COLONIALINVESTORS, LLCv. LOISFURBUSHETAL. (AC 38303)
DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Schaller, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff owner of a mobile home park sought, by way of summary process, toregainpossessionofcertainpremisesleasedtothe defendant in connection with the defendant’s alleged nonpayment of rent. The defendant alleged several special defenses, including that the notice to quitwaslegallyinsufficient, that certaincharges assessedbytheplaintiff

were improperly treated as part of her rent and thereby improperly increased the amount ofher arrearage, and that the plaintiffhad misapplied a payment to the defendant’s arrearage rather than to her current monthlyrental obligation. Thetrialcourtrenderedajudgment ofpossession in favor ofthe plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this court. She claimed, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the legal insufficiency of the notice to quit. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the notice to quit was legallyinsufficientbecause itfailedto informher clearly ofherstatutory (§ 21-80) right to avoid eviction bypaying the total arrearage due within thirty days ofreceipt; the notice to quit clearly specifiedthe total arrearage due and adequately informed the defendant of her right to avoid eviction by paying the total arrearage due within thirty days of receipt, and the disclaimer in the notice to quit that any partial payments would be accepted for use and occupancy only and not for rent was substantiallysimilartothe use and occupancy disclaimersetforth inthe general summary process statute (§ 47a-23 [e]), which applied to mobile home parks pursuant to § 21-80 (a), and, therefore, was not misleading or ambiguous. 2. The defendantcouldnotprevailonherclaimthatthetrialcourtimproperly determined that it did not need to decide her second special defense, in which she alleged that the plaintiff improperly imposed customer service charges for utilities as rent and that the plaintiff’s charges for utilities in excess of the defendant’s usage were illegal and could not

serve as abasis foran eviction fornonpayment ofrent: that court, which concludedthat it did not needto findthatthe surcharges forthe utilities

were excessive or against public policy because, even if they were not enforced, there would still be an arrearage at the time that the notice to quit was served, in effect rejected the defendant’s second special defense as a basis for attacking the legal sufficiency of the notice to quit; moreover, on the basis of the plain and unambiguous language of the parties’ renewal rental agreement andthe accompanying documents related to the defendant’s billing, the customer service charges were properly included as a component of the rent billed to the defendant, and, therefore, the past arrearage due in the notice to quit was correct. 3. The trial court properly rejected the defendant’s claim in her second special defense that the notice to quit included improper water charges and, thus, was legally insufficient, which was based on her claim that the plaintiff had engaged in illegal submetering in violation ofthe state regulation (§ 16-11-55) that requires that submetering of water be approved by the state Public Utilities Commission; that court properly determined that the plaintiff submetered water from the Metropolitan District Commission, which, bytheplainlanguage ofthe relevantstatute (§ 16-1 [a] [6]), was not subject to that regulation, and, therefore, the notice to quit was not legally insufficient on that basis. 4. The trial court properly determined that the defendant’s April, 2014 payment was correctly applied to a past arrearage that was due rather than to her current monthly rental obligation; because each monthly statement given to the defendant included any balance remaining from thepreviousmonth, andbecausethe defendantoftentenderedpayments exceeding hermonthly rental obligation, which lowered herpast arrearage due, it was clear from the parties’ course of performance that the defendant was aware that her payments were applied first to her total arrearage due and then to her current rental obligation.Argued February 1—officially released August 1, 2017

Procedural History Summary process action, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, where the court, Woods, J., denied the named defendant’s motion to dismiss; thereafter, the matter
was tried to the court; judgment for the plaintiff, from whichthe named defendant appealedto this court; subsequently, the court, Woods, J., deniedthenameddefendant’s motion for an articulation. Affirmed

. David A. Pels, with whom, on the brief, was Giovanna Shay, for the appellant (named defendant).
Colin P. Mahon, with whom was Thomas T. Lombardo, for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion SCHALLER, J. The defendant Lois Furbush1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Colonial Investors, LLC, in this summary process action. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trialcourt(1) lackedsubjectmatterjurisdictionoverthe summary process action due to the legal insufficiency of the notice to quit and (2) improperly held that the defendant’s April, 2014 payment to the plaintiff correctly was applied to her past arrearages that were due ratherthan to herApril, 2014 rent obligation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s appeal. The plaintiff owns a mobile home site in East Hartford known as Colonial Mobile Home Park (park). The plaintiff leases the 460 lots in the park to tenants who own mobile homes. In August 2012, the defendant, who owned and occupied
a mobile home, signed a one year rental agreement for a lot, and, in August, 2013, the defendant signed a renewal ofrental agreement (renewal) foran additional year. Pursuant to the rental agreement and renewal, the defendant was to pay a base rent of $420, as well
as additional rent, which included utility charges for kerosene, propane, and water. By January, 2013, the defendant was in arrears on her monthly rent payments. As of April 1, 2014, the defendant had an outstanding arrearage of $1615.13. This included base rent and additional rent. On April 11, 2014, the defendant made a $600 payment to the plaintiff, which was applied to the outstanding arrearage. After said payment, the defendant had a remaining balance of $1015.13.
On April 30, 2014, the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit possession of the premises on or before June 2, 2014. The ground stated in the notice
was for nonpayment ofrenttotaling $1015.13. Pursuant to the notice to quit, the defendant could avoid eviction should she pay the total arrearage due within thirty days of receipt of the notice. The defendant, however, did not tender any payment to the plaintiff within the thirty days. Thereafter, onJune 13, 2014, theplaintiffcommenced this summaryprocess action. In its one count amended complaint, theplaintiffallegedthatthe defendantfailed to pay rent forthe month ofApril, 2014, failedto tender the total arrearage due to the plaintiff following the receipt ofthe notice to quit, and subsequently failed to quit possession ofthe premises by the time designated in the notice to quit. On June 30, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the notice to quit was legally insufficient. The trial court denied the motion
on July 23, 2014.On October 14, 2014, the defendant filed an answer and special defenses. The first special defense alleged that the defendant tendered, and the plaintiffaccepted, rent for the month of April, 2014, prior to the delivery ofthe notice to quit. The second special defense alleged that the plaintiff submetered water at the park without the necessary approval required by § 16-11-55 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. The third specialdefenseallegedthatthenoticetoquitwaslegally insufficient in that it did not state correctly the rent due for April, 2014. After a trial before the court, the trial court issued awritten decision onAugust 21, 2015, in which it rendered judgment of possession of the premises for the plaintiff. The defendant then filed this appeal. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. Before addressing the specifics of the defendant’s claims, it is helpful to identify the legal principles regardingsummaryprocess actions. ‘‘Summaryprocess is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy.

. . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession ofleased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding their terms.

. . . Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination.

. . . Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan

v. Lazzari, 135 Conn. App. 831, 835, 43 A.3d 750, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 925, 47 A.3d 884 (2012).
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the summary process action because the notice to quit was legally insufficient. Specifically, she argues that the notice to quit failedto inform her clearly ofherrightto avoid eviction by paying the total arrearage due within thirty days of receipt. Moreover, she argues that the trial court improperly failed to consider her special defenses that the customerservice charges were imposedimproperly
as rent and that the water was submetered illegally, which led to the significant inflation ofthe past arrearage due as stated in the notice to quit. Our Supreme Court previously has articulated the standard for ‘‘reviewing challenges to the trial court’s subjectmatterjurisdictioninasummaryprocess action
on the basis of a defect in the notice to quit. Before the [trial] court can entertain asummaryprocess action andevictatenant,the ownerofthelandmustpreviously have served the tenant with a notice to quit.

. . . As
a condition precedent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit

. . . is ajurisdictional necessity.

. . . This court’s review of the trial court’s determination asto whetheranoticeto quit servedbytheplaintiffeffectively conferred subject matterjurisdiction is plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 388, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009).
The requirements for a notice to quit in a summary process action involving a mobile home is governed by General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (3). ‘‘Notwithstanding the provisions of [General Statutes] § 47a-23,2 the general summaryprocess statute, whenatenant, as inthis case, breaches her lease by failing to pay rent, and the landlord seeks to terminate the tenancy, the landlord must followtheprocedures enunciatedin § 21-80 (b) (3) (B).3

. . . [U]nder the plain language of § 21-80 (b) (3) (B), the prerequisites to the maintenance ofa summaryprocess action for nonpayment of rent are a written thirty day notification to the tenant and a statement of the total arrearage due.’’ (Footnotes added.) Ossenv. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 568–69, 563 A.2d 741 (1989).
A
We begin with the defendant’s claim that the use and occupancy disclaimerincluded inthe notice to quitwas notaclearnotificationofthe defendant’s rightpursuant to § 21-80 to avoid eviction by making full payment of past arrearage due within thirty days of receipt. The defendantarguesthat, becausetheplaintiffdidnotcomply with the requirements of § 21-80, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
The following facts and procedural history are relevanttothis claim. Thenoticetoquitincludedthefollowing disclaimer: ‘‘ANY PARTIAL PAYMENTS TENDERED WILL BE ACCEPTED FOR USE AND OCCUPANCYONLYAND NOTFORRENT, WITHFULL RESERVATION OFRIGHTSTO CONTINUE WITHTHE EVICTION ACTION IF THE TOTAL OF ALL PARTIAL PAYMENTS MADE WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE DOES NOT EQUAL THE TOTAL ARREARAGE STATED ABOVE. ALL PAYMENTS SHOULD BE MADE TO THE ATTORNEY’S OFFICE AND NOT TO THE LANDLORD.’’ (Emphasis in original.) In its motion to dismiss, the defendant argued thatthe notice to quit failed to meet the requirements of § 21-80 because it did not indicate that the defendant could avoid eviction by paying the past arrearage due. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the notice to quit satisfied the requirements of § 21-80. ‘‘Under [§ 21-80 (b) (3) (B)], to effectuatethetermination [ofa tenancy for nonpayment ofrent] the landlord must give the resident thirty days written notice and that notice must state the total arrearage due. If the tenant tenders the total arrearage due within the thirty day notice period provided in this section, the landlord ‘shall not maintain or proceed with the summary process action.’ General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (3) (B). Thepurposeforrecitingthetotalarrearage due inthenotice is to afford the tenant a final opportunity to save the tenancy by tendering the total arrearage within the thirty day grace period. If tender is made within the graceperiod, the statutebars furtheractionbythe landlord.’’ Ossen v. Kreutzer, supra, 19 Conn. App. 568.
In the present action, the notice to quit clearly specified the total arrearage due; it stated that the defendant owed rent of $834.09 for April, 2014, the balance of $160.04 for March 2014 rent, and a late fee of $21, for
a total of $1015.13. The use and occupancy disclaimer then provided the required notice period; it made clear that the defendant had a thirty day grace period in which she could make payments totaling the past arrearage due in order to avoid eviction. Specifically, the disclaimer stated that the plaintiff reserved the ‘‘rights to continue with the eviction action if the total of all partial payments made within 30 days of receipt of this notice does not equal the total arrearage stated above.’’
The defendant, however, claims that the use and occupancy disclaimer was not a clear statement ofthis grace period, but rather a misleading statement that discouraged her from tendering payment. With regard to the appropriate language for a use and occupancy disclaimer, § 21-80 does not provide any guidance. Pursuant to § 21-80 (a), however, the provisions for summary process in mobile home parks are in addition to the provisions for summaryprocess under chapter 832, unless otherwise specified.4 Section 47a-23, which falls under chapter 832, provides an example of a use and occupancy disclaimer, and, therefore we may examine it in relation to the disclaimer in the present case. Accordingly, § 47a-23 (e) provides that: ‘‘[A use and occupancy] disclaimer shall be in substantially the following form: ‘Any payments tendered after the date specified to quit possession or occupancy, or the date ofthe completion ofthe pretermination process ifthat is later, will be accepted for use and occupancy only and not for rent, with full reservation of rights to continuewiththe evictionaction.’ ’’ Theuse andoccupancy disclaimer in the present case is substantially similar to that in § 47a-23 (e), clearly indicating that future payments by the defendant will be accepted for use and occupancy, not as rent, but that such payments may help the defendant avoid eviction should the total of her payments equal her past arrearage due of $1015.13.
In addition, the defendant claims that the disclaimer lacks claritybecause it is a sentence ofoverfifty words with a double negative. Specifically, the defendant suggests that the phrases ‘‘and not for rent’’ and ‘‘does not equal’’ create a double negative. With regard to the phrase ‘‘and not for rent,’’ the inclusion of the word ‘‘not’’ is to indicate to the defendant that all paymentstendered will be accepted not for rent, but rather for
use and occupancy only. The same language can be
seen in the suggested disclaimer found in § 47a-23 (e). Withregardtothephrase ‘‘doesnotequal,’’theinclusion of the word ‘‘not’’ is to indicate that, if the defendant makes payments within thirty days of receipt of the notice, butthese payments donot equalthe past arrearage due, the defendant cannot avoid eviction. In neither context does the inclusion of the word ‘‘not’’ create a double negative. We therefore determine that there is
no ambiguity regarding the language used in the use and occupancy disclaimer. Accordingly, we conclude that the notice to quit was legally sufficient in this regard.
B
The defendantnextclaimsthatthetrialcourtimproperly determined that it need not decide the defendant’s claims alleged in the second and third special defenses that the past arrearage due in the notice to quit was incorrect, thereby causingthe notice to be legallyinsufficient pursuant to § 21-80 and consequently depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly held that it need not decide whether the plaintiff imposed customer service charges for the utilities as rent in violation of the parties’ rental agreement.5 Furthermore, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly held that it need not decide whether the plaintiff engaged in submetering in violation § 16-11-55 oftheRegulations ofConnecticutStateAgencies, which led to the inclusion of improper water charges in the past arrearage due.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s claim. Pursuant to the renewal, kerosene, propane, and water ‘‘will be billed

. . . based on the usage at the rate posted in the park office

. . . . Except for the

. . . delineated rental payments and the utility charges [provided in § 3 ofthe renewal], the [plaintiff] shall not collect any service charges

. . . unless itemized in billing to Resident and authorized elsewhere in this [r]ental [a]greement. Any charges or expenses assessed under the provisions ofthis [r]ental [a]greementorthe [r]ulesand [r]egulations ofthe [p]ark shall be paid to the [plaintiff] as additional rent

. . . .’’ As part of additional rent, the defendant was billed for all kerosene usage, plus an additional $.70 per gallon ofkerosene used; all propane usage, plus an additional $.45 per gallon of propane used; and all water usage, plus a $40.40 quarterly customer service charge. The monthlystatements senttothe defendantincludedindividual charges for kerosene and propane, and two distinct water charges, one for usage and one for the customer service charge.
Withrespecttowaterusage, theMetropolitanDistrict Commission (MDC) suppliesthe watertothepark. Spe-cifically, MDC delivers the water to the master meter atthe park. Fromthe mastermeter, the plaintiffdistributes the water to individual meters located on each of the occupied lots. The trial court heard evidence that the individual meters measure the water usage at each individual lot. These readings are recorded and sent to the park’s corporate offices where bills are generated. The tenants are billed quarterly for water, and the total owed is comprised of actual water usage as measured bytheindividualmeterandaquarterlycustomerservice charge of $40.40. The plaintiff collects payment from the tenants and pays the usage portion of the bill to the MDC. The plaintiff retains the quarterly customer service charge to cover the cost of maintaining the water system that connects the MDC master meter to the individual meters. Generally, in determining whether a court lacks subject matterjurisdiction, the inquiry does not extend to the merits of the case. See Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 728, 553 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919, 109 S. Ct. 3244, 106 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1989). InLampasona, however, our Supreme Court, in considering whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over asummaryprocessaction, determinedthatanexamination of the facts was necessary. Id. Specifically, the court determined that, because proper notice to quit is
ajurisdictionalnecessityforasummaryprocess action, and the defendant in that case claimed that the notice to quit compliedwiththe inapplicable general summary process provision rather than the applicable mobile home summary process provision, the court was requiredto determine which provision applied. Id., 726, 730. To resolve which provision applied, the court had to examine the facts of the case to determine whether the defendant was a resident of the plaintiff’s mobile home park. Id., 730. In the present case, the defendant claimsthatthetrialcourtlackedsubjectmatterjurisdiction because the notice to quit was defective for failure to stateproperlythetotalarrearage due. The dispositive question in determining if the arrearage was stated properly is whether the customer service charges and watercharges constitutedrent, and, therefore, anexamination of the facts is necessary. 1
We first address the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly held that it did not need to decide whether, as alleged in the defendant’s second special defense, theplaintiffimproperlyimposed customerservice charges for utilities as rent, in violation of the parties’ rental agreement. Specifically, the court held: ‘‘The defendant’s second special defense is that the plaintiff’s charges for utilities in excess of the tenant’s usage [are] illegal and therefore cannot serve as the basis for an eviction for nonpayment ofrent. The court doesnotneedtofindthatthe surchargesfortheutilitiesare excessive and against public policy

. . . because
even if the surcharges are not enforced, there would still be an arrearage at the time that the notice to quit
was served.’’ Therefore, although the defendant argues that the trial court did not decide her second special defense, the record shows that the court essentially rejected the second special defense as a basis for attackingthelegalsufficiencyofthenoticetoquitdueto the existence ofan arrearage apart from the challenged surcharges. Nevertheless, we conclude that the customer service charges were a proper component ofthe rent billed to the defendant. ‘‘In construing a written lease

. . . three elementary principles must be [considered]: (1) The intention of the parties is controlling andmustbe gatheredfromthe language of the lease in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties at the execution of the instrument; (2) the language mustbe given its ordinarymeaning unless a technical or special meaning is clearly intended; [and] (3) the lease must be construed as a whole and in such a manner as to give effect to every provision, if reasonably possible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Elliott Enterprises, LLC v. Goodale, 166 Conn. App. 461, 469, 142 A.3d 335 (2016).
The defendant claims that the rental agreement and renewal6 did not contain an agreement that the defendant would pay utility charges beyond actual usage. The facts and the evidence before the trial court, however, donotsupportthe defendant’sposition. Theplaintiff treated as rent the ‘‘base rent in equal monthly installments’’ pursuant to § 3 (B) and ‘‘additional rent’’ pursuant to § 3 (C) of the renewal. Under the clear language of § 3 (C) ofthe renewal, all utilities are billed based on usage, and the rates at which they are billed
are posted in the park office. The renewal and rental agreementdonotmentionthe customerservice charges related to each utility. Section 3 (D)7 of the renewal, however, statesthat service charges maybe collectedif they are itemized in billing to the tenant and authorized elsewhere in the rental agreement. Section 5 (A) (6) of the rental agreement states that the plaintiff is to maintain all utilities provided by it, and § 5 (A) (7) specifically states that the plaintiff is to maintain all water lines and connections. Recognizing that, when construing the renewal and rental agreement as a whole rent consists of multiple components, we conclude that the customer service charges billed to the defendant were not in violation ofthe rental agreement. Although the customer service charges were not listed specifically as additional rent in § 3 (C) ofthe renewal, they were authorized as additional rent through § 3 (D) of the renewal and § 5 of the rental agreement, for they were customer service charges that were a necessary part of maintaining the utilities and the water system. The details of how thecustomer service charges were calculated into the billing ofutilities were provided to the defendant in utility rate notices sent to all residents ofthe park. The utility rate notices confirmed that the billing rates also would be posted in the park office, as stipulated in the renewal. Moreover, the defendant’s monthly statements itemized these customer service charges. Each monthly statement given to the defendant provided individual utility details for kerosene, propane, and water. For kerosene and propane, the rate at which usage was billedincludedthe customerservice charges. The inclusion ofthe charge inthe rate was stipulatedinthe utility rate notices sent to the tenants. The total billed each month for propane and kerosene match the monthly entriesintheplaintiff’sledgers. Withregardtothewater charges, aquarterly customer service charge was listed consistently under the water detail in the defendant’s monthlystatements. The customerservice charge, however, was only included in the monthly balance due every three statements. These charges coincide with the plaintiff’s ledgers, which included water charges everythree entries. On the basis ofthe plain and unambiguous language in the renewal, rental agreement, and theaccompanyingdocumentsrelatedtothe defendant’s billing, the customer service charges were a proper component of the rent billed to the defendant, and, therefore, the past arrearage due in the notice to quit
was correct. Consequently, this challenge to the legal sufficiency of the notice to quit fails.
2
We next address the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly held that it need not decide whether the plaintiffengaged in illegal submetering as alleged in her second special defense. Specifically, the defendant arguesthattheplaintiffengagedinsubmeteringinviolation of § 16-11-55 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies because that regulation requires that submetering be approved by the state Public Utilities Commission (commission), andthe MDC does nothave such approval.8 As a result, the defendant claims that the notice to quit was legally insufficient, for the total arrearage stated was inflated significantly by the inclusion of improper water charges.
Wefirstnotethatthetrialcourtdidmakeadeterminationwithregardtothis aspect ofthe defendant’s special defense. Specifically, the trial court held that the MDC
was a water company that was not regulated by the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA), the authorityunderwhich § 16-11-55waspromulgated, and, therefore, it rejected the special defense.9 We further concludethatthetrialcourtproperlyrejectedthe defendant’s special defense.
This issue of whether § 16-11-55 of the Regulationsof Connecticut State Agencies applies to the MDC presents a question of statutory interpretation. ‘‘Administrative rules and regulations are given the force and effect of law.

. . . We therefore construe agency regulations in accordance with accepted rules of statutory construction.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 751, 865 A.2d 428 (2005). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.

. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.

. . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z10 directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself andits relationship to otherstatutes. If, afterexamining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.

. . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, andto its relationship to existing legislation and commonlawprinciples governingthe same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Footnote in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re William D., 97 Conn. App. 600, 606, 905 A.2d 696 (2006), aff’d, 284 Conn. 305, 933 A.2d 1147 (2007).
We begin our analysis with the governing statute and its accompanying regulation. Pursuant to General Statutes § 16-1 et seq., public service companies, including watercompanies, are regulatedbyPURA. Awater company includes ‘‘every person owning, leasing, maintaining, operating, managing or controlling any pond, lake, reservoir, stream, well or distributing plant or system employed for the purpose of supplying water to fifty or more consumers,’’ but it does not include ‘‘a municipal waterworks system established under chapter 102, a district, metropolitan district, municipal district or special services district established under chapter 105, chapter 105a or any other general statute ofanypublicorspecialactwhichisauthorizedtosupply water

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 16-1 (a) (6). Pursuant to this statutory authority, PURA promulgated § 16-11- 55 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, subdivision (4) ofwhich requires a public service company to receive the approval of the commission to submeter.
The MDC was created in 1929 by a special act ofthe Connecticut GeneralAssembly, which declares thatthe MDC is a metropolitan district within the county of Hartford formed to provide water and sewage services. 20 Spec. Acts 1204, No. 511, § 1 (1929);11 seeRockyHillConvalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan District, 160 Conn. 446, 450, 280 A.2d 344 (1971). As ametropolitan district established through a special act, the MDC falls within the exception set forth in § 16-1 (a) (6). Thus, the MDC was not required to receive approval from the commission to submeter at the park. Accordingly, the trial court properly rejected the defendant’s specialdefensethattheMDC’ssubmeteringofthewater
was inviolation of § 16-11-55 ofthe Regulations ofConnecticut State Agencies.
We conclude that the notice to quit was legally sufficient. Accordingly, the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the summary process action.
II
The defendant further claims that the trial court improperly determined that her April, 2014 payment
was applied correctly to the past arrearage instead of her April, 2014 rent obligation. Specifically, the defendant argues that no evidence was presented that standardpracticebetweenthepartieswastohavepayments applied to the past arrearage due before the current monthly obligation. Rather, the defendant argues that this was an uncommunicated, unilateral practice of the plaintiff.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s claim. The trial court heard evidence that, if a tenant is in arrears, the custom of the plaintiff is to apply any payment by the tenant to the arrearage first. The tenants are not specificallynotified as to how their payments are being applied, but the practice is memorializedthroughthe monthly statements that tenants are given. The plaintiff’s ledgers also reflect this practice. As recorded in the plaintiff’s ledgers, as ofApril, 2014, the defendant owed abalance of $1615.13. On April 11, 2014, the plaintiff recorded in its ledger a $600 payment made by the plaintiff, which left a balance of $1015.13. Said payment also was reflected in a statement provided to the defendant.
Whether the defendant’s April, 2014 payment properly was applied to the past arrearage due is a mixed question oflaw and fact. ‘‘Questions oflaw mixed with questions of fact receive plenary review.’’ Duperry v. Solnit, 261 Conn. 309, 318, 803 A.2d 287 (2002). ‘‘When
a debtorhas two or more obligations to the same creditor, thedebtorpossessesthepowerto directthemanner in which his payment is to be applied.

. . . The obligor must manifest his direction to the obligee, but he need not manifest it in words. A direction may be inferred from other circumstances, including the performance itself. It is often clear from the nature of the performance that it is to be applied to a particular duty.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) South Sea Co. v. Global Turbine Component Technologies, LLC, 95 Conn. App. 742, 750–51,899 A.2d 642 (2002). Applying the reasoning of South Sea Co. to the present case, we may consider the defendant’s conduct, the parties’ course ofperformance, andthe defendant’s failure to give a contrary direction in determining the proper application of the April, 2014 payment. Each monthly statement given to the defendant included any balance remaining from her previous month, thus providing her with the past arrearage due. By the time that the defendant’s April, 2014 payment was made, the defendant had received numerous monthly statements and tendered payments based on the amount identified in each statement as due. On many ofthese occasions, the payments tendered exceeded the monthly rent and thus further lowered her past arrearage due. Consequently, itmaybeinferredthatthe defendantwasaware that herpayments were applied first to her total arrearage due and then to her current monthly obligation. Despite the defendant’s having knowledge of the manner in which the payments were applied, nothing in the record suggests that she gave the plaintiff direction to apply the April, 2014 payment first to the April rent obligation instead of the past arrearage due. Because nothing suggests that the defendant gave direction to theplaintiff, eitheractuallyorinferentially, weconclude that the trial court properly determined that the defendant’s April, 2014 payment was correctly applied to the past arrearage due rather than to her April, 2014 rent obligation.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although the plaintiff’s amended complaint originally named Lois Furbush and Piper Goehring as defendants, the plaintiff subsequently moved for default against Goehring for failure to appear, which the court granted

on June 1, 2016, and she has not participated in this appeal. We therefore refer to Furbush as the defendant.

2 General Statutes § 47a-23 is the general summary process statute that governs the form and delivery of notices to quit possession, whereas § 21- 80 is the provision specific to mobile home summary process actions. See Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 726, 553 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919, 109 S. Ct. 3244, 106 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1989).

3 General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (3) provides in relevantpart: ‘‘Notwithstanding the provisions of section 47a-23, termination of any tenancy in a mobile manufactured home park shall be effective only if made

. . . (B) By the

owner giving the resident at least sixty days’ written notice, which shall state the reason or reasons for such termination, except that, when the terminationisbaseduponsubparagraph (A) ofsubdivision (1) ofthis subsection, the owner need give the resident only thirty days’ notice, which notice shall state the total arrearage due provided, the owner shall not maintain

orproceed with a summaryprocess against aresident who tenders the total arrearage due to the owner within such thirty days

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A]n owner may terminate a rental agreement or maintain a summary process action against a resident who owns a mobile manufactured home

. . . for

. . . (A) Nonpayment of rent, utility charges or reasonable incidental service charges

. . . .’’

4 General Statutes § 21-80 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘An action for summaryprocessmaybemaintainedbythe ownerofamobilemanufactured homeparkagainstamobile manufacturedhome residentwho rents amobile manufactured home from such owner forthe following reasons, which shall be in addition to other reasons allowed under chapter 832, and, except asotherwisespecified, proceedingsunderthissubsectionshallbeasprescribed in chapter 832

. . . .’’

5 On appeal, the defendant initially argued that the customer service charges were imposed as rent in violation of the parties’ lease agreement and General Statutes § 47a-4 (a) (9). The defendant, pursuant to Practice Book § 67-10, subsequently withdrew § 47a-4 (a) (9) from her argument on the premise that General Statutes § 47a-2 (b) excludes from § 47a-4 (a) (9) mobile home owners who own their mobile homes but rent the lots on which the homes are situated.
6 The renewal substituted § 3 ofthe rental agreement, but otherwise incorporated all of the terms of the rental agreement.
7 Inthe renewal, the subsection of§ 3 discussing service charges is labeled ‘‘A.’’ The subsection is mislabeled, however, and should be labeled ‘‘D,’’ as providedin § 3 oftherental agreement. Therefore, we refertothe subsection of the lease addressing customer service charges as § 3 (D).

8 The defendant also argues that the water customer service charge was
an unfair or deceptive trade practice within the meaning ofthe Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and, therefore, its inclusion in the rent was improper. ‘‘[A] violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice

. . . or apractice amounting to aviolation ofpublic policy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gebbie v. Cadle Co., 49 Conn. App. 265, 279, 714 A.2d 678 (1998). In her brief, the defendant merely states that the discrepancy between what the plaintiff collects from its tenants and what it owes to the MDC is enormous, and that the plaintiff deceives its residents by billing a customer service charge on the claim that it is related to MDC charges. No further analysis is given. Accordingly, we only address the illegality of submetering as to the applicability of § 16-11-55 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which the defendant adequately briefed and argued before this court. See Strobel v. Strobel, 73 Conn. App. 488, 490, 808 A.2d 1138 (‘‘[w]e consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to briefthe issue properly’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 928, 814 A.2d 383 (2002).

9 The trial court also held that ‘‘[a] per se violation of this regulation, without more, would not rise to the level of a special defense in this action because the court finds that the charges for water usage (not the quarterly customer service charge) were reasonable.’’

10 General Statutes § 1-2z provides: ‘‘The meaning ofa statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’

11 The act provides in relevant part: ‘‘There shall be within the county of Hartford a metropolitan district with territorial limits as hereinafter more particularly defined. Allthe inhabitants and electors ofthe towns composing said metropolitan district are constituted and declared, upon the taking effect ofthis act as hereinafter provided, body politic and corporate by the

name of The Metropolitan District

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) 20 Spec. Act 1204, No. 511, § 1 (1929).