J-S01006-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

FRANK JERRID DORTCH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 594 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-67-CR-0003902-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 1, 2022

Frank Jerrid Dortch appeals pro se from the April 26, 2021 order denying 

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant also appeals from the May 5, 

2021 order denying his petition for a bill of particulars.1 Since the appeal is 

interlocutory, we quash.

We provide the following background. Appellant was charged by 

criminal information with one count of possession of cocaine, one count of 

possession of a small amount of marijuana, and two summary vehicle offenses

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 “Generally, taking one appeal from separate judgments is not acceptable 

practice and is discouraged.” Dong Yuan Chen v. Saidi, 100 A.3d 587, 589

n.1 (Pa.Super. 2014) (cleaned up) (quoting Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Aetna 

Cas. & Sur. Co., 263 A.2d 448, 452 (Pa. 1970)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 341, 

Note; Pa.R.A.P. 512, Note. While this Court issued a rule to show cause 

regarding this error, we do not reach this issue in light of our disposition.
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following a traffic stop that was conducted on April 22, 2020. Appellant failed 

to attend his preliminary hearing, and all charges were held for court. 

Thereafter, Appellant pro se filed his first request for a bill of particulars. 

The Commonwealth responded, noting that Appellant’s motion amounted to a 

request for discovery, which it had already prepared for Appellant. The trial 

court held a hearing and ultimately denied Appellant’s request. Appellant 

subsequently filed a petition for “writ of limine,” which the trial court treated 

as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

2

 The trial court held a hearing, during 

which the Commonwealth called Officer Shawn Wilson to testify to the 

underlying evidence supporting the Commonwealth’s case against Appellant

and Appellant cross-examined him. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial 

court found the Commonwealth had established prima facie evidence as to all 

four charges and denied Appellant’s petition. In response, Appellant orally 

moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600(G), which the trial court denied. 

Appellant then filed the underlying bill of particulars, which the court also 

denied.

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2 Appellant did not file this petition of record, but the court, in ordering a 

hearing on the pro se submission, ordered that it be filed of record. In the 

petition, Appellant attempted to explain why he was not present at his 

preliminary hearing and requested that the court “bring [the case] back to 

[the] preliminary hearing” phase. Order, 2/3/21 (attached petition at 

unnumbered 1).
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This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.3 

This Court issued a rule to show cause “why one appeal was taken from 

two separate orders and why the instant appeal should not be quashed as 

taken from unappealable orders.” Per Curiam Order, 6/29/21. Appellant 

responded that the appeal should not be quashed because he is only one 

person appealing from one trial court docket and, relying on Commonwealth 

v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020), he “is appealing a preliminary 

hearing by right.” Answer to Directive of Directory Pa. Rule of Crim. P. 575, 

7/18/21, at unnumbered 1. This Court discharged the rule to show cause and 

referred the matter to the panel for consideration.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

I. Is an interlocutory order bounding over offenses from a 

preliminary hearing appealable before trial on the grounds 

of whether there was prima facie established in which 

probable cause is needed?

II. Is an interlocutory order denying petition for a bill of 

particulars appealable before trial under Rule 311, if a bill of 

particulars does not make a difference of whether the trial 

will continue or not?

III. Is it lawfull [sic] to deny a defense’s timely petition for a bill 

of particulars when its petitioned for only in attempt to avoid 

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3 Upon remand from this Court, the trial court conducted a hearing pursuant 

to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). At the conclusion 

of the hearing, the court found Appellant was knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waiving his right to counsel, and the court allowed Appellant to 

proceed pro se with standby counsel. 
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surprise by asking for one so the offenses are solidified and 

their grading that defendant is scheduled to go to trial for?

IV. Is the bill of particulars a defensive remedy beyond the 

scope solidifying offenses and their grading before trial?

V. Can probable cause or prima facie be established for illegal 

poss. of marijuana without establishing if suspect has or 

does not have a medical marijuana card?

VI. May probable cause be established in front of a magistrate 

judge without an affidavit of probable cause?

VII. May prima facie be established without probable cause?

VIII. Is it beyond the scope of our state’s judiciary to determine 

what a president of the United States make’s [sic] an 

emergency executive order of?

Appellant’s brief at 8-9 (cleaned up).

Before reaching the merits of Appellant’s substantive claims, we must 

first determine whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Brister, 16 A.3d 530, 533 (Pa.Super. 2011) (“The 

appealability of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked 

to review the order.” (cleaned up)). In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court 

urges this Court to quash the appeal as interlocutory. The Commonwealth 

agrees, arguing that Appellant’s appeal from the order denying his bill of 

particulars is premature and that he has not satisfied the requirements for an 

interlocutory appeal. See Commonwealth’s brief at 9-12.4 Appellant, on the 

other hand, contends that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 

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4

In its brief, the Commonwealth focuses its argument on the order denying 

Appellant’s request for a bill of particulars, thereby failing to address the order 

denying Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
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§ 742 (appeals from courts of common pleas), Pa.R.A.P. 311 (interlocutory 

appeals as of right), the doctrine of exceptional circumstances,5 and Pa.R.A.P. 

313 (collateral orders). See Appellant’s brief at 3, 8; Appellant’s reply brief 

at 4, 10, 14. 

“In this Commonwealth, an appeal may only be taken from: 1) a 

final order or one certified by the trial court as final; 2) an interlocutory order 

as of right; 3) an interlocutory order by permission; or 4) a collateral order.” 

Brister, supra at 533 (cleaned up). Here, Appellant appeals from an order 

denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus6 and an order denying a bill of 

particulars. We will consider these orders seriatim. 

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5 Appellant relies on a Supreme Court case pre-dating the promulgation of 

the current rules of appellate procedure for the argument that an appeal from 

an interlocutory order is permissible where exceptional circumstances exist. 

See Appellant’s reply brief at 4 (citing Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 108 

A.2d 780 (Pa. 1954); see also Commonwealth v. Swanson, 225 A.2d 231, 

232 (Pa. 1967) (citations omitted) (explaining that “exceptional circumstances 

arise (1) where an appeal is necessary to prevent a great injustice to the 

defendant, or (2) where an issue of basic human rights is involved, or (3) 

where an issue of great public importance is involved”). Since the inception 

of the rules of appellate procedure, “[a]ppellate review of any court order is a 

jurisdictional question defined by rule or statute.” Commonwealth v. 

Parker, 173 A.3d 294, 296 (Pa.Super. 2017) (cleaned up). Nonetheless, this 

Court continues to consider the doctrine of exceptional circumstances in 

connection with the rules of appellate procedure. See Commonwealth v. 

McClelland, 165 A.3d 19, 23 (Pa.Super. 2017), rev'd on other 

grounds, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020).

6 Although Appellant’s petition was not labeled as a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus, Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s treatment of it 

as such.
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This Court has addressed whether an order denying habeas corpus relief 

is interlocutory for appealability purposes:

As a general rule, an order denying a pre-trial petition for habeas 

corpus is interlocutory. In the absence of exceptional 

circumstances, statutory authorization, or jurisdictional challenge, 

an order denying an application for discharge prior to trial, 

particularly where it is based upon the alleged insufficiency of 

evidence to establish a prima facie case before the magistrate, is 

unappealable.

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 849 A.2d 1254, 1256 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(cleaned up). 

In McClelland, supra at 732 n.8, our Supreme Court noted that “[a]n 

order denying or granting a writ of habeas corpus is interlocutory[,]” but 

declined to consider the appropriateness of this Court’s determination that 

interlocutory appellate review was appropriate in McClelland as it was beyond 

the scope of the issue upon which allocatur was granted. Relevantly, this 

Court concluded that exceptional circumstances warranted review of 

McClelland’s appeal due to an unresolved and important constitutional 

question, and therefore we had jurisdiction to consider the merits of his claim. 

Commonwealth v. McClelland, 165 A.3d 19, 23 (Pa.Super. 2017), rev'd

on other grounds, McClelland, supra. Specifically, McClelland queried 

“[w]hether hearsay testimony from an affiant violates due process when that 

hearsay alone establishes a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing.” Id. 

(citation and footnote omitted).
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Instantly, Appellant raises a similar argument, contending that hearsay 

alone was used to establish a prima facie case at the April 26, 2021 hearing. 

Preliminarily, we observe that following McClelland, supra, it is no longer an 

open question whether hearsay alone may establish a prima facie case at a 

preliminary hearing. Accordingly, an argument based upon that question no 

longer raises an exceptional circumstance, as that question has been 

answered. Moreover, the holding from McClelland was not violated herein 

as the establishment of a prima facie case against Appellant did not hinge 

solely on hearsay evidence. Specifically, Officer Wilson testified that while on 

a traffic detail in the city of York, he observed a van with non-operational 

headlights at approximately 1:30 a.m. N.T., 4/26/21, at 7. Officer Wilson 

attempted to conduct a traffic stop, but the driver of the vehicle continued to 

drive for several blocks, passing easily accessible stopping points and 

ultimately attempting unsuccessfully to parallel park. Based on the suspicious 

behavior, Officer Wilson ordered the driver from the vehicle. Officer Wilson 

immediately recognized Appellant, the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, 

from prior occasions of driving while his license was suspended. Id. at 7-10. 

Officer Wilson confirmed that Appellant’s license was still suspended. Id. at 

11. When Officer Wilson had initially approached the vehicle, he smelled fresh 

marijuana, and upon a search of Appellant incident to arrest, Officer Wilson 

recovered burnt marijuana roaches from his pocket. Id. at 12. Officer Wilson 

directly observed the assisting officer recover a small amount of fresh 

marijuana and a suspected cocaine packet from the driver’s side floorboard. 
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Id. at 12-13, 23. Stated simply, all the facts testified to were directly 

conducted or observed by Officer Wilson, the testifying officer at the hearing 

who was cross-examined by Appellant. Thus, Appellant’s challenge does not 

rise to the level of an exceptional circumstance, and instead, merely amounts 

to an argument that there was a lack of prima facie evidence. Accordingly,

we agree with the trial court that this order is interlocutory and unappealable. 

See Jackson, supra. 

As to the order denying the bill of particulars, this order also is not final 

as it did not dispose of all claims and all parties. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). Thus, 

the order is necessarily interlocutory. Although Appellant contends this order 

is appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311 in his statement of questions, this

order is not an interlocutory order appealable as of right. See Pa.R.A.P. 311. 

Rather, this interlocutory order is only appealable via permission, and 

Appellant has not filed a petition for permission to appeal. Moreover, no 

exceptional circumstances exist warranting review of his claims pertaining to 

the denial of this order. Thus, we may not exercise our discretion to grant 

permission for review. See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 648 A.2d 1172, 

1174-75 (Pa. 1994) (affirming this Court’s quashal of an appeal from a pretrial interlocutory order where the defendant did not file a petition for

permission to appeal).

The only other possible basis for jurisdiction would be a determination 

that the order denying the bill of particulars was a collateral order. A collateral 

order is defined as “an order separable from and collateral to the main cause 
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of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and 

the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment 

in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Since we 

review rulings on motions for bills of particular following a final judgment of 

sentence in criminal cases, the claim will not be irreparably lost by postponing 

review, and it therefore does not qualify as a collateral order. See e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Libengood, 152 A.3d 1057 (Pa.Super. 2016). 

For these reasons, the orders appealed from are interlocutory and 

unappealable. Therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/01/2022