UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

_________________________________________ 

 ) 

KIMBERLY MOORE STARKS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civil Action No. 13-1378 (ESH) 

 ) 

FANNIE MAE, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

_________________________________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, 

Motion to Compel Arbitration [ECF No. 5]. The Court advised the plaintiff of her obligations 

under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of this Court to respond to the 

motion, and specifically warned her that, if she did not respond to the motion by November 15, 

2013, the Court would treat the motion as conceded. At the plaintiff’s request, the Court 

extended the deadline to December 2, 2013. To date, the plaintiff has not filed an opposition to 

the motion, nor has she requested a second extension of time. Therefore, the motion could be 

granted as conceded. See Local Civil Rule 7(b). But, the Court concludes that this action must 

be dismissed for two independent reasons. 

 First, defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII”), see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., because she failed to timely 

file this lawsuit. Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Support of its Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, 

Mot. to Compel Arbitration [ECF No. 5-1] (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 2-3. Generally, a plaintiff who 

has filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
2 

(“EEOC”) must file her lawsuit within 90 days of receipt of a right-to-sue notice. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(f)(1). Plaintiff alleges that she received the notice on April 30, 2013, see Compl. ¶ 4, 

and the Clerk of Court received plaintiff’s complaint 91 days later, on July 30, 2013.1

 The 

complaint was therefore not filed on time and will be dismissed on that ground. 

 Defendant also moves for referral of the plaintiff’s claims to arbitration pursuant to 

Fannie Mae’s Dispute Resolution Policy. See Def.’s Mem. at 3-4. In support of its motion, 

defendant submits a copy of plaintiff’s application for employment, pursuant to which plaintiff 

“agreed to be bound by Fannie Mae’s Dispute Resolution Policy.” Id., Ex. 1 (Application for 

Employment dated February 11, 2000) at 4. The Dispute Resolution Policy purportedly “applies 

to all claims that an employee might make against Fannie Mae . . . involving a legally-protected 

right, that directly or indirectly relate to . . . her employment or the termination of that 

employment,” such as “claims asserting rights protected by . . . Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964 [and the] Age Discrimination in Employment Act.” Id., Ex. 2 (Dispute Resolution 

Policy effective March 16, 1998) at 1. It appears that all of plaintiff’s claims pertain to her 

employment and termination of her employment at Fannie Mae and thus are subject to Fannie 

Mae’s Dispute Resolution Policy. Accordingly, even if the complaint had been timely filed, 

defendant’s motion to compel arbitration would be granted and the claims stayed or dismissed 

pending the conclusion of arbitration. 

 A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

 /s/ 

 ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE 

 United States District Judge 

Date: December 11, 2013 

 

1

 The filing date that appears on the electronic docket, September 11, 2013, is immaterial because a case is not 

formally docketed until after a ruling on an application to proceed in forma pauperis.