IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30085

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JOSE D. BASTARDO-VILLANUEVA,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:15-CR-176-1

Before JONES, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jose D. Bastardo-Villanueva challenges the judgment and sentence of 

48-months’ imprisonment, imposed after he entered a conditional guilty plea 

to possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841 (a)(1). Bastardo claims the court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

evidence seized from his rental vehicle after a traffic stop because: (1) the use 

of a dog sniff impermissibly extended the length of the traffic stop beyond its 

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 10, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 17-30085

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original purpose; (2) the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity to extend the stop; and (3) the officer did not have a valid consent to 

search the vehicle.

In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, in this instance through 

a detailed and comprehensive order, “we review factual findings for clear error, 

and the ultimate constitutionality of law enforcement action de novo”. United 

States v. Zuniga, 860 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 2017). “Factual findings are 

clearly erroneous only if a review of the record leaves this [c]ourt with a definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. 

Hearn, 563 F.3d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). 

The clearly erroneous standard is particularly deferential where, as 

here, “denial of a suppression motion is based on live oral testimony . . . because 

the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses”. 

United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation 

omitted). Moreover, in addition to deferring to the court’s factual findings, the 

evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in 

this instance, the Government. United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th 

Cir. 2010). The district court’s ruling may be upheld “on any basis established 

by the record”. Id. (citing United States v. Charles, 406 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 

2006)).

The legality of a traffic stop is examined under the two-pronged analysis 

described in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). United States v. Brigham, 382 

F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). First examined is whether the initial 

official action was justified; second, whether the subsequent action was 

reasonably related in scope either to the circumstances that justified the stop 

or to dispelling a reasonable suspicion that developed during the stop. Id. at 

506–07.

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Bastardo does not dispute the initial stop was “arguably justified” based 

on probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred. The court 

pretermitted the issues of whether the dog sniff impermissibly extended the 

duration of the stop and whether Bastardo provided valid consent to search his 

vehicle. We need not address those issues, because this appeal is resolved by 

addressing Bastardo’s challenge to the court’s ruling the officer had reasonable 

suspicion to continue the traffic stop. 

Regarding whether the officer who initiated the traffic stop had a 

reasonable suspicion to continue it, the record reveals the officer: (1) was a 12-

year veteran of the sheriff’s department, was assigned to the K-9 unit, and was 

traveling with his dog, which was trained to detect drugs; (2) was also a 

member of the task force with the Drug Enforcement Administration;

(3) noticed Bastardo was so nervous his hand was visibly shaking to such an 

extent that he dropped his driver’s license; (4) noticed Bastardo’s rented vehicle 

was almost two days past the return date memorialized on the rental 

agreement and Bastardo was driving in the opposite direction of the drop-off 

location; and (5) doubted Bastardo’s travel itinerary, which conflicted with his 

explanation that he wanted to save money and had been in Texas for the week 

prior. The record further reveals the officer had not obtained the results of his 

requested computer check and had not completed the initial purpose of the stop 

by issuing a citation prior to the use of the dog-sniff. Viewing these facts in 

the above-referenced requisite light most favorable to the Government, the 

officer had a particularized and objective basis to believe criminal activity was 

afoot. Zuniga, 860 F.3d at 280 (evidence viewed in light most favorable to 

prevailing party). 

Furthermore, the length of the Terry stop was not impermissibly long. 

The 15 minutes that elapsed from the stop until the dog’s positive alert on the 

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vehicle was reasonable, in the light of the officer’s early formation of reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity, and because the K-9 unit was already on the 

scene at the time of the initial stop. Pack, 612 F.3d at 345–46. 

As Bastardo concedes on appeal, the dog’s positive alert for the presence 

of narcotics provided sufficient probable cause to search Bastardo’s vehicle, 

regardless of any subsequent consent. United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 

431, 444 (5th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the court did not err in denying 

Bastardo’s suppression motion. Zuniga, 860 F.3d at 280.

AFFIRMED. 

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