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Filed 11/4/15 In re A.M. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

In re A.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

C078703

SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. JD234843)

S.H., mother of minor A.M., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating 

her parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 §§ 366.26, 

395.) She contends the juvenile court erred by not finding that the beneficial parental 

relationship exception to adoption applied. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

 

1

 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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BACKGROUND

Minor A.M. was born in October 2009. Her parents’ relationship was riddled with 

domestic violence. In May 2013, mother was arrested for charges involving the 

trafficking of minors, and it appears father was also incarcerated around that time, 

although the charges are unclear from the record. Upon mother’s arrest, she left the 

minor in the care of the maternal grandmother. Shortly after mother’s arrest in May 

2013, the minor’s paternal half sibling, De.M., and a nonrelated minor, D.A., were 

detained and placed with minor A.M.’s paternal grandmother.2 Another of minor’s 

paternal half siblings, Da.M., was detained in January 2014 and also placed with the 

paternal grandmother.

On June 13, 2014, the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human 

Services (Department) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the minor alleging that the 

minor’s maternal aunt (a minor), who was also residing in the maternal grandmother’s 

home, had been physically abused by the maternal grandmother. The petition alleged 

mother had placed the minor at risk by leaving her in the care of this inappropriate and 

unsafe caregiver and both parents were incarcerated and unable to provide care for the 

minor. The petition also alleged that the minor’s paternal half siblings had been declared 

dependents due to domestic violence involving father. The minor was detained in the 

home of the paternal grandmother. The minor had asked to be placed with half siblings 

De.M. and Da.M. Father’s parental rights to De.M. were terminated in July 2014.

On September 8, 2014, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction/disposition 

hearing, sustained the allegations in the section 300 petition, declared the minor a 

dependent child of the court, and placed the minor with the paternal grandmother. 

 

2

 The nonrelated minor D.A. is De.M.’s maternal half sibling.
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Mother and father were bypassed for reunification services and a section 366.26 hearing 

was set.

Mother has remained incarcerated and awaiting sentencing on the child trafficking 

charges throughout these proceedings. She anticipated she would be receiving a 

minimum term of 10 years up to a maximum of life in prison. Father had been released

but was subsequently arrested again for felony robbery, assault, and probation violations

in July 2014.

Prior to the minor’s detention, the maternal grandmother brought the minor to visit 

mother twice a week for up to three hours in length. After detention, the minor was 

transported to visit with mother in July 2014, and mother had two telephone calls with the 

minor and sent her two letters in August 2014. Attempts to arrange an August 2014 visit 

were unsuccessful. The minor was unable to visit mother in September 2014 due to 

mother being disciplined. Minor visited mother in October 2014 and the visit went well. 

Both minor and mother stated that they missed each other. The Department was unable 

to arrange visits for the following months, through no fault of mother.

The social worker’s December 29, 2014, report stated that the minor missed 

mother and would cry out for her when she got in trouble. The five-year-old minor was 

developmentally, emotionally, and socially on schedule. She could write her name, count 

to thirty, and identify colors and letters. She appeared happy and healthy and neither the 

paternal grandmother nor the minor’s teacher had any concerns about her behavior. The 

paternal grandmother was in the process of adopting the minor’s half siblings, De.M. and 

Da.M. The minor was generally adoptable and was also likely to be adopted by the 

paternal grandmother.

On January 26, 2015, the juvenile court conducted a contested section 366.26 

hearing. Mother objected to termination of parental rights and argued the beneficial 

relationship exception to adoption applied and that legal guardianship with the relative 

caretaker paternal grandmother was the better option. The parties stipulated to the 
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testimony of the minor as follows: “The child’s statement is that she has a strong 

relationship and bond with her mother. She has visited the mother in custody and has had 

telephone contact with her while she has been in custody. She . . . doesn’t really 

understand the term adoption, but if she were to be asked who her first preference is as 

far as if she had a chance to pick where she lives, her mother would be her first choice. 

And so if mother were to be released tomorrow, she would want to return to the mother.” 

The minor viewed the mother as her mother and the paternal grandmother as her 

grandmother in terms of her familial relationships.

The juvenile court found that while there was consistent and regular contact 

between the minor and mother, the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception to 

the preference of the permanent plan of adoption was inapplicable. The juvenile court 

stated that its finding was based on its “review [of] the file and circumstances of the 

child’s age, how long the child has been out of the custody of the parents, the visitation 

and the relationship,” as well as the minor’s wishes. Parental rights were terminated and 

the permanent plan of adoption was selected and implemented.

DISCUSSION

Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that the beneficial parentchild relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply. We 

find no error.

At the selection and implementation hearing, the juvenile court must choose one 

of four alternative permanent plans for a minor; the permanent plan preferred by the 

Legislature is adoption. If the minor is adoptable, the court must terminate parental rights 

absent a showing of detriment to the minor. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 

1368.) There are only limited circumstances that permit the juvenile court to find a 

“compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be 

detrimental to the child . . . .” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One such circumstance is 

when “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the 
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child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) 

The burden is on the parent to make such a showing. (In re Cristella C. (1992) 

6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1372-1373.)

The phrase “benefit from continuing the relationship” found in the statute means 

that “the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh 

the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In 

other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child 

relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new 

family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the 

child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly 

harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not 

terminated. [¶] . . . The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and 

contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from 

child to parent.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) The preference for 

permanent placements, which is afforded by adoption, is a vital component of the 

statutory scheme. (Cf. In re Mark V. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 754, 760-762.)

The parties note a split of authority as to whether the substantial evidence or abuse 

of discretion standard applies in reviewing the juvenile court’s rejection of exceptions 

to adoption and suggest use of the substantial evidence standard in this case. We will 

employ the substantial evidence standard, although we note “[t]he practical differences 

between the two standards of review are not significant. ‘[E]valuating the factual basis 

for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the 

ruling. . . . Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge.’ ” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 

78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.)

Here, there was no dispute that the minor visited mother regularly. Additionally, 

by all accounts, the minor enjoys her visits with mother and indicated she would prefer to 

live with mother if her mother were to be released from prison tomorrow. But mother is 
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not being released from prison tomorrow. And by the time of the section 366.26 hearing, 

the minor had been out of mother’s care for almost two years, which amounts to a third of 

her young life. She looks to her paternal grandmother to meet her needs. She appears 

happy and healthy in the grandmother’s care and is developmentally on schedule. While 

she reportedly misses mother and is sad when visits end, she transitions back to 

placement without any difficulty.

Such evidence does not compel a finding that the minor’s relationship with mother 

was “sufficiently strong that the child would suffer detriment from its termination” (In re 

Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418), or that it established a “compelling 

reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added). The Legislature has, in effect, found the best interests of 

the minor to be served by permanence and stability afforded by adoption at this stage in 

the proceedings. (In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792, 1799.) The juvenile court 

expressly considered the minor’s age, how long she has been out of mother’s care, their 

visitation, the relationship between minor and mother, and the minor’s wishes. It had to 

find an “exceptional situation existed to forego adoption,” which it did not. (In re 

Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)

Mother argues that “there is no sound reason for termination of parental rights, as 

for the minor, the paternal grandmother will continue to be her grandmother and the 

mother will continue to be known and held by the minor to be her mother.” She points 

out that the minor is in the home of the paternal grandmother and argues that, therefore, 

“[t]here is no ‘tenuous placement’ to be balanced ‘against the security and the sense of 

belonging to a new family would confer.’ [Citation.] The minor is not joining a new 

family. There can be no threat to the security and sense of belonging the minor would 

enjoy in the home of the paternal grandmother.”

We disagree. First, the Legislature has not excepted relative guardianship from 

the preference for adoption. It has not decreed that adoption is somehow less important 
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for a minor if that minor is placed with a relative, rather than nonrelative caretaker. 

Second, mother’s argument that “[t]here can be no threat to the security and sense of 

belonging the minor would enjoy in the home of the paternal grandmother” completely 

disregards the specific facts of this case. The paternal grandmother is in the process of 

adopting the minor’s two half siblings who live in the home with the minor. The minor 

specifically requested that she be placed with her half siblings, indicating she values her 

relationship with them. If she were to remain the only child not adopted by paternal 

grandmother, the minor’s sense of stability and permanence, as well as her feelings of 

belonging in the home and her relationship with her half siblings, could be significantly 

undermined. In light of the particular facts of this case, not freeing the minor for 

adoption by her paternal grandmother could actually magnify the instability the 

Legislature has tried to prevent by making adoption the preferred permanent plan. 

Therefore, the placement of the minor in the paternal grandmother’s home does not 

support mother’s claim that she need not be adopted, but actually contravenes it.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

 /s/

Blease, Acting P. J.

We concur:

 /s/

Robie, J.

 /s/

Butz, J.