A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT A TTORNEYS FOR A PPE L LEE

Taffanee L. Keys Gregory F. Zoeller Fishers, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

_________________

_____________________________________________________________



# In the 

# Indiana Supreme Court

_________________________________ No. 29S02

- 0811

- CR

- 590

T HOMAS A. A RMFIELD , Appellant (Defendant below)
,

v.

S TATE OF I NDIANA , Appellee (Plaintiff below)

.

_________________________________ Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court, No. 29D03

- 0509

- FC

- 384 The Honorable William Greenaway, Judge Pro Tempore

_________________________________ On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 29A02

- 0802

- CR

- 101

_________________________________

December 18, 2009
Sullivan, Justice.

This case requires us to resolve the issue of when an officer has reasonable suspicion to
i n itiate a traffic stop after a routine status check of a license plate reveals that t he driver‟s license of the registered owner of the vehicle is suspended

. W e provide the analytical framework to r esolve the issue presented here and in an other case we decide today, Holly v. State
, – N.E.2d

– , No. 49S02

- 0811

- CR

- 591, slip op. (Ind. Dec. 18 , 2009).2 Background

At approximately 12:30 a.m. on September 12, 2005, Carmel Police Officer Brian Schmidt was patrolling the roads during the night shift verifying vehicle registrations and ru nning checks on license plates. Officer Schmidt ran a licen se plate check on a 1992 blue GMC, which was traveling in the same direction ahead of him. While waiting on the results, O f ficer Schmidt passed the GMC. The license plate check indicated that Thomas Armfield was the re gistered owner and that he had a lif etime suspension of his driving privileges. Officer Schmidt verified that the license plate, make, model, and color of the GMC matched the results from the check. He did not have the opportunity to verify anything about the identity of the driver in the short time it took for him to pass the GMC. 1 Officer Schmidt then asked Officer Michael Flynn, who was driving behind him, for assistance with initiating a traffic stop in order to identify the driver. Prior to the stop, he provided Officer Flynn the fol lowing information: the GMC‟s l icense plate number, a physical description of the vehicle, and the fact that the registered owner had a lifetime suspe n sion of driving privileges.

After Officer Flynn initiated the stop, Officer Schmidt approached the vehi cle and asked
the driver if his name was Tom. The driver replied in the affirmative. Even though the driver
did not have a physical form of identification, he again stated that he was Thomas Ar m field and gave Officer Schmidt his date of birth. Officer S chmidt then arrested Armfield and transported him to the Hamilton County Jail. The State subsequently charged Armfield with Operating a
Motor Vehicle After Forfeiture of License for L ife, a Class C felony under Indiana Code Section
9

- 30

- 10

- 17. Challengin g the validity of the traffic stop, Armfield filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied after an evidentiary hearing. At trial, the court overruled Armfield‟s objection to the testimony from Officer Schmidt regarding the traffic stop. The j ury found Ar mfield guilty , and the trial court sentenced him to six years in the Indiana Department of Corre ction, with two years to be executed on work release and four years suspended to prob a tion.

1 In addition, Armfield testified at his su ppression hearing that “[t]he window tint on that vehicle is dark tint, to where at night you would not be able to see through.” (Tr. 13.)3

Armfield appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the stop was valid and that the trial court properly admitted the evidence resulting from the stop because “kno wledge that the registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended license is enough to constitute re asonable suspicion for an officer to take the minimal action of initiating a traffic stop.” Armfield
v. State , 894 N.E.2d 195, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 2 Armfield petitioned for, and we granted, transfer, Armfield v. State , 898 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. 2008) (t able)
, in order to resolve a spli t in the Court of Appeals on the issue of whether a police officer‟s knowledge that the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license constitutes reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigat o ry traffic stop.

Discussion

I

Armfield challenge s the trial court‟s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence that was gathered from the traffic stop (i.e., Officer Schmidt‟s testimony regarding the stop). He a rgues that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment 3 rights because Off icer Schmidt‟s knowl edge
that Armfield had a lifetime suspension of driving privileges did not constitute reasonable susp icion of criminal activity to initi ate a stop

. 4 His specific contention is that the stop was “impe r-

2 On appeal, Armfield also raised the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support his convi ction. The Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to support Armfield‟s conviction. Armfield , 894 N.E.2d at 199. We summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).

3 The Fourth Amendment to t he United States Constitution states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be v iolated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and pa rticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This provision a pplies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Krise v. State , 746 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind. 2001) (citing Mapp v. Oh io , 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961))

.

4 Armfield also contends for the first time in his petition to transfer that the traffic stop “infringed upon [his] privacy rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.” (Appellant‟s Pet. to Transf. 10.) He presents no arguments in his briefs to support this contention. We thus address his contentions in light of federal, not state, constitutional law. See Myers v. State , 839 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind. 2006) (“Where a party, though citing Indiana con stitutional authority, presents no separate argument specifically treating and analyzing a claim under the Indiana Constitution distinct from its federal counterpart, we r esolve the party‟s claim „on the basis of federal constitutional doctrine and express no opinion as to what,4

missible” b e cause “Officer Schmidt did not obtain any p hysical description or other information which would have indicated Armfield was the driver” prior to initiating the stop. (Appellant‟s
Pet . to Transf. 8.)

The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Fourth Amendment‟s “protections extend
to brief in vestigatory stops of persons or vehicles that f all short of traditional arrest .” United
States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) ( citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). Under Terry , an officer is permitted to “ stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulabl e facts that criminal activity „may be afoot,‟ even if th e officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) ( quoting Terry , 392 U.S. at 3 0 ); see also United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.”).

We review trial court determination s of reasonable suspicion de novo

. State v. Bulin gton , 802 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ind. 2004) ( citing Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 273

- 74). The U.S. Supreme Court has also directed reviewing courts to “make reasona ble

- suspicion determinations by
look [ ing ] at the „totali ty of the circumstances‟ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a „particularized and objective basis‟ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Id.

The issue presented here is whether a police officer is required to verify that the driver of
the vehicle matches the physical description of the registered owner obtained from the license plate check before there is reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop.

Two strands of case law from the Court of Appeals address this question. One strand

st ands for the proposition that a police officer must verify that the driver of the v e hicle matches the description of the owner obtained from the license plate check in order to have re a sonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop. In Wilkinson v. State , 743 N.E.2d 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001),
trans. denied
, the court held that the stop of a vehicle whose license plate indicated the owner

if any, differences there may be‟ u nder the Indiana Constitution.” ( quoting Williams v. State , 690 N.E.2d 162, 167 (Ind. 1997)) )

.5

was a habitual traffic violator was proper where the officer could see the driver and determine
that the driver matched the description of the owner. Id. at 1271. An often

- cited footnote in
Wilkinson stated: “We note that had the officer not obtained a physical description or other i nformation indicating Wilkinson was the driver of the car, we would find the stop imper miss ib le

. . . .” Id. at 1271 n.2. I n Holly v. State , 888 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), aff‟d on other grounds
, – N.E.2d

– ( the companion case to this one ) , the court explicitly adopted the reasoning
from Wilkinson and held that “[a] police officer‟s knowle dge that an owner of a vehicle may not
la w fully drive creates reasonable suspicion of criminal activity only where the officer has reason
to b e lieve that the owner is actually driving the vehicle .” Id

. at 343

. The court found the stop in
Ho l ly to be impr oper because “the officer ha[d] observed absolutely nothing that would indicate that the driver of the vehicle [wa]s the owner [

. ] ” Id.

The second strand of Court of Appeals case law holds a police officer‟s knowledge that the registered owner of a ve hicle has a suspended license constitutes reasonable suspicion to i nitiate a Terry stop without matching the driver with the owner‟s physical description. In Ke nworthy v. State , 738 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied , the court concluded that the officer had “reasonable suspicion to stop and a p proach the truck to investigate” the identity of the driver because he had personal knowledge of the re g istered owner‟s license suspension, was aware that the vehicle he observed belonged to the registere d owner, and confirmed his susp icions through a radio check. Id. at 331. The court found the stop to be proper even though “[d]ue to the late hour, [the o fficer ] could not readily determine who was driving the truck [] ” b efore he initiated the stop. Id. at 330. In State v. Ritter
, 801 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004),

trans. denied
, the court explicitly rejected Wilkinson and followed Kenworthy . The court held that “[the officer] had a reasonable suspicion to stop Ritter‟s car in order to determine wheth er it was Ritter who was driving it [] ” because his license plate check revealed that Ritter was its regi stered owner and that Ritter had a suspended license. Id. at 693. The fact that “[the officer] could not see the person driving the v e hicle and could not verify if the driver matched the description of Ritter” did not make the stop impr o per. Id. 5

5 The court noted that “[h]ad [the o fficer ] been able to see the driver of the vehicle, and been able to di scern that the person driving the car did not match the description of Ritter, our result might have been di ffe r ent. However, we are not faced with that situation.” Ritter , 801 N.E.2d at 693.6

In the case before us, the court explicitly agreed with Ritter and Kenworthy “that kno wledge that the registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended licen se is enough to constitute re ason a ble suspicion for an officer to take the minimal action of initiating a traffic stop.” Armfield
, 894 N.E.2d a t 198

.

II

In Bannister v. State , 904 N.E.2d 1254 (Ind. 2009), Officer Myers saw a pickup truck pass in front o f him at an intersection, proceeded to follow the truck, and then conducted a l icense plate check. The check indicated that Bannister was the registered owner, and that his driver‟s license had been suspended for life because he was a habitual traffic off ender. The check also indicated Bannister‟s gender, height, weight, and hair color. Id. at 1255. Based on this physical description and his unobstructed view of the driver as the truck passed in front of him, 6 the officer stopped the vehicle to determin e whether the driver was Bannister. Id. On a ppeal, Bannister argued that the officer‟s knowledge that the registered owner of the vehicle was a habitual traffic offender did not constitute reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop. He sp ecifically c o n tended that the stop was improper because it was the first time Officer Myers had ever seen his vehicle and that Myers was unable to identify any characteristics of the driver. Id.
at 1256.

Contrary to Bannister‟s contentions, this Court noted the offi cer‟s trial testimony that the
driver was a male with brown hair, which closely matched the physical description of Banni s ter obtained prior to the stop. Id. We also credited the officer‟s testimony that he saw the driver at a lighted intersection in cle ar weather. We analogized the facts in Bannister to those in Wilki n son , where the officer making the Terry stop could see the driver and determine that the driver matched the description of the owner. Based on these similar facts, we arrived at the same r e sult
as the court in Wilkinson , and held that “[u]nder this evidence, we conclude that [the o ffic er ] had

6 The officer‟s testimony at trial was that he saw the driver at a lighted intersection in clear weather and that the driver “closely matched the description of Mr. Bannister [that he received from the license check].” Id. at 1256.7

reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop to determine whether it was Bannister dri ving the vehicle. The stop was not a violation of Ban nister‟s Fourth Amen d ment rights.” Id. We
also discussed Ritter , which , as noted above, held that it had been proper to stop a vehicle to d etermine whether it was being driven by its owner, but had also said, “„Had [the o fficer ] been able
to see the driv er of the vehicle, and been able to discern that the person driving the car did not match the description of Ritter, our result might have been different.‟” Id. ( quoting Ri t ter , 801 N.E.2d at 693).

Bannister did not, however, explicitly provide the rule for the question presented here: whether a police officer is required to verify that the driver of the vehicle matches the physical description of the registered owner obtained from the license plate check before there is reason able suspicion to initiate a Terry stop. In this regard, state courts in other jurisdictions have pr ovided helpful guidance. State supreme courts that have addressed this issue uniformly hold that

an o f ficer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop when (1) the officer kno ws that the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license and (2) the officer is unaware of any ev idence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of the vehicle. See State
v. Tozier , 905 A.2d 836, 838

- 39 (Me. 2006); Commonw ealth v. De ramo , 762 N.E.2d 815, 818 (Mass. 2002); State v. Pike , 551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 1996) ; State v. Halvorson
, 997 P.2d 751, 753 (Mont. 2000); State v. Richter
, 765 A.2d 687, 689 (N.H. 2000) . State intermediate courts of appeal that have contende d with this issue have reached the same conclusion. See Vi llage of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd , 591 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); State v. Mills , 458 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); People v. Jones
, 678 N.W.2d 627, 631 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Howard , 766 N.E.2d 179, 183 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); State v. Panko , 788 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).

The safety of Indiana‟s roadways strongly points toward initiating a Terry stop when the police officer knows that the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license. But this leg itimate public safety concern is, of course, subject to the Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. We believe that this right is vindicated by requiring8

that officers mu st be unaware of any evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner i s not the driver of the vehicle before initiating a Terry stop. 7

We hold that an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop when (1) the o fficer knows that the re gistered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license and (2) the officer is unaware of any evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of the vehicle. This rule does not require officers to match the physical description of th e registered

ow n er from the license plate check to the driver of the vehicle before initiating a Terry stop. We agree with the State that “requiring the officer to verify the driver of the vehicle strikes against basic principles of safety [because it] pu ts the onus on the officer to maneuver himself into a p osition to clearly observe the driver in the midst of traffic.” (State‟s Resp

. to Accept Transf. 5.) In addition, we acknowledge the difficulty that the driver verification requirement would i m pose

o n officers during late night hours and in situations where car windows are darkly tinted, as was
the case here.

To the extent that prior opinions of the Court of Appeals are inconsistent with our hol ding today, we disapprove those decisions. See Holly
, 888 N.E.2d 338
, aff‟d on other grounds
, – N.E.2d

– ; Wilkinson , 743 N.E.2d 1267.

7 Courts in other jurisdictions hav e provided helpful examples of evidence or circumstances which ind icate that the owner is not the driver of the v ehicle. The Minnesota Supreme Court posited this hypothet ical:
[I] f the officer knows that the owner of a vehicle has a revoked license and further, that the owner is a 22

- year

- ol d male, and the officer observes that the person driving the v ehicle is a 50

- or 60

- year

- old woman, any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity evap orates. Absent other articulable facts which would give rise to such suspicion, it would be

u n constitutio nal for the officer to make a stop in such a sit uation.

Pike , 551 N.W.2d at 922. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has noted that “if the driver were of a different gender than the owner, the officer would lack reasonable grounds to assume the owner wa s dri ving. ” Tozier , 905 A.2d at 839 n.1 ( citing Jones , 678 N.W.2d at 631 n.4 (“[I]f the registered owner was a male and the driver was a female, the officer would not have reasonable grounds to assume that the driver was the owner.”)). We agree w ith thes e courts that under such circumstances, the officer would lack re asonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop.9 III

Here, while driving behind Armfield‟s vehicle, Officer Brian Schmidt conducted a l icense plate check at approximately 12:30 a.m. After he passed the vehicle, the resul ts from the check revealed that its registered owner, Thomas Armfield, had a lifetime suspension of driving privileges. Officer Schmidt did not remember if the vehicle had tinted windows or an y thing that would prevent him from seeing inside the vehicle pr ior to the stop, but Armfield test i fied at his suppression hearing that “[t]he window tint on that vehicle is dark tint, to where at night you would not be able to see through.” (Tr. 13.) Officer Schmidt confirmed that the l i cense plate, make, model, and color of the vehicle matched the information from the license plate check b efore initiating the stop. He testified that the check also provided him with the re g istered owner‟s name, address, and physical description. Officer Schmidt made the stop in ord er to determine
whether the information he received from the check matched that of the driver. He approached the vehicle and asked if the driver was Tom, to which the driver affirmatively r e sponded. Even though he had no physical form of identification a t the time of the stop, the driver further ident ified himself as Thomas Armfield and provided his date of birth. Officer Schmidt then arrested Armfield and transported him to the Hamilton County Jail.

Under the two

- prong test that we adopt today, we conc lude that Officer Schmidt had re asonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of Armfield‟s vehicle because (1) he had knowledge that Armfield was the registered owner of the vehicle and that Armfield had a lifetime suspe nsion of driving privileges and (2) he was unaware of any evidence or circumstances which ind icated that Armfield was not the driver of the vehicle. Officer Schmidt also acted properly after initiating the stop when he first ascertained the registered owner‟s name, address, and physical
descr iption before he approached the vehicle and then verified that the name of the driver matched that of the registered owner.10 Conclusion

The investigatory Terry stop of Armfield‟s vehicle was proper. We therefore affirm the
trial court‟s denial of Ar mfield‟s motion to suppress the evidence gathered during the stop. The trial court properly admitted this evidence, and we affirm its judgment.

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.