NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

ANTHONY G. CLARKE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2010-5133 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Case No. 10-CV-283, Judge Nancy B. Firestone. 

____________________________ 

Decided: November 5, 2010 

____________________________ 

ANTHONY G. CLARKE, of Savannah, Tennessee, pro se. 

COURTNEY S. MCNAMARA, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendantappellee. With her on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, 

and BRIAN M. SIMKIN, Assistant Director. 

__________________________ 
CLARKE v. US 2

Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE and MOORE, Circuit 

Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

DECISION

Anthony Clarke appeals from the decision of the 

United States Court of Federal Claims (“the Claims 

Court”) dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Clarke v. United States, Fed. Cl. No. 10-283C 

(May 24, 2010). Because the Claims Court correctly 

determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Clarke’s claim, which pertained to civil rights 

and requested equitable relief, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Clarke’s suit in the Claims Court is based on complaints he filed with the Office of the Inspector General of 

the United States Department of Housing and Urban 

Development (the “OIG” of the “HUD”) and HUD’s office 

of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (“FHEO”) in April 

1998. The FHEO closed Clarke’s case in May 1998, 

finding that there were “no valid issues.” 

Clarke’s complaint in the Claims Court alleges that 

the HUD complaints he filed (which apparently were 

consolidated) were used to further investigations of fraud, 

waste, and abuse of federal funds. At the same time, 

Clarke alleges that the FHEO misrepresented the status 

of the complaints, claiming that they were closed and had 

been destroyed. Clarke’s complaint alleges that the 

government failed to protect him from housing discrimination, a duty that Clarke alleges arose when the government signed a Form HHS-690. The Claims Court 

noted that Clarke’s complaint made no mention of money 

damages. Rather, the court found that although he did 

not specify the relief he sought, it appeared Clarke was 
3 CLARKE v. US

seeking to reopen his 1998 complaint, alleging that he 

was denied equal protection of the law and that the 

government had violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 3631, 14141, 28 C.F.R. Pt 35 A, B, C, D, F, and 

various community development block grant laws. The 

Claims Court noted that none of the cited criminal statutes provided a basis for Clarke to bring a civil action. In 

addition, the Claims Court determined 42 U.S.C. § 14141 

to be irrelevant because it allows the U.S. Attorney General to bring a civil action for civil rights violations committed by law enforcement. The Claims Court further 

noted that the cited regulations, which addressed nondiscrimination on the basis of disability, or the community development block grant laws, which appeared to 

address civil rights violations, would not provide the 

Claims Court with jurisdiction, because the United States 

district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claimed 

civil rights violations. 

The Claims Court thereafter dismissed Clarke’s claim 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Clarke timely 

appealed. 

DISCUSSION

We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Res. Conservation 

Group, LLC v. United States, 597 F.3d 1238, 1242 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010).

Clarke argues that the Claims Court erred in dismissing his claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To 

support his contention, Clarke alleges that his claim 

before the HUD’s OIG had merit based on an audit report, 

but that substantial portions of that original claim were 

“blanked out” by the office because it substantiated various violations he had alleged. Clarke further argues that 

the Claims Court should have inferred that his claim was 
CLARKE v. US 4

a “non-tort monetary claim under special jurisdiction,” 

and brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Lastly, Clarke 

appears to argue here that his suit is a qui tam action 

under the False Claims act, and that because his complaint to the HUD resulted in the discovery of some kind 

of fraud, he was entitled to some percentage of $109 

million. As a result of this claim, Clarke argues, there 

was no need for him to mention money damages in his 

complaint. 

The government counters that none of Clarke’s arguments constitutes an allegation of the existence of a 

contract or money-mandating statute or regulation giving 

rise to jurisdiction in the Claims Court. Specifically, the 

government argues that Clarke’s first argument has to do 

with the merits of his original claim before the HUD, 

rather than relating to the Claims Court’s jurisdiction 

over his action. The government argues that Clarke’s 

suggestion that his claim was a non-tort monetary action 

brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491 is conclusory, and 

merely states that the court should have inferred that it 

had jurisdiction over his claim. Lastly, the government 

argues that Clarke did not allege in the Claims Court that 

his claim was a qui tam action. Nonetheless, the government argues that such allegations would not support 

jurisdiction in the Claims Court. 

We conclude that the Claims Court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 

Clarke’s claim. The Tucker Act is a waiver of sovereign 

immunity allowing a plaintiff to sue the United States for 

money damages. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 

212 (1983). It establishes the limited jurisdiction of the 

Claims Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1491. In order to invoke the 

Claims Court’s jurisdiction, however, a plaintiff must 

identify a money-mandating source within a contract, 

regulation, statute, or constitutional provision itself. 
5 CLARKE v. US

Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 

F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). That is because the 

Tucker Act creates no substantive right of recovery 

against the United States. United States v. Testan, 424 

U.S. 392, 398 (1976). As a result, Clarke’s claim that he 

was bringing a non-tort monetary action under the 

Tucker Act is insufficient to bestow jurisdiction on the 

Claims Court. The Claims Court rightly looked to the 

statutes and regulations cited by Clarke to determine 

whether any of them constituted a money-mandating 

source and correctly concluded that they did not. The 

criminal statutes cited by Clarke do not provide a basis 

for an action in civil court. And, as the Claims Court 

explained, jurisdiction over claimed civil rights violations 

lies in the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1343. To the extent 

Clarke is seeking equitable relief, the Claims Court does 

not have jurisdiction over such claims where they are 

entirely unrelated to a money judgment. See, e.g,, Bowen 

v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 905 (1988). 

Clarke did not allege in the Claims Court that he was 

filing a qui tam action pursuant to the False Claims Act. 

Nevertheless, the Claims Court does not have jurisdiction 

over qui tam suits. Such suits must be brought in the 

district courts. LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 

1031 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Lastly, subject matter jurisdiction 

is a threshold issue; without jurisdiction over the subject 

matter, the court must dismiss the claim. PODS, Inc. v. 

Porta Stor, Inc., 484 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

Therefore, Clarke’s arguments as to the merits of the 

complaints he filed with the HUD are irrelevant to the 

jurisdictional question. 

Accordingly, we affirm the Claims Court’s decision 

dismissing Clarke’s complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 
CLARKE v. US 6

AFFIRMED 

COSTS

No costs.