NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________ No . 17

- 2052

________________ JOHN O. TORREY,

Appellant

v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, Division of Criminal Justice; STEPHEN J. TAYLOR, individually, and in his official capacity of Director of the Division of Criminal Justice; PAUL MORRIS, individually, and in his official capacity as the chief of investigations, Division of Criminal Justice; STANLEY BEET, individually, and in h is official capacity; DERMOT P. O’GRADY, Esq. in his individual and his official capacity; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 TO 25, individually and in their official capacities

________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Ci vi l Action No. 3

- 1 3

- c v - 0 1 192 ) District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan

________________ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 13 , 2017 Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE , and RENDELL , Circui t Judges

(Opinion filed : December 7, 2017 )2 ________________ OPINION *

________________ AMBRO, Circuit Judge John Torrey is a former law enforcement officer who was employed by the New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safet y, Division of Criminal Justice (“DCJ”).
While there he was the target of an internal investigation involving allegations of sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and other misconduct. Following the investigation, h e w as terminated and began apply ing for other law enforcement positions, including positions at the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and the Camden County Police Department. To facilitate routine background checks i n connection with his applications, Torrey signed and notarized consent f orms authorizing the DCJ to share its personnel files relating to him, including those produced by the internal invest igation . After receiving these forms , the DCJ allowed investigators from both the M ercer and Camden County offices to review Torrey’s fil es . He was not hired. Torrey sued the DCJ and individual, state

- employee defendants , alleging a deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and defamation, false light, and tortious interference with economic advantage under N ew Jersey law

. 1

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding preceden t. 1 The District Court also dismissed Torrey’s New Jersey common law due process claim, but he does not challenge that ruling on appeal.3

The District Court ent ered summary judgment for the d efendants and dismissed his claims. It found that there were no genuine issues of material fact about whether the DCJ’s internal files contained false and inaccurate information. It al so concluded that the consent forms signed by Torrey were not void as against public policy. Next, it found no evidence the defendants interfered with his prospective economic advantage

. Finally, it ruled sua sponte tha t the State and state

- employee d efe ndants were entitled to qualified immunity. As none of the Court’s rulings were erroneous, we affirm. For three of Torrey’s four claims, he must produce evidence that the contents of the personnel files we re both false and made public. DeAngelis v. Hil l , 847 A.2d 1261,
1267

– 68 (N.J. 2004) (defamation claims require a “false and defamatory statement” and an “unprivileged publication of that statement” ); see also Hill v. Borough of Kutztown , 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (a section 1983 liber ty interes t in reputation claim require s an employer to have “ disseminate [ d ] a false and defamatory impression about the employee

. ”) ; Romaine v. Kallinger , 537 A.2d 284, 289, 109 N.J. 282, 293 (N.J.,1988) (false light claims require placement “ in a false light befor e the public.” ) The record evidence, however, fails to establish either requirement. To begin , Torrey does not provide evidence of falsity. The District Court found t he majority of Torrey’s file was undisputedly true, as Torrey himself acknowledged in a formal, recorded interview conducted as part of the investigation into the complaints. During that interview, he confirmed making harassing sexual comments, gestures, and c ontact with female subordinates, impr operly using confidential funds, and visiting sexually explicit websites on his work computer. S econd, Torrey does not provide evidence of unprivileged4

publication , as t here is no evidence that the personnel files were disseminated to parties other than Torrey’s prospective employers , who Torrey had authorized to access the files. Torrey answers that the consent forms are void as against public policy. He also challenges the District Court’s qualified immunity analysis for the same reason, disputing
its reliance on the waivers in its reasoning . B ut Torrey’s public policy argument is unpersuasive

. I nvestigators who conduct background checks are capable of independently evaluating the reliability of findings, evidence, and conclusions contained
in internal files . Moreover, as the District Court st ated , the sensitive, dangerous, and public

- facing nature of police work favors a policy encouraging inter

- agency disclosure of information about police officers. Imposing liability here could dissuade police offices from conducting thorough, memorialized investigations into allegations of problem conduct. Torrey ’s final claim is for tort i ous interference with prospective economic advantage

. For this he must show intentional and malicious interference. See Varrallo v. Hammond Inc. , 94 F.3d 842, 848 (3d Ci r. 1996)

. But he does not point to any evidence of anyone at the DCJ speaking negatively about him to the investigators. His assertion that providing the files constituted interference is incorrect because he consented to their limited disclosure

. The D istrict C ourt correctly concluded that this claim fails , as there is
no other c ommu nication or conduct alleged

. Accordingly, we affirm.