J-A07014-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: A.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: SOMERSET COUNTY 

CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES 

No. 1420 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order entered July 24, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County, Orphans’ 

Court, at No(s): 14 Adoption 2013 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, and MUNDY, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 11, 2015 

Somerset County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) appeals from 

the order entered July 24, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset 

County, which denied its petitions to terminate involuntarily the parental 

rights of D.P. (“Mother”) and A.C. (“Father”) to their minor son, A.C. 

(“Child”). After careful review, we reverse the subject order, and remand for 

the orphans’ court to enter decrees terminating the parental rights of Mother 

and Father. 

Child was born in February of 2012. At the time of his birth, Child 

tested positive for oxycodone and methadone. Both Mother and Father 

admitted to CYS that they took prescription drugs that had not been 

prescribed for them, and a safety plan was implemented. On May 25, 2012, 

Mother and Father submitted to drug screens. On May 31, 2012, CYS 

received the results of these screens, indicating that both parents tested 

positive. That same day, CYS sought and received an order of protective 
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custody for Child. A dependency petition was filed on or about June 1, 2012, 

and Child was adjudicated dependent by order dated June 5, 2012. 

 On October 7, 2013, CYS filed petitions to terminate involuntarily the 

parental rights of Mother and Father. A hearing was held on July 14, 2014, 

during which the orphans’ court heard the testimony of Psychologist Dennis 

Kashurba, CYS caseworker Andrea Palguta, CYS casework supervisor Teya 

Lopaze, Father, and Father’s mother, P.C. (Grandmother). Mother failed to 

appear at the hearing.1 On July 24, 2014, the court entered its order 

denying the termination petitions. CYS timely filed a notice of appeal on 

August 22, 2014, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 

CYS now raises the following issues for our review.

I. Whether [CYS] proved by clear and convincing evidence at 

least one statutory ground for the termination of [] Father’s 

parental rights[?] 

A. Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of 

law, or abused its discretion by requiring [CYS] to

show it made reasonable efforts to reunify [Child] 

with [] Father while incarcerated in order to meet its 

burden[?] 

B. Whether [CYS] proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that the termination of [] Father’s parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of 

[Child?] 

 

1

 At the beginning of the hearing, Mother’s counsel stated that he attempted 

to contact Mother, but was unable to reach her. N.T., 7/14/14, at 9-10. 
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II. Whether [CYS] proved by clear and convincing evidence at 

least one statutory ground [for] the termination of [] Mother’s 

parental rights[?] 

A. Whether [CYS] proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that the termination of [] Mother’s parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of 

[Child?] 

CYS’s brief at 4 (orphans’ court answers and unnecessary capitalization 

omitted). 

We consider the claims presented by CYS mindful of our well-settled 

standard of review. 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 
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grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

 In this case, CYS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Mother 

and Father pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), which 

provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties. 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent. 

*** 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at least six months,

the conditions which led to the removal or placement 

of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or 
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will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of

the child within a reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve

the needs and welfare of the child. 

*** 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed 

from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of

the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 

In its opinion accompanying the subject order, the orphans’ court 

concluded that CYS failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the 

parental rights of Father should be terminated under any of these sections. 

The court reasoned as follows, in pertinent part: 

The removal of the Child [] from the parents on May 25, 

2012, at a point in time when the Child was three months of 

age, resulted from a positive test for drugs ... in violation of the 
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existing safety plan. Accordingly, the reunification plan 

consisted of the parents demonstrating that they were no longer 

dependent on drugs.... 

 

It is noteworthy that while Father’s primary goal was to 

eradicate his involvement with drugs, he successfully completed 

an inpatient treatment program with the Cove Forge Treatment 

Center, and his successful completion was reported to agents of 

[CYS]. Although there were treatment recommendations 

assigned to Father upon his release, his incarcerations in early 

2013 and subsequent sentence in the state corrections system 

made [] compliance with those treatment recommendations 

impossible. 

As Father was removed from the ability to visit with his 

son and show meaningful progress towards the stated goals in 

the permanency plan, [CYS] failed to adapt its program goals 

consistent with an incarcerated parent. From that point forward 

the goals as to visitation with the child, attendance at medical 

appointments, maintaining stable employment, following 

treatment recommendations, and the like were meaningless 

because incarceration precluded pursuit of those goals. At that 

point in time [CYS] failed to adjust and monitor Father’s 

progress based on the activities that he was capable of 

performing within the state corrections system. There are many 

programs within the state corrections system which focus on an 

inmate’s post-release freedom from drug dependency as well as 

job skills, parenting skills, and other life skills, which would 

permit an inmate to become reunited with his minor children. 

[CYS] continued to measure Father’s compliance with the plan 

and progress towards achievement of goals based on his conduct 

as if he was not incarcerated. While it might be argued as to 

whose duty it was to report Father’s treatment progress within 

the state correction system, it simply wasn’t done.

*** 

 If it is the role of [CYS] to promote the goal of 

reunification, it seems to the [c]ourt that when the parental 

goals focus on matters which only a parent out in the community 

can do, it is incumbent on [CYS] to modify the goals upon the 

incarceration of a parent to fit the reunification plan. Here, 

Father has completed drug and alcohol inpatient treatment and 

has furthered his drug abstinence through corrections 
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opportunities for AA, NA, substance abuse education, parenting 

skills and the like for which an inmate should be given credit in 

pursuit of his goals. [CYS] had little knowledge of Father’s 

achievements during his incarceration and further was 

apparently unaware of his upcoming release from prison in 

September, 2014. Considering the original “circumstances that 

made placement necessary” centered on Father’s positive drug 

screen and his duty to seek treatment and prove follow-up 

results, Father’s success in inpatient drug treatment followed up 

by drug programs within the correction’s system should have 

been reported to the Dependency Judge. These “successes” add 

up to demonstrate progress toward the goals that matter and for 

which Father has the capacity to complete. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/24/14, at 17-21 (unpaginated). 

Notably, the court offered no discussion as to why it was denying the 

termination petition with respect to Mother. In its opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the court explained its decision not to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights as follows: 

[I]t is our position that the termination of parental rights, when 

posed against both birth parents, is ineffective to promote an 

adoption when the termination is not granted as to both parents. 

Under the circumstances where the court determines that the 

parental rights of one parent should be retained, as in the 

instant case, that parent may well go forward as the primary 

custodian of the child. As a result, where the parental rights of 

the other parent are still intact, the primary custodial parent 

should be in a position to pursue child support. At that point, 

the primary custodial parent is performing parental duties, 

perhaps to the exclusion of the other parent, and the family is no 

longer a burden to [CYS]. Assuming that the primary custodial 

parent is properly parenting the child, it is of little import to the 

court and to society that the noncustodial parent is 

nonfunctioning. Further, over time, as in the instant case, the 

other parent may overcome a drug dependency and thereafter 

become an appropriate and caring parent. Under this scenario, 

the time required by this noncustodial parent is not at the 

expense of [CYS] and may otherwise play out as needed during 
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when the custodial natural parent is appropriately providing all 

parental services. 

 The [c]ourt did not address the involuntary termination 

factors as to Mother because it determined that the rights should 

not be terminated as to Father.... The primary purpose of 

termination of parental rights proceedings is to achieve a 

position where an adoption can proceed. The statutory provision 

for termination are found under the general chapter heading of 

“Proceedings Prior To Adoption” which subdivision is under Title 

23. Domestic Relations, Part III. Adoption. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 2-3 (unpaginated). 

On appeal, CYS argues that the court abused its discretion by denying 

the termination petitions. CYS contends that it presented clear and 

convincing evidence to establish that the parental rights of both Mother and 

Father should be terminated, and that the court improperly required CYS to 

show that it made reasonable efforts to reunify Father with Child. CYS’s 

brief at 12-25. We agree with CYS, and conclude that the orphans’ court 

abused its discretion by refusing to terminate the parental rights of Mother 

and Father pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b). 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) The 

child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or 

more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

“Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8), does not require an 

evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that 
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led to placement of [the] children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 

502, 511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted). 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond 

between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some 

citations omitted). 

[W]hile both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us 

to evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required 

to resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to 

addressing ... Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that 

we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 

2511(b). 

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). 

Initially, we note that the court erred by declining to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights simply because the parental rights of Father were 

being preserved. Our Supreme Court expressly rejected this proposition 

nearly 40 years ago in In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 541 (Pa. 1977) 

(“Nothing in the Adoption Act requires that an agency, which has assumed 

custody of a child, must establish grounds for the involuntary termination of 

both parents, before it can obtain such a decree as to either.”). While 
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Burns was decided under a prior version of the Adoption Act, nothing in the 

current Act contradicts the Court’s decision. Indeed, as acknowledged by 

the orphans’ court, this Court more recently reached a similar result in In re 

C.W.U., Jr., 33 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2011). In that case, a trial court 

“conceded that it refused to terminate Father’s parental rights because the 

court did not wish to leave Child without a father, in light of the fact that it 

was not terminating Mother’s parental rights at this time.” Id. at 9. This 

Court reversed, holding that there was no competent evidence to support 

the trial court’s decision. Id. 

Additionally, as explained infra, the evidence presented by CYS in this 

matter overwhelmingly supported the termination of both parents’ parental 

rights. During the hearing, Ms. Andrea Palguta testified that she was the 

CYS caseworker assigned to this matter from January 30, 2012, prior to 

Child’s birth, until January 5, 2013. Id. at 34-35, 43. Ms. Palguta explained 

that, as a result of Child’s adjudication of dependency, Mother and Father 

were ordered to, inter alia, “complete drug and alcohol evaluations; comply 

with whatever treatment recommendations came from that evaluation; ... 

complete random drug screens and to give at least three consecutive 

negative drug screens ....” Id. at 42-43. Ms. Palguta stated that both 

Mother and Father completed drug and alcohol evaluations. Id. at 43-44. 

However, they did not comply fully with the recommended treatment. Id. at 

44. Ms. Palguta noted that, between the September 4, 2012 permanency 
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review hearing and the November 6, 2012 permanency review hearing, 

Father reported to CYS that that he was receiving drug treatment from a 

“Dr. Cober,” and that he “was going to enter a 90-day drug and alcohol 

treatment program in Harrisburg, but ... we received no verification that he 

ever did that.” Id. at 52-53. 

Additionally, during Ms. Palguta’s time on the case, neither parent had 

three consecutive negative drug screens. Id. at 44, 58-59. Ms. Palguta 

explained that at least seven drug screens would have been requested from 

Mother during her time as the caseworker. Id. at 62-63. Of those seven 

tests, Mother provided four samples and tested positive three of those four 

times. Id. at 63. Ms. Palguta stated that Father at one point refused a drug 

screen, and that there were “other times” when the parents admitted to 

using drugs. Id. at 50. Specifically, Mother admitted to using another 

person’s Percocet on July 10, 2012. Id. Father refused a drug screen that 

same day “stating that he could not product [sic] any urine because of 

severe dehydration from diarrhea.” Id. Finally, Ms. Palguta testified that 

Child appeared very comfortable with his foster family. Id. at 66. She 

noted that, when Child would not see Father for a long period of time, he 

developed “kind of a stranger anxiety around him.” Id. Child appeared 

“fairly comfortable” with Mother. Id. at 67. 

Ms. Teya Lopaze testified that she is a casework supervisor for CYS, 

and that this case “was assigned to a caseworker in my unit in January of ... 
J-A07014-15 

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2013.” Id. at 68. Ms. Lopaze explained that, from the time she had the 

case until the time the termination petitions were filed, neither parent 

submitted three consecutive negative drug screens. Id. at 70, 87. Father 

did complete drug treatment in 2012. Id. at 71, 95. However, Ms. Lopaze 

noted that, when Father was discharged, “it was recommended that he do 

intensive outpatient counseling, attend 90 AA/NA meetings within 90 days of 

discharge, [and] retain a sponsor within three to five days of discharge ....” 

Id. at 95. To her knowledge, Father did not complete these 

recommendations. Id. at 97-98. 

Ms. Lopaze further explained that Mother completed a drug evaluation 

at Twin Lakes in March of 2013, but that CYS did not receive any 

confirmation that Mother completed the recommended drug treatment. Id. 

at 71, 87. The last drug screen administered to Mother took place on April 

2, 2013. Id. at 79. Mother tested positive for opiates and cocaine. Id. Ms. 

Lopaze stated that CYS was not able to administer additional drug screens to 

Mother because, following her final visit with Child on June 11, 2013, “she 

has not made herself available. We didn’t even know her whereabouts.” Id. 

at 79-80, 83. At the time of the termination hearing, Ms. Lopaze still did not 

know where Mother was. Id. at 87. Ms. Lopaze noted that Child is doing 

well in foster care. Id. at 69. She opined that it would be in Child’s best

interest for the parental rights of Mother and Father to be terminated. Id.

at 88-89. 
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Psychologist Dennis Kashurba testified as an expert in bonding studies 

between parents and their children. N.T., 7/14/14, at 12-14. Mr. Kashurba 

explained that he was unable to observe the Child with Father or Mother, as 

Father was incarcerated, and Mother failed to appear for her scheduled visit. 

Id. at 16. However, Mr. Kashurba noted that the bond between Child and 

his foster parents “seems to be quite appropriate,” and that the foster home 

was “more than adequate.” Id. at 18. Mr. Kashurba stated that Child had 

been in the foster home since he was approximately three months old, and 

that he would view his foster parents as his “mom and dad.” Id. at 19. Mr. 

Kashurba opined that it would be a detriment to Child’s development to 

remove him from his current placement. Id. at 21. Mr. Kashura further 

opined that the parental rights of Mother and Father should be terminated, 

and that this would not have a negative impact on Child. Id. at 21. Mr. 

Kashurba noted that he has “no information to suggest” that Child has a 

bond with either Father or Mother, and that it is unlikely that the parents will 

be able to develop a parent/child relationship with Child within a reasonable 

amount of time.2 Id. at 20-25. 

Father, who still was incarcerated at the time of the hearing and 

testified by phone, indicated that he has criminal records in seven 

Pennsylvania counties: Allegheny, Blair, Cambria, Fayette, Indiana, 

 

2

 In his psychological bonding study, admitted during the hearing as Exhibit 

F, Mr. Kashurba reported that Child’s foster father “reiterated that he and his 

wife wish to be considered as adoptive parents for [Child] ....” Exhibit F at 4. 
J-A07014-15 

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Somerset, and Westmoreland. Id. at 114.3 Father has been convicted of a 

variety of criminal offenses, including retail theft, fleeing and eluding police, 

simple assault, tampering with evidence, criminal trespass, public 

drunkenness, disorderly conduct, possession of drug paraphernalia, and drug 

possession. Id. at 114-18. Father also conceded that he has a drug 

problem. Id. at 119. According to Father, he previously completed a drug 

rehabilitation program, which he attended from “November -- I believe 13th 

to early December” of 2012. Id. at 105, 113. Father claimed that 

“somehow CYS contacted the Welfare Office and had my insurance 

terminated,” and that these “insurance issues” prevented him from getting 

into treatment sooner. Id. at 110, 112. Father admitted that he failed to 

complete the recommended follow-up treatment, but insisted that “[w]e 

don’t have 90 and 90 in Johnstown,” and that he did the best he could by 

attending four Narcotics Anonymous and/or Alcoholics Anonymous meetings 

per week. Id. at 119. Father was incarcerated shortly after he completed 

treatment, “in the beginning of January.” Id. at 113. Father’s last visit with 

Child took place in October of 2012, and lasted five minutes. Id.

Father further testified that he participated in “the therapeutic 

community while incarcerated here, which is another alcohol and drug 

treatment,” and that he also attends Narcotics Anonymous, Alcoholics 

Anonymous, and “Smart Recovery” meetings on a weekly basis, as well as 

 

3

 Father neglected to mention his prior conviction in Cumberland County, 

which would bring the total to eight. N.T., 7/14/14, at 117. 
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parenting classes. Id. at 105-06. Father indicated that he would be 

released from incarceration on approximately September 10, 2014, and that 

he would immediately report to a “Community Correction’s Residency Center 

for alcohol and drug treatment, which can range anywhere from 14 to 90 

days.” Id. at 105, 123-25. 

Grandmother testified that Father loves Child, and that she would 

assist Father in caring for Child upon his release. Id. at 134-35. 

Grandmother conceded that Father has a drug problem, that he has been in 

rehabilitation programs “[m]ultiple times,” and that he continues to relapse. 

Id. at 138.4 

Accordingly, the record confirms that CYS presented clear and 

convincing evidence to support the termination of both parents’ parental 

rights. With respect to Section 2511(a)(8), Child was removed from the 

care of Mother and Father on May 31, 2012. At the time of the July 14, 

2014 termination hearing, Child had been in the custody of CYS for over two 

years. As acknowledged by the orphans’ court, Child was removed due to 

drug use, and it was incumbent on both parents to remedy this problem, or 

at least get it under control, in order to regain custody of Child. Neither 

parent did so. Mother’s final drug test with CYS, which took place on April 2, 

 

4

 Grandmother also testified that she considered acting as a kinship 

placement for Child. N.T., 7/14/14, at 133. Following Grandmother’s 

testimony, Ms. Palguta and Ms. Lopaze were recalled as witnesses, and 

testified concerning CYS’s consideration of Grandmother as a possible 

kinship placement. Id. at 145-49. 
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2013, was positive for opiates and cocaine. While Mother underwent a drug 

evaluation at Twin Lakes, CYS did not receive any confirmation that she 

completed drug treatment. The record is simply devoid of evidence that 

Mother remedied the conditions which resulted in Child’s placement. 

Similarly, Father admitted during the hearing that he has a drug 

problem. While Father completed an inpatient drug treatment program in 

late 2012, Father did not complete the recommended follow-up treatment, 

including intensive outpatient counseling, prior to his incarceration. 

Moreover, the record does not suggest that Father was able to complete 

adequate, or equivalent, drug treatment during his time as an inmate. To 

the contrary, Father testified that he was going to be released from 

incarceration directly into a facility where he would receive an additional 14 

to 90 days of treatment. Thus, at the time Father received notice of the 

termination petition in this matter, he too had failed to remedy the 

conditions which resulted in Child’s placement. 

Additionally, it would best serve the needs and welfare of Child to 

terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Child is doing well with 

his foster family, which has cared for and bonded with Child for years. In 

contrast, Mother and Father have spent a significant portion of this time 

incarcerated, or otherwise absent from Child’s life. Father in particular 

appears to be incorrigible, as he has an 18-year criminal history spanning 

numerous Pennsylvania counties. As this Court has stated, “a child's life 
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cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity 

necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will 

not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a 

parent's claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of 

R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

With respect to Section 2511(b), it is apparent that Child has little, if 

any, bond with his parents. Child was removed from his parents’ care when 

he was about three months old. At the time of the termination hearing, 

Child had not visited with Mother since June of 2013, and Child had not 

visited with Father since October of 2012. Mr. Kashurba testified that it 

would not be detrimental to Child if the parental rights of Mother and Father 

were terminated. Mr. Kashurba opined, however, that Child would suffer 

harm if removed from his current foster placement.5 Again, it is abundantly 

clear that termination would best serve the needs and welfare of the Child. 

While the orphans’ court observes that CYS did not adjust Father’s 

reunification goals to accommodate his incarceration, nothing in the 

Adoption Act supports the court’s position. Notably, in its opinion 

 

5

 The orphans’ court did not address Section 2511(b), except to state in its 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) that it placed “little weight” on Mr. 

Kashurba’s testimony because, inter alia, Mr. Kashurba “did not have any 

basis with which to evaluate the natural parent bonding inasmuch as 

[F]ather was incarcerated and [M]other’s whereabouts were unknown.” 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 3. To the extent the orphans’ court 

concluded that termination would not be in Child’s best interest, we conclude 

that the court abused its discretion by reaching a decision that was 

unreasonable and unsupported by evidence of record. 
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accompanying the subject order, the orphans’ court discussed and relied 

upon In re D.C.D., 91 A.3d 173, 179 (Pa. Super. 2014), reversed, 105 A.3d 

662 (Pa. 2014), in which a panel of this Court stated that an agency must 

first make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent with his or her child before 

filing a petition to terminate parental rights. D.C.D. recently was reversed 

by our Supreme Court. We have discussed the Supreme Court’s decision as 

follows: 

In In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme Court 

analyzed the language of Section 2511(a)(2) of the Adoption 

Act, as well as Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6351. The Court reasoned that, while “reasonable efforts may 

be relevant to a court’s consideration of both the grounds for 

termination and the best interests of the child,” neither of these 

provisions, when read together or individually, requires 

reasonable efforts. The Court also concluded that reasonable 

efforts were not required to protect a parent’s constitutional 

right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child. While 

the Supreme Court in D.C.D. focused its analysis on Section 

2511(a)(2), we find the Supreme Court’s reasoning equally 

applicable to Section 2511(a)(8). Like Section 2511(a)(2), 

nothing in the language of Section 2511(a)(8) suggests that 

reasonable reunification services are necessary to support the 

termination of parental rights. 

In re Adoption of C.J.P., 2015 WL 1668310 at *7, 2015 Pa. Super. LEXIS 

181 at *21 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some citations omitted). 

 Critically, our Supreme Court in D.C.D. observed that “the remedy for 

an agency’s failure to provide services is not to punish an innocent child, 

by delaying her permanency through denying termination, but instead 

to conclude on the record that the agency has failed to make reasonable 

efforts ....” 105 A.3d at 675 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Here, the 
J-A07014-15 

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orphans’ court’s opinion reveals that it did precisely what our Supreme Court 

has instructed that courts should not do, i.e., not giving due regard to Child 

for the perceived failings of CYS. 

 Accordingly, because we conclude that the orphans’ court abused its 

discretion by denying CYS’s petitions to terminate the parental rights of 

Mother and Father, we reverse. We remand this matter for the orphans’ 

court to enter decrees terminating the parental rights of both Mother and 

Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). 

 Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this Memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

 Judge Mundy joins this memorandum. 

Judge Lazarus files a concurring statement. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 5/11/2015