### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Se pte m be r 22, 200 4 S es sio n TI ERANY REDMOND v. CLET IDUS MARQUE LL HUNT

Direc t Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Shelb y County

No. N6957 K enneth Turner, Judge

No. W2004-00127-C OA-R3-JV - F iled Dece m ber 10, 2004

Th is i s a child s up po rt

a c tio n. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

a wa rd e d M oth e r r e tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt , s e t ba se c hil d s up po rt , a ndor de re d F a the r t o ma ke mon thl y

pa y me nts int o e du c a tio na l a ndfu tur e c hil d support trust funds. The trial c ourt also ordere d fa ther to pay private e lementary

and hig h school tuition, provide health insuranc e, and m ai n t ai n life insuranc e. The trial court a war ded Mother’ s rea sonable attorney ’s fe es. We aff irm as modified and r emand. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Affi rm ed as Modif ied and Rem anded
D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., joined. H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., filed a dissenting opinion.
Rob e rt F

. Mil le r a nd Paul C. Pe e l, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e fo r the Ap pe lla nt, Cle tid us Ma rq ue ll H un t.
Aubre y L . Br own, J r., Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llee, Tier any

Redmond.
OP IN ION
The unde rly ing f

acts of this child support ac tion are u n d i s p u t ed. Tierany Redmond (“Mother ”) and Cletidus Mar quell Hunt (“F ather ”) are the unmarried par ents of a minor c hild, T.L ., born March 1998. Father and Mother had a brief s exual rela tionship while Father was i n colleg e. Mo the r te sti fi e d tha t she a nd F a the r did no t “date ,” a nd that sh e wa s a lso ha vin g a se xua l r e la tio ns hip with another ma n. She testified t hat, at the t ime of T.L .’s bi rth, she di d not know who T.L .’s fa ther was.
I n 1999, Father c ompleted college and entered into a six-y ear , multi-mi llion doll ar c ontrac t to play profe ssional football for the G ree n Bay Packer s. Mother works p ar t -t i m e at a sala ry of approximately

$14,000 per y ear

and has a nother minor child fr om another r elationship. She rec eives no child support from this child’s Father, nor ha s she soug ht support. T.L . has b ee n i n Mother’s-2-

exclusive custody

since birth. They have resided in the hom es of rela tives and have re ceive d welfa re be ne fi ts a ndfo odsta mps
. Mother testified that F ather contac ted her

upon lear ning of T.L .’s bi rth from friends. I n 2000, t h e p ar t i es voluntarily

participated in DNA testing which conf irmed par entag e. F ather has no additional children.
Mother filed a petition for support in the J uvenile Court for Shelby Countyin March 2003. I n h e r p e tit ion , M oth e r s ou g ht pr os pe c tiv e c hil d s up po rt a ndsu pp ort r e tr oa c tiv e to 1 99 8; h e a lth insurance for T.L . and payment of one-ha lf of medical expenses not reimbursed by insurance ; and attorney ’s fe es. I n his an s wer , Father a sserted he did not know of T.L .’s birth until early 2000. Father a dmitted a duty

of support and pr oposed child support of $2,100 pe r month. Father a g ree d to provide hea lth insurance f or T.L . or to reimburse Mother for the cost of he alth insurance

. The trial court hear d the matter on J uly 9, 2003. By order of Oc tober 21, 2003, the tria l court confirme d and adopte d the recommendations of the R efe ree as the de cre e of the court. It awar ded Mother bac k child support based on 21% of Father’s net income for Marc h 1998 to July 2002, and based on 21% of F ather ’s net income up to $10,000 pe r month for July2002 throug h Aug ust 2003. The court set prospec tive base child support at $2,100 per month. The trial court furth er o rd ered Father to pay

$5,000 per month into a future child support trust fund and $5,000 pe r month into an e du c a tio na l tr

us t f un d; o rd e re d F a the r t o p a y fo r p ri vate e le me nta

ry a ndhig h s c ho ol e xpe ns e s; order ed F ather

to provide hea lth insurance and pay one-ha lf of expenses not cove red by insurance ; and orde red F ather to maintain life insuranc e for the dura tion of his child support obligation. The tr ia l c ou rt a lso a wa rd e d M oth e r atto rn e y ’s fe e s o f $ 15 ,0 00 . F a the r f ile d a tim e ly no tic e of app e a l to thi s Co urt.
Issues Presented
F a the r p re se nts the fo llo wi ng iss ue s, a s w e re -s ta te the m, f or re vie w b y

thi s Co urt: (1 ) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in d e te rm ini ng the a mou nt o f r e tr oa c tiv e c hil d su pp ort; (2) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in awa rding and dete rmining the amount of e du c a tio na l tr

us t f un d p a y me nts a ndfu tur e c hil d s up p o rt trus t f un d p a y me nts ; (3) Whether the trial court erre d in ordering Fathe r t o provide private g rade and high sc hool education for the minor child.
Mo the r p re se nts the fo llo wi ng a dd iti on a l is su e s: (1 ) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in se tti ng pr os pe c tiv e c hil d s up po rt ;It is un c le a r h o w the trial c o u rt d e te rm ine d this su m . H o w e v e r, F a th e r d o e s n o t d isp u te the trial c o u rt’s 1
mat hemat i cal ca l cul at i on. Rat her , Fat her as s er t s t he t r i al cour t er r ed by appl y i ng t he chi l d s uppo r t gu i del i nes i n e f fect p rio r to 2 0 0 2 to d e te rm ine the a m o u n t o f F a the r’s re tro a c tive c h ild su p p o rt o b liga tio n
. -3- (2) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in fa il i n g t o awa rd intere st on the awa

rd of re tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt ; (3) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in fa iling to awa rd all of Mother ’s attorne y ’s fe e s a ndc os ts; (4 ) Whe the r M oth e r i s e nti tle d to a tto rn e y ’s fe e s o n a pp e a l.
Sta nda rd of Re v ie w
Ou r s ta nd ardof

re vie w o f a

tr ia l c ou rt

sitting wi tho ut a

jury is de novo upon the re cord. W rig ht v
. Cityof

Kn oxvil le , 898 S.W .2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995) . We presume the trial court’s fi nd ing s o n q ue sti on s o f f a c t to bec or

re c t, u nle ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s oth e rw ise

. Te nn . R. App. P

. 1 3 (d ). We revie w the trial c ourt’s conc lusions on matters of law, howe ver, w ith no pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Bo wde n v . W ar d , 27 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000).
Re tro ac tiv e Chil d Sup po rt
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

a wa rd e d M oth e r c hil d s up po rt re tr oa c tiv e to Ma

rc h 19 98

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

he ld that F a the r’ s c hil d su pp ort ob lig a tio n sh ou ld b e 21 % o f F a the r’ s n e t in c ome fr om M arc h 1 99 8 to July 2002, and 21% of

Father’s inc ome up t o $10,000 per month from J uly 2002 to Aug ust 2003. The tr ia l c ou rt de te rm ine d that F a the r’ s inc ome du ri ng the re la te d pe ri od wa s: $0 in 1 99 8; $ 49 2, 94 6 in 19 99 ; $ 321, 96 5 in 20 00 ; $2 64 ,6 89 in 2 00 1; $ 72 1, 81 8 in 20 02 ; andapp ro xima te ly $3 .2 mil lio n in 2003. After apply ing cre dits for amounts previously paid, the trial c ourt order ed F ather to pay a total of $2 19 ,6 70 .5 0 to Mo the r i n r e tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt

. I t or de re d F a the r to p a y $1 65 ,0 00 dir e c tly 1 to Mother within 30 day s, and the re maining $54,670.59 into a tr ust. We beg in our ana ly sis with the r ebuttable presumption that the child support g uidelines set fo rth th e c or

re c t a mou nt of c hil d su pp ort. Th is p re su mpt ion app lie s to a wa rd s o f r e tr oa c tiv e c hil d support as well as to prospective c hild support awar ds. State ex re l. Anderson v. Taylor , No. M2001- 02193-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21480087, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 27, 2003) ( no perm. app. filed). Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 36-5- 101 require s that there must be a rebuttable presumption in all child support case s that the amount of child support dete rmined by an application of these g uidelines is the corr ect amount to be awa

rded unless the court makes a w ritten or spec ific finding on the re c or d th a t the app lic a tio n o f the g uid e lin e s w ou ld b e un jus t or ina pp ro pria te in a particula

r case
. . . . The rubuttable presumption must be applied to all child support-4-

awa rds eve n if the orde r is being soug ht for a retroa ctive period befor e Oc tober 13, 1989.
Te nn . Comp . R. & Reg s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 01 (2 )( e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th us , altho ug h the tr ia l c ou rt ma y , in its discretion, deviate from the g uidelines when determining retroa ctive child support, this discretion is na rrow and must be exercised within the constraints and limit ations of the g uidelines. Sta te ex re l. Anderson v. Taylor , 2 0 0 3 W L 2 1 4 8 0 0 8 7 , at * 5 (c i t i n g Sta te ex re l. S te war t v . Lo c k e tt , No. M2001- 00809-COA- R 3 -DC, 2002 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 66, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2000)( no perm. app. filed); Berryhill v. Rhode s , 2 1 S. W.3 d 1 88 , 1 93 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ); bu t see Hi c k ma n v. W ill is , No. M2003-00574-COA- R3-J V, 2003 WL 22019110, at * 4 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug . 27, 2003)( no perm. app. filed). F urthe r, if

the c ou rt

de te rm ine s a

de viatio n f

ro m th e g uid e lin e s is wa rr a nte d in consideration of the be st interests of the c hild(ren) or the e quity betwee n the parties, it must make “a w ritten fi n d i n g t hat the application of the child support g uidelines would be unjust or inappropriate[.] ” Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4- .01(3). The c ourt abuses its discre tion when it deviates fr om the g uidelines without making written finding s based on the e vidence

. Taylor , 2003 WL 21480087, at *4. The provisi o n s o f

th ec h il d s u p p o r t g u id e li nes spec ifically

applicable to high- income oblig ors wer e ame nded betwe en the time T.L . was born in 1998 a nd the date of the J uly 2003 hearing. Prior to July 2002, in situations wher e the net income of the oblig or par ent exceede d $10,000 per month, the cour t h ad the discretion to consider a downwar d deviation from the g uidelines if the obligor pare nt demonstrated a

deviation was r easona

ble and in the be st interest o f t he child in light of the c ir c ums ta nc e s. Te nn . Co mp. R. & Re g s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 04 (3 )( 19 97 ). Th us , h a d F a the r b e e n or de re d to pay child support at the time of T.L .’s birth in 1998, child support would have be en set at 21% of Father’s ne t income unless Father h ad carried the bur den of de monstrating that a downwa rd deviation from t h e guidelines was r easona ble in light of the circ umstances. The child support g uid e lin e s w e re a me nd e d in 2001 , how e ve r, a nd the g uid e lin e s in ef fe c t sinc e July

20 02 pr ov ide that, wher e the ne t in co m e of the obligor pa rent e x cee ds $10,000 per month, the custodialpa re nt m us t prove by a pre pondera nce of the evidence that c hild support based on income a mounts in ex cess of $10,000 per month is rea sonably nece ssary

to provide for the needs of t he minor child(r en). Te nn. Cod e An n. § 3 6- 5- 10 1( e )( 1) (B )( 20 01 ); Te nn . Co mp. R. & R e g s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 04 (3 ). Th us , p ri or to 2002, the pre sumptive child support amount was ca lculated a s a per ce n t age of the oblig or’s ne t inc ome un le ss the ob lig or de mon str a te d a do wn wa rd de viatio n wa s wa

rr a nte d. Sub se qu e nt t o July 20 02 , h ow e ve r, the pr e su mpt ive a mou nt in c a se s of hig h- inc ome ob lig or s h a s b e e n th e app ro pr ia te perc entag e of $10,000 unless the custodial par ent demonstrate s an upwa rd devia tion is warra nted.
The burde n of proof

falls upon the par ent see king a deviation f

ro m the g uidelines. The determinative question here is w hether the pre- J uly 2002 g uidelines or the post-J u l y2 0 0 2 are applicable . Father does not a rg ue that the trial court e rre d by awa rding retroa ctive child support or that the trial court should not have awa rded r etroa ctive child support base d o n the child support g uidelines. Rather, F ather asserts that the trial court should have applied t he guidelines in effec t at the time of the July2003 hear ing, and t hat M other failed t o demonstrate that amounts in ex cess of $2,100 per month we re ne cessa ry to support T.L . from the time of he r birth in 1998. Mother, on the-5-

oth e r h a nd , a

rg ue s th a t to app ly

the a me nd e d g uid e lin e s, wh ic h b e c a me e ff e c tiv e in Jul y

20 02 , w ou ld amount to a re troac tive application of la w.
The trial court ge nera lly will apply the s tatute in eff ect at the time of the hea

ring

. Con ne ll
v . Co nn e ll , No. 03A01-9808-CV- 00282, 2000 WL 122204, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 25, 2000)( no. perm. app. filed

)(holding : trial court prope rly applied provisions of Te nnessee Code Annotated § 36- 6-108 which w ent into effe ct one day befor e hea

ring ). F urther, the question of who be ars the bur den of proof is primarily determined by proce dural rules. Thus, it is primarily a proc edura l matter. See Taylor v. Taylor , 849 S.W .2d 319, 332 (Tenn. 1993) ; Pulaski Highway Exp., I nc. v. Term inal Transp. C o. , 493 S.W .2d 103, 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
I n light of t h e fo regoing , the trial court properly should have a

pplied the provisions of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 36-5- 101(e) (1)( B) and Te nnessee Rules & Reg ulations 1240-2-4- .04(3) whic h wer e in ef

fec t at the time of the J uly 2003 hearing. Thus, the burde n of proof was on Mo t h er to demonstrate that support in excess of the perc entag e base d on a net income of $10,000 per month wa s rea sonably neces s ar y t o p ro v i d e for the nee ds of T.L . The trial c ourt made no finding s conce rn i ng this matter and ther e is nothing in the r ecor d to demonstrate that a n upwar d deviation from the g uidelines was wa rra nted for ba se child support. Acco rdi ng ly , we a ffirm the awa rd of r etroa ctive child support, but modify the awa rd to $2,100 per month for the period comm en cing with T.L .’s birth throug h Aug ust 2003, less credits for amounts previously

paid by Father. This amount is to be paid dire ctly to Mother.
Pr os pe c tiv e Chil

d Sup po rt
The trial c ourt determined Moth er fa i l ed to establish that child support in ex cess of the g uideline amount was r easona bly nece ssary

to provide for

the nee d s o f T.L . Acc ording ly , it set prospec tive base child support at 21% of $10,000 per month, or $2,100 pe r month, as provided by the g uid e lin e s. On app e a l, M oth e r a sse rt s tha t F a the r i s mo re than a ble to p ro vid e c hil d s up po rt we ll abo ve the g uid e lin e a mou nts a ndthat T .L . s ho uld enjo y a sta nd ardof

liv ing c omm e ns ur a te to F a the r’ s.
We are not insensitive to the considerable income disparity betwee n these pa rents, or to the f a c t t h at Fa t h er en

j o y s a li fe s t y l e co n s i d er ab l y m o re co m fo rt ab l e th an t h at o f Mo t h ero rT

. L. Howeve r, the trial c ourt made no w ritten finding s establishing tha t child support in excess of $2,100 per month is rea sonably

nece ssary

to provide for

the needs of T.L

. and, having revie wed the r ecor d, we f ind no evidentiary

basis which would support an upwa rd devia tion from the g uidelines. Mother ha s f a ile d to c arry

he r b ur de n o f d e mon str a tin g that a n u pw ardde viatio n f ro m th e g uid e lin e s is war rante d for the pur

poses of ba se child support in this case. We a ffirm.

Education al TrustFun d
T h e tria l c o u r t o r d e r e d F a th e r to p a y $ 5 , 0 0 0 p e r

mo n thin to a n e d u c a ti o n a l t ru s t f o r T

. L

. We note, as a n initial matter, that Mother did not r equest an educational tr ust in her petition f

or supportT h is re v e rs io n p ro v isio n w a s p ro p o se d b y M o the r a t t ria l. 2
-6- or during the hea

ring of this matter. Howe ver, F ather does n o t as s er t the trial court erre d by e sta bli sh ing a n e du c a tio na l tr us t fund f or T. L ., a ndha s v olu nta

ri ly a g re e d to pr ov ide a

Un ive rs ity of Tenne ssee education f

or T.L . At oral a

rg ument befor e this Court, Fathe r stated that he would be willing to purc hase a

University of Tennessee education for T.L

. “today .” F ather contends, howe ver, t h a tt h e tr i a l c o u r t e rr e d b y o r d e r i n g h i m t o p a y $ 5 , 0 0 0 p e r m o n t h i n t o a n e d u c a t i o n a l t ru s tu n t i l T

. L. rea ches the ag e of ma

jority , or 150 months, which would re sult in an educ ational trust of $750,000, plus interest. We ag ree
. When determining whether to gr ant a r equest for

a deviation, the trial court shall make a written finding that child support in excess of the amount base d on income in excess of $10,000 pe r month is or is not rea sonably nece ssary

to provide for the ne eds of c hild(ren) . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( e)( 1)(B )( 2 001); Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04( 3). The c ourt may require that sums paid above the pe rce ntag e applied to income in excess of $10,000 pe r month be plac ed in an educational or ot her trust fund and must make a written finding in the or der supporting the ba sis for such an or der. Te nn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04( 3)(f ).
Be cause Father ha s voluntarily ag ree d to provide a c olleg e educ ation for T.L ., it is not nece ssary for this Court to address the pr opriety of the e stablishment of the trust itself. Parents may ag ree to provide for their childre n above amounts required by law. See, e .g., Penland v. Pe nland , 52 1 S. W.2 d 2 22 , 2 24 (T e nn .1 97 5) ; Hawkins v. Hawkins , 79 7 S .W .2 d 8 97 , 8 98 (T e nn . Ct

. App.1990). However , we a g ree with Fathe r that the c ourt has fa iled to provide any basis for the amount of the trust.
I n light o f Fa t h er ’s voluntary ag ree ment to provide T.L . with a Univer sityof Tenne ssee education, we af

firm the creation of an educational trust. We modify , howeve r, t he trial court’s orde r that Father pa y

$5,000 per month into the trust for the duration of hi s child support obligation. An e du c a tio na l tr

us t f ar i n e xce ss of wh a t wo uld be ne c e ssa ry to f un d e ve n a n e xpe ns ive e du c a tio n is ne ith e r j us t no r r e qu ir e d b y the g uid e lin e s. W

hiton v. W hiton , No. E2000-00467- COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1585630, at * 11 (Te nn. Ct. App. J uly 18, 2002 ) rev’ d on other grounds ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 3 )

. In consideration of Father’s voluntary offe r to immediately

purcha se a U niversit y o f Tennessee e du c a tio n for T. L ., F a the r s ha ll i mme diate ly fu ndthe trus t w ith a n a mou nt e qu a l to the pr oje c te d c os t of a U niversity

of Tenne ssee unde rg radua t e ed ucation, including tuition and fees, books a nd su pp lie s, ro om a nd bo ard , liv ing e xpe ns e s a nd inc ide nta ls, fo r the pe ri odwh e n T .L . is e xpe c te d to be of c oll e g e a g e
. Th is w ill pr ov ide a po st- hig h s c ho ol e du c a tio n f or T. L . w hil e no t li mit ing he r t o the Univer sityof Tenne ssee. I f T.L

. fails to e nroll in c olleg e or a technical/vocational school by the time she is 21-y ear s of ag e, or if she cea ses to attend class for a period of over one y ear , any unused po rt ion of the fu nd wi ll r e ve rt

to F a the r. We r e mandfo r d e te rm inatio n o f this a mou nt.

2-7- Pr iv ate Sc hoo l Ed

uc ati on
At the hea

ring of this matter, Mother indicated that she would pre fer a priva te school e du c a tio n f

or T. L . F a the r a sse rt s th e re is n o e vid e nc e in the rec or d to de mon str a te that a private sc ho ol i s w arr a nte d for T. L . M oth e r a rg ue s th a t a n u pw ardde viatio n to pa y fo r p ri vate sc ho ol i s supported by

the g uidelines and c ase la w. The g uidelines provide, a s a criteria for deviation from the g uidelines, that “[e]x traordina ry educational expenses and ex traordina ry medical e x penses not cove red by insurance shall be adde d to the perc entag e[.] ” Te nn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04( 1)(c ). Certa inly , Tenne ssee c ase la w supports an upwa

rd deviation to pay

for private education whe re the obligor pare nt has the mea ns to provide such a nd it is warra nted under the circ umstances. Se e , e .g ., Ba rn e tt v . B ar ne tt , 27 S.W .3d 904 (Tenn. 2000) . Father’s a rg ument in this case, fr an k l ysummarized, is that if public school education was g ood enoug h for him, it is good e noug h for T.L

. I t might be sa id that few c hildren need private sc ho ol e du c a tio n in the abs e nc e of a dis abil ity or a specia l ne ed, particula rly wher e the child historically has not attende d private sc hool. Howeve r, th e guide lin e s c le arl y

state that th e “ pe rc e nta g e a mou nts are min imu ms” a ndthat “ the c ou rt sh a ll inc re a se the a wa

rd ” to pr ov ide fo r “ e xtra or din ary e du c a tio na l e xpe ns e s. ” Te nn . Co mp. R. & Re g s. 1240-2-4- .04(1)( c). The g uidelines further provide that in deviating from the minimums required by the g uidelines, “primary co n s i deration must be g iven to the best intere st of the child(re n) for whom support under these guidelines are being util ized in the case bef ore the court.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04( 5).
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

de te rm ine d th at T. L . s ho uldbe a ff or de d th e op po rtun ity

to atte nda

pr ivate sch oo l. I n li g ht o f the e qu iti e s in thi s c a se , w e c a nn ot s a y the c ou rt abu se d it s d isc re tio n w he n it order ed F ather

to provide private school educ ation for T.L

. Certainly , this deviation is withi n the constraints of the g uidelines and supporte d by case law. Additi onally , in light of the e quities betwee n the parties, it works no hardship on F ather . We affirm on this i ssue.
Fut ure Chi ld Su

pport Trust Fun d
I n addition to requiring Father to purc hase life insurance to secure his child support ob lig a tio n, the tr ia l c ou rt or de re d F a the r t o p a y $5 ,0 00 pe r m on th i nto a

trus t f un d to se c ur e his c hil d su pp ort ob lig a tio n at th e pr e se nt am ou nt in the e ve nt F a the r i s in jur e d, re tir e s, or

is o the rw ise un able t o m e e th i s c h i l d s u p p o r to b l i g a t i o n
. F a t h e r ar g u e s t h a tt h i s tru s tf

u n d , w h i c h , i f

p a i d u n t i l T

. L. rea ches the ag e of majority , will amount to approximately twice his entire child support obligation, is not supported by

the guidelines. He further arg ues t hat his situation is not differ ent than that of any obligor pare nt - all of whom may lose a job, bec ome injured, or f ace chang ed cir cumstance

. Mother ar g ues that the trust fund is supported by Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04( 3), Nas h
v . M ull e , 846 S.W .2d 803 (Te nn. 1993), and Lee v. A skew , N o 0 2 A 0 1

- 9 8 0 5

- JV

- 0 0 1 3 3 , 1 9 9 9 WL 142389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 1999)

.-8-

We being our ana ly sis of this is sue by noting that the trust f

unds at issue in the case s cited by Mother we re e stablished to provide for the children’ s colleg e educ ations. I n Lee v. A skew , the trial court’ s orig inal order provided that the trust would be “available for e x traordina ry expenses of the minor child during his minority , and for colleg e expenses if necessa ry there afte r. F urthermor e, these funds w ould be ava ilable for use as m onthly child support in the event that the re spondent’s future inc ome should dimini sh to a point that it is nece ssary to inva de this fund.” Lee v. A skew , No 02A01-9805-JV-00133, 1999 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 29 0 , at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1999). On appea l, in our order

on the appe llant’s petition to rehea r, howe ver, this Court held:
The income will be expended solely for the c hild’s colleg e expenses and will be subject to close a nd rea sonable scr utiny . . . . We concur

with the express intent of the trial court, that the funds in the trust be maintained f or the purpose of providing for the c hild’s colleg e educ ation. Should ex ige ncies oc cur w hich might re quire a n inv a sio n o f thefu nd , s uc h a s e xtra or din ary e xpe ns e s of the min or c hil d or a de c re a se in the appellee ’s income, the a ppellee ma y

petition the . . . court for

a spec ific finding of ne e d a ndjus tif

ic a tio n f or a ny inv a sio n o f the c or

pu s.
Id. at *3-4. T h u s , the trust fund established in Le e v . A ske w was e x pressly intended to be a n educational trust. However , we did not rule out invas i o n o f t he trust for e x traordina ry exigenc ies o r u p o n a d ec re as e i n t h e o b l i go r’ s i n co m e w h e r e s u ch i n v as i o n wa s j u s t i fi ed b y s p ec i fi c f i n d i n gs of the c ou rt

. I n the case now befor e us, an educational trust fund has been separ ately established and the trust at issue has been established for the sole purpose of securing Father’s future chil d s u p port obligation. Additionally , the trust is not necessary to secure Father’s oblig ation in case of F ather ’s dea th

- th e tria l c o u r t o r d e r e d F a th e r to main tain o f li f e in s u r a n c e p o li c y f

o r th is p urpose ( which Father doe s not appea l). Rather, it anticipa tes only Father’s i nability

to pay child support at the curr ent amount in case of a de cre ase in income

. I n Huntley v. Huntley , this Court aff irmed the trial c ourt’s dete rmination that a portion of the obligor ’s child support obligation should be place d in a non-e ducational trust. Huntley v . Huntley , 6 1 S

. W

. 3 d 3 2 9 , 3 3 8 ( T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. 2 0 0 1 )

. In Huntley , howeve r, the sums direc ted into trust were not funds above the g uideline amounts (then 21% of oblig or’s ne t income for one c h i l d ). R ather , the Huntley court de t er m i n ed t h at the oblig or had not c arried his burden of proving a downwa

rd de viatio n f

ro m th e g uid e lin e s w a s n e c e ssa ry , b ut o rd e re d th at his c hil d s up po rt ob lig a tio n b e sp lit betwee n direc t pay ments to the custodial pare nt and into a non-educ ational trust. Id. The Huntley court opined: We ag ree that the dura tion and purpose of the Trust is aty

pical but also find that ther e is n o p ro hib iti on a g a ins t th is t ype of Trust

. W hen th e ob lig or ha s a ne t mo nth ly inc o me in e xc e s s o f $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , a s D e f e n d a n t d o e s , th e G u id e li n e s a ll o w f u n d s to be place d “in an e ducational or oth e r tr us t fund for

the bene fit of the child.”-9-

Id. (citing Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4- .04(3)) (empha sis in the original). Thus, the Huntley c ou rt or de re d p a y me nts e xce e din g tho se ba se d on an inc ome of $1 0, 00 0 p e r m on th t o b e pa id i nto trust.
Th e pr e se nt c a se is d ist ing uis ha ble fr om Huntley , which wa s decide d befor e the a mendment to the g uidelines with respe ct to high- income obli g ors bec ome ef fec tive. I n Huntley , th e c ou rt did no t de viate fr om the g uid e lin e s, bu t simply pla c e d a po rt ion of

ob lig or ’s c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio n in to a trust fund. In the present case , the t rial court implicitl y has deviated from the guidelines, imposing on Father a

$5,000 per month c hild support obligation in ex cess of the g uideline amount, to provide for T.L .’s nee ds in the case of F ather ’s potential income r eduction.
The re g ulations provide:
Th e c ou rt ma y re qu ir e that su ms p a id abo ve the pe rc e nta g e app lie d to the ne t in c ome abo ve Te n Tho us and Do lla rs ($ 10 ,0 00 ) p e r m on th b e pla c e d in a nde du c a tio na l or o t h er t r u st fund f

o r th e b e n e f it o f th e c h il d a n d s h a ll ma

k e a w r it te n f in d in g in the order supporting the basis for suc h an orde r.
Te nn . Co mp. R. & Re g s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 04 (3 )( f) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . Cl e arl y , th e re g ulatio ns pe rm it trusts other than educ ational trusts in situations wher e the oblig or is a hig h-income oblig or and the trial court has made findings supporting t he need for such a trust. Although the reg ulations do not sp e c if ic a lly pr ov ide that a trus t may be e sta bli sh e d sole ly to se c ur e fu tur e c hil d s up po rt pa y me nts , n e i t h e r d o t h e y p r o s c r i b e s u c h tru s t s w h e r e t h e y ar e s u p p o r t e d b y t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
. A d d i t i o n a l l y, Lee and Huntley su pp ort th e pr op os iti on that trus ts ma y be e sta bli sh e d f or no n- e du c a tio na l pu rp os e s, andLee su pp orts the pr op os iti on that trus ts ma y , up on sp e c if ic fi nd ing s of the c ou rt , be uti lize d to provide c hild support upon a decr ease in the obligor ’s income.
I n this case, a s in Lee , w he re the ob lig or pa re nt w a s a

pr of e ssi on a l ba sk e tba ll p la y e r, bo th Father’s inc ome and risk of loss of em p l o y m ent throug h injury or “e arly

retire ment” may

be de sc ri be d a s ult

ra -h ig h. We re c og nize that, a s F a the r a sse rt s, it is po ssi ble that an yhig h- inc ome obligor , indeed, a ny

obligor , will suffer an injury or income re duction. Howeve r, under the fa cts of this case , we believe the establishment of a future child support trust is war rante d. Father’s standa

rd of liv ing lik e ly

wi ll r e ma in h ig h in lig ht o f h is s ub sta nti a l c ur re nt i nc ome no tw ith sta nd ing a de c re a se i n futu re i n co m e; Fa t h er ’s p ro fe s s i o n as a p ro fe s s i o n al fo o tb al l p l ay eru n q u es t i o n ab l y p re s en t s a h i gh risk of injury ; such injury likely would result in an end to F ather ’s cur re n t car eer and in a loss of fu tur e inc ome ; a ndT. L . u nq ue sti on abl y wi ll nee d f utu re c hil d s up po rt

to m e e t e ve n b a sic ne e ds

. Mo re ov e r, the trus t pr e se nts no fi na nc ia l bu rd e n to F a the r, a nd a ny a mou nts re ma ini ng in the trus t will revert to Father

upon T.L .’s re aching the ag e of ma jority

. We ag re e wi th F a the r, ho we ve r, that the tr ia l cou rt ’s or de r that Fa the r pa y $5 ,0 00 pe r m on th int o a f u tu r e c h il d s u p p o r t tr

u s t f o r a n u n s p e c if

ie d le n g th o f ti me ( p r e s u ma b ly f o r th e d u r a tion of Father’s c hild support obligation) is not appropriate. Such pay ment would result in a trust that fa r-10-

exceeds F ather ’s total child support obligation. We acc ording ly modify the trial court’s or der a nd order Father to pay

$5,000 per month into the future child support trust until such time a s the amount in the trus t eq u al s the amount of F ather ’s re maining c hild support obligation. We rema nd for a determination of this pay ment period. Additionally , in light of the tria l court’s orde r that F ather maintain life insuranc e to sec ure his child support oblig ation in the case of his death, we orde r that any amounts remaining in the trust in the event of F ather ’s de at h befor e T.L . rea ches the ag e of majority will revert to Father ’s estate upon rec eipt of life insura nce be nefits by Mother.
Inte re st
Mother asse rts the trial court erre d by failing to award i n t er es t on the awa rd of r etroa ctive c hil d s up po rt . T he c od e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art :
I f the full amount of c hild support is n o t p aid by the date upon w hich the orde red support is due, the unpaid amount is in arr ear s and shall become a judg ment for the unpaid amounts and shall acc rue interest from the date of the ar rea rag e at the r ate of tw e lve pe rc e nt (1 2% ) pe r ann um. Al l in te re st w hic h a c c umu la te s o n a rr e ara g e s sh a ll be c on sid e re d c hil d s up po rt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( a)( 5)(2001)

. Mother’s arg ument, as we perc eive it, is that, upon the trial court’ s awa

rd of r etroa ctive child support, she bec ome entitled to 12% intere st per annum on the child support amounts pay able f or ea ch y ear
. I n his reply

brief , Fa t her a sserts Mother waived this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. A party may

not raise a n issue for the f irst time upon appeal. Cantrell v. W alker Die Casting, Inc. , 121 S.W .3d 391, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Upon revie w of the r ecor d, we f ind the issue of int e re st w a s n ot r a ise d in the tr ia l cou rt a nd , th e re fo re , h a s b e e n w a ive d. We a c c or din g ly de c lin e to addre ss the merits of this issue.
Atto rne y ’s Fe e s a nd Co sts
Mother conte nds the trial er red by failing to awar d her a ll of her attorney ’s fe es and litig ation e xpe ns e s in c ur

re d in pr e pa

ri ng a ndpr os e c uti ng he r c hil d s up po rt pe tit ion

. She a sse rt s th e se c os ts amounted to $24,575.05, and that Father did not object to the reasonablene ss of t his sum. The trial court a war ded Mother $15,000 “ as that just portion of Petitioner’s (Mother’ s) a t t o rn eyfee s and litigation expenses.” F ather does not arg ue that the tria l court er red in a war ding Mothe r’s a ttorney ’s fee s. Father a sserts the amount of attorney ’s fe es re quested by Mother is unrea sonable a nd that the trial court did not abuse its discr etion in de termining the amount of Mother’s rea sonable a ttorney ’s fee s.
An awa

rd of r easona

ble attorne y ’s fee s is a

ppropriate when the se rvice s of a pa rent' s attorney inures to the bene fit of a minor c hild. Dalton v. Dalton , 858 S.W .2d 324, 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). We r eview an awa

rd of attorney ’s fee s under an abuseof discre tion standard. Id. Upon re view of-11-

the re cord, w e note that a s of J uly 7, 2003, Mother’s attorney ’s fe es and e x penses wer e $12,155.59. Ad dit ion a lly

fe e s of $1 ,9 73 .5 0 we re inc ur re d on July 8 a nd 9 in c on

jun c tio n wi th the he ari ng of thi s matter on July9. The re mainder of the $24, 5 7 5

. 05 submitt ed by Mother’s c ounsel was incur red post-trial. We c annot say the trial court abused its discre tion in awarding Mother attorne y ’s fe es of $15,000.
Atto rne y ’s Fe e s o n App e al
Mother re ques ts attorney s fee s on appea l. This court repe atedly has re cog nized that when the o b l i go r p arent appea ls an awa rd of c hild support, “[t ]he allowance of attorne y ’s fe es for [an app e a l] is fo r the be ne fi t of the c hil d, a ndthe c us tod ia l sp ou se sh ou ld n ot h a ve to b e ar the e xpe ns e incurre d on the child’s beha lf.” Huntl ey v. Huntley , 61 S.W .3d 329, 341 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2 0 0 1 )( q u o t i n g Ragan v. Ragan , 858 S.W .2d 332, 334 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)) . We awar d Mother rea sonable attorney ’s fe es incurr ed on appe al. We rema nd to the trial court for dete rmination of the a mou nt o f s uc h r e a so na

ble fe e s. Conc lusion
Th e dis se nt w ou ld h oldthat a n u pw ardde viatio n f ro m the chi ld su pp ort g uid e lin e s is war rante d in this case for

both retroa ctive and pr ospective c hild support. L ike the dissent, we a re not insensitive to the disparate f inancial c ircumstance s of the parties in this c as e. Clearly , Father enjoy s a life- sty le fa

r more la vish than that of M o t her. H oweve r, the trial c ourt’s aw ard of re tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt

wa s bas e d on an e rr on e ou s app lic a tio n of la w a ndno t a fi nd ing of

ne e d in excess of the guideline amounts. Retroac tive child support awa rds recog nize that a parent’s dutyof support b egi n s wi t h the birth of the c hild, and the child support g uidelines provide a presumptive measure of the a war d amount. Berryhill v. Rhode s , 21 S.W .3d 188, 193 (Tenn. 2000) . Mother fa iled to demonstrate e x penses e x cee ding the amount of child support re quired by the g uidelines, and no amount of re troac tive support can a lter the conditions under which T .L . previously lived. The a war d of re troac tive child support mandated by this Opinion i s the statutory amount; it will enable Mother to achieve her state d g oal of purc hasing a home in a mor e affluent area ; and it will compensate he r for e x penses incur

red on T.L .’s beha lf.
The dissent further points to Fathe r’s lac k of visitation as w ar ra n t i ng an upwa rd devia tion from the g uidelines. I n providing criteria for de viation, the g uidelines state, (b ) If t h e c h i l d (r en ) i s / a r e n o ts t ay i n g o v er n i gh twi t h t h e o b l i go r f o r t h e a v er age visitation period of eve ry

other we ekend from Friday evening to Sunday

evening , two wee ks during the summer and two wee ks during holiday periods throug hout the y ear , the n a n a mou nt s ha ll b e a dd e d to the pe rc e nta g e c a lc ulate d in the abo ve ru le to compensate the oblig ee f or the c o s t of providing car e for the child(re n) for

the a mou nt o f t ime du ri ng the a ve ra g e vis itatio n p e ri odthat th e c hil d( re n) is/ are no t w ith the obligor [refer ence 1240-2-4- .02(6)]. The court may consider a d o wn war d-12-

de viatio n f

ro m th e g uid e lin e s if

the ob lig or de mon str a te s tha t he/ sh e is c on sis te ntl y providing more c are and supervision for the children than contemplated in the r ule. Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04( 1)(b) . I t is not di sputed that, in this case, F ather has spent very littl e visitation tim e with T.L . Howeve r, the issue he re be comes how this provision is to be applied in light of sec tion 36-5-101(e )(1) (B )(2001) and Te nn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04( 3). I n resolving appar ent conf licts betwee n the statutes, the courts must s ee k t o p ro v i de for “a harm on io us op erat io n o f t he l aws ." H o ld e r v
. Te n n e s s e e J

u d ic ia l S e le c ti o n Co m m 'n , 937 S.W .2d 8 7 7 , 8 8 3 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( q u o t i n g Bo on e v . S un dq uis t , 8 84 S.W. 2d43 8, 44 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) ). I n th is case , althoug h the g uidelines clea rly permit and provide the basis for an upwar d deviation base d on reduc ed visitation, the trial court found that base c hild support in excess of t he guideline pr esumptive amount of $2100 per month wa s not ne cessa ry despite the undisputed fac t of reduc ed visitation. The trial court determined, however, that a deviation was warra nted insofar as nec essary

to provide for private sc hool education, an educational trust, and a future support trust. The evide n ce d o es not pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s.
I n light of the fore g oing, this matter is aff irmed as modified. We rema nd to the trial court for modifications consistent with t his Opinion. Cos ts of this appeal a re ta x ed one- half to Tier any Redmond, Appellee and one- half to C l eti dus Marque ll Hunt, Appellant, and his surety , for whic h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE