal. On January 13, 2017, the petitioner filed a neglect petition alleging that Marcquan

was being neglected. On May 16, 2017, Marcquan was

adjudicated uncared for and the court, Conway, J.,

ordered that he remain in the care and custody of the

respondent under protective supervision for a period

of six months.4 Subsequently, the order was extended

for an additional six months.

On February 5, 2018, Marcquan appeared in school

with a swollen eye and lines resembling belt marks on

his temple. The respondent admitted disciplining him

on his buttocks with a belt and theorized that she may

have inadvertently struck him on the head. On February

7, 2018, the court, Conway, J., vested temporary custody of Marcquan with his father. On April 11, 2018, by

agreement of the parties, the court, Hon. Richard E.

Burke, judge trial referee, ordered that the order of

temporary custody be vacated and that the father and

the respondent share custody and guardianship of Marcquan, with the father having primary physical residence.

Protective supervision remained in place until August

11, 2018.

On July 10, 2018, at an in-court review hearing, the

father reported that he could no longer care for Marcquan and, on July 12, 2018, the court vested temporary

care and custody of the child with the petitioner. On

July 27, 2018, the court granted the petitioner’s motion

to modify the order of protective supervision and committed Marcquan to the care and custody of the petitioner. Since that time, he has remained committed

to the petitioner. Marcquan was placed in nonrelative

foster care until September, 2019, when he was placed

with his godmother.

On September 30, 2019, the respondent filed a motion
to revoke commitment.5 On October 19, 2019, the petitioner filed a motion for a psychological evaluation of

Marcquan and the respondent. On October 29, 2019,

the court, Conway, J., held a hearing on the petitioner’s

motion for a psychological evaluation and, expressing

its belief that the requested order would be futile,

denied the motion on the ground that ‘‘[the respondent]

refuses to cooperate.’’

On November 25 and December 18, 2019, the court,

Conway, J., held a hearing on the respondent’s motion

to revoke commitment. On December 26, 2019, the

court issued a memorandum of decision wherein it

found the following facts. The permanency plan for

Marcquan was reunification with the respondent.6 To

that end, the respondent and Marcquan were working

with R’kids, a reunification service provider, from May

to August, 2019, to provide a safe transition of Marcquan

from out of home care to the respondent. R’kids identified three goals for the respondent. First, she was to

consistently participate and exhibit progress in her

mental health treatment. Second, she was to engage in

appropriate conversations with Marcquan during visits.

Specifically, the ‘‘respondent . . . [was] to gain a better understanding of her son’s mental health/cognitive

capabilities as it relates to engagement in age appropriate conversations; for [her] to have age appropriate

expectations of Marcquan, and for [her] to gain a better

understanding of her son’s needs and challenges and

for her to learn effective, age appropriate ways to assist

her son in managing his behaviors.’’ Third, she was to

acquire skills and knowledge regarding positive and

effective forms of discipline.

The court found that, in September, 2019, R’kids recommended to the petitioner that Marcquan not return

to the respondent’s care. It found that, although the

respondent participated in supervised visits with her

son, she continued to make inappropriate comments

and engaged in inappropriate conversations in Marcquan’s presence. Moreover, she failed to develop skills

or a working knowledge of positive and effective forms

of discipline.

The court also found that the respondent participated

in weekly individual therapy with a licensed professional counselor at the Shoreline Wellness Clinic for

approximately two years. The respondent made

improvements in managing her anxiety and using coping skills. On the basis of its subordinate findings of

fact, the court concluded, however, that there had not

been any discernable improvement in her ability to conform her behavior so as to make it in Marcquan’s best

interest to reunify with the respondent. The court

expressly found that the benefits the respondent

derived from her therapy sessions did not assist her in

her reunification effort with her son and her ability to

properly care for him. The court found that the respon-
dent’s therapist did not offer any insight as to her emotional and mental makeup and was unable to identify

appropriate interventions or services that could constructively advance the reunification process.

The court concluded that ‘‘absent a credible psychological evaluation, it is impossible to understand or to

predict how [the respondent] will react to and with

others, including Marcquan. The past and present reality

has stalled Marcquan’s return to her care and has

undoubtedly negatively impacted Marcquan’s fragile

well-being.’’ As a result of these findings, the court

determined that grounds for commitment continued to

exist and denied the motion to revoke. The permanency

plan remained reunification of Marcquan with the

respondent.7

After observing that it lacked a credible psychological

evaluation of the respondent, the court also reconsidered its October 29, 2019 denial of the petitioner’s

motion for a psychological evaluation and ordered the

respondent to participate in one. The court stated in

relevant part: ‘‘[From the denial of] her motion to revoke

today, the respondent . . . has to understand that until

she demonstrates an ability to collaboratively and effectively interact with [the Department of Children and

Families] and services providers and she demonstrates

a sustained ability to parent Marcquan in a manner

which affords him both physical and emotional safety,

reunification is highly unlikely. While no guarantee, her

participation in a court-ordered evaluation and her sustained and effective follow-through with treatment recommendations may potentially be the key to a reinvigorated reunification process.’’ This appeal followed.8

In the respondent’s principal brief, she contends that

the court improperly issued the order to participate

in a psychological evaluation, sua sponte, because the

court’s earlier ruling denying the petitioner’s motion

for a psychological evaluation was res judicata, the

motion was not before the court at the time of the

order, and the order violated her right to remain silent.

Reiterating in substance the arguments that she

advanced in her motion to dismiss the appeal; see footnote 8 of this opinion; the petitioner responds that the

court’s order for a psychological evaluation is not an

immediately appealable final judgment, and, therefore,

this court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal.

The respondent did not file a reply brief, so we are left

to consider the jurisdictional analysis that she set forth

in her opposition to the petitioner’s motion to dismiss

the appeal.

We begin our analysis by considering the jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioner and the standard

of review that applies to the issue. ‘‘The lack of a final

judgment implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of

an appellate court to hear an appeal. A determination

regarding . . . subject matter jurisdiction is a question
of law [over which we exercise plenary review]. . . .

The appellate courts have a duty to dismiss, even on

[their] own initiative, any appeal that [they lack] jurisdiction to hear.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Jamar D., 300 Conn. 764, 770,

18 A.3d 582 (2011).

‘‘The right of appeal is purely statutory. It is accorded

only if the conditions fixed by statute and the rules of

court for taking and prosecuting the appeal are met.’’

State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983).

‘‘Because our jurisdiction over appeals, both criminal

and civil, is prescribed by statute, we must always determine the threshold question of whether the appeal is

taken from a final judgment before considering the merits of the claim.’’ Id.

We first consider, as the respondent argued in her

opposition to the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the

appeal, whether the order for a psychological examination, from which the respondent appeals was a part of

the court’s judgment denying the respondent’s motion

to revoke commitment, from which she had a right of

appeal. See, e.g., In re Shawn S., 262 Conn. 155, 167,

810 A.2d 799 (2002) (acknowledging right to appeal

from denial of motion to revoke commitment); In re

Zoey H., 183 Conn. App. 327, 330, 192 A.3d 522 (appeal

from denial of motion to revoke commitment), cert.

denied, 330 Conn. 906, 192 A.3d 425 (2018).

As an initial observation, the respondent’s assertion

that the order for a psychological evaluation was merely

a part of the judgment denying her motion to revoke

commitment is somewhat belied by the fact that, on

her appeal form in the present appeal, she did not state

that she was appealing from the judgment denying the

motion to revoke commitment. Instead, she characterized ‘‘the action that constitutes the appealable final

judgment or decision’’ as ‘‘[a] postjudgment order compelling psychological evaluation.’’ (Emphasis added.)

As this court has observed, ‘‘[t]he construction of a

judgment is a question of law for the court. . . . To

determine the meaning of a judgment, we must ascertain the intent of the court from the language used and, if

necessary, the surrounding circumstances.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ottiano v.

Shetucket Plumbing Supply Co., 61 Conn. App. 648,

652, 767 A.2d 128 (2001). A review of the court’s memorandum of decision and the surrounding circumstances

leads us to conclude that the judgment denying the

respondent’s motion to revoke commitment was separate from the court’s order for a psychological evaluation.

As we have explained, after the respondent brought

her motion to revoke commitment, the petitioner

sought an order for a psychological evaluation. Prior

to the hearing on the motion to revoke commitment, the
court denied the motion for a psychological evaluation.

The court denied the motion to revoke commitment on

its merits, and the court’s memorandum of decision

encompassed its findings and conclusions of law with

respect to the motion to revoke commitment. In addition to denying the motion to revoke commitment, it sua

sponte revisited its prior ruling denying the petitioner’s

motion for a psychological evaluation.

The court’s ruling on the motion to revoke commitment and its ruling to order a psychological evaluation

are addressed in the same memorandum of decision,

but this fact is not dispositive of whether the rulings

should be viewed as a single, immediately appealable

judgment. In setting forth its rationale for denying the

motion to revoke commitment, the court observed that

it did not have before it a credible psychological evaluation of the respondent, but it did not suggest that its

denial of the motion to revoke commitment was based

on its decision to order a psychological evaluation. To

the contrary, undoubtedly mindful of the fact that a

final decision concerning the care and custody of Marcquan in this ongoing child protection matter will be

made in future proceedings, it expressly characterized

its order for a psychological examination as potentially

benefitting the future prospect of reunification following its denial of the motion to revoke commitment. The

court aptly recognized that its order was merely a tool

in the process that began with the petitioner’s uncared

for petition and that an ultimate decision regarding

reunification was yet to be made. In this regard, the

court explained its order in relevant part: ‘‘While no

guarantee, [the respondent’s] participation in a courtordered evaluation and her sustained and effective follow-through with treatment recommendations may

potentially be the key to a reinvigorated reunification

process.’’ Indeed, there is no basis on which to conclude

that the order for a psychological evaluation affected

the court’s ruling to deny the motion to revoke commitment. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that, for

appeal purposes, the order from which the respondent

appeals was part of the court’s judgment denying the

motion to revoke commitment.9

We next address the respondent’s alternative argument that, even if the order to undergo a psychological

evaluation is interlocutory in nature, it nonetheless is

immediately appealable. Our Supreme Court has recognized that certain otherwise interlocutory orders may

be final judgments for purposes of an appeal, and the

court may deem an interlocutory order or ruling to have

the attributes of a final judgment if the ruling or order

falls within either of the two prongs of the test set

forth in Curcio. ‘‘Under Curcio, interlocutory orders

are immediately appealable if the order or ruling (1)

terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2)

so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.’’ (Internal quotations
marks omitted.) State v. Jamar D., supra, 300 Conn. 771.

‘‘The first prong of the Curcio test . . . requires that

the order being appealed from be severable from the

central cause of action so that the main action can

proceed independent of the ancillary proceeding. . . .

If the interlocutory ruling is merely a step along the

road to final judgment then it does not satisfy the first

prong of Curcio. . . . It must appear that the interlocutory ruling will not impact directly on any aspect of the

[action].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Abreu v.

Leone, 291 Conn. 332, 339, 968 A.2d 385 (2009).

We conclude that, unlike the court’s denial of the

respondent’s motion to revoke commitment, the order

for psychological evaluation did not terminate a separate and distinct proceeding. Rather, contrary to her

assertion that the order was not made ‘‘in connection

with any pending matter before the court,’’ the order

is an integral part of the ongoing proceedings involving

the respondent and Marcquan following the uncared for

petition brought by the petitioner. See General Statutes

§ 46b-129 (i).10 As the respondent seems to have recognized in her opposition to the motion to dismiss; see

footnote 8 of this opinion; the results of the evaluation

may affect the ultimate outcome of a later adjudication

of her parental rights. It is not in dispute that, at the

time that the court issued its order, Marcquan was adjudicated uncared for. He remains committed to the petitioner, and the court has an ongoing statutory obligation

to ascertain whether the petitioner’s permanency plan

for Marcquan is in his best interest. See General Statutes

§ 46b-129 (k). Stated otherwise, the order is not severable from the central cause of action involving the

respondent and Marcquan and whether reunification is

possible but is merely a step along the road to a final

judgment in that action. Accordingly, we conclude that

the order does not satisfy the first prong of the Curcio test.

Likewise, we conclude that the order does not satisfy

the second prong of the Curcio test. ‘‘[F]or an interlocutory ruling in either a criminal or a civil case to be

immediately appealable under the second prong of Curcio, certain conditions must be present. There must be

(1) a colorable claim, that is, one that is superficially

well founded but that may ultimately be deemed invalid,

(2) to a right that has both legal and practical value,

(3) that is presently held by virtue of a statute or the

state or federal constitution, (4) that is not dependent

on the exercise of judicial discretion and (5) that would

be irretrievably lost, causing irreparable harm to the

[appellant] without immediate appellate review.’’

Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, 82 Conn. App. 148,

158–59, 842 A.2d 1140, cert. denied, 269 Conn. 908, 852

A.2d 738 (2004). ‘‘The second prong of the Curcio test

focuses on the nature of the rights involved. It requires

the parties seeking to appeal to establish that the trial
court’s order threatens the preservation of a right

already secured to them and that that right will be

irretrievably lost and the [parties] irreparably harmed

unless they may immediately appeal. . . . One must

make at least a colorable claim that some recognized

statutory or constitutional right is at risk.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jamar D., supra, 300

Conn. 771.

Guided by several relevant appellate decisions that

pertain to rulings in family matters, we are not persuaded that the court’s order is immediately appealable

under Curcio on the ground that it risks irreparable

harm to the respondent’s custody or visitation rights.

Relying on the second prong of Curcio, our Supreme

Court in Madigan v. Madigan, 224 Conn. 749, 754–55,

620 A.2d 1276 (1993), concluded that a temporary order

of custody is a final judgment for purpose of an immediate appeal ‘‘because a parent’s custodial rights during

the course of dissolution proceedings cannot otherwise

be vindicated at any time, in any forum.’’ The court,

considering the nature of the right to be vindicated in

such an appeal, observed that temporary custody orders

fall within the narrow class of otherwise interlocutory

orders that are immediately appealable under Curcio

because they ‘‘affect the irreplaceable time and relationship shared between parent and child.’’ Id., 755. The

court in Madigan also reasoned: ‘‘[A] temporary custody order may have a significant impact on a subsequent permanent custody decision. Especially if both

parents would be suitable custodians, an order of temporary custody may establish a foundation for a stable

long-term relationship that becomes an important factor in determining what final custodial arrangements

are in the best interests of the child. . . . Accordingly,

not only is any impropriety in granting an initial order

for temporary custody not subsequently reversible, but

it may also have an adverse spillover effect on the

ultimate determination of custody.’’ (Citations omitted.)

Id., 756–57. It has long been recognized that orders

extending the commitment of children to the petitioner

also satisfy the second prong of Curcio. In In re Todd

G., 49 Conn. App. 361, 364–65, 713 A.2d 1286 (1998),

this court, relying on Madigan, held that a trial court’s

granting of an extension of commitment of a minor

child to the petitioner pursuant to General Statutes

§ 46b-129 (e) is a final judgment for purposes of bringing

an immediate appeal. In determining that the order

extending the child’s commitment, which was dispositional in nature, was immediately appealable, this court

stated: ‘‘The parent-child relationship in the present

case would be . . . disrupted for a significant period

of time if no appeal were possible. There are no further

proceedings in the underlying action brought pursuant

to § 46b-129 (d) that will affect the commitment order

until the petitioner either moves to extend the commitment again or to terminate the respondent’s parental
rights.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id.

We also note that, in Taff v. Bettcher, 243 Conn. 380,

387, 703 A.2d 759 (1997), our Supreme Court, relying

on Madigan, held that an order of the trial court which

barred the parties for one year from seeking review on

the issues of custody and visitation was an immediately

appealable final judgment. The court’s rationale further

illustrates the principles expressed in Madigan: ‘‘The

considerations that informed our decision in Madigan

apply equally to the facts of this case. Just as a temporary custody order may have a significant impact on a

subsequent permanent custody decision, a court order

barring the parties for one year from seeking review

on the issues of custody and visitation may interfere

with a parent’s custodial rights over a significant period

in a manner that cannot be redressed at a later time.

A lost opportunity to spend significant time with one’s

child is not recoverable. . . . Any chance by the noncustodial parent to restructure custody and visitation

to enhance the relationship or further establish a foundation in that interval cannot be replaced by a subsequent modification one year later. Nor can any harm

to the child caused by the custodial arrangement be

meaningfully addressed one year after it occurs. We

are persuaded that, as in the case of a temporary order

of custody, an immediate appeal of the court order in

this case is the only reasonable method of ensuring

that the important rights surrounding the parent-child

relationship are adequately protected.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 386–87.

In the present case, the respondent does not raise a

claim related to the court’s denial of her motion to

revoke commitment or to any other type of order that

interferes, for any length of time, with custody or visitation rights. The order for a psychological evaluation is

not dispositional in nature, and it does not affect the

irreplaceable time and relationship that exists between

a parent and a child. Nor does it risk establishing a

relationship between a child and another suitable custodian that may impact a subsequent decision concerning

custody rights.

In her opposition to the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, the respondent asserted that an immediate appeal

was necessary to avoid irreparable harm to ‘‘her right

to remain silent in neglect proceedings under General

Statutes § 46b-137.’’ Section 46b-137 (d) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any confession, admission or statement,

written or oral, made by the parent or parents or guardian of the child or youth after the filing of a petition

alleging such child or youth to be neglected, uncared

for or abused shall be inadmissible in any proceeding

held upon such petition against the person making such

admission or statement unless such person shall have

been advised of the person’s right to retain counsel,

and that if the person is unable to afford counsel, coun-
sel will be appointed to represent the person, that the

person has a right to refuse to make any statement and

that any statements the person makes may be introduced in evidence against the person . . . .’’11

In an effort to obtain immediate review of the order,

the respondent relies on her right to remain silent,

which is safeguarded by the advisement of rights mandated by § 46b-137. We observe that the court’s order,

which required her to submit to a psychological evaluation, did not directly infringe on or threaten irreparable

harm to her right to remain silent or rule on the admissibility of any statement made by her. The order did not

address her right to remain silent.

Beyond bringing the present appeal, the respondent

has not taken any action with respect to complying

with the order, let alone asserted her right to remain

silent instead of complying with the order. It is possible

that she may refuse to comply with the order and as a

result be found in contempt, at which time she may

bring an immediate appeal. See Khan v. Hillyer, 306

Conn. 205, 216, 49 A.3d 996 (2012) (‘‘a contempt order

is considered final for appellate purposes when the

order so substantially resolves the rights and duties

of the parties that further proceedings relating to the

judgment of contempt cannot affect them’’ (emphasis

in original; internal quotation marks omitted)). Alternatively, the court, at a future proceeding, might enter an

appealable judgment against the respondent based on

an adverse inference drawn from her failure to participate in the psychological evaluation. In such a circumstance, the respondent would be able to challenge the

judgment on the basis that the order for a psychological

evaluation was improper.

It is also possible that the respondent could choose

to attend the psychological evaluation but refuse to

answer some or all of the questions asked of her based

on her right to remain silent. Although under that circumstance it is unlikely that the court would hold the

respondent in contempt for exercising a constitutional

and statutory right, to the extent the court issued a

judgment adverse to the respondent based on her exercise of that right, the respondent could challenge on

appeal that judgment and the propriety of the court’s

psychological evaluation order.

It is also a possibility that the respondent may comply

with the order for a psychological evaluation. Doing so

may benefit her with respect to her efforts to be reunited

with Marcquan, be detrimental with respect to those

efforts, or have no effect on those efforts. The respondent will have an opportunity to challenge the propriety

of the order in the event that there is a final judgment

adverse to her that results from the use, if any, of the

evidence obtained as a result of the order. What all

of these potential scenarios demonstrate is that the

respondent’s rights are far from being finally resolved.12
Although the hearing on the respondent’s motion to

revoke commitment has come to an end, the court’s

involvement in the ongoing child protective case involving Marcquan and the respondent is continuing. ‘‘The

policy concerns underlying the final judgment rule are

to discourage piecemeal appeals and to facilitate the

speedy and orderly disposition of cases at the trial court

level.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pritchard v.

Pritchard, 281 Conn. 262, 270, 914 A.2d 1025 (2007).

To permit an appeal at this juncture would interfere

with the speedy and orderly disposition of that ongoing

case and encourage piecemeal appeals. If the psychological evaluation required by the order yields evidence

that is used by the court in a final judgment from which

the respondent appeals, or if the respondent’s refusal

to participate fully in the psychological evaluation

results in an adverse judgment, a reviewing court will

have an opportunity to evaluate the propriety of the

order at that time, when it may fully apprehend its

import following a trial. Thus, in the absence of an

immediate right to appeal, the respondent’s right to

challenge the order has not been irretrievably lost.

The type of order at issue in the present case merely

is an intermediate step along the road to facilitate reunification, if possible, and provides a factual predicate

for future custody determinations. The order at issue

does not threaten irrevocable harm to the parent-child

relationship or to the rights of the respondent. In light

of the foregoing, we are persuaded that the order from

which the respondent appeals is not part of the judgment denying her motion to revoke commitment. It

is an interlocutory order that is not an immediately

appealable final judgment under either prong of the

Curcio test. Thus, we dismiss the appeal and do not

consider the merits of the respondent’s claim that the

court abused its discretion in ordering the psychological

evaluation. See, e.g., State v. Jamar D., supra, 300

Conn. 770.

The appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection on to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order

of the Appellate Court.

** February 2, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The mother is referred to herein as the respondent. The father, Mark

B., although also a respondent in the underlying proceedings, is not a party

to this appeal and for convenience is referred to herein as the father.

2 The attorney for the minor child has filed a statement, pursuant to

Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c), adopting the brief of the Commissioner

of Children and Families.

3 The respondent also claims that, as part of its order requiring her to

participate in a psychological evaluation, the court abused its discretion

by ordering that confidential records related to her past treatment with a

counselor be disclosed to the court-appointed evaluator. The respondent

argues that the court failed to make a necessary finding pursuant to General

Statutes § 52-146s that the records should be disclosed and that, even if such
a finding was made by the court, the evidence did not support such finding.

For the same reasons that we conclude in this opinion that the appeal

from the court’s order for a psychological evaluation is not an immediately

appealable interlocutory order, we likewise conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this claim, which, according to the respondent, is a component

of the order for a psychological evaluation. As the respondent acknowledges

in her appellate brief, however, the record, including the court’s December

26, 2019 memorandum of decision, wherein it denied the respondent’s

motion to revoke commitment and ordered her to participate in a psychological evaluation, does not reflect that the court made any ruling concerning

the disclosure of her counseling records. Accordingly, even if we did have

jurisdiction to review this claim, the lack of an order leaves us with no

ruling to review.

4 On May 16, 2017, the neglect petition was orally amended to allege that

Marcquan was uncared for.

5 Motions to revoke commitment are governed by General Statutes § 46b129 (m), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘The commissioner, a parent or

the child’s attorney may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon

finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that such revocation

is in the best interests of such child . . . the court may revoke the commitment of such child . . . . No such motion shall be filed more often than

once every six months.’’

Practice Book § 35a-14A provides in relevant part: ‘‘Where a child or youth

is committed to the custody of the Commissioner . . . the commissioner,

a parent or the child’s attorney may file a motion seeking revocation of

commitment. The judicial authority may revoke commitment if a cause for

commitment no longer exists and it is in the best interests of the child

. . . . Whether to revoke the commitment is a dispositional question, based

on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether

to revoke the commitment upon a fair preponderance of the evidence. The

party seeking revocation of commitment has the burden of proof that no

cause for commitment exists. If the burden is met, the party opposing the

revocation has the burden of proof that revocation would not be in the best

interests of the child. If a motion for revocation is denied, a new motion

shall not be filed by the movant until at least six months have elapsed from

the date of the filing of the prior motion unless waived by the judicial

authority.’’

6 General Statutes § 46b-129 (k) (1) (A) requires that nine months after a

child is placed in the care and custody of the petitioner, the petitioner

must file a permanency plan and the court must have a hearing on such

permanency plan. Section 46b-129 (k) (2) provides that such permanency

plan may include the goal of (1) revocation of commitment and reunification

of the child with the parent, (2) transfer of guardianship to a third person,

(3) termination of parental rights and adoption, or (4) a plan for a permanent

living arrangement.

7 At the revocation hearing, Marcquan’s attorney represented that Marcquan’s desire was to go home to the respondent, but that he wanted and

needed her to work on her issues while he remained in foster care with

his godmother.

8 Prior to the time of oral argument, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss

the appeal for lack of an appealable final judgment. The petitioner argued

that the order for a psychological evaluation was not part of the court’s

judgment denying the respondent’s motion to revoke commitment, which

order, as we explain in this opinion, is a final judgment from which she

properly may have appealed. Viewing the order for a psychological evaluation as an interlocutory ruling, the petitioner argued that the order was not

appealable under the test set forth in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463

A.2d 566 (1983). See id. (‘‘[a]n otherwise interlocutory order is appealable

in two circumstances: (1) where the order or action terminates a separate

and distinct proceeding, or (2) where the order or action so concludes the

rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them’’). With

respect to the first prong of Curcio, the petitioner argued that, unlike the

court’s denial of the respondent’s motion to revoke, the order for a psychological evaluation did not terminate a separate and distinct proceeding.

With respect to the second prong of Curcio, the petitioner argued that the

respondent was unable to demonstrate that the order risked irreparable

harm to her. Accordingly, the petitioner argued that the appeal should

be dismissed.

In the respondent’s objection to the motion to dismiss, she argued that,

contrary to the petitioner’s characterization of the order, it was not interlocu-
tory in nature, but ‘‘part of a final judgment from which [she] was entitled

to appeal under General Statutes § 51-197a.’’ She also argued that the denial

of her motion to revoke commitment concluded all matters that were pending before the court and that the order for a psychological evaluation was

made merely ‘‘in anticipation of hypothetical future proceedings that had

not yet been initiated.’’ Thus, the respondent argued, the court was without

authority to order the evaluation.

The respondent also argued that, if the order was interlocutory in nature,

the order was immediately appealable under Curcio in that the order

‘‘directed [her] to speak to a court-appointed psychologist in violation of

her right to remain silent in neglect proceedings under General Statutes

§ 46b-137 . . . .’’ She also argued that the order ‘‘authorized the petitioner

to obtain from [her] licensed professional counselor statutorily privileged

information within the counselor’s control in violation of General Statutes

§ 52-146s.’’ The respondent argued that she was without the ability to prevent

the disclosure of the counseling records because they were in the control

of her counselor and that ‘‘[t]he only judicial recourse available to [her]

in protecting the privileged information . . . was by immediate appeal to

this court.’’

On July 22, 2020, this court denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the

appeal ‘‘without prejudice to the petitioner addressing in her appellee’s brief

on the merits, and the [respondent] addressing in her reply brief, the question

[of] whether there is an appealable final judgment in this matter.’’

9

In her opposition to the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the present appeal,

the respondent heavily relied on this court’s decision in Savage v. Savage,

25 Conn. App. 693, 596 A.2d 23 (1991), for the proposition that the order

for a psychological evaluation was not interlocutory but part of the judgment

of the trial court denying the motion to revoke commitment. Savage involved

an appeal in a dissolution action. The plaintiff wife appealed from the

judgment dissolving her marriage to her former husband, the defendant, as

well as from postjudgment orders. Id., 694. The respondent in the present

case focuses on the plaintiff’s claim in Savage that the trial court abused

its discretion in ordering, as part of its judgment, that the parties and their

minor children engage in postjudgment consultation with a child expert.

Id., 698. This court agreed with the plaintiff that the order was improper

and reasoned: ‘‘The trial court’s order here compelling consultation with

[the child expert] for two years into the future is not a proper custody order

but rather is an attempt to force consultation for purposes of a postjudgment

evaluation. There is no statutory authorization for such an evaluation without

a pending motion or matter before a court.’’ Id., 701.

The respondent’s reliance on Savage is misplaced. In Savage, this court

did not expressly address an issue concerning this court’s subject matter

jurisdiction or whether the plaintiff had appealed from a final judgment.

More importantly, Savage was an appeal from a judgment of dissolution

and postdissoluton orders, not a child protection matter. The judgment

rendered by the trial court in Savage disposed of pending matters between

the parties until such time as one or both parties brought before the court

a new postjudgment motion. The procedural posture of the court’s order

in the present case is materially distinguishable from that at issue in Savage.

Judicial involvement in the present child protection matter will be ongoing

until such time as reunification between the respondent and Marcquan has

been achieved, the court has terminated the respondent’s parental rights with

respect to Marcquan, or the court has made some other final determination

regarding his custody and placement.

10 General Statutes § 46b-129 (i) authorizes the court to order a psychological evaluation when a neglect or uncared petition is filed in said court. It

provides in relevant part: ‘‘When a petition is filed in said court for the

commitment of a child . . . the Commissioner of Children and Families

shall make a thorough investigation of the case and shall cause to be made

a thorough physical and mental examination of the child or youth if requested

by the court. The court after hearing may also order a thorough physical

or mental examination, or both, of a parent or guardian whose competency

or ability to care for a child or youth before the court is at issue. . . .’’

General Statutes § 46b-129 (i).

Practice Book § 34a-21 (a) provides: ‘‘The judicial authority, after hearing

on a motion for a court-ordered evaluation or after an agreement had been

reached to conduct such an evaluation, may order a mental or physical

examination of a child or youth. The judicial authority after hearing or after

an agreement has been reached may also order a thorough physical or

mental examination of a parent or guardian whose competency or ability
to care for a child or youth is at issue.’’

11 As we stated previously; see footnote 8 of this opinion; the respondent

also argued that an immediate appeal was necessary so that she could

protect statutorily protected counseling records that were in the custody

of her counselor. She argued that, as part of its order for a psychological

evaluation, the court had authorized the petitioner to obtain these records

from her counselor. As we determined previously in this opinion, however,

the record does not reflect that the court ordered such disclosure. See

footnote 3 of this opinion. Accordingly, this aspect of the respondent’s

argument is unavailing because it is based on an inaccurate interpretation

of the court’s order.

12 The respondent does not dispute that Marcquan remains committed to

the petitioner following the filing of an uncared for petition. In claiming

that a presently held right is at risk for purposes of the issue before us, she

has focused on her right to remain silent but has not argued that she has

a presently held statutorily or constitutionally protected right to not undergo

a psychological evaluation.