J-S16045-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CALIL TIMAZEE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2576 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 21, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004012-2017

BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 31, 2024

Appellant Calil Timazee appeals the order entered by the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying his petition pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 After careful review, we affirm.

Appellant was charged with criminal homicide in connection with the 

April 24, 2017 shooting death of Boris Kimber, Jr. (“the victim”). On April 22, 

2019, on the day his jury trial was set to commence, Appellant chose to plead 

guilty to third-degree murder and possessing an instrument of crime (PIC). 

In doing so, Appellant admitted to the following factual basis for his 

plea: on April 24, 2017, at approximately midnight, Appellant was inside his 

Philadelphia apartment with his girlfriend, Whitney Burrison, as well as the 

victim, and the victim’s girlfriend, Imani Talbert. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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4/22/19, at 23-24; N.T., 6/17/19, at 3-4. Appellant had allowed the victim 

and Ms. Talbert to stay at his apartment while they looked for a place to live. 

N.T., 4/22/19, at 24. The parties began to argue after Appellant informed the 

victim and Ms. Talbert that they were no longer welcome to stay there due to 

ongoing problems. N.T., 4/22/19, at 24. In this altercation, the victim made 

threats against Appellant and Ms. Burrison. N.T., 4/22/19, at 24.

After the victim sat down on a folding chair in the living room and began 

to smoke a cigarette, Appellant pulled out a firearm and repeatedly shot the 

unarmed victim nine times. N.T., 4/22/19, at 24-25. Appellant proceeded to 

call 9-1-1 and told the emergency operator that he had “emptied his clip into 

[the victim].” N.T., 4/22/19, at 25. When emergency personnel arrived, the 

victim was pronounced deceased. N.T., 4/22/19, at 25. The victim’s autopsy 

revealed that he sustained nine gunshot wounds; eight bullets were recovered 

from the victim’s body. N.T., 4/22/19, at 24-25.

The responding police officers arrived at the scene to find Appellant in 

possession of a 40-caliber Glock with an empty magazine. N.T., 4/22/19, at 

26. The officers also recovered nine fired cartridge casings at the scene. N.T., 

4/22/19, at 25. Subsequent ballistics testing revealed that the nine fired 

cartridge casings and the eight bullets recovered from the victim’s body 

matched Appellant’s firearm. N.T., 4/22/19, at 26-27. 

The Commonwealth indicated that it was prepared to proceed to trial 

with all the physical evidence as well as the testimony of Ms. Talbert, the 

victim’s girlfriend, who would have testified that the Appellant shot the 
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unarmed victim, “who did not have a gun, a knife, or anything else in his 

hands or on his person aside from the cigarette at the time he was shot.” 

N.T., 4/22/19, at 25. The Commonwealth would also present testimony of 

the responding officers who documented in a crime scene video that a 

cigarette was found on the floor next to the folding chair in the living room. 

N.T., 4/22/19, at 27.

On June 17, 2019, the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty to forty 

years’ imprisonment for the third-degree murder charge and no further 

penalty on the PIC charge. On July 8, 2020, this Court affirmed the judgment 

of sentence. Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal to the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

On August 27, 2020, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court appointed Appellant counsel, who subsequently filed a no-merit letter 

and a petition to withdraw. On November 12, 2020, the PCRA court gave 

notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On January 7, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s 

petition and granted counsel’s petition to withdraw.

On July 24, 2023, Appellant filed the instant, counseled PCRA petition 

seeking to withdraw his guilty plea based on his allegations that the 

investigating officers, Detective James Pitts and Detective Levi Morton, had 

coerced the witnesses in this case and provided false information that led to 

his conviction. Appellant asserted that he recently discovered that Detective 

Pitts had been criminally charged in federal court with multiple counts of 
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perjury and obstruction of justice and been accused of engaging in coercive 

tactics when interviewing witnesses. In addition, Appellant alleged that 

Detective Morton was under investigation for unspecified misconduct. Given 

that Detective Pitts and Detective Morton had also interviewed the

Commonwealth’s witnesses that were present in Appellant’s apartment at the 

time of the victim’s murder, Appellant suggested that the detectives used 

similar coercive tactics in this case.

On August 1, 2023, the PCRA court issued its Rule 907 dismissal notice. 

On September 21, 2023, the PCRA Court dismissed Appellant’s instant petition 

as untimely and meritless. Appellant filed a timely appeal and complied with 

the PCRA court’s direction to file a concise statement or errors complained of 

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises the following issues for review on appeal:

1. Did the PCRA Court err by denying Appellant’s PCRA petition in 

light of newly discovered evidence provided in the federal case 

of Obina Onyiah v. City of Philadelphia, et al., establishing 

Detective Pitts’ reputation for habitually coercive conduct 

towards witnesses during interrogations[?]

2. Did the PCRA Court err by denying Appellant’s PCRA petition 

when it failed to consider, without a hearing, newly discovered 

evidence of a history of misconduct by Detective James Pitts 

which was not disclosed by the Commonwealth due to 

governmental interference[?]

3. Did the PCRA Court err when it failed to consider, without a 

hearing, as to when the newly discovered evidence of a history 

of misconduct by Detective James Pitts became known by 

[A]ppellant[?]

Appellant’s Brief, at 2.
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As a preliminary matter, it is well-established that “the PCRA's 

timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly 

construed; courts may not address the merits of the issues raised in a petition 

if it is not timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 591 

(Pa.Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Generally, a PCRA petition “including a 

second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment of sentence becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment 

of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration 

of the time for seeking the review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition 

if the petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of the three exceptions 

enumerated in Section 9545(b)(1), which include: (1) the petitioner's inability 

to raise a claim as a result of governmental interference; (2) the discovery of 

previously unknown facts or evidence that would have supported a claim; or 

(3) a newly-recognized constitutional right that has been held to apply 

retroactively by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

As noted above, Appellant was sentenced on June 17, 2019 and this 

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on July 8, 2020. As such, the 

judgment of sentence became final on August 7, 2020, upon the expiration of 

the thirty-day period to file a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme 

Court. Appellant filed the instant petition in July 2023, nearly three years after 

his judgment of sentence became final.
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While Appellant concedes that his petition is untimely, Appellant asserts 

that he is entitled to review under two of the PCRA time bar exceptions, 

arguing that his discovery that Detective Pitts had been criminally charged for 

misconduct satisfied the newly-discovered fact exception as well as the 

governmental interference exception.2 The Commonwealth “does not dispute 

that former detective Pitts has been accused of misconduct in other cases.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 5.

Even assuming that Appellant has met one of these timeliness 

exceptions, Appellant has not shown that he is entitled to collateral relief. To 

the extent that Appellant raises an after-discovered evidence claim, Appellant 

was required to plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

“[t]he unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has 

subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the 

trial if it had been introduced.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). As such, a 

petitioner must show “(1) the exculpatory evidence has been discovered after 

trial and could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable 

diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to 

impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.” 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted).

“The after-discovered evidence doctrine also applies to evidence discovered 

____________________________________________

2 While Appellant asserted in his PCRA petition that he was entitled to relief 

based on his allegation that Detective Morton had been under investigation 

for unspecified reasons, Appellant does not pursue that claim on appeal.
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after a guilty plea that meets these four standards.” Commonwealth v.

Mach Transp., LLC, 305 A.3d 22, 27 (Pa.Super. 2023) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Peoples, 319 A.2d 679, 681 (Pa. 1974)).

In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1123 (Pa.Super. 

2018), this Court determined that the criminal conviction of an investigating 

detective in the petitioner’s case did not constitute after-discovered evidence 

as it had no bearing on the petitioner’s case, would only be used to impeach 

the detective’s credibility, and would not lead to a different result as the 

petitioner failed to present any evidence that the former detective did anything 

inappropriate in his case. In Commonwealth v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097, 

1109 (Pa.Super. 2016), this Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that he was 

entitled a hearing on his after-discovered evidence claim in which he would 

call witnesses to testify concerning Detective Pitts’ improper interrogation 

tactics in unrelated cases. As Brown failed to present any evidence that 

Detective Pitts committed misconduct in his case, Brown’s proposed witness 

testimony could only be used to attack Detective Pitts’ credibility, which did 

not satisfy the after-discovered evidence test.

3

 

Similarly, in the instant case, even if Appellant could present evidence 

of Detective Pitts’ misconduct in unrelated cases, Appellant failed to point to 

____________________________________________

3 See also Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532 (Pa.Super. 2012) 

(determining that the filing of criminal charges against the investigating 

detective in the appellant’s case in an unrelated matter did not satisfy the 

after-discovered evidence test since such evidence would be used solely to 

impeach the detective’s credibility and would not likely result in a different 

verdict if a new trial were granted). 
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anything in the record that would support his claim of possible police 

misconduct in this case. While Detective Pitts and Detective Morton 

interviewed the women who were at Appellant’s apartment at the time of the 

victim’s murder, there is no evidence that any inappropriate interview tactics 

were used in this case or that any misconduct occurred. Appellant has not 

articulated any evidence that he would present to show that misconduct 

occurred in this case. 

The trial court specifically found that:

[w]hile [Appellant] claims that the detectives coerced witnesses, 

concealed evidence, and fabricated evidence that could have 

proven that he shot the victim in self-defense, [Appellant] utterly 

fails to allege what evidence was fabricated or concealed by either 

detective. He fails to allege what Detective Pitts did in the 

investigation other than being the lead detective on his case. 

Detective Pitts did conduct an interview of the only eyewitness to 

the shooting, [the victim’s] paramour Emani Talbert, but Talbert 

has never recanted her statement or alleged any misconduct by 

Detective Pitts. Talbert provided a videotaped summary of her 

statement following her interview with Detective Pitts, and she 

testified consistently with her statement at [Appellant’s] 

preliminary hearing. N.T. 5/10/17 at 12-58.

Regarding Detective Morton, merely stating that the 

Commonwealth opened an investigation into Detective Morton 

nearly three years ago is not a sufficient basis for relief. Detective 

Morton interviewed [Appellant’s] paramour, Whitney Burrison, 

who witnessed the events surrounding the shooting, but did not 

witness the shooting itself. [Appellant] fails to allege any 

misconduct by Detective Morton regarding this interview, and 

Burrison, who testified on [Appellant’s] behalf at his sentencing, 

has never alleged any misconduct by Detective Morton. Burrison’s 

testimony was consistent with the testimony of Talbert. 

[Appellant] has not attached any certifications from any witness 

alleging that the detectives committed misconduct. N.T. 5/10/17 

at 78-94.
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PCRA Court Opinion, 9/21/23, at 6-7. Appellant is not entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing to conduct a fishing expedition for possible evidence to 

support his claim of alleged misconduct in this case. See Brown, supra.

Moreover, there was sufficient evidence of Appellant’s guilt even without 

the statements that Appellant alleges were coerced. Appellant admitted to 

the 9-1-1 operator that he had “emptied his clip” into the victim, who 

sustained nine gunshot wounds. Officers determined that Appellant was in 

possession of the firearm with an empty magazine that was determined to be 

the murder weapon. Although Appellant suggests that he could have raised 

a claim of self-defense, there is no evidence in the record to show that the 

victim was armed or presented an imminent threat to Appellant. Instead, the 

crime scene video showed a cigarette on the floor next to the chair where the 

victim was shot, supporting the Commonwealth’s assertion that the unarmed 

victim was seated and smoking a cigarette at the time of his death.

As such, the trial court correctly dismissed Appellant’s after-discovered 

evidence as he failed to demonstrate that his proffered evidence would be 

used for anything other than impeachment purposes or that the evidence

would lead to a different outcome in this case. 

Appellant also argues that he is entitled to collateral relief as he asserts 

that the Commonwealth’s failure to provide him Detective Pitt’s police 

misconduct records was a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963). Our Supreme Court has provided that, in order to establish a Brady

violation:
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a defendant must show that: (1) evidence was suppressed by the 

state, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was 

favorable to the defendant, either because it was exculpatory or 

because it could have been used for impeachment; and (3) the 

evidence was material, in that its omission resulted in prejudice 

to the defendant. However, the mere possibility that an item of 

undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might 

have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 

materiality in the constitutional sense. Rather, evidence is 

material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is 

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Willis, 46 A.3d 648, 656 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

Appellant has failed to show that the evidence of Detective Pitts’

misconduct in unrelated cases was material to this case, such that its omission 

resulted in prejudice to Appellant. As noted above, while Detective Pitts was 

involved in Appellant’s case in taking the statement of the victim’s girlfriend, 

Ms. Talbert, there is no evidence in the record to show any indication that 

Detective Pitts committed misconduct or any impropriety in this case. 

Further, there is no reasonable probability that, had the prosecution disclosed 

evidence of Detective Pitts’ misconduct in unrelated cases to the defense, that 

the outcome in this case would have been different.

Accordingly, as the trial court correctly concluded that Appellant was not 

entitled to collateral relief on either of his claims, the trial court did not err in 

dismissing his second PCRA petition.

Order affirmed.
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Date: 5/31/2024