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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OLIVER ROSAS ROSAS

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 23-916

Agency No.

A088-980-977

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted July 16, 2024

Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, PAEZ, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Oliver Rosas Rosas (“Rosas”), a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration 

Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for protection under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as 

here, “the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and the law, [the court] 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUL 30 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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reviews only the BIA’s decision, except to the extent it expressly adopts the IJ’s 

decision.” Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 769–70 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Eneh v. 

Holder, 601 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2010)). We review the agency’s legal 

conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. See Flores 

Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022). We grant the petition for the 

reasons below.

Rosas bases his application for CAT protection on his fear that he will be 

killed or tortured by a cartel or law enforcement if removed to Mexico. He 

contends that because he is a former gang member with noticeable, gang-related 

tattoos, a cartel will forcefully target and recruit him and torture or kill him if he 

refuses to join them. 

“To receive CAT protection, a petitioner must prove that it is ‘more likely 

than not’ that he or she would be tortured if removed.” Lalayan v. Garland, 4 

F.4th 822, 840 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). In evaluating the probability of 

torture under CAT, “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall 

be considered.” Cole, 659 F.3d at 770 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)). 

Although the agency is not required to “discuss each piece of evidence submitted,” 

where “highly probative” or “potentially dispositive” “evidence is submitted, the 

BIA must give reasoned consideration to that evidence.” Id. at 771–72. Failure to 

do so amounts to legal error. Id.; see also Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1077 
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(9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here there is any indication that the agency did not consider 

all of the evidence before it ... the decision cannot stand.” (cleaned up)).

Here, we conclude that the agency committed legal error because it failed to 

give reasoned consideration to highly probative evidence about Rosas’s risk of 

torture by cartels. For example, the BIA’s decision concludes that Rosas does not 

face a particularized risk of torture but never mentions the expert declaration from 

a prominent reporter on cartel networks and government corruption, which

described how Rosas matches the age and profile of young men targeted by cartels. 

Similarly, the agency found that Rosas has not specifically identified any similarly 

situated gang members who have been tortured upon removal to Mexico, but failed 

to acknowledge the evidence he submitted about two different Mexican citizens 

who were tortured upon deportation—including one who was a former gang 

member and had an identical tattoo on his hand. 

Ultimately, the BIA’s analysis suggests it did not adequately review the 

evidentiary record. In light of these omissions, we cannot conclude that the BIA

“consider[ed] all of the evidence before it.” Cole, 659 F.3d at 771–72. We 

therefore GRANT the petition, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND for 

further proceedings consistent with this disposition. Having granted the petition on 

the merits, we DENY the pending motions for stay as moot.

PETITION GRANTED. VACATED and REMANDED.