Opinion filed August 31, 2022

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-20-00255-CV

__________

WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL, LLC AND 

WEATHERFORD U.S., L.P., Appellants

V.

CITY OF MIDLAND, Appellee

On Appeal from the 385th District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV55471

O P I N I O N

This is an interlocutory appeal from the grant of a plea to the jurisdiction in 

favor of Appellee, the City of Midland (the City). See TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE 

ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2021). Appellants, Weatherford International, 

LLC and Weatherford U.S., L.P. (collectively, Weatherford) brought a cost-recovery 
2

action under the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) against the City1 for past and 

future response costs incurred to remediate the contamination of well water located 

on a property once owned by Weatherford. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 

CODE ANN. §§ 361.271(a), .344 (West 2016). In its sole issue on appeal,

Weatherford contends that the trial court erred when it granted the City’s plea to the 

jurisdiction based on the City’s defense of governmental immunity. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Weatherford filed the underlying lawsuit on April 1, 2019, seeking 

contribution from the City under the SWDA. In response, the City answered and 

filed a plea to the jurisdiction. In its filings, the City asserted that (1) it had 

governmental immunity from suit; (2) Weatherford failed to allege any waiver of the 

City’s immunity; (3) Weatherford failed to assert that the City is a transporter of 

hazardous waste; and (4) Weatherford lacked standing to assert the claims it had 

raised in its petition. 

On June 16, 2020, following a stay,2 the trial court signed a scheduling order, 

which contained an agreed-upon discovery deadline of May 25, 2021. On 

October 20, 2020, Weatherford filed its second amended petition, which is the 

operative pleading for purposes of our review. 

A. Weatherford’s Factual Allegations

Approximately twenty-five years ago, Weatherford purchased a 20.7-acre 

tract (the Site) from Energy Industries, Inc. As part of a joint-venture agreement, 

1

In addition to the City of Midland, Weatherford’s original petition named the following defendants:

AB-Tex Beverage, LTD; Aegis Chemical Solutions, LLC; Aplex Industries, Inc.; Bell Petroleum Services, 

Inc.; Control Power, Inc.; CorCoat I, LLC; Core Laboratories, LP; Dawson Geophysical Company; EcoLogical Environmental Services, Inc.; Exterran Energy Solutions, L.P.; Hy-Bon Engineering Company, 

Inc.; KES (USA) Inc.; Logicoat, Inc.; Luna Mesa Ventures, LLC; NCZ I, Inc.; Pentair, Inc.; Spectrum Brand 

Holdings, Inc.; and Strong Properties, LLC.

2

The lawsuit was stayed in July of 2019, when Weatherford commenced voluntary bankruptcy 

proceedings. The trial court later lifted the stay and signed the scheduling order referenced above. 
3

Weatherford performed an environmental assessment of the Site in November of 

1998. The results of that assessment revealed that a water well located on the Site 

contained certain contaminants. Weatherford subsequently notified the Texas 

Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC)—the nominal predecessor 

to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)3

—of their November 

1998 water testing results. 

Weatherford sold the Site in 2001. Despite the sale, Weatherford continued 

its investigation into the source and cause of the contamination: from 2001 through 

2009, Weatherford installed on the Site numerous groundwater monitoring wells, 

which detected the presence of trichloroethylene (TCE) and perchloroethylene

(Perc). It was determined, however, that the highest concentrations of TCE

originated from an offsite location northeast of the Site. 

In August of 2002, Weatherford submitted an Affected Property Assessment 

Report (APAR) to the TCEQ. The APAR revealed the existence of two 

contaminants—TCE and Perc—on the Site. Two years later, toward the end of 2004, 

the TCEQ conferred with Weatherford in regard to Weatherford’s APAR and the 

contamination of onsite well water. At that time, the TCEQ contested Weatherford’s 

representations in the APAR and required that Weatherford continue groundwater 

contamination delineation procedures offsite on water wells located within a halfmile radius of the Site. The TCEQ ultimately rejected Weatherford’s APAR and 

assessment that it had delineated the affected groundwater.

In December of 2007, ownership of the Site again changed hands. However, 

following another TCEQ investigation in July of 2008, the TCEQ concluded that 

Weatherford was the party responsible for the subject contamination and required 

that Weatherford install at least one set of cluster wells. 

3

In 2004, the TNRCC became the TCEQ. Act of May 28, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 965, 

§ 18.01(a)(1), (b), 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1933, 1985.
4

Between 2009 and 2011, the TCEQ continued its investigation. The TCEQ 

also required that Weatherford continue investigating the potential offsite source of 

the contaminants; however, the TCEQ suggested that, if the source of the 

groundwater contamination on the Site was, in fact, offsite, Weatherford could

consider applying for an “Innocent Owner/Operator (IOP) Certificate.” 

Subsequently, a September 2013 groundwater assessment report, prepared by 

Weatherford’s environmental consultant, ENVIRON, concluded that the 

contamination originated from an up-gradient source that was not connected to or 

associated with the Site. However, without denying the apparent existence of an 

offsite contaminator source, the TCEQ rejected Weatherford’s denial of liability for 

the contamination the following month and requested that Weatherford submit 

another APAR.

As a result, ENVIRON continued its investigation. By February of 2015, 

ENVIRON had alerted the TCEQ that Hy-Bon, as successor-in-interest to 

EndDevices, was potentially responsible for the presence of TCE and any resulting 

contamination. According to Weatherford, Hy-Bon and EndDevices operated in 

close proximity to an upgradient monitoring well located northwest of the Site and, 

in prior decades, had utilized TCE and Freon 113 in its manufacture of electronic 

components. 

Within days, Weatherford provided the TCEQ with ENVIRON’s interim 

APAR, which “outlined the history and operations, previous investigations, offsite 

sources, geology, and hydrogeology” and “recommended the installation of [ten] 

additional [monitoring wells].” Although the TCEQ agreed that an offsite 

contributor was likely, it maintained its contention that “sufficient evidence 

demonstrated that Weatherford used TCE during its operations” and, thus, that 

Weatherford’s operations were also a source and cause of the contamination. 

Weatherford disputed this contention. 
5

In March of 2016, Weatherford submitted a final APAR and an interim 

Response Action Plan (RAP) to the TCEQ. In a response letter dated April 15, 2016, 

the TCEQ tentatively approved Weatherford’s APAR, subject to Weatherford’s 

responses to an enclosed list of comments and Weatherford’s revision of a section of 

the APAR. In a subsequent response letter dated April 25, 2016, the TCEQ approved 

Weatherford’s interim RAP.

Ramboll Energy (Ramboll)—successor to ENVIRON—prepared an “Off-Site 

Investigation Summary” dated August 11, 2016 (the Ramboll Report). The Ramboll 

Report provided that “the primary obstacle to completing Weatherford’s 

investigation was the denial of access to a utility easement behind the EndDevices 

(and subsequently Hy-Bon) property to access [the City’s] sewer system, which it 

believed was one of the sources of TCE contamination in the groundwater plume.”

Ramboll concluded that ENVIRON’s 2013 investigation “revealed no evidence that 

Weatherford or its predecessors or successors” were responsible for the release of 

TCE or Perc on the Site. In addition to its initial Report, Ramboll prepared the final 

RAP, dated September 2, 2016. Ramboll’s RAP proposed methods for remediating 

the contamination, and it concluded that “TCE leaking from the sanitary sewer line 

into adjacent soil was the source area of Perc in the groundwater.”

In its pleadings, Weatherford alleged that it complied with the RAP, which in 

turn caused it to expend millions of dollars to investigate and respond to the 

conditions at the Site. With respect to the City, Weatherford alleged that:

[The City] owned and operated the sewer systems running adjacent to 

the Site and the affected water wells. [The City] also permitted 

EndDevices and Hy-Bon to dispose of hazardous waste, including the 

Contaminants of Concern, through its sewer system. During Ramboll’s 

investigation, it identified the sewer system as a likely source of 

contamination of the Site and affected water wells.

(Emphasis added). As such, Weatherford asserted a contribution claim against the 

City for the response costs it incurred under the SWDA. 
6

B. The City’s Response

In its plea to the jurisdiction, the City contended that Weatherford’s factual 

allegations did not give rise to any liability on behalf of the City under the SWDA

and that governmental immunity barred the claims that Weatherford had asserted 

against it. In support of its plea, the City filed, among other things, a declaration by 

Carl Craigo, the City’s Director of Utilities. Craigo’s declaration provided in part:

4. The City owns and operates a domestic wastewater treatment plant

(“WWTP”) . . . .

5. The City’s domestic WWTP is subject to Texas Pollutant Discharge 

Elimination System Permit No. WQ0010223001 (the “Discharge 

Permit”), which regulates [its] treatment of raw domestic 

wastewater and subsequent discharge.

6. The City has not been required to maintain a TCEQ-approved 

Pretreatment Program historically, and prior to the current Discharge 

Permit, no reference to a TCEQ approved Pretreatment Program 

existed in [the City’s] previous permits.

7. In the absence of a TCEQ-mandated Pretreatment Program, the City 

has historically maintained control over discharges to its wastewater 

collection system by issuing Discharge Licenses to industries that 

seek to discharge into the City’s wastewater collection system. That 

process is robust and requires [the City’s] approvals prior to any 

discharge into the City’s wastewater collection system.

8. Upon a diligent search, the City has no Discharge License records 

for either Hy-Bon Engineering Company, Inc. or EndDevices at any 

point in history, including during the time frame . . . alleged by 

[Weatherford] in the current litigation against the City . . . .

9. As such, [the City] has never known of, nor has it ever identified 

Hy-Bon and EndDevices as entities contributing wastewater to [the 

City’s] wastewater collection system.

10.[Weatherford] ha[s] never contacted [the City] to discuss the 

existence of any release from [the City’s] wastewater collection 

system, nor to discuss any cost recovery for any alleged release of 

contaminants. The first occasion of [the City’s] contact from 

[Weatherford] was their filing of the current litigation . . . .
7

The City also filed objections and a motion to strike Weatherford’s responsive 

evidence to the City’s plea, including the Ramboll Report.

We note that, in Weatherford’s response to the City’s plea, Weatherford 

alleged that Ramboll interviewed a former employee of EndDevices. Thisindividual 

informed Ramboll that, during his employment with EndDevices, “it was common 

practice to dispose of TCE down the sink.” This practice continued, according to 

the unnamed former employee, for over ten years—“with the written approval of 

[the City].” However, Weatherford further explained that, “Ramboll’s efforts to 

locate and obtain the written approval from the City have not been successful.” 

C. The Hearing

On October 21, 2020, the day after Weatherford filed its second amended 

petition, the trial court held a hearing on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion 

to strike. After considering the evidence and arguments, in an order dated 

October 28, 2020, the trial court granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and 

dismissed all claims that Weatherford had asserted against the City with prejudice. 

Additionally, the trial court sustained, in part, the City’s objections and motion to 

strike portions of the Ramboll Report.

In its sole issue, Weatherford contends that, because the SWDA waives the 

City’s governmental immunity, the trial court erred when it granted the City’s plea 

and dismissed Weatherford’s cost-recovery claims for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s order. 

II. Standard of Review

Before a court may dispose of a case, it is essential that the court possess 

subject-matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 

(Tex. 2000). Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case is a 

question of law that we review de novo. Harris Cnty. v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 

612 (Tex. 2018) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 
8

226 (Tex. 2004)); Ector Cnty. v. Breedlove, 168 S.W.3d 864, 865 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2004, no pet.).

III. Analysis

A. Governmental Immunity

The term “sovereign immunity” applies to the State and the divisions of state 

government. Goodson v. City of Abilene, 295 S.W.3d 692, 694 (Tex. App.—Eastland 

2009, no pet.). Although the terms “sovereign immunity” and “governmental 

immunity” are often used interchangeably, “governmental immunity” is the proper 

term to use when referring to political subdivisions of the State, such as cities, 

counties, and school districts. Id. Governmental immunity operates like sovereign 

immunity. Therefore, if the State retains sovereign immunity, its political 

subdivisions, such as the City in the case before us, also retains governmental 

immunity. Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004).

Governmental immunity embraces two concepts: immunity from suit and 

immunity from liability. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 

(Tex. 2006); Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). Courts do 

not possess subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim that is asserted against a 

governmental defendant that is immune from suit unless the State has expressly 

consented to suit. Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 

2003) (“Governmental immunity from suit defeats a [trial] court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction.” (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999))); 

Montgomery Cnty. v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 342 S.W.3d 219, 221–22 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont 2011, no pet.). On the other hand, immunity from liability is an 

affirmative defense, not a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction; however, this 

immunity must still be waived by the State. State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 

(Tex. 2009); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224. Because immunity from suit defeats a 
9

trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, it is properly raised in a plea to the 

jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225–26. 

A governmental entity, such as the City, retains its immunity unless the 

legislature clearly and unambiguously waives it. Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 

S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex. 2022) (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 330). The party seeking 

relief against a governmental entity bears the burden of alleging facts that 

affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Ass’n of 

Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). Further, “when the 

Legislature conditions an immunity waiver on the existence of a statutory violation, 

the elements of the violation are jurisdictional facts.” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. 

Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 784 (Tex. 2018). 

B. Plea to the Jurisdiction

A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea and a proper method by which to 

challenge a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554. The 

purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction is to defeat a pleaded cause of action without 

reaching the merits. Id. A plea to the jurisdiction may challenge the pleadings, the 

existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 770; City of Merkel v. 

Copeland, 561 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018, pet. denied). When the 

plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, as in the case before us, we must 

move beyond the pleadings and consider evidence when necessary to resolve the 

jurisdictional issues, even if the evidence implicates both subject-matter jurisdiction 

and the merits of a claim. Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 770–71 (citing Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 

555). In such cases, the standard of review mirrors that of a traditional summary 

judgment. Id. at 771 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225–26). 

If the plaintiff’s factual allegations are challenged with supporting evidence 

necessary to the consideration of the plea to the jurisdiction, the plaintiff must 

raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to the trial 
10

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and avoid dismissal. Id. (citing Miranda, 133 

S.W.3d at 221). When we determine whether a material fact issue exists, “we must 

take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff, indulging every reasonable 

inference and resolving any doubts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. We cannot, however, 

disregard evidence that is necessary to show context; nor can we disregard evidence 

and inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff if reasonable jurors could not. Id. (citing

City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 811–12, 822–23, 827 (Tex. 2005)). 

Here, Weatherford asserts that the SWDA waives the City’s immunity from 

suit and, thus, that the trial court erred when it granted the City’s plea to the 

jurisdiction. The City maintains that Weatherford failed (1) to identify any act 

committed by the City that would implicate the SWDA’s waiver of the City’s 

governmental immunity and (2) to raise a genuine issue of material fact to overcome 

the City’s challenge to the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons 

discussed below, we agree with the City that Weatherford’s cost-recovery action is 

barred because Weatherford failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether the SWDA’s waiver of immunity applies to any alleged act by the City.

C. The SWDA

Codified in the Texas Health and Safety Code, the SWDA’s express purpose 

is “to safeguard the health, welfare, and physical property of the people and to 

protect the environment by controlling the management of solid waste, including 

accounting for hazardous waste that is generated.” HEALTH & SAFETY § 361.002(a) 

(emphasis added). As such, the SWDA provides mechanisms for the “clean-up” of 

solid waste and authorizes a “person” to recover the costs of remediation from other

“persons”—including a “governmental subdivision”—who are responsible for the 

waste. R.R. St. & Co. v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. 2005); see

HEALTH & SAFETY § 361.003(23) (West Supp. 2021) (defining “person” under the 

SWDA); see also HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 361.272, .197, .344. 
11

To establish a viable cost-recovery claim under the SWDA, a plaintiff must 

prove: 

(1) the defendant is a “person responsible for solid waste” as defined in 

[S]ection 361.271;4

(2) the [TCEQ] approved the plaintiff’s removal or remedial action; 

(3) the action was necessary to address a release or threatened release 

of solid waste; 

(4) the costs of the action were reasonable and necessary; and 

(5) the plaintiff made reasonable attempts to notify the defendant of

both the release and the plaintiff’s intent to take steps to eliminate the 

release.

R.R. St. & Co., 166 S.W.3d at 240 (citing HEALTH & SAFETY § 361.344); e.g.,

Montfort Square Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 3:10-CV1673-D, 2012 WL 2358163, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012); Aviall Servs. Inc. v. 

Cooper Indus., LLC, 694 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574 (N.D. Tex. 2010). In this case, the 

parties dispute concerns the first element: whether the City is a person responsible 

for solid waste under the SWDA.

5

The SWDA prescribes four categories of “persons responsible for solid 

waste.” See HEALTH & SAFETY § 361.271(a)(1)–(4). As relevant here, a “person”—

i.e., “an individual, corporation, organization, government or governmental 

subdivision or agency, business trust, partnership, association, or any other legal 

entity”—is responsible for solid waste if the person:

(1) is any owner or operator of a solid waste facility; [or]

. . . .

(3) by contract, agreement, or otherwise, arranged to process, store, or 

4

See HEALTH & SAFETY § 361.271.

5

We note that, although Weatherford has requested that we take judicial notice of the City’s status 

as a municipality, the City does not dispute that it falls within the SWDA’s definition of “person” as a 

governmental subdivision. 
12

dispose of, or arranged with a transporter for transport to process, store, 

or dispose of, solid waste owned or possessed by the person, by any 

other person or entity at: (A) the solid waste facility owned or operated 

by another person or entity that contains the solid waste; or (B) the site 

to which the solid waste was transported that contains the solid 

waste . . . .

Id. §§ 361.003(23) (emphasis added), .271(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)–(B). “Solid waste 

facility” means:

all contiguous land, including structures, appurtenances, and other 

improvements on the land, used for processing, storing, or disposing of 

solid waste. The term includes a publicly or privately owned solid 

waste facility consisting of several processing, storage, or disposal 

operational units such as one or more landfills, surface impoundments, 

or a combination of units. The term does not include a pyrolysis or 

gasification facility. 

Id. § 361.003(36). For purposes of the SWDA, “solid waste” means:

garbage, rubbish, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water 

supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility, and other 

discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained 

gaseous material resulting from industrial, municipal, commercial, 

mining, and agricultural operations and from community and 

institutional activities. The term: (A) does not include: (i) solid or 

dissolved material in domestic sewage . . . . 

Id. § 361.003(35)(A)(i) (emphasis added). The SWDA, therefore, waives immunity 

if a governmental subdivision, such as the City, is responsible for solid waste. R.R. 

St. & Co., 166 S.W.3d at 240 (holding that satisfaction of Section 361.271(a) is the 

first element of an SWDA cost-recovery claim); see HEALTH & SAFETY

§§ 361.003(23), .271(a). Because a statutory violation is necessary to establish an 

immunity waiver under the SWDA, “jurisdiction and the merits intertwine.” Clark, 

544 S.W.3d at 783; e.g., Zumwalt v. City of San Antonio, No. 03-11-00301-CV, 2012 

WL 1810962, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 17, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

In this case, Weatherford asserts that the City is “a [governmental subdivision]

responsible for solid waste” under either of the following two scenarios: (1) as an 
13

owner or an operator of a solid waste facility, or (2) as an arranger of the disposal of 

solid waste at a solid waste facility. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 361.271(a)(1), (a)(3); 

see also id. § 361.003(23). Therefore, taking as true all evidence that is favorable to 

Weatherford, we must determine if a material fact issue exists as to whether, under 

the SWDA, the City is either (1) an “owner” or “operator” of a solid waste facility 

or (2) an “arranger” of the disposal of solid waste at a solid waste facility. 

When we construe a statute, our primary objective is to give effect to the 

legislature’s intent. Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage 

Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 325 (Tex. 2017); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs, 258 

S.W.3d 627, 631–32 (Tex. 2008). Given the SWDA’s remedial purpose, we construe 

the relevant statutory language liberally to give effect to that purpose. R.R. St. & 

Co., 166 S.W.3d at 238. 

As we have discussed, the City contends that it retains its governmental 

immunity from suit under the SWDA unless it is determined to be responsible for 

solid waste. Clearly, Section 361.271(a)(1) conditions a person’s responsibility for 

solid waste on the person’s status as “any owner or operator of a solid waste facility.” 

HEALTH & SAFETY § 361.271(a)(1). However, and importantly, the record before us 

shows that Weatherford’s allegations against the City, as raised in Weatherford’s 

pleadings, are premised on the City’s operation of a domestic sewer system—not the 

City’s disposal of solid waste. In its second amended petition, Weatherford 

specifically refers to and identifies the City’s sewer systems in connection with the

allegations that it claims establish the City’s liability. The City, in support of its plea, 

explained that its “WWTP system collects domestic sewage for conveyance and 

subsequent treatment” (emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that, pursuant to the 

statute’s unambiguous terms, the SWDA’s cost-recovery provision does not apply to 

the allegations and subject matter—i.e., a domestic wastewater collection system—

that form the factual basis of the claims that Weatherford has asserted against the 
14

City in this case. See id. § 361.003(35)(A)(i) (“‘Solid waste’ . . . does not 

include . . . solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage.”). 

Further, the City negated Weatherford’s factual allegations that the City 

authorized EndDevices and Hy-Bon to dispose of waste into the City’s domestic 

wastewater sewer system. Because Weatherford failed to raise at least a genuine 

issue of material fact to overcome the City’s jurisdictional challenge, we agree with 

the City that neither its actions nor the allegations in Weatherford’s pleadings subject 

the City to the provisions of the SWDA upon which Weatherford relies. Therefore, 

Weatherford failed to establish a waiver of the City’s immunity under the statute. 

Because the statutory definitions of “solid waste facility” and “solid waste” 

are fatal to Weatherford’s cost-recovery claim against the City, we hold that the

governmental immunity waiver provisions contained in the SWDA do not apply to 

the City in this case—regardless of whether the City is characterized as either (1) an 

“owner” or “operator” of a “solid waste facility” or (2) an “arranger” of “solid 

waste.” Accordingly, we overrule Weatherford’s sole issue on appeal.

IV. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the order of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER

JUSTICE

August 31, 2022

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.