No. 93-411 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1994 

MABEL MGAN, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v. 

YELMWSTONE COUNTY, METRAPARK 

and METRAPARK BOARD. 

Defendants and Respondents. CL 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Russell K. Fillner, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Terry L. Seiffert, Billings, Montana 

Gary L. Beiswanger, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Steven J. Lehman, Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole 

and Dietrich, Billings, Montana 

Brent Brooks, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, 

Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: December 16, 1993 

Decided: January 26, 1994 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is a claim of wrongful discharge. The District Court for 

the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, entered 

summary judgment for defendants. We affirm. 

The decisive issues are: 

1. Did the District Court err in dismissing the complaint 

when the motion for summary judgment did not specifically request 

that relief? 

2. Did the court err in determining that plaintiff Mabel 

Logan cannot as a matter of law meet the proximate causation 

requirements necessary for recovery? 

Mabel Logan began working forthe Yellowstone Exhibition/Metra 

(Metra) as a switchboard operator in 1980. In May of 1987, she was 

informed that the switchboard position was going to be eliminated 

in a reorganization. Logan was discharged from employment at the 

Metra on June 30, 1987. 

Logan was between jobs for about three weeks. On July 28, 

1987, she began working as a control operator at the Yellowstone 

County Jail. Her new job at the jail paid ninety cents more per 

hour than her former job. 

While working at the jail, Logan suffered a repetitive motion 

injury to her hands. She filed this action in 1988, claiming that 

defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing and negligently breached their employment contract in 

terminating her employment at Metra. She also claims that the 

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Metrapark Commission-Board is an illegal entity whose void acts 

entitle her to recovery. She seeks compensatory damages including 

loss of PERS, health insurance, and other benefits of employment as 

a result of her repetitive motion injury. She also requests 

punitive damages. Beginning in September 1991, she has received 

temporary total disability benefits through workers' compensation 

for her repetitive motion injury. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment based upon the record, 

which included excerpts from depositions. After briefing and oral 

argument, the court entered summary judgment for defendants on all 

counts. The court ruled, as a matter of law, that Logan's 

discharge from employment at Metra was not the proximate cause of 

her injuries, nor were her injuries foreseeable. The court also 

ruled that Logan cannot recover for her damages because of the 

exclusive recovery doctrine of workers1 compensation law. Further, 

the court ruled that neither the dual capacity doctrine nor the 

intentional tort exception to the exclusivity doctrine applies. 

On the claim of negligent discharge, the court noted Logan's 

concession that she does not have a claim due to case law developments since she filed her complaint. In denying the claim that the 

Metrapark Commission-Board is an illegal entity, the court cited 

5 7-21-3451, MCA, and this Court's opinion in Koch v. Yellowstone 

County (1990), 243 Mont. 447, 795 P.2d 454. The court denied the 

punitive damages claim against Yellowstone County on the basis that 

Yellowstone County is a governmental entity. 

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Issue 1 

Did the District Court err in dismissing the complaint when 

the motion for summary judgment did not specifically request that 

relief? 

The brief in support of the motion for summary judgment 

concluded: 

Plaintiff's Complaint fails on all of its counts because 

Plaintiff cannot establish that she suffered any damages 

that were proximately caused by her discharge from the 

Yellowstone County Metra in 1987. The damages she is 

trying to claim arose three years later when she suffered 

a repetitive motion injury at her job running the 

Yellowstone County jail control board. She has recovered 

damages through Montana's workers' compensation law for 

that repetitive motion injury. She cannot as a matter of 

Montana law establish any proximate cause connection 

between her discharge from employment in 1987 and the 

damages suffered in her repetitive motion injury in 1990 

and after. 

Logan cites cases setting forth the rule that a district court does 

not have jurisdiction to grant relief outside the issues presented. 

See, e.g., In re Custody of C.S.F. (1988), 232 Mont. 204, 755 P.2d 

578. However, in this case, the motion for summary judgment on all 

issues put squarely before the court the issue of whether the 

complaint should be dismissed. We hold that the court did not 

exceed the relief requested when it dismissed the complaint. 

Issue 2 

Did the court err in determining that Logan cannot as a matter 

of law meet the proximate causation requirements necessary for 

recovery in tort law? 
Our standard of review of a summary judgment is the same as 

that of the trial court: Based on the record, are there genuine 

issues of material fact, and is the moving party entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law? Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. ; Knight v. 

City of Missoula (1992), 252 Mont. 232, 243, 827 P.2d 1270, 1276- 

77. In this case the parties do not disagree on issues of material 

fact: instead, their arguments address application of the law to 

the facts. Therefore, we proceed to consider whether the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Logan argues that defendants should have foreseen that she 

could lose her PERS, health insurance, and other benefits as a 

result of the termination of her employment at Metra. She states 

that, had she not been wrongfully discharged from her job as a 

switchboard operator at Metra, she never would have taken the 

Yellowstone County Jail job and suffered a repetitive motion 

injury. She therefore claims defendants are obligated for all 

damages she has suffered that have not been paid by Yellowstone 

County's workers1 compensation carrier. She maintains that the 

question of foreseeability is, at minimum, one for a jury. 

Because Logan's discharge from employment preceded the 

effective date of the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, Title 

39, Ch. 2, Part 9, this action was brought under common law 

theories. Breach of the duty to deal fairly and in good faith in 

the employment relationship is a tort. Gates v. Life of Montana 

Ins. Co. (1983), 205 Mont. 304, 307, 668 P.2d 213, 215. Atort is 

5 
comprised of three basic elements: (1) existence of a legal duty 

from defendant to plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) the 

damage as a proximate result. Joseph v. Hustad Corporation (1969), 

153 Mont. 121, 124, 454 P.2d 916, 918. Proximate cause is analyzed 

in terms of foreseeability. "A defendant is liable for his 

wrongful conduct if it is reasonably foreseeable that plaintiff's 

injury may be the natural and probable consequence of that 

conduct." Thayer v. Hicks (1990), 243 Mont. 138, 155, 793 P.2d 

784, 795. 

Whether or not there is substantial evidence to raise an issue 

of fact is a question of law for the court and not an issue of fact 

for the jury. Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Snider (1991), 247 

Mont. 508, 513, 808 P.2d 475, 478; Flansberg v. Montana Power Co. 

(l969), 154 Mont. 53, 60, 460 P.2d 263, 267. We agree with the 

District Court that the causal connection between Logan's discharge 

from employment and her repetitive motion injury is so remote that 

the injury cannot reasonably be described as a foreseeable result 

of the discharge from employment three years earlier. There is 

insufficient evidence in the record to support a reasonable 

inference that Logan's injuries were caused by defendants' act in 

discharging her from employment at Metra. 

We conclude the court properly entered summary judgment for 

defendants on the claim of wrongful discharge, due to insufficient 

evidence on the causation element. Because we so conclude, we need 

not rule on the issues relating to the exclusivity doctrine of 

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workers' compensation or the legality of the Metrapark Board. Nor 

is it necessary that we rule on the correctness of the court's 

separate conclusion that punitive damages are not available against 

Metrapark as a government entity. 

Aff inned. 

We concur: 

Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., dissents from the foregoing opinion. 

Justice 
January 26, 1994 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following 

named.. 

Teny L. Seiffert, Esq. 

316 No. 33rd St. 

P.O. Box 31181 

Billings, MT 59107 

Gary L. Beiswanger, Esq. 

P.O. Box 20562 

Billings, MT 59104 

Steven J. Lehman, Esq. 

Crowley , Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich 

P.O. Box 2529 

Billings, MT 59103-2529 

Brent Brooks 

Deputy County Attorney 

P.O. Box 35025 

Billings, MT 59104 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

STAT OF MONTANA 

I 

BY: 

Depu