FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KAREN LYNETTE LAMBERT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-17102

D.C. No.

2:18-cv-02122-

CKD

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Carolyn K. Delaney, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 12, 2020

San Francisco, California

Filed November 17, 2020

Before: Susan P. Graber and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit 

Judges, and Robert T. Dawson,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bress

* The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for 

the Western District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.
2 LAMBERT V. SAUL

SUMMARY**

Social Security

The panel vacated the district court’s judgment affirming 

the denial of claimant’s application for disability benefits 

under the Social Security Act, and remanded with 

instructions to remand to the administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”) for further proceedings.

A Social Security ALJ found claimant disabled 

beginning June 1, 2005. The Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration (“SSA”) conducted periodic 

continuing disability reviews, and determined that 

claimant’s disability ended January 1, 2015.

After this court issued Bellamy v. Secretary of Health 

and Human Services, 755 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding 

that a claimant’s prior disability determination entitled 

claimant to a presumption of continuing disability), the SSA 

interpreted then-recent amendments to the Social Security 

Act as foreclosing any presumption of continuing disability. 

The panel held that it must defer to the SSA’s intervening 

interpretation of the statute, which was a reasonable one. 

The panel held, therefore, that there was no presumption of 

continuing disability under the Social Security Act. The 

panel concluded that the ALJ did not err in evaluating, 

without any such presumption, the SSA’s determination that 

the claimant was no longer disabled.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
LAMBERT V. SAUL 3

The panel held that the ALJ erred in failing to articulate 

sufficient reasons for refusing to credit claimant’s testimony 

about the severity of her medical condition. Here, the ALJ 

did not identify the specific testimony that he discredited, 

and did not explain the evidence undermining it. The panel 

held that the ALJ was required to do more than was done 

here, which consisted of offering non-specific conclusions 

that claimant’s testimony was inconsistent with her medical 

treatment. Finally, the panel held that the ALJ’s error was 

not harmless.

COUNSEL

John V. Johnson (argued), Chico, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Shea L. Bond (argued) and Allison J. Cheung, Special 

Assistant United States Attorneys; Deborah Lee Stachel, 

Regional Chief Counsel; McGregor W. Scott, United States 

Attorney; Social Security Administration, San Francisco, 

California; for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

BRESS, Circuit Judge:

We address in this case a question that has caused 

confusion in our Social Security disability benefits cases: 

whether a claimant’s prior disability determination entitles 

her to a presumption of continuing disability. We 

recognized such a presumption in Patti v. Schweiker, 

669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982), and applied it most relevantly 

in Bellamy v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 
4 LAMBERT V. SAUL

755 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1985). After Bellamy, however, the 

Social Security Administration (SSA) interpreted thenrecent amendments to the Social Security Act as foreclosing 

any presumption of continuing disability.

We conclude that we must defer to the SSA’s intervening 

interpretation of the statute, which is a reasonable one. See 

Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 

545 U.S. 967 (2005); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. 

Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). We therefore hold that there 

is no presumption of continuing disability under the Social 

Security Act. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) thus did 

not err in evaluating, without any such presumption, the 

SSA’s determination that claimant Karen Lambert is no 

longer disabled.

The ALJ did err, however, in failing to articulate 

sufficient reasons for refusing to credit Lambert’s testimony 

about the severity of her medical condition. Under our cases, 

the ALJ must identify the specific testimony that he 

discredited and explain the evidence undermining it. Here, 

the ALJ did neither. We therefore vacate the district court’s 

judgment and remand with instructions to return this case to 

the ALJ for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

Karen Lambert, now age 54, was employed as a deli 

clerk and overnight retail stocker until 2005, when she 

developed pain related to rheumatoid arthritis. The pain 

prevented her from working. Lambert applied for Disability 

Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and 

Supplemental Social Security Income, 42 U.S.C. § 1382, et 

seq., and an ALJ found her disabled beginning June 1, 2005.
LAMBERT V. SAUL 5

The Commissioner of the SSA must conduct periodic 

continuing disability reviews of persons who receive 

disability benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(i); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1590. As part of such a continuing review, the 

Commissioner, on January 6, 2015, determined that 

Lambert’s disability had ended January 1, 2015. Lambert 

sought reconsideration before a disability hearing officer, 

who denied reconsideration. Lambert then requested a 

hearing before an ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.929.

At her hearing, Lambert testified that she continues to 

suffer from rheumatoid arthritis, in addition to a thyroid 

condition, vision problems, anxiety, and depression. She 

also has a bone spur in her foot, pain in her Achilles tendon, 

and five bulging discs in her neck and back, which make it 

difficult for her to walk and stand. Despite the many 

medications she takes, Lambert stated that her pain is 

debilitating. She asserted that she spends most of her time 

in her bedroom “because it’s unbearable to move.”

Lambert provided examples about how her medical 

conditions affect her daily life. She cannot lift most items or 

complete certain household chores. She sometimes relies on 

her daughter to help her with personal care tasks, including 

bathing and dressing. She requires crutches to get to the 

bathroom but has trouble using them. She drives only short 

distances because her knees become stiff and painful after 

long periods of sitting. Because of these limitations, 

Lambert testified she would not be able to perform any job 

that required standing for extended periods, frequent 

fingering and handling of objects, or working in 

“overwhelm[ing]” situations.

Lambert also submitted medical evidence from her 

treating physicians. Several of her doctors found that her 

rheumatoid arthritis was stable and that her joints showed 
6 LAMBERT V. SAUL

reasonable ranges of motion and minimal inflammation. But 

doctors also noted that Lambert reported continued pain and 

stiffness and displayed difficulty grasping objects. Lambert 

saw two podiatrists for her heel pain, and a later x-ray 

revealed mild thickening of the soft tissue in that area. At 

the recommendation of one podiatrist, Lambert underwent a 

surgical debridement of her Achilles tendon to remove a 

bone spur. Lambert also saw a pain management specialist 

who administered epidural steroid injections in her back, 

which were moderately successful in managing her discrelated pain.

Finally, the ALJ received reports from several State 

agency physicians on behalf of the SSA. These consultants 

offered opinions that differed from Lambert’s selfassessment. The consultants opined that Lambert was 

capable of working, including work that was somewhat 

strenuous in nature. Dr. Sarupinder Bhangoo, who 

examined Lambert in October 2014, reported that Lambert 

“move[d] around well” and “d[id] not seem to be in pain.” 

He concluded that Lambert could walk up to six hours, sit up 

to eight hours, and carry up to fifty pounds. Two other 

doctors reviewed Lambert’s file and agreed with Dr. 

Bhangoo’s conclusions, though they did not actually 

examine Lambert.

The ALJ issued his decision on August 7, 2017, without 

applying a presumption of continuing disability. The ALJ 

found that Lambert’s current impairments consisted of 

rheumatoid arthritis, bilateral calcaneal spurs, right Achilles 

tendinopathy, and degenerative disc disease of the cervical 

spine and lumbar spine. The ALJ concluded that Lambert 

was not able to perform her prior work. But notwithstanding

Lambert’s impairments, the ALJ determined that Lambert 

could perform modified “light work,” which includes lifting 
LAMBERT V. SAUL 7

up to twenty pounds, a “good deal of walking and standing,” 

and “pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.” See 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).

The ALJ noted that, in reaching this conclusion, he gave 

the SSA’s medical consultants “little weight.” Dr. Bhangoo 

“did not have the benefit of reviewing the other medical 

reports contained in the current record,” and his opinion was 

“not consistent with the record in its entirety.” The ALJ also 

gave “little weight” to the opinions of the two other 

consultants. These doctors did not personally examine 

Lambert, and their opinions were also “not consistent with 

the record as a whole.”

Although the ALJ found the SSA’s medical experts 

largely unpersuasive, he declined to credit Lambert’s 

testimony either. According to the ALJ:

After considering the evidence of record, I 

find that the claimant’s current medically 

determinable impairment could reasonably 

be expected to produce the alleged 

symptoms; however, the claimant’s 

statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these 

symptoms are not entirely consistent with the 

objective medical and other evidence for the 

reasons explained in this decision. 

Accordingly, these statements have been 

found to affect the claimant’s ability to work 

only to the extent they can reasonably be 

accepted as consistent with the objective 

medical and other evidence.

The ALJ determined that Lambert’s testimony was “less 

than fully consistent with the evidence” for four reasons. 
8 LAMBERT V. SAUL

First, Lambert had “not generally received the type of 

medical treatment one would expect for a totally disabled 

individual.” Second, the “record reflect[ed] significant gaps 

in [her] history of treatment and relatively infrequent trips to 

the doctor for the allegedly disabling symptoms.” Third, 

Lambert’s “use of medications does not suggest the presence 

of impairments which is more limiting than found in this 

decision.” And finally, “medications have been relatively 

effective in controlling [her] symptoms.”

Lambert requested review of the ALJ’s decision, but the 

SSA’s Appeals Council denied her request. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.967. Lambert then filed an action in federal court 

challenging the denial of benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 

1383(c). The district court granted summary judgment for 

the Commissioner. This appeal followed. We “review the 

district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of social 

security benefits de novo and will disturb the denial of 

benefits only if the decision contains legal error or is not 

supported by substantial evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 

533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations 

omitted).

II

We first address the purely legal question whether the 

ALJ erred in not applying a presumption of continuing 

disability because of Lambert’s earlier, 2005 disability 

determination. We hold that the ALJ did not err. The SSA 

has interpreted later amendments to the Social Security Act 

to preclude such a presumption, and that reasonable 

interpretation warrants our deference.
LAMBERT V. SAUL 9

A

When a claimant was previously found to be disabled

and the SSA is conducting a continuing disability review, is 

the claimant entitled to any presumption that her disability 

still persists? Our cases point in different directions.

In Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982), a 

claimant received disability benefits but the SSA determined 

that her disability had resolved. We used the occasion to 

announce a presumption of continuing disability, holding 

that “a prior ruling of disability can give rise to a 

presumption that the disability still exists.” Id. at 586. We 

explained that we were “unable to discern any reason why 

the familiar principle that a condition, once proved to exist, 

is presumed to continue to exist, should not be applied when 

disability benefits are at stake.” Id. at 587; see also Murray 

v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining the 

operation of the presumption).

Patti did not purport to locate its presumption of 

continuing disability in any text in the Social Security Act. 

Instead, for support Patti cited only the Fifth Circuit’s 

decision in Rivas v. Weinberger, 475 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 

1973). See Patti, 669 F.2d at 586–87. Rivas, in turn, devised 

a presumption based on an offhand statement in Hall v. 

Celebrezze, 314 F.2d 686, 688 (6th Cir. 1963). See Rivas, 

475 F.2d at 258. Neither Rivas nor Hall conducted any 

statutory analysis. Nevertheless, various circuits around this 

time adopted a presumption of continuing disability in some 

form or another. See Rush v. Sec’y of Health & Human 

Servs., 738 F.2d 909, 914–15 (8th Cir. 1984); Dotson v. 

Schweiker, 719 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1983); Kuzmin v. 

Schweiker, 714 F.2d 1233, 1237 (3d Cir. 1983); Simpson v. 

Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966, 969 (11th Cir. 1982); Rivas,

475 F.2d at 258.
10 LAMBERT V. SAUL

In 1984, Congress passed the Social Security Disability 

Benefits Reform Act. Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 

(1984) (“Reform Act”). The Reform Act “made 

comprehensive revisions in the disability program,” Bowen 

v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 486 n.14 (1986), and 

reflected a substantial overhaul of the standards and 

procedures for terminating disability benefits. See Huie v. 

Bowen, 788 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The Act listed 

new standards for determining when disability benefits paid 

pursuant to various titles of the Social Security Act are to be 

terminated.”).

As relevant here, the Reform Act amended the Social 

Security Act to include the following key passage regarding 

the standard for terminating benefits:

Any determination made under this section 

shall be made on the basis of the weight of 

the evidence and on a neutral basis with 

regard to the individual’s condition, without 

any initial inference as to the presence or 

absence of disability being drawn from the 

fact that the individual has previously been 

determined to be disabled.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(f), 1382c(a)(4) (1984).1 Section 423(f) 

lays out the circumstances in which the SSA can conclude 

that disability benefits may be terminated, such as findings 

of medical improvement, new techniques or evaluations that 

make an impairment less disabling, or a prior disability 

determination that was erroneous. See also id.

§ 1382c(a)(4). The Reform Act took effect on October 9, 

1 A later amendment relocated the provision in 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1382c(a)(4) to 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a).
LAMBERT V. SAUL 11

1984, but Congress mandated that any determination 

relating to medical improvement pending judicial review as 

of September 19, 1984 was to be returned to the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services for reconsideration under the 

new standard. Reform Act, 98 Stat. 1794 § 2(d)(2)(C).

Six months later, we decided Bellamy v. Secretary of 

Health & Human Services, 755 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Like Patti, Bellamy was an appeal by a Social Security 

claimant whose disability benefits had been terminated. The 

claimant’s challenge seemingly should have been decided 

under the amended version of the statute, but we did not 

mention the 1984 Reform Act or analyze the new statutory 

provision. Because Bellamy was pending judicial review as 

of September 19, 1984, it appears that the case should have 

also been returned to the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services for consideration under the new legal standard. 

Reform Act, 98 Stat. 1794 § 2(d)(2)(C). It is not apparent 

whether either party advised the court about the 1984 

revisions to the Social Security Act (the case was submitted 

several days before the new amendments took effect). 

Instead, Bellamy applied the “presumption of continuing 

disability” and held that the Secretary had “failed to offer 

evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption.” 755 F.2d 

at 1381.

Following Bellamy, we took note of the continuing 

disability presumption on a few occasions. But it appears 

that we never applied the presumption again in a published 

opinion. Instead, and although they did not concern the 

issue, our later cases made unelaborated statements on 

whether the presumption survived the 1984 Reform Act.

In Warren v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1986) (per 

curiam), amended on denial of reh’g, 817 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 

1987), we considered a claimant whose benefits were 
12 LAMBERT V. SAUL

terminated for a non-medical reason (her income changed). 

Id. at 1121. We rejected the claimant’s argument, grounded 

in Patti, that the claimant was entitled to a presumption of 

continuing disability, explaining that non-medical 

terminations are subject to a specific regulation that 

prescribes a disability presumption of only one year. Id. We 

then stated: “Appellant’s argument that we should use Patti

to second-guess the Secretary on this point was undercut by 

Congress’s decision in 1984 to eliminate the presumption 

that Patti created.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Warren,

817 F.2d at 64 (indicating that this was the wording used in 

the initial Warren opinion).

We discussed the presumption again in W.C. v. Bowen, 

807 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1987), a class action concerning the 

Secretary’s enactment of a review program for termination 

decisions. Id. at 1503–04. In a footnote, W.C. cited Warren 

for the proposition that the 1984 Reform Act “overrule[d] 

the presumption of continuing disability under Patti v. 

Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582, 586–87 (9th Cir. 1982).” Id.

at 1506 n.8.

Several months later, however, we amended Warren by 

deleting the portion of the sentence that we relied on in W.C. 

As noted, Warren originally said Congress in 1984 

endeavored to “eliminate the presumption that Patti 

created.” 804 F.2d at 1121 (emphasis added). In the 

amended opinion, we replaced “eliminate” with “codify,” so 

that the affected sentence now reads: “Appellant’s argument 

that we should use Patti to second-guess the Secretary on 

this point was undercut by Congress’s decision in 1984 to 

codify the presumption that Patti created.” 804 F.2d at 1121 

(emphasis added). No explanation was given for this 

change. And no changes were made to W.C., which had 

relied on the earlier version of Warren.
LAMBERT V. SAUL 13

But the next sentences in Warren clarified what we 

meant by “codify”: in light of the 1984 amendments, we 

explained, “[w]e must now look to the statute and the 

regulations for guidance,” and those “support the Secretary’s 

position” that the claimant was not entitled to a presumption 

of disability but was required to show disability. Id. In other 

words, Warren directed that the space in which the 

presumption had previously operated was now the subject of 

statute and regulation, so that courts should follow “the 

statute and the regulations” and not any judge-made 

presumption.2 Id. That is why the 1984 amendments 

“undercut” the claimant’s position in Warren, which sought 

a judge-made presumption in the face of regulations that 

applied in that area. Id.; see also Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 

539 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (relying on Warren to 

reject claimant’s argument that the ALJ erred in failing to 

apply a presumption of disability).

Most recently, we rejected a pro-claimant presumption 

in Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2007), holding 

that, under 1996 amendments to the Social Security Act, 

before the claimant is considered disabled, he bears the 

burden of proving that substance abuse is not a material 

contributing factor to his disability. Id. at 744–45. We 

explained that the presumption in Bellamy applied only 

when the claimant had already been found disabled. Id.

at 748. But Parra did not validate the presumption of 

continuing disability, nor did it address the suggestions in 

Warren and W.C. as to whether the presumption remained 

2 As the Fourth Circuit has explained, the 1984 amendments could 

be said to “partially codify[]” preexisting case law insofar as that in the 

case of termination decisions based on medical improvement, there must 

be “substantial evidence of medical improvement.” Rhoten v. Bowen, 

854 F.2d 667, 669 (4th Cir. 1988).
14 LAMBERT V. SAUL

good law. In fact, neither Warren, W.C., nor Parra had 

occasion to address that issue, because each case involved 

different issues. Bellamy thus remains our last word on the 

presumption that Patti fashioned.

B

There was, however, a material change in the law postBellamy that we have never considered: the SSA’s 

authoritative interpretation of the 1984 Reform Act as 

precluding any presumption of continuing disability.

The Reform Act required that the SSA promulgate 

implementing regulations through notice and comment 

rulemaking procedures. 42 U.S.C. § 421(k). The SSA 

published its proposed rules on April 30, 1985, with a public 

comment period through June 14, 1985. See Old-Age, 

Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Supplemental 

Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled; 

Determining Disability and Blindness, 50 Fed. Reg. 18432-

01, 1985 WL 105099, at *18432 (Apr. 30, 1985) (to be 

codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416). Because the Act 

contemplated significant changes in this area of law, the SSA 

received “literally hundreds” of public submissions, which 

included data, views, and other comments from a wide 

variety of interested persons, organizations, and public 

agencies. See Supplemental Security Income; Disability and 

Blindness Determinations, 50 Fed. Reg. 50118-01, 1985 WL 

125771, at *50121 (Dec. 6, 1985) (to be codified at 

20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416). The SSA “carefully consider[ed]” 

these comments both in making “extensive changes” to the 

proposed rules and in “reply[ing] to the issues raised in the 

comments [it] received.” Id. at *50118.

The SSA issued its final regulations on December 6, 

1985, more than ten months after our decision in Bellamy. 
LAMBERT V. SAUL 15

Id. On the issue that is our focus here, the SSA’s regulations 

essentially rehashed the language of the 1984 Reform Act, 

providing that termination decisions should be made “on a 

neutral basis—without any initial inference being drawn 

from the fact that an individual had previously been 

determined to be disabled.” Id. at *50119; see also 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1579(b)(4), 404.1594(b)(6).

The SSA also published responses to public comments, 

which were issued in the preamble to the final regulations. 

50 Fed. Reg. 50118-01, 1985 WL 125771, *50121 

(“Comments Received Following Publication of the Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking”). The SSA noted that its 

responses to the comments were aimed at “expand[ing] and 

clarif[ying]” its regulations in order to “make the meaning 

of the rules more precise,” and thereby contribute to “the 

uniformity and equity” with which they would be applied. 

Id.

One such response to public comments is particularly 

relevant here. The SSA noted that “[s]everal commenters 

stated that the proposed rules did not consider a beneficiary’s 

rights to continued benefits once on the rolls. They felt a 

presumption of disability should be applied until otherwise 

overturned.” Id. at *50124. The SSA responded 

unequivocally that “[t]he expressed intent of the Congress as 

stated in the report of the Conference Committee is that the 

continuing disability decision should be made on a neutral 

basis. No inference should be drawn that disability 

continues because disability was once found to exist or that 

disability ends because the issue is being reviewed. The 

regulatory language reflects the language used in this 

report.” Id. The “report of the Conference Committee” to 

which the SSA referred was a House Conference Report, 

which stated in relevant part: 
16 LAMBERT V. SAUL

The conferees intend that determinations of 

continuing eligibility should be made on a 

basis which is as nearly neutral as possible. 

The Secretary should reach conclusions on 

the basis of the weight of the evidence, as 

applied to the statutory standards specified in 

this amendment, and without any 

preconception or presumption as to whether 

the individual is or is not disabled.

H.R. Conf. Rep. 98-1039, 26, 1984 WL 37437, at *26 (Sept. 

19, 1984). In other words, through its response to public 

comments, the SSA determined that a presumption of 

continuing disability was unavailable under the new statute.

We have never considered the legal effect of the SSA’s 

interpretation of the 1984 Reform Act. As a three-judge 

panel, we are bound by circuit precedent except “where the 

reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly 

irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening 

higher authority.” Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). This venerable principle commands 

our utmost respect and is central to the rule of law in 

appellate decision-making.

There are, however, limited circumstances in which we 

are permitted—and, indeed, required—to depart from it. 

Those circumstances include the “intervening higher 

authority,” id., of an administrative agency’s authoritative 

and reasonable interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., CamposHernandez v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 564, 568–69 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(deferring to an agency’s later interpretation of a statute 

when the earlier judicial decision did not hold that the 

agency’s interpretation was unambiguously foreclosed). 

Whether such an intervening agency interpretation can 
LAMBERT V. SAUL 17

overcome our prior interpretation of a statute depends, in 

turn, on whether we regarded the statute as unambiguously 

compelling our interpretation.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X is the guiding 

precedent. There, the Court held that “[a] court’s prior 

judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency 

construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if 

the prior court decision holds that its construction follows 

from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves 

no room for agency discretion.” 545 U.S. at 982.

On various occasions, we have relied on the principle of 

Brand X to recognize that an agency’s intervening 

interpretation of a statute commanded deference in the face 

of a contrary circuit precedent. See Betansos v. Barr, 

928 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2019); Campos-Hernandez, 

889 F.3d at 568–69; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 

900 F.3d 1053, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2018); Garfias-Rodriguez 

v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 516 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); 

Gonzales v. DHS, 508 F.3d 1227, 1237–39 (9th Cir. 2007); 

Metrophones Telecomm., Inc. v. Glob. Crossing 

Telecomms., Inc., 423 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 

550 U.S. 45 (2007); Skranak v. Castenada, 425 F.3d 1213, 

1220 (9th Cir. 2005).

Brand X applies here because neither Bellamy nor any of 

our past precedents held that a presumption of continuing 

disability “follows from the unambiguous terms of the 

statute.” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982. In fact, and as we noted 

above, our prior cases never purported to locate the 

presumption of continuing disability in any statutory text. 

Because “[w]e did not mention” the Reform Act in Bellamy, 

we “thus could not have offered an interpretation that 

‘follows from [its] unambiguous terms.’” Metrophones, 

423 F.3d at 1065 (citing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982). The 
18 LAMBERT V. SAUL

question then becomes whether the SSA’s interpretation of 

the Reform Act, as set forth in its response to public 

comments, is entitled to Chevron deference. We conclude 

that Chevron deference applies here, so that the SSA’s 

authoritative interpretation of the Social Security Act 

displaces our prior precedents on the issue of a presumption 

of continuing disability.

The SSA is charged with administering the Social 

Security Act, a complex statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405, 421, 423. 

The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he statute’s 

complexity, the vast number of claims that it engenders, and 

the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative 

experience lead us to read the statute as delegating to the 

[SSA] considerable authority to fill in, through 

interpretation, matters of detail related to its administration.” 

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002). “We give 

deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutes . . . it is 

charged with administering.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. 

FLRA, 204 F.3d 1272, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, there 

is no dispute that the SSA’s interpretation of the 1984 

amendments brought to bear its “longstanding, technical 

expertise” in administering the Social Security Act. Larson 

v. Saul, 967 F.3d 914, 926 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Astrue v. 

Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 558 (2012) (according 

Chevron deference to SSA’s interpretation of Social 

Security Act); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) 

(same).

The relevant agency action at issue here—a response to 

a public comment provided in the course of a substantial 

notice and comment rulemaking and included in the 

preamble to the SSA’s regulations—is the type of agency 

action that can merit Chevron deference. In this case, 

Congress has clearly “delegated authority to the agency 
LAMBERT V. SAUL 19

generally to make rules carrying the force of law,” and the 

SSA provided formal responses to public comments “in the 

exercise of that authority” and using “formalized 

procedures” in a large rulemaking. Sierra Club v. Trump, 

929 F.3d 670, 692 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). The 

Supreme Court and our court have applied Chevron

deference to agency interpretations made through such 

processes and in this form. See Hillsborough Cnty. v. 

Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714–15 (1985) 

(citing Chevron and explaining that “[t]he FDA’s statement 

[responding to public comment] is dispositive on the 

question of [Congress and the FDA’s] implicit intent to preempt”); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 

698–99 (1991) (citing agency’s responses to comments as 

“warrant[ing] deference from this Court” under Chevron); 

see also Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families v. U.S. E.P.A.,

943 F.3d 397, 422 n.17 (9th Cir. 2019) (evaluating 

interpretation in regulatory preamble under Chevron). Here, 

because the SSA’s interpretation “represents the agency’s 

considered judgment after notice and comment, industry 

input and interagency consultation,” United States v. United 

Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1177 n.9 (9th Cir. 

2016), Chevron deference is available.3

Applying Chevron’s “familiar two-step analysis,” 

Betansos, 928 F.3d at 1139, we conclude that the SSA’s 

interpretation of the 1984 Reform Act requires deference. 

The text of the Reform Act is strongly suggestive of the 

SSA’s interpretation, but Congress did not specifically 

3 Because the SSA’s responses to public comments are eligible for 

Chevron deference, we have no occasion to determine whether the SSA’s 

regulations themselves, which merely parrot the statutory text in the 

1984 Reform Act, are entitled to Chevron deference. See N. Cal. River 

Watch v. Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766, 780 (9th Cir. 2011).
20 LAMBERT V. SAUL

reference any “presumption.” Some courts concluded that 

the Reform Act did not “clearly overturn” the presumption 

of continuing disability because “[a]n inference is not the 

same as a presumption.” Medina v. Colvin, 2015 WL 

5448498, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015); see also 

Palacios v. Astrue, 2012 WL 601874, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 

23, 2012). And the public comments that prompted the 

SSA’s authoritative interpretation of the 1984 Reform Act 

likewise arose from evident uncertainty as to whether any 

presumption of continuing disability should be included in 

the implementing regulations. 50 Fed. Reg. 50118-01, 1985 

WL 125771, at *50124. Under all these circumstances, and 

although the statutory wording strongly supports the SSA’s 

interpretation, it may be that Congress has not “directly 

spoken” to the issue. Betansos, 928 F.3d at 1139.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt the SSA’s interpretation 

is a reasonable one, requiring our deference. See Brand X, 

545 U.S. at 982; Gonzales, 508 F.3d at 1241. The Reform 

Act’s wording—that a disability determination must be 

made “on a neutral basis with regard to the individual’s 

condition, without any initial inference as to the presence or 

absence of disability being drawn from the fact that the 

individual has previously been determined to be disabled,” 

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(f), 1382c(a)(4)—easily permits the SSA’s 

interpretation that a presumption of continuing disability is 

no longer allowed or justified. As we explained in Warren, 

“[w]e must now look to the statute and the regulations” in 

this area of law. 804 F.2d at 1121.

Our holding aligns with those from other circuits that 

have confronted the issue directly, all of which have held 

that there is no presumption of continuing disability after the 

1984 Reform Act. See Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human 

Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 n.1 (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); 
LAMBERT V. SAUL 21

Wilkerson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 996 F.2d 1220 

n.4 (7th Cir. 1993) (unpublished); Rhoten v. Bowen, 

854 F.2d 667, 669 (4th Cir. 1988).4

III

Although the ALJ correctly performed his review 

without applying a continuing disability presumption, the 

ALJ did err in failing to provide sufficient reasons for 

rejecting Lambert’s testimony.

We will “disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny 

benefits ‘only if it is not supported by substantial evidence 

or is based on legal error.’” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

We therefore “leave it to the ALJ to determine credibility, 

resolve conflicts in the testimony, and resolve ambiguities in 

the record.” Id. But the ALJ must provide sufficient 

reasoning that allows us to perform our own review, because 

“the ‘grounds upon which an administrative order must be 

judged are those upon which the record discloses that its 

4 The Third and Fifth Circuits appear to apply some form of a 

presumption, though they have not directly addressed the 1984 Reform 

Act. See Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1274 n.7 (3d Cir. 1987); 

Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2000). The Eighth and 

Eleventh Circuits have recognized that the Reform Act is in tension with 

a presumption of continuing disability but have yet to resolve the issue. 

See Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 

judgment vacated sub nom. Bowen v. Polaski, 476 U.S. 1167 (1986)

(original opinion recognizing that the continuing disability presumption 

“no longer stands,” but eliminating this discussion in replacement 

opinion); Tomaszewski v. Colvin, 649 F. App’x 705, 705 n.2 (11th Cir.

2016) (per curiam) (“[T]he Court need not decide whether Congress 

overruled the presumption of continuing disability for benefit 

continuation cases when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 423(f).”).
22 LAMBERT V. SAUL

action was based.’” Id. at 1102 (quoting SEC v. Chenery 

Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)).

Under our well-established case law, and where, as here, 

the ALJ “determines that a claimant for Social Security 

benefits is not malingering and has provided objective 

medical evidence of an underlying impairment which might 

reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms she alleges, 

the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of those symptoms only by providing specific, clear, 

and convincing reasons for doing so.” Brown-Hunter v. 

Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488–89 (9th Cir. 2015); see also 

Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102. This requires the ALJ to 

“specifically identify the testimony [from a claimant] she or 

he finds not to be credible and . . . explain what evidence 

undermines that testimony.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102 

(quoting Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th 

Cir. 2001)); see also Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493.

The ALJ’s decision does not meet the requirements set 

forth in our cases and does not permit meaningful review. 

The ALJ noted generically that “the claimant’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of 

[her] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the objective 

medical and other evidence for the reasons explained in this 

decision.” But this “boilerplate statement” by way of 

“introductory remark,” which is “routinely include[d]” in 

ALJ decisions denying benefits, did not “identify what parts 

of the claimant’s testimony were not credible and why.” 

Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103.

As noted above, the ALJ also provided four high-level 

reasons as to why Lambert’s allegations were “less than fully 

consistent with the evidence.” But this brief discussion was 

likewise insufficient. “We cannot review whether the ALJ 

provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting 
LAMBERT V. SAUL 23

[Lambert’s] pain testimony where, as here, the ALJ never 

identified which testimony she found not credible, and never 

explained which evidence contradicted that testimony.” 

Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494. Our cases do not require 

ALJs to perform a line-by-line exegesis of the claimant’s 

testimony, nor do they require ALJs to draft dissertations 

when denying benefits. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 

(“[T]he ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive.”). But our 

precedents plainly required the ALJ to do more than was 

done here, which consisted of offering non-specific 

conclusions that Lambert’s testimony was inconsistent with 

her medical treatment. See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 

1138 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that we may not “take a 

general finding—an unspecified conflict between 

[c]laimant’s testimony . . . and her reports to doctors—and 

comb the administrative record to find specific conflicts”); 

see also, e.g., Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493–94; Vasquez 

v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir. 2009). Although the 

ALJ did provide a relatively detailed overview of Lambert’s 

medical history, “providing a summary of medical evidence 

. . . is not the same as providing clear and convincing

reasons for finding the claimant’s symptom testimony not 

credible.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494.5

The district court attempted to fill in the ALJ’s 

reasoning, citing portions of the record suggesting that 

Lambert’s subjective pain complaints were not credible. For 

example, the district court cited evidence about how 

Lambert was able to “perform daily activities including 

5 The Commissioner argues that the “clear and convincing reasons” 

standard is too high but acknowledges that our cases clearly set forth that 

standard. Nor does the Commissioner suggest an alternative standard. 

Regardless, in this case, given the limited nature of the ALJ’s 

explanations, the result would be the same under a more lenient standard.
24 LAMBERT V. SAUL

shopping, performing household chores, managing money, 

reading, personal care, and operating a motor vehicle,” and 

compared this to specific aspects of the medical evidence. 

The district court’s efforts to shore up the ALJ’s decision, 

while understandable, are unavailing. “Although the 

inconsistencies identified by the district court could be 

reasonable inferences drawn from the ALJ’s summary of the 

evidence, the credibility determination is exclusively the 

ALJ’s to make,” and “[w]e are constrained to review the 

reasons the ALJ asserts.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 

(quotations and emphasis omitted).

Nor was the ALJ’s error harmless. An error is harmless 

only if it is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination.” Id. (quotations omitted). Because the ALJ 

did not provide enough “reasoning in order for us to 

meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions 

were supported by substantial evidence,” we cannot treat the 

error as harmless. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103; see also 

Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494–95. Treating the error as 

harmless would also be problematic on this record. The ALJ 

agreed that Lambert was at least impaired to the point that 

she could not perform her past work. And Lambert’s 

testimony held even greater potential after the ALJ rejected 

as “not consistent with the record” the opinions of several 

medical experts who believed that Lambert was capable of 

more strenuous work.

* * *

We vacate the judgment of the district court with 

instructions to remand to the ALJ for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. We have no occasion to reach Lambert’s 

other assignments of error, as the record may change on 
LAMBERT V. SAUL 25

remand. We express no opinion as to whether Lambert is 

entitled to disability benefits.

VACATED AND REMANDED.