FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D19-418

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FARRIS DEAN GREGORY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County.

Mark E. Feagle, Judge.

September 10, 2020

B.L. THOMAS, J.

Appellant argues that his sentence constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment in violation of article I, section 17 of the 

Florida Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. We disagree. 

Appellant was charged by information with two counts of 

dealing in stolen property and two counts of grand theft. In 2018, 

Appellant removed twelve steel fence posts from the fences of two 

property owners and sold them at a nearby recycling plant. The 

posts were valued at between $300 and $500 each, but Appellant 

received approximately $11 for each post. All of the fence posts 

were recovered within days. 
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After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty as charged. 

Appellant’s scoresheet reflected a lowest permissible score of fortytwo months. The two counts of grand theft were vacated pursuant 

to double jeopardy. Appellant had a lengthy prior record which 

included robbery while armed, burglary of a dwelling, burglary of 

a conveyance, dealing in stolen property, grand theft, uttering a 

forgery, false identification of ownership, four misdemeanor thefts, 

and thirteen additional misdemeanors. Appellant’s most recent 

crimes were committed within one year of his last release from 

prison. The trial court found Appellant to be a habitual felony 

offender, and Appellant faced a maximum of thirty years in prison.

However, the trial court sentenced Appellant to fifteen years in 

prison, followed by five years of probation. 

Appellant then filed a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), alleging his sentence constituted 

cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court denied the motion. 

We hold that Appellant’s sentence was permissible and well 

under the maximum possible sentence of thirty years under 

Florida’s habitual felony offender statute. See § 775.084(4)(a), Fla. 

Stat. (2019). We also find that Appellant’s sentence does not 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 

Amendment. 

When considering Eighth Amendment issues, appellate 

courts must yield “substantial deference to the broad authority 

that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and 

limits of punishment for crimes, as well as to the discretion that 

trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals.” Andrews v. 

State, 82 So. 3d 979, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (quoting Solem v. 

Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)); see also Hanf v. State, 182 So. 3d 

704, 706 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 

746, 750 (Fla. 2005)).

Appellant relies on Solem for the proposition that his fifteenyear sentence constitutes a grossly disproportionate prison 

sentence. In Solem, the defendant was sentenced to life 

imprisonment without parole for writing a “no account” check for 

$100. 463 U.S. at 281. The defendant would have ordinarily been 

sentenced to a maximum of five years imprisonment, but he had a 

criminal record of six non-violent felonies, and was therefore, 
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subject to South Dakota’s recidivist statute. Id. None of the six 

felonies was a crime against a person. Id. The Supreme Court 

reversed, finding the sentence to be disproportional and stating 

“[the defendant's] crime was one of the most passive felonies a 

person could commit. It involved neither violence nor threat of 

violence to any person.” Id. at 296.

However, this Court and the Fifth District Court have 

previously stated that “Solem applie[s] only to non-violent 

felonies.” Andrews, 82 So. 3d at 986 (quoting Long v. State, 558 So. 

2d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)). Furthermore, this Court noted 

that “the all-important factor that made the sentence cruel and 

unusual in Solem was that all of the defendant’s prior convictions 

were non-violent,” and that where a defendant’s prior convictions 

were not all non-violent, Solem did not apply. Id. at 986. In 

Andrews, although the triggering crime was non-violent and did 

not involve harm to any particular individual, all of the 

defendant’s prior convictions were violent crimes. Id. Thus, Solem 

did not apply in Andrews, and similarly does not apply in the 

present case because not all of Appellant’s prior convictions were 

non-violent. See id. In addition, unlike in Solem, Appellant’s 

crimes were not victimless, and the victims were adamant that

Appellant’s crimes had cost them money as well as time away from 

their jobs and families.

Therefore, we hold that Appellant’s fifteen-year sentence for 

the crimes of dealing in stolen property and grand theft does not 

violate either article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution or the 

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

AFFIRMED.

RAY, C.J., and KELSEY, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Laurel Cornell Niles, 

Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Steven Edward Woods, 

Assistant Attorney General, and Robert Charles Lee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.