2014 IL App (5th) 130151WC 

Opinion filed June 9, 2014 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION DIVISION 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JACK CARTER, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

 ) of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, 

 ) Randolph County, Illinois. 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Appeal No. 5-13-0151WC 

 ) Circuit No. 11-MR-25 

 ) 

THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION ) Honorable 

COMMISSION et al. (Old Ben Coal Co./ ) Richard A. Brown, 

Horizon Natural Resources, Appellee). ) Judge, Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Hoffman, Hudson, Harris, and Stewart concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

OPINION 

¶ 1 The claimant, Jack Carter, filed a claim against Old Ben Coal Co./Horizon Natural 

Resources (the employer) under the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 

310/1 et seq. (West 2008)) alleging coal workers' pneumoconiosis and claiming a last exposure 

date of September 24, 2004. Medical evidence presented at the hearing indicated that the 

claimant was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) caused in part by 

exposure to coal dust but was not diagnosed with coal workers' pneumoconiosis. The arbitrator 

found that the claimant's claim was time-barred because it was not filed within the three-year 
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statute of limitations applicable to claims alleging occupational diseases other than coal workers' 

pneumoconiosis. See 820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008). 

¶ 2 The claimant appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Illinois Workers' Compensation 

Commission (the Commission), arguing that the arbitrator erred by applying the Act's three-year 

statute of limitations to the claimant's claim rather than the five-year statute of limitations 

governing claims for disability caused by "coal miners pneumoconiosis." The Commission 

unanimously affirmed the arbitrator's decision. 

¶ 3 The claimant then sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court 

of Randolph County, which confirmed the Commission's ruling. The claimant filed a motion to 

reconsider the court's ruling in which he argued for the first time that the "statutory scheme 

devised by the Illinois legislature" (i.e., the legislature's enactment of a five-year statute of 

limitations for "coal miners pneumoconiosis" and a three-year statute of limitations for other 

pulmonary conditions like COPD) "violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Illinois 

Constitution." The circuit court denied the claimant's motion to reconsider. This appeal 

followed. 

¶ 4 FACTS 

¶ 5 For more than 22 years, the claimant worked for the employer as a coal miner. Although 

he spent one year working above ground, 90% percent of his career with the employer was spent 

underground. During his employment, the claimant was exposed to coal dust both underground 

and above ground. During the dustiest conditions he encountered underground, the claimant 

could only see 10 to 15 feet in front of him. In lighter dust he could see approximately 30 to 40 

feet. 
- 3 - 

¶ 6 The employer's mine closed on September 24, 2004. That was the claimant's last day at 

the mine and his last exposure to coal dust. Before his last day, the claimant told two foremen 

that he was having breathing problems. He said that he was experiencing "congestion." He did 

not mention that he thought he had black lung or coal workers' pneumoconiosis. 

¶ 7 On September 3, 2008, the claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim with the 

Commission seeking benefits under the Act for heart, lung, and breathing problems (including 

pneumoconiosis) caused by exposure to coal dust, rock dust, fumes, and vapor during the course 

of his employment. On December 15, 2008, the claimant filed a claim under the federal Black 

Lung Benefits Act (30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2006)). 

¶ 8 The claimant's union recommended that the claimant be evaluated by Dr. William 

Houser, who is board certified in internal medicine and pulmonary disease. On February 16, 

2009, Dr. Houser examined the claimant in connection with the claimant's federal claim for black 

lung benefits. The claimant told Dr. Houser that he had smoked 11⁄2 packs of cigarettes per day 

from age 16 through age 30. Dr. Houser noted that the claimant rode his bicycle up to 10 miles 

per day, 3 times per week in the summertime. An x-ray of the claimant's chest was interpreted as 

negative for coal workers' pneumoconiosis by Dr. Daniel Whitehead, a B-reader. The claimant's 

arterial blood gas testing levels were normal. However, a spirometry revealed mild obstruction 

in the claimant's airways, primarily in his small airways. 

¶ 9 Dr. Houser diagnosed mild COPD and arterial sclerotic heart disease with an "age 

indeterminate anteroseptal myocardial infarct."1

 Dr. Houser opined that the claimant's COPD 

 

1

 A "myocardial infarction," commonly known as a heart attack, is a heart problem where part of 

the heart muscle dies and scars due to poor blood supply. When the patient suffers an 

"anteroseptal" infarction, the tissue damage is centered around the anteroseptal wall, the area 
- 4 - 

was secondary to the inhalation of coal and rock dust during his work as a coal miner and his 

smoking history. Dr. Houser opined that the claimant's arterial sclerotic heart disease was 

secondary to the claimant's cigarette smoking and possibly also to hereditary factors. Dr. Houser 

did not diagnose coal workers' pneumoconiosis. 

¶ 10 On March 23, 2009, the United States Department of Labor (the DOL) issued a Schedule 

for Submission of Additional Evidence (the SSAE) in connection with the claimant's federal 

claim for black lung benefits. The SSAE indicated that: (1) the claimant did not have 

pneumoconiosis caused by exposure to coal mine dust; and (2) the claimant did not have a totally 

disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment caused in part by pneumoconiosis. On June 23, 

2009, the DOL issued a "Proposed Decision and Order" denying benefits and finding that "the 

evidence does not show that the [claimant] has pneumoconiosis (black lung disease)." 

¶ 11 In the instant case, the claimant introduced into evidence the expert report of Dr. 

Lawrence Mayer, a physician who holds a Ph.D. in epidemiology. Dr. Mayer opined that the 

claimant's claim should be governed by the Act's five-year statute of limitations for claims 

involving coal workers' pneumoconiosis, rather than the three-year statute of limitations for other 

claims brought under the Act. Dr. Mayer acknowledged that coal workers' pneumoconiosis and 

COPD affected different parts of the lungs. Specifically, he noted that pneumoconiosis involved 

scarring (fibrosis) on the lung tissue, whereas COPD involved damage to the broncho trachea 

tree. However, Dr. Mayer stated that, like coal workers' pneumoconiosis, COPD could be 

caused by long-term exposure to coal dust. He also noted that both conditions can significantly 

impair lung function and can result in death. Dr. Mayer concluded that there was "no evidence 

to support the suggestion that [coal workers' pneumoconiosis is] a more destructive disease than 

 

between the left and right ventricles. 
- 5 - 

COPD." Based on these conclusions (which were drawn from Dr. Mayer's review of the relevant 

medical literature), Dr. Mayer opined that "from a medical and scientific viewpoint, no 

distinction should be made legally between a disease process that directly attacks the lung tissue 

[pneumoconiosis] *** and one that attacks that part of the lung that permits airflow in and out of 

the lung [COPD]." In other words, Dr. Mayer opined that no distinction should be drawn 

between coal workers' pneumoconiosis and COPD for purposes of applying a statute of 

limitations. He suggested that the distinction between the two conditions reflected in the Act's 

statute of limitations "has to be the product of thinking that COPD can never exist in a coal 

miner unless [there] is evidence that he or she has [pneumoconiosis]," a belief which, according 

to Dr. Mayer, has been proven false. 

¶ 12 The arbitrator denied the claimant's claim as untimely. The arbitrator noted that the 

statute of limitations for claims filed under the Act (820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008)) requires an 

employee to file his claim within three years of the last date of exposure or within two years of 

the last payment of compensation. The arbitrator observed that "the sole exceptions to [this] 

statutory requirement are for claims of coal workers' pneumoconiosis and radiological exposure, 

which allow for filing periods of five years and twenty-five years, respectively." The arbitrator 

found that there was no evidence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis or radiological exposure in 

this case, and no evidence that the claimant received any compensation from the employer after 

September 24, 2004 (the claimant's last date of exposure to coal dust). Accordingly, because the 

claimant filed his claim more than three years after his last date of exposure, the arbitrator found 

that the claim was time-barred under section 6(c) of the Act and found all remaining issues moot. 

¶ 13 The claimant appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Commission, arguing that the 

arbitrator erred by applying the Act's three-year statute of limitations to his claim rather than the 
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five-year statute of limitations governing claims for disability caused by "coal miners 

pneumoconiosis." Citing Dr. Mayer's opinion, the claimant maintained that "the medical 

literature establishes that COPD caused by exposure to coal dust is a form of *** coal workers' 

pneumoconiosis" and that his claim should therefore be governed by the five-year statute of 

limitations. The Commission rejected this argument. The Commission "view[ed] itself as bound 

by the specific language of Section 6(c)" which "contains no specific reference to COPD and 

does not define coal workers' pneumoconiosis so as to include COPD." Based upon Dr. Houser's 

diagnosis and opinions, the Commission found that the claimant's "occupational disease claim 

for COPD is governed by the three-year statute of limitations and was thus not timely filed." 

The Commission denied the claimant's claim on that basis and found all remaining issues moot. 

¶ 14 The claimant then sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court 

of Randolph County, which confirmed the Commission's ruling. The circuit court found that 

there was "insufficient evidence" for the court to find that "the [COPD] which the claimant 

suffers can be considered coal miner's pneumoconiosis." The claimant subsequently filed a 

motion to reconsider the court's ruling in which he argued for the first time that the "statutory 

scheme devised by the Illinois legislature" (i.e., the legislature's enactment of a five-year statute 

of limitations for "coal miners pneumoconiosis" and a three-year statute of limitations for other 

pulmonary conditions like COPD) "violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Illinois 

Constitution." The circuit court held that the evidence to support the claimant's equal protection 

claim was "insufficient" and denied the claimant's motion to reconsider. This appeal followed. 

 
- 7 - 

¶ 15 ANALYSIS 

¶ 16 1. The Governing Limitations Period 

¶ 17 The claimant argues that the Commission erred in applying the Act's three-year statute of 

limitations to his claim, rather than the Act's five-year limitations period governing claims for 

disability caused by "coal miners pneumoconiosis." The claimant contends that the phrase "coal 

miners pneumoconiosis" in section 6(c) of the Act should be interpreted to include COPD caused 

by exposure to coal dust. This argument turns on an issue of statutory construction, a question of 

law which we review de novo. Gruszeczka v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2013 IL 

114212, ¶ 12; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 324 Ill. App. 3d 961, 965 (2001).2

¶ 18 The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of 

the legislature. Gruszeczka, 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 12. The language used in the statute is normally 

the best indicator of what the legislature intended. Id. Each undefined word in the statute must 

 

2

 Although the employer concedes that the "interpretation of the statute of limitations found at 

820 ILCS 310/6(c)" is subject to de novo review, it argues that we should apply a "clearly 

erroneous" standard of review to the Commission's "ultimate conclusion [as] to the facts in this 

case." In support of this argument, the employer cites Dodaro v. Illinois Workers' Compensation 

Comm'n, 403 Ill. App. 3d 538, 544-45 (2010). Dodaro involved a two-step analysis which 

required us to apply two standards of review: first, we reviewed the Commission's interpretation 

of the meaning of a statutory exclusion de novo; second, we reviewed the Commission's 

application of the statutory exclusion to the facts presented in that case under a more deferential 

"clearly erroneous" standard. Dodaro is inapposite. Unlike the situation presented in Dodaro, 

the facts essential to our analysis in this case are undisputed, and the case turns on a pure issue of

statutory construction. Thus, our review is de novo. Dodaro, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 544-45. 
- 8 - 

be given its ordinary and popularly understood meaning. Id.; see also Texaco-Cities Service 

Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998). Words and phrases must not be viewed in 

isolation but must be considered in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. Gruszeczka, 

2013 IL 114212, ¶ 12; Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320 (2003). If 

the meaning of an enactment is unclear from the statutory language itself, the court may look 

beyond the language employed and consider the purpose behind the law and the evils the law 

was designed to remedy as well as other sources such as legislative history. Gruszeczka, 2013 IL 

114212, ¶ 12. However, where the statutory language is clear, it will be given effect without 

resort to other aids for construction. Id.; see also Hollywood Casino-Aurora, Inc. v. Illinois 

Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2012 IL App (2d) 110426WC, ¶ 16. 

¶ 19 Section 6(c) of the Act provides, in relevant part:

"In any case, other than injury or death caused by exposure to radiological 

materials or equipment or asbestos, unless application for compensation is 

filed with the Commission within 3 years after the date of the disablement, 

where no compensation has been paid, or within 2 years after the date of 

the last payment of compensation, where any has been paid, whichever 

shall be later, the right to file such application shall be barred." 

820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008). 

In 1973, the legislature amended section 6(c) by prescribing a five-year limitations period "in 

cases of disability caused by coal miners pneumoconiosis."3

 As noted, the claimant argues that 

 

3

 Specifically, section 6(c) now provides that claims for disability caused by coal miners' 

pneumoconiosis shall be barred unless such claims are filed with the Commission "within 5 

years after the employee was last exposed where no compensation has been paid, or within 5 
- 9 - 

the phrase "coal miners pneumoconiosis" in section 6(c) should be interpreted to include COPD 

caused by exposure to coal dust. 

¶ 20 We disagree. By its plain terms, the five-year limitations period prescribed by section 

6(c) applies only to claims for disability caused by "coal miners pneumoconiosis." It does not 

reference COPD. Nor does it apply to all disabilities or respiratory conditions caused by 

exposure to coal dust. To the contrary, it applies only to claims for disability caused by one 

specific medical condition, "coal miners pneumoconiosis." Had the legislature intended to 

include claims for COPD within the five-year limitations period prescribed in section 6(c), it 

could have explicitly referenced COPD in that provision. Alternatively, it could have drafted the 

provision broadly to include all disabilities or respiratory conditions caused by "exposure to coal 

dust," as it did for other types of occupational disease claims.4

 It did neither. Instead, the 

legislature decided to apply the five-year limitations period only to claims for disability caused 

by "coal miners pneumoconiosis." Accordingly, by its plain language, section 6(c)'s five-year 

limitations period does not apply to disabilities caused by any other conditions, not even to other 

respiratory diseases that can be caused in part by exposure to coal dust, like COPD.5 It is 

 

years after the last payment of compensation where any has been paid." Id. In this case, the 

claimant's last exposure was on September 24, 2004, and the employer paid no compensation 

after that date. 

4

 For example, the legislature prescribed a 25-year limitations period "[i]n cases of disability 

caused by exposure to radiological materials or equipment or asbestos." 820 ILCS 310/6(c) 

(West 2008). 

5

 The claimant explicitly agreed with this conclusion in his motion for reconsideration before the 

circuit court. There, the claimant stated that "the legislature promulgated a statute of limitations 
- 10 - 

undisputed that the claimant in this case was diagnosed with COPD but was not diagnosed with 

coal workers' pneumoconiosis. Thus, the Commission did not err in finding that section 6(c)'s 

five-year statute of limitations did not apply to his claim. 

¶ 21 The claimant argues that, because "coal miners pneumoconiosis" is not defined in the 

Act, we should apply the "ordinary and popularly understood meaning" of that term, which, 

according to the claimant, includes COPD. The claimant asserts that the medical community 

recognizes that COPD caused by exposure to coal dust is a "form of" coal workers' 

pneumoconiosis. In support of this assertion, the claimant cites Dr. Mayer's opinion. However, 

contrary to the claimant's argument, Dr. Mayer did not opine that COPD was a type of coal 

workers' pneumoconiosis. To the contrary, he expressly acknowledged that they were different 

conditions. For example, Dr. Mayer noted that coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a "restrictive 

pulmonary impairment" of the lung tissue, whereas COPD is an "obstructive impairment" of the 

broncho trachea tree. Thus, Dr. Mayer acknowledged that the two conditions involve a different 

disease process and affect "different part[s] of the lung." Moreover, Dr. Mayer stated that the 

"strict medical definition of Coal Worker's Pneumoconiosis requires a finding of fibrosis 

(scaring) [sic] on the miner's lung tissue," and that this scarring "can frequently be seen on a 

chest x-ray." By contrast, Dr. Mayer noted that obstructive impairments like COPD are more 

 

that provides that a coal miner who has sustained damage to his lungs by means of coal dust 

exposure in the form of fibrosis (scaring [sic]) has five years to bring his or her claim," but "[a] 

miner who has sustained damage in the form of emphysema or other form of [COPD] has only 

three years to file his or her claim." As Dr. Mayer noted, coal workers' pneumoconiosis involves 

fibrosis (or scarring) of the lung tissue caused by exposure to coal dust. 
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readily diagnosed by pulmonary function testing and that a "chest x-ray is not a good diagnostic 

tool for detecting emphysema" (one of the two types of COPD). The only similarities between 

COPD and coal workers' pneumoconiosis noted by Dr. Mayer are that both conditions can arise 

from exposure to coal dust and both can result in major pulmonary impairment and death. 

¶ 22 Further, one of the stated purposes of Dr. Mayer's report was to demonstrate that 

exposure to coal dust "can and does cause[ ] [COPD] independent of any radiologic or other 

evidence of the existence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis." (Emphasis added.) Thus, Dr. 

Mayer's entire report is premised on the assumption that COPD is a different condition than coal 

workers' pneumoconiosis. Dr. Mayer's report reinforces this assumption by providing a detailed 

history of the current medical and epidemiological consensus that exposure to coal dust can 

cause COPD even in the absence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis. Accordingly, although Dr. 

Mayer opined that there was no scientific or medical reason to apply a different limitations 

period to claims by coal miners alleging COPD (as opposed to coal workers' pneumoconiosis), 

he never stated or implied that COPD was the same as coal workers' pneumoconiosis or that the 

former was a type of the latter. To the contrary, his report unequivocally provides that they are 

two separate conditions.6

 

6

 Moreover, although we have never addressed the precise question presented in this case, our 

appellate court has treated COPD and coal workers' pneumoconiosis as separate conditions (i.e., 

we have assumed without deciding that they were different diseases) based on the medical 

evidence provided in several cases. See, e.g., Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Illinois 

Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 386 Ill. App. 3d 779 (2008); Shelton v. Industrial Comm'n, 267 

Ill. App. 3d 211 (1994). 
- 12 - 

¶ 23 The claimant points to two other legal provisions in support of his argument that "coal 

miners pneumoconiosis" includes COPD. First, he relies upon section 1(d) of the Act (820 ILCS 

310/1(d) (West 2008)). That section provides, in relevant part, that "[i]f a deceased miner was 

employed for 10 years or more in one or more coal mines and died from a respirable disease 

there shall, effective July 1, 1973, be a rebuttable presumption that his or her death was due to 

pneumoconiosis." 820 ILCS 310/1(d) (West 2008). Contrary to the claimant's argument, this 

provision does not suggest that COPD is equivalent to (or a type of) coal workers' 

pneumoconiosis. It merely suggests that: (1) pneumoconiosis is one of multiple types of 

respirable diseases that can be caused by exposure to coal dust; (2) if a miner who worked in a 

coal mine for 10 years or more dies from a respirable disease before he is diagnosed with 

pneumoconiosis, there will be a presumption that his death was caused by pneumoconiosis; and 

(3) that presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the miner died from some other type of 

respirable disease, such as COPD. 

¶ 24 The presumption cited by the claimant does not apply in this case, because the claimant is 

still alive. But even if there was a rebuttable presumption of pneumoconiosis in this case, the 

presumption was rebutted by Dr. Houser, the claimant's own IME physician, who opined that the 

claimant did not have pneumoconiosis. 

¶ 25 The claimant also relies upon certain regulations promulgated by the DOL pursuant to the 

federal Black Lung Benefits Act (Black Lung Act) (30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2006)). For 

purposes of the Black Lung Act, these regulations define "pneumoconiosis" as "a chronic dust 

disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising 

out of coal mine employment." 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a) (2009). This definition includes both 

medical (or "clinical") pneumoconiosis and statutory (or "legal") pneumoconiosis. "Clinical 
- 13 - 

pneumoconiosis" consists of "those diseases recognized by the medical community as 

pneumoconioses, i.e., the conditions characterized by permanent deposition of substantial 

amounts of particulate matter in the lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that 

deposition caused by dust exposure in coal mine employment." 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(1) 

(2009). "Legal pneumoconiosis" is defined as "any chronic lung disease or impairment and its 

sequelae arising out of coal mine employment," including "any chronic restrictive or obstructive 

pulmonary disease arising out of coal mine employment." 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2) (2009). 

The regulation defines the phrase "arising out of coal mine employment" as including any 

chronic pulmonary disease or respiratory or pulmonary impairment "significantly related to, or 

substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment." 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(b) 

(2009). 

¶ 26 The claimant correctly notes that these federal regulations define "legal pneumoconiosis" 

as including COPD caused by exposure to coal dust. However, this fact does not support the 

claimant's argument in this case because the Act does not define "pneumoconiosis" in a similar 

manner. Nor does it adopt or reference the federal regulations. As noted above, section 6(c) of 

the Act leaves the term "coal miners pneumoconiosis" undefined, and nothing in the Act 

suggests that the legislature intended that term to include COPD. In fact, the legislature's failure 

to include more expansive language supports the opposite inference, i.e., that the term includes 

only diagnosed cases of pneumoconiosis, not COPD.7

 

7

 Moreover, it should be noted that, applying the more expansive definitions of pneumoconiosis 

contained in the federal regulations, the DOL found that the claimant did not have either medical 

or legal pneumoconiosis. 
- 14 - 

¶ 27 In sum, by its plain terms, the Act's five-year statute of limitations applies exclusively to 

"coal miners pneumoconiosis," not to COPD. 820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008). It is undisputed 

that the claimant was diagnosed with COPD but was not diagnosed with coal workers' 

pneumoconiosis. The claimant does not argue that section 6(c) is ambiguous. Thus, the 

claimant's claim for disability caused by COPD could be subject to the five-year limitations 

period only if "pneumoconiosis" is commonly understood as including COPD. However, Dr. 

Mayer's opinion does not support this conclusion. In fact, Dr. Mayer's expert report establishes 

the contrary proposition, i.e., that COPD and pneumoconiosis are separate conditions. 

¶ 28 Relying upon Dr. Mayer's opinion, the claimant argues that there is no medical or 

scientific reason for treating COPD and pneumoconiosis differently for purposes of the statute of 

limitations. However, this is an argument best addressed to the legislature. We must apply the 

Act's unambiguous statute of limitations as written, and we may not amend the statute under the 

guise of interpretation. Hines v. Department of Public Aid, 221 Ill. 2d 222, 230 (2006) ("Where, 

as here, the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must enforce it as written" 

and "may not annex new provisions or substitute different ones, or read into the statute 

exceptions, limitations, or conditions which the legislature did not express."); In re Mary Ann P., 

202 Ill. 2d 393, 409 (2002) (ruling that, where the legislature had not "seen fit to amend" a 

statute in the fashion advocated by the respondent, the supreme court would not "inject [that] 

provision into the statute" "under the guise of statutory construction"); see also Plasters v. 

Industrial Comm'n, 246 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1993). 

¶ 29 2. Equal Protection 

¶ 30 The claimant argues that interpreting the five-year limitations period under section 6(c) as 

applying to claims for coal workers' pneumoconiosis but not to claims for COPD caused by 
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exposure to coal dust violates the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution because it 

treats similar classes of claimants differently without a rational basis. The claimant urges us to 

construe the statute in a manner that avoids this "constitutional infirmity" by applying the fiveyear limitations period to his claim. 

¶ 31 We disagree. As an initial matter, the claimant presented an equal protection argument 

for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before the circuit court. Thus, the claimant 

forfeited the argument by not raising it before the Commission. See, e.g., Carpetland U.S.A., 

Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 397 (2002) (finding 

constitutional argument waived where it was raised before the circuit court but not before the 

administrative agency).8

 Although administrative agencies "lack[ ] the authority to invalidate a 

statute on constitutional grounds or to question its validity" (id.), it is " '[n]onetheless *** 

advisable to assert a constitutional challenge on the record before the administrative tribunal, 

because administrative review is confined to the proof offered before the agency' " (id. (quoting

McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d at 278-79)). Such a practice avoids piecemeal litigation and allows opposing 

 

8

 Moreover, the equal protection argument the claimant raised in the circuit court is different 

from the equal protection argument he raises on appeal. Before the circuit court, the claimant 

argued that "statutory scheme devised by the Illinois legislature" in section 6(c) violated the 

equal protection clause. On appeal, he argues that the Commission's and the circuit court's 

interpretation of that statutory scheme to exclude his claim from the Act's five-year limitations 

period violates the equal protection clause, and he disavows any argument that the statute itself is 

unconstitutional. Accordingly, the claimant arguably forfeited the argument he makes on appeal 

by not raising it before either the Commission or the circuit court. 
- 16 - 

parties to present evidence and to build a record in opposition to a constitutional challenge. 

Carpetland U.S.A., 201 Ill. 2d at 397; McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d at 279. 

¶ 32 We recognize that the rule that issues or defenses not raised before an administrative 

agency will be deemed waived and will not be considered for the first time on administrative 

review is "an admonition to the parties, not a limitation on the court's jurisdiction," and that "the 

waiver rule may be relaxed in order to maintain a uniform body of precedent or *** where the 

interests of justice so require." Daniels v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Ill. 2d 160, 172 (2002). 

However, this is not such a case. If we are to consider whether it would be unconstitutional to 

limit the Act's five-year limitations period to claims for coal workers' pneumoconiosis (as the 

Commission did in this case), the employer and the Commission should first be given the 

opportunity to build a record in response to the constitutional challenge. See Carpetland U.S.A., 

201 Ill. 2d at 397.9

 

9

 The employer also argues that the claimant violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 19 by failing 

to serve an appropriate notice of his constitutional claim on the Attorney General or the 

Commission's attorney. Ill. S. Ct. R. 19(a) (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). We disagree. Supreme Court 

Rule 19 requires that such notice be provided when the State or the political subdivision, agency, 

or officer affected by the constitutional challenge "is not already a party" to the action. Id. The 

purpose of this notice requirement is "to afford the State *** [or] agency *** the opportunity *** 

to intervene in the cause or proceeding for the purpose of defending the law or regulation 

challenged." Ill. S. Ct. R. 19(c) (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). Here, the Commission is a named party to 

the action and has received the claimant's briefs before the circuit and appellate courts. Thus, 

Rule 19 does not require the claimant to provide additional notice to the Commission's attorney. 

Moreover, on appeal, the claimant is challenging the constitutionality of the Commission's and 
- 17 - 

¶ 33 In any event, if we were to address the claimant's constitutional argument, we would 

reject it. The equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2) 

requires the government to "treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." Byrd v. 

Hamer, 408 Ill. App. 3d 467, 490 (2011). It does not preclude the State from enacting legislation 

that draws distinctions between different categories of people, but it does "prohibit the 

government from according different treatment to persons who have been placed by a statute into 

different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation." 

Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). In reviewing a claim that a 

statute violates equal protection, the court applies different levels of scrutiny depending on the 

nature of the statutory classification involved. Id. at 322-23. Classifications based on race, 

national origin, sex, or illegitimacy, and classifications affecting fundamental rights receive 

heightened scrutiny. Id. at 323. In all other cases, the court employs only a "rational basis 

review." Id. As the claimant correctly notes, rational basis review applies in this case. 

¶ 34 Whether a rational basis exists for a classification presents a question of law, which we 

consider de novo. Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 417 (1994). Under the rational basis test, 

a court's review of a legislative classification is "limited and generally deferential." Jacobson, 

171 Ill. 2d at 323. The court simply inquires whether the method or means employed in the 

 

the circuit court's interpretation of section 6(c) of the Act (which he deems erroneous), not the 

constitutionality of the statute itself. Thus, the claimant does not need to provide notice of this 

argument to the Attorney General. The claimant arguably should have provided notice to the 

Attorney General when he challenged the constitutionality of section 6(c) of the Act before the 

circuit court. However, he has abandoned that challenge on appeal, so such notice is no longer 

required. 
- 18 - 

statute to achieve the stated goal or purpose of the legislation is rationally related to that goal. Id.

at 323-24; see also Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 74 (1990). The 

legislation "carries a strong presumption of constitutionality," and "if any set of facts can 

reasonably be conceived to justify the classification, it must be upheld." Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 

324. 

¶ 35 Interpreting section 6(c)'s five-year statute of limitations as applying only to claims 

involving coal workers' pneumoconiosis (and not to claims involving COPD caused by exposure 

to coal dust), does not violate the equal protection clause because this interpretation of the statute

does not treat "similarly situated" individuals differently. All coal miners diagnosed with coal 

workers' pneumoconiosis have five years to file their claims, and all coal miners diagnosed with 

COPD (but not pneumoconiosis) have three years to file their claims. As noted above, coal 

workers' pneumoconiosis and COPD are different conditions which involve different disease 

processes that affect different parts of the lung and that are diagnosed through different 

procedures. Thus, miners suffering from pneumoconiosis are not "similarly situated" to miners 

suffering from COPD, even where the COPD is caused by exposure to coal dust. Because these 

miners are not similarly situated, the government may treat them differently without running 

afoul of the equal protection clause. 

¶ 36 CONCLUSION 

¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Randolph 

County, which confirmed the Commission's ruling. 

¶ 38 Affirmed. 
2014 IL App (5th) 130151WC 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION DIVISION 

JACK CARTER, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

 ) of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, 

 ) Randolph County, Illinois. 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Appeal No. 5-13-0151WC 

 ) Circuit No. 11-MR-25 

 ) 

THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION ) Honorable 

COMMISSION et al. (Old Ben Coal Co./ ) Richard A. Brown, 

Horizon Natural Resources, Appellee). ) Judge, Presiding. 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

Opinion Filed: June 9, 2014

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

Justices: Honorable William E. Holdridge, P.J. 

 

 Honorable Thomas E. Hoffman, J., 

 Honorable Donald C. Hudson, J., 

 Honorable Thomas M. Harris, Jr., J., and 

 Honorable Bruce D. Stewart, J. 

 Concur 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

Attorney Darrell Dunham, Darrell Dunham & Associates, 308 West Walnut Street, 

for Carbondale, IL 62903 

Appellant 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

Attorney Cheryl L. Intravaia, Feirich/Mager/Green/Ryan, 2001 West Main Street, 

for P.O. Box 1570, Carbondale, IL 62903-1570

Appellee 

_____________________________________________________________________________________