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*********************************************** 
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE TOWN OF

GREENWICH v. ROMANA SANCHEZ

RODRIGUEZ ET AL.

(AC 39220)

Keller, Prescott and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff housing authority sought, by way of summary process, to regain

possession of certain premises leased to the defendant tenant, R. R

resided with her two adult children on the premises when her son, C,

was arrested on another property owned by the plaintiff and charged

with certain drug related offenses. Thereafter, the plaintiff served R

with a pretermination notice, as required by statute (§ 47a-15), informing

her of its intent to terminate her lease for violations of the prohibition

against illegal drug related criminal activity on its property. In accordance with the plaintiff’s grievance procedures, R requested and received

an informal meeting with M, the deputy director of the housing authority,

who agreed that the plaintiff would not evict R at that time, but issued

a written notice that any future arrest of C would result in the commencement of eviction proceedings. Approximately four months later, C was

arrested on the premises at R’s apartment and charged with similar drug

related offenses. The plaintiff subsequently commenced the present

summary process action by serving a notice to quit. R filed a motion to

dismiss on the ground that she had not been served with a pretermination

notice prior to service of the notice to quit, as required by § 47a-15, and

that the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to

§ 47a-15, a landlord, prior to the commencement of a summary process

action, is required to deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying

the acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental

agreement shall terminate upon a date not less than fifteen days after

receipt of the notice, and the landlord may terminate the rental

agreement in accordance with the provisions of the summary process

statute (§ 47a-23) if substantially the same act or omission for which

notice was given recurs within six months. The trial court concluded

that the plaintiff was not required to provide a second pretermination

notice under the circumstances of this case, denied the motion to dismiss, and rendered judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff, from

which R appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly found

that the pretermination notice that the plaintiff sent following C’s first

arrest satisfied the clear and unambiguous requirements of § 47a-15: the

pretermination notice specified the acts or omissions that constituted

the breach of the lease, namely, C’s drug related activity, and where,

as here, C was arrested for a second instance of drug related activity

less than four months after the pretermination notice was sent and C’s

arrest involved substantially the same act or omission for which the

pretermination notice had been given, pursuant to § 47a-15 the plaintiff

was not required to send a second pretermination notice prior to commencing eviction proceedings and could rely on the pretermination

notice that was served on R approximately four months prior to the

service of the notice to quit; moreover, although R claimed that, pursuant

to federal regulations, the decision of M at the informal meeting not to

pursue eviction at that time negated the effect of the pretermination

notice and conclusively resolved the question of whether the plaintiff

could evict her on the basis of that notice, the meeting with M was not

a formal hearing that resulted in a decision by a hearing officer, which

would have been binding on the plaintiff under federal regulations but

was never rendered under the facts of this case, as M, the deputy director

of the housing authority, was not an impartial hearing officer within

the meaning of the federal regulations and R requested and received an

informal meeting, not a formal hearing, as those terms are defined in

those regulations.

Argued September 12—officially released November 21, 2017

Procedural History
Summary process action, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk,

Housing Session, where the court, Rodriguez, J., denied

the motion to dismiss filed by the named defendant;

thereafter, the matter was tried to the court; judgment

for the plaintiff, from which the named defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Frederic S. Brody, for the appellant (named

defendant).

Louis P. Pittocco, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

BEAR, J. The defendant1 Romana Sanchez Rodriguez

appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered

in favor of the plaintiff, the Housing Authority of the

Town of Greenwich (housing authority), on its summary process complaint. On appeal, the defendant

claims that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear

the plaintiff’s case because the plaintiff failed to serve

her with a second pretermination notice pursuant to

General Statutes § 47a-15,2 and that a grievance hearing

decision barred the plaintiff from evicting her on the

basis of alleged lease violations described in a prior

pretermination notice that the plaintiff served on her

within six months of the notice to quit. We disagree.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff owns and

operates Wilbur Peck Court, a low income public housing complex in Greenwich. The lease agreement

between the plaintiff and the defendant lists the defendant as the head-of-household tenant and her adult children, Elizabeth Lora Rodriguez and Charlee Javier

Rodriguez,3 as household members of an apartment at

Wilbur Peck Court.

On November 26, 2014, Charlee was arrested at Armstrong Court, a housing authority property, and charged

with possession of a controlled substance, possession

with the intent to distribute, and possession of a controlled substance within 1500 feet of a school. Following

the arrest, on December 11, 2014, the plaintiff sent the

defendant a pretermination notice, commonly referred

to as a Kapa4 notice, pursuant to § 47a-15. The pretermination notice informed the defendant of the plaintiff’s

intent to terminate the lease for violation of § 15 (a)

(7) of the lease5 by service of a notice to quit possession

of the premises on December 29, 2014. Upon receiving

the pretermination notice, the defendant exercised the

option given in the notice to request an informal meeting

in accordance with the plaintiff’s grievance procedure.

On December 18, 2014, an informal meeting took

place between the defendant, Elizabeth, Charlee, and

Terry Mardula, the deputy director of the housing

authority. Following the meeting, Mardula sent a letter

dated December 19, 2014, memorializing the discussion

that took place. Mardula stated that the plaintiff would

not attempt to evict the defendant at that time, but with

the following condition: ‘‘[A]ny future arrest of Charlee

Javier Rodriguez will result in the [housing authority]

taking immediate legal action commencing in eviction

proceedings against the family. . . . Hopefully

[Charlee] Rodriguez will comply with the provisions of

the lease and not jeopardize the continue[d] occupancy

of the family at Wilbur Peck Court.’’

Approximately four months later, on March 30, 2015,
Charlee was arrested at the defendant’s apartment in

Wilbur Peck Court and charged with possession of a

controlled substance, possession with intent to sell,

possession of narcotics, operating a drug factory, possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and sale

or possession of narcotics within 1500 feet of a daycare

facility. Upon learning of the arrest, the plaintiff began

to take steps to evict the defendant. On April 7, 2015,

the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit

possession of the premises, as required by General Statutes § 47a-23 (a),6 by April 14, 2015. The notice to quit

set forth, as reasons for the termination of the lease,

violations of §§ 10 (k), 10 (r), 10 (s),7 and 15 (a) (7) of

the lease and number 21 of the housing authority’s rules

and regulations8—all of which related to the prohibition

against illegal drug related criminal activity on housing

authority property. Despite receipt of the notice to quit,

the defendant remained in possession of the premises.

Thereafter, on April 22, 2015, the plaintiff commenced

the present summary process action. On May 6, 2015,

the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that

the plaintiff had failed to serve her with a second valid

pretermination notice, pursuant to § 47a-15, prior to

serving the notice to quit. The plaintiff filed an opposition to the defendant’s motion on May 15, 2015, arguing

that it had served the defendant with a pretermination

notice on December 11, 2014, and the defendant was

informed at an informal meeting held December 18,

2014, that the lease would be terminated if Charlee’s

drug related activity continued. On June 30, 2015, the

court, Rodriguez, J., denied the defendant’s motion to

dismiss. Thereafter, a trial was held on December 1,

2015. Following the close of testimony, the court

ordered the parties to file posttrial briefs.

On May 5, 2016, the court, having found that the

pretermination notice served on the defendant on

December 11, 2014, was sufficient, rendered judgment

in favor of the plaintiff and granted immediate possession of the premises to the plaintiff. The court held

that ‘‘there was no need for the plaintiff to provide the

[defendant] with a second Kapa notice, and that the

plaintiff’s failure to do so [did] not have any impact on

the court’s decision . . .’’ The court further stated:

‘‘[T]he plaintiff was required to provide the [defendant]

with a pretermination notice prior to initiating this

action. The plaintiff did provide the [defendant] with

a pretermination notice in December [2014], and the

plaintiff was not required to provide a second notice

in March [2015]. Therefore, the [defendant’s] special

defense that the plaintiff’s complaint was procedurally

deficient is not persuasive . . . .’’ This appeal

followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court did

not have jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s summary

process complaint because the plaintiff failed to serve
the defendant with a second pretermination notice, pursuant to § 47a-15, prior to the service of the notice to

quit, and the December 11, 2014, pretermination notice

was not a proper jurisdictional prerequisite to the service of the notice to quit because a ‘‘grievance hearing

decision’’ barred the plaintiff from evicting the defendant based on the lease violations described in the

December 11, 2014, pretermination notice. ‘‘[B]ecause

[a] determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bristol v. Ocean

State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1,

5, 931 A.2d 837 (2007); Firstlight Hydro Generating

Co. v. First Black Ink, LLC, 143 Conn. App. 635, 639,

70 A.3d 174, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 913, 76 A.3d 629

(2013).

‘‘Summary process is a statutory remedy which

enables the landlord to recover possession from the

tenant upon the termination of a lease.’’ Marrinan v.

Hamer, 5 Conn. App. 101, 103, 497 A.2d 67 (1985). ‘‘Pursuant to § 47a-15, before a landlord may proceed with

a summary process action, except in those situations

specifically excluded, the landlord must first deliver

a [pretermination] notice to the tenant specifying the

alleged violations and offer the tenant a . . . period to

remedy.’’ St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson,

124 Conn. App. 728, 734, 6 A.3d 1168 (2010), cert. denied,

300 Conn. 906, 12 A.3d 1002 (2011). ‘‘The legislative

purpose [of a pretermination or Kapa notice] is to discourage summary evictions against first offenders

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 734–35.

Section 47a-15 is ‘‘separate from and preliminary to the

maintenance of a summary process action pursuant to

. . . § 47a-23.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

735. ‘‘The Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear a summary process action only if the landlord has previously

served the tenant with a notice to quit’’ pursuant to

§ 47a-23. Housing Authority v. Harris, 225 Conn. 600,

605, 625 A.2d 816 (1993).

The text of § 47a-15 is clear and unambiguous: ‘‘Prior

to the commencement of a summary process action

. . . the landlord shall deliver a written notice to the

tenant specifying the acts or omissions constituting the

breach and that the rental agreement shall terminate

upon a date not less than fifteen days after receipt of

the notice. . . . [I]f substantially the same act or omission for which notice was given recurs within six

months, the landlord may terminate the rental

agreement in accordance with the provisions of [§§]

47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive.’’ In the present case, substantially the same acts for which notice was given to

the defendant on December 11, 2014, recurred within

six months. As previously described, the plaintiff served

the defendant with the pretermination notice on December 11, 2014, after Charlee was arrested for illegal drug

related activity on housing authority property. Follow-
ing an informal meeting that took place on December

18, 2014, the plaintiff elected not to pursue eviction for

that lease violation, but instead warned the defendant

that any future arrest of Charlee would result in the

immediate initiation of summary process proceedings.

Less than four months later, on March 30, 2015, Charlee

was arrested a second time for illegal drug related activity on housing authority property. Upon learning of the

arrest, the plaintiff elected, pursuant to § 47a-15, to

terminate the lease by serving a notice to quit on the

defendant pursuant to § 47a-23, as Mardula stated

would occur in his letter to the defendant dated December 19, 2014. Pursuant to the clear language of § 47a15, no new pretermination notice was required.

Although the second lease violation occurred within

six months of the December 11, 2014 pretermination

notice, the defendant argues that the plaintiff’s decision,

after the informal meeting that took place on December

18, 2014, not to pursue eviction at that time negated

the effect of the December 11, 2014 pretermination

notice and ‘‘conclusively resolved the question of

whether [the plaintiff] could proceed to evict her.’’9

Specifically, the defendant argues that ‘‘[t]he trial court

misunderstood the nature of the federally mandated

grievance process which [the defendant] availed herself

of . . . [and] failed to fully comprehend the consequence of the hearing officer’s decision. . . . The trial

court failed to recognize that the informal meeting was

an adjudicative proceeding . . . [and] that the hearing

officer’s decision was binding upon [the plaintiff].’’ In

response, the plaintiff argues that the defendant has

‘‘mistaken the informal meeting that took place on

December 18, 2014, with a grievance hearing.’’ Because

the parties disagree as to the nature of the December

18, 2014 meeting and the impact that the meeting had

on the validity of the December 11, 2014 pretermination

notice, we address first whether the meeting was an

informal meeting or a formal grievance hearing.

Where the premises are public housing, as are the

premises in the present case, the federal regulations

codified at 24 C.F.R. Part 966, Public Housing Lease

and Grievance Procedure, must be complied with in

resolving a grievance between a public housing authority and a tenant. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.50 (2014). Pursuant

to 24 C.F.R. § 966.54 (2014),10 a grievance may be settled

informally. If a grievance cannot be resolved informally,

a tenant is entitled to a formal hearing before a hearing

officer. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.56 (2014). Following a formal hearing, ‘‘[t]he decision of the hearing officer or

hearing panel shall be binding on the [public housing

authority] which shall take all actions, or refrain from

any actions, necessary to carry out the decision . . . .’’

24 C.F.R. § 966.57 (b) (2014).

Upon receiving the pretermination notice, the defendant exercised the option given in the notice to request
an informal meeting in accordance with the plaintiff’s

grievance procedure. She received what she requested.

Although Mardula, the deputy director of the housing

authority, presided over the December 18 meeting,11 he

was not an impartial person and, therefore, he was not

a hearing officer within the meaning of § 996.56 (a).12

The defendant’s written grievance was in fact discussed

informally and settled without a hearing. As the defendant acknowledges in her principal brief, an ‘‘informal

meeting is part of the grievance process which may

lead to a settlement of the complaint without resort to

a full hearing.’’13 (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to

§ 966.54, an informal settlement of a tenant grievance

may occur, in which case the housing authority is

required to send a summary of the discussion within a

reasonable time specifying ‘‘the names of the participants, dates of meeting, [and] the nature of the proposed

disposition of the complaint and the specific reasons

therefor . . . .’’ The plaintiff’s December 19, 2014 letter

memorializing the informal meeting did just as § 966.54

requires—it summarized the parties’ discussion and

described the proposed disposition that eviction would

not be pursued at that time, but that summary process

proceedings would immediately commence for any

future arrest of Charlee for illegal drug related activity.

A decision by a hearing officer was never rendered.14

Having determined that the December 18, 2014 meeting did not result in a decision by a hearing officer, we

next address whether a new pretermination notice was

required following the plaintiff’s decision at the informal meeting not to pursue eviction at that time. In

arguing that a new pretermination notice was required,

the defendant cites two cases in which a summary process complaint had been filed, and the courts held that

the withdrawal or adjudication of the summary process

suit required that a new notice to quit be served. See

Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment CentersNortheast, Inc., 292 Conn. 459, 974 A.2d 626 (2009);

Housing Authority v. Hird, 13 Conn. App. 150, 156–57,

535 A.2d 377, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433

(1988). Because neither case makes any mention of

a pretermination notice under § 47a-15, they are not

persuasive in resolving the matter at hand.15 Similarly,

the defendant’s reliance on Housing Authority v. Harris, supra, 225 Conn. 609, is not persuasive because, in

that case, unlike in the present case, no pretermination

notice had been served at all prior to service of the

notice to quit.

The defendant points to no case law, and we have

found none, that requires a plaintiff to issue a second

pretermination notice where substantially the same act

or omission described in a prior pretermination notice

recurs within six months of that prior pretermination

notice.16 See General Statutes § 47a-15. Charlee was

arrested for substantially the same acts approximately
four months after the December 11, 2014 pretermination notice was sent.17 Thus, no new pretermination

notice was required.

The defendant has not provided viable support for

her argument that the plaintiff’s decision after the informal meeting nullified or barred its further reliance on

the prior pretermination notice and precluded it from

proceeding, within the six month period referred to in

§ 47a-15, to terminate the defendant’s lease based on

that prior notice. The statute was designed for the exact

situation that occurred here—to create a ‘‘reconciliation period [to allow] errant tenants to remedy their first

miscue . . . . The legislative purpose is to discourage

summary evictions against first offenders; the machinery of summary process is suspended pending any reoccur[r]ence of substantially the same violation within six

months.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Marrinan v. Hamer, supra, 5 Conn. App. 104.

Thus, the six month period only applies if a plaintiff

elects not to evict a tenant because of the first lease

violation and, instead, provides the tenant with a second

chance—which is what happened here.

Further, the defendant understood that, although she

was being given a second chance dependent on Charlee

not engaging in further criminal behavior, the plaintiff

would immediately initiate summary process proceedings if the same or a substantially similar breach of

the lease, or of the plaintiff’s rules and regulations,

recurred.18 In its December 19, 2014 letter, the plaintiff

warned the defendant and her adult children that,

although summary process proceedings would not be

pursued at that time, ‘‘any future arrest of Charlee Javier

Rodriguez will result in the [housing authority] taking

immediate legal action commencing in eviction proceedings against the family. . . . Hopefully [Charlee]

Rodriguez will comply with the provisions of the lease

and not jeopardize the continue[d] occupancy of the

family at Wilbur Peck Court.’’

In conclusion, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous

text of § 47a-15, the plaintiff was not required to serve

the defendant with a second pretermination notice

when Charlee’s second arrest for illegal drug related

activities occurred within six months of the first arrest,

because the arrests were for substantially the same

acts. In these circumstances, the plaintiff could rely

on the pretermination notice that was served on the

defendant approximately four months prior to the service of the notice to quit. The court thus properly found

that the December 11, 2014 pretermination notice satisfied the clear and unambiguous text of § 47a-15, and

thus satisfied the § 47a-15 prerequisite for the plaintiff’s

summary process action.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Elizabeth Lora Rodriguez and Charlee Javier Rodriguez also were defen-
dants in the summary process proceeding, but they have not participated

in this appeal. Accordingly, we refer in this opinion to Romana Sanchez

Rodriguez as the defendant.

2 General Statutes § 47a-15 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Prior to the commencement of a summary process action, except in the case in which the

landlord elects to proceed under sections 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, to

evict based on nonpayment of rent, on conduct by the tenant which constitutes a serious nuisance or on a violation of subsection (h) of section 47a11, if there is a material noncompliance with section 47a-11 which materially

affects the health and safety of the other tenants or materially affects the

physical condition of the premises, or if there is a material noncompliance

by the tenant with the rental agreement or a material noncompliance with

the rules and regulations adopted in accordance with section 47a-9, and the

landlord chooses to evict based on such noncompliance, the landlord shall

deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement shall terminate upon a date

not less than fifteen days after receipt of the notice. If such breach can be

remedied by repair by the tenant or payment of damages by the tenant to

the landlord, and such breach is not so remedied within such fifteen-day

period, the rental agreement shall terminate except that (1) if the breach is

remediable by repairs or the payment of damages and the tenant adequately

remedies the breach within such fifteen-day period, the rental agreement

shall not terminate; or (2) if substantially the same act or omission for which

notice was given recurs within six months, the landlord may terminate the

rental agreement in accordance with the provisions of sections 47a-23 to

47a-23b, inclusive. . . .’’

3 Because these parties share the last name Rodriguez, we refer to them

herein by their first names for purposes of clarity.

4 Kapa Associates v. Flores, 35 Conn. Supp. 274, 408 A.2d 22 (1979).

5 Section 15 (a) of the lease states in relevant part: ‘‘[The housing] [a]uthority shall not terminate or refuse to renew the lease for other than . . . good

cause. ‘Good Cause’ . . . includes but is not limited to . . . (7) [i]llegal

drug-use or criminal drug activity which includes, but is not limited to,

such use or activity involving possession, sale or distribution of controlled

substances. . . . Criminal activity is cause for eviction even in the absence

of conviction or arrest . . . .’’

6 General Statutes § 47a-23 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘When the owner

or lessor . . . desires to obtain possession or occupancy of . . . any apartment in any building . . . such owner or lessor . . . shall give notice to

each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy of such . . . apartment or dwelling unit, at least three days . . . before the time specified in

the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy.’’

7 Section 10 of the lease provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Tenant and authorized residents (Household Members) as identified in this Lease, guests,

visitors or persons under the Tenant’s control shall . . .

‘‘(k) Refrain from illegal or other activity which impairs the physical or

social environment of any [housing authority] property . . .

‘‘(r) Not engage in criminal activity that threatens the health, safety or

right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents . . .

‘‘(s) Not engage in drug-related criminal activity, on or near [housing

authority] property. The term ‘drug-related criminal activity’ means the illegal

manufacture, sale, distribution, use or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute or use a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia

. . . .’’

8 Number 21 of the housing authority’s rules and regulations states in

relevant part: ‘‘[U]nlawful possession or unlawful use of narcotic drugs or

drug paraphernalia or criminal or unlawful activities on Authority property

are prohibited and will be cause for immediate termination of a lease. The

Tenant is responsible for all authorized residents, guests and persons under

Tenant’s control.’’

9 The defendant’s argument pertains to administrative res judicata, which

is an argument on appeal that was not raised in the trial court. Because the

defendant did not properly plead res judicata as a special defense in her

answer in the summary process proceeding; see Practice Book § 10-50; and

she did not otherwise properly raise it during the proceedings before the

trial court, we need not address it on appeal. See State v. Hilton, 45 Conn.

App. 207, 222, 694 A.2d 830 (‘‘[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law

not properly raised at trial’’), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925, 701 A.2d 659

(1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1134, 118 S. Ct. 1091, 140 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1998).

10 24 C.F.R. § 966.54 (2014) provides: ‘‘Any grievance shall be personally
presented, either orally or in writing, to the [public housing authority] office

or to the office of the project in which the complainant resides so that the

grievance may be discussed informally and settled without a hearing. A

summary of such discussion shall be prepared within a reasonable time and

one copy shall be given to the tenant and one retained in the [public housing

authority’s] tenant file. The summary shall specify the names of the participants, dates of meeting, the nature of the proposed disposition of the complaint and the specific reasons therefor, and shall specify the procedures

by which a hearing . . . may be obtained if the complainant is not satisfied.’’

11 No hearing officer presided over the December 18, 2014, meeting. A

hearing officer, within the meaning of § 966.56 (a), is ‘‘an impartial person

or persons appointed by the [public housing authority], other than the person

who made or approved the decision under review . . . .’’ 24 C.F.R § 966.55

(b) (2014).

12 In support of her argument, the defendant cites Mardula’s testimony at

trial. On cross-examination, the defendant’s counsel asked Mardula whether

he was the hearing officer at the December 18, 2014 meeting, and Mardula

responded ‘‘correct.’’ Mardula, an employee of the plaintiff and the person

who prepared and signed the pretermination notice, was not an impartial

person, and, therefore, he was not a hearing officer within the meaning of

§ 966.56 (a). We are not bound by his statement that he was the hearing

officer because it is contrary to law.

13 The defendant also concedes in her reply brief that no formal hearing

took place. The defendant asserts that ‘‘[t]he informal meeting between [the

defendant] and . . . Mardula was the first step in [the plaintiff’s] grievance

process. . . . With the grievance settled, there was no need for a formal

hearing.’’ (Emphasis added.) The defendant argues, however, that the only

logical way to read § 966.54 is to find that a settlement at an informal meeting

that is satisfactory to the tenant is binding upon the plaintiff, on the basis

of the fact that a formal hearing may be requested ‘‘if the complainant is

not satisfied.’’ In so arguing, it appears that the defendant confuses the

issue. The plaintiff did not ‘‘[back] away from a settlement of a tenant’s

grievance reached following an informal meeting,’’ as the defendant asserts.

Rather, as discussed in greater detail herein, the plaintiff acted in accordance

with the settlement reached at the informal meeting by not pursuing eviction

initially after the first violation, but doing so after the second violation.

14 Because the December 18, 2014 meeting was an informal meeting, and

Mardula was not a hearing officer, we need not address the defendant’s

argument that Mardula’s decision was binding on the housing authority

pursuant to § 966.57 (b).

15 It is well recognized that the purposes of a pretermination notice and

a notice to quit are different. ‘‘A pretermination notice pursuant to § 47a15 does not have the effect of terminating a tenancy or of altering the

relationship of the landlord and tenant. . . . In contrast . . . service of a

notice to quit possession pursuant to § 47a-23 is typically an unequivocal

act terminating a lease agreement with a tenant.’’ (Citation omitted.) St.

Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, supra, 124 Conn. App. 735.

16 The plaintiff also argues that no pretermination notice was required at

all under § 47a-15 due to Charlee’s illegal drug use and criminal activity,

which falls within the ‘‘serious nuisance’’ exception to the notice requirement. Because we ultimately conclude that the December 11, 2014 pretermination notice was sufficient, and no new notice was required, we need not

address further whether the plaintiff was required to serve a pretermination

notice under these circumstances.

17 The defendant argues that ‘‘[t]o allow the December 11, 2014 pretermination notice to be the basis of some future lease violation would, as [our]

Supreme Court described [in Waterbury Twin, LLC] ‘hang like the sword

of Damocles over [the defendant’s] head.’ ’’ This is unpersuasive for two

reasons. First, the court in Waterbury Twin, LLC, was referring to a notice

to quit, not a pretermination notice. See Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal

Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., supra, 292 Conn. 460–61. Second, the

pretermination notice would not have been ‘‘held over’’ the defendant’s

‘‘head’’ because, if six months had passed since the first violation, service

of a new notice would have been required. Similarly, if the violation was

of a different type than the one previously noticed, service of a new notice

would have been required.

18 At trial, the following examination took place:

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: But you knew that if something else happened,

if there was another arrest, that you could be evicted, is that correct?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes I knew.
* * *

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Were you willing to take the chance that if

something else happened you would be evicted?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.’’

The defendant thus admitted that the plaintiff was giving her a second

chance to retain her apartment, despite Charlee’s criminal activities, but

with the warning that summary process proceedings would be pursued

immediately if Charlee’s illegal drug related activity continued.