Filed 3/9/23 In re Savannah K. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re SAVANNAH K., et al., 

Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

________________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RASHAD K.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B315009

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 21CCJP01678)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Robin R. Kesler, Juvenile Court Referee. Dismissed.

Emery El Habiby and Paul Swiller, under appointment by 

the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Rashad K.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________________

INTRODUCTION

Rashad K. appeals from the juvenile court’s July 8, 2021

jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. He argues the court 

erred in denying his request for custody of his children, 13-yearold Savannah and 12-year-old Joshua, under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a), after the court 

removed them from the custody of their mother, Christina W.1

Several weeks after the juvenile court denied Rashad’s 

request for custody of his children under section 361.2, the 

Department filed a subsequent petition under section 342

alleging Rashad physically abused his girlfriend and her oneyear-old child. On October 15, 2021 the juvenile court sustained 

the subsequent petition, declared Savannah and Joshua 

dependent children of the court, and removed them from Rashad. 

Rashad appealed from that order, but we dismissed his appeal 

after his appellate counsel filed a brief stating there were no 

arguable issues. (See In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 

844.) Because the October 15, 2021 order sustaining the petition 

and removing Rashad’s children from him is final, we cannot 

provide Rashad any effective relief in this appeal. Therefore, we 

1 Christina is not a party to this appeal. Undesignated 

statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

dismiss Rashad’s appeal from the July 8, 2021 order denying his 

request for custody under section 361.2. 

Rashad also argues the Department and the juvenile court 

failed to comply with the inquiry and notice provisions of the 

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 

et seq.) and related California law. While this appeal was 

pending, however, the Department conducted a further inquiry 

into whether Savannah and Joshua may be Indian children, and 

the juvenile court, based on the Department’s additional 

investigation, found they are not. Because the parties agree 

these developments moot Rashad’s challenge to the court’s prior 

ICWA findings, we also dismiss this part of his appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Juvenile Court Detains Savannah and Joshua,

Sustains a Petition Under Section 300, and Denies 

Rashad’s Request for Custody Under Section 361.2

In March 2021 the Department received a referral alleging 

Christina was neglecting Savannah, Joshua, and their four halfsiblings. The referral stated the children were living with a 

maternal aunt who was unable to care and financially provide for 

them. The maternal aunt told a social worker that Christina

(who had custody of Savannah and Joshua) left the children in 

the care of a woman the family did not know, that the maternal 

aunt took the children from the woman eight months ago, and 

that Christina had visited the children only three times. 

After an investigation the Department filed a petition 

under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j), alleging 

Christina physically abused Savannah and Joshua, made an 
4

inappropriate plan for their care and supervision, and abused 

and neglected Savannah and Joshua’s siblings. At the detention 

hearing in April 2021 the court found the Department had made 

a prima facie showing Savannah and Joshua were persons 

described by section 300 and detained them from Christina and 

Rashad. 

At a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing on 

July 8, 2021 the juvenile court sustained the petition, declared 

Savannah and Joshua dependent children of the court, and 

removed them from Christina and Rashad. The court ordered 

reunification services and monitored visitation for both parents. 

The court denied Rashad’s request under section 361.2 to place

Savannah and Joshua with him as a non-offending, noncustodial 

parent. The court found that Rashad did not have a relationship 

with his children and that the children reported they were 

uncomfortable in his care. The court also found that, after 

Rashad visited the children in 2020, he left the children with 

Christina, even though she was leaving the children alone for 

extended periods of time. Finally, the court found that relatives 

reported Rashad had mental health issues, that Rashad called 

and “cussed out” relatives who were caring for the children, and 

that in 2019 Rashad said he did not know where Christina was. 

Rashad timely appealed from the jurisdiction findings and 

disposition orders. 

B. The Juvenile Court Sustains a Subsequent Petition 

and Removes Savannah and Joshua from Rashad

Several weeks after the disposition hearing, the 

Department filed a subsequent petition under section 342 (which 

the Department later amended) alleging Rashad was violent 
5

toward his girlfriend and her one-year-old son. On October 15, 

2021 the court sustained the subsequent petition, finding true 

allegations that Rashad kicked the child in the stomach, that he

failed to protect the child from his girlfriend’s substance abuse, 

that his criminal record in four states and history of lying to law 

enforcement put his children at risk of physical harm, and that 

he left his children in a motel room with Christina despite her 

substance abuse issues and inability to care for the children.2

The court removed Savannah and Joshua from Rashad and 

Christina. 

Rashad timely appealed from the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction findings on the sustained petition under section 342

and the court’s disposition orders. We dismissed that appeal 

after Rashad’s appointed counsel advised us in writing there 

were no arguable issues and Rashad failed to file a supplemental 

brief. (In re S.K., B316929, dism. Feb. 1, 2023; see In re 

Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.)

DISCUSSION

A. The Appeal from the Order Denying Rashad’s Request 

for Custody Under Section 361.2 Is Moot

1. Applicable Law

“Juvenile dependency appeals raise unique mootness 

concerns because the parties have multiple opportunities to 

appeal orders even as the proceedings in the juvenile court 

proceed.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 59.) “‘[T]he 

2 We take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s October 15, 

2021 order. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
6

critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is 

moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective 

relief if it finds reversible error.’” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 

63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163; see In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 

275.) An “appeal may become moot where subsequent events, 

including orders by the juvenile court, render it impossible for the 

reviewing court to grant effective relief.” (Rashad D., at p. 163.) 

“A reviewing court must ‘“decide on a case-by-case basis whether 

subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case 

moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a 

subsequent proceeding.’’’” (In re D.P., at p. 276.) “‘When no 

effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be 

dismissed.’” (In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1050-1051.) 

2. We Cannot Grant Rashad Any Effective Relief

in His Appeal from the Order Denying His 

Request for Custody Under Section 361.2

Rashad argues substantial evidence did not support the 

juvenile court’s July 8, 2021 finding under section 361.2, 

subdivision (a), that placing Savannah and Joshua with Rashad 

would be detrimental to their safety, protection, or physical or 

emotional well-being. As discussed, however, on October 15, 

2021 the juvenile court removed Savannah and Joshua from 

Rashad after the court sustained a subsequent petition alleging

Rashad physically abused his girlfriend and her son. Thus, even 

if we were to reverse the juvenile court’s July 8, 2021 order

denying his request for custody under section 361.2, subdivision 

(a), the court’s October 15, 2021 now-final order removing 

Savannah and Joshua from Rashad would preclude placing the 

children with him. Because we cannot provide Rashad any 
7

effective relief, his appeal from the July 8, 2021 order denying his 

request for custody of the children is moot. 

B. The Appeal from the Juvenile Court’s ICWA Findings 

Is Moot

“ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R. 

§ 23.101 et seq. (2022)) set minimal procedural protections for 

state courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing 

them in foster care or adoptive homes.”3 (In re M.B. (2022) 

80 Cal.App.5th 617, 625; see In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 

309, 316.) ICWA provides that, “where the court knows or has 

reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking 

the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, 

an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and 

the Indian child’s tribe . . . of the pending proceedings and of 

their right of intervention.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); see In re 

Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 5; In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 

70, 76.) ICWA’s notice requirements “facilitate a determination 

of whether the child is an Indian child under ICWA” and ensure 

an Indian tribe “is aware of its right to intervene in or, where 

appropriate, exercise jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding 

involving an Indian child.” (Isaiah W., at p. 8; see In re 

Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 429.)

“To ensure Indian tribes may exercise their rights in 

dependency proceedings as guaranteed by ICWA and related 

3 “‘ICWA defines an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person 

who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an 

Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe 

and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”’” 

(In re H.V. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 437; see 25 U.S.C. 

§ 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (a).)
8

state law, investigation of a family member’s belief a child may 

have Indian ancestry must be undertaken and notice provided to 

the appropriate tribes.” (In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 316; see In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678, 688.) Section 

224.2, subdivision (a), provides that courts and child protective 

agencies “‘have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire

whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . is to 

be, or has been, filed is or may be an Indian child.’” (See In re 

Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 9; In re H.V. (2022) 

75 Cal.App.5th 433, 437.) Section 224.2, subdivision (b), requires 

the child protective agency to ask the child, parents, legal 

guardian, and “extended family members,” among others, 

“whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (In re J.C.,

supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 77; see In re A.C. (2022) 

86 Cal.App.5th 130, 132; In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542,

552; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).) 

“The duty to develop information concerning whether a 

child is an Indian child rests with the court and the Department, 

not the parents or members of the parents’ families.” (In re 

Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 430; see In re K.R. (2018) 

20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706 [the juvenile court “and the agency must 

act upon information received from any source, not just the 

parent [citations], and the parent’s failure to object in the 

juvenile court to deficiencies in the investigation or noticing does 

not preclude the parent from raising the issue for the first time 

on appeal”].) “Thus, a juvenile court errs in making a finding 

ICWA does not apply to the proceedings without first ensuring 

that the Department has made an adequate inquiry under ICWA 

and California law, and if necessary, the court must continue the 

proceedings and order the Department to fulfill its 
9

responsibilities.” (In re Antonio R., at p. 431; see § 224.2, 

subd. (i)(2).)

In the Indian Child Inquiry Attachment to the petition 

(Judicial Council Forms, form ICWA-010(A)), the Department 

stated that on April 8, 2021 a social worker questioned a 

maternal aunt, Colinda, and that Colinda gave the social worker 

no reason to believe Savannah and Joshua were or may be Indian 

children. Christina and Rashad completed parental notification 

of Indian status forms (Judicial Council Forms, form ICWA-020), 

in which they indicated they had no known Indian ancestry. At 

the detention hearing the juvenile court found there was no 

reason to believe Savannah and Joshua were Indian children 

under ICWA. At first, this was the extent of the Department’s 

inquiry into the children’s possible Indian ancestry.

The Department concedes its initial inquiry was 

inadequate because the Department “failed to make initial 

inquiry of . . . available relatives” other than Christina, Rashad, 

and Colinda. (See In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 81 

[“[r]egardless of a parent’s response concerning his or her possible 

Indian ancestry on the ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian 

Status form or when questioned by the court at the initial 

appearance, . . . section 224.2, subdivision (b), requires the 

agency to ask the child, the parents, extended family members 

and others who have an interest in the child whether the child is, 

or may be, an Indian child”].) During its investigation into the 

allegations of the petition, the Department interviewed several 

extended family members, including two paternal great aunts 

and a maternal uncle, but did not ask them about Savannah and 

Joshua’s possible Indian ancestry.
10

But on June 14, 2022 the juvenile court ordered the 

Department to make additional inquiry into the children’s Indian 

status. We subsequently granted the Department’s motion for 

judicial notice of the juvenile court’s June 14, 2022 order 

directing the Department to “interview the mother, the father, 

and all available relatives to ascertain whether the family has 

any Indian ancestry” and to file “a detailed report” of its 

interviews. The Department complied with the juvenile court’s 

order, and on July 13, 2022 and September 26, 2022 filed reports 

detailing its supplemental investigation. 

On February 21, 2023 the juvenile court, having read the 

two reports, found ICWA did not apply.4 That same day, the 

parties jointly reported to this court that the Department had 

“conducted additional inquiry of extended family members about 

the ICWA and documented its interviews and efforts to interview 

the parents,” that the Department “subsequently provided 

additional information regarding the ICWA” to the juvenile court, 

and that the court found on February 21, 2023 ICWA did not 

apply. Counsel for Rashad stated “the Department has complied 

with the juvenile court’s order.” 

At this point, we cannot grant Rashad any effective relief in 

this appeal regarding the Department’s and the juvenile court’s 

compliance with ICWA. The Department has conducted an 

additional inquiry, which the juvenile court has found was 

sufficient. If Rashad believes that the Department’s 

supplemental inquiry was insufficient or that the juvenile court 

erred on February 21, 2023 in finding ICWA does not apply, 

Rashad’s remedy is to appeal from that order. In the meantime, 

4 We take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s February 21, 

2023 order. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
11

this appeal challenging the juvenile court’s prior ICWA findings 

is moot.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. 

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

FEUER, J.