JUDICIAL 

PAUL D. SIMMONS

APPELLANT

V.

TERESAA. SIMMONS

APPELLEE

oN ÀPPEAL FIìOM ',l't{F' 1 19 r'rr JUDI(),,\L DIS'|RICT COURI OF .I'OM GIì]ìI]N COUN'I'Y,1'LìXAS

cAUSLì NO. It-1 3-0232-ir

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Gar:re tt Clarl<son FliglcysBN 2404ó074

l-aw Officc of Garrctt C. Fliglcy, Pl,I-C

508 \7. 12'ì' Strcet

Austin, 'I'exas 78701

(512) s14-1940

lìax No. (512) 391-0028G attct.t@higleyfar.ni\'law. com
a

(512)478

1824

r:bluther@lutl'rlaw. con-r

Attorneys on Appeal

For Appellee
PI\UL D. SIMMONS

APPELI.ANT

V.

TERESAA. SIMMONS

APPELLEE

ON APPEAI, IIIIOM TFIL- 1 1 9'II I J UDICIA]- DIS'TRIC']' CO UIL| OII ,fOM G IìI]I]N COUN'I'Y,'[ìXAS cÂusE NO. 1l-1 3-0232-[i

BRIEF OFAPPELLEE

I'O'11'I-Ì l IONOI{,,\BI.,Ij COU1ì I' OF 

^PPIr 

Al .c'

-Appclle c 'le rcsa .4. Simmons respectfully fìle s this Ilrie f.
'l'rial Petìtioner ar-rd Appellee ......,...'I'crcsa À. Sìmmons

'l'dal lìcspondcnt and Appellant........ ....,.....,,.........Paul I). Simmons

Counsel:

Appellce Counsel for'I'etesa A. Sirnrnons......... Iìobcrt B. I-utl'rer

I,AW OFIìICES OII IIOBIìlLI1]. I,[JT]-ìÌìII. i].C.

1800 llio (ìranclc

Austin,'I'exas 78701

(ì arrctt Clarl<sorl Ì Iigìey

l,aw (Jfficc of (ìartctt C. I-iìglcy, PLLC

508 \7, 12'r' Str:co:

-Àustiu,'I'cx¿s 78701

'l'rial Counsel for'I'etcsa Â. Simmons......................... I(irk I-Iawl<ins Àtlorntl¡ at ] aw

224 West I3eaur:cgar<ì, Suitc 303San Angclo,'I'cxas 76903

ftial Counscl for: lìespondctrt/

Âppellant on ÀppealPaul I). S1mmons..................,,,...,,.,Melvin G r:ay

Gary & Iìrigman, Pl-l-C

206 \X/. College Àve.San -A.ngckr, Tcxas 76903



cou

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et

Clctk

s lìecords contairls one volumc. Iìeferenccs in this

,{ppellee 's Btie f to the Cle rk's lìecord are by volurre and pagc numbcr, indicated as "CIì

1t-."

'l'he lìeporter's lìecord lncludes thc transcript of thc bench tr:ial held onJúy 22,

201.4. 'l'he lì.eportcr's lìccord contâins thr:ee volumes. lìcfcrcnces to the lìeportcr's

Iìecord are by volume and page nurnbeL, ir-rdicated as "lì1ì _:_."

'l'he llepottcr's lìccord also includcs all of the pâf tics' cxhibits submitted to thc

tl:ìal court and aclmittcd rnto evidcnce during the bcncl'r trial. Copics of all such exhíbits

al:e included in Volumc 3 of thc lì.eportcr's lìecor:d, lìcfctcnce 1o thc par:tics' exhil¡itsare indrcated as "Iìlì 3:IrX# " or: "lìIì 3:1ìX#

lìcfetences to the triâl couÍt's Irìndìngs of Iìact atc indìcatccl as "IìIr#_

lìe ferer-rces to the trial court's Coflclusions of Law ale indicated as "CL#

lìe fcrcnce s to Appellant's llrief atc indicatecl as ""411:_,"

Party References

Paul l). Stmmons, Âpltellant, shall bc tcfcrred to as eitbcr "Appellant" or "Paul"

hercin. 'I'cr:esa A. Simnons, Apltellee, shall be refelred to as "Appcllee" ot "'I'ercsa."
....5, 13

CoruþnterAssocs., Int'lu.A/tai, Inc.,91BS.\7.2c1 453,456(Tcx. 1996)...................8

l)tratt u. Garcia,224 S W.3d 309,31,3 ('liex.App.,ì11 Paso 2005, no per,).,..........,.......4

Coode u. .lhoakfe |t,943 S.\ø.2d 441 ,446 (I'ex.1997) .....,..................,..,6

ITaas u. George,71 S.\7.3d 904,912

(l-ex. App, - fcxarkana 2002,no pet).. ,. . .,...... .......,...,.....................,9

LIal u. Shell Oil Co.,986 S \7.2d 772,777

(1'cx. App. - Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied)..,.. ...............,..,..,..........8

I'lECl Expl. Co. u. Nee/,982 S.W.2cl BB1, 886 (I"cx. 1998).,... .,.., . .....8

In re T.J.L.,97 S.!7.3d 251 ,265

(I'cx.r\pp.-I{ouston [14th Dist I 2002, ûo pcr.) ............4

In the Alariaga of Reinauer,946 S.Sø.2d 853, B(r0

(I'ex. App. *Arrlarillo 1.997,1':tet. cleniccl) ....................6

I{PMG Peat Mawii;k u. I-Iarrison Coanfl IJoas. t*ur. Corp.,

988 S.\X/.2d 746,749('1ex.1999)............... .......................7

Lid.e u. Ude,116 S.W.3d 141 ,1,51 (I'ex.Âpp.-Bl Pasr¡ 2003, no pcr.),.,.........................5

I-nuu. ['1etn1,221 S.\X/.3c1 609,61,4 (I'ex.2007),...,.. ...............,,.,.,............6

Oliur u. Rogut',976 S,W.2d 792, 802

(llcx. App - Flouston [1" Disll 1998, pct. dcnied).........,,. ....,....,...,.....8
Statutes

\ 9 003(b), fex. Iramì1y Code (Vernon's 2015)............,

S 9.01 1,'I'ex. Family Code (y'ernon's 201 5).......,....,,.,..

Page

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PAUL D. SIMMONS

APPELLANT

V.

TERESAA. SIMMONS

APPELLBE

ON APPEA]- I]IìOM'J]I II- 1 1 91T I JUDICIAI, DIS'IIìIC'| COUITI' OF

TOM GIìEEN COUNT'Y, ]]IXAS

C^USI:ì NO. B-13-0232-IrBRIEF OF APPELLEE

'l'OTHE I-IONOIL\BLL, COUIìT OF APPLrÂI.S:

^PPELLII,E 

1'ìl,lìfis^ À. SIMMONS (hcreaftcr dcsignatcd ";\ppellec" or:

"'Icresa") respectfully sul¡mrts this I'rer Appellec's Iìjcf and would ash this court to affìrm

tl-re fìnal orclcr cntrtled 'Judgrnent" sigîed oû September 15,201,4,, b)'the Honolal¡le Bcn

Woodward, ptesidìng jr-rdge of the 119'r' Juclicial I)istrict Court of ',[-om Green County,

'I'cxas.
to e

otce the Divorce Dccrec, on Âpril 3,201.4. (Clì 1:35

37; Irl#10)(;\R:Appcndix 2).

Teres¿ âsserted in 1'ret enforcernent pleading that she became âware of tl-re retirementpaymelrt in I¡te 201.2 oteatly 2013. (C1ì1:36). Paul asserted various affìrmatìvc defensesto 'l'eresa's cnfotcerrrent action, including but lrot limited to, the statute of [nritations.

(Clt 1 :25-26;IrF#9) (ÂÌì:r\ppendix 2),

-I-etesa met Paul to talk to I'rin-r one tirnc aftet their clivorcc. (l\1124:20-24). ,,\t

that meeting she mentionecl something to hrm w}rìle at an evening dinnct, and he handccl

her a (lonoco knife saying "Hete, you've -- you'vc - you've eamecl part of this." (l{lì

25:10-12) 'fcrcsa tenindccl hil¡ about hcr pctccntage ¿ward of letiremelrtì, aûd he sâicl

"I hnow, I know, I l<now. I won't forget". (Iìlì 25:13-15).

'lclcsa tcstifiecl that she fìrst leamecl about Paul cashing in his tctirerrent from her

daughter: when sl-re told -I'crcsa that Paul "tooh iris money out of Colroco and paid his

home ofl" (Rlì 21:2-B).

'I'he ttial coutt found that "fl'cresa] le¿med of this rctil:cment distribution

sonretimc after ,August 2012 whe¡ her daughter told hcr that l)efendar-rt was mad at a

loan cornpuy and paid thern with procceds frorn a rctilcment distribution." (Clì 52;

lìIr#7). The trial court futthcr concludcd that "'I'he earlicst ['I'elcsal lcarncd a]¡out the
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clairn accrued against Paul, tl'rc d¿tc sl're teccived noticc tlìat hc had cashcd in I'ris Conoco

retitetnent, failed to give l-rer a share of tl're tetiLement, and brcachcd I'ris fiduciary duty.

'I'crcsa asserted in her cnforcemelrt pctìuor-r shc did not fincl out Paul hacl cashcd

tn his tetiretnent until Âugust 2012, t.c., tl-rat she discovcre d he r injury in August of

2012. 'I'I-Le trial court, l¡ased on undispute d facts, found that 'fcrcsa first found out

Paul h¿d receivcd a tetitemellt distribution ir-r August of 2012. 'I'l're trial court futthermade the lcgal conclusion thât tl-ìc cârlicst the Plaintiff ['lietcsa] leatnccl about therctìrcment distr:íbution to l)cfcnc{ant [Par-rll was altcl Âugust 20 [2.

'Il-re trìal court ímpliedly founcl that cashing out rhe redrement fund was

inhcrent\' undiscoverablc, and t,hat 'l'cresa had exercised tcasonal¡lc cliligcncc. As

sucl-r, thc trial cour:t propcdy cotrcludccl drat the discovery rule tolled tl-rc appìicable

two-1rs¿¡ statute of Lir¡itations found ûr 'I'cx. Iìarn. Coclc $ 9.003(b). 'lhe trìal cour:tproPedy enfotcecl the lrtovisicxr of the divorcc decrce ìn tegatds to thc division ofPaul's rctitetrent bel1cfìts.
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discovering his breach of fiduciary responsibility.

Standatd of Revíew

A trial coutt's ruling or-r â post-divoÍce motion fot enforcement of a divorcc dectee

is tcviewed under an aì¡use-o f-discretion stanclatd. See Iø re T.J.I-.,97 S.\(/.3d 257,265

(fex.;\pp.-Flouston [14t1'r Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (abusc of díscrcrion statrdard applicd in

lcviewing ordct ctrfotciug payment of chilcl's l-realthcate expcnse s ancl unínsured me dical

cxper-rse s). In cleter:mining wl'rethel thc ttial court abused its discretiolr, thcrc al:c twoclucstiol'ìs: (1) did the tlial coutt have suffìcrcnt tnformadon upon which to exercisc its

disctetion; ancl (2) díd thc trial couÍt eÍr irr its application of disclction? Duran u. Garcia,

2245.W.3d309,31.3 (Tex.App.-Iil Paso 2005, no pet.).

llìth respcct to thc fìrst clucslion, the tr:¿ditron¿l suffìcicncy stanclarcls apply. .lotelo

u. Conqahs, 170 S,W.3d 783,787 (l'ex.Âpp.-lìl Paso 2005, 1ro pet.). An appellant may

cl'rallcnge thc trìal court's ûndings offact fot lcgal and factual suffìcicncy ofthc evidence.

Sofe/0, 170 S.W,3d at 787. -A. legal sufficìcncy <¡r "no evidence" challengc will be sust¿ined

if t1'rc party suffcring thc ach.er;sc decision at trial shows: (1) the cornplctc absencc of a

vital fact; (2) thc cor-rtt is l¡ancd by tules of law or evidence frorn giving weight to the
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creditìng favorable evidencc if a teasonable fact fìndcr coulcl, and distegarcìing colrtraÐ/

evidence unless a rcason¿blc lact fìndcr could not. id. at 822.'I'l-¡e fìnal tcst for legalsufficieucy must alwa¡rs bc whcther the evidcncc at tÍiâl would cnablc le¿rson¿ble and fairn'úrrdcd peoplc to lcach the verclict uude t teview. id.

ln a factual suffìciency review, al1 of the er,'rdence is considcrcd, both tl-re evidencc

whicl-r ter-rds to provc thc cxistcnce of a vital fact, as well as eviclcncc whrcl'r tcnds t<rdìsprove its existcr.rcc. So/.e/0,1,70 S.W.3d at 787. A findirg should bc ser âside only if it

is so coutlaq' to the ovcÍwhclming wei¡¡ht of thc cr,rdcncc as to bc clcarly wrong and

manifestly unjust. .fcr Cain u. Baitt,709 S.W.2d 17 5, 1,7 6 (I'ex.1986).

Oncc it is detcrmincd drat sufficient evicìencc exists, the court must consiclel

wl-rctlrcr the ttial couft mâcle a re asonablc clecision. L'ide u. Licle 

, 

1 16 S.W.3ct L47 

, 

151

(T'ex.Àpp.-lÌl Paso 2003, 11o pet.), In other wolds, rhc court lrrust determitlc that the

ruling was netther arbitrary 11or unrcasonal¡Ie. id. Under thc sccolrd inquiry, thc test is not

whcthet, in the opinion of tl-re lcvicwrng court, the facts prcscltt an a1t1tr-oprintc case fol:

tlrc trìal coutt's action. Sotelo,1,70 S.W.3d ¿t 787-88, llathcr:, the issuc is whether the trial

cr¡utt actccl witìrout tefete:uce to any guiding rules ol: prìnciplcs sucl'r drat its ruling wls
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judgmcnt. lote/.o, 170 S.W,3c1 at 788.

The Discover|, Rule Avoids Limitations as a Bat to Tercsa's Claim

Âl¡sent a l¡asis to defer the lunning of the clock for purposes <¡f statutes of

limitation, lìmitations generally bcgin to tun when the wrongful act causes an injuq,.

Childs u. Hattl.recker, / 974 ,î.V/.2¿ )/, i6 (lex. / 998). It this casc, -fercsa was ìnjured when

Paul dicì uot comply wìth the tcms of thc divorce clecree. 'l'he parties' clivorcc dccrcc

tcquirecl Paul to tcrnit to 'felcsa "[a] portron of I'Iusband's retjt:ement, pensìon, thrift,

proÂt sharing ancì othct crnlrloyce bcllcfits âccluircd drtougìr llusband's crnplolnlcnt wrth

Oonoco, to bc paid if, as, and when reccived by I*Iusbancl. (Cll 1;14,111ì

3:PX#5;FIr#5;FF#1)(z\ppendices 2-3). 'I'cLesa's injury occurred when Paul widrdr:ew all

of tl're funcls from thc letirernent account and upon doing so thcn failed to irnrnediatclyternit 'I'e tesa's por:tio11 to het. .1¿¿ In the Mariage of Reinaan',94ó S.W.2d 853, 860 (I'ex.App. -,,\rnarillo 1.997, pet. denied).

It is'I'eresa's tnain conteution tirat the discovcry rulc applies to avoid application

of Pauì's limitatious defcnsc to l¡at her claim against hir¡ for failutc to pay hct awatdcd

redtcment funds. 'fhc discovery tule is the lcgal pr:inciple whicìr, whcn applicablc,
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whether thc injury is inherently undiscoveral¡le; meaning, depcndìng or tlle injury, thciujury is unlikely to be discovcrcd witl'rin tl're legislative\' prescribed limited per;iod cvcn

when tlre claimant has exetctscd cluc cliligence. I{/agner ù Brown, Lld. u. LIonyood, 58

S.W3d 732 ^t734-35 (I'ex. 2001). \X4rcn it applics, thc discovery tule defers accrual of

â cause of action until tl-rc plainuff knew ol, cxer:cìsìng tcâso1râble diligencc, shoulcl havc

knowtr of tlrc wtcxrgfully causcd injury." I(PMG Peat Ì¡Laruick u.I:l arri¡on Connþ I7ont. .Fin.

Cor.p.,9B8 S.W.2d 746, 749(l'ex. 1999). Nor.rethelcss, tl.rc cliscovery rule is a Limíted

cxcelltìon to the statutc of linritaúons and applies oûl)¡ "v/hcn the n¿turc of tl're plaintiffs

injury is l¡oth inhetently undiscovctable alrd objectively vcrifìablc." ILonyood,5B S.W.3d^t734.

After decicling whet}rer thc dìscovery rulcs applìes, the ncxt issuc for the coutt to

decicle becomcs "When did 'Ì'eresa learn that Paul had not rernittecl retiternent fundsorvecl to lrer?" .1¿¿ Cl:i/d.ç,974 S.W.2d at 37. Aftcr applicâtion of the discovety rule,

resolving whcn'I'ercsa had actual oÍ constructive knowlcdge of Paul's failur:c to rernit thetetitemcnt funds to her sl-rould rcsolve thc issuc whcthct the trial couît pÍopcdy refusedto time bar 'l'etesa's claim.
She// Oi/ Co. u. Ror,356 S.W.3d 924,930 (l"ex. 2001); IY/agner a. Bron,n, Ltd., u. Honuood,

58 S.W.3d 732,734-35 (Iex. 2001); ContpaterAtncl, Int'/ u. Alrd| Iilî.,918 S.W.2d 453,

456 (Tcx. 1996). \X/hcthet an injury is inl-rerently undiscoveral¡le is dctermincdcategorically - that is, by exarnining whether the palticular rypc of rnjury clairnccl ìs

gcnetal dìscovcrablc through the cxctcise of reasonablc diligcncc, IJECI Expl. Co. u.

Nee/, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (l'cx. 1998). 'l'he plaintiff must demonstrate only rhat it

wa,q diffìcult to discover the ìnjnty, the plaintìff dc)cs not neecl to l)rovc that it was

impossiblc. See S.I/. u. R. l/.,933 S.W.2cl 1 (fcx. 1996),

An injuty is "objecuvcly vetifiable" if the rnjury's cxisrcnce and thc defendant's

wrongful act cânûot be disputed and tl-re facts on which hability is assertcd aredcnronstr¿ted by ditect physical cvidcnce. IJal u. She /l Oi/ Co.,986 S.\ø.2d 172,771

('I'ex. App. - Cotpus Chdsu 1999, pet. denìecì). 'I-his might best be demor.rstrared by

example. An injury resulting from a brcach of conttact is objectìvely vcr:ifìable by

k;olring at the clefcndant's contract wìth a thírd pany. Sae Oliuer u. Rogers,976 S.W.2d'792,802 (I'cx. ,,\pp. * Iloustor.r [1" Dist,] 1998, pet. dcnrcd), \(/hcteas, sexual abuse

by a parcnt would not be objecuvcly vcriÂable because there is no scicntific colrsensus
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aud she did not rcceive thetn because Paul teceived tl-rern fìrst and did 11ot pây thcn'ì to

I'rer, but paicl bílls instc¿d. (1ìlì 1:52; lîÌì#3,4). \71'ren Paul teceived the rctircmentlunds awarded to 'I'eresa, a ficluciary obligatiol'ì in favor of 'I'eresa rvas creatcd, a

collsttuctlvc trust was pìaced on those fuuds for the bcnefit of 'l'eresa, and Paul owed

a ûduciary lcsponsibility to pay tl-re funds to'I'eresa. Sec. 9.011,'I'ex. lìarnily Cocle

(Veruon's 2015). Paul l¡rcachcd his fiduciary rcsponsibiLiry to'I'etesa by not paying

the tctitenent fi-urds he l'reld to 'I'eresa.

'l'hankful\' 'l'cxas casclaw is clcar: that injurics atisurg fi:om a bl:each of a

fiducialy duty are considercd inhetentll' undiscovcrable 5.V.,933 S.W.2d at B;

ConþnlerA.r.roc.r, 918 S,W.2d tt 456; Tlaat u. George,71 S.\)í.3d 904,912 (I'ex. App. - 'I'exatkana 2002, no pet.). Gener:al\', a party who ìs ov¡ed a fìclucìar:y cluty ìs relieved

of tesponsibilit.y of clilìgent incluiry into the fiduciar:y's conduct as long as thc

rclauonslrip exists. ,1. Z, 933 S.W.2cl at 8; 'fre ail u. Tre ni/, 311 S.W.3cl 11,4, 123 (I'ex.

App. - Ileaumont 2010, no pct.). FIowcver, oûce ficluciary misconduct becomes

apparent, it cannot bc ignorecl, r:egalcllcss of the natutc of the rclatìon ship. ConpuÍer

zl¡socs.,91B S.W.2d at 45ó. 'I'hcrc can bc no othel conclusion but that 'l'ercs¿ has rnet
spent thc cntire arnount r:cccived to pay bílls. (Clì:52, llfffi,4). (ll1ì2:5, L 9-24). 'I'he

injury can be quantrÊcd and determiucd wrtl-r cettainty, as opposed to otheÍ injuricswhich can be disputcd and cannot bc dcmonstrated by dir:cct physrcal evidelrce.Iìxarnples of the latter al:c claims ptovecl by ân cxpcrt opiniorl based on rcpressed or

tecovelcd rnernories which are trot suffìcient to objectivcly verify ân injury; there was

no scicntiûc collscnsus on how to gaugc truth or falsity of tcc<;vcrcd rncrnorìcs. J.lZ,933 S.\?.2d at 18. 'I'etesa's injury being "objectìvcly vcrifiable", the sccond prong of

the te st I'ras been mct, and the cliscor.cÐ¡ rule applics to dclay application of thc statutc

of limitatjons to Paul's bteach of fìducìary duty.

Ewdence lVas Sufficient Teresa Exerc.ísed Due DiIlgence and

Filed Claim Within Two Yeats of Nottce

'I'hc evrdcnce adduceci at triâl rcgarding discovcry of thc injury and cfforts to

discovcl tl're injury was tlle tcslimolry of 'I'eresa, who tcstìfìed as follows:

a Ohay, Now, when did you fìtst learn that your: husband had casl'red in his

tetitetnent witl-r Conoco?

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Uhûr lln tl-rirrking that was somewhere n 2012.

a Okay.^ 

Norv, let me tell you, I dcx-r't cliscuss witlr hrm with rny kìcìs bccause I dolr't

u/ant my kids to be dr:ug lrto any krncl of snrff like that.

a Okay. But she just happcncd to trention that?

A. Yeah.

a And then at tlìat point in time you st^rted - what did you t1-y to clo then.

,\. I started colrtactillg diffctent, uhm, attomeys. I thought at the tirnc that he wasliving in New Mcxrco, ar-rd so I contactccl a1l attorûc)¡ in Nerv Mcxico and spol<c withlrim. Ilut hc wasn't living in New Nlcxico, he l-racì -, hc was thcn lìr'ìng - a I'lere?

A. - herc. So then I contactcd you.

a And clid he cver tcll you that hc had câsl'ìed i1r hìs retitcmcnt with thcrn?

r\. ,{bsolutcly not.(ì Did you know al¡out tl-rc banhnrptcl' we just found out about?

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I rnay havc hcard about it slrce t1-ren, uhrn., fiom one of the kicls. I did not get

âlìy notice of auy bankr:uptrcy, no.a Okay. Âr-rd âfe )¡ou askng thc Coutt to award 1'6¡ thc monc;' that I're woulcl

owc you fol your sl'rare of his rctiremcot?

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a Á.nd you didn't know that he was gctring â rctiremenr bcncfit unúl your

daughter told you?

.{. 'I'hat's correct. I - I havc scen hirn to talk to hirn onc time sincc wc wcre

divorced. I tl-rrr-rl<, ancl that was a few yeats beforc l-re retlrcd when thc lads wcre both

in towr. Jesse was in town atrd the l<ids wantcd us to mect for dinner, tl're four of us,

ancl I fìnal\' agt:ecd to it.

a We , accordir-rg to Pagc 4 of your decrce, which rvas back i¡ 1.981 , you kncw

that a tetitement wâs âccruing ât the tìme accorcling to y6¡1 own decrec, -- A. Yeah.

a - dicl you not?

A. Yes, I did.

a Well, then w}ry did you wait another 25 years or so to mahc a claim?

^. 

Iìecause, uhm, 1he clivorcc dcctee orclercd that when hc retilcd I woulcl tcccivc

that perceutage. When wc lrret for dinncr that timc in Ol<lahor¡¿ (ìity, I rnentioncdsolncttú1rÉÌ to him actually that very cvening. I Ie l-rancìcd mc a (lonoco knife ancl l-resaid "Ilerc, you've - )¡ou'vc - you've eamcd part of this." And I said. "Don't forget

¿bout tl-rat peÍccrltâfle of ¡r¡¡s¡ retiremel1t." FIc said, "I know, I know, I know. I won'l: forget." And agrecd that he owed it to me. So I - what woulcl you l-rave rnc do?(lìlì 2: p. 24,1.20 to p. 25, 1. 16).

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awarded to 1rer, alrd he stated "I won't forget." Importantly, the rccord in this case

teflects that Paul nevel testifìcd tl-rat'I'cresa's âccoullt of the convcrsation between

'I'etesa and Paul never occurred, nol did Paul offet any eviclcnce that het recounting

ofthe cxcl'rangc was inaccutate. It is thereforc uncontrovcrtcd that'l'crcsa inquircd of

Paul about the relirer¡ent ¿ward and that Paul tgreecl to be responsiblc fot it.

A finclel of fact cannot "ignote undisputcd tcstin-rony that is clcal, positìve,

direct, otherwrse credible, frcc from contradictiolrs and ìnconsistencies, and could

l.ravc bcen rcaclily controvetted." Ci4t o.f IQ/hr u. l.(/il¡on, 1,68 S.\7.3d 802, B1 1 (I'cx.200s).

Under thc facts of this casc, when Paul t:ccerved dre reútetrcnt funcls cluc

'I'etesa, I-rc owed her: a fìcluciary respotisibility to safekeep the funds and pay I'rer whatwas owed. The undisputed testimony is that'I'eresa ashed of Paul, and Paul agrccd, tcrbe r;esponsible fot thc tctitemellt duc'fetesa undet the clivolce decree. Paul had sole

conttol over the decision to withdr:aw funds fton-r his Conoco accoullt, and he agreedwitl'r 'I'ctcsa's Íequcst to be respousiì¡lc for the payrncllt when he madc the clecision.Nothíng in thc recorcl would rnal<c thc request by'l-clesa oï thc acceptancc of thc

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funds in a constructive ttust, and hc owed a fidr.rciary responsibilìty to'fcresa to pay

her.

It is'I'cresa's contention tl'rat Paul r,rolated his fìduciary responsibiliry to'I'cresa

wheu hc teceived the retitement funcls and did not pay her. It is'Icrcs¿'s furthercontefltiolr that her requcst to Paul honesdy rnadc ancl undisputcdly accepted by Paulto rnal<e thc rctirerner-rt paymclrt satisfìes an)¡ ÍcqrÌircment of re¿sonable diligcrrce for

applicatrou of the discovcry rtrle ir-r this c¿se. 'I'l'rere was no cviclcncc in the recor:d to

Put T'eresa on notice that she sllould not re\¡ o11 Pâul's âcccptalrcc of her rcquest to belcspoÍrsible for the ttaûsfet uûtil'I'cresa hcard from hcr daughtcr regardiûg Paul's

possiblc use of tctircmcnt fuûcìs, and Tcrcsa filecl suit within two ycars of tirat notrcc.

Based on the uncìisputecl, clear, ¡rositive ancl direct tcstimon¡, of 'Jieresa, which

could have been readily coutrovertcd by Paul,'lercsa exercised tcasonablc cliligcnce by

leasonably re\ii11g nu Paul to transfct the funds, a r:csponsibiLity requested of him anclaccepted by l'rirn without rescrvâlioû. Undel thc facts of this casc, the trial court clid

uot abuse its discrct-iolr by fìndng that thc claim by'I'eresa for the rctrremcnt funds

did not accrue undl sl'rc was givcn notice by hcr daughter that Paul wâs 1-ìot going to

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some undetetmiued tcgr-rlat basis to dctetmrlre his retucmcnt status, whcthct he hacl

reclucsted a letìtcment alrroulrt ir-r some fonn from Conoco, and whetl'rer hc had

actually reccived funds from Conoco. It is 'I'ere sa's position that wl-rìle any onc of a

nurnbet of possibilities exist to cxercisc dìligcnce, the fiduciary duty owcd to'l'eresa byPaul, coupled with 'I'cresa's requcst of Paul to rake rcspor-rsibility for the retiremcnt

transfer, and Paul's unhiûdcred and voluntary acceptallce of that rcqucst to, suppoÍts

'I'etesa's position tl-r¿t is was Par-rl's cluq, to disck¡sc the injuty. fiurdrcr, hcr rcliance onPaul to malçc thc r:clircrncnt pâymcnt was rcasonal¡lc. Às sucl'r, to thc cxtent r:cc¡uircdby any rneasure, -feresa cxctcisecì thc "leasonabìc dilìgcncc" l:ccluitcd of her towalds

discovety of an "inhcrently undiscovelable" rnjury sufficient to allow appJicatìor-r of

the discovery r:u1e to delay irnposrtìon of thc statute c¡f limitations in tl'rìs case .

CONCLUSION AND PRA\'ER

'Ihc ttial court propctly fcrund tl-rat'I'cr:cs¿ filcd hct clairn agaínst Paul witl'rin

two yeal's of the datc she hnew ot sl-rould havc l<nown of hcr injury. '1'1-re ttial court

ptoPerty tefused to bar'I'ercsa's clairn agair-rst Paul fol rctitcmcnt fur-rd s hc failcd tcrdelivcr to l'rer. 'I'cresa prays that thìs Court deny Paul's tcquested relicf.

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