Nos. 16-56529 & 16-56532 __________________

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

__________________

R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, SECRETARY OF LABOR, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SCOTT BRAIN,

MELISSA W. COOK, and 

MELISSA W. COOK & ASSOCIATES, PC

Defendants-Appellants.

__________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of California

No. 2:14-CV-03911-JAK-AGR

Hon. John A. Kronstadt

__________________

SECRETARY’S PETITION FOR PANEL OR EN BANC REHEARING

________________

KATE S. O’SCANNLAIN

Solicitor of Labor

G. WILLIAM SCOTT

Associate Solicitor

 for Plan Benefits Security

THOMAS TSO

Counsel for Appellate 

 and Special Litigation

BLAIR L. BYRUM

Trial Attorney

U.S. Department of Labor

Office of the Solicitor

Plan Benefits Security Division

200 Constitution Ave., NW, N-4611

Washington, DC 20210

(202) 693-5595
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... ii

SECRETARY’S PETITION FOR PANEL OR EN BANC REHEARING ........1

STATEMENT OF COUNSEL .............................................................................1

STATEMENT OF ISSUE.....................................................................................3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................................................................3

ARGUMENT........................................................................................................6

The Panel Erred in Concluding Brain Did Not Act as a Fiduciary When 

He Retaliated Against Robbins...................................................................6

CONCLUSION.... ............................................................................................. 17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases:

Acosta v. Brain,

910 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2018) ........................................................................ passim

Batchelor v. Oak Hill Med. Grp.,

870 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1989) ..............................................................................11

Bui v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. Inc.,

310 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2002) ..............................................................................10

Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,

223 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................10

Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc.,

472 U.S. 559 (1985)................................................................................................8

Chao v. Merino,

452 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2006) .................................................................................17

Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman,

98 F.3d 1457 (4th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................12

Cunha v. Ward Foods, Inc.,

804 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1986) ....................................................................... 12, 13

Eskelin v. Ranson Cos.,

121 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1997)(unpublished)......................................................6 n.1

Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Castonguay,

984 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) ................................................................................8

In re Northrop Grumman Corp. Erisa Litig.,

No. CV0606213MMMJCX, 2015 WL 10433713 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2015).8 n.2

Johnson v. Couturier,

572 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2009) ..........................................................................2, 11
iii

Federal Cases-(continued):

Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co.,

51 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995) ..............................................................................2, 6

Kimbro v. Atl. Richfield Co.,

889 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1989) ............................................................................8 n.2

Lane v. Goren,

743 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1984) ................................................................................8

N.L.R.B. v. Amax Coal Co.,

453 U.S. 322 (1981)..............................................................................................15

Pegram v. Herdrich,

530 U.S. 211 (2000)...................................................................................... passim

S. Cal., Ariz., Colo., & S. Nev. Glaziers Architectural Metal & Glass Workers 

Pension Tr. v. Seay,

66 F. App’x 114 (9th Cir. 2003)(unpublished).......................................................9

Varity Corp. v. Howe,

516 U.S. 489 (1996)...................................................................................... passim

Waller v. Blue Cross of Cal.,

32 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................10

Federal Statutes:

ERISA section 3(14)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B)................................................9

ERISA section 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).................................... 2, 5, 12

ERISA section 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104..................................................... 4, 5, 7, 15

ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)......................................2
iv

Federal Statutes-(continued):

ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).......................................2

ERISA section 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109........................................................... 16, 17

ERISA section 502(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) ...........................................4, 17

ERISA section 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140................................................... 4, 8 n.2, 13

Miscellaneous:

29 C.F.R. § 2509.75–8 .................................................................................. 6 n.1, 10

G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees § 543 

(rev. 2d ed. 1980).......................................................................................................2
1

SECRETARY’S PETITION FOR PANEL OR EN BANC REHEARING

STATEMENT OF COUNSEL

A divided panel of this Court (Smith & Drain, JJ. with Schroeder, J., 

dissenting) held that a trustee did not breach his fiduciary duties under the 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) when he executed a

strategy of retaliation against a trust fund employee. Acosta v. Brain, 910 F.3d 

502, 516 (9th Cir. 2018). In an effort to cover up reports of his own misconduct, 

the trustee caused the employee to be placed on administrative leave and ultimately 

caused her termination by outsourcing her department (a service provider to the 

plan). Id. at 507-11. He did so because the employee participated in a Department 

of Labor (“DOL”) investigation of the trustee’s potential ERISA violations and 

raised complaints that the trustee engaged in misconduct detrimental to the trust 

fund. Id. The panel majority reasoned that the trustee did not breach his fiduciary 

duties because he acted as an employer when he engaged in retaliation. Id. at 516-

21. In reaching this conclusion, it ignored factual findings undisputed on appeal 

that the trustee’s actions to retaliate against the employee included the use of his 

fiduciary powers. The panel decision permits fiduciaries committing acts harmful 

to the trust to insulate their acts from ERISA liability simply because they took 

illegal employer decisions along with illegal fiduciary actions.
2

A person is an ERISA plan fiduciary “to the extent . . . he exercises any 

discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such 

plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of 

its assets.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i). This Court “construe[s] ERISA fiduciary 

status ‘liberally, consistent with ERISA’s policies and objectives.’” Johnson v. 

Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). ERISA section 

404 provides that fiduciaries must act “solely in the interest of the participants and 

beneficiaries” and “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 

circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and 

familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like 

character and with like aims.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) & (B). A trustee “must 

display throughout the administration of the trust complete loyalty to the interests 

of the beneficiary and must exclude all selfish interest.” Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 

U.S. 211, 224 (2000) (quoting G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees

§ 543 (rev. 2d ed. 1980)). 

The panel majority’s decision that the trustee was not acting in his fiduciary 

capacity ignores the district court’s undisputed factual findings, undermines 

ERISA’s broad definition of fiduciary status, and conflicts with this Court’s 

“policy of interpreting the fiduciary duty broadly.” Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 

F.3d 1449, 1468 (9th Cir. 1995). The panel decision vacated the permanent 
3

injunction that barred Defendants from serving the fund after dismissing the 

fiduciary breach claims. Brain, 910 F.3d at 521-23. The panel decision threatens 

to curtail the ability of the Secretary of Labor and others to hold fiduciaries 

accountable for failing to act in the best interest of plan participants and 

beneficiaries by insulating acts from liability simply because the fiduciary 

committed fiduciary breaches while also violating ERISA as an employer. Such a 

decision raises a question of exceptional importance that deserves the attention of 

the full court. 

STATEMENT OF ISSUE

Whether the panel erred by concluding that the defendant trustee did not act 

in a fiduciary capacity when he exercised both employer and fiduciary powers to 

retaliate against a trust employee for participating in a DOL investigation and 

raising complaints about his conduct detrimental to the trust. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Secretary sued Scott Brain, a former trustee of the Cement Masons 

Southern California Trust Funds (the “Funds”), which administered five ERISAcovered trusts, and Melissa Cook and her law firm (the “Cook Defendants”), 

former counsel to the Funds. Brain, 910 F.3d at 507. After a five-day bench trial, 

the district court found that Brain and Cook had retaliated against Cheryle 

Robbins, an employee of the Funds’ Audit and Collections Department (“A&C 
4

Department”), for complaining about misconduct by Brain and participating in a 

DOL investigation of Brain. Id. at 507-08, 511. Brain and Cook organized a 

trustee meeting where they caused Robbins to be placed on administrative leave. 

Id. at 508-10. As part of a concerted strategy, they caused the work of Robbins’s 

department to be outsourced to another company and took actions to successfully 

prevent Robbins from being hired by that company, even though all other 

employees of Robbins’s department were hired. Id. at 510-11. 

The district court found that Brain and the Cook Defendants violated 

ERISA’s anti-retaliation provision, section 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, by causing 

Robbins to be placed on administrative leave and eventually terminated in 

retaliation for protected conduct. Brain, 910 F.3d at 511. It also held that Brain 

violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds under ERISA section 404, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1104, and that the Cook Defendants knowingly participated in his breach. Brain, 

910 F.3d at 511. The district court issued a permanent injunction removing Brain 

as the Funds’ trustee and prohibiting him from future fiduciary service to the 

Funds. Id. at 512. It also permanently enjoined the Cook Defendants from 

providing services to the Funds and ordered them to disgorge $61,480.62 in fees

under section 502(a)(5). Id. at 512, 523 n.8.

A panel of this Court unanimously affirmed the district court’s conclusion

that Brain and the Cook Defendants violated ERISA section 510. Brain, 910 F.3d 
5

at 512. But by a 2-1 vote, the panel reversed the district court’s holding that Brain 

also breached his fiduciary duties under ERISA section 404. Id. at 516, 525 

(Schroeder, J., dissenting). Referring to the “two-hat” principle, which recognizes 

that a fiduciary may sometimes act as employer and other times act as fiduciary, 

the panel held that the district court did not address whether Brain was “wearing 

his ERISA fiduciary hat” when he took the actions at issue, id. at 517-18, and 

rejected the Secretary’s argument that Brain’s actions to retaliate against Robbins 

were taken as a fiduciary in the course of discretionary plan management and 

administration, id. at 519, which are by definition fiduciary functions, 29 U.S.C. § 

1002(21)(A)(i),(ii). 

The dissent would have affirmed the district court’s fiduciary breach

holding, finding that Brain was “clearly acting as a fiduciary” and reasoning that 

“there is no law to support characterizing a fiduciary’s efforts to cover up trust 

fund mismanagement as business, rather than fiduciary decisions.” Brain, 910 

F.3d at 525-26 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). 

The Secretary seeks en banc or panel rehearing on the reversal of the 

fiduciary breach decision. 
6 

ARGUMENT

The Panel Erred in Concluding Brain Did Not Act

 as a Fiduciary When He Retaliated Against Robbins

1. ERISA defines a fiduciary with a “functional test.” E.g., Kayes, 51 F.3d

at 1459. Even though it is undisputed that Brain was a trustee, the panel majority 

states that it “lack[ed] basic information such as whether Brain was a named or a 

functional fiduciary.” 1

 Brain, 910 F.3d at 518. But that particular information is 

not needed because regardless of whether he was named as a fiduciary in the plan 

or was a functional fiduciary, the question is whether he acted in that fiduciary 

capacity when he orchestrated the retaliation against Robbins because she 

complained about how Brain was carrying out his fiduciary duties and participated 

in a DOL investigation of Brain. What matters is “whether that person was acting 

as a fiduciary (that is, was performing a fiduciary function) when taking the action 

subject to complaint.” Pegram, 530 U.S. at 226. 

The dissenting opinion noted Brain’s failure to dispute his fiduciary status

below. Brain, 910 F.3d at 525 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (“a question that no one 

in this case heretofore has thought necessary to ask”); see also Sec’y ER 34 

1 Brain was the Funds’ trustee, a position which “by [its] very nature require[s] 

persons who hold [it] to perform [fiduciary functions].” Questions and answers 

relating to fiduciary responsibility under the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75–8 (D-3 Answer). “Plan trustees and 

plan administrators are, by definition, plan fiduciaries.” Eskelin v. Ranson Cos., 

121 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75–8).
7

(“Brain . . . concedes that he is a fiduciary under § 404, and [he] appears to 

concede that the alleged underlying conduct occurred . . . . Instead, [he] argue[s] 

that none of these actions constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty . . . .”). But the 

panel majority, based on its own reading of the facts and relying on arguments 

never raised in the district court, reached its own conclusions about Brain’s 

fiduciary status. 

As the panel majority notes, a “trustee under ERISA may wear different 

hats,” Brain, 910 F.3d at 517 (quoting Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225), and the same 

person may sometimes act as an employer and sometimes act as a fiduciary. 

“Employers, for example, can be ERISA fiduciaries and still take actions to the 

disadvantage of employee beneficiaries, when they act as employers.” Pegram, 

530 U.S. at 225. Nevertheless, persons with two hats often undertake concerted

actions as both employers and as plan fiduciaries without clearly demarcating 

which hat they are wearing. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 503 (1996) 

(“[R]easonable employees, in the circumstances found by the District Court, could 

have thought that Varity was communicating with them both in its capacity as 

employer and in its capacity as plan administrator.” (emphasis in original)). 

2. This petition presents an important question concerning the operation of

plans that hire their own employees. In those circumstances, the trustees operating 

the plan must make both decisions as the employer and as fiduciaries on behalf of 
8

the plan. See Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Gen. Am. 

Life Ins. Co. v. Castonguay, 984 F.2d 1518, 1522 (9th Cir. 1993). Brain’s conduct 

did not, as the panel majority assumed, constitute only an employer decision. 

Instead, Brain acted against Robbins as both a fiduciary and as an employer; he

retaliated against Robbins and her department by removing them as the Funds’ 

service provider—a fiduciary decision. Brain, 910 F.3d at 509-11.

2

 

The undisputed facts establish that Brain exercised fiduciary decisions of 

plan management and administration when retaliating against Robbins. Robbins 

served the plan as an employee in the A&C Department. Brain, 910 F.3d at 507. 

The A&C Department provided important services to the plan, including audits. 

Id. Its role in completing audits is an important aspect of plan administration. See

Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 

 2 Even in cases where plans do not hire their own employees, plan tasks may be 

performed by the corporate plan sponsor’s employees or a third-party service 

provider’s employees. E.g., In re Northrop Grumman Corp. Erisa Litig., No. 

CV0606213MMMJCX, 2015 WL 10433713, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2015). In 

these situations, the corporate plan sponsor or third-party provider is subject to 

section 510 as a “person” who “[is] prohibit[ed] . . . from taking any adverse 

employment action against an employee” for protected activities related to the 

plan. Kimbro v. Atl. Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 880 (9th Cir. 1989). Even in 

these cases, the corporate plan sponsor may use both employer and fiduciary 

authority to retaliate against employees for whistleblowing on ERISA violations, 

for example, by intentionally discharging an employee who is serving as a trustee 

to the plan, causing his removal as a trustee. Such retaliatory actions may violate

both section 510 and fiduciary duties. See infra at 10. 
9

571 (1985). The provision of services under ERISA makes a person, like the A&C 

Department and its corporate entity, a service provider. See, e.g., S. Cal., Ariz., 

Colo., & S. Nev. Glaziers Architectural Metal & Glass Workers Pension Tr. v. 

Seay, 66 F. App’x 114, 117 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (citing 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1002(14)(B)). The district court also found as a fact (undisputed on appeal) that 

[i]n sum, the DOL has demonstrated by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the Cook Defendants and Brain decided to begin the 

process of outsourcing the A&C Department’s work and dissolving 

the Administrative Corporation in response to Robbins’ protected 

activities and that they caused Zenith to elect not to hire Robbins. 

But-for the DOL investigation and Robbins’ role in it, there is no 

showing that the Joint Board would have taken these same steps.3

ER 63. Indeed, in ruling on the fiduciary breach claim against Brain, the district 

court relied on these factual findings, which included the Joint Board’s decision to 

outsource the A&C Department’s work to a third-party service provider. ER 49-

51, 71. In short, the district court found that the Joint Board, as trustees of the plan, 

decided to change service providers based on Defendants’ retaliation against 

Robbins, which started with placing her on administrative leave. Within this 

undisputed factual context, Brain undertook retaliatory actions as a fiduciary with 

Cook’s knowing participation. Defendants manipulated and used fiduciary 

decisions—the retention of a service provider—to retaliate against Robbins and 

 3 “Administrative Corporation” refers to the Cement Masons Southern California 

Administrative Corporation, an entity that the Funds formed to employ A&C 

Department staff. Brain, 910 F.3d at 507. 
10

protect Brain from removal. See Brain, 910 F.3d at 510-11. Based on the 

undisputed factual findings, the district court was clearly correct that Brain 

exercised fiduciary authority to retaliate against Robbins and that he breached his 

fiduciary duties to serve his own personal interests.

3. The fiduciary decision to retain or remove plan service providers is an 

important part of a fiduciary’s job. “Like the selection of providers, the retention 

of providers is a necessary part of the administration of an ERISA plan.” Bui v. 

Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. Inc., 310 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002). The Secretary’s 

long-standing regulations affirm that the selection and retention of service 

providers is a part of plan administration:

A plan fiduciary may rely on information, data, statistics or analyses 

furnished by persons performing ministerial functions for the plan, 

provided that he has exercised prudence in the selection and 

retention of such persons. The plan fiduciary will be deemed to 

have acted prudently in such selection and retention if, in the exercise 

of ordinary care in such situation, he has no reason to doubt the 

competence, integrity or responsibility of such persons.

Questions and answers relating to fiduciary responsibility under the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75–8 (FR-11, Answer) 

(emphasis added). This Court and others have looked carefully at whether plan 

fiduciaries conducted a prudent process in choosing service providers. See Waller 

v. Blue Cross of Cal., 32 F.3d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Bussian v. RJR 

Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 296 (5th Cir. 2000). 
11

4. Not only did Defendants manipulate this important fiduciary decision to 

further their retaliatory aims, the purpose and intent of their retaliation was to 

influence another fiduciary decision—the retention of Brain as trustee. See

Couturier, 572 F.3d at 1076; Batchelor v. Oak Hill Med. Grp., 870 F.2d 1446, 

1449 (9th Cir. 1989). As the dissent emphasized, the Defendants’ actions, as a 

whole, to “oust” Robbins “was a calculated move to insulate the Fund 

mismanagement from further scrutiny” in violation of ERISA’s goals and 

purposes. See Brain, 910 F.3d at 526 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). The district court 

found that Brain and Cook called a special meeting of the Funds’ Joint Board and

“‘fir[ed] up’ their allies for the actions that would be taken in response to 

Robbins’[s] contacts with the DOL.” Brain, 910 F.3d at 509. At the meeting, their

“critical statements of Robbins ‘created an environment that was hostile to her’ and 

‘caused’ the trustees to vote unanimously to put Robins on leave.” Id. These 

actions were taken to insulate Brain from Robbins’s reports of his misconduct: 

Cook “described Robbins’s [DOL contact] as inappropriate” and Brain asked 

another trustee to share “how Robbins had pressured him to . . . complain about 

Brain.” Id. Thus, Brain and Cook’s actions were taken to influence plan 

management and administration by removing an individual participating in DOL’s

investigation of Brain and complaining of Brain’s misconduct. See id. at 508-11. 

In short, the whole purpose of Brain’s actions was to conceal fiduciary misconduct.
12

5. The panel majority did not address the undisputed factual context of the 

decision to place Robbins on administrative leave, which was the beginning of

Defendants’ broader strategy to protect Brain and get rid of Robbins. Instead, it 

erred in creating an all-or-nothing proposition between employer and fiduciary 

action based solely on the fact that placing persons on administrative leave is 

typically an employer function. “[W]hen a fiduciary’s actions that are taken in 

connection with the performance of his duties as trustee or administrator are in his 

own interest as well, [this Court] rigorously scrutinize[s] the conduct.” Cunha v. 

Ward Foods, Inc., 804 F.2d 1418, 1432 (9th Cir. 1986). It is this intersection that 

often requires clarification from courts. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231-37 

(concluding mixed eligibility and treatment decisions by HMO physicians were not 

fiduciary in nature); Varity, 516 U.S. at 498-505 (concluding employer was acting 

as ERISA fiduciary when it made misrepresentations regarding employee 

benefits); see also Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1465 (4th Cir. 

1996) (“[P]lan sponsors . . . are generally free under ERISA to amend plans 

without triggering fiduciary status. However, the power (through plan 

amendment) to appoint, retain and remove plan fiduciaries constitutes 

‘discretionary authority’ over the management or administration of a plan within 

the meaning of § 1002(21)(A).” (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted)). 

Even accepting the fact that administrative leave is typically an employer act, 
13

Defendants indisputably mixed fiduciary and employer decisions to further 

personal interests, including by influencing the trustees’ selection of service 

providers. Unlike Pegram, 530 U.S. at 232, the case law presents no doubt that the 

underlying fiduciary act—selection of service providers to the plan—relates to the

“fiduciaries’ financial decisions” and implicates potential “financial 

mismanagement” of the plan, areas that ERISA directly regulates as fiduciary 

conduct. For this reason, the district court correctly concluded that Brain acted as 

a fiduciary and violated his fiduciary duties in addition to section 510’s antiretaliation provision. In concert with Brain, Cook knowingly participated in that

retaliation and also the fiduciary breach. The fact that a trustee may sometimes act 

as fiduciary and sometimes act as employer should not insulate the trustee from 

liability for breaching his fiduciary duties when his conduct implicates both 

employer and fiduciary decisions.

In contrast to the majority’s analysis, the dissent “rigorously scrutinize[d]” 

Defendants’ conduct by examining the unchallenged factual findings on appeal. 

Cunha, 804 F.2d at 1432; see Brain, 910 F.3d at 525-26 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). 

As the dissent recognized, the factual context of this case points toward a fiduciary 

decision intertwined with an employer decision. “Robbins blew the whistle on 

Brain’s Fund mismanagement—Brain’s decision to oust her was a calculated move 

to insulate the Fund mismanagement from further scrutiny.” Brain, 910 F.3d at 
14

526 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Permitting fiduciaries to blur the lines between 

fiduciary and non-fiduciary conduct undermines decades of case law requiring 

close scrutiny by courts when fiduciaries attempt to skirt responsibilities by 

masquerading as acting purely in a non-fiduciary capacity, like the proverbial wolf 

in sheep’s clothing. The Supreme Court admonished lower courts not to ignore the 

“factual context,” Varity, 516 U.S. at 503, and not to assume employer actions are 

just “ordinary business decision[s]” that “‘turn[ed] out to have an adverse impact 

on the plan,’” id. at 505 (quoting id. at 539 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). “Instead, [the 

court must] accept the undisputed facts found, and factual inferences drawn, by the 

District Court.” Id. In Varity, the Court recognized that the defendants 

“intentionally connected” statements made typically in an employer capacity to 

statements made in a fiduciary capacity. Id. (emphasis in original). The panel 

majority not only ignored the factual context, the district court’s undisputed factual 

findings and its factual inferences, the panel majority also ignored that Defendants 

“intentionally connected” fiduciary decisions (retention of service providers) with 

an arguably employer decision (placing Robbins on administrative leave), as in 

Varity, using both types of decisions to further a strategy of inhibiting Robbins’s

complaints against Brain. The Secretary seeks rehearing to ensure that such 

mixing of fiduciary and employer functions is carefully scrutinized. 
15

6. Defendants’ use of comingled employer and fiduciary decisions to 

retaliate against Robbins and protect Brain only reinforces the finding that Brain 

breached his duty of loyalty to the Funds. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 224; N.L.R.B. 

v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1981) (“To deter the trustee from all 

temptation and to prevent any possible injury to the beneficiary, the rule against a 

trustee dividing his loyalties must be enforced with ‘uncompromising rigidity.’”

(citation omitted)). Defendants’ manipulation of fiduciary decisions to stifle 

reports of Brain’s own misconduct harms the interest of the plan participants and 

beneficiaries. Cf. Varity, 516 U.S. at 506 (“To participate knowingly and 

significantly in deceiving a plan’s beneficiaries in order to save the employer 

money at the beneficiaries’ expense is not to act ‘solely in the interest of the 

participants and beneficiaries.’” (citation omitted)). The district court reasonably 

concluded that Brain was not acting “solely in the interest of the participants and 

beneficiaries,” 29 U.S.C. § 1104, when he used his authority to influence the 

trustees to place Robbins on administrative leave as part of a broader strategy to 

stifle her communicating with the DOL about his potential wrongdoing as a 

trustee. See Brain, 910 F.3d at 526 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s 

approach conflicts with ERISA’s goal to safeguard trust funds, and the Supreme 

Court’s implementing directive to construe broadly the fiduciary duties incumbent 
16

in administering an ERISA trust.”). In doing so, Brain acted to further his own 

personal interests rather than the Funds’ interests. 

7. In response to the Secretary’s arguments that Brain was acting as a 

fiduciary, the panel majority attacks arguments the Secretary did not make. First, 

the Secretary did not argue that Brain’s duty of loyalty extends to Robbins 

individually or that Brain has any fiduciary duties toward Robbins. Rather, the 

Secretary argued that Brain’s actions toward Robbins harmed participants and 

beneficiaries by concealing potential ERISA misconduct. Sec’y Br. 37-38. 

Moreover, the district court explicitly held that Brain breached his fiduciary duties 

to the Funds, not Robbins. ER 2-3, 71. Second, the majority implies that the 

Secretary argued that fees the Funds paid to Cook were evidence of fiduciary

liability or status; to the contrary, the Secretary simply recognized those fees as 

damages or loss from Defendants’ actions. Sec’y Br. 39-40. None of these 

arguments or conclusions undermine the dissent’s correct statement of the factual 

context, which is unchallenged on appeal. 

8. As a result of reversing the district court’s fiduciary breach holding, the 

panel majority improperly dismissed the injunctive relief issued against 

Defendants, which was important for the Funds’ protection. The panel majority 

held that the district court based the injunctive relief on ERISA section 409, 29 

U.S.C. § 1109, which provides for the removal of breaching fiduciaries, and
17

reversed the injunction based on its holding that there was no fiduciary breach. 

Brain, 910 F.3d at 521. It also rejected ERISA section 502(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(a)(5), which provides for “other appropriate equitable relief,” as an 

alternative basis for affirmance. Id. at 521-23.

Because the panel majority erred in concluding that Brain did not act as a 

fiduciary and did not breach his fiduciary duties, injunctive relief under ERISA 

section 409 is appropriate. It is well established that district courts, after 

examining the factual circumstances, may issue injunctive relief against fiduciaries 

who fail to perform their jobs. E.g., Chao v. Merino, 452 F.3d 174, 185-86 (2d 

Cir. 2006) (upholding permanent injunction against a fiduciary who failed to 

monitor and remove another fiduciary who embezzled funds from the plan). Such 

relief is particularly appropriate here, where the district court, after carefully 

examining the facts, found that Brain used his fiduciary powers to remove a 

conscientious employee who was seeking to protect the plan and the interests of its 

participants, and that Cook knowingly participated in that breach.

CONCLUSION

In holding that Brain did not act as a fiduciary, the panel majority raises a 

question that no one asked, contradicts the district court’s unchallenged factual 

findings and inferences, and ignores the factual context for Brain’s actions, which 

sought to use both fiduciary and employer powers to further his own retaliatory 
18

agenda with Cook’s knowing participation. These actions sought to protect Brain 

from oversight as a fiduciary and block information that could have been used for 

his removal as trustee. The panel majority ignores these facts by labeling Brain’s 

actions as “employer” acts, insulating his and Cook’s actions from review as acts 

of a breaching fiduciary and knowing participant, thereby insulating Defendants 

from fiduciary responsibility. 

For the reasons above, the Secretary respectfully requests that the Court 

grant his petition for en banc or panel rehearing. 
19

Respectfully submitted,

KATE S. O’SCANNLAIN

Solicitor of Labor

G. WILLIAM SCOTT

Associate Solicitor 

 for Plan Benefits Security

THOMAS TSO

Counsel for Appellate

 and Special Litigation

s/ Blair L. Byrum

BLAIR L. BYRUM

Trial Attorney

U.S. Department of Labor

Office of the Solicitor

Plan Benefits Security Division

200 Constitution Ave., N.W., Room N-4611 

Washington, D.C. 20210

(202) 693-5595
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

Form 11. Certificate of Compliance for Petitions for Rehearing or 

Answers 

Instructions for this form: http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/forms/form11instructions.pdf

9th Cir. Case Number(s) _16-56529 & 16-56532_________________________

I am the attorney or self-represented party.

I certify that pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-4 or 40-1, the attached petition for 

panel rehearing/petition for rehearing en banc/answer to petition is (select one): 

[x] Prepared in a format, typeface, and type style that complies with Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(4)-(6) and contains the following number of words: ___4188________.

(Petitions and answers must not exceed 4,200 words)

OR

[ ] In compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(4)-(6) and does not exceed 15 pages.

Signature _s/ Blair L. Byrum______________ Date __1/18/2019_________

(use “s/[typed name]” to sign electronically-filed documents)
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this day, January 18, 2019, I electronically filed the 

foregoing SECRETARY’S PETITION FOR PANEL OR EN BANC 

REHEARING with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Ninth Circuit by using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of 

such filing to all registered counsel of record.

/s Blair L. Byrum

BLAIR L. BYRUM

Trial Attorney

United States Department of Labor

Office of the Solicitor

Plan Benefits Security Division

200 Constitution Ave., NW, N-4611

Washington, DC 20210

Telephone: (202) 693-5595